92734 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 226 / Friday, November 22, 2024 / Notices 

1Modern automobiles (including the subject 

vehicle) contain multitudes of microcontrollers that 

communicate over a self-contained computer 

network known as a Controller Area Network. 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. The 

proposed collection OMB 2133–0025 

Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel 

Rescue (AMVER) System is used to 

maintain a current plot of U.S.-Flag and 

U.S.-owned vessels. Since the last 

renewal, there was an increase in the 

total respondents to this collection, 

which has resulted in more responses 

and higher burden hours. There are no 

other changes to this collection. We are 

required to publish this notice in the 

Federal Register to obtain comments 

from the public and affected agencies. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments and 

recommendations for the proposed 

information collections should be sent 

within 30 days of publication of this 

notice to www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ 

PRAMain. Find this particular 

information collection by selecting 

‘‘Currently under 30-day Review—Open 

for Public Comments’’ or by using the 

search function. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alex 

Sedlacek, 202–366–1031, Division of 

Sealift Operations and Emergency 

Response, Maritime Administration, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 

New Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 

20590, Email: alexander.sedlacek@

dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Title: Automated Mutual-Assistance 

Vessel Rescue (AMVER) System. 

OMB Control Number: 2133–0025. 

Type of Request: Extension with 

Change of a Previously Approved 

Collection. 

Abstract: The collection of 

information will be used to gather 

information regarding the location of 

U.S.-flag vessels and certain other U.S. 

citizen-owned vessels for the purpose of 

search and rescue in the saving of lives 

at sea and for the marshalling of ships 

for national defense and safety 

purposes. 

Respondents: U.S.-flag and U.S. 

citizen-owned vessels. 

Affected Public: Business or other for 

profit. 

Estimated Number of Respondents: 

185. 

Estimated Number of Responses: 

33,855. 

Estimated Hours per Response: .07. 

Annual Estimated Total Annual 

Burden Hours: 2,370. 

Frequency of Response: Annually. 

A 60-day Federal Register Notice 

soliciting comments on this information 

collection was published on September 

12, 2024 at 89 FR 74371 (Federal 

Register (FR) 2024–20679). 

(Authority: The Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995; 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, as amended; and 

49 CFR 1.49.) 

By Order of the Maritime Administrator. 

T. Mitchell Hudson, Jr., 

Secretary, Maritime Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2024–27344 Filed 11–21–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–81–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2024–0086] 

Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation. 

ACTION: Denial of petition for a defect 

investigation. 

SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the 

reasons for the denial of a petition 

submitted on June 7, 2023, by 

Kimberlyn Hearns (the petitioner) to 

NHTSA’s Office of Defects Investigation 

(ODI). The petition requests that the 

Agency initiate an investigation into 

alleged remote attacks to the vehicle 

electrical control system associated with 

a variety of reported electrical 

malfunctions that render the petitioner’s 

Model Year 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicle 

(subject vehicle) allegedly unusable. On 

August 30, 2023, NHTSA opened Defect 

Petition DP23–004 to evaluate the 

petitioner’s request. After conducting a 

technical review of the petitioner’s 

submissions, seeing no other complaints 

for 2019 Toyota Yaris vehicles related to 

the types of ‘‘remote attacks’’ described 

by the petitioner, and reviewing 

information provided by Toyota in 

response to an Agency request for 

information regarding the 2019 Yaris 

CAN bus, NHTSA has concluded that 

there is insufficient evidence to pursue 

further investigation. Accordingly, the 

Agency has denied the petition. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Tariq Bond, Vehicle Defects Division— 

D, Office of Defects Investigation, 

NHTSA 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. Telephone (202) 

366–5472. Email: Tariq.Bond@dot.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Introduction 

Interested persons may petition 

NHTSA requesting that the Agency 

initiate an investigation to determine 

whether a motor vehicle or an item of 

replacement equipment does not 

comply with an applicable motor 

vehicle safety standard or contains a 

defect that relates to motor vehicle 

safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162; 49 CFR 552.1. 

Upon receipt of a properly filed 

petition, the Agency conducts a 

technical review of the petition, 

material submitted with the petition, 

and any additional information. 49 

U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. The 

technical review may consist solely of a 

review of information already in the 

possession of the Agency or it may 

include the collection of information 

from the motor vehicle manufacturer or 

other sources. After conducting the 

technical review and considering 

appropriate factors, which may include, 

but are not limited to, allocation of 

Agency resources, Agency priorities, 

and the likelihood of success in 

litigation that might arise from a 

determination of noncompliance or a 

defect related to motor vehicle safety, 

the Agency will grant or deny the 

petition. See 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR 

552.8. 

Background Information 

In a letter dated June 7, 2023, 

Kimberlyn Hearns (the petitioner) 

submitted a petition attributing 

electrical malfunctions of his 2019 

Toyota Yaris (subject vehicle) to remote 

attacks by unknown parties targeted on 

the subject vehicle’s Controller Area 

Network (CAN bus).1 The petitioner 

requested an Agency investigation of the 

susceptibility of the subject vehicle to 

the alleged attacks and for assistance 

securing a full refund of the vehicle 

price. Over four total submissions from 

the June 7, 2023 petition to August 2, 

2023, the petitioner supported his 

request with a chronology of events 

detailing the vehicle fault, service 

history, and a listing of published 

cybersecurity articles. In addition, 

before filing the petition, the petitioner 

sent three pieces of related 

correspondence to the Agency from late 

December 2022 to February 2023. 

NHTSA has based its decision on a 

review of the material cited by the 

petitioner in his petition, information 

submitted by Toyota in response to the 

Agency’s request, and other pertinent 

information in NHTSA’s databases. Staff 

from NHTSA’s Vehicle Research and 

Test Center (VRTC) supported the 

review at all stages. 

Subject Vehicle History 

The subject vehicle is a Model Year 

(MY) 2019 Toyota Yaris LE equipped 

with a 1.5L I4 gasoline engine. 

According to a vehicle history report, 

the subject vehicle has only been owned 

by one person (the petitioner), started 

receiving service in August of 2019, and 

has not experienced any reported 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 226 / Friday, November 22, 2024 / Notices 92735 

2 20TC03 was a quality campaign meant to 

reprogram the Engine Control Module (ECM) 

software due to the software installed being 

intended for vehicles with a different engine 

configuration. 

3 21V617 is a fuel pump recall meant to remedy 

a defective fuel pump by replacement. 

4Based on a contemporaneous service invoice. 

5The model, capabilities, and installer of this 

device are unknown. However, the Rockledge 

Securities website advertises several vehicle 

security devices that may be wired into the vehicle 

and identifies the subject vehicle sales servicing 

dealership as one of several affiliated dealerships. 

6Petitioner’s letter to ODI dated February 28, 

2023 states: ‘‘my opinion and belief is that my 2019 

Toyota Yaris is not defective. It was remotely 

hacked.’’ 

7The petitioner has insisted to the Agency and 

Toyota that only written communications are 

accepted and that he will refuse phone calls, 

emails, and in person visits. 

8The authority to determine whether to approve 

or deny defect petitions under 49 U.S.C. 30162(d) 

and 49 CFR part 552 has been further delegated to 

the Associate Administrator for Enforcement. 

collisions or damage. The vehicle 

history report indicated regular 

servicing of the subject vehicle by the 

Toyota dealership that sold it to the 

petitioner, with no atypical problems 

evident through June of 2022 and after 

approximately 40,000 miles of service. 

During this time, the subject vehicle 

received remedies related to two Toyota 

field campaigns: Service Campaign 

20TC03 2 (performed September 2020) 

and Safety Recall 21V617 3 (performed 

January 2022). 

In mid-November of 2022, with 

46,136 miles of service,4 the petitioner 

reported hearing three beeps while 

driving at low speed, accompanied by 

engine shut down. After a delay, the 

petitioner was able to restart the vehicle, 

but a Check Engine Light (CEL) 

remained illuminated. The petitioner’s 

dealer diagnosed the problem as a bad 

battery and installed a replacement 

battery. 

Over the ensuing two weeks, and 

approximately 700 miles, the petitioner 

reported several instances of engine 

power loss, malfunctioning indicator 

lights, and a head unit delayed start 

malfunction, leading to service at a 

different Toyota dealer in early 

December 2022. That dealer’s invoice 

reported that no problem had been 

identified after several service checks, 

inspection of the ECU wiring, and after 

approximately 30 miles of test driving 

over a two-day period. At the time of its 

release from this dealership, the invoice 

reported that the subject vehicle had an 

odometer reading of 47,009 miles. 

Toyota reported that the dealership had 

also contacted its Technical Assistance 

Center for further guidance. 

The vehicle history report indicates 

that the subject vehicle traveled only 44 

miles over the following three months, 

returning to its regular servicing 

dealership in late March 2023, about a 

week after another report from the 

petitioner of flashing warning lights and 

repeated horn activation while the 

petitioner was inside his house. The 

petitioner reported that this mid-March 

incident coincided with a suspicious 

vehicle driving by his house. The 

petitioner also stated that in late March, 

a service visit to his regular servicing 

dealership included the removal of an 

aftermarket vehicle security system 

manufactured by Rockledge Securities.5

No further service records from 

Toyota or the vehicle history report 

appear after March 27, 2023. The 

petitioner reported eleven instances of 

continued malfunctions from March 30 

through June 3, 2023 related to horn 

activation, inoperative key-fob, no-start 

condition, and fuel gauge inaccuracies. 

The petitioner also reported that two of 

these malfunctions coincided with 

suspicious vehicles driving by his 

house. The petitioner then began 

documenting various additional events, 

including a no-start condition followed 

by a jump-start, inaccurate/slowly 

responding fuel gauge, intermittent CEL, 

‘‘nearly unreadable’’ instrument cluster, 

an inability to turn off the engine, and 

inoperative fan, wipers, and signals. 

Petitioner also cited attempts to 

maintain the battery state of charge by 

idling the subject vehicle in his 

driveway. At the time of the petitioner’s 

last contact with NHTSA in August 

2023, the petitioner reported that his 

subject vehicle was unusable, despite 

efforts to maintain the charge of its 

battery. 

Subject Vehicle Connectivity 

Although the petitioner asserts that 

his vehicle is under remote electronic 

attack, and stipulates that the subject 

vehicle is not defective; the Agency is 

still treating the submitted document as 

a part of a defect petition as initially 

requested.6 The Agency requested that 

Toyota describe the subject vehicle’s 

CAN bus and connectivity to outside 

wireless data sources. In response to the 

Agency’s request, Toyota stated: 

• This vehicle is not equipped with a 

cellular communication module; 

therefore, it is not capable of 

communicating with a cellular network. 

• This vehicle’s multimedia system is 

capable of connecting a cellular phone 

to support hands-free features, such as 

hands-free calling and streaming audio 

from the phone. 

• This vehicle does not have 

advanced connectivity features, such as 

Apple CarPlay or Android Auto. 

• The multimedia system, which 

includes Bluetooth connectivity, 

operates on a local CAN bus network 

dedicated communication for the 

vehicle’s multimedia system. 

ODI Analysis 

ODI reviewed complaint data and 

information in NHTSA’s databases 

concerning all 2019 Toyota Yaris 

vehicles and identified no other 

cyberattack allegations similar to those 

reported by the petitioner. This body of 

information also did not show any 

potential trend of similar electrical or 

power loss symptoms regardless of 

reported cause. 

The symptoms reported by the 

petitioner could not be duplicated by 

the Toyota dealer in three separate 

service visits and may have originated 

from any number of sources. Beyond 

these service visits, the effects of other 

influences such as the Rockledge 

aftermarket security system (including 

its installation and removal), and battery 

maintenance via external charger or 

driveway idling cannot be assessed at 

this time. Toyota has reported that 

difficulty communicating with the 

petitioner 7 inhibits further efforts to 

inspect the vehicle. After assessing the 

material submitted by the petitioner, 

information submitted by Toyota in 

response to an Agency request regarding 

the petitioner’s allegation, and other 

information in NHTSA’s possession, 

NHTSA concludes that: 

• Notwithstanding the conditions 

cited by the petitioner, the 2019 Toyota 

Yaris vehicle lacks the external cellular 

connectivity needed to make it 

vulnerable to remote cyberattacks. 

• The subject vehicle’s Bluetooth 

connectivity ability is limited to 

multimedia and hands-free 

communication. 

• The Agency has uncovered no other 

evidence of related cyberattacks or 

similar symptoms in 2019 Toyota Yaris 

vehicles. 

Accordingly, the Agency is denying 

the petition. As with all potential motor 

vehicle safety risks, NHTSA will 

continue to review any new information 

or incidents as they are submitted to the 

Agency. 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d) and 49 

CFR part 552; delegation of authority at 

49 CFR 1.95(a).8

Eileen Sullivan, 

Associate Administrator, Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2024–27431 Filed 11–21–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 


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