alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Linda R. Graev, Respondent-Appellant, v Lawrence G. Graev, Appellant-Respondent.

[631 NYS2d 685]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Lewis Friedman, J.), entered May 12, 1995, which denied defendant’s motion to dismiss this matrimonial action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) on the ground that there is a prior action pending between the parties in Suffolk County, denied plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 602 (b) to consolidate the two proceedings in New York County, and denied defendant’s cross motion to stay the action pending resolution of his action against plaintiff, and from an order of the same court and Justice entered the same date, which granted plaintiff temporary maintenance and interim counsel, accountant and appraiser fees, modified, on the law, the facts and in the exercise of discretion, to the extent of granting plaintiffs motion to remove the Suffolk County action to New York County and consolidate same with the New York action, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss *(see, Whitney v Whitney,*57 NY2d 731, *on remand 92*AD2d 935, 936), as the action by one spouse for divorce on one set of grounds is not an action "for the same cause of action” (CPLR 3211 [a] [4]) as an action by the other spouse based on different grounds *(Kevorkian v Harrington,*158 Misc 2d 464, 468). Further, merely because defendant commenced his action first by serving and filing a summons with notice (CPLR 304) does not mandate dismissal as a " 'prior action pending’ ” in the absence of service of a complaint *(supra,*at 467, citing *United Enters. v Hill,*185 AD2d 206). Nor was it an improvident exercise of discretion to deny the motion for a stay pending determination of the Suffolk action (CPLR 2201). The award of interim maintenance and professional fees was not excessive based upon, *inter alia,*the parties’ pre-separation lifestyle and the substantial difference in the parties’ assets and income *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; § 237; *Hartog v Hartog,*85 NY2d 36, 50-51; *DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete,*70 NY2d 879, 881; *Baker v Baker,*120 AD2d 374).

However, because the court determined that New York was the first county in which the complaint was served for purposes of CPLR 3211 (a) (4) and as a joint proceedings will serve judicial economy, the court erred in failing to remove the Suf*536folk action to New York County and consolidate it with the New York action. The fact that Suffolk had previously denied a motion for change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510 and 511 would not prevent the grant of such motion pursuant to CPLR 602 *(see,*McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C602:4; *Padilla v Greyhound Lines,*29 AD2d 495, 499). Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Asch, Williams and Mazzarelli, JJ.

Rubin, J., dissents for the reasons stated by Friedman, J.
Order filed December 10, 2013, Withdrawn, Appeal Reinstated and Order 

filed December 10, 2013 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-13-00888-CR

____________

WILLIAM MARK RHODES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 248th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1259408

ORDER

On December 10, 2013, this Court issued an order abating the appeal and directing 

the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether appellant was entitled to proceed 

without payment of costs for the reporter’s record. The reporter’s record has been filed. 

Accordingly, our order of December 10, 2013, is withdrawn. The appeal is 

reinstated. Appellant’s brief is due 30 days from the date of this order.

PER CURIAM
No. 86-870.

#### Phillips Petroleum Co. et al. *v.*Mississippi et al.

Sup. Ct. Miss. Motions of Robert E. Longino, Jr., and City of Elizabeth, New Jersey, et al. for leave to file briefs as *amici curiae*granted. Certiorari granted.
HomeNRC LibraryDocument CollectionsNUREG-Series PublicationsPublications Resulting from International Agreements

# Assessment Study of RELAP5/MOD2 Cycle 36.04 Based on Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valve Tests (NUREG/IA-0034)

On this page:
        - Publication Information
        - Abstract

Download complete document
        - NUREG/IA-0034 (PDF 3.53 MB)

## Publication Information

**Date Published:** July 1990

**Prepared by:** E.J. Stubbe, L. Vanhoenacker

TRACTEBEL Rue de ]a Science, 31 B-1040 Brussels Belgium

**Prepared as part of:** The Agreement on Research Participation and Technical Exchange under the International Thermal-Hydraulic Code Assessment and Application Program (ICAP)

**Published by:** Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Availability Notice

## Abstract

This report presents a code assessment study based on full size relief and assisted safety valve (called SEBIM) tests performed on the CUMULUS valve test rig operated by Electricite de France (EdF).

The increased awareness that the pressuriser safety and relief valves are not reliable under water blowdown conditions, has led to the design, testing and installation of so called assisted safety valves of which the SEBIM (TM) valves are an example. These valves, used in tandem, are gradually replacing the safety and relief valves on pressurisers in some European PWR's.

Before installation at the plant, the Belgian safety authorities requested a thorough full scale testing of these valves on a test rig (CUMULUS) equipped with sufficient diagnostics to measure the characteristics of the valve. The Belgian architect-engineering firm TRACTEBEL was called upon to specify, order and test these valves for installation at the DOEL 1 and DOEL 2 power plants.

These tests do provide sufficient data of high quality to justify an assessment study of the code RELAP-5 MOD-2 CYCLE 36 in the ICAP framework which is the subject of this report.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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Exhibit 33.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                R WIRELESS, INC.

                                 CODE OF ETHICS
                           (ADOPTED FEBRUARY 24, 2004)




         R Wireless, Inc. ("RWireless") has adopted the following Code of
Ethics, which is applicable to all employees of RWireless and to any person, not
an employee, who performs functions similar to those of its principal executive
officer, principal financial officer or principal accounting officer or
controller, who, for purposes of this Code of Ethics, is deemed to be an
employee. Failure to conform to this Code of Ethics may result (to the extent
consonant with law and legally proper agreements of RWireless) in a reprimand, a
reprimand and inclusion of a report thereof in the personnel file of such
employee, loss of salary and/or bonus, suspension of employment and/or
dismissal, as appropriate in view of the nature of the conduct and its effect on
RWireless. In appropriate circumstances, such improper behavior may be made
public or reported to the relevant authorities, civil or criminal.

         1. At all times, each employee of RWireless, in his or her activities
involving RWireless, shall engage only in honest and ethical conduct, including
the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between
personal and professional relationships.

         2. Each employee of RWireless responsible for preparing and filing or
submitting reports and documents to the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission
and in making other public communications by or on behalf of RWireless, shall to
the best of his or her knowledge and ability, cause them to be full, fair,
accurate, timely and understandable.

         3. Each employee of RWireless shall use his or her best efforts to
assure compliance with all applicable governmental laws, rules and regulations.

         4. Each employee of RWireless who learns of any violation of this Code
of Ethics shall report such violation to the chief executive officer. If the
chief executive officer learns of any such violation, he or she shall discuss
such violation with counsel to RWireless, who shall advise the chief executive
officer as to what action should be taken, including, if appropriate, disclosure
to the board of directors of RWireless, the U. S. Securities and Exchange
Commission and/or other public authorities.



                                            /s/ Mark Neuhaus
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Mark Neuhaus
                                            Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
HomeNRC LibraryDocument CollectionsNUREG-Series PublicationsBrochures Prepared by NRC Staff

# Mixed Oxide Fuel News (NUREG/BR-0284)

The Mixed Oxide Xchange newsletter was published quarterly from March 2001 through March 2005 to highlight recent news and events associated with the NRC’s licensing of a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. As noted in the last issue of the newsletter, the NRC issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Construction Authorization, and associated Final Safety Evaluation Report for the facility. Upon completion of these milestones, the NRC decided to discontinue publication of the newsletter and instead, put more resources into maintaining the Web site in order to provide more frequent updates on the status of the MOX project. For more information on MOX, see the MOX webpage.

As always, if you have any questions, comments, or suggestions for the NRC, you may contact us at MOXFEEDBACK.Resource@nrc.gov.

## Mixed Oxide Fuel News

## Mixed Oxide Xchange

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, September 02, 2021
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-7173

DAUGHTON W. LACEY, JR., a/k/a Baruch Yah Hawkins,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DANIEL A. BRAXTON, Warden; STEVE HOLLAR, Assistant Warden; 

TRACY LAWHORN, Treatment Program Supervisor; LIEUTENANT 

PERRY; SERGEANT STICKLER, C/O; WORKMAN, C/O; GRIFFIN, C/O; 

JOHN GARMAN, Regional Director; JOHN JABE, Deputy Director 

of Operations; LIEUTENANT CANTERBURY; PHYLLIS BYRD, Law 

Library Supervisor,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior 

District Judge. (7:10-cv-00139-JLK)

Submitted: January 31, 2012 Decided: February 3, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daughton W. Lacey, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Richard Carson 

Vorhis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, 

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Daughton W. Lacey, Jr., appeals the district court’s 

order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction in his 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) action. We have reviewed the record and 

find no abuse of discretion. See Cienna Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 

F.3d 312, 322 (4th Cir. 2000) (providing review standard). 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Lacey v. Braxton, No. 7:10-cv-00139-JLK (W.D. Va. Aug. 

1, 2011). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IVAN VALENZUELA

- MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 14

- 71865 Agency No. A095

- 017

- 004

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted September 13, 2016 ** Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges Ivan Valenzuela

- Martinez, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. W e have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 21 2016 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 14

- 71865

for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinatio ns created by the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1039

- 40 (9th C ir. 2010). We deny the petition for review. Valenzuela

- Martinez’s contention that the IJ erred by not providing him an opportunity to explain false statements made to immigration authorities is unexhausted. See Barron v. Ashcroft , 358 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the agency). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on Valenzuela

- Martinez’s admissions regarding the false statements and fraudulent tax i nformation he presented to immigration authorities in connection with his pursuit of Temporary Protected Status. See id. at 1048 ( adverse credibility finding reasonable under the totality of the circumstances) ; see Singh v. Holder , 643 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011) (“An asylum applicant who lies to immigration authorities casts doubt on his credibility and the rest of his story.”). Thus, in the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Valenzuela

- Martinez’s asylum claim, even if timely, and his wi thholding of removal claim fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft , 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).3 14

- 71865

Finally, Valenzuela

- Martinez’s CAT claim fails because it is based on the same testimony the agency found not credible, and Valenzuela

- Martinez does not point t o any other evidence in the record that compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official in Nicaragua. See id. at 1156

- 57. In light of our conclusion s , we need not rea ch Valenzuela

- Martinez’s remaining contentions.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
HomeNRC LibraryDocument CollectionsNUREG-Series PublicationsPublications Prepared by NRC Staff

# Standard Review Plan for the review of a license application for a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility (NUREG-1200, Revision 3)

On this page:
        - Publication Information
        - Abstract

Download complete document
        -  NUREG-1200, Revision 3 (PDF - 28.75 MB)

## Publication Information

**Manuscript Completed**: March 1994**Date Published**: April 1994

Division of Low-Level Waste Management and Decommissioning Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Availability Notice

## Abstract

The Standard Review Plan (SRP) (NUREG-1200) provides guidance to staff reviewers in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards who perform safety reviews of applications to construct and operate low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. The SRP ensures the quality and uniformity of the staff reviews and presents a well-defined base from which to evaluate proposed changes in the scope and requirements of the staff reviews. The SRP makes information about the regulatory licensing process widely available and serves to improve the understanding of the staff's review process by interested members of the public and the industry. Each individual SRP addresses the responsibilities of persons performing the review, the matters that are reviewed, the Commission's regulations and acceptance criteria necessary for the review, how the review is accomplished, the conclusions that are appropriate, and the implementation requirements.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-06-006-CV

NO. 2-06-155-CV

Ex Parte S.R.D., a child

In the Interest of B.G.D. a/k/a S.R.D., A Child	APPELLANT

	----------

	FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 COURT OF WICHITA COUNTY	NO. 2-006  -04400    08-367              -CV

JOSEPH H. LEE, III, VIRGINIA K. LEE AND 	APPELLANTS

PATRICIA LEE BARROW AND SAVINGS 

OF AMERICA, INC.	RaAiImMuUnNdDoO ViIeEiIrRaA aAnNdD JoOaAoO BoOsScCoO MoOnNtTeEiIrRoO	   APPELLANT	S

	V.

MoOtTeElL 6 OpPeErRaAtTiInNgG, L.P. OPAL LEE, IN HER CAPACITY AS 	APPELLEE

 TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR OF 

THE ESTATE OF DALE T. LEE, DECEASED	

	----------

	FROM THE 367TH          PROBATE DISTRICT COURT  NO. 2 OF DENOTON                     TARRANT COUNTY

	----------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1 AND JUDGMENT

	----------

	We have considered appellant’s [s’]’’ “Motion To Dismiss aAppealfORFor Dismissal With PrejudiceNotice Of Nonsuit.”  It is the court’s opinion that the motion should be granted; therefore, we dismiss the appeal.  See TEX. R. APP. P.Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1), 43.2(f).

	Costs of the appeal shall be paid by the appellants [ [s][- [oOR the the party incurring the same], for which let execution issue.  See Tex. R. App. P.Tex. R. App. P. 43.4.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL D:   LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, naand HOLMAN, JJ.

    HOLMAN, GARDNER, and WALKER                                     , JJ.

DELIVERED:    September 28, 2006  oCTOBER 2 October 2, 2008
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-1291

WILFREDO GONZALEZ LORA, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus THOMAS M. HOLLENHORST, Virginia Assistant United States Attorney, personal and official capacity; WILLIAM FITZPATRICK, Special Assistant United States Attorney, official and personal capacity; EUGENE ROSSI, Special Assistant United States Attorney; TIMOTHY MCGRATH, Special Agent for the Drug Enforcement Administration, official and personal capacity, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States Dist rict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:03-cv-00449-LMB) Submitted: November 22, 2006 Decided: December 12, 2006 Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Wilfredo Gonzalez Lora, Appellant Pro Se. Leslie Bonner McClendon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Wilfredo Gonzalez Lora appeals the district court’s order denying his motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), in which he sought reconsideration of the court’s prior orders denying reconsideration and dismissing his breach of contract action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Lora v. Hollenhorst , No. 1:03-cv-00449-LMB (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 11, 2006 & entered Jan. 17, 2006). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Manuel Edward Mantos, * From the 35th District

 Court of Brown County,

 Trial Court No. CR21539.

Vs. No. 11-13-00100-CR * March 27, 2014

The State of Texas, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 Willson, J., and Bailey, J.)

 This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the appeal 

should be dismissed. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, the appeal 

is dismissed.
No. 82-5941.

#### Gipson *v.*United States.

C. A. 10th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### In the Matter of Christopher C. and Another, Children Alleged to be Abused. Denise E., Appellant; Commissioner of Social Services, Respondent, et al., Respondent.

[631 NYS2d 666]

Order of disposition, Family Court, New York County (Mary Bednar, J.), entered on or about August 3, 1994, which placed the subject children with the Commissioner of Social Services for a period of 12 months and directed that they reside with their grandmother, following a fact-finding determination of abuse by respondent-appellant mother and respondent father, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Appellant’s abuse of the children was established by evidence that her three-month-old child sustained multiple fractures to the arm and ribs while in her care and custody, and her failure to offer a satisfactory explanation as to how the injuries happened and why she never sought treatment for the earlier rib injuries *(see, Matter of Vincent M.,*193 AD2d 398, 402). There is no evidence of mitigating circumstances that would warrant a finding of neglect rather than abuse *(cf., supra).*Concur — Wallach, J. P., Kupferman, Ross, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.