In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-18-00138-CV 

LAURO DE LEON, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

SANDRA HERNANDEZ, APPELLEE 

 

On Appeal from the 244th District Court 

Ector County, Texas1 

Trial Court No. C-17-04-0392-CV, Honorable James M. Rush, Presiding 

 

June 27, 2019 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PARKER, JJ. 

Lauro De Leon, appellant, sued Sandra Hernandez, appellee, for damages arising 

from an automobile collision. In two issues, De Leon challenges the trial court’s judgment 

entered after a jury trial. Due to our determination that De Leon failed to adequately brief 

any purported trial court error and that he failed to preserve his sufficiency complaint, we 

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

1 Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to 

this Court from the Eleventh Court of Appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013).
2

Background

On September 14, 2016, De Leon and Hernandez were involved in an automobile 

collision at the intersection of Grant and 14th Street in Odessa, Texas. The accident 

occurred as Hernandez, traveling north on Grant, entered the intersection against a red 

light and collided with a pick-up truck driven by De Leon. Hernandez was not injured, her 

air bags did not deploy, and she drove her vehicle home after the accident. De Leon was 

transported by ambulance to the emergency room where he was examined for neck, 

back, and hip pain. CT scans of his head, spine, chest, abdomen, and pelvis were normal 

and revealed no fractures. After approximately two hours, De Leon was discharged and 

given a prescription for ibuprofen. Two days after the accident, De Leon began treatment 

with a chiropractor. After receiving six chiropractic treatments, De Leon had no 

complaints of pain and he was released on September 26, 2016.

De Leon sued Hernandez for negligence and sought damages for past medical 

expenses, pain and mental anguish, and physical impairment. In response, Hernandez 

filed an answer generally denying the allegations.

After the close of the evidence, De Leon moved for an instructed verdict on liability. 

In denying the motion, the judge explained:

THE COURT: Counsel, the evidence pertaining to possible liability of [De 

Leon] is extremely scarce, I agree with that, but I think there is some 

evidence. It went back and forth on, for example, the failure to keep a 

proper lookout. So I’m going to respectfully deny the motion.

The trial court’s charge consisted of three questions and tracked the language 

suggested by the Texas Pattern Jury Charges for a negligence case: broad form-joint 
3

submission of negligence and proximate cause in question one, proportionate 

responsibility in question two, and calculation of damages in question three.

At the charge conference, De Leon objected to question one and two “insofar as 

they show comparative faults on [De Leon], and [Hernandez] did not affirmatively plead 

the negligence of [De Leon] as a defense.”2 The trial court overruled De Leon’s objection.

The jury found both Hernandez and De Leon negligent and assigned 75% 

responsibility to Hernandez and 25% to De Leon. The jury awarded De Leon $12,000 for 

reasonable and necessary medical expenses in the past. After reducing the award by De 

Leon’s percentage of responsibility, the trial court entered judgment against Hernandez.

De Leon filed a motion for new trial arguing that a new trial should be granted 

because Hernandez failed to plead the negligence of De Leon as an affirmative defense. 

The trial court denied his motion and De Leon appealed.

Analysis

Issues Presented

In his brief, De Leon presents the following issues for review:

Issue 1: The trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Appellant’s 

objections to the jury charge and motion for a directed verdict on liability 

against Appellee and included Appellant in question numbers 1 and 2 even 

though Appellee failed to plead contributory negligence as an affirmative 

defense and when it denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial.

Issue 2: The trial court abused its discretion when it signed the final 

judgment which conformed to the jury’s verdict because the jury’s answers 

to all three questions in the jury charge are so contrary to the overwhelming 

weight of the evidence that those answers are clearly wrong and unjust.

 

2 De Leon did not object that there was no evidence to support the submission of his negligence.
4

Issue One

By his first issue, De Leon raises three separate grounds of error. As such, this 

issue is multifarious. See Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 842 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2005, no pet.) (an issue addressing more than one specific ground of error is multifarious). 

Appellate courts may disregard any assignment of error that is multifarious. Rich v. Olah, 

274 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). Alternatively, if a court concludes 

that a point of error is multifarious, it may consider the point of error if it can determine, 

with reasonable certainty, the error about which complaint is made. Green, 152 S.W.3d 

at 842 n.2.

In addressing this point of error, we are mindful that the rules of appellate 

procedure require a brief to contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions 

made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). 

“Bare assertions of error, without argument or authority, waive error.” McKellar v. 

Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478, 484 n.5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.); see Fredonia 

State Bank v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284-85 (Tex. 1994) (discussing 

“long-standing rule” that point may be waived due to inadequate briefing).

In considering De Leon’s issue, it appears that he complains that the trial court 

abused its discretion by overruling his objections to the charge, by denying his motion for 

directed verdict, and by denying his motion for new trial. However, De Leon has failed to 

sufficiently develop any of these purported errors in his briefing. There is no discussion, 
5

analysis, or legal authority cited to support De Leon’s assertion that the trial court abused 

its discretion in denying the directed verdict or the motion for new trial.3

De Leon’s entire argument concerning charge error states:

This Court of Appeals should also find that the trial court’s “erroneous” 

inclusion of Appellant’s name in Question Nos. 1 and 2 of the jury charge 

was not “harmless . . .” Strong v. Strong, 350 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2011, [pet. denied]), citing Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Armstrong, 145 

S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. 2004)[,] and In re C.R., 263 S.W.3d 368, 370-71 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).

This single, conclusory sentence is inadequate to present a challenge to any purported 

trial court error related to the court’s charge and is nothing more than a bare assertion of 

error with no legal analysis. See McKellar, 367 S.W.3d at 484 n.5. Conclusory 

statements are not enough to raise an issue on appeal. See Izen v. Comm’n for Lawyer 

Discipline, 322 S.W.3d 308, 321-22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). 

The only authority cited by De Leon is three cases discussing the erroneous admission 

of evidence, and whether the error caused the rendition of an improper verdict.4 It is 

unclear how that authority applies to the issue here as there is no analysis applying the 

appropriate legal authority to the facts of his case in such a manner as to demonstrate 

harm or that the trial court committed reversible error.

 

3 When an appellant fails to comply with Rule 38.1, it is not this Court’s duty to research the law 

that may support the appellant’s contentions. Tyruin v. Hirsch & Westheimer, P.C., No. 01-17-00014-CV, 

2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 9833, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 19, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per 

curiam); see also Schmitz v. Denton Cty. Cowboy Church, 550 S.W.3d 342, 363 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

2018, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh’g) (appellants failed to present cogent argument explaining how the 

trial court’s denial exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion as an unreasonable or arbitrary 

determination).

4 None of the issues raised by De Leon makes a complaint that the trial court erred in admitting any 

evidence.
6

Although we construe briefs liberally and require only substantial compliance with 

briefing rules, see TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9, if an appellant’s issues are unsupported by clear 

and concise legal argument with appropriate citations to authorities, the appellant waives 

error. Bentley v. Peck, No. 14-17-00561-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8189, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 9, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Vo v. Doan, 

No. 14-14-00994-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 6938, at *24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] June 30, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (overruling several issues because the 

appellants waived error by inadequate briefing when they provided no legal authority or 

analysis applying appropriate authority of their issues presented).

An appellate issue unsupported by argument or by appropriate legal authority 

presents nothing for our review. Blankinship v. Brown, 399 S.W. 3d 303, 307 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2013, pet. denied); see Brock v. Sutker, 215 S.W.3d 927, 929 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2007, no pet.) (holding issue is waived by brief that makes no attempt to analyze trial 

court’s order within context of cited authority). It is not this Court’s duty to research the 

law and fashion a legal argument for a party when he has failed to do so. Canton-Carter 

v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 S.W.3d 928, 931-32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, 

no pet.). It is De Leon’s burden as appellant to discuss his assertions of error, and an 

appellate court has “no duty—or even right—to perform an independent review of the 

record and applicable law to determine whether there was error.” Hernandez v. 

Hernandez, 318 S.W.3d 464, 465 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.); Happy Harbor 

Methodist Home, Inc. v. Cowins, 903 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

1995, no writ) (op. on reh’g) (“We will not do the job of the advocate.”). Were appellate 

courts to do so, they would be abandoning their role as neutral adjudicators and become 
7

an advocate for that party. Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

2007, no pet.). Accordingly, we conclude that De Leon’s first issue is inadequately briefed 

and presents nothing for review. We overrule issue one.

Issue Two

In his second issue, De Leon challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to 

support the verdict and he argues that the findings on the three charge questions are 

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. A “great weight” challenge 

to a jury finding presents an issue of factual sufficiency. Kratz v. Exxon Corp., 890 S.W.2d 

899, 904 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no writ). To preserve a complaint of factual 

insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury finding, a complaint that a finding is against 

the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or that a finding of damages was inadequate, 

a party must raise the issue in a timely filed motion for new trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2)-

(4) (stating appellant cannot challenge factual sufficiency of evidence without first raising 

point in motion for new trial); Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. 1991); Cannon 

v. Castillo, No. 11-12-00256-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8656, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland 

Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).

The record in this case does not indicate that De Leon presented his factual 

sufficiency challenge in a motion for new trial. Although De Leon filed a motion for new 

trial, the sole complaint raised in that motion was that Hernandez failed to plead the 

negligence of De Leon as an affirmative defense. Because De Leon did not raise a factual 

sufficiency complaint in his motion for new trial, he has failed to preserve the issue for our 

review. Ihnfeldt v. Reagan, No. 02-14-00220-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 12776, at *31 
8

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 1, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We overrule De Leon’s 

second issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled both of De Leon’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Judy C. Parker

 Justice