Executive Order 13650 Listening Session, Los Angeles, CA

Date: January 10, 2014

Location: University of California Los Angeles, James West Alumni Center (JWAC), 325 Westwood Plaza, 

Los Angeles, CA 90095

Introduction and Opening Remarks

Jack Eisenhauer, Moderator, introduced the proceedings:

• Welcomed everyone to the listening session and introduced the panel.

• Mentioned future listening sessions and Webinars.

• Written comments can be provided to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov. These comments will be 

included in the docket.

• Announcements:

o Please put phones on vibrate.

o Session is being recorded for note-taking purposes.

o The facility emergency exit information and restroom locations were provided.

• Purpose: Provide stakeholders overview of the Executive Order 13650: Improving Chemical 

Facility Safety and Security (EO) progress to date and to provide an opportunity for the public to 

provide comments, feedback, and suggestions.

Mathy Stanislaus, Deputy Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), provided an overview:

• I would like to give a brief overview of the Executive Order and the progress we have made to 

date. 

• We have had a number of listening sessions held throughout the country. This is our sixth 

session. We have also had some Web-based sessions as well.

• We believe that developing and implementing the Executive Order is dependent upon the input 

of you, the stakeholders. We value your feedback.

• We have a Website to provide updates on our efforts.

• The prominence of the West, Texas event led to the issuance of this Executive Order. The EO 

establishes an interagency working group of the agencies that have a role in chemical security 

and safety. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a focus on security, the 

Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (DOL/OSHA) has an 

emphasis on worker safety, and EPA has a focus on worker health and protection of the 

environment. We also have the Department of Justice/Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

Explosives (ATF); the Department of Transportation (DOT); and the Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) participating as well. 

• We are committed to improving the way that Federal, State, and local governments work 

together, especially regarding communities of color and economic disadvantage.

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• We have organized into a set of sub-working groups. The first working group has been focusing 

on improving coordination among the Federal agencies. This working group is co-chaired by EPA 

and the DHS/U.S. Coast Guard and is developing a plan for how agencies can work more closely 

together. 

• We have been working on a pilot program in Region II to bring together Federal, State, and local 

responders. This pilot is looking at inspection prioritization, data sharing among agencies, and 

ways to improve access to chemical inventory data.

• Another sub-working group, chaired by the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection, is tasked 

with reviewing the ways that we collect and share chemical information. This group is looking at 

data collection approaches for establishing a common taxonomy; is developing methods for 

database integration; and is comparing information to identify areas of potential noncompliance.

• Chaired by OSHA, another sub-working group is reviewing Policy Modernization and Standards. 

This group is examining policies related to the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 

(CFATS) Chemicals of Interest List, the EPA Risk Management Program, and others. On Friday, 

January 3, 2014, this group issued a preliminary list of options, and we are seeking input from 

stakeholders. While the docket is open until March 31, we are asking that, if possible, you 

provide comments prior to the deadline to ensure that we have time to incorporate your 

comments prior to the final report to the President.

• On August 30, EPA, OSHA, and ATF issued an advisory concerning the safe handling and storage 

of ammonium nitrate. We recognize that this is a living document, and we continue to receive 

feedback on its contents. We hope to issue a revision to this advisory based upon the feedback. 

• A sub-working group has been established to ensure effective stakeholder outreach and 

engagement. DHS chairs this group. 

• In addition to providing comments here today, we encourage you to submit written comments. 

You may do so by sending an email to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov. This email address is included 

on your printed agenda for your reference.

• Thank you for attending today. I look forward to listening to each of you. 

Jay Vicory, Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), commented:

• Thank you for being here today.

• We come here with a common vision: to hear from you concerning how to improve chemical 

safety and security.

• OSHA published the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard in 1992 in response to 

worldwide catastrophic chemical incidents and releases. Some of those incidents include: 

o An ammonium nitrate explosion in Texas City in April 1947. This was the Nation’s largest 

industrial accident to date, where 581 people were injured or killed.

o In 1984, an incident in Bhopal, India killed more than 2,000 people.

o In 1989, Philips Petroleum in Pasadena, California killed 23 people.

• More recently, we have seen continued incidents, such as: 

o 2004, a Formosa Plastics facility explosion in Illinois killed and injured employees.

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o In 2005, 15 workers were killed in the BP refinery explosion in Texas City, Texas.

o The 2012 Richmond, California Chevron refinery incident seriously injured 15,000 

people.

• Federal agencies comprising the work group are concerned and seek your comments.

Amy Graydon, Branch Chief, Policy & Programs Branch, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), remarked:

• Thank you for being here today.

• DHS brings a unique security-centric perspective through both voluntary and regulatory 

programs:

o Our regulatory programs include the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) 

and the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).

o We also have voluntary programs focusing on public/private partnerships to ensure that 

dangerous chemicals are safeguarded. DHS serves as a sector-specific agency for the 

chemical sector. In this roll, DHS works across Federal, State, local, and tribal 

governments and industry to develop training and best practices. 

• We have seen the value of ongoing open dialogue with stakeholders. We have heard a 

tremendous amount of constructive ideas through these listening sessions.

• We are looking forward to hearing a diverse set of perspectives.

Sean Lynum, Assistant Director, Department of Transportation (DOT), mentioned:

• I would like to thank all of you for being here today.

• DOT has a unique role in hazardous materials in that we regulate the transportation and 

handling of hazardous chemicals in transit. 

• I am hopeful today that the concerns you raise today will effect meaningful change.

Lisa Long, Director, Office of Engineering Safety, Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), 

U.S. Department of Labor (DOL): 

• Provided an overview of activities relating to Section 6 of the Executive Order, specifically the 

options proposed in the area of Policy Regulation and Standards Modernization located 

at: https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/Section_6ai_Options_List.html.

The moderator asked presenters to come forward to provide comments and reviewed the ground-rules

for the public listening session. The goal is to give everyone an opportunity to speak and to be respectful 

of everyone’s time:

• This is a listening session. The purpose is to hear your comments. There are a broad range of 

perspectives, and it is not anticipated that participants will come to consensus. Please respect 

the opinions of others.

• We are very interested in specific suggestions, as these would be the most helpful.

• Please feel free to provide written comments to eo.chemical@hq.dhs.gov.

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• Individuals providing comments will be limited to 5 minutes.

• Following any remarks, members of the panel may ask questions to gain additional clarification 

and understanding.

• After all registered speakers have had an opportunity to present, we will open the floor to 

anyone who would like to present. Those additional speakers will also be limited to 5 minutes.

Jessie Lueders, Emmett Center on Climate Change & Environment, University of California–Los Angeles 

(UCLA) School of Law, provided the following comments:

• An option that has been suggested is the use of inherently safer processes (ISP). UCLA School of 

Law is preparing a policy brief that will be submitted in the spring. A copy will be submitted to 

the working group.

• By considering ISP strategies, along with other risk reduction strategies, facility operators are 

given a larger set of tools to respond to safety and security threats. 

• When operators are not required to consider ISP solutions, they may overlook effective 

preventive strategies.

• Many of the responsive strategies used today do not account for intentional criminal releases,

but rather only focus on industrial accidents. 

• ISP strategies require a holistic evaluation of hazards. Other strategies treat hazards as 

unavoidable problems; ISP, on the other hand, removes these hazards. ISP can better evaluate 

the risks of alternative practices, leading to better decision making.

• A popular belief is that the use of inherent safety shifts risk, such as from a facility to the 

transportation sector. This claim misunderstands the ISP methodology, which specifically 

accounts for such movements in risk. 

• Other arguments suggest that requiring inherent safety would jeopardize operators’

productivity or competitiveness. The primary concern is that there is a direct cost of compliance 

that would be too burdensome. These concerns can be addressed by completing a feasibility 

study of implementation; this is similar to regulations already in place in New Jersey and parts of 

California. This type of study would allow industry to evaluate the use of ISP without taking on a 

serious financial hardship.

• Some costs would be unavoidable trade-offs to provide additional process safety. The EO clearly 

indicates that existing practices are insufficient to protecting stakeholders. Some additional 

investment will be necessary. Improving existing protections will require additional investment, 

but these costs can be reasonable and manageable. Safer practices can save money in the longrun, especially considering the cost of response.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: You refer to a recommendations document coming 

out in the spring? Do you have a timeframe?

o Mr. Lueders responded: We expect it to be done in April or May. A working draft will be 

sent out in March.

Austin Price, Field Director, California Public Interest Research Group (CALPIRG), provided the following 

comments:

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• I would like to acknowledge the incident yesterday in West Virginia. A quarter of the population 

lives within that watershed and is now under a water advisory.

• I am here on behalf of 22 organizations that represent environmental justice communities, 

fence-line communities, and first responders. We encourage you to use the full extent of your 

legal authority to mandate the use of alternative chemical processes wherever feasible. We 

have submitted a letter to this effect, which has been endorsed by numerous organizations.

• The study we discussed last night at the Los Angeles evening session (January 9, 2014) regarding 

the New Jersey regulation showed that 90 of the highest risk facilities have yet to adopt

inherently safer technology (IST). The New Jersey Work Environmental Council conducted that 

study; I have asked Greenpeace to send a copy of this report to your staff. 

• Voluntary IST programs by themselves do not work. A study by the Congressional Research 

Service (CRS) found that, between 2009 and 2012, the EPA Risk Management Program increased 

the number of regulated facilities by more than 700.

• Several hundred facilities have moved to safer chemical processes at a reasonable cost, and in 

some cases this has resulted in cost savings. 87% of these facilities were able to implement their 

changes for $1M or less. The costs involved in the move to IST pale in comparison to the costs 

involved in personal injury lawsuits and environmental cleanup.

• I will be submitting these as written comments as well.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: Regarding the CRS report you referenced, do you 

know what date that was published?

o Mr. Austin answered: November 16, 2012.

Ann Werboff, United Steelworkers, provided the following comments:

• The United Steelworks, Local 675, has 5,000 members in the greater Los Angeles area.

• We have highly skilled and trained workers on the frontline. We are hurt first and worst when 

an incident takes place.

• Many of the previous tragic events can and should have been prevented.

• We strongly encourage worker participation in risk reduction and incident prevention.

• The most effective approach to prevention is a shift to inherently safer technologies. We 

strongly support a move to IST.

• We recently issued a report about the ability of refineries to shift away from the use of 

hydrofluoric acid.

• We know that IST may take time to implement at all facilities, and we therefore recommend 

that you issue an update to regulations in the meantime. 

• We feel that OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) is broken. This is the most important 

standard to protect workers. While it tells employers what they need to do, it does not describe 

how to do it. This has resulted in many companies keeping old practices in place.

• Industries’ voluntary standards are not enough. We need a modernized standard for PSM that 

will hold employers accountable.

• Workers should be required on all investigation teams.

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• Workers and community members, including emergency responders, should be involved in 

response planning. 

• Federal and State agencies need to work together and with local partners, including unions. We 

support the sharing of information among agencies.

• We also support joint inspections and the sharing of reports generated by inspectors in the field. 

• Thank you for holding this public hearing today and for giving us the opportunity to speak.

Maya Golden-Krasner, Staff Attorney, Communities for a Better Environment, provided the following 

comments:

• We have thousands of members in this region living on the fence line of many hazardous 

facilities. Our members suffer the effects of living near these facilities every day. They see higher 

instances of cancer, nausea, and asthma. 

• Our members were among those who sought medical treatment following the Chevron refinery 

explosion.

• Residents are paying the price of every equipment failure and negligent act. 

• Five years prior to the Richmond, Chevron incident, there were corrosion problems that caused

smaller incidents. Workers were reporting extensive corrosion on the pipes, but only stopgap 

measures were taken. In the end, a catastrophic event resulted.

• We support the implementation of the safety case regime. 

• In our region, dangerous facilities overwhelmingly exist in poorer and Latino communities.

• Refineries are making expensive upgrades in rail so that they can process high-sulfur materials.

• Refining heaver crude requires more intensive processing and more energy to refine, resulting in 

higher greenhouse gas emissions.

• Federal agencies must use their authority to require inherently safer practices. State regulators 

must be adequately funded to enforce the rules.

• The fence-line communities must be regarded as stakeholders, with full input in any strategy or 

plan to address facility safety concerns.

• Our communities must have access to information, including those data-sharing systems 

developed under section 5 of the EO.

• We would urge that any definition of confidential business information be narrowly tailored in 

favor of public access to information. 

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: You mentioned adoption of a safety case regime. 

Have you thought about how a safety case would be implemented?

o Ms. Golden-Krasner responded: At EPA, you have the authority under 112R to require 

the implementation of a safety case regime. More specifically, we could submit 

comments about how this could be implemented. We will submit additional written 

comments.

• A clarifying question was asked by Ms. Graydon: Regarding data, can you be more specific about 

what data fields you want to see?

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o Ms. Golden-Krasner responded: We are interested in information regarding incidents 

and accidents. We’re interested in information about alternatives analysis and best 

practices—anything that will expose our communities to increased pollution and safety 

risk.

Janet Gunter, San Pedro Homeowners United, provided the following comments:

• We are a fence-line community, just west of Wilmington, California.

• Our homeowners group has been complaining and writing; we’ve been trying to figure out 

what’s going on with the facility for more than 40 years. We’ve reached out to EPA, DHS, OSHA,

and others.

• We learned about this hearing through a doctor, who learned about it from a physician’s 

organization. Eventually, we received a notice from Congressman Waxman’s office, but it was 

short notice.

• No one can find or identify who has direct responsibility for the Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG)

facility that I am going to reference today.

• For more than 40 years, an extreme and unimaginable risk has existed in our community due to 

the close proximity of a 25 million gallon liquid petroleum gas facility. The facility was sited 

during the Nixon administration.

• We do not understand how this facility could be constructed within 1000 feet of residents when:

o Exempted from Los Angeles fire regulations

o Constructed without proper permits

o Built in a documented earthquake rupture zone, documented with both 7.3M gallon and 

12.5M gallon explosive butane tanks, and built to a seismic substandard of 5.5-6.0.

• Our efforts have determined that the company CEO was a friend and campaign supporter of

Richard Nixon and had political relationships with Los Angeles City and County officials. The spin 

at the time of the facility introduction was that butane and propane gases were the future of 

energy production in America.

• In 1977, the Los Angeles Times exposed many of the problems with this facility’s construction; 

however, no changes have resulted.

• Using an EPA formula, the 12.5M gallon tank has an impact radius of over 3 miles. 

• A professor, described as the U.S. Government’s own forensic risk expert, has reviewed details 

of this facility and warned of the hazards. In a recent publication, he has called the facility “risky, 

very risky.” 

Connie Rutter, Citizens for Responsible & Equal Environmental Protection, provided the following 

comments:

• I have worked for more than 20 years in the oil industry. I am very familiar with oil refineries and 

storage facilities.

• The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) was promulgated in 1986, 

and then amended in 1990, first addressing toxics and later addressing flammables and 

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explosives. The purpose of the EPCRA is to inform the public about potential chemical hazards 

present in their communities. What was missing from the Act is what to do about a facility that 

is too dangerous. EPCRA did not set a limit of risk that was too great.

• EPCRA was somewhat effective in alarming the public enough that public agencies arranged for 

reduction in some risks. However, to my knowledge, this has not been done with flammables.

• When DHS was formed, it did not give the community a right-to-know about community risks. 

DHS made it much more difficult to know the risks and decreased the effectiveness of EPCRA.

• According to a GAO report in 2012, DHS is not expected to work through all the CFATS facilities 

until 20 years from now.

• Both Federal and State (California) programs have posted the enforcement of eight sets of rules 

to fire departments, which have already said that they do not have the funding or manpower to 

complete the assignment. This has resulted in poor or absent enforcement. 

• In the event of a release, the LPG will vaporize nearly instantly, expanding nearly 200 times. 

There is not effective way to deal with this kind of situation.

Marcie Miller, San Pedro Homeowners Coalition, provided the following comments:

• I have deep respect and gratitude to President Obama for forcing this otherwise unlikely 

assembly of oversight agencies and stakeholders to work together today.

• I am here today to beg for immediate removal of Rancho LPG LLC. from its location at 211 N. 

Gafney Street. It does not need to be here, it does not belong here, and it will be the most costly 

chemical facility failure of all time.

• I am professional researcher and policy analyst. I want to share with you how the 26M gallons of 

LPG and butane came in behind the scenes and remain grandfathered nearly 42 years later.

• Gramps was Richard Nixon. His good friend had been financing Nixon’s political career. RJ 

Munser was president and CEO of several companies. In 1972, RJ Munser himself was one of the 

most powerful and quickly forgotten men in Los Angeles. He chaired the committees for 

construction projects in Los Angeles County. Nowhere in the 150-page report of the committee 

does it describe how the various agencies and officials green-lighted the construction of the LPG 

storage facility. 

• The facility was granted exemptions; public comment was not welcomed. The company went 

bankrupt shortly after the Nixon administration. The vision of the facility was never realized. 

• This facility must be relocated to a more acceptable (remote) location before an accident 

happens.

Chuck Hart, President, San Pedro Peninsula Homeowners United, provided the following comments:

• As you have heard from the previous speakers, we have been talking about the Ranchero facility

for some time.

• I would like to present you with a scenario. On January 14, 2014, at 2:30 pm, school buses and 

soccer moms crowd local streets to pick up some of the 1,300 students located within half of a 

mile from the LPG facility. A 7.3 earthquake ruptures one of 13M gallon butane tank. This 

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spreading vapor cloud soon reaches an ignition source. The earth movement also compromises 

other pipelines and valves on the site. The resulting explosion and fire has a potential for a 

catastrophic event of a scale never before seen.

• Hiding behind grandfathering practices is morally wrong.

• Some facilities cannot be made safe. This LPG facility must be moved or shut down. 

Ron Conrow, Western District Manager, Plaines LPG Services, provided the following comments:

• I am the plant manager for the facility that was recently discussed.

• We are a 20-acre facility near a 440-acre refinery. Refineries are inherently more dangerous 

than an LPG facility.

• Others have indicated that our facility has never been inspected. That simply is not true. A multiagency team was assembled to review the facility, which was completed in 1977. The report 

found essentially nothing at that time.

• The Los Angeles Times articles referenced by earlier speakers do not mention the 1977 report.

• At the time of construction, the facility received 44 permits, 7 of which were from the Los 

Angeles Fire Department. These are evidenced in the 1977 report appendix.

• The facility went through an Environmental Impact Report. In 2011, the Los Angeles City 

Attorney reviewed the report and determined it to be complete. The California Attorney 

General’s Office later reaffirmed this.

• Regarding the reference to Professor B., this individual knew nothing about the flier they 

distributed or this group’s allegations. Nowhere in his article does he mention the Rancho 

facility.

• The EPA has vetted our data. Our RMP is to the letter of the law. Our worst-case scenario does 

not impact the Port of Los Angeles. 

• Thank you for your time.

Kit Fox, Analyst, City Manager’s Office, City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, provided the following 

comments:

• Many of our residents are concerned about the Rancho LPG facility. Our primary concern is that 

the EO should take a more global approach to handling LPG facilities in the harbor area in 

general.

• We would like to see the availability of neutral third-party assessments of facility risk. 

• We are not a fence-line community, but many of our abodes overlook the port community. 

What is the liability of the operators in the event of an incident? We would like to know what 

the limits of liability coverage may be.

• I thank all of you for coming here today. It is great to see representatives from so many agencies 

represented here today.

Martha Arguello, Physicians for Social Responsibility, provided the following comments:

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• If we are going to make the EO listening sessions effective, we need to do a better job of 

outreach. It should not be incumbent on community non-governmental organizations to get the 

word out.

• Voluntary programs are not working. They are simply not effective.

• We want to see innovation. We want to engineer the danger out of these processes for the 

benefit of both workers and residents.

The moderator announced that all scheduled speakers had been called and declared an Open Session, 

calling for speakers to come forward to speak.

Timothy Malloy, Faculty Director, UCLA Sustainable Technology and Policy Program (STPP), provided the 

following comments:

• We are interdisciplinary research program. Our mission is to advance public health and 

environmental protection by integrating science, law, and engineering. 

• We support regulation to mandate or incentivize the use of safer technologies and practices.

• Modernization should use prevention rather than control as a guiding principle. This is not to say 

that current practices are not relevant, but they should be supplemental, with risk reduction 

being the focus. 

• Prevention makes sense. “What you don’t have, you can’t leak.”

• No one disputes that we should prevent instead of control, but the question is whether we can 

do it in a regulatory context.

• ISS (inherently safer systems), when implemented properly, is a process for hazard assessment. 

It includes prevention and engineering controls to identify viable safer alternatives first and then 

ascertain residual protective measures.

• Some of the benefits of ISS include: greater reliability of systems, reduced regulatory costs, 

improved cooperation within firms, and more preparation for the impacts of climate change 

associated with severe weather events.

• ISS originated from industry, yet industry does not widely use it. There are obstacles like 

information barriers and resource issues that prevent adoption.

• I am out of time, but I will come back with some additional information concerning how this 

approach could be implemented in a regulatory model. 

Ron Thomas, Technical Manager, Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME), provided the following 

comments:

• I spoke yesterday (January 9, 2014 – Los Angeles evening EO Public Listening Session) about 

ammonium nitrate. Today, I will talk about transportation.

• Background vetting of individuals is one of the most common ways of safeguarding dangerous 

materials against terrorist threats. We support the vetting of individuals.

• Despite notable similarities among various vetting programs, transportation workers often find 

themselves subject to duplicative vetting programs. Redundancy among programs wastes 

resources without any added benefits. IME has advocated that the Federal Government 

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consolidate vetting programs to provide workers with one access credential. This was one goal 

of the Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) program.

• Department of Defense now recognizes TWIC as a common access credential. 

• The reciprocal approach taken under the Air Cargo Program has proven a good approach to 

avoid duplicative vetting. Unfortunately, the DHS Infrastructure Security Compliance Division

(ISCD) is attempting to implement two standalone programs: the Personnel Surety Program and 

the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program. 

• As of December 2012, ISCD has paid TSA $7.7 million as a placeholder for its yet-to-be-launched 

Personnel Surety Program. However, no one has been vetted for that program.

• Millions of workers are currently subject to a vetting program of some kind. The Federal 

Government has adopted a four-part standard that has been adopted in various venues to 

ensure that individuals seeking access privileges to restricted areas and activities do not present 

a security threat. The TWIC program was envisioned to be a single security vetting program for 

transportation workers, and it is the vetting program of choice for many categories of 

individuals where vetting is required. 

Timothy Malloy, UCLA Sustainable Technology and Policy Program, provided the following comments:

• I am a professor in the UCLA School of Law.

• There is a fair amount of evidence concerning barriers to adopting things like inherently safer 

systems. If we know that these barriers hinder voluntary adoption, then we should look to adopt 

mandates. 

• There are a range of regulatory approaches that fit under existing authorities that would allow 

the Government to mandate inherently safer technologies and systems.

• Reflexive regulation requires facilities to consider a regulation but does not compel them to 

implement. There are benefits and limitations to that approach:

o Benefits: Lower resource demand on the agency; limits impact on facility autonomy; 

maximum flexibility for heterogeneous facilities

o Limitations: Some firms have limited reflexive capacity. Also, some firms are opposed to 

change for a variety of reasons, leading to an inconsistent or uneven implementation 

within the industry.

• Direct regulation is another approach:

o Benefit: Has a great uptake with firms doing what is required.

o Limitation: Limits firm autonomy and generally requires more agency resources to 

ensure compliance.

• There are bridging measures and hybrid formulations of various policies, an example being the 

safety case regime. This hybrid allows us to moderate some of the limits of various approaches. 

We will address the range of these measures in our written policy brief. 

• Whichever form of prevention-based regulation is used will require the regulators’ meaningful 

commitment of resources. To apply insufficient resources will result in the regulations being 

nothing more than empty shells, where compliance is essentially voluntary.

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• I will end with a proverb: “It’s not wise to be penny wise, but pound foolish.” Having a 

meaningful regulatory program requires sufficient resources to implement it.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: What obligation would you put on facility owners to 

look at lifecycle impact and risk shifting? Where would you draw the line and who would have 

an obligation to look at the risk shifting aspect of changes? 

o Mr. Malloy responded: Properly done, inherently safer systems takes a lifecycle view. It 

looks at the consequences of up and downstream risks. Larger facilities with more 

resources would impose a greater requirement to account for consequences up and 

down stream. Smaller firms would be required to participate with the regulatory 

agency, since they would not otherwise have the required resources. Additionally, there 

will be a need to increase the communication of information in the transportation 

sector to the end-users of materials. Implementing a regulatory system that takes into 

account the end-to-end system will have a benefit of improving communication among 

members within that system. 

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: Do you plan to quantify the avoided costs versus

response costs in your paper?

o Mr. Malloy responded: It is unlikely we will perform specific calculations, but we will 

draw upon work that has already been done in this area. Changing these programs will 

have an investment costs initially, but in some cases the benefits may provide improved 

efficiencies. It is important for firms to consider the net costs involved.

• Mr. Stanislaus asked a clarifying question: You reference the need to increase capacity within 

the agencies. What role might you see for third-party organizations?

o Mr. Malloy responded: I do have some thoughts in this area. There are pros and cons in 

this type of approach. Essentially this approach could outsource the costs from the 

agency to the facility. However, we need to consider the potential problems this may 

cause. Consider the Ernst & Young case a few years ago, with the problems that were 

seen in corporate disclosures. You would need to be careful that the independence is 

maintained, especially when a financial relationship is involved for the third party.

Connie Rutter, Citizens for Responsible & Equal Environmental Protection, provided the following 

comments:

• I would like to address the prior speaker’s comments about information that is available 

concerning facilities.

• It appears that those at the nearby LPG facility do not understand the hazards associated with 

butane and propane.

• The American Petroleum Institute (API) recommends an impound basin. LPG can only be 

contained under pressure or low temperature. Once it is released, it converts to vapor and 

expands more than 200 times in volume. An impound basin is simply not effective. To be 

effective, the impound basin would need to be three-quarters of a mile deep.

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• I refute the prior claim about refineries being more dangerous than LPG. You cannot extinguish 

LPG fires. When fighting liquid fire, you can use foam, but with LPG, it will simply convert to 

vapor. The vapor is impossible to contain and will travel until it reaches an ignition source.

• We have been told that some facilities like this one cannot get insurance due to the extreme 

hazards involved. 

• There was virtually no public review involved in the construction of this facility. 

• We will provide you with a copy of a report that raises these same objections. The 

recommendations of that report have been ignored.

• We need to change the way we calculate the worst-case scenario. The rules were established in 

1996. Within a month of the rules becoming final, LPG facilities sued EPA and argued to use the 

same calculations as a toxic facility, which only looks at only the first 10 minutes of an incident. 

When a flammable gas is involved, that is not a reasonable approach. The issue here is that the 

Risk Management Plan that was filed, while technically compliant, does not represent the true 

hazard involved.

• The EPA has once issued a citation to this facility. 

Janet Gunter, San Pedro Homeowners United, provided the following comments:

• Mr. Conrow provided earlier comments about the refinery next to his facility and spoke about 

how it posed a greater threat than his facility.

• In the refinery report, they are required to report the single largest quantity of their most 

hazardous substance. They reported butane storage with a 5M gallon container, with an 

explosion blast radius of 2 miles. The CPG facility reports a blast facility of only half of a mile, 

even though they store more than twice the amount of butane. Why hasn’t someone compared 

the difference in these reports?

• I would encourage you to speak with Professor B. at University of California–Berkley and discuss 

his opinions on this issue. He understands these facilities and has reviewed the details involved. 

• We would support the use of a third-party consultant to review the hazards of the CPG facility; 

that is all we have ever asked for.

• Mr. Vicory asked a clarifying question: Are you in contact with Professor B.? Do you know if he is 

going to turn in a brief?

o Ms. Gunter responded: Yes, I am in contact with him, but I don’t believe he will turn in a 

brief. We do not have a lot of money. We paid $10,000 for a risk analysis, but that does 

not buy very much. I know that Professor B. has concerns with the Rancho facility. I have

heard that he has reviewed the information we have provided and he has gone to see 

the facility. Most of this is common sense. We really need some help. This is as serious 

as Fukashima.

Marcie Miller, San Pedro Homeowners Coalition, provided the following comments:

• I would like to clarify the conflict of interest regarding the Rancho LPG facility:

o The City of Los Angeles’ tenth largest investment is the Rancho LPG facility. 

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 13

January 10, 2014

Los Angeles, CA – Day Session
o Governor Brown’s review of Petrolane was greatly discredited after the FBI investigated 

$60,000 of illegal loans that the President of Petrolane’s Mexico Division gave to 

Governor Brown. Additionally, it was admitted that someone received $7M from 

Petrolane. 

o In the mid-1970s during the permitting process, the port of Los Angeles Harbor 

Commissioner was dismissed when it was found that he was a major shareholder in 

Petrolane.

o In 2013, EPA cited Rancho LPG for several violations; however, we still have not received 

a response. I am interested to know more about how long a facility can take before they 

respond to an EPA finding.

o How can the LPG facility be considered safe when it exists on an earthquake rupture 

zone? It is already in violation of existing industry standards mandating distances 

between hazards and similar facilities. 

o EPA conducted their own study, which found several violations that included burros 

tunneling under the tanks. Additionally, we have found clogged basins.

o How can you regulate safety at a facility that cannot be made safe?

Ron Conrow, Western District Manager, Plaines LPG Services, provided comments:

• The impound basin in question is recognized by the NFPA-58, EPA, and API as acceptable for 

containing releases. 

• This facility has had no significant offsite releases in its 39 years of operation.

• EPA hired a third-party consultant to do an assessment in 2001. Professor Daniel Crowe agreed 

with the different release scenarios and found the impound basin to be sufficient.

• The facility does not exist in a fault zone. The Conoco refinery is in the same area.

• I support what the community residents are doing. I welcome them to visit the facility. 

• DHS was onsite last year. We have an approved Site Security Plan.

• We support the concept of one central agency that would serve as a clearinghouse for all 

Federal activities. 

Chuck Hart, President, San Pedro Homeowners United, provided the following comments:

• We need an independent regulatory agency that is not influenced by the industry. 

• While the CPG facility meets regulations, it is the regulations themselves that are not sufficient. 

They need to be updated in the interest of public safety and should include the worst-case 

scenario.

• Facilities should be required to carry liability insurance that covers their true liabilities. 

Currently, regulations allow facilities to insure actual risks. Essentially, they insure themselves, 

which leaves the public to pay the bill. 

[Lunch Break]

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 14

January 10, 2014

Los Angeles, CA – Day Session
The listening session resumed with Enrique Manzanilla standing in for Mathy Stanislaus. The moderator 

opened the session and called for speakers to come forward. No speakers presented themselves. The 

moderator then moved to closing remarks.

Enrique Manzanilla provided closing remarks:

• Even though there is a deadline for comments, we encourage you to submit your comments as 

early as possible. If possible, please submit your comments within the next 45 days. That will 

assist us in preparing our final recommendations for the President.

• Your input is valued. Anything you can do to translate your real-world experiences into 

recommendations for our agencies is greatly appreciated.

Sean Lynum:

• We appreciate you coming out to speak with us.

• We will take back what you’ve said here today and share it with our leadership.

• I am in the region and am happy to work with you. I am available today after the session if you 

have anything you would like to discuss.

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 15

January 10, 2014

Los Angeles, CA – Day Session
Participant Analysis 

Stakeholder Group

1/10/2014 

Los Angeles, 

CA

Chemical Producer 0

Ag Supply 1

Chemical Storage 2

State/Local Regulator 3

First Responder 2

Media 3

Owner/Operator 0

Industry Association 2

Labor Organization 1

Federal Representative 6

Environment/Community 15

Consensus Organization 1

Other: 

Unk 3

Citizen 1

Education 0

Security 0

Vendor 0

State/Local 0

Tribal 0

Health/Research 1

TOTAL

(Attended In-Person) 41

Conference Call 32

Attended (InPerson & Conf Call) 73

EO 13650 Public Listening Session Page 16

January 10, 2014

Los Angeles, CA – Day Session
Executive Order 13650

Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security

January 10, 2014 Listening Session 

Hosted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 

and the Department of Labor (DoL)

Location: University of California Los Angeles, James West Alumni Center (JWAC), 325 Westwood Plaza, 

Los Angeles, CA 90095

Agenda 

8:00 a.m. – 9:00 a.m. Registration

9:00 a.m. – 9:25 a.m. Welcome, Introductions, and Overview

Jack Eisenhauer, Facilitator

Mathy Stanislaus, EPA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair

Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

Jay Vicory, Department of Labor/Occupational Safety and Health 

 Administration (OSHA)

Amy Graydon, Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Joe Riehl, SAC/Wesley Beck, Department of Justice/ Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

 Representative, Department of Agriculture (USDA) 

Earl (Jack) Whitley and Sean Lynum, Department of Transportation (DOT)

9:25 a.m. – 9:45 a.m. Section 6 a Overview

Lisa Long, Director, Office of Engineering Safety, OSHA

9:45 a.m. – 10:00 a.m. Listening Session Format

Jack Eisenhauer, Facilitator

10:00 a.m. – 1:50 p.m. Comments from Listening Session Participants

1:50 p.m. – 2:00 p.m. Closing Remarks 

 

 Mathy Stanislaus, EPA, Executive Order 13650 Working Group Co-Chair

Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

2:00 p.m. Adjournment 

Persons may also submit written comments to NPPD/ISCD/Mailstop 0610, Department of Homeland 

Security, 245 Murray Lane, SW, Arlington, VA 20598-0610. Comments will also be accepted by email 

at: EO.Chemical@hq.dhs.gov or through the Federal eRulemaking Portal 

at http://www.regulations.gov. For more information on EO 13650, please 

visit https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/index.html

and https://www.dhs.gov/topic/chemical-security.