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No. 17-1082C December6, 2017



## ******************* *

ANDREW U. D. STRAW,
Plaintiff,



## v.
UNITED STATES,

Defendant. 

## * * 

## * * 

## * * * * 

## * ******************* *

Andrew U. D. Straw, Schaumburg, IL, prose. 

# FILED
DEC

- 62017

U.S

.COURTOF FEDERALCLAIMS

Motion to Dismiss; In Forma Pauperis; Judicial Takings; Americans with Disability Act; 28 

## u.s.c

.§ 1500

John SinclairGroat,Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch
, Civil Division, United States Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With him were Douglas K. Mickle, Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director
,Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division
, and Chad A. Readier,Acting AssistantAttorney General.

OPINION

HORN, J.

On August 9, 2017, pro se plaintiff Andrew U. D. Straw, according to his description, "a disabled lawyer," filed a complaint with this court in the above-captioned
case

. Plaintiff separately filed an Application to Proceed 

### !D. Forma Pauperis that same day.

In his complaint, plaintiffseeks $3,000,000

.00 in compensatory damagesfrom the United States "dueto the Fifth Amendment Private Personal PropertyTaking of3federal law licenses as part of a conspiracy to deprive me of rights I have under the ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990], Titles II and V

. .. ." (emphasis in original). According to plaintiff, the alleged conspiracy stems from events which occurred during plaintiff's employment with the Indiana Supreme Court. According to the complaint, in 2001, plaintiff allegedly broke his pelvis and both of his legs driving to the Indiana Supreme Court for work. Plaintiff further alleges that the Indiana Supreme Court has continually discriminated against him since 2001 and, that in an attemptto make plaintiff quit his job, "took away" plaintiff's "handicap parking close [sic] to the office, an



### 7017 1450 DODD 1346 0607accommodation [plaintiff] needed after [his] car accident." In 2014, plaintiffstatesthat he complained to the "ADA Coordinator ofthe Indiana Supreme Court," who, according to plaintiff, "immediately retaliated" against plaintiff, "attacking" plaintiff's disabilities, "disability work, and even [plaintiff's] work helping Ukrainian refugees from the warwith Russia." According to plaintiff, the "disciplinary process then lasted 27 months and I ended up with a suspended license for having filed 4 disability rights cases." Plaintiff states thatthe Indiana Supreme Court suspended his Indiana "law license" for 180 days without automatic reinstatement on February 14, 2017. See Matter of Straw, 68 N.E.3d 1070, 1073 (Ind.) ("For Respondent's [Mr. Straw's] professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a period of not less than 180 days, without automatic reinstatement, effective immediately.") (emphasis omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Strawv. Ind. SupremeCourt, 137 S. Ct. 2309 (2017). Plaintiffstates he is separately "suing the Indiana SupremeCourtin federal courtfor reliefand damages" and has filed complaints with "local, state, and federal civil rights agencies and offices for various aspects ofthe damage to me from the Indiana Supreme Court and its retaliation and discrimination."

Following the Indiana Supreme Court's suspension ofplaintifffrom the practice of law in state court in Indianafor 180dayswithout automatic reinstatement, plaintiffalleges the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the United States District Courtforthe Southern District of Indiana, and the United States District Court for the Northern District ofIllinois "simplyfollowed the Indiana Supreme Court downthe path of suspending me" and "illegally punishing me in 'comity' with the Indiana Supreme Court." See In the Matter of: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17-mc-13-TWP-DKL, (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16, 2017) (suspending Mr. Strawfrom the practice oflaw before the court), appeal docketed, Andrew U.D. Strawv. United States District Court, No. 17-2523, (7th Cir. July 26, 2017); 1 In the Matterof: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17-MC-5-TLS, (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2017) (suspending Mr. Strawfrom the practice of law before the court); In the Matter of Andrew U.D. Straw. An Attorney, No. 17-D-02, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2017) (suspending Mr. Strawfrom the practice oflaw before the court). Plaintiffcontends thethree United States District Courts, which all invited plaintiff to submit documents indicating why reciprocal disciplinewould be unwarranted, did not provide him with properhearings and "ignore[d]" plaintiff's reasons as to whysuspension should notbe imposed. Moreover, plaintiffinsists the District Courts' actions violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment by depriving plaintiffofhis property rights in his "lawlicenses." Plaintiffassertsthis court has jurisdiction over his takings claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491(a)(1). Additionally, plaintiff contends that "under42 U.S.C. 

### § 12203 and 28 C.F.R. 

### § 35.134

... retaliation againstADAcases is illegal and no person maydo so underanycircumstances, including

1 Plaintiff has filed numerous additional documents in this court in addition to those required bythe Rules ofthe United States Court ofFederal Claims, including adocument titled "AFFIDAVIT OFANDREW U. D. STRAW" on September 18, 2017. This document appears to detail plaintiff's experience when appealing what plaintiffterms "an incorrect decision to the 7th Circuit" in Straw v. Indiana Supreme Court. See Straw v. Indiana Supreme Court, 692 F. App'x291 (7th Cir. 2017).



### 2anyfederaljudgewho is administeringthe law licensing in adistrictcourt." Plaintiffalleges this court hasjurisdiction over his ADA retaliation claims under28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491(a)(2).

On October 10, 2017, defendantfiled a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject-matterjurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) (2017) ofthe Rules ofthe United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC), or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under RCFC 12(b)(6). Defendant argues plaintiff "has
no constitutionally protected property interest in his admission to practice before any United States district courts" because "[a]dmission to practice before courts is not a transferrable property right subject to compensation pursuant [sic] the Takings Clause" and, also, that Mr. Straw's contention that his suspensionswere unwarranted defeats his takings claims because ataking can onlyoccurwhen the underlying governmental action is valid. Defendant also asserts that this court lacksjurisdiction to reviewthe merits ofa District Court decision. Additionally, defendant contends 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1500 "bars this action because Mr. Straw claim [sic] that hewas improper [sic] suspended"was pending
on appeal when this action was filed.

Plaintifffiled a response to the defendant's motion to dismiss, in which he states that he learned on October 10, 2017, that his Western District ofWisconsin license was suspended, and that he will "seek amendment to add this claim for another $1,000,000, like the others" if his complaint is not dismissed. In response to defendant's argument thatthis court lacks subject matterjurisdiction overplaintiff's complaint, plaintiffmaintains that "the property interest in my law licenses is created through substantive due process becausefederal law createsthesevery valuable licenses" and declares "[j]udicialtakings
are covered bythe Fifth Amendment." Plaintiffalso asserts that a "that a law license is a fundamental right underthe Privileges and Immunities Clause" and that "[i]nfringing that right mustbe compensated as aTakings."2

As ofthe date ofthis opinion, the court has received and reviewed a continuous stream ofadditional filings from Mr. Straw. These additional filings include a motion for entry ofa defaultjudgment bythe Clerk ofthe Court.3 Mr. Straw's otherfilings appearto

2 In his response, plaintiff states that he incorporates "by reference all exhibits and affidavits in the record, including my MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT

...."

3 In the motion fordefaultjudgment, among other allegations, plaintiffargues defendant
was in default becausethe docket set a deadline ofOctober 9, 2017, for defendantto file an answerto plaintiff's complaint. In fact, plaintiff's motion to dismisswas filed instead ofan answer in accordance with RCFC 12. Moreover, pursuantto RCFC 12(a), defendant had sixty days to file an answerto plaintiff's complaint. Ifthe period in which
a party must afile a documentends on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, thefiling period continues to run until the same time on the nextday. RCFC 6(2)(C). Columbus Day, which was observed on October 9, 2017, is considered a legal holiday. See RCFC 6(6)(A). Thus, defendant's answerto plaintiff's complaintwas not due until October 10, 2017, and defendantwas not in default because it timelyfiled its motion to dismiss instead ofan answer in accordance with RCFC 12 on October 10, 2017.


### 3be largely duplicative ofstatements and allegations raised in plaintiff's earlier response to defendant's motion to dismiss. Overall, they add little, additional, relevant information to assistthe court, although the court has reviewed each ofthe filings.

DISCUSSION

The court recognizes that plaintiff is technically proceeding pro se, without the assistance ofcounsel. When determiningwhethera complaintfiled by a prose plaintiff is sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to liberal construction oftheirpleadings. See Hainesv. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringentstandardsthan formal pleadings drafted bylawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-1

### O(1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthewsv. United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Diamond v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 516, 524, affd, 603 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1909 (2015). "However, "'[t]here is
no duty on the part ofthe trial court to create a claim which [the plaintiff] has not spelled out in his [or her] pleading.""' Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995) (quoting Clark v. Nat'I Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see also Bussiev. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aff'd, 443 F. App'x 542 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "While a prose plaintiffis held to
a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9 and Taylorv. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden ofshowing jurisdiction by a preponderance ofthe evidence."), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Shelkofsky v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 133, 139 (2014) ("[W]hile the court may excuse ambiguities in a pro se plaintiffs complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a complaint's] failures."' (quoting Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Harris v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013) ("Although plaintiff's pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, such leniency 'with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meetjurisdictional requirements.'" (quoting Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. at253)). Although Mr. Straw'sfilings werefiled prose,the court notesthatthe abovecaptioned plaintiff, by his own description, was trained as an attorney.

In the above-captioned case, plaintiff has filed an Application to Proceed

### !n Forma Pauperis. In general, to provide access to this courtto those who cannot paythe filing fees mandated by Rule 77.1(c) ofthe RCFC, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915 (2012) permits a courtto allow a plaintiffto file a complaintwithout payment offees orsecurity, under specific circumstances. Section 1915(a)(1) statesthat:

Subjectto subsection (b), any court ofthe United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense ofany suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment offees or security



### 4therefor, by a person who submits an affidavitthat includes a statement of all assets such prisoner[4] possesses [and] thatthe person is unableto pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's beliefthat the person is entitled to redress.

28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, the statute at 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) requires a person to submit an affidavit with a statement of all the applicant's assets, and that the affidavit state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that the person is entitled to redress. See id.

When enacting the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915, Congress recognized that '"a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits."' Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)); see also McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2006), appeal dismissed, 236 F. App'x 615 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050 (2007). Accordingly, Congress included subsection (e) in the in forma pauperis statute, which allows courts to dismiss lawsuits determined to be "frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(e). The United States Supreme Court has found that "a court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are 'clearly baseless'

... a category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful'

... 'fantastic'

... and 'delusional

...."' Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 32- 33 (internal citations omitted); see also McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. at 3;

4 A numberofcourts have reviewed the words of28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1), regarding in forma pauperis applications by non-prisoner litigants in federal courts, and have concluded that Congress did not intend for non-prisonersto be barred from being able to proceed in forma pauperis in federal court.**See,~.** Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275-76 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied (6th Cir. 1997); Schagene v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 661, 663 (1997), appeal dismissed, 152 F.3d 947 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
see also In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105F.3d1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing howto administer in forma pauperis rights to a non-prisoner, thereby acknowledging the rights ofnon-prisoners to applyfor in forma pauperis status); Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 1996) (using "sic" following theword "prisoner" in 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) seeminglyto indicatethatthe use ofthat word was too narrow); Smith v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 241, 243 (2013); Powell v. Hoover, 956 F. Supp. 564, 566 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that a "fair reading ofthe entire section [28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1)] is that it is not limited to prisoner suits."). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) refers to both "person" and "prisoner." The word "person" is used three times in the subsection, while the word "prisoner" is used only once. This court, therefore, finds thatthe single use ofthe word "prisoner" in the language of28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1)was not intended to eliminate a non-prisonerfrom proceeding in federal court in forma pauperis, provided thatthe civil litigant can demonstrate appropriate need. Any other interpretation is inconsistentwith the statutory scheme of28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915.


### 5Schagenev. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. at663. Courts, however, should exercise caution in dismissing a case under section 1915(e) because a claim that the court perceives as likelyto be unsuccessful is not necessarilyfrivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 33. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "a finding offactual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them." 

### 19.,.

The standard in 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) for in forma pauperis eligibility is "unable to pay such fees or give securitytherefor." Determination ofwhat constitutes "unable to pay" or unable to "give security therefor," and, therefore, whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis is left to the discretion ofthe presiding judge, based on the information submitted by the plaintiff or plaintiffs. See,**~.** Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II Men'sAdvisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 217-18 (1993); Roberson v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 234, 239, appeal dismissed, 556 F. App'x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Fuentes v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 85, 92 (2011). This court and its predecessors
were established to make available a user friendly forum in which plaintiffs can submit their legitimate claims against the sovereign, limited only by the legislative decision to waive sovereign immunity as to the types of claims allowed. In fact, prominently posted at the entrance to this courthouse are the words ofAbraham Lincoln: "It is as much the duty ofgovernment to render promptjustice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administerthe same, between private individuals."
Interpreting an earlier version of the in forma pauperis statute, the United States Supreme Court offered thefollowing guidance:

Wecannotagreewith the court belowthat one must be absolutelydestitute to enjoy the benefit ofthe statute. We think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty "pay or give security for the costs

... and still be able to provide" himself and dependents "with the necessities of life." To say that no persons are entitled to the statute's benefits until they have sworn to contribute to payment of costs, the last dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves and their dependentswholly destitute, would be to construe the statute in awaythat would throwits beneficiaries intothe category ofpubliccharges. The public would not be profited ifrelieved ofpaying costs ofa particular litigation only to have imposed on it the expense ofsupporting the person thereby made
an object ofpublic support. Nordoesthe result seem more desirable ifthe effect ofthis statutory interpretation is to force a litigant to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in orderto spare himself complete destitution. We think a construction ofthe statute achieving such consequences is an inadmissible one.

Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948) (omissions in original).



### 6In Fiebelkorn v. United States, forexample, a Judge ofthe United States Court of Federal Claims indicated that:
[T]he threshold for a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is not high: The statute requires that the applicant be 'unable to pay such fees.' 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1). To be 'unableto pay such fees' means that paying such fees would constitute a serious hardship on the plaintiff, notthat such payment would render plaintiffdestitute.

Fiebelkornv. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007); see also Fuentesv. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. at 92; Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 366, 369 (2006).

In hisApplicationto Proceed In Forma Pauperis, proseplaintiffMr. Straw indicates that he receives an unspecified amount of income from Social Security Disability Insurance, has minimal savings, and has been unemployed since 2008. Plaintiff's application also lists $350.00 from "[r]efugee clients from Ukraine" and $20,500.00 from "settlements for disability discrimination" as his other sources of income within the last twelve months. Plaintiff's application further provides that he has monthly expenses of approximately $1,087.00, as well as approximately $52,000.00 in student loan debt and approximately $30,000.00 in credit card and legal debts. Although plaintiff's income and amountofoutstanding debt mightqualify him to proceed in forma pauperis, as discussed below, his application is moot because his complaint is being dismissed.
Additionally, the court notes that plaintiff is afrequentfiler ofcomplaints in federal courts. Plaintiff has filed multiple complaints or appeals that were dismissed as frivolous
orforfailureto stateaclaim. The statuteat28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(g),titledthe Prison Litigation Reform Act, was enacted with respect to prisoner plaintiffs to discourage frivolous lawsuits and denies informa pauperis statusto repetitive prisonercomplainants. It states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action orproceeding underthis section iftheprisonerhas, on 3ormore prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court ofthe United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(g); see also McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 394 (4th Cir. 2009); Pettusv. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009); Warren v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 507, 509-10 (2012); Dudley v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl. 685, 686 (2004). Since 2014, Mr. Straw has filed at leasttwenty-one complaints and twelve appeals on his
own behalf. Of those filings, in federal courts at least four have been dismissed as frivolous. See Strawv. Kloecker, 576 F. App'x 607, 609 (7th Cir. 2014) ("We agree with the district court [for the Northern District of Illinois] that Straw's lawsuit under RICO is frivolous, as is this appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and order Straw to SHOWCAUSEwithin 30 dayswhy he should not be sanctioned under [Federal Rules of



### 7Appellate Procedure] 38 fortaking this appeal.") (emphasis added); Strawv. Ind. Attorney General, No. 1:17-cv-03975-WTL-TAB, (S.D. Ind. Nov. 6, 2017) (order dismissing plaintiff's complaint as "frivolous," noting that Mr. Straw "is developing a pattern offiling frivolous litigation," and warning Mr. Straw that he could be subject to sanctions if he continued to file furtherfrivolous litigation) (emphasis added), appeal docketed, Strawv. Ind. Attorney General, No. 17-3357 (7th Cir. Nov. 14, 2017); Straw v. Ind. Attorney General, No. 1:17-cv-03975-WTL-TAB, (S.D. Ind. Dec. 4, 2017) (District Court, however, denied Mr. Straw's request to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis because Mr. Straw
was pursuing his appeal "in bad faith") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Straw v. Court, No. 1:15-CV-01015-RL Y-DKL, 2016 WL 344720, at *5-8 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2016) (dismissing the case because Mr. Strawfailed to state a claim underTitle Iand Title V oftheADA and failed to state adeprivation ofdue process in violation ofthe Fifth Amendment); Straw v. Sconiers, No. 3:14-CV-1772-JD, 2014 WL 7404065, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 30, 2014) ("Because Straw's claims are utterly frivolous, the Court dismisses the claimsfor lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction consistentwith Rule 12(b)(1).And even if Strawhad establishedjurisdiction, the motionswould be granted on the groundthatStraw hasfailedtostate aclaim uponwhich reliefcan be granted consistentwith Rule 12(b)(6).") (emphasis added); Straw v. Kloecker, No. 14-C-1420, 2014 WL 883289, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2014) (denying Mr. Straw's application to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissing the action because Mr. Straw's complaint was "legally frivolous") (emphasis added), aff'd, 576 F. App'x 607 (7th Cir. 2014). Additionally, at least two federal judges have dismissed complaints filed by Mr. Straw for reasons other than failure to state a claim, and, in doing so, noted that Mr. Straw also had failed to state a claim. Straw v. Dixon, No. 3:16-CV-276, 2016 WL 4014976, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2016) ("Even if Plaintiffhad properlyalleged thatdiversityjurisdiction exists, he hasfailed to state aclaim for abuse ofprocess."); Strawv. Am. BarAss'n, No. 14-C-5194, 2015 WL602836, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2015) ("Alternatively, even if Straw had standing to bring his claim (which he does not), he hasfailed to state a claim undertheADA.").

With respect to the case currently before this court, plaintiff's complaint also fails to establish a cognizable cause of action within the jurisdiction ofthis court and fails to state a claim. The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491, grants jurisdiction to this court as follows:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall havejurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim againstthe United Statesfounded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon anyexpress or implied contractwith the United States,
orfor liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491(a)(1) (2012). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the TuckerActwaives sovereign immunityto allowjurisdiction overclaims againstthe United States (1) founded on an express or implied contractwith the United States, (2) seeking
a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); see also Greenlee



### 8Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008); Palmerv. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

"Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a regulation is cognizable undertheTuckerAct. The claim must be onefor money damages againstthe United States

...." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see also United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 259 (2013); RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[P]laintiff must

... identify a substantive source of law that creates the right to recovery of money damages against the United States."); Golden v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 764, 768 (2014). In Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified three types ofmonetary claimsforwhichjurisdiction is lodged in the United States Court ofFederal Claims. The courtwrote:

The underlying monetary claims are ofthreetypes

.... First, claims alleging the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall within the Tucker Act's waiver.

. .. Second, the Tucker Act's waiver encompasses claims where "the plaintiff has paid money over to the Government, directlyorin effect, and seeks return ofall orpartofthatsum." Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-06,] 372 F.2d [1002,] 1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims "in which 'the Government has the citizen's money in its pocket"' (quoting Clappv. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, 580 (1954))

.... Third, the Court of Federal Claims hasjurisdiction overthose claims where "money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless entitled to a payment from the treasury." Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1007. Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to the government, either directly or in effect, require thatthe "particular provision oflaw relied upon grantsthe claimant, expressly or by implication, a rightto be paid a certain sum." 

### !.Q.,_; see also [United States v. JTestan, 424 U.S. [392,] 401-02 [1976] ("Where the United States is the defendant and the plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulationdoes not create a cause ofaction for money damages unless, as the Court of Claims has stated, that basis 'in itself

... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."' (quoting Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1009)). This category is commonly referred to as claims brought under a "money-mandating" statute.

Ontario Power Generation. Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
see also Twp. of Saddle Brookv. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 106 (2012).



### 9To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon "'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)); see also United States v. White MountainApacheTribe, 537 U.S. at472; United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217; Blueport Co

.. LLC v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1153 (2009). The source of law granting monetary relief must be distinct from the TuckerAct itself. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (The TuckerAct does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply a] jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)."). "'If the statute is not money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."' Jan's Helicopter Serv

.. Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d at 876); Fisherv. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The absenceofa money-mandatingsource is "fataltothe court'sjurisdiction under theTuckerAct."); Peoples v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009).

When deciding a case based on a lack of subject matterjurisdiction orfor failure to state a claim, this court must assumethat all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint

aretrue and mustdrawall reasonable inferences in the non-movant'sfavor. See Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 ("[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all ofthe factual allegations contained in the complaint." (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (citing Swierkiewiczv. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)))); Fid. 

### &Guar. Ins. Underwriters. Inc. v. United States, 805 F.3d 1082, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Trusted Integration. Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

"Determination ofjurisdictionstartswith the complaint, which mustbewell-pleaded in that it must state the necessary elements of the plaintiff's claim, independent of any defensethat may be interposed." Holleyv. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 203, 208 (2011); Gonzalez-Mccaulley Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 710, 713 (2010). A plaintiffneed only state in the complaint "a short and plain statementofthe groundsforthe court'sjurisdiction,"and "a short and plain statementofthe claim showing thatthe pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2) (2016); Fed. 

### R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2016); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57, 570 (2007)). To properly state a claim for relief, "[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences of fact do not suffice to support a claim." Bradleyv. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Mczeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 1286(3d ed. 2004)); Briscoev. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by any factual assertions will not withstand a motiontodismiss."), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). "Aplaintiff'sfactual allegations must'raise
a right to relief above the speculative level' and cross 'the line from conceivable to

10plausible.'" Three S Consulting v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), aff'd, 562 F. App'x 964 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2014). Asstated in Ashcroftv. Iqbal, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or'aformulaic recitation ofthe elements ofacause ofaction will notdo.' 550 U.S. at555. Nordoesacomplaintsuffice ifittenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at555).

Plaintiff'scurrentcomplaintfiled inthis courtallegesthathe suffered Constitutional, Fifth Amendment takings of his three "federal law licenses" in the United States District Courtforthe Northern Districtof Indiana, the United States District Courtforthe Southern District of Indiana, and the United States District Courtforthe Northern District of Illinois. To succeed under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, a plaintiff must show that the governmenttookaprivate property interestforpublic usewithoutjustcompensation. See Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 811 (2005); Arbelaez v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 753, 762 (201O); Gahagan v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 157, 162 (2006). "The issue ofwhether a taking has occurred is a question oflaw based on factual underpinnings.'' Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1370, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1045 (2008). The government must be operating in its sovereign rather than in its proprietary capacity when it initiates
ataking. See St. ChristopherAssocs., L.P. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The United States Court ofAppeals forthe Federal Circuit has established a two-part test to determine whether government actions amount to a taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment. See Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 511 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir.) (citing M

### &J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808 (1995)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005). A court first determines whether a plaintiff possesses a cognizable property interest in the subjectofthe alleged takings. Then, the court mustdeterminewhetherthe government action is a "'compensable taking ofthat property interest.'" Huntleigh USA Corp v. United States, 525 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Am. Pelagic Fishing Co

.. L.P. v. United States, 379 F.3d at 1372). Among its arguments, defendant urgesthis courtto dismiss plaintiff's complaintfor failure to state a claim because plaintiff does not have a cognizable property interest in his admission to practice law before any ofthe three District Courts. Plaintiff, however, argues that "[p]ersonal property is covered [by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment] and this Court hasjurisdiction overTakings Clause cases.'' Plaintiffasserts in his response to defendant's motion to dismiss that his "property interest in [his] law licenses is created through substantive due process" and that "a law license is a fundamental right under the Privileges and Immunities Clause ofthe U.S. Constitution.'' Plaintiff also insists in his response that "[a]s a disabled person, I am a member of a discrete and insular minority and my rights are subject to heightened scrutiny.'' (emphasis in original).

Mr. Straw appears to be alleging ajudicial takings by the three identified United States District Courts. There existvaried treatments ofjudicialtakings claims bydifferent

11courts. Some courts, including the United States CourtofAppealsforthe Federal Circuit, the binding Circuit Court for this court, have determined that judicial takings can exist, although without concluding that ajudicial taking actually occurred. See Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d at 1116 ("In that case [Stop the Beach], the Court recognized that a takings claim can be based on the action of a court."); see also Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 964 n.4 (9th Cir.) ("[A]ny branch ofstate government could, in theory, effect a taking." (citing Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713-15 (plurality opinion))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 850 (2011). Although it is theoretically possible for a court to effect a fundamental taking, however, the United States Court ofAppeals forthe Federal Circuit also has indicated that the United States Courtof Federal Claims lacksjurisdiction overjudicialtakings claimsthat requirethecourt to scrutinize the decisions of othertribunals for the same plaintiff given the same set of facts. 5 See also Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Binding precedent establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision rendered by a federal district court."); lnnovairAviation Ltd. v. United States, 632 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir.) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decision of district courts and cannot entertain a taking[s] claim that requires the court to scrutinize the actions of another tribunal." (internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original)), reh'g en bane denied, (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 999 (2012); Vereda Ltda. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims cannot entertain ataking claimthat requiresthe courtto scrutinizetheactionsofanothertribunal." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir.) ('"[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions ofdistrictcourts."' (quoting Joshuav. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994))), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001); see also Potter v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 168, 169 (2015); Martiv. United States,6 No. 09-299, 2010WL 369212, at *2 (Fed. Cl.

5 In a non-presidential opinion, the Federal Circuit indicated that "[t]he appellant [Barth] asked the Court of Federal Claims to scrutinize the actions of coordinate federal courts to determinewhethertheir actions effected ataking ofhis property. Thatwas beyond the Court of Federal Claims' jurisdiction." Barth v. United States, 76 F. App'x 944, 945-46 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1049 (2003) (footnote omitted).

6 The Marti case is related to a recent decision ofthe undersigned, Milgroom v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 779 (2015), aff'd, 651 F. App'x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (per curiam), involving the same underlying facts as the Marti case. In the Milgroom case, this court determined:

This court is withoutjurisdiction to review the alleged taking by the District Court, ajudicial taking, see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010), because review in this case ofsuch ataking "would require the Courtof Federal Claimstoscrutinizethe merits of the district court's judgment, a task it is without authority to undertake." Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims does not havejurisdiction

12Jan. 29, 2010) (unpublished) ("[T]his court has nojurisdiction overtakings claimsthatare founded on a challenge to thejudgmentofanotherfederal court.").

Therefore, to determine whetherjurisdiction exists in the above captioned case, this court must ascertain whether ornot plaintiff'sjudicialtakings claims require the court to reevaluate the decisions ofthe United States District Courtfor the Northern District of Indiana, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, and the United States District Courtforthe Northern District of Illinois, including whetherthe case filed inthe United States Courtof Federal Claims involvesthe same plaintiffand the same set offacts as was analyzed in those District Court cases. Although his complaint alleges that ataking occurred when the District Courts each suspended plaintifffrom the practice oflawfor 180days, in his response to defendant's motiontodismiss, plaintiffargues "[n]o examination of the district court decisions is being requested, only verification that my licenses were suspended and providing the monetary takings I asked. Not one jot of these other courts' decisions is being asked to be changed here. I just want compensation."
Following the Indiana Supreme Court's 180 daysuspension ofMr. Straw's license to practice law in Indiana, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana issued an orderto Mr. Strawto show cause "why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed in accordancewith Rule IIofthe LocalRules ofDisciplinaryEnforcemenf'of the court. In the Matter of: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17-mc-13-TWP-DKL, (S.D. Ind. March 16, 2017), appeal docketed, Andrew U.D. Straw v. United States District Court, No. 17-2523 (7th Cir. July 26, 2017). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that Mr. Straw's submission to the court failed to "provide a sufficient bases [sic] to overcome reciprocal suspension in this court" and suspended Mr. Straw for 180 days without automatic reinstatement. 

## kl Similarly, the United States District Courtforthe Northern District of Indiana imposed reciprocal discipline "pursuant to N.D. Ind. L. R. 83-6.8(c)." In the Matter of: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17-MC-5-TLS, (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2017). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana also reviewed Mr. Straw's submission to the court and found that Mr. Straw's

to review the decisions of district courts or the clerks of district courts relating to proceedings before those courts."). Just as the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of the United States District Courts, the Court of Federal Claims also does not have jurisdictionto review decisionsofthe United States Bankruptcy Courts. See Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to entertain judicial takings claims againstfederal bankruptcy courts because "[s]uch a determination would require the court to scrutinize the actions of the bankruptcytrustees and courts"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001); Mora

v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 713, 716 (2014) ("[T]his court does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of state courts, federal bankruptcy courts, federal districtcourts, orfederal circuit courts ofappeals.").
Milgroom v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. at 801-02.

13submission was notsufficientto avoid reciprocal discipline

. 

### .!Q,_ The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana suspended Mr. Straw for 180 days without automatic reinstatement and noted that Mr. Straw's submissions "only highlight that the suspension is appropriate, as [Mr. Straw] is either unwilling or incapable ofaccepting that his claims did not have 'a basis in law and fact

...that is notfrivolous

...."' 

### .!Q,_ (citation omitted). Additionally, inthe United States DistrictCourtforthe Northern DistrictofIllinois, the court determined that Mr. Straw's submission to the court requesting that the court not impose discipline identical to that imposed by the Indiana Supreme Court did not satisfy any of "the grounds setforth in Local Rule 83.26(e)" and suspended Mr. Strawfor 180 days without automatic reinstatement. In the Matter of Andrew U.D. Straw, An Attorney, No. 17-D-02, (N.D. Ill. March 17, 2017). Each ofthese United States District Courts interpreted their own local rules and decided to impose reciprocal discipline and suspend plaintiff's admissionto practice beforetheirparticularcourt. This court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's judicial takings claims because this court should not reviewwhetherthe three United States District Courts properly interpreted theirown local rules when deciding whetherto suspend plaintiff.7

Plaintiff's own submissionsto this courtcontradict his assertion thatwhen alleging
a conspiracy and a taking by each of the District Courts to deprive him of his right to practice law in those District Courts, he is not challenging the propriety of the District Courts' decisions. Plaintiff's argument in his replyto defendant's motionto dismiss,which states "[n]oexamination ofthe district courtdecisions is being requested, onlyverification that my licensesweresuspended

.... Ijustwantcompensation," resemblesthe plaintiffs' argument in Allustiarte v. United States. In Allustiarte v. United States, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully claimed they were "not asking the Court of Federal Claims to review" the Bankruptcy Court'sjudgments, butwere onlyseeking to obtainjustcompensation forthe takings. Allustiartev. United States, 256 F.3d at 1351; see also Shinnecock Indian Nation

v. United States, 782 F.2d at 1353 ("The Court of Federal Claims, however, is without authority to adjudicate the Nation's claim that it suffered a compensable taking at the hands of the district court."); and the undersigned's decision in Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 367, 384 (2016) (observing that plaintiff's argumentthat the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fifth Circuit incorrectly interpreted and applied
case law precedent undercut plaintiff's assertion that he was not challenging the court's decision), aff'd, 862 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Plaintiff is, in fact, seeking to have this court reviewthe same factual issuesthatwere before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which this court cannotdo.

7 On May 19, 2017, the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board also convened a hearing to determine whetherthe Board should impose the same discipline on plaintiff as imposed by the Indiana Supreme Court. After holding a hearing in which plaintiff appeared telephonically, the Board found "that the conduct resulting in the Respondent's suspension in Indiana is not conduct that would be grounds for disciplinary action in Virginia." The Virginia Board elected notto impose reciprocal discipline on plaintiff.

14Moreover, this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's takings claims because the United States Court of Federal Claims may only exercisejurisdiction under the Fifth Amendmentwhen the claimant "concede[s]the validity ofthe governmentaction which isthe basis ofthetaking claim to bring suit undertheTuckerAct

...." Tabb Lakes. Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 802-03 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Mahoney v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 589, 592-93 (2016); Lea v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 440, 445 (2015). In this case, the initial disciplinary action was taken by Indiana's highest state court, and Mr. Straw has not conceded the validity ofthe three District Courts' actions which imposed reciprocal discipline. In sum, plaintiff has not alleged any valid takings claims overwhich this court hasjurisdiction.

Plaintifffurther asserts 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491 provides this courtwith jurisdiction over his "ADA retaliation claims" againstthe threefederal District Courtswhich issued orders suspending plaintiff's admissionsto practice law. This court, however, lacks subject matterjurisdiction over plaintiff'sADA retaliation claims for several reasons. First, as discussed above, to demonstratethatthe TuckerAct providesjurisdiction over claims where a contract between the claimant and governmentdid not exist and no payment has been madetothe government, the claimant must prove thatthe particular provision of law relied upon is money-mandating.**See,~.** United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290; Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d at 1301. The ADA, however, is not a money-mandating law. See Dziekonski v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 806, 809-1

### O(2015) (noting thattheADA is not a money-mandating provision that would provide the COFCwithjurisdiction) (citation omitted); Shipman v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 701, 707 (2014) ("[T]he court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims alleging a violation ofthe Americans with DisabilitiesActof 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 

### § 12101 

### etseq., becausethe ADA is not a money-mandating source oflaw.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, the United States District Courts possess exclusivejurisdiction overADAclaims.**See,~.** McCauleyv. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 250, 266 (1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. 

### § 12117(a)) (finding the district courts had exclusivejurisdiction over claims brought underthe ADA), aff'd, 152 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, this court is not the properforum to seekjudicial relief underthe ADA. 

### kL see Johnsonv. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 560, 564 (2011) ("The Court notes that Federal district courts have exclusivejurisdiction overtheADA and Rehabilitation Actclaims."); Searlesv. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 801, 805 (2009) ("Indeed, the ADA does not applyto the federal governmentas an employer and district courts hold exclusivejurisdiction overADAclaims.").

Plaintiffalso asserts thatthis court hasjurisdiction underTitle II oftheADA arising under28 C.F.R. 

### § 35.134. Under28 C.F.R. 

### § 35.134(a), no "private or publicentity shall discriminate against any individual because that individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, 

### or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Act orthis part." The section of28 C.F.R. 

### § 35.134(b) provides:

No private orpublicentityshall coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interferewith any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her

15having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by the Act orthis part.

"Private or public entity" has been defined as any state or local government, any instrumentality ofa state or local government, orthe National Railroad Passenger Corporation. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. The ADA does not applyto the United States District Courtforthe Northern District of Indiana, the United States District Court forthe Southern District of Indiana, and the United States District Courtforthe Northern District of Illinois because those federal courts are notstate or local governments or instrumentalities ofsuch as defined by 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. See Cellular Phone Taskforce v. F.C.C., 217 F.3d 72, 73 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ("Title II oftheADA is notapplicableto the federal government."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1070 (2001); Pierce

v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 798, 801 (2014) (stating that neitherthe United States Tax Court northe United States District Courtforthe Eastern District ofCalifornia were a "public entity"for purposes oftheADA) (citing United States v. Wishart, 146 F. App'x 171 (9th Cir. 2005)), aff'd, 590 F. App'x 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Grayv. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 95, 101 n.5 (2005)); Agee v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 284, 289 (2006) (concluding that the COFC does not havejurisdiction over claims arising underTitle II of the ADA).
Finally, regardless, defendant asserts plaintiffs claims against the United States would be barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500, which provides:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall not havejurisdiction ofany claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in anyothercourt any suit orprocess againstthe United States or any person who, at the time when the cause of action alleged in such suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or professing to act, directly or indirectly underthe authority ofthe United States.

The application ofsection 1500 turns on whether a plaintiff, at the time suit was filed in the CourtofFederal Claims, had asuit pending in anotherfederal courtagainstthe United States

### ora person acting underauthority ofthe United States, based on substantiallythe
same operative facts as the suit filed in this court, regardless of the relief sought. See United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 315 (2011). "The question of whether another claim is 'pending' for purposes of§ 1500 is determined at the time at which the suit in the CourtofFederal Claims isfiled, notthetimeatwhich the Government
moves to dismiss the action." Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993)). Indeed, "'the jurisdiction of the Court depends uponthe stateofthings atthetimeofthe action brought.'" Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. at 207 (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. 537, 539 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (other citations omitted) (noting that the Court of Federal Claims correctly applied section 1500 by "looking to the facts existing when Keene filed each of its complaints"). When a District Court has entered judgment dismissing a case, the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit has established that once "a notice ofappeal is filed,"

16then the case is "pending" under 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1500. Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

The United States Supreme Court offered some clarification regarding the effect of 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1500 in Tohono O'Odham Nation. In the words of the United States Supreme Court, section 1500 "barsjurisdiction in the CFC [Court of Federal Claims] not only ifthe plaintiffsues on an identical claim elsewhere - a suit 'for' the same claim

- but also ifthe plaintiff's other action is related although not identical - asuit 'in respectto' the
same claim." United Statesv. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. at 312. The Supreme Court explained, "two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are based
on substantiallythesame operativefacts." 

## !flat318 (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 206 (1993)).

There is, however, no settestto determinewhen, according tothe Supreme Court, "two suits have sufficientfactual overlap totriggerthejurisdictional bar." United Statesv. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. at318. Although the assessment must be on a case by case factual basis, the Tohono O'Odham Nation case provides a general framework for consideration. In its decision, the Supreme Court stated in Tohono O'Odham Nation:

The remaining question is whether the Nation's two suits have sufficient factual overlap to trigger the jurisdictional bar. The CFC [United States Court of Federal Claims] dismissed the action here in part because it concluded that the facts in the Nation's two suits were, "for all practical purposes, identical." 79 Fed. Cl. 645, 656 (2007). Itwas correct to do so. Thetwo actions both allegethatthe United States holdsthe same assets in trust for the Nation's benefit. They describe almost identical breaches of fiduciary duty

- that the United States engaged in self-dealing and imprudent investment, and failed to provide an accurate accounting ofthe assets held in trust, for example. Indeed, it appears that the Nation could have filed two identical complaints, save the caption and prayer for relief, without changing either suit in any significant respect. Under 

### § 1500, the substantial overlap in operative facts between the Nation's District Court and CFC suits precludesjurisdiction in the CFC.


## !flat 317.

Plaintiff appealed the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana's order suspending plaintiff's admission to the court for 180 days to the United States Court ofAppeals forthe Seventh Circuit on July 26, 2017, which was two weeks beforeplaintifffiled hiscomplaintwiththis court. 8 SeeAndrew U.D. Strawv. United States

8 It appears that Mr. Straw has not appealed the decision by the United States District Courtforthe Northern District ofIndiana in In the Matterof: Andrew U.D. Straw, No. 1:17- MC-5-TLS, (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2017), orthe decision bythe United States District Court forthe Northern District of Illinois in In the MatterofAndrew U.D. Straw, AnAttorney, No. 17-D-02, (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2017).

17District Court, No. 17-2523 (?th Cir. July 26, 2017). In the docketing statement in the Circuit Court, Mr. Straw sought review ofwhether "the Southern District of Indiana has the authorityto imposediscipline based on cases in otherdistricts" and whether Mr. Straw has "an absolute right not to experience any discrimination or retaliation for filing any disability rights complaint or lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 

### § 12203, 28 C.F.R. 

### § 35.134, and explained in the technical assistance manual at http://www.ada.gov/reg2.htm." )fl Upon review, it is apparentthat the initial case in United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana and the appeal, which, clearly, was pending when plaintiff filed his complaint in this court, arise from substantially the same operative facts, which revolve around whether Mr. Straw's suspension by the Indiana Supreme Court and the United States DistrictCourtfortheSouthern Districtof Indianawere proper. Therefore, his claims filed in this court are barred 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1500. See United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. at 317; see also Trusted Integration. Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d at 1165 (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1500 barred two ofthe plaintiff's three claims when the plaintiff, at the time it filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims, had a complaint pending in a District Courtthat involved "nearly identical conduct").

Finally, this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's allegations that the District Courts' decisions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Due Process Clause "does not 'mandate money damages by the Government."' Chittenden

v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 251, 260 (2016) (quoting Smith v. United States, 36 F. App'x. 444, 446 (Fed. Cir.) (citing LeBlancv. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1010 (2002)), aff'd, 663 F. App'x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Golden v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 764, 768 (2014) (finding the court lackedjurisdiction over plaintiff's claim that the United States Supreme Courtviolated plaintiff's due process rights by disbarring plaintiffwithout providing notice to plaintiff). Also to the extent plaintiff argues the District Courts' decisions violated the Privilege and Immunities Clause ofArticle IVofthe United States Constitution, this court likewise finds that it lacks jurisdiction over such a claim because the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not mandate paymentofmoneybythefederal government. See Howell v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 775, 790 (2016); lvaldyv. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 633, 637 (2015), aff'd, 655 F. App'x 813, 815 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Additionally, this court lacks jurisdiction over claims arising under the Equal Protection Clause ofthe FifthAmendment. SeeJoshuav. United States, 17 F.3d at379; Stephenson

v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 193 (2003). In decidingwhetheran applicant is qualified to practice law before a state court, such as Indiana, and, more particularly, the three federal District Courts addressed in plaintiff's complaint, each such court must make an individualized determination as to whether the applicant has satisfied the established state or federal criteria for admission and continued practice. Each federal court establishes its own criteria to establish when reciprocal suspension or disbarment is appropriate. See LCrR. 83.11; N.D. Ind. R. 83-5; S.D. Ind. R. 83-5. Plaintiffdoes nothave
a constitutionally protected property interest in his admissions before a court. See Conti

v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1112 (2003).

18CONCLUSION

Fortheforegoing reasons, the court lacksjurisdictionto adjudicate anyofplaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. The Clerk ofthe Courtshall enterJUDGMENTconsistentwith this Opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19

# ~~~ MARIAN BLANK HORN Judge