COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00173-CV

REBECCA GEORGE APPELLANT

V.

ADAM M. DEARDORFF AND LANA 

WIRSIG

APPELLEES

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FROM THE 348TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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OPINION

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Appellant Rebecca George appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of her 

claims against Appellees Adam M. Deardorff and Lana Wirsig on jurisdictional 

grounds. In one issue, George argues that the trial court erred by sustaining 

Deardorff’s and Wirsig’s special appearances. Because we hold that the trial 

court did not err by sustaining the special appearances, we affirm the trial court’s 

order dismissing George’s claims against them.
2

Background

George filed suit against Deardorff, Wirsig, and Harlan Hall, a party not 

involved in this appeal. Hall is a resident of Texas, Deardorff is a resident of 

Pennsylvania, and Wirsig is a resident of Missouri. In her petition, George 

asserted claims for, among other things, libel, slander, defamation, civil 

conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with known 

business relations, and negligence.

George asserted the following facts in her petition. In order to assist his 

daughter Dana in achieving the ―High Point in the Nation‖ award from the 

American Paint Horse Association (APHA), Hall began a campaign to sabotage 

Maggie Griffin, one of his daughter’s major competitors, and to discredit George, 

who trained Griffin and her horse. As part of this campaign, Hall filed suit against

George; Griffin; Griffin’s mother; Wirsig; and Wirsig’s mother in Michigan state 

court for battery, assault, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 

and civil conspiracy. Wirsig was at that time one of George’s clients.

Early in the Michigan lawsuit, Wirsig provided Hall with a written statement 

asserting that George and Griffin had instructed her to ―cover‖ Dana at a 

competition (that is, to position her horse between Dana’s horse and the judges 

to obstruct the judges’ view of Dana). Hall dismissed Wirsig and her mother from 

the lawsuit, and Wirsig ceased all communication with George.

Hall produced Deardorff for a deposition in the Michigan suit, and in 

Deardorff’s deposition, he stated that at the same competition, George behaved 
3

in a manner designed to harass and intimidate Dana and other competitors. 

During this time, Deardorff and Hall were engaged in negotiations for Hall to hire 

Deardorff as the Hall family’s horse trainer in Texas.

The trial court in the Michigan suit granted George and the Griffins’ motion 

for summary judgment on Hall’s claims. In addition to filing his lawsuit, Hall 

lodged two complaints with the APHA, causing that organization to revoke 

George’s status as an official APHA judge and to suspend her from APHA 

competitions for six months. This suspension caused her to lose more than half 

of her clients.

Deardorff and Wirsig both filed special appearances asserting that the trial 

court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. In response, George alleged that 

they both had made false statements that were provided to APHA, whose 

headquarters is in Fort Worth. After a hearing, the trial court sustained the 

special appearances and dismissed George’s claims against Deardorff and 

Wirsig.

Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a 

question of law that we review de novo.1The trial court frequently must resolve 

questions of fact before deciding the jurisdiction question, however, and we may 

 

1BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 

2002).
4

review a trial court’s findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency.2 Although 

we do not review the trial court’s legal conclusions for factual sufficiency, we may 

review the trial court’s conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their 

correctness.3If we determine that a conclusion of law is erroneous but that the 

trial court rendered the proper judgment, the erroneous conclusion of law does 

not require reversal.4

When a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law 

with its special appearance ruling, all facts necessary to support the judgment 

and supported by the evidence are implied.5 But when the appellate record 

includes the reporter’s and clerk’s records, these implied findings are not 

conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency.6

Special Appearances

Texas courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident 

defendants in accordance with the Texas long-arm statute.7 The plaintiff has the 

 

2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 795.

6

Id.; Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 332 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2010, pet. filed).

7

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 17.041–.045 (West 2008); BMC 

Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795.
5

initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to confer jurisdiction,

8

and, thus with a 

nonresident defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading sufficient 

allegations to bring the defendant within the reach of the Texas long-arm statute.9

A plaintiff may meet this minimal pleading requirement by alleging that the 

nonresident defendant is doing business in Texas.10 Once the plaintiff has met 

this burden, the nonresident defendant has the burden of negating all bases of 

jurisdiction alleged in the plaintiff’s petition.11 Because the plaintiff defines the 

scope and nature of the lawsuit, the defendant’s burden to negate jurisdiction is 

tied to the allegations in the plaintiff’s pleading.

12

 Thus, if the plaintiff fails to 

plead facts bringing the defendant within reach of the long-arm statute, the 

defendant need only prove that he or she does not live in Texas to meet this 

burden.13

The long-arm statute extends Texas courts’ personal jurisdiction ―as far as 

the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit.‖14 Personal 

 

8Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 337 

(Tex. 2009); Moncrief, 332 S.W.3d at 7.

9BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793.

10Moncrief, 332 S.W.3d at 7.

11Id.

12Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010).

13Id. at 658–59.

14BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795.
6

jurisdiction meets constitutional due process requirements when two conditions 

are met: ―(1) the defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum 

state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.‖15

A nonresident defendant’s contacts with a state can give rise to either 

general or specific jurisdiction.16 General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s 

contacts are continuous and systematic, in which case the forum state may

exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the cause of action did 

not arise from or relate to activities conducted within the forum state.17 Specific 

jurisdiction is established if the defendant’s alleged liability arises from or is 

related to an activity conducted within the forum.18

To have minimum contacts for purposes of specific jurisdiction, a

nonresident defendant must by some act have purposefully availed itself of the 

privileges of conducting activities within Texas.19 Only the defendant’s contacts 

with the state count: a defendant should not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as 

 

15Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154 

(1945)).

16Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575–76 (Tex. 

2007).

17CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1996).

18Id.; Moncrief, 332 S.W.3d at 9.

19See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 576; see also Michiana Easy Livin’

Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784–85 (Tex. 2005).
7

a result of the ―unilateral activity of another party or a third person.‖

20

 The acts 

relied on to show minimum contacts must be purposeful rather ―random, isolated, 

or fortuitous.‖21 Furthermore, the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, 

or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction.

22

One way a nonresident defendant establishes minimum contacts is by 

doing business in the state.23 For purposes of Texas’s long-arm statute, a 

nonresident does business in Texas if the nonresident commits a tort ―in whole or 

in part‖ in the state.

24

 An allegation that the nonresident committed a tort in 

Texas, however, while satisfying the long-arm statute, does not necessarily 

satisfy due process requirements.25

Analysis

In her sole issue, George argues that the trial court erred by sustaining 

Deardorff’s and Wirsig’s special appearances because the undisputed facts and 

legal precedence clearly show that Texas courts have jurisdiction over Deardorff 

and Wirsig. George did not plead any facts in her petition to show general 

 

20Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785.

21Id.

22Id.

23IRA Res., Inc. v. Griego, 221 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tex. 2007).

24Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042.

25Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 788.
8

jurisdiction and did not make any assertion in her response to Deardorff’s and 

Wirsig’s special appearances that the trial court had general jurisdiction over 

Deardorff and Wirsig. In fact, she specifically stated that she was ―not alleging 

general jurisdiction applies here.‖ Accordingly, we focus our analysis on whether 

the facts showed that the trial court had specific jurisdiction.

We first examine George’s petition to see if she alleged facts giving rise to 

jurisdiction. George alleged that Deardorff was a resident of Pennsylvania and 

that Wirsig was a resident of Missouri. She did not allege in her petition that 

Wirsig or Deardorff had done business in Texas, nor did she allege any other 

jurisdictional facts. Although she asserted that Wirsig’s and Deardorff’s 

statements were provided to APHA, she asserted that Hall submitted them, not 

Wirsig or Deardorff.26 She also asserted that Deardorff had engaged in 

negotiations with Hall regarding the possibility of Hall hiring Deardorff to become 

the Hall family’s horse trainer in Texas. But she did not allege where these 

negotiations occurred or allege any other facts about these negotiations. None 

of these alleged facts show that either Deardorff or Wirsig had any actual contact 

with Texas. Based on these pleadings, George did not meet her burden to allege

facts sufficient to give the trial court personal jurisdiction over Deardorff and 

Wirsig.

 

26See id. at 785 (stating that a defendant should not be haled into a 

jurisdiction based solely on the unilateral activity of a third party).
9

Because George failed to plead jurisdictional facts, Deardorff and Wirsig 

could meet their burden to negate jurisdiction by proving that they were 

nonresidents.27 Deardorff and Wirsig both submitted affidavits to the trial court in 

which they swore that they were not residents of Texas. George never disputed 

that they were not Texas residents, and in fact she acknowledged that they were 

nonresidents in her pleadings. Because Deardorff and Wirsig met their burden to 

negate jurisdiction, George had the burden to show that the trial court had 

jurisdiction of Deardorff and Wirsig.28

George filed a response to the special appearances in which, in 

contradiction to her pleadings, she alleged that Wirsig and Deardorff furnished 

defamatory statements to the APHA, which has its headquarters in Texas, 

thereby committing a tort in this state. But then, in her affidavit attached to the 

response, she again alleged that it was Hall who had given the statements to the 

APHA. George did not amend her pleadings, and thus at the time the trial court 

entered its order, her live pleadings alleged that it was Hall who provided 

Deardorff’s and Wirsig’s statement to the APHA, and she affirmed this assertion 

in her affidavit challenging the special appearances.

To this response, Wirsig and Deardorff filed a joint reply. Wirsig attached 

an affidavit in which she stated that she had signed an affidavit in accordance 

 

27See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658–59.

28See Assurances Generales Banque Nationale v. Dhalla, 282 S.W.3d 

688, 695 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)
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with her settlement with Hall of the Michigan lawsuit. She stated that at the time 

she signed the affidavit, she was not aware of any APHA complaints relating to 

the Michigan lawsuit, that she did not give the affidavit to the APHA, and that if it 

was given to the APHA, it was done without her knowledge. Deardorff likewise 

signed an affidavit in which he stated that he signed an affidavit in connection 

with the Michigan lawsuit, that he was unaware of the APHA complaints relating 

to the Michigan lawsuit, that he did not give his affidavit to the APHA, and that if 

the affidavit had been given to that organization, it was done without his 

knowledge.

George failed to assert any grounds on which the trial court could 

determine it had personal jurisdiction over Deardorff and Wirsig. Furthermore, 

even if the trial court considered her one statement in her response that 

Appellees had furnished their statements to the APHA, this allegation is not 

sufficient to show jurisdiction. This act, if true, was too random or isolated to 

constitute purposeful availment and does not show that Deardorff or Wirsig 

sought some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing themselves of Texas.29 

Similarly, George’s allegation that Deardorff engaged in employment negotiations 

with Hall do not show minimum contacts; she did not allege whether these talks 

occurred in Texas or were of a nature to show purposeful availment.

 

29See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 788 (stating that allegations that a tort was 

committed in Texas satisfy the long-arm statute but not necessarily the U.S. 

Constitution).
11

George argues that the fact that it was Hall who provided the statement to 

APHA has no relevance here because ―that issue is applicable under the 

purposeful availment analysis, not the long-arm analysis.‖ We do not understand 

this argument. The ―purposeful availment‖ analysis applies in determining 

whether a defendant has the minimum contacts with a forum to bring the 

defendant within the reach of the long-arm statute. Thus, the purposeful 

availment analysis applies to the long-arm determination.

George then argues that because she asserted a claim for civil conspiracy, 

Hall’s acts are imputed to Deardorff and Wirsig. But George had to establish 

personal jurisdiction over Deardorff and Wirsig individually and not based on the 

acts of another person as part of a conspiracy.30 We overrule this argument.

George also argues that Deardorff and Wirsig attended APHA events and 

Wirsig competed in APHA-sponsored events, and because APHA is 

headquartered in Texas, these acts constitute doing business in Texas. But 

George did not allege that Deardorff and Wirsig attended any of these events in 

Texas, much less that their contacts with Texas in connection with these events 

were more than just random or isolated contacts or that in attending the events 

 

30See Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995) 

(affirming that it is the contacts of the defendant himself that are determinative on 

the question of jurisdiction and declining to recognize the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely upon the effects or 

consequences of an alleged conspiracy with a resident in the forum state); 

Moncrief, 332 S.W.3d at 10 n.7.
12

they had sought some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing themselves of the 

laws of this state.31 We overrule this argument.

George further argues that Wirsig was a customer of George, and 

George’s business is located in Texas. But George never alleged that Wirsig 

ever did business with George in Texas or otherwise alleged facts showing that 

by using George’s services, Wirsig purposefully invoked the benefits or 

protections of Texas laws.32 We overrule this argument.

George contends that under the laws of defamation, publication of a 

defamatory statement is actionable, even if the publishing is done by someone 

other than the party making the defamatory statement, if ―a reasonable person 

would recognize that an act creates an unreasonable risk that the defamatory 

matter will be communicated to a third party.‖ George is correct that in some 

cases, a party will be liable for the republication by a third party of defamatory 

statement made by the party.

33

 But whether Deardorff and Wirsig could 

ultimately be liable in a suit for defamation is not determinative of whether the 

 

31See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 785.

32See id. (―Jurisdiction is premised on notions of implied consent—that by 

invoking the benefits and protections of a forum’s laws, a nonresident consents 

to suit there.‖).

33See Wheeler v. Methodist Hosp., 95 S.W.3d 628, 639–40 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
13

trial court had jurisdiction over them.34 Instead, George must have alleged facts 

showing that Deardorff and Wirsig had minimum contacts with Texas. We 

overrule this argument.

Finally, George argues that provision of Deardorff and Wirsig’s statements 

to APHA directly affected George and her business. But that their conduct in 

another state may have had some affect on George in this state is not enough to 

give Texas courts jurisdiction over them.35 We overrule this argument, and we 

hold that the trial court correctly determined that George failed to meet her 

burden to establish that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Deardorff 

and Wirsig.

Because we have upheld the trial court’s determination based on the 

minimum contacts analysis, we need not consider George’s argument that the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.36 We overrule George’s sole issue.

 

34See Michiana, 168 S.W.3d at 790–91 (rejecting a jurisdiction analysis 

that equates the jurisdictional inquiry with the underlying merits); see also Kelly, 

301 S.W.3d at 660 (―Although the trier-of-fact may ultimately conclude that Kelly 

and Hofstatter violated the Texas Trust Fund Act and committed fraud, the mere 

commission of an act does not grant Texas courts jurisdiction over the actor.‖).

35See Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 660–61 (stating that ―jurisdictional analysis 

always centers on the defendant’s actions and choices to enter the forum state 

and conduct business‖ and holding that the court of appeals erred by allowing the 

plaintiff’s claims to proceed despite the lack of allegations and evidence that any 

part of the claim originated from the defendants’ conduct in Texas).

36See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
14

Having overruled George’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s order 

sustaining Deardorff’s and Wirsig’s special appearances and dismissing 

George’s claims against them.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DELIVERED: February 2, 2012