FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D18-1221

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STEPHEN MIRON,

Appellant,

v.

AMY RICHARDSON,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Jack Schemer, Judge.

July 16, 2019

BILBREY, J.

In this post dissolution of marriage case, Appellant

challenges the final order requiring him to contribute $14,048.75 

towards Appellee’s attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 

61.16, Florida Statutes (2017). He raises several issues 

concerning the award, but we find only one was preserved for 

review by Appellant as it was raised in his motion seeking 

rehearing following the trial court’s order. See Owens v. Owens, 

973 So. 2d 1169, 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that a claim 

that a “final judgment lacks sufficient findings of fact” must be 

brought to the attention of a trial court by proper motion for the 

claim to be preserved for appellate review). We find that the trial 

court abused its discretion in making the award without making 

factual findings on Appellee’s need and Appellant’s ability to pay. 
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See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 251 So. 3d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) 

(applying an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing awards of 

attorney’s fees under section 61.16). We therefore reverse and 

remand for further proceedings. 

In the final order, the trial court made an express finding 

that Appellant’s “financial condition is superior to the financial 

condition of” Appellee. However, there is no language in the final 

order showing that the court first found Appellee’s need for 

financial assistance to retain counsel and Appellant’s ability to 

provide the needed payment. The record contains a previous 

omnibus order on several motions, including the partial grant of 

Appellee’s amended motion for attorney’s fees. That order, 

effective June 23, 2015, instructed Appellee to file delineated 

evidence of attorney time and contemplated further action to 

resolve the issue of attorney’s fees.* Like the final order on 

appeal, that earlier order contained no express finding of fact 

that Appellee had need for financial contribution towards her 

attorney’s fees or that Appellant had the ability to pay. 

While the court “may also consider any other factor 

necessary to provide justice and ensure equity,” the primary 

consideration of the trial court in deciding whether to award 

attorney’s fees and costs under section 61.16 is “the relative 

financial resources of the parties.” Mahoney, 251 So. 3d at 980 

(citations omitted). In “considering the financial resources of 

both parties,” as required by section 61.16, “it is not enough to 

simply show that the adverse party’s ability to pay the fees is 

greater than the party seeking relief or that an award is based on 

the relative financial strain of paying attorney’s fees.” Bauchman 

v. Bauchman, 253 So. 3d 1143, 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (quoting 

Carlson v. Carlson, 719 So. 2d 936, 936 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)). 

The final order awarding the former wife’s attorney’s fees is 

reversed and remanded to allow the trial court to make the 

 * The June 23, 2015, order was therefore nonfinal and not 

subject to appeal on its own. See Threadgill v. Nishimura, 222 

So. 3d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Scullin v. City of Pensacola, 667 

So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). That order is within our scope of 

review in considering this appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(h). 
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required factual findings. See Abott v. Abbott, 187 So. 3d 326, 329 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2016); Winder v. Winder, 152 So. 3d 836, 842 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2014); Mishoe v. Mishoe, 591 So. 2d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 1992). Because Appellant’s other issues were not preserved 

for review, the trial court’s findings of the reasonable number of 

attorney hours, the uncontested reasonable hourly rate, the 

reasonable total for Appellee’s attorney’s fees, and the amount for 

costs are affirmed and may be re-entered in the event the trial 

court finds Appellee had a financial need and Appellant had the 

ability to pay.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. 

WOLF and MAKAR, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Dale E. Workman, The Villages, for Appellant.

No appearance, for Appellee.