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No. 96-2171

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United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Richard Lynn Christian, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: October 4, 1996

 Filed: November 4, 1996

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Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Richard L. Christian challenges the 15-month sentence imposed by the

district court after he pleaded guilty to manufacturing marijuana, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). We remand.

Upon executing a search warrant at a property occupied by Christian

and his wife, Pamela, law enforcement officers discovered an outbuilding

being used for growing marijuana, and marijuana plants and harvested

marijuana inside the Christians' residence. The officers seized four

loaded weapons from the residence--one from Pamela's purse, one from under

a couch, and two from a wall rack. Stating that Christian "was armed at

the time of his arrest," the presentence report (PSR) assessed a two-level

increase under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The PSR also assigned two criminal

history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.10), for a Washington

state robbery charge to which Christian had pleaded guilty. The PSR

indicated Christian was placed on probation for
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five years and commenced a six-month sentence on July 18, 1983, for this

offense.

Christian objected to the statement that he "`was armed at the time

of his arrest,'" asked that the statement be deleted from the PSR, and

argued that the government had not presented evidence to support the

section 2D1.1(b)(1) increase. Christian also objected to inclusion of his

Washington state conviction in his criminal-history calculation. At

sentencing, the district court said, "I'm going to overrule the [section

2D1.1(b)(1)] objection, deny it," and also overruled Christian's criminalhistory objection.

On appeal, Christian argues--and the government concedes--that the

district court should not have counted his robbery conviction in

calculating his criminal history, because the sentence was imposed more

than ten years prior to the commission of the present offense. See

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1-3) (instructing court not to count any sentence less

than thirteen months that was not imposed within ten years of defendant's

commencement of instant offense). Based on the government's concession,

we remand for recalculation of Christian's criminal history category.

Christian also contends the district court improperly required him

to prove that the section 2D1.1(b)(1) increase was not merited and erred

in overruling his objections to the PSR without conducting an evidentiary

hearing. We recognize that Christian did not communicate his PSR

objections to the government within fourteen days after receiving the PSR,

as required, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(6)(B), but counsel for the

government informed the court that she had received a summary of

Christian's objections in the addendum to the PSR. A two-level increase

is appropriate if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence

that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon and it is not clearly

improbable the weapon was connected with the offense. U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) & comment. (n.3); United States v. Hammer, 3 F.3d
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266, 272 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1139 (1994) (discussing

burden). We review for clear error the court's factual findings, and

review de novo the court's application of the Guidelines to the facts.

United States v. Elliott, 89 F.3d 1360, 1370 (8th Cir. 1996).

When, as here, the defendant objects to fact statements in the PSR,

the district court may not accept the disputed facts set forth in the PSR

or require the defendant to disprove those facts, but rather, the

government must prove the disputed facts at the sentencing hearing. See

id.; United States v. Burke, 80 F.3d 314, 315, 317 (8th Cir. 1996). We

conclude the district court's rejection of Christian's section 2D1.1(b)(1)

objection does not "allow for meaningful appellate review," and thus we

remand for the court to make a finding or determination that fulfills the

requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1). See United

States v. Fetlow, 21 F.3d 243, 248 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 456

(1994); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (requiring court to make finding

on disputed matter or determination that no finding is necessary as

disputed matter will not be considered or will not affect sentence).

Accordingly, we vacate Christian's sentence and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BEAM, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Christian did not give appropriate notice to either the United States

or the district court of several of the objections he now raises on appeal.

Thus, these issues were waived. The order of reversal directs the district

court to consider them in further proceedings. From this approach, I

dissent.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.