# Publicatieblad C 245/2011

| | ISSN 1725-2474
  doi:10.3000/17252474.C_2011.245.nld |
| --- | --- |
| Publicatieblad
  van de Europese Unie | C 245 |
| | |
| Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal | Mededelingen en bekendmakingen | 54e jaargang24 augustus 2011 |

ISSN 1725-2474

doi:10.3000/17252474.C_2011.245.nld

Publicatieblad

van de Europese Unie

C 245

Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal

Mededelingen en bekendmakingen

54e jaargang24 augustus 2011

---

| Nummer | Inhoud | Bladzijde |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Mededelingen |
| | MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2011/C 245/01 | Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Nummer

Inhoud

Bladzijde

II   Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

2011/C 245/01

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informatie |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Raad |
| 2011/C 245/02 | Kennisgeving ter attentie van de personen op wie en entiteiten waarop de beperkende maatregelen in Besluit 2011/273/GBVB van de Raad als uitgevoerd bij Uitvoeringsbesluit 2011/515/GBVB van de Raad en in Verordening (EU) nr. 442/2011 van de Raad als uitgevoerd bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 843/2011 van de Raad betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen Syrië van toepassing zijn | 2 |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2011/C 245/03 | Wisselkoersen van de euro | 3 |
| | INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN |
| 2011/C 245/04 | Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij | 4 |
| 2011/C 245/05 | Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij | 5 |
| 2011/C 245/06 | Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij | 6 |
| 2011/C 245/07 | Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij | 7 |

IV   Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Raad

2011/C 245/02

Kennisgeving ter attentie van de personen op wie en entiteiten waarop de beperkende maatregelen in Besluit 2011/273/GBVB van de Raad als uitgevoerd bij Uitvoeringsbesluit 2011/515/GBVB van de Raad en in Verordening (EU) nr. 442/2011 van de Raad als uitgevoerd bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 843/2011 van de Raad betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen Syrië van toepassing zijn

2

Europese Commissie

2011/C 245/03

Wisselkoersen van de euro

3

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN

2011/C 245/04

Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij

4

2011/C 245/05

Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij

5

2011/C 245/06

Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij

6

2011/C 245/07

Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij

7

| | V   Adviezen |
| --- | --- |
| | BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2011/C 245/08 | Oproepen tot het indienen van voorstellen — ESPON 2013-programma | 8 |
| | PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2011/C 245/09 | Steunmaatregelen van de staten — Verenigd Koninkrijk — Steunmaatregel SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Vrijstelling van de aggregaatheffing in Noord-Ierland (ex N 2/04) — Uitnodiging, overeenkomstig artikel 108, lid 2, VWEU, om opmerkingen te maken (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2011/C 245/10 | Steunmaatregelen van de staten — Duitsland (De artikelen 107 en 109 van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie) — Steunmaatregel MC 15/09 — LBBW-afstoting Deka (
  1
  ) | 21 |

V   Adviezen

BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES

Europese Commissie

2011/C 245/08

Oproepen tot het indienen van voorstellen — ESPON 2013-programma

8

PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Europese Commissie

2011/C 245/09

Steunmaatregelen van de staten — Verenigd Koninkrijk — Steunmaatregel SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Vrijstelling van de aggregaatheffing in Noord-Ierland (ex N 2/04) — Uitnodiging, overeenkomstig artikel 108, lid 2, VWEU, om opmerkingen te maken (
  1
  )

1

10

2011/C 245/10

Steunmaatregelen van de staten — Duitsland (De artikelen 107 en 109 van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie) — Steunmaatregel MC 15/09 — LBBW-afstoting Deka (
  1
  )

1

21

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst |

---

(1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst

1

| NL | |
| --- | --- |

NL

---

II Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/1

---

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie

(Zaak COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent)

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

2011/C 245/01

Op 9 augustus 2011 heeft de Commissie besloten zich niet te verzetten tegen bovenvermelde aangemelde concentratie en deze verenigbaar met de gemeenschappelijke markt te verklaren. Deze beschikking is gebaseerd op artikel 6, lid 1, onder b), van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad. De volledige tekst van de beschikking is slechts beschikbaar in het Engels en zal openbaar worden gemaakt na verwijdering van eventuele bedrijfsgeheimen. De tekst is beschikbaar:

| — | op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebeschikkingen op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector, |
| --- | --- |

—

op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebeschikkingen op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector,

| — | in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) onder documentnummer 32011M6298. EUR-Lex biedt online-toegang tot de communautaire wetgeving. |
| --- | --- |

—

in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) onder documentnummer 32011M6298. EUR-Lex biedt online-toegang tot de communautaire wetgeving.

---

IV Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Raad

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/2

---

Kennisgeving ter attentie van de personen op wie en entiteiten waarop de beperkende maatregelen in Besluit 2011/273/GBVB van de Raad als uitgevoerd bij Uitvoeringsbesluit 2011/515/GBVB van de Raad en in Verordening (EU) nr. 442/2011 van de Raad als uitgevoerd bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 843/2011 van de Raad betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen Syrië van toepassing zijn

2011/C 245/02

RAAD VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

De volgende informatie wordt ter kennis gebracht van de personen en entiteiten die genoemd worden in de bijlage bij Besluit 2011/273/GBVB van de Raad, als uitgevoerd bij Uitvoeringsbesluit 2011/515/GBVB (1) van de Raad en in bijlage II bij Verordening (EU) nr. 442/2011 van de Raad, als uitgevoerd bij Uitvoeringsverordening (EU) nr. 843/2011 (2) van de Raad betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen Syrië.

De Raad van de Europese Unie heeft besloten dat de personen en entiteiten die in de bovengenoemde bijlagen voorkomen, moeten worden opgenomen in de lijsten van personen en entiteiten die onderworpen zijn aan de beperkende maatregelen als voorzien in Besluit 2011/273/GBVB en in Verordening (EU) nr. 442/2011 betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen Syrië. De redenen voor de aanwijzing van de betrokken personen en entiteiten staan in de desbetreffende vermeldingen in de bijlagen.

De betrokken personen en entiteiten worden erop geattendeerd dat zij een verzoek kunnen richten tot de bevoegde instanties van de betrokken lidstaat (lidstaten), als vermeld op de websites in bijlage III bij Verordening (EU) nr. 442/2011, om een machtiging te verkrijgen voor het gebruik van bevroren tegoeden voor basisbehoeften of specifieke betalingen (zie artikel 6 van de verordening).

De betrokken personen en entiteiten kunnen, onder overlegging van bewijsstukken, op onderstaand adres een verzoek aan de Raad indienen om het besluit om hen op bovengenoemde lijst te plaatsen, te heroverwegen:

| Raad van de Europese Unie |
| --- |
| Secretariaat-generaal |
| DG K Coördinatie |
| Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Brussel |
| BELGIË |

Raad van de Europese Unie

Secretariaat-generaal

DG K Coördinatie

Wetstraat 175

1048 Brussel

BELGIË

Tevens wordt de betrokken personen en entiteiten erop geattendeerd dat zij tegen het besluit van de Raad beroep kunnen instellen bij het Gerecht van de Europese Unie, overeenkomstig de voorwaarden die zijn neergelegd in artikel 275, tweede alinea, en in artikel 263, vierde en zesde alinea, van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie.

---

(1)  PB L 218 van 24.8.2011.

(2)  PB L 218 van 24.8.2011, blz. 1.

---

Europese Commissie

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/3

---

Wisselkoersen van de euro (1)

23 augustus 2011

2011/C 245/03

1 euro =

| | Munteenheid | Koers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-dollar | 1,4462 |
| JPY | Japanse yen | 110,72 |
| DKK | Deense kroon | 7,4498 |
| GBP | Pond sterling | 0,87600 |
| SEK | Zweedse kroon | 9,1046 |
| CHF | Zwitserse frank | 1,1410 |
| ISK | IJslandse kroon | |
| NOK | Noorse kroon | 7,8080 |
| BGN | Bulgaarse lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tsjechische koruna | 24,417 |
| HUF | Hongaarse forint | 271,78 |
| LTL | Litouwse litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Letlandse lat | 0,7095 |
| PLN | Poolse zloty | 4,1499 |
| RON | Roemeense leu | 4,2574 |
| TRY | Turkse lira | 2,5783 |
| AUD | Australische dollar | 1,3771 |
| CAD | Canadese dollar | 1,4260 |
| HKD | Hongkongse dollar | 11,2766 |
| NZD | Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar | 1,7360 |
| SGD | Singaporese dollar | 1,7414 |
| KRW | Zuid-Koreaanse won | 1 558,38 |
| ZAR | Zuid-Afrikaanse rand | 10,3816 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 9,2513 |
| HRK | Kroatische kuna | 7,4740 |
| IDR | Indonesische roepia | 12 355,53 |
| MYR | Maleisische ringgit | 4,2894 |
| PHP | Filipijnse peso | 61,206 |
| RUB | Russische roebel | 41,8255 |
| THB | Thaise baht | 43,140 |
| BRL | Braziliaanse real | 2,3111 |
| MXN | Mexicaanse peso | 17,7768 |
| INR | Indiase roepie | 65,9830 |

Munteenheid

Koers

USD

US-dollar

1,4462

JPY

Japanse yen

110,72

DKK

Deense kroon

7,4498

GBP

Pond sterling

0,87600

SEK

Zweedse kroon

9,1046

CHF

Zwitserse frank

1,1410

ISK

IJslandse kroon

NOK

Noorse kroon

7,8080

BGN

Bulgaarse lev

1,9558

CZK

Tsjechische koruna

24,417

HUF

Hongaarse forint

271,78

LTL

Litouwse litas

3,4528

LVL

Letlandse lat

0,7095

PLN

Poolse zloty

4,1499

RON

Roemeense leu

4,2574

TRY

Turkse lira

2,5783

AUD

Australische dollar

1,3771

CAD

Canadese dollar

1,4260

HKD

Hongkongse dollar

11,2766

NZD

Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar

1,7360

SGD

Singaporese dollar

1,7414

KRW

Zuid-Koreaanse won

1 558,38

ZAR

Zuid-Afrikaanse rand

10,3816

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

9,2513

HRK

Kroatische kuna

7,4740

IDR

Indonesische roepia

12 355,53

MYR

Maleisische ringgit

4,2894

PHP

Filipijnse peso

61,206

RUB

Russische roebel

41,8255

THB

Thaise baht

43,140

BRL

Braziliaanse real

2,3111

MXN

Mexicaanse peso

17,7768

INR

Indiase roepie

65,9830

---

(1)  Bron: door de Europese Centrale Bank gepubliceerde referentiekoers.

---

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/4

---

Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij

2011/C 245/04

Krachtens artikel 35, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1224/2009 van de Raad van 20 november 2009 tot vaststelling van een communautaire controleregeling die de naleving van de regels van het gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid moet garanderen (1) is besloten de visserij te sluiten overeenkomstig de bepalingen in de onderstaande tabel:

| Dag en uur van sluiting | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Duur | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Lidstaat | Nederland |
| Bestand of groep van bestanden | HKE/571214 |
| Soort | Heek (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Gebied | VI en VII; EU-wateren en internationale wateren van Vb; internationale wateren van XII en XIV |
| Vissersvaartuigtype(s) | — |
| Referentienummer | — |

Dag en uur van sluiting

18.7.2011

Duur

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

Lidstaat

Nederland

Bestand of groep van bestanden

HKE/571214

Soort

Heek (Merluccius merluccius)

Gebied

VI en VII; EU-wateren en internationale wateren van Vb; internationale wateren van XII en XIV

Vissersvaartuigtype(s)

—

Referentienummer

—

Weblink naar het besluit van de lidstaat:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_nl.htm

---

(1)  PB L 343 van 22.12.2009, blz. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/5

---

Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij

2011/C 245/05

Krachtens artikel 35, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1224/2009 van de Raad van 20 november 2009 tot vaststelling van een communautaire controleregeling die de naleving van de regels van het gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid moet garanderen (1) is besloten de visserij te sluiten overeenkomstig de bepalingen in de onderstaande tabel:

| Dag en uur van sluiting | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Duur | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Lidstaat | Nederland |
| Bestand of groep van bestanden | HKE/2AC4-C |
| Soort | Heek (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Gebied | EU-wateren van IIa en IV |
| Vissersvaartuigtype(s) | — |
| Referentienummer | — |

Dag en uur van sluiting

18.7.2011

Duur

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

Lidstaat

Nederland

Bestand of groep van bestanden

HKE/2AC4-C

Soort

Heek (Merluccius merluccius)

Gebied

EU-wateren van IIa en IV

Vissersvaartuigtype(s)

—

Referentienummer

—

Weblink naar het besluit van de lidstaat:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_nl.htm

---

(1)  PB L 343 van 22.12.2009, blz. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/6

---

Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij

2011/C 245/06

Krachtens artikel 35, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1224/2009 van de Raad van 20 november 2009 tot vaststelling van een communautaire controleregeling die de naleving van de regels van het gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid moet garanderen (1) is besloten de visserij te sluiten overeenkomstig de bepalingen in de onderstaande tabel:

| Dag en uur van sluiting | 9.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Duur | 9.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Lidstaat | Frankrijk |
| Bestand of groep van bestanden | COD/5BE6A |
| Soort | Kabeljauw (Gadus morhua) |
| Gebied | VIa; EU-wateren en internationale wateren van Vb ten oosten van 12° 00′ WL |
| Vissersvaartuigtype(s) | — |
| Referentienummer | 792761 |

Dag en uur van sluiting

9.7.2011

Duur

9.7.2011-31.12.2011

Lidstaat

Frankrijk

Bestand of groep van bestanden

COD/5BE6A

Soort

Kabeljauw (Gadus morhua)

Gebied

VIa; EU-wateren en internationale wateren van Vb ten oosten van 12° 00′ WL

Vissersvaartuigtype(s)

—

Referentienummer

792761

Weblink naar het besluit van de lidstaat:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_nl.htm

---

(1)  PB L 343 van 22.12.2009, blz. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/7

---

Door de lidstaten meegedeelde informatie betreffende sluiting van de visserij

2011/C 245/07

Krachtens artikel 35, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1224/2009 van de Raad van 20 november 2009 tot vaststelling van een communautaire controleregeling die de naleving van de regels van het gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid moet garanderen (1) is besloten de visserij te sluiten overeenkomstig de bepalingen in de onderstaande tabel:

| Dag en uur van sluiting | 2.8.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Duur | 2.8.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Lidstaat | Portugal |
| Bestand of groep van bestanden | WHB/8C3411 |
| Soort | Blauwe wijting (Micromesistius poutassou) |
| Gebied | VIIIc, IX en X; EU-wateren van CECAF 34.1.1 |
| Vissersvaartuigtype(s) | — |
| Referentienummer | — |

Dag en uur van sluiting

2.8.2011

Duur

2.8.2011-31.12.2011

Lidstaat

Portugal

Bestand of groep van bestanden

WHB/8C3411

Soort

Blauwe wijting (Micromesistius poutassou)

Gebied

VIIIc, IX en X; EU-wateren van CECAF 34.1.1

Vissersvaartuigtype(s)

—

Referentienummer

—

Weblink naar het besluit van de lidstaat:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_nl.htm

---

(1)  PB L 343 van 22.12.2009, blz. 1.

---

V Adviezen

BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES

Europese Commissie

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/8

---

Oproepen tot het indienen van voorstellen — ESPON 2013-programma

2011/C 245/08

ESPON is het Europees Observatienetwerk voor territoriale ontwikkeling en cohesie. Het ondersteunt de ontwikkeling van het cohesiebeleid van de EU. ESPON wordt medegefinancierd door het Europees Fonds voor Regionale Ontwikkeling in het kader van Doelstelling 3 voor Europese territoriale samenwerking, alsook door 31 landen (27 EU-lidstaten en IJsland, Liechtenstein, Noorwegen en Zwitserland).

In het kader van het ESPON 2013-programma zijn de oproepen tot het indienen van voorstellen nu gepubliceerd. Potentiële begunstigden zijn openbare of particuliere organisaties uit 31 landen (de 27 EU-lidstaten, IJsland, Liechtenstein, Noorwegen en Zwitserland). Onderzoekers en onderzoeksinstellingen, universiteiten, wetenschappers, deskundigen en academische teams wordt verzocht voorstellen in te dienen. De oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen voor transnationale netwerkactiviteiten is bedoeld voor als nationaal ESPON-contactpunt bevestigde instellingen.

| 1. | Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen voor toegepaste onderzoeksprojecten:






  — | Europese nabuurregio's (begroting: 750 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen voor toegepaste onderzoeksprojecten:

—

Europese nabuurregio's (begroting: 750 000 EUR);

| — | Kleine en middelgrote steden in hun functionele territoriale context (begroting: 650 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

Kleine en middelgrote steden in hun functionele territoriale context (begroting: 650 000 EUR);

| — | De territoriale dimensie van armoede en sociale uitsluiting in Europa (begroting: 750 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

De territoriale dimensie van armoede en sociale uitsluiting in Europa (begroting: 750 000 EUR);

| — | Economische crises: het vermogen van regio's om zich van een crisis te herstellen (begroting: 759 153 EUR). |
| --- | --- |

—

Economische crises: het vermogen van regio's om zich van een crisis te herstellen (begroting: 759 153 EUR).

| 2. | Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen voor gerichte analyses op basis van blijken van belangstelling van belanghebbenden:






  — | Groeipolen in Zuidoost-Europa (begroting: 360 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen voor gerichte analyses op basis van blijken van belangstelling van belanghebbenden:

—

Groeipolen in Zuidoost-Europa (begroting: 360 000 EUR);

| — | Sleutelindicatoren voor territoriale cohesie en ruimtelijke planning (begroting: 360 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

Sleutelindicatoren voor territoriale cohesie en ruimtelijke planning (begroting: 360 000 EUR);

| — | Leefbare landschappen voor duurzame territoriale ontwikkeling (begroting: 379 796,09 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

Leefbare landschappen voor duurzame territoriale ontwikkeling (begroting: 379 796,09 EUR);

| — | Landschapsbeleid voor het drielandenpark (begroting: 360 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

Landschapsbeleid voor het drielandenpark (begroting: 360 000 EUR);

| — | Noordzee — verspreiding van transnationale resultaten (begroting: 340 000 EUR). |
| --- | --- |

—

Noordzee — verspreiding van transnationale resultaten (begroting: 340 000 EUR).

De hierboven voor gerichte analyses vermelde thema's zullen in de oproep worden opgenomen op voorwaarde dat met de belanghebbenden achter de projectideeën een overeenkomst is ondertekend. De thema's zullen bijgevolg pas worden bevestigd op de dag waarop de oproep wordt gepubliceerd, namelijk 24 augustus 2011. De thema's die uiteindelijk in de oproep zullen worden opgenomen, zullen op de ESPON-website (http://www.espon.eu) worden gepubliceerd.

| 3. | Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen in het kader van het wetenschappelijk platform van ESPON:






  — | Territoriale controle en verslaglegging binnen de EU (begroting: 598 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen in het kader van het wetenschappelijk platform van ESPON:

—

Territoriale controle en verslaglegging binnen de EU (begroting: 598 000 EUR);

| — | ESPON-atlas van Europese territoriale structuren en dynamiek (begroting: 150 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

ESPON-atlas van Europese territoriale structuren en dynamiek (begroting: 150 000 EUR);

| — | Inventarisering van territoriale mogelijkheden en uitdagingen (begroting: 350 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

Inventarisering van territoriale mogelijkheden en uitdagingen (begroting: 350 000 EUR);

| — | Territoriale bewijspakketten voor EFRO-programma's (begroting: 500 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

Territoriale bewijspakketten voor EFRO-programma's (begroting: 500 000 EUR);

| — | Online ESPON-karteringsinstrument (begroting: 150 000 EUR); |
| --- | --- |

—

Online ESPON-karteringsinstrument (begroting: 150 000 EUR);

| — | Territoriale monitoring in een Europese macroregio — Een test voor het Oostzeegebied (begroting: 360 000 EUR). |
| --- | --- |

—

Territoriale monitoring in een Europese macroregio — Een test voor het Oostzeegebied (begroting: 360 000 EUR).

| 4. | Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen voor transnationale netwerkactiviteiten door het netwerk van ESPON-contactpunten:






  — | Kapitalisatieactiviteiten op transnationaal niveau door het netwerk van ESPON-contactpunten (begroting: 600 227 EUR). |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen voor transnationale netwerkactiviteiten door het netwerk van ESPON-contactpunten:

—

Kapitalisatieactiviteiten op transnationaal niveau door het netwerk van ESPON-contactpunten (begroting: 600 227 EUR).

De voorstellen moeten uiterlijk 20 oktober 2011 worden ingediend.

Op 13 september 2011 zullen in Brussel voor mogelijke begunstigden een infodag en een partnercafé worden georganiseerd.

Alle documentatie betreffende de oproepen, inclusief de aanvraagprocedure, de deelnemingsvoorwaarden, de beoordelingscriteria en het aanvraagformulier, vindt u op de ESPON-website: http://www.espon.eu

---

PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Europese Commissie

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/10

---

STEUNMAATREGELEN VAN DE STATEN — VERENIGD KONINKRIJK

Steunmaatregel SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10)

Vrijstelling van de aggregaatheffing in Noord-Ierland (ex N 2/04)

Uitnodiging, overeenkomstig artikel 108, lid 2, VWEU, om opmerkingen te maken

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

2011/C 245/09

De Commissie heeft bij schrijven van 13 juli 2011, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, het Verenigd Koninkrijk in kennis gesteld van haar besluit tot inleiding van de procedure van artikel 108, lid 2, VWEU ten aanzien van de bovengenoemde maatregel. De Commissie heeft het Verenigd Koninkrijk ook overeenkomstig artikel 11, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 659/1999 verzocht opmerkingen te maken over het voornemen van de Commissie om de formele onderzoeksprocedure in te stellen.

Belanghebbenden kunnen hun opmerkingen over de steunmaatregel kenbaar maken door deze binnen een maand vanaf de datum van deze bekendmaking te zenden aan:

| Europese Commissie |
| --- |
| Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie |
| Griffie Staatssteun |
| 1049 Brussel |
| BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22951242 |

Europese Commissie

Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie

Griffie Staatssteun

1049 Brussel

BELGIË

Fax +32 22951242

Deze opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van het Verenigd Koninkrijk worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

TEKST VAN DE SAMENVATTING

PROCEDURE

Bij brief van 5 januari 2004, ingeschreven op 9 januari 2004, heeft het Verenigd Koninkrijk een maatregel inzake vrijstelling van de aggregaatheffing in Noord-Ierland aangemeld. De maatregel werd aangekondigd als een wijziging van de oorspronkelijke vrijstelling van de aggregaatheffing in Noord-Ierland (geleidelijke invoering van de heffing) die door de Commissie in haar besluit N 863/01 werd goedgekeurd. Op 7 mei 2004 besloot de Commissie geen bezwaar tegen deze maatregel te maken. Op 30 augustus 2004 tekenden British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd en David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd (hierna: „verzoekers”) beroep aan tegen bovengenoemd besluit van de Commissie om geen bezwaar te maken (dit beroep is ingeschreven onder nummer T-359/04).

Op 9 september 2010 verklaarde het Gerecht bovengenoemd besluit van de Commissie nietig. Volgens het arrest had de Commissie niet het besluit mogen nemen om geen bezwaar te maken aangezien zij de kwestie van eventuele belastingdiscriminatie tussen de binnenlandse producten in kwestie en ingevoerde producten in Ierland niet had onderzocht. De Commissie is niet tegen dit vonnis in beroep gegaan.

De Britse autoriteiten hebben de uitvoering van de maatregel per 1 december 2010 opgeschort door de bepalingen inzake de aggregaatheffing 2004 (belastingkrediet Noord-Ierland) in te trekken.

BESCHRIJVING VAN DE MAATREGEL

De vrijstelling van 80 % van de aggregaatheffing was van toepassing op natuurlijke aggregaten die in Noord-Ierland worden gewonnen en er commercieel worden geëxploiteerd en verwerkte producten op basis van aggregaten die in Noord-Ierland worden gewonnen en die daar commercieel worden geëxploiteerd.

De aggregaatheffing als zodanig is een milieuheffing op het commercieel gebruik van aggregaten en geldt voor rots, zand en kiezel. De heffing is door het Verenigd Koninkrijk met ingang van 1 april 2002 ingevoerd en heeft de volgende milieudoelstellingen: maximalisering van het beroep op gerecycleerde aggregaten of andere substitutieproducten in de plaats van natuurlijke aggregaten en de bevordering van een rationeel gebruik van natuurlijke aggregaten, een niet-hernieuwbare natuurlijke hulpbron.

De Britse autoriteiten hebben ter bereiking van de nagestreefde milieudoeleinden besloten aan de vrijstelling de voorwaarde te koppelen dat de ondernemingen die ervoor in aanmerking wensen te komen, formeel verbintenissen aangaan en zich houden aan met de Britse autoriteiten gesloten overeenkomsten op grond waarvan zij tijdens de duur van de vrijstelling aan een programma voor verwezenlijkingen en verbeteringen op milieugebied moeten deelnemen.

BEOORDELING

Ten eerste heeft de Commissie, in het licht van het arrest van het Gerecht, onderzocht of er een intrinsieke band is tussen de steunmaatregel zelf, die bij wijze van belastingvermindering is verleend, en de discriminerende fiscale behandeling van ingevoerde producten. Aangezien deze band in het onderhavige geval is vastgesteld, moest de Commissie onderzoeken of de steunmaatregel niet een discriminerende interne belastingheffing met zich meebracht die in strijd is met artikel 110, VWEU (ex artikel 90 EG). Zij herinnert hoofdzakelijk aan de jurisprudentie betreffende nationale regelgeving die fiscale voordelen verleent aan nationale producten wanneer deze volgens bepaalde milieunormen worden vervaardigd. Dit soort interne belastingheffing wordt niet als verenigbaar met artikel 110 VWEU beschouwd wanneer het voordeel niet wordt uitgebreid naar ingevoerde producten die volgens dezelfde milieunormen worden vervaardigd. Aangezien dit voor de vrijstelling van de aggregaatheffing in Noord-Ierland niet gold, heeft de Commissie dan ook twijfels over de verenigbaarheid van de gewijzigde vrijstelling van aggregaatbelasting in Noord-Ierland met de VWEU, en met name artikel 110.

Gelet op deze twijfels over de verenigbaarheid met artikel 110 VWEU kan de Commissie in dit stadium niet concluderen dat de maatregel verenigbaar is met de interne markt. Wegens deze twijfels met het oog op de verenigbaarheid van de maatregel met de staatssteunregels heeft de Commissie de maatregel in kwestie aan de kaderregeling milieusteun getoetst en met name aan de regels betreffende vrijstellingen of verminderingen van milieubelasting. Gezien het onwettige karakter van de steun die is verleend in de vorm van de gewijzigde vrijstelling van aggregaatbelasting in Noord-Ierland wegens de nietigverklaring door het Gerecht van de verenigbaarheid van de maatregel heeft de Commissie de maatregel in kwestie aan de richtsnoeren milieusteun 2001 en, vanaf 2 april 2008 (dat wil zeggen de datum waarop zij van kracht zijn geworden), aan de richtsnoeren inzake staatssteun voor milieubescherming 2008 getoetst.

Wat met name de toetsing aan de richtsnoeren milieusteun 2001 betreft, is de Commissie tot de conclusie gekomen dat aan de daarin vervatte voorwaarden is voldaan maar herinnert zij er wederom aan dat zij gezien de twijfels over de verenigbaarheid met artikel 110 VWEU in dit stadium niet kan concluderen dat de maatregel verenigbaar is met de interne markt.

Wat de richtsnoeren milieusteun van 2008 betreft, is de Commissie tot de voorlopige conclusie gekomen dat zij betwijfelt of aan de voorwaarde van de noodzaak van de steun is voldaan, en met name of de aanzienlijke toename van de productiekosten niet aan de eindafnemers kan worden doorberekend zonder dat de verkoop hierdoor aanmerkelijk daalt. In dit verband merkt de Commissie op dat, hoewel de door de Britse autoriteiten verstrekte informatie wijst op een zeer significante stijging van de productiekosten ten gevolge van de vrijstelling van de aggregaatheffing, die normaal gesproken tot een aanmerkelijke daling van de verkoop zou moeten leiden, zij, in het licht van de onvoldoende gedetailleerde gegevens, in dit stadium niet kan concluderen dat aan deze voorwaarde inzake verenigbaarheid is voldaan.

Op basis van de voorlopige analyse heeft de Commissie dan ook twijfels over de verenigbaarheid van de maatregel „Vrijstelling van de aggregaatheffing in Noord-Ierland (ex N 2/04)” met het verdrag en over de verenigbaarheid met de interne markt. Overeenkomstig artikel 4, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 659/1999 heeft de Commissie besloten de formele onderzoeksprocedure in te leiden en nodigt derden uit hun opmerkingen kenbaar te maken.

TEKST VAN DE BRIEF

„The Commission wishes to inform the UK authorities that, having examined the information supplied by them on the aid referred to above, it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

1.   PROCEDURE

| 1. | The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004.

| 2. | The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2).

| 3. | On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3).

| 4. | On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04). |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04).

| 5. | On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment.

| 6. | On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959). |
| --- | --- |

6.

On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959).

| 7. | The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The aggregates levy

| 8. | The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity.

| 9. | The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom.

2.2.   The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 10. | In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products. |
| --- | --- |

10.

In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products.

2.3.   The modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 11. | The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there.

2.3.1.   Background

| 12. | The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development.

| 13. | According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded. |
| --- | --- |

13.

According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded.

| 14. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent.

2.3.2.   Modification

| 15. | In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8). |
| --- | --- |

15.

In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8).

| 16. | The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9).

2.3.3.   Environmental agreements

| 17. | In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief. |
| --- | --- |

17.

In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief.

| 18. | The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:






  (a) | the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:

(a)

the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and

| (b) | the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter.

| 19. | Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

19.

Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management.

| 20. | The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings.

2.3.4.   Aggregates production costs, selling price and price elasticity of demand

| 21. | As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

  Table 1


  Selling price







  Type of rock | Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Basalt | 4,21 |
| Sandstone | 4,37 |
| Limestone | 3,72 |
| Sand and gravel | 4,80 |
| Other | 5,57 |
| Weighted average price | 4,42 |

21.

As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

Table 1

Selling price

Type of rock

Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne)

Basalt

4,21

Sandstone

4,37

Limestone

3,72

Sand and gravel

4,80

Other

5,57

Weighted average price

4,42

| 22. | As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

  Table 2 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,5 | 3,4 | 3,9 | 3,6 | 4,3 | 4,3 |
| GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 7,9 | 8,4 | 9,0 | 7,7 | 8,8 | 9,7 | 9,2 | 10,9 |

22.

As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

Table 2

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne

2,9

3,1

3,5

3,4

3,9

3,6

4,3

4,3

GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne

7,9

8,4

9,0

7,7

8,8

9,7

9,2

10,9

| 23. | As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic. |
| --- | --- |

23.

As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic.

2.3.5.   Pass-on and sales reductions

| 24. | As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain. |
| --- | --- |

24.

As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain.

| 25. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

  Table 3


  A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland











  Product | 2000-2001
  (million tonnes) | 2001-2002
  (million tonnes) | 2002-2003
  (million tonnes) | Fall,
  2001-2003
  (%) | Fall,
  2002-2003
  (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sand and gravel | 2,35 | 2,34 | 1,91 | –18,7 | –8,4 |
| Crushed rock | 7,86 | 7,88 | 7,27 | –7,5 | –7,7 |
| Fill material | 3,00 | 3,89 | 1,71 | –43,0 | –56,0 |
| Total | 13,21 | 14,11 | 10,89 | –17,6 | –22,8 |

25.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

Table 3

A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland

Product

2000-2001

(million tonnes)

2001-2002

(million tonnes)

2002-2003

(million tonnes)

Fall,

2001-2003

(%)

Fall,

2002-2003

(%)

Sand and gravel

2,35

2,34

1,91

–18,7

–8,4

Crushed rock

7,86

7,88

7,27

–7,5

–7,7

Fill material

3,00

3,89

1,71

–43,0

–56,0

Total

13,21

14,11

10,89

–17,6

–22,8

| 26. | The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state.

| 27. | As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers. |
| --- | --- |

27.

As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers.

2.3.6.   Other information

| 28. | The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011). |
| --- | --- |

28.

The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011).

| 29. | As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible. |
| --- | --- |

29.

As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible.

| 30. | The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.

2.4.   Position of third parties, appreciable positive effects

| 31. | In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue. |
| --- | --- |

31.

In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue.

| 32. | The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects. |
| --- | --- |

32.

The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects.

| 33. | As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock. |
| --- | --- |

33.

As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock.

| 34. | As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates. |
| --- | --- |

34.

As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates.

| 35. | With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003. |
| --- | --- |

35.

With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003.

| 36. | Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility.

3.   ASSESSMENT

3.1.   State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC)
   (13)

| 37. | State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

37.

State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| 38. | The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

38.

The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States.

| 39. | Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC). |
| --- | --- |

39.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC).

3.2.   Lawfulness of the aid

| 40. | Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15). |
| --- | --- |

40.

Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15).

3.3.   Compatibility of the aid

| 41. | It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16). |
| --- | --- |

41.

It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16).

| 42. | Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17). |
| --- | --- |

42.

Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17).

| 43. | The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

43.

The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States.

| 44. | As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated. |
| --- | --- |

44.

As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated.

| 45. | Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products.

| 46. | Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20). |
| --- | --- |

46.

Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20).

3.3.1.   Compliance with Article 110 of the TFEU

| 47. | According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

47.

According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU.

| 48. | According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect. |
| --- | --- |

48.

According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect.

| 49. | Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements.

| 50. | Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate.

| 51. | Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements.

| 52. | Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21). |
| --- | --- |

52.

Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21).

| 53. | Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment.

| 54. | Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage.

3.3.2.   Compatibility of the measure under the Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 55. | Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection.

| 56. | The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful). |
| --- | --- |

56.

The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful).

| 57. | Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:






  (a) | the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

57.

Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:

(a)

the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and

| (b) | the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008.

Ad (a) Compatibility of the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 58. | Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions. |
| --- | --- |

58.

Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions.

| 59. | The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax. |
| --- | --- |

59.

The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax.

| 60. | Point 51(2) provides that:
  “The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:






  (a) | the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection; |
| --- | --- | --- |

60.

Point 51(2) provides that:

“The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:

(a)

the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection;

| (b) | the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”.

| 61. | Point 51(1) provides that:
  “These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:






  1. | When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:






  (a) | these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.
  These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

61.

Point 51(1) provides that:

“These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:

1.

When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:

(a)

these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.

These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above;

| (b) | these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:






  — | where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:

—

where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection,

| — | where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”. |
| --- | --- |

—

where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”.

| 62. | With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)). |
| --- | --- |

62.

With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)).

| 63. | Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market.

| 64. | The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence). |
| --- | --- |

64.

The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence).

| 65. | In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

65.

In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled.

| 66. | In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent). |
| --- | --- |

66.

In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent).

| 67. | In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25). |
| --- | --- |

67.

In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25).

| 68. | For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

68.

For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage.

Ad (b) Compatibility of the measure under the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 69. | Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159). |
| --- | --- |

69.

Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159).

| 70. | As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes. |
| --- | --- |

70.

As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes.

Environmental benefit

| 71. | Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued. |
| --- | --- |

71.

Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued.

| 72. | As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials. |
| --- | --- |

72.

As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials.

| 73. | Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL.

Necessity of the aid

| 74. | According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

74.

According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary.

(1)   Objective and transparent criteria

| 75. | Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 76. | The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent. |
| --- | --- |

76.

The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent.

(2)   Substantial increase in production costs

| 77. | Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 78. | The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26). |
| --- | --- |

78.

The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26).

| 79. | Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

(3)   Impossibility to pass on the substantial increase in production costs

| 80. | Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned. |
| --- | --- |

80.

Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned.

| 81. | The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland. |
| --- | --- |

81.

The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland.

| 82. | The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased. |
| --- | --- |

82.

The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased.

| 83. | Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007. |
| --- | --- |

83.

Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007.

| 84. | In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided. |
| --- | --- |

84.

In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided.

| 85. | With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided. |
| --- | --- |

85.

With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided.

| 86. | Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers.

| 87. | Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

87.

Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met.

Proportionality of the aid

| 88. | With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:






  (a) | it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

88.

With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:

(a)

it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers;

| (b) | it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified;

| (c) | it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied.

| 89. | The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax. |
| --- | --- |

89.

The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax.

3.4.   Conclusions

| 90. | On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

90.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market.

| 91. | The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158. |
| --- | --- |

91.

The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158.

| 92. | Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision. |
| --- | --- |

92.

Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision.

4.   DECISION

| 93. | In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

93.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| 94. | The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

94.

The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

| 95. | The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.” |
| --- | --- |

95.

The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.”

---

(1)  The phased introduction of the AGL.

1

(2)  OJ C 133, 5.6.2002, p.11.

2

(3)  OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 4.

3

(4)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet reported.

4

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(5)  The AGL is applied to imported raw aggregate, but not to aggregate contained in imported processed products.

5

(6)  On 2 April 2008, i.e. the day from which the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines were applicable, the level of AGL was GBP 1,95/tonne.

6

(7)  OJ C 37, 3.2.2001, p. 3.

7

(8)  The aggregates extracted in Northern Ireland and shipped to any destination in Great Britain were liable to the AGL at the full rate. This was also the case for aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland that was used in the manufacturing of processed products shipped to Great Britain. This ensured that aggregates and processed products from Northern Ireland did not enjoy a competitive advantage in the market of Great Britain.

8

(9)  As referred to above, the implementation of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was suspended as from 1 December 2010.

9

(10)  The information was submitted by the UK authorities for the purposes of an assessment of the measure on the basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. DETI Minerals Statement 2009.

10

(11)  Distribution costs depend on haulage distances, with haulage costs in the range of 15 to 20 pence per tonne per mile, with aggregate being delivered within 10 to 15 miles, depending on local circumstances.

11

(12)  Ecotec (1998) Report; EEA Report (No 2/2008) effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in selected EU countries; British Geological Survey (2008): The need for indigenous aggregates production in England.

12

(13)  The definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) of the TFEU did not change from the one contained in Article 87(1) EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

13

(14)  See Case C-199/06 CELF [2008] ECR I-469, paragraphs 63 and 66 to 68.

14

CELF

(15)  See Case C-199/06 CELF, cited above, paragraphs 61 and 64.

15

CELF

(16)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 91.

16

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(17)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 93.

17

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(18)  “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.

18

Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.”

(19)  The rules for national internal taxation as laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU did not change from those contained in Article 90 EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

19

(20)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 92.

20

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(21)  Case 21/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR p. 1, paragraphs 23 to 26; and in particular Case C-213/96 Outukumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, paragraphs 30 et seq.

21

Commission

Italy

Outukumpu

(22)  The identity of the taxpayer as such is therefore of limited importance.

22

(23)  “Thus [Article 110] must guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between domestic products and imported products.” (Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR p. 1343, paragraph 24).

23

[Article 110]

Bergandi

(24)  Commission Notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid, OJ C 119, 22.5.2002, p. 22.

24

(25)  See for instance Commission Decision on case N 449/01 (Germany) — Continuation of the ecological tax reform (OJ C 137, 8.6.2002, p. 34). Furthermore, this position was confirmed in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines where the payment of 20 % of the tax was explicitly “codified” as a proportionality condition of the aid granted in the form of exemption or reduction from environmental taxes (point 159(b)).

25

(26)  The highest selling price (GBP 5,57/tonne), the lowest profit margin (2 %) and the level of the AGL as originally notified in 2004 (GBP 1,6/tonne) are assumed. If the AGL level on 1 April 2008 (GBP 1,95/tonne) is applied, the share increases to approximately 36 %. Any other combination of price and profit margin necessarily results in the AGL presenting more then 30 % of the production costs.

26

(27)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

27

---

| 24.8.2011 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 245/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 245/21

---

STEUNMAATREGELEN VAN DE STATEN — DUITSLAND

(De artikelen 107 en 109 van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie)

Steunmaatregel MC 15/09 — LBBW-afstoting Deka

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

2011/C 245/10

De Commissie heeft Duitsland bij brief van 14 januari 2011 van haar besluit sui generis ten aanzien van steunmaatregel MC 15/09 in kennis gesteld.

TEKST VAN DE BRIEF

„I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | De Commissie heeft bij besluit van 15 december 2009 in zaak C 17/09 (hierna het „LBBW-besluit” genoemd) (1) twee maatregelen ten gunste van Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (hierna „LBBW” genoemd) goedgekeurd: een kapitaalinjectie van 5 miljard EUR en een maatregel ter bescherming van probleemactiva voor een bedrag van 12,7 miljard EUR voor een gestructureerde portfolio die 35 miljard EUR in activa omvat. Aan die goedkeuring waren een aantal Duitse toezeggingen verbonden. Een van de toezeggingen was dat LBBW vóór (2) [...] haar belang in Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (hierna „Deka” genoemd) zou verkopen. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

De Commissie heeft bij besluit van 15 december 2009 in zaak C 17/09 (hierna het „LBBW-besluit” genoemd) (1) twee maatregelen ten gunste van Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (hierna „LBBW” genoemd) goedgekeurd: een kapitaalinjectie van 5 miljard EUR en een maatregel ter bescherming van probleemactiva voor een bedrag van 12,7 miljard EUR voor een gestructureerde portfolio die 35 miljard EUR in activa omvat. Aan die goedkeuring waren een aantal Duitse toezeggingen verbonden. Een van de toezeggingen was dat LBBW vóór (2) [...] haar belang in Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (hierna „Deka” genoemd) zou verkopen.

| (2) | Op 13 december 2010 heeft Duitsland een brief van LBBW ingediend waarin stond dat Deka niet vóór [...] kon worden afgestoten. Op 21 december 2010 verklaarde Duitsland dat de trustee (3) en het ministerie van Financiën van Baden-Württemberg bevestigden dat LBBW alles gedaan had wat ze kon om het verkoopproces binnen die termijn af te ronden. Op 22 december 2010 meldde Duitsland een verzoek tot verlenging van de afstotingstermijn tot [...] aan. Op 5 januari 2011 diende Duitsland verdere informatie in. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Op 13 december 2010 heeft Duitsland een brief van LBBW ingediend waarin stond dat Deka niet vóór [...] kon worden afgestoten. Op 21 december 2010 verklaarde Duitsland dat de trustee (3) en het ministerie van Financiën van Baden-Württemberg bevestigden dat LBBW alles gedaan had wat ze kon om het verkoopproces binnen die termijn af te ronden. Op 22 december 2010 meldde Duitsland een verzoek tot verlenging van de afstotingstermijn tot [...] aan. Op 5 januari 2011 diende Duitsland verdere informatie in.

| (3) | Op 22 december 2010 deelde Duitsland de Commissie mee dat het wegens hoogdringendheid bij wijze van uitzondering aanvaardt dat het besluit in kwestie in het Engels wordt vastgesteld. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Op 22 december 2010 deelde Duitsland de Commissie mee dat het wegens hoogdringendheid bij wijze van uitzondering aanvaardt dat het besluit in kwestie in het Engels wordt vastgesteld.

II.   FEITEN

| (4) | Het LBBW-besluit is gebaseerd op meerdere toezeggingen. Overweging 38, punt 5, onder c), van het LBBW-besluit bevat de toezegging van Duitsland dat LBBW haar belang in Deka vóór [...] zou verkopen. Het besluit staat een verlenging van die termijn niet expliciet toe. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Het LBBW-besluit is gebaseerd op meerdere toezeggingen. Overweging 38, punt 5, onder c), van het LBBW-besluit bevat de toezegging van Duitsland dat LBBW haar belang in Deka vóór [...] zou verkopen. Het besluit staat een verlenging van die termijn niet expliciet toe.

| (5) | Deka is een publiekrechtelijke instelling (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) die — via dochterondernemingen — de particuliere investeringsfondsen van de Duitse spaarbanken beheert. De helft is in handen van het Deutsche Sparkassen- und Giroverband (hierna „DSGV” genoemd) en de overige helft is eigendom van Landesbanken via een holding (hierna „holding” genoemd). Het middelllijk belang van LBBW in Deka bedraagt 14,8 %. De respectieve eigenaren hebben een voorkooprecht indien een van de partijen haar belang wil verkopen. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Deka is een publiekrechtelijke instelling (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) die — via dochterondernemingen — de particuliere investeringsfondsen van de Duitse spaarbanken beheert. De helft is in handen van het Deutsche Sparkassen- und Giroverband (hierna „DSGV” genoemd) en de overige helft is eigendom van Landesbanken via een holding (hierna „holding” genoemd). Het middelllijk belang van LBBW in Deka bedraagt 14,8 %. De respectieve eigenaren hebben een voorkooprecht indien een van de partijen haar belang wil verkopen.

| (6) | Aanvankelijk had het DSGV een bod op het belang van LBBW in Deka gedaan dat geldig was tot [...]. Om de verkoop effectief te maken, zou die door alle andere Landesbanken met een belang in Deka, alsook door Deka zelf en haar algemene vergadering moeten worden goedgekeurd. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Aanvankelijk had het DSGV een bod op het belang van LBBW in Deka gedaan dat geldig was tot [...]. Om de verkoop effectief te maken, zou die door alle andere Landesbanken met een belang in Deka, alsook door Deka zelf en haar algemene vergadering moeten worden goedgekeurd.

| (7) | Duitsland heeft de Commissie meegedeeld dat alle Landesbanken die aandeelhouder zijn in de holding, voornemens zijn hun belang aan het DSGV te verkopen, wat van die laatste de enige aandeelhouder van Deka zou maken. Een bindend besluit betreffende die verkopen wordt binnen de [...] verwacht, hoewel extra uitstel tot [...] niet kan worden uitgesloten gezien de complexiteit van het besluitvormingsproces in kwestie. Indien de Landesbanken hun belangen in de holding verkopen, zouden de voor de verkoop van LBBW's belang in Deka vereiste overeenkomsten volgens Duitsland meer goedschiks worden verleend en de verkoopprocedure versoepelen. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Duitsland heeft de Commissie meegedeeld dat alle Landesbanken die aandeelhouder zijn in de holding, voornemens zijn hun belang aan het DSGV te verkopen, wat van die laatste de enige aandeelhouder van Deka zou maken. Een bindend besluit betreffende die verkopen wordt binnen de [...] verwacht, hoewel extra uitstel tot [...] niet kan worden uitgesloten gezien de complexiteit van het besluitvormingsproces in kwestie. Indien de Landesbanken hun belangen in de holding verkopen, zouden de voor de verkoop van LBBW's belang in Deka vereiste overeenkomsten volgens Duitsland meer goedschiks worden verleend en de verkoopprocedure versoepelen.

| (8) | Duitsland heeft de Commissie voorts meegedeeld dat het DSGV zijn bod voor de aankoop van het LBBW-belang in Deka verlengd heeft tot [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Duitsland heeft de Commissie voorts meegedeeld dat het DSGV zijn bod voor de aankoop van het LBBW-belang in Deka verlengd heeft tot [...].

| (9) | Niettegenstaande het verzoek om een verlenging van de termijn voor de afstoting van Deka beweert Duitsland dat LBBW alles gedaan heeft wat zij kon om te garanderen dat de verkoop plaatsvond. De trustee die belast is met het toezicht op de afstotingen van LBBW waartoe Duitsland zich in het kader van het LBBW-besluit had verbonden, bevestigde die inschatting. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Niettegenstaande het verzoek om een verlenging van de termijn voor de afstoting van Deka beweert Duitsland dat LBBW alles gedaan heeft wat zij kon om te garanderen dat de verkoop plaatsvond. De trustee die belast is met het toezicht op de afstotingen van LBBW waartoe Duitsland zich in het kader van het LBBW-besluit had verbonden, bevestigde die inschatting.

III.   BEOORDELING

| (10) | Het huidige besluit betreft de uitvoering van het in het LBBW-besluit goedgekeurde herstructureringsplan. Duitsland vraagt om uitstel van de termijn voor de verkoop van Deka met drie maanden, [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Het huidige besluit betreft de uitvoering van het in het LBBW-besluit goedgekeurde herstructureringsplan. Duitsland vraagt om uitstel van de termijn voor de verkoop van Deka met drie maanden, [...].

| (11) | De Commissie kan de termijnen voor afstotingen verlengen. Hoewel dit niet expliciet in Verordening (EG) nr. 659/1999 is opgenomen, heeft de Commissie de discretionaire bevoegdheid een verlenging toe te staan voor zover die de handhaving van het LBBW-besluit niet belemmert (4). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

De Commissie kan de termijnen voor afstotingen verlengen. Hoewel dit niet expliciet in Verordening (EG) nr. 659/1999 is opgenomen, heeft de Commissie de discretionaire bevoegdheid een verlenging toe te staan voor zover die de handhaving van het LBBW-besluit niet belemmert (4).

| (12) | De Commissie merkt op dat LBBW de verkoopsprocedure van Deka reeds actief op gang heeft gebracht door zich te verzekeren van een bod van het DGSV. In dat verband neemt de Commissie akte van het standpunt van zowel Duitsland als de trustee dat LBBW alles gedaan heeft wat zij kon om het verkoopproces te bespoedigen. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

De Commissie merkt op dat LBBW de verkoopsprocedure van Deka reeds actief op gang heeft gebracht door zich te verzekeren van een bod van het DGSV. In dat verband neemt de Commissie akte van het standpunt van zowel Duitsland als de trustee dat LBBW alles gedaan heeft wat zij kon om het verkoopproces te bespoedigen.

| (13) | Voorts lijkt het, volgens Duitsland, hoogst waarschijnlijk dat de Landesbanken met een belang in de holding eveneens hun belang zouden verkopen, wat het algemene verkoopproces van LBBW’s belang in Deka zou vergemakkelijken. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Voorts lijkt het, volgens Duitsland, hoogst waarschijnlijk dat de Landesbanken met een belang in de holding eveneens hun belang zouden verkopen, wat het algemene verkoopproces van LBBW’s belang in Deka zou vergemakkelijken.

| (14) | Ten slotte zijn er overtuigende argumenten dat het verkoopproces binnen het voorgestelde tijdskader succesvol zal worden afgerond, uiterlijk tegen [...]. In het bijzonder lijkt het zo dat [...]. Het huidige besluit maakt het LBBW mogelijk haar Deka-belang te verkopen, zelfs al zouden de besluitvormingsprocessen van de Landesbanken die hun belangen in Deka verkopen langer duren dan verwacht. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Ten slotte zijn er overtuigende argumenten dat het verkoopproces binnen het voorgestelde tijdskader succesvol zal worden afgerond, uiterlijk tegen [...]. In het bijzonder lijkt het zo dat [...]. Het huidige besluit maakt het LBBW mogelijk haar Deka-belang te verkopen, zelfs al zouden de besluitvormingsprocessen van de Landesbanken die hun belangen in Deka verkopen langer duren dan verwacht.

| (15) | Een verlenging van de verkoopstermijn met drie maanden brengt de algemene uitvoering van de in het LBBW-besluit goedgekeurde herstructureringsplan, die tot 2014 zal duren, niet in het gedrang. Deze termijnverlenging zal LBBW eveneens helpen om de nodige overeenkomsten van de andere Landesbanken te verkrijgen en aldus een verkoop, hetzij gezamenlijk of individueel, te versoepelen. De uitbreiding, die beperkt is in de tijd, zou het LBBW dan ook mogelijk moeten maken haar Deka-belang te verkopen vóór [...]. Voorts staat ze LBBW toe de voornoemde, voornamelijk exogene, moeilijkheden te overwinnen en de afstoting van Deka zoals voorzien in het LBBW-besluit af te ronden. De Commissie is bijgevolg van oordeel dat de relatief korte aangevraagde verlenging tot [...] gerechtvaardigd is, vooral in het licht van de bijzonderheden van Deka’s juridische structuur. Gezien de omstandigheden van de zaak geldt een dergelijke verlenging niet als een vertraging ten opzichte van het aanvankelijk goedgekeurde tijdschema die een evenredige vermindering van het steunbedrag zou vereisen (5). |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Een verlenging van de verkoopstermijn met drie maanden brengt de algemene uitvoering van de in het LBBW-besluit goedgekeurde herstructureringsplan, die tot 2014 zal duren, niet in het gedrang. Deze termijnverlenging zal LBBW eveneens helpen om de nodige overeenkomsten van de andere Landesbanken te verkrijgen en aldus een verkoop, hetzij gezamenlijk of individueel, te versoepelen. De uitbreiding, die beperkt is in de tijd, zou het LBBW dan ook mogelijk moeten maken haar Deka-belang te verkopen vóór [...]. Voorts staat ze LBBW toe de voornoemde, voornamelijk exogene, moeilijkheden te overwinnen en de afstoting van Deka zoals voorzien in het LBBW-besluit af te ronden. De Commissie is bijgevolg van oordeel dat de relatief korte aangevraagde verlenging tot [...] gerechtvaardigd is, vooral in het licht van de bijzonderheden van Deka’s juridische structuur. Gezien de omstandigheden van de zaak geldt een dergelijke verlenging niet als een vertraging ten opzichte van het aanvankelijk goedgekeurde tijdschema die een evenredige vermindering van het steunbedrag zou vereisen (5).

IV.   CONCLUSIE

| (16) | Om de voornoemde redenen is de Commissie van oordeel dat een verlenging met drie maanden in het geval van Deka een passende uitvoering van het herstructureringsplan van LBBW niet in de weg staat, maar net mogelijk maakt. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Om de voornoemde redenen is de Commissie van oordeel dat een verlenging met drie maanden in het geval van Deka een passende uitvoering van het herstructureringsplan van LBBW niet in de weg staat, maar net mogelijk maakt.

V.   BESLUIT

De Commissie verlengt de termijn voor de verkoop van Deka tot 31 maart 2011.”

---

(1)  PB L 188 van 21.7.2010, blz. 1.

1

(2)  Deze tekst is op bepaalde plaatsen bewerkt om te voorkomen dat vertrouwelijke gegevens openbaar worden gemaakt. Die plaatsen worden aangegeven met drie punten tussen vierkante haakjes en gemarkeerd met een asterisk.

2

(3)  Aangesteld overeenkomstig het LBBW-besluit om toe te zien op de volledige en correcte uitvoering van de gedane toezeggingen met betrekking tot afstotingen.

3

(4)  Cfr. besluit van 21 december 2010 in zaak MC 8/09 WestImmo.

4

WestImmo

(5)  Zie de richtsnoeren van de Commissie inzake reddings- en herstructureringssteun aan ondernemingen in moeilijkheden, PB C 244 van 1.10.2004, blz. 2, punt 52, onder d).

5

---