## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Abel C. , 2013 IL App (2d) 130263

Appellate Court Caption In re AB EL C., a Mi nor (The People of the S tate of I llinois
, PetitionerAppellee , v. Shana C., Respondent-Appe llant).

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-13-0263

Opinion filed Opinion withdrawn Modified opinion filed August 20, 2013 October 3, 2013 October 3, 2013

Held (Note : This s

yl lab us

c o nst it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt e r of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) On appea l from the t ri al court’s order s finding responde nt’s child a neg lected minor, adjudicating the child a war d of the court, and g ranting custody to the Depa

rtment of Children and Family Serv i ce s , the cause

was rema nded for the limit ed purpose of allowing the trial court to enter the express fac tual basis for the finding of neg lect, since no fac tual basis

was provided in the court’s written order of adju d i ca t i o n or its oral
pronounce ment of the de cision.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Winnebag o County
, No. 12-JA-60; the Hon. Mary

L inn Gree n, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Nicholas O. Mey er , of Mey er & Horning
, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.

J oseph P

. Br

uscato, S tate’s Attorney
, of R ockfor d (L awr ence M. Ba uer and Sally A. Swiss, both of State’s Attorney s Appellate Pr o s ecutor ’s Offic e, of c ounsel), for

the People.

Panel J USTI CE McLAREN delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices J org ensen a

nd Hudson conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Respondent, Shana C., the mother of Abel C., appe als from the tria l c ourt’s order s: ( 1) finding Ab el t o b e a neg lected minor; and (2) adjudicating Abel a war d of the court and
g ranting custody of Abel to the Department of Children and Family Service s (DCFS). W e aff irm.

¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On Fe bruar

y 17, 2012, DCFS took seven- day -old Abel into protec tive custody

. The State there afte r filed a petition on Fe bruar y 22 alleg ing that Abel was a neg lected minor under section 2-3(b) of the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ac t) (705 I L CS 405/2-3(b) (West 2010)),

as his environment was injurious to his welfa re, placing Abel at risk of harm, in that: (1) his siblings had been remove d from Shana’s car e and she had failed to cure the conditions that

cause d their re m o v al ; (2 ) his siblings had been remove d from the car e of J avier C., their fathe r and Abel’s putative father , and he ha d failed to c ure the conditions that caused the ir

remova l; and (3 ) J avier was an untreated sex offe nder. At the shelter car e hear ing held on that date, the tr ial court, Judge Patr ick Hea slip presiding, a ddresse d Shana:
“You are named in a Petition alleg ing that the minor is a neg lected minor. In relation
to that y ou have a rig ht to have a lawyer repr esent y ou in these proce eding s. I f y ou can’ t aff ord one I will appoint one for you.” When she was asked if she could aff ord to hire an attorney , Shana told the trial court that her friends wer e g oing to g ive her money to hire an attorney but she did not have an attorney that day . Shana then denied that J avier
, who was her husband, was Abel’s f ather , but she could
not otherwise name the fathe r; further
, she did not know when Abel was conce ived and could
not name with whom she had had sexual rela tions in th e p ast two y ear s. The court then appointed Amanda Sloniker, the Conflicts 1 attorney from the office of the public defe nder,
to repr esent Shana. After speaking with Shana, Sloniker informed the trial court that Shana

-2-reque sted the appointment of private counsel or a continuance in order to obtain private

counsel; she pr efe rre d “not to have an attorney from the Public De fende r’s office based on prior repr esentation and h o w the prior case s wer e handled.” The trial court denied the
reque st. After another conver sation with Shana, Sloniker told the trial court that Shana “would be waiving her rig ht to shelter car e, ag ree ing to temporar y guardia nship and custody to go to [DCFS].” The trial cour t found probable cause to believe that Abel was subject t o the Act as a neg lected minor and, as a matter of urgen t an d i m m ed iate necessity
, it place d Abel in she lter car e, g ranting DCFS temporar y guardia nship a nd custody

. The hear ing was continued as to Javier. 1 ¶ 4 On Marc h 1, 2012, Shana appea red with private counsel, Chester Chostner, who filed his
ap p ear ance ; the trial court, J udg e Mary L inn Gre en presiding
, vacated Sloniker ’s appointment. Shana filed a motion to rec onsider and vacate the Fe bruar y 22 order
, arguing that she had reque sted a co n t i n u ance , which was denied, and that she did not knowing ly waive her rig ht to a shelter car e hear i n g. S l oniker informed the trial court that, at the Fe bruar y 22 hear ing:
“I discussed wit h Mom the shelter care proce eding and that, howeve r, she was, for lack of a better word, frazzl ed about the whole thi ng , and so it’s possible that she i n a, I guess, fit of frustration or not thinking clea rly did agree to just g o forwa rd, but I don’t know that it was truly a hundred perc ent understood exactly what she was waiving at that point beca

use there was a lot–a lot g oing on with the judge asking her questions and also just conversations about the case in the hall with my self.” The trial court continued the case for a hear ing on the motion. In addition, the court order ed DNA testing for Abel and J avier (who had been made awa re of the court date but had failed
to appea r) and found J avier to be in defa ult for shelter ca re purposes. The trial court also order ed Shana to provide the names of any pot en t i al fathe rs of Abel. The trial court subsequently

denied Shana ’s motion to reconsider

. ¶ 5 After a period for discovery and seve ra l co n t i n u ances, the case was schedule d for a n adju d icatory hear ing on October 4, 2012. On that date, Shana filed an appea ranc e and informed the trial court, “I want to repr esent my self.” The trial court then g rante d Chostner’s oral motion to withdraw and order ed him to turn over his file to Shana by October 21. Over the State’s objection, the court continued the case to October 26 for status reg arding counsel and October 29 for a hear ing. The court advised Shana that she did not have to “g ive us y our decision on whether or not you want to reta in new counsel, or not, but if y ou do decide to do that, Iwould ask that they be her e that day .” ¶ 6 On October 26, Shana informed t h e trial court that she was g oing to repr esent he rself. The trial court responde d, “Oka y

. I guess that’s y our decision. I would highly encour ag e y ou to reta in counsel, but we are set for adjudication on Monday
, starting at 3:30, Courtroom 216. We are g oing to hold to that.” The court further advised Shana, “B e prepa red to proce ed with trial that day , do you understand? Any questions? ” S hana r eplied “N o” and, when aske d if she had r ece ived Chostner’s file, told the c ourt that she had to pick it up that day

.

J avierwas eventual ly ser ved anddef aul te d an d i s no t p ar ty to thi s appe al

. 1

-3-¶ 7 On October 29, the trial court rec ounted with Shana the history of her prior repr esentation

by Sloniker and Chostner. The followingcolloquy then took place : “THE COURT: All rig ht. Now, I think I said to y ou at that time, beca u s e y o u indicated you wished to r epre sent y ourself, that I thought y ou should be repr esente d by counsel. Do you reme mber that, ma’ am? [S HANA]: Yes.
THE COURT: I am asking y ou here t o d ay , beca use we are here today for adjudication, don’t y ou believe i t wo uld be a better idea i f t he C ourt rea ppointed Miss Sloniker to repre sent you befor e we have a trial on these issues? [S HANA]: No.
THE COURT: You understand that y ou are not an attorney , and y ou are insisti ng on g oing f orwa rd, re prese nting y

ourself? [S HANA]: Yes.
THE COURT: I s that y our final a nswer? [S HANA]: Yes.
THE COURT: Once ag ain I would like to remind y ou, the Court does not believe it is a g ood idea for y ou to do that, but y ou are being insistent upon that

. W i l l y ou

rec onsider that? [S HANA]: No. THE COURT: You leave the c ourt no choice ; I ’m g oing to g o ahea d today .” The court then proce eded to explain to Shana the State’s burden of proof and the proce dures
to be followed during the hear ing. The court also g rante d Shana a continuance to prepa re for the hea ring . The c ourt then stated: “Obviously
, the Court takes it very seriously when people who are not lawyers decide
to repr esent themselve s in these matters; ther efor e, I wanted to make sure t hat [ Shana] was given am p l e opportunit y to prepa re, but this is not an is sue where we are going to keep continuing it. She has under the Court’s questioning maintained that she continues
to wish to repr es en t herse lf. She is fairly adama nt about t hat, and I think that the court has outlined for he r wha

t she ca n expect in the trial and the pr ocedur al issues.” ¶ 8 Prior to the beg inning o f t h e ad j u d i ca t o ry hear ing on November 26, the following colloquy took place:
“THE COURT: [Shana], I know that y ou have been repr esente d by attorney s in the past. And the last time we w ere here I believe the court offe red, if y ou could not a ffor d it, to appoint an attorney

to repre sent you and you ref used that; is that corre ct? [S HANA]: Yes. THE COURT: You continue to re fuse a ny offe r of a ppointed repr esentation? [S HANA]: Yes, ma’ am. THE COURT: And you fee l prepa red to g o ahea d and re prese nt yourself toda y ? [S HANA]: Yes, Ma’ am.

-4-THE COURT: You under stand that you need to f ollow the rules of e vidence

– [S HANA]: Yes.
THE COURT:–just as the attorney s do? All rig h t

. An d y ou’re prepa red to g o forwa rd? [S HANA]: Yes.” The case then pr ocee ded to the hea ring , afte r which the trial court found that the S tate had proved a ll three c ounts of the petition. ¶ 9 On J an u ar y 30, 2013, the case proce eded to a dispositi onal hear ing. After noting that Shana was “still not repr esente d by an attorney ,” the trial court told her, “I know that I offe red to appoint someone to y ou previously

. I s that still y our position? ” S h an a re plied, “Ye ah, I will be repr esenting my self.” After p as s i n g the case so that Shana and the State could confe r, the court held a dispositi onal hear ing. On Fe bruar y 27, 2013, the court found that Shana wa s wi l ling to car e for Abel but was unable and unfit to do so beca use she had “some unresolved mental health issues and she is hopefully eng agin g i n n ow [ sic ].” The
court g rant ed conti nued guardia nship and custody to DCFS with discretion to place Abel with a relative or in traditional foster car e. The court then found that Shana qu al i fi ed for appointed appellate counsel and, with Shana’s ag ree ment, appointed an attorney

. This appea l followed.

¶ 10 I I . ANALYSI S ¶ 11 Shana first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing her to r epre sent herse lf. Acc ording to Shana, the trial court did not conduct a thoroug h inquiry to deter mine that her waiver of counsel wa s voluntarily , knowing ly , and intellige ntly made and that she

wa s competent to repr esent herse lf. She further argues that her waiver of coun s el wa s ineffe ctive bec ause the trial court did not prope rly admonish her of

her r ights. ¶ 12 The Act provides the “right to be repr esente d by counsel” to pa rents of minors who are the subject of pr ocee dings unde r the Ac t. 705 I L CS 405/ 1-5(1) (West 2010). Fur ther (with one exception not rele vant to this case) , “[a]t t he re quest of any party financ ially unable to employ counsel, *** the court shall appoint the Public Def ender or such other counsel as the

case may require .” Id. In addition, this court has ag ree d t hat this statutory rig ht to counsel also involves a constitutional rig ht to eff ective counsel in abuse and neg lect case s. See In re Kr. K. , 258 I ll. App. 3d 270, 280 (1994). ¶ 13 Shana argues that “it is axiom atic” that there must be some level of proce dural safe guards
to ensure that a waiver of this statutory rig ht to counsel is made voluntarily
, knowing ly
, and intelligently

. She asser

ts that certa in proce dural saf eguards, a nalog ous to those affor ded to

a cr i m i n al defe ndant pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (ef f. J uly 1, 1984), ar e

nece ssary to ensure t h at pare nts involved in proce eding s under the Act are proper ly ad m o n ished of the rig ht to counsel under the Act and that any waiver of that ri gh t i s voluntarily , knowing ly
, and int ellige ntly made. Rule 401 provide s that, befor e a tr ial court
may permit a person acc used of an offense punishable by imprisonment t o waive counsel, it must inform the person of, and deter mine that he understands: (1) the nature of the char g e;

-5-(2) the minimum and maxi mum sentenc es presc ribed by law; and (3) his rig ht to counsel and,

if he is indige nt, to have counse l appointed for him by the cour t. ¶ 14 Shana has not cited and, to our knowledg e, cannot cite to any authority that require s any specific admoni s h m en t s reg arding a pare nt’s right to counsel in a neg lect proce eding
, let alone any require ment that Rule 401 be used as a gu i d eli ne. This court has previously declined to apply the require ments of criminal admonishments to a proce eding under the Act. In In re Tamera W

. , 2012 I L App (2d) 111131, ¶ 34, this cou rt re fu s ed to extend to a termination proce eding the require ments of I llinois Supreme Court Ru l e 4 0 2 (e ff. J uly 1, 1997) reg arding admonishments that must be g iven in a criminal proce eding befor e a g uilty plea or stipulation may be acc epted. Her e, we simil arly decline to impose the require ments of Rule 401, applicable to criminal proce eding s, to a neg lect proce eding under the Act. Case law sug g ests that no specific admoni s h m en t reg arding a rig ht to counsel is require d. In re J.R.
, 2011 I L App (3d) 100094, involved a petition of war dship alleg ing that the minor was delinquent under section 5-105(3) of the Act (7 0 5 I L C S 405/5-105(3) (West 2008)). On
appea l, the minor’s mother, J acqua line, argued that the trial court err ed when it ruled that she had made a knowing waiver of her rig hts to counsel and to prese nt ev i d en ce at the dispositi onal hea

ring . The a

ppellate c ourt summarily

dealt with this issue:
“In this case , the rec ord is clea r that the trial court advised J acqua line on two separ ate

occa sions that she had the rig ht to reta in counsel of her own or rely on the same counsel
as t he mi nor. On both occa sions, J acqua line indicated that she wanted to proce ed with the same counsel as the minor. Under these circ umstances, we find no err or.” In re J.R.
, 2011 I LApp (3d) 100094, ¶ 18. ¶ 15 Shan a al s o ra ises the issue of competenc y , arguing that she possesses a “low level of intellectual func tioning” a nd thus the trial court should have conducte d a thorough inquiry
to deter mine that her waiver of counsel was made voluntarily
, knowing ly
, and intelligently

. This argument is based on the psy cholog ical evaluation of Shana perf ormed by Dr. Valer ie Bouc hard, which was rec eived b y t h e co u rt on October 29, 2012. The repor t notes that Shana’s I Q score of 79 place s her in the “B order line rang e of intellectual functioning .” The
repor t further notes that Shana’s thought proce sses “we re not alway s logic al and coher ent,” her statements “sometimes did not make sense,” and her judgme nt and insight wer e “poor.” Howeve r, the repor

t notes that Shana was “or iented to time, place
, person and situation.” Shana also cites t o h er conduct at trial as evidenc e that she was unable to competently
repr esent he rself at trial. ¶ 16 Howeve r, our revie w of even the cited portions of the rec ord does not reve al that Shana failed to unde rstand what was g oing on or acte d inappropriately

. To support her argument, Shana points to arguments lackingin merit, improper objec tions to evidenc e, and a lack of understanding of rules of evidenc e, but poor lawyering skills by a pro se party do not establish a lac k of under standingof the proc eeding s. ¶ 17 The trial court is alway s in the best position to evaluate the tempera ments, persona lities,

an d capa biliti es of the parties. In re Marriage of Petraitas
, 263 I ll. App. 3d 1022, 1 0 3 1 (1993). Her e, Shana was advised of her rig ht to counsel, including appointed counsel, at the initial shelter car e hear ing, and she was appointed counsel at that time. At the next court date,

-6-she appea red with counsel she had hired herse lf. When she advised the court that she wanted
to repr esent herse lf, she was g iven three wee ks in which to decide whether to hire a new attorney or repr esent herse lf. On subsequent court dates, the court encour ag ed her to hire an attorney , offe red to appoint counsel to represent her, and thoroug hly explained the
proce dures that would be followed during the adjudicatory hear ing. S h an a had ex perie nce with a ppointed counsel (in this ca se, as we ll as in pr ior case s) and private counsel, and she

was we ll advised by

the cour t of her c ontinuing right to counsel. ¶ 18 Even in the criminal rea lm, we have noted that, while the rig ht to counsel is f undamental and will not lightly be deeme d to be waived, a defe ndant also has the corr elative rig ht to proce ed withou t co u n s el, and this rig ht is as basic and fundame ntal as the rig ht to be
repr esente d by counsel. People v. Jiles
, 364 I ll. App. 3d 320, 328 (200 6 ). Our sy stem of justice allows a c riminal defe ndant to squander his rig ht to counsel. People v. Siler
, 85 I ll. App. 3d 304, 309 (1980) (“To eac h man the fo l l y o f his choice .”). Although a trial court might consider a defe ndant’s decision to proce ed pro se to be unwise, it should honor such

an elec tion out of “ ‘that respe ct for the individual which is the lifeblood of the l aw .’ ” People v. Silagy
, 101 I ll. 2d 147, 180 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Allen
, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (B renna

n, J
., concur

ring )). Her e, Shana was well awa re of her rig ht to counsel, as well

as her rig ht to proce ed p r o se

. After elec ting to proce ed pro se , she turned down multipl e opportunities to ag ain be appointed counse l or to obtain private counsel. Whether wisdom

or folly
, we cannot say that this decision was made without knowledg e and experience

. The trial court’ s decision to allow Shana to proc eed pro se was not er ror. ¶ 19 Shana next contends that the trial co u rt ’s finding that Abel was a neg lected minor is
ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. The State must prove alleg ations of neg lect by

a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e or, in other words, prove that the alleg ations of neg lect are more proba

bly true than not. In re Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d 441, 463-64 (2004) . On re view, a trial court’s deter

mination of neg l ec t wi l l not be reve rsed unless it is ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. Id. at 464. In deter mining whether a judgme nt is ag ainst the manifest weig ht of t he evidence, this court will view the evidenc e in t he li g ht most favor able to the appellee ; wher e evidence permits multipl e rea sonable infere nces, we will acc ept those infere nces that support the trial court’ s judgme nt. In re Marriage of B ates , 212 I ll. 2d 489, 516 (2004). A trier of fac t, by virtue of its abilit y t o ac t u al l y observe the demea nor and conduct of

witnesses, is in the best position to assess their cre dibilit y ; thus, we defe r to the trial court’s finding s reg arding cre dibilit y

. In re Marriage of Berbere t , 2012 I L App (4th) 110749, ¶ 56. This court will not rew eig h evidenc e or make an independe nt deter mination of cre dibilit y

. UDI No. 2, LLC v. Departme nt of Public Health
, 2012 I L App (4th) 110691, ¶ 43. A judgme nt is ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the eviden ce o n l y if the opposite conclusion is clea

rly evident. Arthur H. , 212 I ll. 2d at 464. ¶ 20 In order for this court to deter mine whether a trial court’s finding s of fac t are ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e, we must be able to revie w both the evidenc e prese nted and the trial court’s finding s of fac t. In re G.W

. , 357 I ll. App. 3d 1058, 1060 (2005). Finding s of fac t are nece ssary to enable appellate revie w. Id. ; In re Madison H.
, 215 I ll. 2d 364, 379-80

-7-(2005) (Kilbride, J
., specia lly concur ring ). Section 2-21(1) of the Act require s written 2 finding s of fa ct in neg lect proc eeding s: “Af ter hearing t h e ev idence the court shall deter mine whether or not the minor is abused, neg lected, or depende nt. *** The court’s deter mination of whether the minor is abused, neg lected, or depende nt shall be stated in wri t i n g wi th the fac tual basis supporting that determination.
I f the cour t fi n d s t hat the minor is abused, neg lected, or depende nt, the court shall then deter mine and put in writing the fa ct u al b asi s supporting that deter mination, and specify
, to the extent possible, the acts or omissions or both of eac h pare nt, guardia n, or leg al cu s t o d ian t hat form the basis of t he court’s finding s. That finding s hall appea r i n the orde r of the c ourt.” 705 I L CS 405/ 2-21(1) (West 2010). ¶ 21 The trial c ourt initially provided no finding s of fac t in its wr itten or der of adjudication. The prepr inted order of adjudication was marke d t o indicate that Abel was: “NEG L ECTED/AB USED MI NOR under section 405/2 of the J uvenile Court Act as to”; handwr itten next to this was “counts 1, 2, 3, per fac tual finding of the court.” The trial court’s or al pronounc ement on that day provided a s follows: “All right. The Court has reviewed the eviden ce as p re sented, the testimony of t he witnesses, the documentar y evidenc e, uh, and finds that, uh, the State has met its burden and has proven by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e Cou n t I
, I I
, and I I I of the Neg lect Petition. The Court adjudicates the minor ne g lected pur suant to those finding s.” ¶ 22 Neither the written order of adjudica t i o n n o r t h e t ri al co u rt ’s oral pronounc ement provided any fac tual basis for the trial court’s decision. Acc ording ly
, this court reta ined jurisdiction over the appea l and enter ed a limit ed rema nd for the entry of the express fac tual basis supporting the trial court’s finding of neg lect. A s up p lemental rec ord containing the trial court’s findings of fac t was filed wit h t h i s co u rt on September 16, 2013, and we now revie w those finding s in light of the e vidence prese nted at trial. ¶ 23 C o u n t I o f t h e neg lect petition alleg ed that Abel’s environment was injurious to hi s welfa re, placing him at risk of harm, in that his siblings had been remove d from Shana’s car e and she had failed to cure the conditions that cause d th ei r re m o v al

. The trial court took

F i n d i n gs of fa ct al so pro vide the ben chmark for fur the r pro cee din gs unde r the Act

. 2 Fol lowi ng a fin din g tha t a chil d i s ne glect ed u nde r t he Ac t, t he c our t h old s adi spo si ti ona l h ear ing

a t w h i c h the cou rt dec ide s what fur the r act ion s ar e in the chi ld’ s bes t int er est s, in li ght o f t h e fi ndi n gs o f n e gl ect

. In re G.F.H.
, 315 I ll

. App. 3d 711, 715 (20 00)

. T he fi ndi ngs of fa ct fr om the ad j u d i c a tor y hea ri ng “i nfo rm the cou rt re gardi ng it s opt ion s when it con duc ts the dis pos it ion al hea ri ng.” In re J.W.
, 386 I ll

. App. 3d 847, 855 ( 2 0 0 8 )

. T h e r uli ngs at the dis pos it ion al hea ri ng pro vide the par ent s wit h fa ir not ic e of what the y m ust do to re ta in the ir par ent al ri ghts to the ir chi ld in the fa ce of any fut ure te rminat ion pro cee din gs. In re Apri l C. , 326 I ll . App. 3d 2 25, 2 37 ( 2001 ). I n add it ion
, onl y af

te r the tr ia l cou rt “ha s cl ear ly bef ore it the si tua ti on which le d to rem oval can it det erm ine whet her or not the par ent s have ta ken st eps to improve tha t si tua ti on.” In re Enis , 145 I ll

. App. 3d 753, 763-64 (19 86) (whe re dif fe re nt j udges pre si ded over the adj udi cat ory and te rminat ion hea ri ngs, and the j udge who pre si ded over the te rminat ion pro cee din g was not “i nfo rmed abo ut the fa ct s be hin d” t he a bus e f

ind ings)

.
-8-judicial notice of the following rec ords from the neg lect proce eding s involving the siblings:

the neg lect petitions, the adjudication and dispositi on order s, the order s foll o wi n g a perma nency hear ing, the petitions for termination of pare ntal rig hts, the order s terminating
pare ntal rig h t s , an d an order acknow ledg ing this court’s aff irmance of the trial court’s judgme nt terminating pare ntal rig hts. The State then prese nted the testimony of J ane Whit aker
, t h e DCFS child protec tion investigator who took Abel into protec tive custody

. Whit aker stated that she had lear ned from h er investigation that DCFS g ot involved with Shana beca

use of domestic violence issues and beca use J avier had been indicated for sexual abuse. Abel’s siblings wer e broug ht into DCFS car e beca use of domestic violence betwee n Shana and J avier

. Whil e W h i t aker was not the case worke r for the siblings, through her investigation reg arding Abel she was awa re that
, as o f April 17, 2012, neither Shana nor J avier had cur ed the c onditions t hat brought the siblings into DCFS car e. ¶ 24 L eslie Montoy a t es t i fi ed t h at she was a foster car e case worke r for the Youth Service Bur eau, wher e she pr o v ided case manag ement to families involved with DCFS. She had been the case worke r for Abel’s siblings since J uly 2010 and also for Abel for two m onths, Fe bruar y throug h April 2012. As a result of the siblings’ neg lect proce eding s, Shana had been ordere d to complete d o mestic violence counseling and indi vidual thera py (which led
to a reque st for a psy cholog ical evaluation). Whil e Shana m ad e p ro gress in the domestic violence counseling
, she was unsucce ssfully d i s ch arge d from individual thera py in 2011 beca use of attendanc e issues and her failure to obtain a psy cholog ical evaluation. Shana did
not c ure the conditions that broug ht the siblings into DCF S c are

. Shana’s pare ntal rig hts to the siblings we re te rminated in F ebrua ry 2012. ¶ 25 On cross-e x amin at i o n , M o n t o y a s t at ed t h at , wh i l e S h an a h ad n o t o btained a
psy cholog ical evaluation at her a g ency , Shana told her that she had obtaine d an eva luation at another ag ency , the Glenwood Testing Center. How ever , Montoy a could not obtain any paper work fr om Glenwood, as Shana had an outstandingbalanc e. ¶ 26 Shana testified that she eng ag ed i n s er v i ce s o n h er o wn “with no ref err als from

case worke rs.” She eng ag ed in service s “with no one to appropr iately fi l e m y paper work.” She had been attending WAVE for some unspecifie d service s for approximately three y ear s. She signe d rele ases at WAVE sever al times and faxed information reg arding those service s to case worke rs and public defe nders seve ra l t i m es but could not reme mber when. She stopped attending individual ther apy beca use she felt that her relig ion “wa s being bashed.” She never had a c asew orker

who wante d to help her or g ive her ref err als. ¶ 27 The trial court found that, while Shana “did eng ag e in some service s, she either did not complet e t h e s ervic e or was discharg ed from the service .” Shana “did not succe ssfully complete” the s ervic es ordered as a result of t he si blings’ case s, such that, when Abel was broug ht into DCFS car e, she “had not cure d the conditions that broug ht his older siblings into

car e.” T hese f

indings a re not a g ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e. Montoya cle arly testified to both Shana’s succe s s es an d her failure s in completing the require d service s. Shana admitted to not completing her individual thera py ; further
, she did not substantiate the service s that she cla imed to have eng ag ed in on her own, and she blamed everyone ex cept herse lf for he r fa ilures. We find no err or her e.

-9-¶ 28 Be cause we find no err or in the trial court’s finding of neg lect under count I
, we need not

addre ss the other bases for the trial court’s ruling

. Only a single g round for neg lect need be
proven; when a trial court has found a minor neg lected on more than one g round, this court may aff irm the trial court’s judgme nt if any of the bases of neg lect is upheld. In re Faith B.
, 216 I ll. 2d 1, 14 (2005).

¶ 29 I I I . CONCLUSI ON ¶ 30 For

these re asons, the judg ment of the c ircuit court of Winnebag o County

is affirme d.

¶ 31 Affir

med.

-10-