J-S41039-17

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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFREY LYNN ARMOLT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 23 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 14, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0000509-2002

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 19, 2017

Appellant, Jeffrey Lynn Armolt, appeals pro se from the order entered 

in the Adams County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed as untimely 

his serial petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On December 22, 2003, Appellant entered a 

negotiated guilty plea to three counts of rape of a child, in connection with 

Appellant’s rape of his girlfriend’s twelve-year-old daughter (“Victim”), whom 

Appellant impregnated.1 The court sentenced Appellant on April 12, 2004, 

to an aggregate term of 15-30 years’ imprisonment, in accordance with the 

plea agreement, which provided that Appellant’s maximum sentence would 

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1 Appellant’s and Victim’s child was born prematurely and died 

approximately ten days after birth. 
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not exceed 30 years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not seek direct review. 

Since then, Appellant has filed multiple prior petitions for collateral relief, all 

of which were ultimately unsuccessful. 

On October 19, 2016, Appellant filed the current, serial pro se PCRA 

petition. The court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without 

a hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, on October 27, 2016. Appellant filed a pro 

se response on November 28, 2016, and the court denied PCRA relief on 

December 14, 2016. On January 3, 2017, Appellant timely filed a pro se

notice of appeal and voluntary concise statement per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Preliminarily, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional 

requisite. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016). A 

PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within 

one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is deemed final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The 

statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow for very limited 

circumstances under which the late filing of a petition will be excused; a 

petitioner asserting a timeliness exception must file a petition within 60 days 

of when the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-2). 

Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on May 12, 
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2004, upon expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal with the Superior 

Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 903 (providing 30 days to file notice of appeal from 

judgment of sentence with Superior Court). Appellant filed the current serial 

PCRA petition on October 19, 2016, which is patently untimely. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant now attempts to invoke the “new facts” 

exception to the statutory time-bar per Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), raising 

numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging the 

legality of his sentence. Appellant relies on various judicial decisions as 

“new facts” to permit review of those claims. Initially, judicial decisions do 

not constitute “new facts” for purposes of the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

exception. See Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231 (Pa.Super. 

2012) (explaining subsequent decisional law does not amount to new “fact” 

under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of PCRA). 

To the extent Appellant attempts to invoke the “new constitutional 

right” exception per Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), relying on Alleyne v. United 

States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), Missouri v. 

Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. 

Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012), those 

cases afford Appellant no relief. See Commonwealth v. Washington, ___ 

Pa. ___, 142 A.3d 810 (2016) (holding new constitutional rule announced in 

Alleyne is not substantive or watershed procedural rule that warrants 

retroactive application to collateral attacks on mandatory minimum 
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sentences, where judgment of sentence became final before Alleyne was 

decided); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649 (Pa.Super. 2013) 

(holding appellant’s claim that his petition fits within Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) 

exception lacks merit because neither Lafler nor Frye created new 

constitutional right).2 Thus, Appellant’s current PCRA petition remains time 

barred, and the court properly dismissed it as untimely.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/19/2017

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2 Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims also do not satisfy the 

“governmental interference” exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(i). See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(4) (stating: “For purposes of this subchapter, 

‘government officials’ shall not include defense counsel, whether appointed 

or retained”).