SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0506-18T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LASHAN MATHIS, a/k/a

LASHAWN MATHIS,

____________________________

Submitted March 23, 2020 – Decided June 11, 2020

Before Judges Moynihan and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Indictment Nos. 13-08-0792 

and 14-06-0514.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Elizabeth H. Smith, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Mark Niedziela, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Lashan Mathis appeals from the denial of his post-conviction

relief (PCR) arguing:

[POINT I]

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

DENYING DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] 

WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS 

DEFENDANT HAS MADE A SUFFICIENT PRIMA 

FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL TO WARRANT AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING BASED ON COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO 

VIGOROUSLY ADVOCATE ON HIS BEHALF.

We disagree and affirm.

Following the return of separate indictments charging defendant with four 

counts of second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6, 

(counts one, two, five, and eight);

1

three counts of third-degree possession of a 

weapon for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (counts three, six, and nine); 

and three counts of fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 

2C:39-5(d) (counts four, seven, and ten) in the first indictment, and first-degree 

armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a) (count one); second-degree possession of a 

1

 Count one of the first indictment charged defendant with a second-degree

robbery that he committed without the aid of his co-defendant. Counts two, five 

and eight each charged defendant with second-degree robbery under an 

accomplice liability theory pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2) and N.J.S.A. 

2C:2-6.
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weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count two); third-degree 

possession of a weapon without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count three); 

third-degree theft, receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a) and N.J.S.A. 

2C:20-2(a) (count four); third-degree theft, receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 

2C:20-7.1(b) (count five); and third-degree certain persons not to be in 

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) (count six) in the second

indictment, defendant pleaded guilty before Judge Marilyn C. Clark to counts 

one, two, five and eight of the first indictment, charging him with second-degree 

robbery, and count one of the second indictment, charging him with first-degree 

armed robbery. Under the plea agreement, the State recommended that 

defendant be sentenced to a seventeen-year prison term with eighty-five percent 

parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act ("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 

2C:43-7.2, on count one of the second indictment and concurrent ten-year 

sentences on each of the four counts under the first indictment also subject to 

the NERA. 

Defendant now argues his trial counsel "never objected to the efforts of 

the judge and the prosecutor to elicit [the] factual basis" for his plea to the 

various robbery counts. He continues in his merits brief:

In failing to lodge objections to the questions of 

the court and the prosecutor[,] trial counsel essentially 
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failed to advocate on defendant's behalf, and pressured 

[defendant] to plead guilty and to acknowledge the 

'armed' element of the most serious offense. Trial 

counsel's failure to protect . . . defendant effectively

deprived [him] of his constitutional right to effective 

legal representation. The record is absent of any 

explanation as to why counsel might have done this, 

thus[] requiring a plenary hearing to inquire into those 

facts and circumstances.

Because the PCR court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, we review

both the factual inferences drawn by the PCR judge from the record and the 

court's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. 

Div. 2016). To establish a PCR claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must satisfy the two-pronged test formulated in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in 

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), first by "showing that counsel made errors 

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by 

the Sixth Amendment," Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687); then by proving he suffered prejudice due to counsel's deficient 

performance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 691-92. Defendant must show by a 

"reasonable probability" that the deficient performance affected the outcome.

Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. Under those standards, defendant failed to establish a 

prima facie case of trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
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We first note trial counsel's questioning established much of the factual 

basis from defendant. Although the judge and, at times, the prosecutor 

interposed questions, there was nothing objectionable about that procedure. It 

is incumbent upon the judge to question

the defendant personally . . . and [determine] by inquiry 

of the defendant . . . that there is a factual basis for the 

plea and that the plea is made voluntarily, not as a result 

of any threats or of any promises or inducements not 

disclosed on the record, and with an understanding of 

the nature of the charge[s] and the consequences of the 

plea. 

[R. 3:9-2.] 

"The trial court's [factual-basis] inquiry need not follow a 'prescribed or 

artificial ritual.'" State v. Campfield, 213 N.J. 218, 231 (2013) (quoting State 

ex rel. T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 327 (2001)). "[D]ifferent criminal charges and 

different defendants require courts to act flexibly to achieve constitutional 

ends." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting T.M., 166 N.J. at 327). Inasmuch 

as the judge must ensure that defendant's plea was voluntarily made and not the 

product of promises, threats or coercion, State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 

351, 369 (App. Div. 2014), it was within the judge's discretion to allow 

defendant's own counsel to attempt to elicit the factual basis in order to achieve 

that end. And the further questioning by the judge and the prosecutor were 
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required to establish the requisite elements of each offense, particularly the firstdegree robbery charge because defendant was not armed. The judge had to 

ascertain if defendant participated in the robbery with knowledge that his 

codefendant used a handgun in order to perpetrate the robbery, thus establishing 

his guilt as an accomplice. See State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 422 (1989). 

Judge Clark did just that and there were no grounds to object.

In his merits brief, defendant highlights claims made in his certifications 

submitted in support of his PCR petition: "he was not provided with discovery, 

did not understand the charges against him and was 'not in his right mind at the 

time he entered the plea'"; and that his counsel told him if he did not take "the

plea offer for [an aggregate seventeen-year term he] would get [fifty-eight] years 

and [his] sister would get [forty] years[.]" To the extent these claims deal with 

issues relating to a PCR, and not to inadequate plea issues that are barred 

because they should have been appealed, see R. 3:22-4(a), they are bald and did 

not establish a prima facie case requiring an evidentiary hearing, R. 3:22-10(b); 

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). 

A "defendant must allege specific facts and evidence supporting his 

allegations," State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013), and "do more than make 

bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel," State v. 
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Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). "Defendant may not 

create a genuine issue of fact, warranting an evidentiary hearing, by 

contradicting his prior statements without explanation." Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 

at 299. Defendant's bald averments, belied by the record, do not establish a 

prima facie claim. And, contrary to defendant's argument, an evidentiary 

hearing is not to be used to explore PCR claims. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 

89, 157-58 (1997). As such, an evidentiary hearing was properly denied.

Judge Clark thoroughly reviewed the terms of the plea agreement and 

defendant's sentencing exposure. The factual basis for each charge established 

that defendant understood each; indeed, near the end of the plea colloquy, after 

defendant denied that he had "any questions about what [had] gone on . . . in 

court" that day, the judge asked defendant, "Is there anything that you did not 

understand?" Defendant answered, "[n]o." 

The judge noted a report of a "competency evaluation from Ann Klein 

Forensic Center," dated sixteen days prior to the plea hearing, concluded 

defendant was competent. "Based on that report and several other reports that 

were done prior to [the Ann Klein] report," defense counsel confirmed defendant 

did not dispute the competency finding. The judge also inquired about 

medications defendant was taking for his psychiatric condition and ascertained 
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that the prescribed drugs helped defendant's understanding. The judge observed: 

"[I]t appears that you've understood everything that's gone on here today based 

upon my back[-]and[-]forth questioning of you and your answers to both your 

attorney and the [p]rosecutor." Defendant agreed that it was "fair to say" he 

understood "everything" that occurred during the plea hearing. Indeed, he 

confirmed several times during the colloquy that he understood the judge's 

explanations, including the plea terms and his sentencing exposure. We discern 

no ineffective assistance of counsel issue that arose from defendant's mental 

health condition. See State v. Norton, 167 N.J. Super. 229, 232 (App. Div. 1979)

(finding the defendant was "capable of understanding and voluntarily pleading 

guilty," despite his psychiatric problems, given he "evinced a good memory for 

the circumstances in which the offenses occurred" and psychiatric reports from 

his doctor "pronounced him competent"); State v. Colon, 374 N.J. Super. 199, 

222 (App. Div. 2005) (rejecting defendant's argument that he "lacked the 

capacity" to enter a guilty plea because he was taking Depakote at the time of 

the proceedings, given that the court fully explored defendant's mental state at 

the time of the plea and determined defendant was acting "knowingly, 

voluntarily and intelligently").
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As Judge Clark noted, defendant's factual-basis colloquy evidenced his 

recollection of each of the discrete robberies, interjecting details about most. 

Further, there is no evidence of any threats or promises, or that defendant did 

not enter into the plea agreement voluntarily. Defendant admitted as much 

during the plea hearing.

Defendant's remaining contentions are without sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We note only that he admitted 

several times he reviewed the surveillance video provided in discovery and 

advanced no argument how the lack of discovery impacted on his decision to 

plead guilty.

In that this PCR petition involves a plea agreement, defendant "must show 

that (i) counsel's assistance was not 'within the range of competence demanded 

of attorneys in criminal cases'; and (ii) 'that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel's errors, [defendant] would not have [pleaded] guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)

(quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)). The plea agreement

called for a seventeen-year prison term with eighty-five percent parole 

ineligibility. Judge Clark advised defendant he faced a maximum ordinary term 

of ten years subject to the same parole ineligibility period on each of the four 
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second-degree robbery counts, all of which could have run consecutive.

2

 

Moreover, the judge told defendant, he faced up to twenty years on a regular 

term and, in that he was eligible to be sentenced to an extended term, his 

maximum exposure was life imprisonment. Under the circumstances, even if 

plea counsel was ineffective—which we do not determine or suggest—

defendant has failed to show that "but for counsel's [alleged] errors, [he] would 

not have [pleaded] guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." See ibid.

(quoting DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457).

Affirmed. 

2

 The second-degree robberies took place on July 20, 2012, December 18, 2012, 

January 3, 2013, and January 4, 2013, all against different victims in different 

stores.