1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

E1999-02516-COA-R9-CV

JEFFREY L. LAWSON, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9904-CH-00151

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

)

)

) INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL PURSUANT TO

v. ) RULE 9, T.R.A.P., FROM THE

) KNOX COUNTY CHANCERY COURT

)

)

UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, )

) HONORABLE SHARON BELL,

Defendant-Appellant.) CHANCELLOR

For Appellant For Appellee

BEAUCHAMP E. BROGAN VICTORIA H. BOWLING

General Counsel Norris, Tennessee

University of Tennessee

Knoxville, Tennessee

RONALD C. LEADBETTER

Associate General Counsel

University of Tennessee

Knoxville, Tennessee

O P I N I O N

REVERSED AND REMANDED Susano, J.

FILED

January 28, 2000

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk
 

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29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.

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We granted this Rule 9, T.R.A.P., application to

determine whether the defendant University of Tennessee (“the

University”) can be sued for a violation of the federal Fair

Labor Standards Act. We find that it cannot be sued for such

violations under the current state of the law. Accordingly, we

reverse the trial court’s order denying the University’s motion

to dismiss.

I.

Jeffrey L. Lawson (“Lawson”) filed a complaint in the

trial court alleging that the University had violated the federal

Fair Labor Standards Act of 19381 (“the FLSA”) (1) by “failing to

pay [Lawson] overtime compensation” and (2) by retaliating

against him “by refusing to issue [his] rightful retirement.” 

Lawson sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary

damages as to these two alleged violations of the FLSA. Lawson’s

complaint was met by the University’s motion to dismiss, in which

the University asserts that the trial court “lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim because said claim is barred

by the doctrine of sovereign immunity....” The University later

filed a supplemental motion, asserting, as an alternative basis

for dismissal, that the trial court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because, if the claim is not barred by sovereign

immunity, exclusive jurisdiction to consider it lies with the

Tennessee Claims Commission (“Claims Commission”). The trial

court denied both motions. The University seeks relief in the

Court of Appeals pursuant to our order granting a Rule 9,

T.R.A.P., appeal. The University raises the following issue for
 

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Because we find that the University is entitled to a dismissal on its

primary defense, we do not find it necessary to address the University’s

contention that this matter must be pursued before the Claims Commission. 

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our consideration: Is Lawson’s action under the FLSA barred by

the doctrine of sovereign immunity?2 We hold that it is.

II.

The issue presented by the University is purely a

question of law. Therefore, the record of the proceedings below

comes to us for a de novo review without a presumption of

correctness. Presley v. Bennett, 860 S.W.2d 857, 859-60 (Tenn.

1993); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91

(Tenn. 1993).

III.

After the University filed its notice of appeal, but

before the parties filed their briefs, the United States Supreme

Court released its opinion in Alden v. Maine, __ U.S. __, 119

S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999), wherein it addressed the

constitutionality of 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b)and 203(x), which code

sections purport to authorize actions under the FLSA against a

state in its own courts, even without that state’s consent. The

Supreme Court decreed that “the powers delegated to Congress

under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include

the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for

damages in state courts.” Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2246. (Emphasis

added). The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, went on to find

that Maine had not consented to be sued under the FLSA, and

affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Maine affirming the
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decision of the lower state courts dismissing the plaintiffs’

action under that act. Id. at 2269.

In light of the Alden decision, we must determine

whether the State of Tennessee has consented to be sued under the

FLSA in state court.

Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution

provides as follows:

That all courts shall be open; and every man,

for an injury done him in his lands, goods,

person or reputation, shall have remedy by

due course of law, and right and justice

administered without sale, denial, or delay. 

Suits may be brought against the State in

such manner and in such courts as the

Legislature may by law direct.

(Emphasis added). This provision and the broader concept of

sovereign immunity were addressed by the Tennessee Supreme Court

in the case of Spencer v. Cardwell, 937 S.W.2d 422 (Tenn. 1996):

The rule of sovereign immunity in this state

is both constitutional and statutory. 

Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee

Constitution provides in part that “Suits may

be brought against the State in such a manner

and in such courts as the Legislature may by

law direct.” This section has been

interpreted as a grant of sovereign immunity

to the state, and, accordingly, no suit

against the State may be sustained absent

express authorization from the Legislature. 

Coffman v. City of Pulaski, 220 Tenn. 642,

422 S.W.2d 429 (1967).

The Legislature codified this constitutional

prohibition in T.C.A. § 20-13-102(a) (1994),

which reads as follows:

No court in the state shall have

any power, jurisdiction, or

authority to entertain any suit

against the state, or against any

officer of the state acting by
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authority of the state, with a view

to reach the state, its treasury,

funds, or property, and all such

suits shall be dismissed as to the

state or such officers, on motion,

plea, or demurrer of the law

officer of the state, or counsel

employed for the state.

In the case of State ex rel. Allen v. Cook,

171 Tenn. 605, 106 S.W.2d 858, 860-61 (1937),

the supreme court stated:

Article 1, Section 17, of the

Constitution delegating to the

Legislature the power to authorize

suits against the state, being in

derogation of the state’s inherent

exemption from suit, must itself be

strictly construed; hence

legislation authorizing suits

against the state must strictly

pursue the constitutional

requirements, and be so plain,

clear, and unmistakable in its

provisions as to the manner and

form in which such suits may be

brought as to leave nothing to

surmise or conjecture.

Id. at 423-24. T.C.A. § 20-13-102(a) “bars not only suits with a

view to reach state funds, but also suits ‘with a view to reach

the state’ itself,” such as declaratory judgment actions. Id. at

424. (quoting Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 272

(Tenn.Ct.App. 1986)).

As it relates to the University, T.C.A. § 20-13-102,

partially quoted in Spencer, provides in subsection (b) as

follows:

No statutory or other provision authorizing

the University of Tennessee and its board of

trustees to sue and be sued shall constitute

a waiver of sovereign immunity.

T.C.A. § 20-13-102(b) (1994). By enacting T.C.A. § 20-13-102(b),

the Legislature made “quite clear...that it intended for the
 

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The civil service commission has “jurisdiction to hear civil service

appeals brought pursuant to statute and regulations promulgated pursuant

thereto.” T.C.A. § 8-30-108(2) (1993).

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University of Tennessee to be clothed with sovereign immunity.” 

Stokes v. University of Tennessee at Martin, 737 S.W.2d 545, 546

(Tenn.Ct.App. 1987).

Lawson argues that sovereign immunity does not bar his

claim because, according to him, the State waived its immunity as

to a suit against it under the FSLA when the Legislature enacted

T.C.A. § 9-8-307, dealing with the jurisdiction of the Tennessee

Claims Commission (“the Claims Commission”):

(a)(1) The [claims] commission...has

exclusive jurisdiction to determine all

monetary claims against the state based on

the acts or omissions of “state

employees,”...falling within one (1) or more

of the following categories:

* * *

(N) Negligent deprivation of statutory rights

created under Tennessee law, except for

actions arising out of claims over which the

civil service commission has jurisdiction.3

T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(N) (1999)(Emphasis added). Lawson argues

that the language of subsection (N) is an express waiver of

sovereign immunity and constitutes the State’s consent to be sued

under the FLSA. We disagree. In T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(N), the

Legislature expressly limited the breadth of the Claims

Commission’s jurisdiction over claims of deprivation of statutory

rights to those claims involving rights “created under Tennessee

law.” (Emphasis added). T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(N) does not

purport to give the Claims Commission jurisdiction over claims of

deprivation of statutory rights under federal law. Therefore, we

conclude that T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(N) cannot be construed as an
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expression of the Legislature’s intent to waive the State’s

immunity from suit under the FLSA. In fact, there is nothing in

any part of the statutory scheme pertaining to the Claims

Commission reflecting that the State has waived its sovereign

immunity as to suits under the FLSA.

Next, Lawson argues that the State has consented to be

sued under the FSLA and has thus waived its immunity to such

suits by enacting T.C.A. § 16-11-103 (1994). That statute grants

chancery court original jurisdiction of all cases of an equitable

nature. However, the language of that enactment cannot be

construed as an explicit waiver of immunity, for the simple

reason that it contains no language of the type contemplated by

Spencer. See 937 S.W.2d at 423. (“...no suit against the State

may be sustained absent express authorization from the

Legislature.” (Emphasis added)). 

Lawson also relies on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s

decision in Clover Bottom Hospital and School v. Townsend, 513

S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1974), in support of his contention that the

State has consented to be sued under the FLSA. We find this

reliance on Clover Bottom to be erroneous for two reasons. 

First, as we have already noted, sovereign immunity can be waived

only by express statutory authorization. Tenn. Const. art. I, §

17; Spencer, 937 S.W.2d at 423. Second, although the Tennessee

Supreme Court held in Clover Bottom that a state employee’s

action under the FLSA in state court is not barred by the

doctrine of sovereign immunity, that ruling was premised upon a

finding that the provisions of the FLSA authorizing suits by

state employees against the various states were valid. See

Clover Bottom, 513 S.W.2d at 507-08. The premise underlying
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Clover Bottom clearly has been invalidated by the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in the Alden case.

For all of the above reasons, we hold that the State

has not consented to suits brought under the FLSA. Therefore,

Lawson’s action against the University is barred by the doctrine

of sovereign immunity.

 

IV. 

The order of the trial court is reversed. This case is

remanded to the trial court for the entry of a judgment

dismissing the appellee’s complaint at his costs. Costs on

appeal are also taxed to the appellee.

__________________________

Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
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CONCUR:

______________________

Herschel P. Franks, J.

______________________

D. Michael Swiney, J.