J-S25032-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JOYCE TARR

Appellee

v.

FABIAN YOUNG 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 172 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered January 26, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County

Civil Division at No(s): 2021-120-S

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 21, 2022

Appellant, Fabian Young (“Father”), appeals pro se from the order 

entered in the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas, granting primary 

physical custody of, and sole decision-making authority concerning, minor 

children, L.Y., A.Y., and J.Y. (“Children”) to Appellee, Joyce Tarr (“J.T.”). We 

affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows:

This [c]ourt held a de novo custody trial on January 24, 

2022 at Father’s request. The parties are [J.T.] and 

[Father], who was recently confirmed as the father of the 

three Children through paternity testing.

The subjects of this custody action (hereafter “the 

Children”) are [L.Y.], born July...2017 (currently age 4), 

[A.Y.], born December...2018 (currently age 3), and [J.Y], 

born February...2020 (turning 2 in February).
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On March 24, 2021, the biological mother of the Children, 

[B.K. (“Mother”)], died of a drug overdose. The Children 

resided with their mother since birth at [J.T.’s] residence...in 

Guys Mills, Pennsylvania. Presently residing at [J.T.’s] 

residence are: [J.T], [J.T.’s grandson R.K.], and the 

Children.

The biological father is [Father]. Father resides in Edinboro, 

PA, with his girlfriend [J.G., J.G.’s] five year old son [M.], 

[Father’s] fourteen year old daughter [N.], and, on 

weekends, [Father’s] thirteen year old son. Last week, 

Father started a job as a health care worker at Cross Home 

Care. Father reports he receives income from side jobs and 

two businesses: a cleaning service for Airbnb and another 

online business. Father’s girlfriend works at Walmart in 

Edinboro, Pennsylvania.

This case has a long procedural and factual history both 

before and after [J.T.] filed for custody in April of 2021. The

circumstances surrounding [J.T.] filing for custody of the 

Children were as follows: when [Mother] died in March of 

2021, [Maternal Grandmother], made an emergency 

telephone call to [J.T.] and asked her to care for the 

Children. ([Mother] and the Children had been living with 

[J.T.] and the Children knew her as a caregiver).[1] For the 

transfer, [Maternal Grandmother] arranged to meet [J.T.] in 

a church parking lot. When [J.T.] arrived and was waiting 

for car seats, Father also arrived. The situation became 

hostile and [Maternal Grandmother] called the police. When 

the officers arrived, they permitted the Children to go with 

their father. Father put the children in his car and left 

without car seats.

Having no way to see the Children and no way to contact 

Father, [J.T.] filed for custody and appeared in Custody 

____________________________________________

1 Mother was raised by her stepfather, J.O., and step-grandmother, J.T. 

Mother resided with J.T. frequently throughout her life, including after she 

gave birth to Children. Children primarily resided in J.T.’s home with Mother

since they were born. J.T. is the step-great-grandmother to Children, and 

Children considered J.T. as a grandparent. Although Children primarily 

resided with J.T., on the evening before Mother’s death, Children had visited 

with Maternal Grandmother so they were not in J.T.’s care when Mother died.
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Motions Court on April 14, 2021. The Honorable Mark D. 

Stevens awarded legal and physical custody of the Children 

to [J.T.] Then on April 19, 2021, [J.T.] filed a Motion to 

Preserve the Status Quo. On April 22, 2021, the Honorable 

John F. Spataro ordered that the Children be immediately 

returned to [J.T.] pending mediation. The Judge ordered all 

law enforcement authorities to enforce the order. Erie 

County Judge John J. Trucilla ordered Erie County law 

enforcement and Sheriff’s department to enforce Judge 

Spataro’s order. The case proceeded to mediation on June 

14, 2021. Father did not appear. Judge Spataro entered 

an order following the recommendation of the mediator that 

[J.T.] have sole legal and physical custody and reaffirming 

that all law enforcement were requested to enforce the 

order.

On June 25, 2021, Father filed a Request for De Novo

Hearing stating he was in Florida and did not receive notice 

of the mediation. Upon receipt of the request, Judge 

Spataro ordered the case to be returned to mediation. [J.T.] 

filed an Emergency Petition for Contempt on July 21, 2021. 

The motion was withdrawn as Father had already been 

found in contempt of Erie County Judge Trucilla’s Order by 

the Honorable Connelly Marucci on July 23, 2021. On July 

29, 2021, four months after Father left with the Children, 

Father relinquished the Children to the Erie County Sheriff’s 

Office and [J.T.] received the Children.

Father then filed a Petition to Modify Judge Spataro’s June 

14, 2021 custody order seeking sole legal and physical 

custody of the Children and, once again, the case was 

scheduled for mediation. This time Father appeared. Judge 

Spataro adopted the recommendation of the mediator and 

entered an order dated August 20, 2021 giving [J.T.] 

primary physical custody. Father was given as many 

supervised visits as he can afford at The Center For Family 

Services. [J.T.] and Father were given shared legal custody 

with [J.T.] having sole decision-making authority.

On August 26, 2021, Father’s mother [M.B.], who is the 

paternal grandmother to the Children [(“Paternal 

Grandmother”)], filed a Petition to Intervene. (When 

paternity was established at our de novo hearing on January 

24, 2022, the subject of this opinion, the [c]ourt granted 
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[Paternal Grandmother’s] Petition to Intervene.)

In September, Father filed a pro se Petition for Contempt, a 

Motion for Emergency Custody Order and a Request for a 

De Novo Custody Hearing. Father also filed a Motion for 

Guardian Ad Litem [(“GAL”)] and a Motion for an Expedited 

Hearing. The Motion for Emergency Custody was denied by 

Judge Spataro on September 20, 2021. The remainder of 

the Motions were heard by the Honorable Senior Judge 

William R. Cunningham on September 27, 2021. Judge 

Cunningham granted the request for a [GAL], and appointed 

Mary Adelman, Esquire, as the GAL. Judge Cunningham 

denied or otherwise dispensed the remainder of Father’s pro 

se motions, ordering [Father] to complete paternity testing 

to establish standing for both Father and [Paternal 

Grandmother].

(Opinion and Order, filed 1/26/22, at 1-2). 

Following the September 27, 2021 hearing, the court entered an opinion 

and order on October 6, 2021, expressly rejecting Father’s claim that J.T. 

lacked standing to bring the custody action. The court made clear that J.T. 

has been in loco parentis to Children their entire lives. (See Opinion and 

Order, filed 10/6/21, at 7-9). 

The court held a de novo custody trial on January 24, 2022. On January 

26, 2022, the court entered a custody order adopting the same arrangement 

set forth in the August 20, 2021 order, namely, awarding J.T. primary physical 

custody of Children and Father supervised visitation at The Center for Family 

Services; and for J.T. and Father to share legal custody, with J.T. to have sole 

decision-making authority. Father timely filed a notice of appeal on February 
J-S25032-22

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7, 2022.2 

Father raises four issues for our review:

Did the [trial] court commit an abuse of discretion erring 

when it determined that it had jurisdiction to commence 

[J.T.’s] child custody action?

Did the [trial] court commit an abuse of discretion erring 

when it found that [J.T.] had standing to initiate her custody 

action?

Did the [trial] court commit an abuse of discretion erring 

when it entered an order of default judgment that 

relinquished [Father]’s parental rights to [J.T.]?

Did the [trial] court commit an abuse of discretion erring 

when it allowed the child custody proceedings to egregiously 

proceed past the allotted time established by law?

(Father’s Brief at iv).3

In custody cases, the relevant scope and standard of review are as 

follows:

[T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or 

inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact, 

nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no 

____________________________________________

2 Father did not file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

contemporaneously with his notice of appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 

Following a directive from this Court to file his concise statement by March 14, 

2022, Father complied and filed his concise statement on March 9, 2022. We 

decline to quash Father’s appeal or deem his issues waived under these 

circumstances. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2009) 

(stating that appellant’s failure to file concise statement contemporaneously 

with notice of appeal in children’s fast track case did not result in waiver on 

appeal where appellant subsequently filed statement, and there was no 

allegation of prejudice based on late filing).

3 We note that Father improperly refers to himself as “appellee” and to J.T. as 

“appellant” throughout his brief which makes it difficult to read in some places.
J-S25032-22

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competent evidence to support it.... However, this broad 

scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the duty 

or the privilege of making its own independent 

determination.... Thus, an appellate court is empowered to 

determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible factual 

findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not 

interfere with those conclusions unless they are 

unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings; and 

thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion. 

R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting 

Bovard v. Baker, 775 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa.Super. 2001)). “On issues of 

credibility and weight of the evidence, we defer to the findings of the trial 

judge who has had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor 

of the witnesses.” R.M.G., Jr., supra. 

The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial 

court places on the evidence. Rather, the paramount 

concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child. 

Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s 

consideration of the best interest of the child was careful 

and thorough, and we are unable to find any abuse of 

discretion. 

Id. (quoting S.M. v. J.M., 811 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa.Super. 2002)). Additionally, 

when making an award of custody, the court must evaluate the custody factors 

delineated in Section 5328. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) (factors to consider 

when awarding custody).

In his first issue, Father argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction over 

the custody matter. Father asserts that Erie County was the proper venue in 

which to file the custody complaint because Children had resided there for 12 

months preceding the filing of the complaint. Father claims that J.T. 
J-S25032-22

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improperly filed the custody complaint in Crawford County, before she had 

“physical possession of the children[.]” (Father’s Brief at 8). Father insists 

J.T. knowingly and intentionally included misstatements and omissions of 

material facts in the complaint,4 which prevented the court from performing 

its “neutral and detached function, thereby voiding the complaint.” (Id. at 9). 

We disagree.

Initially, we observe:

A court’s decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction is 

subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review and will 

not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Under 

Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the 

court has overridden or misapplied the law, when its 

judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or when there is 

insufficient evidence of record to support the court’s 

findings. An abuse of discretion requires clear and 

convincing evidence that the trial court misapplied the law 

or failed to follow proper legal procedures.

Lucas v. Lucas, 882 A.2d 523, 527 (Pa.Super. 2005). This Court has 

explained:

Frequently, the terms jurisdiction and venue are used 

interchangeably although in fact they represent distinctly 

different concepts. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the 

competency of a given court to determine controversies of 

a particular class or kind to which the case presented for its 

consideration belongs. Venue is the place in which a 

particular action is to be brought and determined, and is a 

matter for the convenience of the litigants. Jurisdiction 

denotes the power of the court whereas venue considers the 

practicalities to determine the appropriate forum.

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4 Father does not elaborate in his brief on J.T.’s purported “misstatements and 

omissions of material facts.”
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J.K. v. W.L.K., 102 A.3d 511, 513 (Pa.Super. 2014) (internal citation 

omitted). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.2 governs the venue of 

custody matters. The Rule provides, in relevant part:

Rule 1915.2. Venue

(a) An action may be brought in any county

(1)(i) which is the home county of the child at the 

commencement of the proceeding, or

(ii) which had been the child’s home county within six 

months before commencement of the proceeding and the 

child is absent from the county but a parent or person acting 

as parent continues to live in the county[.]

Pa.R.C.P. 1915.2(a)(1).

Instantly, J.T. presented testimony/evidence throughout the history of 

this case that Children resided in J.T.’s home with Mother in Crawford County 

prior to Mother’s death. J.T. acknowledged that on occasion Mother would 

take Children to visit Maternal Grandmother or to visit Father and Father’s 

family in Erie County, as Mother and Father had an “on again, off again” 

relationship. J.T. clarified that Mother never left with Children for more than 

a few weeks at a time. Although Father claimed that Children predominantly 

resided in Erie County, the court credited J.T.’s testimony. (See Opinion and 

Order, 1/26/22, at 3) (stating Children have resided at J.T.’s residence since 

birth). See also R.M.G., Jr. (explaining that we defer to credibility findings 

by trial court). Additionally, the court already decided by opinion and order 
J-S25032-22

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entered October 6, 2021 that J.T. stood in loco parentis to Children. Thus, 

the record shows that at the time J.T. filed the custody complaint on April 8, 

2021, Crawford County had been Children’s home county within the preceding 

six months. Additionally, even though Children were absent from Crawford 

County at the time J.T. filed the custody complaint because Father had taken 

them with him following Mother’s death, J.T. (who was acting in the role of in 

loco parentis) was still residing in Crawford County. Therefore, venue was 

proper in Crawford County per Rule 1915.2(a)(1)(ii), and Father’s first issue 

merits no relief. See Pa.R.C.P. 1915.2(a)(1)(ii).

In his second issue, Father argues the court erroneously concluded that 

J.T. had in loco parentis standing to commence the custody action. Father 

emphasizes that he did not consent to J.T.’s actions evinced by Father’s 

challenge to Children being taken from him. Father submits that Children did 

not reside with J.T. for 12 consecutive months prior to the filing of the action. 

Father concludes J.T. lacked standing to pursue custody, and this Court must 

grant relief. We disagree. 

Preliminarily, we reiterate that the court held a hearing to address the 

parties’ standing on September 27, 2021, and entered an opinion and order 

on October 6, 2021, confirming J.T.’s standing as in loco parentis to pursue 

custody. Although that order was not final, it was immediately appealable 

under the collateral order doctrine. See K.W. v. S.L., 157 A.3d 498

(Pa.Super. 2017) (holding that father’s appeal from order granting appellees’ 
J-S25032-22

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in loco parentis standing was immediately appealable as collateral order). 

Father did not file an interlocutory appeal from that decision as a collateral 

order. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court suggested that Father 

waived the standing issue, presumably because Father could have challenged 

standing following the October 6, 2021 order. Recently, however, this Court

stated: “We can find no rule of law, either statutory or common law, which 

states that a collateral order must be appealed within 30 days of its entrance 

or an appeal based upon the substance of the collateral order is forever 

precluded.” Adams v. Toll Brothers, Inc. No. 1451-1460 EDA 2021 

(Pa.Super. July 28, 2022), 2022 WL 2980865 at *6 (unpublished 

memorandum)5 (emphasis in original). See also Pa.R.A.P. 313(a) (stating 

appeal may be taken as of right from collateral order). Consequently, we 

disagree that Father’s challenge to standing is waived in this appeal and we 

will review the merits of Father’s second issue.

Our review of this issue implicates the following legal principles:

“Threshold issues of standing are questions of law; thus, our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Rellick–Smith v. Rellick, 147 A.3d 897, 901 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Johnson v. American 

Standard, 607 Pa. 492, 8 A.3d 318, 326 (2010)).

Generally, the Child Custody Act does not permit third 

parties to seek custody of a child contrary to the wishes of 

that child’s parents. The Act provides several exceptions to 

this rule, which apply primarily to grandparents and great-

____________________________________________

5 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions from 

this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for persuasive value). 
J-S25032-22

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grandparents. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(3); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5325. In fact, unless a person seeking custody is a parent, 

grandparent, or great-grandparent of the child, the Act 

allows for standing only if that person is “in loco parentis.” 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2).[6]

“The term in loco parentis literally means ‘in the place of a 

parent.’” Peters v. Costello, 586 Pa. 102, 891 A.2d 705, 

710 (2005) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 791 (7th Ed. 

1991)). A person stands in loco parentis with respect to a 

child when he or she “assum[es] the obligations incident to 

the parental relationship without going through the 

formality of a legal adoption. The status of in loco parentis

embodies two ideas; first, the assumption of a parental 

status, and, second, the discharge of parental duties.” Id.

(quoting T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913, 916-

17 (2001)). Critical to our discussion here, “in loco parentis

status cannot be achieved without the consent and 

knowledge of, and in disregard of[,] the wishes of a parent.” 

E.W. v. T.S., 916 A.2d 1197, 1205 (Pa.[Super.] 2007) 

(citing T.B., supra).

____________________________________________

6 Under Section 5324, the following individuals may file an action for any form 

of physical custody or legal custody:

(1) A parent of the child.

(2) A person who stands in loco parentis to the child.

(3) A grandparent of the child who is not in loco parentis to 

the child:

(i) whose relationship with the child began either with the 

consent of the parents of the child or under a court order;

(ii) who assumes or is willing to assume responsibility for 

the child; and 

(iii) when one of the following conditions is met:

* * *

(C) the child has, for a period of at least 12 

consecutive months, resides with the grandparents, 

excluding brief temporary absences of the child from the 

home and is removed from the home by the parents in which 

case the action must be filed within six months after the 

removal of the child from the home.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324. 
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K.W., supra at 504-05. 

Instantly, in the trial court’s October 6, 2021 opinion and order following 

the September 27, 2021 hearing on standing, the court explained that J.T. 

has always been “a grandmother figure” for Children. (Opinion and Order, 

10/6/21, at 5). The court noted that Children resided almost exclusively with 

J.T. since their birth, and any periods of time where Mother would take 

Children to stay at other locations were temporary. Specifically, the court 

noted that J.T. provided parental support for Children by feeding Children, 

bathing them, providing transportation for Children, and assisting with all 

other activities of daily living. In essence, J.T.’s relationship with Children 

“was far beyond that of just a caregiver for Children.” (Id.) J.T. was also the 

primary financial support for Children and Mother. When Mother died, 

Maternal Grandmother immediately called J.T. to pick up Children. Thus, even 

Maternal Grandmother recognized J.T. as the appropriate custodial adult for 

Children after Mother’s death. 

The court further noted that at the September 27, 2021 hearing, Father 

had the opportunity to examine J.T. on the witness stand and to present his 

own testimony and that of witnesses. The court rejected the claims by Father 

and Paternal Grandmother that Children have slept in Paternal Grandmother’s

house in Erie County every night of their lives. The court expressly stated 

“there [was] no basis to find the testimony of [Father] or [Paternal 

Grandmother] to be credible.” (Id. at 7). In sum, the court decided “[t]here 
J-S25032-22

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is no question [J.T.] has been in loco parentis to the Children their entire 

lives.” (Id. at 8).

The record supports the court’s analysis that J.T. had standing to pursue 

custody under Section 5324(2). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2); R.M.G., Jr., 

supra. Further, we defer to the credibility findings of the trial judge, who had 

the opportunity to observe the proceedings and the demeanor of the 

witnesses. See id. See also M.J.S. v. B.B., 172 A.3d 651 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(holding grandmother stood in loco parentis to Child and had standing to 

pursue custody under Section 5324(2) where grandmother, mother, and child 

lived together for five years as intact family unit and grandmother either 

shared or assumed sole parenting responsibility for entirety of child’s life; 

record showed that grandmother fed, bathed, and entertained child daily, 

attended doctors’ appointments, and transported child to kindergarten; 

grandmother also assisted child financially and has consistently been 

stabilizing force in child’s life). Further, we reject Father’s contention that J.T. 

acted in loco parentis to Children against Father’s wishes. As this Court said 

in M.J.S.: “Through his own inaction, Father acquiesced to the development 

of the in loco parentis relationship between Grandmother and [Child]. ... 

Stated another way, by failing to act while Grandmother raised his son, Father 

acted in a manner consistent with his consent to her in loco parentis status.” 
J-S25032-22

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M.J.S., supra at 657.7 For all of these reasons, Father’s second issue on 

appeal merits no relief.

In his third issue, Father contends the court’s entry of “default 

judgment” relinquishing his parental rights was “in stark contrast to [legal] 

principles[.]” (Id. at 10). Father insists the court’s entry of “default 

judgment” is “voidable” here. (Id. at 16). We disagree that relief is due.

Initially, it is unclear why Father refers to the custody order at issue as 

a “default judgment.” To the extent that Father is complaining about the 

court’s temporary custody order after Father failed to attend mediation, the 

court subsequently held another mediation at which Father appeared, and 

ultimately held a de novo custody trial. To the extent Father is complaining 

the court failed to evaluate the relevant custody factors in making its custody 

decision, the record belies that contention. Rather, the record shows the court 

carefully considered each of the sixteen custody factors. (See Opinion and 

Order, 1/26/22, at 3-6). In its conclusion, the court stated: “[I]t is clear to 

this [c]ourt that [J.T.] has rebutted the presumption that custody shall be 

awarded to the parent. She has rebutted the presumption with clear and 

convincing evidence. It is in the best interest of the Children that they remain 

with [J.T.]” (Id. at 6). See also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b) (stating that in any 

____________________________________________

7 We note that Father seems to suggest J.T. lacked standing under Section 

5324(3). As we have already decided that J.T. had standing under Section 

5324(2), we decline to confront Father’s argument related to Section 5324(3).
J-S25032-22

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action regarding custody of child between parent of child and nonparent, there 

shall be presumption that custody shall be awarded to parent; presumption in 

favor of parent may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence). We agree 

with the court’s thorough analysis as detailed in the January 26, 2022 opinion 

and order. Thus, Father’s third issue merits no relief.

In his fourth issue, Father complains the court failed to dispose of the 

custody matter in a timely manner. Father argues the custody matter was 

initiated on April 8, 2021, and that trial did not occur until January 24, 2022, 

through no fault of his own. Father submits the custody complaint should 

have been dismissed on this basis. Father concludes the court’s custody order 

was improper, and this Court must grant him full and sole custody of Children. 

We disagree. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1915.4 provides, in relevant part:

Rule 1915.4. Prompt Disposition of Custody Cases

* * *

(b) Listing Trials Before the Court. Depending upon the 

procedure in the judicial district, within 180 days of the filing 

of the complaint either the court shall automatically enter 

an order scheduling a trial before a judge or a party shall 

file a praecipe, motion or request for trial, except as 

otherwise provided in this subdivision. If it is not the 

practice of the court to automatically schedule trials and 

neither party files a praecipe, motion or request for trial 

within 180 days of filing of the pleading, the court shall, sua 

sponte or on motion of a party, dismiss the matter unless a 

party has been granted an extension for good cause shown, 

or the court finds that dismissal is not in the best 

interests of the child. The extension shall not exceed 60 

days beyond the 180 day limit. A further reasonable 
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extension may be granted by the court upon agreement of 

the parties or when the court finds, on the record, 

compelling circumstances for a further reasonable 

extension. If an extension is granted and, thereafter, 

neither party files a praecipe, motion or request for trial 

within the time period allowed by the extension, the court 

shall, sua sponte or on the motion of a party, dismiss the 

matter unless the court finds that dismissal is not in 

the best interests of the child. A motion to dismiss, 

pursuant to this rule, shall be filed and served upon the 

opposing party. The opposing party shall have 20 days from 

the date of service to file an objection. If no objection is 

filed, the court shall dismiss the case. Prior to a sua sponte

dismissal, the court shall notify the parties of an intent to 

dismiss the case unless an objection is filed within 20 days 

of the date of the notice.

(c) Trial. Trials before a judge shall commence within 90 

days of the date the scheduling order is entered. Trials and 

hearings shall be scheduled to be heard on consecutive days 

whenever possible but, if not on consecutive days, then the 

trial or hearing shall be concluded not later than 45 days 

from commencement.

Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(b), (c) (emphasis added). 

Here, the court noted: 

On December 2, 2021, [Father] filed a Motion to Dismiss in 

which he alleged that the custody complaint should be 

dismissed because the custody trial was not scheduled 

within 180 days of the filing of the custody complaint. By 

Order dated December 3, 2021, [the court] denied the 

Motion to Dismiss as it was abundantly clear that dismissal 

would not be in the best interest of the children. 

Additionally, the custody trial was delayed due to pre-trial 

litigation most of which was initiated by [Father].

(Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 3/15/22, at 1). We agree with the trial court that 

no relief is due.

The record shows that J.T. filed the custody complaint on April 8, 2021. 
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On May 26, 2021, the court issued a notice of mediation. The case proceeded 

to mediation, which Father failed to attend. Father subsequently filed a 

request for a de novo hearing on June 25, 2021, claiming he had no notice of 

the mediation. Therefore, on July 13, 2021, the court scheduled a new 

mediation for August 9, 2021. Following mediation, Father again requested a 

de novo hearing. Paternal Grandmother subsequently filed a petition to 

intervene. In the meantime, Father challenged J.T.’s standing to pursue 

custody. Thus, on September 27, 2021, the court held a hearing to address 

J.T.’s standing. The court further sought to establish Father’s standing by way 

of a paternity test, where there were questions concerning paternity. Once 

the standing issues were resolved, on December 6, 2021, the court scheduled 

the de novo hearing for December 29, 2021; and ultimately rescheduled the 

hearing for January 24, 2022, when it took place. We agree with the trial 

court that the lengthy pre-trial litigation in this case was the cause of any 

postponement of trial.

Additionally, the Rule expressly prohibits dismissal of a custody case 

where it is not in the best interests of the child. See Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(b). We 

agree with the trial court that dismissal would not have served Children’s best 

interests. Moreover, although the court technically failed to schedule the 

custody trial within 180 days of the filing of the custody complaint, factoring 

in the 180 days for scheduling and the 90 days thereafter in which to hold the 

hearing, the Rule contemplates a custody trial occurring within nine months
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(absent any extensions). See Pa.R.C.P. 1915.4(b), (c). Thus, the court held 

the custody trial in the approximate timeframe contemplated by the Rule. 

Under these circumstances, we see no prejudice to Father. See M.S. v. J.K., 

No. 2282 EDA 2020 (Pa.Super. Aug. 17, 2021) (unpublished memorandum) 

(holding no relief was due where trial court failed to comply with language of

Rule 1915.4(c) and did not complete custody hearings for more than two years 

after first hearing because father did not suffer prejudice).8 Therefore, 

Father’s fourth issue on appeal merits no relief. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/21/2022 

____________________________________________

8 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).