,, 

Jf n tbe Wniteb ~tates (ourt of jf eberal QCiaim~ 

No. 17-1082C 

December 6, 2017 

******************* * 

ANDREW U. D. STRAW, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant. 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

* 

******************* * 

Andrew U. D. Straw, Schaumburg, IL, prose. 

FILED 

DEC - 6 2017 

U.S. COURT OF 

FEDERAL CLAIMS 

Motion to Dismiss; In Forma 

Pauperis; Judicial Takings; 

Americans with Disability Act; 

28 u.s.c. § 1500 

John Sinclair Groat, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With him were 

Douglas K. Mickle, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, and 

Chad A. Readier, Acting Assistant Attorney General. 

OPINION 

HORN, J. 

On August 9, 2017, pro se plaintiff Andrew U. D. Straw, according to his 

description, "a disabled lawyer," filed a complaint with this court in the above-captioned 

case. Plaintiff separately filed an Application to Proceed !D. Forma Pauperis that same 

day. 

In his complaint, plaintiff seeks $3,000,000.00 in compensatory damages from the 

United States "due to the Fifth Amendment Private Personal Property Taking of 3 federal 

law licenses as part of a conspiracy to deprive me of rights I have under the ADA 

[Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990], Titles II and V . .. . " (emphasis in original). 

According to plaintiff, the alleged conspiracy stems from events which occurred during 

plaintiff's employment with the Indiana Supreme Court. According to the complaint, in 

2001, plaintiff allegedly broke his pelvis and both of his legs driving to the Indiana 

Supreme Court for work. Plaintiff further alleges that the Indiana Supreme Court has 

continually discriminated against him since 2001 and, that in an attempt to make plaintiff 

quit his job, "took away" plaintiff's "handicap parking close [sic] to the office, an 

7017 1450 DODD 13 46 0607 
accommodation [plaintiff] needed after [his] car accident." In 2014, plaintiff states that he 

complained to the "ADA Coordinator of the Indiana Supreme Court," who, according to 

plaintiff, "immediately retaliated" against plaintiff, "attacking" plaintiff's disabilities, 

"disability work, and even [plaintiff's] work helping Ukrainian refugees from the war with 

Russia." According to plaintiff, the "disciplinary process then lasted 27 months and I 

ended up with a suspended license for having filed 4 disability rights cases." Plaintiff 

states that the Indiana Supreme Court suspended his Indiana "law license" for 180 days 

without automatic reinstatement on February 14, 2017. See Matter of Straw, 68 N.E.3d 

1070, 1073 (Ind.) ("For Respondent's [Mr. Straw's] professional misconduct, the Court 

suspends Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a period of not less than 

180 days, without automatic reinstatement, effective immediately.") (emphasis omitted), 

cert. denied sub nom. Straw v. Ind. Supreme Court, 137 S. Ct. 2309 (2017). Plaintiff states 

he is separately "suing the Indiana Supreme Court in federal court for relief and damages" 

and has filed complaints with "local, state, and federal civil rights agencies and offices for 

various aspects of the damage to me from the Indiana Supreme Court and its retaliation 

and discrimination." 

Following the Indiana Supreme Court's suspension of plaintiff from the practice of 

law in state court in Indiana for 180 days without automatic reinstatement, plaintiff alleges 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, and the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Illinois "simply followed the Indiana Supreme Court down the path 

of suspending me" and "illegally punishing me in 'comity' with the Indiana Supreme 

Court." See In the Matter of: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17-mc-13-TWP-DKL, (S.D. Ind. 

Mar. 16, 2017) (suspending Mr. Straw from the practice of law before the court), appeal 

docketed, Andrew U.D. Straw v. United States District Court, No. 17-2523, (7th Cir. July 

26, 2017);1 In the Matter of: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17-MC-5-TLS, (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 

2017) (suspending Mr. Straw from the practice of law before the court); In the Matter of 

Andrew U.D. Straw. An Attorney, No. 17-D-02, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2017) (suspending Mr. 

Straw from the practice of law before the court). Plaintiff contends the three United States 

District Courts, which all invited plaintiff to submit documents indicating why reciprocal 

discipline would be unwarranted, did not provide him with proper hearings and "ignore[d]" 

plaintiff's reasons as to why suspension should not be imposed. Moreover, plaintiff insists 

the District Courts' actions violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment by 

depriving plaintiff of his property rights in his "law licenses." Plaintiff asserts this court has 

jurisdiction over his takings claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1 ). Additionally, 

plaintiff contends that "under 42 U.S.C. § 12203 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.134 ... retaliation 

against ADA cases is illegal and no person may do so under any circumstances, including 

1 Plaintiff has filed numerous additional documents in this court in addition to those 

required by the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, including a document 

titled "AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW U. D. STRAW" on September 18, 2017. This document 

appears to detail plaintiff's experience when appealing what plaintiff terms "an incorrect 

decision to the 7th Circuit" in Straw v. Indiana Supreme Court. See Straw v. Indiana 

Supreme Court, 692 F. App'x 291 (7th Cir. 2017). 

2 
any federal judge who is administering the law licensing in a district court." Plaintiff alleges 

this court has jurisdiction over his ADA retaliation claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). 

On October 10, 2017, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) (2017) of the Rules of the United 

States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted under RCFC 12(b)(6). Defendant argues plaintiff "has 

no constitutionally protected property interest in his admission to practice before any 

United States district courts" because "[a]dmission to practice before courts is not a 

transferrable property right subject to compensation pursuant [sic] the Takings Clause" 

and, also, that Mr. Straw's contention that his suspensions were unwarranted defeats his 

takings claims because a taking can only occur when the underlying governmental action 

is valid. Defendant also asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of a 

District Court decision. Additionally, defendant contends 28 U.S.C. § 1500 "bars this 

action because Mr. Straw claim [sic] that he was improper [sic] suspended" was pending 

on appeal when this action was filed. 

Plaintiff filed a response to the defendant's motion to dismiss, in which he states 

that he learned on October 10, 2017, that his Western District of Wisconsin license was 

suspended, and that he will "seek amendment to add this claim for another $1,000,000, 

like the others" if his complaint is not dismissed. In response to defendant's argument 

that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff maintains 

that "the property interest in my law licenses is created through substantive due process 

because federal law creates these very valuable licenses" and declares "[j]udicial takings 

are covered by the Fifth Amendment." Plaintiff also asserts that a "that a law license is a 

fundamental right under the Privileges and Immunities Clause" and that "[i]nfringing that 

right must be compensated as a Takings."2 

As of the date of this opinion, the court has received and reviewed a continuous 

stream of additional filings from Mr. Straw. These additional filings include a motion for 

entry of a default judgment by the Clerk of the Court. 3 Mr. Straw's other filings appear to 

2 In his response, plaintiff states that he incorporates "by reference all exhibits and 

affidavits in the record, including my MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .... " 

3 In the motion for default judgment, among other allegations, plaintiff argues defendant 

was in default because the docket set a deadline of October 9, 2017, for defendant to 

file an answer to plaintiff's complaint. In fact, plaintiff's motion to dismiss was filed 

instead of an answer in accordance with RCFC 12. Moreover, pursuant to RCFC 12(a), 

defendant had sixty days to file an answer to plaintiff's complaint. If the period in which 

a party must a file a document ends on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the filing 

period continues to run until the same time on the next day. RCFC 6(2)(C). Columbus 

Day, which was observed on October 9, 2017, is considered a legal holiday. See RCFC 

6(6)(A). Thus, defendant's answer to plaintiff's complaint was not due until October 10, 

2017, and defendant was not in default because it timely filed its motion to dismiss 

instead of an answer in accordance with RCFC 12 on October 10, 2017. 

3 
be largely duplicative of statements and allegations raised in plaintiff's earlier response 

to defendant's motion to dismiss. Overall, they add little, additional, relevant information 

to assist the court, although the court has reviewed each of the filings. 

DISCUSSION 

The court recognizes that plaintiff is technically proceeding pro se, without the 

assistance of counsel. When determining whether a complaint filed by a prose plaintiff is 

sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction 

of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations 

contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 

U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-1 O (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthews v. United States, 750 

F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Diamond v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 516, 524, affd, 

603 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1909 (2015). "However, "'[t]here is 

no duty on the part of the trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled 

out in his [or her] pleading.""' Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) 

(alterations in original) (quoting Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995) 

(quoting Clark v. Nat'I Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see 

also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aff'd, 443 F. App'x 542 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 

Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "While a prose plaintiff is held to 

a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se 

plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) 

(citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9 and Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 

(Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the 

evidence."), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Shelkofsky v. 

United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 133, 139 (2014) ("[W]hile the court may excuse ambiguities 

in a pro se plaintiffs complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a complaint's] failures."' 

(quoting Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Harris v. United 

States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013) ("Although plaintiff's pleadings are held to a less 

stringent standard, such leniency 'with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the 

burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.'" (quoting Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. 

Cl. at 253)). Although Mr. Straw's filings were filed prose, the court notes that the abovecaptioned plaintiff, by his own description, was trained as an attorney. 

In the above-captioned case, plaintiff has filed an Application to Proceed !n 

Forma Pauperis. In general, to provide access to this court to those who cannot pay the 

filing fees mandated by Rule 77.1(c) of the RCFC, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012) permits a 

court to allow a plaintiff to file a complaint without payment of fees or security, under 

specific circumstances. Section 1915(a)(1) states that: 

Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may authorize the 

commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, 

civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security 

4 
therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of 

all assets such prisoner[4] possesses [and] that the person is unable to pay 

such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of 

the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that the person is entitled 

to redress. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, the statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) requires a 

person to submit an affidavit with a statement of all the applicant's assets, and that the 

affidavit state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that the 

person is entitled to redress. See id. 

When enacting the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Congress 

recognized that '"a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, 

unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, 

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits."' Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)); see also McCullough v. United States, 76 

Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2006), appeal dismissed, 236 F. App'x 615 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. 

Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050 (2007). Accordingly, Congress included subsection (e) 

in the in forma pauperis statute, which allows courts to dismiss lawsuits determined to be 

"frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The United States Supreme Court has 

found that "a court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the 

facts alleged are 'clearly baseless' ... a category encompassing allegations that are 

'fanciful' ... 'fantastic' ... and 'delusional .... "' Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 32-

33 (internal citations omitted); see also McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. at 3; 

4 A number of courts have reviewed the words of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), regarding in 

forma pauperis applications by non-prisoner litigants in federal courts, and have 

concluded that Congress did not intend for non-prisoners to be barred from being able 

to proceed in forma pauperis in federal court. See,~. Floyd v. United States Postal 

Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275-76 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied (6th Cir. 1997); Schagene v. United 

States, 37 Fed. Cl. 661, 663 (1997), appeal dismissed, 152 F.3d 947 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 

see also In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105F.3d1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) 

(discussing how to administer in forma pauperis rights to a non-prisoner, thereby 

acknowledging the rights of non-prisoners to apply for in forma pauperis status); 

Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F .3d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 1996) (using "sic" following the word 

"prisoner" in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) seemingly to indicate that the use of that word was 

too narrow); Smith v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 241, 243 (2013); Powell v. Hoover, 

956 F. Supp. 564, 566 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a "fair reading of the entire section 

[28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)] is that it is not limited to prisoner suits."). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(1) refers to both "person" and "prisoner." The word "person" is used three 

times in the subsection, while the word "prisoner" is used only once. This court, 

therefore, finds that the single use of the word "prisoner" in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a)(1) was not intended to eliminate a non-prisoner from proceeding in federal 

court in forma pauperis, provided that the civil litigant can demonstrate appropriate 

need. Any other interpretation is inconsistent with the statutory scheme of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915. 

5 
Schagene v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. at 663. Courts, however, should exercise caution 

in dismissing a case under section 1915(e) because a claim that the court perceives as 

likely to be unsuccessful is not necessarily frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 

at 33. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "a finding of factual frivolousness 

is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly 

incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict 

them." 19.,. 

The standard in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) for in forma pauperis eligibility is "unable 

to pay such fees or give security therefor." Determination of what constitutes "unable to 

pay" or unable to "give security therefor," and, therefore, whether to allow a plaintiff to 

proceed in forma pauperis is left to the discretion of the presiding judge, based on the 

information submitted by the plaintiff or plaintiffs. See, ~. Rowland v. Cal. Men's 

Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 217-18 (1993); Roberson v. United 

States, 115 Fed. Cl. 234, 239, appeal dismissed, 556 F. App'x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 

Fuentes v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 85, 92 (2011). This court and its predecessors 

were established to make available a user friendly forum in which plaintiffs can submit 

their legitimate claims against the sovereign, limited only by the legislative decision to 

waive sovereign immunity as to the types of claims allowed. In fact, prominently posted 

at the entrance to this courthouse are the words of Abraham Lincoln: "It is as much the 

duty of government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to 

administer the same, between private individuals." 

Interpreting an earlier version of the in forma pauperis statute, the United States 

Supreme Court offered the following guidance: 

We cannot agree with the court below that one must be absolutely destitute 

to enjoy the benefit of the statute. We think an affidavit is sufficient which 

states that one cannot because of his poverty "pay or give security for the 

costs ... and still be able to provide" himself and dependents "with the 

necessities of life." To say that no persons are entitled to the statute's 

benefits until they have sworn to contribute to payment of costs, the last 

dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves and their 

dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe the statute in a way that 

would throw its beneficiaries into the category of public charges. The public 

would not be profited if relieved of paying costs of a particular litigation only 

to have imposed on it the expense of supporting the person thereby made 

an object of public support. Nor does the result seem more desirable if the 

effect of this statutory interpretation is to force a litigant to abandon what 

may be a meritorious claim in order to spare himself complete destitution. 

We think a construction of the statute achieving such consequences is an 

inadmissible one. 

Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948) (omissions in 

original). 

6 
In Fiebelkorn v. United States, for example, a Judge of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims indicated that: 

[T]he threshold for a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is not high: The 

statute requires that the applicant be 'unable to pay such fees.' 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(1 ). To be 'unable to pay such fees' means that paying such fees 

would constitute a serious hardship on the plaintiff, not that such payment 

would render plaintiff destitute. 

Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007); see also Fuentes v. United States, 

100 Fed. Cl. at 92; Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 366, 369 (2006). 

In his Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, prose plaintiff Mr. Straw indicates 

that he receives an unspecified amount of income from Social Security Disability 

Insurance, has minimal savings, and has been unemployed since 2008. Plaintiff's 

application also lists $350.00 from "[r]efugee clients from Ukraine" and $20,500.00 from 

"settlements for disability discrimination" as his other sources of income within the last 

twelve months. Plaintiff's application further provides that he has monthly expenses of 

approximately $1,087.00, as well as approximately $52,000.00 in student loan debt and 

approximately $30,000.00 in credit card and legal debts. Although plaintiff's income and 

amount of outstanding debt might qualify him to proceed in forma pauperis, as discussed 

below, his application is moot because his complaint is being dismissed. 

Additionally, the court notes that plaintiff is a frequent filer of complaints in federal 

courts. Plaintiff has filed multiple complaints or appeals that were dismissed as frivolous 

or for failure to state a claim. The statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), titled the Prison Litigation 

Reform Act, was enacted with respect to prisoner plaintiffs to discourage frivolous 

lawsuits and denies in forma pauperis status to repetitive prisoner complainants. It states: 

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a 

civil action or proceeding under this section ifthe prisoner has, on 3 or more 

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an 

action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see also McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 394 (4th Cir. 

2009); Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009); Warren v. United States, 

106 Fed. Cl. 507, 509-10 (2012); Dudley v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 685, 686 (2004). 

Since 2014, Mr. Straw has filed at least twenty-one complaints and twelve appeals on his 

own behalf. Of those filings, in federal courts at least four have been dismissed as 

frivolous. See Straw v. Kloecker, 576 F. App'x 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2014) ("We agree with 

the district court [for the Northern District of Illinois] that Straw's lawsuit under RICO is 

frivolous, as is this appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and order Straw to 

SHOW CAUSE within 30 days why he should not be sanctioned under [Federal Rules of 

7 
Appellate Procedure] 38 for taking this appeal.") (emphasis added); Straw v. Ind. Attorney 

General, No. 1 :17-cv-03975-WTL-TAB, (S.D. Ind. Nov. 6, 2017) (order dismissing 

plaintiff's complaint as "frivolous," noting that Mr. Straw "is developing a pattern of filing 

frivolous litigation," and warning Mr. Straw that he could be subject to sanctions if he 

continued to file further frivolous litigation) (emphasis added), appeal docketed, Straw v. 

Ind. Attorney General, No. 17-3357 (7th Cir. Nov. 14, 2017); Straw v. Ind. Attorney 

General, No. 1:17-cv-03975-WTL-TAB, (S.D. Ind. Dec. 4, 2017) (District Court, however, 

denied Mr. Straw's request to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis because Mr. Straw 

was pursuing his appeal "in bad faith") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 

Straw v. Court, No. 1:15-CV-01015-RL Y-DKL, 2016 WL 344720, at *5-8 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 

28, 2016) (dismissing the case because Mr. Straw failed to state a claim under Title I and 

Title V of the ADA and failed to state a deprivation of due process in violation of the Fifth 

Amendment); Straw v. Sconiers, No. 3:14-CV-1772-JD, 2014 WL 7404065, at *1 (N.D. 

Ind. Dec. 30, 2014) ("Because Straw's claims are utterly frivolous, the Court dismisses 

the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction consistent with Rule 12(b)(1). And even if 

Straw had established jurisdiction, the motions would be granted on the ground that Straw 

has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted consistent with Rule 12(b)(6).") 

(emphasis added); Straw v. Kloecker, No. 14-C-1420, 2014 WL 883289, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 

Mar. 5, 2014) (denying Mr. Straw's application to proceed in forma pauperis and 

dismissing the action because Mr. Straw's complaint was "legally frivolous") (emphasis 

added), aff'd, 576 F. App'x 607 (7th Cir. 2014). Additionally, at least two federal judges 

have dismissed complaints filed by Mr. Straw for reasons other than failure to state a 

claim, and, in doing so, noted that Mr. Straw also had failed to state a claim. Straw v. 

Dixon, No. 3:16-CV-276, 2016 WL 4014976, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2016) ("Even if 

Plaintiff had properly alleged that diversity jurisdiction exists, he has failed to state a claim 

for abuse of process."); Straw v. Am. Bar Ass'n, No. 14-C-5194, 2015 WL 602836, at *6 

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2015) ("Alternatively, even if Straw had standing to bring his claim 

(which he does not), he has failed to state a claim under the ADA."). 

With respect to the case currently before this court, plaintiff's complaint also fails 

to establish a cognizable cause of action within the jurisdiction of this court and fails to 

state a claim. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, grants jurisdiction to this court as 

follows: 

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render 

judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the 

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 

department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, 

or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 

28 U.S.C. § 1491 (a)(1) (2012). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the 

Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity to allow jurisdiction over claims against the United 

States (1) founded on an express or implied contract with the United States, (2) seeking 

a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal 

constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal 

government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 

289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); see also Greenlee 

8 
Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied 

(Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008); Palmer v. United States, 168 F.3d 

1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

"Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is 

cognizable under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the 

United States .... " United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see also United States v. 

White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Smith v. United States, 709 

F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 259 (2013); RadioShack Corp. v. 

United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. 

United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[P]laintiff must ... identify a 

substantive source of law that creates the right to recovery of money damages against 

the United States."); Golden v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 764, 768 (2014). In Ontario 

Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit identified three types of monetary claims for which jurisdiction is lodged in 

the United States Court of Federal Claims. The court wrote: 

The underlying monetary claims are of three types .... First, claims alleging 

the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall 

within the Tucker Act's waiver. . .. Second, the Tucker Act's waiver 

encompasses claims where "the plaintiff has paid money over to the 

Government, directly or in effect, and seeks return of all or part of that sum." 

Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-06,] 372 F.2d 

[1002,] 1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims "in 

which 'the Government has the citizen's money in its pocket"' (quoting 

Clappv. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, 580 (1954)) .... 

Third, the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over those claims where 

"money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless 

entitled to a payment from the treasury." Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1007. 

Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to the 

government, either directly or in effect, require that the "particular provision 

of law relied upon grants the claimant, expressly or by implication, a right to 

be paid a certain sum." !.Q.,_; see also [United States v. JTestan, 424 U.S. 

[392,] 401-02 [1976] ("Where the United States is the defendant and the 

plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of 

the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulationdoes not create a cause of action for money damages unless, as the Court 

of Claims has stated, that basis 'in itself ... can fairly be interpreted as 

mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage 

sustained."' (quoting Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1009)). This category is 

commonly referred to as claims brought under a "money-mandating" 

statute. 

Ontario Power Generation. Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 

see also Twp. of Saddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 106 (2012). 

9 
To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon "'can fairly be 

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v. 

Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 

(1976)); see also United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. at 472; United 

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217; Blueport Co .. LLC v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374, 

1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1153 (2009). The source of law granting 

monetary relief must be distinct from the Tucker Act itself. See United States v. Navajo 

Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (The Tucker Act does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply 

a] jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims 

premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)."). "'If the statute is not 

money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal 

should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' Jan's Helicopter Serv .. Inc. v. Fed. 

Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. 

United States, 487 F.3d at 876); Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 

2005) (The absence of a money-mandating source is "fatal to the court's jurisdiction under 

the Tucker Act."); Peoples v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009). 

When deciding a case based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure 

to state a claim, this court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint 

are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Erickson 

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 ("[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge 

must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." (citing Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 

534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)))); Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters. Inc. v. United States, 805 

F.3d 1082, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Trusted Integration. Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 

1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ). 

"Determination of jurisdiction starts with the complaint, which must be well-pleaded 

in that it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim, independent of any 

defense that may be interposed." Holley v. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) 

(citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh'g 

denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States, 97 Fed. 

Cl. 203, 208 (2011); Gonzalez-Mccaulley Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 710, 

713 (2010). A plaintiff need only state in the complaint "a short and plain statement of the 

grounds for the court's jurisdiction," and "a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2) (2016); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) 

(2016); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 570 (2007)). To properly state a claim for relief, 

"[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences of fact do not suffice to 

support a claim." Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also 

Mczeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., 

concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice 

and Procedure§ 1286 (3d ed. 2004)); Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981) 

("[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by any factual assertions will not withstand a 

motion to dismiss."), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). "A plaintiff's factual allegations must 'raise 

a right to relief above the speculative level' and cross 'the line from conceivable to 

10 
plausible.'" Three S Consulting v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), aff'd, 562 F. App'x 964 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g 

denied (Fed. Cir. 2014). As stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and 

conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' 550 

U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further 

factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Plaintiff's current complaint filed in this court alleges that he suffered Constitutional, 

Fifth Amendment takings of his three "federal law licenses" in the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Indiana, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 

To succeed under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, a plaintiff must show that the 

government took a private property interest for public use without just compensation. See 

Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 

811 (2005); Arbelaez v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 753, 762 (201 O); Gahagan v. United 

States, 72 Fed. Cl. 157, 162 (2006). "The issue of whether a taking has occurred is a 

question of law based on factual underpinnings.'' Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 

525 F.3d 1370, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1045 (2008). The government 

must be operating in its sovereign rather than in its proprietary capacity when it initiates 

a taking. See St. Christopher Assocs., L.P. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008). The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has established a 

two-part test to determine whether government actions amount to a taking of private 

property under the Fifth Amendment. See Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 

505, 511 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 

(Fed. Cir.) (citing M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (Fed. Cir.), cert. 

denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 

(2005). A court first determines whether a plaintiff possesses a cognizable property 

interest in the subject of the alleged takings. Then, the court must determine whether the 

government action is a "'compensable taking of that property interest.'" Huntleigh USA 

Corp v. United States, 525 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Am. Pelagic Fishing Co .. L.P. v. United 

States, 379 F.3d at 1372). 

Among its arguments, defendant urges this court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for 

failure to state a claim because plaintiff does not have a cognizable property interest in 

his admission to practice law before any of the three District Courts. Plaintiff, however, 

argues that "[p]ersonal property is covered [by the Takings Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment] and this Court has jurisdiction over Takings Clause cases.'' Plaintiff asserts 

in his response to defendant's motion to dismiss that his "property interest in [his] law 

licenses is created through substantive due process" and that "a law license is a 

fundamental right under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'' 

Plaintiff also insists in his response that "[a]s a disabled person, I am a member of a 

discrete and insular minority and my rights are subject to heightened scrutiny.'' 

(emphasis in original). 

Mr. Straw appears to be alleging a judicial takings by the three identified United 

States District Courts. There exist varied treatments of judicial takings claims by different 

11 
courts. Some courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 

the binding Circuit Court for this court, have determined that judicial takings can exist, 

although without concluding that a judicial taking actually occurred. See Smith v. United 

States, 709 F.3d at 1116 ("In that case [Stop the Beach], the Court recognized that a 

takings claim can be based on the action of a court."); see also Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 

F.3d 957, 964 n.4 (9th Cir.) ("[A]ny branch of state government could, in theory, effect a 

taking." (citing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 

702, 713-15 (plurality opinion))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 (2011). Although it is 

theoretically possible for a court to effect a fundamental taking, however, the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also has indicated that the United States 

Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over judicial takings claims that require the court 

to scrutinize the decisions of other tribunals for the same plaintiff given the same set of 

facts. 5 See also Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015) ("Binding precedent establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has no 

jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision rendered by a federal district court."); 

lnnovair Aviation Ltd. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir.) ("[T]he Court of 

Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decision of district courts and 

cannot entertain a taking[s] claim that requires the court to scrutinize the actions of 

another tribunal." (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original)), reh'g en bane 

denied, (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 999 (2012); Vereda Ltda. v. United 

States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims cannot 

entertain a taking claim that requires the court to scrutinize the actions of another tribunal." 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1352 

(Fed. Cir.) ('"[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the 

decisions of district courts."' (quoting Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 

1994))), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001); see also Potter v. United States, 121 Fed. 

Cl. 168, 169 (2015); Marti v. United States,6 No. 09-299, 2010 WL 369212, at *2 (Fed. Cl. 

5 In a non-presidential opinion, the Federal Circuit indicated that "[t]he appellant [Barth] 

asked the Court of Federal Claims to scrutinize the actions of coordinate federal courts 

to determine whether their actions effected a taking of his property. That was beyond the 

Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction." Barth v. United States, 76 F. App'x 944, 945-46 

(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003) (footnote omitted). 

6 The Marti case is related to a recent decision of the undersigned, Milgroom v. United 

States, 122 Fed. Cl. 779 (2015), aff'd, 651 F. App'x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam), 

involving the same underlying facts as the Marti case. In the Milgroom case, this court 

determined: 

This court is without jurisdiction to review the alleged taking by the District 

Court, a judicial taking, see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida 

Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010), because review in this case 

of such a taking "would require the Court of Federal Claims to scrutinize the 

merits of the district court's judgment, a task it is without authority to 

undertake." Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 

1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 

(Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction 

12 
Jan. 29, 2010) (unpublished) ("[T]his court has no jurisdiction over takings claims that are 

founded on a challenge to the judgment of another federal court."). 

Therefore, to determine whether jurisdiction exists in the above captioned case, 

this court must ascertain whether or not plaintiff's judicial takings claims require the court 

to reevaluate the decisions of the United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Indiana, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, and the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, including whether the case 

filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims involves the same plaintiff and the same 

set of facts as was analyzed in those District Court cases. Although his complaint alleges 

that a taking occurred when the District Courts each suspended plaintiff from the practice 

of law for 180 days, in his response to defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues "[n]o 

examination of the district court decisions is being requested, only verification that my 

licenses were suspended and providing the monetary takings I asked. Not one jot of 

these other courts' decisions is being asked to be changed here. I just want 

compensation." 

Following the Indiana Supreme Court's 180 day suspension of Mr. Straw's license 

to practice law in Indiana, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana issued an order to Mr. Straw to show cause "why reciprocal discipline should not 

be imposed in accordance with Rule II of the Local Rules of Disciplinary Enforcemenf' of 

the court. In the Matter of: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17-mc-13-TWP-DKL, (S.D. Ind. 

March 16, 2017), appeal docketed, Andrew U.D. Straw v. United States District Court, 

No. 17-2523 (7th Cir. July 26, 2017). The United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Indiana found that Mr. Straw's submission to the court failed to "provide a 

sufficient bases [sic] to overcome reciprocal suspension in this court" and suspended Mr. 

Straw for 180 days without automatic reinstatement. kl Similarly, the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Indiana imposed reciprocal discipline "pursuant 

to N.D. Ind. L. R. 83-6.8(c)." In the Matter of: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17-MC-5-TLS, 

(N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2017). The United States District Court for the Northern District of 

Indiana also reviewed Mr. Straw's submission to the court and found that Mr. Straw's 

to review the decisions of district courts or the clerks of district courts 

relating to proceedings before those courts."). Just as the Court of Federal 

Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the United 

States District Courts, the Court of Federal Claims also does not have 

jurisdiction to review decisions of the United States Bankruptcy Courts. See 

Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding 

that the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to entertain 

judicial takings claims against federal bankruptcy courts because "[s]uch a 

determination would require the court to scrutinize the actions of the 

bankruptcy trustees and courts"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001 ); Mora 

v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 713, 716 (2014) ("[T]his court does not have 

jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts, federal bankruptcy 

courts, federal district courts, or federal circuit courts of appeals."). 

Milgroom v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. at 801-02. 

13 
submission was not sufficient to avoid reciprocal discipline . .!Q,_ The United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana suspended Mr. Straw for 180 days without 

automatic reinstatement and noted that Mr. Straw's submissions "only highlight that the 

suspension is appropriate, as [Mr. Straw] is either unwilling or incapable of accepting that 

his claims did not have 'a basis in law and fact ... that is not frivolous .... "' .!Q,_ (citation 

omitted). Additionally, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

the court determined that Mr. Straw's submission to the court requesting that the court 

not impose discipline identical to that imposed by the Indiana Supreme Court did not 

satisfy any of "the grounds set forth in Local Rule 83.26(e)" and suspended Mr. Straw for 

180 days without automatic reinstatement. In the Matter of Andrew U.D. Straw, An 

Attorney, No. 17-D-02, (N.D. Ill. March 17, 2017). Each of these United States District 

Courts interpreted their own local rules and decided to impose reciprocal discipline and 

suspend plaintiff's admission to practice before their particular court. This court, therefore, 

lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's judicial takings claims because this court should not 

review whether the three United States District Courts properly interpreted their own local 

rules when deciding whether to suspend plaintiff.7 

Plaintiff's own submissions to this court contradict his assertion that when alleging 

a conspiracy and a taking by each of the District Courts to deprive him of his right to 

practice law in those District Courts, he is not challenging the propriety of the District 

Courts' decisions. Plaintiff's argument in his reply to defendant's motion to dismiss, which 

states "[n]o examination of the district court decisions is being requested, only verification 

that my licenses were suspended .... I just want compensation," resembles the plaintiffs' 

argument in Allustiarte v. United States. In Allustiarte v. United States, the plaintiffs 

unsuccessfully claimed they were "not asking the Court of Federal Claims to review" the 

Bankruptcy Court's judgments, but were only seeking to obtain just compensation for the 

takings. Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d at 1351; see also Shinnecock Indian Nation 

v. United States, 782 F.2d at 1353 ("The Court of Federal Claims, however, is without 

authority to adjudicate the Nation's claim that it suffered a compensable taking at the 

hands of the district court."); and the undersigned's decision in Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. 

United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 367, 384 (2016) (observing that plaintiff's argument that the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit incorrectly interpreted and applied 

case law precedent undercut plaintiff's assertion that he was not challenging the court's 

decision), aff'd, 862 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Plaintiff is, in fact, seeking to have this 

court review the same factual issues that were before the United States District Court for 

the Northern District of Indiana, the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of Indiana, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which 

this court cannot do. 

7 On May 19, 2017, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board also convened a hearing to 

determine whether the Board should impose the same discipline on plaintiff as imposed 

by the Indiana Supreme Court. After holding a hearing in which plaintiff appeared 

telephonically, the Board found "that the conduct resulting in the Respondent's 

suspension in Indiana is not conduct that would be grounds for disciplinary action in 

Virginia." The Virginia Board elected not to impose reciprocal discipline on plaintiff. 

14 
Moreover, this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's takings claims 

because the United States Court of Federal Claims may only exercise jurisdiction under 

the Fifth Amendment when the claimant "concede[s] the validity of the government action 

which is the basis of the taking claim to bring suit under the Tucker Act .... " Tabb Lakes. 

Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802-03 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Mahoney v. United 

States, 129 Fed. Cl. 589, 592-93 (2016); Lea v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 440, 445 

(2015). In this case, the initial disciplinary action was taken by Indiana's highest state 

court, and Mr. Straw has not conceded the validity of the three District Courts' actions 

which imposed reciprocal discipline. In sum, plaintiff has not alleged any valid takings 

claims over which this court has jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff further asserts 28 U.S.C. § 1491 provides this court with jurisdiction over 

his "ADA retaliation claims" against the three federal District Courts which issued orders 

suspending plaintiff's admissions to practice law. This court, however, lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's ADA retaliation claims for several reasons. First, as 

discussed above, to demonstrate that the Tucker Act provides jurisdiction over claims 

where a contract between the claimant and government did not exist and no payment 

has been made to the government, the claimant must prove that the particular provision 

of law relied upon is money-mandating. See,~. United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 

U.S. at 290; Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d at 1301. The 

ADA, however, is not a money-mandating law. See Dziekonski v. United States, 120 

Fed. Cl. 806, 809-1 O (2015) (noting that the ADA is not a money-mandating provision 

that would provide the COFC with jurisdiction) (citation omitted); Shipman v. United 

States, 118 Fed. Cl. 701, 707 (2014) ("[T]he court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over claims alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 

("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., because the ADA is not a money-mandating source 

of law.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the United States 

District Courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over ADA claims. See,~. McCauley v. 

United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 250, 266 (1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)) (finding the 

district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under the ADA), aff'd, 152 

F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, this court is not the proper forum to seek judicial relief 

under the ADA. kL see Johnson v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 560, 564 (2011) ("The 

Court notes that Federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act claims."); Searles v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 801, 805 (2009) 

("Indeed, the ADA does not apply to the federal government as an employer and district 

courts hold exclusive jurisdiction over ADA claims."). 

Plaintiff also asserts that this court has jurisdiction under Title II of the ADA arising 

under 28 C.F.R. § 35.134. Under 28 C.F.R. § 35.134(a), no "private or public entity shall 

discriminate against any individual because that individual has opposed any act or 

practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 

the Act or this part." The section of 28 C.F.R. § 35.134(b) provides: 

No private or public entity shall coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with 

any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her 

15 
having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or 

encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right 

granted or protected by the Act or this part. 

"Private or public entity" has been defined as any state or local government, any 

instrumentality of a state or local government, or the National Railroad Passenger 

Corporation. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. The ADA does not apply to the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, and the United States District Court for the Northern District 

of Illinois because those federal courts are not state or local governments or 

instrumentalities of such as defined by 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. See Cellular Phone 

Taskforce v. F.C.C., 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ("Title II of the ADA is 

not applicable to the federal government."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001); Pierce 

v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 798, 801 (2014) (stating that neither the United States 

Tax Court nor the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California were 

a "public entity" for purposes of the ADA) (citing United States v. Wishart, 146 F. App'x 

171 (9th Cir. 2005)), aff'd, 590 F. App'x 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Grayv. United States, 69 

Fed. Cl. 95, 101 n.5 (2005)); Agee v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 284, 289 (2006) 

(concluding that the COFC does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under Title II of 

the ADA). 

Finally, regardless, defendant asserts plaintiffs claims against the United States 

would be barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500, which provides: 

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction of any 

claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in 

any other court any suit or process against the United States or any person 

who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or process 

arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, directly or 

indirectly under the authority of the United States. 

The application of section 1500 turns on whether a plaintiff, at the time suit was filed in 

the Court of Federal Claims, had a suit pending in another federal court against the United 

States or a person acting under authority of the United States, based on substantially the 

same operative facts as the suit filed in this court, regardless of the relief sought. See 

United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 315 (2011). "The question of 

whether another claim is 'pending' for purposes of§ 1500 is determined at the time at 

which the suit in the Court of Federal Claims is filed, not the time at which the Government 

moves to dismiss the action." Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 

1548 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Keene 

Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993)). Indeed, "'the jurisdiction of the Court 

depends upon the state of things atthe time of the action brought.'" Keene Corp. v. United 

States, 508 U.S. at 207 (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539 (1824) (Marshall, 

C.J.) (other citations omitted) (noting that the Court of Federal Claims correctly applied 

section 1500 by "looking to the facts existing when Keene filed each of its complaints"). 

When a District Court has entered judgment dismissing a case, the United States Court 

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has established that once "a notice of appeal is filed," 

16 
then the case is "pending" under 28 U.S.C. § 1500. Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 

1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

The United States Supreme Court offered some clarification regarding the effect 

of 28 U.S.C. § 1500 in Tohono O'Odham Nation. In the words of the United States 

Supreme Court, section 1500 "bars jurisdiction in the CFC [Court of Federal Claims] not 

only if the plaintiff sues on an identical claim elsewhere - a suit 'for' the same claim - but 

also if the plaintiff's other action is related although not identical - a suit 'in respect to' the 

same claim." United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. at 312. The Supreme 

Court explained, "two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based 

on substantially the same operative facts." !fl at 318 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 

508 U.S. 200, 206 (1993)). 

There is, however, no set test to determine when, according to the Supreme Court, 

"two suits have sufficient factual overlap to trigger the jurisdictional bar." United States v. 

Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. at 318. Although the assessment must be on a case 

by case factual basis, the Tohono O'Odham Nation case provides a general framework 

for consideration. In its decision, the Supreme Court stated in Tohono O'Odham Nation: 

The remaining question is whether the Nation's two suits have sufficient 

factual overlap to trigger the jurisdictional bar. The CFC [United States 

Court of Federal Claims] dismissed the action here in part because it 

concluded that the facts in the Nation's two suits were, "for all practical 

purposes, identical." 79 Fed. Cl. 645, 656 (2007). It was correct to do so. 

The two actions both allege that the United States holds the same assets in 

trust for the Nation's benefit. They describe almost identical breaches of 

fiduciary duty - that the United States engaged in self-dealing and 

imprudent investment, and failed to provide an accurate accounting of the 

assets held in trust, for example. Indeed, it appears that the Nation could 

have filed two identical complaints, save the caption and prayer for relief, 

without changing either suit in any significant respect. Under § 1500, the 

substantial overlap in operative facts between the Nation's District Court 

and CFC suits precludes jurisdiction in the CFC. 

!fl at 317. 

Plaintiff appealed the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

Indiana's order suspending plaintiff's admission to the court for 180 days to the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on July 26, 2017, which was two weeks 

before plaintiff filed his complaint with this court. 8 See Andrew U.D. Straw v. United States 

8 It appears that Mr. Straw has not appealed the decision by the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana in In the Matter of: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1 :17-

MC-5-TLS, (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2017), or the decision by the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois in In the Matter of Andrew U.D. Straw, An Attorney, No. 

17-D-02, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2017). 

17 
District Court, No. 17-2523 (?th Cir. July 26, 2017). In the docketing statement in the 

Circuit Court, Mr. Straw sought review of whether "the Southern District of Indiana has 

the authority to impose discipline based on cases in other districts" and whether Mr. Straw 

has "an absolute right not to experience any discrimination or retaliation for filing any 

disability rights complaint or lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 12203, 28 C.F.R. § 35.134, and 

explained in the technical assistance manual at http://www.ada.gov/reg2.htm." )fl Upon 

review, it is apparent that the initial case in United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Indiana and the appeal, which, clearly, was pending when plaintiff filed his 

complaint in this court, arise from substantially the same operative facts, which revolve 

around whether Mr. Straw's suspension by the Indiana Supreme Court and the United 

States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana were proper. Therefore, his claims 

filed in this court are barred 28 U.S.C. § 1500. See United States v. Tohono O'Odham 

Nation, 563 U.S. at 317; see also Trusted Integration. Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d at 

1165 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 barred two of the plaintiff's three claims when the 

plaintiff, at the time it filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, had a 

complaint pending in a District Court that involved "nearly identical conduct"). 

Finally, this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's allegations that the District 

Courts' decisions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Due 

Process Clause "does not 'mandate money damages by the Government."' Chittenden 

v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 251, 260 (2016) (quoting Smith v. United States, 36 F. 

App'x. 444, 446 (Fed. Cir.) (citing LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 

1995)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1010 (2002)), aff'd, 663 F. App'x 

934 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Golden v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 764, 768 (2014) 

(finding the court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that the United States Supreme 

Court violated plaintiff's due process rights by disbarring plaintiff without providing notice 

to plaintiff). Also to the extent plaintiff argues the District Courts' decisions violated the 

Privilege and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution, this court 

likewise finds that it lacks jurisdiction over such a claim because the Privileges and 

Immunities Clause does not mandate payment of money by the federal government. See 

Howell v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 775, 790 (2016); lvaldy v. United States, 123 Fed. 

Cl. 633, 637 (2015), aff'd, 655 F. App'x 813, 815 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). 

Additionally, this court lacks jurisdiction over claims arising under the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d at 379; Stephenson 

v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 193 (2003). In deciding whether an applicant is qualified 

to practice law before a state court, such as Indiana, and, more particularly, the three 

federal District Courts addressed in plaintiff's complaint, each such court must make an 

individualized determination as to whether the applicant has satisfied the established 

state or federal criteria for admission and continued practice. Each federal court 

establishes its own criteria to establish when reciprocal suspension or disbarment is 

appropriate. See LCrR. 83.11; N.D. Ind. R. 83-5; S.D. Ind. R. 83-5. Plaintiff does not have 

a constitutionally protected property interest in his admissions before a court. See Conti 

v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 

(2003). 

18 
CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate any of plaintiff's 

claims. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's 

complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter JUDGMENT consistent with 

this Opinion. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

19 

~~~ MARIAN BLANK HORN 

Judge