NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0712n.06 No. 09-2077 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
MARY ANN GA SCHO, Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt,
v. S C H E U R E R

H O S P IT A L, Def endant- Appellee
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B e fo re : ME RRI TT , RO GE RS and SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s.
S U T T O N , C i r c u i tJ u d g e . M ar y A n nG a s c h o s i g n e d

ana g r e e m e n t r e l e a s i n g h e r T i t l e V II
c la ims a g a ins t Sc he ur e r H os pit a l, h e r former e mpl oy e r. She no w a

rgue s th a t th e a g re e me nt i s unenfor cea

ble bec ause she executed it under duress. The dist rict cour t entere d summary

judgme nt
a g a ins t he r, and be c a

us e sh e ha s no t su

pp or te d he r c la ims wi th e vid e nc e fr om wh ic h a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld c on c lud e tha

t th e a g re e me nt w a s in va lid , w e a ff ir m.
I.
I n 1972, Mary

Ann Gascho beg an working as a reg istered nurse for Sche urer Hospital, near the shoreline of L ake Huron and Sag inaw Ba y . For the last eig hteen y ear s of her employ ment at the hospital, she was mar

ried to the hospital’s President a nd CEO, Dwig ht Gascho.No. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 2 - I n th e summe r o r autumn of 200 6, Ga sc ho su sp e c te d that her hu sb and wa s h a vin g an a ff

a ir wi th M s. Ra

bid e a u, a vic e pr e sid e nt at the ho sp ita l. At that sam e tim e , M r. Ga sc ho g re w p hy sic a lly violent with Gascho. In ear ly November , he kicked her in bed because she was “snoring like a cow .” R.44-3 at 52. L ater , on the nig ht o f No v em b er 1 0 , Mr. Gasc ho alleg edly rape d his wife af

ter she
r e f u s e d t o h a v e s e x w i t h h i m , ani n c i d e n tt h a tc a u s e d h e r t o s u f f e r a s p l i t l i p . T h e f

o l l o w i n g d ay, Gasc ho asked he r husband wh ether he and Ms. Rabide au we re ha ving a n aff air, a nd he
a c kn o w l e d g e d

t h e i n f i d e l i t y.
On Janu ary 17 , 20 07 , a ft e r Mr
. Ga sc ho tol d his wi fe he wa s se e kin g a div or c e , s he we nt t o see Ms. Rabidea

u. Gasc ho sarc astically

cong ratulate d Ms. Rabideau, re ported that he r childre n called Ms. Rabide au “the whore next door” and ber ated he r in other wa y s. R
. 4 4 -3 at 53–54. Mr. Gasc ho, who witnessed the confrontation, asked Gascho to join him in his office . She ref used and, afte r further prodding, refused ag ain. Mr. Gascho g rabbe d her a round the shoulder s and dra g g ed her int o h is o ff

ic e , c a us ingbr uis e s o n h e r b a c k a

nd sc ra tc he s o n h e r b a c k, arm s a nd wr ist s.
Once Mr. Gasc ho had pulled Ga scho into his office, he fired he r. T wo d ay s later, a fter Gasc ho reve aled her i njuries t o L ee Gascho, a hospital employ ee and re lative of Dw ight Ga scho, as
we l l as t o t h e ho s p i t al ’s Hu m an R es o u rc es Di re ct o r Gr ey Fo y , t h e ho s p i t al co n v er t edt h e d i s ch ar ge into a three-da

y suspension. When the suspension ended, the hospital a llowed Gasc ho to take mental health lea ve under the Fa mily and Medic al L eave Act.No. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 3 - I n Fe bruar

y 2007, the husband told Gasc ho that the hospital was g oing to of fer her a separ a ti o na g r e e me n t. F o y an d L e e G a s c h o dr o v e to G a s c h o ’ s h o u s e to p r e s e n t h e r w it h the ag ree ment. The a g ree ment g ave he r a y ear ’s salar y and other

benefi t s i n return f

or her voluntary resig nation and re lease of cla ims, including Title VI Iclaims, ag ainst the hospital. Foy explained the separ ation ag ree ment to G ascho, summarizing its ke y provisions. Foy

rec ommended that she hire
a la bo r- law atto rn e y

to r e vie w the do c ume nt a nd tol d h e r that sh e wo uld

have tw e nty -o ne da

y s to sign the ag ree ment and seven day s to chang e her mind if she did sign it. F oy also told her to “sue [Mr. Gascho] for eve ry

thing he ’s worth.” R.44-3 at 12.
Neither her husba

nd nor anyone fr om the hospital threatene d phy sical h ar m to Gascho betwee n the day

she wa s fired a

nd the day

she sig ned the a g re em en t
. No r we re there a ny other incidents of phy sical violence during this ti me.
Duri ngthi s ti me, ho we ve r, Ga sc ho ha d s e ve ra l c on ve rs a tio ns wi th M r. Ga sc ho and fe lt int imi date d b y

so me of the m. At o ne po int , h e wa rn e d h e r t hat, i f s he fa ile d to sig n th e a g re e me nt, “he w ould be the wor st enemy [she] could eve r imag ine. The h ospital has deep poc kets and we alway s win.” R.40-1 at 32. He pr omised to “destroy [her] l ife” if she did not sign it and told her that he wa s “willing to ruin [other people ’s] li ves” if he lost his job ove r the incident. R.40-1 at 51. At oth e r t ime s, a

pp are ntl y tr y ingto c oa x he r i nto sig nin g the a g re e me nt, he sa id “ y ou ne e d to s ig n it , a t le a st i t g ive s y ou

ins ur anc e ,” and

the a g re e me nt w a s “ on ly a re tir e me nt p a c ka g e and

we do it a ll the time.” R.44-3 at 29, 31, 48; R.40-1 at 26, 49. At still other ti mes, he lashed out at her , calling her “ cra zy ” and “ confuse d,” and insisting that “I am in control!” R.44-3 at 57; R.44-4 at 24–26.No. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 4 - Gasc ho saw a p s y ch i at ri s tan d t o o k an t i d ep re s s an t s as we l l as Lu n es t a, Am b i en , Be n adry l and Ultram, all to help her

sleep. She e x perie nced “ mental anguish” at her husband’s “ betra

y [al] .” R.44- 3 at 19. While she had worke d her w ay to a m anag ement posi tion at Scheur er H ospital, she fea red she would be unable to obtain an equivalent position elsewhe re. She ha d $11,000 in the bank and worrie d about how long that would sustain her.
Gasc ho soug ht advice f

rom s ev er al source s about whethe r to sign the ag ree ment. She showed the a g ree ment to her divorc e lawyer, but the la wy er de clined to re view it be cause she wa s not a labor attorney . She spoke with her thr ee c hildren about it, and they all told her to sign it. She
a lso ta lke d w ithfr ie nd s a bo ut t he a g re e me nt.
On Fe bruar

y 28, 2007, she ca lle d h er husba nd and told him that she was re ady to sign the ag ree ment. He br oug ht a copy of the a g ree ment to her home, w here they had a “ civil” meetingand she sig ned it. R.40-1 at 45.
About a y ear later, Gasc ho filed this a ction in f eder al court seeking to r escind the se ttlement ag ree ment and see king mone y damag es ag ainst the hospital under Title VI Iand Michig an law. T he
c o u rtd i s m i s s e d h e r s t a t e l aw c l a i m s , a d e t e r m i n a t i o n s h e d o e s n o ta

p p e a l , t h e nr e

j e c t e d h e r T i t l e V II claim as a matter of law, concluding that she had voluntarily and knowing ly

signe d the settlement
a g re e me nt a

nd thu s c ou ld n ot r e sc ind

it o n d ur e ss g ro un ds
.No. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 5 - II.
Gasc ho prese nts two questions on appeal: May she re scind the settlement on the g round that dure ss p re ve nte d h e r f

ro m vo lun tari ly

and kn ow ing ly

sig nin g it? And

did the dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se its d i s c r e t i o ni nd e n yi n g h e r

m o t i o nt o c o mp e l d i s c o v e r y?
A.
I n addre ssing the duress ruling , we build f rom the g round floor. We g ive fre sh review to the district court’s summary

judgme nt ruling and draw all fac tual infere nces in fa vor of Ga scho, the party opposing summar

y judgme nt. Re ese v . CN

H A m. LLC , 574 F.3d 315, 321 ( 6th Cir. 2009) ; Fed. R. Civ. P
. 5 6 ( c ) ( 2 )
. T h e p arti e s an d th e d is tr ic t c o u rt h a v e a s s u me d th a t an e f f o rt to r escind a
se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt p re se nts a qu e sti on of fa c t f or a jur y , a nd so have we . “ F e de ra l law c on tr ols the validi ty of a rele ase of a fe dera l cause of ac tion.” Street v. J .C. Bradford & Co. , 886 F.2d 1472, 1481 (6th Cir. 1990). And a “ totality of the c ircumstance s” test dete rm i n es whe ther a n employ ee has “knowing ly and voluntarily executed” a rele ase of her Title VI Iclaims and thus may not rescind it on duress g rounds. Adams v. Philip Morris, Inc. , 67 F. 3d 58 0, 58 3 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 5) . T he te st c a lls
on us to examine “(1) plaintiff’s ex perie nce, backg round, and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to conside r whe ther to sig n the waive r, including wh et her the employ ee ha d an opportunity to c onsult with a lawy er; (3) the clar ity of the wa iver; (4) consideration for the wa iver;
as we ll as (5) the totality

of the c ircumstance s.” Id
.No. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 6 - Gascho’s expe rience

, background and e ducation. No thi nga bo ut G a sc ho ’s his tor

y su g g e sts that th e a g re e me nt w a s b e y on d h e r— that sh e did

no t ha ve the c apaci ty

or ba c kg ro un d to g ra sp its meaning . Even without a bache lor’s deg ree , she took post-g raduate course s to be come a re g istered nurse, a nd she held he r nursingjob fo r m o re t h an thirty y ear s, eventua lly

enter ing the ranks of manag ement. I t is fair to c onclude that an experience d nurse, with he r trainin g an d b ackg round,
c ou ld c omp re he nd

the me anin g and

e ff e c t of a se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt.
I n consideringthis factor, G ascho ur g es us to consider “ her history , marital status and interac tion with Dwig ht Gascho.” Gasc ho Br . at 13. B ut the inquiry reg ardingthis factor g oes not to “ e xpe rience” or “ba c kg ro un d” in t he a bs tr a c t but to the c la ima nt’ s “ e du c a tio n a

nd bu sin e ss experience .” Riley v . Am. Family M ut. Ins. Co. , 881 F.2d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 1989); see Borm ann v. A T& T C o m m c ’ n s , I

nc. , 8 75 F .2 d 3 99 , 4 03 (2 d Ci r. 19 89 ); Coventry v . U.S. Steel Corp. , 856 F.2d 514, 523 (3d C ir. 1988). Gasc ho’s m arital hist ory no doubt affe cts the ultimate ana ly sis, but it does not bear on this factor. Time to consider the waiver and op p o r t u nity to consult an attorney. The hospital g ave Gasc ho twenty -one da

y s to review the ag ree ment and seve n day s to c hang e her mind after sig ning it. These timelines ga

ve her ample opportunity

to consider the a g ree ment and spar ed her the risk of not having enoug h time to consider the pr os and cons of signingit. Our cas es s ay as m uch. See Morrison v. Circuit Ci ty Stores, Inc

. , 31 7 F .3 d 64 6, 66 8 (6 th Cir
. 20 03 ) (a g re e me nt enf or c e a ble
w h e ne mp l o y e e h a d

t h r e e d ay s t o w i t h dr aw h e r c o n s e n ta f

t e r s i g n i n g i t ); Adams , 67 F.3d at 582No. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 7 - (ag ree ment enfor cea

ble when e mploy ee ha d five da y s t o co n s i d er w hether

to waive Title VI Iand ADEA c laims).
A related federa l statute sug g ests a si milar conclusion. Whil e Tit le VI Idoes not contain a
wa ive r- of -c la ims pr ov isi on , th e Ag e Di sc ri min a tio n in Em plo y me nt Act do es. I t sa

y s th a t, t o establish a knowingand voluntary waiver of claims under the Act, the individual must be “g iven a period of at least 21 day s within which to consider the a g ree ment” and a seven- day

revoc ation period
a fter si gning it. 29 U. S.C. § 6 26 (f )( 1) . T his c on g re ssi on a l po lic y in a re late d c ivi l r ig hts statut e bolsters the conclusion that a twenty -one- day consideration pe riod and a seve n-day rec onsideration period suff

ices to establish a le g itimate waiver
. Th e se tim e lin e s a lso g a ve Ga sc ho a mpl e op po rt un iti e s to se e k an a tto rn e y ’s a dv ic e . She did just that, th o u gh fo r rea sons of her ow n she chose only to ask a divorc e attorne y , not a labor- law attorney , even a fter the hospital (throug h Gre g Foy ) re commended she consult a s pecia list i n the ar ea. The que stion at any

rate g oes to the amount of time g iven to sig n the ag ree ment, not to whether the
c l a i m an tp r o p e r l y u s e d

t h e t i m e t o s p e a k

t o t h e r i g h tk i n d

o f a t t o r n e y.
Thec lar it y of t hewai v e r. Th e te rm s o f t he a g re e me nt l e a ve no ro om f or do ub t a bo ut i ts meaning . I t “re lease s and for ever discharg es [Scheurer ] Hospit al . . . from a ny and all claims of any
natur e . . . ba se d on any fa c t, c ir c ums tanc e or e ve nt oc c ur ri ng or e xistin g a t or

be fo re [Ms. Ga sc ho ’s ]
e xec uti on of thi s A g re e me nt. [I t] in c lud e s a ll c la ims wh a tso e ve r . . . includ ing
. . . c la ims under . . . Title VI Iof the Ci vil Rights Act of 1964.” R.26 Ex . 1 at 2–3. One doe s not need a lawNo. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 8 - de g re e to g ra sp the i mpo rt of the se te rm s. B y

sig nin g the a g re e me nt a nd a c c e pti ngthe be ne fi ts of fe re d to he r, Ga sc ho wo uld los e any Ti tle VI Ic la ims sh e ha d a g a ins t th e ho sp ita l.
Con sid e ra tio n fo r th e wai v e r. I n return f or Ga scho’s re lease of any claims ag ainst the ho sp ita l, h e r v olu

nta ry re sig nati on and he r p ro mis e s o f c on fi de nti a lity , th e ho sp ita l of fe re d: a
sever ance pay

ment in the form of a y ear ’s salary ($41,234.96), e ighte en months of hea lth insurance premium pay

ments (roug hly

$9,900), and pay

ment for her acc rued vacation ( $151.47). Gasc ho does not a rg ue that this c onsideration was unfair or otherwise a disproportionate exchang e of value a nd indeed nowhe re c halleng es the fa irness of the be nefits the hospital offe red he r.
Ot he r re le v an t c irc um sta nc es. To the e xten t G a sc ho ha s any c ha nc e of su c c e ss o n th is c la im, i td o es n o tco m e f

ro m t h e f i rs tfo u r co n s i d er at i o n s , wh i ch al l cu t s t ro n gl y aga i n s th er . T h e k n o wi n gand-voluntar

y inquiry is a totality -of- circ umstances test, howeve r, and it allows cla imants to invoke
o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g t h e r i s k t h a tt h e w a i v e r w a s a p r o d u c t o f d u r e s s an d t h u s i n v o l u n t ar

y. Adams , 6 7 F .3 d at 58 3; s e e B e n n e tt v . Co o r s B r e wing Co. , 1 89 F.3d 1221, 1229 ( 10th Cir. 1999) (same r ule for a rele ase of

ADEA c laims). As a gen er al m att er, dur ess involves an unlaw ful or “wr ong ful ac t or threat” that o verc omes the fr ee w ill of the victim. See R issman v. Rissman , 213 F .3 d 3 81 , 3 86 (7 th C ir . 2 00 0) ; see also Happ v . Corning, Inc. , 466 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir
. 2 0 0 6 ). Ga sc ho ’s argume nts on thi s sc or e os c ill a te be tw e e n tw o th e or ie s o f d ur e ss: e c on omi c and

ph y sic a l.
He r e c on omi c -d

ur e ss c la im f

a lls sh or t be c a us e the re wa s n o im

pr op e r o r i lle g a l f

isc a l th re a t. Al l ba rg a ini ng , w he the r to bu y a ho us e , to take a

job or to s e ttl e a

dis pu te , c ome s w ithimp lic itNo. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 9 - e c on omi c and

ps y c ho log ic a l pr e ssu

re s— that if the on e pa

rt y do e s n ot t a ke the of

fe r, it m ay

g o to
so me on e e lse in t

he c a se of the pe rf e c t ho us e or

the ide a l jo b o r it may no t hap pe n at a ll i n th e c a se of the money

and other benef its accompa

nying a settlement offe r. The better the offe r, indeed, the g reater the impl i ed fi scal thre at, cr eatingthe possibilit y that a cla im of duress g rows strong er the more g ener ous the offe r.
Yet that is not how it wor ks. As the Restatement r eminds us, “[a]n ordinary offe r to make a contr act c ommonly

involves an implied threat by one party , the offeror, not to make the contra ct
un le ss h is t e rm s are a c c e pte d b y the oth e r p art

y , th e of fe re e .” Re stat eme nt (S e c on d) of Con tr a c ts § 176 cmt. a (2010)
. That Gascho worried about having to file a lawsuit (and winning it) if she opte d
no t to a c c e pt t

he set tl eme nt o ff

e r i s p re c ise ly

the kin d o f p re ssu

re any on e (n ot i nd e pe nd e ntl y
wea lthy) would fa ce in this context

— t h e fe ar t h at if she chose to liti g ate he r cla ims ag ainst the hospital she might not get any financ ial compensation at all. S he did not need he r for mer husband’ s expli cit war

nings to a pprec iate this impli ed re ality . “No leg al sy stem can a cce p t an assertion that ‘t his c on tr a c t w a s si g ned un der dur e ss b e c a us e my on ly a lte rn a tiv e wa s a

laws uit .’ Th a t w ou ld elim i n at e settlement—a

nd to a substantial deg ree the institut ion of contra ct itself.” Rissman , 213 F .3 d at 38 6; see H

app , 466 F.3d at 44.
Ga sc ho ’s be lie f “ that [she ] h a d no c ho ic e ” in sig nin g the a g re e me nt, in v ie w o f t he e c on omi c be ne fi ts o ff

e re d an d the ri sk of e c on omi c ha rd sh ip if sh e de c lin e d the of fe r, do e s n ot b y

its e lf state a cla im, R.40-1 at 43, beca use this kind of threat is “a n acc epted pa

rt of th e b ar g aining proce ss.” Restatement (Sec ond) of Contrac ts § 176 cmt. a. That is pa rticularly so here , g iven that she make sNo. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 10 - no argument that the settlement produc ed a disproportionate e x chang e of be nefits. A contr ary view,
moreove r, “w ould invalidate most, if not all, rele ases of claims in ag ree ments confe rringsever ance benef its on employ ees.” Dorn v. Gen

. Motors Corp. , 1 31 F . App ’x 46 2, 46 8 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) ; see VKK Cor p. v. Nat’l Football L eague , 244 F. 3 d 1 1 4 , 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (“ Be cause an ele ment of economic dur ess is thus present whe n many contra cts are formed or

rele ases g iven, the abilit y of a party to disown his obli g ations under a contra ct or rele ase on that basis is reser ved for extreme and
e xtra or din ary

c a se s. ” ); Rissman , 213 F.3d at 386.
That l eave s the pos sibili ty that her husba nd’s phy sical abuse makes the a g ree ment voidable. I f Gascho’s testi mony is true, a s we must assume in the conte x t of revie wing a summary judgme nt decision, her

husband is f

ar from an admirable individual. I t a lso is no doubt the case that phy sical and ver bal threats during the barg aining proce ss may rise to the leve l of coe rcion whe n they are “improper ” and when the thre at “lea ves the victim no rea sonable a lternative.” Restatement (Sec ond) of Con tr a c ts § § 1 75 –7 6; see Street , 8 86 F .2 d at 14 82 & n. 27 ; Happ , 466 F.3d at 44.
Vi e we d in a va c uum, the hu sb and ’s mis c on du c t mig ht s ug g e st that th e dure ss c la im s ho uld g o to a jur y . B ut t hr e e fe a tur e s o f t

his c a se (a lon g wi th t

he fo ur oth e r vol un tari ne ss i nq

uir ie s) confirm that the district c ourt fair ly held as a matter of la

w that her decision to enter

the settlement
w a s v o l u n t ar

y.
F ir st, the ke y ob

je c tiv e of the se ttl e me nt, and the on ly pa rt of it G a sc ho c ha lle ng e s h e re , is the re le a se of

Ga sc ho ’s claims against the hospital , n ot the re le a se of any c la ims Ga sc ho ha d a g a ins tNo. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 11 - her husba nd. The hospital play ed no role in the husband’s phy sical m isconduct, and of cour se had
no rea son to know about the incidents at home. The proposed settlement did not even exist when the husband a

bused Ga scho, and inde ed would not exist until a month later. By an y standard,
mor e ov e r, the ho sp ita l to ok re a so na ble me a sure s o nc e it l e arn e d ab ou t th e Ga sc ho s’ pr ob le ms thr ou g h th e e nc ounte r at the of fi c e ov e r t

he hu sb and ’s inf

ide lity . Wh e n th e hu sb and pr e c ipi tate ly fired G ascho, the hospital quickly conver ted the discharg e into a three -day suspension. When the suspensio n

e n d e d , th e hospital allowed G ascho to take mental-he alth leave under the Family Medica l L e a ve Ac t. Wi thi n a

mon th of th is in c ide nt a nd wi thi n a mon th o f l e arn inga

bo ut t he Ga sc ho s’ fra ying ma rriag e, the hospital off

ere d Gasc ho a settlement ag ree ment that to this day she does not claim was unf

air. And in the c ourse of discussing the settlement ag ree ment wi t h Ga s cho, one ho sp ita l e xec uti ve ur g e d h e r t o “ su e [he r hus ba nd ] fo r ev e ry

thi ng he ’s wo rt

h. ” R.4 4- 3 at 12 . T he se
are not the kinds of actions that mig ht coer ce a n employ ee into ente ring a settlement. Second, to the extent Gasc ho was a bused by her husba nd, as opposed to the hospital, sig ning
a se ttl e me nt w iththe ho sp ita l wa s n ot h e r o nly re a so na ble a lte rn a tiv e . G a sc ho ha d th e ri g ht ( and sti ll may have the rig ht) to file criminal char g es aga inst her husband, to sue hi m in tort, to extract a be tter divorce settlement from him, to obtain a restraining order ag ainst him or, as one hospital executive
ur g e d, to “ su e [him ] fo r e ve ry thi ng he ’s wo rt

h. ” R.4 4- 3 a t 12
. Th e pa

rt ie s have no t tol d us the te rm s of the Ga schos’ subseque nt divorce a g ree ment. So far as this rec ord i s conce rned as a re sult, Gascho sti ll may have the ri g ht to vin dic a te so me or a ll of the se c la ims to thi s da y , and if no t t hat is pr e su ma bly be c a us e sh e wa s fa ir ly c omp e ns a te d in the div or c e pr oc e e din g . Wh a t sh e c ann ot d o isNo. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 12 - vitiate the terms of a settlement ag ree ment with the hospital —th e te rm s o f whic h s he ha s y e t to challeng e as unf

air—on the g round that she h ad no re asonable choice in the matter in view of her husband ’s misconduct. A rea sonable alternative will defeat a claim of dure ss, and she ha d just that here : filing any or all of t hese actions ag ainst her husband. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 cmt. b. Whil e initiating litigation is not a re asonable alternative if the proc ess “will not aff ord eff ective r elief to one in the victim’s circumstanc es,” id. , that was not the c ase in this situation. The
o n l y t h i n g G a s c h o c o mp l a i n s a b o u t i n t h i s c a s e i s t h e o p p o rtu n i t y t o s u e t h e h o s p i t a l u n d e r

T i t l e V II, not forg one opportunities to sue her husband, who is plainly

the key targ et of he r complaint.
Th ir d, the c ir c ums tanc e s after the hospital of fer ed her this settlement c onfirm that Gasc ho’s will was not overbor

ne in sig ning this ag ree ment. Over one month had passe d since the la st act of phy sical violence . Neither the husband nor a

ny other a g ent of the hospital voic ed a thr eat of phy sical vio le nc e duri ngtha

t tim e . Ga sc ho ha d ple nty of tim e to c on sid e r t he a g re e me nt, ple nty

of tim e to
resc ind the ag ree ment afte r sig nature and plenty of time to consult a labor attorney , as one hospital executive (Gr egFoy

) re commended she do. She spoke with sever al people befo re s h e signe d the
a g re e me nt, inc lud ingfr ie nd s and tr us te d f a mil y me mbe rs ( e.g. , her c hil d ren), and none of them advised he r not to sign it. I t is difficult to square these circumstance s with the notion that Gascho’s husband c o e r c e d h e r to s ig nth e a g r e e me n t. G a s c h o , in d e e d , o f f e r s n o t a s in g le c a s e o r

an y other authority sug g esting otherwise. But this misses the point, Gascho insists, because she and he r h u s b an d s h are d a fiduc iary
re la tio ns hip owing fr om “ the ir mari ta l r e latio ns hip .” Ga sc ho B r. a t 14 . “ A thr e a t,” sh e a dd s, “ isNo. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 13 - improper if it is in brea ch of a duty of good faith and fair dealing such as exist s betwee n fiduciar ies.” Street , 886 F.2d at 1482. But this ag ain g oes to show only that she may

have ha d, or may

still have, compelling claims ag ainst her husba nd. Her husband, however, is no longe r par t of thi s case , and she has not ra ised any

complaints about the cour t’s dismiss al o f h i m from the case or any other l i m i t at i o n s i ns u i n g him
. B.
Gasc ho independe n tly

argues that the district cour t jumped the g un in gr anting summary jud g me nt b y

fa ili ngto c omp e l se ve ra l of the ho sp ita l’ s w itn e sse s to ans we r c e rt a in q ue sti on s at th e ir depositions. W e disag ree . I n view of the threshold sig nificanc e of the validity of the settlement ag ree ment, the district court “ limit ed” the initial phase o f di scover y “to information re g ardingthe enf orce ability

of the parties’ settlement agree m en t , as well as its terms.” R.14 at 2. Dur ing the depositions of five witnesses, the hospital objecte d to se vera l questions by Gasc ho’s counse l and ultimately instructed the witnesses not to answe r these que stions on the gr ound that they exceede d the scope of the discovery order
. I n response , Gasc ho moved t o compel further depositions of these w itnesses. I n doing so, howeve r, she did not provide the district court with examples of the improper objections but instead promised that “the tr anscr ipts at issue will be supplied so the Court can g et a f lavor for exactly what went on.” R.33 at 2. Yet she ne ver c ame throug h on t h e p rom ise, as she f ailed to produc e theNo. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 14 - transcr ipts to t he cour

t within the required time a nd did not even f

ile a re ply brief a ttempting to re but the ho s p i t al ’s t ake on the dispute. Havingno way to ge t a “f

lavor for exactly what we nt on,” the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d th e mot ion . R. 38 . T he c ourt re a so ne d th a t Ga sc ho fa ile d to e xpla in h owthi s discovery was “ rele vant to . . . her dur ess def ense” and had no t “e x p l ai n ed . . . the nature of the discovery which she soug ht.” R.38 at 4.
The c ourt did not abuse its discretion in rea ching this conclusion. I t was Ga scho’s burde n to provide a f

actua l and l eg al premise for her m otion—the questions asked and the conte x t in which the depone nts refuse d to answer —and she ne ver did so.
Ga sc ho c ann ot s ide ste p th is c on c lus ion on the g ro un d th a t the d ist ri c t c ourt ini tia lly schedule d a hear ing, one at which she hoped to fill in these g aps, then c ance lled it. The court’ s local
ru le s r e ve a l th e pe ri l of fo llo wi ng thi s kind of str a te g y . “O ra l he ari ng s” on su c h mo tio ns , th e y

sa id at the re levant time, “will be he ld unless the judge a t a n y t i me pr ior

to t he he ari ngor de rs the ir submissi on and dete rmination without oral hearing on the briefs filed as required by this rule.” E.D. M i c h . L .R. 7.1(e)( 2) (a pproved D ec. 1, 2005) , available at htt p:/ /w ww .mi e d. us c ourt s. g ov /Ru le s/R e c e nt A m e n d / D o c s / a m e n d m e nts _e ff _1 10 60 6. pd f ( e mph a sis added) . That a district c ourt sets a he aringdate on a motion, ofte n it should be noted as a matter of
course throug h the cler

k’s office , by no means amounts to a n unbrea kable commitment to the par ties to hold the hearing , least of all when one of the pa rties has opted not to pre sent any thing wor thy of
argume nt.No. 09-2077

Gascho v . Scheure r Hosp.

- 15 - Nor may Gasc ho sidestep t his conclusion on t he g round that an untimely reply brief inc luded portions of the re levant depositions. District courts ar e entitled within rea son to set their own
sc he du le s fo r fi lin g br ie fs and int ro du c inge vid e nc e , a

nd a c ourt ’s ins ist e nc e on

ho ldi ngpa

rt ie s to these sche dules g ener ally does not amount to reve rsible er ror. No a buse of discr etion occur

red.
III
F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.