```

[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 185 (Wednesday, December 10, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Pages S10852-S10856]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                       U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL

  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I have sought recognition for a few 
purposes. First, I ask unanimous consent that my statement regarding 
U.S. policy toward Israel be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                      U.S. Policy Regarding Israel

       I have sought recognition to address the subject of United 
     States policy regarding Israel and the Mideast peace process 
     as we look forward to a new Administration and a new Congress 
     next year. It is my expectation that the United States will 
     maintain the close, strong relationship with Israel based on 
     U.S. national interests, especially security interests, and 
     our close cultural and historic ties with Israel.
       While efforts are being made to bring democratic 
     institutions to Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel is the only 
     democracy in the region with our shared values. The record 
     shows the U.S. vigorously supports a close relationship with 
     Israel for good reason. Since the accords between Israel and 
     Egypt in 1978, the United States has given substantial 
     foreign aid to those two countries to improve their security 
     and to promote the Mideast peace process. Since my election 
     in 1980, I have voted for aid to Israel in the amount of 
     $81.6 billion, consisting of $28.8 billion in economic aid--
     including $1.3 billion to resettle Jewish refugees--and $52.8 
     billion in military aid. In the case of Egypt, I have 
     supported $35.2 billion in military aid and $23.9 billion in 
     economic aid.
       The importance of Israel as a strategic U.S. ally has 
     motivated the U.S. to place special emphasis on Israel's 
     security, part of which is promoting the Middle East Peace 
     Process. During my 28 years in the Senate, I have traveled to 
     many foreign countries in connection with my membership on 
     the Intelligence Committee, which I chaired in the 104th 
     Congress, and my membership on the Appropriations 
     Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, where I am now the 
     longest serving Republican on the Subcommittee.
       As part of these travels, I have visited Israel 25 times 
     and Syria 17 times with a view to assisting on a peace treaty 
     between those two countries. As I see it, the key to such an 
     accord is the Golan Heights captured by Israel in the 1967 
     War. Syria has long sought a return of the Golan. Only Israel 
     can decide for itself whether its interests warrant returning 
     the Golan to Syria for significant reciprocal concessions. 
     Obviously, the strategic considerations are vastly different 
     now than they were in 1967 since rockets can easily fly over 
     the Golan. If Israel could rely on Syrian commitments to 
     allow Lebanon to function as a sovereign nation, stop 
     assisting Hezbollah and withdraw support for Hamas, Israel 
     might conclude it was in its interest to return the Golan to 
     Syria.
       Israel and Syria were reportedly very close to a pact in 
     1995 when Yitzhak Rabin was Prime Minister and in 2000 when 
     Ehud Barak was Prime Minister. Diplomacy has produced some 
     results many thought impossible. Negotiations with North 
     Korea have reduced that nation's nuclear threat although that 
     situation remains volatile and uncertain. Negotiations have 
     moved Libya's Muammar Qaddafi from horrendous acts of 
     terrorism, including the blowing up of Pan Am 103 and bombing 
     of a Berlin discotheque, resulting in the murder of US 
     military personnel, to a willingness to negotiate and reform. 
     Libya made reparations in excess of $1,000,000,000 and 
     abandoned plans to design nuclear weapons in order to be 
     admitted to the family of nations.
       My studies and travel in the region lead me to believe that 
     next year may be the right time to secure an Israeli-Syrian 
     Peace Treaty if the new Administration aggressively pursues 
     that objective.
       As I prepare to travel to Israel and Syria in the next 
     several weeks, I have reviewed my Senate activities on this 
     subject. I think it would be useful to list some of the steps 
     I have taken so that my colleagues and others will understand 
     my reasons for optimism and so that the incoming Obama 
     Administration will have my thinking in setting its course on 
     foreign relations in the Mideast.
       I first became deeply involved in an Israeli security issue 
     shortly after being elected in 1981 regarding the proposed 
     sale of E-3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) 
     aircraft by the U.S. to Saudi Arabia. President Reagan 
     notified the Congress that he intended to sell Saudi Arabia 
     $8.5 billion in arms--which at the time would have been the 
     largest weapons transfer in U.S. history--including 5 AWACS 
     aircraft and 101 sets of conformal fuel tanks for F-15 
     aircraft. I opposed the sale on the grounds that it undercut 
     the Camp David accords. I wrote to President Reagan in August 
     1981 to urge him not to proceed with the proposed sale, and 
     on October 28, 1981 I said on the Senate floor:
       ``Until the Saudis are prepared to embrace the principles 
     of the Camp David accords and support the United States on 
     this cornerstone of United States-Mideast foreign policy, it 
     is my judgment that they should not be rewarded with the 
     AWACS and the F-15 enhancement. . . . By focusing on the 
     special United States-Saudi relationship . . . the 
     administration has already moved a step away from the best 
     hope for a Middle East peace--the Camp David accords and the 
     now-reinstated autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel.''
     I was one of 12 Republican senators to vote for a resolution 
     disapproving the proposed arms sale. The resolution was 
     rejected 48-52.
       The same policy that led me to oppose the sale of AWACS to 
     Saudi Arabia has guided my actions throughout my Senate 
     career on Israeli security issues. Before being elected to 
     the Senate in 1980, I visited Israel in 1964, 1969 and 1980. 
     My first visit as a United States Senator came in September 
     1982. During my 1982 visit I met with Prime Minister Menachem 
     Begin, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres, and other Israeli 
     leaders. I urged Prime Minister Begin to discuss with 
     President Reagan the issue of a Mideast peace. I understood 
     the two differed on what approach to take, but as I said on 
     the Senate floor following my trip:
       ``As I [saw] it, there [were] major misunderstandings which 
     could be resolved, or at least clarified, by personal 
     diplomacy between these two men of good will.''
     Prime Minister Begin and I also spoke about my meeting with 
     Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel who was assassinated 
     shortly after I visited him in his Beirut office in September 
     1982. I said that I saw some hope of Lebanese unification, 
     and Prime Minister Begin stressed that a peace treaty with 
     Lebanon was very important to Israel.
       I returned to Israel in May 1983 and met with Prime 
     Minister Begin, Defense Minister Moshe Arens, and Labor 
     leader Shimon Peres. Prime Minister Begin stressed his desire 
     to secure the delivery of F-16's to Israel before the 
     scheduled date of 1985, saying that the planes were crucial 
     for Israel's security.
       Following my meetings in Israel, I traveled to Egypt, where 
     I met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. As I stated in 
     my trip report:
       ``I began [the meeting] by conveying Prime Minister Begin's 
     respects as Prime Minister Begin asked me to do, and 
     President Mubarak responded about his esteem for Prime 
     Minister Begin, saying that the Prime Minister was a man of 
     his word and also . . . tough.' ''
     I pursued a discussion with President Mubarak on the question 
     of further negotiations between Israel and Egypt in pursuance 
     of the principles of the Camp David accords.
       In October 1983, I was an original cosponsor of legislation 
     introduced by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan that would have 
     required that the U.S. Embassy in Israel and the residence of 
     the American Ambassador to Israel be located in Jerusalem. 
     Hearings were held, but the legislation was not passed by the 
     Senate.
       I made my first trip to Syria in 1984 and met Foreign 
     Minister Farouk al-Shara. Following the lead of Congressman 
     Stephen Solarz on an important issue, I urged the Foreign 
     Minister to permit Syrian Jewish

[[Page S10853]]

     women to emigrate because the limited number of Jewish men in 
     Syria presented them with limited opportunities of marriage. 
     Mr. Shara demurred. I raised the issue with President Hafez 
     al-Asad four years later.
       I returned to the Mideast in January 1987 to examine 
     Persian Gulf security concerns as affected by the Iran-Iraq 
     war, and again a year later, in January 1988. In Israel in 
     January 1988, I met with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and 
     Minister of Industry and Commerce Ariel Sharon. I urged Prime 
     Minister Shamir to enter into negotiations that would provide 
     guarantees for peace. From Israel I traveled to Egypt, where 
     I voiced my objections to President Mubarak's statement that 
     the Camp David accords ``were a thing of the past.''
       It was during my second trip to Syria, in January 1988, 
     that I first encountered President Hafez al-Asad in a meeting 
     that lasted 4 hours 38 minutes. We covered a wide range of 
     issues: the Iran-Iraq war, which had just concluded; Syrian-
     Israeli relations; and U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. I found 
     President al-Asad at that time to be a very engaging 
     interlocutor. I suggested, on a number of occasions, that I 
     had taken a sufficient amount of his time, offering to leave, 
     but he generously extended the time until we had discussed a 
     very wide range of issues.
       I also urged Asad to permit Syrian Jewish women to move 
     abroad. Asad resisted, saying that Syria was ``at war'' with 
     Israel, and that such emigration could only strengthen 
     Syria's enemy. I continued to press the issue in subsequent 
     meetings with Asad, and as I reported in a January 1994 
     editorial in The New York Post:
       ``Asad responded with a romantic offer that he would allow 
     any Jewish woman to leave when a suitor came to Syria and 
     took her to the United States to marry.''
     I relayed that offer to the active Syrian Jewish community in 
     Brooklyn and elsewhere. Ultimately, Damascus altered its 
     policy and allowed Jews to emigrate.
       At the time of my first meeting with President Hafez al-
     Asad, Syria was totally uninterested in peace negotiations 
     with Israel. Upon returning to the Senate, I voiced my desire 
     to see the Secretary of State appoint an Ambassador 
     Plenipotentiary, like former Secretary of State Kissinger, to 
     concentrate on the Middle East peace process, as I understood 
     that the President could not focus all his attention on the 
     region.
       I again traveled to the region in January 1989. In 
     Bethlehem that January, I met with the Bethlehem's 
     beleaguered mayor, Elias Friej, who had been personally 
     threatened by Palestinian Leader Yasir Arafat after the mayor 
     had proposed a truce with the Palestinian Liberation 
     Organization (PLO) in which the Israeli Army would cease 
     using force in return for a cessation of violence by the 
     Intifada. In my report to the Senate following my travels, I 
     urged the prospective new secretary of state, James Baker 
     III:
       ``to reexamine the merits of our dealing with the PLO. At 
     an absolute minimum, we should require that the substantial 
     showing by the PLO of deeds instead of rhetoric.''
       I traveled with Senator Richard Shelby to the region in 
     January 1990. In a visit to Damascus, I again met with 
     President Hafez al-Asad. As I outlined in my December 2006 
     article in The Washington Quarterly, Asad initially rebuffed 
     offers to open talks with Israel, stating that Syria would 
     only participate in talks sponsored by all five permanent 
     members of the UN Security Council. Israel opposed this 
     format, believing that the odds would be stacked four to one 
     against it, with only the United States supporting it in 
     negotiations. When I pressed Asad on this issue again in 
     1990, he indicated that he had changed his position on the 
     proposal and that Syria would be willing to participate in 
     meetings organized only by the United States and the Soviet 
     Union. As I reported in a March 6, 1990 floor statement, this 
     change was significant because it appeared to be part of a 
     broader Syrian initiative:
       ``In our January 1989 meeting, I asked on three separate 
     occasions, separated by respectable periods of time, what it 
     would take for Syria and Israel to become friends. President 
     Asad answered, after a third query, that it was not a 
     question of friendship, but that `normalizing' a relationship 
     between Syria and Israel might be possible under certain 
     circumstances.''
       When I arrived in Tel Aviv from Damascus in January 1990, I 
     was greeted with the news that Senator Bob Dole proposed to 
     cut aid to Israel, Egypt and three other countries by five 
     percent in order to increase aid to Eastern Europe. In 
     response to U.S. and Israeli news media inquiries, I publicly 
     stated my opposition to Senator Dole's proposal, opposition 
     which I later restated in a February 7, 1990 speech to the 
     Senate:
       ``This is not the time, in the midst of delicate regional 
     negotiations being encouraged by Secretary of State Baker, to 
     withdraw support from our allies. It is the wrong signal to 
     send, especially to Israel, which faces enormous additional 
     costs as a result of a continuing emigration from the Soviet 
     Union.''
       During a January 1990 meeting with Israeli Prime Minister 
     Yitzhak Shamir, I relayed the news that Asad was willing to 
     attend a conference sponsored only by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
     On January 23, 1990, I said on the Senate floor:
       ``When I was talking to President Asad of Syria, I noted a 
     significant change in his position. For example, on the 
     convening of an international conference where it has been 
     Syria's position that a conference had to be convened by all 
     five permanent members of the United Nations, he now is 
     willing to have the international conference convened by only 
     the United States and Soviet Union.
       ``When I brought that information to Prime Minister Shamir, 
     he expressed interest because there had been a concern that 
     there would be undue pressure on Israel, and that is another 
     point where President Asad, of Syria, was willing to make a 
     very flat statement that there should not be undue pressure 
     and that the parties should sit down and have the 
     discussions.''
     One year later, in October 1991, Syria participated in the 
     Madrid peace conference cosponsored by Washington and Moscow. 
     Although the three days of talks did not yield a peace 
     agreement, the summit marked the first talks between Israel 
     and Syria.
       In February 1993 I again traveled to the region. In Israel, 
     I met with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Foreign Minister 
     Shimon Peres, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and 
     Defense Minister Moshe Arens. I was encouraged on this trip 
     when Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara told me that the 
     presence of United Nations forces on the Golan Heights would 
     be accommodated by Damascus without objection. My hope for 
     Israeli-Syrian agreement was further bolstered by Egyptian 
     President Hosni Mubarak's reaffirmation of the importance of 
     continuing the bilateral dialogue between Israel and Syria 
     for broader regional peace.
       It was not until my sixth visit to Syria, in December 1993, 
     that Asad said his country was ready for a comprehensive 
     peace treaty with Israel. My interest in promoting a 
     comprehensive peace treaty between Israel and Syria was the 
     motivation for each of my trips to Syria.
       In 1994, I joined Senator Richard Shelby in introducing an 
     amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill to 
     condition aid to the PLO on Chairman Arafat's taking concrete 
     steps to curtail terrorism and amending the PLO charter to 
     eliminate the provisions which called for the destruction of 
     Israel. The amendment was adopted by the Congress.
       During my August 1995 visit to Israel, Senator Hank Brown 
     and I met with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, former Prime 
     Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, and 
     President Ezer Weitzman. Prime Minister Rabin said that 
     Israel stood ready to negotiate with Syria, but that the 
     Syrians wanted the U.S. to remain involved as a third party 
     mediator. During this visit I also met with PLO Chairman 
     Yasser Arafat. As I noted in my trip report:
       ``Senator Brown and I challenged Chairman Arafat on why he 
     made speeches condemning terrorism in English and not in 
     Arabic. He said his English was not good and made the 
     contention that he had, in fact, made the speeches in Arabic. 
     He continued to make speeches which poison the atmosphere in 
     which both parties seek a peaceful resolution to the 
     conflict. . . . But it seems to me, Mr. President, that 
     Chairman Arafat could do a great deal more than he is doing 
     at the present time to restrain terrorism. I believe that the 
     U.S. Congress, certainly the executive branch but also the 
     Congress, must be alert on this very, very important issue.''
       I returned to the region in January 1996 and met with Prime 
     Minister Shimon Peres, Likud leader Netanyahu, and PLO 
     Chairman Arafat. I pressed Chairman Arafat on changing 
     the PLO's Charter, and he promised to do so within two 
     months of reelection later that year. When I again met 
     with Chairman Arafat in August 1996, he had yet to make 
     good on his word.
       When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took office 
     following the 1996 elections, he made a public announcement 
     that he would hold Syria responsible for the Hezbollah's 
     attacks in northern Israel. Syria followed by realigning its 
     troops as if to prepare for conflict, drastically raising the 
     threat of direct conflict between Syria's four-million-man 
     army and Israel's smaller but more sophisticated combat 
     force. I was in Jerusalem at the time, and on August 27, 1996 
     met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who asked me to 
     carry a message to President Hafiz al-Asad stating that he 
     was eager to get to the negotiation table with President 
     Asad. The following day, I traveled to Damascus and met with 
     Asad for three and a half hours. As I reported in my floor 
     statement following the trip:
       ``I conveyed Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's message 
     that Israel had only peaceful intentions toward Syria, that 
     both sides should move immediately to reduce military 
     tensions, and that Mr. Netanyahu wanted to reopen direct 
     negotiations between Israel and Syria.''
     Upon returning to the United States, I met Walid al-
     Mouallem--then Syrian Ambassador to the United States and now 
     Syria's Foreign Minister--who said that his government viewed 
     my August round of talks between Prime Minister Benjamin 
     Netanyahu and President Asad as having been helpful in 
     deescalating the dangerous situation. As I reported in a 
     floor statement:

       ``Ambassador al-Mouallem told me that his government viewed 
     my August round of talks between Prime Minister Netanyahu and 
     President Asad as having been helpful in deescalating the 
     dangerous tensions. . .and the Ambassador encouraged me to 
     return to the region for another round of meetings

[[Page S10854]]

     aimed at helping the parties find a basis to reopen their 
     negotiations.''
       At the encouragement of Ambassador Walid al-Mouallem and 
     Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, I returned to the region 
     three months later, in November 1996. During my November 20 
     meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, he told me 
     that:
       ``[T]ensions with Syria [have] been reduced since the 
     August/September time period and that he wants to continue to 
     deescalate the saber rattling. He asked me to convey this and 
     specifically that Israel has no aggressive intent against 
     Syria.''
     As I further noted in my trip report, Netanyahu also asked me 
     to tell Asad:
       ``[T]hat [Netanyahu] wishes to [reopen peace talks] as soon 
     as possible and that he is ready, willing, and able to be 
     personally involved in such talks.''
       I flew to Damascus following my meeting with Prime Minister 
     Benjamin Netanyahu to convey the message to Asad. As I later 
     said on the Senate floor:
       ``President Asad did generally seem to share Prime Minister 
     Netanyahu's desire to continue to ease and avoid military 
     tensions which could lead to unintended hostilities. Asad 
     received this portion of Prime Minister Netanyahu's message 
     positively and reiterated his own return message to the same 
     effect.''
     As I further noted in my Senate speech:
       ``I came away from this round of meetings convinced that 
     the logjam might be broken, but only with direct action by 
     the President of the United States.''
       I returned to the region in December 1997, and as I said 
     before the Senate, I came away from meetings with Prime 
     Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Asad with the 
     conviction that:`
       ``Activist intervention by the President could well bring 
     the Israeli-Syrian tract to a conclusion. As to the 
     Palestinian-Israeli tract, it is much more complicated. But, 
     here again I have urged the President to bring Mr. Netanyahu 
     and Mr. Arafat into the same room, at the same time, to 
     hear their complaints and to try to bring a resolution to 
     these very serious problems.''
       In December 1998, I traveled with President Clinton to the 
     Middle East to encourage the advancement of the Israeli-
     Palestinian peace process in the wake of the accords reached 
     in October of 1998 at Wye Plantation. As I noted following 
     the trip:
       ``Although somewhat overshadowed by the pending impeachment 
     process, the President's trip was useful, I believe, in 
     applying pressure to the sides to abide by their commitments 
     toward future progress.''
       During my August 1999 trip to Israel, I met with Foreign 
     Minister David Levy and Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Prime 
     Minister Barak explained to me that if Israel did not make 
     peace at that time, he was certain that there would be 
     another war in the Middle East. I understood that it was for 
     this reason that he wanted to move forward rapidly with the 
     Wye Accords, despite the political risk.
       In January 2000, I traveled to Israel and met with Prime 
     Minister Barak and Mr. Dan Meridor, a member of the Knesset 
     and Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense 
     Committee. Prime Minister Barak and I discussed the recent 
     Syrian-Israeli peace talks. I also joined Major General Uzi 
     Dayan, the Israeli Defense Force Deputy Chief of Staff and 
     cousin of the late Moshe Dayan, in reviewing the Arrow Anti-
     Missile System, a weapon with a theater ballistic missile 
     defense capability. I understood then that rockets launched 
     by Hezbollah and Hamas pose a major threat to Israel's 
     security. To counter this threat, I have long supported full 
     funding for the Arrow Anti-Missile System, the ``David's 
     Sling'' Weapon System, and the Counter Terrorism Technical 
     Support Working Group. I have helped secure over $1.4 billion 
     for the Arrow Anti-Missile System over the past 19 years.
       Syrian President Hafez al-Asad died in June 2000. I was the 
     only member of Congress to attend his funeral. It was a 33-
     hour trip--15 hours over, 3 hours on the ground, and 15 hours 
     back. I made the trip to pay my respects and to meet the new 
     President, Bashar al-Asad. I found my 9 meetings with 
     President Hafez al-Asad between 1988 and his death in 2000 to 
     be fascinating, very informative and educational for me, and, 
     I think, helpful in promoting better relations between Israel 
     and Syria.
       In December 2000, I introduced a bill to prohibit 
     assistance to the Palestinian Authority unless and until the 
     President certified to Congress that the Palestinian 
     Authority had removed the anti-Semitic, anti-Israel content 
     included in textbooks, used in schools, and on radio and 
     television broadcasts made by publicly funded facilities in 
     the Palestinian Authority-controlled areas of the West Bank 
     and Gaza.
       In January 2001, I traveled to Israel and met with Prime 
     Minister Barak and Likud leader Ariel Sharon and discussed 
     negotiations with Chairman Arafat. As I recounted on the 
     floor of the Senate:
       ``Prime Minister Barak stated that the only reason he had 
     not already ended his negotiations with Arafat was to give 
     President Clinton, who had personally invested so much in the 
     negotiations, one last chance to broker peace in the 
     region.''
       I returned three months later, in April, and met with Prime 
     Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, former 
     Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Minister of Defense Binyamin 
     Eliezer. I described the mood and content of my meeting with 
     Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in my subsequent report to the 
     Senate:
       ``Our meeting was conducted with a backdrop of an 
     escalating conflict. During the previous evening, Israeli 
     planes had bombed a Syrian radar installation in Lebanon in 
     retaliation for the actions of Hezbollah in south Lebanon. I 
     started my conversation with the Prime Minister by noting 
     that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had asked me to talk to 
     Chairman Arafat. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wasted no time 
     in delivering his message. The policy of the Israeli 
     government would be to draw a distinction between the 
     civilian population and terrorists. . . . He stated that he 
     plans to ease the conditions in the territories. . . . 
     Although Sharon did express some willingness to negotiation, 
     it was clear that in his eyes the plan pushed by President 
     Clinton in his waning days in office, is dead.''
       At the time of my March 2002 trip to Israel, the United 
     States was still reeling from the attacks of September 11, 
     2001. During my visit I met with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
     and PLO Chairman Arafat. As recorded in my trip report:
       ``When I saw Chairman Arafat, I conveyed [former US Central 
     Command Commander, General Anthony Zinni's] message that 
     Chairman Arafat ought to make an emphatic, unequivocal 
     statement in Arabic to stop the suicide bombings. Chairman 
     Arafat refused to do that.''
     I pursued this issue further, and on October 30, 2003, I held 
     a Labor, Health, Human Services and Education Subcommittee 
     hearing titled ``Palestinian Education: Teaching Peace or 
     War?'' in which the subcommittee examined the Palestinian 
     Authority's role in encouraging Palestinian youth to commit 
     suicide bombings.
       During my March 2002 trip I also traveled to Damascus and 
     met with President Bashar al-Asad. As I told the Senate:
       ``I commented about President Asad's [2001] speech where he 
     equated Naziism with Zionism. I told him that that not only 
     was unacceptable and problematic for the international Jewish 
     community, but for the international community generally. . . 
     . I said equating Zionism and Naziism is very repugnant, that 
     the principal reason for the Jewish action in Israel was the 
     Holocaust and the incarceration of six million Jews, and that 
     kind of equation is unacceptable.''
       During my January 2003 trip to the region, Prime Minister 
     Ariel Sharon castigated Syria for harboring terrorist 
     organizations and aiding Hezbollah in Lebanon. I asked Prime 
     Minister Ariel Sharon if he would be willing to enter into 
     peace negotiations with Damascus, brokered by the United 
     States, similar to those which Prime Minister Rabin had 
     participated in in the 1990s. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
     acquiesced with the assurances that there would be no 
     preconditions to the talks. Three days later, I passed this 
     message along to President Bashar al-Asad, who responded 
     favorably, saying he was willing to participate in peace 
     talks with Israel. As I noted in The Washington Quarterly:
       ``He said that he did not think it appropriate to conclude 
     a treaty before Israel and the Palestinian Authority had 
     reached a final settlement but that Syrian-Israeli talks 
     could proceed on a separate track.''
     During this trip I also met with former Israeli Prime 
     Minister Ehud Barak, former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 
     Foreign Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Attorney General 
     Elyakim Rubenstein, and chief Palestinian Authority 
     negotiator Saeb Erekat, to whom I expressed my opinion of the 
     need for the Chairman to step aside, as I thought it 
     unrealistic to rely on Chairman Arafat in the peace process 
     because of the evidence implicating him in terror.
       On November 8, 2005, as Chairman of the Judiciary 
     Committee, I held a hearing titled ``Saudi Arabia: Friend or 
     Foe in the War on Terror,'' to examine the role of the Saudis 
     in allowing illicit financing of terrorist groups, including 
     Palestinian terrorist organizations, from within the kingdom 
     and in disseminating hateful anti-American and anti-Israeli 
     propaganda throughout Islamic schools and mosques in the U.S. 
     In June 2005, and again in November 2007, I introduced 
     legislation calling for full Saudi cooperation in the 
     investigation of terrorist incidents and an end to Saudi 
     support for institutions that fund, train, incite, encourage 
     or aid and abet terrorism.
       In December 2005, I traveled to Israel and met with former 
     Prime Minister Ehud Barak and former Prime Minister Shimon 
     Peres. Peres and I discussed the Palestinian Authority and he 
     said that if Hamas were to win the upcoming elections, it 
     would be a wasted victory because Hamas is a religious based 
     group and has no room for compromise. In an August 2006 visit 
     to Israel I met with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense 
     minister Amir Peretz. Prime Minister Olmert and I discussed 
     Iran, and he emphasized that the international community must 
     realize the threat Iran poses and act to confront it 
     accordingly. As I noted to the Senate following my trip:
       ``On the question of Hamas, [Prime Minister Olmert] 
     expressed hope that Abu Mazen would exert his authority and 
     garner more control over the territories.''

[[Page S10855]]

     Defense Minister Peretz and I discussed the conflict with 
     Hezbollah. I said in my trip report:
       ``Peretz expressed his view that the International 
     Community must examine the rules of war for the UN mission in 
     southern Lebanon as Hezbollah is not a conventional force.''
       I concurred, believing that, if there were not a sufficient 
     peacekeeping force on the ground, Hezbollah would have the 
     opportunity to rearm.
       In December 2006, I traveled to Israel and met with Prime 
     Minister Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, and former 
     Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. A major issue of 
     discussion was President Asad's interest in resuming peace 
     negotiations.
       During this trip, I traveled to Damascus against explicit 
     objections of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. I 
     considered her objections, but felt that traveling to Syria 
     was necessary in order to keep dialogue open between our 
     nations. I believed that Senators have a role such as the one 
     I was undertaking and the constitutional doctrine of 
     separation of powers gave me ample standing to pursue the 
     course of conduct I thought appropriate. On this occasion, I 
     met extensively for more than an hour with Foreign Minister 
     Walid al-Mouallem and the next day for a little over an hour 
     with President Bashar al-Asad. President Asad said that he 
     was interested in undertaking peace negotiations with Israel. 
     He said he was obviously looking for a return of the Golan, 
     in return for which he would provide assistance on the 
     fragile truce which Israel then had with Hezbollah.
       I pressed President Bashar al-Asad on the obligations Syria 
     had to abide by U.N. Resolution 1701 not to support 
     Hezbollah, and he said Syria would honor that obligation. I, 
     also, pressed him on allowing the U.S. investigation into the 
     assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, and again I 
     received his assurances on that subject. It is always 
     difficult to know the validity of such assurances, but I 
     think the dialogue and the conversation and pressing the 
     point is very worthwhile.
       Following my meeting, I wrote to President al-Asad to 
     reiterate previous requests for assistance in determining the 
     fate of Guy Hever, the Israeli soldier who disappeared from 
     the Golan Heights on August 17, 1997. My efforts proved to no 
     avail.
       When I later told Prime Minister Olmert about Asad's desire 
     to negotiate, he said Israel would need a ``credible sign'' 
     that Asad is sincere before giving him legitimacy.
       In March, 2007, I joined 78 of my Senate colleagues in 
     writing to Secretary Rice to express our support for the 
     principles put forward by the Quartet regarding restrictions 
     on aid to the Palestinian Authority. As proposed by the 
     Quartet, for the Palestinian Authority to receive direct aid, 
     it would have to: recognize Israel's right to exist; renounce 
     violence and terror; and accept previous Israeli/Palestinian 
     agreements. In the letter we expressed disappointment that 
     the Mecca agreement between Hamas and Fatah failed to meet 
     these principles.
       In September 2007, I wrote a letter to Secretary Rice 
     stating:
       ``The essence is that a strong U.S. effort to resolve the 
     differences between Israel and Syria could have a profound 
     effect on changing Syria's provocative/antagonistic 
     activities with Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah and Hamas.''
     In October 2007, I wrote a letter to President Bush urging 
     him to personally participate in the Mideast peace process:
       ``As you know, I have done considerable work on these 
     issues over the past two decades. . . . I believe that a 
     major U.S. effort to push Israeli-Syrian negotiations could 
     be very productive over the next several months. . . . 
     Minister Barak said that your personal participation in such 
     negotiations at this time could be the causative factor in 
     producing peace in the Mideast.''
       My most recent visit to the region came in December 2007. 
     In Israel, I met with Prime Minster Olmert, Foreign Minister 
     Livni, Defense Minister Barak, President Peres, and Likud 
     leader Benjamin Netanyahu. Issues discussed included the 
     November 2007 Annapolis Conference, Iran's influence in the 
     region, and what could be gained by engaging Syria to end its 
     support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Regarding the last topic, I 
     said on the Senate floor following my trip:
       ``But as Prime Minister Olmert commented . . . there are 
     very material advantages which could come if Syria would stop 
     supporting Hamas. It would promote the possibilities of a 
     treaty between Palestinian President Abbas and Israel. If 
     Syria would stop supporting Hezbollah and destabilizing 
     Lebanon, there could be a great advantage. Such a treaty 
     would have the potential of driving a wedge between Syria and 
     Iran which would be of value.''
       During this trip, I also met with Syrian President Bashar 
     al-Asad and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. I again 
     asked President Asad about the fates of Ron Arad and Guy 
     Hever, and was told, as I had been in the past, that they 
     have no knowledge as to what happened to them. I also asked 
     about captured soldiers Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, who 
     had been taken by Hezbollah, and Gilad Shalit, who was being 
     held by Hamas. I later met with Gilad Shalit's father in 
     Washington, to whom I reiterated my pledge to do whatever I 
     could to help secure the return of captured Israeli soldiers 
     or, where they had perished, to obtain their remains.
       A major issue of discussion with President Asad and 
     President Abbas was what could now be done to pursue the 
     conclusions of the Annapolis Conference, at which the Joint 
     Israeli-Palestinian Declaration was issued:
       ``We express our determination to bring an end to 
     bloodshed, suffering and decades of conflict between our 
     peoples; to usher in a new era of peace, based on freedom, 
     security, justice, dignity, respect and mutual recognition; 
     to propagate a culture of peace and nonviolence; to confront 
     terrorism and incitement, whether committed by Palestinians 
     or Israelis.''
       In April 2008, I introduced a resolution urging Palestinian 
     Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to officially abrogate the 
     ten articles in the Fatah Constitution that call for Israel's 
     destruction and terrorism against Israel, that oppose any 
     political solution, and that label Zionism as racism. By 
     striking that language from its constitution, Fatah would be 
     setting an example for the Arab world. It would demonstrate 
     that the Palestinian leadership understands the importance of 
     words and perceptions in the peace process.
       The problem of the institutionalization of inflammatory 
     language in the Middle East extends beyond the Fatah 
     Constitution. The Center for Religious Freedom, formerly 
     affiliated with Freedom House, in a 2006 report entitled 
     ``Saudi Arabia's Curriculum of Intolerance,'' stated that 
     despite statements in 2005 by the Saudi Foreign Minister that 
     their educational curricula have been reformed, this is 
     ``simply not the case.'' On the contrary, religious textbooks 
     continue to advocate the destruction of any non-Wahhabi 
     Muslim. Saudi Arabia has established Wahhabism, an extreme 
     form of Islam, as the official state doctrine, and about five 
     million children are instructed each year in Islamic studies 
     using Saudi Ministry of Education textbooks.
       My intent in bringing the Fatah Constitution into focus now 
     is not to undermine the Presidency of Mahmoud Abbas. Rather, 
     my intent is to ensure that these problems of perception are 
     addressed now so that all parties can take further steps 
     towards peace.
       As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated on October 
     15, 2007 in Ramallah:
     ``If you're going to have a two-state solution, you have to 
     accept the right of the other party to exist. If you're going 
     to have a two-state solution that is born of negotiation, 
     you're going to have to renounce violence.''
     The purpose of the Fatah Constitution resolution is to urge 
     President Abbas to take action, not only in words, but with 
     deeds, just as I encouraged Chairman Arafat to do over a 
     decade ago.
       In addition to securing direct aid for Israel, I have used 
     my position on the Appropriations Committee to urge my 
     colleagues to maintain important Middle East provisions in 
     the appropriations measures, including, but not limited to: 
     the multitude of policy provisions, restrictions, and 
     auditing requirements linked to bilateral assistance to the 
     Palestinians designed to ensure that no portion of the aid is 
     diverted or misused, provisions designed to compel the 
     Palestinian Authority to commit to negotiations with Israel 
     and to fight terror, and provisions to ensure that steps are 
     taken to promote the detection and destruction of smuggling 
     networks and tunnels that lead from Egypt to Gaza.
       It is also worth recognizing that the relationship between 
     the United States and Israel is built on more than our shared 
     foreign policy objectives and common defensive goals. Our 
     nations have long benefited from strong business and economic 
     alliances in numerous industries. For example, American 
     public and private institutions engaged in the field of 
     renewable energy research and development are increasingly 
     collaborating with their Israeli counterparts, and I have 
     worked to promote such partnerships.
       Congress has demonstrated its recognition of and support 
     for cooperation between the renewable energy industry sectors 
     within the United States and Israel. A Senate resolution 
     passed by the Senate in April 2008 recognizing the 60th 
     anniversary of the independence of the state of Israel cites 
     Israel as being at the forefront of research and development 
     in the field of renewable energy sources. The Energy 
     Independence and Security Act of 2007 included a provision 
     authorizing funding for grants to Americans and Israelis to 
     encourage collaboration on research, development, and 
     commercialization of renewable energy and energy efficiency 
     technologies. This program was originally proposed in 
     legislation introduced by Senator Gordon Smith, the United 
     States-Israel Energy Cooperation Act of 2007, which I 
     supported as a cosponsor.
       During full Senate Appropriations Committee consideration 
     of the fiscal year 2009 Energy and Water Appropriations 
     measure, I worked to secure funding for the newly authorized 
     U.S.-Israel Energy Cooperation program. Given the energy 
     crisis in which we find ourselves and the prospect of 
     leveraging Israeli expertise to pursue our renewable energy 
     goals, I introduced an amendment to provide $5 million to 
     fund the U.S.-Israel Energy Cooperation Act. Subcommittee 
     Chairman Dorgan and Ranking Member Domenici agreed to include 
     my amendment in the bill, as reported by the committee. I 
     look forward to working with my colleagues on this important 
     matter as we proceed through the appropriations process.

[[Page S10856]]

       This statement summarizes some of my efforts to maintain a 
     strong U.S.-Israel relationship, to strengthen Israel as a 
     key strategic partner, and to promote an Israel-Syria peace 
     treaty. Active participation by the Clinton Administration 
     enabled the parties to come very close to an accord in 1995 
     and 2000. Israel potentially has much to gain if Lebanon is a 
     strong, independent nation without undue Syrian influence or 
     Hezbollah domination. If Syria stopped supporting Hamas, that 
     entity committed to the destruction of Israel, might be 
     sufficiently weakened to enable the Palestinian Authority to 
     negotiate a Peace Treaty with Israel. A corollary benefit 
     could be to drive a wedge between Syria and Iran.
       For reasons amplified in my Senate floor statement on June 
     16, 2006 and my article in The Washington Quarterly's Winter 
     2006-2007 issue entitled ``Dialogue with Adversaries,'' I am 
     firmly convinced that aggressive diplomacy holds the key to 
     resolving international disputes, including the Mideast peace 
     process, and should be employed by the new Administration.

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