J-S36002-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.A.Y., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF S.R.Y., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 572 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 26, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2016-A0188

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.R.Y., JR., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF S.R.Y., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 574 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 26, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 2016-A0189

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 06, 2017

S.R.Y. (“Father”) appeals the decrees entered on January 26, 2017, 

that granted the petitions filed by Kelly Weidner, of Haven Adoptions, 

seeking to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to his twin 

children, S.R.Y., Jr., a male, and H.A.Y., a female, (collectively, the 

“Children”) with G.E.E.B. (“Mother”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (6), and (b), so that R.J.S. (“Adoptive Father”) and 
J-S36002-17

- 2 -

D.S. (“Adoptive Mother”) (collectively, “Adoptive Parents”) may adopt the 

Children. We affirm. 

Mother executed consents to adoption on October 21, 2016. Towards 

the end of that month, Adoptive Parents, who live in Utah, had the Children 

residing in their home for at least a week until Father objected to the 

adoption set up by Mother. The Children were then returned to 

Pennsylvania, where Haven Adoptions placed them in temporary foster care 

while the adoption proceedings took place. On November 17, 2016, Kelly 

Weidner, of Haven Adoptions, filed petitions seeking to involuntarily 

terminate the parental rights of Father to the Children and petitions to 

confirm consent to adoptions executed by Mother.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on December 1, 2016. At 

the hearing, the trial court granted the petitions to confirm Mother’s consent 

to adoption, involuntarily terminating her parental rights.1 The trial court 

continued the hearing to January 2017, so that Father could obtain counsel 

prior to the court hearing the petitions to involuntarily terminate his parental 

rights. 

On January 25, 2017, Kelly Weidner, on behalf of Haven Adoptions, 

filed amended termination petitions for the Children. The trial court held an 

____________________________________________

1 Mother has not filed an appeal from the orders confirming her consent to 

the adoption and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to the 

Children.
J-S36002-17

- 3 -

evidentiary hearing with regard to the petitions to terminate Father’s 

parental rights. At the hearing, Adoptive Parents first presented the 

testimony of Mother. See N.T., Termination Hearing, 1/25/17, at 4. Mother 

testified that Father had been at the hospital for the birth of the Children, 

but had not provided any money or gifts for the Children, and had refused 

her requests for money for the Children. See id., at 6-7, 13. She noted 

Father had once provided disposable diapers and a box of baby wipes a 

couple of weeks after the Children were born, and that he had only seen 

them five or fewer times. See id., at 6, 13, 17. Mother stated that she had 

been unable to contact Father for several months, because he had her phone 

number blocked on his phone. See id., at 7. 

After Father opposed the adoption, the Children were returned to 

Mother’s home from Adoptive Parents’ home in November 2016 for a week 

or two. See id., at 18. During the period when the Children were returned to 

Mother, she had driven them to Father, at his request—and he had seen 

them through the car window on a street in Norristown. See id., at 14-15, 

17, 19-20. 

At the time of the hearing, the Children were placed in a foster home 

through Haven Adoptions. See id., at 8. Mother testified that Father is a 

danger to the Children, and has a criminal past. See id., at 9. Mother 

testified that she has a five-year-old daughter, S.B, with Father who resides 

with her. See id., at 11-12. 
J-S36002-17

- 4 -

Adoptive Father then testified on his own behalf. See id., at 21. 

Adoptive Father testified that he and Adoptive Mother have three other 

adopted children. See id., at 12. Adoptive Parents had met the Children and 

immediately fallen in love with them and wished to adopt them. See id., at 

21-23. 

Haven Adoptions, on behalf of Adoptive Parents, then presented the 

testimony of Kayla Mazzotta, a caseworker employed with Haven Adoptions. 

See id., at 24-25. She believed that Adoptive Parents would be good 

parents and that the Children would bond with them. See id., at 25-26. She 

clarified that Haven Adoptions became involved as a provider of temporary 

foster care for the Children and was not acting as an adoption agency. See 

id., at 30. 

Father then presented the testimony of Mother’s brother, A.B. See id., 

at 33. He saw Father at the hospital on the day the Children were born. See 

id., at 34. A.B. also testified that Father had come to the home where he 

resides with his mother, the Children’s grandmother, on several weekends in 

June and July 2016, and a bag with diapers and onesies was on the floor at 

most times. See id., at 37-38. A.B. was unsure whether Father provided 

Mother with any money for the Children. See id., at 38. A.B. testified that 

he had seen Father at the birthday party for A.B.’s son in late September 

2016. See id., at 39-40. A.B. had seen Mother and the Children at the 

party, as well, but he was unsure whether Father brought anything for the 
J-S36002-17

- 5 -

Children. See id., at 40. Between the end of July and the beginning of 

November, Father did not contact A.B. to assist him in getting to see the 

Children. See id., at 42.

Next, Father presented the testimony of A.C., the mother of Mother’s 

niece. See id., at 43. A.C. saw Father at the hospital when the Children 

were born. See id., at 44. A.C. saw Father at the birthday party for A.B.’s 

son on the last weekend of September 2016. See id., at 44-45. A.C. also 

stated that she had seen Father leaving the residence of Mother on four 

occasions on weekends prior to the party, after the birth of the Children. 

See id., at 45. She observed a bag with diapers, and A.B. told her that there 

were wipes and onesies in the bag, but she did not know whether Father had 

brought them for the Children. See id. A.C. testified that Father held the 

Children at the party. See id., at 46-47. 

Father then testified on his own behalf. See id., at 48. Father testified 

that he moved to Norristown in September or October 2016, and that he had 

previously resided in New Jersey after his release from incarceration in 

2014. See id., at 48-50. Father resides with his sixteen-month-old son and 

his girlfriend. See id., at 50. Father also has two older female children, ages 

thirteen and nine, who reside with their mother. See id., at 51-52. Father 

stated that he has custody of the older two children on weekends, by 

agreement of their mother, and not by order of court, and that he pays the 

mother of those children $550 a month in child support through a court 
J-S36002-17

- 6 -

order. See id., at 51. Father stated that he would see his five-year-old 

daughter with mother, S.B., every other weekend until September or 

October 2016, when Mother found out about his girlfriend, and then Mother 

would not let him see S.B. See id., at 52. Father testified that he saw S.B. 

one time around Christmas 2016, when he went to Mother’s home to discuss 

the adoption of the Children. See id., at 52-53. Father stated that Mother 

told him that the Children were at the home of a relative. See id. Father 

stated that he does not provide any set amount of support to Mother for 

S.B., but provides for S.B. on an “as needed” basis. Id., at 53.

Father testified that he was present for the birth of the Children. See 

id., at 53-54. Father stated that he saw the twins more than five times, that 

he had seen them on every weekend in June, and that he had mostly seen 

them on weekends, when Mother would come to his house in Norristown, 

which was being renovated. See id., at 55-59. Father stated that he had 

begun working on Saturdays in November 2016. See id., at 58. Prior to his 

current employment, Father was fired from his previous job, and was 

between jobs. See id., at 57-58. Father stated that the Children had seen 

his older children when they were at his home on weekends and at the 

homes of his sisters. See id., at 58-59. Father had the trial court admit an 

exhibit purporting when he had visited the Children since their birth. See 

id., at 59-60; Exhibit F-1. He stated that the visits during the week might 

not be 100% accurate, but the visits on the weekends were accurate, and 
J-S36002-17

- 7 -

that the document was 98% accurate. See id. Father had the trial court 

admit as an exhibit a group of pictures he had taken of the Children. See 

id., at 62-63; Exhibit F-2. 

Father testified that he was unaware that Mother was placing the

Children for adoption until he was asked to give his consent. See id., at 60-

61. He also testified that he had provided the Children with supplies 

including two boxes of diapers a month, as well as onesies, and that he had 

given Mother money for the Children, in the amount of $40 or $50, on 

several occasions. See id., at 64. Father stated that Mother would bring the 

Children to his Norristown home and stay for the weekend on every weekend 

that he did not have his older two children after their birth until Mother 

placed them for adoption. See id., at 64-65. Father testified that he and 

Mother took the Children outlet shopping in the summer 2016, and he 

purchased some clothing for the Children that Mother subsequently 

destroyed as not good enough for the Children. See id., at 66-67. Father 

testified that he filed a petition for full custody of the Children on the day 

prior to the hearing, January 24, 2017. See id., at 67. Father testified that 

he and Mother’s family believe that Mother is placing the Children for 

adoption to get back at him. See id., at 68. Father stated that he deserves a 

chance to raise them and they deserve a chance to live with him, and not 

with some strangers in Utah. See id., at 68.
J-S36002-17

- 8 -

On cross-examination by counsel for the Children, Father testified that 

he paid Mother $150 to $200 a month for support of the Children, in addition 

to providing two boxes of diapers and onesies. See id., at 76-77. Father 

conceded that the Children cannot survive on $175 a month. See id., at 77. 

Father stated that he had gone with S.R.Y., Jr., to Children’s Hospital of 

Philadelphia for an acid reflux issue in late September 2016. See id., at 79.

When questioned on cross-examination by counsel for Haven 

Adoptions about Exhibit F-1, reflecting that he visited the Children on 

October 22, 23, and 30, Father stated that he probably got the dates wrong. 

See id., at 70. Father stated that he did not know that Mother was placing 

the Children for adoption when he went to her home after Christmas in 

December 2016, and the Children were not present. See id., at 79-80.

Counsel for Haven Adoptions then questioned Adoptive Father on redirect examination. Adoptive Father testified that the Children had been with 

him and Adoptive Mother on October 21, 22, 23, 29, and 30 of 2016, 

contrary to the representation in Father’s Exhibit F-1 and testimony that 

they were with Father on those dates. See id., at 93. Mother testified on redirect examination that the dates represented on Father’s Exhibit F-1 were 

incorrect, and that Father had not seen the Children as many times as 

Father indicated, but only five times in total. See id., at 95-96. Mother 

stated that Father went with her and bought one box of diapers and one box 

of wipes, at her insistence. See id., at 96. She testified that Father never 
J-S36002-17

- 9 -

purchased any clothing for the Children, nor did he provide any money. See 

id. 

On cross-examination by counsel for the Children, Mother testified that 

she could not afford to raise the Children, and that her financial situation 

was a factor in her decision to place the Children for adoption. See id., at 

97-98. Mother testified that she had discussed her financial situation with 

Father and had requested monetary assistance from him, both before and 

after the birth of the Children, and that Father had told her that he was not 

working. See id. She was unaware that Father was working until she saw 

him in his work vest at the termination hearing. See id., at 98. Mother is 

aware that Father provides support for his other children. See id. In their 

conversation in December 2016 around Christmas, Father did not offer to 

provide support for the Children. See id. Mother stated that father’s Exhibit 

F-2 was incorrect because the Children were with Adoptive Parents during 

the last weekend of October 2016. See id., at 99-100.

Mother stated that Father never told her that he and his girlfriend were 

willing to raise the Children, as he has never admitted to her that he even 

has a girlfriend. See id., at 100-101. Mother explained that her five-year-old 

child with Father, S.B., is deaf and has implants to help her hearing, and 

Father has refused to provide any support for the child. See id., at 101. 

Mother’s friend, R., and her husband have helped Mother in raising and 

financially supporting S.B. See id., at 101-102. Father comes to birthday 
J-S36002-17

- 10 -

parties for S.B. without bringing any gift for the child, while Mother is 

working two jobs to provide for the child financially. See id., at 102. Mother 

is afraid that Father poses a danger to the Children and herself because his 

criminal past involved gun violence and a shooting that resulted in the death 

of an individual. See id., at 103-107. 

Based on the testimony and the documentary evidence admitted at the 

hearing, the trial court entered decrees granting the termination petitions. 

Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). This Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the 

appeals on March 2, 2017.

On appeal, Father raises two issues:

1. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding clear and convincing 

evidence existed to terminate Birth Father’s parental rights 

under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(1).

2. The [t]rial [c]ourt erred in finding clear and convincing 

evidence existed to terminate Birth Father’s parental rights 

under 23 Pa.C.S. Section 2511(a)(6).

Father’s Brief, at 4.2

____________________________________________

2

In his brief, Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion or 

erred as a matter of law in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the involuntary termination of his parental rights under § 2511(a)(1) 

and (6). He does not raise the termination of his parental rights under § 

2511(b) in either his concise statement or the Statement of Questions 

Involved portion of his brief. Thus, he has waived any challenge to the 

termination under section 2511(b). See Krebs v. United Refining 

Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding 

that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his concise 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S36002-17

- 11 -

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a 

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency 

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual 

findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

[T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of 

discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, 

unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the 

fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial 

judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and 

often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child 

and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

omitted).

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

statement of errors complained of on appeal and the statement of questions

involved in his brief on appeal). See also In re M.Z.T.M.W., ___ A.3d ___, 

___, n.3, 2017 WL 2153892, *3, n.3 (Pa. Super., filed May 17, 2017).
J-S36002-17

- 12 -

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained that

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of § 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc).

In his brief, Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion or 

erred as a matter of law in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the involuntary termination of his parental rights under § 2511(a)(1) 

and (6). We need only address subsection (a)(1).

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

With respect to subsection (a)(1), our Supreme Court has held that
J-S36002-17

- 13 -

[o]nce the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). 

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1988) (citation 

omitted).

Further, this Court has stated that

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each 

case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations 

omitted).

With regard to § 2511(a)(1), Father asserts that he has not evidenced 

a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights, nor has he failed 

and/or refused to perform his parental duties. Given the trial court’s 

credibility findings, which are supported by the record, we disagree. 

The conflicting testimony is set forth in detail above. The trial court 

found Father’s testimony that he had visited with the Children on most 

weekends since their birth at the end of May 2016 until their placement in 

foster care in November of 2016, and that he had provided support for the 

Children lacked any credibility. See N.T., Termination Hearing, 1/25/17, at 
J-S36002-17

- 14 -

128-130, 133, 138-139. The trial court found no evidence that Father 

interacted with the Children as a parent with an obligation to care for them, 

feed them, change their diapers, or provide for them financially. See id., at 

134, 138-139. Accordingly, the trial court found that, during the six-month 

period preceding the filing of the petition, July 17, 2016 through November 

17, 2016, Father failed to perform his parental duties. See N.T., Termination 

Hearing, 1/25/17, at 125-126. 

The trial court’s credibility determinations are supported by competent 

evidence in the record. The petitioner proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. We agree with the trial court that termination of Father’s 

parental rights under §2511(a)(1) was warranted. 

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2017