alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 98-1894

Darnell Tinker,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

Craig Hanks,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 1:97 CV 230 AS--Allen Sharp, Judge.

Submitted June 13, 2001--Decided June 28, 2001

 Before Posner, Easterbrook, and Kanne,

Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Circuit Judge. A state prisoner

who seeks federal habeas corpus relief

must with immaterial exceptions institute

his habeas corpus proceeding within a

year of when his conviction became final.

28 U.S.C. sec. 2244(d)(1)(A). But this

period is tolled while "a properly filed

application" for state postconviction

review is pending. sec. 2244(d)(2). When

last this case was before us, we held

that an application for permission to

file a second state postconviction

proceeding is not a "properly filed

application" for state postconviction

relief, and so the district court was

correct to hold that the petitioner’s

federal habeas corpus proceeding was

untimely. 172 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 1999).

The Supreme Court vacated our decision

and remanded the case to us for further

consideration in light of Artuz v.

Bennett, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). 121 S.

Ct. 476 (2000).

 Artuz holds that an application for

state postconviction relief is "properly

filed" even if there are good defenses to

it, the requisite propriety having to do

not with the merits of the application

but with whether it conforms to purely

formal requirements such as "the form of

the document, the time limits upon its
delivery, the court and office in which

it must be lodged, and the requisite

filing fee," id. at 364 (footnote

omitted)--but also "preconditions imposed

on particular abusive filers." The Court

illustrated by quoting with pregnant

emphases 28 U.S.C. sec. 2244(b)(3)(A), a

model prefiling provision: "Before a

second or successive application

permitted by this section is filed in the

district court, the applicant shall move

in the appropriate court of appeals for

an order authorizing the district court

to consider the application." 121 S. Ct.

at 364 (emphases in original). And

elsewhere the Court’s opinion remarks "a

condition to filing, as opposed to a

condition to obtaining relief." Id. at

365.

 This case involves the former, a filing

precondition, rather than the latter, a

relief precondition. To prevent abusive

repetitive filings by its prisoners,

Indiana courts, much like federal courts

by virtue of section 2244(b)(3)(A),

quoted in the preceding paragraph,

require the would-be applicant for

postconviction relief to ask leave of

court to file a second or other

successive application for postconviction

relief. Ind. Post-Conviction R. 1(12);

Indiana ex rel. Woodford v. Marion

Superior Court, 655 N.E.2d 63, 65-66

(Ind. 1995). That is a prefiling

requirement. It is the nonpecuniary

equivalent of a stiff filing fee--an

alternative of limited utility in dealing

with prisoners. Our decision conforms to

the Supreme Court’s ruling, and we

therefore reinstate it.
#### In re Braxton Lamont CARTER, Debtor. FIRST AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff, v. Braxton Lamont CARTER, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 379-02339.

Adv. No. 380-0149.

United States Bankruptcy Court, M. D. Tennessee.

Sept. 30, 1981.

L. Wearen Hughes, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff.

John R. Reynolds, Nashville, Tenn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

RUSSELL H. HIPPE, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

In June of this year this court rendered two opinions dealing with the measure of relief available to a defrauded creditor under the discharge exceptions provided by subsections (A) and (B) of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2). The court concluded that in proceedings under subsection (A) the relief available to defrauded creditors was compensatory, measured by the benefit-of-the-bargain rule. *Castner Knott Co. v. Wilson,*12 B.R. 363 (Bkrtcy., M.D.Tenn.1981). By judgment entered in this proceeding on June 30, 1981, 11 B.R. 992, the court concluded that the measure of relief available to defrauded creditors under subsection (B) is punitive rather than compensatory and included the full amount of a debt the renewal of which had been fraudulently induced. In neither of these opinions did the court address the issue of whether the relief available to creditors under either subsection (A) or (B) included reasonable attorney’s fees as provided in the contract with the debtor.

In an opinion being entered contemporaneously herewith, the court has concluded that the compensatory relief available under subsection (A) includes the defrauded creditor’s reasonable attorney’s fees. *First American National Bank v. Crosslin,*14 B.R. 656 (Bkrtcy., M.D.Tenn., 1981). Having concluded that compensatory relief includes recovery of these fees, it follows that a creditor who is entitled to a larger measure of relief — one that is punitive in nature — should also be entitled to recover such fees.

The attorney for the debtor having agreed that a twenty-percent fee would be reasonable, an appropriate order will be entered amending the judgment to include that amount.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 **

U.S.C. § 636(c).

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision ***

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JASON ELLSWORTH COAPLAND,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

LONG, Sgt.; IDAHO STATE

CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 10-35952

D.C. No. 1:07-cv-00486-BLW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Mikel H. Williams, Magistrate Judge, Presiding *

*

Submitted October 27, 2011*** 

San Francisco, California

Before: FARRIS, BEEZER, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

FILED

JAN 03 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Page 2 of 3

Jason Coapland appeals pro se from the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Sgt. Sandra Long on his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

claim. We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The

facts of this case are known to the parties. We need not repeat them here.

The district court properly granted summary judgment to Sgt. Long. To

prove an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner-plaintiff

must show that the prison official was subjectively aware of the risk. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). Coapland provided no evidence, other than

his unsupported allegations, to suggest that Sgt. Long knew the identity of the man

who allegedly assaulted Coapland, and “this court has refused to find a genuine

issue where the only evidence presented is uncorroborated and self-serving

testimony.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.

2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also note that Copeland gave

conflicting accounts regarding his own knowledge of the identity of the assailant,

and he never identified the assailant in the pleadings or other filings.

Coapland argues strenuously that discovery was inadequate, but his proper

recourse would have been a Rule 56(f) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). A

district court may enter summary judgment, where it is otherwise appropriate, if

the non-moving party fails to file a Rule 56(f) application. See Carpenter v.
Page 3 of 3

Universal Star Shipping, S.A., 924 F.2d 1539, 1547 (9th Cir. 1991). For the

reasons stated above, the district court properly granted summary judgment, thus

Coapland’s failure to move for a Rule 56(f) continuance prevents him from

challenging the inadequacy of evidence before the district court. Even if we were

to treat his final motion to compel discovery as a Rule 56(f) application, he has not

provided sufficient facts to show that the alleged tape recording exists. See Blough

v. Holland Realty, Inc., 574 F.3d 1084, 1091 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009).

We have reviewed Coapland’s remaining contentions, and determine that

they lack merit.

AFFIRMED.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NOS. WR-80,939-01, WR-80,939-02, WR-80,939-03

EX PARTE ERIC REED MARASCIO, Applicant

ON APPLICATIONS FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NOS. W380-80601-09-HC, W380-80602-09-HC, W380-80603-09-HC

IN THE 380 DISTRICT COURT OF COLLIN COUNTY

TH

YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion in which KEASLER, J., joined.

CONCURRING OPINION

It is my understanding that one of the reasons we filed and set this post-conviction

application for writ of habeas corpus was to address the latent tension between Gonzalez v.

State, 8 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), and Ex parte Townsend, 137 S.W.3d 79 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004)—especially in light of last year’s opinion in Ex parte Moss, 446 S.W.3d

786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Today, Judge Richardson would have the Court resolve that

tension by simply deferring to Gonzalez’s categorization of a double jeopardy claim as

“fundamental.” Concurring Opinion at 7, 9. But Judge Richardson does not go on to explain

what he means by “fundamental,” much less why Gonzalez’s characterization of double
Marascio — 2

jeopardy rights as “fundamental” should suffice to trump the rule of forfeiture announced in

Townsend—that an issue that was available to be raised on direct appeal, but was not, may

not be broached for the first time in post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings, since habeas

proceedings are not a substitute for direct appeal.

We have subsequently provided a basis for reconciliation, in Moss. There we held that

the Townsend rule of forfeiture is a qualified one, and it does not apply to claims that would

fit within the first category of Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993),

embracing absolute requirements or prohibitions. Such category one Marin claims are

“essentially independent of the litigants’ wishes . . . and cannot, therefore, be waived or

forfeited by the parties.” Moss, 446 S.W.3d at 788 (quoting Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279). It

seems to me that, after Moss, the question whether Townsend applies to foreclose raising a

double jeopardy claim for the first time in a post-conviction habeas corpus application

depends upon whether such a claim is, by its nature, a category one Marin claim. That is the

question the Court should be asking itself today. To simply announce to the bench and bar

that Gonzalez controls because it labeled a double jeopardy claim “fundamental”—without

any explanation of what that means and without any analysis of where such a claim might

fit within the Marin categories—begsthe question entirely. After Moss, we do not adequately

resolve the tension between Gonzalez and Townsend by simply anointing one over the other.

Because Judge Keasler addresses all the right questions, and because I agree with his

answers, I join his concurring opinion.
Marascio — 3

FILED:October7,2015

PUBLISH
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The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or Department) is required by the

1 eeC Or Peesnl.4.OO. Energy Policy and Connervation Act, as amended by section 136(c)(1) of the

Energy Policy Act of 2005, to establinh energy conservation standardn for the

following commercial mfrigeration equipment manufactured on or after

20 It c'brctnre ha,

FmwkDcamt)LqyhpmfthFmi ""

• 'I" Document is to describe the procedural and analytical approaches the

cc 1. S;c,cii.... DOE anticipates using to evaluate and establish energy conservation

c-ni ' '. r: standards for the covered commercial refrigeration equipment, and to

C'. - :v-.c re.. encourage and facilitate utakeholder input during the rUlemaking.

v . For information regaring the May 16, 20D6, public meeting, please visit the

t.,flh ,i'SiaI P25.61 'Olctc Eiul.c'il-St PiJOilt 11cr lie. webpage.

c. .' ii. ,ii,!nl •, ri ,r rI.

Contact thforrnatlou

Project Maeager

(202) 5g6-8654

e )'-iri',,iri. CC''

I - ''t', ': "C:'iJ I 511.' '''Jr .2'. -, ,Sccr'r in -r I Pt 'v,,

Li S Department of Ivergy

Corrtevt lust Updated. 04/20/2006

Summary of Comments on http:II

www.eere.energy.gov/buildings/

appliance_standards/commer

Page: 1

Author: DOE

Subject: Note

Date: 7/3/2007 9:10:44 AM

See comment number 01,1

Author: DOE

Subject: Note

Date: 7/3/2007 9:11:19 AM

See comment number 01.3

EE-2006-STD-0126 COMMENT 02.1
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted

pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

May 26, 2006

Securities and Exchange Commission

450 Fifth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20549



|Re: | Certification Required Under Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------

In connection with the accompanying report on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 1 for the period ended December 31, 2005, and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Earl W. McNiel,
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Transmeridian Exploration Incorporated (the Company), hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



|                                                         
|---------------------------------------------------------
|                                                         
|/s/ Earl W. McNiel                                       
|Earl W. McNiel Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from SEC Form
10-Q and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                          13,931
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  133,430<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0<F1>
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F2>
<PP&E>                                       2,561,205
<DEPRECIATION>                                 295,994
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,883,929
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F2>
<BONDS>                                      2,527,807
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     99,923
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     (6,946)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,883,929
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               456,228
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  251,073
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,274
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             130,531
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 69,153
<INCOME-TAX>                                    69,153
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             69,153
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               (25,173)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    43,980
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.39
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.39
<FN>
<F1>Receivables are stated net of allowances and also include accrued revenues.
<F2>Registrant does not report using a classified balance sheet.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated statement of Financial Condition at December 31, 1997
(Unaudited) and the Consolidated Statement of Income for the six months
ended December 31, 1997 (Unaudited) and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          21,105
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   37,904
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     85,779
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               172,199
<PP&E>                                       2,463,652
<DEPRECIATION>                                (31,536)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,789,652
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,217,739
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     4,565,404
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,993,236)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,789,907
<SALES>                                        596,052
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               596,052
<CGS>                                          240,962
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  782,204
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             (186,152)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              17,917
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (186,152)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.01)
        

</TABLE>
Human Factors Information System (HFIS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

From 01/01/2008 to 12/31/2008Page 23 of 22605/29/2009 10:01:12

2x N

Total 

N

Document Types: IR, LER IR/LER Category Analysis by Docket Report

N

Average for Se

Details Department Work Type 

Facility Name: Byron 2 Docket (050- 00455)

Oversight / IR130 - Inadequate suprevision / command and control H - Health Physics H - Health Physics 130 - Inadequate suprevision / command and control M - Mechanical M - Maintenance / Repair 

222

Number of Items for this Docket: 

Percent of Total for this Docket: 

Procedures & Reference Document / IR113 - Procedure / reference document development and maintenance LT P - Procedure Writers P - Procedure Dev 

111

Number of Items for this Docket: 

Percent of Total for this Docket: 

Problem Identification & Resolution / IR145 - Causal development LTA D - Emergency Planning Q - Fire Protection 146 - Evaluation LTA G - Engineering G - Design 

222

Number of Items for this Docket: 

Percent of Total for this Docket: 

Work Planning & Practices / IR183 - Pre-job activities LTA M - Mechanical M - Maintenance / Repair 185 - Procedural adherence LTA H - Health Physics H - Health Physics 185 - Procedural adherence LTA M - Mechanical M - Maintenance / Repair 187 - Action implementation LTA G - Engineering G - Design 

444

Number of Items for this Docket: 

Percent of Total for this Docket: 

Total Items for this Docket: 9
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Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Kensey Nash Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Joseph W. Kaufmann, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.



|                   |  |                        
|------------------ |  | -----------------------
|Date: May 10, 2007 |  | /s/ Joseph W. Kaufmann 
|                   |  | Joseph W. Kaufmann     
|                   |  | Chief Executive Officer