MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2024 ME	1

Docket: Pen-23-81

Submitted

On	Briefs: September	27,	2023

Decided: January	9,	2024

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and	MEAD,	JABAR,	CONNORS,	LAWRENCE,	and	DOUGLAS, JJ.

IN	RE	CHILDREN	OF	BILLIE	S.

DOUGLAS,	J.

[¶]	 	 Billie	 S.	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court	 (Bangor,	

Roberts,	J.)	terminating	her	parental	rights to	her	children pursuant	to	22	M.R.S.	

§ 4055(1)(B)(2)	 (2023). The	 mother	 contends	 that	 the	 judgment	 does	 not	

make	adequate,	independent	findings	of	fact	to	support	termination.		We	agree	

and vacate	the	judgment.		

[¶2]		The sole	witness at	the	March	2,	2023, hearing	on	the	petition	for	

termination	 of	 parental	 rights1 was	 the	 Department of	 Health	 and	 Human	

Services caseworker, who	 had	 just	 been	 assigned	 to	 the	 case	 two	 months	

earlier. The	 caseworker testified	 that she had	 reviewed	 the	 case	 file,	 had	

spoken	with	her	supervisor	as	well	as	with	the	caseworker	previously	assigned	

1 The	mother	failed	to	appear	at	the	hearing.		Her	counsel’s	motion	to	continue	the	hearing	was	

denied	because	the	mother	had	notice	of	the	hearing	and	no	reason	was	offered	to	account	for	her	

absence.	
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to	the	case,	and	had	reviewed the	petitions	for	termination that	were	prepared	

and	filed	in	June	2021	by	the	previous caseworker.		She also	testified	that	she	

had	reviewed specifically paragraph	nine	of	each	petition2 (which	summarizes	

the	facts	alleged	in	support	of	termination)	and	believed	their	contents	still	to	

be	true	to	the	best	of	her	knowledge.		

[¶3]		Counsel	for	the	Department requested	that the	court	take	“judicial	

notice” of	paragraph	nine	of	each	petition	“relative	to	the	mother,	relative	to	the	

father	of	[the	older child],

3 and relative	to	the	best	interests	in	light	of	the	direct	

testimony	 of	 the	 same	 effect	 subject, of	 course,	 to	 cross.”4	 	 There	 was	 no	

objection,	and	counsel	for	each	parent	and the	guardian	ad	litem affirmatively	

agreed	with this request.	 Following cross-examination of	 the	caseworker by	

the	parents’ counsel, the	Department	rested.		With	the	admission	of	the	reports	

of	the	guardian	ad	litem,	the	evidence	closed.		

2 The	Department	filed	two	termination	petitions	because	the	children	had	different	fathers.		The	

father	 of	 the	younger child	is	 deceased.	 	The	parental	 rights	 of	 the	father	 of	 the	older child were	

terminated	in	this	matter,	and he	did	not	appeal.		

3	 	 Here, counsel	 for	 the	 Department	 had	 mistakenly	 referred	 to	 the	 younger	 child	 by	 name,	

however,	it	is	clear	from	the	record	that he	was	referring	to	the older	child.		

4 The	mother	further	contends	 that	 the	court	abused	its	discretion by	 taking	judicial	notice	of	

paragraph	nine	in	each petition	because	the facts	set	out	therein	are	“subject	to	reasonable	dispute.”	

M.R.	 Evid.	 201(b).	 	 Because	 we	 determine	 that	 the	 judgment	 does	 not	 set	 out	 adequate	 factual	

findings,	we	decline	to	address	this	and	other	issues	the appeal	raises.		See	In re Kenneth	H.,	1997	ME	

48,	¶	5,	690	A.2d	984 (noting	that	effective	appellate	review	requires	“specific	findings	of	fact	that	

would	 inform	 the	 parties or	 this	 [C]ourt	 of	 the	 basis	 of	 [the	 trial	 court’s] decision”)	 (quoting	

In re Amber	B.,	597	A.2d	937,	938	(Me.	1991)).
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[¶4]	 	 Ruling	 from	 the	 bench,	 the court	 said that	 it	 had	 “reviewed	

Paragraph 9	 and	 the	 petition	 that	 was	 admitted into	 evidence,	 heard	 the	

testimony	of	the	caseworker,	and	.	.	. reviewed	[the two	latest	guardian	ad	litem

reports],”	and	found on the	basis	of that	evidence

that	the	parents	are	unwilling	or	[un]able	to	protect	the	children	

from	 jeopardy,	 and	 those	 circumstances	 are	 unlikely	 to	 change	

within	 a	 .	 .	 . time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 the	 [children’s]	

needs.		They	are	unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the	

. .	 .	 children	 within	 the	 time	 reasonably	 calculated	 to	 meet	 the	

children’s	needs.		I’m	not	going	to	find	abandonment.		And	in	terms	

of	[the	mother],	of	course,	I’m	also	not	going	to	find	that	she’s	failed	

to	make	a	good	faith	effort	to	rehabilitate	and	reunify	.	.	.	. I	further	

find	that	termination	is	in	the	children’s	best	interest,	and	I	will	sign	

an	order	once	[the	Department	has] prepared	it .	.	.	.

At	 the	 court’s	 request,	 the	 Department's	 counsel	 subsequently	 submitted	 a	

proposed order of termination of	the	mother’s	parental	rights	to	the	children.

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[¶5]	 	 The	 proposed	 order submitted	 by	 the	 Department	 indicated a	

finding	by	clear	and	convincing	evidence	that	the	mother	“is	unwilling	or	unable	

to	protect	the	[children] from	jeopardy	and	these	circumstances	are unlikely	to	

change	within	a	time	calculated	to	meet	the	[children’s] needs” and	“that it is	in	

the	[children’s] best	interest[s] that	[her] parental	rights	be	terminated.”6		In	

5		The proposed	order also	terminated	the	parental	rights	of	the	father	of the	older	child.		

6		The	proposed	order (which	consisted	of	court	form	PC-036 filled	in	by	counsel) deviated	from	

the	court’s	ruling	 from	 the	bench,	however,	in	 two	respects.		First,	 the	box	indicating	a	 finding	of	
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the	 section	on	 the	 form order entitled	 “Specific	 Findings,” the	 following was

written:

See	¶	9	of	both	petitions	re:	[the	mother]

								¶ 9	of	[the	older child’s]	petition	re:	[the	father]

																				¶	9	of	both	petitions	re:	best	interests

See	GAL	reports

See	also	testimony	of	caseworker.

The	order	was	issued on	March 20,	2023.		The	mother	filed a timely	appeal.		

M.R.	App.	R.	2B(c)(1).	

[¶6]		Although	couched at times in	terms	of	a	challenge	to	the	sufficiency

of the evidence,	the	focus	of	the	mother’s	challenge on	appeal is	on	the	adequacy	

and	 form	 of	 the	 judgment’s	 findings of fact.	 	 Thus,	 she	 contends	 that	 the	

judgment	lacks independent,	specific	facts	to support	the	ultimate	findings	as	

to	 parental unfitness	 and	 best	 interests of	 the	 children, and instead

incorporates in	full	a paragraph	of the	termination	petitions, the	guardian	ad	

litem	reports, and	the	entirety	of	the	caseworker’s	testimony.		

abandonment was	checked,	even	though	the	court	had	expressly	ruled	from	the	bench	that	“I'm	not	

going	to	find	abandonment” as	to	the	mother.		Second,	the	box	indicating	a	finding	that	the parent	is	

unwilling	or	unable	to	take	responsibility	for	the	children	within	a	time	reasonably	calculated	to	meet	

the	 children’s	 needs was	 not	 checked,	 despite	the	 court's	 contrary	 finding from	 the	 bench with	

respect	to	the	mother.		Counsel	preparing	a	proposed	order	at	the	direction	of	the	court	should	make	

every	effort	to	ensure	that	the	proposed	order submitted	to	the	court	reflects	the	rulings	from	the	

bench.
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[¶7]	 	 A	 judgment terminating	 parental	 rights must set	 forth	 specific,	

independently	made	findings	of	fact.		In	re	David	G.,	659	A.2d	859,	862-63	(Me.	

1995);	see	also	M.R.	Civ.	P.	52(a) (“[I]n	every	action	for	termination	of	parental	

rights,	the	court	shall	make	specific	findings	of	fact and	state	its	conclusions	of	

law	.	.	.	as	required	by	22	M.R.S.	§	4055.” (emphasis	added)).		It	must	contain	

more	than	“merely	a	synopsis”	of	testimony	or	evidence	and	a	recitation	of	the	

elements	of	22	M.R.S.	§	4055.		In	re	Dylan	B.,	2001	ME	31,	¶	4,	766	A.2d	577;	see	

also	In re Kenneth	H.,	1997	ME	48,	¶	3,	690	A.2d	984	(concluding	that	a	synopsis	

of	trial	testimony	and	“near-verbatim	recitation” of	section	4055(B)’s	language	

were	inadequate	as	findings);	In	re	Amber	B.,	597	A.2d	937,	937-38	(Me.	1991)	

(holding findings	 of	 fact	 merely	 referencing	 the	 statutory	 elements	 to	 be	

inadequate).		Moreover,	“we	will	not	infer	factual	findings	in	a	termination	case”

when	adequacy	of	the	findings	is	the	issue	presented.		In re Aubrey	R.,	2017	ME	

37,	¶ 2-3,	157	A.3d	212.		

[¶8]		Here,	the judgment	recites	the	court’s ultimate findings	with	respect	

to	 the	 applicable	 statutory	 elements	 and	 then	 incorporates	 as	 its	 “specific	

findings”	entire portions of	the	record	evidence—the	guardian	ad	litem reports,	

all	trial	testimony,	and	paragraph	nine	of	each	petition.		These are not “specific	

findings of	 fact”	 required	 by	Rule	 52(a) or	 our	 prior	 decisions.	 	They	do	 not	
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reflect an	independent articulation	of the	particular	facts	forming the	basis	of	

the	court’s	reasons	in support	of	its	ultimate	findings regarding	the	mother’s	

parental	unfitness	or	the	children’s	best	interests.

7		Because	the judgment lacks

adequate findings	that	would	sufficiently	inform	the	mother	and	this	Court	of	

the	basis	of the	court’s	decision,	we	must	vacate the	judgment.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	vacated.		Remanded	to	the	District	

Court	for	further	proceedings	consistent	with	

this	opinion.

Neil	J.	Prendergast,	Esq.,	Fort	Kent,	for	appellant	mother

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Hunter	C.	Umphrey,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	

of	the	Attorney	General,	Bangor,	for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human	

Services

Bangor	District	Court	docket	numbers	PC-2020-58	and	PC-2020-59

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY

7		The	difficulty	of	appellate	review	due	to	lack of	specific	findings	is	further	compounded	here	by	

contradictions	reflected	in	portions	of	the	incorporated	testimony	and reports.		As	one example,	the	

March	2,	2023,	report	of	the	guardian	ad	litem states	that	“[t]he	visits	[that]	did	occur	went	well”	and	

that	the	mother	“interacted	well	and	appropriately	with	the	children.”		The	caseworker,	on	the	other	

hand,	testified	that	visits	“go	okay”	and	that	there	were	“some	concerns	about	[the	mother’s]	ability	

to	be	appropriate	in	her	conversations	with	[the	children].”