### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 14 , 200 6
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LOU IS LES LIE MY LES
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2005-A- 129 Cheryl Blackbu rn, Judge

No. M2005- 01671-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 25, 2006

The Appellant, L ouis L eslie My les, appea ls the denial of judicial diversion following his guilty pleas to two counts of theft of pr operty over $1,000. After revie w of the record, we reverse the sentenc ing decision of the Da v i d son CountyCriminal Court and remand f or def erme nt of the proc eeding s as provided by

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-313 (2003).
Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt R ever sed and Rem anded

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OHN E V E R E T T W I L L I AMS and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

Adri a n Ch ic k, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theAp pe llant, L ou is L e sli e My le s. Paul G. Summers, At t o rn eyGe n er al an d R ep o rt er ; P re s t o n S h i p p , As s i s t an tAt t o rn eyGe n er al; Victor S. J ohnson I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and B ret Gunn, A ssista n t District Attorney Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On October 6 , 2 0 0 1 , the Appellant, while se rving in a manag eria l capa city at Wendy ’s Re staur a nt i n N a sh vil le , a pp rop ri ate d f

or his pe rs on a l us e $3 ,5 85 that hewa s e ntr us te d to de po sit in the b a n k

. H e d id th e s a me w ith $ 2 , 0 5 5 w h il e w o rk in g a t Sh o n e y ’ s Re s ta u r a n t in N a shville on Oc tob e r 5 , 2 00 2. I n Jan ua ry of 20 05 , a Da vid so n Cou nty g rand jury re turne d a n ind ic tme nt a g a ins t the Appellant c harg ing him with two counts of thef t of property

over $1,000.

Under the terms of a

plea a g ree ment, the Appell an t p l ed g uiltyto both counts of theft of property over $1,000, Class D f

elonies. The term s o f t h e ag ree ment provided: (1) the Appellant would rec eive concur

rent two y ear

sentenc es for

the two convictions, which w ould be suspended, with three y ear s probation on ea ch of th e t wo s u s p en ded sente nces; (2) the Appellant would be permitted to reque st judicial diversion, his suit ability for whic h the trial court would determine at-2-

a sente ncing hearing; an d (3 ) h e would pay restitution to each of

the victims. After a

sentenc ing hearing, the trial court de nied the Appe l l an t ’s reque st for judicial diversion. The Appellant now appea ls this s entenc ing de cision.

Ana lys is
On appe al, the Appellant asserts that the trial court err ed in its denial of his application for judicial diversion. He a

rg ues that the re cord doe s not r efle ct consider ation of all the re levant fa ctors required fo r a d etermination and contends that prope r consider ation of the fa ctors would have resulted in a g rant of dive rsion.

“Judi cial diver sion is leg islative larg ess whereby a defenda nt adjudicated g uiltymay , upon su c c e ssf ul c omp le tio n of a di ve rs ionpr og ram, r e c e ivea n e xpun g e me nt f ro m a ll ‘ of

fi c ia l r e c or ds ’ any rec ordation re lating to ‘ arr est, indictment or information, trial, finding of g uilty , and dismissal and discharg e’ pursuant to the diversion statute.” State v. Schindler , 986 S.W .2d 209, 211 (Tenn. 1999). The e ffe ct of discha rg e and dismissal under the diversion statute “is to re store the pe rson . . . to the status the person oc cupied be fore such ar rest or indictment or inf

ormati o n .” Id . (citing T.C.A. § 40-35-313( b)).

A de fe nd a nt is e lig ibl e fo r jud ic ia l div e rs ion wh e n he or sh e is f ou ndg uil ty

or ple a ds g uil ty to a Cla ss C , D, o r Efe lon y a ndha s n ot p re vio us ly

be e n c on vic te d o f a

fe lon y or a Cla ss A misdemeanor. T .C.A. § 40-35-313(a )(1) (B )(i). H oweve r, elig ibilit y under thediversion statute does not e nsure the g rant of diversion. I ndeed, the decision of whether to pla ce a def endant on judicial diversion is within the sound discretion of the trial c ourt. Sta te v . H ar ris , 953 S.W .2d 7 0 1 , 705 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

.
I n determining whe ther to g rant judicial div er s i o n , the trial court must consider: (1) the defe ndant’s ame nability

to corre ction; (2) the c ircumstance s of t h e offe nse; (3) the defe ndant’s criminal re cord; (4) the def endant’ s social history ; (5) the de fendant’s phy sical and me ntal health; (6) the de terre nce value to the defendant and others; and (7) whether judicial diversion will serve the ends of justice. State v. Electroplating, Inc. , 990 S.W .2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) . The trial court should also conside r whe ther judicial dive rs i o n wi l l serve the ends of justice - - the interests of the public a s we l l as t he ac cused. Sta te v . Le wis , 9 78 S.W. 2d55 8, 56 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 97 ). Ad dit io nal fac tor s w hic h may be c on sid e re d in c lud e theAp pe llant’ s atti tud e , h is be h a v i o r s i n c e arr e s t , h i s h o m e e n v i r o n m e n t , c u rr e n t d ru g u s a g e , e m o t i o n a l s t ab i l i t y , pa st employ ment, g ener al re putation, fami l y re sponsibili ties, and the attitude of law enf orce ment. Id

. I n ad dit ion , “th e r e c o r d m u s tr e f l e c tt h a tt h e c o u rth a s w e i g h e d a l l o f t h e f a c t o r s i n r e a c h i n g i ts determination.” Electroplating, Inc. , 990 S.W .2d at 229. I f t he trial court refuses to g rant judicial diversion, it should state in the rec ord “the specific rea sons for its determination.” State v. Parke r , 932 S.W .2d 945, 958-59 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1 9 9 6 ). I f t h e trial c ourt “ba sed its determinations on only some of the f

actor s, it must exp l ai n wh y these fa ctors outweig h the others.” Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W .2d at 229.-3-

Th e App ell ant co nte nd s th a t th e tria l c ou rt faile d to c on sid e r a ll r e le va nt f a c tor s in determ i n i n g wh ether to gr ant judicial diversion and that it gaveundue importanc e to the circ umstances of

the offe nses. Specific ally , he asse rts that the trial court “fa iled to give any consideration to [ his] amena bilityto corre ction” and f ailed to g ive prope r we ight to his “lac k of criminal re cord and lack of drug usag e.”

I n denying judicia l diversion, the trial court stated:

L oo kin g a t a ll the se fa c tors, w e ha ve so me g oo d a ndba d f a c tor s ina ll o f this

. Ob vio us ly , h e ha s a

wo rk his tory . H ow e ve r, the reare l ot s of di ffe re nt p la c e s, bu t, t h i s p ar t i cu l arcr i m e i n v o l v es t wo o f t h o s e a n d ab o u ta y ea r a p ar t

. . . . [ D] ru g u s age is n ot a pr ob le m, c ri min a l r e c or d is no t a pr ob le m, .

. . his mari ta l st abil ity

. . . h is child support. But, basica lly , it sort of comes down to a

judgme nt in this case about whether or not g iven these two se parate instance s that are like a y ear apart, . . . and exactly the same, w hether

the deter rent e ffe ct of punishment on criminal ac tivityand thee nd s o f j us tic e fo r this wo uldse rv e that.
. . . [Q] uite honestly , this is a l ar ge am o u n t from two sepa rate businesses. . . . The things that bother

me the most about this, is t he fa ct that it’s two separ ate f ast food place s whereit’s the bank deposit that he doe sn’t deposit. . . . [T] he wa rrants were taken out a y ear

apart from ea ch other . So, it wasn’t a s i n gl e i s o l ated e vent that
occur red in its history

. . . . [I ]t might not have occur red since , but, stil l we’ve g ot two separ ate one s.
The trial co u rt undoubtably was troubled most by

the Appellant’ s pattern of criminal behavior , i.e., the fa ct that while wor king a s a mana g er at two separate Na s h v i l le re staurants on
oc c a sio ns se pa

rate d b y on e y e ar, theAp pe llant c omm itt e d ide nti c a l of fe ns e s of app ro priatin g fo r h is persona l use money that he was entrusted to deposit i n the bank. From the re cord, it is clea r that the trial court ba sed its denial solely upon the circ umstances of the offe nse.
We find it d i ff

i cult to disti ng uish this case fr om our supreme court’s holding s in State v. Herron , 767 S.W .2d 151 (Tenn. 1989) and Sta te v . Cu rry , 988 S.W .2d 153 (Tenn. 1999) . I n Herron , our supre me court reve rsed a d en ial of diversion whic h was de nied solely based upon the circ umstances of

the offe nse. I n that case , the fac ts e stablished that the two offe nses for which the defe ndant was indicted “we re committed by means of a car efully contrived, deliberate sche me. [The defe ndant] obviousl y

devoted quite a

bit of planning toward formulating the sche me.” Herron , 767 S.W .2d at 152. Additionally , the “criminal ve nture wa s not one of impulse” a s it was committed on separ ate dates, result i n g i n a l oss of $11,000. Id. Our supre me court reve rsed the de nial of diversion, holding that review of diversion re quires “mor e than an abstrac t statement” in the re cord that the positive fac tors for diver sion have be en conside red. Id. at 156.
Ag ain, in Cur ry , our supre me court upheld the gra nt of di version to a def endant who “ worke d
as an a ssistant clerk for the Cityof McKe nzie, Tennessee . Over a two-y ear

period fr om J uly

of 1993In bo t h H er r on a n d C u rry , t h e di v er s i on prog r am s ou g h t was t h at of pr et r i al di v er s i on , w h i ch w as de n i ed by 1

t h e di s t r i ct a t t or n ey g en er al

. “ Ju di ci al di v er s i on i s s i mi l ar t o pr et r i al di v er s i on a n d i s t o be i mpos ed wi t h i n t h e di s cr et i on of t he t r i al cour t s ubj ect onl y t o t he s ame cons t r ai nt s appl i cabl e t o p ro secu t ors i n a pp l y i ng pre t r i al di ver s i on un der T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 40- 14

- 10 5. ” St at e v. Ander s on , 8 5 7 S .W .2 d 5 7 1 , 5 7 2 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 1 9 9 2 ).

T h e A p p e llan t state s tha t h e is cu rr e n tly in a rr e a rs in h is c h ild su p p o rt p a ym e n ts b u t ac k n o w le d g e s h is 2

re sp o n sib ili ty t o his c h ild re n w h o he a sse rts a re stra igh t “A ” stud e n ts.
-4- to J uly of 1995, [t he defe ndant] embezz led over $27,000 from the City . She was late r indicted for theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000.” Curry, 988 S.W .2d at 155. Diversion wa s d e n i e d b y t h e d i s tr i c t a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l b a s e d u p o n “ t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e o f f e n s e a n d , ar g u ab l y, a veiled c onsideration of de terre nce. Therewas no appare nt consideration given to the de fendant’s 1 lack of a criminal recor d, favor able soc ial history , and obvious amenability to c orre ction.” Id. at 159. Ou r s up re me c ou rt

he ld that:

t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f

t h e o f f e n s e a n d t h e n e e d f

o r d e t e rr e n c e m a y a l o n e j u s t i f y a denial of dive rsion, bu t on ly if a ll of the relev ant factors have bee n considered as well. E.g., State v. W

ashington , 866 S.W .2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993) (“c ircumstance s of thec a se a nd the ne e d for

de te rr e nc e ma y

be c on sid e re d a s tw o o f the ma ny fa c tor s, [but ] they cannot be g iven controlling weig ht unless they are of such ove rwhe lming signific ancethat they

. . . outweig h all other fa ctors”)

. Id . at 158. The supr eme c ourt explained that more than a simple ac k n o wledg ment that positive fac tors exis t must be noted upon the rec ord. Id. a t 15 9. Th e trial cou rt mu st artic ulate ho w the se po sit ivefa c tor s a

reou tw e ig he d b y

oth e r r e le va nt f

a c tor s, inc lud ing thec ir c ums ta nc e s of theof fe ns e and the ne ed for

deter renc e. Id.

I n the ca se sub judice , many of the elements weig h in favor of the Appellant be ing g rante d judicial diversion. The thirty -seve n y ear old Appellant has been on his own and in the work force since h e w a s f

if te e n y e ar s o ld

. Wi th r e g ar d to h is f u ll

- ti me e mp lo y me n t, h e b e g a n working immediately

afte r completing high sc h o o l an d has worke d full-time up to the prese nt date. The Appellant testified that he has neve r had le ss than two jobs at a time and o n s o m e occa sions has

“ wo rk e d th re e job s. ” He is d ivo rc e d a ndthefathe r o f thr e e c hil dr en. He is cu rr e ntl y e nr oll e d in community

colleg e, and it is his intent to c omplete an associate ’s deg ree in business. The Appellant does not drink or smoke and has no history of drug usag e. He acknow ledg es remorse for his actions and curr ent criminal convictions, and he offe rs no excuse for his c onduct. The re cord r efle cts that theAp pe llant h a s n o p ri or c ri min a l hi sto ry

a ndha s c omm itt e d n o a dd iti on a l of fe ns e s. He pr e se nts
a po sit iveso c ia l hi sto ry , e mpl oyme nt h ist ory , a nda c kn ow le dg e s h is f a mil ia l r e sp on sib ili tie s. 2

Ba sed upon the proof

befor e us, we conclude that the Appellant’ s positive factors f or diversion, as a

rticulat ed ab ove, outweig h any neg ative fa ctors and that gr anting judicial diversion would promote the e nds of justice. Acc ording ly , the sentenc ing de cision of the trial c ourt is reve rsed and entry of the judg ments of conviction is vac ated.-5- CO NC LU SION

B a se d up on the re c or d a nd thetria l c ou rt ’s failu reto w e ig h a ndc on sid e r a ll r e le va nt f a c tor s, we conclude that the trial court abused its discr etion by denying judicial diversion. For this reason, the judg ment is rever sed, and the case is remande d for de ferment of further proce eding s as provided by Te nn e sse e Code Ann ot a te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -3 13 a ndfo r i mpo sit ionof su c h o the r r e a so na

ble conditions as may

be dee med appr opriate by the trial court.

_______________________________ DAVID G. HAY ES, J UDGE