Filed 9/17/14 P. v. Patterson CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
HARUM PATTERSON,
Defendant and Appellant. B248859
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA389181)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Craig J. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed as modified. Mark R. Feeser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assist ant Attorney General, and James William Bilderback II and Alene M. Games, Deput y Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________ __________2 Appellant Harum Patterson appeals from his judgment of conviction for carjacking (Pen. Code, 1 § 215, subd. (a)), second degree robber y (§ 211), and criminal threats (§ 422). Patterson asserts the trial court violated his constitu tional rights when it denied his request for self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 ( Faretta ). Patterson also argues the trial court vi olated section 654 a nd failed to properly exercise its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences on the carjacking and robbery counts. We conclude the judgment must be modified to stay the sentence on the robbery count and to award Patterson the correct number of custody credits, but otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND A ND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. The Charges In an amended information, the Los Ange les County District Attorney charged Patterson with one count of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), one count of second degree robbery (§ 211), and one count of criminal th reats (§ 422). It was alleged that Patterson committed the charged offenses fo r the benefit of, at the dire ction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). 2 It was also alleged that Patterson had suffered four prior serious or violent felony convictions with in the meaning of section 667, subds. (b)-(i) and section 1170. 12, subds. (a)-(d)), five prior serious felony convictions within the meani ng of section 667, subdivisi on (a)(1), and five prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b). Patters on pleaded not guilty to all charges and denied the en hancement allegations.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Prior to trial, the trial court granted de fense counsel’s motion to set aside the gang enhancement allegations purs uant to section 995.3 II. The Prosecution’s Case On August 2, 2011, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Juan Carlos Cardona parked his Ford Windstar van in the area of Coco Aven ue and Pinafore Street in Los Angeles. Cardona’s friend, Alma Romero, lived in a nearby apartment complex, and they planned to meet that night for a late meal. Cardona was waiting inside his parked vehicle when Patterson approached the open front passenger window. Patterson first as ked if Cardona wanted drugs or women, and Cardona did not respond. Patterson then asked for money, and Cardona denied having any. At that point, Patterson became angry and walked around the van to the open driver’s side window. Patterson gestured to ward his waistband a nd twice told Cardona not to be stupid or he woul d shoot him. Cardona got out of the van and stood by the driver’s side door as Patterson searched hi m. Patterson took Cardona’s wallet from his back right pocket and continued searching him. Patterson then moved Cardona away from the van and demanded the ke ys, which were still in the i gnition. Patterson got in the driver’s seat and ordered Cardona to get in the passenger seat and go with him. Cardona pretended to comply, but instead ran toward Romero’s apartment bu ilding. Romero was exiting the building when she saw Cardona standi ng near the rear of the van and a Black man in the driver’s seat. Patterson sped aw ay in the van. Card ona and Romero called 911. The following day, Cardona’s van was fo und abandoned in an alley on Santa Rosalia Drive, less than a mile from Romero’s apartment. Patterson’s right palm print was recovered from inside the vehicle on the dr iver’s side door jamb. The police later located Patterson through a GPS tracking devi ce that he was wearing while on parole for a prior offense. The GPS tracking system showed that Patterson was on foot in the vicinity of Coco Avenue and Pinafore Street at the time of the robbery and carjacking. It also showed that Patterson transitioned into a vehicle and then stopped in an alley on Santa Rosalia Drive a short time later. On September 21, 2011, Patterson was arre sted and interviewe d by the police. He denied being in the locati on of the robbery and carjackin g until he was told that his4 fingerprints and GPS tr acking device placed him at the sc ene. Patterson then admitted that he approached a Hispan ic man in a van and asked for money and a cigarette. He denied ever opening the driver’s side door or taking the vehicle.

III. The Defense Case Patterson testified on his own behalf. On the night of August 2, 2011, Patterson and his girlfriend, Andrea Hughes, were wa lking around the neighborhood and smoking marijuana. Cardona called Patterson over to his van and asked where he could get some cocaine. After talking for five to 10 minute s, Cardona asked if Patterson could buy $20
worth of cocaine for him. Patterson told Card ona that they would ha ve to go down the street near Dorsey High Scho ol, and Cardona agreed. At one point, Cardona opened the driver’s side door and his bank card fell ont o the street. Patterson touched the driver’s side door jamb as he reached to pick up the card for Cardona. Patterson and Hughes then got into the passenger side of the van and Ca rdona drove them down the street. Patterson purchased the cocaine for Cardona and handed it to him. Cardona told Patterson that he needed to smoke it at that location because he did not want his girlfriend to know he was using drugs. Hughes did not want to be around someone smoking cocaine so she and Patterson decided to walk back home. Patters on left Cardona in his van and did not see him again. Patterson admitted he had four prior convictions for robbery and attempted robbery, but testified that he had been doing well on parole a nd avoiding legal trouble. Hughes testified that she and Patterson we re walking around the neighborhood on August 2, 2011 when Patterson stopped to talk to a Hispanic man in a van. Patterson asked Hughes to take a ride with him so th at he could get the man some drugs. Hughes and Patterson got into the van and the man drove them to an area near Dorsey High School. Patterson and Hughes got out of the van and Patte rson purchased crack cocaine for the man. They then walk ed back to her house while the man stayed in the van using the drugs. On November 10, 2011, a defense investigator interviewed Hughes. Hughes told the investigator that sh e remained in the van while Patterson made the drug purchase5 and that the man then drove them back to Coco Avenue and Pi nafore Street. Hughes also told the investigator that Patterson never approa ched the driver’s side door of the van. Cardona was also called as a witness by the defense. He testified that, during the robbery, Patterson took $20 and a bank card from his wallet and then threw the wallet into the van. Cardona never recovered e ither his money or his bank card.

IV. Verdict and Sentencing The jury found Patterson guilty on all counts. In a bifur cated proceeding, the trial court found each prior convicti on allegation to be true. Th e court sentenced Patterson to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the robbery and carjacking counts, plus an additional term of 25 years based on the five prior serious felony convictions. The court imposed and stayed a term of 25 years to lif e on the criminal threat s count pursuant to section 654. Patterson was awarded 598 days of presentence custody credit.

DISCUSSION
I. Denial Of the Request For Self-Representation On appeal, Patterson contends the trial court committed revers ible error when it denied his request for self-repr esentation on the day set for tria l. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denyi ng Patterson’s untimely request, and even assuming there was any error in the trial court’s ruling, such error was harmless.

A. Relevant Proceedings On March 28, 2012, Patterson was arrai gned on the amended information before Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Lisa Lenc h. At that hearing, Patterson brought a
Marsden 3 motion to replace his court-appointed attorney, Mitra Donde, because he was dissatisfied with her representation. After Judge Lench denied the Marsden motion, Patterson moved to repr esent himself under Faretta . In open court, Judge Lench stated, “Mr. Patterson, what I’m going to do is I’m goi ng to give you a form to look at and fill

3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.6 out. And after you’re finished with that form, I’m going to ta lk to you again.” Patterson completed and signed a written Faretta waiver form. Judge Le nch continued the hearing on the Faretta motion to the following day, March 29 , 2012, and then to April 17, 2012. Between April 17 and July 8, 2012, Patterson appeared in court with his appointed counsel five additional times. There is no in dication, however, that Patterson renewed his
Faretta motion during any of thos e hearings, or that the trial court made any further ruling on that motion. 4 On July 9, 2012, Patterson’ s trial was scheduled to commence before Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Craig J. Mitchell. Prio r to the start of jury voir dire, Patterson brought another Marsden motion. He stated that he did not feel comfortable going to trial with Ms. Donde and refused to be represented by her. He also stated: “If I have to go pro per, then I’ll go pro per. My family is in the process of trying to obtain counsel for me. . . .” When Judge Mitc hell advised Patterson that his Faretta motion was untimely, Patterson replied: “I tried to do it, sir, . . . and I got ran around w ith Judge Lench. And her and the D.A., they was telling me to come ba ck this day, come back this day, but they would never mention it to me. I tried to do it then. I signed the pape rwork . . . to try to do it, and they gave me the rough shot and acted like I didn’t try to do it, kept on going to proceed, kept asking about it. I got no response, sir. I tried to do it.” In response, Judge Mitchell reiterated that Patterson’s request to represent himself on the day of trial was untimely, and was “off the table” at this stage in the proceedings. Judge Mitchell then addressed the Marsden motion. Patterson raised a number of issues about his current representation, incl uding the fact that Ms. Donde had not filed certain motions on his behalf and had not contacted his ma in witness, Hughes, about

4 The reporter’s transcript does not include a record of any hearings between March 29 and July 8, 2012. The clerk’s transcri pt, however, does include minute orders from hearings held on March 29, April 17, May 1, June 19, June 26, and July 3, 2012. Each minute order indicates that Patterson was pres ent in court with Ms. Donde. The only reference to Patterson’s Faretta motion is in the March 29, 2012 minute order and merely notes that the motion was c ontinued to April 17, 2012.7 testifying. Patterson also stated that Ms. Do nde had told him the week before that she was going to present a GPS expert witness, but later informed him that she had decided not to do so. In addition, Patterson accus ed Ms. Donde of having “an evil disposition,” being an “advocate of the distri ct attorney,” and using “racial slurs” against him when he refused to accept a plea. In response, Ms. D onde noted that she had filed a successful section 995 motion to dismiss the gang enhanc ement allegations, and that she had been in contact with Hughes, who was expected to testify. She acknowledged discussing a GPS expert with Patterson, but explained that sh e had decided not to call the expert because she believed it was unnecessary based on their th eory of the case. Ms. Donde denied ever using racial slurs in speaking with Patterson. Judge Mitchell denied the Marsden motion. Patterson then renewed his request to represent himself, stating: “I would like to exercise my Faretta rights. That’s my right. I don’t have to waive time. I’ll go to trial on my own.” Patterson also noted that it was day 8 of 10 and he s till had two days of statutory time before trial to prepare. Judge Mitchell repeated his pr ior finding that the Faretta request was untimely. Patterson asked the court to reconsider its Marsden ruling and appoint new counsel, or to grant a oneweek continuance so that he could represent himself. When Judge Mitchell denied that request, Patterson stated that he would not be present in court as long as Ms. Donde was representing him. After concluding the Marsden hearing, Judge Mitchell resumed the proceedings in open court, but Patterson refused to atte nd. In Patterson’s absence, Judge Mitchell advised counsel that, over the lunch hour, he had sought guidance from case authority regarding the Faretta request, and in particular, had considered the decision in People v.
Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197 ( Scott ). Applying the factors set forth in Scott , 5 Judge

5 According to Scott , in ruling on an untimely Faretta motion, “a trial court is required to consider (1) the quality of counse l’s representation, (2) the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel, (3) the reasons for the request, (4) the length and stage of the proceedings, and (5) the disruption or dela y which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.” ( Scott , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204.)8 Mitchell found that the quality of Ms. Donde’s representation supported the denial of
Patterson’s Faretta request. He also found th at Patterson previously made a Marsden motion, which was denied. With respect to Patterson’s prior Faretta request, Ms. Donde explained: “He did request to go pro per, an d Judge Lench told him that she would give him an answer on the next occasion, and then the next time he came back, he didn’t want to pursue the pro per status.” Judge Mitche ll noted that he had spoken with the master calendar judge who likew ise had confirmed that there was no pending Faretta request when the case was assigned for trial. Judge Mitchell further found that Patterson’s latest
Faretta request appeared to be based on his un happiness with Ms. Donde’s representation and the denial of his Marsden motion. Judge Mitchell also no ted that the potential jurors had been waiting in the hallway while the court addressed Patterson’s motions, and asked the prosecutor whether it would be difficult to reschedule the witnesse s. In response, the prosecutor stated that she did not believe th ere would be any diffi culty in rescheduling them, but noted that the two main witnesses were both civilians and that “it is always difficult to have civilian witnesses come to court.” Judge Mitchell observed that it was difficult to fully assess the disruption or de lay that might result from granting Patterson’s
Faretta motion given his ongoing refu sal to come to court. Judge Mitchell then ruled as follows: “Weighing the five criteria that is presented in the Scott case, the court does find that, taken in consideration together, Mr. [Patterson’s] request is untimely, particular ly given the fact that I find the quality of his representation to be more than satisfactor y; that on many previous court appearances, he did not ask . . . for substitu tion of counsel or self-represen tation; that he, in fact, is making this request at this late moment beca use he is irritated a nd disagrees with the court’s request to find a lawful justification to substitute counsel and that, in fact, we are in a situation where jurors are actually in the hallway and ready to come into this trial. Based on that assessment of the Scott criteria, [the] court believes it has made an adequate record of why it is exercising its discretion to deny Mr. [Patterson] his request on the day of trial to represent himself.”9 Judge Mitchell also found that Patterson had waived his right to be present at trial by refusing to come to court. After instru cting the prospective jurors not to consider Patterson’s absence from trial in reaching its verdict, jury voir di re commenced. The following day, Patterson renewed his request to represent himself, which the trial court denied based on its prior findings. Afte r Judge Mitchell reiterated to Patterson the importance of attending trial, Patt erson agreed to be present.

B. Applicable Law A criminal defendant has a right to repres ent himself or herself at trial under the Sixth Amendment to the Unite d States Constitution. ( Faretta , supra , 422 U.S. at pp. 835-836; People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 252.) “‘A trial court must grant a defendant’s request for sel f-representation if three conditions are met. First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having been appris ed of the dangers of self-re presentation. [Citations.] Second, he must make his reque st unequivocally. [Citations.] Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time be fore trial. [Citations.]’” ( People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 931-932.) An e rroneous denial of a timely Faretta request is reversible per se. ( People v. Williams , supra , at p. 253; People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 824.) A defendant’s right to self-representation, however, is absolute only if he or she invokes the right within a reasonable tim e prior to the start of trial. ( People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 193 [the constitutio nal right to self-representation “must be asserted within a reasonable time before trial”]; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 ( Windham ) [“to invoke the constitutionally mandated unconditional right of self-representation a defendant in a criminal trial should make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prio r to the commencement of trial”].) “The timeliness requirement ‘serves to prevent a defendant from misusing the motion to delay unjustifiably the trial or to obs truct the orderly administration of justice.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 454.) “[T]imeliness for purposes of Faretta is10 based not on a fixed and arb itrary point in time, but upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances that exis t in the case at the time th e self-representation motion is made.” ( People v. Lynch (2011) 50 Cal.4th 693, 724 ( Lynch ), overruled on other grounds
in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 636-643.) “Even when the trial court does not state it is denying a Faretta motion on the ground of untimeliness, we independently review the record to determin e whether the motion would prop erly have been denied on this ground. [Citation.]” ( People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 433, fn. 15.) “‘When a motion for self-representation is not made in a timely fashion prior to trial, self-representation no longer is a matte r of right but is subject to the trial court’s discretion. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Williams , supra , 56 Cal.4th at pp. 193- 194.) “‘Among [the] factors to be cons idered by the court in assessing [ Faretta ] requests made after the commencement of trial are the quality of coun sel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s pr ior proclivity to substitute co unsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceeding s, and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow th e granting of such a motion.’” ( Id . at p. 194, quoting Windham , supra , 19 Cal.3d at p. 128.) In evaluating a trial court’s denial of a Faretta motion, “‘a reviewing court must give ‘consi derable weight’ to the court’s exercise of discretion and must examine the total circ umstances confronting the court when the decision is made.’” ( People v. Bradford (2010) 187 Cal.App. 4th 1345, 1353.) We accordingly review the denial of an untimely Faretta motion for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Jackson (2009) 45 Cal.4th 662, 689-690.)

C. The Trial Court Properly Denied Patterson’s Faretta Motion On appeal, Patterson challenges the trial cour t’s denial of his July 9, 2012 request for self-representation. He specifically contends that the trial court erred in finding that a
Faretta motion made on the day of trial was per se untimely. He also claims, that even if his July 9, 2012 Faretta motion was untimely, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion solely on timeliness grounds without inquiring in to the circumstances underlying his renewed reques t to represent himself.11 We conclude that the trial court properl y found that Patterson’s July 9, 2012
Faretta motion was untimely because he waited un til the date trial was set to begin to renew his request for self-representation. As the California Supreme Court stated in Windham , “a defendant should not be permitted to wait until the day preceding trial before he moves to represent himself . . . without some showing of reasonable cause for the lateness of the request. In such a cas e the motion for self-representation is addressed to the sound discretion of th e trial court . . . .” ( Windham , supra , 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, fn. 5.) Patterson points out that, mo re recently, the Supreme Court in Lynch refused “to identify a single point in time at which a sel f-representation motion f iled before trial is untimely,” and recognized that “pertinent considerations may extend beyond a mere counting of the days between the moti on and the scheduled trial date.” ( Lynch , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 723.) However, the Court in Lynch also observed that “we have held on numerous occasions that Faretta motions made on the eve of trial are untimely,” and directed its analysis to motions made outsid e the “two extreme time periods” between the “eve of trial” and “long before trial.” ( Id . at pp. 722-723; see also People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 102-103 [ Faretta motion made moments before jury selection was set to begin was untimely and prop erly denied by trial court]; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1110 [ Faretta motion made on date schedule d for trial was untimely and its denial constituted a proper exercise of discretion]; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 99-100 [ Faretta motion made when trial was being co ntinued on day-to-day basis, in effect on the eve of trial, was subject to trial court’s discretion as untimely]; People v.
Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 742 [ Faretta motion made on eve of trial was untimely and its denial was within trial court’s disc retion].) Because Patters on did not renew his
Faretta motion until the day set for trial, the deci sion whether to grant or deny the motion rested within the sound disc retion of the trial court. Patterson argues that, in assessing th e timeliness of his July 9, 2012 Faretta motion, the trial court sh ould have considered that Patterson made a prior Faretta motion months before trial, which was never ruled upon by the court. Undoubtedly, Patterson’s March 28, 2012 request for self-representa tion was timely made. However, the record12 supports a finding that Patterson abandoned that request when he appeared in court with his appointed counsel on five different occa sions between April 17 and July 3, 2012 without making any attempt to renew the motion. ( People v. Butler , supra , 47 Cal.4th at p. 825 [“ Faretta right may be waived by . . . abandonment and acquiescence in representation by counsel”]; People v. Stanley , supra , 39 Cal.4th at p. 929 [defendant abandoned his asserted right of self-repres entation by his “subsequent acceptance of several appointed counsel to represent him”]; People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 609-610 [“after a defendant invokes the ri ght to self-representation, a waiver may be found if it reasonably appears that the defe ndant abandoned the re quest”].) Additionally, at the July 9, 2012 hearing, Patterson’s ap pointed counsel, Ms. Donde, represented to the trial court that, while the prior Faretta motion was pending before Judge Lench, Patterson decided that he “didn’ t want to pursue the pro per st atus.” The trial court also noted that it had consulted on the matter with the master calendar judge, who confirmed that there was no record of any pending Faretta motions by Patterson when the case was assigned for trial. Under these circumstances, the trial court reasonably could find that Patterson had abandoned his prior re quest for self-representation. Patterson also asserts that his July 9, 2012 Faretta motion was timely because he made the motion at the first av ailable opportunity after a conf lict arose with his appointed counsel about trial strategy, an d he did not request a continua nce of the trial date. The record, however, reflects that Patterson’s dissa tisfaction with Ms. D onde’s representation dated back to the March 28, 2012 arrai gnment when he made his first set of Marsden and
Faretta motions, which were denied. Furt hermore, in denying Patterson’s second Faretta motion, the trial court reasonably found that Patterson’s last-minute request for selfrepresentation was the result of his unha ppiness with the denial of his second Marsden motion. With respect to a continuance, Patte rson’s statements to the trial court on this subject were ambiguous. On the one hand, at the July 9, 2012 hear ing, Patterson told the trial court: “I would like to exercise my Faretta rights. That’s my right. I don’t have to waive time. I’ll go to trial on my own.” On the other hand, at that same hearing, Patterson asked for additional time, stating: “I will humbly ask the court to reconsider13 getting me other counsel, giving me a week continuance, so I can be my own attorney, sign my Faretta rights.” During the hearing, Patters on also repeatedly complained to the trial court that his main witness, Hughes, was not then available to testify, and as a result, he should not be forced to go forward with a trial on that date. In any event, in deciding whether a request for self-representation is un timely, “[t]he circumstance that defendant did not seek a continuance is not determinative.” ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 963 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Faretta motion made after start of trial even though defendant did not seek a continuance]; see also People v. Howze (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1397 [t rial court had discretion to deny Faretta motion unaccompanied by request to continue when ma de two days prior to trial].) The record demonstrates that, at th e time Patterson made his Faretta motion, both the prosecutor and defense counsel were prepared to proceed to trial that day, the subpoenaed witnesses were ready to testify, and the prospective ju rors were waiting in the hallway. Under these circumstances, there is no basis in the record to find an abus e of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. Alternatively, Patterson contends th at, even if his July 9, 2012 Faretta motion was untimely, the trial court abused its discre tion by denying the motio n without examining the specific factors underlying his request. In support of this claim, Patterson notes that, when the trial court initially de nied the motion, the court repe atedly stated that it was doing so because the motion was untimely. Pa tterson reasons that, following a break in the proceedings, the trial court must have rea lized that it had failed to properly exercise its discretion in its denial of the motion beca use it then made an after-the-fact attempt to justify its ruling by evaluating the Windham factors on the record . This claim lacks merit. The Supreme Court in Windham “decline[d] to mandate a rule that a trial court must, in all cases, state the reasons unde rlying a decision to deny a motion for selfrepresentation which is based on nonconstitutional grounds.” ( Windham , supra , at p. 129, fn. 6.) Instead, the trial court’s ex ercise of discretion in denying an untimely
Faretta motion is properly affirmed if substantia l evidence in the r ecord supports the inference that the court had those factors in mind when it ruled. ( Scott , supra , 9114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1206 [“while the trial court may not have explicitly considered each of the Windham factors, there were sufficient reasons on the record to c onstitute an implicit consideration of these factors”]; People v. Perez (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 893, 904 [“[w]hile the court did not specifically make [a Windham ] inquiry, . . . there were sufficient reasons on the record for the court to ex ercise its discretion to deny th e request”].) This is true even if the court not only faile d to state the reasons for its denial of the motion, but also failed to make the sua sponte inquiry required under Windham . ( People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 218 [where a trial court denies a Faretta motion without making a proper Windham inquiry, “if the record as a whole establishes defendant’s request was nonetheless properly denied on other gr ounds, we would uphold the trial court’s ruling”].) Here, although the trial court did not explicitly consider the Windham factors when it initially ruled that Patterson’s Faretta motion was untimely, the court did evaluate each of the Windham factors later in the hearing and made an adequate record of its reasons for denying the motion. In pa rticular, the trial court found that Patterson’s appointed counsel was representing him in a conscientious and diligent manner, that Patterson had made two Marsden motions to substitute coun sel which were denied by the court, and that Patterson’s last-minute Faretta motion was made out of frustration with the denial of his second Marsden motion. The trial court also found that, while the prosecution witnesses could be rescheduled, the prospective jurors had been waiting in the hallway since the morning fo r jury selection to begin. Patterson asserts that, because he was not present in the co urtroom at the time of the Windham inquiry, the trial court could not properly assess whether granting the Faretta motion would cause disruption or delay. However, Patterson’s absence from the proceedings was due to his own refusal to appear in court, and he cannot now complain that the trial court was unable to make an adequate inquiry into the reasons underlyi ng his request. Based on the totality of the record, the trial court acted well w ithin its discretion in denying the Faretta motion.15 D. Any Error in the Trial Court’s Ruling Was Harmless Even assuming there were any error in th e trial court’s ruling, Patterson is not entitled to relief unless he can show that such error was not harmless under the standard articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ( Watson ). ( People v. Rogers (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1058 [ “erroneous denial of an untimely Faretta motion is reviewed under the [ Watson ] harmless error test”]; People v. Rivers (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1050 [although trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion in ruling on an untimely Faretta motion, “this error is not automatically reversible, but is reviewed under the ‘harmless error’ test of Watson ”].) In considering whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorab le to Patterson would have been achieved in the absence of the claime d error, we cannot ignore that a defendant who represents himself or herself rarely, if ever, could ach ieve a better result th an competent counsel could obtain. ( Faretta , supra , 422 U.S. at p. 834 [“It is un deniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.”]; People v. Rivers , supra , at p. 1051 [“It is candidly recognized that a defendant who represents himself virtually ne ver improves his situation or achieves a better result than would trained counsel.”].) Patterson does not dispute that he was represented by competent counsel at trial, and through his attorney’s representation, th e trial court dismissed the gang enhancement allegations. The evidence against Patterson wa s also compelling. At trial, Cardona identified Patterson as the perpetrator of the robbery and carj acking and Cardona’s girlfriend confirmed that she saw a man matc hing Patterson’s description drive away in Cardona’s van. In addition, the GPS eviden ce placed Patterson in the vicinity of the robbery at the time it occurred and inside the van as it drove to the location where it was later recovered by the police. Patterson’s claim that he coul d have retained a GPS expert to challenge the accuracy of the prosecution’ s GPS evidence is enti rely speculative. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to believe that Patterson could have mounted a stronger defense at trial by be coming his own attorney. Any error in denying Patterson’s untimely request for sel f-representation was therefore harmless.16 II. Imposition of Consecutive Senten ces for Carjacking and Robbery On appeal, Patterson also challenges th e trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences of 25 years to life on the carjacki ng and robbery counts. Patterson argues that the trial court should have stayed the sentence on the ro bbery count under section 654 because the robbery and carjacking arose fro m a single course of conduct and were committed pursuant to a single obj ective. Alternatively, Patte rson asserts that, even if separate punishments were permitted under sec tion 654, the trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion in im posing consecutive terms for t hose offenses. We conclude that section 654 barred the imposition of se parate sentences for the carjacking and robbery, and the trial court thus erred in fa iling to stay the sentence on the robbery count.

A. Relevant Proceedings At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a term of 25 years to life on the carjacking count. The trial cour t then stated: “As to [the robbery count], insofar as the robbery factually was separate and distinct from the carjacking, the court believes that a consecutive sentence is appropriate. That sent ence will be life plus an additional 25 year minimum sentence.” Patterson, who represente d himself at sentenci ng, objected to the imposition of consecutive terms, arguing that th e crimes were “all one act” and occurred “at one time.” The trial court responded: “It was not one act. You took property from Mr. Cardona that was separate and distinct from the decision you [made] later on in the course of conduct to take his vehicle.” The tr ial court stayed the sent ence on the criminal threats count pursuant to section 654.

B. Applicable Law Section 654 provides, in pertinent part , that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different pr ovisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest pote ntial term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) “‘Section 654 bars multiple punishments for separate offenses arising out of a single occurrence where all of the o ffenses were incident to one objective. [Citation.]’17 [Citation.]” ( People v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 13 68.) “‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisibl e and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507, italics omitted.) “‘[T]he purpose of section 654 “is to insu re that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his culpab ility.”’ [Citation.] ‘It is [the] defendant’s intent and objective, not temporal proximity of hi s offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible.’ [Citation.] ‘“Th e defendant’s intent and objective are factual questions for the trial court; . . . there must be evidence to suppo rt [the] finding the defendant formed a separate intent and ob jective for each offens e for which he was sentenced.”’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 886.) “A trial court’s express or implied determination that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, must be upheld on ap peal if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” ( People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.) Substantial evidence is “‘evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496.) “Robbery occurs when any type of pers onal property is removed from the victim by force or fear with the intent to perman ently deprive the victim of possession of the property. [Citation.] Carjacking requires the taking of a motor vehicle by force or fear with the intent to temporarily or permanen tly deprive the victim of possession of the vehicle.” ( People v. Green (1996) 50 Cal.App. 4th 1076, 1083-1084, fn. omitted.) The two crimes share certain elements. “‘Both in volve “the felonious taking” of property that is “in the possession of another” person. Both require that the taking be from the “person or immediate presence” of the person. Bo th are “accomplished by means of force or fear.”’ [Citations.]” ( People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1059.) However, neither robbery nor carjacking is a necessarily incl uded offense within the other, and a person18 may be charged and convicted of both crimes based on the same conduct. (§ 215, subd. (c); People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 700; People v. Green , supra , at p. 1084.) In general, where a carjacking and robb ery are committed simultaneously for the singular purpose of depriving the victim of his or her property, the two crimes are not separately punishable. (See, e.g., People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 420 [carjacking and robbery constituted the same act for purposes of section 654 where the defendant “placed [a] cold meta llic object to the back of th e victim’s neck and demanded ‘everything he had,’” and “[s]imultaneously , the victim handed over his jewelry and van”].) On the other hand, where a carj acking and robbery involve more than one objective, or derive from two distinct ac ts occurring consecutively rather than concurrently, the offenses may be subject to separate sentences. (See, e.g., People v.
Green , supra , 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085 [where th e defendant approached the victim in her vehicle, took her purse, drove her to a secluded area for an attempted rape, and then took off in her car, “the taking of the purse and the taking of the vehicle were separate incidents which merited separate and a dditional punishment” under section 654].)
In People v. Bauer (1969) 1 Cal.3d 368 ( Bauer ), the defendant entered the elderly victims’ residence and robbed them of variou s items of personal property. The defendant carried the items into the gara ge, and two hours later, drove aw ay in one of the victims’ cars. ( Id . at p. 372.) The Supreme Court held that section 654 precluded separate punishment for the robbery and the automobile theft. ( Id . at pp. 376-378.) In so holding, the Court rejected the Attorney General’ s argument that consecutive sentences were warranted because the defendant formed the intent to stea l the car only after the other items had been taken. Instead, the Court reas oned: “The fact that one crime is technically complete before the other commenced does not pe rmit multiple punishment where there is a course of conduct comprisi ng an indivisible transaction. [Citations.] And the fact that one of the crimes may have been an afterthought does not permit multiple punishment where there is an indivisible transaction.” ( Id . at p. 377; cf. People v. Capistrano , supra , 59 Cal.App.4th p. 887 [separ ate punishment for robbery and carjacking were permitted un der section 654 where the defendant and his cohorts19 “confronted the victims at two points” by “first accost[ing] them at their cars and then again, inside the victims’ residences wh en they demanded the victims’ money and property”].) C. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Stay the Sentence on the Robbery Count Under Section 654
In this case, there was no substantial evid ence to support the trial court’s finding that the carjacking and robbery counts were subject to consecutive sentences. The evidence at trial established that, after Patters on approached the driver’s side window of Cardona’s van, he forced Cardon a out of the vehicle with the threat of violence and began searching him “to see if he had anything.” Patterson took Cardona’s wallet from his back pocket, moved Cardona away from the drive r’s side door, and demanded that Cardona give him the keys. Patterson then got into the driver’s seat of the van and ordered Cardona to get into the passenger seat and go with him. Cardona pretended to comply, but ran to his girlfriend’s apartment complex as Patterson sped away in the van. During the commission of the crimes, Patterson gestur ed toward his waistband and told Cardona not to be stupid or he would shoot him. In imposing consecutive sentences on the r obbery and carjacking counts, the trial court found that the two offenses did not c onstitute a single transaction because Patterson formed a separate intent to take Cardona’s van after he t ook Cardona’s wallet. However, the mere fact that separate ite ms of property were taken fro m Cardona does not, in and of itself, support an inference that Patterson acted with a separate intent. Instead, based on the evidence presented at trial, Patters on took Cardona’s wallet and vehicle in one indivisible transaction, the objective of whic h was to deprive Cardona of his property by means of force or fear. That same force and fear was used to commit both crimes, and the robbery was not separated in either time or place from the carjacking. Rather, both offenses were committed at the same location as part of a continuing course of conduct, and the GPS evidence showed that the entire transaction only lasted a few minutes. Indeed, the robbery was still in progress wh en Patterson got into the van and ordered Cardona to go with him since Patterson had not ye t reached a place of relative safety.20 ( People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994 [“‘c rime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the tim e of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety’”]; People v. Irvin (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 180, 185 [“crime of robbery . . . is not completed until the robber has won his way to a place of temporary safety”].) On this record, there wa s no evidence from which it reasonably could be found that Patterson harbored one objective when he took Cardona’s wallet and a different objective when he took Cardona’ s van during the same course of conduct. Instead, the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the ev idence was that Patterson committed each crime with the single objective to deprive Cardona of his property. As the Supreme Court stated in Bauer , “where a defendant robs his victim in one continuous transaction of several items of property, punis hment for robbery on th e basis of the taking of one of the items and other crimes on the ba sis of the taking of the other items is not permissible.” ( Bauer , supra , 1 Cal.3d at p. 377.) Becaus e the evidence wa s insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Pa tterson acted with separate and distinct objectives in committing the robbery and carjacking, section 654 precluded the imposition of consecutive sentences for these two offenses. The judgment accordingly must be modified to stay the sentence on the robbery count. 6

III. Custody Credit Patterson contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court erred in its calculation of Patterson’s custody credit aw ard. The trial cour t awarded Patterson 598 days of presentence custody cr edit, consisting of 509 days of actual custody credit and 89 days of conduct credit. However, Patterson was arrested on September 21, 2011 and was sentenced on May 10, 2013. Pa tterson is therefore entitled to 598 days of actual custody credit plus 89 days of conduct credit for a total presentence custody credit of 687 days. Patterson’s abstract of judgment must be modified accordingly.

6 In light of our conclusion that secti on 654 barred separate punishment for the robbery and carjacking, we need not addre ss Patterson’s alternative argument that the trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences.21 DISPOSITION The judgment is modified to stay the te rm imposed for the se cond degree robbery conviction (count 2) pursuant to section 654. The judgment is further modified to award Patterson a total of 687 days of presentence custody credit, consis ting of 598 days of actual custody credit and 89 da ys of conduct credit. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to prepare an am ended abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy to the Depa rtment of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

ZELON, J.

We concur:

WOODS, Acting P. J.

SEGAL, J. 

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.