The Honor able William O. Bertelsman, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District * of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0062n.06 F iled: Janu ary 27, 2009 No. 08-1306 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,

v. CH ARLES EV AN S HU G HES, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE WEST ERN DISTRICT OF MIC HIGAN

BE F ORE: BO G G S, C hi e f J ud g e , a nd C LA Y , C ir c ui t J ud g e ; BE R TE LS M A N , D istrict

Judge. * CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Charles Eva n s Hughes a ppeals the c riminal judgme nt and commitment order e ntere d on Marc h 6, 2008 by t h e Un ited States District Court for the Western Di str ic t of

Mic hig an. Hughe s wa s c on vic te d a ft e r a jur y tr ia l of inc ome tax ev a sio n p ur su a nt t o 26 U. S.C. § 7201. He challeng es on appe al seve ral e videntiary ruling s made by

the district court and alleg es that he w as denie d his right to a f air trial due to prosecutor ial m i s co nduct. For the

rea sons that follow, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
. BACK GR OUNDNo. 08-1306

-2- A. P roce dural Hi story On Marc h 29, 2007, a fe d er al g rand jury in the Western District of Michig an re turned a four- count indictment char g ing Cha rles Eva ns Hug hes with i n come tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 for the ca lendar y ear s 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004. Hu g he s w a s tr ie d b e fo re a jur y , a nd on De c e mbe r 6 , 2 00 7, he wa s f ound g uil ty on a ll counts. On Mar ch 5, 2008, the district cour t sentence d Hu gh es to a term of f ifteen months of imprisonment on each c ount to be serve d concur rently , with restitution in t he amount of $3 7, 55 9. 00 . H ug he s f

ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l. B. Sub stantive F acts O nN o v e mb e r

2 1 , 2 0 0 7 , H u g h e s f

il e d a p r e tr ia l m o ti on i n limine reque sting that he be permitted to introduce into ev i d en ce a “r eliance packa g e” of materia ls in support of his asserted belief that the law did not require him to file tax returns or p ay t ax es. The motion s tated that Hug hes’ be lief wa s based in par t upon his und er s t anding that the Six teenth Amendme nt was

ne ve r r a tif

ie d a nd that th e ta x co de con seq uen tly do e s n ot r e qu ir e pe op le to p ay inc ome ta x or t o file income ta x returns. The m aterials included a video, a book entitled “The L aw That Never Was,” and a

written leg al opinion. The g overnme nt filed its own motion in limine , reque sting that the cour

t precl u d e the de fense from admitting a ny evidenc e which soug ht to establish that the inc ome ta x law s o f t

he Un ite d St a te s a

re un c on sti tut ion a l or

un lawf ul. After hear ing a

rg uments by

both parties, the district cour t rul ed in favor of the g overnme nt. The cour

t also stated that the “r eliance packa g e” mig ht be re l ev ant t o show Hug hes’ intent, explaining that “ if that’s the e x cuse he used in oral c o n v er s at ions, then it may beNo. 08-1306

-3- re le va nt t o s ho w that he ha s an in te nt t o e va de the ta x law s and wi ll us e any argum e nt h e c a n to g et out of the tax laws.” (Tr ial Tr. at 8.) At trial, the g overnme nt presente d a number of witnesses, includingHug hes’ f ormer employ ers, to esta

blish that Hughe s had taxable income for the y ear s in qu es t i on. The g ov e rn me nt

a l s o p r e s e n t e d

w i t n e s s e s w h o t e s t i f

i e d t h a te a c h t i m e H u g h e s w a s g i v e na W

- 4 to complete, he either c h ecked “e x empt” on the f orm to indicate that he did not want any taxes withheld, or he w rote “ 99” as the number of de ductions. A forme r empl o y er t es t i fi ed that whe n he aske d Hug hes about his tax-ex empt status, Hug hes re p l i ed that he did not have to pa y taxes beca use his brother- in-law, Stan Smolinski , told him he was not require d to do so. The g overnme nt also prese nted Paul Crowley of the Int er n al R evenue Service (“I RS”) who testified that Hug hes had f iled a joint return f

or tax y ear

1999 but d i d not file retur ns for tax y ear s 2000-2006, eve n though the I RS receive d W-2 forms ref lecting taxable income. Crowley testified that in 1999, Hug hes filed a complex return, wher e he use d specia liz ed for ms and

sc he du le s, and

c or re c tly re po rt e d c a

pit al gains , loss e s, ite mize d d e du c tio ns , a nd int e re st. Crowley also testified re g ardingcer tified rec ords from the State of Mich i gan t h at indicated that Hug hes h a d n o t f

il e d s tate in c o me tax r e tu r n s f r o m 2 0 0 0

- 2 0 0 4

. Pa

u la Co c h r an , an I RS revenue ag ent and tax auditor, testified that Hug hes’ income exceed t h e mi nimal filing re quirements for the y e ars in q

ue sti on . Sh e te sti fi e d th a t sh e ha d c a lc ulate d th a t H ug he s o we d th e g ov e rnme nt a “little over $70,000” for the f our y ear s char g ed in the indictment. Hug hes testified on his ow n behalf

. He testified that he beg an working i n t h e s prinkler trade in 19 7 4 , b u t t

h a t i nth e 1 9 8 0 s an d

1 9 9 0 s , h e s u f

f e r e d s e v e r a l m a

jo r o n - th e - jo b in ju r ie s for which he r equire d su rg ery and wa s paid workman’ s compensation. Af ter surg ery

in 1998, heNo. 08-1306

-4- attempted to c h ang e ca

ree rs and e ng ag ed in commodity trading . I n 2000, he took lump sum distributions from his pensions. He testified that he t h o u gh t the pension distributions and Social Security disability

pay ments were non-taxable bene fits like his workman’s compensation pay me n ts
. H e te s ti f

ie d th a t h e w a s g r an te d a f u ll d is a b il it y p e n s io n in 2 0 0 3 an d h a d not worked since 2002. Hug hes stated that he did not file tax returns in 2 0 0 0 , 2 0 0 1 , 2002, and 2004 bec ause he thought that a s a sole propr ietor he w as not requir ed to file re turns, and be ca u s e he believed he did not have suff

icient i n co m e in light of the $161,000 loss he incurr ed in his commodities tr a d in g b u s in e s s . H e s tate d th a t h e b e li e v e d

th a t the loss offse t a

n y g a in s , an d

d id n o t r e a li ze the re wa s a

$3 ,0 00 y e arl y

li mi t on inve stm e nt l os se s. He a lso te sti fi e d th a t he be lie ve d h e did not have a n y t ax ab l e income from Social Secur ity or his disability

pension, and c onsequently he be lie ve d th a t he wa s n ot r e qu ir e d to fi le re tur ns fo r t ho se y e ars . Hug hes testified that whe n he re ceive d a notice f rom the I RS, he set up an appointment and met with the I RS t o discuss hi s ca s e o n t wo occasions. He state d that on Dec ember 7, 2004, he explained to I RS S pecia l Ag ent J oanne Mc L ean that he was on Socia l Secur i t y d i s ab ility , that his disabilit y

pensi o n wa s n o t taxable, and that he did not have to file taxes. He stated that McL ean ne ver told him he wa s wrong . He state d that he wa s t o l d that he could indicate “e x empt” on W-4 forms for the first five months of the y ear

and then, de pending o n the money ear ned, he c ould execute another W-4 and chang e his exemption st atus to ref lect his ac tual d ep en d en t s . He a lso testified that he neve r
rec eived de ficienc y

notices fr om the I RS or notices that it was a cr im i n al o ff ense to fail to file, and that he did not re alize that h i s p en s i o n was taxable until after he wa s arr ested in 2007. HeNo. 08-1306

-5- denied that he ever

attempted to eva d e pay ing ta x es, conc eal a ssets, lie to an I RS age nt, or willfully violate the tax laws. After Hu g he s’ dir e c t te sti mony , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ru le d th a t th e g ov e rnme nt c ou ld impeach H ug hes wit h what he ha d told the I RS about his reasons for f ailing to f

ile returns, a

nd info rm ed t h e defe nse that they could explain this to the jury prior to Hug hes’ c ross-examination. Hu g he s r e tur

ne d to the sta

nd and te sti fi e d th a t he tol d th e I RS th a t he did no t f ile re tur ns be c a us e he had “ done re sear ch on [his] own and ha d come to ce rtain belief s th at [ h e] wa s n ot under a ny leg al obliga

tion to file a re t u rn .” (Tr ial Tr. at 382.) He testified that he had obtaine d documented pr oof in 1999 that he did n o t h av e to file a return, a nd that he took some of the materia ls to a meeting with the I RS. After Hug hes testified, the c ourt ca lled a sideba r conf ere nce a nd i n formed the pr os e c uti on : “ Al l r ig ht. I ’l l le t y ou g e t in to t he fa c t th a t hi s b e lie f i s c on sti tut ional [ ly ] bas ed; in other wor ds, the Six teenth Amendme nt. And I wi l l i m m ediately g ive the jury

the instruction that this is not a g ood-fa ith basis for not paying inc ome tax.” (Trial Tr . at 385.) On cr oss-examination, Hughe s st at ed t h at h e did not file re turns based on a combination of belief s t h at he ha d no leg al obliga tion to file based on his rese arc h, and bec ause he believed his trading losses offset a ny require ment t o file and that his disabili ty proce eds we re nonta x able. He c onfirmed that he h ad p u rchased a ta x protester “re liance pa ckag e” f

rom Wil liam Be nson, and that he kne w that B enson had be en convict ed of tax evasion. He testified that the relianc e packa g e dea lt with the claim that the Six teenth Amendmen t was ne ver pr operly ratified. T he court then instruc ted the jury that a cla im that the Six teenth Amendme nt had not been r atified d o e s n o t p r o v id e a

g o o d

- f a it h b a s is f o r n o t p ay in g in c o me tax.No. 08-1306

-6- After th e go v ernme nt cross-e x amined Hug hes, the de fense rested. T he g overnme nt called thr ee r ebuttal witnesses. S tan Smolins ki, Hug hes’ br other-in- law, testified that he was employ ed for

27 y ear s as an I RS m anager, b u t t h at Hug hes neve r aske d him any questions about ta x law s, the ta xab ili ty of Soc ia l Se c ur ity

pa y ment s, pen sio n in c ome , o r t he Sixte e nth Amendment. Paula Cochr an testified that she had bee n m i s t ak en when she stated on direc t

e xami na tio n th a t on ly

c or po ratio ns or

partn ers hi ps may

de du c t bu sin e ss l os se s, and that, i n f a c t, ind ividu a ls m ay

a lso take bu sin e ss l os se s. She te sti fi e d th a t H ug he s’ los se s w e re lim ite d to $3 , 0 0 0 a y e ar , h o w e v e r , b e c a u s e u n d e r I RS r e g u lati o n s h e w a s a s an in v e s to r , a s o p posed to a trade r or de aler

. Br uce H arri s t estified that Hug hes’ “ relianc e pac kag e” w as purc hased f rom Be nson, a known tax protester and promoter of tax protester materia ls. Har ris testified that i n Fe b ru ar y of 2004, Hug hes ca

rried his box of tax protester materia ls into t he Gr and Rapids I RS o ffice and demande d to meet with someone fr om th e I R S t o d i scuss a letter he had r ece ived that informed him that he had over due tax returns. Ha rris testified that he met with Hug hes and Be n s on, and that Hug hes hande d him the box of mater ials and said “T hat’s my s t at em en t.” Hug hes then handed H ar ri s a “P ower

of Attorney” for

m signe d by

Hug hes which a

uthorized Benson to spea k on Hug hes’ be half wi t h re g ard to c erta in tax matters. Ha rris told Hug hes that he w ould acc ept the ma te ri a ls b ut t

hat he pr ob a

bly wo uld no t li ke the ma te ri a ls b e c a us e he wo rk e d in the I RS Criminal I nvestig ation Unit. Be nson stated t h at “I know y ou won’t like the re sults. But we’r e building our g ood-fa ith belief ea rly .” (Tr ial Tr. at 493.) I n closing , the g overnme nt a rg ued that it ha d established the elements of tax ev as i o n , and that a re fusal to ac knowledg e the law does not constitute a g ood-fa ith mis understandingof theNo. 08-1306

-7- law. De fe ns e c ouns e l argue d th a t th e governm e nt h a d a “ ma jor pr oo f p ro ble m” be c a

us e de sp ite the “a lmost unl imited resources” of the fe dera l gove rnment, the g overnme nt had left “ major questions” unanswe red, such as the ty pe of I RA acc ount H ug hes had. (Tria l T r. at 5 3 5 -4 6 .) Def ense counsel also pointed out the inconsistencies in Paula Cochran’ s testimony an d argue d t h a tH u g h e s c o u l d

h a v e b e e nl e g i t i m a t e l y c o n f u s e d a b o u t h i s t a x l i a

b i l i t y. On Dec ember

6, 2007, the jury

found Hug hes g uilty

on all counts of the indictment. On Marc h 5, 2008, the district court sente nced H ug hes to a ter m of fiftee n m o nths of imprisonment

o ne a c h c o u n tt o b e s e r

v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y. DI SCU SSIO N

I. Hug hes ar g ues that the district cour t abused its discretion in its evidentiary ruling s by

(1) denying H ug hes’ motion in limine an d p r e c lu d in g th e in tr o d

u c ti o no f “ r e li an c e p a c k ag e” materi a ls th a t s u

p p o rte d h is g o o d

- f

a it h d e f e n s e ; ( 2 ) p e r

mi tt in g th e g o v e r

n me n t, in a late trial ruling , to impeach Hug hes with the mater ials; and (3) pe rmitting the g overnme nt to introduce prejudicia l and improper r ebuttal testimony . This Court reviews a district court’s e videntiary ruling s fo r an ab u s e o f discretion. Un ite d S tat es v . B lac k

we ll, 459 F.3d 739, 752 ( 6th Cir. 2006). A. Hu g he s f ir st a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n b y de nyingHu g he s’ motion in limine to a dmi t mate ri a l th a t su pp or te d h is b e lie f t

hat he was no t re qu ir e d to fi le income tax returns. He ar gu es that a de fenda nt is entitl ed to submit testim ony reg ardingsuch a be lie f, no ma tte r h owun re a sonabl e the be lie f m ay be , a nd that th is r ig ht i nc lud e s th e ri g ht t o
rea d excerpts from the pr offe red materials, if not the rig ht to introduce the mate rials.No. 08-1306

-8- H u g h e s ’ ar g u m e n ti s c o n t r a d i c t e d b y S u p r e m e C o u rtp r e c e d e n t
. InCheek v. United States , the Court examined the claims of a de fenda nt who, like H u g h e s , “ p a i d h i s t a xe s f o r y e a rs , bu t a ft e r atte nd ingva

ri ou s se min ars a nd

ba se d o n hi s own stu dy , . . . c on c lud e d th a t th e inc ome tax l aws c ould not constitut ionally re quire him to pay

a tax.” 498 U.S. 192, 206 (1991). The Court acknowle dg ed that a ta x p ay er ’s u n derstandingof the tax law ca n be at issue in a c ase, a

nd that the willfulness requir ement in cr iminal provisions of the tax code r equire s proof of knowled ge o f the law, be cause “in our c omplex tax s y stem, uncer tainty often a rises eve n among taxp ay e r s w h o e ar

n e s tl y w is h to f

o ll o w th e la

w an d it is n o t th e p u r

p o s e o f th e law to pe n a li ze fra nk differ ence o f o pinion or innocent er rors made despite the e x erc ise of re asonable car e.” Id. at 205 (quotation marks a nd citations omitt ed). The Cheek

Court reve rsed s o m e o f the district court’s r ulings, holding that it was err or for the c ourt to instruct the jury not to consider Chee k’s asser ted belief that his wag es we re not t ax ab l e i ncome. Id. at 207. Howe ver, the Court held that claims that provisions of the tax code

are unconstitutional are “ submissi ons o f a diffe rent orde r” be cause they reve al full knowledg e of the provisions at issue. I d

. at 2 0 5

. I n s u ch a case , the Court explained that “a de fenda nt’s views about the validity

of the tax statutes are ir rele vant to the issue of willfulness, nee d not be hea rd by the jur y , a nd if the y are , a n in str uc ti on to d isr e g ard

the m w ou ld b e pr op e r[, ]” a nd he ld t hat it was “ not error

. . . fo r the District Judge to instruct the jur y not to consider Chee k’s claims that the tax laws were unconstitutional.” Id. at 206-07. Her e, Hug hes ac knowledg ed at tria l that the reli an ce packa g e mater ials were being

su bmi tte d to su

pp or t hi s b e lief th a t th e ta x law s a re un c on sti tut ion a l. T he Court ’s ho ldi nginNo. 08-1306

-9- Cheek is t he re fo re fata l to his argume nt. Mo re ov e r, the dis tr ic t c ourt all owe d H ug he s to su bmi t evidenc e re g ardinghis belief that his own income w as not taxable. Hu g he s r e lie s u

po n thre e case s to s up po rt a c on tr ary c on c lus ion : United States v. Gaumer , 9 7 2 F

. 2 d

7 2 3 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 9 2 ) , Uni ted St at es v . Na sh , 175 F.3d 429 ( 6th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Middleton , 246 F.3d 825 ( 6th Cir. 200 1 ). T h es e ca ses ar e distinguishable from the case at h an d

. I n Gaumer , the def endant soug ht to admit materials relating to the sc ope of the te rm “ex cis e tax .” Th is C ourt no te d th a t G a

ume r a sse rt e d a

be lie f t hat he wa s n ot e ng a g e d in excise-taxable activities, and found that the materia ls he soug ht to admit “discusse[d] the scope of the ter m ‘excise tax’ in a way

that could conc eivably

be thoug ht to provide some co mfort to a person in def

endant Ga

umer’s situation.” 972 F .2d at 725. Un l i k e Hu ghes and unlike the d efendant in Cheek, G a

u me r w a s n o t a

r g u in g th a t h is g o o d

- f

a it h b e li e f s te mm e d f r o m h is b elief that th e ta x co de wa s unc on sti tut ion a l. I n Nas h , this Court acknowledg ed that under Gaumer , a de fe nd ant s ho uld be a llo we d to pr e se nt r e le va

nt e xce rp ts f

ro m do c ume nts that su

pp or t a c on c lus ion

that he wa s n ot requi re d to file income ta x returns, but this Court found no abuse of discretion whe re the d istrict court excluded other mate rials bec ause it found that the pr obati v e value of the evidenc e wa s substantially

outwei gh ed by

the dang er of

confusingthe jury

under Rule 403. 175 F .3d at 435. L ikewise, in Middleton , this Court affirmed the district c ourt’s dec ision to ex clude e vidence

re g ard ingthe de fe nd ant’ s b e lie fs be c a us e it fo un d th e ma te ri a ls t o b e “ ho pe le ssl y c on fu sin g to the jury .” 246 F .3d at 839. These case s do not contradict the Supre me Court’s finding in Cheek that “a de fenda nt’s views about the va lidity

of the tax sta t u t es . . . need not be hea rd by the jury .” 498 U.S. at 206.No. 08-1306

-10- Consequently , we f

ind that the district court di d n o t ab u s e its discretion when it excluded the

ma te ri a ls that H ug he s so ug ht t o a dmi t. B. Hu g he s n e xt ar g ue s th a t be c a us e he wa s p re ve nte d f

ro m intro du cin g e vid e nc e of his belief that the tax s tatutes are unconstit u t i onal, the district cour t abused its discretion by permitting the g overnme nt to impeach him with evidence of the same

. On direc t examination, Hughes submitted r ea s o n s for nonpa y ment of taxes that contra dicted stateme nts he had made befor e the tria l. He testified that he did no t fi le tax returns for the y ear s cover ed b y the indictment beca use (1) he thoug ht as a sole pr oprietor he was not required t o fi l e returns; (2) he believed he did not have suff icient income in lig ht of the losses he inc ur re d in hi s com mod iti e s tr a din g bu sin e ss; (3 ) h e did no t r e a lize the re wa s a

$3 ,0 00 y e a rl y limit on investment losses; and (4) he believed he did n o t h av e any taxable income from Social S ec u ri t y o r hi s disability pension. After

this testim ony , the district court rule d that the g ov e rnme nt c ou ld i mpe a c h H ug he s w ithwh a t he ha d to ld the I RS a bo ut h is r e a so ns fo r f

a ili ngto file re turns and the r esea

rch he had done on the issue. I t is established that evidenc e which is not admiss i b l e fo r one pur pose may be re levant

an d ad m i s s i b l e for another

. United States v. Abe l , 469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984). F urther, w hen a defe ndant choos es t o t ake the stand, “his cr edibility may be impeac hed and his testimony assailed l ike that of a

ny other witness.” Brown v. United States , 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958). A defe ndant “‘ has no rig ht to set forth to the ju ry al l t h e facts which tend in his favor without laying himself ope n to a cr oss-examination upon those facts.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Fitzpatri ck v . United States , 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900)). Conseque ntly , even t h o ug h Hug hes’ “ relianc e pac kag e”No. 08-1306

The F irst Circ uit a ddresse d a similar seque nce of events in United States v. Bonne au , 970 1 F.2d 929 (1st Cir. 1992). The Bonneau c ourt he ld t hat e ve n w he n e vid e nc e is d e e me d in a dmi ssi ble under Cheek, when a

defen d ant takes the stand to profe ss rea sons why he did not pay

taxes, the prosec utor is “entitled to prove that the d ef en d ant held other

beliefs- -whe ther c onstitut ional or philosophical--that pe rsuade d him not to pay taxes.” Id. at 933. -11- materia ls were no t admissible to neg ate willfulness unde r Cheek, there was no e rror in permitting the g ov e rnme nt t o im

pe a c h H ughe s’ c re dib ili ty wi th h is c on tr a dic tor

y state me nts re g ard inghis

re a so ns fo r n ot p ay ingta xes. 1 Hu g he s op e ne d the do or to the g ov e rnme nt’ s imp e a c hme nt wh e n he of fe re d pot ent ial ly leg itimate rea sons for fa iling to p ay t ax es. C onsequently , his arg ument that the district court

e rr e d b y a dmi tti ngimp e a c hme nt e vid e nc e la c ks me ri t. C. Hug hes also ar g ues th at t h e d i strict court a bused its discretion by

admitting the testimony of three g overnme nt witnesses on rebuttal. A district c ourt has broa d discretion to deter mine the

s co p e o f ev i d ence to admit on rebuttal. United States v. Caraway , 411 F.3d 679, 683 ( 6th Cir. 2005). Evidenc e introduce d on rebuttal ty pically serve s t o “‘ re but new evide nce or new theor ies pr of fe re d in the de fe nd ant’s case -i n- c hie f, ’ a nd is n ot l imi te d b y

the fa c t th a t th e pla int if

f c ou ld have introduc ed the pr offe red e v i d en ce in his ca se-in-c hief.” Id. (q u o t i n g Bene dict v. United States , 822 F.2d 1426, 1428 ( 6th Cir. 1987)). The fir st rebuttal wi t n es s called by the g overnme nt was Stan Smoli nski, Hug hes’ br otherin-law a nd a re tired I RS employ ee. Smolinski testifi ed that he wa s employ ed for 27 y ear s as an I RS m anag er, but that Hug hes neve r aske d him any questions about tax l aws, the ta x ability of Social Security

pay ments or pension i ncome, or the Six teenth Amendme nt. At trial, Hug hesNo. 08-1306

-12- ob je c te d to Smo li ns ki’ s te sti mony , a rguin g that he wa s an im pr op e r r e bu tta l w itn e ss b e c a us e Hug hes did not mention Sm olinski i n his own case -in-chie f. The g over n m en t ar gued that Smoli n s k i c o n tr a d ic te d H u g h e s ’ a s s e rti o n th a t h e h a d a g o o d

- f a it h b e li e f th a t h e w a s n o t r equire d to p ay ta xes. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt he ld t hat hi s te sti mony

wa s a dmi ssi ble, e x pl ain in g to de fe ns e
c o u n s e l th a t “ [t ]h e w h o le th in g a b o u t g o o d

- f

a it h b e li e f c a me in d

u r in g y o u r c a s e r a th e r

than the g overnme nt’s case . I m ea n t hey put in a lot of evidenc e to support – or, c ontradict that. B ut he’s the one that sa id he had a g ood-fa ith belief.” ( Trial Tr. at 470-71

. ) A r e vie w o f t

he re c or d s up po rt s th e c ourt ’s ru lin g . H ug he s d id p re se nt e vid e nce in hi s
case that the I RS was either i nacc essible or unc ooperative, and he a sserted a g ood-fa ith belief that he wa s n ot r e qu ir ed to pay ta xes. I t w a s n ot a

n a bu se of dis c re tio n f

or the dis tr ic t c ourt

to ad m i t the testimony

to establish that Smol inski was a potential sourc e of ta x advice but that Hu gh es never aske d him a tax-related que stion. Accordingto the testimony of a f ormer
em p l o y er, H ug hes had state d that he had r ece ived advice from Smolinski . Moreove r, Hug hes ha d th e op po rt

un ity to e xpla in w hy

he did no t c ho os e to c on ta c t Smo lin sk i, a nd he wa s f re e to argue that he w as under

no obligation to do so. I t is therefor e fa ir to conclude that the district court did not abuse the “broa d discretion” it has to de termine the s co p e o f ev i dence to admit on rebuttal. See Caraway , 411 F.3d at 683. L ikewise, Hug hes ar g ues t h at t h e d i strict court a bused its discretion when it allowe d Paula Cochra

n to testify

on rebuttal. Cochr an testified t hat (1) she had bee n mistaken in her previous t es t i m o n y

when she sug g ested that only corpor ations or par

tnerships may

deduct business lo s s es ; (2) that individuals may also take business losses; and ( 3) that Hug hes’ lossesNo. 08-1306

-13- wer e limited to $3,000 a y ear under I RS reg ulations. Hug hes ar gu es t h at h er testimony was not limit ed to re buttal testimony , and th at s h e was called to clar ify information that she ha d offe red in her own te stimony . Howeve r, Hug hes off ers no supp o rt fo r t he conc lusion that the admission

o f t h i s testimony

was a n abuse of

discretion. “A lthough [a] dist rict cour t can limit rebuttal testimony , it is n o t r e qu ir e d to d o s o an d it is n o t an a b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n n o t to im p o se such a limit .” Un ite d S

tat es v . R ay bo rn , 495 F.3d 328, 344 ( 6th Cir. 2007). The t h i rd rebuttal witness was B ruce Har ris, a for mer I RS employ ee w ho testified that Hug hes purc hased his “r eliance packa g e” f rom Be nson, a known tax p ro tester a nd promoter of tax pro te s te r mate r ia ls

. H ar r is te s ti f ie d th a t in F e b r

u ar y o f 2 0 0 4 , H u g h e s an d B e n s o n c arr ied a bo x of t a x pro te ste r m a te ri a ls i nto the Gr and Ra pi ds I RS off

ice and de mand e d to me e t w ithhim

a bo ut t he ma te ri a ls. He stated th at whe n H ug he s e nte re d h is o ff ic e , H ug he s h and e d h im a “Power of Attorney” for

m authorizing B enso n t o speak on H ug hes’ be half, a nd that Be nson stated that “ w e’r e building our g ood-fa ith belief ea

rly .” Hug hes argu es t h at t his testimony included impermissible hea rsay evidenc e. Howe ver, the evidenc e shows that Hug hes intended f or Ben s on to act as his ag ent and that Hug hes prese nted the Power

of Attorney

for that pur

pose. This Co u rt h as advised that a statement is not hear say if it is offe red ag ainst a party and is “ a statement by the party ’s ag ent o r s er vant

conce rning a m at t er within the scope of the ag ency or employ

ment, made dur ing the exis tence of the re lationship.” United States v. W iedyk, 71 F.3d 6 0 2 , 605 (6th Cir. 1995) (c iting F ed. R. Evid. 801(d)( 2)(D) ).No. 08-1306

-14- Moreove r, there is evidence that even if Be nson was not Hug hes’ leg al ag ent, Hug hes adopted a ny statements B enson made . A cour t is permitted to allow into evidence a stat ement as non-hea rsay if the statement is off

ere d ag ainst a par

ty and “is a stat em en t o f which the party has

manif e ste d a n a do pti on

or be lie f i n it s tr

uth .” F e d. R. E vid . 8 01 (d )( 2) (B ); see als o United States v. Jinadu , 98 F.3d 239, 244 ( 6th Cir. 1996 ) (e x p laining that adoption can be manifested by any appropr iate mea

ns, such as languag e, conduc t, or silence). Her e, Hug hes’ c onduct in prese nting Be nson as his repr esentative, as we ll a s h i s s i l en ce w hen B enson dec lare d that the mater ials were

su bmi tte d to bu ild

a g oo d- fa ithbe lie f t

hat H ug he s w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to pa y inc ome ta xes, ind ic a te that he a do pte d B e ns on ’s state me nts . A c c or din g ly , we h old tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n b y

a dmi tti ngHa

rr is’ te sti mony

on re bu tta l. II. I n h i s s e c o n d a s s i g n m e n t o f e r r o r , H u g h e s ar g u e s t h a t h e w a s d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o a fa ir trial due to prose cutorial misconduct be caus e t h e g overnme nt: (1) eng ag ed in improper a nd prejudicia l cross-e x amination of Hugh es at t ri al; (2) e licited improper r ebuttal evidenc e; and ( 3) eng ag ed in fore nsic misconduct in its arg ument to the jury

. Th is C ourt

g e ne ra lly

re vie ws d

e novo t he question of whe ther prose cutorial misconduct require s reve rsal. United States v. Stove r , 474 F.3d 904, 914 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Howeve r, whe n, as he r e , a d e f

e n d an t d o e s n o t o b

j e c t t o t h e p r o s e c u t o r ’ s s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i a l , t h i s C o u rt w i l l on ly

reve rse f or plain er

ror. United States v. Y

oung , 4 70 U. S. 1 , 6 (1 98 5) ; U n it e d S ta te s v . Co k er , 514 F.3d 562, 567 ( 6th Cir. 2008).No. 08-1306

-15- Plain error re v i ew r equire s a cour t to determine whe ther “ (1) a n err or occ urre d in the district court; (2) the err or wa s ob v i o u s or cle ar; (3) the er ror a ffe cted de fenda

nt’s substantial rig hts; and (4) this adver se imp act seriously aff ecte d the fa irness, integ rity , or public re putation

o f th e ju d ic ia l p r o c e e dings.” Un i t ed Stat es v. Em uegbunam , 268 F.3d 377, 406 ( 6th Cir. 2001); Fe d. R. Crim. P

. 5 2(b). “ Only in exceptional circumstanc es in which the e rror is so plain that the tri al j u d ge and prosecutor we re de relict in counte nancingit will t his court re verse a convic tion under the plain-er

ror standa rd.” Emuegbunam , 268 F.3d at 406. When review ing c laims of pro s ec u t o ri al misconduct, this Court first determines whe ther the statements we re imprope r. Stover , 474 F.3d at 915. T h en , if they appea r improper , the Court should “loo k t o s ee if they wer e fla g rant a

nd war rant re versa l.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted).

“ To det erm ine fl a g ra

nc y , th e sta

nd ard se t by thi s Co ur

t is : 1) wh e the r t

he state me nts tended to mislead the jury or pre judice the de fe n d an t ; 2 ) whether the statements we re isolated or among a ser ies of improper statements; 3 ) wh et h er the statements we re de liberate ly or
acc identally

befor e the jury ; and 4 ) the total streng th of the evide nce a g ainst the ac cused.” United States v. Tocc o , 200 F.3d 401, 420 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Flag rantly improper r emar

ks by the pr os e c uto r r e qu ir e re ve rs a l. How e ve r, if the pr os e c uto r’ s r e mark s are no t f la g ra nt, the n th is Court will only

reve rse “ if proof of

[t he def

endant’ s] guilt was not ov er wh elming, [the defe ndant] objected to the improper rema rks, and the co u rt fa i l ed to cure the er ror with an admonishment to the jury .” Stover , 474 F.3d at 915 (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . Ca rro ll , 26 F.3d 1380, 1390 (6th Cir. 1994)).No. 08-1306

-16- A. Hu g he s f ir st a rgue s th a t th e g ov e rnme nt c omm itt e d p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du ct in it s c ro sse xami n a t i o no f

H u g h e s . H u g h e s s t a t e s t h a tt h e g o v e r n m e n t e xp l o d e d i n t o a “ b ar r a g e o f v i t r i o l” ag ainst Hug hes, that in some ca ses the g overnme nt did not permit h i m t o an s wer questions, and that th e pro sec uto r a sk e d th e same qu e sti on s r e pe a te dly , d e sp ite the ob je c tio ns of

de fe ns e
coun s el. Hughes doe s not point t o specific statements that wer e improper and fla g rant; instead he a pp e ars to c ha lle ng e the pr os e c uto r’ s sty le on a mor e g e ne ra l le ve l. We rej ect the se arguments beca

use Hug hes has n o t s h o wn t hat the comments we re imprope r or that they “tende d t o m i s l e a d

t h e j u r y o r p r e j u d i c e t h e d e f

e n d an t ” a s r e qu i r e d

b y Tocco , 2 0 0 F

. 3 d

a t 4 2 0. Mo re ov e r, Hu g he s h a s n ot d e mon str ate d that th e se c omm e nts “ se ri ou sly a ff e c te d th e fa ir

ne ss, integ rity , or public re putation of the judicial proc ee d i n gs” as r equire d under the plain-er ror standard. See Emuegbunam , 268 F.3d at 406. Hug hes also states that the g overnme nt inquired into attorney -client privileg ed

c omm un ic a tio n, de mand ingto k no w w hat a tto rn e y s H ug he s c on su lte d w ithand wha t he to ld them. Howeve r, the re cord r eflect s otherwise. H ug hes testified that he rec eived a “re liance letter” from an a

ttorney named Guy

Curtis in a packa g e o f materia ls he boug ht from B enson. The prose cution inquired as to whe ther he knew Curtis was a n attorney , and Hug hes testified that he thoug ht he was. The re w as no evide nce that Curtis was Hug hes’ attor n ey , o r t h at the pr os e c uti on

inq uir e d a bo ut con fi de nti a l c omm

un ic a tio ns be tw e e n Cu

rt is a nd Hu g he s. Hu g he s’ claim reg arding prosec utorial misconduct as a result of a violation of the at t orney -client pr ivi le g e the re fo re la c ks me ri t.No. 08-1306

-17- Finally , Hug hes ar g ues that the g overnme nt improperly interjec ted fa cts not in evidence into the questions asked of Hug hes. M ore spe cifica lly , he alleg es that the prose cutor interje cted “fa cts” that B enson wa s twice c onvicted of ta x evasion, a nd that courts have reje cted the

argume nt t

hat th e Sixte e nth

Am e ndme nt w a s n ot p ro perly ratif ie d. Ag a in, Hu g he s f

a ils to establish that the questions wer e imprope r, t h at they “tende d to misl ead the jury or pre judice the defe ndant[,] ” or that they “ser iously

aff ecte d t h e fairness, integ rity , or public re putation of the judicial proce eding s.” See Tocco , 200 F.3d at 420 (prosec utorial mi sconduct standa rd) ; Emuegbunam , 268 F.3d at 406 (plain err or standar d). More o v er , l ea d ing que stions are permissible on cross- examination under Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 611(c)

. I n sum, beca

use Hu gh es d o es not establish that any alleg ed prose cutorial c onduct was flag rant, or that he ca

n meet the plain e rror

standard, w e re

ject his cl aim that the g overnme nt

c omm itt e d p ro se c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t in its c ro ss- e xami natio n o f H ug he s. B. Hug hes also ar g ues that t h e governme nt’s introduction of re buttal testimony constituted prosec utorial misconduct. This argument mirrors Hug hes’ a rg ument that the district court abuse d its discretion in its evidentiary ruling s when it admitted such testi m o n y . This claim does not

su pp or t a fi nd in g o f prose c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t be c a us e , a s d isc us se d a

bo ve , n o e rr or

oc c ur re d in the admission of the re buttal evidence . Moreove r, Hug hes make s no argument t h at the evidenc e was pre sented with the de liberate intent to mis lead the j u ry o r t hat it prejudice d him, as require d b y Tocco , 200 F.3d at 420, and he ha s not arg ued that any alleg ed er

ror c o n s t i t u t es p lain err or. We t he re fo re re

je c t th is c la im.No. 08-1306

-18- C. Finally , Hug hes ar g ues that the g overnme nt committed mult iple instances of prosec utorial mis c on du c t du

ri ngc los ingargume nts . F ir st, Hu g he s argue s th a t the govern ment e ng a g e d in improper a

rg uments in closing b y at t em p t ing “ to ge t some shock value out of the fa ct that de fe nd ant h a d a

re la tiv e tha

t w or ke d f or the I RS” and

by arguin g that H ughes was ob lig a te d to consult with a distant relative ab o u t his tax obligations and beliefs. How ever , Hug hes does not prese nt any

leg al support for his argum ent to establish why he believe s that the comments wer e improper, a

nd if so, whether

they wer e fla g ran t
. M oreove r, this Court has held that in closing arguments, prosec utors may argue that a jur

y can dr aw r easona

ble infer ence s from the e vidence prese nted at trial. See U

nited States v. Roach , 502 F.3d 425, 434 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Next, Hug hes rea sserts his a rg ument that the prosec utor improperly submitt ed ev i d ence that Be n s o n wa s co nvicted of ta x evasion a nd that the cour

ts have re jected the notion that the Si x t ee nth Amendment was not prope rly ratified. H oweve r, Hug hes testified at trial that he knew that B e n s o nw a s tw ic e c o n v ic te d o f tax e v a s io nan d

th a t h e kn e w th a t t

h e Si xte e n th

A me n d me nt ratifica tion arg ument had bee n reje cted by the cour ts. This arg ument there fore lacks mer it. Third, Hug hes ar g ues that the g overnme nt improperly vouched f

or its witnesses and bolstered its theory

of the c ase by

st at i n g, “we all know [the income is] taxable. We all know that

any re a so na ble pe rs on

kn ow s th a t [in c ome is] taxab le .” (T ri a l T r. a t 53 0. ) A g a in, Hu g he s f a ils to explain why

he b e li e v e s th a t th e c o mm e n ts w e r e im p r o p e r , an d if s o , w h y th e y w e r e f la g r an t. As dis c us se d a

bo ve , in c los ingargume nts , prose c uto rs may argue that a

jur y c an d ra w r e a so na

bleNo. 08-1306

-19- in f e r e n c e s f r o m th e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d at trial. S

ee R oach , 502 F.3d at 434. Hug hes has not shown that the ar g uments were improper. Four th, Hug hes ar g ues that, in its rebuttal ar gument, the g overnme nt “marg inalized and denig rate d the def

ense a nd defe nse counse l.” (Appe llant’s Br . at 49.) He cit es passa g es whe re the g ov e rnme nt e xpre sse d s arc a sm, su c h a s th e pr os e c uto r’ s st a te me nt t hat, “ [De fe ns e c ouns e l] had to s ay s o m et h i n g. Isat there g lad that I asked one of my

witnesses whe re Munith was so that [de fense cou ns e l] di dn ’t

a c c us e the g ov e rnme nt o f f a ili ngto p ro ve to you

wh e re Munit

h w a s w ith his long list of other irrele vancie s that we didn’t prove, like what kind of an I RA i s t h i s . ” ( T ri al Tr

. a t 54 8. ) H ow e ve r, thi s r e mark , li ke many of the pr os e c uto r’ s r e mark s, wa s a re sp on se to de fe ns e argume nts . In th is e xamp le , th e de fe ns e ha d a rgue d th a t th e g ov e rnm ent, wi th i ts “awes o m e p o wer” and “ almost unlim ited resour ces” had fa iled to addre ss “major que stions that have not be en answ ere d” such a s whether Hug hes had a

Roth or simpl e I RA. (Trial Tr . at 543- 46.) This Court has advised that a “pr osecutor is ordina rily entitled to wid e l atitude in rebuttal argument and may

fairly respond to ar g uments made by def en s e co unsel.” An ge l v . O v e rb e rg , 682 F.2d 605, 607- 608 (6th Cir. 1982). I n sum, Hug hes fa ils to es t ablish that the prosec utor’s ar g uments in closing we re imp roper, of if they

wer e, that they

wer e so flag rant a s to warr ant a r ever sal of convic tion. See Tocco , 2 00 F .3 d at 42 0- 21 . M or e ov e r, he fa ils to e sta bli shthat any

a lle g e d e rr or

c on sti tut e s p la in

err or. Ac cording ly , we ho l d t h at the g overnme nt did not commit reve rsible prosec utorial misconduct in this case. CO NC LU SIONNo. 08-1306

-20- For the re asons stated a

bove, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.