# Amtsblatt C 245/2011

| | ISSN 1725-2407
  doi:10.3000/17252407.C_2011.245.deu |
| --- | --- |
| Amtsblatt
  der Europäischen Union | C 245 |
| | |
| Ausgabe in deutscher Sprache | Mitteilungen und Bekanntmachungen | 54. Jahrgang24. August 2011 |

ISSN 1725-2407

doi:10.3000/17252407.C_2011.245.deu

Amtsblatt

der Europäischen Union

C 245

Ausgabe in deutscher Sprache

Mitteilungen und Bekanntmachungen

54. Jahrgang24. August 2011

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| Informationsnummer | Inhalt | Seite |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Mitteilungen |
| | MITTEILUNGEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION |
| | Europäische Kommission |
| 2011/C 245/01 | Keine Einwände gegen einen angemeldeten Zusammenschluss (Sache COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Informationsnummer

Inhalt

Seite

II   Mitteilungen

MITTEILUNGEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Europäische Kommission

2011/C 245/01

Keine Einwände gegen einen angemeldeten Zusammenschluss (Sache COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informationen |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATIONEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION |
| | Rat |
| 2011/C 245/02 | Mitteilung für die Personen und Organisationen, auf die restriktive Maßnahmen nach dem Beschluss 2011/273/GASP des Rates, durchgeführt durch den Durchführungsbeschluss 2011/515/GASP des Rates, und der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 442/2011 des Rates, durchgeführt durch die Durchführungsverordnung (EU) Nr. 843/2011 des Rates über restriktive Maßnahmen angesichts der Lage in Syrien, Anwendung finden | 2 |
| | Europäische Kommission |
| 2011/C 245/03 | Euro-Wechselkurs | 3 |
| | INFORMATIONEN DER MITGLIEDSTAATEN |
| 2011/C 245/04 | Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien | 4 |
| 2011/C 245/05 | Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien | 5 |
| 2011/C 245/06 | Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien | 6 |
| 2011/C 245/07 | Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien | 7 |

IV   Informationen

INFORMATIONEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Rat

2011/C 245/02

Mitteilung für die Personen und Organisationen, auf die restriktive Maßnahmen nach dem Beschluss 2011/273/GASP des Rates, durchgeführt durch den Durchführungsbeschluss 2011/515/GASP des Rates, und der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 442/2011 des Rates, durchgeführt durch die Durchführungsverordnung (EU) Nr. 843/2011 des Rates über restriktive Maßnahmen angesichts der Lage in Syrien, Anwendung finden

2

Europäische Kommission

2011/C 245/03

Euro-Wechselkurs

3

INFORMATIONEN DER MITGLIEDSTAATEN

2011/C 245/04

Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien

4

2011/C 245/05

Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien

5

2011/C 245/06

Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien

6

2011/C 245/07

Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien

7

| | V   Bekanntmachungen |
| --- | --- |
| | VERWALTUNGSVERFAHREN |
| | Europäische Kommission |
| 2011/C 245/08 | Aufforderungen zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen — Programm ESPON 2013 | 8 |
| | VERFAHREN BEZÜGLICH DER DURCHFÜHRUNG DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK |
| | Europäische Kommission |
| 2011/C 245/09 | Staatliche Beihilfe — Vereinigtes Königreich — Staatliche Beihilfe SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland (ex N 2/04) — Aufforderung zur Stellungnahme gemäß Artikel 108 Absatz 2 AEUV (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2011/C 245/10 | Staatliche Beihilfen — Deutschland (Artikel 107 bis 109 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union) — Staatliche Beihilfe MC 15/09 — Veräußerung der Deka-Anteile durch die LBBW (
  1
  ) | 21 |

V   Bekanntmachungen

VERWALTUNGSVERFAHREN

Europäische Kommission

2011/C 245/08

Aufforderungen zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen — Programm ESPON 2013

8

VERFAHREN BEZÜGLICH DER DURCHFÜHRUNG DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK

Europäische Kommission

2011/C 245/09

Staatliche Beihilfe — Vereinigtes Königreich — Staatliche Beihilfe SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) — Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland (ex N 2/04) — Aufforderung zur Stellungnahme gemäß Artikel 108 Absatz 2 AEUV (
  1
  )

1

10

2011/C 245/10

Staatliche Beihilfen — Deutschland (Artikel 107 bis 109 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union) — Staatliche Beihilfe MC 15/09 — Veräußerung der Deka-Anteile durch die LBBW (
  1
  )

1

21

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| | (1)   Text von Bedeutung für den EWR |

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(1)   Text von Bedeutung für den EWR

1

| DE | |
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DE

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II Mitteilungen

MITTEILUNGEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Europäische Kommission

| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/1

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Keine Einwände gegen einen angemeldeten Zusammenschluss

(Sache COMP/M.6298 — Schneider Electric/Telvent)

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

2011/C 245/01

Am 9. August 2011 hat die Kommission nach Artikel 6 Absatz 1 Buchstabe b der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 139/2004 des Rates entschieden, keine Einwände gegen den obengenannten angemeldeten Zusammenschluss zu erheben und ihn für mit dem Gemeinsamen Markt vereinbar zu erklären. Der vollständige Wortlaut der Entscheidung ist nur auf Englisch verfügbar und wird in einer um etwaige Geschäftsgeheimnisse bereinigten Fassung auf den folgenden beiden EU-Websites veröffentlicht:

| — | Website der GD Wettbewerb zur Fusionskontrolle (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Auf dieser Website können Fusionsentscheidungen anhand verschiedener Angaben wie Unternehmensname, Nummer der Sache, Datum der Entscheidung oder Wirtschaftszweig abgerufen werden, |
| --- | --- |

—

Website der GD Wettbewerb zur Fusionskontrolle (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Auf dieser Website können Fusionsentscheidungen anhand verschiedener Angaben wie Unternehmensname, Nummer der Sache, Datum der Entscheidung oder Wirtschaftszweig abgerufen werden,

| — | der Website EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). Hier kann diese Entscheidung anhand der Celex-Nummer 32011M6298 abgerufen werden. EUR-Lex ist das Internetportal zum Gemeinschaftsrecht. |
| --- | --- |

—

der Website EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm). Hier kann diese Entscheidung anhand der Celex-Nummer 32011M6298 abgerufen werden. EUR-Lex ist das Internetportal zum Gemeinschaftsrecht.

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IV Informationen

INFORMATIONEN DER ORGANE, EINRICHTUNGEN UND SONSTIGEN STELLEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Rat

| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/2

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Mitteilung für die Personen und Organisationen, auf die restriktive Maßnahmen nach dem Beschluss 2011/273/GASP des Rates, durchgeführt durch den Durchführungsbeschluss 2011/515/GASP des Rates, und der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 442/2011 des Rates, durchgeführt durch die Durchführungsverordnung (EU) Nr. 843/2011 des Rates über restriktive Maßnahmen angesichts der Lage in Syrien, Anwendung finden

2011/C 245/02

RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION

Den im Anhang des Beschlusses 2011/273/GASP des Rates, durchgeführt durch den Durchführungsbeschluss 2011/515/GASP (1) des Rates, und in Anhang II der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 442/2011 des Rates, durchgeführt durch die Durchführungsverordnung (EU) Nr. 843/2011 (2) des Rates, über restriktive Maßnahmen angesichts der Lage in Syrien aufgeführten Personen und Organisationen wird Folgendes mitgeteilt.

Der Rat der Europäischen Union hat beschlossen, dass die in den genannten Anhängen aufgeführten Personen in die Liste der Personen und Organisationen aufzunehmen sind, auf die die in dem Beschluss 2011/273/GASP und der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 442/2011 über restriktive Maßnahmen gegen Syrien festgelegten restriktiven Maßnahmen Anwendung finden. Die Gründe für die Aufnahme dieser Personen und Organisationen sind in den jeweiligen Einträgen in den genannten Anhängen aufgeführt.

Die betroffenen Personen und Organisationen werden darauf hingewiesen, dass sie bei den zuständigen Behörden der betreffenden Mitgliedstaaten (siehe Websites in Anhang III der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 442/2011) beantragen können, dass ihnen die Verwendung eingefrorener Gelder zur Deckung ihrer Grundbedürfnisse oder für bestimmte Zahlungen genehmigt wird (vgl. Artikel 6 der Verordnung).

Die betroffenen Personen und Organisationen können beim Rat unter Vorlage von entsprechenden Nachweisen beantragen, dass der Beschluss, sie in die genannte Liste aufzunehmen, überprüft wird; entsprechende Anträge sind an folgende Anschrift zu richten:

| Rat der Europäischen Union |
| --- |
| Generalsekretariat |
| GD K Referat Koordinierung |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Rat der Europäischen Union

Generalsekretariat

GD K Referat Koordinierung

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Die betroffenen Personen und Organisationen werden ferner darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass sie den Beschluss des Rates unter den in Artikel 275 Absatz 2 und Artikel 263 Absätze 4 und 6 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union genannten Voraussetzungen vor dem Gericht der Europäischen Union anfechten können.

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(1)  ABl. L 218 vom 24.8.2011.

(2)  ABl. L 218 vom 24.8.2011, S. 1.

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Europäische Kommission

| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/3

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Euro-Wechselkurs (1)

23. August 2011

2011/C 245/03

1 Euro =

| | Währung | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-Dollar | 1,4462 |
| JPY | Japanischer Yen | 110,72 |
| DKK | Dänische Krone | 7,4498 |
| GBP | Pfund Sterling | 0,87600 |
| SEK | Schwedische Krone | 9,1046 |
| CHF | Schweizer Franken | 1,1410 |
| ISK | Isländische Krone | |
| NOK | Norwegische Krone | 7,8080 |
| BGN | Bulgarischer Lew | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tschechische Krone | 24,417 |
| HUF | Ungarischer Forint | 271,78 |
| LTL | Litauischer Litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lettischer Lat | 0,7095 |
| PLN | Polnischer Zloty | 4,1499 |
| RON | Rumänischer Leu | 4,2574 |
| TRY | Türkische Lira | 2,5783 |
| AUD | Australischer Dollar | 1,3771 |
| CAD | Kanadischer Dollar | 1,4260 |
| HKD | Hongkong-Dollar | 11,2766 |
| NZD | Neuseeländischer Dollar | 1,7360 |
| SGD | Singapur-Dollar | 1,7414 |
| KRW | Südkoreanischer Won | 1 558,38 |
| ZAR | Südafrikanischer Rand | 10,3816 |
| CNY | Chinesischer Renminbi Yuan | 9,2513 |
| HRK | Kroatische Kuna | 7,4740 |
| IDR | Indonesische Rupiah | 12 355,53 |
| MYR | Malaysischer Ringgit | 4,2894 |
| PHP | Philippinischer Peso | 61,206 |
| RUB | Russischer Rubel | 41,8255 |
| THB | Thailändischer Baht | 43,140 |
| BRL | Brasilianischer Real | 2,3111 |
| MXN | Mexikanischer Peso | 17,7768 |
| INR | Indische Rupie | 65,9830 |

Währung

Kurs

USD

US-Dollar

1,4462

JPY

Japanischer Yen

110,72

DKK

Dänische Krone

7,4498

GBP

Pfund Sterling

0,87600

SEK

Schwedische Krone

9,1046

CHF

Schweizer Franken

1,1410

ISK

Isländische Krone

NOK

Norwegische Krone

7,8080

BGN

Bulgarischer Lew

1,9558

CZK

Tschechische Krone

24,417

HUF

Ungarischer Forint

271,78

LTL

Litauischer Litas

3,4528

LVL

Lettischer Lat

0,7095

PLN

Polnischer Zloty

4,1499

RON

Rumänischer Leu

4,2574

TRY

Türkische Lira

2,5783

AUD

Australischer Dollar

1,3771

CAD

Kanadischer Dollar

1,4260

HKD

Hongkong-Dollar

11,2766

NZD

Neuseeländischer Dollar

1,7360

SGD

Singapur-Dollar

1,7414

KRW

Südkoreanischer Won

1 558,38

ZAR

Südafrikanischer Rand

10,3816

CNY

Chinesischer Renminbi Yuan

9,2513

HRK

Kroatische Kuna

7,4740

IDR

Indonesische Rupiah

12 355,53

MYR

Malaysischer Ringgit

4,2894

PHP

Philippinischer Peso

61,206

RUB

Russischer Rubel

41,8255

THB

Thailändischer Baht

43,140

BRL

Brasilianischer Real

2,3111

MXN

Mexikanischer Peso

17,7768

INR

Indische Rupie

65,9830

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(1)  Quelle: Von der Europäischen Zentralbank veröffentlichter Referenz-Wechselkurs.

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INFORMATIONEN DER MITGLIEDSTAATEN

| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/4

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Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien

2011/C 245/04

Gemäß Artikel 35 Absatz 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1224/2009 des Rates vom 20. November 2009 zur Einführung einer gemeinschaftlichen Kontrollregelung zur Sicherstellung der Einhaltung der Vorschriften der gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik (1) wurde beschlossen, die Fischerei wie nachstehend beschrieben zu schließen:

| Zeitpunkt und Uhrzeit der Schließung | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Dauer | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Mitgliedstaat | Niederlande |
| Bestand oder Bestandsgruppe | HKE/571214 |
| Art | Seehecht (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Gebiet | VI und VII; Vb (EU- und internationale Gewässer); XII und XIV (internationale Gewässer) |
| Typ des betreffenden Fischereifahrzeugs | — |
| Referenznummer | — |

Zeitpunkt und Uhrzeit der Schließung

18.7.2011

Dauer

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

Mitgliedstaat

Niederlande

Bestand oder Bestandsgruppe

HKE/571214

Art

Seehecht (Merluccius merluccius)

Gebiet

VI und VII; Vb (EU- und internationale Gewässer); XII und XIV (internationale Gewässer)

Typ des betreffenden Fischereifahrzeugs

—

Referenznummer

—

Weblink zu dem Beschluss des Mitgliedstaats:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_de.htm

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(1)  ABl. L 343 vom 22.12.2009, S. 1.

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| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/5

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Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien

2011/C 245/05

Gemäß Artikel 35 Absatz 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1224/2009 des Rates vom 20. November 2009 zur Einführung einer gemeinschaftlichen Kontrollregelung zur Sicherstellung der Einhaltung der Vorschriften der gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik (1) wurde beschlossen, die Fischerei wie nachstehend beschrieben zu schließen:

| Zeitpunkt und Uhrzeit der Schließung | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Dauer | 18.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Mitgliedstaat | Niederlande |
| Bestand oder Bestandsgruppe | HKE/2AC4-C |
| Art | Seehecht (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Gebiet | IIa und IV (EU-Gewässer) |
| Typ des betreffenden Fischereifahrzeugs | — |
| Referenznummer | — |

Zeitpunkt und Uhrzeit der Schließung

18.7.2011

Dauer

18.7.2011-31.12.2011

Mitgliedstaat

Niederlande

Bestand oder Bestandsgruppe

HKE/2AC4-C

Art

Seehecht (Merluccius merluccius)

Gebiet

IIa und IV (EU-Gewässer)

Typ des betreffenden Fischereifahrzeugs

—

Referenznummer

—

Weblink zu dem Beschluss des Mitgliedstaats:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_de.htm

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(1)  ABl. L 343 vom 22.12.2009, S. 1.

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| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/6

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Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien

2011/C 245/06

Gemäß Artikel 35 Absatz 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1224/2009 des Rates vom 20. November 2009 zur Einführung einer gemeinschaftlichen Kontrollregelung zur Sicherstellung der Einhaltung der Vorschriften der gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik (1) wurde beschlossen, die Fischerei wie nachstehend beschrieben zu schließen:

| Zeitpunkt und Uhrzeit der Schließung | 9.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Dauer | 9.7.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Mitgliedstaat | Frankreich |
| Bestand oder Bestandsgruppe | COD/5BE6A |
| Art | Kabeljau (Gadus morhua) |
| Gebiet | VIa; Vb (EU-Gewässer und internationale Gewässer östlich von 12° 00′ W) |
| Typ des betreffenden Fischereifahrzeugs | — |
| Referenznummer | 792761 |

Zeitpunkt und Uhrzeit der Schließung

9.7.2011

Dauer

9.7.2011-31.12.2011

Mitgliedstaat

Frankreich

Bestand oder Bestandsgruppe

COD/5BE6A

Art

Kabeljau (Gadus morhua)

Gebiet

VIa; Vb (EU-Gewässer und internationale Gewässer östlich von 12° 00′ W)

Typ des betreffenden Fischereifahrzeugs

—

Referenznummer

792761

Weblink zu dem Beschluss des Mitgliedstaats:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_de.htm

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(1)  ABl. L 343 vom 22.12.2009, S. 1.

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| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/7

---

Angaben der Mitgliedstaaten zur Schließung von Fischereien

2011/C 245/07

Gemäß Artikel 35 Absatz 3 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1224/2009 des Rates vom 20. November 2009 zur Einführung einer gemeinschaftlichen Kontrollregelung zur Sicherstellung der Einhaltung der Vorschriften der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik (1) wurde beschlossen, die Fischerei wie nachstehend beschrieben zu schließen:

| Zeitpunkt und Uhrzeit der Schließung | 2.8.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Dauer | 2.8.2011-31.12.2011 |
| Mitgliedstaat | Portugal |
| Bestand oder Bestandsgruppe | WHB/8C3411 |
| Art | Blauer Wittling (Micromesistius poutassou) |
| Gebiet | VIIIc, IX und X; CECAF 34.1.1 (EU-Gewässer) |
| Typ des betreffenden Fischereifahrzeugs | — |
| Referenznummer | — |

Zeitpunkt und Uhrzeit der Schließung

2.8.2011

Dauer

2.8.2011-31.12.2011

Mitgliedstaat

Portugal

Bestand oder Bestandsgruppe

WHB/8C3411

Art

Blauer Wittling (Micromesistius poutassou)

Gebiet

VIIIc, IX und X; CECAF 34.1.1 (EU-Gewässer)

Typ des betreffenden Fischereifahrzeugs

—

Referenznummer

—

Weblink zu dem Beschluss des Mitgliedstaats:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_de.htm

---

(1)  ABl. L 343 vom 22.12.2009, S. 1.

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V Bekanntmachungen

VERWALTUNGSVERFAHREN

Europäische Kommission

| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/8

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Aufforderungen zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen — Programm ESPON 2013

2011/C 245/08

ESPON ist das Europäische Beobachtungsnetz für die territoriale Entwicklung und den territorialen Zusammenhalt. Es dient der Unterstützung der EU-Kohäsionspolitik und wird gemeinsam vom Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung im Rahmen des Ziels 3 — Europäische territoriale Zusammenarbeit — und 31 Ländern (den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten sowie Island, Liechtenstein, Norwegen und der Schweiz) finanziert.

Im Rahmen des Programms ESPON 2013 laufen derzeit Aufforderungen zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen. Teilnehmen können öffentliche und private Stellen aus 31 Ländern (nämlich aus den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten, Island, Liechtenstein, Norwegen und der Schweiz). Die Aufforderung richtet sich an Forscher und Forschungseinrichtungen, Universitäten, Wissenschaftler, Sachverständige und Hochschulteams. Die Aufforderung bezüglich der transnationalen Networking-Aktivitäten ist den Einrichtungen vorbehalten, die als nationale ESPON-Kontaktstellen fungieren.

| 1. | Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen für angewandte Forschungsprojekte:






  — | Europäische Nachbarregionen (Budget: 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen für angewandte Forschungsprojekte:

—

Europäische Nachbarregionen (Budget: 750 000 EUR)

| — | Kleine und mittlere Städte und ihre Funktion im territorialen Kontext (Budget: 650 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Kleine und mittlere Städte und ihre Funktion im territorialen Kontext (Budget: 650 000 EUR)

| — | Die territoriale Dimension von Armut und sozialer Ausgrenzung in Europa (Budget: 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Die territoriale Dimension von Armut und sozialer Ausgrenzung in Europa (Budget: 750 000 EUR)

| — | Wirtschaftskrisen: Widerstandsfähigkeit der Regionen (Budget: 759 153 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Wirtschaftskrisen: Widerstandsfähigkeit der Regionen (Budget: 759 153 EUR)

| 2. | Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen für zielgerichtete Analysen auf Grundlage von Interessenbekundungen der Akteure:






  — | Wachstumszentren in Südosteuropa (Budget: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen für zielgerichtete Analysen auf Grundlage von Interessenbekundungen der Akteure:

—

Wachstumszentren in Südosteuropa (Budget: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Schlüsselindikatoren für territorialen Zusammenhalt und Raumplanung (Budget: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Schlüsselindikatoren für territorialen Zusammenhalt und Raumplanung (Budget: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Bewohnbare Landschaften für eine nachhaltige territoriale Entwicklung (Budget: 379 796,09 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Bewohnbare Landschaften für eine nachhaltige territoriale Entwicklung (Budget: 379 796,09 EUR)

| — | Landschaftspolitik für den Drei-Länder-Park (Budget: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Landschaftspolitik für den Drei-Länder-Park (Budget: 360 000 EUR)

| — | Nordsee: Verbreitung transnationaler Ergebnisse (Budget: 340 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Nordsee: Verbreitung transnationaler Ergebnisse (Budget: 340 000 EUR)

Die oben genannten Themen für die zielgerichteten Analysen werden unter dem Vorbehalt in die Aufforderung aufgenommen, dass ein Abkommen mit den die Projektideen tragenden Akteuren geschlossen wird. Die Themen werden daher erst an dem Tag bestätigt, an dem die Aufforderung offiziell bekannt gegeben wird, also am 24. August 2011. Die endgültigen Themen der Aufforderung werden auf der ESPON-Website (http://www.espon.eu) veröffentlicht.

| 3. | Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen innerhalb der wissenschaftlichen ESPON-Plattform:






  — | Territoriales Überwachungs- und Berichtssystem der EU (Budget: 598 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen innerhalb der wissenschaftlichen ESPON-Plattform:

—

Territoriales Überwachungs- und Berichtssystem der EU (Budget: 598 000 EUR)

| — | ESPON-Atlas der territorialen Strukturen und Dynamiken in Europa (Budget: 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

ESPON-Atlas der territorialen Strukturen und Dynamiken in Europa (Budget: 150 000 EUR)

| — | Erkennung territorialer Potenziale und Herausforderungen (Budget: 350 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Erkennung territorialer Potenziale und Herausforderungen (Budget: 350 000 EUR)

| — | Territoriale Beleg-Mappe für ERDF-Programme (Budget: 500 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Territoriale Beleg-Mappe für ERDF-Programme (Budget: 500 000 EUR)

| — | ESPON-Online-Kartierungstool (Budget: 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

ESPON-Online-Kartierungstool (Budget: 150 000 EUR)

| — | Territoriale Überwachung einer europäischen Makroregion — Test im Ostseeraum (Budget: 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Territoriale Überwachung einer europäischen Makroregion — Test im Ostseeraum (Budget: 360 000 EUR)

| 4. | Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen für transnationale Networking-Aktivitäten des ESPON-Kontaktstellennetzes:






  — | Nutzbarmachung auf transnationaler Ebene durch das ESPON-Kontaktstellennetz (Budget: 600 227 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen für transnationale Networking-Aktivitäten des ESPON-Kontaktstellennetzes:

—

Nutzbarmachung auf transnationaler Ebene durch das ESPON-Kontaktstellennetz (Budget: 600 227 EUR)

Die Frist für die Einreichung von Vorschlägen endet am 20. Oktober 2011.

Am 13. September 2011 findet in Brüssel ein Informationstag mit Partnercafé für potenziell Begünstigte statt.

Alle Unterlagen zu den Aufforderungen — wie Bewerbungsverfahren, Förderkriterien, Bewertungskriterien und Antragsformular — finden Sie auf der ESPON-Website (http://www.espon.eu).

---

VERFAHREN BEZÜGLICH DER DURCHFÜHRUNG DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK

Europäische Kommission

| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/10

---

STAATLICHE BEIHILFE — VEREINIGTES KÖNIGREICH

Staatliche Beihilfe SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10)

Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland (ex N 2/04)

Aufforderung zur Stellungnahme gemäß Artikel 108 Absatz 2 AEUV

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

2011/C 245/09

Mit Schreiben vom 13. Juli 2011, das nachstehend in der verbindlichen Sprachfassung abgedruckt ist, hat die Kommission das Vereinigte Königreich von ihrem Beschluss in Kenntnis gesetzt, wegen der genannten Maßnahme das Verfahren nach Artikel 108 Absatz 2 AEUV zu eröffnen. Die Kommission hat das Vereinigte Königreich ferner nach Artikel 11 Absatz 1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 659/1999 aufgefordert, zu der von der Kommission geplanten Eröffnung des förmlichen Prüfverfahrens Stellung zu nehmen.

Alle Beteiligten können innerhalb eines Monats nach Veröffentlichung dieser Zusammenfassung und des Schreibens zu der Maßnahme Stellung nehmen. Die Stellungnahmen sind an folgende Anschrift zu richten:

| Europäische Kommission |
| --- |
| Generaldirektion Wettbewerb |
| Registratur Staatliche Beihilfen |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22951242 |

Europäische Kommission

Generaldirektion Wettbewerb

Registratur Staatliche Beihilfen

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22951242

Diese Stellungnahmen werden an das Vereinigte Königreich weitergeleitet. Beteiligte, die eine Stellungnahme abgeben, können unter Angabe von Gründen schriftlich beantragen, dass ihre Identität nicht bekannt gegeben wird.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

VERFAHREN

Mit Schreiben vom 5. Januar 2004, das am 9. Januar 2004 registriert wurde, meldete das Vereinigte Königreich eine Maßnahme zur Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland an. Die Maßnahme wurde als Änderung der ursprünglichen Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland (schrittweise Einführung der Abgabe) angemeldet, die von der Kommission mit der Entscheidung in der Sache N 863/01 genehmigt worden war. Am 7. Mai 2004 entschied die Kommission, keine Einwände gegen die Maßnahme zu erheben. Am 30. August 2004 erhoben die British Aggregates Association Healy, Bros. Ltd und David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd (im Folgenden „die Kläger“) Klage (registriert unter der Nummer T-359/04) gegen die vorstehend genannte Genehmigungsentscheidung der Kommission.

Am 9. September 2010 erklärte das Gericht die vorstehend genannte Kommissionsentscheidung für nichtig. Laut dem Urteil des Gerichts konnte die Kommission die Entscheidung, keine Einwände gegen die angemeldete Maßnahme zu erheben, nicht rechtmäßig erlassen, da sie die Frage einer etwaigen abgaberechtlichen Diskriminierung zwischen den fraglichen einheimischen Erzeugnissen und den aus Irland eingeführten Erzeugnissen nicht geprüft hatte. Die Kommission focht dieses Urteil nicht an.

Die britische Regierung setzte die Anwendung der Maßnahme ab dem 1. Dezember 2010 aus, indem sie die Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (Bestimmungen über die Granulatabgabe von 2004 (Steuergutschriften für Nordirland) aufhob.

BESCHREIBUNG DER MASSNAHME

Die 80 %ige Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe galt für Virgin-Granulat, das in Nordirland abgebaut und dort gewerblich genutzt wurde, sowie für in Nordirland gewerblich genutzte Verarbeitungserzeugnisse aus dort abgebautem Granulat.

Bei der Granulatabgabe handelt es sich um eine Umweltabgabe für die gewerbliche Nutzung von Granulat. Sie gilt für Fels, Kies und Sand. Sie wurde im Vereinigten Königreich mit Wirkung vom 1. April 2002 aus Umweltschutzgründen eingeführt, um die Nutzung von aufbereitetem Aggregat und anderen Alternativen zu Virgin-Granulat zu maximieren und die effiziente Verwendung von Virgin-Granulat, das ein nicht erneuerbarer natürlicher Rohstoff ist, zu fördern.

Um die angestrebten Umweltziele, die nicht durch die Granulatabgabe verwirklicht wurden, tatsächlich erreichen zu können, knüpfte die britische Regierung die Befreiung an die Bedingung, dass sich die Unternehmen, die davon profitieren wollten, förmlich verpflichteten und die mit der Regierung des Vereinigten Königreichs ausgehandelten Vereinbarungen einhielten, aufgrund deren sie während der Dauer der Befreiung an einem Programm zur Umweltbilanzverbesserung teilnehmen müssten.

BEIHILFERECHTLICHE WÜRDIGUNG

Angesichts des Urteils des Gerichts prüfte die Kommission zunächst, ob ein innerer Zusammenhang zwischen der eigentlichen Beihilfe in Form einer Steuerermäßigung und der abgaberechtlichen Diskriminierung eingeführter Erzeugnisse besteht. Da ein solcher Zusammenhang im vorliegenden Fall festgestellt wurde, musste die Kommission prüfen, ob die Beihilfemaßnahme eine gegen Artikel 110 AEUV (Ex-Artikel 90 EG-Vertrag) verstoßende diskriminierende inländische Abgabe umfasste. Die Kommission verweist in erster Linie auf die Rechtsprechung im Hinblick auf nationale Rechtsvorschriften, die Steuervorteile für einheimische Erzeugnisse vorsehen, wenn diese unter Einhaltung bestimmter Umweltstandards erzeugt werden. Solche inländischen Besteuerungen sind nicht mit Artikel 110 AEUV vereinbar, wenn der Vorteil nicht auf eingeführte Erzeugnisse ausgeweitet wird, die nach denselben Standards produziert werden. Da dies nicht auf die Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland zutraf, hat die Kommission Zweifel, ob die geänderte Maßnahme zur Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland mit dem AEUV und insbesondere Artikel 110 AEUV vereinbar ist.

Aufgrund dieser Zweifel an der Vereinbarkeit mit Artikel 110 AEUV kann die Kommission die Maßnahme zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht für mit dem Binnenmarkt vereinbar erklären. Mit Blick auf diese Zweifel hinsichtlich der Vereinbarkeit der Maßnahme mit den Beihilfevorschriften prüfte die Kommission die in Rede stehende Maßnahme auf der Grundlage der Leitlinien für Umweltschutzbeihilfen und insbesondere den darin enthaltenen Bestimmungen zu Beihilfen in Form von Umweltsteuerermäßigungen und -befreiungen. Da die nach der geänderten Maßnahme zur Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland gewährten Beihilfen rechtswidrig waren, weil das Gericht die Grundlage der Vereinbarkeitsprüfung für nichtig erklärt hatte, prüfte die Kommission die in Rede stehende Maßnahme nach den Leitlinien für Umweltschutzbeihilfen von 2001 bzw. den am 2. April 2008 in Kraft getretenen Leitlinien für Umweltschutzbeihilfen von 2008.

Insbesondere bei der Prüfung nach den Leitlinien von 2001 kam die Kommission zu dem Schluss, dass die dort aufgeführten Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind; sie wies jedoch erneut darauf hin, dass sie die Maßnahme aufgrund ihrer Zweifel hinsichtlich der Vereinbarkeit mit Artikel 110 AEUV zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht für mit dem Binnenmarkt vereinbar erklären kann.

Im Rahmen der Prüfung auf der Grundlage der Leitlinien von 2008 zog die Kommission die vorläufige Schlussfolgerung, dass sie Zweifel hat, ob das Kriterium der Notwendigkeit erfüllt ist und insbesondere, ob der erhebliche Anstieg der Produktionskosten nicht ohne deutliche Absatzeinbußen an die Endkunden weitergegeben werden kann. Die Kommission stellt in diesem Zusammenhang fest, dass die vom Vereinigten Königreich übermittelten Angaben zwar belegen, dass die Granulatabgabe zu einem beträchtlichen Anstieg der Produktionskosten führt, der normalerweise wahrscheinlich nicht ohne deutliche Absatzeinbußen weitergegeben werden könnte, die Kommission mangels genauer Informationen zu diesem Zeitpunkt jedoch nicht den Schluss ziehen kann, dass dieses Kriterium für die Vereinbarkeit der Maßnahme mit dem Binnenmarkt erfüllt ist.

Auf der Grundlage der vorstehenden Analyse hat die Kommission daher Zweifel, dass die Maßnahme zur Befreiung von der Granulatabgabe in Nordirland (ex N 2/04) mit dem AEUV im Einklang steht und mit dem Binnenmarkt vereinbar ist. Im Einklang mit Artikel 4 Absatz 4 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 659/1999 hat die Kommission beschlossen, das förmliche Prüfverfahren zu eröffnen und fordert Beteiligte zur Stellungnahme auf.

WORTLAUT DES SCHREIBENS

„The Commission wishes to inform the UK authorities that, having examined the information supplied by them on the aid referred to above, it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

1.   PROCEDURE

| 1. | The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004.

| 2. | The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2).

| 3. | On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3).

| 4. | On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04). |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04).

| 5. | On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment.

| 6. | On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959). |
| --- | --- |

6.

On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959).

| 7. | The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The aggregates levy

| 8. | The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity.

| 9. | The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom.

2.2.   The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 10. | In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products. |
| --- | --- |

10.

In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products.

2.3.   The modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 11. | The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there.

2.3.1.   Background

| 12. | The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development.

| 13. | According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded. |
| --- | --- |

13.

According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded.

| 14. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent.

2.3.2.   Modification

| 15. | In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8). |
| --- | --- |

15.

In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8).

| 16. | The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9).

2.3.3.   Environmental agreements

| 17. | In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief. |
| --- | --- |

17.

In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief.

| 18. | The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:






  (a) | the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:

(a)

the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and

| (b) | the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter.

| 19. | Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

19.

Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management.

| 20. | The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings.

2.3.4.   Aggregates production costs, selling price and price elasticity of demand

| 21. | As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

  Table 1


  Selling price







  Type of rock | Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Basalt | 4,21 |
| Sandstone | 4,37 |
| Limestone | 3,72 |
| Sand and gravel | 4,80 |
| Other | 5,57 |
| Weighted average price | 4,42 |

21.

As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

Table 1

Selling price

Type of rock

Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne)

Basalt

4,21

Sandstone

4,37

Limestone

3,72

Sand and gravel

4,80

Other

5,57

Weighted average price

4,42

| 22. | As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

  Table 2 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,5 | 3,4 | 3,9 | 3,6 | 4,3 | 4,3 |
| GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 7,9 | 8,4 | 9,0 | 7,7 | 8,8 | 9,7 | 9,2 | 10,9 |

22.

As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

Table 2

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne

2,9

3,1

3,5

3,4

3,9

3,6

4,3

4,3

GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne

7,9

8,4

9,0

7,7

8,8

9,7

9,2

10,9

| 23. | As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic. |
| --- | --- |

23.

As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic.

2.3.5.   Pass-on and sales reductions

| 24. | As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain. |
| --- | --- |

24.

As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain.

| 25. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

  Table 3


  A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland











  Product | 2000-2001
  (million tonnes) | 2001-2002
  (million tonnes) | 2002-2003
  (million tonnes) | Fall,
  2001-2003
  (%) | Fall,
  2002-2003
  (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sand and gravel | 2,35 | 2,34 | 1,91 | –18,7 | –8,4 |
| Crushed rock | 7,86 | 7,88 | 7,27 | –7,5 | –7,7 |
| Fill material | 3,00 | 3,89 | 1,71 | –43,0 | –56,0 |
| Total | 13,21 | 14,11 | 10,89 | –17,6 | –22,8 |

25.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

Table 3

A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland

Product

2000-2001

(million tonnes)

2001-2002

(million tonnes)

2002-2003

(million tonnes)

Fall,

2001-2003

(%)

Fall,

2002-2003

(%)

Sand and gravel

2,35

2,34

1,91

–18,7

–8,4

Crushed rock

7,86

7,88

7,27

–7,5

–7,7

Fill material

3,00

3,89

1,71

–43,0

–56,0

Total

13,21

14,11

10,89

–17,6

–22,8

| 26. | The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state.

| 27. | As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers. |
| --- | --- |

27.

As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers.

2.3.6.   Other information

| 28. | The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011). |
| --- | --- |

28.

The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011).

| 29. | As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible. |
| --- | --- |

29.

As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible.

| 30. | The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.

2.4.   Position of third parties, appreciable positive effects

| 31. | In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue. |
| --- | --- |

31.

In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue.

| 32. | The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects. |
| --- | --- |

32.

The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects.

| 33. | As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock. |
| --- | --- |

33.

As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock.

| 34. | As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates. |
| --- | --- |

34.

As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates.

| 35. | With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003. |
| --- | --- |

35.

With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003.

| 36. | Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility.

3.   ASSESSMENT

3.1.   State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC)
   (13)

| 37. | State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

37.

State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| 38. | The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

38.

The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States.

| 39. | Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC). |
| --- | --- |

39.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC).

3.2.   Lawfulness of the aid

| 40. | Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15). |
| --- | --- |

40.

Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15).

3.3.   Compatibility of the aid

| 41. | It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16). |
| --- | --- |

41.

It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16).

| 42. | Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17). |
| --- | --- |

42.

Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17).

| 43. | The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

43.

The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States.

| 44. | As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated. |
| --- | --- |

44.

As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated.

| 45. | Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products.

| 46. | Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20). |
| --- | --- |

46.

Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20).

3.3.1.   Compliance with Article 110 of the TFEU

| 47. | According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

47.

According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU.

| 48. | According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect. |
| --- | --- |

48.

According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect.

| 49. | Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements.

| 50. | Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate.

| 51. | Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements.

| 52. | Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21). |
| --- | --- |

52.

Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21).

| 53. | Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment.

| 54. | Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage.

3.3.2.   Compatibility of the measure under the Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 55. | Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection.

| 56. | The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful). |
| --- | --- |

56.

The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful).

| 57. | Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:






  (a) | the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

57.

Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:

(a)

the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and

| (b) | the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008.

Ad (a) Compatibility of the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 58. | Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions. |
| --- | --- |

58.

Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions.

| 59. | The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax. |
| --- | --- |

59.

The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax.

| 60. | Point 51(2) provides that:
  “The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:






  (a) | the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection; |
| --- | --- | --- |

60.

Point 51(2) provides that:

“The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:

(a)

the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection;

| (b) | the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”.

| 61. | Point 51(1) provides that:
  “These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:






  1. | When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:






  (a) | these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.
  These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

61.

Point 51(1) provides that:

“These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:

1.

When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:

(a)

these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.

These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above;

| (b) | these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:






  — | where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:

—

where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection,

| — | where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”. |
| --- | --- |

—

where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”.

| 62. | With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)). |
| --- | --- |

62.

With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)).

| 63. | Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market.

| 64. | The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence). |
| --- | --- |

64.

The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence).

| 65. | In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

65.

In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled.

| 66. | In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent). |
| --- | --- |

66.

In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent).

| 67. | In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25). |
| --- | --- |

67.

In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25).

| 68. | For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

68.

For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage.

Ad (b) Compatibility of the measure under the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 69. | Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159). |
| --- | --- |

69.

Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159).

| 70. | As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes. |
| --- | --- |

70.

As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes.

Environmental benefit

| 71. | Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued. |
| --- | --- |

71.

Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued.

| 72. | As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials. |
| --- | --- |

72.

As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials.

| 73. | Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL.

Necessity of the aid

| 74. | According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

74.

According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary.

(1)   Objective and transparent criteria

| 75. | Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 76. | The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent. |
| --- | --- |

76.

The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent.

(2)   Substantial increase in production costs

| 77. | Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 78. | The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26). |
| --- | --- |

78.

The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26).

| 79. | Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

(3)   Impossibility to pass on the substantial increase in production costs

| 80. | Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned. |
| --- | --- |

80.

Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned.

| 81. | The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland. |
| --- | --- |

81.

The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland.

| 82. | The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased. |
| --- | --- |

82.

The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased.

| 83. | Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007. |
| --- | --- |

83.

Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007.

| 84. | In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided. |
| --- | --- |

84.

In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided.

| 85. | With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided. |
| --- | --- |

85.

With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided.

| 86. | Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers.

| 87. | Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

87.

Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met.

Proportionality of the aid

| 88. | With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:






  (a) | it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

88.

With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:

(a)

it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers;

| (b) | it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified;

| (c) | it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied.

| 89. | The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax. |
| --- | --- |

89.

The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax.

3.4.   Conclusions

| 90. | On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

90.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market.

| 91. | The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158. |
| --- | --- |

91.

The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158.

| 92. | Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision. |
| --- | --- |

92.

Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision.

4.   DECISION

| 93. | In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

93.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| 94. | The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

94.

The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

| 95. | The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.“ |
| --- | --- |

95.

The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.“

---

(1)  The phased introduction of the AGL.

1

(2)  OJ C 133, 5.6.2002, p.11.

2

(3)  OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 4.

3

(4)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet reported.

4

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(5)  The AGL is applied to imported raw aggregate, but not to aggregate contained in imported processed products.

5

(6)  On 2 April 2008, i.e. the day from which the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines were applicable, the level of AGL was GBP 1,95/tonne.

6

(7)  OJ C 37, 3.2.2001, p. 3.

7

(8)  The aggregates extracted in Northern Ireland and shipped to any destination in Great Britain were liable to the AGL at the full rate. This was also the case for aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland that was used in the manufacturing of processed products shipped to Great Britain. This ensured that aggregates and processed products from Northern Ireland did not enjoy a competitive advantage in the market of Great Britain.

8

(9)  As referred to above, the implementation of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was suspended as from 1 December 2010.

9

(10)  The information was submitted by the UK authorities for the purposes of an assessment of the measure on the basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. DETI Minerals Statement 2009.

10

(11)  Distribution costs depend on haulage distances, with haulage costs in the range of 15 to 20 pence per tonne per mile, with aggregate being delivered within 10 to 15 miles, depending on local circumstances.

11

(12)  Ecotec (1998) Report; EEA Report (No 2/2008) effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in selected EU countries; British Geological Survey (2008): The need for indigenous aggregates production in England.

12

(13)  The definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) of the TFEU did not change from the one contained in Article 87(1) EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

13

(14)  See Case C-199/06 CELF [2008] ECR I-469, paragraphs 63 and 66 to 68.

14

CELF

(15)  See Case C-199/06 CELF, cited above, paragraphs 61 and 64.

15

CELF

(16)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 91.

16

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(17)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 93.

17

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(18)  “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.

18

Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.”

(19)  The rules for national internal taxation as laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU did not change from those contained in Article 90 EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

19

(20)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 92.

20

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(21)  Case 21/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR p. 1, paragraphs 23 to 26; and in particular Case C-213/96 Outukumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, paragraphs 30 et seq.

21

Commission

Italy

Outukumpu

(22)  The identity of the taxpayer as such is therefore of limited importance.

22

(23)  “Thus [Article 110] must guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between domestic products and imported products.” (Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR p. 1343, paragraph 24).

23

[Article 110]

Bergandi

(24)  Commission Notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid, OJ C 119, 22.5.2002, p. 22.

24

(25)  See for instance Commission Decision on case N 449/01 (Germany) — Continuation of the ecological tax reform (OJ C 137, 8.6.2002, p. 34). Furthermore, this position was confirmed in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines where the payment of 20 % of the tax was explicitly “codified” as a proportionality condition of the aid granted in the form of exemption or reduction from environmental taxes (point 159(b)).

25

(26)  The highest selling price (GBP 5,57/tonne), the lowest profit margin (2 %) and the level of the AGL as originally notified in 2004 (GBP 1,6/tonne) are assumed. If the AGL level on 1 April 2008 (GBP 1,95/tonne) is applied, the share increases to approximately 36 %. Any other combination of price and profit margin necessarily results in the AGL presenting more then 30 % of the production costs.

26

(27)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

27

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| 24.8.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | C 245/21 |
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24.8.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

C 245/21

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STAATLICHE BEIHILFEN — DEUTSCHLAND

(Artikel 107 bis 109 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union)

Staatliche Beihilfe MC 15/09 — Veräußerung der Deka-Anteile durch die LBBW

(Text von Bedeutung für den EWR)

2011/C 245/10

Die Kommission hat Deutschland mit Schreiben vom 14. Januar 2011 von ihrem Beschluss in dieser Beihilfesache MC 15/09 in Kenntnis gesetzt.

WORTLAUT DES SCHREIBENS

„I.   VERFAHREN

| (1) | Am 15. Dezember 2009 genehmigte die Kommission mit ihrem Beschluss in der Sache C 17/09 (im Folgenden ‚LBBW-Beschluss‘) eine Kapitalzuführung in Höhe von 5 Mrd. EUR und eine Entlastungsmaßnahme für wertgeminderte Vermögensaktiva in Höhe von 12,7 Mrd. EUR für ein Portfolio strukturierter Wertpapiere mit einem Volumen von 35 Mrd. EUR zugunsten der Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (im Folgenden ‚LBBW‘) (1). Diese Genehmigung erfolgte vorbehaltlich einer Reihe von Deutschland zugesicherter Verpflichtungen. Eine der Zusagen bestand darin, dass die LBBW ihre Beteiligungen an der DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale (im Folgenden ‚Deka‘) bis zum (2) [...] veräußert. |
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(1)

Am 15. Dezember 2009 genehmigte die Kommission mit ihrem Beschluss in der Sache C 17/09 (im Folgenden ‚LBBW-Beschluss‘) eine Kapitalzuführung in Höhe von 5 Mrd. EUR und eine Entlastungsmaßnahme für wertgeminderte Vermögensaktiva in Höhe von 12,7 Mrd. EUR für ein Portfolio strukturierter Wertpapiere mit einem Volumen von 35 Mrd. EUR zugunsten der Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (im Folgenden ‚LBBW‘) (1). Diese Genehmigung erfolgte vorbehaltlich einer Reihe von Deutschland zugesicherter Verpflichtungen. Eine der Zusagen bestand darin, dass die LBBW ihre Beteiligungen an der DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale (im Folgenden ‚Deka‘) bis zum (2) [...] veräußert.

| (2) | Am 13. Dezember 2010 übermittelte Deutschland ein Schreiben der LBBW, in dem dargelegt wurde, dass die Deka nicht vor dem [...] veräußert werden könne. Mit Schreiben vom 21. Dezember 2010 teilte Deutschland mit, dass der Treuhänder (3) und das Finanzministerium Baden-Württemberg bestätigten, dass die LBBW alles getan hat, um das Verkaufsverfahren innerhalb der gesetzten Frist abzuschließen. Am 22. Dezember 2010 ersuchte Deutschland hinsichtlich der Veräußerung um eine Verlängerung der Frist bis zum [...]. Am 5. Januar 2011 übermittelte Deutschland weitere Informationen. |
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(2)

Am 13. Dezember 2010 übermittelte Deutschland ein Schreiben der LBBW, in dem dargelegt wurde, dass die Deka nicht vor dem [...] veräußert werden könne. Mit Schreiben vom 21. Dezember 2010 teilte Deutschland mit, dass der Treuhänder (3) und das Finanzministerium Baden-Württemberg bestätigten, dass die LBBW alles getan hat, um das Verkaufsverfahren innerhalb der gesetzten Frist abzuschließen. Am 22. Dezember 2010 ersuchte Deutschland hinsichtlich der Veräußerung um eine Verlängerung der Frist bis zum [...]. Am 5. Januar 2011 übermittelte Deutschland weitere Informationen.

| (3) | Am 22. Dezember 2010 teilte Deutschland der Kommission mit, dass es aufgrund der Dringlichkeit ausnahmsweise akzeptierte, dass der Beschluss in englischer Sprache erlassen wird. |
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(3)

Am 22. Dezember 2010 teilte Deutschland der Kommission mit, dass es aufgrund der Dringlichkeit ausnahmsweise akzeptierte, dass der Beschluss in englischer Sprache erlassen wird.

II.   SACHVERHALT

| (4) | Der LBBW-Beschluss stützt sich auf mehrere Zusagen. Erwägungsgrund 38 Nummer 5 Buchstabe c des LBBW-Beschlusses enthält die Zusage Deutschlands, dass die LBBW ihre Deka-Anteile bis zum [...] veräußert. In dem Beschluss ist eine Verlängerung dieser Frist nicht explizit vorgesehen. |
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(4)

Der LBBW-Beschluss stützt sich auf mehrere Zusagen. Erwägungsgrund 38 Nummer 5 Buchstabe c des LBBW-Beschlusses enthält die Zusage Deutschlands, dass die LBBW ihre Deka-Anteile bis zum [...] veräußert. In dem Beschluss ist eine Verlängerung dieser Frist nicht explizit vorgesehen.

| (5) | Die Deka ist eine rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts, die über Tochtergesellschaften das Geschäft mit privaten Investmentfonds der deutschen Sparkassen tätigt. Die eine Hälfte ist Eigentum des Deutschen Sparkassen- und Giroverbands (DSGV) und die andere Hälfte gehört den Landesbanken über eine Holdinggesellschaft (im Folgenden ‚Holdinggesellschaft‘). Die indirekte Beteiligung von LBBW an der Deka beträgt 14,8 %. Für den Fall, dass eine Partei ihre Anteile verkaufen möchte, verfügen die jeweiligen Anteilseigner über ein Vorkaufsrecht. |
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(5)

Die Deka ist eine rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts, die über Tochtergesellschaften das Geschäft mit privaten Investmentfonds der deutschen Sparkassen tätigt. Die eine Hälfte ist Eigentum des Deutschen Sparkassen- und Giroverbands (DSGV) und die andere Hälfte gehört den Landesbanken über eine Holdinggesellschaft (im Folgenden ‚Holdinggesellschaft‘). Die indirekte Beteiligung von LBBW an der Deka beträgt 14,8 %. Für den Fall, dass eine Partei ihre Anteile verkaufen möchte, verfügen die jeweiligen Anteilseigner über ein Vorkaufsrecht.

| (6) | Zunächst legte der DSGV ein Angebot für die Deka-Anteile der LBBW vor, das bis zum [...] galt. Damit der Verkauf gültig wird, müsste er sowohl von allen anderen Landesbanken, die Beteiligungen an der Deka hielten, als auch von der Deka selbst und ihrer Hauptversammlung akzeptiert werden. |
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(6)

Zunächst legte der DSGV ein Angebot für die Deka-Anteile der LBBW vor, das bis zum [...] galt. Damit der Verkauf gültig wird, müsste er sowohl von allen anderen Landesbanken, die Beteiligungen an der Deka hielten, als auch von der Deka selbst und ihrer Hauptversammlung akzeptiert werden.

| (7) | Deutschland hat der Kommission mitgeteilt, dass alle Landesbanken, die Gesellschafter der Holdinggesellschaft sind, beabsichtigen, ihre Beteiligungen an den DSGV zu verkaufen, wodurch letzterer zum alleinigen Anteilseigner der Deka würde. Ein bindender Beschluss über diese Veräußerungen wird bis zum [...] erwartet, obwohl aufgrund des komplexen Entscheidungsverfahrens eine zusätzliche Verzögerung bis zum [...] nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann. Deutschland zufolge wären die für die Veräußerung der Deka-Anteile der LBBW erforderlichen Vereinbarungen günstiger und würden den Verkaufsprozess erleichtern, wenn die Landesbanken ihre Beteiligungen an der Holdinggesellschaft veräußerten. |
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(7)

Deutschland hat der Kommission mitgeteilt, dass alle Landesbanken, die Gesellschafter der Holdinggesellschaft sind, beabsichtigen, ihre Beteiligungen an den DSGV zu verkaufen, wodurch letzterer zum alleinigen Anteilseigner der Deka würde. Ein bindender Beschluss über diese Veräußerungen wird bis zum [...] erwartet, obwohl aufgrund des komplexen Entscheidungsverfahrens eine zusätzliche Verzögerung bis zum [...] nicht ausgeschlossen werden kann. Deutschland zufolge wären die für die Veräußerung der Deka-Anteile der LBBW erforderlichen Vereinbarungen günstiger und würden den Verkaufsprozess erleichtern, wenn die Landesbanken ihre Beteiligungen an der Holdinggesellschaft veräußerten.

| (8) | Deutschland hat der Kommission außerdem mitgeteilt, dass der DSGV sein Angebot für den Kauf der Deka-Anteile der LBBW bis zum [...] verlängert hat. |
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(8)

Deutschland hat der Kommission außerdem mitgeteilt, dass der DSGV sein Angebot für den Kauf der Deka-Anteile der LBBW bis zum [...] verlängert hat.

| (9) | Ungeachtet des Antrags auf Verlängerung der Frist für die Veräußerung der Deka teilt Deutschland ebenfalls mit, dass die LBBW alles in ihrer Macht Stehende getan hat, um den Verkauf zustande kommen zu lassen. Der Treuhänder, der die von Deutschland im Rahmen des LBBW-Beschlusses zugesicherten Veräußerungen der LBBW beaufsichtigt, bestätigte diese Beurteilung. |
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(9)

Ungeachtet des Antrags auf Verlängerung der Frist für die Veräußerung der Deka teilt Deutschland ebenfalls mit, dass die LBBW alles in ihrer Macht Stehende getan hat, um den Verkauf zustande kommen zu lassen. Der Treuhänder, der die von Deutschland im Rahmen des LBBW-Beschlusses zugesicherten Veräußerungen der LBBW beaufsichtigt, bestätigte diese Beurteilung.

III.   WÜRDIGUNG

| (10) | Der vorliegende Beschluss betrifft die Umsetzung des Umstrukturierungsplans, der mit dem LBBW-Beschluss genehmigt wurde. Deutschland ersucht um eine Verlängerung der Frist für den Verkauf der Deka um drei Monate, [...]. |
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(10)

Der vorliegende Beschluss betrifft die Umsetzung des Umstrukturierungsplans, der mit dem LBBW-Beschluss genehmigt wurde. Deutschland ersucht um eine Verlängerung der Frist für den Verkauf der Deka um drei Monate, [...].

| (11) | Die Kommission kann Fristen für Veräußerungen verlängern. Obwohl dies nicht explizit in der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 659/1999 vorgesehen ist, kann die Kommission eine Verlängerung gestatten, solange dadurch die Durchsetzung des LBBW-Beschlusses (4) nicht beeinträchtigt wird. |
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(11)

Die Kommission kann Fristen für Veräußerungen verlängern. Obwohl dies nicht explizit in der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 659/1999 vorgesehen ist, kann die Kommission eine Verlängerung gestatten, solange dadurch die Durchsetzung des LBBW-Beschlusses (4) nicht beeinträchtigt wird.

| (12) | Die Kommission nimmt zur Kenntnis, dass die LBBW den Verkaufsprozess der Deka bereits aktiv betreibt, indem sie sich eines Angebots des DGSV versichert hat. In dieser Hinsicht nimmt die Kommission die Ansicht sowohl Deutschlands als auch des Treuhänders zur Kenntnis, dass die LBBW alles ihr Mögliche getan hat, um den Verkaufsprozess voranzubringen. |
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(12)

Die Kommission nimmt zur Kenntnis, dass die LBBW den Verkaufsprozess der Deka bereits aktiv betreibt, indem sie sich eines Angebots des DGSV versichert hat. In dieser Hinsicht nimmt die Kommission die Ansicht sowohl Deutschlands als auch des Treuhänders zur Kenntnis, dass die LBBW alles ihr Mögliche getan hat, um den Verkaufsprozess voranzubringen.

| (13) | Außerdem scheint es nach Ansicht der Bundesregierung höchst wahrscheinlich zu sein, dass die Landesbanken mit Beteiligungen an der Holdinggesellschaft ihre Anteile auch verkaufen könnten, was den gesamten Verkaufsprozess der Deka-Anteile der LBBW erleichtern würde. |
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(13)

Außerdem scheint es nach Ansicht der Bundesregierung höchst wahrscheinlich zu sein, dass die Landesbanken mit Beteiligungen an der Holdinggesellschaft ihre Anteile auch verkaufen könnten, was den gesamten Verkaufsprozess der Deka-Anteile der LBBW erleichtern würde.

| (14) | Schließlich gibt es überzeugende Argumente dafür, dass der Verkaufsprozess innerhalb des vorgeschlagenen Zeitrahmens, spätestens aber bis [...], erfolgreich abgeschlossen wird. Insbesondere stellt sich der Sachverhalt folgendermaßen dar: [...]. Der vorliegende Beschluss ermöglicht es der LBBW, ihre Deka-Anteile zu veräußern, auch wenn der Entscheidungsprozess der ihre Deka-Anteile verkaufenden Landesbanken länger als vorhergesehen dauern sollte. |
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(14)

Schließlich gibt es überzeugende Argumente dafür, dass der Verkaufsprozess innerhalb des vorgeschlagenen Zeitrahmens, spätestens aber bis [...], erfolgreich abgeschlossen wird. Insbesondere stellt sich der Sachverhalt folgendermaßen dar: [...]. Der vorliegende Beschluss ermöglicht es der LBBW, ihre Deka-Anteile zu veräußern, auch wenn der Entscheidungsprozess der ihre Deka-Anteile verkaufenden Landesbanken länger als vorhergesehen dauern sollte.

| (15) | Eine Verlängerung der Frist für Veräußerungen um drei Monate stellt die Umsetzung des in dem LBBW-Beschluss genehmigten Umstrukturierungsplans insgesamt nicht in Frage. Dieser gilt bis 2014. Die Fristverlängerung wird der LBBW dabei helfen, die erforderlichen Zustimmungen der anderen Landesbanken zu erhalten, wodurch der Verkauf — ob gemeinschaftlich oder allein — erleichtert wird. Daher sollte die befristete Verlängerung es der LBBW ermöglichen, ihre Deka-Anteile bis zum [...] zu veräußern. Daher wird die LBBW die oben erwähnten exogenen Schwierigkeiten überwinden und die Veräußerung der Deka wie im LBBW-Beschluss vorgesehen abschließen können. Die Kommission ist daher der Ansicht, dass insbesondere angesichts der Besonderheiten der rechtlichen Struktur der Deka die relativ kurze Fristverlängerung bis [...] gerechtfertigt ist. Aufgrund der Umstände in dieser Sache wird eine Fristverlängerung nicht als Verzögerung des ursprünglich genehmigten Zeitplans betrachtet, die zu einer entsprechenden Verringerung der Hilfen geführt hätte (5). |
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(15)

Eine Verlängerung der Frist für Veräußerungen um drei Monate stellt die Umsetzung des in dem LBBW-Beschluss genehmigten Umstrukturierungsplans insgesamt nicht in Frage. Dieser gilt bis 2014. Die Fristverlängerung wird der LBBW dabei helfen, die erforderlichen Zustimmungen der anderen Landesbanken zu erhalten, wodurch der Verkauf — ob gemeinschaftlich oder allein — erleichtert wird. Daher sollte die befristete Verlängerung es der LBBW ermöglichen, ihre Deka-Anteile bis zum [...] zu veräußern. Daher wird die LBBW die oben erwähnten exogenen Schwierigkeiten überwinden und die Veräußerung der Deka wie im LBBW-Beschluss vorgesehen abschließen können. Die Kommission ist daher der Ansicht, dass insbesondere angesichts der Besonderheiten der rechtlichen Struktur der Deka die relativ kurze Fristverlängerung bis [...] gerechtfertigt ist. Aufgrund der Umstände in dieser Sache wird eine Fristverlängerung nicht als Verzögerung des ursprünglich genehmigten Zeitplans betrachtet, die zu einer entsprechenden Verringerung der Hilfen geführt hätte (5).

IV.   SCHLUSSFOLGERUNG

| (16) | Aufgrund der oben ausgeführten Gründe stellt die Kommission fest, dass in der Sache Deka eine Verlängerung um drei Monate für eine ordnungsgemäße Umsetzung des Umstrukturierungsplans für die LBBW erforderlich ist und diese nicht behindert. |
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(16)

Aufgrund der oben ausgeführten Gründe stellt die Kommission fest, dass in der Sache Deka eine Verlängerung um drei Monate für eine ordnungsgemäße Umsetzung des Umstrukturierungsplans für die LBBW erforderlich ist und diese nicht behindert.

V.   BESCHLUSS

Die Kommission verlängert die Frist für die Veräußerung der Deka bis zum 31. März 2011.“

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(1)  ABl. L 188 vom 21.7.2010, S. 1.

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(2)  Einige Textstellen wurden so abgefasst, dass die Vertraulichkeit bestimmter Angaben gewahrt wird; diese Passagen werden durch Punkte in eckigen Klammern gekennzeichnet.

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(3)  Ernannt im Einklang mit dem LBBW-Beschluss zur Überwachung der vollständigen und korrekten Umsetzung der in Bezug auf die Veräußerungen geleisteten Verpflichtungen.

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(4)  Vgl. Beschluss vom 21. Dezember 2010 in der Sache MC 8/09 WestImmo.

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WestImmo

(5)  Vgl. Leitlinien der Kommission für staatliche Beihilfen zur Rettung und Umstrukturierung von Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten (ABl. C 244 vom 1.10.2004, S. 2, Nummer 52 Buchstabe d).

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