United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MICHAEL J. VAILLANCOURT,

Appellant,

v.

BECTON DICKINSON & COMPANY,

Appellee.

______________________ 

2013-1408

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Reexamination 

No. 95/000,565.

______________________ 

Decided: April 24, 2014

______________________ 

DENNIS F. GLEASON, Jardim, Meisner & Susser, P.C., 

of Florham Park, New Jersey, argued for appellant. With 

him on the brief was FRANCIS J. HAND, Carella, Byrne, 

Cecchi, Olstein, Brody & Agnello, P.C., of Roseland, New 

Jersey. 

AMY K. WIGMORE, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 

Dorr, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for appellee. With 

her on the brief were WILLIAM MCELWAIN, DAVID 

CAVANAUGH, and HEATHER PETRUZZI. 

______________________ 
2 VAILLANCOURT v. BECTON DICKINSON & COMPANY

Before RADER, Chief Judge, LINN and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

RADER, Chief Judge. 

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the rejection of all thirty-seven claims of U.S. Patent No. 

6,699,221 on appeal from an inter partes reexamination. 

Appellant Michael J. Vaillancourt previously owned the 

’221 patent, but while the reexamination proceedings 

were still pending, he assigned all right, title, and interest 

in the patent to VLV Associates, Inc. Vaillancourt, and 

not VLV, now appeals the Board decision to this court. 

The only cause of action (right to sue) in this court that 

Vaillancourt invokes is 35 U.S.C. § 141, but the unambiguous language of that provision limits it to the patent 

owner. Though the parties in this case have argued about 

“standing,” the Supreme Court recently clarified that 

some issues often discussed in “standing” terms are better 

viewed as interpretations of a statutory cause of action. 

See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 

134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386-88 (2014). Because the issue here 

focuses on § 141, this opinion directly addresses the scope 

of that cause of action. As Vaillancourt is not the owner 

of the ’221 patent, he cannot bring this appeal before the 

court, for lack of a cause of action. Accordingly, this court 

dismisses the appeal. 

I.

Vaillancourt obtained ownership of the ’221 patent 

from his mother through an assignment recorded with the 

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on April 15, 2011. J.A. 

1026. Vaillancourt represents that the assignment took 

effect November 1, 2005. Id. For the purposes of this 

appeal, the court assumes the assignment was proper but 

does not make any finding about the timing of the transfer. 
VAILLANCOURT v. BECTON DICKINSON & COMPANY 3

On August 12, 2010, Appellee Becton Dickinson & 

Company (BD) requested an inter partes reexamination of 

the ’221 patent. Id. at 2, 357. During the reexamination 

proceedings, Vaillancourt added claims 21 through 37 to 

the patent’s original twenty claims. Id. at 443. 

The patent examiner rejected all thirty-seven claims 

of the ’221 patent. Id. at 510–55. Vaillancourt appealed 

these rejections to the Board on April 25, 2011. Id. at 

680.

However, on April 24, 2012, while the reexamination 

appeal was still pending, Vaillancourt assigned to VLV

“the entire right, title and interest in and to” the ’221 

patent, “including full and exclusive rights to sue upon 

and otherwise enforce” the patent. Id. at 1029. 

Then on April 27, 2012, VLV initiated suit against BD 

for infringement of the ’221 patent in the U.S. District 

Court for the District of New Jersey. VLV Assocs. v. 

Becton Dickinson & Co., No. 12-2476 (D.N.J. 2012). VLV 

sued in its own name and did not join Vaillancourt to the 

suit. 

On June 29, 2012, the Board affirmed all of the examiner’s rejections. J.A. 766. Despite no longer being the 

owner of the ’221 patent, Vaillancourt requested a rehearing with the Board in his own name. Id. at 837. The 

Board denied Vaillancourt’s request to alter the prior 

affirmance of the examiner’s rejections. Id. at 869.

Vaillancourt appealed to this court, identifying himself in the notice of appeal as both the patent owner and 

appellant. Id. at 871. Shortly thereafter, BD moved to 

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 971. On 

October 30, 2013, this court denied BD’s motion without 

prejudice, noting that BD should make its jurisdictional 

arguments in its brief before the merits panel. Id. at 

1044. 
4 VAILLANCOURT v. BECTON DICKINSON & COMPANY

BD renewed its jurisdictional argument in its responsive brief. After consideration of the parties’ arguments, 

this court determines that Vaillancourt may not bring 

this case under § 141 because he is no longer the patent 

owner. 

II.

 Statutory interpretation focuses on the language of 

the statute itself. See Wyeth v. Kappos, 591 F.3d 1364, 

1369 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Hohri, 482 

U.S. 64, 68 (1987)). A statute’s unambiguous language 

“must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Id. (quoting 

Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 

447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The applicable version of § 141 states, in pertinent 

part: “[a] patent owner . . . in an inter partes reexamination proceeding . . . dissatisfied with the final decision in 

an appeal to the Board. . .may appeal the decision only to 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.” 

The unambiguous language of § 141 provides that a 

patent owner alone can appeal a final decision in an inter 

partes reexamination to this court. Thus, the statute 

itself sets the requirements for bringing an appeal here. 

The statute requires the patent owner to initiate any 

appeal. 

III.

Vaillancourt concedes, as he must, that he is not the 

owner of the ’221 patent and that VLV, the actual owner, 

does not appear before this court in the appeal. Appellant 

Reply Br. 4; Oral Arg. at 2:52–3:40, available at 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

13-1408.mp3. He therefore cannot bring this case under 

§ 141.
VAILLANCOURT v. BECTON DICKINSON & COMPANY 5

 Nevertheless, Vaillancourt claims in an affidavit that 

despite his assignment of the entire right, title, and 

interest in the ’221 patent to VLV, he was “authorized to 

continue with all related proceedings including further 

appeals” in connection with the reexamination. J.A. 1027. 

With this purported retention of rights, and because he is 

apparently the sole owner of VLV, Vaillancourt asserts 

that he is authorized to proceed with this appeal on behalf 

of VLV. Appellant Reply Br. 8. 

In essence, Vaillancourt suggests that § 141 allows a 

patent owner to delegate to a third party its authority to 

bring an appeal to this court. Appellant Reply Br. 4. 

Beyond the assertion of this concept, Vaillancourt offers 

no further support for his interpretation of the statute. 

Id. Instead, he states that while the unambiguous language of § 141 does not explicitly provide for such delegation, the section does not explicitly bar it either. Id. This 

assertion carries no weight in the face of a statutory 

requirement. The statute also does not forbid a patent 

owner’s travel agent from filing an appeal, but that hardly 

justifies interpreting the statute to extend to such unmentioned categories. Section 141 grants a procedural right 

to the patent owner to appeal decisions from the PTAB. 

This court sees no reason—and Vaillancourt provides

none—to extend that procedural right beyond what is 

clearly set forth in § 141.

VLV is indisputably the owner of the ’221 patent, and 

held all right, title, and interest to the patent when Vaillancourt filed the notice of appeal with this court. Even if 

all of Vaillancourt’s assertions are taken as true, it nevertheless remains that VLV did not bring this appeal and 

has made no appearance before the court. 

Under the unambiguous language of § 141, Vaillancourt, the sole appellant here, has no cause of action to 

bring this appeal. Therefore, this court dismisses the 

appeal. 
6 VAILLANCOURT v. BECTON DICKINSON & COMPANY

DISMISSED