Filed 7/15/24 P. v. Argel CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JOHN WILLIAM ARGEL,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B333232

(Super. Ct. No. 1488691)

(Santa Barbara County)

John William Argel appeals from the denial of his petition 

for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75. He

contends the trial court erred in concluding it did not have 

jurisdiction to resentence him. We agree, and reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2015, a jury convicted Argel of criminal threats (§ 422), 

domestic abuse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and elder abuse (§ 368, subd. 

(c)). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true 

allegations that Argel had suffered two prior strike convictions

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and a prior serious 

felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and an allegation that he 

had served a prior term in prison (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). It

sentenced him to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in 

state prison plus a determinate term of six years: 25 years to life 

on the criminal threats, a concurrent eight years (the upper term 

of four years, doubled) on the domestic violence, a concurrent 180 

days on the elder abuse, a consecutive five years on the prior 

serious felony, and a consecutive one year on the prison prior.

Seven years later, the trial court notified the parties that 

the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) had 

determined that Argel was eligible for resentencing pursuant to 

what is now section 1172.75. Argel urged the court to strike one 

or both of his prior strikes, his prior serious felony enhancement, 

and his prison prior. The district attorney opposed resentencing, 

arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence Argel 

because he had already served the determinate portion of his 

sentence. The court agreed with each party in part: It struck the 

prison prior, but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to act further

because Argel had already served the determinate portion of his 

sentence. (Citing § 669, subd. (a) [defendant serving sentence 

with both determinate and indeterminate components must serve 

determinate component first].) 

DISCUSSION

Argel contends, and the Attorney General concedes, the 

trial court erred when it determined it lacked jurisdiction to 

conduct a full resentencing. We agree.

Section 1172.75 requires CDCR to inform trial courts of 

inmates serving sentences with one or more now-invalid prior 

prison term enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Once a court 
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receives this information and confirms that the inmate’s sentence 

includes an invalid enhancement, it “shall recall [their] sentence 

and resentence” them. (Id., subd. (c).) During resentencing, 

“[t]he court shall apply . . . any . . . changes in law that reduce 

sentences or provide for judicial discretion” (id., subd. (d)(2))—

i.e., the court shall conduct a full resentencing (People v.

Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 311-317 (Christianson), 

review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189). Such resentencing 

“shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed 

as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, 

unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.”

(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).) 

The plain language of section 1172.75 makes clear that the 

trial court should have conducted a full resentencing. Section 

1172.75 renders any prior prison term enhancement imposed for 

a nonsexually violent offense—such as that imposed in Argel’s 

case—legally invalid. And it applies to any judgment that 

includes an invalid enhancement. (See People v. Escobedo (2023) 

95 Cal.App.5th 440, 451-452 [§ 1172.75 applies when current 

judgment includes invalid prison prior].) It is not limited to a 

defendant currently serving the determinate portion of a 

sentence with a now-invalid enhancement, as the district 

attorney argued below. Were that true here, the court would be 

unable to apply Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)—

which permits striking a five-year serious felony enhancement—

thereby rendering section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) superfluous. 

(Cf. People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400-402 [Senate 

Bill No. 1393 applies during § 1172.75 resentencing].)
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As the Christianson court explained, “ ‘ “[A]n aggregate 

prison term is not a series of separate independent terms, but one 

term made up of interdependent components. The invalidity of 

one component infects the entire scheme.” ’ [Citation.] ‘By 

correcting one part of [a defendant’s] sentence, the trial court is 

resentencing the defendant and, in so doing, is not only 

permitted, but also obligated to look at the facts and the law in 

effect at the time of that resentencing, including “ ‘any pertinent 

circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was 

imposed.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at

p. 315, review granted.)

DISPOSITION

The November 1, 2023, order striking the one-year prior 

prison term enhancement from Argel’s sentence but declining 

further resentencing is vacated, and the matter is remanded to 

the trial court for a full resentencing. We express no opinion as 

to the sentence the court shall impose upon resentencing.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.
John F. McGregor, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.