[Cite as Mousa v. Saad, 2019-Ohio-4406.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MARION COUNTY 

 

EMAD YOUHANNA MOUSA, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 9-19-33 

 v. 

ARLET MOUNIR ISHAK SAAD, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. 

 

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 14-DR-0033 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: October 28, 2019 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Paul Giorgianni for Appellant 

 Todd A. Anderson and Jeff Ratliff for Appellee 
Case No. 9-19-33 

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SHAW, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Emad Youhanna Mousa (“Emad”), appeals the 

April 29, 2019 Judgment Entry-Divorce Decree issued by the Marion County Court 

of Common Pleas, Family Division. On appeal, Emad challenges the trial court’s 

award of $400,000 pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(E)(5) to defendant-appellee, Arlet 

Mounir Ishak Saad (“Arlet”), for Emad’s substantial and willful failure to disclose 

assets during the divorce proceedings. 

{¶2} This case has previously been remanded twice to the trial court for 

correction and clarification of multiple issues related to the parties’ property 

distribution pertaining to the divorce. See Mousa v. Saad, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-

16-43, 2017-Ohio-7116 (“Mousa I”); Mousa v. Saad, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-18-12, 

2019-Ohio-742 (“Mousa II”).1

 In Mousa II, we concluded that the trial court 

erroneously included funds Emad had dissipated prior to and in anticipation of filing 

the divorce complaint when it calculated the total funds resulting from Emad’s nondisclosure under R.C. 3105.171(E)(3),(5). As a result, we specifically remanded the 

case to the trial court to “determine the value of the funds that [Emad] willfully 

failed to disclose in violation of R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) and the value of the funds that 

[Emad] dissipated in violation of R.C. 3105.171(E)(4)” before calculating an award 

under R.C. 3105.171(E)(5). Mousa II, supra, at ¶ 33. 

 

1

 Due to the limited nature of the issue raised in this appeal, we find it unnecessary to recount the entire case 

history which is set forth in detail in Mousa I and Mousa II. 
Case No. 9-19-33 

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{¶3} Upon the second remand, the trial court issued a Divorce Decree 

thoroughly setting forth its rationale to support its findings that Emad willfully and 

deliberately failed to disclose $523,096.80 in marital assets in violation R.C. 

3105.171(E)(3) and that he also engaged in financial misconduct when he 

fraudulently disposed of $268,551.98 under R.C. 3105.171(E)(4). (Doc. No. 321 at 

37-47). The trial court again awarded Arlet $400,000 for Emad’s substantial and 

willful failure to disclose the $523,096.80 in marital assets. See R.C. 3105.171 

(E)(3), (E)(5). 

{¶4} Emad appealed the trial court’s Divorce Decree, raising the following 

assignment of error for our review. 

THE TRIAL COURT ORDERED EMAD TO PAY AN AWARD 

PURSUANT TO R.C. 3105.171(E)(4)/(5) THAT IS SOLELY 

PUNITIVE. (JUDGMENT ENTRY—DECREE OF DIVORCE 

47 (APRIL 29, 2019).) 

{¶5} Initially, it is important to note that Emad does appear to not dispute the 

trial court’s findings that he committed financial misconduct by dissipating 

$268,551.98 prior to the filing of the divorce complaint or that he willfully and 

substantially failed to disclose $523,096.80 during the divorce proceedings.2

 

Rather, the gravamen of Emad’s appeal focuses on his assertion that the trial court’s 

 

2

 Even assuming arguendo that Emad did explicitly challenge these findings, we find they are supported by 

the evidence before the trial court based upon our review of the record. 
Case No. 9-19-33 

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award of $400,000 to Arlet pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(E)(5) is solely punitive rather 

than compensatory in nature, which Emad contends is not permitted by the statute. 

Legal Standard 

{¶6} R.C. 3105.171 governs the trial court’s authority to divide property 

subject to a divorce proceeding. Specifically at issue in this case are the provisions 

of R.C. 3105.171(E) which permit the trial court to make a distributive award in a 

divorce proceeding. 

(E)(1) The court may make a distributive award to facilitate, 

effectuate, or supplement a division of marital property. The 

court may require any distributive award to be secured by a lien 

on the payor’s specific marital property or separate property. 

(2) The court may make a distributive award in lieu of a division 

of marital property in order to achieve equity between the spouses, 

if the court determines that a division of the marital property in 

kind or in money would be impractical or burdensome. 

(3) The court shall require each spouse to disclose in a full and 

complete manner all marital property, separate property, and 

other assets, debts, income, and expenses of the spouse. 

(4) If a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including, but 

not limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, 

nondisclosure, or fraudulent disposition of assets, the court may 

compensate the offended spouse with a distributive award or with 

a greater award of marital property. 

(5) If a spouse has substantially and willfully failed to disclose

marital property, separate property, or other assets, debts, 

income, or expenses as required under division (E)(3) of this 

section, the court may compensate the offended spouse with a 

distributive award or with a greater award of marital property not to 

exceed three times the value of the marital property, separate 
Case No. 9-19-33 

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property, or other assets, debts, income, or expenses that are not 

disclosed by the other spouse. 

(Emphasis added). 

{¶7} R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) imposes a duty upon the parties to a divorce “to 

disclose in a full and complete manner all marital property, separate property, and 

other assets, debts, income, and expenses of the spouse.” R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) 

authorizes a trial court to make a distributive or greater award of marital property to 

one spouse upon a finding that the other spouse “has engaged in financial 

misconduct, including but not limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, 

or fraudulent disposition of assets.” Similarly, R.C. 3105.171(E)(5) provides for 

compensation if a spouse has substantially and willfully failed to disclose marital 

property, separate property, assets, expenses, income, or debt. 

{¶8} Despite Emad’s characterization on appeal, the trial court clearly 

articulated in the decree that the $400,000 was distributed to Arlet to compensate 

her for Emad’s willful non-disclosure of $523,096.80 of marital assets during the 

divorce proceedings pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(E)(5). The trial court identified the 

seven assets comprising the $523,096.80 in its judgment entry. 

{¶9} As previously discussed, R.C. 3105.171(E)(5) permits the trial court to 

“compensate the offended spouse with a distributive award or with a greater award 

of marital property not to exceed three times the value of the marital property, 

separate property, or other assets, debts, income, or expenses that are not disclosed 
Case No. 9-19-33 

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by the other spouse,” which in this case would be $1,596,290.40 ($523,096.80 x 3). 

Clearly, the trial court’s distributive award of $400,000 is well within the parameters 

of the authority conferred to it by R.C. 3105.171(E)(5). 

{¶10} Emad attempts to confuse the issue on appeal by asserting that the trial 

court’s award in this case is “punitive” rather than “compensatory” as provided by 

the statute. In particular, Emad appears to argue that a distributive award under R.C. 

3105.171(E)(5) is intrinsically punitive if it exceeds the amount of expenses, i.e., 

attorney and investigative fees, incurred by the offended spouse in unearthing the 

hidden assets.3

 However, we are not persuaded by Emad’s proposition as his 

interpretation of the statute is wholly inconsistent the plain language of R.C. 

3105.171(E)(5). Rather, it is clear from the specific terms used by the General 

Assembly in drafting the statute that it intended to accord broad discretion to a court 

in formulating an equitable, compensatory award based on the facts and 

circumstances of the case to a spouse who has been aggrieved by the willful and 

substantial non-disclosure and dereliction of the other spouse’s statutory duty under 

R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) so long as that compensation does not exceed three times the 

value of the undisclosed assets. 

 

3

 In this instance, the trial court granted Arlet’s motion requesting Emad to pay her partial attorney fees of 

$32,000. The trial court also ordered Emad to pay Arlet half of the fees for the expert witness who traced 

the undisclosed assets and the litigation expenses for the subpoenas in the amount of $6,691.66. 
Case No. 9-19-33 

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{¶11} Moreover, the case authority cited by Emad in his brief does not 

endorse his stance on appeal. Emad heavily relies on two cases from this Court to 

bolster his position. In Walker v. Walker, this Court reversed a trial court’s 

distributive award premised upon the husband’s dissipation of assets prior to the 

initiation of the divorce which constituted financial misconduct under R.C. 

3105.171(E)(4) because the trial court had erroneously applied the remedy in R.C. 

3105.171(E)(5) by ordering a distributive award to the wife in the amount of three 

times the value of the dissipated assets. Walker v. Walker, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-

12-15, 2013-Ohio-1496, ¶ 32. We concluded that because the assets were no longer 

owned by either party, there was no duty to disclose them under R.C. 

3105.171(E)(3) and therefore the trial court could not apply the remedy under R.C. 

3105.171(E)(5). Id. Nevertheless, we also concluded that the husband’s disposal 

of the assets constituted financial misconduct under R.C. 3105.171(E)(4), which 

provides for a separate remedy and we “remanded the matter to the trial court to 

determine an appropriate award pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(E)(4).” Id. at ¶ 34. 

{¶12} Here, the trial court made a clear distinction between the assets 

dissipated as the result of Emad’s financial misconduct under R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) 

and the assets Emad substantially and willfully failed to disclose under R.C. 

3105.171(E)(3),(5). Moreover, the record demonstrates that the trial court 

appropriately applied these statutes when fashioning its distributive awards. 
Case No. 9-19-33 

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{¶13} Emad also relies upon Eggeman v. Eggeman for the proposition that 

R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) “may only compensate the aggrieved spouse and may not 

punish the offending spouse.” (Appt. Brief at 6, citing Eggeman v. Eggeman, 3d 

Dist. Auglaize No. 2-04-06, 2004-Ohio-6050, ¶ 4, 22). Notwithstanding the fact 

that Eggeman was decided prior to the enactment of R.C. 3105.171(E)(5) and is 

therefore not instructive on the trial court’s authority under that subsection, we do 

not disagree with the general premise put forth by Emad regarding R.C. 

3105.171(E)(4). However, we do not find it dispositive of the issue at hand. 

{¶14} In sum, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to order a 

distributive award of $400,000 to compensate Arlet for Emad’s substantial and 

willful failure to disclose $523,096.80 of marital assets during the divorce 

proceedings. The trial court’s award is clearly permissible under the authority 

conferred to it under R.C. 3105.171(E)(5), and there is nothing in the record to 

indicate that the trial court’s decision in this regard was otherwise inequitable. 

Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of error. 

{¶15} Based on the foregoing, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

 Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur. 

/jlr