NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0145n.06 F iled: F ebruary 18, 2009 No. 08-5302 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
RO B ERT L EWI S B AA R, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. J EFF ERSON COUNTY B OARD OF EDUCATI ON, et a l., De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

B e fo re : ME RRI TT , CO L E a nd SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s.
SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e . Rob e rt B a ar c on te nd s that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in re je c tin g his du e pr oc e ss a

nd F ir st Ame ndme nt cl a ims a s a matt e r of law. We af fi rm in part

and re ve rs e in p art
. I.
On F e b r u ar y 7 , 2 0 0 2 , B a ar , a p u

b l i c - s c h o o l t e a c h e r i n Je f f e r s o n C o u n t y , K e n tu c ky , s e nt a letter to one of his colleag ues, Missy Pay ne, which spoke of incre asing “dang er” to Pay ne and he r family . Pay

ne had r ece ived seve ral “ inappropriate letters” from B aar befor e, JA 60, so she told t he principal a

bout this one. On Fe bruar y 8 , after conf

err ing w ith the J eff

erson County

Boa rd of Education, the principal held a meeting with Ba ar, w here Ba ar a g ree d to sign a “Memora

nd um of Un de rs tand ing ” re qu ir inghim “ to d isc on tin

ue c omm un ic a tio n in

any fo rm , ve rb a l or

wr itt e n, wi thNo. 08-5302

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- 2 - Missy Pay ne,” JA 4 6. I n J une 2002, af ter fur ther investig ation, the principa l issued a written repr imand to Ba ar f

or his repe ated “ inappropriate communications” wi t h P ay ne. JA 60. The
re pr ima nd inf or me d B a ar that he wo uld be tr ans fe rr e d to a no the r s c ho ol a

nd re ite ra te d th a t he sh ou ld have “ no further

contac t with Ms. P ay

ne or he r family .” JA 60.
I n response , Ba ar f

iled a g rieva

nce a g ainst the school boar d , wh i ch the board and the teac hers’ union eventually settled. Whil e the settlement ag ree ment require d the board to remove the J une 2002 wr itten reprimand f ro m Ba ar ’s personne l file, it said nothing about the F ebrua ry 2002 “M em o ra n d

u m o f U n d e r s t a n d i n g . ” B aa r s o o nb ega nt ea ch i n g at an o t h er J ef fe rs o nC o u n t y

h i gh
sc ho ol.
For some time, it looked like the problem had been resolved. I n September 2005, how ever , Ba ar se nt Pay

ne the f ollowing e mail: “ Count me in f or the L ACA meeting on the 29th. Iwill bring the m o n ey

for the due s to the meeting . Bob.” J A 55. L ACA stands for the “L ouisvill e Ar ea Chemistry

Alliance,” a prof

essional org anizatio n

of che mistry

teac hers that B aar

cofounde d, and one in wh ic h h e a c ti v e ly p arti c ip a te d f r o m 1 9 9 2 to 2 0 0 1 b u t h a d n o inv o lv e me n t a f te r 2 0 0 1
. A s Ba ar
e xpla ine d it , h e se nt the e ma il b e c a us e he wa nte d to a tte nd

a n u pc omi ngL AC A m e e tin g and be c a us e Pay ne wa s listed as the RSVP-contact per son.
The e mail led to more discipline. In Decem b er 2 0 0 5 , the principa l issued Ba ar a written repr imand, which: (1) disc iplined him for viol at i ng the Fe bruar y 2002 “Memora

ndum of Under standing ”; (2) instructed him not to communicate with Pay ne “in a ny form or f ashion”; andNo. 08-5302

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- 3 - (3) pr ohibited h i m from “repre sent[ing] . . . the J eff erson County

Public Schools at any

[L ACA] meeting .” JA 50. The third restric tion, the pa rties ag ree , perma

nently prohibits Baa

r fr om attending
any futur e L AC A m e e tin g s.
I n F e br ua ry 20 06 , B a ar f

ile d th is l aws uit in fe de ra l c ourt a g a ins t Pay ne , th e Jef fe rs on County Boa rd of Education, the superintende nt, two othe r school-boa rd off icials and two princ ipals (all told, the “sc hool board” ). Seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, he claimed ( as re levant her e) that the school boar d had violated his due pr ocess a nd First Amendme nt rig hts. The school boa rd moved for summar

y judgme nt on all of Ba ar’ s claims, and the district cour t gr anted the motion.
II. We g ive fr e shre vie w t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt’s su mmar y -j ud g me nt d e c isi on , d

ra wi nga ll
rea sonable infe renc es in Ba ar’ s favor . See M ed. Mut. of Ohio v. K. Am alia Enters., Inc. , 548 F.3d 383, 389 (6th Cir. 2008).
A.
To establish a c og nizable retaliation cla im un d e r th e F ir s t ( a

n d F o u r te e nth) Amendment, B aar
mus t de mon str a te that he “ e ng a g e d in c on sti tut ion a lly pr ote c te d spe e c h, ” that he “w a s subj e c te d to adver se ac tion or was depr ived of some b en efit,” and that “the pr otected spe ech w as a substantial
or a motivating fa ctor in the a dverse action.” Leary v. D aeschne r ( Leary II ), 34 9 F .3 d 8 88 , 8 97 (6 th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks omitted). All that matters here is the first question: Was theNo. 08-5302

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- 4 - sp e e c h p ro te c te d? To s ho w that it wa s, B a ar m

us t e sta bli shthat: ( 1) his sp e e c h w a s n ot m a de in connect i o n wi t h his “offic ial duties” as a school teac her, Garce tti v. Ceballos , 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); (2) it touche s on “a matter of public c oncer n,” Con nic k v . M

y e rs , 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); and ( 3 ) B a ar ’ s in te r e s ts in th e s p e e c h o u tw e ig h th e s c h o o l b o ar d ’ s in te r e s ts in p r omoting “the eff ective a nd eff icient fulfillment of its responsibiliti es to the public,” id. at 150.
Re pr im an d fo r S

e pte mb e r 200 5 e ma il . B a ar f ir st c la ims that th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d w he n it reje cted his c laim that the First Amendment prohibited the school boar d from re primanding him for sending the Septembe r 2 0 0 5 em ail . We disag ree . The substanc e of the email—that B aar was planning to attend an upc oming LACA meeting and would bring his due s to the meeting —does not perta in to “a subjec t of leg itimate news intere st” or “a subject of g ener al interest and of value a nd
conce rn to the public,” the touchstones of the mat t er-of-public- conce rn test. City of San Diego v. Roe , 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). Absent protecte d speec h, the Fir st Amendment does not empower

a public employ ee to “ constitutionaliz e the e mploy ee g rieva nce,” even if

(as may be the case here ) the communication is important to the employ ee. Ga rc e tti , 547 U.S. at 420 (interna l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–47. Prohibition on communicating wit h Payne
. The school board also did not abri d ge B aar ’s F i r s tA m e n dm e n tr i g h t s b y p r o h i b i t i n g h i m f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i n g w i t h P ayn e i n t h e f u tu r e . In r e a l i t y, thi s c la im i s mo re in t

he natur e of

a prio r r e str a int

on sp e e c h, a s o pp os e d to a

re ta liatio n c la im, beca use B aar is complaining a

bout future re s trictions on his free -spee ch rig hts, not a retaliator y
c ha ng e in t he te rm s of h is e mpl oy

me nt. Ev e n s o, the same te st a pp lie s, so lon g a s th e re str ic tio n isNo. 08-5302

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- 5 - narr ow, imp o s ed o n an individual employ ee ( as opposed to many employ ees) and imposed via a disciplinary

action. Com

pa re Farhat v. Jopk

e , 370 F.3d 580, 598 (6th Cir. 2004), Belche r v . Ci ty of McAleste r , 324 F.3d 1203, 1206 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003), and Latino Off icers Ass’n v . City of New Y or k , 196 F.3d 4 5 8 , 4 6 4 (2d. Cir. 1999), with Unit ed States v. Nat’l Treasury Employ ees U nion ( NTEU) , 513 U.S. 454, 467–68 (1995).
Mo st o f B a ar’ s p ri or

c omm un ic a tio ns wi th P ay

ne c on c e rn e d p ri vate matte rs —o f i nte re st t o the two of them a

nd to them alone. And he has expressed no inter est in communicating with Pay ne on matters of public c oncer n in the future—inde ed, he disc laims any interest i n speakingto her ag ain. Even if w e assume f or the sake of ar g ument the possibilit y that he may wish one day to speak to Pay ne about a matter

of public intere st, he ca

nnot overc ome Picke ring balanc ing. See P icke ring v. Bd. of Educ. , 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1 9 6 8 ). The re cord shows B aar ’s intere st in such speec h to be slight; it must be if Ba ar has no further interest in it. The school boa rd’s intere sts, by

contra st, are
o f a h ig h o r d e r : B a a

r ’ s in a p p r o p r i a te c o mm u n ic a ti o n s w it

h Pa y n e d e e p ly “ u p s e t[ ]” an d

“ d is tu r b [e d ]” her, JA 187, cre ating a per sonnel situation that “impair[ed]
. . . h ar mony among cowor

kers, ha [d] a detr imental impact on close wo rk i n g re lationships for which per sonal loy alty and conf idence [were] nece ssary , [and] . . . interfe re[d] wit h the re gular ope ration of the [school],” Rankin v. McPhe rson , 48 3 U. S. 3 78 , 3 88 (1 98 7) ; see also Leary I I , 349 F.3d at 900. The school board above all has a critica l inter est in pr otecting its e mploy ees from har assment. Se e Ra nk in , 483 U.S. at 388. Had the sc hool board looked the other way in dealing with Pay ne’s complaints, it would have taken on the risk of e x posing itself to liability for a hostile w ork environme nt. See Burlington Indus., Inc.No. 08-5302

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- 6 - v . E lle rth , 5 24 U. S. 7 42 , 7 64 –6 5 ( 19 98 ); Faragher v. Boc a Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 807–808 (1998);
se e als o Cra wfo rd

v . M e tro . G ov ’t

of N as hv ill e an d D av ids on Cou nty , ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct . 846, 852 (2009) ( “Employ ers are . . . s u b j ec t to a strong inducement to fe rre t out and put a stop to any discriminatory

activity in their operations as a way to break the circ uit of imputed liabili ty .”).
The school boa

rd’s spee ch re striction also applies only to communications with Pay ne, permitting B aar

to speak fr eely

on any matter

of public intere st to an

y on e e lse in a n

y f o rum he wishes, and thus dea ls with the underlying ha rassment proble m in the most natural and nar row wa y possible: by barr ing Ba ar from speaking direc tly to Pay ne. The school board in the end struck a n appropr iate bala

nce be tween its intere sts in maintaining an order ly , hara ssment-fre e wor kplace on the one ha

nd and Ba ar’ s interest in spe aking as a citizen on matter s of public conc ern on the other. Se e Ak e rs v . M c Gi nn is , 3 52 F .3 d 1 03 0 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 3) ; Farhat , 370 F.3d at 598.
Prohibition on Baar at tending any future LACA meetings
. The school board’s ba n on Ba ar’ s attendanc e at a ll future LACA meeting s is a nother matter. Her e we have a direc t restriction not on what B aar

can sa y but on whom he ca

n associate with—and appa rently for a ll tim e. Althoug h the same fr amewor

k g over n s fr eedom-of-a ssociation and fr ee- speec h claims, se e Ak e rs , 352 F.3d at 10 36 ; Boals v. Gray , 7 75 F .2 d 6 86 , 6 92 (6 th C ir . 1 98 5) , th e br e a dth and tim e le ss n a tur e of this
r e s t r i c t i o np e r

m i t s B a a r t o t a k e t h i s c l a i m t o a

j u r y.
Ba ar’ s association with L ACA involves a matter of public conc ern. LACA is “an independe nt gr oup of scienc e tea cher s from private schools, public schoo ls , [a n d ] p a r o c h ia l s c h o o ls ,”No. 08-5302

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- 7 - J A 202, and its stated g oal i s the i mprovement of scienc e education i n the s chools, something that is “a subjec t of g ener al intere st and of value and conc ern to the public at the time of publication.” City of San Diego , 54 3 U. S. a t 84 ; see also Leary v . Daesc hner ( Leary I) , 228 F.3d 729, 737 ( 6th Cir. 20 00 ) ( “ Th e su

bje c t[] of
. . . th e a pp ro pr iate e du c a tio na l pr og ra m to be imp le me nte d [is ] und ou bte dly [a] matte r [] o f

c o n c e r nto th e c o mm

u n it y a t l ar g e . ” )
. T h e s e r

v ic e s p r o v id e d

b y L A CA

— h o ld ing profe ssional-deve lopment classes, de veloping safe ty protocols for i n - c la s s r o o m lab experiments and providing a for

um to discuss the science curr iculum, tex tbooks, lesson p l an s , effective te aching techniques a

nd way s to improve scienc e educ ation—have value not only to chemistry teac hers ( such as B aar ) but to the g ener al public as we ll.
I t may be true , as the school boa rd points out, tha t L AC A i s n ot devoted to cr iticiz ing the
s ch o o l b o ar d ’s i mp l em en t at i o n o f th e sc i en ce cu rr i cu l u m o r t o b ri n gi n g t o l i gh to ff i ci al wr o n gd o i n g. But while spe ech that attacks policy decisions or that e x poses publi c m al fe asanc e re prese nt quintessential “examples of s p e ech that would involve matters of public c oncer n,” Hughes v . Region VII Are a Agenc

y on Aging , 542 F.3d 169, 182 (6th Cir. 2008), they do not make up the univer se of protec ted spee ch. Also included is spee ch on “issues of community

importance ,” Leary II

, 349 F.3d
a t 90 0, that c an “ be fa ir ly

c on sid e re d a s r e latin g to [a ] matte r of po lit ic a l, soc ia l or oth e r c on c e rn

to the community ,” Connick , 461 U.S. at 146.
At thi s sta g e of the c a se , the c la im a lso satis fi e s Picke ring balanc ing. B aar has a substantial interest in par

ticipating in LACA, a g roup he c ofounded, one he re g ularly attended in the pa st and
one desig ned for the profe ssional de velopment of chemistry teac hers like him. Th e o rga n i z ati onNo. 08-5302

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- 8 - provides an oppor

tunity for B aar to network with other c hemistry teac hers, to lea

rn how he can do his job more eff

ectively and to cha

ng e scie nce e ducation for the better
. The school boa

rd, we appre ciate, a lso has a subst antial i ntere st in curbingBa ar’ s improper communications with Pay ne, which r an the r isk of compromising the school board’ s a b il it y to de liver a valua ble educ ation in an har assment-fr ee w ork environme nt. What tips the bala nce in B aar ’s favor is the brea dth of the school board’ s prohibition. The Dec ember 2005 direc tive prohibits Baa r fr om at t en d i n g anyL ACA meeting for all time, no matter the purpose of the meeting , no matter whe ther Ba ar pla ns to talk to Pay

ne there, no matter indeed whether Pay ne plans to attend the meeting or for that matter re mains a tea cher in the L ouisvill e ar ea. N othing a bout Ba ar’ s past problems conc erns his a sso c ia tio n w ithL AC A. I t is B a ar’ s c omm un ic a tio ns wi th P ay

ne , n ot B aar’ s a sso c iatio n w ith L AC A, that th re a te n to “ un de rm ine a le g iti mate g oa l or

mis sio n” of th e sch oo l bo ard or “ c re a te d is h ar mo n y a mo n g c o - worke rs.” R odgers v. Bank s , 344 F.3d 587, 601 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks omitted). No doubt, a prohibit ion on Ba ar’ s involvement with L ACA is one way to preve nt Ba ar f rom
c omm un ic a tin g wi th P ay

ne , b ut i t is no t th e on ly wa y and it i s n ot a

wa y that com po rts w ith Picke ring ’s a dmo nis hme nt t hat pu bli c e mpl oy e rs must bal anc e the ir ow n in te re sts wi th t

he F ir st Amendment rig hts of their employ ees. B eca use the school boa

rd b ears the burde n of justify ing broade r re strictions on speech w ith ever- strong er State inter ests and bec ause the school board ha s g ive n n o te na

ble e xplanatio n f

or su c h a sw e e pin g and

e ve rl a sti ngpr oh ibi tio n, it is n ot e nti tle d to summary judgme nt on this c laim. See NTEU , 5 13 U. S. at 46 6– 68 ; Nat’l Treasury Employe es UnionNo. 08-5302

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- 9 - v. United States , 3 F.3d 1555, 156 6 (D
. C. Cir. 1993) (Silberman, J ., dissenting f rom denial of
re he ari ng e n banc ) (“ Th e br e a dth , as we ll as the we ig ht, of the g ov e rnme nta l r e str ic tio n is of c ours e relev ant to the Picke ring

analy sis. W hen the g overnme nt bur dens substantially more spee ch than require d by

its as serted inter est, then its asserte d interest mig ht not outweigh that gr eate r burde n. After all, the g reater the bur den on spee ch, cete ris paribus , the more the Picke ring balanc e will point toward inva lidation of the rule.” ) (inter nal quotation marks omitted).
Other Claims
. Ba ar separ ately claims that the school boar d violated his First Amendme nt rig hts (1) whe n it issued the Febru ar y 2002 “Memora

ndum of Under standing ,” which pr ohibited B a ar f ro m c omm

un ic a tin g wi th P ay

ne , ( 2) wh e n it

sig ne d the 20 03 g ri e va

nc e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, which alleg edly

hindere d his rights to f

il e f utu r e g rieva nces a nd (3) whe n Pay

ne appa rently attempted to e je c t B a ar f

ro m an a c a de mic c omp e tit ion in 2 00 3. Th e re le va

nt s tatut e of lim itatio ns ba rs the se
c la ims
. A one- y ear

statute of limitations prohibit s Ba ar f rom rec overing for a

ny injury he knew about
or ha d r e a so n to kn ow a

bo ut be fo re F e br

ua ry 9, 20 05 , one y e ar be fo re the date on wh ic h h e fi le d h is complaint. See Dixon v. Cl em , 492 F.3d 665, 671 (6th Cir. 2007). And B aar has not disclaimed—at least not in any

meaning ful way

—having am ple re ason to know about these incidents befor e Fe bruar y 9, 2005.
Nor c an B aar

sidestep this limitation by invoking the continuing- violation doc trine. I n two “nar rowly limit ed” c ateg ories of c ases, the c ontinuing-violation doctrine allows plaintiffs to rec overNo. 08-5302

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- 10 - for injuries that oc curr ed beyond the limitations period. See Haithcock v. Frank, 958 F.2d 671, 677 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal q u o t at i o n marks omitted). The f irst categ ory

arises w hen the plaintiff alleg es a “prior disc riminatory activity that continues into the prese nt,” Bell v. Ohio State Univ

. , 351 F.3d 240, 247 ( 6th Cir. 2003), a g ood example of which is a hostile-work-e nvironment claim that is “ based on the cumulative e ffe ct of individual ac ts,” National R.R. Passenge r Corp v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002), and that manifests itself over time, not at a ny one moment. The se cond cat ego ry arises w hen the plaintiff c an show “ a long -standing and demonstra ble policy

of discrimination” ag ainst a class of which the plaintiff is a member. Sharpe v. Cureton , 319 F.3d 259, 267 (6th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks omitted). Trying to f

it his c l ai m s i n t o the first categ ory , Ba ar points out that these thre e cla ims are simil ar to those that oc curr ed within the limit ations period. But just because discrete constitutional claims are related to one an o t h er
— in terms of the pa

rties involved, the natur e of the underlying conflict a nd the theory

of r eli ef—doe s not mean that the limitations period is suspended for a ll of the claims so long as just one of them occur red within t he limitations period. As the Supreme Court has ca utioned in the Title VI Icontext, “discrete disc riminatory acts a re not a ctionable if time ba rre d,
e ve n w he n th e y

are re late d to a c ts a lle g e d in t im e ly fi le d c ha

rg e s” be c a

us e “ [e]a c h d isc re te discriminatory act starts a ne w clock f or filing char g es.” Morgan , 536 U.S. at 113. We have a pplied t h i s s am e d o ct ri n e t o § 1 9 8 3 ac t i o n s , h o l d i n g t h at cl ai m an t s ar e “ p re cl u d edfr o m es t ab l i s h i n g a continuing violation exception by proof that the alleg ed ac ts of discrimination occur ring prior to the l i m i t at ions pe riod are sufficie ntly related to those occur ring within the limit ations period.” S eeNo. 08-5302

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- 11 - Sharpe , 319 F.3d at 268. Our sister circ uits have done the same. Se e O’ Con no r v . Ci ty of N e war k , 44 0 F .3 d 1 25 , 1 28 (3 d Ci r. 20 06 ); Hi lde brandt v. Il l. D e pt. of N atu ra l R es. , 347 F.3d 1014, 1036
n. 18 (7 th C ir . 2 00 3) ; RK V e ntu re s, In c . v . Ci ty

of S e att le , 307 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Ci r. 2 0 0 2 ). These thr ee F irst Amendment claims ar e time-ba rre d.
B.
Ba ar ne x t argues that the district c ourt err ed in r ejec ting his due proce ss claim as a matter of law. To preva il, Ba ar must show that (1) he had a c og nizable property interest, (2) the school boar d infring ed that intere st and (3) the school b o ar d d i d not give him the proce ss he was due
. See Gu na se k e ra v . I rwi n , 551 F.3d 461, 467 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Although B aar ’s pleading s are short on specific s, the district court identified the following potential proper

ty interests: his income ($5000 a y ear ) fr om “plann i ng and dire cting various profe ssional development courses,” J A 117 (interna l quotation marks omi tted); his work in judg ing
aca demic competitions ; and the collective barg aining ag ree ment’s prohibi tion on discipline without just case.
Ba ar, f or starte rs, does not have a cog nizable property interest in profe ssional-deve lopment income or in judg ing a cade mic competitions. “To have a prope rty interest in a b en efit, a person clea rly must have more tha

n an abstract need or desire and m ore than a unilater al expectation of it.” Town of Castle Roc k v. G onzales , 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). He must have “a

leg itimate claim of entitlement ” to the b en ef i t , d erivingfrom “e x isting rules orNo. 08-5302

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- 12 - understanding s that stem from an indepe ndent source such as state law.” Id
. ( in te r n a l q u o tati on marks omitted) (empha sis a dded). Ba ar has not ide ntified any contra ct, statute, ru l e o r ot her independe nt source that cre ates a n entitlement to these benefits, and thus they do not rise to the level of “ pr op e rt y ” pr ote c te d b y

du e pr oc e ss.
Ba ar doe s have a

proper ty interest in the just-ca

use discipline re quirement, howe ver. The
c oll e c tiv e ba

rg a ini nga g re e me nt s ay s th a t “[n]o em plo y e e . . . sha ll be dis c ipl ine d . . . wi tho ut j us t
cause ,” Ag ree d Filing of Hr’ g Ex
. at 2 0, and employ ees ha ve a pr operty

interest in such require ments, see, e .g. , J e ffe rso n v . J

e ffe rso n Co un ty

Pu b. Sc h. Sy

s. , 360 F.3d 583, 587 ( 6th Cir. 2004).
Yet even i f we assume that the s chool board short-cha ng ed that proper

ty interest and e ven if we ove rlook Ba ar’ s failure to take adva ntag e of the ag ree ment’s g rieva nce pr ocedur es, se e Bo we rs v. C ity of Flint , 325 F.3d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 2003), B aar still rec eived a ll of the proce ss to which the Constit ution entitles him. Be fore the December 2005 repr imand, the school boar d g ave B aar written notice of the char g es ag ainst him. I t c onducted a n investigation of Pay

ne’s c omplaint, and it gave Ba ar a n opportunity

(with a union re prese ntative at his side) to re view the f indings fr om the inv e sti g a tio n. I t g a ve B a ar a c ha nc e to re sp on d or a lly

to t he fi nd ing s, and

in wri tin g , w hic h h e did throug h a letter s u bmitted by the union. Se e Cle v e lan d B d. of E du c . v . Lo ud

e rm ill , 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ( noting the “ essential” va lue of “ notice” a nd an “oppor

tunity for a hear ing” ) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted).No. 08-5302

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- 13 - Whil e these prede privation proce eding s were not e laborate, they did not have to be—if the school board also provided meaning ful postdeprivation proc ess. See J efferson , 36 0 F .3 d at 58 7; see also Zi nermon v . Burch , 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990). And it did. The collective- barg aining ag ree ment provides for

at l ea s t three lay ers of

revie w of a

g rieva nce, be g inning with mee tings with the employ ee’ s immediate supervisor a nd principal, c ontinuing to a fu ll hearingbefor e the sc hool superintende nt and culminati ng with a hea ring befor e a ne utral ar

bitrator. The se proc edure s are
c omp re he ns ive and

a de qu a te , a s p ro ve d by ou r deci sion t o u ph old ne arl y ide nti c a l pr oc e dure s in another case involving the Jeffe rson County Boa rd of Educ ation. See J

efferson , 360 F.3d a

t 587–89.
Ba ar doe s not challeng e the a dequac y of these pr ocedur al protec tions. He instead argues that he could not use the m beca use the union re fused to re prese nt him in t he grievance proce ss. But union repre sentation is not a prer eq u i s i t e for filing a g rieva nce unde r the c ollective-ba rg aining ag ree ment, which allow ed Ba ar t o fi l e a g rieva nce on his own if he wished. To the e x tent Ba ar complains that the ag ree ment require d union approva l before the thi rd l ay er o f re view bef ore a neutra l arbitrator

—something by

no means c lear

from the text of the ag ree ment—his com p l aint targ ets not the ade quacy of the proce ss pr ovided by the school boar d but the adequa cy of the union’s repr esentation of him, which is another matter
. See, e .g. , Breininger v. She et Me tal W orkers Int’ l Ass’n Local Union No. 6 , 493 U.S. 67, 81 (1989).
Ba ar a lso takes a shot at seve ral incide nts that occur red prior to Fe bruar

y 9, 2005: (1) he w as not afforded notice of or r epre sentation at the F ebrua ry 8, 2002 meeting betwee n Ba ar, his school principal a

nd a school-boa

rd off icial; (2) he was for ced to sig n the 2002 Memora ndum ofNo. 08-5302

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- 14 - Under standing under thre at of ter mination; (3) he was forc ed to unde rg o a psy cholog ical eva luation in 2002; (4) he wa s place d on non-tea ching status during the 2002 investig ation; (5) he w as dis c ipl ine d w ith ou t ju st c a us e in t he June 20 02 wr itt e n r e pr ima nd ; and (6 ) h e wa s tr ansfe rr e d to another school following the written re primand.
For th e s ame r e a s o n s th a t th e o n e - y e ar s tatute o f li mi tati o n s b ar s s o me o f h is f r e e spee ch claims, it ba

rs these due proce ss c laims. As befor e, eac h of these claims turn s o n a d i s crete, separ ately identifiable c onstitut ional injury , and the continuing -violation doctrine ther efor e does not
a p p l y.
C.
B a ar s e pa rate ly see ks du e -p ro c e ss r e lie f o n th e g ro un d th a t th e sc ho ol b oa rd de pr ive d h im of a protec ted l iberty interest in his “g ood name, reputation, honor, or integ rity .” Bd. of Regents of Sta te Col ls. v . R oth , 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). To obtain re lief, B aar must show that (1) the school bo ard ma de sti g m a

t i z i n g s t a te me nts a

bo ut h im i n c onne c tio n w itha c ha ng e in h is e mpl oy

me nt s tatus , Quinn v. Shirey , 293 F.3d 315, 319–20 ( 6th Cir. 2002), (2) the statements so “seriously damag e[d] his sta nd ingand a sso c iatio ns in h is c omm un ity” a s to imp os e on him a sti g ma that “ fo re c los e [d] hi s fre edom to take a dvantag e of other employ ment opportunities,” Lud

wig v . B d. of T

rs. of F e rri s S tate Univ. , 123 F.3d 404, 410 (6th Cir. 1997) (interna l quotation marks omitted), (3) the state ments were p u b l i cl y disclosed, id ., (4) they

wer e fa lse, id
. , an d

( 5 ) th e s c h o o l b o ar d

v o lu n ta r il y d is s e mi n ated them to the public, id
. The claimant also must “show that he reque sted a name-c lear ing he aringandNo. 08-5302

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- 15 - was de nied that hea

ring .” Quinn , 293 F.3d at 322. “[A] plaintiff’s failure to reque st a name- clea ring hear ing is fa

tal to a cla im alleg ing a

deprivation of a liberty

interest without due proc ess.” Id . at 323.
The first problem with this claim is that B aar never reque sted a name- clea ring hear ing. H e does not alleg e other

wise, and a ccor dingly

this claim fails for that re ason alone
. The sec ond problem is that the targ eted state m ents—in the Dec ember 2005 written repr imand—are not so charg ed with a “ moral stigma such as immorality

or dishonesty ” that they fore close Baa

r from taking advanta g e of other e mploy ment opportunities. Lud

wig , 123 F.3d at 410. The 2005 wr itten reprimand disc iplined Ba ar f or fa iling to follow a pe rsonnel dire cti v e a n d c o nta ine d
no acc usation of immorality or di shonesty
. No evidence indicates that, as a r esult of the re primand,
a “ra ng e of oppor

tunities is no l ong er ope n” to B aar , Garvie v . Jack son , 845 F.2d 647, 652 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted), and indee d to this day Ba ar c ontinues to work as a teac her in t he Jef fe rs on County sc ho ols
. D.
Ba ar’ s substantive due proce ss c laim, pr emised on a rig ht to privac y , far es no better. To the extent it turns on Pay

ne’s alleg ed disclosure of the two-pag e letter Ba ar sent her in Febr uary 2002 or t he five -pag e ema il Baa r sent her in October

2001, those claims ar e time-ba rre d, as we have
e xpla ine d. To the e xten t B a ar a lle g e s th a t Pa y ne vio late d h is r ig ht t o pri va c y by dis c los ingthe e ma il Ba ar w rote he r in September 2005, that claim founder s on its own t erms. Abse nt a spec ial duty , one wh o co m m u n i ca t es a m es s age t o an o t h er t ak es t h e r i s k t h at t h e r ec i p i en twi l l d i s cl o s e t h e m es s ageNo. 08-5302

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- 16 - to others. Smith v. Cincinnati Post & Times-Star , 474 F.2d 740, 741 (6th Cir. 1973)
. “[N]o vi olation of the rig ht of privac y ” occ urre d. Id.
E.
Ba ar also claims that the def endants c onspired to violate his constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Yet, as the district c ourt corr ectly conclude d, all of the de fenda nts were part of the
same c ollective entity

—the J eff

erson County Bo ar d o f Education—and thus there we re “ not two separ ate ‘people’ to f

orm a c onspiracy .” Hull v

. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 926 F.2d 505, 510 ( 6th Cir. 1991) (af firming the g rant of summary judgme nt on a § 1985 claim bec ause the plaintiff alleg ed a c onspiracy betwee n “a sc hool superintendent, the e x ecutive direc tor of the district, and a sc hool administrator, all of whom we re e mploy ees or ag ents of the [sc ho ol] [b ]oard ,” ). Ha

vin g fa ile d to cha lle ng e thi s asp e c t of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on , h e mus t live with it. Se e Sp irk

o v . M itc he ll , 3 68 F .3 d 6 03 , 6 12 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ; see also Leary v. Livingston Cou nty , 528 F.3d 438, 449 ( 6th Cir. 2008).
III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m in pa rt , r e ve rs e in p art

and re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.