Thi~ opinion was fllj for record 

at B·QOan on M l3J 2cn1 

~~~~ susAN CCRL'soN 

SUPREME COURT CLERK 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

In the Matter of the Recall of ) 

) No. 93522-0 

MARC BOLDT, ) 

Clark County Councilor, ) 

) 

JEANNE STEWART, ) EnBanc 

Clark County Councilor, ) 

) 

JULIE OLSON, ) 

Clark County Councilor. ) 

) Filed JAN 1 2 2011 

) 

GONZALEZ, J. -Clark County Councilor Thomas Mielke filed recall 

charges essentially alleging that three fellow council members improperly held a 

vote in executive session, improperly designated The Columbian as the newspaper 

of record, and did not prevent the county executive from dissolving a county 

department. The superior court judge dismissed the charges as legally and 

factually insufficient, which Mielke appealed. We affirm the trial court. 
In re Recall of Marc Boldt, eta!., No. 93522-0 

BACKGROUND 

Clark County's Board of County Councilors (Board) operates under a "home 

rule charter." A home rule charter is a municipality's organizational plan, 

analogous to a constitution, drawn by the local government itself and adopted by 

popular vote. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (lOth ed. 2014). In 2014, Clark 

County voters increased the number of the Board from three to five members. 

Under the charter, the Board is the legislative body and the county manager the 

executive. CLARK CoUNTY CHARTER§§ 1.5, 2.1, 3.1. The manager has authority 

to supervise all administrative departments established by the charter or created by 

the Board, and to execute and enforce all ordinances. Id. § 3.2. 

The Board adopted a budget in 2015 that included funding for a county 

Department of Environmental Services. Former Senator Don Benton served as its 

director. In May 2016, County Manager Mark McCauley "reorganize[ d]" the 

Department, eliminating administrative positions, including Benton's, and 

reassigning the services to other county departments. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 520. 

According to McCauley, he based this decision on his authority alone as manager. 

In 2016, Councilors Marc Boldt and Julie Olson were elected to the Board, 

joining Councilors Jeanne Stewart, David Madore, and Thomas Mielke. Tensions 

rose quickly between councilor members. The councilors often disagreed, dividing 

the Board into two factions: Boldt, Olson, and Stewart against Madore and Mielke. 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

E.g., CP at 193-95,11,24,38 (Mielke characterized Boldt, Olson, and Stewart as 

Madore's "political rivals"). Madore eventually became suspicious of Deputy 

County Prosecutors Chris Home and Christine Cook and Planning Director Oliver 

Orjiako, accusing them of providing false information to the Board regarding the 

county's comprehensive plan update as required by the Growth Management Act, 

chapter 36.70A RCW. Madore created a document purportedly showing 

"inaccuracies of their testimony and posted it to the County's website." Br. of 

Appellant at 2 (citing CP at 129-30). 

On March 1, 2016, Home spoke about Madore's concerns and asked for 

guidance from the Board about whether an independent investigation was needed. 

Boldt, Olson, and Stewart stated that an investigation was not necessary, while 

Madore endorsed proceeding with an investigation. On March 2, 2016, a union for 

county employees threatened to file a grievance against Madore's "defamatory" 

public allegations naming Home, Cook, and Orjiako. CP at 131-32.1 On March 9, 

2016, the Board met again, Horne provided additional background on an 

independent investigation, and the Board discussed "moving forward" with it. CP 

at 406. 

1 Madore accused Clark County staff of misfeasance at public meetings, in Facebook postings, in 

e-mails, in an op-ed article, and in an AprilS, 2016 Clark County Focus television interview. CP 

at 235. 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, eta!., No. 93522-0 

On March 15, 2016, Orjiako submitted a complaint, alleging Madore created 

a hostile workplace, to Clark County's director of human resources. In light of the 

Board's discussions, McCauley decided on his own to move forward with an 

investigation. McCauley directed his staff to locate an independent investigator to 

look into the allegations made by and against Madore. While the recruitment 

process was unclear, on March 19, 2016, attorney Rebecca Dean sent an 

engagement letter to the county, agreeing to begin an investigation. McCauley's 

declaration states that his staff proposed Dean's scope of work and he did not 

discuss it with the Board based on his "past practice regarding contracts for 

investigations of county employees." CP at 519. McCauley executed the contract 

"based on [his] authority as County Manager under the Clark County Home Rule 

Charter and related rules." Jd. The Dean contract was not posted on the county's 

website. 

The Board returned to conducting county business despite the allegations 

from Madore and county staff. On AprilS, 2016, the Board considered bids for the 

county's newspaper of record. Four newspapers submitted bids. The county 

purchasing manager presented a report comparing the bids and advised the Board 

that the previous newspaper of record, The Reflector, had "compromised the 

County's ability to meet publishing deadlines and scheduled changes." CP at 443. 

The purchasing manager also stated that The Reflector, a weekly newspaper, would 

4 
In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

require duplicate postings in The Columbian, a daily paper, concluding that The 

Reflector would ultimately be more expensive in total publishing costs. Boldt, 

Olson, and Stewart voted for The Columbian; Mielke and Madore voted for The 

Reflector. 

Meanwhile, at an April20, 2016 board meeting, McCauley explained why 

"he believed that he had unanimous support from the Board to proceed with an 

investigation of Councilor Madore's allegations" and, because the contract 

involved "investigations of one ofthe Board members," why "he decided that it 

was not appropriate" to post the Dean contract on the website. Resp'ts' Br. at 8 

(citing CP at 189-90). Interestingly, Mielke seems to confirm that the Board had 

agreed to pursue an investigation, but believed there had been no agreement 

regarding its scope. CP at 194 ("I thought we would agree to hire someone, but we 

hadn't agreed on what's going to be investigated.").Z 

On June 28, 2016, Mielke filed a recall petition against Boldt, Olson, and 

Stewart in Clark County Superior Court. He claimed that the councilors: (1) 

knowingly violated the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter 42.30 

2 Dean completed her investigation by July 6, 2016. Her report concluded that Madore's 

allegations of staff misfeasance by Orjiako, Cook, and Horne were "[i]n all material respects ... 

false." CP at 23 5. She also concluded that the staff did not engage in misleading behavior or 

deceive the Board or manipulate data. Dean concluded that Madore attempted to directly 

micromanage the Clark County Planning Department's work on the 2016 comprehensive plan 

and "attempted to pressure Orjiako and Planning staff not to exercise independent professional 

judgment." CP at 236. 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

RCW, by authorizing the hiring of Dean, (2) grossly wasted public funds by 

awarding the paper of record contract to The Columbian newspaper, (3) 

purposefully limited Mielke's and Madore's access to advice from the county 

prosecutor's office, and (4) abdicated legislative responsibilities by allowing 

McCauley to dissolve the county's Department of Environmental Services without 

legislative authorization.3 

A sufficiency hearing was held on July 29, 2016. The trial court considered 

affidavits from the parties and reviewed a video recording of a board meeting. The 

court concluded the recall charges were factually and legally insufficient, and ruled 

that Mielke lacked standing to seek recall of Olson because he did not reside in her 

district. Mielke now appeals the superior court's order dismissing the recall 

petition. 

ANALYSIS 

Elected officials in Washington may be recalled for malfeasance, 

misfeasance, or violation of oath of office. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 33-34; RCW 

29A.56.11 0. Courts act as a gateway to ensure that charges are factually and 

legally sufficient before they are placed before the voters, but our role is not to 

evaluate the truthfulness ofthose charges. RCW 29A.56.140; In re Recall ofKast, 

144 Wn.2d 807, 813, 31 P.3d 677 (2001) (citing In re Recall of Beasley, 128 

3 Appellant appears to have abandoned the third allegation on appeal. 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

Wn.2d 419, 427, 908 P.2d 878 (1996); In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wn.2d 

756, 764, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000)). 

Recall petitions must be both legally and factually sufficient, and courts 

must ensure that persons submitting the charges "have some knowledge of the 

facts underlying the charges." In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 791, 72 

P.3d 170 (2003) (citing In re Recall of Ackerson, 143 Wn.2d 366, 372,20 P.3d 930 

(2001)). The facts alleged in a petition are sufficient to proceed to a ballot when, 

taken as a whole, they "identify to the electors and to the official being recalled 

acts or failure to act which without justification would constitute a prima facie 

showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of 

office." Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268, 274, 693 P.2d 71 (1984). 

In determining whether a petition is factually sufficient, we assume the 

veracity of allegations made so long as they are reasonably specific and 

detailed. See In re Recall ofSandhaus, 134 Wn.2d 662, 668-69, 953 P.2d 82 

(1998). "Voters may draw reasonable inferences from the facts; the fact that 

conclusions have been drawn by the petitioner is not fatal to the sufficiency of the 

allegations." In re Recall of West, 155 Wn.2d 659, 665, 121 P.3d 1190 

(2005). Where commission of an unlawful act is alleged, the petitioner must show 

facts indicating the official had knowledge of and intent to commit an unlawful act. 

In re Recall ofTelford, 166 Wn.2d 147, 158,206 P.3d 1248 (2006). 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

Likewise, a recall petition is legally sufficient if it "state[s] with specificity 

substantial conduct clearly amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance or violation of 

the oath of office." Chandler, 103 Wn.2d at 274. An appropriate exercise of 

discretion does not constitute grounds for recall. I d. "The sufficiency of a recall 

petition is reviewed de novo." Wasson, 149 Wn.2d at 791 (citing Teaford v. 

Howard, 104 Wn.2d 580, 590, 707 P.2d 1327 (1985)). A reviewing court does not 

look to the truthfulness of the charges but instead considers whether, accepting the 

allegations as true, the charges on their face support the conclusion that the officer 

abused his or her position. I d. at 792 (citing Teaford, 104 Wn.2d at 5 86). 

The superior court makes the initial sufficiency determination, subject to 

review by this court. See RCW 29A.56.140; Kast, 144 Wn.2d at 813. The charge, 

taken as a whole (which may include consideration of attached documents in 

certain circumstances) must be specific enough to give the elected official 

meaningful notice of the particular conduct challenged and why it is grounds for 

recall. West, 155 Wn.2d at 667 (citing In re Recall of Lee, 122 Wn.2d 613,618, 

859 P.2d 1244 (1993)). 

I. THE DEAN CONTRACT 

Mielke argues that Boldt, Olson, and Stewart knowingly violated the OPMA 

when they allegedly held a clandestine meeting to approve Dean's contract. The 

OPMA allows closed executive sessions to discuss complaints or charges brought 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

against public officials or employees and to converse with legal counsel about 

potential litigation. RCW 42.30.11 0(1 )(f), (i). Before convening in executive 

session, the presiding officer publicly announces the purpose for excluding the 

public and the time when the session will conclude. RCW 42.30.11 0(2). Mielke 

contends that neither he nor Madore were notified of this secret meeting as 

mandated by RCW 42.30.060, making any vote taken in such a meeting null and 

void. 

Mielke seems to argue that because the Dean contract was executed, Boldt, 

Olson, and Stewart had to have met secretly to approve it. There is no direct 

evidence such a secret meeting occurred, but Mielke is correct that the record does 

not definitively establish when the Board discussed hiring an independent 

investigator, whether this was in a public meeting or executive session, whether the 

Board held a formal vote, or whether the county manager made the decision. 

Boldt, Olson, and Stewart's statements as to the nature and timing of the discussion 

appear to conflict.4 Horne stated that he knew "four members ... specifically 

voted in favor of going forward with th[ e] investigation," but it is not clear whether 

4 See, e.g., CP at 404 (Boldt, Olson, and Stewart state that "no investigation was needed"), 191, 

196-97 (Stewart stated that the Board discussed the independent investigator at executive session 

and that Madore was present), 195 (Boldt stated that the Board had "talked about th[e] 

investigation for a month or more ... [;] it was held in open session"), 202 (Olson noted the 

contract was preapproved by the Board). 

9 
In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

he meant "voting" in the context ofthe OPMA. CP at 203. And McCauley states 

that he alone decided to pursue an independent investigator and hire Dean. 

Assuming that Mielke is correct that there was an improper vote held in 

executive session, this alone is not a recallable offense. Where a recall petition 

alleges that an "official committed an unlawful act, factual sufficiency also 

requires that the petition contain a factual basis for both the proposition that the 

official intended to commit the act and 'that the official intended to act 

unlawfully."' In re Recall of Heiberg, 171 Wn.2d 771, 778, 257 P.3d 565 (2011) 

(quoting In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d 255, 263, 961 P.2d 343 

(1998)). If a board member believed that he or she was acting appropriately under 

the law, he or she is not subject to civil penalty under the OPMA. RCW 

42.30.120; see also Cathcart v. Andersen, 10 Wn. App. 429, 436-37, 517 P.2d 980 

(1974) (civil penalties not appropriate where uncontroverted affidavits established 

that attorney general advised law school faculty that meetings did not violate the 

OPMA). But cf In re Recall of Davis, 164 Wn.2d 361,371-72, 193 P.2d 98 (2008) 

(a contract entered outside of a public meeting, when the signatory exceeded the 

scope of her legal authority, is a legally sufficient ground for recall). 

Boldt, Olson, and Stewart's uncontroverted statements establish that they 

relied on the county attorney's advice regarding the "unique" legal situation facing 

the Board and that they did not think they were violating any rule. CP at 199-203. 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

Because Boldt, Olson, and Stewart relied on legal advice and believed they were 

acting in accordance with the law, they did not knowingly violate the OPMA. See 

Wasson, 149 Wn.2d at 791 ("[T]he facts must show that the official intended to 

violate the OPMA." (citing In re Recall of Anderson, 131 Wn.2d 92, 95, 929 P.2d 

410 (1997))). 

Mielke also argues that Boldt, Olson, and Stewart violated their oath of 

office by allowing McCauley to contravene the county code when he failed to post 

the Dean contract on the county website as required by Clark County Code 

2.09.030(2). Br. of Appellant at 11. The county code states that 

( 1) The county manager is authorized to execute contracts in the amounts 

and subject areas set forth below for: 

(a) Contracts for the procurement of professional services not to 

exceed two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) upon compliance 

with all other applicable state and federal laws. Professional 

service contracts funded by the general fund in an amount 

exceeding one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) shall require 

prior council approval. 

CLARK COUNTY CODE 2.09.030. 

The chapter goes on to require that 

(2) Prior to the execution of any contract subject to subsection (1) of this 

section, the county manager will publish all contracts and staff reports 

on the Clark County website including a swnmary of the contract 

purpose, funding sources, and contract term. The county manager will 

also provide a copy of the staff reports and/or contracts to county 

councilors for their review and will not execute the documents for one 

week to provide any councilor an opportunity to review and request 

individual consideration of a document prior to execution. Contracts 

signaled for individual consideration will be approved by a majority 

vote ofthe council at a public meeting. 

11 
In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

CLARK COUNTY CODE 2.09.030(2) (emphasis added). 

McCauley stated that he believed he was not required to post the Dean 

contract on the county website5 because (1) he believed it was within his authority 

as executive to execute the contract alone, (2) it contained sensitive and 

confidential information, and (3) not posting it was consistent with his past 

practices involving contracts for investigations of county employees. Mielke 

asserts that Horne admitted wrongdoing when he stated at a public meeting that the 

contract "wasn't posted on the grid, and the Ordinance [Clark County Code 

2.09.030(2)] requires it to be posted on the grid." Br. of Appellant at 11 (emphasis 

omitted) (citing CP at 199). However, this mischaracterizes Horne's full statement. 

Horne went on to explain that the sihlation facing the Board consisted of "unique" 

issues not contemplated by the county code. He explained that the code did not 

require the Dean contract to be preapproved by the Board and characterized the 

contract as "pre-approved." CP at 199. Nor did the code contemplate the current 

legal situation-an employment action against a sitting councilor (i.e., Madore). 

Although McCauley may have exceeded his authority by failing to post the 

Dean contract to the county website, this does not make Boldt, Olson, or Stewart 

subject to recall since they believed McCauley had authority and they relied on 

5 Clark County maintains a website to post documents for public access. This website is referred 

to as "'The Grid. "' CP at 83 n.2. Two grids exist: one for Board documents and another for 

proposed contracts. 

12 
In re Recall of Marc Boldt, eta!., No. 93522-0 

legal advice. Cf Davis, 164 Wn.2d at 371-72. We affirm the trial judge's 

conclusion that this allegation is insufficient to sustain a recall. 

II. NEWSPAPER OF RECORD 

Mielke argues that Boldt, Olson, and Stewart grossly wasted public funds by 

awarding the county's newspaper of record contract to The Columbian instead of 

The Reflector "as a reward for the aggressive attacks on their political opponents 

Madore and Mielke." Br. of Appellant at 25. Though Mielke did not argue this 

issue at the sufficiency hearing, we may nevertheless accept review of claimed 

errors not appealed as a matter of right. CP at 558 (at trial, Mielke's attorney 

conceded "that the case law does establish the discretion" of the legal newspaper 

contract but wished to preserve the issue for appeal); State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d 

827, 834-35, 344 P.3d 680 (2015) (citing State v. Russell, 171 Wn.2d 118, 122, 

249 P.3d 604 (2011)). 

Counties must designate a newspaper to serve as the official newspaper of 

record, and the "county legislative authority shall let the contract to the best and 

lowest responsible bidder, giving consideration to the question of circulation in 

awarding the contract, with a view to giving publication of notices the widest 

publicity." RCW 36.72.075. Mielke contends that this provision provides "little 

discretion" to decision-makers in awarding the newspaper contract. Br. of 

Appellant at 23. He largely focuses on the "lowest" bidder language in the statute, 

13 
In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

arguing that Boldt, Olson, and Stewart voted for the more expensive newspaper 

"quid pro quo" for negative editorial coverage of Mielke and Madore. !d. at 23 

(citing CP at 433); CP at 96-99. 

RCW 36.72.075 does not define the term "best and lowest responsible 

bidder." '"The determination of the municipal officials concerning the lowest 

responsible bidder will not be disturbed by the courts, unless it is shown to have 

been influenced by fraud, or unless it is an arbitrary, unreasonable misuse of 

discretion."' Chandler, 103 Wn.2d at 275 (quoting 10 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, 

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS§ 29.73, at 398 (3d rev. ed. 1981)). This court held in 

1939 that counties have discretion in selecting an official newspaper. King County 

v. Superior Court, 199 Wash. 591, 92 P.2d 694 (1939) (paper upheld as official 

county newspaper despite its limited circulation and being published by a political 

group). The plain meaning of the statute supports this view. 

The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. 

JM, 144 Wn.2d 472,480,28 P.3d 720 (2001) (citing Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & 

Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 807, 16 P.3d 583 (2001)). If a statute's meaning is plain 

on its face, courts give effect to that meaning. !d. (citing State v. Chapman, 140 

Wn.2d 436, 450, 998 P.2d 282 (2000)). If the language is ambiguous or unclear, 

courts may look to the statutory scheme as a whole or related statutes. Dep 't of 

Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

RCW 36.72.075 requires that the "best and lowest responsible bidder" be 

selected, while also considering circulation and publicity. This statute does not 

require a county to select its newspaper based solely on the lowest monetary bid. 

In fact, it requires decision-makers to balance cost with other factors. Here, the 

Clark County purchasing manager informed the Board that the previous newspaper 

of record, The Reflector, had compromised the County's publishing deadlines, 

would require duplicate postings in other local papers, and in total would increase 

publishing costs. In light of this information, Boldt, Olson, and Stewart did not 

improperly exercise discretion in voting for The Columbian and this allegation was 

not a basis for recall. In re Recall of Reed, 156 Wn.2d 53, 59, 124 P.3d 279 (2005) 

("an elected official cannot be recalled for appropriately exercising the discretion 

granted him or her by law" (citing Kast, 144 Wn.2d at 815)); Chandler, 103 Wn.2d 

at 275. This charge was properly dismissed. 

III. DISSOLUTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 

Lastly, Mielke argues that Boldt, Olson, and Stewart abandoned their 

legislative responsibilities by allowing McCauley to dissolve the county's 

Department of Environmental Services without requiring a vote by the Board as 

required by RCW 36.40.100. 

Essentially, Mielke contends that because the Board sets a department's 

budget, only the Board can transfer or revise that department. But McCauley 

15 
In re Recall ofMarc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

testified that as manager, he had authority to reorganize administrative departments 

such as the Department of Environmental Services and he did not need the Board's 

consent even to eliminate the department. Boldt, Olson, and Stewart state that they 

did not take part in or direct McCauley regarding the reorganization. The 

councilors believed McCauley had authority under the Clark County Charter to 

dissolve or reorganize administrative departments. Even assuming, without 

deciding, that McCauley lacked authority to reorganize a county department, there 

is no evidence that Boldt, Olson, or Stewart intended to violate the law. In re 

Recall ofCarkeek, 156 Wn.2d 469, 474, 128 P.3d 1231 (2006) ("while some 

inferences are permissible, ' [ o ]n the whole, the facts must indicate an intention to 

violate the law"' (alteration in original) (quoting In re Recall ofFeetham, 149 

Wn.2d 860, 865, 72 P.3d 741 (2003))). Thus, this charge is not legally sufficient 

and was properly dismissed. This charge is not legally sufficient to support the 

recall action.6 

6 Mielke also appeals the trial court's conclusion that he lacked standing to recall Olson. The 

Washington State ConstihJtion provides that a public official is subject to recall "by the legal 

voters oftbe state, or of the political subdivision oftbe state." CONST. art. I,§ 33 (emphasis 

added). "Political subdivision" is not defined in RCW 29A.56.11 0 (codifying CON ST. art. I, § 

33). Respondents contend that Teaford controls, urging tbis court to conclude tbat a "political 

subdivision" means an "officer's constituency." 104 Wn.2d at 583. Teaford states that an 

"officer's constituency can initiate recall proceedings" under article I, section 33. ld. (emphasis 

added). But the Teaford court did not conclude that only an officer's constituency in a political 

subdivision can initiate a recall action. Indeed, this appears to be an issue of first impression. As 

Professor Hugh Spitzer notes, a ''political st!bdivision" is "a concept that is defined differently in 

at least half dozen statutes but is used much more frequently in an undefined way." Hugh 

Spitzer, A Local Government By Any Other Name, PROCEEDINGS OF WASH. STATE Assoc. OF 

MUN. ATT'YS 7-7 to 7-8 (2009), http://mrsc.org/getmedia/D2F2FDF4-·9C9C-4D03-8945-

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, eta!., No. 93522-0 

IV. COSTS 

Boldt, Olson, and Stewart argue that the recall allegations are frivolous and 

that they are entitled to compensatory damages under RAP 18.9(a). An appeal is 

frivolous if, considering the whole record, the court is convinced there are no 

debatable issues on which reasonable minds may differ and it is totally devoid of 

merit. Fay v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 194, 200-01, 796 P.2d 412 (1990) 

(citing Green River Cmty. Call. Dist. No. 10 v. Higher Educ. Pers. Bd., 107 Wn.2d 

427, 442-43, 730 P.2d 653 (1986)). Mielke's allegations, while insufficient to 

sustain a recall petition, were not so totally devoid of merit such that there was no 

possibility of reversal. This appeal was not frivolous. Furthermore, "a recall 

petitioner should not be made to pay an elected official's attorney fees merely 

because the petitioner has brought a 'frivolous recall petition."' Pearsall-Stipek, 

141 Wn.2d at 783 (quoting Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wn.2d at 267). 

Boldt, Olson, and Stewart also seek costs under RAP 14.2-14.4 as the 

substantially prevailing party on review. Mielke's allegations are legally and 

factually insufficient to sustain recall charges, and Boldt, Olson, and Stewart 

substantially prevailed on appeal. See Salomi Owners Ass 'n v. Satomi, LLC, 167 

Wn.2d 781, 817,225 P.3d 213 (2009) (citing RAP 14.2). Therefore, we award 

OAl 07182A50B/wsama534-7.aspx [https://perma.cc/SG6R-9U7V]. It is not necessary for us to 

resolve this issue here and we decline to reach it. 

17 
In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

them costs on appeal, to be determined by the commissioner or clerk in accordance 

with RAP 14.6. 

CONCLUSION 

Mielke's recall charges are insufficient to proceed to the voters. We affirm 

the superior court's dismissal of the recall petition and award Boldt, Olson, and 

Stewmi costs on appeal. 

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In re Recall of Marc Boldt, et al., No. 93522-0 

WE CONCUR: 

19