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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

MATTHEW BALDWIN, : No. 2613 EDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the PCRA Order, July 13, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0010832-2013

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2018

Matthew Baldwin appeals pro se the order of October 30, 2017, issued 

by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that denied his petition 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 

After careful review, we affirm.

The factual history of this matter, as initially recounted by the trial 

court during appellant’s direct appeal, is as follows:

On September 10, 2012 at approximately 5:45 p.m., 

Kharee Tillmon was with some friends at the Cecil B. 

Moore Recreation Center located at 22nd Street and 

Huntingdon Street. [Appellant][

1] entered the 

playground and began talking with Tillmon and his 

friends. Eventually, [appellant] began arguing with 

Tillmon about $10 that Tillmon owed [appellant]. 

[Appellant] stated, “Man, you’ve been owing me my 

bread for the longest. Give me my bread.” When 

 

1 Appellant was 17 years old at the time.
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Tillmon stated he did not have [appellant’s] money, 

[appellant] drew a .22 caliber revolver, pointed it at 

Tillmon, and shot him once in the chest. [Appellant] 

then kicked Tillmon once in the head, after Tillmon 

had fallen to the ground, and left the scene.

Tillmon suffered a single gunshot wound to the 

chest, which penetrated his heart and both of his 

lungs. Doctors pronounced Tillmon dead at 

approximately 6:11 p.m.

Trial court opinion, 10/30/17 at 3, citing trial court opinion, 7/2/15 at 2

(footnote omitted).

The trial court recounted the following procedural background:

On November 20, 2014, following a jury trial before 

this Court, [appellant] was convicted of one count 

each of first-degree murder (18 Pa.C.S.[A].

§ 2502(a)), carrying a firearm without a license 

(18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106), carrying a firearm on a 

public street in Philadelphia (18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6108), 

and possessing an instrument of crime 

(18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 907). On January 23, 2015, the 

Court imposed an aggregate sentence of 50 years to 

life in state prison (18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1102.1(a)(1)). 

[Appellant] did not file post-sentence motions. 

[Appellant] was represented at trial and at 

sentencing by Brian J. McMonagle, Esquire. 

[Appellant] was represented on direct appeal by 

James Ephraim Lee, Esquire.

On January 21, 2016, while his direct appeal was 

pending, [appellant] prematurely filed a pro se 

petition under the [PCRA]. This Court deemed the 

[p]etition to have been timely re-filed after the 

Superior Court affirmed [appellant’s] judgment of 

sentence on May 9, 2016, and [appellant] did not 

seek review of that decision in the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania. James Lammendola, Esquire was 

appointed to represent [appellant] on October 27, 

2016.
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On March 3, 2017, pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988), 

Mr. Lammendola filed a letter stating there was no 

merit to [appellant’s] claims for collateral relief. On 

March 28, 2017, [appellant] filed a response to PCRA 

counsel’s Finley letter. On March 31, 2017, the 

Court issued notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 

(“907 Notice”) of its intention to dismiss [appellant’s] 

PCRA Petition without an evidentiary hearing. 

[Appellant] responded to the Court’s 907 Notice on 

May 11, 2017 (“907 Response”), repeating the same 

arguments made in his response to the Finley

Letter. On July 13, 2017, the Court formally 

dismissed [appellant’s] PCRA Petition and granted 

Mr. Lammendola’s motion to withdraw his 

appearance.

Trial court opinion, 10/30/17 at 1-2 (citations omitted).

On August 7, 2017, appellant filed a notice of appeal. On August 10, 

2017, the trial court ordered appellant to prepare a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On 

September 18, 2017, appellant complied with the order. On October 31, 

2017, the trial court filed an opinion, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Appellant raises the following issues for this court’s review:

1. Is it unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to 

50 to Life a de facto sentence of Life 

Imprisonment [without] the possibility of 

parole, [without] a factual basis to determine if 

the juvenile was permanently incorrigible, 

irreparably corrupt, or irretrievably depraved?

2. Absent a judicial finding, a juvenile is 

permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt, 

or irretrievably depraved, is it unconstitutional 

to sentence a juvenile to 50 to Life, a de facto

sentence of Life imprisonment [without] the 

possibility of parole[?]
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3. Under the circumstances of this case[,] was it 

unconstitutional to sentence [appellant] to 50 

to Life, a de facto sentence of Life 

Imprisonment [without] the possibility of 

parole?

4. As the United States Supreme Court in Miller 

v. Alabama, [567 U.S. 460 (2012),] struck 

down the Pennsylvania First and Second 

Degree Murder statutes for juveniles, was the 

only Constitutional Sentence here one for 

Voluntary or Involuntary Manslaughter, due to 

Third Degree Murder in Pennsylvania being 

Unconstitutionally Vague?

5. Did the Trial Court impose an Illegal Sentence 

upon [appellant] when it imposed the 50 years 

to Life Sentence in state prison, pursuant to 18 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1102.1(a)(1), which is 

unconstitutional in its entirety?

Appellant’s brief at 3.2

In PCRA appeals, our scope of review “is limited to the findings of the 

PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA court’s hearing, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” 

Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d 565, 573 (Pa. 2008) (internal quotation 

omitted). Because most PCRA appeals involve questions of fact and law, we 

employ a mixed standard of review. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 

875, 878 (Pa. 2009). We defer to the PCRA court’s factual findings and 

credibility determinations supported by the record. Commonwealth v. 

 

2 Appellant’s brief is not numbered. However, for ease in locating items in 

appellant’s brief, we count the first page after the table of contents and table 

of citations as “1” and proceed forward from that point in counting the 

pages.
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Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc). In contrast, we 

review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.

Appellant’s first three issues are essentially the same: that he 

received an unconstitutional de facto life sentence without possibility of 

parole of 50 years’ to life when he was a juvenile and was not found to be 

permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt, or irretrievably depraved. 

(Appellant’s brief at 3.)

Appellant raises a claim pertaining to the legality of his sentence. “The 

determination as to whether a trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a 

question of law; an appellate court’s standard of review in cases dealing with 

questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 

771 (Pa.Super. 2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Rotola, 173 A.3d 831, 

834-835 (Pa.Super. 2017). An appeal pertaining to the legality of a 

sentence is nonwaivable. Commonwealth v. Foster, 17 A.3d 332, 345 

(Pa. 2011).3

On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States announced 

its decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). In Miller, the 

High Court held that mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment’s 

 

3 The Commonwealth contends that appellant waived all issues because he 

did not raise these issues in his PCRA petition. Because the claims address 

the legality of the sentence imposed upon appellant, we will address them.
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prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment unless there was a 

determination that the offender was permanently incorrigible, irreparably 

corrupt, or irretrievably depraved. Id. at 471-473, 479-480.

In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the Supreme 

Court of the United States held that Miller applied retroactively.

In response to Miller, our General Assembly passed 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1102.1 which provides that a person between 15 and 17 years of age

convicted of first degree murder after June 24, 2012, must be sentenced to 

a maximum term of life imprisonment and a minimum sentence can be set 

anywhere from 35 years’ to life. Appellant was not resentenced to life 

without parole, so Miller, on its face, does not apply.

With respect to a de facto life sentence without possibility of parole, 

in Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416 (Pa.Super. 2018), this court 

held that a trial court may not impose a term-of-years sentence on a 

juvenile convicted of homicide if that sentence is equivalent to a de facto

life without possibility of parole sentence, unless the trial court finds, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation. Id.

at 433. This court also held that de facto life sentences are cruel and 

unusual punishment when imposed on juveniles convicted of non-homicide 

offenses or juvenile homicide offenders capable of rehabilitation. 

Furthermore, when determining whether a sentence is a de facto life 

sentence, this court held that the individual sentences must be examined 
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rather than the aggregate sentence. Id. at 434. In so doing, the court 

determined that each individual sentence did not represent a de facto life 

sentence. With respect to appellant’s argument, he will be in his sixties 

when eligible for parole, hardly a de facto life sentence.

Appellant next contends that the Supreme Court of the United States 

in Miller struck down the first and second-degree murder statutes for 

juveniles and the third degree murder statute was vague so that the only 

crime for which he could be convicted for voluntary or involuntary 

manslaughter. (Appellant’s brief at 16.)

The trial court termed this argument frivolous and opined:

Miller did not render our murder statutes incapable 

of being applied to juveniles. Rather, Miller “held 

that a sentencing scheme that mandates the 

imposition of a life-without-parole sentence for a 

juvenile violates the Eighth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.” Commonwealth v. 

Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 432 (Pa. 2017). After Miller, 

our legislature enacted a sentencing statute to 

ensure that all of the mandates of Miller were 

consistent with Pennsylvania law. 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1102.1. The constitutionality of section 1102.1 

has been upheld by our Superior Court, which held 

that section 1102.1 is fully compliant with the 

mandate of Miller and the requirements of the 

Eighth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. 

Brooker, 103 A.3d 325, 339 (Pa.Super. 2014).

[Appellant] was sentenced for first degree murder 

under section 1102.1, with the sentencing court 

making all of the findings mandated by that statute. 

Accordingly, there is nothing in Miller, nor in any 

other authority, that would render his conviction and 

sentencing for first degree murder unlawful. No 

relief is due.
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Trial court opinion, 10/30/17 at 7 (citation to record omitted).

The trial court has succinctly and accurately analyzed this issue. 

Appellant fails to persuade this court that the trial court erred when it failed 

to find that appellant, at most, could be sentenced to manslaughter.

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court imposed an illegal 

sentence upon him because 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1) is unconstitutional 

in its entirety because he believes that statutes governing sentencing for 

crimes must be contained in the Sentencing Code at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9701-

9799.75. (Appellant’s brief at 20.) This court does not agree. Chapter 11 

of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1101-1110, is entitled Authorized 

Disposition of Offenders and contains sections dealing with the amount of a 

fine that can be imposed based on the offense (Section 1101), 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1101, and sentences for murder, felonies, misdemeanors, and summary 

offenses (Sections 1102-1105), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1102-1105. Most of these 

sections have been effective since 1973. Appellant does not cite any case 

law that supports his contention that the enactment of Section 1102.1 is 

invalid and an unconstitutional ex post facto law. This issue has no merit.

Appellant has failed to prove that the PCRA court’s decision contained 

legal error or that any findings were unsupported by the evidence of record.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/26/18