100730 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 240 / Friday, December 13, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

(SAE) recommended practice J211/1, 

‘‘Instrumentation for Impact Test-Part 1- 

Electronic Instrumentation.’’ 

(c) The occupant must not interact 

with the armrest or other seat 

components in any manner significantly 

different than would be expected for a 

forward-facing seat installation. 

4. Pelvis Criteria: 

Any part of the load-bearing portion 

of the bottom of the ATD pelvis must 

not translate beyond the edges of the 

seat bottom seat-cushion supporting 

structure. 

5. Femur Criteria: 

Axial rotation of the upper leg (about 

the Z-axis of the femur per SAE 

Recommended Practice J211/1) must be 

limited to 35 degrees from the nominal 

seated position. Evaluation during 

rebound does not need to be considered. 

6. ATD and Test Conditions: 

Longitudinal tests conducted to 

measure the injury criteria above must 

be performed with the FAA Hybrid III 

ATD, as described in SAE 1999–01– 

1609, ‘‘A Lumber Spine Modification to 

the Hybrid III ATD for Aircraft Seat 

Tests.’’ The tests must be conducted 

with an undeformed floor, at the mostcritical yaw cases for injury, and with 

all lateral structural supports (e.g. 

armrests or walls) installed. 

Note: The applicant must demonstrate that 

the installation of seats via plinths or pallets 

meets all applicable requirements. 

Compliance with the guidance contained in 

policy memorandum PS–ANM–100–2000– 

00123, ‘‘Guidance for Demonstrating 

Compliance with Seat Dynamic Testing for 

Plinths and Pallets,’’ dated February 2, 2000, 

may be applied. 

7. Head Injury Criteria: 

The HIC value must not exceed 1000 

at any condition at which the 

pretensioner does or does not deploy, 

up to the maximum severity pulse that 

corresponds to the test conditions 

specified in § 25.562. Tests must be 

performed to demonstrate this, taking 

into account any necessary tolerances 

for deployment. 

When an airbag is present in addition 

to the pretensioner restraint system, and 

the anthropomorphic test dummy (ATD) 

has no apparent contact with the seat/ 

structure but has contact with the 

airbag, a HIC unlimited score in excess 

of 1000 is acceptable provided the 

HIC15 score (calculated in accordance 

with 49 CFR 571.208) for the contact is 

less than 700. ATD head contact with 

the seat or other structure, through the 

airbag, or contact subsequent to contact 

with the airbag, requires a HIC value 

that does not exceed 1000. 

8. Protection During Secondary 

Impacts: 

The pretensioner activation setting 

must be demonstrated to maximize the 

probability of the protection being 

available when needed, considering 

secondary impacts. 

9. Protection of Occupants Other than 

50th Percentile: 

Protection of occupants for a range of 

stature from a 2-year-old child to a 95th 

percentile male must be shown. For 

shoulder harnesses that include 

pretensioners, protection of occupants 

other than a 50th percentile male may 

be shown by test or analysis. In 

addition, the pretensioner must not 

introduce a hazard to passengers due to 

the following seat configurations: 

(a) The seat occupant is holding an 

infant. 

(b) The seat occupant is a child in a 

child-restraint device. 

(c) The seat occupant is a pregnant 

woman. 

10. Occupants Adopting the Brace 

Position: 

Occupants in the traditional brace 

position when the pretensioner activates 

must not experience adverse effects 

from the pretensioner activation. 

11. Inadvertent Pretensioner 

Actuation: 

(a) The probability of inadvertent 

pretensioner actuation must be shown 

to be extremely remote (i.e., average 

probability per flight hour of less than 

10¥7). 

(b) The system must be shown not 

susceptible to inadvertent pretensioner 

actuation as a result of wear and tear, or 

inertia loads resulting from in-flight or 

ground maneuvers likely to be 

experienced in service. 

(c) The seated occupant must not be 

seriously injured as a result of 

inadvertent pretensioner actuation. 

(d) Inadvertent pretensioner 

activation must not cause a hazard to 

the airplane, nor cause serious injury to 

anyone who may be positioned close to 

the retractor or belt (e.g., seated in an 

adjacent seat or standing adjacent to the 

seat). 

12. Availability of the Pretensioner 

Function Prior to Flight: 

The design must provide means for a 

crewmember to verify the availability of 

the pretensioner function prior to each 

flight, or the probability of failure of the 

pretensioner function must be 

demonstrated to be extremely remote 

(i.e., average probability per flight hour 

of less than 10¥7) between inspection 

intervals. 

13. Incorrect Seat Belt Orientation: 

The system design must ensure that 

any incorrect orientation (twisting) of 

the seat belt does not compromise the 

pretensioner protection function. 

14. Contamination Protection: 

The pretensioner mechanisms and 

controls must be protected from external 

contamination associated with that 

which could occur on or around 

passenger seating. 

15. Prevention of Hazards: 

The pretensioner system must not 

induce a hazard to passengers in case of 

fire, nor create a fire hazard, if activated. 

16. Functionality After Loss of Power: 

The system must function properly 

after loss of normal airplane electrical 

power, and after a transverse separation 

in the fuselage at the most critical 

location. A separation at the location of 

the system does not have to be 

considered. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

December 9, 2024. 

Patrick R. Mullen, 

Manager, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and 

Standards Division, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2024–29442 Filed 12–12–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 27 

[Docket No. FAA–2024–0875; Special 

Conditions No. 27–058–SC] 

Special Conditions: Skyryse, Robinson 

Helicopter Company Model R66 

Helicopter; Interaction of Systems and 

Structures 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Robinson Helicopter 

Company (Robinson) Model R66 

helicopter. This helicopter, as modified 

by Skyryse, will have a novel or unusual 

design feature when compared to the 

state of technology envisioned in the 

airworthiness standards for normal 

category helicopters. This design feature 

is a novel control input and fly-by-wire 

(FBW) system. The applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for this design feature. These special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Effective December 13, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Daniel Moore, Airframe Section, AIR– 

622, Technical Policy Branch, Policy 

and Standards Division, Aircraft 


khammond on DSK9W7S144PROD with RULES
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 240 / Friday, December 13, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 100731 

Certification Service, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 901 Locust, Kansas 

City, MO 64106; telephone (303) 342– 

1066; email Daniel.E.Moore@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On April 10, 2023, Skyryse applied 

for a supplemental type certificate for 

removal of the mechanical control 

system and installation of a computer 

controlled flight control system in the 

Model R66 helicopter. The Robinson 

Model R66 helicopter, currently 

approved under Type Certificate No. 

R00015LA, is a single engine normal 

category rotorcraft. The maximum takeoff weight is 2,700 pounds, with a 

maximum seating capacity of five 

passengers. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 

21.101, Skyryse must show that the 

Robinson Model R66 helicopter, as 

changed, continues to meet the 

applicable provisions of the regulations 

listed in Type Certificate No. R00015LA 

or the applicable regulations in effect on 

the date of application for the change, 

except for earlier amendments as agreed 

upon by the FAA. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for the Robinson Model 

R66 helicopter because of a novel or 

unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the applicant apply 

for a supplemental type certificate to 

modify any other model included on the 

same type certificate to incorporate the 

same novel or unusual design feature, 

these special conditions would also 

apply to the other model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the Robinson Model R66 

helicopter must comply with the fuelvent and exhaust-emission requirements 

of 14 CFR part 34, and the noisecertification requirements of 14 CFR 

part 36. 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type certification basis under 

§ 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Feature 

The Robinson Model R66 helicopter 

will incorporate the following novel or 

unusual design feature: 

Novel control input and FBW system. 

Discussion 

Skyryse has proposed to install an 

FBW flight control system (FCS) 

intended to replace the current 

hydraulicly boosted mechanical primary 

FCS, on a Robinson Model R66 

helicopter. FBW systems are new to part 

27 rotorcraft and as such, the rotorcraft 

FCS will now contain control functions 

that affect the static strength of 

rotorcraft structure. 

These special conditions would give 

the applicant an option to offset the 

structural factor of safety based on the 

probability of system failure. These 

special conditions apply to systems that 

can induce loads on the airframe or 

change the response of the rotorcraft to 

maneuvers or to control inputs, as a 

result of failure. Some potential 

examples include part 27 rotorcraft 

equipped with FBW or fly-by-light 

FCSs, autopilots, stability augmentation 

systems, load alleviation systems, flutter 

control systems, fuel management 

systems, and other systems that either 

directly or as a result of failure or 

malfunction affect structural 

performance. 

The FAA has issued special 

conditions for the interaction of systems 

and structures to other aircraft in the 

past (parts 23, 25, and 29). Active flight 

control systems are capable of providing 

automatic responses to inputs from 

sources other than the pilots. These 

automatic systems may become 

inoperative or may operate in a 

degraded mode, which could impact the 

loads envelope and rotorcraft static 

strength. 

Therefore, it is necessary to determine 

the structural factors of safety and 

operating margins such that the joint 

probability of structural failures due to 

application of loads during system 

malfunctions is not greater than that 

found in rotorcraft equipped with 

earlier technology control systems. To 

achieve this objective, it is necessary to 

define the failure conditions with their 

associated frequency of occurrence in 

order to determine the structural factors 

of safety and operating margins that will 

ensure an acceptable level of safety. 

The special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. 

Discussion of Comments 

The FAA issued Notice of Proposed 

Special Conditions No. 27–24–01–SC 

for the Robinson Model R66 helicopter, 

as modified by Skyryse, which was 

published in the Federal Register on 

August 28, 2024 (89 FR 68833). 

No comments were received, and the 

special conditions are adopted as 

proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the 

Robinson R66 helicopter. Should 

Skyryse apply at a later date for a 

supplemental type certificate to modify 

any other model included on Type 

Certificate No. R00015LA to incorporate 

the same novel or unusual design 

feature, these special conditions would 

apply to that model as well. 

Under standard practice, the effective 

date of final special conditions would 

be 30 days after the date of publication 

in the Federal Register. However, as the 

certification date for the Robinson R66 

helicopter, as modified by Skyryse, is 

imminent, the FAA finds that good 

cause exists to make these special 

conditions effective upon publication. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only a certain 

novel or unusual design feature on one 

model of helicopter. It is not a rule of 

general applicability and affects only 

the applicant who applied to the FAA 

for approval of these features on the 

helicopter. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 27 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

Authority Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 

44701, 44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for the Robinson R66 

helicopter, as modified by Skyryse. 

Interaction of Systems and Structures 

For rotorcraft equipped with systems 

that affect structural performance, either 

directly or as a result of a failure or 

malfunction, the influence of these 

systems and their failure conditions 

must be taken into account when 

showing compliance with the 

requirements of subparts C and D of part 

27 of title 14 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (14 CFR). 

The following criteria must be used 

for showing compliance with these 

special conditions: 

(a) The criteria defined herein only 

address the direct structural 

consequences of the system responses 


khammond on DSK9W7S144PROD with RULES
100732 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 240 / Friday, December 13, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

and performance. They cannot be 

considered in isolation but should be 

included in the overall safety evaluation 

of the rotorcraft. These criteria may, in 

some instances, duplicate standards 

already established for this evaluation. 

These criteria are only applicable to 

structures whose failure could prevent 

continued safe flight and landing. 

Specific criteria that define acceptable 

limits on handling characteristics or 

stability requirements, when operating 

in the system degraded or inoperative 

mode, are not provided in these special 

conditions. 

(b) Depending upon the specific 

characteristics of the rotorcraft, 

additional studies may be required that 

go beyond the criteria provided in these 

special conditions in order to 

demonstrate the capability of the 

rotorcraft to meet other realistic 

conditions such as alternative gust or 

maneuver descriptions for a rotorcraft 

equipped with a load alleviation system. 

(c) The following definitions are 

applicable to these special conditions. 

(1) Structural performance: Capability 

of the rotorcraft to meet the structural 

requirements of 14 CFR part 27. 

(2) Flight limitations: Limitations that 

can be applied to the rotorcraft flight 

conditions following an in-flight 

occurrence and that are included in the 

flight manual (e.g., speed limitations, 

avoidance of severe weather conditions, 

etc.). 

(3) Operational limitations: 

Limitations, including flight limitations 

that can be applied to the rotorcraft 

operating conditions before dispatch 

(e.g., fuel, payload, and master 

minimum equipment list limitations). 

(4) Failure condition: The term failure 

condition is the same as that used in 

§ 27.1309; however, these special 

conditions apply only to system failure 

conditions that affect the structural 

performance of the rotorcraft (e.g., 

system failure conditions that induce 

loads, change the response of the 

rotorcraft to inputs such as gusts or pilot 

actions, or lower flutter margins). 

Effects of Systems on Structures 

(a) General. The following criteria 

will be used in determining the 

influence of a system and its failure 

conditions on the rotorcraft structure. 

(b) System fully operative. With the 

system fully operative, the following 

apply: 

(1) Limit loads must be derived in all 

normal operating configurations of the 

system from all the limit conditions 

specified in subpart C of this part (or 

used in lieu of those specified in 

subpart C of this part), taking into 

account any special behavior of such a 

system or associated functions or any 

effect on the structural performance of 

the rotorcraft that may occur up to the 

limit loads. In particular, any significant 

nonlinearity (rate of displacement of 

control surface, thresholds, or any other 

system nonlinearities) must be 

accounted for in a realistic or 

conservative way when deriving limit 

loads from limit conditions. 

(2) The rotorcraft must meet the 

strength requirements of part 27 (static 

strength, residual strength), using the 

specified factors to derive ultimate loads 

from the limit loads defined above. The 

effect of nonlinearities must be 

investigated beyond limit conditions to 

ensure the behavior of the system 

presents no anomaly compared to the 

behavior below limit conditions. 

However, conditions beyond limit 

conditions need not be considered when 

it can be shown that the rotorcraft has 

design features that will not allow it to 

exceed those limit conditions. 

(3) The rotorcraft must meet the 

flutter requirements of § 27.629. 

(c) System in the failure condition. 

For any system failure condition not 

shown to be extremely improbable, the 

following apply: 

(1) At the time of occurrence. Starting 

from 1-g level flight conditions, a 

realistic scenario, including pilot 

corrective actions, must be established 

to determine the loads occurring at the 

time of failure and immediately after the 

failure. 

(i) For static strength substantiation, 

these loads multiplied by an appropriate 

factor of safety that is related to the 

probability of occurrence of the failure, 

are ultimate loads to be considered for 

design. The factor of safety is defined in 

figure 1. 

(ii) For residual strength 

substantiation, the rotorcraft must be 

able to withstand two thirds of the 

ultimate loads defined in paragraph 

(c)(1)(i) of these special conditions. 

(iii) Freedom from flutter and 

divergence must be shown under any 

condition of operation including: 

(A) Airspeeds up to 1.11 VNE (power 

on and power off). 

(B) Main rotor speeds from 0.95 × the 

minimum permitted speed up to 1.05 × 

the maximum permitted speed (power 

on and power off). 

(C) The critical combinations of 

weight, center of gravity position, load 

factor, altitude, speed, and power 

condition. 


khammond on DSK9W7S144PROD with RULESER13DE24.078</GPH>
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 240 / Friday, December 13, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 100733 

(iv) For failure conditions that result 

in excursions beyond operating 

limitations, freedom from flutter and 

divergence must be shown to increased 

speeds, so that the margins intended by 

paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of these special 

conditions are maintained. 

(v) Failures of the system that result 

in forced structural vibrations 

(oscillatory failures) must not produce 

loads that could result in detrimental 

deformation of primary structure. 

(2) For the continuation of the flight. 

For the rotorcraft in the system failed 

state, and considering any appropriate 

reconfiguration and flight limitations, 

the following apply: 

(i) The loads derived from the 

following conditions (or used in lieu of 

the following conditions) at speeds up 

to VNE (power on and power off) (or the 

speed limitation prescribed for the 

remainder of the flight) and at the 

minimum and maximum main rotor 

speeds (if applicable) must be 

determined: 

(A) The limit symmetrical 

maneuvering conditions specified in 

§§ 27.337 and 27.339; 

(B) The limit gust conditions specified 

in § 27.341; 

(C) The limit yaw maneuvering 

conditions specified in § 27.351; 

(D) The limit unsymmetrical 

conditions specified in § 27.427; and 

(E) The limit ground loading 

conditions specified in § 27.473. 

(ii) For static strength substantiation, 

each part of the structure must be able 

to withstand the loads in paragraph 

(c)(2)(i) of these special conditions 

multiplied by a factor of safety 

depending on the probability of being in 

this failure state. The factor of safety is 

defined in figure 2. 

Qj = (Tj)(Pj) 

where: 

Qj = Probability of being in failure condition 

j 

Tj = Average time spent in failure condition 

j (in hours) 

Pj = Probability of occurrence of failure mode 

j (per hour) 

Note: If Pj is greater than 10¥3 per flight 

hour, then a 1.5 factor of safety must be 

applied to all limit load conditions specified 

in subpart C. 

(iii) For residual strength 

substantiation, the rotorcraft must be 

able to withstand two thirds of the 

ultimate loads defined in paragraph 

(c)(2)(ii) of these special conditions. 

(iv) If the loads induced by the failure 

condition have a significant effect on 

fatigue or damage tolerance, then their 

effects must be taken into account. 

(v) Freedom from flutter and 

divergence must also be shown up to 

1.11 VNE (power on and power off), 

including any probable system failure 

condition combined with any damage 

required or selected for investigation by 

either § 27.571(e) or § 27.573(d). 

(3) Consideration of certain failure 

conditions may be required by other 

sections of 14 CFR part 27 regardless of 

calculated system reliability. Where 

analysis shows the probability of these 

failure conditions to be extremely 

improbable, criteria other than those 

specified in this paragraph may be used 

for structural substantiation to show 

continued safe flight and landing. 

(d) Failure indications. For system 

failure detection and indication, the 

following apply: 

(1) The system must be checked for 

failure conditions, not shown to be 

extremely improbable, that degrade the 

structural capability below the level 

required by part 27 or that significantly 

reduce the reliability of the remaining 

operational portion of the system. As far 

as reasonably practicable, the flight 

crew must be made aware of these 

failures before flight. Certain elements 

of the control system, such as 

mechanical and hydraulic components, 

may use special periodic inspections, 

and electronic components may use 

daily checks, in lieu of detection and 

indication systems to achieve the 

objective of this requirement. These 

other means of detecting failures before 

flight are considered certification 

maintenance requirements and must be 

limited to components that are not 

readily detectable by normal detection 

and indication systems, and where 

service history shows that inspections 

will provide an adequate level of safety. 

(2) The existence of any failure 

condition, not shown to be extremely 

improbable, during flight that could 

significantly affect the structural 

capability of the rotorcraft and for 

which the associated reduction in 

airworthiness can be minimized by 

suitable flight limitations, must be 

signaled to the flight crew. For example, 

failure conditions that result in a factor 

of safety between the rotorcraft strength 

and the loads of subpart C of this part, 

below 1.25, or flutter and divergence 

margins below 1.11 VNE (power on and 


khammond on DSK9W7S144PROD with RULESER13DE24.079</GPH>
100734 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 240 / Friday, December 13, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

power off), must be signaled to the crew 

during flight. 

(e) Dispatch with known failure 

conditions. If the rotorcraft is to be 

dispatched in a known system failure 

condition that affects structural 

performance, or that affects the 

reliability of the remaining operational 

portion of the system to maintain 

structural performance, then the 

provisions of these special conditions 

must be met, including the provisions of 

paragraph (b) of these special conditions 

for the dispatched condition and 

paragraph (c) of these special conditions 

for subsequent failures. Expected 

operational limitations may be taken 

into account in establishing Pj as the 

probability of failure occurrence for 

determining the safety margin in figure 

1. Flight limitations and expected 

operational limitations may be taken 

into account in establishing Qj as the 

combined probability of being in the 

dispatched failure condition and the 

subsequent failure condition for the 

safety margins in figure 2. These 

limitations must be such that the 

probability of being in this combined 

failure state and then subsequently 

encountering limit load conditions is 

extremely improbable. No reduction in 

these safety margins is allowed if the 

subsequent system failure rate is greater 

than 10¥3 per flight hour. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

November 21, 2024. 

Patrick R. Mullen, 

Manager, Technical Policy Branch, Policy and 

Standards Division, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2024–27713 Filed 12–12–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2024–2553; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2024–00674–T; Amendment 

39–22908; AD 2024–25–06] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Airbus SAS Model A318 series 

airplanes; Model A319–111, –112, –113, 

–114, –115, –131, –132, –133, –151N, 

–153N, and –171N airplanes; Model 

A320 series airplanes; and Model A321 

series airplanes. This AD was prompted 

by reports of jamming of, or inability to 

open, the main landing gear (MLG) door 

during maintenance operations. This 

AD requires repetitive inspection of the 

MLG doors, and, depending on findings, 

accomplishment of applicable corrective 

actions, and prohibits the installation of 

affected parts as specified in a European 

Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 

AD, which is incorporated by reference. 

The FAA is issuing this AD to address 

the unsafe condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective December 

30, 2024. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of December 30, 2024. 

The FAA must receive comments on 

this AD by January 27, 2025. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

regulations.gov. Follow the instructions 

for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

AD Docket: You may examine the AD 

docket at regulations.gov under Docket 

No. FAA–2024–2553; or in person at 

Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this final rule, the mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information 

(MCAI), any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

Docket Operations is listed above. 

Material Incorporated by Reference: 

• For EASA material identified in this 

AD, contact EASA, Konrad-AdenauerUfer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; 

telephone +49 221 8999 000; email 

ADs@easa.europa.eu; website 

easa.europa.eu. You may find this 

material on the EASA website at 

ad.easa.europa.eu. 

• You may view this material at the 

FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 

216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. 

It is also available at regulations.gov 

under Docket No. FAA–2024–2553. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Timothy P. Dowling, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, 

Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; 

telephone 206–231–3667; email 

timothy.p.dowling@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites you to send any 

written data, views, or arguments about 

this final rule. Send your comments to 

an address listed under the ADDRESSES

section. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA– 

2024–2553; Project Identifier MCAI– 

2024–00674–T’’ at the beginning of your 

comments. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the final 

rule, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. The FAA will consider 

all comments received by the closing 

date and may amend this final rule 

because of those comments. 

Except for Confidential Business 

Information (CBI) as described in the 

following paragraph, and other 

information as described in 14 CFR 

11.35, the FAA will post all comments 

received, without change, to 

regulations.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. The agency 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact received 

about this final rule. 

Confidential Business Information 

CBI is commercial or financial 

information that is both customarily and 

actually treated as private by its owner. 

Under the Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt 

from public disclosure. If your 

comments responsive to this AD contain 

commercial or financial information 

that is customarily treated as private, 

that you actually treat as private, and 

that is relevant or responsive to this AD, 

it is important that you clearly designate 

the submitted comments as CBI. Please 

mark each page of your submission 

containing CBI as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA 

will treat such marked submissions as 

confidential under the FOIA, and they 

will not be placed in the public docket 

of this AD. Submissions containing CBI 

should be sent to Timothy P. Dowling, 

Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 

Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, 

NY 11590; telephone 206–231–3667; 

email timothy.p.dowling@faa.gov. Any 

commentary that the FAA receives 

which is not specifically designated as 

CBI will be placed in the public docket 

for this rulemaking. 

Background 

EASA, which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 


khammond on DSK9W7S144PROD with RULES