SECOND DIVI SION NOVEMBER 18, 2008

1-07-1339 MARGARET CORTRIGHT, ) Appeal from the

Plaintiff -Appella nt, ) Circuit Court of ) Co ok Co un ty. v. ) ) JAYNE DOYLE, CAROL YN BAIL EY, and STEVEN ) MINT ER, )

Defendants-Appellees ) No. 01 L 2886 ) (The Illinois Department of Children and F amily Services ) and Rocco J. Claps, Director of the Department of Human ) Rights, a n Agenc y of the State of Il linois, ) Honorab le ) Martin S. Agran, Defendants). ) Judge Presi ding. JUSTICE CUNNI NGHAM de livered

the opinion of the c ourt: Plaintiff Marga ret Cortr ight app eals from the circ uit court’ s November

21, 2006 order dismissing with prejudice her intentional tort claims (count s I, I I, a nd III) and reaf

firming the dismissal of her discrimination claims (counts IV, V and VI) under a pr

evious ruling. Cortright v. Doy le , No. 01 L 02886 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.). On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that: (1) the intentional tortclaims were not barred by the doctrin e of sove

reign i mmunity ; (2) the i

ntentiona l tort cla ims
were not preempted by the I llinois Human Rights Act (775 IL CS 5/1-101 et

seq . (West 1998)); (3) the defendants’ actions were not subject to absolute immunity; and (4) she has ade quately pleade d a claim f or all of t he intent ional tort s. For the

following

reasons , we aff

irm.1-07-1339

2 BACKGROUND Plaintiff Margaret Cortright suffer s from a degenerative

hearing condition called

Meniere’s disease and other related conditions of tinnitus and vertigo. Her s ymp toms includ e heari ng loss, ringing in the ears and dizziness—all of which are exacerbated by stress but can be controlled with prescription

medication and hearing aids. However , the pres cription medicatio n has a te ndency to cause dr owsiness. The plaintiff was an employee of the Illinois Department of Children and F amily Services (DCFS) for over 20 years until her retirement in April 2001. From 1994 until her retir ement, the plaintiff was a public service administrator at DCFS whose responsibilities included supervising 12 employees. Defend ants Jayne Doy

le, Carolyn Ba

iley and Steven Minter (c ollectively the super visors)
wo rkedat DCFS during the relevant periods of the plaintiff’s te nure. In 1997, Doy

le became the plaintiff’s direct supervisor, and subsequently in 1998, Bailey a

ndMinter al so gained supervisory positions and authority

over the plaintiff . The supe

rvisors w ere aw are of t

he plaint iff’s m e dical conditions and the side effects of her medication. The plaintiff

had cons istently

receiv ed “Ou tstanding/Exceptional” ratings on her annual performance evaluatio ns up until March 1998, when Doyle gave her a lesser ra

ting of “A cc om pl is he d/ Sa ti sf

ac to ry” de sp it e, al le ge dl y, that the quality of the plaintiff’s performance had remained the same . In A

pril 1 999, Minter rated the plaintiff’s overall performanc e as “Unacceptable”

and di d not give an y particu lar cat egory a rati ng high er than “Accep table ”—rati ngs that were su pposedly unprecedented in the plaintiff’s evaluations during her approximately 20 years1-07-1339

3

of service at DCFS. T

he overa ll rating of “Unacceptable ” disqualified the plaintiff from receiving a raise at that time. The plaintiff’s most recent l y amended c omplaint alleged that beginning in 1998, the supervisors yelled at and de meaned the plaintiff both in private and in the presence of co-wor kers. They alle ge dly called her

“stupid” or “stupidvisor” regularly and reprimanded the plaintiff for
co mplaining of the pe

rceive d mistrea

tment. The

plaintiff claimed t

hat the su

perviso rs falsel y reprimanded

her for inco mpetenc e, inabil ity t o underst and mana gement directiv es and ina

bility to comprehend

what was said at meetings. Allegedly , the supervisors set unreasonable task deadlines and chastised the plaintiff when she failed to meet them. Bailey also allegedly

threatened the plaintiff with progressive discipline and accused her of having poor judgment. The super visors iss ued formal reprimands and an eight-day suspension to her for sleeping at meetings, which the plaintiff denied doing. The complaint also stated that Doyle issued a

memorandum to the plaintiff threatening

further discipline and possible terminat ion for her continued unacceptable job performance. The stresses of

these events allegedly

caused emotional distress and further deterioration of the plaintiff’s medical condition. This case ha s a long a nd com plica ted pr ocedu ral hi story. Th e plai ntiff , acti ng pro se , attempted to file a c harge of discr imination w

ith the Illinois Department of Hu man Righ ts (IDHR) in1998 which IDHR refused to a ccept. In 1999, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation

with the federal EqualEmployment Opportun

ity C ommission ( EEOC) an d subsequently receiv ed a notic e of rig

ht to sue f rom the EE OC.1-07-1339

4

InJanuary 2000, the plaintiff filed a c omplaint in the Illinois court of claims against the supervisors and DCFS alleg in g age and disability discrimination. Cortright v. Department of Children& Family

Services , No. 00 CC 2519. The court of claims dismissed the federal claims and claims against the supervisors in their individual capacities for want of jurisdiction in its February 2001 order. To the extent the claim s were ba sed on the Illinois Human R

ights Act (Human R

ights Act) (775 IL CS 5/1–101 et seq. (West 1998 )) and th e public officia l immunity

defense, the court of claims allowed the claims to stand pending further oral argument. The cour t of claim s decide d these remaini ng issues in a

later or der date d May

10, 2001, w

hich deni ed DCFS’ motion to dismiss fo r lack of jurisdiction and, instead, placed the claims against DCFS under “general continuance”

on the ground that the p laintiff

had not exha

usted her remedie s before

the IDHR. In March 200 1, the plaintiff commenced this action against the supervisors in the circ uit court of Cook County alleging

disability discrimination under the Human Rights Actand Amer icans wit h Disability Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. (2000)) (count I), age discrimination under the Human Rig

hts Act an

d Age D iscrimina

tion in Employme

nt Act of 1 967 (ADE

A) (29 U. S.C. §621 et seq. (2000)) (count II ), defamation

(count II I), retaliatory

practices (count I

V) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (II ED) (count V). The plaintiff

’s first amended complaint, filed on May 24, 2001, added DCFS as a defendant
an d a mandamu s claim against the ID HR director seeking an order for the director to accept the plaintiff’s charge of discrimination (count VI ). On January 25, 2002, the circ uit court granted the defenda nts’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff ’s first amended complaint without prejudice stating that jurisdiction is proper in the court of claims. The mandamus claim (count VI) was the n transferred1-07-1339

5

to the chancery

division of the circuit court for further consideration. The pla intiff filed

a motion to reconsider the dismissal of counts II I and V of the first amended

complaint on April 9, 2003, the hearing for which was continued until Janu ary 5, 2004, whe n the circuit court found it had jurisdiction over the supervisors. During this interim, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint
onJuly 23, 2003, adding another mandamus cla im (co unt VII) agains t the I DHR direc

tor to compel him to acce pt the pla intif f’s char ges of discrimination as pertaining to a worksha ring agreement between the EEOC and the I DHR. A third amended

complaint was filed on January 6, 2004, by the plaintiff in which she a dded
aneighth claim–interference with prospec tive economic advantage and contra ct ual rel ationship (count VIII)–aga

inst the supervisors and tried to point to the worksharing agreement between I

DHR and EEOC to support her mandam us claim (co unt VI I) a gainst t he IDHR direc

tor. The c ircuit court’s order

on November 21, 2005, dismissed, with prejudice, claims against the supervisors based on a lack of jurisdiction to hear the intentional tort claims. The plaintiff attempted to address the items the court found deficient in the third amended complaint by f iling a f ourth ame

nded comp laint (complaint) in Marc h 2006. No new parties or
causes of action were added to the complaint. Instead, the plaintiff simply attached the plaintiff’ s job evalu ations to the compla

int and re numbere d the coun

ts. The complaint alleged defamation (count I ), II ED (count II

) an d interference with

prospective economic advantage and c ontractual relationship (count II I) aga inst Doyle, Bailey

and Minter. Disability discrimination (count IV), ag e discrimination(count V) and r etaliati on (coun

t VI)agains t DCFS were alleged. The two mandamus claims (c ounts VII , VII I) a gainst t he IDHR direc

tor also1-07-1339

6

remained. The circuit court’s final judgment on N o vember 21, 2006, granted the defenda nts’ motion to dismiss the intentional tort claims against the supervisors (counts I , II , III of the complaint), holding that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity a

nd preempted by the

HumanRights Act. It reaff irmed the dismissal o f the disa

bility discrimination, age discrimination and retaliation claims (counts IV, V and VI

) under a previous ruling. OnApril 17, 2007, the circuit c ourt dismis sed with prejudice the claims against I DHR and DCFS (counts VII

and VII I) pursuant to settlement and that is not at issue in this appeal. The plain tiff now a ppeals di smissal of

counts I , II

and I II of the complaint. ANA LYSIS This court has jurisdiction to hea r the appeal. We review de novo the circuit court’s November

21, 2006 decision granting the defenda nts’ motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Pro cedure

(735 I LCS 5/2-619 (West 2006)). Wolfe v. Wolf , 375 Ill. App. 3d

702, 705, 874 N.E.2d 582, 584 (2007). A section 2-619 motion for involuntary dismissal asserts affirma tive matters–such

as defenses of preemption, so vereig n immunity

and abso lute immuni

ty, in this case–that avoid or defeat the claim. Wolfe , 375 Ill. App. 3d at 705, 874 N.E.2d at 584. In reviewing
a section 2- 619 dismissa

l, we con strue all

pleading s and supp orting d ocuments in a ligh t most favora ble to the plaintiff, the nonmoving party
. Landheer v. Landheer , 383 Ill. App. 3d 317, 320, 891 N.E.2d. 975, 978 (2008). We determine the following three issues: whether (1) the court be low erred in dismissing the intentional to rt c lai ms (co unt s I, II and II I) of the complaint on the basis of sovereign immunity ; (2)1-07-1339

7

the court below erred in dismissing the intentionaltort claims (counts I, I I and I II) of the complaint
onthe basis of preemption by the Human Rights Act; and (3) the intentionalto rt c lai ms (co unt s I, II an d II I) w er e b ar re d b y ab so lu te im mu ni ty. We first add

ress the issue of sov ereign i mmun ity. The d efenda nts ar gue tha t sov ereign immunity applied to bar the plaintiff’s intentional tort claims frombeing h eard in t he circ uit court.

T he I llinois Constitution of 1970 abolished sovereign immunity “[e]xcept as the General Assembly may

provide by law.”

Ill . C on st . 1 97 0, ar t. XII I, § 4. Pu rs ua nt to th is ex pr es s a ut ho ri ty, the legislature enacted

the State Lawsuit I

mmunity Act, which

states tha t the State of Il linois shal l notbe ma de a d ef

en da nt or pa rt y i n any court e x cept as provided in the Illinois Public L abor Relations Act (5 IL CS 315/1 et seq . (West 2006)) and the Court of Claims Act (705 IlL CS 505/1 et seq (West 2006)). Hence, the Court of Claims Act provides that the court of claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear c ertain ma tters, inc luding “ [a]ll claims agains t the State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like cause of action would lie against a private person or corpora tion in a c ivil suit.” 705 IL CS 505/8(d) (West 2006). We must ex amine whe ther an action is one against the State to determine whe ther it was properl y barred by sovereign immunity. Determining state action depends on the issues raised and the relief sought in the action, rather than on whethe r the State i s named as a party
. Brandon v. Bonell , 368 I ll. App. 3d

492, 858 N .E.2d 465 (2006); Kawaguchi v. Gainer , 361 Ill. App. 3d 229, 243, 835 N.E.2 d 435, 447 (2005); Jinkins v. Lee , 209 I ll. 2d 320, 330, 807 N.E.2d 411, 418 (2004). Anaction br

ought no minally

agains t a State e

mploy ee in his individual capacity wher e a judgment1-07-1339

8

for the plaintiff could operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability is deemed to be a claim against the State. Brandon , 368 Ill. App. 3d at 504, 858 N.E.2d at 479. Treating such
cases as ones agains tthe State prevents plaintiffs from circumventing soverei gn immuni

ty by on ly naming as defe

ndants state emp loy ees in the ir individual capacity. Brandon , 368 Ill. App. 3d at 504, 858 N.E.2d at 479. The supreme

court has esta blished a three- part test to deter mine whet

her an a ction ag ainst state employees is ac

tually one agains t the State . The test is summarized as follows: (1) there are
no allegations that an employee or agent of the Stat e acted beyond th e scop e of hi s auth ority th rough wrongf ul acts; (2) the duty alleg ed to have been breac hed was not owed by the em pl oye e independ ently of his state employment; and (3) the complained-of actions involve matters ordinaril y within that employee’s nor

mal and official functions. Jinkins , 209 Ill. 2d at 330, 807 N.E.2d at 418, citi ng Healy v. Va

upel , 133 Ill. 2d 295, 309, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (1990). App lying the three-part test, we find that the plaintiff’s intentional tort claims are one s ag ai ns t t he St at e a nd , t hu s, ba rr ed fr om th e c ir cu it co ur t b y so ve re ig n i mm un it y. For the first prong, the plaintiff argues that the supervisors’ conduct was theirs alone and not
anact of the State. She argues that the alleg ed malicious conduct was en ough to place t he supervis ors’ actions beyond the scope of their authority so as to lose sover eign immunity protection. Insupport, the plaintiff relies on Fritz v. Johnston , 209 Ill. 2d 302, 807 N.E.2d 461 (2004), Hoffman v. Yack , 57 Ill. App. 3d 744 , 373 N.E.2d 486 (1978), Management Ass’n of Illinois, Inc. v. B oard of Regents of

Norther n Illi nois Unive

rsity , 248 Ill. App. 3d 599 , 618 N.E.2d 694 (1993), and Busch v. Bates , 323 Ill. App. 3d 823 , 753 N.E.2d 1184 (2001).1-07-1339

9

The defendants, on the other hand, contend that the supervis ors did

not act beyond the sc ope of their au thority through wrongf ul acts be cause su

pervisors routi nely pr epare performance evaluat ions, issue discipline, criticize subordinates’ work, and set deadlines for comp leting ta sks–all of which constitute a significant portion of the supervisors’ job duties. They a rgue that malicious conduct i s out side the s cope of a state emp loy ee’s au

thority only when the

re are specific facts supporting the allegations, which they argue the plaintiff failed to provide in her c omplaint. In Fritz , the plaintiff alleged civil conspiracy by f our defe ndants to f

orce him out of his job and claimed he suf

fered mental an

guish an d a “der ogation of his name and re

putation” as a res ult of the defendants’ actions. Fritz , 209 Ill. 2d at 306, 807 N.E.2d at 464. One of the defendants, the plaintiff alleged, contacted

the police and falsely

accused the plaintiff of threatening assault on the defendant’s person and property
. Fritz , 209 Ill. 2d at 305-06, 807 N.E.2d at 464. He also alleged intentional interference with employ ment and economic gains. Fritz , 209 Ill. 2d at 306, 807 N.E.2d at 464. The Fritz

defendants moved to dismiss the c laims based on pro tecti on by sove reign im mu ni ty, which was granted by the circuit court and affirmed by the appellate court. Fritz , 209 I ll. 2d at 307-08, 807 N.E.2d at 464-65. The supreme court reve rsed, holding that defendant Johnston’s alleged conduct violated a criminal law and thus, sovereign immunity did not apply. Fritz , 209 I ll. 2d at 313, 807 N .E.2d at 468. It further re asoned that unlike Wozniak v. Conry , 288 Ill. App. 3d 129, 679 N.E.2d 1255 (1997), which involved a lawsuit against supervisors who made “work-related statemen ts” within the context of the ir supervisory roles, the source of the duty some of the Fritz defenda nts purporte dly

violated was a cr

iminal sta

tute appl icable to

both state

and nonsta

te employ ees. Fritz , 209 Ill . 2d at 313-1 4, 807 N.E.2 d at 46 8-69, citi ng Woznia k v. Conry , 288 Ill.1-07-1339

10

App. 3d 129 , 679 N.E.2d 1255 ( 1997). The supreme court fu rther he ld that the

defenda nts who did notviolate this crimi

nal statut e were still not pr

otected by s overeig

n immunity

because they allege dly threatened

to launch a police investigation based on those false claims, as part of the conspiracy to force the plaintiff out of his position. Fritz , 209 Ill. 2d at 315, 807 N.E.2d at 479. Inthe case at bar, the plaintiff does not allege violations of any cr iminal statute. While the plaintiff alleges that the “[d]efendants deliberately and maliciously eng aged in [a] campaign of defamatory

conduct a

nd haras sment in

order to, inter alia , drive [p]laintiff from her job,” we do not find any link to the violation of a criminal statute which would remove the case from the protec tion of sovereign immunity. The plaintiff also alleg es that Bailey engaged in further ha

rassment by sending the plaintiff a posting for an alternate jobfor less pay. H owever, unlike the Fritz defenda nts who threate

ned to lau

nch a poli ce inves tig atio n based on false c laims made to the polic e, this
co nduct was not alleg ed to have been done as a re sult of some violation o f a crimi

nal statut e in furtherance of a conspiracy . Therefore, we find that the facts in the case at bar aremore like those in Wozniakthan in Fritz , and that the statements made by the supervisors are work-related statemen ts within the

scope of their au thority as supervisors. Wozniak , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 133-34 , 679 N.E.2d at

1258-59 (“when a supervisor for a state de partment or entity is sued by

an employee for statements regarding the employ ee’s work-related

conduct and pending

personnel decisions, the suit necessarily thre atens to control the actions of the sta te”; hold ing that Conry ’s conduc

t goes to the core of the State’s ability to control its own affa irs). The Wozniakcourt al so held tha t t h e relevant inquiry to determine scope of authority is “whethe

r the supervisor

would be actin g within the scope of his duties by making truthful statements of the general ty pe alleged.” Wozniak , 288 I ll.1-07-1339

11

App. 3d at 133- 34, 679 N. E.2d at 12 58. Here , if the general ty

pe of alleged

statements made by the supervisors about the plaintiff’s performance were true, the supervisors would be acting within the scope of their authority as supe rvisors to evaluate and com ment upon the plaintiff’s employee performance. The plaintiff’s reliance on Hoffman is also misplaced. In Hoffman , a tenured instructor at
a state univ ersity

brough t suit ag ainst

his supervisor who allegedly made false accusations as to the instructor’s professional competency , aberrational sexual conduct and lack of integrity
. Hoffman , 57 Ill. App. 3d at 746 , 373 N.E.2d at 488. The Hoffman court held that the suit was not against the State because

judgmen t for the p laintiff

would not a

ffect, control or subjec t the St a te to li ab il it y. Hoffman , 57 Ill. App. 3d at 748, 373 N.E.2d at 490. See also Wozniak , 288 I ll. App. 3d at 135 , 679 N.E.2d at 1259 (which clarified Hoffman ’s holding that “a s uit was not

agains t the state

when the defendant supervisor made personal acc usations that did not relate solely to the employ ee’s job”). Inthe case at

bar, the plaintiff allege s that the s

upervisors falsely ac cused her of sleeping at meeting s, underper formi ng, having poor judgment and being incompetent–all accusations that related solely to the plaintiff’s job. The plaintiff failed to plead any false personal accusations made by the supervisors that did not rela te solely to her job. Further, the plain

tiff fai led to alle ge any

specific facts to s upport he r alleg ations of mali ce by the supervisors which, if proven, would show malicious conduct. Management Ass’n , 248 Ill. App. 3d at 617 , 618 N.E. 2d at 706. The plain tiff made conclusory

statemen ts in her complaint

that the supervisors were malicious and deliber ate in all egedly

harassi ng her with their falseaccusations butfailed to

allege any specific facts in her complaint that showed the supervisors harbored personal1-07-1339

12

animosity toward h er or acted for a

ny p urpose ot her than what they

percei ved to be t

he best in terests of DCFS. Management Ass’n , 248 Ill. App. 3d at 617, 618 N.E.2d at 706 , citi ng Nikelly v. Stubing , 204 Ill. App. 3d 870 , 562 N.E.2d 360 (1990). Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate th at the supervisors were not acting in what they perceived to be the best in terests o f DCFS in

evaluating the plaintiff’s job performance and setting deadlines wh ich the pl aintiff believed were unreasonable. Alth ough the super

visors’ b ehavior , if

true, is unpalatable, absent a showing of specific fa cts that the supervisors acted

for any pur

pose other than

what they

percei ved to be t

he best in terests o f DCFS, their actions were not bey

ond the scope of authority. Similarly, in Busch v. Bates , 323 Ill. App. 3d 823, 831 , 753 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (2001), t he court held that soverei gn immuni

ty w as inappl icable because the Busch

plaintiff had alleged that the defendan ts acted in violation of the law. The plaintiff in the case at bar failed to allege the supervisors’ conduct violated an y la

w, and thu s,
so vereign immunity is not precluded. Bec ause the plaintiff has not appealed the circuit court’s dismissal of her a

ge and disability discrimination cla

ims, we will not consider

the plaintiff as having allege d any

violation o f law bas ed on her employ ment discr

imination c laims. We hold that the supervisors’ alleged conduct did not exceed the scope of their authority and the first prong of the test is satisfied. For the seco nd prong , th e plaintif f argu es under the “sour

ce of dut y te st” that be cause defamation, II

ED and interference with prospective e cono mic advan tage and contractual relation ship
are common law duties applicable to all citizens–not only state employ ees–these duties wereowed by the supervisors independently of their state employment. Currie v. Lao , 148 Ill. 2d 151, 159, 592 N.E.2d 977, 9 80 (19 92) (“w here th e empl oyee is cha rged wi th bre achin g a duty imposed on him1-07-1339

1 State-employed prof

essionals, such as public defenders and doctors, are not protected by sovereign immunity whe

n they brea

ch a professional duty

owed by eve

ry member of

that profession. Brandon , 368 Ill . App. 3d at 5 06, 85 8 N.E. 2d at 4 80, ci ting Jinkins , 209 Ill. 2d at 333, 807 N.E.2d at 419-20. 13 independ ently of his Stat e empl oyment, s overei gnimmunity will not attach and a ne glige

nce cla im may be maintained a

gainst him in circuit court” (emphasis in original)). The supervisors, however, contended that their responsibilities to prepare performance evaluations for the plaintiff, discipline and criticize the plaintiff, and set deadlines for her tasks were solely in their capacities as DCFS supervisors. Thus, any duties allegedl y br eached when performing thesefunctions in t heir capac ities as su pervisors were not owed independe ntly of their s tate employment. In Currie , the I llinois Supr eme Court

held that sovereign immunity did not bar jur isdiction inthe circuit court to hear a neglig ence claim against a state trooper whose patrol car collided with the plaintiff’s truck and injured the plaintiff. Currie , 148 Ill. 2d at 151, 592 N.E.2d at 977. Using the source-of- duty

rule, the court reasoned that the duty the trooper allegedly

breached ar ose as a result of his status as a driver

on a public road rather than a result of his employ ment as state trooper. Currie , 148 Ill. 2d at 161-62, 592 N.E.2d at 981. Such neg ligence was a breac h of duties that every driver owes to ev ery

other dr iver, re gardle ss of state e

mploy ment. 1 Currie , 148 Ill. 2d at 160, 592 N.E.2d at 981. The supreme court, however, noted an exception to sovereign immunity whe nthe duty is unique to state employment such that a law suit challenging the conduct could affe ct the actions and policies of the State. Currie , 148 Ill. 2d at 160, 592 N.E.2d at 981; see also Loman v. Freeman , 229 I ll. 2d 104, 123, 890 N.E.2d 446, 459 (2008 ); Wozniak , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 6791-07-1339

14

N.E.2d a t 1258; Brandon , 368 Ill. App. 3d at 506, 858 N.E.2d at 481. The plaintiff in this case argues that because common la

w duties a re appli cable to

all citizens, the supervisors’ alleged conduct was owed inde

pendentl y of their sta te employment. The Wozniak court rejecte d a simi lar argument by a professor who asserted that the department he ad of the universi ty had a general duty

not to interfere with the contractual relationships of others. Wozniak , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 133, 679 N.E.2d at 1258. Inste ad, it hel d that to a llow suit against the defendant inhis individual capacity would limit his ability to engage in lawful

ac ti vi ty on behalf of the
un iv er si ty, such as c ommunica ting, al locating

tasks and making p ersonne l or employ ment dec isions. Wozniak , 288 Ill. App. 3d at 134, 679 N.E.2d at 1259. Inher rep ly brief, the

plaintiff here ar gued th at Wozniakis in conf lict withsupreme court precedent in Fritz because it made thr

ee criti cal e rrors. We find that the plaintiff’s arguments are meritles s because Wozniakis factua lly distingu ishable f rom Fritz . As stated by the supreme court in Fritz :

“ We need not express an opinion on whether Wozni a k

reached the co rrect re sult on its f acts, be cause the case i s distinguishable. As the appellate court dissent noted in thi s case, Wozniakinvolved a

state emp loy ee in a su

pervisor y r ole who me

rely made ‘work-related statements’ w it hin the context of that supervisory role. The insta

nt case, by c ontrast, involves a lleged ly f alse re ports to
ani ndep endent agency

–the State Police–in direct violation of crimin al la w. See 720 IL CS 5/26-1(a)(4) (West 1998). Wozniak1-07-1339

15 itself acknowledged that a statutory violation would change the legal calculus ***.” Fritz , 209 Ill. 2d at 313, 807 N.E.2d at 468. We reject the plaintiff

’s arg ument tha t the supe rvisors’ conduct a

rose independ

ently of their state employment. Supervisors are hired to supervise. Their alleged conduct, no matter how misguided, was work-related and unique to their capa city as supervisors. The i r conduc t in cluded
commu nicat ing, setting dea dlines, evaluating and making pe rsonnel and other employ ment decisions
onbeh alf of DC FS. A suit challenging the allege d conduct could also affect state policies and control state actions because a judgment for the plain tiff woul d directly influenc e the supe

rvisors’ ability as state e mploy ees to ha ndle depa rtmental personne l issues. Therefore, wehold that the duty alleged to have been breached was not owed by the supervisors independently of their employment at DCFS. Fi na ll y, the third prong requires that we look at whether the complained-of actions involve matters ordinar

ily within that employee’s normal a nd official functions
. Jinkins , 209 Ill. 2d at 330, 807 N. E.2d a t 418 , quot ing Healy v. Vaupel , 133 Ill. 2d 295, 309, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (1990). The plaintiff argues that the third prong of the test is not satisfied because the supervisors we re “not performing

a uniquel y g overnme

ntal function” bec ause the same functions oc cur in

private offices and business. She relied on Currie ’s holding that the trooper, at the time of the car collision, was not performing a uniquely

governmental function. Currie , 148 Ill. 2d at 151, 592 N.E.2d at 977. We find that the plaintiff’s reliance on Currie fo r this pro ng of the test is inapposite. The Currie court called into doubt

whether the troop er was e

ven resp onding to

a dispatc h call at t he time of the collis ion or engaged in persona l busin es s in finding

that he wa s not perf

orming a uniquely1-07-1339

16

governmental function at the time of the collision. Currie , 148 Ill. 2d at 162, 592 N.E.2d at 981. The defendants contend that the issue o f whether a function is uniquel

y g overnme

ntal is releva nt solely to the second prong as it relates to an exception to the source of duty rule. Currie , 148 Ill. 2 d at 160, 5 92 N.E.2d at 981. A ccordingly , we only nee d to look at whether the actions complained

of involve matters ordinarily w ithin the superv isors’ normal and official functions as employees. We hold that evaluating, disciplining, and setting assignment de adlines were all within the normal and offi cial functions of the supervisors as state employ ees. Therefore, the third prong of the test is satisfied and the suit against the supervisors is a suit against the state. CONCLUSIO

N Becau se we resolve the case on the basi s of sovereign immunity we need not address the additional issues of

pr ee mp ti on by t he Hu ma n R ig ht s A ct an d a bs ol ut e i mm un it y. We hold that the plaintiff’s intentional tort claims are barred by s overeig

n immunity

and, thus, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case. Affirmed. KARNEZIS, P.J., and QUI NN, J., concur.