NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KAREN VELIE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. ADAM HILL; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-55233 D.C. No. 2:16-cv-07839-DSF-E
MEMORANDUM *

Appeal fromthe United States District Court for the Central District of California Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Subm itted August 6, 2018 Pasadena, California Before: CLIFTON and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and HOYT, * * District Judge. Plaintiff-appellant, Karen Velie (“Velie”), appeals the district court’s dism issal of her com

plaint with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Velie filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law. She alleged that 

# FILED
AUG 30 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

* * The Honorable Kenneth M. Hoyt, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.Defendant-appellees, Adam Hill and the County of San Luis Obispo (“Defendants”), deprived her of her First Am endm ent rights by denying her equal access to inform ation and retaliating against her for her reporting. We affirm
. 1 Velie has failed to state a claim for First Am endm ent denial of equal access. The governm ent enjoys extraordinary discretion when selecting “private speakers to transm it specific inform a tion pertaining to its own [affairs] .” R osenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va. , 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). Although the First Am endm ent guarantees the press a lim ited right to gather news, see Pell v. Procunier , 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974), journalists have no “constitutional right of special access to inform ation not available to the public generally.” Branzburg v. Hayes , 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972); see also Houchins v. KQED, Inc. , 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“This Court has never intim ated a First Am e ndm ent guarantee of a right of access to all sources of inform ation within governm ent control.”); id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgm ent) (“The First and Fourteenth Am endm ents do not guarantee the public a right of access to inform ation generated or controlled by governm e nt, nor do they guarantee the

1 As the parties are fam iliar with the facts and procedural history, we restate them only as necessary to explain our decision. 2press any basic right of access superior to that of the public generally.”). 2 In her

com plaint, Velie asserts only general allegations in support of her claim for denial of equal access to inform ation. She does not sufficiently allege that she was uniquely deprived of public inform ation or inform ation that Defendants distributed to all m edia on a nondiscretionary basis. She has, therefore, failed to state a claim for denial of equal access. Velie has also failed to state a claim for First Am endm ent retaliation. To state a claim

for retaliation, Velie must allege that Defendants subjected her to adverse action because of her constitutionally protected journalistic activities. Mulligan v. Nichols , 835 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2016). Velie has not done so. Defendants’ refusal to grant her access to discretionary governm ent inform ation does not constitute retaliation because the First Am endm ent does not guarantee access to such inform a tion. Velie’s argum ent that Defendants retaliated against her by publicly defam ing her is also unavailing because she does not allege that Defendants’ com m e nts were accom panied by any official action that deprived her of a right or privilege. Sim ilarly, her argum ent that Defendants retaliated against her by pressuring her advertisers to stop working with her is unsuccessful because

2 Because Justice Stewart’s view in Houchins was the narrowest prevailing one, it has controlling effect. See Marks v. United States , 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 3she does not allege that Defendants took or threatened to take state action if the

advertisers did not accede to their requests. See Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco , 277 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002). Moreover, Velie has waived her equal protection claim , as her entire claim rests solely on a single heading asserted in her brief filed in opposition to Defendants’ m otion to dism iss. The district court m ade no finding with regard to this claimbecause Velie failed to raise any argum ent concerning it or offer any legal authority in support thereof. Since Velie failed to properly address this claim before the district court, we need not address it now on appeal. See In re E.R. Fegert, Inc. , 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The rule in this circuit is that appellate courts will not consider argum ents that are not properly raised in the trial courts. . . . A workable standard . . . is that the argum ent m ust be raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it.”) (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). Finally, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendants’ m otion to dism iss without leave to am end. The district court m ay deny leave to am end if am endm ent would be futile. See AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cty. of Tulare , 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). Velie has not provided any specific allegations that she would use to am end her com plaint, either before the district court or on appeal. The district court was, therefore, within its discretion to dism iss
4Velie’s com plaint with prejudice. See Gingery v. City of Glendale , 831 F.3d 1222, 1231 (9th Cir. 2016); Carrico v. City & Cty. of San Francisco , 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). AFFIRMED
.

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