No. CR-95-985

GREG HOGUE

PETITIONER

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

RESPONDENT

Opinion Delivered April 13, 2017

PRO SE SECOND PETITION TO REINVEST 

JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL COURT TO 

CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

ERROR CORAM NOBIS AND TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS

[PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. 60CR-94-

904]

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

A jury found petitioner Greg Hogue guilty of capital murder in the death of Jess 

Brown for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. This court 

affirmed the judgment. Hogue v. State, 323 Ark. 515, 915 S.W.2d 276 (1996). On 

January 19, 2017, Hogue filed his second petition requesting this court to reinvest 

jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis.

1 

The petition for leave to proceed in the trial court is necessary because the trial 

court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram nobis after a judgment has been 

affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539, 

354 S.W.3d 61. A writ of error coram nobis is an extraordinarily rare remedy. State 

v. Larimore, 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000). Coram nobis proceedings are

1For clerical purposes, the motion was assigned the same docket number as the 

direct appeal. 

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.

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attended by a strong presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Id. The 

function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there existed 

some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial 

court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought 

forward before rendition of the judgment. Newman, 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. 

The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic 

to the record. Roberts v. State, 2013 Ark. 56, 425 S.W.3d 771. 

The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and 

to address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is 

available for addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) 

insanity at the time of trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld 

by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-party confession to the crime during the time 

between conviction and appeal. Howard v. State, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38. 

Hogue seeks leave to proceed in the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis 

for a second time, contending the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by 

failing to disclose an intimate relationship between the prosecutor and the circuit

judge.

2 Specifically, he contends that the failure of the prosecutor and the circuit

 

2When a petitioner files a successive application for coram nobis relief in this 

court, it is an abuse of the writ to argue the same claims that have been addressed if 

the petitioner does not allege new facts that are sufficient to distinguish his latest 

claims from the prior claims. Wallace v. State, 2016 Ark. 400, at 11, 503 S.W.3d 754, 

760 (per curiam). Hogue’s second application is not an abuse of the writ as he raises 

wholly new claims. See Hogue v. State, 2011 Ark. 496 (per curiam) (Hogue requested 

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judge to disclose the “exculpatory evidence” of their relationship violated his 

constitutional rights and that the outcome of the trial would have been different 

because the circuit judge favored the prosecutor during the entire trial court 

proceedings by denying multiple defense motions and objections; the circuit judge 

allowed extra preemptory strikes in favor of the prosecution; and the defense could 

have filed a motion to have the circuit judge recuse himself from the case. Hogue also 

argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose that 

the prosecutor was in an intimate relationship with the circuit judge when Hogue 

filed his Rule 37.1 petition.3 

A Brady violation is established when material evidence favorable to the 

defense is wrongfully withheld by the State. Pitts v. State, 336 Ark. 580, 986 S.W.2d 

407 (1999) (per curiam). In Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), the Supreme 

Court revisited Brady and declared that when the petitioner contends that material 

evidence was not disclosed to the defense, the petitioner must show that “there is a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 

 

the writ claiming Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violations involving five 

specific documents.). 

3To the extent Hogue attempts to utilize the petition to reinvest to seek relief 

from any error in his Rule 37 proceedings, the attempt fails because the function of 

the writ is to secure relief from the judgment while there existed some fact that would 

have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial court and which, through 

no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of 

the judgment. See Newman, 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. 

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of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280 (quoting 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 

In Strickler, the Court also set out the three elements of a true Brady violation: 

(1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed 

by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued. 

Strickler, 527 U.S. 263; see Howard, 2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38.

Hogue’s claims are conclusory in nature and fail to establish that there was 

error. Noble v. State, 2016 Ark. 463, 505 S.W.3d 687 (per curiam). In order to carry 

his burden to show that the writ is warranted, a petitioner must demonstrate that the 

State had specific evidence that would have been sufficient to prevent rendition of the 

judgment. Id. Hogue contends that the prosecutor and the circuit judge were in an 

intimate relationship during the time of his trial yet he fails to demonstrate how that

relationship even qualifies as evidence and, if considered as evidence, whether that 

evidence is material, much less, exculpatory. Moreover, the court is not required to 

accept at face value the allegations of the petition. Chatmon v. State, 2015 Ark. 417,

at 2, 473 S.W.3d 542, 544 (per curiam). Hogue’s allegations are conclusory, and he 

offers no factual substantiation that any specific, particular evidence was hidden from 

the defense at the time of trial, nor does he identify any specific motions or rulings 

that favored the prosecution or a specific extra preemptory strike and how the 

outcome of the trial would have been different had any particular evidence been 

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disclosed. Evans v. State, 2016 Ark. 377, at 5, 501 S.W.3d 819, 822–23 (per curiam). 

Hogue fails to establish a Brady violation or to point to any prejudice that may have 

ensued, which would warrant granting the petition. 

Hogue fails to raise a claim that falls within the purview of a coram nobis 

proceeding because the error he claims is not an error found in one of the four abovereferenced categories of error, i.e., insanity at the time of trial, a coerced guilty plea, 

material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or a third-party confession.4 Howard, 

2012 Ark. 177, 403 S.W.3d 38. None of the claims raised by Hogue demonstrate that 

there was some fundamental error at trial or that there existed some fact that would 

have prevented rendition of the judgment if it had been known to the trial court and 

which, through no negligence or fault of his own, was not brought forward before 

rendition of judgment.5 Newman, 2009 Ark. 539, 354 S.W.3d 61. 

Petition denied. 

4Although the four categories are not set in stone, the remedy of coram nobis 

remains an extraordinary remedy. See Strawhacker v. State, 2016 Ark. 348, 500 

S.W.3d 716.

5Hogue fails to make any allegation of judicial bias because he stated a claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct for the State’s failure to disclose the alleged relationship. 

Even had Hogue alluded to a claim of judicial bias, to state a ground for the writ on 

that basis, a petitioner must show that there was a reasonable probability that he 

would not have been convicted if an unbiased judge had served, and an allegation of 

the mere appearance of impropriety is not sufficient. Chatmon, 2015 Ark. 417, at 3, 

473 S.W.3d at 545. Hogue did not make any argument or showing of fundamental 

error to support relief because he failed to demonstrate any actual bias with his 

conclusory claims. Id. 

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HART, J. dissents.

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from this 

court’s denial of Greg Hogue’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. Hogue contends that 

the deputy prosecutor who prosecuted him and the circuit judge who presided over his trial 

were in an intimate relationship during the time of his trial. Contrary to the majority’s 

conclusion, Hogue has raised not only a claim of prosecutorial misconduct but also a claim 

of judicial bias, which we have recently held falls within the purview of an error coram 

nobis proceeding. McArthur v. State, 2017 Ark. 120 (per curiam). By engaging in a narrow, 

cramped reading of Hogue’s petition, the court essentially treats two judicial bias claims 

differently, even though both were raised in error coram nobis proceedings. Moreover, 

Hogue’s claim that he was tried by a circuit judge who was in an intimate relationship with 

the deputy prosecutor is a claim of actual bias, which is a fundamental error.1 Chatmon v. 

State, 2015 Ark. 417, at 3, 473 S.W.3d 542, 545 (per curiam) (stating that a petitioner does 

not make the necessary showing of fundamental error to support relief when there is no

demonstration of actual bias). I would consider the merits of Hogue’s judicial bias claim.

 

1 This court has discussed this relationship in other cases. See Lee v. State, 343 Ark. 

702, 38 S.W.3d 334 (2001), mandate recalled, Lee v. State, 367 Ark. 84, 238 S.W.3d 52 (2006).

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