United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-2708

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William Cavataio; Mary Lou Cavataio, *

*

Appellants, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

City of Bella Villa; Chief of Police * Eastern District of Missouri.

Edward Locke, Jr., in his individual *

capacity, *

*

Appellees. *

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Submitted: April 16, 2009

Filed: July 6, 2009

___________

Before RILEY, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

William Cavataio (William) and Mary Lou Cavataio (Mary Lou) (collectively,

Cavataios), filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Missouri state law, against the

City of Bella Villa, Missouri (City), and the City’s Chief of Police, Edward Locke Jr.

(Chief Locke). The Cavataios asserted constitutional claims against Chief Locke and

the City, alleging Chief Locke (1) used excessive force against William during

William’s arrest, and (2) violated Mary Lou’s substantive due process rights by

touching her breast. The Cavataios also asserted state law tort claims against Chief

Locke and the City for assault and battery and indecent assault and battery. The
1

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, Sr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri, now retired.

2

At her deposition, Mary Lou first denied receiving any notification from the

City informing her she was in violation of a city ordinance. Later in the deposition,

Mary Lou acknowledged she had received a letter from the City “at some time”

regarding the condition of her property.

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district court1

 granted summary judgment to Chief Locke and the City on all claims,

except Mary Lou’s state law claim against Chief Locke. Following a trial on Mary

Lou’s state law claim, the jury found in favor of Chief Locke. The Cavataios appeal

(1) the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Chief Locke and the City on the

Cavataios’ constitutional claims, and (2) certain evidentiary rulings of the district

court during the trial. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

William and Mary Lou are husband and wife. They reside at 709 Dallas Drive

in Bella Villa, Missouri. In late 2005 or early 2006, the Cavataios began to store

materials and debris on the driveway of their residence. The City claims its health and

sanitation director sent a letter to Mary Lou in February 2006, informing her she was

in violation of a city ordinance and requesting that she remove the materials from her

driveway. Mary Lou denies receiving this letter. The health and sanitation director

sent a certified letter to Mary Lou in March 2006, but the letter was returned

unclaimed. On March 30, 2006, the health and sanitation director sent an arrest

notification to Mary Lou charging her with failing to comply with the city ordinance.

Mary Lou denies receipt of the arrest notification.2

In May 2006, the health and sanitation director asked Chief Locke to speak with

the Cavataios about the materials in their driveway. Chief Locke claims he went to

the Cavataios’ residence in May and requested William remove the materials. Chief
3

The Cavataios deny Chief Locke visited their residence in May 2006. 

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Locke maintains William told him he would have the debris cleared away in the next

few weeks.3

On August 19, 2006, Chief Locke went to the Cavataios’ residence because the

Cavataios had failed to remove the materials from their driveway. Chief Locke

approached William after observing William load a cooler into the back seat of a

vehicle. Chief Locke placed William under arrest for violating the city ordinance and

refusing to remove the materials. William, who was 75 years old at the time of the

incident, did not resist arrest. Chief Locke handcuffed William’s hands behind his

back. William alleges Chief Locke applied the handcuffs too tightly around William’s

wrists, pushed down on the handcuffs, and kneed William when placing him in the

patrol car. 

Once inside the patrol car, William complained of back pain and told Chief

Locke he had a “bad back.” William previously had suffered a back injury from a fall,

but William did not inform Chief Locke of those injuries before the arrest. In

response to William’s complaint of pain, Chief Locke called an ambulance. The

paramedics arrived and assessed William’s condition. William refused further

treatment from the paramedics and signed a refusal form. Chief Locke then stated

William was either going to go to the hospital or to jail. William requested that Mary

Lou take him to the emergency room.

Mary Lou did not witness William’s arrest and did not come out of the house

until after William was seated in the patrol car. After William refused treatment from

the paramedics, William entered the passenger side of the Cavataios’ vehicle, and

Mary Lou got into the driver’s seat. At her deposition, Mary Lou testified Chief

Locke stood beside the vehicle, leaning against the side mirror. Mary Lou told Chief

Locke not to do that because he was going to break off the mirror. Mary Lou alleges

Chief Locke then reached into the car, grabbed Mary Lou’s left breast, and squeezed
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it. Mary Lou claims she “smacked” Chief Locke’s hand. William did not see Chief

Locke touch Mary Lou’s breast, and Mary Lou did not tell William about Chief Locke

grabbing her breast until a few days later.

After Chief Locke allegedly touched Mary Lou’s breast and stepped away from

the vehicle, Mary Lou began to drive toward the hospital. Chief Locke followed.

After a few blocks, Chief Locke turned on his siren and pulled over the Cavataios.

Chief Locke issued three tickets to Mary Lou for (1) failure to signal, (2) no insurance,

and (3) invalid plates. Mary Lou testified she was so “shook up” that she drove home

and did not take William to the hospital that day. 

B. Procedural History

On November 9, 2006, the Cavataios filed a complaint in the district court

against Chief Locke and the City. The complaint alleged (1) Chief Locke used

excessive force against William during his arrest, in violation of the Fourth

Amendment; (2) Chief Locke’s excessive use of force against William constituted

assault and battery under Missouri law; (3) Chief Locke violated Mary Lou’s

substantive due process rights by touching her breast; (4) Chief Locke’s touching of

Mary Lou’s breast constituted indecent assault and battery under Missouri law; and

(5) the City was liable for Chief Locke’s constitutional violations under theories of

municipal liability and respondeat superior, and was liable for Chief Locke’s

violations of state law under a theory of respondeat superior. In September 2007, the

district court granted the Cavataios’ voluntary motion to dismiss their state law claims

against the City. 

In October 2007, Chief Locke and the City moved for summary judgment on

all of the Cavataios’ remaining claims. On April 10, 2008, the district court granted

in part, and denied in part, the motion for summary judgment. The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke on William’s excessive force and

state law claims, and on Mary Lou’s substantive due process claim, and granted

summary judgment in favor of the City on each of the Cavataios’ municipal liability
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claims. The district court denied summary judgment on Mary Lou’s claim against

Chief Locke for indecent assault and battery, and that claim proceeded to trial. 

During discovery, the Cavataios endorsed Lieutenant Anthony Russo

(Lieutenant Russo) as an expert witness. Chief Locke and the City moved to strike

the Cavataios’ expert witness endorsement. In December 2007, the district court

granted in part, and denied in part, the motion to strike. The district court determined

Lieutenant Russo’s testimony was “admissible insofar as it relate[d] to his profession

and experience as a law enforcement officer.” After the district court granted

summary judgment on all claims other than Mary Lou’s state law claim, Chief Locke

filed a motion in limine, renewing his motion to strike Lieutenant Russo’s testimony

in its entirety and arguing the testimony did not relate to Mary Lou’s state law claim.

The district court granted Chief Locke’s motion in limine. Chief Locke also moved

in limine to exclude any evidence, testimony, and argument relating to (1) William’s

claims against Chief Locke, (2) William’s alleged injuries and medical treatment, and

(3) the traffic tickets issued to Mary Lou. The district court granted Chief Locke’s

motion in limine. 

The trial on Mary Lou’s state law claim began on May 7, 2008. The following

day, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Chief Locke, and the district court entered

judgment. The district court denied Mary Lou’s motion for a new trial on June 25,

2008, and the Cavataios filed a notice of appeal on July 25, 2008. 

On appeal, the Cavataios argue the district court erred in (1) granting summary

judgment in favor of Chief Locke on William’s excessive force claim, (2) granting

summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke on Mary Lou’s substantive due process

claim, (3) granting summary judgment in favor of the City on the Cavataios’

municipal liability claims, (4) excluding evidence at the trial of Chief Locke’s force

against William and other events of that day, and (5) excluding the expert testimony

of Lieutenant Russo. 

 
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II. DISCUSSION

A. William’s Excessive Force Claim

In granting summary judgment, the district court found Chief Locke’s conduct

during William’s arrest was objectively reasonable as a matter of law, even accepting

as true William’s allegations that Chief Locke applied the handcuffs too tightly and

kneed William when placing him in the patrol car. The district court further reasoned,

“The absence of any substantial injury arising from the alleged ‘excessive force,’

coupled with William’s ability to independently exit and stand outside the patrol car,

and his refusal of same-day medical treatment” supported the court’s finding. 

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the

facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Reed v. City of St. Charles, 561 F.3d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation

omitted). “We will affirm if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)). 

“We analyze Fourth Amendment excessive force claims under a reasonableness

standard to determine whether, in light of the facts and circumstances, the officer’s

actions were objectively reasonable.” Gill v. Maciejewski, 546 F.3d 557, 562 (8th Cir.

2008) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “[T]he right to make an

arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of

physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968)). “[W]hile this court has stated ‘[i]t remains an

open question in this circuit whether an excessive force claim requires some minimum

level of injury,’ a de minimus use of force or injury is insufficient to support a finding

of a constitutional violation.” Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1007 (8th

Cir. 2003) (quoting and citing Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir.

2000)). 
4

Because we find Chief Locke did not violate William’s constitutional rights,

we need not address the parties’ arguments relating to Chief Locke’s entitlement to

qualified immunity. 

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Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to William, we agree with the

district court that Chief Locke’s actions during William’s arrest were objectively

reasonable. Chief Locke’s de minimus use of force under these circumstances is

insufficient to rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation. While William

alleges he suffered back pain as a result of the arrest, (1) William did not inform Chief

Locke of William’s prior back injury before Chief Locke placed William in the patrol

car; (2) William refused treatment from the paramedics when Chief Locke called an

ambulance after learning of the back pain; and (3) other than William’s deposition

testimony that he sought medical care the day after the arrest, William presented no

medical evidence establishing a physical injury as a result of the arrest. See Wertish

v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (reasoning,

“relatively minor scrapes and bruises and the less-than-permanent aggravation of a

prior shoulder condition were de minimis injuries that support[ed] the conclusion that

[the officer] did not use excessive force” against an arrestee); Curd v. City Court of

Judsonia, 141 F.3d 839, 841 (8th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (stating, “[e]ven if

seizing [the arrestee’s] arm and turning her body was unnecessary to effect the arrest,

we can not conclude that this limited amount of force was objectively unreasonable,”

especially where there was no allegation or evidence of injury or physical pain);

Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990) (explaining

“allegations of pain as a result of being handcuffed, without some evidence of more

permanent injury, are [not] sufficient to support [a] claim of excessive force”). We

affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke.4

B. Mary Lou’s Claims

Mary Lou challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

of Chief Locke on Mary Lou’s substantive due process claim and certain evidentiary

rulings the district court made during the jury trial on Mary Lou’s state law claim
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against Chief Locke. We will address the evidentiary issues first because, as

explained below, our resolution of the evidentiary issues impacts our resolution of the

substantive due process claim. 

1. Totality of the Circumstances Evidence

Mary Lou asserts the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence

at trial of the circumstances of Chief Locke’s encounter with the Cavataios, including:

“(a) Chief Locke’s violence against William Cavataio, and (b) the rest of the totality

of the circumstances.” Mary Lou argues exclusion of this evidence was an abuse of

discretion “because that evidence made the squeezing of Mary Lou Cavataio’s breast

more probable than not, and in a case turning on credibility[,] the exclusion of that

evidence was prejudicial.” 

“A district court is possessed with broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings

made at trial, and we will reverse only if they amount to ‘a clear and prejudicial abuse

of discretion.’” Gill, 546 F.3d at 562 (quoting Lovett ex rel. Lovett v. Union Pac.

R.R. Co., 201 F.3d 1074, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000)). “‘Only when the evidence excluded

is of such a critical nature that there is no reasonable assurance that the jury would

have reached the same conclusion had the evidence been admitted has a district court

so abused its discretion.’” Id. (internal marks omitted) (quoting Stephens v. Rheem

Mfg. Co., 220 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2000)). 

Before the trial began, the district court granted Chief Locke’s motions in

limine, excluding evidence, testimony, and argument relating to (1) William’s claims

against Chief Locke, (2) William’s alleged injuries and medical treatment, and (3) the

traffic tickets issued to Mary Lou. On the morning the trial began, Mary Lou’s

counsel requested that the district court reconsider its rulings. Mary Lou’s counsel

proposed to have William and Chief Locke briefly testify to the events that led up to

Mary Lou’s allegations, including testimony that an ambulance was called to the

Cavataios’ residence. Mary Lou’s counsel also requested permission to present

evidence of the tickets Chief Locke issued to Mary Lou. Counsel for both Mary Lou
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and Chief Locke agreed it was appropriate to inform the jury of William’s arrest. The

district court ruled the subsequent issuance of tickets to Mary Lou was not admissible,

because this evidence was not relevant to Mary Lou’s indecent assault and battery

claim. However, the district court “allow[ed] the evidence to come in that [William]

was going to a hospital but not for anything having to do with an arrest or any conflict

that [William] may have had with [Chief Locke] in any way.” 

Despite the district court’s rulings, the jury was informed of the “totality of the

circumstances” leading up to Chief Locke’s alleged indecent assault and battery of

Mary Lou. For instance, during Mary Lou’s testimony, when asked when she first

learned of the dispute regarding the materials on her driveway, Mary Lou volunteered

the following information: “August 19th when [Chief Locke] came up and . . .

attacked my husband.” Mary Lou also testified that when she came outside of the

house that day, she saw William sitting in the back seat of the police cruiser “very

uncomfortably looking, like leaning back.” Mary Lou stated William was

complaining of a sore back and “laid down on the grass [because] his back was

hurting so bad” after Chief Locke took off the handcuffs. Mary Lou testified she

retrieved an ice pack from the house to put on William’s sore back and decided she

would drive William to the hospital due to William’s back pain. Likewise, William

testified that when Chief Locke placed William in the patrol car, “[Chief Locke] kind

of got me off balance and I was halfway, hurt my back.” William gave the following

testimony regarding Chief Locke’s actions while Mary Lou and William sat in the

Cavataios’ vehicle: “He was outside the door, I was sitting there in the car and

passenger seat and he asked if he hurt me.” 

We first note counsel for the Cavataios conceded at oral argument that counsel

did not make an offer of proof at trial of the additional evidence and testimony counsel

would have offered absent the district court’s adverse ruling on Chief Locke’s motion

in limine. This failure to make an offer of proof constitutes a failure to preserve the

issue for our review. See Murphy v. Mo. Dept. of Corr., 506 F.3d 1111, 1117 (8th

Cir. 2007) (“One of the most fundamental principles in the law of evidence is that in
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order to challenge a trial court’s exclusion of evidence, an attorney must preserve the

issue for appeal by making an offer of proof.” (quoting Dupre v. Fru-Con Eng., Inc.,

112 F.3d 329, 336 (8th Cir. 1997)). 

Even if counsel had made an appropriate offer of proof, we nevertheless would

conclude the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in excluding

evidence of Chief Locke’s alleged “violence” against William and the “totality of the

circumstances.” Based on the above testimony, the only “totality of the

circumstances” evidence the jury did not hear was that an ambulance was called to the

Cavataios’ residence and Chief Locke subsequently issued three tickets to Mary Lou.

This evidence was minimally relevant, if relevant at all. Mary Lou fails to

demonstrate “a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion,” Gill, 546 F.3d at 562, as a

result of the district court’s exclusion of this evidence, because the evidence simply

was not “of such a critical nature” to Mary Lou’s indecent assault and battery claim

that no reasonable jury would have reached the same conclusion had the evidence

been admitted. See id.

2. Lieutenant Russo’s Expert Testimony

Mary Lou next argues the district court abused its discretion in excluding the

expert testimony of Lieutenant Russo. “We review the district court’s decision to

exclude expert testimony under an abuse of discretion standard.” Schmidt v. City of

Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 570 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522

U.S. 136, 143 (1997)). 

Mary Lou “concede[s] that expert testimony [was] not required for a jury to

figure out that a policeman should not squeeze an elderly woman’s breast,” but Mary

Lou maintains Lieutenant Russo’s testimony “would have assisted the trier of fact in

understanding the totality of the circumstances.” We agree Lieutenant Russo’s

testimony was not necessary to prove Mary Lou’s claim, and the testimony was not

helpful to the trier of fact on any material issue. Because we concluded above that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the “totality of the
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circumstances” evidence, we similarly find the district court did not abuse its

discretion in excluding Lieutenant Russo’s testimony. 

3. Substantive Due Process Claim

Mary Lou also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

of Chief Locke on Mary Lou’s substantive due process claim. In the order granting

summary judgment, the district court stated, “[W]hile the Court is disturbed by

Locke’s conduct as it is alleged, it does not rise to the level of that afforded

Constitutional protection.” The district court determined Mary Lou’s claim could

adequately be addressed pursuant to state law. 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to Mary Lou, to determine whether there were any material issues

of fact precluding summary judgment. See Reed, 561 F.3d at 790. “The Eighth

Circuit has recognized a substantive due process violation in some instances of sexual

misconduct by police officers.” Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 574 (citing Rogers v. City of

Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1998)). “The standard for evaluating a substantive

due process claim is whether the alleged ‘behavior of the governmental officer is so

egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary

conscience.’” Id. (quoting Rogers, 152 F.3d at 797). “The Supreme Court has been

reluctant to expand the protections afforded by substantive due process ‘because

guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and

open-ended,’ and it has only done so with the ‘exercise [of] the utmost care.’”

Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 780-81 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Collins v. City

of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). “[T]he Due Process Clause ‘does not

purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate

liability for injuries that attend living together in society.’” Collins, 503 U.S. at 128

(quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)). 

 
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Mary Lou suggests the facts in her case are similar to the facts from two prior

opinions of our court, Rogers, and Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720 (8th

Cir. 1997), wherein our court found police officers’ conduct met the “shocks the

conscience” standard. In Rogers, a police officer stopped a woman for a broken tail

light. Rogers, 152 F.3d at 793. When the woman told the officer her proof of

insurance was at her house, the officer followed her home and entered her house. Id.

The officer told the woman “he would let her off but that she owed him one,” and the

officer told her to undress, pushed her onto the bed and had sexual intercourse with

her. Id. at 793-94. The Rogers court held the district court did not err in finding the

officer’s actions in Rogers were “shocking to the conscience.” Id. at 797. The court

explained that Rogers “involve[d] an egregious, nonconsensual entry into the body

which was an exercise of power without any legitimate governmental objective.” Id.

In Haberthur, an officer followed a woman to her house in a marked vehicle and

told the woman he should give her a ticket for speeding, but the officer drove away

without issuing a ticket. Haberthur, 119 F.3d at 721. The next month, the officer, in

uniform, showed up at her place of work, reminded her of their encounter, and told her

he would wait for her and give her a ticket when she left work. Id. Later that month,

the officer, while on duty in his uniform, again showed up at the woman’s place of

work. Id. The officer went up to the woman, placed his hands under her sweatshirt

and fondled her breasts, ran his arms down her sides, placed his arm around her neck,

and asked her to go into the back room with him. Id. Following the incident at her

place of work, the officer repeatedly drove past the woman’s house, sometimes

driving a police car. Id. The Haberthur court found the officer’s conduct was

sufficiently egregious to shock the conscience and reversed the district court’s grant

of summary judgment in favor of the officer on the substantive due process claim. Id.

at 722, 724. The court stated, 

The conduct that [the woman] alleged in her complaint, that [the officer]

reached his hand underneath her shirt and fondled a private erogenous
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area and moved his hands along and caressed her body while making

sexually suggestive remarks, was intrusive, demeaning, and violative of

her personal integrity. The implication for further sexual contact was in

the larger context of threatening adverse official action by way of a ticket

and following her in his police car. 

Id. at 724. The Haberthur court distinguished the facts in Haberthur from the facts in

Reeve v. Oliver, 41 F.3d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1994), wherein our court found an animal

control officer’s rubbing of a woman’s back while staring at her chest did not amount

to a constitutional violation. Haberthur, 119 F.3d at 723.

 

We need not determine whether the district court erred in finding Mary Lou’s

allegations did not meet the “shocks the conscience” threshold, because counsel for

the Cavataios conceded at oral argument that if we were to affirm the district court’s

summary disposition of William’s excessive force claim, and the district court’s

exclusion of the “totality of the circumstances” evidence, Mary Lou would be

precluded from bringing her constitutional claim. Counsel acknowledged that Mary

Lou’s burden of proof on her state law indecent assault and battery claim was lower

than the burden of proof on her constitutional claim. Because the jury found Mary

Lou did not meet the lower burden of proof on her state law claim, counsel further

admitted Mary Lou could not succeed on her constitutional claim without the

excluded evidence.

Mary Lou’s substantive due process claim arose out of the same allegations as

her indecent assault and battery claim, and the evidence to support Mary Lou’s

substantive due process claim would have been the same evidence offered at trial. At

the close of evidence, the district court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict

in favor of Chief Locke on Mary Lou’s indecent assault and battery claim, unless:

First, defendant Chief Edward Locke, Jr. intentionally squeezed

Mary Lou Cavataio’s breast, and;
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Second, that conduct would offend a reasonable sense of personal

dignity; and 

Third, defendant Chief Edward Locke, Jr. took such liberty

without plaintiff Mary Lou Cavataio’s consent and against her will, and

Fourth, plaintiff Mary Lou Cavataio was thereby damaged. 

The jury found Mary Lou did not meet her burden of proof and found in favor of

Chief Locke. Failing to meet her state indecent assault and battery claim burden of

proof, Mary Lou likewise should fail to meet her substantive due process claim burden

of proof. 

Assuming for the sake of argument that the district court erroneously granted

summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke on the substantive due process claim, the

jury’s verdict in favor of Chief Locke on the state law claim indicates the jury would

not have found in favor of Mary Lou on her substantive due process claim. Mary Lou

cannot demonstrate she was prejudiced by the district court’s grant of summary

judgment, and any error in granting summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke was

harmless. See Tennison v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 244 F.3d 684, 691 (9th Cir.

2001) (“Plaintiffs fail to articulate how they were prejudiced by this [summary

judgment] ruling. Their intentional infliction of emotion[al] distress claims are

predicated on the same facts and similar legal inquiries as their sexual harassment

claims. Considering that the jury found against Plaintiffs on their sexual harassment

claims, it is highly unlikely the jury would have found in favor of Plaintiffs on their

intentional tort claims. As such, any error committed by the trial judge was

harmless.”); Fite v. Digital Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (“We see no

reason to reenter this morass, since it is perfectly clear that, even if [plaintiff’s] state

discrimination claims should not have been dismissed on partial summary judgment,

any such mistake was harmless, given the jury’s verdict in [defendant’s] favor on the

federal discrimination claims addressed to the very same discharge.”). We affirm the

district court’s partial summary judgment. 
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C. Municipal Liability

Finally, the Cavataios challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of the City on the Cavataios’ municipal liability claims pursuant to Monell

v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Having affirmed the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of Chief Locke on the Cavataios’ constitutional

claims, we also affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the

City on the municipal liability claims. See Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, 474 F.3d

523, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799

(1986) (per curiam); Walker v. Bonenberger, 438 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 2006))

(“Without a constitutional violation by the individual officers, there can be no [42

U.S.C.] § 1983 or Monell failure to train municipal liability.”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the district court is

affirmed. 

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