NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 22-3128

__________

FRANCIENNA GRANT,

 Appellant

v.

MICHAEL ELIAS; STATE; STEPHEN MILLS, also known as

STEVEN MILLS; MUNICIPAL COURT CAPE MAY COUNTY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-12065)

District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb

___________

No. 22-3141

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FRANCIENNA GRANT,

 Appellant

v.

WILLIAM HUNTLEY PANICO; WILLIAM H. PANICO D.M.D.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-20535)

District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb
2

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No. 22-3142 

___________

FRANCIENNA GRANT,

 Appellant

v.

DANILO G. YBANEZ; DANILO G. YBANEZ D.M.D.

___________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-21201)

District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 21, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 10, 2023)

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OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Francienna Grant appeals from orders of the United States District 

Court for the District of New Jersey denying her motions for reconsideration, relief under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, recusal, and an emergency stay. For the following 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
3

reasons, we will dismiss the appeals in part for lack of jurisdiction, and to the extent that 

we do have jurisdiction, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.

I.

These related appeals stem from three separate pro se actions that Grant initiated 

in the District Court. Each action related to lawsuits she had filed and litigated in the 

New Jersey State courts. Upon the defendants’ motions to dismiss and its own orders to 

show cause, the District Court dismissed all three complaints with prejudice in a single 

opinion and accompanying order filed on each docket on May 15, 2020. The District 

Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the cases because Grant sought to appeal 

from the decisions of state courts.

On June 8, 2020, Grant filed a motion for reconsideration in each case.1 The 

following month, she filed a motion for entry of default. The District Court denied both 

motions as to all cases in an order and opinion filed on September 8, 2020. The District 

Court also ordered that Grant was precluded from filing further motions in any of the 

cases without permission from the court. On October 2, 2020, Grant filed a letter 

requesting permission to file a motion pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 60. After 

receiving no response from the court, Grant filed a Rule 60 motion on September 9, 2021. 

The District Court administratively terminated the Rule 60 motion on January 28, 2022, 

noting that it appeared to reiterate matters already resolved by the court, and that Grant 

did not obtain permission to file the motion. Grant subsequently filed a motion to recuse 

1 After the District Court disposed of the complaints in one opinion and order, all but one 

of Grant’s subsequent filings were cross-filed in all three cases. 
4

the District Judge and, in D.N.J. Civ. No. 19-cv-12065 only, a motion to stay related 

proceedings in state court. The District Court denied those motions in an order entered 

on October 20, 2022. 

On November 7, 2022, Grant filed a notice of appeal, specifying the District 

Court’s January 2022 order administratively terminating her Rule 60 motion and its 

October 2022 order denying her motion for recusal and for an emergency stay.2 Grant 

amended her notice of appeal on November 17, 2022, to also specify the District Court’s 

September 2020 order denying her motions for reconsideration and default and imposing 

the filing restriction.

II.

We will dismiss this consolidated appeal in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

The taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional. 

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007). Grant had thirty days from the District 

Court’s entry of its September 8, 2020, order in which to timely file a notice of appeal, or 

until Thursday, October 8, 2020. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 

Her November 9, 2022, notice of appeal was accordingly not timely filed as to that order. 

The same is true with respect to any earlier order that Grant may seek to challenge in her 

briefs, as well as the District Court’s later administrative termination of Grant’s Rule 

60(b) motion, which was entered on January 28, 2022, several months prior to the filing 

of Grant’s notice of appeal. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal in part. 

2 Her notice of appeal, like the earlier motions, was filed in all three cases. The three 

appeals docketed here have been consolidated for disposition. 
5

However, we exercise jurisdiction over the District Court’s order denying Grant’s 

motion for recusal and emergency stay, as her notice of appeal was filed within thirty 

days of the entry of that October 20, 2022, order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Ohntrup v. 

Firearms Ctr., Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986) (per curiam). We review both 

denials for abuse of discretion. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(per curiam) (regarding motions for recusal); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales 

Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2001) (regarding the denial of injunctive 

relief). 

III.

We cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion here. First, with respect 

to Grant’s motion for recusal, she has not specified whether she was relying on 

28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455, so we will address both statutes. Under § 144, 

recusal is warranted where a party files a “timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge 

before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice against him or in 

favor of any adverse party.” The affidavit “shall be filed less than ten days before the 

beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be 

shown for failure to file it within such time.” Id. Here, Grant did not file her motion for 

recusal until August 2022, several years after she commenced her actions in the District 

Court, and she has not shown good cause to excuse the delay. Her motion was 

accordingly not timely filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. See Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l 

Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, construing her motion as an affidavit 

for § 144 purposes, it is not “sufficient” because it contains only a conclusory assertion 
6

that the District Judge was biased against her. See United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 

1328, 1340 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that conclusory statements and opinions need not 

be credited). Similarly, Grant’s motion does not contain facts suggesting that the District 

Judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” as is required under § 455. See

28 U.S.C. § 455(a). We accordingly conclude that, regardless of the statutory basis for 

the request, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Grant’s motion for 

recusal.

To the extent that Grant appeals from the District Court’s denial of her motion to 

stay state court proceedings, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 

discretion. Federal courts are generally prohibited from granting injunctions to stay state 

court proceedings under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and Grant provides 

no basis for her motion, nor are there any circumstances evident in the record which 

would warrant an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. See In re Prudential, 261 F.3d at 

364.

For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Grant’s 

motion for recusal and her motion for an emergency stay and otherwise dismiss this 

consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Grant's motion to vacate this Court's order 

granting the Appellees leave to file a supplemental appendix and her motions for rulings 

against Appellees for failure to prosecute pursuant to 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 107.2 are 

denied.