IMPORTANT NOTICE 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION 

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." 

PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), 

THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE 

CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER 

CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, 

UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, 

RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR 

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED 

OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE 

BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION 

BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED 

DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE 

ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE 

DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE 

ACTION. 
JOHN D. SANDLIN 

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2015 

NOrTIRBF PU IS 

rrtur Court officR Rik 

2014-SC-000322-MR 

IDATE3-v-a-N es-Ex•Ac.-r-au...L. 

APPELLANT 

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS 

V. CASE NO. 2014-CA-000297-OA 

RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT NO. 13-CI-00372 AND 

MARION CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-CI-00042 

HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR., 

CIRCUIT JUDGE, RUSSELL CIRCUIT COURT APPELLEE 

AND 

KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 

AFFIRMING 

The Appellant, John D. Sandlin, appeals the denial of his petition for a 

writ of prohibition to bar enforcement of an order transferring venue of his civil 

action against his insurer, Kentucky Farm Bureau, to another county. The 

Court of Appeals denied the petition. Sandlin has failed to show the availability 

of a writ in this case, and the order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 

I. Background 

The Appellant, John D. Sandlin, was injured in a car wreck in Marion 

County, Kentucky. He settled with the tortfeasor. He then claimed that the 

tortfeasor had been underinsured and filed a claim on his own insurance 

policy, which included both uninsured motorist (UM) and underinsured 
motorist (UIM) coverage. His insurer, Kentucky Farm Bureau, denied the claim. 

Sandlin, who lives in Russell County, filed a civil action in Russell Circuit 

Court seeking UIM benefits and damages for Kentucky Farm Bureau's bad 

faith in denying his claim.' 

Kentucky Farm Bureau filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that venue 

was improper in Russell County. The motion argued as an alternative that 

venue should be transferred either to Marion County, the site of the car wreck, 

or to Jefferson County, the site of Kentucky Farm Bureau's principal place of 

business. The trial court granted the alternative relief and transferred the case 

to Marion Circuit Court. 

Sandlin filed a motion to amend, alter or vacate this order, and the 

motion was denied. Sandlin then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition 2at the 

Court of Appeals seeking to bar the Russell Circuit Court's order transferring 

the underlying case. He argued that the trial court abused its discretion and 

that he would suffer immediate and irreparable injury from having to travel to 

Marion County, approximately 60 miles away, to litigate his case. The Court of 

Appeals denied the petition with a short order. 

This appeal followed as a matter of right. See CR 76.36(7)(a) ("An appeal 

may be taken to the Supreme Court as a matter of right from a judgment or 

final order in any proceeding originating in the Court of Appeals."); Ky. Const. 

1 In the complaint, Sandlin specifically asked for $10,000 in damages for the 

bad-faith claim. 

2Kentucky Farm Bureau's counsel incorrectly describes this action as an 

"appeal." A writ petition is an original action under Civil Rule 76.36; it is not an 

appeal. 

2 
§ 115 ("In all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of 

right at least one appeal to another court ...."). 

II. Analysis 

Before turning to the parties' arguments, it must first be noted that the 

extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus are disfavored. Bender v. 

Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961); see also Cox v. Braden, 266 S.W.3d 

792, 795 (Ky. 2008). Because writs stem from original actions in an appellate 

court, they "bypass[} the regular appellate process and require[] significant 

interference with the lower courts' administration of justice." Cox, 266 S.W.3d 

at 795. They also proceed on abbreviated, if not nonexistent, records, which 

"magnifies the chance of incorrect rulings that would prematurely and 

improperly cut off the rights of litigants." Id. "To maximize caution and to 

reduce the resources wasted on writ proceedings, the majority of which are 

unsuccessful, this Court has articulated a strict standard to determine whether 

the remedy of a writ is available." Id. at 796. The standard "is a practical and 

convenient formula for determining, prior to deciding the issue of alleged error, 

if petitioner may avail himself of this remedy." Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801. 

The strict standard for availability states: 

A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the 

lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its 

jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an 

intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about 

to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there 

exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great 

injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not 

granted. 

3 
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). Under this standard, there are 

in essence two classes or categories of writ action: those where the trial court is 

alleged to be acting outside its jurisdiction and those where the trial court is 

acting within its jurisdiction but is alleged to be acting erroneously. Failure to 

show the Hoskins prerequisites usually results in dismissal of the writ action. 

Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801. And it is only upon satisfaction of the prerequisites 

that the appellate court will look at the merits of the petitioner's claims. 3 Id. 

The burden to make the required showings is on the petitioner, which in this 

case was the Appellant, Sandlin. 

Sandlin claims that he has satisfied both classes of writs. First, he 

argues, the trial court "abused its jurisdiction" in transferring the case to 

Marion Circuit Court. Second, he argues, he will suffer immediate and 

irreparable injury because he will be forced to travel to litigate his claim. 

First, as to the jurisdictional claim, it is clear that Sandlin's claim fails. 

Indeed, the way he frames his claim—as an abuse of discretion—shows why 

that must be the case. Jurisdiction, as used in Hoskins, refers to subjectmatter jurisdiction, that is, the court's power to hear a certain type of case, see 

Goldstein v. Feeley, 299 S.W.3d 549, 552 (Ky. 2009), not a mere legal error. 

When the complaint is that another of the Commonwealth's circuit courts 

should hear the matter, rather than that no circuit court may do so, "the issue 

is not jurisdiction, it is venue." Pettit v. Raikes, 858 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Ky. 

3Litigants often presume that they will get the writ sought simply by satisfying 

the Hoskins test. This view is mistaken and too common. Even after making the 

Hoskins showing, a petitioner must still show legal error by the trial court. And even 

then, the appellate court is not compelled to grant the writ, issuance of which always 

lies in the court's sound discretion. 

4 
1993). Complaints about venue are therefore not complaints of lack of 

jurisdiction. Thus, Sandlin's complaint is not that the trial court did not have 

subject-matter jurisdiction (otherwise his own action would have to be 

dismissed), but that the court abused its jurisdiction by acting erroneously in 

deciding a venue question. 

Nevertheless, he argues, this Court has previously held that a court acts 

beyond its jurisdiction when it improperly transfers venue of a case. See 

Beaven v. McAnulty, 980 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Ky. 1998). Beaven, however, is 

inapplicable to this case for several reasons. First, its holding is limited to 

when a court applies the doctrine of forum non conveniens to transfer venue, 

which is not the case here. Second, since Beaven, this Court has limited the 

jurisdiction class of writs to those cases where the trial court acts without 

subject-matter jurisdiction, as opposed to other types of "jurisdiction," however 

misnamed. 

Third, and most importantly, Beaven has been superseded by statute. 

See Dollar General Stores, Ltd. v. Smith, 237 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Ky. 2007) 

(discussing KRS 452.105). As noted by this Court, "[s]hortly after Beaven v. 

McAnulty was rendered, the General Assembly adopted KRS 452.105, a statute 

mandating trial court transfer of cases upon a determination that the venue 

selected is improper." KRS 452.105 is quite explicit: "In civil actions, when the 

judge of the court in which the case was filed determines that the court lacks 

venue to try the case due to an improper venue, the judge, upon motion of a 

party, shall transfer the case to the court with the proper venue." 
Sandlin argues that this statute is inapplicable to his case because 

venue was proper in Russell County, and thus the trial court had no 

jurisdiction to transfer the case. This argument confuses jurisdiction with 

abuse of jurisdiction. It goes to the merits of his claim (that venue should not 

have been changed), not whether the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction. 

To allow Sandlin to obtain a no jurisdiction writ in this manner would allow 

him to subvert the carefully crafted writ process by getting to the merits of his 

claim before determining the availability of the remedy. 

The trial court in the underlying case concluded that venue was 

improper in Russell County. That was all that was required for KRS 452.105 to 

apply. The court's transfer of the case, then, was expressly authorized by 

statute. Any claim of error in applying the statute is exactly that: a claim of 

legal error, not a claim of lack of jurisdiction. Such a claim of error can only be 

addressed on appeal. Sandlin, therefore, cannot show that the trial court acted 

outside its jurisdiction, and no writ is available under the first class of cases 

identified in Hoskins. 

The second class of writ requires a petitioner to show that he has no 

adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and that great injustice and 

irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. We address only the 

first of these requirements because it disposes of this, aspect of the case. 

In his opening brief, Sandlin barely touches on the first prerequisite, at 

most reciting that this Court should find that his harm cannot be remedied on 

appeal without explaining or arguing why that should be the case and focusing 

instead only on the claimed immediate and irreparable harm. In his reply brief, 

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he argues that his showing of a burden on his ability to litigate the case 

satisfies this requirement. This is incorrect, and runs the requirement of great 

and irreparable injury together with the requirement of lack of an adequate 

remedy by appeal. They are separate inquiries. Indeed, this is why in "certain 

special cases," the requirement of great and irreparable injury may be set 

aside, Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801, but that in all cases, the requirement of 

"[flack of an adequate remedy by appeal is an absolute prerequisite to the 

issuance of a writ under this second category," Independent Order of Foresters 

v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Ky. 2005). Failure to make this showing is 

fatal to the writ petition under the second class. 

Lack of an adequate remedy by appeal "means that Appellant's injury 

`could not thereafter be rectified in subsequent proceedings in the case."' Lee v. 

George, 369 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Independent Order of Foresters, 

175 S.W.3d at 615). But claims about venue, if not waived, may be raised on 

appeal. Indeed, for this reason, this Court has consistently held that "one 

aggrieved by a venue determination may not obtain a writ of prohibition, but 

must proceed by appeal from a final judgment." Fritsch v. Caudill, 146 S.W.3d 

926, 928 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Pettit, 858 S.W.2d at 172); see also Shumaker v. 

Paxton, 613 S.W.2d 130 (Ky. 1981). 

Because Sandlin cannot show the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal, 

a writ of prohibition is not available under the second class of cases identified 

in Hoskins. 
III. Conclusion 

Because the remedy of a writ of prohibition is not available to the 

Appellant, John Sandlin, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying his 

petition is affirmed. 

Minton, C.J.; Abramson, Cunningham, Keller, Noble and Venters, JJ., 

sitting. All concur. 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 

Robert L. Bertram 

Derrick Giles Helm 

Bertram 86 Wilson 

One Monument Square 

PO Box 25 

Jamestown, Kentucky 42629 

APPELLEE: 

Honorable Vernon Miniard, Jr. 

Circuit Judge, Russell Circuit Court 

Courthouse 

109 N. Main Street 

PO Box 727 

Monticello, Kentucky 42633 

COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: 

Joel Randolph Smith 

The Law Office of Joel R. Smith and Associates, PLLC 

PO Box 1010 

324 Monument Square 

Jamestown, Kentucky 42629 

Jeffrey Hall Hoover 

Hoover Law Office 

40 South Main Street 

PO Box 985 

Jamestown, Kentucky 42629 

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