NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

FRANCISCO ESPADA, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 22-0601 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2021-116801-001

The Honorable Joseph Shayne Kiefer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Diane L. Hunt

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Aaron J. Moskowitz

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 11-21-2023
STATE v. ESPADA

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in 

which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Francisco Espada appeals from his convictions of theft of a 

means of transportation and endangerment, arguing that the trial court 

improperly denied his motion to substitute counsel. For the reasons stated 

below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In May 2021, the State charged Espada with stealing a Slurry 

Seal work truck and endangering its driver, who clung to the outside of the 

vehicle while Espada swerved across lanes and sped down the road.

Espada was released on bail and, upon a finding of indigency, the trial court 

appointed counsel.

¶3 Almost a year later, the State filed an allegation that Espada

had prior convictions that enhanced the sentencing ranges for the charged 

offenses, see A.R.S. § 13–703, and then extended a plea offer that reflected 

the enhanced sentencing ranges. However, due to labeling inconsistencies 

in Espada’s federal criminal record, the prosecution erroneously believed 

Espada to have four, rather than three, prior felony convictions. Upon 

realizing the mistake, the prosecution tendered Espada a revised plea offer, 

reducing the possible prison terms from 3.25–6.5 years to 2–3.5 years.

¶4 After this change in the plea offer, Espada orally moved for 

change of counsel. In explaining his request, he noted that the original plea 

offer was based on the State’s misunderstanding of his criminal history and 

stated that he sought “a second opinion” of the revised plea offer to “make 

sure there’s no other mistakes or anything.” While Espada’s counsel did not 

take a position on the request, the court voiced concerns. The court

explained that the State, not defense counsel, controlled plea offers and 

stated that Espada was offered “a significantly better and very favorable 

plea,” obtained “through the efforts of [his] attorney.” Espada responded: 

“Well, then I guess I’ll—guess we’ll just go to trial. I’ll proceed to trial with 

this attorney.”
STATE v. ESPADA

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The court closed the matter by ruling on Espada’s motion: “So 

at this point in time, I do understand you are requesting a new attorney. 

The Court is going to deny that. The Court does not find that you have 

shown that she is ineffective or that there’s irreconcilable conflict.” “Okay,” 

responded Espada. Upon Espada’s decision to go to trial, the State 

withdrew its plea offer.

¶6 A jury ultimately found Espada guilty of stealing the vehicle, 

a class two felony, and endangering its driver, a misdemeanor. Espada’s 

felony conviction resulted in a nine-year prison sentence; the misdemeanor 

conviction resulted in a concurrent six-month sentence. Espada timely 

appealed and we have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24; A.R.S. 

§ 13–4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Espada asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to adequate representation by improperly denying his 

motion to substitute counsel. The State counters: (1) Espada functionally 

withdrew his motion when he stated that he would “proceed . . . with this 

attorney[,]” and (2) even had he not withdrawn it, the court adequately 

considered the motion in its ruling. While Espada’s remark indicates

possible willingness to withdraw the motion, because the trial court 

ultimately ruled on the motion, we consider the merits of that ruling.

¶8 “A trial court’s decision to deny the request for new counsel 

will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Cromwell, 211 

Ariz. 181, 186 ¶ 27 (2005). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the reasons 

given by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or 

amount to a denial of justice.” State v. Riley, 248 Ariz. 154, 167 ¶ 7 (2020).

Both the United States and Arizona Constitutions guarantee criminal 

defendants the right to representation by counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; 

Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24; A.R.S. § 13–114. This right is to competent counsel, 

State v. LaGrand, 152 Ariz. 483, 486 (1987), but not to any particular counsel, 

nor to a meaningful relationship with the attorney, Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 

186 ¶ 28.

¶9 To protect this constitutional right, the trial court “has the 

duty to inquire as to the basis of a defendant’s request for substitution of 

counsel.” State v. Torres, 208 Ariz. 340, 343 ¶ 7 (2004). The nature of this 

inquiry depends on the nature of the defendant’s request. Id. at 343 ¶ 8.

General complaints about strategic differences may not require a formal 

hearing or evidentiary proceeding; however, “sufficiently specific, factually 
STATE v. ESPADA

Decision of the Court

4

based allegations” necessitate a hearing into the request for substitute 

counsel. Id. (quoting United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1249 (10th Cir. 

2002)); State v. Goudeau, 239 Ariz. 421, 447 ¶ 78 (2016). If the defendant’s 

allegations are specific, “the trial court should elicit specific on-the-record 

responses to the allegations from defense counsel.” State v. Hernandez, 232 

Ariz. 313, 320 ¶ 31 (2013).

¶10 Thus, the trial court inquires first into whether “an 

irreconcilable conflict or a completely fractured relationship between 

counsel and the accused” exists. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186 ¶ 29. Such 

conflicts, unlike mere disagreements or tensions, typically necessitate the 

appointment of new counsel. Id. When a defendant moves to substitute 

counsel, and the conflict is less than irreconcilable, the court considers the 

LaGrand factors: (1) “whether new counsel would be confronted with the 

same conflict”; (2) “the timing of the motion”; (3) “inconvenience to 

witnesses”; (4) “the time period already elapsed between the alleged 

offense and trial”; (5) “the proclivity of the defendant to change counsel”;

and (6) the “quality of counsel.” LaGrand, 152 Ariz. at 486–87; Riley, 248 

Ariz. at 169 ¶ 19 (quoting Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 187 ¶ 31).

¶11 While Espada now asserts on appeal that he had an 

“irreconcilable conflict” with counsel and that he had low-quality 

representation, Espada made no such assertion to the trial court. Although 

Espada stated vaguely that he wanted “a second opinion” and he and his 

attorney did not “see eye to eye,” such vague assertions do not entitle him 

to new counsel. State v. Champagne, 247 Ariz. 116, 129 ¶ 15 (2019) (“[A] mere 

allegation of lost confidence in counsel does not require appointing 

substitute counsel.” (citation omitted)). Espada’s dissatisfaction was not so 

great as to prevent him from agreeing to proceed to trial with his attorney.

Because the record shows that Espada alleged neither an irreconcilable 

conflict nor a total breakdown of the relationship, we must examine 

whether the court abused its discretion as to the other factors—noting, 

however, that failure to consider individually each LaGrand factor

on-record is not an inherent abuse of discretion. See Riley, 248 Ariz. at 169 

¶ 21.

¶12 From the record, the court considered two things: the 

conflict’s nature and the counsel’s competence. Taking into account 

Espada’s statement that he and his attorney did not “see eye to eye,” the 

court nonetheless found Espada had not shown that the conflict was 

irreconcilable or that Espada’s counsel was ineffective. The record supports 

the court’s findings. These findings were sound. A conflict requires far 

more contention than exists here to render it irreconcilable. See, e.g., id. at 
STATE v. ESPADA

Decision of the Court

5

167, 169 ¶¶ 9–10, 18 (finding conflict not irreconcilable where counsel was 

frequently unreachable, failed to show up at scheduled meetings, and client 

had “no trust at all” in counsel); Goudeau, 239 Ariz. at 447, 448 ¶¶ 73, 85 

(finding conflict not irreconcilable despite client allegedly having “serious 

issues” with and “absolutely no faith” in counsel).

¶13 Espada’s conflict with his attorney was over a single 

issue—the discrepancy between the State’s initial and revised plea offers.

However, “[a] single allegation of lost confidence in counsel does not 

require the appointment of new counsel.” Cromwell, 211 Ariz. at 186 ¶ 29; 

Riley, 248 Ariz. at 169–170 ¶ 22. The court did not abuse its discretion nor 

violate Espada’s rights in declining his request for new counsel.

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.