United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued July 7, 2017

Decided October 4, 2017

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐3820

IVAN GENTHOV PICHIMAROV,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,   

Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A 089‐849‐278

O R D E R

Ivan Pichimarov, a 42 year‐old Roma from Bulgaria, petitions for review of the

denial of his application for withholding of removal, both statutorily and under the

United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). But our jurisdiction to consider

this petition is limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2(C), because Pichimarov is removable for

having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. Our jurisdiction thus is confined

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) to questions of law and colorable constitutional claims,

and Pichimarov raises none, so we dismiss the petition.   

Pichimarov fled Bulgaria and entered the United States without inspection in

1996. In 2000 he was convicted in Arkansas of felony theft of property. In 2009 the

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16‐3820    Page 2

Department of Homeland Security started removal proceedings, charging him as

removable as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,

see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and as an alien convicted of a crime involving moral

turpitude, see id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Pichimarov admitted that he was removable on both

grounds but applied for asylum,1 statutory withholding of removal, and withholding of

removal under CAT.

At a hearing before the immigration judge, Pichimarov testified that Bulgarians

discriminate against the Roma. But according to Pichimarov, the biggest threat to Roma

was the organized crime groups in Bulgaria—collectively called “grupirovki”—who

harassed and beat Roma and forced them to transport illegal goods. Pichimarov

recounted that he once refused a local crime leader who had asked him to transport

cargo illegally throughout Europe, and the leader warned that he might “disappear” if

he did not accept the job. Pichimarov reported the threat to the police, who did nothing,

so he moved to a different city in Bulgaria and hid at his aunt’s house for six or seven

months before fleeing to the United States.

Pichimarov testified that he feared returning to Bulgaria because organized

crime now treated Roma more harshly than when he left. He recalled that portions of

money transfers he sent back to his parents had been withheld as a tax by the banks,

which were all controlled by organized crime. Pichimarov also testified that the local

crime groups still controlled the police, who, he believed, would arrest him as soon as

he returned to Bulgaria, extort him for money, and beat him if he refused.

The IJ denied Pichimarov’s application. First the IJ found his testimony “far too

speculative and not persuasive” and his corroborating evidence insufficient to support

“even a subjective fear” of returning to Bulgaria. The IJ also faulted Pichimarov for not

obtaining affidavits from his family and not explaining whether the groups who had

threatened him still existed. Moreover, his testimony conflicted with other evidence in

the record that the Bulgarian government sought to assist the Roma through, among

other things, the construction of new housing. In sum, Pichimarov had not established

an individualized fear—or alternatively, a pattern or practice—of persecution against

the Roma.

                                                 

1 Pichimarov’s asylum application was rejected as time‐barred because he filed it well over a year after

arriving in the United States. He does not seek review of that decision in this petition, so we do not discuss

it further.
No. 16‐3820    Page 3

The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Pichimarov’s appeal in part and

remanded in part. The Board upheld the denial of Pichimarov’s claims for asylum and

withholding of removal, pointing out that he failed to provide reasonably available

corroborating evidence, such as statements from family members. The Board agreed

with the IJ that Pichimarov did not introduce evidence to show that he would face

persecution in Bulgaria: he had not explained why the criminal group, after so many

years, still would want to harass him nor did he substantiate his fear that he would be

arrested or extorted upon return. Additionally, as the IJ found, Pichimarov did not

establish a “nexus” between his ethnicity and any potential future harm. The Board also

agreed that there was no pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Roma: the

background evidence on Bulgaria did not reflect that the government systematically

tried to harm Roma or that the government tolerated persecution against them. The

Board, however, accepted Pichimarov’s argument that the IJ had conflated the analysis

of his claims for statutory withholding of removal and withholding under CAT, and so

remanded the case for the IJ to make the requisite factual and legal findings.

On remand the IJ denied Pichimarov’s CAT claim because he failed to show that

the government would acquiesce in his torture. The IJ concluded that the harm he

feared was “too remote and attenuated” because more than fifteen years had passed

since he had last been threatened.

The Board dismissed Pichimarov’s second appeal. It agreed with the IJ that the

threats were dated, particularly in the absence of evidence that the local crime groups

had any “continued interest” in him. And Pichimarov’s submitted reports of

“generalized violence” were not enough to establish eligibility under CAT.

In his petition for review, Pichimarov challenges the denial of his application for

statutory withholding, asserting that the Board overlooked certain evidence and

applied an incorrect legal standard. He also challenges the denial of his withholding

claim under CAT, generally disputing the Board’s conclusion that he did not meet his

evidentiary burden of showing a likelihood he would be tortured.

The government asserts that we should dismiss the petition for lack of

jurisdiction on the ground that Pichimarov has not raised any “colorable constitutional

or legal claim.” We generally lack jurisdiction to review a final removal order against a

criminal alien, like Pichimarov, who is removable for having committed an offense

covered in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), unless the alien raises a constitutional claim or question
No. 16‐3820    Page 4

of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C–D); Guzman‐Rivadeneira v. Lynch, 822 F.3d 978, 982

(7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 644 (2017).

Pichimarov contests the application of this jurisdictional bar by arguing that the

orders denying him withholding of removal and CAT protection are not final orders of

removal. He is mistaken. A “final order of removal” is “not only the actual order of

deportation, but all orders closely related to the deportation proceeding,” including

those “entered during the proceeding.” Torres‐Tristan v. Holder, 656 F.3d 653, 658

(7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Carvajal‐Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 1984)). The

denial of Pichimarov’s application for withholding of removal—although technically

entered after his removal order—nevertheless was entered during his immigration

proceedings and was “closely related” to his removal, and thus comprised part of his

final order of removal. We routinely have concluded that § 1252(a)(2)(C) bars our

review of orders denying withholding of removal, both statutorily and under CAT.

See, e.g., Lopez v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 464, 466 (7th Cir. 2017); Dominguez‐Pulido v. Lynch,

821 F.3d 837, 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2016); Rosiles‐Camarena v. Holder, 735 F.3d 534, 536

(7th Cir. 2013).

Pichimarov also contends that we have jurisdiction to review the denial of

deferral of removal under CAT—an order not considered final. See Issaq v. Holder,

617 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir. 2010). But he was ineligible for deferral of removal because

his application for withholding was not subject to mandatory denial; withholding and

deferral of removal are mutually exclusive remedies, with deferral available only if the

request for withholding must be automatically denied. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a); see Gutierrez

v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800, 804 n.2 (7th Cir. 2016); Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 263–64

(7th Cir. 2013). Pichimarov argues that withholding and deferral of removal are similar

forms of relief and should be treated alike. Deferral, however, is “a more temporary

form of protection” that can be terminated more quickly and easily than withholding

and thus is “like an injunction.” Wanjiru, 705 F.3d at 264; see also Issaq, 617 F.3d at 969. It

therefore is a “unique remedy that requires a distinct jurisdictional analysis.”

See Moral‐Salazar v. Holder, 708 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2013).

Because Pichimarov mounts no legal or constitutional challenge to his removal

order, we lack jurisdiction to review his petition. And while he does assert—with

regard to his statutory withholding‐of‐removal claim—that the Board overlooked

evidence or used the incorrect legal standard, he does not develop these arguments,

which we regard as improper attempts to “manufacture a legal dispute over a
No. 16‐3820    Page 5

disagreement on the facts,” Jawad v. Holder, 686 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2012).

Accordingly, we DISMISS the petition for lack of jurisdiction.