17-870 

Jara-Llivichuzca v. Sessions

BIA

 Straus, IJ 

A206 689 908

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 20th 4 day of August, two thousand eighteen.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

8 GERARD E. LYNCH,

9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 OFELIA MARGARITA JARA14 LLIVICHUZCA,

15 Petitioner,

16

17 v. 17-870

18 NAC

19 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, 

20 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

21 Respondent.

22 _____________________________________

23

24 FOR PETITIONER: Gregory Osakwe, Hartford, CT.

25

26 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting

27 Assistant Attorney General; 

28 Claire L. Workman, Senior 

29 Litigation Counsel; Juria L. 

30 Jones, Trial Attorney, Office of 
2

1 Immigration Litigation, United 

2 States Department of Justice, 

3 Washington, DC.

4

5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

8 is DENIED.

9 Petitioner Ofelia Margarita Jara-Llivichuzca, a native

10 and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a March 2, 2017,

11 decision of the BIA affirming a June 13, 2016, decision of

12 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Jara-Llivichuzca’s

13 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

14 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ofelia

15 Margarita Jara-Llivichuzca, No. A206 689 908 (B.I.A. Mar.

16 2, 2017), aff’g No. A206 689 908 (Immig. Ct. Hartford June

17 13, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

18 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

19 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s

20 decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S.

21 Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The

22 applicable standards of review are well established. See

23 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d

24 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 
3

1 The governing REAL ID Act credibility standard provides

2 that the agency must “[c]onsider[] the totality of the

3 circumstances,” and may base a credibility finding on the

4 plausibility of an applicant’s account and inconsistencies

5 in her or her statements. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);

6 Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64, 166-67. “We defer . . . to

7 an IJ’s credibility determination unless . . . it is plain

8 that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse

9 credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. For the

10 reasons that follow, we conclude that substantial evidence

11 supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

12 As the Government observes, Jara-Llivichuzca does not

13 specifically challenge the inconsistency, omission, and

14 implausibility findings underlying the adverse credibility

15 determination. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117

16 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs

17 are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on

18 appeal.”); see also Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146-

19 47 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying waiver doctrine to specific

20 findings underlying credibility determination). Moreover,

21 our review of the record and the agency’s decisions reveals

22 that the findings are supported by the record and provide
4

1 substantial evidence for the adverse credibility

2 determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

3 Jara-Llivichuzca’s testimony and application were

4 inconsistent concerning how long she lived with her

5 domestic partner, who or what motivated his decision to

6 start a relationship with their child, how soon he became

7 abusive after moving in, and how many times she left him

8 after he resumed contact with their son. Moreover, Jara9 Llivichuzca’s application was facially implausible because

10 it alleged that the abuse started on a date after she

11 arrived in the United States. And she submitted a letter

12 from a relative that both omitted the only incident of

13 which the author had firsthand knowledge—a threatening

14 visit from Jara-Llivichuzca’s partner—and was inconsistent

15 about when the abuse started, when she decided to flee

16 Ecuador, and whether she ever spoke to the relative about

17 the abuse. Contrary to Jara-Llivichuzca’s position, these

18 discrepancies are extensive and called into question the

19 circumstances of her relationship with her partner, when

20 and how the abuse commenced, the duration of the abuse and

21 her responses to it, and her family’s knowledge of the

22 abuse. Because these discrepancies relate to the very harm
5

1 on which her claim is based, the “totality of the

2 circumstances” supports the adverse credibility

3 determination. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 (“Where the

4 IJ’s adverse credibility finding is based on specific

5 examples . . . of inconsistent statements or contradictory

6 evidence, a reviewing court will generally not be able to

7 conclude that a reasonable adjudicator was compelled to

8 find otherwise.” (quotation marks omitted)); see Xian Tuan

9 Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir.

10 2006) (holding that material inconsistency regarding basis

11 of applicant’s asylum claim is substantial evidence for

12 adverse credibility determination).

13 The credibility determination is dispositive of the

14 asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief claims because

15 all three claims are based on the same factual predicate. 

16 See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

17 We therefore decline to consider the agency’s alternative

18 determination that Jara-Llivichuzca failed to provide or

19 explain the absence of corroborating evidence. See INS v.

20 Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts

21 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the

22 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
6

1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion

3 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 

4 FOR THE COURT:

5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,Clerk