### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON MOTION F OR REHEARING

NO. 03-0 5 -00 413 -CV

Ra ul G ar c ia , A ppe lla nt

v. Com m ission for Law yer D iscipli ne , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN30255 0 , HO NORAB LE MARKD. DAV IDSO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N We withdraw our opinion and judgment i ssued J une 29, 2007, and subst itute the following i ni t s p l ac e. T h e C o u rt h as o v erru l edap p el l an t ’s m o t i o nfo r r eh ea ri n g.

This d i s ci p l i n ary

ac t i o nwa s b ro u gh tb y

t h e C o m m i s s i o nfor L awy er D iscipline ag ainst Raul Gar cia, a Texas-licensed attorney , for violations of rule s 5.04(a) , 5.04(b), 5.05( b), and 7.01(a) of the Texas Disciplinary

Rules of Professional Conduct. On cross-motions for summary judgme nt, the district court g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or the Com mis sio n a s to rule s 5.0 4( a ), 5. 05 (b ), and 7. 01 (a ), and

fo r G arc ia as to rule 5.04( b). Ga

rcia appea ls the distric t c o u

r t’s judgme nt partially

g rantingthe Commiss ion summary ju d gm ent ag ainst him and partially denying his summary

judgme nt motions . We affir m the district
c ourt ’s jud g me nt.These a ctivities included: 1 1. Contracting with individuals to represe nt them in prepar ing, f iling, or a ssisti ng with the prepa

ration or f

iling of a

ny documents wit h t h e United States I mmigration and Natura liz ation Service ; 2. Ad

vis ingind ivi du a ls a s to the ir le g a l rig hts , the a dv isa bil ity and tim e lim its in the makin g of

c la ims fo r t e mpo ra

ry and pe rmane nt r e sid e nc e , a s w e ll a s U .S. citizenship; 3. Advising individuals of their r ights, duties, and pr ivilege s under the la w; 4. Ad

vis ingind ivi du a ls t hat th e y do no t r e qu ir e the a dv ic e or se rv ic e s o f a

du ly l i c e n s e d a t t o r n e y;
2

BACK GR OUND At rele vant times, Garc ia was e mploy ed by Cristo Vive, Christian Social Services, Inc. Cristo V iv e is a n o np r o f it o r g an iz a ti o n th a t, b e g inn in g in th e late 1 9 8 0 s , p r o v id e d s e r v ic e s that have included assisting individuals with i mmigration-relate d leg al matters, tra nslation work, and soc ial-ser vice ref err als. I t is undisputed that some of these a ctivities come within the statutory definition of the pra ctice of law. See Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 81.101(a) (West 2005)

. I t is also undisputed that C ri s t o Vi v e h as char g e d f e e s f o r th e s e le g a l s e r

v ic e s r an g in g f

r o m $ 2 5 0 to $ 4 5 0 , d e p e n d in g o nth e n a tu r e o f s e r vice provided, ser

ved betwe en 3,400 and 5,400 clients annually during the 1999-2001 tax y ear s, and collec ted fee s rang ing f

rom approximately

$230,000 to $619,000 annually during that period. Cristo Vive was previously the targ et of a

proce eding initiated by

the Unauthor ized Practice of L aw Commi ttee (U PL C). See id. §§ 81.103-.104 (W est 2005). Cristo Vive ultimately enter ed into a
c on se nt d e c re e wi th t

he UPL C un de r w hic h Crist o Viv e “ and its a g e nts , o ff

ic e rs , d ir e c tor s, se rv ants , e mpl oy e e s, su c c e sso rs a

nd a ssi g ns ” we re e njo ine d f ro m e ng a g ing i n a r ang e of a c tiv iti e s r e late d to imm ig ratio n le g a l se rv ic e s, subject to the following limit ation on that prohibition: 15. Soliciti ng leg al servic es on beha lf of anothe r for remune ration; 6. Ho ldi ngits e lf

ou t a s an atto rn e y

a uth or ize d to pr a c tic e law in th e State of Te xas; 7. Holding itself out a s qualified to re nder pr ofessional leg al service s of any kind; 8. Advising individuals re g arding(a) which spec ific documents or forms might be n ec es sary for f iling with a c ourt or g overnme ntal ag ency to acc omplish an ind ivi du a l’ s o bje c tiv e ; ( b) ho w t o p ro pe rl y fi ll o ut s uc h p aper s; (c ) whe re to corr ectly fill out such paper s; or (d) how to pr esent a dditional information to a c o u rt , g o v e r

n m e n ta g e n c y o r

qu a s i

- j u d i c i a l b o dy; 9. Em

plo y ingthe wo rd s “ imm ig ratio n s e rv ic e s” or “ imm ig ra

tio n c on sult ant ” in re latio n to any

bu sin e ss i t c on du c ts; 10
. Ad

ve rt isi ng or re pr e se nti ng in wr itt e n or el e c tr on ic me dia or in a ny do c ume nts ordinarily s u b mi tt e d to the United States I mmigration and Natura liz ation Service that it render s o r can r ender “immigr ation service s,” is an “immig ration consultant,” or a

ny service s relatingto United States citiz en s h ip a p p li c a ti o n , n o nimmigra nt or immigra

nt status; or 11. Assisting any

other individual in the unauthorized pra ctice of law. Ex pressly excluded from the pr ohibited activities wer e t ra nslating doc uments; taking ide ntification pictures; takingand filing I mmigration and Natura liz ation Service (I NS) fing erpr int forms; teachi n g and testing Eng l i s h as a se cond languag e, history , g overnme nt, or other c lasses; notary service s; and “providingcommunitary

service s to low income persons,” such as ref err als to social servic e ag encie s and c ha ri ta ble or g anizatio ns re g ard ingfo od , s he lte r, and be ne fi ts. The parties ag ree that the Cristo Vive consent decr ee mistakenly ref ers to 8 C.F.R. § 229.1 2 instead of 8 C.F .R. § 292.2 and that this is purely a ty pog raphic al er

ror. 3 except to the extent it is le g ally permitted to do so by 8 C.F.R. § [292.2] and except 2 to the extent it perf

orms any such ac ts and conduc t under the dire ction, supervision and c on tr ol o f a

me mbe r o f t

he State B ar o f T e xas.
Fe dera l regulation permit s n on-prof it org anizations meeting c erta in criteria to obtain rec og nition or

a c c re dit a tio n f

ro m th e B oa

rd of I mmi g ratio n App e a ls p e rm itt ingthe m to de sig nate a rep re se ntativ e to pr a c tic e be fo re the B oa

rd or I NS. 8 C. F .R. § 2 92 .2 . Cr ite ri a fo r r e c ognit ion

inc lud e “ ha [vin g ] at

itsI n h is i nte rr og a tor y re sp on se s, wh ic h a

re a pa rt of the summa

ry -j ud g me nt r e c or d, Ga

rc ia 3 explained the “proc ess by which im migr ation clients are assisted by Cristo Vive” and his role in that pr oc e ss: Client comes to Cristo Vive and asks for assistance . I f the a ssistance re quires leg al advice they

are told that only

an att orney

can a nswer that question and that they cannot gi v e l ega l advice. T hey are informed that ther e is an attorney in the office [who] can a dvise them. I f t h ey wa n t t o see the attorney the attorne y

perf orms an interview, offe rs a leg al reme dy if there is one available , and prescri b es the appropr iate applications. I f they want to hi re Cristo Vive to fill out the presc ribed applications the attorney

will direct, super

vise and c ontrol the servic e. 4 disposal adequate knowledg e, information and ex perie nce” and “mak[i ng ] onl y nominal char g es . . . for persons g iven assistance .” Id. § 292.2(a)

. The Commi ssion ha s acknow ledg ed that “[i] f Cristo Vive and i t s n o n - l aw y e r

e mp l o y e e s w e r e r e c o g n i z e d / a c c r e d i t e d , ” s t a t e u n a

u t h o r i z e d p r a c t i c e o f

l aw ( U P L) limit ations “would yield to this federa l law.” How ever , it i s u n d i s p uted that Cristo Vive has neve r
su c c e e de d in

ob ta ini ngthe re qu ir e d s tatus
. I n the a f t e r m a t h o f t h e c o n s e n td e c r e e , C r i s t o V i v e , t h r o u g h i t s b o ar d o f d i r e c t or s,
and Ga rc ia e xec ute d a

n e mpl oy me nt c on tr a c t w he re by

Ga rc ia a g re e d to se rv e a s th e e nti ty ’s “ I N- HO USE STAFF ATTORNEY . .
. to supe rvise, direc t a nd control all leg al service s offe red to the community by Cristo Vive.” I t is undisputed that Cristo Vive and Gar cia craf ted t he contr act languag e and the structure of their r elationship with the intent of coming wi t h i n t h e s econd e x ception of the consent de cre e; i.e., Cristo Vive’s ac ts and conduc t otherwise constituti ng UPL would be “perfor m[ ed]

. . . under the direc tion, supervision and c ontrol of a membe r of the State Ba r o f Texas”—Gar cia. Ga rcia acc epted the position on J une 26, 2001.

Th e re a ft e r, Ga

rc ia pr ov ide d le g a l se rv ic e s t o C r i s t o V i v e ’ s c lie nts . G arc ia wo rk e d f ull -t ime in this capa city for Crist o Vive and did not otherwise prac tice law other than occa sional pro bono work thr ou g h V olu

nte e r L e g a l Se rv ic e s. I t is un dis pu te d that a lth ou g h Cr ist o V ive c ha rg e s f e e s v ary ingwi th 3Ga

rc ia fu rt he r d e sc ri be d h is d

uti e s a s an atto rn e y

wi th C ri sto Vi ve a s f

oll ow s: My du tie s are to s up e rv ise , d ir e c t and c on tr ol a ll s e rv ic e s p ro vid e d by the pa ra le g a ls in connec tion with their petitions for s t at u s as lawful pe rmane nt residents or a s cit i z ens of the United States that Imay have a dvised. I n initial consultation, I de te rm ine wh a t f

or ms, if any , w ill a c hie ve the re su lt d e sir e d b y the c lie nt, and

a dv ise them acc ording ly . I f the c lient hired Cristo Vive to ty pe out forms a

nd prepa re, I direc t, supervise, a

nd control t he staff

in ty ping out the f

orm, and a fter the y

are ty ped out, Irevie w to make sure every thing was answe red corre ctly

. I then authorize the client to mail the application [ to] the [Bure au of Citizenship and I mmigration Se r v ic e s ] o r [D e p artm e n t o f

St a te ]. 5 the servic es provided to e ach client, Gar cia rec eived a salary of approximately $50,000 per y ear that was not tied to the ty

pe of se rvice s he provided or the number of

clients he c ounseled. I n J une 2003, the Commission filed a discipli n ar y p roceedingag ainst Garc ia alleg ing vio la tio ns of

the fo llo wi ngpr ov isi on s o f t he Te xas D isc ipl ina

ry Rul e s o f P ro fe ssi on a l Co nd uc t:

! 5.04(a) (fe e-splitting with a non- lawy er) ; ! 5.04(b) ( forming a par tnership with a non-la

wy er) ; ! 5.05(b) ( assisting a person who is not a member of t he state ba r in committing UPL ); ! 7.01(a) (pra cticing in private pra ctice unde r a tra de name ).
Th e Com mis sio n s ub se qu e ntl y so ug ht p art ia l summa

ry jud g me nt t

hat Garc ia ha d viol a te d ea c h o f t he se rules. Gar cia filed a response to the motion and separ ate cross-motions for tra ditional and “no evide nce” summary judgme nt reg arding eac h of t he allege d rule viol ations. The dist rict court gr anted the motions of both the Commissi on and Ga rcia in part and denied them in part. I t rende red judg ment that Gar cia ha d violated rules 5.04( a), 5.05( b), and 7.01(a) but ha d not formed a partne rship with a non-law y er in violation of ru le 5. 05 (b ). Th e c ourt fu rt he r a dju dg e d that the pr op e r dis c ipl ine fo r Ga rc ia ’s vio latio ns wa s a

pu bli c repr imand with an awa

rd of c osts. This appeal ensue d.Al tho ug h w e c on str ue Ga rc ia ’s br ie f t o c ha lle ng e th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of bo th h is 4 trad i t ional and no-e vidence summary -judg ment motions, hi s brief a rg ues only

the g rounds he asser ted in his traditional motion, which are also substantially simil ar to those in his response to the Commi ssion’s motion. 6 AN AL YSI S Gar cia a ppea l s t h e district court’s judg ment that he violated r ules 5.04(a) , 5.05(b) a

nd 7.01(a) . The Commi ssion does not appea l the district court’s judg ment for Ga rcia reg ardingrule 5.05(b)

. Stand ard of review

We reviewthe district court’s summar y jud gm en t d e novo. ValenceOperating Co.

v . D or se tt , 1 64 S.W. 3d

65 6, 66 1 ( Te x. 20 05 ); Pr ov ide nt L ife& Ac c ide nt Ins

. Co . v. Kno tt , 128 S.W .3d 21 1, 21 5 ( Te x. 20 03 ). Whe n r e viewing a summa ry jud g me nt, we take a s tr

ue a ll e vid e nc e fa

vo ra ble to the non-movant, a

nd we indulge ever

y rea sonable infere nce and re solve any doubts in the non-movant’s favor

. Valenc e Op erat ing Co. , 1 64 S.W. 3d a t 66 1; Kno tt , 1 28 S.W. 3d a t 21 5. Sum mary

jud g me nt i s proper when ther e ar e no disputed issues of mate rial fa ct and the mova nt is entitl ed to judgme nt as a matter of law. Te x. R. Civ . P. 16 6a (c ); Shell Oil Co. v. Khan , 1 3 8 S
. W
. 3 d 2 8 8 , 2 9 1 n . 4 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Kno tt , 128 S.W .3d at 215-16).

When, as here , both parties move f or summary

judgme nt on overl ap p i n g g rounds and the district court g rants one motion and de nies the other, we or dinarily revie w the summary -judg ment evidenc e pre sented by

both sides, determine a ll q u est ions presente d, and re nder the judgme nt that the district court should have r ender ed. Texas W orkers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advoc at es o f Tex. , 136 S.W .3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2004). 4Ga rc ia su g g e sts tha

t th e UPL pr oh ibi tio n, a s a

ba rr ie r t o ma

rk e t e ntr y , ma y a lso se rv e to 5 a dv anc e the pure ly

e c on omi c int e re sts of

a tto rn e y s a g a ins t c omp e tit ion fr om oth e r s e rv ic e pr ov ide rs , to the detriment of c onsumers. I t is undisput ed that both the UPL C procee ding a g ainst Cristo Vive and the Commission’s procee ding a g ainst Garc ia wer e instigated by a loca l i m m i gration attorney whose c lient base ove rlaps with the populatio n s er v ed by Cristo Vive. We must decline Gar cia’ s invitation to revisit t he policy decisions of the le g islature and supr eme c ourt that are ref lected in the s t a tu t e s an d

r u l e s t h a tw e ar e b o u n d

t o a p p l y. Se c tio n 8 1. 10 1( a ) o f t

he g ov e rnme nt c od e de fi ne s th e “ pr a c tic e of law” a s: 6 the pre par at i o n of a ple ading or other doc ument incident to an ac tion or special proce eding or the mana g eme n t of the a ction or proc eedingon behalf of a c lient befor e a judge in c ourt as well as a service rende red out of court, includingthe g iving of advic e or the rende ring of any service requiringthe use of le g al skill or knowledg e, such as pr epar ing a will, c ontrac t, or other instrument, the leg al ef fec t of which unde r the fa cts and c onclusions involved must be care fully deter mined. 7 Ru l e 5 . 0 5 (b ): As s i s ti n g UPL

Rule 5.05(b) provide s that a lawy er sha ll not “assist a person wh o is not a member of the bar in the unauthorized prac tice of law.” Tex. Disciplinar y R. Prof ’l Cond u ct 5
. 0 5 (b ), re

pr inte d in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subti t. G app. A (West 2005) (Tex

. State Ba r R
. art. X, § 9). This prohibition ag ainst assisting UPL , as we ll as the underly ing ban on UPLitself, is rooted in a “pe rce ived nee d to protect individuals and the public from the mistakes of the untra ined and the sc hemes of the unscrupulous, who
are not subject to the judicially imposed disciplinary

standards of

competenc e, re sponsibili ty , and
acc ountability .” Te x . Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 5.05 cmt. 1. 5 The Commission’s complaint that Garcia assisted in UPLis predicated on the UPL of Cristo Vive. Cristo Vive’s alleg ed UPL , in turn, is predicated on t he ac ts of Gar cia in providingleg al
se rv ic e s in

the name of

Cr ist o V ive to i ts cu sto me rs , whi c h is imput e d to Cr ist o V ive a s G arc ia ’s pr inc ipa l. I t is undisput ed that the se rvice s Garc ia provided to third parties as an attorney for Cristo Vive included those constituting the pr actice of law. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.101(a) ; see al s o Un a u t horized 6Tex. Gov’ t Code Ann. § 81.101(a) (West 2005)

. Howeve r, this definition “is not ex clusive and doe s

not deprive the judicial branc h of the power and authority under both [cha pter 81 of the g overnme nt code] and the a djudicated case s to de termine whether other service s and ac ts not enumerate d may constitute the prac tice of la w.” Id. § 81.101(b). Cf. American HomeAssurance Co., Inc. v. Un a u t horized Practice of Law Comm. , 7 1 2 1 S
. W
. 3 d

8 3 1 , 8 3 9 -4 2 (T ex . Ap p . — E as t l an d 2 0 0 3 , p et
. gra n t ed ) ( ci t i n g Utiliti es In c . v . M on tgo me ry , 138 S.W .2d 1062, 1064 (Tex. 1940) (sug g esting that corpor ate pr actice of law imputed from ac ts of lawyer a g ent would not constitute unauthorized prac tice of la

w if cor poration reta ined direc t interest i n

matter); Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 15 5 S. W.3 d 5 90 , 5 98 -5 99 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 04 , pe t. fi le d) (s a me ). Th e Te xas S up re me Court has g rante d revie w in American H ome , and it rema ins pending befor e the c ourt. Ga rc ia a lso su g g e sts that “ the Com me nts to t he Rul e s of Pro fe ssi on a l Co nd uc t e xpre ssl y 8 pe rm it G arc ia to un de rt a ke his e mpl oy me nt wi th Cr ist o Vi ve .” F ro m c on te xt, it a pp e ars that G arc ia is refe rringto comments 4, 5, and 6 t o rule 5.04, whic h he sug g ests “conte mplate situations in which a lawy er ma

y be hire d by

an org anization to provide leg al serv i ce s t o another person,” including employ ment with leg al-a id office s. See Tex. D i s ci p l i n ar y R . Prof’l Conduct 5.04 cmts. 4-6. As dis c us se d b e low , r

ule 5. 04 is c on c e rn e d w ithma int a ini ngthe pr of e ssi on a l ind e pe nd e nc e of

lawy e rs . The thre e comments Gar cia cites addre ss the profe ssional-independe nce conce rn wher e lawy ers a re hired to provide le g al servic es to third persons. Contrar y to what Gar cia sug g ests, the comments do not imply th at s u ch arr ang ements ar e categ orica lly permitted without reg ard to the limitations of other rule s. See also Tex. I ns . C o d e Ann. § 961.303 (west 2006) (non-pr ofit leg al-ser vice c or p o r a t i o n s “ m u s t a c t o n l y a s an a g e n t o n b e h a l f o f i t s p art i c i p an t s ” an d a t t o r n e y c o ntr a c tin g to 8 P r a ct i ce o

f L aw Comm. v. Cortez , 6 9 2 S
. W
. 2 d 4 7 , 5 0 ( T e x. 1 9 8 5 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t a dv i s i n g c l i e n t a s to wh e the r t o f

ile imm ig ratio n f

or m c on st it ut es pr a c tic e of

law) . T o d a te , T e xas l aw r e ma ins that, at le a st wher e a c orporation has no direct inter est in leg al work pe rfor med by a lawy er ag ent for the benef it of a third party , the corporation has prac ticed law throug h that lawy er. See San Antonio Bar Ass’n v. Guardian Abstract & Titl e Co. , 2 91 S.W. 2d 69 7, 70 1- 02 (T e x. 19 56 ); He xt erTitl e &Abstract Co. v. Grievanc e Com m. , F ift h Co ng re ssi on al D ist ., 179 S.W .2d 946, 953-54 (Te x . 1944). 7 To avoid the Commission’s entitl ement to s ummary judgme nt on this issue, Gar cia r elies principally o n t he af

firmative de fense that his actions for Cristo Vive we re e x pressly permitted by

that
e nti ty ’s c on se nt d e c re e wi th t he UPL C. As noted pre viously , the co n s en t decr ee e njoined Cristo Vive

8provide ser vices for corpor ation “must be an inde pendent c ontrac tor . . . and may not be an e mploy ee of the c or po rat ion .” ); Touchy v. H ouston Legal Found. , 432 S.W .2d 690, 694-95 (Te x . 1968) (contra sting a

non-prof it corpor ation that is “dire ctly repr esenting clients as an attorney by signing ple a din g s in

its name , o r by appea

ri ngfo r s uc h c lie nts thr ou g h it s e mpl oy e e s, ” wh ic h w ou ld constitute UPL , with “ a leg al aid socie ty which ac ts merely

as a c onduit or intermediar y to bring the attorney and client tog ether ,” which w ould not). 9 “and its ag ents, offic ers, dire ctors, ser vants, employ ees, suc cessor s and assig ns” fr om a rang e of ac tiviti es
re la te d to imm ig ratio n- re late d le g a l se rv ic e s, su bje c t to the fo llo wi ngpr ov isi on : except to the extent it is leg ally permitted to do so by 8 C.F.R. § [292.2] and except to the extent it perf

orms any such ac ts and conduc t under the dire ction, supervision and c on tr ol o f a

me mbe r o f t

he State B ar o f T e xas. Although G arc ia admits that Cristo Vive has not been acc redited unde r sec tion 292.2, he contends that the entity

complied with the conse nt decr ee by “per form[ing] any such acts [ otherwise pr ohibited by the dec ree ] under the direc tion, supervision and control of a member of

the State B ar of Texas”—Gar cia. I n Gar cia’ s view, compliance with the s econd e x ception alone is sufficient to bring Cr ist o V ive in c omp lia

nc e wi th th e c on se nt d e c re e be c a us e the de c re e ’s tw o e xce pti on s a re state d in the alternative, not c umulatively

. The Commi ssion disputes Gar cia’ s constructio n o f t h e consent d e c r e e , m a i n t a i n i n g t h a tC r i s t o V i v e w a s r e qu i r e d t o s a t i s f y both ex ce p t i ons to the consent dec ree ’s pr oh ibi tio ns and

tha t it s in abi lity

to o bta in r e c og nit ion

un de r s e c tio n 2 92 .2 thu s f or e c los e s it s relianc e on either

exception. We need not re ach the proper construction of the consent decr ee be cause we c onclude that Gar cia ha s n o t raised a

fac t issue as to eac h element of any cog nizable defe nse to which it would be rele vant. While he pleaded each defense , Gar cia is uncle ar in his summary -judg ment paper s and brief ing

a bo ut whe the r h e is r e lyingon fo rm e r a dju dic a tio n ( re s ju dic a ta or c oll a te ra l e sto pp e l) or

e qu ita bleWe e xpre ss n o o pin ion re g ard ingthe Commis sio n’s con te nti on that pr ior

jud g me nts in 9 proce eding s broug ht by

the UPL C categ orica lly

cannot have claim- or issue-pre clusive eff ect on the Com mis sio n’ s su

bs e qu ent act ions b e c a

us e the UPL C and

the Com mis sio n—

tho ug h b oth instrumentalities of the supreme court’s r egulatory appar atus over the prac tice of la w in Texas—are
“ se pa rate ” e nti tie s. 10 estoppel. The c onsent dec ree cannot support collatera l estoppel because the issue of whe ther Cristo Vive’s actions would have constituted UPLif supervised by an attorney was not fully

and fa irly

litigated. See A t torney Ge n. of Tex. v. Lavan , 8 33 S.W. 2d 95 2, 95 5 ( Te x. 19 92 ); Ea gle P r o p . , Lt d

. v . S c h a r b a uer , 807 S.W .2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990). Simi larly , we c onclude that Ga rcia did not raise a f

act issue reg arding the final a djudication-on-the- m er i t s element of res judicata. Se e Am sta dt v . U nite d S tates B ra ss C

or p ., 919 S.W .2d 644, 652 (Tex. 1996).

Nor c an Ga

rcia raise a fac t issue reg ardingequitable e stoppel. See City of W hite Settlement v. Super W

ash Inc ., 19 8 S. W.3 d 7 70 , 7 73 (T e x. 20 06 ) ( no tin g that “ e qu ita ble e sto pp e l will no t li e a g a ins t the Gover nment as ag ainst private litiga nts” bec ause “ leg islative prer og ative would be unde rmined if a g overnme nt ag ent could—throug h mistake, neg lect, or a n intentio nal ac t—effe ctively repe al a law

by ignor ing, misre prese nting, o r misint erpr eting a duly enac ted statute or r egulation”). W e , a c c o r d i n g l y, 9 conclude that the district court did not err in g ranting summary judgme nt that Garc ia assisted Cristo Vive in the UPL , in violation of rule 5.04(b).
Rul e 5. 04 (a ): F e e spli tt ing

Rule 5.04(a) provides, with exceptions not applic ab l e h er e, that “a la wy er or law firm shall not share or

promise to share leg al fe es with a non-la wy er.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 5.04(a) , re pr inte d in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (West 2005) (Tex. State B ar R. ar t. X, § 9). The r ationale for this limitation is “to preve nt solicitation by lay persons of c lients for lawy ers a ndThe Commission aptly summarized the arr ang ement in its leg al memora ndum in support 10 of its mot ion

fo r p art ia l summa

ry jud g me nt: Cristo Vive and Respondent have for med a relationship t hat is analog ous to a nonlawy er ( J oe) opening “Joe’s Divorce Clini c, I nc.” a nd hiring a staff

attorney to review and sig n a ll p le a din g s, wh ile the no n- lawy e r p ro vid e s th e of fi c e sp a c e and

e q uip me nt, adver tises for Joe’s Clini c, runs the office , and collec ts a salar y substantially

larg er t h ant h a to f

t h e a t t o r n e y. P l u s , t h e d i v o r c e c l i e n t s p ay t h e i r f e e s t o J o e , w h o t h e np ays a l l e x p e n s e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e a t t o r n e y’ s s a l ar

y. 11 to avoid encour ag ing or

assisting nonlawy ers in the practice of law.” Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 5.04 cmt. 1. I t is undisput ed that persons ser ved by Cristo Vive pay

the entity for leg al servic es provided by or under the supervision of Ga

rcia , that these re venues a re commingle d with othe r reve nues, and that thi s c om mo n po ol o f r e ve nu e s g oe s to pa y Cr ist o V ive ’s e xpe ns e s— inc lud ingGa rc ia ’s a pp ro xima te ly $50,000 annual sa lary and the $85,000 salar y of Cristo Vive founde r, Jorge Sanchez. Gar cia’ s salary was not depende nt on the amount of leg al fee s collecte d by Cristo Vive

. We a g ree with the Commi ssion that these undisputed fa cts establish a violation of rule 5.04(a)

. See Tex. Com m. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 498, 10 58 Tex. B.J . 38 (1995) ( holding that, whe n a lawyer is emplo y ed b y a corporation not owned solely by lic e ns e d atto rn e y s, “ the arr ang e me nt wo uld a mou nt to an a g re e me nt by the lawy e r to sh are le g a l f e e s w ith a non-la wy er ( the cor

poration) in violation of Rule 5.04(a )” if the corpor ation wer e to rec eive pa y ment for the lawy er’ s service s).

Ga rc ia argue s th a t be c a

us e Cr ist o V ive ha s o pe rate d a t a los s, the re we re no “ fe e s” c a pa ble of being“shar ed” in violation of rule 5.04(a) . This argument confuse s fees wi t h profits. The a ct that Cristo Vive has not netted a pr ofit from the lega l service s it provides does not neg ate the f act that it wasS i m i larly , we r ejec t Garc ia’s conte ntion that his decisions fell within a zone of 11 pr of e ssi on a l di sc re tio n c on te mpl a te d b y the se co mm ents f

or wh ic h h e sh ou ld n ot b e su bje c t to discipline. Tex. Discipli nary R. Prof’l Conduct preamble ¶ 10.

12 paid for le g al servic es that Ga rcia provided. Rule 5.04(a ) plainly prohibits a lawy er from sharinghis or he r l e g a l f

e e s w itha no n- lawy e r, wi tho ut r e g ard to whe the r t

he lawy e r a

nd no n- lawy e r e arn

a pr of it. Gar cia a lso emphasizes that comments 4 and 5 to r ule 5.04 contemplate situations in which it i s p e rm iss ibl e fo r a law y er to be e mpl oy e d b y a no n- lawy e r o rg anizatio n to pr ov ide le g a l se rv ic e s to the or g anizatio n’ s c lie nts , a nd that co mm e nt 6 e xpre ssl y pe rm its a

lawy e r t o a c c e pt e mpl oy me nt w ith various ty

pes of leg al-a id office s. See Te x. Di sc ipl ina ry R. Pr of ’l Con du c t 5. 04 c mts . 4 -6 . T he se comments, howev er, merely emphasize that a law y er in these situations mus t not allow the non-lawy er org anization to direct or influenc e his or her profe ssional judg ment in se rving the client. Id . N oth ingin these c omments impl ies t h at s u ch arr ang ements ar e categ orica lly permitted without reg ard to the lim ita tio ns of oth e r r ule s. 11 Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the district c ourt did not err in g rantingsummary judgme nt that Gar cia violated r

ule 5.04(a ) by

sharingleg al fe es with a non-la wy er.
Ru l e 7 . 0 1 (a ): Pra ct i ci n g u n d er a tr a d e n a me

Rule 7.01(a) provides, in part, that “ [a] lawy er in private pra ctice sha ll not practice under

a tr a d e n a me . ” T e x. D is c ip li n ar y R. Pr o f ’ l C o n d u c t 7
. 0 1 ( a), rep ri nt ed in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit

. G a

p p . A ( We s t 2 0 0 5 ) ( T e x. St a te B ar R. art. X , § 9 )

. Ru le 7
. 0 1 is b r o a d ly a im ed at pr eventing lawy e rs fr om usi ng th e name s o f o the r l awy e rs or e nti tie s so a s to mis le a d th e pu bli c re g ard ingthe ir ide nti ty . T e x. Di sc ipl ina ry R. Pr of ’l Con du ct 7. 01 c mt. 1. I n th is r e g ard , “ Tr a de name s are g e ne ra lly considere d inhere ntly

misleading .” Id.13 The Commission presented undisputed sum m ar y -j udg ment evidenc e indicatingthat Gar cia pr ovided leg al servic es to third parties unde r the name of Cristo Vive. T h i s ev idence included letter s f r o m G ar c ia to I

N S r e g ar d in g , in h is w o r d s , “ c li e n ts ” h e “ r e p r e s e n t[ e d ]” in I N S p r o c e e dings, on “Cristo Vive for I mmigra nts, C.S.S., Inc.” le tterhea d indicating Cristo Vive’s addre ss, and sig ned “Ra ul Ga rc i a , A t t o r

n e y a tL aw . ” S i m i l ar l y , G ar c i a ’ s b u s i n e s s c ar d s w e r e t i t l e d “ C r i s t o V i v e f

o r I m mig ra nt: Chr ist ian So c ia l Se rv ic e s, Inc .” ; in dic a te d th e e nti ty ’s a dd re ss, ph on e numbe r, and an e ma il a dd

re ss “cr istovive@ix .netcom.com” ; and identified him as “Raul Gar cia, ESQ., Attorney at L aw/Abog ado.” T he evidenc e also indicated that Cristo Vive’s sig nag e at its offic es, w h i l e i n d i cating the pr esenc e of a n “Attorne y at L aw,” ref

err ed only

to Cristo Vive and not Garc ia. Gar cia a sserts that rule 7.01( a) doe s not apply to him because he is not “in private pr actice ,” b u ti s “ ane mp l o y e e o f

a l e g a l a i d p r o v i d e r ” o r

ani n - h o u s e “ c o r

p o r a t e e mp l o y e e ” o f

a n o n - p r o f i t
. In
su pp or t of thi s argume nt, Ga

rc ia po int s to t

he su pr e me c ourt ’s a tto rn e y -o c c up anc y -t a x exem pti on fo rm , wh ic h id e nt i f

i e s a n e xe m p t c a t e g or y of “ e mpl oy e e of

a 50 1( c )( 3) or

50 1( c )( 6) no n- pr of

it c or po ra tio n w ho se employ ees a

re pr ohibited from priv a

te p rac tice,” a

nd the state ba

r’s membe rship form, which disting uishes betwee n a lawyer in “ Private L aw Pra ctice” and “I n-House/Corpor ate Counsel.” To construe rule 7.01(a) , howeve r, we seek the supreme c ourt’s intent as re flec ted in the text of the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Responsibility . The Commission poi nts out that the term “private pra ctice” as used in the rules distinguishes betwee n g overnme ntal employ ment, in which a lawy er repr esents the public inter est, and a ll other ty pes of e mploy

ment , i n wh ich the lawyer r epre sents the interests of a pr ivate par

ty
. See Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct 1.10, re pr inte d in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subti t. G app. A (West 2005) (Tex. State Ba r R. a rt. X, § 9). We ag ree with the Commi ssion that, f ro m c on te xt, “ pr ivate pr a c tic e ” in ru le 7. 01 (a ) wa s in te nd e d to re fe r t o la wy e rs re pr e se nti ngpr ivate14

thi rd -p art y c lie nts . In li g ht o f o ur

dis po sit ion

of Ga rc ia ’s oth e r i ssu e s, we a g re e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt did not err in g rantingsummary judgme nt that he violated rule 7.01(a) by using the trade name of

Cristo Vive in h is r e pr e se ntatio n o f p ri va te c lie nts
. CO NC LU SION We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.

____________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med on Motion for Rehea ring Filed: Jul y

26, 2007