alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                         Computation of Per Share Earnings
                                           Fields Aircraft Spares, Inc.
                           Statement Regarding Computation of Earnings (Loss) Per Share



                                                                                           Three Months Ended
                                                                                           ------------------
                                                                                    April 3,                 March 31,
                                                                                      1998                    1997
                                                                                      ----                    ----
<S>                                                                              <C>                    <C>
Number of common shares outstanding at beginning
of the period                                                                       2,079,571               1,302,137
                                                                                    ---------               ---------

Number of common shares outstanding at end of the
period                                                                              2,290,235               1,312,918
                                                                                    ---------               ---------

Weighted average common share equivalents
outstanding at the end of the period (primary)                                      3,062,461               2,249,589
                                                                                    ---------               ---------

Weighted average common share equivalents
outstanding at end of the period (fully diluted)                                    3,506,323               2,249,589
                                                                                    ---------               ---------

Net income (loss)                                                                   $ 110,000             $ (654,000)
                                                                                    ---------             -----------

Net income adjusted for interest not to be included in
computing fully-diluted earnings                                                    $ 198,000             $         -
                                                                                    ---------             -----------

Primary earnings (loss) per share                                                   $     .04             $      (.29)
                                                                                    ---------             -----------

Fully-diluted earnings (loss) per share                                             $     .06             $      (.29)
                                                                                    ---------             -----------
</TABLE>
#### MEEDS vs. CARVER.

The'plea of not guilty to an action of trespass on the person, merely denies that he committed any trespass at all.

If, in such an action, the defendant hath matter of justiScation, he cannot give it in evidence undor the general issue, but must plead it specially.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Pasquotank County, at the Spring Term 1847, his Honor Judge Caldwell, presiding.

The action is trespass and false imprisonment, and the plea not guilty. On the trial the defendant showed, that he was Sheriff of Pasquotank, and he offered in evidence a precept from a Justice of the Peace, which is set forth in the exception, and was directed to any lawful officer, and delivered to one of his deputies, who arrested the plaintiff thereon, and committed him to jail. The defendant insisted that the precept was a *capias ad satisfacien-dum,*and authorised the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff; whereas the plaintiff contended that it was void, and did not justify the officer. His Honor was of opinion that the process, though not strictly formal, was valid and justifled the defendant; and therefore directed *274the jury to find for him. There was accordingly a verdict for the defendant, and from the judgment the plaintiff appealed.

*Badger,*for the plaintiff.

*A. Moore,*for the defendant.

Ruffin, C. J.

We are obliged to reverse the judgment, without reference to the question, whether the process be valid as a *ca. sa.*so as to authorise the arrest; because, upon the pleadings in this case, it was not competent to the defendant, to set up that defence. In actions for trespass on the person, not guilty, says Lord Coke, is a a good issue, if the defendant committed no trespass at all; but, by the common law, if he hath cause of justification or excuse, then can he not plead, not guilty, for then upon the evidence it shall be found against him, and upon that issue he cannot justify it, but he must plead the special matter, and confess and justify the battery. *Co. Lit. 283,*and we have no Statute allowing an officer to give the special matter in evidence on the general issue. It is most probable his Honor’s attention was not called to the fact, that, not guilty, was the only plea, as both parties seem to have put the case upon the sufficiency of the process, as a *ca. sa.;*but as the error is apparent in the record, and is insisted on here, this Court must necessarily reverse the judgment and order a *venire de*novo„

Per Curiam. Judgment reversed and *venire de nova*ordered.
<PAGE>
 
                             AMENDMENT NO. 4 TO THE
                 MAY & SPEH, INC. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN


     The May & Speh, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (the "Plan"), as
established and originally effective October 1, 1988, is hereby amended as
follows:

                                       I.

     The third sentence of the third paragraph of Plan Section 7.4(a) is hereby
deleted effective October 1, 1996.

                                      II.

     The second sentence of Plan Section 7.6(c) is hereby amended to read as
     follows:

     Except as provided in Section 7.6(b) regarding the purchase of Company
     Stock using a Participant's Other Investments Account, a Participant's
     Account shall be valued for distribution as of the Anniversary Date
     coincident with or next preceding the distribution date.

                                      III.

     Except as provided herein, the Plan shall remain in full force and effect.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned duly authorized officer of May & Speh,
Inc. has caused the foregoing Amendment No. 4 to the Plan to be executed this
5th day of March, 1997.

                                   May & Speh, Inc.



                                   By:   /s/ Willard E. Engel, Jr.
                                         Willard E. Engel, Jr.
                                         Treasurer/Chief Accounting Officer
#### Arthur LEVINE, Appellant, v. Emily Kathryn LACY, Appellee.

No. 9792.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued April 5, 1965.

Decided April 15, 1965.

*696John A. Beck, Washington, D. C. (A. Andrew Giangreco, Alexandria, Va., on brief), for appellant.

J. Frederick Larrick, Winchester, Va. (Marshall A. Martin, Jr., Herndon, Va., and Wilbur C. Hall, Leesburg, Va., on brief), for appellee.

Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge, and STANLEY, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking to permanently enjoin the enforcement of a state court judgment. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The District Court dismissed the complaint, with leave to amend, on the ground that the amount in controversy did not exceed, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of $10,-000.00.

Thereafter, appellant filed an amended complaint asserting the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as an additional ground for jurisdiction for the reason that the entry of the state court judgment “deprived him of the rights of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws secured to him by the Constitution of the United States.” Upon motion of the appellee, the amended complaint was dismissed on the ground that the appellant had “not asserted the deprivation of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the federal Constitution entitling him to a retrial * * * of the issues determined by the State courts, or any equitable grounds justifying the entry of an order permanently enjoining the collection of the default judgment obtained against him in the Circuit Court of Lou-doun County, Virginia.” We affirm the order of the District Court.

Prior to the institution of the action in the District Court, appellant had sought, without success, to have the judgment set aside in the Circuit Court of Loudoun County, Virginia. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed, Levine v. Lacy, 204 Va. 297, 130 S.E.2d 443 (1963), and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, Levine v. Lacy, 375 U.S. 932, 84 S.Ct. 330, 11 L.Ed.2d 264 (1963), and a petition for rehearing, 375 U.S. 982, 84 S.Ct. 333, 11 L.Ed.2d 264 (1964).

The historical background of this litigation, and a comprehensive discussion of the state procedural rules and regulations involved, will be found in Levine v. Lacy, 204 Va. 297, 130 S.E.2d 443 (1963). A reading of this decision will reveal that the questions presented to the state court involved only matters dealing with state law and procedure. The same questions were presented to the District Court, where federal jurisdiction was properly declined.

The order of the District Court dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.

Affirmed.
HomeNRC LibraryDocument CollectionsNews Releases1997

# NRC Staff Proposes $16,000 Fine Against U.S. Army

----

----

RIII-97-99

November 18, 1997

**NRC STAFF PROPOSES $16,000 FINE AGAINST U.S. ARMY**

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has proposed a $16,000 fine against the U.S. Army for radiation safety program violations at several military installations in the United States.

The Army is licensed by the NRC to use radioactive material -- tritium, americium-241, and nickel-63 -- at its military installations. The radioactive materials are used in such applications as self-luminous fire control devices (weapons sights), chemical agent detectors, and chemical agent monitors.

The Army's radiation safety program for these devices is managed by the Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Activity located at the Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois.

NRC inspections between December of last year and March identified numerous violations at the Army's Fort Bragg, North arolina; Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Fort Devens, Massachusetts; and Rhode Island National Guard facilities. The violations included failing to: conduct requisite annual inspections, notify the NRC of radiological incidents, perform required tests, adequately secure material in storage, and provide appropriate training.

As a result of these inspection findings, NRC in March issued a confirmatory order documenting the Army's commitments to correct program deficiencies. Many of the apparent violations cited in this enforcement action also were found in NRC inspections conducted in 1992, 1993, and 1995.

"The violations impact nearly every aspect of your radiation protection program," said NRC Regional Administrator A. Bill Beach in notifying the Army of the fine. "The repetitive nature of the violations and your relatively poor past performance demonstrate continued severe programmatic deficiencies and the lack of management oversight."

As a result of NRC's inspections, the Army conducted an audit and restructured its radiation safety program. The Army also improved its procedures and training activities.

The Army has until December 12 to pay the fine or to protest it. If the fine is protested and subsequently imposed by the NRC staff, the Army may request a hearing.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
February 25, 2016

Federal Aviation Administration

AFS-80

Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT: Silent Falcon UAS 333 Exemption. Docket No. FAA-2015-5508

I am in receipt of your letter dated February 8, 2016 that informed me you were unable to process our 333 

exemption any further without us explaining the reasons why granting the request would be in the public 

interest. This letter is to address this question.

I want to break the public interest into various parts and address them individually.

1. Possible Improvements in Airspace Safety. This 333 exemption will be beneficial to furthering 

airspace safety. We have ongoing activity in both developing and evaluating other developed 

technology to address a significant concern with integration of UAS into the National Airspace. 

Specifically we are actively working on Detect, Sense (or See) and Avoid technology that could be 

equipped on small-unmanned aircraft, or larger aircraft if desired. The specific focus area we are 

investigation in DETECT portion of the problem with both small low-cost RADAR and acoustic 

sensors.

2. Safe low-altitude mapping operations. Some of our uses for the Silent Falcon involve mapping, be 

it construction, agriculture, utility corridors, or planning natural resource extraction. By conducting 

these operations at lower altitude than safely performed with manned aviation assets we both enhance 

the value of the imagery and believe we improve safety, as there is no requirement in these situations 

to fly a manned aircraft or helicopter to perform the missions.

3. Employee safety. We desire to support surveyors in this country as we do others today. We have 

operational systems that allow surveyors to avoid having to traverse rugged terrain to conduct their 

analysis of natural resource extraction options. By affordably deriving survey grade map products 

from our aerial sensor data (LiDAR, Optical, Spectral, etc.) we have been able to reduce the time 

surveyor crews are in the field and specifically able to reduce that time where access is limited and 

hazardous.

4. Security. We have sold our systems to foreign military organizations and they are using them to help 

their interests. With the 333 exemption we can more easily develop and evaluate our technology for 

our domestic military. This could add if our defense sees fit to the US security objective. 

We are realizing reason 2 and 3 of these overall public benefits in international markets today. With the 333 

we will extend our business to domestic partners and address the first benefit and further expand domestically

on all the reasons.

If you are seeking further elaboration please notify me again and I’ll be happy to elaborate further.

 

Sincerely,

 

Gregory W. Walker

Chief Operating Officer
Exhibit 4.13



Schedule

Setting Forth Information on

Ten Additional and Substantially Identical Mortgages



(Except as set forth below, documents are substantially identical to the

document included as Exhibit 4.12 of this filing, except for immaterial variations)



|                                     |  |                                                      |  |                      |              
|------------------------------------ |  | ---------------------------------------------------- |  | -------------------- | -------------
|Location                             |  | Title of Document                                    |  | Principal Sum ofNote
|Greensboro, North Carolina           |  | Deed of Trust, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing |  | $                    | 4,875,000.00 
|Lubbock, Texas                       |  | Deed of Trust, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing |  | $                    | 2,500,000.00 
|Clearwater/St. Petersburg, Florida   |  | Mortgage and Security Agreement                      |  | $                    | 3,540,000.00 
|Irvine, California                   |  | Deed of Trust, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing |  | $                    | 12,750,000.00
|Arcadia, California                  |  | Deed of Trust, Security Agreement and Fixture Filing |  | $                    | 14,850,000.00
|Chicago-Deerfield, Illinois          |  | Mortgage and Security Agreement                      |  | $                    | 8,100,000.00 
|Pensacola, Florida                   |  | Mortgage and Security Agreement                      |  | $                    | 3,540,000.00 
|Boca Raton, Florida                  |  | Mortgage and Security Agreement                      |  | $                    | 3,750,000.00 
|Columbia/Spartanburg, South Carolina |  | Mortgage and Security Agreement                      |  | $                    | 4,380,000.00 
|Philadelphia/Berwyn, Pennsylvania    |  | Open-End Mortgage and Security Agreement             |  | $                    | 5,979,000.00
#### Arsene LeBlanc *vs.*Louis G. LeVasseur.

Androscoggin County.

Decided October 4, 1922.

An allegation in a declaration in a writ, in effect that the defendant agreed with the plaintiff, at the time of the making of a sale of an automobile, that if it did not measure up to the terms of an accompanying warranty against defects in construction, the vendor “would take the machine back and pay him back his money,” sufficiently lays a promise of a repayment by the defendant, the count in all other respects being good. A demurrer to the declaration was adjudged bad, and rightly. Being devoid of merit, an exception to the overruling of the demurrer is itself overruled.

This action was begun “to recover the money back,” the contract of sale having been rescinded for a breach of the warranty mentioned. Defendant’s liability, as found by the jury, is abundantly supported by proof. Damages were awarded in the sum of $1,740.00. The award is excessive in amount. The price of the automobile apparently was $3,270.00, though the declaration fixes it at $3,240.00. Adopting the latter figure, that price was made up by the plaintiff thusly:

By exchanging with the vendor a truck, at the

agreed value of............................................ $1,940.00

an allowance for tires, stated by plaintiff to have amounted to $75.00 but consistently ........................................................ 60.00

plaintiff’s promissory note to defendant.... 1,000.00

Cash.................................................................. 240.00

$3,240.00

*595
      *Frank A. Morey,*for plaintiff.

*Benjamin L. Berman and Jacob H. Berman,*for defendant.

Plaintiff, before this action was commenced, had paid $500.00 on the note. The immediate question is, not whether the plaintiff will pay the rest of the note which, presumably, the original payee still holds, nor yet in whom the title to the truck, and as well that of the tires, may be, but as to how much money the plaintiff is to be regarded as having paid toward the purchase price of the automobile, and, therefore, to be entitled to recover. He has so paid $740.00. That is the measure of the proper amount of a verdict in this case, save that the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount, calculated from February 14, 1921, the day of the rescission, to May 2, 1922, the day of the date of the verdict.

If, within thirty days after the filing of this rescript, the plaintiff will file a remittitur of so much of the verdict as is herein indicated to be excessive, the motion for a new trial will be overruled; otherwise it must be sustained. Exceptions overruled. Motion overruled, if remittitur filed; otherwise, motion granted.
Exhibit 99.5

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the filing of the Quarterly Report of Headwaters Incorporated
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2002 (the "Report"),
I, Kirk A. Benson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

         (i) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (ii) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Kirk A. Benson
-------------------------
Kirk A. Benson
Chief Executive Officer
August 6, 2002
# L_2016103DE.01005002.xml

| 19.4.2016 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 103/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.4.2016

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 103/50

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 1302/2014 der Kommission vom 18. November 2014 über eine technische Spezifikation für die Interoperabilität des Teilsystems „Fahrzeuge — Lokomotiven und Personenwagen“ des Eisenbahnsystems in der Europäischen Union

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 356 vom 12. Dezember 2014
  )

Seite 262, Anhang, Abschnitt 4.2.3.4.2 Absatz 6 erster Unterabsatz Satz 1:

Anstatt:

„Wenn aktive Systeme (basierend auf Software- oder speicherprogrammierbare Steuerungen, die Aktuatoren regeln) verwendet werden, besteht bei einem Funktionsausfall in den beiden folgenden Szenarien gewöhnlich die ernsthafte Gefahr ‚mehrerer Todesopfer‘:“

muss es heißen:

„Wenn aktive Systeme (basierend auf Software- oder speicherprogrammierbare Steuerungen, die Aktuatoren regeln) verwendet werden, besteht bei einem Funktionsausfall in den beiden folgenden Szenarien gewöhnlich unmittelbar die ernsthafte Gefahr ‚mehrerer Todesopfer‘:“.

Seite 285, Anhang, Abschnitt 4.2.5.5.8 Absatz 1 Satz 2:

Anstatt:

„Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass der Funktionsfehler gewöhnlich unmittelbar mit den nachstehenden Folgen einhergeht:“

muss es heißen:

„Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass der Funktionsfehler gewöhnlich unmittelbar einhergeht mit der ernsthaften Gefahr eines Unfalls:“.

Seite 285, Anhang, Abschnitt 4.2.5.5.8 Absatz 2 Satz 2:

Anstatt:

„Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass der Funktionsfehler gewöhnlich unmittelbar mit den nachstehenden Folgen einhergeht:“

muss es heißen:

„Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass der Funktionsfehler gewöhnlich unmittelbar einhergeht mit der ernsthaften Gefahr eines Unfalls:“.

---