COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Lemons 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

AMBER K. RUFFIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1685-98-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 DECEMBER 28, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge 

Melinda R. Glaubke, Senior Assistant Public 

Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

Pamela A. Rumpz, Assistant Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Amber K. Ruffin (appellant) appeals the revocation of her 

suspended sentence. She contends that (1) the trial court 

abused its discretion in sentencing her to prison because Code 

§ 19.2-306 prevents the court from conducting a revocation 

hearing based solely on an alleged violation for which a 

previous hearing was held, and (2) her denial of a placement in 

an alternative sentencing program was a violation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et

seq. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
 On August 12, 1996, appellant was convicted of prescription 

fraud and was sentenced to three years imprisonment, all 

suspended conditioned upon appellant's good behavior, 

participation in a supervised probation program and payment of 

court costs. On June 2, 1998, the trial court determined that 

appellant had violated the conditions of her probation by using 

cocaine. The trial court revoked and re-suspended appellant's 

sentence upon the condition that she successfully complete the 

Detention Center Program and the Diversion Center Program. At 

that time, the court noted that appellant was first to be 

"evaluated" and "screened" for admission into these alternative 

programs and that her three-year sentence would be re-suspended 

upon completion of the programs. 

 After an evaluation, the Department of Corrections found 

that appellant was ineligible for the detention center and 

diversion center programs due to a history of major depression 

and post-traumatic stress disorder. On June 29, 1998, after 

learning that appellant did not qualify for the alternative 

sentencing programs, the trial court amended its previous order 

and revoked the three years of appellant's suspended sentence. 

While appellant argued that her denial into these programs 

violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, she raised no 

other objection. 

 On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court abused 

its discretion in revoking her suspended sentence as contrary to 

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Code § 19.2-306.1 Appellant's argument is procedurally barred. 

Rule 5A:18 provides: 

No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless 

the objection was stated together with the 

grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, 

except for good cause shown or to enable the 

Court of Appeals to attain the ends of 

justice. A mere statement that the judgment 

or award is contrary to the law and the 

evidence is not sufficient to constitute a 

question to be ruled upon on appeal. 

 "The primary function of Rule 5A:18 is to alert the trial 

judge to possible error so that the judge may consider the issue 

intelligently and take any corrective actions necessary to avoid 

unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials." Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 530, 414 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1992). 

 In the instant case, appellant did not object to the trial 

court's decision at the time of sentencing as either an abuse of 

discretion or contrary to the provisions of Code § 19.2-306. 

Additionally, while this Court will notice error for which there 

has been no timely objection when necessary to satisfy the ends 

of justice, the record must "affirmatively show that a 

 1

 Code § 19.2-306 provides in pertinent part: 

The court may, for any cause deemed by it 

sufficient . . . revoke the suspension of 

sentence. . . . [I]f any court has, after 

hearing, found no cause . . . to revoke a 

suspended sentence or probation, any further 

hearing to . . . revoke a suspended sentence 

or probation, based solely on the alleged 

violation for which the hearing was held 

shall be barred. 

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miscarriage of justice has occurred, not that a miscarriage 

might have occurred." Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 

221, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997). Our review of the record 

discloses no miscarriage of justice in the instant case. 

 Next, appellant contends that her denial of admission into 

the two treatment programs because of her mental health problems 

was a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. However, we recently held that "a 

probation revocation hearing in a criminal court is not the 

proper forum in which to attack that violation." Wilson v. 

Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1999). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court 

is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

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