COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

February 11, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP819-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2014CF932

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

ANDRE D. STACKHOUSE,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Outagamie County: VINCENT R. BISKUPIC, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Andre Stackhouse, who was captured on video 

stabbing an individual in a nightclub in front of a police officer, was convicted after 
No. 2018AP819-CR

2

a jury trial of attempted first-degree intentional homicide and aggravated battery, 

both with a penalty enhancer for the use of a dangerous weapon during the 

commission of the offense. He seeks a new trial based on over a dozen claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that none of the claims are 

meritorious and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Following two attorney changes (neither of which were requested by

Stackhouse), the Office of the State Public Defender appointed attorney Rodman 

Streicher to represent Stackhouse in connection with the charges in this case. The 

appointment was effective March 24, 2015. On June 4, 2015, Stackhouse notified 

the circuit court of his intent to pursue a self-defense jury instruction. A three-day 

jury trial commenced on June 23, 2015, at the conclusion of which the jury found 

Stackhouse guilty of both offenses. 

¶3 The victim, James, did not testify at trial.1 The State presented 

evidence that two groups consisting of many familial-related individuals had 

traveled from Green Bay, on two different party buses, to the Antro Nightclub in 

Appleton. James was celebrating his wedding anniversary on one of the buses; Don, 

James’s brother, was celebrating his birthday on the other bus. The brothers were 

not on speaking terms at the time the two groups arrived at Antro, and Don was seen 

arguing with Jonathan Moore, a member of James’s group, while at the club. 

 

1

 Pursuant to the policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86 (2017-18), we use 

pseudonyms to identify the victim and his immediate family members. 

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2018AP819-CR

3

¶4 A physical altercation occurred between the brothers, and after James 

walked away from the fight, Stackhouse was overheard telling Moore “I’m going to 

knock this nigga out,” referring to Don. Club security eventually required 

Stackhouse, Moore and two other members of James’s group, Jimmy Flemming and 

David Atterberry, to leave the club. They all left through the front door but then 

went around the block and re-entered the club through its back door. 

¶5 When they returned to the club, Stackhouse, Moore and Flemming

“rushed” Don near a dance floor and began fighting with him. Rachel, who is Don 

and James’s sister, testified she saw Stackhouse fidgeting near his pocket during the 

altercation and thought he might have had a firearm. Don was punched and went to 

his knees, at which point James intervened and defended his brother. Stackhouse, 

who was captured on surveillance video wielding a knife earlier in the evening, was 

witnessed standing over Don with the knife drawn. 

¶6 James then intervened to protect Don, and Flemming, Moore and 

Stackhouse began beating James. Video footage from Antro’s security system was 

introduced into evidence at trial. The video depicted Stackhouse kicking Don while 

Don was on the ground. James then intervened to protect Don and was pushed by 

Moore. Stackhouse swung a fist at James’s face, and James then punched him. 

Stackhouse and James separated briefly, and then Stackhouse lunged at James in a 

stabbing motion and pointed at him in a gun-like fashion before James was knocked 

to the ground out of the camera’s view. The video depicted Stackhouse kicking in 

James’s direction, as well as making repeated stabbing motions with a pointed 

object in his hand in the direction in which James fell. Don then intervened and 

punched Stackhouse in the mouth. 
No. 2018AP819-CR

4

¶7 A law enforcement officer witnessed Stackhouse’s knife attack on 

James. Jay Steinke, a lieutenant with the Appleton Police Department, testified he 

had responded to a complaint regarding the initial incident, following which 

Stackhouse and others were asked to leave Antro. After speaking with security

personnel in the front of the club, Steinke went around the block in the same path 

that Stackhouse and the others had taken. Steinke heard another officer radio that 

the fight had resumed inside Antro, and he entered through the back door of the 

club. 

¶8 Steinke testified that after he entered, he saw the fight in front of him 

on the dance floor and approached the scuffle. Stackhouse immediately caught 

Steinke’s attention because he was “taking some humongous, wide, very vicious 

strikes with his right hand” toward a person in front of him. Steinke further 

elaborated that he noticed Stackhouse had a knife in his right hand and was swinging 

in a “very vicious, wide-swinging manner” at the victim’s torso area. James 

ultimately suffered multiple stab wounds and was severely injured in the knife 

attack. 

¶9 Steinke deployed his taser to subdue Stackhouse. Don was also tased 

at approximately the same time as Stackhouse after refusing to comply with officers 

at the scene. Stackhouse dropped the knife upon being tased, and Steinke recovered 

it as soon as Stackhouse had been placed in handcuffs. James’s DNA was identified 

in the blood found on the knife. Stackhouse was later arrested at the hospital, at 

which time police discovered a knife sheath on the right side of his belt. 

¶10 Stackhouse’s defense counsel framed the case as being “about 

self-defense, pure and simple.” The defense theory was that what had been a fist 

fight escalated when James, brandishing his own knife, had attempted to stab 
No. 2018AP819-CR

5

Stackhouse in the stomach, prompting Stackhouse to defend himself. The defense 

highlighted portions of a cell phone video of the incident just before James was 

stabbed, which the defense argued conclusively showed James making a stabbing 

motion toward Stackhouse. Atterberry and another witness testified that they saw 

James make a lunging motion at Stackhouse before Stackhouse retaliated, and 

Atterberry testified he saw James was holding a knife during this motion.

2

 James’s 

wife, Jennifer, testified that other people in the crowd had weapons, and the defense 

also introduced evidence that James was heavily intoxicated and had a reputation 

for being aggressive when he was drinking. 

¶11 Stackhouse filed a postconviction motion for a new trial based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Stackhouse raised sixteen alleged instances of 

ineffective assistance, including that his trial counsel had failed to effectively 

cross-examine certain of the State’s witnesses, had failed to call important witnesses 

as part of the defense case, and had erroneously instructed Stackhouse not to testify. 

In all, Stackhouse’s allegations were directed at the notion that others present at the 

club had weapons, and they may have inflicted the wounds for which Stackhouse 

was charged. 

¶12 The circuit court held a Machner3 hearing on the motion, at which 

Streicher testified that he had become certified to handle Class B felonies shortly 

before Stackhouse’s trial and had once before handled a self-defense claim at trial. 

Streicher testified that based on the strength of the State’s case, which included an 

 

2

 Atterberry, Stackhouse’s older brother, was the only witness to testify that he saw James 

with a knife, and his testimony was impeached by a police detective who said that Atterberry never 

mentioned anyone attacking Stackhouse or having a knife during an interview shortly after the 

incident. 

3

 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).
No. 2018AP819-CR

6

eyewitness to the attack and a video of the same, he felt the best strategy was to 

address the evidence “head on” and argue that Stackhouse’s use of force was legally 

justified. 

¶13 The circuit court denied Stackhouse’s postconviction motion, 

concluding there was “no evidence ... including video or police reports showing 

anyone attacking [James] either before or after Mr. Stackhouse was Tased by 

Lieutenant Steinke.” Among other bases for rejecting Stackhouse’s various 

arguments, the court determined that Streicher’s decision to pursue self-defense was 

a deliberate trial strategy that was reasonably based upon the evidence in the parties’ 

possession. The court found that two significant witnesses, Flemming and Moore, 

might have been helpful to Stackhouse but could not be located, consistent with 

Stackhouse’s statement to Streicher that they would not be found if they did not 

want to be. The court also noted that many of the statements Stackhouse claimed 

should have been introduced at trial had significant hearsay problems that were not 

likely to be overcome. The court’s decision also covered many other aspects of 

Stackhouse’s motion, some of which the court noted had been only minimally 

developed. 

¶14 Stackhouse filed a notice of appeal, which we dismissed based upon 

Stackhouse’s representation that he had discovered new evidence that he wished to 

present to the circuit court. Stackhouse then filed a “second supplemental brief” 

and accompanying motion to reconsider the denial of his postconviction motion. 

Stackhouse primarily centered his renewed motion on the cell phone video that had 

been played at trial, contending that a portion of the video showing “another man in 

combat with the alleged victim” was never played for the jury. The circuit court 

denied the renewed motion following additional evidentiary hearings, concluding 
No. 2018AP819-CR

7

Streicher was not deficient, nor was Stackhouse prejudiced by any alleged errors. 

Stackhouse now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶15 Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant 

the right to the effective assistance of counsel. State v. Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, 

¶37, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93. To demonstrate that counsel’s assistance 

was ineffective, the defendant must show that counsel performed deficiently and 

that the deficient performance was prejudicial. Id. (citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To demonstrate deficient performance, 

the defendant must show that counsel’s representation was objectively unreasonable 

under the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Prejudice requires the 

defendant to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶39. “A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citing State v. Thiel, 2003 

WI 111, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305). 

¶16 Whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel is 

a mixed question of fact and law. Id., ¶37. “The factual circumstances of the case 

and trial counsel’s conduct and strategy are findings of fact, which will not be 

overturned unless clearly erroneous; whether counsel’s conduct constitutes 

ineffective assistance is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Id. If a 

defendant fails to satisfy either prong of the ineffective assistance inquiry, we need 

not consider the other. Id.

¶17 Our review in this case has been significantly hindered by the lack of 

a coherent organizational structure and developed arguments in Stackhouse’s briefs. 
No. 2018AP819-CR

8

For example, the brief-in-chief’s first section4spans twenty-three pages and, 

according to its title, concerns only trial counsel’s failure to subpoena or otherwise 

attempt to obtain the testimony of certain allegedly “necessary parties.” Yet this 

section includes not only allegations concerning missing witnesses; Stackhouse also 

raises within it challenges to his trial counsel’s performance regarding the 

presentation of the cell phone evidence, alleged failure to introduce medical records, 

and alleged failures during cross-examination of witnesses who did testify. 

Moreover, Stackhouse jumps from topic to topic without any apparent transition, 

and his brief intersperses in these materials quotations from other cases without any 

apparent context. While we have done our best to distill Stackhouse’s central 

arguments from his chaotic briefing (as categorized below), any fault for our failure 

to address any particular argument Stackhouse wished to have raised is due to the 

briefing on appeal. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. 

App. 1992) (observing that we may decline to review issues that are undeveloped 

or inadequately briefed).

I. Trial counsel’s self-defense theory was reasonable.

¶18 Stackhouse first argues, in essence, that his trial counsel’s theory of 

defense was unreasonable. He asserts the theory of self-defense was contradicted 

by the video evidence. This argument is also linked to his assertions that other

necessary witnesses were not called or were inadequately cross-examined regarding 

the presence of other weapons at the scene and the nature of James’s injuries. The 

premise of Stackhouse’s argument is that counsel should have pursued a defense 

 

4

 First in sequence, at least. Stackhouse’s brief includes two sections labeled with the 

Roman numeral “I.,” and its table of contents does not subdivide the forty-page argument section. 
No. 2018AP819-CR

9

that others, not Stackhouse, caused the significant stabbing injuries James suffered 

in the attack. 

¶19 We easily reject this argument. As Streicher acknowledged at the 

Machner hearing, the State’s evidence implicating Stackhouse in the stabbing of 

James was quite compelling. Stackhouse was captured on video making repeated 

stabbing motions in the victim’s direction, and a police officer saw Stackhouse 

commit the stabbing. The officer immediately tased Stackhouse to stop the attack

and then picked up the knife Stackhouse had used, which blade contained James’s 

DNA on it. Streicher testified he considered other defenses, including that someone 

other than Stackhouse had committed the attack, but, in light of the foregoing, found 

them unpersuasive and unlikely to win the day with a jury. 

¶20 Rather, Streicher testified he believed the best strategy was to address 

the video evidence “head on” and attempt to establish that Stackhouse’s plain use 

of force was justified. Streicher was able to support a self-defense theory with two 

witnesses who testified that James made a lunging motion at Stackhouse 

immediately before he was stabbed. Atterberry testified he saw a knife in James’s 

hand at the time, and trial counsel was able to marshal the cell phone video in 

support of Stackhouse’s self-defense claim. Streicher successfully obtained a selfdefense instruction based upon Stackhouse’s statements to a police officer that he 

was trying to defend himself. 

¶21 Counsel’s decisions in choosing a trial strategy are given great 

deference. Breitzman, 378 Wis. 2d 431, ¶38. Here, counsel’s decision to pursue 

self-defense in an effort to obtain an acquittal is the quintessential definition of a 

strategic choice. Given the available evidence, Streicher’s decision to pursue that 
No. 2018AP819-CR

10

defense over other defenses he viewed as less compelling was quite reasonable. 

Accordingly, Stackhouse’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently in this respect. 

¶22 Stackhouse makes various arguments suggesting that an alternate 

theory of defense would have been more appropriate. For example, he argues that 

evidence that others had knives “establishes the possibility that the wounds in 

question were not all caused” by Stackhouse.5 Inconsistently, he also appears to 

argue his trial counsel should have pursued a defense more in line with Stackhouse’s 

initial statements to police—namely, that he was uninvolved in the stabbing and was 

handed the knife by someone just before he was tased. 

¶23 Having considered all of Stackhouse’s postconviction allegations, as 

well as the evidence available to his trial counsel at the time, the alternate theories 

 

5 This argument appears to be based on a belief that specific wounds James suffered as 

part of the stabbing attack were associated with specific charges. More specifically, at the Machner

hearing, postconviction counsel’s questioning revealed his belief that a stab wound that caused a 

perforated colon was the basis for the attempted homicide charge, while a stab wound to the 

chest/armpit area was the basis for the aggravated battery charge. 

This notion of apportioning the wounds was not necessarily the way the case was presented 

to the jury, nor did the charges require this level of specificity. Stackhouse was charged with 

attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which required the State to prove that he had the intent 

to kill and that his conduct would have caused James’s death but for the intervention of another

person or some extraneous factor. See WIS. STAT. §§ 939.32(3); 940.01. Contrary to Stackhouse’s 

postconviction theory, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Stackhouse was guilty of this 

offense because he would have continued stabbing James had he not been tased by Steinke. 

Moreover, any of the more severe stab wounds could have established Stackhouse’s liability for 

aggravated battery under WIS. STAT. § 940.19(5). 

In short, from a legal standpoint, the underlying premise of Stackhouse’s postconviction 

motion is deeply flawed. Stackhouse’s postconviction theory is that he was merely one participant 

in the stabbing; he does not appear to argue that he was wholly uninvolved in James’s stabbing. 

Given his undisputed role in the stabbing and the manner in which it was stopped, the State merely 

had to show that Stackhouse had, as to the homicide charge, formed the intent to kill and had, as to 

the battery charge, caused great bodily harm. Thus, evidence of other knives present at the scene 

or of others participating in the knife attack would not have had the absolving effect postconviction 

counsel hopes it would.
No. 2018AP819-CR

11

Stackhouse now prefers seem far less compelling than the self-defense theory 

actually pursued.6 As we address in more detail below, Streicher reasonably 

concluded that the video evidence showing Stackhouse stabbing the victim 

significantly hindered any argument that Stackhouse did not commit the stabbing. 

Moreover, Streicher testified during the Machner hearing that he did not believe the 

jury would find Stackhouse’s statements to police credible, as Stackhouse’s 

assertion that he was handed the knife after the stabbing was inconsistent with the 

stabbing motions seen on the surveillance video. Streicher testified he believed it 

would have hurt Stackhouse’s case to argue in the alternative that he did not commit 

the stabbing, but that if he did, it was in self-defense. And, at the Machner hearing, 

Stackhouse testified he could not remember anyone around him making any 

stabbing motions at or near the time he was stabbing James. 

¶24 Finally, we note that the mere existence of another possible defense 

does not, ipso facto, establish that the defense actually pursued was not the result of 

reasoned trial strategy. Most of Stackhouse’s postconviction claims are related to 

the alternate defenses he believes his trial counsel should have pursued. We address 

Stackhouse’s claims more specifically below, but most of them suffer from the 

defect that his belief as to what trial counsel should have presented was simply not 

relevant to the self-defense theory actually pursued, which was itself reasonable.

II. Trial counsel was not deficient for failing to call as trial witnesses any of the 

individuals Stackhouse now asserts were necessary.

A. Jimmy Flemming and Jonathan Moore

¶25 Stackhouse’s brief devotes a significant amount of attention to the 

absence of Jimmy Flemming and Jonathan Moore at trial, both of whom were 

 

6

 The circuit court, too, recognized that Streicher had very narrow options given the 

evidence, and self-defense was likely the best option at trial. 
No. 2018AP819-CR

12

involved in the fight on Stackhouse’s side. Streicher testified he wanted to call both 

men at trial, but his investigator could not locate them. Prior to trial, Stackhouse 

told Streicher that if Flemming and Moore did not want to be found, they would not 

be found, and, moreover, that they had left Wisconsin. Nonetheless, Stackhouse 

argues that Streicher should have applied for material witness warrants to secure 

their participation in the trial. 

¶26 We conclude Stackhouse’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently as 

a result of his failure to obtain the testimony of Flemming and Moore. Even if 

Streicher had acquired material witness warrants, it would still have been necessary 

to locate those individuals—something Stackhouse himself had told Streicher was 

highly unlikely to occur. Moreover, given that Stackhouse said Flemming and 

Moore had probably left the state, their extradition would be required to secure their 

presence at Stackhouse’s trial. See WIS. STAT. § 976.02(3). The time necessary to 

locate and/or extradite Flemming and Moore could have delayed the trial, and 

Stackhouse had filed a speedy trial demand. 

¶27 Furthermore, Stackhouse has failed to demonstrate any prejudice 

arising from Flemming and Moore’s absence. Neither of them testified at the 

Machner hearing, and Stackhouse did not make an offer of proof as to the content 

of their anticipated testimony. As a result, it remains possible their testimony would 

have suggested, if not established, that Stackhouse committed the stabbing, and that 

he did so alone. Put another way, Stackhouse has not demonstrated prejudice 

because he has not shown a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 

would have been different if Flemming and Moore had been called to testify.
No. 2018AP819-CR

13

B. James, the victim

¶28 Stackhouse next challenges his trial counsel’s failure to name James 

as a trial witness. He appears to argue James would have testified that his sister 

Rachel had told him that Stackhouse, Flemming and Moore were all involved in the 

stabbing, because he made a similar statement to police officers when interviewed 

at the hospital. During the hospital interview, however, James told officers he did 

not realize he had been stabbed and did not remember the stabbing. It therefore 

appears that James’s testimony would not have added anything to the defense case. 

¶29 Indeed, presenting James’s statements risked undercutting the entire 

self-defense claim. Assuming James would have been allowed to testify that he was 

told multiple people had attacked him—which is a significant assumption, given the 

rule against hearsay7—this testimony would likely have only diminished the need 

for, or reasonableness of, Stackhouse’s purportedly defensive use of force. When 

asked at the Machner hearing about subpoenaing the victim, Streicher testified he 

thought not having the victim’s testimony weakened the State’s case and would 

cause the jury to question the State’s version of events. We conclude counsel did 

not perform deficiently by failing to subpoena James, nor has Stackhouse 

established that the absence of his testimony was prejudicial. 

C. Shantel Jamison and Felicia Felton

¶30 Stackhouse next asserts his trial counsel should have subpoenaed 

Shantel Jamison and Felicia Felton. He argues Jamison could have testified that 

 

7

 “Hearsay” is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” WIS. STAT.

§ 908.01(3). Hearsay is generally inadmissible at trial unless admitted pursuant to a recognized 

exception. See WIS. STAT. § 908.02.
No. 2018AP819-CR

14

there were three people involved in the fight against James, and Felton could have 

testified that she heard from Jamison that Flemming was the one who stabbed 

James. In addition to the hearsay issue surrounding Felton’s statement, neither of 

these witnesses would have bolstered Stackhouse’s self-defense claim, which, 

again, was itself a reasonable trial strategy. The trial evidence was consistent with 

Jamison’s statement that more individuals than just Stackhouse were fighting with 

James. As Streicher explained, Felton’s statement was not of much import to him 

because only Stackhouse was captured on video stabbing James. We conclude 

counsel was not deficient for failing to subpoena Jamison or Felton or to otherwise 

introduce their statements. Additionally, because there was ample evidence at trial 

that showed several individuals fighting against James, Stackhouse was not 

prejudiced by the absence of Jamison’s testimony.

D. Don, the victim’s brother

¶31 Stackhouse argues Don was a necessary witness at trial. Stackhouse 

apparently believes Don would have testified that he (Don) had a gun at Antro that 

night and saw others with knives that looked different than the one Stackhouse was 

seen wielding. Stackhouse argues the “presence of 3 additional knives and a Gun, 

adds significant force to the the [sic] apprehension of the defendant as to the 

likelihood of lethal or substantial force being used against him.” 

¶32 Stackhouse significantly overemphasizes the importance of evidence 

regarding other weapons. He does not provide any elaboration upon Don’s alleged 

statement that others had knives, including whom he saw wielding them, and Don 

did not testify at the Machner hearing. It is therefore plausible that, consistent with 

the statements of others raised by Stackhouse in his postconviction motion, the 

knives were possessed by individuals fighting on his side, thereby potentially 
No. 2018AP819-CR

15

undercutting his self-defense claim.8 Moreover, evidence that Don had a gun at 

Antro would not have buttressed Stackhouse’s trial assertion that he was justified in 

using lethal force against James. We conclude trial counsel was not deficient for 

failing to subpoena Don, nor was Stackhouse prejudiced by the absence of his 

anticipated testimony. 

E. Eric Felton

¶33 According to Stackhouse, Eric Felton told police he “heard words” 

that an individual whom Stackhouse believes was Flemming had stabbed James. 

Stackhouse does not address the fact that anything Felton was told by another person 

regarding who was responsible for the stabbing was hearsay. Because Stackhouse 

has not demonstrated that the evidence would have been admitted at trial, he has 

failed to show that counsel performed deficiently by failing to present it. 

F. Stackhouse

¶34 Stackhouse argues that “[n]ot producing [him] to take the stand was 

fatal to the defense of self-defense, as neither the victim nor the accused testified as 

to what happened, the level of danger in the scenario, the people involved intent at 

the time [sic] and much more.” As an initial matter, the choice of whether to testify 

is the defendant’s, State v. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80, ¶10, 355 Wis. 2d 503, 851 

N.W.2d 824, and here, Stackhouse engaged in a thorough colloquy with the circuit 

court to ensure that he was aware of, and was validly waiving, that right. 

¶35 In any event, Streicher was asked during the postconviction 

proceedings about putting Stackhouse on the stand. He testified he “would have 

 

8

 As Streicher acknowledged during the Machner hearing, evidence about the presence of 

other weapons in the crowd was introduced at trial. 
No. 2018AP819-CR

16

loved for Mr. Stackhouse to testify as to why he acted in self-defense and to what 

he saw. He told us he did not remember any of the relevant events at the time.” He 

later elaborated that Stackhouse did not remember seeing the victim making a 

stabbing motion toward him, did not remember seeing a knife in the victim’s hand, 

and did not remember feeling that his life was in danger. Streicher believed that 

having Stackhouse testify that he could not remember any of the relevant events 

would have been detrimental to the self-defense case, just as it would have been if 

Stackhouse had testified consistent with his initial statement to police that he was 

handed the knife just before he was tased. 

¶36 To the extent Stackhouse claims it was necessary for him to testify in 

order to establish his self-defense claim, this assertion is belied by the trial evidence. 

Streicher successfully obtained a self-defense instruction without revealing 

Stackhouse’s failure to recall the relevant events or exposing Stackhouse to crossexamination by the prosecution. And given the previously mentioned limitations 

regarding Stackhouse’s memory of the events, it is not clear what would have been 

accomplished by having Stackhouse testify. We conclude there was neither 

deficient performance nor prejudice with respect to trial counsel’s recommendation 

that Stackhouse not testify. 

III. There is no merit to any claim of ineffective assistance in the cross-examination 

of witnesses.

A. Andrew Avant

¶37 Next, Stackhouse claims his trial counsel was ineffective in his crossexamination of Andrew Avant, a bouncer at Antro who testified he did not see the 

stabbing or the tasing occur. Stackhouse argues it should have been elicited that 

Avant told police after the incident that the “[d]ude with the knife got away.” As 

the circuit court recognized during the trial (outside of the jury’s presence), Avant 
No. 2018AP819-CR

17

had difficulty with his memory and, as a result, was not a very credible witness. In 

any event, even if Stackhouse had been able to effectively cross-examine Avant 

with his prior statement, it would not have supported Stackhouse’s self-defense 

claim in light of all the other trial evidence. Accordingly, we conclude Stackhouse 

has not demonstrated that any alleged failures by counsel in this regard were 

prejudicial. 

B. Jennifer, James’s wife

¶38 Stackhouse similarly asserts his trial counsel failed to effectively 

examine Jennifer as part of the defense case, failed to “adequately investigate her 

knowledge,” and failed to cross-examine the police investigator who took her 

statement. At trial, Jennifer testified that prior to the stabbing, Rachel had started a 

fight with Don, James and Stackhouse, during which Rachel had injured 

Stackhouse’s hand with a pink pocket knife. Jennifer also made reference to hearing 

of Don having a gun, which testimony was stricken as hearsay. It is unclear what 

additional testimony Stackhouse now wishes his trial counsel had elicited that would 

have supported his self-defense claim. Accordingly, we reject this argument as 

undeveloped. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646.

C. Doctor Kenneth Bruder, James’s surgeon

¶39 Stackhouse faults his trial counsel for failing to cross-examine 

Dr. Bruder “as to the fatal nature of the wounds, the locations of the wounds or the 

likelihood that all six wounds were consistent with the weapon published to the 

jury.” We have previously addressed (and rejected) the notion that trial counsel was 

ineffective for not pursuing a defense that others besides Stackhouse were 

responsible for inflicting some of the injuries to James. Notably, Stackhouse has 

not established that James’s treating physician, Bruder, would have testified that 
No. 2018AP819-CR

18

some of the wounds were caused by weapons other than Stackhouse’s knife had he 

been so asked. His arguments in this regard are entirely conclusory and are 

insufficient to demonstrate prejudice.

¶40 Stackhouse also argues that Bruder would have testified that James 

was intoxicated at the time he was taken to the emergency room and was acting 

aggressively. The basis for this claim is apparently a medical report noting that 

James, as a patient, was a “very belligerent [and] agitated” person who was 

“inebriated with a blood alcohol content of 0.215.” However, evidence of James’s 

generally aggressive behavior and drunken state that night was introduced as part of 

the defense case. Because the desired testimony was duplicative of evidence that 

was presented during the trial, we cannot conclude to a reasonable probability that 

additional cross-examination of Bruder along these lines would have made any 

difference in the outcome of the trial.

D. Other witnesses

¶41 Stackhouse asserts his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing 

to call officer Jackie Gleiss and by failing to effectively cross-examine Rachel. We 

note officer Gleiss did testify at trial and was cross-examined by Streicher. It is 

difficult to discern what Stackhouse believes Streicher should have presented with 

respect to these witnesses, but he apparently believes his counsel did not do enough 

to present evidence that other people had been involved in the fight with the victim 

and that there were other weapons at the scene. Stackhouse’s argument in this 

regard concerns hearsay statements, the admissibility of which Stackhouse makes 

no effort to address. Moreover, the evidence Stackhouse apparently wishes to have 

presented would have done nothing to enhance his self-defense case. Accordingly, 
No. 2018AP819-CR

19

we conclude Streicher did not perform deficiently with respect to those witnesses, 

nor has Stackhouse demonstrated he was prejudiced by any arguable deficiency. 

¶42 Also undeveloped is Stackhouse’s assertion that his trial counsel 

failed to effectively cross-examine officer Chue Thao, who assisted in investigating 

the stabbing. Stackhouse argues Thao had unidentified information pertaining to 

various witnesses, including Moore and Flemming. Without Stackhouse explaining 

what information Thao could have presented, we have no basis for concluding trial 

counsel performed deficiently to Stackhouse’s prejudice. This argument consists of 

only conclusory statements and is wholly undeveloped. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 

646.

¶43 Finally, Stackhouse claims his trial counsel should have crossexamined police witnesses on their use of force that night and about their 

apprehension of harm when intervening in the violent brawl at the club. He appears 

to argue such testimony was necessary to present a viable self-defense claim. We 

reject this argument because it was the reasonableness of Stackhouse’s use of force, 

not the police officers’ use of force, that was at issue at trial. Moreover, testimony 

from police officers on the scene regarding their concern for their safety had, at best, 

minimal relevance to Stackhouse’s justification for his use of force during his 

encounter with James. Again, trial counsel successfully procured a self-defense 

instruction without this evidence. Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude 

Streicher was deficient in his cross-examination of police witnesses.

IV. None of Stackhouse’s remaining arguments warrant a new trial based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶44 Stackhouse’s remaining arguments are undeveloped and 

unpersuasive. He argues in conclusory fashion that his trial counsel failed to 
No. 2018AP819-CR

20

“pursue, preserve, and present” evidence that Atterberry and Moore had “blood on 

their person that was arguably attributed directly to the victim.” Given that these 

two individuals were undisputedly engaged in a fight with the victim during which 

the stabbing occurred, the significance of this evidence is not apparent, and 

Stackhouse makes no effort to develop an argument that would warrant further 

analysis. See Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d at 646.

¶45 Stackhouse also argues his trial counsel was deficient with respect to 

his presentation of the cell phone video. One component of this argument is that 

Streicher was deficient for not playing the final portion of the video, but it is not 

clear from the trial record that the challenged portion of the video was not played.9 

In any event, it is apparent that Stackhouse believes the video was significant 

because it showed “multiple people were engaging Stackhouse and his group.” Yet 

the fact that the fight involved individuals beyond just James and Stackhouse was 

readily apparent based on the trial evidence. Stackhouse has not presented any 

evidence to cast doubt upon his trial counsel’s conclusion that only Stackhouse was 

captured on video making stabbing motions toward James.

¶46 Stackhouse’s final argument consists of his vague assertion that 

Streicher was inexperienced and unprepared for trial. Stackhouse posits, in 

conclusory fashion, that “[d]ue to [Streicher’s] inexperience and the short time 

frame he was on the defense[,] there was not adequate time [for Streicher] to file 

and pursue pre-trial motions.” Stackhouse fails to explain what pretrial motions he 

desired counsel to have filed, or what effect they would have had on the trial. This 

 

9

 At trial, Streicher played the video and told the circuit court he would be playing the 

video “from ... 23 seconds until the end.” Witnesses during the postconviction proceedings were 

asked repeatedly if they recalled how much of the video was played at trial, and none could recall 

whether the video was played to the end. 
No. 2018AP819-CR

21

assertion is merely conclusory and does not establish that his attorney made an error 

so serious that Stackhouse was effectively deprived of counsel—particularly in a 

case in which the State had compelling evidence of guilt and trial counsel was 

successful in obtaining a self-defense instruction. We reject this argument as 

undeveloped.

¶47 In all, we conclude Stackhouse has not demonstrated that he is entitled 

to a new trial on the basis that his trial counsel was ineffective. As to each of his 

arguments (individually or in combination), he has not shown that his trial counsel 

performed deficiently, that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency, or both. 

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE 

809.23(1)(b)5.