TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-19-00468-CR

Tutankhamun Holt, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 27TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

NO. 76732, THE HONORABLE JOHN GAUNTT, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Tutankhamun Holt filed a notice of appeal in this Court giving written 

notice of appeal in connection with a post-conviction motion to compel that he filed in the trial 

court.

1

 For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

In criminal cases, this Court has jurisdiction to consider appeals from the entry of 

an appealable order. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.02; see also Tex.

R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). However, there must be a written, signed order from which to appeal. See 

 

1

 Appellant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, see Tex. Penal Code § 20.04, and 

sentenced to life in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, see id. § 12.32. Seven months 

later, he filed a motion in the trial court entitled Motion to Compel Attorney [Stand-by Counsel] 

to Surrender the Case File and Cell Phones Subpoenaed in Cause Number 76732, in which he 

asked the trial court to issue an order compelling the attorney who acted as stand-by counsel

during appellant’s jury trial (in which appellant represented himself) to produce appellant’s case 

file along with cell phones that, according to the motion, were subpoenaed for trial but not 

admitted into evidence. Appellant subsequently filed the instant notice of appeal, which “gives 

notice of appeal of the Motion to Compel Attorney [Stand-by Counsel] to Surrender the Case 

File and Cell Phones Subpoenaed in Cause Number 76732 filed, 21 May 2019.”
2

State v. Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting that “precedent 

requires that an order be in writing”). Here, the record before us contains no written order signed 

by the trial court denying appellant’s motion to compel. Thus, there is no entry of any 

appealable order.

2

Moreover, even had the trial court signed an order denying appellant’s motion to 

compel, we find no authority for appellant to appeal such an order.

In Texas, appeals in a criminal case are permitted only when they are specifically 

authorized by statute. State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); 

see Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that criminal 

defendant’s right of appeal “is a statutorily created right.”). Thus, the standard for determining 

whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a case “is not whether the 

appeal is precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law.” Blanton v. State,

369 S.W.3d 894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 696–97 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)); see Tex. Const. art. V, § 6(a) (providing that courts of appeals have 

appellate jurisdiction “under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law”);

Ragston v. State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining that “[j]urisdiction must 

 

2

 We observe that the record contains a hand-written notation on what appears to be a 

post-it note attached to the cover letter that accompanied appellant’s motion to compel. The

notation states, “I have no jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.” The trial judge’s initials and 

a stamped date appear beneath the notation. The record also contains a letter to appellant from 

the court coordinator that informs appellant that the trial court had reviewed the motion but had 

no jurisdiction or authority to grant appellant’s request. Neither the notation nor the letter

constitutes a written appealable order. See State v. Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d 252, 258–59 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2012) (holding that “entered by the court” under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 

article 44.01(d) “encompasses the signing of an order by the trial judge”); State v. Rosenbaum,

818 S.W.2d 398, 401–02 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that for purposes of appeal, trial court 

“enters” order when judge signs order); see, e.g., State v. Kibler, 874 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1994, no pet.) (concluding that mere notation of “granted” at end of motion to 

suppress, followed by date and purported signature of trial judge, was not appealable order).
3

be expressly given to the courts of appeals in a statute”). We find no statutory authority granting

appellant the right to appeal the denial of a post-conviction motion to compel.

Finally, the trial court certification in the record reflects that “no order exits upon 

which an appeal may be predicated.” We are required to dismiss an appeal “if a certification that

shows the defendant has a right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” See Tex. R.

App. P. 25.2(d); Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

We hold that we lack jurisdiction in this appeal because (1) there is no signed 

written order denying appellant’s motion to compel, see, e.g., Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d at 259 

(affirming appellate court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because there was no written order 

from which to appeal), (2) there is no statutory authority for the appeal that appellant attempts

here, see, e.g., Staley v. State, 233 S.W.3d 337, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (dismissing appeal 

because it was not authorized by law), and (3) the record does not contain a certification from the 

trial court showing that appellant has the right to appeal, see Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). 

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

__________________________________________

Melissa Goodwin, Justice

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Kelly

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: December 17, 2019

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