### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 21, 200 4 S es sio n

ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v

. RON ALD EU GEN E HA LL and HEN RY LEE DIX ON

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2001-D- 1974 WalterKurt z, Judge

No. M2003- 02326-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 8, 2005

De fe nd a n t s R o n a l d E u g e n e H a l l a n d H e n r y L e e D i xo n w e r e e a c h i n d i c t e d o n o n e c o u n t o f fi rs t deg ree felony

murder, one count of fir st deg ree preme ditated mu rd er an d one count of attempted espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry . Following a j u ry t ri al, Defenda nt Hall was c onvicted of the lesser included off

ense of second de g ree murder on c ounts one and two a nd was found not g uiltyon count three , attempted espe cially ag g ravated robbe ry . The trial court merg ed Defenda nt Hall’s conviction of second deg ree murder in count two with his second deg ree murder c onviction in count one and
sentenc ed him to twenty

y ear s. Def

endant Dix on was found not g uilty in counts two and thre e and convicted in c ount one of the lesser included offe nse of fac ilitation of second deg ree murder. T he trial court se ntence d Def

endant Dixon to ni n e y ea rs in the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ection. Def endant Ha ll a

r g u e s o n ap p e a l th a t ( 1 ) th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in it s in s tr u c ti o n to th e ju r y o n the definition of re asonable doubt; (2) the trial court err ed in providing the j ury with an instruction on the introduction of fing erprint e vidence ; (3) the tria l court er red in a dmitti ng cer

tain photogr aphs during Offic er G eorg e B outon’s testimony ; and (4) the t rial court err ed in fa iling to instruct the jury as to fac ilitation as a lesser include d offe nse of the indicte d offe nses. Def endant Dixon challeng es t h e s u ff i ci en cyo f t h e c o n v i ct i n g ev i d en ce an d ar gu es t h at t h e t ri al co u rt erre d i n n o tad m i t t i n g a

v i d e o a n i m a t i o n p o r tr a yi n g t h e s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s d e s c r i b e d d u r i n g D e f e n d a n t D i x o n ’ s t e s t i m o n y. De fe nd a nt D ixon a lso arg ue s th a t hi s se nte nc e is e xce ssi ve . D e fe nd a nt H a ll d id n ot a pp e a l th e le ng th of his sentenc e. Af

ter a thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d and the pa rties’ b riefs, w e af

firm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H A Y ES and J ERRY L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.

Pa ul J. B ru no , N a sh vil le, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Ron a ld E ug e ne Ha ll; Cy nth ia M. F ort, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e (o n ap pe a l) ; and Gl e nn F un k, Na sh vil le , Te nn e sse e (at tria l) , f or the app e lla nt, Henry L ee D ix on.-2-

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th T

. Ry a n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. (Torry ) Johns on I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Br et Gunn, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I. Bac kgr ound

Marc us Scott was the victim of a homicide in this case

. Samuel Scott, J r., said that he knew his son, Marc us Scott, was dating L inda P rovost. Howeve r, Samuel Scott, J r. had not met the y oung woman. Mr. Scott said his son left their apartment a fter he rec eived a telephone c all around 10:18 p.m. on J uly

20, 2001. Approxim ately five minutes later , Mr. Scott hear d four suc cessive shots. Mr. Scott said that his son di d not own a g un.
Shaquita Br ooks said that she had se en Mar cus Scott a couple of times with Ms. Provost and kn e w the c ou ple was da tin g . M s. Pr ov os t to ld h e r that Mr . Sc ott ha d h it h e r d uring on e of the ir dates. Ms. B rooks was a war e that De fenda nt Hall had pre viouslydated Ms. Provost, but she had

ne ve r m e t hi m.

M s

. Br o o k s s ai d that Ms. Provost picked her up a round 8:30 p.m. on J uly

20, and the two women drove to Percy Priest L ake to se e one of Ms. Provost’s friends. While the women we re at the la ke , D e f

e n d a n t H a l l c a l l e d M s

. P r o v o s t a n d a s k e d i f h e c o u l d s e e h e r

. M s

. P r o v o s t a n d M s. B ro ok s th e n d ro ve to the Kr og e r p arking lot on Ga llatin Roa d to me e t D e fe nd a nt H a ll.

After they arri v ed at the parking lot, Ms. P rovost g ot out of the ca r and hug g ed De fenda nt Ha ll. Ms. Pr ov os t a ndDe fe nd a nt H a ll then beg a n d isc us sin g ho w t o lu re Mr . Sc ott ou t of his apartment. Both ag ree d that Ms. Provost would call Mr. Scott a nd ask him to meet her at her car

. Ms. Pr ov os t w a nte d D e fe nd a nt H a ll to ac c os t Mr. Sc ott be fo re he g ot i nto he r c ar. De fe nd a nt H a ll wanted to wa i t u n t i l M r. S co t t was inside the c ar a nd then dra g him back out of the c ar onto the sidewalk. Ms. Br ooks said that she did not know what De fenda nt Hall intended to do af ter he

c on fr on te d M r. Sc ott

.

Def endant Ha ll used Ms. Provost’s cell phone, and Ms. Brooks he ard D efe ndant Hall say that Ms. Pr o v o s t d i d n ot want to g o throug h with “their” plan. Def endant Dixon then walked up a nd joi ne d Ms. Pr ov os t’ s a nd De fe nd a nt Ha ll’ s dis c us sio n abo ut the be st way to c on fr on t the vic tim . M s. Provost told t he men to g et in her car so she could show them the bushes behind Kr og er w here they could hide bef

ore g rab b i n g Mr. Scott. Ms. Brooks said that Mr. Scott’s a partment building was

acr oss the street f

rom the bushy

are a. De fenda nt Hall and De fenda nt Dix on g ot out of Ms. Provost’s

c ar i n f ro nt o f M r. Sc ott ’s apa

rt me nt b uil din g a nd sa id the y wo uld c a ll Ms. Pr ov os t in te n mi nu te s.

Af te r a fe w min ute s, De fe nd a nt H a ll a ndDe fe nd a nt D ixon w a lke d b a c k to the pa rking lot

. De fe nd a nt D ixon t oldMs. Pr ov os t th a t he r p la n w ou ld n ot w or k be c a us e the re we re too ma ny pe op le-3-

about. Def

endant Dixon said he and De fenda nt Hall would prete nd to steal M s

. P ro v o s t ’s purse. De fend ant Di x on tol d M s. Pr ov os t th a t th e re we re no t a ny bu lle ts i n “ the g un .” De fe nd a nt H a ll asked Ms. Provost if Mr. Scott ha d any money , and Ms. Provost said that the victim alway s car ried cash w ith him. I n order

to scare Ms. Provost int o abandoning the plan, Ms. B rooks warned the g roup that the victim might be a rmed. Ms. B rooks said that either Def endant Ha ll o r De fendant Dix on

re pli e d th a t th e vic tim

wou ld no t ha ve tim e to u se a g un be c a us e the y

“ wo uldbe on him .” Ms. Br ooks said that Def

endant Dix on was the f

irst one to mention that he and De fenda nt Hall had a g un. On cr oss-examination, Ms. Brooks said that De fenda nt Dix on was not armed.

Ms. Brooks arg ued with Ms. Provost and got i n Def endant Dix on’s ca

r. She and the two men drove to the vic tim’s apartment building . Th e m en go t o u t , and Ms. B rooks drove Def endant Dix on’s ca

r bac k to the Krog er parking lot. Shortly there afte r, Mr. Dixon came running up to the

car , nervous a nd upset. M s

. Br o o k s then hea rd about thre e g unshots. Mr. Dix on told her that he thought “he shot him.” A few seconds later, Defenda nt Hall got in the car, and said that “he didn’t have a ny money on him.” The trio lef t the parking lot. Defe ndant Dixon l et Ms. Br ooks out at the H. G. Hi ll’ s stor e a c ro ss the str e e t, a ndthe tw o me n d ro ve a way . M s. B ro ok s trie d to te le ph on e Ms. Provost once, but did not rea ch her

.

Ms. B ro ok s w a s late r r e c a lle d a s a wi tne ss b y

the de fe ns e a nda dmi tte d th a t sh e ha d n ot t old
t h e p o l i ce t h at De fe n d an tHa l l s ai d an y t h i n g wh en h e r et u rn ed t o t h e c araf t erth e s h o o t i n g.
Cy nthia Human lived behind Kr og er. O n the eve ning of J uly 20, she hea

rd three or four g unshots. Ms. Human looked out the window and saw the rea r end of an automobile in the Kr og er parking lot. The ca

r drove awa y

two or three minutes after the g unshots. Ms. Human did not see any one either

outside or inside the ca

r.

Of fi c e r G ary

Pot e e t a rrive d a t the sc e ne a t 10 :30 p. m. Ms. Pr ov os t w a s lying in the str e e t, wounded. Ma

rcus Scott, who had a lso been shot, was in the front passeng er seat of a g ree n vehicle. The seat was in a reclined posit ion. Offic er Pot eet said that Ms. Provost tol d him that she did not know who shot her be cause the shooter wor e a ski mask.

Offic er Johnny

L awr ence retrie ved two proje ctiles from the se at in which Mr. Scott had be en sit tin g a ndtw o p ro

je c til e fr a g me nts fr om the drive r’ s se a t. O ff ic e r L a wr e nc e didno t f

ind a ny sh e ll

c a sin g s a t th e sc e ne . Of

fi c e r D a nie l O rr

e xami ne d th e ve hic le a t th e po lic e statio n a ndfo un d a sh e ll

c a sin g in the re ar f

loo r b oa rdbe hin d th e pa sse ng e r s e a t. O ff ice r L orita

Ma rs h matc he d b oth Def endants’ f inge rprints with fing erprints found on the car ’s frame and on items in the ca r.

Offic er G eorg e B outon photogr aphed the scene . He inserted wooden r ods throug h the holes made by the bullets in the passeng er se at’s upholstery to illus trate the bullet s ’ p at h and then ph oto g ra ph e d th e ro ds

.

Dr

. T h o mas Dee ring , an assistant medica l examiner for Da vidson County , perf ormed Mr. Sc ott ’s a uto ps y . D r. De e ri ng sa id that e ith e r thr e e or fo ur bu lle ts e nte re d M r. Sc ott ’s bo dy . T he pa th-4-

of two of the bullets struck major org ans and wer e fatal injuries. On cross-examination, Dr. Dee ring said that Mr. S cott also had a small lace ration over his left ey e that wa s consistent with being struck with a fist.

L ind a Pr ov os t te sti fi e d th a t sh e me t Mr . Sc ott in McM in nvill e , T e nn e sse e abo ut a mon th be fo re the inc ide nt. Ar ou nd July 16 , 200 1, sh e a c c omp a nie d Mr. Sc ott to h is m ote l r oo m be c a us e he told her the re w as g oing to be a party

. No one else was in the room, and Ms. Provost attempted to l e a ve . D ur ing a

str ug g le , M r. Sc ott

str uc k M s. Pr ov os t in the fa c e wi th h is f ist

.

Ms. Prov o st had dated D efe ndant Hall whe n they wer e in hig h school. Shortly befor e the shooting, De fenda nt Hall beg an ca lling Ms. Provost ag ain i n an attempt to resume their re lationship. De fe nd a nt Ha ll c a lle d M s. Pr ov os t on the nig ht o f h e r a lte rc a tio n w ith Mr . Sc ott , a ndMs. Pr ov os t tol d D e fe nd a nt H a ll a

bo ut the inc ide nt b e c a us e sh e wa s up se t. Ms. Pr ov os t sa id D e fe nd a nt H a ll s a id that he would “ta

ke ca re of it.”

Ms. Pr ov os t sa id tha t she arr a ng e d to mee t De fe nd a nt H a ll at th e Kr og e r p arking lot on July 20. When she arrived, Def endant Ha ll told her that “he ha d it planned out.” Ms. Provost said that sh e was su pp os e d to pa

rk in f ro nt o f the vic tim ’s apa

rt me nt b uil din g , c a ll the vic tim on he r c e ll ph on e , a nda sk

him to c ome ou t a ndse e he r. On c e the vic tim wa s in the c ar, De fe nd a nt H a ll s a id he a nd De fe nd a nt D ixon w ou ld s ta g e a ro bb e ry a nddr a g Mr . Sc ott

ou t of the c ar. Ms. Pr ov os t sa id that neither D efe ndant Dixon nor Defendant Hall told her what they planned to do when they g ot the victim out of the car , but she assumed they wer e g oing to be at up Mr. Scott. Ms. Provost said that the re wa s n e ve r any

me nti on of

sh oo tin g or

ro bb ing th e vi cti m, othe r tha n a sta g e d r ob be ry . M s. Pr ov os t sa id tha t sh e me t D e fe nd a nt D ixon f or the fi rs t ti me that ni g ht.

Ms. Pr ov os t sa id tha t sh e dr ov e to the vic tim ’s apa rt me nt b uil din g a s pla nn e d, a nd Mr . Sc ott

came out to her car. He got in the passenge r seat, and Ms. Provost heard a noise outside the open pa sse ng e r s ide wi nd ow . M s. Pr ov os t sa id s he wa s sh ot andthe n h eard tw o mo re g un sh ots . M s. Provost sa w Def

endant Hall fire the shots. She g ot out of her car and saw Def

endant Ha ll run toward the Krog er pa

rking lot. Ms. P rovost called 911 w ith her ce ll phone.

On c ro ss- e xami na tio n, Ms. Pr ov os t sai d tha t De fe nd a nt Dixon wa s n ot w ith De fe nd a nt H a ll when the shooting occur

red. She admitted she l ied t o the pol ice when she told them the shooter w ore a ski mask.

Th e Sta te int

ro du c e d th e ph on e log s Ms. Pr ov os t’ s c e ll ph on e re fl e c tin g the te le ph on e c a lls that w e re ma de on the nig ht o f the sh oo tin g . A t 9: 32 p. m., Ms. Pr ov os t’ s cel l ph on e wa s u se d to place a ca ll to Mr. Scott. A second phone c all to the victim was made at 10:18 p.m. A 911 call was

ma de fr om M s. Pr ov os t’ s c e ll p ho ne a t 10 :24 p. m.

Def endant Dixon testified t hat Defenda nt Hall came by his apartment a round 8:14 p.m. on J uly 20. Def endant Ha ll asked him to go w ith him and meet Ms. Provost and her f riend. De fenda nt Di xon s a id tha t hi s d a te fo r the e ve nin g wa s d ela y e d s o h e a g re e d to a c c omp a ny De fe nd a nt H a ll.-5-

When they

arrived at the Krog er parking lot, De fenda nt D ix on let Def endant Ha ll out of the car

and found a pa

rking place . He sa id that he and Ms. B rooks chatted, and he did not hear what De fenda nt Ha ll a nd Ms. Pr ov os t we re ta lki ng abo ut. De fe nd a nt Ha ll c a lle d him on his c e ll p ho ne a ndtol d h im about the alterc ation betwee n Ms. Provost and the victim. Def endant Hall asked him to come ove r to Ms. Provost’s car so they could discuss a plan of action. Def endant Dix on said that neither he nor Ms. B ro ok s w a nte d to g e t in vo lve d, a ndDe fe nd a nt D ixon ke pt tr y ing to le a ve . D e fe nd a nt H a ll t old him to wait until he ca lmed down Ms. Provost. Defe ndant Dixon s aid that he wa lked over to the bushes at the ba ck of the Krog er pa rking lot in order to re lieve himself.

Ms. Provost drove out of the par king lot, and D efe ndant Hall told Def endant Dixon he was g oing w ith her. De fenda nt D ix on said he wa lked bac k to his car a nd was starting to lea ve whe n he he ardg un sh ots . D e fe nd a nt D ixon p ull e d h is c ar o ut o f t he park in g lot a ndsa w D e fe nd a nt H a ll. De fe nd a nt H a ll j ump e d in to h is c ar, a nd De fe nd a nt D ixon s a id h e le t bo th D e fe nd a nt H a ll a ndMs. Br ooks out at th e H. G. Hill’s acr oss the street. De fenda nt Dix on said that he drove away at that po int . D e fe nd a nt D ixon d e nie d th a t he he lpe d p la n e ith e r an a ssa ult or a ro bb e ry on the vic tim

.

On cr oss-examination, Defendant Dix on admitted that his testimonyin court wa s differ ent from his two prior stateme nts ma de to the police. Def endant Dixon said that he occ asionally advised Def endant Ha ll who was eig hteen or nineteen at the time of the incident, and ha d helped De fenda nt Ha ll f inda job . D e fe nd a nt D ixon a dmi tte d tha t D e fe nd a nt H a ll h a d a sk e d h im w hat to do abo ut M s. Provost ge tting hit by

Mr. Scott on a couple of occa sions prior to t h e s h o o ting. De fenda nt Dix on said that he kne w Def

endant Ha ll and Ms. Provost want ed t o d o s omething to the vic tim, but he de nie d th a t e ith e r o ne of

the m ha d me nti on e d r ob bin g or sh oo tin g the vic tim

.

II. Jur y I nst r uc ti ons

A. “ Re a so na

ble Do ub t”

The trial co u rt instructed the jury , in part, that “Rea sonable doubt does not mea n a doubt arising from possibility .” De fenda nt Hall arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in not inse rting the word

“ me re ” in f

ro nt o f the wo rd“ po ssi bil ity .” Al tho ug h he do e s n ot c ite a ny a uth ority in s up po rt

of his position, Defenda nt Hall contends that rea sonable doubt is, in fac t, alway s based on a possibili ty

that
some ot h e r e xp la n a ti o n f o r a d e f e n d a n t’ s c o n d u c t e xis ts

. We f in d D e f e n d a n t H a ll ’ s is s u e to be without merit. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b).

The trial c ourt utiliz ed T en n es s ee P at t er n J u ryI n s tru ct i o n

– C ri m i n al (T.P.I ) 2.03 (2003) which pr ov ide s th a t:

[a] rea sonable doubt is a doubt e ng ender ed by an investigation of all the proof in the

case and an ina

bility , afte r such investig ation, to let the mind rest easily as to the

cer tainty o f g u il t. Re a s o n ab le d o u b t d o e s n o t me a n a d o u b t th a t may ar is e fr om possibili ty . Absolute ce rtainty of guilt is not demande d by the l aw to convict of any-6-

c ri min a l c ha

rg e , b ut m or a l c e rt a int y

is r e qu ir ed, a ndthi s c e rt a int y is r e qu ir e d a s to

every proposition of proof re quisite to constitut e the of fense

.

“The bey ond a re asonable doubt standard is a r equi re ment of due pr ocess, but the Con sti tut ion ne ith e r p ro hib its tr ia l c ou rt s f ro m de fi nin g re a so na

ble do ub t no r r e qu ir e s th e m to do so

as a ma tter of c ourse.” Victor v. Nebraska , 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L . Ed. 2d 583 (199 4 ). Fu rthermor e, “so long as the c ourt instructs the jury on the nec essity

that the def

endant’ s g uilt be proved be y ond a re asonable doubt, . . . the Constit ution does not require that any particula r form of w ords be use d in advisi ng the jury of the g overnme nt’s burden of proof.” Id. (citations omitted ). Considering the full context of the instruction, we conc lude that the trial c ourt’s instruction on the definition of re asonable doubt “suffici en t l y d escribed the deg ree of doubt

nece ssary for a cquit t al and the deg ree of proof nece ssary

for c onviction.” Pe tty

joh n v . S tat e , 885 S.W .2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) . Def endant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue.

B. F inge rprint Evidenc e

Def endant Ha ll arg ues that the trial court err ed in pr oviding the jury with an instruction on fing erprint e vidence based on Offic er Ma rsh’s testimony

. See T.P.I .–Crim. 42.17(2003). Def endant does not challeng e the content of the i nstruction but contends that the j ury instruction ga ve “undue

e mph a sis ” to the fi ng e rp ri nt e vid e nc e in li gh t of the e vid e nc e ’s la c k o f s ig nif ic a nc e . A s th e Sta te points out, Defenda nt Hall cites no authority to support his a

rg ument and has there fore waived the issue. Tenne ssee Court of Criminal Appe als Rule 10(b) state s that “[i] ssues which a re not support by arg ument, citation to authorities or appropriate ref ere nces to the rec ord will be treated as wa ived by this court.” Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b). Def endant Hall is not entitled to relief on this issue.

C. L esser I ncluded Of

fense s

Def endant Ha ll arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in not instructing the j u ry o n the lesser included off

enses of fac ilitation of first deg ree felony murder and fac ilitation of fir s t-deg ree preme ditated murder

. Def endant contends that the evidenc e could support a finding by

the jury that Ms. Provost spearhea ded the plans to c onfront Mr. Scott, and that De fe n dant Hall’s c onduct fa c ili ta te d M s. Pr ov os t in the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e s a g a ins t Mr . Sc ott

.

At the hea ring on the trial court’s proposed inst ructions to the jury , Def endant Ha ll’s counsel reque sted the trial court to provide an instruction on fa cilitation of felony murder.

THE COURT: Even thoug h, all the pro o f i s t h at he’s the trigg er ma n, socalled trigg erma n ? I m ean, that’s kind of a c ommon part of thi s.

DEF ENDAN T HALL ’S COUNSEL : I think under t h e t h eo ry of L inda Provost as the head of the

r o b b e r y. In o t h e r

w o r d s , t h i s i s h e r

r o b b e r y.-7-

THE COURT: So even though all the proof that [Defenda nt Hall] shot, he’s

just the facilitator?

DEF ENDAN T HALL ’S COUNSEL : He could be the fac ilitator of a robbery

. I ’m not talking a bout the first degr ee premeditate d [charg e]. I ’m just say ing unde r the fe lon y mur de r, if

he wa s th e fa c ili ta tor of the ro bb e ry , in the ca s e, wi th L inda Provost, that could be the theory from which I rely upon in the case

. A pane l of this Court re ce n t l y addre ssed the leg islative amendments to Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-18-110 which altere d the proce dural require ments for prese rving an issue for appea l that involves a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a particular lesse r included of fense

. See State v . Robert Page , No. W2003-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 Tenn. Crim. Ap p

. L E XI S 753 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Aug . 26, 2004), perm. to appeal granted (Ja n. 18 , 2 00 5) . Pu rs ua nt t o the amen d ed s t atutory

provisions, the trial court’s f ailure to instruct the jury

on a particular lesse r included of

fe n s e m ay n o t be ra ised on appe al or in a motion for ne w trial unless the de fenda nt

re qu e sts in w ri tin g that th e tr ia l cou rt pr ov ide su c h an ins tr uc tio n pri or to the tr ia l cou rt ’s c ha rg e to the jury . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 18-110(c ). I n Page , two members of the panel conclude d that “the waiver provision of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-18-110 is an unconstitutional abrog ation of a c ri min a l de fe nd a nt’ s con sti tut ion a l rig ht to ha ve the jury c ha rg e d on all of

fe ns e s in c lud e d w ith in
t he indicted of

fense and supported by

the proof a dduced at trial.” Page
, 2 0 0 4 T e n n

. Crim

. App. L EX I S 7 5 3
, a t * 4 1

. A d i s s e n t i n g m e m b e r o f t h a t p a n e l
, h o w e v e r , e xp r e s s e d t h e v i e w t ha t a defe ndant m ust request a n instruction of the lesser included off

ense on the re c or

d prior to the trial

c ou rt ’s c ha

rg e to the jury ; othe rw ise , th e ri g ht t o a pp e a l th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fai lu re to so ins truc t is waived. See id. , a t *5 1, Hay e s, J., c on c ur ri ng in p art , d iss e nti ng in p art

. A ma jority of the pa ne l in this case sub judice ag ree s with the dissenting opinion in Page

. By law, a trial judge is require d to appoint a court reporte r in all felony case s whose func tion it is to provide a verbatim re cord of all proce eding s in ope n court and such other proc eeding s as the judge may

direc t. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-14-301( 3); -302; and -307. Once the transcript of the

e vid e nc e is fil e d withthe c le rk of the tr ia l c ou rt , th e tr a ns c ri pt b e c ome s th e re c or d o f the tr ia l c ou rt , and the r ec ord of this Court for purpose s of appe al. Sta te v . W att s , 670 S.W .2d 246, 249 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. 19 84 ); see also Tenn. R. A pp. P. 24. An appellate court can only consider those issues which ar e pre serve d in the rec ord. State v. Bane s , 874 S.W .2d 73, 8 2 (T en n

. C rim. App. 1993). Th us , a n o ra l r e qu e st f

or a n in str uc tio n o f a le sse r inc lud e d of fe ns e wh ic h is ma de on the re c or d in a fe lony case wher e by

law a c ourt reporter must be pre sen t t o p re p ar e a verbatim rec ord of the proce eding s, satisfies the “in writing ” require ment of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-18-110 so long a s the oral r equest is made prior to the trial court’s cha rge t o t h e jury and re g ardle ss of whether the proposed c harg e is reduc ed to writing

. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 30 -1 11 (b ); State v. Higgins , 7 29 S.W. 2d28 8, 29 0- 91 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 87 ) (It ha s lon g be e n re c og nize d in the po stc on vic tio n a

re na that a tr ia l c ou rt ’s fa ilu re to redu ce i ts f ind ing s o f f

a c t a ndc on c lus ion s o f l a w t o

wr i t i n g as s t at u t o ri l y

re q u i re d m ayb e h ar m l es s er ro r i f t h e tri al co u rt o ra l l y p ro n o u n ce s i t s fi n d i n gs from the be nch).-8-

First, we note t hat counsel for De fenda nt Hall specific ally ag ree d that a cha

rg e on the lesse r included off

ense of fac ilitation of first deg ree preme ditated murder was not indicate d by

the evidenc e, and thus did not reque st such a cha rg e. Ac cording ly , this iss ue may not be pre sented a s a g round for

relief in either a

motion for new tria l or on appea l. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 18-110(d)

. Be cause , howeve r, De fenda nt H all did orally reque st an instruction on the offe nse of f acilitation of felony murder, w e will addre ss the merits o f Defenda nt Hall’s issues conc erning the trial court’s omission of thi s char g e.

Under the test enunc iated in State v. Burns
, 6 S.W .3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), fac ilitation is a lesser included off

ense of felony murder. Id . a t 46 6- 46 7; se e als o Sta te v . E ly
, 48 S.W .3d 710, 720 (Tenn. 2001). “W hether or not a particular lesser i ncluded offense should be cha rg ed to the jury

depends of whe ther proof

in the rec ord would support the lesse r charg e.” Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 468. Our

su pr e me c ou rt

re c e ntl y re ite rate d th a t:

[t ]hi s Court has adopted a two-step inquiry for determining if the evidenc e justifies a jury instruction on a lesser -included of fense . The trial court must first determine:

‘w h et h er any

evidenc e exists t hat re asonable minds could acc ept as to the lesser- included off

ense. In making this determination, the trial

c ou rt mus t vie w the e vid e nc e lib e ra lly in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to the exist ence of the lesse r-include d o ffense without making any judgme nts on the credibility of such evidence . Second, the tria l court

mus t de te rm ine if

the e vid e nc e , v ie we d in thi s li g ht, is l e g a lly sufficie nt to support a conviction for the lesser- included off ense.’

State v. Robinson
, 1 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 9
, 4 8 6 (T en n

. 2 0 0 4 ) ( q u o t i n g Burns
, 6 S.W .3d at 469). “Whether an instruction is require d depends upon the evidenc e, not the theory of the de fense or the State.” Id. (c i t i n g State v. Allen , 6 9 S. W.3 d 1 81 , 1 88 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; S ta te v. Richm ond , 90 S.W .3d 648, 660 (Tenn. 2001) ).

“A pe rson is criminally

responsible for the facilitation of a f elony if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony
, but without the i ntent require d for c riminal responsibilityunder § 39-11-402( 2), the person knowing ly furnishes substantial a ssistance in the commission of the fe lon y .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 11 -4 03 (a ). On e is cri mi nal ly re sp on sib le fo r ano the r’ s o ff e ns e if “[a]cting with t h e i n t en t to promote or assist the commission of the offe nse, or to bene fit in the proce eds or r esults of th e o ff en s e, t h e per son solicits, di rec ts, or aids or attempts to aid anothe r person to commi t t h e o ffense.” Id. § 39-11-402( 2). Thus, in the ca se sub judice , in order f or a

re a so na ble jury to h a ve fo un d D e fe nd a nt Ha ll g uil ty of fa c ili ta tio n of fe lon y mur de r, “ the jury wo uld have to c onclude that the def endant, while lacking the intent to promote or assist the commission of either of fense , knowing ly

furnished substantial a ssistanc ein th ec o mmis sion of preme ditated murder and [felony murder].” Robinson
, 146 S.W .3d at 487. Ba sed upon our review, the r ecor d does not support such a c onclusion.-9-

Ms. Provost testi fied that she told Defenda nt Hall about her alterc ation with Mr. Scott, and Def endant Hall told her he “ would take c are of it.” De fenda nt Dix on conce ded that on two occ asions Def endant Ha ll had asked his advic e about r esponding to Mr. Scott’s attack on Ms. Provost. When Ms. Pr ov os t a ndDe fe nd a nt H a ll m e t a fe w d a y s late r at th e Kr og e r p arking lot , D e fe nd a nt H a ll t old her the y should stage a robbe ry

and aske d if Mr. S cott had any money

. There was no evidenc e that Ms. Provost planned to rob Mr. Scott. M s

. P ro v o s t said she thoug ht that the g oal of the confr ontation with Mr. Scott was to be at the victim up, not rob or kill him . Ms. Brooks c orrobor ated Ms. Provost’s testim ony

that the stag ed robbery was Def endant Hall’s plan. Ms. Provost stated that the victim had just sat down in her c ar w hen De fenda nt Ha l l fi re d h i s wea pon, striking both the vic tim a ndMs. Pr ov os t.

I n El y , the defe ndant was pr esent at the scene of the robbe ry , he knew his co-def endant wa s g oing to c ommit robbery , and the de fenda nt furnished substantial assistance in the commission of the offe nse. The supr eme c ourt conc luded that no re asonable jury would hav e co n cluded that the de fe nd a nt a c te d w ith ou t a ny int e nt ‘ to p ro mot e or

a ssi st the c omm iss ion of

the of fe ns e or to b e ne fi t in the proce eds or r esults of the offe nse.’” El

y , 4 8 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 2 4 (q u o t i n g Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 470- 71). Se e als o Robinson , 1 46 S.W. 3da t 14 8 ( “ I t si mpl y de fi e s lo g ic to c on c lud e that th e de fe nd a nt, wh il e n o t in te n d in g to a id o r p r o mo te [t h e v ic ti m’ s ] mu r d e r , n e v e r th e le s s o r d e r e d other g ang members to take [t he victim] ‘out of t he dis trict, roug h him up a li ttle bit by phy sical abuse, and let him ge t back the be st way he could,’ knowing all along that these g ang members intende d to kill [ the victim] ”).

Fr om the evidenc e pre sented a t trial in the instant case, no r ea s o nable jury could have conclude d that Def

endant Ha ll had the knowle dg e re quired to fa cilitate the off ense of felony murder but lacked the intent requir ed fo r criminal responsibilit y . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the trial court did not err

in f ai l ing to pr ovide an instruction to the jury as to the lesser

included off

ense of fac ilitation of felony

murder. D efe ndant Hall is not entitled to relief on this issue.

III . A dm iss ion of P hot og r aphs

Def endant Ha ll arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed in admitting c ert ai n p h o t og raphs take n by Offic er B outon during his e x amination of Ms. Provost’s car . Offic er B outon stated that he inserted

wo od e n r od s in to the bu lle t ho le s fo un d in the pa sse ng e r s e a t to app ro xima te the pa th o f the bu lle ts and then photog raphe d the rods. During a hearin g out of the pre sence of the jury , Offic er B outon said that his ex am i n at i o n o f t he ca r led him to conclude that the ca r seat had bee n in the uprig ht position when the shots were fi re d b as ed o n t he aw kwar d ang les depicte d by the rods. Of

fice r Bouton c onced e d th a t h e d id n o t h a v e a n y in f o r mati o n ab o u t th e v ic ti m’ s w o u n d s o r th e p a ththe bullets took through the vic tim’s body at the time he examined the bullet holes. The trial c ourt found that Offic er B outon’s photogr aphs we re a dmiss i b le, but conclude d that Offic er B outon could not testify as to the conc lusions he drew f rom his observations.

Although Def

endant Ha ll cites no authority in support of his positi on, he ar g ues that Off icer Bouton’s “ ex p er iment” was nothing more than a rudimentary

attempt at a ba llist ics test by a non--10-

expert. We ag ree with the State’s assessment that De fenda nt Hall’s ar g ument is essentially one of rele vancy . The a dmissibi li t y o f phot og raph e vidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court a nd will not be disturbed on appea l absent a c lear showing of an a buse of discr etion. State v. Banks , 564 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978). Evidence is rele vant if it has “a ny tendenc y to make the

e xiste nc e of a ny fa c t tha t is of c on se qu e nc e to the de te rm inatio n of the a c tio n mor e pr ob able or le ss probable than it would be without the evidenc e.” Tenn. R

. Evid. 401. Howeve r, “r eleva nt evidence may be excluded if its probative va lue i s substantiallyoutweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury .” Rule 403.

The State arg ues that the photog raphs we re r eleva nt to support its theory that the victim was fi rs t sh ot, a ndthe n th e pa sse ng e r s e a t w a s lo we re d in to a re c lin e d p os iti on so that D e fe nd a nt H a ll could rob the victim. The jury
, howeve r, obviously reje cted the State’s theory whe n i t found Def endant Ha ll not guilty

of attempted especia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry . Even if it wer e er ror f or the trial court to admit the photog raphs, we cannot conclude that the evidenc e more probably than not aff ecte d the re sult of the trial. See Tenn. R. App. P

. 36(a) ; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a)

. Any err or in the admission of this evidence w as there fore harmless.

IV. Suf fi ciency of the Evidence

Def endant Dixon arg ues that the e vidence was insuffic ient t o s u p p o rt his conviction for fac ilitation of second deg ree murder. We must first address whe ther the issue ha s been w aived by the untimely fi l i n g o f Defendant Dixon’s notice of appe al. The tria l court denie d Def endant’ s motion for new tria l on Aug ust 21, 2003. Defe ndant Dixon fil ed his notice of appea l on Septe mber 2 6
, 2 0 0 3

. A n o t i c e o f ap p e a l i s r e q u i r e d t o b e f i l e d w i t h t h e c l e rk o f t h e tr i a l c o u r tw i t h i n t h i r t y d a ys afte r the da te of e ntry

of the judg ment from which r el i ef i s s o u gh t

. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) . The tim e ly fi lin g of a no tic e of app e a l is no t, h ow e ve r, a pr e re qu isite to the jurisd ic tio n o f this Cou rt

. This Court may waive the require ment in the interest of justice. Id. We conclude that waiving the tim e ly fi lin g re qu ir e me nt i n th e ins ta nt c a se se rv e s th e int e re st o f j us tic e a ndde c ide to c on sid e r a ll of the issues in Def

endant Dixon’s appea l.

De fe nd a nt D ixon a

rg ue s tha t no e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d a t tria l th a t he kn e w D e fe nd a nt H a ll was g oing to c ommit second deg ree murder. Def endant Dix on contends that the e vidence showed that the only

offe nses contemplate d by the parties ag ainst the victim involved eit her a ssault or robbery . We respec tfully disag ree with Defe ndant Dixon’s assessment of the evide nce.

When a def

endant c halleng es the suffic iency of the c onvicting e vidence , we must revie w the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution in determining whether a rational trier of fac t could have found all the e ssential elements of the crime b ey ond a re asonable doubt. Jack son v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S.307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L . Ed. 2d 560 (1979). The defe ndant has the burden of overc oming this pre sumption, and the State is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e along with all rea sonable infe renc es which ma y be dra wn from that e vidence

. Id.-11-

Once a jury

finds a def

endant g uilty , his or her pr esumption of innocenc e is remove d and repla ced with a presumption of g uilt. State v. Black , 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991) . The jury is presumed to have resolved all conflicts and draw n any rea sonable infe renc es in favor of the State. State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W .2d 542, 547 (Tenn. 1984) . Questions concer n i n g t h e cr edibilityof witnesses, the we ight a nd value to be g iven t he evidence, and all fac tual issues raised by the evidenc e

ar e r e s o lv e d b y th e trie r o f f a c t a n d n o t this cour t. S t ate v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997).

I n order

to support a

conviction for f

acilitation, the State must prove that the a ccuse d knew another intended to commit a

specific felony , and that the a ccuse d knowing ly furnished a ssistance to the other pe rson in the commission of that offe nse. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 11 -4 03 ; El y , 48 S.W .3d at 719-20.

Def endant Dixon testified that Defe ndan t H a lla s k e d D e f e n d an t D ixo no ntw o occa sions prior to the shooting what he should do ab o u t t h e v i cti m hitti ng Ms. Provost. Defenda nt Dix on drove Def endant Ha ll to meet with Ms. P rovost. Def endant Dixon join ed i n t h e d i scussions betwee n Def endant Ha ll an d M s

. P ro v o s t conce rning their plan to lure the victim out of his apartment and ag ree d with Defe ndant Hall’s plan to stag e a r obbery . After driving around the victim’s apartment bu ild ing , D e fe nd a nt D ixon t oldMs. Pr ov os t th a t th e re we re too many pe op le aro un d to su c c e ssf ull y implement her plan. Ms. B rooks testified that De fenda nt Di x o n t o ld Ms. Provost t hat they wer e g oing to take her pur se but told he r that the g un was not loa ded. Def endants Dixon and Hall walke d toge ther tow ar d t h e v i ct i m ’s ap ar t m en tb u i l d i n g wh i l e M s

. Br o o k s d ro v e D ef en d an tDi x o n ’s ca

r bac k to the Krog er pa

rking lot. Ms. Brooks said that De fenda nt Dix on ran back to hi s car befor e she he ard the g un sh ots . D e fe nd a nt D ixon t oldMs. B ro ok s th a t he tho ug ht D e fe nd a nt H a ll s ho t th e vic tim

. Viewing the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the state, a re as o n able jury could have conclude d that Def

endant Dix on committed the offe nse of fac ilitation of second deg ree m u rd er. Ba sed on Def

endant Dix on’s participa tion in the planning stag e of the offe nse, his transporta tion of Def endant Ha ll to and from the sce ne, his knowledg e that a f irea rm would be involved, a nd his init ial prese nce at the apartment building prior to the shooting, a jury could conclude that Def endant Dixon knew that De fenda nt Hall inte nded to knowing ly shoot the victim, and that Defe ndant Dixon knowin gl y

furnished substantial a ssistance during the planning stag e of the offe nse and up to the point of act u al confr ontation with Mr. Scott. Bec ause D efe ndant Dixon l eft the sc ene be fore Def endant Ha ll shot t he victim, a re asonable jury could also include that Def endant Dix on did not intend to promote, assist or bene fit from the off ense. The evidenc e is sufficie nt to support Defe ndant Dix on’s conviction of f

acilitation of sec ond deg ree murder.

We are mindful that Defe ndant Dixon’s testimony conce rning the seque nce of events lea ding up to the sh oo ti ng c on fl ic te d in larg e pa rt wi th the te sti mon y

of Ms. Pr ov os t a ndMs. B ro ok s. Resolution of these inconsistencies a nd an asse ssment of the witnesses’ cre dibilit y , howeve r, is left to the jury , no t t h i s Court. Bland, 95 8 S. W.2 d a t 65 9. De fe nd a nt i s n ot e nti tle d to re lie f o n th is issue.-12- V. Adm issib ility of

Com puter Anim ation

Def endant Dixon arg ues that the trial court err ed in not admitting a computer animation that portray ed his version of the sequenc e of e vents immediately prior t o the shooting. The trial court h el d a h ea ri ng outside the prese nce of the jury conce rning the admissibilit y of the e vidence

. Def endant Dixon narr ated the animation as i t play ed. The first fra mes showed an aerial view of the Krog er pa rking lot with Defenda nt Dix on’s car. The nex t fra mes, from both an ae rial and a latera l viewpo i n t, showed fig ures r epre senting Def endants Dixon and Hall conve rsing beside De fenda nt Dix on’s ca

r. The two f

igur es then wa lk toward the back of the par king lot fa cing 12 Street whe re th Def endant Dixon said that he relieve d himself in some b ushes. Ms. Provost’s car appea rs on 12 th
str e e t. D e fe nd a nt D ixon tur ns a ndwa lks ba c k to wa rdhis c ar w hil e De fe nd a nt H a ll w a lks ov e r t o Ms. Provost’s car which has stopped at the curb. I n the next frame, Def endant Dixon beg ins to enter his car a s the word “ bang ” floats across the sc ree n. Def endant Di x o n cl o ses his car door, and the word “ bang ” appe ars on the sc ree n ag ain.

On cr oss-examination, Defendant Dix on said that he did not speak direc tly with the person wh o ma d e th e a n im a ti o n

. I n s te a d
, h e p r o v id e d in f o r mati o n to h is c o u n s e l w h o th e n rela y ed that information to the produc er of the animation. Def

endant Dixo n co n ce d ed that the animation

c on ta ine d a

va ri e ty of in accur a c ie s. De fe nd a nt D ixon, fo r e xamp le , s a id that he didno t te ll h is counsel that Ms. Provost’s car stopped on 12 Street or that De fenda nt Hall walked up to he r ca r as th depicted in the animation. Defe ndant Dixon also admit ted that the g unshots portray ed by the word

“ ba ng ” in the a nim a tio n d id not accur a te ly re fl e c t th e nu mbe r o r t imi ng of the g un sh ots a c tua lly fired.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the computer g ener ated an i m at i on i n ad m i s s i b l e s t at i n g:

I t’ s my jud g me nt tha t th e Sta te ’s mot ion in l imi ne wi ll be g rante d. L e t me say , I ag ree with sever al t hings [ Def endant Dix on’s counsel] said. The de fenda nt has

a ri g ht to e xpla in his sto ry in his ow n wo rd s. An d p art of my de c isi on ha s to do wi th
t h e e x ce l l en tj o b M r. Di x o n h as d o n e i n ex p l ai n i n g.

The sec ond thing is, it’s not excluded for the inac cura cies a lone. I think they could be de alt with on a cross-e x amination. I ’m more c oncerned that its cumulative, i t ’ s n o tn e c e s s ar y, [ a n d ] i td o e s c arr y s u b s t a n t i a l i m p a c tw i t h t h e j u r y.
Rely ing on State v. Farner , 66 S.W .3d 188 (Tenn. 2001), Def endant Dix on arg ues that the computer a nimation was co n s i s t ent wit h the State’s proof and aide d the jury

in visualiz ing the sequenc e of events recounted in Def endant Dix on’s testimony , particula rly his return to the Kr og er parking lot before the first g unshot was fire d.

As the supre me court observed in Farner , “ [c]o mpu te r g e ne rate d e vid e nc e is a n in c re a sin g ly common form of de monstrative evidenc e.” Id. at 208 (citations omitted). A computer animation,-13-

as oppos ed to a c omputer simulation, is used to vis ually “illustrate and e x plain a witness’s testimony .” Id. L ike any other form of evidenc e in Tenne ssee, howe ver, the computer a nimation

mus t be re le va nt. Te nn

. R. Ev id. 40 2. I f re le va nt, the e vid e nc e is sti ll su bje c t to e xcl us io n i f “i ts p r o b at i ve va lue is s ub sta nti a lly ou tw e ig he d b y

the da ng e r o f u nf

a ir pr e jud ic e , c on fu sio n o f the iss ue s, or misleading the j ury , or by consideration of undue delay
, waste of time, or nee dless prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. The admissi on of evidence is lar g ely discretional, a nd a trial court’s ruli ng as t o the admis sibili ty of evidence will not be dis turbed on a ppeal unless ther e is a clea r showing of abuse

. Sta te v . H ar ris , 30 S.W .3d 345, 350 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

.

The Farner

court stated that the proponent of the evidenc e must “establish that the c omputer animation is a fair and acc urate depiction of the eve nt it purports to portray .” Id. at 209 (c itations

om itt e d) . T he Cou rt

e xpla ine d th a t “ [b]e c a us e the jury ma y be so pe rs ua de d b y

[the a nim a tio n’ s] life-like nature that it bec omes unable to visualiz e an opposing or differing version of the event, the require ment that the animation fa irly and ac curately

portray the event is particular ly important when the evidenc e at issue is a c omputer animate d rec reation of an eve nt.” Id. (citations omitted)

.

I n Farner , the defe ndant was c onvicted of c riminally neg lige nt homicide and other offe nses resulting from a drag rac e in which he and the victim wer e co- participa nts. A computer g ener ated animation of the drag rac e and resulting collision wa s prepa red from the police office r’ s ac cident report and photog raphs of the ac cident sce ne and sur rounding are a. The animation contained f ifteen vis ua liza tio ns of

thec oll isi on , p ortr a y ing va ri ou s sp e e ds a ndva nta g e po int s.

The Fa rn e r court wa s conce rned not with the c umulative eff ect of t h e ev i d en ce but the balanc e b etwee n the evidenc e’s pr obative value and any prejudice cause d by

the inacc urac ies embodied within the animation. The e v en t s d epicted in the animation, for example, wer e inconsistent with the ey e-w itness testimony

. I n addition, a lthough the inve stigating police office r had not bee n able to determine the s peed at which the two vehicles we re tra veling immediately prior to the collision, the animation portray ed the c ars tra veling at 73.88 m.p.h. based on the prepa rer ’s persona l a ssumptions derive d from the data he was provided. The court conclude d “that th e trial

c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n in a dmi tti ng the c omp ute r anim a te d visu a lizatio n in this ca se be c a us e it is not a f a ir a n d a c c u r a te p o r tr a y a l o f th e e v e n t d e p ic te d
, a n d
, a s a r e s u lt
, it s p r o b a tive value wa s substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.” Id. at 209.

The trial c ourt in the ca se sub judice pla c e d le ss c on c e rn on the ina c c ur a c ie s c on ta ine d w ith in the computer animation than the cumulative nature of the evidenc e. De fenda nt Dix on sug g ests that the trial court improperly drew a distinction bet we en the use of computer animation to assist an expert’s testimony and an animation to illustrate a lay witness’s testimony . We do not read the trial court’s r uling in this light. The trial court’s main conce rn was the cumulative eff ect of the evidenc e. Whil e a c kn ow le dg ing th at a c omp ute r anim a tio n mi g ht b e a us e fu l to ol t o a ssi st the jury in understa n d i n g the complexiti es sometimes attac hed to an e x pert’s te stimony , such assistance was

n o t n e c e s s ar y

f o r D e f e n d a n t’ s te s timon y

. T h e main p u rp o s e o f th e a n im a ti o n w a s to e mp h a s iz e De fe nd a nt D ixon’ s te sti mo ny th at he re turne d to his c ar p ri or to the fi ri ng of

the fi rs t g un sh ot. De fe nd a nt D ixon’ s te sti mon y on thi s p oin t w a s corro bo rate d b y the Sta te ’s wi tne ss, Ms. B ro ok s.-14-

I n addition, Defe ndant Dixon us ed a series of photogr aphs of the Krog er pa rking lot and surrounding

are a to d e mon str a te his mov e me nts imm e diate ly prior to the sh oo tin g to the jury . T he de c isi on to admit or limit cumulative evide nce r ests within the sound dis cr et i o n o f t h e trial c ourt. State v. Br own , 836 S.W .2d 530, 533 (Tenn. 1992)

.

I n this case, it does not appe ar that the trial court abused i ts discretion in ruli ng the computer animation inadmissable. Moreove r, it does not appea r that the e x clusion of the computer animation aff ecte d the re sults of the trial. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The jury , by its verdict finding Def endant Dixon guilty of t he lesser included offense of fac ilitation, obvi ously acc redited his and Ms. B rook’ s tes ti mony

that D e fe nd a nt D ixon h a d r e turne d to his c ar b e fo re the vic tim wa s sh ot. Def endant Dixon is not entitled to relief on this issue.

VI. Defendant Dixon ’s Sentencing Issues

Def endant Dixon arg ues that his sentenc e of nine y ear s for his conviction of f acilitation of

se c on d d e g re e mur de r w a s e xce ssi ve . D e fe nd a nt Dixon c on te nd s tha t he wa s a f a vo ra ble c a nd idate for f ull probation under Te nnessee Code Annotated section 40-35-303. After the parties’ brief

s were filed, De fenda nt Dix on informed the c ourt pursuant to Rule 27(d) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Proc edure that he re lied o n t h e United States Supreme Court’s de cision in Blakely v. W ashington
, _

__ U. S. _

__ , 1 24 S. Ct . 2 53 1 ( 20 04 ) i n s up po rt of his arg ume nt that h is sent e nc e is excessive.

At the conc lusion of the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court found two applica b le e n h an c e ment fa c tor s. Th a t is, De fe nd a nt Dixon ha s a pre vio us his tory of c ri min a l c on vic tio ns in a dd iti on to tho se

nece ssar y to e s ta b li s h th e ap p r o p r iate r a n g e , a n d D e f e n d a n t D ixo n , a lth o u g h n o t th e s h o o te r , w as

a w ar e th a t a f

ir e ar m w a s u s e d in th e c o mm is s io n o f th e o f f e nse. See T en n

. C ode Ann. § 40- 35- 114(2) a nd (10). The trial court a cknowledg ed that De fenda nt Dix on cooper ated with the police, but fo un d that a ny mit ig a tio n that mig ht be a ttribu te d to thi s fa c tor wa s n e g a te d b y the fa lse state me nts Def endant Dixon init ially

made to the investig ati n g office rs. B ased on the prese nce of two enhanc ement fa ct o rs and no mitigating f actor s, the trial court sentence d Def endant Dixon to nine
y e ars c on fi ne me nt.

When a defe ndant challeng es the leng th, r ang e, or manne r of se rvice of a se ntence , this Court conducts a de novo revie w with a pre sumption t hat the dete rminations made by the trial court are

corr ect. Id. § 40-35-401( d). This presumption is “conditioned upon the af firmative showing in the

rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencing pri n ci p l es and all re levant fa cts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby
, 8 2 3 S

. W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . “I f the trial c ourt applies inappropriate fa ctors o r o t h erw ise fails to follow the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct, the pre sumption of

corr ectne ss falls.” State v. Shelton
, 854 S.W .2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Be cause we f ind that the trial court misapplied enhanc ement fa ctor (10) in determinin g the leng th of Def endant Di xon’ s se nte nc e , o ur

re vie w i s de novo wi tho ut a pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss.-15-

The Sentenc ing Commission Com ments provide that the burden is on the de fenda nt to show the imp ro pr ie ty

of the se nte nc e . Te nn . Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

. Our re view re quires an a naly sis of (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the t ri al and sente ncing hearing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) the principles of sentencing and ar g uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the na ture a nd char acte ristics of t h e o ff en s e; (5) any

mitigating or enhanc ing f

a c to r s ; ( 6 ) a n y s tate me n ts ma d e b y th e d e f e n d a n t in h is o w n b e h a lf ; a n d ( 7) the defe ndant’s potential for

reha bilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35-102 , -103, and - 210; Sta te v . S mi th , 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.

As a R ang e I

offe nder c onvicted of a Class B fe lony , Def

endant Dixon is subj ect to a sentenc e of be tween e ight a nd twelve y ear s. Tenn. C ode Ann. § 40-35-112(a )(2) . I n calc ulating the

se nte nc e fo r a Cla ss B fe lon y c on vic tio n, the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e is the min imu m in the ra ng e if there are no enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tors. Id. § 40-35-210(c). I f there are enhanc ement but no mitigating fac tors, the trial court may set the sentence ab o v e t h e mi nimum, but s till wit hin the rang e. Id. 40 -3 5- 20 1( d)

. I f b othe nh a nc ing a ndmit ig a tin g fa c tor s a re pr e se nt, the tr ia l c ou rt

mus t start at the pr esumptive minimum , enhanc e the se ntencewi t h i n t h e ra n g e as a ppropriate for the enhanc ing fac tors, and then r educe the sentenc e as a ppropriate for the mitig ating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e).

Def endant Dix on did not pr esent a ny evidenc e at the se ntencing hearing. T he pre sentenc ing report, however
, ref

lects t hat Defenda nt Dix on has two prior c onvictions for simple possession of drug s, and one conviction for possession of drug para pherna lia. Thus, application of e nhance ment fac tor (2), D efe ndant has a prior history of criminal convictions, is appropriate. Id. § 40-35-114( 2).

Enhanc ement fa ctor (10) require s a finding that t h e d ef endant possesse d or employ ed a firea rm during the com m i s s i on of the off ense. A lthough it is clea

r that De fenda nt Hall employ ed

a fi re arm du ri ng the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e , th e re is n o e vid e nc e in the re c or d to su pp ort a finding that Def

endant Dixon was arme d. We cannot conclude that thi s enhanc ement fa ctor c an be applied vica

riously under the fac ts presente d. Whil e the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support Defe ndant Dix on’s conviction of f

acilitation of sec ond deg ree murder, it cannot be said that he “ possessed or employ ed a f

irea rm” during the commission of his off ense. See State v . Gomez , No. M2002-01209- CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL

305787 (Tenn. Crim. App., Na shville, Feb. 18, 2004)
, perm. to a p peal granted (T e nn . O c t. 4 , 2 00 4) ; Sta te v . H ar ris , No. 03C01-9507-CC-00202, 1996 WL 403585 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knox ville, J uly 19, 1996), perm. to appeal de nied (Tenn. D ec. 30, 1996)

.

Ba sed upon our de novo revie w, we conclude that the trial court pr operly considere d fac tor (2) in dete rmining the leng th of Def endant Dix on’s sentenc e, but imprope rly considere d fac tor (10). We next addre ss the impact of the r uling in Blakely

, if any , on the l eng th of Defenda nt’s sentenc e. The State a

rgue s that Def

endant Dixon has waived a ny sentenc ing issues that are implicated by Bl ake ly under Rules 3( e) and 36(a) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. B eca use Bl ake ly
, ho we ve r, c a l l s i n t o q u e s t i o n c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f o u r c u rr e n ts e n t e n c i n g s c h e m e , w e w i l l a d d r e ss De fe nd a nt D ixon’ s c ha lle ng e to the le ng th o f h is s e nte nc e on the me ri ts.-16-

I n Bl ake ly , the United States Supreme Court c oncluded that “‘[o]t her than the fac t of a prior conviction, any

fac t that increa ses the pena lty for a crime be y ond the pre scribed sta tutory maxi mum

m u s t be submitted to a jury , and prove d bey ond a re asonable doubt.’” Bl ake ly
, 1 2 4 S. Ct

. a t 2536 ( quoting Apprendi v. New Jerse y , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L . Ed. 2d 435 (2000))

.

Prior to Bl ake ly , the Ap

pre nd i court ha d observe d “that nothing in [ t h e] h i s tory [of the

c omm on la w] s ug g e sts that it is i mpe rm iss ibl e fo r j ud g e s to e xer c ise dis c re tio n– takin g int o

c on sid e ratio n v ari ou s f

a c tor s r e la tin g bo th to of

fe ns e a ndof

fe nd e r– in i mpo sin g a

jud g me nt with in the range p r e s c r ib e d b y s tatu te .” Apprendi , 530 U. S. at 48 1, 12 0 S. Ct. a t 23 58 (e mph a sis in orig inal). Thus, the Supreme Court of Tenne ssee c oncluded that unde r Apprendi , a tria l cou rt sti ll
reta ined its discretion to consider a pplicable e nhance ment and mitigating f actor s so long a s the defe ndant’s sente nce is not enhanc ed bey ond the s tatutory maxi mum. Gr ah am v . S tat e , 90 S.W .3d 687, 692 (Tenn. 2002)

.

The Bl ake ly court, however, clarifie d that the re levant “statutory maxi mum” which forms the basis of the Apprendi rule “ is not the m axim um sentenc e a judge may impose afte r finding additional fac ts, but t h e m ax i m u m he may impose without

any additional finding s.” Bl ake ly , 124 S. Ct . at 2537. Bl ake ly , howeve r, does not pre clude a sentenc ing c ou rt ’s co n s idera tion of the defe ndant’s prior convic tions as an enha nceme nt fac tor in d etermining the leng th of the def endant’ s sentence

. Id. at 2536. As the Ap

pre nd i court observe d, prior convictions do not r elate to the commission of the offe nse for

which the de fenda nt is be ing sentenc ed, and presumably the prior c onvictions “had been e ntere d pursuant to proc eeding s with substantial safeg uards of their own.” Apprendi , 5 30 U. S. at 488, 120 S. Ct. at 2 361-62. Thus, enha nceme nt of Def endant Dixon’s sentence in the case sub judice b a s e d o n h i s p r i o r

c o n v i c t i o n s i s u n a f

f e c t e db y Bl ake ly

.

The trial c ourt sentenc ed De fenda nt Dix on to nine y ear s, or one y ear over the presumptive
sentenc e of eig ht y ear s for a Rang e I
, standard offende r, of a C lass B felony

. Although w e conc lude that the trial court misapplied enhanc ement fa ctor (10) , this error doe s not nece ssarily lea d to a reduc tion in the length of his sentence

. Sta te v . W inf ie ld , 23 S.W .3d 279, 284 (Tenn. 2000) . The Bl ake ly ru lin g do e s n ot p re c lud e the c on sid e ratio n o f D e fe nd a nt’ s p ri or c ri min a l c on vi cti on s in determining th e l eng th of his sentence . Ba sed on the pre sence of one e nhance ment fac tor and no mitigating fac tors, we conclude that a sentence of nine y ear s for Defe ndant Dix on’s conviction of fac ilitation of second deg ree murder is a ppropriate

. Be cause Def

endant Dix on’s sentenc e excee ds eig ht y ear s, we need not addre ss his arg uments conce rning his elig ibilit y for pr obation. Tenn. Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (a ) ( Se nte nc e a c tua lly imp os e d must be eig ht y e ars or le ss b e fo re a

de fe nd a nt i s elig ible for pr obation).

CO NC LU SION
Af te r a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f the re c or d w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE