T he H onorabl e D ani el M
. Fr i edm an, Ci r cui t Ju dge of t he U nit ed S t at es Co ur t of Ap peal s f

or t he Federa l * C i rcui t , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0275n.06 F iled: May 19, 2008 Case No. 05- 6189 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. MICHAEL WAYNE MURP HY, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT CO UR T F OR

THE M ID DL E DI STRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEF OR E: BA TC HELD ER , SU TTON , a nd F RI ED M AN , Ci r c uitJudg e s. * ALICE M. B ATCHELDER, Circuit Jud ge. Mic ha e l Way ne Murp hy

(“ Murp hy” ) a

pp e a ls his conviction on a cha

rg e of be i n g a fe lon in possession of a fire arm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ), and his sente nce a s an ar med ca ree r cr iminal in accor dance with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)

. Murp hy ra ise s thre e iss ue s in

thi s a pp e a l: ( 1) the dis tr ic t c ou rt erred in d e nyinghis mot ion to
su pp re ss e vid e nc e ob ta ine d d ur inga tr a ff ic sto p; ( 2) the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in f a ili ngto gra

nt h im a Guidelines r eduction for acc eptanc e of r esponsibility ; and (3) the district court e rre d in sentencing him as an ar

med ca ree r cr iminal. F inding no merit in any of Murphy ’s contentions, we AF F IRM
. I. BACKG ROUNDM urphy was not sur e i f t here was a r o und i n t he cham b er. 1
M ur phy was i s s ued s t at e ci t at i ons f or f ai l i ng t o s t op at a s t op s i gn , cons umi ng or po s s es s i ng an open cont ai ner 2 of an al cohol i c bev er age wh i l e dr i vi ng , an d f ai l i ng t o s how pr oo f

of i ns ur anc e. 2 On the af ternoon of D ece mber 31, 2003, De puty Br ian B edsworth ( “De puty Be dsworth”) of the L awr e nc e vil le , T e nn e sse e , Co un ty She ri ff ’s De pa rtme nt s aw M ur

ph y ru n a sto p sig n a

nd c a us e another vehicle to swe rv e off the r oad. De puty Be dsworth ac tivated the lig hts on his cruiser a nd pulled Murphy

over. Mur

phy g ot out of his vehicle and a pproac hed De puty

Be dsworth, who orde red Murphy to return to his truck; Murphy complied and the de puty followed. As Murphy

g ot back into his truck, De puty Be dsworth s aw him pus h a rifle barr el from the driver’ s side over to the passeng er’ s side. Deputy Be dsworth immediately

order ed Murphy

to place his hands on the s teer ing wheel; as the deputy approa ched the truck on the dr iver’s side, he detec ted an odor of alcohol. When Mur

phy was unable to pr oduce his drive r’s lice nse or pr oof of insura nce, Deputy Be dsworth orde red him to exit the truck. At that point, Deputy

Be dsworth could see inside the truck, whe re he observe d an open be er
c an o n th e c on so le and

a ba g wi th m or e be e r i n it . Upo n b e ingqu e sti on e d, Murphy tol d D e pu ty Be dsworth that he had consumed one beer , he had been deer hunting that morning , the rifle in the truck wa s loaded, and his driver’ s license had been suspended. Assuring Murphy that he wa s not 1 under arr est, Deputy

Be dsworth obtained Murphy ’s conse nt to conduct a pat-down sea rch, dur ing the cour se of whic h he found Mur phy ’s Tenne ssee identific ation car d. The de puty then put Murphy in the back of the patrol car and ran a li cense chec k on his identification car d; finding that Murphy ’s lic e ns e ha d b e e n r e vo ke d, the de puty pla c e d h im und e r a

rr e st. 2M ur phy ’ s f our pri or v i ol ent f

el ony conv i ct i ons , s et fo rth in t he P SR an d ut i l i zed by t he di s t r i ct cour t at 3 sen t en cing , are as f

o l l o w s: ( 1) Ar s on , Au g u s t 16, 1988, Cas e N o. 3099, Ci r cu i t Cour t of G i l es Coun t y , T en n es s ee , s en t en ce of 1 0 years; (2 ) T hi rd D egree B urgl ary , A ugust 1 6 , 1 9 8 8 , C ase N o . 3 1 0 1 , C i rcui t C o urt o f G i le s C o u n ty, T en ne ssee , sen t en ce o f f i ve years; (3 ) T h ird D e g re e B u r g la r y , A u g u st 1 6 , 1 9 8 8 , C a se N o . 3 1 0 2 , C irc u it C o u rt o f G iles C o u n ty, T enness ee, s ent ence o f f i ve y ears; and ( 4) Fe l on y Es ca pe, Se pt embe r 17, 1992, C as e N o. 92- C- 1435, Cr i mi n al / Ci r cu i t Cour t of D av i ds on 3 A fe dera l gr and jury

indicted Murphy for being a felon in possession of a firea rm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g ) and 924, and the Gove rnment filed a notice indicatingits int ent to seek a n enhanc ed sente nce pur suant to the Armed Ca ree r C riminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)

. Murp hy mov e d to su

pp re ss a ll e vid e nc e ob ta ine d d ur ingthe tr a ff

ic sto p a nd his su bs e qu e nt a

rr e st, contendingthat Deputy

Be dsworth had not ha d probable cause to conduct the initial traff ic stop and thu s ha d vio late d Murp hy ’s F ourt h Am e ndme nt Rig hts

. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d the mo ti on to
su pp re ss, c on c lud ingthat D e puty B e ds wo rt

h ha d watc he d Mur

ph y ru n a sto p s ig n, wh ic h g a ve him pr ob a ble c a us e to m ake the ini tia l sto p, and that the su bs e qu e nt e ve nts — the de puty ’s se e ing a ri fl e in plain view and smel l ing the odor of a lcoholic spirits, Murphy ’s admission that he had be en drinking alcohol, and Mur phy ’s fa ilure t o produce a valid driver’ s license or proof of insurance — ha d a ll oc c ur

re d d ur ingthe c ours e of

a va lid tr a ff ic sto p a nd pr ov ide d p ro ba

ble c a us e to a rr e st M u r p h y. The jury found Murphy

guilty on the count cha

rg ed in the indi ctment, and the Presentenc e I nvestig ation Report (“ PSR ”) r ecommende d that the district court sente nce him to a minimum of 15 y ear s’ imprisonment in acc ordanc e with the AC CA beca use he ha d previously

been c onvicted of at le a st thr e e se pa

rate vio le nt fe lon ie s. Murp hy ob je c te d to the PSR, c la imi ng , amon g oth e r t hin g s, 3C o unt y , T enness ee, s ent ence o f one y ear. T he G o vernm ent rej ect ed t ho se prop o sed p l eas bec ause t hey d i d no t ta k e in to acc o unt t he enhancem ent 4 requir ed by 18 U
. S.C
. § 9 2 4 (e)( 1 ). 4 that he had not be en convic ted of thre e “separate” violent offe nses and the AC CA there fore did not apply . Fur

thermore , at his sentenc ing hear ing Mur phy contende d that he should have been grante d a Guidelines r eduction for acc eptanc e of r esponsibility b ec au s e h e had twic e attempted to plea d g uil ty
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ov e rr ule d a ll of

Murp hy ’s ob

je c tio ns and

se nte nc e d h im t o 2 10 months ’ 4 incar cer ation. This timely appea l followed.

II. AN AL YSI S Murp hy ra ise s thre e iss ue s o n a

pp e a l. F ir st, he c la ims the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis motion to s uppress. Sec ond, he argues that the district c ourt err ed when it denied him a Guidelines
re du c tio n f

or a c c e pta nc e of re sp on sib ili ty . T hir d, he c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in sentenc ing him under

the ACCA. A. M ot ion to Suppr e ss The de nial or g rant of a motion to suppress prese nts a mix ed question of law and fa ct. United Sta te s v . S an for d , 4 7 6 F. 3 d

3 9 1 , 3 9 4 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tates v . H ur st , 228 F.3d 751, 756 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)). “T hus, we re view the district cour t’s finding s of fa ct for c lear err or and the district c ourt’s conclusions of law de novo.” Id

. (c i t i n g Un ite d S tates v . D illar

d , 438 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2006)). We must view the evide nce “ in the light most likely to suppor t the district court’s decision.” Di lla rd, 438 F.3d at 680 (interna l quotation marks and citations omitted). We will find a district cour

t’s fac tual finding s clea

rly err oneous only

if, afte r reviewing all the evidenc e, we are5

“lef t with the definite and f

irm co n v i ct i o n t h at a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.” United States v. Navarro-Camacho , 186 F.3d 701, 705 ( 6th Cir. 1999). We evaluate whether a traff ic stop violate s the Four

th Amendment “in the same manner as other alleg ed violations of that Amendment: by undertaking ‘ an objec tive assessment of a n office r’s actions in light of the fac ts and circ umstances then known to him. The lang uag e of the Amendment itself proscr ibes only

‘unre asonable ’ sea

rche s and seizures.’” United States v. Fe rguson , 8 F.3d 385, 3 8 8 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 3 ) ( en b an c) (q u o t i n g Scott v. United States , 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978)). I n other words, an a

utomobile stop m ust “not be ‘unre asonable ’ under the circ umstances.” W

hren v. U nited States , 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Murp hy do e s n ot c on te st a

ny of the fa c ts o f t

he sto p. Rather, he cla im s th a t D e pu ty Be dsworth’s incident r eport a nd his testimony

at the suppre ssion he ar i n g wer e incomplete a nd
c on tr a dic tor

y , a nd fa ile d to de mon str a te that th e de puty ha d p ro ba

ble cau se for makin g the tr a ff ic
s t o p . T h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt f o u n d D e p u t y B e d s w o rt h “ h i g h l y c r e d i b l e , ” an d d e t e r m i n e d t ha t, w hil e Deputy Be dsworth’s incident r eport wa s not without error, his testimony was not unre liable. Deputy Be dsworth clea

rly had proba

ble ca use for the initial stop. The deputy watche d as Murp hy fa ile d to sto p at a

sto p s ig n a

nd fo rc e d a no the r v e hic le of

f t he ro a d —

an o bv iou s tr a ff

ic violation. See F

erguson , 8 F.3d at 391. Hence , the initial stop wa s valid. And, althoug h Murphy do e s n o mo re tha

n hint a t thi s iss ue on

a pp e a l, D e puty

B e ds wo rt

h a lso ha d p ro ba

ble c a us e to a rr e st him, having disc overe d afte r the law ful stop of the vehicle that Murphy smelled of alc ohol, had an open conta iner of a lcohol in plain view on the truc k’s co n s o l e an d m o re beer in a sac k inside the truck, a nd had neither

a valid drive r’s lice nse nor insurance

. Of most conce rn to Murphy , of cour se, is the loaded rif

le that Deputy Be dsworth saw leaning ag ainst the driver’ s side seat of the truck. B ut6

the ri fl e , like e ve ry

thi ng e lse that the de puty fo un d in the tr uc k, wa s found purs ua

nt to a v a lid

tr a ff ic sto p. We f

ind no e rr or in t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of Murp hy ’s mot ion

to s up pr e ss. B. Acce ptance of Responsi bili ty We reviewfor c lear

erro r a d i strict court’s de termination of whe ther to aw ard a defe ndant
a re duction for a cce ptance of re sponsibili ty
. United States v. Kathman , 490 F.3d 520, 524 ( 6th Cir. 20 07 ); se e als o U. S. S EN TENC I NG G U I D ELI N ES M A N U A L (U.S.S.G.) § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 5 (2005) (“The sentenc ing judg e is in a unique position to evaluate a defe ndant’s acc eptanc e of responsibility

. For this reason, the de termination of the se ntencingjudge is entitled to gre at d ef er en ce on r eview.” ). Murphy argues that the district court should ha ve g rante d him a two-point Guidelines reduc tion for
acc eptanc e of r esponsibility beca use he twic e tried to plead guilty but the Government did not acce pt his of fe rs . This Guidelines reduc tion a pplies to de fenda

nts who clea

rly demonstrate that they

acc ept the responsibility

for their crimes. U. S
. S.G. § 3E1.1(a) . Although c onviction at trial does not automatically

prec lude a de fenda

nt’s beingconsidere d for this reduc tion, id . at cmt. n. 2, it is “not intended to apply

to a def endant who puts the g overnme nt to its burde n of proof at trial by denying the essential fac tual elements of g uilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and ex p re s s es
remorse ,” United States v. Ange l , 355 F .3 d 462 , 477 (6 th Cir . 200 4) (q uo tin g U. S.S. G. § 3 E1 .1 c mt. n. 2). Only

in rare circ umstances will a de fenda nt who g oes to trial war

rant a n ac ce p t an ce -ofre sp on sib ili ty

re du c tio n, on e su c h e xamp le be inga defend ant who ma de pr e -t ri a l st a te me nts ind ic a tin g an a c c e pta

nc e of re sp on sib ili ty but wh o we nt to tr ia l to pr e se rv e iss ue s no t re late d to fac tual g uilt. Se e id . (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 2).7

U n l i k e t h e “ r ar e c a s e ” c o n t e mp l a t e d b y Angel and the Gu ide lin e s, Murp hy ’s c a se pr e se nts
us no re a so n to be lie ve that he a c c e pts re sp on sib ili ty fo r h is c ri me . T he Go ve rnme nt r e je c te d h is offe rs to plead guilty beca use hi s proposed guilty plea did not provide for the enha nced punishment
un de r t he AC CA . A t tr ia l, M ur

ph y de nie d his g uil t, t e sti fy

ingthat he did

no t kn owthe ri fl e wa s in the pickup truc k and that it was not his rifle. Murphy ’s ac tions throughout the c ourse of his trial and sentenc ing de monstrate that at no tim e has he acc epted r esponsibility for his cr ime. The district court did not err

in denying Mur

phy this reduction. C. Arm ed Care er C rim inal Act Murp hy ’s fi na l argume nt i s th a t th e distr ic t c ourt e rr e d in e nh anc inghis se nte nc e in

a c c or da nc e wi th t he AC CA . T he AC CA pr ov ide s in re le va nt p art : I n the ca se of a

person who violates section 922(g ) of this title and ha s three pr evious convictions by any court ref err ed to in section 922(g )(1) of this title for a vi o l ent felony or a se rious drug offe nse, or both, c ommitt ed on occa sions differe nt from one another , such per s o n s h al l be fine d under this title and imprisoned not less than fi ft e e n y e ars . 18 U. S
. C
. § 924(e) (1). The Gover nment soug ht to enhance Murphy ’s sentenc e bec ause he was previo u s ly c o n v ic te d o f f o u r s e p ar a te v io le n t f

e lo n ie s : ( 1 ) A r s o n ; ( 2 ) T h ir d D e g r e e B u r g lary ; (3) Third Deg ree Bur g lary ; and (4) F elony Escape
. Murphy argues first that his pr ior convictions for the burg laries of unoccupie d businesses do
no t qu a lif y a s v iol e nt f

e lon ie s f or purp os e s o f t

he AC CA . M ur

ph y did no t a c tua lly dev elop th is argument in his brief on appea l, optinginstead to include a brief a nd g ener al discussion of Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575 (1990), a nd Shepard v. U

nited States , 544 U.S. 13 (2005), but making no eff ort to apply

those ca ses to the fa cts of his own ca se. I n particula r, Murphy

has not eve n attempted to explain the elements of the state-lawburg lary offe nses of which he wa s convicted,8

information cr itical to any deter mination of whether

these offe nses meet the A CCA’s definition of violent felonies. Where the appe llant offer s n o rea l analy sis of his claim or raise s an issue in a perf unctory manner but fails to includ e an y d ev eloped argumentation, we will dee m the issue waived. S

ee Mc P er s o n v. Kelsey , 1 25 F .3 d 9 89 , 9 95 -9 6 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 7) . We the re fo re de c lin e to addre ss this assignment of e rror . Murp hy a lso argue s th a t hi s two burg lary c on vic tio ns and his ars on c on vic tio n we re re a lly part of the same c ourse of conduct a

nd not “committ ed o n occa sions differe nt from one a nother.” He doe s not challeng e any of the fa cts of his prior c onvictions, stating only that beca use they wer e part of one course of conduct, they wer e not thr ee distinct c rimes. We r eview de novo the district court’s de termination that the cr imes were separ ate of fense s. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . H ill , 440 F.3d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2006). The undisputed fa cts are these: On the nig ht of J anuar y 19 and/ or the e arly

morning of J anuar y 20, 1988, Murphy

embar ked on a c rime spre e. F irst, Murphy committed arson ag ainst an apar tment building locate d in Pulaski, Tennessee — Ca se No. 3099. Next, he broke into and car ried persona l goods a

way from the business house of Hay s Distribu t i ng Company — Case No. 3101. Then, a fter le aving Hay s Distributing Company , Murphy broke into and c arr ied equipment aw ay from the business house of Tenne ssee Va lley

Motors — Case No. 3102. This circuit long ag o held that “of fense s committed by

a d ef endant at differ ent times and place s and ag ainst differ ent victims, although c ommitt ed within less than an hour of ea ch other , are separ ate a nd distinct criminal episodes and that c onvictions for those cr imes should be counted a s separ ate pr edicate convictions under § 924(e) (1).” United States v. Brady , 9 88 F .2 d 6 64 , 669 (6 th Cir. 1993) (en ba

nc). Mor e re cently

we he ld “that there are at least thre e indicia that of fe n s es are9

separ ate f rom ea ch other ” under

the ACCA. Hi ll , 4 40 F .3 d at 297

. F ir st, tw o off e ns e s are se pa

rate

“ if it i s p os sib le to d isc e rn the po int a t w hic h th e fi rs t of

fe ns e is c omp le te d” and

the se c on d o ff

e ns e beg ins. Id . Se c on d, tw o sep arat e of fe ns e s are c omm itt e d if

the de fe nd ant h a d th e op po rt un ity to
cea se his c riminal conduct afte r the first offe nse and withdraw from committing the sec ond offe nse. Id . “F inally , separ ate of

fense s are committed if the offe nses ar e committed in differ ent re sidence s or business locations.” I

d. at 29 8. Murp hy ’s a c tio ns satis fy a ll thr e e ind ic ia

of se pa rate of fe ns e s. Hi s c ri me s w e re thr e e dis tin c t a c ts w ithde fi ne d be g inn ing s and e nd s; he ha d a c ha nc e to c e a se his conduct a fter e ach criminal act and befor e car rying out the next cr iminal a ct; and he c ommitt ed the crimes at three diff

ere nt locations and ag ainst three differ ent residenc es or businesse s. We conclude that Murp hy ’s th ree con vi c tio ns ste mmi ngfr om h is a c tio ns on Janu ary 19 -2 0, 19 88 , c on sti tut e offe nses “c ommitt ed on occ asions differ ent from one anot her” for the pur poses of the A CCA. Consequentl y , we hold that the district court did not err in sentencingMurphy

as an a rmed c are er criminal under

the ACCA. III . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.