J-S32031-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFERY DORSEY,

Appellant No. 2743 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 26, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos.: CP-51-CR-0431471-1981

CP-51-CR-0503081-1981

CP-51-CR-0503391-1981

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2016

Appellant, Jeffery Dorsey, appeals pro se from the order dismissing his 

petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. Appellant’s petition is untimely with no statutory 

exception to the time bar properly pleaded and proven. Appellant has also 

filed a pro se application for relief captioned “Appellant Authorities,” and an 

application for reconsideration. We affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s 

petition and deny his applications as moot. 

In 1981, Appellant was convicted in two separate trials of multiple 

crimes including rape, robbery, burglary, theft by unlawful taking and 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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conspiracy. On March 9, 1982, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 

incarceration of not less than twenty-three nor more than forty-six years in 

a state correctional institution. (See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/22/15, at 1-

2). This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. (See Commonwealth 

v. Dorsey, 482 A.2d 667 (Pa. Super. 1984) (unpublished memorandum)).

On August 8, 2012, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition. The 

court appointed counsel who, in due course, filed a Turner/Finley “no 

merit” letter. (See “No Merit/Finley Letter,” 2/11/15, at 1-6); see also 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). The PCRA court 

permitted her to withdraw. After notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the 

PCRA court dismissed the petition, on August 26, 2015. This timely appeal 

followed on September 8, 2015. Appellant filed a statement of errors on 

September 29, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court filed its 

opinion on October 22, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

Preliminarily, we observe that Appellant’s brief fails to comply not only 

with our procedural rules, but even with the most basic requirements of an 

intelligible argument.1 The pages are not consecutively numbered, making 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant filed both his brief and his reproduced record late, on January 12, 

2016. Appellant has filed an Application for Reconsideration, on March 29, 

2016. The application offers an explanation of the circumstances which he 

claims led to (and excused) the late filings. In the interest of justice, and for 

the sake of judicial economy, we have reviewed Appellant’s filings on their 

respective merits, such as there are. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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referencing, let alone cross-referencing, virtually impossible. More 

substantively, Appellant fails to identify any cognizable PCRA court errors. 

In fact, he has failed to include a statement of questions involved on appeal 

at all. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a): (“The statement of the questions involved 

must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and 

circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail.”). 

Similarly, Appellant’s purported concise statement of errors is little 

more than an unfocussed assortment of alleged grievances. These include 

his claimed right to substitute PCRA counsel, an attempt to incorporate by 

reference a variety of previously filed motions, a complaint addressed 

personally to the PCRA judge, and so forth. (See “Claims of Error,” 

9/29/15, at 1-2; see also Appellant’s Brief, “Court’s Exhibit “B,” at 1-4).

Instead of specific reviewable claims, Appellant opts in general for a 

long, rambling narrative punctuated by broad critiques of the PCRA court 

judge, his accuracy, (“totally wrong”) (Appellant’s Brief, at 6), his “Bias,” 

(id. at 12), and even his veracity, (“[T]hat’s a lie.”). (Id.). 

Appellant fails to develop legal arguments or present meaningful 

authority rationally related to support of any of his claims. Often his 

assertions are simply unintelligible, e.g., “[I]t’s just a shame that a (bunch 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

review this application for reconsideration on the merits, and we decline to 

do so. Appellant’s application is denied as moot. 
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of kid pornographic’s) [sic] will try to keep a child, now a grown man in 

prison to die.” (Id. at 4) (parenthesis in original). 

[A]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials 

filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no 

special benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant 

must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or 

dismiss an appeal if an appellant fails to conform with the 

requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. For example,

The argument [section] shall be divided into as many parts 

as there are questions to be argued; and shall have as the 

head of each part-in distinctive type or in type distinctively 

displayed-the particular point treated therein, followed by 

such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed 

pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). In the instant case, the defects in Appellant’s 

brief are substantial. . . . See Pa.R.A.P. 2116, 2119. Appellant’s 

. . . argument is rambling, repetitive and often incoherent. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice we 

address the arguments that can reasonably be discerned from 

this defective brief.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251-52 (Pa. Super. 2003), 

appeal denied, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005) (case citation omitted).2 

To the extent review of the PCRA court’s determinations is 

implicated, an appellate court reviews the PCRA court’s findings 

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2

In the spirit of liberal construction espoused in Lyons, we disregard, as the 

PCRA court did, Appellant’s failure to file separate notices of appeal under 

the proper docket numbers. (See PCRA Ct. Op., at 2-3); see also Grossi 

v. Travelers Pers. Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1145 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2013), 

appeal denied, 101 A.3d 103 (Pa. 2014) (“[I]n the interests of justice and to 

promote judicial economy an appellate court may ‘regard as done that which 

ought to have been done’ and proceed in the matter.”). 
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of fact to determine whether they are supported by the record, 

and reviews its conclusions of law to determine whether they are 

free from legal error. The scope of review is limited to the 

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level. 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted). For questions of law the appellate standard of 

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. See id. 

We must first address whether Appellant satisfied the 

timeliness requirements of the PCRA. The timeliness of a PCRA 

petition is a jurisdictional threshold and may not be disregarded 

in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA 

petition that is untimely. Effective January 16, 1996, the PCRA 

was amended to require a petitioner to file any PCRA petition 

within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes 

final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence 

becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States 

and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of 

time for seeking the review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). . . . 

[A]n untimely petition may be received when the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited 

exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), are met. A petition 

invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within sixty days 

of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions 

to the PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, the petitioner must plead 

and prove specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised 

within the sixty-day time frame under section 9545(b)(2). 

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4-5 (Pa. Super. 2014) (case 

citations, internal quotation marks and other punctuation omitted). 

Here, because Appellant’s sentence became final prior to January 16, 

1996, he had one year from that date, or January 16, 1997, to file a timely 
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first PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056-

57 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 724 A.2d 348 (Pa. 1998). He did not. 

Therefore, Appellant’s PCRA petition, filed in 2012, is untimely on its 

face, and the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of 

Appellant’s claims unless he pleads and proves one of the three statutory 

exceptions to the time bar. 

Liberally construed, Appellant invokes the exception for newly 

discovered facts, specifically, notice from the Department of Corrections that 

it computed his sentences to be consecutive. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 13; 

see also Sentence Status Summary, Appellant’s Brief, at Exhibit E, at 1-3). 

However, Appellant concedes that he learned about this purportedly 

erroneous calculation on November 25, 2002. (See Appellant’s PCRA 

Petition, at 11-13). 

Nevertheless, he did not file his PCRA petition until August 8, 2012, 

almost ten years later. Accordingly, Appellant failed to comply with 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), (“Any petition invoking an exception provided in 

paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have 

been presented.”). 

Furthermore, a claim that the Department of Corrections erroneously 

calculated a sentence is outside of the scope of the PCRA, requiring an 

original action in the Commonwealth Court. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 

563 A.2d 511, 512-13 (Pa. Super. 1989); see also Commonwealth v. 
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Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 394-95 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 

524 (Pa. 2014) (following Perry). None of Appellant’s myriad of other 

undeveloped claims presents anything remotely resembling one of the three 

statutory exemptions to the PCRA time bar.

Accordingly, Appellant’s petition is untimely, with no exception to the 

statutory time bar pleaded and proven. The PCRA court correctly 

determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of Appellant’s petition 

and properly dismissed it. On independent review, we discern no other basis 

on which to disturb the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition as 

untimely. See Spotz, supra at 311.

Appellant has also filed a pro se application for relief captioned 

“Appellant Authorities.” (See Appellant Authorities, 3/18/16, at 1-2). Aside 

from requesting the Prothonotary to send back to Appellant all his previous 

filings, the application does not seek a specific form of judicial relief. Rather, 

it appears to be an effort by Appellant to supply additional authority he 

believes will support his original petition. Nothing in the filing would alter 

our disposition.

Order affirmed. Applications denied as moot. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2016