FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AZRA TASLIMI, 

Petitioner, No. 05-71006

v. Agency No.  A096-360-113 ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

December 10, 2008—Pasadena, California

Filed January 4, 2010

Before: Harry Pregerson, Dorothy W. Nelson and

David R. Thompson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

1
COUNSEL

Haleh Mansouri, Esq., Los Angeles, California, for the petitioner.

Stuart Nickum, Department of Justice Trial Attorney, Washington, DC, for the respondent.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Azra Taslimi (“Taslimi”) petitions for review of a decision

of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) finding her

statutorily ineligible for asylum. We grant the petition for

review, reverse and remand to the BIA to determine whether,

in an exercise of discretion, Taslimi merits a grant of asylum

under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

1The IJ expressly found Taslimi and the other witnesses who testified

at Taslimi’s hearing to be credible. We take those witnesses’ factual contentions as true. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 652 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“Where the BIA does not make an explicit adverse credibility finding, we

must assume that the applicant’s factual contentions are true.”) (citing

Gaya Prasad v. INS, 101 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

4 TASLIMI v. HOLDER
Taslimi is a native and citizen of Iran. She entered the

United States on a visitor visa on or about October 3, 1992,

with authorization to remain until October 3, 1993. She has

not left the United States since her entry. 

Before coming to the United States, Taslimi was Muslim.

In the United States, however, Taslimi began attending Christian churches. Beginning in June 2002, Taslimi attended

prayer services and Bible study at the New Beginnings Christian Fellowship Church of God (“New Beginnings”). On September 5, 2002, Taslimi approached New Beginnings’ pastor

and converted to Christianity. Two members of the church

and the pastor witnessed Taslimi’s conversion ceremony. 

Following her conversion, Taslimi had a conversation with

the pastor of New Beginnings, Pastor Ritchie, in which he

encouraged her to legalize her status and helped her find an

attorney. Before learning of asylum, Taslimi did not know

that she might apply for legal status based on her religious

conversion. Taslimi discussed her legal status with others, and

learned of asylum in March or April of 2003. She applied for

asylum on April 2, 2003, a few days short of seven months

after her religious conversion.

Taslimi did not apply for asylum immediately after her

conversion because she wanted to be sure that it was going to

be a life-long decision.2 Pastor Ritchie testified that he viewed

Taslimi’s period of waiting after her conversion and before

applying for asylum to be healthy, because it “demonstrated

the genuineness of her commitment.”

An asylum officer referred Taslimi’s application for asylum

to immigration court for adjudication. During the hearing on

2When asked why she waited to apply for asylum after her conversion

ceremony and after she learned of asylum, Taslimi explained: “I was seeking to find myself whether I wanted to remain in this [path] or not. I was

contemplating on that.” 

TASLIMI v. HOLDER 5
the merits of her asylum application in immigration court,

Taslimi explained that she would fear for her life if she were

removed to Iran, but that she is committed to practicing Christianity, even if removed. In addition to Taslimi and Pastor Ritchie, two members of the New Beginnings Church testified at

the hearing on Taslimi’s behalf.3

Prior to rendering his oral decision, the IJ indicated that he

intended to grant Taslimi withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but to deny Taslimi’s application for asylum because she failed to apply for

asylum within a reasonable period following her religious

conversion. In light of his intent to grant withholding of

removal, the IJ asked Taslimi’s counsel whether she wanted

to reconsider the request for voluntary departure. After briefly

going off the record, Taslimi’s counsel withdrew the request

for voluntary departure and the IJ rendered his oral decision.

The IJ found that Taslimi was eligible for withholding of

removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), because Taslimi

showed that it was more likely than not that her life or freedom would be threatened in Iran on account of her religion.

The IJ also found Taslimi eligible for protection under the

Convention Against Torture, finding Taslimi met her burden

of establishing that it was more likely than not that she would

be tortured if returned to Iran.

The IJ denied Taslimi’s application for asylum, finding it

to be time-barred. Taslimi converted to Christianity on September 5, 2002, and filed her asylum application on April 2,

2003. The IJ found that Taslimi’s September 5, 2002, conversion constituted “changed circumstances” materially affecting

her eligibility for asylum, which would permit her to file for

asylum more than one year after her entry into the United

States. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2). The IJ further found, how3New Beginnings Church also submitted a petition, signed by ninetyone people, attesting to Taslimi’s dedication to the church. 

6 TASLIMI v. HOLDER
ever, that Taslimi failed to apply for asylum within a “reasonable period” following the change in circumstances. See 8

C.F.R. § 208(a)(4)(ii).4 The IJ reasoned that Taslimi had lived

in the United States since 1992 and had “ample opportunity

to avail herself of resources regarding the laws of asylum.”

The IJ reasoned that Taslimi did not testify that she was

unaware of asylum during the period between her conversion

and filing for asylum, when Taslimi was waiting to see

whether her conversion would hold. The IJ observed that the

Pastor “did not testify that [Taslimi] discussed asylum with

him at all. The Pastor only discussed the need to resolve [Taslimi’s] immigration problem shortly before the baptism, but

never dissuaded her or informed her of the asylum procedure.” Finding no extenuating or special circumstances that

would make the delay in filing for asylum reasonable, the IJ

found that Taslimi failed to show that she qualified for an

exception to the one-year filing deadline. Accordingly, the IJ

found Taslimi statutorily ineligible for asylum. He further

ordered her removed from the United States before granting

her withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s

decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).

Taslimi timely petitioned this court for review. On appeal,

she argues that: (1) the IJ erred by concluding that she failed

to file her asylum application within a reasonable period of

time following changed circumstances affecting her eligibility

for asylum; and (2) the IJ erred by concluding that he was

required to enter an order of removal before granting Taslimi

withholding of removal.

4

8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii) reads in pertinent part: “The applicant shall

file an asylum application within a reasonable period given those ‘changed

circumstances.’ ” 

Taslimi converted to Christianity on September 5, 2002, and filed for

asylum on April 2, 2003. Although the IJ referred to this period as being

“two or three days short of six months,” it is clearly a period just shy of

seven months. Neither party disputes the IJ’s factual finding, and we do

not find it important to our analysis. 

TASLIMI v. HOLDER 7
DISCUSSION

I.

[1] Asylum-seekers have one year from the time of their

entry into the United States to file an application for asylum.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). This one year filing deadline is subject to two statutory exceptions. An asylum seeker may apply

for asylum even if it is more than one year after that person’s

entry by demonstrating “either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility

for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the

delay in filing an application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D)

(emphases added). 

[2] An applicant demonstrating changed circumstances

must further demonstrate that the application was filed

“within a reasonable period given those ‘changed circumstances.’ ” 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii). Similarly, an applicant

demonstrating “extraordinary circumstances” must show that

the application was filed “within a reasonable period given

those circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5).

The IJ found, and the government does not dispute, that

Taslimi’s conversion to Christianity constituted changed circumstances within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).

Taslimi disputes the IJ’s finding that she failed to file her

application for asylum within a “reasonable period” given

those changed circumstances.

II.

We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to

review the IJ’s determination that Taslimi failed to file her

application within a “reasonable period” given her changed

circumstances. “[W]e ‘have jurisdiction to determine whether

jurisdiction exists.’ ” Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d

1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Aragon-Ayon v. INS, 206

8 TASLIMI v. HOLDER
F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 2000)). We review our own jurisdiction de novo. Ruiz-Morales v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1219, 1221

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Rosales-Rosales v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d

714, 716 (9th Cir. 2003)). Based on our decisions in Ramadan

v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) and

Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008), we hold

that we have jurisdiction to consider this question.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) provides that “[n]o court shall have

jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General” regarding changed or extraordinary circumstances. Section 106 of the REAL ID Act of 2005, however, restored

jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law

raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate

court of appeals.” Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B (2005), codified

at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

[3] Accordingly, even though 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) purports to strip our jurisdiction over determinations related to

changed or extraordinary circumstances, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) restored jurisdiction to the extent that determinations concerning changed or extraordinary circumstances

involve constitutional claims or questions of law.

In Ramadan we held that “ ‘questions of law,’ as the phrase

is used in [§ 1252(a)(2)(D)], extends to questions involving

the application of statutes or regulations to undisputed facts,

sometimes referred to as mixed questions of fact and law.”

479 F.3d at 650. In that case we held that we have jurisdiction

to review as a mixed question of fact and law an IJ’s determination that the petitioner failed to demonstrate “changed circumstances” allowing her to file for asylum more than one

year after her arrival in the United States. 479 F.3d at 650.5

5

In Ramadan, as in Taslimi’s case, the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s

decision without an opinion. Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 649. The IJ’s decision

is the final agency determination, 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(e), and we review it

directly. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 919 (9th Cir. 2004). 

TASLIMI v. HOLDER 9
The factual basis of Ramadan’s claim was undisputed, and

our court “only review[ed] whether the IJ appropriately determined that the facts did not constitute ‘changed circumstances’ as defined by immigration law.” Id. at 657. The issue

here, whether we have jurisdiction to consider the further

question of whether an asylum applicant has filed an application within a “reasonable period” following those changed circumstances, was not presented in Ramadan.

In Husyev, we considered the parallel exception to the one

year deadline of “extraordinary circumstances.” 528 F.3d at

1181. In that case, the petitioner filed an asylum application

364 days after the expiration of his legal status. Id. at 1178.

One example provided by regulation of extraordinary circumstances justifying filing an application more than one year

after entry is where an applicant maintains lawful status “until

a reasonable period before the filing of the asylum application.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(iv). The IJ found that the petitioner failed to show that he filed his asylum application

within a “reasonable period” after the expiration of his lawful

status. Husyev, 528 F.3d at 1178. The facts in Husyev were

undisputed, and the issue our court considered was “how the

statute and regulation apply to those facts.” Id. at 1179. Relying on Ramadan, we held that we had jurisdiction to review

the IJ’s determination that the petitioner failed to show that he

filed his asylum application within a “reasonable period” following the expiration of his legal status. Id. at 1179. See also

Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2008)

(holding that jurisdiction exists to review the application of

the extraordinary circumstances exception to undisputed

facts).

[4] Based on our holdings in Ramadan and Husyev, we

hold that we have jurisdiction to consider whether Taslimi

filed her asylum application within a “reasonable period”

given the changed circumstances presented by her religious

conversion. As in Ramadan and Husyev, the facts of Taslimi’s

10 TASLIMI v. HOLDER
case are not in dispute, and we review the application of the

statute and regulations to those undisputed facts.

The government argues that we do not have jurisdiction

because there are no meaningful standards by which the court

can judge whether the delay following changed circumstances

is reasonable. We disagree.

In Husyev, the government also argued that “the nature of

the determination of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ is so lacking in measurable standards that it presents one of the ‘rare

instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in

a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” Husyev, 528 F.3d at

1180 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)

(internal quotations omitted)). We rejected that argument,

finding that the pertinent regulations “provide standards sufficient to permit meaningful review.” Id. at 1181. We observed

that the regulations contain a non-exhaustive list of potential

extraordinary circumstances which “provides a partial adjudicative standard in and of itself.” Id. We also considered the

explanations given by the Immigration and Naturalization

Service and the Executive Office for Immigration Review in

the Preamble to the permanent regulations. Id. Considering

the language of the regulations and the agency’s explanation

in the prefatory language of the Preamble, we reasoned that

“the agency has taken pains to articulate the ‘reasonable

period’ standard that applies to petitioners whose temporary

nonimmigrant status has expired.” Id.

[5] Here, as in Husyev, we find that the statutory and regulatory framework and the agency’s pronouncements provide

a “meaningful standard” by which we may review whether a

petitioner has filed for asylum within a “reasonable period”

given the existence of changed circumstances. The regulations

themselves provide a non-exhaustive list of potential changed

circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A)-(C). Important for

our purposes here, the regulation refines the standard by

which the “reasonable period” may be evaluated by requiring

TASLIMI v. HOLDER 11
an adjudicator to consider an applicant’s delayed awareness of

changed circumstances in determining what constitutes a

“reasonable period” of delay. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii).

In 2000, the agency promulgated permanent regulations

implementing the changed and extraordinary circumstances

exceptions to the one-year bar. 65 Fed. Reg. 76121-01 (Dec.

6, 2000). The Preamble to the permanent regulations shows

that the agency sought to clarify in the permanent regulations

the standards for evaluating the reasonableness of a delay in

filing for asylum following changed circumstances. 65 Fed.

Reg. 76121-01 at 76124. Observing that there was some confusion regarding “the amount of additional time an applicant

should receive in order to file an application when it has been

determined that a changed or extraordinary circumstance is

present in a particular case,” the Preamble noted that “the

finding of changed or extraordinary circumstances justifies

the tardiness being excused to the extent necessary to allow

the alien a reasonable amount of time to submit the application.” Id.6

 The Preamble further noted that while “there may

be some rare cases in which a delay of one year or more may

be justified because of particular circumstances, in most cases

such a delay would not be justified.” Id.

[6] We conclude that the language provided by the statute

and regulations is sufficient to guide our review of whether an

applicant filed an application within a reasonable period following changed circumstances. Whether an asylum applicant

filed for asylum within a “reasonable period” following

changed circumstances affecting her eligibility for asylum is

not one of those “rare instances” in which there is no law to

apply. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830. We have jurisdiction to

review whether an asylum applicant has filed for asylum

6We note that this “prefatory language to a regulation, although often

informative, does not have the same binding force as do the regulations

themselves.” Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1058 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009).

12 TASLIMI v. HOLDER
within a reasonable period after changed circumstances materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum. 

III.

We turn now to the IJ’s ruling in this case. The IJ found

that Taslimi’s religious conversion constituted changed circumstances materially affecting her eligibility for asylum, but

that she failed to apply for asylum within a reasonable period

given her changed circumstances. We are compelled to conclude that Taslimi applied for asylum within a reasonable

period of time.

[7] The final regulations were carefully shaped to take religious conversion into account as a potential changed circumstance, and to highlight the subjective nature of such a

change. For instance, prior to the 2000 amendments, the rule

provided as one example of changed circumstances “changes

in objective circumstances relating to the applicant in the

United States . . . that create a reasonable possibility that

applicant may qualify for asylum.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.4(a)(4)(i)(B) (1999) (emphasis added). As the Preamble

to the final regulations explained, “[t]he modifier ‘objective’

was removed to avoid confusion in cases where, for example,

the changed circumstance relates to a subjective choice an

applicant has made, such as a religious conversion or adoption of political views.” 65 Fed. Reg. 76121-01 at 76123

(emphasis added). “Additionally, the Department [of Justice]

eliminated the requirement that the changed circumstances

occur within the United States, because there may be situations in which the changed circumstances, such as religious

conversion, took place outside the United States, but not in

the applicant’s home country.” Id. (emphasis added).

[8] Judging this case on its individual facts, as we must, we

conclude that Taslimi offered substantial credible evidence

establishing that her subjective religious conversion was a

process that began on the date of her conversion ceremony,

TASLIMI v. HOLDER 13
but took some time to for her to incorporate into her life. Taslimi applied for asylum within a reasonable period after her

conversion. Taslimi submitted substantial evidence concerning the importance in her church’s religious tradition of

allowing time for spiritual growth. Pastor Ritchie testified:

“[T]he whole perspective is that, you know conversion is

instantaneous but growth is a [process], so . . . that day [of

Taslimi’s conversion] was the start of . . . something new.”

Taslimi testified that she waited to be certain that her conversion was going to be a lifelong commitment, stating: “I was

seeking to find myself whether I wanted to remain in this

[path] or not. I was contemplating on that.” That period of

subjective contemplation was consistent with both the advice

of her pastor, who advised her to follow the law but to allow

herself time to consider the genuineness of her commitment

to Christianity, and the federal regulation, which required her

to file for asylum within a “reasonable period” after her subjective, religious conversion.

In finding that Taslimi failed to apply for asylum within a

reasonable period following her changed circumstances, the IJ

reasoned that Taslimi had lived in the United States since

1992 and had “ample opportunity” to learn about asylum law.7

He further reasoned that “[Taslimi] never testified that she did

not know about asylum during the six month time frame, and

the Pastor did not testify that she discussed asylum with him

at all.

[9] The IJ’s analysis misses the mark. Regardless of when

Taslimi learned of asylum, she testified credibly that her conversion ceremony marked the beginning of a process of spiri7We note, however, that the requirement that an applicant file for asylum within one year after her entry was not the law when Taslimi entered

the country, and only became the law in 1996. Khunaverdiants v.

Mukasey, 548 F.3d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 2008). Had Taslimi sought to learn

about asylum law prior to October 3, 1993 (when her lawful status in the

United States expired), she would not have learned about the one-year filing deadline. 

14 TASLIMI v. HOLDER
tual growth in her life. By the IJ’s reasoning, Taslimi should

have applied for asylum sooner after her conversion ceremony, in spite of Taslimi’s credible testimony that she waited

to apply for asylum in order to be sure that her conversion

was permanent. Even if there were solid evidence that Taslimi

knew about the one-year filing deadline for asylum applications when she converted to Christianity, filing for asylum

immediately after her conversion to ensure the timeliness of

her application might have cast doubt upon the sincerity of

her faith. On the other hand, by waiting—as she credibly testified that she did—to be sure of the sincerity of her faith, she

ran the risk that the IJ would find that the delay was unreasonable, and deny her application for asylum. Taslimi should not

have been forced into this untenable position.

[10] Taslimi testified credibly as to the reasons for her

delay. Her pastor also testified to the propriety, in his view

and in his understanding of his religious tradition, of Taslimi’s waiting to test the genuineness of her commitment to

Christianity, and his personal observations that it was a process of a few months for “the realization of what happened

. . . to take hold in [Taslimi’s] life . . . .” Applying the statute

and regulations to the undisputed facts of this case, we hold

that substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s determination that the delay between Taslimi’s conversion ceremony

and her filing of her application for asylum was unreasonable.

IV.

Taslimi next argues that the IJ improperly deprived her of

the privilege of voluntary departure when he entered an order

of removal before he granted her the relief of withholding of

removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. There is no need to reach this issue because we remand

for consideration of Taslimi’s asylum application.

Under the BIA’s precedential opinion Matter of I-S- and

C-S-, “when an Immigration Judge decides to grant withholdTASLIMI v. HOLDER 15
ing of removal, an explicit order of removal must be included

in the decision.” 24 I. & N. Dec. 432, 434 (BIA 2008). That

opinion expressly notes, however, that it only applies “where

. . . an Immigration Judge grants only withholding of removal,

unaccompanied by a grant of asylum. In instances in which an

Immigration Judge grants both asylum and withholding of

removal, an order of removal would not normally be required,

as an asylum grant does not require an order of removal.” Id.

at n.3. 

[11] On remand, the agency will consider Taslimi’s application for asylum. Should the agency determine that, in its

discretion, Taslimi merits a grant of asylum, then under Matter of I-S- and C-S-, an order of removal would no longer be

necessary.

CONCLUSION

[12] Having satisfied the stricter standard for withholding

of removal, Taslimi necessarily satisfied the standard for

showing eligibility for asylum. We remand to the BIA to

determine whether in its discretion Taslimi merits a grant of

asylum. See Fedunyak v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th

Cir. 2007).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

16 TASLIMI v. HOLDER