[Cite as Salpietro v. Salpietro, 2023-Ohio-169.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

WOOD COUNTY

Gina Salpietro Court of Appeals No. WD-22-028

Appellant Trial Court No. 2021-DR-0037

 

v.

Benjamin J. Salpietro, Jr. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellee Decided: January 20, 2023 

* * * * *

Drew Hanna, for appellant.

Julie S. Hoffman, for appellee. 

* * * * *

MAYLE, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Gina Salpietro, appeals the April 5, 2022 judgment of the Wood 

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, granting her and appellee, 

Benjamin Salpietro Jr., a divorce. With one small modification, we affirm the trial 

court’s decision.
2.

I. Background and Facts1

{¶ 2} Gina and Benjamin married in 1990 and separated in 2020. Benjamin is an 

orthopedic surgeon, and Gina was a homemaker for much of the parties’ marriage. They 

have three emancipated children together.

{¶ 3} Although they began a contested divorce trial, by the start of the second day, 

they had “reached an agreement * * * on everything except spousal support and legal 

fees.” At the request of Gina’s attorney, Benjamin’s attorney read the terms of the 

parties’ settlement into the record. They agreed on the distribution of personal property, 

how to handle marital funds in a joint bank account, issues involving automobile loans, 

terms for selling the marital home, issues with filing their tax returns, who was 

responsible for paying specific bills, Benjamin procuring a life insurance policy with 

Gina as the beneficiary, and distribution of Benjamin’s interests in two businesses. Two 

terms of the agreement are particularly relevant here. First, the parties agreed that 

Benjamin would give Gina a lump sum cash payment to compensate her for half of 

Benjamin’s interest in a medical office building that generates rental income and in a 

surgical consulting business. Because Benjamin was paying Gina for her interest in the 

rental property and the consulting business, the parties agreed that the trial court’s 

spousal support award should be based solely on the income he earns from his surgical 

practice.

1 For ease of discussion, we present a cursory summary of the facts here, and will discuss 

the facts in more detail as they become relevant to Gina’s assignments of error.
3.

{¶ 4} After Benjamin’s attorney recited the agreement, Gina’s attorney “conferred 

with [his] client * * *” and said that “what [Benjamin’s attorney] has recited is an 

accurate statement of the settlement.” Later, when Benjamin’s attorney clarified that they 

had also agreed that the court’s spousal support award should be based only on 

Benjamin’s income from his surgical practice because Benjamin was giving Gina a cash 

payment for her half of his interests in the rental property and the consulting business, 

Gina’s attorney simply responded, “So agreed.”

{¶ 5} Following the divorce hearing, the trial court issued its decision on spousal 

support and attorney fees. The court made findings regarding all of the factors in R.C. 

3105.18(C)(1), which controls an award of spousal support. The court ultimately decided 

to award Gina spousal support of $13,000 per month for four years, followed by $10,000 

per month for ten years, and then $6,000 per month indefinitely. Specifically, the court’s 

decision said:

IT IS ORDERED that on May 1, 2022 and on the first day of each 

month for the following 48 months defendant Benjamin Salpietro shall pay 

to plaintiff Gina Salpietro $13,000 as spousal support; that on May 1, 2026 

and on the first day of each month for the following 120 months defendant 

Benjamin Salpietro shall pay to plaintiff Gina Salpietro $10,000 as spousal 

support; and that on May 1, 2032 and on the first day every ensuing month 

thereafter defendant Benjamin Salpietro shall pay to plaintiff Gina Salpietro 

$6,000 as spousal support.
4.

The court also awarded Gina $25,000 for attorney fees, which was in addition to $10,000 

in fees that Benjamin was ordered to pay earlier in the litigation. Gina’s total award for 

attorney fees was $35,000.

{¶ 6} Additionally, the trial court ordered Benjamin’s attorney to prepare a 

proposed judgment entry incorporating the terms of the parties’ settlement and the trial 

court’s decision on spousal support and attorney fees. Benjamin’s attorney certified that 

she sent the proposed entry to Gina’s attorney on March 22, 2022, and that he had not 

responded, objected, or countered with his own proposed entry. On April 5, 2022, the 

trial court signed and filed the entry that Benjamin’s attorney prepared.

{¶ 7} Gina now appeals, raising ten assignments of error:

1. The Court Errs and Abuses its discretion by approving the 

proposed Divorce Decree without giving the Appellant/Plaintiff an 

opportunity to Object to the proposed Decree, containing major errors.

2. It is Error by the Court to limit Appellee/Defendant’s income for 

Spousal Support to just his income as a Surgeon.

3. The Court Errs in ruling there was no Financial Misconduct by the 

Appellee/Defendant.

4. The Court Errs by not considering the contributions 

Appellant/Plaintiff made to the Appellee/Defendant in completing 

Appellee/Defendant’s Surgical Residency.
5.

5. The Court Errs by failing to order Appellee/Defendant to pay 

Appellant/Plaintiff’s health, dental, and optical insurance.

6. The Court Errs by reducing Appellant/Plaintiff’s Spousal Support 

over time.

7. The Court Errs by limiting Spousal Support to $13,000 per month.

8. The Court Errs by making a clerical error in the Spousal Support 

Payment Schedule.

9. The Court Errs by not requiring Appellee/Defendant’s Spousal 

Support Payments to be made by Bank Withholding.

10. The Court Errs in granting inadequate Attorney Fees to the 

Appellant/Plaintiff.

II. Law and Analysis

{¶ 8} In her assignments of error, Gina argues that the trial court (1) erred by 

adopting the final decree of divorce prepared by Benjamin’s attorney, (2) committed 

numerous errors in reaching its spousal support award, (3) made a clerical error in the 

spousal support schedule, (4) should have found that Benjamin committed financial 

misconduct, (5) should have ordered Benjamin to pay spousal support through bank 

withholding, and (6) did not award Gina enough attorney fees. We address each 

argument in turn.
6.

A. We must disregard items that are not in the trial court record.

{¶ 9} As a preliminary matter, we note that Gina makes multiple arguments based 

on information that is not in the appellate record. Appellate review of a trial court’s order 

is limited to the record made in the trial court. Fifth Third Bank v. Fin. S. Office 

Partners, Ltd., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23762, 2010-Ohio-5638, *3, citing Durrstein v. 

Durrstein, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18688, 2001 WL 1203014 (Oct. 12, 2001). The 

record that we can consider is “the record as it existed at the time the trial court rendered 

judgment.” Leiby v. Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1281, 2006-Ohio2831, ¶ 7, citing Chickey v. Watts, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 04AP-818 and 04AP-1269, 

2005-Ohio-4974, ¶ 14; Baker v. Senior Emergency Home Repair EOPA, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-14-1203, 2015-Ohio-3083, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 

N.E.2d 500 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus (“Ohio law is clear that we must limit 

our review on appeal to the record before the court at the time of judgment: ‘A reviewing 

court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s 

proceedings and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.’”). We cannot 

consider any exhibits attached to the parties’ briefs that were not made part of the trial 

court’s record. Star Mgt., LLC v. Fayne, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1342, 2014-Ohio2319, ¶ 7.

{¶ 10} Basically, absent some legal authorization, we cannot consider facts that 

were not presented to the trial court; documents that were not filed with, admitted into 

evidence by, or proffered to the trial court; or any acts that occurred or issues that arose 
7.

after a party filed their notice of appeal. Baker at ¶ 11; see also In re Beck, 7th Dist. 

Belmont No. 00 BA 52, 2002-Ohio-3460, ¶ 21. An exhibit attached to a party’s appellate 

brief—but not filed with the trial court—is not part of the record. In re K.Y., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 109111, 2020-Ohio-4140, ¶ 9, citing Lisboa v. Lisboa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 95673, 2011-Ohio-351, ¶ 10.

{¶ 11} With that in mind, in reviewing Gina’s assignments of error, we will 

disregard (1) any factual information that the parties included in their briefs that is not 

supported by something in the trial court’s record as it existed on May 3, 2022, when 

Gina filed her notice of appeal; (2) the exhibits that Gina attached to her brief that were 

not admitted at the divorce trial or otherwise filed with the trial court; (3) Gina’s 

attorney’s emails; (4) several unfiled motions that Gina included in her brief; (5) Gina’s 

proposed final decree (which the trial court did not adopt and is not in the trial court 

record); and (6) the email and proposed final entry from Gina’s attorney that Benjamin 

attached to his brief.

B. Gina cannot appeal the portions of the divorce decree that she consented to.

{¶ 12} Gina’s second and third assignments of error each relate to portions of the 

final decree that Gina agreed to in her settlement with Benjamin. In her second 

assignment of error, Gina contends that the trial court abused its discretion in considering 

and applying the spousal-support factors in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). She argues that the trial 

court erred by limiting Benjamin’s income for spousal support purposes to the wages he 

made from his surgical practice, rather than including his income from other sources, 
8.

including the rental property and consulting business. In her third assignment of error, 

Gina argues that the trial court erroneously determined that Benjamin did not commit 

financial misconduct because, she claims, he “dissipated” over $358,000 of marital assets 

within the meaning of R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) in the 16 months leading up to the final 

divorce hearing. Because Gina consented to the trial court limiting Benjamin’s income 

and to all parts of the property settlement, she cannot now appeal those issues.

{¶ 13} As the Ohio Supreme Court recognized almost a century ago, when “a 

consent decree has been entered by the court, such a decree is not even subject to direct 

attack, except for irregularity or fraud in its procurement.” Sponseller v. Sponseller, 110 

Ohio St. 395, 399, 144 N.E. 48 (1924), citing Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317, 335, 25 

S.Ct. 679, 49 L.Ed. 1066 (1905); Schenk v. Mohre, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-83-33, 1983 

WL 6982, * 1 (Oct. 28, 1983) (“[I]t is well settled that a judgment of a court of 

competent jurisdiction, entered by consent of the parties, will not be reversed on error and 

is binding and conclusive between the parties in the absence of fraud.”); see also Shanks 

v. Shanks, 4th Dist. Ross No. 96CA2252, 1997 WL 114397, *4 (Mar. 10, 1997) (A 

divorce decree based on a settlement agreement reached by the parties is “effectively [a] 

consent judgment[] * * *.”). We have explicitly held that “unless specifically preserving 

its right to appeal, a party participating in a consent judgment will not be allowed to 

appeal errors from that judgment.” Kerwin v. Kerwin, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1002, 

2004-Ohio-4676, ¶ 8, citing Sanitary Commercial Servs., Inc. v. Shank, 57 Ohio St.3d 

178, 181, 566 N.E.2d 1215 (1991); and Wells v. Warrick Martin & Co., 1 Ohio St. 386 
9.

(1853), syllabus. This is because “[t]he purpose of a consent judgment is to resolve a 

dispute without further litigation, and so would be defeated or at least impaired by an 

appeal. The presumption, therefore, is that the consent operates as a waiver of the right 

to appeal.” (Internal quotation omitted.) Id., citing Tradesmen Internatl., Inc. v. Kahoe, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74420, 2000 WL 283081 (Mar. 16, 2000); and Assn. of 

Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edgar, 99 F.3d 261, 262 (7th Cir.1996).

{¶ 14} In this case, on the second day of trial, Benjamin’s attorney informed the 

court that the parties had “reached an agreement * * * on everything except spousal 

support and legal fees.” In addition to the 90 minutes that the parties spent negotiating 

before the trial began, Gina’s attorney conferred with Gina after asking the court for 

“guidance” on the remaining triable issues (i.e., spousal support and attorney fees). 

Following that conference, Gina’s attorney told the court that “[they]’re ready to 

proceed.” At Gina’s attorney’s request, Benjamin’s attorney read the parties’ agreement 

into the record. After she recited the agreement, Gina’s attorney “conferred with [his] 

client [Gina],” and said that “what [Benjamin’s attorney] has recited is an accurate 

statement of the settlement.” (Emphasis added.) In addition to Gina’s attorney agreeing 

to the terms as recited by Benjamin’s attorney, Gina did not personally voice any 

objections about the settlement or its terms (although she did interject to clarify terms at 

least twice).

{¶ 15} As part of the settlement, the parties agreed that only Benjamin’s surgical 

income should be considered for purposes of determining spousal support because 
10.

Benjamin was giving Gina a cash payment equivalent to half of the value of his interest 

in his rental property and his consulting business. The parties also believed that the issue 

of financial misconduct was resolved by the settlement, as evidenced by (1) their 

representations to the court that the only remaining issues were spousal support and 

attorney fees, (2) the transcript of the second day of the divorce trial being devoid of any 

reference to financial misconduct, (3) Benjamin’s attorney failing to question Benjamin 

about the financial misconduct allegations during his direct testimony, and (4) Gina’s 

attorney specifically withdrawing the exhibits related to financial misconduct after the 

court noted that “a lot of” Gina’s exhibits from the first day of trial were “not terribly 

relevant in consideration of the settlement that you’ve reached[.]”

{¶ 16} As discussed below, the proposed judgment entry that the trial court signed 

and filed as the final divorce decree accurately represents the parties’ agreement, and 

Gina does not allege any “irregularity or fraud in [the agreement’s] procurement.” 

Sponseller at 399. Thus, because the divorce decree is a consent judgment that was 

properly procured, Gina cannot appeal the portions of the judgment that she agreed to. 

Id.; Schenk at *1; Kerwin at ¶ 8. Accordingly, Gina’s second and third assignments of 

error are not well-taken.

C. The trial court properly approved the proposed

decree submitted by Benjamin’s attorney.

{¶ 17} In her first assignment of error, Gina argues that the trial court improperly 

approved the proposed final decree of divorce prepared by Benjamin’s attorney, and that 
11.

the proposed decree “contain[ed] major [e]rrors.” Although she contends that the trial 

court violated its local rules by not giving her 14 days to object to the contents of the 

proposed decree before the judge signed and filed it, Gina’s real complaint under this 

assignment of error is that the final decree did not preserve her right to pursue Benjamin 

for violations of the parties’ temporary support order. Benjamin responds that his 

attorney complied with the local rule, the trial judge signed the final order after the 

appropriate time had passed, and Gina’s attorney did not attempt to object to the 

proposed decree until after the time for objecting had passed.

{¶ 18} Under Local Rule 4.05(B)(4) of the Court of Common Pleas of Wood 

County, General Division, after an attorney who is ordered to prepare a judgment entry 

submits the proposed entry to opposing counsel, opposing counsel can either sign the 

entry or respond to preparing counsel with an entry containing proposed modifications. 

If opposing counsel does not respond within 14 days, preparing counsel is required to 

submit their proposed entry to the court with a certification statement indicating that 

preparing counsel sent the proposed entry to opposing counsel, the date it was sent, the 

manner in which it was sent, and that the proposed order “HAS NOT BEEN 

RETURNED, REVISED NOR [sic] OBJECTED TO.” Local Rule 4.05(B)(5); see also

Local Rule 6.11(I) (Proposed entries in domestic relations cases “shall conform to Local 

Rule 4.05 and shall contain the certification in Local Rule 4.05(B)(5) if the attorney who 

prepared the entry has not received a response from the opposing attorney * * *.”). The 

rule also requires opposing counsel who does not agree with preparing counsel’s 
12.

proposed entry to “prepare and submit to the original preparing counsel an entry with 

proposed modification * * *.” Local Rule 4.05(B)(4).

{¶ 19} Generally speaking, when the parties put the terms of their settlement on 

the record in open court, the trial court is free to adopt a proposed entry that accurately 

reflects the terms of the settlement, unless the record reflects some objection by the nondrafting party. See, e.g., Johnson-Rome v. Rome, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27200, 2017-

Ohio-4099, ¶ 7; Benz v. Benz, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2004-G-2589, 2005-Ohio-5870, ¶ 

14. This is because an in-court settlement is a binding contract between the parties that 

neither party can repudiate unless they prove fraud, duress, overreaching, undue 

influence, or a factual dispute about the terms of the agreement. Wade v. Wade, 6th Dist. 

Fulton No. F-02-14, 2003-Ohio-686, ¶ 7, citing Walther v. Walther, 102 Ohio App.3d 

378, 383, 657 N.E.2d 332 (1st Dist.1995); and Spercel v. Sterling Industries, Inc., 31 

Ohio St.2d 36, 285 N.E.2d 324 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, it is not 

error for a trial court to adopt a proposed entry that one party submits in compliance with 

the court’s local rules when the other party remains silent or fails to comply with the local 

rules. See Johnson-Rome at ¶ 8 (no error when opposing party failed to object to drafting 

party’s proposed entry as required by the local rules); compare Bd. of Twp. Trustees of 

Thorn Twp. v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Perry No. 02 CA 2, 2002-Ohio-5804, ¶ 15-17 (trial court 

erred by adopting one party’s proposed entry before the expiration of the time specified 

in the local rules for the opposing party to object). 
13.

{¶ 20} Based on the record before us, there is nothing indicating that the trial court 

or Benjamin’s attorney failed to comply with Local Rule 4.05(B). The parties entered 

into a binding settlement of all issues except spousal support and attorney fees, which 

neither party can repudiate without showing fraud, duress, overreaching, undue influence, 

or a factual dispute about the terms of the agreement. Wade at ¶ 7. Gina does not argue 

that any of those exceptions apply in this case.

{¶ 21} The certification on the entry that Benjamin’s attorney prepared (and the 

trial court signed) shows that she sent the proposed entry to Gina’s attorney on March 22, 

2022. Local Rule 4.05(B)(4) then put the burden on Gina’s attorney to either approve 

and sign the proposed entry or submit a modified proposed entry to Benjamin’s attorney. 

When Benjamin’s attorney did not receive a response from Gina’s attorney “within 14 

days”—in this case, by April 5, 2022—she was required by Local Rule 4.05(B)(5) to 

submit her proposed entry to the court with the certification that she had sent the entry to 

Gina’s attorney on March 22, and that Gina’s attorney had not returned, revised, or 

objected to the entry. Beyond that 14-day window for objections, Local Rule 4.05 does 

not dictate when the trial court can or must sign a proposed entry. And the trial court 

here chose to sign and file Benjamin’s proposed entry at the end of the day on April 5. 

The record does not reflect that Gina alerted the trial court to her objections by, for 

example, filing a motion to rescind the parties’ settlement agreement or seeking relief 

from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B); in fact, the trial court’s docket shows that Gina did 
14.

not file anything other than her notice of appeal and its related documents until more than 

four months after the trial court entered the final divorce decree.2

{¶ 22} Moreover, assuming that the trial court erred by signing Benjamin’s 

proposed entry, Gina cannot show that the trial court’s actions prejudiced her. The 

parties entered into a binding in-court settlement of all issues except spousal support and 

attorney fees. The terms of the parties’ divorce that Benjamin’s attorney included in the 

proposed decree are the same as the terms that Benjamin and Gina agreed to on the 

record before the second day of the trial began. And (with the exception of the clerical 

error discussed under Gina’s eighth assignment of error) the entry also accurately reflects 

the trial court’s findings on spousal support and attorney fees. A party cannot establish 

prejudicial error when the trial court adopts a proposed entry that accurately reflects the 

parties’ settlement agreement. Benz, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2004-G-2589, 2005-Ohio5870, at ¶ 20. 

{¶ 23} Gina’s real complaint under this assignment of error is that the trial court’s 

final entry did not preserve her right to pursue Benjamin for violations of the parties’ 

temporary support order. However, unless a temporary order is reduced to a separate 

judgment or specifically referred to in the final decree, all temporary orders merge into 

the final decree of divorce and become moot. Row v. Row, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-

2 Although we are not considering the non-record exhibits that the parties submitted with 

their briefs in reaching our decision, we parenthetically note that Gina’s attorney did not 

submit anything purporting to be an objection to the proposed entry to the trial court until 

after the court was closed on April 5—i.e., after the time to object had fully passed.
15.

1231, 2022-Ohio-2525, ¶ 54, citing Dimmerling v. Dimmerling, 7th Dist. Noble No. 18 

NO 0460, 2019-Ohio-2710, ¶ 140-141; Cotter v. Cotter, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25656, 

2011-Ohio-5629, ¶ 10; and Colom v. Colom, 58 Ohio St.2d 245, 389 N.E.2d 856 (1979), 

syllabus. A party’s right to enforce any temporary or interlocutory order that is not 

reaffirmed by a separate judgment or incorporation into the final decree is extinguished 

when the trial court issues the final decree. Id.

{¶ 24} Here, there is nothing in the record showing that the trial court reduced an 

obligation Benjamin had under the temporary order to a separate judgment, and there is 

no mention of the temporary order in the final decree.3 The parties told the trial court on 

the second day of the divorce trial that they had settled all issues except spousal support 

and attorney fees, but the settlement agreement that Benjamin’s attorney read into the 

record—and that Gina’s attorney agreed with—did not include any terms related to 

Benjamin’s obligations under the temporary order. Because the final decree disposed of 

all matters before the court, the temporary order merged into the final decree, rendering 

any violations of the temporary order moot. Row at ¶ 54-55. Moreover, to the extent that 

Gina agreed to forego prosecuting violations of the temporary order by entering into a 

3

In July 2021, Gina filed two motions to hold Benjamin in contempt for violating the 

temporary order. Although the record shows that the magistrate held a hearing in July 

2021—apparently to address contempt motions filed by both parties—the transcript of 

that hearing is not in the record, and neither the magistrate nor the trial court filed any 

entries or orders related to the contempt motions. However, when the trial court fails to 

expressly decide a pretrial motion at the conclusion of the case, we presume that the 

motion is denied. Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, 

¶ 13, citing State ex rel. V Cos. v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 692 N.E.2d 198 

(1998). Therefore, we presume that the trial court denied Gina’s motions.
16.

settlement agreement and consent decree without reserving the right to appeal, she cannot 

now object to the trial court’s judgment entry on that basis. Sponseller, 110 Ohio St. at 

399, 144 N.E. 48; Kerwin, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1002, 2004-Ohio-4676, at ¶ 8.

{¶ 25} Because there is no evidence in the record showing that the trial court 

violated the court’s local rules or otherwise improperly signed the proposed final entry, 

the temporary order merged into the final decree, and Gina waived her right to appeal this 

issue, we find that Gina’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.

D. The trial court properly awarded spousal support.

{¶ 26} Gina’s fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error 

address issues related to the trial court’s award of spousal support. With the exception of 

a clerical error in the support schedule, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in issuing the spousal support award.

1. Standard of review

{¶ 27} We review a trial court’s judgment awarding spousal support for abuse of 

discretion. King v. King, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-17-072, 2019-Ohio-1561, ¶ 8, citing 

Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 67, 554 N.E.2d 83 (1990); and Bowen v. Bowen, 132 

Ohio App.3d 616, 626, 725 N.E.2d 1165 (9th Dist.1999). Abuse of discretion means that 

the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. 

Askew v. Goldhart, 75 Ohio St.3d 608, 610, 665 N.E.2d 200 (1996). An unreasonable 

decision is one that lacks sound reasoning to support the decision. Hageman v. Bryan 

City Schools, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-742, 2019-Ohio-223, ¶ 13, citing AAAA 
17.

Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 

161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). “An arbitrary decision is one that lacks adequate 

determining principle and is not governed by any fixed rules or standard.” Id., citing 

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, LLP v. Frutta del Mondo, Ltd., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

08AP-69, 2008-Ohio-3567, ¶ 11. And an unconscionable decision is one “that affronts 

the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness.” Id.

{¶ 28} Although a trial court has broad discretion in awarding spousal support, its 

determination of whether spousal support is “appropriate and reasonable,” and the nature, 

amount, duration, and terms of payment of spousal support is controlled by the factors in 

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). King at ¶ 8, citing Crites v. Crites, 6th Dist. Wood Nos. WD-04-034 

and WD-04-042, 2004-Ohio-6162, ¶ 26-27; and Schultz v. Schultz, 110 Ohio App.3d 715, 

724, 675 N.E.2d 55 (10th Dist.1996). A trial court is not required to articulate each R.C. 

3105.18(C)(1) factor in its decision, but the court’s judgment entry must show that it 

considered all the “relevant factors.” Id., citing Stockman v. Stockman, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-00-1053, 2000 WL 1838937, *3 (Dec. 15, 2000). The trial court’s judgment entry 

must also “contain sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that the 

spousal support award is ‘fair, equitable and in accordance with the law.’” Crites at ¶ 27, 

quoting Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (1988).

{¶ 29} Under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), when determining whether awarding spousal 

support is “appropriate and reasonable” and deciding the terms of any award, the trial 

court is required to consider:
18.

(a) The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not 

limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed 

[as part of the divorce proceedings] under section 3105.171 of the Revised 

Code;

(b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;

(c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of 

the parties;

(d) The retirement benefits of the parties;

(e) The duration of the marriage;

(f) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because 

that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek 

employment outside the home;

(g) The standard of living of the parties established during the 

marriage;

(h) The relative extent of education of the parties;

(i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not 

limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties;

(j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or 

earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party’s 

contribution to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;
19.

(k) The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking 

spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the 

spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the 

education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought;

(l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal 

support;

(m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted 

from that party’s marital responsibilities;

(n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and 

equitable.

{¶ 30} The trial court cannot consider any single R.C. 3105.18(C) factor in 

isolation. Kaechele at paragraph one of the syllabus. Rather, the court must consider all 

of the statutory factors with the goal of reaching an equitable result because a spousal 

support award cannot be determined by resorting to a mathematical formula. Pearson v. 

Pearson, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-21-066, 2022-Ohio-642, ¶ 12, citing Kaechele at 96.

{¶ 31} With this framework in mind, we turn to Gina’s assignments of error.
20.

2. The trial court considered Gina’s contribution to Benjamin’s residency training.

{¶ 32} In her fourth assignment of error, Gina contends that the trial court abused 

its discretion under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) by not considering the contributions she made to 

Benjamin during his surgical residencies. Benjamin responds that the trial court correctly 

concluded that Gina did not contribute to him completing his residency training.

{¶ 33} We find that the trial court acted within its discretion when it determined 

under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(j) that “[t]here was no evidence that Gina’s earnings * * * 

subsidized Benjamin’s training to become an orthopedic surgeon.” Courts generally 

require more evidence of support than simply paying bills while the other spouse pursues 

education or training. See, e.g., Budd v. Budd, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25469, 2011-Ohio565 (husband contributed to wife’s education by helping with childcare, paying her 

tuition and book fees, and transporting her to and from classes); Addington v. Addington, 

4th Dist. Scioto No. 04CA2951, 2004-Ohio-6931 (parties sold their business and home 

and moved so that husband could go to medical school, and wife was sole wage-earner 

while husband was in school); and compare, e.g., Nieman v. Nieman, 3d Dist. Allen No. 

1-16-22, 2016-Ohio-7169 (affirming trial court’s finding that neither spouse contributed 

to the other’s education because both had finished school and husband was preparing to 

start his residency when they married); Murphy v. Murphy, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

15693, 1996 WL 629522, *4 (Nov. 1, 1996) (Although husband attended medical school 

and received his medical degree during the marriage, there was no evidence in the record 
21.

that “one spouse has forgone educational or employment opportunities in order to provide 

financial support to the other spouse * * *.”).

{¶ 34} Gina testified that she and Benjamin married after Benjamin finished 

medical school, while he was in his first residency. Gina had bachelor’s and master’s 

degrees and was a licensed social worker when they married. Although Gina worked 

full-time and “[p]aid bills” during the seven years that Benjamin was completing his 

surgical residencies, she specifically said that she “didn’t pay for [Benjamin’s] education, 

[she] just paid the bills.” There was no other testimony regarding Gina’s contribution to 

Benjamin’s education and training, and Gina did not claim that Benjamin’s residencies 

were unpaid or that he made no contributions to the household during that time. Further, 

rather than failing to consider any contribution that Gina made to Benjamin’s training and 

education, the trial court concluded (based on the scant testimony that Gina gave on the 

issue) that Gina failed to show that her employment and income for the first seven years 

of the parties’ marriage led to Benjamin becoming an orthopedic surgeon. It was not 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable for the trial court to do so. Therefore, Gina’s 

fourth assignment of error is not well-taken.

3. The trial court’s spousal support award was reasonable and appropriate.

{¶ 35} In her fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth assignments of error, Gina 

argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) only awarding her $13,000 per 

month in support, (2) reducing her monthly support award over time, (3) not requiring 

Benjamin to pay for her insurance, (4) not ordering Benjamin to pay support through 
22.

bank withholding, and (5) making a clerical error in the support schedule included in the 

final divorce decree.

{¶ 36} Benjamin responds that (1) the trial court considered all of the factors in 

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) in fashioning the support order, and it acted within its discretion in 

doing so; (2) Gina never asked for Benjamin to be responsible for her insurance after the 

divorce, and the support award should be sufficient to allow Gina to obtain her own 

insurance; (3) the trial court had the discretion to allow Benjamin to make support 

payments directly to Gina; and (4) Gina should have sought to have the clerical error 

modified by the trial court under Civ.R. 60(A) rather than assigning it as error on appeal.

a. The amount of the spousal support award is reasonable and appropriate.

{¶ 37} In her seventh assignment of error, Gina argues that the trial court acted 

unreasonably when it awarded her only $13,000 per month in spousal support—far short 

of the $33,000 per month that she requested. She contends that she presented the trial 

court with “extensive and persuasive Documentation of [her] Monthly Expenses” that 

justified a spousal support award of $33,000 per month, and argues $13,000 per month is 

inadequate “[c]onsidering the Standard of Living of the parties, and the Abandonment of 

[Gina] by [Benjamin] * * *.” Benjamin responds that the trial court “specifically 

evaluated each and every factor under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) in making the spousal support 

award, [and] provid[ed] ample reasoning and explanation of the specifics of each factor 

in this case[,]” which, he contends, shows that the trial court’s spousal support award was 

not erroneous or unreasonable.
23.

{¶ 38} When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s spousal support award, it is 

important to remember that “[a] trial court must not base its determination [under R.C. 

3105.18(C)] upon any one factor taken in isolation. * * * ‘[A]ll of the statutory factors 

must be considered, with the goal of reaching an equitable result.’” (Second brackets 

sic.) Galloway v. Galloway, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-21-043, 2023-Ohio-29, ¶ 51, quoting 

Pearson, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-21-066, 2022-Ohio-642, at ¶ 12; and citing Organ v. 

Organ, 2014-Ohio-3474, 17 N.E.3d 1192, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.); Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 

518 N.E.2d 1197, at paragraph one of the syllabus; and King, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-17-

072, 2019-Ohio-1561, at ¶ 8-9.

{¶ 39} Gina’s argument on appeal relies solely on the parties’ standard of living 

during the marriage.4 However, neither party is guaranteed the same standard of living 

post-divorce, and the trial court is not required to apply an equal standard of living to the 

parties; all that the trial court is required to do is consider all of the factors in R.C. 

3105.18(C)(1) and fashion an award that is appropriate and reasonable. Dunham v. 

Dunham, 171 Ohio App.3d 147, 2007-Ohio-1167, 870 N.E.2d 168, ¶ 76-77 (10th Dist.).

{¶ 40} In its decision, the trial court made the following findings relative to the 

factors in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1):

4 Although Gina also refers to Benjamin’s “abandonment” of her, the trial court expressly 

determined that spousal support’s “purpose is not to punish a spouse[,]” and that 

“Benjamin’s infidelity * * * was not a relevant and equitable factor to be considered”

under the “[a]ny other factor” provision of R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(n). This finding was not 

an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
24.

• (C)(1)(a) – The income of the parties, from all sources, including, but not 

limited to, income derived from property divided, disbursed, or distributed 

pursuant to the divorce.

The trial court determined that Gina would have $430,000 in income 

from the division of marital property and would be “relatively debt free.” 

Benjamin would have his salary from the surgical practice and income from 

the rental property, which was a gross amount of approximately $874,000 in 

2021. The court said that it would “primarily consider Benjamin’s earnings 

ability as an orthopedic surgeon” for spousal support purposes. Benjamin 

planned to incur around $500,000 in unsecured debt to fulfill his settlement 

agreement with Gina. The parties agreed that their income from the marital 

property was equal.

• (C)(1)(b) – The relative earning abilities of the parties.

The court found that Benjamin, an orthopedic surgeon, had gross 

income that averaged nearly $800,000 over the three years before the divorce 

trial, but that his “take home pay” from his surgical practice was closer to 

$490,000. Benjamin’s contract with his current employer was set to expire in 

April 2022, but would automatically extend for 1-year terms unless either party 

terminated it. Benjamin’s employer was affiliated with St. Luke’s Hospital, 

which had recently been acquired by a new owner, but any impact that might 

have on Benjamin’s income was “purely speculative.”
25.

The court also found that Gina has two master’s degrees and can get her 

Ph.D. in social work from the University of Michigan after four years of study. 

She worked full-time in the social work field from 1990 to 1997, but had not 

worked in the last 25 years. Neither party presented evidence regarding the 

potential earnings of someone with either a master’s degree or a Ph.D. in social 

work.

• (C)(1)(c) – The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the 

parties.

Both parties were born in 1963. There was no evidence regarding 

Gina’s physical health, but she had suffered anxiety and depression when she 

and Benjamin separated. Her mental health was improving. There was no 

evidence regarding Benjamin’s physical or mental health.

• (C)(1)(d) – The retirement benefits of the parties.

Each party would have approximately $500,000 in a retirement fund.

• (C)(1)(e) – The duration of the marriage.

The parties had been married for over 31 years at the time of the trial.

• (C)(1)(f) – The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because 

that party will be custodian of a minor child of the marriage, to seek 

employment outside the home.

This factor is inapplicable.
26.

• (C)(1)(g) – The standard of living of the parties established during the 

marriage. 

The trial court described the parties’ standard of living as “extravagant.” 

They lived in a large home in Perrysburg, and recently sold their second home 

in Florida for $875,000. Both parties had several cars, including Porches. 

Gina testified that their monthly expenses exceeded $33,000.

• (C)(1)(h) – The relative extent of education of the parties.

The court reiterated that Gina has two master’s degrees, and Benjamin 

has a medical degree and is an orthopedic surgeon.

• (C)(1)(i) – The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not 

limited to any court-ordered payments by the parties.

The court found that the parties divided their marital assets equitably, 

and neither party had any separate property.

• (C)(1)(j) – The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning 

ability of the other party, including, but not limited to, any party’s contribution 

to the acquisition of a professional degree of the other party.

Gina and Benjamin married after Benjamin finished medical school. 

Although Gina worked full-time for the first seven years of their marriage, the 

court found that “[t]here was no evidence that Gina’s earnings from 1990 to 

1997 subsidized Benjamin’s training to become an orthopedic surgeon.”
27.

• (C)(1)(k) – The time and expense necessary for the spouse who is seeking 

spousal support to acquire education, training, or job experience so that the 

spouse will be qualified to obtain appropriate employment, provided the 

education, training, or job experience, and employment is, in fact, sought.

The court reiterated that Gina has two master’s degrees, and had 

testified that she could obtain her Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 

four years.

• (C)(1)(l) – The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal 

support.

The parties did not present evidence on this factor.

• (C)(1)(m) – The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted 

from that party’s marital responsibilities.

Gina left the workforce in 1997 when the parties’ youngest child was 

born, and had not returned to work after the children were emancipated.

• (C)(1)(n) – Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and 

equitable.

Although Gina sought to have Benjamin’s “infidelity” recognized under 

this subsection, the court “found that was not a relevant and equitable factor to 

be considered.”

{¶ 41} As demonstrated by the trial court’s spousal support decision, the court 

took into account the parties’ “extravagant standard of living” during the marriage—
28.

along with every other factor in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)—which is all that it was required to 

do. The trial court also had before it the temporary support order, in which the magistrate 

found—based on Gina’s testimony—that Gina and Benjamin had been living above their 

means while they were married. And the court took into account the parties’ incomes, 

earning potential, relative financial positions following the division of marital property, 

health, ages, and Gina’s need and desire for further education. In light of these facts, and 

when all of the facts and factors are considered together, there is no evidence that the trial 

court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in setting the amount of spousal 

support. Accordingly, Gina’s seventh assignment of error is not well-taken.

b. The trial court properly reduced Gina’s spousal support over time.

{¶ 42} In her sixth assignment of error, Gina argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by reducing the amount of spousal support over time. She contends that it was 

unreasonable for the trial court to reduce the spousal support award because the award 

does not cover her monthly expenses, it is “questionable” that she can retrain for gainful 

employment “[a]t her age,” retraining would be expensive, and there is no guarantee that 

she could find “employment or significant pay, after being out of the workforce for 25 

years * * *.” Benjamin again argues that the trial court considered all of the statutory 

factors in fashioning the spousal support award, so its decision to reduce the award over 

time was not an abuse of discretion.

{¶ 43} The crux of Gina’s argument under this assignment of error is that the trial 

court did not give her enough spousal support to meet her needs, and further reducing that 
29.

amount is unreasonable. But a spousal support award is not based on need; it is based on 

what is reasonable and appropriate in light of the factors in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). Basista 

v. Basista, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-076, 2016-Ohio-146, ¶ 28, citing Organ, 2014-

Ohio-3474, 17 N.E.3d 1192, at ¶ 14; and Heslep v. Heslep, 7th Dist. Monroe No. 825, 

2000 WL 818909, *4 (June 14, 2000). And the trial court explained that it was awarding 

Gina $13,000 per month for the first four years to give her time to earn her Ph.D., after 

which she “will have the ability to earn income.” Then, Gina will receive $10,000 per 

month for ten years, at which time Benjamin will be 72 years old and “could reasonably 

reduce his workload or retire.” From that point on, Gina will receive $6,000 per month 

indefinitely. The court also retained jurisdiction to modify the amount and duration of 

the spousal support award, so either party can seek to change the amount of the award if 

their circumstances change.

{¶ 44} The trial court’s broad discretion over spousal support awards encompasses 

the ability to craft an award that changes over time based on the anticipated financial 

situations of the parties. Arthur v. Arthur, 130 Ohio App.3d 398, 409-410, 720 N.E.2d 

176 (5th Dist.1998). The trial court’s explanation for structuring the support the way it 

did shows that the court considered the parties’ anticipated financial situations over the 

coming years and structured a reasonable and appropriate award for those anticipated 

circumstances. The court also retained jurisdiction over spousal support so that either 

party can seek a modification, if necessary. This was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. Gina’s sixth assignment of error is not well-taken.
30.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing

to order Benjamin to pay Gina’s insurance premiums.

{¶ 45} In her fifth assignment of error, Gina argues (without citing any law) that 

she testified to the cost of her health insurance and “[c]onsidering [Benjamin] has an 

Annual Gross Income in excess of $900,000, it is unreasonable, and an Error for the 

Court not to require him to pay for [Gina’s] Health, Dental, and Optical Insurance.” 

Benjamin responds that Gina did not ask the court to order Benjamin to pay for her 

insurance, the spousal support award should cover the costs of her insurance, and because 

the final decree does not address insurance, there is a presumption that each party is 

responsible for their own insurance costs after a divorce.

{¶ 46} Although a person who carries health insurance that covers their spouse is 

prohibited from terminating the spouse’s health insurance coverage while a divorce is 

pending, R.C. 3105.71(A), nothing in the statute requires the person to maintain the 

spouse’s coverage after the divorce is finalized. Whether to require someone to maintain 

health insurance for their spouse after the divorce is “firmly within the discretionary 

power of the domestic relations court.” Roskwitalski v. Roskwitalski, 5th Dist. Licking 

No. 94 CA 103, 1995 WL 498124, *3 (Aug. 10, 1995). “Once the court grants a divorce, 

we must assume in the absence of intent to the contrary, that each party becomes 

responsible for carrying their own health insurance, because the divorce decree 

essentially permits the parties to go their own way, with all the concomitant 

responsibilities that attach to those who are no longer married.” Ianiro v. Pastis, 8th Dist. 
31.

Cuyahoga No. 83368, 2004-Ohio-2987, ¶ 26. In other words, unless the divorce decree 

specifically orders one party to carry the other’s insurance, the parties are each 

responsible for their own insurance after they are divorced.

{¶ 47} In this case, the trial court had before it Gina’s monthly expenses for health 

insurance premiums, and we presume that the court considered those premiums along 

with the rest of Gina’s living expenses when it determined how much spousal support to 

award. Thus, we also presume that the court intended for Gina to pay for her insurance 

out of the spousal support award. The closest Gina came to asking the court to order 

Benjamin to pay for her insurance was when she said on direct that “I think that he 

should have to give me support for life including health insurance * * *.” But Gina’s 

attorney never asked the court in any filings or during the trial to order that Benjamin pay 

for Gina’s insurance, and the parties did not include insurance payments in their 

settlement agreement. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that the trial court 

abused its discretion by failing to order Benjamin to pay for Gina’s health insurance. 

Gina’s fifth assignment of error is not well-taken.

d. The court properly allowed Benjamin to make direct support payments.

{¶ 48} In her ninth assignment of error, Gina argues that the trial court should 

have ordered Benjamin to make his support payments through bank withholding because 

Benjamin violated the temporary support order and owes arrearages under the temporary 

order, and the court “did not resolve the issue of non-compliance by [Benjamin] with the 

Temporary Support Order.” Benjamin responds that the trial court was permitted to order 
32.

direct payments, and Benjamin was never found in contempt of any court orders, so the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering direct payments.

{¶ 49} Direct payments of support are authorized by R.C. 3121.441(A), which 

provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions * * * of the Revised Code providing 

for the office of child support in the department of job and family services 

to collect, withhold, or deduct spousal support, when a court * * * issues or 

modifies an order requiring an obligor to pay spousal support * * *, the 

court may permit the obligor to make the spousal support payments directly 

to the obligee instead of to the office if the obligee and the obligor have no 

minor children born as a result of their marriage and the obligee has not 

assigned the spousal support amounts to the department * * *.

Whether to permit an obligor to make direct spousal support payments “is clearly 

discretionary.” Dingey v. Dingey, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2020-0006, 2020-Ohio5340, ¶ 38; Allen v. Allen, 2022-Ohio-3198, 196 N.E.3d 368, ¶ 84 (11th Dist.). And there 

is no requirement that the court “conduct an analysis of an obligor’s possible failure to 

comply with a direct payment order” before deciding whether to allow direct payments. 

Dingey at ¶ 38.

{¶ 50} Gina’s only argument under this assignment of error is that Benjamin failed 

to comply with the temporary order and still owes arrearages under the temporary order. 

As we have already discussed, any issues that Gina had with the temporary orders are 
33.

now moot because they were not separately reduced to judgment or preserved in the final 

decree. Row, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1231, 2022-Ohio-2525, at ¶ 54. And nothing in 

the record indicates that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably 

by allowing Benjamin to make direct support payments. Therefore, Gina’s ninth 

assignment of error is not well-taken.

e. The trial court made a clerical error in the spousal support schedule.

{¶ 51} In her final assignment of error related to spousal support, Gina argues that 

the trial court made an error in the support schedule it included in the final divorce 

decree. She contends that the trial court has the year when her support award reduces to 

$6,000 per month wrong; the court listed 2032 as the date of the change, which is ten 

years after the support order went into effect, not 14 years later, as the court ordered 

earlier in its decision. Benjamin argues that Gina should have filed a motion to correct 

the error in the trial court, but because she did not, we should overrule this assignment of 

error.

{¶ 52} Although a trial court has the authority under Civ.R. 60(A) to correct a 

clerical mistake—i.e., “a mistake or omission, mechanical in nature and apparent on the 

record which does not involve a legal decision or judgment[,]” State ex rel. Litty v. 

Leskovyansky, 77 Ohio St.3d 97, 100, 671 N.E.2d 236 (1996)—this is not the exclusive 

remedy for clerical errors. Nothing in Civ.R. 60(A) deprives an appellate court of its 

ability to “[r]eview and affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment or final order 

appealed[.]” App.R. 12(A)(1)(a). In fact, “App.R. 12(A)(1)(a) and 12(B) empower this 
34.

court to modify judgments as a matter of law.” Nastasi v. Nastasi, 11th Dist. Trumbull 

No. 94-T-5023, 1994 WL 721611, *1 (Dec. 16, 1994). On that basis, we find Benjamin’s 

argument that Gina missed her opportunity to correct the clerical error in the final decree 

unavailing.

{¶ 53} Turning to the error in the decree, we agree with Gina that the trial court 

erred when it entered the date on which Gina’s spousal support decreases to $6,000. In 

its decision following the divorce hearing, the trial court clearly stated in its analysis that 

it had decided to award Gina $13,000 per month for four years, followed by $10,000 per 

month for ten years, and that the final reduction to $6,000 per month was to happen after 

14 years, when Benjamin is 72 years old. However, in its orders, the court wrote:

IT IS ORDERED that on May 1, 2022 and on the first day of each 

month for the following 48 months defendant Benjamin Salpietro shall pay 

to plaintiff Gina Salpietro $13,000 as spousal support; that on May 1, 2026 

and on the first day of each month for the following 120 months defendant 

Benjamin Salpietro shall pay to plaintiff Gina Salpietro $10,000 as spousal 

support; and that on May 1, 2032 and on the first day every ensuing month 

thereafter defendant Benjamin Salpietro shall pay to plaintiff Gina Salpietro 

$6,000 as spousal support.

(Emphasis added.) Rather than reducing the support order to $6,000 after 14 years, the 

court’s order reduced the award to $6,000 after only 10 years. The error was carried over 

into the final divorce decree.
35.

{¶ 54} It is clear from the record that the trial court intended for Gina to receive 

spousal support of no less than $10,000 for 14 years—i.e., until May 1, 2036. Because 

the court’s spousal support decision and final divorce decree contain a typographical 

error, we hereby modify the spousal support award in the final decree to reflect the trial 

court’s decision. The spousal support order in the final decree, as modified by this 

decision, should read:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 

pursuant to Judge Kelsey’s decision that on May 1, 2022, and on the first 

day of each month for the following 48 months, Husband shall pay to Wife 

$13,000.00 as spousal support; that on May l, 2026, and on the first day of 

each month for the following 120 months, Husband shall pay to Wife 

$10,000.00 as spousal support; and that on May 1, 2036, and on the first 

day of every ensuing month thereafter, Husband shall pay to Wife 

$6,000.00 as spousal support.

(Modifications bolded and underlined.)

{¶ 55} Gina’s eighth assignment of error is well-taken.

4. The trial court’s fee award was fair and equitable.

{¶ 56} In her tenth and final assignment of error, Gina argues that the trial court’s 

attorney fees award was inadequate because the court only awarded her $35,000, rather 

than the $65,000 that she requested. She claims that the award was unreasonable because 

she “has not worked in 25 years and is in complete economic reliance upon [Benjamin’s] 
36.

income.” She also contends that her attorney’s bill “shows the major amount of work 

necessary to prepare this case for Trial, and the lengthy Exhibits, including assembling all 

of the expenses of the parties to establish their Standard of Living.” Benjamin responds 

that the trial court considered all of the statutory factors related to an attorney fee award, 

and the award was appropriate in light of Gina’s and her attorney’s litigation tactics that 

added delay and expense to the proceedings.

{¶ 57} In divorce cases, an award of attorney fees is controlled by R.C. 

3105.73(A). Under the statue, the trial court “may award all or part of reasonable 

attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award 

equitable.” Before awarding fees, the trial court may consider (1) the parties’ marital 

assets and income, (2) any temporary spousal support ordered, (3) the parties’ conduct, 

and (4) “any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate.” Id. “An award of 

attorney fees must be fair, equitable, and serve the ends of justice.” Steinle v. Steinle, 

2018-Ohio-3985, 120 N.E.3d 478, ¶ 41 (6th Dist.), citing Garritano v. Pacella, 6th Dist. 

Lucas No. L-07-1171, 2009-Ohio-2928, ¶ 101; and Bowen, 132 Ohio App.3d at 642, 725 

N.E.2d 1165. We review a trial court’s award of fees for an abuse of discretion. Row, 

6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1231, 2022-Ohio-2525, at ¶ 58, citing Kim v. Kim, 2020-Ohio22, 150 N.E.3d 1229, ¶ 47 (9th Dist.).

{¶ 58} In determining the issue of attorney fees, the trial court explicitly 

considered the factors in R.C. 3105.73(A). The court noted:
37.

that Gina unnecessarily added [Benjamin’s businesses] as third party 

defendants; that she objected unnecessarily to the court’s standard 

temporary restraining order; that she sought, without much basis in law, to 

have many of Benjamin’s expenditures characterized as financial 

misconduct, R.C. 3105.171(E)(4); and that she sought, without much basis 

in law, to argue that Benjamin should be punished through additional 

spousal support awards for his “adulterous” conduct prior to the divorce.

The court also noted that Benjamin had already been ordered to pay $10,000 of Gina’s 

legal fees. Based on this information, the trial court ordered Benjamin to pay an 

additional $25,000 of Gina’s legal fees, for a total of $35,000.

{¶ 59} Our review of the record shows that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in awarding attorney fees. The court considered the statutory factors and 

recognized that Gina and her attorney were responsible for some of the fees because they 

“unnecessarily” added parties and filed objections and pursued dubious legal strategies 

that were “without much basis in law * * *.” Gina’s trial testimony also revealed that she 

had paid her attorney approximately $60,000 by the time of trial, some of which was paid 

out of marital funds that the court’s temporary support order earmarked for other joint 

expenses. See Baum v. Perry-Baum, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-18-085, 2019-Ohio-3923, 

¶ 31-32 (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees 

to wife when, among other things, wife was responsible for some of the delay in the case 

and paid her attorneys from marital funds).
38.

{¶ 60} Because the trial court’s fee award was fair and equitable, and the court did 

not abuse its discretion in arriving at the award, we find that Gina’s tenth assignment of 

error is not well-taken.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 61} Because the trial court properly signed the proposed judgment entry and 

did not abuse its discretion in awarding spousal support or attorney fees, the April 5, 

2022 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 

Division, is affirmed with the modification of “May 1, 2032” to “May 1, 2036” in the 

spousal support schedule. Gina is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to 

App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowsi, J. ____________________________

JUDGE

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

____________________________

Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE

CONCUR. 

____________________________

JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.