### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ja nua ry 20, 200 9 S es sio n
LAMAR ADVERTIS ING COMPANY (fo rmerly Outd oo r Comm uni ca tio ns , Inc .)

v. BY-PASS PARTNERS
Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for Madison Coun ty No. 50768 John Fr ankl in Murchison , Judge

No. W2008-00645-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jul y 22, 2009

This is a dispute over lea se ag ree ments. The plainti ff o u t d o o r adver tising compa

ny lease d two parc els of prope rty

from the de fenda

nt rea l e state deve lopment company for the pur

pose of e rec ting billboard signs. The defe ndant then ca ncelled the lease s. The def endant ha d contra cted to sell the pr op e rt y to a no the r o utd oo r adv ert is ing c omp any , a nd c anc e lle d th e le a se s w iththe pla int if f i n relianc e on a le ase pr ovision allowing canc ellation in the event that the plaintiff’s sig ns interfe red with the defendant’s sale or development of the property

. The plainti ff filed this lawsuit ag ainst the defe ndant, alleg ing that the defe ndant’s ca ncellation wa s ineffe ctive because this was not the ty pe of interf ere nce that was conte mplated in the ag ree ment. The de fenda n t co u n t erc laimed, see king damag es alleg edly

suffe red a s a re sult of the plaintiff’s fa ilure to remove its bil lboards. Mea nwhile, the third-par

ty outdoor adver

tising compa

ny that was supposed to purc hase the proper ty filed a motion to i nterve ne in the lawsuit, alleg ing that the plaintiff was inter fer ing w ith its contra ctual relations with t he def

endant r eal e state deve lopment company . A tri al wa s held, and no proof of dama g e s w a s su

bmi tte d. Th e de fe nd ant r e a l e state de ve lop me nt c omp any and the thi rd-party adver tising compa

ny that soug ht to intervene asked for a hearing on damag es in their post-trial brie f. The trial c ourt issued a letter ruling finding that the def endant’ s termination o f the lease s was e ff e c tiv e . Y e ars la te r, an o rd e r w a s e nte re d r e ite ra tin g the fi nd ingtha

t th e de fe nd ant e ff

e c tiv e ly terminated the lease s; the order set the matter f or a spe cial hea

ring on damag es owe d to the defe ndant
rea l estate de velopment company and the third-pa

rty adver tising company

. The third-pa rty ’s motion to intervene was ne ver e x plicitly g rante d. Shortly there afte r, t he trial judge assig ned to the ca se died. A s ub sti tut e jud g e wa s a ssi g ne d to he ar t he re ma ind e r o f t

he c a se . In r e sp on se to a se ri e s o f m oti on s, the trial cour

t determined that the trial was pr operly bifurcated, that the third-pa rty adve rt ising company did not transfer its rig ht to damag es in a sale of its assets, and that its motion to i nterve ne was ne ver g rante d by

the pre vious trial judge , and it there fore could not rec over damag es. The thirdpa rt y a dv e rt isi ngc omp any

no w a pp e a ls. We rev ers e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on

that th e mot ion

to intervene was ne ver gr anted, finding that the motion to intervene was implicitly g rante d in the order following the trial. We aff irm the trial cour

t’s holding that the bif

urcation was proper, that the de fe nd ant r e a l e state de ve lop me nt c omp any e ff e c tiv e ly te rm inate d th e le a se s, a

n d that th e thi rd -p a rt

yO C I is the p re d e c e sso r o f P la intiff /A p p e llee L a m a r A d v e rtising C o m p a n y. 1

-2- a dv e rt isi ngc omp any that soug ht to p ur c ha se the pr op e rt y re ta ine d th e ri g ht t o d a ma g e s a ft e r t he sa le of its assets. The case is rema nded for a hea

ring on the damag es owe d to the third-par ty adver tising
c o mp an y, i f

an y.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t i s A ffirm e d in P art, R ever sed in Part , and Rem anded

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , P.J ., W.S ., and J. S TEVE N S T A FF O RD , J ., joined.

L arr y A. B utler, Jackson, Tennesse e, for the Appellant L ong Outdoor Adve rtising

David Ha rdee and Mag an N. White, J ackson , T ennesse e, for the Appellee L amar

Adver tising Company (for merly Outdoor Communication, Inc.)

OP IN ION

F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

I n th e la te 19 80 s, Outdo or Com mun ic a tio ns , Inc . ( “ OC I ” ) e nte re d in to t wo le a se a g re e me nts 1 wi th B y -P ass Par

tne rs (“ B y -P a ss” ), wh e re by OC Ile a se d f

ro m B y -P a ss t

wo pa rc e ls o f l a nd

in J ackson, Te nnessee . OCIconstructe d a billboard a dvertising sign on eac h parc el. Eac h lease had
a te r m o f f iv e y e ar s , an d e a c h s tate d th a t th e le a s e w o u ld c o n ti n u e in f o r c e f r o m y e ar to y ear

for a period of se ven y ear s following the initial five-y ear period unless it was terminated at the end of the initial period or at the end of any additional y ear

. The lease s also provided that, afte r the fir st three y ear s of the lea se, in the eve nt that OCI ’s s ign structures interfer ed with the sale or deve lopment of the prope rty , the lessor B y -Pass could cancel the ag ree ment by g iving OCI six ty day s’ written notice

.
I n a letter dated April 3, 1995, By -Pass notified OCI that it was terminating the lease s. I n a su bs e qu e nt l e tte r d a te d Jun e 2, 19 95 , B y -P a ss expl a ine d tha t it wa s ter min a tin g the le a se s b e c a

us e the le a se s and

sig ns we re int e rf

e ri ngwi th B y -P a ss’ s sa le and de ve lop me nt o f t

he pr op e rt

y . B y -P a ss had ente red into a c ontrac t to sell the parce ls to Appell an t L ong Outdoor Adve rtising ( “L OA”) , a c omp any fo rm e d in 19 95 by Jimmy Wal la c e (“ Wal la c e ” ) and tw o o the r p art

ne rs . Wa lla c e wa s a lso the mana g ingpa

rt ne r a nd te n p e rc e nt o wn e r o f B y -P a ss.
On J uly 28, 1995, OCIfiled the unde rlying la wsuit ag ainst By -Pass seeking , i n t e r a l ia , a de c laratio n that B y -P a ss d id n ot h a ve the ri g ht t o te rm inate the le a se s. On Au g us t 17 , 1 99 5, B y -P a ss fi le d it s ans we r a

nd c ounte rc la im, a lle g ing that it su ff e re d dama g e s re su lti ngfr om O CI ’s re fu sa l to
remove its signs. On August 25, 1995, L OA file d a motion to intervene unde r Rule 24 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e dure , and a tta c he d a c omp la int a lle g ing a c a us e of a c tio n a g a ins t O CI-3-

for unlawful interfe renc e with the contra ctual relations be tween By -Pass and L OA. L OA s o u ght dama g e s ari sin g fr om O CI ’s re fu sa l to re lin qu ish po sse ssi on

of the bil lbo ard

sit e s.
A tri a l on the ma tte r w a s hel d be fo re Cha nc e llo r Joe Mor

ri s on Augus t 24, 199 8, on the same day as a companion ca se, Rode Oil Co. v. Lam ar Adver. Co. , No. W2007-02017-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4367300 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2008), also involving OCI and L OA. The testimony at trial focuse d primarily on the contra ctual provision that per mitted By -Pass to terminate the le ases in the event that OCI ’s sig ns interfe red w ith the sale or de velopment of the pr oper t y

. No p roof was
su bmi tte d o n th e iss ue of dama g e s. I n the ir po st- tr ia l me mor and um, B y -P a ss and L OAc la ime d th a t, by implied consent, the par

ties had tried only the issue of whe ther B y -Pass’s termination of the lease s wa s valid; acc ording ly , they asked the trial court to hold a he aringon the issue of damag es in the event that the c ourt found that the lea ses wer e validly terminated.

On No ve mbe r 1 7, 19 98 , th e tr ia l c ourt iss ue d a le tte r r uli ngfi nd ingin favo r of

B y -P a ss. Following the letter ruling , no order was issued or e ntere d by the trial cour

t, so By -Pass and L OA reque sted a c onfer ence befor e Chanc ellor Morris, whic h was he ld in J anuary 2001. At the confe renc e, B y -Pass and L OA aske d Chance llor Morris to enter a n order consi stent with the No ve mbe r 1 99 8 le tte r r

uli ng , to g ra

nt L OA ’s mot ion to int e rv e ne , and to o rd e r a he ari ngto a dd

re ss the damag es incurr ed by

By -Pass and L OA. OCI

challeng ed the reque st, a

rg uing that there had bee n no implied consent at trial to re serve the damag es issue for a later hear ing a nd that By -Pass and L OA should not be g iven a second chanc e to put on proof of damag es. Chance llor Morris enter ed an or der on Fe bruar

y 1, 2001, ruling in favor of By -Pass and ordering a subsequent hear ing to de termine the damag es incurr ed by

By -Pass and L OA.

Di s cover y on the issue of damag es beg an in Octobe r 2001. B efor e any other proc eedings
we re he ld, Cha

nc e llo r M or

ri s d ie d. Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court de sig nate d

r e tir e d Jud g e F ra

nk lin Murchison to hea

r the re mainder of

the ca se.

Meanw hi l e, on October

1, 1998, OCIhad sold all of its assets to L amar Adver tising Company (“L amar ”). Conseque ntly , on May 1 7 , 2002, OCIfiled a motion for L amar to be substitut ed as the plaintiff. This motion was later g rante d.

On Dec ember

15, 2003, L amar filed a motion to dismiss any rema ining claim for da mag es b y L OA

. L am ar

as s er t edt h at , af

t er a s er i es o f a cq u i s i t i o n s , L am ar ac tu al l y o wn edL OA ’s d am age c la ims , s o th e re wa s n o lo ng e r a jus tic ia ble c on tr ov e rs y

. I n a dd iti on , L a mar c on te nd e d th a t th e c a se should be dismissed because Chance llor Morris had i m p ro perly held that the trial wa s bifurcated. On Marc h 11, 2004, J udg e Murc hison held a hea ring on L amar ’s motion to dis miss. On October 20, 2004, the trial cour t en t er ed an order de ny ing L amar ’s motion to dis miss on the gr ound that Chance llor Morris had improper ly held that the trial had been bifurcated. The r emaining portion of the motion, alleg ing that there w as no ju sticiable controve rsy , was c ontinued until an order w as e nte re d s ub sti tut ingL a mar a s a pa rt y de fe nd ant. On No ve mbe r 1, 200 4, a se c on d he ari ngwa s h e ld on L amar ’s motion to dis miss, and the trial court denied the m otion in an orde r ente red on D ece mber 1, 2004.-4-

Me a nw hil e , o n N ov e mbe r 5 , 2 00 4, in l ig ht o f L a mar’ s a sse rt ion that thr ou g h a c qu isi tio n it ha d a c qu ir e d th e ri g hts to L OA ’s dama g e c la ims , L OAfi le d a mot ion a sk ingthe tr ia l c ourt

to deter mine owner ship of L OA’s damag e claims. On September 11, 2006, L amar filed its own motion on the same issue, r equesting the trial cour t to de t er m i n e t hat any

damag es aw arde d to L OA ar e owned by L amar

. This was resolved on November 3, 2006; the t rial court enter ed an order f inding that L OA, not L amar , owned a ny damag e cla ims of L OA. The order also denied L amar ’s m otion to dismi ss.
The parties then f

iled briefs a ddressing whether L OA had e ver be en made a par ty to the action, and thus whe ther L OA could a ssert a c laim for dama g es. Afte r a he aringon Fe bruar y 11, 2008, the trial cour

t entere d an orde r on Mar ch 3, 2008. In the orde r, the trial cour t held that L OA is not a party

and wa s never

made a party in this case bec ause the re w as n o wr i t t en o rder enter ed
e xplic itl y g ra nti ngL OA ’s mot ion

to i nte rv e ne and

th e F e br ua ry 20 01 or de r d id n ot d o s o b e c a us e it f a ile d to c ompl y wi th Rul e 24 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure . T he tr ia l c ourt a lso denied L OA’s motion to inter vene. I n light of these holdings, the trial court de termined that L OA
c ou ld n ot a sse rt

a c la im f or dama g e s. L OAthe n f

ile d a tim e ly no tic e of a pp e a l.

I S S UE S ON A P P E AL AND S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
On a pp e a l, L OAra ise s tw o is su e s f or our r e vie w. I t argue s f

ir st that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in fi nd ingthat th e or de r en te re d by Cha nc e llo r Mor

ri s on Fe br

ua ry 1, 20 01 wa s in su ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh L OA as a n intervening party under Tennessee Rule of C ivil Procedur e 24. Second, L OA asse rts that the trial cour

t should have found in the alternative that L amar was judicially

estopped fr om denying the status of

L OAa s a

pa rt y . In th e e ve nt t

hat th is C ourt

fi nd s th a t L OAis a

pr op e r p art

y to t his laws uit , L a mar r a ise s th re e iss ue s f or our r e vie w. F ir st, L a mar co nte nd s tha t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in h o l d i n g t h at By -P as s co u l d v al i d l y t er m i n at e t h e l ea s e a gre em en t

. S ec o n d , L am ar ar gu es t h at J u d ge Murchison er

red in holding that Chance llor Morris proper ly bifurca ted the liability

issue from the damag es issue. Third, L amar asser ts that the t rial court erre d in finding that L OA re tained the r ight to d a ma g e s a ft e r t

he se ri e s o f a c qu isi tio ns that r e su lte d in L a mar’ s a c qu isi tio n o f L OA ’s a sse ts.

A t rial court’s finding s of fa ct ar e re viewed de novo upon the re cord w ith a presumption of
corr ectne ss of the finding s “unless the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Te nn. R. App. P. 1 3( d) ; Nashville Ford Tractor, Inc v. Gre at Am . Ins. C o. , 194 S.W .3d 415, 424 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Conclusions of law, howe ver, a re r eviewe d de novo wi tho ut a pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss. S. Con structors, I

nc. v. Loudon Cou nty Bd. of Edu c. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted). The trial c ourt’s dec isio n r eg ardingwhether

L ong Outdoor Adve rtising wa s proper ly made
a pa rt y in t his c a se by

the F e br ua ry 1, 20 01 or de r i s an in ter pretatio n o f a pr ior or de r, and

is a qu e sti on of law that this C ourt

re vie ws de novo

. Hastin gs v. Hastings , No. 01A01-9603- CH-00128, 1996 WL 33480501, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1996).-5- A N A L Y SIS

LOAM ot ion to Int e r ve ne

We beg in by

addre ssing the thr eshold issue of whe ther the F ebrua ry 1, 2001 order

established L OA as a n interveningparty

under Rule 24 of

the Tenne ssee Rules of Civi l Procedure . L amar argues th at L OA w a s n e ve r m a de a pa rt y to t he a c tio n b e c a

us e no or de r w a s e nte re d e xpre ssl y permitting L OA to interve ne and L OA’s participation in the lawsuit, in and of itself, is insufficie nt to make it a

pa rt y . L a mar c ite s Carson v. Challenger Corp. , No. W2006-00558-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL17 75 75 (T e nn . Ct . App . Jan . 2 5, 20 07 ), in s up po rt of its argume nt.

I n Carson , the plaintiff, Mr. Car son , was a lessor of commerc ial proper ty who sued his tenant for past due re nt and other da mag es under

the lease

. Id. at *1. The de fenda nt tenant ar g ued that the doctrine of res j u d i ca ta applied to bar Mr. Carson’s suit. Id. a t *3 . T he te na nt’ s re s ju dic ata
argume nt was b a se d o n M r. Cars on ’s pa rt ic ipatio n in

an e arl ie r l aws uit

re g ard ingthe same commerc ial proper

ty , filed by

Mr. Carson’s w ife a g ainst the same tena nt. Id. At the time, Mr. Cars on and his wi fe we re g oin g thr ou g h a div or c e and

sh e su e d th e te na

nt t o c oll e c t r e nt p ay

me nts , claiming that the underlying commerc ial rea lty was mar ital property

. Id. at *1. Mr. Carson f iled a motion to intervene in the wife’ s lawsuit; the trial court ne ver r uled on the motion. Id. A conse nt order was ultimately

enter ed dismissing the wife ’s lawsuit and disbursing the rent pay ments that the tenant had pa id to the court cle rk. Id. at *2.

Th is C ourt

de te rm ine d tha t Mr. Cars on wa s not a p art y in t he pr e vio us laws uit

fi le d b y his wife, a nd there fore , the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to bar Mr. Carson’s lawsuit ag ainst the tenant on the same prope rty

. Id. at *6. The Court noted that “inter v en t i o n as of r ight” is not an absolute rig ht. Id. at *4. There fore , a person does not automatically become a par ty upon the filing
o f a moti on to intervene

. Id. T h e Co u rt h e ld th a t w h e na

mo ti o nto in te r

v e n e is f il e d b u t n e ver g rante d, the movant does not be come a party

. Id. Mr. Carson ha d filed a motion to intervene in the prior proc eeding s, but he never became a party beca use no orde r wa s entere d addre ssing the motion, either g ranting or denying his request. Id. The appellate court acknow ledg ed that Mr. Car son took part in the prior

proce eding s by signing consent order s and filing motions, but reje cted the c ontention that, by doing so, he eff

ectively beca me a pa rty

. Id. at * 5 (c i t i n g Bol

es v . Smith , 37 Tenn. (5 Snee d) 105 (1857)) . I t determined that, beca use Mr. Carson was not a named party in the prior lawsuit, he could not ha

ve asser ted his r ights in the case , despite some level of participation in th e l i t i g ation. Id.

I n Carson , howeve r, we noted that “[t] he rec ord bef ore us doe s not contain an orde r g ranting or deny ing Mr . Carson’s motion to intervene, a nd it a ppear s that the motion wa s never addre ssed by the trial cour

t.” Id. a t *1

. Th e pr e se nt c a se is di st in guis hab le f ro m Carson in that the rec ord
c on ta ins an o rd e r t

hat L OAc on te nd s im

pli c itl y g ra nte d it s motio n to inte rv e ne . The re fo re , w e mus t examine Chancellor Morr is’s Fe bruar y 1, 2001 order

in this case.

We f ir st n ote the g e ne ra l r

ule us e d in

c on str uin g or de rs and

jud g me nts :-6-

The g ener al rule is that a judg ment should be so construed a s to give eff ect to eve ry part of it and w here there are tw o p o s sible interpre tations that one will be adopted which is in harmony

with the entire r ecor d, and is such as ou gh t t o h ave be en rende red a

nd is such as is within the j urisdictional power of t he court. Moreove r, the judgme nt will be r ead in the lig ht of the plea dings a nd the other pa

rts of the re cord.

John Barb, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London , 653 S.W .2d 422, 423 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (i n t ern al ci t at i o no m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g Grant v . D av is , 8 Tenn. Ct. Civ. App. 315, 319 (Ct. App. 1918)).

The F ebrua

ry 1, 2001 order was prec eded by the J anuar y 2001 status confe renc e re quested by By -Pass and L OA. Fr om the transcr ipt of the confe renc e, counse l for B y -Pass and L OA aske d the fo llo wi ngof

the tr ia l c ourt : So three thing s . . . are neede d in this ca se. Number one, an or der is nee ded to be enter ed consistent with the Court’s ruling by letter in Nove mber of ’ 98. Secondly , we’ re requesting that the C ourt also allow L ong Outdoor or Rode
– or excuse me, By Pass Par tners to pr ocee d with a sepa rate hear ing on the ir losses
and dama g e s a s a

re su lt o f t

he ho ldi ngov e r o f t

he sig n s ite s. An d th e n th ir dly , w e ’r e a sk ing that the int e rv e nin g c omp la int , th e mot ion to intervene on behalf

of L ong Outdoor, that that be pe rmitted solely for the pur

poses of pr ov ingof

the dama g e s. Thus, in the status confe renc e with Chance llor Morris, the fa ct t hat t he trial court needed to a ct on L OA’s motion to intervene was c lear ly broug ht to Chancellor Morr is’s attention.

As a re sult of the J anuar

y 2001 status confe renc e, Chanc ellor M orris ente red the Fe bruar y 1, 20 01 or de r. I t pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s:

I N THE CHAN CERY COURT OF MADI SON COUNTY, TEN NESSEE

OUTDO OR COMMUNI CATI ONS, I NC.,
Plaintiff,

VS. R.D. No. 50768

BY -PASS P ARTNERS and L ONG OUTDO OR ADVERTI SI NG,

De fe nd ants

.
OR DE RIn i t s b ri ef , La m ar q uo t es t he f

o l l o wi ng p ass age f

rom t he excell ent t reat i se wri t t en b y P rof ess o rs B anks and 2
Ent man on t h e pr oce du r e t o be f ol l owe d by a pa r t y w h os e mot i on t o i n t er v en e h as be en g r an t ed:

P r es umabl y , t he i nt er ven or s houl d t hen f i l e a nd s er ve t he propo s ed comp l ai nt or an swe r tha t was i n cl u ded wi t h t h e mot i on f or i n t er v en t i on

. I f

t h e i n t er v en or as s er t s a cl ai m, t h e par t y a g ai n s t w h om the c la im is as se rte d is re q u ire d to se rv e a re sp o n siv e p le a d ing o r m o tio n w ithin the ti m e p ro v id e d in R u le 1 2 .0 1 . T h e inte rv e n o r’s p le a d ing m a y b e se rv e d un d e r R u le 5 o n tho se a lre a d y p a rtie s, w h ile (c o n tinu e d ...)
-7- This matter ca

me to be hea

rd on August 24, 1998, upon the “Complaint for Dec laratory

J u d gment and B rea ch of L ease Ag ree ment” filed by Outdoor C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , In c

. a s P l a i n t i f f ( “ O C I ” ) , t h e “ A n s w e r

an d C o u n t e r c l a i m o f

B yPass Partners” , the Third P arty “Complaint” filed ag ainst OCIby L ong Outdoor Adver tising (“ L OA”) , testimony of witnesses a

nd the entire rec ord in this cause, f rom a ll o f w hic h it

a pp e ars a s f

oll ow s: (1 ) T he pr ima

ry iss ue i n th e tr ia l w a s w he the r B y -P a ss P art ne rs e ff e c tiv e ly te rm inate d th e sig n lea se s with OC Iwh e n it

g a ve its wr itt e n n oti c e of

te rm inatio n to OCIon April 3, 1995 as supplemente d by termination letter se nt to OCI on J une 2, 1995. (2 ) T he Court he re by fi nd s th a t th e a fo re de sc ri be d le tte rs we re su ff ic ie nt t o terminate the sign le ases in question.

I T I S, TH EREFORE, ORDERED, ADJU DG ED AND DECREED th at judgme nt on the i ssue of termination of the sign le ases is her eby enter ed in favor of B y -P a ss P art

ne rs ;
AND IT IS FU RTHER ORDERED, ADJUDG ED AND DECREED that this matter shall be set for specia l hear ing on the issue of damag es t hat might a ccr ue t o By -P as s P ar t n er s an d

L o n g Ou t d o o r A d v er t i s i n g. Enter this 1st day

of F eb., 2001.

/s/

H O N O RA B LE J O E C

. M O R R IS

L OA conc edes tha

t th i s o rd er

i n cl u d es n o l an gu age ex p l i ci t l y gra n t i n g i t s m o t i o nt o i n t er v ene. I t ma int a ins , h ow e ve r, th a t th e or de r i mpl ic itl y g ra nts the mot ion . L OAre lie s o n th e fa c t th a t it s n a m e i s i n c l u d e d

i nt h e s t y l e o f

t h e c a s e , t h a tt h e o r d e r s t a t e s t h a tLO A f i l e d a c o mp l a i n ta g a i n s tO C I,
an d t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rts e tt h e m at t e r f o r a s p e c i a l h e ar i n g o n t h e i s s u e o f d a m a g e s o w e d t o b o t h B yPass and L OA. All of these fac ts, L OA argues, indicate that the order was intende d by Chance llor Mo rr is t o ma

ke L OA a pa

rt y

. I n r e sp on se , L a mar a

rgue s th a t, b e c a

us e a c omp la int

is s up po se d to be filed a fter a motion to intervene is g rante d and the order err oneously say s that L OA’s c omplaint 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2

ser vi ce und er R ul e 4 wo ul d be requi red o n any new p arti e s a d d e d by t he p l ead i ng. A s a p art y , t he i nterv en o r w i l l b e sub je ct t o all t he d uti es a nd resp o nsib i l i t i es o f a p arty, i nc l ud i ng p aym en t o f co st s.

R O BERT B ANKS , J R

. & J U N E F. E NTM AN , T ENN ESS EE C I V I L P RO CED U RE § 6

- 9 (m) (2d ed

. 2 0 0 4 ). La m ar do es not argue tha t L O A ’s f

a ilure to a c tua lly fil e it s c o m p la int a fter the F e b ru a ry 1 , 2 0 0 1 o rd e r p re v e n te d it fro m b e c o m ing a p a rty. R at her , Lamar di s cus s ed t he procedur e t o s uppo r t i t s ar gu ment t hat t he Febru ar y 1, 20 01 order s houl d not be i nt er pret ed t o be an order gr ant i ng LO A ’ s mo t i on t o i nt er ven e.

B ec au s e we h av e det er mi n ed t h at t h e t r i al c ou r t ’ s Fe br u ar y 1, 2001 or der i mpl i ci t l y g r an t ed LO A’ s mot i on 3

t o i nterv en e, we d o no t rea ch t he i ssue o f w he t he r L am ar wa s jud i ciall y esto p p ed f ro m d en yi ng t he st atus o f L O A as a p a rty.
-8- was filed, the order seems to assume that the m otion to intervene had already been g rante d, which it had not, and the orde r, there fore , did not gr ant the motion to intervene.

Wit hout que stion, the Fe bruar y 1, 2001 order is ina

rtfully draw n. Whil e it ref ers to L OA as a par ty , it incorrec tly

identifies L OA a s a defenda nt, when L OA’s status, if a ny , would be as a

n interveningplaintiff. The orde r also re fer s to L OA’s c omplaint ag ainst OCIas havingbeen f iled, when in fa ct it was not filed, but rather wa s i n cl u d ed as an exhibit t o L OA’s motion to intervene

. T h e o r d e r d i d , h o w e v e r , i n c l u d e t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s f i n d i n g c o n t a i n e d i n t h e 1 9 9 8 l e t t e r r u l i n g t h a tB yPass effe ctively

terminated the lease s with OCI , and also stated t hat a specia l hear ing would be set to addre ss the issue of dama g es, if any , incurre d by By -Pass and L OA; bot h of t hese rulings ha d been reque sted by counsel for By -Pass and L OA. Moreove r, t he is sue of L OA’s motion to intervene had been clea rly put be fore Chance llor Morris. We must construe the order in light of “ other pa

rts of the
rec ord” a nd “g ive ef

fec t to every

part of [the orde r].” See John Barb, I nc. , 653 S.W .2d at 423. The 3

c on str uc tio n urg e d b y

L a mar w ou ld r e nd er mea ni ngle ss t he langua g e in t

he or de r t hat e xpre ssl y g rants to L OA a he aringon its damag es. Under all of these c ircumstance s, we must conclude that the Fe bruar

y 1, 2001 order

eff ectively g rante d L OA’s motion to intervene

.
Bif urcation Havingdeter m i n ed that L OA is a prope r par ty to the lawsuit, we now a ddress the issues raised by L amar . We first consider L amar ’s ar g ument that the trial cour t erre d in holding that the liability issue was bifur cate d from the damag es issue.

L amar argues that eve n if the F ebrua ry 1, 2001 order

is deemed t o h av e gra

nted L OA’s
mo ti on to int e rv e ne , the or de r wa s e nte re d a ft e r the Au g us t 19 98 tr ia l. Thus , L OA wa s no t y e t a pa rt y a t th e tim e of

tr ia l and c ou ld n ot h a ve re se rv e d th e iss ue of dama g e s f

or a la te r h e ari ng . Ru le 42 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure g overns the bif urcation of trials. I t prov i d es as fo llo ws :
Th e c ourt fo r c on ve nie nc e or to a vo id pr e jud ic e may in jur

y tr ia ls order a s epa

rate tr ia l of any on e or mor e c la ims , c ro ss- c la ims , c ounte rc la ims , o r t hir d- pa rt y c la ims ,F e d e ra l R u le o f C ivil P ro c e d u re 4 2 (b ) p ro v id e s in p e rtine n t p a rt a s fo llo w s : “ F o r c o n v e n ie n c e , t o a v o id 4
p rej ud i ce , o r t o ex p ed i t e a nd ec o no m i ze , t he co urt m ay o rd er a se p a r a t e tri al o f o ne o r m o re se p ara t e issues, cl aim s,
c ro ssc la im s, c o u n te rc la im s, o r th ird -p a rty c la im s.” F e d . R . C iv. P . 4 2 (b ).
-9- or issues on which a

jury trial has bee n waived by

all parties. For the same purpose s the Court may , in no nju ry tr ia ls, or de r a

se pa ra te trial of any on e or

mor e c la ims , c ro ss- c la ims , c ounte rc la ims , th ir d- pa rt y c la ims , o r i ssu e s.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 42.02. The Rule does not a ddress when, or if, a motion to bifurcate must be made to preser ve the issue. The parties have pointed to no Tenne ssee c ase a ddressing this iss ue, and w e have fo un d n on e . How e ve r, be c a us e Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 42 .0 2 is patte rn e d a ft e r R ule 42(b) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e, we loo k t o federal c ase la w for guidance

. See 4 Mull ins v . L ong , 1 98 7 WL

18 90 7, a t *1 (Tenn . Ct . App . O c t. 2 7, 19 87 ); see also Thom as v. Ol df ie ld , 279 S.W .3d 259, 262 n.3 (Tenn. 2009) (citation omitted).

I n Saxion v. Titan-C-Manu facturing, In c. , 8 6 F .3 d 5 53 (6 th C ir 19 96 ), th e Sixth C ir c uit addre ssed whethe r the district cour t abused its discretion in bifurc ating the issues o f l i ab i lity and damag es af

ter the c lose of the plaintiffs’ proof. Id. a t 556. Th e de fe nd ants fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss afte r the plaintiffs rested without putti ng on proof of their dama g es. Id. During the course of the argument on the motion to dismiss , it be came obvious to the district court judge that the par ties had been pr ocee di n g u n d er d iffer ing unde rstanding s as to the scope of the trial, with the plaintiffs believing tha

t t h e tr ia l w a s li mi te d

to th e is s u e o f

li a b il it y an d th e d e f e n d an ts b e li e v in g th a t t

he plaintiffs wer e expected to put on proof of dama g es during

the initial bench trial. Id. The district court de termined that there had been a genuine misunderstanding reg ardingthe scope of the trial, a nd beca use it was unable to determine w hose und erstanding wa s corr ect, it bifurc ated the issues of liability and dama g es. Id.

I n aff ir m i n g the district court’s de cision, the Six th Circuit noted that although usua lly one of the pa rties will move for bifurcation before the start of trial, there wa s no formal re quirement for such a pr ocedur e. Id. I n f a c t, t he Sixth C ir c uit

ha d p re vio us ly re c og nize d that it is no t ne c e ssa ri ly an abuse of discre tion for the trial c ourt to “sepa rat[e] the issues of liabilit y and dama g es ‘at the virtual close of

plaintiff’s proof

s.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g He lminski v . Ay e rst La bs

. , 7 66 F .2 d 208 , 2 12 (6 th Cir. 1985)). The Saxion court a lso observed that the lang uag e in Rule 42(b) sug g ests t hat the decision to bifurc ate a

trial may be made on the trial cour t’s own motion. Id.

L ike F e de ra l Ru le 42 (b ), Te nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e dure 42 .0 2 do e s no t mand a te that a pa rt y e xplic itl y re se rv e the iss ue of dama g e s in or de r fo r the tr ia l c ourt to p ro pe rl y

bif ur c a te the tr ia l. Th e re fo re , L OAwa s n ot r e qu ir e d to e xplic itl y res erve the i ssu e of dama g e s f

or a la te r h e ari ngin
or de r fo r Cha

nc e llo r Mo rr is to p ro pe rl y bif ur c a te the tr ia l. T he re fo re , th e fa c t th a t L OAwa s n ot a party at the time of trial did not prec lude the trial c ourt from bifur cating the issues of liability

and damag es.-10-

L amar also argues that the trial c ourt err ed in dec iding to bifurc ate the c ase. The d ec i s ion of whe ther to bifurc ate a

trial is within the broad discre tion of the trial cour t. En nix v. Clay , 703 S.W .2d 137, 139 (Tenn. 1986) . Howeve r, this discretion mus t b e ex erc ised with the following considerations in m ind:
[T]he int e re sts of

jus tic e wi ll w arr ant a bi furc a tio n o f t he iss ue s in

on ly the mos t exceptional case s and upon a strong showing of nec essity . I n making its decision the tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld c on sid e r the po ssi bil ity of jur or c on fu sio n, the ri sk of pr e jud ic e to
e ith e r p art

y , a nd the ne e ds of jud ic ia l e ff

ic ie nc y

. Ab ov e a ll, the iss ue s at tr ia l mu st not be bifurc ated unless the issue to be tried is so d i s t i n ct and sepa rable from the others that a tr ial of it alone may be had w ithout inj ustice.

Id. (c i t i n g Gasoline Prods. Co., In c. v. Cham plin R ef. Co. , 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931)).

L amar argues that it was pre

judiced by

the dec ision to bi furc ate the tr ial. Be cause L OA wa s not a par ty to the lawsuit at the time of the Aug ust 1998 trial, L amar contends, the g ranting of L OA’s reque st to bifurcate in the Fe bruar y 1, 2001 order

enable d a new

party to bring additional claims for damag es ag ainst L amar

.
La m ar a l s o ar g u e s t h a tb i f

u r c a t i o ni nt h i s i n s t an c e d i d n o tp r o m o t e j u d i c i a l e f

f i c i e n c y

. It
c la ims that, h a d b oth

the lia bil ity and dama g e iss ue s b e e n a dd

re sse d a t tr ia l, t

he pr oc e e din g s w ou ld have c oncluded y ear s ear lier. B ifurcation, L amar maintains, resulted in the proc eeding s being signific antly

prolong ed, with the hea

ring on damag es not held until 2007.

I n r e sp on se , L OAargue s th a t th e re wa s a ba sic mis un de rs tand inga s to the sc op e of the tr ia l. L OA points to the fac t that, pr ior to the trial, there was no discove ry on the issue of damag es, and that its pre-trial br ief did not addre ss damag es. In addition, the underlying c ase a nd the companion Rod eOi l case wer e both set for

trial on the same day , both befor e C hance llor Morris. L OA conte nds that all of these f

acts indicate that the par

ties were proce eding under the understandingt h at the dama g e s is su e wo uld

be a dd re sse d at a lat e r he ari ng

. L OA a lso argue s th a t ju dic ia l e ff ic ie nc y wo uld not have be e nf

u rth e r e d b y p r e s e n ti n g p r o o f

o f d a ma g e s , b e c a

u s e th e f o u n d a ti o n a l i s s u e o f

the lia bil ity un de r t he le a se a g re e me nts ha d to fi rs t be de te rm ine d b y the tr ia l c ourt

.
W e a re n o tp er s u ad edb y

L am ar ’s co n t en t i o n t h at i twa s p re j u d i ce d b y b i fu rc at i o n

. Al t h o u gh L OA wa s not a party at trial, it cer tainly participated in the litigation. So L amar was we ll awar e of L OA ’s c la ims by

the tim e of

the F e br ua ry 1, 20 01 or de r t

hat im pli c itly g ra nte d L OA ’s mot ion

to intervene and held that the tr ial was bifurcate d. Moreove r, Chance llor Morris, having tried the c ase, wa s in the be st pos iti on to de te rm ine the pa rt ie s’ re sp e c tiv e un de rs tand ing s of the sc op e of the tr ia l. Most importantly , howeve r, the issues of liability and dama g es ar e not so intertwined in this case that separ ating the two issues would ca use injustice. I ndeed, the issue of damag es could not be de cided,
an d L O A n e e d

n o tb e p e r

m i t t e d t o i n t e r v e n e , u n l e s s an d

u n t i l t h e t r i a l c o u rtd e t e r

m i n e d w h e t h e r B yPa ss c ou ld t e rm inate the l e a se s. Ac c or din g ly , w e c ann ot c on c lud e tha t th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s dis c re tio n in

bif ur c a tin g the iss ue s o f l ia

bil ity and dama g e s.-11- Lease Ter m ination

Ne xt, L a mar a

rgue s th at th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in de te rm ini ngthat B y -P a ss w a s w ith in i ts r ig hts to te rminate the lease ag ree ments. The provision on which By -Pass relies in its termination of the lease s states as follows: “ After the initial thre e y ear s of the lease ag ree ment [By -Pass] may canc el this ag ree ment by

g iving [OCI ] 60 day s advanc e wr itten notice in the event sig n structure s interfe re with the sale or de velopment of the a bove said de scribe [sic] property .”

L amar argues that B y -Pass did not exercise its rig ht to terminate the lea se ag ree ments in good faith, and theref

ore, the termination of the lea se ag ree ments was not ef fec tive. Specifica lly , L amar contends that B y -Pass’s attempt to sell the t wo s mall parc els of prope rty on which OCI ’s sig ns were er ec t ed is not the ty

pe of “ interfe renc e” c ontemplated by the par ties when they

enter ed into the le a se s. L a mar’ s argume nt s ug g e sts that th e “ a bo ve sa id de sc ri be [d] pr op e rt y ” langua g e in t

he le a se provision ref

err ed to interfe renc e with the s ale or development of the l arg er six ty -six -ac re tract of land of wh ic h th e sig n s ite s w e re a pa rt , r a the r t

ha n s imp ly the ind ivi du a l s ign sit e s. L a mar a lso
asser ts that W allace , as a partne r in L OA and a part-ow ner in B y -Pass, manufa cture d the interfe renc e by fo rm ing L O A i no r d e r t o p u r c h a s e t h e p r o p e r

t y f r o m B y - P a s s , e n a

b l i n g L O A t o c o mp e t e w ith La m ar ’ s p r e d e c e s s o r , O C I.

I n Tenne ssee, a

duty of g ood faith and f

air de aling i s i m p o s ed in the perf ormanc e and enfor ceme nt of eve ry

contra ct. Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Com m erce , 938 S.W .2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F C O N T RA CT S § 205 (1979)) . The purpose of this impli ed
covena nt is (1) to honor the rea sonable expectations of the contra cting parties and (2) to protect the rig hts of the par

ties to rece ive t h e b en efits of the ag ree ment into which they enter ed. Bar

ne s & Robin son Co. v. OneSource Facility Servs., Inc. , 195 S.W .3d 637, 642–43 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (q u o t i n g Go ot v

. M e tro . G ov ’t of Na shv ill e& D av ids on Co unty , No. M2003-02013-COA- R3-CV, 2005 WL 3031638, at *7 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005)). “The implied obligation of g ood faith and fa ir de a lin g do e s n ot, ho wev er, create ne w c on tr a c tua l r ig hts or ob lig a tio ns , n or

c an it be us e d to ci rcumve nt or alter the specific terms of the pa rties’ a g ree ment.” Id. (q u o t i n g Goot , 2 0 0 5 WL 3031638, at *7).

The de termination of what is r equire d by the duty of g ood faith in a g iven ca se turns on an interpre tation of the contra ct at issue. Id. “In construing contra cts, courts look to the languag e of the instrument and to the intention of the pa rties, and impo s e a co n s t ru ction which is fair and
rea sonable.” Id. (q u o t i n g TSC Ind us. , I nc . v . T omlin , 743 S.W .2d 169, 173 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987))

. Whether a pa

rty acte d in good f

aith is a question of fact. Ol d Re pub lic Sur. Co. v

. Es hag hpo ur , No. M1999-01918-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 1523364, at *7 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001). The provision at issue allows the lease s to be canc elled if thre e re quirements ar e met. The
canc ellation provision (1) may only be ex erc ised afte r t he first thre e y ear s of the lea se, (2) require s sixty da y s’ wr itt e n n oti c e of

the c anc e llatio n, and

(3 ) r e qu ir e s th a t th e sig n str uc tur e s inte rf

e re wi th By -Pass’s sale or

development of

the prope rty

.-12-

The fir st require ment was c lear ly met. The two lea ses at is sue are dated November 1, 1988 and May 16, 1990. By -Pass did not seek to t er m i n at e the lease s until 1995, well after the initial thr e e -y e ar l e a se pe ri od . T he se c on d r e qu ir e me nt i n th e le a se pr ov isi on wa s a lso me t. B y -P a ss f

ir st g ave O CIwritten notice of the termination by

way of a le tter date d April 3, 1995. This was followed by another letter dated J une 2, 1995. This se cond letter ag ain g ave OCI notice of the ter mination, and it also informed OCI of t he reason for the t ermination. There fore , if the circ umstances pe rmitted B y- P a s s t o t e r

m i n at e t h e l e a s e , t h e t e r

m i n a t i o nw o u l d

h a v e b e e ne f

f e c t i v e , a tt h e l a t e s t , s i x t y d a ys afte r the June 2, 1995 letter informing OCIof the re ason for termination.

The issue then be comes whe ther OCI ’s “sig n structure s interfe re[d] wit h [By -Pass’s] sale or development of

the . . . prope rty ” re fer

red to in the l ease s. “The car dinal rule for interpre tation of
c on tr a c ts i s to a sc e rt a in t

he int e nti on

of the pa rt ie s and to g ive e ff

e c t to that in te nti on , c on sis te nt w ith leg al principles.” Maggart v. Alm any Rea l to r s, Inc. , 259 S.W .3d 700, 703–04 (Tenn. 2008) (q u o t i n g Bob Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. R egal C hrysler-Plymou th, In c. , 521 S.W .2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1975)). I f the c ontrac t lang uag e is cl ea r an d unambig uous, then its lit era l meaning controls the outcome. Id. (c i t i n g Planters Gin Co. v

. Fed. Com

press & Warehouse Co. , 78 S.W .3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) ). “In such a case , the contract i s interpre ted according to its plain terms as wr itten, and the lang uag e used is take n in its ‘plain, ordinary , and popular sens e. ’ ” Id. (c i t i n g Bob Pe ar sa ll Motors, In c. , 5 21 S.W. 2d a t 58 0; Planters Gin Co. , 78 S.W .3d at 890).

“The lang uag e of a

contra ct is ambig uous when its meaning is uncerta in and when it ca n be fairly construed in more than one wa y .” V anBebber v. Roach , 252 S.W .3d 279, 284 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Farm ers-Pe oples Bank v. Clem m er , 519 S.W .2d 801, 805 (Tenn. 1975) ). Howe ver, a c on tr a c t is no t ambi g uo us sim ply be c a us e the pa rt ie s h a v e d i f f e r e nt i nte rp re ta tio ns of

its pr ov isi on s, Clear Ch annel Out

door, Inc. v. A Qualit

y, Inc. , 250 S.W .3d 860, 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) ( citing Cookeville Gy necology & Obstetrics, P.C. v. Southeastern Data Sys., Inc. , 884 S.W .2d 458, 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)) , and this Court will not place a straine d construction on the languag e of the contra ct in order

to cre ate ambiguity

wher e none e x ists. Ma gg art , 2 5 9 S

. W

. 3 d at 704 (c iting Far mers -Peoples Ba nk , 5 19 S.W. 2d a t 80 5) . “ De te rm ini ngwh e the r a c on tr a c tua l pr ov isi on

is ambig uous is a question of law.” Eat h er l y C o nst. C o. v. HTI Mem’l Hos

p. , No. M2003-02313- COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 2217078, at *12 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2005) (citation omitted).

We first observe that the lang uag e of the provision at i ssue i s quite broad. The lease s do not require the interf

ere nce to r ise to the level of pr eventingBy -Pass’s sale or development of

the proper ty . The wor d “interf

ere ,” mea ns simp l y “t o interpose in a w ay that hinders or impede s,” M E R R I AM W EB S TER ’ S C OL L EGI AT E D I C TI ONAR Y 610 (10th ed. 1995), which w ould include making the s ale or d e v e lo p me n t o f th e p r o p e rty

mo r e d if f ic u lt o r e xp e n s iv e

. I nth e tr ia l c o u rt b e lo w , the pr e sid e nt o f O CI , A .B . I sb e ll ( “ I sb e ll” ), te sti fi e d tha t By -P a ss’ s sal e of the pr op e rt y to L OAc ou ld
no t be c on su mmate d unti l th e le a se s w ithOC Iwe re te rm inate d. Th e tr ia l c ourt wa s e nti tle d to c re dit t h i s testimony , and we g ive g reat defe renc e to its determination of the w itnesses’ cr edibility

. See Keaton v. Hancock Coun ty Bd. of Educ. , 119 S.W .3d 218, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).-13-

The lea se termination provision does not exclude sale of the proper ty to persons or e ntities aff iliated with By -Pass. Ther efor e, under a plain re ading of the provision, B y -Pass may sell the pr op e rt y to a ny on e it c ho os e s, a nd

if the sig n s tr

uc tur e s in te rf

e re wi th t he sa le , th e n B y -P a ss i s w ith in its rights to terminate the lease s. Finally , we must deter

mine whether

the re fer ence in the lease termination provision to the “above said descr ibe[d] proper ty ” ref ers to the sign sites the mselves or to the larg er trac t of adjac ent proper ty o wn ed b y By -P ass. A review of the lease s reve als that the prope rty descr iptions i n the lease s were of the sig n sites leased by OCI

. The November 1, 1988 lease descr ibed the prope rty as “Hwy 45 By -Pass North[,] 2,100 fee t north of Old Humboldt Road[,] J ackson, Te nnessee ,” and the May 16 , 1 99 0 le a se de sc ri be d th e pr op e rt y a s “ Hw y 45 B y -Pass North[, ] 1,0 98 fe e t no rt h o f O ld Humboldt Road[ ,] J ackson, Tenn es s ee .” In fac t, OCIpresident I sbell admitted at trial that the proper ties descr ibed in the lease s were the s ign sites, not the entire six ty -six acr e par cel owne d by B y -P a ss.

Fr om our revie w of the lease s, we must c onclude that the lang uag e in the lease termination provision is clea

r and unambiguous. B ased on a plain rea ding of

the lease ag ree ments, we find no
e rr or in t he tr ia l c ourt ’s ho ldi ngthat th e sig n s tr uc tur e s e re c te d b y

OC Iun de r t

he le a se a g re e me nts int e rf e re wi th B y -P a ss’ s sa le of the sig n s ite s to L OA , s uc h that B y -P a ss’ s le tte rs to O CI e ff e c tiv e ly te rm inate d th e le a se a g re e me nts

.
L a mar c on te nd s th a t By -P a ss did no t ac t in g oo d fa ith wh e n it te rm inate d th e le a se s. B e c a us e Wal la c e wa s a

pa rt -o wn e r i n b oth

B y -P a ss a

nd L OA , L a mar c on te nd s that the “ int e rf e re nc e ” wi th By -Pass’s sale to L OA was manufac tured to cr eate a compe titive advantag e in L OA’s c ompetition with L amar ’s pre dece ssor, OCI . The trial c ourt did not make an expli cit finding that By -Pass ac ted in good f aith in terminating the lease s with OCI . Howeve r, such a finding was impli cit in the trial
c ourt ’s c on clus ion

tha t B y -P a ss e ff

e c tiv e ly te rm inate d th e le a se s b y

wa y of the le tte rs date d Apr il 3 and June 2, 1995. The trial cour t’s finding s of fa ct, whether ex plicit or i mplicit, are e ntitled to a presumption of cor

rec tness. See C

.R. Batts C

onstr., LLC

v. 101 Constr. C

o. , No. M2004-00322- COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL1848495, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2005) (citation omit ted). F rom our revie w of the ove rall re cord, w e c an n o t co n clude that the evidence preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s implicit finding that By -Pass ac ted in g ood faith in terminating the lease s with OCI

.
Ow nership of

LOA Right to Dam ages Finally , L amar

contends that, a fter a

series of acquisitions, L amar now owns the rig ht to any dama g e s that the c ourt may awa rd to L OA a g a ins t OC I/L a mar. On July 31 , 1 99 7, L OAe nte re d in to an Asset Purc hase A g ree ment (“A g ree ment”) w ith Del ite Outdoor Adve rtising of Tenne ssee, Inc. (“D elite”) . Under this ag ree ment, L OA sol d substantially all of its assets to Delite. Sever al y ear s later, on A

pril 1, 2001, L amar

purcha sed De lite’s assets. Ther efor e, to deter mine whether

L amar now owns L OA’s right to any damag es, we look to the Agre ement entered into betwee n L OA and Delite, in orde r to asce rtain whe ther L OA t ra n s fer red its rig ht to damag es to Delite, whic h subsequently

wer e tra nsfer red to L amar

in its acquisition of Delite.-14-

The Ag ree ment addre sses, in g ener al terms, the assets that L OA convey ed to Delite. I t states
a s f oll ow s: 1.) Purchase and Sale of Assets - Subject to the provisions of this Ag ree ment, on the Clo sin g of thi s Ag re e me nt, [L OA ] s ha ll tr ans fe r, se ll, and ass ign to [Delite] , and [Delite] shall purchase f rom [L OA], all of [L OA’s] rig ht, titl e, and intere st in and to all of the tang ible and intang ible assets used in the operation of [L OA’s] Business, whe reve r located. This provision is t hen followe d by a spec ific list of assets beingtransfe rred t o De l i t e i n the transac tion. The list includes , am o n g other thing s, L OA’s a dvertising structure s, adver tising
con tr act s, bu sin e ss r e c or ds , a nd tr a de mark s and

tr a de name s. Th e lis t do e s n ot r e fe r t o c la ims , c ho se s in a c tio n, or

oth e r l angua g e that c ou ld b e read to inc lud e the c la im f or dama g e s in

thi s lit ig a tio n. I t do e s, ho we ve r, inc lud e a br oa d c a tc h- a ll p ro vis ion that st a te s a s f

oll ow s: (h) Othe r Proper

ty

. All other tangible a

nd intang ible proper

ty , machiner

y , equipment and fixed assets of [L OA] relating to or used in conne ction with or in the opera tion of the Asse ts or the B usiness, in c lu ding the proper ty , machiner

y , equipment and f

ix ed assets identified on Exhibit 1(h), attached he reto.

I n addition, the first section of the Ag ree ment specific ally excludes from the sale L OA’s c ash as of the dat e o f c lo s in g , r e f

u n d s d u e to L O A f

r o m th e Ja c k s o n U ti li ty D iv is io n o n a s p e c if ic parc el of pr op e rt y , a nd sp e c if ic c omp ute r e qu ipm e nt.

L amar argues that, under

these provisions of the A g ree ment, Delite ac quired a ll o f L OA’s
a sse ts e xce pt f

or tho se sp e c if

ic a lly e xclu de d, and be c a

us e L OA ’s dama g e c la im w a s n ot s pe c if ic a lly excluded, the damage claim m ust be deemed to have been transfer red to De lite and then to L amar

. L OA , o n th e oth e r han d, int e rp re ts the se pr ov isi on s a s c on ve y ingon ly a sse ts t hat are us e d in
connec tion with or in the operation of the business, and beca use a damag e claim is not an asse t that is u se d in c on ne c tio n w iththe bu sin e ss, it w a s n ot c on ve y e d to De lit e in t he Ag re e me nt.

Th e tr ia l c ourt , o f c ours e , he ld t hat L OAre ta ine d it s r ig ht t o a ny dama g e s a

wa rd e d to it i n the proc eeding s. I n doing so, the trial court r elied on anothe r provision in t h e Agreement that spec if ic a ll y a d dr e s s e s th e li ti g a ti o nc o n c e r n in g th e s ig ns it e s a t i s s u e

. T h e p r o v is io n , e n titled “L itigation L ease s,” re cog nizes that the OCI sign sites at issue, as we l l as two other sites, ar e involved in litig ation, and sets for th L OA’s oblig ations to Delite arising out of the litigation. Under the provision, L OA is requir ed to kee p Delite periodica lly informed of the status of the litigation and to c on su lt w ithDe lit e be fo re se ttl ingthe c ase s. I f t he lit ig a tio n r e su lts in a

fi na l de te rm inatio n in favor of L OA, L OA mus t transfe r a lease for the sites at i ssue t o Delite withi n ten day s of such f inal deter mination. I f the litigation results in a final de termination adve rse to L OA, L OA must transfe r a ne w l e a se to D e lit e fo r t he sit e s at is su e wi thi n th irty da y s a ft e r t he e xpir a tio n o f t

he c ur re ntl y e xistin g le a se s on the sit e s. F ina lly , De lit e is re qu ir e d to pa y L OA a fi nd e r’ s fe e fo r e a c h lea se transfe rre d to Delite under this provision.-15-

Thus, the “L itigation L ease s” provision in the ag ree ment betwee n L OA and D elite details the pa rt ie s’ ob lig a tio ns re la tiv e to t he lit ig a tio n o n th e OC Isig n s ite s at is su e . In h old ingthat L OAdid not c onvey to D elite its rig ht to damag es in the instant lit iga tion, the trial court found that, had the pa rt ie s in te nd e d th a t th e dama g e c la im b e c on ve y e d und e r t he te rms of th e As se t Purc ha se A g r e e me n t, th e ns p e c if

ic la n g u a g e to tha t eff

ect would h a v e b e e nin c lu d e d

in th is p r o v is io n

. We ag ree . I n con t ra ct i nterpre tation, it is well-settled that the “ particula r and spe cific pr ovisions of a contra ct pre vail over g ener al p rovi sions.” Pre c ision M e c h. Co ntra c tor

s v . M e tro . D e v . & H ous. Agency , No. M2000-02117-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 1285900, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2001) (citing S. Sur

. Co . v . T own o f G re e nv ill e , 2 6 1 F

. 9 2 9 ( 6 t h C i r

. 1 9 2 0 ) )

. S a i d an o t h e r w ay: Where the pa

rties express themselves in r efe renc e to a par ticular matter , the attention is di rect ed to that, a

nd it mus t be a ssume d th a t it e xpre sse s th e ir

int e nt, wh e re a s a ref ere nce to some g ener al matter, w ithin which the particula r matter ma

y be included, does not nec essar ily

indicate that the pa

rties had the pa

rticular matter in mind.

17A A M

. J UR

. 2 D Con tra c ts § 363 (2004). Here , althoug h there is very g ener al lang uag e addr essing the s ale of L OA’s assets, we a re pe rsuade d that the “L itigation L ease s” provision is determinative. T h e “ L i t i gat i o nL ea s es ” p r o v i s i o nco n t ai n s n o m en t i o no f LOA as s i gn i n g t o De l i t e a n y d am age awa rd in connec tion with the sign sites at issue. There fore , we a ffirm the tria l court’s holding that L OA ’s dama g e c la im w a s not tra ns fe rr e d to De lit e un de r the te rm s of the As se t Purc ha se Ag re e me nt, and accor dingly , was not acquir ed by L amar ; rather , L OA re tained the r ight to any damag es that may be aw arde d in this case.

C ONCL US I ON

For the re asons stated a

bove, we reve rse the tr ial court’s de cision that the Fe bruar y 1, 2001
or de r d id n ot g ra

nt L OA ’s mot ion to int e rv e ne , and fi nd that L OAis a pr op e r i nte rv e nin g pa

rt y in these proce eding s. We a ffirm the trial court’s rema ining holdings, and rema nd the cause to the trial court for a dete rmination of the dama g es incurr ed by L OA, if a

ny

. The de cision of the trial c ourt is affir m ed i n part, re verse d in part, as se t forth above , and
rema nded for further proce eding s not inc onsistent with this opinion. The costs on appea l are taxed to the Appellee L amar

Adver tising Company , for whic h execution may issue if nec essar

y

.

___________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE