NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2007-5167 

BRIAN GREER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

 Brian Greer, of Walnut Creek, California, pro se. 

A. Bondurant Eley, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. With her 

on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Acting Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, 

and Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Assistant Director. 

Appealed from: United States Court of Federal Claims 

Judge Thomas C. Wheeler 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-5167 

BRIAN GREER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

 ___________________________ 

 DECIDED: December 4, 2007 

 ___________________________ 

Before RADER, Circuit Judge, CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and DYK, Circuit 

Judge. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Brian Greer (“Greer”) appeals from a decision of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because 

that court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Greer’s complaint, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

 The dispute in this case stems from labor grievances filed by Greer against his 

former employer, Safeway, Inc. (“Safeway”), with the National Labor Relations Board 

(“NLRB”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Greer alleges 

that the NLRB and EEOC disclosed the grievance filings to Safeway, which in turn 

disclosed them to other prospective employers. He alleges that he has been unable to 

find employment as a result. Greer filed this action in the Court of Federal Claims 
against the NLRB and the EEOC, alleging that the agencies breached a contract with 

him in which they agreed, through statements on their websites and through an 

“obligation inherent and obvious within [the retaliation] laws,” J.A. at 18, to protect him, 

as a complainant, from retaliation by employers.1 He asserted that the agencies 

breached this alleged contract by providing Safeway with a copy of Greer’s complaint 

and thereby “licensing” Safeway to distribute the complaint to other prospective 

employers. Greer also asserted several equitable causes of action based on this 

alleged breach, seeking, among other things, an injunction ordering the agencies to 

keep the fact of filing of complaints confidential. In a later filing, Greer added claims 

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under the prohibition against bills of 

attainder in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.

 The Court of Federal Claims granted the government’s motion to dismiss the 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Greer alleged jurisdiction under the 

Tucker Act, which authorizes the Court of Federal Claims to hear claims against the 

United States founded upon, inter alia, “any express or implied contract with the United 

 1

 Greer relies on the following statement from the NLRB website: “The 

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects employees’ rights to engage in protected 

concerted activities with or without a union, [including] an employee speaking to his/her 

employer on behalf of him/herself and one or more co-workers about improving 

workplace conditions.” NLRB: About Us, 

http://www.nlrb.gov/Workplace_Rights/i_am_new_to_this_website/what_are_protected_

concerted_activities.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). 

 Greer also relies on the following statement from the EEOC website: “An 

employer may not fire, demote, harass or otherwise ‘retaliate’ against an individual for 

filing a charge of discrimination . . . .” Retaliation, 

http://www.eeoc.gov/types/retaliation.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). 

 Finally, Greer relies on several federal and state laws, including the National 

Labor Relations Act and the California Labor Code. See J.A. at 18. 

2007-5167 2 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000). The court noted that the jurisdiction granted by 

the Tucker Act does not extend to contracts implied in law. Hercules, Inc. v. United 

States, 516 U.S. 417, 423 (1996). The court found that, accepting the undisputed 

allegations as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, no express or 

implied in fact contract existed between Greer and the United States. Thus, “[i]f the 

Court were to find that [the United States] took on a contractual obligation to Mr. Greer 

when he filed his grievances, it would have to be based on an implied in law contract 

which the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider.” Greer v. United States, No. 07-123C, 

slip op. at 3-4 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 1, 2007). The court also determined that it lacked 

jurisdiction over Greer’s other claims. It could not consider a due process claim unless 

it was ancillary to a claim for money damages, and Greer had not asserted a claim for 

damages over which the court had jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Fourteenth 

Amendment, which acts as a restraint only upon the states, was inapplicable to a claim 

against the federal government. Finally, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider Greer’s 

equitable claims because “the Tucker Act does not allow for the award of equitable or 

injunctive relief, except in limited circumstances not applicable here.” Id., slip op. at 4. 

 Greer timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION 

 We review the decision of the Court of Federal Claims to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Sanders v. United States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1333 

(Fed. Cir. 2001). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that the court possessed 

jurisdiction over his complaint. See id.

2007-5167 3 
 Greer’s first argument on appeal is that the Court of Federal Claims did have 

jurisdiction over his complaint, because his purported contract with the government was 

not an implied in law contract. We reject this argument. An express or an implied-infact contract with the government requires, as one element, “’actual authority’ on the 

part of the government’s representative to bind the government.” Schism v. United 

States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Night Vision Corp. v. 

United States, 469 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that elements for express 

and implied-in-fact contracts are the same). The Court of Federal Claims correctly 

found that this element was not satisfied here, because Greer did not allege that any 

government representative with actual authority agreed to bind the United States to a 

contract. Greer v. United States, No. 07-123C, slip op. at 4. Rather, if any contractual 

obligation on the part of the United States were to be found from the alleged promises, 

“it would have to be based on an implied in law contract,” id., slip op. at 3-4, which “is a 

‘fiction of law’ where ‘a promise is imputed to perform a legal duty.’” Hercules, 516 U.S. 

at 424 (internal citation omitted). The Court of Federal Claims correctly found that it 

would lack jurisdiction over such a contract even if one did exist, because the Tucker 

Act’s grant of jurisdiction extends only to express and implied-in-fact contracts. Id. at 

423. 

 Greer’s second argument is that, upon determining that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction, the court was required to transfer the case sua sponte to a court of proper 

jurisdiction. We reject this argument. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, a federal court that 

lacks jurisdiction is permitted, “if it is in the interest of justice, [to] transfer such action or 

appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at 

2007-5167 4 
2007-5167 5 

the time it was filed or noticed.” In this case, there was no other such court in which 

Greer’s damages action could have been brought. Transfer under section 1631 is 

authorized only to the courts listed in 28 U.S.C. § 610: “the courts of appeals and 

district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the 

Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the 

United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade.” None of 

those courts, however, would have had jurisdiction over Greer’s claim. Greer sought to 

recover damages of over four million dollars from the United States. The Court of 

Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims under the Tucker Act for money 

damages exceeding $10,000. See Christopher Village, L.P. v. United States, 360 F.3d 

1319, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The court therefore lacked the ability to transfer the 

claim under section 1631 because there was no other federal court in which it could 

have been brought. Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 

transfer Greer’s equitable claims to another federal court. 

 Greer asserts several additional errors by the trial court. None of these 

arguments has merit, and we reject them. In particular, the allegations of misconduct by 

the Court of Federal Claims judge are speculative and entirely unsupported, and do not 

state a cognizable claim of bias in any event. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 

540, 555 (1994) (requiring an extrajudicial source to support a claim of bias). 

 For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Court of Federal Claims is 

affirmed. 

 No costs.