UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

No. 16-2993

ROBERT M. SELLERS, APPELLANT,

V.

ROBERT L. WILKIE,

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.

On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals

(Argued May 1, 2018 Decided August 23, 2018)

Kenneth M. Carpenter of Topeka, Kansas, with whom John F. Cameron, of Montgomery, 

Alabama, was on the brief for the appellant.

Nathan Paul Kirschner and Carolyn F. Washington, Deputy Chief Counsel, with whom 

James M. Bryne, General Counsel, and Mary Ann Flynn, Chief Counsel, all of Washington, D.C., 

were on the brief for the appellee.

Before DAVIS, Chief Judge, and SCHOELEN and ALLEN, Judges.

ALLEN, Judge: U.S. Navy veteran Robert M. Sellers suffers from depression. He appeals 

through counsel an April 29, 2016, Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) decision denying an 

effective date earlier than September 18, 2009, for his service-connected major depressive disorder 

(MDD) and a higher initial disability rating for MDD.

1 This matter was referred to a panel of the 

Court, with oral argument, to determine whether a claimant's general statement of intent to seek 

benefits, combined with in-service medical diagnoses documented in service treatment records, is 

sufficient to constitute a valid claim for benefits.

We hold that a general statement of intent to seek benefits, coupled with a reasonably 

identifiable in-service medical diagnosis reflected in service treatment records in VA's possession

prior to the RO making a decision on the claim may be sufficient to constitute a claim for benefits. 

 

1 The Board remanded the issues of increased ratings for spondylolisthesis of the lumbosacral spine, right 

index and middle finger injuries, and a left knee disability, and service connection for a bilateral ankle disability. 

Accordingly, these issues are not before the Court. See Breeden v. Principi, 17 Vet.App. 475, 478 (2004) (per curiam 

order). The Board also granted service connection for PTSD and a total disability rating based on individual 

unemployability. These are favorable factual findings the Court may not disturb. See Medrano v. Nicholson, 

21 Vet.App. 165, 170 (2007). Finally, the Board also denied an earlier effective date for the appellant's 40% 

lumbosacral disability rating. As the appellant presents no argument as to this issue, the Court deems it abandoned. 

See Pederson v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 276, 285 (2015) (en banc).
2

Whether service treatment records reasonably identify a claimed disability is a fact-specific 

inquiry. That inquiry was not made here. Accordingly, we set aside the Board's decision and 

remand this matter for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The appellant served honorably on active duty in the U.S. Navy from April 1964 to 

February 1969, and in the U.S. Army from January 1981 to February 1996. In November 1993, he 

was examined by a military psychiatrist to determine fitness for duty. Noting that the appellant 

had symptoms of depression and "prominent" insomnia for the past 2 to 3 years, Record (R.) at 

2930, the psychologist diagnosed dysthymia and concluded that the appellant's psychiatric 

symptoms were not "severe enough to make him unfit for duty." Id.

In April 1995, the appellant's commanding officer recommended that he undergo an 

involuntary acute emergency mental health evaluation because he threatened to commit suicide 

and had engaged in other "irrational" behavior. The commanding officer described him as "angry" 

and a possible threat to himself. R. at 2943. Later that month, the appellant underwent extensive 

psychological testing. The examiner diagnosed a personality disorder and recommended further 

examination to rule out dysthymia. R. at 2923. On May 1, 1995, the appellant was admitted to a 

psychiatric center where he was diagnosed with dysthymia and a personality disorder with 

obsessive-compulsive traits. R. at 2924.

In March 1996, the appellant filed a formal claim for VA disability benefits, listing various 

physical injuries as disabilities. He also stated that he had already received in-service treatment for 

several of those physical injuries. In a section entitled "Remarks," the appellant wrote: "Request 

[service connection] for disabilities occurring during active duty service." R. at 2687. This

statement plays a major role in this appeal. VA adjudicated the appellant's physical disability 

claims but did not adjudicate any mental health claims at that time.

In September 2009, the appellant filed an informal claim for service connection for PTSD, 

which the VA regional office (RO) denied in a March 2011 decision. In May 2011, a VA 

compensation and pension (C&P) examiner diagnosed the appellant with MDD and PTSD. A VA 

psychiatrist opined in July 2011 that the appellant's MDD began in service. In a September 2011 

decision, the RO then granted service connection for MDD at a 70% rating, effective May 13, 

2011. In October 2011, the appellant timely disagreed with both the March and September 2011 
3

decisions and ultimately perfected appeals to the Board. A decision review officer then awarded 

an earlier effective date for the appellant's MDD, September 3, 2010.

On April 29, 2016, the Board issued a decision awarding the appellant an effective date of 

September 18, 2009 for MDD and a higher initial rating for MDD. Regarding its assignment of 

September 18, 2009, as the effective date for MDD, the Board stated:

[A]n effective date of September 18, 2009, and no earlier, is warranted for the grant 

of service connection for the Veteran's psychiatric disability (major depressive 

disorder or MDD). The record shows that VA received on September 18, 2009, an 

informal claim for service connection for psychiatric disability, claimed as PTSD. 

It is noted that, when a claimant makes a claim, he is seeking service connection 

for symptoms regardless of how those symptoms are diagnosed or labeled.

However, there is no legal basis for the assignment of an effective date earlier than 

September 18, 2009 for the award for service connection for MDD because the 

effective date of the award is the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement 

arose, whichever is later. In this case, the later date is September 18, 2009.

The Board observes that VA received no claim (informal or otherwise) for service 

connection for any psychiatric disability prior to September 19, 2009. Notably, 

prior to this date, VA had not received any correspondence from the Veteran or a 

representative since 1996. Also, although the Veteran had filed an original VA 

compensation claim in April 19712and a claim for benefits in March 1996, these 

did not include any claim for psychiatric disorder or problems that could be 

reasonably construed as a claim for service connection for psychiatric disability.

R. at 20 (citations omitted). This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Generally, the effective date of a claim for benefits is the date VA received the claim or 

the date on which entitlement arose, whichever is later. See 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a). The elements of 

any claim, formal or informal,3are "(1) an intent to apply for benefits, (2) an identification of the 

benefits sought, and (3) a communication in writing[.]" Brokowski v. Shinseki, 23 Vet.App. 79, 84

(2009); see also MacPhee v. Nicholson, 459 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Criswell v. 

Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 501, 504 (2006); Brannon v. West, 12 Vet.App. 32, 35 (1998). A veteran's

identification of the benefits sought does "not require any technical precision" and VA "must fully 

 

2

In June 1971, the appellant was granted service connection for bilateral hearing loss.

3 As of September 25, 2015, VA no longer recognizes informal claims. See 79 Fed. Reg. 57,660-01 (2015). 

In their place, VA recognizes "an intent to file a claim," which may be submitted electronically, on a prescribed intentto-file-a-claim form, or through an oral communication to certain VA employees that is later recorded in writing. 38 

C.F.R. §§ 3.155(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (2018).
4

and sympathetically develop a veteran's claim to its optimum before reaching the claim on its 

merits." Brokowski, 23 Vet.App. at 85; see also Ingram v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 232, 256-57 

(2007). In Brokowski, the Court held that VA "is not required to anticipate a claim for benefits for 

disabilities that have not been identified in the record by medical professions or by competent lay 

evidence at the time a claimant files a claim or during the claim's development." 23 Vet.App. at 

88 (emphasis added). But "the Board is not required to conjure up issues that were not raised by 

the appellant." Brannon, 12 Vet.App. at 35; see also Criswell, 20 Vet.App. at 503-04 (same).

A. March 1996 Claim for Benefits for a Psychiatric Disability

The appellant argues his general statement of an intent to seek "[service connection] for 

disabilities occurring during active duty service," combined with VA's actual possession of his 

service treatment records, is sufficient to constitute a valid claim for a psychiatric disability. The 

Secretary argues in response that the Board properly determined the appellant had not submitted a 

claim in March 1996 for a psychiatric disability because general statements do not sufficiently 

"identify the benefit sought" as required under Brokowski, 23 Vet.App. at 89.

4

The Secretary is correct that a general statement of intent to seek benefits for unspecified 

disabilities standing alone is insufficient to constitute a claim. Yet, the Secretary's argument misses 

a crucial additional factor present here: evidence of reasonably identifiable in-service diagnoses of 

psychiatric conditions that predate the appellant's claim were in the possession of the RO before it 

rendered its rating decision. The disability at issue here was identified in the record by military 

medical professionals well before the appellant filed his March 1996 claim, R. at 777, 2922-43,

and the record was in VA's possession at the time of the initial decision, R. at 2667 (July 1996 

rating decision listing "[s]ervice medical records for the period [April 17, 1964,] through [January 

22, 1969,] and the period [February 20, 1981,] through [February 26, 1996,] as "Evidence").

Further, the appellant's mental health issues were well documented in those records. They reflect 

that the appellant's mental health was a subject of serious concern while he was in the military as

he was twice diagnosed with dysthymia, subjected to extensive psychological testing, evaluated 

for retention purposes, and involuntarily hospitalized. It is undisputed on appeal to the Court that 

the appellant was diagnosed in service with a psychiatric condition. But what is not clear is whether 

 

4 There is no dispute that the appellant's statement was in writing and clearly expressed an intent to apply for 

some benefit. The only dispute is whether this written intent sufficiently identified the benefits he asserts now that he 

sought in 1996.
5

that diagnosis was reasonably identifiable by VA adjudicators at the time of his putative formal 

claim in March 1996 or prior to the RO's deciding the claim. As we explain below, whether an inservice diagnosis in a veteran's service records is reasonably identifiable by VA adjudicators at the 

time a claimant seeks benefits or prior to the RO's deciding the claim is a factual determination for

the Board.

As a general principle, VA may not ignore in-service diagnoses of specific disabilities, 

even those coupled with a general statement of intent to seek benefits, provided those diagnoses 

are reasonably identifiable from a review of the record.

5 But, we are cognizant of the difficulties 

that VA adjudicators would face when confronted with a general statement of intent to apply for 

benefits for conditions experienced in service. Service medical records reflecting such conditions 

could be voluminous and, even if they are not, the records could reflect numerous conditions. The 

fact finder must determine, based on the totality of the service medical record, both qualitatively 

and quantitatively, whether the condition at issue would be sufficiently apparent to an adjudicator.

To assist the Board in this endeavor, we provide the following thoughts on the types of 

factors that may be relevant to the Board's inquiry. These are not the only factors the Board may 

find helpful as it makes its assessment on this factual question. They are merely illustrations of 

factors that may be relevant to the Board's assessment. Qualitatively, for example, service medical 

records might contain many notes of conditions ranging from descriptions of trivial conditions (a 

hangnail) to full-blown diagnoses of significant illnesses (PTSD). And the record might describe 

certain conditions in great detail or, in contrast, in only a passing manner. Or, for example, medical 

records could contain vague complaints of symptoms regarding a condition but no formal 

diagnosis.

Quantitatively, the sheer volume of medical records may potentially be a factor in 

determining whether a condition would have been reasonably identifiable to a VA adjudicator. For 

example, the Board could decide that a single diagnosis reflected in a single page of a 2,000-page

service record is not reasonably identifiable. Whether this is the case here is a factual question that 

the Board must address in the first instance, and the Board must provide support its determination 

 

5 Like the Brokowski Court, we do not reach the question whether a general statement of intent to seek 

benefits, standing alone, is sufficient to trigger the Secretary's statutory obligation to notify claimants of the incomplete 

nature of an application, because the appellant did not argue this theory. See 38 U.S.C. § 5102(b) ("If a claimant's 

application for a benefit . . . is incomplete, the Secretary shall notify the claimant and the claimant's representative, if 

any, of the information necessary to complete the application.").
6

with adequate reasons and bases. See Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 362, 367-68 (2005) 

(explaining that it is the Board's duty, as fact finder, to determine the credibility and weight to be 

given to the evidence).

Because the Board did not assess whether the medical record is such that the disability in 

question was reasonably identifiable, it did not appropriately consider this issue and, thus, remand 

is warranted. On remand the Board must determine whether the appellant's in-service records 

reflect a reasonably identifiable diagnosis of a psychiatric condition given the nature of the records 

at issue and, if necessary, reconsider its determination concerning the proper effective date of the 

appellant's MDD accordingly. See Tucker v. West, 11 Vet.App. 369, 374 (1998) (remand is 

warranted "where the Board has incorrectly applied the law, failed to provide an adequate 

statement of reasons or bases for its determinations, or where the record is otherwise inadequate").

In sum, we recognize the Court's warning in Brokowski that general statements of intent 

"cannot be used as a pleading device to require the Secretary to conduct an unguided safari through 

the record to identify all conditions for which the veteran may possibly be able to assert entitlement 

to a claim for disability compensation," 23 Vet.App. at 89, and we emphasize that our holding here 

is a narrow one. Only records containing diagnoses that are reasonably identifiable from a review 

of the record may otherwise cure an insufficient general statement of intent to seek benefits. To 

continue Brokowski's metaphor, we caution that VA at most must participate in a fully guided 

safari.

B. Higher Initial MDD Rating

The appellant also appeals the Board's denial of a higher initial rating for MDD, raising

arguments concerning the Board's discounting of a March 2016 vocational expert opinion and its 

consideration of 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Code (DC) 9434. Addressing these arguments 

would be premature, however, and they are better left to the Board in the first instance. The weight 

to be accorded to the expert opinions of record might change depending on the DC at issue, and 

the relevant DC depends on what effective date the Board assigns. The DC in effect at the time of 

the appellant's March 1996 claim required that a claimant show at least one of three different 

factors for a 100% rating. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, DC 9411 (1996). This Court held in Johnson v. 

Brown that each of those factors provided an independent basis for the award of a 100% rating. 

7 Vet.App. 95, 97 (1994). Additionally, the Court upheld the Secretary's interpretation of DC 9411

to mean that a claimant who was assigned a 70% rating for a psychiatric disability and who was 
7

unable to work would be entitled to a 100% rating. Id. Here, the vocational expert opined that the 

appellant's "psychological disability alone precludes all competitive employment in the national 

economy," R. at 89, and that the accommodations his psychological disability requires "preclude 

competitive work of any kind," R. at 90. These findings appear to fall under at least one of DC 

9411's factors as they existed in March 1996. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, DC 9411 (providing for a 

100% rating where a claimant shows he or she "was demonstrably unable to obtain or retain 

employment"). Alternatively, the appellant might be entitled to a 70% rating under the March 1996 

version of DC 9411 but be elevated to a 100% rating under Johnson. Either way, these

determinations are best left to the Board in the first instance. See Washington, 19 Vet.App. at 367-

68.

Finally, we caution the Board that it cannot reject a vocational expert's opinion merely 

because it is not a medical opinion. Vocational experts can be necessary depending on the facts of 

a particular case. See Smith v. Shinseki, 647 F.3d 1380, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2011). While the Board is 

entitled to discount or reject the medical conclusions of a vocational examiner, it cannot discount 

the vocational conclusions of a vocational examiner simply because he or she is not a medical 

professional. No law, regulation, or precedent requires that an examination be conducted by an 

examiner with a particular expertise or specialty. Instead, an examination must be performed by 

someone with the "education, training, or experience" necessary to provide an opinion. 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.159(a)(1).

Thus, because the legal standard the Board may use to analyze the probative value of the 

vocational opinion may change, the Court holds that the appellant's arguments concerning the 

March 2016 vocational expert opinion and the correct DC to apply are inextricably intertwined 

with the issue of an earlier effective date, and the Court and will not address them further. See

Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 180 (1991).

In pursuing his case on remand, the appellant is free to submit additional evidence and 

argument, including the arguments raised in his briefs to this Court, in accordance with 

Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet.App. 369, 372-73 (1999) (per curiam order), and the Board must 

consider any such evidence or argument submitted, Kay v. Principi, 16 Vet.App. 529, 534 (2002). 

The Court reminds the Board that "[a] remand is meant to entail a critical examination of the 

justification for the decision," Fletcher v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 394, 397 (1991), and the Board 

must proceed expeditiously, in keeping with 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109B and 7112.
8

C. Tinnitus Claim

The appellant also argues the Board erred by failing to refer a purportedly pending claim 

for service connection for tinnitus to an RO for adjudication. He asserts that a May 1996 C&P

examiner's note that the appellant reported tinnitus "explicitly raised" a claim for service 

connection for that condition. The Secretary argues the Board did not err because no evidence of 

record reasonably raised such a claim. As the appellant's counsel conceded at oral argument, Oral 

Argument at 30:05-31:20, Sellers v. O'Rourke, U.S. Vet. App. No. 16-2993, (oral argument held 

May 1, 2018), http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/oral_arguments_audio.php, this Court lacks 

jurisdiction to decide this issue because there is no final Board decision on the matter and thus the 

Court will not consider this issue further. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a), 7266(a); Jarrell v. Nicholson, 

20 Vet.App. 326, 331 (2006) (en banc) (holding that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only 

over claims that are the subject of a final Board decision).

Where a claim is "in an unadjudicated state due to the failure of the Secretary to process" 

it, the claimant's remedy is "to pursue a resolution of the original claim, e.g., to seek issuance of a 

final RO decision with proper notification or appellate rights and initiate [a Notice of 

Disagreement]." DiCarlo v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 52, 56 (2006). "If the Secretary fails to process 

the claim, then the claimant can file a petition with this Court challenging the Secretary's refusal 

to act." Id. at 57 (citing Costanza v. West, 12 Vet.App. 133, 134 (1999)).

D. Other Issues Raised at Oral Argument

At oral argument, the appellant's counsel advanced an argument that was not presented in 

the briefing. In the briefs, the appellant seemed to argue that his March 1996 claim included an 

informal claim for MDD. See, e.g., Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-4. But at oral argument, counsel 

made very clear that he was raising an alternative argument for the first time, Oral Argument at 

4:30-4:53, 26:45-27:22, 43:46-43:55, even stating that the arguments made in the briefs concerning 

informal claims were incorrect, Oral Argument at 38:57-39:20, 41:00-41:16.

The Court generally will not entertain arguments raised by counsel at oral argument for the 

first time. See, e.g., McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., L.L.C., 381 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) ("A 

party is not allowed to raise at oral argument a new issue for review."); Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 

265 F.3d 1329, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding that "[i]t is well settled that an appellant is not 

permitted to make new arguments that it did not make in its opening brief" and not addressing 

arguments presented for the first time at oral argument); Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.3d 1, 7 n.17 
9

(D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Clearly, oral argument on appeal is not the proper time to advance new 

arguments or legal theories.").

Moreover, "[t]his Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have 

repeatedly discouraged parties from raising arguments that were not presented in an initial brief to 

the Court." Norvell v. Peake, 22 Vet.App. 194, 201 (2008); see also Carbino v. West, 168 F.3d 32, 

34 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Improper or late presentation of an issue or argument . . . ordinarily should 

not be considered."), aff'd sub nom. Carbino v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 507, 511 (1997); Fugere v. 

Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 103, 105 ("Advancing different arguments at successive stages of the 

appellate process does not serve the interests of the parties or the Court. Such a practice hinders 

the decision-making process and raises the undesirable specter of piecemeal litigation."). "[T]he 

practice of presenting new issues and arguments during oral argument is even more objectionable." 

Norvell, 22 Vet.App. at 202. Though the Court is aware that the appellant's counsel who presented 

oral argument was not the same counsel who wrote the briefs, counsel could have alerted the Court 

and the Secretary's counsel to the new argument. We strongly urge counsel to avoid this approach 

to oral argument in the future. To be clear, the Court will not consider the arguments the appellant's 

counsel advanced for the first time at oral argument in his matter.

III. CONCLUSION

After consideration of the parties' briefs, oral arguments, the record on appeal, and the 

governing law, the Board's April 29, 2016, decision denying an effective date earlier than 

September 18, 2009, for the award of service connection for MDD is SET ASIDE and the matter 

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this decision.