NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: DAVID ANDREW CROW; RENEE 

TOINETTE CROW, 

Debtors, 

------------------------------

DAVID ANDREW CROW; RENEE 

TOINETTE CROW, 

Appellants, 

 v. 

EDWARD JOHN MANEY, Chapter 13 

Trustee, 

Appellee.

No. 20-60012 

BAP No. 18-1323 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Spraker, Faris, and Brand, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2020**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: BYBEE, MURGUIA, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 23 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

David Crow and Renee Crow (the “Crows”) appeal from the Bankruptcy 

Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit’s (“BAP”) decision affirming the bankruptcy 

court’s Chapter 13 confirmation order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 158(d). We review the BAP’s decision de novo. In re Scovis, 249 F.3d 975, 980 

(9th Cir. 2001). We affirm. 

1. The Crows argue that the bankruptcy court erroneously struck a 

footnote in their proposed order confirming their Chapter 13 plan, which asserted

that the Trustee unilaterally modifying their Chapter 13 plan’s monthly payments

would violate the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

amount to involuntary servitude. But the Crows did not need to preserve that

Thirteenth Amendment argument in a footnote because the Crows may still raise that 

argument if the Trustee attempts to modify their Chapter 13 plan’s monthly 

payments in the future. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2) (providing a debtor with a 

hearing if a trustee seeks to modify the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan). The bankruptcy 

court had broad authority to strike the Crows’ unnecessary footnote. See 11 U.S.C. 

§ 105(a) (stating that a bankruptcy court may issue any order necessary to carry out 

the Bankruptcy Code and no provision “shall be construed to preclude the court 

from, sua sponte, taking any action” necessary to implement court orders). 

2. The Crows argue that the bankruptcy court denied them due process 

because it struck their footnote without providing notice or a hearing. The Ninth 
3 

Circuit rejects due process claims when the alleged absence of due process was 

harmless. See, e.g., In re Rosson, 545 F.3d 764, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2008); In re City 

Equities Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 959–60 (9th Cir. 1994). Because the Crows 

did not need to preserve their Thirteenth Amendment argument in a footnote, the 

Crows did not suffer any harm when the bankruptcy court struck that footnote. 

Because the Crows did not suffer any harm, their due process argument fails.

3. Finally, the Crows point out that the bankruptcy court’s confirmation 

order required them to provide federal and state income tax returns to “assist the 

Trustee in determining any change in [the Crows’] annual disposable income.” The 

Crows contend that requirement cannot be squared with In re Anderson, 21 F.3d 

355, 358 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that a trustee may not demand authority to 

unilaterally modify a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan as a condition for confirmation of the 

plan). But the Crows failed to properly raise the Anderson argument in the 

bankruptcy court. This Court “will not take up an issue not properly raised below 

unless necessary to prevent manifest injustice.” L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters 

Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The 

Crows fail to show any manifest injustice if we decline to consider the Anderson

argument. Accordingly, we decline to consider that argument. 

AFFIRMED