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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

JUSTIN SCOTT DIGNARD, : No. 1629 WDA 2017

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, August 9, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County

Criminal Division at No. CP-61-CR-0000143-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 15, 2018

Justin Scott Dignard appeals from the August 9, 20161judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County following 

his convictions for robbery—threat of serious bodily injury and robbery 

(felony 2).2 Matthew C. Parson, Esq. (“Attorney Parson”) has filed an 

application to withdraw, alleging that the appeal is frivolous, accompanied by 

 

1 Appellant’s appeal rights were reinstated pursuant to a petition filed under 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, 

proceeding. Appellant’s appellate counsel mistakenly stated that he appealed 

to this court from the order of October 2, 2017, which granted the PCRA 

petition. Appellant’s appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence, 

dated August 9, 2016. The caption originally stated that the appeal was from 

the PCRA order. We have amended the caption accordingly.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 3701(a)(1)(v), respectively.
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an Anders brief.3 After careful review, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw 

and affirm the judgment of sentence.

The following factual and procedural history as originally set forth by the 

trial court is as follows:

The above-captioned cases arise out of two armed 

robberies of businesses located in Oil City, 

Pennsylvania, occurring on December 30, 2011 and 

June 1, 2012, respectively. [Appellant] eluded 

authorities for a lengthy period of time, but was 

eventually arrested . . . .

[Appellant] signed a plea agreement dated June 2, 

2016, in which he pled guilty to Count 2, RobberyThreat of Serious Bodily Injury (Felony 1) at 

CR No. 143-2016, and Count 1, Robbery (Felony 2) at 

CR No. 142-2016. The Commonwealth recommended 

[appellant] serve standard range sentences at both 

counts and that they be served concurrently.

Prior to sentencing, [appellant] underwent a 

pre-sentence investigation and his prior record score 

was calculated as being a three (3). The guidelines 

called for a sentence of fifteen (15) to 

twenty-one (21) months, and the statutory minimum 

and maximum sentences were sixty (60) to one 

hundred and twenty (120) months at Count 1, Felony 

2 Robbery. The guidelines called for a sentence of 

forty-two (42) to fifty-four (54) months, and the 

statutory minimum and maximum sentences were 

one hundred and twenty (120) to two hundred and 

forty [240] months at Count 2, Felony 1 RobberyThreat of Serious Bodily Injury.

On August 9, 2016, [appellant] was sentenced by this 

Court at CR No. 142-2016 on Count 1, Felony 2

Robbery as follows:

 

3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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pay the costs of prosecution, all other 

costs, pay a fine $0 in order to facilitate 

restitution, make restitution payable to 

the Clerk of Court[s] of Venango County, 

in the sum of $900, for the use of Leroy 

and Elizabeth George, said restitution 

shall be paid in ten (10) years and is a 

condition of sentence, and undergo an 

imprisonment in a STATE INSTITUTION 

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

for a minimum of which shall be 

twenty-one (21) months, the maximum of 

which shall be ten (10) years.

Judge Boyer’s August 9, 2016 Amended Sentence 

Order (emphasis in original). In the same sentence 

order, [appellant] was sentenced by this Court at 

CR No. 143-2016 on Count 2, Felony 1 RobberyThreat of Serious Bodily Injury as follows:

pay the costs of prosecution, all other 

costs, pay a fine $0 in order to facilitate 

restitution, make restitution payable to 

the Clerk of Court[s] of Venango County, 

in the sum of $6,130, for the use of 

Thorne’s Market, 809 Grandview Road, Oil 

City, Pennsylvania, 16301 (Said 

Restitution shall be joint and several with 

codefendant, Adrian Dignard at 

C.R. No. 78-2016.) said restitution shall 

be paid with [sic] ten (10) years and is a 

condition of sentence, and undergo an 

imprisonment in a STATE INSTITUTION 

OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 

for a minimum of which shall be forty-two 

(42) months, the maximum of which shall 

be twenty (20) years.

Id. (emphasis in original). The Court stated that the 

sentences imposed at CR No. 142-2016 and 

CR No. 143-2016 were to be served concurrently. Id.
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[Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal, and 

[appellant] filed the instant Concise Statement on 

November 17, 2017.[

4]

Trial court opinion, 12/8/175 at 1-3.

Appellant raises the following issue for this court’s review: “Whether 

the Sentencing Court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion when 

the Sentencing Court ordered a Sentence to the maximum of the statute for 

the sole basis of ensuring restitution was paid in full[?]” (Appellant’s brief 

at 5.)

On February 16, 2018, Attorney Parson filed in this court a petition for 

leave to withdraw as counsel, because he found the appeal to be “wholly 

frivolous,” and an Anders brief. (Petition for leave to withdraw as counsel, 

2/16/18 at 1, ¶ 4 (emphasis in original).) This court denied the petition to 

withdraw on the basis that Attorney Parson failed to comply with the third and 

fourth requirements of Santiago in that he failed to set forth his conclusion 

that the appeal was frivolous and failed to set forth his reasons for concluding 

that the appeal was frivolous.

 

4 Appellant filed for reinstatement of his appeal rights due to ineffective 

assistance of counsel under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On October 2, 2017, the trial court granted the 

PCRA petition and ordered Attorney Parson, appellant’s PCRA counsel, to file 

a direct appeal on behalf of appellant from the judgment of sentence. 

Attorney Parson filed the notice of appeal on October 26, 2017. 

5 The trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on December 8, 

2017.
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When this court denied the petition to withdraw, we remanded this case 

to the trial court with instruction to counsel to file either a compliant 

Anders/Santiago brief or an advocate’s brief within 30 days of the date of 

this court’s memorandum. Attorney Parson filed a timely Anders brief on 

June 20, 2018. 

A request by appointed counsel to withdraw 

pursuant to Anders and Santiago gives rise to 

certain requirements and obligations, for both 

appointed counsel and this Court. Commonwealth 

v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1247-1248 (Pa.Super. 

2015).

These requirements and the significant 

protection they provide to an Anders

appellant arise because a criminal 

defendant has a constitutional right to a 

direct appeal and to counsel on that 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 

A.2d 896, 898 (Pa.Super. 2007). This 

Court has summarized these 

requirements as follows:

Direct appeal counsel seeking 

to withdraw under Anders

must file a petition averring 

that, after a conscientious 

examination of the record, 

counsel finds the appeal to be 

wholly frivolous. Counsel 

must also file an Anders brief 

setting forth issues that might 

arguably support the appeal 

along with any other issues 

necessary for the effective 

appellate presentation 

thereof.

Anders counsel must also 

provide a copy of the Anders
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petition and brief to the 

appellant, advising the 

appellant of the right to retain 

new counsel, proceed pro se

or raise additional points 

worthy of the Court’s 

attention.

Woods, 939 A.2d at 898 (citations 

omitted).

There are also requirements as to the 

precise requirements of an Anders brief:

[T]he Anders brief that 

accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw 

. . . must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural 

history and facts, with 

citations to the record; 

(2) refer to anything in the 

record that counsel believes 

arguably supports the appeal; 

(3) set forth counsel’s 

conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for 

concluding that appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should 

articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, 

and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Id. at 1248. If this Court determines that appointed 

counsel has met these obligations, it is then our

responsibility “to make a full examination of the 

proceedings and make an independent judgment to 

decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” 

Id. at 1248. In so doing, we review not only the 
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issues identified by appointed counsel in the Anders

brief, but examine all of the proceedings to “make 

certain that appointed counsel has not overlooked the 

existence of potentially non-frivolous issues.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 118 A.3d 415, 419-420 (Pa.Super. 2015).

Regarding the requirements of Anders, Attorney Parson has filed a 

petition that avers that, after a conscientious examination of the record, he 

finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. He has also filed a brief that attempts 

to set forth the issues that might arguably support the appeal. He identifies 

the issue in the statement of questions involved in the brief as “Whether the 

Sentencing Court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion when the 

Sentencing Court ordered a Sentence to the maximum of the statute for the 

sole basis of ensuring restitution was paid in full[?]” (Anders brief at 5.) The 

body of the argument section of the brief addresses the issue contained in the 

statement of questions involved, so the issue set forth in the brief complies

with Anders. A review of the record reveals that Attorney Parson complied 

with the requirements of Anders concerning notification to appellant.

With respect to the requirements of Santiago, Attorney Parson has 

provided a summary of the procedural history and facts. He has also set forth 

his conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. Attorney Parson reaches this 

conclusion because, based on his review of the relevant case law, the trial 

court’s imposition of a sentence with the maximum sentence at the statutory 

limit does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
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Once counsel has met his obligations, “it then becomes the responsibility 

of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the proceedings and make 

an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly 

frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5. As Attorney Parson has fulfilled 

the requirements of Santiago, we now turn to the merits of appellant’s 

appeal.

The possible issue raised in the brief is that the trial court erred as a 

matter of law or abused its discretion when it ordered a sentence to the 

statutory maximum for the sole basis of ensuring that restitution was paid in 

full. 

In reviewing the record, the trial court had the benefit of a pre-sentence 

investigation report when it imposed the sentence on appellant. The trial court 

imposed minimum sentences within the sentencing guidelines for both robbery 

convictions. The trial court imposed the statutory maximums for both robbery 

convictions and ran the sentences concurrent to one another. At the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court initially stated, “I am putting the maximum 

period of supervision in, that’s because of the restitution.” (Notes of 

testimony, 8/9/16 at 22.) However, later at the sentencing hearing, the trial 

court attempted to clarify the sentencing with respect to restitution:

At the restitution I need to say, restitution shall be 

paid within twenty years. Restitution is a condition of 

sentence. Now that’s on the---wow that’s---no I can’t 

do that because of the ten years. I need to say on 

both of these cases, restitution shall be paid within ten 

years and is a condition of sentence, because the max 
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on that $6,130 is the ten year sentence, it can’t 

exceed that. So restitution has to be paid in ten years 

as a condition of sentence on both. Okay.

Id. at 26-27.

In addition, while discussing the imposition of the sentence, the trial 

court stated, “[a]ny lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the 

offense.” (Id. at 25.)

After a review of the sentencing hearing transcript, it is apparent that 

the trial court did not impose the statutory maximum sentences in order for 

appellant to pay restitution. One can see how appellant might think that the 

trial court based the sentence on restitution, but a review of the transcript as 

a whole yields a different interpretation. Attorney Parson is correct when he 

determined that this issue was frivolous as it is not an accurate 

characterization of the trial court’s reasoning for the sentence. On the record, 

the trial court stated that it imposed the sentences due to the seriousness of 

the offenses. An appeal based on this issue of a sentence based on restitution 

would be frivolous. This court reviews challenges to discretionary aspects of 

sentencing based on whether there was a manifest abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Mola, 838 A.2d 791, 792 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2003). This 

court agrees with Attorney Parson that the trial court did not commit a 

manifest abuse of discretion.
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Additionally, our independent review of the entire record has not 

disclosed any potentially non-frivolous issues. Consequently, we grant 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2018