SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5499-17T2

HARRIET PONTEJOS AMANTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER PONTEJOS SCHROCK

and ROBERT SCHROCK,

Defendants-Respondents.

______________________________

Submitted September 24, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. C000138-17.

Peter W. Latimer, attorney for appellant 

Callagy Law, attorneys for respondents (Christopher R. 

Miller, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 1, 2019
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Although this appeal concerns the enforceability of a settlement 

agreement, we find it necessary to briefly describe the nature of the settled 

claims.

Plaintiff Harriet Pontejos and defendant Jennifer Pontejos Schrock are 

sisters.1 In 2000, Harriet was desirous of owning a home and for reasons not 

entirely clear – or presently relevant – she and Jennifer entered into an unusual 

agreement. Harriet provided the funds for the purchase of a home in Bergenfield

in which Harriet would reside,

2 but Jennifer was designated as the purchaser and 

only Jennifer's name was placed on the deed. Harriet agreed to make all future 

mortgage payments and pay all carrying costs, while Jennifer agreed to hold 

legal title. The sisters also agreed that upon the property's sale they would 

equally share the net proceeds.

For more than a decade, Harriet made all mortgage, tax and insurance 

payments on the property, but the mortgage was also refinanced on a number of 

occasions. The refinancings were apparently necessitated by Harriet's fruitless 

 

1

 We base this brief discussion about the allegations in the underlying suit only 

on the parties' pleadings, which were never tested at trial.

2

 In 1997, Harriet was struck by a car and sustained severe injuries. She settled 

her claim in 2000 for approximately $240,000.
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attempts to keep her convenience store afloat.3 Each refinancing raised the 

extent to which the home was encumbered (likely decreasing the sisters' equity 

in the property) and also raised the monthly payments. In 2012, the sisters' 

parents moved in and began sharing expenses with Harriet.

Late in 2016, the house of cards began to topple and the bank holding the 

note pursued a foreclosure of the mortgage. When Jennifer advised Harriet there 

was no recourse but to sell, Harriet resisted and refused to cooperate, leading to:

their parents' departure from the premises; Jennifer's entry into a short sale; and 

Jennifer's later commencement of an eviction action against Harriet in the 

tenancy court. In turn, Harriet commenced this chancery action, alleging 

Jennifer had been unjustly enriched, and Jennifer and her husband responded 

with a counterclaim that alleged tortious interference with a prospective

economic advantage.

4

The parties engaged in and completed discovery and, in May 2018, 

appeared for trial. Before the trial commenced, the parties and their attorneys 

reached a settlement. Their agreement called for Jennifer to pay $5000, which 

 

3

 The parties disputed the purposes of the refinancings and the use to which the 

funds were put. We repeat that these allegations were never tested, and we offer 

no view of the facts; our intent is only to describe the nature of the suit.

4

 Jennifer's tenancy action was transferred to the Chancery Division.
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consisted of a cash payment to Harriet of $4008, and Jennifer's payment to a 

finance company – to pay off a motor vehicle loan – in the amount of $992; the 

parties also agreed that the motor vehicle, to which her father held title but which 

was used exclusively by Harriet, would thereafter be titled in Harriet's name.

Once finalized, the parties appeared in court to place the settlement on the 

record. The judge swore in the parties, and their attorneys questioned them 

about the voluntariness of the settlement agreement. Although Harriet 

expressed uneasiness, she ultimately assented. Later, after the matter's 

dismissal, Harriet moved to set aside the settlement agreement, alleging fraud, 

coercion, and duress. In arguing fraud, Harriet alluded to the settlement 

agreement's inclusion of terms concerning the motor vehicle that were not at 

issue in the suit. And she claimed coercion and duress because she felt 

intimidated by Jennifer's attempts to incorporate the vehicle as part of the 

settlement negotiations. The trial judge denied Harriet's motion, as well as 

Jennifer's cross-motion for fees and sanctions, for reasons expressed in a written 

opinion.

Harriet appeals, arguing there was sufficient evidence to show the 

settlement agreement was either procured by fraud, coercion or duress. We 
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disagree, finding no merit in these arguments worthy of discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

It is true that in open court Harriet expressed displeasure with the 

settlement agreement. She was asked by her attorney if she "agreed to settle this 

case for $5,000 and [a] transfer of title to [her] car," and Harriet responded: "Do 

I have any choice?" The attorney inexplicably answered "no," but the judge 

immediately interrupted and said:

Let me clear this record up. So you do have a choice, 

okay? You can try the case today. You may win, you 

may lose. I'm sure your attorney told you about the 

possibilities of winning . . . . And as I indicated to you, 

it might take a few days to try the case and you'd be 

here all day today, part of the day tomorrow and maybe 

even part of a third day. And then who knows what the 

results would be. Like I indicated, you may win, you 

may lose and someone – even if you win, the defendants 

might file an appeal and you might come back and try 

it all over again. So you're weighing that against 

settling the case today. Okay? You understand that, 

right? You're nodding yes . . . .

Because Harriet only nodded, the judge asked her to verbally respond, and 

Harriet – in answering whether she understood – said: "Yes, I do." So, while 

there is no doubt Harriet was unhappy with the agreement, there is also no doubt 

she voluntarily entered into it. The judge correctly rejected her later attempt to 

undo the settlement.
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In short, we affirm the order denying Harriet's motion to vacate the 

settlement agreement substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and 

well-reasoned written opinion of Judge Menelaos W. Toskos.

Affirmed.