Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Proposed Rules 3191 

(Subsidence Control), 4.25 (Operations 

on Prime Farmland), 5.03 

(Enforcement), and 5.06 (Alternative 

Enforcement). Additionally, Colorado 

proposes revisions to and additions of 

definitions supporting these proposed 

rule changes. 

As a result of comments received for 

the Federal Register Proposed Rule 

notice published December 6, 2011, 

which announced receipt of the 

amendment and solicited comments (76 

FR 76109), we identified concerns with 

regard to Colorado’s Statement of Basis, 

Purpose, and Specific Statutory 

Authority (SBPSA) document that is 

incorporated with 2 CCR 407–2 by 

reference. We notified Colorado of our 

concerns by letter dated September 19, 

2011 (Administrative Record No. OSM– 

2011–0002–0008). Colorado responded 

in a letter dated September 22, 2011, by 

submitting a revised amendment 

proposal (Administrative Record No. 

OSM–2011–0002–0009). During our 

review of that revised amendment, 

OSMRE found additional deficiencies 

and notified Colorado of these 

deficiencies in a concern letter dated 

May 20, 2013 (Administrative Record 

No. OSM–2011–0002–0012). In 

response to our concerns, Colorado 

resubmitted the amendment formally on 

October 1, 2014 (Administrative Record 

Numbers OSM–2011–0002–0013 (Cover 

Letter), OSM–2011–0002–0014 

(Proposed Revisions), and OSM–2011– 

0002–0015 (SOBAP)). Colorado 

proposes additional language to clarify 

proposed Rules that were initially 

deemed unapprovable by OSMRE. 

III. Public Comment Procedures 

Under the provisions of 30 CFR 

732.17(h), we are seeking your 

comments on whether the amendment 

satisfies the applicable program 

approval criteria of 30 CFR 732.15. If we 

approve the amendment, it will become 

part of the Colorado program. 

Electronic or Written Comments 

If you submit written comments, they 

should be specific, confined to issues 

pertinent to the proposed regulations, 

and explain the reason for any 

recommended change(s). We appreciate 

any and all comments, but those most 

useful and likely to influence decisions 

on the final regulations will be those 

that either involve personal experience 

or include citations to and analyses of 

SMCRA, its legislative history, its 

implementing regulations, case law, 

other pertinent State or Federal laws or 

regulations, technical literature, or other 

relevant publications. 

We cannot ensure that comments 

received after the close of the comment 

period (see DATES) or sent to an address 

other than those listed above (see 

ADDRESSES) will be included in the 

docket for this rulemaking and 

considered. 

Public Availability of Comments 

Before including your address, phone 

number, email address, or other 

personal identifying information in your 

comment, you should be aware that 

your entire comment—including your 

personal identifying information—may 

be made publicly available at any time. 

While you can ask us in your comment 

to withhold your personal identifying 

information from public review, we 

cannot guarantee that we will be able to 

do so. 

Public Hearing 

If you wish to speak at the public 

hearing, contact the person listed under 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT by 

4:00 p.m., m.s.t. on February 6, 2015. If 

you are disabled and need reasonable 

accommodations to attend a public 

hearing, contact the person listed under 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. We 

will arrange the location and time of the 

hearing with those persons requesting 

the hearing. If no one requests an 

opportunity to speak, we will not hold 

the hearing. 

To assist the transcriber and ensure an 

accurate record, we request, if possible, 

that each person who speaks at a public 

hearing provide us with a written copy 

of his or her comments. The public 

hearing will continue on the specified 

date until everyone scheduled to speak 

has been given an opportunity to be 

heard. If you are in the audience and 

have not been scheduled to speak and 

wish to do so, you will be allowed to 

speak after those who have been 

scheduled. We will end the hearing after 

everyone scheduled to speak and others 

present in the audience who wish to 

speak, have been heard. 

Public Meeting 

If only one person requests an 

opportunity to speak, we may hold a 

public meeting rather than a public 

hearing. If you wish to meet with us to 

discuss the amendment, please request 

a meeting by contacting the person 

listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT. All such meetings are open to 

the public; if possible, we will post 

notices of meetings at the locations 

listed under ADDRESSES. We will make 

a written summary of each meeting a 

part of the administrative record. 

IV. Procedural Determinations 

Executive Order 12866—Regulatory 

Planning and Review 

This rule is exempted from review by 

the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) under Executive Order 12866 

(Regulatory Planning and Review). 

Other Laws and Executive Orders 

Affecting Rulemaking 

When a State submits a program 

amendment to OSMRE for review, our 

regulations at 30 CFR 732.17(h) require 

us to publish a notice in the Federal 

Register indicating receipt of the 

proposed amendment, its text or a 

summary of its terms, and an 

opportunity for public comment. We 

conclude our review of the proposed 

amendment after the close of the public 

comment period and determine whether 

the amendment should be approved, 

approved in part, or not approved. At 

that time, we will also make the 

determinations and certifications 

required by the various laws and 

executive orders governing the 

rulemaking process and include them in 

the final rule. 

List of Subjects in 30 CFR Part 906 

Intergovernmental relations, Surface 

mining, Underground mining. 

Dated: November 4, 2014. 

Ervin J. Barchenger, 

Acting Regional Director, Western Region. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00932 Filed 1–21–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4310–05–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 12 

[PS Docket No. 14–193; PS Docket No. 13– 

75; FCC 14–186] 

911 Governance and Accountability; 

Improving 911 Reliability 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: In this document the Federal 

Communications Commission 

(Commission) affirms core principles 

guiding its approach to 911 governance 

and proposes mechanisms to ensure, in 

cooperation with state and local 

partners, that the nation’s 911 

governance structure keeps pace with 

evolving technology so that all entities 

providing 911 service capabilities 

remain accountable for reliable 911 call 

completion and accurate situational 

awareness. This document proposes 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
3192 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

steps to address vulnerabilities in 911 

reliability that have been revealed by a 

series of recent ‘‘sunny day’’ 911 

outages, including the April 2014 multistate outage that was the subject of a 

recent report by the Public Safety and 

Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau). 

Specifically, this document proposes to 

amend the Commission’s 911 reliability 

certification rules to cover additional 

entities and network reliability 

practices; require public notification for 

major changes in multi-state 911 

networks and services, and Commission 

approval for discontinuance of existing 

911 services; require entities seeking to 

provide new 911 capabilities to certify 

as to their technical and operational 

capability to provide reliable service; 

and designate certain 911 service 

providers to take lead responsibility for 

situational awareness and coordination 

with other service providers in the event 

of a 911 outage. 

DATES: Submit comments on or before 

March 9, 2015 and reply comments by 

April 7, 2015. Written comments on the 

Paperwork Reduction Act proposed 

information collection requirements 

must be submitted by the public, Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB), and 

other interested parties on or before 

March 23, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by docket numbers PS 14–193 

and PS 13–75, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal Communications 

Commission’s Web site: http://

fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Mail: U.S. Postal Service first-class, 

Express, and Priority mail must be 

addressed to 445 12th Street SW., 

Washington, DC 20554. Commercial 

overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal 

Service Express Mail and Priority Mail) 

must be sent to 9300 East Hampton 

Drive, Capitol Heights, MD 20743. 

• People with Disabilities: Contact the 

FCC to request reasonable 

accommodations (accessible format 

documents, sign language interpreters, 

CART, etc.) by email: FCC504@fcc.gov 

or phone: 202–418–0530 or TTY: 202– 

418–0432. 

In addition to filing comments with 

the Secretary, a copy of any comments 

on the Paperwork Reduction Act 

information collection requirements 

contained herein should be submitted to 

the Federal Communications 

Commission via email to PRA@fcc.gov 

and to Nicholas A. Fraser, Office of 

Management and Budget, via email to 

Nicholas_A._Fraser@omb.eop.gov or via 

fax at 202–395–5167. Parties wishing to 

file materials with a claim of 

confidentiality should follow the 

procedures set forth in section 0.459 of 

the Commission’s rules. Confidential 

submissions may not be filed via ECFS 

but rather should be filed with the 

Secretary’s Office following the 

procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459. 

Redacted versions of confidential 

submissions may be filed via ECFS. For 

detailed instructions for submitting 

comments and additional information 

on the rulemaking process, see the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric 

P. Schmidt, Attorney Advisor, Public 

Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, 

(202) 418–1214 or eric.schmidt@fcc.gov. 

For additional information concerning 

the Paperwork Reduction Act 

information collection requirements 

contained in this document, contact 

Benish Shah at (202) 418–7866 or send 

an email to PRA@fcc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Commission’s Policy 

Statement and Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (NPRM) in PS Docket No. 

14–193 and PS Docket No. 13–75, 

released on November 21, 2014. The full 

text of this document is available for 

public inspection during regular 

business hours in the FCC Reference 

Center, Room CY–A257, 445 12th Street 

SW., Washington, DC 20554, or online 

at http://www.fcc.gov/document/911- 

governance-and-accountability-policystatement-and-nprm. 

Synopsis of Policy Statement and 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

I. Introduction 

One of the fundamental purposes for 

which Congress created the Federal 

Communications Commission is to 

‘‘promot[e] safety of life and property 

through the use of wire and radio 

communications.’’ Nowhere does the 

Commission give higher expression to 

this overarching obligation than in its 

efforts to ensure that the American 

people have access to reliable and 

resilient 911 communications service. 

To be sure, this is not the Commission’s 

responsibility alone. State regulators 

and local emergency response agencies 

play critical roles in ensuring that 911 

is available when needed and that every 

911 call will be answered, and it is 

undoubtedly in the public interest that 

the Commission should work in close 

partnership with these stakeholders to 

carry out its responsibility. 

Nevertheless, we know that the 

technologies and commercial 

relationships that form the foundation 

of the 911 system are transitioning and, 

as a result, becoming increasingly 

interstate in nature. The Commission is 

uniquely positioned to ensure 911 

reliability on a national scale and across 

different communications platforms and 

technologies, to promote the 

deployment of new and innovative 911 

technologies by an increasingly diverse 

array of stakeholders, and to ensure that 

the benefits of advanced 911 service 

extend to all Americans. 

The importance of ensuring 

nationwide 911 reliability as 

technologies transition has been 

underscored by several recent 

disruptions of 911 service that have 

affected the public in multiple states or 

across the entire nation. For example, in 

April 2014, a software coding error at a 

Colorado-based 911 provider’s call 

routing facility led to a loss of 911 

service to a population of more than 11 

million in seven states—California, 

Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, 

Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and 

Washington—for up to six hours. In 

addition, the state of Hawaii has 

experienced multiple disruptions in 911 

service since January 2014, and the 

entire state of Vermont lost 911 service 

for 40 minutes in August 2014. A 

growing number of disruptions to 911 

service are caused by software 

malfunctions, database failures, and 

errors in conversion from legacy to IPbased network protocols. These failures 

may occur in portions of the network 

that are not directly analogous to the 

legacy architecture. Moreover, these 

new modes of failure have the potential 

to affect many states at once, or even all 

of a service provider’s customers 

nationwide. 

While innovative technologies have 

the potential to improve many aspects 

of 911 service and enhance the ability 

of first responders to do their jobs more 

effectively, these recent outages have 

revealed that technology changes may 

also introduce new vulnerabilities. 

While the Commission has previously 

undertaken to monitor the transition to 

Next Generation 911 (NG911) 

technologies to determine whether our 

rules should be revised or expanded to 

cover new best practices or additional 

entities, recent events have 

demonstrated that the pace of change 

already requires prompt action to 

review these vulnerabilities. Failure to 

take appropriate action risks 

undermining the reliability and 

resiliency of current 911 services and 

endangering the transition to NG911 

technologies that offer even greater 

public safety benefits. The American 

public must have confidence that 911 

will work every time help is needed. 

Any failure to meet this expectation 

puts individual lives at stake and erodes 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Proposed Rules 3193 

vital public trust in our nation’s 

emergency services. 

In this Policy Statement and Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking, we affirm the 

core principles that have guided and 

will continue to guide the Commission’s 

approach to ensuring reliable and 

resilient 911 service and its continuing 

partnership with state and local 

authorities. We propose specific rules 

designed to address failures leading to 

recent multi-state 911 outages, based on 

the October 2014 report of the Public 

Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. 

Finally, we propose additional 

mechanisms designed to ensure that our 

911 governance structure keeps pace 

with evolving technologies and new 

reliability challenges so that all 911 

service providers remain fully 

accountable to the public they serve. 

II. Policy Statement 

It is the policy of the Commission to 

encourage and support efforts by states 

and localities to deploy comprehensive 

end-to-end emergency communications 

infrastructure and programs, including 

seamless, ubiquitous, reliable 911 

service. As IP-based 911 service 

providers transition to architectures that 

extend beyond the boundaries of any 

state and implement network changes 

that may affect quality of service on a 

regional or national scale, consistent 

and collaborative governance is not just 

good governance, but essential to 

maintaining the vital public benefits of 

911. Together with our state and local 

partners, the Commission has the public 

safety imperative to oversee each of the 

increasingly complex component pieces 

of the nation’s 911 infrastructure, and to 

ensure that service providers within our 

respective jurisdictions are held fully 

accountable for providing reliable 911 

service to all Americans. Where there 

are multi-state aspects of the 911 

architecture or technology trends that 

may increase the risk of failure or cause 

confusion to PSAPs and end-users, the 

Commission must, and will, take a 

leadership role in resolving such risks 

and confusion. 

While we seek comment on specific 

proposals designed to address the 

challenges of the transition to NG911, 

we believe it would be useful at the 

outset to articulate the general goals that 

serve as a framework for these 

proposals. We start from the proposition 

that all entities providing 911 

communications services, both 

incumbents and new entrants, occupy a 

unique position of public trust. 

Increased innovation and enhanced 

competition in the 911 ecosystem bring 

tremendous potential to enhance the 

functionality and utility of 911, but 

these transitions must be managed in a 

manner that maximizes the availability, 

reliability, and resiliency of the 911 

network, and ensures the accountability 

of all participants in the 911 

communications ecosystem. Therefore, 

we believe that every entity with a role 

in 911 call completion should be guided 

by two principles: First, any new 

elements of 911 architecture or service 

should have the necessary redundancy 

and reliability safeguards, along with 

the appropriate governance 

mechanisms, to maximize reliability 

and protect public safety. Second, 

significant changes in 911 service 

should be coordinated in a transparent 

manner with the Commission and with 

state and local authorities. To the extent 

that technology transitions and changes 

in the market for 911 services create real 

or perceived gaps in the delivery of 

reliable and resilient 911 service, the 

Commission will act, in cooperation 

with state and local partners, to close 

those gaps and set clear expectations 

regarding each service. 

III. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

In this Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking, we first seek comment on 

specific proposals to advance the 

principles described above by ensuring 

that the Commission’s 911 rules keep 

pace with changing technology. We then 

seek comment on whether it may be 

appropriate to take further steps, in 

coordination with state and local 

authorities, to promote a national 

governance structure that proactively 

increases end-to-end accountability and 

produces measurable results. By 

initiating this rulemaking, we do not 

intend to impose ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ 

mandates on the nation’s 911 

infrastructure when different states and 

communities need flexibility to respond 

to each situation in the way that best 

suits their particular circumstances. 

Rather, we seek to ensure that the 

Commission remains equipped, 

consistent with its statutory mandates 

and existing legal authority, with the 

proper regulatory tools to enforce 

continued and clear lines of 

accountability for reliable 911 call 

completion, including as the nation 

transitions to an IP-based NG911 

architecture. 

We also emphasize that the purpose 

of this rulemaking is not to supplant 

state action. To the contrary, consistent 

with our statutory mandate under the 

911 Act, our goal is to ‘‘encourage and 

support efforts by States to deploy 

comprehensive end-to-end emergency 

communications infrastructure,’’ and to 

‘‘consult and cooperate with State and 

local officials’’ when developing 

national policies with respect to 911 

governance, implementation, and 

reliability. We recognize that many 

decisions regarding 911 deployment, 

operations, and cost recovery are best 

made at the state and local level, and 

continued oversight by states and 

localities is vital to ensuring that 911 

service remains effective and reliable in 

every community across the country. 

Our action today is intended to ensure 

that state and local partners continue to 

be empowered to fulfill this important 

oversight responsibility within their 

jurisdictions, and we seek comment on 

a variety of ways that the Commission 

can assist in local, state, and regional 

efforts to maintain and improve 911 

service quality. Thus, we do not intend 

to interfere with the right of state and 

local 911 authorities to contract for the 

services they desire or to determine the 

best path for deployment of NG911 

technologies within their jurisdictions. 

We also note that, in appropriate 

circumstances, federal rules may ease 

burdens on state and local jurisdictions 

by obviating the need for them to 

promulgate their own potentially 

disparate requirements. 

A. Revisions to 47 CFR 12.4 

The Commission adopted § 12.4 based 

on indications that during the 2012 

derecho storm ILECs providing 911 

service in affected areas failed to follow 

established network reliability best 

practices in three specific areas, which 

resulted in widespread and prolonged 

911 outages. To address these 

deficiencies and ensure improved 

reliability in the future, the rule 

contains two components: (1) A 

substantive requirement that ‘‘covered 

911 service providers shall take 

reasonable measures to provide reliable 

911 service with respect to circuit 

diversity, central-office backup power, 

and diverse network monitoring’’ and 

(2) a reporting requirement that such 

providers certify annually whether they 

have implemented specified best 

practices or reasonable alternative 

measures in each of those substantive 

areas. The rule defines ‘‘covered 911 

service providers’’ as those that provide 

specified 911 capabilities, or the 

functional equivalent, ‘‘directly to a 

PSAP’’—typically meaning those 

entities that provide 911 services 

pursuant to a contractual agreement 

with a PSAP or emergency authority. 

In light of the multistate 911 outages 

discussed above and the lessons they 

provide about 911 network architectures 

already in use in many parts of the 

nation, we propose to expand the scope 

of entities covered by § 12.4 (i.e., the 

definition of ‘‘covered 911 service 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
3194 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

provider’’) to include all entities that 

provide 911, E911, or NG911 

capabilities, such as call routing, 

automatic location information (ALI), 

automatic number identification (ANI), 

location information servers (LIS), textto-911, or the functional equivalent of 

those capabilities, regardless of whether 

they provide such capabilities under a 

direct contractual relationship with a 

PSAP or emergency authority. This 

definition would include all entities 

that provide 911-specific network 

infrastructure, but only to the extent 

that they provide specified 911 

capabilities. For example, a wireless 

carrier would be required to certify with 

respect to any mobile positioning 

centers (MPCs), gateway mobile location 

centers (GMLCs) or other databases that 

it uses to process and route 911 calls, 

but not with respect to individual cell 

sites and its call origination network 

generally. If a wireless carrier 

outsources 911 call processing 

capabilities to a subcontractor, we 

propose that both the carrier and the 

subcontractor would be required to 

certify their respective reasonable 

measures to maintain reliable 911 

service because both entities would 

provide 911 capabilities specified in the 

proposed rule. We seek comment on 

this analysis. This amendment would 

address 911 network architectures 

where multiple service providers or subcontractors provide call routing and 

ALI/ANI capabilities and ensure that 

each link in that chain is treated equally 

under § 12.4. We propose that adding 

these entities would not change the 

duties of those who already qualify as 

covered 911 service providers, except 

with respect to the new certification 

elements proposed below, or the duties 

of their agents under existing principles 

of legal liability. However, we seek 

comment on the existing duties of the 

agents and sub-contractors of covered 

911 service providers, and on the 

feasibility of extending certification 

requirements to such entities. 

To ensure that § 12.4 keeps pace with 

evolving network architectures and 

reliability risks, we also propose to 

amend § 12.4(b) to provide that ‘‘all 

covered 911 service providers shall take 

reasonable measures to provide reliable 

911 service.’’ This obligation would 

include—but not be limited to—the 

existing areas of circuit diversity, 

central-office backup power, and 

diverse network monitoring. While the 

current § 12.4 only addresses reliability 

with respect to these three specific 

areas, we believe it would demonstrate 

better governance for this rule to require 

covered entities to take reasonable 

measures generally to ensure the 

reliability of 911 service, with specific 

behavior identified within this rule as 

necessary to add more detail. 

We seek comment on additional 

network reliability practices that should 

be incorporated into § 12.4 and its 

associated certification requirements. 

Based on the Bureau’s findings with 

respect to the April 2014 multistate 911 

outage and other large-scale disruptions 

in 911 service described above, we 

anticipate that one area of particular 

importance will be the reliability and 

testing of software and databases used to 

process 911 calls, including planned 

maintenance and software upgrades. We 

also believe that the certification should 

indicate whether a service provider’s IPbased 911 architecture is geographically 

distributed, load-balanced, and capable 

of automatic reroutes to backup 

equipment in the event of a hardware, 

network, software or database failure. 

Finally, we believe the network 

monitoring component of the existing 

rule should cover not just the physical 

diversity of monitoring facilities, but 

also the proper prioritization of critical 

network alarms. What other measures 

should be implemented by covered 911 

service providers to mitigate the risk of 

failure and geographic scope of impacts 

on 911 service? For example, should the 

certification address factors such as 

cybersecurity and supply chain risk 

management? 

We also believe that § 12.4 should 

reflect and require certification with 

respect to the duty to take reasonable 

measures to share information and 

situational awareness, as appropriate 

under the circumstances, during 

disruptions in 911 service. We seek 

comment on the scope of information 

and communications that should be 

reasonably expected from various 

entities in the 911 ecosystem, including 

those with direct contractual 

relationships with PSAPs and those that 

provide service on a vendor or subcontractor basis. At a minimum, we 

believe the certification should indicate 

whether a covered 911 service provider 

has a process in place to notify PSAPs 

of an outage within the timeframes 

specified in part 4 of the Commission’s 

rules. While this proposal would not 

change such providers’ substantive 

obligations under part 4, it would 

provide assurance that they have taken 

proactive steps to successfully perform 

their duties under the rules if the need 

arises. Service providers may also be 

able to detect outages in real time 

through call counts, ALI queries, and 

other methods of analyzing network 

traffic. To what extent should the 

certification reflect reasonable measures 

to detect and disseminate such real-time 

outage information? 

We seek comment on these proposals 

and on potential alternative approaches. 

Are there other topics or practices 

should be incorporated into ‘‘reasonable 

measures’’ and annual certification 

requirements? Should any components 

of the certification require testing or 

analysis by an independent third party, 

or is the certifying entity’s own 

attestation sufficient? Should the 

Commission establish standards, best 

practices, or other mechanisms to 

promote the reliability of IP-based 911 

network elements and processes not 

currently covered by § 12.4? Should 

such standards be voluntary (i.e., best 

practices) or mandatory? Should 

providers be required to report or certify 

the extent of their compliance with such 

standards, or should they be required to 

meet certain standards or performance 

requirements? Are there instances in an 

NG911 environment where consensusbased best practices have not yet been 

established and should be referred to an 

advisory committee such as the 

Commission’s Communications 

Security, Reliability, and 

Interoperability Council (CSRIC) for 

further development? Should we 

include any limitations on our 

incorporation of such existing or future 

standards or practices in our rules? If we 

include a more general requirement of 

reliability, should we include additional 

guidance as to the standards by which 

the Commission will measure 

implementation? 

B. Ensuring Transparency and 

Accountability in Connection With 

Major Changes to Existing 911 Service 

The functionality of the nation’s 911 

networks increasingly depends on 

complex relationships between service 

providers and PSAPs, and often among 

multiple service providers, subcontractors, and other affiliated entities 

themselves. While states and localities 

are well-positioned under our 

cooperative governance framework to 

oversee many aspects of these 

relationships based on the needs of the 

PSAPs and residents within their 

borders, critical 911 network 

infrastructure is increasingly shared 

among many jurisdictions and beyond 

the oversight of individual emergency 

authorities, and more complex in its 

design and operation. Accordingly, the 

end-to-end reliability of a 911 network 

depends on the sum of its parts and how 

they function together. We must ensure 

that this transition process is open and 

transparent. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Proposed Rules 3195 

1. Major Changes in 911 Service 

Transparency is essential as the 

technologies and entities delivering 911 

service capabilities evolve over time. In 

accordance with section 251 of the 

Communications Act, the Commission’s 

rules require ILECs to provide public 

notice regarding any network change 

that will (1) Affect a competing service 

provider’s performance or ability to 

provide service, (2) affect the ILEC’s 

interoperability with other service 

providers, or (3) affect the manner in 

which customer premises equipment is 

attached to the interstate network, as 

well as public notice of network 

changes that ‘‘[w]ill result in the 

retirement of copper loops or copper 

subloops, and the replacement of such 

loops with fiber-to-the-home loops or 

fiber-to-the-curb loops.’’ While the 

Commission adopted these 

requirements primarily to ‘‘promote[ ] 

open and vigorous competition’’ among 

local exchange carriers, as contemplated 

by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 

network change notifications have also 

yielded information on certain changes 

in 911 network architecture that affect 

interconnection with an ILEC. However, 

an increasing number of covered 911 

service providers are not ILECs and are 

not required to file notifications when 

changes to their networks may affect 

911 connectivity. 

We therefore propose to require 

notification to the Commission and the 

public of major changes in any covered 

911 service provider’s network 

architecture or scope of 911 services 

that are not otherwise covered by 

existing network change notification 

requirements. Although parties to 

individual contracts for 911 services 

may be aware of major changes in 

network architecture or in the entities 

responsible for various 911 

functionalities, the public also has a 

vested interest in understanding 

changes that may affect its access to 911. 

Transparency will also promote 

cooperation and information-sharing 

among the increasingly diverse range of 

entities across the 911 ecosystem. We 

therefore believe that public disclosure 

of major changes in 911 service is a key 

step toward increasing accountability 

when such changes are not initiated at 

the request of a PSAP or emergency 

authority or implemented on an 

emergency basis to mitigate or recover 

from the effects of an outage. 

We seek comment on this proposal. 

Which 911 service providers should be 

subject to notification requirements? 

Should OSPs, ILECs, SSPs, and their 

sub-contractors each be responsible for 

reporting major changes in their 

respective facilities and networks? Or 

should ILECs and/or SSPs providing 

911 services directly to PSAPs be 

responsible for notification of major 

changes by their subcontractors and 

other affiliated entities? We recognize 

that in many instances changes in 911 

network architecture and the entities 

providing service occur at the request of 

PSAPs and state or local emergency 

authorities that desire new or different 

911 capabilities. Should such changes 

be subject to notification requirements, 

and if so, who should provide the 

notification? Who should receive the 

notification? Should the Commission 

collect and publish such notifications, 

as it does with wireline network change 

notifications required under section 251 

of the Act and associated Commission 

rules? How could public safety 

professional organizations such as 

NENA and APCO facilitate the 

distribution of such information to 

affected PSAPs? To allow sufficient time 

for public inspection without 

unnecessarily delaying beneficial 

network changes, we propose to require 

notification at least 60 days before major 

changes in 911 service take effect. We 

seek comment, however, on whether a 

shorter—or longer—time period would 

strike a more appropriate balance. 

We also seek comment on what 

changes should be considered ‘‘major’’ 

for notification purposes. In general, we 

propose that changes with impact on 

911 service in more than a single state 

should be among the changes 

considered major. We seek comment on 

this proposal. Would such an approach 

lead industry to adopt incremental, 

state-by-state changes that may not be as 

efficient? Should we establish 

thresholds based on factors such as the 

geography or population affected by a 

change in the provision of 911 service, 

regardless of whether their effect is 

limited to a single state or extends to 

multiple states? Beyond geographic or 

population criteria, are there other 

criteria that for changes in 911 service 

or network architecture that should 

trigger a notification requirement? 

Would it be helpful for an advisory 

committee such as CSRIC to develop 

recommendations regarding the types of 

911 network changes that should 

require public notification? Do any 

existing CSRIC best practices or 

recommendations provide guidance? 

2. Discontinuance or Impairment of 

Existing 911 Services Essential To Call 

Completion 

In addition to proposing public 

notification of major changes in 911 

networks as described above, we believe 

that additional safeguards are needed 

where such changes involve 

discontinuance, reduction or 

impairment of existing 911 services that 

are essential to call completion. As with 

network change notifications, the 

Commission already has rules requiring 

common carriers and interconnected 

VoIP providers to obtain authorization 

to ‘‘discontinue, reduce, or impair 

service to a community, or part of a 

community.’’ Similarly, we believe that 

incumbent 911 service providers that 

have historically taken responsibility for 

reliable 911 call completion have 

undertaken a public trust that cannot 

simply be relinquished at will. While 

incumbents are entitled to make 

decisions about their businesses and 

pursue new and different lines of 

service, they are not entitled to do so in 

a manner that endangers the public or 

leaves stakeholders uninformed with 

respect to the functioning of the 

combined network. 

We therefore propose that covered 

911 service providers that seek to 

discontinue, reduce, or impair existing 

911 service in a way that does not 

trigger already existing authorization 

requirements should be required to 

obtain Commission approval. We seek 

comment on this proposal, and on ways 

the Commission might address the 

details of implementation. Are these 

changes in 911 service of such critical 

importance that Commission approval 

should be required before such changes 

proceed? What processes do states and 

localities currently have in place to 

evaluate requests to discontinue, reduce 

or impair existing 911 service, and how 

can the Commission support and 

encourage such processes? Would 

reliance on states and localities to 

oversee discontinuance, reduction, or 

impairment of existing 911 services 

better serve the policy goals of 

transparency and accountability? 

What actions by an incumbent 

provider short of a complete 

discontinuance of 911 service would 

constitute a reduction or impairment of 

service for purposes of this 

requirement? What criteria should the 

Commission use to evaluate a service 

provider’s request to discontinue, 

reduce or impair existing 911 service? 

Which changes in the scope of 911 

services offered by an incumbent would 

be most likely to affect reliable 911 call 

completion? Should the Commission 

adopt other requirements specific to 

incumbent providers seeking to exit 

lines of 911 service or to outsource 

elements of that service to third parties? 

Do CSRIC best practices provide 

guidance on these questions, and should 

CSRIC be charged with developing 

additional best practices or 


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recommendations with respect to the 

discontinuance, reduction, or 

impairment of existing 911 services? 

To be clear, nothing in this NPRM 

would relieve any carrier or 

interconnected VoIP provider of the 

requirement to seek permission to 

discontinue, reduce, or impair service to 

the extent required by section 214(a) of 

the Act and/or the Commission’s 

implementing rules. We do not, 

however, intend to create duplicative 

obligations for entities that are already 

subject to section 214(a) and associated 

authorization requirements. The process 

proposed here would apply only when 

entities seeking to discontinue, reduce, 

or impair existing 911 service are not 

already required to obtain approval 

under other existing Commission rules. 

We also do not propose to require 

public notification or Commission 

approval under these rules where the 

discontinuance or reduction of 911 

service has been requested or initiated 

by the PSAP or the responsible state or 

local emergency authority. We presume 

that PSAPs and emergency authorities 

that initiate such changes have the 

ability to take appropriate steps to 

safeguard 911 reliability in the affected 

facilities without Commission 

intervention. 

C. Ensuring Reliability and 

Accountability of New IP-Based 911 

Capabilities and Services 

Increased innovation and enhanced 

competition in the NG911 ecosystem 

hold the potential to enhance the 

functionality and utility of 911 while 

providing PSAPs and emergency 

authorities with greater choice over 

which services and products they 

purchase. At the same time, the 

increasing diversity of entities offering 

or planning to offer NG911 services 

increases the challenge of ensuring that 

all providers of such services will be 

capable of meeting appropriate 

standards of reliability and 

accountability. It is important that we 

set clear and consistent expectations 

with respect to the level of performance 

that providers of these services will be 

expected to achieve. Clarifying these 

obligations is essential to remove 

uncertainties and barriers to NG911 

investment by state, local, and tribal 

authorities and to maintain public 

confidence in 911 as the transition to 

NG911 progresses. 

Historically, states have overseen the 

entry of entities providing 911 service 

through such mechanisms as tariff 

conditions or issuance of certificates of 

public convenience and necessity. 

However, as we have noted above, 

covered 911 service providers 

increasingly are building and operating 

regional and nationwide IP-based 911 

networks that both extend across state 

boundaries and serve PSAPs in multiple 

states, using less well established 

technologies. Thus, while states 

continue to have authority to regulate 

provision of 911 service within their 

jurisdictions, these multi-state networks 

transcend the regulatory authority of 

any individual state. Moreover, many 

states have elected not to exercise 

jurisdiction over IP-based 

communications, a determination that 

may operate to restrict their ability to 

ensure the reliability of 911 service that 

depends on IP-based technology. We 

therefore believe that a federal-level 

process is needed to ensure that there 

are no regulatory gaps in oversight of 

providers of new 911 services. This 

process is not intended to supplant state 

action; to the contrary, it would 

complement existing state oversight and 

could be used to empower state-level 

action. 

We propose to require covered 911 

service providers that seek to offer new 

services that affect 911 call completion 

to certify to the Commission that they 

have the technical and operational 

capability to provide reliable 911 

service. In addition, to the extent that 

the new services rely on IP-based 

networks, associated infrastructure such 

as servers and data centers, and/or 

associated software applications, we 

propose that covered 911 service 

providers certify that they have 

conducted a reliability and security risk 

analysis of the network components, 

infrastructure, and/or software that they 

will use to support 911 call completion. 

This proposal would not require 

Commission approval of new entrants or 

delay the introduction of innovative 

new 911 technologies. It would, 

however, require entities that seek to 

provide new critical links in 911 call 

completion to publicly acknowledge 

their responsibilities and certify their 

preparedness to implement relevant best 

practices and comply with existing 

Commission rules applicable to the 911 

capabilities they provide. This 

requirement would extend only to IPbased services that are necessary for 

successful transmission of voice calls 

and other data to PSAPs. For example, 

a smart phone ‘‘app’’ that provides the 

ability to originate calls or text messages 

to 911 would be subject to certification 

requirements, while an app that merely 

enhances or adds value to a smart 

phone’s existing 911 dialing capabilities 

would not. 

To what extent do state laws, 

regulations, or common law tort liability 

already provide adequate assurances of 

such qualifications, and is there a need 

for uniform standards in this regard? 

Are there quality-of-service 

requirements under state law that would 

cover 911-related services, and if so, 

what entities do they cover? Is there 

immunity under state law against 

liability for the provision of 911 related 

services, or communications services by 

common carriers or others? If so, how 

does such immunity affect incentives 

among covered service providers and 

others to ensure that 911 service is 

reliable? Do the answers to these 

questions depend upon whether a 

service is IP-based? How can the 

Commission facilitate efforts by states 

and localities to oversee the effective 

and reliable deployment of new 911 

capabilities? 

If we adopt a certification 

requirement, which entities should be 

subject to it, and how should we define 

the scope of new services that would 

trigger the need for certification? What 

information should applicants provide 

to support their certifications? Should 

applicants be required to analyze 

network monitoring capabilities, 

support for situational awareness, and 

the ability to share outage information 

with other stakeholders? Should the 

certification address issues regarding 

geographic diversity and redundancy in 

the network, probabilities of equipment 

failing due to hardware, network, 

software and procedural failures, as well 

as the ability to switch to backup 

systems? To what extent should the risk 

analysis include cybersecurity and 

supply-chain risk assessments? Is it 

sufficient for service providers to 

conduct their own analysis or should 

we require analysis and certification by 

an independent third party? Would it be 

helpful for an advisory committee such 

as CSRIC to develop best practices and 

recommendations that would serve as a 

basis for a certification of compliance 

with best practices for new 911 

capabilities and services? For example, 

should CSRIC be charged with 

recommending guidelines for the 

reliability and security risk analysis 

proposed above? Are there other parts of 

the communication industry or other 

industries that have similar certification 

processes? For example, could the PCI 

Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) selfcertification for entities receiving credit 

card data provide guidance? 

As noted above, we do not envision 

that the federal certification process 

proposed here would preempt existing 

state processes for certification of 911 

service providers. We believe, however, 

that states should have the option of 

adopting the federal certification 

framework as the basis for state-level 


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governance. We further propose to allow 

states to enforce federal certification 

requirements at the state level. We seek 

comment on this approach. Is there any 

potential conflict between federal 

certification for covered 911 service 

providers and similar state-level 

processes, and if so, how could such 

conflicts be minimized? What processes 

do states and localities currently use to 

oversee the entry of new 911 service 

providers, or entities that provide 

components of 911 service? Do these 

forms of oversight apply to all entities 

currently offering one or more 

components of 911 service, or only to 

incumbents or some other class of 

entities? To the extent that states use 

tariff conditions to regulate the 

provision of 911 service, what 

conditions are typically required of new 

entrants? In states where 911 is not a 

tariffed service, how do regulators and 

PSAPs ensure that all entities offering 

911 service are both technically capable 

and committed to public safety? 

We also do not propose that federal 

certification would extend to the 

provision of new call processing 

services or CPE capabilities that are 

provisioned by PSAPs themselves under 

the oversight of state and local 

governments. Nevertheless, we seek 

comment on how the Commission can 

work with state and local partners to 

ensure that the reliability of PSAP call 

processing is also maximized. Are there 

best practices or other measures that 

PSAPs can take to improve the diversity 

and robustness of their inbound 

communications links and the 

reliability of their CPE? What role 

should the Commission play with 

respect to the multi-state deployment 

and maintenance of new CPE 

technologies? We note that the 

Commission recently created a task 

force on PSAP optimization, which we 

anticipate will also provide insight 

regarding PSAP infrastructure, network 

architecture, and procedures, including 

call processing. 

D. Situational Awareness and 

Coordination Responsibility During 911 

Outages 

As demonstrated by recent outage 

trends, the increasing complexity of IPbased 911 network architecture, 

combined with the increased diversity 

of entities supporting 911 capabilities, 

creates potential obstacles to 

establishing prompt situational 

awareness and initiating recovery from 

major 911 outages. While current 

Commission rules address outage 

reporting to the Commission and to 

affected PSAPs, the experiences during 

large-scale 911 outages described above 

also indicate a need for better 

coordination and information-sharing 

among communications providers 

themselves and any subcontractors or 

vendors that provide components of the 

nation’s 911 networks. In such outages, 

restoration of 911 service is likely to be 

significantly delayed when it is unclear 

which part of the 911 system has failed 

and which provider is responsible for 

repairs. A lack of coordination can also 

lead to the unacceptable result of 

multiple entities being involved in an 

outage but no single entity being able to 

provide timely and comprehensive 

information about the outage to the 

PSAPs and public that they serve. 

To address these concerns, we believe 

that more needs to be done to address 

gaps in situational awareness and 

coordination when large-scale 911 

outages affect multiple jurisdictions and 

service providers. First, effective 

information sharing is key when 

diagnosing and repairing problems that 

may span multiple providers’ networks 

or originate with one provider but affect 

many others. Second, in the 

increasingly diverse NG911 ecosystem, 

it will be more and more difficult for 

PSAPs and 911 service providers to 

coordinate an effective and timely 

response to outages without a central 

clearinghouse for obtaining and 

disseminating critical information. 

Accordingly, we propose to clarify 

responsibility for situational awareness 

and coordination among 911 service 

providers, sub-contractors, and other 

affiliated entries during disruptions in 

911 service. While it may not be 

technically or economically feasible for 

a single entity to monitor, control, or 

repair every segment of a 911 network 

from caller to PSAP, it would be helpful 

for one covered 911 service provider in 

each jurisdiction to perform a triage 

function to mitigate the duration and 

impact of outages. 

To establish a clearinghouse 

mechanism for critical information 

during major 911 outages and other 

significant degradations in service, we 

propose to establish a class of covered 

911 service providers that would 

assume primary responsibility for 

situational awareness and information 

sharing. These entities—which we 

propose to call ‘‘911 Network 

Operations Center (NOC) providers’’— 

would be responsible for monitoring 

their networks to detect disruptions or 

degradations in 911 service, and for 

affirmatively communicating relevant 

information, as appropriate, to other 

stakeholders, including OSPs, SSPs, 

vendors, PSAPs, state emergency 

management offices, and the 

Commission’s Operations Center. As a 

corollary to this proposal, 911 NOC 

providers would be empowered to 

obtain relevant information concerning 

outages from other covered 911 service 

providers, who in turn would be 

required to provide information in 

response to the 911 NOC provider’s 

requests. 911 NOC providers would 

then coordinate with other stakeholders 

to collect and distribute information 

regarding the impact of outages on all 

affected portions of the network from 

call origination to completion. 

We propose that the role of 911 NOC 

provider for each jurisdiction should be 

assigned to the entity responsible for 

transport of 911 traffic to the PSAP or 

PSAPs serving that jurisdiction. In many 

cases, we expect that this role would be 

assumed by the incumbent LEC, 

because, as noted above, ILECs have 

historically provided transport of 911 

traffic to PSAPs and have thereby 

occupied the best position to maintain 

comprehensive situational awareness, 

even as SSPs and vendors have come to 

provide component pieces of those 

networks. Nevertheless, as 911 networks 

evolve, other entities may take on the 

911 transport responsibilities that ILECs 

have historically provided. For example, 

in an NG911 environment, the 911 

transport function may be performed by 

an ESINet provider that receives 911 

traffic from originating service providers 

and directs the traffic to PSAPs served 

by the ESINet. In such cases, we 

envision that the ESINet provider would 

assume the 911 NOC provider role. We 

seek comment on this approach. Should 

ILECs, ESINet providers, and other 

entities responsible for 911 transport be 

the 911 NOC providers bearing primary 

responsibility for maintaining 

situational awareness, sharing 

information, and coordinating outage 

recovery among other affected 

providers? Are there situations where 

more than one entity can reasonably be 

described as being responsible for 

aspects of transport of 911 traffic to the 

PSAP or PSAPs serving a jurisdiction? 

In such situations, which entity would 

be best suited to fill the 911 NOC 

provider role? 

Under this framework, we anticipate 

the need for only one 911 NOC provider 

in each jurisdiction; indeed, the 911 

NOC provider’s role as a clearinghouse 

for situational awareness will be most 

effective with a single point of contact 

for relevant information. We also 

emphasize that the proposed 

responsibilities of 911 NOC providers 

during an outage would be limited in 

scope. For instance, 911 NOC providers 

would not be expected to have 

omniscient situational awareness of the 

status of 911 network components 


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outside their control except to the extent 

they are empowered to obtain such 

information from other parties or 

through their own network monitoring 

processes. Instead, 911 NOC providers 

would serve as a hub for the collection, 

aggregation, and communication of 

available information among covered 

911 service providers and other affected 

stakeholders to mitigate the impact of 

outages and support rapid restoration of 

service. In addition, while 911 NOC 

providers would be tasked with 

obtaining and disseminating outage 

information, they would not be legally 

responsible for adverse consequences 

resulting from outages attributable to 

failures of network components outside 

their control, or for remediating or 

repairing such failures. 

We do not intend these proposals to 

supersede or replace existing outage 

reporting requirements under part 4 of 

the Commission’s rules. Thus, we begin 

with the assumption that all parties 

covered by existing part 4 requirements 

would continue to be required to report 

outages to the Commission that meet the 

part 4 outage thresholds, and 

requirements for certain service 

providers to notify PSAPs and other 

‘‘911 Special Facilities’’ of outages 

affecting 911 service would continue to 

apply independently of any action taken 

in this proceeding. We note, however, 

that the Commission has historically 

relied on mandatory outage reporting to 

gather statistical information on trends 

in communications reliability to assess 

the effectiveness of best practices and 

provide policy guidance on efforts to 

increase network reliability. While 

closely related, the need to share 

information and situational awareness 

among service providers affected by an 

outage may pose different challenges 

requiring different oversight 

mechanisms. We therefore seek 

comment on the alternative proposal of 

whether certain obligations currently in 

part 4 would be better assigned to 911 

NOC providers under the framework 

proposed above. For example, should 

current responsibilities to notify PSAPs 

of outages affecting 911 service be 

incorporated into the informationsharing responsibilities of the 911 NOC 

provider, rather than the outagereporting responsibilities of multiple 

service providers under current § 4.9? 

Should the Commission consider any 

other changes to part 4 in light of the 

responsibilities of 911 NOC providers 

proposed here? 

We also seek comment on processes 

and mechanisms that 911 NOC 

providers and other covered 911 service 

providers could use to carry out their 

situational awareness and coordination 

responsibilities proposed here. As 

described above with respect to 

reliability certification requirements, 

service providers may be able to detect 

outages in real time by tracking the 

number of 911 calls that enter and exit 

their networks, an increase in call 

failure rates, positioning failure rates, or 

the number of calls that result in an ALI 

or LIS query from the destination PSAP. 

Service providers should have alarms 

configured to bring such discrepancies 

to the attention of appropriate 

personnel. To what extent should 911 

NOC providers and other covered 911 

service providers be expected to share 

information in real time about call 

counts and alarms using standardized 

network management interfaces or other 

mechanisms? Should CSRIC be charged 

with developing recommendations on 

these topics? 

How can the Commission facilitate 

the real-time exchange of information by 

leveraging technologies such as 

machine-readable data? Should the 

Commission require 911 NOC providers 

or other covered 911 service providers 

to transmit high-level data on the status 

of their networks to a centralized 

‘‘dashboard’’ allowing users to quickly 

identify disruptions in any portion of 

their 911 networks? Who should be 

given access to such data, and how can 

the Commission ensure that privacy and 

confidentiality are protected? 

Alternatively, should 911 NOC 

providers be required to maintain a Web 

page that provides key information on 

the status of their 911 networks? What 

information should be included, and 

should such Web pages be available to 

the public, or only to PSAPs and other 

covered 911 service providers? 

How can the Commission support and 

empower 911 NOC providers and other 

covered 911 service providers to share 

information under the framework 

proposed above? One model for 

improved situational awareness that has 

been developed in the communications 

sector is the Information Sharing and 

Analysis Center (ISAC), a public-private 

partnership overseen by the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security 

National Coordinating Center for 

Communications (NCC). Could a similar 

model be applied to the 911 ecosystem? 

Which entities should be eligible to 

participate, and should certain entities, 

such as NOC providers, be required to 

participate? Should the Commission 

facilitate improved communication by 

maintaining a centralized database of 

contact information for PSAPs and state 

emergency offices, which would allow 

911 NOC providers and other covered 

911 service providers to compile and 

update distribution lists for outage 

notification and recovery? Should the 

Commission serve as a hub for 

compilation and distribution of any 

other information? What role could 

advisory committees such as CSRIC 

play? 

We also seek comment on issues that 

could affect the nature and scope of a 

NOC provider’s responsibility for 

information gathering and 

dissemination. For example, should the 

scope of information that the NOC 

provider is responsible for gathering and 

disseminating vary depending on where 

in the call completion process a 911 

outage has occurred? If so, what should 

the 911 NOC provider’s responsibility 

be? To what extent should 911 NOC 

providers be responsible for addressing 

cybersecurity risks in 911 networks and 

sharing information with other 

stakeholders in the event of a cyber 

attack? What information should other 

covered 911 service providers that 

experience the effects of an outage be 

expected to communicate back to the 

911 NOC provider? 

Where a PSAP is served by more than 

one covered 911 service provider (e.g., 

where a PSAP has a direct contractual 

relationship with an ILEC that subcontracts with an SSP or other affiliated 

entity for 911 capabilities), should the 

parties be required to designate specific 

support roles? Beyond the proposal that 

primary 911 NOC support is best 

provided by the 911 transport provider, 

should the Commission require covered 

911 service providers to designate a 

hierarchy of responsibility for such 

support or encourage PSAPs and 

providers to negotiate their own 

agreements? Or should such 

determinations be made at the state or 

local level through tariff conditions or 

requests for proposals for 911 service? 

What information should covered 911 

service providers that are not NOC 

providers be expected to share with 

each other? 

Are there legal or regulatory barriers 

that currently prevent or discourage 911 

service providers, as well as their subcontractors and other affiliated entities, 

from sharing information during a 911 

outage? What are the specific laws, 

regulations, or contractual provisions 

that would preclude such informationsharing, and how can the Commission 

address those barriers in order to 

improve efficient, privacy-protective 

information sharing and situational 

awareness? Are there issues of legal 

liability for disclosing customer 

information that should be addressed as 

part of the Commission’s efforts in this 

regard? Should the Commission extend 

liability protections already afforded to 


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certain entities to additional 

participants in the 911 ecosystem? 

E. Legal Authority 

The Communications Act of 1934 

established the FCC, in part, ‘‘for the 

purpose of promoting safety of life and 

property through the use of wire and 

radio communication.’’ Beyond that 

general mandate, Congress has 

repeatedly and specifically endorsed a 

role for the Commission in the 

nationwide implementation of advanced 

911 capabilities. The Wireless 

Communications and Public Safety Act 

of 1999 (911 Act) directed the 

Commission to ‘‘designate 911 as the 

universal emergency telephone number 

within the United States for reporting an 

emergency to appropriate authorities 

and requesting assistance.’’ It also 

directed the Commission to ‘‘encourage 

and support efforts by States to deploy 

comprehensive end-to-end emergency 

communications infrastructure and 

programs, based on coordinated 

statewide plans, including seamless, 

ubiquitous, reliable wireless 

telecommunications networks and 

enhanced wireless 911 service.’’ The 

New and Emerging Technologies 911 

Improvement Act of 2008 (NET 911 Act) 

further affirmed the Commission’s 

authority to require interconnected VoIP 

providers to offer 911 service. The 

Twenty-First Century Communications 

and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 

(CVAA) also advanced the 

Commission’s implementation of 

technologies such as text-to-911 by 

granting authority to promulgate 

‘‘regulations, technical standards, 

protocols, and procedures . . . 

necessary to achieve reliable, 

interoperable communication that 

ensures access by individuals with 

disabilities to an Internet protocolenabled emergency network, where 

achievable and technically feasible.’’ 

Together, and in light of the series of 

911 outages described above extending 

across multiple jurisdictions, we believe 

these provisions authorize—and indeed 

require—the Commission to take a 

leadership role, in cooperative 

partnership with states and localities, in 

promoting the continued availability 

and reliability of 911 services 

nationwide. 

To the extent that 911 service 

providers are common carriers, the 

Commission also has based 911 

reliability requirements on section 

201(b) of the Communications Act, 

which requires the ‘‘practices’’ of 

common carriers to be ‘‘just and 

reasonable,’’ and on section 214(d), 

which provides that a common carrier 

must ‘‘provide itself with adequate 

facilities for the expeditious and 

efficient performance of its service as a 

common carrier.’’ Where 911 service 

requirements affect wireless carriers, the 

Commission also has relied on its Title 

III authority to ‘‘[p]rescribe the nature of 

the service to be rendered,’’ and more 

generally, ‘‘to manage spectrum . . . in 

the public interest.’’ 

With respect to proposals to promote 

transparency and public notification for 

changes in 911 service, we note that 

section 218 of the Act authorizes the 

Commission to ‘‘inquire into the 

management of the business of all 

carriers,’’ and to obtain from such 

carriers and from persons directly or 

indirectly under their control ‘‘full and 

complete information necessary to 

enable the Commission to perform the 

duties and carry out the objects for 

which it was created.’’ Section 251(c)(5) 

of the Act also requires each incumbent 

local exchange carrier to ‘‘provide 

reasonable public notice of changes in 

the information necessary for the 

transmission and routing of services,’’ or 

‘‘other changes that would affect the 

interoperability of [its] facilities and 

networks.’’ Furthermore, Section 4(o) of 

the Act states that ‘‘[f]or the purpose of 

obtaining maximum effectiveness from 

the use of radio and wire 

communications in connection with 

safety of life and property,’’ the 

Commission ‘‘shall investigate and 

study all phases of the problem and the 

best methods of obtaining the 

cooperation and coordination of these 

systems.’’ The Commission also has 

authority, under the New and Emerging 

Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 

2008, to ‘‘compile . . . information 

concerning 9–1–1 and enhanced 9–1–1 

elements, for the purpose of assisting IPenabled voice service providers in 

complying with this section.’’ Thus, as 

part of a cooperative governance 

structure for 911, the Commission is 

authorized to gather and disseminate 

information from carriers and other 

regulatees for the purpose of ensuring 

effective public safety communications. 

We seek comment on the application of 

these provisions to proposals in this 

NPRM. 

As the Commission concluded in the 

911 Reliability Order, ‘‘[i]n light of these 

express statutory responsibilities, 

regulation of additional capabilities 

related to reliable 911 service, both 

today and in an NG911 environment, 

would be well within Commission’s 

. . . statutory authority.’’ That order 

also committed to review the rules 

established therein, ‘‘in light of our 

understanding about how NG911 

networks may differ from legacy 911 

service,’’ and based on such factors as 

‘‘outage reporting trends’’ and 

‘‘adoption of NG911 capabilities on a 

nationwide basis.’’ Accordingly, we 

believe that the Commission would 

have ample legal authority to adopt any 

or all of the proposals discussed above, 

consistent with our longstanding policy 

of cooperation with state and local 

authorities. We seek comment on this 

analysis. In particular, we seek 

comment from state and local regulators 

and emergency authorities regarding the 

appropriate balance of federal, state, and 

local authority in each of the proposals 

described above. 

To the extent that any of the proposals 

herein affect entities that are not subject 

to specific statutory authority, we also 

believe that their adoption would be 

that ‘‘reasonably ancillary to the 

Commission’s effective performance of 

its statutorily mandated 

responsibilities.’’ Whether or not the 

increasingly diverse range of entities 

providing 911 services are common 

carriers or Commission licensees, they 

nevertheless have undertaken to provide 

a critical public safety communications 

service that is within our general 

jurisdiction to ‘‘promot[e] safety of life 

and property through the use of wire 

and radio communication.’’ In light of 

the record of recent events leading to 

significant multistate 911 outages, we 

believe such proposals would be 

reasonably ancillary to our fulfillment of 

the specific statutory mandates to 

ensure reliable and resilient 911 service 

across different technologies, as 

discussed above. We seek comment on 

this analysis and any other sources of 

legal authority for the proposals in this 

Notice. 

V. Procedural Matters 

A. Ex Parte Presentations 

The proceedings initiated by this 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking shall be 

treated as ‘‘permit-but-disclose’’ 

proceedings in accordance with the 

Commission’s ex parte rules. Persons 

making ex parte presentations must file 

a copy of any written presentation or a 

memorandum summarizing any oral 

presentation within two business days 

after the presentation (unless a different 

deadline applicable to the Sunshine 

period applies). Persons making oral ex 

parte presentations are reminded that 

memoranda summarizing the 

presentation must: (1) List all persons 

attending or otherwise participating in 

the meeting at which the ex parte 

presentation was made; and (2) 

summarize all data presented and 

arguments made during the 

presentation. If the presentation 

consisted in whole or in part of the 


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presentation of data or arguments 

already reflected in the presenter’s 

written comments, memoranda, or other 

filings in the proceeding, the presenter 

may provide citations to such data or 

arguments in his or her prior comments, 

memoranda, or other filings (specifying 

the relevant page and/or paragraph 

numbers where such data or arguments 

can be found) in lieu of summarizing 

them in the memorandum. Documents 

shown or given to Commission staff 

during ex parte meetings are deemed to 

be written ex parte presentations and 

must be filed consistent with 

§ 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by 

§ 1.49(f) or for which the Commission 

has made available a method of 

electronic filing, written ex parte 

presentations and memoranda 

summarizing oral ex parte 

presentations, and all attachments 

thereto, must be filed through the 

electronic comment filing system 

available for that proceeding, and must 

be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, 

.xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants 

in this proceeding should familiarize 

themselves with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules. 

B. Comment Filing Procedures 

Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 

of the Commission’s rules, 47 CFR 

1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file 

comments and reply comments in 

response to this Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking on or before the dates 

indicated on the first page of this 

document. Comments may be filed 

using the Commission’s Electronic 

Comment Filing System (ECFS). See 

Electronic Filing of Documents in 

Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 

(1998). 

• Electronic Filers: Comments may be 

filed electronically using the Internet by 

accessing the ECFS: http://

fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/. 

• Paper Filers: Parties that choose to 

file by paper must file an original and 

one copy of each filing. If more than one 

docket or rulemaking number appears in 

the caption of this proceeding, filers 

must submit two additional copies for 

each additional docket or rulemaking 

number. 

• Filings can be sent by hand or 

messenger delivery, by commercial 

overnight courier, or by first-class or 

overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All 

filings must be addressed to the 

Commission’s Secretary, Office of the 

Secretary, Federal Communications 

Commission. 

• All hand-delivered or messengerdelivered paper filings for the 

Commission’s Secretary must be 

delivered to FCC Headquarters at 445 

12th St. SW., Room TW–A325, 

Washington, DC 20554. The filing hours 

are 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. All hand 

deliveries must be held together with 

rubber bands or fasteners. Any 

envelopes and boxes must be disposed 

of before entering the building. 

• Commercial overnight mail (other 

than U.S. Postal Service Express Mail 

and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 

East Hampton Drive, Capitol Heights, 

MD 20743. 

• U.S. Postal Service first-class, 

Express, and Priority mail must be 

addressed to 445 12th Street SW., 

Washington, DC 20554. 

C. Accessible Formats 

To request materials in accessible 

formats for people with disabilities 

(braille, large print, electronic files, 

audio format), send an email to fcc504@

fcc.gov or call the Consumer & 

Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202– 

418–0530 (voice), 202–418–0432 (TTY). 

D. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, see 5 U.S.C. 604, 

the Commission has prepared an Initial 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) 

of the possible significant economic 

impact on small entities of the policies 

and rules addressed in this document. 

Written public comments are requested 

in the IRFA. These comments must be 

filed in accordance with the same filing 

deadlines as comments filed in response 

to this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

as set forth on the first page of this 

document, and have a separate and 

distinct heading designating them as 

responses to the IRFA. 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

contains proposed new information 

collection requirements. The 

Commission, as part of its continuing 

effort to reduce paperwork burdens, 

invites the general public and OMB to 

comment on the information collection 

requirements contained in this 

document, as required by PRA. In 

addition, pursuant to the Small 

Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 

we seek specific comment on how we 

might ‘‘further reduce the information 

collection burden for small business 

concerns with fewer than 25 

employees.’’ 

VI. Ordering Clauses 

Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to 

sections 151, 154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 

155(c), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 219, 251(e), 

301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 

403, 615, 615a, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 

621(d) of the Communications Act of 

1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 

154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 201(b), 214(d), 

218, 219, 251(e), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 

303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 615, 615a, 615c, 

621(b)(3), and 621(d), that this Policy 

Statement and Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking in PS Docket Nos. 14–193 

and 13–75 is adopted. 

It is further ordered that the 

Commission’s Consumer and 

Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference 

Information Center, shall send a copy of 

this Policy Statement and Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking, including the 

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, 

to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 

Small Business Administration. 

VII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis 

As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 

(RFA), the Commission has prepared 

this Initial Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis (IRFA) of the possible 

significant economic impact of the 

proposals described in the attached 

Policy Statement and Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on small 

entities. Written public comments are 

requested on this IRFA. Comments must 

be identified as responses to the IRFA 

and must be filed by the deadlines for 

comments in the Notice. The 

Commission will send a copy of the 

Notice, including this IRFA, to the Chief 

Counsel for Advocacy of the Small 

Business Administration (SBA). In 

addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or 

summaries thereof) will be published in 

the Federal Register. 

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the 

Proposed Rules 

The NPRM seeks comment on 

governance mechanisms to promote 

reliable 911 call completion nationwide 

and improve situational awareness and 

information sharing among 911 service 

providers. Specifically, it proposes to: 

(1) Amend the Commission’s 911 

reliability certification rules to cover 

additional entities and network 

reliability practices that are vital to call 

completion; (2) require public 

notification for major changes in multistate 911 networks and services, and 

Commission approval for 

discontinuance of existing 911 services; 

(3) require entities seeking to provide 

new 911 capabilities to certify as to their 

technical and operational capability to 

provide reliable service; and (4) 

designate certain 911 service providers 

to be primarily responsible for 

situational awareness and coordination 

with other service providers in the event 

of a 911 outage. 


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The NPRM also affirms core 

principles guiding the Commission’s 

approach to 911 governance and 

proposes mechanisms for the 

Commission, in cooperation with state 

and local partners, to ensure that the 

nation’s 911 governance structure keeps 

pace with evolving technology so that 

all entities providing 911 service 

capabilities remain accountable for 

reliable 911 call completion and 

accurate situational awareness. As 

discussed in the NPRM, recent outage 

trends have revealed new reliability 

challenges due to geographic 

consolidation of network infrastructure 

and an increasing reliance on softwarebased network components to process 

and route 911 calls on a regional or 

national scale. Furthermore, an 

increasing number of 911 service 

providers subcontract with third party 

vendors for call-routing and other 

technical capabilities that are essential 

to call completion. As a result, 911 call 

centers potentially face real-time 

communication problems in trying to 

mitigate 911 service problems with 911 

service providers and subcontractors. 

The Commission has a responsibility to 

promote reliable emergency 

communications and prevent avoidable 

failures. 

The NPRM builds upon the 911 

Reliability Order adopted by the 

Commission in 2013 following the 2012 

derecho storm, and sets forth principals 

to guide the Commission’s 911 

governance efforts in light of technology 

transitions and changing outage trends. 

In particular, the Policy Statement 

affirms the Commission’s policy of 

working with state and local partners to 

ensure reliable 911 call completion as 

technology transitions consolidate 

network infrastructure and change the 

way 911 services are delivered to PSAPs 

in multiple states. Further, the 

Commission stresses that service 

provider changes to 911 services must 

be transparent and coordinated with the 

Commission and the appropriate state 

and local authorities. 

B. Legal Basis 

The legal basis for any action that may 

be taken pursuant to this Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking is contained in 

sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 5(c), 201(b), 

214(d), 218, 219, 251(e), 301, 303(g), 

303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 615, 615a, 615c, 

621(b)(3), and 621(d) of the 

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 

151, 154(i), 154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 201(b), 

214(d), 218, 219, 251(e), 301, 303(b), 

303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 615, 

615a, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 621(d). 

C. Description and Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities to Which the 

Proposed Rules Would Apply 

The RFA directs agencies to provide 

a description of and, where feasible, an 

estimate of the number of small entities 

that may be affected by the proposed 

rules. The RFA generally defines the 

term ‘‘small entity’’ as having the same 

meaning as the terms ‘‘small business,’’ 

‘‘small organization,’’ and ‘‘small 

governmental jurisdiction.’’ In addition, 

the term ‘‘small business’’ has the same 

meaning as the term ‘‘small business 

concern’’ under the Small Business Act. 

A small business concern is one which: 

(1) Is independently owned and 

operated; (2) is not dominant in its field 

of operation; and (3) satisfies any 

additional criteria established by the 

Small Business Administration (SBA). 

1. Small Businesses, Small 

Organizations, and Small Governmental 

Jurisdictions 

Our action may, over time, affect 

small entities that are not easily 

categorized at present. We therefore 

describe here, at the outset, three 

comprehensive, statutory small entity 

size standards. First, nationwide, there 

are a total of approximately 27.5 million 

small businesses, according to the SBA. 

In addition, a ‘‘small organization’’ is 

generally ‘‘any not-for-profit enterprise 

which is independently owned and 

operated and is not dominant in its 

field.’’ Nationwide, as of 2007, there 

were approximately 1,621,315 small 

organizations. Finally, the term ‘‘small 

governmental jurisdiction’’ is defined 

generally as ‘‘governments of cities, 

towns, townships, villages, school 

districts, or special districts, with a 

population of less than fifty thousand.’’ 

Census Bureau data for 2011 indicate 

that there were 89,476 local 

governmental jurisdictions in the 

United States. We estimate that, of this 

total, as many as 88,506 entities may 

qualify as ‘‘small governmental 

jurisdictions.’’ Thus, we estimate that 

most governmental jurisdictions are 

small. 

The NPRM seeks comment on the 

class of entities to which the proposals 

would apply. In the Derecho Report and 

the 911 Reliability Order the 

Commission defined ‘‘covered 911 

service providers,’’ as those that provide 

specified 911 capabilities, or the 

functional equivalent, ‘‘directly to a 

PSAP.’’ The NPRM asks whether the 

Commission should expand the 

‘‘covered 911 service providers’’ 

definition to also include all entities 

that provide 911, E911, or NG911 

capabilities, such as call routing, 

automatic location information (ALI), 

automatic number identification (ANI), 

location information servers (LIS), textto-911, or the functional equivalent of 

those capabilities, regardless of whether 

they provide such capabilities under a 

direct contractual relationship with a 

PSAP or emergency authority. 

Depending on how 911 calls are routed 

and processed in different network 

architectures, the proposed definition 

could apply to originating service 

providers (OSPs) such as wireless 

carriers and interconnected VoIP 

providers, incumbent local exchange 

carriers (ILECs), 911 system service 

providers (SSPs) that provide 911 

services such as call routing and 

location information to PSAPs, and 

vendors and subcontractors of such 

entities to the extent that they provide 

covered 911 capabilities. 

The NPRM seeks comment on which 

911 service providers should be subject 

to additional 911 network change 

notification requirements, including 

publicly reporting major changes in 

their respective facilities and networks 

that affect PSAPs in multiple states. To 

the extent that changes in 911 service 

amount to a discontinuance, reduction, 

or impairment of existing services, the 

NPRM proposes to require Commission 

approval to the extent that authorization 

is not already required under section 

214 of the Communications Act. The 

NPRM also seeks comment on whether 

to require 911 entities that propose to 

offer new services that affect 911 call 

completion to certify with the 

Commission baseline assurances of their 

technical and operational qualifications 

to provide reliable 911 service, as well 

as comment on which 911 entities 

should be subject to this certification. 

To facilitate situational awareness and 

coordination, the NPRM seeks comment 

on the establishment of a class ‘‘911 

Network Operations Center (911 NOC) 

providers,’’ which would assume 

primary responsibility for situational 

awareness and information sharing 

during disruptions in 911 service. The 

NPRM proposes that the 911 NOC 

provide role for each jurisdiction should 

be assigned to the entity responsible for 

transport of 911 traffic to the PSAP or 

PSAPs serving that jurisdiction— 

typically the local ILEC in legacy 

network architectures. However, as we 

transition into IP-based NG911 

networks, other entities such as SSPs 

and emergency services Internet 

Protocol network (ESINet) providers 

may receive 911 traffic from an OSP and 

then direct traffic to the PSAP. The 

NPRM seeks comment on whether 

ILECs, ESINet providers or other 911 


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call transport entities should be the 911 

NOC providers under this proposal. 

2. Communications Service Entities 

Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers 

(Incumbent LECs). Neither the 

Commission nor the SBA has developed 

a small business size standard 

specifically for incumbent local 

exchange services. The appropriate size 

standard under SBA rules is for the 

category Wired Telecommunications 

Carriers. Under that size standard, such 

a business is small if it has 1,500 or 

fewer employees. Census Bureau data 

for 2007, which now supersede data 

from the 2002 Census, show that there 

were 3,188 firms in this category that 

operated for the entire year. Of this 

total, 3,144 had employment of 999 or 

fewer, and 44 firms had had 

employment of 1,000 or more. 

According to Commission data, 1,307 

carriers reported that they were 

incumbent local exchange service 

providers. Of these 1,307 carriers, an 

estimated 1,006 have 1,500 or fewer 

employees and 301 have more than 

1,500 employees. Consequently, the 

Commission estimates that most 

providers of local exchange service are 

small entities that may be affected by 

the rules and policies proposed in the 

NPRM. Thus under this category and the 

associated small business size standard, 

the majority of these incumbent local 

exchange service providers can be 

considered small. 

Competitive Local Exchange Carriers 

(Competitive LECs), Competitive Access 

Providers (CAPs), Shared-Tenant 

Service Providers, and Other Local 

Service Providers. Neither the 

Commission nor the SBA has developed 

a small business size standard 

specifically for these service providers. 

The appropriate size standard under 

SBA rules is for the category Wired 

Telecommunications Carriers. Under 

that size standard, such a business is 

small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. 

Census Bureau data for 2007, which 

now supersede data from the 2002 

Census, show that there were 3,188 

firms in this category that operated for 

the entire year. Of this total, 3,144 had 

employment of 999 or fewer, and 44 

firms had had employment of 1,000 

employees or more. Thus under this 

category and the associated small 

business size standard, the majority of 

these Competitive LECs, CAPs, SharedTenant Service Providers, and Other 

Local Service Providers can be 

considered small entities. According to 

Commission data, 1,442 carriers 

reported that they were engaged in the 

provision of either competitive local 

exchange services or competitive access 

provider services. Of these 1,442 

carriers, an estimated 1,256 have 1,500 

or fewer employees and 186 have more 

than 1,500 employees. In addition, 17 

carriers have reported that they are 

Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and 

all 17 are estimated to have 1,500 or 

fewer employees. In addition, 72 

carriers have reported that they are 

Other Local Service Providers. Of the 

72, seventy have 1,500 or fewer 

employees and two have more than 

1,500 employees. Consequently, the 

Commission estimates that most 

providers of competitive local exchange 

service, competitive access providers, 

Shared-Tenant Service Providers, and 

Other Local Service Providers are small 

entities that may be affected by rules 

proposed in the NPRM. 

Wireless Telecommunications 

Carriers (except satellite). This industry 

comprises establishments engaged in 

operating and maintaining switching 

and transmission facilities to provide 

communications via the airwaves. 

Establishments in this industry have 

spectrum licenses and provide services 

using that spectrum, such as cellular 

phone services, paging services, 

wireless Internet access, and wireless 

video services. The appropriate size 

standard under SBA rules is for the 

category Wireless Telecommunications 

Carriers. The size standard for that 

category is that a business is small if it 

has 1,500 or fewer employees. For this 

category, census data for 2007 show that 

there were 11,163 establishments that 

operated for the entire year. Of this 

total, 10,791 establishments had 

employment of 999 or fewer employees 

and 372 had employment of 1,000 

employees or more. Thus under this 

category and the associated small 

business size standard, the Commission 

estimates that the majority of wireless 

telecommunications carriers (except 

satellite) are small entities that may be 

affected by rules proposed in the NPRM. 

Wireless Service Providers. The SBA 

has developed a small business size 

standard for wireless firms within the 

two broad economic census categories 

of ‘‘Paging’’ and ‘‘Cellular and Other 

Wireless Telecommunications.’’ Under 

both categories, the SBA deems a 

wireless business to be small if it has 

1,500 or fewer employees. For the 

census category of Paging, Census 

Bureau data for 2002 show that there 

were 807 firms in this category that 

operated for the entire year. Of this 

total, 804 firms had employment of 999 

or fewer employees, and three firms had 

employment of 1,000 employees or 

more. Thus, under this category and 

associated small business size standard, 

the majority of firms can be considered 

small. For the census category of 

Cellular and Other Wireless 

Telecommunications, Census Bureau 

data for 2002 show that there were 1,397 

firms in this category that operated for 

the entire year. Of this total, 1,378 firms 

had employment of 999 or fewer 

employees, and 19 firms had 

employment of 1,000 employees or 

more. Thus, under this second category 

and size standard, the majority of firms 

can, again, be considered small. 

All Other Telecommunications 

Providers. To the extent that entities 

such as SSPs and interconnected VoIP 

providers are subject to proposals in the 

NPRM but are not ‘‘Wired 

Telecommunication Carriers,’’ 

‘‘Wireless Telecommunication 

Carriers,’’ or ‘‘Cellular and Other 

Wireless Telecommunications’’ under 

the categories listed above, the closest 

U.S. Census category appears to be ‘‘All 

Other Telecommunications.’’ All Other 

Telecommunications is defined as 

follows: ‘‘This U.S. industry comprises 

establishments primarily engaged in 

providing specialized 

telecommunications services, such as 

. . . Internet services or voice over 

Internet protocol (VoIP) services via 

client-supplied telecommunications 

connections.’’ In analyzing whether a 

substantial number of small entities 

would be affected by the requirements 

proposed in the NPRM, the Commission 

notes that the SBA has developed a 

small business size standard for All 

Other Telecommunications, which 

consists of all such firms with gross 

annual receipts of $30 million or less. 

For this category, census data for 2007 

show that there were 2,639 

establishments that operated for the 

entire year. Of those establishments, a 

total of 1,912 had gross annual receipts 

between $100,000 and $1 million; 487 

had gross annual receipts between $1 

million and $25 million; and 240 had 

gross annual receipts over $25 million. 

Thus, a majority of All Other 

Telecommunications firms potentially 

affected by the proposals in the NPRM 

can be considered small. 

D. Description of Projected Reporting, 

Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 

Requirements for Small Entities 

As noted above, the NPRM proposes 

to (1) amend the Commission’s 911 

reliability certification rules to cover 

additional entities and network 

reliability practices that are vital to call 

completion; (2) require public 

notification for major changes in multistate 911 networks and services, and 

Commission approval for 

discontinuance of existing 911 services; 

(3) require entities seeking to provide 


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new 911 capabilities to certify as to their 

technical and operational capability to 

provide reliable service; and (4) 

designate certain 911 service providers 

to be primarily responsible for 

situational awareness and coordination 

with other service providers in the event 

of a 911 outage. 

The NPRM proposes that a covered 

911 service provider take reasonable 

measures to provide reliable service and 

complete an annual certification 

indicating whether it has implemented 

specified best practices or reasonable 

alternative measures. Covered 911 

service providers’ ‘‘reasonable 

measures’’ obligation would include 

—but would not be limited to—existing 

areas of circuit diversity, central-office 

backup power, and diverse network 

monitoring. Further, covered 911 

service providers’ certifications to the 

Commission would indicate whether IPbased 911 architecture is geographically 

distributed, load-balanced, and capable 

of automatic reroutes to backup 

equipment in the event of a hardware, 

network, software or database failure. 

The networking monitoring section of 

the certification would also include 

current requirements for physical 

diversity of monitoring facilities, but 

also the proper prioritization of critical 

network alarms. Further, the NPRM 

proposes that 911 entities have a duty 

to take reasonable measures to 

communicate with other 911 entities 

during disruptions in 911 service. 

Providers would be required to certify 

whether they have an outage 

notification process is in place to notify 

PSAPs of disruptions in 911 service 

within time frames specified in part 4 of 

the Commission rules. 

These proposals build upon the 

existing 911 reliability certification 

process for covered 911 service 

providers that the Commission 

established in 2013. Under this process, 

a corporate officer with supervisory and 

budgetary authority over network 

operations in all relevant service areas 

must file an annual attestation with the 

Commission describing the entity’s 

implementation of specified best 

practices, or if it is not feasible to 

implement those best practices, a 

description of reasonable alternative 

measures designed to mitigate the risk 

of failure. The option of certifying 

alternative measures is designed to 

provide flexibility to small entities 

operating in diverse service areas, 

which may have unique ways of 

addressing network reliability 

challenges. Because many covered 911 

service providers have indicated they 

already conduct activities that form the 

basis for this certification in the normal 

course of business, the Commission 

expects the additional burden of filing 

certifications to be minimal. 

Certifications will be submitted through 

a simple online form, which is designed 

to allow small entities to input 

certification information and upload an 

attestation from a corporate officer 

without the need for any specialized 

personnel. In some cases, however, 

covered 911 service providers may 

choose to hire consultants or engineers 

to conduct technical aspects of the 

certification, or an attorney to review 

certification information for compliance 

with applicable rules. However, the 

Commission expects that most covered 

911 service providers, including small 

entities, will be able to complete and 

submit the annual certification using 

only in-house personnel. 

The NPRM proposes to require 

notification to the Commission and the 

public of major changes in any 911 

service provider’s network architecture 

or scope of 911 services that are not 

otherwise covered by existing network 

change notification requirements. The 

NPRM seeks comment on the specific 

changes that would be subject to 

notification requirements but proposes 

generally that changes affecting 911 

service to PSAPs in multiple states 

would be considered ‘‘major’’ and 

subject to public notification. The 

proposed notifications would be filed 

with the Commission in a process 

similar to the existing network change 

notifications required from incumbent 

LECs under section 251 of the 

Communications Act. These are 

typically relatively short filings 

describing the nature of the planned 

changes and location(s) affected. Some 

companies may wish to have an 

attorney review such notifications for 

compliance purposes, but the proposal 

does not require such a review. 

For incumbent 911 service providers 

that seek to discontinue, reduce or 

impair existing 911 service in a way that 

does not trigger already existing 

authorization requirements under 

section 214 of the Communications Act, 

the NPRM proposes to require prior 

Commission approval. The NPRM seeks 

comment on which actions by an 

incumbent 911 service provider would 

be considered a discontinuance, 

reduction or impairment of service. 

However, this proposal would not 

include changes requested by a PSAP or 

the responsible state or local emergency 

authority that might otherwise 

constitute a discontinuance, reduction 

or impairment of service. Commission 

approval under this proposal would 

require the applicant to file a request to 

discontinue, reduce, or impair 911 

services stating the nature of the 

changes, the location(s) affected, and the 

anticipated date of the changes. If the 

Commission does not act on such a 

request within 60 days, the request will 

be deemed approved. As noted above, 

certain applicants may wish to hire 

engineers, consultants, or attorneys to 

review applications for discontinuance 

or technical portions thereof, but there 

is no such requirement in the proposed 

rule. 

The NPRM also proposes to require 

covered 911 service providers that seek 

to offer new services that affect 911 call 

completion to certify to the Commission 

that they have the technical and 

operational capability to provide 

reliable 911 service. To the extent that 

the new services rely on IP-based 

networks, associated infrastructure such 

as servers and data centers, and/or 

associated software applications, the 

NPRM proposes that covered 911 

service providers certify that they have 

conducted a reliability and security risk 

analysis of the network components, 

infrastructure, and/or software that they 

will use to support 911 call completion. 

This proposal would not require 

Commission approval of new entrants or 

delay the introduction of new 911 

technologies. It would, however, require 

entities that seek to provide new critical 

links in 911 call completion to publicly 

acknowledge their responsibilities and 

certify their preparedness to implement 

relevant best practices and comply with 

existing Commission rules applicable to 

the 911 capabilities they provide. The 

Commission does not anticipate the 

need for any specialized personnel to 

provide such a certification. 

To improve situational awareness 

during 911 outages, the NPRM proposes 

to establish a class of ‘‘911 Network 

Operations Center (911 NOC) 

providers,’’ which would assume 

primary responsibility for monitoring 

their networks to detect disruptions or 

degradations in 911 service, and for 

affirmatively communicating relevant 

information, as appropriate, to other 

affected 911 entities, including OSPs, 

SSPs, vendors, PSAPs, state emergency 

management offices, and the 

Commission’s Operations Center. The 

role of the 911 NOC provider would be 

assigned to the entity responsible for 

transport of 911 traffic to the PSAP(s) in 

each jurisdiction. 911 NOC providers 

would receive information from, and 

coordinate with other covered 911 

service providers to collect and 

distribute information regarding the 

impact of outages on all affected 

portions of the network from call 

origination to completion. The NPRM 

seeks comment on other responsibilities 


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3204 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

of the 911 NOC provider, as well as the 

responsibilities of other covered 911 

service providers to share information 

with the 911 NOC provider. The 

Commission anticipates that most or all 

of these information-sharing activities 

would be performed by in-house 

personnel who already are employed to 

monitor and maintain covered 911 

service providers’ networks. In any 

event, the NPRM proposes that 911 NOC 

providers would not be legally 

responsible for outages attributable to 

failures of network components outside 

their control, or for remediating or 

repairing such failures. 

E. Steps Taken To Minimize Significant 

Economic Impact on Small Entities, and 

Significant Alternatives Considered 

The RFA requires an agency to 

describe any significant, specifically 

small business alternatives that it has 

considered in reaching its proposed 

approach, which may include the 

following four alternatives (among 

others): ‘‘(1) The establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance or reporting requirements 

under the rule for small entities; (3) the 

use of performance, rather than design, 

standards; and (4) and exemption from 

coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, 

for small entities.’’ 

The NPRM seeks to update and 

enhance the Commission’s current 911 

reliability certification rules, which 

complement its general approach of 

encouraging communications providers 

to voluntarily implement best practices 

and measuring compliance through 

certification requirements and outage 

reporting. Thus, small entities with 

limited resources would continue to 

enjoy many of the benefits of the current 

regime, including a general focus on 

network performance and reliability 

rather than specific design 

requirements. The option to certify 

reasonable alternative measures in lieu 

of specified certification requirements 

also provides flexibility to small 

entities, and the online system for 

submission of certification information 

is designed for ease of use by all 

communications providers without the 

need for specialized personnel. Public 

notifications and certifications proposed 

in the NPRM would follow similar 

submission processes and would not 

mandate any specific standards for 911 

network architecture. The Commission 

has traditionally considered this 

approach a more flexible and less costly 

alternative to more comprehensive 

regulation, and the NPRM would 

preserve those advantages in large part. 

Furthermore, the proposals in the 

NPRM apply primarily to service 

providers that offer 911 services on a 

multi-state scale to PSAPs in multiple 

jurisdictions. For example, IP-based 911 

call routing capabilities are typically 

concentrated in a small number of 

servers and databases that may serve 

PSAPs across the country. Our 

proposals with respect to public 

notification and Commission approval 

of major changes in 911 service or 

discontinuance of 911 service also 

would apply only to providers serving 

PSAPs in multiple states. Thus, while 

there is no explicit exemption proposed 

for small entities, many of the rules by 

their nature will tend to apply only to 

larger communications providers that 

operate major, multi-state 911 networks. 

To the extent that the NPRM would 

impose new obligations on small 

entities, we seek comment on 

alternatives including (1) the 

establishment of differing compliance or 

reporting requirements or timetables 

that take into account the resources 

available to small entities; (2) the 

clarification, consolidation, or 

simplification of compliance or 

reporting requirements under the rule 

for small entities; (3) the use of 

performance, rather than design, 

standards; and (4) an exemption from 

coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, 

for small entities. Which of the 

proposed approaches do small entities 

find particularly difficult or costly to 

comply with, and how could those 

difficulties be addressed through 

modifications or exemptions? What 

would be the effect on public safety of 

exemptions from 911 service 

requirements, regardless of cost? 

F. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, 

Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed 

Rules 

None. 

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 12 

Resiliency, redundancy and reliability 

of communications. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene H. Dortch, 

Secretary. 

Proposed Rules 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the Federal Communications 

Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR 

part 12 as follows: 

PART 12—RESILIENCY, 

REDUNDANCY, AND RELIABILITY OF 

COMMUNICATIONS 

■ 1. Revise the authority for part 12 to 

read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(j), 

154(o), 155(c), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 219, 

251(e), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 

403, 615, 615a, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 621(d). 

■ 2. In § 12.4 revise paragraph (a)(4); 

add paragraphs (a)(12) through (14); 

revise paragraphs (b) and (c)(3); and add 

paragraphs (c)(4) and (5) to read as 

follows: 

§ 12.4 Reliability of covered 911 service 

providers 

(a) * * * 

(4) Covered 911 service provider. 

(i) Any entity that: 

(A) Provides call routing, automatic 

location information (ALI), automatic 

number identification (ANI), location 

information services (LIS), text-to-911, 

or any other capability required for 

delivery of 911, E911, or NG911, or the 

functional equivalent of any of those 

capabilities, to a public safety answering 

point (PSAP), statewide default 

answering point, or appropriate local 

emergency authority as such entities are 

defined in § 64.3000(b) of this chapter, 

whether directly or indirectly as a 

contractor or agent to any other entity; 

and/or 

(B) Operates a central office that 

directly serves a public safety answering 

point (PSAP), statewide default 

answering point, or appropriate local 

emergency authority as such entities are 

defined in § 64.3000(b) of this chapter. 

For purposes of this section, a central 

office directly serves a PSAP, statewide 

default answering point, or appropriate 

local emergency authority if it hosts a 

selective router or the functional 

equivalent, hosts an ALI/ANI database 

or the functional equivalent, or is the 

last service-provider facility through 

which a 911 trunk or administrative line 

passes before connecting to a PSAP, 

statewide default answering point, or 

appropriate local emergency authority. 

(ii) The term ‘‘covered 911 service 

provider’’ shall not include: 

(A) PSAPs or governmental 

authorities to the extent that they 

provide 911, E911, or NG911 

capabilities; or 

(B) Communications providers that 

solely originate voice calls or text 

messages to 911 but do not provide any 

of the capabilities or services described 

in paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section. 

* * * * * 

(12) Geographically distributed. For 

purposes of this section, 911 network 


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architecture is geographically 

distributed if all calls on the 911 

network can be routed through more 

than one database or call processing 

facility in more than one geographic 

location. 

(13) Load balanced. For purposes of 

this section, 911 network architecture is 

load balanced if call volume is 

dynamically distributed among multiple 

active databases or call processing 

facilities rather than concentrated in one 

active location. 

(14) Situational awareness. For 

purposes of this section, situational 

awareness means the ability to detect 

disruptions or degradations in 911 

service, to assess the scope and impact 

of such disruptions or degradations in 

911 service, and to share information as 

appropriate to mitigate and resolve such 

impacts. 

(b) Provision of reliable 911 service. 

All covered 911 service providers shall 

take reasonable measures to provide 

reliable 911 service. Performance of the 

elements of the Certification set forth in 

paragraphs (c)(1)(i), (c)(2)(i), (c)(3)(i), 

(c)(4)(i), and (c)(5)(i) of this section shall 

be deemed to satisfy the requirements of 

this paragraph (b). If a covered 911 

service provider cannot certify that it 

has performed a given element, the 

Commission may determine that such 

provider nevertheless satisfies the 

requirements of this paragraph (b) based 

upon a showing in accordance with 

paragraph (c) of this section that it is 

taking alternative measures with respect 

to that element that are reasonably 

sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure, 

or that one or more certification 

elements are not applicable to its 

network. 

(c) * * * 

(3) Network monitoring. 

(i) A covered 911 service provider 

shall certify whether it has, within the 

past year: 

(A) Conducted Diversity Audits of the 

Aggregation Points that it uses to gather 

network monitoring data in each 911 

Service Area; 

(B) Conducted Diversity Audits of 

Monitoring Links between Aggregation 

Points and NOCs for each 911 Service 

Area in which it operates; 

(C) Implemented Physically Diverse 

Aggregation Points for network 

monitoring data in each 911 Service 

Area and Physically Diverse Monitoring 

Links from such aggregation points to at 

least one NOC; and 

(D) Established appropriate alarms for 

network failures that would be 

reasonably likely to result in a 

disruption of 911 service within a 911 

Service Area, and procedures designed 

to ensure that such alarms quickly bring 

such network failures to the attention of 

appropriate personnel. 

(ii) If a covered 911 service provider 

has not implemented all of the elements 

in paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section, it 

must certify with respect to each such 

911 Service Area: 

(A) Whether it has taken alternative 

measures to mitigate the relevant risk, or 

is taking steps to remediate any 

vulnerabilities that it has identified with 

respect thereto, in which case it shall 

provide a brief explanation of such 

alternative measures or such 

remediation steps, the date by which it 

anticipates such remediation will be 

completed, and why it believes those 

measures are reasonably sufficient to 

mitigate such risk; or 

(B) Whether it believes that one or 

more of the requirements of this 

subsection are not applicable to its 

network, in which case it shall provide 

a brief explanation of why it believes 

any such requirement does not apply. 

(4) Database and software 

configuration and testing. 

(i) A covered 911 service provider 

shall certify whether it has, within the 

past year: 

(A) Implemented reasonable measures 

to ensure that any Internet Protocol (IP)- 

based architecture used to provide 911, 

E911, or NG911 capabilities defined in 

paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section is 

geographically distributed, load 

balanced, and capable of automatic 

reroutes in the event of a software or 

database failure. 

(B) Implemented reasonable measures 

to ensure that any software or database 

used by the covered 911 service 

provider to provide 911, E911, or NG911 

capabilities such as call routing, 

automatic location information (ALI), 

automatic number identification (ANI), 

location information services (LIS), textto-911, or the functional equivalent of 

those capabilities, is designed, 

configured, and tested to ensure reliable 

operation. 

(C) Implemented reasonable measures 

to maintain continuity of 911 service 

during planned maintenance and/or 

updates to any software or database 

used to provide 911, E911, or NG911 

capabilities. 

(ii) If a covered 911 service provider 

has not implemented all of the elements 

in paragraph (c)(4)(i) of this section, it 

must certify: 

(A) Whether it has taken alternative 

measures to mitigate the risk of a 

hardware, network, software, database, 

or other failure or is taking steps to 

remediate any issues that it has 

identified with respect thereto, in which 

case it shall provide a brief explanation 

of such alternative measures or such 

remediation steps, the date by which it 

anticipates such remediation will be 

completed, and why it believes those 

measures are reasonably sufficient to 

mitigate such risk; or 

(B) Whether it believes that one or 

more of the requirements of this 

subsection are not applicable to its 

network, in which case it shall provide 

a brief explanation of why it believes 

any such requirement does not apply. 

(5) Situational awareness and 

information sharing. 

(i) A covered 911 service provider 

shall certify whether it has, within the 

past year: 

(A) Implemented reasonable measures 

to maintain real-time situational 

awareness regarding the operational 

status of 911, E911, or NG911 service 

throughout any portion(s) of the 911 

network that it owns, leases, or 

otherwise operates or controls or as to 

which it otherwise provides any of the 

capabilities or services described in 

paragraph (a)(4)(i)(A) of this section. 

(B) Implemented reasonable measures 

to share appropriate information with 

PSAPs and other covered 911 service 

providers in the event of a disruption of 

911, E911, or NG911 service, including, 

at a minimum, the information required 

under part 4 of the Commission’s rules 

and under § 12.7 . 

(ii) If a covered 911 service provider 

has not implemented all of the elements 

in paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this section, it 

must certify: 

(A) Whether it has taken alternative 

measures to mitigate the risk of 

inadequate situational awareness and 

information sharing or is taking steps to 

remediate any issues that it has 

identified, in which case it shall provide 

a brief explanation of such alternative 

measures or such remediation steps, the 

date by which it anticipates such 

remediation will be completed, and why 

it believes those measures are 

reasonably sufficient to mitigate such 

risk; or 

(B) Whether it believes that one or 

more of the requirements of this 

subsection are not applicable to its 

network, in which case it shall provide 

a brief explanation of why it believes 

any such requirement does not apply. 

* * * * * 

■ 3. Add § 12.5 to read as follows: 

§ 12.5 Transparency and accountability in 

connection with major changes in 911 

service. 

(a) Major Changes in 911 network 

architecture and services. A covered 911 

service provider, as defined in 

§ 12.4(a)(4), seeking to make major 

changes in its 911 network architecture 

and services shall file a public 


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3206 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

notification under this section, except as 

provided under paragraphs (a)(3) 

through (5) of this section. 

(1) For purposes of this section, the 

following actions by a covered 911 

service provider constitute major 

changes in 911 network architecture and 

services: 

(i) A change in 911 network 

architecture that affects the primary 

geographic routing or logical processing 

of voice calls, automatic location 

information (ALI), automatic number 

identification (ANI), location 

information services (LIS), text-to-911, 

or functionally equivalent capabilities, 

to public safety answering points 

(PSAPs), statewide default answering 

points, or appropriate local emergency 

authorities in more than one state; 

(ii) A change in 911 network 

architecture that affects the availability 

of backup routing or processing 

capabilities for voice calls, ALI, ANI, 

LIS, text-to-911, or functionally 

equivalent capabilities, to PSAPs, 

statewide default answering points, or 

appropriate local emergency authorities 

in more than one state; or 

(iii) A change in the allocation of 

primary responsibility with respect to 

provision of any of the capabilities or 

services described in § 12.4(a)(4)(i) 

affecting more than one state, including 

but not limited to a covered 911 service 

provider’s allocation of such 

responsibilities to a sub-contractor or 

other third party. 

(2) Notifications under this section 

shall be filed with the Commission at 

least 60 days before the changes 

described therein take effect. 

(i) Notifications shall state publicly 

the nature of the proposed changes, the 

geographic area(s) or jurisdiction(s) 

affected, the anticipated date of the 

changes, and any other relevant 

information. 

(ii) To the extent that notifications 

contain information that would cause 

competitive harm or a threat to public 

safety or national security if disclosed, 

a covered 911 service provider may 

request confidential treatment of such 

information under § 0.459 of this 

chapter. 

(3) Changes initiated by a PSAP or 

emergency authority. Changes in 911 

network architecture or service initiated 

by a public safety answering point 

(PSAP) or state or local emergency 

authority shall not require a notification 

to be filed under this section. 

(4) Changes subject to public notice 

under Section 251. Changes in 911 

network architecture or service that 

require public notice of network 

changes under § 51.325 of this chapter 

shall not require a separate notification 

under this section. 

(5) Emergency changes. Changes in 

911 architecture or services reasonably 

necessary to mitigate the impacts of a 

disruption or degradation in 911 

service, including temporary re-routes 

to backup equipment or secondary 

PSAPs, shall not require a notification 

to be filed under this section. 

(b) Discontinuance, reduction, or 

impairment of existing 911 services. A 

covered 911 service provider, as defined 

in § 12.4(a)(4), seeking to discontinue, 

reduce, or impair existing 911 services 

shall file a public notification with the 

Commission and receive approval from 

the Commission before undertaking 

such actions, except as provided in 

paragraphs (b)(3) and (4) of this section. 

(1) For purposes of this section, the 

following actions by a covered 911 

service provider constitute a 

discontinuance, reduction, or 

impairment of existing 911 services: 

(i) Exit from a line of 911 services 

previously provided to PSAPs, 

statewide default answering points, or 

appropriate local emergency authorities 

in more than one state; 

(ii) Termination or reduction in 

technical support or maintenance for 

911 network components or customer 

premises equipment (CPE) to PSAPs, 

statewide default answering points, or 

appropriate local emergency authorities 

in more than one state; or 

(iii) Reduction or impairment of 

quality-of-service levels for 911 services 

to PSAPs, statewide default answering 

points, or appropriate local emergency 

authorities in more than one state. 

(2) Applications for discontinuance, 

reduction, or impairment of existing 911 

services under this section shall be filed 

with the Commission at least 60 days 

before the changes described therein are 

requested to take effect. The 

Commission shall respond within 60 

days by approving the request, 

approving the request subject to 

conditions, or denying the request. If the 

Commission takes no action within 60 

days, the request shall be deemed 

approved. 

(i) Applications shall state publicly 

the nature of the proposed 

discontinuance, reduction, or 

impairment, the geographic area(s) or 

jurisdiction(s) affected, the anticipated 

date of the changes, and any other 

relevant information. 

(ii) To the extent that applications 

contain information that would cause 

competitive harm or a threat to public 

safety or national security if disclosed, 

a covered 911 service provider may 

request confidential treatment of such 

information under § 0.459 of this 

chapter. 

(3) Changes initiated by a PSAP or 

emergency authority. Changes in 911 

network architecture or service initiated 

by a PSAP or state or local emergency 

authority, including changes that would 

otherwise constitute a discontinuance, 

reduction, or impairment of existing 911 

services under paragraph (b) of this 

section, shall not require Commission 

approval under this section. 

(4) Changes subject to Section 214 

authorization. Changes in 911 network 

architecture or service that require 

Commission authorization under 

Section 214 of the Communications Act 

and associated Commission rules shall 

not require separate Commission 

approval under this section. 

■ 4. Add § 12.6 to read as follows: 

§ 12.6 Reliability and accountability of new 

IP-based 911 capabilities and services. 

(a) Certification of capability to 

provide reliable 911 service. Entities 

that propose to provide one or more of 

the capabilities of a covered 911 service 

provider, as defined in § 12.4(a)(4), but 

do not provide such capabilities prior to 

November 21, 2014, shall certify to the 

Commission that they: 

(1) Possess the technical and 

operational capability to provide 

reliable 911 service; 

(2) Have conducted a reliability and 

security risk analysis of any network 

components, infrastructure and/or 

databases and software used to support 

911 call completion, including 

automatic location information (ALI), 

automatic number identification (ANI), 

location information services (LIS), textto-911, or the functional equivalent of 

those capabilities; and 

(3) Understand and agree to abide by 

the Commission’s annual reliability 

certification requirements under this 

part 12, any applicable outage reporting 

or PSAP outage notification 

requirements under § 4.9 of this chapter, 

and any other Commission rules 

applicable to the new 911 capabilities 

that it offers. 

(b) [Reserved] 

■ 5. Add § 12.7 to read as follows: 

§ 12.7 Situational awareness and 

coordination responsibility during 

disruptions in 911 service. 

(a) Designation of 911 Network 

Operations Center (NOC) Provider. The 

covered 911 service provider 

responsible for transport of 911 calls 

and associated information to the public 

safety answering point (PSAP), 

statewide default answering point, or 

appropriate local emergency authority 

in each jurisdiction, pursuant to a 


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contractual relationship with that PSAP, 

statewide default answering point, or 

appropriate local emergency authority, 

shall be the 911 NOC Provider in that 

jurisdiction. 

(b) Responsibilities of 911 NOC 

Provider. The 911 NOC Provider in each 

jurisdiction shall monitor the 

availability of 911 services and 

coordinate situational awareness and 

information sharing during disruptions 

in 911 service. For purposes of this 

section, disruptions in 911 service 

include events resulting in a complete 

loss of 911 service, as well as events that 

substantially impair service quality or 

public access to 911 without a complete 

loss of service, including disruption of 

automatic location information (ALI), 

automatic number identification (ANI), 

location information services (LIS), or 

any other services that locate callers 

geographically. 

(1) In the event of such a disruption 

in 911 service, the 911 NOC Provider 

shall request information from any other 

affected covered 911 service provider(s) 

regarding their situational awareness of 

the cause and scope of the outage from 

the origination to the completion of 911 

communications, including voice calls, 

ALI, ANI, LIS, and text-to-911. The 911 

NOC Provider shall then communicate 

to any other affected covered 911 

service providers, PSAPs, state 

emergency management offices, and to 

the Commission’s Operations Center, all 

information reasonably available to 

mitigate the effects of the disruption and 

to restore service. 

(2) All other covered 911 service 

providers shall communicate to the 911 

NOC Provider all reasonably available 

information regarding the cause and 

scope of a disruption in 911 service that 

occurs on or affects portions of the 911 

network that they own, lease, or 

otherwise operate or control and shall 

respond promptly to any request for 

such information by the 911 NOC 

Provider. 

[FR Doc. 2015–00940 Filed 1–21–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Part 73 

[MB Docket No. 14–236; RM–11739; DA 15– 

10] 

Radio Broadcasting Services; Bogata, 

Texas 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: This document requests 

comments on a Petition for Rule Making 

filed by Charles Crawford, proposing to 

amend the FM Table of Allotments, of 

the Commission’s rules, by allotting 

Channel 247A at Bogata, Texas, as a first 

local service. A staff engineering 

analysis indicates that Channel 247A 

can be allotted to Bogata, Texas 

consistent with the minimum distance 

separation requirements of the 

Commission’s rules with a site 

restriction located 12.9 kilometers (8 

miles) northwest of Bogata. The 

reference coordinates are 33–33–21 NL 

and 95–18–28 WL. 

DATES: Comments must be filed on or 

before March 2, 2015, and reply 

comments on or before March 17, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Secretary, Federal 

Communications Commission, 445 12th 

Street SW., Washington, DC 20554. In 

addition to filing comments with the 

FCC, interested parties should serve the 

petitioner as follows: Charles Crawford, 

2215 Cedar Springs Rd., #1605, Dallas, 

Texas 75201. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rolanda F. Smith, Media Bureau, (202) 

418–2700. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

synopsis of the Commission’s Notice of 

Proposed Rule Making, MB Docket No. 

14–236, adopted January 8, 2015, and 

released January 9, 2015. The full text 

of this Commission decision is available 

for inspection and copying during 

normal business hours in the FCC’s 

Reference Information Center at Portals 

II, CY–A257, 445 12th Street SW., 

Washington, DC 20554. This document 

may also be purchased from the 

Commission’s duplicating contractors, 

Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 445 12th 

Street SW., Room CY–B402, 

Washington, DC 20554, telephone 1– 

800–378–3160 or via email 

www.BCPIWEB.com. This document 

does not contain proposed information 

collection requirements subject to the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 

Public Law 104–13. In addition, 

therefore, it does not contain any 

proposed information collection burden 

‘‘for small business concerns with fewer 

than 25 employees,’’ pursuant to the 

Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 

2002, Public Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C. 

3506(c)(4). 

Provisions of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of l980 do not apply to 

this proceeding. 

Members of the public should note 

that from the time a Notice of Proposed 

Rule Making is issued until the matter 

is no longer subject to Commission 

consideration or court review, all ex 

parte contacts are prohibited in 

Commission proceedings, such as this 

one, which involve channel allotments. 

See 47 CFR 1.1204(b) for rules 

governing permissible ex parte contacts. 

For information regarding proper 

filing procedures for comments, see 47 

CFR 1.415 and 1.420. 

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 73 

Radio, Radio broadcasting. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Nazifa Sawez, 

Assistant Chief, Audio Division, Media 

Bureau. 

Proposed Rule 

For the reasons discussed in the 

preamble, the Federal Communications 

Commission proposes to amend 47 CFR 

part 73 as follows: 

PART 73—RADIO BROADCAST 

SERVICES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 73 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 303, 334, 336 and 

339. 

§ 73.202 [Amended] 

■ 2. Section 73.202(b), the Table of FM 

Allotments under Texas, is amended by 

adding Bogata, Channel 247A. 

[FR Doc. 2015–01021 Filed 1–21–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 622 

[Docket No. 140501394–5011–01] 

RIN 0648–BE20 

Fisheries of the Caribbean, Gulf of 

Mexico, and South Atlantic; SnapperGrouper Fishery Off the Southern 

Atlantic States; Amendment 32 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: NMFS proposes regulations to 

implement Amendment 32 to the 

Fishery Management Plan for the 

Snapper-Grouper Fishery of the South 

Atlantic Region (FMP), as prepared by 

the South Atlantic Fishery Management 

Council (Council). If implemented, this 

rule would remove blueline tilefish 

from the deep-water complex; establish 

blueline tilefish commercial and 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS