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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance S

302 Nebraska Report

GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

Robert E. Glasson, appellant,

Board of Equalization of 

City of Omaha and the Ci

of Omaha, appellees

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 12, 2019. Nos. S-18-472, S-18-474.

1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a jurisdictional 

question does not involve a factual dispute, its determination is a matter 

of law, which requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent of the decision made by the lower court.

2. Special Assessments: Municipal Corporations: Appeal and Error. 

An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitan-class city taken 

as specified in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-813 (Reissue 2012) means that 

proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from a 

county board, and under this section, that means an appeal is taken by a 

petition in error and the review is solely of the record made before the 

tribunal whose action is being reviewed.

3. Statutes: Special Assessments: Words and Phrases: Appeal and 

Error. As a general rule, the word “shall” in a statute is considered 

mandatory and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Therefore, 

based on a plain reading of the statute, unless, as contemplated by Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 14-101 (Reissue 2012), the Legislature or a city of the 

metropolitan class alters the procedure for a claimant or appellant to 

challenge a decision regarding an assessment, the procedure shall follow 

that which is specified in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-813 (Reissue 2012).

4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. When a provision of a statute is plain and 

unambiguous on its face, an appellate court must apply the provision 

as written.

Appeals from the District Court for Douglas County: W. 

Russell Bowie III, Judge. Aff

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

06/14/2019 01:06 AM CDT
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302 Nebraska Report

GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

Jason E. Troia, of Dornan, Troia, Howard, Breitkreutz & 

Conway, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.

Ryan J. Wiesen, Assistant Omaha City Attorney, for 

appellees.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stac

Papik, and Freudenberg,

Heavican, C

INTRODUCTION

This case involves a consolidated appeal in which Robert 

E. Glasson challenges the decision of the Douglas County 

District Court. The district court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the assessment decision made by the Board of 

Equalization of the City of Omaha exercising a quasi-judicial 

function pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-547 (Reissue 2012). 

The district court found that as a result of Glasson’s failure 

to file an appeal bond with the city clerk within 20 days as 

required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-813 (Reissue 2012), the court 

lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On December 5, 2017, the city council for the City of 

Omaha sat as a board of equalization pursuant to § 14-547 

to hear and determine complaints, to equalize assessments, 

and to correct special assessments as the law authorizes. The 

city council, while sitting as a board of equalization zoning 

board of appeals, approved special ordinance No. 10224. The 

special ordinance approved funding for the removal of litter 

from various parcels of real property located within the City 

of Omaha, Nebraska, including one parcel owned by Glasson 

involving two separate assessments: (1) “Item L-20 (Dump 

Fee)—Case No. CI 18-51 and CI 18-1316” (No. 428773) and 

(2) “Item L-21 (Litter-Structure)—Case No. CI 18-52 and 

CI 18-1318” (No. 392788).

Glasson personally appeared before the board of equalization on December 5, 2017, to protest the proposed special 
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302 Nebraska Report

GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

assessment to be levied on his property. The board denied 

Glasson’s protest. Following the board’s denial, Glasson filed 

an appeal on January 3, 2018, regarding proposed assessments 

Nos. 428773 and 392788, under cases Nos. CI 18-51 and 

CI 18-52, before the city council had enacted the ordinance 

regarding the assessment.

On January 23, 2018, the city council for the City of Omaha, 

pursuant to its authority under § 14-547, levied the special 

assessment, by ordinance, on Glasson’s property.

In addition to the public hearing held December 5, 2017, at 

which Glasson was present, the Douglas County treasurer sent 

Glasson a letter dated February 6, 2018. The letter was entitled 

“Special Assessment Levy Notification” and informed Glasson 

that he had until March 15 to remit payment of $978.

Upon receipt of the Douglas County treasurer’s “Special 

Assessment Levy Notification” letter, Glasson attempted to 

file an appeal at the Omaha city clerk’s office on February 

13, 2018, 21 days after the ordinance levying the property 

had passed. Glasson’s filing was denied by the city clerk as 

untimely. On February 20, Glasson filed a petition in error 

and notice of appeal with the district court under cases Nos. 

CI 18-1316 and CI 18-1318.

In reviewing Glasson’s appeal, the district court found that 

there was one assessment of $978 for a dump fee (No. 428773) 

and one assessment of $1,305 for litter removal (No. 392788), 

but that Glasson had filed four separate appeals regarding 

the two assessments. The court noted that assessments Nos. 

428773 and 392788 were each assessed on January 23, 2018. 

Upon motion by the City of Omaha, the district court consolidated the four cases (cases Nos. CI 18-51, CI 18-52, 

CI 18-1316, and CI 18-1318) into one appeal. However, it does 

not appear that the court designated a specific docket number 

under which the cases were to continue.

The district court noted that with regard to Glasson’s 

January 3, 2018, appeals, docketed as cases Nos. CI 18-51 

and CI 18-52, those appeals were filed before the ordinance 
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GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

assessing the levy was enacted. Because the ordinance had not 

been passed at the time of the January 3 filing, there was no 

final, appealable order upon which the court could exercise 

jurisdiction. The court then dismissed that portion of the consolidated action.

The court went on to note that with regard to Glasson’s 

February 20, 2018, appeal for cases Nos. CI 18-1316 and 

CI 18-1318, no appeal bond had been filed with the city clerk 

within 20 days, as required by § 14-813. The court further 

noted that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-548 (Reissue 2012) gives a 

property owner, aggrieved by an assessment ordinance, the 

right to appeal the decision to the district court, and indicated 

that § 14-547 equates an ordinance to a final order. However, 

the district court stated that in order to pursue that remedy, the 

aggrieved party must file an appeal bond with the city clerk 

within 20 days of the date of the contested order. Because 

Glasson had failed to comply with § 14-813 by not filing an 

appeal bond with the city clerk within 20 days, the district 

court dismissed that portion of the action, ultimately dismissing Glasson’s now consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Glasson appealed the consolidated cases to the Nebraska Court 

of Appeals under two separate cases, which we moved to our 

docket on our own motion,1 and have consolidated.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Glasson’s sole assignment of error is that the district court 

erred in granting the City’s motion to dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] When a jurisdictional question does not involve a 

factual dispute, its determination is a matter of law, which 

requires an appellate court to reach a conclusion independent 

of the decision made by the lower court.2

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2018).

2 Pestal v. Malone, 275 Neb. 891, 750 N.W.2d 350 (2008).
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GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

[2] An appeal from a special assessment by a metropolitanclass city taken as specified in § 14-813 means that proceedings from a district court shall be the same as an appeal from 

a county board, and under this section, that means an appeal 

is taken by a petition in error and the review is solely of 

the record made before the tribunal whose action is being 

reviewed.3

ANALYSIS

The thrust of Glasson’s argument is threefold. First, Glasson 

argues that § 14-813 does not require an appeal bond to be 

filed within 20 days of a final order. Next, Glasson contends 

that no bond is required on the basis that an indigent party 

need not file a bond. Lastly, Glasson argues that he was not 

given notice of the final judgment until day 14 of the 20 days 

in which he had the opportunity to file a bond.

Requirements for Filing 

Under § 14-813.

Glasson contends that § 14-813 contains permissive language that removes the requirement of filing within 20 days. 

The language of § 14-813 provides in relevant part:

Whenever the right of appeal is conferred by this act, 

the procedure, unless otherwise provided, shall be substantially as follows: The claimant or appellant shall, 

within twenty days after the date of the order complained 

of, execute a bond to such city with sufficient surety to 

be approved by the clerk, conditioned for the faithful 

prosecution of such appeal, and the payment of all costs 

adjudged against the appellant. Such bond shall be filed 

in the office of the city clerk.

Glasson directs our attention to the opening proviso of § 14-813, 

which states that “[w]henever the right of appeal is conferred 

by this act, the procedure, unless otherwise provided, shall be 

3 See Jackson v. Board of Equal. of City of Omaha, 10 Neb. App. 330, 630 

N.W.2d 680 (2001).
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GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

substantially as follows . . . .” Glasson argues that if language 

providing otherwise is absent, then the procedure identified 

in § 14-813 need only be substantially followed. Accordingly, 

Glasson proposes that under the Omaha Municipal Code,4 there 

is no requirement that a filing be made with the city clerk 

within 20 days.

Glasson contends that the Omaha City Council altered the 

filing procedure set forth in § 14-813 when it enacted Omaha 

Mun. Code § 26-121. Glasson argues that the city council 

altered the process by omitting the 20-day filing requirement 

set forth in § 14-813. Section 26-121 of the Omaha Municipal 

Code provides in part:

Any person who has filed a written complaint before 

the board of equalization shall have the right to appeal to 

the district court of the county within which such city is 

located, by filing a good and sufficient bond in the sum of 

not less than $50.00 and not more than double the amount 

of the assessment complained of, conditioned for the 

faithful prosecution of such appeal, and, if the judgment 

of special assessment is sustained, to pay the amount 

of such judgment, interest and cost. Such bond shall be 

approved and appeal taken as specified in R.R.S. 1943, 

§ 14-813, as amended.

Glasson fails to account for the fact that the language of the 

municipal code specifically states that “[s]uch bond shall be 

approved and appeal taken as specified in . . . § 14-813 . . . .”5

This language requires that appellants adhere to the procedure 

outlined in § 14-813.

[3] Under our jurisprudence, as a general rule, the word 

“shall” in a statute is considered mandatory and is inconsistent 

with the idea of discretion.6 Therefore, based on a plain reading of the statute, unless, as contemplated by Neb. Rev. Stat. 

4 Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 26, art. II, § 26-121 (1980).

5 Id.

6 State v. Irish, 298 Neb. 61, 65, 902 N.W.2d 669, 672 (2017).
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GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

§ 14-101 (Cum. Supp. 2018) the Legislature or a city of the 

metropolitan class alters the procedure for a claimant or appellant to challenge a decision regarding an assessment, the procedure shall follow that which is specified in § 14-813.

Under the plain language of § 14-813, an appellant has 20 

days from the date of the final order to “execute a bond to 

such city with sufficient surety to be approved by the clerk.” 

According to § 14-547, the passage of “[t]he ordinance levying a special assessment shall be final and binding as the final 

order or judgment of a court of general jurisdiction.” Therefore, 

the date of the final order in this case was January 23, 2018, 

the date the city council approved the ordinance.

Here, Glasson attempted to execute a bond with the city 

clerk on February 13, 2018, 21 days after the ordinance operating as a final order had passed. This court addressed a similar 

fact pattern in Black v. State,

7

 in which we stated, “‘[T]he 

filing of an approved bond is a jurisdictional requirement. Its 

filing is a condition precedent to the initiation of the appellate process.’”

In Black, the appellant, William Black, appealed an order 

of the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles regarding 

an implied consent proceeding which resulted in revocation 

of his driver’s license for 1 year. According to the statute in 

Black, the applicant, licensee, or appellant was required to 

execute a bond within 20 days from the date of the final order 

complained of, with costs to the State of Nebraska in the sum 

of $200 with sufficient surety to be approved by the auditor of 

public accounts.

Black’s attorney sent a check, drawn on the trust account 

of the attorney’s firm, to the director of the department. The 

department then notified Black’s attorney that it could not 

accept a cash bond and that a surety bond had to be filed within 

20 days after the license revocation date. Black then executed 

a surety bond to the department; however, we noted that the 

7 Black v. State, 218 Neb. 572, 575, 358 N.W.2d 181, 183 (1984).
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GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

bond was not received until 21 days after the revocation. As 

a result of Black’s failure to file within the prescribed manner 

and time limits, we found that the district court properly dismissed his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

[4] When a provision of a statute is plain and unambiguous 

on its face, this court must apply the provision as written.8

Here, § 14-813, even when read together with Omaha Mun. 

Code § 26-121, is plain and unambiguous on its face. Glasson 

was required to execute a bond to the City of Omaha, with 

sufficient surety to be approved by the clerk, within 20 days 

after the date of the order complained of. Glasson, like Black, 

failed to file within the allotted time.

Indigent Status and Filing 

Requirements.

Glasson next argues, for the first time on appeal, that no 

bond is required on the basis that an indigent party need not 

file a bond. The record does not demonstrate that Glasson even 

attempted to follow the procedure for the waiver of the bond 

based on indigent status, nor does Glasson argue here that 

he qualifies for such status. Therefore, we need not address 

this argument.

Notice.

Glasson also argues that the City of Omaha did not provide 

him with adequate notice of its ultimate decision concerning the assessments. Glasson contends that the city council 

passed the ordinance for the special assessments on January 

23, 2018, at which point it became a final, appealable order, 

but that he was not given notice of the decision until on or 

about February 8, when he received notice from the Douglas 

County treasurer dated February 6, 2018. Glasson asserts 

that the government’s failure to provide notice of the decision deprived him of the 20-day period in which to file, but 

8 See State v. Havorka, 218 Neb. 367, 355 N.W.2d 343 (1984).
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GLASSON v. BOARD OF EQUAL. OF CITY OF OMAHA

Cite as 302 Neb. 869

specified in his briefs the basis of his arguments regarding 

notice. During oral argument of this case, Glasson raised for 

the first time his contention that his statutory right to notice 

by mail, as provided in the Omaha Municipal Code,9 was violated in this case.

The record refutes Glasson’s claim that he lacked notice of 

the City of Omaha’s intended action. As the district court noted 

in its order dismissing Glasson’s consolidated appeal, Glasson 

filed his first appeal on January 3, 2018, following the board of 

equalization’s December 5, 2017, decision denying his protest 

to the proposed assessments. Moreover, Glasson was present at 

the December meeting and was given an opportunity to protest 

the special assessments. Additionally, there is no indication 

in the briefs or in the record that public notice of the Omaha 

City Council’s January 23 meeting was not given according to 

statute.10 The record demonstrates that Glasson was provided 

notice of the assessments by the Douglas County treasurer’s 

office prior to the expiration of the 20 days.

As for Glasson’s contention that he did not receive notice 

by mail, we observe that this issue was not raised below. As 

such, the issue is not appropriately before this court and we 

need not address it further.

Glasson’s assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The statutory scheme requires that an appellant execute 

a bond with the city clerk within 20 days of the final order, 

which Glasson did not do. The decision of the district court 

dismissing Glasson’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.

Affirmed

9 See Omaha Mun. Code, ch. 26, art. II, § 26-123 (1980).

10 See § 14-547.