# Den Europæiske Unions C 245/2011

| | ISSN 1725-2393
  doi:10.3000/17252393.C_2011.245.dan |
| --- | --- |
| Den Europæiske Unions
  Tidende | C 245 |
| | |
| Dansk udgave | Meddelelser og oplysninger | 54. årgang24. august 2011 |

ISSN 1725-2393

doi:10.3000/17252393.C_2011.245.dan

Den Europæiske Unions

Tidende

C 245

Dansk udgave

Meddelelser og oplysninger

54. årgang24. august 2011

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| Informationsnummer | Indhold | Side |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Meddelelser |
| | MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2011/C 245/01 | Ingen indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Informationsnummer

Indhold

Side

II   Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2011/C 245/01

Ingen indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Oplysninger |
| --- | --- |
| | OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Rådet |
| 2011/C 245/02 | Bekendtgørelse til de personer og enheder, der er omfattet af de restriktive foranstaltninger i Rådets afgørelse 2011/273/FUSP som gennemført ved Rådets gennemførelsesafgørelse 2011/515/FUSP, og i Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 442/2011 som gennemført ved Rådets gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 843/2011 om restriktive foranstaltninger over for Syrien | 2 |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2011/C 245/03 | Euroens vekselkurs | 3 |
| | OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE |
| 2011/C 245/04 | Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri | 4 |
| 2011/C 245/05 | Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri | 5 |
| 2011/C 245/06 | Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri | 6 |
| 2011/C 245/07 | Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri | 7 |

IV   Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Rådet

2011/C 245/02

Bekendtgørelse til de personer og enheder, der er omfattet af de restriktive foranstaltninger i Rådets afgørelse 2011/273/FUSP som gennemført ved Rådets gennemførelsesafgørelse 2011/515/FUSP, og i Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 442/2011 som gennemført ved Rådets gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 843/2011 om restriktive foranstaltninger over for Syrien

2

Europa-Kommissionen

2011/C 245/03

Euroens vekselkurs

3

OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE

2011/C 245/04

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

4

2011/C 245/05

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

5

2011/C 245/06

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

6

2011/C 245/07

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

7

| | V   Øvrige meddelelser |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2011/C 245/08 | Indkaldelser af forslag — ESPON 2013-programmet | 8 |
| | PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2011/C 245/09 | Statsstøtte — Det Forenede Kongerige — Statsstøtte SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Fritagelse for afgift på granulater i Nordirland (ex N 2/04) — Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 108, stk. 2, i TEUF (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2011/C 245/10 | Statsstøtte — Tyskland (Artikel 107-109 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde) — Statsstøtte MC 15/09 — LBBW — frasalg af Deka (
  1
  ) | 21 |

V   Øvrige meddelelser

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2011/C 245/08

Indkaldelser af forslag — ESPON 2013-programmet

8

PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN

Europa-Kommissionen

2011/C 245/09

Statsstøtte — Det Forenede Kongerige — Statsstøtte SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Fritagelse for afgift på granulater i Nordirland (ex N 2/04) — Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 108, stk. 2, i TEUF (
  1
  )

1

10

2011/C 245/10

Statsstøtte — Tyskland (Artikel 107-109 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde) — Statsstøtte MC 15/09 — LBBW — frasalg af Deka (
  1
  )

1

21

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   EØS-relevant tekst |

---

(1)   EØS-relevant tekst

1

| DA | |
| --- | --- |

DA

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II Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/1

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Ingen indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion

(Sag COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

2011/C 245/01

Den 9. august 2011 besluttede Kommissionen ikke at gøre indsigelse mod ovennævnte anmeldte fusion og erklære den forenelig med fællesmarkedet. Beslutningen er truffet efter artikel 6, stk. 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004. Beslutningens fulde ordlyd foreligger kun på engelsk og vil blive offentliggjort, efter at eventuelle forretningshemmeligheder er udeladt. Den vil kunne ses:

| — | under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor |
| --- | --- |

—

under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor

| — | i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/da/index.htm) under dokumentnummer 32011M6298. EUR-Lex giver online-adgang til EU-retten. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/da/index.htm) under dokumentnummer 32011M6298. EUR-Lex giver online-adgang til EU-retten.

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IV Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Rådet

| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/2

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Bekendtgørelse til de personer og enheder, der er omfattet af de restriktive foranstaltninger i Rådets afgørelse 2011/273/FUSP som gennemført ved Rådets gennemførelsesafgørelse 2011/515/FUSP, og i Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 442/2011 som gennemført ved Rådets gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 843/2011 om restriktive foranstaltninger over for Syrien

2011/C 245/02

RÅDET FOR DEN EUROPÆISKE UNION

Følgende oplysninger bekendtgøres hermed for de personer og enheder, der er anført i bilaget til Rådets afgørelse 2011/273/FUSP som gennemført ved Rådets gennemførelsesafgørelse 2011/515/FUSP (1), og i bilag II til Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 442/2011 som gennemført ved Rådets gennemførelsesforordning (EU) nr. 843/2011 (2) om restriktive foranstaltninger over for Syrien.

Rådet for Den Europæiske Union har besluttet, at de personer og enheder, der er nævnt i ovennævnte bilag, skal opføres på listerne over personer og enheder, som er omfattet af de restriktive foranstaltninger afgørelse 2011/273/FUSP og s forordning (EU) nr. 442/2011 om restriktive foranstaltninger over for Syrien. Begrundelsen for opførelsen af disse personer og enheder på listen gives i de relevante afsnit i disse bilag.

De berørte personer og enheder gøres opmærksom på muligheden for at indgive en anmodning til de kompetente myndigheder i den eller de relevante medlemsstater, jf. de websteder, der er anført i bilag III til forordning (EU) nr. 442/2011, med henblik på at opnå tilladelse til at anvende indefrosne pengemidler i forbindelse med basale behov eller specifikke betalinger (jf. artikel 6 i forordningen).

De berørte personer og enheder kan med den fornødne dokumentation til følgende adresse rette en anmodning til Rådet om, at beslutningen om at optage dem på ovennævnte liste tages op til fornyet overvejelse:

| Rådet for Den Europæiske Union |
| --- |
| Generalsekretariatet |
| DG K Coordination |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Rådet for Den Europæiske Union

Generalsekretariatet

DG K Coordination

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

De berørte personer og enheder gøres ligeledes opmærksom på muligheden for at indbringe Rådets afgørelse for Den Europæiske Unions Ret på de betingelser, der er fastsat i artikel 275, stk. 2, og artikel 263, stk. 4 og 6, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde.

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(1)  EUT L 218 af 24.8.2011.

(2)  EUT L 218 af 24.8.2011, s. 1.

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Europa-Kommissionen

| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/3

---

Euroens vekselkurs (1)

23. august 2011

2011/C 245/03

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | amerikanske dollar | 1,4462 |
| JPY | japanske yen | 110,72 |
| DKK | danske kroner | 7,4498 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,87600 |
| SEK | svenske kroner | 9,1046 |
| CHF | schweiziske franc | 1,1410 |
| ISK | islandske kroner | |
| NOK | norske kroner | 7,8080 |
| BGN | bulgarske lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | tjekkiske koruna | 24,417 |
| HUF | ungarske forint | 271,78 |
| LTL | litauiske litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lettiske lats | 0,7095 |
| PLN | polske zloty | 4,1499 |
| RON | rumænske leu | 4,2574 |
| TRY | tyrkiske lira | 2,5783 |
| AUD | australske dollar | 1,3771 |
| CAD | canadiske dollar | 1,4260 |
| HKD | hongkongske dollar | 11,2766 |
| NZD | newzealandske dollar | 1,7360 |
| SGD | singaporeanske dollar | 1,7414 |
| KRW | sydkoreanske won | 1 558,38 |
| ZAR | sydafrikanske rand | 10,3816 |
| CNY | kinesiske renminbi yuan | 9,2513 |
| HRK | kroatiske kuna | 7,4740 |
| IDR | indonesiske rupiah | 12 355,53 |
| MYR | malaysiske ringgit | 4,2894 |
| PHP | filippinske pesos | 61,206 |
| RUB | russiske rubler | 41,8255 |
| THB | thailandske bath | 43,140 |
| BRL | brasilianske real | 2,3111 |
| MXN | mexicanske pesos | 17,7768 |
| INR | indiske rupee | 65,9830 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

amerikanske dollar

1,4462

JPY

japanske yen

110,72

DKK

danske kroner

7,4498

GBP

pund sterling

0,87600

SEK

svenske kroner

9,1046

CHF

schweiziske franc

1,1410

ISK

islandske kroner

NOK

norske kroner

7,8080

BGN

bulgarske lev

1,9558

CZK

tjekkiske koruna

24,417

HUF

ungarske forint

271,78

LTL

litauiske litas

3,4528

LVL

lettiske lats

0,7095

PLN

polske zloty

4,1499

RON

rumænske leu

4,2574

TRY

tyrkiske lira

2,5783

AUD

australske dollar

1,3771

CAD

canadiske dollar

1,4260

HKD

hongkongske dollar

11,2766

NZD

newzealandske dollar

1,7360

SGD

singaporeanske dollar

1,7414

KRW

sydkoreanske won

1 558,38

ZAR

sydafrikanske rand

10,3816

CNY

kinesiske renminbi yuan

9,2513

HRK

kroatiske kuna

7,4740

IDR

indonesiske rupiah

12 355,53

MYR

malaysiske ringgit

4,2894

PHP

filippinske pesos

61,206

RUB

russiske rubler

41,8255

THB

thailandske bath

43,140

BRL

brasilianske real

2,3111

MXN

mexicanske pesos

17,7768

INR

indiske rupee

65,9830

---

(1)  Kilde: Referencekurs offentliggjort af Den Europæiske Centralbank.

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OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE

| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/4

---

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

2011/C 245/04

I overensstemmelse med artikel 35, stk. 3, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1224/2009 af 20. november 2009 om oprettelse af en EF-kontrolordning med henblik på at sikre overholdelse af reglerne i den fælles fiskeripolitik (1) er der truffet beslutning om lukning af fiskeri, jf. nedenstående skema:

| Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Varighed | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Medlemsstat | Nederlandene |
| Bestand eller bestandsgruppe | HKE/571214 |
| Art | Kulmule (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Område | VI og VII, EU-farvande og internationale farvande i Vb og internationale farvande i XII og XIV |
| Fiskerfartøjstype(r) | — |
| Løbenummer | — |

Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning

18.7.2011

Varighed

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

Medlemsstat

Nederlandene

Bestand eller bestandsgruppe

HKE/571214

Art

Kulmule (Merluccius merluccius)

Område

VI og VII, EU-farvande og internationale farvande i Vb og internationale farvande i XII og XIV

Fiskerfartøjstype(r)

—

Løbenummer

—

Link til medlemsstatens beslutning:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  EUT L 343 af 22.12.2009, s. 1.

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| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/5

---

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

2011/C 245/05

I overensstemmelse med artikel 35, stk. 3, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1224/2009 af 20. november 2009 om oprettelse af en EF-kontrolordning med henblik på at sikre overholdelse af reglerne i den fælles fiskeripolitik (1) er der truffet beslutning om lukning af fiskeri, jf. nedenstående skema:

| Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Varighed | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Medlemsstat | Nederlandene |
| Bestand eller bestandsgruppe | HKE/2AC4-C |
| Art | Kulmule (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Område | EU-farvande i IIa og IV |
| Fiskerfartøjstype(r) | — |
| Løbenummer | — |

Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning

18.7.2011

Varighed

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

Medlemsstat

Nederlandene

Bestand eller bestandsgruppe

HKE/2AC4-C

Art

Kulmule (Merluccius merluccius)

Område

EU-farvande i IIa og IV

Fiskerfartøjstype(r)

—

Løbenummer

—

Link til medlemsstatens beslutning:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  EUT L 343 af 22.12.2009, s. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/6

---

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

2011/C 245/06

I overensstemmelse med artikel 35, stk. 3, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1224/2009 af 20. november 2009 om oprettelse af en EF-kontrolordning med henblik på at sikre overholdelse af reglerne i den fælles fiskeripolitik (1) er der truffet beslutning om lukning af fiskeri, jf. nedenstående skema:

| Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning | 9.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Varighed | 9.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Medlemsstat | Frankrig |
| Bestand eller bestandsgruppe | COD/5BE6A |
| Art | Torsk (Gadus morhua) |
| Område | VIa, EU-farvande og internationale farvande i Vb øst for 12° 00′ V |
| Fiskerfartøjstype(r) | — |
| Løbenummer | 792761 |

Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning

9.7.2011

Varighed

9.7.2011-31.12.2011

Medlemsstat

Frankrig

Bestand eller bestandsgruppe

COD/5BE6A

Art

Torsk (Gadus morhua)

Område

VIa, EU-farvande og internationale farvande i Vb øst for 12° 00′ V

Fiskerfartøjstype(r)

—

Løbenummer

792761

Link til medlemsstatens beslutning:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  EUT L 343 af 22.12.2009, s. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/7

---

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

2011/C 245/07

I overensstemmelse med artikel 35, stk. 3, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1224/2009 af 20. november 2009 om oprettelse af en EF-kontrolordning med henblik på at sikre overholdelse af reglerne i den fælles fiskeripolitik (1) er der truffet beslutning om lukning af fiskeri, jf. nedenstående skema:

| Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning | 2.8.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Varighed | 2.8.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Medlemsstat | Portugal |
| Bestand eller bestandsgruppe | WHB/8C3411 |
| Art | Blåhvilling (Micromesistius poutassou) |
| Område | VIIIc, IX og X, EU-farvande i CECAF 34.1.1 |
| Fiskerfartøjstype(r) | — |
| Løbenummer | — |

Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning

2.8.2011

Varighed

2.8.2011-31.12.2011

Medlemsstat

Portugal

Bestand eller bestandsgruppe

WHB/8C3411

Art

Blåhvilling (Micromesistius poutassou)

Område

VIIIc, IX og X, EU-farvande i CECAF 34.1.1

Fiskerfartøjstype(r)

—

Løbenummer

—

Link til medlemsstatens beslutning:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  EUT L 343 af 22.12.2009, s. 1.

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V Øvrige meddelelser

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/8

---

Indkaldelser af forslag — ESPON 2013-programmet

2011/C 245/08

ESPON er Observationscentret for EU's Fysiske og Funktionelle Udvikling. Det støtter politikudvikling, for så vidt angår EU's samhørighedspolitik. ESPON samfinansieres af Den Europæiske Fond for Regionaludvikling under mål 3 for europæisk territorialt samarbejde og af 31 lande (27 EU-medlemsstater samt Island, Liechtenstein, Norge og Schweiz).

Som led i ESPON 2013-programmet er der nu offentliggjort indkaldelser af forslag. Potentielle kandidater er offentlige og private organer fra 31 lande (EU-27-medlemsstater, Island, Liechtenstein, Norge og Schweiz). Forskere og forskningsinstitutter, universiteter, videnskabsfolk, eksperter og forskerhold opfordres til at indsende forslag. Indkaldelsen af forslag vedrørende grænseoverskridende aktiviteter inden for netværksdannelse er forbeholdt institutioner, der er bekræftet som ESPON-kontaktpunkter.

| 1. | Indkaldelse af forslag til projekter for anvendt forskning:






  — | European Neighbour Regions (budget 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Indkaldelse af forslag til projekter for anvendt forskning:

—

European Neighbour Regions (budget 750 000 EUR)

| — | Small and Medium sized Towns in their Functional Territorial Context (budget 650 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Small and Medium sized Towns in their Functional Territorial Context (budget 650 000 EUR)

| — | The territorial dimension of Poverty and Social Exclusion in Europe (budget 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

The territorial dimension of Poverty and Social Exclusion in Europe (budget 750 000 EUR)

| — | Economic Crises: Resilience of Regions (budget 759 153 EUR). |
| --- | --- |

—

Economic Crises: Resilience of Regions (budget 759 153 EUR).

| 2. | Indkaldelse af forslag til målrettede analyser på grundlag af interessetilkendegivelser fra interesserede parter:






  — | Growth Poles in South-East of Europe (budget 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Indkaldelse af forslag til målrettede analyser på grundlag af interessetilkendegivelser fra interesserede parter:

—

Growth Poles in South-East of Europe (budget 360 000 EUR)

| — | Key Indicators for Territorial Cohesion and Spatial Planning (budget 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Key Indicators for Territorial Cohesion and Spatial Planning (budget 360 000 EUR)

| — | Liveable Landscapes for Sustainable Territorial Development (budget 379 796,09 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Liveable Landscapes for Sustainable Territorial Development (budget 379 796,09 EUR)

| — | Landscape Policy for the 3 Countries Park (budget 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Landscape Policy for the 3 Countries Park (budget 360 000 EUR)

| — | North Sea — Spreading Transnational Results (budget 340 000 EUR). |
| --- | --- |

—

North Sea — Spreading Transnational Results (budget 340 000 EUR).

Ovennævnte temaer for de målrettede analyser bliver omfattet af indkaldelsen, forudsat at der underskrives en aftale med de interesserede parter bag projektideerne. Temaerne bekræftes derfor først, når indkaldelsen af forslag bliver lanceret den 24. august 2011. De temaer, som i sidste ende bliver omfattet af indkaldelsen, bliver tilgængelige på ESPON's websted: http://www.espon.eu

| 3. | Indkaldelse af forslag som led i ESPON's videnskabelige platform:






  — | EU Territorial Monitoring and Reporting (budget 598 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Indkaldelse af forslag som led i ESPON's videnskabelige platform:

—

EU Territorial Monitoring and Reporting (budget 598 000 EUR)

| — | ESPON Atlas on European Territorial Structures and Dynamics (budget 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

ESPON Atlas on European Territorial Structures and Dynamics (budget 150 000 EUR)

| — | Detecting Territorial Potential and Challenges (budget 350 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Detecting Territorial Potential and Challenges (budget 350 000 EUR)

| — | Territorial Evidence Packs for ERDF Programmes (budget 500 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Territorial Evidence Packs for ERDF Programmes (budget 500 000 EUR)

| — | ESPON Online Mapping Tool (budget 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

ESPON Online Mapping Tool (budget 150 000 EUR)

| — | Territorial Monitoring in a European Macro Region — A test for the Baltic Sea Region (budget 360 000 EUR). |
| --- | --- |

—

Territorial Monitoring in a European Macro Region — A test for the Baltic Sea Region (budget 360 000 EUR).

| 4. | Indkaldelse af forslag til tværnationale netværksaktiviteter i ESPON-kontaktpunktsnetværket:






  — | Capitalisation activities at transnational level by the ESPON Contact Point Network (budget 600 227 EUR). |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Indkaldelse af forslag til tværnationale netværksaktiviteter i ESPON-kontaktpunktsnetværket:

—

Capitalisation activities at transnational level by the ESPON Contact Point Network (budget 600 227 EUR).

Sidste frist for indsendelse af forslag er den 20. oktober 2011.

Der vil den 13. september 2011 blive afholdt en informationsdag og partnercafé for potentielle modtagere i Bruxelles.

Al dokumentation vedrørende indkaldelserne, herunder proceduren for ansøgning, regler for støtteberettigelse, evalueringskriterier og ansøgningsskema findes på ESPON's websted: http://www.espon.eu

---

PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN

Europa-Kommissionen

| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/10

---

STATSSTØTTE — DET FORENEDE KONGERIGE

Statsstøtte SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10)

Fritagelse for afgift på granulater i Nordirland (ex N 2/04)

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 108, stk. 2, i TEUF

(EØS-relevant tekst)

2011/C 245/09

Ved brev af 13. juli 2011, som gengives på det autentiske sprog efter dette resumé, meddelte Kommissionen Det Forenede Kongerige, at den havde besluttet at indlede proceduren efter artikel 108, stk. 2, i TEUF over for ovennævnte foranstaltning. I henhold til artikel 11, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 opfordrede Kommissionen desuden Det Forenede Kongerige til at fremsætte bemærkninger til Kommissionens planer om at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.

Interesserede parter kan senest en måned efter offentliggørelsen af nærværende resumé og det efterfølgende brev sende eventuelle bemærkninger til:

| Europa-Kommissionen |
| --- |
| Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence |
| Registreringskontoret for Statsstøtte |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22951242 |

Europa-Kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence

Registreringskontoret for Statsstøtte

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22951242

Alle bemærkninger vil blive videresendt til Det Forenede Kongerige. Interesserede parter, der fremsætter bemærkninger til sagen, kan skriftligt anmode om at få deres navne hemmeligholdt. Anmodningen skal være begrundet.

RESUME

PROCEDURE

Ved brev af 5. januar 2004, der blev registreret den 9. januar 2004, anmeldte Det Forenede Kongerige en foranstaltning vedrørende fritagelse for afgift på granulater i Nordirland. Foranstaltningen blev meddelt som en ændring af den oprindelige fritagelse for granulatafgiften i Nordirland (gradvis indførelse af afgift), som blev godkendt af Kommissionen ved beslutning N 863/01. Kommissionen vedtog den 7. maj 2004 en beslutning om, at den ikke havde indsigelser over for denne foranstaltning. Den 30. august 2004 appellerede the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd og David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd (i det følgende »ansøgerne«) Kommissionens ovennævnte beslutning (registreret under T-359/04).

Den 9. september 2010 annullerede Retten Kommissionens ovennævnte beslutning. Ifølge Rettens afgørelse havde Kommissionen ikke beføjelse til lovligt at vedtage beslutningen om ikke at gøre indsigelser, da den ikke havde undersøgt spørgsmålet om en mulig afgiftsmæssig forskelsbehandling mellem de pågældende nationale produkter og produkter importeret fra Irland. Kommissionen appellerede ikke denne afgørelse.

Det Forenede Kongeriges myndigheder suspenderede gennemførelsen af foranstaltningen pr. 1. december 2010 ved at ophæve bestemmelserne fra 2004 om granulatafgiften (afgiftslempelse for Nordirland).

BESKRIVELSE AF FORANSTALTNINGEN

Lempelsen af granulatafgiften på 80 % blev anvendt på udyrkede granulater, der blev udvundet i Nordirland, og solgt dér, og på produkter fremstillet ved forarbejdning af granulater, der er udvundet i Nordirland, og solgt dér.

Granulatafgiften er en miljøafgift på kommerciel anvendelse af granulater, og den anvendes på sten, sand og grus. Den blev indført med virkning fra den 1. april 2002 af Det Forenede Kongerige af miljøhensyn: den skulle maksimere anvendelsen af genbrugte granulater og andre alternativer til udyrkede granulater og fremme effektiv udvinding og anvendelse af udyrkede granulater, som er en ikke-fornyelig naturressource.

For i højere grad at kunne virkeliggøre de opstillede miljømål, som ikke kunne nås med granulatafgiften, gjorde Det Forenede Kongeriges myndigheder lempelsen betinget af, at ansøgerne formelt indgik og opfyldte forhandlede aftaler med de nationale myndigheder, som forpligtede ansøgerne til at følge et program med påviste miljøforbedringer i den periode, lempelsen fandt sted.

EVALUERING

På baggrund af rettens afgørelse vurderede Kommissionen for det første, om der er en reel sammenhæng mellem støtteforanstaltningen, i form af en afgiftslettelse, og den afgiftsmæssige forskelsbehandling af importerede produkter. Da der i den foreliggende sag blev fastslået en sådan sammenhæng, skulle Kommissionen vurdere, hvorvidt støtteforanstaltningen indebar en intern afgiftsmæssig forskelsbehandling i strid med artikel 110 i TEUF (tidligere artikel 90 i EF-traktaten). Kommissionen henviser navnlig til retspraksis vedrørende national lovgivning, der giver nationale produkter afgiftsfordele, hvis de lever op til visse miljøstandarder. Sådanne interne afgifter anses ikke for at være forenelige med artikel 110 i TEUF, hvis fordelen ikke indrømmes importerede produkter, der lever op til de samme standarder. Eftersom dette ikke var tilfældet for lempelsen af granulatafgiften i Nordirland, nærer Kommissionen tvivl om, hvorvidt den ændrede lempelse i Nordirland var i overensstemmelse med traktaten, navnlig artikel 110 i TEUF.

Denne tvivl om overensstemmelsen med artikel 110 i TEUF gør, at Kommissionen på nuværende tidspunkt ikke finder, at foranstaltningen er forenelig med det indre marked. Samtidig med at Kommissionen henviste til denne tvivl med hensyn til foranstaltningens overensstemmelse med statsstøttereglerne, vurderede den foranstaltningens overensstemmelse med miljørammebestemmelserne, navnlig reglerne om støtte i form af fritagelser for eller nedsættelse af miljøafgifter. Under hensyn til, at den støtte, der var ydet under den ændrede granulatafgiftslempelse i Nordirland, var ulovlig som følge af Rettens afvisning af forenelighedsgrundlaget, vurderede Kommissionen den foreliggende foranstaltning på baggrund af rammebestemmelserne om miljøstøtte fra 2001 og fra og med den 2. april 2008 (datoen, hvor de træder i kraft) — på baggrund af rammebestemmelserne om miljøstøtte fra 2008.

Hvad specifikt angår vurderingen på baggrund af miljørammebestemmelserne fra 2001, konkluderede Kommissionen, at betingelserne heri er opfyldt, men henviste igen til, at tvivlen med hensyn til overensstemmelsen med artikel 110 i TEUF gør, at Kommissionen ikke finder, at foranstaltningen på indeværende tidspunkt er forenelig med det indre marked.

Hvad angår miljørammebestemmelserne fra 2008, nåede Kommissionen frem til den foreløbige konklusion, at den nærer tvivl om, hvorvidt betingelsen om støttens nødvendighed er opfyldt, navnlig med hensyn til, hvorvidt den mærkbare forøgelse af produktionsomkostningerne kan væltes over på de endelige forbrugere uden betydelig nedgang i salget. Kommissionen bemærker i den forbindelse, at selv om oplysningerne fra Det Forenede Kongerige viser en meget betydelig forøgelse af produktionsomkostningerne på grund af granulatafgiften, som normalt ville indebære, at en sådan stigning ikke kan væltes over på den endelige forbruger uden en markant salgsnedgang, kan Kommissionen - på grund af manglende detaljerede oplysninger — på indeværende tidspunkt ikke konkludere, at denne forenelighedsbetingelse er opfyldt.

Kommissionen nærer derfor på grundlag af denne foreløbige analyse tvivl om, hvorvidt foranstaltningen vedrørende lempelse af granulatafgiften i Nordirland (ex N 2/04) er i overensstemmelse med traktaten og forenelig med det indre marked. Kommissionen har efter artikel 4, stk. 4, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 besluttet at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure og opfordrer interesserede parter til at indgive deres bemærkninger.

BREVETS ORDLYD

»The Commission wishes to inform the UK authorities that, having examined the information supplied by them on the aid referred to above, it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

1.   PROCEDURE

| 1. | The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004.

| 2. | The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2).

| 3. | On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3).

| 4. | On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04). |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04).

| 5. | On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment.

| 6. | On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959). |
| --- | --- |

6.

On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959).

| 7. | The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The aggregates levy

| 8. | The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity.

| 9. | The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom.

2.2.   The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 10. | In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products. |
| --- | --- |

10.

In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products.

2.3.   The modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 11. | The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there.

2.3.1.   Background

| 12. | The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development.

| 13. | According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded. |
| --- | --- |

13.

According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded.

| 14. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent.

2.3.2.   Modification

| 15. | In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8). |
| --- | --- |

15.

In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8).

| 16. | The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9).

2.3.3.   Environmental agreements

| 17. | In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief. |
| --- | --- |

17.

In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief.

| 18. | The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:






  (a) | the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:

(a)

the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and

| (b) | the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter.

| 19. | Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

19.

Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management.

| 20. | The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings.

2.3.4.   Aggregates production costs, selling price and price elasticity of demand

| 21. | As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

  Table 1


  Selling price







  Type of rock | Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Basalt | 4,21 |
| Sandstone | 4,37 |
| Limestone | 3,72 |
| Sand and gravel | 4,80 |
| Other | 5,57 |
| Weighted average price | 4,42 |

21.

As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

Table 1

Selling price

Type of rock

Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne)

Basalt

4,21

Sandstone

4,37

Limestone

3,72

Sand and gravel

4,80

Other

5,57

Weighted average price

4,42

| 22. | As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

  Table 2 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,5 | 3,4 | 3,9 | 3,6 | 4,3 | 4,3 |
| GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 7,9 | 8,4 | 9,0 | 7,7 | 8,8 | 9,7 | 9,2 | 10,9 |

22.

As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

Table 2

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne

2,9

3,1

3,5

3,4

3,9

3,6

4,3

4,3

GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne

7,9

8,4

9,0

7,7

8,8

9,7

9,2

10,9

| 23. | As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic. |
| --- | --- |

23.

As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic.

2.3.5.   Pass-on and sales reductions

| 24. | As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain. |
| --- | --- |

24.

As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain.

| 25. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

  Table 3


  A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland











  Product | 2000-2001
  (million tonnes) | 2001-2002
  (million tonnes) | 2002-2003
  (million tonnes) | Fall,
  2001-2003
  (%) | Fall,
  2002-2003
  (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sand and gravel | 2,35 | 2,34 | 1,91 | –18,7 | –8,4 |
| Crushed rock | 7,86 | 7,88 | 7,27 | –7,5 | –7,7 |
| Fill material | 3,00 | 3,89 | 1,71 | –43,0 | –56,0 |
| Total | 13,21 | 14,11 | 10,89 | –17,6 | –22,8 |

25.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

Table 3

A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland

Product

2000-2001

(million tonnes)

2001-2002

(million tonnes)

2002-2003

(million tonnes)

Fall,

2001-2003

(%)

Fall,

2002-2003

(%)

Sand and gravel

2,35

2,34

1,91

–18,7

–8,4

Crushed rock

7,86

7,88

7,27

–7,5

–7,7

Fill material

3,00

3,89

1,71

–43,0

–56,0

Total

13,21

14,11

10,89

–17,6

–22,8

| 26. | The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state.

| 27. | As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers. |
| --- | --- |

27.

As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers.

2.3.6.   Other information

| 28. | The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011). |
| --- | --- |

28.

The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011).

| 29. | As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible. |
| --- | --- |

29.

As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible.

| 30. | The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.

2.4.   Position of third parties, appreciable positive effects

| 31. | In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue. |
| --- | --- |

31.

In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue.

| 32. | The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects. |
| --- | --- |

32.

The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects.

| 33. | As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock. |
| --- | --- |

33.

As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock.

| 34. | As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates. |
| --- | --- |

34.

As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates.

| 35. | With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003. |
| --- | --- |

35.

With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003.

| 36. | Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility.

3.   ASSESSMENT

3.1.   State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC)
   (13)

| 37. | State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

37.

State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| 38. | The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

38.

The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States.

| 39. | Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC). |
| --- | --- |

39.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC).

3.2.   Lawfulness of the aid

| 40. | Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15). |
| --- | --- |

40.

Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15).

3.3.   Compatibility of the aid

| 41. | It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16). |
| --- | --- |

41.

It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16).

| 42. | Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17). |
| --- | --- |

42.

Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17).

| 43. | The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

43.

The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States.

| 44. | As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated. |
| --- | --- |

44.

As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated.

| 45. | Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products.

| 46. | Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20). |
| --- | --- |

46.

Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20).

3.3.1.   Compliance with Article 110 of the TFEU

| 47. | According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

47.

According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU.

| 48. | According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect. |
| --- | --- |

48.

According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect.

| 49. | Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements.

| 50. | Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate.

| 51. | Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements.

| 52. | Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21). |
| --- | --- |

52.

Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21).

| 53. | Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment.

| 54. | Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage.

3.3.2.   Compatibility of the measure under the Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 55. | Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection.

| 56. | The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful). |
| --- | --- |

56.

The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful).

| 57. | Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:






  (a) | the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

57.

Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:

(a)

the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and

| (b) | the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008.

Ad (a) Compatibility of the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 58. | Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions. |
| --- | --- |

58.

Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions.

| 59. | The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax. |
| --- | --- |

59.

The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax.

| 60. | Point 51(2) provides that:
  “The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:






  (a) | the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection; |
| --- | --- | --- |

60.

Point 51(2) provides that:

“The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:

(a)

the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection;

| (b) | the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”.

| 61. | Point 51(1) provides that:
  “These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:






  1. | When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:






  (a) | these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.
  These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

61.

Point 51(1) provides that:

“These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:

1.

When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:

(a)

these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.

These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above;

| (b) | these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:






  — | where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:

—

where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection,

| — | where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”. |
| --- | --- |

—

where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”.

| 62. | With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)). |
| --- | --- |

62.

With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)).

| 63. | Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market.

| 64. | The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence). |
| --- | --- |

64.

The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence).

| 65. | In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

65.

In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled.

| 66. | In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent). |
| --- | --- |

66.

In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent).

| 67. | In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25). |
| --- | --- |

67.

In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25).

| 68. | For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

68.

For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage.

Ad (b) Compatibility of the measure under the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 69. | Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159). |
| --- | --- |

69.

Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159).

| 70. | As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes. |
| --- | --- |

70.

As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes.

Environmental benefit

| 71. | Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued. |
| --- | --- |

71.

Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued.

| 72. | As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials. |
| --- | --- |

72.

As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials.

| 73. | Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL.

Necessity of the aid

| 74. | According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

74.

According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary.

(1)   Objective and transparent criteria

| 75. | Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 76. | The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent. |
| --- | --- |

76.

The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent.

(2)   Substantial increase in production costs

| 77. | Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 78. | The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26). |
| --- | --- |

78.

The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26).

| 79. | Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

(3)   Impossibility to pass on the substantial increase in production costs

| 80. | Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned. |
| --- | --- |

80.

Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned.

| 81. | The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland. |
| --- | --- |

81.

The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland.

| 82. | The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased. |
| --- | --- |

82.

The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased.

| 83. | Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007. |
| --- | --- |

83.

Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007.

| 84. | In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided. |
| --- | --- |

84.

In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided.

| 85. | With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided. |
| --- | --- |

85.

With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided.

| 86. | Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers.

| 87. | Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

87.

Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met.

Proportionality of the aid

| 88. | With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:






  (a) | it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

88.

With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:

(a)

it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers;

| (b) | it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified;

| (c) | it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied.

| 89. | The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax. |
| --- | --- |

89.

The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax.

3.4.   Conclusions

| 90. | On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

90.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market.

| 91. | The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158. |
| --- | --- |

91.

The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158.

| 92. | Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision. |
| --- | --- |

92.

Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision.

4.   DECISION

| 93. | In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

93.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| 94. | The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

94.

The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

| 95. | The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.« |
| --- | --- |

95.

The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.«

---

(1)  The phased introduction of the AGL.

1

(2)  OJ C 133, 5.6.2002, p.11.

2

(3)  OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 4.

3

(4)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet reported.

4

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(5)  The AGL is applied to imported raw aggregate, but not to aggregate contained in imported processed products.

5

(6)  On 2 April 2008, i.e. the day from which the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines were applicable, the level of AGL was GBP 1,95/tonne.

6

(7)  OJ C 37, 3.2.2001, p. 3.

7

(8)  The aggregates extracted in Northern Ireland and shipped to any destination in Great Britain were liable to the AGL at the full rate. This was also the case for aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland that was used in the manufacturing of processed products shipped to Great Britain. This ensured that aggregates and processed products from Northern Ireland did not enjoy a competitive advantage in the market of Great Britain.

8

(9)  As referred to above, the implementation of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was suspended as from 1 December 2010.

9

(10)  The information was submitted by the UK authorities for the purposes of an assessment of the measure on the basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. DETI Minerals Statement 2009.

10

(11)  Distribution costs depend on haulage distances, with haulage costs in the range of 15 to 20 pence per tonne per mile, with aggregate being delivered within 10 to 15 miles, depending on local circumstances.

11

(12)  Ecotec (1998) Report; EEA Report (No 2/2008) effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in selected EU countries; British Geological Survey (2008): The need for indigenous aggregates production in England.

12

(13)  The definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) of the TFEU did not change from the one contained in Article 87(1) EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

13

(14)  See Case C-199/06 CELF [2008] ECR I-469, paragraphs 63 and 66 to 68.

14

CELF

(15)  See Case C-199/06 CELF, cited above, paragraphs 61 and 64.

15

CELF

(16)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 91.

16

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(17)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 93.

17

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(18)  “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.

18

Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.”

(19)  The rules for national internal taxation as laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU did not change from those contained in Article 90 EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

19

(20)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 92.

20

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(21)  Case 21/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR p. 1, paragraphs 23 to 26; and in particular Case C-213/96 Outukumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, paragraphs 30 et seq.

21

Commission

Italy

Outukumpu

(22)  The identity of the taxpayer as such is therefore of limited importance.

22

(23)  “Thus [Article 110] must guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between domestic products and imported products.” (Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR p. 1343, paragraph 24).

23

[Article 110]

Bergandi

(24)  Commission Notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid, OJ C 119, 22.5.2002, p. 22.

24

(25)  See for instance Commission Decision on case N 449/01 (Germany) — Continuation of the ecological tax reform (OJ C 137, 8.6.2002, p. 34). Furthermore, this position was confirmed in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines where the payment of 20 % of the tax was explicitly “codified” as a proportionality condition of the aid granted in the form of exemption or reduction from environmental taxes (point 159(b)).

25

(26)  The highest selling price (GBP 5,57/tonne), the lowest profit margin (2 %) and the level of the AGL as originally notified in 2004 (GBP 1,6/tonne) are assumed. If the AGL level on 1 April 2008 (GBP 1,95/tonne) is applied, the share increases to approximately 36 %. Any other combination of price and profit margin necessarily results in the AGL presenting more then 30 % of the production costs.

26

(27)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

27

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| 24.8.2011 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 245/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 245/21

---

STATSSTØTTE — TYSKLAND

(Artikel 107-109 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde)

Statsstøtte MC 15/09 — LBBW — frasalg af Deka

(EØS-relevant tekst)

2011/C 245/10

Kommissionen meddelte ved brev af 14. januar 2011 Tyskland sin afgørelse om støtten MC 15/09.

BREVETS ORDLYD

»I.   SAGSFORLØB

| (1) | Ved afgørelse af 15. december 2009 godkendte Kommissionen en foranstaltning til fordel for Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (herefter benævnt »LBBW«) i sag C 17/09 (herefter benævnt »LBBW-afgørelsen (1)«). Foranstaltningen omfatter godkendelse af en kapitaltilførsel på 5 mia. EUR og en hjælpeforanstaltning i form af overtagelse af værdiforringede aktiver til et beløb på 12,7 mia. EUR i forbindelse med en struktureret portefølje med en samlet værdi på 35 mia. EUR. Tyskland måtte i forbindelse med foranstaltningen afgive en række tilsagn. Et af tilsagnene gik ud på, at LBBW skulle frasælge sin andel i Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (herefter benævnt »Deka«) inden (2) [...]. |
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(1)

Ved afgørelse af 15. december 2009 godkendte Kommissionen en foranstaltning til fordel for Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (herefter benævnt »LBBW«) i sag C 17/09 (herefter benævnt »LBBW-afgørelsen (1)«). Foranstaltningen omfatter godkendelse af en kapitaltilførsel på 5 mia. EUR og en hjælpeforanstaltning i form af overtagelse af værdiforringede aktiver til et beløb på 12,7 mia. EUR i forbindelse med en struktureret portefølje med en samlet værdi på 35 mia. EUR. Tyskland måtte i forbindelse med foranstaltningen afgive en række tilsagn. Et af tilsagnene gik ud på, at LBBW skulle frasælge sin andel i Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (herefter benævnt »Deka«) inden (2) [...].

| (2) | Den 13. december 2010 fremsendte Tyskland et brev fra LBBW, hvoraf det fremgik, at Deka ikke kunne afhændes inden [...]. Den 21. december 2010 meddelte Tyskland, at administratoren (3) og Baden-Württembergs finansministerium bekræftede, at LBBW havde gjort alt, hvad der var muligt for at afslutte salget inden for den fastsatte frist. Den 22. december 2010 anmeldte Tyskland en anmodning om forlængelse af fristen for frasalget indtil [...]. Den 5. januar 2011 fremsendte Tyskland yderligere oplysninger. |
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(2)

Den 13. december 2010 fremsendte Tyskland et brev fra LBBW, hvoraf det fremgik, at Deka ikke kunne afhændes inden [...]. Den 21. december 2010 meddelte Tyskland, at administratoren (3) og Baden-Württembergs finansministerium bekræftede, at LBBW havde gjort alt, hvad der var muligt for at afslutte salget inden for den fastsatte frist. Den 22. december 2010 anmeldte Tyskland en anmodning om forlængelse af fristen for frasalget indtil [...]. Den 5. januar 2011 fremsendte Tyskland yderligere oplysninger.

| (3) | Den 22. december 2010 meddelte Tyskland, at det undtagelsesvist af hensyn til sagens hastende karakter accepterede, at denne afgørelse blev godkendt på engelsk. |
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(3)

Den 22. december 2010 meddelte Tyskland, at det undtagelsesvist af hensyn til sagens hastende karakter accepterede, at denne afgørelse blev godkendt på engelsk.

II.   BAGGRUND

| (4) | Afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW er baseret på en række tilsagn. Betragtning 38, punkt 5, c) i afgørelsen indeholder et tilsagn fra Tyskland om, at LBBW afhænder sin andel i Deka inden [...]. Afgørelsen giver ikke eksplicit mulighed for at forlænge denne frist. |
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(4)

Afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW er baseret på en række tilsagn. Betragtning 38, punkt 5, c) i afgørelsen indeholder et tilsagn fra Tyskland om, at LBBW afhænder sin andel i Deka inden [...]. Afgørelsen giver ikke eksplicit mulighed for at forlænge denne frist.

| (5) | Deka er et offentligretligt institut (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts), som — via datterselskaber — varetager de tyske sparekassers aktiviteter på investeringsområdet. Halvdelen ejes af den tyske sparekassesammenslutning (DSGV), og den anden halvdel ejes af delstatsbankerne (herefter benævnt »holding-selskabet«). LBBW's indirekte andel i Deka udgør 14,8 %. De respektive ejere har forkøbsret, hvis en part ønsker at sælge sin andel. |
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(5)

Deka er et offentligretligt institut (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts), som — via datterselskaber — varetager de tyske sparekassers aktiviteter på investeringsområdet. Halvdelen ejes af den tyske sparekassesammenslutning (DSGV), og den anden halvdel ejes af delstatsbankerne (herefter benævnt »holding-selskabet«). LBBW's indirekte andel i Deka udgør 14,8 %. De respektive ejere har forkøbsret, hvis en part ønsker at sælge sin andel.

| (6) | DSGV afgav i første omgang et tilbud på LBBW's andel, som var gældende indtil [...]. En betingelse for gennemførelse af salget var, at det blev godkendt af alle øvrige delstatsbanker, som ejede en andel i Deka samt af Deka selv og dets generalforsamling. |
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(6)

DSGV afgav i første omgang et tilbud på LBBW's andel, som var gældende indtil [...]. En betingelse for gennemførelse af salget var, at det blev godkendt af alle øvrige delstatsbanker, som ejede en andel i Deka samt af Deka selv og dets generalforsamling.

| (7) | Tyskland meddelte Kommissionen, at alle de delstatsbanker, der ejer holdingselskabet, har planer om at sælge deres andel til DSGV, hvilket betyder, at DSGV bliver eneejer af Deka. Der forventes at foreligge en bindende afgørelse om salget inden for [...], selv om det ikke kan udelukkes, at der kan opstå en yderligere forsinkelse indtil [...] som følge af de involverede beslutningers kompleksitet. Det oplyses fra tysk side, at hvis delstatsbankerne sælger deres andele i holding-selskabet, vil det blive lettere at gennemføre de fornødne aftaler vedrørende salget af LBBW's andel i Deka og fremme hele proceduren. |
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(7)

Tyskland meddelte Kommissionen, at alle de delstatsbanker, der ejer holdingselskabet, har planer om at sælge deres andel til DSGV, hvilket betyder, at DSGV bliver eneejer af Deka. Der forventes at foreligge en bindende afgørelse om salget inden for [...], selv om det ikke kan udelukkes, at der kan opstå en yderligere forsinkelse indtil [...] som følge af de involverede beslutningers kompleksitet. Det oplyses fra tysk side, at hvis delstatsbankerne sælger deres andele i holding-selskabet, vil det blive lettere at gennemføre de fornødne aftaler vedrørende salget af LBBW's andel i Deka og fremme hele proceduren.

| (8) | Tyskland har endvidere oplyst, at DSGV har forlænget sit tilbud om købet af LBBW's andel i Deka indtil [...]. |
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(8)

Tyskland har endvidere oplyst, at DSGV har forlænget sit tilbud om købet af LBBW's andel i Deka indtil [...].

| (9) | På trods af anmodningen om forlængelse af fristen for afhændelsen af Deka hævder Tyskland, at LBBW har gjort sit yderste for at få gennemført salget. Denne vurdering deles af den administrator, som overvågede det frasalg, som Tyskland havde givet tilsagn om i forbindelse med afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW. |
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(9)

På trods af anmodningen om forlængelse af fristen for afhændelsen af Deka hævder Tyskland, at LBBW har gjort sit yderste for at få gennemført salget. Denne vurdering deles af den administrator, som overvågede det frasalg, som Tyskland havde givet tilsagn om i forbindelse med afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW.

III.   VURDERING

| (10) | Denne afgørelse omhandler gennemførelsen af den omstruktureringsplan, der er godkendt i afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW. Tyskland anmoder om, at fristen for frasalg af Deka forlænges med tre måneder, [...]. |
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(10)

Denne afgørelse omhandler gennemførelsen af den omstruktureringsplan, der er godkendt i afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW. Tyskland anmoder om, at fristen for frasalg af Deka forlænges med tre måneder, [...].

| (11) | Kommissionen kan forlænge frister for frasalg. Selv om det ikke udtrykkeligt fremgår af forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999, har Kommissionen beføjelse til at tillade en forlængelse, så længe den ikke er til hinder for gennemførelse af afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW (4). |
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(11)

Kommissionen kan forlænge frister for frasalg. Selv om det ikke udtrykkeligt fremgår af forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999, har Kommissionen beføjelse til at tillade en forlængelse, så længe den ikke er til hinder for gennemførelse af afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW (4).

| (12) | Kommissionen noterer, at LBBW allerede har påbegyndt salget af Deka ved at sikre sig et tilbud fra DGSV. Kommissionen tager i den forbindelse hensyn til, at såvel Tyskland som administratoren mener, at LBBW gjorde alt muligt for at fremme salget. |
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(12)

Kommissionen noterer, at LBBW allerede har påbegyndt salget af Deka ved at sikre sig et tilbud fra DGSV. Kommissionen tager i den forbindelse hensyn til, at såvel Tyskland som administratoren mener, at LBBW gjorde alt muligt for at fremme salget.

| (13) | Ifølge Tyskland ser det endvidere ud til, at der er stor sandsynlighed for, at de delstatsbanker, der ejer en andel i holding-selskabet, også vil sælge deres andel, hvilket vil fremme hele salget af LBBW's andel i Deka. |
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(13)

Ifølge Tyskland ser det endvidere ud til, at der er stor sandsynlighed for, at de delstatsbanker, der ejer en andel i holding-selskabet, også vil sælge deres andel, hvilket vil fremme hele salget af LBBW's andel i Deka.

| (14) | Endelig er der overbevisende argumenter for, at salget kan gennemføres inden for den foreslåede tidsfrist, og senest inden [...]. Det ser især ud til, at [...]. Denne afgørelse giver LBBW mulighed for at sælge sin andel i Deka, også selv om beslutningsprocessen i forbindelse med delstatsbankernes salg af deres andele i Deka varer længere end forventet. |
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(14)

Endelig er der overbevisende argumenter for, at salget kan gennemføres inden for den foreslåede tidsfrist, og senest inden [...]. Det ser især ud til, at [...]. Denne afgørelse giver LBBW mulighed for at sælge sin andel i Deka, også selv om beslutningsprocessen i forbindelse med delstatsbankernes salg af deres andele i Deka varer længere end forventet.

| (15) | Forlængelsen af salgsfristen med tre måneder berører ikke den overordnede gennemførelse af den omstruktureringsplan, der blev godkendt i afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW, og som vil vare indtil 2014. Det vil også hjælpe LBBW med til at få indgået de fornødne aftaler med de øvrige delstatsbanker for at fremme et salg, enten individuelt eller i fællesskab. Derfor bør forlængelsen, der er tidsbegrænset, give LBBW mulighed for at sælge sin andel i Deka inden [...]. Den giver derfor LBBW mulighed for at overvinde ovennævnte, primært eksterne, vanskeligheder og afslutte frasalget af Deka som planlagt i afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW. Kommissionen finder derfor, at den forholdsvis korte forlængelse indtil [...] er berettiget, navnlig i betragtning af de særlige forhold omkring Dekas juridiske struktur. På baggrund af sagens omstændigheder medfører en sådan forlængelse ikke, at den oprindeligt fastsatte tidsplan forsinkes, hvilket ville kræve en tilsvarende nedsættelse af støttebeløbet (5). |
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(15)

Forlængelsen af salgsfristen med tre måneder berører ikke den overordnede gennemførelse af den omstruktureringsplan, der blev godkendt i afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW, og som vil vare indtil 2014. Det vil også hjælpe LBBW med til at få indgået de fornødne aftaler med de øvrige delstatsbanker for at fremme et salg, enten individuelt eller i fællesskab. Derfor bør forlængelsen, der er tidsbegrænset, give LBBW mulighed for at sælge sin andel i Deka inden [...]. Den giver derfor LBBW mulighed for at overvinde ovennævnte, primært eksterne, vanskeligheder og afslutte frasalget af Deka som planlagt i afgørelsen vedrørende LBBW. Kommissionen finder derfor, at den forholdsvis korte forlængelse indtil [...] er berettiget, navnlig i betragtning af de særlige forhold omkring Dekas juridiske struktur. På baggrund af sagens omstændigheder medfører en sådan forlængelse ikke, at den oprindeligt fastsatte tidsplan forsinkes, hvilket ville kræve en tilsvarende nedsættelse af støttebeløbet (5).

IV.   KONKLUSION

| (16) | Af ovennævnte årsager finder Kommissionen, at det i tilfældet med Deka er nødvendigt at forlænge fristen med tre måneder for at sikre, at omstruktureringsplanen for LBBW gennemføres korrekt. |
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(16)

Af ovennævnte årsager finder Kommissionen, at det i tilfældet med Deka er nødvendigt at forlænge fristen med tre måneder for at sikre, at omstruktureringsplanen for LBBW gennemføres korrekt.

V.   AFGØRELSE

Kommissionen forlænger fristen for frasalg af Deka indtil 31. marts 2011.«

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(1)  EUT L 188 af 21.7.2010, s. 1.

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(2)  Dele af denne tekst er udeladt for at sikre, at ingen fortrolige oplysninger offentliggøres. De udeladte oplysninger er markeret med tre punktummer i kantet parentes og markeret med en asterisk.

2

(3)  Udpeget i henhold til afgørelsen om LBBW for at overvåge og kontrollere, at tilsagnene i afgørelsen om LBBW i forbindelse med frasalg indfries fuldstændigt og korrekt.

3

(4)  Se afgørelse af 21. december 2010 i sag MC 8/09 WestImmo.

4

WestImmo.

(5)  Se EU's rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder, EUT C 244 af 1.10.2004, s. 2, punkt 52 (d).

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