NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-5167

BRIAN GREER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee. Brian Greer , of Walnut Creek, California, pro se. A. Bondurant Eley , Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Just ice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With her on the brief were Peter D. Keisler , Acting Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, and Martin F. Hockey, Jr. , Assistant Director. Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims Judge Thomas C. WheelerNOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential

. 

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-5167 BRIAN GREER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

___________________________ DECIDED: December 4, 2007

___________________________ Before RADER, Circuit Judge , CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge , and DYK, Circuit Judge

. PER CURIAM. Brian Greer (“Greer”) appeals from a decis ion of the United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing his complaint for la ck of subject matter jurisdiction. Because that court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Greer’s complaint, we affirm

. BACKGROUND The dispute in this case stems from labor grievances filed by Greer against his former employer, Safeway, Inc. (“Safeway ”), with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and the Equal Employ ment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Greer alleges that the NLRB and EEOC disclosed the grievanc e filings to Safeway, which in turn disclosed them to other prospec tive employers. He alleges that he has been unable to find employment as a result. Greer filed this action in the Court of Federal Claimsagainst the NLRB and the EEOC, alleging that the agencie s breached a contract with him in which they agreed, through statements on their websites and through an “obligation inherent and obvious wit hin [the retaliation] laws,” J. A. at 18, to protect him, as a complainant, from retaliation by employers. 1 He asserted that the agencies breached this alleged contract by providing Safeway with a copy of Greer’s complaint and thereby “licensing” Safeway to distri bute the complaint to other prospective employers. Greer also asserted severa l equitable causes of action based on this alleged breach, seeking, am ong other things, an injunction ordering the agencies to keep the fact of filing of comp laints confidential. In a later filing, Greer added claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under the proh ibition against bills of attainder in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. The Court of Federal Claims granted t he government’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdic tion. Greer alleged jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, which authorizes the Court of Federal Claims to hear claims against the United States founded upon, inter a lia, “any express or impli ed contract with the United

1 Greer relies on the following statement from the NLRB website: “The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activities with or without a union, [including] an em ployee speaking to his/her employer on behalf of him/her self and one or more co-workers about improving workplace conditions.” NLRB: About Us, http://www.nlrb.gov/Workplace_Rights/i _am_new_to_this_websit e/what_are_protected_ concerted_activities.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). Greer also relies on the following stat ement from the EEOC website: “An employer may not fire, demote, harass or ot herwise ‘retaliate’ against an individual for filing a charge of discrimination . . . .” Retaliation, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/retaliation.ht ml (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). Finally, Greer relies on several federal and state laws, including the National Labor Relations Act and the California Labor Code. See J.A. at 18.

2007-5167 2States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1 ) (2000). The court noted that the jurisdiction granted by the Tucker Act does not extend to contracts im plied in law. Hercules, Inc. v. United States , 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996). The court found that, accepting the undisputed allegations as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, no express or implied in fact contract existed between Gr eer and the United States. Thus, “[i]f the Court were to find that [the United States] took on a contractual obligation to Mr. Greer when he filed his grievances, it would have to be based on an impli ed in law contract which the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider.” Greer v. United States , No. 07-123C, slip op. at 3-4 (Fed. Cl. A ug. 1, 2007). The court also determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Greer’s other claims. It could not consider a due process claim unless it was ancillary to a claim for money dam ages, and Greer had not asserted a claim for damages over which the court had jurisdic tion. Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment, which acts as a restraint only upon the states, was inapplicable to a claim against the federal government. Finally, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider Greer’s equitable claims because “the Tucker Act does not allow for the aw ard of equitable or injunctive relief, except in limited ci rcumstances not applicable here.” Id. , slip op. at 4. Greer timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). DISCUSSION We review the decision of the Court of Federal Claims to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Sanders v. United States , 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The petiti oner bears the burden of provi ng that the court possessed jurisdiction over his complaint. See id.

2007-5167 3Greer’s first argument on appeal is that the Court of Federal Claims did have jurisdiction over his complaint, because his purported contract wit h the government was not an implied in law contract. We reject this argument. An expr ess or an implied-infact contract with the governm ent requires, as one element, “’actual authority’ on the part of the government’s repr esentative to bind the governm ent.” Schism v. United States , 316 F.3d 1259, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Night Vision Corp. v. United States , 469 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (sta ting that elements for express and implied-in-fact contracts are the same). The Court of Federal Claims correctly found that this element was not satisfied here, because Gr eer did not allege that any government representativ e with actual authority agreed to bind the United States to a contract. Greer v. United States , No. 07-123C, slip op. at 4. Rather, if any contractual obligation on the part of the United States were to be f ound from the alleged promises, “it would have to be based on an implied in law contract,” id. , slip op. at 3-4, which “is a ‘fiction of law’ where ‘a promise is im puted to perform a legal duty.’” Hercules , 516 U.S. at 424 (internal citation omitted). The Cour t of Federal Claims co rrectly found that it would lack jurisdiction over such a contra ct even if one did exist, because the Tucker Act’s grant of jurisdiction extends only to express and implied-in-fact contracts. Id. at 423. Greer’s second argument is that, upon det ermining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the court was requir ed to transfer the case sua sponte to a court of proper jurisdiction. We reject this argument. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, a federal court that lacks jurisdiction is permitted, “if it is in the inte rest of justice, [to] transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which t he action or appeal could have been brought at

2007-5167 42007-5167 5 the time it was filed or noticed.” In this case, there was no other such court in which Greer’s damages action could have been br ought. Transfer under section 1631 is authorized only to the courts listed in 28 U.S.C. § 610: “the courts of appeals and district courts of the United States, the United States Distric t Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of In ternational Trade.” None of those courts, however, would have had jurisdicti on over Greer’s claim. Greer sought to recover damages of over four million dollars from the United States. The Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction ov er claims under the Tucker Act for money damages exceeding $10,000. See Christopher Village, L. P. v. United States , 360 F.3d 1319, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court ther efore lacked the ability to transfer the claim under section 1631 because there was no ot her federal court in which it could have been brought. Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to transfer Greer’s equitable claims to another federal court. Greer asserts several additional errors by the trial court. None of these arguments has merit, and we reject them. In particular, the allegations of misconduct by the Court of Federal Claim s judge are speculative and ent irely unsupported, and do not state a cognizable claim of bias in any event. See Liteky v. United States , 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (requiring an extrajudicial s ource to support a claim of bias). For the reasons set forth above, the decis ion of the Court of Federal Claims is affirmed

. No costs.