J-S70021-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SAMUEL CONYERS

Appellant No. 909 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 11, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0712401-1979

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2014

Appellant, Samuel Conyers, appeals pro se from the March 11, 2014 

order, dismissing as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful 

review, we affirm.

On December 12, 1979, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of 

murder and possession of an instrument of a crime.1 On December 13, 

1979, Appellant proceeded to a non-jury degree-of-guilt hearing, at the 

conclusion of which the trial court found Appellant guilty of first-degree 

murder and imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501 and 907, respectively.
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parole. On November 15, 1985, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence, and our Supreme Court denied his allocatur petition on August 24, 

1994.2 Commonwealth v. Conyers, 505 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Super. 1985), 

appeal denied, 648 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1994). Appellant did not file a petition for 

a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. As a result, his 

judgment of sentence became final on November 22, 1994, when the filing 

period for such a petition expired. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(3); U.S. S. Ct. R. 13(1). Thereafter, Appellant filed unsuccessful 

PCRA petitions in 1996 and 2000. Appellant filed the instant petition on May 

15, 2012. On March 11, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. On March 19, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

As noted above, Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition until 

May 15, 2012. Therefore, it was patently untimely because it was not filed 

within one year of his judgment of sentence becoming final. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Furthermore, Appellant’s brief does not allege that 

any of the three exceptions to the PCRA time-bar applies. See

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(stating, “[t]he PCRA specifically provides that a petitioner raising one of the 

statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirements must affirmatively plead 

and prove the exception[]”) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 951 A.2d 

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2 On January 3, 1994, the trial court granted Appellant leave to file his 

allocatur petition nunc pro tunc.
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1163 (Pa. 2008). We note that Appellant’s brief cites to the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).3 

Appellant’s Brief at 13. To the extent this could be construed as seeking a 

time-bar exception, this Court recently held that Lafler does not create such 

an exception. Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court correctly 

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition as untimely. Accordingly, the PCRA 

court’s March 11, 2014 order is affirmed.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2014

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3

In his PCRA petition, Appellant couched Lafler as a time-bar exception 

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 5/15/12, at 

2. However, Appellant does not cite to the time-bar or any of its 

enumerated exceptions in his brief.