**NRC INSPECTION MANUAL**NSIR/DPR

INSPECTION MANUAL CHAPTER 1601

COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION PROTOCOL FOR DETERMINING THE STATUS OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 

Effective Date:  July 1, 2018

# 1601-01	PURPOSE

To provide guidance for coordination between the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in determining the adequacy of offsite emergency plans and preparedness in response to a natural disaster or event.  Such natural disasters or events might involve hurricanes, tornados, floods, severe storms, or earthquakes.  The natural disaster or event is projected to occur or has occurred in the vicinity of an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility and is expected to result or has resulted in significant damage to roads, buildings, communications, transportation resources, or other offsite infrastructure that potentially degrades the capabilities of offsite response organizations (OROs) to effectively implement appropriate protective actions for the general public in the facility’s plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone.

# 1601-02	OBJECTIVES

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02.01	Enable coordination and communication between FEMA and the NRC before, during, and after a disaster in assessing the status of offsite emergency preparedness (EP) capabilities as they relate to FEMA’s determination of continued reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency at an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility. 

02.02	Identify respective NRC office and Regional responsibilities and authorities for:              1) coordinating with FEMA in assessing the status of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities; 2) obtaining FEMA’s determination as to continued reasonable assurance, and 3) evaluating the impact of FEMA’s determination on NRC decisions regarding licensee restart activities or continued operation.

# 1601-03	APPLICABILITY

03.01	This manual chapter applies only to an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility that requires formal offsite plans and preparedness in accordance with Section 350 of Title 44 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (44 CFR).  It does not apply to fuel cycle facilities, independent spent fuel storage installations, research and test reactors, decommissioning power reactors, or other NRC-licensed facilities that do not require formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness (REP) plans and preparedness.	

03.02	FEMA will determine the need to perform a formal assessment following a natural disaster or event that FEMA determines has resulted in significant damage to offsite infrastructure and response capabilities in the vicinity of an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility that would potentially preclude the ability to implement an appropriate protective action recommendation to the public.  FEMA may choose to assess the impact on offsite infrastructure and EP capabilities by first performing a Preliminary Capabilities Assessment (PCA), which may be conducted via conference call with impacted State(s) and local jurisdictions, prior to making a decision on whether a more detailed Disaster Initiated Review (DIR) is needed. 

03.03	This procedure is intended to be used in coordination with the following procedures:

· FEMA’s Standard Operating Guide (SOG), entitled “Assessment of Offsite Emergency Preparedness Infrastructure and Capabilities Following an Incident in the Vicinity of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensed-Nuclear Power Plant,” which describes the FEMA processes used to assess the impact on offsite infrastructure and emergency response capabilities. 

Note:	A copy of FEMA’s DIR SOG is available on the FEMA public Web site at: https://www.fema.gov/es/media-library/assets/documents/97530.)

· NRC Incident Response Procedure (IRP) 240, “Natural Phenomena.”

03.04	If FEMA’s initial assessment determines that the natural disaster or event has significantly impacted the vicinity around an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility, FEMA may choose to conduct a PCA in coordination with the applicable NRC Region(s) and the appropriate State and local response organizations.  During the PCA, consideration will be given as to whether predetermined backup means are available or measures have been established that can adequately compensate for the impacted offsite capabilities/functions.  Communications and coordination during the PCA should be maintained at the Regional level between the appropriate FEMA Regional Radiological Assistance Committee (RAC) Chairperson and NRC Regional State Liaison Officer (RSLO). 

03.05	FEMA Headquarters (Director, Technological Hazards Division), in consultation with affected FEMA Regional Office(s), will have the sole responsibility for determining the need to initiate a DIR.  FEMA Headquarters will communicate to NRC Headquarters its decision on the need to conduct a DIR to reaffirm “continued reasonable assurance.”  

Note: 	FEMA’s initiation of a DIR, if warranted, may be delayed based on FEMA’s response in support of State and local recovery activities.  

03.06	Questions regarding electric power grid stability concerns, which may need to be confirmed to support a Commission decision on granting enforcement discretion to allow a reactor to restart or to preclude a shutdown following a severe national disaster       (i.e., hurricane), should be directed to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at        (202) 586-8100 / doehqeoc@oem.doe.gov.  The DOE Watch Office will transfer the call to either the DOE Unified Coordination Group (UCG), which would be stood up to monitor a severe natural disaster, or to the DOE Infrastructure Security & Energy Restoration Division / Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response (ISER/CESER).  The UCG would be the Federal point of contact to interface with the Energy Sector Coordinating Council (industry).

Note: 	Essential Support Function (ESF) #12, “Energy,” is intended to facilitate the restoration of damaged energy systems and components when activated by the Secretary of Homeland Security for incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response.  Under DOE leadership, ESF #12 is an integral part of the larger DOE responsibility of maintaining continuous and reliable energy supplies for the United States through preventive measures and restoration and recovery actions.  The ESF #12 portfolio is within ISER/CESER.

# 1601-04	DEFINITIONS

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04.01	Disaster Initiated Review (DIR) - Process used by FEMA following an natural disaster or event to formally determine the offsite emergency response infrastructure and capabilities to effectively implement approved offsite REP plans by State and local authorities.  A DIR is not intended to be a comprehensive review of offsite plans and preparedness.

04.02	Preliminary Capabilities Assessment (PCA) - Process used by FEMA to obtain a prompt assessment (situational report) of offsite EP immediately following a natural disaster or event to assist in the joint determination by the affected FEMA Region(s) and FEMA Headquarters REP Program on the need and timing for a DIR.

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1601-05	RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES

Specific guidance implementing the responsibilities for the positions listed below is provided in Section 07, “Guidance.”

05.01	Regional State Liaison Officers(s)

a. Serve as the primary NRC liaison at the regional level with the FEMA RAC Chair and REP staff, and impacted State and local officials in the assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities.

05.02	Chief, Reactor Licensing Branch (RLB), Division of Preparedness and Response (DPR), Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR)

a. Interface with RSLO(s) in the affected regions to maintain an awareness of FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities.

b. Coordinate with the Chief, FEMA REP Programs Branch on DIR assessment activities, including the prognosis for restoration of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities or implementation of interim compensatory measures, and on licensee plans for reactor restart.

c. Keep the Director, DPR, NSIR, apprised of the status of FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities, including FEMA’s decision to perform a PCA and/or DIR, and the prognosis regarding the restoration of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities or implementation of interim compensatory measures that may impact a licensee’s decision to restart a reactor(s) or maintain a reactor(s) in a shutdown condition.

d. Periodically apprise the Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Project Manager for the affected site(s) of the status of FEMA’s assessment activities, including the prognosis for restoration of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities or implementation of interim compensatory measures.   

05.03	Director, Division of Preparedness and Response (NSIR/DPR)

a. Interface with the Director, FEMA Technological Hazards Division on issues related to FEMA’s decision to perform a PCA and/or DIR and significant concerns related to the restoration of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities or implementation of interim compensatory measures.

b. As deemed appropriate, apprise senior NRC Headquarters and Regional management of the prognosis regarding the restoration of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities or implementation of interim compensatory measures that may impact a licensee’s decision to restart a reactor(s) or maintain a reactor(s) in a shutdown condition.

c. Keep senior management apprised of the status of FEMA PCA/DIR activities.

05.04	Project Manager for Affected Site, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Division of Operating Reactor Licensing (DORL)

a. Brief NRR division management on FEMA offsite assessment activities based on updates obtained from the Chief, RLB.

b. Inform the Chief, RLB of licensee decision and timing to restart a reactor(s) after a disaster.

05.05	Nuclear Reactor Regulation/Nuclear Security and Incident Response                           Office Directors / Regional Administrator(s)

a. Participate in conference calls to discuss the impacts on reactor restart or continued operation decision-making activities based on FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities for the affected nuclear power reactor site(s).

b. As deemed appropriate, apprise the Office of the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and Commission of licensee restart or continued operation decisions that may be impacted by FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities.

c. If deemed appropriate, engage licensee senior management on significant issues with offsite infrastructure and response capabilities that may (or should) impact a licensee’s decision to restart or continue reactor operations during or after a disaster.  

# 1601-06	REQUIREMENTS

06.01 	The “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Homeland Security / Federal Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regarding Radiological Response, Planning and Preparedness” (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15344A371), defines the respective agencies’ responsibilities:

a. The NRC has overall responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of emergency plans and preparedness for NRC-licensed nuclear power reactors.  The NRC will base its reasonable assurance finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented. 

b. FEMA has the lead in assessing the adequacy of offsite plans and preparedness and to certify that the State and local government emergency plans can and will be implemented in a manner to ensure public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency at an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor.  

06.02	A FEMA finding of the failure to maintain continued reasonable assurance will imply the inability to implement one or more planning standards, as outlined in 44 CFR Part 350 and 10 CFR 50.47(b) required to ensure the implementation of appropriate protective measures for the general public if needed.  When a planning standard may only be degraded, but the capability not fully lost, and/or where identified back-up methods or other measures have been or can be implemented in a timely manner to effectively compensate, the planning standard should generally not be considered lost.  

	Continued reasonable assurance is presumed to remain until the NRC receives specific information that the licensee or OROs have lost the ability to implement one or more of the planning standards required to ensure the implementation of appropriate protective measures for the general public if needed.

06.03	In general, the degraded condition of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities does not solely dictate the need for immediate action by the licensee.  

1. A licensee is not required under 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) to immediately shut down due to degraded offsite emergency response infrastructure or response capabilities,[footnoteRef:2] as long as the reactor continues to operate within its Technical Specification safety limits.[footnoteRef:3]  [2:  10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii) provides for a four-month (120 day) period for correction of deficiencies in offsite emergency preparedness.  If the deficiencies are not corrected within 120 days of a Commission finding of deficiency, the NRC is required to determine whether the plant should be shut down or whether enforcement action is appropriate.  In making that determination, the Commission may consider various factors, including “other compelling reasons for continued operation.”]  [3:  Per 10 CFR 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A), ”Safety Limits” for nuclear reactors are limits upon important process variables that are found to be necessary to reasonably protect the integrity of certain physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity.] 

1. When an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor has voluntarily and properly shut down in compliance with NRC regulations, there is no requirement for the licensee to obtain any specific authorization to restart, unless a Technical Specification safety limit has been exceeded.  If a licensee wishes to restart, but the act of restarting would create a      non-compliance with NRC requirements or the terms of the operating license, then the licensee may not restart without prior Commission approval.

1. For a natural disaster or event where one unit at a multi-unit site has shut down, but the second unit remains at power, the shutdown unit could restart if it is within its Technical Specification safety limits.  If the licensee was in noncompliance with an offsite EP requirement, but the licensee for the shutdown unit chose to restart its unit, the licensee would be in the same regulatory position under 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii), as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.  The NRC staff would then have to justify that the deficiencies in offsite EP will cause an immediate public health and safety concern to support consideration by the Commission of an order to shut down, or prevent the restart of the unit(s).[footnoteRef:4] [4:  With respect to the grace period allowed under 10 CFR 50.54(s)(2)(ii), in 52 FR 42078; November 3, 1987, for the Final Rule, entitled “Evaluation of the Adequacy of Off-Site Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants at the Operating License Review Stage Where State and/or Local Governments Decline to participate in Off-Site Emergency planning,” the Commission stated that “...a plant may ordinarily operate for at least four months with deficiencies in emergency planning before the NRC is required even to decide whether remedial action is taken...[thus] the 120 day clock provision for emergency planning deficiencies amounts to a Commission finding that, at least for 120 days, even a major deficiency in emergency planning does not automatically raise a ‘substantial health or safety issue’ with regard to plant operation.  By contrast, a major deficiency related to emergency conditions – for example, the availability of emergency core cooling system – would warrant immediate shutdown.”] 

1. If a licensee foresees that compliance with its Technical Specifications could require an unexpected reactor shutdown during severe weather or other natural phenomenon that could exacerbate already degraded electrical grid conditions and could have an adverse impact on the overall health and safety of the public, the NRC may issue, per the NRC’s Enforcement Policy and Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0410, “Notices of Enforcement Discretion,” a Notice of Enforcement Discretion under specified conditions to permit continued reactor operation.

Note:	Refer to Section 03.06, regarding electric power grid stability concerns.

1. None of the above situations precludes the Commission from taking action in accordance with its authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to immediately order a reactor shutdown or prevent a restart if conditions cause immediate radiological health and safety concerns.

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# 1. In general, decision making by licensees and the NRC in these matters should be governed by common sense and conservative judgment with public health and safety as the overriding consideration.

# 1601-07	GUIDANCE

07.01	Regional State Liaison Officers (RSLOs)  

a. For a natural disaster potentially affecting an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility, where there will be an advance notice (e.g., hurricane), contact the affected FEMA RAC Chair 96-72 hours prior to expected arrival of the event in the vicinity of the facility to coordinate the following:

1. Participate in pre-planning meetings or conference calls with the FEMA Region and affected State and local response organizations to discuss post-event disaster review coordination and identification of potential compensatory measures.

Note: 	Information from the respective site’s Regional Response Center about potential Emergency Action Level (EAL) thresholds and down power/shutdown guidance can be used to inform FEMA Region and State/local officials on applicable emergency plan classification thresholds and down-power/shutdown guidelines.  

2. Consider co-locating NRC personnel with FEMA Regional staff prior to the event at State and/or local emergency operations centers expected to be impacted.

b. Support NRC Headquarters and Regional Incident Response activities as designated in IRP-240, including keeping the Chief, Reactor Licensing Branch (NSIR/DPR/RLB) apprised of planned coordination efforts with the respective FEMA RAC Chair.

c. Contact the respective FEMA RAC Chair(s) to obtain an immediate post-event assessment (situational report) of the event’s impact on offsite infrastructure and response capabilities for the affected nuclear power reactor site(s), based on FEMA’s initial review/discussions with State and local officials.  This should include the following information as it becomes available:

· Overview of the known damage to offsite infrastructure and response capabilities that could potentially preclude the ability to implement an appropriate protective action recommendation to the public, if needed. 

· Prognosis (based on known information) for restoration of capabilities or implementation of appropriate interim compensatory measures.

· Whether FEMA has determined, at that point, the need for further offsite assessment.

Note: 	This immediate post-event assessment is distinct from a PCA.  This immediate assessment would precede a PCA by a time period that is a function of a number of factors, including limited access to State and local emergency response staff, availability of FEMA Regional staff to be dispatched to affected areas, etc.  However, coordination and updates will be attempted by FEMA to the extent the information is available from appropriate stakeholders.  

d. Prior to FEMA determining the need for a PCA or DIR, serve as the NRC’s primary point of contact for communication and coordination with FEMA via the RAC Chair(s) on the status of offsite EP capabilities, which includes:

1. Determine the frequency established by the FEMA RAC Chair for periodic status calls with affected State(s), local counties/parishes and Tribal Nations (as applicable).

2. Advise NRC Headquarters (NSIR/DPR), via the RLB Chief, and Regional management of the results from FEMA Region(s) immediate post-event assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities, and proposed schedule for periodic FEMA status calls with affected State(s), local counties/parishes and Tribal Nations.

3. Promptly inform the RLB Chief of FEMA’s decision regarding whether or not to perform a PCA and its timing.

Note: 	As a goal, a PCA should occur 24-48 hours post-event to determine the status of offsite reasonable assurance and the need to perform a DIR.

e. If FEMA determines the need to perform a PCA, but prior to FEMA determining the need for a DIR, continue to serve as the NRC’s primary point of contact for communication and coordination with FEMA via the RAC Chair(s) on the status of offsite EP capabilities, which includes:

1. Keep NRC Headquarters, via the RLB Chief, Regional management and (if activated) the Regional Base Team periodically apprised of the status of FEMA’s assessment activities. 

2. Maintain frequent contact with respective FEMA RAC Chair, or designated FEMA regional point of contact as appropriate, to support FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities, and provide status to FEMA of licensee’s proposed plans for continued operation or reactor restart activities, and any other licensee-related input that may have a bearing on FEMA’s determination as to whether a DIR is warranted.  

3. Promptly advise the RLB Chief and Regional management of FEMA’s PCA results and any recommendation to FEMA Headquarters by the cognizant FEMA Region on whether or not to conduct a DIR.

f. When notified by the RLB Chief, or FEMA RAC Chair, of FEMA’s decision to initiate a DIR, perform these steps:

Note: 	The decision to initiate a DIR will be made by the FEMA Director, Technological Hazards Division (THD), at the recommendation of the FEMA RAC Chair, and should include a verbal and written notification to the NRC Director, Division of Preparedness and Response (NSIR/DPR).

1. Participate in the FEMA-led DIR discussions and periodic FEMA status calls with affected State(s), local counties/parishes and Tribal Nations.  

2. Determine, through communication with State and local counterparts, the status of roadway access to and from the reactor site and provide this information to Regional Management and RLB Chief.

g. Obtain from the Region’s Division of Reactor Projects and Reactor Safety or Regional Base Team (if activated) information regarding important developments in the onsite recovery, and restart timeline if reactor(s) have been shut down, to support the      FEMA-led DIR.  This information should include the general condition of the licensee’s facility and EP capabilities that may impact offsite response capabilities, with a particular focus on the status of the following:

· Means of communication between the licensee and the offsite authorities; 

· Status of licensee’s offsite emergency response facilities;

· Status of licensee’s offsite radiological monitoring capabilities;

· Availability of site meteorological parameters required for dose assessment, and

· Status of emergency sirens, if maintained by the licensee.

h. Continue to provide periodic updates to the RLB Chief, Regional management, and the Regional Base Team (if activated), on activities associated with FEMA’s review of offsite EP capabilities and infrastructure.

i. Participate in periodic conference calls in support of NRC Headquarters and Regional Incident Response activities per IRP-240.

j. Provide, as appropriate, initial status update information, periodic updates, and final status update on NRC response and licensee restoration and start-up activities to the respective State counterpart(s). 

k. Assist the NRC Regional Office of Public Affairs (OPA), if requested, with establishing OPA communications with respective State Public Information Officer counterparts.

l. Once informed by the RLB Chief of the FEMA Headquarters’ DIR results, provide this information to senior Regional management.  

07.02	Chief, Reactor Licensing Branch (RLB), Division of Preparedness and Response (DPR), Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR)

a. When notified by the Headquarters Monitoring Team Leader / Manager On-Call of the potential for an event having significant impact on the area surrounding an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility, remain available to respond to the Headquarters Operations Center if activated.

Note: 	For a natural phenomenon per IRP-240, this notification should occur 96-72 hours prior to expected arrival of the event in the vicinity of an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility.

b. Assess the need for and, as appropriate, conduct just-in-time training for NSIR staff and management, RSLOs in affected region(s), and NRR project managers responsible for facilities most likely to be impacted.

c. Establish and maintain periodic communication with the RSLO(s) in affected Region(s) to become apprised of coordination with FEMA Region on pre-event preparations and coordination plans, and subsequent post-event efforts to assess the impact on offsite infrastructure and response capabilities for affected nuclear power reactor site(s).

d. Establish and maintain periodic communication with the FEMA Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Programs Branch on respective agency pre- and post-event response activities.

Note:	Coordination of inter-agency pre-and post-event response activities remains at the Regional level prior to a FEMA determination that a DIR is warranted.

1. Depending on the expected severity of event on an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility(ies), discuss requesting that FEMA designated a liaison to report to the NRC Operations Center if activated.

2. Discuss any issues in regional communication and/or coordination between FEMA and NRC, as identified by the RSLO, with the FEMA Chief, REP Program Branch.

e. Based on discussions with RSLO(s) and FEMA, brief the Director, NSIR/DPR on the following:

· RSLO’s pre-event preparations and coordination plans with the respective FEMA Region, and

· Results of immediate and subsequent periodic post-event assessments by FEMA Region(s) with affected State/local officials on offsite infrastructure and response capabilities.

f. When informed by FEMA Chief, REP Programs Branch, of the FEMA Region(s) intent to conduct a PCA, perform the following:

1. Contact the respective RSLO(s) to obtain an update on the status of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities, and licensee’s proposed plans for continued operation or reactor restart activities, and brief NSIR/DPR Director and respective NRR Project Manager on status.

2. Attend/participate in conference calls established in accordance with IRP-240 for natural phenomena affecting a nuclear power reactor facility.

3. Respond to any requests for information and obtain periodic status reports on FEMA activities from the FEMA Chief, REP Program Branch, to ensure alignment at headquarters level between agencies.  However, communications and coordination between FEMA and NRC regarding the conduct of a PCA will be handled at the Regional level through the respective FEMA RAC Chair(s) and RSLO(s).

g. Once the NSIR/DPR Director is notified by FEMA Director, Technological Hazards Division of the outcome of a PCA and/or intent to perform a DIR, perform the following steps: 

1. Ensure FEMA’s findings on the PCA, if performed, and decision whether or not to initiate a DIR, as well as other relevant correspondence between agencies, are entered in ADAMS as publicly available.

· Provide a copy of FEMA’s PCA findings to the NRR Project Manager for the affected site(s). 

2. Act as the point of contact with the FEMA Chief, REP Programs Branch, regarding the periodic status of the DIR activities, including a schedule for the conduct of the DIR.

3. Provide information to FEMA on continued reactor operations or restart activities and obtain from FEMA Chief, REP Programs Branch, periodic verbal status reports to include, per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), interim written reports of its findings, as appropriate, and the bulleted items below.

· What offsite EP capabilities and/or infrastructure are impacted and specific deficiencies have been identified;

· Whether identified deficiencies prevent or significantly degrade the effective and timely implementation of a protective action decision; and

· Expected timeframe for completing restoration activities or implementation of compensatory measures.

4. Participate in periodic status calls conducted in accordance with IRP-240 and, as requested, with State(s) and local response organizations in support of FEMA.

h. Per the MOU, notify FEMA Headquarters, in writing, of the schedule for restart of an affected reactor, if applicable, and provide updates on any changes to that schedule.

Note: 	Communications of reactor restart activities may be provided verbally to FEMA Headquarters initially, but per MOU, should be provided in writing via email as soon as practicable.

i. Ensure that the designated NRR Project Manager for the affected licensee, NSIR/DPR Director, and applicable RSLO(s) are informed of any new developments regarding FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities, decision to perform a DIR, and expectations for issuance of FEMA’s findings.

Note: 	FEMA Headquarters may initially provide DIR results, either verbally (call through Headquarters Operations Officer) or via e-mail or fax, prior to the issuance of a formal written statement of findings per the MOU.  If FEMA’s PCA/DIR will not be complete in time to verify continued reasonable assurance to inform a licensee's proposed restart schedule, or if the nuclear power reactor is operating and FEMA determines that continued reasonable assurance cannot be verified for an extended period, then discuss the status of offsite emergency preparedness with the NSIR/DPR Director to determine an appropriate course of action. 

j. At the NSIR/DPR Director’s request, set-up a conference call, in coordination with the Headquarters Operations Officer, with the senior NSIR and NRR management, and Regional management, and as deemed appropriate, the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs (DEDR) and representatives from OPA and the Offices of the General Counsel (OGC) and Congressional Affairs (OCA), to keep them aware of significant DIR activities and impact on NRC decisions related to licensee restart or continued operation.

k. Periodically apprise the FEMA Headquarters Chief, REP Programs Branch, of NRC discussions regarding plant restart, and inform FEMA in writing (via email) of any changes in a reactor’s restart schedule.

l. Ensure that documentation of FEMA decisions to initiate a DIR and FEMA’s final DIR Report are entered into ADAMS as publicly available, and provide a copy of FEMA’s findings to the NRR Project Manager for the affected site(s). 

07.03	Director, Division of Preparedness and Response (NSIR/DPR)

a. Obtain briefings from the RLB Chief on FEMA’s immediate post-event assessment (situational report) of offsite EP capabilities, as well as FEMA’s decision and proposed timeline for conducting a PCA, based on updates received from the respective RSLO and FEMA Chief, REP Programs Branch.  Information provided should include the following:

· What offsite EP capabilities and/or infrastructure are impacted and specific deficiencies have been identified;

· Whether identified deficiencies prevent or significantly degrade the effective and timely implementation of a protective action decision, and

· Expected timeframe for completing restoration activities or implementation of compensatory measures.

b. While communications and coordination between FEMA and NRC regarding the conduct of a PCA will be handled at the Regional level through the respective FEMA RAC Chair(s) and RSLO(s), ensure that effective and timely communications and coordination is occurring based on periodic discussions with the RLB Chief.

c. As deemed appropriate, communicate directly with the FEMA THD Director to understand conditions for affected communities surrounding an NRC-licensed nuclear power reactor facility and the status of FEMA event response activities.

d. Update and periodically apprise NSIR Office Management, as deemed appropriate, of status of FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities for an affected nuclear power reactor site(s), including deficiencies identified and prognosis for restoration or implementation of compensatory measures.

e. If informed by the RLB Chief that FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities will not be complete in time to verify continued reasonable assurance to inform a licensee's proposed restart schedule, or if the nuclear power reactor is operating and FEMA determines that continued reasonable assurance cannot be verified for an extended period, then perform the following:

Note: 	FEMA’s results of a PCA and decision on whether or not to perform a DIR will be communicated via email or fax using standard text examples provided in FEMA’s DIR SOG.  However, FEMA’s decision may be communicated verbally (via Headquarters Operations Officer recorded line) if the need exists to promptly communicate FEMA’s determination to inform a potential reactor restart, and then followed up by documentation via email or fax.  A final DIR report will be subsequently provided by FEMA formally documenting the results of the DIR in regards to continued reasonable assurance.  

1. Communicate with the FEMA THD Director to discuss reactor restart or operating status for impacted site(s) and obtain a better understanding of:  (1) issues delaying FEMA’s evaluation; (2) identified or expected deficiencies and impact on the implementation of appropriate offsite protective measures if required, and (3) expected timeframe for completing restoration activities or implementation of compensatory measures.  

2. Ensure NSIR Office Management is kept apprised of:  (1) FEMA’s assessment activities and decisions, including significant deficiencies identified in offsite infrastructure and response capabilities and status of restoration/compensatory measures for the affected nuclear power reactor site(s); (2) potential impact on decision-making regarding reactor restart or continued operation at affected reactor site(s); (3) electrical power grid issues, and (4) emergency event classification and status of licensee’s emergency response capabilities.

3. Based on discussions with NSIR Office Management, if the combination of onsite and offsite post-event conditions may be considered an immediate risk to public health and safety, or of sufficient concern to make continued or renewed reactor operations inadvisable, then request that the RLB Chief coordinate with the Headquarters Operations Officers to set-up a conference call in order to facilitate timely communication with senior NSIR, NRR, and Regional management and, as deemed appropriate, the DEDR and representatives from OGC, OPA, and OCA.  

Note:	The purpose of this call is to keep these key managers and staff aware of FEMA offsite assessment activities and findings, and impact on NRC decisions related to licensee restart or continued operation, to formulate a recommended course of action by the NRC and to determine appropriate follow-up actions to be communicated to the licensee and FEMA.

d. Provide documentation received from the FEMA THD Director regarding PCA outcome, decision to perform a DIR, periodic status reports, and DIR finding of reasonable assurance to the Chief, RLB for entry into ADAMS. 

07.04	NRR Project Managers for the Affected Site(s)

a. Inform NRR management of any decision by FEMA to perform a PCA or DIR, and proposed schedule for completion, based on periodic updates provided by the Chief, RLB (NSIR/DPR).

b. Keep the Chief, RLB (NSIR/DPR) informed of any new developments regarding proposed reactor restart schedules and activities.			

07.05	Senior NRR/NSIR Management (Office Director) / Regional Administrator

a. Participate in a conference call to:  (1) discuss impacts on reactor restart or continued operation decision-making activities based on FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities for the affected nuclear power reactor site(s), including deficiencies identified that may impact the implementation of appropriate offsite protective measures if required, and the status of restoration/compensatory measures; (2) formulate a recommended course of action, and (3) determine appropriate follow-up actions with the licensee and FEMA, as appropriate.

1. Ensure that OGC, OPA, and OCA are involved in NRC reactor restart or continued operation decisions where FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities indicates continued reasonable assurance is challenged, or when FEMA’s assessment verifying continued reasonable assurance cannot be completed in time to inform a licensee’s restart schedule.

2. As deemed appropriate, keep the EDO and Commission apprised of restart or continued operation decisions involving FEMA’s assessment of offsite infrastructure and response capabilities, including consideration of a recommendation to the Commission regarding issuing an Order to the licensee preventing reactor restart or directing the shutdown of an operating reactor if the staff believes that an immediate risk to public health and safety exists due to onsite and offsite conditions.

b. If deemed appropriate, discuss with license senior management the NRC’s view that the licensee should maintain the reactor in a shutdown condition to allow sufficient time for FEMA to complete an initial assessment of offsite EP capabilities, or to consider a shutdown or delay restart of the reactor(s) at the affected site(s) if FEMA’s interim findings determine that there is a significant degradation in offsite infrastructure and response capabilities that would adversely impact the ability to implement appropriate offsite protective measures, if required, and appropriate compensatory measures or restoration efforts cannot be implemented within a reasonable period.

Note: 	The Regional Administrator shall be the primary point of contact with senior licensee management regarding reactor operating decisions, unless designated otherwise.

07.06   Regional Branch Chief for the Affected Sites

a. Keep the RSLO and Resident Inspector informed of any new developments regarding the proposed reactor restart schedules and activities.

b. Keep the Chief, RLB (NSIR/DPR) informed of any new developments regarding proposed reactor restart schedules and activities.		

# 1601-08	REFERENCES

“Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Homeland Security / Federal Emergency Management Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regarding Radiological Emergency Response, Planning and Preparedness,” dated December 7, 2015; (ADAMS Accession No. ML15344A371)

FEMA Standard Operating Guide (SOG) “Assessment of Offsite Emergency Preparedness Infrastructure and Capabilities Following an Incident in the Vicinity of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensed-Nuclear Power Plant.”

NRC IRP 240, “Natural Phenomena.”	

END

Attachment 1 – Revision History for IMC 1601	

Issue Date:  06/29/18	1	1601

Issue Date:  06/29/18	14		1601

# ATTACHMENT 1 – REVISION HISTORY FOR IMC 1601

Issue Date: XX/XX/XX	Att 1-1	1601

1601, Appendix A	A-3			        Issue Date: 07/07/05

Issue Date:  06/29/18	Att 1-1	1601

Issue Date:  06/29/18	Att 1-2	1601