Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 43A03-1512-CR-2355 | April 10, 2017 Page 1 of 12

APPELLANT PRO SE

Jacob L. Maciaszek

Greencastle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jacob Lee Maciaszek,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

April 10, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

43A03-1512-CR-2355

Appeal from the Kosciusko 

Superior Court

The Honorable David C. Cates, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

43D01-1205-FB-319

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 43A03-1512-CR-2355 | April 10, 2017 Page 2 of 12

[1] Jacob Lee Maciaszek appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for 

presentence credit time. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 22, 2012, the State charged Maciaszek with two counts of Class B 

felony burglary1 and two counts of Class D felony theft.2

 The next day, the 

State placed a hold on Maciaszek in Collier County, Florida, where he was 

serving a sentence on an unrelated conviction with a release date of August 1, 

2012. When Indiana placed that hold, Maciaszek was already subject to holds 

placed by New Hampshire and Maine,3 where he also was alleged to have 

committed crimes.

[3] After completing his sentence in Florida, Maciaszek was transported to New 

Hampshire, where he was found guilty and given a sentence of one-and-a-half 

to six years, with a parole eligibility date of February 27, 2014. On January 10, 

2013, while incarcerated in New Hampshire, Maciaszek filed a Request for 

Disposition of his pending Indiana charges under the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers (“IAD”), which provides a mechanism for the “attendance of 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(1) (1999).

2 Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(1) (2009).

3 The record does not indicate the resolution of the charges in Maine.
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defendants confined as prisoners in institutions of other jurisdictions of the 

United States” in an Indiana court. Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4 (1981).

[4] Based on his request, Indiana authorities took custody of Maciaszek on March 

19, 2013, and transported him to Indiana. On August 6, 2013, he pled guilty to 

two counts of Class B felony burglary and was sentenced to sixteen years with 

no credit for time served prior to sentencing (“Indiana Sentence”). The trial 

court ordered Maciaszek “shall be immediately returned to the New Hampshire 

State Prison, Northern Correctional Facility, Berlin, New Hampshire. Upon 

completion of the New Hampshire sentence, authorities of the State of Indiana 

shall be notified and custody of Jacob Maciaszek returned to the State of 

Indiana.” (App. at 9/1.4

)

[5] On November 5, 2015, Maciaszek filed, pro se, a “Verified Petition for 

Presentence Jail Time Credit and Earned Credit Time,” (id. at 13), arguing he 

should have been given credit on his Indiana Sentence from May 23, 2012, 

when Indiana put a hold on him in Florida, until his sentencing in Indiana on 

August 6, 2013. The trial court did not hold a hearing, and on December 4, 

2015, the trial court denied Maciaszek’s petition.

Discussion and Decision

 

4 “9/1” is the page number as it appears in Maciaszek’s Appendix.
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[6] We first note Maciaszek proceeded at the trial court level and proceeds in this 

appeal pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se is held to the same established rules 

of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith v. Donahue, 907 

N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, cert. dismissed. One risk a 

litigant takes when he proceeds pro se is that he will not know how to 

accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to accomplish. Id. 

When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for us to indulge in 

any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule for the orderly 

and proper conduct of his appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 502 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2006). 

[7] Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3 (2015) provides, regarding good credit time for 

a person convicted of a crime that occurred prior to July 1, 2014:

(b) A person assigned to Class I earns one (1) day of good time 

credit for each day the person is imprisoned for a crime or 

confined awaiting trial or sentencing.

(c) A person assigned to Class II earns one (1) day of good time 

credit for every two (2) days the person is imprisoned for a crime 

or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.

(d) A person assigned to Class III earns no good time credit.

(e) A person assigned to Class IV earns one (1) day of good time 

credit for every six (6) days the person is imprisoned for a crime 

or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
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[8] As our Indiana Supreme Court has noted, when a defendant challenges the 

validity of the pre-sentence credit time he received, there are two types of credit 

that must be calculated: “(1) the credit toward the sentence a prisoner receives 

for time actually served, and (2) the additional credit a prisoner receives for 

good behavior and educational attainment.” Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 

222 (Ind. 1999). We will refer herein to these two distinct types of credit as 

“credit for actual time served” and “good time credit.”

[9] To determine whether a prisoner is entitled to pre-trial credit for actual time 

served, we must determine whether the defendant was confined before trial and 

whether that confinement was the “result of the criminal charge for which [the] 

sentence is being imposed.” Stephens v. State, 735 N.E.2d 278, 284 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2000), trans. denied. See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3 (requiring defendant be 

“confined awaiting trial or sentencing”). Thus, for example, 

[i]f a person incarcerated awaiting trial on more than one charge 

is sentenced to concurrent terms for the separate crimes, he or 

she is entitled to receive credit time applied against each separate 

term. However, if the defendant receives consecutive terms, he 

or she is only allowed credit time against the total or aggregate of 

the terms.

Payne v. State, 838 N.E.2d 503, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 

[10] Once we have determined whether a prisoner was entitled to credit for actual 

time served and, if so, how many days were earned, then we may turn to 

Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3 to determine how many days of good time 

credit were also earned. Good time credit under that statute is a “matter of 
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statutory right, not a matter of judicial discretion.” Weaver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 

945, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The trial court simply calculates how many 

good time credit days the defendant earned based on the number of days of 

actual time served and the defendant’s “Class,” as defined in Indiana Code 

Section 35-50-6-4. 

Here, Maciaszek asserts error in the calculation of presentence credit time. At 

issue are two different periods of time: (1) when he was incarcerated in foreign 

jurisdictions from May 23, 2012, to March 18, 2013, and (2) when he was 

incarcerated in Indiana awaiting trial and sentencing from March 19, 2013, to 

August 6, 2013. Within each of those periods of time, we will examine 

Maciaszek’s requests for “credit time” in terms of “credit for actual time 

served” and “good credit time.”

I. Presentence Credit for Time Incarcerated in Foreign Jurisdictions

[11] Maciaszek was in jail for an unrelated charge in Florida at the time Indiana put 

a hold on him for the crimes alleged in Indiana. The Indiana hold was 

subsequent to holds placed by New Hampshire and Maine for crimes he 

allegedly committed in those states. After Florida released Maciaszek, he was 

transported to New Hampshire, where he was found guilty of the charged 

crimes and sentenced to one-and-a-half to six years incarcerated. 

[12] Maciaszek argues he should receive credit for actual time served and good time 

credit on his Indiana Sentence for the time he spent incarcerated in Florida and 
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New Hampshire prior to his Indiana Sentence. Maciaszek relies on a portion of 

Dolan v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1364 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), in which we stated:

Where a defendant is confined during the same time period for 

multiple offenses and the offenses are tried separately, the 

defendant is entitled to a “full credit” for each offense for which 

he is sentenced. Each “full credit” is determined by the number 

of days the defendant spent in confinement for the offense for 

which the defendant is sentenced up to the date of sentencing for 

that offense. Ordinarily, the presentence time served credit 

whether the defendant is held on one or multiple offenses is 

determined by the same method. The credit will be the number 

of days the defendant spent in confinement from the date of 

arrest for the offense to the date of sentencing for that same 

offense.

Id. at 1373. However, Maciaszek ignores the other language in Dolan:

Although IC 35-50-6-3 states a defendant is allowed credit for 

time “confined awaiting trial or sentencing,” we conclude the 

Legislature clearly intended the credit to apply only to the 

sentence for the offense for which the presentence time was 

served. Any other result would allow credit time for time served 

on wholly unrelated offenses. Under the criminal justice system, 

once convicted, the defendant must serve the sentence imposed 

for the offense committed. Credit time allowed by legislative 

grace toward a specific sentence clearly must be for time served 

for the offense for which that specific sentence was imposed.

Id. Our court concluded Dolan was not entitled to presentence credit time on 

his sentence in one county for time spent in jail on an unrelated charge in 

another county. 
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[13] We recently applied Dolan to a case involving credit for actual time served in 

Purdue v. State, 51 N.E.3d 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). In Purdue, the trial court 

denied Purdue credit for actual time served awaiting trial for Level 6 felony 

theft because he was also serving time on two offenses that were dismissed as 

part of his plea agreement. Our court reasoned those two offenses, though not 

committed at the same time, were not “wholly unrelated” under Dolan, 420 

N.E.2d at 1373, as to deny Purdue presentence credit for actual time served for 

the theft charge because “the three cause numbers, and the underlying charges 

of each, were considered together during the give and take process of plea 

negotiations.” Purdue, 51 N.E.3d at 438.

[14] The same is not true here, where the charges Maciaszek faced in Indiana were 

not related to those with which he had been convicted in Florida and New 

Hampshire. Further, Purdue distinguished its holding from situations like 

Maciaszek’s in noting Purdue “did not ask the trial court to grant accrued time 

for confinement spent in another state or another county.” Id. at 438. We thus 

hold the trial court did not err when it refused Maciaszek’s request for credit 

time5 for the days he served in Florida and New Hampshire on unrelated 

charges from May 23, 2012, to March 18, 2013.

II. Presentence Credit Time for Time Spent in Indiana Awaiting Trial

 

5 As Maciaszek is not entitled to credit for actual time served against his Indiana Sentence, he is also not 

entitled to good time credit, which allows for extra days of credit based on the credit class of the offender and 

the actual days the offender served. See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3 (good credit time statute).
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[15] Maciaszek also contends he is entitled to presentence credit time from March 

19, 2013, to August 6, 2013. Those are the days he spent in Indiana, 

specifically at the Kosciusko County Jail, after he was extradited from New 

Hampshire to stand trial for the charges against him in Indiana. 

A. Credit for Actual Time Served

[16] Maciaszek’s facts closely parallel those in Ramirez v. State, 455 N.E.2d 609 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Ramirez v. Indiana, 469 U.S. 929 (1984), 

judgment summarily affirmed without opinion sub nom. Ramirez v. Indiana, 471 U.S. 

147 (1985), reh’g denied. Ramirez was incarcerated in Michigan when he was 

transported to Indiana to stand trial for charges filed against him in Indiana. 

He was convicted of the Indiana charges and sentenced accordingly. Ramirez

then petitioned the trial court for credit time against his Indiana sentence for the 

time he was incarcerated in Michigan prior to his sentence as well as the time 

he was in jail in Indiana awaiting trial. The trial court denied Ramirez’s 

request, and he appealed.

[17] Like in Dolan, the court held Ramirez was not entitled to presentence credit for 

the days he served in Michigan on a Michigan conviction. Id. at 617. 

However, the court held Ramirez was entitled to credit time for the days he 

spent in jail in Indiana awaiting trial on Indiana charges. Id. The court stated:

The State argues because Ramirez apparently received credit 

against his Michigan sentence for the days he was in the Howard 

County Jail awaiting trial and sentencing on the Indiana drug 

charges, he is not entitled to also receive credit time for those 
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days in Indiana. The State is incorrect. There is no indication 

the sentences in [the Indiana drug convictions] were to run 

consecutively to the Michigan sentence. Because the Michigan 

and Indiana sentences must therefore be assumed to be 

concurrent, it would appear Ramirez was entitled to have the 322 

days [he spent in the Howard County Jail awaiting trial and 

sentencing on the Indiana drug charges] credited to both his 

Michigan sentence and to the aggregate of the two Indiana 

sentences. 

Id. (citations and footnote omitted).

[18] The same is true here. In its “Amended Judgment of Conviction and Order of 

Commitment” the trial court stated: “[Maciaszek] shall be immediately 

returned to the New Hampshire State Prison, Northern Correctional Facility, 

Berlin, New Hampshire. Upon completion of the New Hampshire sentence, 

authorities of the State of Indiana shall be notified and custody of Jacob

Maciaszek returned to the State of Indiana.” (App. at 9/1.) That language 

does not indicate Maciaszek’s Indiana Sentence was to be served consecutive to 

his sentence in New Hampshire. Nor was there language in Maciaszek’s plea 

agreement to indicate his Indiana Sentence was to be served consecutive to his 

New Hampshire sentence. Thus, as in Ramirez, we must conclude the Indiana 

and New Hampshire sentences were to be served concurrently. We also must 

conclude, as in Ramirez and Dolan that Maciaszek is entitled to credit for actual 

time served in the Kosciusko County Jail awaiting trial on the Indiana charges. 

See Dolan, 420 N.E.2d at 1374 (absence of court order or statute to indicate 

sentences in two jurisdictions are to be served consecutively leads to the 
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conclusion the sentences are to be served concurrently; therefore, Dolan was 

entitled to presentence credit time for time spent in jail awaiting trial while still 

receiving credit against his sentence in a different jurisdiction). 

[19] Maciaszek was in the Kosciusko County Jail from March 19, 2013, until 

August 6, 2013, and the trial court erred by not giving Maciaszek credit for 

actual time served for those 141 days. 

B. Good Time Credit

[20] Because Maciaszek is entitled to credit for actual time served against the 

Indiana Sentence for the days he spent in Indiana awaiting trial on the Indiana 

charges, the trial court also should have determined whether Maciaszek was 

assigned to a credit class, as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-4 (2008), 

that allows him to also receive good time credit for those days. See Ind. Code § 

35-50-6-3. We are unable to determine whether Maciaszek is to receive good 

time credit because the record before us does not indicate Maciaszek’s credit 

class. We therefore remand for the trial court to determine Maciaszek’s credit 

class under Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-4 and to assign him the number of 

good time credit days to which he is entitled under Indiana Code Section 35-50-

6-3.

6

 See Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 792 (Ind. 2004) (“a trial court’s 

 

6 In his initial brief, Maciaszek argued he is also entitled to post-sentence credit for the time he spent in 

Indiana after sentencing awaiting extradition to New Hampshire. In his reply brief, he acknowledged the 

waiver of that argument based on the fact he presented the issue for the first time on appeal, and he withdrew 

that issue from our consideration. 
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sentencing judgment must include both days imprisoned before sentencing and 

the credit time earned thereby, thus reflecting any credit time deprivation 

imposed before sentencing”).

Conclusion

[21] The trial could did not err when it denied Maciaszek’s request for presentence 

credit for actual time served or for good time credit based on the time he spent 

incarcerated in Florida and New Hampshire prior to his extradition to Indiana. 

However, the trial court should have granted Maciaszek’s request for 

presentence credit for actual time served and good time credit for the time he 

spent in Indiana awaiting trial on the Indiana charges. Accordingly, we affirm 

in part, reverse in part, and remand for amendment of Maciaszek’s sentencing 

order to reflect a proper calculation of credit time.

[22] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.