SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

BARBARA ANN LUBIN, a registered ) Arizona Supreme Court 

voter, ) No. CV-06-0321-AP/EL 

 ) 

 Plaintiff/Appellee, ) Maricopa County 

 ) Superior Court 

 v. ) No. CV2006-012777 

 ) 

DOUGLAS E. THOMAS, an individual, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant/Appellant, ) O P I N I O N

 ) 

 ) 

SANDRA DOWLING, in her official ) 

capacity as Superintendent of ) 

Schools of Maricopa County, ) 

Arizona; HELEN PURCELL, in her ) 

official capacity as Recorder of ) 

Maricopa County, Arizona; KAREN ) 

OSBORNE, in her official capacity ) 

as Director of Elections of ) 

Maricopa County, Arizona; and DON ) 

STAPLEY, FULTON BROCK, ANDREW ) 

KUNASEK, MAX WILSON and MARY ROSE ) 

WILCOX, in their official ) 

capacities as Members of the ) 

Board of Supervisors of Maricopa ) 

County, Arizona, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants/Appellees. ) 

 ) 

__________________________________) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Ruth Harris Hilliard, Judge

AFFIRMED

________________________________________________________________

SHUGHART THOMSON & KILROY PC Phoenix

 By Thomas K. Irvine

 Andrew S. Jacob

Attorneys for Barbara Ann Lubin
2

Douglas E. Thomas Phoenix

In Propria Persona

ANDREW P. THOMAS, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY Phoenix

 By M. Colleen Connor

Attorneys for Sandra Dowling, Helen Purcell, Karen Osborne, Don 

Stapley, Fulton Brock, Andrew Kunasek, Max Wilson, and Mary Rose 

Wilcox

________________________________________________________________

B A L E S, Justice 

¶1 This case concerns a challenge to the nomination 

petitions of Douglas Thomas, a candidate for the governing board 

of the Phoenix Union High School District, Ward 3. Thomas 

appealed from a superior court judgment holding that he lacked 

sufficient valid petition signatures to be placed on the 

November 7, 2006 ballot. The key issue is whether the County 

Recorder may invalidate signatures for reasons other than those 

specifically alleged by the challenger. On September 15, 2006, 

this Court issued an order affirming the superior court’s 

judgment. This written opinion explains the basis for our 

decision. 

¶2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 16-351(A) (Supp. 2005). 

I. Background 

¶3 To be placed on the ballot, a candidate for a school 

district governing board must submit nomination petitions signed 

by a sufficient number of qualified electors. Id. § 16-322(A) 

(11). The number of required signatures generally is a 
3

specified percentage of the district’s total registered voters, 

but not more than 400. Id. 

¶4 Thomas needed 400 signatures to appear on the November 

7, 2006 ballot; he filed 481. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351(A), 

Barbara Lubin filed a lawsuit challenging 160 of the signatures. 

As required by the statute, her complaint specified “the 

petition number, line number and basis for the challenge for 

each signature being challenged.” Id. 

¶5 When an elector challenges signatures on a candidate’s 

nomination petitions, the challenged signatures must be 

verified. Id. The County Recorder performs this task as the 

public official charged with maintaining the voting register. 

See id. §§ 16-161 to -162 (1996). The verification procedure 

resembles that used in the context of a challenge to ballot 

measure petitions, in which the County Recorder must “determine 

which signatures of individuals . . . shall be disqualified.” 

Id. § 19-121.02(A) (2002). 

¶6 After being served with Lubin’s challenge, the 

Maricopa County Recorder reviewed the challenged signatures and 

found 110 of them invalid. Some of these signatures were 

invalidated on grounds other than those alleged in the 

complaint. For example, Lubin challenged the signature found at 

line one of petition eleven on the grounds that the elector was 

not registered to vote. The County Recorder, on the other hand, 
4

located this elector on the county register but invalidated the 

signature because the elector was registered to vote in another 

district. As a result of the 110 disqualified signatures, 

Thomas was left with only 371 valid signatures, 29 short of the 

required 400. 

¶7 In response, Thomas argued that the County Recorder 

had exceeded her authority by disqualifying signatures for 

reasons other than those alleged in Lubin’s challenge. The 

superior court rejected this argument, found that Thomas lacked 

sufficient valid signatures, and enjoined his name from 

appearing on the November 7, 2006 ballot. The superior court 

announced its decision in a minute entry on September 1, 2006, 

and entered judgment on September 4, 2006. 

¶8 Thomas filed a notice of appeal on September 6, 2006, 

within the five-day limit provided in A.R.S. § 16-351(A). He 

took no further action, however, to prosecute his appeal. On 

Thursday, September 14, 2006, having received no briefing from 

either party, the Court sua sponte conducted a telephonic 

hearing to inquire as to the status of the case. Because the 

deadline for the printing of absentee ballots was Sunday, 

September 17, 2006, the Court at that point effectively had only 

one business day to consider and decide this matter. 

 
5

II. Laches 

¶9 Initially, we note that this appeal might have been 

dismissed based on the equitable doctrine of laches. The Court 

has often applied this doctrine to actions challenging the legal 

sufficiency of initiative measures. Harris v. Purcell, 193 

Ariz. 409, 412 ¶ 15, 973 P.2d 1166, 1169 (1998); Mathieu v. 

Mahoney, 174 Ariz. 456, 458-59, 851 P.2d 81, 83-84 (1993);

Kromko v. Superior Court, 168 Ariz. 51, 57, 811 P.2d 12, 18 

(1991). The laches doctrine also applies to actions challenging 

candidate nomination petitions. 

¶10 In the context of election matters, the laches 

doctrine seeks to prevent dilatory conduct and will bar a claim 

if a party’s unreasonable delay prejudices the opposing party or 

the administration of justice. Harris, 193 Ariz. at 412 ¶¶ 16-

17, 973 P.2d at 1169 (citing Mathieu, 174 Ariz. at 459, 851 P.2d 

at 84). Time is of particular importance because all disputes 

must be resolved before the printing of absentee ballots. Id.

at 412 ¶ 15, 973 P.2d at 1169. Unreasonable delay can therefore 

prejudice the administration of justice by compelling the court 

to “steamroll through . . . delicate legal issues in order to 

meet” the ballot printing deadlines. Mathieu, 174 Ariz. at 459, 

851 P.2d at 84 (quoting State ex rel. Fidanque v. Paulus, 688 

P.2d 1303, 1308 (Or. 1984)). For that reason, merely complying 

with the time limits in A.R.S. § 16-351(A) for filing a notice 
6

of appeal may be insufficient if the appellant does not also 

promptly prosecute the appeal. Cf. Klebba v. Carpenter, 213 

Ariz. 91, ___ ¶ 10, 139 P.3d 609, 611 (2006)(“The statute . . . 

places the burden to act with celerity not only on the superior 

court, but also on the party challenging nomination 

petitions.”). 

¶11 Here, Thomas’s failure to diligently pursue his appeal 

left this Court a very short time in which to review and decide 

the matter. Given the relative simplicity of the issues before 

us, and because laches was not raised as a defense, we have 

resolved this case on its merits. We caution, however, that a 

party’s failure to diligently prosecute an election appeal may 

in future cases result in a dismissal for laches. 

III. Disqualifying Signatures 

¶12 On the merits, Thomas’s appeal turns on A.R.S. § 16-

351(A). This statute requires an elector challenging a 

candidate’s nomination petitions to “specify in the action the 

petition number, line number and basis for the challenge for 

each signature being challenged.” Failure to do so will result 

in the dismissal of the action. Id. Thomas does not contend 

that Lubin’s challenge failed to specify a basis for challenging 

particular signatures. Thomas instead argues that once Lubin 

had alleged certain grounds for questioning a signature, § 16-
7

351(A) prevented the County Recorder from relying on a different 

basis to invalidate the signature. 

¶13 “We review issues of statutory interpretation de 

novo.” Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, ___ ¶ 23, 139 P.3d 612, 

616 (2006). 

¶14 By its terms, A.R.S. § 16-351(A) does not indicate 

whether the County Recorder may disqualify signatures on bases 

other than those specifically alleged in the complaint. 

Accordingly, we look outside the statute to determine its 

meaning. “To discern the [legislative] intent the court will 

examine the policy behind the statute, the evil sought to be 

remedied, the context, the language, and the historical 

background of the statute.” Moreno, 213 Ariz. at ___ ¶ 24, 139 

P.3d at 616 (citing Clifton v. Decillis, 187 Ariz. 112, 114, 927 

P.2d 772, 774 (1996)). 

¶15 Candidates are required to obtain nomination petitions 

to ensure that they have adequate support from eligible voters 

to warrant being placed on the ballot. See Adams v. Bolin, 77 

Ariz. 316, 320, 271 P.2d 472, 475 (1954) (stating that the 

purpose of requiring nomination petitions is to “make the 

requirements stringent enough to discourage those [candidates] 

who do not for an instant merit the voter's consideration, yet 

not keep out those who are serious in their efforts and have a 

reasonable number of supporters”). If the County Recorder’s 
8

review of the challenged signatures were limited solely to the 

reasons stated in the challenging document, this principle would 

be disserved. It makes little sense to allow an inadequately 

supported candidate to be placed on the ballot simply because 

the challenger misidentified in the complaint why certain 

signatures are invalid. 

¶16 Additionally, the legislative history of A.R.S. § 16-

351(A) is instructive on the purposes behind the requirement 

that a challenger specify the petition number, line number, and 

basis for each signature challenge. The primary purpose is to 

“allow the Elections office to more efficiently do preliminary 

work to deal with candidate challenges, and . . . eliminate the 

need to go to court in some cases.” Ariz. State Senate Fact 

Sheet for H.B. 2101, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1999). 

Before the amendment to A.R.S. § 16-351(A), signature 

verification was often difficult for the County Recorder, and 

the amendment was meant to simplify the process. As the 

committee minutes indicate: 

Helen Purcell, Recorder, Maricopa County, testified 

that the Recorders [sic] Office is in support of H.B. 

2101. She said this legislation gives her office a 

better idea of what to look for in the challenge 

process. It is extremely difficult for her office if 

it does not know what the challenges are. This 

legislation will make it easier for the Recorder’s 

Office to locate the information. 
9

Minutes of House Comm. on Judiciary, 44th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 

(Ariz. Jan. 27, 1999) (“House Minutes”). 

¶17 The pleading requirement of A.R.S. § 16-351(A) also 

serves to discourage frivolous challenges. As Representative 

Gerard explained to the Arizona House Judiciary Committee, “a 

person can challenge a nomination just to cause trouble. This 

bill requires the challenger to show that some evidence exists 

for the challenge.” House Minutes. 

¶18 Nothing in the legislative history of A.R.S. § 16-

351(A) indicates that the legislature intended to limit the 

County Recorder’s review of questioned signatures only to the 

bases stated in the complaint. If a challenger is able, 

consistent with A.R.S. § 16-351(A) and the requirements of Rule 

11 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, to allege particular 

grounds for challenging signatures, the statutory purposes are 

not served by holding that a signature should be treated as 

valid merely because the County Recorder has found it invalid 

for a reason other than that alleged. 

¶19 We therefore hold that the County Recorder, in 

reviewing challenged nomination petition signatures, may 

invalidate signatures for legitimate reasons other than those 

specifically alleged in the challenger’s complaint. 

 
10

IV. Conclusion 

¶20 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the superior court enjoining the placement of Thomas’s name on 

the ballot for the office of governing board of the Phoenix 

Union High School District, Ward 3. 

__________________________________

W. Scott Bales, Justice

CONCURRING:

_______________________________________

Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice 

_______________________________________

Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice 

_______________________________________________ 

Michael D. Ryan, Justice 

_______________________________________

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice