In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16‐3463

ROBERT MCCOY, et al.,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

CHICAGO HEIGHTS ELECTION

COMMISSION, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

Nos. 87 C 5112 and 88 C 9800 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2017 — DECIDED JANUARY 22, 2018

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK,

Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs‐appellants Robert McCoy

and Kevin Perkins (“Appellants”) appeal from the district

court’s order approving as constitutional a reapportioned map

of aldermanic districts in the City of Chicago Heights (“the
2 No. 16‐3463

City”). The City redrew the ward boundaries pursuant to a

consentdecree enteredin2010, afterdecades oflitigation.After

an evidentiary hearing, the district court ruled that the City

had sufficiently justified the population deviations in its

proposed map. We affirm.

I.  BACKGROUND

This case began in 1987, when a class of African‐American

plaintiffs filed suits against the City and the Chicago Heights

Park District, alleging dilution of voting opportunity and

challenging the methods for electing representatives to the

City Council and the Park District Board. We will briefly

summarize the relevant facts, but the long history of this

litigation has been well documented through numerous

written opinions. See Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d

593, 596 (7th Cir. 2000) (summarizing and listing previous

decisions).

Early in the litigation, the election practices at issue were

found to violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42

U.S.C. § 1971, et seq. (currently cited as 52 U.S.C. § 10101). That

finding set in motion an arduous process of attempting to

remedy the violation through the establishment of a consent

decree, which included a number of appeals and remands.

Appellants split from the other class plaintiffs in 1994, and

objected to the entry of the first consent decree. Since that time,

they have remained as the main opposition to the proposed

remedies for the violation.

In November 2010, the district court entered the most

recent consent decree (“the Decree”), which, despite its goal of

settling all outstanding disputes, forms the basis for this
No. 16‐3463 3

appeal. The Decree established a seven‐ward, single alder‐

manic form of government, and included a ward map that

complied with the applicable constitutionalrequirements. The

Decree also contained a provision requiring the City to

reapportion the wards as the population changed.

After the Decree was entered, the 2010 census results

showed that the wards’ populations had changed such that the

map required reapportionment. Accordingly, the City endeav‐

ored to redraw the wards to comply with the Decree. On

June 20, 2014, after a public comment process, the City passed

an ordinance approving its redrawn ward map. Then, on

October 22, 2014, the City filed a motion in the district court

seeking approval of its redrawn map as constitutional. Appel‐

lants responded, objecting to the City’s proposed map and

seeking leave to file their own ward map for approval and

implementation by the court.

As an initial matter, the court held that the Decree did not

allow for Appellants to propose their own ward map. Instead,

it found that the Decree gave the City the exclusive right to

reapportion the wards. Therefore, the court only considered

the City’s proposed map.

The City’s map still contained seven wards, each with an

individual population deviation of less than ten percent.

However, the overall deviation of the proposed map was

12.65%. Therefore, the court denied without prejudice the

City’s motion to approve the new map. The court gave the City

the option of either submitting justification forthe deviation or

proposing a new map that would bring the overall deviation

under ten percent. The City elected to submit a supplemental
4 No. 16‐3463

brief providing its justifications, and the court held an eviden‐

tiary hearing to determine whether those were sufficient to

support the overall population deviation.

Ultimately, the court found that the City had presented

sufficient justification and had made a good faith effort to

reapportion the map with the smallest population deviations

practicable. It found that the City used legitimate and nondis‐

criminatory objectives in reapportioning the wards, such as

maintaining historical and natural boundary lines where

possible, and easing voter confusion by redrawing unusual

boundaries. Forthose reasons, the court held that the City had

complied with the Decree, and it approvedthe City’s proposed

map as constitutional.

II.  DISCUSSION

This appeal presents two distinct issues. The first is

whetherthe district court erred in determining that the Decree

gave the City the exclusive right to propose a reapportioned

ward map. The second is whether the court was correct in

determining thatthe City’s proposed map was constitutionally

valid. We address each in turn.

A. Interpretation of the Decree

A consent decree is a form of contract, the interpretation of

which is typically subject to de novo review. Goluba v. Sch. Dist.

of Ripon, 45 F.3d 1035, 1037–38 (7th Cir. 1995). We have

recognized an exception to that rule, however, and have given

deference to the district court’s interpretation where the judge

who interprets the decree had involvement in its creation and

oversaw the litigation for an extended period of time. See, e.g.,
No. 16‐3463 5

id. at 1038; see also South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 n.4 (7th Cir.

1985).

This case began more than 30 years ago, but it has been

overseen by four different district judges. District Judge Coar

had the case for nearly 15 years before approving the Decree in

2010. The case was then reassigned to District Judge

Gettleman. Judge Gettleman made the rulings that formed the

basis of this appeal, but he did not oversee in the negotiation

of the Decree, nor did he approve it. Therefore, we will review

Judge Gettleman’s interpretation of the Decree de novo.

Appellants argue that they were entitled to submit their

own map for the court’s consideration and approval based on

the second to last sentence of the Decree, which states: “After

the publication of the 2010 census, the parties will, within

reasonable dispatch, reapportion the voting districts, if

necessary, in time for the next election following that date.”

The reference to “the parties,” Appellants contend, indicates

that both they and the City were allowed to submit maps, and

the court was to decide which represented the better remedy.

However, a clause that appears earlier in the Decree, and

on which the district courtrelied forits ruling, contradicts that

notion. It states that after the elections scheduled in February

and April of 2011, “the Defendants shall reapportion the

aldermanic ward boundary lines in accordance with the

provisions of Illinois and federal law.”

As the Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear,

reapportionment of voting districts is, first and foremost, the

responsibility of the local government. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507

U.S. 146, 156 (1993) (“Time and again, we have emphasized
6 No. 16‐3463

that reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility

of the State through its legislature or other body,ratherthan of

a federal court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); Wise v. Lipscomb, 434 U.S. 1329, 1332 (1977) (citing

cases that indicate “municipal election plans are entitled to the

same respect accorded those of state legislatures”). Typically,

a federal court should notinvolve itselfin the reapportionment

process unless the governing body fails to put forth a plan that

complies with constitutional requirements. Wise, 434 U.S. at

1331–32 (explaining that a government’s “decisions as to the

most effective reconciling of traditional policies should not be

restricted beyond the commands of the Equal Protection

Clause”).

Those underlying principles support a reading of the

Decree that gives the City alone the responsibility to put forth

a reapportioned map. Reading the Decree to allow Appellants

to put forth their own map for the district court’s approval

would surely contradict the Supreme Court’s admonitions

explained above. Doing so would allow Appellants, and the

district court, to impermissibly bypass the City’s legislative

process, which is to be given primacy in these disputes. Id; see

also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) (“[J]udicial relief

becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to

reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a

timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do

so.”). Therefore, the Decree’s explicit instruction that “the

Defendants shall reapportion the aldermanic ward boundary

lines” is controlling.

We agree with Appellants that the Decree’s later reference

to the “parties” entitled Appellants to a role in the process. We
No. 16‐3463 7

disagree, however, with their assertion that they were denied

that role by virtue of the fact that the court did not consider

their map.

The City engaged in an open legislative process to create

the new map. At the evidentiary hearing, the City established

that notice of the proposed map was published in a local

newspaper, as well as on the City’s website. The City also

made displays of the current and proposed maps available at

City Hall for public review and comment. The meeting at

which the map was presented to the City Council for approval

was also open for public comments. Appellants had the ability

during that process to propose their own suggestions and

improvements for the new ward map. Moreover, their status

as parties in this lawsuit afforded them the opportunity to

challenge the map and point out its weaknesses to the court.

However, when read within the context of the underlying

legal principles set forth above, the Decree indicates that it was

the City’s sole responsibility to reapportion the ward map.

Therefore, the district court did not err in ruling that

Appellants were not entitled to submittheir own ward map for

approval by the court.

B. Constitutionality of Proposed Map

Having established that it was the City’s responsibility to

reapportion the wards, we are left only to determine whether

the City’s proposed map meets the relevant constitutional

standards. “The Equal Protection Clause principle of ‘one

person, one vote’ requires that officials be elected from voting

districts with substantially equal populations.” League of

Women Voters of Chi. v. City of Chi., 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir.
8 No. 16‐3463

2014) (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577). Though it does not

require exact mathematical precision, the Constitution does

require a governmentto “make an honest and good‐faith effort

to construct its districts as nearly of equal population as is

practicable.” Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743 (1973)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A maximum

population deviation between voting districts of less than ten

percent is presumptively constitutional. League of Women

Voters, 757 F.3d at 725. However, when the maximum

deviation is greater than ten percent, the government must

present justifications for the variance. Id.

Because theirproposed maphadan overalldeviationofjust

over 12%, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine

whether the variance was justified. The City, and in turn the

court, relied heavily on the testimony of Thomas Somer, the

City’s corporation counsel. Somer was the City official

primarily responsible for reapportioning the map, which he

did with the help of a cartographer. He testified that his goal

in redrawing the map was to change the configuration of the

existing wards as little as possible, so as to maintain their

historical configuration and their configuration as drawn for

the map used in the Decree. To ensure that certain wards had

sufficientpopulations, heusedthe natural boundaries of major

thoroughfares as the dividing lines. He testified that these new

boundaries also increased the wards’ compactness and eased

voter confusion that existed due to certain wards’ unusual

shape in the previous map.

These are all legitimate objectives that, absent the use of

discriminatory criteria, could justify a variance in population

between wards. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983)
No. 16‐3463 9

(specifically recognizing “makingdistricts compact,respecting

municipal boundaries, [and] preserving the cores of prior

districts” as goals that can justify population deviations).

Somer also explained how redrawing the map with those goals

in mind resulted in the specific deviations present. Seeid. at 741

(“The [government] must, however, show with some

specificity that a particular objective required the specific

deviations in its plan, rather than simply relying on general

assertions.”). The district court found his explanation credible,

and we find no reason to quarrel with that determination.

Appellants have failed to present evidence, either in the

district court or on appeal, that the City employed any

discriminatory criteria or methods in its reapportionment.

Instead, their arguments can generally can be boiled down to

comparisons between the City’s proposal andtheir own, which

they deem to be more equitable. As we established above,

however, neither the Decree, nor the underlying legal

principles contemplate that the district court should review

competing plans and choose between them.

At this stage in the litigation, all that was left forthe district

court to determine, and therefore for us to review, was

whether the City’s proposal met the constitutional requisites.

Based on the evidence and testimony the City presented at

the hearing, we agree with the district court that the City made

a good‐faith effort to reapportion the wards, adhering to the

Decree and minimizing the population deviations as much as

was practicable. Therefore, the district court was correct to

conclude that the City’s proposed map satisfies the

constitutional principle of one person, one vote.
10 No. 16‐3463

III.  CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.