J-S75040-16

2017 PA Super 46

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

SARAH KATHERINE MARKUN, :

:

Appellant : No. 1009 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 1, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-23-CR-0006444-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.

OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.: Filed: February 27, 2017

Sarah Katherine Markun (“Markun”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following her conviction of possession of a controlled 

substance. See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16). We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant underlying facts as follows:

Twenty-four[-]year[-]old [] Markun ... was found unconscious in 

a Motel 6 in Tinicum, Delaware County[,] on April 10, 2015[,] at 

about 1:30 p.m. Apparently[,] housekeeping personnel called 

911 and reported a medical emergency when she was 

discovered. She was evaluated and treated at the motel by 

emergency medical responders and thereafter transported by 

the EMTs to a nearby hospital. A criminal [C]omplaint charging 

her with possessing heroin and possession of drug paraphernalia 

was issued on August 26, 2015. [The possession of drug 

paraphernalia was later withdrawn.]

A pre[]trial [M]otion to suppress was filed. After a hearing[,] the 

[M]otion to suppress was denied and the matter proceeded by 

way of a non-jury trial with [Markun] stipulating to the testimony 

heard at the suppression hearing for trial purposes. At the 

conclusion of the non-jury trial[,] [Markun] was found guilty of 

possessing a controlled substance. A sentence of twelve months 

of probation was imposed.
J-S75040-16

- 2 -

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/16, at 1-2 (footnotes and citations omitted).

Markun filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise Statement.

On appeal, Markun raises the following question for our review: 

“Whether the lower court was without authority to convict or sentence 

[Markun] for possession of a controlled substance[,] since she was immune 

from prosecution pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-113.7?” Brief for Appellant at 5.

Initially, we must determine whether Markun properly preserved her 

immunity challenge, where she raised this claim for the first time in her Rule 

1925(b) Concise Statement. Resolution of this issue involves the 

interpretation and application of section 780-113.7, which states, in relevant 

part, the following:

(a) A person may not be charged and shall be immune from 

prosecution for any offense listed in subsection (b) and for a 

violation of probation or parole if the person can establish the 

following:

(1) law enforcement officers only became aware of the person’s 

commission of an offense listed in subsection (b) because the 

person transported a person experiencing a drug overdose 

event to a law enforcement agency, a campus security office or 

a health care facility; or

(2) all of the following apply:

(i) the person reported, in good faith, a drug overdose 

event to a law enforcement officer, the 911 system, a 

campus security officer or emergency services 

personnel and the report was made on the reasonable 

belief that another person was in need of immediate 

medical attention and was necessary to prevent death 

or serious bodily injury due to a drug overdose;
J-S75040-16

- 3 -

(ii) the person provided his own name and location and 

cooperated with the law enforcement officer, 911 

system, campus security officer or emergency services 

personnel; and

(iii) the person remained with the person needing 

immediate medical attention until a law enforcement 

officer, a campus security officer or emergency services 

personnel arrived.

(b) The prohibition on charging or prosecuting a person as 

described in subsection (a) bars charging or prosecuting a 

person for probation and parole violations and for violations of 

section 13(a)(5), (16), (19), (31), (32), (33) and (37).

(c) Persons experiencing drug overdose events may not be 

charged and shall be immune from prosecution as provided in 

subsection (b) if a person who transported or reported and 

remained with them may not be charged and is entitled to 

immunity under this section.

(d) The prohibition on charging or prosecuting a person as 

described in this section is limited in the following respects:

(1) This section may not bar charging or prosecuting a person 

for offenses enumerated in subsection (b) if a law enforcement 

officer obtains information prior to or independent of the action 

of seeking or obtaining emergency assistance as described in 

subsection (a).

***

(f) As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall 

have the meanings given to them in this subsection unless the 

context clearly indicates otherwise:

“911 system.” A system, including enhanced 911 service and a 

wireless E-911 system, that permits a person dialing 911 by 

telephone to be connected to a public safety answering point, via 

normal telephone facilities, for the reporting of police, fire, 

medical or other emergency situations.
J-S75040-16

- 4 -

“Campus security officer.” An employee of an institution of 

higher education charged with maintaining the safety and 

security of the property of the institution and the persons on the 

property.

“Drug overdose event.” An acute medical condition, including,

but not limited to, severe physical illness, coma, mania, hysteria 

or death, which is the result of consumption or use of one or 

more controlled substances causing an adverse reaction. A 

patient’s condition shall be deemed to be a drug overdose if a 

prudent layperson, possessing an average knowledge of 

medicine and health, would reasonably believe that the condition 

is in fact a drug overdose and requires immediate medical 

attention.

“Emergency services personnel.” Individuals, including a 

trained volunteer or a member of the armed forces of the United 

States or the National Guard, whose official or assigned 

responsibilities include performing or directly supporting the 

performance of emergency medical and rescue services or 

firefighting.

“Law enforcement officer.” A person who by virtue of the 

person's office or public employment is vested by law with a duty 

to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses, whether 

that duty extends to all offenses or is limited to specific offenses, 

or a person on active State duty under 51 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 508 

(relating to active duty for emergency).

35 P.S. § 780-113.7 (footnote omitted).

“Where reviewing a claim that raises an issue of statutory 

construction, our standard of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. 

Wilson, 111 A.3d 747, 751 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Our task is guided by the sound and settled principles set forth 

in the Statutory Construction Act, including the primary maxim 

that the object of statutory construction is to ascertain and 

effectuate legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(a). In 

pursuing that end, we are mindful that “[w]hen the words of a 

statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is 

not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 
J-S75040-16

- 5 -

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(b). Indeed, “[a]s a general rule, the best 

indication of legislative intent is the plain language of a statute.” 

In reading the plain language, “[w]ords and phrases shall be 

construed according to rules of grammar and according to their 

common and approved usage,” while any words or phrases that 

have acquired a “peculiar and appropriate meaning” must be 

construed according to that meaning. 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] [§] 1903(a). 

However, when interpreting non-explicit statutory text, 

legislative intent may be gleaned from a variety of factors, 

including, inter alia: the occasion and necessity for the statute; 

the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the 

consequences of a particular interpretation; and the 

contemporaneous legislative history. 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1921(c). 

Moreover, while statutes generally should be construed liberally, 

penal statutes are always to be construed strictly, 1 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§ 1928(b)(1), and any ambiguity in a penal statute should be 

interpreted in favor of the defendant.

Notwithstanding the primacy of the plain meaning doctrine as 

best representative of legislative intent, the rules of construction 

offer several important qualifying precepts. For instance, the 

Statutory Construction Act also states that, in ascertaining 

legislative intent, courts may apply, inter alia, the following 

presumptions: that the legislature does not intend a result that 

is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable; and that the 

legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. 

1 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1922(1),(2). Most importantly, the General 

Assembly has made clear that the rules of construction are not 

to be applied where they would result in a construction 

inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly. 1 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1901.

Wilson, 111 A.3d at 751. 

Markun contends that she did not waive the immunity challenge under 

section 780–113.7(a)(2) for failing to raise it before the trial court because 

such a claim implicates the jurisdiction of the court, and cannot be waived. 

Brief for Appellant at 14-15. Markun asserts that the trial court did not have 
J-S75040-16

- 6 -

authority to adjudicate the case, and that her judgment of sentence must be 

vacated. Id. at 15.1

The trial court addressed Markun’s claim as follows:

As the statute places the burden of establishing a person’s 

entitlement to immunity on a defendant, it follows that it is 

incumbent upon a defendant to raise this claim before the trial 

court. While direction on the procedural mechanism through 

which immunity can [be] sought under this provision is not 

included within the statute, guidance may be found in the Rules 

of Criminal Procedure governing pre-trial motions, alibi and 

insanity or mental health defenses. [Markun’s] claim of 

immunity should have been raised in an omnibus pretrial motion. 

Notice to the Commonwealth would then have been followed by 

a hearing where [Markun] would have the opportunity to 

demonstrate that she was immune from prosecution. ... A 

defendant claiming immunity from prosecution must be required 

through notice and a hearing, to give the Commonwealth an 

opportunity to meet her claim and to give the trial court an 

opportunity to consider it through fact-finding based upon 

evidence rather than mere speculation.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/16, at 8-9.

As the trial court notes, while the statute clearly places the burden of 

proving immunity upon the defendant, the statute is silent as to the timing 

and mechanism through which a defendant may seek immunity. However, 

the statute provides that a defendant “may not be charged and shall be 

 

1 Markun also claims that the trial court lacked authority to convict her for 

possession of a controlled substance where she was immune from 

prosecution as a drug overdose victim under section 780-113.7. Brief for 

Appellant at 10, 13. Markun argues that she suffered a drug overdose, 

motel employees reported the overdose, the employees remained on the 

scene until medical responders arrived, and the employees cooperated with 

the responders. Id. at 13-14. Markun asserts that the police did not obtain 

any assistance prior to, or independent of the action seeking medical help. 

Id. at 13.
J-S75040-16

- 7 -

immune from prosecution,” if he/she meets the statutory requirements. 

See Commonwealth v. Carontenuto, 2016 PA Super 197, *4 (Pa. Super. 

2016) (stating that “the statute simply declares that, if the reporting 

individual complies with the three statutory requirements enumerated in 

Section 780–113.7(a)(2), that individual ‘may not be charged and shall be 

immune from prosecution for’ things such as possessing a controlled 

substance and using or possessing drug paraphernalia.”) (citation omitted); 

see also Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 552 A.2d 1075, 1080 (Pa. Super. 

1988) (stating that “the term ‘shall’ is generally construed as creating a 

mandatory duty”) (emphasis omitted). While the statute does not define 

“immune,” “prosecution” or “charged,” we must look to their plain meaning 

to determine the applicability of the statute. “Charge” is defined as “[t]o 

accuse (a person) of an offense <the police charged him with murder.>.” 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 248 (8th ed. 2004). “Immune” is defined as being 

“exempt from a duty or liability.” Id. at 765. Further, “prosecution” is 

defined as “[a] criminal proceeding in which an accused person is tried.” Id. 

at 1258. 

The plain meaning of “may not be charged,” in conjunction with 

“immune from prosecution,” must be construed to create a complete bar of 

the prosecution of criminal proceedings and dismissal of charges against 

persons who establish the other statutory requirements listed in section 780-

113.7. Further, the statute imposes a burden on the defendant, not the 
J-S75040-16

- 8 -

Commonwealth, to prove immunity after the Commonwealth has filed 

charges. Indeed, it would be impractical and unreasonable to impose a 

burden on a defendant to prove immunity prior to an arrest or filing of 

charges. See Wilson, 111 A.3d at 751. Thus, the only mechanism through 

which a defendant could enforce immunity to avoid being subject to a trial or 

criminal proceeding would be through a pretrial motion. See Carontenuto, 

2016 PA Super 197, at *1 (wherein the defendant raised an immunity 

challenge under section 780-113.7 in a pretrial motion). 

Here, Markun failed to raise an immunity challenge in a pretrial 

motion, and there is no record to determine whether she established the 

requirements of section 780-113.7.2 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that 

“[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal.”); see also Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 

1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that issues raised for first time in 

Rule 1925(b) concise statement are waived); Commonwealth v. Hanford, 

937 A.2d 1094, 1098 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007) (noting that “new theories 

ordinarily cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[.]”). Further, 

Markun’s failure to properly raise the immunity claim before the trial court 

did not divest the court of the power to hear the action. See 

 

2 We note that the arresting officer and Markun testified at the bench trial. 

See N.T., 3/1/16, at 4-9, 20-25. However, this testimony was not adequate 

to decide the factual question of the applicability of the statutory immunity. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/16, at 9 (stating that Markun “offered no 

competent evidence that allows the court to conclude that all of the 

provisions of subsection [(a)](2) are satisfied[.]”).
J-S75040-16

- 9 -

Commonwealth v. Seiders, 11 A.3d 495, 497 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating 

that “[c]ontroversies stemming from violations of the Crimes Code are 

entrusted to the original jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas for 

resolution.”); see generally Commonwealth v. Lenart, 242 A.2d 259, 

262 (Pa. 1968) (stating that “the statute of limitations is not per se a bar to 

prosecution; it is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Thus, if not 

pleaded, the prosecution machinery will grind.”). Based upon Markun’s 

failure to raise her immunity challenge in a pretrial motion, we conclude the 

claim is waived on appeal.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Moulton joins the opinion.

Judge Bowes files a dissenting opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/27/2017