08-3527-cv

T.Y. v. New York City Department of Education
UN ITED STA TES COURT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE S E COND C IR C U IT

_____________________ August Term, 2008 (Argued: J une 22, 2009 De cided: Oc tober 9, 2009) Docke t No. 08-3527-c v

_____________________ T.Y., K.Y., O N BE H A LF OF T.Y., Plain tif fs- Ap pe lla nts , — v.— N EW Y O RK C I TY D EP A RT M EN T O F E DUC ATI ON , R EG I ON 4, Defendant-

Appellee
.

___________________ Be fore : B.D
. P ARKE R , W ES L EY , Circuit Judges , C ED AR B AUM , District Judge. * Plaintiffs-Appellants T.Y. a nd K.Y., on beha lf of their son, T.Y ., appea l from an or der of the United States District Court for the Easter n District of Ne w York ( J ohnson, J. ) g ranting summary judgme nt to Defe ndant-Appe llee Ne w York City Depa rtment of Educ ation, Reg ion 4. The pa rents see k tuition reimbursement under the Individuals with Disabilit ies Education I mprovement Ac t, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (“I DEA” or “I DEIA”) . We hold that because the I DEA doe s not require that an Individualiz ed Educ ation Plan (“I EP”) name a spec ific school place ment, T.Y’s I EP was not proce durally defic ient. Fur

thermore , applying our

defe rential standard of

revie w in I DEA c ases, we conclude that T.Y.’s I EP did not subs tantively violate the I DEA. AFF I RMED.
* The Honor able Miriam Goldman Ce darba um, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation.

___________________2 GARY S. MAYERSON (Tra cy Spencer Walsh, on the brief ), Mayerson & Associates, N ew Yor k, New Y ork, for Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts . SUZ ANNE K . COL T, Assistant Corporation Counsel (P ame la Se ide r D olg ow , A nd

re w J. Ra uc hb e rg , K ary

n R. Thompson, of Counsel, on the brief ), for Michae l A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of Ne w York, New Y ork, Ne w York, for Def endant- Appellee
.

___________________ B AR R I NGTON D. P ARKE R , Circuit Judge : T.Y. is a child with autism. His pare nts sued the New York City

Depa rtment of Education (“NYCDOE ”) on his beha lf seekingreimburse ment for T.Y ’s private school tuition under the Individuals with Disabilit ies Education Improvement Ac t, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (“I DEA” or “I DEIA”) . The United States District Court for the Easter

n District of Ne w York (Johns on, J

.) g rante d summary

judgme nt to the NYCDOE, and the pare nts now appea l. We a ff ir m. BACK GR OUND T. Y. , li ke a ll c hil dr e n w itha dis a bil ity , is e nti tle d to a

fr e e and a pp ro pr iate pu

bli c education under the I DEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)( A). As we have pr eviously stated, “[t] he cente rpiec e of the I DEA’s e ducation deliver y sy stem is the individualiz ed educ ation prog ram, or ‘I EP.’” Lill bask ex

rel. Mauclaire v . Conn. Dep’t of Educ. , 397 F.3d 77, 81 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) . “ Th e I EP, the re su lt o f c oll a bo ra tio ns be tw e e n p are nts , educators, and re prese ntatives of the sc hool district, sets out the child’s present e ducational perf ormanc e, esta

blishes annual and shor

t-term objec tives for improveme nts in that performa nce,3

and desc ribes the spe cially desig ned instruction and se rvice s that will enable the c hild to meet those objectives.” Id . (interna l quotation marks omitted). I f a disable d child’s par ents are dissatisfied with the I EP, as here , they may file a c omplaint with the state educational ag ency . There , the complaint will be hea rd by an impartial he aringoffice r (“ I HO”) , 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), whose de cision may

be appe aled to a state re view off icer (“SRO”) , § 1415(g ). The c hild’s pare nts can, in turn, appe al this decision to a fe dera l or state cour t. See§ 1415(i)(2) (A). T. Y. , who ha s si g nif

ic ant d e ve lop me nta l de lay s a nd a se ve re langua g e dis or de r a s a re su lt of his autism, beg an re ceivingear ly intervention ser

vices whe n he wa s one and a half year s old, and in the 2005-2006 sc hool y ear , he wa s place d in a spec ial education class. On May 10, 2006, T.Y.’s Committee on Special Educ ation (“CSE”) me t to form T.Y’s I EP for the 2006-2007 school y ear

(“Ma y I EP”). The CSE included T.Y.’s par ents, as we ll as a district repr esentative, a specia l education teache r, a sc hool psy cholog ist and an Applied B ehavior al Analy sis teache r. The I EP recommende d that T.Y. be pla ced in a specia l class with a 6:1:1 staffingratio, and ad v i s edth ath e r ec ei v e t h re e 3 0 -m i nu t e s es s i o n s p er we eko f i n d i v i d

u al i z eds p ee ch an d

l an gu age thera py , two 30-minute sessions per we ek of individualized occupational therapy , and two 30- minute sessions of individualiz ed phy sical thera py per w eek. T he I EP recognized that T.Y. sometimes responded to f rustration by

cry ing, bitinghis hand and pulling his hair, and
rec ommended that these issues be mana g ed throug h “modeling , reinfor ceme nt, [ and] prompting of appr opriate c lassroom behaviors.” Partially to addre ss these beha

viors, the I EP also provided for “ a full-time 1:1 cr isis manag ement par aprof essional.” Although T .Y.’s May

I EP stated that T.Y.’s school would be in District 75, a g roup of4

schools that specia liz e in providingeducation for childre n with disabilit ies, it did not name the school that T.Y. would attend. Rather, on June 9, 2006, approxim ately a month afte r the I EP was formalized, the par ents rec eived a notice in the mail that re commended a specific school pla c e me nt. T. Y. ’s fathe r v isi te d th e sit e and fo un d it un su ita ble fo r T .Y . f

or va ri ou s r e a so ns , including the staff’ s alleg ed rude ness and the la ck of a g y m or occ upational thera

py room. The NYCDOE of

fer ed the pa

rents anothe r school, which T .Y.’s par ents ca lled, but also found to be
un su ita ble . Su bs e qu e ntl y , th e pa

re nts e nr oll e d T .Y . in

the Re be c c a

Sc ho ol, a sp e c ia lize d p ri vate
sc ho ol f or a uti sti c c hil dr e n, and

no tif ie d th e NY CD OE of

the ir int e nt t o s e e k r e imb ur se me nt. T. Y. ’s pa re nts re qu e ste d a

n im pa rt ia l he ari ngfo r r e imb ur se me nt. Th e y ra ise d nume ro us substantive and proc edura l objections to T.Y.’s May 2006 I EP, contending , inte r a lia , (1) the I EP
mate ri a lly

vio late d T .Y .’ s r ig ht t o a fr e e and a pp ro pr iate e du c atio n, in p art be c a us e the I EP d id not provide T.Y. with ade quate spe ech se rvice s and the I EP failed to provide suf ficient pa rent trainingto the pare nts, and (2) the I EP was proc edura lly defic ient beca

use it did not include a specific school place ment. Th e I HO c on du c te d a

le ng thy he ari ng . In a dd iti on

to s ub mittin ge vid e nc e fr om p ri vate evaluators, the par ents testified at the he aring , alongwith the Prog ram Dire ctor at the Rebec ca S c h o o l an d

v ar i o u s p r o f

e s s i o n a l s w h o h a d

w o r k e d w i thT
. Y
. b o thi ns c h o o l an d ath o m e . In
su pp or t of the ir c la ims , th e pa

re nts a lso su

bmi tte d T .Y .’ s p re vio us I EP, wh ic h w a s p re pa re d in Marc h of 2006 (“ Marc h I EP”), just two months before the May I EP. The Marc h I EP provided T.Y. with substantially

more spee ch and la

ng uag e skill service s than the May I EP, and the Mar ch I EP named a spe cific sc hool placeme nt. An administrator fr om the NYCDOE, Ke nneth Stark,5

also testified. The I HO denie d most of the pare nts’ claims. The I HO re jected the pare nts’ argument that the I EP w a s p ro c e dura lly de fi c ie nt b e c a

us e it f a ile d to name a

sp e c if ic sc ho ol p la c e me nt, explaining that T.Y.’s CSE had “ identified a ty pe of pr og ram, a

nd then the par ent was g iven the opportunity

to see sug g ested sites,” suc h that the I HO could not “se e how the pa rents we re ha rm e d b y the fa ilure to i de nti fy

a sit e at th e CSE me e tin g .” Th e I HO did , h ow e ve r, a g re e wi th the par ents that the I EP did not effec tively meet T.Y.’ s speec h and languag e nee ds, and orde red that the I EP include an a dditional three hours of speec h and languag e ther apy per w eek. Ho we ve r, the I HO de te rm ine d th at th is d e fi c ie nc y a lon e did no t e sta bli shthat “ the ov e ra ll prog ram re commended by the CSE was inappropr iate, except to the extent that outside speech and languag e ser

vices we re not off

ere d in addition to thos e off ere d in school.” On appe al, the SRO larg ely ag ree d with the I HO’s f

indings a nd conclusions, but reve rsed on one point, concludingthat pare nt counselingand tra ining should have been spe cifica lly named in T .Y .’ s I EP. T.Y.’s pa rents subseque ntly

filed suit in the United States District Court for the Ea stern Di str ic t of

Ne w Y or k, se e kin gre vie w o f t

he a dmi nis tr ativ e de te rm inatio ns . T he dis tr ic t c ourt , afte r consider ing the NYCDOE’ s Rule 56.1 statement, and de fer ringto the finding s and conclusions of the I HO and SRO, g rante d summary judgme nt to the NYCDOE. DI SCU SSIO N Our standa

rd for revie winga state’ s administrative dec isions in I DEA c ases is, by now, well established. We have fre quently explained that “the role of the fe dera l courts in revie wing6

state educ ational dec isions under the I DEA is circ umscribed.” Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Di st ., 489 F.3d 105, 112 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (interna l quotation marks omitted). “While the district court must base its dec ision on the preponder ance of the e vidence , it mustg ive due we ight to the ad m i n i s tra t i v e p ro ce ed i n gs , m i n d fu l th atth e j u d i ci ary gen er al l y l ac k s th e s p ec i al i z edkn o wl ed ge and experienc e nec essar

y to resolve pe rsistent and diffic ult questions of educational policy .” A. C.
ex re l. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ. , 5 53 F .3 d 1 65 , 1 71 (2 d Ci r. 20 09 ) ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s, alterations and internal citations omitted). Ther efor e, as the Supreme Court has c oncluded, courts may

not “substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of

the school authorities which they

revie w.” Bd. of Educ. v. R owley , 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). We undertake a thre e-step pr ocess to dete rmine whe ther pa rents ar e entitled to tuition reimburse ment. Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 192 ( 2d Cir. 2005). First, we consider whether

the school district has complied with the I DEA’s pr ocedur al re quirements. Id. Next, we ask whe ther the I EP is “rea sonably calc ulated to ena

ble the child to re ceive educational benef its.” Id. (interna l quotation marks omitted). I f the a nswer to e ither of these questions is “no,” we then a sk whether

“the pr ivate schoolingobtained by the par ents is appropriate to the child’s needs.” Id
. I
. Rule 56.1 Statements in I DEA Case s We h ave no t sq

ua re ly fa c e d th e ro le , if

a ny , th at Ru le 56 .1 state me nts pla y wh e n c ourt s revie w I DEA c ases. L ocal Rule 56.1 wa s adopted to aid the c ourts in decidingsummary judgme nt motions by

quickly identifying disputed material fa cts. The Rule re quires that any motion for summary

judgme nt be ac companied by a list of the " materia l fac ts as to which the7

moving pa

rty contends ther e is no g enuine issue to be tr ied." L ocal Civil Rule 56.1(a). The require ment is strict; failure to submit a Rule 56.1 statement with a motion for summary judgme nt may

result in the motion’s denial. Id. Should the nonmoving par ty wish to contest the
asser tions contained within a Rule 56.1 statement, the nonmovingparty must respond to eac h of the state me nt’ s p ara g ra

ph s and inc lud e , if

ne c e ssa ry , a state me nt o f t

he a dd iti on a l mate ri a l f

a c ts that demonstrate a

g enuine issue f

or trial. L ocal Civil Rule 56.1(b). A nonmovingparty ’s fa ilure to respond to a Rule 56.1 stateme nt permits the court to conc lude that the fa cts asser ted in the statement ar e unconte sted and a dmissibl e. Gubitosi v. Kapica , 154 F.3d 30, 31 n.1 ( 2d Cir. 1998). In the ty

pical ca se, fa ilure to respond r esults in a g rant of summar y judgme nt once the court a ssures itself that Rule 56' s other re quirements have been me t. See, e .g. , Millus v. D’ Ange lo , 224 F.3d 137, 138 ( 2d Cir. 2000). A s umm ary

jud g me nt a

pp ro a c h to I DE A c a se s, ho we ve r, is d if fe re nt. Ins te a d o f d isp ute resolution, a motion for summary judgme nt can se rve a s an aid to the c ourt within a statutory
sc he me wh os e purp os e is t o e ns ur e that c hil dr e n w ithdis a bil iti e s r e c e ive the e du c atio na l be ne fi ts to which they

are entitled. Se e Lillba sk, 3 97 F .3 d at 83 n. 3. Th e c ourt ’s inq uir y is two fo ld: fi rs t, it reviews the state' s compliance with I DEA proc edure s and, sec ond, the cour t determines if the I EP crea ted throug h those proce dures wa s “re asonably calc ulated to ena

ble the child to re ceive educational benef

its.” Id. Thoug h the cour t must show defere nce to a dminist rative boa rd fi nd ing s, the c ourt

is a lso e mpo we re d to c on du c t an in de pe nd e nt r e vie w o f t he re c or d a s a

wh ole
and e ve n h e ar a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e . 2 0 U .S. C. § 14 15 (i )( 2) (C ); Rowley , 4 58 U. S. at 20 6; Ce rra , 427 F.3d at 191-92. The c ourt’s inquiry is a results-ba sed standar d in many respe cts, conc erne d8

more with a just outcome f or a disable d student than with judicial eff iciency
. See R owley , 458 U. S. at 20 6- 07 . ARul e 56 .1 state me nt, wh ile no t r e qu ir e d, may a ssi st the c ourt ’s inq

uir y int o wh e the r I DE A p ro c e dure s w e re fo llo we d a nd wh e the r t he re su lt w a s r e a so na

bly de signe d to confe r educ ational bene fits. But while a Rule 56.1 statement may assist the court in re viewing particula r issues, it is not i n and of itself dispositive. The district cour t's c hara cter ization of Ap p el l ee ’s R

u l e 5 6
. 1 s t at em en tas "n ec es s ary " w as th er ef o re n o ten t i re l y

co rr ec t . T h e c o urt 's
err or wa s of no conse quence , howeve r, bec ause w e ar e satisfied that the court c onducted a n independe nt reviewand ca ref ully revie wed the r ecor d, as is require d by the statute. I I
. Substantive Violations Th e pa re nts argue that th e he ari ngof fi c e rs e rr e d in

no t f ind ingthat th e I EP s ub sta nti ve ly deprive d T.Y. of a

fre e and a

ppropriate education, notwiths tandingthe offic ers’ conclusions that the I EP was def

icient in speec h and languag e ser vices a nd pare nt training . In addition, the pare nts argue that the NY CDOE’s fa ilure to provide f or a F unctional B ehavior al Assessment (“F BA ”) or

Be havior Interve ntion Pl an (“ BI P”) to addre ss T.Y.’s biting, ha ir pulling a nd other behavior s amounted to a substantive violation of the I DEA. As we ha ve noted on se vera l occa sions, “[b] eca use administrative a g encie s have spe cial expertise in making judg ments conce rningstudent prog ress, de fer ence is particular ly important when a ssessing a

n I EP’s substantive adequa cy .” Ce rra , 427 F.3d at 195. I ndeed, w e have
re ve rs e d a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s w he re we de te rm ine d th at “ the Di str ic t Co ur t im pe rm iss ibl y chose be tween the views of c onflicting experts on a controve rsial issue of e ducational policy
. . . in d ir e c t c on tr a dic tio n o f t he op ini on s o f s tate a dmi nis tr ativ e of fi c e rs wh o h a d h e ard

the same9

evidenc e.” Id
. (c i t i n g Gr im v . R hin e be c k Ce nt. Sc h. Di

st. , 346 F.3d 377, 383 ( 2d Cir. 2003)). Under this standard of r eview, w e agree with the NYCDOE that the a dminist rative office rs’ opinions, which we re thorough and we ll-rea soned, dese rve de fer ence . Whil e the pa re nts argue that a

c ri sis pa ra pr of e ssi on a l is no su

bs tit ute fo r a n F B A o r a

B I P, the re is
su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d th at th e 1:1 a ide pr ov ide d s ig nif ic ant b e ne fi ts t o T .Y . in addre ssing the pr oblematic beha viors. We ag ree that the re cord doe s indicate that the initial I EP la c ke d th e re qu isi te sp e e c h a nd langua g e se rv ic e s a

nd pa re nt t ra ini ng , b ut c on c lud e that th e se
e rr or s w e re su ita

bly c or re c te d b y the I HO and

SRO , a nd do no t r e nd e r t

he I EP a s a

wh ole substantively

defic ient. In short, we se e no re ason to second guess the re asonable , profe ssional deter minations of the I HO and SRO in this case. I I I
. Procedur al Violations Finally , the par ents argue that the NY CDOE’s policy of not specif

ying a particula r school in the I EP deprived them of their rig ht to meaning ful participation in the I EP’s development. At the he ari ngbe fo re the I HO , K e nn e th S tark , a re pr e se ntativ e fr om t

he NY CD OE , te sti fi e d th at in New Y ork a spe cific sc hool placeme nt is never of fer ed at the I EP meeting , and that the c hild’s place ment is rather

deter mined by “a c ity wide plac ement off

icer who looks at which school would be the most appropr iate.” Th e pa re nts po int

to v ari ou s im

ple me nti ngre g ulatio ns of the I DE A, wh ic h p ro vid e , in pa rt , th at “ the pa

re nts of a c hil d w itha

dis a bil ity mus t be a ff

or de d a n o pp or tun ity to p art ic ipate in
me e tin g s w ithre sp e c t to . . . [t]h e ide nti fi c atio n, e va luatio n, and e du c atio na l placeme nt

of the
c hil d. ” 34 C.F .R. § 3 00 .5 01 (b )( 1) (i ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he pa re nts a lso dir e c t ou

r atte nti on

to10

20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)( A), whic h define s “individualiz ed educ ation prog ram” as a state ment that includes, inte r a lia , “the a nticipated fr equenc y , location , and dura tion of those service s.” § 1414(d)( 1)(A) (i)(V I I ) (e mphasis added) . Given this languag e, the pa rents ar g ue that “[t]he proce dural saf

eguards of

the fe dera l I DEIA statute thus make c lear that pare nts are to be aff

orded
me anin g fu l pa

rt ic ipatio n in

the de c isi on -m akin gpr oc e ss a s to the loc atio n a nd pla c e me nt o f t

he ir child’s school and c lassroom.” W h i l e t h e p ar en t s ’ c i t at i o no f t h e s t atu t e a n d re gu l at i o n s i s , atfi rs tgl an ce , co mp el l i n g, up on c los e r e va luatio n w e c on c lud e that th is l angua g e do e s n ot c omp e l th e re su lt the pa re nts seek. A s we have pre viously stated, the ter

m “educ ational place ment” in the re g ulations “ref ers only to the g ener al ty

pe of e ducational pr og ram in which the child is placed.” Concerned Parents v. N.Y

. City Bd. of Educ. , 6 29 F .2 d 7 51 , 7 56 (2 d Ci r. 19 80 ). “ Ed uc atio na l pl a c e me nt” ref ers to the g ener al educ ational prog ram—such a s the classe s, individualiz ed attention and
a dd iti on a l se rv ic e s a

c hil d w ill re c e ive—r athe r t ha n th e “ br ic ks and

mor tar” of the sp e c if

ic
sc ho ol. Fur

ther, the r equire ment that an I EP specify the “location” does not mean that the I EP must specify

a spec ific school site. The United States Depa rtment of Educ ation (“U SDOE”)
e x p r e s s l y c o n s i d e r e d

th i s qu e s t i o ni ni t s c o m m e n t ar y t o th e 1 9 9 7 am e n dm e n t s t o th e ID E A
. In that commentar

y , the USDOE noted, Some commenters r equeste d that the term “ location” be define d as the plac ement on the continuum and not the exact building where the I EP service is to be provided . . . . Othe r commente rs similarly stated that a note be adde d clar ifying that “location” means the g ener al setting in which the ser vices will be provide d, and not a pa

rticular sc hool or fac ility
.11

Assistance to States for

the Education of Children with Disabiliti es and the Early Interve ntion Prog ram for

Infants and T oddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Re g . 12406, 12594 (Mar . 12, 1999). In resolvingthis iss ue, the USDOE conclude d that “[t] he location of service s in the context of an I EP ge nera lly

ref ers to the ty

pe of e nvironment that is the appropr iate plac e for provision of the service . For

example, is the related se rvice to be provided in the c hild’s regular c lassroom or
resour ce r oom? ” Id. This conclusion comports with the Senate ’s commentar y , which states that “ [t ]he location wher e spec ial education and related servic es will be provided to a child influence s decisions
a bo ut t he natur e and

amou nt o f t he se se rv ic e s a

nd wh e n th e y

sh ou ld b e pr ov ide d to a

c hil d. ” S. Rep. No. 105-17, at 21 (1977). “F or example, the appr opriate pla ce f or the re lated ser

vice may be the r egular c lassroom, so that the child does not have to choose be tween a neede d service and the re g ular e ducational pr og ram.” Id. “ F or thi s r e a so n, ” the c omm e nta ry c on tin ue s, “ in t he bil l the c omm itt e e ha s a dd e d ‘ loc atio n’ to t he pr ov isi on

in t he I EP that in c lud e s ‘ the pr oje c te d d ate for the be g inning of

service s and modifications, and the anticipated f reque ncy , location, and duration of those se rvice s.’” Id. (e mph a sis omi tte d) . We int e rp re t th e se state me nts to i nd ic ate that the term “ location” doe s not mean the spec ific school location, but the ge nera l environment of the ov e ra ll p ro g ra

m. There fore , we c onclude that be cause there is no require ment in the I DEA that the I EP
n ame a s p e c if ic s c h o o l l o c ati o n , T
. Y
. ’ s I E P w a s n o t p r o c e d ur a ll y d e f ic ie n t f o r th at r e a s o n . We emphasize that we a

re not holdingthat school districts have c arte blanche to assign a child to a school that ca

nnot satisfy

the I EP’s require ments. We simpl y hold that an I EP’s failure to12

identify a spec ific school location will not constitute a pe r seproce dural violation of the I DEA. See W hite ex re l. W

hite v. Asce nsion Parish Sch. Bd ., 343 F.3d 373, 379 ( 5th Cir. 2003). But see A.K. ex re l J.K. v. Alex andria Cit y Sch. B d. , 484 F.3d 672, 682 ( 4th Cir. 2007). We note, howeve r, that notwithstanding our holding he re, the evidenc e re flec ts that T. Y. ’s pa re nts did pa rt ic ipate in s c ho ol s e le c tio n a nd tha t th e NY CD OE wo rk e d c oo pe rativ e ly wi th t he pa re nts a ft e r t

he y vo ic e d th e ir

ob je c tio ns . T he NY CD OE of fe re d th e pa

re nts on e sc ho ol, which they

reje cted. The NYCDOE of fer ed the pa

rents anothe r school, which the y also reje cted without an on-site visit. The pare nts then enrolled their child into the Rebecc a School without
a llo wi ngthe NY CD OE an o pp or tun ity to o ff e r ye t ano the r s c ho ol. Th e pa re nts ’ a c tio ns su g g e st that they seek a “veto” over sc hool choice, r ather than “input”—a

power the I DEA c lear ly

does not gr ant them. Se e W

hite , 343 F.3d at 380.

CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the district cour t is AFF I RMED.