#### STATE TO THE USE OF UNDERWOOD, MARSH & CO. vs. JOAB PARKS AND OTHERS.

June 1843

A witness, who is introduced for the purpose of discrediting another witness in the cause, must profess to know the general reputation of the witness sought to be discredited, before he can be heard to speak of his own opinion or of the opinions of others, as to the reliance to be placed on the testimony of the impeached witness. <

The cases of *State*v *Boswell,*3 DeV. 309 ; and *Downey*v *Smith,*I Dev, & Bat. 63, cited and approved.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Randolph County, at Spring Term, 1843, his Honor Judge Battle presiding.

The action was on a Constable’s bond, to which the defendants pleaded “ conditions performed and not broken.” — ■ After the plaintiffs had made out a *•prima facie*case, the defendants, in support of their plea, introduced as a witness, one *Tidence*Lane, who testified, that, some time before the action was commenced, he saw the principal defendant pay to one of the plaintiffs a sum of money larger than that now claimed by the plaintiffs. On the part of the plaintiffs, *Jonathan Worth*was then called to impeach the credibility of Lane, and stated, that he, Worth, had resided for many years in Ashboro’, while Lane lived about twelve miles from that place — that he did not know Lane’s general character in the immediate neighborhood where he lived, but that Lane had been for many years a public man in the county of Randolph, and he had often seen him in Ashboro’ at Court, and on other public occasions, and had heard a great deal said about his character — that he was not certain that he knew his general character — that he did not know whether a majority of those he heard speak of it spoke well or ill of it, but he had *297beard a great many respectable men speak well of Lane’s character, and a great many, equally respectable, speak ill ot it. The plaintiff’s counsel then asked the witness, whether, from his knowledge *joi*Lane’s general character, he would believe him on oath. This question was objected to by the defendant’s counsel, but permitted by the Court; when the witness said he would not believe him, if his story was at all improbable. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for a new trial, because the Court permitted this last question to be asked. The Court overruled the motion and gave judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed.

No counsel for the plaintiffs.

*J. T. Mordicad*for the defendants.

GastoN, J.

It is essential to the *uniform*administration of justice, which is one of the best securities for *its faithful*administration, that the rules of evidence should be steadily observed. Among these, the rule, which regulates the admission of testimony, offered to impeach the character of a witness, is now so well established and so clearly defined, that a departure from it must be regarded as a violation of law. The witness is not to be discredited, because of the opinions which any person or any number of persons may have expressed to his disadvantage, unless such opinions have created or indicate a *general reputation*of his want of moral principle. The impeaching witness must, therefore, profess to know the general reputation of the witness sought to be discredited, before he can be heard to speak of his own opinion or of the opinions of others, as to the reliance to be placed on the testimony of the impeached witness.

*State*v *Boswell, 2*Dev. 209. *Downey*v *Smith,*1 Dev. & Bat. 62. This rule, we think, was not observed in the case before us, and the exception taken to the reception of Mr. Worth’s testimony was therefore well founded. The judgment must be reversed and a new trial awarded.

Per Curiam. New trial awarded.