NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: DAVID ANDREW CROW; RENEE

TOINETTE CROW,

Debtors,

------------------------------

DAVID ANDREW CROW; RENEE

TOINETTE CROW,

Appellants,

v.

EDWARD JOHN MANEY, Chapter 13

Trustee,

Appellee. No. 20

- 60012

BAP No. 18

- 1323

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Spraker, Faris, and Brand, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Submitted November 16, 2020 * *

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: BYBEE, MURGUIA, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

NOV 23 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

David Crow and Renee Crow (the “Crows”) appeal from the Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit ’s (“BAP”) decision affirming the bankruptcy

court’s Chapter 13 confirmation order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 158(d). We review the BAP’s decision de novo. In re Scovis , 249 F.3d 975, 980

(9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.

1. The Crows argue that the bankruptcy court erroneously str uck a

footnote in their proposed order confirming their Chapter 13 plan

, which asserted

that t he Trustee unilaterally modifying their Chapter 13 plan ’s monthly payments

would violate the Th irteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

amount to involuntary servitude. But t he Crows did not need to preserve th at

Thirteenth Amendment argument in a footnot e because the Crows may still raise that

argument if the T rustee attempts to modify their Chapter 13 plan ’s monthly

payments in the future

. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (b)(2) ( providing a debtor with a

hearing if a trustee seeks to modify the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan). T he bankruptcy

court had broad authorit y to strike the Crows’ unnecessary footnote

. See 11 U.S.C.

§ 105(a) (stating that a bankruptcy court may issue any order necessary to carry out

the Bankruptcy Code and no provision “ shall be construed to preclude the court

from, sua sponte, taking any action ” necessary to implement court orders ).

2. The Crows argue that the bankruptcy court denied them due process

because it struck their footnote with out providing notice or a hearin g. The Ninth3

Circuit rejects due process claims when the alleged absence of due process was

harmless. See, e.g.

, In re Rosson , 545 F.3d 764, 776

– 77 (9th Cir. 2008); In re City

Equities Anaheim, Ltd. , 22 F.3d 954, 959

– 60 (9th Cir. 1994). B ecause the Crow s

did not need to preserve the ir Thirteenth Amendment argument in a footnote, the

Crows did not suffer any harm when the bankruptcy court struck that footnote

.

B ecause the Crows did not suffer any harm, their due process argument fails.

3. Finally

, the C row s point out that the bankruptcy court’s confirmation

order required them to provide federal and state income tax returns to “assist the

Trustee in determining any change in [the Crows’] annual disposable income.” The

Crows contend that requirement cann ot be squared with In re Anderson , 21 F.3d

355 , 358 (9th Cir. 1994) ( stating that a trustee may not demand authority to

unilaterally modify a debtor’s Chapter 13 plan as a condition for confirmation of the

plan ). But the Crows failed to properly raise the Anderson argument in the

bankruptcy court

. This Court “will not take up an issue not properly raised below

unless necessary to prevent manifest injustice.” L .A. News Serv. v. Reuters

Television Int’l, Ltd

. , 149 F.3d 987, 996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)

. The

Crows fail to show any manifest injustice if we d ecline to consider the Anderson

argument. Accordingly, we decline to consider th at argument.

AFFIRMED