Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

VALERIE K. BOOTS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

J.T. WHITEHEAD

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

KEITH CRAWFORD, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A04-1112-CR-648

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT 

The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge

Cause No. 49G20-1106-FA-42703

July 24, 2012

 

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

KIRSCH, Judge 
2

Keith Crawford (“Crawford”) appeals from his sentence for one count of dealing 

cocaine1as a Class A felony, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 

find the hardship his incarceration would cause to his mother from losing the assistance he 

provided to her in caring for Crawford’s paraplegic sister as a mitigating circumstance. 

We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts relevant to this appeal reveal that the State proved at trial that Crawford 

knowingly delivered 0.0954 grams of cocaine to an undercover police officer within one 

thousand feet of Indianapolis Public School #54 on September 21, 2010. Although the jury 

found Crawford guilty of two charges, the trial court entered judgment of conviction only on 

the count alleging that Crawford had committed the offense of dealing in cocaine as a Class 

A felony, finding that the other charge merged with that count. At the conclusion of 

Crawford’s sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years executed in 

the Department of Correction with ten years suspended to probation and credit for time 

served prior to sentencing. Crawford now appeals his sentence. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing sentence 

for a felony offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on 

reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). The statement must include a reasonably detailed recitation of 

the trial court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id. If the recitation includes a 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.
3

finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all 

significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has 

been determined to be mitigating or aggravating. Id. 

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are 

reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the 

decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the 

court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is by failing to enter a 

sentencing statement at all. Id. Other examples include entering a sentencing statement that 

explains reasons for imposing a sentence, including a finding of aggravating and mitigating 

factors if any, but the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits 

reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the 

reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. Because the trial court no 

longer has any obligation to “weigh” aggravating and mitigating factors against each other 

when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in 

failing to “properly weigh” such factors. Id. at 491. 

Once the trial court has entered a sentencing statement, which may or may not include 

the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, it may then “impose any sentence that is. 

. . authorized by statute; and . . . permissible under the Constitution of the State of Indiana.” 

Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d). If the sentence imposed is lawful, this court will not reverse 

unless the sentence is inappropriate based on the character of the offender and the nature of 

the offense. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Boner v. State, 796 N.E.2d 1249, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App.
4

2003). The burden is on the defendant to persuade this court that his sentence is 

inappropriate. Patterson v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

Crawford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find as a 

mitigating circumstance the hardship that would be caused to his mother in the event he 

received a sentence providing for a lengthy period of incarceration. The sentencing range for 

a Class A felony is a fixed term of between twenty and fifty years with an advisory sentence 

of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. In this case, the trial court sentenced Crawford to a 

fixed term of thirty years, with ten years suspended to probation. 

At his sentencing hearing, Crawford presented testimony from his mother, Ada 

Anderson, about her reliance upon Crawford for help. She testified that Crawford helped her 

take care of her paraplegic daughter and served as a maintenance man at the childcare 

business she operated. She testified that he had been working for her for approximately 

eighteen years. On appeal, Crawford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to find as a mitigating circumstance the hardship Crawford’s long-term incarceration 

would cause his mother. We disagree.

In the trial court’s oral sentencing statement, the trial court expressed its consideration 

of several factors. The trial court noted Crawford’s criminal history and that his current 

conviction was his twenty-fourth adult conviction, and fourth felony conviction. The trial 

court also considered the particular circumstances of the crime and concluded that 

Crawford’s actions more closely resembled the acts prohibited by statute than most cases. 

Crawford had to walk across the street near a school and completed the transaction while 

children were playing on the playground while school was in session. The trial court 
5

observed that, while the amount of cocaine delivered was a relatively small amount, because 

of Crawford’s prior criminal history, he was required to serve at least twenty years in the 

Department of Correction. Immediately prior to imposing the sentence, the trial court 

addressed the topic of Crawford’s assistance to his mother and the care required by his sister. 

We note that trial courts are not required to state that all proffered mitigating 

circumstances were considered, just those that are considered to be significant. Gray v. State, 

790 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Furthermore, a trial court is not required to find 

mitigating factors or to accept as mitigating the circumstances proffered by a defendant. Id. 

at 178. That said, the trial court’s oral sentencing statement in this case reflects that the trial 

court considered the argument that Crawford’s mother and sister needed his assistance. 

Although the trial court did not explicitly label the factors considered as aggravating or 

mitigating, such was reflected in the actual sentence imposed. The trial court imposed the 

advisory sentence and then suspended ten years of that sentence to probation. The executed 

portion of Crawford’s sentence was the minimum provided for by statute, which Crawford 

acknowledged could not be suspended further due to his criminal history. Moreover, his 

criminal history and the particular circumstances of the crime, alone or in combination, 

would have justified an enhanced sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when sentencing Crawford. 

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.