AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed August 9, 2023 

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### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-22-00637-CR RICHARD RAY PENCE, II, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE XAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court Grayson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 072811 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith Opinion by Justice Smith Appellant Richard Ray Pence, II appeals his conviction for the murder of his wife Pamela Pence. In a single issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction a nd, specifically, to prove that he (1) intentionally or knowingly caused Pamela’s death, (2) intended to cause serious bodily injury, or (3) committed an act clearly dangerous to human life. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.–2– Background Appellant was charged by indictment wi th Pamela’s murder in alternative paragraphs. The paragraphs, which tracked Texas Penal Code s ection 19.02, alleged that appellant did: (1) intentionally and knowingly cause th e death of . . . Pamela . . . by hitting or striking her body, head , or face with his hand, foot, or other object unknown to the Grand Jury; (2) with intent to cause serious bod ily injury to . . . Pamela . . ., commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death of [Pamela] by hitting or striking her body, head, or face with his hand, foot or other object unknown to the Grand Jury; or (3) commit or attempt to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, namely hitting or striking Pa mela . . . in her body, head, or face with his hand, foot, or other object unknown to the Grand Jury, that caused the death of Pamela . . ., a nd [appellant] was then and there in the course of committing a felony, namely Assault Causing Bodily Injury Family Violence with Previous Conviction, and the death of [Pamela] was caused while [appellant] was in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt of the felony. Appellant pleaded not guilty, and th e case was tried to a jury. The evidence at trial show ed that the Pences lived in Southmayd, Grayson County. Between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. the morning of Se ptember 26, 2020, a neighbor, Jose Venegas, observed the Pen ces arguing. Venega s saw Pamela walk back into her house carefully, like somethi ng hurt. Venegas then heard “banging the walls and all.” At approxima tely 8:30 a.m., another nei ghbor, Arthur Newton, heard a woman’s voice, which he thought came from the Pences’ house, saying “No. No.–3– No. Don’t. Stop.” Both Venegas and Newt on had overheard “a lot” of arguments at the Pences’ house. This argument was di fferent, according to Newton, because it appeared to be “short and done.” Around 10:00 or 11:00 a.m., Ricky Pence, III, the Pences’ adult son, arrived to help appellant move some “stuff.” Ap pellant met him at the back door, and they talked outside for a couple of hours. Appellant stopped Ricky from entering the house and seemed “kind of off.” Appella nt subsequently entered the house and, when he returned, told Ric ky he thought Pamela was dead. Ricky entered the house and found Pamela lying on the kitchen floor. Appellant told Ricky that he did not want to go back to jail and asked Ricky to kill him. He also tried, unsuccessfully, to prevent Ricky from calli ng 9-1-1. Appellant could be heard apologizing to Ricky in th e background of the 9-1-1 recording. Appellant then left in his truck. Grayson County Trooper Michael Landeros, the first peace officer at the scene, testified that the house was dish eveled and Pamela had been “brutally assaulted.” Pottsboro Police Officer St eve Northington, the second to arrive, testified that Pamela’s face was “pretty distorted” and it appeared that there was “some kind of homicidal-type violence.” Pottsboro Police Officer Travis Loone y initiated the investigation at the Pences’ house and observed holes in wa lls, busted sheetrock on the floor, and damage to the underside of a bar top like someone had kicked it. There were bloody–4– napkins everywhere, blood splatter on lowe r cabinets, and blood droplets on the floor. Pamela’s face was unrecognizable; sh e was heavily swollen and looked as if she had been hit by a car or a train. Brad Oliver, a Ranger with the Texas Department of Public Safety, took over the investigati on. Based on his obser vation of Pamela’s injuries, he believed that she “died a ho rrible death from blunt force trauma, . . . multiple blunt force trauma injuries to her body, from her head to her toes.” Peace officers located appellant driv ing north on U.S. Highway 75 and pulled him over. During transport to the police st ation, appellant stat ed, “it’s not supposed to happen; it wasn’t intentional.” Prior to his arrest, appellant phoned bot h a co-worker, Michael Spearman, and his employer, Dwayne Hicks. Appellant told Spearman, “ [I]t’s bad” and that he was “going to prison.” Appellant explained that he had gotte n into a fight with Pamela, it got physical, and Pamela was dead. Appellant told Hicks that he would not be at work on Monday and that “she’s dead,” sh e would not “shut up,” he choked her, and he “didn’t mean to do it.” Appellant al so called Ricky while Ricky was speaking with Trooper Landeros; Landeros overheard appellant apologize. Dr. Stephen Lenfest, a Dallas Count y medical examiner, performed an autopsy on Pamela. The autopsy revealed a number of injuries consistent with recent blunt force impacts. Those injuries include d bruises scattered over the left side of Pamela’s head, all over the right side of her head, on her right eye and cheek, and on her left ear. The right side of her face was swollen. Her scalp was detached from–5– her skull. There were cont usions to her brain and swelling and bleeding in the soft tissue of both sides of the brain. There were abrasions on Pamela ’s forehead and the left side of her face and head. There were lacerations to her nose, upper lip, the inside of her lips, and on her gums. Her t ongue was bruised, c onsistent with being struck in the face or biting the tongue. According to Dr. Lenfest, there were multiple impact points on Pamela’s head. Pamela’s wrists, left hand, arms, thighs , and lower legs were bruised. There were abrasions to her knees and bruising and swelling on her right ankle and foot. Her right shoulder was dislocated. There were contusions to both collar bones and her left lung. Her spleen was lacerated; the impact ha d been hard enough to break tissue inside the spleen while the spleen re mained intact. She suffered fractures to the right second and sixth through eighth ribs and left sixth through tenth ribs. Her eighth and ninth left ribs punctured her ch est cavity. Dr. Lenfes t testified that the cumulation of all of the blunt force injuri es to Pamela caused her death. Dr. Lenfest testified that Pamela was a pproximately five fe et tall and weighed ninety-one pounds. Appellant weighed 250 pounds and stood five feet, ten inches tall when he was booked into jail. Ricky testified that his parents fre quently argued, both verbally and physically, for as long as he could remember . Both appellant and Pamela instigated arguments, and alcohol was typically invol ved. Only appella nt, however, was physical, and Ricky had observed appella nt strike, push, and kick Pamela.–6– Pamela’s niece, Jennifer Hulette, testif ied to a 2006 incident when appellant elbowed Pamela in the stomach and knocked her into some bushe s. Another time, Pamela arrived at Jennifer’s house in a wris t brace and asked if she could stay. Police officer Jason Lurkins and Detective Troy Shor t testified that they had investigated appellant for domestic violence in 2003 and 2006, respectively. As a result of those investigations, appellant was convi cted of several offenses. After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of murder and assessed punishment at confinement for life. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction on the jury’s verdict. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied, and this appeal followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational factfinde r could have found the essen tial elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Isassi v. State , 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) . We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offens e as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge is “one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden–7– of proof or unnecessarily restrict the Stat e’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense fo r which the defenda nt was tried.” Id. When conducting a legal sufficiency revi ew, we consider all evidence in the record regardless of whether it was properly or improperly admitted. Clayton v.
State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim . App. 2007). We defe r to the factfinder to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw r easonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; see also Merritt v. State , 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Isassi , 330 S.W.3d at 638. The factfinder may choose to believe or disbelieve any part of any witness’s testimony. Wyatt v.
State , 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we pres ume that the factfinder resolv ed the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore de fer to that determination.” Clayton , 235 S.W.3d
at 778. A criminal conviction may be supporte d by both direct and circumstantial evidence as well as all reasonable inferenc es that may be drawn from the evidence. Id. “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct ev idence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial eviden ce alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A person commits murder if he: (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;–8– (2) intends to cause serious bodily in jury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that cause s the death of an individual; or (3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual

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. § 19.02(b). “Murder is a ‘res ult of conduct’ offense, which means that the culpable mental state rela tes to the result of the conduct, i.e., the causing of the death.” Schroeder v. State , 123 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Cavazos v. State , 382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex . Crim. App. 2012) (citing Lugo-Lugo v. State , 650 S.W.2d 72, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (op. on reh’g) (noting the statute “focuses the mental state of the individual on the particular result and not on the conduct that causes death”)). A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desi re to cause the result. T EX

. P ENAL C ODE § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly with respect to a resu lt of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). The test for determining whether an act is clearly dange rous to human life is an objective one. Lugo-Lugo , 650 S.W.2d at 81 (the act intending to cause serious bodily injury must be “objectively clearly dange rous to human life”). “Intent and knowledge are fact questions for the jury and are almost always proven through evidence of the circ umstances surrounding the crime.” Manrique v.–9– State , 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring). A jury may infer a defendant’s intent by his acts, words, and conduct, as well as the method he used to commit the crime, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim, and the relative size and stre ngth of the parties. Hart v. State , 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Manrique , 994 S.W.2d at 649); Patrick v. State , 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Appellant asserts the evidence is insuffi cient to support his conviction because the record is “void” of ev idence that he intentionally or knowingly caused Pamela’s death, intended to cause serious bodily in jury, or committed or attempted to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life. We disagree. Appellant does not dispute that he caused Pamela’s de ath. There was evidence indicating that appellant was angry with Pamela because, in his words, she would not “shut up.” The jury reasonably could infer that his anger was a motive for attacking Pamela and a circumstance indicating his guilt and culpable mental

state. See Gonzalez v. State , 616 S.W.3d 585, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing
Guevara v. State , 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). The evidence also shows that appellant “brutally assaulted” Pamela. There was a significant physical disparity between the two, and Dr. Lenfest testified that Pamela’s injuries were not the kind of inju ries seen in persons capable of defending themselves. Dr. Lenfest concluded that the extensive injuries to Pamela’s head alone were the result of “many different impacts” and it would have taken a “significant–10– amount of force” to cause her injuries, par ticularly the separation of her scalp from her skull and the fractures to her ribs. The jury could infer the extremely violent nature of appellant’s behavior from th e testimony about, and photographs showing, Pamela’s injuries, the extent of blood thro ughout the kitchen, and the damage to the Pences’ house. Given the manner in whic h appellant committed the offense and the injuries he inflicted on a much smaller a nd weaker victim, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant attacked Pamela with intent to cause her death, knew that such an attack could kill her, or, w ith intent to cause Pamela serious bodily injury, committe d an act clearly dangerous to human life that created a substantial risk of death. See Patrick , 906 S.W.2d at 487; e.g. , Tretter v. State , No. 03-12-00034-CR, 2014 WL 3893016, at *4 (T ex. App.—Austin A ug. 7, 2014, pet. dism’d) (mem. op., not designated for publi cation) (jury could in fer that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused his wi fe’s death and intentionally caused her serious bodily injury from the severity of her head trauma and other blunt force injuries, which were consistent with mu ltiple impacts and resulted from significant and severe force, and from the size and st rength differential between defendant and his wife). Appellant’s subsequent conduct also suppor ts the jury’s verdict. He initially prevented Ricky from entering the house , waited hours before telling Ricky of Pamela’s death, and then fled. See Wilkerson v. State , 881 S.W.2d 321, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (defendant’s flight from the scene, among other facts, supported–11– jury’s finding of intent to kill). Indeed, the evidence shows that appellant’s priority was to avoid return ing to jail. To support his argument that the evidence is insufficient, appellant points to his expressions of remorse and statements i ndicating that he did not mean for Pamela to die. The jury, however, in fulfilling its duty to resolve conf licting inferences in the evidence, could have determined that appellant’s subseque nt expressions of remorse did not negate or rebut his intent to cause Pamela’s death or serious bodily injury or his knowledge that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause her death. See, e.g. , Gipson v. State , No. 09-19-00275-CR, 2021 WL 3743838, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 25, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (jury could have decided that defendant’s remorse after stabbing victim did not show he did not act intentionally or knowingly when the stabbing occurred). Likewise, the jury was free to distrust appe llant’s self-serving statements that he “didn’t mean to do it” and it “wasn’t intentional ” in light of the evidence indicating otherwise. See, e.g. , Jones v. State , No. 01-01-01233-CR, 2003 WL 21513051, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 3, 2003, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (jur y was free to disbelieve appe llant’s statement that he did not intend to kill victim). Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury rationally could ha ve found that appellan t caused Pamela’s death with the requisite culpable mental state under penal code section 19.02(b)(1),–12– (2), or (3). We further conclude that the jury reasonably could have drawn the inferences necessary to esta blish that appellant’s conduct created a substantial risk of death and, therefore, he committed an act clearly dangerous to human life. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

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. P. 47.2(b) 220637F.U05 /Craig Smith / CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE–13– 

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
RICHARD RAY PENCE II, Appellant

No. 05-22-00637-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 072811. Opinion delivered by Justice Smith. Justices Molberg and Carlyle participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date , the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 9th day of August, 2023.