___________ No. 95-2470

___________ Virgil Clark, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * Western District of Missouri of the Social Security * Administration, * [TO BE PUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: January 5, 1996 Filed: April 24, 1996

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.
Virgil Clark appeals from the district court's order affirming th e decision of the Commissioner of the Social Secur ity Administration to deny Clark disability insurance benefits. We affirm.

Cl ark was born March 9, 1948, has an eighth-grade education, an d worked as a salvage yard foreman at a metal plating company. In Augus t 1990, Clark applied for disability insurance ben efits, claiming disability due to diabetes and a back injury. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. At Clark's request, a n Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing, at which Clark was re presented by counsel. The Appeals Council later remanded the case for a second hearing.

### -2- Clark tes tified that he last worked in December 1987. He stated he experi enced moderate chest pains; constant severe pain in his lef t shoulder, arms, and legs, which was exacerbated by prolonged standing or walking; and pain whe n he moved his neck. He occasionally had memory and concentration problems. Clark stated he could not bend or squat completel y to the floor; during an eight-hour work day he would need to lie down abou t sixtimes for ten to thirty minutes; he could sit for only thirty-fiv e minu tes at a time, and could stand for about one hour. He had troubl e focusing his eyes, which his doctors said was related to his hig h cholesterol and diabetes. Contrary to his testi mony at the first hearing, Clark stated at his second hearing that he drank alcohol whenever he could

.

Ac onsultative neurologist testified that Clark's medical record s indicated his blood lipids were markedly elevated and he was diabetic ;
neur ologically, there was no evidence of objective neurologica l abnorm alities, and some evidence of back and neck movement limitations

. The neurologist disputed Clark's treating physician's opinion that there
wa s a relationship between Clark's hyperlipidemia (high elevation o f cholesterol and fatty acids in the blood) and hi s subjective complaints of pain. Another consultative neurologist testified that test results did no t support the severity of Clark's complaints. A v ocational expert testified tha t Clark had not acquired transferrable skills from his past relevan t work, b ut that there were unskilled entry-level sedentary jobs in th e national economy which Clark could perform. The ALJ ordered an orthopedic consultation with x-rays of th e shoulders and knees to be performed by Clark's t reating orthopedist, Harry Miller. Dr. Miller noted Clark was unable to flex or extend his nec k muscles more than twenty degrees, had extremely poor range of shoulde r motion (although he n oted only minor spurring on the shoulder x-ray), had a decreased left hand grasp, and was unable to h eel walk on his left side; Clark's

### -3-

tho racic spine was unremarkable but his lumbar spine had "rather sever e muscle spasm . . . wi th extreme loss of range of motion." Dr. Miller had prev iouslydiagnosed a 1987 rotator cuff tear in the right shoulder , hyperlipidemia, and d iabetes mellitus; described Clark's limited range of motion ; and opined that Clark's pain, possible diabetic neuropathy, an d lack of education precluded him from gainful employment. Dr. Mille r suggested that Clark' s metabolic disease could produce neuritis or muscle and joint pain. The ALJ concluded that the severity of Clark's pain wa s disproportionate to and not supported by the objective medical evidence; the EMG, x-ray, and neurological examinations we re essentially normal; the minor degenerative joint changes and light defects of the cervical an d lumb ar spine did not explain Clark's allegations of severe pain; hi s treatment history was sporadic; and his earnings had been low since 1984 and thus he had littl e incentive to work. The ALJ noted little treatment for alcohol abuse, an d concluded the evidence did not show Clark had lost voluntary control of his consumption of alcohol.

The ALJ discounted Dr. Miller's opinion that Clark was disable d because his conclusio ns were "based on a complete acceptance of [Clark's] subjective complaints ." The ALJ credited the opinion of the neurological consultant who had st ated that the medical findings and treatment history did not support the severity of Clark's complain ts. The ALJ discounted as outside his realm of expertise Dr. Miller's opinion that Clark's lack of education would prevent him from gainful employment. The ALJ also noted th at treating physicians were under considerable pressure to suppor t patients in their quest for disability income, and that Clark's wife was empl oyed at Dr. Miller's clinic. The ALJ rejected Clark's testimon y concerning his drinking habits and his need to lie down six times during an eight-hour day for pain relief. Given the fact that Clark admitted at the second hearing th at he had not told the truth while under oath at his first hearing, the ALJ's conclusion

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that Clark's testimony was not credible finds substantial support in the record.

The ALJ c oncluded Clark could not return to his past relevant work. Shifting the burden t o the Commissioner, the ALJ concluded that, based on the vocational expert's testimony, there were ot her jobs which Clark could performwhich existed in significant numbers in the national and loca l economies. Thus, Clark was not entitled to disa bility insurance benefits. The Appeals Council d enied further review. Clark sought judicial review, and the district court granted the Commissioner summary judgment.

Upon ou r careful review, we agree with the district court that th e record as a whole reflects substantial evidence to support th e Commissioner's decision. We conclude that the A LJ properly discounted the opinion of Clark's treating physician, in that his opinion was no t consi stent with the objective evidence in the record, and that the AL J properly considered t he factors set forth in Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), in discounting Clark's subjective complaints of pain.

In addi tion, Clark has not demonstrated by his testimony or by th e medical evidence that he has lost voluntary control of his alcoho l consumption. See Metcalf v. Heckler , 800 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1986). Thus, the ALJ did not err in excluding Clark's a lleged uncontrolled use of alcoh ol from the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert. We als o reject Clark's argument that the district court's issuance of a form denia l is g rounds for reversal. The district court expressly stated it ha d reviewed all the evidence in the record.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I would reverse and remand this case for further proceedings for two
reasons. First, I believe the ALJ erred in discrediting Dr. Miller' s opinion while accepting that of a consulting phy sician who did not examine Clark. W e have held that "[t]he opinion of a treating physician i s entitled to great weight `unless it is unsupport ed by medically acceptable clinical or diagnostic data.'" Ghant v. Bowen9 30 F.2d 633, 639 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting Kirby v. Sullivan923 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir. 1991)).
After the first hearing, the ALJ ord ered a consultative examination, including x-rays, to be performed by Dr. Miller. Dr. Miller reported that Clark had difficulty walking, sitting, or standing for longer than thirty minut es; had limited range of motion in his neck, shoulder, and lumba r spine; an d had severe pain limiting his ability to do much of anything

. The ALJ, however, dis counted Dr. Miller's opinions for the very reason we ordinarily accord the treating physician's opini on greater weight than the opinions of other doctors in the case: Dr. Miller knew the patient. See Thomas v. Sullivan , 928 F.2d 255, 259 & n.3 (8th Cir. 1991) (quotin g Sch isler v. Heckler , 787 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1986) ("the treatin g physician is usually more familiar with a claimant's medical condition tha n
are other physicians")). I fail to understand why the ALJ ordered Dr

. Miller to perform the examination and then disco unted his findings because he was "under pressure to support patients in their quest" for benefits. Moreover, Dr. Miller did not rely only on subjective complaints in reachin g his conclusions. The question is whether the medically acceptable clinica l data c ontradicts Dr. Miller's opinions. None of the consultativ e physicians thought Clark was a malingerer; some suggested Clark's symptoms could represent early-stage peripheral neuropathy.

### -6- Second, because the standing/walking /movement restrictions which Dr. Miller found following his consultative examinat ion were not considered in the hy pothetical question, I believe the hypothetical did not precisel y describe Clark's impairments. See Whitmore v. Bowen , 785 F.2d 262, 26 3 (8th Cir. 1986) (for vocational expert's opinionto qualify as substantial evidence, hypothetical question must precisely describe claimant' s impairments).
Accordingly, I dissent.

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.