Opinion filed August 16, 2012

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-10-00367-CR

__________

ANDREW TIMOTHY MARTINEZ, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 39th District Court

Haskell County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 6135

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Andrew Timothy Martinez pleaded guilty to the offense of felony driving while 

intoxicated. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the trial court sentenced him to confinement 

in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of thirty

years. In three issues, appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. We 

affirm.

Background Facts

The trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law after denying 

appellant’s motion to suppress. They read as follows:

1. On or about April 10, 2006, Tom Bassett, Chief of Police of Haskell, 

Texas, was on patrol in the City of Haskell.
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2. At approximately 7:00 a.m., Officer Bassett was flagged down by 

Michelle Santillan.

3. Officer Bassett had known Michelle Santillan for a number of years. 

Officer Bassett had been provided information from Santillan in the past 

that proved to be reliable. Officer Bassett was aware that Santillan had 

connections to law enforcement in that she worked part time for a law 

enforcement agency.

4. Michelle Santillan informed Officer Bassett that Andrew Martinez had 

come to her house that morning; that Andrew Martinez was in town for a 

court hearing; that Andrew Martinez had been argumentative at her house; 

and that Andrew Martinez was intoxicated. Santillan informed Bassett 

that Martinez was driving a light blue 4-door Jeep Cherokee.

5. Officer Bassett waited in the vicinity of Santillan’s home to see if 

Martinez returned. Officer Bassett was concerned about a possible 

domestic disturbance at Santillan’s house if Martinez returned.

6. While waiting near Santillan’s house, a vehicle matching the description 

given to him by Santillan drove up and stopped at Santillan’s house.

7. After the vehicle stopped, Bassett pulled alongside the vehicle, stopped 

and activated his emergency lights.

8. Officer Bassett identified the individual driving the vehicle as Andrew 

Timothy Martinez.

9. Officer Bassett smelled alcoholic beverage upon the person of Andrew 

Martinez, and observed Martinez to have bloodshot eyes.

10. Officer Bassett conducted an investigation, concluded Martinez was 

intoxicated and arrested Martinez for Driving While Intoxicated.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Since Martinez stopped voluntarily at Santillan’s residence, Officer 

Bassett did not initiate a traffic stop. By stopping in front of a residence 

on a public street, Officer Bassett could lawfully approach Martinez; thus, 

the contact between Bassett and Martinez constituted a voluntary 

encounter, that does not implicate the 4th Amendment of the U.S. 

Constitution or any provisions of the Constitution of the State of Texas.

2. Even if Officer Bassett initiated a stop and detained Martinez; Officer 

Bassett had reasonable suspicion to believe Martinez was driving while 

intoxicated, because he had been given information from a source he has 
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known for many years, that he believed to be credible, and that had 

provided him reliable information in the past.

3. Furthermore, Officer Bassett had received information that Martinez had 

been arguing at Santillan’s residence. Martinez returned to that residence. 

Officer Bassett would have been justified in a detention of Martinez for 

community caretaking.

Appellant separately challenges the trial court’s conclusions of law in three issues.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. 

Lujan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In reviewing a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of 

review. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Valtierra v. State, 310 

S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). First, we afford almost total deference to the trial 

court’s determination of historical facts. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. The trial court is the sole 

trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their 

testimony. Id.; Garza v. State, 213 S.W.3d 338, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Second, we 

review de novo the trial court’s application of law to facts. Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 559; Valtierra, 

310 S.W.3d at 447. We also review a trial court’s legal rulings de novo. State v. Iduarte, 268 

S.W.3d 544, 548–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Where, as here, the trial judge makes express findings of fact, we must first determine 

whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, 

supports those findings. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2006). We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the 

record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447–

48; State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Consensual Encounter vs. Investigatory Detention

In his first issue, appellant asserts that the interaction between Officer Thomas Paul 

Bassett Jr. and appellant constituted a detention rather than a consensual encounter. The State 

argues that Officer Bassett initiated a consensual encounter, which then gave rise to reasonable 

suspicion to support an investigatory detention.
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There are three different types of interactions between citizens and law enforcement 

officers: (1) consensual encounters; (2) investigatory detentions; and (3) arrests. State v. 

Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 

429, 434 (1991); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968); and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 

111–12 (1975)). Consensual encounters do not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 

411. Police officers are free to stop and request information from a citizen with no justification. 

Id. A citizen may terminate such a consensual encounter at will. Id. A citizen’s acquiescence to 

an officer’s request does not transform a consensual encounter into a detention or seizure, even if 

the officer does not communicate to the citizen that the request for information may be ignored. 

Id.

We consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a reasonable person 

in the defendant’s shoes would have felt free to ignore the request or terminate the interaction. 

Id. There is no bright-line test. Id.; State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 243 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008). We consider the surrounding circumstances, including the time and place. 

Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 410–11. The officer’s conduct is the most important factor in deciding 

whether an encounter between a citizen and the police was consensual or a Fourth Amendment 

seizure. Id. If a police officer through force or a showing of authority restrains a citizen’s 

liberty, the encounter is not consensual and has become either a detention or an arrest, requiring 

either reasonable suspicion or probable cause, respectively. Id.

As was the case in Woodard, we focus our analysis on the initial interaction between 

appellant and Officer Bassett to determine if it constituted a consensual encounter. The events 

that transpired afterwards are not relevant to our inquiry because Officer Bassett testified that he 

smelled alcohol coming from the car and appellant after talking to him for “a short time.” As 

noted previously, appellant had already stopped his car when Officer Bassett parked beside him. 

Thus, Officer Bassett’s activation of his emergency lights did not cause appellant to stop his 

vehicle. The stop occurred in daylight at approximately 7:00 a.m. Officer Bassett testified that 

his patrol vehicle did not block appellant’s vehicle. In addition to the testimony presented at the 

suppression hearing, an in-car video of the initial contact between appellant and Officer Bassett 

was introduced into evidence; it corroborates the officer’s testimony.1 The in-car video further 

 

1Officer Bassett testified that the in-car video began recording when he activated his overhead lights and that that was 

one of the reasons why he activated the overhead lights.
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reveals that Officer Bassett spoke to appellant in a calm, noncoercive tone in requesting to see 

his driver’s license and insurance information.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances and the conduct of Officer Bassett, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the initial interaction 

constituted a consensual encounter. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a detention 

has occurred would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 

officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, the blocking of appellant’s vehicle 

with a police vehicle, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 

officer’s request might be compelled. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49–50 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010); Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 249. None of these facts occurred in this case. Appellant’s 

first issue is overruled. We need not consider appellant’s remaining issues because our 

resolution of the first issue is dispositive of this appeal. Simply put, no justification is required 

for an officer to request information from a citizen in a consensual encounter. Woodard, 341 

S.W.3d at 411.

Alternatively, we conclude that the information given by Santillan to Officer Bassett 

provided him with reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory detention. As recently noted 

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011):

Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless detention of the person that 

amounts to less than a full-blown custodial arrest must be justified by a 

reasonable suspicion. A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has 

specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, 

would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or 

soon will be engaged in criminal activity. This standard is an objective one that 

disregards the actual subjective intent of the arresting officer and looks, instead, to 

whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. It also looks 

to the totality of the circumstances; those circumstances may all seem innocent 

enough in isolation, but if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of 

criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified. “[T]he relevant inquiry is 

not whether particular conduct is innocent or criminal, but the degree of suspicion 

that attaches to particular noncriminal acts” (alteration in original, footnotes 

omitted).

The court held in Derichsweiler that information provided to police from a citizen-informant 

who identifies himself and may be held to account for the accuracy and veracity of his report 

may be regarded as reliable. 348 S.W.3d at 914–15. In such a scenario, the only question is 
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whether the information that the known citizen-informant provides, viewed through the prism of 

the detaining officer’s particular level of knowledge and experience, objectively supports a 

reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity is afoot. Id. Santillan, a person who had 

provided reliable information in the past, reported that appellant was intoxicated and that he had 

been argumentative at her house. She also provided Officer Bassett with a description of the 

vehicle that appellant was driving. This information constituted sufficient information to support 

an investigative detention.

This Court’s Ruling

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

TERRY McCALL

JUSTICE

August 16, 2012

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Kalenak, J.