UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4773

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICHARD ALLEN WAGER,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 11-4775

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RICHARD ALLEN WAGER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:10-cr-00258-MOC-1; 3:96-cr-00030-MOC-1)

Submitted: January 17, 2012 Decided: January 24, 2012

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henderson Hill, Executive Director, Elizabeth A. Blackwood, 

Research and Writing Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Richard Allen Wager was sentenced to ten months’ 

imprisonment and thirty-nine months’ supervised release 

following the revocation of his supervised release. Wager’s 

counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal but questioning whether the district court imposed a 

substantively unreasonable sentence when it imposed an 

additional thirty-nine months of supervision. Although informed 

of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Wager has not 

done so. We affirm.

In reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release, this court “takes a more ‘deferential 

appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of 

discretion’ than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines 

sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 

(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

439 (4th Cir. 2006)). We will affirm a sentence imposed after 

revocation of supervised release if it is not plainly 

unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th 

Cir. 2010). The first step in this review requires a 

determination of whether the sentence is unreasonable. Crudup, 

461 F.3d at 438. Only if the sentence is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable does the inquiry proceed to the 
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second step of the analysis to determine whether the sentence is 

plainly unreasonable. Id. at 438-39.

A supervised release revocation sentence is 

procedurally reasonable if the district court considered Chapter 

Seven’s advisory policy statement range and the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors applicable to supervised release 

revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 

438-40. “A court need not be as detailed or specific when 

imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a 

post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement 

of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence is substantively 

reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for 

concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up 

to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.

Upon review of the record, we agree with counsel’s 

assessment that Wager’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. 

Although counsel suggests the sentence is substantively 

unreasonable because Wager had been gainfully employed, enrolled 

in substance abuse treatment, and had no contact with law 

enforcement while on supervised release, we conclude otherwise. 

The district court reasonably found that the sentence was 

necessary in light of Wager’s continued use of illegal 

substances, and the court acted well within its discretion in 
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declining to reward Wager for his unabated drug use by ending 

supervision. Because the district court articulated a proper 

basis for imposing a sentence below the statutory maximum, there 

is no substantive error. Because Wager’s sentence is 

procedurally and substantively reasonable, it is not plainly 

unreasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the 

records in these cases and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district 

court. This court requires that counsel inform Wager, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Wager requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave 

to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state 

that a copy thereof was served on Wager. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED