### procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual

prejudice. See 

### NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2).

First, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 

### 566 U.S. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant claimed that he had good cause because he was not appointed counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings. We conclude that this argument lacked merit. The appointment of counsel was discretionary in the first post-conviction proceedings, see 

### NRS 34.750(1), and appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or provide an explanation for why he could not raise this claim earlier. Further, this court has recently held that Martinez 

### does not apply to Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel, 

### 130 Nev. , P.3d , (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014). Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in Martinez 

### would not provide good cause for this late and successive petition. Second, appellant claimed that he had good cause due to recent cases, Lafler v. Cooper, 

### 566 US. , 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 

### 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), to assert that his counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate additional plea offers from the State. Appellant's good-cause argument was without merit because his case was final when Cooper 

### and Frye 

### were decided, and he failed to demonstrate that the cases would apply retroactively to him. Even if Cooper 

### and Frye 

### announced new rules of constitutional law, he failed to allege facts to support that he met either exception to the general principle that such rules do not apply retroactively to cases which were

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### ealready final when the new rules were announced. 

### See Colwell v. State,

118 Nev. 807, 816-17, 59 P.3d 463, 469-70 (2002). Moreover, appellant merely presumed that there were additional plea offers and provided no factual allegation that there were actual plea offers that his counsel failed to communicate to him. A bare claim, such as this one, was insufficient to demonstrate that appellant was entitled to relief. 

### See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

Finally, appellant failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the petition. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Hardesty 

# 2,

, J. Douglas ist7'€

1

CHERRY, J., concurring:

Although I would extend the equitable rule recognized in 

### Martinez to this case because appellant was convicted of murder and is facing a severe sentence, 

### see Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. , P.3d (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014) (Cherry, J., dissenting), I concur in the judgment on appeal in this case because the State pleaded laches under NRS 34.800(2) and appellant failed to rebut the presumption of

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10) 1947A ceoprejudice to the State.

cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge Ronald Jeffrey Mulder Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

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