UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4345

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

WILLIE ANTHONY SAXBY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:11-cr-00132-NCT-1)

Submitted: November 4, 2015 Decided: December 2, 2015

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert L. McClellan, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, GATTON & SIEGMUND, LLP, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Michael 

Hamilton, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

In 2013, Willie Anthony Saxby pled guilty to passing and 

possessing counterfeit currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472 

(2012), and the district court sentenced him to 36 months’ 

imprisonment, to be followed by a 3-year term of supervised 

release. The district court found that while Saxby was on 

supervised release, he violated the terms of his release by (1) 

failing to notify the probation officer ten days prior to moving 

from his approved residence, and (2) testing positive for 

marijuana and using alcohol in excess. The district court 

sentenced Saxby to 12 months’ imprisonment and an additional 24 

months’ supervised release. In accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Saxby’s counsel has filed a 

brief certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for 

appeal. Saxby has filed a supplemental brief raising several 

issues. We affirm the district court’s judgment.

To revoke supervised release, a district court need only 

find a violation of a condition of release by a preponderance of 

the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). “We review a 

district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s 

supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United States v. 

Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). A district court’s 

factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. We conclude 

that the district court’s factual findings are not clearly 
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erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion in 

revoking Saxby’s supervised release.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States 

v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will affirm a 

revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is 

not plainly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Saxby’s sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment to be 

followed by 24 months’ supervised release is within the 

statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2), 

(e)(3), (h) (2012).

“When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly 

unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable 

at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 

2010). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the 

district court adequately explains the sentence after 

considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy 

statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) 

factors. Id. at 546-47; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012). 

“Regardless of whether the district court imposes an above, 

below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the 

record an ‘individualized assessment’ based on the particular 

facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 

325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 
4

U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). “A court need not be as detailed or 

specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when 

imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a 

statement of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 

F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). A revocation 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the court states a 

proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive 

the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. United 

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). Only if we 

find a sentence to be unreasonable will we consider whether it 

is plainly so. Id. at 439.

While the district court did not explicitly refer to the 

Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven policy statements, Saxby’s 

policy statement range, or the relevant § 3553(a) factors, the 

district court’s rationale is apparent from the context 

surrounding its decision. See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006). Defense counsel advised the 

district court of Saxby’s correct policy statement range of 8 to 

14 months’ imprisonment, and the sentence imposed falls within 

that range. Additionally, the district court’s explanation of 

its sentence, while not explicitly mentioning § 3553(a), 

referred to the nature and circumstances of Saxby’s violations

and the need for the sentence to deter future violations. See

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B). Moreover, the district court 
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offered an individualized explanation of why it was sentencing 

Saxby to serve a term of imprisonment and an additional term of 

supervised release. Thus, we conclude that Saxby’s sentence is 

reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case, including the issues raised in Saxby’s pro 

se brief, and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and deny as moot 

Saxby’s motion to expedite. This court requires that counsel 

inform Saxby, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme 

Court of the United States for further review. If Saxby

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that 

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in 

this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Saxby.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED