UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1454

JOHN WESLEY HIGHTOWER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SAVANNAH RIVER REMEDIATION, LLC,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. 

J. Michelle Childs, District Judge. (1:13-cv-03558-JMC)

Argued: October 24, 2017 Decided: November 20, 2017

Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Julius Wistar Babb, IV, J. LEWIS CROMER & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. George A. Reeves, III, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP, Columbia, 

South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

John Wesley Hightower (“Appellant”) appeals the district court’s award of 

summary judgment in favor of his employer, Savannah River Remediation, LLC 

(“Appellee”), on his race discrimination and retaliation claims brought pursuant to Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17. We 

affirm based on the reasoning of the district court in Hightower v. Savannah River 

Remediation, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-03558, 2016 WL 1128022 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2016).

Appellant has been employed with Appellee for a number of years and by all 

accounts was a good performer at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit. On 

November 14, 2012, Appellant held a meeting during which two of his subordinates 

became upset with him and behaved inappropriately by yelling and cursing at Appellant. 

Following this meeting, while Appellant was on previously scheduled medical leave, 

Appellee’s management spoke with Appellant’s subordinates about the incident. Some 

of Appellant’s subordinates reported that Appellant’s management style created a 

stressful workplace environment. Appellant’s supervisors then asked Appellant to 

apologize to his team, which he agreed to do, even though he felt he had done nothing 

wrong. At some point while on leave, Appellant changed his mind about apologizing to 

his team. As a result, Appellee’s management presented him with a “Performance 

Improvement Plan” upon his return to work, which stated that Appellant had “displayed a 
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pattern of unacceptable behaviors” and needed to improve his interpersonal skills and his 

relationship with his subordinates. J.A. 685.*

Appellant expressed concerns about the content of the document, since it implied

that he had a performance problem. Management retitled the document “Development 

Plan” and revised the line about Appellant’s “pattern of unacceptable behaviors” to read 

that Appellant’s management style “needed improvement.” J.A. 686. Still, Appellant 

refused to agree to the terms of the Development Plan because he believed he had done 

nothing wrong, but he acknowledged his receipt of the document. Appellant’s 

supervisors informed him that this would be unacceptable to Appellee’s management and 

that he needed to sign the Development Plan to return to his position. Appellant 

nonetheless refused to sign the Development Plan and was therefore reassigned to a 

similar position with the same salary and benefits but without supervisory authority.

As an initial matter, we question whether Appellant suffered an adverse 

employment action because he was reassigned to a position with the same salary and 

benefits as his former position. However, as the district court did, we assume without 

deciding that Appellant has made out a prima facie case of race discrimination and 

retaliation under Title VII.

Appellant bears the burden to demonstrate that Appellee’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for Appellant’s reassignment -- his refusal to sign the Development 

 

* Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this 

appeal.
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Plan -- “is a pretext and . . . the true reason is discriminatory or retaliatory.” Guessous v. 

Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016). He may do this “by 

showing either that [Appellee’s] explanation [for the adverse action] is not credible, or 

that [Appellee’s] decision was more likely the result of [discrimination or] retaliation.” 

Waag v. Sotera Def. Sols., Inc., 857 F.3d 179, 192 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sharif v. 

United Airlines, Inc., 841 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 2016)).

Appellant has not met his burden. He acknowledges that he was reassigned not 

because he was performing inadequately, or even because his subordinates did not like 

his management style, but because he refused to sign the Development Plan. Appellant 

would have retained his position had he signed this document to the satisfaction of 

Appellee’s management. Further, even assuming that Appellant’s subordinates 

complained about his management style due to some racial or retaliatory animus, there is 

no basis for imputing any such bias to Appellee. We have previously “refused to endorse 

a construction of Title VII that would treat a subordinate who has no supervisory or 

disciplinary authority and who does not make the final or formal employment decision 

[as] a decisionmaker simply because he had a substantial influence on the ultimate 

decision or because he has played a role, even a significant one, in the adverse 

employment decision.” Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 410–11 

(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). We likewise decline to do so here.

AFFIRMED