[Cite as State v. Ellis, 2018-Ohio-5293.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BUTLER COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 

 Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2018-03-043 

 : O P I N I O N 

 - vs - 12/28/2018 

 : 

ROY B. ELLIS, JR., : 

 Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CR2017-09-1539 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Willa Concannon, Government 

Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for appellee 

Michele Temmel, 6 South Second Street, Suite 305, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for appellant 

 RINGLAND, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Roy Ellis, Jr., appeals the sentencing decision of the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm. 

{¶ 2} On April 16, 2017, appellant crossed the center line on Hamilton Cleves Road 

and struck another vehicle head-on. Appellant was discovered at the scene and found to be 

under the influence of heroin and prescription medication. The victim suffered very serious 

injuries, resulting in permanent disabilities. 
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{¶ 3} Appellant was indicted on charges of aggravated vehicular assault in violation 

of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) and (B)(1)(a), a second-degree felony, and vehicular assault in 

violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b) and (C)(2), a third-degree felony. 

{¶ 4} On January 4, 2018, appellant pled guilty to count two of the indictment, 

vehicular assault, and the matter was set for sentencing. Prior to the sentencing hearing, 

appellant requested a continuance to undergo a mental health evaluation to be used in 

mitigation. The trial court denied appellant's request. The trial court then imposed the 

maximum sentence, a mandatory five-year prison term. Appellant now appeals, raising two 

assignments of error for review. 

{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO IMPOSE THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE 

DEFIES THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING. 

{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that his five-year prison 

sentence is contrary to law because it defies the purposes and principles of sentencing. We 

find no merit to appellant's argument. 

{¶ 8} This court reviews felony sentences pursuant to the standard of review set forth 

in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) to determine whether the imposition of those sentences is clearly and 

convincingly contrary to law. State v. Julious, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-12-224, 2016-

Ohio-4822, ¶ 8. Pursuant to that statute, an appellate court may modify or vacate a sentence 

only if, by clear and convincing evidence, "the record does not support the trial court's 

findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law." State v. 

Harp, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-12-096, 2016-Ohio-4921, ¶ 7. 

{¶ 9} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court 

"considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 

2929.12, properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within the 
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permissible statutory range." State v. Ahlers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-100, 2016-

Ohio-2890, ¶ 8. Thus, this court may "increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence only 

when it clearly and convincingly finds that the sentence is (1) contrary to law or (2) 

unsupported by the record." State v. Brandenburg, 146 Ohio St.3d 221, 2016-Ohio-2970, ¶ 

1. 

{¶ 10} When a defendant is sentenced, a trial court is not required to consider each 

sentencing factor, "but rather to exercise its discretion in determining whether the sentence 

satisfies the overriding purpose of Ohio's sentencing structure." State v. Stamper, 12th Dist. 

Butler No. CA2012-08-166, 2013-Ohio-5669, ¶ 11. The factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12 are 

nonexclusive, and R.C. 2929.12 explicitly permits a trial court to consider any relevant factors 

in imposing a sentence. Id. 

{¶ 11} After reviewing the record, we find the trial court did not err by sentencing 

appellant to the maximum five-year prison term, as his sentence was not contrary to law and 

was supported by the record. As previously noted, appellant was convicted of vehicular 

assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b), a third-degree felony pursuant to R.C. 

2903.08(C)(2). R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) provides the "prison term shall be" 12, 18, 24, 30, 36, 

42, 48, 54, or 60 months. As such, appellant's five-year prison sentence is within the 

permissible sentencing range. 

{¶ 12} The trial court also considered the purposes and principles of sentencing as 

required by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. This is evidenced by review of the transcript of the 

sentencing hearing and the trial court's sentencing entry. The trial court acknowledged that 

appellant may be a good person with a supportive family but noted "justice demands that 

there's a price to pay for putting somebody in a wheelchair driving * * * in a state of 

intoxication." In this case, appellant's actions caused the victim to suffer severe injuries that 

will significantly impact the remainder of her life. 
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{¶ 13} After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court's sentence was not 

contrary to law and that it is fully supported by the record. Though appellant contends that 

he is remorseful, has taken responsibility for his actions, and is suffering from mental health 

issues, his arguments in mitigation are unpersuasive given the nature of his conduct. The 

consequences of his actions will have lasting and profound impact on the victim. As such, 

we find the trial court's sentencing decision was not contrary to law. Appellant's first 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 14} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 15} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED A CONTINUANCE AT THE 

REQUEST OF DEFENDANT. 

{¶ 16} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by 

denying his request for a continuance. Appellant maintains that the denial of a continuance 

prior to the sentencing hearing to undergo a mental health evaluation was unreasonable and 

amounted to an abuse of discretion. We disagree. 

{¶ 17} The decision whether to grant or deny a continuance is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that 

discretion. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981). An abuse of discretion connotes 

more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude was unreasonable, 

arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Kash, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-10-247, 2004-

Ohio-415, ¶ 31 

{¶ 18} Furthermore, a trial court's decision to implement a psychological report under 

R.C. 2947.06 is also discretionary. State v. Timberling, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-CA-35, 

2013-Ohio-1377, ¶ 26; State v. Floyd, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101301, 2015-Ohio-763, ¶ 17. 

Though a trial court "may appoint" psychologists or psychiatrists to make a report concerning 

the defendant, it is not mandatory and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. 
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{¶ 19} In the present case, the trial court denied appellant's request for a 

continuance, which was requested at the sentencing hearing. As indicated above, a 

psychological report was not mandatory, and the trial court appropriately noted that appellant 

was at least partially responsible for failing to secure that report. Furthermore, the trial court 

noted, on several occasions, that it was aware that appellant was suffering from mental 

health problems, but nevertheless found the imposition of a five-year prison sentence to be 

appropriate. It is not clear how the results from a psychological report would impact the trial 

court's sentencing decision, as the court had accepted appellant's claims with respect to 

mental health. As a result, we find the trial court did not err by denying appellant's request for 

a continuance. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 20} Judgment affirmed. 

 PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.