Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-786 | September 30, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Raeane L. Pryor 

Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP 

Madison, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tiffany A. McCoy

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Donald A. Earles, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 30, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-786

Interlocutory Appeal from the 

Switzerland Circuit Court

The Honorable W. Gregory Coy, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

78C01-1804-CM-146

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Donald A. Earles, Jr. (“Earles”) brings this interlocutory appeal from the order

of the Switzerland Circuit Court denying his motion for discharge under 
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Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). Earles presents one issue on appeal, which we 

restate as whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 20, 2018, the State charged Earles in the present case in Switzerland 

County with Class A misdemeanor interfering with reporting a crime and Class 

B misdemeanor criminal mischief. On April 23, 2018, the trial court issued a 

summons for Earles to appear in court for an initial hearing to be held on May 

7, 2018. Earles was personally served with the summons on April 26, 2018. 

[4] On May 4, 2018, three days before the scheduled initial hearing in Switzerland 

County, Earles was arrested and charged in neighboring Dearborn County with 

Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony obstruction of 

justice, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On May 7, 

2018, the day his initial hearing was scheduled in Switzerland County, the 

Dearborn Superior Court held an initial hearing in that case, and that court 

ordered Earles to be held on a $7,500 cash bond. Earles therefore failed to 

appear at the initial hearing in Switzerland County.1 For whatever reason, 

however, the Switzerland Circuit Court did not issue a warrant for Earles’s 

1

In his Appellant’s Brief, Earles notes that there is no mention in the Switzerland County CCS entry for May 

7, 2018 indicating that he failed to appear. But when questioned by the trial court in the present case about 

his failure to appear at the initial hearing, Earles admitted that he was incarcerated at the time. And Earles 

admitted in his motion for discharge that he “failed to appear at the initial hearing on May 7, 2018, despite 

service of Summons.” Appellant’s App. p. 30. 
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arrest at that time. And Earles did not inform the trial court in Switzerland 

County of his incarceration in Dearborn County. 

[5] On August 7, 2018, Earles pleaded guilty to both Level 6 felony charges in 

Dearborn County, and the State dismissed the misdemeanor charge. Two days 

later, the Dearborn Superior Court sentenced Earles to consecutive terms of 910 

days on both counts, with credit for time served, and suspended to probation 

700 days of the sentence imposed on the possession charge and all of the 

sentence on the obstruction charge. 

[6] The Switzerland Circuit Court did not issue a warrant for Earles’s arrest in the 

present case until January 28, 2020. Earles was served with this warrant on 

February 3, 2020, and an initial hearing was held the following day. Earles then 

filed a motion for discharge on March 2, 2020, claiming that the State had 

failed to bring him to trial within the one-year time limit imposed by Criminal 

Rule 4(C). The trial court denied Earles’s motion that same day. On March 9, 

2020, Earles filed a motion asking that the trial court certify its order for 

interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted the next day. 

[7] On April 7, 2020, Earles filed a motion in this court requesting that we accept 

interlocutory jurisdiction. We granted Earles’s motion on May 4, 2020, and this 

appeal ensued. 

Standard of Review

[8] Earles argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge 

under Criminal Rule 4(C). This rule provides in relevant part: 
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No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer 

a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than 

one year from the date the criminal charge against such 

defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, 

whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his 

motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was 

not sufficient time to try him during such period because of 

congestion of the court calendar.

Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C). 

[9] Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for discharge under Criminal 

Rule 4(C) is de novo. Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2008). The one-year period fixed by Rule 4(C) will be extended only by 

the defendant’s own act or a continuance had on the defendant’s motion. 

Johnson v. State, 708 N.E.2d 912, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We 

have explained that “[t]he purpose of this rule is to assure criminal defendants 

of early trials, not to provide them with a technical means of avoiding trial.” Id. 

at 915. 

Discussion and Decision

[10] Earles claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for discharge 

because the one-year time limit set forth in Criminal Rule 4(C), within which 

the State had an affirmative duty to bring him to trial, has expired. Earles 

argues that the one-year time limit began to run on April 23, 2018—the date the 

trial court issued the summons in this case. According to Earles, the State had 

to bring him to trial no later than April 23, 2019, which it did not do. Thus, he 
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argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for discharge. We 

disagree. 

[11] The plain text of Criminal Rule 4(C) says that the State must bring a defendant 

to trial within one year of either: (1) the date the charge was filed, or (2) the date 

of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Here, the charges against Earles 

were filed on April 20, 2018, but he was not arrested on this charge until 

February 3, 2020. Thus, the State had until February 3, 2021 (one year from the 

date Earles was arrested) in which to bring him to trial. When Earles filed his 

motion for discharge on March 2, 2020, the one-year time period had not yet 

run. 

[12] As noted, however, Earles claims that the one-year time period began to run on 

the date he was summoned. In support of his argument, Earles cites Johnson v. 

State, 708 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. The defendant in that 

case had been charged with a misdemeanor on September 29, 1996 and was 

served with a summons that ordered her to appear in court on November 17 of 

that year. The State did not bring Johnson to trial within one year of the date 

Johnson had been charged, so Johnson moved for discharge, arguing that the 

one-year period commenced on the day she was charged. The trial court denied 

the motion, and Johnson appealed. 

[13] On appeal, we noted that when a person is charged with a misdemeanor, the 

trial court may issue a summons instead of an arrest warrant. Id. at 915 (citing 

Ind. Code § 35-33-4-1). We held that this statute provides a benefit to a 
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defendant who is charged with a misdemeanor because “it eliminates the need 

for an arrest.” Id. Because Johnson benefitted from this statute by avoiding the 

need for arrest, we held that the one-year time period of Criminal Rule 4(C) did 

not run from the date the charge was filed, but from the date the summons 

ordered her to appear in court, as that was the date that her liberty was truly 

restrained, i.e., she was ordered to appear in court and was subject to arrest if 

she failed to appear. Id.

[14] Earles argues that, pursuant to Johnson, the one-year time period of Criminal 

Rule 4(C) began to run on April 23, 2018—the date the trial court issued the 

summons ordering him to appear for an initial hearing. However, here, Earles 

failed to appear on the date he was summoned. There is no indication that the 

defendant in Johnson similarly failed to appear. We therefore do not find 

Johnson to be controlling in a situation such as here, where the defendant fails to 

appear when summoned. We agree with the State that, because Earles failed to 

appear, “he was not held, nor was his liberty ‘truly restrained,’ under the 

current cause on May 7, 2018, like it would have been had he appeared or been 

arrested.” Appellee’s Br. p. 12. 

[15] We recognize that Earles failed to appear because he was arrested and charged 

in Dearborn County. But Earles failed to inform the trial court in the present 
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case of his arrest and conviction in the neighboring county. We will not permit 

Earles to benefit from his continued criminal activity.2

[16] Indeed, even if we were to agree with Earles that the one-year time limit began 

to run on the date the summons was issued, he would not prevail, as the oneyear time limit of Criminal Rule 4(C) is tolled when a defendant fails to appear 

due to his incarceration in another county yet fails to inform the trial court of 

his incarceration. Ratliff v. State, 132 N.E.3d 41, 43–44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), 

trans. denied. In Ratliff, the defendant failed to appear for a pre-trial hearing 

because he was incarcerated in another county. The trial court therefore 

canceled the scheduled jury trial. Almost four years later, the trial court held a 

status hearing and reset the jury trial date. Ratliff then filed a motion for 

discharge, claiming that the State had failed to bring him to trial within one 

year. The trial court denied Ratliff’s motion. 

[17] On interlocutory appeal, we affirmed the trial court. We noted that the one-year 

time limit is tolled when a “defendant does not appear before the trial court and 

his whereabouts are unknown.” Id. (citing Werner v. State, 818 N.E.2d 26, 31 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied). Although an unidentified speaker informed 

the trial court that Ratliff was incarcerated in another county, Ratliff himself did 

2 We note that with the implementation of Indiana’s statewide computerized Odyssey case-management 

system, it is relatively simple for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial court judges to check if a defendant 

who fails to appear has been charged in another county. Such a simple check in the present case could have 

alerted all parties interested of Earles’s status, thereby prompting the trial court to issue an arrest warrant for 

Earles much earlier.
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not provide written notification of his incarceration to the trial court. In fact, 

Ratliff did not communicate with the trial court to indicate his whereabouts 

until approximately four years after he failed to appear. We therefore held that 

any delay was attributable to Ratliff and that the trial court therefore did not err 

in denying Ratliff’s motion for discharge. Id. at 45; see also Werner, 818 N.E.2d 

at 31 (holding that trial court did not err in denying motion for discharge where 

defendant failed to appear at initial hearing due to his incarceration in another 

county because defendant failed to notify the court in writing of his 

incarceration, even though two people orally informed the trial court of 

defendant’s incarceration). 

Conclusion

[18] The trial court did not err by denying Earles’s motion for discharge. The trial 

court scheduled Earles’s trial to begin within one year of the date Earles was 

arrested in the present case. The one-year time limit did not begin to run when 

the trial court issued the summons because Earles failed to appear at the initial 

hearing. Although his failure to appear was due to his incarceration in another 

county, Earles failed to provide written notification to the trial court of his 

incarceration. Therefore, any delay in bringing him to trial was attributable to 

Earles. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court. 

[19] Affirmed. 

Bradford, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.