No. 90-474 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1991 

LA RUE SMITH, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

CLIFFORD FLADSTOL and NANCY 

FLADSTOL, Husband and Wife, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

La Rue Smith, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Mark Bauer, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: February 14, 1991 

Decided: March 21. 1991 
t 9 I .' 

Hon. Terry N. ~rieweiler delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

La Rue Smith appeals from a judgment entered in the District 

Court, Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, denying attorney 

fees and costs. We affirm the District Court. 

The dispositive issue in this case is whether substantial 

evidence existed to support the District Court's finding that 

attorney Smith was engaged to perform limited duties and was paid 

in full for those services. 

Respondent Nancy Fladstol contacted Smith by telephone on 

December 17, 1986 about retaining Smith as her attorney. An 

appointment was scheduled for the following day. Mrs. Fladstol 

informed Smith of pending proceedings to revoke the custodial 

rights of the Fladstols in their grandson, Louis Jackson. The 

action to set aside the custody decree was initiated by Kevin 

Douglas Hall, the father of the child and the son of Nancy 

Fladstol. Mrs. Fladstol requested Smith to represent her at a 

scheduled meeting with her son and his attorney. 

Smith agreed to accompany Mrs. Fladstol to the December 22, 

1986 meeting in the offices of Kevin Douglas Hall's attorney. 

Pursuant to his representation of Fladstol, Smith accepted a $75 

retainer fee. 

What transpired at the December 22 meeting is at issue. Smith 

contends that Hall admitted his affidavit regarding his mother's 

incompetence as a custodial parent was false, and that a 

stipulation to that effect would be prepared. Fladstol, Hall, and 

his attorney deny any such statement or agreement. Fladstol 

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$ 3 I 

asserts that the agreement reached at the meeting was to allow 

transfer of the custody of Louis to his father, and that Hall's 

attorney would prepare documentation to that effect. Fladstol 

testified that she assumed the agreement would resolve all 

differences between the parties and that no further work would need 

to be done. 

The record shows that Smith refused to enter into any 

stipulation. Smith continued to prepare documents and do research 

on behalf of the Fladstols until he was discharged by Mrs. Fladstol 

on December 29, 1986, for his refusal to sign the stipulation 

prepared by Hall's attorney. 

Smith initiated suit for fees and costs, and a trial de novo 

took place on January 2, 1990. The trial court found Smith had 

been retained as counsel up to and including the December 22, 1986 

meeting, that he had been fully compensated for his work to that 

time, and that all other work was unnecessary to the proper 

representation of Fladstols' interest in the matter. Accordingly, 

the court entered judgment in favor of Fladstols, including costs. 

This appeal ensued. 

It is a well-established rule in Montana that the 

attorney/client relationship is one of agency. Clinton v. Miller 

(1951), 124 Mont. 463, 226 P.2d 487. It is the lawyer's role to 

advocate the client Is interest. In re Marriage of Rolfe (1985) , 216 

Mont. 39, 699 P.2d 79. Contrary to Smith's assertions, the record 

shows that the parties agreed to enter into a stipulation, and 

thereby avoid prolonging the proceedings. Hall's attorney 
testified that: 

The gist of the conversation was about changing custody 

from grandma to son at that time. How it was to be done 

was discussed. I told them I had done it before by 

stipulation by agreement between the parties. There was 

discussion in regards to a little bit that there would 

still have to be a hearing because we still had one other 

party that was concerned. 

The essence of the end of the meeting was that I was to 

draft the document, have it ready, submit it to La Rue, 

and I would review it. And when we left the meeting it 

was my understanding that we had reached an agreement. 

That is between these parties, all issues had been 

settled. 

Hall testified similarly: 

Q: What was the ultimate outcome of the meeting on 

December 22nd in your attorney's office? 

A: The ultimate outcome was is that she agreed to sign 

a stipulation stating that she would not contest the 

custody of Louis being transferred over to me is what I 

believe. 

The direct evidence of one witness is sufficient for proof 

of any fact. Section 26-1-301, MCA. Here we have the testimony 

of several witnesses that the issues had been settled at the 

meeting. There was substantial evidence before the court that the 

continuing actions by Smith were unnecessary after the meeting was 

conducted, and we will not disturb the District Court's finding 

absent a showing of clear error. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P. 

There was also substantial evidence to support the amount of 

attorney fees awarded. It was undisputed that defendants had 

agreed to pay plaintiff $35 per hour for his services. Following 

the December 22 meeting, plaintiff was paid $75. There was no 

evidence offered to prove that based upon the amount of time spent 

on plaintiff's behalf that amount was inadequate as of that date. 
1 1 . For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is 

affirmed. 

We Concur: 

Chief Justice