2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-31-2013

USA v. Anthony Clay

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-2803

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Anthony Clay" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 775.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________

No. 12-2803

_________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANTHONY CLAY,

Appellant

________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00419-001)

District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

_______

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 10, 2013

Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: May 31, 2013) 

______________

O P I N I O N

______________
2

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

Anthony Clay appeals the District Court‟s imposition of a 240-month sentence of 

imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release. For the reasons below, we 

will affirm.

1

I.

In 2008, Clay was arrested and found in possession of 2.783 grams of cocaine 

base, a handgun, and $305 in cash. He was charged with possessing cocaine base with 

intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); possessing a firearm 

in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and 

possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Clay was convicted after a trial. At sentencing, Clay did not dispute 

that the career offender guideline applied to him, but argued that the range the guideline 

produced – 360 months to life – was too high. The District Court departed downward 

and sentenced Clay to 240 months imprisonment, followed by six years of supervised 

release. The Court stressed the seriousness of the offense and deterrence as reasons for 

the sentence. Clay appealed his sentence. 

This court vacated and remanded for resentencing, citing two errors: The District 

Court may have mistakenly believed that the mandatory minimum term of supervised 

release on Count One was six years, when it was three years; and the sentence imposed 

on Count Three exceeded the statutory maximum. See United States v. Clay, 449 F. 

 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
3

App‟x 227, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2011). On remand, Clay documented that during the 

pendency of his appeal, he had been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. He had not 

previously been diagnosed with a mental illness. Clay argued for a lower sentence in 

both his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing. He stated that the 

recently diagnosed illness required the Court to reconsider its previous sentence pursuant 

to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) considerations of deterrence, just punishment, and 

rehabilitation. The District Court imposed a sentence of 240 months, followed by five 

years of supervised release. Clay timely appealed. 

II.

Clay asserts that the District Court erred by failing to meaningfully consider his 

mental illness in determining his sentence. The Government contends that our previous 

remand limited the District Court to addressing the two identified errors, and the Court 

could not consider Clay‟s mental illness. The Government further argues that even if the 

District Court could consider Clay‟s mental illness, we should review for plain error 

because Clay did not object to the sufficiency of the District Court‟s consideration of his

mental health diagnosis. Clay states that he preserved the issue by alerting the District 

Court to his mental illness in both his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing 

hearing. Therefore, we should review for abuse of discretion. 

We need not decide whether the remand limited the District Court or whether Clay 

properly preserved the issue. Even assuming that the Court was not limited and the issue 

was preserved, the District Court did not abuse its discretion. 
4

In sentencing a defendant, a district court must specifically address non-frivolous 

arguments by the parties “in a way that allows [the appellate court] to review the sentence 

for reasonableness.” United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 2006); see also

United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“The touchstone of 

„reasonableness‟ is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 

consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”); United States v. 

Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he court must acknowledge and respond 

to any properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a 

factual basis.”).

Here, the District Court listened to arguments from defense counsel and the 

Government regarding Clay‟s mental illness. After imposing the sentence, the Court 

responded to Clay‟s arguments by acknowledging that it had “consider[ed] the change in 

circumstances or the information that the court now has in regard to your client‟s mental 

health status.” App. at 117. On this record, we are not prepared to state that the Court 

failed to sufficiently consider Clay‟s mental illness.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.