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Filed 2/3/23 P. v. Gonzales CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH GONZALES,

Defendant and Appellant.

C095585

(Super. Ct. No. 95F07960)

In 1997, when defendant Joseph Gonzales was 25 years old, he was sentenced to 

multiple life terms under the Three Strikes law. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i),

1170.12.)

1 After a modification in 2000, the total aggregate term of defendant’s sentence 

was 121 years to life. 

In 2021, after the law regarding parole of youthful offenders changed, defendant 

filed a postjudgment motion for a proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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261 (Franklin) to make a record of youth-related evidence for an eventual youth offender 

parole hearing. The court denied the motion, concluding that defendant is statutorily 

ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing because he was sentenced under the Three 

Strikes law. 

On appeal, defendant concedes that he is statutorily ineligible for a youth offender 

parole hearing under section 3051, subdivision (h), and instead advances two new 

arguments as to why his motion should have been granted. First, he argues the statute’s

differential treatment of Third Strike offenders violates equal protection. Second, he 

argues that, as a youthful offender with an indeterminate life sentence, he should have 

been granted a Franklin proceeding even if he is not entitled to a youth offender parole 

hearing. We reject defendant’s equal protection claim, but agree with the latter 

contention. Thus, we shall reverse the order denying defendant’s Franklin motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1994 and 1995, when defendant was between the ages of 21 and 23, he 

committed four separate robberies using a firearm. Defendant had two prior qualifying 

convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. In September 1997, the court 

sentenced defendant as a third strike offender to six consecutive indeterminate life terms 

(25 years to life) on four counts of robbery (§ 211) and two counts of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm. (Former § 12021, subd. (a).) The court also imposed four 

consecutive four-year terms for firearm enhancements (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), plus a fiveyear prior serious felony conviction enhancement, for a total aggregate term of 171 years 

to life. The court subsequently modified defendant’s sentence to stay execution of the 

two unlawful firearm possession counts, leaving the remainder of the sentence intact. 

In September 2021, defendant, acting in propria persona, filed a postjudgment 

motion for a proceeding under Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 and section 1203.1. 

Defendant alleged that because he was a “ ‘youthful offender’ ” under the age of 26 at the 
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time of his offense, he was entitled to a Franklin proceeding to preserve mitigating 

youth-related evidence for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. 

On December 30, 2021, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that 

defendant is ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051, 

subdivision (h) because he was sentenced under the Three Strikes law. Defendant filed a 

timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant challenges the trial court’s ruling on two grounds, both of which are 

raised for the first time in this appeal. First, he contends section 3051 on its face violates 

equal protection because it irrationally excludes youthful offenders sentenced under the 

Three Strikes law. Second, he argues that irrespective of his right to a youth offender 

parole hearing, as a youthful offender with an indeterminate life sentence, he is entitled to 

a Franklin proceeding under section 4801, subdivision (c) to preserve youth-related 

evidence for his future parole hearing. 

I

Forfeiture

As a preliminary matter, we consider whether defendant forfeited his claims by 

failing to raise them below. “As a general rule, a party who does not raise an argument 

below forfeits the argument on appeal. [Citation.]” (In re Abram L. (2013) 219 

Cal.App.4th 452, 462.) The forfeiture rule applies to claims based on alleged statutory 

violations, as well as the deprivation of constitutional rights. (In re Seaton (2004) 34 

Cal.4th 193, 198; People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.) However, 

application of the rule is not automatic. (In re Abram L., supra, at p. 462.) An appellate 

court has discretion to excuse forfeiture where a case involves an important question of 

law. (People v. Espiritu (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 718, 725; People v. Aviles (2019) 39 

Cal.App.5th 1055, 1074.) 
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We invited supplemental briefing from the parties on the forfeiture issue. In their 

supplemental briefs, both parties argued that we can address the merits of defendant’s 

claims, either because the claim was not forfeited or because the claim presents a pure 

question of law that is well suited to appellate review. We accept the concession and 

shall address the merits of the contentions raised on appeal.

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II

Equal Protection

The trial court denied defendant’s Franklin motion on the ground he is statutorily 

ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing. On appeal, defendant concedes that he is 

statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051, subdivision

(h). But he contends the statutory exclusion of offenders sentenced under the Three 

Strikes law violates his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. We find no 

equal protection violation.

A. Legal framework

In a series of cases addressing limits on juvenile sentencing, the United States 

Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 

unusual punishment “encompasses the ‘foundational principle’ that the ‘imposition of a 

State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were 

not children.’ [Citation.] From this principle, the high court has derived a number of 

limitations on juvenile sentencing . . . .” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 273-274; see 

also People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268-269 [Eighth Amendment prohibits 

de facto sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders].) “The 

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In reaching this conclusion, we assume defendant intends to raise only a facial 

constitutional challenge to the statute. To the extent defendant also intends to raise an 

“as-applied” challenge to the statute, we deem the claim forfeited due to his failure to 

raise it below. (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946.)
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underlying rationale of these decisions is that ‘[b]ecause juveniles have diminished 

culpability and greater prospects for reform,’ as compared to adult offenders, ‘ “they are 

less deserving of the most severe punishments.” ’ [Citation.] [Citation.] Consequently, 

except in the rarest of circumstances[,] . . . juvenile offenders facing lifelong prison terms 

must be given a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness to 

reenter society at some point in the future. [Citation.]” (People v. Delgado (2022) 78 

Cal.App.5th 95, 100 (Delgado).)

In response to these court decisions, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 260 

(2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 260), which added section 3051 and amended 

sections 3041, 3046, and 4801. (People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 197-198

(Sands); In re Trejo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 972, 980.) The stated purpose of the act was 

“to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for 

crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtain release when he or 

she has shown that he or she has been rehabilitated and gained maturity . . . .” (Stats. 

2013, ch. 312, § 1.)

“At the heart of Senate Bill No. 260, was the addition of section 3051, which 

requires the [parole board] to conduct a ‘youth offender parole hearing’ during the 15th, 

20th, or 25th year of a juvenile offender’s incarceration,” depending on the term of the 

offender’s “controlling offense.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.) “By ensuring 

that those eligible for youth offender parole hearings ‘will have a meaningful opportunity 

for release no more than 25 years into their incarceration’ [citation], section 3051 made it 

unnecessary for courts ‘to decide Eighth Amendment challenges to sentences of 25 years 

or more for a broad range of juvenile homicide and nonhomicide offenses’ [citation].” 

(In re Woods (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 740, 750, review granted June 16, 2021, S268740; 

Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 276-277, 280-281.)

As originally enacted, section 3051 made youth offender parole hearings available 

only to juvenile offenders, and it excluded juvenile offenders sentenced to life without the 
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possibility of parole (LWOP). (People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 346.) The

Legislature subsequently increased the age threshold, first to 23 years, and then to 25 

years, and amended section 3051 to allow parole hearings for juvenile offenders (but not 

youthful offenders) sentenced to LWOP. (Ibid.) As a result, most offenders 25 years of 

age and younger at the time of their offense are now eligible for a youth offender parole 

hearing after 15, 20, or 25 years in prison, depending on the sentence. (Sands, supra, 70 

Cal.App.5th at p. 198; § 3051, subd. (b).) However, section 3051, subdivision (h) 

provides that certain youthful offenders, including those sentenced under the “One 

Strike” law (§ 667.61), or the Three Strikes law, are ineligible for youth offender parole 

hearings. (§ 3051, subd. (h).)

After the enactment of section 3051, our Supreme Court decided Franklin, which 

recognized a right, rooted in the language of section 4801, subdivision (c), for offenders 

who qualified for a youth offender parole hearing to preserve youth-related mitigating 

evidence. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.) The goal of such proceeding, the 

court held, is “to provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the 

juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the

[parole board], years later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’

youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is ‘fit to 

rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes 

of the law.’ ” (Franklin, at p. 284.)

In In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook), the California Supreme Court extended

the right to a Franklin proceeding to youthful offenders whose judgments are otherwise 

final. (Cook, supra, at pp. 448-449, 451.) Cook further held that the proper avenue for a

youthful offender to request a Franklin proceeding is through a motion under section 

1203.01. (Cook, at pp. 446-447; People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 748

(Benzler).) 
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B. Analysis

“ ‘ “In considering a facial constitutional challenge to a statute, we uphold the 

statute unless its unconstitutionality plainly and unmistakably appears; all presumptions 

favor its validity.” ’ [Citations.]” (Tos v. State of California (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 184, 

195.) To prevail, the challenger must show that the statute “inevitably poses a present 

total and fatal conflict with the Constitution” or “is unconstitutional in the . . . great 

majority of cases.” (Ivory Education Institute v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2018) 28 

Cal.App.5th 975, 981.) The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, 

which we review de novo. (Persky v. Bushey (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 810, 817.)

Where, as here, a statute is challenged on equal protection grounds, a court’s 

inquiry is twofold. It first must determine whether the “ ‘the state has adopted a 

classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’

[Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated for all 

purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.’ ” 

(Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253.) If such a showing is made, and 

no suspect class or fundamental rights are at issue, the court must determine whether 

there is any rational basis to support treating the two groups differently. (Sands, supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.) 

The rational basis test “sets a very high bar.” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 

204.) To successfully challenge a statute as violating equal protection, the defendant 

must negate every conceivable basis for the differential treatment. (People v. Moore

(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856, 862.) “[A] classification does not violate equal protection if 

there is any rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 

governmental purpose. [Citation.] ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, “[e]qual 

protection analysis does not entitle the judiciary to second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or 

logic of the law.” ’ ” (Ibid.) 
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“A legislative classification does not fail rational basis review because it is

‘ “imperfect” ’ or ‘ “because it may be ‘to some extent both underinclusive and 

overinclusive.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 205, quoting Johnson 

v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 887.) A legislative classification is not 

irrational simply because some offenders may be sentenced to harsher sentences than

others who are arguably less culpable. (Sands, at p. 205.)

Defendant argues that youthful Three Strike offenders are similarly situated to 

youthful offenders who were not sentenced under the Three Strikes law, including first 

degree murderers, and he argues there is no rational basis to deny a youth offender parole 

hearing to youthful Three Strike offenders while providing that benefit to “the worst 

[youthful] offenders.” He relies on People v. Edwards (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 183, which 

held that the statutory exclusion of youthful offenders sentenced under the One Strike law 

violates equal protection because there is no rational basis for punishing youthful One 

Strike offenders more harshly than youthful first degree murderers. (Id. at p. 199.)

Assuming we agree with defendant that youthful Three Strike offenders are 

similarly situated to youthful offenders not sentenced under the Three Strikes law, we 

nevertheless conclude defendant’s equal protection challenge fails because the 

Legislature had a rational basis for the differential treatment. “The well-recognized 

purpose of the three strikes law is to provide increased punishment for current offenders 

who have previously committed violent or serious crimes and have therefore not been 

rehabilitated or deterred from further criminal activity as a result of their prior 

imprisonment. [Citation.]” (People v. Leng (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1, 14.) The 

Legislature rationally could determine that a youthful offender with a criminal history of 

prior strikes should be punished more severely than one who does not. (Id. at p. 12; 

People v. Cooper (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 815, 828-830.)

In People v. Wilkes (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1159 (Wilkes), Division Five of the 

First Appellate District rejected an equal protection challenge to section 3051’s 
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differential treatment of Three Strike offenders. (Id. at pp. 1164-1167.) The court found 

no constitutional violation because the Legislature could rationally determine that “ ‘a 

recidivist who has engaged in significant antisocial behavior and who has not benefited 

from the intervention of the criminal justice system’ [citation] presents too great a risk of 

recidivism to allow the possibility of early parole.” (Id. at p. 1166.) 

The reasoning in Wilkes has been followed by other appellate courts. (Delgado, 

supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 102; People v. Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 863-864.)

We agree with the reasoning of these cases and hold that equal protection does not 

prohibit the Legislature from excluding youthful offenders sentenced under the Three 

Strikes law from the benefits of section 3051.

Defendant’s reliance on People v. Edwards, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 183 is 

misplaced. There, the court considered an equal protection challenge to the exclusion of 

youthful offenders sentenced under the One Strike law, “ ‘an alternative, harsher 

sentencing scheme that applies to specified felony sex offenses.’ ” (Wilkes, supra, 46 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1166, quoting Edwards.) Thus, the court was comparing one group of 

first-time offenders to another. (Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 102.) As Wilkes

explained, “[t]he distinguishing characteristic of Three Strike offenders . . . is that they 

are not being sentenced for a first-time offense. Thus, the ample authority rejecting equal 

protection challenges from Three Strikes offenders did not apply in Edwards. Indeed,

Edwards itself took pains to ‘note that criminal history plays no role in defining a One 

Strike crime’ and that ‘[t]he problem in this case is’ the categorical exclusion of ‘an 

entire class of youthful offenders convicted of a crime short of homicide . . . , regardless 

of criminal history . . . .’ ” (Wilkes, at pp. 1166-1167.) 

We acknowledge defendant’s point that section 3051 is intended to benefit 

youthful offenders who committed crimes before outgrowing the impetuosity of youth. 

But the Legislature still rationally could determine that Three Strike offenders, including 

those who commit offenses during their youth, present too great a risk of committing 
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more violent or serious crimes to allow the possibility of early parole, especially where, 

as here, the “controlling offense” was committed after the age of majority. (Wilkes, 

supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166.) 

For these reasons, we conclude the differential treatment of youthful offenders 

sentenced under the Three Strikes law does not violate equal protection.

III

Section 4801, Subdivision (c)

Defendant contends that even if he is ineligible for an expedited parole hearing 

under section 3051, he nevertheless is entitled to a Franklin proceeding under the 

standard rules applicable to all parole hearings. We agree.

In conjunction with the enactment of section 3051, Senate Bill 260 added section 

4801, subdivision (c). (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 5.) That subdivision now provides: 

“When a prisoner committed his or her controlling offense . . . when he or she was 25 

years of age or younger, the [parole] board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole 

pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth 

as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and 

increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.” (§ 4801, subd. 

(c).) 

In In re Brownlee (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 720, the Fifth Appellate District 

considered whether the parole board’s duty to give “ ‘great weight’ ” to youth-related 

evidence is limited to youth offender parole hearings under section 3051. The court held 

that section 4801, subdivision (c) is not so limited. Rather, “it applies to all parole 

hearings.” (Id. at p. 725.) Thus, even if a prisoner is not eligible for an expedited youth 

offender parole hearing, the parole board still must give “ ‘great weight’ ” to the youthrelated factors at the prisoner’s future parole hearing. (Id. at pp. 724-726.) The Brownlee

decision has been followed by other appellate courts (Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 103; People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 147), and we see no reason to 
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depart from it here. It follows, as a logical extension of Franklin, that a youthful offender

who is eligible for release on parole must be given an opportunity to create a record of

the kinds of information that section 4801, subdivision (c) deems relevant for the future

parole hearing. (Delgado, at pp. 103-104; Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458-459; 

Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 285-286.) 

On our own motion, we notified the parties that we were contemplating taking judicial 

notice of the fact that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s inmate locator 

Web site indicates defendant has a parole suitability hearing set for July of 2032 under 

the Elderly Parole Program. (<https://inmatelocator.cdcr.ca.gov/Details.aspx?

ID=H14833> [as of Feb. 1, 2023], archived at <https://perma.cc/TXX3-64JW> and 

https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/bph/elderly-parole-hearings-overview/> [as of Feb. 1, 2023],

archived at <https://perma.cc/55N2-SSYP>.) We invited the parties to submit letter 

briefs relevant to the propriety of our taking judicial notice of this fact as well as any 

impact it may have on the legal issues raised in this case. Both sides responded and 

agreed that judicial notice was proper, and that the information is relevant because it 

demonstrates there is a reasonable likelihood defendant will receive a parole suitability 

hearing within his lifetime. Thus, we shall take judicial notice of defendant’sscheduled 

parole suitability hearing date. (See Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 750, fn. 3; 

People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1372-1373; Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 

459, subd. (a).)

Because defendant was a youthful offender who is technically eligible to be 

considered for future release on parole, and there is a reasonable likelihood that defendant 

will receive a parole suitability hearing within his lifetime, the Attorney General 

concedes that a limited remand for a Franklin proceeding is justified. We accept the 

concession. We shall order a limited remand in this case to give defendant the 

opportunity to make a record of youth-related evidence so that the parole board may, in 

the future, properly discharge its obligation under section 4801, subdivision (c).
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We note that, on remand, “the manner and extent of a Franklin hearing is left to 

the discretion of the trial court.” (Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 749; see People v. 

Howard, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.) The trial court may “ ‘exercise its discretion 

to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, 

noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and 

regulations.’ [Citation.] The court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding 

the evidence the offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence 

is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record. 

It may also determine whether testimony is ‘appropriate’ [citation], or if other types of 

evidentiary submissions will suffice.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.) 

DISPOSITION

The order denying defendant’s motion seeking a Franklin proceeding is reversed 

and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 KRAUSE , J.

We concur:

 HULL , Acting P. J.

 DUARTE , J.