#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Miguel Padilla, Appellant.

[631 NYS2d 408]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.), rendered March 5, 1991, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Feldman, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

On appeal, the defendant contends, *inter alia,*that he was deprived of his right to due process because the hearing court denied his request to call civilian identification witnesses at the *Wade*hearing and that the showup that resulted in the defendant’s arrest was unduly suggestive. It is settled law that a defendant does not have an absolute, unqualified right to examine a complaining or identifying witness at a *Wade*hearing *(see, People v Chipp,*75 NY2d 327, *cert denied*498 US 833; *People v Harvall,*196 AD2d 553; *People v Christenson,*188 AD2d 659). To the contrary, this right is triggered only when the hearing record raises substantial issues as to the constitutionality of the identification procedure *(see, People v Chipp, supra),*when the People’s evidence is "notably incomplete” *(see, People v Hoehne,*203 AD2d 480; *People v Sokolyansky,*147 AD2d 722), or when the defendant otherwise establishes a need for the witness’s testimony *(see, People v Harvall, supra; People v Ocasio,*134 AD2d 293).

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the testimony presented at the *Wade*hearing failed to raise a substantial issue as to the constitutionality of the identification procedure. Show-ups that are conducted in close temporal and spatial proximity to the commission of the crime being investigated are generally permissible *(see, People v Duuvon,*77 NY2d 541; *People v Holley,*205 AD2d 638; *People v Mitchell,*185 AD2d 249). Given *689the circumstances present in this case, we do not find that the identification procedure which was conducted while the defendant was handcuffed was constitutionally impermissible *(see, People v Bitz,*209 AD2d 709; *People v Grassia,*195 AD2d 607; *People v Rowlett,*193 AD2d 768; *People v Jenkins,*175 AD2d 648).

Any error in permitting the prosecution to elicit testimony from one of the police officers which inferentially bolstered the testimony of a witness who saw the defendant on the subway tracks *(see, People v Trowbridge,*305 NY 471; *see also, People v Holt,*67 NY2d 819; *People v Gordillo,*191 AD2d 455; *People v Bryan,*179 AD2d 667; *People v Vasquez,*120 AD2d 757) must be considered harmless in view of the strong and positive identification that was made within minutes after the crime *(see, People v Colon,*188 AD2d 409; *People v Burgess,*66 AD2d 667) and the other overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt *(see, e.g., People v Gordillo, supra; People v Jones,*186 AD2d 585).

The court’s charge, when taken as a whole, properly conveyed the requirement that the defendant’s identity must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Canty,*60 NY2d 830; *People v Vasquez,*176 AD2d 444). O’Brien, J. P., Santucci, Joy and Goldstein, JJ., concur.