alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ex10_1.htm










FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT












This Fifteenth Amendment to Employment Agreement is made and entered into as of October 6, 2010, by and between PriceSmart, Inc., a Delaware Corporation ("Employer") and Jose Luis Laparte ("Executive").







Recitals








	
A)  

	
On June 3, 2004 an Employment Agreement was made and entered into by and between Employer and Executive.













	
B)  

	
Said Employment Agreement has been amended on fourteen prior occasions;













	
C)  

	
Employer and Executive now desire to amend the Employment Agreement, as set forth hereinbelow:












Agreement








	
1.  

	
Section 3.1 of the Agreement which provides:












3.1           Term.  The term of Executive's employment hereunder shall commence on October 8, 2004 and shall continue until October 7, 2010, unless sooner terminated or extended as hereinafter provided (the "Employment Term").


 

 


is hereby amended, to provide as follows:







3.1 Term.  The term of Executive's employment hereunder shall commence on October 8, 2004 and shall continue until October 7, 2011, unless sooner terminated or extended as hereinafter provided (the "Employment Term").








	
2.  

	
All other terms of the Employment Agreement, as amended, shall remain unaltered and fully effective.

















Executed in San Diego, California, as of the date first written above.












EXECUTIVE                                                                                                EMPLOYER


PRICESMART, INC.







Jose Luis Laparte                                                                            By:           _________________ 







______________________                                                              Name:       _________________                                              


                             Its:           __________________
No. 86-6005.

#### Procup *v.*Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.
**Exhibit99.2**

 

**INSIGNIA SOLUTIONS PLC**

 

CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION1350,

AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of InsigniaSolutions plc (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,2002, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, Mark E. McMillan, President of the Company, certify,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)               TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)               Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Mark E. McMillan |   |
|----------------------|--------|
| Mark E. McMillan     |
| President            |
| November 14, 2002    |

 

----
You are here: EPA Home Compliance and Enforcement ECHO Search Data Search Results

Detailed Facility Report 

 For Public Release - Unrestricted Dissemination Report Generated on 09/11/2012 

 US Environmental Protection Agency - Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance

Gray text in this report indicates information that is not required to be reported to EPA. These data, typically 

regarding non-major or smaller facilities, are often incomplete. 

Facility Permits and Identifiers

Statute System Source ID Facility Name Street Address City State Zip 

 FRS 110038671452 CHILCO LAKE LUMBER(DBA RILEY CR SANDPT) 808 N BOYER RD SANDPOINT ID 83864 

CAA AFS 1601700003 CHILCO LAKE LUMBER(DBA RILEY CR SANDPT) 808 N BOYER RD SANDPOINT ID 83864 

Facility Characteristics

Statute Source ID Universe Status Areas

Permit 

Expiration 

Date

Latitude/ 

Longitude

Indian 

Country?

SIC 

Codes

NAICS 

Codes

 110038671452 

LRT: 

48.280387 , 

-116.557029 

No 

CAA 1601700003 Major (Fed. 

Rep.)

Permanently 

Closed

TITLE V 

PERMITS , SIP , 

PSD 

 NA 2421 

If the CWA permit is past its expiration date, this normally means that the permitting authority has not yet issued a new permit. In these 

situations, the expired permit is normally administratively extended and kept in effect until the new permit is issued.

For the RCRA program, activities that contribute to an overall facility status of Active are displayed in parentheses using the acronym 

HPACS, where H indicates handler activities, P - permitting, A - corrective action, C - converter, and S - state-specific. More information is 

available in the Data Dictionary.

Inspection and Enforcement Summary Data

Statute Source ID Insp. Last 05Yrs Date of Last Inspection Formal Enf Act Last 05 Yrs Penalties Last 05 Yrs 

CAA 1601700003 0 02/17/2005 0 $00 

Compliance Monitoring History (05 years )

Statute Source ID System Inspection Type Lead Agency Date Finding 

- No data records returned.

Entries in italics are not considered inspections in official counts.

Compliance Summary Data

Information on the nature of alleged violations is available on the FAQ page.

Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO)

EPA IDEA Query Results Page 1 of 1

http://www.epa-echo.gov/cgi-bin/get1cReport.cgi?tool=echo&IDNumber=110038671452 9/11/2012
#### ASSOCIATES COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, v. Elray RASH, et ux.

No. 96-454.

Supreme Court of the United States.

April 11, 1997.

Motion of National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Inc., for leave to participate in oral argument as *amicus curiae*and for divided argument denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 143 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 143

   To prohibit anticompetitive activities and to provide that health 
insurance issuers and medical malpractice insurance issuers are subject 
  to the antitrust laws of the United States, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 3, 2017

 Mr. Conyers introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To prohibit anticompetitive activities and to provide that health 
insurance issuers and medical malpractice insurance issuers are subject 
  to the antitrust laws of the United States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Health Insurance Industry Antitrust 
Enforcement Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTIVITIES.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, nothing in the Act of 
March 9, 1945 (15 U.S.C. 1011 et seq., commonly known as the 
``McCarran-Ferguson Act''), shall be construed to permit health 
insurance issuers (as defined in section 2791 of the Public Health 
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 300gg-91)) or issuers of medical malpractice 
insurance to engage in any form of price fixing, bid rigging, or market 
allocations in connection with the conduct of the business of providing 
health insurance coverage (as defined in such section) or coverage for 
medical malpractice claims or actions.

SEC. 3. RESTORING THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO HEALTH SECTOR 
              INSURERS.

    (a) Amendment to McCarran-Ferguson Act.--Section 3 of the Act of 
March 9, 1945 (15 U.S.C. 1013), commonly known as the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall modify, impair, or 
supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws with respect to 
the business of health insurance. For purposes of the preceding 
sentence, the term `antitrust laws' has the meaning given it in 
subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act, except that 
such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to the 
extent that such section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition.''.
    (b) Related Provision.--For purposes of section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent such section applies 
to unfair methods of competition, section 3(c) of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act shall apply with respect to the business of health insurance 
without regard to whether such business is carried on for profit, 
notwithstanding the definition of ``Corporation'' contained in section 
4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of Dave CAMPBELL, Debtor. Dave CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Defendant.

Bankruptcy Nos. 80 B 12117, 81 A 1508.

United States Bankruptcy Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

Jan. 13, 1982.

*497Robert Morel Gray, Joliet, Ill., for plaintiff.

Lawrence Friedman, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD L. MERRICK, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter came on to be heard upon the motion of the debtor to make installment payments under a four-year chapter 13 plan of the redemption amount determined under § 722 of the Bankruptcy Code to represent the present value of a 1979 Ford Thunderbird. It would appear that the redemption amount falls within the guidelines established by this Court in *In re Willis,*6 B.R. 555, 6 BCD 1101, CCH. Bankr.L.Rep. 67640 (Bkrtcy.ND Ill. 1980).

Memoranda submitted by the parties cite Bankruptcy Court decisions on both sides of the issue of whether or not installment payments can be forced upon an unwilling creditor. In the view of this Court none of those cases focuses on the issue which is, alternatively,

> 1. May installment payments be prescribed at the cash price? or

> 2. May installment payments be prescribed where the future payments will cover the time weighted value?

It was implicit in the *Willis*decision that present value is the amount which is to be paid for present payment, and future value is the amount which is to be paid for future payment. To this Court the principle is simple and clear cut and is the basis for all of the provisions of the Code which relate to adequate protection and impairment of collateral.

The legislative background for § 522(e) and (f), § 524(c) and § 722 was described at length in *In re Morris,*12 B.R. 321, 7 BCD 1336 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1981) and will not be repeated here. Most of the legislative hearings were in the context of reaffirmations of contracts secured by tangible personal property, but the overriding desire of the Congress to limit the economic power of the secured lender to a level commensurate with the value of his security interest was pervasive. On the other hand, §§ 361-363 make it abundantly clear that the Congress did not intend to deprive a secured creditor of any security interest which he might have, to the extent of the value of the collateral.

This Court is not about to become involved in the negotiation phase of settlement agreements. After agreements have been reached, the Court will review them to determine whether or not they comply with the Bankruptcy Code and with standards which the Court has established previously.

The appropriate rate of interest for Ford Motor Credit Company to receive for the delayed payments is whatever rate that company will be required to pay to obtain money, which usually runs about *lh*of 1% above the current rate for thirteen-week Treasury Bills. The average auction rate on the day that this opinion was written was 11.04%.

The petition will be denied as presented, but the Court will approve installment payments in equal monthly installments over 48 months computed by including interest on the present value at not to exceed an annual percentage rate of 11.54%.
I 

115TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1545 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify the authority of the 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs to disclose certain patient information 

to State controlled substance monitoring programs, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 15, 2017 

Ms. KUSTER of New Hampshire (for herself, Mr. WENSTRUP, Mr. BERGMAN, 

and Ms. BROWNLEY of California) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify the authority of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to disclose certain patient information to State controlled substance 

monitoring programs, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘VA Prescription Data 

5 Accountability Act 2017’’. 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1545 IH

1 SEC. 2. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS DISCLOSURE 

2 OF PATIENT INFORMATION TO STATE CON3 TROLLED SUBSTANCE MONITORING PRO4 GRAMS. 

5 Section 5701(l) of title 38, United States Code, is 

6 amended— 

7 (1) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ before ‘‘Under’’; 

8 (2) by striking ‘‘a veteran or the dependent of 

9 a veteran’’ and inserting ‘‘a covered individual’’; and 

10 (3) by adding at the end the following new 

11 paragraph: 

12 ‘‘(2) In this subsection, a ‘covered individual’ is an 

13 individual who is dispensed medication prescribed by an 

14 employee of the Department or by a non-Department pro15 vider authorized to prescribe such medication by the De16 partment.’’. 

Æ 


SSpencer on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
```

[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 9 (Thursday, January 15, 2009)]
[House]
[Page H373]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  (Mr. BURTON of Indiana addressed the House. His remarks will appear 
hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

                          ____________________
```
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion *

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-10914

Conference Calendar

NATIVIDAD SILVA, JR

Petitioner-Appellant

v.

DAN BERKEBILE, Warden

Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:08-CV-1240

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In January 1993, Natividad Silva, Jr., now federal prisoner # 23368-077,

was convicted by guilty plea for robbery affecting commerce in Counts 1, 2, 3,

and 5 and for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence in Counts 4 and

6. He was sentenced to concurrent 97-month terms of imprisonment on Counts

1, 2, 3, and 5; a consecutive 60 month-term of imprisonment on Count 4; and a

consecutive 240-month term of imprisonment on Count 6. He appeals from the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 16, 2009

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-10914

2

district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.

This court reviews a district court’s dismissal on the pleadings of a § 2241

petition de novo. Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000).

In Count 6, Silva and Jesus Silva (hereinafter referred to as Jesus) were

charged with knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to

a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c)(1). Silva concedes

that the record established that he robbed an armored truck with the use of a

firearm and that Jesus provided him with transportation to and from the scene

of the crime. Silva argues that, in light of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137

(1995), Jesus should not have been convicted of using or carrying a firearm in

violation of § 924(c)(1). Silva concludes that he could not have been convicted of

aiding or abetting Jesus’s violation of § 924(c)(1) and that he is therefore actually

innocent of Count 6.

When a defendant is charged as both a principal and as an aider or

abettor, the principal need not be identified and the defendant may be convicted

as either a principal or an aider or abettor. United States v. Pearson, 655 F.2d

569, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1981). As Silva failed to show that he was actually

innocent of Count 6, he did not meet the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)

by showing that the remedy provided under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective”

to test the legality of his detention. See Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378, 382

(5th Cir. 2003).

Silva’s appeal is without arguable merit and therefore frivolous. See

Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is

frivolous, it is dismissed. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. Silva is warned that further

frivolous filings will result in the imposition of sanctions.

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
#### Samuel Greenlee *v.*John B. Tate & others, heirs of William Tate,

From Burke.

It is fraudulent in law for the grantee to survey his oxvn entry.— Therefore, when tins fact was found by the Jury, and further, that the survey was fairly made, it was held that the grant must be vacated.

This was a petition to vacate a grant. From the petition it appeared, that the grant to the ancestor of the Defendants, issued in November, 1802 ; that in July,' 1820, a grant for a part of (he same land issued to the Plaintiff. The petition charged, that *William Tate,*the grantee in rhe first grant, surveyed and located his warrant of survey himself.

From the petition and answer, the following issues were made up, and submitted to a Jury :

1. Was the land surveyed according to law, and were the chain-carriers sworn ?

2. Did *William Tate,*enterer and grantee, survey for himself ?

*3013. Did *William Tate*lay before the County Surveyor, the survey made by him, arid was the same ratified and signed by the County Surveyor ?

4. Was there any fraud in surveying the land, oUin obtaining the grant which issued to *William Tate?*

The Jury being instructed by his Honor, Judge Strange, that it was not fraudulent *per*se, for the grantee to survey his own entry,, found,

1. That the land was surveyed according to law, and that the chain-carriers were sworn.

2. That *William Tate,*enterer and grantee, surveyed for himself.

3. That *William Tate*did lay before the County Surveyor, the survey made by him, and that the same was ratified and signed by the County Surveyor..

4. That there was no fraud in surveying the land, or in obtaining the grant which issued to *William Tate.*

Upon this verdict, judgment was rendered for the Defendants j from which the Plaintiff appealed.

The *Attorney-General,*and *Devereux,*for the Plaintiff, contended,

that it was against public policy to permit the grantee to survey his own entry. *{Avery v. Walker*1 *Hawks*140,).

*Wilson, contra.*

Hart. Judge,

The question in this case, lies within narrow limits, It turns upon the fact, that the land in controversy, was surveyed by the ancestor of the Defendants, who entered it, and to whom a grant issued.

The principle which must decide this case against the Defendants, was established in the case of *Avery*v. *Walker.*It is there established, that no Deputy Surveyor shall be permitted to survey land for himself, and to that case I refer, instead of repeating the reasons there given in support of this position. The grant must be vacated.

Per Curiam. — Judgment reversed, and judgment for the Plaintiff.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM BALANCE
SHEET, STATEMENT OF INCOME AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                           1,673
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      944
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      2,832
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 5,570
<PP&E>                                           2,353
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,282
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   8,898
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,223
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             5
<OTHER-SE>                                       7,523
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     8,898
<SALES>                                          4,177
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,177
<CGS>                                            3,456
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      711
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (52)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   1
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     61
<INCOME-TAX>                                        24
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 37
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        37
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .01
        

</TABLE>