# The Att0rne.y General of Texas

JIM MATTOX Attorney General September 25, 1985

Supreme Court Building P.0. Box 12546 Austin, TX. 76711. 2546 5121475-2501 Telex 9101674-1367 Telecopier 51214750266 EonorableNeal Birmingham DistrictAttorney P. 0. Box 555 Linden, Texas 75563 OpinionNo. ~~-354

Re: Whether the exceptionof section 56). article 6701d-11, V.T.C.S., applies to pulpwood or logs being transportedto a mill

714 Jackson, Suite 700 Dallas, TX. 75202.4506 2141742.6944

4624 Alberta Ave., Suite 160 El Paso, TX. 79905.2793 9151533364

1001 Texas. Suite 700 Houston, TX. 77002-3111 713/223-5666

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4309 N. Tenth. Suite 6 McAllen, TX. 76501-1685 5121662-4547

200 Main Plaza. Suite 400 Ssn Antonio, TX. 76205-2797 512lUM191 Dear Mr. Birmingham:

You request an interpretation of the statutory provision which creates a forestry exception in article 6701d-11, section 5(b), V.T.C.S. Specificztlly, you ask whether the exception applies to the hauling of logs or pulpwood from awood yard to a lumbermill or to a paper mill. Section 5(e) of article 6701d-11 makes it unlawful to operate on the public highways a commercial motor vehicle, trucktractor, trailer, or semitrailer having a weight in excess of the specifiedweight l:imitations. In 1983, the legislatureadded section 5(b),which further, provides that
(b) No person shall load, or cause to be loaded, a vehicle for operation on the public highways of this statewith the intent to violate the weight:limitations in Subsection (a) of this section. Intent to violate those limitations is presumed if the loadedvehicle exceeds the applicable groE,s

vehicular *eight limitby 15percent or more. This subsection does not apply to the loading;? causing tobe loadedof an agricultural or a forestry commodityprior to theprocessing of the commc~~ (Emphasisadded).

Your question is not whether the operator of an overloaded truck An Equal OppOrtUnityI Affirmative Action Employer violates article 6701d-11,but whether the owner or operator of avood yard has loadedor caused tobe loaded a vehicle for operation on the public highways inviolation of section 5(b).

You advise us thatwood, afterbeing cut in the forest, is first transported to a wood yard and then transported from thewood yard to a mill. The wood may be transportedto a mill on the same truck that hauled it to the wood yard without being unloaded and reloadedat the wood yard. Itmay be unloaded, stacked,and subsequentlyreloaded for

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hauling to the mill. It my be unloaded, stacked, and subsequently, at the option of the wood yard, sold to a sawmill for lumber or cut into lengths suitable for pll:lpwood and hauled to a paper mill. Even when there is no provable c.l.teration of the wood itself at the wood yard. there may be a change:of ownership. The issue in question is whether the logs or pulpwood leaving a wood yard have been processed within the meaning of the statute so that the forestry exception no longer applies, orwhether i:heyremain "a forestry commodityprior to the processing of the commodity," in which case the owner or operator of thewood yard is protected from criminalchargesunder section 5(b) of article 6701d-11. We conclude that the legislaturedid not intend the forestry exception to apljlyto a vehicle hauling logs or pulpwood from awood yard to a lumber, mill or papermill.
What constitutes "processing" is a complex question. See Commonwealthv. Babcock LumbserCompany, 272 A.2 522, 526 (Pa. 1971). The Texas Legislature did &t define "processing," and we have not found it definedby a court i:nthis context. It iswell settled that an ambiguous statute must be construed consistent with legislative intent. Newsom v. State, 3":!S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex.Crim. App. 1963). We assume that the legislature intendswords used in a statute to be understood in their ordinary sense except where they are given a differentmeaning in the act:. SeeMarkowskyv. Newman, 136 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1940);Attorney Genera1 Opinion JM-106 (1983). There are times when it is necessary to ,:onsulta dictionary to ascertain the appropriatemeaning of a word in a statute. See Board of Insurance Commissioners v. Duncan, L‘14S.W.2d 326, 328(Tex. Civ. App. - Amarillo 1943,writ ref'd);AttorneyGeneralOpinionE-1277 (1978). According to Black's L.arDictionary at page 1084 (5th ed. 1979), one meaning of process is "to prepare for market or to convert into marketable form." Supreme courts in other states have frequently found the term, in analogous contexts in other statutes, to mean the preparation of a product for market or conversion of a product into marketable form. In Moore v. Farmers Mutual Mfg. & Ginning Co., 77 -- P.2d 209, 211 (Aria. 1938). the Supreme Court of Arizona stated the following:
Theword 'process'is given severaldefinitions

by Webster's New International Dictionary, the standardauthority for themeaning of thewords of the English langu;sge. The one which obviously applies to an opezrttion like the ginning of cotton is as follows: 'to subject (especially raw material) to a process of manufacturing, development, preparation for themarket, etc.; to convert into marketable form, es livestock by slaughtering,grainby mjllling,cottonby spinning,milk by pasteurizing, fruits and vegetables by sorting

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and repacking.' It will be seeu that the essentialportion c'fthe definition is to 'prepare rawmaterial

. . , for themarket.

. . .'
See also State v. Four States Drilling Co., 177 So.2d 828, 831 (Ala. --(quoting the same definition from Webster's New International Dictionary); Employment Sf:curityCommission of Arizona v. Bruce Church, Inc., 507 P.2d 108,111 (Ariz. 1973) (cooling of lettuce is incident to preparation fcr market though it does not change its nature or form); Bay Boti:!Led Gas Co. 74 N.W.2d 37, 4(7 (Mich. v. Michigan Department of Revenue, 1955) (processing is refining, development,preparation, or converting of material, especially in a raw state, into marketable form); SouthernNatural Gas Co. v. State, 73 So.2d 731, 735 (Ala. 1953) (processis synonymouswith preparation for market and conversion l.nto marketable form); Colbert Mill & Feed co, v. Oklahoma Tax Comm:~l~, 109 P.2d 504, 506 (Okla. 1941) (definition of process quested from Webster's New International Dictionary shows it is synoilymous with preparation for themarket).

Your inquiry relates to logs and pulpwood leaving a wood yard. Logs and pulpwood do not have fixed definitions in the law, but clearly they are forestry commodities. Decisions of the supreme courts of other stateshave found that a log is the trunk of a tree, cut down and strippedof it!; branches. or the trunk of a tree cut into different lengths-: See Bishop v. DiBose. 113 S.E.2d 309, 313 (N.C. 1960); State v. Addiagtx; 27 S.E. 988, 990 (N.C. 1897). Other decisions have described pulpwood as wood logs, peeled or unpeeled, usually cut in lengths suL,tablefor manufacturina into wood oulo. which coumonlv is used in mskiun paper. Dead Rive< Co. v. Assesso& of Houlton, 103A.2d 123, 129 &.' i953). Cf. Statev. International

163 So.2d ,507 (Ala. 1964)(wood chips not same as You indicate thst the pulpwood in question is a tree that has been cut down, trimmed: and cut into five to seven foot lengths. Even if wood is transported to a mill on the same truck without its being unloaded, it has been visually inspected and sorted and determined tobe in suitable condition for transportationto a mill. Recently, a Texas Court of Appeals determined the meaning of timber as used in a motoc carrier certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Tecas Railroad Commission. The court stated that

We hold that the word 'timber', as used in

appellant's certificate

. . . includes only trees not worked upon 'beyondtheir being felled and subjected to such other processing as may be reasonablyneces&y to facilitatetheir transportation by mOtor carrier, for example, removing limbs from the faL:Len trees and sawing the logs to

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lengths suitable for transport by motor carrier. (Emphasisadded).
Kinner Transp. 8 Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 644 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. APP. - Austin 1982,writ rei'dn.r.e.). The court found that "timber" as used in the certificate has a meaning virtually synonymous with logs.
By the time logs anilpulpwood leave a wood yard, they are products that have been prepared formarket or converted intomarketable formby the trimmingof: branches,by sorting,by reloading,or by cutting into appropriate lt.ngths,and may already have entered into channels of commerce.
It is an establishedri:Leof construction that an exemption from the general terms of a stab&e is strictly construed. See Attorney General OpinionM-507 (1969:. It is our opinion that, inthe event of
a judicial interpretation of the exception for a forestry commodity prior to the processing of the commodity, the exceptionwould not be extended to the hauling of l.ogs or pulpwood from a wood yard under the factspresented to us.

In addition, it is cur opinion that if the legislature had intendedmotor vehicles loathed with logs or pulpwood tobe exempt from the provlsions of article 6701d-11, section S(b), the legislature would have expressly so provided as it did in article 6701d-11, section 6(b), when it exeqlted motor vehicles loaded with timber or pulpwood from theprovisions1 of subdivision1 of section6 of the same statute. The latter provi;xLonrequires the operator or owner of a motor vehicle to unload the vehicle to the extent necessary to reduce its weight to the lawful ,maximumbefore further operation of an overweight vehicle on the public road, unless the load consists of livestock. Subdivision6 oE section 6 was enacted sixyears prior to the enactmentof section 5(h) andprovides that

Notwithstanding:Subdivision 1 of Section 6 of this Act. the ooa:catoror the owner of a motor vehicle loadedwith timber or pulp wood or agricultural products-in their natural state being transported from rhe place of production to the place of market or first processing, the operator or owner of a vehicle crossing a highway as provided by Section 5-l/3 of this Act, or the operator or owner ,ofa vehicle crossing a highway as provided by Section 5-213 of this Act, is not required to unload any portion of his load. (Emphasisadded).

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Unlike the exception in sect:LonS(b). the exemption to subdivision 1 of section 6 expressly applLes to a vehicle loaded with timber or pulpwoodprior to anyprocessing of the timberor pulpwood.
This opinion is lim:.t:ed to your request for a statutory interpretationand doesnot addressany additional issues.
,SUMMARY
The statutory exception in section 5(b) of article 6701d-11, V.T.C.S., for a forestry commodity prior to 1:beprocessing of the commodity does not apply t,Da vehicle hauling logs or pulpwood from a ,alDod yard to a lumber mill or papermill.

JIM MATTOX AttorneyGeneral of Texas

TOM GREEN FirstAssistantAttorneyGeneral

DAVIDR. RICHARDS ExecutiveAssistantAttorneyGeneral

ROBERT GRAY SpecialAssistantAttorneyGeneral

RICK GILPIN Chairman,Opinion Committee Preparedby Nancy Sutton AssistantAttorneyGeneral

APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE
Rick Gilpin, Chairman Colin Carl SusanGarrison Tony Guillory JimMoellinger Nancy Sutton SarahWoelk

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