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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT MURFREESBORO

RONDA A. CAMPBELL, ) Docket No. 2019-05-0540

Employee, )

v. )

MARTEN TRANSPORT, LLC, ) State File No. 32087-2019

Employer, )

And )

AGRI GENERAL INS. CO., ) Judge Dale Tipps

Insurance Carrier. )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This case came before the Court on Marten Transport’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment. The central issue is whether Marten is entitled to summary judgment on grounds 

that Ms. Campbell failed to present sufficient evidence that her injury arose in the course 

and scope of her employment. For the reasons below, the Court holds Marten is entitled 

to summary judgment.

Procedural History

Ms. Campbell works as a truck driver for Marten. On April 23, 2019, Ms. Campbell 

had completed her deliveries and stopped at a store in Chattanooga to buy her mother a 

gift. The store had not opened yet, so Ms. Campbell went into her sleeper compartment to 

rest. While Ms. Campbell slept, a tow-truck operator hooked onto the cab of her truck and 

raised the front of it off the ground.1 He then pounded on the door to wake her up. Ms. 

Campbell was still groggy and did not realize the cab had been elevated. As a result, she 

fell when opening the door and injured her head, shoulder, and left wrist.

Marten denied Ms. Campbell’s claim on the grounds she deviated from her job 

duties to perform a personal errand, and she filed a Petition for Benefit Determination.

1 The parking lot was posted, “No Truck Parking.”

FILED

Jun 29, 2020

08:57 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS
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After an Expedited Hearing, the Court denied benefits because Ms. Campbell was 

not likely to prevail on proving that her injury arose out of the course and scope of her 

employment. Marten filed this Motion for Summary Judgment and a statement of 

undisputed facts. Ms. Campbell did not file a response, and the Court heard the Motion on 

June 18, 2020.

Marten’s Motion

Marten filed a statement of undisputed material facts with citations to the record in 

compliance with Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 56.03. Most of the “facts” were a 

recitation of the procedural history of the claim, along with some of the Court’s findings 

in the Expedited Hearing Order. The Court notes that procedural history and Expedited 

Hearing Order conclusions do not constitute facts upon which summary judgment may be 

granted. However, these material facts may be gleaned from the statement:

1. The sole reason for Ms. Campbell’s stop at the store was to purchase a gift for her 

mother.

2. Ms. Campbell contends she had permission to make the additional stop.

Marten contended these facts support summary judgment because they constitute

affirmative evidence that Ms. Campbell cannot establish essential elements of her claim. 

Specifically, it argued she cannot prove that her alleged injury arose in the course and scope 

of her employment.

As stated, Ms. Campbell did not file a response, but she appeared for the hearing on 

this motion. She contended that she had returned to the course and scope of her 

employment at the time of her injury because she was trying to protect Marten’s truck from 

being towed.

Law and Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 

as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (2019). 

As the moving party, Marten must do one of two things to prevail on its motion: (1) 

submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s 

claim, or (2) demonstrate that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish 

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101; see 

also Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). 

If Marten is successful in meeting this burden, the nonmoving party – Ms. Campbell – must 

then establish that the record contains specific facts upon which the Court could base a 

decision in her favor. Rye, at 265. 
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Ms. Campbell filed no response opposing the motion for summary judgment and 

failed respond to Marten’s statement of undisputed material facts. Therefore, under Rule 

56.04 and Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.18(1)(c) (August 

2019), the Court finds the motion unopposed and the facts admitted. The issue then is

whether under Rule 56.06 summary judgment is “appropriate.” 

Considering the merits of Marten’s motion, the Court finds it successfully

demonstrated that Ms. Campbell’s evidence is insufficient to establish a causal connection 

between her injury and her employment, an essential element of her claim. Under 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102, Ms. Campbell must show that her injury 

arose in the course and scope of her employment.

Application of this course and scope requirement depends in part on the nature of 

an injured employee’s work. A traveling employee is generally considered to be in the 

course of employment continuously during the duration of the entire trip, except when there 

is a distinct departure on a personal errand. McCann v. Hatchett, 19 S.W.3d 218, 221 

(Tenn. 2000). As a truck driver, Ms. Campbell was a traveling employee. The question, 

therefore, is whether her trip to the store constituted a distinct departure on a personal 

errand.

Tennessee Courts have found that some personal acts of comfort and convenience, 

such as bathroom breaks or meal stops, are incidental to the employment. These contribute 

to the furtherance of an employer’s interest, and injuries that occur during these stops are 

deemed to have arisen out of the employment. See McCormick v. Aabakus, Inc., No. 

M1999-01234-WC-R3-CV, 101 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 5, 

2000). However, Ms. Campbell’s sole reason for this stop was to purchase a gift, not for 

food, fuel, or a bathroom break. Her decision to leave her route and park her truck was 

based on purely personal considerations. This differs fundamentally from a comfort stop;

in that it provided no benefit to Marten. Therefore, it represents a distinct departure on a 

personal errand.2

Ms. Campbell contended that she had Marten’s permission to make the stop. Even 

if true, the Court is unaware of any authority that granting permission for a departure 

changes the McCann analysis. Instead, the focus remains on the question of whether Ms. 

Campbell’s deviation from her route provided any benefit to Marten. Ms. Campbell 

offered no evidence of any benefit. Similarly, Ms. Campbell provided no evidence to 

support her argument that her injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment 

because it arose out of her attempts to prevent towing of Marten’s truck.3

2 The statement of undisputed facts does not establish whether the physical deviation from Ms. Campbell’s 

route was geographically significant, but the Court is unaware of any legal authority establishing a 

minimum required distance to constitute a distinct departure.

3 Even if proof of this contention had been admitted, the Court questions whether an employee’s actions to 
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In response to Marten’s motion, Ms. Campbell must “demonstrate the existence of 

specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in [her] favor[.]” 

Rye, at 265. Further, she must do more than simply offer hypothetical evidence; she must 

produce evidence at this summary judgment stage of the case that is sufficient to establish 

the essential elements of her workers’ compensation claim. Id. Ms. Campbell failed to 

meet this burden, as she offered no countervailing evidence and produced no material facts 

to lead the Court to find in her favor.

Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the Court holds Marten is 

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Marten’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Ms. Campbell’s claim is 

dismissed with prejudice to its refiling. 

2. Unless appealed, this order shall become final thirty days after entry.

3. The Court taxes the $150.00 filing fee to Marten Transport under Tennessee 

Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.06, payable to the Clerk within 

five days of this order becoming final.

4. Marten Transport shall file the SD-2 with the Clerk within ten days of the date of 

judgment.

ENTERED June 29, 2020.

______________________________________

Judge Dale A. Tipps

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

mitigate the consequences of a distinct departure, taken before the departure is concluded, would constitute 

a return to the course and scope of employment.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Order was sent as indicated on June 29, 2020.

Name Certified 

Mail

Email Service sent to:

Ronda Campbell,

Self-represented Employee

X Fields1961@yahoo.com

Allen Grant, 

Employer Attorney

X agrant@eraclides.com

______________________________________

Penny Shrum, Court Clerk

Wc.courtclerk@tn.gov