3260 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Notices 

Name: Site visit review of the Materials 

Research Science and Engineering Center 

(MRSEC) at Yale University by the Division 

of Materials Research (DMR) #1203. 

Dates & Times: 

February 18, 2015; 7:15 p.m.–9:00 p.m. 

February 19, 2015; 7:15 a.m.–8:30 p.m. 

February 20, 2015; 7:15 a.m.–4:00 p.m. 

Place: Yale University, New Haven, CT. 

Type of Meeting: Part open. 

Contact Person: Dr. Daniele Finotello, 

Program Director, Materials Research Science 

and Engineering Centers Program, Division of 

Materials Research, Room 1065, National 

Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, 

Arlington, VA 22230, Telephone (703) 292– 

4676. 

Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and 

recommendations concerning further support 

of the MRSEC at Yale University. 

Agenda: 

Wednesday, February 18, 2015 

7:15 p.m.–9:00 p.m. Closed–Briefing of 

panel 

Thursday, February 19, 2015 

7:15 a.m.–4:30 p.m. Open–Review of the 

MRSEC 

5:00 p.m.–6:45 p.m. Closed–Executive 

Session 

6:45 p.m.–8:30 p.m. Open–Dinner 

Friday, February 20, 2015 

7:15 a.m.–9:50 a.m. Closed–Executive 

Session 

9:50 a.m.–4:00 p.m. Closed–Executive 

Session, Draft and Review Report 

Reason for Closing: The work being 

reviewed may include information of a 

proprietary or confidential nature, including 

technical information; financial data, such as 

salaries and personal information concerning 

individuals associated with the MRSEC. 

These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552 

b(c), (4) and (6) of the Government in the 

Sunshine Act. 

Dated: January 15, 2015. 

Suzanne Plimpton, 

Acting, Committee Management Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00989 Filed 1–21–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–368; NRC–2015–0008] 

Entergy Operations, Inc., Arkansas 

Nuclear One, Unit 2 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Exemption; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing an 

exemption in response to a January 21, 

2014, request from Entergy Operations, 

Inc. (Entergy or the licensee), from 

certain requirements to perform Type B 

testing (seal pressure test) of the 

containment emergency escape air lock 

doors. This exemption would permit the 

licensee to perform a door seal contact 

verification check in lieu of the 

currently required seal pressure test. 

DATES: January 22, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2015–0008 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly-available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2015–0008. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then 

select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced in this document 

(if that document is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

a document is referenced. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Andrea George, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 

20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–1081, 

email: Andrea.George@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

Entergy is the holder of renewed 

Facility Operating License No. NPF–6, 

which authorizes operation of Arkansas 

Nuclear One (ANO), Unit 2. The license 

provides, among other things, that the 

facility is subject to all rules, 

regulations, and orders of the NRC now 

or hereafter in effect. 

The ANO facility consists of two 

pressurized-water reactors, Units 1 and 

2, located in Pope County, Arkansas. 

II. Request/Action 

Pursuant to § 50.12 of Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 

‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ by letter dated 

January 21, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14021A085), as supplemented 

by letters dated March 17 and 

September 24, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

Nos. ML14077A139 and ML14268A317, 

respectively), the licensee requested an 

exemption from certain requirements of 

10 CFR part 50, Appendix J, ‘‘Primary 

Reactor Containment Leakage Testing 

for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.’’ 

Specifically, the licensee requested an 

exemption from Option B, Section III.B, 

Type B testing (seal pressure test) of the 

ANO, Unit 2, containment emergency 

escape air lock doors. This exemption 

would permit the licensee to perform a 

door seal contact verification check in 

lieu of the currently required seal 

pressure test. 

Section III.B, Option B, Appendix J, 

10 CFR part 50, defines Type B tests as 

pneumatic tests to detect and measure 

local leakage rates across pressure 

retaining, leakage-limiting boundaries, 

which include containment emergency 

escape air lock door seals. Section III.B, 

Option B, Appendix J, 10 CFR part 50, 

also states that these boundaries, such 

as containment emergency escape air 

locks, must be pneumatically tested (1) 

prior to initial criticality, and (2) 

periodically thereafter at intervals based 

on the safety significance and historical 

performance of each boundary and 

isolation valve to ensure the integrity of 

the overall containment system as a 

barrier to fission product release. 

The licensee stated that the 

exemption request is necessary due to 

the design characteristics of the ANO, 

Unit 2, containment emergency escape 

air lock doors, in that the door sealing 

capability relies, in part, on rising 

containment pressure to provide 

sufficient closing force to produce an 

effective seal. In order to perform 

between-the-seals testing for the doors 

in the absence of containment pressure, 

a strongback must be installed to 

simulate this sealing force. 

III. Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: 

(1) The exemptions are authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

public health or safety, and are 

consistent with the common defense 

and security; and (2) when special 

circumstances are present. Under 10 

CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Notices 3261 

circumstances include, among other 

things, when application of the specific 

regulation in the particular 

circumstance would not serve, or is not 

necessary to achieve, the underlying 

purpose of the rule. 

A. Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present 

whenever application of the regulation 

in the particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of Type B testing in Section 

III.B, Option B, Appendix J, 10 CFR part 

50, is to verify containment integrity as 

a fission product barrier to provide 

reasonable assurance of public health 

and safety in the event of a loss-ofcoolant accident. The evaluations 

described in the following sections of 

this exemption show that the 

underlying purpose of the regulations is 

met by the proposed seal contact check 

for the ANO, Unit 2, containment 

emergency escape airlock doors. 

Specifically, due to the design of the 

doors at ANO, Unit 2, the currently 

required between-the-seals testing (for 

the annulus between the inner and outer 

emergency air lock doors), if done 

without the strongback installed, is 

unable to hold pressure at or near the 

Technical Specification (TS) required 

pressure, and so meaningful betweenthe-seals testing is not possible without 

installing the strongback or exerting 

significant closing torque to the door 

closure mechanism. The seal contact 

check, where chalk is applied to the air 

lock door seal face, the door is cycled 

open and closed, and the chalk outline 

left is representative of the door seal 

bead mating with the seal. If the chalk 

pattern does not show adequate contact, 

the seals are adjusted and the seal 

contact test is reperformed until a 360- 

degree seal results. The seal contact 

check and seal adjustments (if 

necessary), the practices for which have 

been incorporated into ANO, Unit 2, 

maintenance procedures, ensure that the 

containment emergency air lock doors 

are sealing properly and that seal 

integrity of the doors is maintained. The 

underlying purpose of Type B testing in 

Section III.B, Option B, Appendix J, 10 

CFR part 50, is achieved through 

application of the seal contact check for 

the air lock doors. Therefore, the special 

circumstances required by 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(ii) for the granting of an 

exemption exist. 

B. Authorized by Law 

This exemption would allow the use 

of a seal contact check, in lieu of a seal 

pressure test, to verify the seal tightness 

of the ANO, Unit 2, containment 

emergency escape air lock doors. As 

stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the 

NRC to grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 

provided that special circumstances are 

present. As described above, the NRC 

staff has determined that special 

circumstances exist to grant the 

requested exemption. In addition, 

granting the exemption will not result in 

a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, as amended, or the Commission’s 

regulations. Therefore, the exemption is 

authorized by law. 

C. No Undue Risk to Public Health and 

Safety 

This exemption request is necessary 

due to the original design of the 

containment emergency escape air lock 

at ANO, Unit 2. The air lock consists of 

a steel cylinder with a circular door at 

each end, an outer door and inner door, 

with the inner door being directly in 

contact with the interior of the 

containment building. Both of the air 

lock doors open inward toward the 

containment building interior, and so, 

during between-the-seals pressure 

testing (between the two air lock doors), 

the increasing pressure tends to more 

tightly seat the outer air lock door and 

push the inner airlock door off of its 

seat. The licensee stated that though 

each air lock door is fitted with two 

latching pins, one for the top and one 

for the bottom, these pins are not 

designed to provide enough closing 

force for meaningful between-the-seals 

testing without a strongback installed. 

During a postulated design basis event, 

both air lock doors rely on rising 

containment building pressure to 

provide closing force for a sufficiently 

tight seal in order to constitute a fission 

product boundary. 

In its application, the licensee stated 

that during trial testing, the annulus 

between the door seals could not be 

successfully tested without the door 

strongback installed, even at pressures 

as low as 12 pounds per square inch 

gauge. This indicates that the leak rates 

for between-the-seals testing on the 

emergency escape air lock doors cannot 

meet the acceptance criteria found in 

Section III.B.1.(c), Appendix J, 10 CFR 

part 50, without the use of a strongback. 

The licensee stated that it has taken 

efforts to improve the test without the 

use of a strongback, and that these 

efforts have produced conflicting 

results. The licensee concluded that a 

complete change-out of the inner and 

outer bulkhead and door assemblies 

would be required to support 

incorporating an ‘‘O’’ ring seal design 

with a 3-pin latching configuration. 

Based on vendor information, the ‘‘O’’ 

ring seal design is superior to the flat 

seal profile design. Consideration was 

also given to a gear reduction design for 

the opening and closing mechanism. 

The licensee stated that while this 

option would increase sealing forces, 

there is insufficient evidence to 

determine whether such a modification 

would ensure future success with 

respect to between-the-seals pressure 

testing. 

The licensee stated that in recent 

years, it has performed significant 

maintenance and modification activities 

on the air lock doors with onsite vendor 

support. By letter dated August 11, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14218A602), 

the NRC staff submitted a request for 

additional information to the licensee 

regarding whether seal design, seal 

material, seal shape, and seal operation 

conditions had been evaluated to 

address the between-the-seals testing 

difficulties. In its response dated 

September 24, 2014, the licensee stated 

that the following activities have been 

completed in recent years regarding the 

air locks: (1) Increased door to seal 

contact by adjusting door settings, (2) 

designed a torque amplifying device to 

assist in opening/closing the door due to 

increasing the contact pressures, (3) 

replaced door seals every refueling 

outage, (4) upgraded door locking bolt 

compression springs to allow for 

additional closing forces with improved 

ability to open the doors, (5) replaced 

locking bolt brackets and pins, and (6) 

obtained vendor support and expertise 

to maintain and adjust the door for 

optimum performance. The licensee 

also stated that the seal material 

currently in use is an ethylenepropylene-diamine-monomer, which is 

the vendor recommended and qualified 

material. The seals are a square crosssection shape design formed in a 

continuous circle to fit the bulk head 

frame seal channel. By design of the 

channel, the seal shape is limited. In 

addition, each door is designed with a 

‘‘nose/sealing bar’’ that provides a 

continuous protrusion into the flat-faced 

seal for improved sealing contact. These 

features prevent seal design changes 

without extensive changes to the design 

and hardware of the hatch. 

In its application, the licensee 

indicated that the vendor has clearly 

stated that the ANO, Unit 2, air lock 

design does not support testing without 

the use of a strongback and, to meet leak 

rate limits, the airlock’s latching 

mechanism must generate a high latch 

contact such that it will maintain a 

residual compressive load on the gasket 

greater than the unseating effect 

produced by the test pressure. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
3262 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Notices 

Adjustment and/or modification of the 

latch in this manner defeats the purpose 

of the emergency escape air lock since 

excessive human force would be 

required to open the air lock door in an 

emergency situation. The licensee 

provided information regarding two 

events where personnel or equipment 

difficulties precluded the air lock doors 

from being opened or opening as 

designed. In 2008, after an individual 

became trapped in the air lock due to 

being unable to open the door, the 

licensee installed a torque amplifying 

device to assist personnel in door 

opening/closing. In 2012, the air lock 

outer door required mechanical 

agitation to open, and it was noted that 

the 3/4-inch stainless steel latch pins 

were bent. Based on efforts to date, the 

licensee has concluded that attempting 

to apply excessive closing torque to the 

door necessary to overcome the original 

design characteristics is inappropriate. 

The licensee has investigated the 

potential of substantial modifications to 

the air lock doors in order to meet the 

current seal pressure test requirements 

and the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration’s requirements. Beyond 

the many components previously 

replaced, along with spring upgrades to 

help alleviate the excessive force now 

needed to operate the doors, the 

licensee has determined complete door 

replacement (retrofit) would be 

necessary to resolve the aforementioned 

issues and have the ability to perform a 

meaningful between-the-seals pressure 

test. The licensee stated that vendor 

proposals for door replacement reflect 

an extremely high estimated cost, 

without any guarantee that such a 

modification would resolve the issue of 

air lock seal pressure testing. The cost 

of pursuing such a modification is 

unwarranted because no appreciable 

increase in nuclear or public safety 

would be realized. 

In its application, the licensee stated 

that past TS surveillance testing for the 

emergency escape air lock has shown 

that testing with strongbacks in place is 

successful; however, the pressure 

applied by the strongbacks, or the 

pressure applied to the outer door 

during the overall air lock pressure test, 

can cause door seals to take a set that 

reflects the shape of the seal grooves. 

With strongbacks installed or test 

pressure applied to the air lock barrel, 

the male portion of the door seal (the 

seal bead) can be pressed into the seal. 

The seal will remain in this compressed 

condition for the entire test period, 

causing the seal to take a set in the seal 

groove of the air lock bulkhead. After 

completion of an overall air lock barrel 

pressure test, both doors must be 

opened to verify proper seal contact 

with the door seal bead in order to 

ensure that the seals rebound to the pretest condition. During the seal contact 

check, a seal adjustment may be 

required after testing because the force 

of the strongbacks on a given door and/ 

or the force due to the air lock barrel test 

pressure on the outer door can draw the 

seal bead on the doors further into the 

seal groove than what would occur 

under normal door closure forces. 

The seal contact check consists of 

applying chalk or other viable medium 

on the seal face and then closing and 

reopening the emergency escape air lock 

door. This will result in a pattern in the 

chalk (or other medium) that is 

representative of the door seal bead 

mating with the seal. If the chalk (or 

other medium) pattern does not show 

adequate contact, the seals are adjusted 

in the area of the gap. Following 

adjustment, the licensee performs a final 

seal contact check to verify the integrity 

of the sealing surface. The practice of 

verifying acceptable seal contact 

following performance of the overall air 

lock leak test and the acceptance criteria 

for this verification have been 

incorporated into the ANO, Unit 2, 

maintenance procedures. 

The performance of the door seal 

contact check has led to the successful 

completion of subsequent emergency 

escape air lock full pressure tests since 

the procedural practice began. In a 

request for additional information dated 

August 11, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14218A602), the NRC staff 

requested that the licensee provide test 

results to show the effectiveness of the 

seal contact check. In its supplement 

dated September 24, 2014, the licensee 

provided the test results following seal 

contact checks for refueling outages 

from 2008 (2R19) to 2014 (2R23). In its 

supplement, the licensee stated that the 

results indicate that performance of the 

seal contact check is instrumental in the 

successful completion of subsequent 

leak testing. In its application, the 

licensee noted that acceptance criteria 

for containment building integrated leak 

rate testing (ILRT) has been met for each 

ILRT since initial plant startup, 

indicating that the emergency escape 

airlock door seals are meeting their 

design function when exposed to 

pressure in the correct (accident) 

direction. 

As an alternative to the between-theseals pressure test of the emergency 

escape air lock required by Section III.B, 

Option B, Appendix J, 10 CFR part 50, 

the licensee has proposed a final door 

seal contact verification. This seal 

performance verification is completed 

following the full pressure airlock test, 

after the removal of the inner door 

strongback, and just prior to final 

closure of the airlock doors. The 

requested exemption would not affect 

compliance with the requirement to 

perform a full pressure emergency 

escape airlock test each refueling 

outage. Based on these results and 

information provided by the licensee, 

the NRC staff concludes that the 

containment building emergency airlock 

doors at ANO, Unit 2, function as 

designed using current methods of 

testing and maintenance, including seal 

contact checks. The NRC staff further 

concludes that the seal contact checks 

performed on the emergency escape 

airlock door seals ensure that the doors 

are sealing properly and will perform 

their design function to limit 

radiological release in the case of a 

postulated accident. Therefore, the NRC 

staff determined that the between-theseals testing required by Section III.B, 

Option B, Appendix J, 10 CFR part 50, 

is not necessary to achieve the 

underlying purpose of the rule for the 

emergency escape air lock doors, given 

their current design. Since the above 

evaluations demonstrate that the 

underlying purpose of the rule will be 

met with the seal contact check, the 

NRC staff concludes that there is no 

undue risk to the public health and 

safety. 

D. Consistent With the Common Defense 

and Security 

The licensee’s exemption request is to 

utilize an alternative to the Type B 

containment emergency escape air lock 

door seal pressure testing requirement 

in Section III.B, Option B, Appendix J, 

10 CFR part 50. This exemption request 

is not related to, and does not impact 

any security issues at ANO, Unit 2. 

Therefore, the NRC staff determined that 

this exemption does not impact, and is 

consistent with, the common defense 

and security. 

E. Environmental Considerations 

The NRC staff determined that the 

exemption discussed herein meets the 

eligibility criteria for the categorical 

exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) 

because it is related to a requirement 

concerning the installation or use of a 

facility component located within the 

restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 

part 20, and issuance of this exemption 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration, no significant change in 

the types or a significant increase in the 

amounts of any effluents that may be 

released offsite, and no significant 

increase in individual or cumulative 

occupational radiation exposure. 

Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Notices 3263 

51.22(b), no environmental impact 

statement or environmental assessment 

need be prepared in connection with the 

NRC’s consideration of this exemption 

request. The basis for the NRC staff’s 

determination is discussed as follows 

with an evaluation against each of the 

requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i)– 

(iii). 

Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i) 

The NRC staff evaluated whether the 

exemption involves no significant 

hazards consideration using the 

standards described in 10 CFR 50.92(c), 

as presented below: 

1. Does the proposed exemption 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an 

accident previously evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change would permit 

emergency escape air lock door seal leak 

integrity testing to be performed by a 

seal contact check in place of the 

between-the-seals pressure test. The seal 

contact check will be performed 

following emergency escape air lock 

door opening, overall full pressure test 

of the emergency escape air lock, or air 

lock door seal contact adjustments. The 

seal contact test method will result in a 

continuation of the established practice 

at ANO, Unit 2, which has provided a 

high degree of confidence in door seal 

performance. The performance of the 

door seal contact test method at ANO, 

Unit 2, has led to the successful 

completion of subsequent emergency 

escape air lock full pressure tests since 

the procedural practice began. 

Furthermore, the acceptance criteria for 

containment building ILRT has been 

met for each ILRT since initial plant 

startup, indicating that the air lock door 

seals are meeting their design function 

when exposed to pressure in the correct 

(accident) direction. At Palisades 

Nuclear Plant, emergency escape air 

lock door seals which have been 

inspected in accordance with the 

proposed methodology have passed 

subsequent full pressure emergency 

escape air lock leakage tests and have 

not interfered with successful 

Containment Building ILRT. 

Since the proposed methodology can 

be used to successfully verify door seal 

condition and contact, the use of this 

methodology for testing will not cause 

an increase in the probability of a 

leaking emergency escape air lock door 

seal going undetected. The combination 

of the door seal contact check and the 

overall full pressure testing of the 

emergency escape air lock will provide 

high confidence of the air lock 

performing its design function under 

accident conditions. 

Therefore, this change does not 

involve a significant increase in the 

probability or consequences of an 

accident previously evaluated. 

2. Does the proposed exemption 

create the possibility of a new or 

different kind of accident from any 

accident previously evaluated? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change is associated 

exclusively with testing of features 

related to Containment Building 

integrity. The change affects only the 

testing methodology of the emergency 

escape air lock door seals. The proposed 

testing method does not result in any 

physical alterations to the plant 

configuration, no new structure, system, 

or component (SSC) is added, no SSC 

interfaces are modified, and no changes 

to any design function of an SSC or the 

methods of SSC operation are being 

made. As the proposed change would 

not change the design, configuration, or 

operation of the plant, the change would 

not cause the Containment Leakage Rate 

Testing Program to become an accident 

initiator. 

Therefore, this change does not create 

the possibility of a new or different kind 

of accident from an accident previously 

evaluated. 

3. Does the proposed exemption 

involve a significant reduction in a 

margin of safety? 

Response: No. 

The proposed change is associated 

exclusively with testing of features 

related to Containment Building 

integrity. The change affects only the 

testing methodology of the emergency 

escape air lock door seals. The change 

is unrelated to an initiator of any 

accident previously evaluated. The 

proposed application of a door seal 

contact check in lieu of a between-theseals pressure test along with 

continuation of the overall full pressure 

test of the emergency escape air lock 

will continue to provide high 

confidence that the Containment 

Building leakage rate criteria for the 

emergency escape air lock will not 

exceed the maximum allowable leakage 

rates defined in the TSs or assumed in 

the accident analysis. 

Therefore, this change does not 

involve a significant reduction in a 

margin safety. 

Based on the above evaluation of the 

standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), 

the NRC staff concludes that the 

proposed exemption involves no 

significant hazards consideration. 

Accordingly, the requirements of 10 

CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i) are met. 

Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(ii) 

The proposed exemption would allow 

containment emergency escape air lock 

door seal pressure testing to be 

performed by a seal contact verification 

test. This change only affects the leakage 

integrity testing methodology of the 

door seals, and does not change the 

frequency at which the testing must be 

performed. The proposed testing 

methodology serves the same purpose as 

the pressure testing required by 

regulations. Therefore, the proposed 

alternative testing methodology will not 

significantly change the types of 

effluents that may be released offsite, or 

significantly increase the amount of 

effluents that may be released offsite. 

Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9)(ii) are met. 

Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(iii) 

The proposed exemption would allow 

containment emergency escape air lock 

door seal pressure testing to be 

performed by a seal contact verification 

test. This change only affects the leakage 

integrity testing methodology of the 

door seals and has no impact on, or 

change to, fuel or core design. 

Therefore, the proposed alternative 

testing methodology will not 

significantly increase individual 

occupational radiation exposure or 

significantly increase cumulative 

occupational radiation exposure. 

Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9)(iii) are met. 

Conclusion 

Based on the above, the NRC staff 

concludes that the proposed exemption 

meets the eligibility criteria for the 

categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9). Therefore, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental 

impact statement or environmental 

assessment need be prepared in 

connection with the NRC’s issuance of 

this exemption. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants the 

licensee an exemption from 10 CFR part 

50, Appendix J, Option B, Section III.B, 

Type B testing (seal pressure test) to 

perform a seal contact verification test, 

in lieu of seal pressure testing, for the 

ANO, Unit 2, emergency escape air lock 

doors. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
3264 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Notices 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 12th day 

of January 2015. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Michele G. Evans, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2015–01032 Filed 1–21–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2014–0183] 

Laboratory Investigations of Soils and 

Rocks for Engineering Analysis and 

Design of Nuclear Power Plants 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Regulatory guide: issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing Revision 3 

to Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.138, 

‘‘Laboratory Investigations of Soils and 

Rocks for Engineering Analysis and 

Design of Nuclear Power Plants.’’ This 

guide describes a method that the NRC 

staff considers acceptable for use in the 

laboratory testing of soils and rocks 

needed to comply with NRC 

requirements for the siting and design of 

nuclear power plants. 

DATES: January 22, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2014–0183 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly-available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2014–0093. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may access publicly 

available documents online in the NRC 

Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, 

select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and 

then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS accession number for each 

document referenced in this notice (if 

that document is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that a 

document is referenced. Revision 3 of 

Regulatory Guide 1.138 is available in 

ADAMS under Accession No. 

ML14289A600. The regulatory analysis 

may be found in ADAMS under 

Accession No. ML14289A602. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

Regulatory guides are not 

copyrighted, and NRC approval is not 

required to reproduce them. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Scott Stovall, telephone: 301–251–7922, 

email: Scott.Stovall@nrc.gov, or Edward 

O’Donnell, telephone: 301–251–7455, 

email: Edward.Odonnell@nrc.gov. Both 

are staff of the Office of Nuclear 

Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The NRC is issuing a revision to an 

existing guide in the NRC’s ‘‘Regulatory 

Guide’’ series. This series was 

developed to describe and make 

available to the public such information 

as methods that are acceptable to the 

NRC staff for implementing specific 

parts of the NRC’s regulations, 

techniques that the staff uses in 

evaluating specific problems or 

postulated accidents, and data that the 

staff needs in its review of applications 

for permits and licenses. 

Revision 3 of RG 1.138 was issued 

with a temporary identification as draft 

regulatory guide (DG)–1256. The guide 

describes laboratory investigations and 

testing practices acceptable to the NRC 

staff for determining soil and rock 

properties and characteristics needed 

for engineering analysis and design of 

foundations and earthworks for nuclear 

power plants. The guide was 

reformatted and was revised to reflect 

changes in standards for testing 

procedures developed since 2003. The 

most significant change is in Section 

C.6.3, ‘‘Resonant Column Tests,’’ which 

provides an alternative method for 

resonant column and torsional shear 

testing of soil and rock samples. 

II. Additional Information 

The DG–1256 was published in the 

Federal Register on August 4, 2014 (79 

FR 45223), for a 60-day public comment 

period. The public comment period 

closed on October 3, 2014. No public 

comments were received. 

III. Congressional Review Act 

This regulatory guide is a rule as 

defined in the Congressional Review 

Act (5 U.S.C. 801–808). However, the 

Office of Management and Budget has 

not found it to be a major rule as 

defined in the Congressional Review 

Act. 

IV. Backfitting and Issue Finality 

Issuance of this guide in final form 

does not constitute backfitting as 

defined in § 50.109 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) (the 

Backfit Rule) and is not otherwise 

inconsistent with the issue finality 

provisions in 10 CFR part 52. This guide 

would not apply to any construction 

permits, operating licenses, early site 

permits, or limited work authorizations 

already issued under 10 CFR 50.10 for 

which the NRC issued a final 

environmental impact statement (EIS) 

preceded by a draft EIS under 10 CFR 

51.76 or 51.75, or combined licenses, 

any of which were issued by the NRC 

prior to issuance of the final regulatory 

guide. The NRC has already completed 

its siting determination for those 

construction permits, operating licenses, 

early site permits, limited work 

authorizations, and combined licenses. 

Absent voluntary action by the licensee 

(e.g., license amendment, exemption 

request), no further NRC regulatory 

action on siting will occur for those 

licenses, permits, and authorizations for 

which the guidance in the guide would 

be relevant. Licensees and holders of 

NRC regulatory approvals may perform 

testing of soils and rocks for engineering 

analysis and design activities consistent 

with the licensing basis for each permit 

and license. This testing need not 

comply with this regulatory guide. 

However, when a licensee or holder of 

an NRC regulatory approval voluntarily 

requests a change to its license or 

regulatory approval for which new soils 

or rock testing is necessary and is an 

essential consideration of the NRC’s 

evaluation of the request, then the NRC 

may condition its approval of the 

request on the licensee’s or holder’s 

agreement to conduct the soil or rock 

testing in accordance with the guidance 

in the guide. 

The guidance in this regulatory guide 

may be applied to applications for early 

site permits, combined licenses, and 

limited work authorizations issued 

under 10 CFR 50.10 (including 

information under 10 CFR 51.49(b) or 

(f)), any of which are docketed and 

under review by the NRC as of the date 

of issuance of the final regulatory guide. 

The guidance in this regulatory guide 

may also be applied to applications for 


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