___________ No. 96-2171

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Richard Lynn Christian, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 4, 1996 Filed: November 4, 1996

___________ Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Richard L. Christian challenges the 15-month sentence imposed by the distri ct court after he pleaded guilty to manufacturing marijuana, i n violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We remand.
Upon exec uting a search warrant at a property occupied by Christian and his wife, Pamela, law enforcement officers discovered an outbuilding being used for growing marijuana, and marijuana plants and harveste d mariju ana inside the Christians' residence. The officers seized fou r loaded weapons from the residence--one from Pame la's purse, one from under a couch, and two from a wall rack. Stating that Christian "was armed at the time of his arrest," the presentence report (PSR) assessed a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The PSR also assigned two criminal historypoints under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.10), for a Washington stat e robbery charge to which Christian had pleaded guilty. The PS R indicated Christian was placed on probation for

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five years and commenced a six-month sentence on July 18, 1983, for this offense.
Christianobjected to the statement that he "`was armed at the time of his arrest,'" asked that the statement be deleted from the PSR, an d argu ed that the government had not presented evidence to support th e section 2D1.1(b)(1) increase. Christian also ob jected to inclusion of his Wa shingtonstate conviction in his criminal-history calculation. A t sentencing, the district court said, "I'm going to overrule the [section 2D1.1(b)(1)] objection, deny it," and also overr uled Christian's criminalhistory objection.

On a ppeal, Christian argues--and the government concedes--that th e distri ct court should not have counted his robbery conviction i n calcul ating his criminal history, because the sentence was imposed mor e than ten years prior to the commission of the present offense. Se e U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1-3) (instructing court not to count any sentence less than thirteen months that was not imposed within ten years of defendant's commencement of instant offense). Based on the government's concession, we remand for recalculation of Christian's criminal history category.
Ch ristian also contends the district court improperly required hi m to prove that the section 2D1.1(b)(1) increase was not merited and erred in overruling his obj ections to the PSR without conducting an evidentiary heari ng. We recognize that Christian did not communicate his PS R objections to the government within fourteen day s after receiving the PSR, as required, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(B), but counsel for th e go vernment informed the court that she had received a summary o f Christian's objections in the addendum to the PSR. A two-level increase is appropriate if the government proves by a pre ponderance of the evidence that the d efendant possessed a dangerous weapon and it is not clearl y improb able the weapon was connected with the offense. U.S.S.G
. § 2D1.1(b)(1) & comment. (n.3); United States v. Hammer , 3 F.3d

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266, 272 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1139 (1994) (discussing burden). We review for clear error the court's factual findings, an d revie wde novo the court's application of the Guidelines to the facts
. United States v. Elliott , 89 F.3d 1360, 1370 (8th Cir. 1996).
When, as here, the defendant objects to fact statements in the PSR, the district court ma y not accept the disputed facts set forth in the PSR or re quire the defendant to disprove those facts, but rather, th e government must prove the disputed facts at the sentencing hearing. See id. ; United States v. Burke , 80 F.3d 314, 315, 317 (8th Cir. 1996). W e conclude the district court's rejection of Chris tian's section 2D1.1(b)(1) obj ection does not "allow for meaningful appellate review," and thus w e remand for the court to make a finding or determination that fulfills the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1). See United States v. Fetlow , 21 F.3d 243, 248 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 45 6 (1994); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (requiring court to make findin g on disputed matter or determination that no finding is necessary a s disputed matter will not be considered or will not affect sentence).

Ac cordingly, we vacate Christian's sentence and remand for furthe r proceedings consistent with this opinion. BEAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Christian did not give appropriate notice to either the United States or the district court of several of the objections he now raises on appeal
. Thus, these issues were waived. The order of reversal directs the distric t court to c onsider them in further proceedings. From this approach, I dissent.

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Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.