### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON FE BR U A RY 15, 200 6 S es sio n STEVE DAVIS v . TENNESS EE W IL DLI FE RESOURCES AGENCY, ET AL 

### .

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Benton County No. 00-208 Ron E. Harm on, Chan cellor

No. W2005-00406-C OA-R3-C V - F iled April 5, 2006

I n this a ppeal, we are asked to de termine whether the chanc ery court properly g rante d s u m m ary judgme nt to the appellee s o n t he appe llant’s claims of malicious har assment and malicious prosec ution. W hen it g rante d summary judgme nt to the appellee s, the cha ncery court found that the appellant did not have a cognizable claim for malicious ha rassment be cause his claim was not base d on rac e, color , relig ion, natio n al o ri g in, or anc estry and that the a

ppellant’s cla ims for malicious prosec ution failed bec ause the appellee s had not initiated the prosec ution and probable cause exis ted to prosecute the appe llant. On appea l, the appellant asserts that the statute g ranting a civil cause of action for malicious hara ssment is not limit ed to case s based on rac e, color, relig ion, national orig in, or ance stry and that no probable cause exis ted to pr osecute the appellant. Further, t h e a p p ell ant arg ues that if he ha s stated a c og nizable claim for malicious hara ssment, the appellee s are not entitled to any absolute or qualif

i ed i m m u n ity

for their actions. Additionally , althoug h the appe llees won on this iss ue at tria l, the appellee s have appea led whether section 39-17- 309 of the Te nnessee Code stand ing a lon e g ive s rise to a private c aus e of

a c tio n. We aff

ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Robert T. Ke eton, I I I , Huntingdon, T N, for A ppellant Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter , Michae l E

. Moore, Solicitor Ge nera l, Ma rtha A. Campbell, Associate D eputy Attorney Gene ral, for

Appellee sT he s t at e c har ges wer e br ough t i n f eder al cour t pur s uan t t o 18 U

. S. C

. § 13 , which all o ws for f eder al 1
p ro se c u tio n o f a sta te c rim e fo r sta te c rim e s c o m m itt e d o n a re a s w ithin fed e ra l ju risd ic tio n a s p ro v id e d in 1 8 U .S .C . § 7. Si mps on a l l eged tha t t h e l an d w h er e t h e al t er ca t i on oc cu r r ed we r e l an ds w i t h i n f ede r al j u r i s di ct i on pu r s u an t t o 18 U

. S.C

. § 7 (3).

-2- OP IN ION
I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
Som et i m e d u ri n g the 1999-2000 hunting season a nd prior to J anuary 5, 2000, Mr. Steve Davis (“ Davis” or

“Appe llant”) purc hased f rom the permit holder the rig ht to duck hunt in blind 107 located in the Camden Wil dlife Mana g ement Ar ea, be tter known a s Camden B ottoms (the “B lind”). OnJanu ary

5, 20 00 , a

pp ro xima te ly

on e ho ur be fo resh oo tin g wa s to beg in that day , Da vis a ndhis hunting pa

rty arrived at the B lind. Upon arriva l, Davis and his hunting pa rty encou n tere d sever al unknown individuals alrea dy occupying the Blind. Subsequently , an alter cation occ urre d betwee n Davis and the unknown individuals. During the alter cati o n , o n e o f th e u n k n o w n in d iv id u a ls in th e B li n d w a s id e n ti f ie d a s a n o f

f ic e r of the Tenne ssee Wil dlife Resource s Ag ency (“TWRA”). After war ds, Davis and his hunting party left the Blind. The unknow n individuals were subse quently identified as DanFu qua (“ Fuqua ”), G reg Ba rker (“B arke r”) , Clay

Riley (“Riley ”), Richa

rd Stockdale ( “R. S t o ck d al e”) , and Robert “ Buddy ” B rien (“B rien” , and collec tively with Fuqua, B arke r, Riley , and R. Stockdale, the “ TWRA Officer s”).
There afte r, Assistant United States Attorney Tammi Simps on (“Simpson”) broug ht fede ral criminal cha

rg es ag ainst Davis. These char g es i ncluded: “f orce fully enter [i ng ] a duck blind before the leg al daily

opening shooting time beg an, k n o wi ng the blind was pre viouslyoccupie d by other mig ratory bir d h un te rs wh o w e re privi le g e d to theus e of sa id b lin d, a ndkn ow ing that he wa s n ot a permittee, thereby g iving him priority use of the blind over other mig ratory

bird hunters in violation of” state and fe dera l law; committing assault to forc efully enter a duck blind in violation of state law and fe dera l la w; and “disturb[ing] other hunters who wer e eng ag ed in the lawf ul proce ss of taking wi ld anim a l( s) a nd wh o we re e ng a g e d inthepr oc e ss o f t akin g , w ithint e nt t o d iss ua de a ndoth e rw ise pr e ve nt the takin g , in viol atio n of” state a ndfe de ra l la w. At tria l, a ll c ha

rg e s o the r tha n th e a ssa

ult 1 char g es we re dism i s sed upon a motion for judg ment of ac quittal at the close of theg overnme nt’s proof. The rema ining a ssault char g es we re dismissed af ter a bench trial.
On Dec ember

29, 2000, Davis filed a c omplaint ag ainst the TWRA, the TWR A Off icer s, Dr. Wins ton Panne ll ( “Pannell”) , Geor g e Akans, J r. (“A kans”) , Charles Peavyhouse (“Peavyhouse”) , Ear l B e n tz ( “ B e n tz ” ) , B e v e r ly Jo h n s o n ( “ Jo h n s o n ” ) , G

. L

. T e a g u e ( ‘ T e a g u e ” ) , T o m H e n sley (“H ensley ”), John F. Smolko, J r. (“ Smolko”), Ms. W ilda Ba rton (“B arton” ), Ray

Be ll (“B ell”), D an Wheeler ( “Wheeler ” and c ollectively with Pannell, Akans, Peavy h o u s e, Bentz, J ohnson, Teag ue, Hensley , Smolko, B arton, and Be ll, the “TWRA Com missioners”),Ga ry My ers ( “My ers” ), Ron Fox (“F ox ”), Mike Stockda le (“ M . Stockdale”) , and Ga ry Cook (“Cook” a nd collectively with theO n t hat s am e d ay, t he T W R A f i l ed a m o t i o n fo r s um m ary judgm ent cl ai m i ng s o verei gn i m m u n ity, and t he 2 T W R A C o m m i ssi o ne rs f i l ed a m o t i o n for sum m ary jud gm en t claim i ng no i nv o l ve m en t i n t he claim s asse rted b y D av i s.

-3- TWRA, the TW RA Offic ers, the T WR A Commiss ioners, My ers, F ox , and M

. S t o ck d ale, the

“ De fe nd a nts ” or “ Ap pe lle e s” ) a lle g ing ma lic iou s ha ra ssm e nt, ma lic iou s pr os e c uti on , civi l r ig hts intimi dation, and assault. On September 19, 2001, Davis ame nded his complaint to add a c laim for civil conspirac y

and to provide a dditional langua g e conc erning the orig inal claims. On April 29, 2003, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgme nt claiming that they wer e entitled to judgment a s a matter of law as to e ach of

Davis’ c l ai m s
. T he chancery court g rante d 2
su mma ry jud g me nt t o D e fe nd a nts a s to Da vis ’ m a lic iou s h ara ssm e nt, ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on , c ivi l rig hts inti midation, and civil conspira c y c la im s
. The c hance ry

court a lso gr anted summary judgme nt to every one except the TWRA Offic ers a s to Da v i s ’ assault claim. The chancery court then conducte d a trial on the me rits of Davis’ assault claim as to the TWRA Office rs. The c hance ry court found that an assault had been committed but that the of fice r who c ommitt ed the a ssault was immune from sui t beca

use he was “under the course and scope of his authority as a la w enf

orce ment office r a t th a t ti me ” a nd us e d a re a so na blea mou nt o f f

or c e . T he c ha nc e ry

c ou rt dis mis se d th e a ssa

ult c la im as to the other of

fice rs as the c laim was unsupported by the evidenc e.
I. I SSU ES P R ESENTED Appellant has timely

filed his notice of a

ppeal a nd prese nts the following issues f or re view: 1. Whe the r the chan cery c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

g rante d s umm ary

jud g me nt t o A pp e lle e s a s to Ap pe lla nt’ s malic iou s h ara ssm e nt c la ims ; 2. If A p pe lla nt h a s p ro pe rl y

state d a c la im f or ma lic iou s h ara ssm e nt, wh e the r A pp e lle e s p os se ss an absolute or

qualified immunitybarring A ppellant’s malicious har assment claims; and 3. Whe the r the c ha nc e ry c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

g rante d s umm ary

jud gment to App e lle e s a s to Ap pe lla nt’ s malic iou s p ro se c uti on c la ims

. Additionally , Appellee has pre sented the f ollowing issue f

or re view:
4. Whe the r the c ha nc e ry c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

g rante d s umm ary

jud g ment to App ellee s a s to Ap pe lla nt’ s c ivi l r ig hts int imi datio n c laims

. F or thefo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the c ha nc e ry

c ou rt

.

III
. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW-4-

Th is a pp e a l in vo lve s se ve ra l st a nd ard s o f r e vie w. F ir st, a s o ur su pr e me c ou rt

ha s p re vio us ly stated, [t ]he standard for revie wing a g rant of summary judgme nt is de novo without any

presumption that the trial court’s conclusions wer e corr ect. S e e M

o o n ey v. Sne ed , 30 S.W .3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000)

. Sum mary jud g me nt is app ro pria te on ly wh e n the mov ing party demonstrates that there are no g enuine issues of material fa ct and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of la w. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 5 6. 04 ; Penleyv. Honda M otor Co. , 3 1 S

. W .3d 181, 183 (Tenn. 20 00 ); By rd

v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993) . I n revie wing there c or d, “ c ou rt s mu st v ie w the e vid e nc e in the lig ht mos t f a vo ra ble to the nonmoving pa

rty and must also draw all rea sonable infe renc es in the nonmoving pa

rty ’s fa vor.” Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000). “I f bot h the facts and conclusions to be draw n t h er efr om permit a re asonable person to re ach only one conclusion, then summary judgme nt is appropriate .” Seavers v. Me tho dis t M

e d. Ctr

. , 9 S.W .3d 86, 91 (Tenn. 1999)

. Bro ok s v . Bd. of

Pr of'l Re sp ons ibi lit

y of the Supr e me Co urt , 145 S.W .3d 519, 524 (Tenn. 2004)

. Further, this Court review s fac tual finding s of a tria l court sitting with o u t a j u ry u n der a de novo standard with a presumption of correc tness for those f indings, Te nn. R. App. P. 13(d), and re views a tria l c ou rt ’s le g a l c on c lus ion s de novo wi th no pr e su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss f or tho se c on c lus ion s, Union C arbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 8 5 4 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 , 9 1 (T en n
. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Estate of Adkins v. W hite Consol. Indus., Inc. , 788 S.W .2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989))

. IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. M alic iou s Ha ra ssme nt On appe al, Appellant c ontends that the chancery court e rre d when it g rante d summary judgme nt to Appellees a s to Appellant’s malicious hara ssment claims beca use hi s claims wer e not based on any

hara ssment due to his race , relig ion, ance stry , or national orig in. We disagr ee.
Sin c e thi s c la im w a s d e c ide d o n s umm ary jud g me nt, we mus t a naly ze i t w ith in that c on te xt. As su c h, ou r an a ly sis be g ins wi th wh e the r the re are a ny dis pu te d issu e s of ma te ri a l fa c ts. As to this c la im, the re are no dis pu te d is su e s o f m a te ri a l f a c t. Thus, summary

judgme nt as to this claim was ap p ropriate if, afte r viewing the fa cts in the light most favor able to Appe llant , Ap p el l ees w ere entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law

. Appellant conte nds that Appellee s were not entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law beca use sec tion-5-

4-21-701 of

the Tenne ssee Code does not r equire a claim to be base d on rac e, re ligion, anc estry , or national orig in.
As this Court has stated in Lev y v. Franks , 159 S.W .3d 66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), [t ]he malicious harassment statute, Te nnessee Code Annotated, se ction 4-21-701, provides: “(a ) There is here by cre ated a civil cause of action for malicious hara ssment. (b) A pe rson may be liable to the victim of malicious hara ssment fo r both special a nd gen er al d am age s , i n cl u d i n g, b u tn o t l i m i t ed t o , d am age s fo r emotional distress, rea sonable attorney ’s fee s and costs, and punitive damag es.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-701 (1998). The elements of the tort cr eate d by thi s st a tut e we re ou tli ne d b y the T e nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt in W as hin gto n v . R ob e rts on Cou nty :

[A] claim o f ma li c io u s h a r a s s me n t r equire s not only th a t a

pe rs on a c te d ma lic iou sly , i. e ., ill -w ill , hat red or sp ite , b ut a lso that a

pe rs on un la wf

ull y inti mi d a te d a n o th e r

f r o m th e f

r e e e xe r c is e or enjoy ment of a c onstitut ional rig ht b y injuring or threatening to injure or coer cing another person or by damag ing, destroying or defa cing any rea l or persona l property of anothe r per son.
W as hin gto n v. Ro be rts on Cou nty , 29 S.W .3d 466, 473 (Tenn. 2000)

. W ashington made it clea

r th at, in order

to establish a claim under section 4 -2 1-701, the victim must show that the perpe trator intentionally

intimi dated t h e v ictim from the fre e exerc ise of a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht.
W ashington , howeve r, did not d i re ctly addre ss whether malicious hara ssment under sec tion 4-21-701 must be motivated by the victim’s rac e, color , relig ion, ance stry or national orig in, as was held by the trial court be low. That issue was a ddresse d by this Court in Surb er v. Cannon , 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 91, No. M1998-00928-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 120735 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 14, 2 0 0 1 ). In Surber , the minor plaintiff wa s subjected on two oc c a sio ns to the de fe nd a nt’ s le wda nde xhibi tio nis t be ha vi or whil e walking her dog in front of he r home. 2001 Tenn. App. LEXI S 91 at *1-2. Surber

contende d that the def endant’ s malic i o u s behavior deprive d her of her constitutional rig ht to privac y , and was directed at her beca use of he r g ender . 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 91 at *5. After revie wing the short but con v o l uted leg islative history of sec tion-6- 4-21-701, a s well as the Tennessee Supreme Court’s analy sis of the statute in W

as hin gto n v . R ob e rts on Cou nty , the Su rb e r court de nied Sur be r’ s c la im o f m a lic iou s h ara ssm e nt f or tw o a lte rn a tiv e re a so ns
. As the first re ason, the Su rb e r court he ld: “T here is simpl y no evidenc e in this rec ord t hat [ defe ndant]’s actions were moti vated by any intent to inti midate Ms. Surber .

. . . [or] to preve nt her fr om exercising any

civil rig ht or as retribution for the ex erc ise of any such rig ht by her.” 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 91 at *6. As an alternative basis for its holding, the Su rb e r court stated:

I n addition, there is n o evidenc e that [the defe ndant]’s actions wer e dire cted towa rd Ms. Surber beca use of he r “r ace , color, a ncestry , relig ion or nation al origin,” a nd she does not claim they wer e. Rather, she asserts a g ender -base d motivation . . . and arg ues that Tenn.C o de Ann. § 4- 21-701 should be rea d to include ge n d er ba sed har assment. B ased on W ashington , we c ann ot broade n the leg islature’s de f in it io n o f

ma li c io u s h ar a s s me n t b e y o n d the e le me nts of

c ivi l ri ghts i nti mid a tio n, a s se t ou t in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39- 17- 309. Having considere d the plain lang uag e of § 309, w e fail to see that its reac h extends to gende r base d discrimination.
2001 Tenn. App. LEXI S 91 at *6. Thus, the Surber court c oncluded that, to be actionable under section 4-21-701, the hara ssment must be based on the v i ctim’s “ra ce, c olor, anc estry , relig ion or national orig in.” Id.
Lev y , 159 S.W .3d at 80-81 (footnote omitted). Additionally , we noted that even if the alternative rea soning in Su rb e r was dicta , the rea soning was persua sive g iven that it wa s “consistent with case s decide d prior to W

ashington , in which s ec t i o n 4-21-701 ha s consistently been inter

prete d as
r e q u irin g a p r o te c te d c la s s u n d e r [s e c ti o n ] 3 9

- 1 7

- 3 0 9 [o f th e T e n n e s s e e Code].” Id. at 81 (c iting You n g v
. S ta te F

a r m M u t. A u to

. I

n s
. Co. , 86 8 F. Su pp . 9 37 , 9 42 -4 3 ( W.D . T e nn . 1 99 4) ; Parr v. Middle Tenn. State Univ. , N o. M1 99 9- 01 44 2- CO A- R3- CV , 1 99 9 WL 10 86 451, a t *4 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. De c . 3 , 1 99 9) (p e rm . a pp . d e nie d) ; Vafaie v. Owens , No. 92C-1642, 1996 WL 502133, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 6, 1996))

. We can f ind no basi s t o disag ree with our prior re asoning . As such, a c laim for malicious hara ssment must be based on ra ce, c olor, anc estry , relig ion, or national orig in. As Appellant has failed to state a

claim for ma licious harassment ba sed on rac e, color, ance stry , relig ion, or national orig in, the chanc ery

court prope rly gra n t ed summary judgme nt to Appellees a s to this i ssue. A c c o r d i n g l y , w e a f

f i r m t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e c h a n c e r y c o u r t a s t o t h i s i s s u e
. Thus, th e is s ue as to-7-

whether A p p e ll e e s p o s s e s s ana

b s o lu te o r q u alif ied immunitybarring A ppellant’s claim for malicious hara ssment is pretermitted.
B. Maliciou s Prosecution Additionally , Appellant contends that the chanc ery court err ed when it g ranted s u m mary judgme nt to Appellees a s to his malicious prosecution claims. At trial, the chancery court g rante d summary judgme nt to Appellees be cause it found that S i m p s o n i nitiated the prosec ution and that Simps on had probable cause to initiate the prosec ution be cause she conf err ed with her

supervisor, conducte d her ow n investigation, and completed he r own leg al re sear ch.
I n a ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on c aus e of a c tio n, “ [a] p la int if

f mus t sh ow (a ) that a

prior la ws uit or judicial proc eeding was broug ht aga i n s t t he plaintiff without proba ble cause, (b) that the prior lawsuit or judicial proc eeding wa s broug ht ag ainst the plaintiff with malice, and (c) that the prior lawsuit or judicial proc eeding terminated in the plaintiff’s fa vor.” Pa rri sh v . M ar qui s , 172 S.W .3d 5 2 6 , 5 3 0 (T en n
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Christ ian v. Lapidus , 8 33 S.W. 2d71 , 7 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) ; Roberts v. Fe d. Express Corp. , 842 S.W .2d 246, 248 (Tenn. 1992) ).
Ho we ve r, Ap pe ll ant ’s pr e se nt s uit fo r m a lic iou s p ro se c uti on wa s n ot b ro ug ht a g a ins t Simps on. Rather, the ma l i ci o u s prosec ution suit was broug ht ag ainst the TWRA Office rs who broug ht the fac ts surrounding the incident to the attention of Simpson. As this Court has previously stated, [o] ne who c auses another’s prosecution by false statements or misrepre sentations, made to a police office r, with an improper mot ive , is lia

ble fo r ma lic iou s pr os e c uti on , a lth ou g h h e do e s n ot f ile a complaint or actually

procur e the pr osecution. Where, how ever , he dis c los e s in g oo d faith , to a po lic e of fi c e r, or oth e r p ub lic of

fi c e r, a ll fac ts within hi s knowledg e having a materia l bearing on the question of the g uilt of the person suspec ted and lea ves it to the office r to ac t entirely on his own judgme nt and responsibil ity as a public of

fice r as to wh e the r or no t the re sh a ll b e a c ri min a l pr os e c uti on , h e is n ot l ia ble in an ac t ion for malicious prose cution by rea son of the er

roneous co n cl u s i o n o f t h e o ff

i ce r t h att h e f

ac t s w a r r a n th i mi n i n s t i t u t i n g a criminal prose cution. Cohen v. Ferguson , 336 S.W

. 2 d 9 4 9 , 9 5 4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959) ( citing 54 C.J.S

. Malicious Prosecution § 17).
As thi s c la im w a s d isp os e d o f o n s umm ary jud g me nt, we mus t a na ly ze i t in thi s con te xt. Thus, our ana ly sis beg ins with whether ther e wa s a g enuine issue of materia l fac ts to thi s claim.W e ar e mi ndf ul t hat A pp el l ant has po i nt ed t o s eve r al s t at ement s mad e i n Si mp s on’ s depo s i t i on an d U ni t ed 3 St at es Fi s h a nd W i l dl i fe Ser vi ce Speci al Agent Zack G r een ’ s depo s i t i on t o di s put e wh et her a g enu i ne i s s ue of mat er i al f act exi st s as t o whet her t he T W R A O f f i cers l i ed t o Simp son as t o t he event s t hat o ccurred o n t he m o rni ng of January 5, 2000. H owe v er , t h es e s t at eme n t s of fer n o e v i den ce as t o wh et h er t h e T W RA O f f i ce r s l i ed t o Si mps on a s t h ey do n ot p ert ai n t o what t he T W R A O f f i cers t o l d Simp son. -8- I n th is c a se , A pp e lle e s f

ile d a statem ent of undis pu te d mate ri a l f a c ts i n s up po rt

of the ir motion for summary

judgme nt, which i n cl u d ed stateme nts that asserted that “the TWRA office rs wer e forthcoming in pr oviding [S impson] with a ccur ate information” and that no one coe rce d her into prosecuting Appellant. I n support of these statements, Appellee s prese nted Simpson’s deposition as evidenc e. I n response , Appellant st ated that Appellee s had li ed to Simpson about the e ve nts that oc c ur

re d o n Jan ua

ry 5, 20 00 . H ow e ve r, Ap pe llant f a ile d to po int

to any evi den ce to su pp ort th is c la im. 3 As our supre me court stated in By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208 (Tenn. 1993) , [o] nce it is shown by the moving pa rty that there is no ge nuine issue of material fac t, the nonmoving pa rty must then demonstrate, by aff idavits or discovery materia ls, that there is a g enuine, mate rial fa ct dispute to warr ant a tria l. Fo wle r v . H ap py Goodm an Fa mi ly , 575 S.W. 2d49 6, 49 8 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) ; Merritt v. W ilson Ct y. Bd. of Zoning Ap pe als , 656 S.W .2d 846, 85 9 (Tenn. A pp. 1983). I n this reg ard, Rul e 56 .0 5 pro vid e s th a t th e no nmo vin g pa rty c a nn ot s imp ly

re ly upon his pleading s but must s et forth spe cific f acts showing that ther e is a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t for trial. “ I f he doe s not so respond, summary judgme nt . . . shall be enter ed ag ainst him.” Rule 56.05. By rd , 8 47 S.W. 2da t 21 1. He re , A pp e llant h a s f a ile d to me e t hi s b ur de n to de mon str a te a dis pu te as to whethe r Appe llees provided f alse stateme nts or m i s re p re s entations to Sim pson. Thus, we cannot say

that a dispute of mate rial fa ct exist s. Given this undisp u t ed fa ct , the chancery court properly g rante d summary

judgme nt as Appellee s wereen t i t l ed to judgment a s a matter of law. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the c hance ry court’s de cision as to this iss ue. C. Civil R ights Intim idation On appeal, although they wer e succ essful at trial on this issue, Appellee s have r aised the issue as to whether the chancery court e rre d when it g rante d summary judgme nt as to Appellant’s civil rig hts inti midation cases. At tria l, the chanc ery court g rante d summary

judgme nt to Appellees as to Appellant’s c ivil rights intimidation claims because, a fter r eviewing the factors t o determine whether a criminal statute creates a private rig ht of ac tion as set fo rt h in Buckner v. Carlton , 623 S.W .2d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), it found that the criminal civil rig hts inti midation statute did not c re a te a private c aus e of

a c tio n, “ e sp e c ia lly

in l ight of th e fa c t th a t th e ree xists a sp e c if ic statut e g ranting the private cause of ac tion.” Additionally , the cha ncery court found that even if the criminal-9-

c ivi l rig hts statut e c re a te d a private c aus e of a c tio n, Ap pe llant h a d n ot s ta te d th a t hi s c la im f or c ivi l rig hts inti midation because his claim was not base d upon rac e, religion, ancestry or national orig in.
Sin c e thi s c la im w a s d e c ide d o n s umm ary jud g me nt, we mus t a naly ze i t w ith in that c on te xt. As su c h, ou r a na ly sis be g ins wi th wh e the r the rearea ny dis pu te d is su e s o f m a te ri a l f a c ts. As to this c la im, the re are no dis pu te d is su e s o f m a te ri a l f a c t. Thus, summary

judgme nt as to this claim was appropri ate if, after viewing the fa cts in the light most favor able to Appe llant, Appellees w ere entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law

. As we ha ve pre viouslystated in Buckner v. Carlton , 623 S.W .2d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), [t ]he leading case on the i mplication of a private cause of ac tion from th e vi olat ionof

a c ri min a l st a tut e is Cor t v . A sh , 4 2 2 U

. S

. 6 6 , 9 5 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L . Ed. 2d 26 (1975). The C o u rt listed three f actor s rele vant her e in determining this issue. “F irst, is the plaintiff one of the class f

or whose e specia l benef

it the statute was ena cted.” Id. at 2088. “Second, is the re any indication of leg islative intent, ex plicit or implicit, either to create or de ny ” a pr ivate ca use of a ction. Id. Third, is the private c ause of action consistent with t he underly ing pur poses of the leg islation.
Buckner , 623 S.W .2d at 105. Analy z i n g t his case unde r these f actor s, we find that Appe llant cannot, as a matter of la w, maintain a private cause of action under section 39-17-309 of the Tenne ssee Code standing alone. First, Appe llant is not one of the class whose benef it this statu t e wa s enac ted. The Te nnessee le g isl a tur e e na c te d s e c tio n 39- 17 -3 09 of the Te nn e sse e Cod e to p ro te c t in div idu a ls f ro m c ivi l r ig hts intimi dation based on r ace , color, a ncestry , relig ion, or national orig in. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 17-309(a ). Appe llant is not wit hin any of these pr otected c lasses.
Further, we conclude that the leg islature did not i n t en d to confe r a private ca use of a ction based on se ction 39-17-309 of the Tenne ssee Code standing alone. In Washin gto n v. R o b ert son Coun ty , the Tenne ssee Supr em e C o u rt “conc lude[d] that the eleme nts of a civil malicious ha ra ssm e nt a c tio n u nd e r T e nn . Co de An n. § 4 -2 1- 70 1 a rede ri ve d f

ro m the c ri min a l off

e ns e of c ivi l rig hts intimidation unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-309.” Washin gton , 29 S.W .3d at 468. Given that the leg islature has statutorily enac ted a c ivil remedy

for c riminal v io lations of section 39-17- 309, we c annot say

that the leg islature intended to c onfer a private rig ht of action under section 39-17- 309 standing alone. I f the leg islature had intende d to do so, it would not have enac ted s ection 4-21- 701 of the Te nnessee Code. As a private ac tion cannot be maintaine d for a claim under section 39-17-309 standing alone, we c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e c h a n c e r y c o u r t p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t t o A p p e l l e e s a s t o th is issue. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the c hance ry court’s de cision as to this iss ue.-10- V. C ONCL US I ON
F or the a fo re me nti on e d r e a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the c ha nc e ry

c ou rt . Co sts of

thi s app e a l a reta xedto A pp e lla nt, Ste ve Da vis , a ndhis su re ty , f or wh ic h e xec uti on ma y

is su e if
n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE