J-S29032-18

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.L.H.R., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.C.J.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3794 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order October 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): 51-FN-000369-2014, 

CP-51-AP-0000610-2017

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.K.S.R., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: N.C.J.B., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3804 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order October 25, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): 51-FN-000369-2014, 

CP-51-AP-0000611-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 18, 2018

Appellant, N.C.J.B. (“Mother”), files these consolidated appeals from the 

orders entered on October 25, 2017, in the Philadelphia County Court of 

Common Pleas, granting the petition of the Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”) and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to two of her minor, 

dependent children, N.L.H.R., a female born in March of 2011, and L.K.S.R.,
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a male born in March of 2008 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

1

 After careful 

review, we affirm the trial court’s termination orders.

Since 2014, DHS has been involved in the supervision of Mother’s four 

children: N.L.H.R, L.K.S.R., and the Children’s two older siblings (“Sibling 1” 

and “Sibling 2”).2 On January 30, 2014, DHS received a Child Protective 

Services Report that Sibling 1 arrived at school with an abrasion over his right 

eye and a swollen, red left cheek. Sibling 1 indicated that he sustained these 

injuries when Mother hit him in the face with an extension cord. School 

personnel also noted that Sibling 1 and Sibling 2 had poor hygiene and would 

often come to school smelling of urine and other foul odors. School personnel 

had on several occasions changed Sibling 1 and Sibling 2’s clothes and washed 

them due to their poor hygiene; when Mother was made aware of this issue, 

school personnel noted that she did not appear concerned about her children’s 

hygiene.

3

 DHS Exhibit A, at 1.

Upon investigation of this report, DHS personnel observed various scars 

on Sibling 1’s body at various stages of healing. Mother initially claimed the 

____________________________________________

1 On the same day, the trial court also terminated the parental rights of the 

Children’s father, R.R. (“Father”), who has been incarcerated since March 13, 

2013. Father has not filed an appeal and is not a party to the instant appeal.

2 While Sibling 1 and Sibling 2 are also in DHS care, their goal is Permanent 

Legal Custody. The status of Mother’s parental rights to Sibling 1 and Sibling 

2 are not at issue in this case.

3 There is nothing in the record to suggest that school authorities reported the 

previous instances of the Children’s poor hygiene.
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scars were from a recent surgery, but could not provide any additional 

information as to the type of surgery or the hospital where the alleged 

procedure occurred. Subsequently thereafter, on February 12, 2014, DHS 

indicated the report, obtained an Order of Protective Custody (OPC) for Sibling 

1, and placed him in foster care.

Less than a month later, on March 10, 2014, DHS received another 

report indicating that Sibling 2 arrived at school with an abrasion on the right

side of his face, which appeared to have occurred between March 8, 2014, 

and March 10, 2014. Sibling 2 told school staff that Mother had caused the 

injury with a knife and had “stomped on his face.” DHS Exhibit A, at 2. When

DHS questioned Mother about the incident, she first told them that Sibling 2 

was injured when L.K.S.R. hit him with a toy truck, but later changed her 

account to claim that L.K.S.R. had pushed Sibling 2 onto the sidewalk. 

L.K.S.R. told DHS personnel that he witnessed Mother hit and step on Sibling 

2, causing him to bleed.

On March 11, 2014, DHS obtained an OPC for N.L.H.R., L.K.S.R., and 

Sibling 2 and placed them in foster care. On March 25, 2014, N.L.H.R. and 

L.K.S.R. were adjudicated dependent and committed to DHS custody. Mother 

was referred for parenting classes and domestic violence counseling and was 

permitted to have weekly supervised visitation with the Children.

On March 19, 2014, Mother submitted to a psychological evaluation that 

measured Mother’s cognitive function to be at an extremely low range and 

determined that her verbal and perceptual reasoning skills likely limited her 
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ability to handle life challenges effectively. The report also noted that Mother’s 

judgment and insight may be compromised when she faces stress.

After an initial permanency hearing on May 29, 2014, Mother was 

referred for a parenting capacity evaluation (PCE), which was conducted by 

Dr. William Russell, Ph.D., on September 16, 2014. Dr. Russell noted that 

Mother’s general knowledge and intelligence were limited and observed that 

Mother displayed erratic emotion, moving through calm, angry, and sad states 

and returning to a calm demeanor with little provocation. Mother became 

easily angered when confronted with inconsistencies in her statements and 

eventually refused to answer certain questions. Based on these observations, 

Dr. Russell opined that Mother’s pattern of denial and distortion, in conjunction 

with her cognitive limitations, would not allow her to provide safety and 

permanency for the Children without an increase in Mother’s insight and 

judgment.

On October 2, 2014, Mother agreed to submit to a Family Service Plan 

(FSP) in which her objectives were to 1) learn and utilize non-violent, nonphysical discipline methods, 2) maintain regular visitation with the Children, 

3) attend Family School and Achieving Reunification Center (ARC), 4) seek 

and maintain employment or obtain job training, and 5) comply with a referral 

for domestic violence counseling and Intellectual Disability Services (IDS). 

Thereafter, the lower court consistently held permanency review hearings at 

which Mother was found to be moderately compliant with her FSP objectives, 

but Mother failed to attend several of the permanency hearings. Although 
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Mother was permitted to progress to having unsupervised visitation with the 

Children, the trial court subsequently restricted Mother to supervised visits 

after learning of Mother’s inappropriate behavior with the Children during 

unsupervised visits.

On September 27, 2016, Mother submitted to a second parenting 

capacity evaluation (PCE) by Dr. Russell, who noted Mother continued to 

minimize the impact of her unhealthy behavior on the Children and did not 

take responsibility for her role in the Children’s placement with DHS. 

Psychological testing confirmed Mother’s unsophisticated denial of any 

negative behavior or problems. Dr. Russell observed that Mother’s pattern of 

denial and distortion continued as she did not appreciate the Children’s 

behavioral and mental health difficulties and was unable to comprehend how 

she would experience increased emotional, physical, and financial stress if the 

Children were returned to her care. The agency expressed concern after 

learning Mother threatened to beat one of the children if he did not behave. 

Dr. Russell recommended that Mother participate in individual 

counseling along with a gradual increase of visitation with the Children to 

determine if Mother can effectively handle the stress of carrying for the 

Children. In addition, Dr. Russell suggested that Mother be given assistance 

in creating a budget that would allow her to care for her family.

On June 1, 2017, DHS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to the Children and to change the Children’s permanency goal to 

adoption. On June 20, 2017, the trial court held a combined termination/goal 
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change hearing. In addition, the trial court continued the case for further 

testimony given on October 25, 2017. By orders entered October 25, 2017, 

the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) and changed the Children’s 

goal to adoption.4 This timely appeal followed. 

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), and (8)?

B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would 

have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of 

the child as required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief, at 4.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47 

A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an 

error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” 

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4 As Mother did not appeal the change of permanency goal to adoption, we 

need not address this issue.
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Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed 

merely because the record would support a different result. Id.

at [325-26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized our 

deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [608 

Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free 

to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

“[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even 

if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis 

of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental 

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 
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weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998)).

In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long 

held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only 

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination orders pursuant to 

subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 
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With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).

With respect to the grounds for the termination of parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(2), this Court has provided the following:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). “Parents are 

required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption 

of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a 

long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re 

A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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In the case at bar, in finding grounds for termination pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2), the trial court reasoned as follows: 

The children have been in care since March 2014. Mother’s [FSP] 

objectives were [to address] mental health [issues], to complete 

a parental capacity evaluation, attend ARC for parenting and 

domestic violence, cooperate with IDS, provide proof of 

employment, and to maintain visits with the [C]hildren. Mother’s 

objectives have been the same for the life of the case and Mother 

was aware of the objectives.

Mother has claimed that she has been attending individual therapy 

on a weekly basis but Mother did not provide any documentation 

about her attendance or progress in any individual therapy 

program. The last time Mother provided verification of mental 

health therapy was in February 2016. The CUA case manager 

indicated that he never received any information on Mother’s 

current mental health provider. Additionally, Mother never signed 

releases to allow the CUA case manager to receive information on 

Mother’s mental health treatment.

Mother completed the PCE in September 2014 and the 

supplemental PCE in September 2016, but the findings of both 

evaluations exposed concerns involving Mother’s mental health 

and parenting capacity. For the concerns relating to mental 

health, the psychologist indicated that because Mother has an 

extensive history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and domestic 

violence, Mother needs significant individual mental health 

treatment. After the PCE in 2014, there was no indication that 

Mother ever followed the psychologist’s recommendation to 

receive the appropriate type of individual treatment. Additionally, 

the [C]hildren manifest sexual behavior problems and the 

individual treatment will allow Mother to explore her history and 

how that history impacts her ability to function. The psychologist 

indicated that based on the types of trauma Mother has 

experienced in her life, Mother’s mental health concerns cannot 

be resolved with just a few months of individual therapy.

For the concerns related to Mother’s parenting capacity, the 

psychologist expressed concerns as to Mother’s ability to provide 

safety and permanency for the [C]hildren because Mother has 

consistently shown a significant amount of denial and 
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minimization of the problems in her life and the [C]hildren’s lives. 

Mother minimized the impact of her unhealthy behaviors, her role 

in the [C]hildren’s continued placement with DHS, and the 

[C]hildren’s behavioral and mental health difficulties. Mother was 

unable to grasp how caring for the [C]hildren full time will increase 

the stress on her emotionally, physically, and financially. 

The psychologist showed grave concern regarding Mother’s 

history of physical abuse of the [C]hildren along with the stress of 

bringing the [C]hildren home. Although Mother completed 

parenting at the ARC, the psychologist still determined that 

Mother is not able to provide safety and permanency to the 

[C]hildren. While on the phone with one of the children, Mother 

threatened to beat the child if he did not behave.

During the PCE in 2014 and 2016, Mother was administered the 

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 2 (“MMPI-2”).

[FN10]

Mother was also administered the Child Abuse Potential Inventory 

(“CAP”) test [FN11] during the PCE in 2016. The results of Mother’s 

MMPI-2 test in both 2014 and 2016 was that there was an invalid 

profile because Mother failed to give appropriate attention and 

consideration to the questions. Mother had an un-elevated score 

on the VRIN but had an extremely elevated score on the lie scale. 

The absence of substantial elevation on the VRIN together with 

extreme elevation on the lie scale indicates a naïve and 

unsophisticated attempt to appear without faults that are typically 

shared by all, which is why Mother’s results were rendered invalid. 

The results of Mother’s CAP test indicated the same pattern of 

responses by Mother as seen in the MMPI-2. Mother denied any 

negative behaviors, including typical behaviors that everybody 

would admit to, to the point that the CAP test was invalid.

[FN10: The MMPI-2 is a psychological assessment that 

allows the clinician to evaluate the test taker’s personal 

characteristics by comparing the test taker’s answers to 

those given by various psychiatric and non-psychiatric 

comparison groups. The MMPI-2 is the most researched 

psychological instrument in existence. The results of the 

MMPI-2 allow the clinician to make inferences about the 

patient’s typical behaviors and way of thinking. The 

outcomes of the MMPI-2 allow the clinician to determine the 

test taker’s severity of impairment, outlook on life, 

approaches to problem solving, typical mood states, likely 

diagnoses, and potential problems in treatment. The MMPI-
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2 uses two scales to assess the test taker. The MMPI uses 

the Variable Response/Inconsistency Scale (“VRIN”) and the 

True Response Inconsistency Scale, also known as the “lie 

scale.”]

[FN11: The CAP test assists in the screening of physical 

child abuse cases. The test examines personality traits that 

are characteristic of individuals who maltreat children, 

including unrealistic child-rearing attitudes and 

expectations, anxiety over a child’s behavior, problems in 

interpersonal relationships, feelings of inadequacy, feelings 

of isolation, inability to handle stress, rigid attitudes, 

impulsivity, dependency, immaturity, negative childhood 

experiences including abuse and neglect, and problems in 

parental relationships. The primary clinical scale is divided 

into six factor scales measuring distress, rigidity, 

unhappiness, problems with child and self, problems with 

family, and problems from others.

Mother completed domestic violence at ARC. Mother was offered 

IDS in 2014 and at every SCP meeting but Mother repeatedly 

refused the services offered to her. The trial court ordered Mother 

to comply with IDS but Mother failed to comply. The psychologist 

indicated that there was no reason why Mother should have 

denied IDS. 

Mother testified that [she was] employed full-time but she has 

never provided any form of proof of employment. The 

psychologist indicated that even though Mother claims she is 

employed, Mother does not earn enough to support herself and 

the [C]hildren. Mother has been invited to medical and 

educational appointments for the [C]hildren, but Mother does not 

attend. 

In 2016, Mother’s visits were reduced from weekly supervised and 

unsupervised to monthly supervised at the agency because of 

Mother’s behavior during the unsupervised visits. During the 

unsupervised visits, Mother would tell the [C]hildren that they 

would return to Mother’s home permanently. Following the 

unsupervised visits, the [C]hildren would exhibit behavioral 

problems in school and the [C]hildren did not exhibit this behavior 

immediately before the unsupervised visits with Mother.
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At the same time, Mother’s visits were changed back to supervised 

at the agency because Mother was unable to supervise the 

[C]hildren appropriately during the unsupervised visits. Since 

Mother’s visits were reduced back to supervised, Mother has 

attended all scheduled supervised visits at the agency with the 

[C]hildren but Mother does not appropriately engage with the 

[C]hildren at the visits. Mother has brought up inappropriate 

topics with the [C]hildren and the visitation coach would have to 

redirect Mother towards a more appropriate conversation. Mother 

struggles with giving both children attention. Typically, she will 

engage with one child while the other child plays on the phone. If 

both children try to get her attention simultaneously, Mother 

appears frustrated. Additionally, Mother will use her phone during 

the visits and not pay attention to the [C]hildren. 

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 2/2/18, at 10-13 (citations omitted and 

paragraph divided for ease of review).

A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2). The record reveals that, despite 

completion of some her FSP objectives, Mother failed to take responsibility for 

and appreciate the reasons the Children came into care and her role related 

thereto and lacked a protective capacity. At the termination hearing, Mother 

continued to maintain that she did “not physically beat” the Children and 

accused the Children of lying about the abuse. N.T. 6/20/17, at 52-53. As 

emphasized by the trial court, Mother minimizes the behavioral and emotional 

problems she and the Children face and cannot comprehend the significant 

difficulty she would face if the Children were returned to her care. Mother has 

refused to participate in individual therapy to address her own extensive 

history of sexual and physical abuse.
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Accordingly, we find the record substantiates the trial court’s conclusion 

that Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal 

has caused the Children to be without essential parental control or subsistence 

necessary for their physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy this 

situation. See id. As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in 

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of 

progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

513 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

As we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law, we do not disturb 

the trial court’s finding that grounds for termination exist under Section 

2511(a)(2). As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of parental 

rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a) before assessing the determination under Section 2511(b). 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.

We next determine whether termination was proper under Section 

2511(b). Our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the 

child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 

781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & 
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L.M. a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 123, 620 A.2d 481, 485 

(1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be 

paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing 

the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as 

discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-29, 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no

evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer 

that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). 

Moreover, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. . . . 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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In the case sub judice, in determining that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights favors the Children’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b) 

of the Adoption Act, the trial court stated as follows: 

In 2016, Mother’s visits were reduced from weekly supervised and 

unsupervised to monthly supervised at the agency because of 

Mother’s behavior during the unsupervised visits. During the 

unsupervised visits, Mother would tell the children that they would 

return to Mother’s home permanently. Following the unsupervised 

visits, the children would exhibit behavioral problems in school 

and the children did not exhibit this behavior immediately before 

the unsupervised visits with Mother.

***

The [C]hildren did not have any problem separating from Mother 

at the end of visits. The CUA case manager has invited Mother to 

medical and educational appointments for the [C]hildren but she 

has never attended any of the appointments. Mother never 

expressed an interest in medical appointments or educational 

services for the [C]hildren to the visitation coach. The children 

would not suffer any irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were 

terminated. The children do not have a healthy, positive, parental 

bond with Mother.

It is in the [C]hildren’s best interest to be adopted by their 

respective foster parents. Both children are currently placed in 

loving foster homes and are thriving in their placements. 

[N.L.H.R.] has a very strong relationship with the foster parent 

and looks to the foster parent as the parental caregiver. The 

foster parent always involves [N.L.H.R.] in family parties and 

gatherings. [N.L.H.R.] is accepted by the entire foster family as 

part of their own. It is in [N.L.H.R.’s] best interest to be adopted. 

The foster parent is a pre-adoptive resource. [N.L.H.R.’s] CourtAppointed Special Advocate testified that [N.L.H.R.] wants to stay 

with the foster parent and [N.L.H.R.] would be harmed if removed 

from her pre-adoptive home. [N.L.H.R.] is surrounded by love.

[L.K.S.R.] has a strong bond with his foster parent. The foster 

parent provides [L.K.S.R.] with everything he needs to sustain 

and grow. [L.K.S.R.] is progressing in school and actively 

participates in after-school sports. Additionally, [L.K.S.R.] asked 

to have the same last name as the two other children that live in 
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the foster parent’s home. The foster parent has helped [L.K.S.R.] 

become more outgoing and verbal. The CUA case manager 

indicated that removing [L.K.S.R.] from the foster home would be 

very upsetting to [L.K.S.R.]. It is in [L.K.S.R.’s] best interest to 

be adopted. This foster parent is a pre-adoptive resource.

T.C.O. at 22-23. (citations omitted and paragraph divided for ease of review).

Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Mother’s parental 

rights serves the Children’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare and was proper pursuant to Section 2511(b). While Mother may 

profess to love the Children, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for 

a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 

994 A.2d at 1121. At the time of the hearing, the Children had already been 

in DHS care for over three and a half years, and are entitled permanency and 

stability. Mother was given many opportunities, almost to the point of the 

Children’s safety being compromised by being subject to her abusive behavior 

over a period of time, to change her behavior.

As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope 

that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the 

custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or 

her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment 

of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., 

N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 
J-S29032-18

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Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court did not 

err in terminating Mother’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b) 

of the Adoption Act. 

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/18/18