Executive Order 13650 Listening Session, Los Angeles , CA
Date: January 10 , 2014 Location: University of California Los Angeles, James West Alumni Center (JWAC), 325 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095 Introduction and Opening Remarks Jack Eisenhauer , Moderator, introduced the proceedings:

• Welcomed everyone to the listening session and introduced the panel.

• Mentioned future listening sessions and W ebinars.

• Written comments can be provided to eo.chemical@hq.d hs.gov . These comments will be included in the docket

. • Announcements : o Please put phones on vibrate

. o Session is being recorded for note

- taking purposes

. o The facility e mergency exit information and restroom locations were provided

. • Purpose: Provide stakehold ers overview of the Executive Order 13650: Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security ( EO ) progress to date a nd to provide an opportunity for the public to provide comments, feedback, and suggestions

. Mathy Stanislaus, Deputy Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U

. S

. Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA ) , provided an overview :

• I would like to give a brief overview of the Executive O rder and the progress we have made to date.

• We have had a number of listening sessions held thro ughout the country. This is our sixth session

. We have also had some Web

- based sessions as well.

• We believe that developing and implementing the Executive O rder is dependent upon the input of you , the stakeholders

. We value your feedback.

• We have a Website to provide updates on our efforts.

• The prominence of the West, Texas event le d to the issuance of this Executive O rder. The EO establishes a n interagency working group of the agencies that have a role in chemical security and safety

. The Department of Ho meland Security (DHS) has a focus on security, the Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (DOL/OSHA) has an emphasis on worker safety , and EPA has a focus on worker health and protection of the environment. We also have the Depar tment of Justice/Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ( ATF ) ; the Department of Transportation ( DOT ) ; and the Department of Agriculture ( USDA ) participating as well.

• We are committed to improving the way that F ederal, S tate , and local governments work together , especially regarding communities of color and economic disadvantage. EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 1 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Session• We have organized into a set of sub

- working group s . The first working group has been focusing on improving coordination among the F ederal agencies

. T his working group is co

- chaired by EPA and the DHS/U.S. Coast Guard and is developing a plan for how agencies can work more closely together

. • We have been working on a pilot program in Region II to bring together F ederal, S tate, and local responders

. This pilot is looking at inspection prioritization, data sharing among agencies, and ways to improve access to chemical inventory data.

• Another sub

- working group , chaired by the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection, is tasked with reviewing the ways tha t we collect and share chemical information . This group is lookin g at data collection approaches for establish ing a common taxonomy; is developing methods for database integration; and is comparing information to identify areas of potential non

compliance.

• Chaired by OSHA, another sub

- working group is reviewing Policy Modernization and Standards

. This group is examining policies related to the Chemical Facility Anti

- Terrorism Standards ( CFATS ) Chemicals of Interest List, the EPA Risk Management P rogram, and others

. On Friday, January 3, 2014, this group issued a preliminary list of options , and we are seeking input from stakeholders

. While the docket is open until March 31, w e are asking that, if possible, you provide comments prior to the deadline to ensure that we have time to incorporate your comments prior to the final report to the President.

• On August 30, EPA, OSHA, and ATF issued an advisory concerning the safe handling and storage of a mmonium n itrate

. We recognize that this is a living document , and w e continue to receive feedback on its contents

. We hope to issue a revision to this advisory based upon the feedback.

• A sub

- working group has been established to ensure effective stakeholder outreach and engagement . DHS chairs this group.

• In addition to providing comments here today, we encourage you to submit written comments

. You may do so by sending an email to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov

. This email address is included on your printed agenda for your reference.

• Thank you for attending today

. I look forward to listening to each of you

. Jay Vicory, Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) , commented :

• Thank you for being here today

. • We come here with a common vision: to hear from you concerning how to improve chemical safety and security.

• OSHA published the Process Safety Management ( PSM ) standard in 1992 in response to worldwide catastrophic chemical incidents and releases

. Some of those incidents include:
o An a mmoni um nitrate explosion in Texas City in April 1947

. This was the N ation ’ s largest industrial accident to date , where 581 people were injured or killed.
o In 1984, an incident in Bhopal , I ndia killed more than 2,000 people

. o In 1989, Philips Petroleum in Pasaden a, California killed 23 people

. • More recently, we have seen continued incidents, such as:
o 2004, a Formosa Plastics facility explosion in Illino is killed and injured employees

. EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 2 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Sessiono In 2005, 15 workers were killed in the BP ref inery explosion in Texas City, T ex as. o The 2012 Richmond, California Chevron refinery incident seriously injured 15,000 people.

• Federal agencies comprising the work group are concerned and seek your comments. Amy Graydon, Branch Chief, Policy & Programs Branch, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) , remarked :

• Thank you for being here today

. • DHS brings a uniqu e security

- centric perspective through both voluntary and regulatory programs: o Our regulatory programs include t he Chemi cal Facility Anti

- Terrorism Standards ( CFATS ) and the Maritime Transportation Security Act ( MTSA ).
o We also have voluntary prog rams focusing on public/private partnerships to ensure that dangerous chemicals are safeguarded

. DHS serves as a sector

- specific a gency for the chemical sector

. In this roll, DHS works across F ederal, S tate, local, and tribal governments and industry to develop training and best practices

. • We have seen the value of ongoing open dialog ue with stakeholders

. We have heard a tremendous amount of constructive ideas through these listening sessions

. • We are looking forward to hearing a diverse set of perspectives. Sean Lynum, Assistant Director, Department of Transportation (DOT) , mentioned :

• I would like to thank all of you for being here t oday.

• DOT has a unique role in hazardous materials in that we regulate the transportation and handling of hazardous chemicals in transit

. • I am hopeful today that the concerns you raise today will effect meaningful change. Lisa Long, Director, Office of En gineering Safety, Occupational Health and Safety Administration ( OSHA ) , U

. S

. Department of Labor ( DOL ) :

• P rovided an overview of activities relating to Section 6 of the Executive O rder , specifically the options proposed in the area of Policy Regulation and Standards Modernization located at: https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/Section_6ai_Options_List.ht ml

. The moderator asked presenters to come forward to provide comments and reviewed the ground

- rules for the public listening session

. The goal is to give everyone an opportunity to speak and to be respectful of everyone’s time:

• This is a listening session

. The purpose is to hear your comments

. There are a broad range of perspectives , and it is not anticipated that participants will come to consensus
. Please respect the opinions of others.

• We are very interested in specific suggestions , as these would be th e most helpful.

• Please feel free to provide written comments to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov

. EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 3 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Session• Individuals providing comments will be limited to 5 minutes.

• Following any remarks, members of the panel may ask questions to gain additional clarification and understanding.

• After all registered speakers have had an opportunity to present, we will open the floor to anyone who would like to present

. Those additional speakers will also be limited to 5 minutes. Jessie Lueders , Emmet t Center on Climate Change & Environment , University of California

– Los Angeles ( UCLA ) School of Law , provided the following comments :

• An option that ha s been suggested is the use of inherently safer p rocesses ( ISP )

. UCLA S chool of L aw is preparing a p olicy brief that will be submitted in the spring

. A copy will be submitted to the working group.

• By considering ISP strategies, along with other risk reduction strategies, facilit y operators are given a larger set of tools to respond to safety and security threats

. • When operators are not required to consider ISP solutions, they may overlook effective preventive strategies.

• Many of the responsive strategies used today do not account for intentional criminal releases , but rather only focus on industrial acci dents.

• ISP strategies require a holistic evaluation of hazards

. Other strategies treat hazards as unavoidable problems ; ISP , on the other hand, removes these hazards

. ISP can better evaluate the risks of alternative practices, leading to better decision making.

• A popular belie f is that the use of inherent safety shifts risk , such as from a facility to the transportation sector

. This claim misunderstands the ISP methodology, which specifically accounts for such movements in risk

. • Other arguments suggest that requiring inherent safety would jeopardize operators ’ productivity or competitiveness

. The primary concern is that there is a direct cost of compliance that would be too burdensome

. T hese concerns can be addressed by completing a feasibility study of implementation; this is similar to regulations already in place in New Jersey and parts of California

. This type of study would allow industry to evaluate the use of ISP without taking on a serious financial hardship.

• Some costs would be unavoidable trade

- offs to provide additional process safety

. The EO clearly indicates that existing practices are insufficient to protecting stakeholders

. Some additional investment will be necessary

. Improving existing protections will require additional investment, but t hese costs can be reasonable and manageable

. Safer pract ices can save money in the long

run, especially considering the cost of response.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question : You refer to a recommendations document coming out in the spring ? Do you h ave a timeframe?
o Mr. Lueders responded : W e expect it to be done in April or May. A w orking draft will be sent out in March. Austin Price, Field Director, Cal ifornia Public Interest Research Group (CALPIRG) , provided the following comments: EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 4 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Session• I would like to acknowledge the incident yesterday in West Virginia

. A quarter of the population lives within that watershed and is now under a water advisory

. • I am here on behalf of 22 organizations that represent environmental justice communities , fence

- line com munities, and first responders

. We encourage you to use the full extent of your legal authority to mandate the use of alternative chemical processes where ver feasible

. We have submitted a letter to this effect, which has been endorsed by numerous organizat ions.

• The study we discussed last night at the Los Angeles evening session (January 9, 2014) regarding the New Jersey regulation showed that 90 of the highest risk facilities have yet to adopt inherently safer technology ( IST )

. The New Jersey Work Environm ental Council conducted that study; I have asked Greenpeace to send a copy of this report to your staff

. • Voluntary IST programs by them selves do not work

. A study by the Congressional R esearch S ervice (CRS) found that , between 2009 and 2012, the EPA Risk Management Program increased the number of regulated facilities by more than 700

. • Several hundred facilities have moved to safer chemical processes at a reasonable cost, and in some cases this has resulted in cost savings

. 87% of these facilities were abl e to implement their changes for $1M or less

. The costs involved in the move to IST pale in comparison to the costs involved in personal injury lawsuits and environ mental cleanup

. • I will be submitting these as written comments as well.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question : Regarding t he CRS report you referenced , d o you know what date that was published?
o Mr. Austin answered : Nov ember 16, 2012

. Ann Werboff , United Steelworkers, provided the following comments:

• The United Steelworks, Local 675 , has 5,00 0 members in the greater Los Angeles area

. • We have h ighly skilled and trained workers on the frontline

. We are hurt first and worst when an incident takes place.

• Many of the previous tragic events can and should have been prevented.

• We strongly encourage w orker participation in risk reduction and incident prevention.

• The most effective approach to prevention is a shift to inherently safer technologies

. We strongly support a move to IST.

• We recently issued a report about the ability of refineries to shift aw ay from the use of hydrofluoric acid.

• We know that IST may take time to implement at all facilities, and we therefore recommend that you issue an update to regulations in the meantime.

• We feel that OSHA ’ s Process Safety Management ( PSM ) is broken

. This is the most important standard to protect w orkers

. While it tells employe rs what they need to do, it does not describe how to do it

. This has resulted in many companies keeping old practices in place.

• Industries ’ voluntary standards are not enough

. We need a modernized standard for PSM that will hold employers accountable.

• Workers should be required on all investigation teams. EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 5 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Session• W orkers and community members , including emergency responders, should be involved in response planning

. • Federal and S tate agencies ne ed to work together and with local partners, including unions

. We support the sharing of information among agencies.

• We also support joint inspections and the sharing of reports generated by inspectors in the field.

• Thank you for holding this public hearing today and for giving us the opportunity to speak. Maya G olden

- K rasner, Staff Attorney , Communities for a B etter E nvironment, provided the following comments:

• We have t housands of members in this region living on th e fence line of many hazardous facilities

. Our members suffer the effects of living near these facilities every day

. They see higher instances of cancer, nausea, and asthma.

• Our members were among those who sought medical treatment following the Chevron r efinery explosion.

• Residents are paying the price of every equipment failure and negligent act

. • Five years prior to the Richmond, Chevron incident, there were corrosion problems that caused smaller incidents

. Workers were reporting extensive corrosion on the pipes, but o nly stopgap measures were taken

. In the end, a catastrophic event resulted.

• We support the implementation of the safety case regime.

• In our region, dan gerous facilities overwhelmingly exist in poorer and Latino communities.

• Refineries are making expensive upgrades in rail so that they can process high

- sulfur materials.

• Refining heaver crude requires more intensive processing and more energy to refine, resulting in higher green house gas emissions.

• Federal agen cies must use their authority to require inherently safer practices

. State regulators must be adequately funded to enforce the rules.

• The fence

- line communities must be regarded as stakeholders , with full input in any strategy or plan to address facility safety concerns.

• Our communities must have access to information, including those data

- sharing systems developed under section 5 of the EO.

• We would urge that any definition of confidential business information be narrowly tailored in favor of public access to information.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question : You mentioned adoption of a safety case regime

. Have you thought about how a safety case would be implemented?
o Ms. Golden

- Krasner responded : At EPA , you have the authority under 112R to require the implementation of a safety case regime

. More specifically, we could submit comments about how this could be implemented

. We will submit additional written comments.
• A clarifying question was asked by Ms. Gr aydon : Regarding data , can you be more specific about what data fields you want to see?

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 6 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Sessiono Ms. Golden

- Krasner responded : We are interested in information regarding incidents and accidents

. We ’ re interested in information about alternatives analysis and best p ractices

— a nything that will expose our communities to increased pollution and safety risk.
Janet Gunter , San Pedro Homeowners United , provided the following comments:

• We are a fence

- line community, just west of Wilmington , California.

• Our homeowners group has been complaining and writing; we’ve been trying to figure out what’s going on with the facility for more than 40 years

. We’ve reached out to EPA, DHS, OSHA , and others.

• We learned about this hearing through a doctor , who learned ab out it from a physician’s organization

. Eventually, we received a notice from Congressman Waxm a n ’ s office , but it was short notice.

• No one can find or identify who has direct responsibility for the Liquid Petroleum Gas ( LPG ) facility that I am going to ref erence today

. • For more than 40 years, an extreme and unimaginable risk has existed in our community due to the close proximity of a 25 million gal lon liquid petroleum gas facility

. The facility was sited during the Nixon administration.

• We do not understan d how this facility could be constructed within 1000 feet of residents when:
o Exempted from Los Angeles fire regulations
o Constructed without proper permits
o Built in a documented earthquake rupture zone , d ocumented with both 7.3M gallon and 12.5M gal lon explosive butane tanks , and built to a seismic substandard of 5.5

- 6.0.

• Our efforts have determined that the company CEO was a friend and campaign support er of Richard Nixon and had political relationships with Los Angeles City and County officials

. The sp in at the time of the facility introduction was that butane and propane gases were the future of energy production in America.

• In 1977, the Los Angeles Times exposed many of the problems with this facility’s construction; however, no changes have resulted.

• Using an EPA formula, the 12.5M gallon tank has an impact radius of over 3 miles

. • A p rofessor , described as the U

. S

. Government ’ s own forensic risk expert, has reviewed details of this facility and warned of the hazards

. In a recent publication , he has c alled the facility “risky, very risky

. ”
Connie Rutter , Citizens for Responsible & Equal Environmental Protection , provided the following comments:

• I have worked for more than 20 years in the oil industry

. I am very familiar with oil refineries and storag e facilities.

• The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act ( EPCRA ) was promulgated in 1986, and then amended in 1990 , first a ddressing toxics and later addressing flammables and EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 7 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Sessionexplosives

. The purpose of the EPCRA is to inform the public about potential chemical hazards present in their communities

. What was missing from the Act is what to do about a facility that is too dangerous

. EPCRA did not set a limit of risk that was too great.

• EPCRA was somewhat effective in alarming the public enough th at public agencies arranged for reduction in some risks

. However, to my knowledge, t his has not been done with flammables

. • When DHS was formed, it did not give the community a right

- to

- know about community risks

. DHS made it much more difficult to know the risks and decreas ed the effectiveness of EPCRA

. • According to a GAO report in 2012, DHS is not expected to work through all the CFATS facilities until 20 years from now

. • Both F ederal and S tate (California) programs have posted the enforcement of eight sets of rules to fire departments , which have already said that they do not have the funding or manpower to complete the assignment

. This has resulted in poor or absent enforcement

. • In the event of a release, the LPG will vaporize nearly instantly, expanding nearly 200 times

. There is not effective way to deal with this kind of situation. Marcie Miller , San Pedro Homeowners Coalition , provided the following comments:

• I have deep respect and gratitude to President Obama for forcing this otherwise unli kely assembly of oversight agencies and stakeholders to work together today.

• I am here today to beg for immediate removal of Rancho LPG LLC

. from its location at 211 N. Gafney Street

. It does not need to be here , it does not belong here, and it will be the most costly chemical facility failure of all time.

• I am professional researcher and policy analyst

. I want to share with you how the 26M gallons of LPG and b utane came in behind the scenes and remain grandfathered nearly 42 years later.

• Gramps was Richard Nixon

. His good friend had been financing Nixon’s political career

. RJ Munser was president and CEO of several companies

. In 1972, RJ Munser himself was one of the most powerful and quickly forgotten men in Los Angeles

. He chaired the committees for const ruction projects in Los Angeles County

. Nowhere in the 150

- page report of the committee does it describe how the vario us agencies and officials green

- lighted the construction of the LPG storage facility.

• The facility was granted exemptions; public comment was not welcomed

. The company went bankrupt shortly after the Nixon administration

. The vision of the facility was never realized

. • This facility must be relocated to a more acceptable ( remote ) location before an accident happens

. Chuck Hart , President, S an Pedro Peninsula Homeowners United, provided the following comments:

• As you have heard from the previous speakers, we have been talking about the Ranchero facility for some time

. • I would like to present you with a scenario

. On January 14, 2014, at 2:30 pm , school buses and soccer moms crowd local streets to pick up some of the 1,300 students located within half of a mile from the LPG facility

. A 7.3 earthquake ruptures one of 13 M gallon butane tank

. This EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 8 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Sessionsp r eading vapor cloud soon reaches an ignition so urce . The earth movement also compromises other pipelines and valves on the site

. The resulting explosion and fire has a potential for a catastrophic event of a scale never before seen.

• Hiding behind grandfathering practices is morally wrong.

• Some facilit ies cannot be made safe

. This LPG facility must be moved or shut down.
Ron Conrow , Western District Manager, Plaines LPG Services , provided the following comments:

• I am the plant manager for the facility that was recently discussed

. • We are a 20

- acre facil ity near a 440

- acre refinery

. Refineries are inherently more dangerous than an LPG facility.

• O thers have indicated that our facili ty has never been inspected

. That simply is not true

. A multi

agency team was assembled to review the facility , which was com pleted in 1977

. The report found essentially nothing at that time.

• The Los Angeles T imes articles referenced by earlier speakers do not mention the 1977 report.

• At the time of construction, the facility received 44 permits, 7 of which were from the Los Ang eles Fire Department

. These are evidenced in the 1977 report appendix

. • The facility went through an E nvironmental I mpact R eport
. In 2011, the Los Angeles City Attorney reviewed the report and determined it to be complete

. The California Attorney General’s Office later reaffirmed this.

• Regarding t he reference to Professor B

. , this individual knew nothing about the flier they distributed or this group’s allegations

. No where in his article does he mention the R ancho facility.

• The EPA has vetted our data

. Our RMP is to the letter of the law

. Our worst

- case scenario does not impact the Port of Los Angeles

. • Thank you for your time.
Kit Fox , Analyst, City Manager’s O ffice, City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California , provided the following comments:

• Many of our residents are concerned about the Rancho LPG facility

. Our primary concern is that the EO should take a more global approach to handling LPG facilities in the harbor area in general

. • We would like to se e the availability of neutral third

- party assessments of facility risk

. • We are not a fence

- line community, but many of our abodes overlook the port community

. What is the liability of the operator s in the event of an incident? We would like to know what the limits of liability coverage may be.

• I thank all of you for coming here today

. It is great to see representatives from so many agencies represented here today. Martha Arguello , Physicians for Social Responsibility, provided the following comments:

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 9 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Session• If we are going to make the EO listening sessions effective, we need to do a better job of outreach

. It should not be incumbent on community non

- governmental organizations to get the word out.

• Voluntary programs are not working

. They are simply not effective.

• We want to see innovati on . We want to engineer the danger out of these processes for the benefit of both workers and residents. The moderator announced that all scheduled speakers had been called and declared an Open Session, calling for speakers to come forward to speak. Timoth y Malloy, Faculty Director, UCLA Sustainable Technology and Policy Program (STPP) , provided the following comments:

• We are interdisciplinary research program

. Our mission is to advance public health and environmental protection by integrating science, law, and engineering

. • We support r egulation to mandate or incentivize the use of safer technologies and practices.

• Modernization should use prevention rather than control as a guiding principle

. This is not to say that current practices are not relevant , but they should be supplemental , with risk reduction being the focus.

• Prevention makes sense

. “What you don’t have, you can’t leak.”

• No one disputes that we should prevent instead of control, but the question is whether we can do it in a regulatory context.

• I SS ( i nherently safer systems ), when implemented properly, is a process for hazard assessment

. It includes prevention and engineering controls to identify viable safer alternatives first and then ascertain residual protective measures.

• Some of the benefits of ISS include: greater reliability of systems, reduced regulatory costs, improved cooperation within firms, and more preparation for the impacts of climate change associated with severe weather events.

• ISS originated from industry, yet industry does not w idely use it

. There are obstacles like information barriers and resource issues that prevent adoption.

• I am out of time , but I will come back with some additional information concerning how this approach could be implemented in a regulatory model. Ron Thomas, Technical Manager, Institute of Makers of Explosives ( IME ) , provided the following comments:

• I spoke yesterday (January 9, 2014

– Los Angeles evening EO Public Listening Session) about a mmonium n itrate

. Today, I will talk about transportation.

• Background vetting of individuals is one of the most common ways of safeguarding dangerous materials against terrorist threats

. We support the vetting of individuals.

• Despite notable similarities among various vetting programs, transportation workers often find themselves subject to duplicative vetting programs

. Redundancy among programs wastes resources without any added benefits

. IME has advocated that the F ederal G overnment EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 10 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Sessionconsolidate vetting programs to provide workers with one access credential

. This was one goal of the Transportation Worker Identity Credential ( TWIC ) program.
• Department of Defense now recognizes TWIC as a common access credential

. • The reciprocal approach taken under the Air Cargo Program has proven a good approach to avoid duplicativ e vetting

. Unfortunately, the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) is attempting to implement two standalone programs: the Personnel Surety Program and the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program.

• As of December 2012, ISCD has paid TSA $7.7 mi llion as a placeholder for its yet

- to

- be

- launched Personnel Surety Program

. However, no one has been vetted for that program

. • Millions of workers are currently subject to a vetting program of some kind. The F ederal Government has adopted a four

- part stan dard that has been adopted in various venues to ensure that individuals seeking access privileges to restricted areas and activities do not present a security threat

. The TWIC program was envisioned to be a single security vetting program for transportation workers , and it is the vetting program of choice for many categories of individuals where vetting is required. Timothy Malloy , UCLA Sustainable Technology and Policy Program , provided the following comments:

• I am a professor in the UCLA S ch ool of L aw.
• There is a fair amount of evidence concerning barriers to adopting things like inherently safer systems
. If we know that these barriers hinder voluntary adoption, then we should look to adopt mandates

. • There are a range of regulatory approache s that fit under existing authorities that would allow the G overnment to mandate inherently safer technologies and systems.

• Reflexive regulation requires facilities to consider a regulation but does not compel them to implement

. There are benefits a nd limi tations to that approach:
o Benefit s : Lower resource demand on the agency; limits impact on facility autonomy ; maximum flexibility for heterogeneous facilities
o Limitation s : Some firms have limited reflexive capacity

. Also, s ome firms are opposed to change fo r a variety of reasons, leading to an inconsistent or uneven implementation within the industry.

• Direct regulation is another approach:
o Benefit: Has a great uptake with firms doing what is required.
o Limitation: Limits firm autonomy and generally requires m ore agency resources to ensure compliance

. • There are bridging measures and hybrid formulations of various policies , an example being the safety c as e r egime. This hybrid allows us to moderate some of the limits of various approaches

. We will address the ran ge of these measures in our written policy brief.

• Whichever form of prevention

- based regulation is used will require the regulators’ meaningful commitment of resources . To apply insufficient resources will result in the regulations being nothing more than empty shells , where compliance is essentially voluntary

. EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 11 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Session• I will end with a proverb: “ It’s not wise to be penny wise, but pound foolish

. ” Having a meaningful regulatory program requires sufficient resources to implement it.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question : What obligation would you put on facility owners to look at lifecycle impact and risk shifting? W here would you draw the line and who would have an obligation to look at the risk shifting aspect of changes?
o Mr. Malloy responded : Prope rly done , inherently safer systems takes a lifecycle view

. It looks at the consequences of up and downstream risks

. Larger facilities with more resources would impose a greater requirement to account for consequences up and down stream

. Smaller firms would be required to participate with the regulatory agency , since they would not otherwise have the required resources

. Additionally, t here will be a need to increase the communication of information in the transportation sector to the end

- users of materials

. Implementing a regulatory system that takes into account the end

- to

- end system will have a benefit of improving communication among members within that system

. • Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: Do you plan to quantify the avoided costs versus r esponse costs in your paper?
o Mr. Malloy responded : It is unlikely we will perform specific calculations , but we will draw upon work that has already been done in this area

. Changing these programs will have an investment costs initially, but in some cases the benefits may provide improved efficiencies

. It is important for firms to consider the net costs involved.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question : You reference the need to increase capacity within the agencies

. What role might you see for third

- par ty organizations?
o Mr. Malloy responded : I do have some thoughts in this area

. There are pros and cons in this type of approach

. Essentially this approach could outsource the costs from the agency to the facility

. However, we need to consider the potential problems this may cause . Consider the Ernst & Young case a few years ago, with the problems that were seen in corporate disclosures

. You would need to be careful that the independence is maintained, especially whe n a financial relationship is involved for the third party. Connie Rutter, Citizens for Responsible & Equal Environmental Protection , provided the following comments:

• I would like to address the prior speaker’s comments about information that is available concerning facilities.

• It appears that those at the nearby LPG facility do not understand the hazards associated with butane and propane

. • The American Petroleum Institute (API) recommends an impound basin

. LPG can only be contained under pressure or low temperature
. Once it is released, it converts to vapor and expands more than 200 times in volume

. An impound basin is simply not effective. To be effective, the impound basin would need to be three

- quarters of a mile deep.

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 12 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Session• I refute the prior claim about re fineries being more dangerous than LPG

. You cannot extinguish LPG fires

. When fighting liquid fire, you can use foam, but with LPG, it will simply convert to vapor . The vapor is impossible to contain and will travel until it reaches an ignition source.

• We have been told that some facilities like this one cannot get insurance due to the extreme hazards involved

. • There was virtually no public review involved in the construction of this facility

. • We will provide you with a copy of a report that raises the se same objections

. The recommendations of that report have been ignored.

• We need to change the way we calculate the worst

- case scenario

. The rules were established in 1996 . W ithin a month of the rules becoming final, LPG facilities sued EPA and argued to use the same calculations as a toxic facility , which only look s at only the first 10 minutes of an incident

. When a flammable gas is involved, that is not a reasonable approach

. The issue here is that the Risk Management Plan that was filed, while technically compliant, does not represent the true hazard involved.

• The EPA has once issued a citation to this facility

. Janet Gun ter, San Pedro Homeowners United, provided the following comments :

• Mr. Conrow provided earlier comments about the refinery next to his facility and spoke about how it posed a greater threat than his facility

. • In the refinery report, they are required to report the single largest quantity of their most haza rdous substance

. They report ed butane storage with a 5M gallon container, with an ex plosion blast radius of 2 miles

. The C P G facility reports a blast facility of only half of a mile, even though they store more than twice the amount of butane

. Why hasn’t someone compared the difference in these reports?

• I would encourage you to speak with Professor B

. at University of California

– Berkley and discuss his opinions on this issue

. He understands these facilities and has reviewed the details involved

. • We would support the use of a third

- party consultant to review the hazards of the C P G facility ; that is a l l we have ever asked for.

• Mr. Vicory asked a clarifying question : Are you in contact with Professor B

. ? Do you know if he is going to turn in a brief?
o Ms. Gunter responded : Yes, I am in contact with him, but I don’t believe he will turn in a br ief

. We do not have a lot of money. We paid $10,000 for a risk analysis, but that does not buy very much

. I know that Professor B. has concerns with the Rancho facility

. I have heard that he has reviewed the information we have provided and he has gone to see the facility

. Most of this is common sense

. We really need some help

. This is as serious as Fukashima.
Marcie Miller, San Pedro Homeowners Coalition , provided the following comments:

• I would like to clarify the conflict of interest regarding the Ranch o LPG facility:
o The City of Los Angeles ’ tenth largest investment is the Rancho LPG facility

. EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 13 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Sessiono Gov ernor Brown’s review of Petrolane was greatly discredited after the FBI investigated $60,000 of illegal loans that the President of P e trolane’s Mexico Division gave to Gov ernor Brown

. Additionally, it was admitted that someone received $7M from P etrol a ne. o In the mid

- 1970s during the permitting process, the port of Los Angeles H arbor C ommissioner was dismissed when it was found that he was a major shareholder in P etrola ne. o In 2013, EPA cited Ranch o LPG for several violations; however, we still have not received a response . I am interested to know more about how long a facility can take before they respond to an EPA finding.
o How can the LPG facility be considered safe when it exists on an earthquake rupture zone ? It is already in violation of existing industry standards mandating distances between hazards and similar facilities

. o EPA conducted their own study , which found seve ral violations that included burros tunneling under the tanks. Additionally, we have found clogged basins.
o How can you regulate safety at a facility that cannot be made safe?
Ron Conrow , Western District Manager, Plaines LPG Services , provided comments:

• Th e impound basin in question is recognized by the NFPA

- 58 , EPA, and API as acceptable for containing releases

. • This facility has had no significant offsite releases in its 39 year s of operation.

• EPA hired a third

- party consultant to do an assessment in 200 1

. Professor Daniel Crowe agreed with the different release scenarios and f ound the impound basin to be sufficient.

• The facility does not exist in a fault zone

. The Conoco refinery is in the same area.

• I support what the community residents are doing

. I we lcome them to visit the facility

. • DHS was onsite last year

. We have an approved S ite S ecurity P lan.

• We support the concept of one central agency that would serve as a clearinghouse for all F ederal activities. Chuck Hart, President, San Pedro Homeowners United, provided the following comments:

• We need an independent regulatory agency that is not influenced by the industry

. • While the CPG facility meets regulations, it is the regulations themselves that are not sufficient

. They need to be updated in the i nterest of public safety and should include the worst

- case scenario.

• Facilities should be required to carry liability insurance that covers their true liabilities

. Currently, regulations allow facilities to insure actual risks

. Essentially, the y insure themselves, which leaves the public to pay the bill. [Lunch Break]

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 14 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day SessionThe listening session resumed with Enrique Manzanilla standing in for Mathy Stanislaus

. The moderator opened the session and called for speakers to come forward

. No speakers presen ted themselves

. The moderator then moved to closing remarks. Enrique Manzanilla provided closing remarks:

• Even though there is a deadline for comments, we encourage you to submit your comments as early as possible

. If possible, please submit your comments within the next 45 days

. That will assist us in preparing our final recommendations for the President.

• Your input is valued

. Anything you can do to translate your real

- world experiences into recommendations for our agencies is greatly appreciated.
Sean Lynum:

• We appreciate you coming out to speak with us.

• We will take back what you’ve said here today and share it with our leadership.

• I am in the region and am happy to work with you

. I am available today after the session if you have anything you would li ke to discuss.

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 15 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day SessionParticipant Analysis

Stakeholder Group 1/10 /2014 Los Angeles , CA

Chemical Producer 0 Ag Supply 1 Chemical Storage 2 State/Local Regulator 3 First Responder 2 Media 3 Owner/Operator 0 Industry Association 2 Labor Organization 1 Federal Representative 6 Environment/Community 15 Consensus Organization 1 Other: Unk 3 Citizen 1 Education 0

Security 0 Vendor 0 State/Local 0 Tribal 0 Health/Research 1 

## TOTAL (Attended In
- Person) 

## 41 Conference Call 32 

## Attended (In
Person & Conf Call) 73

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 16 January 10, 2014 Los Angeles, CA

– Day Session

# Executive Order 13650 Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security **January 10, 2014 Listening Session**  Hosted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Labor (DoL) Location: University of California Los Angeles, James West Alumni Center (JWAC), 325 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095 

## Agenda 8:00 a.m.

– 9:00 a.m. Registration 9:00 a.m.

– 9:25 a.m. Welcome, Introductions, and Overview Jack Eisenhauer , Facilitator Mathy Stanislaus, EPA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co

- Chair Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response Jay Vicory , Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Amy Graydon, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Joe Riehl, SAC/Wesley Beck , Department of Justice/ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Representative, Departmen t of Agriculture (USDA) Earl (Jack) Whitley and Sean Lynum , Department of Transportation (DOT)
9:25 a.m.

– 9:45 a.m

. Section 6 a Overview Lisa Long, Director, Office of Engineering Safety, OSHA
9:45 a.m.

– 10:00 a.m

. Listening Session Format Jack Eisenhauer, Facilitator
10:00 a.m.

– 1:50 p.m. Comments from Listening Session Participants 1:50 p.m.

– 2:00 p.m. Closing Remarks Mathy Stanislaus, EPA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co

- Chair Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
2:00 p.m. Adjournment Persons may also submit written comments to NPPD/ISCD/Mailstop 0610, Department of Homeland Security, 245 Murray Lane, SW, Arlington, VA 20598

- 0610

. Comments will also be accepted by email at: EO.Chemical@hq.dhs.gov or through the Federal eRulemaking Portal at http://www.regulations.gov

. For more information on EO 13650, please visit https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/index.html and https://www.dhs.gov /topic/chemical

- security

.