Cite as 2016 Ark. App. 60 

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION II 

No. CV-14-1007

ARKANSAS INSURANCE 

DEPARTMENT 

APPELLANT

V.

RACHEAL HENLEY

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered: JANUARY 27, 2016

APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 17CV-12-523] 

HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK, 

JUDGE

APPEAL DISMISSED 

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

The Crawford County Circuit Court remanded an order of the Arkansas Insurance 

Department (Department) for further proceedings after the Department revoked the titleinsurance license of appellee Racheal Henley. The Department appeals the circuit court’s 

ruling, but we must dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order. 

In 2011 and 2012, the Department conducted an investigation of Henley’s 

employer, Edwards Title, LLC. The investigation stemmed from the theft of escrow funds 

by an Edwards closing agent. Henley was not implicated in the theft, but the evidence 

uncovered during the course of the investigation convinced the Department that both 

Henley, who was the title agency’s manager, and Charles Dyer, the agency’s owner, had 

committed violations of Arkansas Insurance Department regulations and the Arkansas 
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2 

Insurance Code. The Department held hearings to determine whether Dyer’s and 

Henley’s title-insurance licenses should be revoked.1

 

Following a hearing, the Department issued an order in October 2012 revoking 

Henley’s license. The order relied in part on Henley’s conduct as Edwards’s operations 

manager in the years prior to March 2011, which was when Henley actually received her 

title-agent license. Henley appealed to the Crawford County Circuit Court, pursuant to 

the Administrative Procedure Act.2 She argued primarily that the Department erred in 

basing her revocation on activities that occurred before her March 2011 licensure. She also 

argued that the Department’s sanction of revocation was too harsh.

The circuit court agreed that “the issues and complaints that arose before [Henley] 

was licensed were given too much weight” and that “a review of the Department’s 

sanctions in previous hearings does not yield a consistent view of what sanction is 

appropriate under similar circumstances.” The court therefore struck some of the findings 

in the Department’s revocation order, although other findings were allowed to stand. The 

court then remanded the case back to the Department for “further proceedings.” The 

Department filed an appeal in our court following the circuit court’s order of remand. 

 A circuit court’s order of remand to an administrative agency for further 

proceedings is not a final, appealable order.

3 This is true even where, as here, the circuit 

 

1 We affirmed the Department’s revocation of Dyer’s license in Dyer v. Arkansas 

Insurance Department, 2015 Ark. App. 446, 468 S.W.3d 303. 

2 See Ark. Code Ann. § 25-15-212 (Repl. 2014).

3 See generally Floyd v. Ark. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 248 Ark. 459, 451 S.W.2d 874 

(1970); Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. J.N., 96 Ark. App. 319, 241 S.W.3d 293 (2006); 
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3 

court has affirmed the agency’s findings in part.4 Because the order is not final, we lack 

jurisdiction to hear the present appeal. 

The Department contends, however, that the circuit court’s decision is final

pursuant Arkansas Code Annotated section 25-15-212(i).

5 That statute provides that an 

agency order that is affirmed or affirmed in part by a court “shall be a final judgment 

subject to writ of garnishment or execution to the extent it is affirmed.” We disagree that 

section 25-15-212(i) confers finality for purposes of appeal in this case. The statute is 

clearly concerned with finality for purposes of garnishment and execution, which are not 

at issue here. Further, the statute does not resolve the question of whether a court’s ruling 

is final with regard to an appeal, nor does it address the question of finality when a case is 

remanded to the administrative agency. We therefore rely on our case law, cited 

previously, to hold that the appeal in this instance does not come from a final order of the 

circuit court. 

The appeal is dismissed without prejudice, subject to re-filing upon entry of a final

order. 

 Dismissed without prejudice. 

 GLADWIN, C.J., and ABRAMSON, J., agree.

Amanda J. Andrews, Assoc. Counsel, Ark. Ins. Dep’t, for appellant. 

 

Joseph C. Self, for appellee.

 

Hargrett v. Dir., 44 Ark. App. 111, 866 S.W.2d 432 (1993) (per curiam); Baldor Elec. Co. v. 

Jones, 29 Ark. App. 80, 777 S.W.2d 586 (1989).

4 Oldenberg v. Ark. State Med. Bd., 2013 Ark. App. 599. 

5 (Repl. 2014).