Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 27, 2010 / Notices 43945 

1The full text of the Convention on 

Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage 

is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publication/ 

Documents/Infircs/1998/infcirc567.shtml. A 

detailed interpretation of the CSC and its provisions 

is contained in ‘‘The 1997 Vienna Convention on 

Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997 

Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 

Nuclear Damage—Explanatory Texts,’’ International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (‘‘Explanatory 

Texts’’). International Law Series No. 3 (2007). The 

Explanatory Texts is available at http://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ 

Pub1279_web.pdf . 

2SDR is the unit of account defined by the 

International Monetary Fund (‘‘IMF’’) and used by 

the IMF for its own operations and transactions. As 

of May 2010, 1 SDR equaled about $1.50 dollars; 

therefore, 300 million SDRs would equal roughly 

$450 million dollars. 

electronic, mechanical, or other 

technological collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology. 

Dated: July 22, 2010. 

Stephanie Valentine, 

Acting Director, Information Collection 

Clearance Division, Regulatory Information 

Management Services, Office of Management. 

Office of Special Education and 

Rehabilitative Services 

Type of Review: Extension. 

Title of Collection: Protection and 

Advocacy for Assistive Technology 

(PAAT) Program Assurances. 

OMB #: 1820–0658. 

Agency Form Number(s): N/A. 

Frequency of Responses: Annually. 

Affected Public: Not-for-profit 

institutions; State, Local, or Tribal 

Gov’t, SEAs or LEAs. 

Estimated Number of Annual 

Responses: 57. 

Estimated Annual Burden Hours: 9. 

Abstract: This information collection 

instrument will be used by grantees to 

request funds to carry out the PAAT 

program. PAAT is mandated by the 

Assistive Technology Act of 1998, as 

amended in 2004 (AT Act), to provide 

protection and advocacy services to 

individuals with disabilities for the 

purposes of assisting in the acquisition, 

utilization, or maintenance of assistive 

technology or assistive technology 

services. 

Requests for copies of the information 

collection submission for OMB review 

may be accessed from the RegInfo.gov 

Web site at http://www.reginfo.gov/ 

public/do/PRAMain or from the 

Department’s Web site at http:// 

edicsweb.ed.gov, by selecting the 

‘‘Browse Pending Collections’’ link and 

by clicking on link number 4306. When 

you access the information collection, 

click on ‘‘Download Attachments’’ to 

view. Written requests for information 

should be addressed to U.S. Department 

of Education, 400 Maryland Avenue, 

SW., LBJ, Washington, D.C. 20202– 

4537. Requests may also be 

electronically mailed to the Internet 

address ICDocketMgr@ed.gov or faxed to 

202–401–0920. Please specify the 

complete title and OMB Control 

Number of the information collection 

when making your request. 

Individuals who use a 

telecommunications device for the deaf 

(TDD) may call the Federal Information 

Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877– 

8339. 

[FR Doc. 2010–18374 Filed 7–26–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Convention on Supplementary 

Compensation for Nuclear Damage 

Contingent Cost Allocation 

AGENCY: Department of Energy. 

ACTION: Notice of inquiry and request for 

comment. 

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy 

(‘‘Department’’ or ‘‘DOE’’) is seeking 

comment and information from the 

public to assist in its development of 

regulations pertaining to section 934 of 

the Energy Independence and Security 

Act of 2007 (‘‘Act’’). Section 934 

addresses how the United States will 

meet its obligations under the 

Convention on Supplementary 

Compensation for Nuclear Damage 

(‘‘Convention’’ or ‘‘CSC’’) and, in 

particular, its obligation to contribute to 

an international supplementary fund in 

the event of certain nuclear incidents. 

Section 934 authorizes the Secretary of 

Energy (‘‘Secretary’’) to issue regulations 

establishing a retrospective risk pooling 

program by which nuclear suppliers 

will reimburse the United States 

government for its contribution to the 

international supplementary fund. The 

Department’s regulations to implement 

the retrospective risk pooling program 

are the subject of this notice. 

DATES: Interested persons must submit 

written comments by September 27, 

2010. 

ADDRESSES: Comments may be 

submitted electronically by e-mailing 

them to: 

Section934Rulemaking@Hq.Doe.Gov. 

We note that e-mail submissions will 

avoid delay associated with security 

screening of U.S. Postal Service mail. 

Also, written comments should be 

addressed to Sophia Angelini, AttorneyAdvisor, Office of the General Counsel 

for Civilian Nuclear Programs, GC–52, 

U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20585. The Department 

requires, in hard copy, a signed original 

and three copies of all comments. 

Copies of the written comments 

received and any other docket material 

may be reviewed on the Web site 

specifically established for this 

proceeding. The Internet Web site is: 

http://gc.doe.gov/ 

civilian_nuclear_programs.htm. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Sophia Angelini, Attorney-Advisor, 

Office of the General Counsel for 

Civilian Nuclear Programs, GC–52, U.S. 

Department of Energy, 1000 

Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20585; Telephone (202) 

586–0319. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

On September 12, 1997, the 

Convention on Supplementary 

Compensation for Nuclear Damage was 

adopted by a diplomatic conference 

convened by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (‘‘IAEA’’).1 The CSC 

provides the basis for a global nuclear 

liability regime. Such a regime is an 

essential element of the infrastructure 

necessary to support the expanded use 

of nuclear power around the world to 

meet the challenges of climate change, 

energy security, and economic growth. 

The CSC provides consistent rules for 

dealing with legal liability resulting 

from a nuclear incident and ensures 

prompt availability of meaningful 

compensation for the nuclear damage 

resulting from any such incident. A 

major feature of the CSC is the creation 

of an ‘‘international supplementary 

fund,’’ which provides an additional tier 

of compensation not otherwise available 

under a State’s national law and to 

which each Party to the Convention 

(‘‘Contracting Party’’) contributes in the 

event of certain nuclear incidents. 

In the event of a nuclear incident, the 

CSC provides a two-tiered 

compensation system based on: (1) A 

Contracting Party’s national law; and 

(2) the international supplementary 

fund. The first tier is provided by funds 

available under the laws of the State 

where the nuclear installation involved 

is located, or under whose authority the 

installation is operated (‘‘Installation 

State’’). The first tier amount is set at a 

minimum of 300 million Special 

Drawing Rights (‘‘SDRs’’).2 In the event 

that the first tier is inadequate to 

compensate all nuclear damage, a 

second tier would be provided via the 

international supplementary fund to 

which all Contracting Parties would 

contribute, including the Installation 


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43946 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 27, 2010 / Notices 

3The Price-Anderson Act (‘‘Price-Anderson’’ or 

‘‘PAA’’), section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954, as amended (‘‘AEA’’), 42 U.S.C. 2210, is the 

national law governing compensation for victims of 

nuclear incidents occurring within the United 

States. The PAA provides that owners of 

commercial reactors must assume all liability for 

nuclear damages awarded to the public; each 

licensed reactor must carry primary financial 

protection in the amount of the maximum liability 

insurance available, currently $375 million U.S. 

dollars, and damages exceeding that amount would 

be assessed equally against all commercial reactors 

(currently 104 reactors) covered by the PAA under 

a retrospective premium requirement pooling 

program. The PAA also provides indemnification 

for public liability in the event of a nuclear incident 

resulting from activities conducted for or on behalf 

of DOE, including a nuclear incident outside the 

United States involving U.S.-owned nuclear 

material. 

4The term ‘‘nuclear supplier’’ means a covered 

person (or a successor in interest of a covered 

person) that— 

State that provided the first tier. This 

obligation arises when, and to the extent 

that, second tier funds are actually 

required, with no obligation to 

contribute if claims can be satisfied 

from the first tier. The second tier 

amount is not preset, but instead is 

calculated based on a formula that takes 

into account the installed capacity of all 

Contracting Parties and their United 

Nations (‘‘UN’’) rate of assessment at the 

time of the incident. If countries with 

most of the current installed capacity 

join the Convention, the second tier will 

amount to approximately 300 million 

SDRs, which, in conjunction with the 

first tier, would guarantee a total of 

approximately 600 million SDRs for 

compensation. 

In 2007, Congress passed the Energy 

Independence and Security Act of 2007 

(Pub. L. 110–140), which includes 

section 934 (‘‘Convention on 

Supplementary Compensation for 

Nuclear Damage Contingent Cost 

Allocation’’) (42 U.S.C. 17373). Section 

934 implements the Convention in the 

United States. Congress found that the 

Convention benefits United States 

nuclear suppliers by replacing their 

potentially open-ended liability with a 

predictable liability regime, and, in 

effect, insurance for nuclear damage 

arising from incidents not covered by 

the Price-Anderson Act (‘‘PAA’’).3 The 

Department and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (‘‘NRC’’) are authorized to 

issue implementing regulations, as 

necessary and appropriate. 934(l). The 

combined operation of the CSC, PAA, 

and section 934 assures funding for 

victims in a wider variety of nuclear 

incidents, while reducing potential 

liability of United States nuclear 

suppliers and without increasing 

potential costs to United States nuclear 

reactor operators. 934(a)(1). 

Section 934 sets forth the means by 

which the United States will contribute 

to the second tier of compensation 

required under the Convention, that is, 

the international supplementary fund. 

(The first tier of compensation would be 

funded pursuant to the governing 

United States law for nuclear incidents, 

the PAA.) Funds available under the 

PAA would be used to pay the United 

States contribution to the international 

supplementary fund for nuclear 

incidents that are covered by the PAA. 

934(c) and (d). For nuclear incidents 

that are not covered by the PAA, section 

934 establishes a new risk pooling 

program for nuclear suppliers to pay the 

United States contribution to the 

international supplementary fund. The 

risk pooling program involves a 

premium to be assessed retrospectively 

(i.e., a deferred payment) based on a 

risk-informed formula taking into 

account specified risk factors in 

conjunction with exclusionary criteria. 

934(e). This notice of inquiry (‘‘NOI’’) is 

focused only on regulations to be 

promulgated by the Department to 

implement the new retrospective risk 

pooling program for nuclear suppliers. 

A section by section explanation of 

section 934 is provided in the Appendix 

to this notice. 

II. Discussion of Section 934 and 

Request for Public Comment 

A. Overview 

The Department is issuing this NOI to 

provide an opportunity for public input 

as the Department develops a rule to 

implement a retrospective risk pooling 

program for nuclear suppliers to fund 

the United States contribution to the 

international supplementary fund 

required by the Convention. 

This NOI discusses the major topics 

related to the implementation of section 

934 by the Department, including: (1) 

Operation of the PAA system; (2) 

pertinent definitions in section 934(b); 

(3) the retrospective risk pooling 

program and deferred payment in 

subsection 934(e)(2); (4) the riskinformed assessment formula in 

subsection 934(e)(2)(C)(i) and factors for 

consideration in subsection 

934(e)(2)(C)(ii); (5) reporting 

requirements in subsection 934(f); and 

(6) payments to and by the United States 

in subsection 934(h). 

B. Operation of the Price-Anderson 

System 

Section 934 is clear in its findings and 

purpose that the existing legal and 

operational framework of the PAA is not 

affected by the compensation system 

established by the Convention. 

Subsection 934(a) specifies that 

contributions under the Convention 

cannot ‘‘(i) upset settled expectations 

based on the liability regime established 

under the Price-Anderson Act; or (ii) 

shift to Federal taxpayers liability risks 

for nuclear incidents at foreign 

installations.’’ 934(a)(1)(H)(i) and (ii). 

With respect to a nuclear incident 

covered by the PAA (‘‘Price-Anderson 

incident’’), ‘‘funds already available 

under the [PAA] should be used’’ for 

contributions due under the 

Convention. 934(a)(1)(I). With respect to 

a nuclear incident outside the United 

States not covered by the PAA, ‘‘a 

retrospective premium should be 

prorated among nuclear suppliers’’ with 

contingent costs allocated equitably, on 

the basis of risk. 934(a)(1)(J) and 

934(a)(2)(B). In sum, the United States 

contribution under the Convention will 

be funded either from existing PAA 

funds or the new retrospective risk 

pooling program for nuclear suppliers. 

In no case would a nuclear reactor 

operator that contributes to the PAA 

pooling program be required also to 

contribute to the new retrospective 

pooling program. Because section 934 is 

clear on this point, and imposes no 

requirements on nuclear reactor 

operators covered by the PAA, the 

statute preserves the existing 

compensation system under the PAA. 

Accordingly, it is not necessary for 

either the Department or the NRC to 

issue implementing regulations to 

effectuate how and when PAA funds 

will be used to cover a contribution 

under the Convention. 

The Department believes that, on this 

point, the operation of the PAA under 

the Convention is clear and selfexecuting; however, the Department 

invites comments if there is any 

question in this regard. 

C. Definitions 

Subsection 934(b) provides 

definitions for certain terms used in the 

Act. In its regulation, the Department 

intends to include the terms defined in 

the statute, as well as other key terms 

necessary to implement the statute. The 

Department views some of the terms 

defined in subsection 934(b) as being 

clear and to not require additional 

clarification. Those terms include: 

‘‘Commission’’ at subsection 934(b)(1); 

‘‘Convention’’ at subsection 934(b)(3); 

and ‘‘Secretary’’ at subsection 934(b)(9). 

Other terms in section 934, although 

defined, are less clear in their 

application or interpretation such that 

clarification may be necessary. For 

example, while the term ‘‘nuclear 

supplier’’ is defined at subsection 

934(b)(7),4 that term is potentially very 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 27, 2010 / Notices 43947 

(A) Supplies facilities, equipment, fuel, services, 

or technology pertaining to the design, 

construction, operation, or decommissioning of a 

covered installation; or 

(B) Transports nuclear materials that could result 

in a covered incident. 

5The term ‘‘contingent cost’’ means the cost to the 

United States in the event of a covered incident the 

amount of which is equal to the amount of funds 

the United States is obligated to make available 

under paragraph 1(b) of Article III of the 

Convention. 

broad in scope, complex, and subject to 

interpretation. As to this definition and 

others below, the Department requests 

comments on how implementation of 

section 934 would be facilitated by 

further clarification and consideration 

in the regulation. If a commenter 

believes that clarifications should be 

provided in the Secretary’s regulation as 

to the terms below, or any other terms, 

the commenter is requested to explain 

why and, if possible, provide suggested 

language. 

The term ‘‘contingent cost,’’ defined at 

subsection 934(b)(2),5 means the cost to 

the United States in the event of a 

covered incident, which is equal to the 

amount the United States is obligated to 

make available under paragraph 1(b) of 

Article III of the Convention (i.e., the 

international supplementary fund) 

pursuant to Article VII. As the 

definition implies, the cost to the 

United States in the event of a covered 

incident (a nuclear incident within the 

scope of the Convention) is contingent, 

and thus only paid under specified 

circumstances. Those circumstances 

and the amount of the payment are 

governed by the Convention, primarily 

Articles IV, VI and VII. 

The formula for calculating the 

amount of the international 

supplementary fund is contained in 

Article IV, and is based upon: 

(1) Nuclear generating capacity (thermal 

power shown at the date of the nuclear 

incident in a list of nuclear installations 

established under Article VIII); and 

(2) UN assessment rate. Article IV.1(c) 

establishes a cap on contributions by 

any Contracting Party, other than the 

Installation State, per nuclear incident 

equal to the Contracting Party’s UN rate 

of assessment plus 8 percentage points 

of the fund as a whole. For the United 

States, the contribution is capped 

initially at 28% (UN rate of assessment 

of 20%, plus 8%) or less than one-third 

of the international supplementary 

fund. As more generating States become 

Contracting Parties, the cap will 

increase, while the United States 

contribution percentage will decrease. 

The Department believes that the 

definition of ‘‘contingent cost’’ is exact 

both as to when the cost is triggered and 

as to the required methodology for 

calculation of such costs. Therefore, the 

current approach is to define this term 

consistent with the Act and the 

Convention. Nonetheless, the 

Department invites comments as to 

related clarifications that should be 

incorporated in its regulation. 

The term ‘‘covered incident,’’ defined 

at subsection 934(b)(4), means a nuclear 

incident ‘‘the occurrence of which 

results in a request for funds pursuant 

to Article VII.’’ Funds may be requested 

under Article VII when a nuclear 

incident results in nuclear damage that 

exceeds the first-tier contribution 

amount. Generally, a covered incident is 

a nuclear incident occurring in the 

territory of a Contracting Party or during 

transportation to or from a Contracting 

Party. 

Because section 934 defines neither 

‘‘nuclear incident’’ nor ‘‘nuclear 

damage,’’ terms which are essential to an 

understanding of what constitutes a 

covered incident, DOE believes that it is 

necessary to look to the Convention and 

existing law to determine the proper 

interpretation and meaning of a covered 

incident under the Act. The Convention 

defines both nuclear incident and 

nuclear damage; the AEA defines 

nuclear incident. 

The Convention, Article I.(i), defines 

‘‘nuclear incident’’ as ‘‘any occurrence or 

series of occurrences having the same 

origin which causes nuclear damage or, 

but only with respect to preventive 

measures, creates a grave and imminent 

threat of causing such damage.’’ This 

definition of nuclear incident includes 

incidents of actual nuclear damage, and, 

in the absence of an actual release of 

radiation, damages incident to 

preventive measures taken only in 

response to a grave and imminent threat 

of a release of radiation that could cause 

other types of nuclear damage. Under 

the AEA, subsection 11q. (42 U.S.C. 

2014q.), a ‘‘nuclear incident’’ is defined 

as, in pertinent part, ‘‘any occurrence, 

including an extraordinary nuclear 

occurrence, within the United States 

causing, within or outside the United 

States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, 

or death, or loss of or damage to 

property, or loss of use of property, 

arising out of or resulting from the 

radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other 

hazardous properties of source, special 

nuclear, or byproduct material.’’ Like the 

Convention, the PAA definition of 

nuclear incident centers on the 

occurrence of injury or damage to 

persons or property directly caused by 

the incident. Unlike the Convention, the 

definition of nuclear incident in the 

PAA does not expressly include damage 

incident to preventive measures. 

However, the PAA provides for 

indemnification in the case of ‘‘public 

liability,’’ where public liability is 

defined as, in pertinent part, ‘‘any legal 

liability arising out of or resulting from 

a nuclear incident or precautionary 

evacuation * * * ’’ (AEA subsection 

11w. (42 U.S.C. 2014w.)), and 

‘‘precautionary evacuation’’ is defined 

as, in pertinent part, a government 

ordered ‘‘evacuation of the public within 

a specific area near a nuclear facility, or 

the transportation route in the case of an 

accident involving transportation of 

source material, special nuclear 

material, byproduct material, high-level 

radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or 

transuranic waste * * * if the 

evacuation is—(1) the result of any 

event that is not classified as a nuclear 

incident but poses imminent danger of 

bodily injury or property damage 

* * *.’’ AEA subsection 11gg. (42 U.S.C. 

2014gg.). The definitions of ‘‘preventive 

measures’’ under the Convention and 

‘‘precautionary evacuation’’ under the 

PAA are similar in scope and effect. 

Thus, when the AEA definitions of 

nuclear incident, public liability, and 

precautionary evacuation are read 

together the net effect is that a nuclear 

incident under the Convention is 

comparable to a nuclear incident under 

the PAA. Notwithstanding this 

comparability, in accordance with 

Article 2.2 of the Annex to the 

Convention (‘‘Annex’’), which permits 

the United States to use its existing 

domestic framework for dealing with 

liability for nuclear damage, the United 

States expects to use the PAA definition 

of a nuclear incident in connection with 

Price-Anderson incidents and the CSC 

definition of nuclear incident in 

connection with incidents that are not 

Price-Anderson incidents when 

implementing the Act. 

The Department requests comments 

on whether and how it may need to 

further clarify those terms in its 

regulation. 

In a similar vein, although the term 

‘‘nuclear damage’’ is defined in the 

Convention, the Annex provides a 

mechanism for the United States to 

apply a definition of nuclear damage 

consistent with both the Convention 

and the PAA. For incidents outside the 

United States not covered by the PAA, 

the United States expects to apply the 

definition of nuclear damage under the 

Convention, Article I.(f). For incidents 

inside the United States covered by the 

PAA, the United States expects to apply 

the definition of nuclear damage in 

Annex Article 2.2(a). 

The Department requests comments 

on whether or how it may need to 

further clarify those terms in its 

regulation. 


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Nuclear damage is defined in the 

Convention, Article I.(f), as loss of life 

or personal injury, loss of or damage to 

property and, to the extent determined 

by the law of a competent court, five 

categories of damages relating to 

impairment of the environment such as 

costs of measures of reinstatement, loss 

of income, costs of preventive measures, 

and other economic loss that must be 

treated as nuclear damage. The types of 

nuclear damage covered by the 

Convention are thus divided into two 

categories: Those which must be 

compensated (loss of life, personal 

injury, and property loss or damage) and 

those that are to be compensated ‘‘to the 

extent determined by the law of the 

competent court.’’ Article I.(f)(ii). This 

provides the competent court flexibility 

in determining under national law how 

to compensate economic loss that does 

not fall into the category of ‘‘loss or 

damage to property.’’ 

Under Annex Article 2.2, the United 

States (the only country able to meet the 

conditions of Annex Article 2.2) may 

define nuclear damage as set forth in 

Article I.(f) of the Convention, or as set 

forth in Annex Article 2.2(a). Annex 

Article 2.2(a) defines nuclear damage as 

including, in addition to that identified 

in Article I.(f) of the Convention, ‘‘any 

other loss or damage to the extent that 

the loss or damage arises out of or 

results from the radioactive properties, 

or a combination of radioactive 

properties with toxic, explosive or other 

hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or 

radioactive products or waste in, or of 

nuclear material coming from, 

originating in, or sent to, a nuclear 

installation; or other ionizing radiation 

emitted by any source of radiation 

inside a nuclear installation, provided 

that such application does not affect the 

undertaking by that Contracting Party 

pursuant to Article III of this 

Convention.’’ The latter definition of 

nuclear damage (i.e., at Annex Article 

2.2(a)) is consistent with the PAA 

approach of compensating victims for 

‘‘bodily injury, sickness, disease or 

death, or loss of or damage to property, 

or loss of use of property, arising out of 

or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, 

explosive, or other hazardous properties 

of source, special nuclear, or byproduct 

material.’’ AEA subsection 11q. (42 

U.S.C. 2014q.). Accordingly, the United 

States would use this broader definition 

for Price-Anderson incidents within the 

United States when implementing the 

Act. 

The Department requests comments 

on whether or how it may need to 

further clarify those terms in its 

regulation. 

The term ‘‘covered installation,’’ 

defined at subsection 934(b)(5), means a 

nuclear installation at which the 

occurrence of a nuclear incident could 

result in a request for funds under 

Article VII of the Convention and thus 

trigger the obligation to contribute to the 

international supplementary fund. The 

Department views this definition as 

clear, except that it is dependent upon 

an understanding of the term ‘‘nuclear 

installation.’’ The term ‘‘nuclear 

installation’’ is not defined in section 

934 or the AEA. The CSC generally uses 

the definition set forth in the Paris 

Convention on Third Party Liability in 

the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 

1960 (‘‘Paris Convention’’), the Vienna 

Convention on Civil Liability for 

Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 

(‘‘Vienna Convention’’) or Article 1(b) of 

the Annex, depending on which 

instrument is applicable to a particular 

nuclear incident. Article 2.2(b) of the 

Annex, however, permits the United 

States to apply the definition of ‘‘nuclear 

installation’’ set forth at Article 2.3 of 

the Annex to the exclusion of the 

definition at Article 1.1(b) of the Annex. 

Thus, for covered incidents within the 

United States, ‘‘nuclear installation’’ is 

defined at Annex Article 2.3 to mean: a) 

Any civil nuclear reactor other than one 

with which a means of sea or air 

transport is equipped for use as a source 

of power, whether for propulsion 

thereof or any other purpose; and b) any 

civil facility for processing, reprocessing 

or storing: (i) Irradiated nuclear fuel; or 

(ii) radioactive products or waste that: 

(1) Result from the reprocessing of 

irradiated nuclear fuel and contain 

significant amounts of fission products; 

or (2) contain elements that have an 

atomic number greater than 92 in 

concentrations greater than 10 nanocuries per gram; or (c) any other civil 

facility for processing, reprocessing, or 

storing nuclear material unless the 

Contracting Party determines the small 

extent of the risks involved with such 

an installation warrants the exclusion of 

such facility from the definition. In the 

context of the CSC, the United States 

interprets this definition of ‘‘nuclear 

installation’’ to cover reactors and 

facilities for which the primary purpose 

is processing, reprocessing, or storing 

spent fuel, high-level radioactive waste, 

or highly radioactive TRU waste. The 

United States further interprets this 

definition of ‘‘nuclear installation’’ as 

excluding all non-DOE nuclear facilities 

to which the NRC has decided not to 

extend Price-Anderson indemnification. 

For covered incidents within the United 

States, the Department’s current 

approach would be to define the term 

‘‘covered installation’’ consistent with 

the PAA and the definition of nuclear 

installation found in the Annex Article 

2. For covered incidents outside the 

United States not covered by the PAA, 

the Department’s current approach 

would be to use the definition of 

nuclear installation applicable under 

the CSC to determine a covered 

installation. The Department requests 

comments on whether or how it may 

need to further clarify those terms in its 

regulation. 

The term ‘‘covered person,’’ is defined 

at subsection 934(b)(6) as: (i) A United 

States person; and (ii) an individual or 

entity (including an agency or 

instrumentality of a foreign country) 

that—(I) is located in the United States; 

or (II) carries out an activity in the 

United States. The term does not 

include—(i) the United States; or (ii) 

any agency or instrumentality of the 

United States. The definition of 

‘‘covered person’’ incorporates another 

defined term, ‘‘United States person,’’ 

which is defined at subsection 

934(b)(11) as: (1) Any individual who is 

a United States resident, national or 

citizen (other than an individual 

residing outside the United States and 

not employed by a United States 

person); and (2) any entity that is 

organized under the laws of the United 

States. 

Read together, these definitions 

provide a frame of reference for the type 

of individual or entity that would 

constitute a ‘‘covered person’’ under the 

Act and the DOE’s regulation. The 

Department’s current approach would 

be to interpret ‘‘covered person,’’ to be 

either: (1) Any individual who is a 

United States resident, national, or 

citizen (other than the non-resident who 

is not employed by a United States 

person); or (2) any entity organized 

under the laws of the United States; or 

(3) any individual or entity—including 

an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 

country—to the extent that it is either 

located in or carries out an activity in 

the United States. The Department 

currently expects to define a covered 

person in the broadest manner as 

including, for example, any individual 

or entity, whether of foreign origin or 

domestic, that carries out any activity in 

the United States that is determined to 

provide an appropriate basis for 

allocating the contingent costs. 

However, a covered person would not 

be the United States itself or any agency 

or instrumentality of the United States. 

The Department believes these 

definitions, although broad in scope, are 

clear and that there is a common 

understanding of how they are to be 

interpreted and applied. Nevertheless, 


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6The EEZ of the United States is ‘‘a zone 

contiguous to the territorial sea, including zones 

contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States, 

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (to 

the extent consistent with the Covenant and the 

United Nations Trusteeship Agreement), and 

United States overseas territories and possessions. 

The EEZ extends to a distance 200 nautical miles 

from the baseline from which the breadth of the 

territorial sea is measured.’’ Presidential 

Proclamation 5030, March 10, 1983, 3 CFR 1983 

Comp., p. 22. 

the Department requests public 

comment on whether additional 

clarification may be necessary in its 

regulation. 

The term ‘‘nuclear supplier,’’ defined 

at subsection 934(b)(7), means a covered 

person (or its successor in interest) that 

(A) supplies facilities, equipment, fuel, 

services, or technology pertaining to the 

design, construction, operation, or 

decommissioning of a covered 

installation, or (B) transports nuclear 

materials that could result in a covered 

incident. The definition of ‘‘nuclear 

supplier’’ refers to a covered person or 

its successor that either: (1) Provides 

goods or services to a covered 

installation (where a nuclear incident 

could trigger an Article VII request for 

funds); or (2) engages in a shipment of 

nuclear materials that could result in a 

covered incident (which could trigger 

an Article VII request for funds). Under 

the Act, a nuclear supplier is the 

individual or entity responsible for a 

pro-rata share based on the riskinformed assessment formula at 

subsection 934(e)(2)(C) of any 

contingent costs the United States may 

bear in the event of a covered incident 

outside the United States that is not 

covered by the PAA. While the statutory 

definition of ‘‘nuclear supplier’’ is broad 

in scope and may require further 

clarification in the regulation, the 

criteria related to the risk-informed 

assessment formula at subsection 

934(e)(2)(C)(i) and factors for 

consideration in determining the 

formula at subsection 934(e)(2)(C)(ii) 

(whereby certain nuclear suppliers 

could be excluded) are directly relevant 

to determining which nuclear suppliers 

are contemplated within the Act. In this 

regard, the Department is considering 

whether it may be appropriate to 

include in its regulation additional 

criteria and requirements which, if met, 

would exclude certain nuclear suppliers 

from participation in the retrospective 

risk pooling program. The Department 

requests comment on whether the 

definition of ‘‘nuclear supplier’’ requires 

further clarification, or whether 

clarification can be appropriately 

addressed in regulations pertaining to 

the retrospective risk pooling program 

and formula at subsection 934(e). 

The term ‘‘Price-Anderson incident,’’ 

defined at subsection 934(b)(8), means a 

covered incident for which section 170 

of the AEA makes funds available to 

compensate for public liability, as 

defined in section 11w. of the AEA (42 

U.S.C. 2014w.). This definition reflects 

the distinction between covered 

incidents within the scope of the PAA 

(where contingent costs would be 

covered by the PAA) and covered 

incidents outside the scope of the PAA 

(where contingent costs would be 

covered by United States nuclear 

suppliers). For covered incidents that 

are also PAA incidents (e.g., either a 

nuclear incident in the United States, or 

a nuclear incident outside the United 

States involving a DOE contractor and 

U.S.-owned nuclear material), the PAA 

would be used to fund the United States 

contribution to the international 

supplementary fund. For a covered 

incident that does not constitute a PAA 

incident, such as a nuclear incident 

occurring in the territory of a 

Contracting Party that does not involve 

U.S.-owned nuclear material, the United 

States contribution would be provided 

by the United States nuclear suppliers 

that must participate in the 

retrospective risk pooling program 

described at subsection 934(e). 

The Department requests comments 

on whether or how it may need to 

further clarify those terms in its 

regulation. 

The term ‘‘United States,’’ defined at 

subsection 934(b)(10), means the same 

geographic area as the definition of 

‘‘United States’’ in section 11bb. of the 

AEA (42 U.S.C. 2014bb.). The AEA 

definition of United States provides 

that, when used in a geographical sense, 

the United States ‘‘includes all 

territories and possessions of the United 

States, the Canal Zone and Puerto Rico.’’ 

(Although the AEA definition includes 

‘‘the Canal Zone,’’ DOE notes that, 

pursuant to the Panama Canal Treaty, 

the ‘‘Canal Zone’’ is no longer so 

included.) For purposes of the AEA 

definition and section 934, the 

geographic scope of the United States 

includes its territorial sea, but not its 

exclusive economic zone (‘‘EEZ’’),6 even 

though the CSC grants a member 

country jurisdiction over nuclear 

incidents in or above the EEZ of a 

Contracting Party under specified 

circumstances, as well as in or above 

other maritime areas beyond the 

territorial sea and EEZ of a Contracting 

Party under specified circumstances. 

The broader geographic scope of the 

Convention from that of the AEA (and 

thus PAA) recognizes the right of a 

Contracting Party, including the United 

States, to exercise its jurisdiction in the 

case of a covered incident that occurs 

during transport of nuclear material 

within its EEZ or in maritime areas 

beyond the territorial seas under the 

conditions specified in Article V of the 

Convention. The Department believes 

this definition is clear; however, the 

Department requests public comment on 

whether additional clarification may be 

necessary. 

In sum, the Department requests 

comment as to whether implementation 

of section 934 would be facilitated by 

the Department further clarifying any of 

the foregoing terms or any other terms 

in its regulations. 

D. Retrospective Risk Pooling Program 

Subsection 934(e) sets forth the 

requirements and risk-informed 

assessment formula to be used in 

establishing the retrospective risk 

pooling program that is central to 

United States participation in the 

Convention and supports its goal of 

ensuring prompt and equitable 

compensation in the event of a nuclear 

incident. PAA funding cannot be used 

for the United States contribution to the 

international supplementary fund in the 

event of a covered incident outside the 

United States that is not a PriceAnderson incident. 934(a)(1)(H)(i). 

Likewise, Federal taxpayers cannot be 

burdened with the liability risks 

associated with nuclear incidents at 

foreign installations. 934(a)(1)(H)(ii). 

Accordingly, subsection 934(e) provides 

for a retrospective risk pooling program, 

with participation by nuclear suppliers, 

as the funding mechanism to cover 

contingent costs resulting from a 

covered incident outside the United 

States that is not a Price-Anderson 

incident. This retrospective risk pooling 

program for nuclear suppliers (which 

provides nuclear suppliers with 

insurance for their potentially unlimited 

liability in the event of a nuclear 

incident) is similar in certain respects to 

the PAA retrospective pooling 

arrangement (which provides United 

States nuclear reactor operators with 

insurance for their potential liability in 

the event of a nuclear incident) wherein 

the premium is assessed retrospectively, 

i.e., after a nuclear incident, by 

allocating the aggregate legal liability (in 

excess of the required liability insurance 

constituting primary financial 

responsibility) that actually resulted 

from such incident among all operators 

without regard to fault or liability. 

Subsection 934(e)(2) provides the 

basic structure of the retrospective risk 

pooling program and criteria for 

determining the prorated deferred 

payment. The program is ‘‘retrospective’’ 


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in the sense that a nuclear supplier’s 

obligation to pay does not arise (i.e., it 

is deferred) unless and until a covered 

incident that is not a Price-Anderson 

incident occurs and the United States is 

called on to provide its contribution to 

the international supplementary fund 

(i.e., resulting in contingent costs). 

934(e)(2)(A). This deferred payment will 

be allocated among the ‘‘pool’’ of nuclear 

suppliers on the basis of a risk-informed 

assessment formula. 943(e)(2)(B). The 

formula cannot be applied by the 

Secretary to any covered installation or 

transportation for which funds are 

available under the PAA. 943(e)(2)(iii). 

The amounts of the deferred payments 

will basically reflect the risk from which 

each nuclear supplier is relieved, 

relative to other nuclear suppliers, by 

reason of the United States participation 

in the international nuclear liability 

compensation system. 

Subsection 934(e)(2)(C) requires that 

the Secretary determine by rulemaking 

the risk-informed assessment formula 

and specifies certain risk factors that the 

Secretary must take into account. These 

risk factors focus on the extent of the 

potential liability of each nuclear 

supplier resulting from its activities 

relative to other nuclear suppliers and 

are comparable to factors currently used 

by private insurers to allocate risk. 

While subsection 934(e)(2)(C) contains 

specific risk factors to be accounted for 

in arriving at the risk-informed 

assessment formula, the Secretary has 

broad discretion to interpret and 

implement this provision. The 

Department believes that the public, and 

in particular the nuclear insurance 

industry, can provide valuable 

information to DOE regarding how each 

of the following six (6) risk factors 

enumerated in subsection 934(e)(2)(C)(i) 

should be taken into account 

(particularly in light of other factors, 

such as the exclusionary criteria in 

subsection 934(e)(2)(C)(ii) and the 

period on which risk is assessed in 

subsection 934(e)(2)(C)(ii)(II)): 

(I) The nature and intended purpose 

of the goods and services supplied by 

each nuclear supplier to each covered 

installation outside the United States; 

(II) The quantity of the goods and 

services supplied by each nuclear 

supplier to each covered installation 

outside the United States; 

(III) The hazards associated with the 

supplied goods and services if the goods 

and services fail to achieve the intended 

purposes; 

(IV) The hazards associated with the 

covered installation outside the United 

States to which the goods and services 

are supplied; 

(V) The legal, regulatory, and 

financial infrastructure associated with 

the covered installation outside the 

United States to which the goods and 

services are supplied; and 

(VI) The hazards associated with 

particular forms of transportation. 

Without the six risk factors at 

subsection 934(e)(2)(C)(i) above, the 

retrospective risk pooling program 

could conceivably require the 

participation of any nuclear supplier 

involved in activities such as supplying 

facilities, equipment, fuel, services, 

technology, or transport of nuclear 

materials related to any step within the 

nuclear fuel cycle—from activities such 

as mining, milling, enrichment, and 

fabrication through reprocessing—no 

matter its size or contribution relative to 

the nuclear installation. However, 

application of the risk formula provides 

a basis for the Department to assess a 

deferred premium according to the 

relative risk a nuclear supplier’s goods 

or services contribute to a nuclear 

incident. 

Further, subsection 934(e)(2)(C)(ii) 

lists factors for consideration whereby 

the Secretary may exclude certain 

nuclear suppliers. The Department 

believes that its interpretation of the risk 

factors enumerated above will be 

influenced significantly by the 

following factors in subsection 

934(e)(C)(ii) that the Secretary may 

consider: 

(ii) Factors for Consideration.—In 

determining the formula, the Secretary 

may— 

(I) exclude 

(aa) Goods and services with 

negligible risk; 

(bb) Classes of goods and services not 

intended specifically for use in a 

nuclear installation; 

(cc) A nuclear supplier with a de 

minimis share of the contingent cost; 

and 

(dd) A nuclear supplier no longer in 

existence for which there is no 

identifiable successor; and 

(II) Establish the period on which the 

risk assessment is based. 

The Department believes the intent of 

this provision is to exclude from 

participation in the risk pooling 

program those nuclear suppliers that 

provide goods or services that are the 

least likely to result in a nuclear 

incident for which requests under the 

Convention for contributions to the 

international supplementary fund 

would be invoked. Stated otherwise, the 

contingent costs should be allocated 

among those suppliers that provide 

goods or services most likely to result in 

significant potential liability in the 

event of a covered incident. 

Accordingly, only nuclear suppliers of 

goods and services that are likely to 

cause a covered incident with 

significant damage should be 

contributors to the risk pooling program. 

The exclusionary considerations are 

indicative of the type of nuclear 

supplier unlikely to contribute to the 

risk of such an incident, that is, a 

nuclear supplier that does not provide 

goods or services specifically for nuclear 

facilities; that does not engage in 

activities likely to result in significant 

potential nuclear liability, or that 

engages in such activities to a minor 

extent; or is no longer in existence and 

therefore cannot be expected to 

contribute to the pooling program. 

If the United States is called upon to 

contribute to the international 

supplementary fund, the risk-informed 

formula would be applied to calculate 

the amount that each ‘‘nuclear supplier’’ 

within the definition of the Act would 

be obligated to pay. The Department 

believes that, reading both subsections 

934(e)(2)(C)(i) and (ii) together, the 

formula is expected to include nuclear 

suppliers based on the relative risk of 

their goods or services causing a 

covered incident resulting in a request 

for contributions under the international 

supplementary fund, and to exclude 

nuclear suppliers with little or no risk 

of being determined legally liable for a 

covered incident resulting in nuclear 

damage in excess of 300 million SDRs. 

Because of the importance of each risk 

factor and the exclusionary 

considerations in establishing the 

formula, the Department seeks public 

comment on all of these criteria and 

how they should be interpreted and 

applied. Each risk factor, and the 

corresponding exclusionary 

considerations, will be discussed below. 

1. The first risk factor to be used as 

a basis for the formula is the nature and 

intended purpose of the goods and 

services supplied by each nuclear 

supplier to each covered installation 

outside the United States. 

934(e)(2)(C)(i)(I). The Department’s 

current approach would be to interpret 

this risk factor, in light of the presence 

of other statutory criteria that could 

exclude nuclear suppliers providing 

goods and services with negligible risk 

and in classes not intended specifically 

for use in a nuclear installation 

(subsections 934(e)(2)(C)(ii)(I)(aa) and 

(bb)), to mean that, as a general matter, 

only nuclear suppliers that provide 

goods or services specifically intended 

for use in structures, systems, and 

components (‘‘SSCs’’) that are important 

to safety at a nuclear installation should 

be included. This concept of SSCs 

important to safety is utilized in NRC 


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licensing of nuclear installations (e.g., 

nuclear reactors, fuel storage facilities) 

as a means to evaluate items based on 

their relative risk and importance to the 

safe operation of the nuclear 

installation. As such, this concept can 

provide a useful tool to identify those 

goods and services that have a greater 

potential for causing a nuclear incident 

that might result in significant nuclear 

damage. Focusing on SSCs important to 

safety would eliminate many nuclear 

suppliers of goods or services that do 

not contribute significantly to the risk of 

a nuclear incident, as well as suppliers 

of goods or services not intended 

specifically for use in a nuclear 

installation. For example, the 

Department believes that, under this 

interpretation, suppliers of such items 

as laboratory equipment, cleaning 

services, routine operational and 

technical reporting services, and 

computers not intended for control of 

the installation would be excluded from 

the formula. In contrast, the Department 

believes that suppliers such as designers 

and builders of nuclear islands 

(involving nuclear steam supply 

systems, reactors, etc.), and designers, 

manufacturers, and sellers of nuclear 

fuel assemblies or on-line nuclear 

measurement devices would be 

included in the formula. The 

Department seeks public comment on 

this interpretation, and in particular as 

to whether it has too narrowly or 

broadly interpreted this risk factor. 

2. The second risk factor to be used 

as a basis for the formula is the quantity 

of the goods and services supplied by 

each nuclear supplier to each covered 

installation outside the United States. 

934(e)(2)(C)(i)(II). The Department’s 

current approach would be to interpret 

this risk factor to mean that the formula 

should take into account the amount of 

goods and services provided by a 

nuclear supplier as an indicator of the 

extent to which a nuclear supplier 

contributes to overall risk. The 

Department seeks public comment on 

whether this factor should be assessed 

on the basis of the value of the goods or 

services supplied, the volume of the 

goods or services supplied, or some 

other criteria. 

3. The third risk factor to be used as 

a basis for the formula is the hazards 

associated with the supplied goods and 

services if they fail to achieve the 

intended purposes. 934(e)(2)(C)(i)(III). 

The Department’s current approach 

would be to interpret this risk factor, in 

light of the presence of other statutory 

criteria that could exclude nuclear 

suppliers providing goods and services 

with negligible risk or in classes not 

intended specifically for use in a 

nuclear installation (subsections 

934(e)(2)(C)(ii)(aa) and (bb)), in a 

manner analogous to the first risk factor. 

That is, only nuclear suppliers of safetyrelated goods or services would be 

included in the formula. Among those 

goods and services, risk would then be 

determined based on the relative 

radiological hazard or harm that may be 

caused if a particular good or service 

failed to achieve its intended function. 

For example, the supplier of a reactor 

vessel would be weighted with greater 

risk than the supplier of the safetyrelated concrete forming the foundation 

of the reactor building. Both goods are 

safety-related, but the malfunction of 

the former presents a greater risk of 

radiological hazard than the latter. 

Further, the Department expects that the 

relative hazard of a good or service may 

be evaluated in terms of whether it is a 

likely contributor to a covered incident 

resulting in a request for contributions 

under the international supplementary 

fund (i.e., is it so hazardous as to likely 

cause a covered incident of a magnitude 

that first-tier compensation is 

inadequate). The Department seeks 

public comment on these issues and as 

to how it should further define the term 

‘‘hazard’’ in light of various factors, such 

as whether hazard should be 

differentiated on the basis of harm to 

persons or property, or on the basis of 

its hazard standing alone or as part of 

a redundant system of protection. 

4. The fourth risk factor to be used as 

a basis for the formula is the hazards 

associated with the covered installation 

outside the United States to which the 

goods and services are supplied. 

934(e)(2)(C)(i)(IV). The Department’s 

current approach would be to interpret 

this risk factor to mean that risk should 

be determined based on the hazard 

associated with the nuclear installation 

itself, because some nuclear 

installations bear more risk or hazard of 

a nuclear incident than others. These 

differences in risk stem from a variety 

of factors. For example, the risk of a 

nuclear incident causing significant 

nuclear damage may be greater at a 

nuclear reactor facility than at a spent 

fuel storage facility, or it may be greater 

for a facility located in a densely 

populated area as opposed to a facility 

in a remote area. Further, there may be 

distinctions within a class of nuclear 

installations that would make the risk 

posed by some classes more or less than 

others. For example, among nuclear 

reactors, research reactors having a 

thermal power rating of 20 Megawatts or 

less may have less hazard associated 

with them than power reactors having a 

thermal power rating of over 300 

Megawatts. Also, nuclear facilities other 

than reactors may be distinguished 

based on common nuclear industry 

standards for hazard categorization and 

accident analysis techniques. Category 1 

facilities pose the most hazardous risk 

as they have postulated accidents that 

could result in significant offsite 

consequences. Category 2 facilities have 

postulated accidents that could result in 

significant on-site consequences. 

Category 3 facilities have postulated 

accidents that could result in only 

localized consequences. Accordingly, 

the risk formula would include 

consideration of not only the type of 

good or service provided by the nuclear 

supplier, but also the type of nuclear 

installation that will utilize such good 

or service. DOE seeks public comment 

on this approach. 

5. The fifth risk factor to be used as 

a basis for the formula is the legal, 

regulatory, and financial infrastructure 

associated with the covered installation 

outside the United States to which the 

goods and services are supplied. 

934(e)(2)(C)(i)(V). The Department’s 

current approach would be to interpret 

this risk factor to refer to the relative 

risk of a nuclear incident arising from a 

nuclear installation based upon the 

legal, regulatory, or financial 

environment in which the installation 

operates. For example, a nuclear 

installation situated in a country with 

little regulatory oversight of public 

health and safety, or inadequate 

financial requirements for the nuclear 

operator, or without the availability of 

judicial recourse, may lead to a relative 

risk factor greater than the supply of 

goods or services to a nuclear 

installation in a country with rigorous 

regulatory oversight, robust financial 

requirements, and an efficient judicial 

system. Thus, for example, the presence 

of independent regulatory inspectors 

onsite at a nuclear installation of a more 

hazardous classification (such as a 

Category 1 facility) could constitute a 

favorable risk factor. The Department 

recognizes that this type of risk factor 

may be difficult to assess in a 

quantitative fashion, nevertheless, the 

statutory language must be given a goodfaith reading, and the Department seeks 

public comment on how to interpret and 

implement this factor in its risk-based 

formula. 

6. The sixth risk factor to be used as 

a basis for the formula concerns the 

hazards associated with particular forms 

of transportation. 934(e)(2)(C)(i)(VI). 

The Department’s current approach 

would be to interpret this risk factor to 

require consideration of how contingent 

costs should be allocated between 

suppliers of goods and services to 


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7Webster’s Third New Dictionary (2002) 

nuclear installations and suppliers of 

transportation services, as well as an 

assessment of the various forms of 

transportation and the relative risks of 

that transportation. The Department 

seeks public comment on the extent, if 

any, to which the assessment of 

transportation services should be 

different than the assessment of other 

goods and services, especially with 

respect to the application of the first risk 

factor on nature and intended purpose. 

The Department also seeks public 

comment on the means to differentiate 

the hazards between particular forms of 

transportation, and the nuclear 

suppliers involved in such 

transportation. For example, how 

should the Department assess the 

relative risks among the various forms of 

radiological transportation such as 

truck, ship or rail and the contribution 

of a nuclear supplier to that risk? 

Should the hazard be assessed solely on 

the safety record within each type of 

transportation, or other factors such as 

the risks associated with the 

transportation routes used for a 

particular form of transportation? For 

example, transportation by truck may 

entail greater potential exposure to 

population centers than transportation 

by ship. 

Further, should certain nuclear 

suppliers be excluded regardless of the 

form of transportation in which the 

good or services is utilized? For 

example, suppliers that provide 

navigational systems might be excluded 

from the formula, as the purpose of the 

navigational system is not specific to 

nuclear transport or any one form of 

transport, and would constitute a 

negligible risk for causing a nuclear 

incident. On the other hand, suppliers 

of transportation casks designed for 

nuclear material would be included and 

risk assessed based on the relative 

contribution of the cask to a nuclear 

incident while in transport. The 

Department seeks public comment on 

these questions or other means to 

differentiate the hazards associated with 

particular forms of transportation as 

well as identifying mitigating factors to 

appropriately rank risk in its formula. 

Subsection 934(e)(2)(ii)(I)(cc) states 

that the Secretary may exclude ‘‘a 

nuclear supplier with a de minimis 

share of the contingent cost.’’ As 

commonly used, the term ‘‘de minimis’’ 

means lacking significance or 

importance, or so minor in importance 

as to be disregarded.7 The Department’s 

current approach would be to interpret 

this ‘‘de minimis’’ criteria to mean that 

nuclear suppliers likely to contribute 

only a small percentage of the overall 

contingent costs should be excluded 

from the formula because they (1) Do 

not contribute in any meaningful 

manner to the risks intended to be 

covered by the Convention, (2) are 

unlikely to be sued in the event of a 

nuclear incident, and (3) are even more 

unlikely to be determined legally liable 

for significant amounts of nuclear 

damages. The Department believes this 

provision is intended to keep the risk 

pooling program from becoming 

unmanageable because of the number of 

potential contributors and to focus 

operation of the program on the major 

beneficiaries of the Convention. The 

Department could incorporate these 

criteria into its regulations by excluding 

those suppliers that would contribute 

less than a specified percentage (e.g., 

.5%) of the contingent costs. 

This approach, however, would result 

in uncertainty as to which suppliers 

would be included in the program prior 

to the actual implementation of the 

formula. Accordingly, the Department is 

considering alternative approaches that 

would implement the ‘‘de minimis’’ 

criteria in a manner that provides 

upfront certainty as to which suppliers 

would be included in the program. For 

example, the Department might exclude 

suppliers on the basis of the dollar value 

of the goods or services (e.g., nuclear 

suppliers that provide less than $50,000 

per year in goods or services may be 

excluded from the formula), the volume 

of goods or services (e.g., nuclear 

suppliers of less than 10 cooling 

pumps), or the percentage of annual 

business attributable to nuclear goods or 

services (e.g., nuclear suppliers for 

which the nuclear equipment or 

services provided per year are less than 

10% of such entities’ overall annual 

sales). The Department seeks comments 

on these alternatives, as well as other 

fair and equitable approaches for 

excluding ‘‘de minimis’’ suppliers. 

Finally, subsection 934(e)(2)(C)(ii)(II) 

permits the Secretary to ‘‘establish the 

period on which the risk assessment is 

based.’’ By so doing, the Department 

could exclude certain nuclear suppliers 

by virtue of the time period established. 

The Department interprets this 

provision to give the Department 

discretion to determine the time period 

to use in the risk-informed formula. 

That time period may be set based on 

several relevant factors, including when 

the majority of domestic nuclear 

suppliers provided supplies in the 

global market and how many of those 

suppliers continue in existence today, 

or based on what suppliers are currently 

in existence for which the goods or 

services they supplied are likely to 

contribute to a future nuclear incident. 

The Department invites comments on 

how and what an appropriate and 

equitable time period should be used in 

order to determine the risk-informed 

formula. 

E. Reporting 

In addition to the information 

obtained through this NOI and the 

subsequent rulemaking process, 

subsection 934(f)(1) expressly 

authorizes the Secretary to collect 

information and data from nuclear 

suppliers ‘‘necessary for developing and 

implementing the formula for 

calculating the deferred payment of a 

nuclear supplier under subsection 

(e)(2).’’ The Department requests 

comment on whether it should include 

in its regulations provision for 

collection of such information and, if so, 

what form of information collection 

requirements should be imposed. For 

example, what type of information and 

data should be collected, at what level 

of specificity, and how often (e.g., onetime or periodic updates)? 

While the Department may require 

that certain information be provided by 

nuclear suppliers and other appropriate 

persons (including insurers) as 

necessary or appropriate to assist in 

formulating and implementing the risk 

formula, the Department is required to 

provide certain information to nuclear 

suppliers and insurers of nuclear 

suppliers. Thus, subsection 934(f)(2) 

directs that the Secretary make available 

to ‘‘nuclear suppliers, and insurers of 

nuclear suppliers, information to 

support the voluntary establishment and 

maintenance of private insurance 

against any risk for which nuclear 

suppliers may be required to pay 

deferred payments under this section.’’ 

Such information would facilitate the 

creation of a voluntary private insurance 

system to cover potential payments by 

nuclear suppliers under the 

retrospective risk pooling program. The 

Department anticipates its regulations 

will include a provision to address this 

requirement; however, the Department 

requests comment on what type of 

information would be necessary to assist 

the nuclear suppliers and insurers of 

nuclear suppliers in the establishment 

of private insurance for the deferred 

payment. The Department is especially 

interested in obtaining specific and 

detailed comments on the type of 

information necessary to develop and 

implement such a private insurance 

system from nuclear suppliers and 

insurers of nuclear suppliers as such 

commentary would be most relevant to 

an appropriate formulation and 

implementation of this requirement. In 


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this regard, the Department is especially 

interested in descriptions of prior and 

existing insurance systems that allocate 

risks among nuclear suppliers, as well 

as systems that allocate risks among 

participants in comparable situations. 

F. Payments to and by the United States 

Subsection 934(h) sets forth the 

procedure for the Secretary and nuclear 

suppliers to follow in the event of a call 

for funds under the Convention so that 

the deferred payments are made to the 

Treasury of the United States and 

conveyed from the Treasury to the 

appropriate entity in fulfillment of the 

obligation of the United States to 

contribute to the international 

supplementary fund. Subsection 

934(h)(1) prescribes the method by 

which the Secretary will collect the 

deferred payment from nuclear 

suppliers in the event the United States 

is called upon under Article VII to 

contribute to the international 

supplementary fund for a covered 

incident that is not a Price-Anderson 

incident. The nuclear suppliers are only 

required to make a deferred payment 

when and if the United States is 

required to make a payment under the 

Convention upon the occurrence of a 

covered incident. When notified by the 

Secretary of the amount of the deferred 

payment that is due, each nuclear 

supplier must either deposit the 

required payment into the general fund 

of the Treasury within 60 days after 

receipt of notification (subsection 

934(h)(1)(B)(i)), or elect to prorate 

payment in that amount in 5 equal 

annual payments (including interest on 

the unpaid balance at the prime rate 

prevailing at the time the first payment 

is due) (subsection 934(h)(1)(B)(ii)). In 

making the payment, each nuclear 

supplier must submit a payment 

certification voucher to the Secretary of 

the Treasury in accordance with 31 

U.S.C. 3325. 934(h)(1)(C). 

The Department believes the statutory 

scheme for making the deferred 

payment is clear and in effect selfexecuting. Therefore, it does not 

anticipate significant commentary on 

the meaning or interpretation of this 

statutory provision. The Department’s 

implementing regulations will specify 

when and how a nuclear supplier will 

make the lump-sum deferred payment, 

as well as the method of calculating and 

depositing the prorated annual 

payments with interest. The Department 

requests comments on how its 

regulations may provide clear direction 

to nuclear suppliers on how, when, and 

where to make the required deferred 

payments. 

Subsection 934(h)(3) addresses the 

consequences of a nuclear supplier’s 

failure to pay the deferred payment. In 

the event a nuclear supplier defaults on 

its obligation to make the required 

deferred payment, subsection 934(h)(3) 

authorizes the Secretary to take 

appropriate action to recover from the 

nuclear supplier ‘‘(A) the amount of the 

payment due from the nuclear supplier; 

(B) any applicable interest on the 

payment; and (C) a penalty of not more 

than twice the amount of the deferred 

payment due from the nuclear supplier.’’ 

The Department is authorized to take 

appropriate action to ensure each 

nuclear supplier makes the deferred 

payment and to impose a penalty for 

noncompliance; however, the means by 

which the Department exercises this 

authority is not prescribed in the Act. 

The Department’s implementing 

regulations will clarify what actions it 

deems appropriate to take to ensure the 

payment is made, how it will calculate 

the interest due on the payment, and the 

method and criteria for determining the 

penalty amount. The Department 

solicits comment from the public on 

how this statutory provision should be 

implemented and, in particular, what 

criteria may be appropriate for 

calculating the penalty amount. 

G. General Questions 

In addition to comment on the 

particular matters discussed in the 

preceding paragraphs, DOE solicits 

general comments on how best to 

implement section 934, including 

comments that are based on existing 

systems or prior experience in regard to 

insurance programs, regulatory controls, 

reporting requirements, or other 

mechanisms pertaining to the supply of 

goods and services for nuclear projects. 

For example, DOE would be interested 

in whether there are any existing 

systems that control or collect 

information on the export of goods and 

services for nuclear projects that could 

be useful in implementing section 934. 

Likewise, DOE would be interested in 

prior experience with how risk is 

allocated when there are multiple 

participants in a nuclear project. 

III. Public Participation 

A. Submission of Comments 

The Department requests written 

comments from interested persons on 

all aspects of implementing the 

Convention on Supplementary 

Compensation for Nuclear Damage. All 

information provided by commenters 

will be available for public inspection at 

the Department of Energy, Freedom of 

Information Reading Room, Room 1G– 

033, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20585 between the 

hours of 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. Monday 

through Friday, except for Federal 

holidays. 

The Department also intends to enter 

all written comments on a Web site 

specifically established for this 

proceeding. The Internet Web site is: 

http://gc.doe.gov/. To assist the 

Department in making public comments 

available on a Web site, interested 

persons are encouraged to submit an 

electronic version of their written 

comments in accordance with the 

instructions in the ADDRESSES section of 

this notice. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on July 21, 

2010. 

Scott Blake Harris, 

General Counsel. 

Appendix—Overview of Section 934 

The Energy Independence and Security Act 

of 2007, Section 934 

The Energy Independence and Security Act 

of 2007 (Pub. L. 110–140) was enacted in 

2007. Section 934 of the Act (‘‘Convention on 

Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 

Damage Contingent Cost Allocation’’) (42 

U.S.C. 17373) implements the Convention in 

the United States. Congress found that the 

Convention establishes a global system to: 

provide a predictable legal framework 

necessary for nuclear energy projects; ensure 

prompt and equitable compensation in the 

event of a nuclear incident; provide benefits 

to United States nuclear suppliers from a 

predictable liability regime and, in effect, 

insurance for nuclear damage arising from 

incidents not covered by the Price-Anderson 

Act (PAA); and assure funding is available 

for victims of a wider variety of nuclear 

incidents, without increasing potential 

liability of United States nuclear suppliers or 

costs to United States nuclear operators or 

Federal taxpayers. 934(a)(1). 

Section 934 implements the Convention by 

enacting into law provisions that enable the 

United States to carry out its obligations as 

a Contracting Party. Specifically, section 934 

provides for the allocation of costs associated 

with the United States’ participation in the 

Convention’s compensation system and 

affirms the right to seek relief in United 

States courts for covered nuclear incidents. 

The purpose of section 934 is to ensure that 

the allocation of costs is fair and equitable 

and does not burden Federal taxpayers with 

liability risks for nuclear incidents at foreign 

installations or adversely impact obligations 

under the existing system of indemnification 

under the PAA for nuclear incidents in the 

United States. 

The Secretary and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission are both authorized to issue 

rules to implement section 934, as 

appropriate. 934(l). The Department’s 

implementing regulations will be focused on 

allocating contingent costs equitably, on the 

basis of risk, among nuclear suppliers for a 

covered incident outside the United States 

that is not a Price-Anderson incident. This 


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43954 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 27, 2010 / Notices 

8The following illustrates the combined 

operation of the Convention, the PAA, and section 

934 in the case of a Price-Anderson incident. For 

this example, assume: (1) The limitation on public 

liability under the PAA is $10 billion8; (2) there are 

100 reactors covered by the PAA system; (3) the 

operator of each reactor must contribute a 

maximum of $100 million to the PAA system if 

legal liability reaches $10 billion dollars; (4) 1 SDR 

equals $1.50 dollars; (5) the United States 

contribution to the international supplementary 

fund is $100 million dollars; (6) the payment to the 

United States from the international supplementary 

fund is $300 million; and (7) there is an a nuclear 

incident at a domestic reactor resulting in damage 

that exceeds $10 billion dollars. Within these 

parameters, the PAA would use funds from 

operators to indemnify legal liability resulting from 

the nuclear incident until legal liability reached 

$450 million dollars (Article III. 1(a)(i) first tier 

compensation minimum of 300 million SDRs 

multiplied by $1.50 dollars). At this point, the 

United States would use the next $100 million 

dollars from operators under the PAA to cover the 

United States contribution to the international 

supplementary fund. At the same time the United 

States would receive a payment of $300 million 

dollars from the international supplementary fund. 

This payment from the international supplementary 

fund would be used to indemnify legal liability 

between $450 million dollars and $750 million 

dollars. In addition, the limitations on the PAA 

public liability would be increased by the net $200 

million dollars from Contracting Parties other than 

the United States ($300 million from the 

international supplementary fund minus the $100 

million dollars provided by the United States to 

that fund). When legal liability reached $750 

million dollars, operators would resume making 

funds available through the PAA system to cover 

legal liability and continue to do so until such 

liability reached the $10.2 billion dollar limit. In 

this scenario, the additional $200 million dollars 

from the international supplementary fund is 

available to indemnify legal liability resulting from 

cost allocation system will be structured 

consistent with provisions of the Act that 

mandate the use of existing PAA funding for 

a Price-Anderson incident. 

For an incident covered by the Convention 

(‘‘covered incident’’) that is also covered by 

the PAA (‘‘Price-Anderson incident’’), the Act 

would use existing PAA funding mechanisms 

to cover the United States contribution to the 

international supplementary fund. 934(b) and 

(c). For a covered incident outside the United 

States that is not a Price-Anderson incident, 

the Act would allocate contingent costs owed 

by the United States among United States 

nuclear suppliers on the basis of risk. 

934(a)(2). In this regard, the Act establishes 

a retrospective risk pooling program 

involving a premium assessed retrospectively 

(i.e., a deferred payment) on nuclear 

suppliers based on a risk-informed formula 

taking into account specified risk factors in 

conjunction with exclusionary criteria. 

934(e). 

In developing the formula, the Secretary is 

authorized to collect information necessary 

for calculating the deferred payment. Each 

nuclear supplier and other-appropriate 

persons are required to make available 

information, reports, records, documents, 

and other data that the Secretary determines, 

by regulation, to be necessary or appropriate. 

934(f)(1). In turn, the Secretary must make 

available to nuclear suppliers and their 

insurers information to support the voluntary 

establishment and maintenance of private 

insurance to cover any deferred payments 

nuclear suppliers may be subject to pay 

under the retrospective risk pooling program. 

934(f)(2). 

When the United States is called upon to 

contribute, the Secretary must notify the 

nuclear suppliers of the amount of their 

deferred payment. The nuclear suppliers may 

either: (1) Pay within 60 days of notification 

to the general fund of the Treasury; or (2) 

elect to prorate payment in five equal annual 

payments (including interest). 934(h)(1). 

Amounts paid must be available, without 

further appropriation or fiscal year 

limitation, for contribution by the Secretary 

of the Treasury to the international 

supplementary fund. 934(h)(2)(A). Such 

contribution will be to the court of competent 

jurisdiction under Article XIII of the 

Convention. 934(h)(2)(B). If a nuclear 

supplier fails to pay, the Secretary of Energy 

may take appropriate action to recover the 

amount due with any applicable interest and 

penalty. 934(h)(3). 

Section 934(i) addresses where and what 

type of actions may be brought in United 

States courts arising from participation in the 

Convention. All causes of action arising from 

a nuclear incident that is not a PriceAnderson incident and for which the United 

States has been granted jurisdiction under 

the Convention will be adjudicated on appeal 

or review in the United States Court of 

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 

934(i)(1)(A). In addition to any existing cause 

of action, section 934(i)(2)(A) creates a 

Federal cause of action for an individual or 

entity against an operator to recover for 

nuclear damage suffered in connection with 

a nuclear incident covered by the 

Convention. This provision ensures that a 

cause of action will be available in all 

situations where United States courts have 

jurisdiction over a nuclear incident covered 

by the Convention, such as a nuclear incident 

during transportation beyond State 

boundaries in the territorial sea, or the 

exclusive economic zone (EEZ), or the high 

seas, for which Federal or State law may not 

currently provide a cause of action. This 

provision does not apply to causes of action 

arising from a nuclear incident covered by 

the Convention that is a Price-Anderson 

incident, as the PAA already provides for a 

cause of action and assignment of 

jurisdiction in such cases. While subsection 

934(i) creates a cause of action for 

individuals or entities suffering nuclear 

damage against an operator of a covered 

installation under certain circumstances, 

subsection 934(j) makes clear that the Act 

does not provide to the operator of a covered 

installation a right of recourse against a 

nuclear supplier or any other person for any 

liability it may incur as a result of the nuclear 

incident. Also, participation in the 

Convention does not require disclosure of 

sensitive United States information. 934(k). 

The following provides additional 

information regarding the allocation of 

contingent costs under section 934 between 

the PAA and nuclear suppliers. 

Costs Allocated to PAA. One of the 

purposes of the statute, to ensure that 

contingent costs associated with a PriceAnderson incident are paid with PAA funds, 

is met primarily through the requirements of 

subsections 934(c) (‘‘Use of Price-Anderson 

Funds’’) and (d) (‘‘Effect on Amount of Public 

Liability’’). These provisions are selfimplementing and establish how funding 

under the PAA is to be used to cover 

contingent costs resulting from a PriceAnderson incident. As defined in subsection 

934(b)(8), a Price-Anderson incident is a 

covered incident within the scope of the PAA 

for which PAA funding would be available 

to compensate for ‘‘public liability’’ defined 

in section 11w. of the AEA (42 U.S.C. 

2014w.). Under subsection 934(b)(2), 

contingent costs represent the funds that the 

United States is obligated to make available 

to the international supplementary fund. 

Subsection 934(c)(1) states the requirement 

that PAA funds be used to cover contingent 

costs resulting from any Price-Anderson 

incident. Subsection 934(c)(2) directs that 

any PAA funds used to pay contingent costs 

shall not reduce the public liability 

limitation set by the PAA. These funding 

requirements serve to maintain the status quo 

of the PAA liability regime such that 

payment of contingent costs neither increases 

the burden on reactor operators nor decreases 

the benefits of the PAA since any contingent 

costs resulting from the United States 

contribution would come from funding 

otherwise required under the PAA. Using 

PAA funds to pay the contingent costs will 

not decrease funds available under the PAA 

because the contribution by the United States 

to the international supplementary fund and 

the distribution from the international 

supplementary fund of a corresponding 

amount will offset each other and result in 

a wash for accounting purposes. As described 

in the following paragraph, the remaining 

distribution amount will be used to 

compensate damage in lieu of using PAA 

funds. Thus, the benefits of the PAA 

indemnification system will be increased 

slightly with no additional burden imposed 

on reactor operators. 

Subsection 934(d) addresses the situation 

involving a Price-Anderson incident, where 

funds are made available to the United States 

under Article VII of the Convention and sets 

out the effect thereof on the amount of public 

liability allowable under the PAA. 

Subsection 934(d)(1) provides that, for an 

incident covered by the PAA, funds made 

available to the United States from the 

international supplementary fund will be 

used to pay persons indemnified under the 

PAA. In addition, subsection 934(d)(2) 

provides that the PAA limitation on public 

liability will be increased by the net amount 

of funds that the United States receives from 

the international supplementary fund (i.e., 

the increase is equal to the difference 

between the amount the United States 

receives from the international 

supplementary fund and the amount which 

it contributed to the international 

supplementary fund). Thus, the United States 

must use any funds made available to it 

under the Convention to satisfy any public 

liability resulting from a Price-Anderson 

incident and will increase the amount 

payable under the PAA based upon the net 

increased amount of funding available 

pursuant to the Convention.8


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 143 / Tuesday, July 27, 2010 / Notices 43955 

a nuclear incident covered by the PAA, at no 

additional cost to reactor operators. (The numbers 

used in this example were selected to facilitate 

understanding of how the mechanism operates, and 

do not reflect the actual numbers that would result 

from application of the PAA.) 

Costs Allocated to Nuclear Suppliers. 

Another purpose of the statute, to ensure that 

nuclear suppliers pay the contingent costs for 

a covered incident outside the United States 

that is not a Price-Anderson incident, is met 

primarily by subsections 934(e) 

(‘‘Retrospective Risk Pooling Program’’) and 

(f) (‘‘Reporting’’). These provisions: (1) 

Require participation in a retrospective risk 

pooling program to cover contingent costs for 

which nuclear suppliers would be 

responsible; and (2) authorize the Secretary 

to collect information necessary for 

developing and implementing the formula to 

calculate the deferred payments. For such an 

incident outside the United States, 

subsection 934(e) requires that nuclear 

suppliers that supply certain nuclear 

equipment and technology and transport of 

nuclear materials contribute to a pool of 

money used to reimburse the United States 

for its contribution to the international 

supplementary fund. In an arrangement 

known as retrospective pooling, the 

obligation to pay into the pool will be 

deferred until the United States’ is called 

upon to contribute with respect to an actual 

nuclear incident that has occurred. Article 

VII.1; 934(e)(1). 

The following illustrates the combined 

operation of the Convention and section 934 

in the case of a covered incident that is not 

a Price-Anderson incident. For a covered 

incident that takes place in the territory of 

another Contracting Party, the responsible 

operator (alone or in combination with 

available public funds) would provide the 

first tier of compensation pursuant to the 

national law of the Installation State. If 

nuclear damage exceeds the first tier, all 

Contracting Parties, including the Installation 

State, would contribute to the international 

supplementary fund according to the Article 

IV formula. 

As a Contracting Party, the United States 

would contribute an amount determined by 

application of the formula in Article IV. 

Under section 934, the amount of the 

contribution required of the United States 

would be funded through payments of 

United States nuclear suppliers under the 

retrospective risk pooling program. As 

previously noted, the formula depends upon 

the installed capacity of the Contracting 

Parties at the time of the incident and the UN 

assessment rate assigned to each State. The 

exact amount owed by the United States 

would depend upon the number and 

generating capacity of the States that 

participate in the Convention at the time of 

a nuclear incident. For additional 

information, the IAEA Web site for the Office 

of Legal Affairs contains a calculator that can 

be used to run scenarios and estimate the 

contribution amount from various States. 

(http://ola.iaea.org/CSCND/calculate.asp). 

[FR Doc. 2010–18357 Filed 7–26–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Energy Information Administration 

Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Submission for OMB 

Review; Comment Request 

AGENCY: U.S. Energy Information 

Administration (EIA), Department of 

Energy (DOE). 

ACTION: Agency Information Collection 

Activities: Submission For OMB 

Review; Comment Request. 

SUMMARY: The EIA has submitted the 

‘‘Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse 

Gases,’’ form EIA–1605 to the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) for 

review and a three-year extension under 

section 3507(h)(1) of the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104– 

13)(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). 

DATES: Comments must be filed by 

August 26, 2010. If you anticipate that 

you will be submitting comments but 

find it difficult to do so within that 

period, you should contact the OMB 

Desk Officer for DOE listed below as 

soon as possible. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments to OMB 

Desk Officer for DOE, Office of 

Information and Regulatory Affairs, 

Office of Management and Budget. To 

ensure receipt of the comments by the 

due date, submission by FAX (202–395– 

7285) or e-mail to 

Christine_J._Kymn@omb.eop.gov. is 

recommended. The mailing address is 

725 17th St., NW., Washington, DC, 

20503. The OMB Desk Officer may be 

telephoned at (202) 395–4638. (A copy 

of your comments should also be 

provided to EIA’s Statistics and 

Methods Group at the address below.) 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Requests for additional information 

should be directed to Alethea Jennings. 

To ensure receipt of the comments by 

the due date, submission by FAX (202– 

586–5271) or e-mail 

(alethea.jennings@eia.doe.gov) is also 

recommended. The mailing address is 

Statistics and Methods Group (EI–70), 

Forrestal Building, U.S. Department of 

Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW., 

Washington, DC, 20585–0670. Ms. 

Jennings may be contacted by telephone 

at (202) 586–5879. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 

section contains the following 

information about the energy 

information collection submitted to 

OMB for review: (1) The collection 

numbers and title; (2) the sponsor (i.e., 

the Department of Energy component); 

(3) the current OMB docket number (if 

applicable); (4) the type of request (i.e., 

new, revision, extension or 

reinstatement); (5) response obligation 

(i.e., mandatory, voluntary, or required 

to obtain or retain benefits); (6) a 

description of the need for and 

proposed use of the information; (7) a 

categorical description of the likely 

respondents; (8) estimate number of 

respondents and (9) an estimate of the 

total annual reporting burden (i.e., the 

estimated number of likely respondents 

times the proposed frequency of 

response per year times the average 

hours per response). 

1. Forms EIA–1605, ‘‘Voluntary 

Reporting of Greenhouse Gases’’. 

2. Energy Information Administration. 

3. OMB Number 1905–0194. 

4. Three-year extension to an existing 

approved request. 

5. Voluntary. 

6. EIA–1605 form is designed to 

collect voluntarily reported data on 

greenhouse gas emissions, achieved 

reductions of these emissions, and 

carbon fixation. Data are used to 

establish a publicly available database. 

Respondents are participants in a 

domestic or foreign activity that either 

reduces greenhouse gas emissions or 

increases sequestration. 

7. Individuals or households; business 

or other for-profit institutions; farms; 

Federal government; State, local or 

tribal government. 

8. Estimate number of respondents. 

9. 6000 hours. 

Please refer to the supporting 

statement as well as the proposed forms 

and instructions for more information 

about the purpose, who must report, 

when to report, where to submit, the 

elements to be reported, detailed 

instructions, provisions for 

confidentiality, and uses (including 

possible nonstatistical uses) of the 

information. For instructions on 

obtaining materials, see the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section. 

Statutory Authority: Section 13(b) of the 

Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 

Public Law 93–275, codified at 15 U.S.C. 

772(b). 

Issued in Washington, D.C., July 20, 2010. 

Stephanie Brown, 

Director, Statistics and Methods Group, 

Energy Information Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2010–18353 Filed 7–26–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 


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