I N S I D E T H I S 

I S S U E :

MILOPS 2-3

Guam is U.S. 

Homeland

4

PRC 

influence 

4

Large Scale 

Exercise

5

2TS Update 6

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Legal Vigilance Dispatch

Promoting the Rule of Law to Ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

I S S U E 4 , S U M M E R S E P T E M B E R 2 0 2 3

S P E C I A L 

P O I N T S O F 

I N T E R E S T :

 MILOPS 23

 PRC uses 

membership in 

international 

organizations to 

push revisionist 

agenda 

 International 

resolve on 

display following 

Philippine 

transparency in 

South China Sea

T

he Republic of Palau was 

thrust into the spotlight 

following a Russian 

military boarding of a Palauflagged commercial vessel in the 

Black Sea. Sukru Okan, a 328’ 

long bulk carrier, was transiting 

to the Ukrainian port of Izmail 

on August 13 when it was fired 

upon and boarded by a Russian 

warship. 

The Russian Ministry of 

Defense acknowledged that its 

forces opened fire with 

automatic small arms and 

landed a helicopter on the deck 

of Sukru Okan, but did not 

articulate a legal basis for doing 

so. According to reporting from 

the New York Times, Sukru 

Okan was located in 

international waters in the 

southwestern Black Sea at the 

time of the boarding. The 

incident is representative of 

Russian aggression in the Black 

Sea and a failure to respect the 

navigational rights and 

freedoms of all nations in 

accordance with international 

law. 

Although the boarding of 

Sukru Okan occurred in the 

Black Sea thousands of miles 

from the USINDOPACOM area 

of responsibility, it nonetheless 

underscores the far-reaching 

implications of Russian 

aggression on the sovereign 

rights and interests of IndoPacific nations. Despite these 

implications, the Russian 

Federation and the PRC boast of 

a “no limits” friendship 

exemplified by frequent 

combined exercises across the 

Indo-Pacific region. In contrast, 

USINDOPACOM stands with 

Palau and other allies and 

partners to uphold the rulesbased international order 

against aggression and coercion. 

On August 23, as part of a 

continued commitment to 

enhancing maritime governance 

and promoting regional 

sovereignty, representatives of 

the United States and the 

Republic of Palau signed an 

expanded bilateral law 

enforcement agreement.

In addition, the Compacts of 

Free Association (COFA)

between the United States and 

the Federated States of 

Micronesia, the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands, and Republic 

of Palau vests full authority and 

responsibility for the islands’ 

security and defense matters 

with the United States. All 

three COFA states operate 

commercial vessel registries; the 

Marshall Islands’ registry is the 

second largest in the world 

(nearly five thousand vessels), 

and Palau’s registry is one of the 

world’s fastest growing. As 

sovereign nations, COFA states 

have the legal authority to 

maintain commercial ship 

registries. USINDOPACOM will 

continue to support the 

navigational rights and 

freedoms of commercial vessels 

flagged to COFA states.

Image from a video released by Russia’s Defense Ministry showing crew members of the 

Palau-flagged Sukru Okan kneeling on deck during a boarding by the Russian Navy in the 

Black Sea. Photo by Reuters via the Russian Ministry of Defense

USINDOPACOM stands with Palau following Russian 

boarding of Palau-flagged vessel in the Black Sea 
P A G E 2

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 

Law as a domain of 

competition

Commander Tim Boyle 

(USINDOPACOM) moderated a 

panel titled “law as a domain of 

strategic competition” and 

featuring leading practitioners of 

counter-lawfare, legal operations 

(NATO), and legal transparency 

(Philippines Coast Guard). In 

describing the Philippines groundbreaking transparency initiative, 

Commodore Jay Tarriela of the 

Philippines highlighted the need to 

deter aggression by “leveraging the 

power of public opinion.” As 

Commander Boyle noted, 

“competition in the legal domain 

means that we must consider the 

law not just in terms of compliance, 

but in terms of opportunity...

opportunity to expand the 

competitive space by leveraging 

legal information, legal 

instruments, legal institutions, and 

legal cooperation to advance our 

common interests and deny 

potential adversaries from gaining 

the legal high ground.” 

Island nations take 

center stage 

MILOPS 23 included a 

memorable panel featuring senior 

leaders from the Pacific Island 

nations of Palau, Fiji, Nauru, 

Tuvalu, and the U.S. state of 

Hawaii. Commentary by the 

panelists underscored the vast 

Nearly 200 delegates from more than 30 countries gathered for the 

34th annual International Military Law and Operations Conference 

(MILOPS 23) in Bali, Indonesia, 31 July – 3 August 2023. MILOPS 23 

featured the highest level of international participation in the conference’s 

history and an unmatched slate of prominent speakers and attendees. 

Keynote addresses included Admiral Aquilino, Commander, U.S. IndoPacific Command; Lt Gen (ret) Muhammad Herindra, Deputy Minister of 

Defense, Indonesia; and the Hon Dr. Kevin Rudd AC, Australia’s 

Ambassador to the United States and former Prime Minster of Australia.

The theme for MILOPS 23 was Cooperating to Defend the Rules Based 

International Order in the Indo-Pacific. Consistent with this theme, 

participants engaged with leading experts and contributed to panel 

discussions and a syndicate exercise to expand cooperation and uphold 

international law, rules, and norms. Topics discussed at MILOPS 23 

included serious and sustained challenges to the rules-based international 

order, such as Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and its implications on 

Indo-Pacific security; the PRC’s excessive maritime and territorial claims 

in the South China Sea; and security impacts of climate change.

MILOPS 23 addressed these challenges through dialogue that 

forged person-to-person ties, built consensus on regionally significant 

aspects of international law, and advanced mechanisms for continued 

collaboration. MILOPS 23 resulted in a series of key takeaways, including 

resolutions to communicate and collaborate on combined legal initiatives 

to build trust and a culture of legal transparency across national 

boundaries. A complete MILOPS 23 Record of Proceedings and the full 

listing of takeaways is available here. 

(continued on next page)
P A G E 3

USINDOPACOM, Japan Joint Staff Legal Advisors sign memo on 

People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia 

The legal staffs from 

USINDOPACOM and the Japan Joint 

Staff (JJS) frequently collaborate to 

develop legal products that document 

and solidify consensus and common 

understanding of legal issues affecting 

the region. These efforts recently 

resulted in the release of a bilateral 

memorandum on the People’s Armed 

Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). 

The paper addresses PAFMM’s 

status as a reserve force of the People’s 

Liberation Army and its obligation to 

follow international law, including 

customary international law reflected 

in the U.N. Convention on the Law of 

the Sea. In addition, the paper cites 

examples of activity by PAFMM that 

erodes fundamental principles of 

international law. 

USINDOPACOM and JJS legal 

advisors are committed to further legal 

cooperation to build strength in 

numbers and expose and oppose 

activities that undermine the rulesbased international order. 

(Left to Right) MILOPS Organizer Wing 

Commander Hatem Abiad introducing The 

Honorable Dr Kevin Rudd AC, Australian 

Ambassador to the United States and former 

Prime Minister of Australia. 

MILOPS participants from the U.S., Japan, and 

Brunei cooperate to develop legal solutions 

during a syndicate exercise. 

Rear Admiral Kresno Bunturo (Director of 

BABINKUM, Indonesia’s National Legal Development Agency) and 

Vice Admiral Del Crandall (U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General) 

discuss opportunities for bilateral legal cooperation. 

range of unique challenges faced by 

island nations and broader 

implications for the international 

community. As one panelist remarked, 

climate change is an “existential 

threat” and “the most important 

security issue for many island nations.” 

To protect the sovereign rights of 

nations whose territories are 

threatened due to rising sea levels, 

another panelist advocated for 

“freezing maritime boundaries,” and 

noted that the United States has 

already come out in support of such 

action. 

The panelists also spoke to issues 

such as IUU fishing and maintaining 

maritime domain awareness in vast 

exclusive economic zones. “Without the 

fish, we have nothing,” remarked one 

panelist. 

Operationalizing legal 

cooperation 

For the first time in over two 

decades, MILOPS 23 included a 

practical exercise during which 10 

syndicate groups cooperatively 

developed legal and policy solutions 

against a range of realistic threats to 

the rules based international order 

from dangerous air intercepts to 

malicious cyber activity and violations 

of sovereignty by high-altitude 

balloons. Spokespersons from 10 

different countries debriefed their 

respective group’s findings during a 

plenary session facilitated by Professor 

Dale Stephens. 

A common 

prevailing 

sentiment among 

the syndicates 

related to the 

deterrent value of 

exposing and 

opposing unlawful 

behavior. As one 

Indonesian junior officer stated, “if the 

world knows about it, it can change 

everything.”

In addition to plenary sessions, 

MILOPS 23 participants held 

bilateral / multilateral breakout 

meetings, key leader engagements, and 

social events. These engagements 

afforded opportunities for participants 

to address issues in small-group 

settings and build lasting friendships. 

“...if the 

world knows 

about it, it 

can change 

everything”

All MILOPS Photos by MCC Shannon Smith, USINDOPACOM PA 

CAPT Dom Flatt (USINDOPACOM SJA) and 

Colonel Junji Shinagawa (Legal Affairs General, Japan 

Joint Staff) finalize a bilateral legal memorandum. 
P A G E 4

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 

Guam defense: A 

legal obligation

Guam is part of the U.S. homeland 

and is indistinguishable from the fifty 

states for purposes of defense under 

international and domestic law. As 

the westernmost U.S. territory in the 

Pacific, Guam sits at the heart of 

USINDOPACOM's priority mission to 

defend the U.S. homeland. 

The conventional threats to Guam 

underscore the need to prioritize 

Guam’s defense. These include 

threats from intermediate and 

medium range ballistic missiles as 

well as H-6K/J/N bombers equipped 

with DH-10 LACM cruise missiles 

and YJ-12 anti-ship missiles. In 

addition to conventional threats, 

Guam faces a range of asymmetric 

challenges. Of note, a recent advisory

released by the National Security 

Agency and international 

cybersecurity authorities from the 

Five Eyes partners spotlighted a 

report from Microsoft on activity 

associated with a PRC statesponsored cyber actor known as Volt 

Typhoon. The report says that Volt 

Typhoon has been active since mid2021 targeting infrastructure in 

Guam ranging from communications 

to transportation and education. 

USINDOPACOM's priority 

mission to defend the U.S. homeland 

is based in the inherent right of all 

states to defend their territory and 

their people from an actual or 

imminent armed attack. The U.N. 

Charter’s prohibition on the threat or 

use of force against the territorial 

integrity or political independence of 

any state applies to all U.S. territories 

including Guam. U.S. officials have 

“very clearly stated an attack on 

Guam is, in fact, an attack on the U.S. 

homeland.” The inherent right of selfdefense applies equally to cyber 

operations that amount to an armed 

attack or imminent threat thereof. 

The United States has expressed the 

view that when warranted, it will 

respond to hostile acts in cyberspace 

as it would to any other threat to the 

country.

Guam’s legal status as U.S. 

homeland means that its defense will 

remain a top priority as a matter of 

law and policy. As described by Lt 

Gen Stephen Sklenka, 

USINDOPACOM Deputy 

Commander, “Guam is a place [from 

which] we send a powerful strategic 

message to our allies and our 

adversaries that the United States 

has invested in this region.” See 

USINDOPACOM J06’s TACAID for 

more information on legal 

considerations related to defense of 

Guam as well as the Commonwealth 

of the Northern Marianas Islands. 

PRC seeks influence 

through dominating 

international 

organizations

The PRC’s efforts in the last 

several decades to modify various 

tenets of clearly established 

international law should lead lawabiding states around the world to 

pay close attention to the PRC’s 

powerful influence in international 

organizations. 

A short list of the PRC’s efforts to 

either change or disregard 

international law include: fabricating 

a “near-arctic” status to gain arctic 

rights, violating the long established 

principle of due regard by performing 

unsafe and unprofessional aircraft 

intercepts in international airspace, 

violating sovereignty by denying 

freedom of navigation in the South 

China Sea based on vague and 

unlawful legal claims, and violating 

states’ territorial airspace by claiming 

rights to operate high-altitude 

balloons in “near space.” 

Because of the PRC’s willingness 

to promote revisionist views about 

international law, combined with its 

regular exercise of military power in 

support of those views, states must 

carefully consider the purposes for 

which the PRC will employ every form 

of its national power in the 

international community—especially 

in international organizations. 

All states play important roles in 

international organizations, but it 

An aerial view of U.S. Naval Base Guam shows several Navy vessels moored in Apra 

Harbor. U.S. Navy Combat Camera photo by MC1 Stacy D. Laseter

(continued on next page)
P A G E 5

seems that no state other than the PRC has 

ever consciously and concertedly made 

efforts to: 1) revise accepted provisions of 

international law, and 2) hold so many 

powerful positions in international 

organizations. As recently as 2020, the PRC 

led 4 of the United Nations specialized 

agencies, the International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO), the International 

Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Food 

and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the 

U.N. Industrial Development Organization 

(UNIDO). 

By contrast, in 2020, the UK, US, and 

France, led only one agency each, and the US 

has not led four since the 1950s. As of 

December 2022, this trend has evolved 

slightly. Although the PRC no longer leads 

any single agency, it still holds 32 positions

in key international organizations at the 

board of directors or senior management 

team level. 

Due to the PRCs extended network of 

leadership positions in these international 

organizations, combined with the PRC’s 

proclivity to either disregard or change 

international law, all states that engage in 

international organizations must continue to 

exercise vigilance and careful assessment of 

the legal and policy positions of PRC 

representatives. 

 

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 

United Nations Building, New York, NY. 

United Nations photo by Milton Grant

Pacific Fleet practices legal compliance, 

messaging during a ‘high-end’ fight

F

rom 9-18 August 2023, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) 

participated in the U.S. Navy Large Scale Exercise 2023 

(LSE 23), a U.S. Navy-Marine Corps training event that 

leveraged the combined firepower of U.S. maritime force 

across six maritime component commands, seven numbered fleets, 

and 22 time zones to defend U.S., ally, and partner interests around 

the globe. 

LSE 23 was designed 

as a live, virtual, and 

constructive, globallyintegrated exercise that 

enabled the U.S. Navy 

and Marine Corps team 

to practice synchronizing 

maritime operations 

across multiple fleets, in 

support of a broader joint and combined force. To enhance the 

Fleet’s support to Joint and Combined operations, LSE merged realworld operations with virtually constructed scenarios originating in 

the Western Pacific and Eastern Europe to create a realistic exercise 

environment that allowed Sailors and Marines to train towards a 

high-end fight in multiple theaters of wars that cross conventional 

geographic boundaries.

Throughout the exercise, PACFLT staff judge advocates were 

critical force multipliers to this fight. Consistent legal coordination 

horizontally to other theaters and vertically up and down the chain 

of command ensured global Fleet operations advanced Joint 

warfighting concepts, complied with the law of armed conflict, 

respected the rights of partner nations, and met obligations under 

international and U.S. domestic laws. Key legal focus areas 

included use of military information support operations and 

strategic messaging as a form of counter-lawfare to highlight the 

belligerent and unlawful actions of adversary forces while 

underscoring the legitimacy and legality of U.S. actions – which 

were designed to safeguard freedom of navigation and commerce 

while protecting the sovereign rights of all nations. 

PACFLT will take lessons learned from LSE 23 and apply them 

to day-to-day operations, ensuring that the United States maintains 

the ability to deter, defend, and, if necessary, defeat aggression in 

any location at any time, whether directed against the U.S. or our 

allies and partners. Working as part of the USINDOPACOM Joint 

Force and supporting our partners and allies, PACFLT remains 

committed to defending the rules-based international order and 

ensuring the Indo-Pacific remains free and open for all. 
On 4 Feb 2023, the U.S. conducted a successful operation to take down a PRC high-altitude balloon (HAB) 

above its territorial sea, off South Carolina. U.S. officials stated the HAB was equipped to collect signals 

intelligence (SIGINT) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and had targeted over 40 countries. The U.S. 

Congress condemned the PRC for the “brazen violation” of U.S. sovereignty and efforts to “deceive the 

international community through false claims about its intelligence collection campaigns.”

At first, the PRC implausibly characterized its HAB as a “civilian airship” used for “meteorological” 

purposes while blaming “force majeure” for “unintended entry”. Now that time has passed and the extent 

of the PRC’s HAB program is widely known, the PRC seems to have a pivoted from one-off excuses in favor 

of sowing confusion around the idea of “near space” and the false notion that international law does not 

limit State activity above altitudes at which aircraft operate. 

CNN reported that searches on CNKI, the PRC’s largest online academic database, show PRC military and 

civilian researchers have published more than 1,000 papers and reports on “near space.” Some PRCcontrolled media have even claimed that the Outer Space Treaty and its provisions on “exploration and use 

by all states” should be applied to HAB flights. 

By propagating the existence of “near space” in various publications, the PRC likely aims to foment a grey 

zone in which to execute unlawful surveillance under a veneer of legitimacy. To be clear, there is no “near 

space” in international law – only airspace and outer space. International law does not specify where airspace ends and space begins, but all proposals demarcating the airspace-outer space divide begin at 

altitudes well above where HABs operate.

Notwithstanding the PRC’s attempts to sow confusion, HABs are aircraft under international law subject to 

the rules and norms governing safety of flight and observance of national boundaries, even in uncontrolled 

airspace above altitudes at which aircraft operate. Under international law every nation has complete and 

exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. As such, all nations may take measures within 

their respective airspace to mitigate threats posed by unlawful HAB surveillance. The measures taken by 

U.S. forces to mitigate the threat posed by the PRC’s HAB were consistent with longstanding practice of 

States exercising jurisdiction in their territories and airspace in analogous circumstances. 

USINDOPACOM’s legal position regarding HABs has been consistent and transparent. As an example, 

nearly a year prior to the U.S. takedown of the PRC’s HAB, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and 

USINDOPACOM coordinated on the use of HABs for combined maritime domain awareness during Balikatan, a large-scale bilateral exercise. AFP and USINDOPACOM ensured their cooperative use of HABs during Balikatan conformed to international law and standards governing navigational freedoms and safety of 

flight. 

Setting the Record Straight on Balloon Law

P A G E 6

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 

P A G E 6

Chinese Coast Guard water cannon impacts Philippine Coast Guard patrol vessel (right) resulting in the PCG vessel steering away 

from the cannon impact. Image Source

International resolve on display following 

Philippine transparency in South China Sea

On 5 August 2023, the China Coast Guard (CCG) once again “interfered with the Philippines’s lawful exercise 

of high seas freedom of navigation and jeopardized the safety of the Philippine vessels and crew.” Specifically, 

CCG vessels fired water cannons and blocked the passage of Philippine vessels that were transporting supplies 

to Philippine marines stationed onboard Sierra Madre, a naval vessel grounded at the Second Thomas Shoal in 

the Philippine exclusive economic zone.

Following the incident, the European Union and eight nations, (France, Germany, South Korea, the UK, 

Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States) expressed deep concerns over the CCG’s dangerous actions, 

which were said to “undermine the status quo and directly threaten regional peace and stability.” Canada

“unreservedly condemn[ed] the dangerous and provocative” actions of the CCG and noted “to disrupt the lawful 

operations of the Philippine vessels is unacceptable, and inconsistent with the obligations of the [PRC] under 

international law....continued acts of intimidation and coercion by the PRC against its neighbors undermine 

safety, security, and stability across the region and raise the risks of grave miscalculations.” Australia described 

the CCG’s actions as destabilizing. Japan stated it “strongly” supports the Philippines’ position, highlighting 

that it is “totally unacceptable any harassment and actions which infringe on lawful activities of the sea and 

endanger the navigational safety.” In addition to the previously mentioned nations, the EU, South Korea, 

Germany and France, reaffirmed their support for international law, particularly the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal 

ruling. A common theme among these international statements is the call for peaceful dispute resolution without 

force or coercion. 

The statements described above follow concerted efforts by the Philippines to publicly highlight the 

lawfulness of the Philippines’ activities and unlawful acts by the People’s Republic of China within the South 

China Sea. Alongside other partners within the Government of the Philippines Information Working Group, the 

Philippines Coast Guard is leading a “recalibrated” approach, known as its transparency initiative, to truthfully 

inform domestic audiences and the international community. For more information on the situation at Second 

Thomas Shoal see LVD Issue 3, Spring and the INDOPACOM J06 TACAID. 
USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 

What is Legal Vigilance?

Legal vigilance refers to the monitoring and assessment of the 

legal environment. Maintaining legal vigilance ensures the United 

States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and its allies 

and partners are able to identify threats (including “legal warfare” 

by the People’s Republic of China), integrate across the combined 

joint force, and implement action to uphold the rule of law. 

The Legal Vigilance Dispatch is an informal, non-comprehensive 

survey of open-source information on the legal environment. Unless otherwise noted, content is produced by the USINDOPACOM 

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) and does not necessarily 

reflect official positions of the U.S. government.

In addition to identifying threats in the legal environment, the 

Legal Vigilance Dispatch highlights cooperative efforts by the 

United States and its allies and partners to uphold the rule of law. 

USINDOPACOM OSJA is committed to building legal partnerships and working with allies and partners to preserve peace and 

stability in the Indo-Pacific. If you have comments, feedback, or 

vignettes to share, please contact us.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Joint Operational Law Team

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Camp H.M. Smith

Hawaii, United States

Phone: (808) 477-6378

Email: j06.pacom@pacom.mil

Web: www.pacom.mil

Promoting the Rule of Law to Ensure a 

Free and Open Indo-Pacific

MILOPS group photo. Photo by MCC Shannon Smith, USINDOPACOM PA