Filed 11/15/22 In re E.A. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re E.A., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

2d Juv. No. B315127

(Super. Ct. No. FJ56399)

(Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.A.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

E.A. appeals the juvenile court’s order sustaining a 

wardship petition alleging possession of a firearm by minor. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602;

1 Pen. Code, § 29610.) He contends the 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code, unless otherwise stated.
2

juvenile court erroneously denied his suppression motion

pursuant to section 700.1. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At about 6:00 p.m., June 2021, two Los Angeles police 

officers were on patrol when they noticed a group of 

approximately eight males standing in the middle of the street

near the intersection of 17th and Oak Street. The officers also 

observed a vehicle in the westbound driving lane of 17th Street 

that appeared to be attempting to cross Oak Street but was

blocked by the group standing in the street. The officers stopped 

their patrol car to detain the individuals for violating the Vehicle 

Code regarding pedestrians on the roadway. (Veh. Code, § 

21954.) 

Upon exiting the patrol car, Officer Barrera ordered the 

group to the sidewalk. All of the individuals complied except 

appellant. Instead, he turned and walked down the street toward

his parked vehicle and attempted to enter it. Meanwhile, as 

Officer Yahcamara exited the patrol car, he observed a “bulge” at 

appellant’s waistband, which he believed to be the handle of a 

firearm. Officer Yahcamara physically detained appellant,

performed a pat search, and recovered a firearm.

After the group was moved from the street to the sidewalk, 

the officers determined the vehicle that they initially believed 

was attempting to cross Oak Street was in fact unoccupied and

illegally parked in the driving lane of the street. 

In denying the motion to suppress, the juvenile court 

indicated that it had listened to Officer Yahcamara’s testimony 

and watched the body-worn camera video of both officers. It 

further stated, “I believe that [appellant] was part of the 

collective group that was blocking the roadway . . . . ¶ I think it 
3

was a lawful detention and a lawful pat down . . . the fruit of 

which was a gun. So, the motion is denied.” Thereafter, the

juvenile court sustained the section 602 petition and ordered 

appellant to continue as a ward of the court. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant erroneously contends the juvenile court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress because both the initial detention 

and subsequent search were unlawful. 

In reviewing the denial of the suppression motion, we defer 

to the juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by substantial 

evidence, but independently review its application of the law to 

those findings. (In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 142.)

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of

unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement

personnel. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 

U.S. 1, 8-9 (Terry).) However, an officer may conduct a brief, 

investigative stop when the officer has reasonable suspicion, 

supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity may be 

afoot. (United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7; Terry, at p. 

22.) An ordinary traffic stop is treated as an investigatory 

detention and is justified if it is based on at least reasonable 

suspicion that an individual has violated the Vehicle Code or 

some other law. (People v. Durazo (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728, 

734-735.) The reasonable suspicion standard is not based on the 

officer’s subjective state of mind, rather it is objective in nature

and determined based on the totality of the circumstances. (In re 

Edgerrin J. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 752, 762; People v. Letner and 

Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 (Letner and Tobin); Sokolow, at 

p. 8.)
4

Here, appellant’s initial detention was justified based on 

the officers’ observations that appellant, along with seven other 

individuals, was unlawfully standing in the middle of the street 

blocking a vehicle on the roadway. Vehicle Code section 21954, 

subdivision (a) provides: “Every pedestrian upon a roadway at 

any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an 

unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-ofway to all vehicles upon the roadway so near as to constitute an 

immediate hazard.” 

Appellant cites People v. Ramirez (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th

849, and contends the stop was “nothing more than a subterfuge”

to detain Hispanic males “for which there was no legal basis.” 

This argument lacks merit for the following reasons. First, there 

is no evidence in the record to support appellant’s contention that 

the officers impermissibly detained him because he is Hispanic. 

Second, Ramirez is distinguishable and does not support a 

finding that the detention in this case was unlawful. In Ramirez, 

the officer witnessed an individual crossing an intersection 

diagonally who was already three-quarters of the way from the 

other side of the street. The only visible vehicle was the officer’s 

patrol car. (Id. at pp. 853-854.) In reversing the trial court’s 

denial of the suppression motion, the Court of Appeal concluded 

there was no violation of Vehicle Code section 21954 because the 

defendant had not impeded anyone on the roadway and the 

officer’s patrol car did not pose an “immediate hazard.” (Id. at 

pp. 852-854.) 

Appellant contends, like Ramirez, he could not have 

violated Vehicle Code section 21954 because there was no 

“traffic” at the time of the detention. But appellant’s contention

ignores the officer’s testimony that he observed a vehicle located 
5

in the driving lane of 17th Street that appeared to be crossing, or 

about to cross, Oak Street. It is irrelevant that the vehicle was 

later determined to be unoccupied and parked in the middle of 

the street. Rather, the relevant consideration is what 

“circumstances [were] known or apparent to the officer” at the 

time of the investigative stop. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 

888, 893.) “‘[W]e cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty 

from . . . law enforcement officers where none exists. . . .’” (Letner 

and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 146.) Based on the foregoing 

reasons, the initial detention was lawful. 

The detention and pat search of appellant were also lawful. 

Officer Yahcamara testified that as he exited his patrol car, he 

observed a “bulge” in appellant’s waistband area, which based on 

his training and experience, was consistent with the handle of a 

firearm. Where, as here, an officer “reasonably suspects that an 

individual whose suspicious behavior he or she is investigating is 

armed and dangerous to the officer or others, [the officer] may 

perform a pat search for weapons.” (In re H.M., supra, 167 

Cal.App.4th at p. 143; Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 24, 30.) In 

light of the officer’s suspicion that appellant had a firearm, and 

given appellant’s suspicious behavior during the detention, 

including his refusal to follow commands, it would be 

unreasonable to deny the officer the power to “neutralize the 

threat of physical harm.” (See Terry, at p. 24; In re Jeremiah S.

(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 299, 305; Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 

U.S. 119, 124.) 

Finally, appellant’s contention that evidence of the firearm 

should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree is meritless. 

There was no poisonous tree. 
6

DISPOSITION

The judgment (orders denying motion to suppress and 

sustaining section 602 petition) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.
Christina L. Hill, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.