The Honor able Curtis L . Colli er, Chief United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0064n.06 F iled: Janu ary 29, 2009 No. 06-3327 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. LA WREN CE JEF F RE Y H AR RI S, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COUR T F O R THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O O P I N I O N

BEFORE: MARTIN and McK EAGU E, Circuit Judges, and CO L LIER, Chi ef District Judge. * McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge . This case involves an intere sting tale of fr aud and de ception by a do c tor a tte mpt ingto a

vo id r e pa y ing his stu de nt loa

ns to the g ov e rnme nt. As a me dic a l st

ud e nt, L awr e nc e Ha

rr is t oo k o ut H e a lthEd ucat io n a nd As sis tanc e L oa

ns (“ HE AL

loa ns ” ) i n o rd e r t o
co mp l et e h i s edu ca t i o n . HE AL l o an s ar e p ri v at e l o an s b ac k edb y t h e go v ern m en t
. Af

t er gra d u at i n g, Har ris did not make regular pay ments on his loa

ns, and his pr ivate lende r filed a claim for his loans with the Depa

rtment of Health and Human Service s (“H HS”). HHS paid the private lender , and then the g overnme nt obtained a c ivil judgment ag ainst Harr is. Harr is entere d a re pay ment a gr e e ment afte r that judgme nt, but ag ain failed to make consistent pay ments. The gove rnment sus pended H arr is’sNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 2 - acc ess t o Medica

re and Medica id pay

ments in November

2000, and, in 2002, Har

ris convince d the g overnme nt that he was pe rmane ntly unable to pay off his loans. The g overnme nt forg ave the loans and re admitted Har

ris to Medicar e and Me dicaid pra ctice. Suspi cious cha rg es involving H arr is led to an inve sti g a tio n. Th a t in ve sti g a tio n r e su lte d in an in dic tme nt a g a ins t H arr is, c ha rg inghim wi th ten counts of he alth car e fra ud, one conspirac y

count, and one count of makinga fa lse statement. A j u r y c o n v i c t e d

H ar r i s o na l l t w e l v e c o u n t s , an d t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rts e n t e n c e d h i m t o s e v e n t yeig ht mon t hs in prison and $528,074 in restitution. Harris now a ppeals, c halleng ing the denial of a motion to compel eff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel that he filed just bef ore tria l b eg an, the use of judicial fac t-finding in his sentencing , and the obstruc tion of justice enha

nceme nt he re ceive d during
se nte nc ing . F or

the re a so ns se t f

or th b e low , w e a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt. I. BACKG ROUND A. His to r y o f Har r is’ s Lo ans Be g inning in 1983, Harris attended the Ohio College of Podiatry Medicine. I

n order to attend Ohio College , Har

ris too k o u t HEAL

loans. HEAL

loans are private loa

ns backe d by

the g overnme nt. Harr is acc rued $66,100 in loans dur ing his time in school. I t is un c le ar i f H arr is e ve r t oo k a de fe rm e nt o n h is l oa

ns . I t is c le ar, ho we ve r, that H arr is d id not make at least six loan pay ments. Sallie Ma e, the pr ivate lende r re sponsible for the loans, f iled an insuranc e cla im with HHS. HHS repaid Sallie Mae f or Harris’s loans and S allie M ae a ssigne d the loans to HHS. HHS then refer red the loans to the U.S. Attorney ’s Off ice in Clevela

nd, Ohio for collection.No. 06-3327

US v . H arris

Nationwide Insu ra n ce o v er saw the Me dicar e trust fund. Adva nce Me d now serve s that 1 function. F or ea se of r efe renc e, both entities are ref err ed to as Medic are . - 3 - B. Th e F irst Judgm ent against Harris and the Loan Repaym ent P lan I n 1 98 9, the g ov e rnme nt ini tiate d a civ il a c tio n a g a ins t H arr is t o c oll e c t on the HE AL

loa ns . I t ob ta ine d a judg me nt ag a ins t Harr is in th e a mou nt o f $ 12 7, 52 0. 18 . B a se d o n th a t ju dg me nt, Ha rr is and the g overnme nt entered into a repa y ment ag ree ment in 1991. The plan re quired re g ular repa y ment be made from the reimburse ments Har ris rec eived f

rom Medica

re f or ser vices re ndere d. 1 The g overnme nt would rec eive the f irst $1,500 of the Medica re pa y ments Harr is recei ved ea ch
mon th. Th e ne xt $1 0, 00 0 ea c h mont h w ou ld b e Ha

rr is’ s, wh ile any

thi ngov e r $ 11 ,5 00 in a

mon th would be split equally

betwee n Har

ris and the g overnme nt. C. Harris’s A tte m pts to Lim it his Paym ents During the same pe riod, Har ris beg an attendingan “a sset protec tion class” off ere d by J ay Mitton. He attended this class y ear ly , often with other doc tors he knew. One of the seminar books indicated that f

orming a cor

poration and wo rk i ng as the c orporation’s employ ee w ould allow an individual with heavy

loan pay ments to have better c ontrol of his finance s. Harr is rece ived similar advice from his acc ountant, Kenne th Embry

. Embry indicated that, if H arr is formed a corpor ation and listed himself as its employ ee, “ Medica re w ould discontinue interce pting his fun d s . ” Rep a y me nt of Ha rr is’ s lo ans wa s in iti a lly

ma de fr om M e dic are re imburs eme nts wh ic h h e ob ta ine d u sin g his Medica re PI N number. Cre ating a cor poration would cre ate a

new PI N number f

or the c orporation
un de r wh ic h Ha

rr is c ou ld b ill Me dic are fo r r e imb ur se me nts . E mbr y ind ic a te d th a t Me dic are wo uld not deduct pay

ments for Ha

rris’s re pay

ment plan from Medica

re reimbursements obtained using theNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

D r . M a l i k h a d b e e nc h ar g e d

w i t h t a k i n g a

k i c k b a c k p r e v i o u s l y. H e w a s f

o u n d n o tg u i l t y. 2 D r . Il o d i w a s c o n v i c t e d o f r e c e i v i n g a k i c k b a c k i n an u n r e l a t e d c a s e . H e w a s f o u n d g u i l t y, 3 and his license to pr actice medicine wa s revoke d in 2002. Dr. Walker was diag nosed with sarcoidosis in 1992. He stopped pr acticingin 2000, and he 4 died in 2002. - 4 - c or po ratio n’ s PI

N num be r i f H arr is w a s li ste d a s an e mpl oy e e of the c or po ratio n. B a se d o n th is advice , Har

ris formed Me tropolitan Foot and A nkle (“ Metropolitan”) in 1993. To incorpor ate u n d er Oh i o state law, H arr is believed he neede d to have other doctors as share holders. He listed severa l other doctors as share holders, doctors that he knew from school a nd who had a lso attended the Mitton seminars. One of these doctors was Dr. Taj Malik. Dr. Malik later te sti fi e d h e ha d n e ve r b e e n invo lve d w ithMe tr op oli tan. Dr. Geo rge I lod i w a s a lso lis te d a s a 2 share holder. Dr . I lodi late r testified that he had never been involved with or had any knowledg e of Me tr op oli tan. Af

te r b e ingc on ta c te d b y

F B Ia g e nts inv e sti g a tin g Ha rr is, Dr . I lod i sen t a le tte r t o 3 Har ris inquiring w hy

Har ris had used D r. I lodi’s name in connec tion with Metropolitan. Harris sent
a re sponse, but the re sponse was a ddresse d to Dr. Malik rather than Dr. I lodi: in it, Harris apolog ized to Dr. Malik for usingDr. Malik’s a ddress in re lation to Metropolitan and explained it away as an
a c c ide nt. Ne e dle ss t o s ay , the le tte r did no thi ngto a ssu a g e Dr . I lod i’ s c on c e rn s a bo ut t he us e of his own name. D r. Ke nneth Walker wa s also listed a s a share holder. Dr. Walker’s wife testified that 4 Dr. Walker w as not i n v o l v ed in any way with Metropolitan. Dr. Da mon L itsey

and Dr . Br endaNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

Many of these doctors wer e also fa lsely listed as prac ticing at Metropolitan in an 5 org anizational char

t Harr is submit ted to the g overnme nt at the time. - 5 - Casselberr

y also testified that, thoug h listed as share holders in Metropolitan, neither had any involvement with Metropolitan. 5 When Metropolitan first incorpor ated, Me dicar e beg an deduc ting H ar ri s’s pay ments from

r e i mb u r s e m e n t s t o M e t r o p o l i t an . In r e s p o n s e , H ar r i s i n f o r m e d M e d i c ar e h e w a s s i mp l y a Metropolitan employ ee. He submitted a handw ritten cha rt showing other doc tors’ roles at Metropolitan. I t list ed Dr . Walker as president of Metropolitan and Dr . Casselberr y as pre sident of Metropolitan ’s Podopediatrics De partment, thoug h neither doc tor had a ny involvement with the
c or po ratio n. Ha

rr is a lso wr ote le tte rs to Me dic are –u sin g oth e r do c tor s’ name s– that in dic a te d H a rr is had no fina

ncial intere st in Metropolitan and that Harris would be f ired if Me dicar e continued de du c tin g a mou

nts Ha rr is o we d un de r the re pa

y me nt p lan f

ro m Me tr op oli tan’ s Me dic are pa y me nts
. Har ris did not rece ive per

mission from these other doc tors to use their name s, but his efforts we re
su c c e ssf ul: Medic are sto pp e d d e du c tin g a mou nts Ha rr is o we d f

ro m r e imb ur se me nts ma de to Me tr op oli tan. He wr ote the fi rs t of the se le tte rs in 1 99 3, and Me dic are sto pp e d d e du c tin g a mou nts Har ris owed f rom reimburse ments made to Metropolitan’s Me dicar e re imbursements soon afte r. Embolde n ed b y t he succ ess of this ruse, Ha rris for med another

corpor ation, Achilles F oot and Ankle ( “Ac hilles”), in 1994. He did not ac tively use the Ac hilles corporation until the fa ll of 2000, shortly

afte r he le arne d that the g overnme n t wa s go i n g t o exclude him from Medica re. H e submitt ed re quests for PI

N numbers unde r Ac hilles for both himself and Dr . Walker. He admitted signingfor both himself and D r. Walker. Ha rris included w ith the application an em ploy mentNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

Thoug h the exhibi ts a

re not in the r ecor d, it appear s from the phra sing of questions at trial 3 that Har ris did make pay

ments in 1996 and 1997, but that they wer e so small as t o have no impact on the principa l of the loan. On May 1, 2000, Har

ris made a

loan pay ment of $20.65. 4 - 6 - ag ree ment and withholding f orm signe d by

Dr. Walker. A s with Metrop o l i t an , Dr
. Walker’s wife denied that Dr . Walker had a ny involvement in Achilles. She also t estified that the signature s on the forms we re not fr om Dr. Walker. She f urther te stified that, at the time the for ms were signe d, Dr. Walker could no long er hold a pen. Throug h his use of these c orporations, Harris wa s able to limit t he amount the gove rnment
rec eived unde r his repa

y ment plan. Pay

ments wer e made using his Medic are reimburse ments from 1991 throug h 1993. I n 1993, the g overnme nt stopped deducting pay ments from Me t ro politan’s Medica re r eimbursements ba sed on the letter s rec eived f rom Har ris. I n 1994, Har

ris made two dire ct pay ments to the g overnme nt. I n 1995, Har ris made no pa

y ments until May

. He then made r eg ular pay ments for the r est of the y ear . Har ris made no mea

ningf ul pa y ments on his de bt in 1996 or 1997. 3 He made occa sional, small direct pay ments in 1998 and 1999. For example, he made a pay

ment of $39.45 in J une of 1999. In 1999, the g overnme nt resumed takingpay ments from Metropolit an ’s Medica re r eimbursements. The re w ere no further pay ments after

May 1, 2000. 4 D. Exc lusi on fr om M e dic ar e and H ar r is’ s Lo an F or giv e ne ss I n J une 2000, the gove rnment issued a le tter to Har ris informing him that he had to make pa y me nts or he wo uld be ba rr e d f ro m Me dic are and

Me dic a id. Ha

rr is m a de no fu

rt he r p ay me nts
. He wa s th e n e xcluded fro m Medi c are and Me dic a id o n N ov e mbe r, 20 , 2 00 0. He c on tin ue d toNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

Embry had pre viously

been c onv i ct ed t wi ce o f tax fraud. Ha rris testified that he did not 5 know of those c onvictions. - 7 - pr a c tic e , th ou g h h e la te r t e sti fi e d th a t he did no t bill Me dic are fo r any se rv ic e s re nd e re d d ur inghis exclusion. I n 2001, Har

ris applied for loan forg iveness. Har ris had his acc ountant, Ken Embry , fill out the financ ial statement provided by the g overnme nt. The fina ncial stateme nt form clea

rly stat ed that 5 all statem en t s must be true under penalty of per jury . The for

m list ed Metropolitan a s Harr is’s employ er. It did not li st Achilles. Ba sed on t he fina

ncial stateme nt, the g overnme nt found Har ris could not repa

y the loan. The principal a

nd interest at the time totale d $216,492.98. The g overnme nt forg ave the entire loa n. After the g overnme nt forg ave his loan, Harris applied to be re admitted to Medicar e. He was re admitted to Medicar e in 2002. E. Investigation i nto Su spiciou s Bill ing Activity During his exclusion from Medicare , multipl e suspi cious reque sts for re imbursement wer e
ma de fo r s e rv ic e s cha

rg e d usin g Dr . Walk e r’ s Ac hil le s PI N num be r. Me dic are re fe rr e d th e re qu e sts to the Offic e of I nvestig ations in HHS. Special Ag ent Catherine Hanse lman led the investig ation. Hanse lman contac ted Medica re be nefic iari es as s o ci ated with the charg es for service s. All of the benef iciarie s identified Har

ris as the doctor that provided the service s for which pay ment was soug ht from Medic are using D r. Walker’ s PI N. Ba sed on this infor

mation, H anselman obtained a sear ch war rant for Ha

rris’s off ices. Af ter executing the war

rant, Ha nselman obtained a

second searc h war

rant in order to obtain further patientNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 8 - fi le s. An ana ly sis of the patie nt fi le s re ve a le d tha t, in the re c or ds ana ly zed , a lmo st a ll o f t

he patie nts for whic h reimbursement was soug ht using the A chilles PI N numbers matc hed entr ies in Harr is’s
rec ords. The investig ation also implicated Barba ra Kelley

. Embry testified t hat Kelley had wor ked for Ha rris for y ear s. When investigator s first sear ched H arr is’s office , Kelley identified herself as the of fi c e mana g e r. Ha

ns e lma n ob ta ine d a su

bp oe na fo r Ke lle y ’s e mpl oy me nt re c or ds . Ha rri s
re sp on de d to the su

bp oe na wi th a le tte r statin g that, sp e a kin g “ a s the c us tod ian of re c or ds ” fo r b oth
c or po ratio ns , B arb ara

Ke lle y ha d n e ve r b e e n a

n e m plo y e e of e ith e r c or po ra tio n. Mu lti ple do c ume nts contra dicted this letter, including an application for h e a lt h c o v e r a g e a

t M e tr opolitan that list ed Ke lley
as an e mploy ee. F . P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound Th e inv e sti g a tio n ult imate ly le d to an ind ic tme nt c ha rg ingHa rr is w ithte n c ounts of

he a lth
car e fr aud, one c ount of making a fa lse statement and o n e co u n t of conspira cy . The district cour t appointed counse l for Ha rris and sc heduled th e o ri ginal trial date f or June 13, 2005. Harris’s

a tto rn e y so ug ht a c on tin ua nc e be c a us e it w a s “ a

c omp le x ca se ” and

he ne e de d “ mor e tim e to thoroug hly revie w all of the discovery .” The court g rante d a continuance until Oc t o b er 3 , 2 0 05. Trial wa s later r eset for

October 11, 2005. On Octobe r 7, 2005, Ha rris filed a p ro s e m o t i on in paper form without his attorney ’s kn o w l e d g e . T h e m o t i o nw a s c a p t i o n e d a “ M o t i o nt o C o mp e l E f

f e c t i v e A s s i s t an c e o f C o u n s e l

. ” It
so ug ht a con tin

ua nc e be c a us e Ha rr is f e lt unp re pa

re d f or tr ia l. S pe c if

ic a lly , h e c la ime d th a t hi s
a tto rn e y ’s fa ilure to sha

re dis c ov e ry ma te ri a ls wit h him pr e ve nte d h im f

ro m le nd inghis e xpe rt ise toNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 9 - the c a se . T he mot ion

no te d th a t th e “ de fe nd ant is e mph a tic a lly statin g that he is n ot at od ds wi th Court Appointed Counsel’s defe nse strateg y .” Oc tober 7 wa s the Fr iday befor e Columbus Day , a fede ral holiday

on which the fede ral courts wer e closed. Har ris did not send a copy

of the motion to the trial judg e or to opposing counsel. On Oc tob e r 1 0, Col umb us Da y , H arr is m e t w ith his c ouns e l to dis c us s the up c omi ngtr ia l. At the end of

that meeting , Har

ris informed his counse l that he had soug ht a continuanc e. Ea rly the next m orning , Har

ris’s counse l called the c ourt and informe d the judg e about the motion. The tria l jud g e the n me t br ie fl y

wi th b oth

c ouns e l in

c hambe rs . The c ourt addre ssed the motion on the rec ord at the start of trial. The court denied the motion beca use def ense c ounsel had a “stellar reputation,” defe nse counse l stated he ha d been pr epar ing f or trial for a signific ant amount of t ime, and Ha rris himself had missed many meeting s with his counsel befor e trial. F inding no pr ejudice to Ha rris in deny

ing the motion, the court also noted the pr ejudice to the g overnme nt that a continuance would cause . The g overnme nt ha d prepa red for trial on that date , r e arr ang e d s e ve ra l sc he du le s, and pr oc ur e d w itn e sse s f

or tr ia l. The jury trial commenc ed, and, a fter a four- day trial, the jury

–not surpris i n gl y

– co nvicted Ha rr is o n a ll co un ts. At se nte nc ing , the tr ia l judg e a pp lie d a numbe r o f s e nte nc inge nh anc e me nts , including e nhance ments for the amount of the loss, use of sophisticated mea ns, Harr is’s position of trust as a doctor in the M edica re sy stem, his role as a leader in the offense, and obstruction of justice. Adding these e nhance ments to his base offe nse level produce d an advisory SentencingGuidelines rang e o f s ev enty -eig ht to ninety -seve n months. The court sente nced H arr is to a prison term of seventy -eig ht months, t hree y ear s of supervise d rele ase, a nd require d restitution in the amount ofNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 10 - $528,074. The statutory maxi mum f or counts 1, 11, and 12 was five y ear s in pr ison; the statutory maximum f

o r c o u n ts 2

- 1 0 w a s te ny e ar s im p r is o n me n t. T h e c o u rt m a d e c le ar th a t H ar r is was sentenc ed to six ty

months each f

or counts 1, 11, and 12, and seve nty -eig ht months for eac h of the
rema ining c ounts. The sentenc es we re to be serve d concur rently

. II. AN AL YSI S A. Mot ion to Com pel Ef fective Assistance of Cou nsel Har ris first argues that the district cour t er re d in denying his motion to compel eff ective

a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l. I

n p ra c tic a l e ff

e c t, thi s wa s a motio n for a c on tin ua nc e , a s it so ug ht t ime in which Ha rris could re view discove ry materia ls. “[B]road discretion must be g rante d trial courts on matters of c ontinuances.” Morris v. Slappy , 463 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). A de nial of a motion to continue is reviewe d only

for a buse of discr etion. United States v. Garne r , 507 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2007). A denial of a continuance amounts to a constitutional violation “only if there is an unrea soning a nd arbitra ry insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable r equest for delay .” Mo rri

s , 463 U. S. a t 1 1

- 1 2
. “ T h e r e ar e n o m e c h an i c a l t e s t s f o r d e c i d i n g w h e n a d e n i a l o f a c o n t i n u an c e is s o arbitra ry as to violate due pr ocess. The answe r must be found in the c ircumstance s prese nt in every
case , particula

rly in the rea sons pr esente d to the trial judg e at the time the r equest is denied.” Ungar

v . S arafi te , 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1969). To succe ed on appea l, the movant must show that the denial resulted in ac tual prejudice

. United States v. Crossley , 224 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2000). Prejudice require s showing the “continuanc e would have made r el evant witnesse s available or adde d something to the de fense .” U n it e d States v. King , 127 F.3d 483, 487 ( 6th Cir. 1997) ( qu ote d in Crossley , 224 F.3d at 855). A showing of pre judice based on new e vidence or newwitnesses thatNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

P r e s u m a b l y, t h e p a

p e r m o t i o n w a s n o td o c k e t e d b y t h e c l e r

k ’ s o f f i c e u n t i l l a t e r

o nT u e s d a y. 6 - 11 - t h e d e f e n d an tw o u l d

h a v e p r o d

u c e d i f t h e m o t i o nh a d

b e e ng r an t e d m u s t b e m a d e w i t h s p e c i f i c i t y. United States v. Graham , 2 78 F . App ’x 53 8, 54 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 8) ; see also King , 127 F.3d at 487. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de nyingthe mot ion . D istri ct court s mu st “asse mbl[ e] t h e wi t n es s es , lawy ers a nd jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels ag ainst continuance s except for c ompelling r easons.” Mo rri s , 461 U.S. at 11. Har

ris filed his m o ti o n late o n a F r id ay a f te r n o o n in p a

p e r f o r m an d d id n o t p r o v id e a c o p y to h is a tt o r n e y or
se rv e the a tto rn e y

fo r t he g ov e rnme nt. He did no t inf or m his ow n atto rn e y

a bo ut t he mot ion

un til 6 Monday , and the judge d i d n ot rec eive the motion until just befor e the star t of trial on Tuesda

y morning . The law y ers a nd jurors we re a lrea dy

prese nt by

the time the cour

t could addre ss the motion. I n decidingto deny Har ris’s motion, the court noted that “the g overnme nt has a substantial number of la

y witnesses who have bee n put on notice of their obligation to appe ar f or trial” a nd that the g ov e rnme nt’ s c a se a g e nt ha d a lso un de rg on e “ su bs tanti a l in c on ve nie nc e ” to m e e t th e sc he du le for tr ia l. T he c ourt

a lso ob se rv e d th a t H arr is’ s atto rn e y ha d s pe nt a

su bs tanti a l amou

nt o f t ime prepa ring for Har

ris’s trial, and the court noted that Har ris’s attorne y

continued pre paringfor tria l afte r he le arne d of Ha

rris’s motion. These f

actor s cut strong ly

in favor of

upholdi n g t h e dis trict court’s e x erc ise of its discretion. No r c an H arr is i de nti fy

a ny pr e jud ic e in the de nia l. H arr is’ s mo tio n in dic a te d h e fe lt h is counsel was inadequately prepa red–pa rticularly beca

use his c ounsel had failed to g ive Har ris all the discovery materia ls to review. Ye t he does not identify with any specific ity what the c ontinuanceNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 12 - would have a dded to his defe nse. He emphasizes his counsel’s fa ilure to consult him on the discovery materia l; however , his counsel examined Har ris on th e s t and re g ardinga wide a rra y of dis c ov e ry ma te ri a ls. Duri ng his te sti mony , Ha rr is d isc us se d r ou g hly

tw e nty -f ive dif fe re nt e xhibi ts. On a pp e a l, H arr is i de nti fi e s n o f ur the r p ie c e of

dis c ov e ry

that hi s c ouns e l f

a ile d to a dd

re ss. Harris also contends on ap p e a l t h a t t h e d e n ia l o f

th e continuance preve nted him from

“ pr ov id[i ng ] the name s and a dd re sse s o f w itn e sse s th a t w ou ld h a ve a ssi ste d in his de fe ns e .” Ha

rr is ha s not ide nti fi e d any sp e c if ic wi tne sse s h e wo uld

have c a lle d. Ov e r t

he c ours e of

the tr ia l, at le a st tw e nty - t w o w i t n e s s e s w e r e c a l l e d

– i n c l u d i n g a l l o f t h e d o c t o r s H ar r i s c o n t e n d s w e r e i n v olv e d in either Me tropolitan or Achilles, a s well as Ha rris’s a ccounta

nt. By failing to identify any specific neg ative effec t resulting from the de nial of the motion for continuance , Har

ris has failed to ma

ke the requisite showing of ac tual prejudice . Acc ording ly , the district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing the motion. Har ris also contends the de nial of the motion violated his rig ht to counsel. I n Har ris’s motion to compel ef

fec tive assistance of counse l, Harr is arg ued that if the court denied his moti on, the denial
wo uld pr e ve nt h im f

ro m r e c e ivi nge ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Th e mot ion a lso state d that “ if by some strang e rule of law, the Def endant is pr eclude d from re ceivingthe re quested mate rials of

any ty pe un til the 11 th hou

r be c a us e the De fe nd ant i s ‘ Re pr e se nte d b y Couns e l’ Th e n [si c ], pl e a se consider this a mo t i o n t o appoint Def endant a s Co-Counsel.” Har ris’s brief on appea l rec ites the applicable standard f

or re viewing a motion to substitut e counsel and then contends that the denial of the c on tin

ua nc e “ ro se to t

he le ve l of

a vio la tio n o f h is fu

nd a me nta l ri g ht to du e pr oc e ss b e c a us e he wa s eff

ectively denied the a ssistance of c ounsel.”No. 06-3327

US v . H arris

We n ote that th e mot ion its e lf wa s not an un qu a lif ie d mo tio n to su

bs tit ute c ouns e l. I

n f a c t, 7 Har ris soug ht to repre sent h i m s el f onl y if there was a

rule ba rringhim from seeingdiscovery materia ls while repr esente d by counsel. The re is, of c ourse, no s u ch rule. The district court may rea sonably have taken Ha rris at his word that he did not want to repr esent himself if ther e we re no su c h rul e . F ur

the rm or e , Harr is co uld e ith e r b e re pr e se nte d b y c ouns e l or

he c an r e pr e se nt h ims e lf (with or without standby

counsel). T here is no right to be “ co-c ounsel” in re prese nting yourself.

- 13 - Neither of t hese Si x th Amendment arg uments alters our finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Assuming Harris’s moti on did constitute a motion to be allowed to re prese nt himself as co- counsel, the district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing 7 the motion. I n assessing a motion to substi tute counsel, a court must consider the timeliness of the motion; the adequa cy of the court’s inquiry into the defe ndant’s complaint; and whethe r the conflict betwee n the attorne y and client wa s so gr eat that it resulted in a total lack of communication pre venting an ade quate de fense

. . . Fur ther, [c]onsideration of such motions require s a balanc ing of the ac cused' s rig ht to counsel of his choic e and the public' s interest in the prompt and e ff icient administration of justice. Un ite d Sta te

s v . S ald iv ar -T ru jil lo , 3 8 0 F. 3 d 2 7 4 , 2 7 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Ile s , 906 F.2d 1122, 1130 n.8 ( 6th Cir.1990)). Har ris’s motion did not s atisfy a ny o f th e s e elements ne cessa

ry to substit ute counse l. Harr is’s motion was not tim ely . He f iled it late on the Fr iday befor e trial would beg in and did not notify the court, opposing counsel, or hi s own attorney of t he motion. Com pa re Un ite d Sta te

s v . Tr uji llo , 376 F.3d 593, 606- 07 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding a motion to substi tute counsel filed thr ee da y s befor e trial
wa s unti me ly

); Uni t ed S t a t es v. W

illiams , 1 76 F .3 d 3 01 , 3 14 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) (f ind inga mot ion to substitut e two we eks bef

ore tria l was untimely). The dist rict court also addre ssed the ade quacy of Har ris’s re prese ntation. The cour t found that Har

ris had met multipl e times with his counsel, thatNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 14 - his c ouns e l ha d w or

ke d h ard in p re pa ra tio n f or tr ia l, a nd that hi s c ouns e l ha d a ste lla r r e pu ta tio n in the community . Fur

ther, Ha rris himself asse rted that there was not a total lac k of communication:
no t on ly ha d h e me t mu lti ple tim e s w ithhis c ouns e l, b ut h is m oti on state d th a t he a g re e d w ithhis counsel’s strateg y . Finally , the public interest in the prompt and ef ficient a dminist ration of justice outweig hed Ha

rris’s rig ht to substi tute counsel at the last minute in this case . Har ris expressed, at most, a limi ted intere st in repr esenting himself. Trial, meanwhile, was imm inent. The g overnme nt and the c ourt had invested signific ant resource s in prepar ing f or trial on that day , while Har ris had not demonstrated a

ny prejudice that would flow from continuing with his curr ent counsel. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing the motion. Ad dit ion a lly , th e de nia l of th e motio n d id n ot d e ny Ha rr is e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. The Six th Amendment does not req u i re t h at the ac cused ha ve a “ meaning ful attorney -client relationship.” W

ilson v. Mintzes , 7 6 1 F. 2 d 2 7 9 n . 3 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 8 5 ). Ha rr i s ’s m o t i o n d i d n o tal l ege acts that rose to the l evel of ineffe ctive assist ance of counse l, and Har ris made c lear

that he appr oved of his c ouns e l’ s tr ia l strate g y . A s su c h, it i s im possibl e to s ay

that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s discretion in finding Har

ris’s counse l was providing adequate re prese ntation. B. J udic ialF ac t- F indin g Har ris did not challeng e the f

act- finding below, and he acknow ledg es t hat pl ain er ror r eview

a pp lie s to this a

rgume nt o n a

pp e a l. N e ve rt

he le ss, Ha

rr is a rgue s th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c omm itt e d p la in
e rr or by e ng a g ingin j ud ic ia l f

a c t- fi nd inge n r ou te to d e te rm ini ngthe Gu ide lin e s r ang e fo r h is
se ntenc e. Harr is a c kn ow le dg e s th a t SixthCir c uit pr e c e de nt s tand s in

op po sit ion

to h is a rgume nt. The e n banc Sixt h Circuit r ec en t l y upheld the use of

judicial fac t-finding in calculating theNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 15 - Guidelines ra

ng e so long as the district cour t t re at s t h e Gui delines as a dvisory

. United States v. Vonner , 51 6 F .3 d 38 2, 38 4- 85 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (e n b anc ); see also United St ates v. Osborne , 545 F.3d 44 0, 44 5 (6 th C ir . 200 8) ; United States v. Phillips , 516 F.3d 479, 485- 86 (6th Cir. 2008). The district court in this case ma de fa ctual finding s to determine the G uidelines rang e and tr eate d the Guidelines ra

ng e as a dvisory . I n the abse nce of an int erve ning en banc or S upreme Court decision,
we a re bound by

these opinions. See U

nited States v. Lanier , 201 F.3d 842, 846 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Har ris relies he avily

on Cun nin gh am v . Ca lif or nia , 549 U.S. 270 (2007), a l l egi n g that Cunningham s t an d s fo r t h e p ro p o s i t i o nt h at j u d i ci al fa ct -f i n d i n g t h at i n cr ea s es t h e G u i d el i n es ra n ge is impermissibl e. The Six t h Circuit has pr e vio us ly he ld t hat Cunningham does not aff ect judicial fac t-finding inside the statutory rang e when the district c ourt treated the SentencingGuidelines as advisory

. See U

nited States v. Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 5 2 7 -2 8 (6 t h Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Ma y be rry , 5 40 F .3 d 506 , 517 (6 th Cir . 200 8)

. Ac c or din g ly , we fi nd the dis tr ic t cou rt did no t e rr in finding fac ts at sentencingen route to a sentenc e within the statutory rang e. C. Obstruction of Ju stice Har ris also cha lleng es the obstruc tion of justice sentenc ing e nhance ment. He a rg ues that (1) the e nh ancem ent is unc on sti tut ion a l a s a vio la tio n o f d

ue pr oc e ss; (2 ) t

he e nh anc e me nt i s unconst i t u t i o n al as a

n infring ement of his rig ht to testify ; (3) the e nhance ment is unconstituti onal beca use it deprive s h i m of the rig ht to trial by jury ; (4) the a

pplication of the e nhance ment was
err oneous bec ause it ig nored the equally plausible infere nce that the ot her witnesses wer e lying; a nd (5) the a pplicatio n o f t h e enha

nceme nt was er

roneous be cause the sentenc ing judg e re lied on po stv e rd ic t c omm e nts the jur y ma de . A ll f

ive c la ims la c k me ri t.No. 06-3327

US v . H arris

Dunnigan re qu i re s t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt t o s t at e w h i ch p ar to f d ef en d an t ’s t es t i m o n y t h e j u d ge 8 f in d s to b e p e r

ju r y an d to ma k e s p e c if ic f in d in g s a s to e a c h e le me nt of perjury

. United States v. Chance , 306 F.3d 356, 390 ( 6th Cir. 2002). The district cour t fulfilled both require ments. - 16 - Both pa rties ag ree that the S upreme Court squarely addre ssed the due pr ocess involved in the obstruction of justice enha nceme nt in United States v. Dunnigan , 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993), abrogated

on oth e r g

ro un ds by

Un ite d S

tat es v . W

e lls , 519 U.S. 482 (1997). Se e als o Uni t ed S t a t es v. 8 W illiamson , 154 F.3d 504, 505 ( 3d Cir. 1998) (“I n United States v. Dunnigan
. . . the Supreme Court held that a de fe nd ant' s du e pr oc e ss ri g hts are no t vio la te d wh e n a dis tr ic t c ourt e nh anc e s a defe ndant' s sentence under U .S.S.G. § 3C 1.1 based on a finding that the def

endant c ommitt ed perjury .”). Mo re re c e nt d e c isi on s a lso up ho ld t he ob str uc tio n o f j us tice e nh anc e me nt a g a ins t constitutional attack. United States v. W illiams , No
. 07 -3 09 6, 20 08 WL29 52 78 8, a t *2 (6 th C ir . July 30 , 2 00 8) ; Un ite d Sta te

s v . Ne gr e te , 5 3 7 F. 3 d

9 1 8 , 9 2 3 (8 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ad dre s s i n g Bo ok e r and the pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e sta

nd ard ); United States v. Addison , 253 F. App’x 849, 851 (11th Ci r. 2007) (a ddressing due proc ess a r g u me nt that enhanc ement lac ked prote ction of indictment and trial)

. Har ris “objec ts” to Dunnigan ’s holding. He identifie s no later Supre me Court decision cha lleng ing that holding, howe ver, a

nd this court is bound by

decisions of the Supre me Court. Har ris also cha lleng es the use of the enha nceme nt beca

use it provides a punishment for perjury without providing a

jury trial. This a

rg ument larg ely repe ats Har ris’s challeng e to judicial fa c t- fi nd ing . To the e xten t th a t it do e s, the argume nt m

us t f a il f or the re a so ns g ive n a

bo ve . H a rr is al s o b el i ev es t h a t a j u r y t ri al i s n ee d edb ec au s e t h e e n h an ce m en ti s es s en t i al l y a c ri m i n al ch ar ge masquera ding a s a sentenc ing e nhance ment. Dunnigan reje cted a simil ar a rg ument, noting that “ theNo. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 17 - e nh anc e me nt i s mo re tha n a me re surr og a te fo r a

pe rj ur y pr os e c uti on . I t f

ur the rs le gitimate sentenc ing g oals rel ati ng to the principal c rime, including the g oals of re tribution and incapa citation.” Dunnigan , 5 07 U. S. at 97 ; see also W illiams , 2008 WL 2952788, at *2. As such, the enha nceme nt is an appropr iate par t of sentenc ing a

nd does not violate Ha

rris’s righ t t o a jury tr ia l. Har

ris’s ar gument reg arding the rig ht to testify far es no better. Dunnigan square ly addre ssed it a s w e ll: Respondent ca

nnot contend that incr easingher se n t en ce beca use of he r per

jury int e rf e re s w ithhe r r ig ht t o te sti fy , fo r we have he ld on a numbe r of oc c a sio ns that a defe ndant' s rig ht to testify does not include a

rig ht to co m m i t p erjury . Nor c an responde nt contend § 3C1.1 is unconstituti onal on t he si mple basis that it dist orts her decision whe ther to testify or re main silent. Our au t h o rities do not impose a cate g orica l ban on eve ry g overnme ntal action aff ecting the strateg ic dec isions of an a c c us e d, inc lud ingde c isi on s w he the r o r n ot t o e xer c ise c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts

. Dunnigan , 5 07 U. S. at 96 (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see also W illiams , 200 8 WL 29 52 78 8, a t *2 ; Addison , 25 3 F . App ’x a t 85 1. Th e re fo re , th e ob str uc tio n of jus tic e e nh anc e me nt doe s not vio la te the Sixth Amendment. Ac cording ly , there is no error –much less plain er

ror–in the district cour

t’s use of the ob str uc tio n o f j us tic e e nh anc e me nt. Ha rr is als o cha lle ng e s th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g the e nh anc e me nt. Spe c if ic a lly , h e argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt fi nd ing “ fa il[e d] to take int o a c c ount t he re a so na

ble inf e re nc e that the oth e r do c tor s wh o te sti fi e d” pe rj ur e d the mse lve s to pr ote c t th e ir me dic a l li c e ns e s. A district c ourt’s fac tual finding s underly ing the enhanc ement ar e re viewed f or cle ar e rror . United Sta te s v . D av ist , 4 81 F .3 d 4 25 , 4 27 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) . T he dis tr ic t co urt ’s ass essme nt o f w itn e ss
cre dibilit y

as it aff ects a sentenc ing e nhancem en t i s “b asica lly unassailable.” United States v.No. 06-3327

US v . H arris

- 18 - Maliszewski , 161 F.3d 992, 1020 ( 6th Cir. 1998). As the re cord is replete with evidence suppor ting the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing , H arr is’ s su ff ic ie nc y -o f- the -e vid e nc e argume nt m us t f a il. Finally , Har

ris notes in a footnote that it “is problematic” that the district court consider ed post-deliberation jury statements. This court does not consider an i ssue raised so casua lly

. United States v. Johnson , 44 0 F .3 d 83 2, 84 6 (6 th Cir

. 20 06 ). Ev e n if we did , the state me nt H arr is o bje c ts to d id n ot i nd ic a te re lia

nc e on the jur y ; it wa s simp ly an obs e rv a tio n tha t the jur y and the jud g e bo th found Ha rris incre dible. I V. CO NC LU SION We AF F IRM the sentenc e imposed on Ha rris and the d en i al of the motion to compel
e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l.