COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: J udges Humphreys, Beales and Alston Argued at Richmond, Virginia

MICHAEL ANTHONY EDWARDS OPINION BY v. Record No. 0902-16-2 J UDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. DECEMBER 19, 2017 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT O F CHESTERFIELD COUNTY Steven C. McCallum, Judge Gregory R. Sheldon (Bain Shel don, PLC, on brief), for appellant

. J. Christian Obenshain, Assist ant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Michael Edwards (“appellant”) appeals his murder conviction fr om the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County (“t rial court”), where a jury convicted himof killing Leyla Namiranian. On appeal, appellant asserts that t he trial court erred by (1) den ying his motion to dismiss for improper venue, and (2) finding s ufficient evidence to support his conviction. We find that the trial court did not err and affirm.
B ACKGROUND Leyla Namiranian (“Namiranian” ) was last seen alive on April 4 , 2012. That evening, she hosted her friend Peter Pao li for dinner. Namiranian was u nusually anxious throughout the entire evening, frequently check ing her cell phone and looking out the front door of her home. Namiranian and Paoli ate dinner, exchanged gifts, and became in timate with each other. At around 9:45 p.m., a neighbor observed a silver Cadillac driven by a “football-player type” African-American male quickly rev erse out of Namiranian’s drive way. When Paoli later departed at around 11:00 p.m., Nam iranian was alive and well.PUBLISHED- 2 - At around 5:15 a.m. on April 5, aneighbor walking his dogs no ticed a large, African-American male in Namir anian’s front yard. A little mor e than an hour later, between 6:15 and 6:30 a.m., another neighbo r heard two brief, high-pitc hed noises sounding like screams come from the directi on of Namiranian’s house. Namiranian neve r showed up for work on April 5, so a coworker began periodi cally calling her cell phone to c heck on her. The coworker testified that on some calls the phone would ring several times , and on other calls, it would only ring once and then trans ition to voicemail. After several fail ed attempts to get in contact with Namiranian, the coworker became very concerned and contacted th e police. When the police arrived at Nam iranian’s house, nothing in part icular indicated that a crime had occurred. The front door of the house was locked, no evidence of any forced entry was observed, and Namiranian’s car was parked in the garage. I nside the house, there were no signs of a struggle – nothing was broken or knocked over, and e verything seemed in its proper place. An investigation conducte d by the police established th at Namiranian was leading a completely normal life, and was not planning any trips or movin g from the area. Her mailbox contained several envelopes, and N amiranian’s two cats were in the house. She had tickets for an upcoming event in Washington, D.C. All of Namiranian’s pers onal items were in various rooms, including her car keys, work bag, glasses, pills, hairbr ush, and toothbrush. Her passport, social security card, and citizenship documents were filed away in her home office. However, the police did not find Namir anian’s two cell phones. Further investigation by the pol ice began yielding interesting details. Namiranian kept two couches in her living room – on e had a large, red blanket draped over it, the other did not. However, the couch without a blan ket had a rectangular discolor ation across the cushions. Additionally, Namiranian’s journal was found in her work bag, a nd it contained se veral entries about her tumultuous rela tionship with appellant.- 3 - Namiranian’s friend, Kimberly P ugh, testified about the history between Namiranian and appellant. According to Pugh, the relationship began well but unraveled due to appellant’s possessive and violent nature. E ventually, Namiranian broke it off. During an altercation in February 2012, appellant choked N amiranian and threw her to the ground. Significantly, Namiranian noted in her journal that she then end ed the relatio nship permanently. Namiranian

wrote: I’m going between fear and anger. I broke up with [appellant] for the fourth and last time yester day. He lost his mind with jeal ousy in trying to choke me, but ga ve up. Thank God. I was never so scared . . . I slept at Kim’s because I was afraid he’d come ba ck. Today I called – she called som ebody – so he would stop calling me, or thinking we would somehow get back together. Appellant had once to ld Namiranian “one day, I’m gonna get you. Somehow, some way, when you least expect it, I’m gonna get you.” Appellant would show up at Namiranian’s house without warning, and Namiranian de veloped a significant fear of him. Neighbors also observed him sitting in his car near her house on another occasion befor e her disappearance. Appellant’s phone records reveal ed that between April 2 and Ap ril 4, the days leading up to Namiranian’s disappearance, appellant called Namiranian eigh t different times, none of which Namiranian answered or returne d. The records also revealed tha t appellant did not call Namiranian on April 5, April 6, or any other day after that. Appellant exhibited unusual be havior and demeanor on April 5. He reported late to work at his job at Vitran Express i n Ashland, Virginia, located off of Interstate 95. Appellant’s supervisor testified that he called appellant between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m. that day because appellant had not yet arrived, a nd appellant appeared upset and exhausted when he finally reported at around 2:00 p.m. Additionally, appellant’s friend Carla Hargrove had attempted to call him multiple times on the morning of April 5, but received no answer. Appellant called her- 4 - back later that nigh t, and told her to pre tend that she had bee n with him during the morning of April 5, should anyone ask her. The police wanted to speak with appellant about Namiranian, bu t appellant declined the opportunity. He refused to tell the police where he worked andthen refused to meet in person. Appellant finally agreed to tal k with the police during the aft ernoon of April 6. H e initially denied being near Namiranian’ s house on April 4 or April 5. Ho wever, once detectives showed him his cell phone records proving h e was in that vicinity, he admitted to being around Namiranian’s house and leaving h is car on her street overnight. A forensic analysis of his cell phone revealed that he had delete d all of his text messages to Namiranian. Forensic technicians recovered the messages, and one message from April 2 read “plea se don’t see him again. Okay. Love you very much. Love you very, very much. I’m sorry,” sug gesting appellant’s jealousy of Namiranian’s current relations hip. Appellant was also inconsis tent with other details from the previous two days, providing four different times at which he h ad reported to work on April 5. The police searched appellant ’s vehicle and found a bag in the trunk, containing a red blanket, duct tape, and a buc ket. They also found various cleaning supplies. Further analysis of the blanket and bag revealed a hair consistent with Namiranian’ s hair color, and another hair found in the trunk was consisten t with her DNA profile. Police then searched the car with a canine trained to detect human r emains, which sniffed the insid e of the trunk and then alerted his handler to the presence of huma n remains. Police also found mu ltiple blood stains in the trunk. The police thoroughly reviewed the cell phone records from app ellant and Namiranian and concluded that both individual s were near or inside Namiran ian’s house during the night of April 4 and throughout the morning of April 5. Both phones had pinged off a tower 1 close to

1 “Pinging” occurs when a cell phone connects to a local cell to wer and then links with the cellular network, allowing the phone’s user to make calls, send or receive text messages, and- 5 - Namiranian’s house during that time frame. Moving into the ear ly afternoon of April 5, both phones pinged to towers locate d away from her house. By around 2:00 p.m., both phones pinged off a tower north of appellant’s hom e, adjacent to Interstate 9 5. Appellant’s pinged to the tower near his work around 2:00 p.m., and around the same time Namiranian’s phones pinged to towers close to a section of Inter state 95. The phones were found sha ttered and in sever al pieces in the woods near the Atlee/Elmont exit. The police continued investiga ting whether Namiranian was stil l alive somewhere, but since April 4, 2012, all of her ema il, social media, and financ ial and credit accounts have remained inactive, she never c hecked into any hospital in the C hesterfield County area, her name never appeared on any flight manifests, and her passport was ne ver logged at any airport. Eventually, the authorities conc luded that Namiranian is deceas ed, despite never finding her body, and charged appellant with her murder. At appellant’s five-day jury t rial, the Commonw ealth called 31 witnesses to establish its case. Ultimately, the jury convicted appellant of second-degre e murder and recommended a 30-year penitentiary sentence th at the trial court imposed. Th is appeal followed.
A

NALYSIS I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Appellant’s Motion t o Dismiss In his first assignment of error , appellant argues that the tr ial court e rred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because the Commonwealth did n ot prove that Chesterfield County was the proper venue for this case. We disagree. On appeal, we review “whether t he evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to support the [trial court’s] venue findings.” Williams v.

access the Internet. When analysts determine which tower a pho ne connected with, they are able to approximate a location of the phone.- 6 - Commonwealth, 289 Va. 326, 336, 771 S.E.2d 675, 680 (2015) (quo ting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990)). The burden is on the Commonwealth to establish ve nue. Ware v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 520, 522, 201 S.E.2d 791, 793 (1974). Evidence on venue is vi ewed in the light most favo rable to the Commonwealth, and it must give rise to a “strong pres umption that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.” Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S. E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (citation omitted). The failure to clearly prove ve nue is usually due to inadverten ce, flowing naturally from the familiarity of court, counsel, witne sses, and jurors with the locality of t he crime; therefore, this Cour t will generally and properly lay hold of and accept as sufficient any evidence in the case, direct or otherwise, from which the fact may be reasonably inferred. Williams, 289 Va. at 336, 771 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting Randall v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 182, 187, 31 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1944)). Here, the applicable venue st atute is Code § 19.2-248, which pr ovides, in relevant part, that “if a mortal wound, or othe r violence or injury, be inflic ted . . . and death ensues therefrom in another county or city, the o ffense may be prosecuted in eit her.” 2 Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove tha t Chesterfield County was a pro per venue for his trial. We note that the Commonwealth can e stablish venue using either dir ect or circumstantial evidence. Foster-Zahid v. Commonw ealth, 23 Va. App. 430, 442, 477 S.E.2d 759, 765 (1996). In this

2 We note that the Commonwea lth relied on Code § 19.2-244 at tri al and oral argument, which provides, in relevant part , that “the prosecution of a cr iminal case shall be had in the county or city in which the offens e was committed.” We find th at Code § 19.2-248 is more applicable. Moreover, proceeding under Code §§ 19.2-244 or -24 7 would have required the various jurisdictions involved i n this case to collaborate with one another to formalize a set theory on the factual circumstances of the case, because neithe r Code §§ 19.2-244 nor -247 contain the geographical fl exibility found within Code § 19.2-2 48. The record does not reflect that any discussion between the jur isdictions ever occurred.- 7 - case, the Commonwealth relied on c ircumstantial evidence to est ablish Chesterfield County as a
proper venue. On the last day she was seen a live, April 4, 2012, Namiranian h osted a friend for dinner at her house in Chesterfield County. Cell phone tower evidence showed that appellant was around Namiranian’s house for se veral hours between the night o f April 4 and the morning of April 5. Namiranian’s neighbors noticed appellant ’s car parked outside the house, and he admitted the same to the police. One neighbor noticed an indiv idual fitting appellant’s description in Namiranian’s fr ont yard in the early morning of April 5. Another neighbor heard noises sounding like screams come from the direction of Namiran ian’s house shortly thereafter. By the afternoon of April 5, both Namiranian’s and appellant’s cell phones pinged from towers located away from the house. N amiranian’s phones were found di scarded on the side of Interstate 95. Inside Namirani an’s house, police found all of her personal belongings, including her luggage, passport, glasses , purse, and car keys, and even h er cats were still there. When police searched appellant’s car, a canine alerted police to the presence of human remains, blood stains were noticeable in the trunk, and they found a blanket t hat had a hair on it matching Namiranian’s hair color. Although police recovered no blood or hair evidence from inside the house, appellant had a bucket a nd cleaning supplies in his car, suggesting that he wrapped up Namiranian’s body in the blanket , and thoroughly cleaned the ho use to erase any evidence of the murder. Based on the evidence presented, t he Commonwealth established astrong inference that on the night of April 4, appellant w ent into Namiranian’s house in Chesterfield County for several hours and either morta lly wounded or murdered her there , 3 and then disposed of her body

3 We recognize that venue woul d be established under Code § 19.2 -248 if any violence leading to Namiranian’s deat h occurred within the home, no matt er how minor. Thus, our analysis does not purport to di minish Code § 19.2-248’s applicability in other cases with- 8 - elsewhere. With all reasonable inferences drawn in the light m ost favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient under Code § 19.2-248 to establish venue in Chesterfield County. For the foregoing reasons, the Commonwealth met its burden of p roof regarding venue in this case and the trial court did not err in denying the motionto dismiss. II. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Convict Appellant of Murder In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the e vidence was insufficient to prove that appellant murdered Nam iranian and that the Commonwea lth did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We disagree. A. Circumstantial Evidence When the sufficiency of the e vidence is challenged on appeal, w e review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it al l reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” Ke lly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254, 584 S.E.2d 444, 446 (2003) ( en banc ) (quoting Bright v. Co mmonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 250, 356 S.E .2d 443, 444 (1987)). “In so doing, we must dis card the evidence of the acc used in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true a ll the credible evidence favo rable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Watkins v. C ommonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998) (quoting C irios v. Commonwealth , 7 Va. App. 292, 295, 373 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1988)). This Court will “presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct and reverse only if the trial co urt’s decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Kelly, 41 Va. App. at 257, 584 S.E.2d at 447.

different facts. In this case, how ever, we believe that the Co mmonwealth’s evidence showed that Namiranian was lik ely killed within her home.- 9 - “Murder at common law is a homicide committed with malice, eith er express or implied.” Tizon v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 1, 11, 723 S.E.2d 260, 265 (2012) (quoting Pugh v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 667, 292 S.E.2d 339, 341 (19 82)). “Malice inheres in the ‘doing of a wrongful act intenti onally, or without just cause o r excuse, or as a result of ill will.’” Id. (quoting Dawkins v. C ommonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 61, 41 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1947)). In proving that a crime occurred, “[t]her e is no distincti on in the law be tween the weight or value to be given to either direct or circum stantial evidence. The finder of fact is entitled t o consider all of the evidence, without distincti on, in reaching its determinatio n.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512-13, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003). And “[w]hile no s ingle piece of evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of many concurrent and related c ircumstances . . . may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.” Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479, 619 S.E.2d 16, 32 (2005). We begin our analysis by recognizi ng that no law exists in Virg inia requiring the Commonwealth to produce a vic tim’s dead body to obtain a convic tion for murder. See Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 229-30, 294 S.E.2d 882, 890-91 (1 982). 4 In this case, Namiranian’s body was never found, but the Commonwealth present ed substantial and probative circumstantial evidence to e stablish beyond a r easonable doubt that appellant had motive and opportunity to murder and that he carried out th e murder of Nam iranian.

4 Virginia is part of the major ity of jurisdictions that follow this principle. See, e.g., Gov’t of Virgin Islands v . Harris, 938 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1991); Nebraska v. Edwards, 767 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 2009); Arizonav. Hall, 65 P.3d 90 (Ariz. 2003 ); Michigan v. Fisher, 483 N.W.2d 452 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Il linois v. Faulkner, 542 N.E .2d 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Pennsylvania v. Smith, 588 A .2d 600 (Pa. 1989); Ohio v. Nicely, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio 1988); Rawlings v. Oklahoma, 740 P.2d 153 ( Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Hur ley v. Maryland, 483 A.2d 1298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Utah v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 12 65 (Utah 1984); California v. Manson, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal . Ct. App. 1977); New Jersey v. Zarinsky, 362 A.2d 611 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Washington v. Lung, 423 P.2d 72 (Wa sh. 1967).- 10 - Namiranian and appellant had a m ercurial romantic past. Namira nian eventually became scared of appellant, and this f ear escalated to the point of anactual physical c onfrontation in which appellant choked Namirania n. After that incident, Namira nian resolved to end her relationship with appellant, but appellant found it difficult t o move on. Namiranian told her friend Kimberly Pugh that appellanthad once threatened her, st ating “one day I’m gonna get you. Somehow, some way, when you l east expect it, I’m gonna ge t you.” Namiranian’s personal journal co ntained various statements exhi biting Namiranian’s fear of appellant. In a journal entry from February 19, 2012, Namir anian wrote: I’m going between fear and anger. I broke up with [appellant] for the fourth and last time yester day. He lost his mind with jeal ousy in trying to choke me, but ga ve up. Thank God. I was never so scared . . . I slept at Kim’s because I was afraid he’d come ba ck. Today I called – she called som ebody – so he would stop calling me, or thinking we would somehow get back together. Appellant’s cell phone records s howed that in the days leading up to Namiranian’s disappearance, appellant attemp ted to contact Namiranian almost every day, but stopped after April 4, the last day she was e ver seen. On April 2, appellant had sent Namiranian a text saying “[P]lease don’t see him agai n. Okay. Love you very much. Lov e you very, very much. I’m sorry.” Clearly, appellant knew Namiranian was involved with a nother man but was unable to move on from her, supplying him wit h the motive to murder Namir anian. Appellant also had the opportunit y to murder Namiranian. A sig nificant amount of evidence placed appellant near N amiranian’s house between April 4 and April 5. Appellant’s cell phone records showed that his phone pinged off a tower nea r Namiranian’s house during the night of April 4 and throughout t he morning of April 5. When a ppellant’s cell phone finally left the area near Namiranian’s house late in the morning on April 5 , Namiranian’s cell phones moved along with his, pinging off of the same towers. Namirani an’s neighbors tes tified that they saw appellant’s car in the area on April 4, and he admitted tha t it was parked there that night.- 11 - Another neighbor witnessed an Afr ican-American male, “about 6’2 ”, 250 pounds, a big man,” walking across Namiranian’s l awn early in the morning on April 5. 5 Appellant admitted to the police that he had access to Namiranian’s house, explaining the lack of evidence of any forced entry. It was also around ear ly morning on April 5 that anothe r neighbor heard two loud, high-pitched screams emanate from the direction of Namiranian’s house. In the early afternoon of April 5, appellant showed up late to work without explanation and appeared exhausted and upset. Appellant worked at a buildi ng close to Interstate 95, affording him the opportunity to dump Namiranian’s phones out h is car window on the way there. The shattered cell phones were recovered in several pie ces, strewn alongside Interstate 95. Later that night, appellant spoke to his friend Carla Hargrove over the phone, and asked her to tell anyone who inquired that they h ad been together that day, in a clear attempt to formulate an alibi for his whereabouts. Additionally, while sev eral canine searches of Namiranian’s hou se and the surrounding area did not produce any leads, t he police even tually found mor e evidence implicating appellant. During a search of appellant’s ca r, a canine alerted to the pre sence of human remains in the trunk, a hair matching Namiranian’ s hair color was recovered fr om a red blanket, and another hair corresponding to Namiranian’ s DNA profile was recovered fr om the trunk. The police also observed blood stains in the tr unk, and a roll of duct tape in the backseat had traces of male and female DNA on it. Within Namiranian’s house itsel f, the police observed that she owned two couches – one had a large, red blanket drape d over the top, while the second did not. However, a close

5 While we normally would not repeat edly reference a perpetrator ’s ethnicity, we believe it prudent here because the Com monwealth relied exclusively on circumstantial evidence in this case, and thus it is highly mat erial that on April 4 and April 5, the time frame during which the Commonwealth alleged the murder occurred, Namiranian’s neighbor s observed an individual fitting appellant’s description bot h in ethnicity and physical build.- 12 - inspection of the second couch r evealed a noticeable, rectangul ar discoloration, indicating that something rectangular-shaped had been sitting on it for a long period of time, protecting the fabric from light. A reasonable jury could concl ude that the s econd couch had an identical large, red blanket draped over it, whi ch appellant removed and used during the disposal of Namiranian’s body. A red blanket wa s recovered from the trunk of appellant’s car. Moreover, police discovered a bucket and various cleaning supplies in app ellant’s car, suggesting to a reasonable factfinder that appe llant had undertaken the task of cleaning up any evidence of the murder before departing from the house. Finally, considering the totality of the evidence, it is clear that appellant displayed express malice in killing Namira nian. “Express malice is evide nced when ‘one person kills another with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design.’” C anipe v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 629, 642, 491 S.E.2d 747, 753 (1997) (quoting Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 280, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1984) (citation omitted)). Appellant demonstrated a significant feeling of “ill will” toward N amiranian through a series of sta tements and actions. See Tizon, 60 Va. App. at 11, 723 S.E.2d at 265. He ha d previously threatene d Namiranian, stating “I’m gonna get you.” He choked Namirania n and threw her on the ground dur ing the February 2012 altercation, and his April 2 tex t message to her revealed his e nduring jealousy over her new relationship. Appellant then lurked around Namiranian’s house on the night of April 4, biding his time until he could catch he r alone and off-guard. Furthermore, appellant’s act of wrapping Namiranian’s body in a blanket a nd disposing of it so that it w ould never be found indicates a knowledge that his actio ns were “without jus t cause or excuse.” Id. The decisive and calculated methods employed by appellant evi nce his “formed design” of the murder. See Canipe, 25 Va. App. at 642, 491 S.E.2d at 753. Appe llant ensured that Nam iranian’s body would never be found, and he attempted to elimina te all physical evidence of t he murder by cleaning- 13 - Namiranian’s house, undercutting the possibility that appellant killed Namiranian accidentally. In that vein, we note that nothi ng within the Commonwealth’s ev idence suggested that the killing may have been accidental. For the aforementioned reasons, w e find that the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant committed second-degree murd er. B. The Jury Rejected Appellant’s Hypothesis of Innocence Appellant also argues that the Commonwealth did not exclude eve ry reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and thus he cannot be convicted of sec ond-degree murder. “The statement that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reaso nable theory of innocence is simply another way of stating tha t the Commonwealth has the bur den of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785. However, “[m]erely because [a] defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the C ommonwealth does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consis tent with his innocence has n ot been excluded. What weight should be given evidence is a matter for the [factfinder] to de cide.” Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9, 602 S.E.2d 402, 406 (2004) (quoting Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 462, 467, 138 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1964). “By finding [ a] defendant guilt y, therefore, the f actfinder ‘has found by a process of elimination that the evidence does not co ntain a reasonable theory of innocence.’” Id. (citing Un ited States v. Kemble, 197 F.2d 316 , 320 (3d Cir. 1952)). Additionally, “the jury’s verdi ct cannot be overturned on appea l unless no rationa l trier of fact could have come to the conclusi on it did.” Stevens v. Commonwe alth, 46 Va. App. 234, 248, 616 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2005). “The issue is whether a reasonable jury, upon consideration of all the evidence, could have rejecte d [appellant’s] theories in his defense and [find] him guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785.- 14 - Appellant contends that Namira nian could have voluntarily disap peared and that she simply decided to abandon her curr ent life and start anew elsew here, or alternativ ely, that “the Commonwealth’s evidence could onl y truly prove that [Namiranian ] was probably dead.” Appellant argues that Namiranian’ s journal entries revealed her to be a “sad, lonely woman [who] was unhappy at work” a nd who “dreamed about being in a di fferent place.” Appellant relies on these characterizations to assert the hypothesis that“Namiranian elected to live life in absentia,” and argues that the C ommonwealth never excluded that possibility. However, the items that Namiranian would still have needed in a new life were all recovered from her house, except for her cell phones, which wer e found in pieces alongside Interstate 95. Namiranian’s ha irbrush and toothbrush, pets, ca r keys, and car were all at her house. Her passport, birth cer tificate, and citizenship docume nts were safely stored away. Namiranian had purchased tickets for an upcoming event in Washi ngton, D.C., and there was no activity in any of her social media accounts or bank accounts a fter April 4. Because appellant’s and Namiranian’s cell phones moved together on April 5, both pi nging off of towers located away from Namiranian’s house, it can be inferred that appellant took Namiranian’s phones with him after he left and attem pted to dispose of them. In positing his hypothesis of inno cence, appellant undervalues the significant volume of the Commonwealth’s evidence and o veremphasizes the absence of N amiranian’s body. The absence of the body is the only f act to which appellant’s hypot hesis is anchored, and that fact alone cannot prevent the tide of significant circumstantial evi dence from sweeping his hypothesis away. Contrary to appellant’s theory, “[t]he unlikelihood of [ a victim’s] voluntary disappearance is circumstantial evidence ent itled to weight equal to that of [other] evidence.” Epperly, 224 Va. at 229, 294 S.E.2d at 890. Courts have rejected efforts to “pl ace a premium on stealthy murder and successful concealment of the victim’s body.” Id. Thus, V irginia jurisprudence already- 15 - contains examples of how a factfi nder could interpret the absen ce of a body as probative evidence in a murder prosecuti on, and the principle does not su pport appellant’s hypothesis. Furthermore, appellant specifica lly argued the “Namiranian is l iving life in absentia” theory to the jury during his cl osing arguments and the jury re ndered a guilty verdict, thus necessarily rejecting appellant ’s hypothesis. We recognize tha t “a factfinder cannot ‘arbitrarily’ choose, as between two equally p lausible interpretations, one t hat incriminates [appellant].” Haskins, 44 Va. App. at 9, 602 S.E.2d at 406 (citing Dixon v. C ommonwealth, 162 Va. 798, 803, 173 S.E. 521, 523 (1934)). If, “after the factfinder ‘resolves all conflicts in t he evidence’ . . . the evidence of guilt or innocence remains anywhere near equipoise – that is, the facts are ‘equally susceptible to two or more cons tructions’ – then reasonable dou bt exists as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Feigley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 717, 724, 432 S.E .2d 520, 525 (1993)). However, when a factfinder rej ects a hypothesis of innocence as unreasonable, the “verdict cannot be overturned on appeal unless no rational trier of fact could have come to the conclusion it did.” Stevens, 46 Va. App. at 248, 616 S.E.2d at 761 (empha sis added). Put another way, “[t]he issue is whether a reas onable jury, upon consideration o f all the evidence, could have rejected [appellant’s] theori es in his defense and found him gu ilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785 (emphasis ad ded). Here, all the evidence presen ted at trial c ould, and did, lead a rational trier of fact to determine that appellant had the motive and opportunity to murd er Namiranian and that he succeeded in killing her. In reaching that conclusion, the jur y rejected appellant’s theory that Namiranian began living a life “in absentia,” and the evidence supports as much. The Commonwealth is not required t o address and disprove every conc eivable possibility of what could have occurred. Rather, it is only required to eliminate all reasonable hypotheses of- 16 - innocence. The Commonwealth a ccomplished that here. Thus, we decline to disturb the jury’s verdict. Based on the evidence presented w e cannot say the trial court w as plainly wrong or without evidence to support itwhen it convicted appellant of s econd-degree murder. Accordingly, the judgment of t he trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.