United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

RAYMOND E. STAUFFER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

BROOKS BROTHERS, INC. 

AND RETAIL BRAND ALLIANCE, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Movant-Cross Appellant, 

__________________________ 

2009-1428, -1430, -1453 

__________________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York in Case No. 08-CV-10369, 

Judge Sidney H. Stein. 

____________________________ 

Decided: August 31, 2010 

____________________________ 

RAYMOND E. STAUFFER, of Chatham, New Jersey, pro 

se. 

STEPHEN L. BAKER, Baker & Rannells, PA, of Raritan, 

New Jersey, argued for defendants-appellees. With him 
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 2

on the brief were NEIL B. FRIEDMAN and RYAN A.

MCGONIGLE. 

DOUGLAS N. LETTER, Appellate Litigation Counsel, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of 

Washington, DC, argued for movants-cross appellants. 

With him on the brief was TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney 

General. 

THOMAS P. STEINDLER, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 

of Washington, DC, for amicus curiae CIBA Vision Corporation. With him on the brief were M. MILLER BAKER and 

JEFFREY W. MIKONI. 

BRYAN P. COLLINS, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman 

LLP, of McLean, Virginia, for amicus curiae Stanley 

Black & Decker, Inc., et al. With him on the brief was 

JACK S. BARUFKA. 

__________________________ 

Before RADER, Chief Judge, and LOURIE and MOORE, 

Circuit Judges. 

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Raymond E. Stauffer and the government appeal from 

the decision of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York dismissing Stauffer’s false 

marking qui tam action for lack of standing. Stauffer v. 

Brooks Bros., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 

(“Standing Op.”). The government also appeals from the 

court’s denial of its motion to intervene. Stauffer v. 

Brooks Bros., Inc., No. 08-cv-10369, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 

51166 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (“Intervention Op.”). 

Because Stauffer had standing to bring his claim, and 

because the government had a right to intervene, we 

reverse on both grounds. 
3 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS

BACKGROUND

Brooks Brothers, Inc. and its parent Retail Brand Alliance, Inc.1 (collectively, “Brooks Brothers”) manufacture 

and sell men’s bow ties. Some of the Brooks Brothers bow 

ties contain an “Adjustolox” mechanism that is manufactured by a third party, J.M.C. Bow Company, Inc. 

(“J.M.C. Bow”), and are marked with, inter alia, U.S. 

Patent Nos. 2,083,106 and 2,123,620, which expired in 

1954 and 1955, respectively. Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 

2d at 251, 255. 

Stauffer is a patent attorney who has purchased some 

of the marked bow ties. Id. at 251. In December 2008, 

Stauffer brought a qui tam action under 35 U.S.C. § 292 

alleging that Brooks Brothers had falsely marked its bow 

ties. Section 292, the “false marking” statute, provides 

that: 

(a) . . . 

Whoever marks upon, or affixes to . . . any unpatented article, the word “patent” or any word or 

number importing that the same is patented, for 

the purpose of deceiving the public 

. . . 

Shall be fined not more than $500 for every such 

offense. 

(b) Any person may sue for the penalty, in which 

event one-half shall go to the person suing and the 

other to the use of the United States. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

 1 According to the parties, Brooks Brothers, Inc. has 

merged into Retail Brand Alliance, Inc. and no longer 

exists as a separate legal entity. 
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 4

Brooks Brothers moved to dismiss Stauffer’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure for lack of standing and pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) for failure to allege an intent to deceive the public 

with sufficient specificity to meet the heightened pleading 

requirements for claims of fraud. The district court 

granted Brooks Brothers’ motion pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(1), concluding that Stauffer lacked standing. According to the court, all plaintiffs, including qui tam

plaintiffs (or “relators”), must establish (1) that they have 

suffered an injury in fact (2) that is causally connected to 

the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by the 

court. Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 253. The court 

further noted that the qui tam provision of section 292(b) 

operates as a statutory “assignment” of the rights of the 

United States, so Stauffer must prove that the government, rather than he, satisfies the requirements for 

standing, including that it has suffered an injury in fact. 

Id. 

The district court held that Stauffer had not sufficiently alleged that the United States had suffered an 

injury in fact from Brooks Brothers’ false marking. 

According to the court, Stauffer’s allegations of Brooks 

Brothers’ conduct wrongfully quelling competition were 

too conjectural or hypothetical to constitute an injury in 

fact. Id. at 254–55. The court added that even the hypothetical harm to competitors was lessened by the fact that 

J.M.C. Bow provides the marked Adjustolox mechanism 

to many of Brooks Brothers’ competitors, in addition to 

providing it to Brooks Brothers. Id. at 255. 

The district court further held that Stauffer’s assertions that he himself was injured were not contained in 

the complaint and were thus not properly alleged. Id. at 

255 n.7. Moreover, according to the court, those assertions would only support an injury to Stauffer, not to the 
5 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS

public, and thus would not be a basis for finding standing. 

Id. Because the court found a lack of standing, it did not 

reach the merits of Brooks Brothers’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss for failure to allege an intent to deceive the 

public with sufficient specificity. Id. at 251 n.1. 

After the district court’s decision on standing, Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d 248, the government moved to 

intervene, arguing that the court’s opinion called into 

question the constitutionality of section 292 and that the 

government was therefore entitled to defend the statute 

pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 2403. The 

government also argued that its interest in seeing the 

patent laws enforced gave it a right to intervene pursuant 

to Rule 24(a)(2) and that it should be permitted to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1)(B). The court denied the 

motion, finding no basis for the government to intervene 

as of right and finding the showing for permissive intervention insufficient. Intervention Op., 2009 U.S. Dist. 

Lexis 51166. 

The district court reasoned that it had not decided 

any constitutional issue that would give the government 

the right to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1), as it had 

only decided the case on its facts. Id. at *8–9. The court 

added that, contrary to the government’s argument, it 

was entitled to rule on Brooks Brothers’ motion before the 

government’s deadline to decide whether it would seek to 

intervene had expired, as the court had not held the 

statute unconstitutional. Id. at *9–10 n.4. The court 

further found that the government did not have a sufficient interest in the action to have a right to intervene 

pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) because the court had denied 

standing only to Stauffer, not to the United States itself. 

Id. at *12. 
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 6

Finally, the district court denied permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1)(B), finding that the government’s interest in the outcome of the case was 

premised on issues and legal questions not actually 

presented to or decided by the court. Id. at *13–14. The 

court further reasoned that Brooks Brothers would be 

prejudiced by a post-judgment intervention that would 

impose needless costs and delay. Id. at *14–15. 

Stauffer timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

A. Stauffer’s Standing 

The government argues that the district court erred in 

dismissing Stauffer’s suit for lack of standing based on a 

lack of injury in fact.2 The government asserts that 

Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex 

rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), controls the outcome in 

this case, and that decision held that a qui tam relator 

has standing without an injury to the relator himself, a 

proposition that, according to the government, the court 

stated but did not follow. Furthermore, the government 

argues that the United States’ interest in seeing its laws 

enforced itself leads to an injury in fact when those laws 

are not obeyed. In other words, according to the government, in enacting the false marking statute, Congress 

determined that such conduct is harmful and should be 

prohibited, which is a sufficient injury in fact to confer 

standing on the government and therefore on Stauffer as 

 2 Appeal numbers 2009-1430 and -1453 are the 

government’s appeals, and we granted the government’s 

motion to intervene in appeal number 2009-1428. 

Stauffer v. Brooks Bros, Inc., No. 2009-1428, Dkt. No. 62 

(Fed. Cir. July 16, 2010) (granting government’s motion to 

intervene). 
7 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS

the government’s implicit assignee of the action to recover 

for injury. Finally, the government asserts that even if a 

proprietary injury involving the federal treasury’s being 

directly diminished were required under Vermont Agency, 

as opposed to solely a sovereign injury based on the 

United States’ interest in seeing its laws enforced, the 

United States has a proprietary interest in receiving half 

of the recovery in a suit under section 292. 

Stauffer separately argues that, according to this 

court’s decision in Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 

406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the public is injured by 

false marking, which misleads and wrongly imposes the 

costs of evaluating patents on the public. Thus, he argues, the public has suffered an injury in fact sufficient to 

confer standing. Stauffer adds that his complaint alleged 

that Brooks Brothers had “wrongfully quelled competition 

with respect to . . . bow tie products thereby causing harm 

to the economy of the United States.” J.A. 66, para. 129. 

That, he argues, further demonstrates an injury to the 

public. Stauffer also asserts that he has individually been 

injured as a member of the public, thereby demonstrating 

another injury to the public. 

Brooks Brothers responds that standing is not automatically conferred on qui tam relators, but that they 

must demonstrate standing. Brooks Brothers adds that 

Stauffer’s conclusory allegations that he was personally 

injured are insufficient to establish an injury, and the 

court properly looked outside the pleadings to assure 

itself that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Finally, 

as an alternative ground for affirmance, Brooks Brothers 

asserts that Stauffer has not met the other factors required for standing; the marking is not fairly traceable to 

Brooks Brothers but to J.M.C. Bow, and any injury to the 

United States is unlikely to be redressed by a favorable 

decision. 
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 8

We agree with the government and Stauffer that 

Stauffer had standing to sue Brooks Brothers. “The 

question of standing to sue is a jurisdictional one, which 

we review de novo.” Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 

1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

Every plaintiff must demonstrate standing, a jurisdictional prerequisite under Article III’s case-or-controversy 

requirement. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. Thus, a 

plaintiff must show (1) that he has suffered an “injury in 

fact,” an invasion of a legally protected interest that is “(a) 

concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, 

not conjectural or hypothetical,” (2) that there is “a causal 

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed 

by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations and quotations 

marks omitted); see Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. We 

conclude that Stauffer has met that test and hence has 

standing in this case. 

As the district court noted, section 292(b) is a qui tam

provision, “i.e., a statute that authorizes someone to 

pursue an action on behalf of the government as well as 

himself.” Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 253. The 

Supreme Court, this court, and the Second Circuit have 

repeatedly treated it as such. See Vermont Agency, 529 

U.S. at 768 n.1 (listing section 292(b) as one of four qui

tam statutes currently in force); Pequignot v. Solo Cup 

Co., 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (referring to section 

292 as a qui tam provision); Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware 

Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (Section 292 “is 

enforceable by a qui tam remedy, enabling any person to 

sue for the statutory penalty and retain one-half of the 

recovery.”). 

Under Vermont Agency, a qui tam plaintiff, or relator, 

can establish standing based on the United States’ im-
9 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS

plicit partial assignment of its damages claim, 529 U.S. at 

773, to “any person,” see 35 U.S.C. § 292(b). In other 

words, even though a relator may suffer no injury himself, 

a qui tam provision operates as a statutory assignment of 

the United States’ rights, and “the assignee of a claim has 

standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773. Thus, in order 

to have standing, Stauffer must allege that the United 

States has suffered an injury in fact causally connected to 

Brooks Brothers’ conduct that is likely to be redressed by 

the court. 

As the government points out, Congress has, by enacting section 292, defined an injury in fact to the United 

States. In other words, a violation of that statute inherently constitutes an injury to the United States. In 

passing the statute prohibiting deceptive patent mismarking, Congress determined that such conduct is harmful 

and should be prohibited. The parties have not cited any 

case in which the government has been denied standing to 

enforce its own law. Because the government would have 

standing to enforce its own law, Stauffer, as the government’s assignee, also has standing to enforce section 292. 

Brooks Brothers relies heavily on Lujan, which denied 

plaintiffs standing under a citizen-suit provision. 504 

U.S. 555. However, in that case, the citizen-suit provision 

allowed private individuals to sue the government. Thus, 

the Supreme Court reasoned that such a law would 

enable courts “to become virtually continuing monitors of 

the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.” Id. at 

577. Hence, it was “clear that in suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury [to the plaintiff] 

requirement must remain.” Id. at 578. Here, in contrast, 

the qui tam provision operates not to allow individuals to 

sue the government, but to allow individuals to stand in 

the government’s stead, as assignees of the government’s 
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 10

own claims. See id. at 572–73 (emphasizing that Lujan’s 

was not “the unusual case in which Congress has created 

a concrete private interest in the outcome of a suit against 

a private party for the Government’s benefit, by providing 

a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff”). Thus, Lujan

does not preclude Congress from assigning the government’s claims to “any person,” even if that person has no 

concrete injury himself. 

Contrary to the district court’s decision and Brooks 

Brothers’ argument, Stauffer’s standing as the United 

States’ assignee does not depend upon the alleged injury 

to the United States being proprietary, as opposed to 

sovereign. We therefore express no view as to whether 

section 292 addresses a proprietary or a sovereign injury 

of the United States, or both (as does the False Claims 

Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733, according to Vermont 

Agency, 529 U.S. at 771). The court incorrectly read 

Vermont Agency as applying only to the United States’ 

proprietary injury. In fact, the Supreme Court stated, “It 

is beyond doubt that the complainant asserts an injury to 

the United States—both the injury to its sovereignty 

arising from violation of its laws (which suffices to support a criminal lawsuit by the Government) and the 

proprietary injury resulting from the alleged fraud.” 

Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. The Supreme Court 

considered both types of injuries and found them collectively to be sufficient to confer standing on the government and therefore on the relator. See id. at 774 

(concluding, without stating which specific injury, “that 

the United States’ injury in fact suffices to confer standing on respondent Stevens”). The Court made no distinction between the two, and we similarly do not do so here. 

To support the contrary proposition that sovereign injury is not assignable, the district court cited Fed. Election 

Comm. v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998), which stated that 
11 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS

an “abstract” harm, “for example, injury to the interest in 

seeing that the law is obeyed—deprives the case of the 

concrete specificity” necessary for standing. However, 

that statement referred to a private individual’s abstract 

interest in seeing that the law is obeyed, not the government’s interest in seeing that its own law is obeyed. From 

the government’s perspective, a harm arises from an 

“injury to its sovereignty arising from violation of its 

laws.” Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. 

Indeed, the Court in Vermont Agency recognized and 

found conclusive the historical precedent of informer 

statutes enacted by the First Congress, which assigned 

certain sovereign interests of the United States to private 

parties. Id. at 776–77. For example, the Court relied 

upon statutes allowing an informer to sue for, and receive 

half the fine for, failure to file a census return, carriage of 

seamen without contract or illegal harboring of runaway 

seamen, and unlicensed trading with Indian tribes. Id. at 

777 n.6. Those fines were not based on harms to the 

United States’ proprietary interest, as the federal treasury was not directly diminished because of the violations. 

The fines were instead based only on harms to the sovereign interest of the United States, viz., the interest in 

seeing the harms, as defined in the statutes, redressed. 

One statute noted by the Court even allowed informers to 

conduct a criminal prosecution and receive half the fine, 

id., which would redress an injury that the Court explicitly found to be sovereign, id. at 771 (stating that a sovereign, as opposed to proprietary, injury “suffices to support 

a criminal lawsuit”). Thus, under Vermont Agency, the 

United States’ sovereign injury is sufficient to confer 

standing upon it and therefore upon Stauffer, its implicit 
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 12

partial assignee.3 We therefore take no view as to 

whether section 292 addresses a proprietary or a sovereign injury of the United States, or both, as either one 

would confer standing on the government, and therefore 

Stauffer. 

Amicus Ciba asserts that the government cannot constitutionally assign any claim without retaining control 

over the relator’s actions, arguing that such assignment 

violates the “take Care” clause of Article II, § 3 of the 

Constitution. According to Ciba, in enacting section 

292(b), Congress has stripped the executive branch of its 

duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” 

by giving such power to the public. In support of that 

position, Ciba contrasts section 292 with the False Claims 

Act, which provides the government with, inter alia, the 

right to be notified of a case before the defendant is 

served, the right to intervene, and the right to seek dismissal or settlement over the objection of the relator or to 

prevent dismissal of the action by the relator. While Ciba 

raises relevant points, the district court did not decide, 

and the parties did not appeal, the constitutionality of 

section 292. Thus, we will not decide its constitutionality 

without the issue having been raised or argued by the 

parties. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 778 n.8 (ex-

 3 Amicus curiae Ciba Vision Corporation (“Ciba”) 

argues that the United States cannot assign its sovereign 

interest to “any person,” asserting that sovereign interests are analogous to personal interests and are not 

assignable at common law. Even if the interest of the 

United States here were purely sovereign, however, it is 

clear that the United States has partially assigned it, as 

the United States did in the statutes relied upon by the 

Supreme Court in Vermont Agency. See id. Given the 

Court’s heavy reliance upon that historical underpinning, 

we consider the question decided, that the United States 

may assign even a purely sovereign interest. 
13 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS

pressing no view on whether qui tam suits violate the 

“take Care” clause of Article II, as the parties did not 

raise it, “nor is the validity of qui tam suits . . . a jurisdictional issue that we must resolve here”). 

We also need not address whether Stauffer’s alleged 

injuries to himself or his asserted injuries to competition 

give him standing, either individually or as a member of 

the public. Stauffer’s standing arises from his status as 

“any person,” and he need not allege more for jurisdictional purposes. The district court conflated its jurisdiction with the merits of the case when it stated that 

Stauffer had failed to sufficiently allege a “purpose of 

deceiving the public.” Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 

254 n.5. Brooks Brothers similarly conflates jurisdiction 

and merits in asserting that Stauffer must show that the 

marking is fairly traceable to Brooks Brothers, rather 

than to J.M.C. Bow, the third party Adjustolox manufacturer. Neither of those points is jurisdictional in nature, 

nor do they fall under the standing inquiry. The standing 

doctrine is intended to require that the plaintiff is a 

proper person to bring the suit; it does not require that 

the plaintiff properly allege all of the elements of his 

claim. Thus, “standing does not depend on the merits of 

the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal”; it instead requires a claim to an injury of a legally 

cognizable right. 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s 

Federal Practice—Civil ¶ 101.40[5][a]. By allowing any 

person to sue, Congress granted individuals a legally 

cognizable right to half of the penalty defined in section 

292(a). Thus, Stauffer has sufficiently alleged (1) an 

injury in fact to the United States that (2) is caused by 

Brooks Brothers’ alleged conduct, attaching the markings 

to its bow ties, and (3) is likely to be redressed, with a 

statutory fine, by a favorable decision. See Lujan, 504 

U.S. at 560–61. 
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 14

We therefore reverse the district court’s decision concluding that Stauffer did not have standing. We remand 

for the court to address the merits of the case, including 

Brooks Brothers’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) “on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a 

plausible claim to relief because it fails to allege an ‘intent 

to deceive’ the public—a critical element of a section 292 

claim—with sufficient specificity to meet the heightened 

pleading requirements for claims of fraud imposed by” 

Rule 9(b). Standing Op., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 251 n.1. 

B. The Government’s Intervention 

The government argues that the district court abused 

its discretion in denying the government’s motion to 

intervene. According to the government, the court should 

have granted its motion to intervene as of right under 

Rule 24(a)(1) or (a)(2), or alternatively the government 

should have been permitted to intervene under Rule 

24(b)(1)(B). Rule 24(a)(2) requires the court to allow 

anyone to intervene who “claims an interest relating to 

the property or transaction that is the subject of the 

action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may 

as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s 

ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties 

adequately represent that interest.” With regard to that 

subpart, the government specifically argues that it has an 

interest in seeing the patent statute enforced, in preventing the distribution of falsely marked items, and in receiving half the statutory damages. Without intervention, 

according to the government, the disposition of this action 

might prejudice the government’s ability to protect its 

interests, which have not been adequately represented by 

Stauffer. 
15 STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS

Brooks Brothers responds that Rule 24(a)(2) does not 

apply because the district court’s decision would not 

prevent the United States from bringing its own action. 

We review the district court’s denial of intervention 

under Rule 24 under regional circuit law, in this case that 

of the Second Circuit. Ericsson Inc. v. InterDigital 

Commc’ns. Corp., 418 F.3d 1217, 1220–21 (Fed. Cir. 

2005). The Second Circuit reviews denials of motions to 

intervene under Rule 24 for an abuse of discretion. 

Mastercard Int’l, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 

377, 389 (2d Cir. 2006). However, a court “by definition 

abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” 

Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 

502 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). We agree with the government that the district court made an error of law in 

denying the government’s motion to intervene under Rule 

24(a)(2). Because we decide the issue on that basis, we 

need not address the government’s arguments with respect to subparts (a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).

Contrary to Brooks Brothers’ position, the government has an interest in enforcement of its laws and in one 

half the fine that Stauffer claims, disposing of the action 

would “as a practical matter impair or impede the [government’s] ability to protect its interest,” and Stauffer 

may not adequately represent that interest. Rule 

24(a)(2). As an initial matter, Brooks Brothers does not 

contest the government’s assertion that Stauffer does not 

adequately represent the United States’ interest in this 

case. 

Furthermore, the government would not be able to recover a fine from Brooks Brothers if Stauffer loses, as res

judicata would attach to claims against Brooks Brothers 

for the particular markings at issue. See United States ex 

rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 
STAUFFER v. BROOKS BROTHERS 16

2008) (“[T]he United States might become bound by res

judicata or collateral estoppel as a result of the actions of 

a pro se in bringing and losing a qui tam action.”) (citing 

Stoner v. Santa Clara County Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 

1116, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[Q]ui tam relators are not 

prosecuting only their ‘own case’ but also representing the 

United States and binding it to any adverse judgment the 

relators may obtain.”)). Thus, even though, as the district 

court noted, “the issue of the government’s ability to bring 

an action pursuant to section 292” in general was not 

presented, Intervention Op., 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51166, 

at *12, the United States’ ability to protect its interest in 

this particular case would be impaired by disposing of this 

action without the government’s intervention. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision denying the 

government’s motion to intervene. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and do not find them persuasive.4 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is 

REVERSED and REMANDED 

 4 In his brief, Stauffer also requests that the case be 

reassigned to a different judge on remand. He has not 

presented any argument as to why he requests reassignment, nor have the district court’s decisions shown any 

basis for doing so. We therefore deny Stauffer’s request.