NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ No. 15-3213

________________

RICHARD C. HVIZDAK, Appellant

v. CITIZENS BANK OF PENNSYLV ANIA; RBS CITIZENS NA; RBS CITIZENS FINANCIAL GROUP INC; ROYAL BANK OF SC OTLAND PLC; SENIOR V.P. KAREN D. BUDNIAK; RI CHARD J. BOUDREAU & ASSOCIATES LLC; UNIVERSAL FIDELITY LP; ME RCANTILE ADJUSTMENT BUREAU LLC

________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-00406) District Court Judge: Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.

________________ Argued Pursuant to Thir d Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on September 25, 2018 Before: McKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: January 30, 2019)

________________ OPINION *

________________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the fu ll Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Richard C. Hvizdak 110 South Main Street Pittsburgh, PA 15220 Pro Se Appellant

Richard H. Frankel Andrew J. Gree, Student Counsel Kaitlin O’Donnell, Student Counsel (Argued) Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law 3320 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19104 Counsel for Court Appointed Amicus Appellant Jamie S. Dycus (Argued) Fraser L. Hunter, Jr. David S. Lesser WilmerHale 7 World Trade Center New York, NY 10007 Counsel for Appellees

McKEE, Circuit Judge

Richard Hvizdak claims that the District Court erred in granting Citizens Bank’s 12(b)(6) motion and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. We disagree and will affirm essentially for the reasons stated by the District Court. 1 Because we fully rely on the District C ourt’s thoughtful opini on, we need only briefly address the challenge to the District Court’s jurisdiction that Hvizdak has made on

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.3 appeal. Hvizdak argues that the District C ourt lacked jurisdiction to decide his claims

because it ruled that he lacked prudential standing as a thir d party, and that the court

should therefore have dismisse d his suit without prejudice. This case is peculiar for that reason. Hv izdak, who has alleged a violation of a federal statute, now seeks to have us rule th at the suit he brought is beyond the reach of

the federal tribunal. He misunderstands our case law on prudential standing and seeks to turn prudential standing into a weapon of last resort for litigants. The limitations on third-party standing “are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary ‘rule of self-restraint’ designed to minimize unwarranted interventio n into controversies where the applicable cons titutional questions are ill-de fined and speculative.” 2 We have held that the District Court may, at its discre tion, review a plaintiff’s claims on the merits despite a party having third- party prudential standing. 3 Hvizdak alleged an “injury in fact,” a “causal connection between the injury and

the conduct co mplained of,” 4 and that a favorable decision by the District Court could have redressed that injury. “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice.” 5 Accordingly, Hvizdak satisfied the

2 Craig v. Boren , 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (citing Barrows v. Jackson , 346 U.S. 249, 255, 257 (1953)). 3 See Pa. Psychiatric Soc. v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc. , 280 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2002); The Pitt News v. Fisher , 215 F.3d 354 ( 3d Cir. 2000) (hol ding that Pitt News, as a third-party, had standing to challenge a Penn sylvania statute that penalized businesses that advertised alcoholic beverages in pub lications made by, or on behalf of, an educational institution). 4 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 5 Id. at 5614 requirements necessary for an in jury in fact and therefore th e District Court had Article III jurisdiction. Federal courts “lack the authority to abst ain from the exercise of jurisdiction that

has been conferred” or to “define[] the scope of fede ral jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds.” 6 Here, because Hvizdak’s complaint alleged the three elements required for Article III jurisd iction over his claims, the District Court properly exercised the authority granted by Article III. However, as the District Court explained, Article III standing does not mean that a petitione r has successfully laid out a claim that will defeat a 12(b )(6) motion. Hvizdak’s allega tions, while satisfying standing requirements, fail to state a clai m on which relief can be granted. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

6 New Orleans Public Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans , 491 U.S. 350, 358–59 (1989) (citing Kline v. Burke Constr. Co. , 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)).