UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4371

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ISADORE JOHNSON,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:15-cr-00166-FDW-DSC-1)

Submitted: January 18, 2018 Decided: March 5, 2018

Before DUNCAN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Martinez, Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public 

Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Amy E. 

Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Isadore Johnson appeals from the criminal judgment entered following his 

conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Johnson challenges the district court’s denial of 

his motion to suppress a firearm discovered on his person by police. We affirm.

“In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, [we] review[]

conclusions of law de novo and underlying factual findings for clear error.” United 

States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“When reviewing factual findings for clear error, we particularly defer to a district court’s 

credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and 

weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United States v. Palmer, 

820 F.3d 640, 653 (4th Cir. 2016) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

When the district court denies a defendant’s motion to suppress, “we construe the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Clarke, 842 F.3d at 293

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Johnson argues that Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Detective Rolando 

Ortiz-Trinidad detained him without reasonable suspicion and, therefore, that the frisk of 

Johnson’s person conducted during his detention that revealed a firearm violated the 

Fourth Amendment. “Although brief encounters between police and citizens require no 

objective justification, a brief investigatory stop is impermissible unless the officer’s 

action is supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be 

afoot.” United States v. Foster, 824 F.3d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 2016) (alterations, citations, 
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and internal quotation marks omitted). If a person is seized within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment, then we consider whether the seizure is supported by reasonable 

suspicion under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 89. “While a mere hunch is 

insufficient, reasonable suspicion is less demanding than probable cause and may well 

fall considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id.

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Seemingly innocent factors, when 

viewed together, can amount to reasonable suspicion.” Id. However, we have cautioned 

the government not “to spin largely mundane acts into a web of deception.” Id.

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that, when Detective Ortiz-Trinidad approached Johnson and began 

questioning him, Ortiz-Trinidad had reasonable suspicion to detain Johnson and 

investigate whether Johnson was engaged in criminal activity. At the time Ortiz-Trinidad 

detained Johnson, Ortiz-Trinidad knew the police had received a complaint that 

Johnson’s companion was engaging in prostitution at her apartment and that officers had 

observed Johnson perform acts consistent with those of a lookout or guard outside of the 

companion’s apartment. In addition, another officer informed Ortiz-Trinidad that 

Johnson carried a firearm when he exited his companion’s apartment, which might seem 

suspicious considering that Johnson left the apartment only to stand nearby with child in 

tow. And, based on Ortiz-Trinidad’s experience, he knew that women engaged in similar 

crimes commonly had others act as security, which might explain why Johnson carried a 

firearm. See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that
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reasonable suspicion analysis must account for “the particular experience of officers 

charged with the ongoing tasks of law enforcement”). 

Furthermore, on the day Ortiz-Trinidad detained Johnson, an undercover detective 

arranged to meet Johnson’s companion. Shortly before the undercover detective arrived 

at the companion’s apartment, Ortiz-Trinidad observed Johnson act in a manner

consistent with previously received information. Under the totality of the circumstances, 

Ortiz-Trinidad had reasonable suspicion that Johnson was aiding and abetting his 

companion in committing prostitution and, thus, could detain Johnson to confirm or 

dispel his suspicion. See State v. Goode, 512 S.E.2d 414, 422 (N.C. 1999) (stating 

elements of aiding and abetting).

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly denied Johnson’s motion 

to suppress, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.*

 We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 * Because Johnson’s argument on appeal related to the subsequent frisk relies on 

his assertion that Ortiz-Trinidad lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him, we conclude 

that Johnson’s challenge to the frisk also fails.