# Úradný vestník C 245/2011

| | ISSN 1725-5236
  doi:10.3000/17255236.C_2011.245.slk |
| --- | --- |
| Úradný vestník
  Európskej únie | C 245 |
| | |
| Slovenské vydanie | Informácie a oznámenia | Zväzok 5424. augusta 2011 |

ISSN 1725-5236

doi:10.3000/17255236.C_2011.245.slk

Úradný vestník

Európskej únie

C 245

Slovenské vydanie

Informácie a oznámenia

Zväzok 5424. augusta 2011

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| Číslo oznamu | Obsah | Strana |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Oznámenia |
| | OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE |
| | Európska komisia |
| 2011/C 245/01 | Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii (Vec COMP/M.6298 – Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Číslo oznamu

Obsah

Strana

II   Oznámenia

OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Európska komisia

2011/C 245/01

Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii (Vec COMP/M.6298 – Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informácie |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE |
| | Rada |
| 2011/C 245/02 | Oznámenie určené osobám a subjektom, na ktoré sa vzťahujú reštriktívne opatrenia ustanovené v rozhodnutí Rady 2011/273/SZBP vykonávanom vykonávacím rozhodnutím Rady 2011/515/SZBP a v nariadení Rady (EÚ) č. 442/2011 vykonávanom vykonávacím nariadením Rady (EÚ) č. 843/2011 o reštriktívnych opatreniach voči Sýrii | 2 |
| | Európska komisia |
| 2011/C 245/03 | Výmenný kurz eura | 3 |
| | INFORMÁCIE ČLENSKÝCH ŠTÁTOV |
| 2011/C 245/04 | Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu | 4 |
| 2011/C 245/05 | Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu | 5 |
| 2011/C 245/06 | Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu | 6 |
| 2011/C 245/07 | Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu | 7 |

IV   Informácie

INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Rada

2011/C 245/02

Oznámenie určené osobám a subjektom, na ktoré sa vzťahujú reštriktívne opatrenia ustanovené v rozhodnutí Rady 2011/273/SZBP vykonávanom vykonávacím rozhodnutím Rady 2011/515/SZBP a v nariadení Rady (EÚ) č. 442/2011 vykonávanom vykonávacím nariadením Rady (EÚ) č. 843/2011 o reštriktívnych opatreniach voči Sýrii

2

Európska komisia

2011/C 245/03

Výmenný kurz eura

3

INFORMÁCIE ČLENSKÝCH ŠTÁTOV

2011/C 245/04

Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu

4

2011/C 245/05

Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu

5

2011/C 245/06

Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu

6

2011/C 245/07

Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu

7

| | V   Oznamy |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY |
| | Európska komisia |
| 2011/C 245/08 | Výzvy na predloženie návrhov – Program ESPON 2013 | 8 |
| | KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE |
| | Európska komisia |
| 2011/C 245/09 | Štátna pomoc – Spojené kráľovstvo – Štátna pomoc SA.18859 – 11/C (ex NN 65/10) – Oslobodenie od dane z kameniva v Severnom Írsku (ex N 2/04) – Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 108 ods. 2 ZFEÚ (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2011/C 245/10 | Štátna pomoc – Nemecko (Články 107 až 109 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie) – Štátna pomoc MC 15/09 – LBBW Deka divestment (
  1
  ) | 21 |

V   Oznamy

ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY

Európska komisia

2011/C 245/08

Výzvy na predloženie návrhov – Program ESPON 2013

8

KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE

Európska komisia

2011/C 245/09

Štátna pomoc – Spojené kráľovstvo – Štátna pomoc SA.18859 – 11/C (ex NN 65/10) – Oslobodenie od dane z kameniva v Severnom Írsku (ex N 2/04) – Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 108 ods. 2 ZFEÚ (
  1
  )

1

10

2011/C 245/10

Štátna pomoc – Nemecko (Články 107 až 109 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie) – Štátna pomoc MC 15/09 – LBBW Deka divestment (
  1
  )

1

21

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text s významom pre EHP |

---

(1)   Text s významom pre EHP

1

| SK | |
| --- | --- |

SK

---

II Oznámenia

OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Európska komisia

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/1

---

Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii

(Vec COMP/M.6298 – Schneider Electric/Telvent)

(Text s významom pre EHP)

2011/C 245/01

Dňa 9. augusta 2011 sa Komisia rozhodla nevzniesť námietku voči uvedenej oznámenej koncentrácii a vyhlásiť ju za zlučiteľnú so spoločným trhom. Toto rozhodnutie je založené na článku 6 ods. 1 písm. b) nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004. Úplné znenie rozhodnutia je dostupné iba v angličtine jazyku a bude zverejnené po odstránení akýchkoľvek obchodných tajomstiev. Bude dostupné:

| — | v časti webovej stránky Komisie o hospodárskej súťaži venovanej fúziám (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Táto webová stránka poskytuje rôzne možnosti na vyhľadávanie individuálnych rozhodnutí o fúziách podľa názvu spoločnosti, čísla prípadu, dátumu a sektorových indexov, |
| --- | --- |

—

v časti webovej stránky Komisie o hospodárskej súťaži venovanej fúziám (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Táto webová stránka poskytuje rôzne možnosti na vyhľadávanie individuálnych rozhodnutí o fúziách podľa názvu spoločnosti, čísla prípadu, dátumu a sektorových indexov,

| — | v elektronickej podobe na webovej stránke EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) pod číslom dokumentu 32011M6298. EUR-Lex predstavuje online prístup k európskemu právu. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronickej podobe na webovej stránke EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) pod číslom dokumentu 32011M6298. EUR-Lex predstavuje online prístup k európskemu právu.

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IV Informácie

INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ, ORGÁNOV, ÚRADOV A AGENTÚR EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Rada

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/2

---

Oznámenie určené osobám a subjektom, na ktoré sa vzťahujú reštriktívne opatrenia ustanovené v rozhodnutí Rady 2011/273/SZBP vykonávanom vykonávacím rozhodnutím Rady 2011/515/SZBP a v nariadení Rady (EÚ) č. 442/2011 vykonávanom vykonávacím nariadením Rady (EÚ) č. 843/2011 o reštriktívnych opatreniach voči Sýrii

2011/C 245/02

RADA EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Nasledujúce informácie sú určené osobám a subjektom, ktoré sa uvádzajú v prílohe I k rozhodnutiu Rady 2011/273/SZBP vykonávanom vykonávacím rozhodnutím Rady 2011/515/SZBP (1) a v prílohe II k nariadeniu Rady (EÚ) č. 442/2011 vykonávanom vykonávacím nariadením Rady (EÚ) č. 843/2011 (2) o reštriktívnych opatreniach voči Sýrii.

Rada Európskej únie rozhodla, že osoby a subjekty uvedené v predmetných prílohách by sa mali zaradiť do zoznamu osôb a subjektov, na ktoré sa vzťahujú reštriktívne opatrenia ustanovené v rozhodnutí 2011/273/SZBP a v nariadení (EÚ) č. 442/2011 o reštriktívnych opatreniach voči Sýrii. Dôvody zaradenia týchto osôb a subjektov sa uvádzajú v príslušných záznamoch v týchto prílohách.

Dotknuté osoby a subjekty upozorňujeme na možnosť podať žiadosť príslušným orgánom relevantného členského štátu alebo štátov, uvedeným na internetových stránkach v prílohe III k nariadeniu (EÚ) č. 442/2011, s cieľom získať povolenie na použitie zmrazených finančných prostriedkov na základné potreby alebo osobitné platby (pozri článok 6 uvedeného nariadenia).

Dotknuté osoby a subjekty môžu podať Rade žiadosť o opätovné posúdenie rozhodnutia zaradiť ich do uvedeného zoznamu spolu s podpornou dokumentáciou, pričom žiadosť zašlú na túto adresu:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| DG K Coordination |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG K Coordination

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Dotknuté osoby a subjekty sa tiež upozorňujú na možnosť napadnúť rozhodnutie Rady na Všeobecnom súde Európskej únie v súlade s podmienkami ustanovenými v článku 275 ods. 2 a článku 263 ods. 4 a 6 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie.

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 218, 24.8.2011.

(2)  Ú. v. EÚ L 218, 24.8.2011, s. 1.

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Európska komisia

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/3

---

Výmenný kurz eura (1)

23. augusta 2011

2011/C 245/03

1 euro =

| | Mena | Výmenný kurz |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Americký dolár | 1,4462 |
| JPY | Japonský jen | 110,72 |
| DKK | Dánska koruna | 7,4498 |
| GBP | Britská libra | 0,87600 |
| SEK | Švédska koruna | 9,1046 |
| CHF | Švajčiarsky frank | 1,1410 |
| ISK | Islandská koruna | |
| NOK | Nórska koruna | 7,8080 |
| BGN | Bulharský lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Česká koruna | 24,417 |
| HUF | Maďarský forint | 271,78 |
| LTL | Litovský litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lotyšský lats | 0,7095 |
| PLN | Poľský zlotý | 4,1499 |
| RON | Rumunský lei | 4,2574 |
| TRY | Turecká líra | 2,5783 |
| AUD | Austrálsky dolár | 1,3771 |
| CAD | Kanadský dolár | 1,4260 |
| HKD | Hongkongský dolár | 11,2766 |
| NZD | Novozélandský dolár | 1,7360 |
| SGD | Singapurský dolár | 1,7414 |
| KRW | Juhokórejský won | 1 558,38 |
| ZAR | Juhoafrický rand | 10,3816 |
| CNY | Čínsky juan | 9,2513 |
| HRK | Chorvátska kuna | 7,4740 |
| IDR | Indonézska rupia | 12 355,53 |
| MYR | Malajzijský ringgit | 4,2894 |
| PHP | Filipínske peso | 61,206 |
| RUB | Ruský rubeľ | 41,8255 |
| THB | Thajský baht | 43,140 |
| BRL | Brazílsky real | 2,3111 |
| MXN | Mexické peso | 17,7768 |
| INR | Indická rupia | 65,9830 |

Mena

Výmenný kurz

USD

Americký dolár

1,4462

JPY

Japonský jen

110,72

DKK

Dánska koruna

7,4498

GBP

Britská libra

0,87600

SEK

Švédska koruna

9,1046

CHF

Švajčiarsky frank

1,1410

ISK

Islandská koruna

NOK

Nórska koruna

7,8080

BGN

Bulharský lev

1,9558

CZK

Česká koruna

24,417

HUF

Maďarský forint

271,78

LTL

Litovský litas

3,4528

LVL

Lotyšský lats

0,7095

PLN

Poľský zlotý

4,1499

RON

Rumunský lei

4,2574

TRY

Turecká líra

2,5783

AUD

Austrálsky dolár

1,3771

CAD

Kanadský dolár

1,4260

HKD

Hongkongský dolár

11,2766

NZD

Novozélandský dolár

1,7360

SGD

Singapurský dolár

1,7414

KRW

Juhokórejský won

1 558,38

ZAR

Juhoafrický rand

10,3816

CNY

Čínsky juan

9,2513

HRK

Chorvátska kuna

7,4740

IDR

Indonézska rupia

12 355,53

MYR

Malajzijský ringgit

4,2894

PHP

Filipínske peso

61,206

RUB

Ruský rubeľ

41,8255

THB

Thajský baht

43,140

BRL

Brazílsky real

2,3111

MXN

Mexické peso

17,7768

INR

Indická rupia

65,9830

---

(1)  Zdroj: referenčný výmenný kurz publikovaný ECB.

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INFORMÁCIE ČLENSKÝCH ŠTÁTOV

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/4

---

Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu

2011/C 245/04

V súlade s článkom 35 ods. 3 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 1224/2009 z 20. novembra 2009, ktorým sa zriaďuje systém kontroly Spoločenstva na zabezpečenie dodržiavania pravidiel spoločnej politiky v oblasti rybného hospodárstva (1), sa prijalo rozhodnutie ukončiť rybolov, ako sa uvádza v tejto tabuľke:

| Dátum a čas ukončenia | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Trvanie | 18.7.2011 – 31.12.2011 |
| Členský štát | Holandsko |
| Zásoba alebo skupina zásob | HKE/571214 |
| Druh | merlúza európska (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Zóna | VI a VII, vody EÚ a medzinárodné vody zóny Vb a medzinárodné vody zón XII a XIV |
| Druh(-y) rybárskych plavidiel | — |
| Referenčné číslo | — |

Dátum a čas ukončenia

18.7.2011

Trvanie

18.7.2011 – 31.12.2011

Členský štát

Holandsko

Zásoba alebo skupina zásob

HKE/571214

Druh

merlúza európska (Merluccius merluccius)

Zóna

VI a VII, vody EÚ a medzinárodné vody zóny Vb a medzinárodné vody zón XII a XIV

Druh(-y) rybárskych plavidiel

—

Referenčné číslo

—

Webový odkaz na rozhodnutie členského štátu:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 343, 22.12.2009, s. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/5

---

Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu

2011/C 245/05

V súlade s článkom 35 ods. 3 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 1224/2009 z 20. novembra 2009, ktorým sa zriaďuje systém kontroly Spoločenstva na zabezpečenie dodržiavania pravidiel spoločnej politiky v oblasti rybného hospodárstva (1), sa prijalo rozhodnutie ukončiť rybolov, ako sa uvádza v tejto tabuľke:

| Dátum a čas ukončenia | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Trvanie | 18.7.2011 – 31.12.2011 |
| Členský štát | Holandsko |
| Zásoba alebo skupina zásob | HKE/2AC4-C |
| Druh | merlúza európska (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Zóna | vody EÚ zón IIa a IV |
| Druh(-y) rybárskych plavidiel | — |
| Referenčné číslo | — |

Dátum a čas ukončenia

18.7.2011

Trvanie

18.7.2011 – 31.12.2011

Členský štát

Holandsko

Zásoba alebo skupina zásob

HKE/2AC4-C

Druh

merlúza európska (Merluccius merluccius)

Zóna

vody EÚ zón IIa a IV

Druh(-y) rybárskych plavidiel

—

Referenčné číslo

—

Webový odkaz na rozhodnutie členského štátu:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 343, 22.12.2009, s. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/6

---

Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu

2011/C 245/06

V súlade s článkom 35 ods. 3 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 1224/2009 z 20. novembra 2009, ktorým sa zriaďuje systém kontroly Spoločenstva na zabezpečenie dodržiavania pravidiel spoločnej politiky v oblasti rybného hospodárstva (1), sa prijalo rozhodnutie ukončiť rybolov, ako sa uvádza v tejto tabuľke:

| Dátum a čas ukončenia | 9.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Trvanie | 9.7.2011 – 31.12.2011 |
| Členský štát | Francúzsko |
| Zásoba alebo skupina zásob | COD/5BE6A |
| Druh | treska škvrnitá (Gadus morhua) |
| Zóna | zóna VIa a vody EÚ a medzinárodné vody zóny Vb východne od 12° 00′ západnej dĺžky |
| Druh(-y) rybárskych plavidiel | — |
| Referenčné číslo | 792761 |

Dátum a čas ukončenia

9.7.2011

Trvanie

9.7.2011 – 31.12.2011

Členský štát

Francúzsko

Zásoba alebo skupina zásob

COD/5BE6A

Druh

treska škvrnitá (Gadus morhua)

Zóna

zóna VIa a vody EÚ a medzinárodné vody zóny Vb východne od 12° 00′ západnej dĺžky

Druh(-y) rybárskych plavidiel

—

Referenčné číslo

792761

Webový odkaz na rozhodnutie členského štátu:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 343, 22.12.2009, s. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/7

---

Informácie oznámené členskými štátmi o ukončení rybolovu

2011/C 245/07

V súlade s článkom 35 ods. 3 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 1224/2009 z 20. novembra 2009, ktorým sa zriaďuje systém kontroly Spoločenstva na zabezpečenie dodržiavania pravidiel spoločnej politiky v oblasti rybného hospodárstva (1), sa prijalo rozhodnutie ukončiť rybolov, ako sa uvádza v tejto tabuľke:

| Dátum a čas ukončenia | 2.8.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Trvanie | 2.8.2011 – 31.12.2011 |
| Členský štát | Portugalsko |
| Zásoba alebo skupina zásob | WHB/8C3411 |
| Druh | treska belasá (Micromesistius poutassou) |
| Zóna | zóny VIIIc, IX a X a vody EÚ zóny CECAF 34.1.1 |
| Druh(-y) rybárskych plavidiel | — |
| Referenčné číslo | — |

Dátum a čas ukončenia

2.8.2011

Trvanie

2.8.2011 – 31.12.2011

Členský štát

Portugalsko

Zásoba alebo skupina zásob

WHB/8C3411

Druh

treska belasá (Micromesistius poutassou)

Zóna

zóny VIIIc, IX a X a vody EÚ zóny CECAF 34.1.1

Druh(-y) rybárskych plavidiel

—

Referenčné číslo

—

Webový odkaz na rozhodnutie členského štátu:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

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(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 343, 22.12.2009, s. 1.

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V Oznamy

ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY

Európska komisia

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/8

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Výzvy na predloženie návrhov – Program ESPON 2013

2011/C 245/08

ESPON je európska sieť na pozorovanie územného rozvoja a súdržnosti, ktorá podporuje rozvoj politík súvisiacich s politikou súdržnosti EÚ. Program ESPON je spolufinancovaný Európskym fondom regionálneho rozvoja v rámci cieľa 3 Európskej územnej spolupráce a 31 krajinami (27 členskými štátmi EÚ a Islandom, Lichtenštajnskom, Nórskom a Švajčiarskom).

V rámci programu ESPON 2013 sa teraz zverejňujú výzvy na predloženie návrhov. Potenciálni príjemcovia sú verejné a súkromné subjekty z 31 krajín (27 členských štátov EÚ, Island, Lichtenštajnsko, Nórsko a Švajčiarsko). Návrhy môžu predkladať výskumní pracovníci a výskumné inštitúcie, univerzity, vedeckí pracovníci, odborníci a vedecké tímy. Výzva na predloženie návrhov pre nadnárodné činnosti vytvárania sietí je určená pre inštitúcie, ktoré sú uznané ako národné kontaktné miesta programu ESPON.

| 1. | Výzva na predloženie návrhov pre projekty aplikovaného výskumu:






  — | Európske susediace regióny (rozpočet 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Výzva na predloženie návrhov pre projekty aplikovaného výskumu:

—

Európske susediace regióny (rozpočet 750 000 EUR)

| — | Malé a stredne veľké mestá vo svojom funkčnom územnom kontexte (rozpočet 650 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Malé a stredne veľké mestá vo svojom funkčnom územnom kontexte (rozpočet 650 000 EUR)

| — | Územný rozmer chudoby a sociálneho vylúčenia v Európe (rozpočet 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Územný rozmer chudoby a sociálneho vylúčenia v Európe (rozpočet 750 000 EUR)

| — | Odolnosť regiónov voči hospodárskym krízam (rozpočet 759 153 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Odolnosť regiónov voči hospodárskym krízam (rozpočet 759 153 EUR)

| 2. | Výzva na predloženie návrhov pre cielené analýzy na základe vyjadrenia záujmu zainteresovaných strán:






  — | Centrá rastu na juhovýchode Európy (rozpočet 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Výzva na predloženie návrhov pre cielené analýzy na základe vyjadrenia záujmu zainteresovaných strán:

—

Centrá rastu na juhovýchode Európy (rozpočet 360 000 EUR)

| — | Kľúčové ukazovatele územnej súdržnosti a územného plánovania (rozpočet 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Kľúčové ukazovatele územnej súdržnosti a územného plánovania (rozpočet 360 000 EUR)

| — | Obývateľné krajiny pre udržateľný územný rozvoj (rozpočet 379 796,09 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Obývateľné krajiny pre udržateľný územný rozvoj (rozpočet 379 796,09 EUR)

| — | Politika v oblasti tvorby krajiny pre krajinný park troch krajín (rozpočet 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Politika v oblasti tvorby krajiny pre krajinný park troch krajín (rozpočet 360 000 EUR)

| — | Severné more – šírenie nadnárodných výsledkov (rozpočet 340 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Severné more – šírenie nadnárodných výsledkov (rozpočet 340 000 EUR)

Uvedené tematické oblasti pre cielené analýzy budú do výzvy zahrnuté pod podmienkou, že so zainteresovanými stranami, ktoré iniciovali dané projekty, bude podpísaná dohoda. Tieto oblasti budú preto potvrdené až dňom vyhlásenia výzvy 24. augusta 2011. Tematické oblasti nakoniec zahrnuté do výzvy budú dostupné na webovej stránke ESPON http://www.espon.eu

| 3. | Výzva na predloženie návrhov v rámci vedeckej platformy ESPON:






  — | Územné monitorovanie EÚ a podávanie správ (rozpočet 598 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Výzva na predloženie návrhov v rámci vedeckej platformy ESPON:

—

Územné monitorovanie EÚ a podávanie správ (rozpočet 598 000 EUR)

| — | Atlas ESPON o európskych územných štruktúrach a dynamike (rozpočet 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Atlas ESPON o európskych územných štruktúrach a dynamike (rozpočet 150 000 EUR)

| — | Zisťovanie územného potenciálu a problematických otázok (rozpočet 350 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Zisťovanie územného potenciálu a problematických otázok (rozpočet 350 000 EUR)

| — | Súbory územných podkladov pre programy EFRR (rozpočet 500 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Súbory územných podkladov pre programy EFRR (rozpočet 500 000 EUR)

| — | Nástroj ESPON na vytváranie máp on-line (rozpočet 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Nástroj ESPON na vytváranie máp on-line (rozpočet 150 000 EUR)

| — | Územné monitorovanie v európskom makroregióne – test pre región Baltského mora (360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Územné monitorovanie v európskom makroregióne – test pre región Baltského mora (360 000 EUR)

| 4. | Výzva na predloženie návrhov pre nadnárodné činnosti vytvárania sietí prostredníctvom siete kontaktných miest ESPON:






  — | Kapitalizačné činnosti na nadnárodnej úrovni realizované prostredníctvom siete kontaktných miest ESPON (rozpočet 600 227 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Výzva na predloženie návrhov pre nadnárodné činnosti vytvárania sietí prostredníctvom siete kontaktných miest ESPON:

—

Kapitalizačné činnosti na nadnárodnej úrovni realizované prostredníctvom siete kontaktných miest ESPON (rozpočet 600 227 EUR)

Termín na predloženie návrhov je 20. október 2011.

Dňa 13. septembra 2011 sa v Bruseli bude konať informačný deň pre potenciálnych príjemcov a stretnutie s partnermi programu.

Celá dokumentácia týkajúca sa uvedených výziev vrátane postupu na prihlásenie, pravidiel oprávnenosti, kritérií hodnotenia a formuláru žiadosti je k dispozícii na webovej stránke programu ESPON http://www.espon.eu

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KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE

Európska komisia

| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/10

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ŠTÁTNA POMOC – SPOJENÉ KRÁĽOVSTVO

Štátna pomoc SA.18859 – 11/C (ex NN 65/10)

Oslobodenie od dane z kameniva v Severnom Írsku (ex N 2/04)

Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 108 ods. 2 ZFEÚ

(Text s významom pre EHP)

2011/C 245/09

Listom z 13 júla 2011, ktorý je uvedený v autentickom jazyku za týmto zhrnutím, Komisia oznámila Spojenému kráľovstvu svoje rozhodnutie začať konanie podľa článku 108 ods. 2 ZFEÚ, pokiaľ ide o uvedené opatrenie. Komisia zároveň v súlade s článkom 11 ods. 1 nariadenia (ES) č. 659/1999 vyzvala Spojené kráľovstvo, aby predložilo pripomienky k zámeru Komisie začať konanie vo veci formálneho zisťovania.

Zainteresované strany môžu predložiť svoje pripomienky k opatreniu v lehote jedného mesiaca odo dňa uverejnenia tohto zhrnutia a nasledujúceho listu. Kontaktné údaje:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22951242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22951242

Tieto pripomienky sa oznámia Spojenému kráľovstvu. Zainteresované strany môžu písomne s uvedením dôvodov požiadať o dôverné zaobchádzanie s údajmi o ich totožnosti.

TEXT ZHRNUTIA

POSTUP

Spojené kráľovstvo listom z 5. januára 2004, ktorý bol zaevidovaný 9. januára 2004, notifikovalo opatrenie týkajúce sa oslobodenia od dani z kameniva v Severnom Írsku. Opatrenie bolo notifikované ako úprava pôvodného oslobodenia od dane z kameniva v Severnom Írsku (postupné zavedenie dane), ktoré Komisia schválila vo svojom rozhodnutí N 863/01. Dňa 7. mája 2004 Komisia prijala vo veci tohto opatrenia rozhodnutie bez námietok. Dňa 30. augusta 2004 spoločnosti British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd a David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd (ďalej len „žiadatelia“) podali odvolanie proti uvedenému rozhodnutiu Komisie bez námietok (zaevidované pod číslom T-359/04).

Dňa 9. septembra 2010 Všeobecný súd zrušil uvedené rozhodnutie Komisie. Podľa rozsudku Komisia nebola oprávnená zákonným spôsobom prijať rozhodnutie o nevznesení námietok, pretože neskúmala otázku možnej daňovej diskriminácie medzi predmetnými domácimi produktmi a dovážanými produktmi pochádzajúcimi z Írska. Komisia sa neodvolala proti tomuto rozsudku.

Orgány Spojeného kráľovstva pozastavili vykonávanie opatrenia od 1. decembra 2010 zrušením predpisov o dani z kameniva (daňové úľavy v Severnom Írsku) z roku 2004.

OPIS OPATRENIA

Oslobodenie od dani z kameniva do výšky 80 % (ďalej len „ODK“) sa uplatňovalo na čisté kamenivo vyťažené a komerčne využité v Severnom Írsku, ako aj na spracované produkty z kameniva vyťaženého v Severnom Írsku, ktoré tam boli aj komerčne využité.

Daň z kameniva je v podstate environmentálna daň na komerčné využívanie kameniva a uplatňuje sa na kameň, piesok alebo štrk. Spojené kráľovstvo ju zaviedlo s účinnosťou od 1. apríla 2002 na tieto environmentálne účely: maximalizovať využívanie recyklovaného kameniva a iných alternatív čistého kameniva; podporiť efektívnu ťažbu a využívanie čistého kameniva, ktoré je neobnoviteľným prírodným zdrojom.

S cieľom účinnejšie dosiahnuť zamýšľané environmentálne ciele, ktoré ODK neprinieslo, orgány Spojeného kráľovstva podmienili oslobodenie od dane tým, že nárokovatelia mali formálne začať rokovania o dohodách s orgánmi Spojeného kráľovstva a riadiť sa týmito dohodami, čím nárokovatelia boli zaviazaní k programu na zlepšenie environmentálneho správania počas trvania oslobodenia od dane.

POSÚDENIE

Po prvé, vzhľadom na rozsudok Všeobecného súdu Komisia posudzovala, či existuje bezprostredné spojenie medzi samotným opatrením pomoci poskytnutým formou oslobodenia od dane a diskriminačným daňovým postupom vo vzťahu k dovážaným produktom. Keďže v predmetnom prípade sa zistilo takéto spojenie, Komisia mala posúdiť, či opatrenie pomoci nie je spojené s diskriminačným vnútroštátnym zdaňovaním, ktoré je porušením článku 110 ZFEÚ (bývalý článok 90 Zmluvy o ES). Komisia sa v tejto súvislosti odvoláva najmä na judikatúru týkajúcu sa vnútroštátnej legislatívy, ktorou sa poskytujú daňové výhody domácim produktom v prípade, že sú vyprodukované za určitých environmentálnych podmienok. Takéto vnútroštátne zdaňovanie sa nepovažuje za zlučiteľné s článkom 110 ZFEÚ, ak sa výhoda nerozšíri na dovážané produkty vyrábané za rovnakých podmienok. Keďže v prípade ODK v Severnom Írsku tomu tak nebolo, Komisia má pochybnosti, či sa upraveným ODK platným v Severnom Írsku zabezpečil súlad so zmluvou, predovšetkým s článkom 110 ZFEÚ.

Tieto pochybnosti o súlade s článkom 110 ZFEÚ neumožňujú Komisii, aby konštatovala v tejto fáze zlučiteľnosť opatrenia s vnútorným trhom. S odkazom na tieto pochybnosti, pokiaľ išlo o súlad opatrenia s pravidlami štátnej pomoci, Komisia posudzovala predmetné opatrenie v zmysle usmernení Spoločenstva o štátnej pomoci na ochranu životného prostredia, najmä podľa pravidiel týkajúcich sa formy výnimiek alebo znížení environmentálnych daní. Vzhľadom na nezákonný charakter pomoci poskytnutej na základe upraveného ODK v Severnom Írsku v dôsledku toho, že Všeobecný súd zrušil základ zlučiteľnosti, Komisia posudzovala uvedené opatrenie v zmysle usmernení Spoločenstva o štátnej pomoci na ochranu životného prostredia z roku 2001, a od 2. apríla 2008 (t. j. odo dňa ich uplatňovania) v zmysle usmernení Spoločenstva o štátnej pomoci na ochranu životného prostredia z roku 2008.

Konkrétne pokiaľ ide o posúdenie v zmysle usmernení Spoločenstva o štátnej pomoci na ochranu životného prostredia z roku 2001, Komisia dospela k záveru, že ich podmienky sú splnené, pričom opätovne pripomenula, že pochybnosti o súlade s článkom 110 ZFEÚ jej neumožňujú, aby konštatovala v tejto fáze zlučiteľnosť opatrenia s vnútorným trhom.

Pokiaľ ide o usmernenia Spoločenstva o štátnej pomoci na ochranu životného prostredia z roku 2008, Komisia dospela k predbežnému záveru, že má pochybnosti, či je splnená podmienka nevyhnutnosti pomoci, najmä či podstatné zvýšenie nákladov produkcie nemožno preniesť na konečných spotrebiteľov bez značného obmedzenia predaja. Komisia v tejto súvislosti poznamenáva, že hoci informácie, ktoré poskytli orgány Spojeného kráľovstva, ukazujú veľmi významné zvýšenie nákladov produkcie v dôsledku ODK, čo by za bežných okolností znamenalo, že takéto zvýšenie by nebolo možné preniesť ďalej bez značného zníženia predaja, vzhľadom na nedostatok podrobných údajov v informácii Komisia v tejto fáze nemôže konštatovať, že táto podmienka zlučiteľnosti je splnená.

Preto na základe predbežnej analýzy má Komisia pochybnosti o zlučiteľnosti opatrenia „Oslobodenie od dane z kameniva v Severnom Írsku (ex N 2/04)“ so zmluvou a o jeho zlučiteľnosti s vnútorným trhom. Komisia v súlade s článkom 4 ods. 4 nariadenia (ES) č. 659/1999 rozhodla začať konanie vo veci formálneho zisťovania a vyzýva zainteresované tretie strany, aby predložili svoje pripomienky.

TEXT LISTU

„The Commission wishes to inform the UK authorities that, having examined the information supplied by them on the aid referred to above, it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

1.   PROCEDURE

| 1. | The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004.

| 2. | The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2).

| 3. | On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3).

| 4. | On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04). |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04).

| 5. | On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment.

| 6. | On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959). |
| --- | --- |

6.

On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959).

| 7. | The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The aggregates levy

| 8. | The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity.

| 9. | The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom.

2.2.   The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 10. | In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products. |
| --- | --- |

10.

In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products.

2.3.   The modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 11. | The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there.

2.3.1.   Background

| 12. | The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development.

| 13. | According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded. |
| --- | --- |

13.

According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded.

| 14. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent.

2.3.2.   Modification

| 15. | In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8). |
| --- | --- |

15.

In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8).

| 16. | The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9).

2.3.3.   Environmental agreements

| 17. | In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief. |
| --- | --- |

17.

In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief.

| 18. | The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:






  (a) | the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:

(a)

the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and

| (b) | the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter.

| 19. | Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

19.

Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management.

| 20. | The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings.

2.3.4.   Aggregates production costs, selling price and price elasticity of demand

| 21. | As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

  Table 1


  Selling price







  Type of rock | Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Basalt | 4,21 |
| Sandstone | 4,37 |
| Limestone | 3,72 |
| Sand and gravel | 4,80 |
| Other | 5,57 |
| Weighted average price | 4,42 |

21.

As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

Table 1

Selling price

Type of rock

Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne)

Basalt

4,21

Sandstone

4,37

Limestone

3,72

Sand and gravel

4,80

Other

5,57

Weighted average price

4,42

| 22. | As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

  Table 2 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,5 | 3,4 | 3,9 | 3,6 | 4,3 | 4,3 |
| GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 7,9 | 8,4 | 9,0 | 7,7 | 8,8 | 9,7 | 9,2 | 10,9 |

22.

As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

Table 2

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne

2,9

3,1

3,5

3,4

3,9

3,6

4,3

4,3

GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne

7,9

8,4

9,0

7,7

8,8

9,7

9,2

10,9

| 23. | As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic. |
| --- | --- |

23.

As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic.

2.3.5.   Pass-on and sales reductions

| 24. | As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain. |
| --- | --- |

24.

As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain.

| 25. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

  Table 3


  A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland











  Product | 2000-2001
  (million tonnes) | 2001-2002
  (million tonnes) | 2002-2003
  (million tonnes) | Fall,
  2001-2003
  (%) | Fall,
  2002-2003
  (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sand and gravel | 2,35 | 2,34 | 1,91 | –18,7 | –8,4 |
| Crushed rock | 7,86 | 7,88 | 7,27 | –7,5 | –7,7 |
| Fill material | 3,00 | 3,89 | 1,71 | –43,0 | –56,0 |
| Total | 13,21 | 14,11 | 10,89 | –17,6 | –22,8 |

25.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

Table 3

A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland

Product

2000-2001

(million tonnes)

2001-2002

(million tonnes)

2002-2003

(million tonnes)

Fall,

2001-2003

(%)

Fall,

2002-2003

(%)

Sand and gravel

2,35

2,34

1,91

–18,7

–8,4

Crushed rock

7,86

7,88

7,27

–7,5

–7,7

Fill material

3,00

3,89

1,71

–43,0

–56,0

Total

13,21

14,11

10,89

–17,6

–22,8

| 26. | The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state.

| 27. | As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers. |
| --- | --- |

27.

As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers.

2.3.6.   Other information

| 28. | The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011). |
| --- | --- |

28.

The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011).

| 29. | As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible. |
| --- | --- |

29.

As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible.

| 30. | The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.

2.4.   Position of third parties, appreciable positive effects

| 31. | In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue. |
| --- | --- |

31.

In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue.

| 32. | The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects. |
| --- | --- |

32.

The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects.

| 33. | As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock. |
| --- | --- |

33.

As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock.

| 34. | As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates. |
| --- | --- |

34.

As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates.

| 35. | With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003. |
| --- | --- |

35.

With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003.

| 36. | Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility.

3.   ASSESSMENT

3.1.   State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC)
   (13)

| 37. | State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

37.

State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| 38. | The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

38.

The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States.

| 39. | Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC). |
| --- | --- |

39.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC).

3.2.   Lawfulness of the aid

| 40. | Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15). |
| --- | --- |

40.

Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15).

3.3.   Compatibility of the aid

| 41. | It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16). |
| --- | --- |

41.

It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16).

| 42. | Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17). |
| --- | --- |

42.

Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17).

| 43. | The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

43.

The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States.

| 44. | As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated. |
| --- | --- |

44.

As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated.

| 45. | Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products.

| 46. | Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20). |
| --- | --- |

46.

Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20).

3.3.1.   Compliance with Article 110 of the TFEU

| 47. | According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

47.

According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU.

| 48. | According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect. |
| --- | --- |

48.

According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect.

| 49. | Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements.

| 50. | Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate.

| 51. | Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements.

| 52. | Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21). |
| --- | --- |

52.

Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21).

| 53. | Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment.

| 54. | Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage.

3.3.2.   Compatibility of the measure under the Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 55. | Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection.

| 56. | The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful). |
| --- | --- |

56.

The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful).

| 57. | Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:






  (a) | the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

57.

Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:

(a)

the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and

| (b) | the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008.

Ad (a) Compatibility of the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 58. | Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions. |
| --- | --- |

58.

Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions.

| 59. | The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax. |
| --- | --- |

59.

The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax.

| 60. | Point 51(2) provides that:
  “The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:






  (a) | the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection; |
| --- | --- | --- |

60.

Point 51(2) provides that:

“The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:

(a)

the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection;

| (b) | the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”.

| 61. | Point 51(1) provides that:
  “These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:






  1. | When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:






  (a) | these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.
  These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

61.

Point 51(1) provides that:

“These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:

1.

When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:

(a)

these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.

These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above;

| (b) | these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:






  — | where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:

—

where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection,

| — | where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”. |
| --- | --- |

—

where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”.

| 62. | With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)). |
| --- | --- |

62.

With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)).

| 63. | Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market.

| 64. | The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence). |
| --- | --- |

64.

The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence).

| 65. | In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

65.

In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled.

| 66. | In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent). |
| --- | --- |

66.

In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent).

| 67. | In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25). |
| --- | --- |

67.

In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25).

| 68. | For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

68.

For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage.

Ad (b) Compatibility of the measure under the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 69. | Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159). |
| --- | --- |

69.

Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159).

| 70. | As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes. |
| --- | --- |

70.

As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes.

Environmental benefit

| 71. | Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued. |
| --- | --- |

71.

Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued.

| 72. | As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials. |
| --- | --- |

72.

As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials.

| 73. | Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL.

Necessity of the aid

| 74. | According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

74.

According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary.

(1)   Objective and transparent criteria

| 75. | Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 76. | The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent. |
| --- | --- |

76.

The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent.

(2)   Substantial increase in production costs

| 77. | Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 78. | The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26). |
| --- | --- |

78.

The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26).

| 79. | Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

(3)   Impossibility to pass on the substantial increase in production costs

| 80. | Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned. |
| --- | --- |

80.

Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned.

| 81. | The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland. |
| --- | --- |

81.

The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland.

| 82. | The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased. |
| --- | --- |

82.

The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased.

| 83. | Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007. |
| --- | --- |

83.

Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007.

| 84. | In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided. |
| --- | --- |

84.

In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided.

| 85. | With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided. |
| --- | --- |

85.

With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided.

| 86. | Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers.

| 87. | Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

87.

Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met.

Proportionality of the aid

| 88. | With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:






  (a) | it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

88.

With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:

(a)

it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers;

| (b) | it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified;

| (c) | it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied.

| 89. | The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax. |
| --- | --- |

89.

The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax.

3.4.   Conclusions

| 90. | On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

90.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market.

| 91. | The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158. |
| --- | --- |

91.

The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158.

| 92. | Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision. |
| --- | --- |

92.

Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision.

4.   DECISION

| 93. | In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

93.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| 94. | The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

94.

The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

| 95. | The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.“ |
| --- | --- |

95.

The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.“

---

(1)  The phased introduction of the AGL.

1

(2)  OJ C 133, 5.6.2002, p.11.

2

(3)  OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 4.

3

(4)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet reported.

4

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(5)  The AGL is applied to imported raw aggregate, but not to aggregate contained in imported processed products.

5

(6)  On 2 April 2008, i.e. the day from which the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines were applicable, the level of AGL was GBP 1,95/tonne.

6

(7)  OJ C 37, 3.2.2001, p. 3.

7

(8)  The aggregates extracted in Northern Ireland and shipped to any destination in Great Britain were liable to the AGL at the full rate. This was also the case for aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland that was used in the manufacturing of processed products shipped to Great Britain. This ensured that aggregates and processed products from Northern Ireland did not enjoy a competitive advantage in the market of Great Britain.

8

(9)  As referred to above, the implementation of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was suspended as from 1 December 2010.

9

(10)  The information was submitted by the UK authorities for the purposes of an assessment of the measure on the basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. DETI Minerals Statement 2009.

10

(11)  Distribution costs depend on haulage distances, with haulage costs in the range of 15 to 20 pence per tonne per mile, with aggregate being delivered within 10 to 15 miles, depending on local circumstances.

11

(12)  Ecotec (1998) Report; EEA Report (No 2/2008) effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in selected EU countries; British Geological Survey (2008): The need for indigenous aggregates production in England.

12

(13)  The definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) of the TFEU did not change from the one contained in Article 87(1) EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

13

(14)  See Case C-199/06 CELF [2008] ECR I-469, paragraphs 63 and 66 to 68.

14

CELF

(15)  See Case C-199/06 CELF, cited above, paragraphs 61 and 64.

15

CELF

(16)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 91.

16

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(17)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 93.

17

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(18)  “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.

18

Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.”

(19)  The rules for national internal taxation as laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU did not change from those contained in Article 90 EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

19

(20)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 92.

20

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(21)  Case 21/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR p. 1, paragraphs 23 to 26; and in particular Case C-213/96 Outukumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, paragraphs 30 et seq.

21

Commission

Italy

Outukumpu

(22)  The identity of the taxpayer as such is therefore of limited importance.

22

(23)  “Thus [Article 110] must guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between domestic products and imported products.” (Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR p. 1343, paragraph 24).

23

[Article 110]

Bergandi

(24)  Commission Notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid, OJ C 119, 22.5.2002, p. 22.

24

(25)  See for instance Commission Decision on case N 449/01 (Germany) — Continuation of the ecological tax reform (OJ C 137, 8.6.2002, p. 34). Furthermore, this position was confirmed in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines where the payment of 20 % of the tax was explicitly “codified” as a proportionality condition of the aid granted in the form of exemption or reduction from environmental taxes (point 159(b)).

25

(26)  The highest selling price (GBP 5,57/tonne), the lowest profit margin (2 %) and the level of the AGL as originally notified in 2004 (GBP 1,6/tonne) are assumed. If the AGL level on 1 April 2008 (GBP 1,95/tonne) is applied, the share increases to approximately 36 %. Any other combination of price and profit margin necessarily results in the AGL presenting more then 30 % of the production costs.

26

(27)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

27

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| 24.8.2011 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 245/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 245/21

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ŠTÁTNA POMOC – NEMECKO

(Články 107 až 109 Zmluvy o fungovaní Európskej únie)

Štátna pomoc MC 15/09 – LBBW Deka divestment

(Text s významom pre EHP)

2011/C 245/10

Komisia oznámila Nemecku svoje rozhodnutie sui generis o pomoci MC 15/09 listom zo 14. januára 2011.

TEXT LISTU

„I.   POSTUP

| (1) | Rozhodnutím z 15. decembra 2009 Komisia schválila kapitálovú injekciu vo výške 5 miliárd EUR a ochranu pre aktíva so zníženou hodnotou vo výške 12,7 miliardy pre štruktúrované portfólio zahŕňajúce aktíva v hodnote 35 miliárd EUR v prospech spoločnosti Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (ďalej len ‚LBBW‘) vo veci C 17/09 (ďalej len ‚rozhodnutie o LBBW‘) (1). Uvedené schválenie bolo podmienené niekoľkými záväzkami zo strany Nemecka. Jedným zo záväzkov bolo, že spoločnosť LBBW predá svoj podiel v spoločnosti Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (ďalej len ‚Deka‘) do (2) [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Rozhodnutím z 15. decembra 2009 Komisia schválila kapitálovú injekciu vo výške 5 miliárd EUR a ochranu pre aktíva so zníženou hodnotou vo výške 12,7 miliardy pre štruktúrované portfólio zahŕňajúce aktíva v hodnote 35 miliárd EUR v prospech spoločnosti Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (ďalej len ‚LBBW‘) vo veci C 17/09 (ďalej len ‚rozhodnutie o LBBW‘) (1). Uvedené schválenie bolo podmienené niekoľkými záväzkami zo strany Nemecka. Jedným zo záväzkov bolo, že spoločnosť LBBW predá svoj podiel v spoločnosti Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (ďalej len ‚Deka‘) do (2) [...].

| (2) | Dňa 13. decembra 2010 Nemecko predložilo list od spoločnosti LBBW, v ktorom sa vysvetľovalo, že spoločnosť Deka nemohla byť odčlenená pred [...]. Dňa 21. decembra 2010 Nemecko uviedlo, že správca (3) a ministerstvo financií Bádensko-Württemberska potvrdili, že spoločnosť LBBW urobila všetko preto, aby uzavrela proces predaja v uvedenej lehote. Dňa 22. decembra 2010 Nemecko oznámilo žiadosť o predĺženie lehoty na odčlenenie do [...]. Dňa 5. januára 2011 Nemecko predložilo ďalšie informácie. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Dňa 13. decembra 2010 Nemecko predložilo list od spoločnosti LBBW, v ktorom sa vysvetľovalo, že spoločnosť Deka nemohla byť odčlenená pred [...]. Dňa 21. decembra 2010 Nemecko uviedlo, že správca (3) a ministerstvo financií Bádensko-Württemberska potvrdili, že spoločnosť LBBW urobila všetko preto, aby uzavrela proces predaja v uvedenej lehote. Dňa 22. decembra 2010 Nemecko oznámilo žiadosť o predĺženie lehoty na odčlenenie do [...]. Dňa 5. januára 2011 Nemecko predložilo ďalšie informácie.

| (3) | Dňa 22. decembra 2010 Nemecko informovalo Komisiu, že kvôli naliehavosti výnimočne súhlasí s tým, aby sa toto rozhodnutie prijalo v anglickom jazyku. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Dňa 22. decembra 2010 Nemecko informovalo Komisiu, že kvôli naliehavosti výnimočne súhlasí s tým, aby sa toto rozhodnutie prijalo v anglickom jazyku.

II.   OPIS OPATRENIA

| (4) | Rozhodnutie o LBBW sa zakladá na niekoľkých záväzkoch. Zarážka c) bodu 5 odôvodnenia 38 rozhodnutia o LBBW obsahuje záväzok Nemecka, že spoločnosť LBBW predá svoj podiel v Deka do [...]. Rozhodnutie neobsahuje výslovné povolenie na predĺženie uvedenej lehoty. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Rozhodnutie o LBBW sa zakladá na niekoľkých záväzkoch. Zarážka c) bodu 5 odôvodnenia 38 rozhodnutia o LBBW obsahuje záväzok Nemecka, že spoločnosť LBBW predá svoj podiel v Deka do [...]. Rozhodnutie neobsahuje výslovné povolenie na predĺženie uvedenej lehoty.

| (5) | Deka je verejnoprávny orgán (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts), ktorý sa zaoberá – prostredníctvom svojich dcérskych spoločností – podnikateľskými aktivitami nemeckých sporiteľní v oblasti súkromných investičných fondov. Polovicu vlastní združenie nemeckých sporiteľní (DSGV) a zvyšnú časť vlastnia prostredníctvom holdingovej spoločnosti (ďalej len ‚holdingová spoločnosť‘) krajinské banky. Nepriamy podiel spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti Deka dosahuje 14,8 %. Príslušní vlastníci majú predkupné právo v prípade, že jedna zmluvná strana chce svoj podiel predať. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Deka je verejnoprávny orgán (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts), ktorý sa zaoberá – prostredníctvom svojich dcérskych spoločností – podnikateľskými aktivitami nemeckých sporiteľní v oblasti súkromných investičných fondov. Polovicu vlastní združenie nemeckých sporiteľní (DSGV) a zvyšnú časť vlastnia prostredníctvom holdingovej spoločnosti (ďalej len ‚holdingová spoločnosť‘) krajinské banky. Nepriamy podiel spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti Deka dosahuje 14,8 %. Príslušní vlastníci majú predkupné právo v prípade, že jedna zmluvná strana chce svoj podiel predať.

| (6) | Pôvodne dalo združenie DSGV ponuku na podiel spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti DEKA, ktorá bola platná do [...]. Aby bol predaj právoplatný, museli by ho schváliť všetky ostatné krajinské banky vlastniace podiel v spoločnosti Deka, ako aj samotná spoločnosť Deka a jej valné zhromaždenie. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Pôvodne dalo združenie DSGV ponuku na podiel spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti DEKA, ktorá bola platná do [...]. Aby bol predaj právoplatný, museli by ho schváliť všetky ostatné krajinské banky vlastniace podiel v spoločnosti Deka, ako aj samotná spoločnosť Deka a jej valné zhromaždenie.

| (7) | Nemecko informovalo Komisiu, že všetky krajinné banky vlastniace holdingovú spoločnosť zamýšľajú predať svoj podiel združeniu DSGV, čím by sa združenie DSGV stalo výlučným vlastníkom spoločnosti Deka. Záväzné rozhodnutie o tomto predaji sa očakáva v lehote [...], hoci vzhľadom na zložitosť rozhodovacieho procesu nemožno vylúčiť dodatočný odklad do [...]. Podľa Nemecka, ak krajinné banky predajú svoj podiel v holdingovej spoločnosti, bude jednoduchšie získať súhlas na predaj podielu spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti Deka a uľahčil by sa proces predaja. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Nemecko informovalo Komisiu, že všetky krajinné banky vlastniace holdingovú spoločnosť zamýšľajú predať svoj podiel združeniu DSGV, čím by sa združenie DSGV stalo výlučným vlastníkom spoločnosti Deka. Záväzné rozhodnutie o tomto predaji sa očakáva v lehote [...], hoci vzhľadom na zložitosť rozhodovacieho procesu nemožno vylúčiť dodatočný odklad do [...]. Podľa Nemecka, ak krajinné banky predajú svoj podiel v holdingovej spoločnosti, bude jednoduchšie získať súhlas na predaj podielu spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti Deka a uľahčil by sa proces predaja.

| (8) | Nemecko ďalej informovalo Komisiu, že združenie DSGV predĺžilo svoju ponuku na nákup podielu spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti Deka do [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Nemecko ďalej informovalo Komisiu, že združenie DSGV predĺžilo svoju ponuku na nákup podielu spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti Deka do [...].

| (9) | Napriek žiadosti o predĺženie lehoty v prípade odčlenenia spoločnosti Deka Nemecko tvrdí, že spoločnosť LBBW urobila všetko, aby zabezpečila uskutočnenie uvedeného predaja. Správca dohliadajúci na odčlenenie spoločnosti LBBW, ku ktorému sa Nemecko zaviazalo v rámci rozhodnutia o spoločnosti LBBW, potvrdil uvedené tvrdenie. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Napriek žiadosti o predĺženie lehoty v prípade odčlenenia spoločnosti Deka Nemecko tvrdí, že spoločnosť LBBW urobila všetko, aby zabezpečila uskutočnenie uvedeného predaja. Správca dohliadajúci na odčlenenie spoločnosti LBBW, ku ktorému sa Nemecko zaviazalo v rámci rozhodnutia o spoločnosti LBBW, potvrdil uvedené tvrdenie.

III.   POSÚDENIE

| (10) | Toto rozhodnutie sa týka vykonania reštrukturalizačného plánu schváleného v rozhodnutí o LBBW. Nemecko žiada o odklad lehoty predaja spoločnosti Deka o tri mesiace, [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Toto rozhodnutie sa týka vykonania reštrukturalizačného plánu schváleného v rozhodnutí o LBBW. Nemecko žiada o odklad lehoty predaja spoločnosti Deka o tri mesiace, [...].

| (11) | Komisia môže predĺžiť lehotu na odčlenenie. Aj keď sa tak výslovne nestanovuje v nariadení (ES) č. 659/1999, Komisia môže predĺženie povoliť, pokiaľ tým nezabráni presadzovaniu rozhodnutia o LBBW (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Komisia môže predĺžiť lehotu na odčlenenie. Aj keď sa tak výslovne nestanovuje v nariadení (ES) č. 659/1999, Komisia môže predĺženie povoliť, pokiaľ tým nezabráni presadzovaniu rozhodnutia o LBBW (4).

| (12) | Komisia poznamenáva, že spoločnosť LBBW už aktívne začala s procesom predaja spoločnosti Deka tým, že zaistila ponuku zo združenia DGSV. V tejto súvislosti Komisia berie na vedomie názor Nemecka aj správcu, že spoločnosť LBBW urobila všetko, aby urýchlila proces predaja. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Komisia poznamenáva, že spoločnosť LBBW už aktívne začala s procesom predaja spoločnosti Deka tým, že zaistila ponuku zo združenia DGSV. V tejto súvislosti Komisia berie na vedomie názor Nemecka aj správcu, že spoločnosť LBBW urobila všetko, aby urýchlila proces predaja.

| (13) | Podľa Nemecka okrem toho existuje vysoká pravdepodobnosť, že krajinné banky vlastniace podiel v holdingovej spoločnosti by mohli takisto predať svoj podiel, čo by uľahčilo celkový proces predaja podielu spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti Deka. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Podľa Nemecka okrem toho existuje vysoká pravdepodobnosť, že krajinné banky vlastniace podiel v holdingovej spoločnosti by mohli takisto predať svoj podiel, čo by uľahčilo celkový proces predaja podielu spoločnosti LBBW v spoločnosti Deka.

| (14) | Napokon existujú presvedčivé argumenty, že proces predaja bude v rámci navrhovaného časového rámca najneskôr do [...] úspešný. Konkrétne sa zdá, že [...]. Toto rozhodnutie umožňuje spoločnosti LBBW predať svoj podiel v spoločnosti Deka aj v prípade, že by mal rozhodovací proces krajinských bánk týkajúci sa predaja podielov v spoločnosti Deka trvať dlhšie, ako sa predpokladalo. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Napokon existujú presvedčivé argumenty, že proces predaja bude v rámci navrhovaného časového rámca najneskôr do [...] úspešný. Konkrétne sa zdá, že [...]. Toto rozhodnutie umožňuje spoločnosti LBBW predať svoj podiel v spoločnosti Deka aj v prípade, že by mal rozhodovací proces krajinských bánk týkajúci sa predaja podielov v spoločnosti Deka trvať dlhšie, ako sa predpokladalo.

| (15) | Predĺženie lehoty na predaj o tri mesiace nespochybňuje celkové vykonávanie reštrukturalizačného plánu schváleného v rozhodnutí o LBBW, ktoré má trvať do roku 2014. Spoločnosti LBBW to takisto pomôže získať nevyhnutný súhlas ostatných krajinných bánk, či už spoločne alebo jednotlivo, čo predaj uľahčí. Predĺženie, ktoré je časovo limitované, by preto malo spoločnosti LBBW umožniť predaj podielu v spoločnosti Deka do [...]. Spoločnosti LBBW to preto umožní prekonať uvedené hlavné vonkajšie ťažkosti a ukončiť odčlenenie spoločnosti Deka tak, ako sa uvádza v rozhodnutí o LBBW. Komisia preto zastáva názor, že relatívne krátke predĺženie do [...] je oprávnené, predovšetkým vzhľadom na osobitosti právnej štruktúry spoločnosti Deka. Vzhľadom na okolnosti prípadu sa takéto predĺženie nepovažuje za odklad pôvodne prijatého časového harmonogramu, ktorý by si vyžadoval zodpovedajúce zníženie výšky pomoci (5). |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Predĺženie lehoty na predaj o tri mesiace nespochybňuje celkové vykonávanie reštrukturalizačného plánu schváleného v rozhodnutí o LBBW, ktoré má trvať do roku 2014. Spoločnosti LBBW to takisto pomôže získať nevyhnutný súhlas ostatných krajinných bánk, či už spoločne alebo jednotlivo, čo predaj uľahčí. Predĺženie, ktoré je časovo limitované, by preto malo spoločnosti LBBW umožniť predaj podielu v spoločnosti Deka do [...]. Spoločnosti LBBW to preto umožní prekonať uvedené hlavné vonkajšie ťažkosti a ukončiť odčlenenie spoločnosti Deka tak, ako sa uvádza v rozhodnutí o LBBW. Komisia preto zastáva názor, že relatívne krátke predĺženie do [...] je oprávnené, predovšetkým vzhľadom na osobitosti právnej štruktúry spoločnosti Deka. Vzhľadom na okolnosti prípadu sa takéto predĺženie nepovažuje za odklad pôvodne prijatého časového harmonogramu, ktorý by si vyžadoval zodpovedajúce zníženie výšky pomoci (5).

IV.   ZÁVER

| (16) | Z uvedených dôvodov Komisia zastáva názor, že predĺženie o tri mesiace je v prípade spoločnosti Deka nutné v záujme umožnenia riadneho vykonávania reštrukturalizačného plánu spoločnosti LBBW. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Z uvedených dôvodov Komisia zastáva názor, že predĺženie o tri mesiace je v prípade spoločnosti Deka nutné v záujme umožnenia riadneho vykonávania reštrukturalizačného plánu spoločnosti LBBW.

V.   ROZHODNUTIE

Komisia predlžuje lehotu na predaj spoločnosti Deka do 31. marca 2011.“

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(1)  Ú. v. EÚ L 188, 21.7.2010, s. 1.

1

(2)  Časti tohto textu boli vypustené, aby sa zabezpečilo, že sa nezverejnia dôverné informácie. Tieto časti sú nahradené troma bodkami v hranatých zátvorkách a označené hviezdičkou.

2

(3)  Menovaný v súlade s rozhodnutím o LBBW s cieľom monitorovať úplné a správne vykonávanie záväzkov prijatých v súvislosti s odčleneniami.

3

(4)  Porovnaj rozhodnutie z 21. decembra 2010 vo veci MC 8/09 WestImmo.

4

WestImmo.

(5)  Porovnaj Usmernenia Spoločenstva o štátnej pomoci na záchranu a reštrukturalizáciu firiem v ťažkostiach, Ú. v. EÚ C 244, 1.10.2004, s. 2, bod 52 písm. d).

5

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