FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT AUG 29, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble David M. Ebe l, United States Circuit J udg e for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by * desig nation. [ P U B L I S H ]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1053 6

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 05-00153 -CV -D HB- 1 TRACY ANTHONY MILLER, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us COMM ISSI ONER JAMES DONALD, GE ORG IADE PA RT MEN T O F CO RRE CT IO NS , Geo rg ia , et al ., D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ __ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ _ (A ug us t 29, 200 8) Be fo re T JO FL A T , BL A CK and E BE L , Ci rc uit

Jud ge s. *The district cour t adopted in full the re commendation of the mag istrate judg e to whom 1 Miller’s complaint had be en re fer red. 2 TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: T ra cy A nth ony Mi lle r is an in m at e in the G eo rg iapr iso n sy ste m . H e is a freq ue ntli ti ga nt , as p la in ti ff, in th e fed eral co ur ts in Geor gi a. Sin ce 1 99 2, proceeding pro se and in form a pauperis, he has filed at least thirty cases in district co urt and h as take n ne ar ly a s m any appe al s to thi s c ourt. T he de fe ndants in the se cases ar e, for the m ost part, offic ials of the Ge orgia De partm ent of Corre ction. In the c as e nowbe fo re us, he ha s su ed in the S outhe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg iathe Co m m iss ion er of the D ep ar

tm en t of Co rr ec tio n and v ar iou s D ep ar tm en t of fi ci al s (c oll ec tiv el y

“ Co m m iss ion er ”) und er

42 U . S. C. § 19 83, se ek ing r el ie f fo r the ir co nti nuou s in fr ing em en t of his r igh ts unde r T itl e II of the A m er ic an s w ith D isa bil iti es A ct

( “ A D A ”) , 42 U . S. C. § 12 131 et se q. , and s ec tio n 50 4 of

the Reh ab il it at io n Actof 1 97 3, 2 9 U.S.C. § 79 4. O n r ec ei vin g M ill er ’ s c om pla int , the dis tr ic t c ourt, a ct ing sua spo nte , too k not e of the lawsui ts M ill er

pr ev iou sly

ha s br ough t a ga ins t D ep ar tm en t of Correc tion o fficials, exam ined the com plaint’s f actual allegations and conclud ed that the y w er e fr ivo lou s, and d ism iss ed the c om pla int w ith out pr ej udi ce und er

28 U.S .C . § 1 9 1 5 (g ). In i t s o rd ero f d i s m i s s al , t h e c o u rt , i nan ef fo rtt o cu rb Mi l l er ’s 1The unpa id fee s amount to $1,329. 2 3 lit igi ous ac tiv ity , e nj oin ed Mi lle r fr om

sub m itt ing f

urthe r fi lin gs w iththe c ourt, except in lim ited circum stances, w ithou t pay ing th e unpaid filing fee s he has accr ued. Miller now appeals. W e re verse the district court’ s dism issal of 2 Mi lle r’ s c om

pla int , va cate the inj unc tiv e pr ovi sio n of the c ourt’ s or de r re gard ing futur e fi lin gs, and r em an d th e ca se f or f urthe r pr oc ee din gs. I A t the ti m e he f

ile d hi s c om

pla int in thi s c as e, Mi lle r w as inc ar ce rate d inthe Augusta State Me dical Prison (“ AS MP”) . His com plaint alleges in su bstance that the officials at A SMP f

ailed to m ake adequate ac com m odation s for his phy sical lim itatio ns. H e is a

para ple gic c onf

ine d to aw he el ch ai r, and a s a r es ult of his im m obi lity , he w as and c ont inu es to be sub j ec te d to phy sic al harm . T he of fi ci al s al so f ai le d to m ak e ac co m

m odatio ns f

or his a lim en ts. T he y

e sse nti al ly

ign or ed his kidne y c ondi tio n, w hic h r equir es c athe te r tr eatm en t and m ed ic at ion , and h is ch ro nic hig h bl ood pr es sur e, w hic h r equir es m ed ic at ion . A s an e xam ple of the of fi ci al s’ dis re gard

of his phy sic al c ondi tio n, the c om pla int a lle ge s th at

the of fi ci al s c onf

ine d hi m f or tw en ty -f our hours aday

in a ce ll too sm al l f

or his w he el ch ai r to m ove and d en ie d hi m a cc es sib le toi le ts and uri ne c athe te rs , the re byIn a dd iti on to t he se a lle g atio ns c on c e rn ingc on dit ion s o f h is c on fi ne me nt a nd ina de qu ate 3 medical c are at ASMP, the complaint alleg es that prison off icials at unname d fac iliti es kn ow ing ly

pla c e d h im i n c los e pr oximi ty to o the r i nmate s o n h is “ e ne my lis t,” and fa ile d to int e rv e ne wh e n h e wa s r e pe ate dly atta c ke d b y

oth e r i nmate s. He ha s b e e n s ub je c te d to a ll o f t

his – at the hands of

the Commiss ioner of the Geor g ia Depa rtment of Corre ction, the war den, corr ection off

icer s, medical staf

f, prose cutors, and judg es – bec ause he possesses evide nce of officia l corruption in Geor g ia’s prison sy stem. 4 forcing him

to lie in his o wn bodily

wa ste. 3 Mi lle r la ck ed

the m eans t o pay

the $25 0 f

ee f or f ili ng h is c om

pla int , so h e so ug htlea ve to pro ceedin form a p aupe ris (“ IFP” ) pu rs ua ntto 28 U.S.C. § 1 91 5. Se ct ion191 5( g) , a s am en de d by the P ri son L iti ga tio n R ef orm A ct of 199 5 (“ PL RA ”) , pr ec lud es apr iso ne r fr om “br ing [i ng] ac ivi l a ct ion. . . und er thi s section if the prisoner has, on 3 or m ore prior occa sions ,” brought an action that w as dis m iss ed

e ith er a s f ri vol ous or

be ca use the c om

pla int f ai le d to state ac la im for re lief, “ unless th e prisoner is under im m inent dang er of se rious ph y sical injury .” 28 U. S. C. § 191 5(g). It is undisp uted that Miller has had enoug h cases dis m iss ed to fa ll unde r thi s so -c al le d th re e- str ike s pr ovi sio n. S ee Mi lle r v. Br ow n, CV604 -1 00, 200 4 U . S. D ist . L E X IS 283 97, a t *3 ( S. D . G a. S ep t. 15, 200 4) (l ist ing Mi lle r’ s qu al if

y ing pr ior c as es ). I n th is c as e, Mi lle r ar gue s th at his allegations of imm inent ph y sical danger fr om continu ing m istreatm ent qualifies hi m forth e § 19 15 (g ) “ imm in en t d an ge r” ex cep ti on . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t ov er loo k M ill er ’ s arg um en t tha t i t sh oul d e nte rt ai n5

his lawsui t be ca

use it f el l w ith in the im

m ine nt d an ge r ex ce pti on. A ft er r ev ie w ing the c as es Mi lle r ha d pr ev iou sly f ile d c ha lle ngi ng c ondi tio ns o f his c onf ine m en t i n Ge orgia’ s prison s y stem , how ever, the court concluded that Miller was

“ atte m pti ng t o us e cl ai m s of

‘ im m ine nt d an ge r’ a s am eans t o f or ce asho tgun bl as t of oth er f ri vol ous an d du

pli cativ e cl ai m s in to c ourt. ” T he c ourt ob se rv ed that allegations of the com

plaint were nearly

identical to the allegations Miller had br ough t a ga ins t othe r G eo rg iapr iso n of fi ci al s. T w o of

tho se c as es , Mi lle r v. K ing , 449 F. 3d 1 149 (1 1thCi r. 200 6) and M ill er v. P ry or , CV505 -0 29 ( M. D . G a. Aug. 11, 200 5) , ha d a dvanc ed

be y ond the sc re en ing pha se , ha d by pa sse d th e § 19 15( g) bar, and wer e still pendin g. A lthou gh King and Pry or concern the condition s at Ge orgia State P rison and Men’s S tate Pr ison, respectively , the c ourt determ ined th atMi ll er’s al le ga ti on s wer e dup li cat iv e o f hi s co m pl ai nt s i n Ki ng an d P ry or . Th e p ro v i s i o no f t h e d i s tri ctco u rt ’s d i s m i s s al o rd erth aten jo i n edMi l l er ’s fi lin g a ct ivi ty

w as dr awn f

ro m apr ac tic e inv oke d f

ro m ti m e to t im e by

the Southern District of G eorgia to curb filing abuses in prisoner cases. W ith three narr owe xc ep tio ns, apr iso ne r is p ro hib ite d f ro m f ili ng any ne wpa pe rs w iththe court under § 191 5(g) until he has paidall acc rued filing fees. T he exceptions are that a pr iso ne r m ay

f ile ( 1) pa pe rs in a cr im ina l pr oc ee din gs b ro ught a ga ins t hi m by the state , ( 2) ati m el y

m oti on f or r ec onsi de ratio n of

the f ili ng b ar a s a ppl ie d,6

an d ( 3) aple ad ing or

pa pe r de m onstratin g th at

he ha s be ende nie d a cc es s to state co urt and h as no r ec our se e xc ep t t o r ep ai r to the dis tr ic t c ourt. N oti ce ab ly abse nt from this listof exceptions is a com plaint allegin g that the prison er is under imm in en t d an ge r of

ser io us ph y si cal in

jury. II O ur f ir st t as k inthi s a

ppe al is to c onsi de r the appr opr iate ne ss o f the f ili ng in jun ct io n a ndth en to co ns id er t he di sm is sa l o f Mi ll er’s co m pl ai ntas f riv ol ou s. W e re view the inj unctive prov ision under the abuse of discretion stand ard. See Klay v. Uni te d Hea lt hg ro up , Inc ., 37 6 F .3d10 92 , 10 96 (11 th Cir . 20 04 ). T he pr opr ie ty

of an in j unc tio n a ga ins t I FP f

ili ngs by ali tig an t de pe nds on w ei ghi ng the int er es t of

the c ourt t o pr ote ct

it s own j ur isd ic tio n to he ar m er ito ri ous m at te rs ag ai ns t t he in te res t o f th e IFP l it ig an t p res en ti ng hi s cl ai m forad jud ic at io n. Ac cess to the courts is un questio nably a right of considerable constitut ional si gn ifi can ce, s ee Bo un ds v. Sm it h, 4 30 U.S. 81 7, 8 21 , 97 S. Ct. 1 49 1, 1 49 4, 5 2 L. E d. 2d 7 2 ( 1977 ), part ic ularl y w he n th e ind ivi dua l se ek s “ vin dic at ionof fundam en ta l c ivi l r igh ts, ” Ri ve ra v. A lli n, 144 F . 3d 7 19, 724 n. 9 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) (quot ing L y on v . K

ro l, 940 F . S upp. 143 3, 143 7 ( S. D . I ow a 1996 )) , inc lud ing the ri ght “ to b e fr ee of

unw ar rante d ‘ im

m ine nt d an ge r of

se ri ous phy sic al inj ur

y . ’ ” Id . at 724 (quo ting 2 8 U. S. C. § 191 5(g)). When such fund am ental interests are at7

stake , the li tig an t’ s in ab ili ty to pay the f ili ng f ee c annot be abarr ie r to h is a cc es s to the j udi ci ar

y . S ee Bo ddi e v. Co nne ct ic ut, 401 U . S. 371 , 374 , 91 S . Ct . 780 , 784 , 28 L. Ed. 2d11 3 (1 97 1) . The r ight o f ac cess to the courts “ is neither absolu te nor uncond ition al.” Co fi el d v. A la . P ub. S er

v. Co m m ’ n, 936 F . 2d 5 12, 516 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) ( quot ing Inr e G re en , 669 F . 2d 7 79, 785 ( D . C. Ci r. 198 1) ). C ondi tio ns and r es tr ic tio ns o n each person’ s acce ss are nec essary to preserve the j udicial resource for all other pe rs ons. F ri vol ous an d ve xa tio us l awsui ts thr eate n th e av ai la bil ity of aw el lfunctionin g judiciary

to all litigants . As the Supre m e Court has noted, filing fees in the or y dis co ur ag e fr ivo lou s lawsui ts and thus he lp a llo cate j udi ci al r es our ce s to m or e m er ito ri ous ca se s. S ee I n r e Mc D ona ld, 489 U . S. 180 , 184 , 109 S . Ct . 993 , 996, 103 L . E d. 2d 1 58 ( 1989 ). “ Bu t pa upe rs f ili ng p ro se are not

sub j ec t t o th e fi nanc ia l c onsi de ratio ns – f ili ng f ee s and atto rn ey ’ s f

ee s – tha t de te r oth er

li tig an ts fr om f ili ng f ri vol ous pe tit ion s. ” I d. ; se e al so I n r e Si ndr am , 498 U . S. 177 , 179 , 111 S. Ct . 596 , 598 , 112 L . E d. 2d 5 99 ( 1991 ) (d ir ec tin g th e cl er k of the Co urt no t to a cc ep t f

urthe r IF P ex tr ao rd inary

w ri t pe tit ion s f

ro m the pe tit ion er ). Abse nt m one tary c ost a s ac onstra int , the she er vol um e of

f ri vol ous IF P sui ts thr eate ns t o underm ine the availability of the feder al courts to the pub lic. To counter such thr eat and t o pr ote ct

it s j ur isd ic tio n, the dis tr ic t c ourts are auth or iz ed by the A ll8

Wri ts A ct , 28 U . S. C. § 16 51( a) , to re str ic t a cc es s to ve xa tio us and a busi ve lit igants . R ei m

posi ng f inanc ia l c onsi de ratio ns i n th e fo rm of f ili ng f ee s on ind ige nt l iti gants is one w ay the c ourts c anf

ulf ill the ir “ co nst itutio na l ob lig at ion to p ro te ct the ir j ur isd ic tio n f

ro m c ondu ct w hic h im

pa ir s th ei r ab ili ty

to carr y out A rt ic le I II f

unc tio ns. ” P ro cu

p v. S tr ic kland, 792 F . 2d 1 069, 107 3 ( 11th C ir . 198 6) (e n banc ) (p er

c ur iam ) (quot ing I n r e: Mart in- T ri gona , 737 F . 2d 1 254, 126 1 ( 2d Ci r. 19 84 )). Y et to the ind ige nt, af

ili ng f ee is a blunt i nstrum en t tha t c annot dis cr im inate be tw ee n va lid

and b ogus c la im s. Ablanke t i nj unc tio n th at pr ohi bit s a ll IF P fi lin gs by agiv enpe rs on w oul d be ove ri nc lus ive ; i t w oul d sc re enout le git im at e cl ai m s of the ind ige nt, e ve n if

the se c la im s c onc er

ne d f undam en ta l i nte re sts . F or thi s reason, C ongress has been careful to tailor lim itations on IFP f iling s to m inim ize the e xc lus ionof

va lid c la im s th at

inv olv e fundam en ta l i nte re sts . I n th e co nte xt o f pr iso ne r lit igatio n, Co ngr es s w as de lib er at e in l eavin g an e xc ep tio n f or c la im s of im m inent threat of serious phy sical injury when it enac ted the three-strikes provisi on that screens out all oth er I FP suits as part of the P LR A. See 28 U. S. C. § 19 15( g) . L ike w ise , w he n e xe rc isi ng the ir inh er en t po w er s, c ourts h av e m ad e sure that indig ent litigant s are not com pletely prohibit ed from

seeking judicial relief. See , e .g. , P rocup, 792 F.2d at 1074 (vacating an injunction that proh ibited9

fi lin gs b y ind ige nt p ri sone r w ith out an atto rn ey

and h old ing that l iti gants “ cannot be c om ple te ly f or ec los ed f ro m any a cc es s to the c ourt. ”) ; c f. Co pe land v . G re en , 949 F.2d 390 , 391 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (r eversing district court’s order banni ng I FP li tig an t f

ro m de liv er ing doc um en ts t o th e co urtho use be ca use it is

“ im perm issib ly

restrictive of his right of acc ess to that court”). De signi ng an acceptable procedural device to screen out frivolous IFP fi lin gs r equir es som e de gr ee of nuanc e, and f

or that r ea son “ [c ] onsi de ra

ble di sc ret io n n eces sa ril y

is rep os edin th e d is tri ctco ur t.” Pr oc up , 79 2 F .2dat 1 07 4. Our opinion in Procup cata logu ed a w ide range of then-state-of- the-art tools that vari ous co urts h av e em

plo y ed to de al w ithabusi ve li tig an ts, se e id. a t 10 72- 73 & nn. 2- 8 ( lis tin g c as es and r ule s) , and a lth oughP ro cu p is ove r tw en ty

y ears old , tho se a cc ep ta

ble e xam ple s st ill pr ovi de gui danc e fo r us t oday . What a ll of the se m ethods have in co m

m on i s th at

the y do n ot i m

pose blanke t pr ohi bit ion s onthe lit igant. S ee id. Whe n P ro cu p w as de ci de d, w e not ed

that the li ste d m ethods of ch eck in g abu si ve li ti ga nt s was “ in te nd edto be ne it he r ex ha us ti ve no r li m it in g,” and that “ [a] s new ideas develop and old devi ces prove ineffe ctive, the j udiciary m ust respondwith im aginative new techniques design ed to protect the court ac ce ss o f al l l iti gants . ” I d. a t 10 73. T he m ethod use d inthe S outhe rnD istri ct of G eo rg ia , tho ugh nove l and undou bte dly e ff ec tiv e at ke ep ing out

f ri vol ous cl ai m s,10

ex ce ed s th e boun ds o f dis cr et ionthat c ourts i n th is and o the r ci rc uit s have ex erci se d. In Cofield v. A labam a Public Ser vice Com m issio n, 936 F.2d 512 (11th Cir. 19 91 ), we ad dr es se d ave ry si m il ar s itua ti on in vo lv in g “ anov erl y li ti gi ou s fe ll ow” na m edSirKeen an Co fie ld , an i nm at e in th e Alaba m a p ris on syste m . Id. at51 3. Co fi el d’ s ob vio usl y

f ri vol ous sui ts t ar ge te d de fe ndants f ro m pr iso n of fi ci al s to Burger K ing, Coca- Cola, and AT &T. See id. T he district court for the N orthern District of A labam a sua sponte dis m issed all of Cofield’ s pendin g suits and barred him f ro m f ili ng f urthe r cl ai m s I FP ; the c ourt a lso r equir ed Co fi el d to obt ai n le av e of c ourt be fo re f

ili ng any pa pe rs e ve n a ft er

pay ing af

ee . I d. a t 51 4. O n a

ppe al , w e ag re ed

w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ac tua l c onc lus ionthat C of ie ld f ile d hi s m er itl es s c om

pla int s ou t of

spi te and v an ity . S ee id. a t 51 6- 17. A s to the pr opr ie ty of the court’ s injunction againstCofield, we aff irm ed the provisio n that required Co fi el d to obt ai n le av e of c ourt be fo re f

ili ng, but r ev er se d th e pr ovi sio n de ny ing IF P status in al l f

uture c as es , hol din g th at

“ [o ] ur pr ec ed en t c onde m

ns” the

“pr os pe ct iv e sh ut ti ng [of ] th e co ur th ou se do or .” See i d. at51 8. O the r co urts o f ap pe al s have , in the y ears sin ce P ro cu p w as de ci de d, lik ew ise pr oc ee de d r igh t up to the li ne of pr ospe ct ive ly

banni ng a ll IF P fi lin gs b y a lit igant, but

have y et to cr oss it . F or

e xam ple , in Co k v. F am ily

Co urt of Rh ode11

Is land, 985 F . 2d 3 2 ( 1st

Ci r. 199 3) , the F ir st C ir cu it uphe ld an in j unc tio n prohibi ting an abus ive litigantfrom rem ovin g fam ily

court m atters to feder al co urt, but va cate d th e ad dit ion al sanc tio n pr ohi bit ing the li tig an t f ro m f ili ng any other “ unperm itted pro se actions in the district court.” Id. at 36. T he court em phasized that altho ugh “ the district court is in th e best positi on to set pr ec ondi tio ns o n a cc es s, ” id. ( ci tin g P ro cu p, 792 F . 2d at 10 73) , the pr ec ondi tio ns ough t t o be “ lim ite d to r es tr ic tin g im pr ope r co nduc t of

the ty pe w hic h th e pr es en t re co rd ind ic at es pla int if

f ha s di spl ay ed

in the pa st. ” I d. I ndi sc ri m inate prohibi tions are too broad. T he Sixth Circuit also rej ected an inj unctive order pr ohi bit ing ave xa tio us p la int if f fr om “ fi lin g any

c ivi l l aw sui t . . . ba se d up on o r ar isi ng o ut o f” the und er ly ing sui t. O rtm anv. T hom as , 99 F . 3d 8 07, 810 -1 1 ( 6th Ci r. 19 96 ) (quo ti ng Ortm an v. Th om as , 90 6 F . Sup p. 4 16 , 42 4 (E.D. Mi ch . 19 95 )). The c ourt noted th at while sanctions against the abusiv e plaintiff w ere appropriate,

“ [t] he absolute bar to further litigation . . . is too broad.” Id. at 811. More re ce ntl y , the F ourth C ir cu it va cate d an in j unc tio n pr ohi bit ing apla int if f fr om f ili ng any pa pe rs w ith out

le av e of c ourt. S ee Cr om er

v. K ra ft F oods N . A m . , I nc . , 390 F. 3d 8 12, 818 -1 9 ( 4thCi r. 200 4) . A lth oughnot an I FP c as e, Cr om er

tur ne d onthe sam e ri ght

of a cc es s to the c ourts i nvol ve d he re , and i t he ld tha t an in j unc tio n prohibi ting th e plaintiff fr om m aking “ any

and all filings” was overbroad. Id. at12

819. L ike the c ourts i n C ok and O rtm an , the F ourth C ir cu it in C ro m er a lso em pha siz ed that pr ospe ct ive f

ili ng l im itatio ns o ught

to be ar som e re latio nshi p to the li tig an t’ s ob

j ec tio nable a ct ion s inpe ndi ng s uit s, and c annot be w hol es al e res tri ct io ns on all fut ur e fi li ng s i n u nr el at edm at te rs . See i d. The inj unction against Miller is sim ilarly overbroad. M iller has indeed filed se ve ra l su its a lle gin g si m ilar co re f ac ts, i. e. , that of

fi ci al s at thr ee dif

fe re nt p ri sons have f ai le d to pr ovi de him

w itha de quate tr eatm en t f or his m ed ic al c ondi tio ns, and these suits raise a host of additi onal incoh erent allegations of official wr ongd oing s, r eal or im agined. A ssum ing th at Miller’ s claim s in this case are fr ivo lou s or

r ep et iti ve , anarr ow er

inj unc tio n c oul d targ et

Mi lle r’ s f

ili ngs ar isi ng fr om the f ac ts o r tr an sa ct ion s a lr ea dy r ai se d and l iti ga te d inoth er c as es , suc h a s in Mi ll er v . Pry oran d M il le r v. Ki ng . W e too k th e sam e ap pr oa chin U nit ed S tate s v. F lin t, 178 F ed . Appx. 964 (11th Cir. 2006) (per c uriam ). In Flint, a crim inal case, the district court enjoined Flint from

filing any

further plea ding s or m otion s after he had inund ated the court wit h p ap ers du rin g h is tri al an d fo ll owi ng hi s co nv ic ti on . 17 8 F ed . App x. at96 5. W e va cate d th e inj unc tio n a s ov er br oa d be ca

use it r ea ch ed be y ond the are a in which Flint had dem onstrated a histo ry of abusive litig ation, nam ely the crim inal ca se it se lf

, and e nc om

pa sse d a ll unr el at ed

bus ine ss tha t F lin t m igh t su bse que ntl y13

have w iththe c ourt. I d. a t 97 0. T he c ourt’ s e xpansi ve inj unc tio n inF lin t

“ im pr ope rl y inf ri ng[ ed ] on F lin t’ s r igh t of a cc es s to the c ourts. ” I d. ( ci tin g Pro cup, 7 92 F.2dat 1 07 2- 73 ). The inj unction in this case likewise goes bey ond what is sufficient to protect the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j ur isd ic tio n f ro m Mi lle r’ s r ep et iti ve f

ili ngs re late d to the co ndi tio ns o f his c onf

ine m en t, and f

ai ls t o up hol d M ill er ’ s r igh t of a cc es s to the co urts. T he thr ee li m ite d e xc ep tio ns i n th e inj unc tio n, take n to ge the r, do n ot pr ovi de Mi lle r w ithm eanin gf ul a cc es s. T he f

ir st e xc ep tio n pe rm its Mi lle r to f ile onl y r es pons ive pa

pe rs in cr im ina l c as es br ough t a ga ins t hi m . T he se co nd ex ce pti on a

ppl ie s on ly

to a “ tim el y

f ile d r ec onsi de ratio n m oti on, ” an d ob vio usl y Mi lle r m ay

have ava lid

c la im that ari se s a ft er

the te n- day

pe ri od f or m ovi ng the co urt t o a lte r or

a m en d aj udgm en t ha s e la pse d, se e Fe d. R. Ci v. P . 59( e) . T he thi rd e xc ep tio n, that M ill er

c anf ile his c om

pla int if he c ande m onstrate that he la ck s a cc es s to the state c ourts, m iss es the poi nt tha t the r el ev an t r igh t i n qu es tio n is acce ss to th e fed eral co ur ts . Th e c as es th e C o m

m i s s i o n erre l i es up o nd o n o ts up p o rtth e d i s tri ctco u rt ’s br oa d in j unc tio n. F ir st, S loan v. L es za , 181 F . 3d 8 57 ( 7thCi r. 199 9) , w hic h th e Co m m iss ion er c ont en ds s tands fo r the pr opos iti on tha t c ourts m ay bar inm at e litigant s from

filing any

further paper s with the court until all ou tstandin g court14

fe es have be enpa id, is dif fe re nt f ro m Mi lle r’ s c as e in an im

portant w ay . A lth ough th e S e v e n th C i r c u i t ’s o p i n i o ni nS l o and o e s n o td e t a i l th e n a tu r e o f S l o an ’s c l a i m, the c ourt e xpr es sly

state d th at

he w as und er

§ 19 15( g) ’ s th re e- str ike s pr ovi sio n an d th at he did “ not c ont en d th at

he [ w as ] ‘ unde r im

m ine nt d an ge r of

se ri ous phy sic al inj ur

y . ’ ” Id . a t 85 9 ( quot ing 28 U . S. C. § 19 15( g) ). O f co ur se , if S loan di d not allege imm inent dang er of se rious ph y sical injury , it f ollows that § 19 15(g) w oul d bar him

f ro m f ili ng f uture c as es I FP . T he S ev en th C ir cu it’ s or de r m er el y added the provis ion of pay ing ou tstandin g court fees as an additio nal m onetary barr ie r, but

it in no w ay

he ld o r ev ensug ge ste d th at § 19 15( g) ’ s e xc ep tio n f

or al le ga ti on s o f imm in en t d an ge r of ser io us ph y si cal in

jury no l on ge r ap pl ie d. Se co nd, the S upr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio ns b annin g ve xa tio us l iti gants f ro m se ek ing le av e to f

ile I FP pe tit ion s f

or e xtr ao rd inary

w ri ts are a lso ina

ppos ite be ca use the y “ ke pt at l ea st o ne doo r ope n by a llo w ing . . . [ lit igants ] to fi le the ir wr its of certiorar i, by

far the m ost im

portant doo rw ay

to Suprem e Court re view. ” Cofield, 936 F. 2d at 518 ; see, e. g., In re Sindram , 498 U. S. at 179, 111 S. C t. at 597 (writ of m andam

us); In re Mc Donald, 489 U. S. at 180, 109 S. C t. 993-94 at (w rit of habeas corpus). A s we discuss ed in Cofield, petitions for extraordinary w ri ts are tr eate d w ithske pti ci sm , and “ [t ] he Co urt e sse nti al ly a dopt ed a p re s u m p t i o no f f ri v o l i ty i nth es e c as es ,” a p o s tu re th ati s n o tp ro p erfo r M i l l er ’s15

ca se “be ca

use the pr ospe ct ive de nia l i s no t l im ite d to his appl ic at ion s f or so m et hi ng so rare ly gran te d a s an ex tra or di na ry writ .” Co fie ld , 93 6 F .2dat 5 19 . T he Co m m iss ion er f ina lly ur ge s us to af

fi rm and v al idate the pr ac tic e of issui ng these “ § 191 5(g)-plus” sanctions because this provisi on of the PLR A has pr ove n in suf

fi ci en t f or m an ag ing inm at e lit iganti on. A s age ne ra l m atte r, c ourts shou ld b e he sit an t t o su

ppl em en t the r

ule s and r em ed ie s th at

Co ngr es s pr ovi de s by statut e. T he S upr em e Co urt r ei te rate d th is v ie wr ec en tly in the c ont ex t of

the PL RAw he n it

he ld unanim ousl y

that be ca use the statut e doe s no t r equir e inm at e pla int if fs to ple ad

that the y have e xhaust ed

the a dm ini str at ive r em ed ie s, c ourts cannot im pose thi s a ddi tio na l pl ea din g r equir em en t. Jon es v. Bo ck , 549 U . S. 199 , __, 127 S. C t. 910, 921, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007). T he opini on acknowledges that co m bi ni ng th e su bs ta nt iv e PLRA ex ha us ti on requi rem en t, s ee 4 2 U.S.C. § 1997 e( a) , w ithan a ddi tio na l pl ea din g r eq uir em en t w oul d sc re enout m or e sui ts, but also s tates that there is sim ply nothi ng in th e language of the PL RA itself that supp orts the additio n of the pleading rule. Se e Jones, 549 U. S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 921- 22. L ike w ise , in thi s c as e, it is unde rs tanda

ble that § 1915 (g ) as e na ct ed by Co ngr es s m ay

not be able to sc re enout

a s m any f ri vol ous law sui ts quic kly en ough , y et

thi s pe rc ei ve d de fi ci en cy is not an in vit at ionf

or the dis tr ic t c ourts t o im pr ove upo n th e statut e. S ee id. a t 92 1. O f co ur se , thi s is not to say that the16

PL RA ’ s pr ovi sio ns s ha ck le the dis tr ic t c ourts’ inh er en t po w er to pr ote ct

the co urts’ own j ur isd ic tio n. R athe r, it of fs et s th e Co m

m iss ion er ’ s su gge sti on – im pli ci t i n th e ve ry

nam e “ § 19 15( g) -p lus ” – th at the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in

j unc tio n do es no th in g m or e th an ex ecu te Co ng res s’s p ur po se in en act in g t he PLRA, a p u rp o s e w h o s e i m

p er fe ctembo d i m en ti na s t at u t e c an b e c o rr ec t edb y th e c o u rt ’s o w ns up e r i o r

h i n d s i g h t . T h e d i s tr i c tc o u rt s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o d e v e l o p me c h an i s ms that pr ote ct

the ir own j ur isd ic tio n c onsi ste nt w iththe ir inh er en t po w er

and lim itations , and § 19 15(g)’ s relatively narrowrule-and-exce ption pairing neither su bt ract s fr om

no r ad ds to th em . III W e tu rn no w to whet he r th e co ur t erredin di sm is si ng Mi ll er’s co m pl ai nt . The ap pr op ria te st an da rdof r ev ie w to ap pl y is no t wi th ou t s om e am

bi gu it y . Form ally , the district court’ s order dism issed the com plaint withou t prej udice be ca use it de nie d M ill er

I FP status . T his im

pli es that the dis m iss al w as pur suant to 2 8 U . S. C. § 19 15( g) , w hic h w e re vie wde nov o. S ee , e . g. , Br ow n v. Joh nson , 3 8 7 F. 3 d1 3 4 4 , 1 3 4 7 (1 1 th Ci r. 2 0 0 4 ). Th e d i s tri ctco u rt ’s o rd erre fe rs t o Mi l l er ’s al le gatio ns a s f

ri vol ous, and i t i s th is d et er m inatio n of

f ri vol ity that a ppe ar s to be dispo sitive. Acourt’ s sua spon te dism issals based on frivolity are provided for, an d i nd eedm an da te d b y

28 U.S.C. §§ 19 15 (e)( 2) (B)( i), a nd19 15 A(b )(1 ), an d we17

re vie wtho se de ci sio ns f

or abuse of dis cr et ion . S ee Bi la l v. D ri ve r, 251 F . 3d 1 346, 1348 -4 9 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . B ec au se it appe ar s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt c onsi de re d th e allegations of Miller’ s com plaint frivolo us and dis m issed the com plaint on that gr ound , w e w ill r ev ie wthe c ourt’ s de ci sio n un de r the abuse of dis cr et ionstandard . Ac la im is fr ivo lou s if

and o nly if it “ la ck s an arg uable ba sis e ith er in lawor in fact .” Neit zk e v . W il li am s, 4 90 U.S. 31 9, 3 27 , 10 9 S . Ct. 1 82 7, 1 83 1- 32 , 10 4 L. E d. 2d 3 38 ( 1989 ); se e al so B ila l, 251 F . 3d at 13 49. T he c ourt’ s po w er to dis m iss a cl ai m f or f ri vol ity dif fe rs and i n so m e w ay s su pe rc ed es the pow er

to dis m iss f

or fa ilure to state ac la im

und er Ru le 12( b) (6 ) of

the F ed er al Ru le s of

Ci vil Pr oc ed ur e. S ee N ei tz ke , 490 U . S. a t 32 7, 109 S . Ct . a t 18 33. T he P L RA“ ac co rd s j udge s no t on ly

the auth or ity

to dis m iss ac la im

ba se d onan in dis put ab ly m er itl es s l eg al th eo ry, b u tal s o th e u n u s u al p o we r t o p i er ce th e v ei l o f th e c o m p l ai n t ’s fa ct ua l a lle ga tio ns and d ism iss tho se c la im s whose f ac tua l c ont en tio ns are c le ar ly ba se le ss. ” I d. ; se e al so C lark v. G a. P ar dons & Paro le s B d. , 915 F . 2d 6 36, 639 -4 1 & n . 1 ( 11th C ir . 199 0) . A t the sam e tim e, w e ar e m ind fu l tha t “pr o se ple ad ing s ar e he ld t o ale ss s tr ing en t st an dard than pl ea din gs dra ft ed

by a tto rn ey s and w ill , therefore , be liberally

construed.” H ughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 115 7, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003 ) (quoting Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F. 3d 12 62, 1263 (11t h Cir. 1998 ) (p er

c ur iam )) . T hus, w ild ly

im pla usi ble a lle ga tio ns i n th e co m pla int sho uld18

not be take n to be tr

ue , but the c ourt ou ght

not pe na liz e the li tig an t f

or li ngui sti c im pr eci si on in th e m or e p laus ib le all eg at io ns . T he Co m m iss ion er ’ s arg um en ts s uppo rt ing dis m iss al a ll co nde nse to the poi nt tha t the a lle ga tio ns o f Mi lle r’ s c om pla int are r ep et iti ve of

the a lle ga tio ns presented in Miller v. K ing and Mill er v. Pry or. This repetition, the Com m issio ner subm its , de m onstrate s th at Mi lle r’ s c om

pla int c le ar ly “ la ck s an arg uable ba sis in lawor in fa ct ” an d thus s houl d be dis m iss ed f or f ri vol ity und er vari ous se ct ion s of the PL RA; a lternatively , the c om plaint evid ences Miller’ s abusiv e litigation tactics an d sh oul d be dis m iss ed

a s an e xe rc ise of

the c ourt’ s inhe re nt p ow er to pr ote ct

it s ow n j ur isd ic tio n. P utt ing a sid e the que sti on whe the r m er e re pe tit ionr en de rs a cl ai m fr i v o l o u s , we ar e n o tco n v i n ce dth atth e r ec o rdi nth i s ca s e s h o ws Mi l l er ’s cl ai m s to be r ep et iti ve . A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt i ndi cate d, Mi lle r’ s a lle ga tio ns a bout the pr iso n’ s c ondi tio ns i n th is c as e ar e str iki ngl y sim ilar to h is a lle ga tio ns a bout prison con ditio ns in King and Pry or, and thi s sim ilarity m ay be due to the actual ex ist en ce of

sim ilar co ndi tio ns i n th e A SM P. H ow ev er , Mi lle r al so c he ck ed the box m ar ke d “ y es ” in the standard pr iso ne r § 19 83 f

orm c om pla int se ct iona ski ng w he the r the pr iso ne r ha s be gun “ oth er lawsui ts . . . de al ing w iththe sam e fa ct s invo lved in th is action.” T he Com m issio ner w ouldhave us interpret this as an adm iss ionthat the c la im

in thi s c as e w hol ly

dup lic at es e ar lie r ca se s. B ut w e do19

not ho ld the pro se com

plaint to such exacting pleadin g standards. Rea d in a m ore ch ar ita ble li ght , the “ sam e fa ct s in vol ve d inthi s a ct ion ” lik el y m eans tha t the prison con ditio ns at ASM P ar e the sam e as those in the other prison s in which Mi lle r ha d be eninc ar ce rate d. B ec au se Mi lle r’ s A D Ac la im ha s at l ea st a

pla usi ble chance of succe ss, see K ing, 449 F.3d at 1150, we conclude that it has an

“ arg uabl e b as is in law.” Miller’ s factual allegations, or at least those m aking up the AD A c laim , are al so n ot s o f

an ta sti ca l a s to be c le ar ly ba se le ss. T he a lle ga tio ns w er e en oughto sur viv e sc re en ing in K ing . T he re is no n ewr ea son to v ie wthe m m or e ske pti ca lly in this case once w e consider that the sam e condition s that existed in the other pr is on s t ha t h os te d M il le r co ul d a ls o p rev ai l i n t he ASMP. Fi n al l y, we d i s ag re e w i th th e C o m m i s s i o n er ’s ar g u m en tth atMi l l er ’s pr es en t l aws ui t re pr es en ts ab us iv e li ti ga ti on warran ti ng di sm is sa l as a sa nc ti on . O f co ur se , “ the c ourt c anc onsi de r [the pr iso ne r’ s hi sto ry of m er itl es s li tig at ion ] in de ci din g to dis m iss aque sti ona ble c la im . ” Cl ar

k, 915 F . 2d at 64 1. T his c as e ra ise s c la im s and i ssu es sim ilar to those in the sti ll pe ndi ng c as es of K ing and Pr y or , and w e he sit at e to c hara ct er iz e tho se c la im s a s f ri vol ous. S ee I n r e Po w el l, 851 F. 2d 4 27, 431 ( D . C. Ci r. 198 8) ( pe r curi am) (“ Inm ak ing ade te rm inatio n a s to the f ri vol ousn es s of

num er ous ac tio ns . . . the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d be c ar ef ul n ot t oAs mentioned in Miller v. King , 449 F.3d 1149 ( 11th Cir. 2006), the district court 4 sh ou ld “ de te rm ine on

a c la im- by -c la im b a sis . . . to wh at e xtent su c h a lle g e d mi sc on du c t a lso violates [the Eighth Amendme nt to] the Constitut ion.” I d. at 1150-51. 20 reviewpending cases. ”). T he rec ord indicates that Miller has indeed been re pe at ed ly

m ove d to and f

ro m vari ous pr iso ns i n G eo rg ia , so o ne c anund er stand ho w th e al le ga ti on s i n t he co m pl ai ntco ul d b e true of d iff eren t l oc at io ns . On re m an d, the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d c onsi de r Mi lle r’ s A D Ac la im s a ga ins t the of fi ci al s f or the c ondi tio ns i n A SM P usi ng the sam e an al y sis de sc ri be d inK ing an d th e Su

pr em e Co urt’ s de ci sio n inU nit ed S tate s v. G eo rg ia , 546 U . S. 151 , 126 S . C t . 8 7 7 , 1 6 3 L . E d . 2 d6 5 0 ( 2 0 0 6 ) . M o r e o v e r , th e o u t l an d i s h an c i l l ary c l a i ms 4 – su cha s th ey

c anbe m ad e out

– tha t are part

of Mi lle r’ s c om

pla int w er e pr ope rl y dis m iss ed a s f ri vol ous. T he c or e A D Ac la im s th at are a lso the sub

j ec t of K ing and Pryor, ho wev er, p as s t hi s ea rly thr es ho ld . IV For the fore goin g reasons, the provision of the district court’ s order d i s m i s s i n g Mi l l er ’s co m

p l ai n ti s RE VER SE D; th e p ro v i s i o nen jo i n i n g Mi l l er ’s future filings is VAC AT ED ; and the case is RE MAN DE D f or further pr oc ee din gs. REVERSED, in pa rt; VACATED, in pa rt; an d R EMANDED.21

BL A CK , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , spe ci al ly

c onc ur ri ng: The d is tri ctco ur t’s i nju nc ti on flo wedfro m a m is ta ke n fi nd in g o f fri vo li ty. I w oul d va cate the inj unc tio n onthat gr ound a lon e; the re fo re , I j oinin part I II of the m aj or ity

opi nio n.