SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2338-17T1

ABDUL-MALIK MUHAMMAD,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE 

BOARD,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Submitted May 1, 2019 – Decided July 11, 2019

Before Judges Vernoia and Moynihan.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Abdul-Malik Muhammad, appellant pro se. 

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Susanne M. Davies, 

Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Appellant Abdul-Malik Muhammad was released on parole in May 1989. 

He was arrested on November 7, 1990 for aggravated manslaughter and robbery. 

A parole warrant was issued on December 7 or 12, 19901and appellant was 

returned to State prison on December 27, 1990. He was sentenced on May 6, 

1991 to an aggregate State prison term of fifty years with twenty-five years of 

parole ineligibility for aggravated manslaughter and robbery (the 1991 

sentence). Appellant waived his right to a final parole revocation hearing in 

September 1991. His parole was revoked by the New Jersey State Parole Board 

on October 23, 1991 and he was directed to serve the adjusted maximum term 

of five years, eleven months and one day (the parole revocation sentence) 

consecutive to the 1991 sentence.

Appellant appeals from the Board's final agency decision contending the 

Board erred in calculating his parole eligibility date (PED). He argues the 

Board's decision requiring him to first serve the 1991 sentence before the parole 

revocation sentence was "unreasonable, misplaced and erroneous." In support 

of his argument that his parole revocation sentence should be served first, 

 

1

 Appellant contends in his merits brief that the warrant was issued on December 

12. The final agency decision lists both dates. We were not provided with the 

warrant.
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appellant notes that he was returned to State prison on the parole violation, for 

which he "could not make bail or regain his liberty . . . due to the fact that a 

parole warrant was lodged." He contends the Board cannot 

argue that the time he spent in prison on [the parole] 

violation is jail credit[] toward[] the [1991 sentence]. 

Nor can [the Board], after having returned him to 

prison, stop the parole term initiated, and legitimately 

require appellant to serve the parole violation at the end 

of the [1991] sentence.

Mindful of the standards that guide our review, we conclude that the Board's 

decision was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and affirm; we are 

constrained, however, to remand this matter to the Board to address any 

calculation of appellant's PED based on the award of jail credits during the 1991 

sentencing.

We accord a strong presumption of reasonableness to the Board's 

decisions. Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 

1993). Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the Board's decision was 

arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. Id. at 304-05. Our task is to review the 

record and the agency's findings to determine whether the findings could have 

reasonably been reached on the credible evidence before the agency. Close v. 

Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599 (1965). We owe deference to the expertise of 
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the Board when it renders decisions in this field. Puchalski v. N.J. State Parole 

Bd., 104 N.J. Super. 294, 301 (App. Div.), aff'd, 55 N.J. 113 (1969).

In that the judge did not order the 1991 sentence to run concurrent to the 

parole revocation sentence, "such term of imprisonment and any period of 

reimprisonment that the parole board may require the defendant to serve upon 

the revocation of his parole shall run consecutively." N.J.S.A. 2C: 44-5(c). The 

Board determined 

the aggregate parole eligibility term consists of the 

twenty-five (25) year mandatory minimum term 

imposed as a component of the [1991 sentence] and the 

five (5) years[,] eleven (11) months and one (1) day 

parole eligibility term established upon [appellant's]

parole status being formally revoked on October 23, 

1991; that the first component of the aggregate parole 

eligibility term is the twenty-five (25) year parole 

eligibility term as said term was imposed prior to the 

formal revocation of [appellant's] parole status; and that 

the aggregate parole eligibility term is deemed to have 

commenced on May 6, 1991, the date [appellant was]

sentenced. 

Thus the Board complied with N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(c) and imposed the period of 

reimprisonment – after the revocation on October 23, 1991 – to run 

consecutively to the sentence imposed in May 1991. And the Board correctly 

aggregated the parole eligibility terms. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.2(d). The fact that 

appellant was housed in State prison after the parole warrant was issued is not 
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determinative of which sentence is first served. The 1991 sentence was imposed 

in May. Appellant's reimprisonment on the parole sentence did not begin until 

his parole was revoked in October. As such, we conclude the Board's decision

that appellant serve the 1991 sentence prior to the parole revocation sentence

was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

 We recognize defendant's jail credits from the day the parole warrant was 

issued through May 6, 1991 were not applied toward the parole revocation 

sentence as is now required by the Supreme Court's holding in State v. Black, 

153 N.J. 438 (1998), and our ruling in State v. Harvey, 273 N.J. Super. 572 

(App. Div. 1994). Once a parole warrant is issued, unless "the warrant is 

withdrawn or parole is not revoked and the defendant is not returned to custody," 

Harvey, 273 N.J. Super. at 576; see also Black, 153 N.J. at 459, credits are 

properly applied "to the original offense on which the parole was granted and

not to any offense or offenses committed during the parolee's release," Black, 

153 N.J. at 461; see also Harvey, 273 N.J. Super. at 573, 574-75.

Credits from the issuance of the parole warrant on December 7 or 12

through the day prior to sentencing should have accrued toward the parole 

revocation sentence, not the 1991 sentence. The Board recognized this anomaly 

but concluded that the 1991 sentencing judge awarded the credits against that 
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sentence; "therefore, [appellant's] date returned to custody was adjusted from 

November 7, 1990 to May 6, 1991."

The judge's award of credits is not before us on this appeal; we, therefore, 

cannot remand the matter to the sentencing judge for correction of the judgment 

of conviction. To the extent that the credit award impacted the calculation of 

appellant's PED – if at all – we remand only for the Board to calculate the PED 

utilizing the proper jail credits attributable to each sentence: November 7, 1990 

to the day before the parole warrant was issued should be attributable to the 1991 

sentence; time from the date the parole warrant was issued forward should be 

attributable to the parole revocation sentence.

In sum, we affirm the Board’s determination that appellant must serve the 

1991 sentence prior to the parole revocation sentence and remand for the Board 

to address the calculation of appellant’s PED date. 

Affirmed in part and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.