# FILED
March 27, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk 

## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

EDWARD H. MOODY, ) ) Plaintiff/Appell

ant, )

) VS. ) Davidson Chancery ) No. 97-159-III STATE OF TENNESSEE ) DISTRICT PUBLIC DEFEN DERS ) Appeal No. CONFERENCE, ) 01A01-9707-CH-00311 ) Defendant/Appellee. )



## D I S S E N T

I respectfully disagr

ee with the court’ s opinion that effectivel y denies Mr. Moody judicial review of the calculation of

his salary by the District Publ ic Defenders Conference under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 8 -14-207 (Supp. 1997). The Chancery Court for Davidson C ounty has subject matte

r jurisdiction to hea r Mr. Moody’s petition beca

use the District Public Defenders Conference is an “agency” for the purpose of Tenn . Code Ann. § 4-5-225(a) ( Supp. 1997).
I.
EdwardH. Moody’s salary as an assistant district public defender is ba sed, in part, on statutory credit for certain types of prior service. See Tenn. Code Ann.§§ 8- 14-207(b)(3). An assistant district public de fender is not entitle d to receive prior service credits unless the district public defender who hired the assist ant recommends the prior servi ce credit s and the Executive Committee of the District Public Defenders Conference approves the recommendation

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-14-207(d). Believingthat the District Public Defenders Conference had not awarded him all the prior servic

e credits to which h

e was entitled, Mr. Moody filed a petition for
a declaratory order

requesting the Confe

rence to determine

how Tenn. Code

Ann. § 8-14-207 applied to h is prior service. After the Conference declined to render a declaratory o r der, Mr. Moody fi led a petition for de

claratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a declaration of th e prior service-2-

credits to which he

was entitled under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-14-207. The trial court dismissed this petition on the ground that it lac ked subject matter j urisdiction.
II.
The concept of subject m atter jurisdiction r

elates to a court's authority

to hear
a particular type of cas e. See Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Comm. Co. , 924 S.W.2d 632, 639 (Tenn.1996); Tu rpin v. Conner Bros. Excavating Co. , 761 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tenn.1988). It

necessarily involve s the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought, see Landers v. Jones , 872 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn.1994), an

d subject matter jurisdiction

can only be conferr

ed by the Constitution

of Tennessee or by statu te. See Kane v. Kane , 547 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tenn. 1977); Brown v. Brown , 198 Tenn. 600, 618-19, 281 S.W.2d 49 2, 501 (1955).
Tenn. Code An n. § 4-5 -225(a) specifica lly gives the Chancer

y Court for Davidson County the authority to issue declarator y ju dgments concerning the “applicability of a statute . . . to specified circumstances” as long as the agency has declined to render a declar atory order. Thu s, the pivota l question in this case i s whether the District Public Defenders Conference is an “agency” for

the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223 , -225. Because Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-102( 2) (1991) defines an “agency” as a “ state board, commission, committee, depar

tment, officer,
or any other unit of stat

e government authori

zed or requir

ed by any st atute or constitutional provision

to make rules or to de

termine contested cases,”

we need only determine

whether the

District Public D

efenders Confere

nce is “authorized” to ma

ke rules or to determi

ne contested cases.
No provision in the statutes creatingthe District Public Defenders Conference specifically

empowers the Conference to promulgate rules or to determine contested cases; however, the Conf erence may draw

its powers from

other applicable

statutes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223(a), ena cted eight years af

ter the enactment of the original UniformAdministrative Procedures Act, permits affected pe rsons to “petition an agency for a declarator

y order as to the vali

dity or applicability

of a statute, rule , or order within the primary ju risdiction of the a gency.” This statute authorizes, but does not require, any agency to convene a contested case hearing in response to a petition for adeclaratory order. See Tenn. Code Ann.§ 4-5-223(a)(1); see also Tenn. Code-3-

Ann. § 4-5-102(3) (includ ing a “declarator

y proc e eding” in the definition of a “contested case”).
Determinations

of the salaries of assistant distric t public defenders a

re within the primary jurisd iction of the Distri ct Public Defende

rs Conference. Thus, the Conference could have convened a contested case proc

eeding when Mr. Moody requested a declaratory ord er concerning his

claim for prior service

credits. Because Tenn. Code A nn. § 4-5- 223 authorized the Con ference to convene

contested case proceedings to consider petitions for a declarator y order, it is an “a

gency” for the purposes of Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 4-5-225(a).
The Conference exercised its statutory prerogative to decline to respond to Mr. Moo dy’s petition for a declara tory order. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-2 23(a)(2)

. Once the Conference declined to render a declaratory order

, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5- 225(a) permitted Mr. Moo dy to seek a

declaratory judgme

nt from the Chancery Court for Davidson County and em powered the Chanc

ery C ourt fo r Davidson County to consider Mr. Moody’s pet iti on. Accordingly, I would vacate the dismissal of Mr. Moody’s petition and remand the case to enable t he t rial court to determine Mr. Moody’s eligibility for

prior service cre

dits under Tenn. Co

de Ann. § 8-14-207.

_______________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE