### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE N ove m be r 16, 200 5 S es sio n

CONNIE J. OT TI NGER v . PATRICI A E. STOO KSB URY

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for K nox Coun ty No. 160833-2 Dar yl R. F ansler, Chancellor

No. E2005-00381-COA- R3-CV - F ILED FEBRUARY 7, 2006

Connie J . Ottinge r (“ Plaintiff”) sued Patr icia E. Stooksbury (“D efe ndant”) seeking , among other things, to quiet title to a thirty foot ea sement. De fenda nt answer ed the complaint and f iled a counte rclaim asserting, in part, that her rig ht to use t he easement is exclusive and that Plaintiff has no rig ht to use the ea sement. The c ase w as tried without a jury and the Trial Court entere d a fi n al order holding, int e r a lia , tha t De fe nd a nt is pe rm a ne ntl y e njo ine d fr om int e rf e ri ng wi th P la int if

f’ s r ig ht t o use the e aseme nt located on Plaintiff’s pr operty . Def endant a ppeals c laiming that t h e Trial Court
err ed by considering parol e vidence and by requiring Def

endant to prove her case by clea r evide nce. Def endant a lso ar gu es t hat the evide nce pr eponder ates a g ainst the Trial Court’s finding that the
or ig ina l g ra nto rs didno t in te nd to c re a te a n e xclu siv e e a se me nt in fa vo r of De fe nd a nt. We a ff

ir m.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cha nc e r y C our t A ffirm e d; Case Re m anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.

Charles W. Van Be k e and Mark N. Foste r, Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee f or the Appe llant, Patricia E. S t o o k s b u r y.

Arthur F . Knig ht, I I I , Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee f or the Appe llee, Connie J. Ott inge r.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Th is c a se inv olv e s th e ri g ht t o u se a n e a se me nt, or ri g ht- of -w a y , o n la ndc ur

re ntl y owned by Plaintiff. The ea sement wa s cre ated i n 1 9 6 3 wh en Oaty and Mary

Shelton deeded a porti o n o f their land to Charle s and May me Stooksbury . The Septembe r 26, 1963 dee d from the She lto ns to the Sto ok sb ury s st a te s, in p e rt ine nt p art :

The fir st parties also g rant a 30 foot rig ht of way for ing ress a nd eg ress a djoining and ly ing north of the north line of subjec t property extendin g from the west line of Norris Fr eew ay west along the north line of subjec t property at the north we st corner of subject pr operty ; s ai d ri g ht-of-w ay to be for the second pa

rties, their he irs and assig ns of the first pa

rties but by

the first parties only so long as they are the owner s of the a djo ini ng pr op e rt y ;...

Th e 19 63 de e d ide nti fi e s the She lto ns a s th e fi rs t pa rt ie s a ndthe Sto ok sb ury s a s th e se c on d p art ie s.

Def endant is Charle s and May m e S tooksbury ’s daug hter a nd is the curr ent re cord
owner of the pa rce l deede d to Charles and May me Stooksbury by the September

26, 1963 deed f

rom the Sheltons. The ea sement at iss ue contains a driveway that leads to Defenda nt’s house. Plaintiff is the curr ent re cord ow ner of the par cel of

land burde ned with the eas em en t . Plaintiff purcha sed her la nd from Way ne Shelton, Oaty and Mary

Shelton’s son.

I n the spring of 2003, bef

ore Plaintiff moved to he r prope rty , Def end an t b e g an to e rec t a fe nce to pr event Plaintiff fr om using the e aseme nt. I n Marc h of 2004, Plaintiff sued De fendant seeking , in part, t o q uiet title to the easeme nt. Defe ndant answe red the complaint and filed a counter -cla im asserting , in part, that he r ri gh t to use the ea sement is exclusive and, there fore , Plaintiff has no rig ht to use the ease ment even though it is l ocate d on Plaintiff’s land. The c ase w as tried without a jury

in October

of 2004.
At trial, Def

endant e x plained that she be g an to co n s t ru ct her f ence beca use “it’s alway s been my

assumption that it was our drivewa y with a rig ht of way

that the Sheltons were allowed to use. B ut it has alway s - - a s long a s I ’ve know n, it’s bee n o u r d ri v ew ay .” De fenda nt t e s t i f i e d t h a ts h e d o e s n ’ tw a n t

P l a i n t i f f t o u s e t h e d r i v e w a y:

beca use it’s out in the country

. They have a driveway that g oes rig ht to their g ara g e. I have lived the re w here I

live now off a nd on since I was ten, e ither there or on the oth e r s ide of [Pla int if

f]. I t’ s v e ry

pr ivate ba c k th e re . T he re ’s ne ve r b e e n a ny bo dy us e th at dri vew ay

. An d I

g ue ss I jus t do n’ t w a nt t o h a ve to l oo k, a s I ba c k o ut o f m y car port, for tra ffic, be cause it’s alway s been a private drive.-3- Def endant testified tha t she has lived on this prop er t y for a pproxi mately

two y ear s and also li ved there when she was a child. Def endant ex plained that her fathe r built the drivewa y within the ease ment. Def endant a dmitted that, over the y ear s, Oaty Shelton used this driveway
occa sionally

to ge t to his barn wher e he store d his lawnmower.
Plaintiff’s husband, De nnis Ky le Ottinge r, testified that alt h o u g hh e and his wife ha ve another drivewa y leading to their property , they want to use the e aseme nt “[t] o g et ac cess to the top of the hill. On the left side of the prop er t y , i t’s pretty

steep a round the ba ck of it, and the re’ s not
rea lly a g ood way

to ge t in there e x cept to g o up the drivew ay [wit hin the ea sement].” Mr. Ottinge r testi fi ed that a motor ve hicle ca nnot ge t up the back to the southwe st corner of the prope rty . He further testified that he trie d taking a Bobc at up the hill, but sli d off the hill. Mr. Otting er te stified that it would cost at lea st $150,000, not including labor if he construc ted it himself, to build another way of ac cess up to the southwe st corner of the prope rty . Mr. Ottinge r testified that he and his wife ha ve no pr ob le m w ith De fe nd a nt c on tin uin g to us e the e a se me nt, the y simply wa nt to be able to u se it too.

Her shel J ohn Sharp testified that he wa s relate d to Oaty and Mary

Shelton and that he assi ste d th e She lto ns in c ari ng fo r the ir pr op e rt y a ft e r the y

be c a me dis able d. Mr . Sh arp a lso t e s t i f i e d t h a th e v i s i t e d t h e S h e l t o n s o v e r t h e y e ar s a n d u s e d t h e e a s e m e n tw h e n h e v i s i t e d

. In addition, Mr

. Sharp testified that he had seen other visitors to the Sheltons use the ease ment over the y e ars

. Wayne She lto n te sti fi e d th a t his fathe r, Oaty She lto n, a lw a y s sa id h e pla nn e d to bu ild his wife a home up on the hill on the southwest corne r of the property . Way ne Shelton stated: “When they

boug ht this property back in 1958, Mother - - Da d’s promise to Mom was that he w as g oing to build her

a new home at a l at er d ate upon that hill and we - - throug hout as far as I can
re m e m b e r h e a l w a y s t r i e d t o m a i n t a i n t h a t p r o m i s e , a n d M o t h e r k e p t h o l d i n g i t o v e r h im. B ut, unfortunate ly , the eve nts didn’t go ther e.”

Wayne She lto n te sti fi e d th a t hi s f a the r p a id fo r ha lf of a br idg e that Paul a ndMa y me Sto ok sb ury c on str

uc te d wi thi n the e a se me nt. Th is br idg e le a ds to the dr ive wa y in the easeme nt. Wayne S hel to n te sti fi e d th a t hi s f a the r c omp la ine d a

bo ut the c os t of

the br idg e a ndstate d “ [h]is complaint at t he ti me was that he only wanted acc ess t o g et to his property to the top of the hill and up the valley

there to the barn.”
Way ne Shelton further

testified that he use d the ea sement to g et t o wh er e h e was allowed to par

k his car w hen he w as a te enag er a nd still living with his pa rents. He stated: “From about 1960 until 1995 Dad had e x clusive use of the one- car

g ara g e ther e at the house , and no one
was a llowed to block him in....So, t here fore , the re st of us had to g o and use the drivewa y [i n the
ease ment] that g oes t o the barn to park our vehicles.” Way ne Shelton testified that there was a g rave l drivewa y leading from the dr iveway in the ease ment to the Shelt ons’ bar n. He f urther sta ted: “Any one that wa s a re gu l ar v i s i t o r would usuallyg et the lec ture a bout using [the drivewa y

in the-4-

ease ment]. Mydad’s f

irst cousin, who maintain ed the y ard f or them af

ter they beca me unable to, he would alway s take his pickup truc k and come in that way to perform the y ard ma intenance .”
Wayne She lto n te sti fi e d th a t a ft e r h e mov e d out of his pa re nts ’ h ou se , h e wo uldvis it his pa re nts fo ur or fi ve time s a

y e ar a ndwo ulda lw a y s u se the dr ive wa y in the e a se me nt. He a lso
s t at ed t h at “i n t h e fa i l i n g y ea rs o f Da d ’s h ea l t h

. At t h at p o i n t i n t i m e D ad wo u l d - - Da d u s ed t o go to the store two to thr ee times a wee k. Of c ourse, he was a lway s in his car. And he would come up the southern dr iveway

[i n the ea sement], turn behind the house, unload the g roce ries and the n park his car. So he w as alwa y s coming in and out of t hat driveway numerous ti mes per w eek.” Way ne She lto n a lso te sti fi e d th a t hi s f a the r w ou ld u se the dr ive wa y in the e a se me nt s o h e did n’ t ha ve to
ne g oti a te so me ste ps . I n ad dit ion , Way ne She lto n tes tif ie d tha t he a ndhis pa

re nts ha d a lw a y s p a id taxes on the portion of land containing the easement. Way ne Shelton also testified that to cre ate a road to the southwe st corner of the prope rty

now owned by

Plaintiff would be cost prohibitive.

After trial, the Tria l Court entere d its Final Orde r of Judgment on November 17, 2004, incorporating the T rial Court’s memora ndum opinion. The fi n a l j u dg ment, int e r a lia , held that Def endant is per manently

enjoined fr om interfering w ith P l aintiff’s use of the e aseme nt, and dismiss ed Plaintiff’s claims for wr ong ful interfe renc e of a n ease ment and tre spass and De fenda nt’s
c ou nte r- c la im. I n p e rt ine nt p a rt , th e Tr ia l Co urt’ s me mor a nd um o pin ion state s:

Def endant a rg ues that there is a typog raphic al err or in the 1963 deed, E x . 1. I t is defenda nt’s arg um en t that if this ty pog raphic al er ror is cor rec ted then the exclusive right to use the easem en t v es t ed in the def endant upon the sa le of the orig inal trac t by

the Sheltons to Otti ng er.

I n its sim plest form the Court believe s the issue in this case to be whether the 19 63 de e d c on ve y e d to de fe nd a nt’ s p re de c e sso r i n ti tle a n e xclu siv e e a se me nt.

* * *
The pa rt i es h av e cited no Te nnessee case , and the Court has f ound none, dealing with the g rant of a n exclusive easeme nt. Howeve r, plaintiff ha s cited the
case of L atham v. Gar ner, 105 I daho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983), which dealt with the g rant of an ex clusive easement. Of course this Court i s not bound by a dec ision of the I daho courts but it nevertheless constitutes persua sive authority for this Court’s consideration.

* * *
When construing a deed the Court should determine the intention of the g rantor. This intent is to be asce rtained f rom a c onsideration of the entire instrument
rea d in the light of the surroundi n g circumstances. B arbe r v. Westmoreland, 601 S.W .2d 712 (Tenn. A pp. 1980).-5- I n revie wing the circ umstances surr ounding this transa ction the Court notes that the property

convey ed to the Stooksbury s in 1963 was survey ed out of a larg er trac t the Sheltons had purchased in 1957. The testim ony of Way ne Shelton, the son of Oa ty and Mary Shelton, by deposition, e stablished that in 1963, and for a period of time th e r e a f

te r , it w a s O a ty Sh e lt o n ’ s in te n t to b u il d a h o u s e f o r h is wife on a po rt ion of

his pr op e rt y

c omp ri sin g abo ut t wo a c re s a ndsitua te d in the so uth we st
c o r n e r o f t h e p r o p e r t y.

Th e un dis pu te d te sti mo ny at tria l w a s th a t th is s e c tio n o f the pr op e rt y is rela tively flat and pr esently

acc essible only

by t h e 3 0 -f oot rig ht-of-w ay . The testimonywas further undisputed that in orde r to g ain ac cess f rom any other portion of plaintiff’s pr operty

she would have to construct a r oad, whi ch would re quire a g reat deal of e x cavation at a cost estimated by plaintiff’s husband, Dennis Ottinge r, to be in the neig hborhood of $150,000.00.

I t is ex tremely

interesting t o n ote that in conveying pr operty to the Stooksbury s the Sheltons did not convey i n fee this 30-foot rig ht-of-w ay rese rving
a n e a se me nt t o th e mse lve s. On e wo uld p res um e that if the g ra nto r o nly

de sir e d to pr e se rv e the ri g ht o f i ng re ss a nde g re ss d ur ing the tim e he he ld the re ta ine d p arc e l in fee then he would ha ve conve y ed the pr operty comprising the rig ht-of-w ay rese rving
an eas ement to hi mself during the time of his owner ship. Counsel for defe ndant
a c kn ow le dg e d a s mu c h in c los ing arg ume nt.

Ad dit ion a lly , if

on e int e nd e d to bu ilda

re sid e nc e on a

po rt ion of

the pr op e rt y a c c e ssi ble o n l y

b y t h e r i g h t

- o f

- w a y i tw o u l d n o ts e e m p r a c t i c a l , a n d i n f a c tw o u ld
se e m to be imp ra c tic a l, t o d e ny su bs e qu e nt p ur c ha se rs the ri g ht of ing re ss a nde g re ss to tha t r e sid e nc e wi tho ut h a vin g to c on str uc t a no the r r oa d a t c on sid e ra ble c os t.

Wit hout que stion the 1963 deed is ambig uous and borde rs on the nonsensica l in its present form....

* * *

Ho we ve r, thi s is no t a n a c tio n to re fo rm the de e d an d it is unn e c e ssa ry fo r this Cou rt to d e te rm ine the pr e c ise int e nt o f the part ies w he n E x. 1 w a s d ra ft e d. I t is sufficie nt for this Court to deter mine whether Ex

. 1 establishes a clea r i ntent by

the g rantor to e ventually

deprive his successor s in tit le the use of the se rvient estate . The Court is of the opinion that Ex . 1 fails to do so.

Def endant f iled a motion to alter or a mend the judg ment, which the Tri al Court denied by order
e nte re d Jan ua

ry 14 , 2 00 5. De fe nd a nt a

pp e a ls t o th is C ou rt

.-6- Discussion
Although not stated exactly as such, De fenda nt raises thre e issues on appe al: 1) wh e the r the Tr ia l Co urt er re d in c on sid e ri ng pa

ro l e vid e nc e ; 2) wh e the r the Tr ia l Co urt e rr e d in requiring Def

endant to prove he r ca se by clea r evide nce; a nd, 3) whe ther the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the Trial Court’ s finding that the orig inal g rantors did not intend to cre ate a n exclusive
ease ment in favor of Def

endant. Plaintiff raises additional issues which we restate as: I f t he Tria l Court erred i n en

j o ining De fenda nt from interfe ring with Plainti ff’ s use of the e aseme nt for the g rounds relied on by the Trial Court, 1) whether Plaintiff ha s an ease ment by presc ription; and, 2) whether Plaintiff has an e aseme nt by nece ssity

.
Ou r r e vie w i s de novo up on the re c or d, a c c omp a nie d b y a pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss of the finding s of fact of t he trial court, unless the pre pondera nce of the evidenc e is otherwise . Tenn. R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001) . A trial court's c onclusions of law ar e subjec t to a de novo revie w with no presumption of cor rec tness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Count

y Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.
We first consider w het h er the Trial Court err ed in considering pa rol evidenc e. To beg in, we note that there is no question that an ambig uity exis ts in the deed. De fenda nt, however , arg ue s, in p art , th a t “ [a] c ou rt ma y no t c on sid e r p aro l e vid e nc e that a dd s to, v ari e s, or oth e rw ise contra dicts the lang uag e of a d eed unless there is a la tent ambig uity ,” and, D efe ndant ar g ues, the deed c ontains a pate nt, not latent, ambiguity

. Howeve r, t here is no need for us to determine w hether the ambig uity

in the deed is pa tent or latent a s Defe ndant ra ised no objection t o the introduction of this evidence at trial.

As this Court st ated in Grandstaff v. Hawks , Objections to the introduction of e vidence must be timelyand spec ific.

* * *
A p arty wh o in vit e s o r w a ive s e rr or , o r w ho fa ils to take re a so na ble ste ps to
cure an error, is not entitled to relief on appea l. Fa ilure t o object [ to] evidenc e in a time ly a n d s p e c if

ic f a s h io n p r e c lu d e s ta

k in g is s u e o n ap p e a l w ith th e a d mi s s ion of the evidenc e. Grandstaff v. Hawks , 36 S.W .3d 482, 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ( citations omitt ed).

De fe nd a nt d id n ot o bje c t to the int ro du c tio n o f this e vid e nc e a t tr ia l, a nd , a s su c h, is not entitled to raise this as an issue on a ppeal. We find this issue to be without merit.

We next consider w hether the Trial Court err ed in requiring Def endant to prove her
case by clea r evidence. Def

endant arg ues, i n part, that the Trial Court “relied he avily on the I daho-7-

Supreme Court’s de cision in Lat ha m v . G ar

ne r, ” 67 3 P.2 d 10 48 (I daho 19 83 ), a ndbe c a us e of thi s, require d Def

endant to m ee t a “heig htened bur den of pr oof” ba sed upon the Latham Court’s
rec og nition of case s from other states that discuss that an intention to cr eate an ea sement excluding
a ll r ig hts of

the grant or c a nn ot b e imp ute d in the abs e nc e of a c le ar i nd ic a tio n o f s uc h in te nt. Def endant, howe ver, ha s misread the Trial Court’s memorandum opinion.

The Tr ial Court stated:

Def endant a rg ues that there is a typog raphic al err or in the 1963 deed, E x . 1. I t is defenda nt’s arg ument that if this ty pog raphic al er ror is cor re cted then the exclusive right to use the ease ment vested in the de fend an t u p o n the sale of the orig inal trac t by

the Sheltons to Otti ng er.

I n its sim plest form the Court believes the i ssue in this case to be w hether the 19 63 de e d c on ve y e d to de fe nd a nt’ s p re de c e sso r i n ti tle a n e xclu siv e e a se me nt.

* * *
The pa rties h av e ci t ed no Tennessee case , and the Court has f ound none, dealing with the g rant of a n exclusive easeme nt. Howeve r, plaint iff has c ited the
case of L atham v. Ga

rner , 105 I daho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983), which de alt with the g rant of a n exclusive easeme nt. Of cour se this Court is not bound by a dec ision of the I daho courts but it nevertheless constitutes persua sive authority for this Court’s consideration.

* * *

W h en construing a dee d the Court should determine the intention of the g rantor. T his intent is t o be ascerta ined from a consideration of the entire instrument
rea d in the light of the surrounding circ umstances. B arbe r v

. Westmoreland, 601 S.W .2d 712 (Tenn. A pp. 1980).

* * *

Ho we ve r, thi s is no t a n a c tio n to re fo rm the de e d an d it is u nn e c e ssa ry fo r this Cou r t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p r e c i s e i n t e n t o f t h e p ar t i e s w h e n E x. 1 w a s d r a f t e d

. I tis sufficie nt for this Court to de termine whether Ex

. 1 establishes a c lear intent by the g rantor to e ventually

deprive his successor s in title the use of the ser vient estate. The Court is of the opinion that Ex . 1 fails to do so.

T h e T r i a l C o u r t c o rr e c t l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i t w a s n o tb o u n d b y Latham v. Garner , but in the absenc e of Te nnessee case law d i re ct l y on point, could consider Latham as per suasive authority . The Tr ial Court also corr ectly re co gn i z ed that the dispositive issue in thi s case was-8-

wh e the r the 19 63 de e d con vey ed a n e xclu siv e e a se me nt tha t w ou ld g ive De fe nd a nt the ri g ht t o exclude Plaintiff’s use of the ease ment even though the ease ment is loc ated on land now owne d by Plaintiff. The Trial Court corr ectly stated t hat under Tenne ssee law, when c onstruing a deed, a court should de termine the intention of the g rantor by considering the deed rea d in lig ht of the surrounding circ umstances. Give n the issue at hand, the Trial Court then applied the law to determine if it wa s the int e nti on of the g ra nto r to cr e a te a n ea se me nt tha t wou ld de pr ive the g ra nto r’ s su c c e sso rs in t itl e the use of the ease ment. The Tr ial Court did not hold Defenda nt to a “heig htened bur den of pr oof” to prove that the e aseme nt was exclusive to Defendant only . Additionally and as discusse d below,
our re view of the evidenc e shows that whe ther a clea r e v i d en ce standard or

preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standa

rd wa s require d o f Defenda nt, Defe ndant did not meet her burden ba sed upon the evidenc e pre sented to the Tr ial Court a s contained in the rec ord bef ore us. We find this issue to be wi tho ut m e ri t.

Fi n a ll y , w e c o n s id e r w h e th e r th e e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t th e T r ia l Court’ s finding that the orig inal g rantors did not intend to cre ate a n ex cl u s i v e easement in fa vor of Def endant. As our

Supreme Court re cently

explained in Griffis v. Davidson County M etro. Gov’ t :

I n construing a dee d, our primary task is to ascertain the g rantor’ s inte n t from the words of the deed a s a whole a nd from th e s u rr o unding c ircumstance s. Colli ns v. Smithson , 5 85 S.W. 2d59 8, 60 3 ( Te nn . 1 97 9) ; Benne tt v. Langham , 214 Tenn. 674, 383 S.W .2d 16, 18 (1964). I nterpre tation of a de ed is a question of law

. Rodgers v. Bu rn e tt , 108 Te nn . 173 , 6 5 S. W. 4 08 , 4 11 (1 90 1) ; Mitchell v. Chance , 149 S.W .3d 40, 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
Griffis v. Davidson County Metro. Gov’ t , 164 S.W .3d 267, 274 (Tenn. 2005)

.

I n the 1991 ca se of Lowe v. Gulf Coast Dev., Inc

. , this Court not ed:

I f an e aseme nt is ex clusive, the owne r of the servie nt estate loses its rig ht to use the
ease ment along with the easement holder. Bijou Irr. Dist. v. Empire Club , 804 P.2d 17 5, 18 3 ( Col o. 19 91 ); Stephens v . Dobbins , 511 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. D ist. Ct . App. 1 9 87 ); L a tham v. Garne r , 105 I daho 854, 673 P.2d 1048, 1050-51 (1983) ; Re sta te me nt ( Fi rst

) of P ro pe rty § 493 comm. c (1944) . Ex clusivitywill ge nera lly not b e imp li e d u n le s s it is n e c e s s ar y f o r th e u s e o f th e e a s e me n t. C a p i t o l R o d & Gun Club v. Lower Col orado River Auth. , 622 S.W .2d 887, 893-94 (T ex . Civ. App. 1981).

Lowe v. Gulf Coast Dev ., Inc. , No. 01-A-01- 9010-CH-00374, 1991 Tenn. App. LEXI S 860, a t *28 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1991) , no appl. perm. appeal filed

.

The e vidence of the surrounding circ umstances shows that a t the time the ease ment
wa s c re a te d, Oaty

She lto n p la nn e d to bu ilda ne w h ou se fo r h is w if

e on the hil l on the s ou thw e st
c or ne r o f the She lto ns ’ pr op e rt y a nd that the on ly re a so na ble a c c e ss t o th a t po rt ion of thi s p ro pe rt y-9-

wa s, a ndsti ll i s, ov e r the 30 -f oo t e a se me nt. Th e e vid e nc e fu rthe r s ho ws th at it w ou ld c os t a signific ant amount of money to construct anothe r ac cess r oad to this southwest corner of Plaintiff’s pr op e rt y . Pl a int if

f’ s h us ba nde sti ma te d th a t it wo uldc os t at lea st $1 50 ,0 00 if he c on str

uc te d it himself, and Way ne Shelton testified that it would be cost prohibitive to construct suc h a roa d.

B oth Wayne She lto n a ndMr . Sh arp te sti fi e d th a t ov e r the y e ars the She lto ns a nd the ir visitors reg ularly

used the drivewa y in the ease ment. Way ne Shelton testified that his father paid for ha lf of a br idg e c on str

uc te d b y th e S to ok sb ury s w ith in the e a se me nt a ndc omp la ine d a t th e tim e beca use “he only

wanted a cce ss to ge t to his property to the top of t he hill and up the valley there to the barn.” Way ne S helton testified t hat t here was a g rave l drivewa y

leading from the dr iveway in the ease ment to the Sheltons’ barn. De fenda nt admitted that O aty Shelton ha d used the e aseme nt to g et to his barn wher e he stored his la wnmower . I n addition, Way ne Shelton testified that he a nd his pa re nts ha d a lw a y s p a id t a xes o n th e po rt ion of la ndc on ta ini ng the e a se me nt. We cannot imply

exclusivi ty

in the ease ment as it is not nece ssary for De fenda nt’s use of the e aseme nt for De fenda nt to have the sole right to use the ease ment. Plaintiff’s use of the
ease ment will not interfe re with Def endant’ s use. Even if we construe the ease ment as strong ly as possible ag ainst the g rantor, a s Defe ndant arg ues we should, the evidence pr eponder ates in fa vor of the Trial Court’s finding that when they cre ated the ease ment, Oaty and Mary Shelton never intende d to deprive the mselves or their suc cess o rs in interest of the right to use the ease ment. Further, we note that it is undisput ed that De fenda nt had the burden to prove tha t the ease ment was e x clusive. We find no err or with the Tria l Court’s decision that Def endant f ailed to meet he r burde n.

Our re s o lu ti o n o f

D e f e n d an t’ s is s u e s p rete rmits the nece ssityof considering the issues raised by Plaintiff. We affirm the Trial Court’s Final Order of J udg ment enter ed on November 17, 2004.

Conclusion

The judg ment of the Tr ial Court is a ffirme d, and this cause is re manded to the Tr ial Cou rt fo r c oll e c tio n of the c os ts be low

. Th e c os ts on app e a l are a sse sse d a g a ins t t he A pp ellan t, Patricia E. Stooksbury , and her surety

.

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D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE