FILED

February 3, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

DECEMBER SESSION, 1997

GEORGE F. JONES, JR., ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9702-CR-00062

)

Appellant, ) 

) JOHNSON COUNTY

)

V. ) 

) HON. LYNN W. BROWN, JUDGE 

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) 

) 

Appellee. ) (HABEAS CORPUS) 

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

GEORGE F. JONES, JR., pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

#163274 NECC Attorney General & Reporter

P.O. Box 5000 

Mountain City, TN 37683-5000 SANDY COPOUS PATRICK 

Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37243

DAVID CROCKETT 

District Attorney General

Route 19, Box 99

Johnson City, TN 37601 

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED 

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Petitioner, George F. Jones, Jr., appeals as of right the trial court’s

dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. We affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

Petitioner was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated rape in violation of

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502. All offenses were alleged to have

been committed in November of 1989. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was

convicted on four (4) counts of aggravated rape and sentenced to four (4) concurrent

sentences of twenty (20) years. On December 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a petition for

habeas corpus relief in the Johnson County Criminal Court which is the subject of

this appeal. In essence, Petitioner argues that his sentence is void because the

culpable mental state for the offense of aggravated rape was not alleged in the

indictments. 

In support of his argument, Petitioner relies upon the decision of this Court in

State v. Roger Dale Hill, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267, Wayne County (Tenn.

Crim. App., Nashville, June 20, 1996). However, our supreme court reversed this

Court’s decision in Hill. See State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997). The

Tennessee Supreme Court held in Hill as follows: 

[F]or offenses which neither expressly require nor plainly dispense with

the requirement for a culpable mental state, an indictment which fails

to allege such mental state will be sufficient to support prosecution and

conviction for that offense so long as

(1) the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the

constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the

charge against which the accused must defend, adequate basis
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for entry of a proper judgment, and protection from double

jeopardy;

(2) the form of the indictment meets the requirements of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-13-202; and 

(3) the mental state can be logically inferred from the conduct

alleged.

Id. at 726-27. 

The issue before this Court is the same issue addressed by the supreme court

in Hill, that is, whether an indictment charging aggravated rape was void for failure

to allege a culpable mental state. Tennessee Code Annotated section § 39-13-

502(a)(3)(A) defines aggravated rape as the “unlawful sexual penetration of a victim

by the defendant” where the “defendant is aided or abetted by one (1) or more other

persons; and [f]orce or coercion is used to accomplish the act.” This statute does

not specify a mental state, but the required mental state may be inferred from the

nature of the criminal conduct alleged in the indictments in the Petitioner’s case.

The indictments alleged that Petitioner on four different days did “unlawfully, sexually

penetrate [the victim] by force or coercion while aided and abetted by one or more

persons, in violation of T.C.A. § 39-13-502, contrary to the statute, and against the

peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee." Obviously, the act for which Petitioner

is indicted, “unlawfully, sexually penetrat[ing]” a victim, is “committable only if the

principal actor’s mens rea is intentional, knowing, or reckless.” Hill, 954 S.W.2d at

729. Also, the language of the indictment sufficiently apprised Defendant of the

offenses charged, and were stated in ordinary and concise language so that a

person of common understanding would know what was intended. Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-13-202. Furthermore, the language in the indictments adequately protects

Defendant against subsequent reprosecution for this same offense. Hill, 954 S.W.2d
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at 727, 729. Therefore, the indictments in this case meet constitutional and statutory

requirements of notice and form and are, therefore, valid.

Petitioner’s petition may be dismissed summarily if the petition fails to state

a cognizable claim. See Passarella v. State, 891 S.W .2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1994); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-109. The trial court properly dismissed

Petitioner’s petition.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge 

CONCUR:

___________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, Judge

___________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, Judge