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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM HUDSON,

Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 971 WDA 2018 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 6, 2018 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP

- 02

- CR

- 0003728

- 2006 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 13, 2019 William Hudson (“Hudson”) appeals from the Order dismissing his first Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 1
We affirm

. In 2006, Hudson was charged with one count each of rape, c orruption
of minors , incest, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and endangering the welfare of children, as well as three counts each of indecent sexual assault and aggravated indecent assault

. 2 On January 15, 2008, a jury found Hudson guilty of corruption of minors. The trial court granted judgment of acquittal
as to one count each of indecent assault and aggravated indecent assault. The jury was unable to reach a consensus on the remaining charges. The

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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546.

2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121, 6301, 4302, 3123, 4304, 3126, 3125.J

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remaining charges were withdr awn. On April 17, 2009, Hudson pled guilty to
incest , in exchange for a sente nce of 5 to 10 years in prison and a 10

- year Megan’s Law III 3 registration requirement. Hudson received no further penalty on the corruption of minors conviction. Hudson did no t file any post

sentence motions or a direct appeal. In 2012, Hudson’s 10

- year Megan’s Law III registration period was supplanted by the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 4 which required Hudson to become a lifetime registrant

. On May 24, 2015, Hudson filed the instant pro se Petition, 5 which was subsequently amended by counsel on November 8, 2017, seeking relief from the application of SORNA in lieu of his sentence under Megan’s Law III . The PCRA court
dismissed Hudson’s Petition as being untimely filed. Hudson thereafter filed a timely Notice of Appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925( b ) Concise Statement. On appeal, Hudson raises the following question for our review: “Whether [Hudson] is entit led to post

- conviction relief

— the strik ing of SO RNA

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3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9795.1 (expired).

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10

- 9799.41.

5 Hudson filed a Moti on to Reinstate Appellate Right s Nunc Pro Tunc and to Remove Defendant from the Registration and Reporting Requirements of SORNA, which the PCRA court properly treated as a PCRA Petit ion. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose.”)

. Because Hudson would not be required to comply with SORNA u ntil his release from prison in May 2017, the PCRA court granted successive continuances on the issue until it was ripe for review upon Hudson’s release.J

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registration requirements

— pursuant to Commonwealth v. Muniz , 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018)?” Brief for Appellant
at 1. We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to th e prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fo rd , 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of Hudson’s appeal, w e must first address whether Hudson has satisfied the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. Section 9545 of the PCRA expressly states that a PCRA petition “shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 (b)(1)

. A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discret ionary review, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review. Id. §9545(b)(3). “Our courts have strictly interpreted this requirement as creating a jurisdictional deadline.” Commonwealth v.
Jackson , 30 A.3d 516, 522 (Pa. Super. 2011). A court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.
Commonwealth v. Albrecht , 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010). Hudson’s judgment of sentence became final on May 17, 2009. Under the PCRA, Hudson had until May 17, 2010 , t o file a timely PCRA Petition. Hudson filed the instant Petition on May 24, 2015 . Thus, Hudson’s Petition is facially untimely. However, Pennsylvania courts may consider petitions filedJ

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beyond the one

- year deadline if the petitioner can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i

- iii). A petition invoking such an exception must be filed within 60 days 6 of the date the claim could have been presented. Id. § 9545(b)(2). Hudson attempts to invoke the “ newly

- recognized constitutional right” timeliness exception f ound at Section 9545(b)(1)(iii ). As previously explained
in Commonwealth v. Murphy , 180 A.3d 402, 405 (Pa. Super. 2018), o ur Supreme Court has held that [S] ubsection (iii) of Section 9545 [(b)] has two requirements. First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or [the Pennsylvani a Supreme C ] ourt after the time provided in this section. Second, it provides tha t the right “has been held” by “that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove that there is a “new” constitutional right and that the right “has been held” by that court to apply retroactively. The language “has been held” is in the p ast tense. These words mean that the action has already occurred, i.e. , “that court” has already held the new constitutional right to be retroactive to cases on collateral review. By employing the past tense in writing this provision, the legislature cle arly intended that the right was already recognized at the time the petition was filed. Id. (citation omitted).

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6 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended on October 24, 2018, effective in 60 days ( i.e. , December 24, 2018), extending the time for filing from 60 days of the date the claim could have been first presented, to one year. The amendment applies to claims arising on December 24, 2017, or thereafter. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3 (hereinafter “Act 146”). In the instant case, the one

- year time limit of Act 146 does not apply to Hudson’s Petition, as he filed it prior to December 24, 2017.J

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I n order to avail himself of the timeliness exception found at Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), Hudson would need to demonstrate that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that its ruling in Muniz applies retroactively. 7 Because our Supreme Court has not issued such a ruling, Hudson’s reliance

on Muniz cannot satisfy the “ newly

- recognized constitutional right” except ion
at S ection 9545(b)(1)(iii). Ac cordingly, we affirm the PCRA court ' s O rder dismissing Hudson’s Petition as untimely filed.
Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/2019

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7 After Muniz , this Court, in Commonwealth v. Rivera - Figueroa , 174 A.3d 674, 678 (Pa. S uper. 2017), held that “ Muniz created a substantive rule that retroactively applies in the collateral context.”