NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

EFRAIN GALVEZ-GALVEZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0128

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2015-001282-001

The Honorable Bradley H. Astrowsky, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Gracynthia Claw

Counsel for Appellee

The Poster Law Firm PLLC, Phoenix

By Rick D. Poster

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding 

Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

FILED 7-10-2018
STATE v. GALVEZ-GALVEZ

Decision of the Court

2

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1 Efrain Galvez-Galvez appeals his convictions for six counts of 

sexual conduct with a minor, one count of attempt to commit molestation 

of a child, and one count of sexual abuse. He contends that the superior 

court improperly admitted other-act evidence and should have required a 

separate verdict form for the jury to find that the other acts had occurred. 

He also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support one of the 

sexual conduct convictions. We reject Galvez-Galvez’s contentions, and 

affirm.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 For years, Galvez-Galvez would have “sleep-overs” with his 

minor stepdaughter, Victim A. During the sleep-overs, Galvez-Galvez 

would have sexual intercourse with Victim A. Galvez-Galvez also had 

sexual contact with his minor daughter, Victim B.

¶3 The jury found Galvez-Galvez guilty of three counts of sexual 

conduct with a minor for the conduct involving Victim A. The jury also 

found him guilty of one count of attempt to commit molestation of a child, 

one count of sexual abuse, and three counts of sexual conduct with a minor 

for the conduct involving Victim B. The superior court imposed

consecutive prison terms totaling 120 years.

¶4 Galvez-Galvez appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. THE SUPERIOR COURT DID NOT ERR BY ADMITTING OTHERACT EVIDENCE.

¶5 Galvez-Galvez first challenges the superior court’s pretrial 

admission, under Ariz. R. Evid. (“Rule”) 404(b) and (c), of fifteen statements 

made by Victim A referring to other acts committed by Galvez-Galvez. 

Galvez-Galvez contends that the superior court failed to adequately 

analyze the evidence as required by the rules of evidence. We review 

rulings on evidence under Rule 404 for abuse of discretion. State v. Coghill, 

216 Ariz. 578, 582, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). We will not overturn a conviction 

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdict. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
STATE v. GALVEZ-GALVEZ

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based on an erroneous evidentiary ruling if the ruling is harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, 340, ¶ 27 (App. 2003).

¶6 Evidence of a defendant’s past acts generally may not be 

admitted to prove that the defendant committed similar acts on a different 

occasion. Rule 404(a). The superior court may, however, admit evidence 

of other acts to show a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual 

propensity to commit the charged offense under Rule 404(c)(1)(B), or for 

other purposes, such as demonstrating a plan or knowledge, under Rule

404(b). Before admitting the evidence, the court must first find that the 

evidence is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Rule 404(c)(1)(A); 

State v. Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. 254, 278, ¶ 77 (2017); State v. Terrazas, 189 

Ariz. 580, 582 (1997). Second, the court must find that the evidence is 

relevant to demonstrating a character trait prompting an aberrant sexual 

propensity to commit the charged offense or is relevant for other Rule 

404(b) purposes. Rule 404(c)(1)(B); Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at 278, ¶ 77. 

Finally, the court must find that the danger of unfair prejudice does not 

substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Rule 

404(c)(1)(C); Escalante-Orozco, 241 Ariz. at ¶ 77. The court must explicitly 

make each of these findings to admit evidence under Rule 404(c). Rule

404(c)(1)(D).

¶7 Here, the superior court made requisite findings for many of 

the fifteen statements. The court expressly found clear and convincing 

proof supporting all but one of the acts, for many of the acts expressly found 

that the evidence was relevant to show a character trait giving rise to an 

aberrant sexual propensity or a proper Rule 404(b) purpose, and for many 

of the acts expressly considered many of the factors relevant to balancing 

prejudice and the probative value of the evidence.

¶8 While the court did not explicitly make all of the findings 

required by Rule 404(b) or 404(c) for each of the acts, consideration of the 

entire trial record shows that this was harmless error. See State v. Vega, 228 

Ariz. 24, 29, ¶ 18 (App. 2011) (concluding, based on entire trial record, that 

the court’s admission of other-act evidence without making explicit 404(c) 

findings was harmless error). There was clear and convincing proof of the 

other acts. Victim A testified to all but one of the acts that the court deemed 

admissible, and others’ testimony corroborated her description of the 

family’s living and sleeping arrangements.

2 Additionally, the court 

instructed the jury that it could only consider the acts if the state proved 

 

2 Because the victim did not testify to the remaining act, any error in 

the admissibility determination was harmless.
STATE v. GALVEZ-GALVEZ

Decision of the Court

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that the defendant committed them by clear and convincing evidence, and 

could only consider the other acts if it determined that they showed a 

character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the 

charged offenses or established one of the purposes listed in Rule 404(b). 

We presume that the jury followed the instructions. State v. Newell, 212 

Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 68 (2006). Further, the court could reasonably have 

concluded that unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the other 

acts’ evidentiary value. The other acts described Galvez-Galvez’s sexual 

contact with Victim A over a period of years, thereby providing relevant 

evidence of his aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offenses charged 

and his plan or knowledge to commit the offenses.

II. THE SUPERIOR COURT DID NOT ERR BY FAILING TO PROVIDE 

A VERDICT FORM FOR THE OTHER-ACT EVIDENCE.

¶9 Galvez-Galvez next contends that the jury should have been 

required to use a separate verdict form to determine that the state proved 

the other-act evidence. He contends that absent such separate 

determinations, he can only speculate as to whether the jury was 

improperly influenced by the other-act evidence. Because he failed to object 

to the jury instructions at trial, we review for fundamental error. State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19 (2005). To prevail, Galvez-Galvez must 

establish the existence of fundamental error and resulting prejudice. Id. at 

¶ 20.

¶10 Galvez-Galvez does not establish error, fundamental or 

otherwise. He cites no authority requiring a separate verdict form for the 

jury’s determination of proof of other acts. The court instructed the jury it 

could only use the other-act evidence after determining sufficient proof and 

discerning its proper purpose. Presuming the jury followed its instructions, 

we conclude the jury properly evaluated the other-act evidence. See Newell, 

212 Ariz. at 403, ¶ 68.

III. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY’S VERDICT ON 

COUNT 3.

¶11 Galvez-Galvez finally challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction for Count 3, on which the jury found 

Galvez-Galvez guilty of intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual 

intercourse or oral sexual contact with Victim A when she was a minor and 

he was her stepfather. Galvez-Galvez contends that the state failed to prove 

he was Victim A’s stepfather. We review the sufficiency of evidence de 

novo. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). The question is whether 
STATE v. GALVEZ-GALVEZ

Decision of the Court

5

there is substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have 

found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 99 

(1983).

¶12 In this case, sufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s 

finding that Galvez-Galvez was Victim A’s stepfather—Victim A and her 

mother both testified to the same.

CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm Galvez-Galvez’s convictions and sentences for the 

reasons set forth above.