[Cite as Eschmann v. RLA Invests., Inc., 2016-Ohio-3331.]

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed from is: Reversed and Cause Remanded 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 10, 2016 

Gary F. Franke, for Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

Freund, Freeze & Arnold and Timothy B. Spille, for Defendant-Appellee. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

FLORENCE AND EDWARD 

ESCHMANN, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 

 vs. 

RLA INVESTMENTS, INC., 

 Defendant-Appellee, 

 and 

DUKE ENERGY OHIO, INC., et al. 

 Defendants. 

 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

APPEAL NO. C-150576 

TRIAL NO. A-1405210 

 

 O P I N I O N.

 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2

CUNNINGHAM, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants Florence and Edward Eschmann appeal the 

Hamilton County Common Pleas Court’s entry of summary judgment for defendantappellee RLA Investments, Inc., (“RLA”). RLA moved for summary judgment 

claiming that under the open-and-obvious doctrine, it had owed no legal duty to 

Florence with respect to a hazardous condition that it had created on her property. 

Because the open-and-obvious doctrine defense extends only to those who have a 

property interest in the premises, and the record does not demonstrates that RLA 

had the requisite property interest in the premises to employ the defense, the trial 

court erred by granting summary judgment to RLA. 

I. Background Facts and Procedure 

{¶2} Florence injured her left foot on a metal plate installed on her 

driveway by RLA when it was completing utility gas line work on her street for Duke 

Energy, the public utility provider. She subsequently filed a complaint seeking to 

recover for negligence against RLA, Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.,1 Buckeye Utility 

Services, Inc.,2 and John Does 1 through 3. Florence’s husband Edward sought loss 

of consortium damages. 

{¶3} Duke Energy Ohio and Buckeye Utility Services were dismissed 

without prejudice. RLA moved for summary judgment on the negligence and 

derivative-loss-of-consortium claims on the ground that it owed no duty to Florence 

because the hazardous condition that caused Florence’s injury was “open and 

obvious” as defined in premises liability case law. See Armstrong v. Best Buy, 99 

 

1 This defendant was improperly named in the complaint as Duke Energy Business Services, LLC, 

d.b.a Duke Energy Corporation. 

2 This defendant was improperly named in the complaint as Buckeye Utility Services d.b.a. RLA. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3 

Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 13. RLA presented Florence’s 

deposition in support, which showed that the steel plate had been on her property for 

about a month and that she knew that it was slippery when wet. The trial court 

granted summary judgment to RLA and certified in its judgment entry that there was 

no just cause for delay. The Eschmanns now appeal, challenging the grant of 

summary judgment in their sole assignment of error. 

II. Analysis 

{¶4} We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

standards set forth in Civ.R. 56. See Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio4559, 833 N.E.2d 712, ¶ 8; Vonderhaar v. City of Cincinnati, 191 Ohio App.3d 229, 

2010-Ohio-6289, 945 N.E.2d 603, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). To prove negligence, a party must 

first show that a duty was owed to her. See, e.g., Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc., 122 

Ohio St.3d 120, 2009-Ohio-2495, 909 N.E.2d 120. Here, RLA claimed that it owed 

no duty to Florence based on the open-and-obvious doctrine. 

{¶5} The open-and-obvious doctrine negates the duty of “an owner or 

occupier of property * * * to warn invitees entering the property of open and obvious 

dangers on the property.” (Internal citations omitted.) Simmers v. Bentley Constr. 

Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 597 N.E.2d 504 (1992), quoted in Vonderhaar at ¶ 24. 

The open-and-obvious doctrine arose out of premises liability law and extends only 

to those with the requisite property interest in the premises. Id. at 645. For other 

defendants, such as independent contractors, ordinary negligence principles apply, 

including a comparative-negligence analysis, if appropriate. Id. at 645-646. 

{¶6} Although RLA moved for summary judgment based on the open-andobvious doctrine, it failed to demonstrate that it had the requisite property interest in 

the premises necessary to gain the benefit of the doctrine. In fact, the record 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4

demonstrates only that Florence owned the premises where she was injured and that 

RLA was an independent contractor working for Duke Energy Ohio. Thus, RLA 

cannot assert the “open-and-obvious doctrine” as a complete defense to liability. See 

Simmers; Vonderhaar. 

{¶7} Because RLA failed meet its burden under Civ.R. 56 to establish that it 

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court erred by granting 

summary judgment in its favor. Accordingly, we sustain the assignment of error. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶8} We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for RLA on the 

Eschmanns’ negligence and loss-of-consortium claims, and we remand this cause for 

further proceedings consistent with the law and this opinion. 

Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

DEWINE and MOCK, JJ., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.