U.S. Nuclear Office of Nuclear NUREG/BR-0117

Regulatory Material Safety No. 06-02

Commission and Safeguards June 2006

NMSS Quarterly Newsletter

Contents	 Page

1.	 Revision To Title 10, Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR), 10 CFR 35.50(d) ...............1

2.	 E-mail Subscription Service of the NMSS

Quarterly Licensee Newsletter..........................1

3.	 Decommissioning of Nuclear

Facilities Website...............................................2

4.	 Notice of Meeting and

Invitation for Speakers ......................................2

5.	 Well Logging Event in Zealand, Denmark........3

6.	 New Authorized User as RSO on New Medical

Use Licenses......................................................3

7.	 Generic Communications Issued

(March 1, 2006 - May 31, 2006) .......................4

8.	 Significant Events

(March 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006) ....................

9.	 Significant Enforcement Actions.......................5

10.	 Selected Federal Register Notices)....................6

REVISION TO TITLE 10, CODE OF FEDERAL 

REGULATIONS, (CFR)ˇ10 CFRˇ35.50(d)

TheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)recently

corrected an inadvertent omission to the regulations in

10 CFR 35.50(d). Section 35.50 covers the training a

experience (T&E) requirements for Radiation Safety

Officers (RSO). Paragraphs 35.50(a) through 35.50(

provide five separate T&E pathways for an individual

seeking authorization as the RSO for a medical use

license. All five pathways require an RSO precept

attestation under 10 CFR 35.50(d). Although all fi

pathways are described in 10 CFR 35.50(a) through (c),

35.50(d) omitted listing 10 CFR 35.50(c)(2), the T&E

pathway for already-authorized individuals, as one ofthe

optional pathways.

IntheThursday,January12,2006, editionoftheFederal 

Register(71 FR1926), the NRCcorrected the omission

to 10CFR35.50(d) by adding the text, “or(c)(2)” to the

listedparagraphs. ThischangeallowsthepreceptorR

to attest that the authorized individual (e.g., authorized

user, authorizedmedical physicist or authorized nuclear

pharmacist)seekingRSO statusmeetsthe requirements

in 10 CFR 35.50(c)(2) (i.e., is presently an authorized

user,authorizedmedicalphysicist,orauthorizednuclear

pharmacist identified on the licensee’s license and has

experience with the applicable elements of radiation

safety for the types and use of byproduct material

similar to those required for the RSO responsibilities).

The preceptor RSO must also attest that the authorized

individual hastraining in the radiation safety,regulatory

issues and emergency procedures for the types of use

for which a licensee seeks approval, and has achieved a

levelofradiationsafetyknowledgesufficienttofunction

independentlyastheRSOforamedicaluselicense. Th

rule change eliminates the unintended requirement for

an authorized individual seeking approval as the RSO

for the medical use license to also have completed the

T&E requirements for one of the other four pathways

in 10 CFR 35.50(a) through (c)(1).

(Contact: Cindy Flannery, Office of Nuclear Materi

Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-0223; e-mail: cm

nrc.gov)

E-MAIL SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE OF THE 

NMSS QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER

TheOfficeofInformationServices,alongwiththeOffice

ofNuclearMaterialSafetyandSafeguards(NMSS),has

implemented a Listserv program that allows external

stakeholders to subscribe to, and receive, electronic

copies of the NMSS Quarterly Newsletter. This newly

created subscription service will allow interested

parties to add their e-mail addresses to a list that will

automatically send e-mailed copies of the newsletter

every 3 months.
2

To sign up for this service, send an e-mail to: Lyri

nrc.gov

In the Subject field place: NMSS Quarterly Newslett

IntheMessage/Bodyfieldaddthewords: subscribenm

quarterly newsletter/user’s name

______________________________________

Unsubscribingisthesamemethod,excepttypeunsubscribe

in the body instead of subscribe.

Currently, each issue of the NMSS newsletter is mailed

to more than 4300 individuals and organizations. 

encouraging licensees to receive the NMSS newsletter

as an e-mail attachment, theAgency willsave substantial

resources in staff hours and printing and mailing costs.

Readers preferring to continue to receive a paper copy of

the newslettershould contact Michael Williamson at the

e-mail address and/or phone number provided below.

(Contact: Michael K. Williamson, Editor, NM

Quarterly Newsletter, 301-415-6234, e-mail: mkw

nrc.gov)

DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR

FACILITIES WEBSITE

The quarterly update ofthe website will be effective June

30, 2006. The update to the website incorporates t

current status of the sites undergoing decommissioning,

the lessons learned, and adds to the currently existing

information. TheDecommissioningofNuclearFaciliti

website, accessible from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s (NRC) public home page, includes

information on all decommissioning sites (complex

materials, power reactors, research and test reactors,

uranium recovery, and fuel cycle facilities) This site

also includes maps, applicable regulations, guidance

and communications, the decommissioning process,

financialassurancefordecommissioning,theoversightof

materials and reactorsites undergoing decommissioning,

and opportunities for public involvement. Users c

also find decommissioning program documents, the

terminated license tracking system, international aspects

ondecommissioning,lessonslearnedindecommissioning

ofnuclearfacilities,frequentlyaskedquestionsandhowto

contact the NRC about the decommissioning program.

(Contact: Sam Nalluswami, Division of Waste

Management and Environmental Protection, 301-415-

6694; e-mail: smn@nrc.go

NOTICE OF MEETING AND 

INVITATION FOR SPEAKERS

Title: Fuel Cycle Information Exchange 2006 (FC

2006)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is hosting

a seminar on August 30 and 31, 2006, to provide

an opportunity for licensees, NRC staff, and other

stakeholdersto exchange information and discussissues

of interest pertaining to the regulation of NRC regulated

fuel cycle facilities.

The seminar will be held in Rockville, Maryland, at the

Universities of Maryland at the Shady Grove Campus

Auditorium and will be open to the public. Fuel Cycle

licensees and other interested parties were previously

notified of the possibility of this meeting in a letter from

Robert Pierson, dated November 28, 2005 (ADAMS

accession number ML053220226). In that letter, M

Pierson also solicited topics of discussion and volunteer

speakers for the meeting. We are expecting that N

staff,licenseesandcertificateholders,andotherinterested

parties and stakeholders will be making presentations on

varyingsubjectsofinterest,withopportunityforfollow-up

discussion on each subject.

The proposed items of discussion are listed below;

however,theNRCisseekingadditionalspeakerstodiscuss

topics of a broad nature,relative to the nuclearfuel cycle.

If you would like an opportunity to discuss an issue, or

to offer an additional topic of discussion, please contact

the staff member listed below.

Currently Proposed Topics of Discussion:

•	 10 CFR Part 70, Subpart H Implementation Issues

•	 Databases and Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS)

Tracking Systems

•	 Boundaries of IROFS

•	 Impact of Increased Use of Nuclear Energy in

Domestic Electricity Generation

•	 IAEA safety documents related to fuel cycle

facilities

•	 360-degree feedback fromthe industry and public of

issues ofinterest pertaining to the regulation of NRC

regulated fuel cycle facilities

•	 Overview and Experience Under the NRC’s New

Hearing Process By Fuel Cycle Applicants and

Licensees
3

Location:	 Universities of Maryland at the

	 	 Shady Grove Campus Auditorium

	 9630 Gu

	 	 Rockvil

Dates: 		 August 30, 2006

	 	 9:00 am - 4:30 pm

	 	 August 31, 2006

	 	 9:00 am - 12:00 

(Contact: James Smith, Project Manager, Office 

NuclearMaterialSafetyandSafeguards,DivisionofFuel

Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Special Projects Branch,

Mail Stop: T8F42, 301-415-6459, Fax: 301-415-537

e-mail: jas4@nrc.go

WELL LOGGING EVENT IN 

ZEALAND, DENMARK 

TheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)reported

in April 2006, that a 185-gigabecquerel (GBq) (5 Curie)

Americium-241/Beryllium(GulfNuclearInc.Model71-

1)sealedsourcewasunintentionallydisconnectedfromits

holder and attached on the outside of a storage/transport

container (neutron/gamma shield), where it remained

unshielded for a period of 52 days.

According to the report, after a well logging operation

on October 31, 2005, an operator was unable to insert a

connected source and source holder into the transport/

storage container. In examining the device, the operat

found that the base of the source capsule was irregular

and mistook it for a mounting device that had broken off

from the interior of the container. He disconnected t

source from the holder with his fingers and placed the

empty holderin the container. The operatorthen attach

the source to the exterior of the container with adhesive

tape. On returning to his company’s location, he plac

the container in the storage room and reported that a

mounting device had broken off from the interior of the

container. The IAEA report indicates that the compa

management failed to react, and the unshielded source

remained attached to the exterior of the container in the

storage room.

Forty-eight dayslater, a different operator, who had been

informed of the container’s potentially broken mounting

device, but not told to take anymaintenance actions, took

thecontaineroutofstorage,withtheunshieldedsourcestill

attachedontheoutside,fora4-daywellloggingoperation.

Use of the neutron probe was not planned until the end

of the fourth day. However, during the 4-day peri

and while using various other types of non-radioactive

loggingprobes,theoperatorrepeatedlyrestedontopofthe

container only a few inches from the unshielded source.

Apparently, from this position he could operate both the

winch and computer simultaneously, which placed him

approximately 3-6 inches from the source for 8-9 hours

over the 4-day logging activities. It wasn’t until t

neutronloggingoperationfailed,thattheoperatorbecame

aware that the source was disconnected from the holder,

and eventually discovered it attached to the container’s

exterior. Thesourcewasreturnedtoasafestoragepositi

in the container on December 22, 2005.

Although the operators had been instructed in neutron

logging, nonewere familiarwith the design ofthe source,

the source holder, or the container in detail. The IA

report indicates that neither operator was equipped

with a real-time dosimeter. The first operator carried

personal dosimeter, which indicated an effective dose

of 6.6 millisieverts (mSv) (660 mrem). The seco

operator did not carry a personal dosimeter, as required

by Danish regulations. His dose was assessed fr

biological dosimetry, as well as log-timer readouts and

distance estimates. The dose was below the lowest lev

of detectability (LLD) for biological dosimetry, using

standard analysis of dicentric chromosomes. This 

consistent with preliminary maximal dose estimates

of 100-150 mSv (10,000 - 15,000 mrem). The repo

provides no information concerning exposures to any

individuals while in storage. Further information ab

this event, or other eventsreported by the IAEA, may be

found at: http://w

news.iaea.org/news/news_login.asp.

(Contact: BruceCarrico,OfficeofNuclearMaterialSafe

and Safeguards, 301-415-7826; e-mail: jbc@nrc.go

NEW AUTHORIZED USER AS RSO ON NEW 

MEDICAL USE LICENSES

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff

recently received an application from a physician

requesting to be listed as an authorized user(AU), aswell

as, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), on a new NRC

medical use license. The physician met the training a

experience requirements to be recognized as an AU, but

did notmeetthe requirementsinTitle 10,Code ofFederal

Regulations (CFR), 10 CFR 35.50(c)(2) to be listed as

an RSO,since the physician had never been named as an

AUonanyNRC,orAgreementStatemedicaluse license.

In addition, the physician did notsatisfy the training and

experience requirements specified in 10 CFR 35.50(a),

(b), or (c)(1).

This training and experience pathway in 10 CFR

35.50(c)(2)tobecomeanRSOrequiresanAU,authorized

medicalphysicist(AMP),orauthorizednuclearpharmacist

(ANP) to; (1) be identified on the licensee’s license; and

(2) have experience with the radiation safety aspects of

similar types of use of byproduct material for which the

individual has Radiation Safety Officer responsibilities.
4

NRCrevised10CFR35.50onMarch30,2005,torequire

any individual seeking to be recognized as an RSO to

haveawrittenattestation,signedbyapreceptorRadiation

Safety Officer, that the individual has satisfactorily

completed specific requirementsreferenced in 35.50(d

and has achieved a level of radiation safety knowledge

sufficientto function independently as aRadiationSafety

Officer for a medical use licensee (60 Federal Register

(FR) 16336, March 30, 2005). Prior to this revision, t

requirementsthat are now in 10CFR35.50(c)(2), did not

requiresuchanattestation. NotethatonJanuary12,200

NRC corrected an inadvertent omission in paragraph (d)

to make it clear that an AU, AMP, or ANP meeting the

requirements in paragraph (c)(2), does not have to meet

thehealthphysicist/medicalphysicistrequirementsinthe

other training and experience pathways. However, t

preceptor must still attest that the individual meets the

requirements specified in paragraphs (c)(2), and (d) (71

FR 1926, January 12, 2006).

Although the physician applying to be both a new

AU and RSO had experience with the radiation safety

aspects of similar types of use of byproduct material

for which the individual would have Radiation Safety

Officer responsibilities, the physician could not meet the

other requirement in 10 CFR 35.50 (c)(2), because the

individual was not yet an AU. In addition, a precept

RSO could not attest that the person was either an AU,

or met the training and experience requirements, in any

of the other pathways specified in 10 CFR 35.50. T

applicant wasrequested to identify another individual as

theRSO, and provide documentation that the person met

the requirements in 10 CFR 35.50. Applicants for n

licenses should be aware of the current requirements.

(Contact: Donna-BethHowe,Office ofNuclearMateri

Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-7848; e-mail: db

nrc.gov)

GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS ISSUED 

(March 1, 2006 - May 31, 2006)

The followingare summariesofU.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission (NRC) generic communications. If one

of these documents appears relevant to your needs and

you have not received it, please call one of the technical

contacts listed below. The Internet address for the N

library of generic communications is - http://www.nrc.

gov/readingrm/doccollections/gencomm/index.html.

Please note that this address is case-sensitive and must

be entered exactly as shown. If you have any questio

or comments about generic communications in general,

please contact Angela R. McIntosh, (301) 415-5030, or

by e-mail: arm@nrc.gov.

Bulletins (BLs)

None.

Generic Letters (GLs)

None.

Information Notices (INs)

IN 2006-07, “Inappropriate Use of a Single-Parameter 

Limit,” asaNuclearCriticalitySafetyLimit,” wasis

on March 31, 2006. This IN was issued to all license

authorized to possess a critical mass of special nuclear

material.

(Technical contact: Tamara D. Powell, NMSS, 301-415-

5095; email: tdp@nrc.gov)

IN 2006-10, “Use of Concentration Control for 

Criticality Safety,” was issued on April 23, 2006. Th

IN was issued to all licensees authorized to possess a

critical mass of special nuclear material.

(Technical contact: Natreon Jordan, NMSS, 301-41

7648; e-mail: njj@nrc.go

Regulatory Issue Summaries (RIS’)

RIS 2006-05, “Withdrawal of Transportation 

Safeguards Advisories SA-01-01, Rev. 1 and SA-03-02,”

was issued on April 20, 2006. This RIS was issued 

licenseesthattransport,ordelivertoacarrierfortransport,

radioactive material in quantities of concern.

(Technicalcontacts:OlegBukharin,NSIR,301-415-3551;

e-mail oab@nrc.gov; andAdelaideGiantelli,NSIR,30

415-3521; e-mail: asg2@nrc.go

(GeneralContact:AngelaR.McIntosh,NMSS,301-415-

5030; e-mail: arm@nrc.go

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

(March 1, 2006 - April 30, 2006)

Event #1: Overexposure to Radiographe

Date and Place: March 3, 2006, North Kensingto

Rhode Island

Nature and Probable Causes: The licensee repor

that two radiographersreceived radiation overexposures.

Aradiographytrainerandtraineeweretraversingfromone

celltoanotheratafixedradiographyfacility. Theyenter

a cell, without a survey meter, to view the radiography

setupandcheckouttheguide tube andother components.
5

The trainer and trainee were in close proximity to the

partially collimated source tip, unaware that the source

was exposed. Both persons handled the source duri

the training experience. A third radiographer, who w

actually performing the radiography in the cell, became

aware that the source was exposed and advised the other

two radiographers. All three exited the cell, secured t

source, and notified the radiation safety officer. T

incident involved anAEATechnologies exposure device

(Model 660-B, Serial #B1302) with an Iridium -192 (Ir192) source (Model 424-9, Serial #27093B) containing

an activity of 3.44 terabecquerel (93 curies). A reenactment was performed to determine the time line f

involvement in the cell and actual handling ofthe source.

The radiographer trainer and trainee were estimated to

have handled the source 15 to 20 seconds, which resulted

in estimatedmaximumdoses of 4.889 centisieverts(rem)

whole-body deep dose; 4.889 centisieverts (rem) lens of

the eye dose, and 4.643 centisieverts(rem)shallow dose.

Extremity doses to the trainer and trainee range from

1000 to 18,450 centigray (rad). The third radiographer

estimated whole-body dose was 3.95 millisieverts (395

mrem) Investigation is ongoingwith the assistance oft

NRC staff. The licensee also solicited the assistance 

dose recreation and assessment from a private physicist

and the provider ofthe radiography source. The licens

has suspended the use of radioactive material until the

investigation is complete.

Event #2: Brachytherapy Overdose Eve

Date and Place: April 11, 2006, Clarksburg, West

Virginia

Nature and Probable Causes: Thelicenseereportedth

two female patients received brachytherapy high-doserate treatment doses more than 50 percent greater than

the prescribed dose. Each patient was to receive a tot

dose of 3000 centigray (cGy)(rad), distributed during six

treatmentsof500cGy(rad)each. Thetreatmentsinvolv

the insertion of a 162.8 gigabecquerel (4.4 curie) Ir-192

source into the cervical area. During the first treatmen

thefirstpatientreceived1040cGy(rad)onApril11,2006,

and the second patient received 1058 cGy (rad) onApril

18, 2006. The attending physician is going to alter t

remaining treatments to 350 cGy (rad) for each patient

to keep the total dose to the prescribed 3000 cGy (rad).

The cause of the medical events was human error. T

operator did not check the magnification reading on the

computer before administering the dose to each patient.

The referring physician discussed the error with each

patient when they came in for their next treatments on

April 21, 2006.

(Contact: Angela R. McIntosh, NMSS, 301-415-503

e-mail: arm@nrc.go

SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s)

enforcement program can be accessed via the NRC’s

homepage [http://www.nrc.gov/] under “What We Do.”

Documentsrelatedtocasescanbeaccessedat[http://www.

nrc.gov/], “Electronic Reading Room,” “Documents in

ADAMS.” ADAMS is the Agency-wide Docum

AccessandManagementSystem. HelpinusingADA

is available from the NRC Public Document Room,

telephone: 301-415-4737 or 1-800-397-4209

Washington Hospital Center (EA-06-029)

On May 4, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a

Severity Level III violation involving deliberate failure

to secure, from unauthorized removal, and failure to

maintain constant surveillance over licensed material.

Specifically,thelockonthedoortothehotlab,acontrolled

area containing licensed material, had been deliberately

disabledwith tape,to allowease of access, and the hotlab

was left unattended, with the door lock disabled.

Epsilon Products Company (EA-06-026)

On May 3, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $16,250

was issued for a Severity Level III problem composed

of six violations of NRC requirements involving the

licensee’sfailure to conduct operationssuch that the dose

in an unrestricted area, from external sources, exceeded

regulatorylimits. Themostsignificantoftheseviolatio

involved the radiation exposure of five employees and

contractors,whowerenotradiationworkers(andtherefore

consideredmembersofthepublic),whoreceivedradiation

doses in excess of the regulatory limit of 0.001 Sievert

(Sv)(100millirem)in a year,i.e.,they received estimated

dosesrangingfrom0.00103Sv(103millirem)to0.00197

Sv (197 millirem).

H&G Inspection Company, Inc. (EA-06-021)

On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $6500

was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving a

willfulfailure to block and brace a radiographic exposure

device during transport to and from a temporary jobsite.

Two additional violations, not assessed a civil penalty,

were identified. These involved failure to control a

maintain constantsurveillance of licensed material in an

unrestricted area, and failure to have a second qualified

individualobserveradiographicoperations. Becausethe

violationswereunrelated,eachwasseparatelycategorized

as Severity Level III.

GEO EXPLOR, Inc. (EA-06-017)

On April 17, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $3250 was

issued for a Severity Level III problem involving three

violations. The violations occurred as a result of t
6

surveys. Specifically, a nuclear medicine technologi

(NMT) received an exposure to the skin of the right

thumb when it became contaminated with sodiumiodide

(iodine-131), during treatment of a patient. TheNMTd

not perform adequate surveys necessary for the timely

identification of skin contamination and assessment

of dose to the skin of her right thumb. As a result, t

NMT’sskin was contaminated for 26 hours before being

detected.

Star-Lite Global, Inc. (EA-05-174)

OnFebruary 28, 2006, aNotice ofViolation andExercise

ofEnforcementDiscretionwasissuedforaSeverityLevel

III violation involving the failure to obtain an exempt

distribution license, asrequired by 10CFR30.15, before

transferring specialty light bulbs containing radioactive

material, Krypton -85 (Kr-85). Based on the facts th

Star-Lite Global stopped importing and distributing the

Kr-85 bulbs by the fall of 2003, no longer operates nor

conducts transactions, plans to file for bankruptcy, and

the low safety significance of the Kr-85 bulbs that it

distributed, NRC is exercising discretion to refrain from

issuing a civil penalty in this case.

(GeneralContact:SallyMerchant,OfficeofEnforcement,

301-415-2747; e-mail: slm2@nrc.gov)

SELECTED FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICES

(March 1, 2006 May 31, 2006)

“Abnormal Occurrence Reports: Implementation 

Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974;

Revised Policy Statement,” 71 FR 10568, March 1,

2006.

(Contact: SherylBurrows, Office of NuclearRegulato

Research, 301-415- 6086; e-mail: sab2@nrc.gov, Ma

Stop: T9-F3

10 CFR Part 72 [RIN 3150-AH87] “List of Approved

Spent Fuel Storage Casks: VSC-24 Revision 6,” 71 

14120, March 21, 2006.

(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, Office of Nucle

Material Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-6219; e-mail:

jmm2@nrc.gov)

“State of Minnesota: Discontinuance of Certa

Commission Regulatory Authority Within the State;

Notice ofAgreement Between the NRC and the State of

Minnesota,” 71 FR 14965, March 24, 2006.

(Contact: Aaron T. McCraw, Office of State and Trib

Programs, 301-415-1277; e-mail:

atm@nrc.gov)

authorized user’s failure to: (1) control and mainta

constant surveillance of a licensed gauge; (2) use two

independent physical controls to form a tangible barrier

to secure the gauge against unauthorized removal; and

(3) properly block and brace the gauge during transport.

Specifically, the authorized user failed to adequately

lock a transport case onto the bed of his truck and close

the tailgate. As a result, the case containing a licens

gauge fell off the truck and was in the public domain for

approximately 6 days before it was recovered.

MISTRAS Holdings Group (EA 05-238; EA-06-065;

and EA-06-066)

On April 6, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $19,500,

wasissuedforthreeSeverityLevelIIIproblemsassociated

with violations of NRC requirements. The first Severi

Level III problem involved the licensee’s failure, after

performing radiographic operations, to: (1) survey t

radiographicexposuredeviceandguidetubetodetermine

that the sealed source had been returned to its shielded

position,beforedismantlingtheequipment;and(2)secure

the sealed source in the shielded position after the source

wasreturnedtotheshieldedposition. ThesecondSeveri

LevelIIIprobleminvolvedthe licensee’sfailure, at afield

location, to: (1) have two qualified individuals prese

when a radiographic exposure was being performed;

and (2) have a qualified individual directly observe the

radiographic assistant perform radiographic operations.

The third Severity Level III problem involved: (

the licensee’s failure to control and maintain constant

surveillance of licensed material that isin a controlled or

unrestricted room and that is not in storage; and (2) the

licensee’sfailuretoimmediatelyreporttotheNRCmissing

licensedmaterial,Iridium-192,inaradiographicexposure

device (i.e., licensed material in an aggregate quantity

greater than 1000 timesthe quantity specified in 10 CFR

Part 20,Appendix C), that could result in an exposure to

persons in an unrestricted area. A base civil penalty 

the amount of $6500 was imposed for each of the three

problems, resulting in a civil penalty of $19,500.

Bayou Inspection Services, Inc. (EA-05-137)

On March 17, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Proposed

Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $6000 was

issued for a Severity Level III violation. The violati

involved two separate instances of the failure to secure

or maintain constant surveillance of licensed material

(radiographic exposure devices) in unrestricted areas.

In addition, the NRC determined that willfulness was

associated with one instance of this violation.

Thomas Jefferson University Hospital (EA-05-237)

On March 3, 2006, a Notice of Violation wasissued for a

SeverityLevelIIIviolationinvolvingthefailuretocontrol

the annual occupational shallow dose equivalent to 0.5

sieverts (50 rem), and the failure to conduct adequate
7

10 CFR Part 110 [RIN 3150-AH89] “Revision of NRC

Form 7, Application for NRC Export/Import License,

Amendment, or Renewal,” 71 FR 19102, April 13,

2006.

(Contact: Brooke G. Smith, Office of Internation

Programs, 301-415-2347; e-mail: bgs@nrc.go

10 CFR Part 72 [RIN 3150-AH86] “List of Approved

Spent Fuel Storage Casks: FuelSolutions TM Ca

System, Revision 4,” 71 FR 19831, April 18, 2006.

(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, Office of Nucle

Material Safety and Safeguards; 301-415-6219, e-mail:

jmm2@nrc.gov)

NRC Enforcement Policy: “Extension of Discretion

Period of Interim Enforcement Policy,” 71 FR 19905,

April 18, 2006.

(Contact: MichaelJohnson,Office ofEnforcement, 30

415-2741; e-mail: mrj1@nrc.go

10 CFR Part 110 [RIN 3150-AH88] “Implementation of

the Nuclear Export and Import Provisions of the Energy

Policy Act of 2005,” 71 FR 20336, April 20, 2006.

(Contact: Brooke G. Smith, Office of Internation

Programs, 301-415-2347; e-mail: bgs@nrc.go

“Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences; Fiscal

Year2005;DisseminationofInformation,” 71FR2639

May 4, 2006.

(Contact: None liste

“Notice of Availability of Draft Standard Review Plan

for Activities Related to U.S. Department of Energy

Waste Determinations”, NUREG-1854, 71 FR 30967,

May 31, 2006.

(Contact: Anna Hajduk Bradford, Division of Was

Management and Environmental Protection, 301-415-

5228; fax 301-415-5397; e-mail: ahb1@nrc.gov)

(General Contact: Michael K. Williamson, Office of

Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 301-415-6234,

e-mail: mkw1@nrc.go

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Michael K. Williamson, Editor

NMSS Quarterly Newsletter

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Two White Flint North

Mail Stop: T8F-3

Washington D.C. 20555-0001