29986 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 98 / Monday, May 21, 2012 / Notices 

The Designated Federal Officer, or the 

Alternate Designated Federal Officer, 

shall call all of the Panel’s and 

subcommittees’ meetings; prepare and 

approve all meeting agendas; adjourn 

any meeting when the Designated 

Federal Officer, or the Alternate 

Designated Federal Officer, determines 

adjournment to be in the public interest 

or required by governing regulations or 

DoD policies/procedures; and chair 

meetings when directed to do so by the 

official to whom the Panel reports. 

Pursuant to 41 CFR 102–3.105(j) and 

102–3.140, the public or interested 

organizations may submit written 

statements to Uniform Formulary 

Beneficiary Advisory Panel membership 

about the Panel’s mission and functions. 

Written statements may be submitted at 

any time or in response to the stated 

agenda of planned meeting of Uniform 

Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel. 

All written statements shall be 

submitted to the Designated Federal 

Officer for the Uniform Formulary 

Beneficiary Advisory Panel, and this 

individual will ensure that the written 

statements are provided to the 

membership for their consideration. 

Contact information for the Uniform 

Formulary Beneficiary Advisory Panel’s 

Designated Federal Officer can be 

obtained from the GSA’s FACA 

Database—https://www.fido.gov/ 

facadatabase/public.asp. 

The Designated Federal Officer, 

pursuant to 41 CFR 102–3.150, will 

announce planned meetings of the 

Uniform Formulary Beneficiary 

Advisory Panel. The Designated Federal 

Officer, at that time, may provide 

additional guidance on the submission 

of written statements that are in 

response to the stated agenda for the 

planned meeting in question. 

Dated: May 15, 2012. 

Aaron Siegel, 

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison 

Officer, Department of Defense. 

[FR Doc. 2012–12145 Filed 5–18–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 5001–06–P 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES 

SAFETY BOARD 

[Recommendation 2012–1] 

Savannah River Site Building 235–F 

Safety 

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board. 

ACTION: Notice, recommendation. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, the 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

has made a recommendation to the 

Secretary of Energy concerning safety at 

the Savannah River Site Building 

235–F. 

DATES: Comments, data, views, or 

arguments concerning the 

recommendation are due on or before 

June 20, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments concerning 

this notice to: Defense Nuclear Facilities 

Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue NW., 

Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2001. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau 

at the address above or telephone 

number (202) 694–7000. 

Dated: May 15, 2012. 

Peter S. Winokur, 

Chairman. 

RECOMMENDATION 2012–1 TO THE 

SECRETARY OF ENERGY Savannah 

River Site Building 235–F Safety 

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5), 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As 

Amended 

Dated: May 9, 2012 

Background 

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (Board) believes that the 

Department of Energy (DOE) needs to 

take action to remove and/or immobilize 

the residual contamination within 

Building 235–F because of the potential 

dose consequences to collocated 

workers and the public. Furthermore, 

the Board believes that DOE must also 

take near-term action to more effectively 

prevent a major fire in Building 235–F. 

Building 235–F at the Savannah River 

Site (SRS) houses several partially 

deactivated processing lines including 

the Plutonium Fuel Form (PuFF) 

facility, Actinide Billet Line, Plutonium 

Experimental Facility, and the old 

metallography lab glovebox. Building 

235–F no longer has a DOE mission. It 

is currently operated in a surveillance 

and maintenance mode and is normally 

unoccupied. 

With the exception of residual 

contamination, Building 235–F has been 

de-inventoried of special nuclear 

material. The remaining residual 

contamination is the principal hazard 

posed by Building 235–F and includes 

a significant quantity of plutonium-238 

(Pu-238). More than 95 percent of the 

Pu-238 is located in the PuFF facility; 

approximately 82 percent is 

concentrated in 2 of the 9 PuFF facility 

cells. It should be noted that the 

residual Pu-238 contamination is a fine 

ball-milled powder that is in a highly 

dispersible form, which increases the 

potential dose consequences associated 

with a radiological release. 

The responsible SRS contractor, 

Savannah River Nuclear Solutions 

(SRNS), has determined that the 

unmitigated consequences of a 

seismically-induced full-facility fire are 

greater than 10 rem offsite and 27,000 

rem to the collocated worker at 100 

meters. F-Area routinely has more than 

a thousand site workers who are 

normally in the facilities, construction 

sites, and trailers located adjacent to 

Building 235–F. Some of the trailers that 

house workers are located within the 

Building 235–F fence line. 

While DOE does not conduct any 

operations within Building 235–F, fires 

could start inside the building if 

energized electrical equipment or wiring 

failed or was damaged during a seismic 

or other natural hazard event. Electrical 

sparks or heat from electrical equipment 

could ignite adjacent combustible 

material. Two of the key preventive 

controls for fire scenarios are 

eliminating potential ignition sources 

and controlling the amount of 

combustibles. In September 2011, 

during a walkdown of Building 235–F, 

the Board’s staff identified a significant 

quantity of transient and fixed 

combustibles and unnecessary electrical 

equipment that had not been air gapped. 

DOE has taken action to remove the 

transient combustible material and to 

limit access to Building 235–F. 

However, no actions are currently 

planned to remove the fixed 

combustibles or unneeded electrical 

equipment. 

In the event of a fire, Building 235– 

F has several vulnerabilities. First, the 

Building 235–F fire detection system is 

not credited, does not provide complete 

coverage, nor is the building normally 

occupied; consequently, a fire could 

smolder and burn undetected. Second, 

Building 235–F does not have a fire 

suppression system to prevent an 

incipient stage fire from growing into a 

room fire. Third, Building 235–F does 

not have fire barriers with a qualified 

fire rating to prevent the spread of a fire 

to adjacent rooms. The Building 235–F 

Fire Hazards Analysis notes that the 

subdividing walls and floors are in 

many places incomplete or penetrated 

and are not adequately sealed to achieve 

a qualified fire rating. In addition, some 

of the existing walls contain cellulose, 

which is combustible and could allow a 

room fire to spread to other portions of 

the building. Fourth, the absence of 

standpipes or hose connections inhibits 

the ability of the fire department to fight 

a fire inside Building 235–F. To combat 

a fire, firefighters would need to prop 

open the exterior doors to allow the 

passage of fire hoses; this would allow 

smoke and firewater, potentially 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 98 / Monday, May 21, 2012 / Notices 29987 

1U.S. Department of Energy, 1991, Report of an 

Investigation into the Deterioration of the 

Plutonium Fuel Form Fabrication Facility (PuFF) at 

the DOE Savannah River Site, DOE/NS–0002P, 

http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/6246281- 

tBgi3H/6246281.pdf. 

contaminated with radioactive material, 

into the environment. 

The July 2011 draft of the Basis for 

Interim Operations (BIO), prepared by 

SRNS notes that the Building 235–F 

structure can only provide limited 

confinement during or following a 

seismic event because seismicallyinduced building cracks may develop. 

Consequently, the building structure 

cannot be credited as a control to 

prevent a post-seismic unfiltered 

release. In 2010, DOE took action to 

improve the safety posture of Building 

235–F by reducing the height of the 

abandoned stack located adjacent to the 

building. The contractor’s structural 

analysis indicated that the concrete 

stack, prior to the height reduction, 

could have collapsed onto Building 

235–F during a seismic event causing 

significant structural damage. 

In addition to fires, loss of 

confinement accidents could also 

release radioactive material. For 

instance, a release could be caused by 

a breach of the confinement or the 

ventilation system during a seismic 

event. However, the Building 235–F 

confinement ventilation system cannot 

be relied upon to continue to perform its 

safety function during or following a 

seismic event. The draft BIO states that 

non-load-bearing building elements may 

fail during a Performance Category-3 

seismic event, resulting in impact 

damage to safety-related structures, 

systems, and components such as 

ventilation ducts. The draft BIO states 

that the metal ventilation ducts may 

leak after an earthquake because they 

are not completely welded and that the 

concrete roof exhaust tunnel may 

develop cracks. 

Loss of confinement can be caused by 

degraded equipment. The deteriorated 

condition of the PuFF facility was noted 

in an October 1991 report by DOE’s 

Office of Nuclear Safety,1 which 

identified as an issue the integrity of 

elastomer seals that form part of the 

confinement boundaries inside Building 

235–F. In addition to degradation with 

age, these elastomer seals also degrade 

with exposure to Pu-238. Although 

identified two decades ago, this issue 

remains. The cells have numerous 

penetrations (e.g., glove ports, viewing 

windows, ventilation supply and 

exhaust, utility services). In the draft 

BIO, SRNS stated that ‘‘the [elastomer] 

seals around the cell and glovebox 

penetrations are expected to be in a 

degraded condition due to the years of 

operation in a radiation environment.’’ 

The continued deterioration of the 

elastomer seals increases the potential 

for the spread of the contamination 

outside of the cells. Even under normal 

operations, a loss of confinement from 

these cells would greatly increase the 

complexity and hazard associated with 

decontamination and decommissioning 

of Building 235–F. 

DOE conducted a small fire drill at 

Building 235–F in December 2011, 

which simulated a minor radiological 

release. While DOE conducts periodic 

drills, DOE has not conducted a 

Building 235–F radiological drill 

involving the adjacent Mixed Oxide 

Fuel Fabrication Facility or Waste 

Solidification Building construction 

sites to examine how these facilities 

would respond to a significant 

radiological release from Building 235– 

F. In the event of a significant 

radiological release, the amount of 

mitigation provided by sheltering in 

place may not be sufficient to protect 

nearby workers. This is especially true 

for seismically-induced fires, since the 

same seismic event may also damage 

nearby trailers and administrative 

buildings. 

The Board has previously identified 

the need to address the residual 

contamination in Building 235–F. In a 

June 12, 2003, letter to the Secretary of 

Energy, the Board noted that the risk 

associated with several hazards in 

Building 235–F, including the Pu-238 

residual contamination, had been 

accepted rather than eliminated. The 

report enclosed with the June letter 

further noted that DOE should consider 

decontaminating areas with residual 

contamination to reduce the risk 

associated with a potential release. 

Since that time, DOE has on a number 

of occasions evaluated options and 

developed plans to address the residual 

contamination. However, these efforts 

have not successfully transitioned from 

planning to execution, and the residual 

contamination and the hazard it poses 

still remain in Building 235–F. 

Conclusion 

The Board believes that due to the 

potential dose consequences to 

collocated workers and the public, it is 

unacceptable for the residual 

contamination within Building 235–F to 

continue to remain unaddressed. 

Recommendation 

Given the continuing hazard posed by 

Building 235–F as detailed above, the 

Board recommends that DOE: 

1. Take action to immobilize and/or 

remove the Pu-238 that remains as 

residual contamination within Building 

235–F. 

2. Concurrent with subRecommendation 1, take near-term 

actions and implement compensatory 

measures to improve the safety posture 

of Building 235–F and reduce the 

potential for and severity of a 

radiological release, including but not 

limited to the following. 

a. To the extent feasible, remove from 

Building 235–F all transient and fixed 

combustibles that are not directly 

necessary for surveillance and 

maintenance activities and ensure that 

the transient combustible loading in the 

facility remains as low as reasonably 

achievable. 

b. Ensure that all electrical equipment 

not necessary to support facility safety 

systems, life safety, or surveillance and 

maintenance activities is de-energized 

and air gapped. Remove all electrical 

and support equipment remaining 

within former process areas that is not 

necessary for surveillance and 

maintenance. 

c. Evaluate the condition and 

operability of early detection and alarm 

systems in the PuFF facility, such as the 

heat and smoke detectors (with the 

exception of those located within the 

PuFF facility cells, if evaluating them 

would require intrusion into the cells). 

Take action, as necessary, to ensure that 

these systems are credited in the safety 

basis, are remotely monitored, provide 

reliable detection of hazards, and are 

maintained in accordance with National 

Fire Protection Association 72, National 

Fire Protection Alarm and Signaling 

Code. 

3. Concurrent with subRecommendation 1, take action to 

ensure that the SRS emergency response 

to a radiological release from Building 

235–F is adequate and effective, 

including but not limited to the 

following. 

a. Ensure that an integrated 

emergency response plan is in place that 

considers the collocated workers in 

facilities, construction sites, and trailers 

located adjacent to Building 235–F. 

Development of this plan should 

include an evaluation of the specific 

locations where collocated workers are 

directed to shelter in place to ensure 

their adequate protection during and 

following a potential radiological 

release from Building 235–F. 

b. Ensure that periodic coordinated 

drills in response to a simulated event 

at Building 235–F are conducted. Such 

drills should include appropriate 

response actions by personnel in the 

adjacent facilities and construction 

sites, such as sheltering in place or 

evacuating depending on proximity to 


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29988 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 98 / Monday, May 21, 2012 / Notices 

the simulated plume of radioactive 

material. 

The Board urges the Secretary to avail 

himself of the authority under the 

Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2286d(e)) 

to ‘‘implement any such 

recommendation (or part of any such 

recommendation) before, on, or after the 

date on which the Secretary transmits 

the implementation plan to the Board 

under this subsection.’’ 

Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D., 

Chairman. 

[FR Doc. 2012–12179 Filed 5–18–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3670–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

Notice of Submission for OMB Review; 

Federal Student Aid; William D. Ford 

Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) 

Program: Internship/Residency and 

Loan Debt Burden Forbearance Forms 

SUMMARY: These forms serve as the 

means by which a borrower may request 

forbearance of repayment on his or her 

William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan 

(Direct Loan) or Federal Family 

Education Loan (FFEL) Program loans 

based on participation in an eligible 

internship/residency program, National 

Guard duty, receiving benefits under the 

Department of Defense’s Student Loan 

Repayment Program, or having a federal 

education loan debt burden that equals 

or exceeds 20 percent of the borrower’s 

monthly gross income. 

DATES: Interested persons are invited to 

submit comments on or before June 20, 

2012. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments 

regarding burden and/or the collection 

activity requirements should be 

electronically mailed to 

ICDocketMgr@ed.gov or mailed to U.S. 

Department of Education, 400 Maryland 

Avenue SW., LBJ, Washington, DC 

20202–4537. Copies of the proposed 

information collection request may be 

accessed from http://edicsweb.ed.gov, 

by selecting the ‘‘Browse Pending 

Collections’’ link and by clicking on 

link number 04798. When you access 

the information collection, click on 

‘‘Download Attachments’’ to view. 

Written requests for information should 

be addressed to U.S. Department of 

Education, 400 Maryland Avenue SW., 

LBJ, Washington, DC 20202–4537. 

Requests may also be electronically 

mailed to ICDocketMgr@ed.gov or faxed 

to 202–401–0920. Please specify the 

complete title of the information 

collection and OMB Control Number 

when making your request. 

Individuals who use a 

telecommunications device for the deaf 

(TDD) may call the Federal Information 

Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877– 

8339. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 

3506 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) requires 

that Federal agencies provide interested 

parties an early opportunity to comment 

on information collection requests. The 

Acting Director, Information Collection 

Clearance Division, Privacy, Information 

and Records Management Services, 

Office of Management, publishes this 

notice containing proposed information 

collection requests at the beginning of 

the Departmental review of the 

information collection. The Department 

of Education is especially interested in 

public comment addressing the 

following issues: (1) Is this collection 

necessary to the proper functions of the 

Department; (2) will this information be 

processed and used in a timely manner; 

(3) is the estimate of burden accurate; 

(4) how might the Department enhance 

the quality, utility, and clarity of the 

information to be collected; and (5) how 

might the Department minimize the 

burden of this collection on the 

respondents, including through the use 

of information technology. Please note 

that written comments received in 

response to this notice will be 

considered public records. 

Title of Collection: William D. Ford 

Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) 

Program: Internship/Residency and 

Loan Debt Burden Forbearance Forms. 

OMB Control Number: 1845–0018. 

Type of Review: Revision. 

Total Estimated Number of Annual 

Responses: 25,842. 

Total Estimated Number of Annual 

Burden Hours: 5,814. 

Abstract: The U.S. Department of 

Education and FFEL Program lenders 

and servicers use the information 

collected on these forms to determine 

whether a borrower meets the eligibility 

requirements for the specific 

forbearance type that the borrower has 

requested. This collection is being 

revised so that it may be used by both 

the Direct Loan and FFEL Programs and 

also expands one of the mandatory 

forbearance forms to include additional 

mandatory forbearances; as a result, 

additional data elements have been 

added to support the additional 

forbearances. 

Dated: May 11, 2012. 

Kate Mullan, 

Acting Director, Information Collection 

Clearance Division, Privacy, Information and 

Records Management Services, Office of 

Management. 

[FR Doc. 2012–11974 Filed 5–18–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4000–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

Notice of Submission for OMB Review; 

Federal Student Aid; William D. Ford 

Federal Direct Loan Program 

Deferment Request Forms 

SUMMARY: These forms serve as the 

means by which borrowers in the 

William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan 

(Direct Loan) and Federal Family 

Education Loan (FFEL) Programs may 

request deferment of repayment on their 

loans if they meet certain statutory and 

regulatory criteria. 

DATES: Interested persons are invited to 

submit comments on or before June 20, 

2012. 

ADDRESSES: Written comments 

regarding burden and/or the collection 

activity requirements should be 

electronically mailed to 

ICDocketMgr@ed.gov or mailed to U.S. 

Department of Education, 400 Maryland 

Avenue SW., LBJ, Washington, DC 

20202–4537. Copies of the proposed 

information collection request may be 

accessed from http://edicsweb.ed.gov, 

by selecting the ‘‘Browse Pending 

Collections’’ link and by clicking on 

link number 04789. When you access 

the information collection, click on 

‘‘Download Attachments’’ to view. 

Written requests for information should 

be addressed to U.S. Department of 

Education, 400 Maryland Avenue SW., 

LBJ, Washington, DC 20202–4537. 

Requests may also be electronically 

mailed to ICDocketMgr@ed.gov or faxed 

to 202–401–0920. Please specify the 

complete title of the information 

collection and OMB Control Number 

when making your request. 

Individuals who use a 

telecommunications device for the deaf 

(TDD) may call the Federal Information 

Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877– 

8339. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 

3506 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 

1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) requires 

that Federal agencies provide interested 

parties an early opportunity to comment 

on information collection requests. The 

Acting Director, Information Collection 

Clearance Division, Privacy, Information 

and Records Management Services, 

Office of Management, publishes this 

notice containing proposed information 


ebenthall on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES