[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 18

- 1 4 781 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 0:17

- cv - 60255

- CMA

JODI

- KAYE SPARKES, as personal representative of the Estate of Marlon Woodstock , Plaintiff

– Appell ant ,
versus
CITY OF SUNRISE, GREGORY LOOR , Defendant s

– Appell ees .

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florid a

________________________ ( July 1, 2019 ) Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 1 of 102 Before WILLIAM PRYOR , NEWSOM and BRANCH , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jodi

- Kaye Sparkes, as personal representative for Marlon Woodstock ’s
estate , appeals the summary judgment against her second amended complaint against the City of Sunrise, Florida, and O fficer Gregory Loor of the Sunrise Police Department for excessive force in the fatal shooting of Woodstock

. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. W oodstock’s family requested assistance in commit ting him involuntarily for a mental examination, Fla. Stat. § 394.463, but when officers confronted him , Woodstock refus ed to relinquish his knife , even after being shocked with taser s and bitten by a police canine. When Woodstock sw iped his knife at him, Officer
Loor shot Woodstock and then other officers disarmed him

. The district court ruled that Officer Loor was entitled to qualified immunity

. W e affirm. I. BACKGROUND The morning of September 30, 2014, Woodstock’s roommate, Keith Daley,

saw Woodstock talking to himself and spinni ng around in their back yard while holding multiple knives. Daley retreated to his bedroom and called a member of Woodstock’s family. Woodstock’s cousin, Leighton Buckley, drove to t h e house

. Buckley tried to persuade Woodstock to put down the weapons, but Woodstock responde d , “try me, try me , ” displayed his knives, chased Buckley down the street , returned to h is house, and slashed the tires on Buckley’s truck

. Buckley called

Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 2 of 103 Woodstock’s brother, O’Neil Woodstock , for assistance , and O’Ne i l drove to Buckley ’s location

. After Buckley got into O’Neil ’s vehicle , the two men follow ed Woodstock at a distance

. A round 11:00 a.m., O’Neil called 911 and reported Woodstock’s behavior earlier that morning , including his hostility t o Buckley. O’Neil stat ed that Woodstock was mentally ill, off his medications, extremely confrontational, known to be violent, and armed with a knife. O’Neil asked for Woodstock to be committed under the “ Baker Act , ” s ee Fla. Stat. § 394.463 , because he suffered from schizophrenia and other mental disorders and he was “ in mental health
court.” After O’Neil stated that Woodstock w as at the Mobil gas station on the corner of Sunset Strip and University Drive , officers were dispatched to t ake Woodstock into custody

. Officer M.D. Mosher of the Sunrise Police Department was first to the scene and spoke briefly with O’Neil about Woodstock. After backup officers arrived, Officer Mosher approached Woodstock and yelled , “Hey, Marlon,” but Woodstock did not r espon d

. After Officer Mosher repeated his greeting , Woodstock pulle d out

a large pocket knife from the waistband of his shorts and walked away

. Officer Mosher broadcast over his radio that Woodstock had a knife and the dispatch operator repeated the officer’s warning.

Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 3 of 104 Officers activated their emergency sirens and follow ed Woodstock across
t raffic in to the parking lot of a busy Walgreens store where a crew of landscapers

w as working

. Detective Eric Bates blocked Woodstock’s path with his patrol vehic le, but Woodstock ran into the passenger side of the vehicle, rolled off , and

resum ed running. Detective Bates abandoned his vehicle and chased Woodstock alongside Officer Luis Fernandez. When Woodstock reached the lawn crew’s truck, Officer Fernandez di scharged his taser at Woodstock who then f e ll d own . Detective Bates unholstered his taser and circled the truck to obstruct Woodstock ’s path as backup officers closed in. The group of officers repeatedly instruct ed Woodstock to drop his knife to no avail. A s soon as the five

- second shock from Officer Fernandez’s taser ended, Woodstock stood up with his knife still clench ed in his right hand

. Detective Bates discharged his taser , and as Woodstock fell to his knees, Officer Loor ran to the scene with his police canine, Recon

. The parties dispute w hat happened next , but we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to Sparkes. See Lee v. Ferraro , 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002)

. One officer used his knee to pin Woodstock’s head to his shoulder while another officer stepped on Woodstock’s arm to immobilize his right hand i n which he still clenched his knife. Woodstock continued to resist , which prevented officers from handcuffing his left arm. Officer Loor guided h is police canine,

Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 4 of 105 Recon , by his harness close enough to bit e Woodstock’s leg

. Officer Loor and other officers instructed Woodstock to drop his weapon, but when he failed to comply, Dete ctive Bates tas ed Woodstock. Officer Loor grabbed Woodstock’s right hand, but Woodstock swung his knife at Officer Loor

. When Woodstock’s arm touched Officer Loor’s leg, he drew his service weapon and ordered Woodstock to drop his knife , but he ignored th at order

. Officer Loor then shot Woodstock in the chest. Woodstock glanced at his left shoulder and, without a sound, turned to face Officer Loor and continued to resist. Officer Loor shot Woodstock a second time, which caused Woodstock’s torso t o drop to the ground

. Officer Loor then step ped on Woodstock’s right forearm and call ed for assistanc e. Detective Eric Fernandez kneeled on Woodstock’s right arm , while Major Louis Berman stomped on Woodstock’s hand and pried the knife out of Woodstock’s h and as a third officer handcuffed Woodstock

. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo a summary judgment. Nam Dang by & through Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla. , 871 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2017)

. Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We “ resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the plaintiff ” and “then

answ er the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to qualified

Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 5 of 106 immunity under that version of the facts.” Lee , 284 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). III. DISCUSSION Sparkes argues that a genuine dispute of material fact exists “whether the use of deadly force was reasonable and necessary” against Woodstock. Sparkes contend s that Officer Loor “charged in without assessing [the] situation or determining if officers already on scene required K9 services” and “p laced himself in a situation where one of his choices afterwards was to kill Mr. Woodstock.” Sparkes also contend s that the City is liable for Officer Loor’s actions because he acted “in accordance with” its policies

. Qualified immunity shields government officials who are acting within their discretionary authority from liability when “ their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” N am Dang , 871 F.3d at 1278 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) )

. If an official is acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he or she committed the allegedly unlawful actions, the plaintiff must prove “that qualified i mmunity is not appropriate.” Lee , 284 F.3d at 1194. “We are required to grant qualified immunity to a defendant official unless the plaintiff can demonstrate two things: (1) that the facts, when construed in the plaintiff’s favor, show that the official co mmitted a constitutional violation and, if

Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 6 of 107 so, (2) that the law, at the time of the official’s act, clearly established the unconstitutionality of that conduct.” Singletary v. Vargas , 804 F.3d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 2015). Because the parties agree that Of ficer Loor w as acting within hi s discretionary authority when he shot Woodstock , th is appeal turns on whether Officer Loor is entitled to qualified immunity

. See Shaw v. City of Selma , 884 F.3d 1093, 1099 (11 th Cir. 2018). Sparkes a r g u es that Officer Loor’s use of force against W oodstock was excessive. The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures “encompasses the right to be free from excessive force during the course of a ” seizure

. Oliver v. Fiorino , 586 F.3d 8 98, 905 (11th Cir. 2009). We evaluate an officer’s use of force under an “objective reasonableness” standard

. Graham v.
Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). The officer’s actions must be objectively reasonable in the light of the situation faced by the office r. Id. at 396. The force the officer employ s “must be reasonably proportionate to the need for that force,” as measured by , among other factors, the danger posed to officers on the scene

. Shaw , 884 F.3d at 1099. In the face of unfolding events, Officer Loor acted reasonably by us ing his police canine , Recon, to subdue Woodstock

. The o fficers had been warned that
W oodstock w as mentally ill, confrontational and aggressive , armed with a knife, had discontinued his medications, and had acted unpredictably and violen tly t hat

Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 7 of 108 morning

. When greeted amicably by one o fficer , Woodstock fled wielding a knife. Woodstock ignored officers’ orders to drop his weapon an d refused to relent when shocked with taser s. Sparkes argues that “the Taser Deployments . . . [were] controlling” Woodstock, bu t the undisputed evidence establishe s that Woodstock

was still “actively resisting arrest,” Graham , 490 U.S. at 396, while armed with his knife

. We have approved of using a police canine when a person “up to that point, ha[s] shown anything but an intention of surrendering.” Crenshaw v. Lister , 556 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11 th Cir. 2009). Because officers were unable to se cure Woodstock using other non - lethal m e thods , it was objectively reasonable for Officer Loor to deploy Recon

. Sparkes argues that Wood stock had yet to pose any actual threat to the police or the public so Officer Loor should have diffuse d the situation rather than use force , but “[o] ur task is not to evaluate what the officer [] could or should have done in hindsight ,” Garczynski v. Bradshaw , 573 F.3d 1158, 1167 (11th Cir. 2009)

. We evaluate “[t]he ‘reasonableness “of a particular use of force . . . from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the s cene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight

. ” Graham , 490 U.S. at 396

. Woodstock had threatened to stab his cousin a few hours earlier and, i n view of hi s repeated refusal s to surrender or to relinquish his weapon, Officer Loor was not required “ to wait ‘ and hope for the

Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 8 of 109 best.’” Jean

- Baptiste v. Gutierrez , 627 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007) ) (alteration adopted). Officer Loor’s later use s of deadly force w ere also objectively reasonable.

“ [T] he law does not require officers in a tense and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect uses a deadly weapon to act ,” Long v. Slaton , 508 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir. 2007) , but Officer Loor did so

. F aced with a deranged and defiant man who m officers were unable to subdue or disarm , Officer Loor used deadly force when Woodstock threatened t o stab him

. See Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“[I] f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon

. . . , deadl y force may be used . . . .”). When one bullet failed to in capacitate Woodstock, Officer
Loor acted reasonably in using additional deadly force to overpower Woodstock so that officers could disarm and handcuff him

. Officer Loor was entitled to qualified immunity. His use of a police canine and deadly force was objectively reasonable i n th is circumstance and did not violate Woodstock’s right to be free from excessive force. The district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Officer Loor and against Sparkes’s clai m of excessive force. Sparkes’s claim against the City also fails as a matter of law. “Only when it is clear that a violation of specific rights has occurred can the question of § 1983 municipal liability for the injury arise.” Vineyard v. Cty

. of Murray , Ga. , 990 F.2d

Case: 18-14781 Date Filed: 07/01/2019 Page: 9 of 1010 1207, 1211 (11th Cir. 1993) . Officer Loor did not commit a constitutional violation, which means that the City has no municipal liability. See Los Angeles v. Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”)

. I V . CONCLUSION We affirm the summary judgment in favor of Officer Loor and the City of Sunrise

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