### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00509- CR

Al le n M e e ks, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 331ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT

NO. 90341 23, H ONO RAB LE BO B PERK INS, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found appe llant Allen Meeks gu i l t y o f crimi nal trespa ss of a ha bitation and violating a p ro t ec t i v e o rder , and asse ssed both confine ment and a f ine for e ach of

fense

. See T e x. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 25.07(g ), 30.05 (West Supp. 2004- 05). On appe al, Mee ks prese nts three issues related to the evidenc e int roduce d ag ainst him in t he punishment stag e of tria l. First, he a rg ues that the district court violated his Six th Amendment rights by preve nting him from introduc ing e vidence that a pr os e c uti on wi tne ss wa s on pa ro le and , thu s, po ssi bly bia se d fo r t he State . N e xt, Me e ks c la ims that evidenc e of cer

tain unadjudicate d prior bad a cts should have be en excluded bec ause the State’s
no tic e of int e nt to int

ro du c e that e vid e nc e wa s o ve rl y br oa d. F ina lly , M e e ks a sse rt s th a t he sh ou ld have be en per

mitted to int roduce eviden ce t h at h e had been “ no-billed” by a g rand jury

for a n
e xtra ne ou s se xua l a ssa

ult . We wi ll a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.Meeks is appa rently the father of this child. 1 2 BACK GR OUND I n a thr e e c ount i nd ic tme nt, the State a lle g e d th a t Me e ks c omm itt e d b ur g lary wi th intent to commit aggr av at ed assault, ag g ravated assault with a de adly wea pon, and violation of a pr ote c tiv e or de r d

ur inga F e br ua ry 20 03 inc ide nt inv olv inghis e x-w if e , F ri e da Jone s. At

the tim e of the inc id ent , Me e ks wa s und e r a n Apr il 8 , 2 00 2, a g re e d p ro te c tiv e or de r e nte re d b y the Tr a vis County dis tr ic t c ourt

that pr oh ibi te d h im f

ro m, amo ngoth e r t

hin g s, c omm itt inga c ts o f f a mil y vio le nc e or

c omi ngwi thi n 2 00 y ard s o f F ri e da , w ho wa s the n ma rr ie d to him . T he pa ir

div or c e d in November

of that y ear . The State a lleg ed that Mee ks entere d J ones’ home uninvited on or about Fe bruar

y 11, 2003. J ones testified that, as she woke up in he r bed, Meeks wa s in her bedr oom threate ning he r and swing ing a

club with metal on the end of it. J ones ra

n from the home a

nd attrac ted the attention of an off -duty senior patrol office r for the Aust in Police Depa rtment, Manuel Martinez, who happene d to be driving by

on his way

to work. Mar

tinez testi fied that, a s he wa s dri v i n g , he sawa woman
ru nn ingin h is d ir e c tio n w a vin g he r h and s at hi m. A lth ou g h M art ine z recoun ted that it wa s c old outside, J ones wa s wea

ring a nightg own and was car rying her baby , who was we aringonly a diape r. 1 Acc ording to Martinez, J ones wa s “ver y , very em otional, y elling, c rying, r epeating he rself.” Mart ine z the n c a lle d 91 1 and a sk e d fo r ba c ku p. Jone s tol d Ma

rt ine z that he r h

us ba nd wa s tr y ingto k i l l h er . M ar t i n ez t h en n o t i ce d M ee k s p ee k i n g at th em ar o u n d t h e c o rn er

o f a s m al l b u i l d i n g. Martinez order ed Mee ks to come out, and Mee ks was ar rested.3 M e e k s w a s tr ie d

b e f o r e a ju r y . Se v e r a l w it

n e s s e s te s t i f

i e d , in c lu d in g Jo n e s , M arti n e z, and Mee ks. The jury

acquitted Me eks of the char g es of burg lary of a habitation. Mee ks was found g uilty , howeve r, of the l esser included charg e of criminal t respa ss of a habitation, and of violating the protec tive order , althoug h the jury found t hat he did not use a de adly wea pon during the violation of the prote ctive order. The jury assessed punishment at one y ear ’s conf inement and a

$4,000 fine
on the criminal trespass char g e; and ten y ear s’ confine ment and a $10,000 fine for violation of the pr ote c tiv e or de r. Me e ks tim e ly fi le d th is a

pp e a l.
DI SCU SSIO N Meeks doe s not challeng e his adjudication of guilt but bring s three issues c oncer ning the evidenc e introduce d during the punishment phase of trial. I n his f irst issue, Meeks claims that his Sixth A me ndme nt r ig ht t o c on fr on t w itn e sse s w a s v iol a te d w he n h e wa s p re ve nte d f ro m c ro ssexamining a witness r eg arding possible bias arising from the witness’ s parole status. I n his second iss ue , h e c omp la ins that th e State ’s no tic e of int e nt to intr od uc e e vid e nc e of

oth e r a lle g e d b a d a c ts committed by

Meeks wa s overly

broad a nd insufficient. F inally , in his thi rd issue, Mee ks contends that the di strict court e rre d by failing to allow him to int roduce evidenc e that an e x trane ous sexual assault cha

rg e ag ainst him had been “ no-billed” by the g rand jury

. Right of conf

rontation I n his f ir s t i s s u e , M e e k s ar g u e s th a t h is Si xth A me n d me n t r ig h ts w e r e v io late d beca use he was prec luded from cross-e x amining a witness conce rning her possible bia s arising from he r p aro le status . H e re lie s o n th e same ana ly sis in c on te nd ingthat r ule 61 3 p ro vid e s a

se pa ra te ba sis4

f o r p e r mi tt in g h im to in qu ir e in to h e r u n d e r ly in g c o n v ic ti o n an d p ar o le status. See T ex. R . Evid. 613. The State responds that Meeks waived these arguments by failing to produce evidenc e that the witness was a ctually

on probation, by o b

j ec ting at trial solely

under r ule 609 instead of unde r the Sixth A me ndme nt or rul e 61 3, and by fa ili ngto a lle g e bia s at th e tim e of his ob je c tio ns . Alternatively , the State ar g ues that any err or wa s harmless. At the punishment stag e of the trial, the State ca ll ed as a witness Mee ks’s sister, Br enda Me eks. B efor e she te stified, the par ties ap p roac hed the be nch to discuss matters that ha d been a ddresse d in a motion in li mine. During that discussion, Meeks’s attorney noted that B renda Meeks “ was c onvicted in 1987 for delivery of controlled substance, sentenc ed to twenty -five y ear s in the I nstitut ional Division of the Texa s De p ar t ment of Criminal J ustice, [and] would st ill be on pa ro le and is s o unti l th e y e ar 2 01 2. As re su lt the re of , I be lie ve that si nc e sh e is t e c hn ic a lly sti ll confine d due to the conditions of par ole . . . that matter should be a llowed pursuant to 609 for impeachme nt purposes of this witness.”

Texas Rule of Evidenc e 609 per mits, under cer

tain circ umstances, the a dmission of
e vid e nc e tha

t the wi tne ss ha s bee n co nv ic te d of a cr ime fo r the purp os e of a tta c kin g the c re dib ili ty of a w itness. See Tex. R. Evi d. 609(a) . Howeve r, evide nce of a convic tion is not admissible under 60 9 if “ a pe ri od of mor e tha n te n y e ars ha s e la

ps e d sin c e the date of the c on vic tio n or of the re le a se of the wi tne ss f

ro m th e c on fi ne me nt imp os e d for that con vic tio n, wh ic he ve r is th e la te r d a te , unle ss the court deter

mines, in the i ntere sts of j ustice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific fac ts and circumstance s substantially outweig hs its prejudicial eff ect.” Se e id

. at 609(b).5 Meeks’ s entire a

rg ument at trial conc erningadmissio n of B renda Meeks’ s conviction cente red on the application of r ule 609 and, in par

ticular, whe ther the r

ule’s ten- y ear

limit ation on convictions beg an runningupon Br enda Me eks’s rele ase from prison or would only beg in running afte r she c ompleted par ole. On appea l, he does not contend that the tr ial court a bused its discretion in reg ard to rule 609. Rather, Meeks complains only that the cour

t violated his Si x th Amendment rig ht to confront witnesses a nd rule 613. Me e ks ur g e s th a t he did

no t w a ive the Sixth A me ndme nt i ssu e and that hi s argume nts
wer e suff icient t o apprise the district court of his c ontention that the witness was potentially biased. He points to his statement at trial that the witness was “ still servingthat sentenc e. I t’s just a matter of her being on parole instead of in the i n s t i t u t i o n . S he could be sent bac k to the instit utional div isi on any tim e .” We h a ve re vie we d th e re c or d, and it is cle ar that Me e ks ma de the se state me nts in the context of his argument reg ardingrule 609—whe n the ten-y ear period be g an to run—a

nd that he wa s n ot r e fe rr ingto p ote nti a l bi a s or his ri g ht t o c on fr on ta tio n. No r d o th e se state me nts ind ic a te any relianc e on rule 613.

Exc e pt f or c omp la int s in vo lvi ngfu

nd a me nta l c on sti tut ion a l sy ste mic re qu ir e me nts , “all other complaints based on a violation of both c onstitut ional and statutory rig hts are w aived by failure to c omply with Rule 33.1.” Me nd e z v . S tat e , 138 S.W .3d 334, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ib arra v . S

tat e , 11 S.W. 3d

18 9, 19 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); se e Ga llu ps v . S tat e , 151 S.W .3d 196, 204-205 (Te x . Crim. App. 2004). I n order to preser ve er ror f or our r eview, the re cord must show
c omp lia nc e wi th r ule 33 .1 of

the ru le s o f a

pp e llate pr oc e dure re qu ir ingtha t:6

( 1 ) the compla in t w a s ma d e to th e tr ia l c o u rt b y a ti me ly r e qu e s t, o b je c ti o n , or mot ion that: (A) stated the g rounds for the ruling that the complaining party soug ht from the trial cou rt wi th sufficient spec ificity to make the tria l court aw are of the complaint, unless the s pecif ic grounds were appare nt from the context; and (B ) complied with the re quirements of the Texas Rules o f C i v i l or Criminal Evidence or the Te x as Rules of Civil or Appellate Proc edure ; and (2 ) the tr ia l c ourt : (A) ruled on the r equest, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitl y ; or (B ) ref used to rule on the r equest, objec ti o n, or motion, and the complaining party objected to the r efusa l.
T ex . R. App. P. 33.1; see G allups , 1 51 S.W. 3d a t 20 4- 20 5; He ide lbe rg

v . S tat e , 1 4 4 S. W. 3 d

535, 53 7 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ). Te xas R ule of Ev ide nc e 10 3( a )( 1) c on ta ins sim ila r guid e lin e s, pr ov idi ngthat if

the ru lin g is o ne a dmi tti nge vid e nc e , a tim e ly ob je c tio n o r m oti on to s tr ike mus t app ear on the re cord, “ stating the specific g round of objec tion, if the specific g round wa s not
a pp are nt f ro m th e c on te xt.” Te x. R. E vid . 1 03 (a )( 1) ; Gallups , 1 5 1 S
. W
. 3 d a t2 0 4

- 0 5
. A d d i t i o n a l l y, it is well settled that the leg al basis of a complaint raised on a

ppeal cannot vary from that raised at trial. See G allups , 1 51 S.W. 3d a t 20 4- 05 ; He ide lbe rg , 144 S.W .3d at 537. Although Me eks complains that his Six th Amendment rig hts were v i olated by the district court’s refusa l to allow cross-examination on the i ssue of the wit ness’s par ole under rule 609, the dis tr ic t c ourt

ne ve r h a d th e op po rt

un ity to co ns ide r the me ri ts of that argume nt. Se e He ide lbe rg ,Meeks’ s reque st for notice was addressed to the State but included an unsig ned dra ft order 2 at the end of

the re quest. The State a rg ues that Mee ks’s reques t was flawed be cause it was eff ectively a discove ry order

which wa s not signed by

the district court. Se e Es

pin os a v . S

tat e , 853 S.W. 2d 36 , 3 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); see also Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 37 .0 7(g) (We st Supp. 2004-05); Tex. R. Evi d. 404(b). How ever , we do not re ach thi s issue beca use we find that Meeks wa ived his challeng e to the notice. 7 144 S.W .3d at 538 (“pr esenting a claim based solely on fede ral g rounds will not suffice to put the court o n n o ti c e to c la im s b a s e d o n St a te g r o u n d s , u n le s s th e St a te g r o u n d is a p p ar ent from the
c on te xt.” ). No r was th e distr ic t c ourt pr e se nte d th e op po rt

un ity to c on sid e r M e e ks ’s argume nts reg ardingrule 613. The ref ore, be cause Meeks’ s trial objection does not c omport with the issues he raises on a

ppeal, a nd his appea l gr ounds were not appar ent from t h e co ntext , he has pr eser ved nothing f or re view. See M

endez , 138 S.W. 3d

a t 33 8; Ib ar

ra , 1 1 S. W.3 d at 19 7; see also Mum phrey

v . S tat e , 1 55 S.W. 3d

65 1, 65 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 05 , n o p e t.) . We ov erru le Me e ks ’s fi rs t issue.
Notice of extraneous bad acts

Ne xt, Me e ks argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d b y a dmi tti nge vid e nc e of

c e rt a in
un a dju dic a te d b a d a c ts be c a us e the State ’s no tic e wa s ins uf fi c ie nt to a llo w his a tto rn e y to i nv e sti g a te the acc urac y

of the c laims or otherwise de fend a g ainst the alleg ations. Specifica lly , Meeks a rg ues that th e no tic e s we re “ de fi c ie nt to the po int of be ing me anin g le ss” be c a us e the y we re too va g ue to g ive notice r eg ardingthe testimony to be elicited by

the State. For

ex am p l e, o n e o f t he State’s twenty -nine issues included in its Second Ame nded Notice of Intent to I ntroduce Evidence of Ex trane ous Conduct stated that it intended to intro d u ce ev i d en ce that “on or a bout various dates 28

from January

1, 1955 and De cembe r 20, 1967, in Travis County and Atasc osa County , Texas, the d e f e n d an t c o m m i t t e d t h e o f

f e n s e o f i n j u r y t o a c h i l d

. T h e v i c t i m w a s B r e n d a M e e k s . ” A p p ar e n t l y, this noti ce r elated to testimony that, int e r a lia , Meeks threw kni ves at his sist er, B renda Meeks, whe n the y we re c hil dr e n. Me e ks su

bmi ts that the br oa d ti me fr a me s in the no tic e c on sti tut e “ un re a so na ble notice under

Article 37.07.” See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 37.07. How ever , this arg ument was not ra ised at trial.

Be fore Br enda Me eks wa s called a s a witness in the punishment s t age , the par ties approa ched the bench to discuss Mee ks’s objections to la ck of notice. Meeks complained a bout the timing of when notice was g iven—not that the notice was de ficient be cause it was too broad. The pr os e c uto r d isc us se d th e fa c t th a t sh e be c a me awa re of c e rt a in al le g a tio ns by B re nd a Me e ks a g a ins t Meeks a pproxi mately

one we ek bef

ore tria l and g ave notice to Meeks’s attorney the same d ay

by fac simil e. The court stated “ well, it appea rs to me . . . that in te rms of the seve n day s . . . the rea son why the rule is wr itten is just to g ive y ou-all a chanc e to prepa re for i t.” M eeks’ s attorney ag ree d but stated t hat “the problem i s that if we’ re in trial, I can’ t run down a ny thing, try to investigate furthe r.” After discoveringthat notice wa s faxed eig ht day s befor e trial, the c ourt ruled that the notice complied with the cour

t’s order , and while “ it’s not as m uch noti ce” as t he court would like, the fa ct that notice wa s g iven when the information was r ece ived was suf ficient. I t is clear f

rom the re cord that Meeks wa s not obje cting that the time frames stated in the no t i ce wer e vague, but about the timing of when he rec eived the notice . The district cour t
never had the oppor

tunity to consider the me rits of this arg ument beca use i t was neve r ra ised. See9

He ide lbe rg , 144 S.W .3d at 538. Ther efor e, we will not consider it for the f irst time on appeal. See Mende z , 1 38 S.W. 3d

a t 33 8; Ib arra , 11 S. W.3 d a t 19 7; see also Mum

phrey , 1 5 5 S. W. 3 d

a t 6 5 6
. We
overr ule Mee ks’s second issue.
Evi de nc e of gr and j ur y “ no- bill ”

I n his third issue, Meeks claims that the district court e rre d by preve nting him from introducing evidenc e in the punishment stag e that he had b ee n “no-billed” by a g rand jury

for a n ext ra n eo u s u nadjudicate d sexual assault ag ainst his ex -wife , J ones. He relies on the g ener al rele vance principles stated in rule 401. See Tex. R. Evi d. 401. The State fir st responds that the issue
was wa ived, and that, alternatively , Meeks’ s attorney had re ndere d any

err or har mless by discussing the no-bill in closing a

rg ument. During the punishment stag e, a de tective testified that J ones filed c harg es of se x ual assault/domestic violen ce aga i n st Meeks in Marc h 2002. On cr oss-examination of the detec tive, Meeks’ s attorney

beg an a que stion by

stating “ And this case w as no billed by a . . . .” T he prose cutor quickly objected, pointing out that mention of the no-bill was bar red by t h e m o t i o n in limi ne. Meeks’ s attorney

“apolog ize[ d] fo r t h e wa y the question came out” and later c oncede d that the question was cove red by the motion in li min e. At the benc h, the prosec utor inquired whe ther evidenc e that the se x ual assault wa s no-billed would be admi s sible. Although the district court stated that he didn’t “ know what r ule would serve to keep it out, ” t h e p rosecutor reque sted andTh e pr os e c uto r s ta te d “ Can w e jus t ha ve him ins tr uc te d n ot t o g o in to i t any mor e sin c e it 3 is part of my motion in limine? ” The court re sponded in the af firmative, then sustaine d the State’s objection to the question. 10 re c e iv ed a

n in str uc tio n to Me e ks ’s a tto rn e y to “ no t g o in to i t any

mor e .” Th e pr os e c uto r a lso

3 obtained a jur

y instruction to disreg ard the question. At trial, Meeks’ s att o rn ey n ev er presente d any rea son why

the evidenc e would be admissible or should not be subject to the motion in li mine. Fur thermore , he did not comment on or otherw ise object to the c ourt’s instructing the jury to disreg ard the question. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 33.1. There fore , the issue was w aived.

Ho we ve r, e ve n if erro r had be e n p re se rv e d, the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in excluding th e ev i d ence. The duty of a g rand jury

is to determine whe ther e vidence exis ts to formally

char g e a pe rson with an off ense. Se e Ra c ha l v . S

tat e , 9 1 7 S. W. 2 d

7 9 9 , 8 0 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1996). “A G rand Jury ’s no-bill is merely a finding that the spec i fi c evidenc e broug ht befor e the pa

rticular G rand Jury

did not conv i n ce t hem to formally char g e the a ccuse d with the offe nse alleg ed.” Id

. E v i d en ce o f a prior “no- bill” does not addre ss the issue of g uilt, and was proper ly excluded beca

use it was not materia l in any way to the defe nse of the c ase. See Shum ake

v . S tat e , 502 S.W. 2d 75 8, 76 0 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 73 ); Sm ith v . S tat e , 4 7 4 S. W. 2 d

4 8 6 , 4 8 9 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1971).

F ur the rm or e , th e e vid e nc e wa s c on str uc tiv e ly int ro du c e d in clo sin g argume nts
. De sc ri bin g the de te c tiv e ’s te sti mony , M e e ks ’s a tto rn e y tol d th e jur

y that th e de te c tiv e be lie ve d b oth J ones and Me eks we re c redible w itnesses; and that “the re’ s evidenc e bef ore you that Mr. Meeks ha s
no t e ve r b e e n c on vic te d o f a fe lony . Se xua l a ssa

ult is a fe lony of fe ns e . T hat c a se wa s f

or wa rd e d to11

the district attorney ’s offic e. One m u s t assume, since there ’s bee n no conviction, since [the detec tive] has never testified in court be fore , that that case went nowhe re w ithin their office .” The State did not object to this l ine of a rg ument. We overrule Meeks’ s third issue.
CO NC LU SION Having overr

uled all of the issues on a ppeal, we aff

irm the judg ment of the district
c ourt
.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: June 23, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh