DAN MORALES 

.A?TORNEY GNERAL 

QMfice of tip !Zlttornep Qhneral 

&date of I[texas 

May 13, 1993 

Honorable Jet&y D. Herrington 

Criminal District Attorney 

Anderson County Courthouse 

500 North Church Street 

Palestine, Texas 75801 

Opiion No. DM-222 

Re: Whether a child support obligee may 

modify a child support order by 6ling with a 

district clerk a limited power of attorney 

authoriaing a corporation to receive child 

support payments paid through the district 

ckrkk office along with a request that the 

clerk send the child support payments to that 

corporation (RQ-478) 

Dear Mr. Herrington: 

You have asked us to determine the responsibility of a district clerk when a child 

support obtigee files with the clerk a limited power of attorney assigning to a corporation 

thetighttoreccive child support paid through the clerks office along with a request that 

the clerk send child support payments it mceives to the corporation named in the limited 

power of attorney. As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the child support 

obhgee may modify the child support order simply by thing these documents. We 

determine that a child support obligee may not modii the child support order; only the 

cant with combming, exchtsive jurisdiction in the case may modify the child support 

order. Hence, in such a situation, the district clerk’s responsibiity is to comply with the 

terms of the existing child support order unless and until the proper court modifies the 

Oh.’ 

As background, you state the following: 

In 1990, Mr. and Mrs. M. were divorced in Anderson County. Mrs. 

M. was named the managiq conservator of Baby M. The Fii 

Decree of Divorce provided that Mr. M. shag pay [child support] to 

Mrs. M. . in the amount of 8150.00 a month. The Final Decree 

tiuther provides that all child support payments be made through the 

IWe dctamhc in this opinion only whcthu a child support oblige may authoti pqmutt of 

cbildrupportpaymntstopnmtityotherthenthatprovidedinthccourtorda. Wettndcrstaudthata 

courtordagarrallydoanotattempttofixtheaddrrsofanoblig~. Accmdin@y,wedowtdctcmim 

in this opinion whctltor a child support oblige may change his or her addxss for pqoses of transmitting 

t&child sopport pymcnts. 

P. 1161 
Honorable Jefiky D. Herrington - Page 2 (~~-222) 

office of the District Cl& who shag remit those payments to Mrs. 

M., for the support of Baby M. 

In 1992, the District Clerh mceived two instruments from the child 

support obligee, Mrs. M. The thst instrument is entitled “Limited 

Power of Attorney and Authorization to Release I&ormation” and 

appears to make Child Support Collections dba In the Interest of 

Childrea Inc. the ageat of Mrs. M, with the authority to collect and 

receive the child support payments due Mrs. M. The second 

~isarequestthatallkturechildsupportpaymemsmade 

through the District Clerks O&e be sent to Child Support 

Collections. Both are notaked. 

Section 14.05(a) of the Family Code authorizes a district court, in a child custody 

prowed& to order either or both parents to, among other things, make periodic 

paymmtsforthesupportofthechild”inthenwnaandtoorforthebenefitofthe 

penons”thatthecouthassqsxci6cdintbcdccree.2 SeedwU%itev.A&ock,666 

S.W.2d 222,225 (Tex. App.-Houston 114th Disk] 1984, no writ) (emphasizing that court 

may order payments for support of children “to rhr per& specified in decree). This 

office previously has stated that section 14.05 of the Family Code “confers broad 

disaaionuponthedistrics~ind~aminingtowhomchildsupportpaymmtswillbe 

made.” Attorney Gatd Opinion H-343 (1974) at 1. Generally, in a brocading in which 

acourto~paiodicchildrupportpayrmnts,~courtmustordathrtincomebe 

withheld from the obliger’s eamings and that a court registry, a child support collection 

office, or tbe attomey gewral initially receive the payment. Fam. Code $8 14.05(e), 

14.43(c). The initial receiver of the payment is promptly to distriite the paymen& 

presumably to a peraott designated in the court order. See id. 55 14.05(a), 14.43(c); 

Rhi&?, 666 S.W.Zd at 225. Based on the language of sections 14.05(a) and 14.43(c) of 

the Family Code, the court of appeals’ construction in KJt& and the statements this office 

made in Attorney General Opiion H-343, we believe that no person or entity other than 

the district court is authorizul to determine in the original order to whom child support 

payments will be made or distributed. 

Section 14.08 of the Family Code provides the procedure by which a child support 

order or that portion of a divorce decree pertaining to child support may be modiied. 

Signiticantly, only the court having continuing exchtsive jmisdiction over the suit 

2we mtc that tbc 7lst Lcgihtm enactal hvo msions of sation 14.05(s). compare Act5 1989, 

71~4 Le& ch. 617. 5 5 with Acts 1989, 7ls1 Leg, 1st C.S., ch. 25, 0 13. While the two vcrsiom anz 

similar,toih~ttbattbcLanguageoTthctwo~~~~.welrdatotbcvQsionenencd 

later, tinting the legislahuek fltst called session. See Attomcy General Opiion M-497 (1%9) al 14 

Oatcat oxprcaaion of kghlalure contmls ova prior ccntlictin8 Ie8isMion). 

p. 1162 
Honorable JeEey D. Henington - Page 3 (D&222) 

affecting the parent-child relationships may, after a motion has been filed and a hearing 

wnducted, mod@ the order or portion of a divorce decree that provides for child 

suppott4 Fam. Code 4 14.08(a). In our opinion, the wurt’s exchtsive power to modify 

the child support order encompasses the power to modii that part of the order 

designating the person or persons who is ultimately to rewive. the child support payments. 

The court’s exchrsive power therefore generally precludes modification of that portion of 

the order designating the person who is to receive the child support payments by any other 

means.’ 

Generally, of course, the law favors the assignment of wntracmal rights. See 7 

TEX. Jm. 3d Aarigrmterrfs $5 2,4, at 175-76. 178. However, ifan assignment would be 

wntrary to public policy, the right to assign a wntmcmal provision should not be 

presumed. See id. 8 4, at 178-79. In our opinion, the assignment of the right to receive 

child support payments is wntraq to public policy. 

In a case such as the one you raise, a managing conservator accepts the child 

support payments for the benefit of the child, not for him- or haself. See Hill v. Hill, 8 19 

S.W.2d 570.572 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied). Child support agreements are, 

therefore, structured to provide for the best interests of the child. Id. Consqucntly, a 

managinB conservator may not unilaterally assign to a third party the child’s right to child 

support payments. Instead, the managing wnservator must seek the approval of the court 

with wntinuing, exclusive. jurisdiction over the child, which will consider and protect the 

child’s interest in the. child support payments. 

p. 1163 
Honorable Jefhy D. Herrington - Page 4 W-222) 

SUMMARY 

Unless section 14.08(h) of the Family Code applies, a district 

ciakmustp~childsupportpaymentstothepasondesignatedin 

the existing child support order or in that portion of a divorce decree 

providing for child support. Thus, a district clerk must wntinue to 

pay the obligee designated in the court order even though the obligee 

has 6led with the clerk a limited power of attorney authorizhg a 

wqoration to receive the child support payments and a request that 

the clerk send the child support payments to that corporation. 

DAN MORALES 

Attorney Genarsl of Texas 

WJLL PRYOR 

Fkst Assistant Attorney General 

MARYKELLER 

Daputy Attorney General for Litigation 

RENEAHlcKs 

State Solicitor 

MADELEINE B. JOHNSON 

Chair, Opiion Committee 

Prepared by Kymberly K. Oltrogge 

Assistant Attorney Gene-ml 

p. 1164