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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT MURFREESBORO

RONDA A. CAMPBELL, ) Docket No. 2019

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- 0540

Employee, )

v. ) MARTEN TRANSPORT, LLC, ) State File No. 32087

- 2019

Employer, )

And ) AGRI GENERAL INS. CO., ) Judge Dale Tipps

Insurance Carrier. )

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This case came before the Court on Marten Transport’s Motion for Summary Judgment

. The central issue is whether Marten is entitled to summary judgment on grounds

that Ms. Campbell failed to present sufficient evidence that her injury arose in the course and scope of her employment

. For the reasons below, the Court holds Marten is entitled to summary judgment.

Procedural History

Ms. Campbell works as a truck driver for Marten

. On April 23, 2019, Ms. Campbell had completed her deliveries and stop ped at a store in Chattanooga to buy her mother a gift

. The store had not opened yet , so Ms. Campbell went into her sleeper compartment to

rest

. While Ms. Campbell slept, a tow

- truck operator hooked onto the cab of her truck and raised the front of it off the ground. 1 He then pounded on the door to wake her up. Ms. Campbell was still groggy and did not realize the cab had been elevated. As a result, she

fell when opening the door and injured her head, shoulder, and left wrist.

Marten denied Ms. Campbell’s claim on the grounds she deviated from her job duties to perform a personal errand , and she filed a Petition for Benefit Determination.

1 The parking lot was posted, “No Truck Parking.” 

### FILED Jun 29, 2020 08:57 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS2

After an Expedited Hearing, the Court den ied benefits because Ms. Campbell was

not likely to prevail on proving that her injury arose out of the course and scope of her employment. Marten filed this Motion for Summary Judgment and a statement of undisputed facts. Ms. Campbell did not file a response , and t he Court heard the Motion on June 18 , 2020

.

Marten ’ s Motion

Marten filed a statement of undisputed material facts with citations to the record in compliance with Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 56.03. Most of the “facts” were a recitation of the procedural history of the cla im, along with some of the Court’s findings in the Expedited Hearing Order. The Court notes that procedural history and Expedited Hearing Order conclusions do not constitute facts upon which summary judgment may be granted. However, these material facts may be gleaned from the statement :

1. The sole reason for Ms. Campbell’s stop at the store was to purchase a gift for her

mother.

2. Ms. Campbell contends she had permission to make the additional stop.

Marten contended th e se facts support summary j udgment because they constitute

affirmative evidence that Ms. Campbell cannot establish essential element s of her claim

. Specifically, it argued she cannot prov e that her alleged injury arose in the course and scope

of her employment.

As stated, Ms. Campbell did not file a response, but she appear ed for the hearing on

this motion. She contended that she had returned to the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury because she was trying to protect Marten’s truck from being towed.

L aw and Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matte r of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (2019)

.

As the moving party, Marten must do one of two things to prevail on its motion: (1) submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim, or (2) demonstrate that the n onmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. Te nn. Code Ann. § 20

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- 101 ; see also Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC , 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015).

If Marten is successful in meeting this burden, the nonmoving party

– M s. Campbell

– must then establish that the record contains specific facts upon which the Court could base a

decision in her favor. Rye

, at 265.3

Ms

. Campbell filed no response opposing the motion for summary judgment and

failed respond to Marten ’s statement of undisputed material facts. Therefore, under Rule

56.04 and Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800

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- .1 8 ( 1 )(c) (August 2019), the Court finds the motion unopposed and the facts admitted . The issue then is whether under Rule 56.06 summary judgment is “appropriate.”

Considering the merits of Marten ’s motion, t he Court finds it successfully

demonstrate d that Ms. Campbell ’s evidence is insufficient to establish a causal connection between her injury and her employment, an essential element of her claim

. Under

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50

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- 102, Ms. Campbell must show that her injury arose in the course and scope of her employment.

Application of this course and scope requirement depend s in part on the nature of an injured employee’s work. A tra veling employee is generally considered to be in the course of employment continuously during the duration of the entire trip, except when there is a distinct departure on a personal errand. McCann v. Hatchett , 19 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tenn. 2000). As a truck driver, Ms. Campbell was a traveling employee. The question, therefore, is whether her trip to the store constituted a distinct departure on a personal

errand.

Tennessee Courts have found that some personal acts of comfort and convenience, such as bathroom breaks or meal stops, are incidental to the employment. These contribute to the furtherance of an employer’s interest, and injuries that occur during these stops are
deemed to have arisen out of th e employment. See McCormick v. Aabakus, Inc

., No.

M1999

- 01234

- WC

- R3

- CV, 101 S.W.3d 60, 63 ( Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 5, 2000). However, Ms. Campbell’s sole reason for this stop was to purchase a gift, not for food, fuel, or a bathroom break. Her decision to leave her route and park her truck was based on purely personal considerations. This differs fundamentally from a comfort stop; in that it provided no benefit to Marten. Therefore, it represents a distinct departure on a personal errand. 2

Ms. Campbell contended that she had Marten’s permission to make the stop. Even

if true, the Court is unaware of any authority that granting permission for a departure changes the McCann analysis

. Instead, the focus remain s on the question o f whether Ms. Campbell’s deviation from her route provided any benefit to Marten . Ms. Campbell

offer ed no evidence of any benefit. Similarly, Ms. Campbell provided no evidence to support her argument that her injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment because it arose out of her attempts to prevent towing of Marten’s truck. 3

2 The statement of undisputed facts does not establish whether the physical deviation from Ms. Campbell’s route was geographically significant, but the Court is unaware of any legal authority establishing a minimum required distance to constitute a distinct departure.

3 Even if proof of this contention had been admitted, the Court questions whether an employee’s actions to4

I n respon se to Marten ’ s motion, M s. Campbell must “demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational trier of fact to find in [her] favor[.]” Rye

, at 265. Further, s he must do more than simply offer hypothetical evidence; s he must produce evidence at this summary judgment stage of the case that is sufficient to establi sh

the essential elements of her workers’ compensation claim. Id

. Ms. Campbell failed to meet this burden, as she offered no countervailing evidence and produced no material facts

to lead the Court to find in her favor.

Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the Court ho lds Marten is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. Marten ’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted

, and Ms. Campbell’s claim is dismissed with prejudice to its refiling.

2. Unless appeal ed , this order shall become final thirty days after entry.

3. The Court taxes the $150.00 filing fee to Marten Transport under Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800

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, payable to the Clerk within five days of this order becoming final.

4. Marten Transport shall file the SD

- 2 with the Clerk within ten days of the date of judgment.

ENTERED June 29

, 2020

.

______________________________________ Judge Dale A. Tipps

Court of W orkers’ Compensation Claims

mitigate the consequences of a distinct departure, taken before the departure is concluded, w ould constitute a return to the course and scope of emplo yment.5 C ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Order was sent as indicated on June 29 , 2020

.

Name Certified

Mail Email Service sent to:

Ronda Campbell,

Self

- represented Employee X Fields1961@yahoo.com

Allen Grant

, Employer Attorney X agrant@eraclides.com

______________________________________ Penny Shrum, Court Clerk Wc.courtclerk@tn.gov