NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-1118

SCOTT E. SQUILLACE, trustee,1

vs.

MERRIAGNES M. ASHLEY & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Carol Ann Filardo, appeals from a judgment 

of dismissal on a complaint for contempt filed by the plaintiff, 

Scott E. Squillace, trustee (trustee) of the Administrative 

Trust of the Mario R. Filardo 2003 Trust (trust). The complaint 

alleged that Carol3 failed to pay a sum certain to the trust in 

accordance with a stipulation that was incorporated and merged

in a judgment. Notwithstanding the finding of no contempt, the 

judge ordered the trustee to offset the monies owed by Carol

against her interest in the trust, with any deficiency to be 

paid by her within sixty days. On Carol's appeal, we affirm.

1 Of the Administrative Trust of the Mario R. Filardo 2003 Trust, 

as amended.

2 Marco A. Filardo and Carol Ann Filardo.

3 Because many parties share a surname, we use first names to 

avoid confusion.
2

Background. In 2017 the trustee filed a complaint for 

instructions in the Probate and Family Court seeking guidance on 

issues relating to the trust. The litigation resulted in a 

stipulation of the parties that was incorporated and merged in a 

judgment in June 2018. As relevant here, the four parties4

agreed to pay one-quarter of the fees, costs, and expenses 

incurred by the trust and Mario's estate as of June 13, 2018. 

The judgment provided that Carol's repayment obligation was to 

be "allocated to the respective trust share and/or paid in 

cash." As of May 2021, the trust lacked sufficient liquid 

assets, and therefore Carol's repayment obligation could not be 

offset against her ultimate share of the trust.5 As a result, 

the trustee sought a cash payment from Carol. When Carol did 

not pay, the trustee filed a complaint for contempt. After 

hearing arguments on Carol's motion to dismiss, the judge 

allowed the motion concluding that there was not clear and 

convincing evidence that Carol disobeyed a clear and unequivocal 

order. Nonetheless, the judge ordered the trustee to offset 

Carol's repayment obligation against her share in the trust, and 

4 The parties included Carol, Marco (Mario and Carol's son), 

Merriagnes M. Ashley, and Waterfront Travel Services (WTS). The 

judge allowed an oral motion to add WTS as a party.

5 The trust has not yet been wound down due to ongoing 

litigation. As a result, there is no final accounting and 

therefore no "offset" of Carol's share of the repayment 

obligation.
3

that any deficiency be paid by Carol within sixty days. This 

appeal followed.

Discussion. We review a judge's decision on a complaint 

for contempt for an abuse of discretion. See Smith v. Smith, 93 

Mass. App. Ct. 361, 363 (2018). In a civil contempt proceeding, 

the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing 

evidence, "two elements: . . . (1) clear disobedience of (2) a 

clear and unequivocal command." Id. Here, the judge concluded 

that Carol was not guilty of civil contempt because the 

stipulation provided that Carol's repayment obligation could be 

allocated against her share of the trust "and/or" be paid in 

cash. The judge reasoned that where the "parties agree[d] to 

alternative methods of payment, and [Carol] select[ed] one of 

the alternatives," there is no contempt.6

Notwithstanding her finding of no contempt, the judge did 

not err in ordering the trustee to offset Carol's repayment 

obligation against her share of the trust with any deficiency to 

be paid by Carol in sixty days.7 This is because the "Probate 

Court [is] empowered to enter an order for payment of monies due 

6 To the extent that the trustee contends that this ruling was in 

error, the trustee did not cross-appeal, and, in any event, the 

judge's ruling is supported by the plain language of the 

stipulation.

7 The judge accepted Carol's representation that her assets were 

insufficient to make a cash payment of her obligation. This is 

not an issue on appeal.
4

pursuant to its determination of the parties' rights under" the 

stipulation. Colorio v. Marx, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 382, 389 

(2008), quoting Krapf v. Krapf, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 485, 491 

(2002). Ordering Carol to pay the monies she agreed to pay in 

the 2018 stipulation did nothing more than "enforce[] the 

parties' . . . agreement in order to insure that the [trust]

received" the payment. Colorio, supra, quoting Krapf, supra.

The judge's inclusion of a deadline for payment was also 

not error. Because the stipulation did not contain a time frame 

for compliance, it was proper to infer that a reasonable time 

for compliance was intended by the parties. See Dalrymple v. 

Winthrop, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 555 (2020) (if contract fails 

to specify time to perform contractual obligation, judge may 

infer parties intended reasonable date provided it does not 

change essence of contract). Where four years had passed since 

entry of the judgment, the judge did not err or abuse her 

discretion in determining that sixty days after dismissal of the 

contempt complaint was a reasonable time for Carol to comply.

To the extent that Carol argues that the judge's order 

requires her to pay her obligation twice, we are not persuaded. 

Whether as a setoff against her share of the trust, a cash 

payment, or a combination thereof, Carol's obligation under the 

terms of the judgment is limited to the amount set forth in the 

2018 stipulation. The judge merely clarified Carol's repayment
5

obligation to add a time for compliance; she did not alter the 

amount of Carol's obligation in any way. Carol's claim that she 

is being charged twice is unfounded. And Carol's claim that she 

was "at peril of incurring an additional obligation to pay for 

expenses incurred after June 13, 2018," is not borne out by the 

record as the judgment covers the period ending June 13, 2018.

Finally, Carol's due process argument is misplaced as the 

complaint for contempt put her on notice that the trust was 

seeking payment of the amount set forth in the stipulation, and 

nothing more. See Sodones v. Sodones, 366 Mass. 121, 127 

(1974).8

Judgment and order on 

complaint for contempt 

dated April 27, 2022, 

affirmed.

By the Court (Blake, 

Massing & Hand, JJ.9),

Clerk

Entered: November 3, 2023.

8 The trustee's request for appellate attorney's fees and costs 

is denied.

9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.