[Cite as Tredanary v. Fritz, 2018-Ohio-2374.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

ANTOINETTE TREDANARY, : O P I N I O N 

 Petitioner-Appellant, : 

 CASE NO. 2017-L-173

 - vs - : 

DANIEL FRITZ, : 

 Respondent-Appellee. : 

Civil Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 

Division, Case No. 2017 DV 000153. 

Judgment: Reversed and remanded. 

David M. Lynch, 333 Babbitt Road, Suite 333, Euclid, OH 44123 (For PetitionerAppellant). 

Elaine Tassi, 34955 Chardon Road, Willoughby Hills, OH 44094 (For RespondentAppellee). 

DIANE V. GRENDELL, J. 

{¶1} Petitioner-appellant, Antoinette Tredanary, appeals an award of attorney 

fees from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. The 

issue before this court is whether a court may avoid holding a hearing on a motion for 

sanctions pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and Civil Rule 11 where the court determines such 

a hearing would be burdensome for the parties. For the following reasons, we reverse 

the decision of the court below and remand for further proceedings. 
 2

{¶2} On July 19, 2017, Tredanary filed a Petition for Domestic Violence Civil 

Protection Order (R.C. 3113.31) alleging that the respondent-appellee, Daniel Fritz, had 

committed acts of domestic violence against their son.1 A Civil Protection Order was 

issued ex parte allocating to Tredanary “temporary possession of the protected child.” 

{¶3} On August 17, 2017, following the full hearing on the Petition mandated by 

Civil Rule 65.1, a Magistrate’s Order issued, dismissing the Petition and terminating the 

ex parte Order as Tredanary failed to meet her burden of proof. 

{¶4} On August 29, 2017, Tredanary filed Objections to the Magistrate’s 

Decision with a Request for Leave to Supplement these Objections once the Transcript 

of the Hearing is Prepared. The domestic relations court granted Tredanary until 

September 29, 2017, to file the transcript and supplemental objections. 

{¶5} On September 15, 2017, Fritz filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and 

Expenses pursuant to R.C. 2323.51 and a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Civil Rule 

11. 

{¶6} On September 25, 2017, a Magistrate’s Order issued, ruling that “the 

respondent’s motions shall be set for hearing, once the petitioner’s objections have 

been decided.” 

{¶7} On October 23, 2017, the domestic relations court adopted the August 17 

Magistrate’s Order and overruled Tredanary’s Objections. The court noted that 

Tredanary failed to file a transcript of supplementary objections and, inasmuch as “the 

Petitioner’s objection is fact based, said objection cannot be considered without a 

transcript.” With respect to Fritz’ Motions for Attorney Fees and Sanctions, the court 

ruled: “Counsel for the Respondent is ordered to file by November 9, 2017, her affidavit 

 

1. Tredanary and Fritz are former spouses. Following the parties’ divorce, Fritz has full custody of the 

minor child while Tredanary has supervised parenting time. 
 3

of fees and companion billing invoice detailing the legal services provided in the instant 

case for the Court’s consideration.” 

{¶8} On November 3, 2017, counsel for Fritz submitted an Affidavit of 

Reasonable Attorney Fees and Costs in the amount of $3,690. 

{¶9} On November 27, 2017, the domestic relations court awarded Fritz 

attorney fees in the amount of $3,690. The court held: 

The Court finds a hearing on the Respondent’s August 29, 

2017 Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs will only increase the 

attorney fees incurred by both parties. Such a hearing would be 

burdensome for both parties and inequitable as to the Respondent. 

The Petitioner has had over 21 days to file a response to the 

Respondent’s fee affidavit and chose not to do so. The Court finds 

the fee affidavit of Respondent’s counsel as to the fees incurred 

herein reasonable and equitable. 

{¶10} On December 27, 2017, Tredanary filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal, 

she raises the following assignment of error: 

{¶11} “[1.] The trial court committed error in awarding attorney fees without a 

hearing after specifically ordering that a hearing would be held on that issue, the motion 

for fees not timely filed to begin with.” 

{¶12} It has generally been held that a trial court is required to hold a hearing 

when sanctions are imposed under R.C. 2323.51 or Civil Rule 11. State ex rel. Ebbing 

v. Ricketts, 133 Ohio St.3d 339, 2012-Ohio-4699, 978 N.E.2d 188, ¶ 24 (“[i]t is an abuse 

of discretion to award attorney fees [under Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51] without [an 

evidentiary] hearing”) (citation omitted).2

 

2. As this court has acknowledged on multiple occasions, the standard of review employed by an 

appellate court when reviewing the imposition of sanctions for frivolous conduct “varies and is contingent 

upon the basis for the trial court’s decision.” Keith-Harper v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 2017-Ohio-7361, 96 

N.E.3d 823, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.). Inasmuch as neither the statute nor the case law interpreting the Rule hold 

that the decision to hold a hearing when granting a motion for sanctions is discretionary, we shall apply 

the de novo standard of review appropriate “when reviewing legal conclusions” to the issue. (Citation 

omitted.) Burnett v. Burnett, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2010-A-0035, 2011-Ohio-2839, ¶ 10. 
 4

{¶13} The requirement is express in the statute authorizing an award of attorney 

fees for frivolous conduct: 

An award may be made * * * only after the court does all of the following: 

(a) Sets a date for a hearing to be conducted in accordance with division 

(B)(2)(c) of this section * * *; 

(b) Gives notice of the date of the hearing described in division (B)(2)(a) 

of this section * * *; 

(c) Conducts the hearing described in division (B)(2)(a) of this section in 

accordance with this division, allows the parties and counsel of record 

involved to present any relevant evidence at the hearing, * * * determines 

that the conduct involved was frivolous and that a party was adversely 

affected by it, and then determines the amount of the award to be made. 

R.C. 2323.51(B)(2); Dennison v. Lake Cty. Commrs., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-097, 

2014-Ohio-4295, ¶ 15 (“a hearing is required by R.C. 2323.51(B)(2) before a court can 

grant an award of attorney fees”). 

{¶14} Although an evidentiary hearing is not expressly required by the Civil Rule, 

when sanctions have been imposed for violations of the Rule the “courts have held that 

an evidentiary hearing is required.” Ebbing at ¶ 24, citing Burnett v. Burnett, 11th Dist. 

Ashtabula No. 2010-A-0035, 2011-Ohio-2839, ¶ 26 (“the trial court erred in finding 

appellant’s conduct to be frivolous and awarding attorney fees * * * without first 

engaging in a hearing”). 

{¶15} In the present case, there is no indication that Tredanary waived the 

required hearing or otherwise agreed to have the matter determined based on affidavits. 

Although Tredanary did not respond to Fritz’ Affidavit of Reasonable Attorney Fees and 

Costs, the expectation that the matter would be set for an evidentiary hearing was 

reasonable in light of the statutory mandate, case law interpreting the Rule, and the 

magistrate’s statement that the matter would be set for hearing “once the petitioner’s 
 5

objections have been decided.” Furthermore, we are aware of no case law holding that 

the hearing on sanctions may be dispensed with to avoid burdening the parties. 

{¶16} We must also address Tredanary’s argument that Fritz’ Motion violated 

Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Local Rule 17 

which provides that “[p]arties must file a motion for attorney fees or expenses no later 

than seven days before the hearing on the issue that gives rise to the request for the 

fees,” and that the failure to do so “shall result in the Court’s denial of the motion for 

attorney fees or expenses.” Local Rules 17.01(A) and 17.02. Tredanary notes that 

Fritz’ September 15, 2017 Motion was filed 49 days after the July 28, 2017 hearing on 

the Petition. 

{¶17} Tredanary’s argument is meritless. As Fritz notes, this court has often 

recognized that “the enforcement of local rules is a matter within the discretion of the 

court promulgating the rules, and a violation of a local rule is generally insufficient 

support for a reversal.” Iacampo v. Oliver-Iacampo, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2011-G3026, 2012-Ohio-1790, ¶ 39. 

{¶18} We further note that R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) allows a movant until “thirty days 

after the entry of final judgment in a civil action or appeal” to file a motion for sanctions. 

Statutory enactments may not be abrogated by local rules of court. Krupansky v. 

Pascual, 27 Ohio App.3d 90, 92, 499 N.E.2d 899 (9th Dist.1985) (“while the courts of 

common pleas have the inherent power to make reasonable rules regulating practice 

and procedure in those courts, these rules must not be in conflict with the statutes”), 

citing Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St.2d 17, 231 N.E.2d 64 (1967), paragraph three of 

the syllabus (“[a] Common Pleas Court has inherent power to make reasonable rules 

regulating the practice and procedure in such court where such rules do not conflict with 
 6

the Constitution or with any valid statute”). To the extent that Local Rule 17 conflicts 

with R.C. 2323.51(B)(1), the Rule is unenforceable. 

{¶19} The sole assignment of error is with merit. 

{¶20} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of 

Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, awarding Fritz attorney fees is reversed 

and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Fritz’ 

request, raised in his appellee’s brief, that we determine this to be a frivolous appeal is 

denied. Costs to be taxed against the appellee. 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J., 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

concur.