This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. A-1-CA-35579 4 SALVADOR CURIEL, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LUNA COUNTY 7 Daniel Viramontes, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Emily Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 13 C. David Henderson, Appellate Defender 14 MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 VANZI, Chief Judge. 192 {1} Defendant Salvador Curiel appeals his convictions after a jury found him guilty 1 of aggravated burglary, aggravated battery against a household member with great 2 bodily harm, and criminal trespass. We affirm in part, reverse inpart, and remand the 3 case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 4 BACKGROUND 5 {2} Defendant and Lynne Hafer (Victim) had dated for fiveyears and lived together 6 at Victim’s home for three of those years. They broke up, and Defendant moved out, 7 but the two started seeing each other again. One evening while Defendant and his dogs 8 were at Victim’s residence, he and Vic tim got into an argument, and police were 9 called to the home. Victim to ld the officer that she wanted Defendant “gone for the 10 night.” The officer gave Defendant a verbaltrespass warning, telling him that he was 11 “not allowed there” and if hecame back he would be arre sted for trespassing. Before 12 Defendant left, he told the officer that hewanted to get his dogs from Victim’s back 13 yard. The officer told Defendant that he could come back the next morning with an 14 officer to get his dogs and any other property he needed. After De fendant left, Victim 15 heard the dogs barking outside and let them into her house because she did not want 16 them to disturb the neighbors. She locked the doors to her home and went back to bed. 17 {3} About two hours later, Defendant returned to Victim ’s home. He broke through 18 the back door, entered the home, and kicked in Victim’s bedroom door. Defendant 193 entered the bedroom, pulled Victim out of her bed and dragge d her through the house 1 to the back door, while beating her in th e face and head. The injuries that Victim 2 suffered from this beating in cluded a knocked-out tooth; numerous lumps and bruises 3 on her face, head, shoulders, arms, back, torso, and foot; and a sprained ankle. 4 Defendant told Victim during the attack th at she was “holding his dogs . . . hostage 5 and that he was going to kill [her].” Defendant left the home before police arrived, and 6 police were not able to locate him that night. 7 {4} The reporting officer filed a criminal complaint against Defendant in the 8 magistrate court, and the magistrate court issued a warrant fo r Defendant’s arrest. 9 Both the criminal complaint and the warrant charged Defendant with breaking and 10 entering, aggravated battery against a household member, and criminal trespass. 11 However, the criminal information later f iled in the district court charged Defendant 12 with aggravated burglary, aggravated battery against a household member, and 13 criminal trespass, but not with breaking and entering. The aggravated burglary count 14 in the criminal information contained the fo llowing allegations that are relevant to this 15 appeal: 16 COUNT 1: Aggravated Burg lary (Commits Battery) , . . . [D]efendant 17 did enter the dwelling house of [Victim] . . . without authorization or 18 permission, with intent to commit A ggravated Burglary or theft when he 19 got inside[.] 20 Also relevant are the following allegations contained in the criminal trespass count: 214 COUNT 3: Criminal Trespass (Damage) , . . . [D]efendant did 1 knowingly enter [Victim’s premises], without permission, and damaged 2 or destroyed a bedroom door and back door[.] 3 A jury found Defendant guilty of all three charges. Defendant appeals each 4 conviction. He asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 5 aggravated burglary, the district court committed fundamental error because it gave 6 the jury confusing instructions on crimes against household members, and his 7 convictions for both aggravated burglary and criminal trespass violate his 8 constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. 9 DISCUSSION 10 Insufficient Evidence 11 {5} Defendant asserts that there was in sufficient evidence to convict him of 12 aggravated burglary because the State did not prove that he entered Victim’s home 13 with the specific intent to “commit any felony or theft therein[.]” NMSA 1978, 14 Section 30-16-4 (1963) (setting forth the elements of aggravated burglary). At trial, 15 the prosecutor tendered the following instructions for aggravated burglary: 16 INSTRUCTION NO. 3 17 For you to find [D]efendant guilty of aggravated burglary as 18 charged in Count 1, the [S]tate must prove to your satisfaction beyond 19 a reasonable doubt each of the fo llowing elements of the crime: 20 1. [D]efendant entered a dwe lling without authorization; 215 2. [D]efendant entered the dwelli ng with the intent to commit 1 breaking and entering once inside; 2 3. [D]efendant touched or applie d force to [Victim] in a rude 3 or angry manner while entering or leaving, or while inside; 4 4. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 24[th] day 5 of November, 2014. 6 INSTRUCTION NO. 4 7 The elements of breaking and entering are as follows: 8 1. [D]efendant entered the dwelling of [Victim] without 9 permission; the least intrusion constitutes an entry; 10 2. The entry was obtained by the breaking of a door; 11 3. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 24[th] day 12 of November, 2014. 13 Defendant contends that the State’s th eory underlying his aggravated burglary 14 conviction was illogical and factually impo ssible: one cannot enter a home with the 15 intent to break into that home once he wa s already inside. And, because the theory 16 presented to the jury was factually impossible, he asserts that there is no set of facts 17 sufficient to prove that he committed aggravated burglary. 18 {6} The State concedes, and we agree, thatthe evidence presented at trial was not 19 sufficient to convict Defendant of aggrav ated burglary under the theory presented to 20 the jury. The State requests that we reverse the aggravated burglary conviction and 21 remand the case to the district court for entry of judgment for breaking and entering 226 “as a lesser included offense” under the direct-remand rule sanctioned by our Supreme 1 Court in State v. Haynie , 1994-NMSC-001, ¶ 4, 116 N.M. 746, 867 P.2d 416. 2 {7} In Haynie , the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder 3 and remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment and resentencing for 4 the lesser included charge of second degree murder. Id. ¶ 5. It held that, where “the 5 evidence does not support the offense for wh ich the defendant was convicted but does 6 support a lesser included offense[,]” appellatecourts “have the authority to remand 7 a case for entry of judgmen t on the lesser included offense and resentencing rather 8 than retrial[.]” Id. ¶ 4. “The rationale . . . is that there is no need to retry a defendant 9 for a lesser included offense when the elemen ts of the lesser offense necessarily were 10 proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt inthe course of c onvicting the defendant 11 of the greater offense.” Id. The Court considered the f act that “substantial evidence 12 support[ed] the verdict” in determining th at the defendant’s conduct met the elements 13 of the lesser included offense. Id. 14 {8} A decade later, our Supreme Court revisited Haynie ’s direct-remand rule and 15 emphasized that, “[i]n deciding whether direct remand is appropriate in these 16 circumstances, . . . the inquiryis whether the interests of justice would be served by 17 ordering a new trial.” State v. Villa , 2004-NMSC-031, ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 367, 98 P.3d 18 1017. The VillaCourt reversed this Court’s remand to the district court because the 197 jury was not instructed on the elements of the lesser included o ffense, and therefore, 1 the defendant did not have an opportunity todefend against that charge at trial. Id. 2 ¶¶ 8 n.3, 9, 12. The Court acknowledged th at, “[h]ad the State at trial requested 3 instructions on the lesser[]included offenses and the trial court properly granted that 4 request, the parties would havehad a full and fair opportunity to marshal evidence and 5 craft their argument to persuade the jury for or against the elements of those offenses.” 6 Id. ¶ 13. 7 {9} Peculiarly, in this case, all of the elements of breaking and entering were 8 contained within the jury instructions for aggravated burglary. “Breaking and entering, 9 however, is not a lesser[]included offense of aggravated burglary under our former, 10 strict elements test because each offens e requires an element not included in the 11 other.” State v. Hernandez , 1999-NMCA-105, ¶ 25, 127 N.M. 769, 987 P.2d 1156. 12 “Contrary to the common-law definition of burglary, New Mexico does not consider 13 ‘breaking’ to be an element of burglary.” Id. 14 {10} Nevertheless, our review of the record in this case leads us to conclude that the 15 proper disposition is direct remand for en try of judgment for breaking and entering, 16 as the State has suggested. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. 17 {11} First, we note that after the State presented its case-in-chief, defense counsel 18 moved for directed verdict on the aggravated burglary charge, arguing that the State 198 presented no evidence that Defendant intende d to commit a theft or a felony inside of 1 Victim’s home. A lengthy discussion ensued between the district court, the prosecutor, 2 and defense counsel about whether the ev idence showed that Defendant committed 3 aggravated burglary or whether breaking and entering was the appropriate offense. 4 The judge stated, “I tend to agree that this looks more like a breaking and entering. . 5 . . Clearly the evidence points to that at this time, so I would go along with . . . a 6 breaking and entering.” Defense counsel alsoasserted that “breaking and entering . 7 . . is a lesser included [offense]” to aggrav ated burglary, and argued that instead of 8 aggravated burglary, the State could “pro ceed on a breaking and entering, perhaps.” 9 The prosecutor then pointed to Hernandezand stated her concern that breaking and 10 entering was not a lesser included o ffense of aggravated burglary. See1999-NMCA11 105, ¶ 29. The court adjourned for lunch toallow it and defense counsel to review 12 Hernandez . When the court reconvened, defense counsel stated that after reviewing 13 Hernandez , he wanted to modify his argument to assert that the State could not go 14 forward with breaking and entering becauseit is not a lesser included offense and 15 Defendant did not have any notice of th at charge. The district court denied 16 Defendant’s directed verdict motion and allowed the State to proceed with its 17 aggravated burglary prosecution, using breaking and entering as the predicate felony 18 for that crime in the jury instructions. 199 {12} Despite Defendant’s eventual assertion that he did not have notice of the 1 breaking and entering allegations, we conclude that Defendant had notice of these 2 allegations when he was serv ed with a copy of the crimin al information. Count 1 of 3 the information alleged, in part, that Defendant “did enter the dwelling house of 4 [Victim] . . . without authorization or permission[.]” Count 3 of the information 5 alleged, in part, that Defendant “did knowingly enter” Victim’s premises “and 6 damaged or destroyed a . . . back door[.]” Taken together, these allegations contain the 7 essential elements of breaking and entering. SeeNMSA 1978, § 30-14-8(A) (1981) 8 (“Breaking and entering consists of the unauthorized entry of any . . . dwelling . . . 9 where entry is obtained . . . by the breaking or dismantling of any part of the . . . 10 dwelling[.]”). Therefore, the “sum of the charges” contained in the criminal 11 information gave Defendant “notice of the elements he needed to defend against[.]” 12 Hernandez , 1999-NMCA-105, ¶ 28; see also Villa , 2004-NMSC-031, ¶ 12 (stating 13 that the defendant mu st have adequate notice of the lesser included offense that the 14 appellate court orders for entry on remand); State v. Meadors , 1995-NMSC-073, ¶ 19, 15 121 N.M. 38, 908 P.2d 731 (holding that the sum of the charges in the indictment gave 16 the defendant “meaningful notice” that he needed to defend against the elements of 17 a crime that was not explicitly charged in the indictment). 18 {13} Second, after the district court denied Defendant’s directed verdict motion and 1910 allowed the State to proceed with the th eory that breaking and entering was the 1 predicate felony under the aggravated burglary count, Defendant had an opportunity 2 to defend against the breaking element wh en he put on his evidence, unlike the 3 defendants in Villaand Hernandez

. See Villa , 2004-NMSC-031, ¶ 13 (stating that 4 direct remand was improper where that the de fendant in that case did not have “a full 5 and fair opportunity to marshal evidence and craft [his] argument to persuade the jury 6 . . . against the elements of [the lesser included] offenses”); Hernandez , 1999-NMCA7 105, ¶ 30 (suggesting that, if the defendant had known that he was in jeopardy for 8 breaking and entering, he “would have put on specific evidence regarding, for 9 example, preexisting damage to [the vic tim]’s door which would have contradicted 10 the [s]tate’s position that he broke or dism antled the door or lock . . . [or testimony 11 about] whether [the d]efendant still had a key”). When defense counsel called 12 Defendant to testify, he asked Defendant whether he was “able to use a key or 13 anything to get in” to Victim’s home. Defendant replied, “No.” And although he 14 denied kicking in the door, Defendant admitte d that he “pushed” the door to enter the 15 home. Defense counsel did not elicit further testimony from Defendant about the 16 nature of his entry, nor di d he attempt to rebut the State’s substantial evidence that 17 Defendant broke the door to enter the home. Defendant’s theory of the case 18 throughout the trial was that Defendant was justified in entering Victim’s home by 1911 whatever means necessary because he was concerned for the welfare of his dogs; the 1 fact that he broke the door to en ter the home was never in dispute. See Meadors , 1995- 2 NMSC-073, ¶ 20 (stating that the defendant was not “taken by surprise” or his 3 “defense . . . in any way impaired” because his “theory of the case differed from the 4 [s]tate’s theory only on the issue of his ment al state at the time of the act” and not on 5 the issue whether he did the act itself). 6 {14} Third, unlike the sparse eviden ce of the breaking element in Hernandez , there 7 was substantial evidence in this case that Defendant broke the back door to enter 8 Victim’s home. See 1999-NMCA-105, ¶ 30 (noting that the state presented “some” 9 evidence about damage to the door, but did notadequately establish the fact that the 10 defendant broke the door); see also Haynie , 1994-NMSC-001, ¶ 4 (justifying direct 11 remand because, among other things, substantial evidence supported a conviction on 12 the lesser included offense). Victim testifie d that she heard “crashing” just before 13 Defendant came into her bedroom. She tes tified that “the w hole [door] frame was 14 broke” and that the door frame was not broke n before this incident. Photographs of 15 the broken door frame were admitted as e xhibits and published to the jury. Both 16 officers who responded to Victim’s home right after the incident testified that one of 17 the first things they noticed was thatthe frame of the back door was broken. 18 {15} Fourth, unlike the jury in Villa , the jury in this case was instructed on the 1912 elements of breaking and entering. See 2004-NMSC-031, ¶ 9 (distinguishing the case 1 before them from Hayniebecause “the jury was not tendered an instruction on any 2 lesser[]included offenses”). The breaki ng and entering elements were included 3 alongside the instruction for aggravated burglary as a prerequisite for finding 4 Defendant guilty of aggravated burglary. 5 {16} Fifth, because the jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated burglary using 6 instructions that contained the elements of breaking and entering as the predicate 7 felony, the jury necessarily found that Defendant’s conduct met the elements of 8 breaking and entering; thus, there is no need to retry Defendant. See Haynie , 1994- 9 NMSC-001, ¶ 4 (“[T]here is no need to retry a defendant for a lesser included offense 10 when the elements of the lesser included offense necessarily were proven to a jury 11 beyond a reasonable doubt in the course of convicting the defendant of the greater 12 offense.”). 13 {17} All of these reasons lead us to concludethat “the interests of justice would not 14 be served by remanding this case for a new trial[,]” id. ¶ 3; see Villa , 2004-NMSC15 031, ¶ 9, and that direct remand for entry of judgment for breaking and entering and 16 resentencing on that count is appropriate in this case. 17 Confusing Jury Instructions 18 {18} Defendant asserts that the district court committed fundamental error because 1913 it gave the jury confusing instructions c oncerning the lesser included offense of simple 1 battery against a household member. We disagree. 2 {19} We review unpreserved claims of errone ous jury instructions for fundamental 3

error. SeeRule 12-321(B)(2)(c) NMRA; State v. Benally , 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 4 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134. “The doctrine of fundamental error applies only under 5 exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” State v. 6 Barber , 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P. 3d 633 (“Error that is fundamental 7 . . . must go to the foundation of the case ortake from the defendant a right which was 8 essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive.” 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We reverse for fundamental error 10 “only for the protection of those whose innocence appears indisputably, or open to 11 such question that it would shock the cons cience to permit the conviction to stand.” 12 State v. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 13, 128 N.M . 711, 998 P.2d 176 (internal 13 quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether fundamental error 14 exists, we evaluate the juryinstructions as a whole. Id. ¶ 21. 15 {20} The district court instructed the ju ry on three crimes against household 16 members, starting with the most severe crime and ending with th e least severe crime. 17 It first instructed the jury on the crime of aggravated battery against a household 18 member withgreat bodily harm, a third degree felony. SeeNMSA 1978, § 30-3-16(C) 1914 (2008, amended 2018). This instruction re quired, among other things, proof beyond 1 a reasonable doubt that the injury to Victimresulted in one or more of the following: 2 a high probability of death, serious disfigurement, loss of any member or organ of the 3 body, or permanent or prolonged impairment of the use of any member or organ of the 4 body. SeeUJI 14-131 NMRA (defining “[g]reat bodily harm”). Defendant does not 5 contend that there are any errors in the distri ct court’s instructions for this crime, and 6 we find no errors in these instructions. Th is was the crime for which the jury found 7 Defendant guilty. We note that it did not find Defendant guilty of the next, lesser 8 included offense of aggravated battery against a household member without great 9 bodily harm, a misdemeanor. See§ 30-3-16(B). 10 {21} The next two instructions are those th at Defendant conte nds were confusing. 11 These instructions were intended to direct th e jury to consider the even lesser included 12 offense of simple battery against a household member. Simple battery against a 13 household member does not require proof thatVictim sustained any injuries from the 14 battery. SeeNMSA 1978, § 30-3-15 (2008). We agree that these instructions contain 15 errors that could have caused the jury someconfusion. For example, they erroneously 16 instructed the jury to consider, once again, the offense of “aggravated battery against 17 a household member without great bodily harm,” instead of the offense of simple 18 battery against a household member. (Emphasis added.) A nd, although the next 1915 instruction contained the elements of si mple battery against a household member, it 1 erroneously named the offense “battery against a household member withgreat bodily 2 harm[.]” 3 {22} However, the jury was instructed to cons ider these instructions only if it did not 4 find that Defendant committed aggravated battery of a household member without 5 great bodily harm. As we have noted, the jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated 6 battery of a household member withgreat bodily harm, and it therefore had no need 7 to consider the simple battery against a household member instructions. Furthermore, 8 instructions on simple battery against a household member were not essential to 9 Defendant’s defense,” see Barber , 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8; the instructions “as a whole” 10 were not confusing as to the crime for which the jury ultimately found Defendant 11 guilty, see Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 21; and giving the jury these erroneous 12 instructions did not create “a mis carriage of justice” in this case, see Barber , 2004- 13 NMSC-019, ¶ 8. It does not appear that Defendant is “indisputably” innocent of 14 aggravated battery against a household memb er with great bodily harm or that his 15 guilt for that offense is “open to such que stion that it would shock the conscience to 16 permit the conviction to stand.” Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 13 (internal 17 quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant dragged Victim through her home 18 while severely beating her. He knocked out her tooth; bruised her head, face, 1916 shoulders, arms, back, and torso; and sprainedher ankle. Therefore, the errors in the 1 jury instructions in this case are not fundamental and do not require reversal of 2 Defendant’s conviction. See Barber , 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8; Cunningham , 2000- 3 NMSC-009, ¶ 13. 4 Double Jeopardy 5 {23} Defendant asserts that his right to be free from double jeopardy under the 6 federal and state constitutions was violated when he was convicted of both aggravated 7 burglary and criminal trespass, because both offenses constitute the same conduct. We 8 disagree. 9 {24} As we have concluded above, there was insufficient evidence to sustain 10 Defendant’s conviction for aggravated burglary, and we have instructed the district 11 court to enter judgment for breaking and entering. Because Defendant argues that it 12 is the “breaking” aspect of the aggravated burglary offense, along with the criminal 13 trespass offense, that constitutes the same conduct, we proceed to determine whether 14 conviction for both breaking and entering and criminal trespass violates Defendant’s 15 double jeopardy rights. 16 {25} “We generally review double jeopardy claims de novo.” State v. Rodriguez , 17 2006-NMSC-018, ¶ 3, 139 N.M . 450, 134 P.3d 737. But “where factual issues are 18 intertwined with the double jeopardy analysis , we review the [district] court’s fact 1917 determinations under a defere ntial substantial evidencestandard of review.” Id. 1 Double jeopardy claims may be raised for the first time on appeal. SeeNMSA 1978, 2 § 30-1-10 (1963); State v. Lopez , 2008-NMCA-002, ¶ 12, 143 N.M. 274, 175 P.3d 3 942. 4 {26} The right to be free from double jeopardy “protects against both successive 5 prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Contreras , 6 2007-NMCA-045, ¶ 19, 141 N.M. 434, 156 P.3d 725 (internal quotation marks and 7 citation omitted). Multiple punishment pr oblems may arise from double description 8 claims, “in which a single act results in multiple charges under different criminal 9 statutes,” or unit of prosecution claims, “in which an individual is convicted of 10 multiple violations of the same criminal statute.” State v. Bernal , 2006-NMSC-050, 11 ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 644, 146 P.3d 289. Defendant’s claim is a double description claim 12 because he asserts that his single act of “breaking a door” resulted in conviction under 13 both criminal trespass and under the breaking and entering elements of his aggravated 14 burglary conviction. 15 {27} We examine double description claims using the two-part test set forth in 16 Swafford v. State , 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 25, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223. The first part 17 of the test asks us to determine “whe ther the conduct underlying the offenses is 18 unitary, i.e. , whether the same conduct violates both statutes.” Id. And the second part 1918 of the test “focuses on the statutes at i ssue to determine whether the [L]egislature 1 intended to create separate ly punishable offenses.” Id. But, “[i]f the conduct is not 2 unitary, then the inquiry is at an end and there is no double jeopardy violation.” 3 Contreras , 2007-NMCA-045, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 4 Conduct is not unitary unless “the same criminal conduct is the basis for both 5 charges.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]e will not find that 6 a defendant’s conduct is unitary where the defendant comp letes one of the charged 7 crimes before committing the other.” Id. ¶ 21. 8 {28} Here, the jury instructions establish that Defendant was tried and convicted 9 under the elements of breaking and enteri ng because he entered Victim’s “dwelling” 10 by means of “the breaking of a door[.]” He was tried and convicted for criminal 11 trespass because he “damaged the bedroom door[.]” The evidence is clear that the 12 door that Defendant broke to enter Victim’s dwelling was the back door, and that after 13 he broke the back door and entered the home, he proceeded to break another 14 door—the bedroom door. These two acts are not the same conduct because he 15 “complete[d] one of the charged crimes before committing the other.” Id. Therefore, 16 our inquiry ends, and we conclude that De fendant’s constitutional right to be free from 17 double jeopardy is not violated by convic tion for both breaking and entering and 18 criminal trespass. See id. ¶ 20. 1919 CONCLUSION 1 {29} For reasons we have explained above, weaffirm Defendant’s convictions for 2 aggravated battery against a household memb er with great bodily harm and criminal 3 trespass; we reverse Defendant’s aggravated burglary conviction; and we remand the 4 case to the district court for entry of j udgment for breaking and entering, contrary to 5 Section 30-14-8, and for resentencing on that offense as the district court deems 6 appropriate. 7 {30} IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

__________________________________ 9 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 10 WE CONCUR: 11

_______________________________ 12 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 13

________________________________ 14 DANIEL J. GALLEGOS, Judge 15