Opinion issued December 15, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-19-00777-CV

———————————

JAMES D.C. ROBINSON AND CLAIR E.M. ROBINSON, Appellants

V.

MURALI BONTHA AND SWATHI BONTHA, Appellees

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Tarrant County, Texas1

Trial Court Case No. 2018-006220-1

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, James D.C. Robinson and Clair E.M. Robinson, sued appellees, 

Murali Bontha and Swathi Bontha, for breach of a lease contract and violations of 

1 The Texas Supreme Court transferred this appeal to this Court from the Court of 

Appeals for the Second District of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001 

(authorizing transfer of cases between courts of appeals).
2

the Texas Property Code, namely, bad-faith retention of a security deposit and failure 

to provide an accounting of deductions.

2

 The trial court granted summary judgment 

in favor of appellants. In two issues, appellants contend that the trial court erred in 

calculating their damages and erred in awarding attorney’s fees.

We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified. 

Background

On July 6, 2018, appellants sold their residential real property to appellees. In 

conjunction with the sale, appellees granted appellants a three-week leaseback, or 

temporary lease prior to vacating. Pursuant to the Seller’s Temporary Residential 

Lease Agreement (the “Lease”), the term of the Lease was from July 6, 2018 through 

July 27, 2018, and appellants were not charged any rental fees. Appellants paid

appellees a security deposit of $3,600.00, which the Lease authorized appellees to 

use to satisfy appellants’ obligations therein. However, appellees were required to 

refund any unused portion of the deposit to appellants, together with an itemized list 

of any deductions, within 30 days after appellants surrendered possession of the 

property and provided appellees with written notice of their forwarding address. 

Appellants alleged in their petition that, when the term of the Lease expired,

they vacated the property and hand-delivered to appellees a notice of forwarding 

address. However, appellees refused, after demand, to return the security deposit or 

2 See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 92.103, 92.104, 92.109.
3

to provide an accounting. Appellants brought claims against appellees for breach of 

the Lease and for violations of the Property Code, i.e., bad-faith retention of their 

security deposit and failure to provide an accounting.3 Appellants sought the return 

of their deposit, statutory damages, and attorney’s fees. Appellees answered, 

generally denying the allegations. 

Appellants then filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they 

were entitled to judgment on their claims for violations of the Property Code and, 

alternatively, on their claim for breach of the Lease. They asserted that the evidence 

established that they paid appellees a refundable security deposit of $3,600.00 and

that, when the Lease term expired, they vacated the property and hand-delivered to 

appellees a notice of forwarding address. They asserted that appellees were required

to refund their deposit and to provide a written accounting of any deductions no later 

than August 26, 2018. However, despite receiving the written demand, appellees 

did neither. Appellants asserted that the evidence conclusively showed that 

appellees acted in bad faith, as defined in the Property Code.4 

Appellants asserted that they were entitled to statutory damages in the amount 

of $14,500.00, comprised of “forfeiture of the $3,600.00 security deposit, three times 

the amount of the security deposit withheld or $10,800.00, plus an additional $100 

3 See id. §§ 92.103, 92.104, 92.109.

4 See id. § 92.109.
4

under the statute.”5 They also sought attorney’s fees through trial in the amount of 

$16,611.26, plus fees for appeal. They attached to their motion, as supplemented,

the Lease, a copy of the security deposit check, Inventory and Condition Forms, a 

notice of forwarding address, a demand letter, the affidavit of appellant James D.C. 

Robinson, and an affidavit and various billing records in support of their attorney’s 

fees. 

In their summary-judgment response, appellees asserted that they inspected 

the property after appellants vacated and “found damages.” They asserted that 

appellants did not leave a forwarding address. Appellees asserted that they provided 

an itemized accounting and remaining deposit to their real estate agent, who 

forwarded the items to appellants’ agent. Appellees did not attach any evidence. 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellants and awarded 

damages in the amount of $10,900.00, attorney’s fees through trial in the amount of 

$5,000.00, and attorney’s fees of $8,000.00 for appeal; $3,000.00, in the event of a 

petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court; $8,000.00, in the event that briefing 

were required; and $5,000.00 for representation through oral argument and the 

completion of proceedings in the supreme court.

5 See id. § 92.109(a).
5

Summary Judgment

In their second issue, appellants assert that the trial court erred in calculating 

their damages on their claims for violations of the Property Code. See TEX. PROP.

CODE §§ 92.103, 92.104, 92.109. 

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. 

v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). To prevail on a motion for summary 

judgment, a movant has the burden to establish that he is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law and that there is no genuine issue of material fact. TEX. R. CIV. P.

166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). When a plaintiff moves 

for summary judgment on his own claim, he must conclusively prove all essential 

elements of his cause of action. Rhône–Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 

(Tex. 1999). If the movant meets his burden, the burden shifts to the non-movant to 

raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Centeq Realty, 

Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). The evidence raises a genuine 

issue of fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in 

light of all of the summary-judgment evidence. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 

Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007). When deciding whether there is a 

disputed, material fact issue, evidence favorable to the non-movant is taken as true. 

Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548–49 (Tex. 1985). Every 
6

reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts 

resolved in his favor. Id. at 549. 

B. Legal Principles

Texas Property Code chapter 92, subchapter C, governs the rights of landlords 

and tenants with respect to security deposits applicable to residential leases. See

TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 92.101–.110. Section 92.103 provides that a landlord “shall 

refund a security deposit to the tenant on or before the 30th day after the date the 

tenant surrenders the premises,” with the exception in section 92.107 below. Id.

§ 92.103. Section 92.104 provides that a landlord “may deduct from the deposit 

damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a 

result of breaching the lease.” Id. § 92.104(a). “If the landlord retains all or part of 

a security deposit under this section, the landlord shall give to the tenant the balance 

of the security deposit, if any, together with a written description and itemized list 

of all deductions. . . .” Id. § 92.104(c). Section 92.107 provides that a landlord is 

not obligated to return a tenant’s security deposit or to give the tenant a written 

description of deductions until the tenant gives the landlord a written statement of 

forwarding address. Id. § 92.107 (noting, however, that tenant does not forfeit right 

to refund of deposit or right to receive description of deductions merely for failing 

to give forwarding address to landlord).
7

Section 92.109 provides that a landlord who fails to return the security deposit 

or fails to provide a written description and itemization of deductions within 30 days 

after the date the tenant surrenders possession is “presumed to have acted in bad 

faith” and is subject to the following: 

(a) A landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation 

of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of 

$100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, 

and the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit to recover the 

deposit.

(b) A landlord who in bad faith does not provide a written 

description and itemized list of damages and charges in violation 

of this subchapter:

(1) forfeits the right to withhold any portion of the security 

deposit or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to 

the premises; and

(2) is liable for the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit 

to recover the deposit.

(c) In an action brought by a tenant under this subchapter, the 

landlord has the burden of proving that the retention of any 

portion of the security deposit was reasonable.

(d) A landlord who fails either to return a security deposit or to 

provide a written description and itemization of deductions on or 

before the 30th day after the date the tenant surrenders possession 

is presumed to have acted in bad faith.

Id. § 92.109. 

C. Analysis

Appellants’ summary-judgment evidence includes a copy of the Lease and 

their deposit check, which reflect that, on July 6, 2018, they paid appellees a security 

deposit of $3,600.00 and began occupying the property under the terms of the Lease, 
8

which provided for a three-week term ending on July 27, 2018. The Lease also 

provided that appellees “shall refund” the deposit, with an itemized list of any 

deductions, within 30 days after appellants vacated and gave written notice of their 

forwarding address. Appellant James D.C. Robinson testified in his affidavit that, 

when the Lease expired, appellants vacated the property and hand-delivered to 

appellees a notice of forwarding address. Because appellants presented evidence 

that they vacated the property at the end of the Lease term, on July 27, 2018, and 

provided written notice of their forwarding address, appellants were entitled to the 

return of their deposit and an itemized list of any deductions within 30 days, or by 

August 26, 2018. See id. §§ 92.103, 92.104. Robinson testified that appellees 

neither returned their security deposit nor provided an accounting. Thus, appellees 

were presumed under section 92.109 to have acted in “bad faith.” See id. 

§ 92.109(d). 

Appellees then had the burden to present evidence that their retention of the 

deposit was reasonable. See id. § 92.109(c); Lost Creek Ventures, LLC v. Pilgrim, 

No. 01-15-00375-CV, 2016 WL 3569756, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

June 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); Pulley v. Milberger, 198 S.W.3d 418, 431 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied); see also Siegler, 899 S.W.2d at 197 (holding that 

once movants meet their burden, burden shifts to non-movants to raise genuine issue 

of material fact precluding summary judgment). 
9

In their summary-judgment response, appellees did not present any evidence

to rebut the presumption or establish that their retention of the deposit was 

reasonable. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.109(c), (d). Accordingly, the trial court 

granted summary judgment in favor of appellants and awarded them damages in the 

amount of $10,900.00.

Appellants assert on appeal that the trial court erred by not awarding them the

full amount of statutory damages to which they were entitled. Specifically, they 

assert that they “should have received the return of their security deposit in the 

amount of $3,600.00,” citing section 92.103, “plus treble damages for bad faith 

retention of [their] deposit, as well as the sum of $100.00,” citing section 92.109, for 

a “total award of $14,500.00.” See id. §§ 92.103, 92.109 (emphasis added). 

We review the trial court’s interpretation of the statutes at issue de novo. City 

of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008). Our primary objective is 

to ascertain and to give effect to the legislature’s intent as expressed in the language 

of the statutes. Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). In so doing, 

we look first to the plain and common meaning of the statutes’ words, and apply any 

definitions that the legislature prescribes. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison 

Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. 1998); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 311.011(b). “Where statutory text is clear, that text is determinative of legislative 

intent unless the plain meaning of the statute’s words would produce an absurd 
10

result.” Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2012). We 

presume that the legislature intends for the entire statute to be effective and that its 

application yield a just and reasonable result. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021(2)-(3); 

Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. v. Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). We do not examine any terms or provisions

in isolation; rather, we read the statutes as a whole. Gutierrez, 237 S.W.3d at 873. 

Reading the statutes together as a whole makes clear that sections 92.103 and 

92.104 create statutory liability for a landlord who does not return a security deposit, 

along with a list of any deductions, within 30 days after the tenant vacates the

property. See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 92.103, 92.104. A landlord who fails to timely 

comply with either section 92.103 or 92.104, or both, is presumed to have acted in 

“bad faith” under section 92.109(d). See id. § 92.109(d); Frazin v. Sauty, No. 05-

15-00879-CV, 2016 WL 7163858, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 7, 2016, pet. 

denied) (mem. op.) (holding that, because jury found that landlord failed to return

security deposit, “[a] bad faith failure to return the security deposit was presumed”). 

Barring evidence from the landlord to rebut the presumption, see TEX. PROP. CODE

§ 92.109(c), the damages for a violation of section 92.103 or 92.104, or both, are as 

stated in sections 92.109(a) and (b). See id. § 92.109(a), (b). Section 92.109(a) 

provides that a landlord who in bad faith “retains a security deposit in violation of 

this subchapter,” i.e., in violation of section 92.103, is liable for the sum of $100.00, 
11

treble damages, and attorney’s fees. Id. § 92.109(a). And, a landlord who acts in 

bad faith in failing to provide an accounting of deductions, i.e., in violation of section 

92.104, forfeits the right to withhold any portion of the deposit or to recover for 

damages to the premises and is liable for attorney’s fees. See id. § 92.109(b). 

Here, because appellees failed to return appellants’ deposit and failed to return 

an accounting, and failed to rebut the presumption of bad faith that arose, appellees

forfeited their right to make deductions and thus were liable to appellants for

damages in the amount of $100.00, plus three times the full amount of their deposit, 

i.e., $3,600.00, for a total of $10,900.00. See id. § 92.109(a), (b). This conclusion

is supported in the caselaw. 

In Frazin, a jury found that the landlord failed to return the tenants’ security 

deposit and failed to provide them with a written description and itemized list of 

damages and charges within 30 days after the end of the lease term and the receipt 

of the tenants’ written statement of their forwarding address. 2016 WL 7163858, at 

*3. The jury found that the tenants were entitled to a refund of $2,195.00, the full 

amount of their security deposit. Id. The trial court found that the landlord acted in 

bad faith as a matter of law. Id. Applying section 92.109(a), the trial court awarded 

the tenants damages of $100.00, plus three times their actual damages of $2,195.00, 

for a total of $6,685.00, which the court of appeals affirmed. Id.
12

In Hardy v. 11702 Memorial, Ltd., this court held that the “uncontradicted 

evidence that [the] landlord neither returned the deposit nor sent [the] tenant an 

itemized list of deductions within 30 days” after her surrender of the property 

established as a matter of law the landlord’s bad faith in retaining her entire 

$20,250.00 security deposit. 176 S.W.3d 266, 272, 275–76 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). Thus, the tenant was entitled to recover “statutory damages 

under sections 92.109(a) and (b) of the Property Code in the amount of (1) $100, 

plus (2) her entire security deposit of $20,250 multiplied three times for a total of 

$60,750, plus (3) her reasonable attorney’s fees.” Id. at 276.

Appellants do not direct us to any authority supporting their assertion that they 

are entitled to actual damages, i.e., the full amount of their $3,600.00 deposit, plus

treble that amount, $10,800.00, or quadruple their actual damages. Cf. Smith v. 

Kinslow, 598 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ.) (construing 

DTPA as not authorizing recovery of both actual and treble damages). 

We hold that the trial court did not err in calculating appellants’ damages. 

We overrule appellants’ second issue. 

Attorney’s Fees

In their first issue, appellants assert that the trial court erred in not awarding 

them the full amount of their attorney’s fees. 
13

Appellants moved for a summary judgment on their request for attorney’s fees

pursuant to Property Code section 92.109(a), which provides that a “landlord who 

in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable 

for . . . the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit to recover the deposit.” See

TEX. PROP. CODE § 92.109(a). 

Ordinarily, the amount of an award of attorney’s fees rests within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 

Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990). In

determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, courts consider:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal 

service properly;

(2) the likelihood . . . that the acceptance of the particular 

employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 

services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 

circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 

client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 

performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or 

uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been 

rendered.

Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).
14

Fixing the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees is usually a question for the 

fact finder. Hernandez v. Lautensack, 201 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2006, pet. denied). The testimony of an interested witness on attorney’s fees 

generally does no more than raise a fact issue. Id. However, when the “testimony 

of an interested witness is not contradicted by any other witness, or attendant 

circumstances, and the same is clear, direct and positive, and free from contradiction, 

inaccuracies, and circumstances tending to cast suspicion thereon, it is taken as true, 

as a matter of law.” Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882; see also Smith v. Patrick W.Y. 

Tam Trust, 296 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Tex. 2009); Hernandez, 201 S.W.3d at 778. This 

is especially true when the opposing party has the means and opportunity to disprove

the testimony or evidence and fails to do so. Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882; see 

Hernandez, 201 S.W.3d at 778. “[A]n affidavit filed by the movant’s attorney that 

sets forth his qualifications, his opinion regarding reasonable attorney’s fees, and the 

basis for his opinion will be sufficient to support summary judgment, if 

uncontroverted.” Gaughan v. Nat’l Cutting Horse Ass’n, 351 S.W.3d 408, 423 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (internal quotations omitted). 

Here, in support of their motion, appellants attached the affidavit of their 

counsel, Eric F. Dankesreiter, and fee invoices. In his affidavit, as supplemented,

Dankesreiter testified that he has been a licensed, practicing attorney in Texas since 

1996. He has primarily practiced in Denton, Dallas, Collin, and Tarrant Counties. 
15

He testified that members of his firm had “spent approximately 63.29 hours on this 

matter at rates between $200 to $300 per hour.” Their work included 

communications with the client and opposing counsel; drafting pleadings and

responses to discovery; attending hearings and mediation; and preparation for and

attending the trial. Specifically, he spent 19.2 hours at $300 per hour; Debra S. 

Crafton spent 5.85 hours at $275 per hour; Thomas Emmet spent approximately 

32.89 hours at $200 to $230 per hour; and, his paralegals spent approximately 5.27

hours at $100 to $125 per hour. He testified regarding each person’s qualifications

and that their rates were reasonable in Denton County, Texas. He attached fee 

invoices and opined that the fees were reasonable and necessary in order to defend 

and prosecute this matter, based on the Arthur Andersen factors. See 945 S.W.2d at 

818. Dankesreiter testified that appellants incurred reasonable and necessary 

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $16,611.26 through trial.

6

 

Dankesreiter’s testimony is clear, direct, positive, and free from contradiction. 

See Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882. Appellees had the means and opportunity to

disprove the testimony or evidence and did not file controverting evidence. See 

Gaughan, 351 S.W.3d at 423. Thus, appellants established as a matter of law their 

6 Dankesreiter further testified that reasonable and necessary fees included $8,000.00 

in the event of an appeal, $3,000.00 in the event of a petition for review, $8,000.00 

in the event that review was granted and briefing was required, and $5,000.00 for 

representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings. The trial 

court awarded these fees as requested. 
16

reasonable attorney’s fees through trial in the amount of $16,611.26. See TEX. PROP.

CODE § 92.109(a); Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882; Hernandez, 201 S.W.3d at 778–79. 

We hold that the trial court erred in awarding appellants only $5,000.00 in attorney’s 

fees through trial.

We sustain appellants’ first issue.

Conclusion

We modify the portion of the trial court’s judgment in which it awards

appellants “reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees through trial in the amount of 

$5,000.00” to state, “reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees through trial in the 

amount of $16,611.26.” We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.7 

Peter Kelly

Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Lloyd and Kelly.

7 See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Hernandez, 201 S.W.3d at 779.