1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

________________

NO. 09-15-00299-CV 

________________

NATIONAL SECURITY FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant

V.

RENE LAMPSON AND JUSTINA HENRIQUEZ, 

Appellees

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 136th District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. D-187,954

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

National Security Fire and Casualty Company (“National”) appeals the trial 

court’s judgment in favor of Rene Lampson and Justina Henriquez following a jury 

trial. In seven appellate issues, National challenges Lampson’s standing to sue;

Lampson’s alleged lack of full ownership of the subject property; the trial court’s 

admission of expert testimony over National’s objection; the trial court’s refusal to 

include a jury instruction on spoliation; the legal and factual sufficiency of the 
2

damages verdict; the trial court’s alleged failure to require appellees to elect a 

remedy; and the award of attorney’s fees to appellees. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellees Rene Lampson and his wife, Justina Henriquez, sued National, 

alleging that when Hurricane Ike occurred,1 their home in Jefferson County, Texas, 

was damaged.2 Appellees contended that during the hurricane, their “roof was 

damaged resulting in interior water damage throughout the residence.” In addition, 

appellees asserted that the house sustained damage to the sheetrock, exterior 

bricks, and windows, “as well as walls, cabinets[,] and insulation throughout the 

entire house.” According to appellees, the home also shifted during the storm, 

causing the foundation to be unlevel and the ceilings and walls to crack. Appellees 

further claimed that their personal property inside the home was damaged and they 

lost food.

Appellees asserted that they filed a claim for the damages with their 

insurance company, National, immediately after the storm. According to appellees, 

National wrongfully denied their claim for repairs, even though their policy 

 1

Hurricane Ike struck Texas on September 13, 2008. 

2

Appellees also sued claims examiner Renee Snellgrove, but Snellgrove is 

not a party to this appeal. 
3

provided coverage for losses such as theirs, and National underpaid some of their 

claims “by not providing full coverage for the damages sustained by Plaintiffs, as 

well as under-scoping the damages during its investigation.” Appellees asserted

claims for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, breach of contract, unfair settlement 

practices, failure to promptly pay as required by the Texas Insurance Code, and

breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. Appellees also 

sought to recover attorney’s fees. 

The jury found that National failed to comply with the terms of the insurance 

policy; awarded appellees $50,000 for failure to comply with the coverage for 

physical damage to the structure, $950 for failure to comply with the personal 

property provisions of the policy, $750 for failure to comply with the coverage for 

reasonable repairs, and $5000 for failure to comply with the loss of use provisions, 

for a total past damages award of $56,700. The jury also found that National 

knowingly engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice that caused damages to 

Lampson and Justina by failing in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair, and 

equitable settlement when liability had become reasonably clear, failed to provide 

appellees a reasonable explanation of the factual and legal basis in the policy for its 

denial of their claim, and refused to pay their claim without conducting a 

reasonable investigation. The jury awarded damages for the unfair practices in the 
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same amounts it had found pursuant to the question on failure to comply with the 

terms of the policy and also awarded $100,000 damages because the unfair or 

deceptive practice was committed knowingly. 

In addition, the jury found that National failed to comply with its duty of 

good faith and fair dealing by failing to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable 

settlement when liability became clear and by refusing to pay the claim without 

conducting a reasonable investigation. The jury awarded $10,000 for appellees’

loss of use and enjoyment of their property caused by National’s failure to comply 

with its duty of good faith and fair dealing and found that National committed 

fraud against appellees. The jury also awarded Lampson and Justina attorney’s fees 

of $152,000 for representation in the trial court, $50,000 for representation in the 

Court of Appeals, $10,000 for representation at the petition for review stage in the 

Supreme Court, $15,000 for merits briefing at the Supreme Court, and $10,000 for 

oral argument and completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court.

The trial court signed a final judgment in which it found that Lampson and 

Justina were entitled to recover $56,700 for past damages, $10,000 for National’s 

failure to comply with its duty of good faith and fair dealing, and $100,000 

because National knowingly committed deceptive acts or practices. The trial 

court’s final judgment awarded the Lampson’s attorney’s fees of $152,000 for trial 
5

representation. In addition, the trial court’s judgment awarded $50,000 for 

representation in the Court of Appeals, $10,000 for the petition for review stage in 

the Supreme Court, $15,000 for merits briefing in the Supreme Court, and $10,000 

for oral argument and completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court, with each 

award being conditioned upon Lampson and Justina’s success during the appellate 

process. National then filed this appeal from the trial court’s judgment. 

THE EVIDENCE

Lampson testified3 that he married Justina4 on March 20, 1966, and they 

have five children. Lampson explained that he purchased the home for $46,000 in 

1998 by obtaining a ten-year mortgage, and Lampson explained that he had paid 

off the mortgage by approximately 2008. Lampson testified that his daughter’s 

name was on the deed during 2007 and 2008. Lampson explained that he put his 

daughter’s name on the deed when he purchased the home because his wife was in 

Nicaragua at that time, and “anything could happen[,]” and he put his wife’s name 

on the deed when she returned to the country.

 3

Lampson testified via an interpreter. 

4

Justina testified that she became a permanent resident of the United States 

eight years ago. Prior to that time, she traveled back and forth between Nicaragua 

and the United States. Justina was in Nicaragua when Hurricane Ike struck. 
6

In 2007, Lampson purchased an insurance policy from National that 

provided coverage of $50,000, and he paid the premiums on the policy. Lampson 

testified that National inspected the home in 2007, before Hurricane Ike occurred.

According to Lampson, Hurricane Ike caused some new cracks in the home’s 

brick, broke six windows, caused the floor to become unlevel and to crack, and 

caused the roof to leak. In addition, the garage door sustained wind damage, and 

water entered the home. Lampson testified that he had to replace a sofa and a 

refrigerator. In addition, Lampson and his family evacuated to Lufkin, where they 

stayed in a hotel for approximately one week. According to Lampson, after his 

home was inspected, National sent him a letter denying his claim. After National 

denied Lampson’s claim, Lampson contacted Southeast Texas Regional Planning 

Commission (“SETRPC”), and SETRPC paid to tear down Lampson’s home and 

build a new house. Lampson testified that any photographs he had of his home 

before Hurricane Ike struck were no longer in his possession, and he did not recall 

whether he removed the pictures from the house before SETRPC demolished it. 

Shanna Burke, the director of SETRPC’s Disaster Recovery Division 

Program, testified that Lampson applied for assistance in March of 2010. As part 

of the application, Lampson signed a subrogation agreement. SETRPC sent an 

inspector to the home in October of 2010, and the inspector concluded that “[d]ue 
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to high winds, there was extensive foundation, structural, electrical, plumbing, 

mold, and roof damage.” SETRPC determined that the cost of repairing Lampson’s 

home would exceed SETRPC’s $85,000 cap, so SETRPC decided to demolish the 

home and build a new one.

Almus Shively, claims manager for National during the aftermath of

Hurricane Ike, testified that National provided insurance to Lampson in the amount 

of $50,000 for the dwelling, $5000 for other structures, $20,000 for personal 

property on the premises, and $1000 for personal property off the premises. As part 

of the underwriting process, National inspected and photographed Lampson’s 

property. According to Shively, a June 2007 “photo report” in National’s file 

indicated that there was a four-foot crack “on exterior wall on right[,]” windows at 

the rear of the house were boarded, and there was “possible mildew” on the siding 

on the front and left side of the house. National decided to provide coverage to

Lampson. Shively testified that after the hurricane, there were additional cracks 

and broken windows that were not present in the photos from the underwriting file.

National memorialized Lampson’s claim in a written Property Loss Notice,

dated September 29, 2008. After Hurricane Ike occurred, National utilized an 

outside adjusting firm, IAS Claims Service, Inc., to handle claims, including 

Lampson’s. Jack Fielder, an independent adjuster from IAS, inspected Lampson’s 
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home on October 14, 2008, and provided a written report to National. In the report, 

Fielder stated that three windows were broken; the garage door was damaged; the 

roof was in good condition, and there was no evidence that it leaked; and there 

were “some large cracks in the brick veneer that appear new, but [Fielder] could 

not be sure if they [were] related to the wind storm.” Fielder’s report also 

recommended that the file be closed without any payment being made because the 

loss, which Fielder estimated as $572.66, did not exceed Lampson’s $1000 

deductible. According to Shively, Fielder’s report also stated that any roof leaks 

were due to flashing that was not installed, but Shively testified that there was 

nothing in the underwriting file regarding a lack of flashing on the roof. Shively 

testified that Fielder’s report was transmitted to National’s claims examiner. 

According to Fielder, he noted in his report the insured claimed the house 

was unlevel. Fielder observed cracks that appeared to be new, and noted in his 

report, “if you wish to pursue this matter further, . . . I leave it to your discretion.”

Fielder explained that he is “not qualified” to determine whether the cracks in the 

brick were due to hurricane-force winds. When asked whether he went inside the 

home to see if there was water damage, he responded, “I don’t remember, but I 

went in the house.” Fielder testified that he only photographed the bathroom area.

Fielder did not recall going into any area inside the home except the bathroom.
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Fielder explained that he got onto the roof of the home, “went underneath” the 

tarp, and took approximately six photographs. Fielder testified that he did not 

photograph the area where water came in and was observed inside the house, and 

he testified “I don’t know” when asked whether water came inside the house from 

the area underneath the tarp. Fielder testified that he merely noted in his report that 

there was a lack of flashing, and he did not attribute the damage to the lack of 

flashing. Fielder explained that he did not document whether there was interior 

water damage as a result of the broken windows.

After receiving Fielder’s report, National denied Lampson’s claim in a letter, 

dated October 24, 2008. The letter stated, “We have learned from our adjuster’s 

report that the cost to repair the damage to your dwelling will be less than the 

deductible in your policy. Under the circumstances, no payment can be made for 

this claim. . . . We will be glad to consider anything you would like to submit[.]”

Shively testified that he approved the issuance of the denial letter, which was 

signed by claims examiner Renee Snellgrove.

Phil Spotts testified as an expert witness regarding claims adjusting and 

handling. Spotts testified that he is a part owner of an insurance claims consulting 

company, which he founded in 1991. Spotts explained that he has worked in the 

adjusting field for thirty-five years. Spotts testified that for twenty-five years, he 
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has held an all-lines Texas adjuster’s license, which allows him to handle any type 

of claim. Spotts also “studied and received designations from the Insurance 

Institute of America, including associate in claims, associate in risk management 

and chartered underwriter, which is considered to be the highest designation in the 

insurance industry.” According to Spotts, CPCU (chartered property casualty 

underwriter) is the highest level of specialized education in the field of insurance 

adjusting, and Spotts had to take ten rigorous exams over a period of several years 

to achieve that designation. Spotts testified that he received the CPCU designation 

in 1993.

Spotts explained that he has been involved in adjusting insurance claims 

from eighteen hurricanes, has trained over one hundred adjusters, and has an 

extensive background in claims handling. Spotts estimated that he has been 

involved in the handling or supervision of over 100,000 claims. Spotts testified:

A claims adjuster is really the only advocate that the homeowner has. 

I mean, if you think about it he has a little bit of conflict of interest 

because he is getting paid by the insurance company, but it’s his job to 

make sure that he analyzes all of the damage that could have occurred 

in a hurricane, right? If not him then who, right? So it’s critically 

important for the claims adjuster to know the coverage, be a great 

communicator, know how to estimate the costs of any repairs . . . 

based on whatever the going rate in that town is at that time and then 

communicate that with the insured. Those are critical elements in any 

claim adjustment. . . . He is the only one really who can help the 

insured in a time of distress after a hurricane and it’s critically 
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important that he take enough time to properly do his job and analyze 

all the damage at that property. 

According to Spotts, an adjuster should question an insured about such 

issues as whether he had to evacuate, where he went, how long he was gone, how 

the house looked when the insured returned, whether the power was off and for 

how long, and whether the insured lost food. Spotts explained that the claim file “is 

meant to document all of the activities on a claim and so it should read like a 

book.” Spotts testified, “I should be able to pick up this claim file two years later 

and understand exactly what happened on this claim. And if I can’t do that, then 

this claim file is not very well documented[.]” Spotts testified, “in reading this 

claim file it didn’t answer very many of my questions, but it sure asked a whole lot 

more questions that we’re trying to find the answers to here[.]”

Spotts explained that he was asked to review and provide an opinion on the 

claims handling in Lampson’s case. According to Spotts, the claims file does not 

reflect that a full copy of Lampson’s insurance policy was ever provided to Fielder,

and Spotts testified that the policy may contain coverage information that is not 

reflected on the declarations page. Spotts testified that Lampson’s policy has 

additional endorsements and other additions that Fielder could not know about 

without reading the policy. According to Spotts, Fielder’s level of communication 

with Lampson could not have been very effective due to the language barrier, and 
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Spotts testified, “my review of the claim file . . . did not indicate a very high level 

of communication or understanding between the adjuster and the homeowner.”

Spotts explained that when an independent adjuster encounters someone who does 

not speak English well, the adjuster should inform the insurance company that he 

is unable to communicate with the insured and ask for either a hired interpreter or a 

family member of the insured to assist him. 

Spotts noted that Fielder’s report stated that the loss was due to hail rather 

than a hurricane, and he opined that such an error “just goes to attention to detail, 

being in a hurry.” Spotts explained that Lampson had reported four areas of 

concern to National: roof damage, leaking inside the home, damaged windows, and 

the fact that the home was unlevel. According to Spotts, the adjuster “should be 

inspecting those and determining whether those things were legitimately damaged 

by the hurricane. That’s his job.” Spotts opined that Fielder did not adequately 

investigate any of those four areas. Spotts saw no evidence that Fielder did a 

thorough inspection underneath the tarp on Lampson’s roof. According to Spotts, 

Fielder should have taken “an extra special look at that area of the roof to see if 

any of those shingles have been detached by wind in a hurricane, maybe laid back 

down, or if there is another problem up there that could have created this leaking 

inside the house.”
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When asked what Fielder concluded with respect to the leak, Spotts testified, 

“I didn’t see that he actually investigated the leak inside the house because there 

weren’t any photos.” Spotts explained that the only photographs from inside the 

home were two photographs of the bathroom, and he testified that there are no 

scope notes, activity records, or photographs to indicate that Fielder inspected the 

leak on the ceiling. According to Spotts, an adjuster’s job is to find the spot on the 

ceiling where water is coming in and then figure out where it is coming from, and 

nothing in the file indicates that Fielder did so. Spotts testified that Fielder should 

have tested some shingles in a representative area by seeing if he could lift them 

up. Spotts explained that although a roof may appear undamaged, it may be 

unsealed. 

With respect to the broken windows, Spotts testified that Fielder allowed 

Lampson $55.44 for each broken window, and he explained:

I don’t have a problem with the price of the glass. The issue I have, 

based on my experience, . . . these are 50-year old windows that aren’t 

in the world’s greatest condition to begin with, so to think that you 

can replace the glass in these wood windows without replacing the 

window sash is, in my opinion, unreasonable. It just can’t be done. 

You[’ve] got to take that wood off to put the glass in and put new 

wood back and then you have to paint it to match what it looked like 

before. He didn’t pay for any of that, plus Mr. Lampson boarded up 

the windows, which he is required to do under the terms of the policy 

to protect the house from further rain and [Fielder] didn’t pay for that 

either. And how much damage did that cause that had to be repaired 

that was never paid for or considered? So maybe he got the glass part 
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right, but he missed on all the other stuff that . . . should have gone 

with that. 

According to Spotts, Fielder did not investigate or photograph the inside of the 

windows that broke in the hurricane to determine whether there was water damage.

With respect to the house being unlevel and having cracks, Spotts testified that “an 

adjuster is not qualified, in my opinion, to make coverage determinations on 

foundation issues that are this complicated.” In addition, Spotts explained that the 

claim file does not indicate that Fielder’s estimate was ever provided to Lampson.

Spotts opined that Fielder “was in a hurry” and “didn’t take enough time to do his 

job.” Spotts testified: 

[T]ypically what I found through studying fee schedules is that the 

most efficient fee schedule for an adjuster to make the most money is 

that first layer. Going out, looking at a loss quickly, closing the claim 

quickly[,] and getting paid for it quickly provides the greatest 

incentive for the adjuster [to] get paid quickly. Unfortunately, it 

doesn’t provide the greatest incentive of service to the insured because 

when you are working and you are in a hurry, you are going to make 

mistakes[.] 

Spotts explained that there is an economic incentive for field adjusters to hurry to 

complete a claim, and that fact “doesn’t lead to great service.” When asked 

whether Lampson failed to do anything that National required of him, Spotts 

testified, “According to my review of the claim file and all the other documents I 

have been provided, I saw no evidence that Mr. Lampson did anything in violation 
15

of the insurance policy[;] in fact, he went further by providing those temporary 

repairs . . . to prevent further damage[.]”

Engineer Terry Shipman of the Fittz and Shipman engineering firm in 

Beaumont testified that he has a Master of Science degree in civil engineering, and 

he explained that his firm provides “general civil engineering, land survey, and 

structural engineering services.”5 According to Shipman, structural engineering is 

a subset of civil engineering. Shipman explained that the structural division of his 

firm does “the foundation design and the structural frame for buildings that 

[architects] are designing, anywhere from residential to multi-story buildings.”

Shipman testified that any opinions about which he would testify would be based 

on his education and training as a structural engineer and would be based on 

reasonable engineering probabilities.

Lampson’s attorneys retained Shipman to inspect the home after Hurricane 

Ike, and Shipman provided a report. Shipman testified that “rather than sending an 

engineer or myself . . . to inspect the property, we had our field inspector, Don 

Burrell, go out and inspect the property, [and] generate the report for my review 

 5

Before Shipman’s testimony, National’s counsel stated, “it’s our belief that 

the trial court cannot re-visit our Daubert/Robinson challenge of Mr. Terry 

Shipman pursuant to the multi-district litigation rules and we want the record to 

reflect that we re[-]urge it but it’s our belief that the trial court . . . cannot re-visit 

it.” 
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and signature.” Burrell inspected the property on December 14, 2010. Shipman 

explained that it is less expensive to send Burrell than if Shipman personally did 

the inspection, but if Shipman felt it was necessary to investigate further, his 

agreement with Lampson’s counsel permitted him to do so. Shipman estimated that 

he has handled more than one hundred files by sending an inspector. Shipman 

testified that he believed he discussed Burrell’s report with Burrell before signing

it, but he could not “say for certain.” 

Shipman explained that Burrell inspected the home, took photographs, and 

reported back to Shipman. According to Shipman, Burrell has an associate degree 

in construction science technology, and Burrell previously worked for the City of 

Beaumont’s code enforcement department for twenty-two years, and for “either 6 

or 8 of those years he was the building official with the City of Beaumont.”

Shipman explained that before Burrell became the building official, “he did go out 

and inspect properties for code compliance. After he became the building official, 

in addition to doing some of that, he would inspect properties that were damaged 

and would recommend to the city council that they be condemned and 

demolished.”

According to Shipman, Burrell noted that there were broken window panes 

and cracks in the brick façade of Lampson’s home. Shipman explained,
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[T]here’s a brick wainscot around a portion of the house and the brick 

wainscot shifted during the hurricane event and there were new cracks 

in the brick wainscot that were not there prior to the hurricane event. 

And that is just an indication that the foundation shifted during the 

event.

Shipman testified that Burrell also noted that a door was no longer functioning, and 

according to Shipman, “[t]hat means the foundation has shifted. The frame has 

become out of align relative to the door. Therefore, the door is either stuck shut or 

it’s very difficult to open and close.” Shipman testified that Burrell’s observation 

that the kitchen floor noticeably sloped toward the middle of the structure also 

indicates that the foundation has shifted and the floor has become unlevel.

Shipman explained that when the foundation has shifted and the floor has become

unlevel, interior sheetrock cracks occur and doors may not work properly.

When asked to explain how a pier and beam home such as Lampson’s could 

be shifted by a hurricane, Shipman testified:

[T]he storm didn’t last just a few minutes. It was the long-term storm. 

. . . There was also a significant amount of rainfall which softened the 

soils; and during the worst part of the storm, about every 3 seconds or 

5 seconds, a gust of wind would hit the house. The house would 

shudder. It would shake. Due to the softened soils, pressures would be 

put on the piers that were supporting the foundation and they would 

sink a little bit. And every few seconds another gust would hit it and 

little bit more would go down. The house would shudder, shake, 

possibly become distorted a little bit as the wind pressure hit it, 

depending on the angle and the magnitude of the wind. 
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Shipman explained that the storm caused the cracks in the wainscot around the 

house, and that he had reviewed data from the National Weather Service in 

formulating his opinion. In addition, Shipman testified that he used a site-specific 

wind analysis made by CompuWeather for another house he analyzed, which was 

located approximately one mile from Lampson’s house. According to Shipman, 

CompuWeather is an online weather service that has a forensic division which, 

when provided with an address, will perform a forensic analysis of the weather 

events at that address. Shipman explained that said data was relevant to Lampson’s 

home, and he testified: 

[T]he data from CompuWeather indicated that the house experienced 

a maximum gust of 97 miles per hour. The wind[s] exceeded Category 

1 hurricane force winds for 4 hours. The winds exceeded tropical 

storm force winds for 22 hours, and it also indicated 6.5 inches of rain 

in a 23-hour period.

Shipman also explained that, “[b]ased on the 97 [m]ile per hour maximum 

gust that CompuWeather reported, the wind pressures on the Lampson property 

varied from 32 to 75 pounds per square foot.” According to Shipman, the pressures

at the corners, ridge lines, and eaves are higher, and the pressure on the interior 

portion of the walls is lower. In addition, Shipman explained that pressures from 

thirty-two to seventy-five pounds per square foot are of sufficient magnitude to 

structurally move Lampson’s pier and beam home. Shipman explained that, after 
19

providing his report, he saw pre-Hurricane Ike photographs of Lampson’s home 

from National’s underwriting file, and he explained that the additional photographs 

confirmed his opinion. Shipman also testified that the findings of the inspector 

from SETRPC matched Shipman’s own observations and conclusions regarding 

the home.

Additionally, Shipman testified that one of Burrell’s photographs from the 

December 2010 inspection showed what appeared to be a new crack, and Shipman

explained that he believed the crack was new because there was “not debris build 

up in the crack. The brick had been painted. There was no paint in the crack. The 

edges of the mortar where the mortar had cracked was sharp. The crack looked 

fresh.” Shipman also noted in his report that at least seven panes had blown out of 

windows in the home, which indicates significant wind pressure as well as flying 

debris. Shipman also testified that the broken panes indicate that “the outside 

envelope of the house was broken. Therefore, wind was able to enter the house. 

Pressures tend to go up when that happens.” 

Attorney Randy Cashiola testified regarding Lampson’s attorney’s fees.

Cashiola explained that Lampson’s attorneys could only recover their fees if 

Lampson prevails in the lawsuit. Cashiola testified that the rates charged are 

reasonable, reflective of the risk involved in taking the case, and are commensurate 
20

with the lawyers’ skills. According to Cashiola, the rates are reasonable for the 

area of first-party insurance law, as well as for the Jefferson County area.

Cashiola explained that after the case was filed in Jefferson County, it was 

moved to Harris County for a time during the pretrial phase as part of the 

multidistrict litigation (MDL) pretrial procedure,6 which necessitated more travel 

time for the attorneys. In addition, Cashiola testified that taking Lampson’s case 

precluded Lampson’s attorneys from accepting some other cases. Cashiola testified 

that $160,145 in attorney’s fees had been incurred, and he explained that attorney’s 

fees were accruing during trial at the rate of approximately $6000 per day.

Cashiola explained that appellate attorneys charge approximately $500 per hour, 

and he anticipated that fees for an appeal to this Court would be $50,000, and fees 

for an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court would be $10,000 for the petition for 

review stage, $15,000 for the briefing stage and $5000 for oral argument. National 

did not call any witnesses, and both National and Lampson rested at the conclusion 

of Lampson’s evidence. 

ISSUE TWO

In issue two, National argues that Lampson lacks standing to sue National 

because he “assigned all rights of recovery, including the National Security 

 6

The case was transferred to the MDL court pursuant to National’s motion 

requesting the transfer. See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 13.3.
21

insurance policy, to the [SETRPC][.]” Because this issue, if sustained, would result 

in reversal of the trial court’s judgment and dismissal of the appeal, we address it 

first. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 149-

50 (Tex. 2012); Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1985). 

Although Lampson questions whether National, as a stranger to the contract, 

has standing to assert SETRPC’s rights, we will address Lampson’s standing as 

briefed by National in issue two rather than ruling upon National’s standing. 

National presented its motion to dismiss to the MDL court in Harris County, in 

which it asserted that the Lampsons lack standing, and after the MDL Court denied 

the motion to dismiss, National re-urged the motion before the trial court. The trial 

court signed an order denying National’s motion to dismiss. In its order, the trial 

court stated, “In an effort to circumvent an emergency interlocutory appeal filing 

on the day of trial, it is this Court’s opinion that the MDL Court’s denial of 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction be reiterated in the trial 

court.”

As discussed above, Lampson and SETRPC entered into a “Subrogation and 

Assignment Agreement[.]” The agreement identified Lampson as the borrower and 

SETRPC as the “Subrecipient[,]” and stated that Lampson “hereby assigns to 

[SETRPC] all of [Lampson’s] future rights to reimbursement and all payments 
22

received under any policy of casualty or property damage insurance . . . for 

physical damage to the Structure[.]” The agreement also provided: “Borrower 

agrees to assist and cooperate with the Subrecipient should the Subrecipient elect 

to pursue any of the claims Borrower has against the Insurers for reimbursement 

under any such policies. Borrower’s assistance and cooperation shall include 

allowing suit to be brought in Borrower’s name(s)[.]” 

To determine whether Lampson had standing to bring his claims against 

National, we must examine the subrogation and assignment agreement. We 

construe the subrogation and assignment agreement by giving the language therein 

its plain meaning. Phoenix Network Techs. (Europe) Ltd. v. Neon Sys., Inc., 177 

S.W.3d 605, 615 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). In construing a 

contract, we must consider the instrument as a whole rather than give controlling 

effect to a single provision. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 

(Tex. 2003).

If the written instrument is so worded that it can be given a certain or 

definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and 

the court will construe the contract as a matter of law. A contract, 

however, is ambiguous when its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or 

it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Whether a 

contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide by 

looking at the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances present 

when the contract was entered.

Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tex. 1983) (citations omitted). 
23

We conclude that the plain language of the subrogation and assignment 

agreement indicates that Lampson was assigning to SETRPC the funds recovered 

from his insurance policy with National (as well as from any other sources, such as 

FEMA). The agreement gave SETRPC the right to bring a lawsuit in Lampson’s 

name, but not the exclusive right to do so, and nowhere does the agreement refer to 

assignment of a cause of action by Lampson. See generally id. Applying the rules 

of contract construction and reading the agreement as a whole, we conclude that 

the agreement’s purpose was to insure that SETRPC would recoup the money it 

spent on Lampson’s property from any money Lampson received from National or 

other sources. Because Lampson did not assign the exclusive right to assert a cause 

of action regarding the property to SETRPC, the trial court did not err by denying 

National’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we overrule issue two.

ISSUE ONE

In issue one, National argues that the jury “necessarily” answered several 

questions of the charge incorrectly because, according to National, Lampson only 

owned a one-half interest in the insured structure. Specifically, National asserts 

that because Lampson’s daughter’s name appears on a deed, dated November 19, 

2010, in which she conveyed an unspecified interest in the property to Lampson 

for “Ten dollars ($10.00) cash and other good and valuable consideration[,]” 
24

Lampson only owned one half of the property before that date. In addition, 

National contends that Lampson’s wife “clearly has no ownership, has no claim on 

which damages can be awarded[,] and is not entitled to an award of attorney’s 

fees.” 

National does not direct this Court to the deed that reflects Lampson’s 

purchase of the home in 1998; rather, as explained above, National simply

references the 2010 deed from Chirly to Lampson and concludes, without citation 

to any authorities, that the deed shows that Lampson only owned a one-half 

interest in the home prior to the deed from Chirly. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) 

(Appellant’s brief must contain appropriate citations to authorities and to the 

record.). As explained below, National’s argument contradicts well-established 

principles of community property law, as well as the evidence adduced at trial. 

Lampson testified that he married his wife in 1966 and purchased the home 

in 1998. No evidence to the contrary was introduced. In addition, Lampson 

testified that he added his daughter to the deed to his home because his wife was 

living in Nicaragua and “anything could happen[,]” and Lampson explained that he 

changed the title to reflect Justina’s name when she returned to the country. There 

was no evidence adduced to indicate that Lampson intended to convey any interest 

to Chirly when he put her name on the deed. 
25

There is a presumption under Texas law that property possessed or acquired 

by either spouse during the marriage is community property, and to prove that 

particular property is separate property requires clear and convincing evidence. 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003 (West 2006); see Gameson v. Gameson, 162 S.W. 

1169, 1171 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1913, no writ). As discussed above, the 

evidence established that Lampson purchased the home during the marriage, and 

there was no evidence that Lampson intended to convey any interest to Chirly or 

that Chirly contributed any funds toward the purchase of the home. The evidence 

adduced at trial was insufficient to rebut the presumption that the house was 

community property. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003; Gameson, 162 S.W. at 

1171. Therefore, because the home was community property, Lampson and Justina 

each owned an interest in the home. See generally Patterson v. Twaddell, 301 

S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

In its brief, National also quotes a portion of the insurance policy, which 

states that it will not be liable to the insured for more than the amount of the 

insured’s interest at the time of the loss. As discussed above, Lampson and Justina 

owned the home as community property when Hurricane Ike struck. For the same 

reasons discussed above, we reject National’s argument and overrule issue one.
26

ISSUE THREE

In issue three, National complains that the trial court erred by allowing 

Shipman to testify because Shipman did not inspect the property, take any 

photographs, and “did not even write his ‘own’ expert report.” National asserts that 

it was “substantially prejudiced” by the admission of Shipman’s testimony over its 

objection. 

Under Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the party seeking to admit 

expert testimony must establish that (1) the expert is qualified to render an opinion 

on the subject matter and (2) the testimony is relevant to the issue in the case. Tex. 

R. Evid. 702; TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2010). 

Expert testimony must rely on sufficient data and proper methodology. 

Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 905-06 (Tex. 2004); KerrMcGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. 2004). “An expert may base 

an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of, 

reviewed, or personally observed.” Tex. R. Evid. 703.

“An expert’s bare opinion will not suffice.” Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 906. If 

the analytical gap between the offered opinion and the underlying data is too great, 

the expert testimony is unreliable. Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 39 

(Tex. 2007); see Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 
27

(Tex. 1998). A trial court must act as a gatekeeper to screen out unreliable expert 

evidence. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Tex. 1999); see

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556-57 (Tex. 1995). 

The examination of an expert’s methodology, technique, or foundational data is a 

task for the trial court in its role as gatekeeper. Coastal Transp. Co., Inc. v. Crown 

Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Tex. 2004). A Robinson

determination is “not an analysis that should be undertaken for the first time on 

appeal.” Id. Requiring the trial court to first address the issue insures that a full 

record will be developed and an appellate court will be able to evaluate the 

sufficiency of the evidence without looking beyond the appellate record. Id.

Shipman testified regarding his credentials, as well as those of Burrell, and 

he stated that all of his testimony would be based upon his training as a structural 

engineer, as well as reasonable engineering probabilities. As discussed above, 

Shipman estimated that he has handled more than one hundred files by sending an 

inspector, such as Burrell, to the site. Burrell photographed and described in the 

report the damage to Lampson’s home, and Shipman explained how he used data 

from CompuWeather to calculate the range of wind pressures to which Lampson’s 

property was exposed during the hurricane. Shipman testified regarding the 

damage depicted in Burrell’s photographs, and he explained how the length and 
28

force of the storm, as well as the amount of rain, caused the house to shake and 

“possibly become distorted[.]” Shipman further explained the basis for his belief 

that the cracks in the brick were new, and he testified that the broken windows 

indicated significant wind pressure and flying debris.

We conclude that Shipman’s testimony did not merely consist of his bare 

opinion; rather, it was supported by sufficient data and proper methodology and 

was not conclusory. See Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 905-06; Helton, 133 S.W.3d at 

257. In addition, we conclude that National’s complaint that Shipman did not 

personally inspect the property, photograph it, or personally write the report is 

without merit. See Tex. R. Evid. 702; Schronk v. City of Burleson, 387 S.W.3d 

692, 716 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet. denied) (holding that a testifying expert 

need not have personally inspected an object before offering testimony about the 

object). For all of these reasons, we overrule issue three.

ISSUE FOUR

In issue four, National contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

refusing to submit the spoliation instruction National requested. National argues 

that the condition of the property before and after Hurricane Ike was “critical 

physical evidence[,]” yet Lampson “allowed the structure to be demolished, 
29

together with photographs of the [structure’s] pre and post Hurricane Ike 

condition[.]” 

In Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2014), the Texas 

Supreme Court held that because a spoliation instruction is based on a presumption 

of wrongdoing rather than mere negligence, “a party must intentionally spoliate 

evidence in order for a spoliation instruction to constitute an appropriate remedy.” 

Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 23-24. The Supreme Court explained that “[b]y 

‘intentional’ spoliation, often referenced as ‘bad faith’ or ‘willful’ spoliation, we 

mean that the party acted with the subjective purpose of concealing or destroying 

discoverable evidence.” Id. at 24. Accordingly, the Court held that “a trial court’s 

finding of intentional spoliation . . . is a necessary predicate to the proper 

submission of a spoliation instruction to the jury.” Id. at 25. The Supreme Court 

qualified its broader holding by providing a means for the trial court to give a 

spoliation instruction “if the act of spoliation, although merely negligent, so 

prejudices the nonspoliating party that it is irreparably deprived of having any 

meaningful ability to present a claim or defense.” Id. at 25-26.

The record reflects that Lampson filed a claim with National for his damages 

from Hurricane Ike on September 29, 2008, applied for assistance from SETRPC 

on March 5, 2010, filed suit against National on September 3, 2010, and SETRPC 
30

demolished the home in May of 2012. Nothing in the record before us suggests that 

Lampson intentionally spoliated any evidence by allowing SETRPC to demolish 

the house, nor does the record suggest that the alleged spoliation deprived National 

of any meaningful ability to present a claim or defense; rather, the record reflects 

that National vigorously defended itself, and that National had inspected and 

photographed the home in 2007 during the underwriting process. We conclude that 

the trial court did not err by refusing to submit National’s requested spoliation 

instruction. In addition, we note that National has not established that the refusal of 

the instruction probably led to the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 44.1(a)(1). For all of these reasons, we overrule issue four.

ISSUE FIVE

In issue five, National appears to argue that the evidence was legally and 

factually insufficient to support the damages verdict. National briefs the issue by 

asserting its challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence concurrently with 

complaints about the denial of its requested jury questions on causation, policy 

defenses, and spoliation. National also includes in its discussion of issue five an

oddly-placed argument regarding Lampson’s alleged failure to fulfill his duties 

under the policy to (1) provide prompt written notice of the facts relating to the 

claim, (2) protect the property from further damage, (3) make reasonable and 
31

necessary repairs to protect the property, (4) keep an accurate record of the repair, 

(5) allow National access to the property as often as National reasonably requires, 

and (6) provide pertinent documents and records upon request.

National does not discuss the standards of review for legal and factual 

sufficiency of the evidence or explain how the evidence was insufficient. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 38.1(i). National does not explain how its arguments regarding the jury 

charge relate to its challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence as 

to damages; rather, National seems to make a separate argument regarding the 

refusal of its requested instructions regarding causation, Lampson’s duties under 

the policy, and spoliation.

In a legal sufficiency review, we are to “credit favorable evidence if 

reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors 

could not.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Evidence is

legally sufficient if it “would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach 

the verdict under review.” Id. We will sustain a legal sufficiency challenge if the 

record shows one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital 

fact; (2) rules of law or rules of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the 

only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital 

fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence conclusively establishes 
32

the opposite of the vital fact that is at issue in the appeal. Id. at 810. “Evidence 

does not exceed a scintilla if it is ‘so weak as to do no more than create a mere 

surmise or suspicion’ that the fact exists.” Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’Ship v. Suberu, 216 

S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 

598, 601 (Tex. 2004)). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses 

and is responsible for resolving any conflicts in the evidence, weighing the 

evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. City 

of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819-21; Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 625 

(Tex. 2004).

In a factual sufficiency review, we consider and weigh all of the evidence, 

and we will set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so 

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong 

and unjust. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). As long 

as the evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we cannot 

substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 

822.

National argues that the only causation testimony came from Shipman, and 

National also complains that because Hurricane Rita damaged Lampson’s house 

prior to Hurricane Ike, the trial court erred by refusing its requested jury question 
33

regarding whether Hurricane Ike caused the damage to Lampson’s property. As 

previously discussed, after Hurricane Rita occurred,

7 National inspected Lampson’s 

home and photographed it, and National’s underwriters decided to insure the 

property.

In addition to Shipman’s testimony, which we will not reiterate here, the 

jury also heard evidence from Lampson regarding the damage Hurricane Ike 

inflicted upon the property. Specifically, Lampson testified that Hurricane Ike 

caused new cracks in the brick, broke six windows, caused the floor to become 

unlevel and to crack, caused the roof to leak, damaged the garage door, and 

allowed water to enter the home. Lampson also testified regarding items he had to 

replace, as well as his family’s evacuation to a hotel for about one week. Lampson 

testified that he had to spend one week in a hotel during the evacuation, had to 

replace a refrigerator and a sofa, and that he lost food. In addition, Lampson 

testified that his home cost $46,000 when he purchased it in 1998, and Burke 

testified that SETPRC determined that it was more cost efficient to demolish the 

home and rebuild rather than to repair it because the repair cost would have 

exceeded SETRPC’s $85,000 cap. The jury also heard Shively testify that there 

 7

Hurricane Rita made landfall on September 24, 2005. 
34

were cracks and broken windows in the post-hurricane photos that did not appear 

in the photographs National took in 2007. 

With respect to the award of damages for National’s knowingly committing 

unfair or deceptive trade practices, the jury heard evidence from Spotts that 

National’s claim file was not well documented; National apparently did not give 

Fielder a copy of Lampson’s insurance policy; Fielder did not communicate 

effectively with Lampson or seek assistance from an interpreter; Fielder did not 

adequately investigate any of the four areas of concern reported by Lampson; and 

Fielder was in a hurry and did not take sufficient time to do his job. The jury heard

evidence that National accepted Fielder’s report and denied Lampson’s claim 

without further investigation. 

Crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding 

contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not, we conclude that the 

evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the damages 

verdict and, therefore, is legally sufficient. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. 

Furthermore, considering and weighing all of the evidence, we conclude that the 

evidence is not so weak nor is the finding so against the great weight and 

preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Francis, 46 
35

S.W.3d at 242. Therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient. Accordingly, we 

overrule the legal and factual sufficiency challenges raised in issue five.

We now turn to the charge error arguments alleged within issue five. The 

trial court shall submit instructions and definitions as shall be proper to enable the 

jury to reach a verdict and which are raised by the written pleadings and the 

evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 277, 278. We review alleged jury charge error under an 

abuse of discretion standard. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 

649 (Tex. 1990) (op. on reh’g); Lake Conroe Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. KMT Bldg. Co., 

290 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.). We may not reverse 

for charge error unless the error “probably caused the rendition of an improper 

judgment[.]” Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1); Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 

579 (Tex. 2006). To determine whether an alleged error in the jury charge is 

reversible, we consider the pleadings of the parties, the evidence presented at trial, 

and the charge in its entirety. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Rep. of Tex. Sav. 

Ass’n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 1986). “Charge error is generally considered 

harmful if it relates to a contested, critical issue.” Columbia Rio Grande 

Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex. 2009). To be included in 

the charge, a question or instruction must be supported by the pleadings and the 
36

evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 278; Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 693 (Tex. 

2012).

National’s first charge complaint in issue five concerns the rejection of its 

proposed jury question, which inquired whether Hurricane Ike caused the alleged 

windstorm damage. National asserts that because Lampson’s home had been 

previously damaged in Hurricane Rita, the charge on causation was required. As 

discussed above, Lampson testified that Hurricane Ike damaged his home and 

explained in detail the extent of the damage, and National had in its underwriting 

file pictures of the home’s condition in 2007, which was after Hurricane Rita but 

before Hurricane Ike. Shipman testified in detail regarding the forces to which 

Lampson’s home was exposed during the storm and the resulting damages to the 

structure. No witnesses testified that Hurricane Ike did not damage Lampson’s 

home. 

We conclude that the proposed instruction was not supported by the 

evidence, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by refusing to 

submit it. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 278; Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 693. In addition, National 

has not demonstrated that the trial court’s refusal of its requested instruction 

probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 

44.1(a)(1); Shupe, 192 S.W.3d at 579.
37

In its next charge error argument, National complains of the trial court’s 

refusal to submit its proposed question that set forth all of Lampson’s duties 

pursuant to the insurance policy and asked the jury to determine whether Lampson 

had fulfilled those duties. The evidence established that National had received 

notice of Lampson’s claim by September 29, 2008, and denied Lampson’s claim 

on October 24, 2008, after receiving Fielder’s report. In addition, Spotts testified 

that Lampson did not violate the insurance policy, and that Lampson made 

temporary repairs to prevent further damage to the property. National’s proposed 

question inquired about issues upon which there was no evidence, such as 

Lampson allowing National access to the property until its demolition, providing 

prompt notice, and providing documents upon request. Because National’s 

proposed issue included issues not supported by the evidence, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit it. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 278; Thota, 

366 S.W.3d at 693. In addition, National has not demonstrated that the trial court’s 

refusal of its requested instruction on Lampson’s obligations under the policy 

probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 

44.1(a)(1); Shupe, 192 S.W.3d at 579. 

In its final charge error argument, National again contends that the trial court 

erred by refusing its requested instruction on spoliation. We have already 
38

addressed the refusal of a spoliation instruction in our analysis of issue four, and 

we need not repeat that analysis here. For the same reasons discussed in issue four, 

we overrule National’s argument in issue five regarding the trial court’s refusal to 

submit National’s proposed spoliation charge. Having addressed all of the 

multifarious arguments raised in issue five, we overrule issue five.

ISSUE SIX

In issue six, National asserts that the trial court failed to require Lampson to 

elect a remedy, and that Lampson cannot recover “under both his statutory claims 

and his breach of contract claim.” As discussed above, the jury awarded actual 

damages totaling $56,700 in response to both Question 2, which dealt with breach 

of contract, and Question 5, which dealt with unfair or deceptive acts by National.

The record reflects that appellees filed a motion for entry of final judgment on 

March 2, 2015, with which they submitted a proposed final judgment. Appellees’ 

proposed final judgment included a single finding of past damages of $56,700, as 

well as $10,000 for National’s failure to comply with its duty of good faith and fair 

dealing and $100,000 for National’s knowing engagement in unfair or deceptive 

acts or practices. The trial court signed its final judgment in accordance with the 

requests made in appellees’ proposed final judgment. Therefore, appellees did not 

recover twice for the same injury. Cf. Waite Hill Servs. v. World Class Metal 
39

Works, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Tex. 1998) (holding that when technically 

differing acts cause the same injury, the one satisfaction rule prohibits the plaintiff 

from recovering the same damages twice).

National also complains that appellees “failed to segregate the covered from 

the uncovered losses.” National’s brief contains no explanation of what losses 

National contends were not covered; therefore, said argument is inadequately 

briefed, and we need not address it. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). For all of these 

reasons, we overrule issue six.

ISSUE SEVEN

In issue seven, National argues that the attorney’s fees award was “wholly 

unsupported in fact and law and amounted to a recovery based on ipse dixit

testimony[,]” and National also asserts that the trial court erred by overruling its 

objections to jury Question 10, which dealt with attorney’s fees. National 

complains that appellees’ “proof of attorney’s fees . . . was a reconstituted 

spreadsheet itemizing the time performed on specific tasks[,]” and points out that 

Cashiola testified that appellees’ counsel did not keep contemporaneous time 

records. 

We generally review an attorney’s fee award for an abuse of discretion. 

Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 163 (Tex. 2004). “Even though 
40

the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion, we may nevertheless 

review a fee award for sufficiency of the evidence.” Cordova v. Sw. Bell Yellow 

Pages, Inc., 148 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.). The lodestar 

method of determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee involves two 

steps: (1) determining the reasonable hours spent by counsel and a reasonable 

hourly rate for such work, and (2) multiplying the number of such hours by the 

applicable rate, “the product of which is the base fee or lodestar.” El Apple I, Ltd. 

v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. 2012). “[A] party applying for an award of 

attorney’s fees under the lodestar method bears the burden of documenting the 

hours expended on the litigation and the value of those hours.” Id. at 761. 

Sufficient evidence should include, “at a minimum, documentation of the services 

performed, who performed them and at what hourly rate, when they were 

performed, and how much time the work required.” Id. at 764. Contemporaneous 

evidence may be unavailable, but it is permissible for attorneys to reconstruct their 

work to provide the factfinder with sufficient information. Long v. Griffin, 442 

S.W.3d 253, 256 (Tex. 2014).

As Cashiola acknowledged during his testimony, the Supreme Court has set 

forth a list of eight factors that the factfinder should consider when determining the 

reasonableness of attorney’s fees. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 
41

945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997). In Arthur Andersen, the Supreme Court held

that the factors the factfinder should consider are:

1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 

involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;

2) the likelihood . . . that the acceptance of the particular employment 

will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 

performing the services; and

8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or 

uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Id. (quoting Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct R. 1.04, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t 

Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R., art. X, § 9)).

National asserts that Cashiola’s testimony was legally insufficient to prove Arthur 

Andersen factors one, four, and eight. A party need not prove all of the Arthur 

Andersen factors for the evidence supporting an attorney’s fee award to be 

sufficient. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Dieterich, 270 S.W.3d 695, 706 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). 
42

Cashiola testified that the rates charged per hour by appellees’ attorneys are 

reasonable, reflective of the risk of taking the case, and commensurate with the 

attorneys’ skills, and he explained that the rates are reasonable for the area of firstparty insurance law, as well as for the Jefferson County area. Cashiola further 

explained that appellees’ attorneys had to travel more after the case was moved to 

Harris County as part of the MDL procedure. In addition, Cashiola explained that 

appellees’ attorneys would only recover their fees if Lampson won the lawsuit, and 

“there is no guarantee here of any kind of recovery.” Cashiola also testified that 

appellate attorneys charge approximately $500 per hour, and he used that figure in 

estimating appellate attorney’s fees.

Cashiola testified that appellees’ attorneys had created a fee report in 

spreadsheet format, which reflected their work up to two days before Cashiola’s 

testimony, and the report was admitted into evidence without objection. As 

previously discussed, Cashiola testified that $160,145 in attorney’s fees had been 

incurred, and he explained that attorney’s fees were accruing during trial at the rate 

of approximately $6000 per day. The fee report lists the services performed, who 

performed them, the hourly rate for the services, when they were performed, and 

how much time the work required. On this record, we conclude that the evidence 

was sufficient to support the attorney’s fees awarded. See Long, 442 S.W.3d at 
43

256; Olivas, 370 S.W.3d at 764. Accordingly, we overrule issue seven. Having 

overruled all of National’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

_____________________________

 STEVE McKEITHEN

 Chief Justice

Submitted on May 19, 2016

Opinion Delivered October 20, 2016

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.