UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-5116

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ERIC PRESTON HANS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District 

Judge. (6:05-cr-01227-HMH-1) 

Argued: March 25, 2009 Decided: May 29, 2009 

Before DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, Robert J. CONRAD, Jr., Chief 

United States District Judge for the Western District of North 

Carolina, sitting by designation, and Thomas D. SCHROEDER, 

United States District Judge for the Middle District of North 

Carolina, sitting by designation. 

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Conrad wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Schroeder joined. 

ARGUED: Benjamin Thomas Stepp, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Greenville, South Carolina; Richard Walter Vieth, 

HENDERSON, BRANDT & VIETH, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for 

Appellant. Robert Frank Daley, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: W. 

Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney, Columbia, South 

Carolina, Regan A. Pendleton, Assistant United States Attorney, 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

2 
3 

CONRAD, Chief District Judge: 

On November 16, 2005, a grand jury for the District of 

South Carolina returned a one-count indictment against Eric 

Preston Hans. The indictment charged Hans with maliciously 

damaging and destroying, and attempting to damage and destroy, 

by means of fire, the Comfort Inn and Suites at 831 Congaree 

Road in Greenville, South Carolina, a building used in 

interstate commerce, resulting in the death of six individuals 

and in bodily injury to eleven individuals. For this 18 U.S.C. 

§ 844(i) violation, the Government sought the death penalty. 

The case went to trial on July 23, 2007. On August 2, 

2007, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The jury was unable 

to reach a unanimous verdict as to a sentence. 

On October 25, 2007, the district court sentenced Hans to 

life in prison and the court entered judgment on October 29, 

2007. Hans timely appealed his sentence and conviction. We 

hold that the district court did not violate Hans’s Sixth 

Amendment Rights, nor did the court abuse its discretion when it 

denied Hans’s motion for a mistrial. Further, we hold that the 

Government presented sufficient evidence at trial to support 
4 

 

Hans’s conviction. We therefore affirm the district court’s 

decision. 

I. Relevant Facts 

A. The Fire 

 On January 25, 2004, at approximately 4:22 a.m., the desk 

clerk at the Comfort Inn and Suites at 831 Congaree Road, 

Greenville, South Carolina (the “Comfort Inn”) made a 9-1-1 call 

reporting a fire at the hotel. Approximately four minutes after 

the first 9-1-1 call, Fire Engine 2 from Wade Hampton Fire 

Department arrived on the scene. The firemen immediately 

reported rolling flames and heavy smoke at the north exit door 

of the third floor of the hotel, a five floor building. The 

third floor exit door opens to the ground level at the back of 

the Comfort Inn.1 According to the first firefighter on the 

scene, flames were coming out of the top of the door and rising 

upward about two feet. 

1

On the evening of the fire, the security access to the 

hotel through the third floor exit door was not working, so 

anyone could enter that door. 
5 

 The firemen suppressed the fire within several minutes. 

The Greenville County Sheriff’s Office Deputies joined the 

firemen and assisted with the rescue of hotel guests. 

The firemen reported that the area outside the rear third 

floor door was littered with cardboard and Styrofoam packing 

material. There was extensive fire damage in the area around 

the door and nearby hallways. Investigators determined that no 

accelerant was used, so the only way the extreme heat patterns 

could have been produced was by a person placing combustible 

materials (i.e., the cardboard boxes and Styrofoam) in the foyer 

area and igniting them with a direct flame. A stack of 

cardboard boxes inside the foyer had burned from the top down 

and was still smoldering during the initial stages of the 

investigation. Investigators concluded that arson caused the 

fire, and that the fire was likely started between 4:05 a.m. and 

4:10 a.m. on January 25, 2004. 

B. Relationship between Cromer and Canty 

As the investigation continued, law enforcement officers 

learned that one of the deceased victims of the fire, Melba 

Canty, and a surviving victim, Zachery Cromer, had a turbulent 

relationship. Cromer and Canty had a sixteen-month old son, 
6 

who, along with Canty, died in the fire at the Comfort Inn. 

Further, investigators found that Canty was friends with the 

appellant, Hans, and that Hans and Cromer held significant 

animosity toward each other in relation to Cromer’s treatment of 

Canty. Cromer believed that Hans was extremely jealous of 

Cromer’s relationship with Canty and that Hans continually 

interfered in their lives. Cromer told law enforcement that his 

house was broken into a few months prior to the fire, and that 

Hans taunted him on the phone about being the one who committed 

the burglary. 

 A couple of weeks before the fire, Canty needed a place to 

stay and went to live with Hans. The week prior to the fire, 

while Canty was living with Hans, the situation between Hans and 

Cromer escalated with numerous belligerent phone calls back and 

forth. 

 According to Cromer, he and Canty decided that they needed 

to spend some time together with their son to try and mend their 

relationship. On January 24, 2004, at approximately 10:30 p.m., 
7 

 

a few hours before the fire, Hans rented a third floor room for 

one week for Canty and her son at the Comfort Inn. 

 Later that same evening, Cromer arrived at the Comfort Inn.2 

After Cromer’s arrival, he and Hans argued on the phone. Cromer 

told Hans that he and Canty were back together and that Hans 

could do nothing to change that. Cromer testified that after 

telling Hans that he and Canty were back together, Hans replied, 

“she’s not going to stay up there with you. I’ll make sure of 

it.” (J.A. 367). Telephone records confirm that Hans and 

Cromer exchanged sixty-six phone calls on January 24. Cromer 

acknowledged that during some of these calls he taunted Hans 

about Canty. 

 Witnesses later verified that Cromer left the room around 

2:00 a.m. on the morning of January 25th, and rode with two 

friends to a nearby Waffle House to get take-out food to bring 

back to Canty. Cromer returned to the Comfort Inn with the 

food. Cromer reported that there were no boxes or debris on the 

2

As part of their effort to mend their relationship, Canty 

agreed to stop spending time with Hans, and Cromer agreed to 

stop spending time with one of his female friends. 
8 

 

steps or in the walkway at the time but that there may have been 

some boxes stacked next to the rear exit door. Cromer and Canty 

then went to sleep and were later awakened by the fire alarms. 

Cromer survived the fire, but Canty, her son, and four other 

individuals died in the fire. 

C. After the Fire 

 Shortly after the fire, investigators located Hans at the 

Crowne Plaza Hotel, which is next to the Comfort Inn. Hans 

waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed. In his 

statement to the police, he claimed the following: 

• After he checked Canty in at the Comfort Inn, he went to 

Platinum Plus, a nearby strip club.3

• He later left Platinum Plus, went home, and fell asleep. 

• After receiving a call from a friend, he returned to 

Platinum Plus. 

• He stayed at Platinum Plus until around 3:30 a.m. 

• He then attempted to go to a nearby storage unit to drop 

some things off but could not get there because a police 

car was blocking the road. 

3

Platinum Plus strip club was only .9 miles from the Comfort 

Inn and Hans was a regular patron at both. 
9 

• Next, he went back to Platinum Plus; on his way there, 

he saw that the Comfort Inn was on fire. 

• He stayed at Platinum Plus a few minutes before going 

back to the storage unit; this time he was able to get 

through. 

Hans’s statements to police were contradicted by video 

footage from Platinum Plus showing that Hans left Platinum Plus 

at 4:01 a.m. Fire investigators estimated that someone started 

the fire between 4:05 a.m. and 4:10 a.m. Video footage from a 

Lowe’s parking lot camera across the street from the Comfort Inn 

showed Hans driving through the parking lot at 4:15 a.m. Video 

footage from the BP gas station camera, also across the street 

from the Comfort Inn, showed Hans making a purchase from 4:22 to 

4:23 a.m. The Comfort Inn records showed the fire being called 

in at 4:22 a.m. and the 9-1-1 records showed the call about the 

fire being received at 4:24 a.m. Video footage from Platinum 

Plus showed Hans arriving in the parking lot again at 4:29 a.m. 

and walking into the building at 4:31 a.m. Upon returning to 

Platinum Plus at 4:31 a.m., Hans told several individuals that 

he had not gone home because the Comfort Inn was on fire and 
10 

 

there was a roadblock.4 According to police records, the first 

roadblock was set up at 4:32 a.m., after Hans returned to 

Platinum Plus. Numerous witnesses testified that Hans was not 

concerned about the fire, even though he knew that Canty and her 

son were staying at the hotel. Platinum Plus video footage 

showed Hans leaving again at 4:55 a.m. The records at the 

storage unit show that he checked into his storage unit at 5:03 

a.m. 

In July 2007 the case was tried capitally. During jury 

selection, Hans sought to disqualify four jurors, because, he 

claimed, they were biased. The district court refused to 

disqualify them. Hans then used his peremptory challenges to 

disqualify these jurors. The district court sua sponte

disqualified another juror for bias. 

At trial, Canty’s aunt, Rolissa Jordan, testified that Hans 

told her after the fire that the last thing Canty told Hans was 

that she and Hans could no longer be friends because Canty was 

4

The government introduced evidence that Hans would have 

headed in a direction away from the roadblock and the Comfort 

Inn if, as he told his friends, he intended to head home after 

leaving Platinum Plus. 
11 

 

going back to Cromer. Jordan testified that Canty, in a similar 

vein, also told Jordan that she was going back to Cromer. 

Hans’s housemate, Rodney Babb testified at trial that the day 

after the fire Hans said either “I did something bad” or 

“Something bad happened.” (J.A. 997). These statements 

differed from the statement Babb gave police earlier, at which 

time Babb only said that Hans said “I done something really 

bad.”5 The prosecutor later impeached Babb with his prior 

inconsistent statements to the police. Additionally, Curtis 

Kricke, an inmate incarcerated with Hans on an unrelated charge 

in December 2005, testified that Hans told Kricke that he, Hans, 

started the fire at the Comfort Inn.6

5

Previously, Hans’s housemates, Rodney Babb and Jill 

LeGreca, told the police that the day after the fire Hans 

stated, “I’ve done something really bad.” Hans also stated that 

he could not tell Babb about it because Babb had a baby. (J.A. 

995-1003; 1017; 1271). Babb became scared and called the police 

in the middle of the night to report this statement. Babb and 

LeGreca stayed that night at Babb’s parent’s house. 

6

Although some of the details of Kricke’s testimony did not 

match the actual incident (e.g., Kricke stated that Hans claimed 

to have used an accelerant to start the fire), the account of 

the confession and the inconsistencies were put before the jury. 
12 

During trial one of the prosecutors asked about an 

“unrelated” criminal investigation in which Hans was involved. 

Hans objected that the evidence was prejudicial and moved for a 

mistrial. The district court sustained the objection, but 

denied the motion for mistrial. The court gave a curative 

instruction. 

 On August 2, 2007, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On 

August 10, 2007, the sentencing phase of Hans’s trial ended with 

the jury unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the imposition 

of the death penalty. On October 25, 2007, the district court 

sentenced Hans to life in prison. Hans timely appealed, raising 

three issues: 1) whether the jury selection process violated 

Hans’s Sixth Amendment rights; 2) whether the mention of Hans’s 

unrelated criminal activity warranted a mistrial; and 3) whether 

the Government presented sufficient evidence for Hans’s 

conviction. We address each in turn. 

II. Hans’s Right to an Impartial Jury 

 Hans contends that the district court committed three 

errors during jury selection: 1) qualifying four jurors despite 

their allegedly pro-death penalty responses to certain voir dire

questions about the death penalty; 2) not granting Hans’s 

motions to excuse these four potential jurors for cause; and 3) 
13 

dismissing Juror 98 for cause after Juror 98 said that he was 

ambivalent about whether the Government had the right to take a 

life. This Court recognizes the district court’s crucial role 

in assessing demeanor and credibility during jury selection. 

Consequently, we review challenges to the jury selection with 

great deference to the trial court. Our review is for abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 1004, 1007 

(4th Cir. 1979). Hans’s first and second contentions are 

considered together. 

A. Jurors Removed with Peremptory Challenges 

 Hans argues that the responses provided by four jurors 

during voir dire reflected bias in favor of the death penalty. 

Hans requested that each of these potential jurors be removed 

for cause and the court denied the request. After the court 

qualified these jurors, Hans struck all four jurors with 

peremptory challenges. A “trial court’s refusal to strike a 

juror for cause does not affect the right to an impartial jury 

if the defense in fact strikes the juror with a peremptory 

challenge.” Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561, 574 (4th Cir. 

1997). 

 Thus, with respect to these four jurors, Hans’s only 

alleged injury is the loss of his peremptory challenges. Yet, 

it is well settled that the loss of a peremptory challenge does 
14 

not violate a defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial 

jury because “peremptory challenges are not of constitutional 

dimension.” Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). 

Therefore, the district court did not violate Hans’s Sixth 

Amendment right to an impartial jury by either the qualification 

of the four potential jurors or by the denial of the request to 

strike the jurors for cause. 

B. Dismissal of Juror by the Court 

 Next, Hans challenges the district court’s disqualification 

of Juror 98. Hans argues that Juror 98's statement during voir 

dire that he was “unsure that the Government had the right to 

take a life,” (J.A. 100), should not have disqualified the 

juror. Further, he argues that the court created a proprosecution jury by dismissing such a juror. 

 In order to sustain a claim that a jury was not impartial 

on a question of conviction, a defendant must show that a juror 

who actually sat on the jury was biased, not that an allegedly 

impartial juror was improperly dismissed. See id. at 86 (“Any 

claim that the jury was not impartial . . . must focus . . . on 

the jurors who ultimately sat” on the jury). In this case, Hans 

presents no evidence that the sitting jurors were biased toward 

the death penalty. Indeed, the jury here did not sentence Hans 
15 

 

to death.7 The trial court’s dismissal of Juror 98 did not 

violate Hans’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 

III. Hans’s Motion for a Mistrial 

 Hans next contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for mistrial after the Government presented 

prejudicial testimony of possible unrelated criminal activity. 

 At the end of the second day of its case, the Government 

called Investigator Mark Justice of the Greer Police Department 

who testified that he obtained a search warrant for Hans’s 

residence and seized items from the residence. The search 

warrant was in an unrelated case. The Greer Police Department 

7

The Supreme Court in Bumper v. North Carolina, upheld the 

imposition of life in prison despite the contention that the 

court dismissed jurors with hesitations about the death penalty 

and found that the “decision in Witherspoon does not govern the 

present case, because here the jury recommended a sentence of 

life imprisonment.” 391 U.S. 543, 545 (1968). The Court 

reiterated this distinction in Morgan v. Illinois, reversing a 

death sentence based on inadequate voir dire, but noting that 

this decision had “no bearing on the validity of petitioner’s 

conviction.” 504 U.S. 719, 739 n.11 (1992); see also Gray v. 

Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 650-51, 668 (1987) (observing that 

the Witherspoon error means “a death sentence imposed by the 

jury cannot stand,” and reversing judgment only “insofar as it 

imposes the death sentence”). 
16 

turned over some of the seized items to the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) for its investigation of the 

Comfort Inn fire. Hans objected to the Government’s questions, 

which were prefaced by the comments that the search warrant was 

“completely unrelated to this case” and “[h]ad absolutely 

nothing to do with this.” (J.A. 588-89). He also objected to 

Investigator Justice’s statement that ATF looked through the 

items and determined that some of the items were “necessary for 

their investigation.” (J.A. 589). 

 Hans claims that the Government insinuated that he was 

involved in other criminal activity beyond the accusation of 

arson through this line of questioning. Upon commencement of 

the third day of the Government’s case, Hans moved for a 

mistrial based on the questioning by the Government and the 

testimony of Investigator Justice from the previous afternoon. 

 The district court agreed with Hans, stating, “[i]t was 

improper to ask the questions the way they were asked because it 

did reference possibly another criminal charge against this 

defendant.” (J.A. 602). However, the district court denied the 

motion for a mistrial, and Hans accepted the district court’s 

offer of a curative instruction in accordance with the guidance 

of United States v. Martin, 756 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1985). See

id. at 328 (“Before granting a mistrial, the court should always 
17 

consider whether the giving of a curative instruction or some 

alternative less drastic than a mistrial is appropriate.”). 

 We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a 

mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Guay, 108 

F.3d 545, 552 (4th Cir. 1997). We will only disturb a decision 

under the most extraordinary of circumstances: a showing of an 

error that prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights. See

United States v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 1996). In 

examining possible prejudice, a court must look at the complete 

record and consider the offending actions in light of the 

totality of circumstances. United States v. Nyman, 649 F.2d 

208, 211-12 (4th Cir. 1980). This Circuit has adopted a threefactor framework to aid this analysis, looking at: (1) the 

closeness of the case; (2) the centrality of the issue affected 

by the error; and (3) the district court’s mitigating steps. 

United States v. Callanan, 450 F.2d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 1971). 

 The evidence against Hans was substantial. Notwithstanding 

Hans’s argument of a possible alternative arsonist, the case was 

not close. Ample evidence, including: video footage showing 

Hans near the Comfort Inn both immediately before and after the 

fire started, Hans’s threatening statements to Cromer before the 

fire, the time during which Hans was unaccounted for, Hans’s 

statements to his roommates after the fire, his inconsistent 
18 

statements to investigators about where he was during that 

night, and Hans’s confession to a cellmate demonstrates the 

strength of the Government’s case. 

 The second factor also tips in the Government’s favor. 

Considering all of the testimony regarding drug use, drug 

possession, time at strip clubs, and other generally 

questionable behavior, the brief mention of a search of Hans’s 

home in an unrelated matter was not central to the question of 

guilt or Hans’s credibility. Hans’s credibility was at issue in 

the timeline he provided police and the Government used 

surveillance video to show deceit in Hans’s statements to the 

police. The questioning by the Government which implied Hans’s 

possible involvement in other criminal activity was not elicited 

to show Hans’s duplicity; instead, the questions appear to be 

merely an unpolished attempt to establish a chain of custody for 

certain items. Lack of intent by the Government does not 

exonerate it nor would it undo a harm if one existed, but the 

context of the questioning is important. The Government did not 

ask the question during a high pressure moment in the trial; it 

was asked during mundane chain of custody questioning. The 

Government had already presented evidence of other criminal 

behavior related to Hans. Hans’s credibility and law abiding 

status were already severely damaged; these passing references 
19 

to a search warrant in an unrelated matter were not dispositive 

to any central issue in the case. 

 Finally, the district court’s curative instruction 

mitigated any possible prejudice caused by the improper 

questioning. Absent extreme circumstances, we presume that a 

jury will follow instructions to disregard potentially 

prejudicial evidence. United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 435, 

444 (4th Cir. 1997). 

 The district court agreed that the Government’s questions 

were improper. Yet, the district court reminded counsel that an 

instruction might bring more attention to the issue than just 

moving forward. Defense counsel still desired the instruction, 

and the court provided a well-worded instruction to the jury.8 

 

8

The court gave the jury the following curative instruction: 

“Before the Government calls its next witness I want to advise 

you that yesterday one of the Government’s witnesses, an 

officer, brought in evidence about a seizure of certain evidence 

from the defendant pursuant to a search warrant. I believe he 

was asked questions about was that something to the effect of in 

another matter. Whatever reference there was, an inference by 

the question to the officer that the search warrant was pursuant 

to another matter, you are not to consider that in any way as 

evidence of guilt as to this defendant.” (J.A. 604). 
20 

Further, Hans showed no extraordinary circumstances to merit an 

inquiry into whether the jurors would apply the instruction, and 

therefore, the curative instruction was appropriate. 

 The prosecutor’s unfortunate reference to a search warrant 

in an unrelated matter was nonspecific, fleeting, and ultimately 

harmless. Looking at the record as a whole, the strength of the 

Government’s case, the lack of centrality of the issue of 

possible other criminal conduct, and the court’s curative 

instruction, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion 

for mistrial. 

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 As his last argument for overturning his conviction, Hans 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. 

Hans argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for 

acquittal under a sufficiency of evidence standard.9 Hans faces 

a “heavy burden” in contesting the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting a jury verdict. United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 

 

9

Although Hans argues that a female friend of Cromer’s 

should also have been a suspect, the relevant inquiry is whether 

there was sufficient evidence to convict Hans. 
415, 421 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). In resolving 

issues of sufficiency of the evidence, this Court does not weigh 

evidence or reassess the fact finder’s assessment of witness 

credibility. United States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir. 

2002). Hans’s jury conviction must be sustained if, taking the 

view most favorable to the Government, there is substantial 

evidence to support the verdict. Glasser v. United States, 315 

U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Substantial evidence is evidence that a 

rational trier of fact could have found adequate and sufficient 

to establish the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). Reversal is reserved for the rare case where the 

prosecution’s failure to produce such evidence is clear. United 

States v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1984). 

 To sustain a conviction for arson under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), 

the Government must prove that a defendant “(1) maliciously; (2) 

damaged or destroyed a building . . . ; (3) by means of fire . . 

. ; and (4) the building . . . was used in interstate or 

foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or 

foreign commerce.” United States v. Gullett, 75 F.3d 941, 947 

(4th Cir. 1996). Hans does not dispute elements three or four, 

but instead argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

establish elements one and two. However, when the evidence is 

21 
22 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, a 

reasonable jury could find that the Government proved these 

elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Multiple witnesses 

testified to Hans’s jealousy and that he felt threatened by the 

likelihood that Cromer and Canty were about to patch up their 

relationship and resume life together as a family, the result of 

which would be the end of Hans’s friendship with Canty. These 

witnesses provided evidence of Hans’s possible motive in 

starting the fire: to vent his anger about Cromer and Canty or 

to prevent the end of his friendship with Canty. Either of 

these motives provides evidence of Hans’s malice. 

 Further, evidence presented by the Government places Hans 

at the scene of the crime at the appropriate time. Government 

evidence, both in the form of testimony and video footage, 

establishes that Hans was at Platinum Plus Club, a short 

distance from the Comfort Inn, before the fire and that he left 

the club at 4:01 a.m. and returned at 4:29 a.m. The 

Government’s fire reconstruction evidence indicated that the 

fire was intentionally started between 4:05 a.m. and 4:10 a.m. 

by someone lighting discarded packaging materials found 

scattered in and around the Comfort Inn. A security video from 

a gas station across the road from the Comfort Inn showed Hans 

buying a drink there at 4:22 a.m. From (1) Hans’s motive; (2) 
23 

 

his presence in the vicinity of the hotel near the time of the 

fire; (3) the readily available means used to start the fire; 

and (4) his inculpatory statements to witnesses and his 

inconsistent statement to law enforcement, a reasonable jury 

could have concluded that Hans had the opportunity and means to 

commit the arson. 

 The Government presented sufficient evidence that the fire 

was intentionally set and ample evidence of Hans’s motive, 

opportunity, deceit, and remorse. Although most of the 

Government’s evidence was circumstantial, circumstantial 

evidence, if probative, is enough to convict a defendant.10 From 

this cumulative evidence against Hans, a reasonable jury could 

find that the Government established all the elements of the 

arson beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Hans’s 

sufficiency of the evidence claim fails. 

10See United States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 281, 289 (4th Cir. 

2008) (circumstantial evidence permitted a reasonable jury to 

conclude that the defendant intentionally set a building ablaze 

where there was evidence that (1)the fire was intentionally set 

and evidence of (2) the defendant’s financial motive to cause 

the fire; (3) the defendant’s opportunity to set the fire; (4) 

the defendant’s presence alone in the building mere minutes 

before the fire; and (5) the defendant’s lies to investigators). 
24 

V. Conclusion 

 For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district 

court is 

AFFIRMED.