Filed 1/27/14 P. v. Basey CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TYREESE BASEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B239723

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. LA064105)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Michael K. Kellogg, Judge. Affirmed.

John Alan Cohan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez,

Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Defendant and appellant, Tyreese Basey, appeals his conviction for 

attempted unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, unlawful driving or taking of a 

vehicle, hit and run (property), carjacking and attempted carjacking, with a prior 

prison term enhancement (Veh. Code, §§ 664, 10851, 20002; Pen. Code, §§ 664, 

215, 667.5).1 He was sentenced to state prison for a term of ten years and six 

months. 

The judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Viewed in accordance with the usual rule of appellate review (People v. 

Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206), the evidence established the following. 

1. Count 2: Attempted unlawful driving of the Cortez vehicle.

Around 5:30 a.m. on January 9, 2010, Jose Cortez was returning home from 

work. As he was getting out of his car, he ran into defendant Basey who asked for 

Cortez’s car keys. When Cortez refused, Basey tried to grab the keys. Cortez 

resisted and ran to the front of his apartment building and yelled for help. Basey 

pushed Cortez to the ground and hit him in the forehead while unsuccessfully 

trying to grab the keys. Basey fled when Cortez’s neighbors came outside.

2. Count 3: Carjacking of Uribe.

Later that same morning, Rudy Uribe was in a donut shop in Van Nuys. 

He had just ordered food for himself and his daughter. He placed his car keys on 

the table and was reading a book while waiting for his order. Basey walked by 

and grabbed Uribe’s keys.

Basey left the donut shop and tried to unlock a truck, but it wasn’t Uribe’s 

vehicle. Uribe approached and said, “I want my keys back.” Basey asked, “Is this 

your truck?” Without answering, Uribe asked for his keys back. Basey again 

asked about the truck, this time more angrily. Uribe did not answer and Basey 

 

1 All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
3

walked over to Uribe’s car, which was parked next to the truck. Uribe again 

approached and said, “I need my keys.” Basey reached into his waistband and 

said, “I have a gun, you motherfucker.” Uribe put his hands up and walked back 

to the donut shop. Basey drove off in Uribe’s silver Toyota Avalon.

3. Count 4: Hit and run.

Between 7:00 and 7:30 a.m. that same morning, Jesse Arispuro, a security 

guard at the Skirball Cultural Center Museum, heard a loud boom and saw a silver 

car hit the curb, fly into the air, hit a tree, and lodge itself between a fence and the 

Skirball Center’s water main. Rushing over to the crash, Arispuro saw Basey exit 

the car and walk past him. When Arispuro asked if he needed help, Basey said 

“no” and continued walking away. Arispuro’s supervisor radioed him not to lose 

sight of Basey, so Arispuro followed him to the second floor of the parking 

structure. Basey tried to enter a Toyota truck, but it was locked. Basey then tried 

to enter an elevator, but Arispuro’s supervisor had ordered the elevators locked. 

While heading toward a stairwell, Basey ran into Arispuro and his supervisor, who 

told Basey they had called the police to report a hit-and-run. Basey immediately 

fled.

4. Count 6: Taking Leonard’s vehicle.

Shortly thereafter, at about 8:00 a.m., Christopher Leonard was at home in 

Encino when he heard the motor of his Ford Expedition running. The Ford was in 

his driveway and the keys had been left on his dining room table, which was 

visible from the side yard. The house was unlocked at the time. Leonard came 

out of the house and found Basey in the Ford’s driver’s seat. Leonard yelled, 

“What are you doing?” and banged on the Ford. Basey was struggling to get the 

vehicle into gear. When he was succeeded, he quickly backed out, sped down 

Leonard’s steep driveway and crashed into a neighbor’s brick wall. Leonard ran 

over and started banging on the Ford again, telling Basey to get out. Basey put the 

Ford into gear again and drove off.
4

5. Basey’s arrest.

On the following day, Los Angeles Police Sergeant James Kim responded 

to a 911 call reporting a burglary suspect in a Laundromat on Lenox Ave. He 

found Basey standing in his boxer shorts inside the Laundromat. Kim handcuffed 

him and asked for identification. Basey directed him to a plastic shopping bag on 

the floor. Inside the bag, Kim found Basey’s identification and a set of keys. 

When Kim hit the key alarm, a Ford Expedition activated. Basey was arrested.

CONTENTION

The trial court erred by restricting the proposed testimony of a defense 

psychiatric expert.

DISCUSSION

Basey contends the trial court erred by restricting a defense expert’s 

proposed testimony about Basey’s schizophrenia. This claim is meritless. 

1. Background.

In April 2010, Basey was found incompetent to stand trial on the basis of 

psychiatric reports from Dr. Kory J. Knapke and Dr. Kaushal Sharma, and he was 

admitted to Metropolitan State Hospital (MSH). Knapke later submitted a second 

report concluding Basey was still incompetent, but Sharma’s second report 

concluded Basey was now competent. On April 21, 2011, the trial court found 

Basey mentally competent to stand trial.

Before the jury was empanelled, defense counsel raised the issue of 

whether Dr. Knapke could testify. The trial court expressed concern about the 

relevancy of Knapke’s testimony because his report had addressed competency, 

rather than the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Defense counsel took 

the position Knapke’s opinion was relevant to the issue of Basey’s specific intent,2

 

2 Both carjacking and the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle are specific 

intent crimes.
5

arguing that “if a person believes . . . it’s his property whether by a mental health 

[defect] or by mistake of fact, it’s not a crime.” Counsel said he expected 

Knapke’s testimony to demonstrate Basey “suffered from a serious mental health 

defect from the date of arrest, that . . . he was under some . . . paranoid, delusional 

thoughts[, and] believed he was the [prophet] of god.” 

The trial court ruled Knapke’s testimony might be relevant if Basey 

decided to testify and put his mental health at issue. Subsequently, the court held 

a mid-trial evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of Knapke’s testimony. 

Although Knapke was not present for this hearing, defense counsel made a record 

based on a letter he had received from Knapke.

Defense counsel represented that, after reviewing the MSH records, the 

police reports, and the transcript of a police interview from when Basey was 

arrested, Knapke concluded Basey had been schizophrenic at the time of his arrest. 

Knapke did not believe Basey was malingering. Defense counsel said he planned 

to ask Knapke if someone suffering an extreme schizophrenic episode “could . . . 

believe truly that the property is his and they are a messenger of god,” and that 

Knapke would agree a “person in that situation going through that delusion may 

truly believe that.” 

The trial court asked what Knapke would be talking about “other than 

schizophrenia in general?”, to which defense counsel replied: “Delusional 

behavior, the medications that my client required to regain competency,” and 

“that [Basey] is schizophrenic and delusional at times. That he was suffering at 

the time he observed him in Department 95. He was psychotic,” and that he may 

have been “operating under those same type of delusions at the time of his arrest.” 
6

Defense counsel then said he specifically asked Knapke if someone who 

was delusional might steal a vehicle believing “that’s through God and not 

intending to take property from another.”3 (Italics added.) The trial court replied: 

“When you use that last phrase, that’s precluded in all case law. . . . Up until that 

point it’s admissible. Up until the point where you changed it. By saying – and 

you didn’t use specific intent[,] to form specific intent, you didn’t use any of that. 

Just changing the wording or changing the definition doesn’t change the purpose 

for which the testimony is being offered. [¶] If the testimony is being offered to 

preclude the ability of your client to form any specific intent, it’s barred by both 

[sections] 28 and 29 of the Penal Code. . . . All you’re doing is changing the 

language. By changing the language you’re seeking admissibility of inadmissible 

evidence . . . .” 

The trial court ruled Knapke “can and would be allowed to talk to this jury 

in general terms about schizophrenia, about disassociation, about delusion,” but 

not about whether or not Basey had the ability to “make a conscious decision as to 

the specific intent involved.” Defense counsel asked if Knapke would be 

permitted to offer an opinion as to “whether or not Mr. Basey was delusional or 

psychotic at the time these incidents occurred? Without going into specific intent 

to do these things, just was he . . . exhibiting delusional psychotic behavior at the 

time.” The trial court said no: “It would be the same thing as using synonyms and 

make up another word that would be identical to specific intent. . . . [B]ecause if 

you say that he is delusional or if he is compulsive at that time, it’s one and the 

 

3 Defense counsel said: “Then I asked [Knapke] in generalities what type of 

symptoms in . . . extreme cases someone with delusional thoughts or 

schizophrenia, what the symptoms would be and whether or not hypothetically a 

person can be . . . in this type of scenario that vehicles were in front [sic], that 

that’s through God and not intending to take property from another.” 
7

same of saying he didn’t have the ability to form specific intent. The doctors are 

precluded from doing that.” (Italics added.) 

Defense counsel subsequently indicated that, based on the trial court’s 

ruling, Knapke would not testify.

2. Standard of review.

A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to admit expert 

testimony and its ruling will be reversed on appeal only where the record reveals 

an abuse of discretion. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299 

[“the decision of a trial court to admit expert testimony ‘will not be disturbed on 

appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown’ ”]; People v. Ramos (2004) 

121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1205 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 

admit expert testimony regarding police interrogation techniques and false 

confessions].)

3. Discussion.

Basey contends the trial court erred by limiting Dr. Knapke’s testimony 

“to speaking about schizophrenia in generalities,” and precluding him from 

testifying “whether appellant was operating under delusional behavior at the time

of the charged offenses and whether . . . there was evidence from which the jury 

might infer that appellant lacked the mental state required to commit the charged 

crimes.” 

We disagree. Letting Knapke testify Basey was delusional when he 

committed the charged acts would, in effect, have allowed Knapke to testify Basey 

had been acting with a state of mind that negated specific intent. “Expert opinion 

on whether a defendant had the capacity to form a mental state that is an element 

of a charged offense or actually did form such intent is not admissible at the guilt 
8

phase of a trial. [Citation.] Sections 28 and 29[

4] permit introduction of evidence 

of mental illness when relevant to whether a defendant actually formed a mental 

state that is an element of a charged offense, but do not permit an expert to offer 

an opinion on whether a defendant had the mental capacity to form a specific 

mental state or whether the defendant actually harbored such a mental state.” 

(People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 582, fns. omitted, disapproved on 

other grounds by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)

In People v. Nunn (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1357, Nunn had been charged 

with assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder after he fired his gun at 

several people for no apparent reason. Dr. Lipson, a clinical psychologist, 

examined Nunn and concluded that as a result of Vietnam war trauma he 

overreacted to stress and apprehension. Lipson also concluded the encounter 

giving rise to the criminal charges “was the type that could result in an impulsive 

reaction from one with appellant’s mental condition.” (Id. at p. 1365.) The trial 

court ruled Lipson’s conclusion that Nunn had fired his gun impulsively was 

 

4 Section 28 states, in relevant part: “(a) Evidence of mental disease, mental 

defect, or mental disorder shall not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to 

form any mental state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, 

premeditation, deliberation, or malice aforethought, with which the accused 

committed the act. Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder 

is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a 

required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice 

aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.” 

Section 29 states: “In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert 

testifying about a defendant’s mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect 

shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required 

mental states, which include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or 

malice aforethought, for the crimes charged. The question as to whether the 

defendant had or did not have the required mental states shall be decided by the 

trier of fact.”
9

inadmissible because it amounted to an opinion about Nunn’s intent at the time of 

the shooting. 

The Court of Appeal found no error: “Appellant seems to suggest that 

section 29 allows an expert to express any opinion, however specific and 

determinative of the mental issues involved, as long as he does so without using 

the name of the specific mental state involved, for example, malice aforethought.” 

(People v. Nunn, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1363.) “We conclude section 29 

does not simply forbid the use of certain words, it prohibits an expert from 

offering an opinion on the ultimate question of whether the defendant had or did 

not have a particular mental state at the time he acted. An expert may not evade 

the restrictions of section 29 by couching an opinion in words which are or would 

be taken as synonyms for the mental states involved. Nor may an expert evade 

section 29 by offering the opinion that the defendant at the time he acted had a 

state of mind which is the opposite of, and necessarily negates, the existence of the 

required mental state.” (Id. at p. 1364.)

Nunn went on: “We conclude . . . sections 28 and 29. . . allow the 

presentation of detailed expert testimony relevant to whether a defendant harbored 

a required mental state or intent at the time he acted. Thus, in the present case it 

was permissible for Dr. Lipson to opine that appellant, because of his history of 

psychological trauma, tended to overreact to stress and apprehension. It was 

permissible for him to testify such condition could result in appellant acting 

impulsively under certain particular circumstances. Dr. Lipson could have 

evaluated the psychological setting of appellant’s claimed encounter with the men 

at the fence and could have offered an opinion concerning whether that encounter 

was the type that could result in an impulsive reaction from one with appellant’s 

mental condition. What the doctor could not do, and what the defense proposed he 

do here, was to conclude that appellant had acted impulsively, that is, without the 

intent to kill, that is, without express malice aforethought. The court acted 
10

properly in excluding Dr. Lipson’s opinion that appellant fired his weapon 

impulsively.” (People v. Nunn, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365, fn. omitted, 

italics added.)

In the case at bar, the trial court properly indicated Dr. Knapke would have 

been allowed to testify Basey suffered from schizophrenia, and to explain the 

symptoms and effects of that disorder. Knapke could discuss the details of 

Basey’s condition, his hospitalizations, and the medications he had been 

prescribed. Knapke could explain the sort of delusions someone with Basey’s 

diagnosis would typically experience, and opine that one such delusion would be 

the belief stolen property actually belonged to him because he was God’s 

messenger. On the other hand, the trial court properly precluded Knapke from 

offering his opinion Basey was in fact delusional when he was taking or trying to 

take the vehicles. Such testimony could have been understood by the jury as 

Knapke’s expert opinion that Basey lacked the requisite specific intent because he 

had been acting out of a delusion.

Basey cites People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, disapproved on 

other grounds in People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1086, as a case 

where “restriction to testimony in ‘generalities’ was found to be in error.” 

Aris killed her husband while he slept. At trial, she wanted to present expert 

testimony on battered woman syndrome to support her self-defense claim. 

Basey relies on the following portion of Aris: “[I]t was error not to permit 

Dr. Walker to testify . . . how the defendant’s particular experiences as a battered 

woman affected her perceptions of danger, its imminence, and what actions were 

necessary to protect herself. An expert’s opinion about a defendant’s mental state 

does not violate section 29 as long as the expert does not express an opinion on 

the ultimate issue that defendant did or did not have a mental state required for a 

charged offense. [Citations.] Dr. Walker’s proposed testimony that defendant 

was a battered woman and how being a battered woman affected defendant’s 
11

perceptions and conduct stops short of the ultimate issue of what defendant’s 

perception actually was and, therefore, does not violate section 29.” 

(People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1198, fn. omitted)

But Basey is ignoring another portion of the same opinion: “However, 

Dr. Walker’s opinion is inadmissible to the extent that it is testimony ‘the 

defendant had or did not have . . . malice aforethought . . . .’ [Citation.] Since 

having an actual perception that one is in imminent danger negates malice 

aforethought [citation], we hold that Dr. Walker was properly prohibited from 

stating an opinion that defendant actually perceived that she was in imminent 

danger and needed to kill in self-defense.” (People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d

at pp. 1197-1198.) If anything, the reasoning in Aris supports the trial court’s 

ruling here.

Basey argues Knapke “should have been able to testify that, on the day of 

the charged offenses, appellant was gripped by certain delusions, so long as his 

cross examination did not offer an opinion on whether appellant’s mental defect 

prevented him from having specific intent.” (Italics added.) We disagree. It is 

clear from the record those “certain delusions” consisted of Basey’s purported 

belief he was entitled to take the vehicles because he was acting on God’s orders.5 

In this situation, Knapke’s testimony that Basey was delusional at the time of the 

incidents amounted to expert evidence Basey did not have the specific intent 

required to commit either carjacking or the unlawful taking of a vehicle. Such 

testimony violates Penal Code sections 28 and 29.

 

5 As Basey acknowledges: “In Dr. Knapke’s report . . . he states that during 

his interview with detectives . . . appellant said that he is a ‘prophet of God named 

Royal Republic and is a joint heir with God. All things belong to God and he, 

suspect Basey, can take whatever he wants but it was actually God taking those 

things through him.’ ” 
12

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by restricting the scope of 

Knapke’s proposed testimony.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KLEIN, P. J.

We concur:

CROSKEY, J.

ALDRICH, J.