Filed 6/22/21 Conservatorship and Estate of Manuel CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

Conservatorship of the Person and 

Estate of SUSAN MANUEL.

 B297334

 (Los Angeles County

GREGORY (MANUEL) 

MANVELIAN, 

Petitioner and Respondent,

JEFFREY SIEGEL, as Conservator,

 

Respondent,

v.

YANA MARIE MANVEL,

Objector and Appellant.

 Super. Ct. No. BP141252)

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County. David J. Cowan, Judge. Affirmed.
2

Yana Manvel, in pro. per.; Schorr Law, Zachary D. Schorr, 

and Valerie H. Li for Objector and Appellant. 

Klapach & Klapach and Joseph S. Klapach; Adam L. 

Streltzer for Petitioner and Respondent Gregory Manvelian.

Law Offices of Stewart J. Levin and Stewart J. Levin; 

Zarmi Law and David Zarmi for Respondent Jeffrey Siegel, as 

Conservator.

_______________________

INTRODUCTION

Gregory Manvelian filed a petition for a conservatorship of 

his mother, Susan Manuel, which the probate court granted. 

Yana Manvel, Susan’s daughter, appealed, and we affirmed. (See 

Conservatorship of Manuel (Feb. 14, 2017, B266834) 

[nonpub. opn.].)

Jeffrey Siegel, the court-appointed conservator, 

subsequently filed a petition on behalf of Susan against Yana to 

recover real property and other assets Yana arranged for Susan 

to transfer to her. On the third day of the trial on the 

conservator’s petition, Siegel, Yana, and Gregory reached a 

settlement that resolved all claims in the conservatorship 

proceeding. Among other terms, the settlement required Yana to 

return certain property. Each of the three parties orally agreed 

to the terms of the settlement on the record and in open court. 

Siegel and Yana (but not Gregory) also submitted a stipulation 

and proposed order that resolved Siegel’s petition against Yana

by requiring Yana to return the property. The probate court 

signed and entered the order.
3

Four months later Gregory filed a motion to enforce the 

oral settlement agreement. Yana opposed the motion, arguing 

she agreed to the settlement because of extrinsic fraud and under 

duress. Yana also filed a motion to set aside the written 

stipulation and order resolving Siegel’s petition against her. The 

probate court granted Gregory’s motion to enforce the settlement 

and denied Yana’s motion to vacate the written stipulation and 

order. Yana appeals from both orders. We conclude that we have 

jurisdiction to hear both appeals and that the probate court did 

not err in making either ruling. Therefore, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Probate Court Appoints a Conservator of Susan’s 

Person and Estate

As discussed in our prior opinion, Susan had two children, 

Yana and Gregory. At one time Susan owned substantial assets, 

but over time she transferred some of them (or rights to them) to 

Yana. In 2007 Susan’s revocable trust was amended to name 

Yana as the sole beneficiary. Also in 2007 Susan transferred to 

Yana three parcels of real property, one of which was in Orange 

County and included an income-producing commercial mall (the 

Orange County property). In 2008 Susan transferred to Yana 

two condominium units in the Ocean Towers buildings in Santa 

Monica. And in 2013 Yana became the sole primary beneficiary 

of Susan’s $1.4 million individual retirement account (IRA), 

which previously had designated Yana as a 50 percent 

beneficiary and Gregory as a 50 percent beneficiary. Meanwhile, 

although in 2012 the trust was amended to name Gregory as a 

50 percent beneficiary, in March 2013 the trust was amended to 
4

again name Yana as the sole beneficiary of the trust. 

(Conservatorship of Manuel, supra, B266834.) 

Gregory filed a petition in 2013 to appoint a 

conservatorship of Susan’s person and estate. In 2015 the 

probate court conducted a seven-day trial at which Susan, Yana, 

Gregory, Dr. Susan Bernatz, the court appointed expert, and 

several percipient witnesses testified. The court granted 

Gregory’s petition and issued letters of conservatorship. In 

February 2017 this court affirmed the probate court’s orders. 

(Conservatorship of Manuel, supra, B266834.)

B. The Conservator Files a Petition To Recover Assets 

from Yana, Which the Parties Settle During Trial

In February 2017 Siegel filed a petition on behalf of Susan 

under Probate Code section 850 to compel Yana to transfer 

certain property back to Susan.1 In particular, Siegel sought to 

recover the three parcels of real property and the two 

condominium units Susan had transferred to Yana in 2007 and 

2008, as well as $720,000 Yana allegedly caused Susan to 

withdraw from her IRA and give to Yana. Siegel also asserted

several causes of action, including for financial elder abuse, and 

claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. Siegel filed a 

separate petition for a substituted judgment modifying and 

reforming Susan’s trust to provide that, upon Susan’s death, 

Yana and Gregory would receive equal distributions from the 

trust estate. 

The probate court held a three-day trial on the section 850 

petition. The following witnesses testified: Yana; Richard 

Skolnick, an attorney who prepared Susan’s amended trust and 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
5

the deeds transferring the parcels of real property and 

condominium units from Susan to Yana; Vineendra Jain, a 

certified property manager and real estate broker who testified 

that the Orange County property generated over $1 million 

between 2012 and 2018; Dr. Bernatz, who testified that by 2012 

Susan suffered from significant cognitive impairment and did not 

understand the nature and consequences of her transfers to 

Yana; and Dr. Robert Kahn-Rose, a geriatric psychiatrist who, in 

contrast to Dr. Bernatz, testified Susan had testamentary and 

contractual decisionmaking capacity as late as 2013, only 

minimal susceptibility to undue influence prior to 2008, and only

mild to moderate susceptibility from 2012 to 2013. 

On August 6, 2018, the third day of trial, Yana, Gregory, 

Siegel, and Susan (through her attorney) informed the court they 

had reached a settlement. Counsel for the parties recited the 

terms of the settlement on the record and in open court. The 

parties agreed that Siegel, as Susan’s conservator, would obtain 

title to one of the condominium units in the Ocean Towers 

building and to the Orange County property and that Yana would 

retain title to the remaining properties. The parties agreed that 

Susan’s estate would pay $190,000 for Gregory’s attorneys’ fees 

and costs and that Yana and Gregory would receive equal shares 

of the remainder of the trust estate upon Susan’s death. The 

parties also agreed to release all claims against each other, 

including the conservator’s claims to recover the money allegedly 

obtained by Yana from Susan’s IRA.2 After counsel stated the 

2 The settlement did not affect the conservator’s right to seek 

expenses relating to management of the estate properties or 

Yana’s right to seek reimbursement for expenses she incurred 

maintaining the Orange County property. 
6

terms, the probate court asked Yana, Gregory, and Siegel, 

individually whether each of them understood the terms, had 

enough time to discuss the terms with their attorneys, and 

agreed to the terms. They all answered they did. 

After Yana, Gregory, Siegel, and counsel for Susan stated 

their agreement to the settlement, Yana and Siegel (but not 

Gregory) submitted a signed written stipulation regarding the 

section 850 petition that contained only those settlement terms 

relevant to them—namely, that Siegel would release all claims 

against Yana and that Siegel, as Susan’s conservator, would 

receive title to one of the condominium units and the Orange 

County property. The probate court signed and entered the 

written stipulation and order that day. 

C. Gregory Seeks To Enforce the Oral Settlement

Agreement, Yana Seeks To Vacate the Written One

In December 2018 Gregory filed a motion under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 664.6 for an order to enter judgment 

enforcing the terms of the settlement the parties had orally 

agreed to in court on August 6, 2018. Yana opposed the motion, 

arguing that her attorneys had “work[ed] with opposing counsel 

to unduly pressure her to settle” and that she agreed to the 

settlement under duress. Yana claimed that at the trial her 

attorneys were unwilling to present evidence favorable to her 

case and that they told her the judge “hated her,” thought she 

“was on the road to perjury,” “would jail her,” and would “fine her 

treble damages” if she did not settle. Yana also filed a motion to 

set aside the stipulation and order signed by the parties (other 
7

than Gregory) and the probate court that resolved Siegel’s section 

850 petition. 

In April 2019 the probate court denied Yana’s motion to set 

aside the written stipulation and order and granted Gregory’s 

motion for an order to enter judgment enforcing the March 6, 

2018 oral settlement. The court found Yana presented 

insufficient evidence her attorneys were unprepared for trial, 

were “selling [her] out,” or were in “cahoots” with the attorneys

for Gregory or Siegel. Yana filed a timely notice of appeal from

both the order granting Gregory’s motion for entry of judgment 

and the order denying Yana’s motion to set aside the stipulation 

and order. 

DISCUSSION

A. The Orders Are Appealable

1. The Order Granting Gregory’s Motion To Enforce 

the Stipulated Settlement Is Appealable

We agree with the parties the order granting Gregory’s 

motion to enforce the oral settlement agreement is appealable. 

“In all proceedings governed by” the Probate Code, “an appeal 

may be taken” from an order “[d]irecting or allowing payment of a 

. . . cost” or “authorizing, allowing, or directing payment of 

compensation or expenses of an attorney.” (§ 1300, subds. (d) & 

(e).) The order granting Gregory’s motion is both: It authorizes

and approves payment from Susan’s estate to Jackson Chen, 

Susan’s attorney, of “$26,025.00, plus an additional $330.00 in 

reimbursement of costs,” and it authorizes and approves payment 

from the estate to Gregory’s attorneys of $190,000. In addition, 
8

“[w]ith respect to a trust, the grant or denial” of “[a]ny final 

order” under section 17200 is appealable. (§ 1304, subd. (a).) The 

order granting Gregory’s motion is a final order under section 

17200 because it grants Siegel’s petition for a substituted 

judgment modifying and reforming Susan’s trust and it orders 

that Gregory and Yana will be equal beneficiaries of the trust 

estate upon Susan’s death. 

2. The Order Denying Yana’s Motion To Set Aside the 

Stipulated Order Is Also Appealable, but It’s a 

Little Messy

The appealability of the probate court’s order denying 

Yana’s motion to set aside the stipulation and order resolving 

Siegel’s section 850 petition is a closer question. Under section 

1300, subdivision (k), “an appeal may be taken from” an order 

“[a]djudicating the merits of a claim made under” section 850. 

Siegel and Gregory contend that under subdivision (k), Yana 

could have appealed from the court’s August 6, 2018 stipulation 

and order, but she cannot appeal from the court’s April 2019

order denying her motion to set aside the prior order. According 

to Siegel and Gregory, who have moved to dismiss Yana’s appeal, 

because the Probate Code does not include a provision that allows 

an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a prior order, 

the order denying Yana’s motion to vacate is not appealable. 

There is authority supporting Siegel and Gregory’s 

position. “The right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point 

Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5; 

accord, Levinson Arshonsky & Kurtz LLP v. Kim (2019) 

35 Cal.App.5th 896, 903; In re Marriage of Garcia (2017) 

13 Cal.App.5th 1334, 1342.) “Unless an order is expressly made 
9

appealable by a statute,” we have “no jurisdiction to consider it.” 

(Levinson Arshonsky & Kurtz LLP, at p. 903; see Smith v. Smith 

(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1083.) 

The Code of Civil Procedure has a “‘catch-all’” provision 

(City and County of San Francisco v. Shers (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 

1831, 1835) that allows a party to appeal from a postjudgment 

order, so long as “the issues raised by the appeal from the order 

[are] different from those arising from an appeal from the 

judgment” and the postjudgment order “‘either affect[s] the 

judgment or relate[s] to it by enforcing it or staying its 

execution.” (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 644, 651-652; see Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2).) 

But “[i]t is well established that ‘[a]ppeals which may be 

taken from orders in probate proceedings are set forth in . . . the 

Probate Code, and its provisions are exclusive.’” (Estate of 

Stoddart (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1125-1126; see Kalenian 

v. Insen (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 569, 575; Estate of Downing 

(1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 159, 163.) Therefore, Code of Civil 

Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), does not apply to 

probate proceedings. And as Siegel and Gregory point out, the 

Probate Code does not contain a provision similar to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), that authorizes an 

appeal from postjudgment orders in probate proceedings. 

Therefore, an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment or 

prior order in a probate proceeding is generally not appealable. 

(See Conservatorship of Harvey (1970) 3 Cal.3d 646, 652; Estate

of Duke (1953) 41 Cal.2d 509, 515-516; Estate of Martin (1999) 

72 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442; cf. Estate of Stoddart, at pp. 1123, 

1126 [order denying an alleged heir’s motion for reconsideration 
10

of an order denying her petition to obtain portion of trust and 

estate proceeds was not appealable].) 

Nevertheless, in Estate of Baker (1915) 170 Cal. 578 

(Baker) the California Supreme Court recognized an exception to 

this general rule, holding that an “appeal is permitted from an 

order refusing to vacate a judgment or decree when, for reasons 

involving no fault of the appealing party, he has never been given 

an opportunity to appeal directly from the judgment or decree.” 

(Id. at p. 582.) In Baker a sister contested her deceased brother’s 

will, but died while her action was pending. (Id. at p. 581.) After 

the trial court dismissed the action and entered judgment, the 

administrator of the sister’s estate moved to vacate the judgment 

and substitute himself as a party, which the trial court denied. 

(Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that, because the administrator 

was not a party to the action and therefore could not have 

appealed from the order of dismissal, he could appeal from the 

postjudgment order denying his motion to vacate the judgment. 

(Id. at p. 584; see Estate of Cahoon (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 434, 

438 [“‘The general rule allowing appeals from orders granting or 

denying . . . motions to vacate . . . does not apply in probate,’” but 

“‘an exception is recognized where the motion to vacate is the 

only way in which an aggrieved party can protect his rights; 

denial of the motion in such a case is appealable.’”].) 

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has declined to 

extend Baker to allow a party to appeal from an order denying a

motion to vacate an order under Code of Civil Procedure section 

473. In Estate of Allen (1917) 175 Cal. 356 (Allen) the widow of 

the decedent failed to timely secure a bill of exceptions and 

moved for relief under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure 

on the ground of excusable neglect. The trial court denied the 
11

motion. (Allen, at pp. 356-357.) The Supreme Court held the 

order denying the motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 

473 was not appealable, even though the basis of the widow’s 

motion was excusable neglect, because the Probate Code did not 

contain any provision permitting such an appeal. (Allen, at 

p. 357.)

Similarly, in Estate of O’Dea (1940) 15 Cal.2d 637 (O’Dea) 

two claimants filed a motion for relief under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 473 (although it is not clear on what ground 

they moved) after the probate court dismissed them from a 

proceeding to determine the heirs of a decedent, and the trial 

court denied the motion for relief. (O’Dea, at p. 638.) Again 

holding that the order denying the motion for relief was not 

appealable, the California Supreme Court stated “the peculiar 

and unusual situation arising out of the facts in [Baker] does not 

lay down any general exception to the rule that appeals in 

probate matters must be limited to those orders and judgments 

specified” and that the “facts in the instant case have no 

similarity to those in” Baker. (O’Dea, at p. 639.)

This case falls between Allen and O’Dea, on the one hand, 

and Baker, on the other. Like the appellants in Allen and O’Dea, 

and unlike the appellant in Baker, Yana was a party to the 

proceeding when the court entered the stipulation and order. 

And unlike the appellant in Baker, Yana received notice of the 

order she later sought to set aside. (Cf. Kalenian v. Insen, supra, 

225 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 [children of a trustor could appeal the 

trial court’s order denying their motion to vacate an order 

dismissing their petition where they did not receive notice of the 

trial court’s dismissal order and therefore “could not avail 

themselves of the right to appeal”].) 
12

But like the appellant in Baker, and “for reasons involving 

no fault” on her part, Yana “has never been given an opportunity 

to appeal directly from” the stipulation and order on the grounds 

she argues the court should set aside the stipulated order. 

(Baker, supra, 170 Cal. at p. 582.) Contrary to Siegel and 

Gregory’s argument, Yana could not have appealed (or at least 

meaningfully appealed) from the stipulation and order on the 

ground of extrinsic fraud or duress. She claims she was under 

duress—i.e., that she was compelled to act against her will (see 

In re Marriage of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1523)—

when she agreed to, and the probate court signed, the stipulation 

and order. And even if, after the probate court entered the order,

Yana overcame the effects of the claimed duress, she could not 

have challenged the order on either extrinsic fraud or duress 

because the facts she needed to support her challenge were not in 

the record. The only way for Yana to present her arguments 

based on extrinsic fraud and duress was to file the post-order 

motion she filed to set aside the stipulated order and present her 

evidence.

In the end, this case is closer to Baker than Allen and 

O’Dea. Like the appellant in Baker, Yana asked the court to use 

its equitable authority to set aside an order that deprived her of a 

fair adversary proceeding. Yana claims she stipulated to the 

order under duress and without knowing “her trial attorneys . . . 

worked with opposing counsel and sold out her interest to the 

opposing parties to pressure her into [the] settlement . . . .” And 

as was true for the appellant in Baker, Yana, through no fault on 

her part, could not have meaningfully appealed from the 

stipulated order. She could not have argued the evidence of the 

alleged extrinsic fraud and duress warranted vacating the order
13

until she filed a motion to set aside the order. Therefore, under 

Baker, which the Supreme Court has never overruled and thus is 

still binding, the order denying Yana’s motion to vacate the 

stipulated order is appealable.

B. The Probate Court Did Not Err in Refusing To Set 

Aside the Stipulated Order

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

A “‘party may obtain relief from an erroneous judgment,’” 

including a stipulated judgment, “‘by establishing that it was 

entered through extrinsic fraud or mistake.’” (Warga v. Cooper

(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 371, 376; see In re Marriage of Grissom 

(1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 40, 46.) A party may also move to vacate a 

stipulated judgment on the ground that the stipulation was 

entered as a result of duress. (See In re Marriage of Baltins 

(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 66, 83 [“Duress has . . . been recognized as 

a ground justifying relief from a final judgment.”]; see also Leeper 

v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 205 [because the plaintiffs 

“pleaded duress against” the defendants, “any consent judgment 

or judgment of dismissal that may have been entered pursuant to 

a settlement agreement would not act as a bar to the present 

action”].) “‘[T]he party seeking equitable relief on the grounds of 

extrinsic fraud’” or duress “‘must show three elements: (1) a 

meritorious defense; (2) a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a 

defense in the first place; and (3) diligence in seeking to set aside 

the [order] once discovered.’” (Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments 

Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1025; see Warga, at p. 376.) 

A motion to set aside a stipulated order for extrinsic fraud 

or duress “is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, 

and, in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion, the 
14

order will not be disturbed on appeal.” (In re Marriage of 

Grissom, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 46; accord, In re Marriage of 

Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 118; see Richardson 

v. Franc (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 744, 751 [“After the trial court 

has exercised its equitable powers, the appellate court reviews 

the judgment under the abuse of discretion standard.”].) We 

review “the [probate] court’s findings of fact pertaining to the 

existence of extrinsic fraud [or duress] . . . for substantial 

evidence.” (Kramer v. Traditional Escrow (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 

13, 28.) But the “burden is on the complaining party to establish 

abuse of discretion, and the showing on appeal is insufficient if it 

presents a state of facts which simply affords an opportunity for a 

difference of opinion.” (Marriage of Eben-King & King, at p. 118; 

see Richardson, at p. 751 [“Under [the abuse of discretion] 

standard, we resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the 

judgment and determine whether the trial court’s decision falls 

within the permissible range of options set by the legal criteria.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.)].)

2. Extrinsic Fraud

“[E]xtrinsic fraud” occurs where “a party has been denied 

by his opponent or otherwise an opportunity to be heard or to 

fully present a claim or defense” and “usually arises when a party 

is denied a fair adversary hearing because he has been 

deliberately kept in ignorance of the action or proceeding, or in 

some other way fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim 

or defense.” (F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 

462, 472, internal quotation marks omitted; see Kulchar v. 

Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471; Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v. 

Philadelphia Television Network, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894, 

910-911.) And a party may show extrinsic fraud where “‘“the 
15

attorney regularly employed”’” by the moving party “‘“corruptly 

sells out his client’s interest to the other side . . . .”’” (Warga v. 

Cooper, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at pp. 376-377.) 

Yana asserts her attorneys must have sold out her interests 

because, according to her, (1) her attorneys performed poorly and 

were unprepared at trial; (2) her attorneys forced her to settle by 

telling her the judge hated her, thought she was lying, and was 

going to fine her and send her to jail; and (3) the settlement 

terms were one-sided. The probate court, however, did not abuse 

its discretion in ruling Yana failed to show extrinsic fraud. Most 

significantly, the probate court did not find credible Yana’s 

description of her attorneys’ purported efforts to coerce her to 

settle, finding it “exaggerated.” “[S]o long as it has ‘reasonable’

grounds to do so,” a factfinder “may reject even uncontradicted 

testimony by a witness it does not find credible.” (Moran v. 

Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 500, 518; see

Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 

(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1204.) “‘Consequently, the testimony 

of a witness which has been rejected by the trier of fact cannot be 

credited on appeal unless, in view of the whole record, it is clear, 

positive, and of such a nature that it cannot rationally be 

disbelieved.’” (In re Marriage of Grimes & Mou (2020) 

45 Cal.App.5th 406, 422; accord, DiPirro v. Bondo Corp. (2007) 

153 Cal.App.4th 150, 196; see Estate of Sapp (2019) 

36 Cal.App.5th 86, 106 [“the probate court, as the trier of fact, 

was entitled to determine how much credence and weight the 

testimony deserved” and was “‘the sole judge of the credibility of 

witnesses’”].)

The probate court had numerous rational and reasonable 

grounds to disbelieve Yana’s description of her attorneys’
16

allegedly coercive statements. For example, Yana was not a 

disinterested witness; she was the party seeking to avoid the 

settlement terms, and she relied largely on her uncorroborated 

declaration. (See Jennifer K. v. Shane K. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 

558, 579 [“‘“[i]n passing on the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be given their testimony, the trier of fact is entitled to 

consider their interest in the result of the case, [and] their 

motives”’”]; South Bay Transportation Co. v. Gordon Sand Co.

(1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 650, 657 [while “[u]ncontradicted 

testimony should not be arbitrarily rejected by the fact finder, . . . 

it may be self-impeaching and warrant disbelief for a number of 

reasons, such as . . . obvious bias”].) In addition, the court stated 

it had participated in settlement discussions with Yana’s 

attorneys and never observed any conduct suggesting they were 

either “selling” Yana out or “forcing” her to settle. (See A.G. v. 

C.S. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287 [trial court was “entitled 

to rely” on its observations of a party’s conduct during trial when 

making findings]; Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 

749, 762 [trial court’s “observations are evidence which may be 

used alone or with other evidence to support its findings”].) The 

court’s credibility findings were also supported by the declaration 

of Adam Streltzer, Gregory’s attorney, who stated that Yana “was 

an active participant” in settlement discussions and “successfully 

asserted key negotiating points in her favor”—namely, the 

provision allowing her to retain the right to seek reimbursement 

from Susan for money Yana paid to maintain the Orange County 

property. And the probate court observed that Yana had replaced 

multiple, “well-qualified” lawyers. 

Moreover, there were a number of rational and reasonable 

explanations for the conduct of Yana’s attorneys other than 
17

corruption and duplicity. For example, her attorneys may have 

reasonably believed that Yana did not have a strong defense, that 

the trial was not going well for her, and that it was not in her 

interest to proceed and risk greater liability. (See In re Marriage 

of Eben-King & King, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 118 [a showing 

of extrinsic fraud on appeal “is insufficient if it presents a state of 

facts which simply affords an opportunity for a difference of 

opinion”].) Yana complains her attorneys did not call several 

witnesses that would have been “key to corroborating [Yana’s] 

testimony at trial” and did not submit documents and video 

recordings that “supported [her] claims . . . .” But Yana does not 

provide any further detail in her opening brief about how these 

purported witnesses or exhibits would have advanced her defense

to the petition, nor does she explain why her attorneys’ tactical 

decision not to call certain witnesses or submit evidence showed 

they had sold out her interests to Siegel and Gregory. 

Finally, as the probate court correctly determined, the 

settlement terms were not one-sided. In his section 850 petition, 

Siegel sought to recover both condominium units and all three 

parcels of property Susan had transferred to Yana; the $720,000 

Susan withdrew from her IRA that Yana allegedly received; 

damages equal to twice the value of the transferred property 

pursuant to section 859;

3 punitive damages; and attorneys’ fees. 

3 Section 859 provides that, “[i]f a court finds that a person 

has in bad faith wrongfully taken, . . . property belonging to a 

conservatee,” or “an elder,” or has taken “the property by the use 

of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of 

elder or dependent adult financial abuse, as defined in Section 

15610.30 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the person shall 

be liable for twice the value of the property recovered . . . .” 
18

Under the settlement, Yana lost only a fraction of what Siegel 

sought; she only had to return one of the two condominium units

and one of the three parcels of property. She did not have to give

back any of the money she received from Yana’s IRA and she 

escaped liability for any further damages. Not a bad settlement 

for Yana, especially considering the probate court, in its order 

appointing a conservator, had already found Yana unduly 

influenced Susan—a finding we held in the prior appeal was 

supported by substantial evidence. (See Conservatorship of

Manuel, supra, B266834.)4

3. Duress

“‘“‘[D]uress, which includes whatever destroys one’s free 

agency and constrains [her] to do what is against [her] will, may 

be exercised by threats, importunity or any species of mental 

coercion [citation] . . . .’” [Citation.] It is shown where a party 

“intentionally used threats or pressure to induce action or 

nonaction to the other party’s detriment.”’” (In re Marriage of 

Balcof, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523; see Tarpy v. County of 

San Diego (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 267, 276 [“Duress generally 

exists whenever one is induced by the unlawful act of another to

4 Yana complains the settlement was unfair because it 

provided that Gregory would receive $190,000 in attorneys’ fees 

from the trust, even though he was not a party to the section 850 

petition. But Gregory agreed to release all claims he had in the 

conservatorship proceedings (and any other potential claims 

against Yana) as a condition of the settlement. Again, not a bad 

deal for Yana.
19

make a contract or perform some other act under circumstances 

that deprive him of the exercise of free will.”].) 

Yana contends her attorneys exercised duress by making 

the statements to pressure her to settle; she does not contend 

Siegel or Gregory exercised any duress. Even assuming a party 

can set aside a settlement agreement as a result of duress 

exercised by the party’s attorney,

5 as discussed the probate court

did not abuse its discretion in finding Yana’s description of her 

attorneys’ statements was not credible. Moreover, even if the

probate court had credited some of Yana’s testimony, it would 

have been reasonable for the court to infer the statements by 

Yana’s attorneys were not sufficiently coercive to cause duress 

(with the possible exception of the alleged statement that the 

judge would send Yana to jail if she did not agree to a 

settlement—an allegation that seems particularly farfetched). As 

discussed, the party exercising the alleged duress generally must 

perform an unlawful or wrongful act. (Tarpy v. County of San 

Diego, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 276; see Hester v. Public 

Storage (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 668, 679 [“[e]conomic duress

requires an unlawful or ‘wrongful act,’” such as the “‘the assertion 

of a claim known to be false or a bad faith threat to breach a 

contract or to withhold a payment’”].) There is nothing unlawful 

or wrongful about an attorney giving his or her honest, negative 

5 Generally, if a party enters a settlement agreement under 

duress, the party may only rescind the contract if the duress was 

“‘exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he 

rescinds.’” (Chan v. Lund (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1174; see 

Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b)(1); Leeper v. Beltrami, supra, 

53 Cal.2d at p. 206 [duress “renders a transaction voidable by a 

party induced thereby to enter into it if the other party thereto 

. . . has reason to know” of the duress].)
20

impressions of a case to the client, including that a court may 

award all or most of the damages sought against the client

(including treble damages, which Siegel sought in his petition),

that the court does not appear to believe the client’s testimony is 

truthful, or even that the judge does not appear to like the client.

C. The Probate Court Did Not Err in Granting Gregory’s 

Motion To Enforce the Settlement

In ruling on a motion to enter judgment pursuant to a 

settlement agreement “‘the trial court acts as the trier of fact, 

determining whether the parties entered into a valid and binding 

settlement.’” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 

1360; see Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1454; 

Kohn v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533.) 

Generally, “[t]he standard of review on appeal is whether 

substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s ruling.” 

(Terry, at p. 1454; see Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 

779, 790; Williams v. Saunders (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1162; 

Kohn, at p. 1533.)

Yana does not dispute that the terms described in the order 

granting Gregory’s motion to enforce the settlement accurately 

reflect the terms she orally agreed to in court. Yana’s only 

argument is that she agreed to those terms under duress and as a 

result of extrinsic fraud, the same grounds on which she moved to 

set aside the stipulated order. As discussed, the probate court

did not err in declining to find that Yana entered the agreement 

under duress or as a result of extrinsic fraud, and therefore 

granting the motion to enforce the settlement.
21

DISPOSITION

The orders are affirmed. Siegel and Gregory are to recover 

their costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

FEUER, J.