[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 14 (Thursday, January 22, 2015)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 3191-3207]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-00940]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 12

[PS Docket No. 14-193; PS Docket No. 13-75; FCC 14-186]


911 Governance and Accountability; Improving 911 Reliability

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) affirms core principles guiding its approach to 911 
governance and proposes mechanisms to ensure, in cooperation with state 
and local partners, that the nation's 911 governance structure keeps 
pace with evolving technology so that all entities providing 911 
service capabilities remain accountable for reliable 911 call 
completion and accurate situational awareness. This document proposes

[[Page 3192]]

steps to address vulnerabilities in 911 reliability that have been 
revealed by a series of recent ``sunny day'' 911 outages, including the 
April 2014 multi-state outage that was the subject of a recent report 
by the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau). 
Specifically, this document proposes to amend the Commission's 911 
reliability certification rules to cover additional entities and 
network reliability practices; require public notification for major 
changes in multi-state 911 networks and services, and Commission 
approval for discontinuance of existing 911 services; require entities 
seeking to provide new 911 capabilities to certify as to their 
technical and operational capability to provide reliable service; and 
designate certain 911 service providers to take lead responsibility for 
situational awareness and coordination with other service providers in 
the event of a 911 outage.

DATES: Submit comments on or before March 9, 2015 and reply comments by 
April 7, 2015. Written comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act proposed 
information collection requirements must be submitted by the public, 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other interested parties on 
or before March 23, 2015.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket numbers PS 14-
193 and PS 13-75, by any of the following methods:
    <bullet> Federal Communications Commission's Web site: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. Follow the instructions for submitting 
comments.
    <bullet> Mail: U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and 
Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC 
20554. Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service 
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton 
Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
    <bullet> People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request 
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language 
interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#43050000767377032520206d242c35"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="8bcdc8c8bebbbfcbede8e8a5ece4fd">[email protected]</span></a> or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
    In addition to filing comments with the Secretary, a copy of any 
comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection 
requirements contained herein should be submitted to the Federal 
Communications Commission via email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#1d4d4f5c5d7b7e7e337a726b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="41111300012722226f262e37">[email protected]</span></a> and to Nicholas A. 
Fraser, Office of Management and Budget, via email to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#236d4a404b4c4f42507c620d7c655142504651634c4e410d464c530d444c55"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="91dff8f2f9fefdf0e2ced0bfced7e3f0e2f4e3d1fefcf3bff4fee1bff6fee7">[email protected]</span></a> or via fax at 202-395-5167. Parties 
wishing to file materials with a claim of confidentiality should follow 
the procedures set forth in section 0.459 of the Commission's rules. 
Confidential submissions may not be filed via ECFS but rather should be 
filed with the Secretary's Office following the procedures set forth in 
47 CFR 0.459. Redacted versions of confidential submissions may be 
filed via ECFS. For detailed instructions for submitting comments and 
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric P. Schmidt, Attorney Advisor, 
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1214 or 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#cbaeb9a2a8e5b8a8a3a6a2afbf8bada8a8e5aca4bd"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="2a4f5843490459494247434e5e6a4c4949044d455c">[email protected]</span></a>. For additional information concerning the 
Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained 
in this document, contact Benish Shah at (202) 418-7866 or send an 
email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#3f6f6d7e7f595c5c11585049"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="acfcfeedeccacfcf82cbc3da">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Policy 
Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in PS Docket No. 14-
193 and PS Docket No. 13-75, released on November 21, 2014. The full 
text of this document is available for public inspection during regular 
business hours in the FCC Reference Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th 
Street SW., Washington, DC 20554, or online at http://www.fcc.gov/document/911-governance-and-accountability-policy-statement-and-nprm.

Synopsis of Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

I. Introduction

    One of the fundamental purposes for which Congress created the 
Federal Communications Commission is to ``promot[e] safety of life and 
property through the use of wire and radio communications.'' Nowhere 
does the Commission give higher expression to this overarching 
obligation than in its efforts to ensure that the American people have 
access to reliable and resilient 911 communications service. To be 
sure, this is not the Commission's responsibility alone. State 
regulators and local emergency response agencies play critical roles in 
ensuring that 911 is available when needed and that every 911 call will 
be answered, and it is undoubtedly in the public interest that the 
Commission should work in close partnership with these stakeholders to 
carry out its responsibility. Nevertheless, we know that the 
technologies and commercial relationships that form the foundation of 
the 911 system are transitioning and, as a result, becoming 
increasingly interstate in nature. The Commission is uniquely 
positioned to ensure 911 reliability on a national scale and across 
different communications platforms and technologies, to promote the 
deployment of new and innovative 911 technologies by an increasingly 
diverse array of stakeholders, and to ensure that the benefits of 
advanced 911 service extend to all Americans.
    The importance of ensuring nationwide 911 reliability as 
technologies transition has been underscored by several recent 
disruptions of 911 service that have affected the public in multiple 
states or across the entire nation. For example, in April 2014, a 
software coding error at a Colorado-based 911 provider's call routing 
facility led to a loss of 911 service to a population of more than 11 
million in seven states--California, Florida, Minnesota, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington--for up to six 
hours. In addition, the state of Hawaii has experienced multiple 
disruptions in 911 service since January 2014, and the entire state of 
Vermont lost 911 service for 40 minutes in August 2014. A growing 
number of disruptions to 911 service are caused by software 
malfunctions, database failures, and errors in conversion from legacy 
to IP-based network protocols. These failures may occur in portions of 
the network that are not directly analogous to the legacy architecture. 
Moreover, these new modes of failure have the potential to affect many 
states at once, or even all of a service provider's customers 
nationwide.
    While innovative technologies have the potential to improve many 
aspects of 911 service and enhance the ability of first responders to 
do their jobs more effectively, these recent outages have revealed that 
technology changes may also introduce new vulnerabilities. While the 
Commission has previously undertaken to monitor the transition to Next 
Generation 911 (NG911) technologies to determine whether our rules 
should be revised or expanded to cover new best practices or additional 
entities, recent events have demonstrated that the pace of change 
already requires prompt action to review these vulnerabilities. Failure 
to take appropriate action risks undermining the reliability and 
resiliency of current 911 services and endangering the transition to 
NG911 technologies that offer even greater public safety benefits. The 
American public must have confidence that 911 will work every time help 
is needed. Any failure to meet this expectation puts individual lives 
at stake and erodes

[[Page 3193]]

vital public trust in our nation's emergency services.
    In this Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we 
affirm the core principles that have guided and will continue to guide 
the Commission's approach to ensuring reliable and resilient 911 
service and its continuing partnership with state and local 
authorities. We propose specific rules designed to address failures 
leading to recent multi-state 911 outages, based on the October 2014 
report of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. Finally, we 
propose additional mechanisms designed to ensure that our 911 
governance structure keeps pace with evolving technologies and new 
reliability challenges so that all 911 service providers remain fully 
accountable to the public they serve.

II. Policy Statement

    It is the policy of the Commission to encourage and support efforts 
by states and localities to deploy comprehensive end-to-end emergency 
communications infrastructure and programs, including seamless, 
ubiquitous, reliable 911 service. As IP-based 911 service providers 
transition to architectures that extend beyond the boundaries of any 
state and implement network changes that may affect quality of service 
on a regional or national scale, consistent and collaborative 
governance is not just good governance, but essential to maintaining 
the vital public benefits of 911. Together with our state and local 
partners, the Commission has the public safety imperative to oversee 
each of the increasingly complex component pieces of the nation's 911 
infrastructure, and to ensure that service providers within our 
respective jurisdictions are held fully accountable for providing 
reliable 911 service to all Americans. Where there are multi-state 
aspects of the 911 architecture or technology trends that may increase 
the risk of failure or cause confusion to PSAPs and end-users, the 
Commission must, and will, take a leadership role in resolving such 
risks and confusion.
    While we seek comment on specific proposals designed to address the 
challenges of the transition to NG911, we believe it would be useful at 
the outset to articulate the general goals that serve as a framework 
for these proposals. We start from the proposition that all entities 
providing 911 communications services, both incumbents and new 
entrants, occupy a unique position of public trust. Increased 
innovation and enhanced competition in the 911 ecosystem bring 
tremendous potential to enhance the functionality and utility of 911, 
but these transitions must be managed in a manner that maximizes the 
availability, reliability, and resiliency of the 911 network, and 
ensures the accountability of all participants in the 911 
communications ecosystem. Therefore, we believe that every entity with 
a role in 911 call completion should be guided by two principles: 
First, any new elements of 911 architecture or service should have the 
necessary redundancy and reliability safeguards, along with the 
appropriate governance mechanisms, to maximize reliability and protect 
public safety. Second, significant changes in 911 service should be 
coordinated in a transparent manner with the Commission and with state 
and local authorities. To the extent that technology transitions and 
changes in the market for 911 services create real or perceived gaps in 
the delivery of reliable and resilient 911 service, the Commission will 
act, in cooperation with state and local partners, to close those gaps 
and set clear expectations regarding each service.

III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

    In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we first seek comment on 
specific proposals to advance the principles described above by 
ensuring that the Commission's 911 rules keep pace with changing 
technology. We then seek comment on whether it may be appropriate to 
take further steps, in coordination with state and local authorities, 
to promote a national governance structure that proactively increases 
end-to-end accountability and produces measurable results. By 
initiating this rulemaking, we do not intend to impose ``one-size-fits-
all'' mandates on the nation's 911 infrastructure when different states 
and communities need flexibility to respond to each situation in the 
way that best suits their particular circumstances. Rather, we seek to 
ensure that the Commission remains equipped, consistent with its 
statutory mandates and existing legal authority, with the proper 
regulatory tools to enforce continued and clear lines of accountability 
for reliable 911 call completion, including as the nation transitions 
to an IP-based NG911 architecture.
    We also emphasize that the purpose of this rulemaking is not to 
supplant state action. To the contrary, consistent with our statutory 
mandate under the 911 Act, our goal is to ``encourage and support 
efforts by States to deploy comprehensive end-to-end emergency 
communications infrastructure,'' and to ``consult and cooperate with 
State and local officials'' when developing national policies with 
respect to 911 governance, implementation, and reliability. We 
recognize that many decisions regarding 911 deployment, operations, and 
cost recovery are best made at the state and local level, and continued 
oversight by states and localities is vital to ensuring that 911 
service remains effective and reliable in every community across the 
country. Our action today is intended to ensure that state and local 
partners continue to be empowered to fulfill this important oversight 
responsibility within their jurisdictions, and we seek comment on a 
variety of ways that the Commission can assist in local, state, and 
regional efforts to maintain and improve 911 service quality. Thus, we 
do not intend to interfere with the right of state and local 911 
authorities to contract for the services they desire or to determine 
the best path for deployment of NG911 technologies within their 
jurisdictions. We also note that, in appropriate circumstances, federal 
rules may ease burdens on state and local jurisdictions by obviating 
the need for them to promulgate their own potentially disparate 
requirements.

A. Revisions to 47 CFR 12.4

    The Commission adopted Sec.  12.4 based on indications that during 
the 2012 derecho storm ILECs providing 911 service in affected areas 
failed to follow established network reliability best practices in 
three specific areas, which resulted in widespread and prolonged 911 
outages. To address these deficiencies and ensure improved reliability 
in the future, the rule contains two components: (1) A substantive 
requirement that ``covered 911 service providers shall take reasonable 
measures to provide reliable 911 service with respect to circuit 
diversity, central-office backup power, and diverse network 
monitoring'' and (2) a reporting requirement that such providers 
certify annually whether they have implemented specified best practices 
or reasonable alternative measures in each of those substantive areas. 
The rule defines ``covered 911 service providers'' as those that 
provide specified 911 capabilities, or the functional equivalent, 
``directly to a PSAP''--typically meaning those entities that provide 
911 services pursuant to a contractual agreement with a PSAP or 
emergency authority.
    In light of the multistate 911 outages discussed above and the 
lessons they provide about 911 network architectures already in use in 
many parts of the nation, we propose to expand the scope of entities 
covered by Sec.  12.4 (i.e., the definition of ``covered 911 service

[[Page 3194]]

provider'') to include all entities that provide 911, E911, or NG911 
capabilities, such as call routing, automatic location information 
(ALI), automatic number identification (ANI), location information 
servers (LIS), text-to-911, or the functional equivalent of those 
capabilities, regardless of whether they provide such capabilities 
under a direct contractual relationship with a PSAP or emergency 
authority. This definition would include all entities that provide 911-
specific network infrastructure, but only to the extent that they 
provide specified 911 capabilities. For example, a wireless carrier 
would be required to certify with respect to any mobile positioning 
centers (MPCs), gateway mobile location centers (GMLCs) or other 
databases that it uses to process and route 911 calls, but not with 
respect to individual cell sites and its call origination network 
generally. If a wireless carrier outsources 911 call processing 
capabilities to a subcontractor, we propose that both the carrier and 
the subcontractor would be required to certify their respective 
reasonable measures to maintain reliable 911 service because both 
entities would provide 911 capabilities specified in the proposed rule. 
We seek comment on this analysis. This amendment would address 911 
network architectures where multiple service providers or sub-
contractors provide call routing and ALI/ANI capabilities and ensure 
that each link in that chain is treated equally under Sec.  12.4. We 
propose that adding these entities would not change the duties of those 
who already qualify as covered 911 service providers, except with 
respect to the new certification elements proposed below, or the duties 
of their agents under existing principles of legal liability. However, 
we seek comment on the existing duties of the agents and sub-
contractors of covered 911 service providers, and on the feasibility of 
extending certification requirements to such entities.
    To ensure that Sec.  12.4 keeps pace with evolving network 
architectures and reliability risks, we also propose to amend Sec.  
12.4(b) to provide that ``all covered 911 service providers shall take 
reasonable measures to provide reliable 911 service.'' This obligation 
would include--but not be limited to--the existing areas of circuit 
diversity, central-office backup power, and diverse network monitoring. 
While the current Sec.  12.4 only addresses reliability with respect to 
these three specific areas, we believe it would demonstrate better 
governance for this rule to require covered entities to take reasonable 
measures generally to ensure the reliability of 911 service, with 
specific behavior identified within this rule as necessary to add more 
detail.
    We seek comment on additional network reliability practices that 
should be incorporated into Sec.  12.4 and its associated certification 
requirements. Based on the Bureau's findings with respect to the April 
2014 multistate 911 outage and other large-scale disruptions in 911 
service described above, we anticipate that one area of particular 
importance will be the reliability and testing of software and 
databases used to process 911 calls, including planned maintenance and 
software upgrades. We also believe that the certification should 
indicate whether a service provider's IP-based 911 architecture is 
geographically distributed, load-balanced, and capable of automatic 
reroutes to backup equipment in the event of a hardware, network, 
software or database failure. Finally, we believe the network 
monitoring component of the existing rule should cover not just the 
physical diversity of monitoring facilities, but also the proper 
prioritization of critical network alarms. What other measures should 
be implemented by covered 911 service providers to mitigate the risk of 
failure and geographic scope of impacts on 911 service? For example, 
should the certification address factors such as cybersecurity and 
supply chain risk management?
    We also believe that Sec.  12.4 should reflect and require 
certification with respect to the duty to take reasonable measures to 
share information and situational awareness, as appropriate under the 
circumstances, during disruptions in 911 service. We seek comment on 
the scope of information and communications that should be reasonably 
expected from various entities in the 911 ecosystem, including those 
with direct contractual relationships with PSAPs and those that provide 
service on a vendor or sub-contractor basis. At a minimum, we believe 
the certification should indicate whether a covered 911 service 
provider has a process in place to notify PSAPs of an outage within the 
timeframes specified in part 4 of the Commission's rules. While this 
proposal would not change such providers' substantive obligations under 
part 4, it would provide assurance that they have taken proactive steps 
to successfully perform their duties under the rules if the need 
arises. Service providers may also be able to detect outages in real 
time through call counts, ALI queries, and other methods of analyzing 
network traffic. To what extent should the certification reflect 
reasonable measures to detect and disseminate such real-time outage 
information?
    We seek comment on these proposals and on potential alternative 
approaches. Are there other topics or practices should be incorporated 
into ``reasonable measures'' and annual certification requirements? 
Should any components of the certification require testing or analysis 
by an independent third party, or is the certifying entity's own 
attestation sufficient? Should the Commission establish standards, best 
practices, or other mechanisms to promote the reliability of IP-based 
911 network elements and processes not currently covered by Sec.  12.4? 
Should such standards be voluntary (i.e., best practices) or mandatory? 
Should providers be required to report or certify the extent of their 
compliance with such standards, or should they be required to meet 
certain standards or performance requirements? Are there instances in 
an NG911 environment where consensus-based best practices have not yet 
been established and should be referred to an advisory committee such 
as the Commission's Communications Security, Reliability, and 
Interoperability Council (CSRIC) for further development? Should we 
include any limitations on our incorporation of such existing or future 
standards or practices in our rules? If we include a more general 
requirement of reliability, should we include additional guidance as to 
the standards by which the Commission will measure implementation?

B. Ensuring Transparency and Accountability in Connection With Major 
Changes to Existing 911 Service

    The functionality of the nation's 911 networks increasingly depends 
on complex relationships between service providers and PSAPs, and often 
among multiple service providers, sub-contractors, and other affiliated 
entities themselves. While states and localities are well-positioned 
under our cooperative governance framework to oversee many aspects of 
these relationships based on the needs of the PSAPs and residents 
within their borders, critical 911 network infrastructure is 
increasingly shared among many jurisdictions and beyond the oversight 
of individual emergency authorities, and more complex in its design and 
operation. Accordingly, the end-to-end reliability of a 911 network 
depends on the sum of its parts and how they function together. We must 
ensure that this transition process is open and transparent.

[[Page 3195]]

1. Major Changes in 911 Service
    Transparency is essential as the technologies and entities 
delivering 911 service capabilities evolve over time. In accordance 
with section 251 of the Communications Act, the Commission's rules 
require ILECs to provide public notice regarding any network change 
that will (1) Affect a competing service provider's performance or 
ability to provide service, (2) affect the ILEC's interoperability with 
other service providers, or (3) affect the manner in which customer 
premises equipment is attached to the interstate network, as well as 
public notice of network changes that ``[w]ill result in the retirement 
of copper loops or copper subloops, and the replacement of such loops 
with fiber-to-the-home loops or fiber-to-the-curb loops.'' While the 
Commission adopted these requirements primarily to ``promote[ ] open 
and vigorous competition'' among local exchange carriers, as 
contemplated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, network change 
notifications have also yielded information on certain changes in 911 
network architecture that affect interconnection with an ILEC. However, 
an increasing number of covered 911 service providers are not ILECs and 
are not required to file notifications when changes to their networks 
may affect 911 connectivity.
    We therefore propose to require notification to the Commission and 
the public of major changes in any covered 911 service provider's 
network architecture or scope of 911 services that are not otherwise 
covered by existing network change notification requirements. Although 
parties to individual contracts for 911 services may be aware of major 
changes in network architecture or in the entities responsible for 
various 911 functionalities, the public also has a vested interest in 
understanding changes that may affect its access to 911. Transparency 
will also promote cooperation and information-sharing among the 
increasingly diverse range of entities across the 911 ecosystem. We 
therefore believe that public disclosure of major changes in 911 
service is a key step toward increasing accountability when such 
changes are not initiated at the request of a PSAP or emergency 
authority or implemented on an emergency basis to mitigate or recover 
from the effects of an outage.
    We seek comment on this proposal. Which 911 service providers 
should be subject to notification requirements? Should OSPs, ILECs, 
SSPs, and their sub-contractors each be responsible for reporting major 
changes in their respective facilities and networks? Or should ILECs 
and/or SSPs providing 911 services directly to PSAPs be responsible for 
notification of major changes by their subcontractors and other 
affiliated entities? We recognize that in many instances changes in 911 
network architecture and the entities providing service occur at the 
request of PSAPs and state or local emergency authorities that desire 
new or different 911 capabilities. Should such changes be subject to 
notification requirements, and if so, who should provide the 
notification? Who should receive the notification? Should the 
Commission collect and publish such notifications, as it does with 
wireline network change notifications required under section 251 of the 
Act and associated Commission rules? How could public safety 
professional organizations such as NENA and APCO facilitate the 
distribution of such information to affected PSAPs? To allow sufficient 
time for public inspection without unnecessarily delaying beneficial 
network changes, we propose to require notification at least 60 days 
before major changes in 911 service take effect. We seek comment, 
however, on whether a shorter--or longer--time period would strike a 
more appropriate balance.
    We also seek comment on what changes should be considered ``major'' 
for notification purposes. In general, we propose that changes with 
impact on 911 service in more than a single state should be among the 
changes considered major. We seek comment on this proposal. Would such 
an approach lead industry to adopt incremental, state-by-state changes 
that may not be as efficient? Should we establish thresholds based on 
factors such as the geography or population affected by a change in the 
provision of 911 service, regardless of whether their effect is limited 
to a single state or extends to multiple states? Beyond geographic or 
population criteria, are there other criteria that for changes in 911 
service or network architecture that should trigger a notification 
requirement? Would it be helpful for an advisory committee such as 
CSRIC to develop recommendations regarding the types of 911 network 
changes that should require public notification? Do any existing CSRIC 
best practices or recommendations provide guidance?
2. Discontinuance or Impairment of Existing 911 Services Essential To 
Call Completion
    In addition to proposing public notification of major changes in 
911 networks as described above, we believe that additional safeguards 
are needed where such changes involve discontinuance, reduction or 
impairment of existing 911 services that are essential to call 
completion. As with network change notifications, the Commission 
already has rules requiring common carriers and interconnected VoIP 
providers to obtain authorization to ``discontinue, reduce, or impair 
service to a community, or part of a community.'' Similarly, we believe 
that incumbent 911 service providers that have historically taken 
responsibility for reliable 911 call completion have undertaken a 
public trust that cannot simply be relinquished at will. While 
incumbents are entitled to make decisions about their businesses and 
pursue new and different lines of service, they are not entitled to do 
so in a manner that endangers the public or leaves stakeholders 
uninformed with respect to the functioning of the combined network.
    We therefore propose that covered 911 service providers that seek 
to discontinue, reduce, or impair existing 911 service in a way that 
does not trigger already existing authorization requirements should be 
required to obtain Commission approval. We seek comment on this 
proposal, and on ways the Commission might address the details of 
implementation. Are these changes in 911 service of such critical 
importance that Commission approval should be required before such 
changes proceed? What processes do states and localities currently have 
in place to evaluate requests to discontinue, reduce or impair existing 
911 service, and how can the Commission support and encourage such 
processes? Would reliance on states and localities to oversee 
discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of existing 911 services 
better serve the policy goals of transparency and accountability?
    What actions by an incumbent provider short of a complete 
discontinuance of 911 service would constitute a reduction or 
impairment of service for purposes of this requirement? What criteria 
should the Commission use to evaluate a service provider's request to 
discontinue, reduce or impair existing 911 service? Which changes in 
the scope of 911 services offered by an incumbent would be most likely 
to affect reliable 911 call completion? Should the Commission adopt 
other requirements specific to incumbent providers seeking to exit 
lines of 911 service or to outsource elements of that service to third 
parties? Do CSRIC best practices provide guidance on these questions, 
and should CSRIC be charged with developing additional best practices 
or

[[Page 3196]]

recommendations with respect to the discontinuance, reduction, or 
impairment of existing 911 services?
    To be clear, nothing in this NPRM would relieve any carrier or 
interconnected VoIP provider of the requirement to seek permission to 
discontinue, reduce, or impair service to the extent required by 
section 214(a) of the Act and/or the Commission's implementing rules. 
We do not, however, intend to create duplicative obligations for 
entities that are already subject to section 214(a) and associated 
authorization requirements. The process proposed here would apply only 
when entities seeking to discontinue, reduce, or impair existing 911 
service are not already required to obtain approval under other 
existing Commission rules.
    We also do not propose to require public notification or Commission 
approval under these rules where the discontinuance or reduction of 911 
service has been requested or initiated by the PSAP or the responsible 
state or local emergency authority. We presume that PSAPs and emergency 
authorities that initiate such changes have the ability to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard 911 reliability in the affected 
facilities without Commission intervention.

C. Ensuring Reliability and Accountability of New IP-Based 911 
Capabilities and Services

    Increased innovation and enhanced competition in the NG911 
ecosystem hold the potential to enhance the functionality and utility 
of 911 while providing PSAPs and emergency authorities with greater 
choice over which services and products they purchase. At the same 
time, the increasing diversity of entities offering or planning to 
offer NG911 services increases the challenge of ensuring that all 
providers of such services will be capable of meeting appropriate 
standards of reliability and accountability. It is important that we 
set clear and consistent expectations with respect to the level of 
performance that providers of these services will be expected to 
achieve. Clarifying these obligations is essential to remove 
uncertainties and barriers to NG911 investment by state, local, and 
tribal authorities and to maintain public confidence in 911 as the 
transition to NG911 progresses.
    Historically, states have overseen the entry of entities providing 
911 service through such mechanisms as tariff conditions or issuance of 
certificates of public convenience and necessity. However, as we have 
noted above, covered 911 service providers increasingly are building 
and operating regional and nationwide IP-based 911 networks that both 
extend across state boundaries and serve PSAPs in multiple states, 
using less well established technologies. Thus, while states continue 
to have authority to regulate provision of 911 service within their 
jurisdictions, these multi-state networks transcend the regulatory 
authority of any individual state. Moreover, many states have elected 
not to exercise jurisdiction over IP-based communications, a 
determination that may operate to restrict their ability to ensure the 
reliability of 911 service that depends on IP-based technology. We 
therefore believe that a federal-level process is needed to ensure that 
there are no regulatory gaps in oversight of providers of new 911 
services. This process is not intended to supplant state action; to the 
contrary, it would complement existing state oversight and could be 
used to empower state-level action.
    We propose to require covered 911 service providers that seek to 
offer new services that affect 911 call completion to certify to the 
Commission that they have the technical and operational capability to 
provide reliable 911 service. In addition, to the extent that the new 
services rely on IP-based networks, associated infrastructure such as 
servers and data centers, and/or associated software applications, we 
propose that covered 911 service providers certify that they have 
conducted a reliability and security risk analysis of the network 
components, infrastructure, and/or software that they will use to 
support 911 call completion. This proposal would not require Commission 
approval of new entrants or delay the introduction of innovative new 
911 technologies. It would, however, require entities that seek to 
provide new critical links in 911 call completion to publicly 
acknowledge their responsibilities and certify their preparedness to 
implement relevant best practices and comply with existing Commission 
rules applicable to the 911 capabilities they provide. This requirement 
would extend only to IP-based services that are necessary for 
successful transmission of voice calls and other data to PSAPs. For 
example, a smart phone ``app'' that provides the ability to originate 
calls or text messages to 911 would be subject to certification 
requirements, while an app that merely enhances or adds value to a 
smart phone's existing 911 dialing capabilities would not.
    To what extent do state laws, regulations, or common law tort 
liability already provide adequate assurances of such qualifications, 
and is there a need for uniform standards in this regard? Are there 
quality-of-service requirements under state law that would cover 911-
related services, and if so, what entities do they cover? Is there 
immunity under state law against liability for the provision of 911 
related services, or communications services by common carriers or 
others? If so, how does such immunity affect incentives among covered 
service providers and others to ensure that 911 service is reliable? Do 
the answers to these questions depend upon whether a service is IP-
based? How can the Commission facilitate efforts by states and 
localities to oversee the effective and reliable deployment of new 911 
capabilities?
    If we adopt a certification requirement, which entities should be 
subject to it, and how should we define the scope of new services that 
would trigger the need for certification? What information should 
applicants provide to support their certifications? Should applicants 
be required to analyze network monitoring capabilities, support for 
situational awareness, and the ability to share outage information with 
other stakeholders? Should the certification address issues regarding 
geographic diversity and redundancy in the network, probabilities of 
equipment failing due to hardware, network, software and procedural 
failures, as well as the ability to switch to backup systems? To what 
extent should the risk analysis include cybersecurity and supply-chain 
risk assessments? Is it sufficient for service providers to conduct 
their own analysis or should we require analysis and certification by 
an independent third party? Would it be helpful for an advisory 
committee such as CSRIC to develop best practices and recommendations 
that would serve as a basis for a certification of compliance with best 
practices for new 911 capabilities and services? For example, should 
CSRIC be charged with recommending guidelines for the reliability and 
security risk analysis proposed above? Are there other parts of the 
communication industry or other industries that have similar 
certification processes? For example, could the PCI Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS) self-certification for entities receiving credit 
card data provide guidance?
    As noted above, we do not envision that the federal certification 
process proposed here would preempt existing state processes for 
certification of 911 service providers. We believe, however, that 
states should have the option of adopting the federal certification 
framework as the basis for state-level

[[Page 3197]]

governance. We further propose to allow states to enforce federal 
certification requirements at the state level. We seek comment on this 
approach. Is there any potential conflict between federal certification 
for covered 911 service providers and similar state-level processes, 
and if so, how could such conflicts be minimized? What processes do 
states and localities currently use to oversee the entry of new 911 
service providers, or entities that provide components of 911 service? 
Do these forms of oversight apply to all entities currently offering 
one or more components of 911 service, or only to incumbents or some 
other class of entities? To the extent that states use tariff 
conditions to regulate the provision of 911 service, what conditions 
are typically required of new entrants? In states where 911 is not a 
tariffed service, how do regulators and PSAPs ensure that all entities 
offering 911 service are both technically capable and committed to 
public safety?
    We also do not propose that federal certification would extend to 
the provision of new call processing services or CPE capabilities that 
are provisioned by PSAPs themselves under the oversight of state and 
local governments. Nevertheless, we seek comment on how the Commission 
can work with state and local partners to ensure that the reliability 
of PSAP call processing is also maximized. Are there best practices or 
other measures that PSAPs can take to improve the diversity and 
robustness of their inbound communications links and the reliability of 
their CPE? What role should the Commission play with respect to the 
multi-state deployment and maintenance of new CPE technologies? We note 
that the Commission recently created a task force on PSAP optimization, 
which we anticipate will also provide insight regarding PSAP 
infrastructure, network architecture, and procedures, including call 
processing.

D. Situational Awareness and Coordination Responsibility During 911 
Outages

    As demonstrated by recent outage trends, the increasing complexity 
of IP-based 911 network architecture, combined with the increased 
diversity of entities supporting 911 capabilities, creates potential 
obstacles to establishing prompt situational awareness and initiating 
recovery from major 911 outages. While current Commission rules address 
outage reporting to the Commission and to affected PSAPs, the 
experiences during large-scale 911 outages described above also 
indicate a need for better coordination and information-sharing among 
communications providers themselves and any subcontractors or vendors 
that provide components of the nation's 911 networks. In such outages, 
restoration of 911 service is likely to be significantly delayed when 
it is unclear which part of the 911 system has failed and which 
provider is responsible for repairs. A lack of coordination can also 
lead to the unacceptable result of multiple entities being involved in 
an outage but no single entity being able to provide timely and 
comprehensive information about the outage to the PSAPs and public that 
they serve.
    To address these concerns, we believe that more needs to be done to 
address gaps in situational awareness and coordination when large-scale 
911 outages affect multiple jurisdictions and service providers. First, 
effective information sharing is key when diagnosing and repairing 
problems that may span multiple providers' networks or originate with 
one provider but affect many others. Second, in the increasingly 
diverse NG911 ecosystem, it will be more and more difficult for PSAPs 
and 911 service providers to coordinate an effective and timely 
response to outages without a central clearinghouse for obtaining and 
disseminating critical information. Accordingly, we propose to clarify 
responsibility for situational awareness and coordination among 911 
service providers, sub-contractors, and other affiliated entries during 
disruptions in 911 service. While it may not be technically or 
economically feasible for a single entity to monitor, control, or 
repair every segment of a 911 network from caller to PSAP, it would be 
helpful for one covered 911 service provider in each jurisdiction to 
perform a triage function to mitigate the duration and impact of 
outages.
    To establish a clearinghouse mechanism for critical information 
during major 911 outages and other significant degradations in service, 
we propose to establish a class of covered 911 service providers that 
would assume primary responsibility for situational awareness and 
information sharing. These entities--which we propose to call ``911 
Network Operations Center (NOC) providers''--would be responsible for 
monitoring their networks to detect disruptions or degradations in 911 
service, and for affirmatively communicating relevant information, as 
appropriate, to other stakeholders, including OSPs, SSPs, vendors, 
PSAPs, state emergency management offices, and the Commission's 
Operations Center. As a corollary to this proposal, 911 NOC providers 
would be empowered to obtain relevant information concerning outages 
from other covered 911 service providers, who in turn would be required 
to provide information in response to the 911 NOC provider's requests. 
911 NOC providers would then coordinate with other stakeholders to 
collect and distribute information regarding the impact of outages on 
all affected portions of the network from call origination to 
completion.
    We propose that the role of 911 NOC provider for each jurisdiction 
should be assigned to the entity responsible for transport of 911 
traffic to the PSAP or PSAPs serving that jurisdiction. In many cases, 
we expect that this role would be assumed by the incumbent LEC, 
because, as noted above, ILECs have historically provided transport of 
911 traffic to PSAPs and have thereby occupied the best position to 
maintain comprehensive situational awareness, even as SSPs and vendors 
have come to provide component pieces of those networks. Nevertheless, 
as 911 networks evolve, other entities may take on the 911 transport 
responsibilities that ILECs have historically provided. For example, in 
an NG911 environment, the 911 transport function may be performed by an 
ESINet provider that receives 911 traffic from originating service 
providers and directs the traffic to PSAPs served by the ESINet. In 
such cases, we envision that the ESINet provider would assume the 911 
NOC provider role. We seek comment on this approach. Should ILECs, 
ESINet providers, and other entities responsible for 911 transport be 
the 911 NOC providers bearing primary responsibility for maintaining 
situational awareness, sharing information, and coordinating outage 
recovery among other affected providers? Are there situations where 
more than one entity can reasonably be described as being responsible 
for aspects of transport of 911 traffic to the PSAP or PSAPs serving a 
jurisdiction? In such situations, which entity would be best suited to 
fill the 911 NOC provider role?
    Under this framework, we anticipate the need for only one 911 NOC 
provider in each jurisdiction; indeed, the 911 NOC provider's role as a 
clearinghouse for situational awareness will be most effective with a 
single point of contact for relevant information. We also emphasize 
that the proposed responsibilities of 911 NOC providers during an 
outage would be limited in scope. For instance, 911 NOC providers would 
not be expected to have omniscient situational awareness of the status 
of 911 network components

[[Page 3198]]

outside their control except to the extent they are empowered to obtain 
such information from other parties or through their own network 
monitoring processes. Instead, 911 NOC providers would serve as a hub 
for the collection, aggregation, and communication of available 
information among covered 911 service providers and other affected 
stakeholders to mitigate the impact of outages and support rapid 
restoration of service. In addition, while 911 NOC providers would be 
tasked with obtaining and disseminating outage information, they would 
not be legally responsible for adverse consequences resulting from 
outages attributable to failures of network components outside their 
control, or for remediating or repairing such failures.
    We do not intend these proposals to supersede or replace existing 
outage reporting requirements under part 4 of the Commission's rules. 
Thus, we begin with the assumption that all parties covered by existing 
part 4 requirements would continue to be required to report outages to 
the Commission that meet the part 4 outage thresholds, and requirements 
for certain service providers to notify PSAPs and other ``911 Special 
Facilities'' of outages affecting 911 service would continue to apply 
independently of any action taken in this proceeding. We note, however, 
that the Commission has historically relied on mandatory outage 
reporting to gather statistical information on trends in communications 
reliability to assess the effectiveness of best practices and provide 
policy guidance on efforts to increase network reliability. While 
closely related, the need to share information and situational 
awareness among service providers affected by an outage may pose 
different challenges requiring different oversight mechanisms. We 
therefore seek comment on the alternative proposal of whether certain 
obligations currently in part 4 would be better assigned to 911 NOC 
providers under the framework proposed above. For example, should 
current responsibilities to notify PSAPs of outages affecting 911 
service be incorporated into the information-sharing responsibilities 
of the 911 NOC provider, rather than the outage-reporting 
responsibilities of multiple service providers under current Sec.  4.9? 
Should the Commission consider any other changes to part 4 in light of 
the responsibilities of 911 NOC providers proposed here?
    We also seek comment on processes and mechanisms that 911 NOC 
providers and other covered 911 service providers could use to carry 
out their situational awareness and coordination responsibilities 
proposed here. As described above with respect to reliability 
certification requirements, service providers may be able to detect 
outages in real time by tracking the number of 911 calls that enter and 
exit their networks, an increase in call failure rates, positioning 
failure rates, or the number of calls that result in an ALI or LIS 
query from the destination PSAP. Service providers should have alarms 
configured to bring such discrepancies to the attention of appropriate 
personnel. To what extent should 911 NOC providers and other covered 
911 service providers be expected to share information in real time 
about call counts and alarms using standardized network management 
interfaces or other mechanisms? Should CSRIC be charged with developing 
recommendations on these topics?
    How can the Commission facilitate the real-time exchange of 
information by leveraging technologies such as machine-readable data? 
Should the Commission require 911 NOC providers or other covered 911 
service providers to transmit high-level data on the status of their 
networks to a centralized ``dashboard'' allowing users to quickly 
identify disruptions in any portion of their 911 networks? Who should 
be given access to such data, and how can the Commission ensure that 
privacy and confidentiality are protected? Alternatively, should 911 
NOC providers be required to maintain a Web page that provides key 
information on the status of their 911 networks? What information 
should be included, and should such Web pages be available to the 
public, or only to PSAPs and other covered 911 service providers?
    How can the Commission support and empower 911 NOC providers and 
other covered 911 service providers to share information under the 
framework proposed above? One model for improved situational awareness 
that has been developed in the communications sector is the Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), a public-private partnership 
overseen by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security National 
Coordinating Center for Communications (NCC). Could a similar model be 
applied to the 911 ecosystem? Which entities should be eligible to 
participate, and should certain entities, such as NOC providers, be 
required to participate? Should the Commission facilitate improved 
communication by maintaining a centralized database of contact 
information for PSAPs and state emergency offices, which would allow 
911 NOC providers and other covered 911 service providers to compile 
and update distribution lists for outage notification and recovery? 
Should the Commission serve as a hub for compilation and distribution 
of any other information? What role could advisory committees such as 
CSRIC play?
    We also seek comment on issues that could affect the nature and 
scope of a NOC provider's responsibility for information gathering and 
dissemination. For example, should the scope of information that the 
NOC provider is responsible for gathering and disseminating vary 
depending on where in the call completion process a 911 outage has 
occurred? If so, what should the 911 NOC provider's responsibility be? 
To what extent should 911 NOC providers be responsible for addressing 
cybersecurity risks in 911 networks and sharing information with other 
stakeholders in the event of a cyber attack? What information should 
other covered 911 service providers that experience the effects of an 
outage be expected to communicate back to the 911 NOC provider?
    Where a PSAP is served by more than one covered 911 service 
provider (e.g., where a PSAP has a direct contractual relationship with 
an ILEC that sub-contracts with an SSP or other affiliated entity for 
911 capabilities), should the parties be required to designate specific 
support roles? Beyond the proposal that primary 911 NOC support is best 
provided by the 911 transport provider, should the Commission require 
covered 911 service providers to designate a hierarchy of 
responsibility for such support or encourage PSAPs and providers to 
negotiate their own agreements? Or should such determinations be made 
at the state or local level through tariff conditions or requests for 
proposals for 911 service? What information should covered 911 service 
providers that are not NOC providers be expected to share with each 
other?
    Are there legal or regulatory barriers that currently prevent or 
discourage 911 service providers, as well as their sub-contractors and 
other affiliated entities, from sharing information during a 911 
outage? What are the specific laws, regulations, or contractual 
provisions that would preclude such information-sharing, and how can 
the Commission address those barriers in order to improve efficient, 
privacy-protective information sharing and situational awareness? Are 
there issues of legal liability for disclosing customer information 
that should be addressed as part of the Commission's efforts in this 
regard? Should the Commission extend liability protections already 
afforded to

[[Page 3199]]

certain entities to additional participants in the 911 ecosystem?

E. Legal Authority

    The Communications Act of 1934 established the FCC, in part, ``for 
the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of 
wire and radio communication.'' Beyond that general mandate, Congress 
has repeatedly and specifically endorsed a role for the Commission in 
the nationwide implementation of advanced 911 capabilities. The 
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999 (911 Act) 
directed the Commission to ``designate 911 as the universal emergency 
telephone number within the United States for reporting an emergency to 
appropriate authorities and requesting assistance.'' It also directed 
the Commission to ``encourage and support efforts by States to deploy 
comprehensive end-to-end emergency communications infrastructure and 
programs, based on coordinated statewide plans, including seamless, 
ubiquitous, reliable wireless telecommunications networks and enhanced 
wireless 911 service.'' The New and Emerging Technologies 911 
Improvement Act of 2008 (NET 911 Act) further affirmed the Commission's 
authority to require interconnected VoIP providers to offer 911 
service. The Twenty-First Century Communications and Video 
Accessibility Act of 2010 (CVAA) also advanced the Commission's 
implementation of technologies such as text-to-911 by granting 
authority to promulgate ``regulations, technical standards, protocols, 
and procedures . . . necessary to achieve reliable, interoperable 
communication that ensures access by individuals with disabilities to 
an Internet protocol-enabled emergency network, where achievable and 
technically feasible.'' Together, and in light of the series of 911 
outages described above extending across multiple jurisdictions, we 
believe these provisions authorize--and indeed require--the Commission 
to take a leadership role, in cooperative partnership with states and 
localities, in promoting the continued availability and reliability of 
911 services nationwide.
    To the extent that 911 service providers are common carriers, the 
Commission also has based 911 reliability requirements on section 
201(b) of the Communications Act, which requires the ``practices'' of 
common carriers to be ``just and reasonable,'' and on section 214(d), 
which provides that a common carrier must ``provide itself with 
adequate facilities for the expeditious and efficient performance of 
its service as a common carrier.'' Where 911 service requirements 
affect wireless carriers, the Commission also has relied on its Title 
III authority to ``[p]rescribe the nature of the service to be 
rendered,'' and more generally, ``to manage spectrum . . . in the 
public interest.''
    With respect to proposals to promote transparency and public 
notification for changes in 911 service, we note that section 218 of 
the Act authorizes the Commission to ``inquire into the management of 
the business of all carriers,'' and to obtain from such carriers and 
from persons directly or indirectly under their control ``full and 
complete information necessary to enable the Commission to perform the 
duties and carry out the objects for which it was created.'' Section 
251(c)(5) of the Act also requires each incumbent local exchange 
carrier to ``provide reasonable public notice of changes in the 
information necessary for the transmission and routing of services,'' 
or ``other changes that would affect the interoperability of [its] 
facilities and networks.'' Furthermore, Section 4(o) of the Act states 
that ``[f]or the purpose of obtaining maximum effectiveness from the 
use of radio and wire communications in connection with safety of life 
and property,'' the Commission ``shall investigate and study all phases 
of the problem and the best methods of obtaining the cooperation and 
coordination of these systems.'' The Commission also has authority, 
under the New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008, to 
``compile . . . information concerning 9-1-1 and enhanced 9-1-1 
elements, for the purpose of assisting IP-enabled voice service 
providers in complying with this section.'' Thus, as part of a 
cooperative governance structure for 911, the Commission is authorized 
to gather and disseminate information from carriers and other 
regulatees for the purpose of ensuring effective public safety 
communications. We seek comment on the application of these provisions 
to proposals in this NPRM.
    As the Commission concluded in the 911 Reliability Order, ``[i]n 
light of these express statutory responsibilities, regulation of 
additional capabilities related to reliable 911 service, both today and 
in an NG911 environment, would be well within Commission's . . . 
statutory authority.'' That order also committed to review the rules 
established therein, ``in light of our understanding about how NG911 
networks may differ from legacy 911 service,'' and based on such 
factors as ``outage reporting trends'' and ``adoption of NG911 
capabilities on a nationwide basis.'' Accordingly, we believe that the 
Commission would have ample legal authority to adopt any or all of the 
proposals discussed above, consistent with our longstanding policy of 
cooperation with state and local authorities. We seek comment on this 
analysis. In particular, we seek comment from state and local 
regulators and emergency authorities regarding the appropriate balance 
of federal, state, and local authority in each of the proposals 
described above.
    To the extent that any of the proposals herein affect entities that 
are not subject to specific statutory authority, we also believe that 
their adoption would be that ``reasonably ancillary to the Commission's 
effective performance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.'' 
Whether or not the increasingly diverse range of entities providing 911 
services are common carriers or Commission licensees, they nevertheless 
have undertaken to provide a critical public safety communications 
service that is within our general jurisdiction to ``promot[e] safety 
of life and property through the use of wire and radio communication.'' 
In light of the record of recent events leading to significant 
multistate 911 outages, we believe such proposals would be reasonably 
ancillary to our fulfillment of the specific statutory mandates to 
ensure reliable and resilient 911 service across different 
technologies, as discussed above. We seek comment on this analysis and 
any other sources of legal authority for the proposals in this Notice.

V. Procedural Matters

A. Ex Parte Presentations

    The proceedings initiated by this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
shall be treated as ``permit-but-disclose'' proceedings in accordance 
with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex parte 
presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a 
memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days 
after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the 
Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations 
are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must: (1) List 
all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at 
which the ex parte presentation was made; and (2) summarize all data 
presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the 
presentation consisted in whole or in part of the

[[Page 3200]]

presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's 
written comments, memoranda, or other filings in the proceeding, the 
presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her 
prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant 
page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be 
found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown 
or given to Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be 
written ex parte presentations and must be filed consistent with Sec.  
1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by Sec.  1.49(f) or for which the 
Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written ex 
parte presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte 
presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the 
electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and 
must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, 
searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize 
themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.

B. Comment Filing Procedures

    Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 
CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments and reply 
comments in response to this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on or before 
the dates indicated on the first page of this document. Comments may be 
filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS). 
See Electronic Filing of Documents in Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 
24121 (1998).
    <bullet> Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically 
using the Internet by accessing the ECFS: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/.
    <bullet> Paper Filers: Parties that choose to file by paper must 
file an original and one copy of each filing. If more than one docket 
or rulemaking number appears in the caption of this proceeding, filers 
must submit two additional copies for each additional docket or 
rulemaking number.
    <bullet> Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by 
commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. 
Postal Service mail. All filings must be addressed to the Commission's 
Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
    <bullet> All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings 
for the Commission's Secretary must be delivered to FCC Headquarters at 
445 12th St. SW., Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours 
are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand deliveries must be held together 
with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be 
disposed of before entering the building.
    <bullet> Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service 
Express Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton 
Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743.
    <bullet> U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, and Priority 
mail must be addressed to 445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC 20554.

C. Accessible Formats

    To request materials in accessible formats for people with 
disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), 
send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection" class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="aaccc9c99f9a9eeaccc9c984cdc5dc">[email protected]</a> or call the Consumer & Governmental 
Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

D. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, see 5 U.S.C. 
604, the Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic impact on small 
entities of the policies and rules addressed in this document. Written 
public comments are requested in the IRFA. These comments must be filed 
in accordance with the same filing deadlines as comments filed in 
response to this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking as set forth on the 
first page of this document, and have a separate and distinct heading 
designating them as responses to the IRFA.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking contains proposed new 
information collection requirements. The Commission, as part of its 
continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general 
public and OMB to comment on the information collection requirements 
contained in this document, as required by PRA. In addition, pursuant 
to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, we seek specific 
comment on how we might ``further reduce the information collection 
burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.''

VI. Ordering Clauses

    Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to sections 151, 154(i), 
154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 219, 251(e), 301, 303(b), 
303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 615, 615a, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 
621(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 
154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 219, 251(e), 301, 
303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 615, 615a, 615c, 621(b)(3), 
and 621(d), that this Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in PS Docket Nos. 14-193 and 13-75 is adopted.
    It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of this Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
including the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

VII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 
(RFA), the Commission has prepared this Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant economic impact of the 
proposals described in the attached Policy Statement and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on small entities. Written public comments 
are requested on this IRFA. Comments must be identified as responses to 
the IRFA and must be filed by the deadlines for comments in the Notice. 
The Commission will send a copy of the Notice, including this IRFA, to 
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration 
(SBA). In addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be 
published in the Federal Register.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules

    The NPRM seeks comment on governance mechanisms to promote reliable 
911 call completion nationwide and improve situational awareness and 
information sharing among 911 service providers. Specifically, it 
proposes to: (1) Amend the Commission's 911 reliability certification 
rules to cover additional entities and network reliability practices 
that are vital to call completion; (2) require public notification for 
major changes in multi-state 911 networks and services, and Commission 
approval for discontinuance of existing 911 services; (3) require 
entities seeking to provide new 911 capabilities to certify as to their 
technical and operational capability to provide reliable service; and 
(4) designate certain 911 service providers to be primarily responsible 
for situational awareness and coordination with other service providers 
in the event of a 911 outage.

[[Page 3201]]

    The NPRM also affirms core principles guiding the Commission's 
approach to 911 governance and proposes mechanisms for the Commission, 
in cooperation with state and local partners, to ensure that the 
nation's 911 governance structure keeps pace with evolving technology 
so that all entities providing 911 service capabilities remain 
accountable for reliable 911 call completion and accurate situational 
awareness. As discussed in the NPRM, recent outage trends have revealed 
new reliability challenges due to geographic consolidation of network 
infrastructure and an increasing reliance on software-based network 
components to process and route 911 calls on a regional or national 
scale. Furthermore, an increasing number of 911 service providers 
subcontract with third party vendors for call-routing and other 
technical capabilities that are essential to call completion. As a 
result, 911 call centers potentially face real-time communication 
problems in trying to mitigate 911 service problems with 911 service 
providers and subcontractors. The Commission has a responsibility to 
promote reliable emergency communications and prevent avoidable 
failures.
    The NPRM builds upon the 911 Reliability Order adopted by the 
Commission in 2013 following the 2012 derecho storm, and sets forth 
principals to guide the Commission's 911 governance efforts in light of 
technology transitions and changing outage trends. In particular, the 
Policy Statement affirms the Commission's policy of working with state 
and local partners to ensure reliable 911 call completion as technology 
transitions consolidate network infrastructure and change the way 911 
services are delivered to PSAPs in multiple states. Further, the 
Commission stresses that service provider changes to 911 services must 
be transparent and coordinated with the Commission and the appropriate 
state and local authorities.

B. Legal Basis

    The legal basis for any action that may be taken pursuant to this 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is contained in sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 
4(o), 5(c), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 219, 251(e), 301, 303(g), 303(j), 
303(r), 332, 403, 615, 615a, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 621(d) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 
155(c), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 219, 251(e), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 
303(r), 332, 403, 615, 615a, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 621(d).

C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
the Proposed Rules Would Apply

    The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of and, where 
feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities that may be 
affected by the proposed rules. The RFA generally defines the term 
``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business 
Act. A small business concern is one which: (1) Is independently owned 
and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) 
satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA).
1. Small Businesses, Small Organizations, and Small Governmental 
Jurisdictions
    Our action may, over time, affect small entities that are not 
easily categorized at present. We therefore describe here, at the 
outset, three comprehensive, statutory small entity size standards. 
First, nationwide, there are a total of approximately 27.5 million 
small businesses, according to the SBA. In addition, a ``small 
organization'' is generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is 
independently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' 
Nationwide, as of 2007, there were approximately 1,621,315 small 
organizations. Finally, the term ``small governmental jurisdiction'' is 
defined generally as ``governments of cities, towns, townships, 
villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population of 
less than fifty thousand.'' Census Bureau data for 2011 indicate that 
there were 89,476 local governmental jurisdictions in the United 
States. We estimate that, of this total, as many as 88,506 entities may 
qualify as ``small governmental jurisdictions.'' Thus, we estimate that 
most governmental jurisdictions are small.
    The NPRM seeks comment on the class of entities to which the 
proposals would apply. In the Derecho Report and the 911 Reliability 
Order the Commission defined ``covered 911 service providers,'' as 
those that provide specified 911 capabilities, or the functional 
equivalent, ``directly to a PSAP.'' The NPRM asks whether the 
Commission should expand the ``covered 911 service providers'' 
definition to also include all entities that provide 911, E911, or 
NG911 capabilities, such as call routing, automatic location 
information (ALI), automatic number identification (ANI), location 
information servers (LIS), text-to-911, or the functional equivalent of 
those capabilities, regardless of whether they provide such 
capabilities under a direct contractual relationship with a PSAP or 
emergency authority. Depending on how 911 calls are routed and 
processed in different network architectures, the proposed definition 
could apply to originating service providers (OSPs) such as wireless 
carriers and interconnected VoIP providers, incumbent local exchange 
carriers (ILECs), 911 system service providers (SSPs) that provide 911 
services such as call routing and location information to PSAPs, and 
vendors and subcontractors of such entities to the extent that they 
provide covered 911 capabilities.
    The NPRM seeks comment on which 911 service providers should be 
subject to additional 911 network change notification requirements, 
including publicly reporting major changes in their respective 
facilities and networks that affect PSAPs in multiple states. To the 
extent that changes in 911 service amount to a discontinuance, 
reduction, or impairment of existing services, the NPRM proposes to 
require Commission approval to the extent that authorization is not 
already required under section 214 of the Communications Act. The NPRM 
also seeks comment on whether to require 911 entities that propose to 
offer new services that affect 911 call completion to certify with the 
Commission baseline assurances of their technical and operational 
qualifications to provide reliable 911 service, as well as comment on 
which 911 entities should be subject to this certification.
    To facilitate situational awareness and coordination, the NPRM 
seeks comment on the establishment of a class ``911 Network Operations 
Center (911 NOC) providers,'' which would assume primary responsibility 
for situational awareness and information sharing during disruptions in 
911 service. The NPRM proposes that the 911 NOC provide role for each 
jurisdiction should be assigned to the entity responsible for transport 
of 911 traffic to the PSAP or PSAPs serving that jurisdiction--
typically the local ILEC in legacy network architectures. However, as 
we transition into IP-based NG911 networks, other entities such as SSPs 
and emergency services Internet Protocol network (ESINet) providers may 
receive 911 traffic from an OSP and then direct traffic to the PSAP. 
The NPRM seeks comment on whether ILECs, ESINet providers or other 911

[[Page 3202]]

call transport entities should be the 911 NOC providers under this 
proposal.
2. Communications Service Entities
    Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). Neither the 
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard 
specifically for incumbent local exchange services. The appropriate 
size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired 
Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a business 
is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. Census Bureau data for 
2007, which now supersede data from the 2002 Census, show that there 
were 3,188 firms in this category that operated for the entire year. Of 
this total, 3,144 had employment of 999 or fewer, and 44 firms had had 
employment of 1,000 or more. According to Commission data, 1,307 
carriers reported that they were incumbent local exchange service 
providers. Of these 1,307 carriers, an estimated 1,006 have 1,500 or 
fewer employees and 301 have more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, 
the Commission estimates that most providers of local exchange service 
are small entities that may be affected by the rules and policies 
proposed in the NPRM. Thus under this category and the associated small 
business size standard, the majority of these incumbent local exchange 
service providers can be considered small.
    Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs), Competitive 
Access Providers (CAPs), Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and Other 
Local Service Providers. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has 
developed a small business size standard specifically for these service 
providers. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the 
category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, 
such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. Census 
Bureau data for 2007, which now supersede data from the 2002 Census, 
show that there were 3,188 firms in this category that operated for the 
entire year. Of this total, 3,144 had employment of 999 or fewer, and 
44 firms had had employment of 1,000 employees or more. Thus under this 
category and the associated small business size standard, the majority 
of these Competitive LECs, CAPs, Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and 
Other Local Service Providers can be considered small entities. 
According to Commission data, 1,442 carriers reported that they were 
engaged in the provision of either competitive local exchange services 
or competitive access provider services. Of these 1,442 carriers, an 
estimated 1,256 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 186 have more than 
1,500 employees. In addition, 17 carriers have reported that they are 
Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and all 17 are estimated to have 1,500 
or fewer employees. In addition, 72 carriers have reported that they 
are Other Local Service Providers. Of the 72, seventy have 1,500 or 
fewer employees and two have more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, 
the Commission estimates that most providers of competitive local 
exchange service, competitive access providers, Shared-Tenant Service 
Providers, and Other Local Service Providers are small entities that 
may be affected by rules proposed in the NPRM.
    Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except satellite). This 
industry comprises establishments engaged in operating and maintaining 
switching and transmission facilities to provide communications via the 
airwaves. Establishments in this industry have spectrum licenses and 
provide services using that spectrum, such as cellular phone services, 
paging services, wireless Internet access, and wireless video services. 
The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category 
Wireless Telecommunications Carriers. The size standard for that 
category is that a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer 
employees. For this category, census data for 2007 show that there were 
11,163 establishments that operated for the entire year. Of this total, 
10,791 establishments had employment of 999 or fewer employees and 372 
had employment of 1,000 employees or more. Thus under this category and 
the associated small business size standard, the Commission estimates 
that the majority of wireless telecommunications carriers (except 
satellite) are small entities that may be affected by rules proposed in 
the NPRM.
    Wireless Service Providers. The SBA has developed a small business 
size standard for wireless firms within the two broad economic census 
categories of ``Paging'' and ``Cellular and Other Wireless 
Telecommunications.'' Under both categories, the SBA deems a wireless 
business to be small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. For the census 
category of Paging, Census Bureau data for 2002 show that there were 
807 firms in this category that operated for the entire year. Of this 
total, 804 firms had employment of 999 or fewer employees, and three 
firms had employment of 1,000 employees or more. Thus, under this 
category and associated small business size standard, the majority of 
firms can be considered small. For the census category of Cellular and 
Other Wireless Telecommunications, Census Bureau data for 2002 show 
that there were 1,397 firms in this category that operated for the 
entire year. Of this total, 1,378 firms had employment of 999 or fewer 
employees, and 19 firms had employment of 1,000 employees or more. 
Thus, under this second category and size standard, the majority of 
firms can, again, be considered small.
    All Other Telecommunications Providers. To the extent that entities 
such as SSPs and interconnected VoIP providers are subject to proposals 
in the NPRM but are not ``Wired Telecommunication Carriers,'' 
``Wireless Telecommunication Carriers,'' or ``Cellular and Other 
Wireless Telecommunications'' under the categories listed above, the 
closest U.S. Census category appears to be ``All Other 
Telecommunications.'' All Other Telecommunications is defined as 
follows: ``This U.S. industry comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in providing specialized telecommunications services, such as . 
. . Internet services or voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) services 
via client-supplied telecommunications connections.'' In analyzing 
whether a substantial number of small entities would be affected by the 
requirements proposed in the NPRM, the Commission notes that the SBA 
has developed a small business size standard for All Other 
Telecommunications, which consists of all such firms with gross annual 
receipts of $30 million or less. For this category, census data for 
2007 show that there were 2,639 establishments that operated for the 
entire year. Of those establishments, a total of 1,912 had gross annual 
receipts between $100,000 and $1 million; 487 had gross annual receipts 
between $1 million and $25 million; and 240 had gross annual receipts 
over $25 million. Thus, a majority of All Other Telecommunications 
firms potentially affected by the proposals in the NPRM can be 
considered small.

D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

    As noted above, the NPRM proposes to (1) amend the Commission's 911 
reliability certification rules to cover additional entities and 
network reliability practices that are vital to call completion; (2) 
require public notification for major changes in multi-state 911 
networks and services, and Commission approval for discontinuance of 
existing 911 services; (3) require entities seeking to provide

[[Page 3203]]

new 911 capabilities to certify as to their technical and operational 
capability to provide reliable service; and (4) designate certain 911 
service providers to be primarily responsible for situational awareness 
and coordination with other service providers in the event of a 911 
outage.
    The NPRM proposes that a covered 911 service provider take 
reasonable measures to provide reliable service and complete an annual 
certification indicating whether it has implemented specified best 
practices or reasonable alternative measures. Covered 911 service 
providers' ``reasonable measures'' obligation would include --but would 
not be limited to--existing areas of circuit diversity, central-office 
backup power, and diverse network monitoring. Further, covered 911 
service providers' certifications to the Commission would indicate 
whether IP-based 911 architecture is geographically distributed, load-
balanced, and capable of automatic reroutes to backup equipment in the 
event of a hardware, network, software or database failure. The 
networking monitoring section of the certification would also include 
current requirements for physical diversity of monitoring facilities, 
but also the proper prioritization of critical network alarms. Further, 
the NPRM proposes that 911 entities have a duty to take reasonable 
measures to communicate with other 911 entities during disruptions in 
911 service. Providers would be required to certify whether they have 
an outage notification process is in place to notify PSAPs of 
disruptions in 911 service within time frames specified in part 4 of 
the Commission rules.
    These proposals build upon the existing 911 reliability 
certification process for covered 911 service providers that the 
Commission established in 2013. Under this process, a corporate officer 
with supervisory and budgetary authority over network operations in all 
relevant service areas must file an annual attestation with the 
Commission describing the entity's implementation of specified best 
practices, or if it is not feasible to implement those best practices, 
a description of reasonable alternative measures designed to mitigate 
the risk of failure. The option of certifying alternative measures is 
designed to provide flexibility to small entities operating in diverse 
service areas, which may have unique ways of addressing network 
reliability challenges. Because many covered 911 service providers have 
indicated they already conduct activities that form the basis for this 
certification in the normal course of business, the Commission expects 
the additional burden of filing certifications to be minimal. 
Certifications will be submitted through a simple online form, which is 
designed to allow small entities to input certification information and 
upload an attestation from a corporate officer without the need for any 
specialized personnel. In some cases, however, covered 911 service 
providers may choose to hire consultants or engineers to conduct 
technical aspects of the certification, or an attorney to review 
certification information for compliance with applicable rules. 
However, the Commission expects that most covered 911 service 
providers, including small entities, will be able to complete and 
submit the annual certification using only in-house personnel.
    The NPRM proposes to require notification to the Commission and the 
public of major changes in any 911 service provider's network 
architecture or scope of 911 services that are not otherwise covered by 
existing network change notification requirements. The NPRM seeks 
comment on the specific changes that would be subject to notification 
requirements but proposes generally that changes affecting 911 service 
to PSAPs in multiple states would be considered ``major'' and subject 
to public notification. The proposed notifications would be filed with 
the Commission in a process similar to the existing network change 
notifications required from incumbent LECs under section 251 of the 
Communications Act. These are typically relatively short filings 
describing the nature of the planned changes and location(s) affected. 
Some companies may wish to have an attorney review such notifications 
for compliance purposes, but the proposal does not require such a 
review.
    For incumbent 911 service providers that seek to discontinue, 
reduce or impair existing 911 service in a way that does not trigger 
already existing authorization requirements under section 214 of the 
Communications Act, the NPRM proposes to require prior Commission 
approval. The NPRM seeks comment on which actions by an incumbent 911 
service provider would be considered a discontinuance, reduction or 
impairment of service. However, this proposal would not include changes 
requested by a PSAP or the responsible state or local emergency 
authority that might otherwise constitute a discontinuance, reduction 
or impairment of service. Commission approval under this proposal would 
require the applicant to file a request to discontinue, reduce, or 
impair 911 services stating the nature of the changes, the location(s) 
affected, and the anticipated date of the changes. If the Commission 
does not act on such a request within 60 days, the request will be 
deemed approved. As noted above, certain applicants may wish to hire 
engineers, consultants, or attorneys to review applications for 
discontinuance or technical portions thereof, but there is no such 
requirement in the proposed rule.
    The NPRM also proposes to require covered 911 service providers 
that seek to offer new services that affect 911 call completion to 
certify to the Commission that they have the technical and operational 
capability to provide reliable 911 service. To the extent that the new 
services rely on IP-based networks, associated infrastructure such as 
servers and data centers, and/or associated software applications, the 
NPRM proposes that covered 911 service providers certify that they have 
conducted a reliability and security risk analysis of the network 
components, infrastructure, and/or software that they will use to 
support 911 call completion. This proposal would not require Commission 
approval of new entrants or delay the introduction of new 911 
technologies. It would, however, require entities that seek to provide 
new critical links in 911 call completion to publicly acknowledge their 
responsibilities and certify their preparedness to implement relevant 
best practices and comply with existing Commission rules applicable to 
the 911 capabilities they provide. The Commission does not anticipate 
the need for any specialized personnel to provide such a certification.
    To improve situational awareness during 911 outages, the NPRM 
proposes to establish a class of ``911 Network Operations Center (911 
NOC) providers,'' which would assume primary responsibility for 
monitoring their networks to detect disruptions or degradations in 911 
service, and for affirmatively communicating relevant information, as 
appropriate, to other affected 911 entities, including OSPs, SSPs, 
vendors, PSAPs, state emergency management offices, and the 
Commission's Operations Center. The role of the 911 NOC provider would 
be assigned to the entity responsible for transport of 911 traffic to 
the PSAP(s) in each jurisdiction. 911 NOC providers would receive 
information from, and coordinate with other covered 911 service 
providers to collect and distribute information regarding the impact of 
outages on all affected portions of the network from call origination 
to completion. The NPRM seeks comment on other responsibilities

[[Page 3204]]

of the 911 NOC provider, as well as the responsibilities of other 
covered 911 service providers to share information with the 911 NOC 
provider. The Commission anticipates that most or all of these 
information-sharing activities would be performed by in-house personnel 
who already are employed to monitor and maintain covered 911 service 
providers' networks. In any event, the NPRM proposes that 911 NOC 
providers would not be legally responsible for outages attributable to 
failures of network components outside their control, or for 
remediating or repairing such failures.

E. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant, 
specifically small business alternatives that it has considered in 
reaching its proposed approach, which may include the following four 
alternatives (among others): ``(1) The establishment of differing 
compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into 
account the resources available to small entities; (2) the 
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance or 
reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; (3) the use 
of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) and exemption 
from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small entities.''
    The NPRM seeks to update and enhance the Commission's current 911 
reliability certification rules, which complement its general approach 
of encouraging communications providers to voluntarily implement best 
practices and measuring compliance through certification requirements 
and outage reporting. Thus, small entities with limited resources would 
continue to enjoy many of the benefits of the current regime, including 
a general focus on network performance and reliability rather than 
specific design requirements. The option to certify reasonable 
alternative measures in lieu of specified certification requirements 
also provides flexibility to small entities, and the online system for 
submission of certification information is designed for ease of use by 
all communications providers without the need for specialized 
personnel. Public notifications and certifications proposed in the NPRM 
would follow similar submission processes and would not mandate any 
specific standards for 911 network architecture. The Commission has 
traditionally considered this approach a more flexible and less costly 
alternative to more comprehensive regulation, and the NPRM would 
preserve those advantages in large part.
    Furthermore, the proposals in the NPRM apply primarily to service 
providers that offer 911 services on a multi-state scale to PSAPs in 
multiple jurisdictions. For example, IP-based 911 call routing 
capabilities are typically concentrated in a small number of servers 
and databases that may serve PSAPs across the country. Our proposals 
with respect to public notification and Commission approval of major 
changes in 911 service or discontinuance of 911 service also would 
apply only to providers serving PSAPs in multiple states. Thus, while 
there is no explicit exemption proposed for small entities, many of the 
rules by their nature will tend to apply only to larger communications 
providers that operate major, multi-state 911 networks.
    To the extent that the NPRM would impose new obligations on small 
entities, we seek comment on alternatives including (1) the 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; 
(3) the use of performance, rather than design, standards; and (4) an 
exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for small 
entities. Which of the proposed approaches do small entities find 
particularly difficult or costly to comply with, and how could those 
difficulties be addressed through modifications or exemptions? What 
would be the effect on public safety of exemptions from 911 service 
requirements, regardless of cost?

F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the 
Proposed Rules

    None.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 12

    Resiliency, redundancy and reliability of communications.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.

Proposed Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR part 12 as follows:

PART 12--RESILIENCY, REDUNDANCY, AND RELIABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS

0
1. Revise the authority for part 12 to read as follows:

    Authority:  47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 
201(b), 214(d), 218, 219, 251(e), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 
303(r), 332, 403, 615, 615a, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 621(d).

0
2. In Sec.  12.4 revise paragraph (a)(4); add paragraphs (a)(12) 
through (14); revise paragraphs (b) and (c)(3); and add paragraphs 
(c)(4) and (5) to read as follows:


Sec.  12.4  Reliability of covered 911 service providers

    (a) * * *
    (4) Covered 911 service provider.
    (i) Any entity that:
    (A) Provides call routing, automatic location information (ALI), 
automatic number identification (ANI), location information services 
(LIS), text-to-911, or any other capability required for delivery of 
911, E911, or NG911, or the functional equivalent of any of those 
capabilities, to a public safety answering point (PSAP), statewide 
default answering point, or appropriate local emergency authority as 
such entities are defined in Sec.  64.3000(b) of this chapter, whether 
directly or indirectly as a contractor or agent to any other entity; 
and/or
    (B) Operates a central office that directly serves a public safety 
answering point (PSAP), statewide default answering point, or 
appropriate local emergency authority as such entities are defined in 
Sec.  64.3000(b) of this chapter. For purposes of this section, a 
central office directly serves a PSAP, statewide default answering 
point, or appropriate local emergency authority if it hosts a selective 
router or the functional equivalent, hosts an ALI/ANI database or the 
functional equivalent, or is the last service-provider facility through 
which a 911 trunk or administrative line passes before connecting to a 
PSAP, statewide default answering point, or appropriate local emergency 
authority.
    (ii) The term ``covered 911 service provider'' shall not include:
    (A) PSAPs or governmental authorities to the extent that they 
provide 911, E911, or NG911 capabilities; or
    (B) Communications providers that solely originate voice calls or 
text messages to 911 but do not provide any of the capabilities or 
services described in paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section.
* * * * *
    (12) Geographically distributed. For purposes of this section, 911 
network

[[Page 3205]]

architecture is geographically distributed if all calls on the 911 
network can be routed through more than one database or call processing 
facility in more than one geographic location.
    (13) Load balanced. For purposes of this section, 911 network 
architecture is load balanced if call volume is dynamically distributed 
among multiple active databases or call processing facilities rather 
than concentrated in one active location.
    (14) Situational awareness. For purposes of this section, 
situational awareness means the ability to detect disruptions or 
degradations in 911 service, to assess the scope and impact of such 
disruptions or degradations in 911 service, and to share information as 
appropriate to mitigate and resolve such impacts.
    (b) Provision of reliable 911 service. All covered 911 service 
providers shall take reasonable measures to provide reliable 911 
service. Performance of the elements of the Certification set forth in 
paragraphs (c)(1)(i), (c)(2)(i), (c)(3)(i), (c)(4)(i), and (c)(5)(i) of 
this section shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of this 
paragraph (b). If a covered 911 service provider cannot certify that it 
has performed a given element, the Commission may determine that such 
provider nevertheless satisfies the requirements of this paragraph (b) 
based upon a showing in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section 
that it is taking alternative measures with respect to that element 
that are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure, or that 
one or more certification elements are not applicable to its network.
    (c) * * *
    (3) Network monitoring.
    (i) A covered 911 service provider shall certify whether it has, 
within the past year:
    (A) Conducted Diversity Audits of the Aggregation Points that it 
uses to gather network monitoring data in each 911 Service Area;
    (B) Conducted Diversity Audits of Monitoring Links between 
Aggregation Points and NOCs for each 911 Service Area in which it 
operates;
    (C) Implemented Physically Diverse Aggregation Points for network 
monitoring data in each 911 Service Area and Physically Diverse 
Monitoring Links from such aggregation points to at least one NOC; and
    (D) Established appropriate alarms for network failures that would 
be reasonably likely to result in a disruption of 911 service within a 
911 Service Area, and procedures designed to ensure that such alarms 
quickly bring such network failures to the attention of appropriate 
personnel.
    (ii) If a covered 911 service provider has not implemented all of 
the elements in paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section, it must certify 
with respect to each such 911 Service Area:
    (A) Whether it has taken alternative measures to mitigate the 
relevant risk, or is taking steps to remediate any vulnerabilities that 
it has identified with respect thereto, in which case it shall provide 
a brief explanation of such alternative measures or such remediation 
steps, the date by which it anticipates such remediation will be 
completed, and why it believes those measures are reasonably sufficient 
to mitigate such risk; or
    (B) Whether it believes that one or more of the requirements of 
this subsection are not applicable to its network, in which case it 
shall provide a brief explanation of why it believes any such 
requirement does not apply.
    (4) Database and software configuration and testing.
    (i) A covered 911 service provider shall certify whether it has, 
within the past year:
    (A) Implemented reasonable measures to ensure that any Internet 
Protocol (IP)-based architecture used to provide 911, E911, or NG911 
capabilities defined in paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section is 
geographically distributed, load balanced, and capable of automatic 
reroutes in the event of a software or database failure.
    (B) Implemented reasonable measures to ensure that any software or 
database used by the covered 911 service provider to provide 911, E911, 
or NG911 capabilities such as call routing, automatic location 
information (ALI), automatic number identification (ANI), location 
information services (LIS), text-to-911, or the functional equivalent 
of those capabilities, is designed, configured, and tested to ensure 
reliable operation.
    (C) Implemented reasonable measures to maintain continuity of 911 
service during planned maintenance and/or updates to any software or 
database used to provide 911, E911, or NG911 capabilities.
    (ii) If a covered 911 service provider has not implemented all of 
the elements in paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section, it must certify:
    (A) Whether it has taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk 
of a hardware, network, software, database, or other failure or is 
taking steps to remediate any issues that it has identified with 
respect thereto, in which case it shall provide a brief explanation of 
such alternative measures or such remediation steps, the date by which 
it anticipates such remediation will be completed, and why it believes 
those measures are reasonably sufficient to mitigate such risk; or
    (B) Whether it believes that one or more of the requirements of 
this subsection are not applicable to its network, in which case it 
shall provide a brief explanation of why it believes any such 
requirement does not apply.
    (5) Situational awareness and information sharing.
    (i) A covered 911 service provider shall certify whether it has, 
within the past year:
    (A) Implemented reasonable measures to maintain real-time 
situational awareness regarding the operational status of 911, E911, or 
NG911 service throughout any portion(s) of the 911 network that it 
owns, leases, or otherwise operates or controls or as to which it 
otherwise provides any of the capabilities or services described in 
paragraph (a)(4)(i)(A) of this section.
    (B) Implemented reasonable measures to share appropriate 
information with PSAPs and other covered 911 service providers in the 
event of a disruption of 911, E911, or NG911 service, including, at a 
minimum, the information required under part 4 of the Commission's 
rules and under Sec.  12.7 .
    (ii) If a covered 911 service provider has not implemented all of 
the elements in paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section, it must certify:
    (A) Whether it has taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk 
of inadequate situational awareness and information sharing or is 
taking steps to remediate any issues that it has identified, in which 
case it shall provide a brief explanation of such alternative measures 
or such remediation steps, the date by which it anticipates such 
remediation will be completed, and why it believes those measures are 
reasonably sufficient to mitigate such risk; or
    (B) Whether it believes that one or more of the requirements of 
this subsection are not applicable to its network, in which case it 
shall provide a brief explanation of why it believes any such 
requirement does not apply.
* * * * *
0
3. Add Sec.  12.5 to read as follows:


Sec.  12.5  Transparency and accountability in connection with major 
changes in 911 service.

    (a) Major Changes in 911 network architecture and services. A 
covered 911 service provider, as defined in Sec.  12.4(a)(4), seeking 
to make major changes in its 911 network architecture and services 
shall file a public

[[Page 3206]]

notification under this section, except as provided under paragraphs 
(a)(3) through (5) of this section.
    (1) For purposes of this section, the following actions by a 
covered 911 service provider constitute major changes in 911 network 
architecture and services:
    (i) A change in 911 network architecture that affects the primary 
geographic routing or logical processing of voice calls, automatic 
location information (ALI), automatic number identification (ANI), 
location information services (LIS), text-to-911, or functionally 
equivalent capabilities, to public safety answering points (PSAPs), 
statewide default answering points, or appropriate local emergency 
authorities in more than one state;
    (ii) A change in 911 network architecture that affects the 
availability of backup routing or processing capabilities for voice 
calls, ALI, ANI, LIS, text-to-911, or functionally equivalent 
capabilities, to PSAPs, statewide default answering points, or 
appropriate local emergency authorities in more than one state; or
    (iii) A change in the allocation of primary responsibility with 
respect to provision of any of the capabilities or services described 
in Sec.  12.4(a)(4)(i) affecting more than one state, including but not 
limited to a covered 911 service provider's allocation of such 
responsibilities to a sub-contractor or other third party.
    (2) Notifications under this section shall be filed with the 
Commission at least 60 days before the changes described therein take 
effect.
    (i) Notifications shall state publicly the nature of the proposed 
changes, the geographic area(s) or jurisdiction(s) affected, the 
anticipated date of the changes, and any other relevant information.
    (ii) To the extent that notifications contain information that 
would cause competitive harm or a threat to public safety or national 
security if disclosed, a covered 911 service provider may request 
confidential treatment of such information under Sec.  0.459 of this 
chapter.
    (3) Changes initiated by a PSAP or emergency authority. Changes in 
911 network architecture or service initiated by a public safety 
answering point (PSAP) or state or local emergency authority shall not 
require a notification to be filed under this section.
    (4) Changes subject to public notice under Section 251. Changes in 
911 network architecture or service that require public notice of 
network changes under Sec.  51.325 of this chapter shall not require a 
separate notification under this section.
    (5) Emergency changes. Changes in 911 architecture or services 
reasonably necessary to mitigate the impacts of a disruption or 
degradation in 911 service, including temporary re-routes to backup 
equipment or secondary PSAPs, shall not require a notification to be 
filed under this section.
    (b) Discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of existing 911 
services. A covered 911 service provider, as defined in Sec.  
12.4(a)(4), seeking to discontinue, reduce, or impair existing 911 
services shall file a public notification with the Commission and 
receive approval from the Commission before undertaking such actions, 
except as provided in paragraphs (b)(3) and (4) of this section.
    (1) For purposes of this section, the following actions by a 
covered 911 service provider constitute a discontinuance, reduction, or 
impairment of existing 911 services:
    (i) Exit from a line of 911 services previously provided to PSAPs, 
statewide default answering points, or appropriate local emergency 
authorities in more than one state;
    (ii) Termination or reduction in technical support or maintenance 
for 911 network components or customer premises equipment (CPE) to 
PSAPs, statewide default answering points, or appropriate local 
emergency authorities in more than one state; or
    (iii) Reduction or impairment of quality-of-service levels for 911 
services to PSAPs, statewide default answering points, or appropriate 
local emergency authorities in more than one state.
    (2) Applications for discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of 
existing 911 services under this section shall be filed with the 
Commission at least 60 days before the changes described therein are 
requested to take effect. The Commission shall respond within 60 days 
by approving the request, approving the request subject to conditions, 
or denying the request. If the Commission takes no action within 60 
days, the request shall be deemed approved.
    (i) Applications shall state publicly the nature of the proposed 
discontinuance, reduction, or impairment, the geographic area(s) or 
jurisdiction(s) affected, the anticipated date of the changes, and any 
other relevant information.
    (ii) To the extent that applications contain information that would 
cause competitive harm or a threat to public safety or national 
security if disclosed, a covered 911 service provider may request 
confidential treatment of such information under Sec.  0.459 of this 
chapter.
    (3) Changes initiated by a PSAP or emergency authority. Changes in 
911 network architecture or service initiated by a PSAP or state or 
local emergency authority, including changes that would otherwise 
constitute a discontinuance, reduction, or impairment of existing 911 
services under paragraph (b) of this section, shall not require 
Commission approval under this section.
    (4) Changes subject to Section 214 authorization. Changes in 911 
network architecture or service that require Commission authorization 
under Section 214 of the Communications Act and associated Commission 
rules shall not require separate Commission approval under this 
section.
0
4. Add Sec.  12.6 to read as follows:


Sec.  12.6  Reliability and accountability of new IP-based 911 
capabilities and services.

    (a) Certification of capability to provide reliable 911 service. 
Entities that propose to provide one or more of the capabilities of a 
covered 911 service provider, as defined in Sec.  12.4(a)(4), but do 
not provide such capabilities prior to November 21, 2014, shall certify 
to the Commission that they:
    (1) Possess the technical and operational capability to provide 
reliable 911 service;
    (2) Have conducted a reliability and security risk analysis of any 
network components, infrastructure and/or databases and software used 
to support 911 call completion, including automatic location 
information (ALI), automatic number identification (ANI), location 
information services (LIS), text-to-911, or the functional equivalent 
of those capabilities; and
    (3) Understand and agree to abide by the Commission's annual 
reliability certification requirements under this part 12, any 
applicable outage reporting or PSAP outage notification requirements 
under Sec.  4.9 of this chapter, and any other Commission rules 
applicable to the new 911 capabilities that it offers.
    (b) [Reserved]
0
5. Add Sec.  12.7 to read as follows:


Sec.  12.7  Situational awareness and coordination responsibility 
during disruptions in 911 service.

    (a) Designation of 911 Network Operations Center (NOC) Provider. 
The covered 911 service provider responsible for transport of 911 calls 
and associated information to the public safety answering point (PSAP), 
statewide default answering point, or appropriate local emergency 
authority in each jurisdiction, pursuant to a

[[Page 3207]]

contractual relationship with that PSAP, statewide default answering 
point, or appropriate local emergency authority, shall be the 911 NOC 
Provider in that jurisdiction.
    (b) Responsibilities of 911 NOC Provider. The 911 NOC Provider in 
each jurisdiction shall monitor the availability of 911 services and 
coordinate situational awareness and information sharing during 
disruptions in 911 service. For purposes of this section, disruptions 
in 911 service include events resulting in a complete loss of 911 
service, as well as events that substantially impair service quality or 
public access to 911 without a complete loss of service, including 
disruption of automatic location information (ALI), automatic number 
identification (ANI), location information services (LIS), or any other 
services that locate callers geographically.
    (1) In the event of such a disruption in 911 service, the 911 NOC 
Provider shall request information from any other affected covered 911 
service provider(s) regarding their situational awareness of the cause 
and scope of the outage from the origination to the completion of 911 
communications, including voice calls, ALI, ANI, LIS, and text-to-911. 
The 911 NOC Provider shall then communicate to any other affected 
covered 911 service providers, PSAPs, state emergency management 
offices, and to the Commission's Operations Center, all information 
reasonably available to mitigate the effects of the disruption and to 
restore service.
    (2) All other covered 911 service providers shall communicate to 
the 911 NOC Provider all reasonably available information regarding the 
cause and scope of a disruption in 911 service that occurs on or 
affects portions of the 911 network that they own, lease, or otherwise 
operate or control and shall respond promptly to any request for such 
information by the 911 NOC Provider.

[FR Doc. 2015-00940 Filed 1-21-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P


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