United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 23-40562 

Summary Calendar 

____________ 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Jonathan Lamar Simpson, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:21-CR-120-1 

______________________________ 

Before Wiener, Ho, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

A jury convicted Jonathan Lamar Simpson of possession of a firearm 

and ammunition by a convicted felon. The district court sentenced him to 

120 months of imprisonment, which was a departure or, alternatively, an 

upward variance from the guidelines range. On appeal, Simpson argues that 

(1) his trial counsel was ineffective, (2) the district court erroneously denied 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

August 9, 2024 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

Case: 23-40562 Document: 96-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/09/2024
No. 23-40562 

2 

his motion to suppress evidence, and (3) his sentence is unreasonable. The 

record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of 

Simpson’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; we therefore decline to 

consider the claims without prejudice to collateral review. See United States 

v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014). 

Regarding the motion to suppress, Simpson argues that the arresting 

officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle he had just parked. 

Assuming without deciding that trial counsel did not waive this issue, “[we] 

review[] factual findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of 

law enforcement action de novo.” United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 

594 (5th Cir. 2014). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party, and “the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong” 

where the district court’s ruling is based on live oral testimony. United States 

v. Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We will uphold a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support 

it.” United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Under the “automobile exception,” if law enforcement officials have 

probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, a warrantless 

search is permitted. United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2006). 

Probable cause is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. 

Id. A showing of probable cause requires only a “fair probability” on which 

a “reasonable and prudent” person would believe that contraband or 

evidence of a crime is present. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2013) 

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted; quotes at 244).

Contrary to Simpson’s contention, the district court accurately 

characterized an officer’s testimony that he detected the odor of marijuana 

Case: 23-40562 Document: 96-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/09/2024
No. 23-40562 

3 

coming from Simpson’s person when he opened the door to the vehicle and 

brought Simpson to the ground. Moreover, the district court did not clearly 

err in determining that the officer’s testimony was credible. See Gibbs, 421 

F.3d at 357. Further, Simpson fails to show error in the district court’s 

determination that the officers’ knowledge of the facts—many of which 

Simpson does not address in his brief—in their totality supplied the requisite 

probable cause. See Fields, 456 F.3d at 523. 

As for Simpson’s challenge to his sentence, the record does not 

support his assertion that the district court mistakenly believed that an 

amendment to the sentencing guidelines, had it been effective at the time of 

his sentencing, would not apply to him. Moreover, the district court was not 

required to apply the guidelines amendment prior to its effective date. See

United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2007). Simpson 

fails to show that the district court miscalculated his guidelines range or 

otherwise committed a significant procedural error. See Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Simpson also generally argues that his guidelines 

range adequately accounted for the sentencing factors and that the evidence 

failed to support the district court’s sentence as an upward variance. 

However, a “district court is free to conclude that the applicable [g]uidelines 

range gives too much or too little weight to one or more factors, and may 

adjust the sentence accordingly.” United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 

804, 807 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Simpson’s conclusory arguments do not demonstrate that the district court 

failed to consider a factor that should have received significant weight, gave 

significant weight to an improper factor, or made a clear error of judgment in 

balancing the sentencing factors. See United States v. Fraga, 704 F.3d 432, 

440 (5th Cir. 2013). 

AFFIRMED. 

Case: 23-40562 Document: 96-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/09/2024