Opinion issued July 31, 2018

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-15-00881-CR

———————————

JENNIFER H ZARNFALLER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 179th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1370846

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant, Jennifer H. Zarnfaller, guilty of the felony offense of 

injury to a child,

1

and the trial court assessed her punishment at confinement for 

eighty years. In thirteen issues, appellant contends that the evidence is legally 

 

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1), (b)(1), (e) (Vernon Supp. 2017); TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001 (Vernon 2014).
2

insufficient to support her conviction and her trial counsel provided her with 

ineffective assistance.

We affirm. 

Background

Veronica Parga-Lopez, formerly the assistant property manager and a tenant 

at the Wimbledon Apartments in Spring, Texas (the “apartment complex”), 

testified that in July 2010, appellant lived with her mother in an apartment near 

Parga-Lopez. Appellant would often come to see Parga-Lopez in the leasing 

office, “boo-hooing, . . . always crying, always depressed, always, . . . hysterical.” 

Parga-Lopez would listen to appellant, who would confide in her. At one point, 

appellant, while pregnant with the complainant, told Parga-Lopez that “[s]he didn’t 

want the [complainant].”

After the complainant’s birth, appellant again told Parga-Lopez that “she 

didn’t want the [complainant].” And she specifically asked Parga-Lopez to “take” 

the complainant. This caused Parga-Lopez “a lot of concern,” particularly about 

appellant’s “ability to mother” the complainant. Parga-Lopez opined that appellant 

did not “enjoy[] having [the complainant],” who, she felt, “was a bother” to 

appellant. 

Parga-Lopez noted that the complainant “was sometimes dirty and smelled 

like smoke, like cigarettes.” Appellant “constantly drank” and smoked cigarettes 
3

inside her apartment. She was not employed. Her mother, Rona Landon, was the 

“only provider” for the family. And appellant and her boyfriend, Vikas Sharma, 

spent “most of the time” at home in the apartment with the complainant. 

Parga-Lopez explained that she and her daughter, Dora, would occasionally 

babysit the complainant. The last time that they watched her, Dora noticed that the 

complainant was “not her usual self” and “just laid [sic] there.”2 She was also 

“fussy,” “irritable,” and not smiling. And she “didn’t want to eat” or play. When 

Parga-Lopez sought to comfort the complainant by massaging her head, she 

noticed that her head was “real soft on the side,” “kind of like how [a] breast feels, 

like just a gel.” Alarmed, Parga-Lopez tried to reach appellant and Landon, but 

appellant “never came to get” the complainant. When Landon came to pick up the 

complainant later that night, Parga-Lopez expressed her concern about the 

complainant’s head and demeanor. 

Parga-Lopez further testified that thereafter, her concern for the complainant 

grew when she noticed that appellant “didn’t come over anymore, didn’t go to the 

[leasing] office, . . . [and] just stayed inside.” When Parga-Lopez later spoke to 

appellant about the condition of the complainant’s head, appellant responded that 

 

2 Parga-Lopez also noted that on another occasion, appellant “bang[ed]” on the door 

to her apartment. When Parga-Lopez opened it, appellant screamed, “I don’t 

know what happened.” The complainant “had blood” on her and a cut inside her 

mouth and appellant told Parga-Lopez that the complainant had been 

“crawling . . . and [then] stood up and fell.”
4

she would “take [the complainant] to the doctor.” Parga-Lopez did not see the 

complainant that day, and she opined that appellant was “hiding something.” 

Parga-Lopez explained that on the day of the complainant’s death, July 28, 

2010, she, while away from her apartment, received a telephone call from the 

apartment complex’s property manager, who told her that “something had

happened to” the complainant. When Parga-Lopez arrived home, Dora, who was 

crying, told Parga-Lopez that she had been “looking out the window” and heard 

appellant “outside screaming,” “My Baby, my baby, my baby.” Dora then saw 

emergency medical personnel arrive and take the complainant to a hospital.

Harris County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”) Deputy M. Newcomb testified 

that on July 28, 2010, he was dispatched to the apartment complex for “a CPR in 

progress.” When he arrived, appellant, Sharma, and the complainant were present.

Vivien Miller, a paramedic for Cypress Creek EMS, testified that on July 28, 

2010, she was dispatched to the apartment complex in response to a call about a 

“cardiac arrest” of an infant. When she arrived, the scene was “complete chaos,” 

and she had great difficulty in “determin[ing] if any type of compressions [had 

been] done prior to [her] arrival, which is very vital.” According to the 

complainant’s family members, she “had been feeling ill all day and . . . resting in 

a swing carrier.” When the family members “went to check on her . . . and picked 
5

her up,” they discovered that “she was unresponsive and not breathing,” and they 

telephoned for emergency assistance.

Miller explained that her examination of the complainant revealed that she 

had “no pulse” and was not “breathing whatsoever.” Miller noted that the 

complainant had “bruises on her face,” her “little legs” were “so dirty,” and her

“rectum did not look normal.” The complainant’s body temperature was 

ninety-four degrees, indicating that she was in “a state of septic shock,” which 

would have occurred “over [a period] of days.” This constituted a “red flag” to 

Miller because it “indicated that the [complainant] couldn’t have been recently ill 

as reported” by her family members.

Miller further testified that despite extensive lifesaving measures 

administered by emergency medical personnel, the complainant remained “in 

asystole,” meaning “there [was] no -- absolutely no activity of [her] heart, no 

muscles in [her] heart [were] moving, . . . [and] no cells in [her] heart muscle itself 

[were] working at all.” The complainant, who showed no “signs of life,” was then

transported by ambulance to a hospital, where Miller saw appellant’s mother

“yell[]” at “mak[e] comments toward” appellant.

Dr. Douglas Kasper, the attending physician in the emergency room at the 

hospital where the complainant was treated, testified that on July 28, 2010, he 

examined the complainant. She was unresponsive, had “no respirations,” had no 
6

pulse or “evidence of cardiac activity,” had severe hypothermia, and was dead. 

Because the complainant had “no signs of life,” Kasper opined that “nothing else 

could be done” for her.

Dr. Kasper noted that when he informed appellant of the complainant’s 

death, her “affect was blunted” and “strange.” And she did not seem to “want to 

be involved.” Kasper opined that the “story” that appellant had provided to 

emergency medical personnel about what happened to the complainant was “not 

congruent” with “th[e] massive amount of trauma[]” that the complainant had

sustained. He also stated that he did not believe that whatever had happened to the 

complainant was “accidental.”

After he had pronounced the complainant dead, Dr. Kasper ordered a full 

scan of the body because of appellant’s “affect” and “things that [he had] found” 

during his examination of the complainant. For instance, he found that the 

complainant’s skull was “crushed” or “creaking or cracking,” indicating that she 

had suffered “skull fractures” and “head trauma.” And her skull “felt mushy,”

“like there was lots of movement.” According to Kasper, “something grave had 

occurred.”3

In regard to the full body scan, Dr. Kasper explained that it showed that the 

complainant’s head had sustained “multiple skull fractures,” including a 

 

3 Dr. Kasper noted that his examination of the complainant also showed that she had 

a “[d]ilated rectum with tears,” which were “old.”
7

“depressed skull fracture,” “in numerous locations”; “hemorrhaging outside the 

skull”; an epidural hematoma “all over the scalp,” indicating that “a very large 

blood vessel [had been] damaged”; a subdural hematoma, indicating that “bridging 

veins [had been] damaged”; and other bleeding “inside the brain itself.” According 

to Kasper, the “depressed skull fracture” indicated that “some blunt force trauma” 

to the complainant had occurred, and the force used to cause the fracture would 

have been significant. He also noted that the complainant had a 

pneumomediastinum, meaning “there was air around the heart where it shouldn’t 

be”; “a distal tibia/fibula fracture”; a pneumothorax, meaning there was “air 

outside of the lung where it’s not supposed to be”; “bruising of the lung”; “gas in 

[her] left liver lobe,” potentially indicating a “bowel wall injury”; and a “dilated 

rectum.” Kasper opined that the “air around the heart” and the “air outside of the 

lung” could have been related to a trauma, including a blunt force trauma. And the 

“tibia/fibula fracture” was “consistent with nonaccidental trauma” because “a child 

that’s not ambulatory can’t really muster up the acceleration or deceleration to

harm themselves in that way.” Kasper further opined, therefore, that there was a 

“high probability” that “somebody had grabbed [the complainant] by the 

leg . . . and swung [her] around the room” or grabbed her “by [a] lower extremity 

and str[uck] her head against an object.”
8

Deputy J. Ortiz, a member of the HCSO crime scene unit, testified that on 

July 28, 2010, he was dispatched to the hospital to photograph the “wounds” found 

on the complainant. He noted that she had “readily apparent” “bruising on her 

cheek” and chest, and she had a “lemon-size bump” on the right side of her head, 

which was “a different color” than the other parts of the complainant’s skin. The 

complainant also had “redness behind [her] ear,” which could be “visibly see[n]” 

and “some [other] bumps on her head.” Ortiz observed discoloration on her back 

and “bruise discoloration” on her lower leg, above the ankle. According to Ortiz, 

the complainant’s injuries were “numerous” and “obvious.”

Deputy Ortiz further testified that he spoke to appellant, who showed no 

emotion, at the hospital to obtain her consent to take photographs of her apartment. 

In appellant’s apartment, Ortiz found several prescription pill bottles with 

appellant’s name on their labels. And he saw “lot[s] of empty alcohol bottles” in 

the closet in the bedroom.

HCSO Sergeant R. Hunter, the lead investigator assigned to the case, 

testified that on July 28, 2010, he was dispatched to the hospital following the 

“non[-]accidental” death of the complainant, who was nine-months old. He

determined that appellant, Landon, and Sharma “lived with” and “had access to” 

the complainant. When Hunter spoke with appellant at the hospital, he noted that 

she was agitated and “appeared to be mad but not upset and crying.” Based on his 
9

“professional experience of having dealt with [similar] cases in the past,” Hunter 

opined that appellant’s behavior was “quite different than someone that’s 

mourning for [her] child.” After speaking to appellant, Landon, and Sharma at the 

hospital, they agreed to come to the HCSO station to be interviewed.

During one audio-recorded interview with appellant, admitted into evidence 

as State’s Exhibit 92 and played for the jury at trial, Sergeant Hunter noted that she 

frequently referred to the complainant as “that baby.” And appellant admitted to 

having left the complainant and Sharma alone in her apartment the morning of July 

28, 2010 so that she could go to a liquor store, where she purchased “a 1.75-liter 

bottle of rum.” 

After listening to an audio recording of appellant’s telephone call for 

emergency assistance, admitted into evidence as Defense’s Exhibit 1 and played 

for the jury at trial, Sergeant Hunter further noted that appellant, on July 28, 2010, 

had a “slight slur” in her speech indicating that “there might have been some 

drinking” that had occurred that day, or that she “may have been under the 

influence of something.” Based on his investigation, Hunter opined that appellant 

had “caused the injuries” sustained by the complainant who was dead at the time 

that appellant called for emergency assistance.

HCSO Lieutenant W. Kuhlman testified that on July 28, 2010, he was

dispatched to appellant’s apartment following the complainant’s death. He noted 
10

that appellant’s apartment was “in desperate need of cleaning” and contained 

“really bad living conditions.” In the closet in one of the bedrooms, Kuhlman 

found empty “alcoholic beverage containers, beer boxes, as well as rum bottles.”

Lieutenant Kuhlman further testified that he conducted a video-recorded 

interview with appellant, admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 93 and played 

for the jury at trial, during which she stated that the complainant, “a couple [of]

weeks” before her death, had “stopped crawling” and would cry whenever she was 

“touched.” Appellant, thinking this “was weird,” further stated that she had also 

noticed that, about “a week or two” before the complainant’s death, she had 

become “scared to death” of Sharma. And when Sharma would hold her, the 

complainant “would scream her head off.” Appellant admitted, however, that she 

continued to allow Sharma to care for and bathe the complainant outside of 

appellant’s presence.

Dr. Dwayne Wolf, the deputy chief medical examiner at the Harris County 

Institute of Forensic Sciences (“HCIFS”), testified that he performed an autopsy on 

the body of the complainant. He explained that an external examination of the 

complainant revealed contusions and abrasions on the top and back of her head, 

behind her ears,4 on her right forehead, on her left cheek, and on both sides of her 

 

4 Dr. Wolf opined that the contusions behind the complainant’s ears were caused by 

“impacts to the sides of [her] head.”
11

jaw.5 There was also a hemorrhage near the complainant’s wrist area; contusions 

on her upper chest, abdomen, and both upper and lower extremities; and “scabbed 

abrasion[s]” on “the right side of [her] chest,” her “central back” area, and “the 

outer part of [her right] leg.” According to Wolf, the contusions sustained by the 

complainant were caused by “blunt force trauma”

6 by being “struck with an 

object.”

In regard to the complainant’s skull, Dr. Wolf’s examination revealed that 

the contusions on her head were “extensive” and she had “fractures on both sides 

of [her] skull.” The fractures on the right side of the complainant’s head looked as 

though they had been “healing . . . before the autopsy.” But the fractures on the 

left side of her head were “more acute” and had occurred “shortly before [her] 

death.” There also appeared to be “depressed fracture[s]” on the complainant’s 

head, indicating an “impact of the head against [a] surface” or an “impact of a 

surface or object against the head.” 

 

5 Dr. Wolf noted that the complainant’s jaw was fractured, with one fracture being 

consistent with “the front of [her] chin” being “impacted.”

6 Dr. Wolf explained that by “blunt force trauma,” he meant that the complainant 

had been struck with a “blunt object,” such as “a table, floor, chair, hand, [or] 

fist.” And blunt force trauma would have occurred if the complainant’s head had 

been struck “against a surface” or if she had been struck “with an object.”
12

Also, on the back of the complainant’s head were signs of “recent 

hemorrhaging,” and some of the contusions and fractures on her head occurred 

“recent[ly].”7

Dr. Wolf opined that the contusions on the complainant’s head were caused 

“by [an] impact with [a] elongated object or objects” and consistent with “a hand 

striking or slapping” the complainant. The complainant was “certainly . . . struck” 

on her head, and the hemorrhaging seen in her head was caused by “a significant 

impact of the head.” Wolf also noted that there was “evidence of direct brain 

trauma” as the result of “a significant impact” and the complainant “likely would 

have been unconscious at some point before dying.” He opined that there were 

likely “at least two or more separate incidents of head trauma” to the complainant,

she had to have been struck with “a lot of force,” and the injuries that she sustained 

were “not the kind of injuries [one] would expect to see from a childhood fall.”

Dr. Wolf further noted that the complainant had a contusion on her left lung 

and “an impact on [her] back that’s hard enough” it could have caused the lung to 

bleed. In other words, the lung contusion was the result of a “blunt trauma” with 

 

7 Dr. Wolf noted that several contusions on the complainant’s head were “from 

different time periods,” with some being “acute or recent” and others having 

started to heal. He explained that some of the complainant’s head injuries were 

“several days” old, while others were “probably less than six hours” old. In regard 

to the older skull fractures, Wolf opined that the complainant would have 

exhibited symptoms of lethargy or increased sleepiness, crankiness, “general 

malaise,” or “not feeling well.”
13

“considerable force.” There appeared to be a bite mark on the complainant’s arm. 

And her right forearm had a fracture that appeared to be healing, indicating that her

arm had been broken several weeks prior to the autopsy. According to Wolf, the 

fracture on the complainant’s arm would have prevented her from using her hand,

and she would not have been able to crawl using that hand. 

There was also a hemorrhage near the complainant’s wrist area that was 

“much more recent,” possibly “within six hours” of her death. In regard to the 

complainant’s left leg, Dr. Wolf explained that her tibia and fibula had been 

fractured “near the time of [her] death” as a result of “bending [her] foot back or 

the lower part [her] leg back or an impact.” And the location of the leg fractures 

was “consistent with [the complainant] being struck against something” or 

someone “grabbing onto [her] leg and possibly swinging th[e] leg.”

Dr. Wolf further testified that his examination of the complainant revealed 

that she did not show any signs of illness or disease and nothing other than the 

injuries he described at trial would have prevented her “from living a healthy life.” 

Based on the autopsy, Wolf opined that the cause of the complainant’s death was 

“blunt trauma to the head with skull fractures of the brain injury” and her death 

was a result of a homicide.

Dr. Deborrah Pinto, a forensic anthropologist with the HCIFS, testified that 

she performed “a pediatric skeletal survey” of the complainant’s body to assess the 
14

extent of damage and the age of her various bone injuries. Pinto explained that the 

fracture injuries to the right side of the complainant’s skull8and her right arm were 

“healing injuries,” which occurred “within a month” of her death. However, the 

injuries to the left side of the complainant’s skull,9jaw, left tibia, and left fibula10

occurred “at or around the time of [the complainant’s] death.” Pinto opined that at 

least “two traumatic events” had occurred—one “likely within the month prior to 

[her] death” and the other “at or around the time” of her death. It was also possible 

that more than two traumatic events had occurred.

Appellant testified that before the complainant was born, she had given birth 

to two other children. Because she had “f[allen] on hard times,” “didn’t have 

money,” was “getting evicted,” and “didn’t have anywhere to go,” appellant sent 

her two children to live with her aunt with whom “they would have such a great 

life.” After “a year or two,” appellant allowed her aunt to adopt her two children. 

 

8 Dr. Pinto opined that fractures on the right side of the complainant’s skull were 

caused by a “right to left . . . direct[] impact with an object of small-to-medium 

surface area” and not the ground.

9 Dr. Pinto explained that the fractures on the left side of the complainant’s skull 

were caused by an “impact” with “something” with a “relatively small surface” 

area and not the ground.

10 Dr. Pinto noted that the fractures to the complainant’s tibia and fibula would have 

been caused by her foot “being pushed into the leg; so some type of force [that 

would] driv[e] the foot and the leg together so that the bone gives way at the ankle 

and . . . just collapse[].” The force needed to cause the tibia and fibula fractures 

would have been “significant,” “more than just regular . . . day-to-day handling.”
15

Her daughter is now “an honor student,” and her son plays baseball at high school 

and is on a “Select Baseball team.”

When appellant was “six months pregnant” with the complainant, she moved 

into the apartment complex with Landon. After her birth on October 4, 2009, the 

complainant lived in the apartment with “[a]t first just” appellant and Landon. 

When the complainant was “about three months old,” Sharma, who had been living 

in a “catty-corner” apartment “with his wife, Michelle,” moved into appellant’s 

apartment. Appellant explained that Sharma lived in the apartment at “the time of 

[the complainant’s] death” and continued to do so afterwards. Appellant admitted

that after the complainant’s death, she continued “sleeping in the same bedroom” 

with Sharma.

Appellant explained that she was not working when the complainant was 

born and it had been “[a]while” “since [she] had held a regular job.” Her mother, 

in contrast, worked “normal hours during the day” and was “the sole source of 

income” for the household. A week before the complainant’s death, Sharma began 

working the “night-shift.” Before the complainant’s death, appellant was home 

most of the time with the complainant. At all times, either appellant’s mother or 

Sharma were there with her and the complainant, depending on the time of day. 

And, according to appellant, she would only “occasionally” drink alcoholic 

beverages. 
16

On July 27, 2010, the day before the complainant’s death, appellant called 

the complainant’s pediatrician to make a “sick[-]baby appointment” because the 

complainant “wasn’t feeling good.” On July 28, 2010, the day of the 

complainant’s death, appellant, after Landon “left for work,” was “in [her] bed” 

when she “heard [the complainant] screaming.” She then took the complainant 

from Sharma. She noted that this incident “didn’t alarm” her because she “just 

thought [the complainant] was being cranky.” She subsequently “went to the 

liquor store,” leaving “only [Sharma] and [the complainant alone] in the 

apartment” for “[a]bout 15, 20 minutes.”

When appellant returned to the apartment, she noticed that the complainant 

“didn’t seem like she felt that well” and “felt hot,” but otherwise “she was acting 

normally.” Appellant then took the complainant’s temperature, “gave her 

Tylenol,” “fed [her] a bottle,” and “held her for a little while” before “put[ting] her 

in [her baby] swing.” 

While the complainant was sleeping in her swing, appellant and Sharma 

started “watching TV” and “[h]aving [some] drinks.” Appellant had “two or three” 

drinks, and after a few hours, Sharma went “to go get [the complainant’s] blanket.” 

He then “came running out,” saying, “[t]here’s something wrong. . . with [the 

complainant]” and “she [is not] breathing.” Appellant then “immediately” called 

for emergency assistance.
17

In regard to the complainant, appellant agreed that she had been “an active 

baby,” whose “main mode of transportation” was crawling. And when asked 

whether she had ever noticed the complainant “not being able to crawl because of 

the broken arm,” appellant stated that “[s]he crawled. She was crawling.” She 

explained, “[i]t wasn’t like there was something wrong like she was hurt. She 

never cried. She was always laughing and happy.” According to appellant, if she 

had noticed that the complainant was “unable to crawl because something was 

wrong with her arm or her leg,” she “would have t[aken] her to the emergency 

room.”

In regard to who she thought had caused the fractures to the complainant’s 

skull and leg, appellant testified that, “I feel that [Sharma] did it.” And although 

Landon had previously told her that the complainant had fallen, “like, three 

times . . . off the bed,” appellant herself had never seen the complainant fall. She 

also stated that she had never seen Sharma “hit” or “drop” the complainant. 

Further, she explained that the “bump” on the complainant’s forehead was “a 

mosquito bite” that had “welled up.” Moreover, although she admitted that the 

“other bruises” on the complainant were “obvious,” she stated that she “didn’t see 

them” before. When appellant bathed the complainant the night before her death, 

she did not observe any “unusual mark or bruise” on the complainant’s body.
18

Dr. Laeeq Khan, the complainant’s pediatrician, testified about the 

complainant’s medical care prior to her death and the developmental “checkup” 

examinations that he had conducted on the complainant. On cross-examination, 

Khan admitted that it would be “incredibly difficult for a 9-month-old to be mobile 

in any way” with the fractures that she had sustained to her arm. And he agreed 

that the complainant’s arm fractures and external injuries observed at the time of 

her death “would certainly be noticeable and obvious” and would be “concerning”

to a pediatrician and a parent.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In her first issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support her conviction because the State did not prove that she “knowing[ly] 

injur[ed]” the complaint by omission. She asserts that there is “no evidence” that 

she “was aware with reasonable certainty that [the complainant] would be injured 

in any way” or that “an injury would have been prevented had [she] done 

something/anything to protect [the complainant] or sought medical attention for 

[the complainant] in a timely manner.” 

We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether any 

“rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 
19

(1979); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Our role 

is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of fact’s 

finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We give deference 

to the responsibility of the fact finder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh 

evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 

750. However, our duty requires us to “ensure that the evidence presented actually 

supports a conclusion that the defendant committed” the criminal offense of which 

she is accused. Id.

We note that in reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a court must 

consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any reasonable 

inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 

772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is just as probative as 

direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and a conviction may be 

supported by circumstantial evidence standing alone. See Kuciemba v. State, 310 

S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Each fact need not point directly and 

independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all 

the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper v. 

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury, as the judge of the facts 

and credibility of the witnesses, could choose to believe or not to believe the 
20

witnesses, or any portion of their testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).

A person commits the offense of injury to a child if she intentionally, 

knowingly, or recklessly causes serious bodily injury by omission to a child when 

she has a legal duty to act. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1), (b)(1) (Vernon 

Supp. 2017); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001 (Vernon 2014) (rights and 

duties of parent). “Child” means a person fourteen years of age or younger. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(c)(1). “Serious bodily injury” means “bodily injury 

that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent 

disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 

member or organ.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46) (Vernon Supp. 2017).

“Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense requiring a mental state that 

relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct.” Williams, 235 

S.W.3d at 750; see also Thompson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 153, 159 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Thus, “[t]he State must prove that a 

defendant caused a child’s serious bodily injury with the requisite criminal intent.” 

Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. A person acts “intentionally” or with intent “with 

respect to . . . a result of [her] conduct when it is [her] conscious objective or desire 

to . . . cause the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2011). A 
21

person acts “knowingly” or with knowledge “with respect to a result of [her] 

conduct when [she] is aware that [her] conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 

result.” Id. § 6.03(b). 

Direct evidence of the required mental state is not required. Hart v. State, 89 

S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Instead, proof of mental state almost 

always depends upon circumstantial evidence. Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 745 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Knowledge and intent may be 

inferred from any facts which tend to prove their existence, including the acts, 

words, and conduct of the accused, and the method of committing the crime and 

from the nature of wounds inflicted on the complainant. Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64; 

Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Stahle v. 

State, 970 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet. ref’d) (“Knowledge may 

be inferred from an accused’s acts, words, and conduct.”).

Here, appellant stood accused by indictment of intentionally or knowingly 

causing serious bodily injury to the complainant, a child younger than fifteen years 

of age, by failing to protect her.

11

 

11 Appellant also stood accused by indictment of intentionally or knowingly causing 

serious bodily injury to the complainant by failing to seek medical attention for 

her in a timely manner. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(a)(1), (b)(1). The 

trial court’s charge authorized the jury to convict appellant if it found she 

intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to the complainant, a child 

younger than fifteen years of age, by failing to protect her or by failing to seek 

medical attention for her in a timely manner. The jury returned a general verdict 
22

Appellant specifically argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

establish that she was aware with reasonable certainty that her failure to protect the 

complainant would cause the complainant serious bodily injury because there is 

“no evidence” that she was aware of the complainant’s previous injuries or that the 

complainant had suffered severe abuse before her death, such that appellant would 

have known that allowing Sharma or Landon to have access to the complainant

would place the complainant in danger of sustaining further serious bodily injury. 

There is ample evidence in the record that establishes that the complainant 

had suffered serious injuries that would have been apparent to appellant in the 

weeks leading up to her death. Forensic anthropologist Dr. Pinto testified about

the age of the complainant’s various bone injuries. And he explained that the 

fractures to the right side of the complainant’s skull and her right arm were 

“healing injuries” that occurred “within a month” of her death. Similarly, Dr. 

 

of guilty of the felony offense of injury to a child as alleged in the indictment. 

“When a general verdict is returned and the evidence is sufficient to support a 

finding of guilt under any of the paragraph allegations submitted, the verdict will 

be upheld.” Herrin v. State, 125 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) 

(quoting McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); see also

Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (when charge 

authorizes jury to convict defendant on more than one theory, verdict of guilt will 

be upheld if evidence sufficient on any theory authorized by jury charge). Thus, if 

the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction of the offense of 

injury to a child based on her failure to protect the complainant, we need not 

address whether the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction based 

on a failure to seek medical attention for the complainant in a timely manner. See 

Russo v. State, 228 S.W.3d 779, 795 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d); see 

also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
23

Wolf, who performed the autopsy on the complainant’s body, opined that there had 

likely been “at least two or more separate incidents of head trauma,” noting that 

some of the complainant’s head injuries were “several days” old.

Several witnesses testified that the trauma the complainant suffered in the 

weeks prior to her death would have been readily apparent. In regard to pain, Dr. 

Wolf explained that the head trauma she had suffered would have caused the 

complainant to exhibit symptoms of lethargy, sleepiness, crankiness, “general 

malaise,” or “not feeling well.” And the complainant’s broken right forearm 

would have prevented use of her hand such that she would have been unable to 

crawl. Appellant’s own witness, Dr. Khan, who was the complainant’s 

pediatrician, agreed that these injuries would have been “noticeable and obvious”

in a nine-month-old and “concerning” to him, both as a pediatrician and parent.

See Sandoval v. State, No. 14-12-00879-CR, 14-12-00880-CR, 2014 WL 3870504, 

at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (evidence sufficient to show defendant knew with 

reasonable degree of certainty her child abused, where child “covered in bruises at 

the time of her death” and testimony bone fractures and other injuries “would have 

caused the child pain”); see also Guerrero v. State, No. 04-15-00762-CR, 2016 

WL 4537694, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 31, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., 
24

not designated for publication) (knowledge failure to act substantially certain to 

result in serious bodily injury inferrable from apparent and obvious condition).

The record also shows that the complainant had visible injuries to her body

at the time of her death. Deputy Ortiz, who saw the complainant at the hospital

following her death, noted “numerous,” “obvious,” and “readily apparent” injuries, 

including “bruising on her cheek” and chest, a “lemon-size bump” on the right side 

of her head, “redness behind [her] ear,” “some [other] bumps on her head,” 

obvious discoloration on her back, and “bruise discoloration” on her lower leg. 

See Tijerina v. State, No. 13-11-00430-CR, 2012 WL 3525632, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi Aug. 16, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) 

(eyewitness testimony concerning child’s appearance provided evidence of extent 

of defendant’s awareness of child’s condition); Payton v. State, 106 S.W.3d 326, 

328–30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (jury could reasonably conclude 

defendant knew eighteen-month-old child seriously injured because emergency 

medical personnel immediately noticed bruises and distended stomach caused by 

internal bleeding).

Dr. Wolf’s external examination of the complainant also revealed evidence 

of what appeared to be a bite mark on her arm and “blunt force trauma,” including 

bruises, contusions, and abrasions on the top and back of her head, on both sides of 

her jaw, behind her ears, and on her right forehead, left cheek, upper chest, 
25

abdomen, back, and both upper and lower extremities. See Tijerina, 2012 WL 

3525632, at *5; Payton, 106 S.W.3d at 328–30.

There is also evidence that appellant had actual knowledge that the 

complainant had been seriously injured in the weeks before her death. In an 

interview with Lieutenant Kuhlman, appellant stated that “[a] couple of weeks” 

before the complainant’s death, she noticed that the complainant had “stopped 

crawling” and would cry when “touched.”

12

 And at trial, appellant admitted that 

she had seen the “bump” on the complainant’s forehead, although she stated that 

she believed it to be “a mosquito bite” that had “welled up” and when shown 

photographs of the complainant’s body at trial, appellant acknowledged that many 

of the bruises were noticeable, although she could not explain why she had not 

noticed them before the complainant’s death.

Parga-Lopez’s testimony provides further evidence that appellant was aware 

that the complainant had been seriously injured in the weeks leading up to her 

death. While the complainant was in the care of Parga-Lopez’s daughter, Dora, 

 

12 At trial, however, appellant testified that she did not notice the complainant “not 

being able to crawl because of the broken arm” and the complainant did not act 

“like there was something wrong like she was hurt. She never cried. She was 

always laughing and happy.” However, the jury, as the judge of the facts and 

credibility of the witnesses, could choose to believe or not to believe appellant’s 

testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); 

Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. 

ref’d). Further, we note that “inconsistent statements . . . are probative of 

wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt.” Guevara v. State, 152 

S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
26

she noticed that the complainant was “not her usual self” and “just laid [sic] there.” 

She was also “fussy,” “irritable,” “didn’t want to eat,” or “play,” and she was not 

smiling. Parga-Lopez discovered that the complainant’s head was “real soft on the 

side,” like “a gel.” After she tried unsuccessfully to reach appellant, Parga-Lopez 

expressed her concerns about the complainant’s head and demeanor to appellant’s 

mother, Landon. Later, her lingering concern led Parga-Lopez to check on the 

complainant at appellant’s apartment, where appellant assured her that she would 

“take [the complainant] to the doctor.” Perez v. State, No. 08-12-00340-CR, 2015 

WL 4940375, at *9 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 19, 2015, no pet.) (not designated 

for publication) (defendant’s misrepresentation to witness she had sought medical 

care for child established defendant’s knowledge child seriously ill, but refused to 

seek medical care).

There is also evidence in the record that appellant had motive not to protect 

the complainant because she did not want her. See Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 

45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Motive is a significant circumstance indicating 

guilt. Intent may also be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, 

and the conduct of the appellant.” (internal citations omitted)). Parga-Lopez 

explained that during her pregnancy with the complainant, appellant confided that 

she did not want the complainant. And after the complainant’s birth, appellant 
27

asked Parga-Lopez to take the complainant permanently because she did not want 

her. 

Parga-Lopez also testified that after she had visited appellant to 

communicate her concerns about the complainant, appellant stopped visiting her at 

the apartment complex’s leasing office and instead “just stayed inside” her

apartment. Parga-Lopez opined that appellant was “hiding something.” See 

Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50 (attempts to conceal incriminating evidence probative 

of wrongful conduct and also circumstance of guilt); Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64 (jury 

may infer both intent and knowledge from any facts tending to prove existence of 

mental states, including defendant’s acts, words, or conduct); In re P.M.S., No. 03-

01-00178-CV, 2001 WL 1167166, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 4, 2001, no pet.) 

(not designated for publication) (“Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies 

upon circumstantial evidence, such as the suspicious conduct or statements of the 

actor . . . .”).

Further, in her interview with Lieutenant Kuhlman, appellant stated that in 

the weeks before the complainant’s death, she had become “scared to death” of 

Sharma. And when Sharma would hold her, the complainant “would scream her

head off.” Despite this, appellant admitted that she continued to allow Sharma to 

continue to care for and bathe the complainant outside of her presence. This 

includes the morning of the complainant’s death, when, even after having “heard 
28

[the complainant] screaming” while in Sharma’s arms earlier that morning,

appellant left the complainant with him so she could go to the “liquor store.” 

Appellant’s delay in seeking medical assistance for the complainant on the 

day she died further indicates her intent. Despite Dr. Wolf’s testimony that the 

complainant “likely would have been unconscious at some point before dying” due 

to the brain trauma that she had suffered from being struck on the head, appellant 

waited until the complainant had stopped breathing before calling for emergency 

assistance.13 See Vasquez v. State, No. 13-08-00684-CR, 2011 WL 345919, at *20 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (because defendant knew complainant sick and had thrown up many 

times, his stomach hurt, he had bruises to his lower abdomen and other parts of his 

body, and he had “labored” breathing, jury could reasonably conclude defendant 

 

13 We note that in her brief, appellant asserts that the evidence shows that the only 

indication that she had that the complainant had suffered head trauma before her 

death led her to take the complainant to her pediatrician, Dr. Khan, on July 6, 

2010. She points out that, according to medical testimony, it is possible that the 

first skull fracture could already have been inflicted at this point. She then asserts 

that it had, and that she had misidentified, and Dr. Khan’s physician’s assistant 

misdiagnosed, it as conjunctivitis and rhinitis. However, the jury was free to 

accept or reject this explanation. Evidence is not insufficient merely because a 

defendant offers a different explanation for the facts. See Jenkins v. State, No. 

01-05-00299-CR, 2006 WL 23323, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 5, 

2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Coleman v. State, 113 

S.W.3d 496, 502 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), aff’d, 145 S.W.3d 649 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). And the fact finder alone determines what weight to 

place on contradictory testimonial evidence, as it depends on the evaluation of 

credibility and demeanor. Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 408–09 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997); Jenkins, 2006 WL 23323, at *6.
29

knew complainant suffered some sort of blunt-force trauma requiring medical 

treatment); see also Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64 (jury may infer both intent and 

knowledge from any facts tending to prove existence of mental states, including 

defendant’s acts, words, or conduct); In re P.M.S., 2001 WL 1167166, at *2 (proof 

of culpable mental state generally relies upon circumstantial evidence, such as 

suspicious conduct or statements of actor).

Further, several witnesses were troubled by appellant’s incongruous 

demeanor in response to the complainant’s death. Dr. Kasper, the emergency 

physician who treated the complainant at the hospital, testified that “the affect of 

[appellant] was very strange in general,” describing it as “blunted” and not

“want[ing] to be involved.” Deputy Ortiz, who observed appellant at the hospital, 

noted that “there was no emotion.” And Sergeant Hunter noted that appellant 

appeared to be agitated, but “not upset or crying.” He further opined that her 

behavior was “quite different than someone that’s mourning for [her] child.” See 

Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64 (jury may infer both intent and knowledge from any facts 

tending to prove their existence, including defendant’s acts, words, or conduct); In 

re P.M.S., 2001 WL 1167166, at *2 (proof of culpable mental state generally relies 

upon circumstantial evidence, such as actor’s suspicious conduct or statements).

Finally, appellant does not dispute the fact that she continued living with 

Sharma, who she believed was responsible for the complainant’s injuries. See
30

Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64 (jury may infer both intent and knowledge from any facts 

tending to prove their existence, including defendant’s acts, words, or conduct); In 

re P.M.S., 2001 WL 1167166, at *2 (proof of culpable mental state generally relies 

upon circumstantial evidence, such as actor’s suspicious conduct or statements).

Given the record evidence that appellant was made aware of the soft spot on 

the complainant’s skull; appellant admitted that she knew the complainant had 

stopped crawling and would cry when touched, especially when being touched by 

Sharma; appellant admitted that many of the complainant’s bruises were 

immediately apparent; and appellant did not want the complainant, the jury could

have reasonably concluded that appellant was aware with reasonable certainty that 

failing to protect the complainant, by preventing her from being left in the care of 

those who were supervising her when her injuries occurred, would continue to 

result in serious bodily injury to the complainant. See Sandoval, 2014 WL 

3870504, at *6 (evidence sufficient to show defendant knew with reasonable 

degree of certainty girlfriend abusing child, where “the complainant was covered 

in bruises at the time of her death” and testimony bone fractures and other injuries 

“would have caused the child pain”); Dusek v. State, 978 S.W.2d 129, 134 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d) (jury could rationally conclude mother of child

whose body covered by many large bruises of varying ages knew boyfriend 

abusing child).
31

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we 

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that appellant intentionally or 

knowingly caused serious bodily injury by omission to a child by failing to protect 

the complainant when she had a legal duty to act.14 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.04(a)(1), (b)(1); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.001; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. 

at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. Accordingly, we hold that 

the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for injury to a 

child.

We overrule appellant’s first issue.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In her second through thirteenth issues, appellant argues that her trial 

counsel did not provide her with effective assistance because counsel did not 

“object to the State’s closing argument”; “discover whether the State intended to 

use extraneous conduct against [a]ppellant”; “request notice of expert witnesses”; 

“object[] to the introduction of” a portion of State’s Exhibit 4; “apply for a 

subpoena”; “object to the [trial court’s] charge” to the jury or “request[] an 

appropriate instruction on the issue of ‘but for’ causation”; “object to [Sergeant] 

 

14 Having held that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for the 

offense of injury to a child based on her failure to protect the complainant, we do 

not reach the issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction based on the alternative theory of failure to seek medical attention. See 

Anderson, 416 S.W.3d at 889; see also TEX. APP. P. 47.1.
32

Hunter’s opinion testimony”; “object to inadmissible, extraneous, prejudicial, 

character conformity evidence”; “request a limiting instruction to inadmissible, 

extraneous, prejudicial, character conformity evidence”; “give an opening 

statement”; or move for a directed verdict.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to the reasonably effective 

assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Garcia v. 

State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). To prove a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, appellant must show that (1) her trial counsel’s performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984); Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 

142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 

at 2068. In reviewing counsel’s performance, we look to the totality of the 

representation to determine the effectiveness of counsel, indulging a strong 

presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance or trial strategy. See Robertson v. State, 187 S.W.3d 475, 

482–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Appellant has the burden to establish both prongs 

of the Strickland test by a preponderance of the evidence. Jackson v. State, 973 
33

S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). An appellant’s failure to satisfy one 

prong of the test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong. Williams v. 

State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Generally, a silent record that provides no explanation for counsel’s actions 

will not overcome the strong presumption of reasonable assistance. Goodspeed v. 

State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In rare cases in which trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness is apparent from the record, an appellate court may 

address and dispose of the claim on direct appeal. Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143.

However, the record must demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness as a matter of law and no reasonable trial 

strategy could justify trial counsel’s acts or omissions, regardless of counsel’s 

subjective reasoning. Id. 

Closing Argument

In her second and thirteenth issues, appellant argues that her trial counsel 

improperly failed to object to the State’s closing argument to the jury because the 

State “asked the jury to convict on a theory contrary to the law and the jury 

charge” and its argument “was outside the four general areas of jury argument.” 

In her second issue, appellant complains about the following portion of the 

State’s closing argument:

Now, intentionally and knowingly, there’s something a little different 

here that we didn’t have in voir dire. Intentionally and knowingly 
34

doesn’t go to her causing the actual injuries, right? Because she’s 

charged with omission. That mental state of intentionally and 

knowingly means that she intentionally and knowingly failed to get 

medical attention that the child needed. She intentionally and 

knowingly failed to protect that child, as opposed to recklessly. And 

so, that’s pretty obvious with the evidence, right?

Appellant asserts that “to properly convict [her],” the State had to prove that she 

“consciously and deliberately omitted performing some act, . . . knowing that ‘but 

for’ that omission, [the complainant’s] death was reasonably certain.” The State 

does not dispute this characterization of its burden. However, it responds that, 

taken in context, the complained-of argument was merely a botched effort to 

explain that it “was not required to prove that appellant caused the initial injuries to 

the complainant.” The State acknowledges that it was “required to prove that 

appellant caused additional serious bodily injury to the complainant by failing to 

seek medical attention . . . [or] by failing to protect the complainant.” And it notes 

that it, later in its closing argument, explained to the jury, “you have to agree 

overall that [appellant] caused serious bodily injury by omission.”

Here, although the State’s inartful explanation to the jury of a complex legal 

concept may not have been ideal, we cannot conclude that appellant’s trial 

counsel’s decision to not object to it was “so outrageous that no competent 

attorney” would have done the same. See Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392). Trial counsel 

could have reasonably concluded that it was unnecessary to object to the 
35

complained-of argument because the trial court had already properly instructed the 

jury on the subject, and counsel did not want to further confuse the jury. See 

Brown v. State, 482 S.W.3d 157, 164 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (trial 

counsel could have found it unnecessary to address misstatement by State in 

closing argument because “the trial court was going to instruct the jury on the 

proper standard of proof and/or because he did not want to further confuse the 

jury”); see also Helmke v. State, No. 04-12-00826-CR, 2013 WL 5570474, at *3 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op, not designated for 

publication) (assistance not ineffective where alleged misstatement of law by trial 

counsel was considered in context of other statements). 

Where a reviewing court can conceive of a potentially reasonable trial 

strategy that counsel could have been pursuing, it “simply cannot conclude that 

counsel has performed deficiently.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, in the absence of a record reflecting why 

appellant’s trial counsel did not object to the complained-of statements, and given 

the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable, professional assistance, we hold that appellant has failed to rebut the 

presumption that her trial counsel’s decision to not object was reasonable. See 

Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (appellate court 

may not conclude, based on speculation, counsel ineffective when record silent 
36

about why he made decisions at trial); see also Miles v. State, No. 

01-11-00401-CR, 2012 WL 2357449, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] June 

21, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“In the absence of a 

record reflecting why [defendant]’s counsel did not object, we hold that the record 

does not firmly establish deficient performance.”). 

In her thirteenth issue, appellant complains about the following portion of 

the State’s closing argument:

And as you’ve sat there this week, I know that many of you have 

thought, I wish [the complainant] had been older so she could run to 

[Parga-Lopez]’s apartment and say, [Parga-Lopez] my mommy’s 

hurting me. [Sharma], he’s hurting me, please help me. I know many 

of you have thought that. She could call her Aunt . . . and say, Please 

save me like you did [appellant’s two older children].

Proper jury argument generally must concern one of the following areas: 

(1) a summation of the evidence presented at trial, (2) a reasonable deduction 

drawn from that evidence, (3) an answer to opposing counsel’s argument, or (4) a 

plea for law enforcement. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1999); Acosta v. State, 411 S.W.3d 76, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, 

no pet.). 

Although appellant argues in her brief that because the complained-of 

statements “fell outside of the four areas of [permissible] jury argument,” her trial 

counsel should have objected to them, she provides no supporting argument or 

authorities, nor any analysis or explanation, to support her argument. See Tufele v. 
37

State, 130 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) 

(“Appellant has a duty to cite specific legal authority and to provide legal argument 

based upon that authority.”). 

An appellant’s “brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the 

contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX.

R. APP. P. 38.1(i). And an appellant waives an issue on appeal if she does not 

adequately brief that issue, i.e., by presenting supporting arguments and 

authorities. Id.; Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 

Accordingly, we hold that she has waived her complaint that her trial counsel 

provided her ineffective assistance by not objecting to the State’s closing argument 

as “outside the four general areas of jury argument.” See Lucio v. State, 351 

S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (point of error inadequately briefed 

“presents nothing for review”); Ruiz v. State, 293 S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2009, pet. ref’d) (complaint waived where defendant’s brief 

“contain[ed] no argument or authorities” to support contention that his counsel was 

ineffective); Tufele, 130 S.W.3d at 270–71 (ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

complaint waived for inadequate briefing); see also Castellanos v. State, No. 13-

04-023-CR, 2005 WL 1981519, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 18, 2005, 

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant waived 
38

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel complaint by “fail[ing] to make a clear and 

concise argument with appropriate citations” as required by rule 38.1).

We overrule appellant’s second and thirteenth issues.

“Extraneous Conduct” Evidence

In her third, ninth, and tenth issues, appellant asserts that her trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance regarding certain “extraneous conduct” evidence 

admitted at trial.15

In her third issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance in not filing a written request “to discover whether the State intended to 

use extraneous conduct [evidence] against [her]” at trial because it used such 

evidence to suggest that she was “a miserable mother of two other children.” And 

 

15 In discussing “extraneous conduct [evidence],” appellant directs us to the 

following evidence admitted at trial:

(1) appellant’s two older children went to live with, and were 

ultimately adopted by, appellant’s aunt; (2) appellant failed to appear 

in court in connection with her custody of her two older children, 

resulting in full custody being awarded to her aunt; (3) the 

complainant was exposed to methadone at birth; (4) appellant did 

not want the complainant; (5) appellant offered to give the 

complainant away; (6) Child Protective Services was involved in 

supervising appellant’s custody of the complainant; (7) appellant on 

occasions other than the date of the complainant’s death commonly 

went to Spec’s liquor store to purchase liquor within 15 minutes of 

10:00 a.m. opening time; (8) appellant came from a family with 

divorced parents; (9) none of appellant’s children share the same

father; (10) none of appellant’s children’s fathers were in the 

children’s lives; (11) appellant lived with Sharma, a married man; 

(12) appellant continued living with Sharma after the complainant’s 

death; and (13) appellant and Sharma lived off of appellant’s mother.
39

“[h]ad trial counsel filed a . . . request in an attempt to discover whether the State 

intended to use extraneous conduct [evidence] against [a]ppellant, the State would 

have been compelled to give notice” of such evidence.

The record is silent as to why appellant’s trial counsel did not file a written 

request “to discover whether the State intended to use extraneous conduct 

[evidence] against [her]” at trial. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593 (“An 

ineffective-assistance claim must be firmly founded in the record and the record 

must affirmatively demonstrate the meritorious nature of the claim.”) (internal 

quotations omitted)); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 835

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not built on 

retrospective speculation; they must be firmly founded in the record.”) (internal 

quotations omitted)). Therefore, we must presume that counsel was acting pursuant 

to a sound trial strategy. See Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833; see also Thompson v. State, 

9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (“There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”); Crocker v. State, 

441 S.W.3d 306, 315 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (“Because 

the record is silent concerning counsel’s reasons for not objecting, we must 

presume counsel had a valid strategy.”); Smith v. State, 84 S.W.3d 36, 42 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (“Without evidence of the strategy and methods 
40

involved concerning counsel’s actions at trial, the court will presume sound trial 

strategy.”).

Further, in general, a trial counsel’s failure to file pre-trial motions such as a 

request for notice of intent to introduce “extraneous conduct” evidence does not 

rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Autry v. State, 27 S.W.3d 

177, 182 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. ref’d) (trial counsel may have 

received oral notice from State and defendant “has not stated what steps he would 

have taken if he had received written notice of the State’s intent to introduce 

extraneous evidence”); see also Petty v. State, No. 01-01-00213-CR, 2001 WL 

1315028, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 25, 2001, pet. ref’d) (not 

designated for publication) (defendant did not meet burden of showing trial 

counsel’s deficient performance because he “did not show that the State did not 

provide oral notice. . . [which] would explain why defense counsel did not object”

(internal citations omitted)).

Accordingly, in the absence of a record reflecting why appellant’s trial 

counsel did not file a written request “to discover whether the State intended to use 

extraneous conduct [evidence] against [her]” at trial, and given the strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable, 

professional assistance, we hold that appellant has failed to rebut the presumption 

that her trial court’s decision was reasonable. See Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771 
41

(appellate court may not conclude, based on speculation, counsel ineffective when 

record silent about why he made decisions at trial); see also Miles, 2012 WL 

2357449, at *4 (“In the absence of a record reflecting why [defendant]’s counsel 

did not object, we hold that the record does not firmly establish deficient 

performance.”). 

In her ninth and tenth issues, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance in not objecting to or “request[ing] a limiting instruction,” 

pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 105(a), about certain “extraneous conduct” 

evidence because such evidence was inadmissible under Texas Rules of Evidence 

401, 402, 403, 404, and 405.

As previously noted, an appellant’s “brief must contain a clear and concise 

argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to 

the record.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Tufele, 130 S.W.3d at 271 

(“Appellant has a duty to cite specific legal authority and to provide legal argument 

based upon that authority.”). And an appellant waives an issue on appeal if she 

does not adequately brief that issue by presenting supporting arguments and 

authorities. Id.; Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393. 

Here, appellant has not made any attempt to demonstrate how the admission 

of the “extraneous conduct” evidence about which she complains violates the 

Texas Rules of Evidence, or how her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
42

by not objecting to such evidence or requesting a limiting instruction. 

Accordingly, we hold that she has waived her complaint that her trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance in not objecting to or “request[ing] a limiting 

instruction,” pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 105(a), about certain “extraneous 

conduct” evidence. See Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Ruiz, 293 S.W.3d at 693; 

Tufele, 130 S.W.3d at 270–71; see also Castellanos, 2005 WL 1981519, at *2.

We overrule appellant’s third, ninth and tenth issues.

Notice of Expert Witnesses 

In her fourth issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance in not “request[ing] notice of [the] expert witnesses” to be 

called by the State because “[o]ne purpose of requesting and receiving notice of

expert witnesses is to adequately prepare for cross-examination” and “[i]t [is] 

patently clear from the record that [trial] counsel . . . failed to accomplish any 

meaningful cross-examination of the State’s expert[]” witnesses. 

Here, we note that the State supplied appellant with its expert witness list 

well in advance of trial, making trial counsel’s decision not to request it of no 

consequence to the outcome of the trial. Thus, we cannot conclude that there is a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s purported error, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. See Fisher v. State, No. 09-11-00379-CR, 

2012 WL 5450828, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 7, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., 
43

not designated for publication) (defendant failed to show prejudice because 

“[r]egardless of the fact that trial counsel failed to make a motion, all of the State’s 

expert witnesses were timely designated” and defendant failed to allege how filing 

motion for timely designation of experts “reasonably could have changed the 

outcome of his case”); Arnolie v. State, No. 01-11-00348-CR, 2012 WL 1143591, 

at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] April 5, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (rejecting ineffective-assistance complaint based on 

failure to timely request notice of “other bad acts” because record indicated 

counsel received notice). Accordingly, we hold that appellant has not shown that 

she suffered prejudice because her counsel did not “request notice of [the] expert 

witnesses” to be called by the State. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 570 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999) (defendant’s failure to make any effort to prove prejudice from 

counsel’s allegedly deficient performance precluded relief on ineffective-assistance 

claim); Mitchell v. State, 989 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (defendant 

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must affirmatively prove prejudice from 

counsel’s deficient performance); see also Cox v. State, 389 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2012) (reviewing court need not consider both prongs of Strickland test 

and can dispose of ineffectiveness claim if defendant fails to demonstrate sufficient 

prejudice). 

We overrule appellant’s fourth issue. 
44

Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation

In her fifth and sixth issues, appellant asserts that her trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance regarding her Sixth Amendment right to confront forensic 

neuropathologist Dr. Glenn Sandberg.

In her fifth issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance in not objecting to the admission into evidence of Dr. Sandberg’s report, 

contained within State’s Exhibit 4, the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Wolf, 

because it “was inadmissible under (1) the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment . . . , (2) Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1345, 158 

L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and (3) Tex. R. Evid. 801(d).” 

The record is silent as to why appellant’s trial counsel did not object to the 

admission of Dr. Sandberg’s report into evidence. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 

593 (“An ineffective-assistance claim must be firmly founded in the record and the 

record must affirmatively demonstrate the meritorious nature of the claim.”) 

(internal quotations omitted)); Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 835 (“Ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims are not built on retrospective speculation; they must be firmly 

founded in the record.”) (internal quotations omitted)). Therefore, we must 

presume that counsel was acting pursuant to a sound trial strategy. See Bone, 77 

S.W.3d at 833; see also Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 (“There is a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 
45

professional assistance.”); Crocker, 441 S.W.3d at 315 (“Because the record is 

silent concerning counsel’s reasons for not objecting, we must presume counsel 

had a valid strategy.”); Smith, 84 S.W.3d at 42 (“Without evidence of the strategy 

and methods involved concerning counsel’s actions at trial, the court will presume 

sound trial strategy.”). As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in regard to the 

admission of a laboratory report, explained in Menefield, “[w]e [simply] do not 

know why counsel failed to raise a Confrontation Clause objection.” 363 S.W.3d at 

593. “[P]erhaps the State could (and with an objection would) have brought [the 

report’s author] to the courtroom to testify, and counsel realized that 

cross-examining [him] would not benefit his client.” Id.

Accordingly, in the absence of a record reflecting why appellant’s trial 

counsel did not object to the admission into evidence of Dr. Sandberg’s report, and 

given the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable, professional assistance, we hold that appellant has failed to rebut the 

presumption that her trial counsel’s decision not to object was reasonable. See

Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771 (appellate court may not conclude, based on 

speculation, counsel ineffective when record silent about why he made decisions at 

trial); see also Miles, 2012 WL 2357449, at *4 (“In the absence of a record 

reflecting why [defendant]’s counsel did not object, we hold that the record does 

not firmly establish deficient performance.”). 
46

In her sixth issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance in not “apply[ing] for a subpoena for the appearance of” Dr. Sandberg 

because it deprived her of her constitutional right of confrontation. Appellant’s 

brief includes only a single conclusory statement: “Should this Court find that Dr. 

Glenn Sandberg’s report was admissible, trial counsel failed to secure the 

attendance of Dr. Glenn Sandberg to enforce Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right 

to confrontation.” Because appellant offers no argument or authorities, nor any 

analysis or explanation, to support her assertion, we hold that she has waived her 

complaint that her trial counsel provided her with ineffective assistance in not 

“apply[ing] for a subpoena for the appearance of” Dr. Sandberg. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.1(i); Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393; see also Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; 

Ruiz, 293 S.W.3d at 693; Tufele, 130 S.W.3d at 270–71; see also Castellanos, 

2005 WL 1981519, at *2.

We overrule appellant’s fifth and sixth issues.

Jury Charge

In her seventh issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance in not objecting to the trial court’s charge to the jury and not 

“mak[ing] a request for the inclusion of an appropriate instruction on the issue of 

‘but for’ causation,” pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 6.04(a), because had 
47

counsel requested the “‘but for’ causation instruction,” the jury would have been 

prohibited from “convicting [appellant] on a theory that was contrary to the law.”

Assuming without deciding that appellant was entitled to the 

above-referenced instruction, she still must show that her trial counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when considering 

prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; 

Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. Here, the record is silent as to why appellant’s trial

counsel did not object to the trial court’s charge to the jury or why her trial counsel 

did not request the jury instruction to which she now contends she was entitled. 

See Henderson v. State, 29 S.W.3d 616, 624 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2000, pet. ref’d) (overruling defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim, where 

“[t]here [was] no evidence in the record as to why [his] trial counsel did not 

request an instruction on concurrent causation”); see also Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 

593 (“An ineffective-assistance claim must be firmly founded in the record and the 

record must affirmatively demonstrate the meritorious nature of the claim.”) 

(internal quotations omitted)); Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 835 (“Ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims are not built on retrospective speculation; they must be firmly 

founded in the record.”) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, we must 

presume that counsel was acting pursuant to a sound trial strategy. See Bone, 77 

S.W.3d at 833; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 (“There is a strong presumption that 
48

counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance.”); Crocker, 441 S.W.3d at 315 (“Because the record is silent 

concerning counsel’s reasons for not objecting, we must presume counsel had a 

valid strategy.”); Smith, 84 S.W.3d at 42 (“Without evidence of the strategy and 

methods involved concerning counsel’s actions at trial, the court will presume 

sound trial strategy.”). 

Accordingly, in the absence of a record reflecting why appellant’s trial 

counsel did not object to the trial court’s charge to the jury or “make a request for 

the inclusion of an appropriate instruction on the issue of ‘but for’ causation,” 

pursuant to Texas Penal Code section 6.04(a), and given the strong presumption 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable, professional 

assistance, we hold that appellant has failed to rebut the presumption that her trial 

counsel’s decision not to object or to request a certain instruction was reasonable. 

See Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771 (appellate court may not conclude, based on 

speculation, counsel ineffective when record silent about why he made decisions at 

trial); see also Miles, 2012 WL 2357449, at *4 (“In the absence of a record 

reflecting why [defendant]’s counsel did not object, we hold that the record does 

not firmly establish deficient performance.”). 

We overrule appellant’s seventh issue. 
49

Opinion Testimony 

In her eighth issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance in not objecting to Sergeant Hunter’s “opinion testimony” 

that she “cried ‘tears of guilt’ and acted like ‘a mother who did something to her 

child’” because Hunter “comment[ed] directly on the credibility and guilt of 

[a]ppellant.” 

The record is silent as to why appellant’s trial counsel did not object to 

Sergeant Hunter’s “opinion testimony.” See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143–44 

(defendant did not meet burden of proving ineffective assistance where record 

silent as to why trial counsel did not object to witness testimony); see also 

Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593 (“An ineffective-assistance claim must be firmly 

founded in the record and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the 

meritorious nature of the claim.”) (internal quotations omitted)); Bone, 77 S.W.3d 

at 835 (“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not built on retrospective 

speculation; they must be firmly founded in the record.”) (internal quotations 

omitted)). Therefore, we must presume that counsel was acting pursuant to a 

sound trial strategy. See Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813

(“There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range 

of reasonable professional assistance.”); Crocker, 441 S.W.3d at 315 (“Because the 
50

record is silent concerning counsel’s reasons for not objecting, we must presume 

counsel had a valid strategy.”); Smith, 84 S.W.3d at 42 (“Without evidence of the 

strategy and methods involved concerning counsel’s actions at trial, the court will 

presume sound trial strategy.”). 

Accordingly, in the absence of a record reflecting why appellant’s trial 

counsel did not object to Sergeant Hunter’s “opinion testimony” and given the 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable, professional assistance, we hold that appellant has failed to rebut the 

presumption that her trial court’s decision not to object was reasonable. See

Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771 (appellate court may not conclude, based on 

speculation, counsel ineffective when record silent about why he made decisions at 

trial); see also Miles, 2012 WL 2357449, at *4 (“In the absence of a record 

reflecting why [defendant]’s counsel did not object, we hold that the record does 

not firmly establish deficient performance.”). 

We overrule appellant’s eighth issue. 

Opening Statement 

In her eleventh issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance in not “giv[ing] an opening statement” to the jury because 

this case involved “an incredibly emotional trial” and counsel “fail[ed] to attempt 

to focus the jury on the facts applicable to the law.” 
51

In her brief, appellant summarily asserts that “[a]t the inception of this trial, 

trial counsel metaphorically and literally started on the bench. This conduct ‘fell 

below the objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional 

norms.’” She neither asserts, nor shows, that her trial counsel’s decision to not

make an opening statement, an entirely discretionary and inherently tactical 

decision, probably caused the jury to return a guilty verdict against her. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.01(b) (Vernon 2007) (opening statement optional); 

see also Jones v. State, No. 08-14-00122-CR, 2017 WL 3048575, at *6–8 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso July 19, 2017, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (failure to 

meet second Strickland prong where defendant did not show “a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of trial would have been different if [trial counsel] had 

made an opening statement”); Hernandez v. State, No. 04-01-00242-CR, 2002 WL 

31465802, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 6, 2002, no pet.) (not designated 

for publication) (defendant who did “not direct this court to anywhere in the record 

that indicates he was prejudiced by counsel’s decision not to make an opening 

statement,” not prejudiced by counsel’s actions); Hernandez v. State, No. 04-00-

00151-CR, 2000 WL 1727098, at *4 (Tex. App. San Antonio—Nov. 22, 2000, no 

pet.) (not designated for publication) (defendant “cannot demonstrate the prejudice 

required in the second prong of the Strickland test” because he “has not pointed out 

evidence in the record which shows how an opening statement could have caused 
52

the jury to return a not guilty verdict”); Calderon v. State, 950 S.W.2d 121, 127

(Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.) (“Few matters during a criminal trial could be 

more imbued with strategic implications than the exercise of th[e] option [to give 

an opening statement].”); Standerford v. State, 928 S.W.2d 688, 697 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1996, no pet.) (because giving opening statement provides State 

preview of defense strategy, decision to not make opening statement “valid tactical 

decision”). 

Accordingly, we hold that appellant has not shown that she suffered 

prejudice by her trial counsel’s decision not to make an opening statement. See 

Ladd, 3 S.W.3d at 570 (defendant’s failure to make any effort to prove prejudice 

from counsel’s allegedly deficient performance precluded relief on ineffective 

assistance claim); Mitchell, 989 S.W.2d at 748 (defendant claiming ineffective 

assistance of counsel must affirmatively prove prejudice from counsel’s deficient 

performance); see also Cox, 389 S.W.3d at 819 (reviewing court need not consider 

both prongs of Strickland test and can dispose of ineffectiveness claim if defendant 

fails to demonstrate sufficient prejudice).

We overrule appellant’s eleventh issue.

Directed Verdict

In her twelfth issue, appellant argues that her trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance in not moving for a directed verdict because “[t]he evidence 
53

in this case was legally insufficient” and “[h]ad trial counsel made a motion for a 

directed verdict, the trial court [w]ould have granted that motion.” Because 

appellant offers no argument or authorities, nor any analysis or explanation, to 

support her argument, we hold that she has waived her complaint that her trial 

counsel provided her with ineffective assistance of counsel by not moving for a 

directed verdict. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393; see also 

Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Ruiz, 293 S.W.3d at 693; Tufele, 130 S.W.3d at 

270–71; see also Castellanos, 2005 WL 1981519, at *2. Further, having held that 

the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support her conviction, we note that 

appellant would not have been entitled to a directed verdict. See Williams v. State, 

937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (challenge to trial court’s ruling on 

motion for directed verdict is challenge to sufficiency of evidence to support 

conviction, and is reviewed under same standard).

We overrule appellant’s twelfth issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Terry Jennings

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Brown.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).