IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

) I.D.: 2008000653

v. )

)

MICHAEL PULLIAM, )

)

Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

This 20th day of June, 2023, upon consideration of Defendant Michael 

Pulliam’s Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, the State’s response, the affidavit of 

Erica LaCon, Esquire, and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:

1. On November 16, 2020, Pulliam was indicted in a six-count indictment. He 

was charged with Burglary First Degree, Robbery First Degree, Possession of 

a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Criminal Mischief, 

Theft and Terroristic Threatening. If convicted on all counts, Pulliam faced a 

sentence ranging from 4 years minimum mandatory to 50 years.

2. These charges stem from an incident that occurred at 114 Margaretta Drive, 

Middletown, Delaware. Defendant was found inside the home of the victim 

by the police. The search warrant indicates that Pulliam entered the house by 

shattering the living room window. While inside the residence, Pulliam

ransacked the victim’s belongings. Pulliam approached the victim’s bedroom, 
where she was located. The victim fired several shots at the Defendant. The 

Defendant was found in the house by police after the victim had called 911.

3. On April 18, 2022 Pulliam pled guilty to Burglary 1st degree and PDWDCF. 

A nolle prosequi was entered as to all remaining charges. Upon completion of 

the plea colloquy, the Court ordered a Pre-Sentence Investigation. At the time 

of the filing of the instant motion, Pulliam has not yet been sentenced.

4. On July 5, 2022, Pulliam advised Ms. LaCon, his defense counsel, that he 

desired to withdraw his guilty plea. Pulliam stated to his counsel that he did 

not understand the sentencing guidelines or recommendations that were in 

play with acceptance of his guilty plea.

5. On July 18, 2022, Ms. LaCon filed a Motion to Withdraw, which was granted.

Brian Chapman was appointed to represent Pulliam for all further 

proceedings, including his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Chapman filed 

a Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea on April 6, 2023. The State filed its 

response on May 12, 2023. Ms. LaCon, at the Court’s direction, filed an 

affidavit on May 23, 2023.

6. While a guilty plea may be withdrawn before sentencing, there is no absolute 

right to do so.1 The defendant bears the “substantial” burden of showing “any 

fair and just reason” for withdrawal.

2 This decision is purely discretionary.3

1 Del. Crim. R. 32(d); United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

2

Id.; United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d. Cir. 2003).

3

Id. (“the court may permit withdrawal of the plea”) (emphasis added); State v. Phillips, 2007 WL 3105749 at *1 

(Del. Super. Ct. 2007) (quoting Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 504 (Del. 1969)).
7. To determine whether there is a “fair and just” reason for the withdrawal of a 

guilty plea, the Court must address the following: 

a) Was there a procedural defect in taking the plea;

b) Did the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consent to the plea 

agreement;

c) Does the defendant presently have a basis to assert legal innocence;

d) Did the defendant have adequate legal counsel throughout the 

proceedings; and

e) Does granting the motion prejudice the State or unduly inconvenience 

the Court.4

The Court does not balance these factors.5Instead, “[c]ertain of the factors, 

standing alone, will themselves justify relief.”6

8. Pulliam argues that his counsel was ineffective and that his plea was not 

entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently because he did not 

understand the sentencing guidelines or recommendations. The State argues 

that there is no basis to allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.

9. There were no procedural defects in the plea colloquy. Defendant does not 

cite any procedural defect in his plea, nor can the Court locate one upon 

review of the record.

10.Pulliam’s plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. In 

the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Pulliam remains 

bound by the answers he provided during his guilty plea colloquy.7 These 

4 State v. Friend, 1994 WL 234120, at * 2 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994) (internal citations omitted); see Scarborough v. 

State, 938 A.2d 644, 649 (Del. 2007); McNeill v. State, 2002 WL 31477132, at * 1–2 (Del. 2002).

5 Patterson v. State, 684 A.2d 1234, 1239 (Del. 1996).

6

Id.

7

Id. at 632.
statements are “presumed to be truthful”8

and pose a “formidable barrier to a 

collateral attack on a guilty plea.”9

11.The Court asked Defendant, “The sentencing in this case, the minimum 

sentence in this case that I’m required to impose is four years. The deal that’s 

been cut with the State is there’s going to be a recommendation on both sides 

that you will serve at least five years, but there’s been no recommendation as 

to what that ceiling should be. And that would be determined after the 

presentence investigation report. Do you understand that?” Defendant 

responded “yes sir.”

12.Further, the Court then asked, “Did you also understand that the statutory 

penalty, the maximum statutory penalty for you in this , if the judge choses to 

do it, is up to 50 years in jail. Do you understand that? Do you understand that 

the ultimate decision maker on what the sentencing ought to be, whether its 

four years as a minimum or five years as a minimum or another number is 

ultimately up to the sentencing judge? Do you understand that? Defendant 

responded, “yes, sir.”

13.Having reviewed the plea colloquy, the Court finds that each of Pulliam’s 

contentions were adequately and appropriately addressed at the time. He is 

bound by his in-court representations. So, this Court finds that Pulliam entered 

his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

8

Id.

9 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 64 (1977).
14.Pulliam does not have a basis to establish factual or legal innocence. Criminal 

defendants remain presumptively bound by their representations to the 

Court.10 So, after pleading guilty, a defendant must present “some other 

support” to overcome a guilty plea and to assert innocence.11

15.During his plea colloquy, Pulliam admitted his guilt as to each offense.

12

Pulliam makes a bare assertion that he believes he has a basis to assert his 

innocence without more. There is no justification to allow him to withdraw 

his guilty plea on this basis.

16.Pulliam had effective legal counsel throughout his proceedings. To prevail on 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Pulliam must satisfy the two-prong 

standard established by Strickland v. Washington.

13 He must show that: (1) 

his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness;” and (2) that counsel’s actions were so prejudicial “that there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [the defendant] would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’”14 When 

evaluating counsel’s performance, “[a] court must indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.”15

10 Somerville, 703 A.2d at 632.

11 State v. McNeill, 2001 WL 392465, at * 3 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001) (citing Russell v. State, 734 A.2d 160 (table) 

(Del. 1999)).

12 Tr., at 17:7–18:19, D.I. 78.

13 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988).

14 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).

15 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added); see also Albury, 551 A.2d at 59.
17.In his motion, Pulliam claims he told counsel that he did not understand the 

sentencing guidelines or the recommendations that were in play with 

acceptance of his guilty plea.16 These blanket assertions are insufficient bases 

for granting withdrawal.

18.In opposition to Pulliam’s claims, Ms. LaCon states that she and Pulliam 

discussed the case and the risks and rewards of going to trial and the risks and 

rewards of entering a plea. She advised Pulliam that, as a condition of 

lowering his minimum mandatory exposure, the State was requesting open 

sentencing. Ms. LaCon advised Pulliam that the State was not bound by a 

recommendation in the plea and could ask for the maximum Level V time 

permissible under the law.

19.Ms. LaCon’s affidavit is contrary to Pulliam’s assertions. Having considered 

the record, the Court does not find that Pulliam satisfied his burden to show 

that Ms. LaCon’s conduct fell below the strong presumption of reasonable 

professional assistance. Pulliam remains bounds by this statements that he 

was neither forced nor coerced into pleading.

20.Granting withdrawal would prejudice the State and unduly inconvenience the 

Court. While it is true that “[o]ur Court is in the business of conducting 

trials,”17 prejudice need not be considered “when a defendant has failed to 

16 D.I. 72.

17 State v. Jones, 2020 WL 5530332, at * 4 (Del. Super. Ct., 2020), aff’d, 276 A.3d 1053 (Del. 2022); see D.I. 97, at 

18.
demonstrate that the other factors support a withdrawal of the plea.”18 Pulliam, 

as detailed above, failed to establish a “fair and just” reason to withdraw his 

guilty plea. Thus, the Court need not address this factor, but nonetheless, finds 

that the State would be prejudiced and resources would be unjustifiably 

expended if the motion were granted. The basis of this conclusion is the age 

of the case, that the victim suffers from severe emotional distress, and the 

withdrawal of the guilty plea would be unfair to the victim, who after the 

defendant admitted in open court to committing these crimes, gained some 

closure on this traumatic event in her life. 

THEREFORE, Defendant Michael Pulliam’s Motion to Withdraw 

Guilty Plea is DENIED. A sentencing date shall be set.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.

 Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

cc: Original to the Prothonotary

Matthew Hicks, Deputy Attorney General

Brian J. Chapman, Esquire

Erika B. LaCon, Assistant Public Defender 

18 United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 255 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1210 (3d. 

Cir. 1995)).