COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LINDA I. THOMAS 

v. Record No. 0671-95-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MARCH 26, 1996 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY 

Joseph E. Spruill, Jr., Judge 

 Wayne L. Emery (Wilkins, Davison & Emery, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Patricia L. McKenney, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Linda I. Thomas (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial 

of two counts of making or uttering a false or forged 

prescription in violation of Code § 18.2-258.1(E). On appeal, 

she argues that the trial court erred in finding the evidence 

sufficient to convict because the Commonwealth failed to prove 

that: (1) the prescriptions were for drugs; (2) the 

prescriptions were forged; and (3) she made or uttered the 

prescriptions. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 BACKGROUND 

 On July 27, 1994, appellant and a companion entered the 

pharmacy owned by Dr. Michael J. Mangano, a licensed pharmacist. 

 Dr. Mangano's clerk handed him two prescriptions purportedly 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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ordered by Dr. James F. Hamilton. The prescriptions were for 

Tylenol No. 4, which contains codeine, and Xanax, an anxiety 

medication. Dr. Mangano had filled over 5,000 of Dr. Hamilton's 

prescriptions and was familiar with both his signature and his 

method of prescribing medication. He called Dr. Hamilton to 

verify the prescriptions. After this telephone call, he 

immediately notified the police of a possible irregularity and 

filled the prescriptions. 

 Dr. Mangano did not see who initially left the prescriptions 

but called the name, "Carrie Brown," which was listed on the 

requests. Appellant responded to the name, and Dr. Mangano 

"counseled her" about the pills, referring to her as "Carrie 

Brown." After appellant left the store with the medication, 

Lieutenant Wilkins and Captain Neale of the Northumberland County 

Sheriff's Department confronted her in the parking lot and 

questioned her about the prescriptions. Appellant was "very 

vague at first." She then said Carrie Brown was a friend, but 

could not give an address, phone number, or other identifying 

information for her. 

PRESCRIPTION FOR "DRUGS" 

 Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that 

the items requested in the prescriptions were "drugs." We 

disagree. 

 "When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 

of a criminal conviction, we must view all the evidence in the 
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light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to the 

evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." 

Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 

721 (1988). "The judgment of a trial court sitting without a 

jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will 

not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the 

judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 

(1987). 

 Code § 18.2-258.1 provides as follows: 

 A. It shall be unlawful for any person 

to obtain or attempt to obtain any drug or 

procure or attempt to procure the 

administration of any controlled substance or 

marijuana: (i) by fraud, deceit, 

misrepresentation, embezzlement, or 

subterfuge; or (ii) by the forgery or 

alteration of a prescription or of any 

written order; or (iii) by the concealment of 

a material fact; or (iv) by the use of a 

false name or the giving of a false address. 

 B. It shall be unlawful for any person 

to furnish false or fraudulent information in 

or omit any information from, or willfully 

make a false statement in, any prescription, 

order, report, record, or other document 

required by Chapter 34 of Title 54.1. 

 C. It shall be unlawful for any person 

to use in the course of the manufacture or 

distribution of a controlled substance or 

marijuana a license number which is 

fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to 

another person. 

 D. It shall be unlawful for any person, 

for the purpose of obtaining any controlled 

substance or marijuana, to falsely assume the 

title of, or represent himself to be, a 

manufacturer, wholesaler, pharmacist, 

physician, dentist, veterinarian or other 

authorized person. E. It shall be unlawful for any person 
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to make or utter any false or forged 

prescription or false or forged written 

order. 

 F. It shall be unlawful for any person 

to affix any false or forged label to a 

package or receptacle containing any 

controlled substance. 

 G. This section shall not apply to 

officers and employees of the United States, 

of this Commonwealth or of a political 

subdivision of this Commonwealth acting in 

the course of their employment, who obtain 

such drugs for investigative, research or 

analytical purposes, or to the agents or duly 

authorized representatives of any 

pharmaceutical manufacturer who obtain such 

drugs for investigative, research or 

analytical purposes and who are acting in the 

course of their employment; provided that 

such manufacturer is licensed under the 

provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and 

Cosmetic Act; and provided further, that such 

pharmaceutical manufacturer, its agents and 

duly authorized representatives file with the 

Board such information as the Board may deem 

appropriate. 

 H. Any person who shall violate any 

provision herein shall be guilty of a Class 6 

felony. 

(Emphasis added). The Virginia Drug Control Act defines 

"prescription" as "an order for drugs or medical supplies." Code 

§ 54.1-3401. "While penal statutes must be strictly construed 

against the Commonwealth, '[t]he plain, obvious, and rational 

meaning of a statute is always preferred to any curious, narrow 

or strained construction; a statute should never be construed so 

that it leads to absurd results.'" Newton v. Commonwealth, 21 

Va. App. 86, 89, 462 S.E.2d 117, 119 (1995) (quoting Branch v. 

Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 839, 419 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1992)). 

 Examining the plain meaning of Code § 18.2-258.1(E), we hold 
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that the term "prescription" refers to "an order for drugs or 

medical supplies." In this case, Dr. Mangano testified that the 

prescriptions at issue were for pain and anxiety medicine. One 

of the prescriptions was for Tylenol Number 4, which contains 

sixty milligrams of codeine. This testimony was sufficient to 

identify the substances listed in the prescriptions as "drugs." 

LAY WITNESS TESTIMONY AS TO HANDWRITING

 Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in 

admitting Dr. Mangano's testimony to establish that the 

signatures on the prescriptions were not Dr. Hamilton's. 

 At trial, Dr. Mangano testified that he had filled over 

5,000 prescriptions for Dr. Hamilton and was familiar with his 

signature. He examined the two prescriptions and stated that 

they were not signed by Dr. Hamilton. He also testified that Dr. 

Hamilton did not normally prescribe the types or quantities of 

drugs contained in the prescriptions, nor the number of refills 

indicated. Appellant argued that, in the absence of a showing 

that Dr. Hamilton was unavailable, Dr. Mangano's lay opinion as 

to the authenticity of the signatures was inadmissible. 

 "[A] [lay] witness is competent to testify to the 

genuineness of a controverted signature if he has the proper 

knowledge of the party's handwriting." Pepper v. Barnett, 63 Va. 

(22 Gratt.) 405, 407 (1872). The lack of familiarity with the 

handwriting of another affects the weight of the testimony, not 

its admissibility. Id. The party offering the handwriting 
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evidence is not required to show that the author is unavailable. 

See Foulkes v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 836, 841 (1843). 

See also 1 Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia 

§ 15-9, at 627-28 (4th ed. 1993). 

 In the instant case, the evidence established that Dr. 

Mangano was very familiar with Dr. Hamilton's signature, having 

filled over 5,000 prescriptions written by Dr. Hamilton. After 

questioning the authenticity of the prescriptions, Dr. Mangano 

called Dr. Hamilton to verify them and immediately after the 

conversation called the police. Dr. Mangano testified that the 

signatures on the two prescriptions were not Dr. Hamilton's and 

that Dr. Hamilton did not normally prescribe these types and 

quantities of drugs, nor the number of refills. Additionally, 

the Commonwealth introduced into evidence, without objection, an 

authentic prescription of Dr. Hamilton that clearly differed from 

the two presented in this case. The testimony of Dr. Mangano was 

clearly admissible, and his intimate knowledge of Dr. Hamilton's 

signature was entitled to great weight. The pharmacist's 

testimony was competent, not inherently incredible, and was 

sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

prescriptions had been forged. 

UTTERING A PRESCRIPTION

 Lastly, appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient 

to show that she made or uttered the prescriptions. 

 "Uttering" is defined as "'[t]o put or send [as a forged 
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check] into circulation . . . to utter and publish.' It is an 

assertion by word or action that a writing known to be forged is 

good and valid." Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 265, 269, 

343 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1986) (quoting Bateman v. Commonwealth, 205 

Va. 595, 599-600, 139 S.E.2d 102, 106 (1964)). 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the evidence proved that appellant entered the 

pharmacy with a companion. Dr. Mangano's store clerk then handed 

him two prescriptions to be filled. After Dr. Mangano filled the 

prescriptions, he called the name "Carrie Brown," listed on the 

prescriptions. Appellant responded, and Dr. Mangano proceeded to 

counsel her on the medicine. Appellant then left the store with 

the drugs. Under these circumstances, the trial court was 

entitled to infer that appellant had not only picked up the drugs 

for "Carrie Brown," but also was the one who gave the 

prescriptions to the clerk. The trial court was not required to 

believe appellant's self-serving testimony that the prescriptions 

were for a friend. See Daniel v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 736, 

744, 427 S.E.2d 423, 428 (1993) ("[T]he trial court as the trier 

of fact is not required to accept any of [appellant's] testimony 

and may rely on it in whole, in part, or reject it completely."). 

 Thus, the evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant made or uttered the forged prescriptions in 

violation of Code § 18.2-258.1(E). 

 Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. 
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 Affirmed.