[Cite as Crow v. Baughman, 2011-Ohio-1170.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

BRANDON CROW, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 5-10-28 

 v. 

BRANDI BAUGHMAN, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court, 

Juvenile Division 

Trial Court No. 20940224 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: March 14, 2011 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Howard A. Elliott for Appellant 

Donald J. Rasmussen for Appellee 
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SHAW, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Brandi Baughman (“Brandi”), appeals the judgment of 

the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, overruling her 

objections to the magistrate’s decision designating Plaintiff-Appellee, Brandon Crow 

(“Brandon”), the residential parent and legal custodian of their child, establishing 

visitation for Brandi, and ordering her to pay child support. The trial court subsequently 

adopted and incorporated the magistrate’s decision in its August 30, 2010 Judgment 

Entry. 

{¶2} The parties’ child, Liberty, was born in May of 2009. On June 23, 2009, 

Brandon filed a complaint requesting to be designated residential parent or, in the 

alternative, to establish a shared parenting plan and to resolve other support matters. On 

July 7, 2009, Brandon filed a motion requesting the trial court to establish temporary 

visitation and companionship rights. In his motion, Brandon alleged that Brandi refused 

to allow him to exercise their agreed upon visitation and companionship, which they had 

established prior to the filing of his complaint. On September 1, 2009, the magistrate 

granted Brandon’s motion for temporary visitation and established a temporary visitation 

schedule. The schedule gave Brandon visitation with Liberty on Tuesdays and Thursdays 

during the day and on alternating weekends. The magistrate also ordered a Court 

Appointed Special Advocate to be appointed to serve as the Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) 

for Liberty throughout the pendency of the custody case. 
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{¶3} On October 30, 2009, Brandon filed a motion for contempt of court alleging 

that Brandi denied him visitation with Liberty on a weekend allocated to him by the 

temporary orders. On November 19, 2009, the trial court appointed CASA Stephanie 

Stephan as the GAL in the case. On November 24, 2009, the parties appeared before the 

magistrate along with the GAL. The magistrate ordered that Brandi furnish Liberty’s 

social security number to Brandon so that he could obtain medical insurance for her 

through his employment. The magistrate also established a temporary holiday schedule 

for Thanksgiving and Christmas. 

{¶4} On February 17, 2010, the parties and the GAL appeared before the 

magistrate for a pre-trial hearing. The magistrate found that the GAL had concerns 

regarding the “rearing of this child.” (Order, Feb. 17, 2010). Based on the GAL’s 

temporary recommendation, the magistrate ordered Brandon’s visitation to be expanded 

to include overnight visits every Thursday, and that Brandon shall keep Liberty until 7:00 

p.m. on Sundays during his scheduled weekends. The magistrate also ordered Brandon to 

have extended visitation with Liberty over Easter. 

{¶5} On March 30, 2010, the GAL filed her report and final recommendations 

with the court. In the report, the GAL recommended that Brandon be named the 

residential parent and legal custodian of Liberty and that Brandi be given visitation. On 

April 8, 2010, the parties appeared before the magistrate for the final hearing. Brandon 

appeared with counsel and Brandi appeared pro se. The GAL Stephanie Stephan was 
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also present. At the hearing, Brandon withdrew both his motion for shared parenting and 

his motion to find Brandi guilty of contempt. Both parties and the GAL testified, as well 

as family members and friends of each party. On April 12, 2010, the magistrate issued 

her decision finding that it is in their child’s best interest to designate Brandon the 

residential parent and legal custodian. The magistrate noted that she considered each of 

the “best interest” factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). The magistrate specifically stated 

the following in her decision: 

As stated above, each parent appears to be equally qualified to care for 

Liberty with one exception. Specifically, the Court must consider R.C. 

3109.04(F)(1)(f) which states: In determining the best interests of a 

child, the court shall consider the parent more likely to honor and 

facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and 

companionship rights. Several witnesses testified as to [Brandi’s] 

unwillingness to openly cooperate with visitation. In reaching this 

decision, the Magistrate relied on the testimony and report of the GAL 

and her independent investigation revealing that visitation was 

hampered greatly by the actions of [Brandi]. Moreover, the testimony 

and investigation revealed that [Brandon] did not have such issues and 

would be willing to permit and facilitate [Brandi’s] visitation with the 

child. Based upon the foregoing, the Magistrate concludes that if this 

child is to have a normal, healthy relationship with both of her parents, 

then placement with her father is in her best interests. 

(Decision, Apr. 12, 2010). 

{¶6} In accordance with the magistrate’s decision, Brandon was named residential 

parent and Brandi was given visitation. The order also provided for a more liberal 

visitation schedule as the parties agree. However, in the event that the parties could not 
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reach an understanding on visitation, Brandi would be given visitation in accordance with 

the local rules. Brandi was also ordered to pay child support. 

{¶7} Brandi retained counsel and subsequently filed objections to the magistrate’s 

decision, which were overruled by the trial court. On August 30, 2010, the trial court 

adopted and incorporated the magistrate’s April 12, 2010 Decision and journalized the 

decision as an order in its Judgment Entry. It is from this Judgment Entry that Brandi 

now appeals, asserting the following assignment of error. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

IN ALLOCATING PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

AND NAMING APPELLEE-FATHER OF THE MINOR CHILD AS 

THE RESIDENTIAL PARENT, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT’S 

[SIC] DISCRETION IN THAT IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL 

RELEVANT FACTORS AS MANDATED BY ORC § 3109.04(F), 

AND ACCORDINGLY, THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT 

MUST BE REVERSED. 

{¶8} In her sole assignment of error, Brandi argues that the trial court erred in 

adopting the magistrate’s decision because the magistrate failed to consider all the 

statutory factors when she concluded that naming Brandon the residential parent would 

be in their child’s best interest. Specifically, Brandi maintains that the magistrate only 

focused on one of these statutory factors and based her decision exclusively on that 

factor. 

{¶9} Custody determinations are some of the most difficult and agonizing 

decisions a trial court must make, therefore, a trial court must have wide latitude in its 
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consideration of the evidence. Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418, 1997-Ohio260, 674 N.E.2d 1159. When reviewing a ruling pertaining to the allocation of parental 

rights, the trial court is to be afforded great deference. Id. Thus, we will not reverse a 

child custody decision that is supported by a substantial amount of competent, credible 

evidence absent an abuse of discretion. Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 

syllabus, 550 N.E.2d 178. The reason for this standard of review is that the trial judge 

has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, 

something that does not translate well on the written page. Davis, 77 Ohio St.3d at 418. 

{¶10} Initially, we note that there is no presumption that either the mother or the 

father should become the residential parent; the parents stand on equal footing regarding 

the final allocation of parental rights and responsibilities. R.C. 3109.03; Bechtol, supra, 

at 24, 550 N.E.2d 178. In allocating custody, the trial court must determine what is in the 

“best interest” of the child. See R.C. 3109.04(B). To make this determination, the trial 

court must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to the statutory factors 

listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), which provide as follows: 

(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;

(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers .*.*.* regarding the 

wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities 

concerning the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the 

court; 
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(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, 

siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best 

interest; 

(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community; 

(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation; 

(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting 

time rights or visitation and companionship rights; 

(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments, 

including all arrearages, that are required of that parent pursuant to a child 

support order under which that parent is an obligor; 

(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent 

previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense 

involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected 

child * * *; 

(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared 

parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s 

right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court; 

(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to 

establish a residence, outside this state. 

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). 

{¶11} We acknowledge that Brandi’s primary contention with the magistrate’s 

decision is that the magistrate specifically focused on only one factor in deciding to name 

Brandon the residential parent and legal custodian of their child. However, we note that 

even though R.C. 3109.04(F) provides a list of factors for the trial court to consider in 

determining the best interest of the child, there is no requirement that the trial court set 
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out an analysis of each factor in its judgment entry, so long as the judgment entry is 

supported by a substantial amount of competent, credible evidence that the best interest 

of the child was considered. Bunten v. Bunten (1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 443, 447, citing 

Masitto v. Masitto (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 63. 

{¶12} Contrary to Brandi’s contention on appeal, the magistrate specifically stated 

that she “reviewed the ‘best interest’ factors specified in R.C. 3109.04 for a determination 

of residential parent.” (Decision, Apr. 12, 2010, p.3). The factor specifically discussed 

in the magistrate’s decision pertained to the consideration of the parent more likely to 

honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time or visitation rights. R.C. 

3109.04(F)(1)(f). In focusing on this particular factor, the magistrate acknowledged that 

“each party is a competent, attentive and capable parent to Liberty. Both parents have 

suitable homes, are capable of providing food and genuinely care and love their child.” 

(Decision, Apr. 12, 2010, p.2) However, based on the evidence adduced from the 

testimony at the final hearing, it became evident to the magistrate that Brandon would be 

the parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time and 

visitation. 

{¶13} Our review of the record reveals several instances which support the 

magistrate’s conclusion on this point. Shortly after Liberty was born, Brandon initiated 

these proceedings to be named residential parent, or in the alternative, to establish a 

shared parenting plan. Within the matter of weeks, Brandon filed a motion to establish 
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temporary visitation alleging that Brandi was preventing him from having visitation with 

their child as the parties previously agreed. Testimony at the hearing revealed that 

Brandi was cooperative with facilitating Brandon’s visitation so long as she was in 

control when it took place. However, after court proceedings were initiated, Brandi was 

less inclined to cooperate with Brandon. 

{¶14} In addition, after temporary visitation orders were in place, Brandi violated 

the temporary orders when she took Liberty out of town on Brandon’s scheduled 

weekend and denied him visitation. Several months later, Brandi eventually agreed to 

permit Brandon to make-up that weekend. However, there was testimony suggesting that 

Brandi only did so because she was under scrutiny as a result of these proceedings. To 

the contrary, Brandon had never denied Brandi visitation and testified that he would 

facilitate Brandi’s visitation in the future.

{¶15} It is evident from the testimony that both Brandon and Brandi are good, 

loving parents, who are both capable of adequately caring for Liberty. However, every 

witness at the final hearing testified to the substantial amount of tension that remained 

between the parties, which strained their ability to communicate effectively with one 

another. 

{¶16} In particular, the GAL testified that Brandi was very resistant to 

communicating with Brandon and letting him be involved in making decisions about 

Liberty’s medical care. Specifically, the testimony revealed that despite being court-
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ordered, Brandi refused to give Brandon access to Liberty’s medical records, which were 

password-protected. The GAL testified that she spoke with Brandi and explained that she 

needed to provide Brandon access to those records. After that conversation, Brandi 

removed the password restraint. However, Brandi arranged for the doctor’s office to call 

her immediately anytime Brandon schedules an appointment for their child. 

{¶17} The GAL stated that she explained to both parties on numerous occasions 

that they needed to put their differences aside and communicate with one another because 

it is in the best interest of their child. According to the testimony at the hearing, Brandon 

made several attempts to establish communication with Brandi. The GAL noted that in 

several meetings with the parties, Brandi refused to make eye-contact with Brandon, and 

was resistant to any type of communication with Brandon. The record demonstrates that 

eventually Brandi would only communicate with Brandon by writing him notes, which 

were delivered at the custody exchanges. It is based on these observations that the GAL 

recommended that Brandon be named the residential parent. 

{¶18} On appeal, Brandi argues that the magistrate failed to consider other 

important best interest factors such as the fact that Liberty has been living in Brandi’s 

household with her two other children from a prior relationship, and that Brandi has been 

the primary caretaker of Liberty for since her birth in May of 2009. As noted above, the 

magistrate’s decision indicated that she considered these factors and gave weight to them. 

The magistrate noted that both parties were equally qualified to care for Liberty with the 
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exception of one factor. It was Brandi’s blatant unwillingness to cooperate and 

communicate with Brandon that tipped the scales in Brandon’s favor. Brandi’s resistance 

to facilitating Brandon’s visitation with Liberty was not only attested to by many 

witnesses, but the GAL also documented several instances throughout the proceedings 

where Brandi repeatedly demonstrated her obstinance in allowing Brandon to have equal 

access to their child. The magistrate explicitly stated she “relied on the testimony and 

report of the GAL and her independent investigation revealing that [Brandon’s] visitation 

was hampered greatly” by Brandi’s actions. (Decision Apr. 12, 2010, p.3). 

{¶19} Accordingly, after reviewing the record before us, we find that the 

magistrate’s determination that it is in Liberty’s best interest to designate Brandon as the 

residential parent and legal custodian was supported by a substantial amount of 

competent, credible evidence. Therefore, we cannot find that the trial court abused its 

discretion in affirming the magistrate’s decision. 

{¶20} Brandi’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶21} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Hancock County Juvenile 

Court is affirmed. 

 Judgment Affirmed 

ROGERS, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur. 

/jlr