[4910

- 13]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. 92

-NM

- 67

- AD; Amendment 39

- 8547; AD 93

- 07

- 15] Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Models 707, 727, 737, 747, and 757 Series Airplanes; and McDonnell Douglas Models DC

- 8, DC

- 9, and DC

- 10 Series Airplanes AGENCY: F ederal Aviation Administration, DOT. ACTION: F inal rule. SUMMARY: T his amendment supers edes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Boeing and McDonnell Douglas airplanes, that currentl y requires certain operational and equipment changes and design modifications to be accomplished to maximize fire detection and protection in main deck cargo compartments. T he existing rule was issued based on the FAA's determination that the existing Class B cargo compartment firefighting procedures and fire protection features were inadequate, and could result in the loss of an airplane. T hi s amendment requires certain design modifications and operational requirements to ensure an adequate level of safety on airplanes with Class B cargo compartments. T his amendment is prompted by comments from the public and additional information received a fter issuance of the existing AD. EFFECT IVE DATE: M ay 2, 1993. ADDRESSES: Information pertaining to this AD may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 L ind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, L os Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. FOR FURTHER IN FORMATION CONTACT: F or information concerning Boeing airplanes, contact Ms. Susan Letcher, Aerospace Engineer, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, S ys tems and Equipment Branch, ANM

- 130S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Rento n, Washington 98055

- 4056; telephone (206) 227

- 2670, fax (206) 227

- 1181. F or information concerning McDonnell Douglas airplanes, contact Mr. Kevin Kuni yoshi, Aerospace Engineer, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Mechanical/Environmental and Crashworthiness Section, ANM

- 131L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806

- 2425; telephone (310) 988

- 5337; fax (310) 988

- 5210. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Aproposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regul ations by

superseding AD 91

- 10

- 02, Amendment 39

- 6986 (56 FR 20529, May 6, 1991), which is applicable to various Boeing and McDonnell Douglas airplanes, was published in the Federal Register on August 17, 1992 (57 FR 36918). T he action proposed to require certain design modifications and operational requirements to ensure an adequate level of safety on airplanes with Class B cargo compartments. Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. D ue c onsideration has been given to the comments received. Response to Commenters One commenter supports the proposal, especially the decision to delete the2

previous requirement for use of a firefighter. T his commenter considers that, although conversion to the Class C cargo compartment configuration will provide the greatest level of safety, the options proposed by the FAA in this rulemaking action provide a more acceptable and practical choice for the affected industry

. Several commenters are concerned ab out the worldwide impact of the proposed rule. T hese commenters recommend that the FAA coordinate the proposal with the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) and Transport Canada Aviation. T he FAA notes that it has worked, and will continue to work, very clos el y with these organizations in the development of rulemaking concerning combi

- configured ("Combi") airplanes and their operations. Two commenters recommend that a separate AD be issued that would apply only t o narrow - body

airplanes. Aseparate AD could take into account all of the differences between narrow

- body

and wide

- body

operations, and specify onl y those requirements that specificall y pertain to narrow

- body airplane configurations and operations. S uch an action also would make for an AD that would be considerabl y easier to read. T he FAA disagrees. T he threat of an uncontrolled fire is equivalent for both narrow

- body and wide

- body

airplanes. T he FAA recognizes that the solutions may differ based on size of the airplane and airline route structure ; however, it is impractical to address each operator's unique circumstance in this AD or through a collection of AD's, due to the varied airplane ty pes and route structures. The options offered in this rule appl y equall y to both narrow

- body and wide

- bo dy airplanes. O perators who need to tailor certain of the requirements for various operations may apply for alternative methods of compliance with the rule, under the provisions of paragraph (d). One commenter requests that the rule be revised to require specifically that safety equipment be located in the passenger cabin, outside of the cargo compartment. T he FAA agrees with the commenter's suggestion that certain equipment be located outside of the cargo compartment, but does not consider that a revisi on to the rule is necessary

. Paragraph (b) of the rule does require that protective garments and protective breathing equipment (PBE) be located outside of the cargo compartment; additionally, paragraph (a) of the rule requires that portable fire extingui shers be located such that they are readil y available for use in the cargo compartment. In fact, the FAA previously has required that, for compliance with AD 89

- 18

- 12 R1 [Amendment 39

- 6557 (55 FR 11163, March 27, 1990)], a portion of the extinguishers mus t be located outside of the cargo compartment for ready access. T he FAA will continue to require that a number of the extinguishers be located in the passenger compartment, unless adequate data can be submitted to support a different location. Severa l commenters note, and agree with, the FAA's previous acceptance of certain existing smoke detection sy stems in meeting the intent of the "one

- minute detection" requirement of the rule. ( The intent of this requirement was explained in detail in the preamb le to the notice.) T he FAA points out, however, that operators should be aware that acceptance of these sy stems for the purposes of this rule does not necessarily c onstitute compliance with FAR 25.858 ("Cargo compartment fire detection sy stems"). Two c ommenters question the differences in wording appearing in the proposed rule concerning the personnel required to perform the preflight inspection. T hese3

commenters point out that paragraph (a)(1) would require that a "flight deck crewmember" perform the inspection, whereas paragraphs (b)(3)(ix) and (b)(4)(xi) would require that a "crewmember" perform the inspection. B ecause of these differences, operators would be required to make two different revisions to the Airplane Fight Manual (AFM). O ne of the co mmenters requests that paragraph (a)(1) be modified to allow a "crewmember," rather than a "flight deck crewmember," to perform the preflight inspection. T he FAA does not concur that a change in the wording of the rule is warranted. At this point, the re quirement of paragraph (a)(1) should have been implemented on existing airplanes by M ay 3 , 1991, in accordance with the existing rule, AD 91

- 10

- 02. A lthough compliance with paragraph (b) is not required for several years after the effective date of this f inal rule, operators have the option to comply

directl y with individual portions of paragraph (b) prior to the compliance date. O perators should recognize that compliance with the paragraph (b)(3)(ix) or (b)(4)(xi) requirement supersedes the paragraph (a) (1) requirement. In addition, the paragraph (b) requirement is considered "relieving," as it allows any crewmember to perform the preflight inspection, whereas paragraph (a) allows onl y a flight deck crewmember to perform the inspection. Another commenter states that the preflight inspection requirements of proposed paragraphs (a)(1), (b)(3)(ix), and (b)(4)(xi) would be more appropriatel y placed in the Normal Procedures section (Section 3) of the AFM, rather than in the Limitations section. This commenter considers that it is inappropriate to put this information in the Limitations section because it does not meet the intent of FAR 25.1583 ("Operating limitations"). T he commenter states that these requirements of the rule also restrict the operators in the development of their operations manuals. T he FAA does not concur. T he preflight inspection is appropriate in the L imitations section of the AFM because it is a flight crew duty , in accordance with FAR 25.1583(d). A lthough paragraphs (b)(3)(ix) and (b)(4)(xi) allow an y crewmember to perform the inspection, the pilot remains the individual responsible for safe operation of the airplane in accordance with FAR 91.3 ("Responsibility

and authority

of the pilot in command") and, therefore, is responsible f or ensuring that the preflight inspection is properly conducted. S pecific reminders to this effect are included in the final rule as Notes 1, 2, and 3. Another commenter requests that proposed paragraphs (a)(1), (b)(3)(ix), and (b)(4)(xi) be revised to allow insertion of a cop y of the AD into the AFM as an option to revising the AFM to reflect the preflight inspection requirement. T he FAA does not concur. C ompliance with paragraph (b) of the rule requires additional modifications to the flight manual, depending upon the option selected. T he necessary revisions to the flight manual to accommodate the new equipment and procedures could not be adequatel y communicated b y inserting a cop y of the AD in the AFM. One commenter requests that proposed paragra ph (a)(2)(iv) be revised to delete the requirement for two

- sided access to loaded pallets or containers. Another commenter requests that the placard that would be required b y the same paragraph be revised to consider "the top and one side" of a loaded pal let/container as equivalent to "two

- sided access" for airplanes such as the Boeing Model 727 and Model 737. T he FAA does not concur with the request to delete the requirement. T he FAA considers two
- sided access to be an important requirement to ensure th at adequate access is available for the remote instance when manual firefighting is required. T he FAA does consider that the top and4

one side of a loaded pallet/container could be acceptable as two

- sided access in certain cases, based on size of the airpl ane, nature of the airline operation, and incorporated fire protection features; however, the FAA does not concur that such a provision should apply universally

t o all airplanes. Insertion of such a provision in the rule is impractical. In the past, the FAA has allowed the top and one side of palleted cargo and containers to be considered two
- sided access as an alternative method of compliance with AD 89

- 18

- 12 R1. The FAA will continue to recognize that acceptable alternative methods of compliance that a llow such a provision could be acceptable on a case

- by

- case basis; operators may appl y for the use of such methods under the provisions of paragraph (d) of the final rule. Several commenters request that the proposed 30

- month compliance period for the requirements of paragraph (b) be extended. T he commenters indicate that modification kits for the Boeing Model 747

- 100, 747

- 200 and 747

- 300 series airplanes will not be available from the manufacturer until August 1993, at which time the kits will be pro duced at a rate of onl y three per month. L ikewise, modification kits for the Boeing Model 747

- 400 series airplanes will not be available until August 1994. In light of this schedule, the commenters request that the compliance period be extended to allow 5 years after kit availability

for airlines to schedule modification of their airplanes; this would amount to a 3

- to 4

- ye ar extension beyond the proposed 30

- month compliance period. O ne commenter also requests more flexibility in the schedule for modific ation implementation on Boeing Model 747

- 400 series airplanes because of related improvements that have already been implemented on these airplanes. Upon review of this new data provided by the commenters, the FAA concurs that additional time can be provi ded for compliance. The proposed 30

- month compliance period was based on initial estimates of the time required to design, produce, and install modifications on Boeing Model 747 series Combi airplanes, for which the required modifications were considered to be the most extensive. Based on the production schedule for the modification kit for these as well as other airplanes, the FAA now considers that the proposed 30

- month compliance period is insufficient. T he FAA does not concur, however, with the reque st for the extensive delays suggested by

the commenters. T he FAA has determined that an additional 12 months will provide sufficient time for compliance without adversel y affecting safety. T he final rule has been revised to reflect this. Several commenters state that the option of covering all cargo, in accordance with proposed paragraph (b)(3), is not practical. O ne commenter states that certain noncombustible items, such as animals, vehicles, and steel for oil rigs, are not fire hazards and should not be required to be covered. O ne commenter suggests that the rule require that only material meeting certain hazardous material criteria be required to be covered. The FAA concurs that some noncombustible cargo may not need to be covered, provided that it is not packed in or covered with combustible packing materials. H owever, these situations must be considered on a case

- by

- case basis. Under the provisions of paragraph (d) of the final rule, operators can request to use an alternative method of comp liance with paragraph (b)(3) when certain cargo typ es are carried. One commenter states that the ty pes of covers that would be required by proposed paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) are hard to find. T his commenter requests that the rule be delayed until an ade quate number of covers are developed and manufactured. T he FAA does not concur that delay

of the rule is warranted. T he FAA recognizes that FAA

- approved cargo5

covers are not readil y available at this time. H owever, the compliance time for the relevant p ortion of the final rule provides adequate time to develop and manufacture covers or containers that comply with this requirement. One commenter recommends that aural and visual warnings that would be required by proposed paragraph (b)(3) be limited to the flight deck in order to prevent unnecessary alarm to the passengers, particularl y in the case of false alarms. T he FAA disagrees. Although the FAA acknowledges that warning signals may alarm passengers, the FAA considers that the warning signal in the passenger compartment is necessary in order to alert the flight attendants so that procedures for responding to alarms can be initiated. Several commenters disagree with the quantities of PBE that would be required b y proposed paragraphs (b)(3) (viii)(B) and (b)(4)(x)(B). S everal commenters submitted data that would support specific reductions in the PBE requirement. T he FAA agrees that, in certain cases, this quantity could be reduced without adversel y impacting safety. T he quantity of PBE as proposed was based on a 120

- minute diversion scenario; the proposed amount was considered to be warranted in order to allow sufficient PBE for one person to monitor the fire continuously throughout the diversion, and an additional 30 minutes of PBE for a second person. T he FAA does not consider that it is necessary to revise the specific requirements in paragraphs (b)(3)(viii)(B) and (b)(4)(x)(B), however. T he FAA may consider accepting requests for the use of reduced quantities of PBE in certain operati ons, based on the fire protection features provided and maximum diversion times expected. Under the provisions of paragraph (d) of the final rule, operators may request such reductions through applications for alternative methods of compliance. Sever al commenters request the rule be revised to reduce the required quantity of halon extinguishant, water extinguishers, and protective garments. In particular, one commenter recommends that proposed paragraph (b)(3) of the rule specifically not require wat er extinguishers. T his commenter notes that it would be unrealistic to require water to be applied directly

to the burning material, especially since the cargo would be under a cover or in a container. T he commenter further notes that water runoff could also damage the electrical sy stems in the cargo compartment. T he FAA concurs that the number of halon and water extinguishers could be reduced on a case

- by

- case basis, depending on the method of compliance selected and individual airline operational consi derations. Operators who can adequately justify such reductions may

request such relief through alternative methods of compliance, in accordance with paragraph (d) of the rule. T he FAA does not concur, however, with a reduction in the requirement for two sets of protective garments. T he FAA considers that this number of protective garments is essential in the event that manual intervention becomes necessary and a second person is required to assist in firefighting duties. One commenter requests that the rule be revised to provide relief from some of the requirements of paragraph (b)(3), including the illumination, smoke barrier, crew training, and flight test requirements. T he FAA cannot concur since this commenter provided no data to substantiate the request. Under the provisions of paragraph (d) of the final rule, any operator who requires "relief" of any type from the requirements of this rule has the opportunity

to appl y for the use of an alternative method, provided that adequate supporting dat a to justify such a request is submitted with the application. One commenter points out that proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) should be6

corrected to read ".05 foot candle," rather than "5 foot candles." T he FAA concurs. T he same error occurred in paragraph (b)(4)(vi)(B). T he final rule has been corrected to reflect this. Two commenters request clarification of proposed paragraph (b)(4)(v), which would require operators to demonstrate that critical sy stems in the cargo compartment are adequatel y prote cted from fire. T hese commenters point out that, in the preamble to the notice, the FAA stated that it had originall y intended to allow crewmembers first to confirm the presence of fire on alarm b y looking into, and possibly entering, the cargo compartment prior to release of the halon. ( This procedure was considered primarily in recognition of the fact that the likelihood of a false alarm is considerably h igher than that of a real fire.) B ecause this act of "manually" confirming the fire would delay rel ease of the halon, the proposed rule would require that operators demonstrate that critical systems in the cargo compartment would not be compromised in that period of time prior to halon release and effectiveness. H owever, the FAA also indicated that aut omatic release of halon on alarm, without manual confirmation, might be required to compensate for this if adequate protection could not be demonstrated. R egardless of the procedure for halon release (automatic discharge or confirmation), adequate protection of critical sy stems in the cargo compartment must be validated. In view of this, one commenter requests that the automatic release of halon procedure not be permitted, since false alarms often occur when carrying cargo such as animals, vegetables, and flowers. In response to this commenter's concern, the FAA recognizes that the likelihood of a false alarm is much greater than that of a real fire. T he FAA considers that automatic halon release would be required only if adequate protection could not be demonstrated to ensure timely release of halon before damage to critical sy stems occurs. I f adequate protection of these sy stems is demonstrated, automatic release would not be required. Along this same line, another commenter questions whether the FAA would consider an acceptable "automatic" halon release procedure to be "the release of halon immediately

b y c rew procedure upon smoke detection indication and confirmation." T he FAA responds to this commenter by indicating that it currentl y does not consi der manual release of halon on alarm to constitute "automatic" release. H owever, if adequate supporting data were submitted to the FAA to demonstrate that manual release of halon by crew procedure would not cause a delay i n halon discharge and would not r esult in damage to critical sy stems, the FAA would be willing to consider it as an alternative method of compliance with the relative portion of the rule. O perators interested in using such an alternative method should review the provisions of paragraph ( d) of the final rule. One commenter requests that the rule be revised to provide an additional option that would allow the halon protection sy stem to be reduced to 60 minutes, provided that the maximum diversion was alway s within 90 minutes. P roposed paragraph (b)(4) offers operators an option to install only a 90

- minute halon protection sy stem. T he FAA does not concur. T he 90

- minute halon sy stem, along with the associated required design and operational changes, was intended to provide protection for diversions up to 120 minutes. In developing the rule, the FAA surveyed Combi operators worldwide; based on data received from this survey, the FAA determined that only 10% of Combi flight time would be beyond 90 minutes of a suitable landing in the event of a fire. T herefore, a 90

- minute7

halon sy stem would provide full halon coverage through the diversion in most cases. Conversel y, almost 30% of Combi flight time would be beyond 60 minutes of a suitable landing, leading to a much higher probability that diversions will not have full halon coverage. T he commenter submitted no specific operational data to support the reduction in halon proposed. H owever, under the provisions of paragraph (d) of the final rule, operators may

request the use of an alternati ve method of compliance with the rule, provided that data submitted adequately supports the request. Several other commenters recommend that an additional option be provided in the rule to allow for the installation of a 60

- minute halon sy stem, provided that the crew is trained in accordance with the firefighter requirements specified b y the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA). T he FAA does not concur. A s previously stated, a survey

of current Combi operations has shown that almost 30% of Combi flight time would be more than 60 minutes from a suitable landing. T he FAA has previously determined that manual firefighting is ineffective and should onl y be attempted as a last resort; therefore, additional training to fight fires would not sufficiently offset the reduced safety of a 60

- minute halon sy stem. One commenter requests that the rule be revised to delete the special illumination criteria specified in proposed paragraph (b)(4)(vi). T he FAA disagrees. Acertain level of lighting is required for co nfirming the presence of a fire in the cargo compartment, and for monitoring the compartment after an alarm. S ome existing lighting s ystems may be adequate to meet the intent of the requirement. O perators interested in using existing lighting may

request approval of the use of an alternative method of compliance with the rule, in accordance with paragraph (d) of the final rule. One commenter requested relief from the illumination requirement of proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iv) for narrow - body airplanes. Because of the configuration of the cargo compartment on narrow
- body airplanes, the onl y pathway in the compartment is fore and aft along the left sidewall of the compartment; in all configurations, this pathway is "defined" b y the cargo and containers. The commenter states that, even with reduced visibility , a crewmember monitoring the compartment could easil y navigate by touch. Further, additional illumination is provided during daylight hours from windows with raised shades. T he FAA does not concur with the commenter's request. T he FAA has determined that a certain level of lighting is required for adequatel y monitoring the cargo compartment. T he FAA does acknowledge, however, that some existing lighting on certain airplane configurations may b e ac ceptable to meet the intent of the rule. O perators who consider that the current configuration of their airplanes meet this intent, may suppl y substantiating data to the FAA through the alternative method of compliance provisions of paragraph (d) of the f

inal rule. One commenter points out that paragraph (b)(4)(ii) should reference Amendment "25

- 54," rather than Amendment "25

- 4." T he FAA acknowledges this publication error. The final rule has been revised to reflect the correct amendment number. In addition, another publication error was identified in paragraph (b)(4)(x)(B). T he Technical Standard Order (TSO) referenced in that paragraph should be TSO "C

- 116," rather than "C

- 16." T he final rule has been corrected to reflect this. After car eful review of the available data, including the comments noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule8

with the changes previously described. T he FAA has determined that these changes will ne ither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD. Cost Impact There are approximately

278 Boeing Models 707, 727, 737, 747, and 757 series airplanes and 124 McDonnell Douglas Model DC

- 8, DC

- 9, and DC

- 10 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. It is estimated that approximately 80 Boeing Model 707, 727, 737, 747, and 757 series airplanes, and 79 McDonnell Douglas Model DC

- 8, DC

- 9, and DC

- 10 series airplanes, of U.S. registry have been certificated to operate with a Class B main deck cargo compartment. M any of these airplanes are operated permanentl y i n the all

- passenger configuration and, therefore, are not affected by this rule. Approximately

40 of these airplanes are currentl y operated b y U. S. operators in the mixed cargo/passenger configuration and are affected b y this amendment. The design alternative selected b y the operator and the ty pe of airplane will have a significant impact on the cost of complying with this AD. T he highest cost o ption is expected to be the conversion to a Class C compartment, as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of this proposal. Aconservative cost estimate for incorporating the extended halon option into Boeing Model 747 airplanes, based upon costs of required materi als, labor, and testing, is $2,000,000 per airplane. Aconservative estimate for incorporating the blanket/container option on Boeing Model 747 airplanes, based upon the costs of required materials, labor, and testing, is $200,000. The FAA is not aware o f any U.S. Model 747 Combi operators. M ost U.S.

- registered Combis are Boeing Models 727 and 737 airplanes operated in Alaska. The FAA previousl y has granted these operators alternative methods of compliance with AD 89

- 18

- 12 R1. T hese alternative methods of compliance are acceptable to meet the intent of this amendment as well. Therefore, this AD should incur no additional cost on U.S operators. Regulatory

Impact The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. T h erefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this actio n (1) is not a "major rule" under Executive Order 12291; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substant ial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility

Act. Afinal evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. Acop y of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption "ADDRESSES." List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety9

ADOPTION OF THE AMENDMENT Accordingly , pursuant to the authority delegated to me by

the Administrator, the Federal Aviation A dministration amends 14 CFR part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations as follows: PART 39

- AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. T he authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: Authority : 4 9 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106( g); and 14 CFR 11.89. Section 39.13

- [AMENDED] 2. S ection 39.13 is amended b y removing Amendment 39

- 6986 (56 FR 20529, May 6, 1991) and by

a dding a new airworthiness directive (AD), amendment 39

- 8547, to read as follows: 93

- 07

- 15 BOEING AND MCDONNE LL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39

- 8547, Docket No. 92

-NM

- 67

- AD. S upersedes AD 91

- 10

- 02, Amendment 39

- 6986. Applicability : B oeing Models 707, 727, 737, 747, and 757 series airplanes and McDonnell Douglas Models DC

- 8, DC

- 9, and DC

- 10 series airplanes; equipped with a main deck Class B cargo compartment, as defined by Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 25.857(b) or its predecessors, with a volume exceeding 200 cubic feet; certificated in any category
. Compliance: R equired as indicated, unless accomplished pre viously

. To minimize the hazard associated with a main deck Class B cargo compartment fire, accomplish the following: (a) W ithin one year after May 3 , 1990 (the effective date of Amendment 39

- 6557, AD 89

- 18

- 12 R1), or prior to carrying cargo in a Clas s B cargo compartment, whichever occurs later, accomplish the following in accordance with the appropriate technical data approved b y the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (for affected Boeing series airplanes), FAA, Transport Airplane Directo rate; or the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (for affected McDonnell Douglas series airplanes), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate: (1) R evise the L imitations Section of the FAA

- approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following:

"FOR EACH FLIGHT IN WHI CH CARGO IS TRANSPORTED I N THE CLASS B CARGO COMPARTMENT:

Prior to flight, a flight deck crewmember must make a visual inspection throughout the Class B cargo compartment to verify access to cargo and the general fire security of the compartment after the cargo door is closed and secured." NOTE 1 : T his visual inspection is in no manner intended to relieve the pilot of his/her responsibility

to ensure safe operation of the airplane, as required b y FAR 91.3. (2) Inc orporate the following s ys tems and equipment: (i) P rovide a minimum of 48 lbs. Halon 1211 fire extinguishant, or its equivalent, in portable fire extinguisher bottles readil y available for use in the cargo compartment. At least two bottles must be a min imum of 16 lb. capacity

. (ii) P rovide at least two Underwriters Laboratories (UL)2A (2

- 1/2 gallon) rated water portable fire extinguishers, or its equivalent, adjacent to the cargo compartment entrance for use in the compartment. (iii) P rovide a me ans for two
- way communication between the flight deck and the10

interior of the cargo compartment. (iv) Install placards in conspicuous place(s) within the cargo compartment clearl y defining the cargo loading envelope and limitations that provide sufficient access of sufficient width for firefighting along the entire length of at least two sides of a loaded pallet or container. Amend the appropriate Weight and Balance and loading instructions by description and diagrams to include this information. (3) Incorporate the following s ys tems and equipment: (i) P rovide appropriate protective garments stored adjacent to the cargo compartment entrance. (ii) P rovide a minimum of 30 minutes of protective breathing. T his equipment must meet the requirements of Technical Standard Order (TSO) C

- 116, Action Notice 8150.2A, or equivalent, and be stored adjacent to the cargo compartment entrance. (b) W ithi n 42 months after the effective date of this AD, or prior to carryi ng cargo in a Class B cargo compartment, whichever occurs later, accomplish the requirements of either paragraph (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), or (b)(4) of this AD: (1) OPTION 1 : M odify the Cl ass B cargo compartment to comply with the requirements for a Class C cargo compartment, as defined in FAR 25.855 (Amdt. 25

- 60), 25.857(c), and 25.858 (Amdt. 25

- 54). (2) OPTION 2 : M odify a ll main deck Class B cargo compartments to require the following placard installed in conspicuous locations approved b y the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate (for affected Boeing series airplanes), or the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate (for affected McDonnell Douglas series airplanes), throughout the compartment: "Cargo carried in this compartment must be loaded in an approved flame penetration

- resistant container meeting the requirements of FAR 25.857(c) with ceili ng and sidewall liners and floor panels that meet the requirements of FAR 25, Appendix F, Part III, (Amdt. 25

- 60)." (3) OPTION 3 : In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2) of this AD, accomplish the following in accordance with technical data approved b y the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (for affected Boeing series airplanes), or the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (for affected McDonnell Douglas series airplanes): (i) C arriage of all cargo in Class B cargo compartments must meet the requirements of either paragraph (b)(3)(i)(A) or (b)(3)(i)(B) of this AD: (A) C over cargo with fire containment covers. (B) C arry cargo in fire containment containers. (ii) P rovide a smoke or fire detection sy stem in the Class B cargo compartment that meets the requirements of FAR 25.858 (Amdt. 25

- 54) and also provides an aural and visual warning to the crewmembers in the passenger compartment. (iii) P rovide a barrier between the Class B cargo compartment and the pass enger compartment to prevent the penetration of smoke or flames from the cargo compartment into the passenger compartment. T he barrier must extend from the cargo compartment floor to the upper crown area of the fuselage, and from the right sidewall to the left sidewall of the cargo compartment, completely isolating the cargo compartment from the passenger11

compartment. T he barrier and associated seals/interfaces must meet the requirements of FAR 25, Appendix F, Part III (Amdt. 25

- 60). (iv) P rovide illum ination of the Class B cargo compartment as specified in paragraphs (b)(3)(iv)(A) and (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this AD: (A) G eneral area illumination of the cargo with an average illumination of 0.1 foot

- candle measured at 40

- inch intervals both at one

- half the pallet or container height, and at the full pallet or container height, or as approved b y the FAA. (B) I llumination of the longitudinal access pathway s, required by paragraph (a)(2)(iv) of this AD, with an average illumination of .05 foot

- candle when m easured at 40

- inch intervals along a line that is within 2 inches of and parallel to the floor centered on the pathway , or illumination under visibility conditions likely

to occur in the cargo compartment in the event of a fire. (v) E stablish FAA

- approve d procedures and training as specified in paragraphs (b)(3)(v)(A) and (b)(3)(v)(B) of this AD: (A) U se and maintenance of items required by paragraph (b)(3)(i). (B) R esponding to alarms, and monitoring and controlling Class B cargo compartment fires. (vi) P rovide a viewport into the Class B cargo compartment from the passenger compartment. T he viewport must be located such that a crewmember can readily identif y the overall smoke conditions in the compartment prior to entering it. (vii) D emonstrate the following features and functions, specified in paragraphs (b)(3)(vii)(A), (b)(3)(vii)(B), and (b)(3)(vii)(C) of this AD: (A) S moke or Fire Detection System, required by paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this AD, by flight test. (B) P revention of smoke pen etration into occupied compartments [refer to FAR 25.857(b)(2) and 25.855(e)(2)], b y flight test. (C) C argo accessibility , as specified in paragraph (a)(2)(iv) of this AD. (viii) P rovide the following s ys tems and equipment: (A) P rovide appropriate protective garments for two persons stored in the passenger compartment, adjacent to the Class B cargo compartment entrance. (B) P rovide a minimum of 120 minutes of protective breathing for one person, and an additional 30 minutes of protective breathing f or an additional person. T his equipment must meet the requirements of Technical Standard Order (TSO) C

- 116, Action Notice 8150.2A, or equivalent, and at least 30 minutes of the total protective breathing must be stored adjacent to the Class B cargo compar tment entrance. A ll protective breathing equipment must be located outside the cargo compartment. (ix) R evise the Limitations Section of the FAA

- approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following: "FOR EACH FLIGHT IN WHICH CARGO IS TRANSPORTED I N THE C LASS B CARGO COMPARTMENT: Prior to flight, a crewmember who is assigned firefighting responsibility for the flight must make a visual inspection throughout the Class B cargo compartment for familiarization, after the cargo door is clos ed and secured." NOTE 2 : T his visual inspection is in no manner intended to relieve the pilot of his/her responsibility

to ensure safe operation of the airplane, as required b y FAR 91.3.12 (4) OPTION 4 : In addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) (2) of this AD, accomplish the following in accordance with technical data approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (for affected Boeing series airplanes), or the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (for affected McDonn ell Douglas series airplanes): (i) P rovide a cargo compartment fire extinguishing s ys tem in the Class B cargo compartment that provides an initial fire extinguishant concentration of at least 5 percent of the empty compartment volume of Halon 1301 or equ ivalent, and a fire suppression extinguishant concentration of at least 3 percent of the empty compartment volume of Halon 1301 or equivalent, for a period of time not less than 90 minutes. (ii) P rovide a smoke or fire detection sy stem in the Class B car go compartment that meets the requirements of FAR 25.858 (Amdt. 25

- 54) and also provides an aural and visual warning to the crewmembers in the passenger compartment. (iii) P rovide a means from the flight deck to shut off ventilation sy stem inflow to the Class B cargo compartment. (iv) P rovide a barrier between the Class B cargo compartment and the passenger compartment to prevent the penetration of smoke or flames from the cargo compartment into the passenger compartment. T he barrier must extend from the cargo compartment floor to the upper crown area of the fuselage, and from the right sidewall to the left sidewall of the cargo compartment, completely isolating the cargo compartment from the passenger compartment. T he barrier and associated seals/inte rfaces must meet the requirements of FAR 25, Appendix F, Part III (Amdt. 25

- 60). (v) P rovide appropriate protection of the cockpit voice and flight data recorders, and all systems or components required for safe flight and landing of the airplane, unless it can be demonstrated that these s ys tems are not susceptible to damage in the event of a fire in the Class B cargo compartment. (vi) P rovide illumination of the Class B cargo compartment as specified in paragraphs (b)(4)(vi)(A) and (b)(4)(vi)(B) of thi s AD: (A) G eneral area illumination of the cargo with an average illumination of 0.1 foot

- candle measured at 40

- inch intervals both at one

- half the pallet or container height, and at the full pallet or container height, or as approved b y the FAA. (B) I llumination of the longitudinal access pathway s, required by paragraph (a)(2)(iv) of this AD, with an average illumination of .05 foot

- candle when measured at 40

- inch intervals along a line that is within 2 inches of and parallel to the floor centered on the pathway , or illumination under visibility conditions likely

to occur in the cargo compartment in the event of a fire, as approved b y the FAA. (vii) E stablish FAA

- approved procedures and training for responding to alarms, and monitoring and control ling cargo compartment fires. (viii) P rovide a viewport into the Class B cargo compartment from the passenger compartment. T he viewport must be located such that a crewmember can readily identif y the overall smoke conditions in the compartment prior to entering it. (ix) D emonstrate the following features and functions: (A) F ire extinguishant concentration, required b y paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this AD, by flight test. (B) S moke or fire detection system, required by paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of this AD,13

by flight test. (C) P revention of smoke penetration into occupied compartments [refer to FAR 25.857(b)2 and 25.855(e)2], demonstrated by flight test. (D) C argo accessibility , as specified in paragraph (a)(2)(iv) of this AD. (x) P rovide the following s y stems and equipment: (A) P rovide appropriate protective garments for two persons stored in the passenger compartment, adjacent to the Class B cargo compartment entrance. (B) P rovide a minimum of 120 minutes of protective breathing for one person, and an additional 30 minutes of protective breathing for an additional person. T his equipment must meet the requirements of Technical Standard Order (TSO) C

- 116, Action Notice 8150.2A, or equivalent, and at least 30 minutes of the total protective breathing mu st be stored adjacent to the Class B cargo compartment entrance. A ll protective breathing equipment must be located outside the cargo compartment. (xi) R evise the Limitations Section of the FAA

- approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the foll owing statement: "FOR EACH FLIGHT IN WHICH CARGO IS TRANSPORTED IN THE CLASS B CARGO COMPARTMENT: Prior to flight, a crewmember who is assigned firefighting responsibility for the flight must make a visual inspection throughout the Class B cargo compartm ent for familiarization, after the cargo door is closed and secured." NOTE 3 : T his visual inspection is in no manner intended to relieve the pilot of his/her responsibility

to ensure safe operation of the airplane, as required b y FAR 91.3. (c) C ompliance with paragraph (b)(1) or (b)(2) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD. C ompliance with paragraph (b)(3) or (b)(4) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3) of this AD. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety m ay b e used if approved by

the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate (for affected Boeing series airplanes); or the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate (for affected McDonnell Douglas series airplanes). O perators shall submit their requests through an ap propriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, of the Seattle ACO, or the Manager of the Los Angeles ACO, as appropriate. NOTE 4 : Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods o f compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO or the Los Angeles ACO. NOTE 5 : A lternative methods of compliance previously granted for Amendment 39

- 6557, AD 89

- 18

- 12 R1; or Amendment 39

- 6986, AD 91

- 10

- 02; continue to be considered as acceptable alternative methods of compliance with this amendment. (e) S pecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (f) T his amendment becomes effective on May 2, 1993. Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 14, 1993.14

Original Signed By : Darrell M. Pederson, Acting Manager Transport Airplane Directorate Aircraft Certification Service

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**DATE** : M arch 24, 1993 **SUBJECT** : M cDonnell Douglas and Boeing models; Final Rule after NPRM; Docket 92

-NM

- 67

- AD **PROJECT ENGINEER/TECH WRITER** : Sue L etcher, ANM

- 130S; Jill DeMarco, ANM

- 103 **BACKGROUND** : O n April 19, 1991, the FAA issued AD 90

- 10

- 02 to require (1) modification of all Class B cargo compartments to Class C, or (2) the use of flame penetration

- resistant cargo containers equipped with smoke detection and fire extinguishing sy stems, or (3) the use of individuals trained to fight cargo fires and certain modifications to Class B cargo compartments and associated s ys tems. T hat action was prompted by an FAA evaluation following the loss of a Boeing Model 747

- 200 "Combi" airplane that developed a major fire in the main deck cargo compartment. T hat AD contained a provision for submission of additional comments from the public concerning the firefighting concepts and training guidelines, and for the re - evaluation some of the more extensive required modifications. **UNSAFE CONDITION** : A irplanes with Class B main deck cargo compartments do not have adequate smoke/fire detection and protection features to prevent the occurrence of an uncontrolled cargo fire that could cause sy stems and structural damag e, leading to loss of an airplane. **ACTION** : O n July

21, 1992, the FAA issued an NPRM proposing to supersede the AD 90

- 10

- 02 to include additional optional actions and to delete other previously required actions. The new proposed requirements include: (1 ) use of an extended halon s ys tem; (2) an increase in protective breathing/garment quantities; (3) change in illumination criteria; (4) use of blankets/containers; and (5) one

- minute smoke detection. T his deleted requirements include: (1) use of trained firefighters, (2) installation of a thermal monitoring s ys tems, and (3) installation of extensive liners. Most comments received were requests for clarification of certain wording in the rule, and requests for consideration of unique airplane configurations (which the FAA will handle through the "alternative methods of compliance" provision of the final rule). The only substantive change was an extension of the compliance time for the (new) requirements of the rule. T he proposed compliance time of 30 mo nths was based on initial estimates for designing, producing, and installing modifications on the affected airplanes. H owever, based on the production schedule for the new m odification kits for these airplanes, a compliance time of 42 months is more real istic and warranted. of 42 months. **COST IMPACT** : W orldwide fleet: 402; U .S. registered airplanes: 40 * ( * Although 124 U.S.

- registered airplanes are certificated to operate with a Class B main deck cargo compartment, onl y 40 operate as Combis.) The desi gn alternative and airplane ty pe will have significant impact on the cost of complying with this AD. An estimated average cost could range from $2,000,000/airplane for incorporating extended halon option, to $200,000/airplane for incorporation of the blanket/container option. The AD has no additional cost burden on U.S. operators. T he onl y U.S. operators of Combis were previously

granted alternative methods of compliance with the existing AD. **AFFECTED U.S. OPERATORS** : A laska, MarkAir, Continental, NMB, Federal Express,Aloha, Evergreen, Fl yi ng Tigers, Reeve Aleutian, U.S. Air Force

**COORDINATED WITH** : JAA, Transport Canada, ATA, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas **ENFORCEMENT ACTION INVOLVED?** Not applicable. **CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES / MEDIA INTEREST** : T his issue ha s worldwide impact. It has been a "high visibility" topic among world aviation authorities for the past four years.AIR
- 1 _____________ Date

_ ____________ 

### AD **MINISTR ATO**  **R'S AI**  **RWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE AL**  **ER T**  **SUBJECT** : M cDonnell Douglas and Boeing models; Final Rule after NPRM; Docket 92
- NM
- 67
-AD **BACKGROUND** : I n 1987, a South African Airways Boeing Model 747
- 200 "combi" airplane was lost over the Indian Ocean after a fire broke out in its main deck cargo compartment. As a result of this accident, the FAA reviewed its airworthiness standards for all U.S.
- man ufactured combination passenger/cargo ("combi") aircraft, and subsequently proposed changes in airworthiness regulations to require a higher level of fire detection and protection in these aircraft. In April 1991, the FAA issued AD 91
- 10
- 02 to require ( 1) upgrading of all Class B cargo compartments to Class C (which entails enhanced fire/smoke detection and protection features); or (2) the use of flame penetration
- resistant cargo containers equipped with smoke detection and fire extinguishing systems; or (3) certain modifications to Class B cargo compartments and associated systems and the use of individuals trained to fight cargo fires. A D 91
- 10
- 02 contained a provision for submission of additional comments from the public concerning the firefighting co ncepts and training guidelines, and for the re
- evaluation some of the more extensive required modifications. **UNSAFE CONDITION** : A irplanes with Class B main deck cargo compartments do not have adequate smoke/fire detection and protection features to preve nt the occurrence of an uncontrolled cargo fire that could cause systems and structural damage, leading to loss of an airplane. **ACTION** : O n July 21, 1992, the FAA issued an NPRM proposing to supersede the AD 90
- 10
- 02 to include additional optional action s and to delete other previously required actions. T he new proposed requirements include: (1) use of an extended halon system; (2) an increase in protective breathing/garment quantities; (3) change in illumination criteria; (4) use of blankets/containers; and (5) one
- minute smoke detection. T he deleted requirements include: ( 1) use of trained firefighters, (2) installation of a thermal monitorin g systems, and (3) installation of extensive liners. Most comments received were requests for clarification of certain wording in the rule, and requests for consideration of unique airplane configurations (which the FAA will handle through the "alternative methods of compliance" provision of the final rule). T he only substantive change was an extension of the compliance time for the (new) requirements of the rule from the proposed 30 months to 42 months, based on problems involving availability of an ample number of modification kits. This AD action has been coordinated extensively with all foreign aviation au thorities; its intent has worldwide acceptance. **COST IMPACT** : W orldwide fleet: 402; U .S. registered airplanes: 40 * ( *Although 124 U.S.
- registered airplanes are certificated to operate with a Class B main deck cargo compartment, only 40 operate as combis. ) The AD has no additional cost burden on U.S. operators. T he only U.S. operators of combis operate in Alaska, and were previo usly granted alternative methods of compliance with the existing AD; those alternative methods continue to be acceptable for t his AD. **AFFECTED U.S. AIRLINES** : A laska, MarkAir, Continental, NMB, Federal Express, Aloha, Evergreen, Flying Tigers, Reeve Aleutian, U.S. Air Force **NEWS VALUE/MEDIA INTEREST** :
THIS AD WILL BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER WITHIN 7 WORKING DAYS.
cc: S
- 1, A
- 1, ADA
- 1, AOA
- 2, AXO
- 1, AVR
- 1, APA
- 1 (2), AGC
- 210, AGC
- 1, AFS
- 300, ANM
- 1

## U.S. DEP **AR TMENT OF TRA**  **NSPORT AT**  **ION**

**Federal Avi**  **ation A dministration**  

## TRA **NSPORT A IRPL**  **AN E DIRECTORA** **TE AI**  **RCRA FT CERTIFICA**  **TION SERVICE,**  **AN M**  **- 100** 

**═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═** 

**═ To:**  **AI R**  **- 107**  **Attn: LINDA**  **WA LKER**  **Phone: (**  **202) 267 -**  **9592**

**═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═** 

**═ From:**  **R. Jill DeMarco, S upervisory**  **Technical Publications Writer**  **- Editor, A**  **NM -**  **103 Phone:**  **Office: (206) 227 -**  **2125 / Fax: (206) 227 -**  **1100**

**═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═** 

**═ Total Pages (excluding this lead sheet):**  **1 Date of Transmission:**  **Ap ril 6, 1993** 

**═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═** 

**═ Remarks / Delivery Instructions**  **: Here's a new A** **OA -**  **1 A lert for the combi AD.**  **I added a**  **few words about the Al**  **askan operators, under "COST IMPA CT"**  **Call me when all is clear. T**  **hanks!**

**═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **═ ═**  **This message transmitted by the Federal A** 

**viation Ad**  **ministration, Ai**  **rcraft Certification S ervice, 1601 Lind A**  **venue S.W., Renton, Washington 98055**  **- 4056**