NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ANDREW R., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.R., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0298

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD14709

The Honorable Cari A. Harrison, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll Esq., Scottsdale

By Denise L. Carroll

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Cathleen E. Fuller

Counsel for Appellees
2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge 

John C. Gemmill and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.

K E S S L E R, Judge:

¶1 Andrew R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating 

his parental rights to his child M.R. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Andrew R. and Crystal C. (“Mother”)

1 are the biological parents of 

M.R., born on December 11, 2008. The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)2 took 

temporary custody of M.R. in December 2012 due to allegations of abandonment, 

neglect, and substance abuse. Mother had left M.R. in the maternal grandmother’s 

care without leaving any forwarding address or phone number to reach her. 

Father was living in a halfway house and receiving substance abuse treatment.

¶3 Father contested all allegations at the Preliminary Protective Hearing 

in December 2012 and informed the juvenile court that he would be in the 

Maricopa County Sheriff’s custody for approximately six months. Father was not 

incarcerated until March 2013, but he failed to attend court, participate in services, 

or communicate with DCS between December 2012 and March 2013. The juvenile 

court found that M.R. was dependent as to Father on February 27, 2013.

¶4 While incarcerated, Father remained in contact with his mother, his 

grandmother, and M.R.’s maternal grandmother. Father had no contact with DCS 

or M.R., however.

¶5 The DCS case manager assigned to M.R. did not know that Father 

was incarcerated until Father’s grandmother informed her several months after 

 

1 Mother’s parental rights to M.R. were terminated in October 2014. She is not a 

party to this appeal. Accordingly, we will not address issues related to Mother.

2 Effective May 29, 2014, the Arizona legislature repealed the statutory 

authorization for the Arizona Department of Economic Security (“ADES”) under 

title 8, and the powers, duties, and purposes from that entity were transferred to 

the newly established DCS. See 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 1, §§ 6, 20,

54. For simplicity’s sake, DCS has been substituted for ADES in this matter.
3

Father’s arrest. Prior to that, the case manager had filed multiple parent locates in 

an effort to locate Father. Father’s grandmother would not give the case manager 

Father’s address, and the case manager did not use the Department of Corrections’

website to locate Father. The case manager asked Father’s grandmother to send 

Father a letter with the case manager’s phone number, but the case manager had 

no contact with Father until his release in October 2013.

¶6 After his release in October 2013, Father appeared at the Permanency 

Planning Hearing later that month. Father stated that he was interested in 

participating in services and being involved in M.R.’s life, but the court granted 

DCS’ request to change the case plan to severance and adoption with respect to 

Father. DCS notified Father of services he was required to complete to achieve 

reunification with M.R. by service letters, phone calls with the case manager, and 

at court hearings. These included substance abuse assessment and treatment 

through TERROS, random urinalysis through TASC, visitation, a case aid, and 

paternity testing. 

¶7 Father failed to successfully complete any of the services with the 

exception of paternity testing. The paternity test had to be rescheduled four times 

due to Father’s repeated failures to complete the scheduled tests. Paternity was 

finally established as to M.R. on April 9, 2014. 

¶8 Although Father initially refused drug treatment because he said he 

did not need it, he later admitted at trial that he had a drug problem and had used 

methamphetamine regularly in the past. DCS sent referrals for TERROS when 

Father was released in October 2013 and again in January 2014, but both referrals 

were closed out due to lack of contact. Father asked to participate again in March 

but then declined services because he “did not feel like [he] needed it.” The case 

manager asked Father about TERROS again in August 2014, but Father refused to 

participate when offered another referral at that time. At trial two months later, 

however, Father said he was willing to participate at TERROS and had an 

appointment set up for the end of the month.

¶9 DCS also sent a referral for TASC when Father was released in 

October 2013, but this too was closed out due to lack of contact. Although Father 

participated in several random urinalyses through TASC while on probation, he 

stopped participating after his probation ended in February 2014. DCS put in a 

new referral in April 2014, and although Father tested negative in April, May, and 

June 2014, he did not test each time he was required to in May and July, did not 

provide a hair follicle test sample as required, and quit testing and calling into 

TASC in July. After that, Father communicated with the case manager but did not 

mention that his TASC referral was expired. Father says he did not test on July 2 

because he “just didn’t think about it,” he did not test in July 11 because of 
4

“forgetfulness,” and provided no explanation for why he did not test for the rest 

of July. As of September 2014, he had not resumed testing. 

¶10 While a referral for visitation was put out in late 2013, no evidence 

presented showed that Father was aware of this referral because the case manager 

sent all service letters to Father’s grandmother’s house and had no direct contact 

with him until October 2013. Once Father was released from custody, he was able 

to visit M.R. twice a week through the family placement and started participating

consistently in visitation with the case aide in March 2014.

¶11 Although Father testified at the severance hearing that he was 

willing to participate in services through TERROS, the juvenile court found 

statutory grounds for severance. First, the court found that Father had abandoned 

M.R. See A.R.S. §§ 8-531(1) (Supp. 2014), -533(B)(1) (Supp. 2014). The court based 

its decision on Father’s failure to provide any reasonable support, maintain regular 

contact, or maintain a normal parental relationship with M.R. It stated that

Father’s efforts to maintain a relationship with M.R. had been minimal and related 

only to visitation, and accordingly were insufficient to overcome grounds for 

abandonment. Additionally, Father testified he had emotionally and physically 

abandoned M.R. in the period between the dependency hearing and the severance 

hearing. 

¶12 Second, the juvenile court found that Father had substantially 

neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused M.R. to be 

in an out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a). It reasoned that DCS had 

made diligent efforts to provide reunification services for Father, but Father had 

failed to successfully complete any services with the exception of paternity testing. 

¶13 Finally, the juvenile court found that severance was in M.R.’s best 

interests. The court recognized that Father did not have stable housing or income 

at the time of the hearing and that Father had a history of drug use that remained 

untreated. Additionally, M.R. had been in her current placement since February 

2014, and the placement was meeting all of her needs. In light of these facts, the

court concluded that returning M.R. to the care of Father would subject her to 

untreated substance abuse issues, instability, homelessness, and neglect. 

¶14 The court granted severance of Father’s parental rights on October 

17, 2014. Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-

235(A) (2014), 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), and 12-2101(A)(1) (Supp. 2014).
5

DISCUSSION

¶15 A parent’s right to custody and control of his or her own child is 

fundamental, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), but not absolute. Michael 

J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12, 995 P.2d 682, 684 (2000). 

To justify severance of a parental relationship, one of the statutory grounds 

provided in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 

Id. at 249, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d at 685. In addition, the State must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that severance of the relationship is in the child’s 

best interest. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2005). 

Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and judge 

credibility, “we will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact unless no 

reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order 

unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 

280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). We do not reweigh the evidence, but “look 

only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the court’s ruling,” Mary Lou C. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004), and reverse 

only if no reasonable evidence to support the ruling exists, Raymond F. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 376, ¶ 13, 231 P.3d 377, 380 (App. 2010). If the 

court finds multiple statutory bases for termination, we may affirm on any one 

basis and need not discuss the other bases for termination. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at

280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d at 205.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶16 Father argues that insufficient evidence exists to support termination 

of his parental rights based on his substantial neglect or willful refusal to remedy 

the circumstances that caused M.R.’s out-of-home placement. A.R.S. § 8-

533(B)(8)(a) provides:

B. Evidence sufficient to justify the termination of the parent-child 

relationship shall include any one of the following, and in 

considering any of the following grounds, the court shall also 

consider the best interests of the child:

. . . 

8. That the child is being cared for in an out-of-home placement 

under the supervision of the juvenile court, the division or a licensed 

child welfare agency, that the agency responsible for the care of the 

child has made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification 

services and that one of the following circumstances exists:
6

(a) The child has been in an out-of-home placement for a cumulative 

total period of nine months or longer pursuant to court order or 

voluntary placement pursuant to § 8-806 and the parent has 

substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home 

placement.

¶17 Severance under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) is not appropriate when a 

parent has made “appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial 

programs outlined by [DCS].” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 

571, 576, 869 P.2d 1224, 1229 (App. 1994). The parent must, at a minimum, 

demonstrate “something more than trivial or de minimus efforts at remediation.” 

Id. at n.1.

¶18 Father does not dispute that M.R. was in an out-of-home placement 

for longer than nine months or that DCS provided sufficient reunification services. 

Rather, he argues his participation in services after his incarceration and at the 

time of the trial as well as his commitment to participate in future services prove 

that Father was doing more than “sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy.” 

Specifically, Father attempts to support this argument by emphasizing his 

consistent participation in visitation with M.R., lack of positive drug tests, and his 

participation in services at the end of October 2014. According to Father, such 

evidence shows his commitment to reunification. 

¶19 We disagree. At the time of the severance hearing, M.R. had been in 

an out-of-home placement for almost two years. Father testified that he knew 

which services DCS asked him to engage in and that he refused all of the services 

offered to him. Father was first offered services when he was released from 

incarceration in October 2013 and repeatedly failed to participate. Although 

Father participated in some drug testing, he failed to provide a hair follicle test 

sample as required or complete his drug testing through TASC. Father also 

refused to participate in TERROS on multiple occasions and only agreed to 

participate in TERROS at the severance hearing in October. We recognize Father’s 

efforts to participate consistently with visitation, but sufficient evidence exists to 

support the juvenile court’s finding that Father’s efforts did not surpass “trivial or 

de minimus efforts” at remediation. See JS-501568, 177 Ariz. at 576 n.1, 869 P.2d at 

1224 n.1.

¶20 Since the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion on out-ofhome placement, we do not need to address the court’s additional finding on 

abandonment. Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d at 205. 
7

II. Best interest

¶21 Father argues that the juvenile court erred when it found that 

severance was in the child’s best interest. “Termination of the parent-child 

relationship is in the child’s best interests if the child would be harmed if the 

relationship continued or would benefit from the termination.” Jose M. v. Eleanor 

J., 234 Ariz. 13, 17, ¶ 21, 316 P.3d 602, 606 (App. 2014). 

¶22 Factors to be considered for best interests include whether an 

adoptive placement is immediately available, whether the existing placement is 

meeting M.R.’s needs, and whether M.R. is adoptable. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. 

at 379, ¶ 30, 31 P.3d at 383. A determination that the child is adoptable alone does 

not require the fact finder to conclude that severance is in the child’s best interests.

Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 587, ¶ 8, 177 P.3d 327, 329 

(App. 2008).

¶23 Father argues that he is bonded to his child and has made great 

strides in maintaining his relationship with her through visitation. He claims that 

the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that M.R. would

accrue an affirmative benefit from his parental rights being severed or that she 

would incur a detriment by continuing in the relationship. According to Father,

no detriment to M.R. would result from allowing Father to continue to participate 

in services since DCS has not found an adoptive placement for M.R.

¶24 We disagree. At the time of trial, M.R. had been in an out-of-home 

placement for almost two years, and the case manager testified that prolonging 

finding a permanent placement for M.R. could be detrimental to her. Additionally, 

DCS presented evidence of Father’s unstable housing and employment situations

as well as evidence of Father’s history of substance abuse. Sufficient evidence 

existed, therefore, to indicate that returning M.R. to the care of Father would 

subject her to untreated substance abuse issues, instability, homelessness, and 

neglect.

¶25 Additionally, the DCS case manager testified that the current 

placement was meeting all of M.R.’s needs and was even considering adopting 

M.R. Accordingly, sufficient evidence existed to support the juvenile court’s 

finding that severance was in M.R.’s best interests.
8

CONCLUSION

¶26 Having found sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

findings, we affirm its order to terminate Father’s parental rights to M.R.