Slip Op.06-133

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

____________________________________

:

SKF USA INC, SKF FRANCE S.A., :

and SARMA, :

:

Plaintiffs, :

: Before: WALLACH, Judge

v. : Court No.: 03-00490

:

UNITED STATES, :

: PUBLIC VERSION

Defendant, :

:

and :

:

TIMKEN U.S. CORPORATION, :

:

Defendant-Intervenor. :

____________________________________:

[United States Department of Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermination is Affirmed in Part

and Stricken in Part.]

Dated: September 1, 2006

Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, (Herbert C. Shelley, Alice A. Kipel, and Susan R. Gihring) for

Plaintiffs.

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director; Jeanne E. Davidson,

Deputy Director; Stephen C. Tosini, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division,

Commercial Litigation Branch; and Rachael E. Wenthold, Attorney-Advisor, Office of Chief

Counsel for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Counsel, for Defendant.

OPINION

Wallach, Judge:

I

Introduction

This matter comes before the court following the court’s order of August 24, 2005,
2

remanding this matter to the United States Department of Commerce (“the Department” or

“Commerce”) to recalculate its antidumping duty margin for SKF USA Inc., SKF France S.A.,

and Sarma (collectively “SKF”) in its administrative determination in Ball Bearings and Parts

Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Singapore: Final Results of Antidumping Duty

Administrative Reviews, Recission of Administrative Review in Part, and Determination Not to

Revoke Order in Part, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,623 (June 16, 2003) (“Final Results”). With regard to its

recalculation of SKF’s margin, Commerce’s Remand Redetermination is found to be supported

by substantial evidence and in accordance with law because Commerce properly supported its

finding after conducting a re-verification of SKF’s facilities in France. As a result, the portion of

Commerce’s Remand Redetermination recalculating SKF’s margin is affirmed. Because the

remainder of the Remand Redetermination attempts to improperly reargue issues already decided

by this court, misstates the court’s prior opinion, misconstrues its holding, and mischaracterizes

the evidence before the court, it is hereby stricken. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2003).

II

Background

Plaintiffs are producers and exporters of ball bearings subject to the antidumping duty

order on ball bearings and parts thereof from France published on May 15, 1989. Antidumping

Duty Orders: Ball Bearings, Cylindrical Roller Bearings, Spherical Plain Bearings, and Parts

Thereof from France, 54 Fed. Reg. 20,902 (May 15, 1989). On February 7, 2003, Commerce

published its preliminary results of administrative review for the May 1, 2001, to April 30, 2002,

period of review (“POR”). Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, and
3

Singapore: Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Reviews, Partial Rescission

of Administrative Reviews, and Notice of Intent to Revoke Order in Part, 68 Fed. Reg. 6404

(February 7, 2003).

In the Final Results, Commerce held that because SKF and Sarma were unprepared at

verification to segregate sales by market or by class or kind of subject merchandise Commerce

was therefore unable to verify the accuracy of the reported information. Defendant’s Opposition

at 6. As a result, Commerce found that SKF did not act to the best of its ability and assigned a

margin of 10.08 percent based on partial adverse facts available (“AFA”) in the Final Results. 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record (“Plaintiffs’ Motion”) at 4.

The parties filed briefs on this matter in which Plaintiffs claimed they had offered to

provide all necessary documentation at verification and were fully prepared to do so, and the

Defendant directly disputed that allegation saying that at verification Plaintiffs’ representatives

had said they were unable to obtain or provide the necessary documentation. The parties to this

proceeding were notified via an in-court status conference held on September 10, 2004, that the

court intended to hold a hearing on this matter. The court held its hearing on November 19,

2004, to determine the accuracy of the directly conflicting factual statements made by the parties

in their initial briefs. The court issued its order on August 24, 2005, instructing Commerce to reevaluate and re-examine its decision by providing evidentiary support for utilizing partial adverse

facts available, unrelated to SKF’s alleged failure to offer evidence at verification, or in the

alternative to re-calculate SKF’s margin using SKF’s own information. Commerce filed its Final

Results of Redetermination on December 20, 2005, and recalculated SKF’s margin as 6.19

percent for the period of review of May 1, 2001 to April 30, 2002. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
4

Final Results of Redetermination at 1 (December 20, 2005) (“Remand Redetermination”). 

Plaintiffs filed their Response on January 23, 2006, and Defendant filed its Reply on June 12,

2006. Oral argument was held on August 24, 2006.

III

Arguments

Commerce states that it has reconsidered its partial adverse facts available determination

for SKF by reopening the record and allowing SKF to supply supporting documentation to recalculate the antidumping duty margin. Id. Commerce further states that it complied with the

court’s order albeit under protest. Id.

Plaintiffs agree that Commerce properly recalculated SKF’s margin without the use of

partial adverse facts available and concur with the result of the Remand Redetermination, but not

with much of its content. Plaintiffs’ Comments on the Final Results of Redetermination

(“Plaintiffs’ Comments”) at 1.

IV

Applicable Legal Standard

The Court of International Trade, when reviewing a challenge to the Department’s final

results of administrative review, will uphold Commerce’s determinations unless it is

“unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with

law. . . .” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2003). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere

scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S. Ct. 456, 459,

95 L. Ed. 456, 462 (1951) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct.

206, 217, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). Substantial evidence has been defined by the courts as
5

“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being

supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S. Ct.

1018, 1026, 16 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1966). The court, however, “may not substitute its judgment for

that of the [agency] when the choice is ‘between two fairly conflicting views, even though the

court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.’”

American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 8 CIT 20, 22, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (1984)

(quoting Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488).

V

Discussion

A

Commerce Properly Recalculated SKF’s Antidumping Duty Margin in its Remand 

Redetermination

Commerce reopened the administrative record and conducted a second verification of

SKF and Sarma on September 28-29, 2005. Remand Redetermination at 4. Upon completion of

the verification, Commerce recalculated SKF’s margin using the company’s own data and

without the application of partial facts available. Id. According to Commerce the verification of

Sarma’s data required numerous steps and several personnel in order to demonstrate how

Plaintiff compiled and reported its sales data. Id. at 11.

Commerce states in its Remand Redetermination that it disagrees with the court’s August

24, 2005, Opinion. Id. at 4. It challenges the court’s conclusions regarding Commerce’s conduct

during its administrative review and objects to the extra-record affidavits submitted by SKF for

the court’s review. Id. at 5. Defendant also states in its Remand Redetermination that it disagrees
6

with what it calls “the court’s ‘verification test’” during the evidentiary hearing held on

November 19, 2004. Id. at 12-13.

SKF agrees that Commerce properly verified Sarma’s sales and properly recalculated

SKF’s margin. Plaintiffs’ Comments at 2-3. SKF, however, disagrees with the Defendant’s

characterization of the proceedings before the Court of International Trade. Id. at 5-6.

B

Commerce May Not Relitigate This Matter

Defendant believes that it can reargue issues before the Court of International Trade

based upon dicta in Viraj Group, Ltd., v. United States, 343 F. 3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

There, the Federal Circuit, addressed the issue of whether the government was a non-prevailing

party and could assert a case or controversy. Id. In doing so, the court noted that “[e]ven though

technically the prevailing party . . . the government prevailed only because it acquiesced and

abandoned its original position, which it had zealously advocated, and adopted under protest a

contrary position forced upon it by the court. Thus, in substance, the government is truly the

non-prevailing party in this case.” Id.

The government indicated at oral argument that it takes the Federal Circuit’s reference to

“zealous advocacy” as not only a predicate to preserving its rights of appeal, but as a virtual

license to reargue and reject issues already decided by this court. Although the Defendant, like

many litigants, may wish to re-argue and re-litigate issues already decided, it may not do so,

without the prior permission of the court, at the trial court level. 

This court simply does not read Viraj in the fashion asserted by the Government, nor does

it understand the law to require reargument for purposes of preserving an appellate right. Rather,
1

 In SKF, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1329, the court stated:

The core conflict between the parties is whether representatives of

SKF did or did not offer to provide supporting documentation.

In its Remand Redetermination the Department of Commerce repeatedly characterized what the

court did at the hearing which produced that opinion as a “verification test” which it argues,

produced information which was insufficient for Department verifiers to have conducted a full

audit. Remand Redetermination at 12-13.

In oral argument regarding this Remand Redetermination the court questioned

Government counsel how the Department could take that position when at the oral argument,

prior to the SKF opinion referenced above, the court stated:

7

a party may preserve an issue by stating an objection or offering a document on the record. See,

e.g., Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F. 3d 1366, 1374 (Fed.

Cir. 2005) (“counsel . . . informed the district court that he ‘would like to just read these [issues]

into the record for purposes of preserving issues for appeal.’ After the district court allowed

[counsel] to make his record, he objected to the jury instructions by requesting insertion of

[specific] language. . . . Because [the party] sufficiently raised specific objections before jury

deliberations, [it] did not waive its objections to the sufficiency of evidence on appeal.”). Thus,

if Defendant wishes to challenge this court’s final decisions, the appropriate step is to file an

appeal at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. It need not demonstrate any particular

form of advocacy, it may not reargue its position before this court without first filing an

appropriate motion for rehearing pursuant to USCIT R. 59, and it must not, in any case, act in a

contumacious fashion.

As stated by the court, in its earlier opinion, the primary issue before it was “whether

representatives of SKF did or did not offer to provide supporting documentation to Department

officials from which they could verify the accuracy of Sarma’s reported sales.”1 SKF USA Inc. et
. . . Mr. Tosini, let me state my concern to you as I did in September and October. 

My concern is that somebody is lying to me. Not whether the quantity of evidence

is sufficient to meet the approval of the Department of Commerce, but

rather–because that is discretionary on the part of the Department of Commerce,

and I review it as to whether there is law or evidence to support it. I don’t

reweigh it. That is not what we are doing here. 

* * *

[I]t is about that specific factual question, did they make the offer to provide the

information and was it turned down or not . . . .

Transcript of November 19, 2004, Evidentiary Hearing (“Hr’g Tr.”) at 228:5-24 (emphasis

added).

Counsel for the United States informed the court that it was the Department’s position

that it could read the “core conflict” sentence in this court’s opinion quoted above as meaning the

court believed it was testing the adequacy of records offered at verification as opposed as to

whether someone was lying about the offer of any records at all. Counsel also informed the

court, that while the above quoted colloquy might make it clear that was not the court’s intent,

the Department felt it could look only to this court’s opinion to determine its meaning, and not

the discussion at oral argument or the pleadings or evidence before this court.

The court presumes that a competent and ethical agency official, adequately advised of

the record before this court read this court’s opinion in full, including its conclusion that “. . .

there is well nigh irrefragable evidence that Commerce’s representations regarding the events

which occurred at verification were . . . not factually accurate . . . .” Nothing in that opinion or

the record behind it identified the conflict between the parties as having been which information

was offered as opposed to whether information was offered. Id. at 1333 (citing Galen Med.

Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1324, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, the

Government’s counsel having offered no better explanation, and based on the statements made in

the Remand Redetermination this court has determined that the Department of Commerce’s

“interpretation” constitutes a mischaracterization of this court’s opinion.

8

al. v. United States, Slip Op. 05-104 at 6, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1330 (CIT 2005). Commerce’s

attempts to characterize the course of events during the court’s evidentiary hearing as a miniverification is factually incorrect. See Remand Redetermination at 12-15. What the court

determined at the hearing was that SKF and Sarma were able to provide the information

requested by Commerce officials and would have done so at the time of the original verification.
9

SKF, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1331. That determination remains unchanged. What is particularly

relevant to that conclusion is that “offers were made and persons, at Sarma, were able and

available to send information to the verification site.” Plaintiffs’ Comments at 5. The court’s

Opinion of August 24, 2005, discusses the sequence of events that took place during

Commerce’s initial verification, the briefings, the evidentiary hearing, as well as the court’s

conclusion. SKF, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1330-33. Commerce may not, by inaccurately

recharacterizing the inquiry, findings, and holding of this court, be permitted to relitigate prior

matters to the detriment of Plaintiffs, or of the judicial process.

The Department also challenges the court’s conclusion that it should have “provided SKF

with an opportunity to remedy its verification failure,” pursuant to Section 782(d) of the Tariff

Act of 1930, section 782(i) of the Act, and 19 C.F.R. § 351.307. Remand Redetermination at 16. 

As stated by the court in SKF, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1336, Commerce’s announcement of its

decision to use partial adverse facts available in the Final Results without providing a

cooperative respondent such as SKF the opportunity to respond is contrary to 19 U.S.C. §

1677m(d). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i), this court has the

authority to remand matters to Commerce if it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the

record, or otherwise not in accordance with law” and instructed Commerce to re-examine the

record of this case accordingly. Id.

C

Even If Commerce Could Reargue the Issues Previously Before This Court, It May Not Do

So By Mischaracterizing, Misstating, and Misconstruing the Court’s Opinion

Defendant states in its Remand Redetermination that “[a]t the center of this litigation are

the questions of whether SKF/Sarma offered information to the Department’s verifiers and, if so,
10

whether the information would have supported Sarma’s designation of sales to report and sales it

did not report to the Department in its questionnaire response.” Remand Redetermination at 6. 

The Department also claims that “[d]uring her depositions and during the Court hearing, [SKF

Employee A] testified that, during the February 2003 verification, she recalled being asked to

demonstrate the split between sales” but that the Commerce verifiers did not recall this offer. 

Remand Redetermination at 6-7. Defendant, however, continues to argue that “neither of the

offers which [SKF Employee A] testified she made at verification would have been sufficient to

verify the accuracy of the quantity and value figures Sarma submitted to the Department.” Id. at

7. 

What the court said at the hearing was the following:

Court: [I]f any of those are available and she can get those materials and have them faxed

to this Court, then I will accept that if they were capable of doing that, then if they

can do it now without notice and without preparation, they certainly could have

done it then, and it would weigh heavily in this Court’s determination.

Hr’g Tr. at 11:8-14. The court expressly stated during the course of the hearing that:

Court: Taken together, what I have right now is the testimony of [SKF Employee A] that

she made the offer and [SKF Employee B] demonstrating that she has the ability

to obtain information by calling her office.

Hr’g Tr. at 173:19-23. Thereafter, the court determined based upon the in-court hearing that “the

court was able to test the recollections of Commerce officials as well as SKF officials . . . 

Commerce officials did not clearly recollect whether they had specifically requested source

documentation. . . . SKF officials on the other hand testified that they communicated their

willingness and ability to provide such source documentation.” SKF, 391 F Supp. 2d at 1332. 

The court did not at any juncture, opine or rule on whether SKF/Sarma’s proffered
11

documentation would have supported the information originally reported by SKF; it found that

SKF/Sarma was able to physically provide the supporting documentation for the Department’s

review upon request. Id. Once again, the court stated on the record of the hearing that:

Court: No, no, no. Once again, Mr. Tosini, let me state my concern to you as I did in

September and October. My concern is that somebody is lying to me. Not

whether the quantity of evidence is sufficient to meet the approval of the

Department of Commerce, but rather–because that is discretionary on the part of

the Department of Commerce, and I review it as to whether there is law or

evidence to support it. I don’t reweigh it. That is not what we are doing here. 

* * *

[I]t is about that specific factual question, did they make the offer to provide the

information and was it turned down or not . . . .

Hr’g Tr. at 228:5-24. Finally, the court summarized what transpired at the hearing on the record

and clarified for the parties its basic concern:

Court: [I]n the morning I asked [SKF Employee B], because my concern, and I don’t

know if you were told this, but what my concern is is that I have squarely

contradictory testimony between the verifiers and the various Sarma

representatives, be they outside or inside, as to the ability of Sarma to obtain

information and ship it up to SKF so I said to [SKF Employee B]. . . “[i]t was a

couple of years ago, but could you call your office right now and have them – talk

to somebody and have them fax information to the United States?”

* * *

It seems to me if she could do it today, she could have done it a lot easier a couple

of years ago, and it bothers me intensely, because what you and your colleague are

testifying is “These individuals said we can’t do it.” Not that “We won’t” or not

that anything; specifically, “We can’t do it,” and she is in here and is incapable of

doing it, and yet she vigorously in her deposition and in her affidavit statement

said, “Oh, I could do it,” so I asked her to do it and, by golly, she did it.

Hr’g Tr. at 254:17 - 256:6. Based upon this testimony and the court’s observations of the

witnesses’ demeanor, it concluded that “SKF’s versions of this particular series of events is
12

strongly supported by the ability of SKF officials to provide the information from the subject

period of review to the court on the day of the hearing.” SKF, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1332-33. In no

instance did the court attempt to reweigh or verify the accuracy of the substantive data included

in the provided documents and expressly stated that it “held a hearing on those conflicting

presentations, not to reweigh the evidence presented, but to examine the very existence of the

facts as stated by the parties.” Id. at 1329. Defendant’s attempt to mischaracterize, misstate, and

misconstrue the court’s processes, Opinion, and Order is improper in these, and in the following

respects:

(1) The court found in its August 24, 2005, opinion that Commerce’s decision was

unsupported by substantial evidence. SKF et al. v. United States, Slip Op. 05-104, 391 F. Supp.

2d 1327 (CIT 2005); see 19 U.S.C. §1516a(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Universal Camera Corp., 340

U.S. at 477 (stating that “substantial evidence is more than a “mere scintilla.” It means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”). 

Commerce in its Remand Redetermination argues that the issue of whether SKF offered to

provide supporting documentation at verification “was addressed fully on the record of the

administrative review . . . .” Remand Redetermination at 2. By definition, the court’s finding that

“Commerce’s announcement of its decision to use partial AFA for the first time in the Final

Results, and to offer no opportunity for SKF to respond, correct, or clarify while finding SKF had

not cooperated to the best of its ability, is unsupported by substantial evidence and not in

accordance with law,” means that it did not address this issue fully on the record of the

administrative review. SKF, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1336. Accordingly, Defendant is attempting to
2

 Defendant states that it “has not had the opportunity, as an agency, to address the

proceedings that have transpired before the Court.” Remand Redetermination at 4. Although

counsel for the Department of Justice has represented the Defendant, United States, at all stages

of this litigation and counsel for the Department of Commerce has appeared before this court at

all hearings, Commerce seems to believe that it was not afforded the opportunity to voice its

position to the court. At oral argument, the attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice stated

that he is counsel for the United States and not counsel for the Department of Commerce. As

such, the attorney for the Department of Justice argued that the Department of Commerce had not

had the opportunity to present its argument before the court until it filed its Remand

Redetermination. Upon further questioning from the court, the attorney for the Department of

Justice refused to address any discussions between it and Commerce citing attorney/client

privilege. Even though this court disagrees with Commerce’s position, this is not the appropriate

juncture to address this particular stance of the Department of Commerce.

13

reargue its prior position rather than to simply preserve the issue for appeal.2

(2) Defendant states that it disagrees with the “conclusion that the extra-record affidavits

SKF submitted with its brief to the court was the first time SKF had an opportunity to obtain

relief concerning its failures at verification.” Remand Redetermination at 5. The court, in its

opinion, made no determination as to the timeliness of SKF’s arguments or the filing of the

affidavits in its original Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record. See SKF, 391 F. Supp.

2d at 1333-39. The court originally found and continues to find that Commerce did not provide

SKF adequate notice of its decision to use partial AFA in calculating SKF’s margin. See id.

(3) Commerce argues that in its view, “it had considered the matter fully and addressed it

during the normal course of its administrative proceeding.” Remand Redetermination at 6. 

Defendant is re-arguing issues previously reviewed and decided. See Paragraphs 1) and 2) infra.

(4) Defendant’s statement that “neither of the offers which [SKF Employee A] testified

she made at verification would have been sufficient to verify the accuracy of the quantity and

value figures Sarma submitted to the Department” is an attempt to reargue, without permission of

the court, issues which were or which should have been briefed previously. Remand
14

Redetermination at 7.

(5) Defendant further argues that it is clear to “the Department that, if [SKF Employee

A] made these offers, they were not remotely sufficient to support the line items the Department

selected in Sarma’s verification worksheet. Remand Redetermination at 12. As noted above, the

question before the court was not the sufficiency of the underlying data and whether or not the

data provided by SKF could be audited to the satisfaction of Commerce, but rather it was to

determine whether or not offers were made to provide documentation to Commerce officials. 

SKF 391 F. Supp. 2d at 1329. This court relied on evidence presented to it at or in court during

the November 19, 2004, hearing and was satisfied that offers were made by SKF officials to

provide any requested documentation to Department officials. See id.; see also Hr’g Tr. at 61:13-

64:16 (Test. of [SKF Employee A]); Hr’g Tr. 92:21-94:5 (Test. of [SKF Employee A]); Hr’g Tr.

156:8-11 (Test. of [SKF Employee B]); Hr’g Tr. 173:19-22 (statement of the court). Defendant’s

statement to the contrary directly mischaracterizes the ruling of this court.

(6) Defendant alleges that what it calls the court’s “verification test” was not sufficient to

satisfy Commerce’s audit procedures. Remand Redetermination at 15. Defendant states that it

“agrees with Mr. Schauer’s testimony that one invoice is not sufficient to demonstrate that the

totals presented in each line item were accurate.” Remand Redetermination at 13. Commerce

may not in its Remand Redetermination reargue without the court’s permission issues previously

decided. See Paragraph 5 infra.

(7) Defendant says that it “finds that the fact that both the documentation submitted in

Court and [SKF Employee A]’s claimed offers would have been insufficient calls into question

Sarma’s preparedness, ability, and willingness to provide the requisite documentation during the
15

February 2003 verification.” Remand Redetermination at 14. Defendant may appeal this court’s

rulings, but its position that it may ignore them is directly contrary to the concepts of judicial

review articulated in Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 175-76, 1 cranch 137, 68-70, 2 L. Ed. 60

(1803). See also United States v. Dalcour, 203 U.S. 408, 420, 27 S. Ct. 58, 59, 51 L. Ed. 248

(1906) (holding that the Circuit Court of Appeals shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review

final decisions in the District Courts, et cetera, in all cases other than those provided for in the

preceding section, “unless otherwise provided by law.”); Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. 568 (1833)

(“[t]he jurisdiction of the court can never depend upon its decision upon the merits of a case

brought before it; but upon its right to hear and decide it at all . . . it is the essential criterion of

appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and

does not create that cause.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)). In this instance this court

was satisfied and continues to remain satisfied that [SKF Employee A]’s offers were sufficient to

substantiate SKF’s claim that it had the ability to provide data requested by Commerce. SKF, 391

F. Supp. 2d at 1333. Since the Court of International Trade has original jurisdiction over matters

arising out of the administrative decisions of the Department of Commerce, its decision that SKF

offered to provide documentation can be challenged via appeal but not via reargument without

permission of the court. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a.

(8) Defendant states that “[n]owhere on the record of the review or in the documentation

presented before the Court was there any indication of preparation by SKF or Sarma personnel to

provide such information during the February 2003 verification.” Remand Redetermination at 15. 

SKF officials testified in open court on November 19, 2004, that they were prepared for

verification as well as able and willing to provide any documentation requested by Commerce
16

officials and the court found that there was sufficient indication of that intent. See SKF, 391 F.

Supp. 2d at 1332-33; see also Hr’g Tr. 53:10-18; 57:11-22; 73:2-13 (Testimony of [SKF

Employee A]); Hr’g Tr. 153:23-154:16 (Test. of [SKF Employee B]); Hr’g Tr. 210:4, 213:2-5;

218:9-14 (Test. of [SKF Employee C]). The court is satisfied that SKF offered to provide

supporting documentation to the Commerce verifiers. If the Department disagrees with that

determination it must appeal it or seek a rehearing. It may not reargue it without the court’s

permission.

V

Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Remand Redetermination is hereby affirmed in

part and stricken in part. Paragraph 1 at page 5 through paragraph 1 at page 9, and paragraph 1 at

page 12 through paragraph 2 at page 17, of Defendant’s Remand Redetermination are hereby

stricken on the grounds that those portions misconstrue, misstate and/or mischaracterize the

court’s findings.

__/s/ Evan J. Wallach___________

 Evan J. Wallach, Judge

Date: September 1, 2006

New York, New York