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*********************************************** 
IAN WRIGHT v. CARLETON GILES ET AL.

(AC 42686)

Moll, Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The self-represented, incarcerated plaintiff brought this action against the

defendants pursuant to federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983), claiming violations

of his federal and state constitutional rights. The plaintiff claimed that

he was entitled to deportation parole or a deportation parole eligibility

hearing pursuant to statute (§ 54-125d (c)) and, that under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, the defendants had violated his rights to due process by failing

to implement policies, procedures, and/or regulations that provided him

with a deportation parole hearing and/or with eligibility. The trial court

dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that the defendants

were protected by sovereign immunity and rendered judgment thereon,

from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the judgment

of the trial court was affirmed on the alternative ground that the plaintiff

lacked standing; the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he had a specific,

personal, or legal interest in deportation parole eligibility as the possibility of deportation parole created by § 54-125d does not create a legal

interest in parole eligibility, and the failure to exercise discretion to

grant a deportation parole eligibility hearing is not within the zone of

interests protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Argued September 10—officially released November 17, 2020

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the alleged

deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal constitutional

rights, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of New London, where the court,

Hon. Joseph Q. Koletsky, judge trial referee, granted the

defendants’ motion to dismiss and rendered judgment

thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Ian Wright, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).

Janelle R. Medeiros, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the

appellees (defendants).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The plaintiff, Ian Wright, appeals from

the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of

the defendants, Carlton Giles, Richard Sparraco, Scott

Semple, and George Jepsen, to dismiss the action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 We disagree and, accordingly,

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural

history. As we stated in Wright v. Commissioner of

Correction, 201 Conn. App. , , A.3d (2020):

‘‘The [plaintiff] is a Jamaican national who was convicted in 2002, following a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and carrying a pistol

or revolver without a permit in violation of General

Statutes § 29-35. The [plaintiff] was sentenced to a total

effective term of thirty-five years of incarceration,

including a sentence enhancement pursuant to General

Statutes § 53-202k. His conviction was affirmed on

direct appeal. State v. Wright, 77 Conn. App. 80, 822

A.2d 940, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 913, 833 A.2d 466

(2003). In 2013, the United States Immigration Court

ruled that the [plaintiff] be removed from the United

States to Jamaica.’’

In March, 2018, the self-represented plaintiff initiated

an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he

alleged that he sent an application to the Board of

Pardons and Paroles requesting a deportation parole

eligibility hearing, but to date has not received such

a hearing. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants

violated his federal and state constitutional rights to

due process by failing to implement policies, procedures and/or regulations providing him with a deportation parole hearing and/or providing him with eligibility.

He specifically alleged that the mandatory language

‘‘shall’’ used in General Statutes § 54-125d (c) creates

a legitimate expectation in parole to aliens who have

served at least 50 percent of their sentence. On April

16, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff’s

lack of standing and sovereign immunity. In a memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss, the

defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked standing

because no mandatory, statutory right to parole exists.

The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. On January 23, 2019, the court issued an order that

read: ‘‘The defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.’’

In response to a motion for articulation filed by the

plaintiff, on May 22, 2019, the trial court explained its

dismissal as follows: ‘‘The state enjoys sovereign immunity in this case. Calling this case a ‘civil rights action’

does not make that the case. [The plaintiff’s] allegations

that he was being denied a ‘deportation parole hearing

and/or eligibility’ does not rise to that level.’’
The plaintiff’s principal argument on appeal is that

his claim that due process entitled him to a deportation

parole eligibility hearing pursuant to § 54-125d (c)2 demonstrates a liberty interest in deportation parole eligibility sufficient to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants contend that the plaintiff has no

such liberty interest and argue that the court’s decision

should be affirmed on the alternative ground of lack

of standing.3

‘‘Where the trial court reaches a correct decision

but on [alternative] grounds, this court has repeatedly

sustained the trial court’s action if proper grounds exist

to support it. . . . [W]e . . . may affirm the court’s

judgment on a dispositive [alternative] ground for which

there is support in the trial court record.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Heisinger v. Cleary, 323

Conn. 765, 776 n.12, 150 A.3d 1136 (2016).

‘‘A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on

the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.

. . . When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most

favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court must take

the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including

those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,

construing them in a manner most favorable to the

pleader. . . . The motion to dismiss . . . admits all

facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing

record and must be decided upon that alone. . . . A

motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff

cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of

action that should be heard by the court. . . . The issue

of standing implicates [the] court’s subject matter jurisdiction. . . . If a party is found to lack standing, the

court is without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the

cause. . . . Because standing implicates the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff ultimately bears

the burden of establishing standing.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Manning v. Feltman, 149 Conn. App. 224, 230–31, 91 A.3d 466 (2014).

‘‘When standing is put in issue, the question is

whether the person whose standing is challenged is a

proper party to request an adjudication of the issue and

not whether the controversy is otherwise justiciable,

or whether, on the merits, the plaintiff has a legally

protected interest that the defendant’s action has

invaded. . . . Standing is established by showing that

the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring

suit or is classically aggrieved. . . . The fundamental

test for determining aggrievement encompasses a [well

settled] twofold determination: first, the party claiming

aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific,

personal and legal interest in [the challenged action],

as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the
concern of all members of the community as a whole.

Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the

[challenged action].’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn. 572, 579, 668 A.2d 688 (1995).

‘‘Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility,

as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected. . . .

With respect to whether the [plaintiff has] demonstrated

some legally protected interest, we often have stated:

Standing concerns the question [of] whether the interest

sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably

within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated

by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.

. . . [I]n considering whether a plaintiff’s interest has

been injuriously affected . . . we have looked to

whether the injury he complains of [his aggrievement,

or the adverse effect upon him] falls within the zone

of interests sought to be protected . . . .’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 154–

55, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004).

‘‘An allegation of injury is both fundamental and

essential to a demonstration of standing. Under Connecticut law, standing requires no more than a colorable

claim of injury; a plaintiff ordinarily establishes his

standing by allegations of injury. . . . As long as there

is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks

redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great.

. . . Furthermore, an allegation of injury is a prerequisite under federal law to the maintenance of an action

under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis

in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Johnson v. Rell, 119 Conn. App. 730, 737, 990

A.2d 354 (2010).

The plaintiff has not established that he has standing

because he has not demonstrated that he has a specific,

personal, or legal interest in deportation parole eligibility. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged a violation of

procedural due process as the basis for his § 1983

action, and claimed that he was deprived of a liberty

interest in deportation parole eligibility pursuant to

§ 54-125d. The possibility of deportation parole created

by § 54-125d does not create a legal interest in parole

eligibility. The plaintiff’s due process claims in the present case mirror those that he made in Wright v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 201 Conn. App. . In

that case, we determined that the plaintiff did not have

a liberty interest in deportation parole eligibility and/

or a deportation parole hearing pursuant to the deportation parole statute, § 54-125d. Id. We are mindful of the

limited scope of relief available through a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus; see Green v. Commissioner
of Correction, 184 Conn. App. 76, 85, 194 A.3d 857 (petitioner must allege either illegal confinement or deprivation of liberty interest to invoke jurisdiction of habeas

court), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 933, 195 A.3d 383 (2018);

and of the broader jurisdictional basis implicated in this

action. In this civil action, the plaintiff is not required

to demonstrate the existence of a liberty interest in

order to invoke jurisdiction. See Vincenzo v.Chairman,

Board of Parole, 64 Conn. App. 258, 263, 779 A.2d 843

(2001) (lack of liberty interest does not prevent plaintiff’s pursuit of declaratory judgment action as long as

statutory requirements for bringing declaratory judgment are satisfied). The plaintiff, however, must satisfy

the requirements of establishing standing to bring his

civil action. See, e.g., Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 235 Conn. 579–80.

The plaintiff has failed to allege a direct or imminent

injury to a legal interest. He does not have a legally

protected interest in deportation parole eligibility. See

Wright v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 201

Conn. App. . Furthermore, as the trial court alluded,

although the plaintiff wrapped his claim in the garb of

a civil rights action, his action concerns the fact that

he was not given a parole eligibility hearing. The failure

to exercise discretion to grant a deportation parole

eligibility hearing is not within the zone of interests

protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Hinesburg

Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 166 Vt. 337, 342, 693 A.2d

1045 (1997) (dispute dressed up as civil rights action

not within zone of interests of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff lacks standing.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff also raises an additional related claim regarding the Uniform

Administrative Procedures Act, General Statutes § 4-183 et seq., which he

did not raise in the trial court. This claim is unreviewable for a number of

reasons, but we simply state that, because the plaintiff lacks standing, we

decline to address this claim.

2 General Statutes § 54-125d (c) provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions

of subdivision (2) of subsection (b) of section 54-125a, any person whose

eligibility for parole is restricted under said subdivision shall be eligible for

deportation parole under this section after having served fifty per cent of

the definite sentence imposed by the court.’’

3 All parties also presented us with opposing arguments addressing the

trial court’s stated ground for dismissal, namely, that the action is barred

by sovereign immunity.