United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted June 10, 2022*

Decided June 16, 2022 

Before 

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge 

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

No. 21-1600 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOSEPH MILLER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Hammond Division. 

No. 2:12 CR 10 

James T. Moody, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Joseph Miller, a federal prisoner with chronic health conditions, appeals the 

denial of his motion for compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The 

district judge concluded that Miller did not demonstrate that a heightened risk of 

*

 We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and the 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 21-1600 Page 2 

complications from COVID-19 justified his early release. Because the judge did not 

abuse his discretion, we affirm. 

Miller robbed a bank in Hammond, Indiana, in 2011. At that time he had six 

prior felony convictions and was on supervised release as part of his sentence for a 

previous bank robbery. A jury found Miller guilty of the Hammond robbery, see id.

§ 2113(a), and the judge imposed a prison term of 225 months, within the applicable 

range under the Sentencing Guidelines. Miller is housed at the Federal Correctional 

Institution in Greenfield, Illinois, with a projected release date in 2028. 

 

In September 2020 Miller filed a pro se motion for compassionate release, later 

supplemented by appointed counsel, based on his age (now 56), obesity, diabetes, high 

cholesterol, a liver ailment, and what he described as “contact with tuberculosis.” See

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He had contracted and recovered from COVID-19 in December 2020, 

but he maintained that his poor health and inadequate preventative measures at the 

prison put him at risk of reinfection and serious illness. 

The judge denied the motion in March 2021, using the policy statement in 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 “as a guide.” See § 3582(c)(1)(A) (instructing courts to consult 

“applicable policy statements”). Acknowledging that Miller’s medical conditions placed 

him at increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19, the judge found that the virus 

was “effectively controlled” at the prison because there were no active inmate cases and 

no reason to believe that staff members continued to bring the virus into the prison. 

Under these circumstances, the judge concluded, Miller’s risk of reinfection did not 

create an “extraordinary and compelling” justification for compassionate release. The 

judge did not consider the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Miller appealed. 

We review the denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Kurzynowski, 17 F.4th 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2021). Miller first 

argues that the judge inappropriately relied on § 1B1.13. See United States v. Gunn, 

980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th Cir. 2020). But although that policy statement has not been 

applicable since the compassionate-release statute was updated, here the judge 

recognized its nonbinding nature and consulted it only “as a guide,” which is 

permitted. Id.; United States v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2022). 

Miller next contends that the judge erred by failing to consider the combined 

effects of Miller’s health conditions on his susceptibility to COVID-19. But the judge 

acted within his discretion in concluding that Miller did not show a sufficient risk of 
No. 21-1600 Page 3 

contracting the virus again and suffering its worst outcomes. The judge assumed that 

Miller’s medical comorbidities “place[d] him at an increase[d] risk of severe illness were 

he to contract COVID-19 for a second time,” but after discussing Greenville’s response 

to the pandemic, concluded that this risk was not extraordinary based on the prison’s 

adequate management of the virus. Miller did not present any evidence that contradicts 

this assessment. The judge reasonably concluded that Miller did not meet his burden to 

establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See United States v. Barbee, 

25 F.4th 531, 532 (7th Cir. 2022). And to the extent that Miller challenges the conditions 

and medical care at Greenfield more generally, a compassionate-release motion is not 

the right vehicle. See United States v. Bridgewater, 995 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Finally, Miller contends that the judge neglected to discuss the § 3553(a) 

sentencing factors, particularly his rehabilitative progress while imprisoned. But the 

judge permissibly declined to discuss the factors after concluding that Miller lacked a 

reason for release. A motion for compassionate release involves a two-step inquiry: first, 

whether the prisoner presented an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, and 

second, whether release would be consistent with the § 3553(a) factors. See Kurzynowski, 

17 F.4th at 759. Because Miller fell short at the first step, the judge did not need to 

address the second. See United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021). 

AFFIRMED