NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

BETHANY C., Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.C., G.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD509925

The Honorable Brian K. Ishikawa, Retired Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Higley

By Steven Czop

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Nicholas Chapman-Hushek

Counsel for Appellee
BETHANY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Bethany C. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her two minor children, J.C. and G.C., on 

the ground of 15 months in out-of-home placement pursuant to court order

under A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(8)(c). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 One December day, nine-year-old C.A. called her father 

Joshua—Mother’s ex-husband—from Mother’s house. Joshua arrived at

Mother’s house and found C.A. and her two half-siblings, J.C. and G.C., 

home alone. Joshua called the police. They responded and unsuccessfully 

attempted to contact Mother. Mother had gone to a bar and left C.A. in 

charge of three-year-old J.C. and one-year-old G.C. 

¶3 As a result, the Arizona Department of Economic Security1

investigated and instituted in-home services, including family preservation 

and 24-hour daycare. While working with the Department, Mother 

exhibited basic parenting skills, but needed to improve her parenting skills, 

such as picking up on the children’s social cues, and frequently had her 

children nap, demonstrating her lack of patience with the children. 

Meanwhile, her home was infested with cockroaches and often in disarray, 

with food on the floor and toys throughout. 

¶4 Although Mother continued services, the Department 

suspected that she was still leaving her children home alone. That suspicion 

was confirmed in February 2012 when the case manager received a report

that Mother had walked around her apartment complex looking for 

someone to watch her children overnight. She left her children—with no 

 

1 The Arizona Department of Economic Security is substituted for the 

Arizona Department of Child Safety in this matter. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 

27; S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (enacted). 

For convenience, we refer to both as “the Department.”
BETHANY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

3

clothes, diapers, or shoes—with a neighbor, who had trouble finding 

Mother the next day to return the children. 

¶5 The Department consequently intervened and placed the 

children in an out-of-home placement. A couple months later, they were 

transferred to Joshua’s home. The case manager discussed with Mother her 

ability to provide for the children’s care, safety, and stability. He noted

specifically that Mother had mental-health issues, had not bonded with her 

children, had left the children home alone or with unwilling caregivers and 

strangers, and that her home was cluttered and infested with bugs. The 

Department offered Mother parent aide services, a psychological 

consultation, and supervised visitation and petitioned for dependency. The 

juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and ordered family 

reunification as the case plan. 

¶6 To eliminate the safety threats and risk factors identified in 

the case plan, Mother was expected to consistently visit her children, accept 

the parent aide’s recommendations, address mental-health concerns, accept 

responsibility for her actions, and complete a psychological evaluation and 

follow the recommended services. To help Mother, the Department offered 

psychological consultation; a psychological evaluation; and parent aide, 

family preservation, and transportation services. 

¶7 Mother completed parenting skills classes and had 

supervised visitation with the children. The supervised visits 

“successfully” closed after seven months. Mother had gained parenting 

skills, understood the children’s expectations, could secure their safety, and 

was nurturing them.

¶8 Mother then began unsupervised visits, but several months 

later, the Department suspended those visits. Both children reported to the 

case manager that during the unsupervised visits, Mother spanked them, 

was mean, did not give them food, put them in time-out for long periods of 

time, and had them nap for long periods of time. The children’s parent aide

reported that they would stall going to the visits. Because of the children’s 

reports, the case manager contacted a clinical psychologist. The 

psychologist opined that “the visits [were] traumatizing to the children” 

and recommended suspending them. 

¶9 Meanwhile, the Department offered services to Mother to 

address her mental-health issues. She engaged in individual therapy and 

psychological evaluations. Mother completed one psychological evaluation 

in June 2012. The psychologist diagnosed Mother with an Adjustment 
BETHANY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

4

Disorder with Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood. She recommended that 

Mother participate in individual trauma-based therapy, parenting sessions, 

and parent aide services. Eight months later, Mother had a follow-up 

session. The psychologist again recommended individual therapy 

services—this time with a forensically-informed doctoral-level therapist—

and parent-child interaction therapy. 

¶10 Thereafter, Mother engaged in individual-trauma therapy to 

address, among other things, her history of domestic violence. Mother’s 

individual therapy closed out because she met the treatment goals. Her 

group therapy closed out, however, because she stopped attending.

¶11 Mother and the children consequently engaged in family 

relational and filial therapies, child-parent psychotherapy, and parent-child 

interaction therapy. Their therapist reported that during filial therapy 

sessions, Mother was unable to identify “a comfortable level of comfort and 

affection with them.” When the children were affectionate, “oftentimes she 

interpreted it as invading her space or being rude or being mean in some 

way.” Mother often used “a very harsh tone” with the children and called 

them mean; misinterpreted their age-appropriate actions; used excessive 

time-outs, without explaining why they were in time-out or redirecting 

them; and could not comprehend the children’s cues. The therapist’s efforts 

to redirect Mother were unsuccessful. 

¶12 As a result of Mother’s actions, the children “became more 

subdued,” “[m]ore anxious,” and sometimes asked Mother if she was mad 

at them. The therapist also observed the children with their foster parents

and found them to be much different. The children were affectionate with 

their foster parents, constantly engaged them in their play, and felt very 

comfortable directing and asking them for help. The therapist described 

them as carefree, playful, talkative, and imaginative.

¶13 Mother next engaged in parent-child interaction therapy with 

another therapist in October 2013, but that service was discontinued after 

four sessions. Mother was “very passive” during sessions and 

“argumentative” with this therapist. The therapist ultimately 

recommended that the sessions be discontinued because G.C. was 

“becoming more anxious and withdrawn.” 

¶14 In January 2014, a third therapist conducted a bonding/bestinterest assessment with Mother, the children, and the foster mother. The 

therapist noted, “some attachment exist[ed] between the children and their 

mother, but it would appear to be an anxious attachment.” They were 
BETHANY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

5

“hesitant in their interactions with her and nonresponsive to her 

directions.” In contrast, they “played independently with the foster mom,” 

“utilize[d] her as a secure base,” and were “relaxed and followed her 

directions well.”

¶15 Mother’s interactions with the children “were mechanical,”

and “she demonstrated no empathy or warmth towards the children” and 

seemed “unable to recognize their needs for nurturance and warmth.” The 

therapist opined that the children were in need of permanency and stability 

and that the Department should identify an adoptive home for the children 

and pursue permanent placement. 

¶16 Mother subsequently employed her own psychologist for a

best-interest evaluation. He diagnosed Mother with Bipolar II Disorder, 

current/most recent hypomanic. This psychologist noted that in contrast to 

the reports he had received about Mother, she “was not only aware of their 

individual needs and interests but she was also prepared to address them 

in a comfortable way for the children.” He recommended that she receive 

individual-trauma therapy and have visitation with the children. 

¶17 When the children had met their goals and were doing well 

in their foster home, counseling sessions were discontinued. One of their 

therapists opined that they should remain with their foster parents and that 

they would benefit from permanency through adoption because they 

would have a sense of safety and security and thrive in their foster parents’ 

care. That same month, the Department moved for termination of Mother’s 

parental rights. It contended that the children were being cared for in an 

out-of-home placement and had been in an out-of-home placement for a 

cumulative total of fifteen months or more pursuant to court order. 

¶18 Before the severance hearing and as relevant here, Mother 

objected to the admission and use of psychological reports “unless the State 

presents the author of the report and/or documentations and removes all 

statements” that originated from someone other than the author. Mother’s 

attorney subpoenaed the psychologist the Department had retained. The 

psychologist later requested release, however, because Mother refused to 

pay her. 

¶19 At the severance hearing, the State and Mother stipulated to 

admission of exhibits 2, 3, 4, 32, and 34. Mother’s exhibits 3 and 4 were 

copies of the psychologist’s reports and exhibit 2 also included copies. The 

State’s exhibits 32 and 34 were also copies of the reports. The juvenile court 

quashed the psychologist’s subpoena because Mother would not pay her, 
BETHANY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

6

but gave Mother the opportunity to show that she was not required to.

Mother did not do so, but reiterated her same arguments in a motion for 

reconsideration, which the trial court denied.

¶20 Joshua testified that the children were his daughter’s halfsiblings and that they had bonded with his family and were comfortable in 

the family’s home. He explained that his family could provide the children 

with a safe, stable, and loving home and that they were currently meeting 

and could continue to meet the children’s needs. He also testified that if 

given the opportunity, his family would adopt the children. 

¶21 The case manager testified that the children had been in an 

out-of-home placement pursuant to court order for 34 cumulative months. 

He also testified that the children’s current placement, their older halfsibling’s home, was willing to adopt them and that the foster parents would 

be able to meet the children’s needs.

¶22 After considering the evidence and counsels’ arguments, the 

juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 8–533(B)(8)(c), finding that they had been in an out-of-home placement 

for over fifteen months pursuant to court order and that termination was in 

the children’s best interests. Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶23 As relevant to our disposition of this appeal, Mother argues 

that the juvenile court violated her due process rights by quashing the 

psychologist’s subpoena, that it erred by admitting the psychologist’s

reports without her testimony, and that the evidence did not support its 

finding that a substantial likelihood existed that Mother was incapable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care in the near future. We review 

constitutional claims de novo, State v. Nordstrom, 230 Ariz. 110, 117 ¶ 27, 280 

P.3d 1244, 1251 (2012), but because Mother raises the due process claim for 

the first time on appeal, we review for fundamental error only, see Ruben M. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 239 ¶¶ 15–16, 282 P.3d 437, 440 

(App. 2012). Mother therefore bears the burden of establishing that error 

occurred, the error was fundamental, and the error caused her prejudice. 

Id. at 239 ¶ 16, 282 P.3d at 440. Moreover, because a juvenile court has broad 

discretion in admitting evidence, we will not disturb its decision absent a 

clear abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice. Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 82–83 ¶ 19, 107 P.3d 923, 928–29 (App. 2005). 

¶24 Here, we need not address whether the juvenile court erred 

in quashing the subpoena or whether it properly admitted her reports 
BETHANY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

7

because any arguable error was harmless. See State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 

205 ¶ 39, 84 P.3d 456, 470 (2004) (providing that error is harmless when “the 

reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 

contribute to the verdict”); Alice M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 237 Ariz. 70, 

73 ¶ 12, 345 P.3d 125, 128 (App. 2015) (providing that even if the juvenile 

court erred in admitting disputed exhibits, the error was harmless).

Sufficient evidence, even without the psychologist’s reports, supports each 

element of termination on the ground of 15 months in out-of-home 

placement. 

¶25 We review a juvenile court’s termination order for an abuse 

of discretion. Angel S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 132, 136 ¶ 12, 347 

P.3d 578, 582 (App. 2015). We accept the court’s factual findings unless no 

reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm a 

severance order unless it is clearly erroneous. Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 508 ¶ 1, 200 P.3d 1003, 1005 (App. 2008). 

¶26 As pertinent here, to terminate parental rights for time in an 

out-of-home placement, the juvenile court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence that (1) the children had been in an out-of-home 

placement for a cumulative total period of fifteen months or longer 

pursuant to court order; (2) the parent has been unable to remedy the 

circumstances that caused the children to be in an out-of-home placement; 

and (3) a substantial likelihood exists that the parent will be incapable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. 

A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(8)(c); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41, 110 P.3d 

1013, 1022 (2005). In its determination, the court must consider “the 

availability of reunification services to the parent and the participation of 

the parent in these services.” A.R.S. § 8–533(D). Moreover, the court must 

find by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the children’s 

best interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 288 ¶ 41, 110 P.3d at 1022.

¶27 Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

order terminating Mother’s parental rights and finding that the termination 

was in the children’s best interests, the court did not abuse its discretion. 

First, the record shows that on the date of the severance hearing, the 

children had been in an out-of-home placement pursuant to court order for 

34 cumulative months. Second, the record shows that the Department made 

diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services for Mother, 

including parent aide services, supervised and unsupervised visitations, a 

psychological consultation, two psychological evaluations, a bonding/ best 

interest assessment, individual-doctoral level-trauma therapy, parenting 

classes, and family therapy, which included parent-child interaction 
BETHANY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

8

therapy. Although Mother participated in these services, she failed to make 

the necessary behavioral changes that allowed for family reunification. In 

parent-child interaction therapy, Mother was passive during play sessions 

and argued with the therapist about parenting techniques. In filial therapy 

sessions, she interpreted the children’s affection as invading her space or 

being rude or mean. 

¶28 Moreover, although Mother was successful during 

supervised visits, the record shows that she did not internalize the 

parenting skills she previously learned. The children reported that during 

the unsupervised visits, she spanked them, was mean, did not give them 

food, put them in time-out for long periods of time, and made them nap for 

long periods of time. In fact, a psychologist opined that the visits were

traumatizing the children and therefore recommended suspending the 

visits. Consequently, despite knowing that she was expected to accept the 

parent aide’s recommendations and responsibility for her actions, Mother

would not use the suggestions for extended periods of time and instead

“revert[ed] back to her previous parenting paradigm.”

¶29 The record also shows that Mother was unable to remedy the 

circumstances that caused the children to be in an out-of-home placement. 

The Department was initially concerned about Mother’s failure to bond 

with the children and her mental-health issues. Even though Mother 

engaged in a variety of services, including therapy sessions by herself and 

with her children, she was unable to bond with them. Further, although one 

psychologist noted that Mother had bonded with the children, all others 

involved noted that Mother’s interactions with her children remained 

mechanical and that she demonstrated no empathy or warmth towards her 

children and was unable to recognize their needs. This continued even after 

receiving and completing individual-trauma therapy. Consequently, the 

record reveals that a substantial likelihood exists that Mother will not be 

capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the 

near future.

¶30 Finally, the record shows that termination was in the 

children’s best interests. See Angel S., 237 Ariz. at 141 ¶ 33, 347 P.3d at 587

(“In determining whether the child would benefit, relevant factors to 

consider include whether the current placement is meeting the child’s 

needs, whether there is an adoption plan in place, and whether the child is 

adoptable.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The case 

manager and the children’s foster father testified that their foster family 

was willing to adopt them. The case manager and foster father also testified 

that the foster family was meeting and could continue to meet the children’s 
BETHANY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

9

needs. Several individuals who observed the children with Mother and

with their foster parents noted that, in contrast to their interactions with 

Mother, the children were affectionate with their foster parents and were 

comfortable directing and taking directions from them. Consequently, even 

without the psychologist’s reports, reasonable evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights and finding that 

the termination was in the children’s best interests. 

CONCLUSION

¶31 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.