alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED SEPTEMBER 23, 2020

NO. 03-14-00551-CV

Scott Schroeder, Appellant

v.

Eduardo S. Espinosa, in his Capacity as Receiver of Retirement Value, LLC, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES BAKER AND KELLY

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE BAKER

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the trial court on May 28, 2014. Having reviewed 

the record, the Court holds that appellant has not prosecuted his appeal and did not comply 

with a notice from the Clerk of this Court. Therefore, the Court dismisses the appeal for want of 

prosecution. Appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and in the 

court below.
#### In re CHARLES RIVER BOOKS, INC., Debtor.

Bankruptcy No. 82-01694-JG.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts.

Aug. 1, 1984.

Gerald D. Rosen, Richmond, Rosen, Cros-sen & Resnek, Boston, Mass., for debtor.

Howard Bryant, for creditor.

MEMORANDUM

JAMES N. GABRIEL, Bankruptcy Judge.

Howard Bryant (“Bryant”), a former employee of Charles River Books, Inc. (“Charles River” or “the debtor”) filed a proof of claim in this case in the amount of $4119.20 for out of pocket expenses incurred on behalf of Charles River during 1981 and 1982. The debtor objected to the claim and an evidentiary hearing was held on April 18,1984. Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence, I find the following facts.

Bryant commenced employment with Charles River in 1979 as an independent contractor. In 1981 his status changed to that of a salaried employee and he continued to work there until September 1982 when the company filed its chapter 11 petition. During the time of his employment he was authorized by the company’s president, Bruce Comjean (“Comjean”) to incur expenses on behalf of the company. He was reimbursed on a monthly basis until the beginning of 1982.

Specifically, Bryant claims that he is entitled to reimbursement for the following expenses:

> Reproduction — $268.69

> Art Supplies — $853.42

> Stationery — $150.80

> Business Trips for Calendars — $2347.05

> Book covers, Promotions — $499.24

The $4119 sought represents expenses incurred from the fall of 1981 to the filing date in September 1982. There is no dispute that $1500 in expenses incurred in 1982 are reimburseable. The sole question is whether the debtor owes $2600 for 1981 expenses.

The debtor was unable to rebut the pri-ma facie validity of the proof of claim, see Bankruptcy Rule 3001(f), except with respect to one charge. All of Bryant’s invoices for both 1981 and 1982 and his testimony support the priority of the expenses for supplies, reproduction, stationery, and promotions, and the Washington trips.

The debtor did raise a valid objection, however, to the travel expenses for the San Francisco trip. There was a direct conflict in the testimony on this issue. Bryant testified that Comjean agreed to pay his air fare to San Francisco. Comjean stated that in a conversation with Bryant he *145agreed to pay only Bryant’s expenses while in California, and not the air fare, because a central purpose of Bryant’s trip was to visit relatives, which Bryant does not dispute. Bryant did devote some time to company business while in California in selecting photos for a 1983 calendar. I find that the agreement was that Charles River did not agree to pay Bryant’s air fare, and therefore $360 cost of air fare shall be deducted from that allowable proof of claim. Otherwise, Bryant has substantiated the propriety of the charges and the debtor has failed to sustain the objection. The claim is allowed in the amount of $3759.20.
EXHIBIT 23.1 Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm We consent to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements: (1)

          Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-136802) of Micromet, Inc., (2)

          Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-120579) pertaining to the CancerVax Corporation Amended and Restated 2003 Equity Incentive Award Plan, (3)

          Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-110085) pertaining to CancerVax Corporation Third Amended and Restated 2000 Stock Incentive Plan, CancerVax Corporation 2003 Equity Incentive Award Plan and CancerVax Corporation Employee Stock Purchase Plan, (4)

          Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-144695) of Micromet, Inc., (5)

          Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-154732) of Micromet, Inc., (6)

          Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-155996) of Micromet, Inc., (7)

          Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-162541) of Micromet, Inc., (8)

          Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-131817) pertaining to Micromet, Inc.s 2006 Equity Incentive Award Plan, (9)

          Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-163839) pertaining to Micromet, Inc.s Amended and Restated 2003 Equity Incentive Award Plan and Employee Stock Purchase Plan, (10)

          Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-160130) of Micromet, Inc. (11)

          Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-160888) of Micromet, Inc. (12)

          Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-170537) of Micromet, Inc. of our report dated March 3, 2011 (except for the effects of the matters described in Note 20, as to which the date is April 15, 2011), with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Micromet, Inc. and our report dated March 3, 2011 (except for the effects of the material weakness described in the sixth paragraph of that report, as to which the date is April 15, 2011) with respect to the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Micromet, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) of Micromet, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2010. /s/ Ernst & Young LLP McLean, Virginia April 15, 2011
Opinion issued November 21, 2017

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-17-00434-CV

———————————

MARTHA E. AYALA RODRIGUEZ, Appellant

V.

MARIBEL SANCHEZ, Appellee

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2015-68702

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Martha E. Ayala Rodriguez, has failed to timely file her appellate 

brief. See TEX.R. APP. P. 38.6(a),(d), 38.8(a)(1). Further, appellant has neither paid 

the required filing fee nor established indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See 

id. 5, 20.1; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.207, 51.941(a), 101.041(1) (West 
2

2016); Order, Fees Charged in the Supreme Court, in Civil Cases in the Courts of 

Appeals, and Before the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, Misc. Docket 

No. 15-9158 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2015). After being notified by this Court’s October 10, 

2017 Order and Notice of Intent to Dismiss for Want of Prosecution that this appeal 

was subject to dismissal for failure to pay the required fee and to file the appellant’s 

brief within thirty days of the date of that order, appellant failed to timely respond. 

See id. 5, 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution for failure to 

timely file a brief and for failure to pay all required fees. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 

38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c).

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Lloyd.
AFS-15-3544-E

October 5, 2015

 Exemption No. 10882A

 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2013-0078

Mr. Ronald Thomas

Managing Director, Flight Operations

American Airlines

4601 Highway 360 MD 843

Fort Worth, Texas 76155

Dear Mr. Thomas:

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your petition to extend Exemption 

No. 10882. It explains the basis for our decision, describes its effect, and lists the conditions 

and limitations.

The Basis for Our Decision

By letter dated July 30, 2015, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on 

behalf of American Airlines for an extension of Exemption No. 10882. That exemption from 

§ 121.915(d) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) provides American Airlines

with relief from the requirement that an initial continuing qualification cycle approved for an 

AQP must not exceed 24 calendar months in duration. This allows for an initial continuing 

qualification cycle of 36 calendar months in duration.

In your petition, you indicate that there has been no change in the conditions and reasons 

relative to public interest and safety that were the basis for granting the original exemption.

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested extension of the exemption would not set a 

precedent, and any delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to American Airlines.
2

Our Decision

The FAA has determined that the justification for the issuance of Exemption No. 10882

remains valid with respect to this exemption and is in the public interest. Therefore, under the 

authority provided by 49 U.S.C. §§ 106(f), 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator 

has delegated to me, American Airlines is granted an extension to Exemption 10882 for 

§ 121.915(d) allowing relief from the requirement that an initial continuing qualification cycle 

approved for an AQP must not exceed 24 calendar months in duration, subject to the 

following conditions and limitations.

Conditions and Limitations

1. The petitioner must continue to comply with all elements of their approved AQP.

The Effect of Our Decision

Our decision extends the termination date of Exemption No. 10882 to October 31, 2017

unless sooner superseded or rescinded. 

Sincerely,

/s/

John Barbagallo

Deputy Director, Flight Standards Service
#### In re Rita M. DeSIMONE, Debtor.

Bankruptcy No. 81-02575G.

United States Bankruptcy Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

July 14, 1982.

Jack K. Miller, Philadelphia, Pa., for debtor, Rita M. DeSimone.

George M. Bobrin, Philadelphia, Pa., for Jay Eichler and Mary Eichler.

James J. O’Connell, Philadelphia, Pa., Trustee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

EMIL F. GOLDHABER, Bankruptcy Judge:

The instant case is before us on the “petition” 2 of two creditors (husband and wife) for a declaratory judgment holding that the debt owed to them by the debtor is nondis-chargeable. We will deny the motion because we find it to be without merit.

Jay and Mary Eichler (“the creditors”) assert that they are the holders of an unsecured claim3 against Rita M. DeSimone *632(“the debtor”) which is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code (“the Code”). That section provides that:

> (a) A discharge under section 727,1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt—

> 

> (6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.

In her answer to the creditors’ motion, the debtor requests that we abstain from hearing that motion because, she asserts, the issue was already decided by Judge King in a previous case between these parties.4 In that decision, Judge King stated:

> [Wjhere a debtor completes the payments required by his plan, he is discharged of any debt falling within § 523(a)(6). *See*11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). Because there is no evidence before us that the debtor herein will not complete her payments and not obtain a discharge under § 1328(a), we are unable at this time to determine that the debt owed to the plaintiffs is nondis-chargeable.5

We conclude that Judge King’s decision was not a final decision on the issue of the dischargeability of the debt in question and, therefore, that the creditors are not precluded from filing the instant motion. However, the creditors have still failed to show that the debtor will not be able to complete her payments under her chapter 13 plan and will not be able to obtain a discharge under § 1328(a) of the Code. Until that can be proven, the creditors are not entitled to the relief they request. All of the cases and sections of the Code which are cited by the creditors to the contrary are inapplicable because they deal with cases under chapter 7 or 11 of the Code rather than a case, such as this one, under chapter 13.

1

. This opinion constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 752 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

2

. This is a misnomer. The only “petition” in a case under the Bankruptcy Code is the initial pleading, the petition for relief. We will, therefore, treat the creditors’ so-called “petition” herein as a motion.

3

. The creditors assert that they hold a judgment against the debtor but the debtor has avoided the judgment lien arising therefrom in her chapter 13 plan. See *In*re *DeSimone,*13 *632B.R. 981 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1982). Therefore, the claim of the creditors herein is an unsecured claim.

4

. See *In re DeSimone,*13 B.R. 981 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Pa.1982).

5

. *Id.*at 983-84.
Exhibit 99.1


                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                           (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)


In connection with the accompanying Annual Report of Trade Wind Communications
Limited (the "Company") on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2003
(the "Report"), I, Frank Favretto, Chairman of the Board of the Company,
hereby certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 20-F of Trade Wind
Communications Limited;

2.   Based on my knowledge, the Annual Report on Form 20-F fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. Section 78m or Section 78o(d));

3.   Based on my knowledge, this Annual Report does not contain any untrue
statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Annual Report
on Form 20-F; and

4.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements and other financial
information contained in this Annual Report on Form 20-F, fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition, results of operations and cash
flows of the Company for the periods presented.


Dated: March 17, 2004                             /s/ Frank Favretto
                                                  Frank Favretto
                                                  Chairman of the Board


The above certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350) and is not being filed as
part of the Form 20-F or as a separate disclosure document.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999             DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999             SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                       6,926,417               6,926,417
<SECURITIES>                                30,915,162              30,915,162
<RECEIVABLES>                               37,896,818              37,896,818
<ALLOWANCES>                               (6,391,164)             (6,391,164)
<INVENTORY>                                  3,146,703               3,146,703
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            76,516,363              76,516,363
<PP&E>                                      38,487,225              38,487,225
<DEPRECIATION>                             (8,248,961)             (8,248,961)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             147,442,180             147,442,180
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       14,089,236              14,089,236
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                        43,107                  43,107
<OTHER-SE>                                 122,143,690             122,143,690
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               147,442,180             147,442,180
<SALES>                                     21,543,312              59,359,200
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            21,543,312              59,359,200
<CGS>                                        8,201,579              21,900,669
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               17,886,900              49,899,730
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0                       0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             290,158                 704,169
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,010,487              10,862,537
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,604,194               4,368,790
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,406,293               6,493,747
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,406,293               6,493,747
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.30                    0.81
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.30                    0.79



</TABLE>
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

KEITH KALNAS
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 19

- 2564

[ October 29, 2020 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County ; Cheryl Caracuzzo , Judge; L.T. Case No. 50

- 2018

- CF012020

- AXXX

- MB

.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Claire Victoria Madill, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach ; Alexis Agathocleous of the Innocence Project, Inc., New York, NY, Pro Hac Vice; and Seth E. Miller of the Innocence Project of Florida, Inc., Tallahassee, Amicus Curiae, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Alexandra A. Folley, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

D AMOORGIAN

, C IKLIN and F ORST

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED MARCH 30, 2021

NO. 03-20-00405-CV

Appellant, Double Happiness Development, Inc.// Cross-Appellant, River Oaks Ranch 

Homeowners Association

v.

Appellee, River Oaks Ranch Homeowners Association// Cross-Appellee, Double Happiness 

Development, Inc.

APPEAL FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES GOODWIN, TRIANA, AND SMITH

DISMISSED ON JOINT MOTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the interlocutory order signed by the trial court on July 14, 2020. The 

parties have filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal and the cross appeal, and having 

considered the motion, the Court agrees that the motion should be granted. Therefore, the Court 

grants the motion and dismisses the parties’ respective appeals. Each party shall bear their own 

costs relating to their respective appeals, both in this Court and in the court below.
## TWENIY-NINE PALMSBAND OF

## MISSIONINDIANS 46-200 Harrison Place. Coachella. California. 92236. Ph: 760.863.2444. Fax: 760.863.2449 July 7, 2014 Mr. Fred Leutner Office ofScience & Technology (Mail Code 4305T) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington DC 20460 E-mail: Leutner.Fred@epa.gov RE: Potential Reinterpretation ofthe Clean Water Act (CWA) Provisions regarding Treatment in a Similar Manner to States (TAS) Dear Mr. Leutner: Ithas come to the Twenty-Nine Palms Band ofMission Indians' attention that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is considering a Reinterpretation ofthe rules governing the burdenplaced on Tribes applying for TAS under the CW A for Section 303(c), Water Quality Standards. Currently, Tribes must demonstrate their own inherentregulatory authority, which is challenging andresource intensive. This burden alone has cost Tribes both time and funds to meetthis requirement. The potential reinterpretation which would eliminate the "Montana Test" by stating that CW A Section 518 is a delegation by Congress to eligible Tribes to administer CW A regulatory programs overtheir entire reservations regardless ofland ownership will allow Tribes to exercise their sovereignty by our ability and willingness to accept this delegation. The Twenty-Nine Palms Band ofMission Indians received treatment in the same manner as a state (TAS) in October 2006. Since there are no non-member land owners onthe Twenty-Nine Palms Reservation, the Tribe did nothave the burden ofdemonstrating authority over such lands in its application. The TAS process therefore required less time and money than other tribes have experienced. Even so, the Tribe supports this reinterpretation for potential future TAS applications. The Twenty-Nine Palms Band ofMissionIndians believes EPA's reinterpretation will clarify and strengthen the inherentregulatory authority ofsovereign tribes to implement EPA statutes within reservations regardless ofland ownership. Reinterpretation would validate the legal basis for tribal assertion ofregulatoryjurisdiction under the CW A and decrease the administrative burden ofcase-by-case assessments oftribal authority.As Tribal leader ofthe Twenty-Nine Palms Band ofMission Indians, I support EPA's efforts to reinterpret provisions ofthe CW A regarding the TAS process. Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments onthis potential rule change.

Respectfully,

Darrell Mike, Tribal Chairman Twenty-Nine Palms Band ofMission Indians
COUNTY AT UAC*

FG CODE COUNTY AT UAC FG CODE

BRONX 3 1001 30 GREENE 1 0 40

KINGS 3 1001 30 FULTON 1 0 40

NEW YORK 3 1001 30 FULTON 2 2 30

QUEENS 3 1001 30 HAMILTON 1 0 60

RICHMOND 3 1001 30 MADISON 1 0 40

NASSAU 3 1001 30 MADISON 2 2 30

SUFFOLK 1 0 60 MONTGOMERY 1 0 40

SUFFOLK 2 2 30 MONTGOMERY 2 2 30

SUFFOLK 3 1001 30 CAYUGA 1 0 40

PUTNAM 1 0 40 CAYUGA 2 2 30

PUTNAM 3 1001 30 CORTLAND 1 0 40

PUTNAM 3 11240 30 CORTLAND 2 2 30

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ROCKLAND 3 1001 30 OSWEGO 2 2 30

WESTCHESTER 1 0 40 SENECA 1 0 40

WESTCHESTER 3 1001 30 SENECA 2 2 30

ALBANY 1 0 40 GENESEE 1 0 40

ALBANY 3 11041 30 GENESEE 2 2 30

RENSSELAER 1 0 40 LIVINGSTON 1 0 40

RENSSELAER 2 2 30 LIVINGSTON 2 2 30

RENSSELAER 3 11041 30 ONTARIO 1 0 40

SARATOGA 1 0 40 ONTARIO 2 2 30

SARATOGA 2 2 30 ORLEANS 1 0 40

SARATOGA 3 11041 30 ORLEANS 2 2 30

SARATOGA 3 11341 30 WYOMING 1 0 40

SCHENECTADY 1 0 40 WAYNE 1 0 40

SCHENECTADY 3 11041 30 WAYNE 2 2 30

WARREN 1 0 60 CATTARUAGUS 1 0 40

WARREN 3 11341 30 CATTARUAGUS 2 2 30

WASHINGTON 1 0 40 CHAUTAQUA 1 0 40

WASHINGTON 3 11341 30 CHAUTAQUA 2 2 30

HERKIMER 1 0 40 ALLEGANY 1 0 60

HERKIMER 3 11089 30 ALLEGANY 2 2 40

ONEIDA 1 0 40 SCHUYLER 1 0 40

ONEIDA 3 11089 30 STEUBEN 1 0 40

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ONONDAGA 3 11056 30 YATES 1 0 40

TOMPKINS 1 0 40 YATES 2 2 30

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MONROE 1 0 40 CLINTON 2 2 40

MONROE 2 2 30 FRANKLIN 1 0 60

MONROE 3 11039 30 FRANKLIN 2 2 40

ERIE 1 0 40 JEFFERSON 1 0 60

ERIE 3 11016 30 JEFFERSON 2 2 40

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NIAGARA 3 11016 30 ST LAWERENCE 1 0 60

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TIOGA 1 0 40 CHENANGO 2 2 40

TIOGA 3 11110 30 DELAWARE 1 0 60

ORANGE 1 0 40 OTSEGO 1 0 60

ORANGE 2 2 30 OTSEGO 2 2 40

ORANGE 3 11342 30 SCHOHARIE 1 0 60

ESSEX 1 0 60 SCHOHARIE 2 2 40

ESSEX 2 2 40 SULLIVAN 1 0 60

SULLIVAN 2 2 40

* AT = Area Type 1=Rural, 2=Small Urban, 3=Urban UAC = Modified HPMS Areawide Urban Area Code