J-A20025-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ESTATE OF WALTER J. 

KONJOLKA

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

APPEAL OF: TARA JOLLEY KONJOLKA 

BROWN

Appellant No. 1664 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order entered October 1, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans' Court at No: 0936 of 2014

BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2017

Appellant Tara Jolley Konjolka Brown (“Brown”) appeals from the 

October 1, 2015 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny 

County (“trial court”) denying the petition to admit the codicil dated July 1, 

2012, (“Codicil”) into probate. Appellee is the Estate of Walter J. Konjolka. 

Upon review, we affirm.

Walter J. Konjolka, (“the Decedent”) died testate on February 3, 2014. 

On February 13, 2014, testamentary letters were granted to Ena W. 

Konjolka (“Konjolka”) for the Decedent’s will dated October 15, 2003 (“the 

Will”). On October 14, 2014, Brown filed a petition for citation seeking to 

have a codicil dated July 1, 2012, into probate. Konjolka filed an answer 

and new matter on December 4, 2014, asserting the Codicil was a forgery. 
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Brown filed a reply to the new matter on January 23, 2015. Konjolka and 

Brown filed pre-trial statements on April 20, 2015. The trial court held a 

hearing on May 4-5, 2015. Following a hearing, the trial court made the 

following fact and credibility findings in its June 30, 2015 opinion.

Both parties presented the testimony of expert witnesses

with regard to whether the Decedent’s signature on the Codicil 

was a forgery. [Brown’s] expert, George Papadopoulos, opined 

that the signature was authentic, while the Executrix’s expert, 

Khody Detwiller determined that the signature was a “crude 

imitation” and not a genuine signature. Their reports were 

introduced as Exhibits A and 6, respectively, along with Exhibit 

7, which was Mr. Detwiller’s enlarged comparison charts. The 

[trial court found] Mr. Detwiller’s testimony to be more 

convincing for the following reasons. First, Mr. Detwiller’s 

credentials, education, and training are superior to that of Mr. 

Papadopoulos. Second, Mr. Detwiller’s techniques, including the 

scanning of the signatures at high resolution of 800DPI and 1200 

DPI, are superior to Mr. Papadopoulos’s use of a hand-held 

magnifying glass of unknown strength. Third, Mr. Detwiller’s 

analysis of each portion of the known signatures vs. the 

questioned signature was infinitely more detailed than the 

analysis put forth by Mr. Papadopoulos. Accordingly, the [trial 

court] relied more heavily on the opinion of Mr. Detwiller.

In addition to the testimony of the experts, [Brown] 

presented the testimony of Isaac Melvin, who was the Notary 

Public. Mr. Melvin testified the Decedent called him and asked 

him to notarize the document. He met the Decedent, along with 

the three witnesses, at the Steak ‘n Shake on Route 51 on July 

1, 2012. He requested identification from each of them and he 

witnessed the Decedent signing the document, which he 

notarized for a fee of $100. Conveniently, Mr. Melvin’s notary 

log was “destroyed in a fire” and he did not produce any 

evidence of payment. The Court finds the loss of the notary log 

book to be dubious and the $100 payment for a single notary act 

to be extraordinary; thus, Mr. Melvin’s testimony was 

questionable. 

[Brown] also presented her own testimony, the testimony 

of her [h]usband, and the testimony of Joseph DeSalvo. All 
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three of these witnesses testified that they were present when 

the Decedent signed the Codicil and they were witnesses to his 

signature. [Brown’s] testimony was self-serving and her 

credibility was questionable based upon her criminal history and 

check forgery introduced as Exhibit 1. Also, the fact that she 

threatened the Executrix with “war” in an email and then 

appeared with the purported Codicil almost three months later, 

which was over eight months after the Decedent’s death is 

suspicious. The testimony of [Brown’s] [h]usband was also selfserving in that he would benefit, even if indirectly, if [Brown] 

received an inheritance from her father. With regard to Joseph 

DeSalvo, there was testimony that he was incarcerated on the 

date that the Codicil was allegedly signed. He claimed to have 

been on “work release” from the Fayette County Jail; however, 

[Brown] failed to produce any evidence, even after the hearing, 

to prove that claim. As such, the [trial court was] skeptical that 

it was true, especially in light of the fact that Mr. DeSalvo 

claimed that he was the only person to ever be granted work 

release from the Fayette county Jail and he was permitted to 

basically come-and-go as he pleased.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/15, at 1-3 (sic).

On July 17, 2015, Brown filed exceptions/objections to the trial court’s 

decision. On July 21, 2015, the trial court established a briefing schedule on 

Brown’s exceptions. By order entered October 1, 2015, the trial court 

denied the exceptions to the trial court’s June 30, 2015 opinion. Brown filed 

a timely notice of appeal on October 22, 2015. The trial court did not 

request a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, instead, 

the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporating its June 30, 

2015 opinion.

This Court issued an order on January 24, 2017, striking the brief of 

the Estate of Walter J. Konjolka and Brown’s reproduced record as the 

documents contained confidential personal identification information of a 
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non-party. The parties were directed to file identical documents with all 

confidential information redacted. Appellee filed a redacted brief on January 

30, 2017,1and Appellant filed a redacted reproduced record on March 10, 

2017. 

On appeal, Brown raises four issues which we quote verbatim.

1. The [trial] court erred by patently ignoring the clear and 

convincing evidence burden of Appellee in making its 

decision. The [trial] court’s own findings of fact can only 

support a decision that the codicil in question was genuine.

2. The [trial] court erred as a matter of law by admitting into 

evidence a detailed expert report that had never been 

provided to [Brown’s] counsel, additionally th[e trial] court 

further erred by permitting the Appellee’s expert to testify 

extensively with regard to said report.

3. The [trial] court erred by patently ignoring established case 

law holding that expert testimony in a forgery case holds very 

little weight and cannot prevail against credible testimony of 

fact witnesses.

4. The [trial] court erred by permitting a witness to testify that 

was never listed on Appellee’s pre-trial statement and 

unknown to [Brown’s] counsel. The [trial] court further erred 

by admitting into evidence documents that were brought by 

this witness that had never been seen by [Brown’s] counsel.

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

Brown’s first claim is a challenge to the trial court’s findings of fact. 

Our standard of review of such claim is well established. 

____________________________________________

1 While Appellee redacted the information, upon scanning the document into 

this Court’s computer system, the redacted information remains visible. 

Thus, we will order that the scanned document be sealed from public 

viewing.
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When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans’ Court, this 

Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error 

and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence. 

Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines 

the credibility of the witnesses, and on review, we will not 

reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of 

discretion.

In re Estate of Cruciani, 986 A.2d 853, 855 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In 

re: Estate of Presutti, 783 A.2d 803, 805 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation 

omitted)). Moreover, in cases involving alleged forgery, the moving party 

“has the burden of proving the existence of the forged document by clear, 

direct, precise, and convincing evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Additionally, “forgery presents an issue of fact, the resolution of the issue 

necessarily turns on the court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.” 

Id. (citations omitted). 

In the matter sub judice, the trial court found the testimony of Brown’s 

witnesses, Melvin, DeSalvo, Joseph Brown, and Brown herself, incredible. 

Upon review, we find that the trial court adequately explained the reasons 

for finding this testimony incredible; thus, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/15, at 1-3. Moreover, the trial 

court found that the expert testimony provided by Mr. Detwiler was more 

credible than the testimony of Mr. Papadopoulos, due to his superior 

credentials, education, training, technique, and his analysis was significantly 

more detailed. See id. at 1-2. The record supports this finding. Upon 

review, the trial court found there was clear and convincing evidence that 
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the codicil in question was a forgery and did not abuse its discretion; thus, 

Brown’s first claim fails.

Relatedly, Brown argues that the trial court improperly weighed the 

testimony of Mr. Detwiler because “[t]he Supreme Court has held that the 

opinion evidence of an expert is, in cases of forgery, entitled to very little 

weight and cannot prevail against positive evidence of actual facts by 

witnesses.” Appellant’s Brief at 15 (citing In re Elias’ Estate, 239 A.2d 

393, 396 (Pa. 1968) (additional citations omitted)). While Brown quotes the 

holding of Elias, she omits a key phrase resulting in a misstatement of the 

holding in that case. The complete holding reads as follows: “the opinion 

evidence of an expert, is in cases of forgery, entitled to very little weight and 

cannot prevail against positive evidence of actual facts by witnesses whom 

the Chancellor considers credible.” Elias, 239 A.2d at 396. As 

discussed above, the trial court found the testimony of Brown’s fact 

witnesses incredible. Thus, Brown’s third claim fails. 

Next, Brown argues that the trial court erred by permitting Mr. 

Detwiller to testify, and admitting his expert report into the record. 

Appellant fails to develop the argument with citation to and analysis of 

relevant authority; thus, Brown’s claim is waived. See Harris v. Toys “R” 

Us-Penn, Inc., 880 A.2d 1270, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(b); Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305, 319 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

Even if Brown’s claim was not waived, it is meritless. Brown cites 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5, which deals with the discovery of expert testimony and 
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an expert report, not the admission of expert testimony. Brown’s second 

claim fails.

Finally, Brown argues that the trial court erred by permitting Michelle 

Horan, the Fayette County Prison records supervisor, to testify because she 

was not listed as a witness on the pretrial statement. Brown fails to cite to 

any legal authority for this proposition other than a blanket assertion that it 

was a violation of Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.5. Thus Brown’s claim is waived for 

failing to develop an argument. See Harris, 880 A.2d at 1279; Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(b). Even if Brown’s claim was not waived, it is meritless, since Rule 

4003.5 applies to the discovery of expert testimony, not the admissibility of 

impeachment testimony. 

Order affirmed. Appellee’s Brief is ordered to be sealed from public 

view.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/2017