UNITED STATES NAVY-MARINE CORPS 

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Before

K.J. BRUBAKER, M.C. HOLIFIELD, J.P. ELLINGTON

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

WILLIAM J. BEAUMONT

PRIVATE (E-1), U.S. MARINE CORPS

NMCCA 201500237

SPECIAL COURET-MARTIAL

Sentence Adjudged: 18 March 2015.

Military Judge: LtCol E.H. Robinson, Jr., USMC.

Convening Authority: Commanding Officer, Marine Corps 

Communications-Electronics School, Training Command, 

Twentynine Palms, CA.

Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: LtCol M.E. Sayegh, 

USMC.

For Appellant: LtCol Richard A. Viczorek, USMCR.

For Appellee: CDR James E. Carsten, JAGC, USN.

12 January 2016

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OPINION OF THE COURT 

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THIS OPINION DOES NOT SERVE AS BINDING PRECEDENT, BUT MAY BE CITED AS 

PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY UNDER NMCCA RULE OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 18.2.

 

ELLINGTON, Judge: 

The appellant was convicted, in accordance with his pleas, 

by a military judge sitting as a special court-martial of one 

specification of violating a lawful general regulation 

(consumption of alcohol by a person under the age of twenty-one) 

and three specifications of assault consummated by battery, in 

violation of Articles 92 and 128, Uniform Code of Military 

Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892 and 928. The military judge sentenced 
2

the appellant to a reprimand, forfeiture of $1000.00 pay per 

month for four months, restriction for 120 days, and a badconduct discharge. The convening authority (CA) approved the 

sentence as adjudged.

The appellant raises three assignments of error (AOEs):

(1) The military judge erroneously excluded defense 

mitigation evidence by sustaining a series of general 

objections by the Government and refusing to relax the 

rules of evidence during the defense sentencing case.

(2) The military judge erred by adjudging 120 days of 

restriction.

(3) The appellant’s sentence was inappropriately severe.

After carefully considering the record of trial and the 

submissions of the parties, we find merit in the appellant’s 

first and second AOEs and grant partial relief in our decretal 

paragraph. We find AOE three to be without merit. Also, 

although not raised by the parties, we find error in documenting 

the letter of reprimand and thus will not affirm that part of 

the sentence.

Factual Background

On 31 May 2014, the appellant and Lance Corporal (LCpl) 

A.R.R. were socializing at an on-base bowling alley. After 

leaving the bowling alley, the pair decided to go to a fast food 

restaurant for a meal. While walking to the establishment, the 

appellant became aggressive and made numerous attempts to kiss 

LCpl A.R.R. In one attempt, he grabbed her wrist and pulled her 

to the ground. He attempted to kiss her while simultaneously 

impeding her ability to stand. Eventually, LCpl A.R.R. was able 

to break free of the appellant’s grasp. In another attempt, the 

appellant grabbed LCpl A.R.R., pulled her hair and attempted to 

prevent LCpl A.R.R. from breaking free of his grasp. Once again 

LCpl A.R.R. was able to distance herself from the appellant. In 

his final attempt to kiss LCpl A.R.R., the appellant was again 

rebuffed and, in the ensuing struggle, the appellant struck LCpl 

A.R.R. in the face.

During sentencing, the military judge did not allow a 

defense character witness to answer certain questions. 

Initially, the witness testified that he had known the appellant

for more than six months and had supervised him as his squad 

leader. The witness was then asked how the appellant performed 
3

at the jobs he was given. After responding that the appellant’s 

job performance was excellent, the trial counsel objected.1 The 

military judge sustained the objection. Trial defense counsel 

moved to relax the rules. The trial counsel argued that the 

rules could not be relaxed as “[i]mproper character evidence 

can’t be relaxed, sir.”2 The military judge sustained the 

objection. Trial defense counsel then asked two more questions 

regarding the appellant’s military performance to which the 

trial counsel again made objections which were sustained by the 

military judge:

DC: How did Private Beaumont compare to other Marines

that you supervised?

WIT: Excellent, sir. Every time I left, he was –

TC: Objection. 

MJ: Sustained.

DC: During the time you observed Private Beaumont, 

did you ever see him drop his pack?

WIT: No, sir. 

TC: Objection. 

MJ: Sustained.3

Trial defense counsel then asked the witness if he was 

aware of the substance of the charges the appellant had pleaded

guilty to. After receiving affirmative responses, trial defense 

counsel attempted to inquire as to why the witness still 

supported the appellant. 

DC: Why did you agree to testify as a sentencing 

witness?

TC: Objection. 

MJ: Sustained. 

 

1 The appellant cites United States v. McMillion, 16 M.J. 658 (A.C.M.R. 1983) 

in his brief to support the position that if a trial counsel does not state 

the reason for an objection, the military judge should routinely require 

counsel to state the basis prior to any ruling. But here, the trial counsel 

initially stated a basis for his objection, albeit somewhat unartfully. The 

record indicates that the military judge viewed the trial counsel’s objection 

as an ongoing objection for purported improper mitigation evidence. 

2 Record at 92.

3 Id. at 92-93.
4

DC: Do you support any of those activities? 

WIT: No, sir. 

DC: Why do you still support Private Beaumont?

TC: Objection. 

MJ: Sustained.4

After the military judge sustained these objections, trial 

defense counsel again attempted to relax the rules of evidence.

DC: Have you had the opportunity to have a 

conversation with Private Beaumont about his 

feelings towards alcohol?

TC: Objection. 

MJ: Sustained. 

DC: Sir, at this time, defense asks to relax the 

rules as to hearsay?

MJ: As I look at the rule, it says that the military 

judge, with respect to matters in extenuation and 

mitigation, may relax the rules of evidence.

This includes admitting letters, affidavits, 

certificates, and civil offices – certificates of 

military and civil offices and other writings of 

similar authenticity and reliability. I don’t see 

anything that says that we can relax the rules as 

it relates to testimony of witnesses. You’ve got 

something to support that this permits the Court 

– this rule permits the Court to relax the rules 

regarding witness testimony?

DC: I don’t, sir.

MJ: The analysis doesn’t really say anything about it 

that I’m finding. And so, that objection by the 

government remains sustained. And the – yeah, the 

objection is sustained.5

The witness then testified that his opinion, as to the 

appellant’s rehabilitative potential, was that “he’s perfectly 

 

4 Id. at 93. 

5 Id. at 94. 
5

fine now” and that his military character was “outstanding and 

loyal.”6

The appellant then called his noncommissioned officer in 

charge as a witness. After laying an appropriate foundation,

the witness ultimately stated that he believed the appellant had 

good military character. Turning to the appellant’s 

rehabilitative potential, the following colloquy occurred:

DC: Have you had the opportunity to form an opinion 

as to Private Beaumont’s potential for 

rehabilitation?

WIT: Yes, sir, I have. 

DC: And what’s that opinion?

WIT: I believe that he is a good Marine and with the 

proper guidance he could be –

TC: Objection.

DC: [Witness], there’s going to be a sustained 

objection there. It’s just whether or not you 

believe he has rehabilitative potential.

WIT: Yes, sir.7

Analysis

Exclusion of Defense Mitigation Evidence

We review a military judge's evidentiary ruling for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Owens, 51 M.J. 204, 209 

(C.A.A.F. 1999). The military judge’s findings of fact receive 

deference and will only be overturned if they are clearly 

erroneous; we review conclusions of law de novo. Id. 

RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 1001(c)(3), MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED 

STATES (2012 ed.), provides that the military judge may, with 

respect to matters in extenuation or mitigation or both, relax 

the rules of evidence. While the rule does specifically discuss 

documentary evidence, this authority to relax the rules is not 

limited to documentary evidence. United States v. Roth, 52 M.J. 

187, 190 (C.A.A.F. 1999). The Court of Appeals for the Armed 

Forces (CAAF) has stated “that the intent of the sentencing 

rules is to favor the admission of relevant evidence in the 

 

6 Id.

7 Id. at 98.
6

sentencing proceeding, regardless of the form of the evidence.” 

Id. But relaxation of evidentiary rules “‘goes more to the 

question of whether the evidence is authentic and reliable’ and

‘otherwise inadmissible evidence still is not admitted at 

sentencing.’” United States v. Saferite, 59 M.J. 270, 273 

(C.A.A.F. 2004) (quoting United States v. Boone, 49 M.J. 187, 

198 n.14 (C.A.A.F. 1998)).

Matters in mitigation of an offense are introduced to 

lessen the punishment to be adjudged by the court-martial, or to 

furnish grounds for a recommendation of clemency. R.C.M. 

1001(c)(1)(B). Mitigation evidence includes “evidence of the 

reputation or record of the accused in the service for 

efficiency, fidelity, subordination, temperance, courage, or any 

other trait that is desirable in a servicemember.” Id. 

Positive character evidence is a relevant factor in evaluating 

an appropriate sentence. United States v. Tangpuz, 5 M.J. 426, 

429 (C.M.A. 1978). The CAAF has consistently recognized that an 

accused has a broad right to present mitigation evidence.

United States v. Perry, 48 M.J. 197, 199 (C.A.A.F. 1998); United 

States v. Becker, 46 M.J. 141, 143 (C.A.A.F. 1997). 

The Government concedes that the military judge applied an 

erroneous view of the law that relaxation of the rules of 

evidence in sentencing only pertains to documentary evidence and 

erred by excluding relevant mitigation evidence. We turn then 

to whether the appellant was prejudiced by this error. To 

evaluate prejudice when evidence was erroneously excluded during 

the sentencing portion of a court-martial, we ask “if the error 

substantially influenced the adjudged sentence.” United States

v. Griggs, 61 M.J. 402, 410 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citations omitted).

In measuring the influence of the error, we use the CAAF's 

logic from Saferite, 59 M.J. at 274-75; see also United States 

v. Griggs, 61 M.J. 402, 411 (C.A.A.F. 2005)(Crawford, S.J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Saferite, the 

CAAF evaluated the effect of an evidentiary error in the 

sentencing case by assessing: the probative value and weight of 

the evidence; the risk of unfair prejudice resulting from the 

ruling; the evidence in light of other sentencing 

considerations; and the sentence actually imposed compared to 

the maximum and to the sentence the trial counsel argued for. 

Id. 

We recognize that a service member’s job performance, 

community support and good conduct may be probative areas in 

sentencing. Here, however, even when somewhat limited by the 
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military judge’s rulings, the appellant solicited highly 

favorable conclusions from each of his live witnesses. In 

addition, the appellant submitted two exhibits that stated the 

authors’ positive view about rehabilitative potential as well as 

overall character. 

The appellant faced a maximum sentence of confinement for 

12 months, forfeiture of two-thirds’ pay for 12 months, 

reduction to the lowest pay grade (E-1), and a bad-conduct 

discharge. The trial counsel argued for five months of 

confinement, forfeiture during that period, and a bad-conduct 

discharge. The appellant received a reprimand, partial 

forfeiture, restriction, and a bad-conduct discharge. The 

sentence the appellant received was thus substantially less than 

the maximum or what the trial counsel sought. 

We find that the admission of the excluded testimony, to 

the extent that it was error to exclude it, would not have led 

the military judge to award a more lenient sentence. As the 

appellant’s sentence was not substantially influenced by the 

exclusion, we find no prejudice.

Legality of the Sentence

A CA may not approve an illegal sentence. United States v. 

Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 145 (C.A.A.F. 2010). In this case the 

military judge adjudged, and the CA approved, 120 days’ 

restriction.

“Restriction may be adjudged for no more than 2 months for 

each month of authorized confinement and in no case for more 

than 2 months.” R.C.M. 1003(b)(5). The military judge’s 

sentence exceeded this limitation. This, as the Government 

concedes, is plain error. Accordingly, we will affirm only two 

months of restriction.8

Sentence Severity

The appellant argues that his sentence was inappropriately 

severe given the support of the Marines who supervised the 

appellant, the rehabilitative potential of the appellant, and 

the appellant’s new understanding of his alcohol problem. We 

disagree.

 

8 Documents filed with the Court indicate that the appellant did not serve any 

days of restriction as he was placed on appellate leave before the CA ordered 

the restriction executed. We thus find any further relief unnecessary.
8

We review the appropriateness of the sentence de novo. 

United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006). Under

Article 66(c), UCMJ, this court “may affirm only such findings 

of guilty and the sentence or such part or amount of the 

sentence, as it finds correct in law and fact and determines, on 

the basis of the entire record, should be approved.” “Sentence 

appropriateness involves the judicial function of assuring that 

justice is done and that the accused gets the punishment he 

deserves.” United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 

1988). That analysis requires “individualized consideration of 

the particular accused on the basis of the nature and 

seriousness of the offense and character of the offender.”

United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Factors 

include “the circumstances surrounding the offense, [the 

accused's] acceptance or lack of acceptance of responsibility 

for his offense, and his prior record.” United States v. 

Aurich, 31 M.J. 95, 97 (C.M.A. 1990). Determining sentence 

appropriateness does not include granting clemency. Healy, 26 

M.J. at 395. 

The appellant violated a lawful general order and assaulted

a fellow Marine without provocation. Evidence regarding the 

appellant's misuse of alcohol——which included three nonjudicial 

punishments, two of which involved underage drinking of alcohol—

—was offered during presentencing in aggravation as well as in

mitigation and extenuation. The appellant presented evidence of 

his efforts to tame his abuse of alcohol. Weighing the gravity 

of the appellant’s offenses against his rehabilitative 

potential, background, potential sobriety, and the support of 

his fellow Marines9, we decline to find his sentence 

inappropriate.

Letter of Reprimand

Although the CA’s action purported to incorporate a copy of 

the letter of reprimand, no copy was present. Responding to our 

order to produce a copy, the Government’s inquiries revealed no 

record of a letter of reprimand ever actually being issued. 

Accordingly, we will not affirm that part of the sentence 

extending to a letter of reprimand. 

 

9 This list is not exclusive as the court considered all relevant sentencing 

factors outlined by the trial counsel as well as trial defense counsel.
9

Conclusion

The findings and only so much of the sentence as includes a 

bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of $1000 pay per month for 

four months, and restriction for two months is affirmed. 

Chief Judge BRUBAKER and Judge HOLIFIELD concur.

 For the Court 

 R.H. TROIDL 

 Clerk of Court