COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA159 

Court of Appeals Nos. 14CA1435 & 14CA1436 

Pueblo County District Court Nos. 12CR222 & 12CR27 

Honorable William David Alexander, Judge 

The People of the State of Colorado, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

Valerie Christine Harris, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED 

Division II 

Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS 

Dailey and Furman, JJ., concur 

Announced November 3, 2016 

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Darol C. Biddle, Pueblo, Colorado; Darrel L. Campbell, Westminster, Colorado, 

for Defendant-Appellant
1 

¶ 1 Valerie Christine Harris was convicted of twenty-two counts of 

cruelty to animals after dozens of malnourished animals were 

discovered on her property by employees of the Humane Society 

acting as state animal protection agents. 

¶ 2 Her appeal raises two novel issues of statutory construction: 

first, we consider whether, under section 35-42-107(7), C.R.S. 

2016, an animal protection agent who is an employee of the 

Humane Society is authorized to obtain a search warrant to 

investigate the suspected mistreatment of horses. We conclude that 

the agent exceeded her statutory authority but determine that 

suppression of the evidence seized in executing the warrant is not 

required. 

¶ 3 Second, we consider the proper unit of prosecution in an 

animal cruelty case. Harris contends that her mistreatment of the 

twenty-two animals constituted one continuous course of conduct, 

and the district court’s entry of judgment on twenty-two counts 

therefore violated her rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. We 

conclude, however, that under section 18-9-202, C.R.S. 2016, 

cruelty to each identified animal victim constitutes a separate and 

distinct offense. 
2 

¶ 4 Harris raises a number of other claims, which we address in 

turn and reject. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I. Background 

¶ 5 In December 2011, Harris’s neighbor called animal control to 

report a dead horse near the fence line of his property with Harris. 

Animal protection agent Sergeant Stephanie Garcia and a fellow 

officer, employees of the nonprofit corporation Humane Society of 

the Pikes Peak Region, responded to the call and discovered that 

the dead horse was visibly emaciated. Using binoculars, the agents 

observed additional horses, a donkey, and a llama on Harris’s 

property, all of which also appeared malnourished. 

¶ 6 Based on the condition of the animals, Sergeant Garcia sought 

a search warrant (the horse warrant) for Harris’s ranch to 

investigate possible animal cruelty. During the search, conducted 

on January 6, the animal protection agents and accompanying law 

enforcement officers discovered a recently deceased donkey that, 

like the previously discovered deceased horse, appeared drastically 

underfed. About one-third of the horses on the property similarly 

showed signs of starvation. 
3 

¶ 7 The officers also discovered a number of dogs showing signs of 

neglect: many of them appeared severely malnourished, and they 

did not appear to have adequate care or shelter. However, the 

horse warrant only allowed the agents to search for and seize 

abused livestock. Based on her observations of the dogs, Sergeant 

Garcia obtained a second warrant (the dog warrant) to search for 

and seize mistreated domestic dogs, which was executed that same 

day. 

¶ 8 Harris was charged with fifteen counts of cruelty to animals 

(second offense)1 and two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals 

for needlessly killing an animal (case 12CR27). 

¶ 9 Approximately three weeks later, on January 27, the same 

neighbor who had made the initial report informed animal control 

that three dead horses had been dragged onto his property. The 

neighbor later observed Harris and her brother attempting to drag 

the horses back onto her property. Sergeant Garcia responded to 

the call and, after observing the three dead horses, contacted 

 

1 She was originally charged with seventeen counts of cruelty to 

animals, but two counts were dismissed before trial. 
4 

Harris. With Harris’s permission, Sergeant Garcia entered onto her 

property and discovered two additional dead horses. 

¶ 10 Harris was charged in a separate case with five counts of 

aggravated cruelty to animals for needlessly killing the five horses 

(case 12CR222). The two cases were later consolidated for trial. 

¶ 11 At trial, the prosecution presented multiple witnesses, 

including an expert in veterinary medicine, who were on the 

property during the search. All of these witnesses testified that the 

animals at issue in the case appeared severely malnourished and 

that there was no evidence of food on the property. To demonstrate 

this fact, the prosecution submitted numerous pictures depicting 

the visibly emaciated animals. 

¶ 12 Harris’s theory of defense was that the horses were 

malnourished due to excess sulfates in the water. She insisted that 

she was regularly feeding her horses and justified the absence of 

any food on the ranch by explaining that she procured hay from a 

neighbor on a daily basis. In support of this defense, Harris 

presented evidence that a test had revealed high sulfate levels in 

her well water, and an expert witness who opined that this level of 

sulfates in the water could cause horses to be malnourished. 
5 

¶ 13 The jury convicted Harris on all counts. In a bifurcated 

proceeding, the court determined that the fifteen animal cruelty 

convictions counted as a second offense due to Harris’s prior 

misdemeanor convictions for animal cruelty in 2007. The court 

sentenced Harris to concurrent ten-year terms of probation for all 

counts of conviction in case 12CR27. On the five aggravated animal 

cruelty counts in case 12CR222, the court sentenced Harris to 

three years in the custody of the Department of Corrections, to run 

concurrently to each other and to her sentences in 12CR27. 

II. The Search Warrants 

¶ 14 In the district court, Harris moved to suppress all evidence 

obtained from the search on the grounds that the animal protection 

agents were not statutorily authorized to obtain a livestock warrant 

and that both warrants lacked probable cause. She renews that 

argument on appeal. 

¶ 15 We agree that the animal protection agent exceeded her 

statutory authority in procuring the horse warrant. However, we 

reject Harris’s argument that the warrants were otherwise deficient 

because they were not supported by probable cause. Based in part 

on this latter determination, we conclude that the statutory 
6 

violation does not implicate constitutional concerns and, therefore, 

does not require suppression of any evidence obtained from the 

search. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion 

to suppress. See People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 

2006) (we may affirm the district court on any grounds supported 

by the record). 

A. Authority to Obtain the Horse Warrant 

¶ 16 Harris contends that, although Sergeant Garcia is a peace 

officer under the Animal Protection Act, because she is an employee 

of a nonprofit organization, she was not statutorily authorized to 

investigate cases of cruelty to livestock. 

¶ 17 The People respond that Harris raised this issue for the first 

time on appeal, but our review of the record establishes that 

Harris’s counsel argued the issue at the hearing on the motion to 

suppress evidence.2 Accordingly, the claim of error is preserved. 

 

2 Defense counsel stated: 

And there’s no response by the People denying 

the limitations that are set out in the Animal 

Protections Act, 35-42-107, Paragraph 7, 

where it says, ‘Agents authorized to investigate 

cases of livestock shall be employees of 
7 

¶ 18 Ordinarily, in reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress evidence, we are presented with a mixed question of fact 

and law and apply a dual standard of review, deferring to the 

factual findings and reviewing legal conclusions de novo. People v. 

Vaughn, 2014 CO 71, ¶ 9. Here, Harris’s contention raises an issue 

of statutory construction, and thus we review her claim de novo. 

People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 16, ¶ 9. 

¶ 19 Our primary duty in interpreting statutes is to give full effect 

to the intent of the General Assembly. Ryan Ranch Cmty. Ass’n v. 

Kelley, 2014 COA 37M, ¶ 39, aff’d, 2016 CO 65. To determine 

legislative intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute. 

State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 500 (Colo. 2000). When the language 

of a statute is clear, we apply the statute as written. Id.

¶ 20 Under section 35-42-107, the Colorado Commissioner of 

Agriculture may appoint animal protection agents, who are 

designated as peace officers. These agents may be employees of the 

state, nonprofit corporations, municipal corporations, counties, 

 

division of agriculture, the brand inspector, 

and the sheriffs.’ We don’t have that here. 
8 

cities, cities and counties, or any other local governmental entity or 

political subdivision of the state. § 35-42-107(2). 

¶ 21 Harris does not dispute that Sergeant Garcia was properly 

commissioned as an animal protection agent even though she was 

an employee of the Humane Society, a private nonprofit 

organization. She contends, though, that under section 

35-42-107(7), only state employees may investigate livestock cases. 

¶ 22 Subsection 107(7) specifies that “[a]gents authorized to 

investigate cases involving livestock shall be employees of the 

division or the division of brand inspection of the department or any 

sheriffs when appointed and within their jurisdiction.” In 

construing this provision, we must look first to the plain language 

of the statute, Nieto, 993 P.2d at 500, which indicates that agents 

who investigate livestock cases “shall” be specifically designated 

public officials. “It is axiomatic that the term ‘shall’ is usually 

interpreted to make the provision in which it is contained 

mandatory.” Estate of Guido v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 COA 48, ¶ 25; 

see also Hillebrand Constr. Co. v. Worf, 780 P.2d 24, 25 (Colo. App. 

1989) (the term “shall” connotes a mandatory requirement). Thus, 

under the plain language of the statute, the provision restricts the 
9 

investigation of livestock cases to employees of the Division of 

Agriculture, brand inspectors, and sheriffs. 

¶ 23 This interpretation of the provision’s plain language comports 

with other standards applicable to investigations involving livestock. 

Because livestock generally have greater economic value than 

companion animals, the article provides certain protections for 

owners of livestock. For example, livestock cannot, under any 

circumstances, be seized without a court order. Compare 

§ 35-42-109(2)(b), C.R.S. 2016 (livestock may only be seized 

pursuant to a court order, even when the animal’s life or health is 

endangered), with § 35-42-109(2)(a) (companion animals may be 

seized whenever the animal’s life or health is endangered). 

¶ 24 Our interpretation insures that owners of livestock have a 

broader remedy against agents who commit negligence or 

misconduct. The state may disclaim liability for the conduct of 

animal protection agents employed by nonprofit organizations, see

§ 35-42-107(3), but it is liable for the conduct of the designated 

public officials. We believe the legislature’s mandate that animal 

protection agents who seize livestock shall be employees indicates 
10 

an intent that the state be accountable for the misdeeds of agents 

entrusted with livestock investigations. 

¶ 25 The People insist that section 34-42-107(7) does not limit the 

animal protection agents who are authorized to investigate 

livestock; rather, it confers employment status on those agents. 

But they offer no support for this novel interpretation, and this 

construction does not comport with the plain language of the 

statute or its purpose. See Tatum v. Basin Res., Inc., 141 P.3d 863, 

871 (Colo. App. 2005) (“Courts may not interpolate into a statute 

words that it does not contain, or extract a meaning which is not 

expressed by it.”). Accordingly, we reject this reading of the statute. 

¶ 26 Thus, because Sergeant Garcia is an employee of a nonprofit 

corporation, she was not authorized to investigate livestock cases. 

And the People do not dispute that the horses at issue are livestock. 

Therefore, we conclude that Sergeant Garcia was not authorized to 

investigate Harris’s suspected mistreatment of the horses or to 

obtain the horse warrant. 

B. Remedy for the Statutory Violation 

¶ 27 Next, we must decide the appropriate remedy for this violation. 

Both parties assume that, if Sergeant Garcia had no authority to 
11 

obtain the horse warrant, the search necessarily violated Harris’s 

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 

seizures. On this basis, Harris contends that the exclusionary rule 

applies, and thus the evidence obtained during the search should 

have been suppressed. The People maintain that the evidence was 

properly admitted under the “good faith exception” to the 

exclusionary rule, as codified in section 16-3-308(1), C.R.S. 2016. 

We reject both contentions. 

¶ 28 We conclude that, although Sergeant Garcia was not 

authorized to obtain the horse warrant, the statutory violation did 

not amount to a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the 

exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence was properly 

admitted at trial. 

¶ 29 “[T]he exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine whose 

sole purpose is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations.” 

People v. Marko, 2015 COA 139, ¶ 150. Violations of statutory 

provisions, though, are not per se violations of the Fourth 

Amendment. People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152, 156 (Colo. 1983). 

Thus, before employing the exclusionary rule as a remedy, we must 

determine whether there was a constitutional violation, rather than 
12 

a mere statutory violation. See People v. Bowers, 716 P.2d 471, 473 

(Colo. 1986) (“[S]uppression of evidence is a drastic remedy and is 

generally confined to violations of constitutional rights.”); People v. 

Casillas, 2015 COA 15, ¶ 19 (“A statutory violation does not 

ordinarily trigger suppression of evidence because suppression ‘is 

designed to effectuate guarantees against deprivation of 

constitutional rights.’” (quoting People v. McKinstry, 843 P.2d 18, 20 

(Colo. 1993))) (cert. granted May 16, 2016). 

¶ 30 Harris contends, or rather assumes, that the horse warrant 

was constitutionally deficient because Sergeant Garcia was not 

authorized to obtain it. But to be valid under both the United 

States and Colorado Constitutions, a warrant must meet three 

requirements: (1) it must have been issued by a neutral, 

disinterested magistrate; (2) those seeking the warrant must have 

demonstrated to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that 

the evidence sought would aid in a particular apprehension or 

conviction for a particular offense; and (3) the warrant must 

particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to 

be searched. People v. Pacheco, 175 P.3d 91, 94 (Colo. 2006); 
13 

Marko, ¶¶ 145-46; see also Bowling v. Rector, 584 F.3d 956, 969 

(10th Cir. 2009). 

¶ 31 Based on these requirements, Sergeant Garcia’s acting beyond 

her statutory authority when she obtained the horse warrant has 

no bearing on the constitutionality of the warrant and related 

search. See Bowling, 584 F.3d at 968 (warrant was constitutional 

even though officer acted beyond his statutory authority when he 

applied for it); United States v. Freeman, 897 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 

1990) (A limited-authority officer’s conduct in excess of his 

statutory jurisdiction is an example of “procedural violations which 

do not implicate the constitutional values of probable cause or 

description with particularity of the place to be searched and items 

to be seized.”). Whether or not she exceeded her statutory authority 

is simply unrelated to the core constitutional concerns of a neutral 

magistrate, probable cause, and particularity. Indeed, this 

statutory violation “is not, without more, significantly relevant to 

our Fourth Amendment analysis.” Bowling, 584 F.3d at 967. 

¶ 32 Accordingly, if the horse warrant procured by Sergeant Garcia, 

although obtained in excess of her statutory authority, meets the 

three requirements of a neutral magistrate, probable cause, and 
14 

particularity, there is no constitutional violation. While Harris does 

not contest that the first and third requirements were met, she does 

contend that the warrants were not supported by probable cause. 

¶ 33 An affidavit establishes probable cause if the affidavit contains 

“sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe 

that contraband or evidence of criminal activity is located at the 

place to be searched.” People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1112 (Colo. 

2003). In determining whether probable cause exists, a judge must 

look to the totality of the circumstances and make a “practical, 

commonsense decision” as to whether there is a fair probability that 

a search will reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. People v. 

Scott, 227 P.3d 894, 897 (Colo. 2010) (quoting Pacheco, 175 P.3d at 

94). A court reviewing the validity of a search warrant does not 

engage in de novo review but rather examines whether the 

magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable 

cause existed. Pacheco, 175 P.3d at 94. 

¶ 34 Here, probable cause clearly existed for the horse warrant.3 

The warrant affidavit stated that the affiant observed on Harris’s 

 

3 Harris contends that this warrant stemmed from an illegal search 

on December 31, when the officers used binoculars to look into her 
15 

property several horses that appeared underfed because they had 

visible spines and pin bones, and a deceased horse that appeared 

malnourished because his “[r]ibs, spine, withers, loin, [and] pin 

bones are all visible.” The affiant further stated that, as a trained 

animal protection officer, these observations led her to believe that 

the animals were not being provided with adequate sustenance. 

She also noted that Harris had previously been convicted of animal 

cruelty for neglecting livestock and domestic animals, and that 

there is “a long history of animal neglect” on this property, 

supporting the inference that the observed malnourished horses 

were not merely sick or old. Cf. People v. Bustam, 641 P.2d 968, 

971-72 (Colo. 1982) (knowledge of prior criminal record, in addition 

to other facts, supported probable cause for warrant on new 

instance of the same crime). 

¶ 35 Given that the crime of animal cruelty can be established by 

demonstrating that defendant’s animals were not provided sufficient 

sustenance and care, these facts provide a substantial basis for the 

 

pastures from a neighboring property. However, this action was not 

a search under the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Oynes, 920 

P.2d 880, 883 (Colo. App. 1996) (officers did not conduct a search 

by looking into the defendant’s brightly lit home while standing in 

an open field using binoculars). 
16 

judge to have found probable cause that the crime of animal cruelty 

was occurring on the property. Accordingly, the horse warrant was 

constitutionally sufficient.4

¶ 36 In the absence of a constitutional violation, suppression of 

evidence is the appropriate remedy only if the statutory violation 

was “willful and recurrent.” People v. Lancaster, 2015 COA 93, 

¶ 22. The record does not support a conclusion that this violation 

was willful and recurrent. People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213, 218 (Colo. 

1981). 

III. Unit of Prosecution in Animal Cruelty Cases 

¶ 37 Harris was convicted of fifteen counts of animal cruelty 

(second offense) and seven counts of aggravated animal cruelty. 

She contends that the court violated section 18-1-408(1)(e), C.R.S. 

2016, and double jeopardy principles by entering judgment and 

imposing sentence on each count of conviction for what amounted 

to a single course of conduct. We review these questions of law de 

 

4 We also reject Harris’s contention that the dog warrant lacked 

probable cause. The affidavit detailed the poor conditions in which 

the dogs were found, including the lack of adequate food, shelter, 

and water; that they were thin; and “[o]ne dog that was emaciated 

was observed eating the carcass of [a] dead donkey.” 
17 

novo. See People v. Reed, 2013 COA 113, ¶ 69 (we review district 

court’s interpretation of sentencing statutes de novo); People v. 

Arzabala, 2012 COA 99, ¶ 19 (de novo review applies to double 

jeopardy claims). 

¶ 38 Under section 18-1-408 — entitled “Prosecution of multiple 

counts for same act” — a defendant cannot be convicted of more 

than one offense if “[t]he offense is defined as a continuing course of 

conduct and the defendant’s course of conduct was uninterrupted, 

unless the law provides that specific periods or instances of such 

conduct constitute separate offenses.” § 18-1-408(1)(e). 

¶ 39 The statute is designed to prevent the problem of “multiplicity” 

— the charging of multiple counts and the imposition of multiple 

punishments for the same criminal conduct. People v. Borghesi, 66 

P.3d 93, 98 (Colo. 2003). The vice of multiplicity is that it may lead 

to multiple sentences for the same offense and thereby implicate 

double jeopardy protections. Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209, 214 

(Colo. 2005). 

¶ 40 If a defendant is simultaneously prosecuted for distinct 

offenses under the same statute, as Harris was here, to determine 

whether the defendant’s rights against double jeopardy were 
18 

violated, a reviewing court must resolve (1) whether the unit of 

prosecution prescribed by the legislature permits the charging of 

multiple offenses and (2) whether the evidence in support of each 

offense justified the charging of multiple offenses and the 

imposition of multiple sentences. See Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 

585, 590 (Colo. 2005); Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215. 

¶ 41 “Unit of prosecution” refers to the extent to which the relevant 

statute permits the prosecution to separate the defendant’s conduct 

into discrete acts for purposes of prosecuting multiple offenses. 

Quintano, 105 P.3d at 590. The determination of the proper unit of 

prosecution in this case turns on whether we construe the statute 

as designed primarily to protect property interests or primarily to 

protect the animals themselves. 

¶ 42 If we view animal cruelty as primarily an offense against 

property, then Harris committed a single offense by injuring or 

destroying the animals, much like the defendant who commits a 

single offense by destroying various items of personal property of 

another. See, e.g., People v. Feldscher, 380 N.W.2d 50, 51-52 (Mich. 

Ct. App. 1985) (unit of prosecution in destruction of property case 

was single incident of destroying property of another person, 
19 

regardless of how many items of property were destroyed); see also 

People v. Harris, 139 Cal. Rptr. 778, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) 

(defendants charged with receiving various stolen items could be 

convicted only of one count of receipt of stolen property). But if we 

view animal cruelty as an offense against a sentient being that the 

legislature is trying to protect from needless pain and suffering, 

Harris committed twenty-two separate offenses. See Borghesi, 66 

P.3d at 98 (armed robbery statute is designed primarily to protect 

people, not property, and therefore each victim supported a 

separate count of armed robbery). 

¶ 43 To determine the unit of prosecution, we look to the statute. 

Arzabala, ¶ 23. As already explained, in construing a statute, we 

must discern and effectuate the intent of the legislature based 

primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory 

language. Id.

¶ 44 The plain language of section 18-9-202 suggests that the unit 

of prosecution is “an animal.” As relevant here, a person commits 

animal cruelty if he or she “mistreats or neglects any animal . . . or, 

having the charge or custody of any animal, fails to provide it with 

proper food, drink, or protection from the weather consistent with 
20 

the species, breed, and type of animal involved.” § 18-9-202(1)(a). 

And, under subsection (1)(b) a person commits aggravated cruelty 

to animals if he or she “knowingly tortures, needlessly mutilates, or 

needlessly kills an animal.” The phrases “any animal” and “an 

animal” suggest that a person commits a separate offense for each 

animal that is mistreated or neglected, deprived of adequate 

sustenance, or killed. See Borghesi, 66 P.3d at 98 (robbery 

statute’s reference to a singular victim suggests that the legislature 

intended to create a separate offense for each person against whom 

the defendant uses force and intimidation). 

¶ 45 Moreover, whether conduct constitutes an offense is 

dependent upon the particular species, breed, or type of animal 

involved in the criminal act. This provision emphasizes that the 

specific mistreated animal is the subject of the offense. 

¶ 46 Importantly, in prohibiting the killing or abuse of “any” or “an” 

animal, the statute makes clear that a person can be charged with 

mistreating his own animal or a stray animal, demonstrating that 

property law principles do not underlie the statute’s purpose. And 

we note that the statutes appear in the section of criminal laws 
21 

devoted to “offenses against public peace, order, and decency” 

rather than the section involving “crimes against property.” 

¶ 47 In our view, the language of the statute demonstrates that the 

legislature perceived animal cruelty not as an offense against 

property but as an offense against the individual animal. 

¶ 48 This interpretation is consistent with the evolution of animal 

cruelty laws in the United States. Animal cruelty was not a crime 

under common law. See McCausland v. People, 58 Colo. 303, 305, 

145 P. 685, 686 (1914). Early animal cruelty laws were designed to 

protect the property interests of owners and did not restrict what an 

owner could do to his or her own animals. See David Favre, Living 

Property: A New Status for Animals Within The Legal System, 93 

Marq. L. Rev. 1021, 1027 (2010).5

¶ 49 But by the end of the nineteenth century, many states had 

enacted laws that reflected society’s acceptance of the idea that 

animals had an inherent right to be free from unnecessary pain and 

suffering and that the legal system should recognize that right. 

 

5 An 1846 Vermont law, for example, made it unlawful for a person 

to “wil[l]fully and maliciously kill, wound, maim or disfigure any 

horse, or horses, or horse kind, cattle, sheep, or swine, of another 

person.” Act of Oct. 23, 1846, no. 34, § 2, 1846 Vt. Acts & Resolves 

35 (emphasis added). 
22 

See, e.g., Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456, 456, 459 (1881) (Statute 

making it unlawful to needlessly mutilate or kill “any living 

creature” was enacted to “protect some abstract rights in all that 

animate creation . . . from the largest and noblest to the smallest 

and most insignificant.”); Stephens v. State, 3 So. 458, 458 (Miss. 

1888) (Statute making it unlawful for person to abuse certain 

animals, “whether they belong to himself or another,” is “for the 

benefit of animals, as creatures capable of feeling and suffering, and 

it was intended to protect them from cruelty, without reference to 

their being property.”).6

¶ 50 Colorado enacted such a statute in 1889; the supreme court 

determined that the law precluded members of a country club from 

trapping, then releasing and shooting, doves for their amusement. 

See Waters v. People, 23 Colo. 33, 46 P. 112 (1896). The court 

observed that animal cruelty laws had evolved as society gained a 

greater understanding of animals’ capacity for pain and suffering: 

 

6 Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 (1881), was still a sign of its times: the 

court cautioned against construing the statute to lead to absurd 

results, like punishing a person for such petty offenses as 

“impal[ing] a butterfly” or “drown[ing] a litter of kittens.” Id. at 459; 

see also State v. Pierce, 7 Ala. 728, 731 (1845) (offense against 

animals could be prosecuted as “malicious mischief” but only if it 

could be proved that the animal killed was the property of another). 
23 

¶ 51 It is of common knowledge that within the past few years, as 

incident to the progress of civilization, and as the direct outgrowth 

of that tender solicitude for the brute creation which keeps pace 

with man’s increased knowledge of their life and habits, laws, such 

as the one under consideration, have been enacted by the various 

states having the common object of protecting these dumb 

creatures from ill treatment by man. Id. at 35, 46 P. at 113.7

¶ 52 As states move away from property-law-based principles, 

many animal cruelty statutes now explicitly define the unit of 

prosecution as each animal victim. See Alaska Stat. § 11.61.140(b) 

(2016) (“Each animal that is subject to cruelty to animals . . . shall 

constitute a separate offense.”); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-62-103 (2016) 

(“[E]ach alleged act . . . of cruelty to animals committed against 

more than one . . . animal may constitute a separate offense.”); La. 

Stat. Ann. § 14:102.1(A)(3) (2016) (“[I]f more than one animal is 

subject to an act of cruel treatment . . . , each act shall constitute a 

separate offense.”); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-211(2)(c) (2016) 

 

7 The statute made it a crime for any person to “torture[], 

torment[], . . . or needlessly mutilate[] or kill[] . . . any animal.” 

Waters v. People, 23 Colo. 33, 34, 46 P. 112, 113 (1896) (quoting 

Mills’ Ann. Stat. § 104 (1891)). 
24 

(“[W]hen more than one animal is subject to cruelty to animals, 

each act may comprise a separate offense.”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 6-3-203(k) (2016) (“Each animal affected by the defendant’s 

conduct may constitute a separate count . . . under this section.”); 

see also Cal. Penal Code § 597(f) (West 2016) (“[E]ach act of 

malicious and intentional maiming, mutilating, or torturing a 

separate specimen of [endangered species or protected animal] is a 

separate offense.”); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5511(e.1) (2016) (“A person 

who violates this subsection on a second or subsequent occasion 

commits a misdemeanor of the third degree for each equine animal 

transported.”); State v. Helmbright, 990 N.E.2d 154, 164 (Ohio Ct. 

App. 2013) (rejecting property law principles and holding that 

animal cruelty statute, like domestic violence law, creates a 

chargeable offense for each “victim of a defendant’s conduct”). 

¶ 53 Based on the language and purpose of section 18-9-202, we 

join those states that have delineated the unit of prosecution in 

animal cruelty cases as each animal abused or killed. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the unit of prosecution permits the charging of 

multiple offenses. 
25 

¶ 54 Nonetheless, Harris argues that the conduct underlying her 

convictions was not a series of discrete and distinct criminal acts 

but instead a single course of conduct that resulted in the death or 

poor health of a number of animals. In light of our conclusion that 

the unit of prosecution is an animal, we have little difficulty in 

further concluding that the prosecution proved twenty-two factually 

distinct offenses. See People v. Abiodun, 111 P.3d 462, 470 (Colo. 

2005) (“[F]actual distinctness is ultimately a function of the 

legislature’s definition of the crime itself — the legislature’s choice 

of an allowable unit of prosecution.”). 

¶ 55 To determine whether offenses are factually distinct, courts 

consider whether the acts occurred at different times and were 

separated by intervening events; whether there were separate 

volitional acts; and factors such as temporal proximity, the 

defendant’s intent, and the number of victims. People v. McMinn, 

2013 COA 94, ¶ 22. 

¶ 56 While Harris’s conduct in mistreating the animals occurred 

over the same period of time and consisted of the same general acts, 

each of the charged offenses had a different, identifiable animal 

victim. We conclude that the existence of multiple victims created 
26 

factually distinct offenses. See People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667, 670 

(Colo. App. 2000) (section 18-1-408(3) not applicable where offense 

involved multiple victims), aff’d, 48 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2002). And, as 

we have explained, the evidence supported the jury’s verdict that 

each of the identified animals had been mistreated. 

¶ 57 We therefore reject Harris’s claim that her sentence violated a 

statutory or constitutional prohibition against multiple convictions 

or punishments for a single offense. 

IV. Other Contentions 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Aggravated Cruelty to Animals 

¶ 58 Harris contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

her of the seven counts of aggravated cruelty to animals for 

needlessly killing an animal. She insists that there was no evidence 

that definitively proved that the horses died from starvation, and 

therefore the jury could not convict her on these counts. We are 

not persuaded. 

¶ 59 On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 

record de novo to determine whether the evidence, viewed as a 

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is both 

“substantial and sufficient” to support the defendant’s guilt beyond 
27 

a reasonable doubt. Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 

2005). In applying this test, “we must give the prosecution the 

benefit of every reasonable inference that might fairly be drawn 

from the evidence.” People v. Atencio, 140 P.3d 73, 75 (Colo. App. 

2005). And we will not disturb the fact finder’s determinations of 

witness credibility and the weight to be given to the evidence. 

People v. McIntier, 134 P.3d 467, 471 (Colo. App. 2005). 

¶ 60 A person commits the crime of aggravated cruelty to animals 

if, as relevant here, she “needlessly kills an animal.” 

§ 18-9-202(1.5)(b). 

¶ 61 Harris contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove 

that she actually killed the animals, and that they did not otherwise 

die of natural causes. While we agree that there was no direct 

evidence that the horses died because Harris did not feed them, 

there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury 

could have drawn this inference and reached this conclusion 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Medina, 51 P.3d 1006, 

1013 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[I]n determining sufficiency the law makes 

no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.”), aff’d 

sub nom. Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003); cf. 
28 

People v. Strohm, 185 Colo. 260, 268, 523 P.2d 973, 977 (1974) 

(cause of death can be established by circumstantial evidence). 

¶ 62 First, it is uncontroverted that the horses were malnourished. 

Dr. Gary Mason, who testified as an expert in veterinary medicine 

and veterinary pathology, tested femur bones recovered from nine 

deceased animals discovered during this investigation. According to 

Dr. Mason, all seven of the bones susceptible to testing8 showed a 

loss of fat in the bone marrow. This fat loss is “the end stage of 

inability to acquire enough energy from the diet. . . . It’s the end 

result of insufficient energy intake, and that fat is the last in the 

body to be metabolized in order to maintain life.” He testified that 

the fat loss indicates that “[t]here is some condition which is long 

term in nature that’s required those animals to use marrow fat to 

stay alive.” He described the condition as a “chronic negative 

energy balance.” While Dr. Mason could not definitively determine 

the cause of this chronic imbalance, he testified that it could be the 

result of starvation and lack of proper feeding. 

 

8 Two of the femurs submitted were too old and dried out to 

analyze. 
29 

¶ 63 In addition to the scientific evidence of malnutrition, there was 

considerable testimony that the animals appeared emaciated. 

Veterinarian Marvin Hamann, who was present during the 

searches, testified that the dead horse and donkey discovered on 

January 6 were “emaciated” and “basically skin and bones.” 

Similarly, he testified that the additional dead horses discovered on 

January 27 were “completely emaciated and just essentially skin 

and bones.” 

¶ 64 Further, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 

could determine that the horses were malnourished because they 

were not properly fed. Dr. Hamann, who testified as an expert in 

veterinary medicine,9 explained that he checked the property 

looking for a feed source, but “[t]here was basically no feed on the 

property,” even though one would need between seven and eight 

hundred pounds of hay per day to feed the number of animals 

found on the ranch. He further testified that there were no 

remnants of feed or hay, which he would expect to see if the 

 

9 The record reflects that the People moved to have Dr. Hamann 

qualified as an unspecified “expert”; however, the foundation for 

this qualification was entirely based on his veterinary practice with 

cattle and horses. 
30 

animals were being fed regularly. Not only was there no feed on the 

property, but Dr. Hamann also testified that the ranch did not have 

sufficient grass on which the horses could graze. A multitude of lay 

witnesses present during the January 6 search confirmed that there 

was little to no food on the property and echoed Dr. Hamann’s 

observations that there were no food remnants or grass for grazing. 

¶ 65 Based on these observations, Dr. Hamann concluded that the 

horses were “malnourished because of lack of food available.” 

¶ 66 Finally, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 

could conclude that the horses died of malnutrition. Dr. Hamann 

testified that chronic malnutrition eventually leads to death. And 

Dr. Mason described the horses’ bone marrow condition as the “end 

stage” of the animal’s inability to obtain sufficient energy, and that 

they had to use the fat in the bone marrow to “stay alive” and 

“maintain life.” 

¶ 67 Harris maintains that because Dr. Mason could not rule out 

other causes of malnutrition, such as disease or toxins in the water, 

there was insufficient evidence to prove that her conduct caused the 

animals’ deaths. But the prosecution is not obliged to disprove the 

defendant’s theories in order for the evidence to be deemed 
31 

sufficient under the substantial evidence test. Clark v. People, 232 

P.3d 1287, 1292 (Colo. 2010); see also State v. Angus, No. 05AP1054, 2006 WL 2474512 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2006) 

(unpublished opinion) (holding animal cruelty conviction supported 

by sufficient evidence where veterinarian testified that emaciated 

condition of animals was due to lack of food, not whipworms, as the 

defendant contended). Moreover, Dr. Hamann testified that, 

contrary to Harris’s theory of defense, there was no evidence that 

the horses were affected by disease or sulfates in the water; he 

explained that if the horses were malnourished because of water 

sulfates, there would have been evidence of diarrhea on the ranch, 

and there was none. 

¶ 68 Accordingly, we conclude that a rational juror could find proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the horses died because Harris did 

not sufficiently feed them. 

B. Sufficiency of the Charging Document 

¶ 69 Harris argues that the charging documents filed in the two 

cases failed to charge an offense. She acknowledges that the 

information in each case tracked the statutory language of the 
32 

offenses,10 but she insists that the charging documents also had to 

allege the specific manner in which she killed the deceased animals; 

the ways in which she mistreated the other animals; and the 

definition of statutory terms, including “needless killing,” 

 

10 In 12CR27, each of the cruelty to animals offenses was charged 

identically, except that each count referred to a different animal by 

its identifying number: 

A0973012. On or about January 6, 2012, 

[Harris] unlawfully, knowingly, recklessly, or 

with criminal negligence, tormented, or 

deprived of necessary sustenance, or allowed 

to be housed in a manner that resulted in 

chronic or repeated serious physical harm, or 

having the charge or custody of an animal 

failed to provide it with proper food, drink, or 

protection from the weather consistent with 

the species, breed and type of animal, or 

otherwise mistreated or neglected, or caused or 

procured the mistreatment or neglect of 

animals, namely: canine listed above. 

In 12CR222, each of the five counts of aggravated cruelty to 

animals was charged identically, except that each described a 

different animal: 

On or about January 27, 2012, [Harris] 

unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly 

tortured, needlessly mutilated, or needlessly 

killed an animal, namely: a white with brown 

leopard spot[s] Appaloosa horse; in violation of 

section 18-9-202(1.5)(b), C.R.S. 
33 

“necessary sustenance,” and “mistreated or neglected.” We review 

the sufficiency of the indictment de novo. McIntier, 134 P.3d at 470. 

¶ 70 A charge is sufficient if it alleges sufficient facts to permit the 

accused to prepare an adequate defense and to assure that the 

defendant cannot be prosecuted again for the same crime. People v. 

Chavez, 730 P.2d 321, 325 (Colo. 1986). To that end, if the 

information identifies the essential elements of the crime charged, it 

is sufficient. People v. Melillo, 25 P.3d 769, 778 (Colo. 2001). 

Ordinarily, an information identifies the essential elements of the 

crime when it tracks the statutory language. Id.

¶ 71 Harris’s reliance on People v. Beruman, 638 P.2d 789 (Colo. 

1982), and People v. Donachy, 196 Colo. 289, 586 P.2d 14 (1978), is 

misplaced. In Beruman, the defendant was charged with failing to 

perform a duty imposed upon him by law in connection with his job 

as a social services caseworker. The indictment, though, did not 

inform the defendant of the duties he had failed to perform, 

preventing him from preparing a defense to the charge. Because 

the mandatory legal duty was not identified, the indictment was 

insufficient. 638 P.2d at 794. Likewise, in Donachy, the public 

official was charged with converting public money and property to 
34 

some unauthorized use, but the indictment did not provide any 

further information. The court found that the vagueness of the 

indictment did not sufficiently advise the defendant of the 

prohibited conduct. 196 Colo. at 292-93, 586 P.2d at 16-17. 

¶ 72 But here, the indictment set forth the prohibited conduct — 

killing and mistreating specific animals by failing to provide 

necessary sustenance and care. The indictment in this case was 

sufficient to put Harris on notice of the charges against her and to 

allow her to prepare an adequate defense. See Melillo, 25 P.3d at 

778 (information was sufficient where it tracked statutory language 

but did not specify how the defendant committed the crime of 

sexual assault on a child); see also § 16-5-202(3), C.R.S. 2016 (“An 

information may be filed using the language of the statute . . . .”). 

C. Bifurcation of Trial 

¶ 73 After the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to 

consolidate cases 12CR27 and 12CR222, Harris filed a motion to 

bifurcate the trial. She argued that evidence of her prior 

misdemeanor convictions, alleged in the information to support 

each charge of animal cruelty (second offense), would be unduly 

prejudicial in her trial on the substantive animal cruelty offenses. 
35 

Initially, the trial court denied her motion. However, on the fourth 

day of trial, it reconsidered its ruling and announced that the 

animal cruelty charges would be determined by the jury and the 

existence of prior convictions would be determined separately by 

the court. The prosecution did not present evidence of the prior 

convictions to the jury. 

¶ 74 On appeal, Harris contends that the trial court erred by 

initially denying her motion for bifurcation.11 We review the denial 

of a motion to bifurcate the trial for an abuse of discretion. See In 

re Marriage of Foottit, 903 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Colo. App. 1995). A 

trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly 

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if its decision is based on an 

erroneous understanding or application of the law. People v. 

Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 17. 

¶ 75 Cruelty to animals is a class 1 misdemeanor; however, a 

second or subsequent conviction is a class 6 felony. See

§ 18-9-202(2)(b)(I). Under this statutory scheme, the prior 

 

11 The People interpret Harris’s argument as a challenge to the 

court’s decision to consolidate the two cases. But Harris presents 

no argument with respect to the consolidation order and instead 

focuses exclusively on the alleged prejudice that flowed from the 

court’s denial of her bifurcation motion. 
36 

conviction is a sentence enhancer rather than a substantive 

element of the offense. See People v. Schreiber, 226 P.3d 1221, 

1223 (Colo. App. 2009) (prior conviction for indecent exposure was 

sentence enhancer, not element of offense, even though prior 

conviction raised offense from class 1 misdemeanor to class 6 

felony). 

¶ 76 Bifurcated trials are preferred in prosecutions for second or 

subsequent offenses when the prior convictions are alleged as a 

basis for imposition of a harsher sentence and are relevant only to 

punishment. People v. Fullerton, 186 Colo. 97, 99, 525 P.2d 1166, 

1167 (1974). To avoid prejudice to the defendant in the initial 

determination of the issue of guilt, the trial court should conduct 

the proceedings in two stages and determine the collateral issue of 

enhanced punishment only after the jury has determined guilt on 

the substantive offense. Id.

¶ 77 We will assume, therefore, that the trial court abused its 

discretion by initially failing to grant Harris’s motion to bifurcate 

the proceedings. But the error requires reversal under the 

harmless error standard only if the error substantially influenced 

the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial. Hagos v. People, 
37 

2012 CO 63, ¶ 12. The trial court ultimately agreed to the 

bifurcation request; still, Harris contends that the damage had been 

done — the trial court had read the charging document to the jury 

at the beginning of trial, and the document repeatedly referenced 

her prior misdemeanor convictions for animal cruelty. 

¶ 78 We do not agree that the court’s one-time reading of the 

information requires reversal. For one thing, there was no evidence 

presented that Harris had prior convictions. At the time it read the 

information to the jury, the court properly instructed the jurors that 

the information was not evidence. We generally presume that the 

jury understood and followed the court’s instructions. See People v. 

Manyik, 2016 COA 42, ¶ 40 (although prosecutor’s comments were 

improper, court had instructed the jury that lawyers’ arguments 

were not evidence and the court of appeals presumes jurors 

followed instructions). Additionally, the weight of the evidence 

against Harris was significant and it is unlikely that the mere 

reference to prior misdemeanor convictions substantially affected 

the verdict. As well, the court offered to give the jury a curative 

instruction, which defense counsel declined. See People v. Helms, 

2016 COA 90, ¶ 61 (denial of mistrial after introduction of prior bad 
38 

act evidence was not abuse of discretion where weight of admissible 

evidence was substantial and court offered to give curative 

instruction). Accordingly, the trial court did not commit reversible 

error by initially denying Harris’s bifurcation motion. 

D. CRE 404(b) Evidence 

¶ 79 Harris contends that the trial court improperly admitted 

evidence of other bad acts under CRE 404(b). Harris challenges the 

testimony of two witnesses, Daryel McCurry and Brett Smith, both 

of whom testified regarding events and circumstances in 2007.12 

She contends that this testimony detailed previous misconduct and 

was not admitted for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). 

¶ 80 McCurry is a ranch hand who worked for Harris in the 

summer of 2007. He testified that during his time on the ranch, 

Harris owned approximately sixty horses, a third of which were in 

poor condition and did not appear adequately fed. Further, he 

explained that in his two months working on the ranch, there was 

 

12 In her briefs, Harris contends that the CRE 404(b) evidence 

relates to acts in both 2007 and 2009. On our review of the record, 

however, the only testimony relating to 2009 was that horses were 

not seized at that time. Further, while her opening brief purports to 

challenge the admission of her previous criminal convictions 

stemming from these incidents in 2007 and 2009, the trial court 

excluded all references to the convictions. 
39 

only one delivery of hay. McCurry stated that the horses fed on 

grass, but that there was not much grass around. During his two 

months on the ranch, McCurry never saw a farrier13 or veterinarian 

come out to the ranch. He also testified that he was present when 

animal protection agents came to the ranch in 2007. 

¶ 81 Officer Smith is an animal protection agent who had been 

involved with Harris and her ranch since 2006. He testified that, in 

2007, animal protection agents seized nineteen horses from Harris’s 

ranch, seventeen of which were in very poor condition. He also 

described one of the victim horses as a horse they had 

contemplated seizing in 2007; he explained that in 2007, the horse 

was thin, but only moderately so. Officer Smith also identified 

several of the deceased horses as horses he had seen when he was 

previously on the property. Finally, Officer Smith testified that 

Harris had large quantities of pellet feed on the property in 2007, 

but not in 2012. 

¶ 82 The court admitted this evidence for the limited purpose of 

proving “opportunity, mental culpability, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake.” 

 

13 A farrier is person who trims and shoes horses’ hooves. 
40 

¶ 83 Pursuant to CRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 

acts is inadmissible if its relevance depends on an inference that 

the person has a bad character and acted in conformity with that 

character. However, this evidence may be admissible for other 

purposes. CRE 404(b). 

¶ 84 A trial court has substantial discretion to determine the 

admissibility of prior acts evidence, and such a determination will 

not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. 

People v. Torres, 141 P.3d 931, 934 (Colo. App. 2006). 

¶ 85 As an initial matter, much of the challenged testimony did not 

describe other “bad acts,” which would be subject to Rule 404(b). 

This includes Officer Smith’s testimony identifying the deceased 

horses as Harris’s, which was a contested issue at trial; his 

testimony that she used pellet feed in 2007, but that feed was not 

found on the property in 2012; and McCurry’s testimony about the 

condition of the ranch. Accordingly, Rule 404(b) is inapposite to the 

admissibility of this testimony. See People v. Greenlee, 200 P.3d 

363, 368 (Colo. 2009) (stating that evidence that does not comprise 

“conduct, do[es] not amount to a crime, and do[es] not reveal prior 

bad acts” does not implicate Rule 404(b)) (footnote omitted). 
41 

¶ 86 Even if we assume that the remainder of the challenged 

testimony is subject to the limitations of Rule 404(b), we conclude 

that it was properly admitted. Evidence that animal protection 

agents previously seized horses in 2007, and that these horses were 

in poor condition and not being fed regularly, is logically relevant to 

a material fact: the evidence makes it less likely that, in 2012, the 

horses were suffering from sulfate poisoning and experiencing 

sudden weight loss, as Harris claimed. See CRE 401; Greenlee, 200 

P.3d at 366 (Evidence is relevant where it has “any tendency to 

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 

would be without the evidence.” (quoting CRE 401)). It also 

supports the inference that Harris knew that infrequent feeding 

could negatively impact the health of her horses and that she 

disregarded this risk. See People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d 1314, 1318 

(Colo. 1990) (Rule 404(b) evidence must be logically relevant to a 

material fact). 

¶ 87 Additionally, the logical relevance of this evidence is 

independent of the inference that Harris has a bad character, and 

that she acted in conformity with this character by neglecting her 
42 

horses. Rather, the evidence was admitted for the proper purpose 

of proving Harris’s mens rea; it demonstrates that Harris was aware 

of the potential consequences of sporadically feeding her horses, 

and it negates the argument that the horses were malnourished 

from some mistake or accident. See CRE 404(b) (permitting prior 

misconduct evidence to prove intent and absence of mistake or 

accident); People v. Davis, 218 P.3d 718, 729 (Colo. App. 2008) 

(Rule 404(b) evidence was properly admitted to show absence of 

mistake). 

¶ 88 Finally, we conclude that the probative value of this evidence 

is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 

Spoto, 795 P.2d at 1318. The evidence presented at trial 

overwhelmingly established that the animals were malnourished 

and not properly maintained, and the only other possible 

explanation for this fact was some mistake or accident (sulfate 

poisoning, according to Harris). So the probative value of the 

evidence outweighs any potential prejudice. Cf. People v. McBride, 

228 P.3d 216, 227 (Colo. App. 2009) (probative value outweighed 

prejudice because prior bad acts were directly relevant to whether 
43 

the crime charged was intentional, as the prosecution contended, or 

accidental, as defendant claimed). 

¶ 89 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the admission of the 

challenged evidence. 

E. Exclusion of Photographs of Healthy Animals 

¶ 90 At trial, Harris attempted to introduce, through her brother, 

photographs of all of the animals seized by the animal protection 

officers. The trial court admitted into evidence only those 

photographs depicting animals that were the subject of the criminal 

charges. 

¶ 91 On appeal, Harris contends that the trial court erred in 

excluding the remaining photographs. The photographs of the 

nonvictim horses were relevant, she argues, because they would 

have established that some of the animals were in good condition, 

and the presence of healthy animals would have undercut the 

prosecution’s theory that she had systematically starved the 

animals on her ranch. We review the trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings for an abuse of discretion. People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44, 

¶ 40. 
44 

¶ 92 We agree with Harris that the condition of the other animals 

on the ranch was at least marginally relevant because that evidence 

would tend to make the prosecution’s theory that Harris did not 

feed her animals somewhat less probable. See CRE 401. And 

relevant evidence is generally admissible. CRE 402. 

¶ 93 The court, though, did not exclude all evidence of the other 

animals’ condition: Dr. Hamann conceded that approximately twothirds of the horses on the ranch were in either good condition or 

moderate condition and that only a third of the horses were in very 

poor condition. Likewise, the expert admitted that while some 

horses were dehydrated, others had normal hydration. Certain of 

the defense witnesses also testified about the animals’ condition at 

around the time of their seizure by the animal protection agents. 

That evidence was sufficient to support Harris’s argument that she 

was not systematically starving the animals on the ranch. 

¶ 94 What the court did not allow was photographs of the horses 

and dogs that the witnesses had already characterized as being in 

good or moderate health. As to that specific evidentiary ruling, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. 
45 

¶ 95 Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration 

of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 

cumulative evidence. CRE 403; People v. Salazar, 2012 CO 20, 

¶ 16. As the trial court noted, the photographs were merely 

cumulative of the testimony that the nonvictim animals were in 

generally “ok” condition. We agree that, under those 

circumstances, the photos of animals already deemed to be healthy 

or moderately healthy had no additional probative value. 

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s 

exclusion of the photographs. 

F. Jury Instructions 

¶ 96 Harris contends that the trial court erroneously rejected her 

tendered jury instructions defining various terms in the cruelty to 

animals statute and left the terms undefined. She insists that by 

failing to define the terms “needlessly killed,” “proper protection 

from weather conditions,” “proper drink,” “proper food,” and 
46 

“necessary sustenance,” the jury was left to define its own standard 

of care for the animals.14

¶ 97 It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine 

whether additional jury instructions that properly state the law 

should be submitted. People v. Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471, 480 

(Colo. App. 2011). 

¶ 98 When a term, word, or phrase in a jury instruction is one with 

which reasonable persons of common intelligence would be familiar, 

and its meaning is not so technical or mysterious as to create 

confusion in jurors’ minds as to its meaning, an instruction 

defining it is not required. People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 45 P.3d 737, 

745 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d, 70 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2003). 

¶ 99 Here, all of the undefined terms are common words the jury 

was capable of understanding, and there is no indication that the 

jury was confused by these terms. See People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 

447, 451 (Colo. 1983) (“[T]he language of the cruelty to animals 

statute may be readily comprehended and applied by jurors.”). 

 

14 While Harris contends that the trial court erroneously failed to 

instruct the jury on the definition of “otherwise mistreated,” the 

court did instruct the jury on the statutory definition of 

mistreatment. 
47 

Thus, the court acted within its broad discretion when it declined to 

define these terms further. See Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d at 480 

(“When a jury indicates no confusion about the meaning of such 

common phrases, the trial court’s failure to define such phrases 

specifically does not require a new trial.”). 

V. Conclusion 

¶ 100 The convictions and sentences are affirmed. 

JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE FURMAN concur.