PRESENT: All the Justices 

VIKING ENTERPRISE, INC. 

v. Record No. 080215 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 

 January 16, 2009 

COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Herbert C. Gill, Judge 

Viking Enterprise, Inc., (Viking) and the County of 

Chesterfield (the County) entered into a contract covered by the 

Virginia Public Procurement Act, Code §§ 2.2-4300 through -4377 

(the Procurement Act).1 Viking filed an appeal within the sixmonth period required by Code § 2.2-4363(E) from the County’s 

disallowance of a monetary claim arising out of the contract. 

The sole issue on appeal is whether Viking also had to comply 

with the provisions of Code § 15.2-1246 requiring written notice 

of the appeal to be served on the clerk of the County’s 

governing body and execution of a bond. Because we conclude 

that the statutory provisions at issue are not in conflict and 

can be read together, we hold that the circuit court did not err 

in dismissing Viking’s complaint for failure to fulfill the 

requirements of Code § 15.2-1246. 

 1

 For purposes of this opinion, we assume the Procurement 

Act applies to the contract between Viking and the County. The 

County, however, argues that it enacted an ordinance opting out 

of the Procurement Act in accordance with Code § 2.2-

4343(A)(10), and therefore the Procurement Act does not apply. 

Because we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court on 
Viking entered into a written contract with the County for 

the construction of a fire station. During the performance of 

the contract, the County insisted that Viking remove and replace 

the entire concrete floor in the apparatus bay area of the 

station. Viking contended that replacement of the concrete was 

unnecessary and the floor’s problem could be repaired without 

re-pouring concrete. Nevertheless, Viking caused its 

subcontractor to remove and replace the entire concrete floor in 

the apparatus bay area. Viking then submitted a claim to the 

County in the amount of $86,531 for the additional work 

performed and materials furnished. The County’s board of 

supervisors denied the claim at its July 25, 2007 meeting. The 

clerk of the County’s board of supervisors gave Viking written 

notice of the denial in a letter dated August 2, 2005. 

Viking filed a complaint in the circuit court on January 

27, 2006. Viking non-suited its action and refiled its 

complaint on February 13, 2007, seeking a judgment against the 

County in the amount of $86,531. In response, the County filed 

a demurrer and motion to dismiss, asserting that Viking had 

failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Code 

§ 15.2-1246 governing the appeal of a monetary claim against a 

county. The County argued that Viking failed to state a claim 

 

other grounds, we will not address this argument nor decide 

whether the County properly preserved it for appeal. 

2
for relief and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over 

Viking’s claim. 

Before the circuit court, Viking acknowledged it did not 

serve written notice of its appeal on the clerk of the County’s 

governing body and did not execute a bond to the County, as 

required by Code § 15.2-1246. Viking, however, asserted it had 

timely filed its complaint and otherwise complied with the 

requirements of the Procurement Act, specifically Code §§ 2.2-

4363(E) and -4364(E), for appealing the County’s denial of its 

claim. Viking argued the provisions of the Procurement Act 

“superseded” the requirements of Code § 15.2-1246 because the 

statutes are in conflict and the Procurement Act, which is more 

specific, is controlling. Thus, according to Viking, it did not 

need to comply with the notice and bond requirements of Code 

§ 15.2-1246. 

The circuit court sustained the County’s demurrer and 

motion to dismiss. In a letter opinion incorporated into its 

final order, the court concluded “that while [Code] § 2.2-4363 

applies to how claims are initially presented to the public 

body, it does not direct how suits against the County are to be 

brought.” The court further stated: 

[Code §] 2.2-4363(E) directs that legal actions are to 

be instituted as provided in [Code §] 2.2-4364. [Code 

§] 2.2-4364 merely provides that such actions are to 

be brought in [the] proper circuit court. The circuit 

court, however, must have jurisdiction. The [c]ourt 

3
rules it cannot exercise jurisdiction for [Viking’s] 

failure to comply with [Code §] 15.2-1246: neither the 

time nor bond requirements have been met. 

Thus, the court dismissed Viking’s complaint with prejudice. 

Viking appeals from the circuit court’s judgment. 

The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred 

by dismissing Viking’s complaint because it failed to comply 

with the requirements of Code § 15.2-1246. The provisions of 

Code § 15.2-1246 set out the procedures for an appeal from a 

decision by a county’s governing body disallowing a monetary 

claim against the county. See Nuckols v. Moore, 234 Va. 478, 

482, 362 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1987) (holding that the procedural 

requirements of former Code §§ 15.1-550 through -554, now Code 

§§ 15.2-1245 through -1248, are applicable only to monetary 

claims against a county).2 The statute, in its entirety, states: 

When a claim of any person against a county is 

disallowed in whole or in part by the governing body, 

if such person is present, he may appeal from the 

decision of the governing body within thirty days from 

the date of the decision. If the claimant is not 

present, the clerk of the governing body shall serve a 

written notice of the disallowance on him or his 

agent, and he may appeal from the decision within 

thirty days after service of such notice. In no case 

shall the appeal be taken after the lapse of six 

months from the date of the decision. The appeal shall 

be filed with the circuit court for the county. No 

 2

 The General Assembly enacted legislation in 1997 to create 

Title 15.2 and repeal Title 15.1, “revising and recodifying laws 

pertaining to counties, cities and towns of Virginia.” 1997 

Acts ch. 587. The General Assembly, however, made no 

substantive changes to the sections of the Code at issue in this 

case.

4
appeal shall be allowed unless the amount disallowed 

exceeds ten dollars. The disallowance may be appealed 

by serving written notice on the clerk of the 

governing body and executing a bond to the county, 

with sufficient surety to be approved by the clerk of 

the governing body, with condition for the faithful 

prosecution of such appeal, and the payment of all 

costs imposed on the appellant by the court. 

Code § 15.2-1246 (emphasis added). 

In contrast, the Procurement Act, in particular Code § 2.2-

4363, establishes certain procedures for handling claims arising 

out of public procurement contracts. As relevant to the issue 

before us, Code § 2.2-4363(E) states: 

The decision of the public body shall be final 

and conclusive unless the contractor appeals within 

six months of the date of the final decision on the 

claim by the public body by invoking administrative 

procedures meeting the standards of § 2.2-4365, if 

available, or in the alternative by instituting legal 

action as provided in § 2.2-4364. 

Pursuant to Code § 2.2-4364(E), “[a] contractor may bring an 

action involving a contract dispute with a public body in the 

appropriate circuit court.” 

Viking asserts it complied with the requirements of Code 

§§ 2.2-4363(E) and -4364(E) by filing its complaint in the 

circuit court within six months after the County’s board of 

supervisors denied its claim and the circuit court, therefore, 

had jurisdiction to decide the claim on its merits. Viking 

argues here, as it did in the circuit court, that it needed only 

to comply with requirements of the Procurement Act in order to 

5
challenge the County’s denial of its claim. Viking contends it 

did not have to fulfill the notice and bond requirements of Code 

§ 15.2-1246. 

Continuing, Viking asserts that the provisions of Code 

§ 2.2-4363(E) and those of Code § 15.2-1246 are conflicting. 

According to Viking, the Procurement Act is more specific 

because it addresses claims arising out of public procurement 

contracts whereas Code § 15.2-1246 concerns all monetary claims 

asserted against a county. For these reasons, Viking contends 

the Procurement Act controls. 

Our resolution of the issue before us is guided by wellsettled principles of appellate review and statutory 

construction. The interpretation of the various cited statutes 

involves a pure question of law, which we determine de novo on 

appeal. Logan v. City Council of the City of Roanoke, 275 Va. 

483, 492, 659 S.E.2d 296, 300 (2008); Miller v. Highland County,

274 Va. 355, 364, 650 S.E.2d 532, 535 (2007); Budd v. 

Punyanitya, 273 Va. 583, 591, 643 S.E.2d 180, 184 (2007). 

“[T]he primary objective of statutory construction is to 

ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.” Turner v. 

Commonwealth, 226 Va. 456, 459, 309 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1983) 

(citing Tiller v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 420, 69 S.E.2d 441, 

443 (1952)). “[W]hen two statutes seemingly conflict, they 

should be harmonized, if at all possible, to give effect to 

6
both.” Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 

608, 609 (1998) (citing Board of Supervisors v. Marshall, 215 

Va. 756, 761, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975)). However, when two 

statutes do conflict, and “one statute speaks to a subject 

generally and another deals with an element of that subject 

specifically,” the more specific statute is controlling. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 706, 529 S.E.2d 96, 101 

(2000) (citing Virginia Nat’l Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336, 340, 

257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979)); see also County of Fairfax v. 

Century Concrete Servs., Inc., 254 Va. 423, 427, 492 S.E.2d 648, 

650 (1997); Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Serv., Inc., 241 Va. 

89, 94-95, 400 S.E.2d 178, 181 (1991). 

This Court has held that the requirements of former Code 

§§ 15.1-550 et seq., now Code §§ 15.2-1243 et seq., “ ‘provide 

the exclusive procedure for litigating claims against a 

county’ ” and the “ ‘[f]ailure to allege compliance with these 

statutes is fatal to an action against a county.’ ” New Kent 

County v. Worley Aviation, Inc., 255 Va. 186, 193, 496 S.E.2d 

70, 74 (1998) (quoting Burk v. Porter, 222 Va. 795, 797, 284 

S.E.2d 602, 603 (1981)). Further, failure to substantially 

comply with the statutory requirement for executing a bond with 

sufficient surety “constitutes a jurisdictional defect” that 

prevents a circuit court from acquiring jurisdiction of an 

appeal from a county’s disallowance of a monetary claim. Parker 

7
v. Prince William County, 198 Va. 231, 235, 93 S.E.2d 136, 139 

(1956). 

In other words, the notice and bond requirements set forth 

in Code § 15.2-1246 are the “mode prescribed” for pursuing an 

appeal from a county’s disallowance of a monetary claim. 

Botetourt County v. Burger, 86 Va. 530, 533, 10 S.E. 264, 265 

(1889). As stated by this Court in Burger: 

The sovereign can be sued only by its own consent, and 

a state granting the right to its citizens to bring 

suit against it can be sued only in the mode 

prescribed. The same principles apply to a county, 

which is a part of the state, which is, as we have 

said, a political subdivision of the state, suable 

only in the mode prescribed in the law granting the 

right to sue. 

Id. 

We explained, however, in Kirkpatrick v. County of Prince 

William, 238 Va. xxvii, xxvii, 384 S.E.2d 800, 801 (1989), that 

in order to perfect an appeal to a circuit court from the denial 

of a monetary claim by a county’s governing body, a claimant 

needs only to serve the notice of appeal on the clerk of the 

governing body and execute a bond to the county, all within 30 

days after either the date of the decision or service of a 

written notice of the disallowance upon the claimant.3 Id. The 

 

3

 Regardless of when the 30-day period commences to run, the 

provisions of Code § 15.2-1246 also direct that “[i]n no case 

shall the appeal be taken after the lapse of six months from the 

date of the decision.” 

8
claimant is not required to file a complaint in the circuit 

court within the 30-day deadline. Id.

Thus, contrary to Viking’s argument, the provisions of Code 

§§ 2.2-4346(E) and 15.2-1246 are not in conflict. Accordingly, 

there is no need to determine which statute is more specific. 

The two statutes can be “harmonized” and both can be “give[n] 

effect.” Zamani, 256 Va. at 395, 507 S.E.2d at 609. 

When the County’s board of supervisors denied Viking’s 

claim and the clerk of the governing body served Viking with a 

written notice of the disallowance, Viking then had 30 days to 

comply with the requirements of Code § 15.2-1246 by serving 

written notice of its appeal on the clerk of the governing body 

and executing a bond to the County with sufficient surety. 

Viking had to do so in order for the circuit court to acquire 

jurisdiction of its appeal. See Parker, 198 Va. at 235, 93 

S.E.2d at 139. Since Viking’s claim arose out of a construction 

contract subject to the Procurement Act, it then had to file its 

complaint in the circuit court within six months of the date of 

the final decision of the public body in accordance with Code 

§§ 2.2-4363(E) and -4364(E). 

Viking, nevertheless, points to our decisions in Flory 

Small Business Development Center v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 230, 

541 S.E.2d 915 (2001), Mid-Atlantic Business Communications, 

Inc. v. Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, 269 Va. 51, 606 

9
S.E.2d 835 (2005), and Blake Construction Co. v. Upper Occoquan 

Sewage Authority, 266 Va. 564, 587 S.E.2d 711 (2003), for the 

proposition that the provisions of the Procurement Act are 

controlling and the notice and bond requirements set forth in 

Code § 15.2-1246 can, therefore, be disregarded. We do not 

agree. These cases are not dispositive of the issue before us 

in this appeal. 

In Flory, the Court decided whether the Procurement Act 

applied to the Center’s contractual claim against the 

Commonwealth and if so, “whether the Center complied with the 

notice provisions of [the] Act” when initially presenting its 

claim. 261 Va. at 233, 541 S.E.2d at 916. After concluding the 

Procurement Act did apply to the claim at issue, the Court held 

the Center had failed to substantially comply with the notice 

requirements of the Procurement Act. Id. at 238-39, 541 S.E.2d 

at 919. The Center, however, argued its claim was nevertheless 

valid since it had complied with the more general notice 

requirements for presenting pecuniary claims against the 

Commonwealth. Id. at 239, 541 S.E.2d at 920. In response to 

this argument, the Court stated, “the Procurement Act is a 

specific statute relating to the acquisition of services by 

public bodies and thus prevails over the more general statutes 

relating to the presentation of pecuniary claims against the 

Commonwealth.” Id. We did not address what procedures a 

10
claimant must follow when appealing the Commonwealth’s denial of 

a claim covered by the Procurement Act, much less the 

requirements for appealing the denial of a claim by a county’s 

governing body. Rather, the decision addressed only the 

requirements for initially presenting to the Commonwealth a 

claim to which the Procurement Act applied. Id. at 237, 541 

S.E.2d at 918. 

The Court in Mid-Atlantic decided whether a claimant 

instituted a legal action challenging the denial of a claim by 

the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles within six months of 

the final decision of the public body in accordance with 

provisions of Code § 2.2-4363(D), now Code § 2.2-4363(E).4 269 

Va. at 54, 606 S.E.2d at 836-37. Unlike the case before us, the 

issue in Mid-Atlantic did not involve an appeal from the 

disallowance of a claim by the governing body of a county. 

Similarly, the issue in Blake concerned an appeal from a 

decision of a sewage authority, not a county, denying a claim 

covered by the Procurement Act. 266 Va. at 568, 587 S.E.2d at 

713. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the procedural 

requirements set forth in Code §§ 2.2-4363(E) and -4364(E) do 

 

4

 The 2005 amendment inserted new subsection C; redesignated 

former subsections C and D as present subsections D and E; and 

made minor stylistic changes. See 2005 Acts ch. 815. 

11
12

not conflict with the notice and bond requirements of Code 

§ 15.2-1246. Thus, we hold that, when appealing from a county’s 

disallowance of a claim arising out of a contract covered by the 

Procurement Act, the claimant must serve written notice of its 

appeal on the clerk of the county’s governing body and execute a 

bond to the county, both within 30 days from the date of either 

the decision or service of written notice of the denial, in 

accordance with Code § 15.2-1246. The claimant must then 

institute legal action in the appropriate circuit court within 

six months of the date of the decision denying the claim, in 

accordance with Code §§ 2.2-4363(E) and -4364(E).5 Because 

Viking failed to comply with the requirements of Code § 15.2-

1246, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

Affirmed.

 

5

 We recognize that the provisions of Code § 2.2-4363(E) 

also allow a claimant to appeal the denial of a claim by a 

public body “by invoking administrative procedures meeting the 

standards of § 2.2-4365, if available.” We express no opinion 

whether this portion of Code § 2.2-4363(E) conflicts with the 

notice and bond requirements of Code § 15.2-1246.