IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent,

v. JONATHAN WELLS BRADFORD, Appellant. DIVISION ONE No. 68568-6-1

PUBLISHED OPINION FILED: August 12, 2013 ro

C"J CO O Dwyer, J. — A jury found Jonathan Bradford guilty of several offenses, 

### includingthe felony stalking of Vanida Vilayphone. Pursuant to RCW 9A.46.110,
a person is guilty ofstalking if, inter alia, he or she "repeatedly harasses" another person. The stalking statute's delineation ofthe term, "harasses," incorporates the phrase, "course ofconduct," as setforth in RCW 10.14.020(1). The plain language ofthe definition of this term explicitlyexcludes from its scope constitutionally protected free speech activities. Accordingly, contrary to Bradford's contention, the stalking statute's harassment provision does not criminalize constitutionally protected free speech activities and, thus, is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. Bradford further contends that the stalking statute is unconstitutionally vague because that which might be excluded from its purview as constitutingNo. 68568-6/2 

### constitutionally protected free speech activities can be difficult to discern and subjectto debate amongst the legally-trained. Close analysis of this claim reveals that it is, put mildly, silly. Also unavailing is Bradford's contention that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence of his harassing activities. We
affirm.
I 

### Vilayphone met Bradford in early 2007 through her friend, Rose Smith. Although Vilayphonewas married to Ron Mason, she and Bradforddeveloped a romantic relationship toward the end of 2007. Bythe middle of 2009, Vilayphone decided to end her affair with Bradford. Bradford, however, rejected 

### Vilayphone's repeated attempts to end their relationship. Bradford did not have Vilayphone's cellulartelephone number. Thus, in order to contact her, he began telephoning her at her place of employment 

### several times a day. Hewould also appear at herworktwice each week. In October2010,Vilayphone quit her jobbecause ofBradford's unrelenting efforts
to contact her there. 

### Bradford additionally attempted to communicate with Vilayphone through her friend, Smith, whose cellular telephone number he had acquired. In 

### November 2009, Bradfordbegan to send Smith text messages, and continued to 

### do so throughout 2010. Smithwould forward these messages toVilayphone. Some of the text messages that Bradford sent to Smith during this time warned 

### that, ifVilayphone did not callhim, he would harm himselfor others. The 

### messages also included threats to distribute to neighbors andfamily members a
-2-No. 68568-6/3

sex video ofVilayphone and Bradford. In May 2010, a copy ofthe sex video was placed on Vilayphone's husband's car. In addition, Bradford appeared outside ofVilayphone's house almost 

### every day in2010. He would drive around the block on which her house was located, honk his car's horn, and park outside of her house. 

### On December 5, 2010, copies ofthe sex video were left on several cars in Vilayphone's neighborhood. A handwritten note withVilayphone's name and address was included ineach envelope that contained the video. On December 

### 30, 2010, Vilayphone obtained an antiharassment protection order against Bradford. Nevertheless, Bradford continued to drive by and around Vilayphone's
house.Bradford also continued to send text messages to Smith throughout 

### January 2011. On January 10, 2011, Smith forwarded to Vilayphone messages that stated: "Have Vanida call me, please"; "I know she's with you, and all Iam 

### asking for her is to call me. Ineed totell her a few things before it'sall over"; and, "Would you please askVanida tocall me. Ireally need totalkto her before
it's toooooooo late." 

### On January 15, 2011, Vilayphone received anotherforwarded text 

### message from Smith, which read: "By the way, the video isgetting distributed to [her] neighbors." On January 16, 2011, Smith forwarded the following text messages to Vilayphone: "Have Vanida check her Yahoo account"; "Have 

### Vanida give me a call, please. It is a life or death emergency. Iknow you have

-3-No. 68568-6/4 

### been passing my messages to her, so you can pass this"; "I said itwas life or death. Well, boooooommmmmmm!!!!"; and, "Smell gas? So do I." Upon receiving the various text messages from Smith, Vilayphone would 

### invariably call 911, and did so on several occasions during the month ofJanuary. Officer Vasilios Sideris responded to many ofthese calls. As part ofeach investigation, Vilayphone would show Officer Sideris the forwarded text message 

### displayed on her cellular telephone. OfficerSideris would record each text 

### message verbatim into his notebook, from which he would subsequently copy the entries verbatim into a police report. At trial, Officer Sideris read the January 

### 2011 text messages aloud, quoting directlyfrom the police reports.1 On January 20, 2011, Vilayphone discovered a suspicious package outside of her front door. The sender's information indicated that it was from Bradford. She called 911 and the police responded. After performing an x-ray 

### examination of the package, the police opened the package and found a bottle of
wine and a letter. 

### Two days later, Bradford was arrested afterpolice officers observed him driving past Vilayphone's house. OnApril 12, 2011, Bradford pleaded guilty in Seattle Municipal Court to twocounts ofviolation of the December 2010 antiharassment protection order, premised upon Bradford's contactwith 

### Vilayphone through a third party. He also pleaded guilty to one count ofstalking Vilayphone. 1Afterfinding that there was sufficient proofofauthentication regarding the January2011 textmessages, the trial court admitted six of them, thereby permitting Officer Sideris to read them into the record. The police reports themselves were not admitted into evidence.
-4-No. 68568-6/5
A domestic violence no-contact order was entered on April 12,2011. The 

### order prohibited Bradford from contacting Vilayphone and was effective until April 

### 12, 2016.2 That same day, a second no-contact orderwas entered, prohibiting Bradford from contacting Smith untilApril 12, 2016. 

### On June 17, 2011, shortly after his release from jail, Bradfordappeared at
a restaurant in which Vilayphone was sitting. According to Vilayphone, he leftthe
restaurant once he saw her there. One week later, Bradford located Vilayphone 

### at that same restaurant, approached her, and professed his love for her. He left the restaurant after Vilayphone threatened to call the police. 

### Shortly thereafter, Bradford once again began to send text messages to Smith. Vilayphone contacted the police upon receivingthese text messages 

### forwardedfrom Smith. The police conducted a "phonedump" of Smith's cellular 

### telephone.3 This procedure generated a 280-pagereport itemizing each text 

### message thatSmith's cellulartelephone sent orreceived during a several-month period. Thetrial court admitted into evidence a 12-page condensed version of this report, which displayed each textmessage that Smith'scellulartelephone had sent or received between June 26 and July 10, 2011. Included within this 

### examination report were 25 relevant text messages received bySmith: 1. "Don'tworry Iwill settle all ofit in the next day or so! Thank you and yave [sic] a good night." June 28, 2011.
2The orderprohibited Bradford from coming within 500 feet ofVilayphone and from contacting her"directly orindirectly by text messages, instant messages, electronic mail, voice mail, Internetphone service, website communications or postings." 3At trial, a police officerinvolved in the investigation testified that a "phone dump" is a method usedby investigators toretrieve messages that are sent to andfrom a cellulartelephone.
-5-No. 68568-6/6 

### 2. "Rons going to know that she went to his house instead of yours you know that right? It isn't that hard to figure out." June 28, 2011. 

### 3. "It has always been a shame with her and you. Its a sad twist of affairs and itshouldn't have been. She was never honest with me, him or any body." June 28, 2011. 

### 4. "Youneed to guess who this is and yes it is the truth about her and the karma bartender. We all three know that's the truth." June 28, 2011. 

### 5. "Who? And why am Idoing this? Answer the first question and Iwill answer the second. Ok then have her meet me at gasworks to talk about things." June 28, 2011. 6. "Hello??????" June 28, 2011. 7. "I need an answer." June 28, 2011. 

### 8. "Why is she doing this? Ineed an answer." June 28, 2011. 9. "Hello? Ineed a reply." June 28, 2011. 

### 10."Ijust want to let everyone know that Iam not mad and that Iam sorry for everything that happened. Ididn'tknow that Iwas making everyone scared." June 30, 2011. 

### 11."I am not mad at anyone and Iam sorry forall the stress Icaused. By doing what she did she destroyed mylife. Ijust need to correct things." July 2, 2011. 

### 12."I never hurt anyone or ever would so Idon't understand whyshe did what she did or wouldn't try to help me because that is all I asked for." July 2, 2011. 

### 13."I know that she is seeing the bartenderfrom karma and that is said because she was seeing himbefore we broke up." July 2, 2011. 14. "She used it to have me put where she did and all Iasked for is 

### honesty. I, you and she know the truth and she shouldtell ron." July 2, 2011. 15. "Last chance go reply." July 5, 2011. 

### 16.";)- no other chance than today!" July 5, 2011. 17. "Sorry but its true." July 5, 2011. 

### 18. "Done did done. Itold you its her and you Iwould sent it to her family!" July 5, 2011. 

### 19. "It is sad that she let itget to this without talking things out. Her 

### family gets the video byWednesday. She still can call nworkthings out." July 5, 2011. 20. "I need to talk." July 6, 2011.
-6-No. 68568-6/7
21. "She needs to call me tonight." July 6, 2011 

### 22. "So are you going to have her call me? Iam sure that she shouldn't be that hard to get a hold of to ask, right?" July 8, 2011. 

### 23. "I guess the question should be renton or seatac?" July 8, 2011. 24. "I thought Iasked her to call and Iam still waiting. Ireally don't want to have to go to the next step. Iam trying to be nice n make things right." July 9, 2011. 25. "She should call me tonight. Like now." July 10, 2011. 

### The report did not identify the sender's identity, as it did withothertext messages from Smith's known contacts. Afterthe police produced the examination report, 

### Smith identified the 25 messages as those which she believed had been sent by
Bradford. 

### On July 23, 2011, Bradford was arrested after he rammed his automobile into Vilayphone'shusband's car (while he was inside ofit) and, thereafter, collided with a police officer's patrol vehiclewhile fleeing the scene of the first
collision. 

### Subsequently, ajuryfound Bradford guilty of the following offenses: (1) felony stalking (domestic violence) ofVilayphone; (2) domestic violence misdemeanorviolation of the April 2011 court order protecting Vilayphone; (3) 

### felony stalking ofSmith; (4)violation of the April 2011 antiharassment order 

### protecting Smith;4 (5) driving while under the influence; (6) hit andrun; and (7) reckless endangerment. Bradford appeals.
4Thecharging period for offenses(1) through (4) listed herein was between June 17 and July23, 2011. The other 3 offenses were alleged to have been committed on July 23.
-7-No. 68568-6/8

Bradford first contends that the harassment provision of the stalking statute, RCW9A.46.110(1)(a), proscribes constitutionally protected speech and, thus, is facially overbroad. We disagree. The statutory scheme, by its express terms and structure, does not seek to regulate constitutionally protected free speech activities. It is constitutionally sound. We review de novo a trial court's interpretation of constitutional provisions 

### and legislative enactments. State v. Immelt. 173 Wn.2d 1,6, 267 P.3d 305 

### (2011). Generally, legislativeenactments are presumed to be constitutional. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d at 6. An overbreadth challenge premised on the state 

### constitution5 isanalyzed in the same manner as when such a challenge is grounded in the FirstAmendment. Bradburn v. N. Cent. Rea'l Library Dist., 168 Wn.2d 789, 804, 231 P.3d 166 (2010). 

### "A law is overbroad if itsweeps within its prohibitions constitutionally 

### protected free speech activities." Citv ofSeattle v. Huff. 111 Wn.2d 923, 925, 

### 767 P.2d 572 (1989). However, "the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is notsufficientto render it susceptible to
an overbreadth challenge." Members of Citv Council ofCitv of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent. 466 U.S. 789, 800, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 

### (1984). Moreover, "[a] statute regulating behavior and not pure speech will not be overturned unless the overbreadth is both real and substantial in relation to
5Article I, section 5 of theWashington State Constitution provides: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish onall subjects, being responsiblefor the abuse ofthatright."
-8-No. 68568-6/9 

### the statute's legitimate sweep." State v. Lee. 135 Wn.2d 369, 388, 957 P.2d 741 (1998) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahama. 413 U.S. 601, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830(1973)). Thus, we must first determine whether the challenged enactment criminalizes constitutionally protected activity. Citv ofTacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 841, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992). Ifthe statute does criminalize some 

### constitutionally protected conduct, we must next ask whetherthe statute prohibits a "real and substantial" amount ofprotected conduct in relation to the statute's 

### plainly legitimate sweep. Luvene. 118Wn.2d at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Citv ofSeattle v. Webster. 115Wn.2d 635, 641, 802 P.2d 1333 (1990)). Astatute "will be overturned onlyifthe court is unable to place a 

### sufficiently limiting construction on a standardless sweep oflegislation." Luvene.
118Wn.2dat840. 

### The challenged provision of the stalking statute, RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a), provides, in relevant part: 

### (1) A person commits the crime ofstalking if, without lawful authority and under circumstances not amounting to a felony attempt of another crime: 

### (a) He or she intentionally and repeatedly harasses or 

### repeatedlyfollows anotherperson.[6] 6The remainder of RCW9A.46.110(1) states: (b) The person being harassed orfollowed is placed in fear that the stalker intends to injure the person, another person, or property of the person or of another person. Thefeeling of fear must be one that a reasonable person in the same situation would experience under all the circumstances; and (c) The stalker either: (i) Intends to frighten, intimidate, or harass the person; or (ii) Knows or reasonably shouldknow that the person isafraid, intimidated, or harassed even ifthe stalker did not intend to place the person infear or intimidate or harass the person. -9-No. 68568-6/10

Pursuant to RCW 9A.46.110(6)(c), "'[h]arasses' means unlawful harassment as defined in RCW 10.14.020," which, in turn, provides: (1) "Course of conduct" means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. "Course of conduct" includes, in addition to any otherform ofcommunication, contact, or conduct, the sending ofan electronic communication, but does not include constitutionallyprotected free speech. Constitutionallyprotected activity is not included within the meaning of "courseofconduct." (2) "Unlawfulharassment" means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawfulpurpose. The course ofconduct shall be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and shall actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner, or, when the course ofconduct would 

### cause a reasonable parent to fear for the well-being of their child. RCW 10.14.020 (emphasis added). As an initial matter, Bradford contends that the legislature, when enacting 

### the stalking statute, did not intend for the definition of"course of conduct," as set forth in RCW 10.14.020(1), to be applied to the statute. This is so, he asserts, 

### because "well-settled principles of statutory interpretation prohibit a courtfrom adding words to a statute that the Legislature has chosen not to include." Bradford's assertion is in contravention to the statutory scheme's clear delineation ofthe term, "harasses." Italso ignores previous Washington 

### Supreme Court decisions that have applied the citeddefinition of "course of conduct" to the stalking statute. See State v. Kintz. 169 Wn.2d 537, 545-56, 238 

### P.3d 470 (2010); State v. Becklin. 163 Wn.2d 519, 527-28, 182 P.3d 944 (2008);

-10-No. 68568-6/11

see also State v. Haines. 151 Wn. App. 428, 434, 213 P.3d 602 (2009). Bradford does not convincingly explain why we should not follow this decisional authority. Therefore, in analyzing the meaning and scope of "harasses," we will apply to the stalking statute the definition of "course ofconduct" setforth in RCW 10.14.020(1). 

### By so doing, itbecomes obvious that the stalking statute's proscriptions do not intrude upon constitutionally protected activities because the plain language ofthe definition ofthe term "course ofconduct" explicitly excludes from its scope such activities. The text of RCW 10.14.020(1) expressly declares that "'[c]ourse of conduct'.
. . does not include constitutionally protected free speech. 

### Constitutionally protected activity is not includedwithin the meaning of 'course of conduct.'" Thus, the stalking statute explicitly does not criminalize actions—"a 

### course ofconduct"—that are constitutionally protected.7 In defining the term, "harasses," the stalking statute incorporates the definition of "course ofconduct" setforth in RCW 10.14.020(1). That language 

### specifically excepts from its reach constitutionally protected free speech activity. Therefore, Bradford's facial overbreadth challenge to the stalking statute fails.

7By excluding constitutionally protected activities from its purview, thechallenged statute also renders evidence of such activities inadmissible. Because evidence of constitutionally protectedactivities cannotform a basis fora conviction, such evidence isirrelevant and, thus, inadmissible. Hence, in the courtroom, questions concerning the interplay between the stalking statute and constitutionally protected activities are, inessence, questions of evidentiary admissibility, not questions ofstatutory validity.
-11

-No. 68568-6/12

Bradford next contends that RCW 9A.46.110(1) is unconstitutionally vague on its face because, he asserts, the statutory definition of "course ofconduct" contains phrases that leave ordinary citizens to speculate as to what conduct is proscribed. We disagree. "A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on its face as 

### unduly vague, in violation ofdue process. To succeed, however, the 

### complainant must demonstrate that the law is impermissiblyvague in all of its applications." Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.. 455 U.S. 489, 497, 102 S. Ct. 1186,71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982). "Avagueness 

### challenge seeks to vindicate twoprinciples of due process: the need to define prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice of what conduct they must avoid, and the need to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory lawenforcement." Lee, 135 Wn.2d at 393 (citing Luvene, 118 Wn.2d at 844). A 

### statute violates the due process clause ifit (1) "does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 

### conduct is proscribed" or (2) "does not provideascertainable standards ofguilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement." Citv ofSpokane v. Douglass. 115Wn.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). 

### Our courts do not apply the void forvagueness doctrine casually; rather, 

### we "approach a vagueness challengewith a strongpresumption in favor of the statute's validity." State v. Smith. 111 Wn.2d 1, 5, 759 P.2d 372 (1998). Merely
-12-No. 68568-6/13

because some terms in a statute are undefined does not mean that the statute is 

### unconstitutionally vague. Lee, 135 Wn.2d at 393 (citing Douglass. 115 Wn.2d at 177). The party asserting a vagueness challenge bears the heavy burden of establishing that the legislative enactment is unconstitutionally vague beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn.2d 259, 263-64, 676 P.2d 996 (1984).Here, Bradford contends that the phrases, "constitutionally protected free 

### speech" and "constitutionally protected activity," contained in the definition of "course of conduct," as set forth in RCW 10.14.020(1), render the stalking statute 

### void forvagueness. This is so, Bradford maintains, because that which is 

### considered speech protected by the FirstAmendment has been the "subject of considerable litigation and scholarly debate since [the First Amendment's]
ratification." 

### Put plainly, Bradford's argument is nonsensical. In essence, his contention is that the concept of"constitutionally protected" activities is beyond 

### the ken of ordinary citizens. Were we to accept Bradford's assertion, allcriminal statutes would be void for vagueness. This is so because every statute— 

### whether implicitly orexplicitly stated—is subject to constitutional limitations. 

### Simply put, Bradford posits thefollowing: (1) constitutional analysis can be hard; (2) constitutional limitations apply to allstatutes; (3) it is hard to analyze the scope ofthese limitations; (4) therefore, allstatutes are unconstitutionally vague. This is not a winning argument.

- 13-No. 68568-6/14 

### Indeed, "[presumptively available to all citizens are the statements of law contained in statutes and in court rulings." Smith. 111 Wn.2d at 7 (holding that former RCW 9A.46.020 is not unconstitutionally vague because readily ascertainable sources of law provide meaning to the phrase "lawful authority" as itappears inthe statute). Hence, ascertainable standards exist to informthe public as to what type ofconduct is constitutionally unprotected and, thus, 

### proscribed by the stalking statute. A litany ofUnited States Supreme Court and Washington Supreme Court decisions has interpreted the scope of the First Amendment's free speech protections in similar instances. See e.g.. Virginia v. Black. 538 U.S. 343, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003); R.A.V. v. Citv of St. Paul. Minn.. 505 U.S. 377, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992); Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed 2d 430 (1969); United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1968); Chaolinskv v. New Hampshire. 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1942): Immelt. 173 Wn.2d 1: State v. Williams. 144Wn.2d 197, 26 P.3d 890 

### (2001); Citv ofSeattle v. Eze. 111 Wn.2d 22, 759 P.2d 366 (1988). Bradford fails to carry his burden ofproving that the stalking statute is 

### unconstitutionally vague beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, hisclaim fails.
IV 

### Finally, Bradford contends that the trial court erroneouslyadmitted evidence of text messages sent to Smith's cellulartelephone because, he asserts, such messages were not sufficiently identified or authenticated, as required by ER 901(a). Again, we disagree.
-14-No. 68568-6/15

A court's admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State
v. Magers. 164Wn.2d 174, 181, 189 P.3d 126(2008). Abuse ofdiscretion
occurs when a trial court's decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Magers. 164 Wn.2d at 181. Pursuant to ER 901 (a), "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." This requirement is met "ifsufficient proof is introduced to permit a reasonable trier offact to find in favor of authentication or identification." State v. Danielson. 37 Wn. App. 469, 471, 681 P.2d 260 (1984). Furthermore, the trial 

### court is not bound bythe rules ofevidence when making a determination as to 

### authenticity. State v. Williams. 136 Wn. App. 486, 500, 150 P.3d 111 (2007) (citing ER 104(a); ER 1101(c)(1); Danielson. 37 Wn. App at 471). Here, the trial court admitted Officer Sidaris's testimony, in which he read 

### to the jurythe text messages received byVilayphone in January 2011. The court also admitted as an exhibit the 12-page examination report ofSmith's cellular 

### telephone, which included the text messages that Smith received between June and July 2011. Bradfordcontends that this evidence was not sufficiently authenticated because, he asserts, the State did not prove that he was the 

### individual responsible for sending thesetext messages.8

8On appeal, Bradford additionally asserts that the Statefailed toprove that thedevice used during the "phonedump" was "in properworking order." In so contending, he relies on ER 901(b)(9), which provides that, as an example ofauthentication, a proponent may present "[ejvidencedescribing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the
-15-No. 68568-6/16
Sufficient evidence was introduced to support a finding that the text messages that were read to thejury and contained inthe 12-page examination report were what the State purported them to be: text messages written and sent by Bradford. For a substantial period of time, Bradford telephoned Vilayphone and appeared at her place ofemployment on a frequent basis. He also regularly 

### appeared outside of her house. These actions demonstrated Bradford's desperate desire to communicate with Vilayphone. It was consistentwith this obsessive behaviorthat he would also send text messages to Smith as part of his efforts to contact Vilayphone. In addition, the content ofthe text messages themselves indicated that Bradford was the individual who sent them. For example, the January 2011 text 

### messages repeatedly mentioned Vilayphone's name, demanding that Smith have Vilayphone call the sender. Furthermore, the threats contained in the January 2011 messages regarding the sex video were similarto Bradford's previous threats made in 2010. In January 2011, Smith received a text message warning that "the video is getting distributed to the neighbors." This text message was 

### preceded by an incident in December 2010, in which copies of the sex video were placed on several cars in Vilayphone's neighborhood. In addition, in 2010, Smith received text messages with similarthreats to distribute the video tofamily process or systemproduces an accurateresult." However, attrial, Bradford did notobjectto the admission of the textmessages on thisspecific basis. Nordid he raise this issue in hisbriefings to the trial court. Instead, Bradford's authentication objections were grounded on the asserted lack ofsufficient evidence establishing that he was the individual responsible for sending the text messages. "A party may assign evidentiary erroron appeal only on a specific ground made at trial." State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d 125 (2007); accord ER 103(a)(1). Bradford did not raise this issue in the trial court and, thus, did not properly preserve this challenge for appeal. -16-No. 68568-6/17 

### members and neighbors and, subsequently, a copy of the video was found on Vilayphone's husband's car. These January 2011 threats to distribute the video
were consistent with Bradford's previous threats made in 2010. They also comported with Bradford's obsessive behavior at that time. Furthermore, two ofthe text messages sent to Smith inJanuary 2011 

### threatened to cause an explosion. They stated: "I said itwas life or death. Well, boooooommmmmmm!!!!"; and, "Smell gas? So do I." Shortly afterthese 

### messages were sent, Vilayphone received a suspicious package from Bradford. Also pertinent was the fact that, between January 22 and May 23, 2011, Bradford was injail and, therefore, unable to send text messages or emails. During this same time period, Smith did not receive any offensive text messages. Once Bradford was released from jail, however, he located Vilayphone in person at a restaurant. Thereafter, Smith began, once again, to receive offensive text 

### messages, which she believed werefrom Bradford. Thecontent oftwo ofthe messages referred toVilayphone's husband, Mason. Two ofthe messages referenced the name ofthe restaurant in which Bradford had seen Vilayphone. 

### Finally, Smith and Vilayphone testified to their beliefthat the text messages were from Bradford. There was no trial court error inthe admission ofthe challenged evidence. 

### The State properly authenticated the evidence of Bradford's text messages 

### pursuanttoER 901(a).9

9Bradfordasserts several claims in a separate statementof additional grounds. He asserts: (1) multiple violations oftheright to due process; (2) a violation ofthe Sixth
-17-No. 68568-6/18

Affirmed.

We concur:



# /~J.e.J ^qArd&, *

Amendment's Confrontation Clause; (3) prosecutorial misconduct; (4) that several witnesses committed perjury; and(5) a violation oftheSixth Amendment right tocounsel. Several of Bradford's contentions are incoherent. However, insofar as some of his arguments are comprehensible, theynevertheless fail to have any basisin thelaw orfacts. Accordingly, each of Bradford's contentions is without merit. -18-