Pre-award bid protest; 

Competitive range 

determination; FAR 

15.306; technically 

unacceptable; prejudice. 

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

Nos. 20-120C & 20-150C (consolidated)

(Originally Filed: September 23, 2020)

(Re-issued: November 2, 2020)1

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

QUANTICO TACTICAL INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant,

and

ATLANTIC DIVING SUPPLY, INC.

Intervenor-Defendant.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

UNIFIRE, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Anuj Vohra, Washington, D.C., with whom was Daniel R. Forman, 

Eric M, Ransom, and Rina M. Gashaw, for plaintiff Quantico Tactical Inc.

1 This opinion was originally issued under seal in order to afford the parties 

an opportunity to propose redactions of protected material. The parties have

done so but disagree as to the extent of those redactions. Appropriate 

redactions appear in brackets below. 
2

David S. Black, Tysons Corner, VA, for plaintiff Unifire, Inc. Gregory 

R. Hallmark and Amy L. Fuentes of counsel. 

Douglas T. Hoffman and Mariana T. Acevedo, United States 

Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

Washington, D.C., with whom was Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Deputy Director,

Robert E. Kirschman, Jr., Director, and Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, for defendant.

Paul F. Khoury, Washington, D.C., for intervenor. John R. Prairie, 

Kendra P. Norwood, and J. Ryan Frazee of counsel.

OPINION

BRUGGINK, Judge.

In these consolidated bid protest actions, Quantico Tactical Inc. 

(“Quantico”) and Unifire, Inc. (“Unifire”) challenge their exclusion from the 

competitive range by the Defense Logistics Agency (“DLA”) in a 

procurement for special operations equipment and logistical support. 

Pending before the court are plaintiffs’ motions for judgment on the 

administrative record and the cross-motions of defendant and intervenor, 

Atlantic Diving Supply, Inc. (“ADS”). The motions are fully briefed, and 

oral argument was held on September 15, 2020. Because Quantico cannot 

show prejudice, its protest must be denied. Unifire’s protest is denied because 

it has not shown irrationality in DLA’s decision to exclude it from the 

competitive range.

BACKGROUND

On November 16, 2018, DLA issued Request for Proposals (“RFP”) 

No. SPE8EJ-18-R-0001 for the Special Operations Equipment (“SOE”) 

Tailored Logistics Support (“TLS”) Program. The RFP contemplated

multiple awards for an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (“IDIQ”)

contract with a two-year base period and up to four two-year option periods

(potential 10-year total). Under the SOE TLS program, contract holders will 

compete to supply special operations equipment to authorized Department of 

Defense customers. In addition, contractors will provide logistics support for 

the supplied equipment. 

The RFP provides that DLA would engage in a best value tradeoff 

process to make “[a]wards . . . to offerors whose proposals are most 

advantageous to the Government considering non-price evaluation factors 

and price.” Administrative Record (“AR”) at 151. The two non-price 
3

evaluation factors are: Factor I – Past Performance; and Factor II – Technical 

Merit. The Technical Merit Factor is broken into two subfactors: (a) Product 

Sourcing and (b) Distribution. Factor I is more important than Factor II and,

within Factor II, (a) Product Sourcing is more important than (b)

Distribution. Non-price factors are “significantly more important than 

price,” but, the importance of price would increase if the technical merits of 

proposals were equivalent. Id. 

The Past Performance Factor assesses “the offeror’s probability of 

meeting the solicitation requirements.” Id. at 151-52. Offerors were to submit

up to three past performance references to allow DLA to evaluate their

relevance. DLA would then assign a ranking based on each past performance 

reference of either “Very Relevant,” “Relevant,” “Somewhat Relevant,” or 

“Not Relevant,” along with a quality of contractor performance ranking of 

either “Outstanding,” “Good,” “Acceptable,” “Marginal,” or 

“Unacceptable.” Id. at 145, 152. These assessments resulted in DLA 

assigning an overall “Confidence Assessment” of the contractor’s ability to 

perform on the new contract—“Substantial Confidence,” “Satisfactory 

Confidence,” “Limited Confidence,” “No Confidence,” or “Neutral 

Confidence”—which DLA assigned “based on the offeror’s record of 

relevancy and quality of performance.” Id. at 152. 

The Solicitation’s Statement of Work (“SOW”) contained several 

critical performance metrics that offerors’ proposals would be measured 

against. Contractors are required to maintain a “quote rate” of 90%, meaning 

the contractor “must submit quotes on 90% of the Delivery Order RFQs.” 

AR 130. Contractors must also maintain a 95% “fill rate,” defined as the 

proportion of quantity ordered that the contractor actually delivers. Id. at 135. 

The contractor also must maintain a 90% “on-time delivery rate,” defined as 

the proportion of quantity ordered that the contractor delivers on time. Id. 

Under Factor II, Technical Merit, subfactor (a), Product Sourcing, 

DLA would assess an offeror’s plan to meet certain RFP requirements, 

including: (1) purchasing system requirements; (2) a 90 percent Quote Rate 

Performance Metric; and (3) a 95 percent Fill Rate Metric. Subfactor (b), 

Distribution, would assess an offeror’s distribution plan for whether it could 

“meet the delivery requirements including, routine, urgent, emergency 

orders, and consolidated bill of material requirements and plan to meet the 

90% on-time delivery metric and ensure control over subcontracting.” Id. at

153. Under each subfactor, DLA promised to assign an overall adjectival 

rating of “Outstanding,” “Good,” “Acceptable,” “Marginal,” “Unacceptable” 

based on the strengths, deficiencies, weaknesses, and risks of the offeror’s 

proposal. AR at 45-46 (acquisition plan).
4

The Source Selection Plan explained that these adjectival technical 

ratings “reflect[] the degree to which the proposal meets or does not meet the 

minimum requirements” for each subfactor. Id. at 43 (Product Sourcing), 44 

(Distribution). An offeror’s plan to meet the SOW’s performance metrics 

was an important aspect of the ratings for each subfactor. See id. at 43-46. 

An unacceptable rating was defined as a “proposal [that] does not meet 

requirements of the solicitation, and thus, contains one or more deficiencies, 

and/or risk of unsuccessful performance is unacceptable.” Id. at 44, 46. The 

solicitation warned that such a rating meant that the proposal was 

“unawardable.” Id. A “weakness” was defined by DLA to mean a “flaw in 

the proposal that increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance, 

while a “deficiency” meant that DLA found a “material failure of a proposal 

to meet a Government requirement.” AR at 151. A deficiency was 

alternatively defined as a “combination of significant weaknesses.” Id. 

Either of which would “increase the risk of unsuccessful contract 

performance to an unacceptable level.” Id. 

Quantico, Unifire, and 27 other vendors timely submitted offers by 

the deadline of January 18, 2019. [ ] of the [ ] offerors failed to meet the 

requirement to offer on 90 percent of the Price Evaluation List (“PEL”) and 

were thus considered unresponsive. The remaining [ ] offerors were 

evaluated by the Source Selection Evaluation Board (“SSEB”), which began 

its non-price evaluation on January 31, 2019. The non-price evaluation was 

completed on June 14, 2019; the report details the results for the plaintiffs as 

detailed below. 

I. Quantico

DLA rated Quantico as follows:

Factor I 

Past 

Performance –

Confidence 

Assessment

Factor II 

Technical Merit 

Subfactor (a) 

Product 

Sourcing

Factor II 

Technical Merit 

(b) Distribution

Total 

Evaluated 

Price

Satisfactory 

Confidence

Marginal Unacceptable $[ ]

According to DLA’s debriefing letter, under Factor I – Past 

Performance, DLA had “a reasonable expectation that Quantico [would] 

successfully perform the required effort.” Id. at 4515. Under Factor II –

Technical Merit, subfactor (a), Quantico’s proposal received [
5

]. Id. Under subfactor (b), Quantico received [

]. Id.;see also AR at 3568-83 (SSEB NonPrice Evaluation Report). 

II. Unifire

Unifire was evaluated as follows:

Factor I 

Past 

Performance –

Confidence 

Assessment 

Factor II 

Technical Merit 

Subfactor (a) 

Product Sourcing 

Factor II 

Technical Merit 

(b) Distribution 

Total 

Evaluated 

Price

Satisfactory 

Confidence 

Unacceptable Good $[ ]

For Past Performance, Unifire was rated as Satisfactory Confidence, 

which means, like Quantico, DLA had a “reasonable expectation” that 

Unifire would successfully perform. For the technical subfactors, Unifire was 

rated having one strength and one deficiency for Product Sourcing. The 

deficiency was found due to a lack of a plan for how Unifire would meet the 

95 percent fill rate metric and ensure control over subcontracting. For the 

Distribution subfactor, Unifire was found to have a strength and it was rated 

“Good” overall. AR at 4528-36 (Unifire’s debriefing letter from DLA); see 

also AR at 3680-98 (SSEB Non-Price Evaluation Report). 

Ultimately, DLA only selected [ ] offerors for inclusion in the 

Competitive Range: (1) ADS; [

]. On December 4, 2019, 

DLA informed both Quantico and Unifire in that they were being excluded 

from the competitive range. More detailed debriefing letters were requested 

and provided shortly thereafter.

III. Procedural History

On December 23, 2019, Quantico filed a protest before the 

Government Accountability Office (“GAO”). After GAO’s denial of

Quantico’s request for documents, Quantico filed its complaint here on 

February 3, 2020. On January 6, 2020, Unifire filed a protest at GAO. GAO 

dismissed Unifire’s protest after Quantico filed its protest here. Unifire filed 

here on February 13, 2020, and we consolidated the actions at the request of 

the parties on March 3, 2020. We also granted the request by ADS, an offeror 
6

who was part of the competitive range, to intervene by separate order on that 

date. 

Although the parties were then fully assembled, they presented 

several preliminary matters. On March 12, 2020, Quantico filed a motion to 

supplement the administrative record and for permission to take limited 

discovery relevant to asserted bias and fraud in the procurement on the part 

of DLA and ADS. On March 20, 2020, ADS filed a motion to disqualify 

plaintiff’s counsel because it is had formerly represented intervenor in a 

related matter. The parties then completed briefing on those motions. We 

held oral argument on the motion to disqualify counsel on April 29, 2020, at 

the conclusion of which we announced that we would grant the motion 

because we agreed that the former representation of ADS concerned matters 

substantially related to the issues presented here. See Quantico Tactical Inc.

v. United States, 148 Fed. Cl. 440 (2020) (explaining that counsel was 

disqualified for breaching duty of loyalty). We afforded plaintiff 30 days in 

which to substitute new counsel, which it did on May 11, 2020. 

After affording new counsel time to get up to speed and an opportunity 

to amend its request to supplement the record, which it declined, we held 

argument on that motion on June 4, 2020, at the conclusion of which we 

announced that we would, except for two documents, deny the request. We 

issued a written opinion several days later. Quantico Tactical Inc. v. United 

States, No. 20-120C, 2020 WL 4197333 (Fed. Cl. July 17, 2020) (publication 

pending). The case was then set for disposition on the merits by crossmotions for judgment on the administrative record. 

DISCUSSION

The main thrust of Quantico’s motion is that DLA’s evaluation of its 

proposal under the Past Performance Factor was arbitrary because it 

measured Quantico against a standard that it did not apply to any other 

offeror, i.e., that it should have been rated higher. It also challenges the 

weakness it received for the Product Sourcing subfactor and [ ]

deficiencies for the Distribution subfactor. It believes that, had any or all of 

the ratings, but particularly past performance, come out differently, it might 

have been kept in the competitive range. 

Defendant and intervenor respond generally that plaintiff has not 

established any error in DLA’s evaluation, but more importantly, they 

highlight the [ ] left unchallenged by Quantico for its 

Distribution rating, namely that Quantico[

]. They argue that Quantico cannot show 
7

prejudice because its proposal was technically unacceptable and 

unawardable [ ], irrespective of what the court might 

conclude with respect to the errors Quantico asserts. 

Unifire argues that DLA’s flawed evaluation of its proposal under 

technical subfactor (a), Product Sourcing, kept it out of the competitive range

arbitrarily. It challenges DLA’s assignment of a deficiency for failing to 

show how it will meet the 95 percent fill rate metric and alleges that it was 

treated unequally in this regard when compared to another offeror who it 

argues offered a similar plan but was found acceptable. Unifire also argues 

that it should have been awarded a strength for its plan to provide a narrative 

explanation to DLA whenever it could not source an item and submit a quote 

for it, which is relevant to the 90 percent quote rate requirement from the 

SOW for the Distribution subfactor. Unifire again points to another offeror 

that received a strength for offering to exceed the fill rate and to notify and 

explain when it could not source a compliant item. This, Unifire urges, is 

unequal treatment because, in substance, the two proposals offered the same 

service but only one, not the protestor, received a strength for it. The 

competitive range determination was thus based on flawed ratings and was 

not rational, according to Unifire. 

Defendant disagrees, arguing that Unifire’s challenges are nothing 

more than disagreements with government evaluators and are not the basis 

of a legitimate protest.2 The government finds a substantive difference when 

comparing the proposals highlighted by Unifire and also argues that Unifire’s 

reliance on material outside the particular section of its proposal dealing with 

the fill rate was improper. Defendant argues finally that Unifire has not 

established prejudice, even if we were to sustain its challenges, because there

is no evidence it would have received a high enough rating to make the 

competitive range. 

Under Court of Federal Claims Rule 52.1, we review agency 

procurement decisions to determine whether they are supported by the 

already-existing administrative record. See, e.g., Lawrence Battelle, Inc. v. 

United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 579, 585-86 (2014) (citing Florida Power & 

Light v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985) (stating “the focal point for judicial 

review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some 

record made initially in the reviewing court”)). Rule 52.1 is “designed to 

provide for trial on a paper record, allowing fact-finding by the trial court.” 

Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

2

Intervenor did not respond to Unifire’s motion for judgment on the 

administrative record. 
8

The Court reviews the merits of an award decision under the arbitrary 

and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §

706(2)(A). See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (2012). The proper inquiry is whether 

the agency action was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.” Lawrence Battelle, Inc., 117 Fed. Cl. 

at 586 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). Under this standard, the court should 

set aside an agency decision if “(1) the procurement official’s decision lacked 

a rational basis; or (2) the procurement involved a violation of regulation or 

procedure.” Impresa Construzioni Geom. Demonico Garufi v. United States, 

238 F.3d 1324, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Generally, this court gives great 

deference to an agency’s decision in establishing the competitive range. 

Birch & Davis Int’l, Inc. v. Christopher, 4 F.3d 970, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 

Therefore, the protestor “bears a heavy burden” to demonstrate that the 

contracting offeror’s determination lacked a rational basis as the agency 

“need only articulate ‘a rational connection between the facts found and the 

choice made.’” KSC Boss Alliance, LLC v. United States, 142 Fed. Cl. 368, 

380 (2019) (quoting Impresa, 238 F.3d at 1338)). 

I. Quantico Has Not Established That It Was Prejudiced By DLA’s Evaluation

The bulk of Quantico’s briefing is focused on its Past Performance –

Confidence Assessment rating of “Satisfactory Confidence.” It believes that 

it has objectively the best Past Performance history, particularly regarding its

incumbent SOE TLS effort. In its view then, it should have been rated higher 

than all the other offerors. By not singling Quantico out for its superior past 

performance, DLA was able to exclude Quantico from the competition based 

entirely on Quantico’s Technical Merit scores. In other words, if DLA had 

recognized Quantico’s superior past performance and weighted that factor 

according to the terms of the RFP, Quantico believes that it would have been 

included in the competitive range. Additionally, Quantico views the agency’s 

reliance on technical subfactors as a discriminator on which to exclude 

Quantico, as having “diminish[ed] the importance of past performance in the 

evaluation” contrary to the terms of the solicitation. Quantico’s Mot. for J. 

on the AR 23. Therefore, Quantico concludes that, “[b]y evaluating past 

performance as it did, DLA rendered Quantico’s superior past performance 

– and really, the Past Performance Factor as a whole – a nullity, making the 

less-important Technical Merit Factor singularly determinative for purposes 

of inclusion in the Competitive Range.” Id. 

For any of that to matter, however, Quantico must have had a 

technically acceptable proposal, which, according to defendant and 

intervenor, it did not due to the “unacceptable” rating for the Distribution 
9

subfactor. This rating would not change, argues the defense, even crediting 

Quantico’s arguments, because [ ] are left undisturbed 

by plaintiff’s protest. Per the Source Selection Plan, [

] and the proposal 

unawardable. Thus, in intervenor’s and defendant’s eyes, plaintiff cannot 

show any prejudice from the errors alleged regarding its Past Performance or 

other aspects of its Technical Merit. 

Quantico’s response is twofold. First, it argues that DLA’s treatment 

of technical deficiencies as per se disqualifying is contrary to FAR part 15 

because, in a negotiated procurement, deficiencies and weaknesses are to be 

discussed by the agency during the period for discussions and clarifications, 

which had not happened prior to the competitive range determination. Using 

them as a discriminator in a competitive range determination is thus illegal, 

according to Quantico. Second, Quantico argues that the weighing of factors 

by the Contracting Officer (“CO”) was contrary to the solicitation, which 

promised that a best value tradeoff would be performed in which Past 

Performance would be the most important factor. Thus, the decision to 

exclude solely based on Quantico’s technical deficiencies was arbitrary and 

capricious because DLA did not follow its own promise to perform a tradeoff 

in which it weighted past performance more heavily. We disagree. 

For the Technical Merit subfactor (b), Distribution, DLA assigned 

Quantico’s proposal [ ] and an 

overall rating of “Unacceptable.” An “unacceptable” proposal is one that 

“does not meet requirements of the solicitation, and thus, contains one or 

more deficiencies, and/or risk of unsuccessful performance[.]” AR at 46. 

Even crediting Quantico’s arguments with respect to this subfactor, it would 

only have had [ ], still 

resulting in an unacceptable rating. 

[

]. Quantico does not challenge this 

assessment. [

]. According to its proposal, Quantico stated that “[u]rgent 

orders will be flagged in our system and shipped the same day via the best 

method to ensure delivery within seven days,” AR at 1482, which is well 

beyond 72 hours.

[ ] resulted from Quantico’s failure to provide [

]. According 

to its proposal, Quantico stated that it would [
10

]. Quantico does not argue that it could 

meet this requirement.

[

]. We do not 

reach the merits of this rating, however, because, taken alone, a different 

result would not change the agency’s rating of the proposal as unacceptable 

and unawardable. 

The CO’s competitive range determination document thoroughly

reviewed the SSEB’s ratings for each of the factors and for price. Although 

it listed several areas for discussion with Quantico for each factor, when it 

came to the Distribution subfactor, the summary of findings notes that 

Quantico’s proposal was unawardable. AR at 4402. No areas were listed for 

discussions for the Distribution subfactor. 

After exhaustively detailing all of the offerors’ proposal ratings by the 

SSEB, including listing areas for discussions with each offeror, the CO 

ranked all of the offerors for non-price factors. Quantico was ranked [

]. Id. at 4455-57. The CO then ranked the offerors by lowest 

to highest evaluated price. Quantico was [ ]. Id. at 4458. The CO wrote a

narrative description for each offeror’s ratings in the order of their non-price 

ratings. The top six such offerors were included in the competitive range. 

For Quantico, the CO wrote that, for subfactor (b) [

] Id. at 4470. The CO also took note of 

Quantico’s [ ]. She concluded that Quantico was not

included in the competitive range because its proposal was not considered a 

“highly rated proposal.” Id. She notes that [

].

When considering what the CO did in making the determination and 

what the solicitation promised, we find no reversible error. The CO 

concluded that Quantico was not among the most highly rated offerors. This 

may not have been the most artful explanation, but it is clear that she 

excluded Quantico due to its inability to meet all of the technical subfactors. 

No offerors with such a rating were included in the competitive range, which 

is consistent with the Source Selection Plan’s instruction that unacceptable 

technical factors were unawardable. Nothing alleged by Quantico as error
11

could change that result, even if it were rated higher on Past Performance. 

When confronted, as here, with almost over [ ] responsive offers, the agency 

is well within its rights to be selective in setting the competitive range, a 

determination that is owed a great deal of deference regardless of the number 

of offerors and is, in any event, a result clearly spelled out in the solicitation

and source selection plan.

Quantico had [ ] for the second technical subfactor, 

any one of which, according the Source Selection Plan, would render the 

proposal unawardable. Not having challenged [ ], the conclusion 

is inescapable that the other ratings challenged are immaterial to the 

outcome. The CO excluded all offerors with unacceptable ratings. Plaintiff 

would still have such a rating even if we agreed with its allegations of 

irrationality. 

FAR part 15 does not prohibit the CO from using deficiencies as a 

basis for a competitive range determination. Although plaintiff is correct that 

the agency is required to discuss weaknesses and deficiencies for any offeror 

with which it holds discussions, see 48 C.F.R. § 15.306(d)(3), that same 

subpart also requires that agencies make a competitive range determination 

prior to discussions and that it include in the range only those offerors whose 

proposal are the “most highly rated.” Id. § 306(c). Further, subpart 306 

assumes that, in doing so, the agency will conduct an evaluation consistent 

with the solicitation, which, here, is to say that deficiencies in technical 

proposals would make those proposals unawardable. See id. § 306(c)(1) 

(“agencies shall evaluate all proposals in accordance with 15.305(a), and if 

discussions are to be conducted, establish a competitive range”). FAR 

15.305(a) establishes general guidelines for proposal evaluations, stating that 

they “may be conducted using any rating method or combination of methods” 

and that the “relative strengths, deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and 

risks supporting proposal evaluation shall be document in the contract file.” 

Agencies are required to evaluate proposals consistent with the scheme 

advertised in the solicitation. Id. Thus subpart 306 contemplates, if not 

requires, agencies taking deficiencies and weaknesses into account in making 

the competitive range determination. Further, the limited communication 

with offerors allowed prior to the competitive range determination is 

prohibited by the FAR from being used as an opportunity to “cure proposal 

deficiencies” or to otherwise afford an opportunity to revise proposals. Id. § 

306(b)(2). 

 

FAR part 15 establishes that the steps in a negotiated procurement

(competitive range determination and discussions) be taken seriatim and that

they be independent of one another. The purpose of the competitive range 
12

determination, as made clear in FAR part 15.306, is to winnow the number 

of offerors with whom discussions are required. That being the case, the 

former cannot anticipate the latter, otherwise its purpose would be frustrated.

Weaknesses and deficiencies are properly considered as part of the 

competitive range determination. We also find no incompatibility with the 

solicitation in this regard. Although Past Performance was the most 

important factor, that weighting did not prevent the agency from treating a 

technically unacceptable proposal unawardable nor relying on this rubric to 

set a competitive range. We thus find no irrationality nor illegality in treating 

the technical ratings in the competitive range determination as the agency 

did. The conclusion is thus unavoidable that Quantico has not shown 

prejudice from the alleged evaluation errors. Its rating for the Distribution 

subfactor would not have improved and its proposal was unawardable. 

Quantico was thus properly excluded from the competitive range. 

II. Unifire’s Technical Ratings Were Not Arbitrary

As shown in the table above, Unifire received a Factor I, Past 

Performance – Confidence Assessment rating of “Satisfactory Confidence.” 

Under Factor II, Technical Merit, subfactor (a), Product Sourcing, it received 

a rating of “Unacceptable,” and for subfactor (b), Distribution, it received a 

rating of “Good.” Unifire argues that DLA’s flawed evaluation of its 

proposal under Factor II, subfactor (a), Product Sourcing, kept Unifire out of 

the competitive range. 

Under Technical Merit, subfactor (a), the solicitation identified three 

components of the Product Sourcing subfactor and instructed offerors to 

provide a clear explanation as to how the offeror would meet each 

requirement. The first component related to purchasing system requirements, 

listing six elements to be addressed. The Solicitation also instructed offerors 

to provide a plan to meet the quote rate metric. Finally, the Solicitation 

instructed offerors to describe a plan to meet the fill rate metric and ensure 

control over subcontracting.3

While Unifire received a strength because it “has manufacturers and 

vendors visit the offeror’s location to demonstrate products and provide 

training on these items to Unifire staff[,]” it received a deficiency because 

“[t]he information provided in [its] proposal does not constitute a plan as to 

3 The quote rate metric requires vendors to submit quotes on 90% of delivery 

order competitions; whereas, the fill rate metric requires vendors to provide 

the full quantity for 95% of all lines delivered to be calculated as quantity 

delivered/quantity ordered. 
13

how the offeror will meet the 95% Fill Rate Performance Metric and ensure 

control over subcontracting.” AR at 3695. As a result, Unifire received an 

“unacceptable” rating for subfactor (a). Like Quantico, it was thus kept from 

the competitive range because the unacceptable rating put it outside of the 

top-rated offerors because none selected for discussions had any ratings 

lower than “acceptable” and all had prices lower than Unifire’s. AR at 4471. 

Unifire argues that it did submit a plan to satisfy the solicitation’s 

requirement of a 95% Fill Rate Performance Metric, which was clearly 

denominated in its proposal as its “Plan to Meet the 95% Fill Rate 

Performance Metric.” Unifire further points out that its proposal for this 

requirement touted its established relationships with manufacturers of all of 

the products in the Price Evaluation List and also highlighted its relationship 

with certain notable non-manufacturer suppliers in its proposal section 

labeled “Business Alliances and Contractual Relationships,” which was 

directly referenced in the plan to meet the 95% Fill Rate Performance Metric. 

The import is that the agency ought to have understood that this meant that 

Unifire could meet the requirement. Moreover, Unifire also avers that its 

technical proposal, considered as a whole, addresses how it plans to fill 

orders in detail. The agency ought not have ignored other indicia in its 

proposal that provided details regarding its ability to meet the fill rate

requirements, according to Unifire.

Unifire also argues that another offeror included in the competitive 

range, [ ], provided a similarly scanty level of detail in its specific response 

to the Fill Rate requirement and also touted generally its relationship with 

manufactures and suppliers, but was found to have met the requirement. 

Thus, in Unifire’s view, it, like [ ], ought not to have been assigned a 

deficiency and booted from the competitive range. 

Defendant responds that, unlike [ ], Unifire failed to explain how it 

would use its business relationships to meet the fill rate metric, reiterating 

that the SSEB found a general lack of information and narrative regarding 

the “steps, processes, procedures, methods, etc. that it intends to utilize to 

meet the Fill Rate Performance Metric and ensure control over 

subcontracting.” AR at 3694. By way of contrast, the government points out 

that [ ]’s proposal offered a “Vendors Relations” group that would seek 

“out new manufacturing companies,” conduct “market research to 

proactively meet the future demands,” maintain frequent “product training 

with outside and inside sales representatives,” and do “joint sales calls,” its 

“own on base trade shows,” and “sales training” with top vendors at its 

headquarters.” AR at 2848. 
14

Defendant also contends that the reviewers were not obligated to sift 

through Unifire’s technical proposal to supplement the brief comments 

unique to the fill rate metric. Indeed, the solicitation warned offerors not to 

incorporate other sections of their proposal by reference when it stated: “TO 

ENSURE THAT YOUR NON-PRICE PROPOSAL IS PROPERLY 

EVALUATED, PLEASE ARRANGE YOUR REPSONSES IN THE 

ORDER SHOWN ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES. EACH OF YOUR 

INDIVIDUAL REPSONSES SHOULD CITE THE APPLICABLE 

NON-PRICE FACTOR AND PARAGRAPH TO WHICH YOU ARE 

RESPONDING.” AR at 145. Thus, because information regarding Business 

Alliances was not found in the section of Unifire’s proposal marked “Fill 

Rate,” it could not be considered by the SSEB nor the CO, urges the 

government.

We need not go so far in accepting the government’s larger point that 

it was not erroneous or arbitrary for the SSEB to evaluate Unifire’s proposal 

with respect to the first technical subfactor in the way that it did. A

comparison between Unifire’s and [ ]’s proposals regarding this metric 

reveals that, although both relied on business relationships and took up very 

similar (limited) space in their proposals, there was a difference in approach 

in the way the two companies explained their respective abilities to meet the 

fill rate metric. Unifire touted its existing network of manufacturers and 

suppliers, but [ ] primarily relied on a plan to continually grow its network, 

a plan that included certain specific proposed activities. In essence, [ ]’s 

was prospective while Unifire’s was retrospective. The agency chose to 

credit the forward-looking approach of [ ] and discredit Unifire’s plan to 

rest on its laurels. We find no irrationality therein. 

In sum, having a deficiency for the Product Sourcing subfactor, 

Unifire’s rating was properly considered unacceptable and unawardable. 

The CO found such proposals not among the most highly rated, consistent 

with FAR 15.306, and excluded Unifire from the competitive range. 

Plaintiff’s other arguments are thus moot because it cannot show prejudice 

resulting from the alleged errors, and we need not reach them. Unifire’s 

protest must be denied. 

CONCLUSION 

Given the lack of success on the merits, we need not reach the other 

injunctive factors. Both plaintiffs have [ ] deficiencies 

that rendered their proposals for a technical subfactor unacceptable and 

unawardable. That fact is dispositive of all the other arguments because the 
15

protestors cannot show prejudice resulting from the alleged other errors. 

Accordingly, the following is ordered: 

1. Plaintiffs’ motions for judgment on the administrative record (ECF 

Nos. 72 and 73) are denied. 

2. Defendant’s and intervenor’s cross-motions for judgment on the 

administrative record (ECF Nos. 76, 77, and 78) are granted.

3. The Clerk of Court is thus directed to enter judgment for defendant, 

dismissing the complaints in case numbers 20-120C and 20-150C. No 

costs.

s/ Eric G. Bruggink 

ERIC G. BRUGGINK

Senior Judge