U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory 

Commission

NUREG/BR-0117

No. 01-4

December 2001 - January 2002

NRC ACTIVITIES IN RESPONSE TO 

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, EVENTS

In light of the terrorist attacks that occurred 

September 11, 2001, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has taken action to enhance 

security for nuclear power plants, nuclear fuel 

facilities, and other licensed facilities and activities. 

Safety and security are inseparable topics that remain 

the top priorities of NRC, licensees, and other 

government agencies.

NRC’s response to the terrorist attacks took three 

forms: 

1. Although there were no attacks on, or specific, 

credible threats against, NRC-licensed 

facilities, NRC took immediate actions to 

monitor and assess events and threats, to ensure 

that NRC and licensees took appropriate security 

measures, and to issue safeguards advisories 

to licensees. 

2. NRC has taken continuing actions, including 

updating and supplementing advisories to 

licensees; coordinating closely with military, 

intelligence, law enforcement, and State 

agencies; informing Congress and the public of 

Agency actions; and reviewing licensee actions.

3. NRC has initiated short-term and longterm actions to thoroughly review 

safeguards programs, including their 

underlying assumptions.

NRC’s safeguards program is based on the definition 

of the threat against which different licensees 

must defend. The extent of the threat and the 

requirements for protection depend on the type of 

facility and the risk of theft or sabotage of the 

nuclear or radioactive material involved. Generally, 

NMSS Licensee Newsletter

(December 2001 - January 2002)

Contents Page

1. NRC Activities in Response to 

September 11, 2001, Events ..................... 1

2. NRC Measures to Increase Security 

and Control of Licensed Material .............. 3

3. NRC Participation in the FBI Strategic 

Information Operations Center.................... 4

4. NRC Threat Assessment Program............... 4

5. Review of Lost, Stolen, or Abandoned 

Radioactive Source Data Reported 

to NMED..................................................... 5

6. Use of NUREG-1556, “Consolidated 

Guidance About Materials Licenses,” by 

Licensees, Applicants, and Agreement 

State Regulators........................................... 7

7. Significant Enforcement Actions................. 10

8. Significant Events........................................ 13

9. Selected Federal Register Notices 

(September 1, 2001 - November

30, 2001) .................................................... 14

10. Generic Communication Issued 

(September 1, 2001 - November 

30, 2001) ..................................................... 15

Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety

and Safeguards

NMSS Licensee Newsletter
requirements are higher for nuclear power plants and 

nuclear fuel cycle facilities than for most other types 

of facilities.

Licensees use material control and accounting 

measures to keep track of nuclear material in 

process, storage, or transport. Facilities with 

quantities and types of nuclear material that could 

pose a substantial public risk have physical security 

plans that consider the robust design of major 

facilities and use the principle of defense-in-depth, 

or multiple measures, to control access to facilities. 

Normal security measures for large nuclear facilities 

include well-armed civilian guard forces, physical 

barriers; detection systems; access controls; alarm 

stations; and detailed response strategies. NRC 

inspects security measures routinely and periodically 

undertakes various exercises. Key licensee 

employees are subject to clearance requirements, 

including background investigations, and must meet 

requirements for fitness for duty. Licensees must 

be prepared to implement protective strategies when 

faced with an armed attack. NRC is reconsidering 

all these elements of the safeguards program as 

part of its comprehensive examination of the 

necessary level of protection for licensed facilities 

and activities. 

NRC took a number of immediate actions after the 

attacks of September 11, 2001. Immediately after 

the second plane crash, NRC activated its Operations 

Center at Headquarters, and the Incident Response 

Centers in the regions. The Agency has operated 

the Emergency Operations Center around the clock. 

Teams consisting of top officials and specialists were 

assigned to these centers. NRC issued safeguards 

advisories to power reactors and certain fuel cycle 

facilities, recommending that they go to the highest 

level of security, which they did. All facilities have 

remained at the highest security level, Security 

Level 3, because of the threat of retaliatory attacks 

by terrorists. The licensees were advised to maintain 

heightened security. Specific actions taken by 

the licensees include increased patrols; additional 

security posts; limited access of personnel and 

vehicles to facility sites; and increased coordination 

with local law enforcement and military authorities. 

Subsequently, NRC issued safeguards advisories to 

other facilities and to Agreement States, which 

regulate many nuclear facilities. The Agency 

2

continues to monitor the situation, in close 

coordination with other Federal and State agencies.

NRC has been working closely with the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Office of Homeland 

Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

Department of Energy, Federal Aviation 

Administration, the military, and others. NRC 

temporarily assigned staff to the FBI’s Strategic 

Information and Operations Center and the 

Consequence Management Team of the Office 

of Homeland Security. Lastly, the Agency has 

continued communicating with nuclear regulators 

around the world, including Canadians and 

Mexicans, as well as the International Atomic 

Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency.

The terrorist attacks have also prompted NRC’s 

review of the sensitivity of information contained 

in documents and information received and issued 

by the Agency. The Agency has removed, from 

public availability, documents and information that 

might be of help to an attacker or saboteur, and 

has temporarily shut down its public website, to 

determine what information should not be available. 

A redesigned website has since been partially 

restored and will be fully restored when all the 

information has been reviewed for its potential 

security sensitivity, and the new information can be 

posted. NRC has also communicated with the public 

by issuing press releases, briefing interested parties, 

and responding to inquiries.

In the long term, NRC is considering the 

implications of the September 11 attacks for NRC’s 

responsibilities for security of nuclear facilities and 

material, as part of a National examination of 

security measures. In addition to the elements 

of NRC’s safeguards program discussed above, 

the comprehensive review will include questions 

of coordination with other Government agencies, 

particularly the new Office of Homeland Security; 

the respective responsibilities of the Federal 

Government and the private sector for defense of 

nuclear facilities; the threat of additional attacks 

against the U.S.; consistency in the level of 

protection against terrorist attacks throughout the 

critical infrastructure; and emergency preparedness 

by NRC, licensees, States, and localities.
3

(Contacts: Kim Karcagi, NMSS, 301-415-6701; 

e-mail: kk2@nrc.gov; Paul Goldberg, NMSS, 

301-415-7842; e-mail: pfg@nrc.gov)

NRC MEASURES TO INCREASE SECURITY 

AND CONTROL OF LICENSED MATERIAL

The way the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) looks at control and security of licensed 

material, as required by 10 CFR 20.1801 and 

20.1802, changed dramatically after September 11, 

2001. Before the terrorist attacks, NRC was 

principally concerned about accidental exposure to 

material. Industry history has shown the danger 

from lost sources, as evident from events in 

Thailand, Brazil, and other real events. After 

September 11, the danger of Radiological 

Dispersion Devices, aka “Dirty Bombs,” became 

more apparent. Numerous news organizations, 

including The Washington Post, on December 4, 

2001, have reported that documents captured from 

the Al Qaeda organization and other leads indicated 

the organization’s interest in developing such a 

weapon, which would use conventional explosives to 

spread radioactive material. Now NRC is looking at 

control and security of licensed material as a means 

to prevent theft and malevolent use of that material, 

in addition to loss and accidental exposure.

After the September 11 attacks, NRC implemented 

both immediate and interim actions intended to 

increase the security and control over radioactive 

materials possessed by NRC and Agreement State 

licensees. Immediate actions included staffing the 

NRC Headquarters operations center on a 24-hr 

basis, right after the attacks, and recommending that 

licensees with security plans go to a heightened 

security level.

NRC is currently conducting a “top-to-bottom” 

review of security requirements, which will consider 

all aspects of security for radioactive sources. This 

review is expected to result in additional, long- term 

recommendations for increasing security and control 

to protect radioactive materials from a terrorist threat 

or other malevolent uses. NRC is also coordinating 

with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to 

accelerate the DOE program to retrieve unused 

greater than Class C waste radioactive sources 

(primarily americium-241 and plutonium) that are 

awaiting disposal.

Interim measures since September 11 have also 

included the issuance of several safeguards 

advisories to materials licensees. The advisories 

have been used to communicate to licensees the need 

for prudent and prompt actions to strengthen security 

measures and awareness, in light of the potential 

for a terrorist threat; to strongly encourage licensees 

to establish and maintain a high level of alertness 

to security-related matters; to increase attention 

to unusual activities; and to conscientiously use 

security controls such as locks, and stricter access 

controls for their sources. The following advisories 

were issued to materials licensees:

• September 25, 2001: A Safeguards Advisory 

was issued to Large Materials Licensees and 

Agreement States. That advisory was issued 

to ensure that large materials licensees and 

Agreement States were aware of the threat of 

terrorist attacks. 

• October 16, 2001: A second Safeguards 

Advisory was issued to an expanded list of 

materials licensees, providing more specific and 

formal recommendations for enhancing security 

of licensed materials. 

The advisory also urged licensees to promptly 

contact local law enforcement agencies, the 

local Federal Bureau of Investigation, NRC, 

and applicable Agreement State agencies, when 

relevant suspicious or unusual situations arise. 

This Safeguards Advisory was followed up with 

telephone inspections, by NRC and Agreement 

States, with their licensees, to verify that the 

licensees received the advisory and to determine 

if appropriate measures had been taken in light 

of the threat.

• October 26, 2001: A third advisory urged all 

manufacturers and distributors to be even more 

careful to confirm the identity and authorization 

of recipients, before transferring large amounts 

of radioactive material. 

• November 8, 2001: This advisory urged 

materials licensees that prepare or receive 

radioactive material shipments, other than 

irradiated fuel shipments that meet the 

Department of Transportation definition of a 

Highway Route Controlled Quantity, to take 

additional security precautions. 

• December 13, 2001: This was an update to the 

November 8, 2001 advisory, providing further 

guidance on additional security precautions.
4

As earlier stated, in response to the terrorist attack 

of September 11, NRC is doing a “top-to- bottom” 

review of security requirements. Although the longterm review is underway, interim measures are being 

considered, using some of the lessons learned in 

developing the recommendations of the Safeguards 

Advisories. 

(Contact: Charles Cox, NMSS, 301-415-6755; 

e-mail: cxc5@nrc.gov)

NRC PARTICIPATION IN THE FBI 

STRATEGIC INFORMATION 

OPERATIONS CENTER

Since September 11, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has assigned staff to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Strategic Information 

Operations Center (SIOC). SIOC is located 

in the FBI Headquarters building in downtown 

Washington, DC. It covers about 3700 square 

meters (40,000 square feet) of windowless office 

space in the central part of the building. Some 

of the other agencies that provide staff are the 

Department of Defense; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco 

and Firearms; Federal Aviation Administration; and 

many more that have responsibilities to protect the 

public health and safety. NRC staff was assigned to 

the Consequence Management Group. 

At any given time, there are approximately 500 

Federal agents and attorneys working to review 

incoming information, referred to as “leads,” to the 

appropriate agency, or to assign FBI agents to work 

the lead. 

At first the SIOC was manned 24 hours a day, 7 

days a week. Leads came in frequently, and the 

primary focus was on aviation. Eventually those 

leads dropped off as the investigation became more 

involved with the anthrax threat. As the situation 

became more stable, the hours were reduced to 

12-hour days, from 8:00 am to 8:00 pm. Now, 

because leads have become scarce, NRC no longer 

has staff present in the SIOC, but has someone on 

call around the clock at the NRC Operations Center. 

Work at SIOC involved receiving information from 

the FBI or other agencies and forwarding that 

information to the NRC Operations Center. This 

information also flowed in the other direction, as 

information was received by our regional offices or 

by Headquarters and then forwarded to the FBI, 

for investigation. Most leads were provided by 

well-meaning citizens who wanted to help. Many 

calls related to information that was weeks or even 

months old and, before September 11th, did not seem 

important to the caller. After the attack, many people 

thought that some past activities or discussions now 

seemed suspicious. 

On most occasions, what appeared to be a 

substantial and suspicious bit of information turned 

out to be quite innocent. 

NRC on-site support at the SIOC was necessary for 

establishing an efficient flow of information between 

NRC and other Federal agencies. In the fight against 

terrorism, the efficient flow of information is critical. 

The cooperation among agencies, as evidenced at 

the SIOC, has helped make the response to potential 

threats more effective and timely. 

(Contact: Ed Johannemann, NMSS, 301-415-8147; 

e-mail: exj@nrc.gov)

NRC THREAT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

has a well-established threat assessment program, to 

support safeguards policy decisions, as well as to 

evaluate current threat information, to determine 

the need for both NRC and licensee response. 

Although the program is maintained by the 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

(NMSS), it serves as an Agency asset, and 

team members, who are intelligence analysts with 

counterterrorism backgrounds, evaluate intelligence 

and law enforcement information daily. The threat 

team has established liaison contacts throughout the 

intelligence and law enforcement communities, to 

assure receipt of information in a timely manner. As 

part of the NRC response to September 11, the threat 

team provided around-the-clock intelligence support 

to NRC’s Safeguards Team and Executive Team, 

which assess conditions and decide on Agency action 

during an incident. This support has been scaled 

back, along with the rest of the Agency response; 

however, the threat team continues to be on call on 

a 24-hour basis. 
5

(Contact: Roberta Warren, 301-415-8044; e-mail: 

rfw@nrc.gov)

REVIEW OF LOST, STOLEN, OR 

ABANDONED RADIOACTIVE SOURCE 

DATA REPORTED TO NMED

This article presents the result of a review of data, 

reported to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC),1 involving the reportable2 loss of control 

of radioactive material (lost, stolen, or abandoned 

radioactive material) for the period January 1, 1997 

- December 31, 2001. A total of 1742 sources 

was reported lost during this period. This equates 

to an average of about 348 sources lost annually. 

There are approximately 2 million radioactive 

sources licensed by NRC and its Agreement States. 

Therefore, the reported loss rate is less than twotenths of 1 percent of the source inventory, annually. 

Based on information reported to the Nuclear 

Materials Events Database (NMED), approximately 

45 percent of sources lost or stolen were recovered. 

However, this may underestimate the recovery rate, 

because information on the final disposition of 

sources is not always reported to NMED.

There is no evidence from reported event data that 

any of the lost, stolen, or abandoned radioactive 

material was stolen or otherwise diverted for use in 

a terrorist act. 

About 24 percent (435 out of 1742) of the sources 

were stolen. Most of the reported thefts (over 80 

percent) involved stolen portable moisture/density 

gauges used in highway construction. Most of 

the lost moisture/density gauges were stolen from 

vehicles where the gauges were temporarily stored, 

along with other construction tools and equipment. 

The gauges typically contain two separate sources; 

therefore, the loss of a single gauge accounts for 

two sources. The primary reason for the theft of 

portable/moisture density gauges appeared to be the 

attraction of expensive portable equipment. The 

reported thefts do show a regional bias.

About 45 percent of the stolen gauges occurred in 

four States: Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas. 

The reason more gauges are stolen in these States 

is not known. It could be because there are more 

gauge users in these States. The gauges are used in 

highway and other paving construction projects, and 

the States listed have long construction seasons.

The majority of lost sources reported to NMED 

were sources lost as a result of improper inventory 

control by source owners. This accounts for about 

60 percent (1103 out of 1742) of the lost sources. 

Found sources account for about 12 percent (204 out 

of 1742) of the lost sources. Most (about 98 percent) 

were found at scrap metal recycling facilities or 

landfills. A source found in a scrap recycling facility 

or landfill is counted as a lost source, since the 

source is out of the control of the owner. In some 

cases, the same source may have been reported lost 

by the owner. An attempt is made to match any 

source found, with a source previously reported lost, 

so as not to double-count the loss. 

Table 1, below, shows the typical devices, with 

associated isotopes and activities, that are reported 

lost, stolen, or abandoned.

With the exception of fixed gauges (Cs-137) which 

account for approximately 13 percent of the 

lost sources, and self-luminous devices (H-3), the 

activities of other sources reported lost were less 

than 1.85 megabecquerels (MBq) (50 mCi). The 

activities of sources lost in fixed gauges were as high 

as 74 gigabecquerels (GBq) (2 Ci).

_________________

1

NRC maintains a database, the Nuclear 

Materials Events Database (NMED), on incidents 

and accidents (events) involving the use of 

radioactive material licensed under the Atomic 

Energy Act (AEA). NMED contains records 

of events reported to NRC by NRC licensees, 

Agreement States, and non-licensees, from 1990 to 

the present.

2

The criteria for reporting lost sources are 

based on activity levels specified in Title 10, Part 

20, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) - 10 

CFR 20.2201.
6

 Class of device Typical radioisotopes Typical activity range

 Table 1. Type devices, isotopes, and activities for about 75 percent of lost devices

 Portable gauge

 

 Fixed gauge

 Brachytherapy seed

 Radiopharmaceutical

 Self-luminous device

 Ionization device

 Chemical agent 

 detector/monitor

 Gas Chromatography unit

 Calibration source

 Cs-137, Am-241/Beryllium

 Cs-137

 Ir-192, Cs-137

 I-125, I-131, Tc-99m

 H-3

 Po-210

 Am-241, Ni- 63

 Ni-63

 Am-241, Cs-137, Gd-153, 

 Pu-239, Co-60

 Cs-137: 0.3 GBq (8 mCi)

 Am-241: 1.48 GBq (40 mCi)

 0.74 GBq - 74 GBq (20 mCi - 2 Ci)

 0.3 GBq to 1.48 GBq (8 - 40 mCi )

 3.7 MBq - 740 MBq (100 μCi - 20 mCi)

 7 GBq - 2 TBq (190 mCi- 58 Ci)

 0.37 GBq - 1.48 GBq (10 mCi - 40 mCi)

 Am-241: 9.25 MBq (250 μCi)

 Ni-63: 0.56 GBq (15 mCi)

 Gas Chromatography unit

 Calibration source

Note: Definitions for Table:

Cs-137 - cesium-137; Am-241 - Americium-241; GBq - gigabecquerels; mCi - millicuries; 

IR-192 - iridium-192; I-125 - iodine-125; I-131- iodine-131; Tc-99m - technetium-99 molybdenum; 

MBq - megabecquerels; μCi - microcurie; H-3 - tritium; TBq - terabecquerels; Po - 210 - polonium-210; 

Ni-63 - Nickel-63; Gd-153 - gadolinium-153; Pu-239 - plutonium-239; Co-60 - cobalt-60.
7

In addition to the devices described in Table 1, one 

irradiator [15.5-GBq (420 Ci) Cs- 137] source and 

22 radiography exposure devices with Ir-192 sources 

ranging in activity from 0.59 terabecquerels (TBq) 

(16 Ci) to 3.1 TBq (84 Ci) were also reported lost 

during the period January 1, 1997 - December 31, 

2001. The reported disposition of these sources is 

as follows:

• The irradiator source was licensed before 1980 

and could not be accounted for by the licensee 

during an NRC inspection in July 2000. The 

source had not been in use for an extended 

period of time. It was identified as being 

unaccounted for during an NRC review of 

former licensees. The licensee believes that the 

source was shipped to an authorized recipient, 

although there is not documentation to support 

that belief. 

• About 36 percent (8 out of 22) of the 

radiography exposure devices were stolen.

Half of the devices were stolen while secured 

in vehicles, and the other half were stolen while 

locked in sheds. Six of the eight devices 

were reported recovered. The remainder of 

the devices were lost either through unsecured 

devices’ falling off licensees’ trucks transporting 

the device; falling overboard off barges; being 

left unattended; or being part of misdirected 

shipments by common carrier. All devices, 

except one that fell overboard, were recovered.

During the period for which data were reviewed 

for this article, there were no reports of personnel 

exposures exceeding regulatory limits because of 

loss of control of radioactive material. However, 

three of the loss-of-control of material events 

did result in facility contamination. The most 

severe event occurred in July 2001 at a steel 

recycling facility. Investigators suspected that the 

contamination was from a sealed source belonging 

to a fixed gauge that was melted. Estimates placed 

the source activity at no more than 3.7 GBq (100 

mCi). The facility was shut down for more than 

24 days for decontamination. The estimated cost is 

4 million dollars for the cleanup contractor: 4 to 5 

million dollars lost in production and business; and 

a balance of the cost in transportation and disposal. 

The total cost of cleanup is estimated at 10 to 12 

million dollars. 

The second event, which occurred in 1999, involved 

contamination at a landfill with Thorium-232 

inadvertently received from a general licensee. The 

clean-up cost was estimated to be between 300,000 

and 400,000 dollars. The third event involved a 

private individual who found a 0.74-TBq (20-Ci) 

H-3 exit sign and broke open one or more of the 

tubes in the sign while eating sunflower seeds. 

The individual and his house were contaminated. 

The highest uptake was calculated to be 0.92 

kilobecquerels/liter (24.8 microcuries/liter). The 

committed effective dose equivalent calculated 

for the highest uptake was 0.86 millisieverts 

(86 millirem).

(Contact: Sam Pettijohn, 301-415-6822; e-mail: 

slp@nrc.gov)

USE OF NUREG-1556, “CONSOLIDATED 

GUIDANCE ABOUT MATERIALS 

LICENSES,” BY LICENSEES, 

APPLICANTS, AND AGREEMENT STATE 

REGULATORS

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) has produced a series of technical reports 

(NUREG-1556 series, “Consolidated Guidance 

about Materials Licenses”) providing programspecific guidance. The series contains 20 volumes 

intended to facilitate the processes of license 

application, NRC review of applications, renewal of 

licenses, and NRC inspection of licensees. This 

series of NUREGs also provides a comprehensive 

source of reference information about materials 

regulations for those involved in various aspects of 

licensed materials utilization. The NUREGs are 

reviewed and, if necessary, revised every 3 years.

All 20 NUREGs, with the exception of Volume 

9, “Program-Specific Guidance About Medical Use 

Licenses,” have been published in final form. 

Volume 9 will be issued for a 60-day public 

comment period and finalized after comments have 

been considered. Development of the NUREG-1556 

series supports NRC’s performance goals of 

maintaining safety, improving public confidence, 

and increasing efficiency, effectiveness, and realism, 

as well as reducing unnecessary regulatory burden.
8

recommended that NRC take a pro-active posture 

by encouraging licensees to use the NUREG-1556 

documents as a means of improving the process 

for materials licensing. Future license renewal 

letters will strongly request that licensees use the 

NUREG-1556 documents in preparing applications.

The NUREGs are available electronically by visiting 

NRC’s Home Page (http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1556/). For your 

convenience, a list of these NUREGs follows:

NRC strongly encourages current licensees, 

applicants for licenses, and Agreement State 

regulators to use the NUREG-1556 guidance 

documents in preparing new and renewal 

applications. We believe that use of these documents 

will make the NRC staff’s review of these 

applications and inspections more effective and 

efficient. It is particularly important that licensees 

and applicants use these documents, because they 

supersede much of the guidance previously used 

for licensing. NRC’s report, “Phase II- Byproduct 

Materials Review,” August 2001, specifically 

 Vol. No. Volume Title Final Published

 1, Rev. 1

 2

 3

 4

 5

 6

 7

 8

 9

10

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Portable Gauge Licenses”

 

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Radiography Licenses”

 “Applications for Sealed Source and Device Evaluation and Registration”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Fixed Gauge Licenses”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Self-Shielded Irradiators”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about 10 CFR Part 36 Irradiators”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Academic, Research and Development, 

 and Other Licenses of Limited Scope”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Exempt Distribution Licenses”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Medical Use Licenses”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Master Material Licenses”

 11/01

 08/98

 07/98

 10/98

 10/98

 01/99

 12/99

 09/98

 Draft

 12/00
9

 Volume Title Final Published

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Licenses of Broad Scope”

 

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Possession Licenses for Manufacturing 

 and Distribution”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Commercial Radiopharmacy Licenses”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Well Logging, Tracer, and Field Flood 

 Study Licenses”

 “Guidance about Changes of Control and about Bankruptcy Involving

 Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Materials Licenses”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Licenses Authorizing Distribution to

 General Licensees”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Licenses for Special Nuclear Material

 of Less Than Critical Mass”

 “Program-Specific Guidance about Service Provider Licenses”

 “Guidance for Agreement State Licensees Proposing to Work in NRC

 Jurisdiction (Non-Agreement States, Areas of Exclusive Federal

 Jurisdiction, or Offshore Waters) and Guidance for NRC Licensees

 Proposing to Work in Agreement State Jurisdiction (Reciprocity)” 

 “Guidance about Administrative Licensing Procedures”

 04/99

 12/00

 09/99

 06/00

 11/00

 12/00

 11/00

 11/00

 12/00

 12/00

(Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: cxb@nrc.gov)

 1, Rev. 11

 12

 13

 14

 15

 16

 17

 18

 19

20

 Vol. No.
10

SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Detailed information about these enforcement 

actions can be accessed via the U. S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) homepage 

(http://www.nrc.gov/OE/). Click on “Enforcement 

Actions.” Cases are listed alphabetically. To access 

the complete enforcement action, click on the 

highlighted text after the name of the case.

Medical

Jameson Memorial Hospital (EA 01-103)

On September 25, 2001, a letter was issued 

documenting NRC’s decision to exercise 

enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 

VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the failure to maintain 

the whole-body dose, to a physician, below 50 

millisieverts (5 rem). The licensee replied, in a 

letter dated March 22, 2001, that it had used 

a different dose evaluation methodology and that 

it had concluded that the dose was within the 

regulatory limit. Although this methodology was not 

specifically approved for use by the licensee, NRC 

concluded that discretion was warranted because the 

licensee’s dose evaluation methodology is accepted 

by the State of Pennsylvania and is similar to 

other accepted methodologies. NRC is currently 

evaluating the use of alternative dose evaluation 

methodologies and is developing its regulatory and 

technical positions on this issue.

University of Medicine and Dentistry of New 

Jersey (EA 01-186)

On September 25, 2001, a Notice of Violation 

and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $3000 was issued for a Severity Level III 

problem. The problem included two violations, the 

first involving the failure to control and maintain 

constant surveillance of material in controlled or 

unrestricted areas; and the second, the failure to 

make surveys (i.e., evaluations of the radiological 

conditions and potential hazards incident to the use, 

transfer, release, disposal, or presence of radioactive 

material or other sources of radiation). Although 

the normal civil penalty assessment process would 

have fully mitigated the civil penalty, a base civil 

penalty was proposed in accordance with Section 

VII.A.1.g of the Enforcement Policy, to emphasize 

the significance of the loss of licensed material in 

this case.

El Senorial PSI Nuclear Medical Laboratory

(EA 01-145)

On September 28, 2001, a Notice of Violation 

and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $2750 was issued for a Severity Level 

III violation. The violation was based on the 

failure to issue film or thermoluminescent dosimeter 

whole-body monitors to all individuals who were 

occupationally exposed to ionizing photon radiation 

on a regular basis.

Washington Hospital Center (EA 01-184)

On October 2, 2001, a letter was issued documenting 

NRC’s decision to exercise enforcement discretion, 

in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the 

Enforcement Policy, for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the failure to maintain the wholebody dose to a physician below 50 millisieverts (5 

rem). The licensee replied, in a letter dated June 13, 

2001, that it had used a different dose evaluation 

methodology, and that it had concluded that the dose 

was within the regulatory limit. Although NRC 

had not specifically allowed the licensee to use this 

methodology, NRC concluded that discretion was 

warranted, because the licensee’s dose evaluation 

methodology is accepted by the District of Columbia 

and is similar to other accepted methodologies. 

NRC is currently evaluating the use of alternative 

dose-evaluation methodologies and is developing its 

regulatory and technical positions on this issue.

Halifax Regional Hospital (EA 01-260)

On October 24, 2001, a letter was issued 

documenting NRC’s decision to exercise 

enforcement discretion, in accordance with Section 

VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy, for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the failure to maintain 

the whole-body dose to a physician below 50 

millisieverts (5 rem). The licensee informed NRC 

that it had used a different dose evaluation 

methodology, and that it had concluded that the dose 

was within the regulatory limit. Although NRC 

had not specifically allowed the licensee to use this 

methodology, NRC concluded that discretion was 

warranted because the licensee’s dose-evaluation 
11

methodology is accepted by the State of Virginia 

and is similar to other accepted methodologies. 

NRC is currently evaluating the use of alternative 

dose-evaluation methodologies and is developing its 

regulatory and technical positions on this issue.

Glendive Medical Center (EA 01-180)

On November 1, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to secure from unauthorized removal, or 

limit access to, licensed material [37 gigabecquerels 

(1-curie) molybdenum-99/technetium-99m 

generator] in an unrestricted area ,and failure 

to control and maintain constant surveillance of 

licensed material. Although a civil penalty would 

normally be proposed by the civil penalty assessment 

process, NRC exercised discretion in accordance 

with Section VII.B.6 and did not propose a penalty, 

because it concluded the incident was an isolated 

occurrence caused by personnel error.

Gauges

Construction Engineering Labs, Inc. (EA 01-181)

On September 27, 2001, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem 

involving willfulness. The problem consisted of 

two violations involving the failure to secure and 

maintain constant surveillance over a gauge and 

failure to assure that gauges were routinely secured 

in vehicles, according to procedures.

Design Fuels Corporation (EA 01-245)

On October 9, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the improper transfer of a gauge regulated by NRC 

under a general license. Although a base civil 

penalty was warranted under the Enforcement 

Policy’s assessment process, a penalty was not 

proposed because the case exceeded the 5-year 

statute of limitations.

LTV Steel Company, Inc. (EA 01-244)

On October 9, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the transfer of a gauge, without reporting the transfer 

to NRC, and without providing the transferee with a 

copy of 10 CFR Part 31, per the regulations.

Palmerton & Parrish, Inc. (EA 01-218)

On November 1, 2001, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3000 was issued for a Severity Level III 

problem involving: (1) failure to maintain control of 

radioactive material that is in an unrestricted area 

and that is not in storage; (2) failure to transport 

a portable moisture/density gauge in the required 

container; (3) failure to block and brace the gauge 

during transportation; and (4) failure to lock the 

gauge during transportation. Although the civil 

penalty would have been fully mitigated, based 

on the normal civil penalty assessment process, a 

base civil penalty was assessed, in accordance with 

Section VII.A.1.g of the Enforcement Policy, to 

reflect the significance of maintaining the control of 

licensed material.

Redondo Construction Corporation (EA 01-240)

On November 6, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the unauthorized transfer of byproduct material 

(cesium-137 and americium-241) contained in three 

portable gauges.

Mathy Construction Company (EA 01-214)

On November 6, 2001, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem 

involving the failure to secure and limit access to 

a portable moisture/density gauge and the failure to 

lock the gauge or transport case while the gauge was 

being transported. Although the civil penalty would 

have been fully mitigated based on the normal civil 

penalty assessment process, a base civil penalty was 

assessed in accordance with Section VII.A.1.g of the 

Enforcement Policy, to reflect the significance of 

maintaining control of licensed material.

SCI Engineering, Inc. (EA 01-237)

On November 15, 2001, a Notice of Violation 

and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 
12

Nondestructive and Visual Inspection, Inc.

(EA 01-216)

On September 28, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure of Nondestructive and Visual Inspection, 

Inc., a licensee of the State of Louisiana, to file NRC 

Form 241, “Report of Proposed Activities in NonAgreement State,” before conducting radiographic 

operations using curie quantities of iridium-192 on 

off-shore platforms in waters off of the Gulf of 

Mexico in areas of Federal jurisdiction.

Conam Inspection (EA 01-225)

On November 9, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

performance of radiography at a location other than 

a permanent radiographic installation, with only one 

qualified individual present.

Other

Southeast Missouri State University (EA 00-201)

On September 13, 2001, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $11,000 was issued for a Severity Level I problem 

involving the failures to: (1) control activities to 

limit doses in accordance with requirements; (2) 

make necessary surveys to determine radiological 

hazards; and (3) possess only material authorized 

on the University’s license. Although a base civil 

penalty would be warranted, based on the normal 

civil penalty assessment process, NRC exercised 

enforcement discretion, in accordance with Section 

VII.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy, and increased 

the penalty by 100 percent, based on the licensee’s 

particularly poor performance. Additionally, a 

Notice of Violation (see EA 01-151) was also 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to secure from unauthorized removal, 

or limit access to, a strontium-90 sealed source 

with a nominal activity of 740 megabecquerels (20 

millicuries), and failure to control and maintain 

constant surveillance of this licensed material. 

amount of $3000 was issued for a Severity Level 

III violation involving the failure to secure from 

unauthorized removal, or limit access to, byproduct 

material (cesium-137 and americium-241) contained 

in two portable moisture/density gauges, and the 

failure to control and maintain constant surveillance 

of this licensed material. Although the civil penalty 

would have been fully mitigated, based on the 

normal civil penalty assessment process, a base 

civil penalty was assessed, in accordance with 

Section VII.A.1.g of the Enforcement Policy, to 

reflect the significance of maintaining control of 

licensed material.

Centennial Engineering and Research, Inc.

(EA 01-219)

On December 3, 2001, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3000 was issued for a Severity Level III 

problem involving the willful failure to: (1) submit 

an amendment request to reflect the designation 

of a new radiation safety officer; and (2) confine 

possession of byproduct material to the location 

authorized by the license.

Radiography

Allied Inspection Services, Inc. (EA 01-213)

On September 17, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

a radiographer’s failure to wear a direct reading 

dosimeter and a personal dosimeter at all times 

during radiographic operations. 

Cooperheat-MQS Inspection, Inc. (EA 01-166)

On September 18, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

multiple failures to use certified radiographers while 

performing radiography operations.

X-Ray Inspection, Inc. (EA 01-215)

On September 27, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to have two qualified individuals present 

during radiography conducted at a temporary jobsite.
13

Nuclear Fuel Services (EA 01-098)

On September 24, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to maintain a criticality alarm system for 

storage of approximately 20 kilograms (about 43 

pounds) of highly enriched uranium.

Earthline Technologies (EA 99-290)

(Previously RMI Environmental Services)

On September 24, 2001, a Notice of Violation 

and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $17,600 was issued for a Severity 

Level II violation. The violation was based on the 

licensee discriminating against a radiation protection 

technician for engaging in protected activities. In 

addition, a Notice of Violation for a Severity Level 

III violation was also issued in conjunction with 

this case (see EA 01-037). The violation involved 

the failure to secure from unauthorized removal, or 

limit access to, licensed material in an unrestricted 

area, and failure to control and maintain constant 

surveillance of licensed material.

Burlington Performance Wear (EA 01-266)

On November 6, 2001, NRC exercised enforcement 

discretion, in accordance with the Interim 

Enforcement Policy for Generally Licensed Devices 

Containing Byproduct Material, and refrained from 

issuing enforcement action for a violation involving 

the loss of a generally licensed spectrochemical 

analyzer. Discretion was warranted because the 

licensee’s actions were not willful, it identified and 

reported the loss, and it took appropriate corrective 

actions to prevent recurrence.

(Contact: Sally Merchant, OE, 301-415-2747; 

e-mail: slm2@nrc.gov)

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

is providing summaries of these events to inform 

licensees of conditions they may encounter and of 

actions that may be taken to deal with them.

Event 1: Overexposure of a consultant employee 

from intake of americium-241 at Southeast Missouri 

State University, Cape Girardeau, Missouri

Date and Place: June 13, 2000; Southeast Missouri 

State University; Cape Girardeau, Missouri.

Nature and Probable Consequences: The licensee 

reported that a consultant identified americium-241 

(Am-241) radioactive contamination throughout 

storage areas in one of the campus basements. 

The consultant attempted to perform “spot” 

decontamination, re-surveyed the areas he had 

decontaminated, and again found removable 

contamination as high as 540,000 counts per minute. 

The licensee shut down the ventilation system 

and established control of contaminated areas by 

posting and locking access to the basement. The 

consultant communicated to the licensee that the 

decontamination efforts had not been effective, and 

that further decontamination efforts were beyond his 

ability. The licensee suspected that the contamination 

came from an empty vial that was labeled as 

containing 0.19 gigabecquerels (5 millicuries) of 

Am-241. NRC inspectors identified several areas 

of both fixed and removable contamination in the 

basement and on the second floor of the building. 

Extensive surveys of homes, automobiles, etc., did 

not identify off-site contamination or contaminated 

janitorial supplies. The licensee and a new contractor 

initiated an exposure evaluation involving multiple 

bioassay samples and lung, knee cap, skull, 

and liver in-vivo measurements. The final dose 

estimate to the individual who attempted to perform 

decontamination was 15 centisieverts (cSv) (rem) 

committed effective dose equivalent and 263 cSv 

(rem) committed dose equivalent to the bone surface. 

The licensee concluded that the interior of its storage 

safe likely became contaminated with Am-241 as 

material was routinely retrieved from and returned 

to the safe over the course of several years (1970 

through 1979). It is possible that the contamination 

was the result of a spill that occurred in 1997 when 

the safe was dropped. After decontamination efforts, 

NRC determined that no detectable radioactivity 

remained and the building met NRC criteria for 

unrestricted use. The licensee stated that the most 

significant root cause for the event is a significant 

degradation of its radiation safety program in the 

past several years. 
14

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: The licensee appointed a new Radiation 

Safety Officer (RSO) and assistant RSO to its 

program. A Radiation Safety Committee was 

chartered with the charge of providing oversight 

of the licensee’s Radiation Safety Program. The 

licensee developed and implemented new Radiation 

Safety Program policies and procedures with the 

assistance of a contractor. 

NRC: On September 13, 2001, a Notice of Violation 

and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $11,000 was issued for a Severity 

Level I problem involving the failures to: (1) 

control activities to limit doses in accordance 

with requirements; (2) make necessary surveys to 

determine radiological hazards; and (3) possess 

only material authorized on the University’s license. 

Also, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the failure to secure, 

from unauthorized removal, or limit access to, a 

strontium-90 sealed source with a nominal activity 

of 740 megabecquerels (20 mCi), and failure to 

control and maintain constant surveillance of this 

licensed material.

Event 2: Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery 

(Gamma Knife) Medical Event at Saint Luke’s 

Medical Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Date and Place: July 10, 2001; Saint Luke’s Medical 

Center; Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

Nature and Probable Consequences: The licensee 

reported a medical event involving a patient who 

received a cobalt-60 gamma knife treatment to 

the wrong site. Two patients were prepared for 

treatment, but the wrong treatment plan was used 

for the first patient. Four of eight shots were 

administered to the wrong site before it was 

discovered that the wrong package was being used. 

The patient received approximately 1300 centigray 

(rad) to the 50 percent isodose line, over a short 

period of time, to a small area of the brain. The 

consequences of the exposure are not known at 

this time and are being investigated. The patient’s 

progress will be followed for some time. The patient 

subsequently received the correct treatment. The 

attending physician and the patient were notified on 

July 7, 2001.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: Corrective actions taken included a more 

prominent display of the patient’s name on the 

treatment forms, triple verification of each treatment 

coordinate, and physician sign-off that both the 

patient’s name, and the patient himself/herself, 

are correct.

NRC: NRC contracted a medical consultant to 

review this event.

(Contact: Roberto Torres, NMSS, 301-415-8112, 

e-mail: rjt@nrc.gov)

SELECTED FEDERAL REGISTER

NOTICES

(September 1, 2001 - November 30, 2001)

NOTE: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) contacts may be reached by mail at the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 

20555-0001.

FINAL RULES

“Interim Storage for Greater Than Class C 

Waste,” 66 FR 51823, October 10, 2001.

Contact: Mark Haisfield, NMSS, 301-415-6196; 

e-mail: mfh@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: NACUMS Revision,” 66 FR 52486, October 16, 2001

Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, NMSS, 

301-415-6219; email: jmm2@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

Westinghouse MC-10 Termination; Confirmation of 

Effective Date,” 66 FR 55559, November 11, 2001.

Contact: Merri Horn, NMSS, 301-415-8126; e-mail: 

mlh1@nrc.gov.

“Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a 

Proposed Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, 

NV,” 66 FR 55732, November 2, 2001.

Contacts: Timothy McCartin, NMSS, 301415-7285; 

 e-mail: tjm3@nrc.gov; 
15

 Janet Kotra, NMSS, 301-415-6674; 

 e-mail: jpk@nrc.gov;

 Clark Prichard, NMSS, 301415-6203; 

 e-mail: cwp@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

Fuel Solutions Cask System Revision,” 66 FR 

56982, November 14, 2001.

Contact: Merri Horn, NMSS, 301-415-8126; e-mail: 

mlh1@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

NAC-MPC Revision; Confirmation of Effective 

Date,” 66 FR 58056, November 20, 2001.

Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, NMSS, 

301-415-6219; e-mail: jmm2@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

Standardized NUHOMS-24P, -52B, and -61BT 

Revision,” 66 FR 59531, November 29, 2001.

Contact: Merri Horn, NMSS, 301-415-8126; e-mail: 

mlh1@nrc.gov.

PROPOSED RULES

“Debt Collection Procedures,” 66 FR 50860, 

October 5, 2001.

Contact: Leah Tremper, OCFO, 301-415-7347; 

e-mail: lpt@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: NACUMS Revision,” 66 FR 52554, October 16, 2001

Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, NMSS, 

301-415-6219; email: jmm2@nrc.gov.

“Availability of Official Records,” 66 FR 52721, 

October 17, 2001.

Contact: Catherine M. Holzle, OGC, 301-415-1560; 

email: cmh@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: Fuel 

Solutions Cask System Revision,” 66 FR 57002, 

November 14, 2001.

Contact: Merri Horn, NMSS, 301-415-8126; e-mail: 

mlh1@nrc.gov.

OTHER NOTICES

“Notice of Availability of NUREG-1748, Draft 

Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing,” 

66 FR 52951, October 18, 2001.

Contacts: Matt Blevins, NMSS, 301-415-7684; 

 e-mail: mxb6@nrc.gov;

 Melanie Wong, NMSS, 301-415-6262; 

 e-mail: mcw@nrc.gov.

“Final Decision Related to the US Department 

of Energy’s General Guidelines for the 

Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste 

Repositories and Its Yucca Mountain Site Suitability 

Guidelines,” 66 FR 54303, October 26, 2001.

Contacts: Michael P. Lee, NMSS, 301-415-6677; 

 e-mail: mpl@nrc.gov;

 C. William Reamer, NMSS, 

 301-415-6537; e-mail: cbr@nrc.gov.

“National Mining Association; Receipt of Petition 

for Rulemaking (PRM-170-5),” 66 FR 55604, 

November 2, 2001.

Contact: Michael T. Lesar, ADM, 301-415-7163: or 

Toll-Free: 1-800-368-5642; e-mail: mtl@nrc.gov.

(General Contact: Paul Goldberg, NMSS, 

301-415-7842; e-mail: pfg@nrc.gov)

GENERIC COMMUNICATION ISSUED

(September 1, 2001 - November 30, 2001)

Note that this is only a summary of a U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) generic 

communication. If this document appears relevant 

to your needs, and you have not received it, please 

call one of the technical contacts listed below. The 

Internet address for the NRC library of generic 

communications is -- www.nrc.gov/NRC/GENACT/

GC/index.html. Please note that this address is casesensitive and must be entered exactly as shown.

Information Notice (IN)

IN 2001-08, Supplement 2, “Update on Radiation 

Therapy Overexposures in Panama,” was issued 

on November 20, 2001. This notice was issued 

to all medical licensees to provide additional 
16

information related to the radiation therapy 

overexposures that recently occurred in Panama. 

Contacts: Robert Ayres, NMSS, 301-415-5746; 

 e-mail: rxa1@nrc.gov;

 Donna-Beth Howe, NMSS,

 301-415-7848; e-mail: dbh@nrc.gov;

 Roberto J. Torres, NMSS, 301-415-8112; 

 e-mail: rjt@nrc.gov.

(General Contact: Mark A. Sitek, NMSS, 

301-415-5799; e-mail: mas3@nrc.gov)

Comments, and suggestions you may have for 

information not currently included, that might 

be helpful to licensees, should be sent to:

E. Kraus

NMSS Licensee Newsletter Editor

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Two White Flint North, Mail Stop T-8 A23

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
17