# Jornal Oficial C 245/2011

| | ISSN 1725-2482
  doi:10.3000/17252482.C_2011.245.por |
| --- | --- |
| Jornal Oficial
  da União Europeia | C 245 |
| | |
| Edição em língua portuguesa | Comunicações e Informações | 54.o ano24 de Agosto de 2011 |

ISSN 1725-2482

doi:10.3000/17252482.C_2011.245.por

Jornal Oficial

da União Europeia

C 245

Edição em língua portuguesa

Comunicações e Informações

54.o ano24 de Agosto de 2011

---

| Número de informação | Índice | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicações |
| | COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2011/C 245/01 | Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Número de informação

Índice

Página

II   Comunicações

COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

2011/C 245/01

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informações |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA |
| | Conselho |
| 2011/C 245/02 | Aviso à atenção das pessoas e entidades a que se aplicam as medidas restritivas previstas na Decisão 2011/273/PESC do Conselho, executada pela Decisão de Execução 2011/515/PESC do Conselho e pelo Regulamento (UE) n.o 442/2011 do Conselho, executado pelo Regulamento de Execução (UE) n.o 843/2011 do Conselho que impõe medidas restritivas contra a Síria | 2 |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2011/C 245/03 | Taxas de câmbio do euro | 3 |
| | INFORMAÇÕES DOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS |
| 2011/C 245/04 | Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca | 4 |
| 2011/C 245/05 | Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca | 5 |
| 2011/C 245/06 | Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca | 6 |
| 2011/C 245/07 | Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca | 7 |

IV   Informações

INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Conselho

2011/C 245/02

Aviso à atenção das pessoas e entidades a que se aplicam as medidas restritivas previstas na Decisão 2011/273/PESC do Conselho, executada pela Decisão de Execução 2011/515/PESC do Conselho e pelo Regulamento (UE) n.o 442/2011 do Conselho, executado pelo Regulamento de Execução (UE) n.o 843/2011 do Conselho que impõe medidas restritivas contra a Síria

o

o

2

Comissão Europeia

2011/C 245/03

Taxas de câmbio do euro

3

INFORMAÇÕES DOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS

2011/C 245/04

Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca

4

2011/C 245/05

Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca

5

2011/C 245/06

Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca

6

2011/C 245/07

Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca

7

| | V   Avisos |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2011/C 245/08 | Convites à apresentação de propostas — Programa ESPON 2013 | 8 |
| | PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2011/C 245/09 | Auxílio estatal — Reino Unido — Auxílio estatal SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Exoneração do imposto sobre os granulados na Irlanda do Norte (ex N 2/04) — Convite à apresentação de observações nos termos do artigo 108.o, n.o 2, do TFUE (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2011/C 245/10 | Auxílio estatal — Alemanha (Artigos 107.o a 109.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia) — Auxílio estatal MC 15/09 — Alienação do Banco Deka pelo LBBW (
  1
  ) | 21 |

V   Avisos

PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comissão Europeia

2011/C 245/08

Convites à apresentação de propostas — Programa ESPON 2013

8

PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA

Comissão Europeia

2011/C 245/09

Auxílio estatal — Reino Unido — Auxílio estatal SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Exoneração do imposto sobre os granulados na Irlanda do Norte (ex N 2/04) — Convite à apresentação de observações nos termos do artigo 108.o, n.o 2, do TFUE (
  1
  )

o

o

1

10

2011/C 245/10

Auxílio estatal — Alemanha (Artigos 107.o a 109.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia) — Auxílio estatal MC 15/09 — Alienação do Banco Deka pelo LBBW (
  1
  )

o

o

1

21

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE |

---

(1)   Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE

1

| PT | |
| --- | --- |

PT

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II Comunicações

COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/1

---

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada

(Processo COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

2011/C 245/01

Em 9 de Agosto de 2011, a Comissão decidiu não se opor à concentração notificada e declará-la compatível com o mercado comum. Esta decisão baseia-se no n.o 1, alínea b), do artigo 6.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho. O texto integral da decisão apenas está disponível na língua inglês e será tornado público após terem sido suprimidos quaisquer segredos comerciais que possa conter. Poderá ser consultado:

| — | no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência, (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do sector de actividade, |
| --- | --- |

—

no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência, (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do sector de actividade,

| — | em formato electrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32011M6298. |
| --- | --- |

—

em formato electrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32011M6298.

---

IV Informações

INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Conselho

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/2

---

Aviso à atenção das pessoas e entidades a que se aplicam as medidas restritivas previstas na Decisão 2011/273/PESC do Conselho, executada pela Decisão de Execução 2011/515/PESC do Conselho e pelo Regulamento (UE) n.o 442/2011 do Conselho, executado pelo Regulamento de Execução (UE) n.o 843/2011 do Conselho que impõe medidas restritivas contra a Síria

2011/C 245/02

CONSELHO DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comunica-se a seguinte informação às pessoas e entidades que constam do anexo à Decisão 2011/273/PESC do Conselho, executada pela Decisão de Execução 2011/515/PESC do Conselho (1) e do Anexo II ao Regulamento (UE) n.o 442/2011 do Conselho, executado pelo Regulamento de Execução (UE) n.o 843/2011 (2) do Conselho que impõe medidas restritivas contra a Síria.

O Conselho da União Europeia determinou que as pessoas e entidades constantes dos anexos acima referidos devem ser incluídas na lista de pessoas e entidades sujeitas às medidas restritivas previstas na Decisão 2011/273/PESC e no Regulamento (UE) n.o 442/2011, que impõe medidas restritivas contra a Síria. Os fundamentos para a designação das pessoas e entidades em causa constam das entradas pertinentes dos referidos anexos.

Chama-se a atenção das pessoas e entidades em causa para a possibilidade de apresentarem às autoridades competentes do(s) Estado(s)-Membro(s) relevante(s), indicadas nos sítios Web referidos no anexo III do Regulamento (UE) n.o 442/2011, um requerimento no sentido de serem autorizadas a utilizar fundos congelados para suprir necessidades básicas ou efectuar pagamentos específicos (ver artigo 6.o do regulamento).

As pessoas e entidades em causa podem enviar ao Conselho um requerimento, para o endereço abaixo indicado, acompanhado de documentação justificativa, para que seja reapreciada a decisão de as incluir na lista supracitada.

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| DG K Coordination |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG K Coordination

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Chama-se igualmente a atenção das pessoas e entidades em causa para a possibilidade de interporem recurso contra a decisão do Conselho junto do Tribunal Geral da União Europeia, nas condições estabelecidas no artigo 275.o, segundo parágrafo, e no artigo 263.o, quarto e sexto parágrafos, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia.

---

(1)  JO L 218 de 24.8.2011.

(2)  JO L 218 de 24.8.2011, p. 1.

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Comissão Europeia

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/3

---

Taxas de câmbio do euro (1)

23 de Agosto de 2011

2011/C 245/03

1 euro =

| | Moeda | Taxas de câmbio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar americano | 1,4462 |
| JPY | iene | 110,72 |
| DKK | coroa dinamarquesa | 7,4498 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,87600 |
| SEK | coroa sueca | 9,1046 |
| CHF | franco suíço | 1,1410 |
| ISK | coroa islandesa | |
| NOK | coroa norueguesa | 7,8080 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | coroa checa | 24,417 |
| HUF | forint | 271,78 |
| LTL | litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats | 0,7095 |
| PLN | zloti | 4,1499 |
| RON | leu | 4,2574 |
| TRY | lira turca | 2,5783 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,3771 |
| CAD | dólar canadiano | 1,4260 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 11,2766 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandês | 1,7360 |
| SGD | dólar de Singapura | 1,7414 |
| KRW | won sul-coreano | 1 558,38 |
| ZAR | rand | 10,3816 |
| CNY | yuan-renminbi chinês | 9,2513 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,4740 |
| IDR | rupia indonésia | 12 355,53 |
| MYR | ringgit malaio | 4,2894 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 61,206 |
| RUB | rublo russo | 41,8255 |
| THB | baht tailandês | 43,140 |
| BRL | real brasileiro | 2,3111 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 17,7768 |
| INR | rupia indiana | 65,9830 |

Moeda

Taxas de câmbio

USD

dólar americano

1,4462

JPY

iene

110,72

DKK

coroa dinamarquesa

7,4498

GBP

libra esterlina

0,87600

SEK

coroa sueca

9,1046

CHF

franco suíço

1,1410

ISK

coroa islandesa

NOK

coroa norueguesa

7,8080

BGN

lev

1,9558

CZK

coroa checa

24,417

HUF

forint

271,78

LTL

litas

3,4528

LVL

lats

0,7095

PLN

zloti

4,1499

RON

leu

4,2574

TRY

lira turca

2,5783

AUD

dólar australiano

1,3771

CAD

dólar canadiano

1,4260

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

11,2766

NZD

dólar neozelandês

1,7360

SGD

dólar de Singapura

1,7414

KRW

won sul-coreano

1 558,38

ZAR

rand

10,3816

CNY

yuan-renminbi chinês

9,2513

HRK

kuna croata

7,4740

IDR

rupia indonésia

12 355,53

MYR

ringgit malaio

4,2894

PHP

peso filipino

61,206

RUB

rublo russo

41,8255

THB

baht tailandês

43,140

BRL

real brasileiro

2,3111

MXN

peso mexicano

17,7768

INR

rupia indiana

65,9830

---

(1)  Fonte: Taxas de câmbio de referência publicadas pelo Banco Central Europeu.

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INFORMAÇÕES DOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/4

---

Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca

2011/C 245/04

Em conformidade com o artigo 35.o, n.o 3, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1224/2009 do Conselho, de 20 de Novembro de 2009, que institui um regime comunitário de controlo a fim de assegurar o cumprimento das regras da política comum das pescas (1), foi decidido encerrar a pesca como indicado no quadro seguinte:

| Data e hora do encerramento | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Duração | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Estado-Membro | Países Baixos |
| Unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais | HKE/571214 |
| Espécie | Pescada branca (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Zona | VI, VII; águas da UE e águas internacionais da divisão Vb; águas internacionais das subzonas XII, XIV |
| Tipo(s) de navios de pesca | — |
| Número de referência | — |

Data e hora do encerramento

18.7.2011

Duração

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

Estado-Membro

Países Baixos

Unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais

HKE/571214

Espécie

Pescada branca (Merluccius merluccius)

Zona

VI, VII; águas da UE e águas internacionais da divisão Vb; águas internacionais das subzonas XII, XIV

Tipo(s) de navios de pesca

—

Número de referência

—

Ligação Web para a decisão do Estado-Membro:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_pt.htm

---

(1)  JO L 343 de 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/5

---

Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca

2011/C 245/05

Em conformidade com o artigo 35.o, n.o 3, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1224/2009 do Conselho, de 20 de Novembro de 2009, que institui um regime comunitário de controlo a fim de assegurar o cumprimento das regras da política comum das pescas (1), foi decidido encerrar a pesca como indicado no quadro seguinte:

| Data e hora do encerramento | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Duração | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Estado-Membro | Países Baixos |
| Unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais | HKE/2AC4-C |
| Espécie | Pescada branca (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Zona | Águas da UE das zonas IIa, IV |
| Tipo(s) de navios de pesca | — |
| Número de referência | — |

Data e hora do encerramento

18.7.2011

Duração

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

Estado-Membro

Países Baixos

Unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais

HKE/2AC4-C

Espécie

Pescada branca (Merluccius merluccius)

Zona

Águas da UE das zonas IIa, IV

Tipo(s) de navios de pesca

—

Número de referência

—

Ligação Web para a decisão do Estado-Membro:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_pt.htm

---

(1)  JO L 343 de 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/6

---

Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca

2011/C 245/06

Em conformidade com o artigo 35.o, n.o 3, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1224/2009 do Conselho, de 20 de Novembro de 2009, que institui um regime comunitário de controlo a fim de assegurar o cumprimento das regras da política comum das pescas (1), foi decidido encerrar a pesca como indicado no quadro seguinte:

| Data e hora do encerramento | 9.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Duração | 9.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Estado-Membro | França |
| Unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais | COD/5BE6A |
| Espécie | Bacalhau (Gadus morhua) |
| Zona | VIa; águas da UE e águas internacionais da divisão Vb a leste de 12° 00' W |
| Tipo(s) de navios de pesca | — |
| Número de referência | 792761 |

Data e hora do encerramento

9.7.2011

Duração

9.7.2011-31.12.2011

Estado-Membro

França

Unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais

COD/5BE6A

Espécie

Bacalhau (Gadus morhua)

Zona

VIa; águas da UE e águas internacionais da divisão Vb a leste de 12° 00' W

Tipo(s) de navios de pesca

—

Número de referência

792761

Ligação Web para a decisão do Estado-Membro:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  JO L 343 de 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/7

---

Informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros a respeito do encerramento da pesca

2011/C 245/07

Em conformidade com o artigo 35.o, n.o 3, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 1224/2009 do Conselho, de 20 de Novembro de 2009, que institui um regime comunitário de controlo a fim de assegurar o cumprimento das regras da política comum das pescas (1), foi decidido encerrar a pesca como indicado no quadro seguinte:

| Data e hora do encerramento | 2.8.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Duração | 2.8.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Estado-Membro | Portugal |
| Unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais | WHB/8C3411 |
| Espécie | Verdinho (Micromesistius poutassou) |
| Zona | VIIIc, IX e X; águas da UE da zona CECAF 34.1.1 |
| Tipo(s) de navios de pesca | — |
| Número de referência | — |

Data e hora do encerramento

2.8.2011

Duração

2.8.2011-31.12.2011

Estado-Membro

Portugal

Unidade populacional ou grupo de unidades populacionais

WHB/8C3411

Espécie

Verdinho (Micromesistius poutassou)

Zona

VIIIc, IX e X; águas da UE da zona CECAF 34.1.1

Tipo(s) de navios de pesca

—

Número de referência

—

Ligação Web para a decisão do Estado-Membro:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  JO L 343 de 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

V Avisos

PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comissão Europeia

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/8

---

Convites à apresentação de propostas — Programa ESPON 2013

2011/C 245/08

ESPON é a Rede Europeia de Observação do Desenvolvimento e da Coesão Territoriais. Apoia o desenvolvimento de políticas relacionadas com a política de coesão da UE. O programa ESPON é co-financiado pelo Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional no âmbito do Objectivo 3 para a cooperação territorial europeia e por 31 países (27 Estados-Membros da UE e a Islândia, o Lichtenstein, a Noruega e a Suíça).

No âmbito do programa ESPON 2013, é aberta uma série de convites à apresentação de propostas. Os potenciais beneficiários são os organismos públicos e privados de 31 países (27 Estados-Membros da UE, a Islândia, o Lichtenstein, a Noruega e a Suíça). São convidados a participar investigadores e instituições de investigação, universidades, cientistas, peritos e equipas académicas. O convite à apresentação de propostas em matéria de actividades transnacionais de ligação em rede destina-se às instituições confirmadas como pontos de contacto ESPON.

| 1. | Convite à apresentação de propostas para projectos de investigação aplicada:






  — | Regiões vizinhas europeias (orçamento: 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Convite à apresentação de propostas para projectos de investigação aplicada:

—

Regiões vizinhas europeias (orçamento: 750 000 EUR)

| — | Cidades de pequena e média dimensão no seu contexto territorial funcional (orçamento: 650 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Cidades de pequena e média dimensão no seu contexto territorial funcional (orçamento: 650 000 EUR)

| — | A dimensão territorial da pobreza e da exclusão social na Europa (orçamento: 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

A dimensão territorial da pobreza e da exclusão social na Europa (orçamento: 750 000 EUR)

| — | Crises económicas: capacidade de adaptação das regiões (orçamento: 759 153 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Crises económicas: capacidade de adaptação das regiões (orçamento: 759 153 EUR)

| 2. | Convite à apresentação de propostas sobre análises orientadas para temas específicos baseadas em manifestações de interesse pelas partes interessadas:






  — | Pólos de crescimento no Sudeste da Europa (orçamento: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Convite à apresentação de propostas sobre análises orientadas para temas específicos baseadas em manifestações de interesse pelas partes interessadas:

—

Pólos de crescimento no Sudeste da Europa (orçamento: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Indicadores-chave para a coesão territorial e o ordenamento do território (orçamento: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Indicadores-chave para a coesão territorial e o ordenamento do território (orçamento: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Paisagens habitáveis para um desenvolvimento territorial sustentável (orçamento: 379 796,09 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Paisagens habitáveis para um desenvolvimento territorial sustentável (orçamento: 379 796,09 EUR)

| — | Política paisagística para o parque dos três países (orçamento: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Política paisagística para o parque dos três países (orçamento: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Mar do Norte — Difusão dos resultados transnacionais (orçamento: 340 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Mar do Norte — Difusão dos resultados transnacionais (orçamento: 340 000 EUR)

Os temas acima indicados no que respeita a análises orientadas para temas específicos serão incluídos no convite à apresentação de propostas, na condição de ser assinado um acordo com as partes interessadas que apoiam as ideias do projecto. Por conseguinte, os temas apenas serão confirmados no dia de lançamento do convite à apresentação de propostas, em 24 de Agosto de 2011. Os temas incluídos no convite à apresentação de propostas podem ser consultados no sítio Web ESPON http://www.espon.eu

| 3. | Convite à apresentação de proposta no quadro da plataforma científica ESPON:






  — | Sistema de monitorização territorial e de apresentação de relatórios da UE (orçamento: 598 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Convite à apresentação de proposta no quadro da plataforma científica ESPON:

—

Sistema de monitorização territorial e de apresentação de relatórios da UE (orçamento: 598 000 EUR)

| — | Atlas ESPON sobre estruturas e dinâmicas territoriais europeias (orçamento: 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Atlas ESPON sobre estruturas e dinâmicas territoriais europeias (orçamento: 150 000 EUR)

| — | Detecção do potencial e dos desafios territoriais (orçamento: 350 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Detecção do potencial e dos desafios territoriais (orçamento: 350 000 EUR)

| — | Pacote de resultados territoriais para programas do FEDER (orçamento: 500 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pacote de resultados territoriais para programas do FEDER (orçamento: 500 000 EUR)

| — | Instrumento cartográfico ESPON em linha (orçamento 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Instrumento cartográfico ESPON em linha (orçamento 150 000 EUR)

| — | Monitorização territorial numa macrorregião europeia – um teste para a região do Mar Báltico (orçamento: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Monitorização territorial numa macrorregião europeia – um teste para a região do Mar Báltico (orçamento: 360 000 EUR)

| 4. | Convite à apresentação de propostas para actividades transnacionais de ligação em rede pela rede de pontos de contacto ESPON






  — | Actividades de capitalização a nível transnacional pela rede de pontos de contacto ESPON (orçamento: 600 227 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Convite à apresentação de propostas para actividades transnacionais de ligação em rede pela rede de pontos de contacto ESPON

—

Actividades de capitalização a nível transnacional pela rede de pontos de contacto ESPON (orçamento: 600 227 EUR)

A data-limite para a apresentação de propostas é 20 de Outubro de 2011.

Em 13 de Setembro de 2011, terá lugar em Bruxelas uma jornada informativa (Info Day and Partner Café) para potenciais beneficiários.

Toda a documentação relacionada com o convite, incluindo a indicação do procedimento de candidatura, as regras de elegibilidade, os critérios de avaliação e o formulário de candidatura, será disponibilizada no sítio Web ESPON, http://www.espon.eu

---

PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA

Comissão Europeia

| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/10

---

AUXÍLIO ESTATAL — REINO UNIDO

Auxílio estatal SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10)

Exoneração do imposto sobre os granulados na Irlanda do Norte (ex N 2/04)

Convite à apresentação de observações nos termos do artigo 108.o, n.o 2, do TFUE

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

2011/C 245/09

Por carta de 13 de Julho de 2011, publicada na língua que faz fé a seguir ao presente resumo, a Comissão comunicou ao Reino Unido a sua decisão de dar início ao procedimento previsto no artigo 108.o, n.o 2, do TFUE relativamente ao auxílio acima referido. Nos termos do artigo 11.o, n.o 1, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 659/1999, a Comissão convidou igualmente o Reino Unido a apresentar observações sobre a sua intenção de iniciar o procedimento formal de investigação.

As partes interessadas podem apresentar as suas observações relativamente à medida no prazo de um mês a contar da data de publicação do presente resumo e da carta, enviando-as para o seguinte endereço:

| Comissão Europeia |
| --- |
| Direcção-Geral da Concorrência |
| Registo dos Auxílios Estatais |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22951242 |

Comissão Europeia

Direcção-Geral da Concorrência

Registo dos Auxílios Estatais

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22951242

Estas observações serão comunicadas ao Reino Unido. Qualquer interessado que apresente observações pode solicitar por escrito o tratamento confidencial da sua identidade, devendo justificar o pedido.

RESUMO

PROCEDIMENTO

Por carta de 5 de Janeiro de 2004, registada em 9 de Janeiro de 2004, o Reino Unido notificou uma medida de exoneração fiscal relativamente ao imposto sobre os granulados na Irlanda do Norte. A medida foi notificada enquanto alteração da exoneração inicial do imposto sobre os granulados na Irlanda do Norte (introdução progressiva do imposto), que foi aprovada pela Comissão na sua decisão N 863/01. Em 7 de Maio de 2004, a Comissão adoptou uma decisão de não levantar objecções relativamente a esta medida. Em 30 de Agosto de 2004, a British Aggregates Association, a Healy Bros. Ltd e a David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd (a seguir designados «os requerentes») introduziram um recurso contra esta decisão da Comissão (este recurso foi registado sob o número T-359/04).

Em 9 de Setembro de 2010, o Tribunal de Primeira Instância anulou a decisão da Comissão acima referida. De acordo com o acórdão, a Comissão não estava legalmente habilitada a adoptar a decisão de não levantar objecções uma vez que não tinha examinado a questão da eventual discriminação fiscal entre os produtos nacionais em causa e os produtos importados da Irlanda. A Comissão não recorreu deste acórdão.

As autoridades britânicas suspenderam a aplicação da medida em 1 de Dezembro de 2010, revogando o Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004.

DESCRIÇÃO DA MEDIDA

A redução de 80 % do imposto sobre os agregados (a seguir designado «AGL») foi aplicada aos agregados virgens extraídos na Irlanda do Norte e que aí são explorados comercialmente, bem como aos produtos transformados provenientes de granulados extraídos na Irlanda do Norte que aí são explorados comercialmente.

O AGL é um imposto ambiental sobre a exploração comercial de agregados e aplica-se às rochas, à areia e à gravilha. Foi introduzido pelo Reino Unido com efeito a partir de 1 de Abril de 2002 para fins ambientais: visa optimizar a utilização de agregados reciclados e outras alternativas aos agregados virgens e promover uma extracção e utilização racionais dos agregados virgens que constituem um recurso natural não renovável.

A fim de atingir mais eficazmente os objectivos ambientais perseguidos que não decorriam do AGL, as autoridades do Reino Unido subordinaram a concessão da redução ao compromisso por parte dos requerentes de subscreverem formalmente e respeitarem os acordos negociados com as autoridades britânicas, que os obrigaram a participar num programa de melhoria dos resultados ambientais ao longo do período de duração da medida.

APRECIAÇÃO

Em primeiro lugar, à luz do acórdão do Tribunal de Primeira Instância, a Comissão examinou se existia uma relação intrínseca entre a medida de auxílio propriamente dita, concedida sob forma de uma exoneração fiscal, e o tratamento fiscal discriminatório dos produtos importados. Como no caso em apreço essa relação foi verificada, a Comissão teve de apreciar se a medida de auxílio não envolvia uma tributação interna discriminatória em violação do artigo 110.o do TFUE (ex artigo 90.o). A Comissão recorda principalmente a jurisprudência relativa à legislação nacional que concede benefícios fiscais aos produtos de origem nacional quando são produzidos segundo determinadas normas ambientais. Esta imposição interna não é considerada compatível com o artigo 110.o do TFUE se a vantagem não se aplicar aos produtos importados fabricados segundo essas mesmas normas. Uma vez que não era esse o caso da isenção do AGL na Irlanda do Norte a Comissão tem, consequentemente, dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade com o TFUE, nomeadamente com o artigo 110.o da isenção do AGL alterada na Irlanda do Norte.

Estas dúvidas sobre a compatibilidade com o disposto no artigo 110.o do TFUE impedem, nesta fase, a Comissão de considerar a medida compatível com o mercado interno. Recordando as dúvidas relativas à compatibilidade da medida com as regras em matéria de auxílios estatais, a Comissão apreciou as medidas em causa nos termos do Enquadramento dos auxílios estatais a favor do ambiente, nomeadamente as suas regras relativas à concessão de auxílios sob a forma de isenções ou reduções dos impostos ambientais. Considerando o carácter ilegal do auxílio concedido ao abrigo desta exoneração AGL alterada na Irlanda do Norte em virtude da anulação pelo Tribunal da compatibilidade da medida, a Comissão apreciou a medida em causa nos termos do Enquadramento dos auxílios estatais a favor do ambiente de 2001 e, a partir de 2 de Abril de 2008 (ou seja, a data a partir da qual os mesmos são aplicáveis) ao abrigo do Enquadramento dos auxílios estatais a favor do ambiente de 2008.

No que respeita, concretamente, à apreciação ao abrigo do Enquadramento de 2001, a Comissão chegou à conclusão de que as condições estavam preenchidas, recordando de novo que as suas dúvidas quanto ao respeito do artigo 110.o do TFUE a impedem de considerar, nesta fase, a medida compatível com o mercado interno.

No que se refere ao Enquadramento dos auxílios estatais a favor do ambiente de 2008, a Comissão chegou à conclusão preliminar de que tem dúvidas quanto ao respeito do requisito da necessidade do auxílio, em especial, se o aumento substancial dos custos de produção não puder ser repercutido nos clientes finais, sem provocar quebras significativas nas vendas. A Comissão observa, neste contexto, que, embora as informações prestadas pelas autoridades do Reino Unido demonstrem um aumento muito significativo dos custos de produção decorrentes do AGL, o que normalmente implicaria uma importante quebra nas vendas, à luz do carácter pouco pormenorizado das informações, a Comissão não pode concluir, na presente fase, que esta condição de compatibilidade se encontre preenchida.

Por conseguinte, com base na análise preliminar, a Comissão tem dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade da medida de «Exoneração do imposto sobre os granulados na Irlanda do Norte (ex N 2/04)» com o Tratado e quanto à sua compatibilidade com o mercado interno. Em conformidade com o artigo 4.o, n.o 4, do Regulamento (CE) n.o 659/1999, a Comissão decidiu dar início ao procedimento formal de investigação e convida as partes interessadas a apresentarem as suas observações.

TEXTO DA CARTA

«The Commission wishes to inform the UK authorities that, having examined the information supplied by them on the aid referred to above, it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

1.   PROCEDURE

| 1. | The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004.

| 2. | The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2).

| 3. | On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3).

| 4. | On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04). |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04).

| 5. | On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment.

| 6. | On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959). |
| --- | --- |

6.

On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959).

| 7. | The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The aggregates levy

| 8. | The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity.

| 9. | The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom.

2.2.   The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 10. | In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products. |
| --- | --- |

10.

In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products.

2.3.   The modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 11. | The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there.

2.3.1.   Background

| 12. | The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development.

| 13. | According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded. |
| --- | --- |

13.

According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded.

| 14. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent.

2.3.2.   Modification

| 15. | In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8). |
| --- | --- |

15.

In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8).

| 16. | The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9).

2.3.3.   Environmental agreements

| 17. | In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief. |
| --- | --- |

17.

In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief.

| 18. | The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:






  (a) | the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:

(a)

the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and

| (b) | the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter.

| 19. | Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

19.

Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management.

| 20. | The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings.

2.3.4.   Aggregates production costs, selling price and price elasticity of demand

| 21. | As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

  Table 1


  Selling price







  Type of rock | Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Basalt | 4,21 |
| Sandstone | 4,37 |
| Limestone | 3,72 |
| Sand and gravel | 4,80 |
| Other | 5,57 |
| Weighted average price | 4,42 |

21.

As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

Table 1

Selling price

Type of rock

Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne)

Basalt

4,21

Sandstone

4,37

Limestone

3,72

Sand and gravel

4,80

Other

5,57

Weighted average price

4,42

| 22. | As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

  Table 2 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,5 | 3,4 | 3,9 | 3,6 | 4,3 | 4,3 |
| GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 7,9 | 8,4 | 9,0 | 7,7 | 8,8 | 9,7 | 9,2 | 10,9 |

22.

As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

Table 2

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne

2,9

3,1

3,5

3,4

3,9

3,6

4,3

4,3

GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne

7,9

8,4

9,0

7,7

8,8

9,7

9,2

10,9

| 23. | As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic. |
| --- | --- |

23.

As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic.

2.3.5.   Pass-on and sales reductions

| 24. | As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain. |
| --- | --- |

24.

As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain.

| 25. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

  Table 3


  A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland











  Product | 2000-2001
  (million tonnes) | 2001-2002
  (million tonnes) | 2002-2003
  (million tonnes) | Fall,
  2001-2003
  (%) | Fall,
  2002-2003
  (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sand and gravel | 2,35 | 2,34 | 1,91 | –18,7 | –8,4 |
| Crushed rock | 7,86 | 7,88 | 7,27 | –7,5 | –7,7 |
| Fill material | 3,00 | 3,89 | 1,71 | –43,0 | –56,0 |
| Total | 13,21 | 14,11 | 10,89 | –17,6 | –22,8 |

25.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

Table 3

A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland

Product

2000-2001

(million tonnes)

2001-2002

(million tonnes)

2002-2003

(million tonnes)

Fall,

2001-2003

(%)

Fall,

2002-2003

(%)

Sand and gravel

2,35

2,34

1,91

–18,7

–8,4

Crushed rock

7,86

7,88

7,27

–7,5

–7,7

Fill material

3,00

3,89

1,71

–43,0

–56,0

Total

13,21

14,11

10,89

–17,6

–22,8

| 26. | The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state.

| 27. | As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers. |
| --- | --- |

27.

As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers.

2.3.6.   Other information

| 28. | The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011). |
| --- | --- |

28.

The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011).

| 29. | As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible. |
| --- | --- |

29.

As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible.

| 30. | The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.

2.4.   Position of third parties, appreciable positive effects

| 31. | In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue. |
| --- | --- |

31.

In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue.

| 32. | The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects. |
| --- | --- |

32.

The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects.

| 33. | As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock. |
| --- | --- |

33.

As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock.

| 34. | As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates. |
| --- | --- |

34.

As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates.

| 35. | With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003. |
| --- | --- |

35.

With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003.

| 36. | Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility.

3.   ASSESSMENT

3.1.   State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC)
   (13)

| 37. | State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

37.

State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| 38. | The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

38.

The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States.

| 39. | Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC). |
| --- | --- |

39.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC).

3.2.   Lawfulness of the aid

| 40. | Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15). |
| --- | --- |

40.

Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15).

3.3.   Compatibility of the aid

| 41. | It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16). |
| --- | --- |

41.

It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16).

| 42. | Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17). |
| --- | --- |

42.

Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17).

| 43. | The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

43.

The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States.

| 44. | As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated. |
| --- | --- |

44.

As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated.

| 45. | Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products.

| 46. | Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20). |
| --- | --- |

46.

Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20).

3.3.1.   Compliance with Article 110 of the TFEU

| 47. | According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

47.

According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU.

| 48. | According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect. |
| --- | --- |

48.

According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect.

| 49. | Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements.

| 50. | Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate.

| 51. | Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements.

| 52. | Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21). |
| --- | --- |

52.

Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21).

| 53. | Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment.

| 54. | Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage.

3.3.2.   Compatibility of the measure under the Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 55. | Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection.

| 56. | The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful). |
| --- | --- |

56.

The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful).

| 57. | Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:






  (a) | the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

57.

Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:

(a)

the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and

| (b) | the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008.

Ad (a) Compatibility of the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 58. | Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions. |
| --- | --- |

58.

Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions.

| 59. | The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax. |
| --- | --- |

59.

The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax.

| 60. | Point 51(2) provides that:
  “The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:






  (a) | the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection; |
| --- | --- | --- |

60.

Point 51(2) provides that:

“The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:

(a)

the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection;

| (b) | the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”.

| 61. | Point 51(1) provides that:
  “These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:






  1. | When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:






  (a) | these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.
  These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

61.

Point 51(1) provides that:

“These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:

1.

When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:

(a)

these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.

These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above;

| (b) | these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:






  — | where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:

—

where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection,

| — | where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”. |
| --- | --- |

—

where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”.

| 62. | With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)). |
| --- | --- |

62.

With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)).

| 63. | Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market.

| 64. | The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence). |
| --- | --- |

64.

The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence).

| 65. | In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

65.

In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled.

| 66. | In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent). |
| --- | --- |

66.

In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent).

| 67. | In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25). |
| --- | --- |

67.

In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25).

| 68. | For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

68.

For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage.

Ad (b) Compatibility of the measure under the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 69. | Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159). |
| --- | --- |

69.

Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159).

| 70. | As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes. |
| --- | --- |

70.

As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes.

Environmental benefit

| 71. | Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued. |
| --- | --- |

71.

Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued.

| 72. | As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials. |
| --- | --- |

72.

As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials.

| 73. | Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL.

Necessity of the aid

| 74. | According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

74.

According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary.

(1)   Objective and transparent criteria

| 75. | Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 76. | The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent. |
| --- | --- |

76.

The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent.

(2)   Substantial increase in production costs

| 77. | Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 78. | The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26). |
| --- | --- |

78.

The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26).

| 79. | Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

(3)   Impossibility to pass on the substantial increase in production costs

| 80. | Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned. |
| --- | --- |

80.

Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned.

| 81. | The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland. |
| --- | --- |

81.

The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland.

| 82. | The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased. |
| --- | --- |

82.

The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased.

| 83. | Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007. |
| --- | --- |

83.

Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007.

| 84. | In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided. |
| --- | --- |

84.

In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided.

| 85. | With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided. |
| --- | --- |

85.

With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided.

| 86. | Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers.

| 87. | Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

87.

Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met.

Proportionality of the aid

| 88. | With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:






  (a) | it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

88.

With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:

(a)

it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers;

| (b) | it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified;

| (c) | it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied.

| 89. | The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax. |
| --- | --- |

89.

The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax.

3.4.   Conclusions

| 90. | On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

90.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market.

| 91. | The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158. |
| --- | --- |

91.

The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158.

| 92. | Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision. |
| --- | --- |

92.

Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision.

4.   DECISION

| 93. | In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

93.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| 94. | The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

94.

The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

| 95. | The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.» |
| --- | --- |

95.

The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.»

---

(1)  The phased introduction of the AGL.

1

(2)  OJ C 133, 5.6.2002, p.11.

2

(3)  OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 4.

3

(4)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet reported.

4

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(5)  The AGL is applied to imported raw aggregate, but not to aggregate contained in imported processed products.

5

(6)  On 2 April 2008, i.e. the day from which the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines were applicable, the level of AGL was GBP 1,95/tonne.

6

(7)  OJ C 37, 3.2.2001, p. 3.

7

(8)  The aggregates extracted in Northern Ireland and shipped to any destination in Great Britain were liable to the AGL at the full rate. This was also the case for aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland that was used in the manufacturing of processed products shipped to Great Britain. This ensured that aggregates and processed products from Northern Ireland did not enjoy a competitive advantage in the market of Great Britain.

8

(9)  As referred to above, the implementation of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was suspended as from 1 December 2010.

9

(10)  The information was submitted by the UK authorities for the purposes of an assessment of the measure on the basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. DETI Minerals Statement 2009.

10

(11)  Distribution costs depend on haulage distances, with haulage costs in the range of 15 to 20 pence per tonne per mile, with aggregate being delivered within 10 to 15 miles, depending on local circumstances.

11

(12)  Ecotec (1998) Report; EEA Report (No 2/2008) effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in selected EU countries; British Geological Survey (2008): The need for indigenous aggregates production in England.

12

(13)  The definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) of the TFEU did not change from the one contained in Article 87(1) EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

13

(14)  See Case C-199/06 CELF [2008] ECR I-469, paragraphs 63 and 66 to 68.

14

CELF

(15)  See Case C-199/06 CELF, cited above, paragraphs 61 and 64.

15

CELF

(16)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 91.

16

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(17)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 93.

17

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(18)  “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.

18

Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.”

(19)  The rules for national internal taxation as laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU did not change from those contained in Article 90 EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

19

(20)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 92.

20

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(21)  Case 21/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR p. 1, paragraphs 23 to 26; and in particular Case C-213/96 Outukumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, paragraphs 30 et seq.

21

Commission

Italy

Outukumpu

(22)  The identity of the taxpayer as such is therefore of limited importance.

22

(23)  “Thus [Article 110] must guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between domestic products and imported products.” (Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR p. 1343, paragraph 24).

23

[Article 110]

Bergandi

(24)  Commission Notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid, OJ C 119, 22.5.2002, p. 22.

24

(25)  See for instance Commission Decision on case N 449/01 (Germany) — Continuation of the ecological tax reform (OJ C 137, 8.6.2002, p. 34). Furthermore, this position was confirmed in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines where the payment of 20 % of the tax was explicitly “codified” as a proportionality condition of the aid granted in the form of exemption or reduction from environmental taxes (point 159(b)).

25

(26)  The highest selling price (GBP 5,57/tonne), the lowest profit margin (2 %) and the level of the AGL as originally notified in 2004 (GBP 1,6/tonne) are assumed. If the AGL level on 1 April 2008 (GBP 1,95/tonne) is applied, the share increases to approximately 36 %. Any other combination of price and profit margin necessarily results in the AGL presenting more then 30 % of the production costs.

26

(27)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

27

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| 24.8.2011 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 245/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 245/21

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AUXÍLIO ESTATAL — ALEMANHA

(Artigos 107.o a 109.o do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia)

Auxílio estatal MC 15/09 — Alienação do Banco Deka pelo LBBW

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

2011/C 245/10

Por carta de 14 de Janeiro de 2011, a Comissão notificou à Alemanha a sua decisão sui generis relativa ao auxílio MC 15/09.

TEXTO DA CARTA

«I.   PROCEDIMENTO

| (1) | Por Decisão de 15 de Dezembro de 2009, a Comissão autorizou uma injecção de capital de 5 mil milhões de EUR e a adopção de medidas de protecção em relação a activos depreciados de 12,7 mil milhões de EUR, relativamente à carteira estruturada num montante de 35 mil milhões de EUR de activos a favor do Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (a seguir designado “LBBW”) no processo C 17/09 (a seguir designada “Decisão LBBW”) (1). Tal autorização foi subordinada à assunção de um certo número de compromissos por parte da Alemanha. Um dos compromissos consistia no facto de o LBBW dever alienar a sua participação no Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (a seguir designado “Banco Deka”) por (2) [...]. |
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(1)

Por Decisão de 15 de Dezembro de 2009, a Comissão autorizou uma injecção de capital de 5 mil milhões de EUR e a adopção de medidas de protecção em relação a activos depreciados de 12,7 mil milhões de EUR, relativamente à carteira estruturada num montante de 35 mil milhões de EUR de activos a favor do Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (a seguir designado “LBBW”) no processo C 17/09 (a seguir designada “Decisão LBBW”) (1). Tal autorização foi subordinada à assunção de um certo número de compromissos por parte da Alemanha. Um dos compromissos consistia no facto de o LBBW dever alienar a sua participação no Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (a seguir designado “Banco Deka”) por (2) [...].

| (2) | Em 13 de Dezembro de 2010, a Alemanha apresentou uma carta do LBBW que assinalava que o Banco Deka não podia ser alienado antes de [...]. Em 21 de Dezembro de 2010, a Alemanha declarou que o administrador (3) e o Ministério das Finanças de Baden-Württemberg tinham confirmado que o LBBW tinha feito tudo o que estava ao seu alcance para concluir o processo de venda no prazo estabelecido. Em 22 de Dezembro de 2010, a Alemanha notificou um pedido de prorrogação do prazo de alienação até [...]. Em 5 de Janeiro de 2011, a Alemanha apresentou informações adicionais. |
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(2)

Em 13 de Dezembro de 2010, a Alemanha apresentou uma carta do LBBW que assinalava que o Banco Deka não podia ser alienado antes de [...]. Em 21 de Dezembro de 2010, a Alemanha declarou que o administrador (3) e o Ministério das Finanças de Baden-Württemberg tinham confirmado que o LBBW tinha feito tudo o que estava ao seu alcance para concluir o processo de venda no prazo estabelecido. Em 22 de Dezembro de 2010, a Alemanha notificou um pedido de prorrogação do prazo de alienação até [...]. Em 5 de Janeiro de 2011, a Alemanha apresentou informações adicionais.

| (3) | Em 22 de Dezembro de 2010, a Alemanha informou a Comissão de que, por razões de urgência, aceitava a título excepcional que a presente decisão fosse adoptada na língua inglesa. |
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(3)

Em 22 de Dezembro de 2010, a Alemanha informou a Comissão de que, por razões de urgência, aceitava a título excepcional que a presente decisão fosse adoptada na língua inglesa.

II.   FACTOS

| (4) | A Decisão LBBW assenta em vários compromissos. A alínea c, do n.o 5 do considerando 38 da Decisão LBBW faz referência ao compromisso assumido pela Alemanha de que o LBBW venderia a sua participação no Banco Deka até [...]. A decisão não permitia explicitamente uma prorrogação desse prazo. |
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(4)

A Decisão LBBW assenta em vários compromissos. A alínea c, do n.o 5 do considerando 38 da Decisão LBBW faz referência ao compromisso assumido pela Alemanha de que o LBBW venderia a sua participação no Banco Deka até [...]. A decisão não permitia explicitamente uma prorrogação desse prazo.

| (5) | O Banco Deka é uma instituição de direito público (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) que procede — através de filiais — à gestão dos fundos de investimento privado das caixas económicas alemãs. Metade do seu capital é detido pela associação alemã das caixas económicas (DSGV), sendo os restantes 50 % detidos pelos Landesbanken através de uma sociedade holding (a seguir designada “sociedade holding”). A participação indirecta do LBBW no Banco Deka ascende a 14,8 %. Os proprietários têm um direito de preferência no caso de uma das partes pretender vender a sua participação. |
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(5)

O Banco Deka é uma instituição de direito público (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) que procede — através de filiais — à gestão dos fundos de investimento privado das caixas económicas alemãs. Metade do seu capital é detido pela associação alemã das caixas económicas (DSGV), sendo os restantes 50 % detidos pelos Landesbanken através de uma sociedade holding (a seguir designada “sociedade holding”). A participação indirecta do LBBW no Banco Deka ascende a 14,8 %. Os proprietários têm um direito de preferência no caso de uma das partes pretender vender a sua participação.

| (6) | Inicialmente, a DSGV apresentou uma oferta pela participação do LBBW no Banco Deka, que era válida até [...]. Para que a venda se tornasse efectiva, devia ser aceite por todos os outros Landesbanken que detivessem uma participação no Banco Deka, bem como pelo próprio Banco Deka e pela sua assembleia geral. |
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(6)

Inicialmente, a DSGV apresentou uma oferta pela participação do LBBW no Banco Deka, que era válida até [...]. Para que a venda se tornasse efectiva, devia ser aceite por todos os outros Landesbanken que detivessem uma participação no Banco Deka, bem como pelo próprio Banco Deka e pela sua assembleia geral.

| (7) | A Alemanha informou a Comissão de que todos os Landesbanken com uma participação na sociedade holding tencionam vender a sua participação à DSGV, o que tornaria esta associação a única proprietária do Banco Deka. Prevê-se uma decisão vinculativa sobre estas vendas até [...], embora não posse excluir-se um novo adiamento até [...], em razão da complexidade do processo decisório. Segundo a Alemanha, se os Landesbanken venderem as suas participações na sociedade holding, os acordos necessários para a alienação da participação do LBBW no Banco Deka serão alcançados de forma mais rápida o que facilitaria o processo de alienação. |
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(7)

A Alemanha informou a Comissão de que todos os Landesbanken com uma participação na sociedade holding tencionam vender a sua participação à DSGV, o que tornaria esta associação a única proprietária do Banco Deka. Prevê-se uma decisão vinculativa sobre estas vendas até [...], embora não posse excluir-se um novo adiamento até [...], em razão da complexidade do processo decisório. Segundo a Alemanha, se os Landesbanken venderem as suas participações na sociedade holding, os acordos necessários para a alienação da participação do LBBW no Banco Deka serão alcançados de forma mais rápida o que facilitaria o processo de alienação.

| (8) | A Alemanha informou ainda a Comissão de que a DSGV prolongou a sua oferta para a aquisição da participação do LBBW no Banco Deka até [...]. |
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(8)

A Alemanha informou ainda a Comissão de que a DSGV prolongou a sua oferta para a aquisição da participação do LBBW no Banco Deka até [...].

| (9) | Não obstante o pedido de prorrogação do prazo de alienação do Banco Deka, a Alemanha defende que o LBBW fez tudo o que estava ao seu alcance para assegurar a sua concretização. O administrador que supervisiona as alienações do LBBW, relativamente às quais a Alemanha assumiu um compromisso no quadro da Decisão LBBW, confirmou a avaliação. |
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(9)

Não obstante o pedido de prorrogação do prazo de alienação do Banco Deka, a Alemanha defende que o LBBW fez tudo o que estava ao seu alcance para assegurar a sua concretização. O administrador que supervisiona as alienações do LBBW, relativamente às quais a Alemanha assumiu um compromisso no quadro da Decisão LBBW, confirmou a avaliação.

III.   APRECIAÇÃO

| (10) | A presente decisão diz respeito à execução do plano de reestruturação aprovado no âmbito da Decisão LBBW. A Alemanha solicita um adiamento do prazo para a alienação do Banco Deka de três meses, [...]. |
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(10)

A presente decisão diz respeito à execução do plano de reestruturação aprovado no âmbito da Decisão LBBW. A Alemanha solicita um adiamento do prazo para a alienação do Banco Deka de três meses, [...].

| (11) | A Comissão pode prorrogar os prazos para as alienações. Embora tal não esteja explicitamente previsto no Regulamento (CE) n.o 659/1999, a Comissão tem a faculdade de autorizar uma prorrogação do prazo, desde que tal não impeça a execução da Decisão LBBW (4). |
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(11)

A Comissão pode prorrogar os prazos para as alienações. Embora tal não esteja explicitamente previsto no Regulamento (CE) n.o 659/1999, a Comissão tem a faculdade de autorizar uma prorrogação do prazo, desde que tal não impeça a execução da Decisão LBBW (4).

| (12) | A Comissão observa que o LBBW já desencadeou o processo de venda do Banco Deka de forma activa, obtendo uma oferta da DGSV. A esse respeito, a Comissão regista a opinião das autoridades alemãs e do administrador, segundo a qual o LBBW fez tudo o que estava ao seu alcance para fazer avançar o processo de alienação. |
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(12)

A Comissão observa que o LBBW já desencadeou o processo de venda do Banco Deka de forma activa, obtendo uma oferta da DGSV. A esse respeito, a Comissão regista a opinião das autoridades alemãs e do administrador, segundo a qual o LBBW fez tudo o que estava ao seu alcance para fazer avançar o processo de alienação.

| (13) | Além disso, afigura-se muito provável, de acordo com a Alemanha, que os Landesbanken com uma participação na sociedade holding venham a vender igualmente a sua participação, o que facilitaria o processo global de alienação da participação do LBBW no Banco Deka. |
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(13)

Além disso, afigura-se muito provável, de acordo com a Alemanha, que os Landesbanken com uma participação na sociedade holding venham a vender igualmente a sua participação, o que facilitaria o processo global de alienação da participação do LBBW no Banco Deka.

| (14) | Por último, existem argumentos convincentes de que o processo de alienação se realizará no prazo proposto, ou seja, até [...], o mais tardar. Em especial, afigura-se que [...]. A presente decisão permite que o LBBW venda a sua participação no Banco Deka, mesmo que o processo decisório dos Landesbanken para a venda das suas participações no Banco Deka seja mais longo do que o previsto. |
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(14)

Por último, existem argumentos convincentes de que o processo de alienação se realizará no prazo proposto, ou seja, até [...], o mais tardar. Em especial, afigura-se que [...]. A presente decisão permite que o LBBW venda a sua participação no Banco Deka, mesmo que o processo decisório dos Landesbanken para a venda das suas participações no Banco Deka seja mais longo do que o previsto.

| (15) | Um alargamento do prazo de alienação de três meses não põe em causa a execução global do plano de reestruturação aprovado na Decisão LBBW, que se manterá em vigor até 2014. Por outro lado, ajudará o LBBW a obter os necessários acordos dos outros Landesbanken com vista a facilitar a alienação, tanto conjunta como individualmente. Consequentemente, a prorrogação, limitada no tempo, deve permitir que o LBBW venda a sua participação no Banco Deka antes de [...]. Assim, permitirá ao LBBW ultrapassar as dificuldades acima mencionadas, na sua maioria de carácter exógeno, e completar a alienação do Banco Deka, tal como previsto na Decisão LBBW. Consequentemente, a Comissão considera que o pedido de uma prorrogação relativamente curta até [...] é justificado, especialmente atendendo às especificidades da estrutura jurídica do Banco Deka. Dadas as circunstâncias do processo, tal prorrogação não é considerada um adiamento do calendário inicialmente adoptado, o que exigiria uma redução correspondente do montante do auxílio (5). |
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(15)

Um alargamento do prazo de alienação de três meses não põe em causa a execução global do plano de reestruturação aprovado na Decisão LBBW, que se manterá em vigor até 2014. Por outro lado, ajudará o LBBW a obter os necessários acordos dos outros Landesbanken com vista a facilitar a alienação, tanto conjunta como individualmente. Consequentemente, a prorrogação, limitada no tempo, deve permitir que o LBBW venda a sua participação no Banco Deka antes de [...]. Assim, permitirá ao LBBW ultrapassar as dificuldades acima mencionadas, na sua maioria de carácter exógeno, e completar a alienação do Banco Deka, tal como previsto na Decisão LBBW. Consequentemente, a Comissão considera que o pedido de uma prorrogação relativamente curta até [...] é justificado, especialmente atendendo às especificidades da estrutura jurídica do Banco Deka. Dadas as circunstâncias do processo, tal prorrogação não é considerada um adiamento do calendário inicialmente adoptado, o que exigiria uma redução correspondente do montante do auxílio (5).

IV.   CONCLUSÃO

| (16) | Pelas razões acima expostas, a Comissão considera que uma prorrogação do prazo de três meses no caso do Banco Deka é necessária para permitir uma correcta execução do plano de reestruturação do LBBW, e que não impede a sua realização. |
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(16)

Pelas razões acima expostas, a Comissão considera que uma prorrogação do prazo de três meses no caso do Banco Deka é necessária para permitir uma correcta execução do plano de reestruturação do LBBW, e que não impede a sua realização.

V.   DECISÃO

A Comissão prorroga o prazo para a alienação do Banco Deka até 31 de Março de 2011.»

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(1)  JO L 188 de 21.7.2010, p. 1.

1

(2)  Alguns trechos do presente texto foram omitidos a fim de assegurar a não divulgação de informações confidenciais. Essas partes são indicadas com reticências entre parênteses rectos, sendo assinaladas com um asterisco.

2

(3)  Nomeado em conformidade com a Decisão LBBW para acompanhar e execução dos compromissos assumidos relativamente às alienações, a fim de determinar se foram cumpridos de forma integral e correcta.

3

(4)  Ver Decisão de 21 de Dezembro de 2010 no processo MC 8/09 WestImmo.

4

WestImmo.

(5)  Ver Orientações comunitárias relativas aos auxílios estatais de emergência e à reestruturação a empresas em dificuldade, JO C 244 de 1.10.2004, p. 2, ponto 52, alínea d).

5

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