Filed 7/17/23 Connell v. Connell CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

MAYA CONNELL,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AARON CONNELL, 

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Civ. No. B322982

(Super. Ct. No. 21FL00943)

(Santa Barbara County)

Appellant Aaron Connell appeals an ex parte order 

requiring supervision during visits with his son. The supervision 

requirements were initially imposed as part of a restraining order 

issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). 

(Fam. Code, §§ 6200, 6300.) We conclude the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion when it issued the order and affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Aaron and Maya1 divorced in 2018. Their two children 

lived with Maya but saw Aaron on occasion. Maya obtained a 

1 We use the first names of the parties for clarity, intending 

no disrespect.
2

domestic violence restraining order against Aaron in 2021 

following an incident between him and their 17-year-old daughter

(restraining order). The restraining order prohibited contact with 

his daughter and restricted him to monthly supervised visits with 

their nine-year-old son, A.C. It allowed unsupervised visits with 

A.C. to resume if, among other things, Aaron joined an alcohol 

monitoring program and documented his compliance.

Aaron demanded an unsupervised visit with A.C. in August 

of 2022. Maya requested ex parte orders keeping the original 

supervision requirements in effect. She expressed concern about 

Aaron’s mental health and requested the court order him to 

provide a verifiable physical address before allowing 

unsupervised visits with A.C. Maya further alleged Aaron had 

not completed his 30-day alcohol monitoring program. 

Maya and her counsel appeared at the ex parte hearing 

remotely via Zoom. The trial court granted her requests and 

issued an “Order After Ex Parte Application for Supervised 

Visitation” (ex parte order). It confirmed the original restraining 

order remained “in full force and effect.” Aaron received notice of 

the hearing but did not attend in person or remotely. He 

appealed the order.2

2 The DVPA contains no section governing appeals of 

domestic violence restraining orders. However, we treat the 

restraining order and ex parte order as a final judgment and 

order following judgment, respectively, for the purposes of 

appealability. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1) & (2); see, 

e.g., Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1378

[custody order entered after contested hearing was a final 

judgment because it decided the issues raised in the complaint; 

later order denying request to modify appealable as an order 

made after judgment].)
3

DISCUSSION

Aaron states he is homeless. He challenges the 

constitutionality of an order conditioning his unsupervised 

visitation with A.C. on providing a verifiable physical address. 

He also contends the trial court excluded him from the ex parte

hearing by failing to provide him with “appropriate 

accommodations” for his cognitive disabilities. We find nothing 

in the record showing Aaron raised these issues below. He did 

not oppose Maya’s application despite receiving notice. New 

theories on appeal are generally forfeited. (See D.Z. v. L.B.

(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 625, 632 [“California courts recognize that 

claims alleging violations of due process rights can be forfeited by 

failing to raise them in the trial court”].) The court may, in its 

discretion, hear new legal arguments “‘determinable from facts 

which not only are uncontroverted in the record, but which could 

not be altered by the presentation of additional evidence.’” (In re 

Marriage of Priem (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 505, 510-511.) These 

conditions are not present. We dispose of the arguments on this 

basis but would also reject them on the merits.

Aaron contends the order’s physical address requirement 

criminalizes his homelessness. He likens it to the anti-camping 

ordinance struck down in Martin v. City of Boise (9th Cir. 2019) 

920 F.3d 584. The argument does not persuade us. DVPA 

confers on the trial court “a discretion designed to be exercised 

liberally, at least more liberally than a trial court’s discretion to 

restrain civil harassment generally.” (Nakamura v. Parker

(2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 334.) We review the granting or 

renewing of a domestic violence restraining order for the abuse of 

discretion. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 

1483, 1495; Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420.) 

“To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s 

factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of 
4

review.” (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505.)

We find no abuse of discretion. Requiring a restrained party to 

provide a verifiable address before visiting with a minor 

protected party was a reasonable condition under the 

circumstances. Maya offered unrebutted evidence of Aaron’s

ongoing struggles with alcoholism and his mental health. 

The analogy to Martin v. City of Boise, supra, 920 F.3d 584,

is factually tenuous as well. Aaron’s inability to provide a 

verifiable physical address appears to be a consequence of living

“off the grid” in the Trinity County wilderness. He implies his 

exile is forced, like the plaintiffs in Martin whose poverty drove 

them to sleep on city sidewalks. Aaron makes no such showing. 

Aaron states the trial court failed to accommodate his 

disabilities, which include major depressive disorder, impaired 

executive functioning, and cognitive impairment. He does not 

explain how the court failed to accommodate him. Nor does he 

explain why he could not appear remotely (as did Maya and her 

counsel) or oppose the order in writing.

3

Lastly, any error was harmless. Aaron asserts he “fulfilled 

all of the [restraining order’s] requirements and should have had

unsupervised visits with [A.C].” We find no evidence of his 

compliance in the record. The attestations and exhibits 

submitted with Maya’s ex parte application provide substantial 

evidence to support a contrary finding. This means the 

supervision requirements would have remained in effect 

regardless of whether Aaron provided a verifiable physical 

3 The record confirms Aaron has used the trial court’s 

electronic case filing system to submit documents on his own 

behalf before and after this date, including a request to find 

Maya in contempt of court only two days before the ex parte 

hearing. 
5

address or appeared at the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 475; see 

Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 570 [trial 

court error harmless if “it is not reasonably probable defendant 

would have obtained a more favorable result in its absence”].)

DISPOSITION

The ex parte order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover 

her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

BALTODANO, J. 
6

Stephen Foley, Commissioner

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Aaron Connell, in pro per, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Maya Connell, in pro per, for Plaintiff and Respondent.