COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Powell and Senior Judge Clements

DAVID PAUL JONES MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1418-09-3 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 15, 2009 WILLIAM C. BENNETT AND ANDREA BENNETT

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY Charles J. Strauss, Judge (Gregory T. Casker, on brief), for appellant. (William C. Bennett, Jr.; Andrea B. Bennett, pro se , on brief).
David Paul Jones (father) appeals the trial c ourt’s ruling to grant th e petition for adoption filed by William C. Bennett and Andrea Bennett (the gr andparents). Father ar gues that (1) the trial court judge erred by failing to recuse himself; (2) Code § 63.2 -1242.3 does not eliminate the requirement for parental consent in adoption procee dings; (3) the trial court erred in finding that father demonstrated a lack of desire to be invol ved in his son’s life; (4) the trial court erred in finding that father’s desire for hi s son to keep his name was not a valid reason to withhold consent for adoption; (5) the trial court erred in granting the adoption where there wa s no evidence that the ongoing relationship would be detrimental to the child’s well-being; (6) th e trial court erred in considering the financial status of the grandparents in granting the adoption petition; (7) the trial court erred by not allowi ng father sufficient opportunity to present his rebuttal testimony; and (8) the trial court erred in finding that the best in terests of the child would be served by granting the adoption petition. Upon reviewing the record and br iefs of the parties, we conclude that this

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - appeal is without merit. Acco rdingly, we summarily affirm th e decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND The child was born on April 27 , 2001. Father and the child’s mother were never married. On April 22, 2002, the Pittsylvania County Department of Social Services (the Department) became involved with the fa mily because of the parents’ drug use. On June 27, 2002, the Pittsylvania County Juvenile and Domestic Re lations District Court (the JD R court) entered an emergency removal order, and gave physical custody of the child to the grandparents. Legal custody was transferred to the grandparents on September 9, 2 002. Father visited sporadically with the child because he lacked transportation. On January 26, 2006, the JDR court awarded father supervised visitation. Father visited with the child only three times before his incarceration on April 10, 2006. 1 His anticipated release date is June 6, 2018. 2 On November 20, 2008, the grandparents filed a petition for adoption. The mother consented to the adoption, but father did not. On April 23, 2009, the trial cour t held a hearing and granted the grandparents’ pe tition for adoption. Father timely noted his appeal.
ANALYSIS Issue 1 – Rule 5A:8 Father argues that the trial ju dge erred in failing to recuse hi mself. However, father did not file a transcript or statemen t of facts for the hearing on father’s motion to recuse.

1 Father admitted that he has been convicted of approximately thirty bad check charges and attempted bank robbery.

2 The child will be seventeen years old when father is released from prison.- 3 - An appellant has the responsibility to provide a complete record to the appellate court. Twardy v. Twardy , 14 Va. App. 651, 658, 419 S.E.2d 848, 852 (1992) ( en banc ). We conclude that a transcript or written stat ement of facts is indispensable to a determination of the question presented on appeal. See Anderson v. Commonwealth , 13 Va. App. 506, 508-09, 413 S.E.2d 75, 76-77 (1992); Turner v. Commonwealth , 2 Va. App. 96, 99-100, 341 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1986). Therefore, we are unable to address this issue. Issues 2 and 3 – Rule 5A:20 Father argues that Code § 63.2-1242.3 does not eliminate the requirement for parental consent in adoption proceedings. Father also c ontends the trial court erred in finding that he lacked a desire to be involved in the child’s life to the extent that adop tion was justified without his consent. Rule 5A:20(e) mandates that appellant’s openi ng brief include “[t]he principles of law, the argument, and the authoritie s relating to each question presen ted . . . .” Father did not comply with Rule 5A:20(e) because his opening br ief does not contain any principles of law or citation to legal authorities to fully develop his arguments. Father has the burden of showing that reversible error was committed. See Lutes v. Alexander , 14 Va. App. 1075, 1077, 421 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1992). Unsupported assertions of error “do not merit appellate consideration.” Buchanan v. Buchanan , 14 Va. App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Furthermore this Court “will no t search the record for errors in order to interpret the appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a brief.” Id. Nor is it this Court’s “function to comb through the record . . . in or der to ferret-out for ourselves the validity of [appellant’s] claims.” Fitzgerald v. Bass , 6 Va. App. 38, 56 n.7, 366 S.E.2d 615, 625 n.7 (1988) ( en banc ).- 4 - We find that father’s failure to comply with Rule 5A:20(e) is significant, so we will not consider questions presented 2 and 3. See Fadness v. Fadness , 52 Va. App. 833, 851, 667 S.E.2d 857, 866 (2008) (“If the part ies believed that the ci rcuit court erred, it was their duty to present that error to us with legal aut hority to support their contention.”); Parks v. Parks , 52 Va. App. 663, 664, 666 S.E.2d 547, 548 (2008). Issues 4, 6, and 7 - Rule 5A:18 Father contends the trial court erred in finding father’s desire for his child to keep his family name was not a valid reason to with hold consent for adoption and in considering the fi nancial status of the grandparents in granting the adoption petition. Father also argues that the trial court erred by not allowing him ample opportun ity to give rebuttal testimony. Father did not present these arguments to the trial court. We “will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court.” Ohree v. Commonwealth , 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998). “The purpose of Rule 5A:18 is to allow the trial court to correct in the trial court any error that is called to its attention.” Lee v. Lee , 12 Va. App. 512, 514, 404 S.E.2d 736, 737 (1991) ( en banc ). There was no miscarriage of justice in this case, and th e ends of justice exception does not apply. Accordingly, we will not consider father’s questions presented 4, 6, and 7. Issue 5 – Detrimental to the child’s well-being Father argues that the trial court erred in granting the adoption where there was no evidence that the on-going relationship between him and the child would be detrimental to the child’s well-being. Previously under Virginia law, Code § 63.2-1205, and its predecessors, required that the c ourt apply the detriment-to-the child standard in an adoption pr oceeding where a birth parent’s consent to the adoption was being withheld . . . . See Gooch v. Harris , 52 Va. App. 157, 160-61, 662 S.E.2d 95, 96-97 (2008); Hickman v. Futty , 25 Va. App. 420, 426, 489 S.E.2d 232, 235- 5 - (1997). Even that requirement, however, is no longer applicable, with the amendment of Code § 63.2-1205 in 2006. Gooch , 52 Va. App. at 161, 662 S.E.2d at 97. T.S.G. v. B.A.S. , 52 Va. App. 583, 597, 66 5 S.E.2d 854, 861 (2008). Therefore, the trial court did not err when it did not consider wh ether continuation of father’s relationship would be detrimental to the child. Issue 8 – Best interests of the child Father argues that the trial co urt erred in finding that the best interests of the child would be served by granting the adoption petition. “When addressing matters concerning a child . . . the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Human Dev. , 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citations omitted). In determining whether the valid consent of any person whose consent is required is withheld cont rary to the best interests of the child, or is unobtainable, the ci rcuit court . . . shall consider whether granting the petition pending before it would be in the best interest of the child. The circuit court . . . shall consider all relevant factors, including the birt h parent(s)’ efforts to obtain or maintain legal and physical custody of the child; wh ether the birth parent(s) are currently willing and able to assume full custody of the child; whether the birth parent (s)’ efforts to assert parental rights were thwarted by other people ; the birth parent(s)’ ability to care for the child; the age of the ch ild; the quality of any previous relationship between the birth pare nt(s) and the child and between the birth parent(s) and any other minor children; the duration and suitability of the child’s presen t custodial environment; and the effect of a change of physical custody on the child. Code § 63.2-1205.- 6 - Here, father had little i nvolvement in th e child’s life. The grandpar ents have had custody of the child since the child wa s one year old. Father visited sporadically when he was not incarcerated. In 2006, he was awarded supervis ed visitation, but he missed approximately ten visits before his most recent incarceration. Since father’s incarceration, his only contact with the child has been monthly phone calls, some le tters, and three vis itations in the prison. As th e trial court noted, father “has never been a father to this child and has never been able to be a father to this child.” “‘[P]ast actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.’” Linkous v. Kingery , 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 (1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte , 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 315, 319 (1987)). Father has made no efforts to ob tain custody of the child or to assert his parental rights over the child. He is currently unab le to assume custody of the chil d due to his incarceration, and his release date is not until the child is seventeen years old. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). The parties agreed that the ch ild was doing well in the grandp arents’ care. The trial court did not err in finding that the adoption was in the child’s best interests.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ru ling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.