UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

LADONA A. POORE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

STANLEY GLANZ, in his individual 

capacity; VIC REGALADO, in his official 

capacity,*

 

 Defendants - Appellants. 

No. 16-5164 

(D.C. No. 4:11-CV-00797-JED-TLW) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT**

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

In 2010, detention officer Seth Bowers sexually abused then-seventeen-yearold Ladona Poore while she was incarcerated at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice 

Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Poore brought Eighth Amendment claims under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against the Tulsa County sheriff, Stanley Glanz, in his individual and 

 *

 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Vic Regalado, the current Tulsa County 

sheriff, is automatically substituted for former Tulsa County sheriff Michelle 

Robinette as an appellant. 

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 5, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

official capacities,1

 alleging that the jail provided inadequate housing, staffing, and 

supervision for the area of the facility where juvenile female inmates were housed. 

Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Poore, awarding $25,000 in 

damages. The district court denied a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of 

law (“JMOL”) or a new trial. 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Viewed in the light 

most favorable to Poore, the evidence shows that Glanz knew the policies he 

implemented with respect to juvenile female inmates created an excessive risk of 

sexual assault and that he was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Although Glanz 

acknowledged that juvenile female inmates were at a heightened risk of sexual abuse, 

he chose to house them in an area of the jail that was visually isolated, unmonitored, 

and often staffed by only one male officer, and where a prior incident of misconduct 

had occurred. He did so despite written policies intended to prevent sexual abuse 

that required direct supervision of juvenile inmates and prohibited male officers from 

entering the cell of juvenile female inmates alone. We conclude that the evidence is 

sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions that Glanz caused a violation of Poore’s 

constitutional rights and that he acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. We 

further conclude that the contours of the constitutional right at issue were sufficiently 

 1

 After Michelle Robinette replaced Glanz as acting Tulsa County sheriff, she 

took his place as the defendant with respect to Poore’s official capacity claim 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). As noted in the caption, Robinette was 

subsequently replaced by Vic Regalado.
3 

clear that Glanz is not entitled to qualified immunity. We reject a number of other 

evidentiary arguments advanced on appeal. 

I 

A 

We review a district court’s denial of JMOL de novo, drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377 

F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 2004). In conducting this review, we cannot “weigh the 

evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our conclusions for 

th[ose] of the jury.” Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 

1999) (quotation omitted). “[W]e may find error only if the evidence points but one 

way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party for whom the 

jury found.” Ralston Dev. Corp. v. United States, 937 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1991) 

(quotation omitted). “We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a 

motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a).” M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 

F.3d 753, 762 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If “a new trial motion asserts that 

the jury verdict is not supported by the evidence, the verdict must stand unless it is 

clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence.” Anaeme 

v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). 

In contrast to the deferential standard we apply in reviewing a jury’s verdict, 

we review a district court’s doctrinal analysis regarding qualified immunity de novo. 

Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003). If a defendant asserts 

qualified immunity, “the plaintiff has the heavy burden of establishing: (1) that the 
4 

defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the 

right violated was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s actions.” Greene 

v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 1999). 

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 

imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, 

including “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation omitted). However, this minimum 

standard does not impose constitutional liability on prison officials for every injury 

an inmate suffers during detention. First, the alleged injury must be “sufficiently 

serious.” Id. at 834 (quotation omitted). It is undisputed that sexual assault satisfies 

this objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. See Hovater v. Robinson, 

1 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A]n inmate has a constitutional right to be 

secure in her bodily integrity and free from attack by prison guards.”). 

Second, the prison official must have had “a sufficiently culpable state of 

mind” amounting to “deliberate indifference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quotation 

omitted). Under this standard, “a prison official cannot be found liable under the 

Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless 

the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

at 837. The official must actually be “aware of facts from which the inference could 

be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the 

inference.” Id. “An official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk of which he was 

unaware, no matter how obvious the risk or how gross his negligence in failing to 
5 

perceive it, is not an infliction of punishment and therefore not a constitutional 

violation.” Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). 

This mens rea standard extends to Eighth Amendment claims brought against 

supervisors. To prevail on a supervisory liability claim, there must be an 

“affirmative link between the constitutional deprivation and the supervisor’s actions.” 

Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Keith I”). A supervisor is 

directly responsible for an Eighth Amendment violation if the plaintiff can show: 

“(1) personal involvement, (2) sufficient causal connection, and (3) culpable state of 

mind.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010). Similarly, 

because we have recognized that “[s]uing individual defendants in their official 

capacities under § 1983 . . . is essentially another way of pleading an action against 

the county or municipality they represent,” Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 

(10th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), an official capacity claim can only be established 

if the official’s own policies led to the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[A] 

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” 

(italics omitted)). 

B 

With this framework in mind, we turn to the evidence presented at trial. Poore 

was housed at the Tulsa County jail from January to April of 2010. During that time 

period, she occupied one of the few cells in the north wing of the jail’s medical unit. 
6 

The cell was located near a nurses’ station, but curtains obscured the view from the 

nurses’ station to the door to Poore’s cell. The area had no surveillance cameras. 

Poore testified that during the early portion of her detention, Bowers began 

groping her. She stated that he entered her cell and engaged in this type of 

misconduct more than fifty times. The sexual abuse escalated during the course of 

her incarceration. Bowers watched Poore in the shower, asking if she was done and 

then laughing at her. He later exposed himself to Poore and demanded oral sex. 

Bowers engaged in oral sex with her on approximately ten occasions, and sexual 

intercourse approximately five times. Poore did not inform jail staff of the abuse 

because Bowers convinced her they would both face consequences if she reported 

him. 

After Poore was released, jail officials received a report about possible 

misconduct by Bowers. A material witness who had also been housed in the north 

wing informed an investigator, Billy Joe McKelvey, that Bowers would enter Poore’s 

cell and stay anywhere from five to twenty minutes at a time. The witness also 

informed McKelvey that another officer knew about these “inappropriate relations.” 

McKelvey met with the officer, who conceded he was aware of the misconduct and 

agreed to write a report. However, McKelvey explained that he had to engage the 

officer “pretty bluntly because he did not want to provide me this information.”

During McKelvey’s investigation, two other detention officers reluctantly 

admitted they heard from an inmate that “an employee of the sheriff’s office was 

having relations with the females on the . . . north end of the medical unit.” The 
7 

inmate explained that Bowers entered the cells of juvenile female inmates by himself 

and stayed for approximately twenty minutes. A juvenile female inmate who was 

housed across from Poore informed McKelvey that Bowers entered both of their 

cells. 

At the time of these events, Glanz was responsible for overseeing operation of 

the Tulsa County jail. Glanz recognized that rates of sexual abuse are much higher 

for incarcerated juveniles than for incarcerated adults. He acknowledged that girls 

are disproportionately represented among sexual abuse victims. And he agreed with 

Poore’s counsel that “youth incarcerated with adults are probably at the highest risk 

of sexual abuse.” 

Glanz further agreed that eliminating “blind spots” is key to effective 

supervision and that it is “critical” that individuals within the jail are aware that their 

conduct will be monitored or subject to surveillance. He stated that juvenile male 

inmates are housed in a “direct supervision” unit because very few inmate assaults 

occur in such settings. Female juvenile inmates, however, were not placed in a direct 

supervision environment. Glanz conceded that this placement decision violated his 

own policies. He further admitted that jail policies prohibiting a male officer from 

entering the cell of a juvenile female alone were instituted to protect those inmates 

from sexual assault, and that the policy was disregarded. 

Glanz also admitted he was aware of a prior incident in which a male nurse 

had been watching a juvenile female inmate shower in the medical unit. Although he 

conceded that better monitoring in that unit could discourage future incidents, Glanz 
8 

had not made any change to the manner in which juvenile female inmates were 

supervised after this prior incident. 

II 

A 

On appeal, defendants argue that Poore’s Eighth Amendment claim fails 

because she merely established a generalized risk of sexual assault rather than 

identifying any threat Bowers posed to herself. But an “official’s knowledge of the 

risk need not be knowledge of a substantial risk to a particular inmate, or knowledge 

of the particular manner in which injury might occur.” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916 

(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843). Nor must a defendant be aware of the “specific 

[individual] who eventually committed the assault . . . and it does not matter whether 

the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters 

whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or 

because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. 

Poore does not argue that all the inmates in the jail faced a general risk of 

sexual assault. Instead, she contends that Glanz was deliberately indifferent to a 

specific subset of individuals incarcerated in the jail: juvenile female inmates housed 

in the north wing of the medical unit—a small, clearly defined group. At the time of 

the incidents at issue, there were two or three such inmates. At most, six juvenile 

female inmates were present at any one time during Glanz’s tenure. Poore presented 

evidence showing that Glanz was subjectively aware that these inmates were at a 

high risk of sexual assault and that conditions in the north wing were especially 
9 

dangerous. The jury permissibly inferred that he was aware of the specific risk faced 

by Poore and other juvenile female inmates housed in the north wing. See generally 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848 (noting that “because of petitioner’s youth and feminine 

appearance,” respondents admitted that he was “likely to experience a great deal of 

sexual pressure in prison” (quotation omitted)). 

Defendants further argue that they cannot be liable because no juvenile female 

inmate housed in the north wing of the medical unit had ever been sexually assaulted 

prior to Poore. Many of our prior cases in which a supervisor was held liable for 

sexual misconduct involved prior instances of abuse. See, e.g., Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 

915; Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179, 1182-85 (10th Cir. 2005). But Poore did 

present evidence of a prior instance of sexual misconduct in the medical unit. Glanz 

was aware that a male nurse employed by the jail inappropriately watched a fifteenyear-old female inmate while she showered in the medical unit. He also conceded 

that this type of misconduct could have been discouraged by changes to the jail’s 

monitoring policy for that area. Despite his knowledge of this prior instance of 

sexual misconduct, Glanz did not make any changes to the manner in which juvenile 

female inmates were housed or how the medical unit was supervised, staffed, or 

monitored. 

Nevertheless, defendants argue that the shower incident was distinct enough 

from the events at issue in this case that it could not establish deliberate indifference. 

This argument ignores the fact that during the course of Bowers’ escalating 

misconduct, he engaged in precisely the same action, watching Poore while she 
10 

showered. In any event, we reject the suggestion that the only possible prior incident 

that could have alerted jail officials to the risk Poore faced would be a prior sexual 

assault of a juvenile female inmate by a detention officer in the north wing of the 

medical unit. As appellants themselves point out, the population of juvenile female 

inmates housed in the jail was very small. Defendants thus ask us to reverse a jury 

verdict based on the notion that, in an exceedingly small sample size, a prior incident 

must be identical rather than merely similar to the misconduct at issue to demonstrate 

a sufficiently serious risk. This we cannot do. As we have previously recognized, 

instances of sexual assault often begin with lesser violations of prison policy and are 

thus “relevant to the totality of the circumstances at [a prison] that may have 

contributed to the sexual misconduct.” Keith v. Koerner, 843 F.3d 833, 842 (10th 

Cir. 2016) (“Keith II”). 

“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a 

question of fact . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. We do not suggest that the shower 

incident, standing alone, would place every reasonable prison official on notice of a 

substantial risk. Instead, given the evidence presented in this case—including 

Glanz’s admissions of the dangers at issue—we conclude that the jury acted within 

its discretion when it determined that Glanz was subjectively aware of Poore’s risk of 

sexual assault in the north wing of the medical unit and that his decision to house her 

there evinced deliberate indifference. 
11 

B 

For similar reasons, we reject the argument that defendants are entitled to 

qualified immunity because this court has not previously held that the precise 

combination of policies implemented by Glanz constituted deliberate indifference. 

We have recognized “it is clearly established that a prison official’s deliberate 

indifference to sexual abuse by prison employees violates the Eighth Amendment.” 

Keith I, 707 F.3d at 1188. And because “a prison official’s failure to protect an 

inmate from a known harm may constitute a constitutional violation,” we have 

further held it to be clearly established that inmates possess “a constitutional right to 

expect” that jail officials will “reasonabl[y] protect[]” them from such abuse. Keith 

II, 843 F.3d at 850 (quotation and citation omitted). 

Principles regarding supervisory liability in this context are also firmly 

established. In Dodds, we explained that “the clearly established prong of the 

qualified immunity inquiry asks whether the contours of the right the plaintiff claims 

the defendant violated are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” 615 F.3d at 1206 (quotations 

and alteration omitted). We concluded it was “clearly established by 2007 that 

officials may be held individually liable for policies they promulgate, implement, or 

maintain that deprive persons of their federally protected rights.” Id. at 1207. 

 We have held corrections supervisors liable for failing to protect inmates from 

sexual abuse from staff on several occasions. In Keith I, we affirmed the denial of 

qualified immunity to a warden following sexual misconduct by an officer toward a 
12 

female inmate who was participating in a vocational training program. 707 F.3d at 

1187. We concluded that prior instances of sexual misconduct and undue familiarity 

along with “structural policy problems” relating to “the vocational training program 

and the insufficient use of cameras to monitor inmates and staff” suggested that the 

warden disregarded a substantial risk of such abuse despite being aware of the 

problem. Id. at 1189. In Tafoya, we concluded that a sheriff was liable for failing to 

prevent sexual assaults at a jail for several reasons, including: maintaining a staff 

who “did not report rapes, assaults, and illegal activities”; failing to enforce a “no 

contact policy . . . because there was not always a female detention officer on duty”; 

and failing to fully eliminate “blind spots where assaults could, and did, take place” 

when coupled with knowledge “that having some cameras in the jail was not enough 

to deter assaults in unmonitored areas.” 516 F.3d at 918-19. And in Keith II, we 

identified, among other factors that put the prison warden on notice, three prior 

incidents of “undue familiarity” and “opportunities for employees to be outside of 

other people’s eyesight, outside of cameras, inside of rooms with individual inmates” 

in the area of the facility where the incident occurred. 843 F.3d at 841 (quotation 

omitted). 

 Defendants rely heavily on our prior decisions holding that merely placing a 

female inmate in the custody of a single male guard does not amount to a 

constitutional violation. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 

1998); Hovater, 1 F.3d at 1066. In those cases, “however, a constitutional violation 

was not found because the only proof of prison officials’ knowledge of a substantial 
13 

risk of serious harm to a female inmate and failure to protect was predicated on the 

existence of a per se violation of a written jail policy.” Gonzales, 403 F.3d at 1186; 

see also Keith I, 707 F.3d at 1190 (noting that, in Barney, “the plaintiff presented no 

evidence of the actual knowledge required for § 1983 liability for deliberate 

indifference” and that, in Hovater, plaintiff’s claim was based on nothing more “than 

the fact she was a female inmate”). In this case, Poore has identified particular 

conditions in the north wing of the medical unit and adduced evidence that enabled 

the jury to find that Glanz was subjectively aware that those conditions constituted an 

excessive risk. See Keith I, 707 F.3d at 1190 (rejecting reliance on Barney and 

Hovater if prison official has “actual knowledge” of threat). 

 In addition, defendants correctly point out that other facts not present in this 

case supported a finding of deliberate indifference in Keith I, Tafoya, and Keith II.2

 

But the qualified immunity analysis is not “a scavenger hunt for prior cases with 

precisely the same facts”; the relevant inquiry is “whether the law put officials on fair 

notice that the described conduct was unconstitutional.” Casey v. City of Fed. 

Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). “We cannot find 

 2

 Defendants place special emphasis on the general lack of discipline at the 

facilities at issue in these cases, in contrast to a “zero tolerance” policy they contend 

was indisputably present at the Tulsa County jail. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 

(official may be “free from liability” if he “responded reasonably to the risk, even if 

the harm ultimately was not averted”). But the record does not clearly demonstrate 

that such a policy was enforced. See Keith II, 843 F.3d at 848 (“[E]ven with policies 

in place to respond to misconduct, such policies may be empty gestures without 

corresponding supervision and a legitimate threat of discipline for infractions.” 

(quotation and alteration omitted)). Three officers were aware of the sexual 

misconduct and failed to report it until confronted during McKelvey’s investigation. 

There is no evidence that these individuals were ever sanctioned. 
14 

qualified immunity wherever we have a new fact pattern.” Id. Although each of the 

conditions identified by Poore taken individually would not constitute a clearly 

established violation of Poore’s Eighth Amendment rights, the confluence of factors 

in this case impels us to affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. See 

Keith II, 843 F.3d at 840 (“[W]e must consider the conditions of confinement as a 

whole.” (quotation omitted)). A reasonable official in Glanz’s position, who had his 

subjective knowledge of the dangers posed by conditions in the north wing, would 

have been on fair notice that his conduct was unlawful. 

C 

We also affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL as to Poore’s official 

capacity claim. Because an official capacity claim “is essentially another way of 

pleading an action against the county or municipality [the official] represent[s],” 

Porro, 624 F.3d at 1328, we consider whether the Monell factors are satisfied. Under 

that test, “a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim must show 1) the existence of a 

municipal policy or custom and 2) a direct causal link between the policy or custom 

and the injury alleged.” Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 933 (10th Cir. 

2015) (quotation omitted). 

A policy or custom may take a variety of forms, including: 

(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting 

to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or 

express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 

custom or usage with the force of law; [or] (3) the decisions of employees with 

final policymaking authority . . . . 
15 

Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations and 

alteration omitted). For the same reasons we have concluded that the jury 

permissibly found Glanz liable on Poore’s supervisory liability claim, we uphold its 

verdict on her official capacity claim. A jury could have concluded in light of the 

evidence presented that the jail’s policy as to housing juvenile females directly 

caused the sexual assaults Poore endured.3

III 

Defendants also raise a number of evidentiary challenges on appeal. A district 

court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cartier v. Jackson, 

59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995). To warrant a new trial, evidentiary errors must 

“affect a party’s substantial rights.” Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1162 (10th 

Cir. 2005). 

First, defendants contend that the district court erred in refusing to permit 

Bowers to testify live, as opposed to by deposition, at trial. It is uncontested that at 

the time of his deposition, and at the time of trial, Bowers resided in Illinois, much 

farther than one hundred miles from the district court in Oklahoma. As a result, he 

was “unavailable” to testify at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B). The pretrial 

 3

 We thus affirm the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for JMOL on 

both the individual and official capacity claims. For the same reasons, we affirm the 

denial of defendants’ motion for a new trial to the extent that it is grounded on 

insufficiency of the evidence. See Lompe v. Sundridge Partners, LLC, 818 F.3d 

1041, 1062 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[a]s with the JMOL standard, the trial court must view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party” when evaluating a 

motion for a new trial); Miller v. Eby Realty Grp. LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1110 (10th 

Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s denial of motion for JMOL or in the alternative 

for a new trial where the “same three issues” were raised). 
16 

order listed Bowers as a witness by deposition. However, shortly before trial, 

defendants sought to call him live, apparently to withdraw his prior invocations of the 

Fifth Amendment during the deposition. The district court reasonably concluded that 

such conduct would be unfairly prejudicial. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Graystone 

Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 190-91 (3rd Cir.1994) (noting that “because the [Fifth 

Amendment] privilege may be initially invoked and later waived at a time when an 

adverse party can no longer secure the benefits of discovery, the potential for 

exploitation is apparent” and thus “belated waiver of the privilege could be unfair”). 

Second, defendants object to the district court’s admission of evidence 

regarding Bowers’ prior criminal history. A witness’ prior bad acts are generally 

inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). However, “[a]dmission of rebuttal evidence, 

particularly when the defendant ‘opens the door’ to the subject matter, is within the 

sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 

1450 (10th Cir. 1987). During opening statement, counsel for the defendants stated 

that Bowers had “not even a speeding ticket in his life.” We rule that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in permitting admission of evidence regarding 

Bowers’ criminal history. 

Third, defendants assert that the district court erred in permitting Poore’s 

counsel to question an expert witness about another alleged sexual assault of a female 

inmate in the jail’s medical unit. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked 

questions about that witness’ deposition testimony in a case arising from the incident. 

On re-direct, Poore’s counsel elicited additional testimony regarding the other case. 
17 

Because the district court issued a curative instruction to the jury to disregard this 

evidence, we hold that even were it erroneously admitted, defendants’ substantive 

rights were not violated as a result. See United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 

1042 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that “juries are presumed to follow curative 

instructions” to disregard evidence). 

Fourth, defendants argue that the district court erred in denying their motion to 

permit the jury to view the jail’s medical unit. “Whether the jury is permitted to 

view evidence outside the courtroom is a matter for the discretion of the trial court.” 

United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 883 (10th Cir. 1987). At trial, the jury saw 

photographs of the medical unit and heard evidence concerning the structure of this 

portion of the jail. And by the time trial commenced, the medical unit had changed 

significantly from the time when Poore was incarcerated.4

 We conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying this request. 

Finally, defendants argue that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of 

the crimes Poore committed. They suggest that admission of this evidence was 

necessary because Poore’s counsel cross-examined Glanz and Robinette on the jail’s 

policies regarding youthful offenders. By not allowing counsel to explain Poore’s 

status as an adult offender, defendants contend the district court prejudiced them. 

 4

 Ironically, defendants moved to exclude as an improper subsequent remedial 

measure under Fed. R. Evid. 407 evidence that cameras had been added to the jail 

since Poore’s release, which the trial court granted. A jury view thus would have 

presumably prejudiced the defendants by revealing to the jury the addition of 

cameras. 
18 

We are not persuaded. Weighing against this limited probative value was the danger 

of unfair prejudice to Poore. See United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th 

Cir. 2005) (noting “the introduction of evidence” of an individual’s “prior crimes 

risks significant prejudice”) (quotation omitted). We rule that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in weighing the competing factors and excluding this 

evidence.5

IV 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge 

 5

 Defendants also contend that if we reverse on the merits, we must vacate the 

district court’s cost award. Because we reject defendants’ arguments on the merits, 

there are no grounds for us to do so.