Filed 7/22/21 In re L.S. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re L.S. et al, Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH 

AND HUMAN SERVICES 

AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D078535

 (Super. Ct. Nos. J520350A-B)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Marian F. Gaston, Judge. Affirmed. 

Shobita Misra, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Office of County Counsel, Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel 

and Emily Harlan, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

B.A. (Mother) appeals a dispositional order entered in a juvenile 

dependency proceeding removing her older son, L.S, from her custody 
2

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 361, subdivision (c)(1). 

The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) 

initiated the dependency proceeding after Mother’s younger son, M.S., was 

hospitalized with multiple injuries from abuse. Mother contends substantial 

evidence does not support the juvenile court’s dispositional findings. She also 

claims the court erred by failing to consider less drastic alternatives when it 

ordered that L.S. be removed from her care. We reject these challenges and 

affirm the judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Abuse of L.S.’s Sibling

Mother and J.S.2 (Father) have two sons, five-year-old L.S. and oneyear-old M.S. On April 7, 2020, Mother took then six-month-old M.S. to the 

hospital after she noticed he was having difficulty using his left arm and 

appeared to be in pain. Evaluations at the hospital revealed M.S. had 

multiple injuries in different stages of healing. This included a spleen injury;

bruising of the left arm, right hip, abdomen, lower back, and ears; a scabbed 

lesion and healing trauma on the left calf; bite marks on his left cheek and 

right hand; multiple fractures of several extremities; and complex skull 

fractures. A group of child abuse doctors concluded M.S.’s injuries were 

highly specific for abuse, as the injuries were consistent with squeezing, 

yanking, slamming or falling, and forceful grabbing. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 

2 J.S. is the presumed father of L.S. and M.S. He is not a party to this 

appeal. 
3

Earlier medical records also showed that M.S. had been taken to the 

hospital when he was 14 days old for inconsolable crying. During this 

hospital visit, M.S. was found to have a bruise on his left hand and wrist. 

One child abuse doctor determined this injury was also indicative of abuse. 

Mother initially could not explain M.S.’s injuries other than suggesting

that then four-year-old L.S. was to blame. During her interview with the 

investigating social worker, she described L.S. as “naughty” and “rough” with 

M.S. She reported that two weeks prior to M.S.’s hospitalization, L.S. was 

jumping on the bed and fell on M.S. Mother indicated that M.S.’s 

hospitalization made her realize L.S. needed help for his hyperactivity. 

Mother also suggested Father could be responsible for some of M.S.’s 

injuries. For instance, she reported witnessing Father grab and squeeze M.S. 

to the point that the child would grunt. However, she later said Father was 

not at fault and was a “loving father” to the children. 

Mother also accused the children’s maternal step-grandfather, who 

lived with the family at the time, of abusing M.S. She told the social worker

the step-grandfather drank excessive amounts of beer daily and used to use 

methamphetamine. She also disclosed that this step-grandfather sexually 

abused her as a child. She acknowledged that it had not been safe for her to

leave her children alone with their step-grandfather. 

Although L.S. was interviewed, he was initially unable to give any 

details about the abuse. When asked by a forensic interviewer what 

happened to M.S., L.S. replied, “baby crying, mama, papa[,] Tata,” with 

“Tata” referring to his paternal step-grandfather. His speech then became 

incomprehensible, and the forensic interviewer ended the interview due to 

L.S.’s speech impediment 
4

2. L.S.’s Dependency Proceedings 

Following the diagnosis that M.S. had suffered multiple injuries 

indicative of abuse, the Agency filed dependency petitions on behalf of both 

siblings. L.S.’s petition alleged he was at substantial risk of suffering harm 

based on the injuries suffered by his brother. (See § 300, subd. (j).) The 

Agency created a safety plan for L.S. and M.S., removing the children from 

the parents’ custody and placing them with family members. 

After the children were removed from the home, the parents had a 

domestic violence dispute. According to the police report, Mother pushed 

Father, causing him to fall and sustain minor injuries. The couple separated 

and Mother began living with relatives. 

This domestic violence incident occurred while Mother had been 

participating in family reunification services, including a 52-week child abuse 

group, in-home parenting, and individual counseling. As of mid-December 

2020, Mother’s child abuse group progress report indicated that Mother still 

had 25 sessions remaining before completing the program. She received 

lower scores in the areas of acceptance of responsibility, empathy, and 

insight, where the report specifically noted the need for improvement. For 

example, although Mother had acknowledged M.S. “got hurt,” she had not 

expressed empathy for his experience and her acknowledgement of 

responsibility was limited. 

L.S. also began receiving behavioral services. A family caregiver 

reported L.S.’s behavior and speech had improved since being placed in her 

care. L.S. also had a second forensic interview, in which the interviewer 

noted that L.S.’s verbal abilities had “greatly improved” since being placed in 

protective custody. When asked in the second interview about how his 

brother was hurt, L.S. stated, “daddy hit [M.S.].” L.S. demonstrated how 
5

M.S. was hit with his open hands and then with fists to his face. He said he 

felt “mad” and “sad” when his brother was hurt. 

A paternal aunt and uncle provided additional details about the 

parent’s treatment of the children. These relatives had lived with the family 

for two months. They reported to a social worker that they did not view the 

step-grandfather as responsible for M.S.’s abuse, and that they believed the 

children would not be safe if returned to the parents’ care. They reported 

that L.S. was hyperactive, “really wild,” and the parents were “too rough” 

with him. The paternal aunt described both parents as “physical” with the 

children, and that Mother was the more aggressive parent. The paternal 

aunt reported observing Mother hit L.S. “on the butt” with an open hand and 

with clothes on. She also reported witnessing Mother pull L.S.’s hair and 

ears. 

The contested adjudication and disposition hearing was held on 

January 28, 2021. The juvenile court received the Agency’s reports into 

evidence along with the social worker’s stipulated testimony. The social 

worker stated that she had spoken to Mother one week prior to the hearing. 

According to the social worker, Mother was currently living in a one-bedroom 

apartment with her cousin and did not want to reunify with the children 

until she found her own place. The Agency’s most recent report also noted 

that Mother had “some anxiety about having the children in her care.” 

Additionally, Mother had begun to suspect Father was responsible for M.S.’s 

injuries. 

As to the evidence submitted on Mother’s behalf, the juvenile court 

received progress reports from Mother’s education classes and individual 

therapy, visitation logs from her supervised visits with the children, Mother’s 

handwritten child abuse prevention plan, an apology letter to her children, 
6

her stipulated testimony, and a police report showing Mother was never 

arrested for the domestic violence incident with Father. According to 

Mother’s stipulated testimony, her cousin had given permission for the 

children to move in while Mother looked for her own place to live. 

Although the specific perpetrator of M.S.’s abuse had not been 

identified, the Agency took the position that because the parents were M.S.’s 

primary caregivers at the time of the abuse, one parent was the abuser and 

the other parent knew or reasonably should have known about the abuse. As 

to disposition, the Agency requested removal of both children due to the 

substantial danger posed by remaining in the parents’ care. In the Agency’s 

view, Mother was not ready to have custody because she was looking for 

housing and was still in the process of accepting responsibility and 

developing insight about the abuse. The Agency indicated that Mother could 

potentially move forward to unsupervised visitation after the parameters 

were discussed. The Agency’s arguments were adopted by the children’s 

attorney. 

Mother’s counsel countered that there was no evidence to show Mother 

had caused M.S.’s injuries, nor had Mother ever physically injured L.S. 

beyond spanking him for discipline. Although Mother was looking for a 

larger home, that did not present a protective issue preventing placing the 

children in her custody. Mother’s counsel argued that if the juvenile court 

found jurisdiction, the court should order family maintenance or, in the 

alternative, provide for overnight visitation. 

In rebuttal, the Agency clarified that its concern about Mother’s living 

arrangement was that, as of one week before the hearing, Mother was still 

unsure of whether the children could live with her. The Agency further noted 

that this was a “high risk” case and, given the severity of M.S.’s injuries and 
7

the confirmation provided by family members that the parents were 

aggressive with the children, the Agency did not believe Mother was ready to 

receive custody. 

After hearing arguments from the parties and reviewing the 

documentary evidence, the juvenile court found the jurisdictional allegations 

true by clear and convincing evidence as to both children. It further found 

that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for 

the children’s removal and to make it possible for the children to return 

home. Nonetheless, the court believed removal was necessary due to a 

substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being of the children if the children were returned home, and 

concluded there were no reasonable means to protect the children’s physical 

health without removal.3

Although the juvenile court recognized that Mother had made progress, 

it was concerned with her lack of specificity about how M.S. was injured, as 

this made it “very difficult” for her to protect her children from future harm. 

The court also referenced the social worker’s recent report in which Mother 

expressed she was not ready for the children to return to her custody, and she 

was looking for a new place to live with the children. For these reasons, the 

court determined it would be detrimental to place the children in her care. It 

nonetheless authorized the Agency to permit Mother to have unsupervised 

and overnight visits with the children under certain circumstances.

3 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings as 

to either child or its removal order as to M.S. 
8

DISCUSSION

Mother’s sole challenge in this appeal is to the juvenile court’s 

dispositional order removing L.S. from her custody. She argues the evidence 

does not support a finding of substantial danger to L.S. if he were returned to 

her custody. She asserts there is no evidence in the record showing she 

harmed either of her children, and she claims that other positive equities, 

such as her participation in reunification services, weigh in her favor. She 

further contends the court erred by failing to consider less drastic 

alternatives to L.S.’s removal. 

1. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review

“After the juvenile court finds a child to be within its jurisdiction, the 

court must conduct a dispositional hearing. [Citation.] At the dispositional 

hearing, the court must decide where the child will live while under the 

court’s supervision.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169 (N.M.).) 

“ ‘The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been 

actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on 

averting harm to the child. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 169–170.) At the 

dispositional stage, the court may consider a parent’s past conduct, present 

circumstances, and response to the conditions giving rise to the dependency 

proceedings. (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.) 

To support an order removing a child from parental custody, the 

juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or 

would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or 

physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned 

home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical 

health can be protected without removing the minor from the parent’s . . . 

physical custody . . . .” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) The court must also determine 
9

“whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for 

removal of the minor” and “state the facts on which the decision to remove 

the minor is based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) “The juvenile court has broad 

discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest 

and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with this discretion.” (In re 

Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103–1104.) 

The standard of review for a dispositional order is substantial evidence.

(In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 916.) “Substantial evidence is 

evidence that is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. We do not 

reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or resolve 

evidentiary conflicts. We draw all legitimate and reasonable inferences in 

support of the judgment. The appellant has the burden to demonstrate there 

is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or 

orders. [Citation.]” (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328–329 (D.B.).) 

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Dispositional Findings

Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support removing 

L.S. from her custody because there is no evidence L.S. had ever been abused

or that she had caused M.S.’s injuries. She also points to her demonstrated 

progress during the reunification services, and that she had a safe and 

suitable home for L.S. She concludes that the record lacks clear and 

convincing evidence of a substantial danger to L.S. if he remained in her 

custody. 

Before addressing the juvenile court’s dispositional order, we pause to 

address the jurisdictional findings. Mother contends that jurisdictional 

findings may serve as prima evidence for removal only in cases under section 

300, subdivision (e), where a young child has suffered severe physical abuse 

and is adjudicated a dependent. Because the court took jurisdiction over L.S. 
10

under section 300, subdivision (j), Mother contends the presumption does not 

apply. 

Even assuming the jurisdictional findings would not automatically 

constitute prima facie evidence at the dispositional stage under the statute,4

the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence that L.S. was a 

dependent under section 300, subdivision (j). This is a heightened burden of 

proof from the preponderance of evidence standard required for taking 

jurisdiction over a child. (§§ 300, 355, subd. (a).) Because the court applied 

the elevated clear and convincing standard of proof to the jurisdictional 

findings, those findings should apply to the dispositional order. (In re Hailey 

T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146 (Hailey T.) [“The elevated [clear and 

convincing] burden of proof for removal from the home at the disposition 

stage reflects the Legislature’s recognition of the rights of parents to the care, 

custody and management of their children, and further reflects an effort to 

keep children in their homes where it is safe to do so.”].) 

Further, even without the presumption that the jurisdictional findings 

are prima facie evidence for removal, Mother has not met her burden on 

appeal to demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to support the 

juvenile court’s dispositional findings. Mother relies on Hailey T., in which 

the Court of Appeal reversed the dispositional order removing a four-year-old 

minor from her parents’ custody after her infant sibling was found with a 

nonaccidental injury to one eye. (Hailey T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 

4 We note that several appellate courts have applied the statutory 

presumption to jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (j), 

holding that such findings are prima facie evidence that the child cannot 

safely remain in the home. (See D.B., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 332; In re 

T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135; Hailey T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 146.) 
11

p. 145.) In Hailey T., there was disputed expert testimony regarding whether 

the eye injury was inflicted by the parents or could have been caused by the 

minor. (Id. at p. 148.) Additionally, there was no evidence the minor was 

ever physically harmed in the parents’ home or had suffered harm because of

the abuse to her sibling. (Id. at pp. 147–148.) There was also evidence to 

show the minor would have been capable of reporting any abuse, since she 

possessed good language skills, and was outgoing and social. (Id. at p. 147.) 

The appellate court also noted that the parents had a “healthy relationship,” 

as there was no evidence of any domestic violence between them, and neither 

parent had any mental health or other issues that would put the minor at a 

continuing risk. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that although the 

record supported the court’s jurisdictional findings, the record was 

insufficient to show a substantial risk of harm to the minor if not removed 

from her parents’ custody under the clear and convincing standard of proof. 

(Id. at p. 148.) 

We are not persuaded that Hailey T. requires reversal of the juvenile 

court’s dispositional order in this case. Unlike the eye injury that gave rise to 

the dependency proceedings in Hailey T., the abuse to L.S.’s sibling was not 

an isolated incident. Rather, M.S. was diagnosed with multiple, serious

injuries, including a lacerated spleen, bruising, scabbing, bite marks, 

multiple limb fractures, and a complex skull fracture. These injuries were 

indicative of multiple incidents of abuse, as some injuries were in the process 

of healing, and one injury was at least 10 days old. In contrast with the 

dueling expert testimony presented in Hailey T., the undisputed record in 

this case shows that M.S.’s injuries, with the possible exception of the bite 

marks, could not have been caused by a child of L.S.’s age. In fact, four child 

abuse doctors agreed M.S.’s injuries were highly specific for abuse. As one of 
12

these doctors opined, given the severity of M.S.’s condition, failure to remove 

him from the environment where he sustained the injuries would place him 

at extreme risk of ongoing abuse and potentially death. 

In addition to the severity and protracted nature of the abuse inflicted 

on his brother, L.S.’s situation is further distinguishable from that of the 

minor in Hailey T. because the evidence in the record supports a finding that

L.S. was physically harmed in his parents’ home. L.S.’s paternal relatives 

contacted a social worker to report their concerns about returning L.S. to his 

parents’ custody, describing both parents as too rough with L.S. for his age, 

and that Mother was the more aggressive parent. They observed Mother

physically disciplining L.S. with spankings, and pulling his hair and ears 

when he was three years old. This report of abuse to L.S. mirrors to a degree 

M.S.’s documented injuries, which included bilateral ear bruising. 

There is also evidence to contradict Mother’s assertion that L.S. was 

“healthy [and] well cared for” prior to his removal from her custody. Unlike 

the minor in Hailey T., who could speak in full sentences at the age of three,

L.S. had a noticeable speech impediment during his first forensic interview, 

which made him incapable of providing any details about M.S.’s abuse. 

There were numerous reports that L.S. had behavioral problems prior to his 

removal from the home, and Mother even acknowledged that L.S. needed 

help for his hyperactivity. L.S. was also harmed by witnessing his sibling’s 

abuse, stating he felt “mad” and “sad” when M.S. got hurt. Mother’s lack of 

attention to, or disregard for, the effect on L.S. of witnessing the abuse of his 

brother further supports the removal of L.S. from her care. (D.B., supra, 26 

Cal.App.5th at p. 330 [emotional effect of sibling’s abuse was probative in 

determining whether the abuse of the sibling presented a substantial risk to 

the other child].) 
13

Lastly, there is evidence in the record to suggest that Mother was not 

yet prepared to provide L.S. with a safe home. Prior to the children’s 

removal, the family had been living with an alcoholic relative who had 

sexually abused Mother as a child, a decision Mother recognizes created an 

unsafe environment for the children. Although at the time of the 

dispositional hearing Mother was receiving reunification services and had 

made progress, she had not yet completed the program and needed to 

improve in the areas of acceptance of responsibility, empathy, and insight. 

And unlike the parents in Hailey T., Mother and Father engaged in a 

domestic violence dispute, which occurred after the dependency case began

and despite Mother’s participation in services. 

Mother further contends the juvenile court erred by failing to 

separately assess the risk to L.S. Although the court entered separate 

dispositional orders for each child , the oral dispositional findings did not 

distinguish between the children individually. We conclude there was no 

error in the court’s analysis, and even if there was, any error was harmless. 

The requirement for the juvenile court to analyze each child’s 

circumstances individually at the dispositional stage was articulated in In re 

Dakota J. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 619 (Dakota J.). In that case, there was 

clear and convincing evidence to support removal of the child who resided 

with the mother based on the mother’s failure to provide regular care and 

supervision. (Id. at pp. 626–627.) But the juvenile court also ordered 

removal of her two other children even though those children did not reside 

with the mother when the dependency petitions were initiated. (Ibid.) The 

appellate court decided that removal of the children residing outside her 

physical custody was error because section 361, subdivision (c)(1) did not 

apply to the children who were not in the mother’s physical custody. (Id. at 
14

pp. 627–630.) It further determined that the error was not harmless, citing 

the mother’s ability to recognize her limitations since she had arranged for 

her two other children to live with a family member. (Id. at p. 632.) The 

court concluded that “where more than one child is the subject of a 

dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must analyze each child’s 

circumstances independently at the dispositional stage.” (Id. at p. 632.) 

The unique circumstances of Dakota J. are not present in this case. 

Unlike Dakota J., where two of the mother’s three children were not in her 

physical custody when the dependency proceedings were initiated, Mother 

was L.S.’s primary caregiver at the time of M.S.’s hospitalization. 

Additionally, the children in Dakota J. were found dependents under section 

300, subdivision (b), which provides the juvenile court with jurisdiction over a 

child who has suffered or is at risk of suffering serious physical harm based 

on the parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect the 

child. (Dakota J., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 626.) In this case, the 

juvenile court took jurisdiction over L.S. under section 300, subdivision (j).

As our Supreme Court has explained, the statutory provision for dependency 

jurisdiction based on sibling abuse directly connects the abuse of a sibling to 

the other child’s future risk of harm: “[T]he more severe the type of sibling 

abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such 

abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under 

section 300. If the sibling abuse is relatively minor, the court might 

reasonably find insubstantial a risk the [other] child will be similarly abused; 

but as the abuse becomes more serious, it becomes more necessary to protect 

the child from even a relatively low probability of that abuse.” (In re I.J.

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 778.) Although the risks posed to the sets of children 
15

in Dakota J. may have been distinct, the future risk of harm to L.S. is 

necessarily intertwined with the abuse of M.S.

Additionally, we presume the juvenile court is aware of and followed 

applicable law. (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499.) Generally, 

orders will be upheld if the evidence supports implied findings. (In re Andrea 

G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 547, 554–555.) As the juvenile court correctly 

observed in this case, Mother had yet to identify the perpetrator of M.S.’s 

abuse as of the date of the dispositional hearing. At first, Mother blamed L.S. 

as the cause of M.S.’s injuries. She then began to suggest Father was 

responsible, although she later said he was not to blame and was a “loving 

father.” Mother then suggested the maternal step-grandfather was to blame. 

She later told her therapist, following the domestic violence dispute, that she 

suspected Father again. Based on Mother’s inconsistent stories about who 

was responsible for M.S.’s injuries and her inability to identify the source of 

the harm, the juvenile court reasonably determined that it would be difficult 

for Mother to protect both children from future abuse. Although not 

expressly phrased in these terms, the juvenile court effectively found that 

Mother’s lack of insight presented a risk of harm to L.S. individually. 

Even assuming the juvenile court erred by failing to analyze the risk to 

L.S. individually, any such error was harmless. An error by the court in 

failing to comply with section 361, subdivision (e) will be deemed harmless if 

“ ‘it is not reasonably probable such finding, if made, would have been in 

favor of continued parental custody.’ [ Citations.]” (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 

Cal.App.3d 1206, 1218.) The undisputed record shows Mother had physically 

harmed L.S., she failed to seek help for L.S.’s behavioral problems prior to 

the Agency intervening, and L.S. demonstrated improvement after being 

removed from her care. Mother was also in the process of developing insight
16

into M.S.’s abuse and had yet to complete her reunification services. 

Considering both past and present circumstances, we do not find it was 

reasonably probable that a ruling more favorable to Mother would have 

occurred if the court had analyzed L.S.’s risk of harm independently. 

3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding of No 

Reasonable Alternatives to L.S.’s Removal

Mother contends the juvenile court failed to consider less drastic 

alternatives to removal, instead merely stating in perfunctory language that 

there were no reasonable means to place L.S. with Mother. She contends 

family maintenance services were a reasonable option the juvenile court 

should have considered, as this option would have allowed her to retain 

custody while still requiring her participation in services under the social 

worker’s supervision.5

In the juvenile court, Mother argued for family maintenance, or in the 

alternative, overnight visits.6 The record shows that the court considered 

5 To the extent Mother contends the juvenile court failed to consider 

alternatives other than family maintenance, she forfeited this argument by 

failing to suggest additional options. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293

[dependency matters are not exempt from forfeiture rule], superseded by 

statute on other grounds as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953,

961–962; In re Daniel D. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1823, 1831 [by only seeking 

placement with herself in the trial court, mother waived right on appeal to 

contend child should be placed with a relative].) 

6 Family maintenance services may be provided if “a child is adjudged a 

dependent child of the court, on the ground that the child is a person 

described by Section 300, and the court orders that a parent or guardian shall 

retain custody of the child subject to the supervision of the social worker, 

[and] the parents or guardians shall be required to participate in child 

welfare services or services provided by an appropriate agency designated by 

the court.” (§ 362, subd. (c).) 
17

both options, and it ultimately allowed the Agency discretion to permit

unsupervised and overnight visits. However, as to placing L.S. with Mother 

in conjunction with family maintenance services, the court concluded it would 

be premature for L.S. to return to Mother’s custody. In reaching this 

conclusion, it cited the “extremely serious injuries” to M.S., and that Mother 

had not yet demonstrated that unsupervised visitation would not result in 

injuries. It also referenced Mother’s lack of insight into the circumstances 

that caused the children’s removal from her custody, rendering it difficult for 

her to protect both children from future abuse. Finally, the judge noted that 

Mother had expressed a week before the hearing that she was not yet ready 

to receive the children into her home. Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the

record shows the court considered family maintenance, but it determined

that removal was necessary until Mother had sufficient time to develop 

insight and could demonstrate through unsupervised visits that L.S. would 

be safe if placed in her care. 

Mother contends the juvenile court improperly relied on her housing 

status, as her limited finances were not legitimate grounds for L.S.’s removal. 

However, the evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that, as of the date of the dispositional hearing, Mother was not ready to

receive L.S. into her home full-time. In November 2020, Mother began living 

with her cousin in a one-bedroom apartment. Yet as of one week before the 

hearing, Mother was still unsure whether her cousin would allow the 

children to live with them, and Mother told the social worker she wanted to 

move before reunifying with the children. Although Mother’s stipulated 

testimony was that her cousin had given permission for the children to live 

with her while she looked for a new home, the juvenile court could have been 

concerned with Mother’s lack of foresight, as she had failed to secure housing 
18

for her children as of one week prior to the hearing. Housing insecurity had 

been a problem for Mother in the past, since she had previously chosen to

move with the children into the home of their maternal step-grandfather, 

despite his alcoholism and history of sexual abuse. Based on this record, it 

was reasonable for the court to conclude that family maintenance was not a

safe option for L.S.

Mother’s attempt to analogize to In re Ashly F. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 

803 (Ashly F.) is also unpersuasive. There, the mother inflicted physical 

abuse on two children, of which the father was largely unaware. (Id. at 

p. 806.) The Court of Appeal reversed the dispositional order, concluding 

there was ample evidence that the children could be protected without 

removing them from the family home. (Id. at pp. 810–811.) The court 

focused on the mother’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility, and that 

both parents had enrolled and parenting classes. (Id. at p. 810.) It concluded 

that reasonable alternatives to the removal existed, which included 

removing the mother as the abusive parent from the home. (Ibid.) 

Unlike Ashly F., where one parent was unaware of the abuse inflicted 

by the other parent, the juvenile court here determined that given the nature 

of M.S.’s injuries, Mother should have at least been aware of the abuse. 

Additionally, given the severity of M.S.’s injuries and Mother’s lack of insight 

into how the injuries occurred, the court was justifiably concerned that L.S. 

and his sibling faced an ongoing threat of harm if returned to Mother’s 

custody. It identified the facts on which the decision to remove L.S. was 

based, and substantial evidence supports the finding that alternative 

measures were not a viable option at the time of the dispositional hearing. 

(Cf. Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810 [court erred by failing to state 

the facts supporting its conclusion].) 
19

Lastly, any error by the juvenile court in failing to address reasonable 

alternatives to L.S.’s removal was harmless. As of one week before the 

dispositional hearing, Mother had failed to make housing arrangements for 

the children, and she herself expressed anxiety about receiving the children 

into her home. Mother also needed to develop insight and responsibility for 

the risks she created to the children’s safety. Based on these circumstances, 

it is not reasonably probable that the court would have concluded there were

reasonable alternatives to removal. (In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 

Cal.App.4th 292, 304.) 

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders and findings are affirmed. 

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.