COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

JENNIFER L. BLAKE, S/K/A 

 JENNIFER LYNN BLAKE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2872-96-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 JANUARY 20, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 

Russell I. Townsend, Jr., Judge 

 Randolph D. Stowe for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; 

H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Jennifer Lynn Blake (defendant) was convicted of forging a 

public record in violation of Code § 18.2-168 as a result of 

signing another's name to a traffic summons. On appeal, 

defendant argues that a traffic summons is not a writing 

contemplated by Code § 18.2-168. We disagree and affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this 

memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a 

disposition of the appeal. 

 On May 18, 1995, Trooper Deena Suits stopped defendant for 

speeding in Chesapeake, Virginia. When asked for identification, 

defendant produced a driver's license bearing the name "Marla 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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George." The trooper issued a Uniform Summons against "George," 

and defendant signed the document accordingly. The 

misrepresentation was subsequently discovered, and a grand jury 

indicted defendant for forgery of "a public record or certificate 

in relation to a matter where said document may be received as 

legal proof, to wit: a Virginia Uniform Summons, in violation of 

Section 18.2-168 of the Virginia Code." 

 Code § 18.2-168 provides that 

 [i]f any person forge a public record, or 

certificate, return, or attestation, of any 

public officer or public employee, in 

relation to any matter wherein such 

certificate, return, or attestation may be 

received as legal proof, or utter, or attempt 

to employ as true, such forged record, 

certificate, return or attestation, knowing 

the same to be forged, he shall be guilty of 

a Class 4 felony. 

As "recorded information that documents a transaction . . . with 

. . . [a] public officer . . . of the state government," a 

properly issued Uniform Summons is clearly a public record.1

 See

Code § 42.1-77; Cf. Reid v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 468, 

470-71, 431 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (1993) (fingerprint card a public 

record). Defendant contends, however, that a violation of Code 

§ 18.2-168 requires forgery of a "public record" which also "may 

be received as legal proof." Because a traffic summons does not 

rise to "legal proof," defendant reasons that her conduct is not 

violative of the statute. 

 

 1Although defendant, on appeal, does not contest that a 

traffic summons is a public record, we necessarily address the 

issue as a predicate to our ultimate disposition. 
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 When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a 

court will give the statute its plain meaning. Tross v. 

Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 362, 377-78, 464 S.E.2d 523, 530 

(1995). We recognize that criminal statutes must be construed 

strictly against the Commonwealth and in favor of the accused, 

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 815, 819, 180 S.E.2d 661, 664 

(1971); however, "the province of construction is wholly within 

the domain of ambiguity, and that which is plain needs no 

interpretation." Barnett v. D.L. Bromwell, Inc., 6 Va. App. 30, 

34, 366 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1988) (citation omitted). 

 It is well established that legislative use of the "word 

. . . 'may' should be given its ordinary meaning - permission 

. . . ." Masters v. Hart, 189 Va. 969, 970, 55 S.E.2d 205, 210 

(1949); see Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 250 Va. 184, 

194, 462 S.E.2d 892, 898 (1995) (defining "may" as "prima facie

permissive"). Defendant does not dispute that the offending 

summons could constitute permissible "legal proof" under certain 

circumstances. Thus, the summons before the court was clearly a 

forged "public record" which "may be received as legal proof," a 

writing expressly proscribed by Code § 18.2-168. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.