RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0876-MR

JOSHUA JAYNES APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE MITCHELL PERRY, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 21-CI-005290

CONSOLIDATED LOCAL 

GOVERNMENT POLICE FORCE 

MERIT BOARD A/K/A LOUISVILLE 

METRO POLICE MERIT BOARD 

AND LOUISVILLE METRO POLICE 

DEPARTMENT APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Appellant, Joshua Jaynes, was terminated from the Louisville 

Metro Police Department (LMPD), on January 5, 2021, for violating standard 

operating procedures regarding the preparation of a search warrant and 

untruthfulness. Mr. Jaynes’ termination resulted from an extensive LMPD 
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investigation surrounding the death of Breonna Taylor on March 13, 2020. Ms. 

Taylor was killed by LMPD officers while executing the search warrant that relied 

upon the search warrant affidavit prepared by Mr. Jaynes. 

The LMPD’s Professional Standards Unit (PSU) performed the initial 

investigation of Mr. Jaynes and other officers. As a result, former LMPD Chief 

Yvette Gentry terminated Mr. Jaynes’ employment for violating LMPD Standard 

Operating Procedure (SOP), 8.1.17 and SOP 5.15. He appealed that decision to the 

Louisville Metro Police Board (Merit Board), which affirmed the underlying 

termination decision. Mr. Jaynes then appealed to the Jefferson Circuit Court, 

which affirmed the Merit Board.

1

 Mr. Jaynes now appeals to this Court as a matter 

of right. He specifically argues: 1) The circuit court’s opinion and order 

erroneously adopted the arbitrary and false findings of the Louisville Metro Police 

Merit Board; 2) The LMPD Merit Board made findings of fact which were false 

and arbitrary; 3) The LMPD Merit Board’s lawyer displayed prejudice against Mr. 

Jaynes and his counsel and exceeded his role as advisor. For the following 

reasons, we affirm. 

1 On September 15, 2022, Appellee LMPD moved this Court to enter an order dismissing 

Appellant’s appeal filed on July 18, 2022, on the grounds that it was from a non-final Opinion 

and Order entered by the circuit court on June 22, 2022. The basis of this Motion was that 

Appellant’s July 18, 2022 Notice of Appeal only referenced the circuit court’s June 22, 2022 

Opinion and Order, and not the final Amended Opinion and Order entered on July 13, 2022. A 

panel of the Court denied the motion to dismiss on November 1, 2022. We are bound by that 

prior decision and will rely on the Amended Order entered on July 13, 2022. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A panel of this Court has previously discussed the applicable standard 

of review as follows:

In Crouch v. Jefferson County, Kentucky Police

Merit Board, 773 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1988), the Supreme 

Court of Kentucky held that the standard of review to be 

applied by the circuit court in this type of case is a 

modified de novo. As explained in Brady v. Pettit, 586 

S.W.2d 29 (Ky. 1979), this standard allows the reviewing 

court to invade the mental processes of the Merit Board 

to determine whether its action was arbitrary. To 

determine arbitrariness, the circuit court may review the 

record, the briefs, and any other evidence or testimony 

which would be relevant to that specific, limited issue. A 

decision is arbitrary if it is clearly erroneous. Crouch at

464, citing Thurman v. Meridian Mutual Insurance

Company, Ky., 345 S.W.2d 635, 639 (1961). The appeal 

to circuit court is not the proper forum to retry the merits. 

It is limited only to the question of whether the Merit 

Board’s action was clearly unreasonable. Crouch, 773

S.W.2d at 461.

On appeal from the circuit court, however, this 

Court is guided by the clearly erroneous standard set out 

in Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. We 

are not to disturb the determinations of the trial court 

unless they are not supported by substantial evidence. 

Stallins v. City of Madisonville, 707 S.W.2d 349, 350 

(Ky. App. 1986). Of course, as with any appeal from a 

decision of an administrative agency, we review the trial 

court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. See

Reis v. Campbell County Board of Education, 938 

S.W.2d 880, 885-86 (Ky. 1996).
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Ca’Mel v. Louisville Metro/Jefferson Cnty. Metro. Gov’t Police Dep’t, No. 2013-

CA-001988-MR, 2015 WL 226088, at *6 (Ky. App. Jan. 16, 2015). With this 

standard in mind, we now turn to the record in the present case. 

ANALYSIS

The forty-two page unanimous decision by the Merit Board contains 

an extensive analysis of the underlying events, as well as numerous and precise 

findings in support of its decision. It ultimately concluded as follows: “The 

totality of the circumstances include what appears on its face to be a relatively 

clean employment history but what turned out to be a blunder, which contributed 

to a tragedy, in being untruthful in his Affidavit in support of the Search Warrant 

for 3003 Springfield Drive, #4.” In its Opinion And Order affirming the Merit 

Board, the Jefferson Circuit Court provided the following instructive summary of 

the Board’s decision: 

[I]t was established that Mr. Jaynes was the affiant for 

the search warrant of Breonna Taylor’s apartment. In the 

search warrant, Mr. Jaynes stated that he had directly 

verified with a U.S. Postal Inspector that Jamarcus 

Glover was receiving packages at Ms. Taylor’s address.

However, it was then established that this statement was 

false. The Merit Board found that this untruthfulness 

regarding consultation with a U.S. Postal Inspector was 

indeed a violation of LMPD SOP 5.1.5 as given in Mr. 

Jaynes’ termination letter.

In addition to this, the Merit Board found that Mr. 

Jaynes violated LMPD SOP 8.1.17 when he failed to 

complete a “Search Warrant Operations Plan.” This form 
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is required to be completed by the lead investigator 

before any search warrant is executed, and is to include 

information regarding the nature of the search to be 

conducted. Mr. Jaynes was unable to present any 

evidence to show that he ever completed this required 

form aside from a picture of a white board which he 

claimed to contain the required information. The Merit 

Board however found that this was an inadequate 

substitute for the required form and upheld the violation 

of LMPD SOP 8.1.17.

. . . .

At Oral Arguments, both parties agree that the 

crux of this case is the truthfulness of Mr. Jaynes’ 

statement in the search warrant affidavit. Because it is 

false that he consulted with a U.S. Postal Inspector for 

this search warrant, the decision of the Merit Board must 

be affirmed. 

On appeal, Mr. Jaynes raises the collective 

knowledge doctrine to claim that his statement in the 

search warrant affidavit was not false because he was 

relying on information from a fellow officer. The 

collective knowledge doctrine allows one officer to rely 

on information communicated from a fellow officer to 

support his or her decision to make a stop or arrest Lamb 

v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Ky. 2017). 

However, the Merit Board directly addressed this 

argument in its Findings and Order. It held that the 

collective knowledge doctrine does not apply in this case 

because the information Mr. Jaynes provided did not 

come from a reliable LMPD source and was indeed 

untruthful. See Merit Board Findings & Order at p. 187. 

Further, the collective knowledge doctrine applies 

primarily to suppression hearings for suspect stops and 

searches. Its applicability in administrative proceedings 

is doubtful at best. Regardless of the applicability, the 

collective knowledge doctrine argument is defeated by 
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the untruthfulness of the information provided in the 

search warrant affidavit.

. . .

[E]xtensive evidence was provided to demonstrate that 

Mr. Jaynes did not directly consult with a Postal 

Inspector as he claimed in the search warrant affidavit. 

Indeed, Mr. Jaynes himself testified at the hearing that he 

had not received the information directly from a Postal 

Inspector, but had instead received it from [Sergeant]

Mattingly. He also testified that he did not know whether 

Sergeant Mattingly had received the information from a 

Postal Inspector or a detective with the Shively Police 

Department. Either way, the information provided in the 

search warrant affidavit, that Mr. Jaynes had directly 

verified the information with a Postal Inspector, was 

false. . . . 

The Merit Board conducted a full and comprehensive 

hearing lasting three days. Its decision is neither 

arbitrary nor capricious, nor contrary to established law. 

Instead, it is thorough, well-reasoned, and amply 

supported by substantial evidence. 

In support of his argument on appeal, Mr. Jaynes relies in part on the 

testimony of his expert witness, Alexander Payne. Mr. Payne testified that the 

search warrant was not defective pursuant to the collective knowledge doctrine. 

However, the Merit Board concluded that “[t]he testimony of Alex Payne in this 

matter revealed that he had not reviewed the entire PSU file which Chief Gentry 

had before her as she made her decisions to terminate Mr. Jaynes and the Board so 

finds as a matter of fact.” 
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In addition, Mr. Jaynes cites the testimony of former LMPD Chief 

Robert Schroeder. He was questioned by Mr. Jaynes’ counsel as follows: “[s]o if 

Detective Jaynes had gotten that information about contact with [United States 

Postal Service] individual from Sergeant Mattingly, was he entitled to rely on that 

information?” Mr. Schroeder responded in the affirmative, based on the 

constructive knowledge doctrine. However, he also testified that he had not 

reviewed the PSU file. And during his avowal testimony, he stated that “I think it

comes down to the question at heart is whether he’s saying he verified it or 

whether he is saying Sergeant Mattingly verified it.” Moreover, “[w]ith regard to 

the Search Warrant Operations Plan, and the violation of SOP 8.1.17,” the Merit 

Board cited the following:

[Mr. Jaynes] testified that he did not appropriately 

prepare one but he claimed the white board (AX-7) to be 

an appropriate substitute. He testified that he was not the 

one who prepared the white board. The Board finds, 

therefore, that as the self-identified lead officer in the 

matter he failed to complete a Search Warrant Operations 

Plan as required by LMPD SOP 8.1.17. 

Other officials involved with the underlying events and investigation 

testified as well. It is not our task to “determine the credibility or lack thereof, of 

witnesses. These tasks are assigned to the Board alone . . . .” Crouch v. Jefferson

Cnty., Kentucky Police Merit Bd., 773 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Ky. 1988). See also

Kentucky Revised Statute 67C.323(3)(b) (“The procedure as to the appeal to the 
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Court of Appeals shall be the same as in any civil action.”). Accordingly, we leave 

the “weighing of the evidence to the fact-finder – here the . . . Board – and that 

weighing includes credibility determinations.” Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. Ashcraft, 559 

S.W.3d 812, 821 (Ky. 2018).

In consideration of the record and arguments presented, we cannot 

conclude that the findings of the Merit Board were false or arbitrary. Rather, we 

conclude that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. In so 

holding, we reiterate the circuit court’s observation that:

the crux of this case is the truthfulness of Mr. Jaynes’ 

statement in the search warrant affidavit. Because it is 

false that he consulted with a U.S. Postal Inspector for 

this search warrant, the decision of the Merit Board must 

be affirmed. 

Mr. Jaynes’ final argument on appeal that the Merit Board’s lawyer 

displayed prejudice is insufficiently supported and unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s 

supplemental order entered on July 13, 2022. 

DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS.

ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.

ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURRING: Respectfully, although I fully 

concur with the presiding Judge’s analysis in the body of the Opinion, I disagree 
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with a comment in footnote 1 that “[w]e are bound by” the denial of Appellee’s 

motion to dismiss entered by another panel of this Court. We are not so bound and 

can reconsider that order because the “denial of a motion to dismiss is interlocutory

. . . .” Halle v. Banner Industries of N.E., Inc., 453 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Ky. App. 

2014). But, even if the motion were brought anew, I would not dismiss the appeal 

for the same reason given in the November 1, 2022 order.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Thomas E. Clay

Louisville, Kentucky 

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Michael J. O’Connell

Jefferson County Attorney

Carrie P. Hall

David A Sexton

Assistant Jefferson County Attorneys

Louisville, Kentucky