1

Filed 6/28/21 Marriage of McAuley CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re the Marriage of AMEENAH and JEFFERY 

ALLEN MCAULEY.

C090504

AMEENAH SALAAM,

Appellant,

v.

JEFFERY ALLEN MCAULEY,

Respondent.

(Super. Ct. No. 12FL07094)

Ameenah Salaam (mother) appeals from an order changing primary physical 

custody of her minor son, A., from mother, in Maryland, to father, Jeffery Allen 

McAuley (father), in California. Although mother had been the child’s primary physical 

caretaker since birth, the trial court decided a change of custody was in A.’s best interest 

after finding mother had engaged in a continuous course of conduct designed to frustrate 

father’s visitation rights and alienate A. from father. 
2

On appeal, mother argues the trial court erred by (1) conducting a hearing without 

proper service of father’s initial request for order, (2) granting relief in excess of what 

was requested in the initial request for order, (3) rendering a decision without considering 

all the relevant facts, (4) improperly excluding relevant evidence, and (5) failing to 

properly weigh the evidence adduced at trial.

1

 Finding no error, we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother and father were married in July 2011, and separated in December 2012. 

They had one son, A., born in September 2012. Father stipulated to a five-year domestic 

violence restraining order in April 2013, which expired in April 2018. After dissolution, 

mother and father were awarded joint legal custody of A. Mother was given sole 

physical custody, with father having visitation rights three days a week and during 

specified holidays. 

In November 2017, mother filed a request for an order allowing her to relocate to 

Virginia. In December 2017, over father’s objection, the court granted the “move-away” 

request and awarded mother sole legal custody of A. Father was awarded

visitation/parenting time with A. in California during the month of July, Thanksgiving 

holidays in odd-numbered years, winter break in even-numbered years, and spring break 

every year. The court also ordered that each parent shall have the right to “reasonable 

Facetime or Skype communication . . . when [A.] is with the other parent.” 

As ordered, A. visited father in July of 2018. Around the same time, mother 

moved from Virginia to Maryland without seeking court approval. Mother told father

about her move, but would not disclose her new address. 

Father alleged that after A.’s summer visit, his parenting time with A. was 

significantly reduced. He also claimed that he was no longer able to speak with A. on a 

1 Although father did not file a respondent’s brief, we reverse only if prejudicial 

error is found. (Lee v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1192, fn. 7.) 
3

regular basis. Video calls failed because A.’s tablet always was set to “do not disturb.” 

Father would sit and wait for hours for A. to call him. Sometimes the phone would ring 

only once and, if father missed the call, A. would not call again. 

Father claimed that he would ask mother to have A. call, but mother would tell 

him A. was busy or did not want to call. Mother told him that she was unwilling to force 

A. to call if he did not want to. As a result, father claimed he was only able to speak to 

his son approximately seven or eight times between August and December 2018. Father 

produced a call log to support his claim. 

On November 30, 2018, a few weeks before A. was scheduled to fly to California 

for winter break, mother e-mailed father stating that A. would no longer be allowed to 

visit or communicate with him in any way. Mother explained to father, for the first time,

that “[u]pon [A.’s] return home from his [July 2018] visit . . . , A. told me on August 7th

[that] ‘Daddy pulled my penis and made it bleed.’ ” In response, father sent mother a text

message calling the accusation “ridiculous” and accusing her of deliberately interfering

with his relationship with A. 

Father’s requests for court orders

On December 19, 2018, father filed an ex parte request for an emergency order

compelling mother to (1) comply with the previously established visitation schedule, 

(2) pay for the next visit and split the cost of future visits equally, and (3) ensure A. has at 

least a 15-minute visit with father every two days. Father also asked the court to reinstate 

joint legal custody and order mother to provide him with A.’s school and medical 

information. 

At the December 19, 2018 hearing on the ex parte request, the court referred the 

parties to Family Court Services for mediation, temporarily halted father’s visitation and 

parenting time, and set a further hearing on February 5, 2019. 

Both parties appeared for the February 5 hearing. At the hearing, the court heard

father’s explanation of the alleged sexual abuse. According to father, A. came into father 
4

and his fiancée’s bedroom one night and said that his “ ‘pee pee hurts.’ ” Father asked A. 

to pull down his “pull-ups” training pants, which A. wore because of a bed-wetting 

problem, noticed that the pull-up was wet, and saw that A. had mild redness on the tip of 

his penis. Father cleaned up A., applied ointment, and told A. not to wear the pull-ups for 

the next few days until the soreness went away. 

The court learned that mother had arranged for A. to be interviewed at the 

Children’s National Hospital, Child and Adolescent Protection Center (Children’s 

National), in August 2018. The report from that interview stated: “ ‘Patient made no 

direct disclosure about anyone touching his body in a way that made him feel 

uncomfortable or that he considered to be inappropriate.’ ” 

Several weeks after the Children’s National interview, mother arranged for A. to 

be interviewed by Maryland police. A recording of that interview was forwarded to the 

Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, and a detective was assigned to review the recorded 

interview. The detective concluded there was insufficient evidence of sexual abuse, and 

declined to open a criminal investigation. Both Maryland and Sacramento Child 

Protective Services (CPS) also declined to take action. 

The court, unpersuaded by mother’s sexual abuse allegations, restored father’s 

visitation/parenting time and ordered mother to pay the transportation costs for A.’s 

upcoming 2019 spring break visit. In addition, mother was to allow father to have video

calls with A. on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, and ordered both parents to “exert 

every effort to maintain free access and unhampered contact” between A. and the other 

parent. The court also ordered, “[s]hould either parent engage in conduct which 

undermines the shared custody arrangement, it shall be considered that the parent is not 

acting in the best interests of the child and such non-conformance may be the grounds for 

modification of this order.” At mother’s request, the matter was set for trial on June 13, 

2019. 
5

After the February 5 hearing, mother informed father that despite the court’s 

orders, she would not allow A. to visit during spring break due to the alleged sexual 

abuse. Thus, on February 22, 2019, father filed another ex parte request seeking an order 

to show cause regarding contempt for violating the February 5 order, sanctions, costs and 

attorney fees. Although father did not check the “child custody” box on the form, father 

checked the box indicating that he was requesting an order relating to “physical custody,”

and explained that “[t]he law allows for changing primary physical custody away from 

the parent who refuses to comply with visitation orders.” 

At the February 22 ex parte hearing, mother told the court that she could not afford 

to pay for A.’s spring break travel and did not think A. should have to go because the 

sexual abuse allegations had not been (in her mind) adequately investigated. The court 

did not change its prior order, and set the matter for further hearing on March 26. 

On or about March 15, 2019, mother applied for and was granted a 15-day 

temporary protective order (TPO) by a Maryland court. Relying on the Maryland TPO, 

mother refused to allow father any visitation/parenting time with A. In response, father 

again requested emergency relief, seeking an order to show cause for contempt, sanctions 

and attorney fees, as well as sole physical custody of A. The court set the matter for 

hearing on March 26, the same day as the continued hearing on the prior request for 

order. 

At the March 26 hearing, mother promised she would follow the prior orders and 

deliver A. to father for his spring break visit. At the time, mother intended to seek an 

extension of the Maryland TPO, but she concealed this fact from the court.

2

 Mother later 

defended the nondisclosure by claiming she did not know whether the extension would 

be granted. 

2 Mother also filed a request for an order changing jurisdiction of the case from 

California to Maryland, which was denied. 
6

On March 29, the Maryland court granted mother’s request to extend the TPO 

through April 30, 2019. Mother then relied on the Maryland TPO to deny A.’s spring 

break visit with father. 

In early April, father filed yet another request for an emergency order, seeking 

sole physical custody of A., an order to show cause for contempt, sanctions, and attorney 

fees. In response, the court slightly increased father’s parenting time and ordered mother 

to pay the transportation costs for A.’s summer visit.

3

 

Arguments at trial

Trial was held on June 13, and July 10-11, 2019. Mother’s position at trial was 

that father sexually abused A. Mother testified that shortly after A. returned from visiting 

father in July 2018, she took A. to his pediatrician, and then to a therapist at Children’s 

National to be interviewed about the alleged abuse. She contacted law enforcement and 

child protection agencies in California and Maryland, but none were willing to take 

action against father. Mother testified that she was not satisfied with the results of the 

investigations into the alleged sexual abuse and believed A. was not safe around father. 

Mother denied that she intentionally frustrated father’s visitation rights. She 

claimed that father received regular calls from A. prior to the alleged abuse. She argued 

that her actions after the alleged abuse were taken to protect A.’s health, safety, and 

welfare. 

Mother admitted that she violated California court orders to produce A. for the 

2019 spring break visit. She testified that she believed the Maryland TPO superseded the 

California orders, even though the California court had told her otherwise. 

3 The court also ordered mother to pay $1,500 in attorney fees, which was in 

addition to fees awarded at the March 26 hearing. These fee orders are beyond the scope 

of this appeal. (In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119; In re Marriage 

of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1311.)
7

Mother also admitted that there were many missed calls with father. She testified 

that it was not her obligation to ensure that A. called father or to have A. return missed 

calls from father. Mother left it up to A. If A. wanted to call, he would call; if he did not 

want to call, she did not make him call. Mother claimed that A. did not want to talk with 

father due to the alleged abuse. 

Mother argued it would not be in A.’s best interest to change custody to father. In 

addition to the alleged sexual abuse, mother argued that father had posttraumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD) and a history that includes “home drinking” and a domestic violence

restraining order.

4

 In contrast, she argued that she has been with A. since birth and has 

provided consistency, continuity, and stability. Mother asked for sole legal and physical 

custody of A., while allowing father only limited, supervised visits. 

In her case-in-chief, mother called Family Court Services counselor Marie Sims 

(Sims). Sims testified that after interviewing mother and father, reviewing the Children’s 

National report, and speaking to the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, she concluded the 

sexual abuse allegations could not be substantiated. 

Sims testified that it is detrimental for a child to have no contact with the 

noncustodial parent and that a parent who prevents contact with the other parent is not 

acting in the best interest of the child. But Sims also testified that a sudden change in 

custody is hard on a child and, before ordering a change in custody based on interference 

with visitation rights, she first would want to work with the custodial parent to try to help 

the parent understand how important it is to facilitate contact with the other parent. 

Depending on the circumstances, she testified she also might recommend a more “in4 Father denied current treatment for PTSD. A 2014 forensic evaluation indicated 

that father stopped drinking in February 2013. Father testified that he was tested for 

alcohol as part of the domestic violence restraining order and that he never had a positive

test. 
8

depth” evaluation by a licensed private mental health professional to determine why 

visitation was being blocked. 

Father’s position at trial was that the sexual abuse allegation was part of a broader 

effort by mother to alienate him from his son. 

Father called his fiancée, Megan Daniel (Daniel), who had lived with father for 

four years and knew A. well. Daniel testified that she had acted as a stepmother to A.

and had a good relationship with him. Daniel is employed as a social worker for CPS. 

She deals with allegations of sexual abuse and has been trained to recognize signs of 

sexual abuse. She testified it is not uncommon for parents to use allegations of sexual 

abuse to gain an advantage in custody cases. 

With regard to the sexual abuse allegations against father, Daniel testified there 

was nothing out of the ordinary during A.’s July 2018 visit. She recalled an incident in 

which A. came into their bedroom and said, “[M]y penis hurts.” Father pulled down A.’s 

pull-up training pants and they saw that A. had redness on the tip of his penis that looked 

like diaper rash. Father told A. not to wear the pull-ups for a few days to let the area 

heal, and that was the end of it. 

Daniel testified that not having consistent contact with father had been traumatic 

for A. She recalled a call in 2019 when A., who had not spoken to his father for many 

months, asked father, “[D]id you miss me? Did you forget about me?” On crossexamination, Daniel admitted it also could be “traumatic” to remove A. from mother’s 

physical custody. 

Coleman Daniel (Mr. Daniel), Megan Daniel’s 32-year-old brother, also testified

for father. Mr. Daniel testified that he lived in the home during the summer of 2018 and 

recalled the incident with A. His account was consistent with his sister’s. Mr. Daniel 

testified that A.’s demeanor did not change after the incident and that A. was sad to leave 

at the end of July. 
9

Father also called Detective Campoy from the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department, 

Child Abuse Bureau, to testify. Detective Campoy reviewed the written reports and 

watched the recorded interview of A. conducted by Maryland police. He testified that the 

victim did not make a proper disclosure of any criminal conduct and there was 

insufficient evidence to warrant an investigation in Sacramento. In his opinion, it was 

extremely unlikely that sexual abuse occurred. 

Father testified on his own behalf. He denied sexual abuse of A. and asserted that 

mother had been trying to exclude him from A.’s life since shortly after A. was born. 

Father testified that mother had on more than one occasion asked him to relinquish 

parental rights. Mother also told him that if he requested shared physical custody, she 

would move away, which is what happened. 

Father testified that he disagreed with the merits of the 2013 domestic violence 

restraining order, but stipulated to it because he did not understand its significance and 

did not want to speak to mother anyway. After the restraining order was issued, mother 

threatened to send a copy to his employer unless father relinquished his parental rights. 

When father refused, mother followed through on her threat, and father lost his job. 

Mother did this more than once and, as a result, father has not been employed full time

since 2013. Father testified that if he received custody, he would be available to care for 

A., as his work is sporadic and occurs primarily in the evenings. 

Father acknowledged that mother is a good mother, but claimed she had

deliberately interfered with his visitation rights and tried to alienate A. from him. He 

argued that mother not only does not care whether he has a meaningful relationship with 

his son, she has actively sought to diminish and destroy the relationship. Father testified 

that after mother and A. moved to the east coast, mother gave him very little information 

about his son and he had not seen and had very little contact with A. for approximately 11 

months. 
10

Father argued that mother’s sabotage of his visitation rights justified reversing the 

custody and visitation order to give him sole physical custody of A., with mother having 

parenting time on specified holidays and school breaks. He argued such relief was 

necessary due to mother’s history of violating court orders with which she does not agree. 

Father argued that giving him sole physical custody would be in the child’s best 

interest because, among other reasons, A. would have a better living situation in a stable 

home with two parents and access to stepsiblings, would attend a better school, and 

would have no need for daycare. Father argued that, unlike mother, he would comply 

with all court orders and facilitate contact between A. and mother. 

Trial court’s ruling

The trial court found the testimony of Detective Campoy, Ms. Daniel, Mr. Daniel, 

Sims, and (for the most part) father to be balanced and credible. In contrast, it found 

mother’s testimony to be self-serving and not credible. The court found that mother has 

consistently and intentionally frustrated father’s visitation rights, in violation of court 

custody orders. The court found that mother had no interest in allowing A. to have a 

relationship with father, that she “manipulated” court processes to defeat father’s 

visitation rights, and that she is only willing to follow court orders when she agrees with

them. 

The court found mother’s conduct to be “unacceptable” and “detrimental” to A. 

Considering all the facts and circumstances, and bearing in mind the importance of 

preserving parental relationships, the trial court concluded that it was in the best interest 

of A. to modify the custody arrangement and give father joint legal and sole physical 

custody of A., with mother having visitation/parenting time on specified holidays and 

school breaks. 
11

DISCUSSION

I

Service of the Initial Request for Order

Mother argues the trial court’s order must be overturned due to father’s failure to 

properly serve the December 2018 request for order. She argues that rules 5.92 and 5.167 

of the California Rules of Court required father to personally serve the papers supporting 

the request for order “at the first reasonable opportunity before the hearing.” (Cal. Rules 

of Court, rules 5.167(a) & 5.92(f).) She contends that father violated these rules because 

she did not receive the papers supporting the request until February 8, 2019, at the 

earliest. She contends this prejudiced her ability to respond to father’s request and to 

participate in the mediation. 

We conclude that mother’s challenge is moot because the February 5, 2019 ruling 

on father’s initial request for order is no longer in effect, having been superseded by later 

requests for orders and the eventual August 2, 2019 decision and order after trial, which 

is the subject of this appeal. (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 566; see also 

Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1378.) 

II

Granting Relief in Excess of the Request for Order

Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it granted relief 

exceeding what father requested in his request for order. In particular, mother complains 

that the trial court ordered a change of custody from mother to father even though 

custody was not “in dispute” until father “verbally” requested it on “the first day of trial.” 

The record belies her claim.

Although mother is correct that father’s initial request for order only sought to 

enforce father’s visitation rights, father’s later requests for orders explicitly requested that 

he be granted sole physical custody of A. And mother had actual notice father was 

requesting a change in custody well before trial. In her petition for the Maryland TPO, 
12

filed in March 2019, mother expressly acknowledged that the “issue of visitation and 

custody is set for trial in late June 2019.” There is nothing in mother’s trial testimony to 

suggest she was unfairly surprised when father requested physical custody in his opening 

statement. In sum, the evidence shows that mother had notice that father was requesting 

a change of custody. We therefore reject her claim that the trial court exceeded its 

authority when it granted that request.

5

III

Evidentiary Rulings

Mother contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence relevant to the issue of 

custody. In particular, she contends the court improperly excluded (1) a recorded video 

of A. refusing to call father, (2) a recorded video showing “verbal abuse” of father 

towards mother, and (3) a copy of the Sacramento CPS “ ‘evaluated out’ ” report of child 

abuse. Mother contends the court improperly excluded the first two items because the

transcripts were not certified, and improperly excluded the CPS report on hearsay 

grounds. 

We deem mother’s contentions to be forfeited because she has not supported them 

with adequate citations to legal authority or the record. (Fernandes v. Singh (2017) 16 

Cal.App.5th 932, 942-943; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) We are not 

required to search the record to determine whether it contains support for her contentions. 

(Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545.)

In any event, mother’s contentions appear to lack merit. As far as we can 

ascertain, both the CPS report and the recorded calls were properly excluded, both on 

5 Mother also argues that the court abused its discretion by ordering her to post a 

$5,000 bond, instead of the $3,000 bond requested in the December 2018 request for 

order. Because she fails to cite any legal authority to support her contention, we deem 

the argument forfeited.
13

hearsay grounds and because there was no evidence that the call participants consented to 

the recording. (Pen. Code, § 632, subd. (d); Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. 

(2006) 39 Cal.4th 95, 117-120 [Penal Code section 632 applies when the communication 

takes place in part in California and in part in another state].)6

IV

Failure to Consider All Relevant Evidence

Mother further contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider 

all the facts relevant to a determination of what was in the best interest of A. We are 

unpersuaded.

A. Legal Background

The focus of California’s statutory scheme governing child custody and visitation 

determinations is the “ ‘best interest of the child.’ ” (In re Marriage of Brown & Yana

(2006) 37 Cal.4th 947, 955 (Brown); Fam. Code, § 3040; see also Fam. Code, §§ 3011, 

3020.) When making an initial custody determination, a trial court has broad discretion 

to determine what arrangement serves the child’s best interest. (In re Marriage of 

Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 34 (Burgess).) It must consider all relevant factors, 

including the health, safety, and welfare of the child; any history of abuse by one parent 

against the child or the other parent; and the nature and amount of the child’s contact with 

the parents. (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 955-956.)

Once a particular custody arrangement is deemed to be in a child’s best interest, 

the “ ‘paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements . . . weigh 

6 Although mother is correct that under rule 2.1040(b)(1) of the California Rules of 

Court, the transcripts were not required to be certified, mother did not object to the 

certification ruling at trial, thereby forfeiting the issue. (Smith v. County of Los Angeles

(1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 266, 284 [questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will 

not be reviewed on appeal absent a specific and timely objection at the trial on the ground 

sought to be urged on appeal].) 
14

heavily in favor of maintaining’ that custody arrangement.” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 

p. 956.) Thus, a party seeking to modify a permanent custody order can do so only if he 

or she demonstrates a significant change of circumstances justifying the modification. 

(Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 256.)

This “changed circumstance rule” is not a different test, but a “variation on the 

best interest standard . . . that the trial court must apply when a parent seeks modification 

of a final judicial custody determination.” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 956.) The rule 

protects the interest in stable custody arrangements by preserving the established mode of 

custody unless some significant change of circumstances indicates that a different 

custody arrangement would be in the child’s best interest. (Ibid.; Montenegro v. Diaz, 

supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256.)

Our Supreme Court has considered the changed circumstances rule in the context 

of a custodial parent’s request to move a child to a distant location (sometimes called a 

“move-away” case). (In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072 (LaMusga).) 

The court held that the mere fact that a custodial parent proposes to move the child does 

not by itself constitute “ ‘changed circumstances’ ” requiring a reevaluation of an existing 

custody order. (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) Thus, in a typical move-away 

case in which the custodial parent seeks to relocate, the noncustodial parent has the initial 

burden to show the move will cause some detriment to the child. (Brown, supra, 37 

Cal.4th at pp. 959-960; accord, LaMusga, at p. 1096.) If the noncustodial parent makes 

the threshold showing of detriment, warranting reevaluation of the existing custody 

arrangement, the trial court is then obligated to “perform the delicate and difficult task of 

determining whether a change in custody is in the best interests of the [child].” 

(LaMusga, at p. 1078; accord, Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 960.) 

Among the factors a court ordinarily should consider when deciding whether to 

modify custody in light of a proposed move are: the child’s interest in stability and 

continuity in the custodial arrangement; the distance of the move; the child’s age; the 
15

child’s relationship with both parents; the relationship between the parents, including 

their willingness to put the child’s interests above their own; the child’s wishes (if the 

child is mature enough for this inquiry to be appropriate); the reasons for the proposed 

move; and the extent to which the parents currently share custody. (LaMusga, supra, 32 

Cal.4th at p. 1101; accord, Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 960-961.)

The California Supreme Court has clarified that the noncustodial parent in a 

typical move-away case has no burden to prove that a change of custody is “ ‘essential’ ” 

to prevent detriment to the child from the planned move.

7

 (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th 

at pp. 1078, 1097-1098.) After overcoming the initial hurdle of showing the proposed 

relocation would cause detriment to the child, the noncustodial parent’s burden instead is 

to show that, under all the circumstances, a change of custody would be in the child’s 

best interest. (Ibid.; Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 956; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 

37; Speelman v. Superior Court (1983) 152 Cal.App.3d 124, 129; see also Burchard v. 

Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 535-536 [under policy favoring stable custodial 

arrangements, the noncustodial parent has the burden to show a change is in the child’s 

best interest].) 

Here, unlike a typical move-away case, it is the noncustodial parent requesting a 

change of custody that would require the child to relocate. Nevertheless, we conclude 

that the standard is the same as any other change of custody case involving a proposed 

relocation. The noncustodial parent must satisfy an initial burden by showing that, due to 

7 The relevant language, from its earlier ruling in Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at page

38, stated that a change of custody in a move-away case is justified “only if, as a result of 

relocation with that parent, the child will suffer detriment rendering it ‘ “essential or 

expedient for the welfare of the child that there be a change.” ’ ” In LaMusga, the 

California Supreme Court clarified that the paramount principle in custody cases is the 

welfare and best interest of the child, and held that a change in custody is “ ‘essential or 

expedient’ ” within the meaning of Burgess if it is in the best interest of the child. 

(LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1097-1098.)
16

a significant change of circumstances, there will be detriment to the child unless custody

is changed. Once the noncustodial parent meets this threshold showing of detriment, the 

court must exercise its discretion to decide whether, in light of the change in

circumstances and all other relevant factors (health, safety, and welfare of the child, any 

history of abuse, the child’s age, community ties, etc.), a change of custody is in the 

child’s best interest. (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1078, 1089, 1095, 1101; Brown, 

supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 960-961.)

Although the need for continuity and stability weighs heavily in favor of existing 

custody arrangements, courts enjoy “ ‘wide discretion’ to order a custody change based 

upon a showing of detriment . . . if such a change is in the best interest of the child in 

light of all the relevant factors.” (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 961.) We review the 

trial court’s order for an abuse of discretion. (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32.) 

Frustration of the other parent’s visitation rights is a circumstance that has been 

held to justify a change in custody. (Brown, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 960, citing LaMusga, 

supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1083-1085; Speelman v. Superior Court, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 132; In re Marriage of Wood (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 671, 682, questioned on 

unrelated grounds in In re Marriage of S. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 738, 749, In re 

Marriage of Ciganovich (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 289, 293-294; see also Moffat v. Moffat

(1980) 27 Cal.3d 645, 652 [deliberate sabotage of visitation rights furnishes ground for 

custody modification and is a significant factor bearing on the fitness of the custodial 

parent].)

B. Analysis

In this case, the trial court heard testimony from several witnesses about the 

importance of maintaining stability and continuity in A.’s custody arrangement. 

Nevertheless, the trial court impliedly found that there had been a significant change of 

circumstances warranting a change of custody based on mother’s frustration of father’s 

visitation rights and attempts to alienate A. from father, which the court found to be 
17

detrimental to the child. After considering all the evidence, including the evidence about 

A.’s proposed living situation in California and father’s pledge to ensure A. maintains his 

relationship with mother, the court concluded that giving father physical custody would 

be in the child’s best interest.

Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider all the 

facts relevant to a determination of what was in A.’s best interest. In particular, she 

contends the court failed to consider (1) how disrupting the existing custodial 

arrangement might affect A.’s mental and emotional stability; (2) whether father’s PTSD 

presents safety and welfare concerns for the child; (3) father’s (alleged) sexual abuse of 

A. in July 2018; and (4) father’s history of domestic violence and alcohol abuse. 

Before turning to the substance of her claim, we return to the issue of mother’s 

failure to comply with the rules of appellate procedure, namely, her failure to provide any 

record citations in the argument portion of her brief. Rule 8.204 of the California Rules 

of Court requires any reference to a matter in the record to be supported by a citation to 

the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Although mother included citations to the record in the

factual portion of her brief, such citations do not cure her failure to cite evidence in the 

argument section of her brief. (City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 

1211, 1239; Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, 

fn. 8.) As a result, we may disregard her arguments. 

But even if not forfeited, mother has failed to demonstrate error. Mother assumes

the court did not consider evidence that was not specifically addressed in the court’s

ruling. However, under established rules of appellate procedure, when the record is 

silent, we presume that the trial court weighed the evidence and that the trial court’s order 

is correct. (Young v. Rosenthal (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 96, 123; Cable Connection, Inc. 

v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1362.) The burden of demonstrating error 
18

rests on the appellant. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 

624, 631-632.) 

Here, mother has failed to meet her burden to show the court failed to weigh all 

the evidence at trial. The court expressly stated that it considered “all of the facts and 

circumstances” bearing on the best interest of the child and the court referred, 

specifically, to father’s domestic violence restraining order, the alleged sexual abuse, and

testimony that changing custody would be traumatic for A. There is nothing in the record 

to indicate the court ignored this evidence or failed to consider the other factors cited by 

mother. A trial court’s failure to discuss every factor in its ruling is not error and does 

not indicate the court failed to properly discharge its duties. (LaMusga, supra, 32 Cal.4th 

at p. 1093 [court’s failure to state on the record consideration of child’s interest in stable 

custodial and emotional ties with custodial parent not error].) Accordingly, we find no 

abuse of discretion.

V

Weight of the Evidence

Mother also claims the court failed to properly weigh the evidence and determine 

the credibility of the witnesses. In particular, she contends father was not credible and 

that the court should not have believed his version of the events regarding the alleged 

sexual abuse. 

As discussed, we review a custody and visitation order for abuse of discretion. 

(Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32.) In evaluating the factual basis for a court’s exercise 

of discretion, broad deference is required. “ ‘ “The trial judge, having heard the 

evidence, observed the witnesses, their demeanor, attitude, candor or lack of candor, is 

best qualified to pass upon and determine the factual issues presented by their 

testimony.” ’ [Citation.]” (Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1163.) It is 

not our role as the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence, redetermine the credibility of 

the witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony. (Catherine D. v. Dennis B. (1990) 
19

220 Cal.App.3d 922, 931; accord, Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 

Cal.App.4th 892, 916.) We may reverse only if under all the evidence, viewed most 

favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no reasonable person could have reached 

the same conclusion. (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.) 

Here, mother has failed to show that the trial court’s findings are not supported by 

substantial evidence or that they exceeded the bounds of reason. She simply refers 

(without citation) to evidence supportive of her position and invites us to reweigh the 

evidence and reach a different conclusion. This is beyond the scope of our review. 

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a 

change in custody was in the child’s best interest. 

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order is affirmed. There is no prevailing party for purposes of 

costs on appeal. 

 KRAUSE , J.

We concur:

 RAYE , P. J.

 HOCH , J.