FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 AUGUST 19, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 09-11144

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D. C. Docket No. 08-01421-CV-LSC-S

SIDNEY GIPSON,

WILLIAM MCGUIRK,

TIMOTHY GUTHERY, and other

similarly situated individuals,

JAMES SASSER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

MIKE HALE, Jefferson County Sheriff,

in his official capacity,

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

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Before EDMONDSON, BARKETT and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

*

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

We previously issued an opinion reversing in part the district court’s

dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against defendants Mike Hale,

the Sheriff of Jefferson County, and the State of Alabama. Gipson v. Jefferson

Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 613 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 2010). Still pending is the State’s

petition for rehearing.

When we issued our opinion in this case and when the State filed its petition

for rehearing, the State had detained the plaintiffs pursuant to Alabama’s

Community Notification Act (the “Act”), which required individuals convicted of a

sex offense to provide a residential address before the expiration of their sentence

or else be “remanded to . . . custody at the time of release.” Ala. Code § 15-20-

22(a)(1)(a) (repealed by 2011 Ala. Acts 640). The plaintiffs’ suit challenged their

indefinite detention and the procedures available to them. The Act at the time

lacked any procedures for homeless and indigent offenders to demonstrate their

inability to comply with this requirement. However, the Alabama state

government has recently revised the law to provide a procedure for homeless and

indigent offenders who are unable to comply with the Act’s other provisions to be

 Honorable Jane R. Roth, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by *

designation.

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released at the expiration of their sentences. See 2011 Ala. Acts 640 § 12. We

ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the question of whether the

case has become moot in light of the revisions to the law and changes in

circumstances.

As a result of the change in the law, no plaintiff remains detained pursuant to

the Act, and the parties all agree that there is no longer any active case or

controversy and so the case is moot. “In this circuit, when a case becomes moot

after the panel publishes its decision but before the mandate issues, we dismiss the

appeal, vacate the district court’s judgment, and remand to the district court with

instructions to dismiss the case.” Key Enters. of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 9

F.3d 893, 894 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also Soliman v. United States ex rel.

INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, we sua sponte VACATE our prior opinion, 613 F.3d 1054,

VACATE the district court’s order dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit, REMAND with

instructions to dismiss the case as moot, DISMISS the appeal, and DENY the

petition for rehearing as moot.

VACATED, REMANDED, and DISMISSED.

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