J-A29045-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION 

OF: Z.J.C.-.Z.

APPEAL OF: D.M.L., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 823 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 20, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): 22 in Adoption 2022.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: MARCH 8, 2023

In this matter, D.M.L. (Mother) appeals the decree terminating her 

parental rights to her six-year-old daughter Z.J.C.-Z., pursuant to the 

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

Additionally, Mother’s counsel has filed an application to withdraw and a brief, 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). After review, we 

affirm, and grant counsel leave to withdraw.1

In its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans’ court set 

forth the relevant factual and procedural history:

Child was adjudicated dependent on April 9, 2021 after a 

hearing conducted on April 6, 2021. Mother was not 

present. Father was present and represented by counsel. 

Mother has a history of unstable housing, [homelessness], 

drug use and poor employment history. She left the Child 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court also terminated the rights of I. C.-Z. (Father). 
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in care of her maternal uncle for lengthy periods of time and 

did not provide necessary care items. She was on probation 

and had not had recent contract with her probation officer. 

Critically, Mother had not attended to the Child’s medical 

and dental needs. Child had extensive tooth decay that 

caused her pain, a vaginal rash and complained of pain upon 

urination. Once in placement, Child was treated for urinary 

tract infection(s). 

In additional to being on probation, Mother had pending 

criminal charges. Notably, she pleaded guilty to one charge 

of 26 Pa.C.S.A. s. 780-113(a)(30) on January 10, 2022 and 

was sentenced to 18-36 months incarceration with 2 years 

consecutive probation. She is currently confined to SCI 

Cambridge Springs, PA.

From the beginning of this case, Mother was required to take 

necessary steps to effectuate reunification with Child. She 

was to: (1) participate in random urinalysis screens; (2) 

obtain and maintain safe and stable housing; (3) participate 

in drug and alcohol assessment and follow 

recommendations; (4) participate in a mental health 

assessment and follow recommendations; (5) participate in 

an approved parenting program and demonstrate an 

understanding of Child’s medical, dental, educational, 

physical and emotional needs; (6) attend Child’s medical 

and dental appointments and follow all recommendations, 

as well as participate in any therapy services recommended 

for Child; and (7) follow requirements of her probation.

[The termination trial] was conducted on June 16, 2022, 

(Father did not appear). Mother, represented by counsel, 

participated by “zoom” call from her penal institution. 

Various exhibits were proffered by counsel for the Erie 

County Office of Children and Youth (“OCY”) and admitted 

by the court.

Ms. Haley Schaef, an OCY caseworker, testified that she 

received the case on April 7, 2021. As noted above, 

concerns were Mother’s homelessness, substance abuse, 

Child’s tooth decay and urological ailments. Furthermore, 

Child was living with maternal relatives “for weeks on end” 

without any form of consent or authorizations for the 

relatives to obtain medical or dental care for Child. Child 

was also exhibiting behavioral problems. After a shelter 
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care hearing, Child went into kinship care. At that time 

Mother was on probation and had not been in contact with 

her probation officer.

[Following the Child’s dependency adjudication in March 

2021,] the goal was reunification and a plan with 

recommended services was implement[ed]. At the time, 

OCY had difficulty assessing Mother’s situation due to her 

unavailability. Furthermore, although the Child was 6 years 

old, she had not started school. OCY initiated dental and 

medical care for the Child.

On April 16, 2021, OCY became aware that Mother was 

incarcerated. She had been arrested after police found a 

half pound of cocaine in her possession. (She was released 

from jail).

FN 4: Mother remained at liberty until January 10, 2022 

when she was sentenced on the drug charge.

During this period, Child was exhibiting behavioral 

difficulties and was hospitalized for mental health 

treatment. Her kinship caretakers at that time were unable 

to care for her so she was placed with a maternal second 

cousin, [S.L.] (now adoptive resource).

Ms. Schaef testified concerning Child’s progress. Since her 

placement, her behavior has greatly improved and she 

continues in therapy. [S.L.] can see the Child’s needs are 

met. Child is excited about being adopted and has the 

stability she has never had. Ms. Schaef noted that Child has 

been ”grasping” for a “consistent, stable home” and she has 

found it in [S.L.’s] home. Responses to this Court’s 

additional inquiry confirmed the suitability of Child’s current 

placement.

Mother’s compliance with the treatment plan was “minimal 

at best.” Her drug dependency continued to be an issue. A 

review of her urinalysis disclosed 21 negatives and 122 noshow positives. She was positive 7 times for both 

methamphetamines and THC (marijuana). She admitted 

that she continued to use drugs while she was in counseling 

and did not comply with urinalysis testing requirements.

As to visitation, Mother’s last visit with the Child was June 

28, 2021. She did, however, attend some medical visits for 
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Child and there was some correspondence. At time of [the 

termination hearing], she had not visited Child in a year.

Mother testified at trial. In addition to expressing her desire 

to reunify with Child, she discussed her residential plans 

upon parole and attendance at prison counseling programs. 

However, these efforts are post-petition or hoped-for 

arrangements.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/3/22, (T.C.O.) at 1-3 (citations to the record and some 

footnotes omitted).

The orphans’ court granted the petition of the Agency and terminated 

Mother’s rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). Mother 

appealed. Before we address her appeal, we note that Mother’s counsel has 

filed a petition to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 

2009).2 To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel 

has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) 

furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 

3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to 

retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the 

[appellant] deems worthy of the court's attention.

With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that 

counsel inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of 

counsel's withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must 

“attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent 

to their client advising him or her of their rights.”

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2 This Court extended the Anders principles to appeals involving the 

termination of parental rights. In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted).
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In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted). 

Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the following 

requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, 

with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and

(4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 1217, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation 

omitted).

Preliminarily, we find that Counsel has substantially complied with the 

technical requirements to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 

777, 781 (Pa. Super. 2015) (observing that substantial compliance with the 

Anders requirements is sufficient).

In addition to verifying that Counsel substantially complied with Anders 

and Santiago, this Court also must “conduct an independent review of the 

record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked 

by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 

2015) (footnote omitted). Flowers does not require us “to act as counsel or 

otherwise advocate on behalf of a party.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 

A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). “Rather, it requires us only to 
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conduct a simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face 

to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or 

misstated.” Id. Traditionally, we would start our review by giving “a most 

generous reading and review of ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record 

with consideration first of issues raised by counsel.” See id. (citing Anders, 

386 U.S. at 744).

Before we conduct our independent review, however, we first address 

the issues counsel presented in the Anders brief that arguably support 

Mother’s appeal. See M.C.F., 230 A.3d at 1219. The two issues presented 

are as follows:

1. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of 

parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)?

2. Whether the orphans’ court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of 

parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Anders Brief at 3 (cleaned up).

We review these issues mindful of our well-settled standard of review.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 
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the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 

2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the 

child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the 

orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc). Moreover, we may uphold a termination decision if any 

proper basis exists for the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201(Pa. 

Super. 2000) (en banc).

Mother’s first issue of arguable merit involves the initial prong of the 

termination analysis under Section 2511(a). As we need only agree with the 

orphans’ court as to one subsection of Section 2511(a), we analyze whether 
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the Agency properly established grounds for termination under Section 

2511(a)(2). That section provides in relevant part:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Parents 

are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt 

assumption of full parental duties. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. 

Super. 2010).

In determining that the Agency met its burden under Section 

2511(a)(2), the orphans’ court stated:

The evidence of record demonstrated that by a clear and 

convincing nature that Mother was either incapable, refused 

– or both – to comply with the [reunification] plan. First, 
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she failed to comply with urinalysis requirements and 

continued to use substances illegally. Second, she did not 

demonstrate that she could provide Child with safe and 

stable housing. Third, she failed to obtain and maintain 

gainful employment or demonstrate her ability to provide 

financial support for the Child. Fourth, she did not 

adequately participate in drug and alcohol services. Fifth, 

she did not adequately take advantage of family 

reunification services. Sixth, she did not show that she 

could attend the Child’s medical, dental, or mental health 

needs. Seventh, her visitation record was spotty. Eighth, 

it is relevant that her incarceration will impair her ability to 

parent.

T.C.O. at 6.

Upon our review, the orphans’ court properly determined that the 

Agency established grounds under Section 2511(a)(2) by clear and convincing 

evidence. The abuse caused the Child to go without parental care. The 

Agency provided services to no avail. Mother cannot or will not remedy the 

conditions which caused the Child to be removed from her care. Mother’s first 

issue is without merit.

In her second issue of arguable merit, Mother argues the trial court 

abused its discretion when it found that termination best served the Child's 

needs and welfare. Section 2511(b) provides:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 
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are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

This Court has explained that:

[S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. 

In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), 

this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the 

needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 

that the trial court must also discern the nature and status 

of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. 

However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond 

between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular 

case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, 

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child 

had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting 

bond to be too attenuated). Moreover, the court is not required to use expert 

testimony to resolve the bond analysis. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)). 
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“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. Finally, we 

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child 

is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

Here, the orphans’ court noted that there may be a bond between 

Mother and the Child, it is not a strong one worth preserving. See T.C.O. at 

6.

Furthermore, considering the fundamental needs of Child 

and her welfare, it is clear that Mother has not consistently 

met those needs as evidenced by the fact that she often left 

Child in the care of others and failed to address Child’s 

health and dental conditions. [...] Child wants to remain with 

[S.L.] where her needs are being met. Therefore, Child’s 

interests are best served by terminating Mother’s parental 

rights [pursuant to] 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Id. at 6.

Upon review, discern no error or abuse of discretion regarding the 

court’s findings under Section 2511(b). Thus, we agree with counsel that this 

issue also lacks merit.

Finally, we must conduct our independent review to discern whether 

there are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel, pursuant 

to Flowers, 113 A.2d at 1250. In doing so we briefly address Mother’s 
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incarceration. Our Supreme Court has held that “incarceration, while not a 

litmus test for termination, can be determinative of the question of whether a 

parent is incapable of providing ‘essential parental care, control or 

subsistence’ and the length of the remaining confinement can be considered 

as highly relevant to whether ‘the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent,’ 

sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2).” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012).

In this case, the earliest Mother could be released is July 2023. The

orphans’ court found Mother’s incarceration to be relevant, but it was clear 

from its findings that the court did not terminate Mother’s rights solely 

because of Mother’s conviction. Indeed, Mother had demonstrated her 

noncompliance with the reunification plan prior to her incarceration. We 

conclude that the orphans’ court properly understood the legal effects of 

Mother’s incarceration in this termination matter. Upon a “generous” review 

of the record, we discover no other issues of arguable merit. See Dempster, 

187 A.3d at 272. 

In sum, after review, we agree with counsel’s assessment that Mother’s 

issues on appeal are frivolous and that the Agency presented clear and 

convincing evidence to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2) and (b). We therefore grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and affirm the orphans’ court order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.
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Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2023