SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1883-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RUSSELL B. STEVENS, a/k/a

RUSSELL B. STEVENS, 4TH, 

and RUSSELL B. STEVENS IV,

Defendant-Respondent.

___________________________

Argued June 2, 2022 – Decided August 1, 2022

Before Judges Gilson and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 18-10-

1329.

Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Michael Denny, of counsel 

and on the brief).

Alexis R. Agre, Special Deputy Attorney General/ 

Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for 

respondent (LaChia L. Bradshaw, Acting Burlington 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent; Alexis R. 

Agre, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On October 11, 2018, a Burlington County grand jury returned a threecount indictment charging defendant with second-degree disarming a law 

enforcement officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11(a) (count one); fourth-degree 

aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a) 

(count two); and third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3) (count 

three). The charges stemmed from an encounter during which police responded 

to defendant's home after a 9-1-1 call reporting defendant's attempted suicide.

In November 2019, defendant proceeded to trial before a jury. At the 

close of the State's case, the trial judge granted defendant's motion for judgment 

of acquittal on count three pursuant to Rule 3:18-1. Thereafter, the jury 

convicted defendant of counts one and two. At sentencing, the judge found that 

the presumption of imprisonment for a second-degree crime was overcome, see

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(d), due, in large part, to defendant's mental health history. As 

a result, the judge sentenced defendant to two years' probation on count one, and 

a concurrent two-year probationary term on count two. Defendant now appeals 

his convictions memorialized in an amended judgment of conviction entered on 

June 9, 2020. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
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I.

We summarize the salient facts elicited during a three-day trial conducted 

on November 14, 19, and 20, 2019. At the trial, the State produced two 

witnesses, Maple Shade Police Department Sergeants William Turner, III, and 

Brian Weiss. 

Sergeant Turner testified that just before midnight on August 17, 2017, he

responded to a 9-1-1 call from a residence in Maple Shade Township reporting 

an "intoxicated" male, later identified as defendant, "covered . . . in gasoline" 

and "threatening to set himself on fire." When Turner arrived on the scene, he 

encountered defendant's sister, Rosemarie Nye, outside the residence. Nye 

informed Turner that earlier that evening, she and defendant "had been at a 

Jimmy Buffet concert," and there had been "an altercation . . . where [defendant] 

had pulled a knife . . . on one of his friends and was ejected from the concert." 

"The knife was taken away" and defendant and his sister left the concert.

Nye explained that on the drive home, defendant "thr[e]w himself from 

the moving vehicle" but Nye was able to coax defendant back into the vehicle. 

Once they arrived home, defendant, in an agitated state, "emptied his belongings 

from the car, . . . dumped a container of gasoline on himself and said . . . I'm 
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going to burn in [H]ell." According to Nye, at some point, defendant changed 

his mind and went inside the residence to take a shower.

Turner testified that after he had confirmed that defendant was still inside 

taking a shower, Turner went into the house "to check on [defendant's] wellbeing." Turner intended to ascertain whether defendant was "suicidal" and in 

need of "crisis intervention." Upon entering the home, Turner went to the 

bathroom where "[t]he door was open[]" and "announced [him]self." Because 

Turner lived on the same street, he said to defendant, "hey Rusty, it's BJ, your 

neighbor." Turner asked defendant if he was "okay" and indicated that he 

"need[ed] to talk to [him]." According to Turner, defendant was agitated and 

ordered Turner to leave his house, essentially asserting that Turner was violating 

his constitutional rights by being in his home and questioning him. Defendant 

"yell[ed] in a loud voice" that he was not going to talk to Turner.

Turner remained "[i]n the threshold of the doorway in the bathroom" and 

could see defendant's "shape behind the [frosted shower] glass," which also had 

a "shower curtain" in front of it. Turner stated he was unsure if defendant had

a weapon. Turner repeated that he "need[ed] to talk to [defendant]" and would 

"wait for [him] to be done," but defendant refused and became "irate" and 

"belligerent," yelling that Turner "had to leave" and "had to get a warrant." 
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Defendant also declared to Turner that "he was a sovereign citizen" and

"had . . . constitutional right[s]."

When Sergeant Weiss arrived as backup, both officers tried to convince

defendant to exit the shower. However, defendant refused and "eventually said 

the only way [they were] getting [him] out of the shower [was] if [they] . . . 

sho[]t [him]." Weiss testified that in a "last[-]ditch effort" to reason with 

defendant, he "tr[ied] to open the [shower] door" but defendant "slam[med] the 

shower door shut." Weiss then reached over the "shower curtain rail" and 

deployed pepper spray towards defendant. Defendant responded by opening the 

shower door and "charging out" of the shower at the officers. After defendant 

disregarded all verbal commands, Weiss deployed pepper spray a second time 

and a struggle ensued between defendant and Turner. The struggle began on the 

"bathroom floor and . . . wound up in the hallway of the residence." 

During the struggle, defendant removed Turner's taser from the holster 

and discharged it into the wall behind Turner. Ultimately, the officers were able 

to subdue defendant, secure him in handcuffs, and take him outside where an 

ambulance was waiting. Defendant was then transported with a police escort to 

a hospital for a mental health evaluation and treatment for injuries sustained 
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from the gasoline. The entire encounter was captured on the officers' body-worn 

cameras and played for the jury during the trial.

Prior to the trial, defendant had moved to compel discovery of all 

documentation regarding prior interactions between defendant and members of 

the Maple Shade Police Department. The State had opposed the motion, arguing 

it had "turned over everything in [its] possession." The State asserted that 

defendant's request "for all prior unrelated bad acts that have anything to do 

with . . . defendant" was "a fishing expedition," and "not relevant" to the case. 

The judge denied defendant's motion, finding that "the State ha[d] turned over 

all relevant discovery within its possession" and "[e]vidence of prior contact 

between the Maple Shade Police Department and . . . defendant [was] not, by 

itself, relevant." 

During the trial, towards the end of Turner's direct examination, the 

prosecuting attorney asked Turner if he had known defendant from prior 

encounters. The following questioning ensued:

[PROSECUTOR]: And based on your work experience 

do you know [defendant] to have ever used or 

threatened violence in the past? And we know the 

suicide attempt, he threatened violence against himself, 

but what about against others in the past?

[TURNER]: So, [defendant] is somebody that we use 

as an example for new officers for somebody that could 
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be suicidal or violent. There's two instances that come 

to mind that we share with other officers. 

One in which he had pulled a knife on other 

officers and his father had to intervene and then they 

were to take him into custody at that point.

And another situation was a domestic violence 

situation. His sister had injuries as a result. He was 

going to be arrested for the domestic violence incident. 

He ingested pills when the police said, hey, you're 

under arrest and he ate a bunch of pulls in an attempt to 

kill himself. And in the report it said something to the 

effect of I'd rather die than go to jail. 

Defense counsel did not object to the testimony when it was elicited. 

However, after direct examination of Turner concluded but before crossexamination commenced, out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel

requested a mistrial, arguing to the judge:

On direct examination the prosecutor . . . talked 

about other acts on the part of [defendant]. There have 

been no [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) motions made to adduce 

those acts. Those acts as stated by the officer had to do 

with a knife that he pulled on other officers and there 

was a domestic violence incident. . . .

. . . These are issues that should have been . . . 

decided before trial. And now we're in the midst of trial 

and these things are coming forward. The prejudice to 

my client as a result of that is extraordinary.

. . . . 
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This is prosecution by sabotage. We don't bring 

the things up properly before trial and now we bring 

them up . . . while the witness is on the stand.

The State countered that the testimony was "not prejudicial" and was 

"directly relevant" to establish "the officer's state of mind" and to "explain[] the 

officer's actions" when he entered defendant's residence. 

The judge denied the application for a mistrial. The judge expressed 

surprise that defense counsel did not object immediately when the testimony

was elicited but indicated that the issue could "be addressed in a less extreme or 

radical manner" by "instruct[ing] the jury to not consider th[e] testimony." To 

support his ruling, the judge explained:

The [S]ergeant's state of mind was set once he 

heard that a knife had been pulled at the Jimmy Buffet 

concert; that there was a fight at the Jimmy Buffet 

concert; that the defendant tried to jump out of the car; 

and that he was drunk and that he doused himself with 

fire. 

I think any reasonable person would conclude 

that this officer was justified in having a state of mind 

that he was going to stay there until he found out what 

the real situation was. He wasn't going to leave. And 

the officer testified we didn't know what was behind the 

shower curtain, whether he had a weapon when he was 

in there. We know he had a weapon earlier in the day. 

I think that's enough to show state of mind. I 

think this extra testimony is unduly prejudicial. I would 

have preferred a 404(b) hearing to look further into it. 
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That didn't happen. I think that it unduly prejudices the 

jury against [defendant]. I'm going to instruct them not 

to consider it.

Thereafter, when the jury returned to the courtroom, the judge issued the 

following instruction:

During the direct examination by the State of 

Sergeant Turner you may recall there was a question 

and I will read it to you. 

"Question: And based on your work experience 

do you know him to have ever used or threatened 

violence in the past? And we know the suicide attempt 

he threatened violence against himself, but what about 

against others in the past?" And there was an answer to 

that. 

I'm going to instruct you to disregard the question 

and the answer. You are not to consider it in your 

deliberations. The answer -- and I'll make it clear to 

you what you are not to consider. 

Answer: "So, [defendant]" -- this is the answer 

of Sergeant Turner -- "So, [defendant] is somebody that 

we use as an example for new officers for somebody 

that could be suicidal or violent. There's two instances 

that came to mind that we share with other officers. 

One in which he had pulled a knife on other officers 

and his father had to intervene and then they were taken 

to -- they took him into custody at that point. And 

another situation was a domestic violence situation. 

His sister had injuries as a result. He was going to be 

arrested for the domestic violence incident. He 

ingested pills when the police said, hey, you're under 

arrest and he ate a bunch of pills in an attempt to kill 
10 A-1883-20

himself. And in the report it said something to the 

effect of I'd rather die than go to jail." 

Again, that is the answer that I'm instructing you 

to disregard and not to consider in your deliberations as 

well as the question that preceded it. 

In this ensuing appeal, defendant raises the following points for our

consideration:

POINT I 

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL 

BECAUSE THE JURY HEARD TESTIMONY THAT 

HE HAD PREVIOUSLY PULLED A KNIFE ON 

OTHER POLICE OFFICERS, THAT HE HAD BEEN 

ARRESTED FOR A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 

INCIDENT WHERE IT WAS IMPLIED THAT HE 

HAD INJURED HIS SISTER, AND THAT HE WAS 

"SOMEBODY THAT WE USE AS AN EXAMPLE 

FOR NEW OFFICERS FOR SOMEBODY THAT 

COULD BE SUICIDAL OR VIOLENT."

A. The Trial Court Failed To Conduct The 

Required Analysis Before Admitting The 

Prior Bad Acts Testimony.

B. The Court Erred By Instructing The 

Jury To Disregard The Testimony Instead 

Of Granting The Mistrial Motion.

POINT II

THE FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT 

[DEFENDANT] HAD THE RIGHT TO RESIST THE 

OFFICERS'[] USE OF UNLAWFUL FORCE 
11 A-1883-20

REQUIRES REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS. 

(NOT RAISED BELOW).

II.

In his first point, defendant argues the judge's "failure to analyze the 

testimony under the applicable legal framework found in State v. Cofield, 127 

N.J. 328 (1992)" deprived him of "a fair trial" and the judge's "failure to grant 

the mistrial resulted in extraordinarily unfair prejudice to [defendant]."

N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 

is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that such 

person acted in conformity therewith." "However, if that evidence is offered to 

prove other facts in issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, it may be admissible 

subject to a weighing of the probative value against its apparent prejudice." 

State v. Barden, 195 N.J. 375, 388 (2008).

In Cofield, the Court articulated a four-part test 

designed to guide the determination of when to admit 

such evidence. The Court defined the four-part test as 

follows:

1. The evidence of the other crime must be 

admissible as relevant to a material issue;
12 A-1883-20

2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably 

close in time to the offense charged;[1]

3. The evidence of the other crime must be 

clear and convincing; and

4. The probative value of the evidence 

must not be outweighed by its apparent 

prejudice.

[Barden, 195 N.J. at 389 (citations omitted) (quoting 

Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338).]

This analysis is intended to reduce the underlying danger that the 

factfinder may convict a defendant because "he or she is a 'bad person' who must 

be guilty of the crime charged." State v. Castagna, 400 N.J. Super. 164, 175 

(App. Div. 2008). "Because of the damaging nature of such evidence, the trial 

court must engage in a 'careful and pragmatic evaluation' of the evidence to 

determine whether the probative worth of the evidence is outweighed by its 

potential for undue prejudice." Barden, 195 N.J. at 389 (quoting State v. 

Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 303 (1989)). "In the weighing process, the court should 

also 'consider the availability of other evidence that can be used to prove the 

same point.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 365 (2004)). 

1

 "[T]he second prong may be eliminated where it 'serves no beneficial 

purpose.'" Barden, 195 N.J. at 389 (quoting State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 

131 (2007)).
13 A-1883-20

"[U]nder N.J.R.E. 404(b), the party seeking to admit other-crimes 

evidence bears the burden of establishing that the probative value of the 

evidence is not outweighed by its apparent prejudice." State v. Reddish, 181 

N.J. 553, 608-09 (2004). "In our review of a trial court's determination on the 

admissibility of the evidence of other crimes under N.J.R.E. 404(b), we give 

great deference to the decision of the trial court." Barden, 195 N.J. at 390. 

"However, when a trial court does not analyze the admissibility of other-crimes 

evidence under Cofield, we may conduct a plenary review to determine its 

admissibility." Id. at 391.

Here, there can be no question that Turner's serial references to

defendant's threats of violence against others in the past, threats that informed 

law enforcement's view of defendant as "suicidal or violent," fell within the 

purview of N.J.R.E. 404(b). Because the judge did not analyze the admissibility 

of the testimony under Cofield, we must conduct a plenary review to determine 

its admissibility. Based on our review, we conclude the evidence was 

inadmissible. We reach this conclusion largely because the probative value of 

the evidence was outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice. "The risk 

involved with such evidence is 'that it will distract a jury from an independent 

consideration of the evidence that bears directly on guilt itself.'" State v. 
14 A-1883-20

Vallejo, 198 N.J. 122, 133 (2009) (quoting State v. G.S., 145 N.J. 460, 468 

(1996)). Indeed, although the judge did not employ a Cofield analysis, in his 

ruling, he found that the testimony "unduly prejudice[d] the jury against 

[defendant]." 

While we acknowledge that an immediate objection by defense counsel 

would have been preferable, had the State been more forthcoming when 

defendant moved prior to the trial to compel discovery of all prior interactions 

between defendant and members of the Maple Shade Police Department, 

undoubtedly, the evidence would have been properly vetted and the error

avoided entirely. Critically, it was the State's, not defendant's, burden to

establish that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its 

apparent prejudice. Because the State failed to move to admit the evidence in a 

N.J.R.E. 104 hearing prior to eliciting the objectionable testimony from 

Sergeant Turner during the trial, the fault lies squarely on the State. 

Having determined that the testimony was inadmissible, we must decide 

whether a mistrial was warranted. "A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy" that 

should be employed "[o]nly when there has been an obvious failure of justice." 

State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37, 57 (App. Div. 1997). "Whether an event at 

trial justifies a mistrial is a decision 'entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial 
15 A-1883-20

court.'" State v. Smith, 224 N.J. 36, 47 (2016) (quoting State v. Harvey, 151 

N.J. 117, 205 (1997)). We "will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion for 

a mistrial, absent an abuse of discretion that results in a manifest injustice." 

State v. Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 407 (2012) (quoting Harvey, 151 N.J. at 205).

"To address a motion for a mistrial, trial courts must consider the unique 

circumstances of the case." Smith, 224 N.J. at 47. "If there is 'an appropriate 

alternative course of action,' a mistrial is not a proper exercise of discretion." 

Ibid. (quoting State v. Allah, 170 N.J. 269, 281 (2002)). "For example, a 

curative instruction, a short adjournment or continuance, or some other remedy, 

may provide a viable alternative to a mistrial, depending on the facts of the 

case." Ibid.

To be sure, "inadmissible evidence frequently, often unavoidably, comes 

to the attention of the jury, and the record cannot be purged of all extraneous 

influence." State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 646 (1984). 

The decision on whether inadmissible evidence is 

of such a nature as to be susceptible of being cured by 

a cautionary or limiting instruction, or instead requires 

the more severe response of a mistrial, is one that is 

peculiarly within the competence of the trial judge, who 

has the feel of the case and is best equipped to gauge 

the effect of a prejudicial comment on the jury in the 

overall setting.

[Id. at 646-47.]
16 A-1883-20

When the trial judge determines that a curative instruction, rather than a 

mistrial, will suffice to rectify the error, generally, the instruction "must be firm, 

clear, and accomplished without delay." Vallejo, 198 N.J. at 134. "The same 

deferential standard that applies to the mistrial-or-no-mistrial decision applies 

to review of the curative instruction itself." State v. Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. 

490, 503 (App. Div. 2019).

Our Supreme Court "has consistently stressed the importance of 

immediacy and specificity when trial judges provide curative instructions to 

alleviate potential prejudice to a defendant from inadmissible evidence that has 

seeped into a trial." Vallejo, 198 N.J. at 135; see State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 

397, 440 (2007) (noting trial court issued "immediate" curative instructions 

"promptly and effectively"); State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 614 (2000) 

(explaining that State expert's testimony regarding defendant's guilt was 

improper but "the trial court's curative instructions given immediately after [the] 

statements . . . were sufficient to remedy [the] improper testimony"); Winter, 96 

N.J. at 649 (holding instruction sufficient because "[b]efore defense counsel 

even objected, the court struck the offending remark" and, after brief recess, 

issued "sharp and complete curative instruction"); State v. La Porte, 62 N.J. 312, 
17 A-1883-20

318 (1973) ("The trial judge immediately instructed the jury in the strongest

terms to disregard the offending remark.").

In Herbert, we provided guidance in assessing the adequacy of a curative

or limiting instruction. "First, a court should consider the nature of the 

inadmissible evidence the jury heard, and its prejudicial effect." 457 N.J. Super. 

at 505. In that regard, "[t]he adequacy of a curative instruction necessarily 

focuses on the capacity of the offending evidence to lead to a verdict that could 

not otherwise be justly reached." Ibid. (quoting Winter, 96 N.J. at 647). We 

pointed out that "while a general charge may suffice to cure 'only slightly 

improper' remarks, 'a single curative instruction may not be sufficient to cure 

the prejudice resulting from cumulative errors at trial,'" and "[e]vidence that 

bears directly on the ultimate issue before the jury may be less suitable to 

curative or limiting instructions than evidence that is indirect and that requires 

additional logical linkages." Ibid. (quoting Vallejo, 198 N.J. at 136).

"Second, an instruction's timing and substance affect its likelihood of 

success." Ibid. "As for timing, . . . a swift and firm instruction is better than a 

delayed one," and "[a]s for substance, a specific and explanatory instruction is 

often more effective than a general, conclusory one." Id. at 505-06. We noted 

that an instruction can be more effective when the judge "'explains the reason 
18 A-1883-20

for the underlying rule'" and "[a]lthough trial judges may understandably try to 

avoid repeating and thereby reinforcing an offending remark, a court must 

describe it with enough specificity to enable the jury to follow the instruction." 

Id. at 506-07 (quoting David A. Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury 

as Other, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 407, 452 (2013)).

"Third, a court must ultimately consider its tolerance for the risk of 

imperfect compliance." Id. at 507. "Yet, even in criminal cases involving errors 

of constitutional dimension, 'not "any" possibility [of an unjust result] can be 

enough for a rerun of the trial.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Winter, 

96 N.J. at 647). "The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable 

doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have 

reached." Ibid. (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971)). "By contrast, 

a non-constitutional error 'shall be disregarded by the appellate court "unless it 

is of a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result."'"

Id. at 507-08 (quoting Winter, 96 N.J. at 648).

Guided by these principles, we are persuaded that the judge's curative 

instructions did not cure the prejudicial impact of Turner's inadmissible 

testimony describing defendant's prior violent acts. Although the judge issued

swift and firm curative instructions, the instructions did not fully and clearly 
19 A-1883-20

address the prejudicial aspects of the testimony. We acknowledge that the 

State's proofs, which included the officers' body-worn cameras depicting the 

entire encounter, were strong. However, the charges defendant was convicted 

of both required knowing conduct, while the defense theory was that defendant's 

conduct was accidental and defendant lacked the requisite mental state. See

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-11(a) (providing a person is guilty of second-degree disarming 

a law enforcement officer when that person "knowingly takes or attempts to 

exercise unlawful control over a firearm or other weapon in the possession of a 

law enforcement . . . officer when that officer is acting in the performance of his 

duties"); N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a) (providing a person commits fourth-degree 

aggravated assault if he "[a]ttempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or 

recklessly causes bodily injury" to a "law enforcement officer acting in the 

performance of the officer's duties while in uniform"). 

That said, the references to defendant's prior bad acts and history of 

violence with the police and his sister had a real potential to prejudice the 

defense and reinforce the notion that defendant was predisposed to the acts with 

which he was charged. In that regard, the references "may not be minimized as 

'fleeting comments' that likely escaped the jury's notice." Herbert, 457 N.J. 

Super. at 508; cf. Jackowitz v. Lang, 408 N.J. Super. 495, 505 (App. Div. 2009) 
20 A-1883-20

("Fleeting comments, even if improper, may not warrant a new trial, particularly 

when the verdict is fair."). Rather, Turner's testimony gave the distinct 

impression that defendant was known to the police and repeatedly threatened 

violence to himself and others, prompting a police response. It was a relatively 

short trial and Turner was one of the only two witnesses who testified at the 

trial. His testimony could "not [be] missed." Herbert, 457 N.J. Super. at 509. 

We would be remiss if we did not express our displeasure with the position 

taken by the State when defendant moved to compel disclosure of the very same 

information disclosed during Sergeant Turner's objectionable testimony. The 

State took the position that it neither possessed such information nor deemed 

such information relevant to the charges. Even if the information did not come 

to light until after the discovery motion was adjudicated, it did not absolve the 

State of its obligation to disclose the information prior to Turner's testimony. 

Under Rule 3:13-3(b)(1), the State has an affirmative duty to make timely 

disclosure of "relevant material" to defendant. Moreover, it has "a continuing 

duty to provide discovery." Rule 3:13-3(f).

Under these circumstances, we have no confidence that defendant's 

convictions were based on only admissible evidence. Instead, we are convinced 

that the inadmissible evidence was of "a nature as to have been clearly capable 
21 A-1883-20

of producing an unjust result," Winter, 96 N.J. at 648, and the judge's curative 

instructions were insufficient to cure the prejudice. For this reason, we are 

constrained to reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial. Given our 

decision on this point, we need not address defendant's second point that the 

judge's failure to instruct the jury that he was entitled to use force "in selfdefense" constituted plain error.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.