J-S43032-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANA SUE LAUGHBAUM 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 516 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000007-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANA SUE LAUGHBAUM 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 517 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000264-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANA SUE LAUGHBAUM 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 518 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000265-2018
J-S43032-20

- 2 -

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANA SUE LAUGHBAUM 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 519 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000266-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANA SUE LAUGHBAUM 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 520 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000267-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANA SUE LAUGHBAUM 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 521 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000268-2018
J-S43032-20

- 3 -

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANA SUE LAUGHBAUM 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 522 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000582-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LANA SUE LAUGHBAUM 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 523 WDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000392-2018

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: March 19, 2021

Appellant, Lana Sue Laughbaum, appeals from the orders entered in the 

Jefferson County Court of Common Pleas, which denied her first petition filed 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

We affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. In 

2018, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with multiple counts of bad 
J-S43032-20

- 4 -

checks and theft by deception. These charges stemmed from Appellant’s 

attempts to sell timber on her land despite having a lien on the property which 

forbid her from doing so until the lien was satisfied. The PCRA court 

summarized the subsequent case history as follows:

[Appellant] met [plea counsel] for the first time at [the] 

Magisterial District Judge[’s]...office in Punxsutawney. 

There she discussed with him the civil happenings and 

litigation that gave rise to her criminal charges. [Plea 

counsel] advised her that he did not feel comfortable or 

competent to deal with the complex civil issues her defense 

would entail but offered to find her another attorney who 

did. When she later learned that having a new attorney 

would mean an additional delay, however, she elected to 

wait and see what kind of plea deal the Commonwealth was 

willing to offer her.

After exchanging a few letters with her, [plea counsel] had 

[Appellant] transported to his office on January 14, 2019 to 

review discovery and answer her questions. He had already 

conveyed the Commonwealth’s offer of 18 months [to] 10 

years in prison and advised her that the [c]ourt was willing 

to give her time served [to] 10 years if she pled that day—

a sentence the Commonwealth formally offered in the 

meantime. That would mean pleading to 2 [misdemeanor 

one] counts of Bad Check[s] and 6 [felony three] counts of 

Theft by Deception, [plea counsel] explained, and receiving 

concurrent sentences on each charge. Either option, he 

conveyed, would involve being subject to the terms and 

conditions of parole until 10 years had expired—a 

circumstance that raised a number of questions in 

[Appellant’s] mind. She wanted to know, for instance, how 

long it would take to get paroled and whether she would be 

permitted to relocate to California or Utah. [Plea counsel] 

was unable to answer all of her questions and frankly told 

her so. He advised her, however, that classification would 

likely take 4 [to] 6 months and that both her parole date 

and her ability to relocate were discretionary to the Parole 

Board. 

Though convinced her rights had been violated during the 
J-S43032-20

- 5 -

aforementioned civil litigation[1] and that these criminal 

charges were bogus, [Appellant] was concerned that she 

could not get a fair trial. A local jury, she thought, might be 

biased against her since she was originally from New York. 

She was also concerned, as was [plea counsel], that its 

members would have trouble understanding her complex 

defense, which depended on them appreciating the nuances 

of the prior civil litigation and agreeing with her assessment 

that its outcome represented a derogation of justice. She 

thus agreed to go forward with the open plea under the 

terms and conditions [plea counsel] had explained to her, 

but only if she could plead no contest.

At 12:12 p.m. that same day, the district attorney called the 

cases..., announcing that a plea deal had been reached. 

Referring to the plea colloquy he had already completed and 

explained to his client, [plea counsel] confirmed its specific 

terms as follows: “My client entered a no contest plea to the 

above charges and received time served to ten years SCI on 

each theft by deception concurrent and time served to five 

years SCI on each bad checks also concurrent [and the 

Commonwealth agreed to] nolle pros others including 

pending game law summaries.” [Appellant] then affirmed 

that she understood the legal effects of pleading no contest 

rather than not guilty; the elements of the offenses to which 

she was pleading; the maximum and guideline sentencing 

ranges assigned to each; and the facts the Commonwealth 

had alleged in support of the charges. [Plea counsel], who 

had already explained each of those things to his client, was 

directing her to the corresponding information on the 

written colloquy as the [c]ourt was questioning her. 

After the [c]ourt delivered the sentence, [Appellant] 

affirmed that she understood its terms and conditions.2 She 

further acknowledged that she understood her postsentence and appeal rights, and left the courthouse without 

asking any further questions of either her attorney or the 

[c]ourt. Housed in the Jefferson County Jail for 2-4 more 

weeks, she also did not reach out to either one before being 

transferred to the D.O.C. Confident that she had received 

precisely the sentence she had agreed to and was expecting, 

____________________________________________

1 The record does not specify the details of the civil litigation.
J-S43032-20

- 6 -

[plea counsel] did not reach out to her, either. [On February 

5, 2019, plea counsel filed a motion to withdraw and 

indicated no post-sentence motions or notice of appeal 

would be filed. The court permitted plea counsel to 

withdraw on February 11, 2019.]

2 By order dated January 22, 2019, the [c]ourt 

subsequently corrected what would otherwise have 

been an illegal sentence, assessing the maximum at 7 

years rather than 10 and recalculating [Appellant]’s 

RRRI date.

Nearly ten months after being sentenced, having neither 

filed a direct appeal nor asked [plea counsel] to do so on 

her behalf, [Appellant] filed the subject PCRA petition [on 

November 7, 2019]. She knew by then that the Parole 

Board was not going to approve her proposed relocation to 

California.

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed March 24, 2020, at 1-3) (internal citations and 

footnote omitted). 

In her PCRA petition, Appellant alleged plea counsel was ineffective for, 

inter alia, convincing her to enter an unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent 

plea. Appellant contended that, following her conversations with plea counsel, 

she believed that if she pled nolo contendere, she would receive a time-served 

sentence with immediate release, no parole, and permission to relocate to 

California. Appellant claimed she did not find out until after sentencing that 

her immediate release was not guaranteed, she was subject to ten years of 

parole, and she could not relocate out of state. Appellant also attached to her 

petition a handwritten copy of an alleged January 16, 2019 letter she sent to 

plea counsel. In the letter, Appellant expresses her concern that her sentence 

did not reflect the plea to which she thought she agreed, and requests that 
J-S43032-20

- 7 -

plea counsel pursue an appeal on her behalf. 

The court appointed PCRA counsel on November 13, 2019, and held a 

PCRA hearing on March 17, 2020, during which both Appellant and plea 

counsel testified. Significantly, plea counsel denied having received the 

January 16, 2019 letter during the following exchange:

[PCRA Counsel]: [Appellant] attached to her PCRA a 

letter she alleges she wrote to you January 16, 2019.

[Plea Counsel]: I looked at it when I was back there.

[PCRA Counsel]: Yeah. And I just set this up. I just 

want to tell you that the only letters that are contained in 

your file in this case—well, the last letter from [Appellant] 

to you is August of 2018.

[Plea Counsel]: Okay.

[PCRA Counsel]: Okay. If a defendant were to write you 

a letter, would it be your practice to stick it in the file?

[Plea Counsel]: Yeah, to stick it in the file. Like I said, 

even if to say in a case like this, I want to appeal, I would 

have said, what’s your basis for appeal. You know, we can’t 

challenge the legality of the sentence, we can’t challenge 

jurisdiction, and I’m saying generally if someone would just 

say I want to appeal the sentence, I always say on what 

basis. You know, we can’t just say you don’t like it. You 

need to tell me what the issue is, but I would have 

responded. 

[PCRA Counsel]: This is the January 16th, 2019—

[Plea Counsel]: I looked at it. I have no recollection.

[PCRA Counsel]: Basically, she’s saying, hey, this isn’t 

the agreement. I want to appeal, kind of?

[Plea Counsel]: Had I received that, I would have 

written back to her.
J-S43032-20

- 8 -

[PCRA Counsel]: Okay. And had you received it, you 

would have kept a copy at least in your file, correct?

[Plea Counsel]: Yes. 

[PCRA Counsel]: And it’s not there. ... 

(N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/17/20, at 45-46). 

On March 24, 2020, the court denied PCRA relief. Appellant filed timely 

notices of appeal at each underlying docket number on April 16, 2020. The 

court ordered Appellant on April 27, 2020, to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Instead, on April 29, 

2020, counsel filed a Rule 1925(c)(4) statement of intent to file a 

Turner/Finley2 brief. This Court consolidated Appellant’s appeals sua sponte 

on May 7, 2020. On July 30, 2020, counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a 

Turner/Finley brief in this Court. 

Preliminarily, before counsel can withdraw representation under the 

PCRA, the law requires counsel to satisfy the mandates of Turner/Finley. 

Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 947 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

...Turner/Finley counsel must review the case zealously. 

Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a “no-merit” 

letter to the [PCRA] court, or brief on appeal to this Court, 

detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review 

of the case, listing the issues which the petitioner wants to 

have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack 

merit, and requesting permission to withdraw. 

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988); 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
J-S43032-20

- 9 -

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

Additionally, counsel must contemporaneously serve on Appellant copies of 

the “no-merit” letter or brief, the petition to withdraw, and a letter advising 

Appellant that she has the immediate right to file a brief in this Court pro se

or with new privately-retained counsel. Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 

509 (Pa.Super. 2016). “Substantial compliance with these requirements will 

satisfy the criteria.” Karanicolas, supra at 947. 

Instantly, counsel submitted a Turner/Finley brief on appeal and a 

petition to withdraw as counsel. Both the brief and counsel’s petition to 

withdraw demonstrate that counsel has made a conscientious examination of 

the record in this case and determined the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel 

notified Appellant of counsel’s request to withdraw, advised Appellant of her

right to retain new counsel and/or raise any points she might deem worthy of 

consideration, and furnished Appellant with a copy of the petition and the brief 

prepared for this appeal. Thus, counsel has substantially complied with the 

technical requirements of Turner/Finley. See id. Accordingly, we proceed 

with our independent assessment. See Turner, supra at 494-95, 544 A.2d 

at 928-29 (stating appellate court must conduct independent analysis and 

agree with counsel that appeal is frivolous). 

Counsel raises the following issues on Appellant’s behalf:

3

____________________________________________

3 Appellant has not responded to the Turner/Finley brief pro se or with newly 

retained private counsel. 
J-S43032-20

- 10 -

[Whether Appellant] was sentenced above the maximum 

sentence allowed by law?

[Whether Appellant]’s pleas of “no contest” were not 

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made?

[Whether Appellant]’s [plea counsel] was ineffective for 

allowing her to enter pleas that were not knowingly made?

[Whether t]he sentencing court was biased and prejudiced 

and should have recused himself from taking [Appellant]’s 

pleas and sentencing her?

[Whether Appellant] was not aware, at [the] time of 

entering her pleas, of the nature of the charges and possible 

sentence ranges?

[Whether Appellant]’s [plea] counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file post-sentence motions and direct appeals from 

the judgments of sentences?

[Whether t]he trial court improperly engaged in the plea 

bargaining process in [Appellant]’s cases?

(Turner/Finley Brief at 4).4 

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination 

____________________________________________

4

In her first issue, Appellant alleges the court sentenced her above the lawful 

maximum, where the court imposed a ten-year sentence on her felony-three 

theft by deception convictions. Here, the court initially imposed an illegal 

maximum sentence of ten years’ incarceration for the third-degree felony theft 

by deception convictions. Realizing its error, however, the court amended the 

sentence on January 22, 2019, to a maximum sentence of seven years’ 

incarceration. Thus, Appellant’s sentence is no longer illegal, and this issue 

merits no relief. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(3) (explaining term of incarceration 

for third-degree felony is fixed at no more than seven years); 

Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 A.2d 479, 482 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal 

denied, 591 Pa. 688, 917 A.2d 844 (2007) (stating: “[A]n illegal sentence is 

one that exceeds the statutory limits”). 
J-S43032-20

- 11 -

and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway, 

14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 

(2011). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if 

the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 

923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 

(2007). We do not give the same deference, however, to the court’s legal 

conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190 (Pa.Super. 2012). 

Traditionally, credibility issues are resolved by the trier of fact who had the 

opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. Commonwealth v. AbuJamal, 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810, 120 

S.Ct. 41, 145 L.Ed.2d 38 (1999). “A PCRA court passes on witness credibility 

at PCRA hearings, and its credibility determinations should be provided great 

deference by reviewing courts.” Commonwealth v. R. Johnson, 600 Pa. 

329, 356-357, 966 A.2d 523, 539 (2009). 

Appellant’s remaining issues concern allegations of plea counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. Pennsylvania law presumes counsel has rendered effective 

assistance. Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 

(2008). When asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

petitioner is required to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or 

inaction; and, (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
J-S43032-20

- 12 -

different. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). 

The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the 

claim to fail. Williams, supra. 

“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit....” Commonwealth 

v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot be 

found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” 

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ 

test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was 

designed to effectuate his client’s interests. If we conclude 

that the particular course chosen by counsel had some 

reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s 

assistance is deemed effective. 

Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95 (internal citations omitted). 

Prejudice is established when [an appellant] demonstrates

that counsel’s chosen course of action had an adverse effect

on the outcome of the proceedings. The [appellant] must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome. In [Kimball, supra], we held that a “criminal 

[appellant] alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 

trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 21-22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002) 

(some internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

In her second, third, and fifth issues combined, Appellant argues plea 
J-S43032-20

- 13 -

counsel was ineffective for leading her to enter an unknowing, unintelligent, 

and involuntary plea. Appellant alleges plea counsel led her to believe she 

would receive a sentence of time-served, with immediate release and no 

parole. Based upon this belief and in reliance on plea counsel’s advice, 

Appellant contends she only answered “yes” to the oral and written plea 

colloquies as a “mere formality” to achieve the sentence to which she thought 

she had agreed. (Turner/Finley Brief at 20). Appellant concludes plea 

counsel was ineffective and this Court must grant her appropriate relief. We 

disagree. 

A nolo contendere or no contest plea is treated the same as a guilty plea 

“in terms of its effect upon a case.” Commonwealth v. Leidig, 850 A.2d 

743, 745 (Pa.Super. 2004), aff’d, 598 Pa. 211, 956 A.2d 399 (2008). 

“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will 

serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to 

enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 

A.2d 526, 531 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citation omitted). “Where the 

defendant enters [her] plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the 

plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence 

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. 

Pennsylvania law does not require the defendant to “be pleased with the 

outcome of [her] decision to enter a plea of guilty[; a]ll that is required is that 

[her] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.” 
J-S43032-20

- 14 -

Id. at 528-29. A guilty plea will be deemed valid if the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the plea shows that the defendant had a full 

understanding of the nature and consequences of her plea such that she 

knowingly and intelligently entered the plea of her own accord. 

Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312 (Pa.Super. 1993). Pennsylvania 

law presumes the defendant is aware of what she is doing when she enters a 

guilty plea, and the defendant bears the burden to prove otherwise. 

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

Instantly, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s plea-related claims as 

follows:

[T]he credible evidence does not support the idea that 

[Appellant] entered an involuntary plea. On the contrary, 

she entered the courtroom knowing that her overall 

sentence included a 10-year tail; knowing that she would be 

serving at least 4 [to] 6 months in prison for purposes of 

classification; knowing that she would be on parole for the 

remainder of the sentence; and knowing that her parole 

date and ability to relocate to California were matters left to 

the discretion of the Parole Board. She was further aware 

of the maximum penalties and applicable guideline ranges. 

[Plea counsel] had explained them to her prior to the 

hearing, and she stated on the record that she understood

both her maximum sentencing liability and the terms of the 

deal she had reached with the Commonwealth. She cannot 

undo that now by insisting that she thought the words 

spoken in the courtroom that day were effectively 

meaningless. See Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 

A.2d 378, 384 (Pa.Super. 2002) (“We note that one is bound 

by one’s statements made during a plea colloquy, and may 

not successfully assert claims that contradict such 

statements”). 

By [Appellant]’s account, what happened on January 14, 

2019 was that she went into [c]ourt believing she would get 
J-S43032-20

- 15 -

the plea deal she alleged in her petition and assuming that 

the [c]ourt’s utterances and her replies were mere 

formalities that each needed to recite to accomplish what 

she wanted. What the record credibly suggests, though, is

that she fabricated the alleged plea deal only after learning 

that the Parole Board would not approve her proposed 

relocation. What it suggests, moreover, is that she drafted 

and pre-dated a letter she could attach to her petition to 

purportedly confirm that she knew even 2 days after her 

hearing that the sentence she received did not comport with 

the actual terms to which the parties had agreed off the 

record. Had she in fact drafted and mailed it on January 16, 

2019, it would have been in her file at the Public Defender’s 

Office. 

(PCRA Court Opinion at 3-4). The record supports the PCRA court’s analysis 

and we see no reason to disrupt the court’s credibility determinations in favor 

of plea counsel and against Appellant. See R. Johnson, supra; Conway, 

supra. 

Here, Appellant engaged in thorough oral and written plea colloquies

fully communicating her decision to plead nolo contendere on January 14, 

2019. Appellant acknowledged the nature of the charges against her, her

understanding of the maximum penalty and restitution required, and the 

rights she relinquished by entering a plea. Nothing in Appellant’s oral or

written colloquies suggests Appellant’s plea was anything but knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary. See Fluharty, supra. Appellant cannot now claim 

that the oral and written colloquies were “mere formalities” to achieve her 

desired sentence, nor can she rely on the fabricated January 16, 2019 letter 

to prove that she anticipated a different result at sentencing. See Pollard, 

supra. Consequently, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims in connection with 
J-S43032-20

- 16 -

her plea of nolo contendere merit no relief. See Pierce, supra.

In her fourth issue, Appellant argues plea counsel was ineffective for 

failing to request that the trial judge recuse himself from taking Appellant’s 

pleas and sentencing her, where the same judge placed the lien on Appellant’s 

land. Appellant contends the lien prevented her from timbering, which led to 

the instant bad checks and theft by deception charges. Appellant concludes 

she is entitled to relief. We disagree. 

“[A] party seeking recusal or disqualification must raise the objection at 

the earliest possible moment or that party will suffer the consequence of being 

time barred.” Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 846 (Pa.Super. 

2004), appeal denied, 580 Pa. 712, 862 A.2d 1254 (2004). Furthermore, “[i]t 

is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing 

bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s 

ability to preside impartially.” Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 611 Pa. 203,

222, 24 A.3d 319, 330 (2011). “In considering a recusal request, the jurist 

must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess 

the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the 

outcome.” Commonwealth v. Flor, 606 Pa. 384, 443, 998 A.2d 606, 641-

42 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 941, 131 S.Ct. 2102, 179 L.Ed.2d 900 

(2011). “The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued 

involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would 

tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary.” Id. at 443, 998 A.2d 
J-S43032-20

- 17 -

at 642.

Instantly, the PCRA court addressed this issue as follows:

There is...no merit to [Appellant]’s claim that [plea counsel] 

was ineffective for failing to ask [the judge] to recuse from 

[Appellant’s] cases. In the first instance, [Appellant]

testified herself that she did not broach the subject [with 

plea counsel]. She simply concluded that her attorney 

should have perceived from the way it had handled her civil 

cases that the [c]ourt was biased against her. [Plea 

counsel], though, was not familiar with the civil litigation 

beyond what she had told him—a fact she knew based on 

discussions regarding his intention to bring in another 

attorney if she wished to pursue a trial. Other than her 

opinion, moreover, she offered no evidence to indicate that 

the [c]ourt’s rulings in those matters were even in error, let 

alone the result of a personal animus. 

(PCRA Court Opinion at 5). We agree with the court’s analysis of this issue. 

Appellant failed to present any evidence to support her claim that the court 

was prejudiced against her due to its previous involvement in her civil 

proceedings. See Birdsong, supra. Further, Appellant has failed to 

demonstrate how plea counsel’s failure to request the judge’s recusal 

prejudiced her, where the court simply sentenced Appellant according to the 

terms of the plea agreement she had entered into with the Commonwealth. 

See Chambers, supra. Thus, this claim merits no relief.

In her sixth issue, Appellant argues plea counsel was ineffective for 

failing to file post-sentence motions or direct appeals on her behalf, where 

Appellant claims she requested that he do so because the sentence she 

received did not adhere to the terms of the plea agreement as she understood 

them. In support of her argument, Appellant relies on the handwritten 
J-S43032-20

- 18 -

January 16, 2019 letter she attached to her PCRA petition. Appellant 

concludes plea counsel’s ineffectiveness entitles her to relief. We disagree. 

“Before a court will find ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to file a 

direct appeal, the defendant must prove that [she] requested an appeal and 

that counsel disregarded that request.” Commonwealth v. Knighten, 742 

A.2d 679, 682 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 563 Pa. 659, 759 A.2d 383 

(2000) (citing Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999) 

(holding counsel will be deemed ineffective if counsel is unjustified in failing 

to file requested direct appeal)). “Mere allegations will not suffice; the burden 

is on Appellant to plead and prove that [her] request for an appeal was ignored 

or rejected by [plea] counsel.” Commonwealth v. Harmon, 738 A.2d 1023, 

1024 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 562 Pa. 666, 753 A.2d 815 (2000). 

“In addition, if a post-conviction court’s credibility determination is supported 

by the record, it is binding on the appellate court.” Knighten, supra at 682.

Instantly, in addressing this issue, the PCRA court reasoned:

[Appellant]...used that letter to set up the claim that she was 

denied her right to file a direct appeal. Clearly an intelligent 

woman, she doubtlessly realized that [plea counsel] would 

have been obligated to file an appeal on her behalf if she 

requested it in a timely fashion. Because the [c]ourt does 

not believe that she wrote the letter before developing her 

PCRA claims, though, that document has no evidentiary 

value. 

A defendant’s request is not the only thing that should make 

an attorney consider the efficacy of a direct appeal, of 

course. Defense counsel is also bound to consult with his 

client regarding the advantages and disadvantages of taking 

an appeal if the circumstances would lead him to believe she 
J-S43032-20

- 19 -

would want to appeal. Here, though, [plea counsel] had no 

reason to wonder whether [Appellant] might want to appeal 

her sentence. Not only had she received precisely the 

sentence to which she had agreed when she went before the 

[c]ourt, but the subsequent correction order left [her] with 

an even better sentence tha[n] she was anticipating. With 

no request from [Appellant] and no independent reason to 

believe [Appellant] might want to take an appeal, therefore, 

[plea counsel] was not ineffective for failing to file one. 

(PCRA Court Opinion at 4-5) (internal citation omitted). 

Here, Appellant relied on the January 16, 2019 letter to argue that she 

had asked plea counsel to file post-sentence motions and/or a direct appeal, 

which counsel ignored. During the PCRA hearing, however, plea counsel 

testified that he did not receive any such letter, and he would have placed a 

letter in Appellant’s file if he had received one. The PCRA court found the 

testimony of plea counsel credible and the testimony from Appellant 

incredible. The record supports the PCRA court’s analysis, and we see no 

reason to disrupt the court’s credibility determinations. See R. Johnson, 

supra; Knighten, supra. See also Conway, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s 

ineffectiveness claim merits no relief. See Pierce, supra. 

In her seventh and final issue, Appellant argues plea counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s improper participation in the 

plea-bargaining process. Appellant contends the trial court engaged in the 

plea-bargaining process when plea counsel approached the court prior to the 

plea/sentencing hearing and the court informed plea counsel that it would 

accept a time-served to ten-year aggregate sentence, rather than the 18-
J-S43032-20

- 20 -

month to ten-year sentence the Commonwealth had initially offered. 

Appellant concludes plea counsel’s ineffectiveness entitles her to relief. We 

disagree. 

“[A] plea entered on the basis of a sentencing agreement in which the 

judge participates cannot be considered voluntary.” Commonwealth v. M. 

Johnson, 875 A.2d 328, 331 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 748, 

892 A.2d 822 (2005).

A trial judge is forbidden from participating in any respect 

in the plea bargaining process prior to the offering of a guilty 

plea. When a judge becomes a participant in plea 

bargaining he brings to bear the full force and majesty of 

his office.... The unquestioned pressure placed on the 

defendant because of the judge’s unique role inevitably 

taints the plea.

Id. at 331-32 (quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 55, 252 A.2d 

689, 691 (1969)).

Instantly, the court explained: 

Also lacking was evidence that the [c]ourt impermissibly 

inserted itself into plea negotiations, which means that [plea 

counsel] had no objection to make in that regard. 

What [plea] counsel told his client on January 14, 2019, was 

that the [c]ourt was willing to give her a time served 

minimum while adhering to the Commonwealth’s proposed 

maximum if she entered open pleas. Making more of it than 

was warranted, she construed that information to mean that 

the [c]ourt was actively constructing the terms of an 

agreement it deemed to be suitable. As the record reflects, 

though, what happened was that the Commonwealth 

ultimately came back with an offer of time served [to] 10 

years in exchange for her pleading to eight separate counts,

... an offer she and the [c]ourt both accepted. 
J-S43032-20

- 21 -

Beyond that, counsel’s failure to [object to the court’s] 

alleged interference with plea negotiations did not prejudice 

[Appellant]. The Commonwealth’s original offer was for a 

10-year maximum, and it never retreated from that 

number. There is thus nothing to suggest that the [c]ourt’s 

involvement, however extensive she has construed it to 

have been, resulted in a sentence greater than she would 

have gotten otherwise. 

(PCRA Court Opinion at 5). The record supports the court’s analysis. The 

court’s statement that it would accept a lesser minimum sentence does not 

constitute impermissible “participation” in the plea-bargaining process in this 

case. See M. Johnson, supra. Additionally, Appellant did not demonstrate 

prejudice. See Chambers, supra. Following our independent review of the 

record, we agree with counsel that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous. See 

Turner, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s orders denying PCRA relief 

and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

Orders affirmed; counsel’s petition to withdraw is granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/19/2021