T h e H on or abl e H ar ol d A. Ack er man , U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f or t h e D i s t r i ct of

N ew J er s ey , s i t t i n g by * d esi gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0787n.06 F iled: October 23, 2006 Case No. 05- 2165 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT VENUS HEARD, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. SBC AMERITECH CORPORATION, A D e lawa r e Co r por at ion , Defendan t-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

BEFORE: BATCHELDER and MCK EAGU E, Circuit Ju d g es ; A CK E RM AN, District Judge. * ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Circ uit Jud ge. The appellant, Venus Hea rd, ap p ea l s t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of

he r m oti on

to a me nd he r c omp la int . B e c a

us e the pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l c la im that Hea rd soug ht to add to her c omplaint is pre-empted by Section 301 of the L abor Ma nag ement Relations Ac t (t h e “LMR A”) , 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) et seq. , and ame ndment would – as the district

c ourt pr op e rl y he ld – be futil e , w e a ff

ir m. Hea rd is a former

employ ee of

the appe llee, SBC Amer itech (“ Ameritec h”). B eca use of he r

ow n h e a lthpr ob le ms a

nd tho se of he r m ino r son , He ard wa s fr e qu e ntl y a bs e nt fr om he r j ob . In la

te 2002, Hea

rd’s son was hospit alized, which required Hear d to miss four c onsecutive da y s of work.2

She notified her supe rvisor of the r eason f or her absenc e, re quested lea

ve under the Fa mily Medica l L eave Act (the “F ML A”) , and g ave the appropr iate medical c ertification form to her son’s nur se for

c omp le tio n b y

the do c tor

. Ac c or din g to He ard , the nurs e pla c e d the fo rm in a fil e and ne ve r se nt i t to Ameritec h. Ameritec h denied He ard’ s reque st for F ML A leave beca use i t n ev er rec eived he r medical c ertifi ca t i o n . L ater , when He ard e x cee ded her unexcused absenc e limit, Ameritech te rm inate d h e r e mpl oy

me nt. He ard fi le d a c omp la int

a nd a vir tua lly ide nti c a l f

ir st a me nd e d c omp la int in the dis tr ic t c ourt

. The fir st count claimed that he r termination by Ameritec h violated the F ML A bec ause A meritec h did not inform her that it had not rece ived her medical c ertification. The second c ount claimed that Ameritec h had ter

minated her

employ m ent i n reta liation for her exercising her r ights unde r the FMLA. After Ameritec h moved for summary judgme nt, H ear d filed a ple ading entitled “Plaintiff’s Response to Def

endant’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment . . . and Pl ai n tiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint . . . .” A proposed S ec o n d Am en d ed C omplaint was attac hed to this pleading as an exhib it

. T h e r e s p o n s e c o n c e d e d th a t A me r it e c h w a s e n ti tl e d to ju d g me n t o n b o th c o u n ts of the complaint. The propose d Second Amende d C o m p l aint contained only a state la

w claim for promissory

estoppel alleg ing that Hear d had detr imentally relied on A meritec h’s leave policy and that Ameritec h had not f ollowed the policy

. The district c ourt g rante d Ameritec h’s motio n for summary ju d g me n t an d d e n ie d H e ar d ’ s mo ti o n to a me n d th e c o mp la in t. H e ar d a p p e a ls o n ly

the de nia l of le a ve to a

me nd he r c omp la int

. Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 15(a ) provides that a par ty may amend its pleadingonce a s a matter of cour se. Afterwa

rd, “a party may amend the party ’s pl eading only by leave of cour

t . . . and leave shall be freely g iven when justice so require s.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 15(a) . “[I ]t is well settled3

law that the district co u rt m ay d en y a motion to amend if the c ourt conc ludes that the plea ding a s amende d could not w ithstand a motion to di smiss.” Martin v. Associated Truck Lines, Inc. , 801 F.2d 246, 248 (6th Cir. 1986). “[W] hen a district c ourt bases its dec ision solely on a leg al conc lusion that the amende d pleadingwould no t wi t h s t and a motion t o dismiss , this court must review the le g al conclusion de novo .” Id. The district cour

t in this case denied He ard’ s motion on t wo separ ate ba ses. Fir st, the court held that Hea

rd’s propose d amende d complaint did not state any basis for f

eder al jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 or 1332. Second, the court held that amending the complaint as He ard pr oposed would be futile. Pointing out that the ter ms of Hea

rd’s employ

ment wer e gover

ned by a collec tive barg aining ag ree ment, the cour t held t h at b ec ause Michig an law pe rmits the application of pr omi sso ry e sto pp e l only in the a bs e nc e of a c on tr a c t cov e ri ngthe same su bje c t matte r, He ard

c ou ld not bring a promissory

estoppel cla im. Further more, the c ourt held, e v en i f t h e claim wer e permissible under state law, it would be pr e-e mpted by Section 301 of the L MRA. Although it is clea

r that the propose d amende d complaint does not state any fede ral que stion, it i s n ot c le a r w he the r H e ard c ou ld, if g ive n the op po rt

un ity to do so , p le a d f

a c ts t o s up po rt

div e rs ity jur isd ic tio n. We n e e d n ot t a c kle th e ju ri sd ic tio na l is su e , h ow e ve r, be c a us e e ve n if

He ard c ou ld demonstrate the exis tence of diversity jurisdiction, her propose d claim would be pr eempted.

“ [W]he n r e so lut ion

of a state -l aw c la im is su

bs tanti a lly de pe nd e nt up on ana ly sis of

the te rm s of an a g re e me nt m a de be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s in a la bo r c on tr a c t, t

hat c la im mus t e ith e r b e tr e a te d a s a § 301 claim, or dism i s s ed as pre-empted by fede ral labor -contra ct law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) (inter nal citation omitted). Fur thermore , we have not “ limit ed § 301 pre- emption to case s wher e the prec ise meaning of prec ise words in the C BA is the crux of the4

state-ba sed cla im.” Jones v. Gene ral Motors Corp. , 939 F.2d 380, 383 ( 6th Cir. 1991). “Rather , we have f ound many

state-ba sed cla ims pre-e mpted beca use they have implicate d the fe dera l policies underlying f

eder al labor la

w.” Id . F or

e xamp le , w e have fo un d pr e -e mpt ion wh e re the ri g hts in dispute were cre ated by a collective bar g aining ag ree ment, wher e the implicated e mploy ment relationship was su

bject to a c ollective bar g aining ag ree ment, and whe re the state-law claim re quired the cour t to ex amine “the prac tices and c ustoms of a workplac e whose conditions are g overne d by a CBA .” Id . (collec ting c ases)

. We employ

a two-pa rt test to determine whether a state-law claim is pr e-e mpted by Section 301 of the L MRA. Mattis v. Massman , 355 F.3d 902, 906 ( 6th Cir. 2004). First, cour

ts must determine whethe r re solving the state -law cl aim would require int e rp re ta tio n o f the te rm s of the c oll e c tiv e ba rg a ini ng a g re e me nt. I f so , the c la im i s pree mpted. Second, cour

ts must ascertain whe ther the rig hts claimed by the plaintiff wer e created by the collective barg aining ag ree ment, or i nstead by state l aw. I f the rig hts were cre ated by

the collec tive barg aining ag ree ment, the claim is pree mpted. I n s ho rt , if a st ate -l aw c la im f a ils e ith e r of these two r equire ments, it is preempted by § 301. Id . (empha sis in original, c itations omi tted). Hea rd ar g ues that her

state law pr omissory

estoppel cla im is not pre- empted under the Ma tti s test beca use it does not rely

on a specific provision of the collective barg aining ag ree ment, and is not a cla im of u n

j u s t t ermination, but rathe r, “he r cla im rests on the policies and pr actice s of [Ameritech] as they

relate t o t h e FM L A.” We disag ree . Hea rd’s c laim is quint essentially one of

w r o n g f u l t e r m i n a t i o n . H e ar d

c o n c e d e d i nt h e p r o c e e d i n g s b e f

o r e t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt t h a th e r F M LA claims wer e without merit, and that he r leave entitlement and a lleg edly improper discha

rg e we re go v erned by

the collec tive barg aining ag ree ment. Fur ther, the r ecor d ref

lects that af

ter she w as discharg ed for

exces s i ve abse nces, the union insti tuted a g rieva nce pr ocee ding on he r beha lf,5

c la imi ngthat th e dis c ha

rg e vio la te d th e te rm s o f t he a g re e me nt. We h a ve no do ub t th a t in or de r t o a dd

re ss He ard ’s state law c la im, the dis tr ic t c ourt wo uld be re quired to interpr et the ter ms of the collec tive bargai n ing a g ree ment, and Ma tti s there fore mandates pr e-e mption. Furthermor e, the c ourt could not adjudica te H ea rd ’s claim without examini n g “the c ustoms and prac tices” of Ameritec h’s workpla ce in c ontrave ntion of Jones , 939 F.2d at 383. Hear d cannot make an end r un around f

eder al labor la

w simply b y as s er t i n g that the

c o l l e c t i v e b ar g a i n i n g a g r e e m e n td o e s n o ts p e l l o u t t h e p r e c i s e d e t a i l s o f A m e r i t e c h ’ s l e a v e p o l i c y. The district cour

t did not err in conc luding that He ard’ s state law claim would be pr e-e mpted by section 301, and that the proposed amendment to the complaint would be f utile. For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

.