MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 202 4 ME 1 Docket: Pen

- 23

- 81 Submitted

On	Briefs: September	27,	2023 Decided: January	9,	2024

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and	MEAD,	JABAR, CONNORS,	LAWRENCE,	and	DOUGLAS, JJ.

IN	RE CHILDREN	OF	BILLIE	S.

DOUGLAS ,	J.
[¶] Billie	 S.	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court	 (Bangor,

Roberts,	J. )	terminating	her	parental	rights to	her	children pursuant	to	22	M.R.S.

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)	 (20 2 3). The	 m other	 contends	 that	 the judgment	 does	 not
make	adequate,	independent	findings	of	fact	to	support	termination. W e agree

and vacate the	judgment.
[¶ 2 ] The sole	witness at	the March	2, 2023, hearing	on	the	petition	for
termination	 of	 parental	 rights 1 was the Department of	 Health	 and	 Human

Services caseworker
, who had just been	 assigned	 to	 the	 case	 two	 months

earlier

. The caseworker testified	 that she had reviewed	 the	 case	 file, had
spoken with her	supervisor	as	well	as with the	caseworker	previously	assigned

1 The	mother	failed	to	appear	at	the	hearing. Her	counsel’s	motion	to	continue the hearing	was denied	because	the	mother	had	notice	of	the	hearing	and	no	reason	was	offered	to	account	for	her absence.2
to	the	case, and had reviewed the	petitions	for	termination that	were prepared

and	filed in	June	2021 by	the previous caseworker

. S he also testified	that	she

had	reviewed specifically paragraph	nine	of	each	petition 2 (which	summarizes
the	facts	alleged	in	support	of	termination)	and	believed	t heir contents	still	to
be	true	to	the	best	of	her	knowledge.
[¶ 3 ] C ounsel	for	the	Department requested	that the	court take “judicial

notice ” of p aragraph nine	of	each petition	“ relative	to	the	mother,	relative	to	the
father	of	[ the older child]
, 3 and relative	to	the	best	interests	in	light	of	the	direct
testimony	 of	 the	 same	 effect	 subject
, of	 course,	 to	 cross.” 4 There	 was	 no
objection
, and	c ounsel	for each	parent and the g uardian	ad l item affirmatively
agreed	with th is request. Following cross
- examination of	 the	caseworker by
the	parents ’ counsel
, the	Department	rested

. With	the	admission	of	t he reports

of	the g uardian	ad l item ,	the	evidence	closed

.

2 The	Department	filed	two	termination	petitions	because	the	children	had	different	fathers. The father	 of	 the younger child	is	 deceased.	 	The parental	 rights	 of	 the father	 of	 the older child were terminated	in	this	matter
, and he did	not appeal.

3 Here, counsel	 for	 the	 Department	 had	 mistakenly	 referred	 to	 the	 younger	 child	 by	 name
, however,	it	is	clear	from	the	record	that he	was	referring	to	the older	child.

4 The	mother further contends	 that	 the	court	abused	its	discretion by	 taking	judicial	notice	of paragraph	nine in	each petition	because	the facts	set	out	therein	are	“subject	to	reasonable	dispute.” M.R.	 Evid.	 201(b). Because we	 determine	 that the	 judgment	 does	 not	 set	 out	 adequate	 factual findings,	we	decline	to	address	this	and	other	issues th e appeal	raises

. See	In re Kenneth	H., 1997	ME 48,	¶	5,	690	A.2d	984 ( n oting	that	effective	appellate	review	requires	“specific	findings	of	fact	that would	 inform	 the	 p arties or	 this [C] ourt	 of	 the	 basis	 of	 [the	 trial	 court’s ] decision”)	 ( quoting In re Amber	B. ,	597	A.2d	937,	938	(Me.	1991 ) )

.3
[¶ 4 ] Ruling	 from	 the	 bench,	 t he court said that	 it had “reviewed
Paragraph 9	 and	 the	 petition	 that	 was admitted into	 evidence,	 heard	 the
testimony	of	the	caseworker,	and

.	.	. reviewed	[ the two latest g uardian	ad l item

reports ]
, ”	and found on the	basis	of that	evidence

that the	parents	are	unwilling	or	[un]able	to	protect	the	children from	 jeopardy,	 and	 those	 circumstances	 are	 unlikely	 to	 change within	 a

.	 .	 . time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 the	 [children’s] needs.		They	are	unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the

. .	 . children	 within	 the	 time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 the children’s	needs.		I’m	not	going	to	find	abandonment.		And	in	terms of	[ the mother],	of	course,	I’m	also	not	going	to	find	that	she’s	failed to	make	a	good	faith	effort	to	rehabilitate	and	reunify	.	.	.

. I	further find	that	termination	is	in	the	children’s	best	interest,	and	I	will	sign an	order	once [the	Department	has] prepared	it

.	.	. . At	 the	 court’s	 request, the	 Department's c ounsel subsequently submitted	 a
proposed order of termination of	the	mother’s	parental	rights	to	the	children

. 5

[¶ 5 ] The proposed order submitted	 by	 the	 Department indicate d a
finding	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence that the mother “ is	unwilling	or	unable
to	protect	the [ children ] from j eopardy	and	these	circumstances are unlikely	to
change	within	a	time	calculated	to	meet	the [ children ’ s ] needs ” and “ that it is	in

the [ children’s ] best	interest [s] that [ her ] parental	rights	be	terminated

. ” 6 In

5 The proposed	order also	terminated the parental	rights of	the	father of the	older	child.

6 The	proposed	order ( which	consisted	of	court	form	PC

- 036 filled	in	by	counsel ) deviated	from the	court’s	ruling	 from	 the	bench,	however,	in	 two	respects .		First,	 the	box indicating	a	 finding	of4

the	 section on	 the	 form order entitled	 “Specific	 Findings
, ” the	 following was

written:
See	¶	9	of	both	petitions	re:	[the	mother] ¶ 9	of	[the older child’s]	petition	re:	[the	father] ¶	9	of	both	petitions	re:	best	interests See	GAL	reports See	also	testimony	of	caseworker.

The	order	was issued on	March 20 ,	2023. The	mother filed a timely	appeal.
M.R.	App.	R.	2B(c)(1).
[¶ 6 ] Although	couched at times in	terms	of a challenge	to	the sufficiency

of the evidence
, the focus	of	the mother’s	challenge on	appeal is on the	adequacy

and	 form	 of	 the judgment’s findings of fact

. Thus,	 s he	 contends	 that	 the
judgment lacks independent,	specific	facts to support	the	ultimate	findings as

to	 parent al unfitness	 and	 best	 interest s of	 the	 children
, and instead

incorporates in	full	a paragraph of the	termination	petitions
, the g uardian	ad

l item	reports , and the entirety	of	the	caseworker’s	testimony.

abandonment was	checked ,	even	though	the	court	had	expressly	ruled	from	the	bench	that “ I'm	not going	to	find	abandonment ” as	to	the	mother

. S econd, the	box	indicating	a	finding	that the parent	is unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the	children	within	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet the	 children’s	 needs was	 not	 checked,	 despite the	 court's contrary finding from	 the	 bench with respect	to	the	mother .		Counsel	preparing	a	proposed	order	at	the	direction	of	the	court	should make every	effort	to ensure	that	the proposed order submitted	to	the	court	reflects the rulings	from	the bench

.5
[¶ 7 ] A	 judgment terminating	 parental	 rights must set	 forth specific,
independently	made	findings	of	fact. In	re	David	G. ,	659	A.2d	859,	862

- 63	(Me.
1995) ; see	also M.R.	Civ. P. 52(a) (“[I]n	every	action	for	termination	of	parental
rights,	the	court shall	make specific	findings	of	fact and	state	its	conclusions	of

law

.	.	. as	required	by	22	M.R.S.	§	4055. ” ( e mphasis	added) )

. It	must	contain
more	than	“merely	a	synopsis”	of	testimony	or	evidence	and	a	recitation	of	the

elements	of	22	M.R.S.	§	4055. In	re	Dylan	B., 2001	ME	31,	¶	4,	766	A.2d	577; see

also	In re Kenneth	H., 1997	ME	48,	¶	3,	690	A.2d	984	(concluding	that a synopsis
of	trial	testimony	and “ near
- verbatim recitation ” of	section	4055(B)’s	language
were	inadequate	as	findings); In	re	Amber	B., 597	A.2d	937,	937

- 38	(Me.	1991)
(holding findings	 of	 fact	 merely	 referencing	 the	 statutory	 elements	 to	 be
inadequate).		Moreover, “ we	will	not	infer	factual	findings	in	a	termination	case”
when	adequacy	of	the	findings	is	the	issue	presented. In re Aubrey	R., 2017	ME

37,	¶ 2

- 3 ,	157	A.3d	212.
[¶ 8 ] Here,	t he judgment recites the	court’s ultimate findings	with	respect
to	 the	 applicable	 statutory	 elements	 and	 then incorporates as	 its	 “specific
findings” entire portions of the	record evidence

— the g uardian	ad l item reports,

all trial	testimony, and paragraph	nine	of	each petition

. Th ese are not “specific
findings of	 fact”	 required	 by	Rule	 52 (a) or	 our	 prior	 decisions.	 	They do	 not6

reflect an	independent articulation of the particular	facts	form ing the	basis	of

the	court ’ s	reason s	in support	of	its ultimate findings regarding	the	mother ’ s
parental	unfitness	or	the	children ’ s	best	interests

. 7 Because	the judgment lacks
adequate findings that	would sufficiently inform	the	mother	and	this C ourt	of

the	basis of the court’s decision,	w e must vacate the	judgment

. The	entry	is:
Judgment	vacated.		Remanded	to	the	District Court	for	further proceedings	consistent	with this	opinion.

Neil	J.	Prendergast,	Esq.,	Fort	Kent,	for	appellant m other
Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Hunter	C.	Umphrey,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office of	the	Attorney	General,	Bangor,	for	appellee	Department	of Health	and	Human Services

Bangor	District	Court	docket	numbers	PC

- 2020

- 58	and	PC

- 2020

- 59 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

7 The difficulty	of	appellate	review	due	to lack of specific	findings is further compounded	here	by contradictions	reflected	in	portions	of	the	incorporated	testimony	and reports. As	one example,	the March	2,	2023, report	of	the g uardian	ad	litem states	that	“[t]he	visits	[that]	did	occur	went	well”	and that	the	mother	“interacted	well	and	appropriately	with	the	children.”		The	caseworker,	on	the	other hand,	testified	that	visits “ go	okay”	and	that	there	were	“some	concerns	about	[the	mother’s]	ability to	be	appropriate	in	her	conversations	with	[the	children].”