J-S55031-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WALTER DONALD BRADSHAW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 561 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 12, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-05-CR-0000445-2010

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 10, 2021

Walter Donald Bradshaw appeals from the July 12, 2019 order that

denied his petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). After 

careful review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

As previously summarized by this Court, this case concerns “allegations 

of [Appellant] sexually assaulting H.O., an unrelated, minor female, over a 

period of approximately two years.” Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 116 

A.3d 699 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum at 1). The charges in 

this case stem from Appellant spending a night with the victim at a hotel, 

where he “initiated sexual contact despite H.O.’s protests.” Id.

Appellant was represented at his trial by Thomas Crawford, Jr., Esquire 

(“Attorney Crawford”), and Barbara Weiss, Esquire (“Attorney Weiss”). 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Ultimately, a jury convicted Appellant of rape of a child and numerous related 

crimes. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of sixty-six 

years and eight months to 150 years of incarceration. Appellant filed a timely 

direct appeal to this Court, which affirmed his judgment of sentence. Id. at 

11. Appellant petitioned for allowance of appeal before our Supreme Court, 

which denied his request to appeal. Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 118 A.3d 

1107 (Pa. 2015) (per curiam order).

On October 11, 2016, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition alleging that 

Attorneys Crawford and Weiss “were ineffective for failing to introduce into 

the record at trial medical records detailing [H.O.’s] medical examination[.]” 

Memorandum Opinion, 7/12/19, at 2. A hearing was held to investigate these 

claims. However, at the PCRA hearing, Attorney Crawford’s testimony 

revealed serious concerns unrelated to Appellant’s initial allegations. 

Specifically, Attorney Crawford began his testimony by claiming that he 

had “endless” but unsuccessful discussions with then-District Attorney William 

Higgins, Esquire (“DA Higgins”), concerning a potential plea. See N.T. PCRA 

Hearing, 7/13/18, at 5-7, 11. Moments later, however, Attorney Crawford 

suddenly conceded that he could neither remember nor directly testify as to 

the plea discussions involving the Commonwealth. Id. at 11-13. Specifically, 

Attorney Crawford testified that Attorney Weiss had handled these 

negotiations with the Commonwealth. As such, Attorney Crawford 

acknowledged that the Commonwealth may have advanced a plea 
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counteroffer that Appellant may not have been informed about.

1

 Id. 

Immediately after this disquieting testimony, Appellant and the 

Commonwealth jointly requested that the PCRA court enter a continuance to

permit further investigation, which the court granted. 

On August 1, 2018, Attorney Crawford passed away unexpectedly. At 

a follow-up hearing, “both [Appellant] and the District Attorney noted they 

wished to discuss a potential settlement but needed additional time.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 5/28/20, at 3. Eventually, “the parties informed the [PCRA 

court] that they had agreed that [Appellant] had been denied effective 

assistance of counsel during pre-trial negotiations,” and the Commonwealth 

concurred in Appellant receiving some manner of relief under the PCRA. Id. 

Specifically, the parties proposed that Appellant’s conviction be vacated. 

Thereafter, he would plead guilty to certain charges and, in return, receive an 

aggregate sentence of ten to twenty-five years of incarceration followed by 

twenty years of probation. Id.

The PCRA court provided the parties with an opportunity to file briefs in 

support of this proposed resolution, but did not contemplate any additional 

hearings or amended filings. Thereafter, the PCRA court provided a number 

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1

 Prior to disclaiming responsibility for the plea negotiations during his 

muddled testimony, Attorney Crawford averred that he had made an initial 

offer to the Commonwealth that Appellant would plead guilty in exchange for 

a total sentence of “five years” of incarceration. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 

7/13/18, at 13. Although Attorney Crawford initially testified that the 

Commonwealth refused this offer without tendering a counteroffer, he 

immediately backtracked by disclaiming that he did not handle the 

negotiations directly. Id. at 13-15.
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of extensions for the completion of this supplemental briefing. However, the 

parties ultimately averred that they were unable to “to find authority to 

support the agreed upon disposition proposed to the [PCRA court] on October 

2, 2018, since the evidence [had] not been fully developed on the issue of 

ineffectiveness of counsel during pre-trial representation.” See Joint Motion 

for Reconsideration, 5/2/19, at ¶ 22. Thus, the parties requested that the 

PCRA court “reconvene the evidentiary hearing for the parties to present 

additional evidence to the Court upon which a ruling on all of the claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel could be based.” Id. at ¶ 26.

On July 12, 2019, the PCRA court denied this joint petition for a new 

evidentiary hearing. On August 14, 2019, Appellant filed a motion for 

reconsideration requesting, inter alia, leave to amend his PCRA petition to 

include these allegations concerning the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. See 

Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration, 8/14/19, at ¶ 31. This filing also noted 

the marked deficiencies in the incomplete testimony from the PCRA hearing. 

Id. at ¶ 29 (“Notably, examination of former [DA] Higgins never occurred nor 

did counsel question [Attorney Weiss], who also represented [Appellant] and 

who [Attorney Crawford] indicated was involved in pre-trial negotiations.”). 

This motion was also denied by the PCRA court. On July 12, 2019, the PCRA 

court entered an order and memorandum opinion denying Appellant’s petition.

After Appellant’s counsel initially failed to file an appeal, the PCRA court 

reinstated his appellate rights nunc pro tunc due to ineffective assistance. 

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied 
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with their respective requirements pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant has 

presented the following issues for our consideration:2

1. Whether the PCRA court erred in closing the evidentiary record 

and dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition without affording

[Appellant] the opportunity to testify or present the testimony of 

[Attorney Weiss] and [DA Higgins]?

2. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA 

petition without affording him the opportunity to amend his 

petition in writing to include his claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to inform [Appellant] of the Commonwealth’s 

plea offers, which was based on testimony revealed during the 

testimony of trial counsel during the PCRA proceedings?

Appellant’s brief at 7. These issues are closely interrelated, and we will discuss 

them collectively below.

In reviewing these issues, we are mindful of the following basic legal 

principles that will guide our adjudication: 

Our standard of review in a PCRA appeal requires us to determine 

whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the 

record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal 

error. The scope of our review is limited to the findings of the 

PCRA court and the evidence of record, which we view in the light 

most favorable to the party who prevailed before the court. . . . 

The PCRA court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, 

when supported by the record, are binding upon this Court. . . . 

However, we review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

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2

 The Commonwealth has not filed a brief or participated in this appeal.
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In his first issue, Appellant has challenged the PCRA court’s denial of his 

serial requests to supplement the evidentiary record with an additional 

hearing. See Appellant’s brief at 19-20. Rule of Criminal Procedure 908 

(“Hearing”), governs this issue and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(A) Except as provided in Rule 907, the judge shall order a 

hearing:

. . .

(2) when the petition for post-conviction relief or the 

Commonwealth’s answer, if any, raises material issues of 

fact. However, the judge may deny a hearing on a specific 

issue of fact when a full and fair evidentiary hearing upon 

that issue was held at trial or at any proceeding before or 

after trial.

The judge shall schedule the hearing for a time that will 

afford the parties a reasonable opportunity for investigation 

and preparation, and shall enter such interim orders as may 

be necessary in the interests of justice.

(B) The judge, on petition or request, shall postpone or continue 

a hearing to provide either party a reasonable opportunity, if one 

did not exist previously, for investigation and preparation 

regarding any new issue of fact raised in an amended petition or 

amended answer.

. . .

(D) Upon the conclusion of the hearing the judge shall determine 

all material issues raised by the defendant’s petition and the 

Commonwealth’s answer . . . .

Pa.R.Crim.P. 908. Rule 908 establishes that “a PCRA court should hold an 

evidentiary hearing where a PCRA petition raises any material issues of fact.” 

Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 851 A.2d 883, 889 (Pa. 2004).

Overall, we conclude that the materiality of the troubling testimony at 

the PCRA hearing is largely self-evident. Attorney Crawford’s testimony has 
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raised a lingering uncertainty as to whether Appellant’s trial counsel kept him 

appropriately informed regarding plea offers from the Commonwealth. 

Commonwealth v. Copeland, 554 A.2d 54 (Pa.Super. 1988), is instructive

as to the propriety of granting an evidentiary hearing in this context. 

Copeland was convicted of first-degree murder. On appeal, he alleged 

that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to inform him of an offer from the 

Commonwealth that would have permitted him to enter an open guilty plea to 

third-degree murder. Reviewing the case, this Court observed that, “[t]he 

prevailing view among courts which have considered this issue is that counsel 

has a duty to inform his client of tendered plea agreements and may be found 

ineffective for failing to do so.” Id. at 60. Thus, we held that “there is 

arguable merit in appellant’s contention that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to tell him of the plea agreement which the Commonwealth had offered.” Id. 

at 61. Accordingly, we remanded “for an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to disclose to him that a plea 

agreement had been offered by the Commonwealth.” Id.

While Copeland does not explicitly discuss the materiality standard 

under Pa.R.Crim.P. 908, it relied upon precedent providing that “[w]hen an 

arguable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been made,” this Court 

“shall” remand “to permit the defendant to develop evidence on the record to 

support the claim, and to provide the Commonwealth an opportunity to rebut 

the claim[.]” Copeland, supra at 61. Applying this reasoning to the case at 
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bar, Attorney Crawford’s testimony and the parties’ applications clearly raised

a material issue of fact, i.e., whether Appellant was misinformed regarding 

plea offers from the Commonwealth.3 The trial court erred by denying the 

parties’ requests for a follow-up evidentiary hearing.

4

 Accord Copeland, 

supra at 60-61; see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 482 

(Pa.Super. 2018) (holding that where there are “disputed factual issues,” the 

PCRA court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing “as a matter of law”) 

(citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2)).

Accordingly, we will vacate the underlying order in this case and remand 

for a supplemental evidentiary hearing consistent with this memorandum. 

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3

 The Dissent suggests that we may overlook the deficiencies in the record 

below and proceed to an immediate merits analysis, correctly observing 

Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness is still subject to the requirement that a 

petitioner establish prejudice in order to obtain relief. Accord 

Commonwealth v. Chazin, 873 A.2d 732, 736 (Pa.Super. 2005). 

Respectfully, the Dissent’s logic does not have an appropriate appreciation for 

the impact that the paucity of the factual record below has had upon the 

pleadings in this case. We perceive any deficiencies in Appellant’s allegations 

of ineffectiveness to be tied inextricably to the PCRA court’s erroneous refusal 

to permit additional fact-finding or amendatory filings. Accordingly, we will 

not speculate as to the potential merits of these issues until Appellant’s claim 

for relief has had a full and fair hearing.

4

 Rule 908(D) only permits the PCRA court to issue a determination of the 

“material issues” in a case at the “conclusion” of a hearing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 

908(D). We are not convinced that a half-finished proceeding satisfies the 

requirement of a “full and fair evidentiary hearing” contemplated by the

Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Cf. Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2).
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Due to the nature of our disposition, we will not address Appellant’s second 

issue concerning amendment of his PCRA petition.5

Order vacated. Remand with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge McCaffery joins the memorandum.

Judge Colins files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/10/2021

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5 The PCRA court has not offered any justification for denying leave to amend, 

aside from referencing the approximately six-month period during which the 

parties unsuccessfully pursued a brokered solution to Appellant’s case. While 

this delay is unfortunate, we do not believe that overlooking a potential issue 

of effective representation is an acceptable solution. See Commonwealth 

v. Crisp, 193 A.3d 919, 930 (Pa. 2018) (“Adherence to this liberal standard 

for amendment is essential because criminal defendants may have just one 

opportunity to pursue collateral relief in state court.”).