RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2023

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2022-SC-0350-WC

DANIEL FARLEY APPELLANT 

V. 

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS

NO. 2022-CA-0332

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION NO. WC-17-83257

P&P CONSTRUCTION, INC; AIR EVAC 

LIFETEAM; ARH DANIEL BOONE 

CLINIC HARLAN; BRAD FINE; GRAM 

RESOURCES, INC.; HARLAN ARH; 

LEXINGTON FOOT AND ANKLE 

CENTER, INC.; HONORABLE PETER 

GREG NAAKE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 

JUDGE; AND WORKERS’

COMPENSATION BOARD 

APPELLEES 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE THOMPSON

AFFIRMING

This appeal concerns whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that 

P&P Construction Inc. (P&P), and by extension its insurer Kentucky Employers 

Mutual Insurance (KEMI), was not responsible for payment of medical billing 

statements submitted outside of the 45-day period set forth in Kentucky 

Revised Statute (KRS) 342.020(4).

1 That opinion reversed the opinion of the 

1 The statutory language at issue in KRS 342.020 was contained in subsection 

(1) at the time of Farley’s injury; however, as of July 13, 2018, this subsection was 

renumbered as subsection (4). To avoid confusion, we will consistently refer to it by its 

current designation, KRS 342.020(4).
2

Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board) affirming the Administrative Law

Judge’s (ALJ) determination that medical providers did not have to submit their 

billings until after a determination of liability. Farley now appeals to this Court 

as a matter of right. See Vessels v. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 793 S.W.2d

795, 798 (Ky. 1990); Ky. Const, § 115

In accord with published precedent, employers and their insurance 

carriers are not responsible for the payment of medicals—that have been 

contested and/or which have not yet (pre-award) been adjudged to be workrelated or medically necessary—until such time as a determination of necessity 

or liability has rendered. 

However, medical providers have no such right to delay tendering their

billings. We agree with the Court of Appeals that pursuant to the unambiguous 

language of KRS 342.020(4), medical providers are required to submit their 

billings within 45-days of service, regardless of whether a determination of 

liability has been made, and employers and their insurance carriers are not 

responsible for payment of billings submitted to them after the 45-day period. 

The statute is unambiguous. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 8, 2017, Daniel Farley was injured while working as a section 

foreman for P&P when an air hose for a mine pump exploded causing a 

segmental left tibial shaft fracture and fibula fracture to his left leg. Farley 

underwent three surgeries to repair these fractures.
3

Farley’s injury was indisputably work-related and KEMI, P&P’s worker’s 

compensation carrier, accepted the claim and began paying temporary total 

disability (TTD) benefits and—with certain exceptions—paying Farley’s medical 

expenses. 

In 2018 Farley sought treatment at ARH Daniel Boone Clinic (ARH) for 

“post-traumatic stress disorder and mood disorder.” He saw a clinician at ARH 

on five occasions in 2018 (January 3rd, March 1st, May 1st, July 10th, and 

October 10th). The record shows billings for $123.00 per appointment for a 

total of $615.00. KEMI did not receive a billing for any of these appointments

prior to December 12, 2018. Since each of the billings were for services 

rendered more than 45 days earlier, KEMI rejected them pursuant to KRS 

342.020(4) which states, “The provider of medical services shall submit the 

statement for services within forty-five (45) days of the day treatment is 

initiated and every forty-five (45) days thereafter, if appropriate, as long as 

medical services are rendered.”

KEMI also rejected billings totaling $128.00 from Harlan ARH 

Hospital/Gram Resources (Gram Resources) for imaging services performed on 

May 8, 2017, which were not received by KEMI until September 6, 2018. 

In February 2019, Farley filed his initial workers’ compensation claim 

alleging entitlement to benefits for injuries to his left leg, left hip and his lower 

back. The next day Farley filed a second claim asserting entitlement to benefits 

for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) resulting from the accident. By that 

time, KEMI had paid Farley $71,390.16 in TTD and had paid an additional 
4

$107,681.50 for Farley’s medical expenses. Later that year, on October 28, 

2019, Farley filed a third claim for “psychological overlay.” 

The parties ultimately negotiated a settlement on August 31, 2020, 

which was formally approved by the ALJ on September 1, 2020. The settlement 

with P&P and KEMI provided a lump sum payment of $125,000.00 to Farley 

with P&P and KEMI only “remain[ing] liable for reasonable, necessary & workrelated medical expenses causally related to the left leg injury.” Farley waived 

all claims for psychological injury or related expenses and agreed that “any 

provider of medical services is required to submit a statement for services 

within forty-five (45) days of the day treatment is initiated and neither the 

employer nor its carrier are liability [sic] for untimely medical billing under the 

[Workers’ Compensation] Act and regulations.” 

On August 31, 2020, the ALJ also issued a conference order which 

recognized the remaining issue of unpaid and contested medical expenses

which stated “[P&P] shall file the contested bills on or before the date of 

Hearing.” At that time, the only two bills that KEMI had submitted to the ALJ 

for consideration were one regarding Farley being airlifted and another

regarding a future proposed surgery, neither of which is a subject of this 

appeal.

On September 14, 2020, KEMI filed a written motion to amend its Form 

112 Medical Fee Dispute filing and to join ARH and Gram Resources, noting 

that their billings had been previously denied by KEMI as being untimely 
5

pursuant to KRS 342.020(4). Farley did not object to this amendment or the 

joinder of ARH and Gram Resources. 

On November 13, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision determining that the 

45-day rule in KRS 342.020(4) did not apply until after an award is made in 

the claim (i.e. the September 1, 2020 settlement), stating:

The Defendant disputes treatment billing based on late submission 

of the medical billing based on KRS 342.020[(4)], which requires 

medical service providers to submit medical expenses to the 

employer, insurer, or medical payment obligor within 45 days after 

treatment is initiated. The Workers’ Compensation Board has

consistently held on a number of occasions the 45 day rule for 

submission of statements for services in KRS 342.020[(4)] has no 

application in a pre-award situation. The Kentucky Supreme Court 

in R.J. Corman Railroad Construction v. Haddix, 864 S.W.2d 915, 

918 (Ky. 1993) pointed out that the requirement in KRS 

342.020[(4)] for the payment of bills within 30 days receipt of the 

statement for services “applies to medical statements received by 

an employer after an ALJ has determined that said bills are owed 

by the employer.” 

. . . .

The Administrative Law Judge finds that the 45 day rule cited by 

the Defendant as a bar to its responsibility to pay for the medical 

treatment of an injured employee is inapplicable prior to the entry of 

an award or agreement which establishes that a work-related 

injury has occurred. 

(Emphasis added). 

Notably here, no party disputed that Farley had suffered a work-related 

injury and P&P had already paid, and never objected to paying, the vast 

majority of Farley’s incurred medical bills prior to the settlement. 

P&P appealed the ALJ’s determination to the Board, but the appeal was 

held in abeyance while the case of Wonderfoil, Inc. v. Russell, 630 S.W.3d 706 

(Ky. 2021), was pending before this Court. After our opinion in Wonderfoil
6

became final in October 2021, P&P pointed out to the Board that this Court 

had not addressed whether KRS 342.020(4) applied to medical providers preaward, but rather discussed two administrative regulations concerning the 

time for claiming expenses and the filing of unpaid medical bills by claimants, 

not providers. 

On February 25, 2022, the Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the 

ALJ’s decision adding: 

We held in Brown Pallet v. David Jones, Claim No. 2003-69633 

(entered September 20, 2007) the reasoning of the Supreme Court 

in R.J. Corman Railroad Construction v. Haddix, [864 S.W.2d 915 

(Ky. 1993)] concerning the thirty-day provision for payment of 

medical benefits should also apply to the forty-five day rule for 

submission of medical bills. The Court in R.J. Corman stated, 

“until an award has been rendered, the employer is under no 

obligation to pay any compensation, and all issues, including 

medical benefits, are justiciable.

. . . . 

Contrary to P&P's arguments, we find the rationale contained in 

R.J. Corman Railroad Construction v. Haddix, supra, is applicable. 

We additionally find instructional the recent holding by the 

Kentucky Supreme Court in Wonderfoil, supra. There the Court 

held the sixty-day submission requirement for injured workers 

only applied post-award, or a determination of compensability by 

an ALJ, stating specifically, “Accordingly, when viewed in the 

context of the regulatory scheme, 803 KAR 25:096, § 11’s

application only post-award best effectuates the intent of the 

Commissioner and prevents an absurd result.” By extension, we 

find the forty-five-day requirement set forth in KRS 342.020(4) 

likewise is applicable only after a determination of compensability 

of a claim by an ALJ. 

P&P appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals arguing that the ALJ and 

Board had incorrectly ruled that the 45-day rule for submission of billings by 

medical providers only applies post-award and that the holdings in R.J. Corman
7

and Wonderfoil, supra, were not applicable to the statutory duties of the 

medical providers.

The Court of Appeals agreed with P&P writing:

[W]e hold that the Board misconstrued the controlling statute and 

precedent and therefore erred as a matter of law in holding that 

the 45-day requirement for providers to submit billing statements 

applied only post-award. The plain and mandatory language of the 

statute does not contain anything that limits the application of the 

45-day rule to post-award situations. Therefore, we hold that this 

requirement applies both pre- and post-award. In addition, this 

interpretation of KRS 342.020(4) will not harm the claimant, as 

“[t]he medical provider shall not bill a patient for services which 

have been denied by the payment obligor for failure to submit bills 

following treatment within forty-five (45) days as required by KRS 

342.020 and Section 6 of this administrative regulation.” 803 KAR 

25:096 § 10(3).

P&P Construction, Inc. v. Farley, 2022-CA-0332-WC, 2022 WL 2898502, at *6 

(Ky. App. July 22, 2022) (unpublished). 

The matter now stands before this Court following Farley’s appeal. 

Farley argues that that KRS 342.020 should be read to extend the 45-day 

deadline for submission of bills until after an award because (i) precedent 

supports this interpretation, (ii) this Court had “tacitly approved” of the Board's 

ruling in its Wonderfoil decision, and (iii) the Legislature would have amended 

KRS 342.020 if it had disagreed with the Board’s long-standing posture on the 

question. 

II. ANALYSIS

“Review by this Court of workers’ compensation cases is is de novo.” Ford

Motor Co. v. Jobe, 544 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Ky. 2018).
8

Whether the 45-day rule for providers to submit statements for services 

set forth in KRS 342.020(4) (previously found in KRS 342.020(1)) only applies 

post-award is a question of statutory interpretation.

In construing a statute, it is fundamental that our primary objective is to 

determine the legislature’s intent in enacting the legislation. “To determine 

legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving the words 

their plain and ordinary meaning.” Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty.

Metro Gov’t, 260 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Ky. 2008). Further, we interpret a “statute 

only as written, and the intent of the Legislature must be deduced from the 

language it used, when it is plain and unambiguous . . . .” W. Ky. Coal Co. v.

Nall & Bailey, 14 S.W.2d 400, 401-02 (1929). When a statute is unambiguous, 

we need not consider extrinsic evidence of legislative intent and public policy. 

Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. S. Pac. Co., 9 S.W.2d 984, 986 (1928).

The relevant text of KRS 342.020(4) states: 

The employer, insurer, or payment obligor acting on behalf of the 

employer, shall make all payments for services rendered to an 

employee directly to the provider of the services within thirty (30) 

days of receipt of a statement for services. The commissioner shall 

promulgate administrative regulations establishing conditions 

under which the thirty (30) day period for payment may be tolled. 

The provider of medical services shall submit the statement for 

services within forty-five (45) days of the day treatment is initiated 

and every forty-five (45) days thereafter, if appropriate, as long as 

medical services are rendered. 

There are two distinct time restrictions set forth in this statute. The first 

applies to employers and insurers, such as P&P and KEMI, who must pay 

medical providers within thirty days of receiving the provider’s billings. This 
9

first deadline has been the specific subject of published caselaw while the 

second deadline applying to medical providers has only been discussed in 

adjunct. 

The time restriction, which concerns us here, is unambiguous and 

requires a provider to submit billing statements within 45 days after treatment 

has been provided. The mandate to providers is unmistakable in its clarity. The

plain and forthright language of the statute affords no other construction but 

that the provider “shall” submit the statement for services within forty-five days 

of the day treatment. “In common or ordinary parlance, and in its ordinary 

signification, the term ‘shall’ is a word of command and . . . must be given a 

compulsory meaning.” Black's Law Dictionary 1233 (5th ed.1979). “Shall means 

shall.” Vandertoll v. Commonwealth, 110 S.W.3d 789, 795–96 (Ky. 2003).

No language in the statute limits the application of this 45-day rule to a 

period of time post-award. Rather, the date of treatment is the determinative 

factor and is this date that triggers the start of the 45-day period for a provider 

to submit its billing to the employer or insurer. In holding that a provider has 

45 days from the date of an award to deliver its billings to an employer, the 

Board has impermissibly rewritten an unambiguous statutory provision. With 

that being said, the Board asserted reliance on precedent for its determination 

which we will next examine. 

In R.J. Corman, 864 S.W.2d at 915, the billings at issue were submitted 

to the employer between two and six months before an award was entered. The 

employer believed that the proper time to challenge payment was at the hearing 
10

before the ALJ. However, that hearing was more than thirty days after the bills 

had been received. The Board determined the employer should have challenged 

payment by motion prior to the expiration of thirty days, which would also have 

been prior to the hearing before the ALJ and thus before an award of medical 

benefits had ever been made. We reversed and determined that the 

requirement of KRS 342.020 for employers to make payment for medical bills 

within thirty days of receipt only “applies to medical statements received by an 

employer after an ALJ has determined that said bills are owed by the employer

(emphasis added).” Id. 918. That was, and remains, an entirely logical 

conclusion. An employer should not be compelled to make payments on behalf 

of an employee when his or her entitlement to benefits is contested or 

otherwise still at issue requiring adjudication. 

We made our determination because “[t]he amendment to KRS 

342.020(1) requiring the payment of medical benefits in 30 days is clearly 

intended to hasten payment of those medical bills that the employer is 

obligated to pay” and that “[u]ntil an award has been rendered, the employer is 

under no obligation to pay any compensation, and all issues, including medical 

benefits, are justiciable.” Id. at 918.

Simply put, when an employer properly contests an employee’s right to 

compensation, the employer cannot be expected to pay medical claims before 

an ALJ determines it is liable. Strict enforcement of the 30-day payment rule 

against an employer, prior to an award being determined, would violate due 

process. In R.J. Corman, this Court addressed the portion of the statute 
11

requiring an employer to pay medical benefits, not the second part requiring a 

provider to submit these billing statements within 45 days of the of treatment 

which is a wholly different circumstance.

Subsequently, the Board made a determination in Brown Pallet. In that 

case, the Board extended this Court’s ruling in R.J. Corman to include the 

portion of KRS 342.020(4) that requires a medical provider to submit 

statements for services within forty-five days of the day treatment is provided. 

The Board decided “the requirement that the provider submit statements for 

services within forty-five days of treatment would also apply post-award and 

not during the pendency of a claim.” Brown Pallet, Claim No. 2003-69633. That 

particular Board determination was not appealed and is of no precedential 

value to this Court. However, the Board relied upon its decision in Brown Pallet

to justify its decision in the case now before us. 

To the extent that Farley argues that the legislature’s failure to amend 

KRS 342.020 denotes approval of this interpretation of the statute, we stated in 

Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 560 (Ky. 2011), that

“legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean, and a poor beacon to 

follow in construing a statute.” We believe this observation to be even more apt 

when it comes to instances of administrative bodies (mis)construing a statute,

in a way it has never before been, within an unpublished administrative 

decision. 

Next, in Wonderfoil, 630 S.W.3d at 706, the employer admitted that the 

employee’s injury was compensable; however, it argued that the ALJ should 
12

not order it to compensate the employee for past medical expenses that the 

employee (not a medical service provider as is the case here) had not submitted 

in accordance with 803 KAR 25:096 § 11(2).

2 The ALJ agreed with Wonderfoil

but the Board reversed holding that the submission requirements apply only 

after an interlocutory decision or final award has been entered by the ALJ. We 

affirmed the Board’s determination after first examining 803 KAR 25:096 §

11(2)’s requirement that “[e]xpenses incurred by an employee for access to 

compensable medical treatment . . . shall be submitted to the employer or its 

medical payment obligor within sixty (60) days of incurring of the expense”

utilizing a specific form within the claims process and determining that the 

regulation was ambiguous because it was impossible to tell from the context 

whether it “applies only post-award, during litigation but pre-award, or even 

before the potential claimant files his claim.” Wonderfoil, 630 S.W.3d at 710. 

Only subsequent to the initial determination of ambiguity, did we then 

examine the regulation in the context of the broader scheme established by the 

Department of Workers’ Compensation’s administrative regulations. In so 

doing, this Court noted that other regulations required an employee to disclose 

2 This regulation provides: 

Expenses incurred by an employee for access to compensable medical 

treatment for a work injury or occupational disease, including reasonable 

travel expenses, out-of-pocket payment for prescription medication, and 

similar items shall be submitted to the employer or its medical payment 

obligor within sixty (60) days of incurring of the expense. A request for 

payment shall be made on a Form 114.

803 KAR 25:096 § 11(2) (emphasis added).
13

and submit unpaid medical expenses prior to final adjudication by the ALJ and 

stated that “[o]ur interpretation of 803 KAR 25:096, § 11(2) is a natural and 

logical extension of R.J. Corman and Brown Pallet, despite Brown Pallet’s lack 

of precedential value to this Court.” Id. at 712.

We concluded:

[O]ur interpretation does not offend due process by creating unfair 

surprise to employers, despite arguments made otherwise to this 

Court. Even under our interpretation of 803 KAR 25:096, § 11(2), a 

claimant is still required to submit medical expenses they wish to 

have paid pursuant to 803 KAR 25:010, §§ 7 and 13. Those 

medical expenses must be included in the claimant's notice of 

disclosure that must be filed within forty-five days of the issuance 

of the Notice of Filing of Application. 803 KAR 25:010, § 7(2)(e)7. 

The claimant is then under a continuing obligation to turn over 

new medical expenses within ten days of receiving those expenses 

pursuant to 803 KAR 25:010, § 7(2)(f). Further, a claimant is 

required to bring copies of unpaid medical bills and expenses to 

the benefit review conference. 803 KAR 25:010, § 13(9)(a). If he or 

she fails to do so and does not show good cause, such failure “may 

constitute a waiver to claim payment for those bills.” Id. These 

requirements prevent employers from being unfairly surprised by 

requested medical expenses and provide a mechanism by which 

claimants may be penalized for failure to comply.

Id. at 713.

Therefore, in Wonderfoil we only addressed the time limits for employees

to submit medical bills to the employer for repayment as set forth in 803 KAR

25:096 § 11(2). Neither that regulation, nor this Court, addressed the statutory 

language of KRS 342.020(4) requiring medical service providers to submit 

billing statements within 45 days of service.

Neither R.J. Corman nor Wonderfoil provides support for the Board’s 

ruling that the 45-day requirement for a provider to submit medical billing 
14

statements only applies post-award. Accordingly, we agree with the decision of 

the Court of Appeals that the Board misconstrued the controlling statute and 

precedent and therefore erred as a matter of law in holding that the 45-day 

requirement for providers to submit billing statements applied only post-award. 

To permit some, if not all, medical providers to withhold their billings for 

indefinite periods of time from consideration and payment by the employer, its 

insurer, the ALJ, and even their patients, would upend the statutory and 

regulatory framework of our workers’ compensation adjudicatory process, the 

billing processes for providers, and the adjustment processes for obligors. Such 

delays are contrary to the fundamental purposes of the Workers’ Compensation 

Act, one of which is the prompt resolution of workers’ compensation claims. 

See Searcy v. Three Point Coal Co., 280 Ky. 683, 134 S.W.2d 228 (1939). Such 

indefinite delays, if allowed, would also undermine the ability of obligors and 

claimants to effectively assess, and then fairly settle, their claims in a timely 

and cost-effective manner as occurred in this case. 

Arguments by either the Board or providers regarding the narrow 

timeframe of the 45-day window for the submission of medical billings must be 

made to the legislature as its province is to draft and, if necessary, amend our 

Commonwealth’s statutes. This Court interprets our statutes, it cannot rewrite 

them. As stated in University of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 648 

(Ky. 2017):

We hold fast to the rule of construction that the plain meaning of 

the statutory language is presumed to be what the legislature 

intended, and if the meaning is plain, then the court cannot base 

its interpretation on any other method or source. In other words, 
15

we assume that the Legislature meant exactly what it said, and 

said exactly what it meant.

(internal alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted).

KRS 342.020(4) is unambiguous, and its plain language does not contain 

anything that limits the application of the 45-day rule to after an award 

determination has been made. 

This opinion however does not address the applicability or potential 

implementation of 803 KAR 25:096 § 6 which states, “Tender of Statement for 

Services. If the medical services provider fails to submit a statement for 

services as required by KRS 342.020(4) without reasonable grounds, the 

medical bills shall not be compensable.” (Emphasis added). 

In this matter, neither ARH nor Gram Resources appeared or submitted 

any responses to the ALJ, the Board, the Court of Appeals or this Court despite 

being served. The record contains no grounds whatsoever for their delays in 

transmitting billings to the P&P or KEMI. 

Lastly, we note, as did the Court of Appeals, that this interpretation of 

KRS 342.020(4) will not harm Farley as “[t]he medical provider shall not bill a 

patient for services which have been denied by the payment obligor for failure 

to submit bills following treatment within forty-five (45) days as required by 

KRS 342.020 and Section 6 of this administrative regulation.” 803 KAR 25:096 

§ 10(3).
16

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, we conclude that the requirements of KRS 342.020(4) 

clearly mandate that medical service providers submit their billings within 45 

days of treatment and such requirement applies both pre- and post-award. 

We affirm the Court of Appeals decision which reversed the opinion of the 

Workers’ Compensation Board affirming the decision of the ALJ who had 

determined that P&P was responsible for payment of the billing statements 

submitted outside of the 45-day period.

This matter is remanded with directions that the Board reverse the ALJ's 

decision as to the billing statements submitted by ARH and Gram Resources

because they were submitted outside of the 45-day period.

All sitting. All concur. 
17

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Jeffery A. Roberts

Roberts Law Office 

Edmond Collett 

Edmond Collett, PSC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

W. Barry Lewis

Lewis and Lewis Law Offices

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: 

Hon. Peter Greg Naake

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD: 

Michael Wayne Alvey

Chairman 

AMICUS CURIAE COUNSEL FOR 

KENTUCKY WORKERS ASSOCIATION:

Eric M. Lamb