In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, 08-3931, 08-3936

SUNSTAR, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

ALBERTO-CULVER COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee,

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

and

BANK ONE CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

KANEDA, KOSAN, KABUSHIKI KAISHA,

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Nos. 01 C 736, 01 CV 5825—Ronald A. Guzmán, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2009—DECIDED OCTOBER 28, 2009
2 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

Before POSNER, MANION, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. This is an immense, unwieldy,

complex, multiparty commercial case, now in its ninth year

and on its second district judge. The case has been

protracted unduly and should probably have been resolved

on summary judgment years ago.

The principal issues concern the interpretation of a

trademark licensing agreement and Japanese trademark law. In 1980, Alberto-Culver, a major U.S. producer

of hair-care and skin-care products (its home page,

under hair-care brands, states that “Alberto VO5—the

company’s flagship brand after 53 years remains a

favorite of millions of women and men throughout

the world, offering solutions from daily hair care to

innovative styling products”), sold Japanese trademark

registrations, covering 13 trademarks. The buyer was a

Japanese manufacturer of such products named Sunstar

(plus an affiliate, Kaneda, Kosan, Kabushiki Kaisha, that

need not be discussed separately; we pass over other

immaterial facts as well). Most of the trademarks are

forms or variants of “VO5”; those that are not have no

bearing on the litigation. The forms or variants, as

presented in appendices to the license agreement, are as

follows: 
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 3
4 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 5

The agreement of sale provided that upon receiving the

trademarks Sunstar would transfer them to Bank One

Corporation to hold in trust for 99 years, to license their

use during this period to Sunstar, and at the end of the

period to return them to Sunstar. If at any time while

the trust was in force the trustee had a “reasonable

ground” for thinking Sunstar had committed an act

that created “a danger to the value or validity of

LICENSOR’s [i.e., Bank One’s] ownership and title in

Licensed Trademarks,” Sunstar would have to stop using

the endangered trademarks until the trustee “reasonably

determined” that the danger had passed. In the event of

an actual breach of the license by Sunstar, the trustee

was to rescind the license and return the trademarks

to Alberto-Culver.

The license agreement (the terms of which were

negotiated by Sunstar and Alberto-Culver, Bank One’s

duties being limited to enforcement) calls the license

granted Sunstar a senyoshiyoken, which in English means

“exclusive-use right.” The holder of a senyoshiyoken not

only has an exclusive right to use the licensed trademarks

within the geographical scope of the license (see next

paragraph) but can sue infringers of the trademarks in its

own name. The grantor of the license—in this case the

trustee—cannot use the trademarks while the license is in

force. Japanese Trademark Act, arts. 25, 30(2), 36(1), 38,

71(1)(iii).

Sunstar, for its part, was forbidden by the agreement to

export any products bearing the licensed trademarks to

countries in which Alberto-Culver was selling products
6 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

under any of the trademarks, had granted an exclusive

license to a third party to sell such products, or had

registered or applied to register any of the trademarks

licensed to Sunstar. Although the agreement forbids

Sunstar to register (except for the purpose of defending

the licensed trademarks) “any new trademarks containing the names Alberto, Alberto VO5 or VO5 or any of

the names or marks set forth in [the appendices to the

agreement],” Sunstar is not forbidden to use new

trademarks in Japan.

All the products sold under the license are made by

Sunstar; as far as the record shows, Alberto-Culver sells

no hair-care products—maybe no products, period—in

Japan. The agreement does not require Sunstar to pay

royalties for using the licensed trademarks; the entire

compensation to Alberto-Culver for the license consisted

of lump-sum payments (totaling more than $10 million)

by Sunstar made in 1980 when the license agreement

was made.

The difference between obtaining a 99-year exclusive

trademark license with no royalty obligation and buying

trademarks outright is small. Sunstar had wanted to buy

the trademarks outright but Alberto-Culver had balked

because it wanted to restrict Sunstar’s ability to use the

trademarks in countries in which Alberto-Culver used or

might want to use them (these restrictions take up

more space in the license agreement than any other

subject), and doubtless also because it wanted to be able

to recapture and then relicense the use of the trademarks

in Japan should Sunstar for some reason stop using them.
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 7

In 1989 Sunstar asked Alberto-Culver for permission to

license this new variant of the VO5 trademark:

Alberto-Culver refused. Sunstar used the variant anyway,

contending that it did not violate the license. But the

trustee said it did. Negotiations between AlbertoCulver and Sunstar ensued, and ultimately Sunstar

agreed to pay $10 million for the right to add the variant

to the list of licensed trademarks and register it, and for

some trade secrets.

Ten years later, Sunstar started using a further variant,

consisting mainly of a different typeface for “VO5,” but

also adding a black background and a vertical bar (rather

than a space) between the “O” and the “5”:
8 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

Sunstar describes this as a “modernized” version of the

licensed VO5 trademarks, which we assume means alluring to modern Japanese consumers. Alberto-Culver

refused to amend the agreement to permit Sunstar to use

the modernized version, and, as before, the trustee

commanded Sunstar to desist—which it refused to do,

instead filing this suit in 2001 against both Alberto-Culver

and Bank One. The suit, which invokes federal jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) because it is between a

foreign citizen (Sunstar) and two U.S. citizens (AlbertoCulver and Bank One), seeks a declaration that Sunstar’s

use of the mark is permitted by the license. Sunstar sought

other relief as well, including damages from Bank One, but

has abandoned the additional claims. Alberto-Culver, as

a third-party beneficiary of the license agreement, filed a

mirror-image suit against Sunstar, seeking damages and

injunctive relief, including an order that the license be

rescinded and the trademarks returned to Alberto-Culver.

The suits were consolidated, and tried to a jury.

The agreement is in English and states that disputes

arising under it are to be resolved in accordance with the

law of Illinois. But we cannot look to Illinois law to define

senyoshiyoken, a term the meaning of which is given by

Japanese law. Illinois law will not tell us whether the

holder of a senyoshiyoken can use variants of its licensed

trademarks. Alberto-Culver has taken the position that

the parties used the term merely to indicate that Sunstar

could register the license with the Japanese trademark

office, and not to confer on Sunstar the rights that a

senyoshiyoken confers on the holder under Japanese law.

The district judge agreed, and refused to instruct the jury
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 9

on the legal meaning of the Japanese term. Under Rule 44.1

of the civil rules, the judge decides the meaning of relevant

foreign law and instructs the jury on that meaning, just as

it would do in the case of issues of domestic law. The

parties had submitted affidavits from experts on Japanese

law concerning that meaning, but the judge, thinking the

Japanese legal meaning irrelevant, did not try to determine

it. Alberto-Culver argues that Sunstar forfeited any

challenge to the judge’s ruling by failing to ask him to

instruct the jury on the legal meaning of senyoshiyoken. But

he had made his position clear and Sunstar’s lawyers’

were not required to ask him to reconsider it.

In the course of its deliberations, the jury sent a note to

the judge asking: “What exclusive rights does the

Senyoshiyoken license give Sunstar PLEASE BE

EXPLICIT!” The judge declined to answer, and the jury

then returned a verdict for Alberto-Culver, except that it

awarded no damages—for the excellent reason that there

were none. The judge then enjoined Sunstar from using

the variant mark—and also ordered the license agreement terminated because of Sunstar’s breach and all the

licensed trademarks therefore returned to Alberto-Culver.

Alberto-Culver’s cross-appeal is from the judge’s refusal

to grant a broader injunction; we shall not have to consider the merits of the cross-appeal.

We cannot find any basis for the proposition embraced

by the district judge that the term senyoshiyoken bears

a private meaning in the contract. Only if Sunstar was

the holder of a senyoshiyoken within the meaning that

Japanese law assigns to that term, rather than in some
10 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

idiosyncratic sense that the parties assigned to it (nor did

they say they were doing that), was it authorized to

register the license agreement, as Alberto-Culver concedes

Sunstar was authorized to do, and to sue in its own name

for infringement of the licensed trademarks, as AlbertoCulver also concedes that Sunstar was authorized to do.

Japanese Trademark Act, arts. 36(1), 38(2); Kenneth L.

Port, Trademark and Unfair Competition Law and Policy in

Japan 94 (2007). Alberto-Culver does not argue that

Sunstar’s license is not a “real” senyoshiyoken, but only

that such a license doesn’t authorize Sunstar to use

variants of the licensed trademarks, and that is a question of Japanese law.

When parties to a contract, especially sophisticated

parties, use a technical term, there is a presumption that

they are using it in its technical sense. Reed v. Hobbs, 3 Ill.

297 (1840); Minges Creek, LLC v. Royal Ins. Co., 442 F.3d

953, 956 (6th Cir. 2006); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business

Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1013 (3d Cir. 1980); Superior

Business Assistance Corp. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1036,

1039 (10th Cir. 1972); Restatement (Second) of Contracts

§ 202(3)(b) (1981). (That is American law—but remember

the choice of law provision in the license agreement.) If the

technical term happens to be a foreign term, the

presumption is that it is used in its foreign technical sense.

But if the technical term is a foreign technical legal term,

one might wonder what sense it bears if as in this case

the contract provides that domestic law (Illinois law in

this case) governs. The wonderment is superficial: the

parties can’t have meant that the meaning of senyoshiyoken

would be decided under Illinois law, because the word
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 11

has no meaning in that law. And as we said before, unless

senyoshiyoken was used in its technical legal sense, Sunstar

could not have registered the license agreement or

enforced the licensed trademarks against infringers.

So we must decide whether the holder of a senyoshiyoken

is permitted by Japanese law to use variants of the

licensed trademarks. Rule 44.1 makes that a question of

law. The rule permits foreign law to be proved by

testimony or affidavits of experts, and that is the route

followed in most cases. But it also permits judges to

consult other sources of foreign law, such as articles,

treatises, and judicial opinions.

Those are superior sources. When a court in one U.S.

state applies the law of another state, or when a federal

court applies state law, the court does not permit expert

testimony on the meaning of the “foreign” law, even if it

is the law of Louisiana, which is based to a significant

degree on the French Civil Code. Yet if the law to be

applied is the law of a foreign country, even if it is an

English-speaking country the legal system of which derives

from the same source as ours—England—our courts

routinely admit testimony by lawyers on the meaning of

the foreign law, see, e.g., Schexnider v. McDermott Int’l, Inc.,

868 F.2d 717, 719 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), and rely

heavily on that testimony.

But the lawyers who testify to the meaning of foreign

law, whether they are practitioners or professors, are paid

for their testimony and selected on the basis of the

convergence of their views with the litigating position of

the client or their willingness to fall in with the views

urged upon them by the client. Those are banes of expert
12 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

testimony. When the testimony concerns a scientific or

other technical issue, however, it may be unreasonable

to expect a judge to resolve it without the aid of such

testimony. But judges are experts on law, and there are

published materials on foreign law, in the form of treatises,

law review articles, and cases. Of course the most

authoritative literature on the law of a foreign country is

apt to be in a language other than English. But the parties

can have the relevant portions translated into English;

judges can handle translations, which figure prominently

in a variety of cases tried in American courts, such as drugtrafficking and immigration cases. Relying on paid

witnesses to spoon feed judges is justifiable only when the

foreign law is the law of a country with such an obscure

or poorly developed legal system that there are no

secondary materials to which the judge could turn.

The parties presented evidence by expert witnesses

concerning the meaning of senyoshiyoken in Japanese

trademark law. But fortunately the experts cited to

scholarly literature as well, which can help us decide

whether a senyoshiyoken allows its holder to vary a licensed

trademark.

Issues of the scope of a trademark usually arise in suits

for infringement. The trademark’s owner tries to prove

that the defendant’s mark is confusingly similar to his

own, and if he succeeds, this implies that the defendant’s

variant is within the trademark’s scope—it’s so like his

trademark that no one else is entitled to use the variant in

the same market. The issue in this case is not confusion;

rather, it is whether the variant is so similar to the orig-
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 13

inal that it should be deemed to have been included in

the license to use the original.

In U.S. law, a change in a trademark’s typeface is not

considered a material alteration of the original trademark.

Drexel Enterprises, Inc. v. Richardson, 312 F.2d 525, 527 (10th

Cir. 1962); Miyano Machinery USA, Inc. v. MiyanoHitec

Machinery, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 868, 882 (N.D. Ill. 2008). A

related rule, called “tacking on,” makes the use by a

trademark’s owner of a variant of his original trademark

a defense to a claim that replacing the original with the

variant constituted the abandonment (a better word

would be forfeiture) of the trademark. So in Sands, Taylor

& Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 955 (7th Cir.

1992), the owner of the trademark THIRST-AID “First

Aid for Your Thirst” had dropped “First Aid for Your

Thirst” and this was held not to be an abandonment of

the trademark. See also Brookfield Communications, Inc. v.

West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th

Cir. 1999); Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada,

525 F. Supp. 1108, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 3 J. Thomas

McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition

§§ 17:27, 17:28 (4th ed. 2009).

In a licensing case, “tacking on” becomes a guide to

interpretation of the license. A licensee would be

reluctant to agree to be prohibited from making

modest changes in the appearance or wording of the

trademark because it would prevent him from adjusting his marketing of the trademarked product to

unpredictable fluctuations in consumer response.

Suppose the dropped phrase in the THIRST-AID

trademark had been “First Aid for His Thirst” at a time
14 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

when the male pronoun was the default pronoun for a

person of unspecified gender. As language conventions

evolved, the licensee might think it essential, to change

“First Aid for His Thirst” to “First Aid for Your Thirst.” It

would be senseless to consider this a violation of the

parties’ understanding unless the license had explicitly

forbidden any changes.

That is American law and the issue in this case is

Japanese law. But the Japanese rule is the same as the

American. See Tokutaro Morikawa v. Foundation Ritoru

Waarudo, 1350 Hanrei Jiho 137 (Tokyo High Ct. Feb. 20,

1990) (LITTLWORLD and LITTLEWORLD), cited in

Kenneth L. Port, Japanese Trademark Jurisprudence 98 n. 16

(1998); Limoneira v. Pola Kasei Kogyo K.K., 23 Chiteki Saishu

163 (Tokyo High Ct. Feb. 28, 1991) (“the Trademark has

a large figure with two lines of letters in smaller size

below the figure: one line representing ‘POLA’ in Roman

letters and the other in katakana [a Japanese script],

whereas the Mark has smaller figure with a large Roman

letter representation of ‘POLA’ on its right and two

katakana representations . . . placed slantly at the upperleft corner and lower-right corner of the paper

strip more than 20 cm away from the said figure and

Roman letter elements”); Heiwado Boeki Kabushiki Kaisha v.

Kabushiki Kaisaha Taihei, 10 Mutai Saishu 193 (Tokyo Dist.

Ct. May 12, 1988) (different typeface).

The longer the term of the license, moreover, the less

plausible it is to assume, in the absence of express

language, that the licensee was forbidden to make

even minute changes. The license in this case, the
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 15

senyoshiyoken, was to continue for 99 years. Over so long a

period, changes in language, typefaces, marketing

methods, and trademark style would be likely (we are

tempted to say would be certain) to require varying the

wording or appearance of the licensed mark in order

to enable the trademarked product to be marketed

effectively. The license may even have required Sunstar

to make such changes, for remember that the licensee

must do nothing that would create a “danger to the

value or validity” of the licensed marks, and stubbornly

clinging to a dowdy, old-fashioned, “unmodernized”

original mark might create an acute danger.

This is especially likely because the right conferred by

a senyoshiyoken is exclusive of the licensor as well as of

potential other licensees. The licensee will be the only

user of the trademark in the relevant market and the

only entity therefore with either a stake in or a feel for

the needs of that market and thus the only entity

motivated and able to preserve the value of the trademark

by adjusting its appearance. The holder of a senyoshiyoken,

standing in the shoes of the trademark owner, must

have the same right that the owner would have (were

there no senyoshiyoken) to make small changes. Indeed, the

right of a 99-year exclusive licensee to make such

changes is more needful than that of the once and farfuture owner.

Article 50(1) of the Japanese Trademark Act provides

for cancellation of a trademark registration if the

registrant—or the holder of a senyoshiyoken—has, for more

than three years, not been using the trademark. A
16 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

registered trademark “includes a trademark consisting of

the same letters having modified typefaces . . . [or] of

figures having the appearances that can be regarded as the

same, or a trademark that can be regarded as the same

as the registered trademark in question in the common

sense of the society: the same applies in subsequent

provisions of this Article.” Alternatively, and more

helpful to Alberto-Culver, a registered trademark “for the

purposes of this Article . . . includes trademarks which are

based on the registered mark but written in a different

style than the registered trademark, trademarks with the

same sound or meaning as the registered mark . . .,

trademarks considered to have the same appearance as

the registered trademark, and any other trademarks

generally accepted by society as identical to the registered

mark.” (We have cited both translations because there is

no official English translation of Japanese laws.)

Alberto-Culver relies on the passages that we have

italicized, especially the second one, which is the more

authoritative since it appears in a scholarly book—and

by one of Sunstar’s expert witnesses! Port, Japanese

Trademark Jurisprudence, supra, at 143. But whether the

quoted provision is meant to exclude variants from the

scope of a registered trademark for all purposes other

than cancellation is unclear. Such an exclusion would

make no sense, at least as applied to this case. AlbertoCulver is not seeking the cancellation of the trademarks.

It is seeking to recapture them; and from Sunstar’s

standpoint it is all the same—if the use of a variant of a

trademark does not warrant cancellation because the
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 17

variant “can be regarded as the same as the registered

trademark in question,” why should it warrant the loss of

trademark rights?

Moreover, one expects trademark cancellation to be

easier in Japan than in the United States because Japan

permits registration of trademarks without use, unlike the

United States. Japanese Trademark Law, art. 18(1); Port,

Trademark and Unfair Competition Law and Policy in Japan,

supra, at 77-78; Masaya Suzuki, “The Trademark

Registration System in Japan: A Firsthand Review and

Exposition,” 5 Marquette Intellectual Property L. Rev. 133,

139-43 (2001); Teruo Doi, Intellectual Property Protection

and Management: Law and Practice in Japan 182-83 (1992).

A pure registration system enables the “banking” of

trademarks, which clogs the trademark registry with

trademarks that may never be used. Paul J. Heald,

“Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the

Contours of the TRIPS Agreement,” 29 Vanderbilt J.

Transnational L. 635, 659 (1996). A requirement of

continuous use is therefore more important to unblock

the trademark arteries in Japan than in the United States.

Even so, Japan does not permit a small variation to

destroy trademark rights.

Alberto-Culver further argues, however, that Sunstar

violated a provision of the license that requires it to “keep

each of the [licensed] Trademarks in continuous use and

in a manner and quantity sufficient to meet the statutory

requirements as to use.” The briefs do not say which of the

13 trademarks Sunstar failed to use continuously, but

Sunstar concedes that there were some. Yet at the oral
18 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

argument, Alberto-Culver’s lawyer conceded in turn

that the only consequence of such a failure would be the

return to his client of those trademarks. To suggest that if

Sunstar failed to use any one of the 13 trademarks (or

rather 14, because of the 1989 amendment) continuously

for 99 years the entire license would be canceled would

be ridiculous. It would be especially ridiculous since

Alberto-Culver had no financial stake in Sunstar’s use

of those trademarks, because it had no right to any

royalties or other compensation based on that success; it

therefore could not be hurt by the abandonment of some or

for that matter all of the marks.

The parties presented a good deal of evidence concerning

discussions of the license agreement over the course of the

many years since it was first made. The discussions

indicate that Sunstar may not have attached much

significance to the designation of the license as a

senyoshiyoken (though that is hard to believe, since

without that designation it would not have the statutory

rights that the status conveys and that Alberto-Culver

concedes that Sunstar has, apparently without recognizing

the significance of the concession), and that it

acknowledged that its 1989 variant of VO5 violated the

license agreement until amended to allow it. The evidence

should not have been admitted. The license agreement

grants Sunstar a senyoshiyoken. This is a Japanese legal term

which, as we said, is to be given the meaning that it bears

in Japanese law. That meaning, we have decided as a

matter of law (because it is an issue of law), is that the

holder of such a license is entitled to make minor
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 19

changes in the trademark without being deemed to have

exceeded the rights conferred on it by the license.

Alberto-Culver has one more arrow in its quiver.

Remember that Sunstar continued to use the variant

trademark after being told by the trustee that the use

endangered the licensed trademarks. If that determination was based on a “reasonable ground,” then

Sunstar’s continued use of the trademark, until the danger

disappeared, was in violation of the agreement. The

trustee’s determination was unreasonable. (Whether it

was in good faith, a question relevant only to Sunstar’s

attempt to obtain damages from the trustee, is moot

now that Sunstar has abandoned the attempt.) We cannot

find anything in the record to suggest that Sunstar’s use

of the variant could reduce the value of the licensed

trademarks. Remember that the danger must be to the

value or validity of the licensor‘s, which is to say the

trustee’s—Bank One’s—interest in the trademarks. That

interest is confined to their use in Japan, or other countries

in which Alberto-Culver has no presence, because it is

only the Japanese registrations that were placed in the

trust, and they can be used only in Japan or such

countries, though people do sometimes move from

Japan to another country and their decision whether to

buy VO5 in that country might conceivably be influenced

by the variant they had seen in Japan.

Even so, we suppose (a variant of the last point) that if

Sunstar affixed “VO5” to an illegal product the trustee

could cancel the license, on the theory that the outrage

would be bound to be communicated to countries in
20 Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al.

which Alberto-Culver uses the trademark. And we

suppose it could be argued that since Alberto-Culver might

some day (before 2079, when the trademarks will be

transferred to Sunstar) obtain the return of the trademarks because of some future breach of the license, it

has an expectancy that would be destroyed if because of

Sunstar’s alterations of the trademark, it lost the goodwill that Japanese consumers had bestowed on it. But

the challenged variant is too close to the original (that is

to say, the 1989 variant licensed to Sunstar) to make any of

these dangers more than chimeras.

It is true that the trustee was supposed to watch out

for Alberto-Culver’s interests in other countries; it is

required to rescind the agreement if there is a breach, and

sales by Sunstar of products bearing the licensed

trademarks in forbidden countries would be a breach.

But there is no suggestion of such a violation.

Apparently Sunstar has done better in Japan than

Alberto-Culver expected, and, as in 1989, Alberto-Culver

has tried to use a hypertechnical, but more important an

unsound, interpretation of the licensing agreement to

extort additional compensation.

We are tempted simply to order all the claims in this

litigation dismissed with prejudice; that would restore

the status quo that existed before the trustee complained

about Sunstar’s use of the variant VO5 trademark. But

we’ll resist the temptation. Sunstar has not requested

such relief (just a new trial and a dismissal of the crossappeal), and as a result the defendants have not had an

opportunity to contest such a request. We doubt that
Nos. 07-3288, 07-3289, 08-3835, 08-3836, et al. 21

further trial proceedings are warranted, but leave that

decision to be made in the first instance by the district

court.

The judgments (including the dismissal of the crossappeal, as it is premature to determine what injunctive

relief if any the defendants are entitled to) are vacated

and the case is remanded. 7th Cir. R. 36 shall apply on

remand.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

10-28-09