UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: DAVID LEE WRIGHT; SANDRA

LIANE WRIGHT,

Debtors.

COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION;

FRANK J. SANTORO,

No. 95-1800

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

DAVID LEE WRIGHT; SANDRA LIANE

WRIGHT,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.

Robert G. Doumar, District Judge.

(CA-94-129-4, BK-94-40616-B)

Argued: November 2, 1995

Decided: February 14, 1996

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Richard G. Poinsett, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD G.

POINSETT, Hampton, Virginia, for Appellant. Frank J. Santoro,
MARCUS, SANTORO & KOZAK, Portsmouth, Virginia, for Appellee Santoro; Melvin Reginald Zimm, GLASSER & GLASSER,

P.L.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee Commercial Credit. ON

BRIEF: Linda Weston Coppinger, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD G.

POINSETT, Hampton, Virginia, for Appellant.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In April 1994, David and Sandra Wright filed a petition to adjust

their debts pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act. At the time

the Wrights filed the petition, they also circulated a plan which treated

Commercial Credit Corp., a second mortgagee on the Wrights' house,

as an unsecured creditor, stating that the value of the Wrights' house

was inadequate to provide security for Commercial Credit's lien.

Commercial Credit and the United States trustee objected to confirmation of the plan, but for differing reasons. In its objection, Commercial Credit stated, "It is submitted that there is equity in said

property which secures the repayment of the indebtedness due this

creditor," and therefore its lien should not be voided. The trustee challenged the court's right to strip a consensual lien where there is no

underlying equity and contended that before the court could consider

the issue, it was required to hold a hearing on the value of the

Wrights' property. The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing "to

consider and act upon an objection of Commercial Credit Corporation

to confirmation of the Chapter 13 plan" and at the hearing, following

the argument of counsel, concluded that the objections of both Commercial Credit and the trustee "are sustained and confirmation [of the

plan] is denied." The court stated, "[The creditors' lien-stripping proposal] may not be put in the plan itself." It did not, however, schedule

a separate property valuation hearing.

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The Bankruptcy Court's order denying confirmation of the plan

was appealed to the district court which, on the papers, "AFFIRMED

as to the need to hold an adversarial hearing to determine whether

appellee Commercial Credit Corporation is a secured or an unsecured

creditor, and REVERSED insofar as the Bankruptcy Judge's determination that Noblemen v. American Savings Bank [113 S.Ct. 2106

(1993)] prohibited lien stripping in this matter." The district court

then directed, "This matter is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this order." This appeal was noticed from the district court's

remand order.

While all parties are interested in having us decide whether there

is a procedural mechanism available for "lien stripping" where there

is no equity, we conclude that the order of the district court remanding this case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings is not a

final order and, therefore, is not appealable. See Capitol Credit Plan

of Tennessee, Inc. v. Shaffer, 912 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1990). Because

we are without subject matter jurisdiction, we must dismiss this

appeal.

DISMISSED

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