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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-1766

P ATRI C K H AH N

AND E RI K R E DW

OOD, Admini strat or of the Estate o f Janet Loui se Hahn

, Deceas ed, Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v.

D ANI E L W AL S H

, et al. , Defen dants-Appellees.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Central Distri ct o f Il l i noi s. No. 2: 09 -cv-02 14 5- MPM- DGB — Micha el P. McCus key, District Judg e.

A RGU E D A PRI L 15, 2014

— D E C I D E D A UGUS T 12, 2014

Before R I PPL E and W I L L I AM S , Circ uit Judges , and S T

. E V E, District Judge. *

The Hono rab l e Amy J. St. Eve, ofth e United Sta tes D i stric t Court for the * Nor thern Distri ct o f Il l i noi s, si tting by desi gna tio n.2 No. 13-1766

R I P PL E, Circ uit Judge. Janet Hahn was a pret rial detain ee at the Champai gn County Cor rectional Center (“CCCC”) i mmedi ately befo re she di ed as a result of di abeti c ket oaci dosi s. Patric k Hahn, Mr s. Ha hn ’s husband, and

1 Erik R edwood, the admini strat or of her estate, brought thi s acti on, allegin g thatvar i ous gov ernment offi ci als and private contracto rs fai led to prov i de adequate medi cal tr eatment, in violati on of Mr s. Hahn’s rights under the Four teenth Amendment, the Americ ans wi th Di sabi li ties Act, the Rehabi li tation Act and Illinoi s state law. The di stric t court di smi ssed some of the plainti ffs ’ clai ms under Fede r al Rule of Ci vil Procedure 12(b) (6) and gr anted sum mary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining clai ms. The plainti ffs now appeal, rais ing three i ssu es. Firs t, the plainti ffs sub mi t that the di stric t court err ed in di smi ssing their state law wrongful death clai m. The di stric t court faulted the plainti ffs fo r fai ling to comply wi th an Illinoi s statute that

r equi res plainti ffs who allege medi cal malpracti ce to sub mi t

Diabetic ketoaci do sis i s a seri ous compl i catio n of di ab etes. Indi v i d u als 1 with Type-1 di ab etes, l i ke Mrs. H ahn , hav e l i ttle or no i nsuli n i n their b od i es. Diabetes , Mayo Cl i nic, http://www.mayocl i nic. or g/di seasescondi tio ns/di ab etes/bas i cs/de fi ni tio n/co n-20 03 30 91 (l ast v i site d Jul y 31 , 20 14 ). Insuli n trans por ts gluco se to cel l s fo r use as energy; the ab sence of i nsuli n l eads to a b uil dup of gluco se i n the b l oo dstream. Id

. Many di ab eti cs modul ate this b uil dup b y admini steri ng i njecti ons of i nsuli n. Id

. Di abetic ketoaci d o si s occ urs when an i ndivid ual’s b od y do es not b reak do wn this g l ucose; rather, the b od y b egi ns to b reak do wn fat fo r fuel

. Diabet i c Ketoacidosis , Mayo Cl i nic, http://www.mayocl i nic. or g/di seases-condi tio ns/ di ab eti c-keto acido sis/

b asics/d efi niti on/c on-2 00 26 47 0 (l as t v i site d Jul y 31 , 20 14 ). This si tuatio n causes “a b uil dup o f toxic aci ds i n the bloo dstream,” which can, as in thi s i nstance, be fatal. Id

.No. 13-1766 3

wi th their complaints (1) an affi davit confi rming that a medi cal professi onal has ver i fi ed the clai m’s merit and (2) a wri tte n repo rt from that medi cal professi onal. Second, the p l a int i ffs contend that the di stric t court abus ed i ts di screti on by di smi ssing their wrongful death clai m wi th prej udi ce inste ad of gr anti ng them leave to amend in order to cure t he defi ci ency. Fin ally, they sub mi t that the di stric t court e r r e d in gr anting
sum mary j udgment to t wo of the defendants.
We affi rm in part and rev erse in part the judgm e nt o f t he di stric t court . The di stric t courtcorr ectly dis mi ssed the plaintiffs’ wrongful death clai m bu t e r r e d by di smi ssing i t wi th prej udi ce. The plainti ffs produced insu ffi ci e nt e videnc e to permi t their clai ms again st Sher i ff Walsh and Hea l t h Professi onals Ltd. (“HP L”), the j a il’s medi cal services contracto r, to survive sum mary judgment. Accordingly, we rev erse the di stric t court’s judgment insofar as it di smi ssed the wrongfu l death clai m wi th prej udi ce. We affi rm the remain der of i ts deci si ons.

I

BACKGRO UND
A.
We recount the facts in the li ght most favor able to the plainti ffs

. See Hardaway v. Meyerhoff , 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Ci r. 2013).
On the evening o f Ju ne 15, 2007, Mr s. Hahn was arr ested for aggr avat ed domesti c ba tte ry an d tr an s p or te d to the satelli te location of the CCCC. The Champai gn County Sher i ff’s Offi ce,4 No. 13-1766

headed by Sher i ff Dani el Walsh, oper ates the CCCC. Upon her

a r r i val, Offi cer Chad Schwei ghart processed Mr s. Hahn into the CCC C as a detain ee. She was angry and unc ooper ative 2 during book ing. Mr s. Hahntold Offi cer Schwei ghartthat she

wa s di abeti c and sui ci dal, but she refused to prov i d e a ny addi tional information, such as the type of insu lin she h a d been prescribed. She also refused to si gn a release so that the CCCC

c ou l d ob ta in h e r m e di cal recor ds. Offi cer Schwei ghart re p or te d thi s information to hi s su perv i sor. Mr s. Hahn was placed on sui cid e watch pursuant to a CCCC policy fo r handling detain ees who are i denti fi ed as mentally i ll, who demonstrate unus ual beha v io r or who indi cate that they are exper i encing sui ci dal i deations

. Accordingly, Mrs. Hahn was given a gown an d blanket m ade from a material that prev ents detainees from fash i oni ng them into instruments of self- harm. Furt her, corr ecti onal offi cers were required to observe Mr s. Hahn ever y fi fteen minutes for si gns of physi cal o r ment a l d ist ress and to repo rt any such signs to their su perv i sors. B e yond the fi fteen-minute chec ks, the C C C C h a d a d d i ti on a l po li ci es in place relev ant to Mr s. Hahn’s phy si cal and mental

c on d iti on s

. First, the CCCC contracted wi th a p riva te c om p any, HPL, to prov i de medi cal and mental health services to detain

ees in i ts cus tody

. All medi cal i ssu es were refer red to HPL’s 3

Thi s was not M rs. Hahn’s fi rst dete ntio n at the CCCC. In May 20 07, she 2 also had b een arrested and detained there.

It appears tha t the CCCC houses b oth pretri al detainee s and se nt e nced 3 (co ntinued. ..)No. 13-1766 5
medi cal staff and mental health i ssu es were refer red to i ts
couns elor s. CCCC offi cers deferre d to the judgmen t o f HPL professi onals on i ssu es of medi cal and mental health. Second, the CCCC had a poli cy of not fo r cing medi cal care on a resi sting detain ee. For example, i f a d i abeti c det ainee refused to have her blood su g a r checked or to take insu lin, CCCC offi cers were not supp osed to force car e o n the detain ee; the offi cers should have report ed the refus al to a supervis or or to both a supervis or and medi cal staff. The CCCC also would not force patien ts to eat i f they refused to do so. If a detain ee refused a meal, the corr ecti ona l o ffic er on duty should have notifi ed a supervis or ; i f the detain ee refused mo r e than one meal, i t was “normal practic e” for the corr ecti onal offi cer to notify both a supervis or and medi cal staff. Medic al or mental 4 health staff then deci de d what to do about a detainee who refused to eat. Fin ally, i f a detain ee was sufferin g from an “obvious/l i fe-threatening acute/emergen cy si tuation,” CCCC offi cers were to call for emerge ncy medi cal as si stance. 5
In or der to p ro vide the necess ary medi cal and mental health care, HPL staffe d t he CCCC wi th a physi ci an (wh o vis i ted once per week), reg i stered nurses and mental health personnel. Cor rectional offi cers could contact an on-call nurse at any tim e. HPL prov i ded tr aining on an annual ba sis to

( ...c onti nued) 3 i nma tes. Fo r si mpli ci ty’s sa ke, we use the wo rd “ detainee ” generi call y, to refe r to all i ndivid uals housed i n the CCCC.

R.16 5 at 9

. 4

Id

. (i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 56 No. 13-1766

corr ecti onal offi cers about the care and moni tor ing of di abeti c patien ts. Thi s tr aining inclu ded instruct i on on how to recog

ni ze hy pogly cemi a and hyperg lycemi a (low and hi gh blood sugar, respectively).
In addi tion to the CCCC’s poli ci es and practic es, HPL had i ts own poli ci es for i denti fying and handling detain ees suffering from seri ous medic al cond it io ns, in clud ing mental i llness and di abetes. For di abeti c detain ees whose tr eatment prot ocol

was unknown, HPL’s poli cy called for blood sugar to be chec ked twi ce each day using an Accu -Chek glucose meter, for insu lin to be deli ver ed based on a particu lar dosage scal e and 6 for an evening snac k to be prov i ded t o the detain ee. Insulin could be admini stered by a nurse, wi thout co nsu ltin g a phy sic i an. If a di abeti c detain ee refused tr eatment, medi cal staff would atte mpt to have the detain ee si gn a refusal-of- care form. HPL di d not have a speci fi c poli cy for chec kin g the blood sugar of di abeti c inmates who r e fused to use the Accu -Chek mach ine. When Mr s. Hahn was fir st p r ocessed into the jail, Offi cer Joanne Le wis a nd a supervis or , Ser geant Michael Johnson, were among the offi cers on duty. Offi cer Lewi s gav e M r s. Hahn a meal on the evening of June 15, 2007. When sh e ret urned to ret rieve the tr ay, Offi cer Lewi s noted that some of

At the time of Mrs. Hahn’s death, HPL had i n pl ace a “sl i di ng sc al e ” 6 pol i cy tha t call ed fo r the admini stratio n of a p articul ar am o u nt of i nsuli n b ased on the i ndivid ual’s b l oo d suga r readi ng. See R.133 -7 at 36 , 46 –4 7, 16 6. For exa mple , i f an i ndivid ual’s b l oo d suga r readi ng was higher than 20 1 b ut l ower than 25 0, he rece i v ed fi v e units of regul ar i nsuli n. If i t was higher than 25 1 but l ower than 30 0, he rece i v ed e i ght units o f re gular i nsuli n.No. 13-1766 7

the food was gone, but she di d not k now whether Mr s. Hahn had eaten i t. At some poin t t ha t e venin g, Mr s. Hahn too k off her gown and stuffed her gown and blanke t into the toilet in her cell. The cell then flooded. Accor dingly, the water to Mr s. Hah n’s cell was shu t off. After the water was shu t off,

corr ecti onal office rs brought Mr s. Hahn water upon request. Offi cer Lewi s ass i sted Mr s. Hahnin putting on a new gown. Ser geant Johnson also interacte d wi th Mr s. Hah n that evening. He spoke wi th Mr s. Hahn about her di abetes and disc uss ed chec kin g her blood sugar. Mr s. Hahn ini tiall y resi sted but event ually agr eed to have her blo od sugar
c h e c k e d

. A f t e r c o n t a c t i n g t h e o n
- c a l l H P L n u r s e , Kendra Adams, Ser geant Johnson chec ked Mr s. Hahn’s blood

su g a r and, at 9:40 p.m., her blood sugar reading was 1 6 0

. Adams advis ed Ser geant Johnson that thi s reading was wi thin
an acceptable range , a nd no insu lin was prov i ded to M r s. Hahn. The reading was recor ded on a form called the

7 “Blood S ugar and Insulin Tracking Sheet .” After hi s interaction wit h Mr s. Hahn, Ser geant Johnson wrot e an e-mai l to HPL staff. He s tate d that M rs. Hahn w as a “psych patien t,” that she had a cut and sti tches on her left arm (and that the bandage had been remov ed for safety purpo ses becau se sh e had made statements about hurting herself), that she was unpre d ictable and had flooded her cell, and that her blood sugar was 1 6 0 and she was not given insu lin.

The di stric t cour t noted , however, tha t a normal b l oo d suga r readi ng was 7 80 –1 20

. The pl aintif fs’ expert testif i ed tha t a readi ng of160 i s “ab ove wha t you’d l i ke i n an

i nsuli n depe ndent di ab eti c, b ut i t i s not l i fe- threatening.” R.165 at 11 n.4.8 No. 13-1766

Ser geant Johnson also left a mess age for offi cers assi gned to sub sequent shi fts. That mess age inclu ded most of the information g i ven to HPL, as well as a note th a t Mr s. Hahn had been

ver y unc ooper ative and that the water in he r cell had been t ur ne d off. CCCC staff start ed a “segreg ation log” for Mr s. Hahn, whi ch noted var i ous information, inclu ding her refusal of meals

. On that same ev ening, according to the testim ony of Donald MacFar lane, a detain ee at the CCCC, Mr s. Hahn stood at her cell window fo r mo re than an hour, yellin g that she needed help and asking that her doctor be called. MacFar lane testifi ed that t hi s epi sode began after about9:00 p.m. O ff i cer Kar ee Voges was on duty from 11:45 p.m. o n Jun e 15, 2007, to 8:15 a.m. on June 16, 2007. She testifi ed that becau se she had interacte d wi th Mr s. Hahn during her prior detention, she k ne w that Mr s. Hahn was a Type-1 di abeti c and that she had a hi stor y of being angry and unc ooper ative. Offi cer Voges sai d that thro ughout that ni ght, she brought Mr s. Hahn cups of water when requested. S he offered breakfast to M rs. Hahn

aro und 6:30 a.m., but she documented on the l o g that Mr s. Hahnrefused the meal.
On the mornin g of June 16, Mr s. Hahn was se e n by both Alyson M or ris, a mental health clini ci an wi th HPL, and by 8

Mo rri s had a mas ter’s degre e i n counsel i ng and rece i v ed addi tio nal 8 traini ng f r o m H P L, which covered suici de preventio n and, i n particul ar, suici de p reventio n in a co rrecti onal env i ro nment.No. 13-1766 9

Susan Swain, a nurse wi th HPL. M o rr i s’s interaction wi th 9 Mr s. Hahn was brief

; at i ts conclu si on, she wro te an e-mai l to Ser geant Johnson, on whi ch she copi ed her supervis or

. Mor ris wrot e that M rs. Hahn w as sti ll unc ooper ative and angry.
Swain arr i ved at the CCCC aro und 9:30 a

. m. on June 16. She rev i ewed Offi cer Sc hw ei ghart ’s paperwor k reg ardin g M rs. Hahn. Swain recalled from a prior exper i ence wit h Mr s. Hahn and from lo o k ing at Mr s. Hahn’s recor ds that Mr s. Hahn was an insul in- dependent di abeti c and that she prev i ously had refused insu lin and blood sugar chec ks. She also was aware of the possi bi li ty that Mr s. Hahn suffered from

a mental di sabi li ty. Swain was calle d t o M r s. Hahn’s cell at

Whil e Mrs. Hah

n was detained at the CCCC i n May 20 07, she had been 9 treated b y Swain. At tha t time, Swain sent an e-mail to an account call ed “Co rrecti ons” regardi ng her di ffi cul tie s with Mrs. Hahn. The e-mai l read:

Hi there! This youn g l ady i s quite a chall enge to work with. She refuses to di sclo se any of her medi cal histo ry or condi tio ns except fo r the fact tha t she i s i nsuli n depe ndant [si c] di ab eti c. She also refuses to sign any rel ease of i nfor mati on and tol d me tha t she wil l n ot tel l m e wh o her do ctor i s o r wh ere she seeks treatment at. She wil l b e l eav i ng tomo rro w ( 0 5

- 0 7- 07 ) and she states tha t she wil l not eat whil e she i s he r e. She has pretty much tie d my han ds as far as hel p i ng he r goes. Ple ase b ri ng her to the i nfi rmary to test her bl oo d suga r toni ght and tomo rro w morni ng BUT I am not at all sure tha t she wil l coo perate with the test. She can give hersel f i nsuli n per sli di ng scale however I am pretty sure tha t she wil l not do tha t ei ther! Thanks fo r yo ur assistance in thi s matt er!!!!

Id

. at 3–4.10 No. 13-1766

a r o und 10:00 a.m. becau se a corr ecti onal offi cer had te st e d Mr s. Hahn’s blood sugar and found i t to be 396. The reading 1 0

was documented on the tr acking sheet. When Swain arr i ved at Mr s. Ha hn ’s cell, she atte mpted to take vital si gns and get a medi cal hi stor y, but Mr s. H ahn re s i s te d p ro vi d in g in for mati on. Mr s. Hahn also r e fu sed to si gn a release that would allow S wa in to obtain her medi cal information from her usu a l physi ci an. Swain testifi ed that, at thi s poin t in tim e, Mr s. Hahn

was “or i ented to tim e and p l a ce” and di d not complain of feeling poor ly. Mr s. Hahn refused to go to the infi rmary wi th 1 1 Swain. Instead, S wain brought twenty uni ts of insu lin to Mr s. Hahn and admini stered i t in her cell. Thi s was recor ded 1 2

on the tr acking sheet. Swain placed Mr s. Hahn on the di abetes tr eatment prot ocol described above. Later that mo rnin g, Mr s. Hahnwas taken to bond court

. On the afterno on of June 16, Mor ris conduc ted a more in-depth a ssessmen t of Mr s. Hahn. She completed an “Ini tial Mental Health Screening and Asses sment For m,” whi ch noted

The pl aintif fs ci te testimo nial evidence tha t a readi ng of 3 9 6 wa s 1 0 “extremel y high” and tha t a do ctor shoul d have be e n contacted at this poi nt. Appe l l ant s’ Br. 8 n.1 3 ( i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted).

R.16 5 at 1 4; seealso R.133 -7at 45 –4 6. 1 1

Swain testif i ed tha t accord i ng to HPL’s scale, an i ndivid ual with a b l oo d 1 2 suga r readi ng of 39 6 i s to b e given fi fteen units of i nsuli n. Howe ve r , she also testif i ed tha t a d octo r had advised her tha t when the readi ng i s cl ose to a l i mit on the scale, she shoul d adm i ni st er the do sag e of i nsuli n
cor resp o nd i ng with the nex t i ncrement on the scale. Theref or e, she admini stered twenty units o f i nsuli n to M rs. Hahn.No. 13-1766 11

Mr s. Hahn’s anti depressant medi cati on and prim ary mental 1 3 health clini ci an. She e-mai led CCCC st aff, statin g that Mr s. Hahn was “mentally ret arded and a poor hi stor i an,” and tha t she should remain on sui ci de watch for at least seventy

two hours. She stated that mental health staff would reev alu-

1 4 ate Mr s. Hahn’s condi tion in twenty-four to fort y-ei ght hours. Mor ris also told Swain that Mr s. Hahn was unc ooper ative and that she was tr yin g to convin ce Mr s. Hahn about the imp or

tance of work ing wi th the medi cal s taff to t reather diab etes. Aro und 4 : 00 p.m. on June 16, Mr s. Hahn was escorted to the infi rmary by Offi cer J enna Thode for a blood s ugar ch eck. Offi cer Thode ini tiall y wrot e down 320 on the tr acking sheet as Mr s. Hahn’s blood su gar level. She then crossed i t out and wrot e 107. Offi cer Thode’s explanation i s that 320 i s her badge numb er, and she had wri tte n i t acci dental l y. Mr s. Hahn refused dinner on the evening of June 16. MacFar lane testifi ed that M rs. Hahn looked si ck and pale that eve ning. Offi cer Voges work ed ov ernight again from June 16 to June 17. She bro ught Mr s. Hahn water o n several o ccas i ons. In the mornin g on June 17, Mr s. Hahn refused breakfast. Offi cer Voges tr i ed to test Mr s. Hahn’s blood sugar. The Accu

Chek mach ine read “E” on two atte mpts. An “E” reading could

Mo rri s noted tha t Mrs. Hahn had b een prescri b ed Ser oquel

. Ser oquel i s 1 3 prescri b ed “as an anti psychoti c i n the treatment of schizophre nia and other psychoti c di sord ers,” Dor l and’s Il l ustrated Med i cal Dicti onary 1566 , 169 8 (3 2d ed. 20 12 ), b ut Mo rri s b el i eved tha t Mrs. Hahn too k Ser oquel pri maril y
as asl eep aid.

R.16 5 at 1 4 ( i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 1 412 No. 13-1766

indi cate that there was not enough blood used or that the sti ck contai ning blood was not inserted properly into the Ac cu

- Chek mach ine. Accordi ng to the plainti ffs, i t also could me a n t hat there was “some problem wi th t he machine.” These err or 1 5 readings were not recor ded on the tr acking sheet. Aro und 9:00 a.m., Mr s. Hahn a sk e d a di fferent offi cer to have her blood sugar checked. When Swain arrived at t he CCCC, that offi cer told he r t ha t Mr s. Hahn had not eaten breakfast and that atte mpts to chec k her blood sugar were uns ucc essf ul. Swain chec ked on Mr s. Hahn and, at thi s poin t, Mr s. Hahn refused to allow staff to tr y to use the A cc u-Chek mach ine again

. Swain told Mr s. Hahn that the fai lure to chec k her blood sugar could compromi se her health, but there i s no evidenc e as to whether anyone asked M rs. Hahn to si gn a refusal-of-treatment for m. At approx i mately 11:00 a

. m. that same mor ning, a corr ectional offi cer told Swain that Mr s. Hahn had repo rt ed vo mi tin g in her cell. Swain i mmedi ately we nt to chec k on Mr s. Hahn, but she di d not observe any si gns of vo mi tin g. Swain sai d that she spoke wi th Mr s. Hahn at thi s point a nd observe d her for any si gns or symptoms of i llness

. Throughout the day on June 17, Offi cer Terrance Al e x a nder had repeat ed contacts wi th Mr s. Hahn. He di d not observe any si gns of medi cal or mental di stress. He asked Mr s. Hahn multi ple tim es i f she would have her blood sugar tested, and she refused. M r s. Hahn refused lunch that afterno on. At 3:00 p.m., S wain ret urned to Mr s. Hahn’s cell. Swain testifi ed that she di d not o bserve any si gns of di abeti c ket oaci dosi s and that Mr s. Hahn spoke to her

A ppel l ant s’ Br. 10

. 1 5No. 13-1766 13 coherently

. She also testifi ed that she offered to test Mr s. Hahn ’s blood sugar, but she refused.
Later that evening, Offi cer Thode tr i ed to test Mr s. Hahn’s blood sugar but Mr s. Hah n again refused. Mr s. Hahn also refused dinne r that evening. Mr s. Hahn told Offi cer Thode that she had been thro wing up for the last few days. Offi cer Thode told the offi cers whose shi ft fol l o we d hers about her interactions wi th Mr s. Hahn, but Mr s. Hahn’s refusa l s t o have her blood sugar chec ked were not docum e nt ed on the tr acking sheet or segreg ation log. Sixty-one cell chec ks, conduc ted by multi ple corr ecti onal offi cers, were perfor med from 3:00 p.m. on June 17 to 6:30 a.m.
on June 18. One offi cer tes t ified that when he chec ked on Mr s. Hahn thr o ug ho ut hi s ov ernight shi ft, she was making sounds and moving aro und a lot and that he heard her hi tting the door

. Another offi cer, Matt hew M cCalli ster, t e st ifi ed that someti me between 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., he opened the door to Mr s. Hahn’s cell to chec k on her becau se she was so close to the door that he could not see her from the outsi de, but that she was r esponsiv e and mov ed away from the door when he opened i t. Two detainees testifi ed that, during the ni ght, t hey heard a female detain ee s tating that sh e di d not feel well, that she w anted to see the nurse and that she needed insu lin. Early in the mornin g on June 18, CCCC staff began to tr eat Mr s. Hahn’s condi tion as acute. MacFar lane t e st i fi ed that,

aro und 6 :00 a.m., a corr ecti onal offi cer look ed into Mr s. Hahn’s14 No. 13-1766

ce ll and sai d, “Thi s one’s not look ing so goo d.” Appr o x i- 1 6 mately twenty-fi ve minutes later , Offi cer A r no ld Mathews observe d Mr s. Hahn and found he r to be in medi cal di stress. He called for medi cal assi st a nce, and emerge ncy medi cal services were contacted. Mr s. Hahn was take n to the hospi tal, where tests showed that Mr s. Hahn had a blood sugar reading of 966, a blood urea ni tr oge n reading of 62, a creatinine reading of 3–4 a nd swelling in the brain as a result of di abeti c ke t oaci dosi s. The plainti ffs ’ exper t testifi ed that thi s data indi cated that Mr s. Hahn had been suffe r ing from di abeti c ket oaci dosi s for hours. Mrs

. Hahn di ed in the hospi tal later that day.

B.
In June 2009, Mr

. Hahn a nd Mr

. Redwood fi led an ei ghtcount complaint in the Uni ted St a t e s Di stric t Court for the Centr al Di stric t o f Illinoi s. The Amended Complaint, fi led shortly after t he original complaint, named as defendants t he County of Champai gn, Sher i ff Walsh, Offi cer McCalli ster and oth e r u n n a m e d Champai gn County corr ecti ona l offi c e rs

. It a l s o

n a med HPL and unnam ed “jail nurse(s ).” Lastly, i t n a m e d the 1 7 C it y of Urbana and the Urbana poli ce offi cers who ha d

arr ested Mr s. Hahn on June 15. Only some of the counts in the

R.16 5 at 1 8 ( i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 1 6

R.3 at 1. 1 7No. 13-1766 15

Amende d Complaint are relev ant here. Count II of the 1 8

Co unt I and some of the other counts i n the Amended Co mplai nt rel ate 1 8
to d e fendants or cl aims tha t are not part of this appeal. Co unt I of the Amended Co mplai nt all eged tha t the i ndivid ual def endants exhi b i ted del i b erate i ndif fere nce to Mrs. Hahn’s serio us medi cal nee ds, i n v i ol atio n of he r F o urteenth Amendment ri ghts, when they refused to take her to a hospi tal or pro v i de necessary medi cal or psyc hi at r i c care. Co unt I was termi nat ed as to all of the CCCC def endants except f o r Sheri ff Walsh b ecause those def endants we r e nev er served. The pol i ce of fi cers were granted summa ry judgment on Co unt I. Sheri ff Walsh also was g r an t e d

summa ry judgment on Co unt I b ecause the pl aintif fs coul d not pro duce any evid e nc e estab l i shing his perso nal knowl edge of or i nv ol v ement i n Mrs. Hahn’s treatment. T he pl aintif fs do not appeal this por tio n of the di stric t co urt’s summa ry j udgment rul i ng.

Co unt III all eged tha t the Ci ty of Urban a exhi b i ted del i b erate i ndif ference b y fail i ng to i mple ment adequa te pol i ci es and pro cedur es fo r h andli ng arrestees with seri o u s medi cal and menta l health condi tio ns. The di stric t

c o u r t granted summa ry judgment to the Ci ty on this count, and the pl aintif fs do not appeal this p art ofthe di stric t co urt’s deci sio n.

Co unt VI all eged tha t Cham paign Co unty and HPL v i ol ated the A meri cans with Disab i l i tie s Act and the Rehab i l i tatio n Act b y fa i l i ng t o
acco mm o d ate Mrs. Hah n’s menta l health and medi cal condi tio ns and b y d e nyi ng her adequa te treatment. The di stric t cour t granted summar y judgment to the def endants on this count. The pl aintif fs do not appeal this deter minatio n.

Co unt VII all eged a cl aim aga i nst all of the def endants b y Mr. Hahn fo r l oss of conso rti um. The di stric t cour t di smissed this count, hol di ng tha t l oss
o f c o nsorti um was not a separate cause of actio n. It or dere d tha t t he pl aintif fs b e given l eav e to amen d their compl aint to i nc l u de with their consti tutio nal cl aims a demand fo r dama ges fo r l oss of conso r t i u m. The pl aintif fs therefo re fi l ed a Seco nd Amended Co mplai nt tha t i ncorp or ated (co ntinued. ..)16 No. 13-1766

Amended Complaint alleged that Sher i ff Walsh had exhib i ted deliberate indi fference to Mr s. Hahn’s medi cal needs by fai ling to i mplement p o l i ci es and procedures necess ary to prev ent deaths as a result of inadequate medical and mental health tr eatment. Count IV alleged that HPL had exhib i ted deliberate indi fference by fai ling to i mplement adequate poli ci es and procedures for prov i ding detain ee s wi th medi cal and mental health care. Count V alle ge d that Sher i ff Walsh’s fai lure to tr ain and supervis e jail employees consti tuted deliberate indi fference becau se i t had created an atmosphere where “unc onsti tutional behavi or [wa] s rat ifi ed, toler ated, acqui esced or condoned.” Fin ally, Count VIII alleged t ha t HPL and i ts nurses

1 9 had vi olated Illinoi s’s Wr ongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1 t o /2.2. The plainti ffs requ e st ed compens ator y and puni tive damages, atto rney’ s fees and li tigati on expenses. The defendants moved to di smi ss the complaint on var i ous gr ounds. Relevant to thi s appea l , t he County of Champai gn, Sher i ff Walsh and HPL moved to di smi ss Count VIII, the state l aw wrongful death acti on. Speci fi cally, the defendant s contended that the plainti ffs had fai led to comply wi th an Illinoi s sta t e law, 735 ILCS 5/2-622, that required them to inclu de wi th their complaint “an affi davit o f merit and a

( ...c onti nued) 1 8 the l oss of conso rti um cl aims i nto each of the other, remaini ng counts. The pl aintif fs mak e no arguments on appeal ab out the l oss of conso rti um cl aim.

R.3 at 7. 1 9No. 13-1766 17

wri tte n rep o r t from a health professi onal.” The magi strat e 2 0 ju d ge re c om m e n d e d d i s mi ssing thi s count for fai lure to in c lu d e the r e quir ed affi davit and repo rt

. Notably, he further wrot e 2 1 that he too k “no posi tion as to whether the di smi ssal should be wi th or wi thout prej udi ce, leaving that [deci si on] t o the di screti on of the Di stric t Court .” The di stric t court di smi ssed 2 2 Count VIII for fai lure to inclu de the affi dav i t and repo rt and

or der e d that the di smi ssal be wi th prej udi ce becau se the

R.17at 5. 2 0

In reaching thi s co nclusi on, the magistrate judge rejecte d the pl aintif fs’ 2 1 contenti on tha t they had satisfi ed the re qu i rements of secti on 2- 62 2 b y i nclud i ng in thei r co mplai nt a para graph sta ting:

5 0. Plai ntif f has b een unab l e to secure the affi dav i t o f

a medi cal pro fessi onal i n suppor t of t he Co mplai nt b ecause Defendant Dani el Walsh fail ed and refu se d to
res p o nd to a dul y served Freed om of Infor mati on Act Request fo r all reco rds, i nclud i ng jai l medi cal reco rds,

conce rning Janet Lo uise Hahn and pl aintif f do es not hav e i ndependent access t o these medi cal reco rds which are necessary fo r the review of a medi cal pro fessi onal and the affi dav i t requi red.

R.3 at 11

. The mag i strate judge wrote tha t even where reco rds can no t b e obtained and, therefo re, a r epo rt cann ot b e pre pared by a medical pro fessio nal, secti on 2-6 22 requires the pl aintif fs’ a ttorney to sub mit an affi dav i t containi ng certai n i nfor mati on ab out the attempt to obtain the necessary
reco rds. R.34 at 16

. An all egatio n i n the compl aint, t he magi strate judge

reco mmended, co uld not be subs titute d f or the re quired affi dav i t. Id

.
R.34 at 17

. 2 218 No. 13-1766 “[p]lainti ffs clearly fai led to comply wi th the requirements of § 2-622 and the statute of lim i tations has pass ed.” 2 3
The plainti ffs then fi led a Second Amended Complaint that addressed the rul in gs made by the di stric t court on the motions to di smi ss. Counts II, IV and V remain ed sub stanti ally unchanged in the Second Amended Complaint. The plainti ffs di d not inclu de a wrongful death claim in t he Second Amended Complaint. They di d, however , fi le a motion under F e d e ral Rule of Ci vil Procedure 59(e) to amend the judgment di smi ssing Count VIII. They made two arg uments: (1) that no affi davit

or repo rt needed to be prov i ded becau se Feder al Rule of Ci vil Procedure 8, not Illinoi s state ple a d ing rules, gov erned the suffi ci ency of their complaint; and (2) that, in the alter nati ve, they should have bee n p e rmi tte d to amend their complaint under the relat i on-back doctrine, despi te the expirati on of the relev ant l i mi tations period. The di stric t c ourtdeni ed the Rul e 59(e) motion; i t held that secti on 2-622 appli es in federal court and that di smi ssal wi th prej udi ce was proper becau se plaintiffs’ couns el knew of the aff ida v it requirement and fai led to atte mpt to comply wi th i t before the statute of li mi tations had expired.
The case proceeded thro ugh di scovery , and, in Februar y 2012, the defendants moved for su mm a ry judgment. The di st r ict court gr anted sum mary judgment in favor of the defendants. Wi th respect to the clai ms again st Sher i ff Walsh in hi s offi ci al capac i ty (Counts II and V), the di stric t court held that the plainti ffs had “not i denti fi ed evidenc e suffi ci ent for the

R.40 at 1– 2. 2 3No. 13-1766 19

factfinder to conclu d e that Walsh maintained a poli cy or
cus tom evinc ing deliberate indi fference to the needs of mentally i ll o r di abeti c inmates that resulted in harm to Janet.” Wi th respect to the clai ms again st HPL, the di stric t

2 4

co ur t he ld that, “based upon the evidenc e in thi s case, the medi cal prot ocol Ja ne t was prescribed was not the moving force behind any consti tutional vi olation.” 2 5

II
DISCUSSION The plainti ffs tim ely appealed and now ch allenge three of the di stric t court’s rulings. First, t he y sub mi t that the di stric t court err ed in di smi ssing the state law wrongful death clai m (Count VIII). Speci fi cally, they contend that Illinoi s’s statuto ry requirement that a clai m allegin g medi cal malpracti ce—as the wrongful death c lai m against HPL does—be accompani ed by

an affi davit and wri tte n repo rt confi rming the clai m’s merit, see 735 ILCS 5/2-622, confli cts wi th Rule 8 or Rule 11 of the Feder al Rules of Ci vil Procedure and, there fore, should not be enforced in federal court under the Erie doctrine. Second, they arg ue that the di stric t court’s di smi ssal wi th prej udi ce of the wrongful death clai m consti tuted an abus e of di screti on. Fin ally, they sub mi t that the di stric t court i mproper ly gr anted sum mary judgment t o S heriff Walsh and HP L on the § 1983 clai ms.

R.16 5 at 4 2–43

. 2 4

Id

. at 54

. 2 520 No. 13-1766

The jurisdi cti on of thi s cour t and of the di stric t court i s
secu re. We rev i ew de no v o the di stric t court’s deci si on to

2 6 gr ant the defendants’ motion to di smi ss the plainti ffs ’ wrongful death c lai m. See Windy City Meta l Fabricators & Suppl y, Inc.

v. CIT Tech. Fin

. Servs

. , In c

. , 536 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Ci r. 2008). We rev i ew for abuse of dis cretion the di stric t court ’s deci si on to di smi ss that clai m wi th prej udi ce. See Sherrod v. Lin gle, 223 F

. 3 d 605, 614 (7th Ci r. 2000). Fin ally, we rev i ew de novo t he di stric t court’s g r a nt of sum mary judgment in favor of the defendants. Mullin v. Temco Mach., Inc

. , 732 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Ci r. 2013). In doin g so, we construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the li ght most favor a bl e t o the plainti ffs

. Id.

A.
We fi rst turn to the di smi ssal of the defen d ants’ wrongful death clai m. Count VIII of the plainti ffs ’ Amended Complaint alleged that HPL had fai led to prov i de adequate medi cal tr ea t me nt to Mr s. Hahn, in violati on of the state’s Wro ngful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1 to /2.2. Under Illinoi s law, a plainti ff seeki ng damages for “medi cal, ho sp i tal, or other healing art malpracti ce” mus t attach to hi s comp l a int ei ther (1) an affi davit

co nfi rming that he has rev i ewed the facts of the case wi th a health care professi onal and that the professi onal beli eves that there i s a “re asonable and meritorious caus e for the fi ling of

su ch acti on,” as well as a copy of the professi onal’s wri tte n

We have juri sdi cti on under 28 U.S .C. § 12 91

. The di stric t cour t had 2 6 juri sdi cti on under 28 U. S.C. §§ 13 31 , 1 34 3 and 1 36 7.No. 13-1766 21

repo rt on the case, or (2) a n affi davit statin g an acceptable

reason why such an opin i on and repo rt could not be obtained. 735 ILCS 5/2-622(a)

. The statute goe s on to state that “[t]he 2 7

S ecti on 2 -6 22 reads, i n perti nent part: 2 7

(a) In any actio n, whether i n tor t, contract or otherwi se, i n which th e plainti ff seeks dama ges fo r injuri es or death b y
reason of medi cal, hospi tal, or other heali ng art malpractic e, the pl aint i f f ’ s attorney

... sha l l fi l e an affi dav i t, atta ched to t he or i ginal and all cop i es of the compl aint, decl aring o ne o f the f ol l owi ng:

1. That the affi an t has consul ted and rev i ewed the facts ofthe case wi th a health pro fessi onal

... ; tha t the reviewi ng health pro fessi onal ha s deter mined i n a wri tten repo rt, after a review of the medi c al recor d and other rel evant materi al i nv ol v ed i n the particul ar actio n tha t there i s a reasonab l e and meri tor i ous cause fo r the fi l i ng of such actio n; and tha t the affi ant has concl uded on the b asis of the reviewi ng health pro fessi onal’s review and consul tatio n tha t there i s a reasonab l e and meri t or i ous cause fo r fi l i ng of such actio n.

... A cop y of the wri tten repo rt, cl early i denti fyi ng the pl aintif f and the reaso ns fo r the reviewi ng health pro fessi o na l ’s deter minatio n that a reasonab l e and meri

tor i ous cause fo r the fi l i ng of the actio n
e x i s t s , m u s t b e a t t a c h e d t o t h e affi dav i t ... .
(co ntinued. ..)22 No. 13-1766

fai lur e to fi le a certifi cate required by thi s Section shall be gr ounds for di smi ssal .” Id. § 5/2-622(g).
The parties do not di spute that i f thi s claim had been brought in state court, thi s prov i si on would have required the p l a int i ffs to fi le an affi davit and repo rt conforming to th e statuto ry requirements. They di sagree solely as to whether the affi davit and repo rt mus t be attached when the state law clai m i s brought in federal court. The di stric t cour t he l d that they

mus t comply wi th the pr ov i si ons of state law.

( ...c onti nued) 2 7 2. That the affi ant was unab l e to obtain a

consul tatio n requir ed b y paragra p h 1 b ecause a statute of l i mitatio ns woul d i mpair t he actio n and the consul tatio n requir ed coul d not b e obtained b efo re the expirati on of the statu te of l i mitatio ns.

...

3. T hat a request has b een made b y the pl aintif f or his attorney fo r exa minatio n and cop ying of reco rds pu r su ant to Part 20 of Arti cl e VIII o f t hi s Co de and the party requir ed to compl y u nder those Secti on s has fail ed to pro duce such recor ds wi thin 6 0 days of the rece i pt o f the request.

73 5 ILCS 5/ 2- 62 2( a). Thus, the statu te requir es the fi l i ng of ei ther an affi dav i t and a repo rt or, i f t ho se pref erre d i tems cann ot b e obtained, an affi dav i t explaini ng the def i ci ency. Througho ut this opi nio n, we frequentl y refe r to this pro v i sio n as a requir ement to sub mit an “affi dav i t and repo rt,” with the under stan di ng tha t, o ccasio nall y, o nly an affi dav i t i s necessary.No. 13-1766 23

The plainti ffs now seek a rev ersal of that ruling. They sub mi t that secti on 2-622 i s a state p ro cedural rule that confli cts wi th ei ther Rule 8 or Rule 1 1 o f the Feder al Rules of Ci vil Pro ce d ure. Therefore , in their view, secti on 2-622 does not

2 8 apply in federal court under the ter ms of the Erie doctrine. The defendants reply that secti on 2-622 i s state sub stanti ve law that

mus t be appli ed in federal court.
The di stric t court was corr ect. The basi c doctrine gov ernin g t his area stems from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 6 4 (1938). There, the Suprem e Court addressed the questi on of whether state law or federal law contro ls when the two confli ct in di ver si ty cases

. S t a t e d in the broadest of stro kes, the Erie 2 9 doctrine prov i des that “federal courts si tting in di ver si ty apply state sub stanti ve law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humani ties, Inc. , 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). But analysi s of particu lar appli cati ons of thi s broad doctrine i s more nuanc ed than s i m p ly labeling a state law “sub stanti ve” or “procedural.” See Lux v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (In re Air Crash Disaster) , 803

T he pl aintif fs di d not argue to the di stric t cour t tha t secti on 2- 62 2 2 8 conf l i cts with Feder al Rule of Ci v i l Proc edure 11

. T hu s, the i ssue was waived. See, e.g

. , Puffer v

. Allstate Ins. Co. , 6 75 F.3d 70 9, 71 8 (7 th Ci r. 20 12 ) (“ It i s a wel l -estab l i shed rul e tha t argumen ts not raised to the di stric t cour t
a re w a iv ed on appeal.” ). Nevertheless, we address the possi b l e conf l i ct with Rule 11 b ecause the def endants di d not argue tha t the i ssue was wa i ve d , t he r e by waiving the waiver argument. See, e.g. , Riemer v. Illinois Dep’t o f Transp. , 1 48 F.3 d 8 00 , 8 04 n.4 (7 th Ci r. 1 99 8)

.
Thi s b od y of l aw appl i es not onl y to di v ersi ty cases, b ut also where, as 2 9 here, fed eral cour ts he ar st at e l aw cl aims pursuant to their exerci se of suppl emental jur i sdi cti on. See Houben v. Telular Corp. , 30 9 F.3d 10 28 , 10 32 (7 th Ci r. 2 00 2)

.24 No. 13-1766

F.2d 304, 313 (7th Ci r. 1986) (observing that the Erie doctrine i s not a “monoli thi c legal prin ci ple” that i s appli ed the same way in all si tuations ( internal quot ation marks omi tte d)).
In thi s ca se , the analytic al path set out in the Supreme Court ’s later deci si on in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), prov i des us wi t h mo re preci se gui dance. There, the Court addressed speci fi cally how we ought to proceed when a state law i s alleged to confli ct wi th a Feder al Rule o f Ci vil Procedure. See Windy City, 536 F.3d at 670–71. Under Hanna , “i f a duly pro mu l ga te d federal rule of procedure confli cts wi th state l a w, the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, command s a federal court to apply [the federal] rule of procedure unles s to do so would abri dge a sub stanti ve right under state law.” In re Air Crash Disaster, 803 F.2d at 313–14 (footnot e omi tte d). In applying Hanna , we fir st consi der whether there i s a confli ct between 735 ILCS 5/2-622 and ei ther Rule 8 or Rule 1 1 , or whether the state and fe d e r al laws may be reconci led. Windy City, 536 F.3d at 671 (ci tin g Burlin gton N. R.R. Co. v

. Woo ds , 480 U

. S

. 1 (1987) and Walker v. Armco Steel Corp. , 446 U.S. 74 0 (1980))

. If there i s no confli ct, th e n o ur inqui ry ends becau se there i s no need to dis place any rule.
In thi s cas e , we conclu de that there i s no confli ct between secti on 2-622 and ei ther Rule 8 or Rule 11 a nd , t he r e fore, we only need to conduc t the fir st st ep of the Hanna analysi s. See Shady Gr ov e , 559 U.S. at 398 (“We do not wade into Erie ’s murky waters unles s the federal rule i s inapplic a bl e or invalid.”)

. The Supreme Court has held in a numb er of instances that a Feder al Rule contro lled in the face of a confli cting stateNo. 13-1766 25
law, but the case before us i s more si mi lar to Walker, 446 U.S. 3 0

For exa mple , i n Hanna v

. Plumer , 38 0 U.S

. 46 0, 46 1 (1 96 5) , the pl aintif f 3 0 served a def endant b y l eav i ng a summons and compl aint at the def endant’s home with his wif e, i n compl i ance with Feder al Rule of Ci v i l P r oce dure 4( d)( 1)

. The def endant c o nte nded tha t service was i mprop er under a Massa chusetts l aw requir i ng i n-han d service. Id

. at 46 1– 62

. The Co urt held tha t Rule 4( d)( 1) “ wi th unmistaka b l e cl arity [said] tha t i n-han d service i s not requir ed i n fed eral cour ts.” Id

. at 47 0. Theref o r e , Rule 4( d)( 1) “unav oi dab l [y]” conf l i cted with the Massa chusetts rul e. Id

. In the f ac e of this conf l i ct, the Co urt concl uded tha t b ecause Rule 4( d)( 1) was v ali d under the Rules Enab l i ng A ct and the Co nsti t u t i o n, i t contro l l ed i n tha t case

. Id

. at 463 –6 4, 474.

I n B u rl i n gt on North ern Railroad Co. v. Woods , 48 0 U.S

. 1, 2 (1 98 7) , t he pl aintif fs b ro ught tor t cl aims i n Al ab ama state cour t ag ai ns t a def endant who remo v ed those cl aims to fed eral cour t on di v ersi ty grounds. The pl aintif fs won a monetary judgment at tri al. Id

. The def endant posted b ond to stay the judgment pendi ng appeal, and the cour t of appeals affi rmed the judgment. Id

. Under Feder al Rule of Appe l l ate Proc ed ure 38 , fed eral appell ate cour ts hav e di screti on to awa rd dama ges or costs to appell ees i n f r i vo l ous appeals. Al ab ama l aw, however, man dates tha t i f a monetar y judgment fo r which the appell ant posted b ond pendi ng appeal i s affi rmed witho ut modi fi cat i o n, the Al ab ama cour ts must awa rd a penalty to the appell ee i n the amount of ten perce nt of the dama ges awa rd. Burlington N. , 48 0 U.S

. at 3–4. The Supre me Co urt he l d tha t Rule 38 and Al ab ama l aw di rectl y conf l i cted b ecause the Al ab ama l aw i nterfer ed with Rule 3 8 ’s “di screti onary mode ofoperatio n” and b ecause “the purpo ses underl ying the Rule are suffi ci ently coe xt ensive with the ass ert e d p u r pose s of the A l ab ama statu te to i ndic ate tha t the Rule occ upi es the statu te’s fi el d of ope ratio n so as to precl ude i ts appli catio n i n fed eral di v ersi ty actio ns.” Id

. at 7. Thus, b ecause there was a conf l i ct and b ecause Rule 38 was v ali d under the Co nstituti on and the Rules En ab l i ng Act, Rule 38 di splaced the Al ab ama statu te i n fed eral di v ersi ty cases. Id

. at 8.
(co ntinued. ..)26 No. 13-1766
740, where t he C o ur t held t hat there was no confli ct between the relev ant federal and state rules. In Walker, the plainti ff was in ju re d whi l e h a mmering an allegedly defecti ve nai l on Au gu s t 22, 1975. Id. at 741. He fil e d a di ver si ty sui t again st the nai l’s manuf acturer on August 19, 1977. Id. at 742. However , the plainti ff di d not serve t he d efendant wi th process unti l December 1, 1977. Id. Under Feder al Rule of Ci vil Procedure 3,

“ [a ] ci vil acti on i s commenc ed by fi ling a complaint wi th t he court.” Fed. R. Ci v. P

. 3; see a lso Walker, 446 U.S. at 743. Under Okl a ho ma state law, however , an acti on gener ally i s commenced upon service. Walker, 446 U.S. at 742–43. The appli cable statute of li mi tations was two year s, so the plainti ff’s sui t was ti mely under Rule 3 but barred under O klahoma law. Id.

a t 742–43, 748. The Court held that, in di ver si ty cases, Rule 3

( ...c onti nued) 3 0 In Shady Grove Orth oped ic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insuranc e Co. , 55 9 U.S

. 39 3, 39 7 (2 01 0) , the pl aintif f fi l ed a di v ersi ty suit on i ts own b ehalf and

on b eh al f of a c l ass of pl aintif fs who i t all eged were owed i nterest on l ate b enefi ts paymen ts rece i v ed fro m the def en d an t

. F eder al Rule of Ci v i l Proc edure 23 sets out the pro cedur es fo r pursui ng a cl ass actio n i n fed eral

cour t; notab l y, there i s no l i mitatio n b ased on the type of rel i ef sought. See Fed. R. Ci v

. P. 23

. New York l aw, b y contrast, pro hibits cl ass acti o n suits seeki ng to reco v er a “pe nalty,” such as the statu tor y i nterest sought b y the pl aintif fs. Shady Grove, 55 9 U.S

. at 39 7. The Co urt held tha t b oth Rule 23 and the New Yor k l aw a t i ssue governed wh en plainti ffs may maintain a class actio n and, therefo re, there was a di rect conf l i ct b etween them. Id

. at 39 8– 99

. A pl urali ty of the Co urt held tha t Rule 23 was val i d under the Rules Enab l i ng Act, id. at 40 7– 08 (o pi nio n of Scal i a, J

. ) , an d fi v e Justi ces agreed tha t Rule 23 , not the New York l aw at i ssu e , shoul d b e appli ed i n fed eral

cour t. Id

. at 41 6; id. at 41 6 (Ste v ens, J., concur ri ng i n part and concur ri ng i n the jud gment).No. 13-1766 27

does not di splac e state tolling rules; rat her, i t si mply “gov erns the date from whi ch var i ous timing requirements of the Feder al R ul e s begi n to run.” Id. at 750–51 (internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). Thus, the Court conclu ded that Rule 3 and the Oklaho ma l a w “ can exis t si de by si de,

... each contro lling i ts
own intended sphere of cover age wi thout confli ct.” Id. at 752.
As wi th the rules in Walker , Rules 8 and 11 and secti on 2-622 comfortably “can exis t si de by si de” in di ver si ty cases

. Nothing in t he oper ative prov i si ons of Rule 8, Rule 11 or secti on 2-622 prev ents us from si multaneously applying the m. Rule 8 gov erns the content and for m of a complaint. It requires, in pert inent part, that a complaint inclu de a jurisdi cti onal statement, a statement of the clai m a nd a d e mand for relief. 3 1

Rul e 8 (a) pro v i des: 3 1

A pl eadi ng tha t states a claim f or rel i ef must contain:

(1 ) a sho rt and pl ain statem ent of the grounds fo r the cour t’s juri sd i cti on, unl ess the cour t already has juri sdi cti on and the cl aim needs no new juri sdi cti onal suppor t;
(2 ) a short and pl ain state ment of the cl aim showing tha t the pl eader i s entitl ed to rel i ef; and

(3 ) ademand fo r the re l i ef sought, which

ma y i nclud e rel i ef i n the alternative o r di ffe rent types o f re l i ef.

(co ntinued. ..)28 No. 13-1766

S ecti on 2-622 says nothin g about the contents of the act ua l complaint; i t i s only concerned wi th a pre-sui t consu ltation and relat ed attachments to the complaint. Illinoi s courts have held speci fi cally th a t t he affi davit and repo rt required by secti on 2-622 are notto be consi dered par ts of a plainti ff’s c omplaint. Garrison v. Choh , 719 N .E.2d 237, 240, 243–44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). Rule 8 and secti on 2-622 gov e r n d i fferent aspects of

commenc ing an act i on and may be enforced si multaneously wi thout confli ct. Rule 11 may be enforced consi stently wi th secti on 2-622 as well. Th e relev ant por tion of Rule 11 provides: By pres e nti ng to the court a pleading, wri tte n motion, or other paper

... an atto rney

... certifi es that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and b eli ef, ... : (1) i t i s not being presented for any i mpr o per purpose, such as to harass, caus e unnec e ssary de l a y , or needless ly increase the cost of li tigation; (2) the c lai ms, defenses, and other legal c ontentions are warrante d by exis tin g law or by a nonfri vo lous arg ument for ext ending, mo di fying, or rev ersing exis tin g law or for establi shing new law ; [and]

( ...c onti nued) 3 1 Fed. R. Ci v . P. 8( a).No. 13-1766 29 (3) the factual contentions ha ve evidenti ary supp or t or , i f speci fi cally so i denti fi ed , wi ll li kely have evidenti ary supp or t aft er a reasonable oppor tuni ty for further inves t ig ation or di scovery

... . Fed. R. Ci v. P. 11(b) (1)–( 3). Section 2-622’s requirement that an atto rney attach an affi davit a nd repo rt to the complaint does not interfer e wi th the abi li ty of the at t o r ne y t o certify the

accu racy and legiti macy of that co mp l aint. Accordingly, secti on 2-622 and Rule 11 may be appl i ed si multaneously.
Furt her, given the resp e ct iv e purposes of Rule 8, Rule 11 and secti on 2-622, i t cann o t be sa i d that one of the Feder al Rules occupi es the fi eld that secti on 2-622 ai ms to reg ulate and, there fore, mus t tr ump the state law. See Burlin gton N. , 480 U.S. at 7. The purpose of secti on 2-622 i s “to reduce the numb er of fri vo lous medi cal malpracti ce laws ui ts that are fi led and to eli minate such acti ons at an early stage.” Apa v. Rotman , 680 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). I t is d e si gned to ensure 3 2 that a complaint has “factual validi ty” and “reasonable merit.” Garrison , 719 N.E.2d at 243 (internal quotat i on marks omi tte d). By contrast, the purpose of Rule 8 i s to prov i de a defendant wit h fai r notic e of the clai ms again st hi m. Vicom, Inc. v

. Harbridge Merch. Servs., Inc. , 20 F.3d 771, 775 (7th Ci r. 1994); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U

. S. 544, 555 (2007). Even after Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqb al , 556 U.S. 6 62 (2009), whi ch clari fi ed that a compl aint mus t state a clai m for relief that i s

See also Avak ian v. Chulengarian , 766 N.E.2d 283, 294 (Il l . App. Ct. 20 02 ); 3 2 Tucker v. St. Jam es Hosp. , 6 65 N.E. 2d 39 2, 39 6 ( Il l . A pp. C t. 1 99 6)

.30 No. 13-1766 “plaus ible” on i ts face, we have emphas i zed that plaus i bi li ty i s required “in or der to assu re that a plea d ing su ffi ces to give effecti ve notic e to the opposing party ,” not in or der to evaluate the ver aci ty of the pleaded fa cts or the ulti mate merits of the plainti ff’s clai m. Alexander v. United States , 721 F. 3 d 4 18, 422 (7th Ci r. 2013); cf. Skinn er v. Switzer , 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (2011) (notin g that a complaint need not show whether a plainti ff wi ll ul tim ately prev ai l). Thus the purposes of Rule 8 (fai r notic e ) and sect ion 2-622 (eli minating fri vo lous clai ms) are di fferent enough that the rules comfortably may coexis t in di ver si ty
cases

. Wi th respect to Rule 11, the Supreme Court has stated that i ts “central purpose

... i s to d e t e r baseles s fi lings in di stric t court and thus, consi stent wi th the Rules Enabling Act’s gr ant of authority, streaml ine the admini strat i on and procedure of the feder al courts.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. , 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “Rule 11 i mposes a duty on atto rneys to certify that they have co nd uc ted a reasonable inqui ry and have deter mined that any papers fi led wi th the court are well gr ounded in fact, legally tenable, and ‘ not int e r posed for any i mproper purpose.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Ci v. P. 1 1 (1989))

. Becaus e Rule 11 i s about atto rney conduc t—not about (or only inci dentally about) the merits of a plainti ff’s case—i t has a suffi c i e ntly s e p a ra te p urpose from secti on 2-622 that no confli ct exis ts between them.
Our prior cases supp or t the conclu si on that Rules 8 and 11 and secti on 2-622 may be enforced si multaneously in di ver si tyNo. 13-1766 31

cases

. In Hine s v. Elkhart General Hospital, 603 F.2d 646, 647

3 3 (7th Ci r. 1979), we held that an Indi ana law requiring a medi cal malpracti ce plainti ff to obtain the opin i on of a medi cal rev i ew panel prior to ini tiating a court acti on di d not confli ct wi th any federal rules and should be enforced in federal courts si tting in di ver si ty. Indeed, we ha v e no ted that, in di ver si ty acti ons, appli cati on of state law i s usu ally indi ca t e d where the state rule may seem procedural but “i s li mi ted to a particu lar sub stanti ve area.” S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. S ewerage Dist. , 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Ci r. 1995) (collecting cases ). Such a li mi tation, we have sai d, indi cates a “state’s intention to influ ence sub stanti ve outcomes.” Id. Here, Illinoi s has li mi ted section 2-622 to cases involv ing medi cal or other healing a r t malpr acti ce. We there fore may infer that Illinoi s’s “goals ar e sub stanti ve” and would be thwarted i f parties havin g acces s to
a federal court under di ver sit y jurisdi cti on could there by exempt themselves fr om the compuls or y requirement. See id. Toget her, Hine s and He al y require the result we reach today : that secti on 2-622 must be applied by feder al courts si tting in di ver si ty.

This concl usio n also is consi stent with th e few ofour sister ci rcui ts tha t 3 3 hav e addressed this preci se i ssue

. See, e.g. , Liggo n-Redding v. Estat e of Sugarman , 65 9 F.3d 25 8, 26 1– 65 (3 d Ci r. 201 1) (findi ng no confl i ct b etween Rule 8 or Rule 11 and a Pennsy l v ania statu t e r e qu i r i ng a “ce rti fi cate of meri t” to b e fi l ed i n pro fessi onal ma l p r actice cl aims); Chamberlain v. Giamp apa , 210 F.3 d 154 , 158 –6 1 (3d Cir. 20 00 ) (fi nding no confl i ct b etween Rule 8 or Rule 9 and a simi l ar New Jerse y l aw); cf. Littlepaig e v. United States , 52 8 F. App’x 28 9, 29 2– 93 (4 th Ci r. 20 13 ) (hol di ng tha t a Nor th Carol i na rul e requir i ng an expert certi fi catio n i n a medi cal malpractic e case appli ed i n a Feder al Tor t Cl aims Act case soundi ng i n medi cal malp ractice brought in fed eral cour t).32 No. 13-1766

In sum, secti on 2-622 may be appli ed in di ver si ty ca se s wi thout running afoul of ei ther Rule 8 o r R ul e 11. Therefore , the di stric t court proper ly di smi ssed the plainti ffs ’ wrongful death clai m again st HPL becau se the plainti ffs had fail e d t o attach the r equi red affi davit and report

.

B.
Havin g deter mined that the di stric t court proper ly gr anted the defendants’ motion to di smi ss the plainti ffs ’ state law wrongful death claim , we now exami ne the di stric t court’s deci si on to di smi ss that clai m wi th prej udi ce. In di smi ssing the clai m ini tially, the di stric t court wrot e, “Plainti ffs clearly fai led to comply wi th the requirements of § 2-622 and the stat ute of li mi tations has pass ed. Therefore , thi s cour t co ncludes that di smi ssal of Count VIII wi th prej udi ce i s proper in thi s case.” 3 4 In denyi ng t he p l a inti ffs ’ Rule 59(e) mot i on, the di stric t court emphas i zed that p l a inti ffs ’ couns el was aware from a prior

case befo re the same di stric t court that the court enforced secti o n 2 -622. The di stric t court also di stingui shed between 3 5

cases where plainti ffs had filed defecti ve affi davits or repo rt s ( wh e re d i smi ssal wi thout prej udi ce was appropr i ate) an d c a s e s where they had fai led to fi le an affi davit and repo rt altog ether (wh ere dis mi ssalwi th prej udi ce wasappropr i ate).

R.40 at 2 ( ci tatio n omi tted). 3 4

R.49 a t 6 (ci ting Winfrey v . Walsh , No . 0 7- CV-2 09 3, 20 07WL 4 55 67 01 , at 3 5 *1 (C .D. Il l . Dec. 21 , 2 00 7) ).No. 13-1766 33

We are mindfu l of the di screti on accorded to di stric t courts in deci ding whether to gr ant a motion to d ismi ss wi th or wi thout prej udi ce. We a re e s p e ci ally cauti ous about interfer ing wi t h t hat di screti on here becau se the di stric t court beli eved that counsel knew t hat the di stric t court required compli ance wi th secti on 2-622 and delibe r a t ely had fai led to respect the court’s prior holdings. Never thel e ss, we think that several consi derat i ons require that the di stric t court reconsi der thi s i ssu e. First, our cases and Illinoi s cases suggest that when a clai m i s di smi ssed for fai lure to inclu de a secti on 2-622 affi davit and repo rt, the di smi ssal should be wi thout prej udi ce. The Appellate Court of Illinoi s has he ld expr essly that when a plainti ff rais es a clai m that im pli cates sec tion 2-622 b ut fai ls to in clud e
an affi davit and repo rt, the plainti ff should have the oppor tuni ty to amend her complaint before it i s di smi ssed wi th prej udi ce: Section 2-622 i s a pleadin g r equi rement desi gned to reduce fri vo lous laws ui ts, no t a sub stanti ve defense whi ch may be emp l o y e d to bar plainti ffs who fai l to meet i ts ter ms. Accordingly, the statute should be liberally construed and not mechan i cally

a ppli ed to deprive a plainti ff of her sub sta nt iv e rights. The plainti ff in a medi cal malpractic e acti on should be allowed ever y reasonable oppor tuni ty to establi sh her cas e. The deci si on as to whether an acti on shoul d be di smi ssed by reason of the pla inti ff’s fai lure to comply wi th the requirements o f se cti on 2-622 i s a34 No. 13-1766

matter commi tte d to the di screti on of the tr i al court. When, as in thi s case, a plainti ff fai ls t o attach the requis i te affi davit and health care professio nal’s repo rt to a complaint based on medi cal malpracti ce,
a sound exer c i se of discretion mandates that she be at least afforded an opport uni ty to amend her complaint to comply with section 2-622 before her action is dismissed with prejudic e

. Cammon v. W. Subu rban Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 704 N.E.2d 731, 738–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (emphas i s added) (cita t io ns omi tte d) (internal quotat i on mar ks omi tte d). We quoted Cammon and echoed i ts senti ment in Sherrod v. Lin gle, 223 F.3d 605, 614 (7th Ci r

. 2000), where we held that a di stric t court’s fai lure to permi t a plainti ff t o amend hi s complaint in or der to comply wi th secti on 2-622 was an abus e of di screti on. 3 6 Second, although the di stric t court beli eved that plainti ffs ’

couns el should have known to submi t an affi davit and repo rt in accordance wi th secti on 2-622, i t made no speci fi c finding that the fai lure to do so was in bad fai th or an atte mpt to delay

T he di stric t cour t di stingui shed Sherrod v. Lingle, 22 3 F.3d 60 5 (7 th Ci r. 3 6 20 00 ), fro m this case because, in Sherrod, the pl aintif f had fi l ed a de fecti v e affi dav i t and repo rt and, i n this case, the pl aintif fs had fail e d t o f i l e an affi dav i t and repo rt at all

. We cannot accept this readi ng of Sherrod

. We reasoned there tha t, under Il l i noi s l aw, i f a tri al cour t i s supposed to give a pl aintif f l eav e to amen d when she fail s to fi l e any affi dav i t and repo rt, then certai nly a tri al cour t shoul d grant a pl aintif f l eav e to amen d when she fi l es a fl awed affi dav i t and repo rt. See id

. at 61 4; cf. Cookson v . Price, 9 14 N.E. 2d 22 9, 2 3 2 ( I l l

. App. Ct. 20 09 ) (noti ng tha t there i s no di ffe rence b etween
amen di ng an existi ng repo rt and sub mitti ng a new repo rt in li eu of an old one)

.No. 13-1766 35

li tigati on. See Cook

son v. Price, 914 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that i t was err or for the tr i al court to r e fu se to permi t pla int iff to amend hi s complaint to inclu de a new affi davit and repo rt complying wi th secti on 2-622 where there

was no indi cati on that the plainti ff’s fai lure to fi le the repo rt earlier in the li tigati on was in bad fai th). Furt her, i t did no t explain whether or in what manner the defendants mi ght be prej udi ced by permittin g the plainti ffs to replead. See Christmas v. Dr. Donald W. Hugar, Ltd. , 949 N.E.2d 675, 684 (Ill. App. Ct

. 2011) (li sting p rej udi ce to the other party as one of the factor s that a tr i al court should consi der in d e t e r mining whether to gr ant leave to amend a compl a int t hat di d not comply wi th secti on 2- 622). On thi s recor d, we decline to affi rm the di stric t
co ur t ’ s deci si on to di smi ss the clai m wi th prej udi ce. Cf. Apa , 680 N.E.2d a t 8 0 5 (over turnin g for abus e of di screti on a tr i al court’s deci si on to di smi ss a clai m wi th prej udi ce for fai lure to comply wi th secti on 2-622 becau se “the tr i al court fai led to take into co ns ide rat i on the particu lar facts and uni que ci rcumstances o f t his case,” where there was no indi cati on that the plainti ff was bri ngin g a fri vo lous clai m and no suggesti on of bad fai th or abus e of pro cess ).
Fin ally, the di stric t court’s conc lusi on that the plainti ffs could not tim ely fi le an amended complaint —attaching a proper affi davit and repo rt —becau se the statute of li mi tations had lapsed on their wrong fu l d e ath clai m fai ls to take into
accoun t the possi

bi li ty that the amendmen t would relat e back to the plainti ffs ’ initi al, tim ely complaint. Cf. Fed. R. Ci v. P. 15(c) (explaining the doctrine of relat i on back). We take no posi tion on whether rel ation back would permi t amendmen t36 No. 13-1766

under the speci fi c ci rcums ta nc e s o f thi s case; we only note 3 7

On remand, the di stric t cour t may b e guid ed b y b oth fed eral and s t at e 3 7 rel atio n b ack rul es. Feder al Rule o f C i vi l Proc edure 15 (c) (1 ) pro v i des i n rel evant part:

An amen dment to a pl eadi ng rel ates b ack to the date of the

or i ginal pl eadi ng when:
(A) the l aw tha t pro v i des the appli cab l e statu te of l i mitatio ns all ows rel atio n b ack; [o r]
(B) the amen dment ass erts a cl aim or def ense tha t arose o u t of the conduc t, trans actio n, or occ urrence set out—o r attempted to b e set out—i n the or i ginal pl eadi ng ... .
Thus, ei ther I l l i noi s l aw (which suppl i es the statu te of l i mitatio ns fo r the pl aintif fs’ wrongful de at h cl aim here) or Feder al Rule of Ci v i l Proc edure 15 (c) (1 )(B ) co uld dete rmine whether an amen ded pl eadi ng rel ates b ack to the pl aintif fs’ i niti al pl eadi ng. See Fed. R. Ci v

. P

. 1 5 adv i sory commi ttee’s note to the 19 91 amen dment (“ What ever may b e the contro l l i ng b od y of l i mitatio ns l aw, i f tha t l aw affo rds a more fo rgi v i ng pri ncipl e of rel atio n b ack than the one pro v i ded i n this rul e, i t shoul d b e av ail ab l e to sa ve the cl aim.”) ; Arendt v . V

etta Sp orts, Inc

. , 9 9 F. 3d 23 1, 23 6 ( 7th Ci r. 1 99 6)

.
There i s no meani ngful di stincti on, however, b etween Il l i noi s l aw on rel atio n b ack and Feder al Rule of Ci v i l Proc edure 15 (c) (1 )(B ). See Henderson

v. Boland a , 25 3 F.3d 92 8, 93 2– 33 (7 th Ci r. 20 01 ) (“ Il l i noi s l aw on rel atio n b ack i s not more fo rgi v i ng [than fed eral l aw].”). Il l i noi s perm i t s rel atio n b ack when the sam e two requi rements are m et: “(1 ) the or i ginal compl aint w as timel y fi l ed, and (2 ) the amen ded compl aint grew out of the sam e trans actio n or occ urrence set fo rth i n the or i ginal pl eadi ng.” Id

. ; see also Porter v. (co ntinued. ..)No. 13-1766 37

that the dist r i ct court’s fai lure to address the plainti ffs ’ properly rais ed arg ument, combined wi th our prefere nce for 3 8 permi tting a me nd ment in thi s type of case and the lack of factual findings described above , consti tuted an abus e of di screti on. 3 9

( ...c onti nued) 3 7 Decat u r Me m ’l Hosp. , 88 2 N.E.2 d 58 3, 59 1– 92 (Il l

. 20 08 ) (rec ogni zing simi l ariti es between Ill i noi s and fede ral l aw on rel atio n b ack).

SeeR.46 at 3. 3 8

There are sev eral reasons fo r requir i ng the p l ai nti ffs to amen d their 3 9 compl aint, rather than all owi ng them simpl y to fi l e the requi red affi dav i t and repo rt upon remand. Fir st, the ope rative pl eadi ng i n the di stric t cour t at the time the fi nal judgment was entered was the Seco nd Amended Co mplai nt, which di d not i nclud e a wro ngful death cl aim

. If this cl aim i s to b e re i nsta ted, i t needs to be repl eaded.

Seco nd, the Il l i noi s cour ts t hat hav e b een conf ro nted with a d efe cti v e affi dav i t and repo rt hav e requir ed amen dment, not just the fi l i ng of a new affi dav i t and r epo rt once the def i ci ency has b een uncovered. See, e.g

. , Apa

v. Rotman , 68 0 N.E.2 d 80 1, 80 4 (Il l

. App. Ct. 19 97 ). The Il l i noi s cour ts l i b erall y permi t amen dments i n or der to prevent technical fi l i ng rul es fro m cutting of f a pl aintif f’s ab i l i ty to pursue a meri tor i ous cl aim. See Cammon v. W. Subu rban Hosp. Med. Ctr. , 70 4 N

. E.2 d 73 1, 73 8– 39 (Il l

. App. Ct. 19 98 ). That pol i cy i s furthere d b y requir i ng amen dment here. The pl aintif fs nev er satisfi ed all of the requir ements fo r b ri nging a wrongful death c l ai m; b ecause the statu te of l i mitatio ns on tha t cl aim has expire d, they are unab l e to b ri ng the cl aim unless amen dment i s permi tted. If their cl aim has meri t, then not permi tting amen dment woul d cut of f a cl aim b ecause of a technical fi l i ng rule

.
Finall y, this approach appears to b e consistent with the statu te, whi ch (co ntinued. ..)38 No. 13-1766

C.
We now turn to the di st r ict court’s sum mary judgment deci si on. As prev i ously di scu ssed, the di st r ict court gr anted

sum mary judgment to the defenda nt s on all clai ms that remain ed after their respecti ve motions to di smiss were deni ed. The p l a inti ffs confine their appeal, however , to the di stric t court’s gr ant of su mm a r y judgment (1) to Sher i ff Walsh, on the plainti ffs ’ § 1983 clai ms again st hi m in hi s offi ci al capac i ty; and (2) to HPL, on the plainti ffs ’ § 1983 clai m again st the or gani zation. Our standard of rev i ew i s clear. We shall affi rm the di stric t court’s gr ant of sum mary j ud g ment i f, exer ci sing de novo
rev i ew and construing a l l fa cts and inferences in favor of the plainti ffs, there i s no genuine i ssu e of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Guzman

( ...c onti nued) 3 9 i denti fi es speci fi c situati ons—not i nclud i ng the one presented her e— where a p l aintif f may fi l e an affi d avi t and r epo rt l ate and wi thout amen di ng hi s compl ai nt

. F or exa mple , 73 5 ILCS 5/ 2- 62 2( a)(2) pro v i des tha t where an affi d avi t and repo rt cann ot b e obtained i n a timel y fashio n and the l i mitatio ns peri od i s ab out to expire , the pl aintif f may sub mit with t he compl aint onl y an affi dav i t explaini ng the situati on, an d the requir ed affi dav i t and repo rt conf i rming the cl aim’s meri t may b e fi l ed withi n ninety days. Subsectio n 5/ 2- 62 2( a)(3 ) simi l arly states tha t i f a pl aintif f cann ot obtain the requir ed affi dav i t and re p o rt b ecause a party has fail ed to pro duce necessary reco rds as requir ed b y statu te, the pl aintif f may sub mit with the compl aint onl y an affi dav i t explaini ng t he situati on, and the

r e qu i red affi dav i t and repo rt conf i rming the cl aim’s meri t may b e fi l ed withi n ninety days. If the l egi slature wanted l i tigants i n the pl ai nt i ffs’ situati on t o pro ceed witho ut fi l i ng an amen ded compl aint, i t coul d hav e i nclud ed a spec i fi c subs ecti on authori zing such a course ofactio n.No. 13-1766 39

v. Sheahan , 495 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Ci r. 2007); see also Fed. R. Ci v. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Anderson v. L iberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986).

1.
The plainti ffs sub mi t that Sher i ff Wa l sh was deliberately indi fferent prim arily for fai ling to ensure that medi cal staff had

a “wri tte n poli cy or procedur e fo r di abeti c detain ees whose blood sugar wa s not being measu red and who refused to eat.” Becaus e the plainti ffs have sued Sher i ff W a l sh in hi s 4 0 offi ci al capac i ty, they mus t show (1) that a genuine i ssu e of material fact exis ts a s to whether he “maintains a poli cy or
cus tom that infr ing e s upon the rights prot ected” by the Four teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; and (2) that “a genuine i ssu e of mater ial fact exis ts as t o whether [the death]

was p r oximately caus ed by ei ther an offi ci al poli cy of the muni ci pali ty or from a g o ver nmental cus tom or usage.” Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cnty. of Madiso n, Illinois , 746 F.3d 766, 780 (7th Ci r. 2014) ( internal quotation marks omitted); see also Estat e of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Woo d, 226 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Ci r. 2000) (holding that the “poli cy or practic e mus t be the ‘d irect caus e’ or ‘moving force’ behind the consti tutional violati on”). A plainti ff can show that a muni ci pali ty has caus ed

a consti tutional injury ei ther “by demo nstrating that [the

mu nici pali ty’ s] poli cy i tself i s unc onsti tutional,” or “ by showing a seri es of bad acts and inviting the court to infer from them that the poli cymaking level of gov ernment was bound to

A ppel l ant s’ Br. 27

. 4 040 No. 13-1766

have notic ed what was going on and by fai ling to do anythin g
mus t have encouraged or at least condoned

... the mi scondu ct of sub or dinate offi cers.” Estat e of Novack , 226 F.3d at 531 (internal quot ation marks omi tte d).
If a plainti ff’s allegation i s that an expr ess muni ci pal poli cy violates the consti tution when enforced, then a single inci dent may be suffi ci ent to sus tain li abi li ty for the muni ci pali ty under § 1983. See Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379–80 (7th Ci r. 2 0 0 5 ). However, where, as here, the plainti ffs are concer ne d wi th a lack of poli ci es, we look for “more evidenc e than a single inci dent to establi sh li abi li ty.” Id. at 380. Wi thout evidenc e that

a seri es of inci dents brought the ris k at i ssu e to the atte nti on of the poli cymaker, we cannot infer that the lack of a poli cy i s the

r e sult of deliberate indi fference becau se “[t]he absenc e of a poli cy mi ght

... mean o nly that the gov ernment sees no need to addr ess the point at all, or that it beli eves thatcase-by-cas e deci si ons are best, or that i t wants to accu mulate some exper i

ence befor e selecting a reg ular course of acti on.” Id.
In thiscase, the plainti ffs have notshown that there wasa “seri es of uncons tituti onal acts from whi ch i t m ay b e inferred that the [sh eriff ] knew [CCCC] offi cers were violat ing the consti tutional rights of [CCCC] inmates and did no thing.” Estat e of Novack

, 226 F.3d at 531. Before the di stric t co ur t, the plainti ffs alleged that the following put Sher i ff Walsh on notic e of the unconsti tutional practi ces in the jail: (1) [S]even inmates prev io us ly di ed in the jail, inclu ding Quentin Larr y, who Plainti ffs contend di ed becau se of defi ci enci es in the intake pr ocess at the jail; (2) Swain’s emai l reg ardin g th e problemsNo. 13-1766 41

wi th Janet during her May 2007 incarceration was
s e nt to “Cor rections” so Walsh should have received i t; (3) Walsh was person ally notifi ed by lette r, fax

an d a te l e p h one c onversati on wi th Plainti ffs ’ c oun s e l in May 2006 about complaints a di abeti c inmate, Joey Mor ris sey, had a bo ut how tr eatment for hi s di abetes was handled at the jail, to whi ch Walsh responded following an investigati on ... . [4 1 ]
The problem wi th these contentions is that none of them

su p p o r t the conclu si on that the sheri ff was on notic e that the

cus tom of which t he plainti ffs complain on appeal—the sheri ff’s lack of poli ci es for tr eating a di abeti c detain ee who refuses to partici pate in her own care—could caus e death as a result of di abeti c ket oaci dosi s. Al th ou gh s e ven indi vidu als had di ed in the CCCC, none had di ed becau se of compli cati ons from di abetes. In Pittman , 746 F.3d at 780, we held that thi rtysi x faile d sui ci de atte mpts and three sui ci des were not enough—standing alone—to show t ha t a sheri ff’s sui ci deprev ention p ol i ci es were inadequate becau se the fact that other inmates atte mpted sui ci de di d no t necess arily show a defi

ci ency in those poli ci es. Sim i larly, in thi s case, the seven deaths refer enced by the plainti ffs —no t ably, deaths from di fferent

caus es than Mr s. Hahn’s—d o not show that Sher i ff Walsh was “aware of any

... r isk posed by [hi s] poli ci es or that [Sheriff Walsh] faile d to take appropr i ate steps to prot ect [Mrs. Hahn].” Id.

R.165 a t 39 –4 0. The addi tio nal reasons raised to the di stric t cour t b y the 4 1 pl aintif fs are unrel ated to the speci fi c pol i cy they all ege o n ap p e al i s l acking.42 No. 13-1766

Swain’s e-mai l dealt wi th a single inci de nt , not a “seri es,”

a nd i t di d not describe any adver se effects on Mr s. Hahn’s health caus ed by the poli ci es in place. At best, i t showed that

one member of HPL’s nursing staff e x p erienc ed a tempor ary d ifficulty wi th one detain ee. See Calhoun , 408 F.3d at 38 0 (notin g that the same problem needs to have come up multi ple tim es to put a muni ci pali ty on notic e that a poli cy may need to be i mplemented to address the si tuation). The complaint by

couns el on behalf of the earlier detain ee, Mor ris sey, i s si mi larly flawed. It does not show that detain ees suffered a seri ous ris k of har m, only that one detain ee was di ssati sfi ed wi th hi s tr e a tm e nt. Mor eov er, Mor ris sey’s si tuati on w ou l d n ot h a ve p u t S heriff Walsh on notic e that he mi ght need a poli cy for handling di abeti c inmates who refuse to partici pate in their own care, becau se those ci rcums tances were not presented in Mor ris sey’s si tuation.
We contrast thi s case wi th Kin g v. Krame r, 6 8 0 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Ci r. 2012), whe r e we held that sum mary judgment

w a s in a p p ropriate for a muni ci pali ty where there was e vi d e n c e that o ff ici als were on notic e that the muni ci pali ty’ s medi cal poli ci es were caus ing seri ous problems at the jail. Ther e, the plainti ff challen ged the jail’s poli cy of taking detainees off of their prescribed medi cati ons and tr ansi tioning t hem to preferre d medi cati ons abs ent pro per supervisi on by a physi ci an. Id. at 1020–21. We held that t here was a tr i able i ssu e of fact as to whether the muni ci pali ty was aware of the problem becau se several news paper art i cles had addressed i t and the sheri ff had publi cl y acknowledged hi s awareness of the problem. Id. at 1 0 2 1. Unli ke in Kin g, the plainti ffs here do not poin t to a ny evidenc e that Sher i ff Walsh knew that ther e was a problemNo. 13-1766 43

wi th di abeti c detain ees refusing to partici pate in their own care and, as a consequen ce, sufferin g seri ous medi cal rami fi cati ons. The recor d before ussuggests that any deli berate indi fference that may have occurred in thi s case was at the hands of the indi vid ua l corr ecti onal offi cers or HPL employees who interacte d wi th Mr s. Hahn. S uch evidenc e i s legally insu ffi

4 2 ci ent to i mpose li abi li ty under § 1983 on the CCCC’s poli cymakers. See Holmes v. Sheahan , 930 F.2 d 1196, 1201–02 (7th Ci r. 1991) (“[W] i thout more evidenc e poin tin g to defi ci enci es in the se procedures, [the plainti ff’s] stor y suggests a problem w i th p ersonnel an d the i mplementati on of poli cy,

... bu t no t a problem wi th County poli cy i tself.”). We must conclu de that the di stric t court prope r ly gr anted sum mary judgment o n the offi ci al capac i ty claimagain st Sher i ff Wals h.

2. The plainti ffs next sub mi t that the di stric t court err ed in gr anti ng summ ary judgment t o HPL. They fi rst c ontend that, contrar y to establi shed precedent set fort h in Iska nder v. Village of For e s t P ark

, 690 F.2d 126 (7th Ci r. 1982), and sub sequent
cases, HPL should be l ia ble for the acti ons of i ts employees

un d e r a respondeat superi or theor y of li abi li ty. Second, they sub mi t that even i f HPL i s not li able und e r a respondeat

Cf. Egebergh v. Nich olson , 27 2 F.3d 92 5, 92 7– 28 (7 th Ci r. 20 01 ) (hol di ng 4 2 tha t there was a genuine i ssue fo r tri al r e g ar d i ng whether i ndivid ual of fi cers who withhel d i ns u l i n fro m a di ab eti c detainee were del ib eratel y i ndif fere nt); Estat e of Gee ex rel. Beeman v. Joh nson , 36 5 F. App’x 67 9, 68 3– 84 (7 th Ci r. 2 01 0) (same).44 No. 13-1766 superi or theor y of li abi li ty, the company i s li able under a di rect theor y of liab ilit y becau se i ts poli ci es and procedures for tr eating di abeti c detain ees were deliberately indi fferent to the needs of those individu als. We shall a d d r e ss each of these contentions.

a. The p l a int i ffs sub mi t that they should be able to pursue a clai m under § 1983 again st HPL for i ts employees’ mi scondu ct. I n t he i r view, we have err ed in ext ending the li mi tatio n o n muni ci pal li abi li ty establi shed in Monell v. Department of Social Servic es , 436 U.S. 658 (1978), to private actor s. Monell p e r mit s sui ts again st muni ci pal entiti es under § 1983, but only when a gov ernmental poli cy or cus tom caus ed t he co nsti tutional deprivati on; muni ci pal entiti es cannot be l ia bl e for their employees’ actions under a respondeat superior theo ry

. Id. at 691. Our cases have ext ended thi s li mi tation to private entiti es. See, e.g. , Iska nder, 690 F.2d at 128 (“Mor eov er, just as a muni ci

pa l co r porat i on i s not vic arious ly li able upon a theor y of respondeat superi or for the consti tutional tor ts of i ts employees,

a private corpor ation i s not vic arious ly li able under § 1983 for i ts employees’ depr iv a tions of other s’ ci vil rights.” (ci tation omi tte d)); see also Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 834 (7th Ci r. 2010) (notin g that “a corpor ation that contract[s] wi th [a] jail to prov i de medi cal services

... i s tr eated the same as a muni ci pali ty for li abi li ty purposes under § 1983”). The plainti ffs ask us to “rev i si t these holdings” because they are based on “hi stor i calNo. 13-1766 45

mi sreadings” and we are “free to rev i si t and rej ect [our] ext ensi on of Monell to pr i vat e corpo rat i ons.” 4 3
As a prelim inary matter , the plainti ffs ha v e waived the i ssu e of HPL’s respondeat superi or li abi li ty becau se they fai led to rais e i t before the di stric t court. Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7 t h Ci r. 2012). In their appellate bri ef, the plainti ffs state, “The di stric t court gr anted sum mary judgment to defendant Health Professi onals Ltd. (‘HPL’) by applying the

r ul e that respondeat superi or does not apply to Section 1 9 8 3 clai ms brought again st private corpor ations .” The di stric t 4 4 court made no mention of any s uchcontention. Further more, the plainti ffs have i denti fi ed no part of the di stric t court recor d in whi ch a respondeat superi or clai m was rais ed or other wi se di scu ssed.
We rais ed the matter of wai ver at or al arg ument, and plainti ffs ’ couns el sub sequently sub mi tte d a lette r pursuant to Feder al Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) contending that the respondeat superi or arg ument was not wai ved becau se a court of appeals may rev i ew “‘the merits o f each and ever y theor y the di str ict j udge relied upon in deci ding the case.’” Ess en- 4 5 tiall y, the plainti ffs now arg ue that the di stric t court i mpli edly

A ppel l ant s’ Br. 32 –3 5 ( i nternal quotatio n ma rks omi tted). 4 3

Id

. at 15

. 4 4
App. R. 50 (L etter fro m Kenneth N. Flaxm an to Gino J. Agnel l o, Cl erk, 4 5 Uni ted States Co urt o f Appe als fo r the Seventh Ci rcui t (Ap r. 15 , 20 14 ) (quoti ng United States v. City of Chicag o , 86 9 F.2d 10 33 , 10 36 (7 th Ci r. 19 89 )) (ci ting Pitt man v. Warden, Pontiac Corr. Ctr. , 96 0 F.2d 68 8, 69 0– 91 (7 th Ci r. 19 92 )))

.46 No. 13-1766 rej ected a theor y of respondeat superi or li abi li ty by gr anting
sum mary judgment to HPL. Thi s asserti on cannot prev ai l. The plainti ffs ’ complaint rais ed only direct clai ms again st HPL. In 4 6 their opposi tion to HPL’s motion for sum mary judgment, the plainti ffs again di scu ssed only direct clai ms again st HPL. We 4 7 si mply have no basi s upon whi ch to infer that the di stric t court had even consi dered, much less had relied upon, the rule that private corpor ations cannot be held li able in § 1983 acti ons under a respondeat superior theo ry of li abi li ty. Even i f we were to reach the respondeat superi or i ssu e, we would not tak e the posi tion urged by the plainti ffs

. The plainti ffs poin t to no “interv ening on-point Supreme Court deci sio n” t hat would permi t us to ov err ule our prior cases

. De Leon Castellanos v. Holder, 652 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Ci r. 2011). Our co nsidered deci si on in Iska nder i s compatible wi th the holding of ever y ci rcui t to have addressed the i ssu e. See Shiel ds

v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr. , 746 F

. 3d 782, 790 & n.2 (7th Ci r. 2014) (collecting cases ).

See R.42 at 8 (“ [T] his def endant, act i ng with del i b erate i ndif fere nce 4 6 and/or negli gence, among other things, fail ed to develo p and i mple ment adequa te pol i ci es and p ro cedur es with the f or eseeab l e resul t tha t pretri al detainee s l i ke Janet woul d not b e i denti fi ed and woul d not rece i v e appropr i ate treatment and moni tor i ng.”).

See R.144 at 8 8 (di scussing how a su p e r vi so r y def endant may b e l i ab l e 4 7 under § 19 83 fo r f ai l i ng to estab l i sh customs or pol i ci es to ensure tha t unconstituti onal pr ac t i c e s do not occ ur or fo r estab l i shing customs or pol i ci es tha t l ead to unconstituti onal practic es); id. at 89 (arguing tha t HPL unlawful l y too k no actio n i n re sp o ns e to knowl edge tha t i ts pol i cy fo r treating di ab etes was inadequate).No. 13-1766 47

Becaus e the i ssu e was wai ved or , alter nati vely , becau se i t fai ls on the merits, we conclu de that the plainti ffs ’ arg um ent for holding HP L l i able on a respondeat superi or theor y i s unavai ling.

b.
W e next asses s the plainti ffs ’ di rect clai ms again st HP L

. “Pri vat e corpor ations acting under color of state law may, li ke muni ci pali ties, be held li able for injuries resulting from their poli ci es and practic es.” Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs. , 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7 t h Ci r. 2012). As wi th muni ci pal defendants (li ke Sher i ff Walsh, in hi s offi ci al capac i ty), the plainti ff “mus t show t hat hi s injury was the result of the

... corpor ation’s offi ci al poli cy or cus tom.” Id. The p lainti ff mus t i denti fy a poli cy: An offi ci al policy o r cus tom may be establi shed by

means of an expr ess poli cy, a wid e spread practic e wh ich, although unw ritten, i s so entre nched and well-known as to car r y the force of poli cy, or thro ugh the ac tions of an indi vidu al who possess es the authority to make final poli cy deci si ons on behalf of the mu ni ci pali ty o r cor porat i on. Id. The plainti ff also mus t establi sh a caus al link between the corpor ation’s poli cy (or lack of poli cy) and the p l ainti ff’s injury

. Id.
The plainti ffs here sub mi t that three of HPL’s poli ci es
caus ed consti tutional violati ons: (1) the poli cy of not requiring HPL employees to obtain detain e e s’ medi cal recor ds; (2) the48 No. 13-1766 poli cy of admini stering insu lin according to a g e ne ric sli ding scal e; and (3) the poli cy of i gnor ing er r oneous readings from the blood sugar mo ni tor ing machines. The fi rst t wo of these arg uments f ai l becau se the plainti ffs cannot demonstrate the requis i te caus ation. The plainti ffs present no evidenc e tha t obtaining Mr s. Hahn’s medi cal

recor ds would have saved her li fe. HPL and CCCC personnel

a l ready knew that Mr s. Hahn was an insu lin-dependent di abeti c who was i rr esponsi ble wi th h er medi cati ons. Indeed, the plainti ffs d o not arg ue that havin g Mr s. Hahn’s recor ds would have prev ented her deat h. Nor do the plainti ffs arg ue that HPL’s insu lin-dosage poli cy caus ed her death. They arg ue that the poli cy was problematic in the abstract but concede that i t di d not cau se Mr s. Hahn’s d eath here. I f i t had, the c ause of death would have been hy pogly cemi a (low blood sugar), not di abeti c keto aci dosi s. 4 8
The plaint iff s’ thi rd contention deserves independent exami nati on. Unli ke their other contentions, there i s a link here between the fai lure to prov i de an alter nati ve met hod of chec kin g a detain ee’s blood s ugar and Mr s. Hahn’s death: On the day before her death, she consented on one occasi on to havin g her blood sugar chec ked, only to have that option take n

Spec i fi call y, th e plainti ffs’ ex pert fo und fault i n Swain’s a dmi nistratio n 4 8 of twenty units of insul i n b ased on HPL’s sli di ng scale, which h e b el i eved “co uld hav e ki l l ed her i n a dif fere nt manner—with hypogl ycemia, o r l ow b l oo d suga r.” Appe l l ant s’ Br. 36 –3 7. This i s b ecause some Type-1 di ab eti cs
are particul arly sensiti v e to i nsu lin; therefo re, twenty units might hav e b een much mo re than needed and coul d hav e caused Mrs. Hahn’s blo od suga r to pl ummet. See id. at 37

.No. 13-1766 49

a wa y fr o m her when the mach ine would not work

. It is possi ble that i f CCCC or HP L st aff had been able to obtain a
rea d ing fr om Mr s. Hahn at the tim e she consented to be chec ked, that reading mi ght have indica t e d that she was in need of imm e di ate tr eatment. In the plainti ffs ’ view, i t was consti tutionally acti onable for HPL to have fai led to prov i de a method for moni tor ing the blood sugar levels of di abeti c detain ees when an Accu -Che k ma chine fai ls to produce a reading.
HPL had a poli cy in place fo r rechecking an indi vidu al’s blood suga r when the Accu -Chek mach ine ret urned an err or
mess age; the exis tence of that policy indi cates that HPL was
a war e that, on occasi on, the Accu -Chek mach ine would no t render an accurate r e a d ing. The r ecord shows, however , that

such a malfuncti on could have been due to a var i ety of caus es,
such as the use of an insu ffi cien t amount of blood, i mproper insertion of the sti ck containing blood into the Accu -Chek mach ine or a brok en mach ine. So me of these caus es are due to oper ator err or or other ci rcums tances not necess arily linked to
a d efect in the mach ine i tself and there fore do not result in § 1983 li abi li ty. Cf. Rice , 675 F.3d at 676 (notin g t hat where “most of the err or s and omi ssi ons” ci ted by the plainti ffs were about ho w st aff handled the detain ee’s medi cal condi tion, there could be no l ia bility for the poli cymaker). Absent evi dence that the mach ine was inoperable a si gni fi cant numb er of tim es and that i ts predic able fai lure to oper ate was due to a malfu ncti on of the mach ine i tself, a jury could not find that the company’s fai lure to maintain an alter nate testing devic e to chec k di abeti cs’ bl ood sugar levels on a reg ular basi s was deliberately indi fferent. See Shiel ds , 746 F.3d at 796 (observing50 No. 13-1766

that i solated inci dents do n ot “ s upport an inference of a cus tom
or poli cy,” a s i s required to find a corpor ation li able for deliberate indi fference un der § 1983).

Conclus ion
For the foreg oin g reasons, we affi rm t he judgment of the di stric t court wi th respect to the appli cabi li ty of 735 ILCS 5/2-622 in federal di stric t courts. We rev erse the di stric t court’s deci si on to di smi ss the plaintiff s’ wrongful death clai m wi th prej udic e

. W e affi rm the di stric t court’s gr ant of sum mary judgment t o Sher i ff Wals h and to HPL. Th e case i s remanded to the di stric t court for further proceedings consi stent wi th thi s opin i on. Each party wil l bear i ts own costs in thi s appeal.

AFF IRM ED in part, REVERS ED and REMANDED in part NO COS TS IN THIS CO URT