C O U R T O F A P P E A LS EI GHTH D I STRI CT OF TEXAS ELPASO, TEXAS

I N RE: CEL ADON T RUCKI NG SERVI CES, I

NC., Relator. § § § § § § No . 0 8- 07 -0 00 76 -C V

An Or i gi n al P ro ce ed i n g In M and amus

O P I N I O N Relator, Celadon Tr

uckingService s, I nc. (Cela don) see ks mandamus re lief fr om an orde r
e n t e r e d b y t h e H o n o r a

b l e P a t r i c k

M
. G ar c i a , J u d g e o f

th e 3 8 4 thD i s tr i c tC o urto f E l P a s o C o u n ty, denying a motion to quash the notice of deposition of its Chief Executive Offic er Stephe n Russell. W e find that the r eal pa rties in interest did not establish that Mr. Russell has any unique or super ior knowledg e of f acts in the unde rlying c ase; ther efor e, we will conditionally g rant the relief reque sted. This mandamus proce edingarises out of a n employ ment dispute filed by

former Celadon Tr uc kin g e mpl oy e e s, Mari o M art ine z an d M anu e l L un a . M r. Ma

rt ine z an d M r. Lun a , b oth El Paso residents, we re e mploy ed by Celadon as truc k drivers. The two men suffe red se rious injuries when a

tire on the Celadon tr actor trailer the y

wer e drivingfailed a

nd cause d a collision. Both men w ere initially

treated for the ir injuries in El Paso. Celadon later move d both men to a
c omp any -o wn e d lo c a tio n in I nd iana wh e re the y

re c e ive d f

ur the r t re a tme nt, and

wh e re the ir employ ment was ultimately

terminated.The trial c ourt g rante d Celadon’s motion for summary judgme nt on many

of 1 Mr. Martinez’s cla ims. The rema ining c auses have bee n expressly limit ed to wrong ful termination, fra

ud, fra udulent inducement, a

nd neg lige nt misreprese ntation. The fr aud and misrepre sentation claims have been f urther limited to Mr. Martinez’s alleg ation that a Celadon repr esentative made misstatements re lated to obtaining his relea se for light duty

work. -2- Acc ording to the petitions, Celadon contacte d Mr. Martinez and Mr. L una’s medic al pr ov ide rs in E l Pa so wi tho ut a uth or izatio n a

nd ob ta ine d me dic a l r e le a se s f or the me n to tr ave l. Once they

arr ived in I ndiana, the me n alleg e they wer e for ced to live in substandar d company housing, where their complaints re g ardingthe living c onditions were ig nored. Mr . Martinez and Mr. Luna also c laim their Indiana phy sicians ig nored the ir medica l complaints, and ultimately the company discontinued their medica l benef its. Both claim Celadon c oerc ed them into signing leg al documents, whic h they could not rea d, and did not understand. Ce ladon then paid e ach
man w hat th e c omp any

re fe rr e d to a s a

“ se ttl e me nt” un de r I

nd iana law, and te rm inate d th e ir
e mpl oy me nt. Mr. Martinez and Mr. L

una brought suit aga inst Celadon under a varie ty of theorie s of lia bil ity inc lud ing : f

ra ud ; ne g lig e nc e ; in te nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss; fa lse i mp r i s o n m e n t ; i n v a s i o no f p r i v a c y; c o n s p i r a c y; an d

w r o n g f u l t e r m i n a t i o n . D ur i n g d i s c o v e r y, 1 they serve d a notice of

intention to take the deposition of Mr. Stephen Russell, Celadon’s c hief executive offic er. Cela don responde d by filing a motion to quash the notice, arguing that Mr. Russell was entitled to protec tion under the guidelines of Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Ga rc ia , 9 04 S.W. 2d

12 5 ( Te x. 19 95 ). In a

n a ff ida vit fi le d in su pp or t of the mot ion , M r. Rus se ll state d th a t he ha s n o p e rs on a l kn ow le dg e of fa c ts r e le va

nt t o th e laws uit
. I n response to Mr. Russell’s affidavit, Mr. Martinez and Mr. L una submitted deposition testimony from the c hairman of

the Indiana Worker ’s Compensation Commi ssion, G. Terr ence-3-

Coriden. Acc ording to Mr. Coriden’s testimony , Celadon’s top executive attended a me eting wi th m e mbe rs of

the c omm iss ion

so me tim e in t

he late 19 90 ’s to d isc us s Ce la do n’ s a pp lic a tio n to become self-insure d within the I ndiana wor ker’ s compensation sy stem. The Celadon e x ecutive,
was a ccompa

nied by sever al company

attorney s at the mee ting. In support of the c ompany ’s application for

self-insura

nce, the Celadon off

icial explained the org anization’s prac tice of treating e mploy ee injurie s in company dormitories. Duringthe meeting , Mr. Coriden explained that only I ndiana’ s top employ ers we re a pproved f or self- insurance by

the commission, and he
e xpre sse d c on c e rn s r e g ard ingCe la do n’ s d or mit or y sy ste m and

its a bil ity to p ro vid e a de qu a te treatment for employ ees who wer e not re sidents of Indiana. Cela don’s application for self-insura

nce w as later

approve d, in part base d on assura nces ma de by

the Celadon e x ecutive who attende d the meeting . Mr. Martinez and Mr. L una maintain Mr. Coriden’ s testimony
re butte d M r. Rus se ll’ s st a te me nt t hat he ha s n o uniq

ue or su pe ri or kn ow le dg e of

fa c ts r e late d to their cla ims. They

argue, Mr. Coriden’ s testimony established that Mr. Russell has knowledg e of statements made to the Commission which are rele vant to their cla ims ag ainst Celadon. The tria l court a g ree d, and denie d Celadon’s motion to quash. Celadon ar g ues the trial c ourt’s orde r violates the ape x depositions guidelines, a nd is subject to mandamus relief pursuant to Cro wn Central
. Relief by writ of manda

mus is only

appropr iate to cor

rec t a clea

r abuse of discre tion. See W alker v . Pack

er , 8 27 S.W. 2d

83 3, 83 9- 40 (T e x. 19 92 )( or ig . p ro c e e din g ); In reEl Pa so He alt hc ar e Sy s. , 969 S.W .2d 68, 72 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1998, orig . proce eding ). In addition, there must be no other ade quate r emedy at law. W

alker , 827 S.W .2d at 840. A clea r abuse of discre tion, warra nting c orre ction by

mandamus, occ urs when a court-4-

issues a dec ision which is without a lega l basis, or support in g uiding pr inciples of law. See J oh ns on v . F

ou rth Cou rt o

f A pp e als , 7 00 S.W. 2d

91 6, 91 7 ( Te x. 19 85 )( or ig . p ro c e e din g ). With respe ct to the re solution of fact issues or matters committed to the trial court’ s discretion, a revie wing court may

not substit ute its judgment for that of the trial c ourt. W alker , 827 S.W .2d at 839-40. The r ealtor must there fore establish that the trial cour t could rea sonably

have r eac hed only one dec ision. Id . E ve n if the re vie wi ngc ourt

wo uld have de c ide d th e iss ue dif fe re ntl y , it cannot disturb the tria l court’s de cision unless it is s hown to be ar bitrary and unre asonable
. Id
. On the other

hand, a tr ial court ha s no “discre tion” in determiningwhat the law is or in applying the law to the f

acts. Braden v. M

arquez , 9 5 0 S
. W
. 2 d

1 9 1 , 1 9 3 (T ex . Ap p . -- E l P as o 1 9 9 7 , o ri g. proce eding ). Thus, a c lear failure to analy

ze or apply

the law c orre ctly

will constitut e an a

buse of discretion, and ma

y result in appellate reve rsal by extraordinary

writ. In re : E l P as o H

e ath c ar e Sy s. , 969 S.W .2d at 72. A wr it of mandamus is the proper vehicle to attack an or der granting discovery
. Id
. Gene rally , a par

ty is entitled to discovery

that is releva

nt to the subject matter of the claim, and whic h appea

rs re asonably

calc ulated to lead to the disc overy of admissible evidenc e. See T EX .R.C IV .P. 19 2. 3( a ); Crown Central Petroleum Corp. , 904 S.W .2d at 127. Parties ar e g ener ally permitted to take the deposition of, “any person.” Id . The pe rson noticed f or deposition, however , has the rig ht to protection from, “ undue burde n, unnece ssary expense, hara ssment or annoy ance , or investig ation of per sonal, constitutional, or proper ty rig hts.” See In re: El Paso He althcare Corp. , 969 S.W .2d at 72-3. Whe n th e dis c ov e ri ngpa

rt y se e ks to d e po se a

high le ve l c or

po rate of fi c ia l, t he of fi c ia l (or the c orporation on the official’ s behalf) , may file a motion for pr otective or der to prohibit the-5-

deposition under the Cro wn C e ntral g uidelines. See I

n re: Alc atel USA, Inc

. , 11 S.W .3d 173, 175 (Tex. 2000)(orig . proce eding ). A pa rty initiates the protections of the a pex depositi on doctrine by

moving f or a pr otective or der to pre vent the ape x officia l’s deposition. Id . The motion shoul d be supported by the offic ial’s af

fidavit deny

ing a ny knowledg e of r eleva

nt fac ts. Id
. T h e b u r d e nt h e ns h i f

t s t o t h e d i s c o v e r

y p r o p o n e n tt o ar g u a

b l y s h o w th a tth e o f

f i c i a l h a s an y, “unique or

superior pe rsonal knowledg e of discove rable information.” Id . at 175-76. I f the discoveringparty

is unable to make suc h a showing , the trial cour t should gra

nt the motion. Id
. at 176. Ther eaf

ter, the de position shoul d not go f orwa rd abse nt a demonstration by the dis c ov e ri ngpa

rt y that: ( 1) the re is a

re a so na ble ind ic a tio n th a t th e of

fi c ia l’ s d e po sit ion

is calc ulated to lead to the disc overy of admissible evidenc e; and ( 2) that less intrusive mea ns of discovery are unsatisfac tory , insufficient, or ina dequate
. Id
. I n it s so le iss ue pr e se nte d f or re vie w, Ce la do n a

rgue s th e tr ia l c ourt

c le arl y a bu se d it s discretion by

denying the motion for protec tive order filed to preve nt Mr. Russell’s deposition. Ac co rd i n g t o t h e a ff

i d av i tat t ac h edt o C el ad o n ’s m o t i o n , as C
. E
. O. o f C el ad o nT ru ck i n g, Mr. Russell was not involved with the day -to-day manag ement of individual trucke rs. Mr. Russell further stated that he ha d no persona l knowledg e of f acts re lated to the lawsuit as he did not directly

supervise or

control the a ctivities of Mr. Luna or Mr . Martinez. He wa s not
awa re of the worke r’s c ompensation claims filed by Mr. Luna and Mr . Martinez until the laws uit s w e re fi le d, and

did no t pa rt ic ipate in a

ny de c isi on makin g re g ard ingho w tho se c la ims would be handle d by

the company . He c oncludes by stating that he has no unique or persona l kn ow le dg e of

dis c ov e ra

ble inf or matio n r e late d to the laws uit
. The re al par

ties in interest do not dispute that this depositi on was suff icient to support-6-

Celadon’s motion. The primar y dispute is whether e x cer

pts from Mr. Coriden’s de position
argua bly sh ow s th a t Mr . Ru sse ll h a s any un iqu e or

su pe ri or pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e of

dis c ov e ra

ble information. An individual has unique or supe rior knowledg e whe n he or she is the only person with personal knowle dg e of the information soug ht or that arguably possesses re levant knowledg e g reater in quality or quantity

than other a

vailable sourc es. In re: Alcatel USA, I nc. , 11 S.W .3d at 179. Mr. Martinez and Mr. L

una do not dispute that other pe ople, including other Celadon repr esentatives, attended the meetingdescr ibed by Mr. Coriden. Instead they argue the e vidence indicates Mr. Russell per sonally made state ments conce rning Celadon’s dormitory sy stem and t h e h ar d s h i p s i tp o s edfo r o u t -o f- s t at e e mp l o y ee s an d th er ef o re h as un i qu e o r s u

p er i o r kn o wl ed ge of the c or po ratio n’ s p oli c ie s, the a c tio ns take n b a se d o n th os e po lic ie s, the purp os e be hin d th e m,
and the c omp any ’s kn ow le dg e and int e nti on s. This argument amounts to lit tle more than a n alleg ation that as the c hief e x ecutive, Mr. Russell has specia liz ed insig ht into C eladon’ s corpor ate de cision making . An ape x de po sit ion

wi ll n ot b e pe rm itt e d b a se d o n a c la im that th e of

fi c ia l ha s k

no wl e dg e of

c or po ra te policy , or ultimate responsibility for c orporate dec isions. Se e In re : E l P as o H e ath c ar e Sy

s. , 969 S.W .2d at 74. At most, Mr. Russell’s presence at the mee ting e stablishes that he has some know ledg e of discovera ble information. The first step in the Crown Central g uidelines requir es more tha n “some knowle dg e” of

discovera

ble information. In re: Alcatel USA, I nc. , 11 S.W .3d at 179. Th e dis c ov e ri ngpa

rt y mus t ma ke so me sh ow ing

be y on d me re re le va

nc e , “ su c h a s e vid e nc e that a high- level executive is the only person with per sonal knowledg e of the information soug ht or thatShould good fa ith effor ts to obtain the information throug h less intrusive means prove 2 inadequate, Mr. Mar

tinez and Mr. Luna may

return to the tr ial court a

nd reque st that the protec tive order

be vac ated or

modified. See Crown Central Petroleum Corp. , 904 S.W .2d at 128. -7- the executive ar g uably

possesses re levant knowledg e g reater in quality or quantity

than other available source s.” Id . T he re is n oth ingin t he re c or d at th is s ta g e in t he pr oc e e din g to i nd ic a te that Mr. Russell’s knowledg e of Cela don’s discussion with the Commi ssion is superior to the kn ow le dg e of

the oth e rs wh o atte nd e d th e me e tin g . Witho ut s uc h e vid e nc e , a nd a bs e nt a sh ow ingthat Mr . M art ine z an d M r. Lun a have a tte mpt e d to ob ta in t he inf or matio n thro ug h le ss intrusive means, the tria l court had no discr etion to allow the deposition to procee d. Se e id . at 2 181. B e c a

us e the tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

de nyingCe la do n’ s mo tio n to qu a sh Mr . Ru sse ll’ s d e po sit ion , w e c on dit ion a lly g ra nt t he c omp any ’s pe tit ion

fo r wri t of

mand amus . We a re c on fi de nt t

he tr ia l c ourt

wi ll v a c a te its or de r i n a c c or da nc e wi th t his op ini on . T he wr it will issue only

if the trial cour

t fails to comply

with this opi nion.

J une 19, 2008 DAVI D WEL L I NGTONCHEW, C hief Just ice B e f o r e C h e w , C
. J. , M c C l u r e , a n d C ar r , JJ.