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1 While the BAP docket is captioned with the correct

spelling of the Appellant’s name “Carter Stephens,” the

bankruptcy docket is captioned incorrectly as “Carter Stevens.”

2 This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

-1-

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-12-1144-DHKi

)

MARCELO BRITTO GOMEZ, ) Bk. No. 11-26905-TBD

)

Debtor. ) Adv. No. 11-02360-TBD

______________________________)

)

CARTER STEPHENS,1 )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM2

)

LORI SMITH, ESQ.; )

MARCELO BRITTO GOMEZ, )

)

Appellees. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on November 15, 2012

at Pasadena, California

Filed - November 28, 2012

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Thomas B. Donovan, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding Appearances: The Appellant, Carter Stephens, argued pro se;

Douglas Crowder, Esq. argued for Appellee Marcelo

Britto Gomez.

___________________________________

Before: DUNN, HOLLOWELL, and KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judges.

FILED

NOV 28 2012

SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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3 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and

rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-

1532, and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-

9037. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are referred to as

“Civil Rules.”

-2-

Plaintiff, Carter Stephens ("Appellant"), filed an

adversary complaint (“Adversary Proceeding”) seeking to except

from discharge debts owed to Appellant by debtor defendant

Marcelo Britto Gomez ("Appellee") under § 523(a)(2)(A)3

 and

(a)(6) on the bases that the debts arose from Appellee’s false

pretenses and caused Appellant willful and malicious injury,

respectively. Due to the failure of Appellant's attorney to

file status reports timely, appear at status conference

hearings, and respond to discovery requests on several

occasions, as well as Appellant's failure to find new counsel,

the bankruptcy court dismissed the Adversary Proceeding for

failure to prosecute. Appellant filed two subsequent motions

for reconsideration, both of which the bankruptcy court

summarily denied without making separate findings of fact or

conclusions of law. Appellant then appealed from the dismissal

and the denial of the first motion for reconsideration. 

However, the BAP motions panel (1) determined that appellate

jurisdiction existed only to hear the appeal from the denial of

the first motion for reconsideration because Appellant did not

timely appeal the dismissal order and (2) ordered that the scope

of the appeal be limited to denial of the first motion for

reconsideration. We VACATE the bankruptcy court’s order on the

first motion for reconsideration and REMAND for findings of fact

and conclusions of law.
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4 The procedural and substantive details of the motions

panel's decision to limit the scope of review are discussed infra

at notes 7 and 8.

-3-

I. FACTS

The limited record presented in this appeal is not very

helpful or illuminating. To aid our determinations, the Panel

has reviewed the docket and documents filed in the Adversary

Proceeding, Case No. 11-02360-TBD. See O’Rourke v. Seaboard

Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 958 (9th Cir.

1989) (court may take judicial notice of underlying bankruptcy

records).

This appeal is complicated procedurally, as noted above,

because, although Appellant appealed from both the order

dismissing the Adversary Proceeding and an order denying

Appellant's first motion for reconsideration of the dismissal

order, the motions panel limited the scope of review to denial

of the motion for reconsideration filed on February 27, 2012

(“Motion”), as the notice of appeal was untimely as to the

dismissal order.4

 Therefore, the facts set forth below are

limited to those bearing on the Motion.

On April 19, 2011, Appellee filed a voluntary petition for

chapter 7 relief. On June 15, 2011, Appellant filed the 

Adversary Proceeding.

On September 1, 2011, the bankruptcy court held a first

status conference in the Adversary Proceeding. Appellant’s

attorney, Lori Smith (“Smith”), failed to appear or file the

required pre-hearing status report. However, Appellant did

appear and indicated that Appellant believed that Smith would
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5 The motion also was brought pursuant to Local Rule

7041-1(a) which provides that “[a] proceeding that has been

pending for an unreasonable period of time without any action

having been taken therein may be dismissed for want of

prosecution upon notice and opportunity to request a hearing.”

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appear and was handling the case. Appellant also expressed

concern about Smith’s failure to communicate with Appellant and

failure to appear, causing Appellant to proceed without counsel. 

The bankruptcy court explained to Appellant the nature of the

required status report and that Appellant could either terminate

Smith’s representation and obtain new counsel or appear pro se. 

The bankruptcy court further warned Appellant that “[o]ne way or

the other, [Appellant has] to do something to move this case

ahead . . .,” and that after terminating Smith, Appellant would

have personal responsibility to prosecute the Adversary

Proceeding in an effective way. Hr’g Tr. (Sept. 1, 2011) at

7:12-13; 11:3-8. The bankruptcy court emphasized that failure

to file the status report was a ground for dismissal and that a

status report would be required two weeks in advance of the

continued hearing which the bankruptcy court would schedule.

On January 13, 2012, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the

Adversary Proceeding for lack of prosecution under Rule 7041.5

On February 2, 2012, the bankruptcy court held a continued

status conference in the Adversary Proceeding and also

considered Appellee’s motion to dismiss. Again, Smith failed to

file the required status report, but did appear at the hearing. 

The bankruptcy court began by noting that the case was seven

months old. The court then outlined the standards required for

diligent prosecution of the case under the local rules including
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sharing information and communication between the parties. It

concluded that “[the court] pretty consistently [had] not had

much of a showing of any compliance with standards that I’ve

just outlined from the Plaintiff’s side.” Id. at 1:21-25,

2:1-8.

The bankruptcy court initially warned that “[the late

filing of reports] is unacceptable, and if that happens one more

time in this case, this [Adversary Proceeding] will be

dismissed.” Id. at 2:11-13. Further, the court made clear that

“if, [Smith fails] to follow our rules and procedures, as

outlined in our Local rules, and as I’ve announced in this court

to you before, one more time, this case will be dismissed for

lack of diligent prosecution.” Id. at 2:14-17. Before hearing

from Smith, the court concluded by saying that “this case is

wasting a lot of the Defendant’s time. This case is wasting a

lot of the Court’s time, and this is probably one of the busiest

courts in the country.” Id. at 4:2-5. 

Smith first alleged that “there has been a complete and

irredeemable breakdown of relationship between the client and

the attorney.” Id. at 4:16-18. Smith further told the court

that:

[Appellant] has refused to -- to sign a substitution

of attorney. [Appellant] has made a terrorist threat

against me. [Appellant] has been alleged to have

sexually assaulted, on two separate occasions, one of

the women that was working on his case. [Appellant]

has filed a complaint against me with the State Bar. .

. . I’ve been advised to get out of any cases I’m

with [Appellant] as soon as possible. Id. at 5:20-25,

5:1-2.

Smith then asked the bankruptcy court if a court security

officer could accompany Smith out of the courtroom because Smith
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6 Though the record is not entirely clear, the “other

court” hearings are presumably hearings in which Smith was to

appear as Appellant’s attorney in the related prepetition state

court fraud case against Appellee.

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was afraid of Appellant. The bankruptcy court assured Smith

that an escort would be provided. Finally, Smith alleged that

Appellant and Smith did not have a fee agreement which covered

fees related to trial and that Appellant insisted that Smith go

to trial without further payment.

The bankruptcy court then gave Appellant an opportunity to

speak to the allegations to which the Appellant responded that

“100-percent they’re lies.” Id. at 6:21. Appellant told the

court that Appellant had paid Smith an $8,500 retainer, which

Smith had requested, and Smith had failed to appear at six

hearings, including hearings before the bankruptcy court and

hearings in “other courts.”6 Appellant concluded, requesting

from the court time to find new counsel, saying that:

I’m going to need counsel, and since Ms. Smith has not

fulfilled her obligation for the retention and the

retaining by me giving her money, I would like that –

the retainer back so that I can obtain counsel that

are viable, very reliable counsel, so that I can

continue this. Id. at 8:22 - 9:5.

The bankruptcy court then proceeded to dismiss the

Adversary Proceeding for lack of diligent prosecution. As bases

for its ruling, the bankruptcy court noted that the case had

been pending for seven months, and for the court to learn of the

failed relationship between Smith and Appellant at this late

stage was “an inexcusable burden on the [Appellee], and on the

legal process, and on this Court.” Id. at 9:13-20. On February
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7 The motions panel determined that because the Motion 

pursuant to Civil Rule 59 or Civil Rule 60, made applicable in

adversary proceedings by Rule 9023 and Rule 9024 respectively,

was not filed within fourteen days after the Dismissal Order was

entered, the fourteen day time limit to file a notice of appeal

was not tolled pursuant to Rule 8002(b). Therefore, the motions

panel held that no jurisdiction existed to hear the appeal of the

Dismissal Order. However, because the denial of the Motion

itself was appealed within fourteen days, pursuant to

Rule 8002(a), jurisdiction was proper as to denial of the Motion. 

Order of Motions Panel re “motion for extension of time, scope of

appeal & completion of the record” (“Limiting Order”)(granted in

part), May 7, 2012.

8 On June 7, 2012, Appellant filed a “Request for BAP to

Consider Dismissal” which the motions panel considered as an

untimely motion for reconsideration of the Limiting Order. 

Though untimely, the motions panel addressed the merits of the

(continued...)

-7-

8, 2012, the bankruptcy court entered a written order dismissing

(“Dismissal Order”) the Adversary Proceeding for the reasons

stated on the record at the February 2, 2012 hearing. 

On February 27, 2012, Appellant in pro se filed the Motion,

nineteen days after the date of entry of the Dismissal Order. 

On March 1, 2012, the court summarily denied the Motion by

writing “Motion denied” in handwriting in the upper-right corner

of the first page of the Motion, dated and initialed immediately

below. No findings of fact or conclusions of law were docketed

separately, nor written on the face of the Motion.

On March 13, 2012, Appellant filed a notice of appeal

(“Notice”) from the Dismissal Order and the March 1, 2012 denial

of the Motion. On May 7, 2012, the motions panel limited the

scope of the appeal to review of the Motion because the Notice

of Appeal was untimely as to the Dismissal Order,7 but not as to

the Motion.8
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8(...continued)

motion and denied the motion by order entered on August 20, 2012. 

Order of Motions Panel re “Appellant’s request for BAP to

consider dismissal” (denied), August 20, 2012.

9 The Civil Rules do not recognize motions for

reconsideration. Captain Blythers, Inc. v. Thompson (In re

Captain Blythers, Inc.), 311 B.R. 530, 539 (9th Cir. BAP 2004). 

The Civil Rules do provide, however, two avenues through which a

party may obtain post-judgment relief: (1) a motion to alter or

amend judgment under Civil Rule 59; and (2) a motion for relief

from judgment under Civil Rule 60.

-8-

II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 158.

III. ISSUES

1. Whether the bankruptcy court failed to make sufficient

findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow for meaningful

review.

2. Whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in

denying the Motion.

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the bankruptcy court's denial of the Motion for

abuse of discretion.9 Arrow Elecs., Inc. v. Justus

(In re Kaypro), 218 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000); Sewell v.

MGF Funding, Inc. (In re Sewell), 345 B.R. 174, 178 (9th Cir.

BAP 2007). We apply a two-part test to determine objectively

whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion. United

States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir.

2009)(en banc). First, we “determine de novo whether the

bankruptcy court identified the correct legal rule to apply to
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the relief requested.” Id. Second, we examine the bankruptcy

court’s factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. 

Id. at 1262 & n.20. De novo means review is independent, with

no deference given to the trial court's conclusion. See First

Ave. W. Bldg., LLC v. James (In re Onecast Media, Inc.),

439 F.3d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 2006).

Where a party files a motion for reconsideration within

14 days following the date of entry of the judgment or order,

the motion is treated as a motion to alter or amend the judgment

under Civil Rule 59(e). Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v.

N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citation omitted). Such a motion is “analogous to a motion for

new trial or to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to [Civil

Rule] 59 as incorporated by Rule 9023.” United Student Funds,

Inc. v. Wylie (In re Wylie), 349 B.R. 204, 209 (9th Cir. BAP

2006).

However, where the fourteen day time for appeal has

expired, a motion for reconsideration should be construed as a

motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b). Negrete

v. Bleau (In re Negrete), 183 B.R. 195, 197 (9th Cir. BAP

1995)(citing In re Cleanmaster Indus., Inc., 106 B.R. 628, 630

(9th Cir. BAP 1989)(internal citations omitted)). Civil

Rule 60(b) provides that relief may be granted from an order for

several reasons, including (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,

or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; and (3) any
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10 Civil Rule 60(b) provides that:

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party

or its legal representative from a final judgment,

order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable

diligence, could not have been discovered in time to

move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or

extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an

opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or

discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has

been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively

is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

-10-

other reason that justifies relief.10 Relief from judgment for

“any other reason” under Civil Rule 60(b)(6) should be limited

only to exceptional or extraordinary circumstances, and the

moving party bears the burden of establishing the existence of

such circumstances. Negrete, 183 B.R. at 197. In the

circumstances of this appeal, we conclude that analysis under

Civil Rule 60(b) applies.

A motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing an

adversary proceeding is a contested matter under Rule 9014,

subject to Civil Rule 52(a) by incorporation under Rule 7052,

which requires the bankruptcy court to find the facts

specifically and state its conclusions of law separately. In

the absence of complete findings, we may vacate a judgment and

remand the case to the bankruptcy court to make the required

findings or develop further evidence. In re First Yorkshire
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Holdings, Inc., 470 B.R. 864, 871 (9th Cir. BAP 2012)(citing

United States. v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005));

Rule 8013.

V. DISCUSSION

The bankruptcy court failed to make specific findings of fact

and conclusions of law in denying the Motion.

1. Arguments on Appeal

Appellant argues on appeal that gross negligence of counsel

is an appropriate ground for relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b)

from an order of dismissal for failure to prosecute, and,

therefore, the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by denying

the Motion on the facts presented. 

For support, Appellant first cites Cmty. Dental Servs. v.

Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002), where the Ninth

Circuit held that a default judgment may be set aside under the

“catch all” clause of Civil Rule 60(b)(6). Specifically, the

court held that “a party merits relief under Rule 60(b)(6) if he

demonstrates 'extraordinary circumstances which prevented or

rendered him unable to prosecute [his case].'” Id. (citing

Martella v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 448 F.2d 729, 730

(9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)). To be entitled to relief, “the

party must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his

control that prevented him from proceeding with the prosecution

or defense of the action in a proper fashion.” Tani, 282 F.3d

at 1168 (citing United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.,

984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)).

In holding that gross negligence of counsel may provide a

basis for relief, the Tani court distinguished negligent acts of
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counsel, which are attributable to the client under an agency

theory, from the more unusual case of extreme or gross

negligence which is “neglect so gross that it is inexcusable.” 

Id. at 1168. For example, the Tani court cited L.P. Steuart,

Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1964), for the

proposition that “[Civil Rule] 60(b)(6) 'is broad enough to

permit relief when as in this case personal problems of counsel

cause him grossly to neglect a diligent client's case and

mislead the client.'” Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169. Further, even

though a client choosing incompetent counsel typically risks

suffering any negative consequences as a result, a client should

not “suffer the ultimate sanction of losing his case without any

consideration of the merits because of his attorney's neglect

and inattention,” for example where there is evidence of

counsel's “blatant disregard for explicit [court] orders.” Id.

at 1168-69 (citing Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. William Darrah

& Assocs., 796 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1986); Carter v. Albert

Einstein Med. Ctr., 804 F.2d 805, 806 (3d Cir. 1986)). 

Because the appellant's lawyer in the Tani case “virtually

abandoned” the client by failing, inter alia, to proceed despite

court orders, to attend hearings and file papers, and most

especially, by duping the client by representing to the client

that the case was proceeding properly, the Ninth Circuit

ultimately reversed the trial court, which had held the

appellant responsible for the lawyer's failures, and held that

the “unknowing client should not be held liable on the basis of

a default judgment resulting from an attorney's grossly

negligent conduct, and that in such cases sanctions should be
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11 The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the district

court that the appellant's remedy should be a separate action for

malpractice, rather than relief from the default judgment. The

Ninth Circuit reasoned that while malpractice was a possibility,

the remedy was insufficient due to delay, increased load on the

courts, and the uncertainty of receiving a money judgment in a

malpractice action, while the client may have to pay out

substantial sums before the action concludes many years in the

future. Id. at 1171.

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imposed on the lawyer, rather than on the faultless client.” 

Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168, 1171. Underlying the holding, the Tani

court explained that because default is an extreme measure, “the

judicial system loses credibility as well as the appearance of

fairness, if the result is that an innocent party is forced to

suffer drastic consequences.” Id. at 1170.11

Appellant further argues that an attorney's failure to

prosecute a case on behalf of the plaintiff is an “extraordinary

circumstance” under Civil Rule 60(b) warranting relief from an

order of dismissal, citing Lal v. Cal., 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th

Cir. 2010). In Lal, the Ninth Circuit approvingly cited Tani

with respect to default judgments and applied the Tani reasoning

to gross negligence of counsel resulting in dismissal with

prejudice for failure to prosecute. Id. The court reasoned

that “[d]ismissal with prejudice under [Civil] Rule 41(b) for

failure to prosecute is the converse of a default judgment. In

both instances, the consequence of the attorney's action (or

inaction) is a loss of the case on the merits. The only

significant difference is that the plaintiff rather than the

defendant suffers the adverse judgment.” Id. In Lal, the

plaintiff's counsel failed to make disclosures, attend status
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conferences, and attend hearings. Id. at 525. In addition, as

in Tani, the attorney in Lal deliberately misled the client

regarding the status of the case. Id. The Lal court reversed

the trial court and held that the Civil Rule 60(b) motion for

relief should have been granted. Id. at 527.

Appellant alleges by declaration on appeal that Appellant’s

attorney, Smith, failed to file status reports, failed to show

up for several hearings, failed to oppose the motion to dismiss,

failed to respond to discovery requests, failed to return phone

calls, and was untruthful about the status of the case. 

Stephens Dec. (July 2012) at ¶ 2. Further, Smith declared that

she was found guilty by the State Bar of California for, inter

alia, not properly communicating with the Appellant and not

responding to discovery with respect to the Adversary

Proceeding. Smith Dec. (June 11, 2012) at ¶ 3. Smith further

states that Appellant filed the State Bar complaint prior to the

February 2, 2012 hearing at which Smith failed to produce a

status report, failed adequately to explain the failure to

produce discovery, and alleged a total breakdown of

communications with Appellant. Id. at ¶ 2. Smith states

finally that “[b]ecause of my behavior, Mr. Stephens was unable

to present or have presented his case properly. . . .” Id. at

¶ 5. 

In response, Appellee first argues that the Motion should

be treated as a motion pursuant to Civil Rule 59 rather than

Civil Rule 60 because, according to Appellee without reference

to any dates in Appellee's Opening Brief, Appellant filed the

Motion within the fourteen day appeal period. However, Appellee
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is in error because, as noted above, the Motion was filed on

February 27, 2012, nineteen days after the Dismissal Order was

entered. Next, Appellee argues that the bankruptcy court

properly denied the Motion under Civil Rule 60(b), arguing that

Appellant failed to show that any of the Civil Rule 60(b)

conditions were present in this case. Appellee alleges that

Appellant produced no new evidence, nor evidence of fraud, nor

that the order is void, nor finally that the order has been

“satisfied, released, or discharged.” Appellee states that

because Appellant had ample time, after warning from the

bankruptcy court, to change counsel during the eight months

while the case was pending, Appellant was not denied effective

assistance of counsel. Appellee further contends that under the

reasoning of In re Williams, 287 B.R. 787 (9th Cir. 2002),

holding that Appellant has the burden of providing an adequate

record on appeal, the appeal should be dismissed because the

record is inadequate to show that the bankruptcy court abused

its discretion.

2. New Evidence in the Motion for Reconsideration

In the Motion, Appellant urged the court to consider that

the order had been granted “without full facts being presented

in the case.” Though many of the facts asserted in the Motion

are simply reassertions of facts that Appellant alleged during

the two status conference hearings or in other filings,

Appellant alleged that after several requests for return of

Appellant’s file, Smith refused to return Appellant’s complete

file. Appellant further alleged that Appellant did search for

other attorneys and that attorneys with whom he spoke gave
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12 On March 9, 2012, Appellant filed a second motion for

reconsideration of the dismissal of the Adversary Proceeding

(continued...)

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Appellant additional information with respect to Smith’s

difficulties serving clients. Appellant also alleged that on a

weekly basis, Appellant asked Smith’s office to provide status

information and a list of completed activities with respect to

the Adversary Proceeding, which Appellant further alleges was

provided, but which was falsified to include completion of tasks

not actually performed. 

In addition, Appellant gave more specific information about

the larger scope of Smith’s difficulties and Appellant’s

knowledge of those issues by alleging that not until “well into

our history” did Appellant learn that “Smith had been reported

[by four (4)] other clients, with [eleven] incidents, for lack

of doing her job . . . .”

3. Bankruptcy Court's Holding

The court denied the Motion by writing “Motion denied” in

handwriting in the upper-right hand corner of the Motion papers

and initialing immediately below, with nothing more. No

separate findings of fact or conclusions of law were docketed,

nor written on the face of the Motion. Because the bankruptcy

court did not make any findings of fact or conclusions of law

with regard to the Motion, the Panel does not have a basis for

evaluating whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in

this appeal. Therefore, the matter is VACATED and REMANDED to

the bankruptcy court for findings of fact and conclusions of law

pursuant to Rules 7052 and 9014.12
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(“Second Motion”). On March 23, 2012, the bankruptcy court

denied the Second Motion by written order stating in one line

that “Mr. Stephens' Motion for Reconsideration of the order

denying his Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.” Though

not before us, the Panel would not be able to review adequately

denial of the Second Motion any more than the denial of the

Motion in this appeal due to the same lack of findings of fact

and conclusions of law.

-17-

VI. CONCLUSION

The bankruptcy court failed to make specific findings of

fact and conclusions of law on the record sufficient to allow

review of its denial of the Motion when it made only a

handwritten statement on the face of the Motion that the Motion

was denied. Accordingly, we VACATE the order denying the Motion

and REMAND for findings of fact and conclusions of law

consistent with this Memorandum disposition.