F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

K.C., by and throug h Erica C., her g uardian; A.A., by

and throug h Stacey A., her guardian; M.C., by and throug h L aurie C., her g uardian; K.F ., by and throug h Sheree F ., her g uardian; A M E R

I C A N D I A B E T E S A S S O C I A T I O N , Plaintiffs-Appellants
,

v

.

T O M T O R

L A K S O N , in his official capacity as Superintendent of Public I nstruction for the State of California, Defendant-Appellee

. N o. 12-16178

D.C. No. 3:05-cv-04077- MMC

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Max ine M. Chesney , Senior District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted April 10, 2014—San F rancisco, California

F iled Aug ust 11, 2014

B efore: J ohn T. Noonan, J acqueline H. Ng uy en, and Paul J . W atford, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by J udg e Ng uy enK.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 2

SUMMARY *

Ancillary Jurisdiction / Attorneys’ F ees

The panel reversed the district court’s denial, for lack o f jurisdiction, of plaintiff s ’ m o tion for attorney s’ fees for monitoring d efendants’ compliance with a s ettlement ag reement in an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act and other statutes c oncerning servi c e s f or students with diabetes in California public schools.
The district court retained limited jurisdiction to enforce the settlement ag re ement. Plaintiffs soug ht attorney s’ fees after the court’s jurisdiction to e n f o r ce the settlement ag reement had ex p ired u nder the terms o f that ag r eement. The panel h eld that the motion for a ttorney s’ fees did not seek to enforce the settlement ag reement; consequently
, the conclusion that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement ag reement was irrelevant. T he panel also held that the district court independently h ad a ncillary jurisdiction o ver the post-judg ment attorney s’ fees dispute, irrespective of the fact that the court’s jurisdiction to e nforce the settlement ag reement had ex pired. T he panel re m a nded for the district co u r t in its d iscretion to decide whether to

ex e r cise ancillary

jurisdiction over the motion for attorney s’ fees.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.K.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 3

COUNSEL

Donna B rorby (arg

ued), L aw Office of Donna Br o r b y , San F r a n cisco, California; Arlene B

. May erson, L a risa M. Cumming s and C h a rlotte L

. L anvers, Disability Rig hts Education and Defense Fu n d, I nc., B erkeley
, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Paul E. L acy (arg

ued), Deputy General Counsel, Amy B isson Holloway
, General Counsel, Edmundo Ag uilar, Assistant General Counsel, a n d A va C. Yajima, Deputy General Counsel, Californi a Department o f Education, Sacramento, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OP INION

NGUYEN, Circuit J u dg e:

The com m o n

- law doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction over related c laims
, codified a s p a r t of a federal court’s

s u pplemental jurisdiction under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1367, i s g enerally well understood. Yet, as the Supr e m e Court observed, the “ doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction can hardly be criticiz ed for being overly rig id or precise,” because the more obscure doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction over collateral pr oceedings remains a matter of case law. Kokkonen v

. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.
, 511 U.S. 375, 379 (1994); see 13 Charles Alan W rig ht et al., F ederal Practice & Procedure § 3523 ( 3d ed.). The present appeal involves the latter—ancillary jurisdiction over proceedings related to, but technically separate from, a federal lawsuit. Under this doctrine, a federal cour t may ex ercise ancillary jurisdiction

over collateral p ro ceeding s in two distinct contex ts that a reK.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 4

relevant here: to e nforce a settlement ag reement, and to resolve an attorney ’s fees dispute.

F our juvenile plaintiff

s , b y a nd throug h their respective gu ar d ians, a

nd the A merican Diabetes Associat i o n (collectively
, “Plaintiffs”) filed a putative class action ag ainst J ack O’Connell, in his official capacity as Superintendent o f Public I nstruction for the State of California, 1 the State B oard of Education and the California Department of Ed u cation (collectively
, “Defe n d ants”). The parties eventually settled, and the district court retained limi t e d j urisdiction to e nforce their settlement ag reement. After the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement ag r eement had ex pired under the terms of that a g reement, Plaintiffs f iled a motion seeking attorney s’ fees for monitoring De f endants’ c o mpliance with the agr e e m ent. The district c o urt denied the motion f or lack o f jurisdiction o n the g round that i t s j u r isdiction to enforce the settlement ag r eement had ex pired.

On appeal, Plaintiffs’ arg ument is two- f o l d

. F irst, they arg ue that their motion for attorney s ’ f ees does not seek to enforce the settlement ag r eement. Consequen t l y , the conclusion that the district c o urt lacks a ncillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement a gr e ement is irrelevant. Second, they a rg u e t h a t the district court independently has a ncillary jurisdiction over a post-judg ment attorney s’ f ees dispute, irrespective of the fact that the court’s jurisdiction to e nforce the settlement ag reement has ex p ired. W e ag ree. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

1 T o m T o rlak so n su

b seq u en tly rep laced J ack O’ Co n n ell as
su p erin ten den t.K.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 5

BACK G ROUND

I n O ctober 2005, Plain t i f f s filed a putative class action alleg ing that D efendants failed to p rovide necessary services for students with d iabetes in California p ublic schoo ls. Plainti ffs alleg ed violations of the Americans with Disabilities A ct ( “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 e t seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitatio n Ac t o f 1973 (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the I ndivi duals with Disabilities Education Act (“I DEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.

I n J uly 2 007, the p arties entered i n t o a settlement ag reement, resolving P laintiffs’ claims (the “Settlement Ag reement”). On Aug ust 8, 2007, “pursuant to the settlement ag reement between the parti e s , the terms of which [we] re
ex p ressly incorporated [ t] herein,” the district court entered an order of dismissal with prejudice

. Under the Settlement Ag reement, Plaintiffs’ attorney s were awarded $400,000 in fees. 2

Under parag r aph 14 of the Settlement Ag reement, t h e district court retained jurisdiction for two and one-half y ears from the effective date of the Settlement Ag reement, “solely to rule on any motion filed pursuant either to Parag raph 1.b.

o r to Parag raph 10, of [the Settlement Ag reement] .” The district c ourt f

ound that the “effective date” of the Settlement Ag reement was J uly

24, 2007.

On November 18, 2011, almost two y ears after the district court’s jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Ag reement h ad

2 Sep arately , P lain tif

f s’ p ro b o n o co

- co u n sel w ere aw ard ed $3 0 ,0 0 0 in

co sts, w aiv in g a claim f o r p o ten tial atto rn ey s’ fe e s i n ex cess of $ 1 ,8 0 0,0 0 0

.K.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 6

ex p ired, Plaintiffs f

i l e d a motion for an additional $288,627.41 in attorney s’ fees, pursuant to the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, Section 5 0 4, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b), and the I DEA, 20 U .S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B ), “for their work monitoring implementatio n of the settlement with the California Department of Education in this matter.”

On April 2 0, 2012, the d istrict court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for lack of jurisdiction. The court ruled t hat the Settlement Ag reement limited the “time within which the Court may entertain a motion f or such f ees,” and that the time had ex p ired. On May

15, 2012, Plaintiffs timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The d istrict court had jurisdiction p u rsuant to 2 8 U .S.C. § 1331. W e have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cf. Balla v. Idaho
, 677 F .3d 910, 9 1 5 (9th Ci r

. 2 012) (“Periodic fee awards for monitoring compliance w ith a final judg ment are appealable [ u nder Section 1 2 9 1 ] if the award disposes of the attorney s’ fee issue for the work performed during the time period covered by the award.”).

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“A district court’s de c ision to deny attorney ’ s f ees is reviewed f

or an ab u s e o f discretion.” U nited States v. One 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser
, 248 F .3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2001). “An abuse of discretion occurs if t h e district c ourt based its decision on an e r r oneous leg al conclusion or a clearly

erroneous finding of fact.” A ndrew v. Bowen , 837 F .2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1988). “Any elements of leg al analy s is a nd statutory interpretation that f ig ure i n the district court’s

a t t o rney s’ fees decision are reviewed de novo.” Barrios v.K.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 7

Cal. Interscholastic F

e d’n
, 277 F .3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, “[ t] he ex istence o f subject matter jurisdiction is

a question of law that we review de novo.” Marin G e n. Hosp.

v. M odesto & Empire Traction Co.
, 581 F .3d 941, 94 4 (9th Cir. 2009).

D ISCUSSION

I

The “doctrine o f ancillary jurisdiction

. . . recog niz e s federal courts’ jurisdiction over some matters ( otherwise bey ond their competence) that are incidental to other matters properly before them.” Kokkonen
, 511 U.S. at 378. B roadly speaking
, f

e deral cou r ts ex ercise ancillary jurisdiction “for two separate, thoug h sometimes rela ted, purposes: (1) to permit disposition by a sing le court of claims t h a t a re, in vary ing respects and deg rees, factually inter d e p endent; a nd (2) to enable a court to f unction successf

u l l y , that is, to

m anag e its proceedings
, vindicate its authority
, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 379–80 (emphases added).

The first and well-known purpose—ancillary jurisdiction

over factually interdepende n t c laims—is codified as part o f 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Peacock v. Thomas
, 5 16 U.S. 349, 354 n.5 (1996) (“Cong ress c odified much of the common-law doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as part of ‘supplemental jurisdiction’ in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.”). That purpose, however, is not relevant here.

This case instead i n v o lves the second, less common purpose—ancillary jurisdiction over collateral proceeding s. Nat’l City Mortgage Co. v. Stephen
, 647 F .3d 78, 85 ( 3d Cir. 2011) (“Ancillary jurisdiction is a common law doctrine thatK.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 8

survived the codific ation of supplemental jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 6 7

. ” ) ; see 13 Charles Alan W rig ht et al., F ederal Practice & Pr o c e dure § 3523.2 ( 3d ed.) (differentiating “supp l emental jurisdiction over c laims asserted in federal court” from “ jurisdiction over re l a t e d proceedings that are technically separate from the initial case that invoked federal subject matter jurisdiction” (emphasis in orig inal)).

As the Tenth Cir c uit has ex plained, this less common
ex e r cise of n o n

- statutory ancillary jurisdiction “rests on the premise that a federal c ourt acquires jurisdiction of a case o r controversy in its entirety

. I nciden t to the disposition of the principal issues before it, a cou r t m a y decide collateral matters necessary to render complete justic e

. ” Jenkins v

. W einshienk , 670 F .2d 915, 918 (10th Cir. 1982).

I n particular, this appeal turns on the distinction b etween

a court’s a

ncillary jurisdiction to enf o r c e a settlement ag reement a

n d its ancillary jurisdiction over collateral matters such as an attorney ’s fees dispute.

II

A

W e first address a court’s authority to enforce settlement agr eements. F ederal courts “have no inherent power to enforce settlement ag reements entered into b y parties litig ating before them.” A rata v. Nu Skin Int’l, I nc. , 96 F .3d 1265, 1 268 (9th Cir

. 1996) (citing Kokkonen
, 511 U.S. at 378). R a t h er, courts have ancillary jurisdiction to e nforce a settlement ag reement only “ i f the p arties’ oblig ation to comply with the terms of the settlement ag reement h a[ s] beenK.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 9

made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision (such as a provision ‘ retaining jurisdiction’ over the

s ettlement ag reement) or b y incorporating the terms of t h e settlement a g reement in the order.” Kokkonen
, 511 U.S

. at 381.

I n the event the s et t l e ment ag reement is breached, the court w o u l d have ancillary jurisdiction that arises from breach of the court’s dismissal order. Id. ; see also Alvarado

v. Table Mountain R a ncheria
, 509 F .3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir. 2007) ( s tating that where “the dismissal order incorporates the settlement terms, o r the court has retained jurisdiction

over the settlement c ontract

. . . . the party seeking enforceme n t of the settlement ag reement must alleg e a violation of the settlement ag reement in order to esta b lish ancillary jurisdiction” (citing Kokkonen
, 511 U.S. at 381–82, and O’Connor v. Colvin , 70 F

. 3d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1995)).

B

I n this case, there is n o d ispute that the terms of the parties’ Settlement Ag reement “ h a d been made par t o f t he order of d ismissal

. . . by incorpo r a ting the terms of the settlement a g reement in the order. ” Kokkonen
, 511 U.S. at 381. F urther, th e d i s trict c ourt specifically retained jurisdiction over the Settlement A greement. Consequently
, any bre a c h o f the Settlement A g reement “would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the ag reement would therefore ex ist.” I d

.
As the district court noted, the Settlement Ag reement, a nd the court’s order incorporating its terms, “limit[ ed ] the Court’s ex ercise o f that jurisdiction in both time a nd manner.” T he district court r etained jurisdiction for two a ndK.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 10

one-half y ears from the e ffective date of t h e Settlement Ag reement—that is, un t i l J a nuary 24, 2010—“solely to rule

on any motion filed pursuant ei t h er t o Parag raph 1.b. or to Parag raph 10, of [ the Settlement Ag reement]

. ” B ecause Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney s’ fees was filed well after that date, a nd was not filed pursuant to e ither Parag raph 1

. b. o r Parag raph 10, the district court correctly concluded that it has

no a ncillary jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ Settlement Ag reement.

III

That conclusion, however, does not end the matter. The dispositive question is whether the court ne v e r t h eless has ancillary jurisdictio n over Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney s’ fees, even thoug h it n o long er has jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Ag reement. T o a nswer that question, we turn to the case law reg arding ancillary jurisdiction over a postjudg ment attorney ’s fees dispute.

A

1

There is no debate that a f e d e r a l court properly may
ex e r cise a

ncillary ju risdiction “over attorney fee disputes collateral to the underly ing litig ation.” Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Co r p

. v. Ferrante , 364 F .3d 1037, 1 041 (9th Cir. 2 004) (citing cases); W

hite v. N.H. Dep’t o

f E mployment Sec.
, 455 U.S. 445, 454 (1982) (discussing postjudg ment motion in which the plaintiff soug ht attorney ’s fees, as the prevailing party u nder 4 2 U.S.C. § 1988, four and one-half months a fter the parties had sig ned a settlement ag reement and the district court had approved a consent d e c r ee); Sprague v

. TiconicK.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 11

Nat’l Bank
, 307 U.S. 1 61, 164 ( 1939) (“Allowance of such costs in appropriate situation s i s part of the historic e quity jurisdiction of the federal courts.”); Schmidt v. Zazzara , 544 F

. 2d 412, 4 14 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting Sprague
, 3 07 U.S. at 164); Wrig ht et al., supra , §3523.2 (“One of the bestestablished uses of ancillary jurisdiction is over proceeding s concerning costs and attorney ’s fees.”).

Moreover, such ancillary jurisdiction ex ists even a fter the underly ing litig a tion has concluded. Cooter & Gell v

. Hartmarx Corp.
, 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990). A s the Supreme Court ex plained, “motions f or costs or attorne y ’ s fees a re ‘independent proceeding [ s] supplemental to the orig inal proceeding and not a request for a modification of the orig inal decree.’” Id. (quoting Sprague
, 307 U.S. a t 1 7 0 )

. “Thus,

even ‘y ears after the entry o f a judg ment o n t h e merits’ a federal court could consider a n award of counsel fees.” Id. at 395–96 (quoting W

hite , 455 U.S. 451 n.13); see also Zucker

v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.
, 192 F .3d 1323, 1329 (9th Cir. 1999) (“No Article I I I case or controve r s y i s needed with reg ard to attorney s’ fees

. . . because they are but an a ncillary matter over w h i c h the district court retains equitable jurisdiction e ven when the underly ing case is moot.”); Reiser

v. Del Monte P rops. Co.
, 605 F .2d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 1 979) (“[ A] n attorney s’ f

ees question ancillary to the case survives independently under the court’s equitable jurisdiction.” (citing S chmidt
, 544 F .2d at 414)); United States v

. Ford
, 650 F .2d 1 1 4 1
, 1 143–44 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Carter v

. Veterans Admin.
, 780 F .2d 1479, 1481 (9th Cir. 1986) (same (citing Ford , 650 F

. 2 d

at 1143–44)).K.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 12

2

I mportantly
, a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction over
an attorney ’s fees dispute i s inherent and broader than its ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement ag reement. The Second Circuit’s decision in In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litigation , 317 F .3d 91 ( 2 d C i r

. 2003), is illustrative. There, the p arties had settled a complicated class action lawsuit and ag reed that a ttorney s’ f ees would be awarded pursuant to the decision o f t w o arbitrators. Id. at 92–97. Certain class members objected to the ar bitrators’ eventual fee award. I

d

. a t 96–97. The district court f ound t h a t i t lacked jurisdiction and denied the petition for f ee forfeiture. Id. a t 97. The Second Circuit affirmed on different g rounds, b ut d isag reed on the jurisdictional question. I

d

. at 92.

I n i ts discussion, the Second Circuit differentiated between ancillary jurisdiction to e nforce the ag reement a nd ancillary jurisdiction over the collateral fee dispute, stating :
Appellees contend that the District Court lacked jurisdi c tion

. . . because the Consolidated Complain t had been dismissed without any reservation of continuing court authority

. They rely on [ K o kkonen ]
, which held that a d i s t rict court lacks a ncillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement ag reement

a fter the underly ing lawsuit has been dismissed unless the p a r t ies ag ree to such contin u i n g authority or the court retains j u risdiction for such purpose. I n Appelle e s ’ view, because the fees were provided p ursuant to the German Compact, any review of feesK.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 13

w o uld constitute a review of the Compact, which would amount to an attempt to enforce a settlement in violation of Kokkonen

.

. . . .
W e disag ree. [ The o b

j e c tors are] not seek i n g to implement any aspect of the German Compact or a

ny o f its constitu ent parts. [ They are] not contendin g, a s did the claimants in Kokkonen
, that some provision o f

a settle m e n t (here, the Compact or its components) obli ga t e s the Appellees to take the a ction [ the object o r s seek]

. Rather, [ the objecto r s ] merely seek[ ] to adjudicate a lawy er’s entitlement t o retain fees earned, at lea s t in part, for services rendered in connection with a case within a district court’s jurisdiction.

Id. at 97–99 (citations omitted).

B

L i k e w i se, here, Plaintiffs a re “not seeking to implement any aspect” of the Settlement Ag r eement or “ a n y of its constituent parts.” Id. at 9 9. Nor are they “ co n t e n d i n g

. . . that some p rovision” o f the Settlement Ag reement or “its components[ ] oblig ates” Defendants to pay att o r n e y s’ fees for the monitoring of post-settlement compliance. Id. I n s tead, they arg ue that they are the “prevailing party ” un d er the relevant federal statutes—e.g ., the A DA, Section 504, and the I DEA—and seek to c ollect attorney s’ fees on this basis. As such, the fact that the d istrict court lacks ancillary jurisdictionK.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 14

t o enforce the Settlement A g r eement under Kokkonen i s irrelevant.

T h e district court’s error was in failing to recog n iz e t h e distinction between ancilla r y jurisdiction to enforce a settlement a g r eement and ancilla r y jurisdiction over an attorney ’s f

e es dispute. As discussed a bove, the district court has broad
, i n h erent authority o ver collateral matters such a s attorney ’s fees, a

n d such ancillary jurisdiction ex tends bey ond dismissal of the underly ing lawsuit. See, e.g. , Ferrant e , 364 F .3d at 1041 (citing cases); Zucker
, 192 F .3d at 1329; see also I

n r e A ustrian & German Bank H olocaust Litig. , 3 17 F .3d at 98 (“W henever a district court has federal jurisdiction over a c a se, it retains ancillary j u r i sdiction a fter dismissal to adjudica t e collateral matters such as attorney ’s fees.” (discussing Cooter & Gell , 496 U.S. 384)).

Cons e q uently
, while the Settlement Ag reement (as incorporated into the district court’s dismissal order) limited the district court’s ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the parties’ settlement, it did not affect the court’s a ncillary jurisdiction over an a ttorney ’s f ees disp u t e

. U nlike its ancillary jurisdiction to enfo rce the Settlement Ag r eement, the court’s ancill a r y jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney s’ fees need not have been ex plicitly “retained.”

I n Schmidt
, we rejected the defendant’s arg ument that the di s trict court had erred in “ r etaining jurisdiction over the question of attorney ’s fees a f t e r the consent judg ment h ad been e ntered.” 544 F .2d at 414. W e reasoned that “[ a] l l o w a nce of attorney ’s fees ‘is part of the historic e quity jurisdiction of the federal courts,’ and the district c ourt could properly retain juris diction to determine appropriate attorney ’s f

e e s a ncillary to the c a se.” Id. (citing Sprague
,K.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 15

307 U.S. at 164). Bu t n either Schmidt nor any other case requires tha t a district court e x plicitly “retain” a ncillary jurisdiction to a d

judicate a post-judg ment motion for attorney ’s f

e e s

. See In re Austrian & German Bank H o locaust Litig. , 317 F .3d at 97–99 (concluding that t h e district court had ancillary jurisdiction over the f ee d i s p u t e even thoug h the complaint “had been dismissed without any reservation of continuing court authority ”); cf. Peacock
, 516 U

. S

. at 3 56 (“W e have reserved the use of anci l l a r y jurisdiction in subsequent proce eding s for the ex e rcise o f a federal c o u rt’s inherent power to enforce its judg ments.”). Similarly
, Defendants have identified no autho ri t y for the proposition that a district c ourt’s dismissal order can d ivest (or o therwis e impose a time limit upon) the court’s inherent jurisdiction over a collateral attorney ’s fees dispute. See Cooter & Gell
, 496 U.S. at 3 9 6 ( “ L i k e the imposition o f costs, attorney ’s f

ees, and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is n ot a judg ment on th e m e r i t s of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue

. . . . Such a determination may be m ade after the principal suit has been terminated.”).

I t bears repeating that Plaintiffs a re seeking attorney s’ fees pursuant to federal law. This is n ot an attorney -client f ee dispute that coul d be resolved in state court as a breach o f cont r a c t claim. As the Seventh Circuit has said, “[ t] he purpose of the ancillary

jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . is to e nable a federal court to render a judg ment that resolves the entire case before it and to effectuate its judg ment once it has been rendered.” Shapo v

. Engle
, 463 F .3d 641, 644–45 (7th Cir. 2006). “I t is not to enable a f ederal c ourt to encroach on the jurisdicti o n r eserved to the states merely because the p arties would p r e f er to have a federal court resolve their future disputes . . . .” Id. at 645.K.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 16

Moreover, even assuming that Plaintiffs could recast their motion as a c laim for attorney s’ f ees in a separate federal lawsuit, it is not “necessary ” for them to do so. Schmidt
, 544 F .2d at 414 (citation and internal quotation m a r k s omitted). Requiring a separat e l awsuit – that hy pothetically would invoke federal question jurisdiction – not only would interfere with the district court’s powers to render a judg ment that r eso l v e s the entire case and to effectuate its judg ment, but al so w ould harm judicial e conomy and e fficiency

. Practically speaking
, any such separate “attorney s’ f ees o nly ” lawsuit likely would be referred to the distric t j u d g e w ho presided over the underly ing lawsuit any

way

. Thus, we hold that the d istrict court has a ncillary jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney s’ fees.

IV

Our holding is limited to the jurisdictional qu e s t ion. W h ether Plaintiffs a

re entitled to attorney s’ fees is a question for the district court on remand. See Reiser , 605 F .2d at 1140 (“W e

. . . ex press no opinion co n c erning the propriety of an award in this case, a matter w i t h in the d iscretion o f the trial judg e.”).

F urther, the ex ercise o f a ncillary jurisdiction over an attorney ’s fees dispute is discretionary

. See In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig. , 317 F .3d at 101 (“W e have previously recog niz e d that the e x isten c e of a ncillary jurisdiction to a d

j u d i c ate a fee dispute after the d ismissal o f

a lawsuit calls for the sound ex ercise of a dis t r i c t c o urt’s discretion whether to e ntertain the merits of the dispute

. . . .”); c f. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 4 4 (1991)K.C. V

. T O R L A K S O N 17
(“B ecause of their very potency , inherent p o w ers must be

ex e r cised with restraint and discretion.”).

CONCLUSION

On remand, the d istrict court in its discretion will decide whether to ex ercise ancillary jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney s’ fees.

W e need not address any other arg uments raised o n appeal.

REVERSED and REMANDED.