*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
DANIEL KLEIN v. QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY

(AC 41964)

Lavine, Keller and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant private university for negligence in connection with personal injuries he sustained

when, while riding his bicycle on the defendant’s campus, he hit a speed

bump and was thrown over the bicycle’s handlebars. The plaintiff alleged

that the speed bump was a dangerous, defective and unsafe condition

on the defendant’s property and that his injuries resulted from the

defendant’s negligence. The defendant denied any negligence and raised

as a special defense that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Following a trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendant, but no interrogatories were submitted to it. The trial court rendered

judgment in accordance with the verdict, and the plaintiff appealed to

this court. Held:

1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred by

declining to instruct the jury on the definition of, and the duty owed

to, a licensee: the evidence in the record did not reasonably support a

conclusion that the plaintiff was a licensee, as there was no evidence

that the defendant explicitly or implicitly expressed a desire that the

plaintiff enter its campus or a willingness that he do so, and, contrary

to the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant impliedly gave him consent to ride his bicycle on the campus because there was a lack of ‘‘no

trespassing’’ signs and no gate or the like at each entrance to the campus,

the lack of such signs or a gate at each entrance, without some additional

evidence demonstrating implied consent, was insufficient to send the

question of whether the plaintiff was a licensee to the jury, and if this

court were to adopted the plaintiff’s reasoning and permit liability to

be imposed in situations such as these, it essentially would require

many private properties in the state that are now used for recreational

purposes, to be fenced, gated and covered with ‘‘no trespassing’’ signs

to bar access by the public, which would have significant societal impact

and concomitant cost; moreover, even if this court were to assume that

the plaintiff was a licensee, the evidence did not support a finding that

the defendant breached any duty to the plaintiff as a licensee because,

under the circumstances in this case, the defendant was not required

to warn the plaintiff of the obvious dangers of his actions, namely, riding

his bicycle over a speed bump as he proceeded down a hill with no

intention of obeying the stop sign that lay just beyond the speed bump.

2. The general verdict rule precluded review of the plaintiff’s claim that the

trial court improperly permitted a certain witness to testify concerning

the estimated speed of the plaintiff’s bicycle at the time of the accident;

because the general verdict rule applied, this court was required to

presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the defendant,

including that the defendant was not negligent, and, therefore, that rule

precluded review of the plaintiff’s remaining evidentiary claim, which

related only to the defendant’s special defense of contributory negligence.

(One judge dissenting)

Argued May 16—officially released October 8, 2019

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for the defendant’s alleged

negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New Haven, and tried

to the jury before, Wahla, J.; verdict and judgment for

the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Steven D. Jacobs, with whom, on the brief, was Rich-
ard L. Jacobs, for the appellant (plaintiff).

James E. Wildes, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. In this premises liability action, the plaintiff, Daniel Klein, appeals from the judgment of the

trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the

defendant, Quinnipiac University. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by (1) permitting

a witness to testify about the estimated speed of the

plaintiff’s bicycle at the time of his collision, and (2)

refusing to give a jury instruction on the definition of,

and the duty owed to, a licensee. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. The weather was clear and sunny on July 30,

2014, and the plaintiff, who was then seventy-one years

old, and his friend, Richard Lebov, decided to take a

bike ride through the defendant’s campus because the

‘‘hill’’ offered a ‘‘difficult climb’’ that was ‘‘fun’’ and ‘‘a

challenge.’’ The two had ridden their bicycles there the

year before. They were not students at the defendant,

employed at the defendant, invited onto the campus,

or planning to meet anyone on the campus.1 The campus

was not gated, and there were no ‘‘no trespassing’’ signs.

Upon entering the campus, there were alternative

routes available, one of which would pass by a guardhouse where a public safety officer was stationed at all

times.2 There was a sign posted on the guardhouse

directing vehicles to check in.3

The plaintiff and Lebov took the road to the right

that avoided the guardhouse and rode to the top of the

hill.4 They rode down the hill on a road that passes near

the guardhouse. At the end of the road, there were two

bright yellow speed bumps and a stop sign. There was

nothing that obstructed the plaintiff’s, or Lebov’s, view

of the speed bumps and the stop sign—especially as it

was a clear and sunny day. Both of them saw the bright

yellow speed bumps clearly.5

At trial, the plaintiff and Lebov each testified that

they had no intention of stopping at the stop sign.6 They

both rode over the first speed bump without incident.

When the plaintiff’s bicycle made contact with the second speed bump, he flew over the top of his handlebars,

hit the ground, and sustained serious injuries. The officer stationed at the guardhouse, Juan Melendez, called

dispatch, and the plaintiff received medical assistance.

Officer Melendez had seen the plaintiff and Lebov

ride up the hill and had left the guardhouse to survey

the area because he thought that they were still in the

general area.7 He turned when he heard a noise and

saw the tire of the plaintiff’s bicycle hit the second

speed bump and the plaintiff thrown over the handlebars. Officer Melendez was permitted, over objection,

to testify that the plaintiff’s speed was ‘‘conservatively

ten miles an hour’’ or faster because of the hill’s incline.

The plaintiff brought the present action, seeking mon-
etary damages, claiming that the speed bump was dangerous, defective, and unsafe and that his injuries

resulted from the defendant’s negligence. The defendant denied any negligence and raised the special

defense that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.

The case was tried to a jury, but no interrogatories were

submitted to it. Following the trial, the jury returned a

general verdict in favor of the defendant, and the court

rendered judgment accordingly. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff first challenges the court’s evidentiary

ruling permitting Officer Melendez to estimate the

speed of the plaintiff’s bicycle. Second, he claims that

the court improperly refused to instruct the jury that

his status could have been that of a licensee and erred

by charging the jury only on his status as a trespasser.8

The defendant, however, argues that the general verdict

rule applies to this case and precludes a review of the

plaintiff’s contentions on appeal. The plaintiff argues

that although the general verdict rule might insulate

the verdict from attack in other circumstances, it does

not do so in the present case because the improper

jury charge affected both the negligence claim and the

contributory negligence special defense. We view the

plaintiff’s second claim of error with respect to the jury

charge to be without merit, and we conclude that the

general verdict rule applies to defeat the plaintiff’s first

claim. We address the plaintiff’s second claim first.

The essential issue in this case is whether the plaintiff,

an experienced bicyclist, who was injured while riding

his bicycle on the York Hill campus of the defendant,

a private university, was entitled to have the jury

instructed on the definition of, and the duty owed to,

a licensee. The trial court decided that the issue was

one of law, that the evidence did not support the claim

that the plaintiff was a licensee, and that he was not

entitled to such a jury charge. On appeal, the plaintiff

claims that it was reversible error for the court to take

the issue away from the jury, which returned a verdict

in favor of the defendant, because, in his view, there

was evidence that the defendant implicitly consented

to his presence.

Connecticut’s premises liability law has long provided that ‘‘[t]he status of an entrant on another’s land,

be it trespasser, licensee or invitee, determines the duty

that is owed to the entrant while he or she is on a

landowner’s property.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, 178 Conn. App. 647, 655, 176

A.3d 586 (2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 906, 177 A.3d

1159 (2018). ‘‘Ordinarily, the status of one who sustains

injury while upon the property of another is a question

of fact.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moonan

v. Clark Wellpoint Corp., 159 Conn. 178, 185, 268 A.2d

384 (1970); see also Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn.

110, 112, 148 A.2d 142 (1959). ‘‘Where, however, the

facts essential to the determination of the plaintiff’s
status are not in dispute, a legal question is presented.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gargano v. Azpiri,

110 Conn. App. 502, 506, 955 A.2d 593 (2008); see also

Brown v. Robishaw, 282 Conn. 628, 633, 922 A.2d 1086

(2007) (‘‘[i]f . . . the evidence would not reasonably

support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court

has a duty not to submit it to the jury’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The plaintiff argues that he asked the court to charge

the jury on the definition of and the duty owed to a

licensee. He cites in his appellate brief to a proposed

jury instruction that states: ‘‘A licensee is a person who

is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue

of the possessor’s consent, that is, with the possessor’s

permission or with the possessor’s express or implied

consent.’’ (Emphasis in original.) See Connecticut Civil

Jury Instructions 3.9-3, available at http://www.jud.ct.-

gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf (last visited October 3, 2019).9 He

argues that the ‘‘evidence reasonably supported a finding that [he], while on the defendant’s property on July

30, 2014, was there, if not with the possessor’s express

consent, then with its implied consent . . . .’’

While the civil jury instruction cited to by the plaintiff

contains the phrases ‘‘express consent’’ and ‘‘implied

consent,’’ those precise phrases do not appear in our

case law discussing the classification of someone entering onto someone else’s land. Rather, our Supreme

Court, guided by § 330 of the Restatement (First) of

Torts, has defined a licensee as ‘‘a person who is privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the

possessor’s consent, whether given by invitation or

permission.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469,

473, 78 A.2d 693 (1951); see also Salaman v. Waterbury,

246 Conn. 298, 305, 717 A.2d 161 (1998) (same).

Although our Supreme Court has made clear that

licensee status can be established by demonstrating

that the possessor of the land gave someone permission

or an invitation to enter the property, only a few cases

following our Supreme Court’s adoption of the licensee

definition discuss such status, and they shed little light

on precisely what a plaintiff entrant is required to show

in order to establish that it received the requisite

consent.

For example, in Salaman v. Waterbury, supra, 246

Conn. 301, an administrator of a swimmer’s estate

brought an action against the defendant city for premises liability negligence, after the swimmer drowned

while swimming across a reservoir owned by the city.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, but

the court ultimately granted the city’s motion to set

aside the verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict, concluding that there was insufficient evidence

to impose either trespasser or licensee liability. Id.,

303. This court disagreed and reversed the trial court’s
judgment. Id. Our Supreme Court then granted certification to appeal. Id., 304. After defining ‘‘licensee,’’ the

court went on to note that ‘‘[i]n order to prove that the

decedent was a licensee, the plaintiff was required to

prove that the decedent was on the city’s land with its

permission or by its express or implied invitation.’’10

Id., 306.

In construing this statement by our Supreme Court,

it is unclear whether licensee status can also be established by implied permission. One could argue that the

absence of the phrase ‘‘express or implied’’ before the

word ‘‘permission’’ suggests that the court intended to

preclude proof of licensee status by implied permission.

One could also argue that our Supreme Court’s use

of the phrase ‘‘implied invitation’’ was intended to be

interchangeable with ‘‘implied permission.’’ The court

in Salaman, however, did not reach the issue of whether

the swimmer was in fact a licensee or provide any

further analysis on his status. The court concluded that

it need not examine the record to determine if there

was some evidence from which the jury reasonably

might have concluded that the decedent was a licensee

because, even if it assumed that the decedent was a

licensee, the evidence did not support a finding that

the city breached any duty to the decedent as a licensee.

Id, 306.

Older case law, however, suggests that implied permission may be sufficient to establish licensee status.

For example, in Katsonas v. Sutherland Building &

Contracting Co., 104 Conn. 54, 132 A. 553 (1926), which

was decided prior to our Supreme Court’s adoption

of its current licensee definition, stated that ‘‘when a

landowner tacitly permits certain acts upon his property, a license to do these acts may be inferred from

his failure to object . . . .’’

In an attempt to clarify this ambiguity and determine

what proof is permissible to establish licensee status,

we turn our attention to the comments of § 330 of the

Restatement (First) of Torts, the section from which

our Supreme Court adopted the licensee definition.

Comment (a) to that section states: ‘‘ ‘Invitation’ and

‘permission.’ An invitation differs from a permission

only in this: an invitation is conduct which justifies

others in believing that the possessor desires them to

enter; a permission is conduct justifying others in

believing that the possessor is willing that they shall

enter if they desire to do so. It is immaterial whether

the consent which creates the license is an invitation

originating with the possessor of the land or by a permission given upon request made by the licensee. The

important fact is that the entry is by the consent of the

possessor and it is immaterial that the suggestion of

the visit originates with him or with his licensee.’’ 2

Restatement (First), Torts § 330, comment (a), p. 893

(1934).
Furthermore, comment (b) to § 330 of the

Restatement (First) of Torts states: ‘‘ ‘Toleration’ and

‘permission.’ The word ‘permission’ indicates that the

possessor’s conduct is such as to give others reason to

believe that he consents to their entering the land if

they desire to do so. A mere failure to object to another’s

entry may be a sufficient manifestation of consent

thereto if the possessor knows of the other’s intention

to enter and has reason to believe that his objection

is likely to be effective in preventing the other from

entering. On the other hand, the fact that the possessor

knows of the other’s intention to enter and does not

prevent it may not be of itself a sufficient manifestation

of consent and, therefore, is not necessarily permission.

A failure to take burdensome and expensive precautions against intrusion manifests an unwillingness to

go to the trouble and expense of preventing others from

trespassing upon the land and expresses toleration of

the practically unavoidable rather than consent to their

entry as licensees. Even a failure to post a notice warning the public not to trespass cannot reasonably be

construed as an expression of consent to the intrusions

of persons who habitually and notoriously disregard

such notices.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., comment (b),

p. 893–94.

Additionally, comment (d) to § 330 of the

Restatement (First) of Torts states in relevant part:

‘‘License created otherwise than by words. The consent

which is necessary to confer a license to enter land,

may be expressed by acts other than words. Here again

the decisive factor is the interpretation which a reasonable man would put upon the possessor’s acts.’’ Id.,

comment (d), p. 894.

In light of the guidance provided in the comments to

§ 330 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, and in light

of the myriad cases from other jurisdictions recognizing

that both express and implied permission is sufficient

to render an entrant a licensee; see, e.g., Fitzsimmons

v. State, 42 App. Div. 2d 636, 637, 345 N.Y.S.2d 171

(1973) (‘‘[a] licensee is one who enters the premises for

his own benefit without invitation, but with permission,

express or implied, of the owner or person in possession’’), aff’d, 34 N.Y.2d 739, 313 N.E.2d 790, 357 N.Y.S.2d

498 (1974); we are assuming, arguendo, that express or

implied permission, in addition to an express or implied

invitation, if established, can render an entrant a

licensee.

In the present case, we must determine if the court

properly concluded, as a matter of law, that the evidence did not reasonably support a finding that the

plaintiff was a licensee. See Gargano v. Azpiri, supra,

110 Conn. App. 506 (‘‘[w]here . . . the facts essential

to the determination of the plaintiff’s status are not in

dispute, a legal question is presented’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
We conclude that the essential facts in the present

case are not in dispute, and, thus, the determination of

the plaintiff’s status is a question of law. The essential

facts are as follows: The plaintiff is an avid bicyclist;

he entered the private campus of the defendant on his

bicycle; he did not stop at the clearly visible guardhouse

located near the two main roads accessing the buildings

on campus, but took the road that avoided it by riding

to the right of it; there were no ‘‘no trespassing’’ signs

present; there were not gates at every entrance to the

campus; the plaintiff was not employed by the defendant at the time of the accident; he was not a student

or a parent of a student attending the university; he

had no other purpose for being on campus other than

his desire to continue his bike ride through the campus,

which he had done one previous time a year earlier;

and there was no evidence that the defendant knew of

the plaintiff’s prior bike ride on the campus a year

earlier.

On the basis of the record before us, we have little

difficulty concluding that the court properly declined

to give the jury a licensee instruction. The evidence in

the present case did not reasonably support a conclusion that the plaintiff was a licensee—that is, that he

received an express or implied invitation or express or

implied permission to enter the campus. Indeed, there

was no evidence of the defendant’s having explicitly or

implicitly expressed a desire that the plaintiff enter its

campus, nor was there any evidence of the defendant’s

having expressed a willingness that he do so. See 2

Restatement (First), supra, § 330, comment (a), p. 893.

The plaintiff primarily argues that the defendant

impliedly gave him consent to ride his bicycle on the

campus because there was a lack of ‘‘no trespassing’’

signs and no gate or the like at each and every entrance

to the campus. The lack of ‘‘no trespassing’’ signs or a

gate at each entrance, however, without some additional evidence demonstrating implied consent, is insufficient to send the question of whether the plaintiff was

a licensee to the jury. See 2 Restatement (First), supra,

§ 330, comment (b), p. 894 (‘‘[e]ven a failure to post a

notice warning the public not to trespass cannot reasonably be construed as an expression of consent’’). Put

another way, there is insufficient evidence in the record

before us demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct,

either expressly or implicitly, made others believe that

the defendant was willing to let them enter the campus

if they desired to do so. If we were to adopt the plaintiff’s

reasoning and permit liability to be imposed in situations such as these, ‘‘no trespassing’’ signs will go up,

along with fences and gates, barring access to many

private properties now used for recreational purposes,

creating closed enclaves throughout our state. The societal impact, and concomitant cost, of such a ruling

would be significant. See, e.g., Salaman v. Waterbury,
supra, 246 Conn. 307 (‘‘A rule requiring a property owner

to post warning signs about the dangers inherent in

swimming is unreasonable. In Connecticut, a small

state, hundreds of miles of shoreline would be exposed

to this unreasonable requirement. Property owners who

have water on their land are entitled to assume that a

reasonable adult would be aware of the risk of drowning

in a body of water.’’) We, therefore, conclude that the

court did not err in declining to instruct the jury on

licensee status and its corresponding duty of care.11

Moreover, even if we were to assume that the plaintiff

in this case was a licensee, we would be unable to

conclude that the evidence supports a finding that the

defendant breached any duty to the plaintiff as a

licensee. See Salaman v. Waterbury, supra, 246 Conn.

306. ‘‘The duty that a . . . [landowner] owes to a

licensee . . . does not ordinarily encompass the

responsibility to keep the property in a reasonably safe

condition, because the licensee must take the premises

as he [or she] finds them. . . . If the licensor actually

or constructively knows of the licensee’s presence on

the premises, however, the licensor must use reasonable care both to refrain from actively subjecting him

[or her] to danger and to warn him [or her] of dangerous

conditions which the possessor knows of but which he

[or she] cannot reasonably assume that the licensee

knows of or by reasonable use of his [or her] faculties

would observe.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Morin v. Bell Court Condominium

Assn., Inc., 223 Conn. 323, 327, 612 A.2d 1197 (1992).

The plaintiff would have been required to establish

that the defendant breached the duty owed to a licensee.

On the basis of our review of the evidence, no jury

reasonably could have concluded that the defendant

breached that duty even if one assumes the plaintiff

was a licensee. In particular, there was no claim or

evidence to support a finding that the defendant actively

subjected the plaintiff to danger. Thus, the defendant’s

duty to the plaintiff, had he in fact been a licensee,

would be to ‘‘warn him [or her] of dangerous conditions

which the possessor knows of but which he [or she]

cannot reasonably assume that the licensee knows of

or by reasonable use of his [or her] faculties would

observe.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 329.

We are simply unwilling to conclude that on a sunny

and clear day, a plainly visible bright yellow speed bump

located on a paved road, even if on a hill, can be considered a hidden, dangerous condition. In fact, there was

testimony that speed bumps ‘‘are a known hazard to

bicyclists.’’ Moreover, there was no evidence before the

jury demonstrating that the defendant was aware of

this alleged defect. In particular, there was no evidence

that the defendant was aware that the way that the

speed bump was constructed rendered the premises

unsafe. Here, under the circumstances of this case, the
plaintiff should have been aware of the dangers of riding

his bicycle over a speed bump as he proceeded down

the hill with no intention of obeying the stop sign that

lay just beyond the speed bumps. See, e.g., Hanks v.

Powder Ridge Restaurant Corp., 276 Conn. 314, 336

n.12, 885 A.2d 734 (2005) (‘‘[t]he risks inherent in each

type of recreational activity will necessarily vary, and it

is common knowledge that some recreational activities

are inherently more dangerous than others’’); see also

Rivera v. Glen Oaks Village Owners, Inc., 41 App. Div.

3d 817, 820, 839 N.Y.S.2d 183 (2007) (‘‘[b]y engaging in

a sport or recreational activity, a participant consents

to those commonly-appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally

and flow from such participation’’) Even if we had

assumed the plaintiff was a licensee, we would conclude on the facts of the present case that the defendant

was not required to warn the plaintiff of the obvious

dangers of his actions.

Lastly, we conclude that the general verdict rule

applies to defeat the plaintiff’s remaining claim that the

court improperly permitted Officer Melendez to estimate the speed of the plaintiff’s bicycle. ‘‘[The general

verdict] rule operates . . . to insulate a verdict that

may have been reached under a cloud of error, but

which also could have been reached by an untainted

route.’’ Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., supra, 248

Conn. 376. ‘‘[It] applies whenever a verdict for one party

could reasonably have been rendered on one or more

distinct causes of action or distinct defenses. . . . [A]

defendant[’s] denial of negligence and . . . allegations

of contributory negligence constitute two discrete

defenses, either of which could [support a] jury’s general verdict. . . . The verdict [could be] predicated on

the defendant[’s] freedom from negligence or on the

plaintiff’s comparatively greater negligence. . . . In

light of [a] plaintiff’s failure to request interrogatories

to ascertain the basis of the jury’s verdict, [the verdict]

must [be] uph[eld] . . . under the general verdict rule,

if either defense is legally supportable. . . . Further,

if the trial court’s instructions to the jury are shown to

be proper and adequate as to any of the defenses raised,

the general verdict must stand, regardless of error, if

any, in the charge as to any other defense.’’12 (Citations

omitted.) Staudinger v. Barrett, 208 Conn. 94, 99–100,

544 A.2d 164 (1988).

Because the general verdict rule applies, we must

presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the

defendant. We, therefore, conclude that the jury found

that the defendant was not negligent. The plaintiff’s

remaining evidentiary claim, that the court improperly

permitted Officer Melendez to estimate the speed of

the plaintiff’s bicycle, relates only to the contributory

negligence special defense. As such, it is precluded by

the general verdict rule; see Segale v. O’Connor, 91

Conn. App. 674, 680, 881 A2d 1048 (2005); and does not
require further discussion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion KELLER, J., concurred.

1 The plaintiff gave the following testimony:

‘‘Q. And on the day of the accident, no one invited you to go onto the

campus, is that fair to say?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. And no one gave you permission to enter the campus?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. You just decided to go up the hill and go onto the campus?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. And you never worked there?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. You weren’t a student there?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. You were never a student there?

‘‘A. Never.

‘‘Q. You didn’t know anybody who worked there?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. So, your sole purpose of going onto the campus that day was just to

go for a bike ride?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. And [the defendant] is a private university, is that so?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. All right. So, you went onto private property to go for your bike ride?

‘‘A. Correct.’’

2

In our view, the dissent places too much weight on Officer Juan Melendez’

following testimony in support of its argument that ‘‘visitors without any

affiliation with the defendant were generally permitted [on campus] unless

they appeared suspicious’’:

‘‘Q. . . . [I]t’s within the—and that person is not affiliated with the university, it’s within the discretion of the officer then on duty to let that person

up; is it not?

‘‘A. Yes, it is.

‘‘Q. And is it fair to say that unless that person appears to be suspicious

in some way that you, as the guard at the guardhouse, would be inclined

to exercise your discretion to let that person up.

‘‘A. Yes.’’

Notably, Officer Melendez additionally testified to the following:

‘‘Q. When you were assigned to the [defendant’s] York Hill campus in the

guardhouse, what were your—what were your responsibilities?

‘‘A. My responsibilities when I was assigned there was to man that gate,

stop traffic, make sure—ask for [identification cards], determine who was

coming on campus and what are their nature; what are they there for. One

of the reasons they have us ask for student [identification cards] is because

we would have people that may want to come on campus that are not

students or affiliated with the [defendant], and we do not want to have

people that do not belong there there. Because if something happens there

could—hurt somebody or do something that they’re not, you know, of

criminal intent. So, that’s why they have us there.

‘‘Q. Is [the defendant] a private university?

‘‘A. It’s private.

‘‘Q. And the property of York Hill campus that’s private property?

‘‘A. That’s a private property. . . .

‘‘Q. Back on July 30, 2014, what was the practice and procedure of guards,

such as yourself, public safety officers, if someone had stopped at the

guardhouse going up the York Hill campus?

‘‘A. You would ask in—you would ask them for their information, their

[identification card], and their business there. If they were a student, faculty,

staff, and—you would let them go because they would have a decal on

their vehicle.’’

3 The dissent’s supposition that ‘‘the only apparent purpose of the guardhouse was to limit vehicular access’’ is not supported by the record. The

testimony on the issue from Officer Melendez was that ‘‘[t]he reason there’s

a guardhouse is for security reasons. [The defendant has] a student population that [it is] responsible for.’’ Likewise, Barbara Barbuito, the assistant

director of facilities for the defendant’s York Hill campus, testified as follows:

‘‘Q. Why is there a guardhouse in that location?

‘‘A. There’s a guardhouse there so no one enters, other than faculty,
students, and student parents, and our staff. . . .

‘‘Q. I mean security, are—are you concerned about the security of the

students, their safety at campus?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Is that—could you tell us whether or not that’s a reason why there’s

a guardhouse there?

‘‘A. That is the reason why there’s a guardhouse, so, there’s only specific

people that are allowed past that guardhouse. . . .

‘‘Q. Is the guardhouse occupied?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And who occupies the guardhouse?

‘‘A. Public safety.

‘‘Q. And how often does public safety occupy the guardhouse?

‘‘A. 24/7.

‘‘Q. Does that include the summer time?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. And on July 30, 2014, was the guardhouse—did the guardhouse have

somebody in it?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Why was there somebody in the guardhouse?

‘‘A. For safety.

‘‘Q. What are the responsibilities of a public safety officer of [the defendant] who’s assigned to that guardhouse?

‘‘A. So, he is not to allow anyone, other than a student, staff member,

faculty, or a parent up in the area where the dorms are located. . . .

‘‘Q. Could you tell us whether or not it’s the responsibility of who’s

ever assigned to the guardhouse to stop people from entering that area of

campus? . . .

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Is [the defendant] a private or public university?

‘‘A. Private.

‘‘Q. And is the York Hill campus part of the [defendant]?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Is that private or public?’’

‘‘A. Private.

‘‘Q. Does [the defendant] have a policy regarding individuals who come

onto the campus who are not students, faculty, staff?

‘‘A. I believe it’s a verbal policy that no one is allowed in the areas where

the student dorms are.

‘‘Q. And was that policy in place on July 30, 2014?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. If someone rode up on a bicycle to the open campus where the

guardhouse [was] back on July 30, 2014, what was the procedure that was

in place at the time for public safety?

‘‘A. They would stop them, and ask for [identification], and ask them what

they were doing on campus.

‘‘Q. And, again, why would they do that?

‘‘A. For the safety of the students.’’

4 The plaintiff testified to the following on cross-examination:

‘‘Q. Exactly. So, rather than go up to the guardhouse to check in at the

guardhouse, you took a right?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. You didn’t see what the sign said?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. Because you avoided the guardhouse by going to the right?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. So, obviously, you didn’t stop at the guardhouse and check in?

‘‘A. Correct.’’

On redirect examination the plaintiff testified to the following:

‘‘Q. Did you purposely avoid the guardhouse?

‘‘A. No, I came down by the guardhouse.’’

5 The plaintiff gave the following testimony:

‘‘Q. And you saw these speed bumps as you were going down the hill?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. And the speed bumps were yellow?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. And they were bright yellow?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Yes? And you had no difficulty seeing them?

‘‘A. No.’’
6 The plaintiff gave the following testimony:

‘‘Q. My question is, you were not planning on stopping at the stop sign

at the bottom of the hill, is that correct?

‘‘A. To make a full stop, no, that—we don’t—we never stop, make full

stops unless there was traffic or something. That’s just what bicyclists do.

When we get to a stop sign, we look both ways, if there’s nothing coming,

we—I mean, we slow until maybe one or two miles an hour. But to stop

means we have to get out of our pedals and put our feet down. . . .

‘‘Q. I think you just said that you were going to slow, but, you were—

you were not going to stop. Were you planning on stopping that day?

‘‘A. Was I planning on coming to a full stop, probably not. . . .

‘‘Q. Right. So, you didn’t plan on stopping?

‘‘A. Not to a full stop, no. . . .

‘‘Q. My question is this, you didn’t plan on stopping at the guardhouse,

is that correct?

‘‘A. That’s correct.

‘‘Q. Okay. And you didn’t plan on stopping at the stop sign, is that correct?

‘‘A. That is correct.’’

7 Officer Melendez gave the following testimony:

‘‘Q. Had you seen [the plaintiff] before the moment when you observed

him being thrown off the bike?

‘‘A. Yes.

‘‘Q. Where did you observe him?

‘‘A. I saw him come up the hill, and they went out through the backend

of the—of the campus where the armed gate is situated.

‘‘Q. So—so you saw him enter the campus?

‘‘A. I saw him en—enter—I saw him go up the campus, but they didn’t

go by me or by the guardhouse.

‘‘Q. They went up by the wind—by the wind farm.

‘‘A. By the wind farm.

‘‘Q. Okay. Did you call to any—withdrawn. Were there any other officers

on campus at that time?

‘‘A. There was another patrol officer.

‘‘Q. Did you call to the other patrol officer to alert him to the presence

of—of the bicyclists?

‘‘A. At the time I did not do that. That’s one of the reasons why I was

out of the guardhouse. I was looking in the general area, seeing traffic,

observing my—observing my surroundings. And—I—and usually I was

expecting them to come back.

‘‘Q. Okay. So, about how much time passed from the moment when while

standing outside of the guardhouse you observed them, the two—there were

two riders?

‘‘A. There were two riders.

‘‘Q. When you observed them right up the road past the wind farm to the

time when they came back?

‘‘A. Well, when they were coming up the hill, I was still in the guardhouse

when they went back through the wind farms. There was a time I couldn’t

tell you how long. And that’s when I exited the guardhouse and decided to

look around the area; observe my area.’’

Officer Melendez further testified:

‘‘Q. And can you just explain for the ladies and gentlemen of the jury

again, why you were not in the guardhouse and where you were?

‘‘A. I was in front of the guardhouse, towards the left side of it. I was

surveying my area, my post. I had [seen] bicycles—bicyclists come up, and

I thought they were still in the general area, but they didn’t come by my

gate. So, I was just surveying my area.’’

8 The court instructed the jury on the duty owed to a trespasser as well

as to a constant trespasser. Although used infrequently, our Supreme Court

has recognized the status of constant trespasser where a heightened duty is

owed when the possessor of land has knowledge that trespassers constantly

intrude upon a limited area of the land. See Morin v. Bell Court Condominium Assn., Inc., 223 Conn. 323, 333, 612 A.2d 1197 (1992). The court charged

the jury as follows: ‘‘If a possessor of the land has knowledge that the

trespassers constantly intrude upon a limited area of the land, the possessor

of the land is liable for an artificial condition that caused injury to the

trespasser on that part of the land if all of the following are met. The condition

is one that the possessor has created or maintains and the condition is

one that to the possessor’s knowledge is likely to cause death or serious

bodily harm to such trespasser. And the condition is of such nature—of

such a nature that the possessor has reason to believe that such trespasser
will not discover it. And the possessor has failed to use reasonable care to

warn such trespassers of [the] artificial condition and the risk involved.’’

9 The Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions state on page one of the collection: ‘‘This collection of jury instructions was compiled by the Civil Jury

Instruction Committee and is intended as a guide for judges and attorneys

in constructing charges and requests to charge. The use of these instructions

is entirely discretionary and their publication by the Judicial Branch is not

a guarantee of their legal sufficiency.’’ Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions,

available at https://jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf (last visited October 3, 2019).

10 Our Supreme Court has explained that a person ‘‘might be found to

have been impliedly invited if he came to the premises under either of two

sets of facts: First, because he was led to believe that [the premises] were

intended to be used by visitors or passengers, and that such use was not

only acquiesced in by the owner or person in possession and control of the

premises, but that it was in accordance with the intention and design with

which the way or place was adapted and prepared or allowed to be so used;

or, secondly, he was using them with the acquiescence, actual or implied,

of the defendant in pursuance of a matter of mutual interest.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dym v. Merit Oil Corp., 130

Conn. 585, 588–89, 36 A.2d 276 (1944).

11 We note that even if it was error for the court not to send the question

of whether the plaintiff was a licensee to the jury, the plaintiff’s one sentence

harmfulness argument contained in his appellate brief was insufficient to

address the harm of the court’s alleged error. See MacDermid, Inc. v.

Leonetti, 328 Conn. 726, 749, 183 A.3d 611 (2018) (‘‘Specifically, with respect

to jury instructions, we have explained that [i]t is axiomatic . . . that not

every error is harmful. . . . [W]e have often stated that before a party is

entitled to a new trial . . . he or she has the burden of demonstrating that

the error was harmful.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

In light of the court’s constant trespasser jury instruction; see footnote

8 of this opinion; which is substantially similar to the licensee instruction

the plaintiff seeks, it would have been incumbent upon the plaintiff to

address sufficiently the harm with respect to the court’s alleged error. See

MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, supra, 328 Conn. 748 (‘‘without adequate briefing on the harmfulness of an alleged error, the defendant is not entitled to

review of [the] claim on the merits’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

12 This court’s recent decision in Farmer-Lanctot v. Shand, 184 Conn.

App. 249, 194 A.3d 839 (2018), illustrates this principle. In Farmer-Lanctot,

two defenses, a denial of negligence and a special defense of contributory

negligence, could have supported the general verdict, and there was a claim

of instructional error as to each ground. Id., 254. This court, therefore,

considered the first claim of instructional error, which pertained to the

negligence claim, as part of its analysis into whether there was a properly

and adequately instructed defense that supported the verdict. Id., 254–59.

This court concluded that the general verdict rule applied because there

was no error in the instructions on the negligence claim, and, therefore, it

did not need to consider the claimed errors relating to contributory negligence. Id., 258–59.