[Cite as Stowe v. Chuck's Automotive Repair, L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-572.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

JOHN R. STOWE 

 Appellant 

 v. 

CHUCK'S AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR, LLC 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 28686 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

BARBERTON MUNICIPAL COURT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CVF 1501913 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: February 14, 2018 

 

TEODOSIO, Judge. 

{¶1} John R. Stowe appeals the judgment entered on June 12, 2017, by the Barberton 

Municipal Court. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part. 

I. 

{¶2} Beginning in February 2013, Mr. Stowe entered into a commercial lease 

agreement with Chuck’s Automotive Repair LLC (“Chuck’s Automotive”) whereby Chuck’s 

Automotive provided him with storage and warehouse space in one of the buildings it owned. 

Mr. Stowe filed a complaint against Chuck’s Automotive in October 2015, and an amended 

complaint in December 2015, stating a claim for damage to Mr. Stowe’s pickup truck allegedly 

caused by shingles that had come from the roof of the storage space, as well as a consumer sales 

practices claim pursuant to R.C. 1345.03. Chuck’s Automotive filed an answer to the amended 

complaint and asserted a counterclaim for Mr. Stowe’s alleged failure to pay for automotive 

repairs. A trial was conducted in May 2016, and on August 2, 2016, a magistrate’s decision was 
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entered in favor of Chuck’s Automotive as to Mr. Stowe’s amended complaint and dismissing 

the counterclaim. 

{¶3} On August 16, 2016, Mr. Stowe filed his objections to the magistrate’s decision, 

stating: 

Plaintiff objects to the [magistrate’s] finding that: 

1. Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his truck was 

damaged by shingles which fell from the roof of Defendant’s building; 

2. Plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant 

was negligent in his upkeep and/or repair of the roof; 

3. Defendant failed to claim, argue, or offer any proof that the damage to 

Plaintiff’s truck was from an act of God; 

4. Repairs to Plaintiff’s wife’s automobile were not a “Consumer Transaction” 

and therefore not subject to [R.C.] 1345.02 et seq. 

Mr. Stowe noted he would supplement his objections with specific references to testimony and 

exhibits after being provided with the transcript of the proceedings. Mr. Stowe’s supplement, 

filed on October 28, 2016, does not state any additional objections to the magistrate’s decision, 

not does it address the four original objections separately; rather, the supplement is divided into a 

section setting forth the background of the case, a section offering a statement of facts, and a 

section captioned “LAW AND ARGUMENT.” 

{¶4} On January 3, 2017, the trial court overruled Mr. Stowe’s objections “with the 

exception of the ‘act of God’ finding,” which it struck from the magistrate’s decision on the 

grounds that such a defense was neither plead nor argued. An attempted appeal of that order was 

dismissed by this Court because the trial court had failed to independently enter a judgment. 

Subsequently, on June 12, 2017, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Chuck’s automotive 

and dismissed the counterclaim. 
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{¶5} Mr. Stowe now appeals, raising six assignments of error, which have been 

reordered for the purpose of discussion. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE 

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW AS 

TO THE OBJECTED MATTERS TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE MAGISTRATE 

PROPERLY DETERMINED THE FACTUAL ISSUES AND 

APPROPRIATELY APPLIED THE LAW. 

{¶6} Mr. Stowe argues the trial court erred because it did not independently review the 

magistrate’s decision, conduct a de novo review of the record, and make its own independent 

determination as to whether the magistrate properly determined factual issues and appropriately 

applied the law. We agree. 

{¶7} “[T]he decision to adopt, reject, or modify a magistrate’s decision lies within the 

discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” 

Barlow v. Barlow, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 08CA0055, 2009–Ohio-3788, ¶ 5. An abuse of 

discretion implies that a trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable in its 

judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). As a reviewing court 

applying the abuse of discretion standard, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial 

court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). 

{¶8} Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides: “In ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an 

independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly 

determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” “The independent review that 

is required of the trial court has two components: (1) whether, with respect to the objected 

matters, the magistrate properly determined the factual issues before it, and (2) whether the 

magistrate appropriately applied the law to those factual determinations.” Lakota v. Lakota, 9th 
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Dist. Medina No. 10CA0122-M, 2012-Ohio-2555, ¶ 14. “The independent review requirement 

of Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), * * * does not prohibit the trial court from deferring to the magistrate’s 

resolution of credibility because the magistrate retains a superior position, as the trier of fact, to 

consider the demeanor of witnesses and evaluate their credibility.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 9th 

Dist. Medina No. 08CA0049-M, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 14. However, “[a] trial court is not allowed 

to defer to the magistrate in determining the weight and importance of evidence.” In re J.W., 9th 

Dist. Lorain No. 10CA009939, 2011-Ohio-3744, ¶ 26. 

{¶9} In support of his argument, Mr. Stowe points to the trial court’s statement that the 

magistrate “was in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the 

sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.” Although the trial court may defer to the 

magistrate’s resolution of credibility issues, it may not defer to the magistrate in determining the 

weight and importance of the evidence. See id. Because the trial court indicated that it deferred 

to the magistrate as to the weighing of the evidence, we conclude that it failed to conduct an 

independent review of the magistrate’s decision as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), thereby 

abusing its discretion. 

{¶10} Mr. Stowe’s first assignment of error is sustained. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND BY THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFF’S TRUCK 

WAS DAMAGED BY SHINGLES WHICH FELL FROM THE ROOF OF THE 

LEASED PREMISES ON NOVEMBER 24, 2014. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FOUR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE TESTIMONY 

OF MR. DICE SUPPORTED THE FINDING OF THE MAGISTRATE THAT 

PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF. 
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{¶11} We do not reach the merits of assignments of error three and four because our 

resolution of the first assignment of error necessitates further factual considerations by the trial 

court. We therefore decline to address assignments of error three and four as they are rendered 

moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY 

APPLY THE LAW WHEN IT PERFORMED AN INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS 

OF THE ISSUES OF THIS CASE. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR FIVE 

AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT IS LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGE 

CAUSED BY THE SHINGLES THAT STRUCK PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE ON 

NOVEMBER 24, 2014[,] REGARDLESS OF WHERE THEY CAME FROM. 

{¶12} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Stowe argues the trial court erred in 

applying tort law to the facts and contends that Chuck’s Automotive is strictly liable, as a matter 

of contract, for the damage caused by shingles that had become dislodged on November 24, 

2014. In his fifth assignment of error, Mr. Stowe argues that Chuck’s Automotive is liable as a 

matter of law for damages under a theory of a breach of agreement to repair, regardless of where 

the shingles originated. We disagree. 

{¶13} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) provides: “An objection to a magistrate's decision shall be 

specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.” None of the four objections raised 

by Mr. Stowe address the issue of contractual liability. “Issues that were not raised to the trial 

court may not be considered for the first time on appeal.” Rozhon v. Rozhon, 9th Dist. Medina 

No. 05CA0075-M, 2006-Ohio-3118, ¶ 18. 

{¶14} We further note that the lease at issue was made between SB Contracting and 

Chuck’s Automotive. At hearing before the trial court, counsel for Mr. Stowe was adamant that 
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SB Contracting was “not, in any way, shape or form, a party to this litigation.” Consequently, 

even if the lease did provide any warranty against damage, it would not be enforceable by Mr. 

Stowe, who was not a party to the lease in his individual capacity. 

{¶15} Mr. Stowe’s second and fifth assignments of error are overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR SIX 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT REPAIRS MADE BY 

DEFENDANT TO PLAINITFF’S WIFE’S PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE WERE 

NOT A CONSUMER TRANSACTION UNDER [R.C.] 1345.01. 

{¶16} In his sixth assignment of error, Mr. Stowe argues the trial court erred in 

determining that repairs made by Chuck’s Automotive to his wife’s automobile were not a 

consumer transaction under R.C. 1345.01. 

{¶17} As indicated by the trial court, Mr. Stowe’s “objection concerning the repairs to 

his wife’s vehicle was neither argued by [him] nor supported by any authority in his supplement 

to his objections.” As we have previously stated, “Issues that were not raised to the trial court 

may not be considered for the first time on appeal.” Rozhon at ¶ 18. 

{¶18} Mr. Stowe’s sixth assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶19} Mr. Stowe’s first assignment error is sustained. Mr. Stowe’s second, fifth, and 

sixth assignments of error are overruled. The third and fourth assignments of error are dismissed 

as moot. The judgment of the Barberton Municipal Court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, 

and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

Judgment affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and cause remanded. 

 
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 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Barberton 

Municipal Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A 

certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed equally to both parties. 

 

 THOMAS A. TEODOSIO 

 FOR THE COURT 

SCHAFER, P. J. 

CONCURS. 

CARR, J. 

CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY. 

APPEARANCES: 

DANIEL M. WALPOLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

TERRENCE UFHOLZ, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.