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LICENSEE NEWSLETTER

NUREG/BR-0117, No. 11-03 Summer 2011

Oce of Federal & State Materials &

Environmental Management Programs

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

Improper Gauge Lockout

Results in Radiation Exposures... 1

Alarm Ratemeter Operability 

Checks .............................................. 2

From the Desk of the 

FSME Director................................. 3

The New Office Director

for FSME............................................ 4

National Source Tracking

System Version 2............................ 4

Safety Culture ................................. 5

Do You Have

Unlicensed NARM.......................... 6

Significant

Enforcement Actions ....................7

Generic Communications

Issued................................................. 9

Selected Federal 

Register Notices............................10

The NRC wants to inform 

gauge users of the 

requirements for lockout. 

A 2009 event resulted in 

exposures to non-radiation 

workers conducting welding 

and other fabrication activities 

in the vicinity of fixed gauges 

due to apparent inadequate 

lockout/tagout procedures.

In September 2009, welders 

and fabricators were working 

on coal feeder chute 

modifications at a coalburning power plant. The 

modifications involved cutting 

a hole in seven chutes, which 

lead to coal pulverizers, and 

installing a 10-inch cleanout 

for preventing potential 

spontaneous combustion of 

coal trapped in the chutes 

during extended outages. 

Fourteen specifically licensed 

TN Technologies, Inc. 

(previously Texas Nuclear) 

SeCoal Model 5219 fixed 

nuclear gauges, containing 

a nominal 50 millicuries of 

cesium-137 were attached 

to the chutes. Each SeCoal 

unit assembly consisted of 

2 nuclear gauges on each 

coal chute, one mounted 

at the top of the coal chute 

(approximately 20 feet high) 

and the other mounted 

approximately 10 feet from the 

ground. The 10-inch cleanouts 

were being installed on the 

feeder chutes approximately 

10 feet off the ground, near 

the location of the lower 

SeCoal nuclear gauges. 

Neither the gauges nor areas 

were conspicuously posted 

as containing radioactive 

materials. The fixed nuclear 

gauges were mounted on a 

swivel type mechanism, which 

allowed them to be rotated 

away from the coal chute. 

This would result in a direct 

radiation beam pointing into 

the work area if the shutters 

were not closed. Typically, 

work done on and around 

the pulverizers is done with 

the SeCoal gauge in the 

operational position, where 

the beam remains inside the 

chute and does not pose the 

risk of exposure.

Over a two week period, the 

workers completed installation 

of six of the seven chute 

cleanouts. At the end of this 

period, the power plant’s 

lead instrument technician 

discovered that the welders 

had been working in the 

vicinity of the fixed gauges 

with the shutters open. It 

was later discovered that 

the welders and fabricators 

had also rotated the nuclear 

gauges away from the coal 

IMPROPER GAUGE LOCKOUT RESULTS 

IN RADIATION EXPOSURES
2

chutes to enable them to get 

closer to the chutes, thereby 

pointing the direct radiation 

beam into the immediate 

vicinity of their work area. 

A power plant operations 

employee, who had not 

received training regarding 

the nuclear gauges, showed 

the welders and mechanics 

how to rotate the arm for 

the purpose of moving it out 

of the way to make it easier 

for them to do their work. 

Apparently, this employee 

believed that rotating the 

arm automatically closed the 

shutters on the gauges. 

Through an 

investigation, 

based on 

interviews 

with affected 

employees 

and by 

performing time and 

motion studies, the licensee 

determined that the work 

went on for 11 days, and 15 

workers received radiation 

exposures. The licensee 

estimated that 6 workers 

received a dose in excess of 

100 millirems, and 2 workers 

received a radiation dose 

in excess of 500 millirems 

although large error bands 

are likely due to uncertainties 

associated with occupancy 

times in the radiation beam.

The licensee determined 

three root causes for the 

incident: (1) gauge labeling 

was insufficient to inform 

employees of the presence 

of radioactive material; (2) 

the clearance procedure was 

inadequate in that it failed to 

identify specific hazards on 

the work order by failing to 

identify the need to shut and 

lock the gauge; and (3) the 

employee was not adequately 

trained on the nuclear gauges.

However, the primary cause 

of this incident appears to 

be the inadequate lockout/

tagout procedures used by the 

licensee to work around fixed 

nuclear gauges. Specifically, 

the lockout/tagout procedures 

only required the nuclear 

gauges to be locked out if 

entry into a vessel onto which 

a nuclear gauge was mounted 

was necessary. However, 

the procedures did not 

require nuclear gauges to be 

locked out if work was to be 

performed in the immediate 

vicinity of the nuclear gauges, 

or if work was to be performed 

on a vessel for which entry into 

the vessel was not required. 

This was important, because 

the coal chute modifications 

did not require personnel 

access within the chute for 

the work being performed. 

Therefore, no gauge lockouts 

were performed, which 

resulted in the unnecessary 

radiation exposure of several 

members of the public. For 

more detailed information, 

please consult the NRC 

Inspection Report dated

May 27, 2010 (ML101471015).

(Contacts: J. Bruce Carrico, 

FSME, 301-415-7826 or e-mail: 

Jbruce.Carrico@nrc.gov and 

Jack Foster, FSME, 

301-415-6250 or e-mail: 

Jack.Foster@nrc.gov)

ALARM RATEMETER 

OPERABILITY CHECKS

The NRC wants 

to remind 

all alarm 

ratemeter 

users of 

the need to 

follow the 

manufacturer’s 

instructions 

regarding 

proper 

operational checks. The 

NRC has identified that 

some radiography licensees 

have not conducted proper 

operability checks of their 

NDS Products (NDS) Model 

RA-500 alarm ratemeters. 

On April 30, 1998, the NRC 

issued Information Notice 

(IN) 98-16 to all industrial 

radiography licensees to 

alert them of the need to 

follow the manufacturer’s 

instructions regarding 

proper operational checks 

of alarm ratemeters. The 

IN was prompted by an 

exposure event where two 

radiographers failed to read 

their survey instruments 

when approaching the 

exposure area to prepare for 

the next shot. After the setup of the next shot, the crew 

realized that the source was 

already exposed, and their 

RA-500 alarm ratemeters did 

not alarm during the event. 

The licensee’s operational 

check of its RA-500 alarm 

ratemeters involved pushing 

a button and listening to 

an audible signal without 

looking at the LED light 

(visual signal) as part of 
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Since FSME was created in October 2006, Charlie Miller has been 

its only Office Director. Charlie was a leader who provided FSME 

with steady, consistent program stewardship, and the regulatory 

continuity that the nuclear materials and waste programs needed. 

The Office owes so much of its success to his leadership. 

His leadership and dedication remained constant until March of 

this year; Charlie announced his plans to retire. Shortly thereafter, 

the tragic earthquake and tsunami struck Japan and the enormous 

impacts to the Fukushima reactor and potentially other nuclear 

facilities began to unfold. Drawing on Charlie’s long-standing career 

experience, the NRC leadership requested that he lead a Task Force 

to provide near-term recommendations on what regulatory changes 

might be required from our nation’s perspective. To perform this 

important task properly, he is solely dedicated to that task. 

Just recently, the Agency announced the selection of Mark Satorius 

as the new FSME Office Director. Mark is currently the NRC Region III 

Regional Administrator and we are excited that Mark will be joining 

us as our new Office Director in the coming months. 

Until Mark arrives from Chicago, I have the privilege of acting as the Director of FSME. I have been Charlie’s Deputy Office 

Director since October 2009. When the Japan events transpired, I was on assignment outside of FSME. When my rotational 

assignment ended in early June, I returned to FSME, this time as its acting Director. My acting Deputy Director is Robert 

Lewis, who is one of the Division Directors in this office. 

To let you know a little about me, I joined the NRC in 1987 as a Reactor Engineer in Region I after many years working 

in naval shipyards. I became a Resident Inspector at the Yankee Rowe and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Stations. I have held 

a number of senior management positions in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in the inspection, licensing and 

rulemaking programs. Before I joined FSME as the Deputy Office Director in 2009, I was the Director of the NRC’s Office of 

Enforcement.

I want to take the remainder of this space to assure you that although there are some new names on FSME rulemakings, 

licenses, or other regulatory products, the regulatory philosophy and commitment to the agency’s principles (such as 

the protection of public health and safety, and the commitment to protect the environment) will remain unwaveringly 

constant. 

I would like to close by acknowledging one of Charlie’s office founding principles. That is, we, FSME management and staff, 

appreciate the critical role that all 20,000+ nuclear materials licensees, 37 Agreement States, and NRC’s Regional Offices 

play in ensuring the safe use of radioactive materials. Moreover, we understand that you are on the front lines of so many 

diverse uses of nuclear materials. Please know that we will never lose an appreciation for your important contributions. 

Cynthia Carpenter, Acting Director

FROM THE DESK OF 

THE FSME DIRECTOR
4

the check. However, NDS’ 

operation manual for the 

Model RA-500 states that the 

battery and audio tone check 

requires pressing a button 

after the unit is powered on. 

The red LED lights up (visual 

signal) if the battery is O.K. 

and the alarm will sound 

(audible signal). If either the 

visual or audible signal fails, 

the alarm ratemeter must not 

be used. The licensee sent 

the alarm ratemeters back to 

NDS for repair. NDS reported 

that the alarm ratemeters had 

dead or weak batteries. A 

representative from nmNDS 

confirmed that the audible 

signal is only a speaker 

test. The battery check (i.e., 

voltage across the detector) 

requires the visual signal. 

Therefore, failure to check the 

LED light equates to failure 

to check the battery. The 

licensee’s failure to perform 

adequate operational checks 

resulted in a lost opportunity 

to identify the weakened 

state of the batteries in the 

ratemeters before they were 

used during the event. 

(Contact: Robert Gattone, 

NRC RIII, 630-829-9823 or 

e-mail: 

Robert.Gattone@nrc.gov)

THE NEW OFFICE 

DIRECTOR FOR FSME

The Commission has 

announced the appointment 

of Mark A. Satorius as the new 

Director, FSME. He succeeds 

Charles L. Miller, who recently 

retired after a long and 

distinguished career.

Mr. Satorius 

joined the NRC 

in 1989, serving 

in Region IV as 

an Operating 

Licensing 

Examiner, 

and then as a 

Reactor Inspector and Senior 

Project Engineer. In 1994, he 

transferred to Headquarters 

as a Senior Enforcement 

Specialist in the Office of 

Enforcement (OE), and in 

1996 was selected as Deputy 

Director, OE. In 1999, Mr. 

Satorius joined the staff of 

the Office of the Executive 

Director for Operations as a 

Senior Regional Coordinator, 

and later served as Chief, 

Regional Operations and 

Program Management 

Staff. From 2001 to 2003, he 

served as Chief, Performance 

Assessment Section, Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 

In 2003, Mr. Satorius was 

selected for the Senior 

Executive Service position of 

Deputy Director, Division of 

Reactor Projects, Region IV, 

and was later promoted to 

Director, Division of Nuclear 

Materials Safety, Region 

IV. In 2004, he transferred 

to Region III and served as 

Director, Division of Reactor 

Projects, and later as Deputy 

Regional Administrator. In 

2009, he was appointed to his 

former position of Regional 

Administrator, Region III. 

Mr. Satorius graduated from 

the United States Naval 

Academy with a bachelor’s 

degree in mechanical 

engineering and served as a 

nuclear-trained submarine 

officer. Mr. Satorius will 

begin transitioning to his new 

position in the near future.

The FSME management and 

staff are looking forward to 

the knowledge and leadership 

that we will receive from 

Mr. Satorius, our new Office 

Director.

NATIONAL SOURCE 

TRACKING SYSTEM 

VERSION 2 

Earlier this year, the FSME 

staff made improvements to 

the National Source Tracking 

System (NSTS) and the National 

Source Tracking Transaction 

Report Form 748, which is an 

alternative reporting method 

to the NSTS. 

The NSTS was mandated by 

Congress in the Energy Policy 

Act of 2005. It is a centralized 

national registry that provides 

lifetime accounting of certain 

high-risk radioactive materials 

used in industry, medicine, 

and research. The NRC issued 

regulations implementing 

the system in November 2006 

and it was fully deployed in 

December 2008. The NSTS 

contains information on who 

possesses nationally-tracked 

sources, including the name 

and address of the facility, the 

license number, and contact 

information. Information 

on each source includes the 

make, model, serial number, 

radioactive material, and 

activity. The information 

includes records of transfers 

– shipment and receipt – 

Mark A. Satorius
5

between 

licensees, 

from the 

original 

sale by the 

manufacturer to eventual 

disposal. 

The NSTS strengthens efforts 

by the NRC and other Federal 

and State agencies to monitor 

the location, use, and disposal 

of certain radiation sources 

that, if not properly controlled, 

might pose a safety and 

security risk to the public 

and environment. The NSTS 

also improves the ability of 

regulators to detect and act 

on inventory discrepancies, 

respond to emergencies, and 

verify legitimate import, export, 

ownership, and use of sources. 

Lastly, the NSTS harmonizes 

domestic requirements with 

internationally recognized 

guidance for the safety and 

security of radioactive material 

of concern, including the 

International Atomic Energy 

Agency’s Code of Conduct 

on the Safety and Security of 

Radioactive Sources.

On May 31, 2011, FSME 

deployed the second version 

of the NSTS. The NSTS version 

2 includes functionality 

enhancements designed 

to broaden the system 

capabilities for all system 

users. The enhancements 

for licensees include eventtriggered alerts and automated 

system interfaces. Moreover, 

the enhancements for agency 

users include full reporting 

and query capabilities, 

import/export consents and 

notifications, and the ability 

to download data for other 

Federal agencies. 

In addition, on

April 29, 2011, FSME released 

a new version of NRC Form 

748. The form provides an 

alternative reporting method 

to NSTS and contains the 

minimum information 

necessary to track the 

nationally tracked sources 

from cradle to grave, which will 

ensure that all such sources 

continue to be accountable. 

The collection of NSTS data 

using NRC Form 748 began in 

2009. The form was revised 

in order to better meet the 

needs of licensees, allow more 

efficient gathering of data, 

and improve the ability of 

licensees to comply with the 

regulations in 10 CFR 20.2207. 

The benefits of the updated 

form include e-mail capability, 

dropdown menus for quick 

form completion, and a more 

intuitive design, with short 

forms for each transaction 

reporting type and a long 

form for multiple transactions. 

To access the new forms and 

acquire more details on the 

NSTS, please visit the agency’s 

external NSTS Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/security/

byproduct/nsts.html. 

(Contact: Irene Wu, FSME,

301-415-1951 or e-mail: 

Irene.Wu@nrc.gov)

SAFETY CULTURE

On June 14, 2011, the NRC 

issued its final safety culture 

policy statement (SCPS) in 

the Federal Register (76 FR 

34773). This policy statement 

sets forth expectations that 

individuals and organizations 

involved in NRC-regulated 

activities establish and 

maintain a positive safety 

culture proportionate to the 

safety and security significance 

of their activities. The SCPS 

applies to all licensees, 

certificate holders, permit 

holders, authorization holders, 

holders of quality assurance 

program approvals, vendors 

and suppliers of safety-related 

components, and applicants 

for a license, certificate, permit, 

authorization, or quality 

assurance program approval, 

subject to NRC authority. In 

addition, the Commission 

encourages the Agreement 

States, their licensees, and 

other organizations interested 

in nuclear safety to support 

the development and 

maintenance of a positive 

safety culture within their 

regulated communities.

The SCPS was developed over 

a three-year period during 

which the agency engaged 

in extensive outreach with a 

broad range of stakeholders. 

As the SCPS transitions from 

the development phase to 

the implementation phase, 

the NRC staff believes that 

outreach, cooperation and 
6

interaction with 

and between 

external 

stakeholders will 

become even 

more important 

to the success 

of the SCPS. 

During this phase, 

the NRC staff 

will continue 

to engage stakeholders 

in dialogue regarding the 

importance of a positive 

safety culture in their specific 

activities. The NRC will also 

seek out feedback on the 

ability of stakeholders to 

use the policy statement in 

those activities, as well as 

to determine whether there 

are areas in the SCPS where 

changes may be appropriate.

Safety culture refers to an 

organization’s collective 

commitment, by leaders and 

individuals, to emphasize 

safety as an overriding priority 

to competing goals and other 

considerations to ensure 

protection of people and the 

environment. The SCPS is not 

a regulation and, as such, does 

not impose requirements; the 

SCPS complements agency 

regulations and guidance. 

The Commission expects 

the regulated community 

to take the necessary steps 

for promoting a positive 

safety culture by fostering 

the nine traits as they apply 

to their specific activities. A 

trait, in this case, is a pattern 

of thinking, feeling, and 

behaving that emphasizes 

nuclear safety. The traits 

included in the SCPS are: (1) 

Leadership Safety Values 

and Actions, (2) Problem 

Identification and Resolution, 

(3) Personal Accountability, 

(4) Work Processes, (5) 

Continuous Learning, (6) 

Environment for Raising 

Concerns, (7) Effective Safety 

Communication, (8) Respectful 

Work Environment, and (9) 

Questioning Attitude.

The NRC has developed a 

brochure associated with the 

final SCPS that is intended 

to aid stakeholders in 

understanding the safety 

culture traits and using the 

policy statement and the 

safety culture traits as they 

deem appropriate. The 

SCPS brochure describes the 

development of the SCPS 

and provides the definition 

of nuclear safety culture and 

the traits of a positive nuclear 

safety culture. The SCPS 

brochure has been published 

as NUREG/BR-0500. The SCPS 

brochure is available in a full 

color version and a printerfriendly version on the NRC’s 

safety culture Web site at 

http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory/enforcement/

safety-culture.html. This Web 

site also includes additional 

information about the SCPS, 

including relevant background 

documents, Federal Register 

notices, meeting notices and 

presentations made at public 

meetings, as well as other 

outreach activities. This Web 

site will also have tools that 

support the SCPS, including 

case studies, in the near future.

(Contact: Cindy Flannery, 

FSME, 301-415-0223 or e-mail: 

Cindy.Flannery@nrc.gov)

DO YOU HAVE 

UNLICENSED NARM?

As many of 

you know, 

certain 

naturallyoccurring and accelerator 

produced radioactive 

material (NARM) came under 

the jurisdiction of the NRC 

when the Energy Policy Act 

of 2005 was signed into 

law. This change expanded 

the definition of byproduct 

material regulated by NRC to 

include NARM, and required 

action on the part of licensees 

or NARM possessors. For 

example, nuclear gauge 

users that were licensed or 

registered by a State were 

required to apply for or amend 

their NRC license to continue 

operations with gauges 

containing NARM, such as 

radium-226. Likewise, medical 

licensees possessing material 

previously licensed by the 

State that are authorized for

10 CFR 35.100 and

10 CFR 35.200 uses may not 

realize that, even though the 

materials are automatically 

authorized under an existing 

NRC license, their license 

may need to be amended 

to include an additional use 

location. The radioisotopes 

that are now covered under 

the definition of byproduct 

material include but are 

not limited to: fluorine-18, 

manganese-54, cobalt-57, 

gallium-67, germanium-68, 

palladium-103, cadmium-109, 

indium-111, iodine-123, 

thallium-201, and radium-226. 

These radioisotopes may be 
7

found in 

fixed and 

portable 

gauges, 

medical 

imaging 

solutions, flood sources, 

and x-ray fluorescence (XRF) 

analyzers, to name a few.

The NRC staff has encountered 

unlicensed material during 

inspection and licensing 

activities in Region I. Since the 

mission of NRC is to ensure 

that byproduct materials are 

used in a manner that will 

not cause harm to persons 

or the environment, the risk 

associated with unlicensed 

use of these materials is 

important. In an effort to help 

identify NARM possessors 

who may not be properly 

licensed, Region I formed the 

NARM license reconciliation 

team (NLRT). The team has 

conducted an internal review 

of information related to 

potential NARM possessors 

and to date, nearly 1,100 

cases have been evaluated. In 

about 100 cases, the NLRT was 

not able to confirm that NRC 

licenses existed. An outreach 

effort is underway to contact 

those entities and inform any 

others thought to possess 

NARM. 

The choices available to 

possessors are to: (1) dispose 

of the material at a low-level 

radioactive waste facility; (2) 

transfer the material to an 

authorized licensee; or (3) 

submit a license application 

or license amendment to 

the appropriate NRC Region 

or Agreement State. In 

May 2009, the NRC issued 

an Enforcement Guidance 

Memorandum (EGM-09-

004), ADAMS Accession No. 

ML091340060, concerning 

the enforcement discretion 

under certain circumstances; 

therefore, possessors are 

encouraged to take immediate 

actions to avoid escalated 

enforcement.

The guidance for completing 

license applications and 

amendments is provided 

in different volumes of the 

NRC’s NUREG 1556 series, 

Consolidated Guidance 

About Materials Licenses. For 

example, Volume 1 provides 

guidance for applications 

related to portable nuclear 

gauge use, Volume 9 provides 

guidance for applications 

related to medical use, 

Volume 13 provides guidance 

for applications related 

to radiopharmacies, and 

Volume 21 provides guidance 

for applications related 

to production. For your 

convenience, the NUREG 

1556 series is available on 

the NRC Web site at http://

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

doc-collections/nuregs/staff/

sr1556/.

(Contact: Scott Wilson, NRC 

Region I, 610-337-5136 or 

e-mail: R1NARM@nrc.gov) 

SIGNIFICANT 

ENFORCEMENT 

ACTIONS

The NRC issued significant 

enforcement actions for failure 

to comply with regulations.

Owensby and 

Kritikos, Inc.

 (EA-11-100)

On June 8, 2011, 

the NRC issued a Notice of 

Violation to Owensby and 

Kritikos, Inc., for a Severity 

Level III violation involving the 

licensee’s failure to control and 

maintain constant surveillance 

of the licensed material in an 

unrestricted area as required 

by 10 CFR 20.1801 and

10 CFR 20.1802. Specifically, 

during an inspection on

July 29, 2010, the radiography 

camera was found on the floor 

of the unlocked darkroom 

and no radiography personnel 

were maintaining constant 

surveillance over the material.

Alaska Industrial 

X-Ray, Inc. 

(EA-10-231)

On June 7, 2011, 

a Confirmatory 

Order (effective immediately) 

was issued to Alaska Industrial 

X-Ray Inc. (AIX) to confirm 

commitments made as 

a result of an Alternative 

Dispute Resolution (ADR) 

settlement agreement. During 

inspection and investigation, 

NRC identified a deliberate 

violation associated with 

two conditions of the Order 

Modifying License (EA-08-

196): (1) failure to have an 

independent consultant 

or contractor perform field 

audits and submit the audit 

reports to AIX, and the NRC, 

as required by Condition 1 of 

the Order, from August 2008 

through March 2010 and (2) 

failure to have an independent 
8

consultant or a contractor 

evaluate the effectiveness of 

AIX’s radiation safety program, 

as required by Condition 3 of 

the Order, from September 

2008 through October 2010. 

In response to these violations, 

the licensee requested ADR. 

As part of the agreement, AIX 

agreed to take a number of 

actions including training for 

all AIX employees engaged 

in licensed activities on 

what is meant by willfulness, 

conducting an annual review 

of its radiation safety and 

compliance program by 

an independent auditor, 

conducting quarterly audits 

of AIX radiographers as they 

perform radiography, and 

paying a civil penalty in the 

amount of $1,000. 

Medical

Community Hospitals of 

Indiana (EA-11-016)

On April 20, 2011, the NRC 

issued a Notice of Violation to 

the Community Hospitals of 

Indiana for a Severity Level III 

violation involving the failure 

to fully implement procedures 

to provide high confidence 

that a brachytherapy 

treatment was in accordance 

with the written directive as 

required by 10 CFR 35.41(a). 

Specifically, on

September 30, 2010, an 

authorized medical physicist 

missed a step in the 

procedure that established 

the starting position for the 

high dose remote afterloader 

brachytherapy treatment. The 

failure to implement this step 

resulted in a medical event. 

West Virginia University 

Hospitals, Inc. 

(EA-11-027)

On March 25, 2011, the NRC 

issued a Notice of 

Violation to West 

Virginia University 

Hospitals, Inc. 

(WVUH) for a 

Severity Level 

III violation 

involving the failure to notify 

the NRC Operations Center 

by telephone no later than 

the next calendar day after 

discovery of the medical event 

as required by

10 CFR 35.3045(c). Specifically, 

WVUH did not notify the 

NRC until July 7, 2010, after 

discovering that a dose 

administered on January 

20, 2010, differed from the 

prescribed dose.

Individual 

Actions

Gregory Desobry

(IA-10-010)

On February 23, 2011, 

the NRC issued an Order 

requiring notification of future 

involvement in NRC licensed 

or Agreement State regulated 

activities to Mr. Gregory 

Desobry, who was involved 

in the medical events that 

occurred at the Philadelphia 

Veterans’ Affairs Medical 

Center from February 2002 

through June 2008 and the 

resulting identified violations 

(EA-09-038). This action will 

provide NRC the opportunity 

to confirm that reasonable 

assurance exists that licensed 

activities can be conducted 

in compliance with the 

Commission’s requirements 

and that the health and 

safety of the public will be 

protected. Specifically, the 

Order requires Mr. Desobry to 

make a one-time notification 

to the NRC within 20 days 

of accepting a position as a 

medical physicist involving 

the use of byproduct materials 

in either NRC’s jurisdiction 

or an Agreement State. The 

Order noted that Mr. Desobry 

provided corrective actions 

that he had taken in a June 28, 

2010, response to a Demand 

for Information that the NRC 

issued on May 24, 2010. The 

Order will be effective 20 days 

after it is published in the

Federal Register.

Gary Kao

(IA-09-035)

On February 23, 2011, the 

NRC issued an 

Order prohibiting 

involvement in 

NRC licensed 

activities to

Dr. Gary Kao. This 

action will provide the NRC 

with reasonable assurance 

that the protection of public 

health and safety will not be 

compromised until such time 

that Dr. Kao provides NRC with 

sufficient information relative 

to the corrective actions 

he has taken to address his 
9

part in the medical events 

that occurred at the VA 

Philadelphia Medical Center 

from February 2002 through 

June 2008, and resulting 

identified violations (EA-09-

038). Specifically, the Order 

prohibits Dr. Kao’s involvement 

in any NRC licensed activity 

until rescinded by the NRC, 

contingent upon Dr. Kao 

completing specialized 

training, demonstrating 

the ability to correctly 

identify and report medical 

events, and providing other 

documentation to the NRC 

supporting completion of 

the requirements specified 

in the Order. The Order 

noted that Dr. Kao voluntarily 

stopped performing 

brachytherapy treatments 

and was committed to take 

all necessary and appropriate 

steps to ensure that he was 

current on all applicable 

requirements should he 

perform brachytherapy 

treatments in the future. The 

Order will be effective 20 days 

after it is published in the 

Federal Register.

The NRC’s enforcement 

program can be accessed at

http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/

regulatory/enforcement/

current.html under Recently 

Issued Significant Enforcement 

Actions. Documents related to 

cases can be accessed through 

the NRC’s Agencywide 

Document Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) 

at http://www.nrc.gov/

reading-rm/adams.html. Help 

in using ADAMS is available 

by contacting the NRC Public 

Document Room staff at 

301-415-4737 or 1-800-397-4209 

or by sending an e-mail to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov.

(Contact: Michele Burgess, 

FSME, 301-415-5868 or e-mail: 

Michele.Burgess@nrc.gov)

GENERIC 

COMMUNICATIONS 

ISSUED

The following are 

summaries of NRC generic 

communications issued 

by FSME. If any of these 

documents appear relevant to 

your needs and you have not 

received it, please call one of 

the technical contacts listed 

below. The Internet address 

for the NRC library of generic 

communications is http://

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

doc-collections/gen-comm.

Information Notices (INs)

The NRC issues 

Information 

Notices (INs) to 

addressees to 

provide recent 

significant 

identified information 

about safety, safeguards, 

or environmental issues. 

Addressees are expected to 

review the information for 

applicability to their facilities 

and consider actions, as 

appropriate, to avoid similar 

problems. 

IN 2011-11: Reporting 

Requirement for Heat and 

Smoke Detector Failures in 

10 CFR Part 36 Irradiators

On April 27, 2011, the NRC 

issued IN 2011-11 to all 

holders of irradiator licenses 

under 10 CFR Part 36, 

“Licenses and Radiation Safety 

Requirements for Irradiators,” 

and to all Agreement State 

Radiation Control Program 

Directors and State Liaison 

Officers. The IN informed 

addressees that reporting may 

be necessary when the smoke 

or heat detection systems in 

panoramic irradiators do not 

function properly. Also, the 

IN reminded licensees that 

smoke and heat detectors 

required by 10 CFR Part 36 

were independent systems 

and the inoperability of either 

is reportable when there is 

no redundant equipment 

available to perform the 

required safety function. 

(Contacts: Tomas Herrera, 

FSME, 301-415-7138 or e-mail: 

Tomas.Herrera@nrc.gov or 

Jack Foster, FSME,

301-415-6250 or e-mail: 

Jack.Foster@nrc.gov)

(General Contact: Angela 

McIntosh, FSME, 301-415-5030 

or e-mail: 

Angela.McIntosh@nrc.gov) 
10

CITATION SUBJECT CONTACT PUBLISHED

76 FR 28336

IDomestic Licensing of Source

Material-Amendments/Integrated

Safety Analysis (Proposed Rule)

Edward M. Lohr, FSME, 

301-415-0253 or e-mail: 

Edward.Lohr@nrc.gov May 17, 2011

76 FR 29171

Medical Use Regulations (Availability of 

preliminary draft rule language and notice of 

public workshops)

Varughese Kurian, FSME, 

301-415-7426 or e-mail: 

Varughese.Kurian@nrc.gov

or Michael Fuller, FSME, 

301-415-0520 or e-mail: 

Michael.Fuller@nrc.gov

May 20, 2011

76 FR 35512

Decommissioning Planning 

(Final Rule)

Robert D. MacDougall, 

FSME, 301-415-5175 or 

e-mail: 

Robert.MacDougall@nrc.

gov

or Kevin O’Sullivan, FSME, 

301-415-8112 or e-mail: 

Kevin.OSullivan@nrc.gov

June 17, 2011

76 FR 38212

Notice of Issuance and

Availability of Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 

(RG) 1.179, ‘‘Standard Format and Content of 

License Termination Plans for Nuclear Power 

Reactors’’

James C. Shepherd, FSME, 

301-415-6712 or e-mail: 

James.Shepherd@nrc.gov June 29, 2011

SUGGESTED FEDERAL 

REGISTER NOTICES
11

In our attempt to keep the FSME Licensee Newsletter relevant, we welcome useful and informative 

feedback on the contents of the newsletter. If you would like to suggest topics, please contact 

Vanessa Cox or Gwendolyn Davis, from FSME Rulemaking Branch A. Ms. Cox may be contacted at 

301-415-8342 or e-mail: Vanessa.Cox@nrc.gov. Ms. Davis may be contacted at 301-415-8165 or 

e-mail: Gwendolyn.Davis@nrc.gov. In addition, to ensure proper delivery of the FSME Licensee 

Newsletter, please report any address changes to Ms. Cox to prevent any interruption of service at 

FSME_Newsletter@nrc.gov. 

Please send written correspondence to the following address: 

Vanessa Cox, Editor FSME Licensee Newsletter

Office of Federal and State Materials and

Environmental Management Programs

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Two White Flint North, Mail Stop: T-8-F42

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001