J-A18039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CARL ANTHONY BREVARD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 947 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0006007-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED; December 5, 2023

Carl Anthony Brevard appeals from his judgment of sentence for 

convictions1 arising from a police chase and car crash. He challenges the 

denial of his suppression motion and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 

his conviction for driving under suspension. After careful review, we reverse

on both challenges. 

The suppression court summarized the facts presented at the hearing2:

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1) (persons not to possess firearms), 6106(a)(1) 

(carrying a firearm without a license), 2705 (recklessly endangering another 

person); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32) (possessing drug paraphernalia); 75 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3733(a) (fleeing or attempting to elude officer), 1543(a) (driving 

while operating privilege is suspended or revoked), 3736(a) (reckless driving), 

3714(a) (careless driving), 3361 (driving at safe speed).

2 Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 581(I) mandates that “At the 

conclusion of [a suppression] hearing, the judge shall enter on the record a 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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[O]n June 25, 2021, . . . [a] vehicle driven by [Brevard] was 

“clocked” driving at 40 miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour speed 

zone. Officers attempted to conduct a traffic stop[,] and 

[Brevard’s] vehicle initially pulled over. As officers were about to 

alight from their vehicle, [Brevard’s] vehicle sped off. Officer

[Susalla] followed the vehicle and observed it . . . crash into 

another vehicle. . . . After [Brevard] crashed his vehicle, [he] was 

removed from his vehicle and identified. His vehicle was not 

operable and[,] pursuant to the departmental policy of the 

Edgewood Police Department, it was towed from the scene. 

Pursuant to their departmental policy concerning towed vehicles, 

the police conducted an inventory search of the vehicle[,] and a 

.380 semiautomatic handgun [and a small backpack containing 

bags of marijuana were] recovered from the vehicle. Officer 

Susalla from the Edgewood Police Department prepared a 

departmental tow slip noting the items located during the 

inventory search.

Suppression Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 2–3.3

Notably, Officer Roznick4 conducted the search of Brevard’s vehicle, but 

Officer Susalla was the only witness at the suppression hearing. Officer 

Susalla testified on direct examination that he watched Officer Roznick 

inventory Brevard’s vehicle. But, on cross-examination, he acknowledged that 

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statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . .” Commonwealth 

v. Sharaif, 205 A.3d 1286, 1289 (Pa. Super. 2019). Filing an opinion under 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) “is no substitute” for 

compliance with Rule 581(I). Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 68 

n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003). However, because the opinion in this case contains a 

factual summary and the parties have not challenged the court’s failure to put 

its factual findings on the record at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, 

we will review based on these facts. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Reppert, 

814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2002)).

3 The suppression court drew facts from both Officer Susalla’s testimony and 

the affidavit of probable cause in support of the criminal complaint. Based on 

the scope of our review, we have limited the above quotation to those facts 

that were at least arguably supported by evidence at the suppression hearing.

4 Officer Roznick’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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while he was in the area when Officer Roznick conducted the search, he 

“wasn’t watching him.” N.T., 2/16/22, at 17. Therefore, Officer Susalla did 

not observe where in the vehicle Officer Roznick found the gun. Id. at 17–

18, 20. Nor did Officer Susalla describe the procedure or scope of the search.

Officer Susalla further testified that Brevard’s vehicle was “pretty much 

empty other than small personal items, nothing of value.” Id. at 11. 

However, he “[did not] recall” whether Brevard’s vehicle contained any items

other than the contraband, such as a gold chain with a pendant, a computer 

keyboard, or tools. Id. at 21. Officer Susalla testified that he did not suspect 

that there was a firearm in the vehicle until one was found during the inventory 

search. Id. at 23–24. Once the gun was found, he checked it and learned 

that it was stolen. Id. at 19–20.

Regarding the police department policy on towing and inventory 

searches, Officer Susalla testified that he had reviewed the policy. Id. at 9, 

21–22. He said the policy is to write on a “tow slip” any items that are 

removed from a vehicle and “items of value that shouldn’t be left in the car so 

there’s no recourse down the road.” Id. at 11. However, he was “not sure of 

all of the verbiage” from the policy. Id. Officer Susalla did not state what the

policy provided about the procedure and scope of an inventory search. The 

Commonwealth did not introduce a written policy into evidence.

Finally, Officer Susalla filled out a tow slip based on the items that Officer 

Roznick found. Id. at 10. In the space marked “Inventory All Items of Value 

Found In or On the Vehicle to Include the Trunk,” Officer Susalla listed the 
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“recovered hi-point 9mm gun stolen out of Wilkinsburg” and the “recovered 

small backpack with multiple bag[s] of marijuana.” Tow Slip, 6/25/21 

(Suppression Exhibit 1). He did not list anything else. Id.

Following this testimony, the suppression court heard argument. The 

court found that even though the car contained other personal items, those 

items were not of sufficient value that they had to be included on the tow slip. 

It reasoned that the gun was discovered during a valid inventory search:

The officers generally work together. That’s what they do. They 

always rely on each other. If you do this part, I’ll do that part. 

An officer calls and says, hey, there’s a car speeding down the 

road. The other officer is going to have to rely on that to go see 

what’s going on with that car.

In this case, we have a crash, a disabling crash, that involves not 

just [Brevard’s] vehicle, but another one. And under the 

circumstances, I don’t see anything unreasonable about what the 

officers did here.

Id. at 34–35. Therefore, the court denied Brevard’s motion to suppress.

The case proceeded immediately to a stipulated non-jury trial based on 

the evidence at the suppression hearing and the affidavit of probable cause 

attached to the criminal complaint. The court found Brevard guilty of the 

above offenses. On June 22, 2022, the court sentenced Brevard to an 

aggregate term of 8 to 16 years of confinement and a $200.00 fine.
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Brevard timely appealed.5 Both he and the suppression court complied 

with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. Brevard’s 1925(b) 

concise statement identified five errors, which he has narrowed to two issues 

on appeal: 

I. Did the trial court err in denying suppression because the 

search of Mr. Brevard’s vehicle was not a valid inventory 

search that was done in accordance with reasonable, 

standard police procedures?

II. Was the evidence . . . insufficient to sustain the conviction 

at Count 7 – driving while operating privilege is suspended 

or revoked – as the Commonwealth did not present any 

evidence that Mr. Brevard’s operating privilege was 

suspended or revoked?

Brevard’s Brief at 6 (capitalization omitted).

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5 Brevard was sentenced on June 22, 2022. He had either 30 days to file a 

notice of appeal (July 22, 2022) or 10 days to file a post-sentence motion 

(July 5, 2022, see 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908). Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (3). On July 

11, 2022, Brevard filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider his sentence and 

a petition to accept that motion nunc pro tunc. On July 21, 2022, the trial 

court granted Brevard’s petition to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc. 

It directed him to file a post-sentence motion within 14 days, i.e., by August 

4, 2022.

On July 22, 2022, Brevard filed a notice of appeal, which this Court 

docketed at No. 859 WDA 2022. On August 2, 2022, the trial court denied 

Brevard’s reconsideration motion “as moot” based on the pending appeal. On 

August 11, 2022, Brevard discontinued his first appeal and filed another notice 

of appeal with the trial court, from both his judgment of sentence and the 

denial of his reconsideration motion. We treat this notice of appeal as timely. 

Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2003). We 

remind counsel that the appeal lies only from the judgment of sentence, which 

is made final by the denial of post-sentence motions. Commonwealth v. 

Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 658 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. Super. 1995)).
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Brevard’s first issue concerns the denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence. On suppression issues, this Court’s standard of review:

is limited to determining whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression 

court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the 

record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo. 

Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression 

rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes 

evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. McFarland, 278 A.3d 369, 377 (Pa. Super. 2022) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017)). At 

a suppression hearing, “it is the Commonwealth’s burden to present evidence 

that the defendant’s constitutional rights were not infringed.” Id. (quoting

Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 701 (Pa. 2014)); see Pa.R.

Crim.P. 581(H).

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect individuals from 

unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby ensuring the right of each 

individual to be let alone.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 

(Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. 

Super. 2002)). A search conducted without a warrant is presumptively

unreasonable unless it meets one of the “few specifically established, welldelineated exceptions.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 
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621, 627 (Pa. 2007)). Relevant here, these exceptions include an inventory 

search of a vehicle. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 289 A.3d 1104, 1107 

(Pa. Super. 2023) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)), 

allocatur granted, No. 85 MAP 2023, 2023 WL 5028963 (Pa. Aug. 8, 2023).6 

A valid inventory search does not require probable cause and is thus

“doctrinally distinct” from an investigative search for evidence of a crime. Id.

at 1109. The purposes of an inventory search include “(1) protection of the 

owner’s property while it remains in police custody; (2) protection of the police 

against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; (3) protection of the 

police from potential danger; and (4) assisting the police in determining 

whether the vehicle was stolen and then abandoned.” Commonwealth v. 

Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 102 (Pa. 2013) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 

428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)).

To prove that items were taken during a valid inventory search, the 

Commonwealth must establish that “(1) the police have lawfully impounded 

the vehicle; and (2) the police have acted in accordance with a reasonable, 

standard policy of routinely securing and inventorying [its] contents.” Id.

(citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375). In other words, (1) “the vehicle is 

lawfully in the custody of police” and (2) “police are able to show that the 

search was in fact a search conducted for the purposes of protection of the 

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6 The Supreme Court granted review in Thompson to determine whether an 

inventory search is an exception to the rule in Commonwealth v. 

Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020). This Court’s opinion in Thompson

remains valid pending disposition by the Supreme Court.
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owner’s property while it remains in police custody.” Commonwealth v. 

White, 669 A.2d 896, 903 (Pa. 1995) (citing Commonwealth v. Timko, 417 

A.2d 620 (Pa. 1980)).

The first requirement, which turns on the authority of the police to 

impound the vehicle, is not at issue in this case.

Brevard challenges only the second requirement, whether the police 

established that they conducted a reasonable inventory search. “An inventory 

search is reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to reasonable standard police 

procedures and in good faith and not for the sole purpose of investigation.” 

Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 103 (quoting Commonwealth v. Henley, 909 A.2d 

352, 359 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc)). 

To determine the purpose of a search, a suppression court “must 

consider” the following factors: “the scope of the search, the procedure utilized 

in the search, whether any items of value were in plain view, the reasons for 

and nature of the custody [of the vehicle], the anticipated length of the 

custody,” and any other important facts. Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 

A.2d 245, 256 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brandt, 366 

A.2d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 1976) (en banc)). Weighing all the facts and 

circumstances, the court then determines whether the search was for 

inventory or investigative purposes. Id.

For example, if while taking inventory of the contents of the car, 

the police remove the seats, rip open the upholstery and find 

contraband, the evidence must be suppressed—not because the 

inventory [search] was unreasonable but rather because it is 

apparent that the police were not conducting an inventory 
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pursuant to the objectives laid down in Opperman, but were 

searching for incriminating evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 56 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting 

Brandt, 366 A.2d at 1242 n.7).

Even when police have authority to impound a vehicle, the 

Commonwealth still must prove that the police performed a valid inventory 

search. If not, the evidence must be suppressed See Commonwealth v. 

West, 937 A.2d 516, 529 (Pa. Super. 2007). In West, the police took lawful 

possession of a motorcycle. Id. at 523, 528. However, they could not show 

that the search was a valid inventory search. At the suppression hearing, the 

officer who conducted an inventory search of the motorcycle did not testify;

instead, the Commonwealth presented testimony from the officer who had 

arrested the defendant. Id. at 528. Although the arresting officer testified

that the department followed a policy to impound arrestees’ vehicles and that 

bags of cocaine were found in the motorcycle seat compartment, that officer 

did not explain “the policy and full manner in which the inventory search was 

conducted.” Id. at 529 (holding testimony about an impoundment policy 

“irrelevant to the issue of how searches are to be conducted once a vehicle is 

in custody”). 

In West, we held that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that 

the inventory search followed a reasonable, standardized policy to inventory 

the contents of the validly seized vehicle. Id. Notably, it was not enough that 

“merely open[ing] the seat compartment” seemed consistent with an 

inventory purpose. Id. There was no evidence about how many 
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compartments the motorcycle had, whether the seat compartment was 

locked, or whether the officer had to open the bags to determine if they 

contained cocaine, nor was there evidence that “the department had in place 

and employed a standard, reasonable policy” to search the motorcycle. Id. 

“The Commonwealth had the burden to demonstrate the particulars of that 

policy and to show the search was done in accordance therewith.” Id. Having 

not done so, we concluded that the search could not be upheld as a valid 

inventory search. Id.7

Turning to the search in this case, the suppression court explained why 

it denied Brevard’s motion to suppress:

The record reflects that the inventory search in this case 

was occasioned by [Brevard’s] clear violation of the vehicle code 

by speeding and crashing his vehicle and because his vehicle was 

inoperable and had to be towed from the scene after he had been 

placed under arrest. Officer Susalla testified that he attempted to 

conduct a valid traffic stop to cite [Brevard] for speeding. 

However, [Brevard] crashed his vehicle during his attempts to flee 

the officers. Consistent with departmental policy, [the] officer 

called for the vehicle to be towed. Officers dutifully took necessary 

steps to remove a safety hazard from the roadway. Officer Susalla 

testified about the Edgewood Police Department’s policy taking an 

inventory of a vehicle that requires towing. Pursuant to this same 

policy, officers were required to conduct an inventory search to 

protect [Brevard’s] property as well as protect himself and others 

acting on behalf of the government from any risks associated with 

the caretaking of [Brevard’s] property. The officers were not 

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7

In West, police found cocaine under the motorcycle seat, stopped searching, 

and obtained a search warrant before continuing the search. 937 A.2d at 523. 

Ultimately, this Court upheld the denial of suppression because the warrant, 

without tainted portions, provided probable cause to search. Id. at 529–31.

Here, the police did not obtain a warrant to search Brevard’s vehicle. They

rely solely on the inventory search to justify the seizure of Brevard’s items. 
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seeking evidence of a crime at the time of the inventory search 

and the inventory search was, therefore, proper.

Suppression Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 3–4.

Again, Brevard argues that the Commonwealth did not prove the second 

requirement of a valid inventory search. Brevard contends that Officer 

Susalla’s testimony could not establish that Officer Roznick conducted the

search in accordance with a reasonable, standard policy, because Officer 

Susalla did not watch the search.8 Brevard likens his case to others in which

this Court found the evidence insufficient to conclude that police performed 

inventory searches pursuant to standard policies, without investigatory 

motives. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Germann, 621 A.2d 589, 593–95

(Pa. Super. 1993) (finding no inventory search where, among other factors,

“there [was] no evidence that any valuable items were in plain view”). He 

argues that the evidence here, including the tow slip listing only items of 

contraband, shows that the police had an investigatory motive when Officer 

Roznick searched his vehicle.

The Commonwealth responds that the suppression court was free to 

credit Officer Susalla’s testimony that he was present when Officer Roznick 

conducted the search pursuant to departmental policy. It acknowledges that 

Officer Susalla did not see the exact position of the gun and backpack inside 

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8 Brevard argues that, based on Officer Susalla’s admission that he was not 

watching Officer Roznick search his vehicle, the record does not support a 

finding that he was watching. He cites Commonwealth v. Martin, 253 A.3d 

1225 (Pa. Super. 2021), where this Court reversed a denial of suppression 

after a suppression court had relied only on an officer’s testimony on direct 

examination but where the officer recanted on cross. Id. at 1229–31.
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the vehicle; however, it suggests that his testimony was sufficient to establish 

that Officer Roznick was not rummaging in search of evidence of a crime. 

Because Officer Susalla testified that any other personal items in Brevard’s

vehicle were of so little value that they did merit inclusion on the tow slip, the 

Commonwealth argues that the tow slip supports a conclusion that the 

inventory search was valid. It echoes the suppression court’s reasoning that 

because officers work together, the court could infer that the search was

proper.

We conclude that the Commonwealth’s evidence at the hearing was 

insufficient to demonstrate that the police conducted a reasonable inventory 

search pursuant to their standard policy. First, there was sparse evidence

about what the Edgewood Police Department policy on inventory searches said

about the scope and manner of inventorying an impounded vehicle. No 

written policy was introduced into evidence. Officer Susalla had reviewed the 

policy but did not remember its “exact verbiage.” He did not say how an 

inventory should be conducted pursuant to the policy. The only details about 

the requirements of the policy were Officer Susalla’s testimony about which

items should be listed on a tow slip. This limited evidence effectively precludes 

any analysis of whether the departmental policy at issue was constitutionally 

reasonable. Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 102 (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 375)).

Second, even assuming that the department had a reasonable, standard 

policy, the evidence did not show that the search was conducted in accordance 

with that policy, in good faith, and without an investigatory motive. Id. at 
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103. Officer Susalla did not watch Officer Roznick search Brevard’s vehicle. 

He did not testify where Officer Roznick looked in the vehicle, where the 

contraband was located, or whether any items were in plain view—all factors 

that a court “must consider” in determining whether the search was being 

done to safeguard Brevard’s possessions or to uncover evidence of a crime. 

Hennigan, 753 A.2d at 256. Officer Susalla was unable to recall whether the 

vehicle contained non-contraband items like a pendant, keyboard, and tools. 

Thus, the evidence does not support a finding based only on Officer Susalla’s 

direct examination that the vehicle’s remaining contents were “small personal 

items, nothing of value.” Moreover, the tow slip that Officer Susalla completed 

lists only a stolen gun and a backpack of marijuana, neither of which are 

property that a vehicle owner would likely seek to recover from the police. 

Here, as in West, the testimony of an officer who did not perform a search 

was insufficient to establish the particulars of a reasonable, standard policy or 

that the search complied with that policy. See West, 937 A.2d at 529. As 

such, the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to show that the evidence 

seized was the product of a valid inventory search.

The suppression court’s reasoning, and the Commonwealth’s claim, that 

the search was valid because police officers usually work together and rely on 

each other, is insufficient to justify the search here. N.T., 2/16/22, at 34. The 

implication is that while Officer Susalla did not personally search Brevard’s 

vehicle, he could trust that Officer Roznick was performing a proper inventory 

search. In some cases, we may impute knowledge from one officer to another, 
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such as when assessing probable cause for an arrest. See generally

Commonwealth v. Yong, 177 A.3d 876 (Pa. 2018) (holding under the 

“collective knowledge doctrine” that direct communication is not required 

between officers working together who would inevitably arrest a suspect). 

Here, however, Officer Susalla provided no reason why he would know where 

Officer Roznick was looking in Brevard’s vehicle or if Officer Roznick was 

looking for evidence of a crime. Officer Susalla did not watch the search and 

there was no evidence that the officers discussed the search as it was 

happening. Thus, any findings about how Officer Roznick conducted this

search are speculation, not reasonable inferences from Officer Susalla’s 

testimony. 

In sum, the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden to prove that the 

search of Brevard’s vehicle complied with a reasonable, standard policy and 

was conducted in good faith without an investigatory motive. Officer Susalla’s 

testimony was insufficient to support findings about Officer Roznick’s purpose 

or procedure in performing the search. Accordingly, the suppression court 

erred by denying Brevard’s motion to suppress the evidence. We therefore 

reverse the denial of Brevard’s motion and remand for a new trial on those 

charges for which Brevard was convicted.9

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9 This Court may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress for any valid reason 

that is supported by the record. See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 217 A.3d 

833, 839 (Pa. 2019). Notably, when police have authority to impound a 

vehicle, we may assess whether items found in that vehicle would have been 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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inevitably discovered in an inventory search. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Bailey, 986 A.2d 860, 862–63 (Pa. Super. 2009). Under this doctrine:

Evidence which would have been discovered was sufficiently 

purged of the original illegality to allow admission of the evidence. 

Implicit in this doctrine is the fact that the evidence would have 

been discovered despite the initial illegality.

If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the illegally obtained evidence ultimately or 

inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, the 

evidence is admissible. The purpose of the inevitable discovery 

rule is to block setting aside convictions that would have been 

obtained without police misconduct.

Id. at 862 (brackets and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 890 (Pa. Super. 2009).

For example, in Bailey, the police arrested a man and obtained consent 

to search his car; they found a gun in the center console. Id. at 861. The 

suppression court found that the consent was coerced, rendering the 

“permissive search” illegal. Id. at 862. However, the suppression court ruled 

that the police would have found the gun during an inventory search. Id. We 

agreed: the police had statutory authority to tow the car, and they would have 

opened the center console as part of a valid inventory search. Id. at 862–63.

Here, we first note that the Commonwealth did not argue inevitable 

discovery. If the Commonwealth had proceeded under the doctrine of 

inevitable discovery, such an argument would fail under the facts of this case. 

Under this analysis, we set aside the police error or misconduct and assume 

that police (1) would search Brevard’s car only for a valid inventory purpose 

and (2) would follow a reasonable policy of conducting inventory searches.

However, without evidence in the record, we cannot invent facts 

and assume that the gun was found in a location where police would 

look during a reasonable inventory search. Doing so would relieve the 

Commonwealth of its burden to prove that the gun would have been 

discovered by lawful means. Unlike in Bailey, there was no evidence of where 

the gun was found inside the vehicle. The evidence at the suppression hearing 

did not establish that the police would inevitably have found the gun by lawful 

means. Therefore, under these facts, inevitable discovery would not provide 

an alternative basis to affirm the denial of Brevard’s suppression motion. 
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Brevard’s second issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

sustain his conviction at Count 7, driving while operating privilege is

suspended or revoked. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a). The parties and the trial 

court agree that there was no evidence at Brevard’s stipulated non-jury trial 

that Brevard’s operating privilege was suspended or revoked. Our review of 

the record confirms this. We will therefore reverse his conviction at Count 7. 

Because the evidence at Brevard’s first trial was insufficient to sustain this 

conviction, Brevard may not be re-tried for this offense on remand.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Denial of motion to suppress reversed. 

Conviction reversed at Count 7. Case remanded for new trial on Counts 2, 3, 

4, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 19. Jurisdiction relinquished.

P.J.E. Bender votes to join. Judge Lazarus notes dissent.

 12/5/2023