Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety

and Safeguards

NMSS Licensee Newsletter

(March 2003)

Contents Page

1. NRC Effort to Enhance Security of 

Radioactive Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2. U.S. Department of Energy Off-Site 

Source Recovery Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

3. License Application Received from 

U.S. Enrichment Corporation . . . . . . . . . . 4

4. Significant Events. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

5. Generic Communications Issued 

(November 1, 2002 – January 31, 2003) . . 6

6. Significant Enforcement Actions . . . . . . . . 7

7. Selected Federal Register Notices 

(December 1, 2002 – February 28, 2003) . 10

NUREG/BR-0117

No. 03-1

March 2003

U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory 

Commission

NRC EFFORT TO ENHANCE SECURITY 

OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is 

leading the effort to improve security for radioactive 

materials at the local, national, and international 

levels. The goal is to prevent radioactive material 

from falling into the wrong hands, where it 

could be used by terrorists to frighten, injure, or 

kill Americans.

After the events of September 11, 2001, NRC 

Chairman Richard A. Meserve ordered a 

comprehensive review of the Agency’s safeguards 

and security programs. Security at commercial 

nuclear reactors is the headline news, but NRC has 

also been working hard to enhance the security of 

radioactive materials. Initial steps included issuance 

of a number of advisories to licensees containing, at 

first, common-sense security improvements.

These enhancements included measures such as 

higher awareness of potential threats, improved 

access control, and better security measures to 

search and limit vehicles near important facilities. 

Subsequently, the Agency has been developing 

additional measures to spell out, in detail, for 

licensees, the safeguards and security enhancements 

that need to be implemented.

In the materials arena, the first priority was given 

to large fuel cycle licensees, facilities that store 

spent fuel, and spent fuel transportation activities. 

Orders have already been issued to implement 

security measures at Independent Spent Fuel 

Storage Installations, in spent fuel transportation, 

at Category I and Category III fuel cycle and 

uranium conversion facilities. Orders to Category 

III facilities were issued February 6, 2003. These 

orders make binding specific security enhancements 

that, in some cases, were first mentioned in our 

initial advisories, but also include better alarms, 

vehicle barriers, tighter background checks on 

workers, more extensive emergency preparations, 

and other measures necessary to protect against 

security risks.

For other materials licensees, radioactive sources 

could be stolen or lost and end up in terrorist hands, 

where they could be used to fashion a radiological 

dispersal device (RDD), sometimes called a “dirty 

bomb.” Intelligence reports show that acquiring 

RDDs has been one of al Qaeda’s goals. Press 

reports describe an RDD as a “poor man’s nuclear 

NMSS Licensee Newsletter
2 

weapon,” although the hazard is dramatically less 

than a true nuclear weapon.

NRC is working with Agreement States, the 

Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland 

Security, and others to identify licensees that have 

radioactive sources that pose the greatest concern 

for use in RDDs. We are also examining security 

measures that may be needed to reduce the risk from 

the radioactive material used by these licensees.

NRC’s efforts are just part of a larger, U.S. 

Government effort to enhance control over 

radioactive material. The Office of Homeland 

Security, Department of Energy, and other agencies 

are working with NRC to understand and counter the 

RDD threat. 

For example, the agencies have been cooperating 

to: calculate the risk from dispersal of radioactive 

material, using available data; evaluate which 

isotopes pose the greatest threat, identify existing 

material tracking systems; and look at disposal 

options for old, unwanted sources.

NRC staff are involved in groups looking at the 

feasibility of a system to track radioactive materials, 

how to manage sources that are discarded, how 

to more securely transport radioactive materials 

and detect sources concealed in shipment, how to 

manage the consequences of a successful RDD 

attack, and other challenges.

The effort doesn’t stop at America’s borders. NRC 

is also heavily involved with the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations agency, 

to carry the effort to the rest of the world. One 

of the goals of this work is to gain better control 

of radioactive material, including enhancements 

to security during its import, export, and 

subsequent use.

The effort to enhance security for radioactive 

materials is substantial and comprehensive. But, 

we believe the improved security that results will 

reduce the risk of a successful terrorist attack, using 

radioactive materials, while allowing continued use 

of the material for the benefit of society.

(Contact: Fritz Sturz, NSIR, 301-415-6678; 

e-mail; fcs@nrc.gov)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

OFF-SITE SOURCE RECOVERY 

PROJECT FOR GTCC SOURCES

Many greater than Class C (GTCC) sealed sources 

are excess, unwanted, and orphaned in the industrial, 

medical, academic, and government sectors. This 

presents a growing problem because these sources 

are not suitable for disposal in shallow land burial 

facilities. Other appropriate disposal options are not 

yet available. The Off-Site Source Recovery (OSR) 

Project, managed by the U.S. Department of Energy 

(DOE) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(LANL), collects and stores these sources. 

GTCC sealed sources consist mainly of americium 

neutron sources, other americium-241 sources, 

plutonium-238 heat sources, plutonium-239 neutron 

sources, and large strontium-90 sources. Large 

cesium-137 sources also typically exceed the U.S. 

regulatory criteria for shallow low-level radioactive 

waste (LLW) disposal, but are largely recycled and 

remanufactured into new sources.

An Emergency Response Team Recovers a Damaged 

Americium Neutron Source in Texas

Public health and safety risks are posed by unwanted 

GTCC sealed sources. One of the most common 

isotopes used is americium-241. Many of these are 

used in oil and gas well-logging activities. Small 

firms lacking the physical capability and financial 

resources to provide safe storage commonly own 

these neutron sources.

Considerable numbers of heat sources containing 

plutonium-238 once were used in manufacturing 

cardiac pacemakers. 
3

These pacemakers and plutonium-238 batteries 

became obsolete in the 1970s, with the onset of 

long-life chemical battery technology. The OSR 

Project has recovered approximately 2000 excess 

and unwanted pacemakers.

Licensees in the U.S. use GTCC sealed sources 

primarily in portable and fixed industrial 

gauges. Approximately 9000 such sources, 

chiefly containing americium-241, are found in 

manufacturing and general commerce. Recovering 

these sources is particularly important, because 

many are excess and unwanted, and commonly are 

lost, stolen, or inadvertently discarded. 

Source Recovery and Storage

Beginning in the late 1990s, DOE greatly expanded 

the sealed source handling capacity at LANL to 

accommodate thousands of excess sealed sources 

from the commercial sector. Initially, neutron 

sources were chemically processed to eliminate 

neutron generation. However, this was determined to 

be unnecessary. Instead, excess and unwanted sealed 

sources are simply stored as radioactive waste at 

government nuclear facilities.

This strategy required developing new nuclear 

material containers specifically for neutron sources. 

The first of these is a special-form overpack capsule 

for individual sources. The second is a multifunction container capable of providing safe storage, 

transportation, and ultimately disposal. 

The special-form capsule has been designed, tested, 

and certified in several configurations. Composed of 

thick-walled stainless steel, it safely stores and ships 

damaged sealed sources, or sources that, for other 

reasons, cannot be certified for transportation. Once 

closed, a special-form capsule cannot be reopened. 

DOE and LANL continue to modify and fabricate 

these capsules to accommodate unique sources 

as they appear, especially from nuclear research 

and development laboratories. These capsules are 

available for both government and commercial 

radioactive waste management activities. 

The multi-function container evolved from 

containers used by DOE for transportation and 

disposal of transuranic waste. The container 

incorporates neutron shielding and accommodates 

considerable quantities of neutron sources without 

special handling requirements. The pipe overpack 

concept was modified to provide a narrow-diameter 

[15-centimeter (5.9-inch)] inner payload container, 

within a standard 208-liter (55-gallon) drum. The 

annular space is filled by neutron shielding material. 

This multi-function container has been evaluated 

and approved by the transuranic waste certification 

program, and is now acceptable for field recovery, 

transportation, long-term storage, and disposal in the 

waste repository

Cost, Capacity, and Schedule

The OSR Project reached a 5000-source recovery 

milestone in 2002. Another 4000 sealed sources are 

known to be excess and unwanted, and are slated 

for recovery by 2005. The OSR Project expects to 

store more than 14,000 GTCC sealed sources by 

Sealed Sources Prepared for Loading into a MultiFunction Drum

The special form over-pack capsule
4 

2010. Subsequent sealed source recovery will occur 

at a pace depending on numbers of sources declared 

excess, and funding levels. 

Current OSR Project operating costs for sealed 

source recovery and management average less 

than $3000 per source. Large licensees may incur 

the costs for packaging, shipment, and storage of 

sources at LANL. However, DOE is working with 

small licensees to reduce or eliminate costs. 

Ultimate Disposition 

No established disposition path exists for most 

GTCC sealed sources. The only suitable disposal 

site is the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP), 

a geological repository mined in bedded salt 

formations in southeastern New Mexico. It is 

restricted to transuranic waste generated from 

the nuclear defense program. A large share of 

waste from the OSR Project will be generated 

by the commercial and academic sector. These 

waste streams cannot be disposed of with Federal 

Government waste at WIPP.

addresses a substantial public health and safety risk; 

recovers sources from the commercial and academic 

sector, more promptly than previously; and provides 

safe, long-term storage.

You Can Help 

DOE requests cooperation from GTCC radioactive 

source holders to register all sources, even those that 

are currently in use, with the OSR Project on line at 

http://osrp.lanl.gov/. Source registration is voluntary, 

but allows DOE to plan and prioritize recovery 

efforts. The source registry is a key component in 

planning to ensure that adequate funding, facility, 

and personnel resources are available to recover, 

store, and eventually dispose of GTCC sources. 

To register sources online, visit http://

osrp.lanl.gov/. For more information about the OSR 

Project, visit the new DOE OSR Project website at 

http://www.doeal.gov/OSRP.

(Contact: Joel Grimm, 505-845-5463; 

e-mail: jgrimm@doeal.gov)

LICENSE APPLICATION RECEIVED 

FROM U.S. ENRICHMENT 

CORPORATION

On February 12, 2003, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission received a license application, from 

the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), to 

operate a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment test 

and demonstration facility (Lead Cascade) for 

5 years. The proposed facility will be based on 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) advanced gas 

centrifuge technology. USEC plans to assemble 

and operate the Lead Cascade in an existing DOE 

gas centrifuge building located at the Portsmouth 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant site in Piketon, Ohio. 

The Lead Cascade, which will consist of up to 

240 centrifuges, will provide USEC with reliable 

information on the machines and auxiliary systems, 

as they would be used in commercial operations. 

The staff anticipates completing its acceptance 

review of the Lead Cascade facility application 

by March 14 and issuing a Notice of Opportunity 

for Hearing by March 28, 2003. Final licensing 

approval for this site is expected to be issued in early 

2004. USEC plans to submit a license application 

Packaged Sealed Sources Are Prepared for 

Shipping to LANL

Therefore, the OSR Project will develop and 

provide storage capacity until a disposal pathway 

is developed. OSR Project projections indicate less 

than 500 cubic meters (654 cubic yards) of waste in 

shielded containers will require indefinite storage. 

The next step is to examine final disposal options.

The OSR Project for managing large numbers 

of excess and unwanted GTCC sealed sources 
5

for its commercial-scale facility in late 2004 or 

early 2005. 

In a separate action, Louisiana Energy Services 

(LES) has delayed the submittal of its application 

for a commercial-scale gas centrifuge enrichment 

facility. LES notified the staff, on January 29, 

2003, that the application, originally scheduled for 

January 30, would be delayed for approximately 

6 weeks. The reason cited for the delay was 

to resolve utility contractual commitments 

regarding output.

(Contact: Yawar Faraz, 301-415-8113, 

e-mail: yhf@nrc.gov)

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

is providing summaries of these events to inform 

licensees of conditions they may encounter and of 

actions that may be taken to deal with them.

Event 1: Industrial Radiographer receives a 

Total Effective Dose Equivalent in Excess of 

25 centiSievert (rem) from a Single Event

Date and Place: October 18, 2002; Huntington 

Testing and Technology, Ghent, Kentucky.

Nature and Probable Consequences: An Agreement 

State licensee reported an overexposure, to an 

industrial radiographer, of 31.4 centiSievert (cSv) 

(rem) for 2002. A radiographer was reeling in the 

3.81-terabecquerel (103-curie) iridium-192 source 

after an exposure, when the source did not fully 

retract to its shielding position. The radiographer, 

unaware of this situation, entered the restricted 

area for approximately 3 minutes. When he 

realized that the source was not fully retracted, 

he immediately left the area, extended the source, 

and then retracted it to the shielded position. [The 

exposure device (Model 660–B, Serial #B2954) 

involved was manufactured by AEA Technologies.] 

The licensee’s Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) 

was contacted and the radiographer was removed 

from radiological work. His dosimetry was sent 

for processing and results indicated a wholebody exposure of only 4.86 cSv (rem). However, 

the licensee, with assistance from the AEA 

Technologies’ RSO, completed a reconstruction of 

the whole-body exposure to the radiographer. The 

final result of the incident was an event exposure 

of 30 cSv (rem) whole-body, in addition to his 

year-to-date exposure of 1.4 cSv (rem), for a total 

yearly whole-body exposure of 31.4 cSv (rem). 

Discussions with the State regulatory agency, 

along with independent calculations, confirmed 

the 30 cSv (-rem) event exposure. The licensee 

stated that the thermoluminescent dosimeter and 

operating ratemeter were in the radiographer’s 

pocket. Consequently, the badge did not reflect 

true whole-body exposure and the alarm ratemeter 

was never heard in an alarming condition. The 

cause of the event included inadequate operating 

procedures for the exposure device, the radiographer 

having his alarm ratemeter in his pocket, and failure 

to survey the exposure device on completion of 

the radiograph.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: The licensee’s corrective actions included 

revising the operating procedure for restoration of 

the source to the exposure device; personnel training 

on the revised procedure and proper wearing of 

dosimetry devices; and annual refresher training 

on proper operation and responses of survey 

instrumentation. Also, the radiographer involved 

in this event will receive an additional 40 hours of 

radiation safety training before returning to work in 

radiography, and will be evaluated at least once a 

month for the next year. The State of Kentucky has 

accepted the licensee’s corrective actions. 

Event 2: Individual Members of the Public Receive 

Doses in Excess of 0.1 centiSievert (rem)

Date and Place: July 1, 2002; Saint Joseph Mercy 

Hospital; Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Nature and Probable Consequences: An NRC 

licensee reported that several members of the 

public (all over 18 years of age) received radiation 

exposures in excess of regulatory limits. The 

exposures occurred during visits by family members 

to a patient who had received a therapeutic dose 

of 10.6 gigabecquerel (285 millicuries) of iodine131 (I–131) on July 1, 2002. The individuals 

visited throughout the treatment period and were 

in prolonged, close contact with the patient. 

Because of the patient’s poor renal function, 
6 

typical biological elimination of the I–131 did not 

occur. Radiation levels measured on July 1 were 

4 millisieverts (mSv)/hr (400 mrem/hr) at the 

bedside and 0.4 mSv/hr (40 mrem/hr) at 1 meter 

(3.3 feet). The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) 

estimated that one individual received a radiation 

dose in the range of 3.0 to 5.673 centisievent (cSv) 

(rem). The RSO estimated that approximately 10 

other individuals received radiation doses as high as 

0.5 cSv (-rem). The licensee had placed shielding 

around the patient to reduce the radiation levels and 

counseled the individuals on the need to minimize 

their time and proximity to the patient. Many of 

the individuals did not adhere to the directions and 

controls established to minimize radiation exposure. 

Based on additional information received during 

interviews, NRC inspectors estimated the highest 

dose received to be 0.15 sievert (15 rem).

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: Corrective actions include staff education 

regarding potential safety concerns of staff and 

family members; notifying NRC of any unusual 

circumstances when family members fail to follow 

procedures; convening a family care conference to 

discuss a plan for care of the patient and discuss 

family concerns; and modifying the procedures 

for allowing visitors into rooms of patients 

undergoing therapy. 

NRC: The NRC Region III conducted a special 

inspection from October 4 through October 16, 

2002, with in-office review through November 15, 

2002. NRC has not made a final determination in 

this matter.

(Contact: Roberto Torres, NMSS, 301-415-8112; 

e-mail: rjt@nrc.gov)

GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS ISSUED

(November 1, 2002–January 31, 2003)

Note that these are only summaries of U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) generic 

communications. If one of these documents appears 

relevant to your needs and you have not received it, 

please call one of the technical contacts listed below. 

The Internet address for the NRC library of generic 

communications is: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

doc-collections/gen-comm/index.html. Please 

note that this address is case-sensitive and must be 

entered exactly as shown.

Information Notices (INs)

IN 2002-30, “Control and Surveillance of Portable 

Gauges during Field Operations,” was issued on 

October 30, 2002. This notice was issued to all 

licensees authorized to possess, use, transport, 

and store portable gauges, to remind them of 

their responsibility to maintain control and 

constant surveillance of portable gauges during 

field operations.

(Contact: Michael T. Markley, NMSS, 

301-415-5723, e-mail: mtm@nrc.gov)

IN 2002–31, “Potentially Defective UF6 Cylinder 

Valves (1-Inch),” was issued on October 31, 2002. 

This notice was issued to all licensees authorized 

to possess and use source material and/or special 

nuclear material for the heating, emptying, filling, or 

shipping of uranium hexafluoride (UF-6) in 30-inch 

and 48-inch cylinders. The purpose of this notice 

was to inform addressees about safety concerns 

related to UF6 cylinder valves manufactured by the 

Hunt Valve Company, Inc., of Salem, Ohio. The two 

safety concerns involve: (1) cracked packing nuts 

and (2) the loss of material traceability and failure to 

conduct hardness testing of the valve stems.

(Contacts: William Troskoski, NMSS, 

301-415-8076, e-mail: wmt@nrc.gov; 

Geoffrey Hornseth, NMSS, 301-415-2756, 

e-mail: gph@nrc.gov)

IN 2002–33, “Notification of Permanent Injunction 

against Neutron Products Incorporated of Dickerson, 

Maryland,” was issued on November 22, 2002. This 

notice was issued to all teletherapy and radiation 

processing licensees to inform them that the State 

of Maryland has placed a permanent injunction on 

the company Neutron Products, Inc. (NPI), 22301 

Mount Ephraim Road, Dickerson, Maryland 20842, 

radioactive materials license number MD-31-025-

01. The State has requested that NRC licensees be 

informed of this action because of potential impact 

on those using NPI sources.
7

(Contact: Raymond Manley, Supervisor, Radioactive 

Material Licensing Section, State of Maryland 

Radiological Health Program, Maryland Department 

of the Environment, 1800 Washington Boulevard, 

Suite 705, Baltimore, MD 21230–1720; telephone: 

410-537-3301; e-mail: rmanley@mde.state.md.us)

IN 2002-35, “Changes to 10 CFR Parts 71 and 

72 Quality Assurance Programs,” was issued on 

December 20, 2002. This notice was issued to 

all holders of 10 CFR Part 71 quality assurance 

program approvals and all 10 CFR Part 72 licensees 

and certificate holders to remind them of the 

requirement to obtain NRC approval of all changes 

to Parts 71 and 72 quality assurance programs before 

implementation of the changes.

(Contact: Frank Jacobs, NMSS, 301-415-3961, 

e-mail: fxj2@nrc.gov) 

IN 2002–36, “Incomplete or Inaccurate Information 

Provided to the Licensee and/or NRC by any 

Contractor or Subcontractor Employee,” was issued 

on December 27, 2002. This notice was issued to 

all materials and fuel cycle licensees and certificate 

holders to remind them of the importance of 

diligently ascertaining the accuracy of educational 

background and professional qualifications of any 

contractor or subcontractor employees subject to 

such qualification requirement. This notice also 

alerts addressees to the potential penalties that could 

result from intentionally providing incomplete or 

inaccurate information to NRC.

(Contacts: Ivelisse M. Cabrera, NMSS, 

301-415-8152, e-mail: imc1@nrc.gov; 

Thomas R. Decker, RII, 404-562-4721, 

e-mail: trd@nrc.gov)

Regulatory Issue Summaries (RISs)

RIS 2002-20, “Clarification of Requirements under 

10 CFR 35.432—Calibration Measurements of 

Brachytherapy Sources,” was issued on November 7, 

2002. This summary was issued to all medical 

licensees to provide clarification to them concerning 

the requirements under 10 CFR 35.432, “Calibration 

of Measurements of Brachytherapy Sources.”

(Contact: Linda Psyk, NMSS, 301-415-0215, 

e-mail: lmp1@nrc.gov)

RIS 2002–23, “Availability of Guide for Diagnostic 

Nuclear Medicine,” was issued on November 27, 

2002. This summary was issued to all medical 

licensees to inform them of the availability, 

from NRC, of a “Guide for Diagnostic Nuclear 

Medicine,” prepared by the American College of 

Nuclear Physicians and the Society of Nuclear 

Medicine and published under the auspices of the 

Society of Nuclear Medicine.

(Contact: Roger W. Broseus, NMSS, 301-415-7608, 

e-mail: rwb@nrc.gov)

RIS 2003–04, “Use of the Effective Dose Equivalent 

in place of the Deep Dose Equivalent in Dose 

Assessments,” was issued on February 13, 2003. 

This summary was issued to all NRC licensees 

to provide guidance on situations in which it is 

permissible to use the effective dose equivalent, 

in place of the deep dose equivalent, in showing 

compliance with regulatory requirements.

(Contacts: Sami Sherbini, NMSS, 301-415-7853, 

e-mail: sxs2@nrc.gov; Roger Pedersen, NRR, 

301-415-3162, e-mail: rlp1@nrc.gov)

(General Contact: Ivelisse M. Cabrera, NMSS, 

301-415-8152, e-mail: imc1@nrc.gov)

SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) 

enforcement program can be accessed via NRC’s 

homepage [http://www.nrc.gov] under “What We 

Do.” Documents related to cases can be accessed 

at http://www.nrc.gov, “Electronic Reading Room,” 

“Documents in ADAMS.” ADAMS is the AgencyWide Document Access and Management System. 

Help in using ADAMS is available from the NRC 

Public Document Room, telephone: 301-415-4737 

or 1-800-397-4209. 

Gauges

Advance Testing Company, Inc. (EA-03-001)

On January 28, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to control and maintain constant surveillance 

of licensed material [296 meqabecquerel (mBq) (8 

millicuries) (mCi) of cesium-137 and 1480 mBq 
8 

(40 mCi) of americium-241 in a moisture density 

gauge] located at a temporary job site, which was in 

an unrestricted area. 

Columbia Curb & Gutter Company (EA-02-263)

On January 21, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to secure from unauthorized removal or 

limit access to, licensed material [289 megabecqurel 

(mBq) (7.8 millicuries) (mCi) of cesium-137 and 

1480 mBq (40 mCi) of americium-241 contained 

in a moisture density gauge] in an unrestricted area, 

and the failure to control and maintain constant 

surveillance of this licensed material.

Rio Construction Corporation (EA-02-215)

On January 15, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3000 was issued for a Severity Level III 

violation. This involved an individual who had not 

been provided required radiation safety training, 

and who did not work under the supervision and in 

the physical presence of an individual who had the 

required radiation safety training, using a moisture 

density gauge, despite this. 

Delta Consulting Engineers, Inc. (EA-03-002)

On January 13, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to control and maintain constant 

surveillance of licensed material [approximately 

333 megabequerel (mBq) (9 millicuries) (mCi) 

of cesium-137 and 1628 mBq (44 mCi) of 

americium-241 in a portable moisture density gauge] 

that is in a controlled or unrestricted area and that is 

not in storage.

Medical

Medical Providers Capital Network (EA-02-205)

On February 11, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $3000 was issued for a willful Severity Level III 

problem involving: (1) the failure of the authorized 

user/radiation safety officer (AU/RSO) to perform 

monthly visits to the licensee’s facilities to review 

the use of byproduct material, as required by a 

condition of the license; (2) the creation of false 

records that the visits had occurred; and (3) the 

receipt, possession, and use of a byproduct material 

without the supervision of an AU/RSO. 

University of Puerto Rico (EA-02-227)

On February 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount 

of $9000 was issued for three willful Severity 

Level III violations involving: (1) the failure to 

perform daily radiation surveys of areas where 

radiopharmaceuticals are routinely administered 

to patients; (2) the failure of the radiation 

Safety Officer (RSO) to calibrate contamination 

survey instruments annually in accordance with 

requirements; and (3) the failure to notify the RSO 

immediately, after unexpectedly high radiation levels 

were found, in accordance with requirements. 

Community Health Center of Branch County 

(EA-02-23)

On December 11, 2002, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to secure, from unauthorized removal, 

or limit access to, licensed material, and the failure 

to control and maintain constant surveillance of 

licensed material.

University of Pennsylvania (EA-02-214)

On December 11, 2002, a letter was issued 

documenting NRC’s decision to exercise 

enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 

VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy for a violation 

involving an exposure in excess of regulatory limits 

to a member of the public. The violation involved 

the parent of a child treated with iodine-131 

who received a total effective dose equivalent of 

0.7 centisievert (cSv) (rem) while providing care 

for the child during a treatment in September 2002. 

Discretion was warranted because the licensee 

took reasonable actions to keep the dose as low 

as is reasonably achievable by giving training 

and direction to the parent and by monitoring the 

parent’s dose with a personal dosimeter. In addition, 

NRC recently approved the licensee’s request to 

authorize a 2.0-cSv (rem) annual dose limit for the 

parent involved with the treatment, so that the parent 
9

could provide care to the child during a second 

treatment, which was subsequently completed in 

November 2002.

Washington Hospital (EA-02-244)

On November 26, 2002, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to properly prepare written directives on 

multiple occasions for brachytherapy treatments.

Radiography

H&H X-Ray Services, Inc. (EA-02-195)

On February 3, 2003, a Notice of Violation 

was issued for a Severity Level III problem 

involving: (1) the failure to reduce the allowable 

dose limit for an individual by 1.25 centiSievert 

(cSv) (rem) for each quarter for which complete 

records were unavailable; and (2) as a result, the 

failure to limit the annual occupational dose to an 

adult radiographer to 5 cSv (rem) total effective 

dose equivalent. 

Magna Chek, Inc. (EA-02-221)

On January 29, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $6000 was issued for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the performance of radiographic 

operations by an uncertified individual at the 

licensee’s permanent radiographic facility, and at 

temporary job sites. Since the licensee does not 

intend to use the material in the future, the license 

was amended for storage incident to disposal. To 

encourage prompt disposal of the sources, NRC has 

given the licensee 60 days to dispose of the material, 

in which case, NRC will forego the proposed 

civil penalty.

Testing Technologies, Inc. (EA-02-166)

On January 22, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 

amount of $9600 was issued for a Severity Level II 

problem involving the willful: (1) performance of 

radiographic operations at temporary job sites by 

radiographers’ assistants and helpers who were not 

accompanied by at least one qualified radiographer; 

(2) performance of radiographic operations by 

individuals who had not met training requirements; 

(3) failure to wear a combination of a direct reading 

pocket dosimeter, an alarming ratemeter, and either 

a film badge or thermoluminescent dosimeter; and 

(4) failure of the corporate and site Radiation Safety 

Officer to oversee the radiation safety program.

Dayton X-Ray Company (EA-02-201)

On November 29, 2002, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the performance of radiographic operations 

at a temporary job with only one qualified 

individual present. 

Individual Actions 

Stuart Jones, M.D. (IA-02-046)

On February 11, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 

the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 

at Medical Providers Capital Network. As the 

authorized user/radiation safety officer (AU/RSO), 

the individual deliberately failed to provide required 

AU/RSO oversight of the licensee’s facilities and 

deliberately falsified records with respect to the 

performance of these duties.

Dr. Heriberto Torres (IA-02-054)

On February 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 

the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 

by the University of Puerto Rico. As the Radiation 

Safety Officer, the individual was aware that direct 

radiation level surveys were not being performed 

daily in areas where radiopharmaceuticals were 

routinely prepared for use or administered to 

patients, and he took no effective action to correct 

the situation.

Dr. Frieda Silva (IA-02-053)

On February 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 

the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 

by the University of Puerto Rico. As the Chairman 

of the Radiation Safety Committee and Chief 
10 

of Nuclear Medicine, the individual was aware 

that direct radiation-level surveys were not being 

performed daily in areas where radiopharmaceuticals 

were routinely prepared for use or administered to 

patients, and he took no effective action to correct 

the situation. 

James Fowler (IA-02-057)

On January 29, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 

the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 

at Magna Chek, Inc., Madison Heights, Michigan. 

The individual deliberately performed radiographic 

operations without being certified through a 

recognized radiographer certification program. The 

radiographic operations by this individual were 

performed at the licensee’s permanent radiographic 

facility, and at temporary job sites.

Scott Kinsella (IA-02-043)

On January 22, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation, based on 

the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 

at Engineering and Inspections, Unlimited, Inc., 

a company authorized to conduct radiographic 

activities under the materials license of Testing 

Technologies Inc., an NRC licensee. The individual 

participated in radiographic operations at multiple 

temporary job sites, with the knowledge that these 

operations did not conform to NRC requirements 

and dispatched individuals to conduct radiographic 

operations at multiple temporary job sites, with the 

knowledge that the dispatched individuals were not 

in compliance with NRC training requirements. 

Brian McKenna (IA-02-030)

On January 22, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level II violation, based on 

the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 

at Engineering and Inspections, Unlimited, Inc., 

a company authorized to conduct radiographic 

activities under the materials license of Testing 

Technologies Inc., an NRC licensee. The individual 

participated in radiographic operations at multiple 

temporary job sites with the knowledge that these 

operations did not conform to NRC requirements, 

and dispatched individuals to conduct radiographic 

operations at multiple temporary job sites, with the 

knowledge that the dispatched individuals were not 

in compliance with NRC training requirements.

Ramón Baquero (IA-03-001)

On January 15, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 

the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 

at the Rio Construction Corporation. As a Project 

Manager, the individual deliberately permitted the 

use of a moisture density gauge (NRC-licensed 

materials) by an individual who had not been 

provided required radiation safety training.

(Contact: Sally Merchant, 301-415-2747; 

e-mail: slm2@nrc.gov)

SELECTED FEDERAL REGISTER 

NOTICES

(December 1, 2002 – February 28, 2003)

NOTE: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) contacts may be reached by mail at the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 

20555–0001.

FINAL RULES

“Material Control and Accounting Amendments,” 67 

FR 78130, December 23, 2002. 

(Contact: Merri Horn, 301-415-8126; 

e-mail: mlh1@nrc.gov)

“Decommissioning Trust Provisions,” 67 FR 78332, 

December 24, 2003.

(Contact: Brian J. Richter, 301-415-1978; 

e-mail: bjr@nrc.gov)

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

Standardized Advanced NUHOMS–24PT1; 

Addition,” 68 FR 463, January 6, 2003.

(Contact: Jayne McCausland, 301-415-6219; 

e-mail: jmm2@nrc.gov)

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

VSC–24 Revision; Direct final rule; confirmation of 

effective date,” 68 FR 2686, January 21, 2003.
11

Comments, and suggestions you may have for 

information not currently included, that might be 

helpful to licensees, should be sent to:

E. Kraus

NMSS Licensee Newsletter Editor

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Two White Flint North, Mail Stop 8-A-23

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, 301-415-6219; 

e-mail: jmm2@nrc.gov)

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

FuelSolutions Cask System Revision,” 68 FR 8445, 

February 21, 2003.

(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, 301-415-6219; 

e-mail: jmm2@nrc.gov)

PROPOSED RULES

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

FuelSolutions Cask System Revision,” 68 FR 8472, 

February 21, 2003. 

(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, 301-415-6219; 

e-mail: jmm2@nrc.gov)

OTHER NOTICES

“Memorandum of Understanding Between the US 

NRC and the US Department of Health and Human 

Services, Food and Drug Administration (Notice of 

renewal),” 67 FR 78262, December 23, 2002.

(Contact: Thomas H. Essig, 301-415-7231; 

e-mail: the@nrc.gov)

“Notice of Availability, ‘Consolidated NMSS 

Decommissioning Guidance: Financial Assurance, 

Recordkeeping, and Timeliness’ (NUREG–1757, 

Vol. 3),” 68 FR 1487, January 10, 2003.

(Contact: Duane W. Schmidt, 301-415-6919; 

e-mail: dws2@nrc.gov)

“Availability of NUREG/CR–6477, ‘Revised 

Analysis of Decommissioning Reference 

Non-Fuel-Cycle Facilities,’ ” 68 FR 4801, 

January 30, 2003.

(Contact: Clark Prichard, 301-415-6203; 

e-mail: cwp@nrc.gov)

“Solicitation of Public Comments on Spent Fuel 

Transportation Package Performance Study Test 

Protocols, NUREG–1768 (draft),” 68 FR 8530, 

February 21, 2003. 

(Contact: Dr. Andrew J. Murphy, 301-415-6011; 

e-mail: ajm1@nrc.gov)

“State of Nevada; Denial of a Petition for 

Rulemaking (PRM-63-1),” 68 FR 9023, 

February 27, 2003.

(Contacts: Timothy McCartin, 301-415-7285 or 

Toll-Free: 1-800-368-5642; e-mail: tjm3@nrc.gov;

Clark Prichard, 301-415-6203 or Toll-Free: 

1-800-368-5642; e-mail: cwp@nrc.gov

“Rulemaking on Controlling the Disposition of 

Solid Materials: Scoping Process for Environmental 

Issues and Notice of Workshop,” 68 FR 9595, 

February 28, 2003.

(Contact: Frank Cardile, 301-415-6185; 

e-mail: fpc@nrc.gov

Specific comments on the public meeting process 

should be directed to Chip Cameron; 301-415-1642; 

e-mail: fxc@nrc.gov)

(General Contact: Paul Goldberg, NMSS, 

301-415-7842; e-mail: pfg@nrc.gov)