No. 87-415 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

LARRY E. NASI, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, 

a Department of the State of Montana, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, 

The Honorable Henry Loble, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

William F. Hooks and Patrick F. Hooks; Hooks & Budewitz, 

Townsend, Montana 

For Respondent: 

John Bobinski, Department of Administration, Helena, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 11, 1988 

Decided: April21, 1988 

Filed: 'APR 2 1 1988' 

df5irLl. *, 

Clerk 
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Plaintiff Nasi appeals the June 12, 1987, order of the 

First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, granting State Department of Highways' motion for summary judgment. We affirm. 

The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred in applying res judicata to Nasi's wrongful discharge 

action. 

Nasi began working for the Department of Highways 

(Department) at its Townsend maintenance shop on February 5, 

1979. On June 18, 1982, his employment ended. Nasi claims 

he was fired. The Department claims he voluntarily quit. 

On March 12, 1984, Nasi filed a grievance with the 

Board of Personnel Appeals (BPA). On April 17, 1984, the BPA 

preliminary hearing examiner decided that Nasi had "quit 

and/or walked off the job." The following day, Nasi filed 

his rejection of the preliminary decision. 

On April 23, 1984, Nasi filed a separate tort action in 

District Court, alleging wrongful discharge and bad faith. 

The Department filed motions to dismiss on several grounds 

including (1) BPA had exclusive jurisdiction, (2) Nasi failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies, and (3) the tort 

action was barred by res judicata. On July 5, 1984, the 

District Court ordered that all further tort proceedings 

would be stayed until the BPA made a final determination on 

the grievance. 

On October 11, 1984, the BPA formal hearing examiner 

found that Nasi had "voluntarily terminated his employment 

with the Department of Highways." The examiner concluded 

that Nasi had not been aggrieved by the Department. On 

February 5, 1985, the BPA adopted t.he examiner's recommended 

order as the final order. 
On March 5, 1985, Nasi filed a petition for judicial 

review of the BPA final order. On August 15, 1986, the 

District Court affirmed the BPA final order. Nasi did not 

appeal the judicial review. 

On August 29, 1986, the District Court lifted its stay 

on the tort action. On October 27, 1986, the Department 

filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, a 

motion to dismiss the tort action. On June 12, 1987, the 

District Court granted the Department's motion for summary 

judgment on the grounds that the matter was res judicata. 

The court stated: "BPA specifically found that Nasi quit. 

Such a determination is dispositive in the court case. It 

forecloses Plaintiff's wrongful discharge and bad faith 

causes of action and any additional issues associated therewith." Nasi appeals the summary judgment. 

Res Judicata 

Nasi contends that the BPA did not act in a judicial 

capacity in its grievance decision and res judicata is therefore inapplicable. Nasi also asserts that the issues, remedies and subject matter of his tort action differ from those 

of his BPA grievance. 

In analyzing this case, we note that Title 2, Chapter 

4, Montana Code Annotated, establishes the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) . Section 2-4-102 (2) (a) , MCA, 

defines agency as any agency defined in $ 2-3-102 (1) , MCA, 

which provides: "'Agency' means any board . . . of the state 

. . . authorized by law to . . . determine contested cases 

... " Section 2-15-1705, MCA, creates a Board of Personnel 

Appeals and subsection (6) provides: "The board is designated 

a quasi-judicial board for purposes of 2-15-124.'' 

Title 2, Chapter 4, Part 6, sets forth the statutory 

provisions relating to contested cases. Section 
2-18-1001(1), MCA, grants the BPA the jurisdiction to conduct 

hearings and resolve grievances of employees of the Department of Highways. Title 2, Chapter 4, Part 7, provides for 

judicial review of contested cases by the District Court with 

a right of review of a final judgment of the District Court 

by the Supreme Court. 

As we have noted, Nasi had a contested case hearing 

before the BPA. From its adverse decision, he sought and 

received judicial review by the District Court. The District 

Court affirmed the decision of the Board, but Nasi did not 

assert his right of appeal. 

The District Court decision rested on the doctrine of 

res judicata. The doctrine reflects a policy of judicial 

finality: 

The basic proposition embraced by the 

doctrine of res judicata has always 

remained the same: a party should not be 

able to relitigate a matter he or she 

has already had an opportunity to litigate. This policy reflects the notion 

that a lawsuit should not only bring 

justice to the aggrieved parties but 

provide a final resolution of the 

controversy. 

Brault v. Smith (Mont. 1984), 679 P.2d 236, 238, 41 St-Rep. 

Res judicata applies when administrative proceedings 

possess a judicial character: 

When an administrative agency is acting 

in a judicial capacity and resolves 

disputed issues of fact properly before 

it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the 

courts have not hesitated to apply - res 

judicata to enforce repose. 

United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co. (1966)~ 384 

U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed. 642, 661. 
The application of res judicata rests on the following 

four criteria: (1) the parties must be the same; (2) the 

subject matter must be the same; (3) the issues must be the 

same, and (4) the relationship among the parties, the subject 

matter and the issues must be the same. Brault, 679 P.2d at 

239, 41 St.Rep. at 530, citing Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co. 

(1982), 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929. 

In comparing Nasi's tort action and his BPA grievance, 

we note an identity of the parties, the subject matter and 

the relationship. Both the tort action and the grievance 

flowed from the same set of facts. The pivotal issue was 

identical: Did Nasi voluntarily quit or was he fired? 

At each level of the administrative process, Nasi had 

an adequate opportunity to litigate his claim. Nasi fully 

utilized the procedural safeguards of MAPA, including notice, 

right to counsel, evidence, cross-examination and judicial 

review. At each level, the decision was the same: Nasi 

voluntarily quit. 

Nasi failed to appeal the judicial review. Instead, he 

asked the District Court to reach an opposite decision with 

an encore of the identical issue. We will not allow Nasi to 

relitigate his grievance in a tort action raising the same 

issue previously litigated. 

We hold that the BPA acted in a judicial capacity and 

provided Nasi with a full contested case hearing which was 

subsequently judicially reviewed. We further hold the District Court correctly applied res judicata to Nasi's tort 

action. 

To preclude parties from contesting 

matters that they have had a full and 

fair opportunity to litigate protects 

their adversaries from the expense and 

vexation attending multiple lawsuits, 

conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by 
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions. 

Montana v. United States (1979), 440 U.S. 147, 153-154, 99 

S.Ct. 970, 973-974, 59 L.Ed.2d 210, 217. The four res judicata criteria of Brault have been satisfied. Where the 

moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 

law, we will uphold the District Court. Schaffer v. Champion 

Homes Builders (Mont. 19871, 747 P.2d 872, 874, 44 St.Rep. 

2196, 2198. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: