SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2825-19

HAROLD HANSEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RITE AID CORP. and 

CRAIG MAURIELLO,

Defendants-Respondents,

and 

ECKERD CORPORATION,

MICHELLE CAGA, and

LISA FORD,

Defendants.

____________________________

Argued September 23, 2021 – Decided October 6, 2021

Before Judges Alvarez and Haas.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-4790-08.

Denise Campbell argued the cause for appellant.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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James Bucci argued the cause for respondents (Genova 

Burns, LLC, attorneys; James Bucci, of counsel and on 

the brief; Peter F. Berk, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Harold Hansen appeals from the Law Division's February 25, 

2020 Order of Judgment granting his post-trial motion for counsel fees and costs 

in part and denying it in part. Having considered plaintiff's arguments on appeal 

in light of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the February 25, 2020 

judgment substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Linda Grasso Jones in 

her comprehensive, seventy-three-page written decision.

The parties are fully familiar with the history of this matter, which is 

detailed in our two prior opinions, Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp. (Hansen I), No. A2972-13 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2016) and Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp. (Hansen II), 

No. A-4750-16 (App. Div. May 2, 2018), and in Judge Grasso Jones' decision. 

Therefore, we will not recite that history in detail here.

Plaintiff filed his action against his former employers, Rite Aid Corp. and

Eckerd Corp., and some individual employees of those companies. Among other 

things, he alleged sexual orientation, age, and gender discrimination in violation 

of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. At the end 

of the third trial in this matter in June 2019, the jury returned a verdict in favor 
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of plaintiff on his sexual orientation discrimination claim against Rite Aid and 

one of its employees, Craig Mauriello. The jury awarded plaintiff $220,000 in 

economic damages against these defendants for lost back pay, $200,000 in 

punitive damages against Rite Aid, and $500 in punitive damages against 

Mauriello. Judge Grasso Jones subsequently awarded defendant $38,975.28 in 

prejudgment interest.

In July 2019, plaintiff filed a motion for counsel fees and costs as 

permitted under the LAD, N.J.S.A. 10:5-27.1. Plaintiff requested "an award of 

counsel fees in the amount of $4,773,845[] ($2,386,922.50 with a 100% 

enhancement which doubles the lodestar fee request) and costs in the amount of 

$261,928.58." Thus, "[t]he total request by plaintiff for counsel fees and costs 

in this matter [was] $5,035,773.50." Defendants opposed the motion and argued 

that although plaintiff might be entitled to counsel fees and costs under the LAD, 

the amount he sought was not supported by the record and should be reduced.

In addressing plaintiff's motion, Judge Grasso Jones carefully reviewed

plaintiff's request on a line-by-line basis, and created a detailed fifty-four-page 

chart evaluating each of the individual items contained in plaintiff's lengthy 

request for counsel fees and costs. She then wrote an exhaustive decision 

explaining each of her rulings.
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Judge Grasso Jones denied many of plaintiff's desired fees and costs 

because she found them unreasonable. Judge Grasso Jones found, and we 

concur, that this was not a particularly complex matter, even though it was tried 

three times. The judge also found that plaintiff's calculation of the lodestar 

based upon a $725 hourly rate for his two attorneys was unreasonable because 

there was no persuasive evidence that the attorneys had ever charged any client 

that amount, or that this was a "local customary rate" in the vicinage or anywhere

else in New Jersey. Thus, Judge Grasso Jones found $375 per hour was an 

appropriate rate for plaintiff's primary attorney, and calculated the other 

attorney's fees at the rate of $325 per hour.

Judge Grasso Jones found that the total hours for which plaintiff sought 

compensation also needed to be drastically reduced. For example, plaintiff's 

attorney submitted bills containing "numerous entries" for more than twentyfour hours in one day. Plaintiff also sought reimbursement for counsel fees he 

expended on the two appeals, even though such a request was clearly barred by 

Rule 2:11-4, which requires that motions for counsel fees related to an appeal 

be filed in the Appellate Division within ten days after the termination of the 

appeal. In addition, plaintiff improperly asked to be paid for the fees his attorney 

charged for an unrelated unemployment compensation matter.
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Judge Grasso Jones disallowed other fees because they were incurred in 

the presentation of arguments, such as plaintiff's motions to recuse two trial 

court judges, that were unsuccessful. The judge also disallowed fees where there 

were "[e]rrors and excessive time" in the billing statements.

Judge Grasso Jones rejected plaintiff's request for a 100% enhancement 

of the counsel fees he sought. Applying the standards set forth in Walker v. 

Giuffre, 209 N.J. 124, 138 (2012), the judge found "[n]o support . . . for 

plaintiff's request for a 100% enhancement," instead granting a more reasonable 

20% enhancement. At the same time, however, the judge reduced plaintiff's 

attorney's fees by 20% to account for the limited success of plaintiff's attorney's 

efforts throughout the course of the trials. Finally, the judge reduced the total 

costs plaintiff sought in his application for the reasons set forth in her opinion.

As a result of her thorough review of plaintiff's application, the judge 

awarded plaintiff $643,892.50 in counsel fees and $97,495.47 in costs, for a total 

of $741,387.97. The judge entered a judgment to this effect in plaintiff's favor 

on February 25, 2020. This appeal followed.

On appeal, plaintiff raises the same contentions he unsuccessfully 

presented to Judge Grasso Jones. He asserts that the judge abused her discretion 

by not awarding him all of the fees and costs he sought in his application.
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The standards governing our review of a trial judge's decision on an 

application for counsel fees and costs are well established. A trial court's award 

of counsel fees "will be disturbed only on the rarest occasions, and then only 

because of a clear abuse of discretion." Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 

(1995). The first step in determining the fee award is calculating the "lodestar," 

which is a reasonable hourly rate for counsel's services multiplied by the number 

of hours reasonably expended. Walker, 209 N.J. at 130-31. This is "the most 

significant element in the award of a reasonable fee because that function 

requires the trial court to evaluate carefully and critically the aggregate hours 

and specific hourly rates advanced by counsel for the prevailing party to support 

the fee application." Rendine, 141 N.J. at 335. 

The Supreme Court has cautioned that trial courts "should not accept 

passively the submissions of counsel to support the lodestar amount[.]" Ibid. "'It 

does not follow that the amount of time actually expended is the amount of time 

reasonably expended.'" Ibid. (quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 

(D.C. Cir. 1980)). Hours are not considered reasonably expended if they are 

"excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary" or are spent on "claims on 

which the party did not succeed" or "that were distinct in all respects from claims 
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on which the party did succeed." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

Applying these principles, we discern no basis for disturbing Judge Grasso 

Jones' reasonable resolution of plaintiff's application for counsel fees and costs. 

The judge went over plaintiff's bills line-by-line and fully explained each and 

every ruling she rendered. The judge's findings are fully supported by the record 

and, in light of those findings, her legal conclusions are unassailable.

Affirmed.