NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

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No. 15-3213 

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RICHARD C. HVIZDAK, 

 Appellant 

v. 

CITIZENS BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA; RBS CITIZENS NA; 

RBS CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP INC; ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC; 

SENIOR V.P. KAREN D. BUDNIAK; RICHARD J. BOUDREAU & ASSOCIATES 

LLC; UNIVERSAL FIDELITY LP; MERCANTILE ADJUSTMENT BUREAU LLC 

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On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-00406) 

District Court Judge: Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 

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Argued Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

on September 25, 2018 

Before: McKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 30, 2019) 

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OPINION*

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*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

Richard C. Hvizdak 

110 South Main Street 

Pittsburgh, PA 15220 

 

 Pro Se Appellant 

Richard H. Frankel 

Andrew J. Gree, Student Counsel 

Kaitlin O’Donnell, Student Counsel (Argued) 

Drexel University 

Thomas R. Kline School of Law 

3320 Market Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19104 

Counsel for Court Appointed Amicus Appellant 

Jamie S. Dycus (Argued) 

Fraser L. Hunter, Jr. 

David S. Lesser 

WilmerHale 

7 World Trade Center 

New York, NY 10007 

Counsel for Appellees 

McKEE, Circuit Judge

Richard Hvizdak claims that the District Court erred in granting Citizens Bank’s 

12(b)(6) motion and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. We disagree and will 

affirm essentially for the reasons stated by the District Court.1 

Because we fully rely on the District Court’s thoughtful opinion, we need only 

briefly address the challenge to the District Court’s jurisdiction that Hvizdak has made on 

 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
3 

appeal. Hvizdak argues that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to decide his claims 

because it ruled that he lacked prudential standing as a third party, and that the court 

should therefore have dismissed his suit without prejudice. 

This case is peculiar for that reason. Hvizdak, who has alleged a violation of a 

federal statute, now seeks to have us rule that the suit he brought is beyond the reach of 

the federal tribunal. He misunderstands our case law on prudential standing and seeks to 

turn prudential standing into a weapon of last resort for litigants. The limitations on 

third-party standing “are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary 

‘rule of self-restraint’ designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies 

where the applicable constitutional questions are ill-defined and speculative.”2

 We have 

held that the District Court may, at its discretion, review a plaintiff’s claims on the merits 

despite a party having third-party prudential standing.3

Hvizdak alleged an “injury in fact,” a “causal connection between the injury and 

the conduct complained of,”4

 and that a favorable decision by the District Court could 

have redressed that injury. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury 

resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice.”5

 Accordingly, Hvizdak satisfied the 

 

2 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 

255, 257 (1953)). 

3 See Pa. Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 280 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 

2002); The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that Pitt News, as a 

third-party, had standing to challenge a Pennsylvania statute that penalized businesses 

that advertised alcoholic beverages in publications made by, or on behalf of, an 

educational institution). 

4 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 

5 Id. at 561 
4 

requirements necessary for an injury in fact and therefore the District Court had Article 

III jurisdiction. 

Federal courts “lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that 

has been conferred” or to “define[] the scope of federal jurisdiction within the 

constitutionally permissible bounds.”6

 Here, because Hvizdak’s complaint alleged the 

three elements required for Article III jurisdiction over his claims, the District Court 

properly exercised the authority granted by Article III. However, as the District Court 

explained, Article III standing does not mean that a petitioner has successfully laid out a 

claim that will defeat a 12(b)(6) motion. Hvizdak’s allegations, while satisfying standing 

requirements, fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

 

 

6 New Orleans Public Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358–59 (1989) 

(citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)).