# Journal officiel C 245/2011

| | ISSN 1725-2431
  doi:10.3000/17252431.C_2011.245.fra |
| --- | --- |
| Journal officiel
  de l'Union européenne | C 245 |
| | |
| Édition de langue française | Communications et informations | 54e année24 août 2011 |

ISSN 1725-2431

doi:10.3000/17252431.C_2011.245.fra

Journal officiel

de l'Union européenne

C 245

Édition de langue française

Communications et informations

54e année24 août 2011

---

| Numéro d'information | Sommaire | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Communications |
| | COMMUNICATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE |
| | Commission européenne |
| 2011/C 245/01 | Non-opposition à une concentration notifiée (Affaire COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Numéro d'information

Sommaire

page

II   Communications

COMMUNICATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

Commission européenne

2011/C 245/01

Non-opposition à une concentration notifiée (Affaire COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informations |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE |
| | Conseil |
| 2011/C 245/02 | Avis à l'attention des personnes et entités auxquelles s'appliquent les mesures restrictives prévues par la décision 2011/273/PESC du Conseil, mise en œuvre par la décision d'exécution 2011/515/PESC du Conseil, et par le règlement (UE) no 442/2011 du Conseil, mis en œuvre par le règlement d'exécution (UE) no 843/2011 du Conseil concernant des mesures restrictives à l'encontre de la Syrie | 2 |
| | Commission européenne |
| 2011/C 245/03 | Taux de change de l'euro | 3 |
| | INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES ÉTATS MEMBRES |
| 2011/C 245/04 | Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries | 4 |
| 2011/C 245/05 | Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries | 5 |
| 2011/C 245/06 | Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries | 6 |
| 2011/C 245/07 | Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries | 7 |

IV   Informations

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

Conseil

2011/C 245/02

Avis à l'attention des personnes et entités auxquelles s'appliquent les mesures restrictives prévues par la décision 2011/273/PESC du Conseil, mise en œuvre par la décision d'exécution 2011/515/PESC du Conseil, et par le règlement (UE) no 442/2011 du Conseil, mis en œuvre par le règlement d'exécution (UE) no 843/2011 du Conseil concernant des mesures restrictives à l'encontre de la Syrie

o

o

2

Commission européenne

2011/C 245/03

Taux de change de l'euro

3

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES ÉTATS MEMBRES

2011/C 245/04

Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries

4

2011/C 245/05

Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries

5

2011/C 245/06

Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries

6

2011/C 245/07

Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries

7

| | V   Avis |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCÉDURES ADMINISTRATIVES |
| | Commission européenne |
| 2011/C 245/08 | Appels à propositions — Programme ORATE (ESPON) 2013 | 8 |
| | PROCÉDURES RELATIVES À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA POLITIQUE DE CONCURRENCE |
| | Commission européenne |
| 2011/C 245/09 | Aide d'État — Royaume-Uni — Aide d'État SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Exonération du prélèvement sur les granulats en Irlande du Nord (ex N 2/04) — Invitation à présenter des observations en application de l'article 108, paragraphe 2, du TFUE (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2011/C 245/10 | Aides d’État — Allemagne (Articles 107 à 109 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne) — Aide d'État MC 15/09 — LBBW Deka divestment (
  1
  ) | 21 |

V   Avis

PROCÉDURES ADMINISTRATIVES

Commission européenne

2011/C 245/08

Appels à propositions — Programme ORATE (ESPON) 2013

8

PROCÉDURES RELATIVES À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA POLITIQUE DE CONCURRENCE

Commission européenne

2011/C 245/09

Aide d'État — Royaume-Uni — Aide d'État SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Exonération du prélèvement sur les granulats en Irlande du Nord (ex N 2/04) — Invitation à présenter des observations en application de l'article 108, paragraphe 2, du TFUE (
  1
  )

1

10

2011/C 245/10

Aides d’État — Allemagne (Articles 107 à 109 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne) — Aide d'État MC 15/09 — LBBW Deka divestment (
  1
  )

1

21

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE |

---

(1)   Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE

1

| FR | |
| --- | --- |

FR

---

II Communications

COMMUNICATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

Commission européenne

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/1

---

Non-opposition à une concentration notifiée

(Affaire COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent)

(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)

2011/C 245/01

Le 9 août 2011, la Commission a décidé de ne pas s'opposer à la concentration notifiée susmentionnée et de la déclarer compatible avec le marché commun. Cette décision se fonde sur l'article 6, paragraphe 1, point b) du règlement (CE) no 139/2004 du Conseil. Le texte intégral de la décision n'est disponible qu'en anglais et sera rendu public après suppression des secrets d'affaires qu'il pourrait contenir. Il pourra être consulté:

| — | dans la section consacrée aux concentrations, sur le site internet de la DG concurrence de la Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Ce site permet de rechercher des décisions concernant des opérations de concentration à partir du nom de l'entreprise, du numéro de l'affaire, de la date ou du secteur d'activité, |
| --- | --- |

—

dans la section consacrée aux concentrations, sur le site internet de la DG concurrence de la Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Ce site permet de rechercher des décisions concernant des opérations de concentration à partir du nom de l'entreprise, du numéro de l'affaire, de la date ou du secteur d'activité,

| — | sur le site internet EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/fr/index.htm), qui offre un accès en ligne au droit communautaire, sous le numéro de document 32011M6298. |
| --- | --- |

—

sur le site internet EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/fr/index.htm), qui offre un accès en ligne au droit communautaire, sous le numéro de document 32011M6298.

---

IV Informations

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS, ORGANES ET ORGANISMES DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE

Conseil

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/2

---

Avis à l'attention des personnes et entités auxquelles s'appliquent les mesures restrictives prévues par la décision 2011/273/PESC du Conseil, mise en œuvre par la décision d'exécution 2011/515/PESC du Conseil, et par le règlement (UE) no 442/2011 du Conseil, mis en œuvre par le règlement d'exécution (UE) no 843/2011 du Conseil concernant des mesures restrictives à l'encontre de la Syrie

2011/C 245/02

LE CONSEIL DE L'UNION EUROPÉENNE,

Les informations figurant ci-après sont portées à l'attention des personnes et entités visées à l'annexe de la décision 2011/273/PESC du Conseil, mise en œuvre par la décision d'exécution 2011/515/PESC (1) du Conseil, et à l'annexe II du règlement (UE) no 442/2011 du Conseil, mis en œuvre par le règlement d'exécution (UE) no 843/2011 (2) du Conseil concernant des mesures restrictives à l'encontre de la Syrie.

Le Conseil de l'Union européenne a décidé que les personnes et entités visées dans les annexes susmentionnées devaient être inscrites sur la liste des personnes faisant l'objet des mesures restrictives prévues par la décision 2011/273/PESC et par le règlement (UE) no 442/2011 concernant des mesures restrictives à l'encontre de la Syrie. Les motifs justifiant l'inscription de ces personnes et entités sur cette liste sont mentionnés en regard des entrées correspondantes dans les annexes en question.

L'attention des personnes et entités concernées est attirée sur le fait qu'il est possible de présenter aux autorités compétentes de l'État membre concerné (ou des États membres concernés), selon les indications figurant sur les sites internet mentionnés à l'annexe III du règlement (UE) no 442/2011, une demande visant à obtenir l'autorisation d'utiliser les fonds gelés pour répondre à des besoins fondamentaux ou procéder à certains paiements (voir article 6 du règlement).

Les personnes et entités concernées peuvent adresser au Conseil une demande de réexamen de la décision par laquelle leur nom a été inclus dans la liste en question, en y joignant les pièces justificatives requises. Toute demande en ce sens doit être envoyée à l'adresse suivante:

| Conseil de l'Union européenne |
| --- |
| Secrétariat général |
| DG K Coordination |
| Rue de la Loi 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles |
| BELGIQUE |

Conseil de l'Union européenne

Secrétariat général

DG K Coordination

Rue de la Loi 175

1048 Bruxelles

BELGIQUE

L'attention des personnes et entités concernées est également attirée sur la possibilité de contester la décision du Conseil devant le Tribunal de l'Union européenne, dans les conditions prévues à l'article 275, deuxième alinéa, et à l'article 263, quatrième et sixième alinéas, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne.

---

(1)  JO L 218 du 24.8.2011.

(2)  JO L 218 du 24.8.2011, p. 1.

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Commission européenne

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/3

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Taux de change de l'euro (1)

23 août 2011

2011/C 245/03

1 euro =

| | Monnaie | Taux de change |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dollar des États-Unis | 1,4462 |
| JPY | yen japonais | 110,72 |
| DKK | couronne danoise | 7,4498 |
| GBP | livre sterling | 0,87600 |
| SEK | couronne suédoise | 9,1046 |
| CHF | franc suisse | 1,1410 |
| ISK | couronne islandaise | |
| NOK | couronne norvégienne | 7,8080 |
| BGN | lev bulgare | 1,9558 |
| CZK | couronne tchèque | 24,417 |
| HUF | forint hongrois | 271,78 |
| LTL | litas lituanien | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats letton | 0,7095 |
| PLN | zloty polonais | 4,1499 |
| RON | leu roumain | 4,2574 |
| TRY | lire turque | 2,5783 |
| AUD | dollar australien | 1,3771 |
| CAD | dollar canadien | 1,4260 |
| HKD | dollar de Hong Kong | 11,2766 |
| NZD | dollar néo-zélandais | 1,7360 |
| SGD | dollar de Singapour | 1,7414 |
| KRW | won sud-coréen | 1 558,38 |
| ZAR | rand sud-africain | 10,3816 |
| CNY | yuan ren-min-bi chinois | 9,2513 |
| HRK | kuna croate | 7,4740 |
| IDR | rupiah indonésien | 12 355,53 |
| MYR | ringgit malais | 4,2894 |
| PHP | peso philippin | 61,206 |
| RUB | rouble russe | 41,8255 |
| THB | baht thaïlandais | 43,140 |
| BRL | real brésilien | 2,3111 |
| MXN | peso mexicain | 17,7768 |
| INR | roupie indienne | 65,9830 |

Monnaie

Taux de change

USD

dollar des États-Unis

1,4462

JPY

yen japonais

110,72

DKK

couronne danoise

7,4498

GBP

livre sterling

0,87600

SEK

couronne suédoise

9,1046

CHF

franc suisse

1,1410

ISK

couronne islandaise

NOK

couronne norvégienne

7,8080

BGN

lev bulgare

1,9558

CZK

couronne tchèque

24,417

HUF

forint hongrois

271,78

LTL

litas lituanien

3,4528

LVL

lats letton

0,7095

PLN

zloty polonais

4,1499

RON

leu roumain

4,2574

TRY

lire turque

2,5783

AUD

dollar australien

1,3771

CAD

dollar canadien

1,4260

HKD

dollar de Hong Kong

11,2766

NZD

dollar néo-zélandais

1,7360

SGD

dollar de Singapour

1,7414

KRW

won sud-coréen

1 558,38

ZAR

rand sud-africain

10,3816

CNY

yuan ren-min-bi chinois

9,2513

HRK

kuna croate

7,4740

IDR

rupiah indonésien

12 355,53

MYR

ringgit malais

4,2894

PHP

peso philippin

61,206

RUB

rouble russe

41,8255

THB

baht thaïlandais

43,140

BRL

real brésilien

2,3111

MXN

peso mexicain

17,7768

INR

roupie indienne

65,9830

---

(1)  Source: taux de change de référence publié par la Banque centrale européenne.

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INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES ÉTATS MEMBRES

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/4

---

Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries

2011/C 245/04

Conformément à l'article 35, paragraphe 3, du règlement (CE) no 1224/2009 du Conseil du 20 novembre 2009 instituant un régime communautaire de contrôle afin d’assurer le respect des règles de la politique commune de la pêche (1), une décision de fermer la pêcherie a été prise telle que décrite dans le tableau ci-après:

| Date et heure de la fermeture | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Durée | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| État membre | Pays-Bas |
| Stock ou groupe de stocks | HKE/571214 |
| Espèce | Merlu (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Zone | VI et VII; eaux UE et eaux internationales de la zone V b; eaux internationales des zones XII et XIV |
| Type(s) de navires de pêche | — |
| Numéro de référence | — |

Date et heure de la fermeture

18.7.2011

Durée

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

État membre

Pays-Bas

Stock ou groupe de stocks

HKE/571214

Espèce

Merlu (Merluccius merluccius)

Zone

VI et VII; eaux UE et eaux internationales de la zone V b; eaux internationales des zones XII et XIV

Type(s) de navires de pêche

—

Numéro de référence

—

Lien internet vers la décision de l'État membre:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_fr.htm

---

(1)  JO L 343 du 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/5

---

Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries

2011/C 245/05

Conformément à l'article 35, paragraphe 3, du règlement (CE) no 1224/2009 du Conseil du 20 novembre 2009 instituant un régime communautaire de contrôle afin d’assurer le respect des règles de la politique commune de la pêche (1), une décision de fermer la pêcherie a été prise telle que décrite dans le tableau ci-après:

| Date et heure de la fermeture | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Durée | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| État membre | Pays-Bas |
| Stock ou groupe de stocks | HKE/2AC4-C |
| Espèce | Merlu (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Zone | Eaux UE des zones II a et IV |
| Type(s) de navires de pêche | — |
| Numéro de référence | — |

Date et heure de la fermeture

18.7.2011

Durée

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

État membre

Pays-Bas

Stock ou groupe de stocks

HKE/2AC4-C

Espèce

Merlu (Merluccius merluccius)

Zone

Eaux UE des zones II a et IV

Type(s) de navires de pêche

—

Numéro de référence

—

Lien internet vers la décision de l'État membre:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_fr.htm

---

(1)  JO L 343 du 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/6

---

Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries

2011/C 245/06

Conformément à l'article 35, paragraphe 3, du règlement (CE) no 1224/2009 du Conseil du 20 novembre 2009 instituant un régime communautaire de contrôle afin d’assurer le respect des règles de la politique commune de la pêche (1), une décision de fermer la pêcherie a été prise telle que décrite dans le tableau ci-après:

| Date et heure de la fermeture | 9.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Durée | 9.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| État membre | France |
| Stock ou groupe de stocks | COD/5BE6A |
| Espèces | Cabillaud (Gadus morhua) |
| Zone | Zone VI a; eaux UE et eaux internationales de la zone V b à l'Est de 12° 00′ O |
| Type(s) de navires de pêche | — |
| Numéro de référence | 792761 |

Date et heure de la fermeture

9.7.2011

Durée

9.7.2011-31.12.2011

État membre

France

Stock ou groupe de stocks

COD/5BE6A

Espèces

Cabillaud (Gadus morhua)

Zone

Zone VI a; eaux UE et eaux internationales de la zone V b à l'Est de 12° 00′ O

Type(s) de navires de pêche

—

Numéro de référence

792761

Lien internet vers la décision de l'État membre:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_fr.htm

---

(1)  JO L 343 du 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/7

---

Informations communiquées par les États membres concernant la fermeture de pêcheries

2011/C 245/07

Conformément à l'article 35, paragraphe 3, du règlement (CE) no 1224/2009 du Conseil du 20 novembre 2009 instituant un régime communautaire de contrôle afin d’assurer le respect des règles de la politique commune de la pêche (1), une décision de fermer la pêcherie a été prise telle que décrite dans le tableau ci-après:

| Date et heure de la fermeture | 2.8.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Durée | 2.8.2011-31.12.2011 |
| État membre | Portugal |
| Stock ou groupe de stocks | WHB/8C3411 |
| Espèce | Merlan bleu (Micromesistius poutassou) |
| Zone | Zones VIII c, IX et X; eaux UE de la zone COPACE 34.1.1 |
| Type(s) de navires de pêche | — |
| Numéro de référence | — |

Date et heure de la fermeture

2.8.2011

Durée

2.8.2011-31.12.2011

État membre

Portugal

Stock ou groupe de stocks

WHB/8C3411

Espèce

Merlan bleu (Micromesistius poutassou)

Zone

Zones VIII c, IX et X; eaux UE de la zone COPACE 34.1.1

Type(s) de navires de pêche

—

Numéro de référence

—

Lien internet vers la décision de l'État membre:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_fr.htm

---

(1)  JO L 343 du 22.12.2009, p. 1.

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V Avis

PROCÉDURES ADMINISTRATIVES

Commission européenne

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/8

---

Appels à propositions — Programme ORATE (ESPON) 2013

2011/C 245/08

L'ORATE (ESPON en anglais), ou Observatoire en réseau de l’aménagement du territoire européen, est un réseau soutenant le développement de la politique de cohésion de l’Union européenne. Le programme ORATE est cofinancé par le Fonds européen de développement régional (FEDER) au titre de l’objectif 3 («coopération territoriale européenne») et par 31 pays (les vingt-sept États membres, l’Islande, le Liechtenstein, la Norvège et la Suisse).

Dans le cadre du programme ORATE 2013, des appels à propositions sont à présent ouverts. Les organismes publics et privés des 31 pays précités en sont les bénéficiaires potentiels. Chercheurs et instituts de recherche, universités, scientifiques, experts et équipes universitaires sont invités à soumettre leurs propositions. L’appel à propositions pour des activités transnationales de mise en réseau s’adresse aux institutions désignées comme points de contact ORATE.

| 1. | Appel à propositions pour des projets de recherche appliquée:






  — | Régions voisines européennes (budget: 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Appel à propositions pour des projets de recherche appliquée:

—

Régions voisines européennes (budget: 750 000 EUR)

| — | Villes de petite ou moyenne taille dans leur contexte territorial fonctionnel (budget: 650 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Villes de petite ou moyenne taille dans leur contexte territorial fonctionnel (budget: 650 000 EUR)

| — | Dimension territoriale de la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale en Europe (budget: 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Dimension territoriale de la pauvreté et de l’exclusion sociale en Europe (budget: 750 000 EUR)

| — | Résilience des régions face aux crises économiques (budget: 759 153 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Résilience des régions face aux crises économiques (budget: 759 153 EUR)

| 2. | Appel à propositions pour des analyses ciblées sur la base des manifestations d’intérêt des parties prenantes:






  — | Pôles de croissance en Europe du Sud-est (budget: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Appel à propositions pour des analyses ciblées sur la base des manifestations d’intérêt des parties prenantes:

—

Pôles de croissance en Europe du Sud-est (budget: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Indicateurs clés de la cohésion territoriale et de l’aménagement du territoire (budget: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Indicateurs clés de la cohésion territoriale et de l’aménagement du territoire (budget: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Paysages habitables pour un développement territorial durable (budget: 379 796,09 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Paysages habitables pour un développement territorial durable (budget: 379 796,09 EUR)

| — | Politique paysagère pour le Parc des trois Pays (budget: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Politique paysagère pour le Parc des trois Pays (budget: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Mer du Nord — diffusion des résultats de la coopération transnationale (budget: 340 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Mer du Nord — diffusion des résultats de la coopération transnationale (budget: 340 000 EUR)

Les thèmes précités seront inclus dans l’appel à propositions pour autant qu’un accord soit signé avec les parties prenantes à l'origine des idées de projet. C’est pourquoi ils ne seront pas confirmés avant le jour du lancement de l’appel à propositions, le 24 août 2011. Les thèmes retenus pourront être consultés sur le site web de l'ORATE: http://www.espon.eu

| 3. | Appel à propositions à réaliser au sein de la plateforme scientifique ORATE:






  — | Système d'observation du territoire et de notification de l'UE (budget: 598 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Appel à propositions à réaliser au sein de la plateforme scientifique ORATE:

—

Système d'observation du territoire et de notification de l'UE (budget: 598 000 EUR)

| — | Atlas ORATE des structures et dynamiques territoriales européennes (budget: 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Atlas ORATE des structures et dynamiques territoriales européennes (budget: 150 000 EUR)

| — | Définition du potentiel et des enjeux territoriaux (budget: 350 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Définition du potentiel et des enjeux territoriaux (budget: 350 000 EUR)

| — | Dossiers d'information territoriale pour les programmes du FEDER (budget: 500 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Dossiers d'information territoriale pour les programmes du FEDER (budget: 500 000 EUR)

| — | Outil cartographique ORATE en ligne (budget: 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Outil cartographique ORATE en ligne (budget: 150 000 EUR)

| — | Observation territoriale dans une macrorégion européenne — un test pour la région de la mer baltique (budget: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Observation territoriale dans une macrorégion européenne — un test pour la région de la mer baltique (budget: 360 000 EUR)

| 4. | Appel à propositions pour des activités transnationales de mise en réseau par le réseau de points de contact ORATE:






  — | Activités de mise à profit au niveau transnational par le réseau de points de contact ORATE (budget: 600 227 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Appel à propositions pour des activités transnationales de mise en réseau par le réseau de points de contact ORATE:

—

Activités de mise à profit au niveau transnational par le réseau de points de contact ORATE (budget: 600 227 EUR)

La date limite de soumission des propositions est le 20 octobre 2011.

Une journée d’information et un «café des partenaires ORATE» («Info Day and Partner Café») à l’intention des bénéficiaires potentiels se tiendront le 13 septembre 2011 à Bruxelles.

Tous les documents relatifs aux appels à propositions peuvent être consultés sur le site http://www.espon.eu: procédure et formulaire de candidature, règles d’admissibilité, critères d’évaluation, etc.

---

PROCÉDURES RELATIVES À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA POLITIQUE DE CONCURRENCE

Commission européenne

| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/10

---

AIDE D'ÉTAT — ROYAUME-UNI

Aide d'État SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10)

Exonération du prélèvement sur les granulats en Irlande du Nord (ex N 2/04)

Invitation à présenter des observations en application de l'article 108, paragraphe 2, du TFUE

(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)

2011/C 245/09

Par lettre du 13 juillet 2011, reproduite dans la langue faisant foi dans les pages qui suivent le présent résumé, la Commission a notifié au Royaume-Uni sa décision d'ouvrir la procédure prévue à l'article 108, paragraphe 2, du TFUE concernant la mesure susmentionnée. La Commission a aussi invité le Royaume-Uni, conformément à l'article 11, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) no 659/1999, à lui présenter ses observations sur son intention d'ouvrir la procédure formelle d'examen.

Les parties intéressées peuvent présenter leurs observations sur la mesure en cause dans un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de publication du présent résumé et de la lettre qui suit, à l'adresse suivante:

| Commission européenne |
| --- |
| Direction générale de la concurrence |
| Greffe des aides d'État |
| 1049 Bruxelles |
| BELGIQUE |
| Fax +32 22951242 |

Commission européenne

Direction générale de la concurrence

Greffe des aides d'État

1049 Bruxelles

BELGIQUE

Fax +32 22951242

Ces observations seront communiquées au Royaume-Uni. L’identité des parties intéressées ayant présenté des observations peut rester confidentielle sur demande écrite et motivée.

RÉSUMÉ

PROCÉDURE

Le Royaume-Uni a notifié une mesure d’exonération du prélèvement sur les granulats en Irlande du Nord par lettre du 5 janvier 2004, enregistrée le 9 janvier 2004. La mesure a été notifiée en tant que modification de l'exonération initiale du prélèvement sur les granulats en Irlande du Nord (instauration progressive du prélèvement) approuvée par la Commission dans sa décision N 863/01. Le 7 mai 2004, la Commission a adopté une décision de ne pas soulever d’objection à l’égard de cette mesure. Le 30 août 2004, la British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd et David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd (ci-après les «requérantes») ont introduit un recours contre la décision de la Commission mentionnée ci-dessus de ne pas soulever d’objection (ce recours a été enregistré sous le numéro T-359/04).

Le 9 septembre 2010, le Tribunal a annulé la décision de la Commission mentionnée ci-dessus. Selon l’arrêt, la Commission n’était pas fondée à adopter légalement la décision de ne pas soulever d’objection faute d’avoir examiné la question d’une éventuelle discrimination fiscale entre les produits nationaux en cause et les produits importés d’Irlande. La Commission n’a fait appel de cet arrêt.

Les autorités britanniques ont suspendu l'exécution de la mesure à partir du 1er décembre 2010 en abrogeant les «Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004».

DESCRIPTION DE LA MESURE

L’exonération de 80 % du prélèvement sur les granulats («Aggregates Levy», ci-après «AGL») s’appliquait aux granulats vierges extraits en Irlande du Nord et qui y sont commercialement exploités ainsi qu’aux produits transformés à partir de granulats extraits en Irlande du Nord et qui y sont commercialement exploités.

L’AGL, en tant que tel, constitue une taxe environnementale sur l'exploitation commerciale des granulats et s’applique aux roches, au sable et aux graviers. Il a été introduit par le Royaume-Uni avec effet au 1er avril 2002 à des fins environnementales: il vise à maximiser l’utilisation de granulats recyclés et d’autres produits de remplacement des granulats vierges et à favoriser une extraction et une utilisation rationnelles des granulats vierges, qui constituent une ressource naturelle non renouvelable.

Pour atteindre plus efficacement les objectifs environnementaux poursuivis qui n’étaient pas induits par l’AGL, les autorités britanniques ont subordonné l'exonération à la condition que les entreprises qui entendent en bénéficier s’engagent formellement et respectent des accords négociés avec lesdites autorités, les obligeant à participer à un programme de réalisations et d’améliorations d’ordre environnemental pendant la durée de l’exemption.

APPRÉCIATION

Premièrement, à la lumière de l'arrêt du Tribunal, la Commission a examiné s’il existait un lien intrinsèque entre la mesure d’aide proprement dite, accordée sous la forme d’une exonération de taxe, et le traitement fiscal discriminatoire des produits importés. Étant donné que ce lien a été établi en l’espèce, la Commission a dû examiner si la mesure d'aide ne renfermait pas une imposition intérieure discriminatoire en violation de l'article 110 TFUE (anciennement article 90 CE). Elle rappelle principalement la jurisprudence relative à la législation nationale apportant des avantages fiscaux aux produits nationaux lorsqu’ils sont produits selon certaines normes environnementales. Cette imposition intérieure n’est pas jugée compatible avec l’article 110 TFUE si l’avantage n’est pas étendu aux produits importés fabriqués selon les mêmes normes. Comme ce n’est pas le cas pour l’exonération de l’AGL en Irlande du Nord, la Commission émet donc des doutes quant à la compatibilité de l'exonération de l'AGL modifiée en Irlande du Nord avec le TFUE, et notamment son article 110.

Compte tenu de ces doutes sur la compatibilité avec l'article 110 TFUE, la Commission ne peut en déduire, à ce stade, que la mesure est compatible avec le marché intérieur. Tout en rappelant ces doutes, en ce qui concerne la conformité de la mesure avec les règles en matière d'aide d'État, la Commission a apprécié la mesure en cause à la lumière des lignes directrices concernant les aides d'État à la protection de l'environnement, en particulier les règles relatives aux aides sous forme d’exonérations ou de réductions des taxes environnementales. Eu égard au caractère illégal de l’aide accordée au titre de l’exonération de l’AGL modifiée en Irlande du Nord en raison de l’annulation par le Tribunal du caractère compatible de la mesure, la Commission a apprécié la mesure en cause à la lumière de l’encadrement communautaire des aides d’État pour la protection de l’environnement de 2001 et, depuis le 2 avril 2008 (soit la date depuis laquelle elles sont applicables), à la lumière des lignes directrices concernant les aides d’État à la protection de l'environnement de 2008.

En ce qui concerne plus particulièrement l’appréciation selon l’encadrement communautaire des aides d’État pour la protection de l’environnement de 2001, la Commission est parvenue à la conclusion que les conditions sont réunies, rappelant à nouveau que les doutes quant au respect de l’article 110 TFUE l’empêchent, à ce stade, de juger la mesure compatible avec le marché intérieur.

Pour ce qui est des lignes directrices concernant les aides d’État à la protection de l'environnement de 2008, la Commission est arrivée à la conclusion préliminaire selon laquelle elle se demande si la condition de la nécessité de l'aide est respectée, et notamment si l’augmentation substantielle des coûts de production ne peut se répercuter sur les clients finaux sans provoquer d’importantes baisses des ventes. La Commission observe, dans ce contexte, que bien que les renseignements transmis par les autorités britanniques révèlent une hausse très significative des coûts de production due à l’AGL, qui devrait normalement se traduire par d’importantes baisses des ventes, à la lumière des renseignements insuffisamment détaillés, la Commission ne peut conclure, à ce stade, que la condition de la compatibilité est respectée.

Par conséquent, sur la base de l’analyse préliminaire, la Commission émet des doutes sur la compatibilité de la mesure «Exemption du prélèvement sur les agrégats en Irlande du Nord (ex N 2/04)» avec le traité et sur la compatibilité avec le marché intérieur. Conformément à l’article 4, paragraphe 4, du règlement (CE) no 659/1999, la Commission a décidé d’ouvrir la procédure formelle d’examen et invite les tiers à présenter leurs observations.

TEXTE DE LA LETTRE

«The Commission wishes to inform the UK authorities that, having examined the information supplied by them on the aid referred to above, it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

1.   PROCEDURE

| 1. | The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004.

| 2. | The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2).

| 3. | On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3).

| 4. | On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04). |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04).

| 5. | On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment.

| 6. | On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959). |
| --- | --- |

6.

On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959).

| 7. | The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The aggregates levy

| 8. | The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity.

| 9. | The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom.

2.2.   The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 10. | In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products. |
| --- | --- |

10.

In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products.

2.3.   The modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 11. | The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there.

2.3.1.   Background

| 12. | The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development.

| 13. | According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded. |
| --- | --- |

13.

According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded.

| 14. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent.

2.3.2.   Modification

| 15. | In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8). |
| --- | --- |

15.

In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8).

| 16. | The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9).

2.3.3.   Environmental agreements

| 17. | In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief. |
| --- | --- |

17.

In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief.

| 18. | The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:






  (a) | the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:

(a)

the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and

| (b) | the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter.

| 19. | Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

19.

Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management.

| 20. | The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings.

2.3.4.   Aggregates production costs, selling price and price elasticity of demand

| 21. | As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

  Table 1


  Selling price







  Type of rock | Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Basalt | 4,21 |
| Sandstone | 4,37 |
| Limestone | 3,72 |
| Sand and gravel | 4,80 |
| Other | 5,57 |
| Weighted average price | 4,42 |

21.

As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

Table 1

Selling price

Type of rock

Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne)

Basalt

4,21

Sandstone

4,37

Limestone

3,72

Sand and gravel

4,80

Other

5,57

Weighted average price

4,42

| 22. | As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

  Table 2 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,5 | 3,4 | 3,9 | 3,6 | 4,3 | 4,3 |
| GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 7,9 | 8,4 | 9,0 | 7,7 | 8,8 | 9,7 | 9,2 | 10,9 |

22.

As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

Table 2

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne

2,9

3,1

3,5

3,4

3,9

3,6

4,3

4,3

GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne

7,9

8,4

9,0

7,7

8,8

9,7

9,2

10,9

| 23. | As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic. |
| --- | --- |

23.

As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic.

2.3.5.   Pass-on and sales reductions

| 24. | As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain. |
| --- | --- |

24.

As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain.

| 25. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

  Table 3


  A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland











  Product | 2000-2001
  (million tonnes) | 2001-2002
  (million tonnes) | 2002-2003
  (million tonnes) | Fall,
  2001-2003
  (%) | Fall,
  2002-2003
  (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sand and gravel | 2,35 | 2,34 | 1,91 | –18,7 | –8,4 |
| Crushed rock | 7,86 | 7,88 | 7,27 | –7,5 | –7,7 |
| Fill material | 3,00 | 3,89 | 1,71 | –43,0 | –56,0 |
| Total | 13,21 | 14,11 | 10,89 | –17,6 | –22,8 |

25.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

Table 3

A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland

Product

2000-2001

(million tonnes)

2001-2002

(million tonnes)

2002-2003

(million tonnes)

Fall,

2001-2003

(%)

Fall,

2002-2003

(%)

Sand and gravel

2,35

2,34

1,91

–18,7

–8,4

Crushed rock

7,86

7,88

7,27

–7,5

–7,7

Fill material

3,00

3,89

1,71

–43,0

–56,0

Total

13,21

14,11

10,89

–17,6

–22,8

| 26. | The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state.

| 27. | As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers. |
| --- | --- |

27.

As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers.

2.3.6.   Other information

| 28. | The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011). |
| --- | --- |

28.

The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011).

| 29. | As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible. |
| --- | --- |

29.

As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible.

| 30. | The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.

2.4.   Position of third parties, appreciable positive effects

| 31. | In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue. |
| --- | --- |

31.

In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue.

| 32. | The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects. |
| --- | --- |

32.

The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects.

| 33. | As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock. |
| --- | --- |

33.

As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock.

| 34. | As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates. |
| --- | --- |

34.

As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates.

| 35. | With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003. |
| --- | --- |

35.

With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003.

| 36. | Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility.

3.   ASSESSMENT

3.1.   State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC)
   (13)

| 37. | State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

37.

State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| 38. | The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

38.

The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States.

| 39. | Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC). |
| --- | --- |

39.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC).

3.2.   Lawfulness of the aid

| 40. | Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15). |
| --- | --- |

40.

Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15).

3.3.   Compatibility of the aid

| 41. | It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16). |
| --- | --- |

41.

It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16).

| 42. | Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17). |
| --- | --- |

42.

Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17).

| 43. | The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

43.

The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States.

| 44. | As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated. |
| --- | --- |

44.

As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated.

| 45. | Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products.

| 46. | Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20). |
| --- | --- |

46.

Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20).

3.3.1.   Compliance with Article 110 of the TFEU

| 47. | According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

47.

According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU.

| 48. | According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect. |
| --- | --- |

48.

According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect.

| 49. | Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements.

| 50. | Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate.

| 51. | Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements.

| 52. | Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21). |
| --- | --- |

52.

Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21).

| 53. | Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment.

| 54. | Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage.

3.3.2.   Compatibility of the measure under the Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 55. | Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection.

| 56. | The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful). |
| --- | --- |

56.

The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful).

| 57. | Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:






  (a) | the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

57.

Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:

(a)

the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and

| (b) | the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008.

Ad (a) Compatibility of the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 58. | Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions. |
| --- | --- |

58.

Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions.

| 59. | The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax. |
| --- | --- |

59.

The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax.

| 60. | Point 51(2) provides that:
  “The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:






  (a) | the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection; |
| --- | --- | --- |

60.

Point 51(2) provides that:

“The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:

(a)

the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection;

| (b) | the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”.

| 61. | Point 51(1) provides that:
  “These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:






  1. | When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:






  (a) | these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.
  These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

61.

Point 51(1) provides that:

“These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:

1.

When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:

(a)

these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.

These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above;

| (b) | these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:






  — | where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:

—

where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection,

| — | where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”. |
| --- | --- |

—

where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”.

| 62. | With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)). |
| --- | --- |

62.

With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)).

| 63. | Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market.

| 64. | The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence). |
| --- | --- |

64.

The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence).

| 65. | In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

65.

In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled.

| 66. | In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent). |
| --- | --- |

66.

In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent).

| 67. | In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25). |
| --- | --- |

67.

In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25).

| 68. | For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

68.

For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage.

Ad (b) Compatibility of the measure under the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 69. | Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159). |
| --- | --- |

69.

Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159).

| 70. | As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes. |
| --- | --- |

70.

As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes.

Environmental benefit

| 71. | Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued. |
| --- | --- |

71.

Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued.

| 72. | As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials. |
| --- | --- |

72.

As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials.

| 73. | Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL.

Necessity of the aid

| 74. | According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

74.

According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary.

(1)   Objective and transparent criteria

| 75. | Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 76. | The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent. |
| --- | --- |

76.

The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent.

(2)   Substantial increase in production costs

| 77. | Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 78. | The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26). |
| --- | --- |

78.

The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26).

| 79. | Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

(3)   Impossibility to pass on the substantial increase in production costs

| 80. | Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned. |
| --- | --- |

80.

Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned.

| 81. | The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland. |
| --- | --- |

81.

The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland.

| 82. | The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased. |
| --- | --- |

82.

The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased.

| 83. | Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007. |
| --- | --- |

83.

Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007.

| 84. | In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided. |
| --- | --- |

84.

In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided.

| 85. | With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided. |
| --- | --- |

85.

With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided.

| 86. | Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers.

| 87. | Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

87.

Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met.

Proportionality of the aid

| 88. | With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:






  (a) | it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

88.

With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:

(a)

it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers;

| (b) | it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified;

| (c) | it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied.

| 89. | The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax. |
| --- | --- |

89.

The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax.

3.4.   Conclusions

| 90. | On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

90.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market.

| 91. | The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158. |
| --- | --- |

91.

The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158.

| 92. | Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision. |
| --- | --- |

92.

Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision.

4.   DECISION

| 93. | In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

93.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| 94. | The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

94.

The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

| 95. | The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.» |
| --- | --- |

95.

The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.»

---

(1)  The phased introduction of the AGL.

1

(2)  OJ C 133, 5.6.2002, p.11.

2

(3)  OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 4.

3

(4)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet reported.

4

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(5)  The AGL is applied to imported raw aggregate, but not to aggregate contained in imported processed products.

5

(6)  On 2 April 2008, i.e. the day from which the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines were applicable, the level of AGL was GBP 1,95/tonne.

6

(7)  OJ C 37, 3.2.2001, p. 3.

7

(8)  The aggregates extracted in Northern Ireland and shipped to any destination in Great Britain were liable to the AGL at the full rate. This was also the case for aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland that was used in the manufacturing of processed products shipped to Great Britain. This ensured that aggregates and processed products from Northern Ireland did not enjoy a competitive advantage in the market of Great Britain.

8

(9)  As referred to above, the implementation of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was suspended as from 1 December 2010.

9

(10)  The information was submitted by the UK authorities for the purposes of an assessment of the measure on the basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. DETI Minerals Statement 2009.

10

(11)  Distribution costs depend on haulage distances, with haulage costs in the range of 15 to 20 pence per tonne per mile, with aggregate being delivered within 10 to 15 miles, depending on local circumstances.

11

(12)  Ecotec (1998) Report; EEA Report (No 2/2008) effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in selected EU countries; British Geological Survey (2008): The need for indigenous aggregates production in England.

12

(13)  The definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) of the TFEU did not change from the one contained in Article 87(1) EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

13

(14)  See Case C-199/06 CELF [2008] ECR I-469, paragraphs 63 and 66 to 68.

14

CELF

(15)  See Case C-199/06 CELF, cited above, paragraphs 61 and 64.

15

CELF

(16)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 91.

16

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(17)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 93.

17

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(18)  “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.

18

Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.”

(19)  The rules for national internal taxation as laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU did not change from those contained in Article 90 EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

19

(20)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 92.

20

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(21)  Case 21/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR p. 1, paragraphs 23 to 26; and in particular Case C-213/96 Outukumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, paragraphs 30 et seq.

21

Commission

Italy

Outukumpu

(22)  The identity of the taxpayer as such is therefore of limited importance.

22

(23)  “Thus [Article 110] must guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between domestic products and imported products.” (Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR p. 1343, paragraph 24).

23

[Article 110]

Bergandi

(24)  Commission Notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid, OJ C 119, 22.5.2002, p. 22.

24

(25)  See for instance Commission Decision on case N 449/01 (Germany) — Continuation of the ecological tax reform (OJ C 137, 8.6.2002, p. 34). Furthermore, this position was confirmed in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines where the payment of 20 % of the tax was explicitly “codified” as a proportionality condition of the aid granted in the form of exemption or reduction from environmental taxes (point 159(b)).

25

(26)  The highest selling price (GBP 5,57/tonne), the lowest profit margin (2 %) and the level of the AGL as originally notified in 2004 (GBP 1,6/tonne) are assumed. If the AGL level on 1 April 2008 (GBP 1,95/tonne) is applied, the share increases to approximately 36 %. Any other combination of price and profit margin necessarily results in the AGL presenting more then 30 % of the production costs.

26

(27)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

27

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| 24.8.2011 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 245/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 245/21

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AIDES D’ÉTAT — ALLEMAGNE

(Articles 107 à 109 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne)

Aide d'État MC 15/09 — LBBW Deka divestment

(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)

2011/C 245/10

Par lettre du 14 janvier 2011, la Commission a notifié à l'Allemagne sa décision sui generis concernant l'aide MC 15/09.

TEXTE DE LA LETTRE

«I.   PROCÉDURE

| (1) | Par décision du 15 décembre 2009, la Commission a approuvé un apport en capital de 5 milliards d'EUR et une mesure de sauvetage d'actifs dépréciés de 12,7 milliards d'EUR pour un portefeuille structuré couvrant des actifs d'un montant de 35 milliards d'EUR en faveur de la Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (ci-après dénommée “LBBW”) dans l'affaire C 17/09 (ci-après dénommée “décision LBBW”) (1). Cette approbation était subordonnée à un certain nombre d'engagements à prendre par l'Allemagne. L'un de ces engagements était que LBBW vende sa participation dans Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (ci-après dénommé “Deka”) au plus tard le (2) [...]. |
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(1)

Par décision du 15 décembre 2009, la Commission a approuvé un apport en capital de 5 milliards d'EUR et une mesure de sauvetage d'actifs dépréciés de 12,7 milliards d'EUR pour un portefeuille structuré couvrant des actifs d'un montant de 35 milliards d'EUR en faveur de la Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (ci-après dénommée “LBBW”) dans l'affaire C 17/09 (ci-après dénommée “décision LBBW”) (1). Cette approbation était subordonnée à un certain nombre d'engagements à prendre par l'Allemagne. L'un de ces engagements était que LBBW vende sa participation dans Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (ci-après dénommé “Deka”) au plus tard le (2) [...].

| (2) | Le 13 décembre 2010, l'Allemagne a présenté une lettre de LBBW expliquant que Deka ne pouvait être cédée avant le [...]. Le 21 décembre 2010, elle a déclaré que le mandataire (3) et le ministère des finances du land de Bade-Wurtemberg avaient confirmé que LBBW avait fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour mener à terme la procédure de vente dans les délais. Le 22 décembre 2010, l'Allemagne a notifié une demande visant à repousser le délai accordé pour la cession jusqu'au [...]. Le 5 janvier 2011, elle a soumis des informations supplémentaires. |
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(2)

Le 13 décembre 2010, l'Allemagne a présenté une lettre de LBBW expliquant que Deka ne pouvait être cédée avant le [...]. Le 21 décembre 2010, elle a déclaré que le mandataire (3) et le ministère des finances du land de Bade-Wurtemberg avaient confirmé que LBBW avait fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour mener à terme la procédure de vente dans les délais. Le 22 décembre 2010, l'Allemagne a notifié une demande visant à repousser le délai accordé pour la cession jusqu'au [...]. Le 5 janvier 2011, elle a soumis des informations supplémentaires.

| (3) | Enfin, le 22 décembre 2010, l'Allemagne a informé la Commission que pour des raisons d’urgence, elle acceptait, à titre exceptionnel, que la présente décision soit adoptée en anglais. |
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(3)

Enfin, le 22 décembre 2010, l'Allemagne a informé la Commission que pour des raisons d’urgence, elle acceptait, à titre exceptionnel, que la présente décision soit adoptée en anglais.

II.   LES FAITS

| (4) | La décision LBBW se fonde sur divers engagements. Le considérant 38, paragraphe 5, point c), de la décision LBBW contient l'engagement pris par l'Allemagne que LBBW vendrait ses participations dans Deka au plus tard le [...]. Cette décision n'autorise pas explicitement une prorogation de ce délai. |
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(4)

La décision LBBW se fonde sur divers engagements. Le considérant 38, paragraphe 5, point c), de la décision LBBW contient l'engagement pris par l'Allemagne que LBBW vendrait ses participations dans Deka au plus tard le [...]. Cette décision n'autorise pas explicitement une prorogation de ce délai.

| (5) | Deka est un établissement de droit public (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) qui gère — par l'intermédiaire de filiales — les fonds d'investissement privés des caisses d'épargne allemandes. Elle est détenue pour moitié par l'association des caisses d'épargne allemandes (DSGV) et pour moitié par des banques régionales (Landesbanken) par l'entremise d'une holding (ci-après dénommée “holding”). La participation indirecte de LBBW dans Deka s'élève à 14,8 %. Les propriétaires disposent chacun d'un droit de préemption dans le cas où une partie voudrait vendre sa participation. |
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(5)

Deka est un établissement de droit public (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) qui gère — par l'intermédiaire de filiales — les fonds d'investissement privés des caisses d'épargne allemandes. Elle est détenue pour moitié par l'association des caisses d'épargne allemandes (DSGV) et pour moitié par des banques régionales (Landesbanken) par l'entremise d'une holding (ci-après dénommée “holding”). La participation indirecte de LBBW dans Deka s'élève à 14,8 %. Les propriétaires disposent chacun d'un droit de préemption dans le cas où une partie voudrait vendre sa participation.

| (6) | Initialement, la DSGV avait fait une offre pour la participation de LBBW dans Deka qui était valable jusqu'au [...]. Pour devenir effective, il faudrait que la vente soit acceptée par toutes les autres banques régionales détenant une participation dans Deka ainsi que par Deka elle-même et son assemblée générale. |
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(6)

Initialement, la DSGV avait fait une offre pour la participation de LBBW dans Deka qui était valable jusqu'au [...]. Pour devenir effective, il faudrait que la vente soit acceptée par toutes les autres banques régionales détenant une participation dans Deka ainsi que par Deka elle-même et son assemblée générale.

| (7) | L'Allemagne a informé la Commission que toutes les banques régionales détenant la holding comptent vendre leur participation à la DSGV, ce qui ferait d'elle l'unique propriétaire de Deka. Une décision contraignante relative à ces ventes doit être adoptée d'ici le [...], bien qu'un délai supplémentaire jusqu'au [...] ne soit pas exclu, compte tenu de la complexité des processus décisionnels concernés. D'après l'Allemagne, si les banques régionales vendaient leur participation dans la holding, les accords indispensables à la vente de la participation de LBBW dans Deka seraient plus faciles à obtenir et simplifieraient la procédure de vente. |
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(7)

L'Allemagne a informé la Commission que toutes les banques régionales détenant la holding comptent vendre leur participation à la DSGV, ce qui ferait d'elle l'unique propriétaire de Deka. Une décision contraignante relative à ces ventes doit être adoptée d'ici le [...], bien qu'un délai supplémentaire jusqu'au [...] ne soit pas exclu, compte tenu de la complexité des processus décisionnels concernés. D'après l'Allemagne, si les banques régionales vendaient leur participation dans la holding, les accords indispensables à la vente de la participation de LBBW dans Deka seraient plus faciles à obtenir et simplifieraient la procédure de vente.

| (8) | L'Allemagne a également informé la Commission que la DSGV a prolongé son offre d'achat de la participation de LBBW dans Deka jusqu'au [...]. |
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(8)

L'Allemagne a également informé la Commission que la DSGV a prolongé son offre d'achat de la participation de LBBW dans Deka jusqu'au [...].

| (9) | Nonobstant la demande de prorogation du délai pour la cession de Deka, elle fait valoir que LBBW a fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour que la vente soit conclue. Le mandataire supervisant les cessions de LBBW au sujet desquelles l'Allemagne a pris des engagements dans le cadre de la décision LBBW a confirmé cet élément. |
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(9)

Nonobstant la demande de prorogation du délai pour la cession de Deka, elle fait valoir que LBBW a fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour que la vente soit conclue. Le mandataire supervisant les cessions de LBBW au sujet desquelles l'Allemagne a pris des engagements dans le cadre de la décision LBBW a confirmé cet élément.

III.   APPRÉCIATION

| (10) | La présente décision concerne la mise en œuvre du plan de restructuration approuvé par la décision LBBW. L'Allemagne sollicite un report de trois mois du délai fixé pour la vente de Deka, [...]. |
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(10)

La présente décision concerne la mise en œuvre du plan de restructuration approuvé par la décision LBBW. L'Allemagne sollicite un report de trois mois du délai fixé pour la vente de Deka, [...].

| (11) | La Commission peut proroger les délais accordés pour les cessions. Bien que le règlement (CE) no 659/1999 ne le prévoie pas explicitement, la Commission a toute discrétion pour autoriser une prorogation, pour autant que cela n'empêche pas la mise en œuvre de la décision LBBW (4). |
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(11)

La Commission peut proroger les délais accordés pour les cessions. Bien que le règlement (CE) no 659/1999 ne le prévoie pas explicitement, la Commission a toute discrétion pour autoriser une prorogation, pour autant que cela n'empêche pas la mise en œuvre de la décision LBBW (4).

| (12) | La Commission note que LBBW a déjà activement engagé la procédure de vente de Deka en obtenant une offre de la DGSV. Par conséquent, elle prend note du point de vue tant de l'Allemagne que du mandataire selon lequel LBBW a fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour faire avancer la procédure de vente. |
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(12)

La Commission note que LBBW a déjà activement engagé la procédure de vente de Deka en obtenant une offre de la DGSV. Par conséquent, elle prend note du point de vue tant de l'Allemagne que du mandataire selon lequel LBBW a fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour faire avancer la procédure de vente.

| (13) | Par ailleurs, il semblerait, d'après l'Allemagne, qu'il y ait une forte probabilité que les banques régionales détenant une participation dans la holding vendent aussi celle-ci, ce qui faciliterait la procédure de vente globale de la participation de LBBW dans Deka. |
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(13)

Par ailleurs, il semblerait, d'après l'Allemagne, qu'il y ait une forte probabilité que les banques régionales détenant une participation dans la holding vendent aussi celle-ci, ce qui faciliterait la procédure de vente globale de la participation de LBBW dans Deka.

| (14) | Enfin, il existe des éléments convaincants indiquant que la procédure de vente se fera dans le délai fixé, d'ici le [...] au plus tard. En particulier, il semble que [...]. La présente décision permet à LBBW de vendre sa participation dans Deka même si les processus de décision des banques régionales vendant leurs participations dans Deka devaient prendre plus de temps que prévu. |
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(14)

Enfin, il existe des éléments convaincants indiquant que la procédure de vente se fera dans le délai fixé, d'ici le [...] au plus tard. En particulier, il semble que [...]. La présente décision permet à LBBW de vendre sa participation dans Deka même si les processus de décision des banques régionales vendant leurs participations dans Deka devaient prendre plus de temps que prévu.

| (15) | Une prorogation du délai de vente de trois mois ne remet pas en question la mise en œuvre globale du plan de restructuration approuvé par la décision LBBW, qui durera jusqu'en 2014. Elle aidera également LBBW à obtenir l'accord nécessaire des autres banques régionales en vue de faciliter la vente, soit conjointement, soit individuellement. Une prorogation limitée dans le temps devrait donc permettre à LBBW de vendre sa participation dans Deka avant le [...]. En effet, LBBW pourrait ainsi surmonter les difficultés précitées, de nature essentiellement exogène, et mener à bien la cession de Deka comme prévu dans la décision LBBW. La Commission considère dès lors que la demande de prorogation relativement courte jusqu'au [...] est justifiée, en particulier si l'on tient compte des caractéristiques de la structure juridique de Deka. Compte tenu des circonstances de l'affaire, une telle prorogation ne constitue pas un retard du calendrier initialement adopté qui justifierait une réduction du montant de l'aide en conséquence (5). |
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(15)

Une prorogation du délai de vente de trois mois ne remet pas en question la mise en œuvre globale du plan de restructuration approuvé par la décision LBBW, qui durera jusqu'en 2014. Elle aidera également LBBW à obtenir l'accord nécessaire des autres banques régionales en vue de faciliter la vente, soit conjointement, soit individuellement. Une prorogation limitée dans le temps devrait donc permettre à LBBW de vendre sa participation dans Deka avant le [...]. En effet, LBBW pourrait ainsi surmonter les difficultés précitées, de nature essentiellement exogène, et mener à bien la cession de Deka comme prévu dans la décision LBBW. La Commission considère dès lors que la demande de prorogation relativement courte jusqu'au [...] est justifiée, en particulier si l'on tient compte des caractéristiques de la structure juridique de Deka. Compte tenu des circonstances de l'affaire, une telle prorogation ne constitue pas un retard du calendrier initialement adopté qui justifierait une réduction du montant de l'aide en conséquence (5).

IV.   CONCLUSION

| (16) | Pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus, la Commission estime qu'une prorogation de trois mois du délai dans le cas de Deka est nécessaire afin de permettre la bonne mise en œuvre du plan de restructuration de LBBW et n'entrave pas celle-ci. |
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(16)

Pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus, la Commission estime qu'une prorogation de trois mois du délai dans le cas de Deka est nécessaire afin de permettre la bonne mise en œuvre du plan de restructuration de LBBW et n'entrave pas celle-ci.

V.   DÉCISION

La Commission proroge le délai pour la vente de Deka jusqu'au 31 mars 2011.»

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(1)  JO L 188 du 21.7.2010, p. 1.

1

(2)  Des parties de ce texte ont été omises afin de garantir qu'aucune information confidentielle ne soit communiquée. Ces parties sont indiquées par des points de suspension entre crochets, suivis d'un astérisque.

2

(3)  Désigné conformément à la décision LBBW afin d'assurer la mise en œuvre pleine et correcte des engagements pris concernant les cessions.

3

(4)  Cf. décision du 21 décembre 2010 dans l'affaire MC 8/09 WestImmo.

4

WestImmo.

(5)  Cf. Lignes directrices communautaires concernant les aides d'État au sauvetage et à la restructuration d'entreprises en difficulté, JO C 244 du 1.10.2004, p. 2, paragraphe 52, point d).

5

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