U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory 

Commission

Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety

and Safeguards

NUREG/BR-0117

No. 01-1

March-April 2001

NUREG-1556, “CONSOLIDATED 

GUIDANCE ABOUT MATERIALS 

LICENSES”

In 1998, the Division of Industrial and Medical 

Nuclear Safety, in the Office of Nuclear Material 

Safety and Safeguards, used a Business Process 

Redesign technique to redesign its materials 

licensing process. One of the elements of the new 

process was an aggressive program to update 

and consolidate numerous guidance documents into 

a NUREG series of subject-specific documents 

over a 3-year period. NUREG-1556, containing 

Volumes 1-20, was developed and entitled, 

“Consolidated Guidance about Materials Licenses.” 

These NUREGs are for use by the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC), Agreement State 

regulators, and licensees/applicants. 

We are pleased to announce that, as of December 

2000, all 20 NUREGs, with the exception of Vol. 

9, “Program Specific Guidance about Medical Use 

Licenses,” have been published in final form. Volume 

9 will not be issued until publication of the final 10 

CFR Part 35 rulemaking. The Commission approved 

Part 35 in a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated 

October 23, 2000; it will be published after Office of 

Management and Budget approval of the information 

collection requirements. The development of the 

NUREG-1556 series supports the performance goals 

of maintaining safety, protection of the environment, 

and the common defense and security, as well as 

reducing unnecessary regulatory burden.

We encourage licensees/applicants and Agreement 

State regulators to use the NUREG-1556 guidance 

documents in preparing new and renewal 

applications. We believe that use of these NUREGs 

will help the NRC staff make timely and thorough 

reviews of these applications. It is particularly 

important that licensees and applicants use these 

documents, since they supersede much of the 

guidance previously used for licensing.

These NUREGs are available electronically by 

visiting NRCs Home Page (http://www.nrc.gov/

NRC/NUREGS/indexnum.html #-1-3). A list of 

these NUREGS follows. 

NMSS Licensee Newsletter

(March - April 2001)

Contents Page

1. NUREG–1536, “Consolidated 

Guidance about Materials Licenses” ......... 1

2. Recent Policy Changes in the

Uranium Recovery Program ....................... 3

3. Privacy Information in Licensee 

Documents .................................................. 6

4. Dual-Purpose Interim Storage/ 

Transportation Casks—The Status ............ 7

5. Operational Experience .............................. 7

6. Significant Enforcement Actions ................ 8

7. Generic Communications Issued 

(December 1, 2000 - January 31, 2001) ..... 10

8. Significant Events ....................................... 11

9. Selected Federal Register Notices 

(October 1, 2000 - March 31, 2001) ........... 13

NMSS Licensee Newsletter
Vol. No. Volume Title When Published

1 “Program-Specific Guidance about Portable Gauge Licenses” 05/97

2 “Program-Specific Guidance about Radiography Licenses” 08/98

3 “Applications for Sealed Source and Device Evaluation and Registration” 07/98

4 “Program-Specific Guidance about Fixed Gauge Licenses” 10/98

5 “Program-Specific Guidance about Self-Shielded Irradiators” 10/98

6 “Program-Specific Guidance about 10 CFR Part 36 Irradiators” 01/99

7 “Program-Specific Guidance about Academic, Research and Development, 

and Other Licenses of Limited Scope” 12/99

8 “Program-Specific Guidance about Exempt Distribution Licenses” 09/98

9 “Program-Specific Guidance about Medical Use Licenses” Not issued 

 at this time

10 “Program-Specific Guidance about Master Material Licenses” 12/00

11 “Program-Specific Guidance about Licenses of Broad Scope” 04/99

12 “Program-Specific Guidance about Possession Licenses for Manufacturing 

and Distribution” 12/00

13 “Program-Specific Guidance about Commercial Radiopharmacy Licenses” 09/99

14 “Program-Specific Guidance about Well Logging, Tracer, and Field Flood 

Study Licenses” 06/00

15 “Guidance about Changes of Control and about Bankruptcy Involving 

Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Materials Licenses” 11/00

16 “Program-Specific Guidance about Licenses Authorizing Distribution to 

General Licensees” 12/00

17 “Program-Specific Guidance about Licenses for Special Nuclear Material

of Less Than Critical Mass” 11/00

18 “Program-Specific Guidance about Service Provider Licenses” 11/00

19 “Guidance for Agreement State Licensees Proposing to Work in NRC 

Jurisdiction (Non-Agreement States, Areas of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 

or Offshore Waters) and Guidance for NRC Licensees Proposing to Work in 

Agreement State Jurisdiction (Reciprocity)” 12/00

20 “Guidance about Administrative Licensing Procedures” 12/00

(Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail:cxb@nrc.gov)

2
3

RECENT POLICY CHANGES IN THE 

URANIUM RECOVERY LICENSING 

PROGRAM

Background

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff 

prepared four Commission Papers, in 1999, to 

address uranium recovery issues. One Commission 

Paper (SECY-99-011, “Draft Rulemaking Plan: 

Domestic Licensing of Uranium and Thorium 

Recovery Facilities—Proposed New 10 CFR Part 

41”) addressed the need to revise and update 

uranium recovery regulations, particularly with 

respect to in situ leach (ISL) facilities, and 

recommended the initiation of rulemaking to create 

a new Part 41 specific to uranium recovery. The 

other three Commission Papers addressed issues 

raised by the National Mining Association (NMA) 

in its April 1998 paper, “Recommendations for a 

Coordinated Approach to Regulating the Uranium 

Recovery Industry.” The first of those papers 

(SECY-99-012, “Use of Uranium Mill Tailings 

Impoundments for the Disposal of Other than 11e.(2) 

Byproduct Material, and Reviews of Applications 

to Process Material Other than Natural Ore”) 

discussed the disposal of radioactive waste, other 

than byproduct material defined in section 11e. (2) of 

the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, 

in mill tailings impoundments, and the processing of 

material, other than natural ore, for source material 

at licensed uranium mills. The second of those 

papers (SECY-99-013, “Recommendations on ways 

to Improve the Efficiency of NRC Regulation at 

in Situ Leach (ISL) Uranium Recovery Facilities”) 

discussed the regulation of ground water at ISL 

sites and the issue of which waste streams at ISL 

facilities come under NRC regulatory jurisdiction 

as 11e.(2) byproduct material. The last paper 

(SECY-99-277, “Concurrent Jurisdiction of NonRadiological Hazards of Uranium Mill Tailings”) 

addressed the issue of concurrent jurisdiction (with 

States that do not have Agreement State regulatory 

authority for 11e. (2) material under section 274 of 

the AEA) of the non-radiological hazards of uranium 

mill tailings.

In July and August 2000, the Commission issued 

Staff Requirements Memoranda (SRMs) on all these 

issues. The decisions and directions, in these SRMs, 

and the staff actions in response, were discussed in 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-23, November 30, 

2000 (sent to all holders of materials licenses for 

uranium and thorium recovery facilities) and are 

summarized in sections that follow.

Part 41 Rulemaking (SECY-99-011)

The Commission approved the staff’s 

recommendation to provide a draft Rulemaking Plan 

(RP), for comment, to the Agreement States, with 

the preferred option being the creation of a new Part 

41 dedicated to uranium recovery regulation. The 

Commission directed the staff to revise the draft RP 

to reflect the Commission’s guidance in the other 

uranium recovery SRMs.

On September 11, 2000, the staff transmitted the 

draft RP to all States for comment. NRC has 

received comments on the draft RP, which included 

information on the current depressed state of the 

uranium industry, and a recent proposal, from the 

National Materials Program Working Group, to 

pilot-test its rulemaking. 

In the time since this action was initiated, the 

uranium industry has changed sufficiently to warrant 

revisiting the previous alternatives proposed for 

issuing regulations for the industry. The price of 

uranium has dropped by about half, over the last 

3 years, and is not expected to increase soon. 

Presently, there are only five NRC-licensed facilities 

that produce uranium. There have not been any 

applications for a new license since 1998 and 

no new applications are anticipated for several 

years. Based on the current state of the uranium 

recovery industry and on the additional information 

received in comments, the staff has presented to 

the Commission other alternative approaches for 

updating the regulatory regime for uranium recovery. 

The Commission is considering holding a public 

meeting, in mid-April, to receive input on the issues 

related to uranium recovery regulations. 

Disposal of Non-11e.(2) Byproduct Material in 

Tailings Impoundments (SECY-99-012)

In 1995, the staff published guidance, in the Federal 

Register (60 FR 49296), for the disposal, in uranium 

mill tailings impoundments, of radioactive material 

that is not byproduct material, as defined in section 
4 

11e.(2) of the AEA. The guidance consisted of 10 

items that had to be met, for the staff to approve a 

proposed disposal of non-11e.(2) byproduct material 

in a uranium mill tailings impoundment. In its 1998 

white paper, the NMA argued that the requirements 

were too restrictive, pointing out that no requests for 

such disposals have been made since the guidance 

was issued. The Commission, in the SRM for 

SECY-99-012, approved an option that would allow 

more flexibility in permitting non-11e.(2) byproduct 

material to be disposed of in tailings impoundments. 

To comply with the direction in the SRM, the staff is 

revising the 1995 guidance in the following manner:

• The staff will remove the prohibitions, found in 

items 2, 4, and 5, regarding non-AEA radioactive 

material and material subject to regulation under 

other legislative authorities, such as the Toxic 

Substance Control Act (TSCA) or the Resource 

Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).

• The staff will add a requirement to obtain 

approval, from the appropriate regulators of 

TSCA, RCRA, and non-AEA radioactive 

material, for disposal of such material in the 

tailings impoundment.

• The staff will revise the requirement, in item 

8, for approval by Low-Level Waste Compacts, 

to allow for the situation in which material 

proposed for disposal does not fall under 

the jurisdiction of Low-Level Waste Compacts 

(e.g., radioactive material not regulated under 

the AEA).

Processing of Material Other Than Natural 

Uranium Ores (SECY-99-012)

In 1995, the staff published its position and 

guidance, in the Federal Register (60 FR 49296), on 

the use of uranium feed material other than natural 

ores (alternate feed material), in uranium mills. 

The guidance identified three determinations that 

the staff had to make to approve an alternate feed 

request. The third determination, whether the ore 

is being processed primarily for its source material 

content, generated considerable controversy. This 

determination was required to address the concern 

that wastes that would otherwise have to be disposed 

of as radioactive or mixed waste would be proposed 

for processing at a uranium mill primarily to 

be able to dispose of it in the tailings pile as 

11e.(2) byproduct material. This determination was 

essentially a determination of the motives of the mill 

operator in requesting approval of a specific stream 

of alternate feed material. In many cases it involved 

questioning the financial aspects of acquiring and 

processing the alternate feed material, and selling the 

resultant uranium product.

The Commission, in the SRM for SECY-99-0012, 

directed the staff to allow processing of alternate 

feed material without inquiry into a licencee’s 

motives, and referred to a Commission decision 

(CLI-00-01 51 NRC 9) on a specific instance 

of proposed processing of alternate feed, that 

was brought before the Atomic Safety Licensing 

Board and then appealed to the Commission. 

The Commission also addressed the second 

determination in the 1995 guidance (i.e., whether 

the feed material contains hazardous waste). It 

directed the staff to allow more flexibility with 

regard to this issue consistent with its direction to 

the staff on the disposal of non-11e.(2) byproduct 

material in tailings piles.

To comply with the SRM, the staff is revising the 

1995 position and guidance in the following manner:

• The staff will modify the prohibition, in 

item 2, on feed material containing hazardous 

waste, to allow such feed material provided 

that the licensee obtains approval of the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (or the 

State) and a commitment from the long-term 

custodian to take the tailings after site closure.

• The staff will revise the manner in which it 

determines whether the ore is being processed 

primarily for its source material content to focus 

on the product of the processing, and eliminate 

any inquiry into the licensee’s motives for 

the processing.

Classification of Liquid Wastes at ISL Facilities 

(SECY-99-013)

Before 1995, the staff practice for addressing the 

disposal of evaporation pond sludges relied on a 

broad reading of the definition of 11e.(2) byproduct 

material. This broad reading only addressed discrete 

surface wastes capable of controlled disposal and 

did not distinguish between wastes generated at 
5

various phases of an ISL operation. All waste 

materials generated during ISL operations and 

ground-water restoration activities were designated 

11e.(2) byproduct material and disposed of at 

licensed uranium mill tailings impoundments in 

accordance with 10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A, 

Criterion 2.

The staff issued two guidance documents in 

1995 to address issues raised by the industry 

in the uranium recovery program. The first, 

“Staff Technical Position on Effluent Disposal at 

Licensed Uranium Recovery Facilities” (hereinafter, 

the effluent guidance), was intended to provide 

uranium recovery licensees with flexibility regarding 

the disposal of various types of liquid effluents 

generated during the operation of their facilities. In 

issuing this guidance, the staff took a more narrow 

view of the definition of 11e.(2) byproduct material. 

It differentiated between the various waste waters 

generated during ISL operations on the basis of their 

origin and whether uranium was extracted for its 

source material content during that phase of the 

operation. Waste waters and the associated solids 

produced during the uranium extraction phase of site 

operations, called “production bleed,” were classified 

as AEA section 11e.(2) byproduct material and 

therefore subject to regulation by NRC. Conversely, 

waste waters and the resulting solids produced 

after uranium extraction (i.e., during ground-water 

restoration activities) are classified as “mine waste 

waters,” and therefore are subject to regulation 

by individual States under their applicable mining 

programs. These wastes are considered naturally 

occurring radioactive material (NORM). However, 

because licensees often dispose of waste waters from 

uranium extraction and post-extraction activities in 

the same evaporation ponds, the resulting solids are 

a commingled waste consisting of 11e.(2) byproduct 

material and sludges derived from mine waste water.

In the second guidance document, “Final Revised 

Guidance on Disposal of Non-Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, Section 11e.(2) Byproduct Material in Tailings 

Impoundments” (hereinafter, the disposal guidance), 

the staff identified 10 criteria that licensees should 

meet before NRC could authorize the disposal of 

AEA material other than 11e.(2) byproduct material 

in tailings impoundments. One of these criteria 

prohibited the disposal of radioactive material not 

covered by the AEA, including NORM (see earlier 

discussion for policy revisions). This criterion was 

intended to avoid the possibility of dual regulation 

of the radioactive constituents in the impoundments, 

since individual States are responsible for radioactive 

materials not covered by the AEA.

The industry expressed concerns, in NMA’s white 

paper, that, taken together, these two guidance 

documents leave no option for the disposal 

of radioactively contaminated sludges from ISL 

evaporation ponds. The reason for this concern is 

that the 11e.(2) byproduct material was commingled 

with a NORM waste, which is prohibited from 

disposal in a tailings impoundment by the disposal 

guidance. The industry contends that the staff’s 

waste classification, based on the origin of the waste 

water (i.e., from the extraction or restoration phase) 

at an ISL facility, makes the disposal of such sludges 

in a mill tailings impoundment, as required under 

Criterion 2 of Part 40, Appendix A, impossible—

even though the sludges derived from waste waters 

produced throughout a facility’s life cycle are 

physically, chemically, and radiologically identical.

The staff recommended several options, in SECY99-013, for addressing the industry’s concerns. The 

Commission determined that all liquid effluents 

at ISL uranium recovery facilities are 11e.(2) 

byproduct material. NRC takes the position that 

any waste water generated during or after the 

uranium extraction phase of site operations, and all 

evaporation pond sludges derived from such waste 

waters, are classified as 11e.(2) byproduct material. 

The staff will make no legal distinction among 

the waste waters produced at different stages in a 

facility’s life cycle.

Ground-water Issues at ISL Facilities (SECY99-013)

Over the past several years, the industry has argued 

that NRC’s regulation of ground water at ISLs is 

duplicative of the ground-water protection programs 

required by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 

as administered by EPA or EPA-authorized States. 

EPA and the States protect ground-water quality 

through the Underground Injection Control (UIC) 

program, under the SDWA. The States often require 

additional measures in the UIC permitting that 

are more stringent than the Federal program. 

Additionally, NMA also had argued that NRC did 

not have authority to regulate ground water at ISLs.
6 

The industry’s preferred approach for addressing 

dual regulation in the wellfield is for NRC to 

determine that it does not have jurisdiction in 

the wellfield. NRC’s position on its authority and 

jurisdiction over ISL operations is that NRC does 

have jurisdiction over ground water in the wellfield. 

However, to address the industry’s dual regulation 

concerns, staff requested that the Office of the 

General Counsel (OGC) determine whether NRC 

could rely on the actual (or expected) existence 

of a permit, issued by EPA or an EPA-authorized 

State, under the UIC program, as a basis for NRC 

to withdraw from active regulation of the ground 

water at ISL facilities currently under its jurisdiction. 

OGC concluded that the Commission could exercise 

its discretion and rely on the UIC permit for the 

protection of ground water. NRC would still retain 

jurisdiction over the wellfield and ground water, 

under the Agency’s AEA authority, but would simply 

defer active regulation to EPA or the EPA-authorized 

State, not unlike the way transportation issues are 

addressed with the Department of Transportation. 

In the SRM for SECY-99-013, the Commission 

approved the staff continuing discussions with EPA 

and appropriate States to determine the extent NRC 

can rely on the EPA UIC program for ground-water 

protection issues, thereby potentially minimizing 

NRC review of ground-water protection issues at 

ISL facilities. In the interim, it is recognized that 

NRC/EPA dual regulation of the ground water at ISL 

facilities will continue until such time that NRC can 

defer to EPA’s UIC program.

Discussions between NRC and EPA began in late 

2000, and discussions with the appropriate States 

should begin by mid-2001.

In February 1998, staff institutionalized its review 

process for ISLs, including a detailed evaluation 

of ground-water activities, in a draft Standard 

Review Plan (draft SRP) for ISL facility license 

applications (NUREG-1569), that was published for 

public comment. After the comment period, staff 

held a public workshop on the SRP to discuss the 

issues raised. The staff intends to use the draft SRP 

in licensing reviews until any rulemaking for a new 

Part 41 (SECY 99-011) has been completed and 

NUREG-1569 is finalized.

Concurrent Jurisdiction of Non-Radiological 

Hazards of Uranium Mill Tailings (SECY99-277)

In 1980, the staff considered the issue of whether 

the Uranium Mill tailings Radiation Control Act 

(UMTRCA) preempts a non-Agreement State’s 

authority to regulate the non-radiological hazards 

associated with 11e.(2) byproduct material and 

concluded that it did not. The NRC legal staff 

concluded that NRC and the State exercised this 

authority concurrently. As a result, the staff has 

followed the practice of sharing jurisdiction of 

the non-radiological hazards with States. In its 

1998 white paper, the NMA argued that the 1980 

staff legal analysis interpreted UMTRCA incorrectly. 

The Commission, in the SRM for SECY-99-0277, 

disapproved the staff’s recommendation to formally 

adopt the staff practice. Rather, the Commission 

determined that NRC has exclusive jurisdiction over 

both the radiological and non-radiological hazards of 

11e.(2) byproduct material.

As a result of this decision, the staff will implement 

its exclusive authority over the non-radiological 

hazards of 11e.(2) byproduct material and not 

recognize State authority in this area.

(Contacts: Myron Fliegel, 301-415-6629; e-mail: 

mfh1@nrc.gov; 

Dan Gillen, 301-415-7295; e-mail: dmg2@nrc.gov).

PRIVACY INFORMATION IN LICENSEE 

DOCUMENTS

Occasionally, a licensee will submit, to the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 

license applications, event reports, and other 

documents, including personal information on 

individuals. Documents coming into NRC are 

captured electronically or scanned into NRC’s 

automated Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System and are normally made widely 

available, both within NRC, and to the public. 

An effort is made to screen these documents for 

material that should not be disseminated, but it is 

sometimes not possible to screen large documents 

that have personal identifying information, such 

as names, addresses, telephone numbers, Social 

Security Numbers or other identifying numbers, 

personnel information, or medical records. Such 
7

purpose” cask systems.

Dual-purpose cask systems generally consist of three 

main parts: the inner canister, a storage overpack, 

and a transport overpack. The spent fuel is initially 

placed into the inner canister, which is filled with 

helium and sealed. This sealed inner canister is then 

placed into the storage overpack for interim storage 

at an ISFSI. This storage cask system is evaluated 

against the 10 CFR Part 72 requirements, as well 

as the review guidance and acceptance criteria 

for interim storage described in NRC’s “Standard 

Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems,” 

NUREG-1536. NUREG-1536 may be found on 

the NRC web site at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/

NUREGS/SR1536/index.html.

When the licensee decides to ship the spent fuel 

away from the ISFSI, it can transfer the sealed inner 

canister containing the spent fuel out of the storage 

overpack into the transport overpack. This transport 

cask system configuration is evaluated against the 

design requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 and the 

review guidance and acceptance criteria for spent 

fuel transportation described in NRC’s “Standard 

Review Plan for Transportation Packages for 

Spent Nuclear Fuel,” NUREG-1617. NUREG-1617 

may also be found on NRC’s web site at: 

http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/NUREGS/SR1617/

index.html.

Thus far, NRC has approved five dual-purpose 

cask systems for use. They are the NAC-MPC/NACSTC cask system; the NUHOMS-24P/NUHOMS 

MP-187 cask system; the Holtec Hi-Storm/Holtec 

Hi-Star-100 cask system; and most recently, the 

TN-68/TN-68 cask system. Four more dual-purpose 

cask systems are in various stages of NRC review.

(Contact: Patricia Eng, 301-415-8577; e-mail: 

ple@nrc.gov)

OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

is providing a summary of these events to inform 

licensees of conditions they may encounter and of 

actions that may be taken to deal with them.

information should not be included in reports to 

NRC unless it is relevant to and necessary for 

Agency action. Any such information that is 

included should be clearly marked and accompanied 

by a request to treat the information as exempt 

from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.790(a)(6). 

A 10 CFR 2.790 affidavit is not required where 

Exemption 6 is being claimed. However, a bracketed 

proprietary version and a nonproprietary version, 

with the proprietary information blacked out, are 

required. Before formal use of the material, NRC 

will determine whether the information is exempt 

from disclosure and notify the licensee, by letter, of 

the staff’s determination. 

(Contact: Paul Goldberg, 301-415-7842; e-mail: 

pfg@nrc.gov)

DUAL-PURPOSE INTERIM STORAGE/ 

TRANSPORTATION CASKS—THE 

STATUS

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the need for 

alternative methods for spent fuel storage was 

recognized when pools at many nuclear power 

reactors began to fill up with stored spent fuel. 

Utilities began looking at options for increasing 

spent fuel storage capacity. One option for 

increasing on-site storage capacity is storage in U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved 

dry storage cask systems. These systems provide 

safe storage for spent fuel assemblies, in a sealed 

canister that is then placed in a storage overpack. 

The filled canister, along with its storage overpack, 

is a dry cask storage system that provides aboveground interim storage for spent fuel. These dry cask 

storage systems are located in an independent spent 

fuel storage installation (ISFSI). As of February 

2001, 19 sites have opted to store spent fuel in an 

ISFSI. Such storage may be either at the reactor 

site or another NRC-approved location. Although the 

spent fuel may be stored in wet or dry ISFSIs, all but 

one ISFSI store the spent fuel in dry casks. 

Anticipating the availability of a geologic repository 

for disposal of the Nation’s spent fuel, utilities began 

working with cask designers on the development of 

a cask system that could be used both to store the 

spent fuel, on an interim basis, while the repository 

was being built, and to transport the spent fuel to 

the repository. Such cask systems are called “dual-
8 

Events Involving Damage to I-125 

Brachytherapy Seeds during Use of a Popular 

Seed Implant Applicator.

NRC has been notified of four incidents involving 

Iodine-125 (I-125) brachytherapy seeds being 

damaged during the use of a cartridge (magazine) 

with a seed implant applicator. 

Two separate licensees experienced the following 

incident. On completion of a brachytherapy implant, 

unused seeds from the procedure were being 

unloaded from the cartridge into a storage container. 

After unloading, a survey performed on the cartridge 

showed that all the seeds had not been removed. An 

inspection of the unloaded seeds and the cartridge 

found that one seed had been sheared in half. One 

portion of the seed was left in the cartridge and 

another was unloaded with the others. All seeds 

were inspected before loading the cartridge, with no 

irregularities noted. It is suspected that the damage 

occurred during the process of loading the seeds into 

the cartridge.

In the third instance, an I-125 seed broke—while 

still in the applicator—during a prostate implant 

procedure. After several seeds were implanted in the 

patient, one seed in the magazine became jammed 

as the physician attempted to push the seed from 

the magazine into the applicator. The handle of 

the applicator would not move and the magazine 

was stuck in the applicator. After the procedure, the 

magazine was forcibly removed from the applicator. 

There should have been nine seeds left in the 

magazine, but only eight were found. Part of the 

ninth seed was found at the tip of the stylet, and the 

other piece of the seed was found in the magazine 

cartridge channel. 

The fourth event occurred during a brachytherapy 

implant procedure. The last seed in a cartridge 

became jammed while the magazine was still 

attached to the applicator. Some force was required 

to remove the magazine from the applicator. On 

inspection, the jammed cartridge was discovered to 

contain half of the final seed. The partial seed was 

removed and found to be severed. The other half of 

the seed was not found. 

Based on NRC’s review of these events, two possible 

causes resulted in sheared or cut seeds: 1) human 

error in loading the cartridge; and 2) malfunction 

of the cartridge/magazine when attached to the 

applicator. Problems involving brachytherapy seeds 

and the applicator mechanism can be prevented by 

careful attention during preparation of seed loading 

and use of the magazine and applicator. 

(Contact: Linda Psyk, 301-415-0215; e-mail: 

lmp1@nrc.gov)

SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Detailed information about these enforcement 

actions can be accessed via the U. S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) homepage 

[http://www.nrc.gov/OE/]. Click on “Enforcement 

Actions.” Cases are listed alphabetically. To access 

the complete enforcement action, click on the 

highlighted text after the name of the case.

Gauge

Alfonso DeLeo, Jr., Ardmore, Pennsylvania, EA 

99-057 & EA 99-217

On October 23, 2000, the licensee transferred his 

gauges to an authorized recipient. In response, 

NRC terminated the license on November 9, 2000, 

and on December 26, 2000, NRC withdrew civil 

penalties that had been issued to the licensee in 1999 

for willful unauthorized possession of two nuclear 

density gauges. 

Medical

Temple University Hospital, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, EA 00-156

On October 19, 2000, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty, in the amount 

of $8,800, was issued for a Severity Level II 

violation based on discrimination against a former 

Nuclear Medicine Technologist for raising safety 

concerns.
9

Radiography

NDT Services, Inc. (NDTS) Caguas, Puerto Rico, 

EA 00-031

On October 17, 2000, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level I violation based on 

multiple failures of two former Radiation Safety 

Officers to ensure that radiation safety activities 

were performed in accordance with approved 

procedures and regulatory requirements. Discretion 

was exercised pursuant to Section VII.B.6 of the 

Enforcement Policy, and a civil penalty was not 

proposed because NDTS transferred all licensed 

material to authorized recipients; NDTS is no longer 

conducting business on licensed activities, and it has 

requested that the license be terminated.

Testing Technologies, Woodbridge, Virginia, 

EA 00-231

On November 14, 2000, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $5500 was issued. The action was based on a 

Severity Level III problem involving the failure to: 

(1) limit unrestricted area doses to less than 20 

microsievert (2 millirem) in any 1 hour; (2) post 

each radiation and high radiation area with the 

appropriate sign; and (3) perform surveys necessary 

to demonstrate compliance with the regulations and 

to evaluate the radiological hazards present.

Other

Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, 

Oklahoma, EA 00-203

On December 7, 2000, a Notice of Violation 

was issued for a Severity Level III violation 

associated with the use of licensed material (tritiated 

thymadine) in an unapproved and unauthorized 

location. Although a civil penalty would normally 

be proposed by the assessment process, NRC 

exercised discretion and did not propose a penalty 

because of the licensee’s corrective actions and 

the low risk associated with the small amount of 

radioactive material.

Mallinckrodt, Inc., Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 

EA 00-180

On October 4, 2000, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $2750 was issued for violations that occurred at 

a Mallinckrodt, Inc., radiopharmacy in Harrisburg, 

Pennsylvania. The action was based on the failure to 

control the occupational dose to the skin, or to any 

extremity of an individual, below the annual dose 

limit of 500 millisieverts (50 rems) shallow-dose 

equivalent, and the failure to make adequate surveys 

to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20.201.

Mallinckrodt, Inc., Maryland Heights, Missouri, 

EA 00-178

On December 21, 2000, a Notice of Violation 

and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $125,000 was issued for a Severity 

Level I problem that occurred at Mallinckrodt, 

Inc. manufacturing facility in Maryland Heights, 

Missouri. The Notice of Violation was based 

on numerous failures to: (1) control activities 

to keep occupational doses to workers within 

regulatory limits; (2) use procedures and engineering 

controls to maintain doses as low as is reasonably 

achievable; and (3) make necessary surveys to ensure 

compliance with the regulations for protection 

against radiation. Although the normal civil penalty 

assessment process would have resulted in a base 

civil penalty in the amount of $27,500, NRC 

exercised discretion in accordance with Section 

VII.A.1 of the Policy and increased the penalty 

because of: (1) the number of overexposures (31); 

(2) the severity of the overexposures; (3) the 

time frame over which the exposures occurred; 

(4) the failure to identify the exposures despite 

multiple precursor events, and (5) the licensee’s 

poor enforcement history. A Notice of Violation was 

also issued for a Severity Level III violation for a 

subsequent failure to properly survey.

National Institutes of Health (NIH), Bethesda, 

Maryland, EA 01-001

On January 17, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the licensee’s failure to make surveys that were 

necessary to assure compliance with the regulations 

that limit radiation exposure to the skin of a minor 
10 

to 50 millisieverts (5 rems). The violation resulted 

from an August 8, 2000, contamination incident, at 

the facility, that resulted in an unplanned exposure 

to a minor who was a student working at NIH as 

an intern. 

(Contact: Sally Merchant, 301-415-2747; e-mail: 

slm2@nrc.gov)

GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS ISSUED

(December 1, 2000 - January 31, 2001)

Note that these are only summaries of U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) generic 

communications. If one of these documents appears 

relevant to your needs and you have not received it, 

please call one of the technical contacts listed below. 

The Internet address for the NRC library of generic 

communications is—www.nrc.gov/NRC/GENACT/

GC/index.html. Please note that this address is casesensitive and must be entered exactly as shown.

Information Notices (INs)

IN 2000-19, “Implementation of Human Use 

Research Protocols Involving U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission Regulated Materials” was 

issued on December 5, 2000. This notice was issued 

to all medical use licensees to remind them of 

their responsibility to ensure compliance with NRC 

requirements and all their license conditions, when 

participating in research involving human subjects, 

using NRC’s regulated materials. It is also intended 

to remind licensees that Title10 of the U.S. Code 

of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 35.6, 

“Provisions for research involving human subjects,” 

is not a blanket authority to conduct research 

involving human subjects.

Contacts: Robert L. Ayres, NMSS, 301-415-5746, 

e-mail: rxa1@nrc.gov.

Donna-Beth Howe, NMSS, 301-415-7848, 

e-mail:dbh@nrc.gov.

IN 2000-22, “Medical Misadministrations Caused 

by Human Errors Involving Gamma Stereotactic 

Radiosurgery (Gamma Knife)” was issued on 

December 18, 2000. This notice was issued to 

all medical licensees authorized to conduct gamma 

stereotactic radiosurgery treatments to remind them 

of the importance of following written directives 

and treatment-planning procedures, and the need 

to pay attention to detail during preparation and 

administration of gamma stereotactic radiosurgery.

Contact: Roberto J. Torres, NMSS, 301-415-8112, 

e-mail: rjt@nrc.gov.

Regulatory Issue Summaries (RIS’)

RIS 2001-03, “Changes, Tests, and Experiments” 

was issued on January 23, 2001. This summary was 

issued to all NRC Part 50 and Part 72 licensees 

and Part 72 Certificate of Compliance holders, to 

provide guidance to them in making the transition 

to the requirements of recently amended regulations 

in Title 10 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 

(10 CFR), namely, 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 

72.48. Both sections are titled “Changes, tests, 

and experiments.”

Contacts: Eileen M. McKenna, NRR, 

301-415-2189, e-mail: emm@nrc.gov.

Christopher Jackson, NMSS, 301-415-2947, e-mail: 

cpj@nrc.gov.

RIS 2000-04, “Issuance of Updated Guidance on 

the Transfer of Ownership or Control of Licensed 

Activities (NUREG-1556, VOLUME 15)” was 

issued on January 24, 2001. This summary was 

issued to all materials and fuel cycle licensees to 

inform them of the availability of NUREG-1556, 

“Consolidated Guidance about Materials Licenses,” 

Volume 15, “Program-Specific Guidance about 

Changes of Control and about Bankruptcy Involving 

Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material 

Licenses.” NUREG-1556, Volume 15, supersedes 

all previous guidance that has been issued 

concerning changes in ownership or control of 

licensed activities.

Contacts: John Pelchat, Region II, 404-562-4729, 

e-mail: jmp2@nrc.gov.

Loren Hueter, Region III, 630-829-9829, e-mail: 

ljh1@nrc.gov.

David Everhart, Region I, 610-337-6936, e-mail: 

dbe@nrc.gov.

(General Contact: Mark A. Sitek, NMSS, 

301-415-5799, e-mail: mas3@nrc.gov)
11

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

is providing summaries of these events to inform 

licensees of conditions they may encounter and of 

actions that may be taken to deal with them.

Event 1: Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery 

(Gamma Knife) misadministration at University of 

California in San Francisco, California.

Date and Place: September 11, 1998; University of 

California; San Francisco, California. The California 

Department of Health Services, Radiologic Health 

Branch, was notified of the misadministration on 

September 17, 1998. The NRC staff was informed 

of this event in July 2000. The State of California 

indicated that the delay in reporting this event to 

NRC was caused by a computer error.

Nature and Probable Consequences: A patient was 

prescribed a radiation therapy treatment, for two 

metastatic lesions of the brain, which used a gamma 

stereotactic radiosurgery (GSR) device. The patient 

was prescribed a dose of 16 Gray (Gy)(1600 rad) to 

one of the brain lesions. However, because of an 

error, the wrong site of the brain received more than 

10 Gy (1000 rad). The patient was treated for two 

metastatic brain lesions, one in the left thalamus and 

the other in the right parietal region of the brain. A 

treatment plan was developed, for the lesion in the 

left thalamus, to deliver a single dose of 16 Gy 

(1600 rad), at the 60 percent isodose line. However, 

one of the seven parameter settings of the GSR, 

the “left Y” coordinate, was erroneously set at 111 

millimeters (mm) (4.37 in.) instead of 101 mm (3.98 

in.), resulting in a 5-mm (0.20-in.) translocation 

of the treatment volume. This error resulted in an 

underdose of a portion of the intended treatment 

volume and an unintended dose of more than 

10 Gy (1000 rad) to brain tissue outside of the 

prescribed treatment volume. The misadministration 

was discovered when the licensee performed a 

quality control verification of the GSR parameters 

after the radiation treatment. The licensee reported 

that the patient experienced no acute side effects 

from this misadministration. The physician who 

was involved in this treatment notified the patient 

of this misadministration. An additional treatment 

was added to the treatment plan to complete the 

prescribed dose to the intended treatment volume of 

the left thalamus, and the treatment was completed. 

The patient died as a direct result of the metastatic 

condition on March 3, 1999. The misadministration 

was caused by a human error. One member of 

the treatment team set a wrong coordinate and 

another member of the treatment team failed to 

independently verify the coordinate setting.

Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: The licensee’s initial corrective actions 

included decreasing distractions to the treatment 

team by limiting telephone calls in the treatment 

control area and restricting conversations in the 

treatment room to conversations required for the 

treatment of the patient. The State requested the 

licensee to contact other GSR facilities, to review 

their methods of operation. The licensee found 

that another GSR facility had performed a study 

comparing the frequency of incorrect coordinate 

settings by licensees who did one independent 

verification and licensees who did two. The licensee 

used this study as a guide and has adopted the 

procedure of performing two independent checks 

of the coordinate settings before each treatment 

and retaining the follow-up check of the coordinate 

settings after each treatment, to determine if an error 

was made. 

State Agency: The findings of the State staff’s 

on-site investigation agreed with the findings of 

the licensee’s quality assurance review. The State 

also shared the licensee’s study findings with other 

Agreement States and with NRC, because of the 

study’s generic implications. The State was satisfied 

with the licensee’s corrective actions and believes 

they should be adequate to prevent recurrence. The 

State did not take any enforcement actions for this 

misadministration.

Event 2: Brachytherapy misadministration at 

Aultman Hospital, Canton, Ohio.

Date and Place: August 22, 2000 through 

October 30, 2000; Aultman Hospital; Canton, Ohio.

Nature and Probable Consequences: As a result 

of a common error, four patients who were 

prescribed manual brachytherapy gynecological 

procedures were administered doses higher than 

those prescribed.
12 

The licensee submitted a written report to the 

Ohio Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation 

Protection, within 15 days of discovering the 

misadministrations.

State Agency: The Ohio Department of Health, 

Bureau of Radiation Protection, performed an on-site 

investigation on November 21 and 22, 2000, to 

review the procedures and the findings of the 

licensee’s quality management review and to confirm 

that the licensee’s corrective action proposal is 

adequate to prevent recurrence. Enforcement actions 

or penalties, if any, will be determined at a later date.

Event 3: Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery (Gamma 

Knife) misadministration at Wills Eye Hospital, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Date and Place: October 4, 2000; Wills Eye 

Hospital; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Nature and Probable Consequences: On October 5, 

2000, the licensee notified the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Operations 

Center of a misadministration to a patient 

undergoing gamma knife treatment for an acoustic 

tumor. The licensee stated that the patient’s treatment 

plan called for the administration of 1200 CentiGray 

(cGy) (rad) to a tumor volume in three shots. While 

setting up for the first shot, which used the 8-mm 

(0.31-in.) collimated helmet, the physician correctly 

read the X-coordinate and Y-coordinate from the 

treatment plan, and these coordinates were used 

to position the patient for treatment; however, 

when asked for the Z-coordinate, the physician 

incorrectly provided the treatment plan value for 

the X-coordinate. Therefore, the wrong Z-coordinate 

was used to position the patient for the treatment. 

The licensee identified this error while setting up 

to perform the second shot, and the physician 

was notified. The licensee determined that the 

positioning error resulted in the treatment of an 

area approximately 8-mm (0.31-in.) superior to the 

intended treatment site. The licensee stated that this 

area would have received some radiation exposure 

during the normal course of treatment, but not the 

400 cGy (rad) that resulted from the positioning 

error. The treatment was appropriately modified for 

the second and third shot, and a fourth shot was 

added to make up for the dose that was missed in the 

first shot. The licensee stated that the patient and the 

The first patient was given a brachytherapy dose 

of 33.3 Gray (Gy) (3330 rad) iridium-192 , 

(Ir-192), instead of the prescribed dose of 20 Gy 

(2000 rad). Approximately 3 weeks later, the same 

patient was administered another brachytherapy 

dose of 35 Gy (3500 rad) Ir-192, instead of the 

prescribed dose of 22.5 Gy (2250 rad). The second 

patient was administered a brachytherapy dose of 

35.2 Gy (3520 rad) Ir-192, instead of the prescribed 

dose of 19.8 Gy (1980 rad) Ir-192. The third patient 

was administered a brachytherapy dose of 32.4 Gy 

(3240 rad) Ir-192, instead of the prescribed dose of 

18.9 Gy (1890 rad) Ir-192. The fourth patient was 

administered a brachytherapy dose of 31.5 Gy (3150 

rad) Ir-192, instead of the prescribed dose of 20.3 Gy 

(20.25 rad) Ir-192.

The misadministrations were discovered on 

November 3, 2000, and November 13, 2000, 

during an internal audit of the licensee’s Quality 

Management Program (QMP) by the Radiation 

Safety Officer (RSO) and the Radiation Protection 

Staff. The licensee’s RSO made a telephone report 

to the Ohio Department of Health, Bureau of 

Radiation Protection, on November 4, 2000, and 

November 13, 2000.

The first, second, and fourth patients were notified 

of the misadministrations. The notification of the 

third patient is pending because the patient was 

hospitalized for an unrelated infection. The licensee 

stated that the clinical treatment of these patients has 

not been affected by misadministrations.

The licensee indicated that this event was primarily 

caused by an operator error when entering source 

strength data in the treatment planning computer. 

The facility obtained a new computer in August 

2000, and the operator made a mistake and entered 

the source strengths in milligram-radium-equivalent 

instead of millicurie. Also, the quality assurance 

of the treatment planning was inadequate, and the 

second checks of treatment plans, to which the 

licensee committed in its QMP, were inadequate. 

Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: As soon as the licensee’s management 

determined that a reportable event had occurred, the 

licensee took action to provide additional training 

to the staff involved in brachytherapy procedures. 
13

patient’s physician were immediately advised of the 

error. The licensee does not believe that the patient 

will develop any adverse effects from this event. 

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: In a letter dated October 18, 2000, the 

licensee has provided its corrective and preventive 

actions. The actions include: 1) written procedures 

have been expanded to explicitly state that all team 

members must verify coordinates from the treatment 

protocol sheet before setting or checking a patient’s 

treatment coordinates; 2) this policy has been posted 

in and also outside the Gamma Knife suite: and 3) 

training was conducted to re-familiarize the team 

members with the Quality Management Program 

and the revised procedure involving the verification 

of the treatment coordinates from the treatment 

protocol sheet.

NRC: Staff from NRC Region I office reviewed 

the event and evaluated the licensee’s corrective 

and preventive actions during a special inspection 

conducted during the week of October 9, 2000. 

NRC also contracted a medical consultant to 

review the event, its effect on the patient, and the 

licensee’s corrective actions to avoid recurrence of 

similar incidents.

Correction

There is an error in Event #5 in the Significant 

Events section of the Dec 2000 - Jan 2001 (No. 

00-4) issue of the NMSS Licensee Newsletter. The 

error is in the following sentence: “The conversion 

is supposed to be the mCi divided by 1.27, but 

the licensee multiplied by 1.27 instead.” The correct 

sentence should be: “The conversion is supposed to 

be air kerma strength divided by 1.27 to obtain mCi; 

however, the licensee multiplied by 1.27 instead.”

In the event in question, the seed strength obtained 

from the treatment planning computer was in air 

kerma units, which required conversion to units 

of millicuries when ordering the seeds from the 

vendor. For I-125, the air kerma strength must 

be divided by 1.27 to obtain millicuries. The 

conversion factor for I-125 is 1.27 U/mCi according 

to “Dosimetry of interstitial brachytherapy sources: 

Recommendations of AAPM Radiation Therapy 

Committee Task Group No. 43,” Med. Phys. 22, pp. 

209-234, Table IV (1995).

SELECTED FEDERAL REGISTER

NOTICES

(October 1, 2000 - March 31, 2001)

NOTE: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) contacts may be reached by mail at the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 

20555-0001.

FINAL RULES 

“Adjustment of Civil Penalties for Inflation; 

Miscellaneous Administrative Changes,” 65 FR 

59270, October 4, 2000.

Contact: Norman St. Amour, 301-415-1589; e-mail: 

NXS1@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

HI-STAR 100 Revision,” 65 FR 60339, October 11, 

2000 (Direct Final Rule).

Contact: Gordon Gundersen, 301-415-6195; e-mail: 

geg1@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: NACUMS Addition,” 65 FR 62581, October 19, 2000.

Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov

“Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and 

Materials,” 65 FR 70287, November 22, 2000.

Contact: Suzanne Schuyler-Hayes, 301-415-2333; 

e-mail: ssh@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: TN-32 

Revision,” 65 FR 75853, December 5, 2000.

Contact: Roger W. Broseus, 301-415-7608; e-mail : 

rwb @nrc.gov.

“New Dosimetry Technology; Confirmation of 

Effective Date of January 8, 2001 (Direct Final 

Rule), 66 FR 1573, January 9, 2001.”
14 

Contact: Betty Ann Torres, 301-415-0191; e-mail: 

bat@nrc.gov.

 “List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

HI-STAR 100 Revision; Confirmation of Effective 

Date of December 26, 2000 (Direct Final Rule),” 66 

FR 1573, January 9, 2001.

Contact: Gordon Gundersen, 301-415-6195; e -mail: 

geg1@nrc.gov.

 “List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: Fuel 

Solutions Addition,” 66 FR 3444, January 16, 2001.

Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov.

 “Termination of Section 274i Agreement Between 

the State of Louisiana and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission,” 66 FR 5441, January 19, 2001.

Contact: Stephanie P. Bush-Goddard, Ph.D., 

301-415-6257; e-mail: spb@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: NACUMS Revision, Confirmation of Effective Date,” 66 

FR 10569, February 16, 2001.

Contact: Keith K. McDaniel, 301-415-5252; e -mail: 

kkm@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: TN-32 

Revision, Confirmation of Effective Date,” 66 FR 

10569, February 16, 2001.

Contact: Roger W. Broseus, 301-415-7608; e -mail: 

rwb@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

Fuel Solutions Revision,” 66 FR12435, February 27, 2001.

Contact: Gordon Gundersen, 301-415-6195; e-mail: 

geg1@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

VSC-24 Revision (Direct Final Rule),” 66 FR 13407, 

March 6, 2001.

Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

HI-STAR 100 Revision (Direct final rule),” 66 FR 

14483, March 13, 2001.

Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov.

PROPOSED RULES

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

HI-STAR 100 Revision,” 65 FR 60384, October 11, 2000. 

Contact: Gordon Gundersen, 301-415-6195; e-mail: 

geg1@nrc.gov.

“Medical Use of Byproduct Material - Speciality 

Boards and Medical Speciality Boards: Solicitation,” 

65 FR 65793, November 2, 2000. 

Contact: Sam Jones, 301-415-6198; e-mail: 

szj@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

Fuel Solutions Revision,” 66 FR12439, February 27, 2001.

Contact: Gordon Gundersen, 301-415-6195; e-mail: 

geg1@nrc.gov.

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

VSC-24 Revision,” 66 FR 13459, March 6, 2001.

Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov.

Storage Casks: HI-STAR 100 Revision, 66 FR 

14503, March 13, 2001. 

Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov.

“Revision of Fee Schedules; Fee Recovery for FY 

2001,” 66 FR 16982, March 28,2001.

Contact: Glenda Jackson, 301-415-6057.
15

OTHER NOTICES

“Draft Regulatory Guide DG-3020, ‘Guidance for 

Implementation of 10 CFR 72.48, Changes, Tests, 

and Experiments,’ ” 66 FR 390, January 24, 2001.

Contact: C.P. Jackson, 301-415-2947; e-mail: 

cpj@nrc.gov.

“Notice of Availability, NUREG-1556, Volume 17, 

‘Consolidated Guidance about Materials Licenses: 

Program-Specific Guidance about Special Nuclear 

Material of Less Than Critical Mass Licenses’ ” 66 

FR 2461, January 11, 2001.

Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: 

cxb@nrc.gov.

“Notice of Availability of final NUREG-1556, 

Volume 18, ‘Consolidated Guidance about Materials 

Licenses: Program-Specific Guidance about Service 

Provider Licenses,’ ” 66 FR 6704, January 22, 2001.

Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: 

cxb@nrc.gov.

“Notice of availability of final NUREG-1556, 

Volume 19, ‘Consolidated Guidance about Materials 

Licenses: Guidance for Agreement State Licensees 

about NRC Form 241, “Report of Proposed 

Activities in Non-Agreement States, Areas of 

Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, or Offshore Waters,” 

and Guidance for NRC Licensees Proposing to Work 

in Agreement State Jurisdiction (Reciprocity),’ ” 

66 FR 6704, January 22, 2001.

Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: 

cxb@nrc.gov.

“Notice of Availability of final NUREG-1556, 

Volume 15, ‘Consolidated Guidance about Materials 

Licenses: Program-Specific Guidance about Change 

of Control and about Bankruptcy Involving 

Byproduct, Source, or Special Nuclear Material 

Licenses.’ ” 66 FR 7518, January 23, 2001.

Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: 

cxb@nrc.gov.

“United Plant Guard Workers of America; Denial 

of Petition for Rulemaking (Parts 73, 76, and 95) 

(PRM-76-1),” 66 FR 10839, February 20, 2001.

Contact: Merri Horn, 301-415-8126; e-mail: 

mlh1@nrc.gov.

“Withdrawal of Regulatory Guide 8.14, ‘Personnel 

Neutron Dosimeters (Revision 1),’ ” 66 FR 11611, 

February 26, 2001.

“Proposed Revision of the NRC Enforcement 

Policy,” 66 FR14224, March 9, 2001.

Contact: Nick Hilton, 301-415-2741; e-mail: 

ndh@nrc.gov.

(General Contact: Paul Goldberg, 301-415-7842; 

e-mail: pfg@nrc.gov)

Comments, and suggestions you may have for 

information not currently included, that might 

be helpful to licensees, should be sent to:

E. Kraus

NMSS Licensee Newsletter Editor

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Two White Flint North, Mail Stop 8-A-23

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001