* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Kenneth S. Apfel is substituted for

John J. Callahan, former Acting Commissioner of Soc ial Security, as the defendant in this action.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### FEB 26 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

SAMMY GRAY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 97-7081 (D.C. No. 96-CV-165) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before BALDOCK , EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral-2-

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Sammy Gray appeals from the district court ’s order affirming the Commissioner’s decision denying his claim for d isability insurance benefits at step five of the five-part process for determini ng disability, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Claimant alleged disability since Octo ber 31, 1992, because of back and knee pain and hearing loss. Through an adminis trative law judge (ALJ), the Commissioner determined that claimant had a past hi story of injuries to his back, including a lumbar fusion, injuries to his knees, p robable degenerate joint disease and bilateral hearing loss. The ALJ determined that claimant was unable to perform his past work as a welder, equipment operat or, truck driver or construction laborer, but retained the residual fun ctional capacity (RFC) to perform the requirements of sedentary work, with op portunities to change position from sitting to standing, except for jobs requiring acute auditory abilities. The ALJ considered the medical-vocational guideline s (grids), 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, and vocational expert (VE) testim ony and determined that a significant number of jobs exist that claimant co uld perform, compelling a conclusion that claimant was not disabled. Claimant argues on appeal that substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner’s decision because the ALJ (1) failed to give proper consideration-3-

to claimant’s combination of impairments and to eva luate properly his allegations of pain and improperly relied upon the grids, and ( 2) failed to pose hypothetical questions to the VE that accurately reflected his i mpairments. We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether factua l findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal s tandards were applied.
See Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994).

I. Claimant first contends that the ALJ failed to give proper consideration to claimant’s combination of impairments and to evaluate properly his allegations of pain. See Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1491 (10th Cir. 1991) (Commissioner must consider the combined effects of impairments). A review of the ALJ’s opinion shows that he did consider all of claimant’s alleged impairments in combination. The ALJ found that cla imant’s impairments do not, singly or jointly, preclude the performance of subs tantial gainful employment. The ALJ discussed all of claimant’s impairments in his evaluation of claimant’s RFC and the credibility of claimant’s subjective co mplaints of disabling pain. Contrary to claimant’s contention, this is not a ca se in which the ALJ relied upon “the absence of evidence” to reach his decisio n. See Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993). The ALJ desc ribed the evidence in the1 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 po unds at a time and

occasionally lifting or carrying articles like dock et files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which in volves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary i n carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are requ ired occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567( a).

-4- record upon which he based his conclusion that clai mant could perform work at the sedentary exertional level. 1 This evidence included an RFC assessment indicating that claimant could lift ten pounds, sitfor six hours in an eight-hour workday, had no postural, manipulative or visual li mitations, but did have limited hearing. The ALJ also considered the findings of aphysical examination that claimant had no joint deformities, had a normal gai t and did not need any device to walk, had good gross and fine motor skills, and good range of motion with his knees, though he had stiffness and pain with moveme nt. The ALJ considered claimant’s daily activities, which included house c leaning, animal feeding, and driving. The ALJ discussed the medical evidence th at despite claimant’s hearing loss, he was able to hear conversation with a heari ng aid in his right ear. The ALJ also noted that observations of treating and ex amining physicians and objective test results did not reveal claimant to h ave disabling functional limitations. To the extent claimant seeks to chall enge the weight the ALJ gave to the evidence, his argument must fail. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991) (on appellate review, we can neither2 The framework for evaluating evidence of disabling pain is

well-established: [The ALJ] must consider (1) whether Claimant establ ished a pain-producing impairment by objective medical evid ence; (2) if so, whether there is a “loose nexus” between the provenimpairment and the Claimant’s subjective allegations of pain; and (3) if so, whether considering all of the evidence, both objective andsubjective, Claimant’s pain is in fact disabling. Kepler , 68 F.3d at 390 (quotations omitted). Once the AL J finds objective medical evidence of a pain-producing ailment, he mu st consider: the levels of medication and their effectiveness, the extensiveness of the attempts (medical or nonmedical) to obtain reli ef, the frequency of medical contacts, the nature of daily activities , subjective measures of credibility that are peculiarly within the judgment of the ALJ, the motivation of and relationship between the claimant and other witnesses, and the consistency or compatibili ty of nonmedical testimony with objective medical evidence. Id. at 391 (quotations omitted). -5- reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment fo r that of the ALJ). We find

no error. Claimant further argues that the ALJ improperly eva luated his subjective complaints of disabling pain. The ALJ applied the familiar framework for evaluating pain allegations. 2See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1995). Though the ALJ did not state whether the objective evidence established a pain-producing impairment or whether there was a loose nexus between that impairment and claimant’s subjective complaints of pain, there appears to be-6-

sufficient objective medical evidence of pain-produ cing impairments and a nexus with claimant’s subjective complaints to proceed to the final step of the analysis. The ALJ considered the objective medical evidence, claimant’s testimony and his daily activities, use of medication, and fr equency of medical contacts.
See Kepler , 68 F.3d at 391. The ALJ appropriately discussed in detail what evidence led him to believe that claimant’s pain wa s not as severe as he alleged. In addition to claimant’s description of his daily activities, described above, the ALJ noted that claimant took only Tylenol for his p ain, rather than any strong prescription medications, even though there was no evidence he would have adverse side effects from stronger medication. The ALJ determined that the medical evidence and objective test results did notreveal disabling functional restrictions caused by pain. The ALJ’s credibilityfindings regarding pain are closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evi dence and are not merely conclusory, see Huston v. Bowen , 838 F.2d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 1988), thus we defer to those findings, cf. Kepler , 68 F.3d at 391. The record provides substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s determ ination that claimant’s pain was not disabling. We see no reversible error in the ALJ’s pain or credibility analysis.-7- II. Claimant next contends that the ALJ improperly reli ed on the grids because his limitations do not specifically match a certainwork level. Claimant misstates the law when he argues that the grids cannot be app lied as a framework for decision making under such circumstances. Where a claimant’s RFC matches the criteria of a particular work level, the grids may be applied conclusively.
See Trimiar v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir. 1992). Where a cl aimant cannot perform the full range of a certain work lev el, however, the grids may be used only as a framework for decision making, and v ocational testimony should be obtained. Id. at 1333. Here, the ALJ did not exclusively rely on the grids . Because the evidence showed that claimant could not perform the full ran ge of sedentary work, the ALJ secured vocational testimony and used the grids mer ely as a framework for his conclusions. As this is the required procedure, th ere was no error. Claimant next argues that any reliance on the VE’s testimony is improper because the hypothetical questions eliciting that t estimony by the ALJ and claimant’s former counsel did not reflect all of cl aimant’s impairments. See Hargis , 945 F.2d at 1492 (“[T]estimony elicited by hypoth etical questions that do not relate with precision all of a claimant’s impairments cannot constitute-8-

substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner’s ] decision.”) (quotation omitted). The ALJ thoroughly analyzed the medical evidence an d concluded that the evidence supported a finding that claimant could pe rform the requirements of sedentary unskilled work, with opportunities to change position from sitting to standing, except for jobs requiring acute auditory abilities. The ALJ included these restrictions in his hypothetical questions to the VE. See Decker v. Chater , 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996) (hypothetical que stions to the VE need only reflect impairments and limitations that are borne out by the evidentiary record). The VE then identified microfilm document preparer and an envelope addresser as jobs claimant could perform with his hearing los s and in which he would have an opportunity to sit or stand. The VE testified that a total of 675 such jobs exist in Oklahoma and 27,000 exist nationally. The VE’s testimony, therefore, provided substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s denial of benefits. The ALJ need not present to the VE the details of the medic al evidence that supports such restrictions to satisfy the applicable legal standards.-9-

The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge