[Cite as Whitaker v. Whitaker, 2020-Ohio-2774.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

FAYETTE COUNTY 

CARRIE M. WHITAKER, 

 Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 

 - vs - 

CODY B. WHITAKER, 

 Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 

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CASE NOS. CA2019-05-008 

 CA2019-05-009 

O P I N I O N 

5/4/2020 

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION 

Case No. DRA 20140128 

Engel & Martin, LLC, Mary K. Martin, 4660 Duke Drive, Suite 101, Mason, Ohio 45040, for 

appellee and cross-appellant 

Wood & Long, LLC, Chelsea L. Long, Marcie A. Fronefield, 503 South High Street, Suite 

205, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for appellant and cross-appellee 

 RINGLAND, J. 

{¶1} Appellant/Cross-appellee, Cody Whitaker ("Father"), appeals from a decision 

of the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, following his 

divorce from appellee/cross-appellant, Carrie Whitaker ("Mother"). Mother also appeals the 

trial court's decision. 
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{¶2} Mother and Father were married on August 31, 2002 and had two children: 

Ca.W born on June 6, 2007, and Co.W born on July 1, 2010. Mother filed a complaint for 

divorce on April 14, 2014. 

{¶3} Mother was awarded temporary custody and the parenting schedule provided 

for equal parenting time. The parties were able to reach agreement regarding the allocation 

of marital debts and assets; however, the parties could not agree to the allocation of 

custody, parenting time, child support, and spousal support. 

{¶4} There were 12 evidentiary hearings before the magistrate between June 5, 

2014 and November 17, 2015. The record is replete with testimony concerning the parties' 

devout religious beliefs. Mother and Father met at Jamestown Church of Christ ("JCC") 

where Father's brother was the Pastor. In 2006, Father's brother resigned as Pastor at the 

JCC and started a new church called the Transformation Christian Church ("TCC"). The 

TCC differed in many respects from the JCC, but especially with respect to their beliefs 

concerning the covenant marriage tenant. The TCC teaches that divorce and remarriage 

is an unforgivable sin. There is evidence in the record that members of the TCC must 

"shun" Christian family members and friends that have either divorced and remarried or are 

married to a person who was previously divorced.1 

{¶5} This tenant of the TCC caused significant marital strife. Although there is 

evidence that Mother initially agreed with the teachings of the TCC, the record indicates 

that her faith in the church soured, especially as the teachings interfered with other 

relationships that Mother wished to continue. Mother testified that she was expected to not 

associate with her mother and stepfather because, as professing Christians, they had both 

 

1. Father presented testimony from several members of the TCC. Some members denied there was an 

outright prohibition on associating with divorced Christians, but some alluded to the practice. 
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divorced their original spouses and remarried each other several decades prior. There was 

evidence, for example, that Father would fly into a fit of rage if she communicated with her 

mother, such as one time when he became extremely angry and tossed several birthday 

gifts outside into the snow after her mother visited her on her birthday. That same day, 

Father "ransacked" her closet looking for any other gifts or receipts for gifts that could have 

been given to her in the past. Mother also testified that she was not allowed to attend her 

younger sister's wedding because she married a man who had previously been divorced. 

{¶6} When Mother began to reject the TCC's teachings, she explained that the 

ensuing years were "tense." Though she denied any physical violence, Mother testified that 

Father would psychologically torment her for veering from the teachings of the TCC. The 

record also reveals that Father would engage in certain bullying behaviors, such as throwing 

water on her and referring to her as a "whore" because of past relationships she had prior 

to their relationship.2 

{¶7} The record reveals that the parties had significant marriage difficulties 

including issues of mistrust and jealousy. Father admits to certain behaviors, including 

surveilling Mother, demanding passwords for emails and messages, and attaching a GPS 

device to Mother's vehicle. There was testimony that, on one occasion, Father became so 

upset that Mother would not give him her passcode to her phone that he held a gun and 

threatened to kill himself. Father later smashed Mother's phone with a hammer. 

{¶8} There was also significant testimony concerning a black dress that Mother 

wore to a funeral that Father later considered to be immodest. As a result, Father would 

take photographs of Mother "[t]o show other's how far [Mother] had fallen." Mother 

explained that this practice has impacted her oldest son, who seems preoccupied with what 

 

2. Father described the insult of calling Mother a "whore" his "go to thing." 
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clothing she wears. Mother believes that Father's conduct has had a negative impact on 

her relationship with her oldest son. When Mother brought up a concern to Father that their 

oldest son had said disrespectful things toward her, Father replied "if it was true he could 

say whatever he wants to me [Mother]." 

{¶9} While all this was ongoing, there were developments concerning the 

investigation of an inappropriate relationship between Mother and a former student where 

revealing photographs of Mother in lingerie were found on the former student's personal 

computing device. Mother admits to taking revealing photographs of herself but insists that 

she took them for Father's viewing. Mother denied sharing the photographs with the 

student. Mother was never convicted of a crime based on this investigation, but she did 

voluntarily resign her license to teach. The former student was called to testify but declined 

to appear and contested the subpoenas.3 

{¶10} The magistrate issued a judgment entry naming Father residential parent and 

awarding Mother parenting time. The parties filed objections to the magistrate's decision. 

Following independent review, the trial court named Mother as the residential parent and 

awarded equal parenting time. Father now appeals, raising six assignments of error. 

Mother cross-appeals, raising two cross-assignment of error for review. We will address 

the assignments of error out of order. 

{¶11} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

GRANTING APPELLEE, MOTHER, CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN AS THE

DECISION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶13} Assignment of Error No. 4: 

 

3. The student did appear for a deposition, which was later admitted into the record. 
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{¶14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING FATHER'S OBJECTIONS 

TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION. 

{¶15} In his first and fourth assignments of error, Father argues the trial court erred 

by designating Mother as the residential parent and legal custodian of their children and in 

ordering equal parenting time. Father's arguments are without merit. 

{¶16} R.C. 3109.04 governs the award of parental rights and responsibilities. In 

making this determination, the primary concern is the best interest of the child. Albrecht v. 

Albrecht, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2014-12-240 and CA2014-12-245, 2015-Ohio-4916, ¶ 

22. In order to determine the best interest of a child, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) requires the trial 

court to consider all relevant factors. Bristow v. Bristow, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-05-

139, 2010-Ohio-3469, ¶ 8. These factors include, but are not limited to: (1) the wishes of 

the parents, (2) the child's interaction and interrelationship with his parents, siblings, and 

other persons who may significantly affect the child's best interest, (3) the child's adjustment 

to home, school and community, (4) the mental and physical health of all persons involved, 

and (5) the likelihood that the caregiver would honor and facilitate visitation and parenting 

time. Denier v. Carnes-Denier, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-11-106, 2016-Ohio-4998, ¶ 

14. 

{¶17} An appellate court will not disturb a trial court's decision with regard to the 

allocation of parental rights and responsibilities absent an abuse of discretion. Rainey v. 

Rainey, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2010-10-083, 2011-Ohio-4343, ¶ 15. An abuse of 

discretion implies that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When reviewing 

a trial court's decision, an appellate court "may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

trial court because the 'discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be 
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accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court's 

determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.'" Renner v. Renner, 12th Dist. 

Clermont No. CA2014-01-004, 2014-Ohio-2237, ¶ 16, quoting Caldwell v. Caldwell, 12th 

Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2008-02-019 and CA2008-03-021, 2009-Ohio-2201, ¶ 15. 

{¶18} In ruling on objections to a magistrate's decision, Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) requires 

a trial court to independently review the objected matters to ascertain whether the 

magistrate properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law. 

Koeppen v. Swank, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2008-09-234, 2009-Ohio-3675, ¶ 26. When 

conducting its de novo review, the trial court may not defer to the magistrate because the 

magistrate is a subordinate officer of the trial court, not an independent officer performing a 

separate function. Leach v. Leach, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-06-092, 2020-Ohio-1181, 

¶ 11. Consequently, the trial court has the ultimate authority and responsibility over the 

magistrate's findings and rulings. Mandzak v. Graves, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-06-

173, 2010-Ohio-595, ¶ 7. 

{¶19} After a thorough review of the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by designating Mother as the residential parent and legal custodian of the 

children and allocating equal parenting time. The record reflects that the trial court 

considered all relevant factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and applied those factors in making its 

decision. 

{¶20} The record reflects that both Mother and Father wish to be the residential 

parent and legal custodian of the children and presented evidence and testimony to support 

their respective positions. The children were not interviewed in camera, but the testimony 

presented indicates that the children are both bonded to their parents and are well cared 

for. The children are well-adjusted to their home, school, and community. 
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{¶21} As it relates to the mental and physical health of the persons involved, the 

record reflects that Father ordered a psychological report pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(C). The 

record reflects that both parents may suffer from some mental health distress. Father 

presented psychological testing and exhibits from a psychologist, Dr. Richard Bromberg. 

Dr. Bromberg conducted clinical interviews and psychological testing on both Mother and 

Father and recommended that Father be the primary residential parent for the children. Dr. 

Bromberg also recommended that Mother only have supervised visitation with the children 

until she was able to complete a psychological examination and make progress in 

treatment. 

{¶22} The trial court found Dr. Bromberg's testimony and report was relevant and 

probative, but ultimately outside the scope of the referral. In so doing, the trial court noted 

that Dr. Bromberg's recommendation was "specious." Though Dr. Bromberg indicated that 

his recommendation was made to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, he 

indicated that many of his conclusions were just "test findings" and equivocated on the value 

of his findings in terms of a diagnosis. The confusion surrounding Dr. Bromberg's testimony 

was also shared by the GAL who included as part of her written report: 

My main problem in this case is Dr. Bromberg's testimony. As 

may have been evident by the direction my cross-examination 

took, it surprises me that he did not take into consideration the 

reality that these parties were in. He seemed to want to insist 

that the test could filter that out, but couldn't say how. He said 

[Mother] tested very high on the paranoia scale and that the fact 

that she was in fact being followed and ostracized did not affect 

the results. I find that hard to believe. In further questioning, he 

admitted that if a hypothetical spy, who was also being followed 

and living a deceptive life, took the same test, he did not know 

how the test would turn out. He called it an interesting question.4 

 

4. We note that the GAL recommended that Father be the residential parent and recommended a schedule 

for equal parenting time. 
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Thus, although the trial court considered Dr. Bromberg's testimony and report, the court 

declined to adopt his "recommendations" as specious and outside the scope of the referral. 

{¶23} As it relates to the likelihood that the caregiver would honor and facilitate 

visitation and parenting time, the trial court found that Mother would be most likely to 

cooperate in that regard. In this case, there is evidence that Mother facilitates a relationship 

between Father and the children, while Father has been less cooperative in this regard. For 

example, Mother testified that Father would not allow her to visit with the children on 

Mother's Day because "Mother's Day was for mothers who actually cared about their 

children." There was also substantial evidence, much of it elicited by Father, regarding the 

TCC's intolerance regarding divorce. As a result, Mother is concerned that Father's views 

are impacting her relationship with the children. This is evidenced by Father's behavior 

towards Mother. As previously noted, when Mother brought up a concern to Father that 

their oldest son had been behaving disrespectfully towards her, Father replied "if it was true 

he could say whatever he wants to me" and "if it's the truth I'm not going to tell him not to 

quote scripture." 

{¶24} Following review, we find that the trial court properly performed a thorough 

review of the record, including a proper balancing of best interest factors, and did not abuse 

its discretion in ordering that Mother remain the children's residential parent and legal 

custodian and ordering equal parenting time. 

{¶25} Assignment of Error No. 3: 

{¶26} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOCATING 

PARENTING TIME ON AN EQUAL BASIS, AS IT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT 

OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶27} In his third assignment of error, Father argues the trial court's decision 
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allocating parenting time is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Father's argument 

is without merit. 

{¶28} Father is incorrect that the manifest weight of the evidence standard applies 

to his challenge to the trial court's decision regarding parenting time. It is well established 

that a trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the visitation rights of a 

nonresidential parent, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 

Warman v. Warman, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-08-170, 2017-Ohio-7462, ¶ 8. 

{¶29} In this case, the trial court ordered equal parenting time in an alternating week 

schedule.5 Father states that the trial court's decision includes numerous transitions but 

fails to explain how this arrangement negatively impacts their best interests. Furthermore, 

a review of this assignment of error reveals that Father is merely reasserting or repackaging 

the arguments made with respect to the trial court's decision on naming Mother residential 

parent and legal custodian. In so doing, Father summarily argues that equal parenting time 

is not in the children's best interest and that the "children should reside primarily with 

[Father] and exercise alternate weekends with [Mother]." However, for the reasons detailed 

in resolution of Father's first and fourth assignments of error, Father's third assignment of 

error is also without merit and is hereby overruled. 

{¶30} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶31} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT CONSIDERING TESTIMONY OR 

 

5. The trial court adopted the parenting time schedule in the temporary order: 

Mother: Tuesday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 

Father: Sunday at 6:00 p.m. to Tuesday at 6:00 p.m. 

Mother: Tuesday at 6:00 p.m. to Thursday 6:00 p.m. 

Father: Thursday at 6:00 p.m. to Tuesday at 6:00 p.m.
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EVALUATION OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERT. 

{¶32} In his second assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred by not 

considering the testimony or evaluation of Dr. Bromberg. We disagree. 

{¶33} As noted above, the trial court considered Dr. Bromberg's testimony and 

report but ultimately found his recommendations to be "specious." As noted in resolution 

of Father's first and fourth assignments of error, this finding was supported by the record. 

This court has previously noted that such considerations are "only one consideration that 

the trial court may take into account when making its best interest determination." Albrecht, 

2015-Ohio-4916 at ¶ 25. In this case, the trial court considered the testimony presented by 

the psychologist, but ultimately rejected the psychologist's recommendation and found it 

was in the best interest of the children for Mother to be named residential parent and 

custodian based on additional evidence that was presented during the hearings. Father's 

second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶34} Assignment of Error No. 5: 

{¶35} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING FATHER'S RELIGIOUS 

BELIEFS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO FREEDOM OF 

RELIGION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION. 

{¶36} In his fifth assignment of error, Father alleges the trial court violated his 

constitutional rights to freedom of religion. Father's assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶37} "[P]arents have a fundamental right to educate their children, including the 

right to communicate their moral and religious values * * * [and] 'direct the religious 

upbringing of their children.'" Suwareh v. Nwankwo, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2017-12-174, 

2018-Ohio-3737, ¶ 29, quoting Pater v. Pater, 63 Ohio St.3d 393, 397 (1992). "In a custody 

dispute, the parents' rights must be balanced against the state's need to determine the best 
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interests of the child." Pater at 397. "[A] domestic relations court may consider the religious 

practices of the parents in order to protect the best interests of a child." Id. at 395. However, 

a court may not restrict a parent's right to expose his or her child to religious beliefs, "unless 

the conflict between the parents' religious beliefs is affecting the child's general welfare." 

Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 

{¶38} In this case, Father presented extensive testimony and argument regarding 

his religious convictions. Mother expressed concerns with the TCC's teachings due to 

Father's intolerance regarding divorce and that he may be forcing these beliefs on his 

children to the detriment of Mother. 

{¶39} Following review, we find that Father's constitutional rights were not violated 

or improperly considered in the trial court's decision. In this case, the trial court only 

referenced Father's religious beliefs in order to protect the best interests of the children, 

which is permissible under Pater. In this case, the trial court's entry states: 

The Court finds the Guardian ad litem's report to be instructive 

and verified by the testimony adduced at trial. The children love 

each parent and are adjusting to the emotional turmoil of 

separation and divorce. [Mother's] concerns about the potential 

influence of [Fathers'] church (Transformation Christian Church) 

[are] valid, given its tenet of intolerance regarding divorce. This 

is evidenced by the children's inappropriate comments to their 

mother, rationalized by their father as consistent with biblical 

teaching. The parenting schedule ordered herein will give 

[Mother] the opportunity to choose the children's church on her

parenting Sundays and expose the children to alternative 

Christian teaching and principles. 

{¶40} In so doing, the trial court did not violate Father's rights to freedom of religion 

or deprive him of his fundamental rights to educate his children. The trial court merely noted 

Mother's concern and the way these beliefs may affect the children's general welfare. 

{¶41} Finally, Father summarily asserts that Mother once shared the same religious 

beliefs and "[i]f the Court is to consider [Father's] faith and its impact on the children, [it] 
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should do so for the [Mother]." However, following review, we find the trial court did not err 

in its handling of the religious matters in this case, an issue that was very much the focus 

of Father's case. Father's fifth assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. 

{¶42} Assignment of Error No. 6: 

{¶43} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ISSUE FINDINGS OF FACT 

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WHEN NOT GRANTING AN ADDITIONAL DEVIATION TO 

CHILD SUPPORT EVEN THOUGH APPELLANT WAS GRANTED IN EXCESS OF 147 

OVERNIGHTS. 

{¶44} In his sixth assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred by failing 

to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law after not allowing a deviation under R.C. 

3119.231. We sustain Father's sixth assignment of error. 

{¶45} In the present case, the trial court ordered a ten percent deviation as Father's 

parenting time exceeded 90 days as provided in R.C. 3119.051. However, on March 28, 

2019, shortly before the final judgment entry, R.C. 3119.231 became effective. R.C. 

3119.231 provides: 

(A) If court-ordered parenting time exceeds ninety overnights 

per year, the court shall consider whether to grant a deviation

pursuant to section 3119.22 of the Revised Code for the reason 

set forth in division (C) of section 3119.23 of the Revised Code. 

This deviation is in addition to any adjustments provided under

division (A) of section 3119.051 of the Revised Code. 

(B) If court-ordered parenting time is equal to or exceeds one

hundred forty-seven overnights per year, and the court does not

grant a deviation under division (A) of this section, it shall specify 

in the order the facts that are the basis for the court’s decision. 

{¶46} Thus, R.C. 3119.231(A) provides for an additional deviation along with the 

deviation contained in R.C. 3119.051 and, if the overnight parenting time exceeds the 

overnights contained in R.C. 3119.231(B) and is not granted a deviation, the trial court "shall 
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specify in the order the facts that are the basis for the court’s decision." 

{¶47} It is undisputed that Father's parenting time exceeds 147 overnights per year. 

However, the trial court's entry did not grant Father the additional deviation and thus was 

required to "specify in the order the facts that are the basis for the court’s decision" to satisfy 

R.C. 3119.231(B). Since these findings were not made, we sustain Father's sixth 

assignment of error. 

{¶48} Cross-Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶49} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPUTING A WAGE OF $42,000 TO 

APPELLEE. 

{¶50} In her first cross-assignment of error, Mother alleges the trial court erred by 

imputing $42,000 in income. The record indicates that Mother, a former schoolteacher, lost 

her job when she surrendered her license after there were reports she had an inappropriate 

relationship with a student. We find Mother's argument is without merit. 

{¶51} A trial court's decision specific to whether a parent is voluntarily 

underemployed will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. McLaughlin 

v. Kessler, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2011-09-021, 2012-Ohio-3317, ¶ 14. For an 

unemployed or underemployed parent, income is the "sum of the gross income of the parent 

and any potential income of the parent." R.C. 3119.01(C)(5)(b). Potential income includes 

imputed income that a trial court determines the parent would have earned if fully employed 

based upon the criteria set forth in R.C. 3119.01(C)(11)(a)(i)-(xi), which includes the 

parent's prior employment experience, education, skills and training, employment 

availability, and local wages. Daniel v. Hester, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-02-037, 2016-

Ohio-7543, ¶ 12. Before a trial court may impute income to a parent, however, it must first 

find that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed. R.C. 
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3119.01(C)(11); Kessler at ¶ 13. The parent who claims the other parent is voluntarily 

underemployed bears the burden of proof. Reynolds-Cornett v. Reynolds, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA2013-09-175, 2014-Ohio-2893, ¶ 10. 

{¶52} Following review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imputing 

$42,000 as Mother's income. In this case, the trial court found that Mother was voluntarily 

underemployed. The record reflects that Mother's 2013 tax return shows that she earned 

a salary of $42,000. Though Mother no longer holds a license to teach, she holds a master's 

degree in education and testified about certain job opportunities that she was seeking, even 

without the licensure. In fact, Mother testified that she was "very confident" in her "abilities 

to procure not even just another job, but another job with my degrees." Furthermore, the 

trial court indicated that Mother is currently pursuing additional educational opportunities 

and that she has no mental or physical problems that would prevent her from obtaining and 

maintaining employment. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

imputing Mother's income as $42,000. Mother's first cross-assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶53} Cross-Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶54} THE MAGISTRATE COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN ALLOWING THE 

DEPOSITION OF L.R. TO BE USED AS EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED 

ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION ON THIS ISSUE TO 

STAND. 

{¶55} In her second cross-assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court erred 

by allowing the deposition of L.R., the student she allegedly had an inappropriate 

relationship with, to be admitted in lieu of live testimony. However, based on the trial court's 

decision, Mother concedes that "it would appear this issue is moot." Furthermore, we find 

that any such error was harmless, as the trial court's decision would have likely been the 
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same without the inclusion of the deposition. In this case, Mother was granted custody of 

the children and the trial court awarded appropriate parenting time. Mother does not contest 

the award of custody or the amount of parenting time. 

{¶56} It is well established that an error in the admission of evidence only warrants 

a reversal if the error prejudices the appealing party. Banford v. Aldrich Chem. Co. Inc., 

126 Ohio St.3d 210, 2010-Ohio-2470, at ¶ 38; Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 106 Ohio 

St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, at ¶ 20. If a factfinder probably would have arrived at the same 

decision absent the occurrence of the error, then the error is harmless and will not justify 

reversal. Hayward v. Summa Health Sys./Akron City Hosp., 139 Ohio St. 3d 238, 2014-

Ohio-1913, ¶ 25; Theobald v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-560, 2005-

Ohio-1510, ¶ 17 ("[w]hen avoidance of the error would not have changed the outcome of 

the proceedings, then the error neither materially prejudices the complaining party nor 

affects a substantial right of the complaining party"). As a result, we overrule Mother's 

second cross-assignment of error. 

{¶57} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 

 HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.