J-A24006-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.J.V., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.J.V., A MINOR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 607 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Dispositional Order February 13, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-22-JV-0000547-2017

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 17, 2018

K.J.V. appeals from the dispositional order entered February 13, 2018, 

in the Juvenile Division of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. The 

juvenile court adjudicated K.J.V. delinquent on charges of possession of a 

small amount of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia,1 and 

entered a dispositional order placing her on formal probation. On appeal, 

K.J.V. argues the court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence 

recovered during a warrantless search of her vehicle. For the reasons below, 

we affirm.

The facts underlying the adjudication of delinquency are summarized by 

the juvenile court as follows:

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1 See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(31) and (32), respectively.
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On July 1, 2017, at 7:15 a.m., Officer Michael McCormick of 

the Derry Township Police Department, who has been a police 

officer since 2009, was sitting in a marked police vehicle on the 

median of Hersheypark Drive and Old West Chocolate Avenue. 

Officer McCormick observed a black Acura sedan come through a 

curve and it appeared to be going above the posted 35 MPH speed 

limit. The Acura was unable to maintain its lane of travel as it 

rounded the curve. As the vehicle got closer, the officer noticed 

the car had extremely dark window tint, by his estimation darker 

than the tint allowed by law. Officer McCormick pulled off the 

median, activated his emergency lights, and the car stopped.

Officer McCormick approached the driver side window of the 

vehicle, identified himself, and outlined the reason for the stop. 

The officer obtained the driver’s license of the driver, which 

identified her as [K.J.V.]. Officer McCormick testified, “While 

speaking with [K.J.V.], I could smell the strong odor of unburnt 

marijuana coming from inside the vehicle.” The officer outlined 

his training and experience. Officer McCormick had [K.J.V.] get 

out of the car and conducted a search. In the center console he 

located numerous pieces and stems of marijuana. In the ashtray 

he found a burnt marijuana cigarette and on the passenger floor 

he found a sandwich bag containing small pieces of marijuana 

residue. [K.J.V.] was then charged with unlawful possession of a 

small amount of marijuana and unlawful possession of drug 

paraphernalia, as well as summary traffic violations.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 6/11/2018, at unnumbered 3-4 (record citations 

omitted).

On February 6, 2018, K.J.V. filed a motion to suppress the evidence 

recovered during the warrantless search. The juvenile court conducted a 

suppression hearing on February 13, 2018, following which it denied the 

motion. The case proceeded immediately to an adjudication hearing. The 

court adjudicated K.J.V. delinquent on the drug possession and paraphernalia 

charges, but found her not guilty of the traffic offenses. The same day, the 
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juvenile court placed K.J.V. on formal probation. K.J.V. filed a postdispositional order, which the court denied, and this timely appeal followed.2

K.J.V.’s sole issue on appeal challenges the juvenile court’s denial of her 

suppression motion. Specifically, she insists Officer McCormick did not 

possess the requisite probable cause to search her vehicle based solely on the 

purported odor of unburnt marijuana.3 See K.J.V.’s Brief at 5.

Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the 

denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether 

the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the 

record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts 

are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. The 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.

Moreover, appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the 

evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a 

ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.

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2 On April 17, 2018, the juvenile court ordered K.J.V. to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. K.J.V. complied with the court’s 

directive, and filed a concise statement on May 2, 2018.

3 K.J.V. does not challenge the basis for Officer McCormick’s stop of her 

vehicle.
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Commonwealth v. Freeman, 150 A.3d 32, 34–35 (2016) (quotation 

omitted), appeal denied, 169 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2017).

Generally, “a search conducted without a warrant is presumed to be 

unreasonable unless it can be justified under a recognized exception to the 

search warrant requirement.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 188 A.3d 454, 457 

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). One such exception is when police 

possess probable cause to search a lawfully stopped motor vehicle. See id. 

In Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (plurality opinion), the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the federal automobile exception, 

holding “[t]he prerequisite for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle is 

probable cause to search; no exigency beyond the inherent mobility of a motor 

vehicle is required.” Id. at 138. Furthermore, 

[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within 

the officers’ knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is 

being committed. With respect to probable cause, [our Supreme 

C]ourt adopted a “totality of the circumstances” analysis 

in Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921, 926 

(1985) (relying on Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, [103 S.Ct. 

2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527] ( 1983)). The totality of the circumstances 

test dictates that we consider all relevant facts, when deciding 

whether [the officer had] probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2017), quoting 

Commonwealth v Luv, 735 A.2d 87, 90 (Pa. 1999).

In the present case, K.J.V., insists the odor of marijuana that Officer 

McCormick purportedly smelled, did not provide him with the requisite 

probable cause to search her vehicle. See K.J.V.’s Brief at 13-16. Rather, 
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she relies on this Court’s statement in Commonwealth v. Trenge, 451 A.2d 

701, 708 (Pa. Super. 1982), that “odors without more in the usual case will 

not provide probable cause.” K.J.V. emphasizes there is no “plain smell” 

exception to the warrant requirement, and in those cases in which an officer 

cited an odor of marijuana as cause for the search, there were also other 

factors present. See Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 471 A.2d 1223, 1225 

(Pa. Super. 1984) (officer detected the odor of burning marijuana, “in addition 

to observing [] furtive behavior of the [defendant] who appeared to be stuffing 

something under his seat”); Trenge, supra, 451 A.2d at 703 (officer detected

strong odor of burning marijuana, and noticed the end of a pipe stem 

protruding from defendant’s pocket); Commonwealth v. Stoner, 344 A.2d 

633, 634 (Pa. Super. 1975) (officer detected “a very distinct odor of marijuana 

about the interior of the vehicle” as he reached in to secure a firearm from the 

glove compartment). K.J.V. also asserts a “plain smell” exception would 

constitute “bad policy” because “a police officer’s alleged detection of an odor 

is less reliable, more subjective, and also open to abuse.” K.J.V.’s Brief at 23. 

Here, the juvenile court addressed this claim as follows:

An odor may be sufficient to establish probable cause for a search 

warrant. Commonwealth v. Stainbrook, 324 Pa.Super. 410, 415, 

471 A.2d 1223, 1225 (1984), citing U.S. Supreme Court cases. 

In Commonwealth v. Stoner, 236 Pa.Super. 161, 344 A.2d 633 

(1975), the Superior Court stated that the rationale used to 

establish probable cause in those Supreme Court cases applies 

equally well when determining the validity of a search of a 

movable vehicle. In Stoner, the Court analogized a “plain smell” 

concept with that of plain view and held that where an officer is 

justified in being where he is, his detection of the odor of 
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marijuana is sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 636. 

Likewise, officers who detected the strong odor of marijuana 

emanating from a trailer had probable cause to obtain a search 

warrant. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930 (Pa.Super. 

2013).

The prerequisite for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle 

is probable cause to search; no exigency beyond the inherent 

mobility of a motor vehicle is required. Commonwealth v. Gary, 

625 Pa. 183, 242, 91 A.3d 102, 138 (2014) (plurality opinion). 

Gary represented a departure from prior Commonwealth 

jurisprudence which required either an exigency or search warrant 

for a valid automobile search. [K.J.V.] cites Commonwealth v. 

Trenge, 305 Pa.Super. 386, 451 A.2d 701 (1982) for its 

proposition that “odors without more in the usual case will not 

provide probable cause.” Trenge does not, however, state that 

odors alone cannot provide probable cause. Also, as noted above, 

numerous other cases hold that an odor alone can provide 

probable cause. 

Here, Officer McCormick made a lawful traffic stop and 

smelled the odor of marijuana when he spoke to the juvenile. That 

odor provided him with probable cause to believe marijuana was 

located in the car, under a “plain smell” analysis or with a 

commonsense analysis of the situation. Pursuant to Gary, he 

conducted a lawful, warrantless search of the car and found 

marijuana and paraphernalia. As such, the motion to suppress 

was properly denied.

Juvenile Court Opinion, 6/11/2018, at unnumbered 4-5.

We agree with the rationale of the juvenile court. While we recognize 

many of the “plain smell” decisions involved factors in addition to the smell of 

marijuana, we find that under the totality of the circumstances presented 

here, Officer McCormick had probable cause to search K.J.V.’s vehicle. The 

officer conducted a proper traffic stop when he observed K.J.V. driving too 

fast for a sharp curve, and traveling in a vehicle with “extremely dark window 

tint.” N.T., 2/13/2018, at 6. While he was speaking to K.J.V. and obtaining 
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her driver’s license, Officer McCormick smelled “the strong odor of unburnt 

marijuana coming from inside the vehicle.” Id. at 7. He explained he 

identified the smell “[t]hrough [his] training and experience in the police 

academy, and [he had] also been involved in hundreds of arrests throughout 

[his eight-year] career.” Id. See also id. at 5 (Officer McCormick testifying 

he has a “police K-9 trained in narcotics and patrol”). The juvenile court 

specifically determined the officer’s testimony was credible, particularly 

because the officer testified he smelled “raw marijuana ... not burning 

marijuana.” See id. at 25. 

This Court’s decision in Stoner, supra, is particularly instructive. In 

that case, an officer validly stopped the defendant on the turnpike for a traffic 

violation. When the officer asked the defendant for his paperwork, one of the 

passengers opened the glove compartment and a pistol dropped out. See 

Stoner, supra, 344 A.2d at 633. The officer ordered all of the occupants out 

of the vehicle and placed them under arrest. When he returned to the car to 

retrieve the pistol, he “noted a very distinct odor of marijuana in the interior 

of the vehicle[,]” and observed marijuana seeds and leaves throughout the 

interior. Id. at 634. However, the officer “was certain the odor was too strong 

to be coming from the small amount of drugs he could see.” Id. He

subsequently searched the trunk of the vehicle, where he recovered 150 

pounds of freshly cut marijuana. See id. 
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On appeal, a panel of this Court first noted that the marijuana seeds 

and leaves in plain view were “sufficient to establish probable cause for the 

search of the car.” Id. at 635. Nevertheless, the panel opined:

However, we need not base our decision solely on the 

evidence in plain view. Trooper Williams indicated additionally 

that he noted a very strong odor of marijuana coming from inside 

the car. He stated that the odor was, “(v)ery strong, it was similar 

to standing in the center of a field of marijuana.” Officer Williams 

testified that he had, in fact, stood in a field of marijuana while 

serving as a Military Policeman in Vietnam. He also indicated that 

freshly cut marijuana emits a stronger odor than does dried 

marijuana.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that an 

odor may be sufficient to establish probable cause for the issuance 

of a search warrant. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 

85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); Johnson v. United States, 

333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). This position has 

been followed by other federal courts. United States v. Curran, 

498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 

208 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pond and Fanelli, 382 

F.Supp. 556 (S.D. New York 1974). While these cases have been 

concerned with securing warrants for the search of a house, the 

rationale used to establish probable cause applies equally well 

when determining the validity of a search of a movable vehicle.

The court in United States v. Curran, supra, discussed

establishing probable cause from the existence of odors.

‘The government touches upon the theory sometimes 

advanced that the courts should acknowledge a ‘plain smell’ 

concept analogous to that of plain sight. . . . However, 

before the officer could rely upon his smelling marijuana as 

probable cause, he would have to justify his presence at the 

place . . . where he detected the odor, just as he would have 

to justify his presence at the place from which he saw the 

contraband in order to rely on the doctrine of plain view.’

498 F.2d at 33.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that Trooper Williams 

was justifiably in the position from which he detected the odor. It 
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would have been a dereliction of duty for him to ignore the obvious 

aroma of an illegal drug which he was trained to identify.

We are impressed by United States v. MartinezMiramontes, 494 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1974), a case nearly on point 

with the case at bar. In Martinez-Miramontes, a border patrol 

officer observed two persons walking away from a parked car, and 

stopped to question them. While the officer was questioning the 

individuals, a customs agent also stopped. The customs agent 

walked around the car, sniffed the crevice where the trunk closes, 

and detected an odor of marijuana. The trunk was searched and 

marijuana was found. In upholding the validity of the warrantless 

search of the vehicle as being based on adequate probable cause, 

the court stated:

‘We find no distinction of substance between leaning down 

and turning the head to look inside a motor vehicle to see 

articles which then come within the ‘plain view’ doctrine, 

(citation omitted), and leaning down and sniffing to detect 

the odor of marijuana.

‘The appellant relinquished his reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the trunk of his automobile when he loaded it with 

442 pounds of an odorous weed. By the use of ordinary 

senses while standing in a place where the officer had a right 

to be standing, he could then detect the nature of the load.’

494 F.2d at 810.

We believe that the rationale employed by the federal court in 

California is correct and that it is consistent with interpretations of 

our Supreme Court, and adopt it in the Commonwealth.

Id. at 635–636. Under this analysis, Officer McCormick’s search of K.J.V.’s 

vehicle was also proper.4

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4 We note the Commonwealth relies solely on the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court’s decision in Gary, supra. See Commonwealth’s Brief at unnumbered 

5. However, the Gary Court focused on whether to adopt the federal 

automobile exception for warrantless vehicle searches, rather than a 

determination of whether the officer’s smell of marijuana provided probable 

cause for the search. Indeed, the Court specifically stated, “there is no dispute 
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Furthermore, we emphasize that the motor vehicle violations with which 

K.J.V. was charged were all summary offenses. See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3309 

(failure to stay in single lane), 4107(b)(2) (operating a vehicle with unsafe 

window tint), and 4703(a) (operating a vehicle without a valid inspection 

certificate). Therefore, had Officer McCormick not conducted the search, he 

would have been obliged to permit K.J.V. to leave in a vehicle in which he 

detected a strong odor of unburnt marijuana. The juvenile court heard Officer 

McCormick’s testimony and adjudged him credible. Accordingly, we agree 

“the facts and circumstances within [Officer McCormick’s] knowledge [were]

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an 

offense has been or is being committed.” Harris, supra, 176 A.3d at 1023. 

Therefore, K.J.V. is entitled to no relief.

Dispositional order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/17/2018

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that probable cause exists to search [the defendant’s] motor vehicle.” Gary, 

supra, 91 A.3d at 138. Moreover, in that case, after the officer detected the 

odor of marijuana, he asked the defendant “if there was anything in the vehicle 

that the officers ‘need [to] know about[,]” and the defendant responded that 

“there was some ‘weed.’” Id. at 104. Therefore, the officer had probable 

cause to search based on the defendant’s admission that he possessed illegal 

drugs, as well as the smell of marijuana.
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