No. 05-056 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2006 MT 57 

KENNETH D. CREVELING and 

SHARON L. CREVELING, 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

v. 

E.W. INGOLD, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDV 2004-725, 

Honorable Julie Macek, Presiding Judge 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

 Steven T. Potts, Thompson Potts & Donovan, P.C. 

Great Falls, Montana 

 

For Respondents: 

Chris A. Johnson, Sullivan Tabaracci & Rhoades, P.C. 

Missoula, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: September 7, 2005 

 Decided: March 14, 2006 

Filed: 

__________________________________________ 

Clerk 
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Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Appellant, E.W. Ingold (Ingold), seeks reversal of summary judgment in favor of 

Respondents Kenneth and Sharon Creveling (Crevelings), and interpretation by this Court of 

a restrictive covenant (covenant) contained in the warranty deed that effectuated the sale of 

real property from Ingold to the Crevelings. The covenant states, “No trailers or mobile 

homes are to be placed upon the property conveyed by this deed.” At issue is whether the 

District Court was correct in determining that the covenant allowed: (1) temporary 

placement of trailers and mobile homes on the property, (2) placement of trailer houses and 

mobile homes for non-residential purposes, and (3) development of the property as a 

campground for recreational vehicles (RVs) and travel trailers. We reverse. 

ISSUES

¶2 The restated issues on appeal are: 

1. Did the District Court err by ruling that the covenant prohibits only the permanent

placement of mobile homes and trailers on the property? 

2. Did the District Court err by ruling that “trailers or mobile homes,” as used in the 

covenant, means only trailer houses or mobile homes used for residences? 

3. Did the District Court err by ruling that the covenant allows development of the property 

as a campground for RVs and travel trailers? 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 The material facts underlying this dispute are not at issue. Ingold sold a portion of his 

land to the Crevelings in 1977 while he retained adjoining parcels. At Crevelings’ request, 

the warranty deed transferring the property contained a restrictive covenant which states, “No 

trailers or mobile homes are to be placed upon the property conveyed by this deed.” The 

deed contained no other covenants except those of public record. Nor did the deed contain 

any other language either explaining the purpose of the covenant, or defining its terms. 

¶4 During the summer of 2004, Crevelings negotiated the sale of their property to a thirdparty purchaser who planned to develop a “sportsman’s or RV park.” On July 1, 2004, 

Crevelings filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the District Court, seeking an 

interpretation of the covenant, and a judicial determination of whether the terms of the 

covenant prevented use of the property as a campground accommodating RVs and travel 

trailers. Ingold responded to the petition on August 13, 2004. On September 24, 2004, 

Crevelings moved for summary judgment, which Ingold opposed on October 5, 2004. The 

District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Crevelings on November 24, 2004. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 Generally, we review de novo a district court’s summary judgment ruling, applying 

the same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. criteria applied by the district court. Howard v. St. James 

Community Hospital, 2006 MT 23, ¶ 14, 331 Mont. 60,¶ 14, ___ P.3d ___ ¶ 14 (citation 

omitted). Here, however, as the material facts are uncontroverted, we limit our review to 

questions of law. Travelers Cas. v. Ribi Immunochem Research, 2005 MT 50, ¶ 14, 326 
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Mont. 174, ¶ 14, 108 P.3d 469, ¶ 14 (citation omitted). A district court’s interpretation of 

a restrictive covenant is a conclusion of law which we review to determine whether the 

court’s conclusion is correct. Pablo v. Moore, 2000 MT 48, ¶ 12, 298 Mont. 393, ¶ 12, 

995 P.2d 460, ¶ 12. 

DISCUSSION 

¶6 Ingold raises three allegations of error by the District Court. First, Ingold contests the 

District Court’s determination that use of the phrase “placed upon” in the covenant prevents 

only permanent, but not temporary, placement of trailers and mobile homes on the property. 

Second, Ingold argues the District Court erred when it interpreted the covenant as preventing 

trailer houses and mobile homes used as residences, but not RVs and travel trailers used 

temporarily for camping purposes. Finally, Ingold disputes the District Court’s 

determination that the covenant does not preclude use of the property for a “RV park, which 

would provide facilities such as water and electricity, and sewage” for “tents, motor homes, 

or travel trailers.” 

ISSUE ONE

¶7 1. Did the District Court err by ruling that the covenant prohibits only the permanent 

placement of mobile homes and trailers on the property? 

¶8 General rules of contract interpretation apply to restrictive covenants. Toaves v. Sayre

(1997), 281 Mont. 243, 245, 934 P.2d 165, 166 (citations omitted). Any person having an 

interest under a writing constituting a contract—like a restrictive covenant—may seek 

declaratory relief concerning any question of construction arising under the instrument. 
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Section 27-8-202, MCA. Where a contract, and by extension a restrictive covenant, has been 

reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained, if possible, from the 

writing alone. Section 28-3-303, MCA; Wurl v. Polson School Dist. No. 23, 2006 MT 8, 

¶ 16, 330 Mont. 282, ¶ 16, 127 P.3d 436, ¶ 16, (citation omitted). The determination of 

whether an ambiguity exists in a restrictive covenant, as in a contract, is a question of law for 

a court to determine. King Resources, Inc. v. Oliver, 2002 MT 301, ¶ 21, 313 Mont. 17, ¶ 21, 

59 P.3d 1172, ¶ 21 (citation omitted). Restrictive covenants are strictly construed and 

ambiguities in covenants are resolved to allow free use of property. Newman v. Wittmer

(1996), 277 Mont. 1, 6, 917 P.2d 926, 929 (citations omitted). Mere disagreement between 

the parties as to the interpretation of a written instrument, however, does not automatically 

create an ambiguity. Wurl, ¶ 17 (citations omitted). Where the language of a covenant is 

clear and explicit, the Court must apply the language as written. Wurl, ¶16 (citations 

omitted). 

¶9 Here, the District Court looked only to the “plain meaning” of the language of the 

covenant, and not to extrinsic evidence, to interpret the meaning of the covenant. Therefore, 

the District Court must have concluded the instrument was not ambiguous and its words 

should be applied as written. The covenant states, “No trailers or mobile homes are to be 

placed upon the property conveyed by this deed.” We agree with the District Court’s 

conclusion that the restrictive covenant is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, Crevelings’ 

and Ingold’s intent in agreeing to the terms of the covenant shall be determined solely by the 

language of the covenant itself. 
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¶10 The language of a restrictive covenant should be understood in its ordinary and 

popular sense. Fox Farms Estates Landowners v. Kreisch (1997), 285 Mont. 264, 268, 947 

P.2d 79, 82, citing Toaves, 281 Mont. at 246, 934 P.2d at 166-67. The District Court here 

recognized that Montana law gives no specific meaning to the term “placed upon,” nor was 

the phrase defined by the parties in their deed. Therefore, “placed upon” should be given an 

“ordinary meaning.” We disagree however, with what the District Court determined “placed 

upon” ordinarily means. The District Court found that “‘placed upon’ contemplates a 

permanent placement of a trailer or mobile home on the property.” (Emphasis added.) Thus 

the District Court concluded that temporary placement of trailers or mobile homes on the 

property was not precluded by the covenant. 

¶11 Ingold argues that the District Court’s interpretation of “placed upon” is wrong 

because the parties to the deed did not use any temporal modifiers, like “permanently,” to 

limit the application of the term. We agree. “In the construction of an instrument, the office 

of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained 

therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted.” Section 1-4-

101, MCA, quoted in Wurl, ¶ 20. In Wurl, we applied this rule in the context of an 

employment contract between a speech pathologist and the school district. In that case, 

unambiguous language in Wurl’s contract stated that Wurl assented to “other provisions” 

outlined in a separate agreement which dictated Wurl’s compensation. No language of 

limitation modified the phrase “other provisions.” On that basis, we concluded that “to adopt 

the School District’s interpretation of the employment contract would require us to ignore our 
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proper role in interpreting contracts and insert language such as ‘salary-related’ into the clear, 

unambiguous and inclusive phrase ‘other provisions’ in the contract.” Wurl, ¶ 20. We 

declined to insert limiting language into the contract in Wurl. Wurl, ¶ 20. Similarly, we must 

decline to insert limiting language into the restrictive covenant before us. 

¶12 As discussed in Wurl, it is not the proper role of the judiciary to insert modifying 

language into clearly written and unambiguous instruments where the parties to the 

instrument declined to do so. The unambiguous language of the covenant here contains no 

words to indicate the parties’ intent to restrict the prohibition of trailers and mobile homes on 

the property, whether temporally or otherwise. Therefore, pursuant to statutory rules of 

construction and our case law, we must conclude that the District Court erred in its 

interpretation of the plain language of the covenant, and that the covenant as written 

precludes the placement of any trailers or mobile homes upon the property. 

ISSUE TWO 

¶13 2. Did the District Court err by ruling that “trailers or mobile homes,” as used in the 

covenant, means only trailer houses or mobile homes used for residences? 

¶14 Ingold next objects to the District Court’s determination that the covenant disallows 

only trailer houses, and those trailers or mobile homes used for residences. 

¶15 Relying on the same rules of interpretation outlined in Issue One, we determine that 

the District Court erroneously inserted into the covenant modifying language not intended by 

the parties when it limited the covenant’s effect to prohibiting only “trailer houses” and 

mobile homes “used for residences.” The covenant includes neither the word “house” nor the 
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modifying phrase “used for residences” to confine its application. The covenant’s plain 

language gives no indication the parties intended anything but an absolute prohibition of 

trailers and mobile homes on the property. 

ISSUE THREE 

¶16 3. Did the District Court err by ruling that the covenant allows development of the 

property as a campground for RVs and travel trailers? 

¶17 We have determined that the unambiguous language of the covenant prohibits trailers 

from being placed on the property. Therefore, the District Court erred in ruling that the 

covenant allows the development of an RV park to the extent that it would accommodate 

trailers or mobile homes in contravention of the covenant. 

CONCLUSION

¶18 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse. 

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER 

 

We Concur: 

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

/S/ JIM RICE 

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART 

/S/ JOHN WARNER 
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Justice John Warner concurs. 

¶ 19 I concur with the Opinion of the Court. The only alternative to this Court’s 

conclusions is that the warranty deed that effectuated the sale of the property in question 

from Ingold to Crevelings was ambiguous, and thus a trial would be necessary to determine 

the intention of the parties. However, Crevelings specifically argued that the deed is 

unambiguous and is to be interpreted as a matter of law. This Court will not formulate 

arguments or locate authorities for parties on appeal. State v. Kearney, 2005 MT 171, ¶ 16, 

327 Mont. 485, ¶ 16, 115 P.3d 214, ¶ 16. 

 /S/ JOHN WARNER