Filed 4/18/23 Marriage of Ghazaryan CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re Marriage of SAMVEL and 

SIRANUYSH GHAZARYAN.

 B321151

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VD087018)

SAMVEL GHAZARYAN,

Appellant,

v.

SIRANUYSH GHAZARYAN,

Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Maria Puente-Porras, Judge. Affirmed in 

part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Decker Law and James D. Decker for Appellant.
2

Law Offices of Varoujan Agemian, Varoujan Agemian and 

Anahid Agemian for Respondent.

______________________________

In this marital dissolution case, appellant Samvel 

Ghazaryan (Samvel)1 appeals from the trial court’s March 16, 

2022, postjudgment order dividing the proceeds from the sale of 

the community home. Samvel contends that (1) the court erred 

in determining that a $35,000 mechanics lien was his separate 

debt rather than a community liability; and (2) the accounting 

report relied upon by the court contained errors regarding cash 

outs Samvel received from refinances of the community home, 

leading to an improper division of the proceeds from its sale. We

reject Samvel’s first contention but find merit in the second.

BACKGROUND

The Marriage

Samvel and respondent Siranuysh Ghazaryan (Siranuysh) 

were married in 2008 and separated in 2015. They had two 

children, who are still minors.

Judgment of Marital Dissolution

The trial court entered a judgment of marital dissolution on 

November 19, 2019 (the judgment), which incorporated the 

parties’ settlement agreement.

According to the judgment, certain real property located on 

Colima Road in Whittier (the Colima property) was community 

1 Because the parties to this appeal share the same last 

name, we refer to them by their first names for ease of 

identification. No disrespect is intended.
3

property, with Samvel and Siranuysh each taking a one-half 

interest subject to certain conditions. Among those conditions, 

Samvel was entitled to a credit of $54,795 for the down payment; 

Samvel was prohibited from “further encumber[ing] the property, 

including adding any additional amounts to the current 

mortgage”; and, absent an equalization payment from Samvel to 

Siranuysh, the Colima property was to be sold. Upon the sale of 

the Colima property, the judgment provided that “after payment 

of broker’s commissions, encumbrances, and other costs of sale, 

the net proceeds shall be divided equally between the parties 

except that any lien or encumbrance incurred by either party 

alone, which is not a community obligation, shall be charged only 

to that party’s share of the proceeds.”

The judgment entitled Samvel to the exclusive use and 

possession of the Colima property until its sale. Samvel was 

required to pay “all costs of ordinary maintenance and repair of 

the property.” As for “[e]xtraordinary maintenance and repair,” 

the judgment provided that the costs “may be shared between the 

parties only with the written consent of the other party or further 

court order.”

Mechanics Lien

On March 15, 2020, the CEO of NH Management Inc. (NH 

Management) executed a claim of mechanics lien against the 

Colima property for $35,415 plus interest for “emergency water 

restoration and repairs.”

2

July 2020 Refinance

Samvel refinanced the Colima property in July 2020

(July 2020 refinance). As part of that refinance, NH 

2 The record does not disclose if the mechanics lien was ever 

recorded.
4

Management was paid $35,000. Samvel received a $61,143.92 

cash out.

Order to Sell the Colima Property

In November 2020, Siranuysh filed a request for order

(RFO) “[t]o enforce [the] [j]udgment . . . by [o]rdering the sale of 

real property, accounting, and distribution of proceeds.”

Following a hearing in June 2021, the trial court ordered 

the Colima property to be sold. The court ordered that Samvel 

was to receive a $55,500.91 credit, and that all proceeds from the 

sale were to be held by the escrow company or in a joint trust 

account until the distribution of the funds was determined by 

written agreement of the parties or by court order.

The trial court also found “that the parties ha[d] already 

agreed to the joint retention of an accountant, . . . Mark 

Falkenhagen [(Falkenhagen)], to assist the parties and the 

[c]ourt with respect to the accounting as necessary.”

July 2021 Refinance

Samvel refinanced the Colima property again in July 2021 

(July 2021 refinance). This time, he received $104,090.57 in 

cash.

Samvel’s RFO

In August 2021, Samvel filed an RFO seeking, inter alia,

the “determination” of the mechanics lien and reimbursement for 

child support and a $55,500 equalization payment given to 

Siranuysh. In an accompanying declaration, Samvel stated:

“In the judgment, I was ordered to preserve the family 

residence. I was having trouble with the shower handle in the 

bathroom, having to use a pair of pliers for a while, until [I] 

called a plumber to fix the problem. The plumber had to cut into 

the drywall from the opposite side of the shower wall from the 
5

kitchen side. After cutting the wall, the plumber gave me an 

estimate of between $1250 to $1500 to fix the problem, which was 

too expensive for me. Because a portion of the drywall was 

already cut, I decided to fix the problem my[]self. I had done 

simple plumbing jobs around the house before and I went to 

Home Depot to get the parts I needed to do the repair and started 

repairing the bathroom, after shutting off the water. It was a 

difficult job and I couldn’t finish the job in one day. Although I 

thought the work I did was tempora[r]y and would hold, I turned 

the water back on[] and I would finish the job the next day. The 

pipe was leaking, but not too much and I put a plastic container 

in the wall to collect the leaking water. During the night, the 

water leak had increased and the house became flooded. [¶] . . . 

[¶] In the morning I shut off the water supply and got the 

number for NH Management, . . . who came to the house to fix 

everything, which cost $35,000.”

Sale of the Colima Property

The parties sold the Colima property in October 2021 for 

$600,000.

Siranuysh’s Response to Samvel’s RFO; Samvel’s Reply

In November 2021, Siranuysh filed a declaration in 

response to Samvel’s RFO. Siranuysh contended that the 

$35,000 mechanics lien was “another tactic by . . . [Samvel] to 

shortchange [her] share in the property proceeds.” According to 

Siranuysh, NH Management was a suspended corporation at the 

time of the alleged water restoration services in 2020. 

Siranuysh’s counsel filed a declaration with an attached 

accounting report prepared by Falkenhagen, the accountant 

retained jointly by the parties.
6

In his reply, Samvel submitted a supplemental declaration 

in which he stated that at the time he hired NH Management he 

did not know that its license had been suspended. He contended 

that “[t]he repairs were legitimate and the costs were real.”

Hearing

The hearing on Samvel’s RFO was held on February 16, 

2022. In addition to the specific issues raised in the RFO, the 

trial court received evidence and considered the broader issue of 

the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the Colima 

property.

Falkenhagen testified as an expert accountant, explaining 

the methodology underlying his accounting report and his 

conclusions regarding the proper distribution of the sale 

proceeds. This included allocating between the parties various 

expenses related to the refinances of the Colima property. In 

Falkenhagen’s opinion, Samvel was entitled to $42,038.75 and 

Siranuysh was entitled to $138,304.60.

Samvel also testified. He stated that, in 2020, a bathroom 

pipe began to leak at the Colima property. Unable to fix it 

himself, he called a plumber. The plumber provided an estimate 

that “was very expensive”; Samvel thus “refuse[d] his service.”

Samvel eventually called NH Management to repair the property, 

which cost over $35,000. A mechanics lien was placed on the 

property after Samvel “refused to pay” NH Management. Samvel 

did not recall having any invoices or receipts from NH 

Management or taking any photos from before or after the work 

was performed.

Following Samvel’s testimony, the trial court stated: 

“[T]his very articulate, thoughtful, detail-oriented individual 

would like this court to believe that some 35,000-dollar 
7

mechanic’s lien is warranted to be community debt given that he 

has nothing to support it. I got to tell you I’m not buying that. 

So at this point in time, the court’s tentative is not to make that 

community property. And if in fact those damages did occur, he 

was the user of the house. He’s responsible for them. But I don’t 

believe that those things occurred.”

Later in the hearing, the trial court reiterated its position 

regarding the mechanics lien. “The court remains in the same 

mind-set that the mechanic’s lien is definitely not community 

property. The court has zero, other than the petitioner’s 

testimony, zero evidence that would give it any kind of 

opportunity to consider that this is something other than a bill. 

And the court has already articulated the petitioner’s credibility 

is quite suspect given that again he was very articulate in 

everything else and to have nothing in court today, to have not 

taken any photographs, to have not memorialized that troubling 

situation where he contended that this pipe burst in the middle of 

the night—in fact I remember reading the declaration that he 

tried to fix it and then he realized he couldn’t fix it—and nothing 

to support this. Nothing. And he carries the burden to prove 

that that is exactly what happened.”

The trial court also explained why it would make some 

adjustments to Falkenhagen’s calculations to account for closing 

cost credits received in connection with the July 2021 refinance, 

attorney fees, and accountant fees.

Throughout the hearing, Samvel contended that 

Falkenhagen’s accounting report did not accurately reflect his 

refinance cash outs.
8

Findings and Order After Hearing

In the findings and order after hearing filed on March 16, 

2022, the trial court distributed the remaining proceeds of 

$176,041.41 from the sale of the Colima property, with 

$45,252.01 going to Samvel, $130,789.40 going to Siranuysh, and 

$3,000 going to Siranuysh’s attorney from Samvel’s share.

Appeal

Samvel filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s 

March 16, 2022, order.

DISCUSSION

I. Standards of Review

A trial court’s characterization of property as either 

community or separate is a factual finding that we review for 

substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Campi (2013) 

212 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1572.) “[T]he court has broad discretion to 

determine the manner in which community property is divided 

and the responsibility to fix the value of assets and liabilities in 

order to accomplish an equal division. [Citations.] The trial 

court’s determination of the value of a particular asset is a 

factual one and as long as that determination is within the range 

of the evidence presented, we will uphold it on appeal. 

[Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 

617, 631–632.)

But where “‘“the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof 

at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the 

evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of 

law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the 

appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ 

and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a 

judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a 
9

finding.’”’ [Citations.]” (SwiftAir, LLC v. Southwest Airlines Co.

(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 46, 59 (SwiftAir).)

This case also requires us to interpret the terms of the 

judgment, which incorporated the parties’ settlement agreement.

We do so de novo. (In re Marriage of Belthius (2023) 

88 Cal.App.5th 1, 9 [appellate court construes de novo the terms 

of a stipulated judgment of marital dissolution not involving 

extrinsic evidence].) “Marital settlement agreements 

incorporated into a dissolution judgment are construed under the 

statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts 

generally. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 

55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) “When the language of the judgment 

incorporating the marital settlement agreement is clear, explicit, 

and unequivocal, and there is no ambiguity, the court will enforce 

the express language. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

II. Characterization of Mechanics Lien

Samvel challenges the trial court’s conclusion that NH 

Management’s $35,000 mechanics lien was his separate debt

rather than a community liability. He contends that the debt 

incurred was necessary to preserve the Colima property as a 

community asset and, therefore, the debt should be borne by the 

community.

Under the judgment, Samvel had exclusive use and 

possession of the Colima property until its sale. While Samvel 

was required to pay “all costs of ordinary maintenance and repair 

of the property[,]” the judgment provided that costs of 

“[e]xtraordinary maintenance and repair may be shared between 

the parties only with the written consent of the other party or 

further court order” (italics added). Samvel does not contend that 

Siranuysh ever consented to share the costs of NH Management’s 
10

work. Thus, under the plain language of the judgment, the lien 

could only be attributed to the community if it was for 

“[e]xtraordinary maintenance and repair” and so ordered by the 

trial court.

Based on Samvel’s declaration and live testimony, the trial 

court made a credibility finding that Samvel’s account of the 

circumstances of the mechanics lien was untrue. The court did 

not “believe that those things occurred.” We must defer to that 

determination. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403 [“it is 

the exclusive province of the . . . [factfinder] to determine the 

credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon 

which a determination depends”].) The court implicitly found a 

lack of evidence that the lien was for services constituting 

“[e]xtraordinary maintenance and repair” that could be shared by 

the community.

Apart from Samvel’s testimony, which the trial court 

explicitly rejected, the only evidence presented by Samvel to 

support his claim that the community should be responsible for 

the debt to NH Management was the mechanics lien itself, which 

only described the associated services as “emergency water 

restoration and repairs.” Given the evidence that NH 

Management was a suspended corporation at the time of its 

alleged services in 2020, the court was entitled to discount this 

cursory characterization. With no evidence compelling a finding 

that the lien constituted a legitimate debt attributable to the 

community as a matter of law (see SwiftAir, supra,

77 Cal.App.5th at p. 59), the court did not err in finding that it 

was Samvel’s personal debt.

Our conclusion is unaffected by In re Marriage of Reilley

(1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1119 (Reilley), a case upon which Samvel 
11

relies heavily. In Reilley, a husband used his separate earnings 

to remodel a community property while he and his wife were 

separated. (Id. at p. 1121.) In the judgment of marital 

dissolution, the trial court ordered that the husband be 

reimbursed for the entire amount he had separately expended to 

improve the property. (Id. at p. 1122.) The Court of Appeal 

agreed that the husband was entitled to reimbursement but 

concluded that the proper amount of reimbursement was not 

necessarily the entire amount he had paid. (Id. at p. 1123.)

Samvel argues that if the “discretionary remodel work 

warranted reimbursement in Reilley, then certainly Samvel’s 

necessary plumbing repairs” should too. The premise of this 

argument is flawed, as the trial court rejected Samvel’s version of 

events and nothing in the record compels a finding that the 

repairs were necessary to preserve the community asset.

Moreover, the circumstances in Reilley are markedly 

different than those of the instant case. Among other things, in 

Reilley, there was no evidence that reimbursement from the 

community had been discussed before the renovations 

commenced. (Reilley, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 1121.) Here, 

the judgment, which predated the mechanics lien, specified that 

Samvel was required to pay for ordinary maintenance and repair 

of the Colima property and merely permitted the sharing of costs 

for extraordinary maintenance and repair.

III. Distribution of Sale Proceeds

Samvel also argues that Falkenhagen’s accounting report

contained errors, which were ultimately used by the trial court to 

order an improper division of the proceeds from the sale of the 
12

Colima property.

3 Samvel disputes the reduction of his share by 

$37,608.31, caused by erroneously including a deduction of 

$98,732.62 for the cash out from an “August 2021 Refinance” 

while erroneously excluding the $61,124.31 cash out he received 

from the July 2020 refinance.4

Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we agree with 

Samvel that irreconcilable errors relating to the refinance cash 

outs appear in the accounting report. No refinance occurred in 

August 2021, and the evidence does not support an inference that 

Falkenhagen actually meant to refer to the July 2020 or July 

2021 refinances. A deduction for the July 2021 refinance cash 

out already appears in the report (albeit erroneously labeled as 

being for the July 2020 refinance)

5 in the amount of $104,224.38.6

3 The trial court did not adopt Falkenhagen’s calculations in 

full, instead making some adjustments to account for closing cost 

credits and professional fees. These deviations are not at issue 

here.

4 According to the closing disclosure from the July 2020 

refinance, Samvel received $61,143.92 in cash. The estimated 

closing statement for that refinance indicated that Samvel would 

receive $61,124.31.

5 Although mislabeled, it is clear from other information, 

including the name of the escrow company, that the deduction 

labeled “Cash out July 2020 Refinance” actually refers to the 

July 2021 refinance.

6 The actual cash out from the July 2021 refinance was 

$104,090.57. Although not clear from the appellate record, the 

slightly larger number used by Falkenhagen may have been from 

an estimate.
13

For the actual July 2020 refinance, Samvel received a $61,143.92 

cash out—a substantially different sum than $98,732.62. In 

short, it is entirely unclear what the $98,732.62 deduction from 

Samvel’s share of the sale proceeds is meant to represent.7 

Further, as Samvel acknowledges, the actual amount of the

July 2020 refinance appears to have been excluded from the 

deductions. Because we cannot reconcile the amounts used to 

calculate the parties’ shares, we conclude that substantial 

evidence does not support the trial court’s distribution of the 

proceeds from the sale of the Colima property.

On remand, the trial court must recalculate the parties’ 

share of the proceeds from the sale using accurate values for 

Samvel’s cash outs from the July 2020 and July 2021 refinances.

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s finding that NH Management’s $35,000 

mechanics lien was Samvel’s separate debt rather than a 

community liability is affirmed.

The trial court’s March 16, 2022, order distributing the 

remaining proceeds from the sale of the Colima property is 

reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for the sole 

purpose of recalculating each party’s share using accurate values 

for Samvel’s cash outs from the July 2020 and July 2021 

refinances.

7 Siranuysh’s respondent’s brief does not provide any 

assistance in this respect, stating that “[t]here is nothing in 

[Falkenhagen’s] accounting which is amiss” and that any error 

benefitted rather than prejudiced Samvel.
14

The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, P. J.

LUI

________________________, J.

CHAVEZ