*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 3, 2006*

Decided May 8, 2006

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2208

RODOSVALDO C. POZO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JANE HEIN, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 02-C-0414

Rudolph T. Randa, 

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Rodosvaldo Pozo challenges the dismissal of three discrete claims among the

22 he and a fellow Wisconsin inmate leveled against 30 different prison employees

in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm the judgment.

Pozo, who at all relevant times has been confined at the Wisconsin Secure

Program Facility, contests the dismissal of his lawsuit only as to Claims 1, 4, and

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-2208 Page 2

14. In Claim 1 he alleges that four of the defendants refused to serve him breakfast

for nine days in December 2001 during Ramadan, a time of dawn-to-dusk fasting. 

The deprivation, he says, ostensibly was prompted by his refusal to remove a towel

from his head but really was motivated by a desire to retaliate for several specific

lawsuits. In Claim 4 Pozo alleges that two other defendants engineered his

demotion to a more-restrictive custody classification for a period of just over two

weeks at the end of 2001, again out of retaliation for his lawsuits. And, finally, in

Claim 14 he alleges that three of the defendants confiscated an order issued by the

judge presiding over one of his lawsuits after he mailed it to his co-plaintiff in this

case. Ultimately the district court dismissed all three claims at summary

judgment, the first on the merits and the other two for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. The defendants rest on lack of exhaustion with respect to

Claims 4 and 14, so we will not discuss the merits of either claim. See Perez v. Wis.

Dep’t of Corrs., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). Our review is de novo. Thornton

v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 693 (7th Cir. 2005).

Pozo’s challenge to the grant of summary judgment on Claim 1 ignores the

procedural posture of this appeal. The defendants introduced evidence, which

wasn’t contested, that Pozo was denied breakfast because he refused to comply with

a prison rule requiring that he first remove clothing from his head so that guards

could determine whether he had a weapon. The defendants’ enforcement of this

rule did not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543

(7th Cir. 2006) (holding that defendants did not violate Eighth Amendment by

denying food to inmate who refused orders to put on pants and remove sock from

his head as a condition of being served). It does not matter that, partly in response

to Pozo’s grievance, prison administrators later concluded that future intransigence

should be met with a disciplinary case instead of withholding food. The defendants

acted consistently with the prison rule as it existed at the time, though Pozo would

not have a claim under § 1983 even if that was not the case. See Scott v. Edinburg,

346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that § 1983 provides a remedy for

constitutional violation, not violations of state statutes and regulations); Archie v.

City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that violation of

state law does not give rise to actionable § 1983 claim unless it independently

violates the Constitution or federal law). Moreover, although Pozo alleged in his

complaint that the defendants enforced the rule in retaliation for his litigiousness,

he did not contradict their statements denying knowledge of his lawsuits (none of

which involve the four defendants). See Hayes v. Potter, 310 F.3d 979, 982-83 (7th

Cir. 2002) (holding that, in employment context, employer cannot retaliate when it

is unaware of any complaints). In any event, given his rule violation he could not

establish that retaliation was a substantial motivating factor for the defendants’

actions. See Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 942 (7th Cir. 2004); Babcock v. White,

102 F.3d 267, 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
No. 05-2208 Page 3

Pozo’s challenge to the dismissal of Claim 4 is frivolous. The defendants

acknowledge that Pozo submitted a grievance to an Inmate Complaint Examiner

alleging that his custody classification had been changed in retaliation for his

litigation activities. The defendants also acknowledge that Pozo sent an appeal of

the warden’s decision to a Corrections Complaint Examiner (“CCE”), but they

introduced evidence that Pozo took no further action after the CCE returned the

unprocessed appeal to Pozo because it was not signed. Prisoners must exhaust

administrative remedies in the manner prescribed by administrative rules, Conyers

v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2005); Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025

(7th Cir. 2002), and the Wisconsin prison system requires that appeals be signed,

Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.09(1)(b). Pozo’s attempt here to show that he fully

exhausted another grievance that challenged his custody classification on a

different basis is beside the point. Accordingly, there is no legitimate dispute about

Pozo’s failure to exhaust this claim.

Pozo’s challenge to the district court’s exhaustion analysis on Claim 14 is

more substantial but nonetheless without merit. The warden dismissed Pozo’s

grievance on that claim, and at summary judgment a CCE submitted an affidavit

attesting that her search for a corresponding appeal had been fruitless. Pozo,

though, responded by submitting his copy of a CCE’s recommendation to the

Secretary of the Department of Corrections that his appeal concerning “Complaint

File # SMCI-2002-9110" be dismissed. The district court took the position that this

recommendation must be unrelated to the grievance underlying Claim 14 because

the CCE’s one-line reference to Pozo’s grievance mentions a disciplinary case filed

against the inmate from whom the defendants seized the court order. But the

grievance number on the CCE’s recommendation matches the grievance underlying

Claim 14, and the examiner’s recommendation was to dismiss Pozo’s appeal of that

grievance “based on the rejection summary of the Inmate Complaint Examiner.” 

That would be enough to defeat summary judgment if the only question was

whether the CCE’s recommendation concerns the grievance underlying Claim 14. 

The district court also noted, however, that the CCE’s recommendation is not the

final step in the administrative process because the Secretary may accept or reject

that recommendation or return the matter to the CCE for further investigation. 

See Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 310.14. In this case the CCE’s report bears a “Print

Date” of April 15, 2002, more than three weeks after Pozo’s § 1983 complaint was

signed and notarized. That complaint was already filed by the district court on

April 23, 2002, so it is apparent that Pozo did not wait for the Secretary’s decision

before including this claim in his complaint. Indeed, Pozo has never said that he

got an answer from the Secretary before bringing suit. For that reason the court

was correct to dismiss the claim. See Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir.

2002); Perez, 182 F.3d at 534-35.

AFFIRMED.