Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A03-1504-PC-127| November 6, 2015 Page 1 of 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

John Pinnow

Deputy Public Defender

Anne C. Kaiser

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General

Brian Reitz

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cesar Contreras-Munoz,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

November 6, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A03-1504-PC-127

Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Terry C. 

Shewmaker, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20C01-1110-PC-24

Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Cesar Contreras-Munoz appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his 

petition for post-conviction relief. Contreras-Munoz raises two issues for our 

review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether he entered into his guilty plea knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily, or whether he received 

ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, when he did 

not have an English-Spanish interpreter present during his 

guilty-plea hearing or other court proceedings.

2. Whether he received ineffective assistance from his trial 

counsel when counsel did not call two witnesses on 

Contreras-Munoz’s behalf during the sentencing hearing.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 26, 2007, the State charged Contreras-Munoz with possession of 

cocaine, as a Class A felony, and with a criminal gang enhancement. 

Thereafter, Contreras-Munoz hired David W. Newman, Jr. as counsel. 

Newman “every day represent[s] someone who speaks Spanish.” Tr. at 27. 

Although Newman does not speak Spanish, his secretary does. If Newman has 

any trouble communicating with a client, he brings his secretary in to translate.

[4] When he met Contreras-Munoz, Newman “didn’t notice any trouble” with 

communicating in English “at all.” Id. at 20. Indeed, Newman not only 

observed that Contreras-Munoz had “no difficulty” in speaking and 
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understanding English, Newman observed that Contreras-Munoz was 

“conversational” in English. Id. at 20-21. Contreras-Munoz and Newman 

“had conversations” in English “throughout” Newman’s representation of him. 

Id. at 28. Newman found Contreras-Munoz to be “a very likeable fellow in the 

discussions, polite, funny.” Id. Contreras-Munoz’s responses to Newman were 

“appropriate based on the questions and the context.” Id. During his 

representation of Contreras-Munoz, Newman wrote him nine letters, each in 

English. Contreras-Munoz also wrote letters to Newman in English. At no 

time did Contreras-Munoz indicate to Newman that Contreras-Munoz did not 

understand English, and at no time did Contreras-Munoz request that Newman 

obtain a translator.

[5] On January 24, 2008, the court held a bond reduction hearing for ContrerasMunoz. Contreras-Munoz appeared at that hearing with Newman. “At no 

point during these proceedings did [Contreras-Munoz] appear to have difficulty 

communicating in English,” and Contreras-Munoz did not request an 

interpreter. Appellant’s App. at 283. The court ordered Contreras-Munoz’s 

bond reduced. 

[6] On May 22, 2008, the court held a status hearing, at which Contreras-Munoz

appeared with Newman. At that hearing, Contreras-Munoz “acknowledged his 

trial date . . . in English and . . . did not request an interpreter or demonstrate 

any difficulty understanding the proceedings.” Id. The court held another 

status hearing just over one year later. Again, Contreras-Munoz appeared with 

Newman and “acknowledged his trial date . . . in English.” Id. at 284. 
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Contreras-Munoz “made no request for an interpreter” at that time. Id. A third 

status hearing occurred four months after the second. Contreras-Munoz 

appeared with Newman and again did not request an interpreter.

[7] In November of 2009, Newman negotiated a plea agreement with the State on 

Contreras-Munoz’s behalf. The plea agreement was reduced to writing and in 

English. Newman went over the terms of the written plea agreement with 

Contreras-Munoz “on multiple occasions.” Tr. at 12. Contreras-Munoz signed 

the plea agreement, pleading guilty to possession of cocaine, as a Class A 

felony. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the criminal gang 

enhancement. 

[8] The court held a plea hearing on November 12, 2009. The court had an 

English-Spanish interpreter present at that hearing, but neither ContrerasMunoz nor Newman requested her services. Instead, the court engaged 

Contreras-Munoz in English as follows:

THE COURT: Tell me your name.

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Cesar Contreras-Munoz.

* * *

THE COURT: All right. We have a plea agreement. Mr. 

[Contreras-]Munoz, have you reviewed it?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: And did you sign it?
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MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: The Plea Agreement says you’re going to plead 

guilty to Count I, Dealing in Cocaine, a Class A Felony. Is that 

correct?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: And on Count I, whatever sentence is imposed 

will be up to the Court’s discretion, is that correct?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: The other Count, Criminal Gang Activity, will 

be dismissed, the enhancement, and the State consents to 

jurisdiction for a modification from January 1, 2012, after that 

date. The State doesn’t agree to a modification[] but only grants 

to give the Court jurisdiction. The modification must be filed in 

calendar year 2012.

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Is there any other term of this . . . agreement of 

which I’m unaware?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.

THE COURT: Did I describe it correctly?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: . . . All right, Mr. Contreras-Munoz, are you 

telling me you committed the offense, the Class A felony, as 

alleged on page one?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
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THE COURT: Are you telling me on November 19, 2007, in 

Elkhart County, Indiana, you knowingly possessed cocaine with 

the intent to deliver the cocaine?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: And the amount of the cocaine was three grams 

or more, is that correct?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

* * *

THE COURT: Mr. Contreras-Munoz, before I can accept your 

plea of guilty, I must be satisfied that you fully understand your 

constitutional rights; that your plea of guilty is made freely and 

voluntarily; and, that you are, in fact, guilty.

It will, therefore, be necessary that I ask you certain 

questions and, perhaps, hear some evidence. If you do not 

understand the questions or words that I use, please let me know. 

I will explain them to you.

You may talk with your attorney about any matter during 

questioning and prior to answering any questions.

First of all, do you read, write[,] and understand the 

English language?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Have you ever been treated for any mental 

illness, or[,] to your knowledge, do [you] now suffer from any 

mental or emotional disability?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.

THE COURT: Are you now under the influence of alcohol or 

any drugs that would affect your ability to understand these 

proceedings?
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MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Contreras-Munoz, your attorney[ ha]s 

informed the Court that you want to withdraw your former plea 

of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to page one of the charge, 

the Class A Felony. Is that what you want to do?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: You and I have reviewed your plea agreement, 

correct?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it?

MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.

Appellant’s App. at 300-04. The court then advised Contreras-Munoz of his 

rights. With each advisement, the court asked Contreras-Munoz if he 

understood the right described. Contreras-Munoz repeatedly acknowledged 

that he understood. The court then again reviewed the terms of ContrerasMunoz’s plea agreement as well as the State’s charging information and 

relevant statutes, each of which, again, Contreras-Munoz stated he understood. 

And the court thoroughly described the sentencing process. At each point, 

Contreras-Munoz affirmed that he understood the court’s description. When 

asked fact-specific questions that required either a yes or no answer, ContrerasMunoz answered appropriately as the facts required. E.g., id. at 310 (“THE 

COURT: Are you now on parole? MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.”). 
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The court then accepted Contreras-Munoz’s guilty plea and entered judgment 

of conviction accordingly. Thereafter, the court sentenced Contreras-Munoz to 

thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction.

[9] On August 12, 2010, Contreras-Munoz filed a hand-written request, in English, 

with the trial court in which Contreras-Munoz requested “all information” 

pertaining to his case. Id. at 91. Around that same time, Contreras-Munoz sent 

a request to Newman, partly hand-written and partly typed, in English, in 

which Contreras-Munoz requested his “entire client file” in anticipation of a 

“petition for post-conviction relief.” State’s Ex. 4. 

[10] On August 23, 2010, Contreras-Munoz filed a pro se motion for modification of 

sentence. This motion was partly hand-written and partly typed, all in English. 

Over eight consecutive paragraphs, Contreras-Munoz hand wrote his 

explanations for why his sentence should be modified. The court denied 

Contreras-Munoz’s motion the same day.

[11] On February 14, 2011, Contreras-Munoz filed a pro se petition for direct 

placement into community corrections. This motion was partly hand-written 

and partly typed, all in English, and included a lengthy, hand-written letter 

from Contreras-Munoz to the trial court explaining the basis for the petition. 

The court denied the petition the following day.

[12] On May 24, 2011, Contreras-Munoz sent a letter to the Clerk of Elkhart Circuit 

Court. This letter was hand-written and in English. Contreras-Munoz 

requested case-file documents potentially relevant to “a Post-Conviction Relief 
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Petition.” Id. at 104. Contreras-Munoz sent two additional such letters to the 

trial court clerk on July 15 and July 25.

[13] On September 14, 2011, Contreras-Munoz, pro se, filed a petition for leave to 

file a belated notice of appeal. The petition was entirely in English. The court 

set a hearing date on Contreras-Munoz’s petition; Contreras-Munoz, in 

English, requested an interpreter for this hearing, and the court granted 

Contreras-Munoz’s request. At the hearing, however, Contreras-Munoz 

withdrew his petition for a belated notice of appeal.

[14] On October 20, 2011, Contreras-Munoz, pro se, filed his initial petition for 

post-conviction relief, which was typed in English. Contreras-Munoz’s original 

grounds for post-conviction relief were based on Newman’s alleged “fail[ure] to 

investigate the facts and circumstances of the case” and on the theory that 

Contreras-Munoz’s “guilty plea was coerced by threats, false promises, and 

counsel’s lack of effort on behalf of the petitioner.” Id. at 121-22. Thereafter, 

Contreras-Munoz filed numerous documents with the court that were handwritten and in English. Contreras-Munoz eventually moved to withdraw his 

petition for post-conviction relief without prejudice, which the court permitted.

[15] On December 2, 2013, Contreras-Munoz, pro se, filed a new petition for postconviction relief, which was typed in English. On February 6, 2014, counsel 

filed an appearance on Contreras-Munoz’s behalf, and, on September 18, 2014, 

Contreras-Munoz, through counsel, filed an amended petition for postconviction relief. For the first time in his amended petition, Contreras-Munoz
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asserted that he did not understand the English language and, as such, he did 

not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter into his guilty plea. For the 

same reason, Contreras-Munoz alleged that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. Contreras-Munoz further alleged Newman to be 

ineffective in his presentation of potential mitigating evidence at ContrerasMunoz’s sentencing hearing.

[16] The post-conviction court held a hearing on Contreras-Munoz’s amended 

petition for post-conviction relief on November 20, 2014. Thereafter, the court 

entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the petition. In 

particular, the post-conviction court noted that John Ford, Contreras-Munoz’s 

employer, testified that Contreras-Munoz had “interpreted English to [other] 

Spanish speaking employees” at his place of employment. And the court found 

that it “had no reason to believe [Contreras-Munoz] did not understand English 

as [he] communicated in English and indicated an understanding of all court 

proceedings,” and Contreras-Munoz “understood English.” Id. at 294-95, 298. 

The court then concluded that Contreras-Munoz had knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily entered into his guilty plea. The court further concluded that 

Contreras-Munoz did not receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. 

This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[17] Contreras-Munoz appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for 

post-conviction relief. As our supreme court has explained:

“The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden 

of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). 

“When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the 

petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative 

judgment.” Id. To prevail on appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence as a 

whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion 

opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Weatherford v. 

State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). Further, the postconviction court in this case made findings of fact and 

conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction 

Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-conviction 

court’s legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings 

and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear 

error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 

102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (quotation omitted). 

Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014) (alteration original to 

Hollowell). Because the clearly erroneous standard “is a review for sufficiency of 

evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of 

witnesses.” Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258-59. Rather, we “consider only the 

evidence that supports that judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from that evidence.” Id.
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[18] On appeal, Contreras-Munoz asserts that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or 

voluntarily plead guilty because “he did not have an interpreter at the guilty 

plea hearing.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. Contreras-Munoz also asserts that 

Newman rendered ineffective assistance when he did not request an interpreter

be present during court proceedings. And Contreras-Munoz asserts that 

Newman rendered ineffective assistance when he did not present certain 

evidence during Contreras-Munoz’s sentencing hearing. We address the 

English-language issues first and the sentencing-hearing issue second.

Issue One: Contreras-Munoz’s Understanding of English

[19] Contreras-Munoz first asserts that he did not enter into his guilty plea 

knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because he did not have an interpreter 

present at the guilty-plea hearing. As our supreme court has explained:

As we have previously declared: “In considering the 

voluntariness of a guilty plea we start with the standard that the 

record of the guilty plea proceeding must demonstrate that the 

defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and knowingly 

and voluntarily waived them.” Turman v. State, 271 Ind. 332, 392 

N.E.2d 483, 484 (1979) (citing Boykin [v. Alabama], 395 U.S. [238, 

242 (1969)]). And Boykin requires that a trial court accepting a 

guilty plea “must be satisfied that an accused is aware of his right 

against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right 

to confront his accusers.” Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 171 

(Ind. 2001) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243). The failure to advise 

a criminal defendant of his constitutional rights in accordance 

with Boykin prior to accepting a guilty plea will result in reversal 

of the conviction. Youngblood v. State, 542 N.E.2d 188, 188 (Ind. 

1989) (quoting White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ind. 1986)). 

Accordingly, a defendant who demonstrates that the trial court 
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failed to properly give a Boykin advisement during the guilty plea 

hearing has met his threshold burden for obtaining postconviction relief.

* * *

Courts have long recognized that “a foreign language defendant’s 

capacity to understand and appreciate the proceedings, to 

participate with his counsel, to confront his accusers, and to 

waive rights knowingly and intelligently, is undermined without 

an interpreter actively participating in his defense.” United States 

v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing United 

States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970)). 

Undoubtedly, the defendant is denied due process when, among 

other things, “what is told him is incomprehensible [or] the 

accuracy and scope of a translation at a hearing or trial is subject 

to grave doubt [.]” Cirrincione, 780 F.2d at 634. For this reason 

we have declared that a “defendant who cannot speak or 

understand English has [the] right to have his proceedings 

simultaneously translated to allow for effective participation.” 

Diaz, 934 N.E.2d at 1095 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 1989) (citation 

omitted)). We elaborated that such interpretation must include 

“the precise form and tenor of each question propounded, 

and . . . in like manner translate the precise expressions of the 

[defendant].” Id. at 1095 (quoting People v. Cunningham, 215 

Mich. App. 652, 546 N.W.2d 715, 716 (1996) (quotation 

omitted)). This is so because the interpreter’s role during a 

criminal proceeding is a critical one. “Language interpreters 

overcome the barriers and cultural misunderstandings that can 

render criminal defendants virtually absent from their own 

proceedings. Interpreters also eliminate the misinterpretation of 

witnesses’ statements made to police or triers of fact during court 

proceedings.” Lynn W. Davis, et al., The Changing Face of 

Justice: A Survey of Recent Cases Involving Courtroom 

Interpretation, 7 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 3 (2004).
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Ponce v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1265, 1270, 1272 (Ind. 2014) (footnote omitted; 

alterations and some omissions original).

[20] In Ponce, our supreme court held that a post-conviction petitioner had met his 

burden on appeal to show that he did not enter into his guilty plea knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily. In particular, in that case the petitioner 

demonstrated that his Boykin advisements “were not accurately communicated 

to [him] . . . in Spanish—the language he understood.” Id. at 1273. Moreover, 

the only evidence that the petitioner in Ponce understood the English-language 

version of his advisements was his statement, “I understand it, and I speak it a 

little.” Id. As our supreme court held, this statement, standing alone, did not 

show that the petitioner would understand “an explanation given in a foreign 

language of his legal rights.” Id. And the court concluded that the State failed 

to show that the record as a whole demonstrated that the petitioner understood 

his constitutional rights and waived them. Id. at 1274.

[21] Contreras-Munoz’s case is readily distinguishable from Ponce. Viewing the 

evidence most favorable to the post-conviction court’s judgment, as we must, 

see Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258-59, we cannot say that the evidence leads 

unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the postconviction court, see Hollowell, 19 N.E.3d at 269. Indeed, here the trial court 

expressly found that Contreras-Munoz understood the English language. That 

finding is well-supported by the evidence. Specifically, over the course of about 

six years, Contreras-Munoz wrote—sometimes by hand—numerous letters and 

documents to Newman and the court, all of which were in English. Some of 
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those documents made specific references to legal proceedings; others made 

specific legal arguments with citations to authority. Further, Newman testified 

that he frequently engages with Spanish-speaking clients and has an interpreter

on staff. But he had no problem communicating with Contreras-Munoz in 

English at any point, either orally or in writing, and, as such, Newman did not 

see the need to utilize his Spanish-speaking employee when communicating 

with Contreras-Munoz. And the trial court engaged Contreras-Munoz in 

numerous proceedings up to, during, and after Contreras-Munoz’s guilty plea. 

Contreras-Munoz had no problems communicating with the court in English

when the court engaged him.

[22] Contreras-Munoz asserts on appeal that his responses to the trial court during 

the various proceedings are not indicative of his understanding of the English 

language because he merely gave “yes” or “no” answers. But the trial court’s 

questions were often fact-specific—to give a correct yes or no answer required 

an understanding of the question’s factual reference. For example, during the 

guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked Contreras-Munoz if he was on parole 

or probation. Contreras-Munoz answered “[n]o” to both questions. 

Appellant’s App. at 310. Contreras-Munoz does not explain on appeal how he 

could correctly answer “yes” to some fact-specific questions and “no” to others 

without first understanding the facts referenced in the question.

[23] In any event, Contreras-Munoz’s argument on appeal amounts to a request for 

this court to reweigh the evidence before the post-conviction court. That is, 

Contreras-Munoz’s appeal is premised on the evidence he presented to the post-
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conviction court rather than the evidence most favorable to the court’s 

judgment, which is contrary to our standard of review. Thus, we decline 

Contreras-Munoz’s invitation to reassess the evidence on appeal. 

[24] We hold that the post-conviction court’s judgment that Contreras-Munoz 

entered into his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently is not 

clearly erroneous. For the same reasons Contreras-Munoz cannot demonstrate 

that the post-conviction court erred on this issue, he cannot demonstrate that 

the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that Newman had not 

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to secure an interpreter 

during any of the proceedings before the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the 

post-conviction court’s judgment on these issues.

Issue Two: Sentencing Hearing

[25] Contreras-Munoz also argues on appeal that Newman rendered ineffective 

assistance of counsel when he failed to present certain evidence on ContrerasMunoz’s behalf during the sentencing hearing. When evaluating an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Hollowell, 19 N.E.3d at 269. To satisfy 

the first prong, “the defendant must show deficient performance: 

representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 

(Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). To satisfy the second prong, 

“the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability 
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sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

[26] Here, Contreras-Munoz asserts that Newman rendered ineffective assistance at 

the sentencing hearing when he did not call Ford, Contreras-Munoz’s 

employer, and Amy Contreras, Contreras-Munoz’s former wife, as witnesses on 

Contreras-Munoz’s behalf. According to Contreras-Munoz, Ford would have 

testified that Contreras-Munoz had worked for Ford for eight years and was a 

trusted worker with supervisor authority. And Contreras-Munoz asserts that 

Amy would have testified that Contreras-Munoz supported his family.

[27] But the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that “which witnesses to call is the 

epitome of a strategic decision” that “we will not second-guess.” Wrinkles v. 

State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1200 (Ind. 2001) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Accordingly, Contreras-Munoz cannot demonstrate that Newman’s 

strategic decision to not call Ford and Amy as witnesses was objectively 

unreasonable. 

[28] Moreover, the post-conviction court concluded that there was not a reasonable 

probability that the result of Contreras-Munoz’s sentence would have been 

different had Newman called Ford and Amy as witnesses. Indeed, while 

Newman did not call these potential witnesses, he did ask the trial court 

to note [Contreras-Munoz’s] strong family support. His ex-wife 

and his children have written letters. He has four children. He 

was current on child support until he was incarcerated . . . . He 
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had a good work history before his arrest, and he was . . . in a 

supervisory position.

Appellant’s App. at 319. Thus, while Ford and Amy might have bolstered 

Newman’s assertions, nonetheless the trial court at the sentencing hearing had

the information regarding Contreras-Munoz’s family support and work history 

before it. And, despite having that information before it, the court still 

concluded that the aggravating factors overcame the proffered mitigators. We 

cannot say that the post-conviction court’s conclusion that Contreras-Munoz 

would not have received a different sentence had Newman called Ford and 

Amy as witnesses is clearly erroneous. As such, we affirm the post-conviction 

court’s denial of Contreras-Munoz’s petition for post-conviction relief.

[29] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.