1

Filed 9 / 3 / 15 In re C.H. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re C. H

. et al. , Person s Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY , Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. SABRINA H ., Defendant and Appellant

. A141655, A141984 & A143907
(Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. SJ13022115, 13022173 & 13022174)

SABRINA H., Petitioner,

v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY, Respondent;

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et al., Real Parties in Interest.2

In these consolidated dependency pr oceedings, Sabrina H. (mother) contests the j urisdictional findings and dispositional orders mad e with res p e ct to her two youngest

sons

— S.H. (born May 2012) and C. H. (born May 2013). Specifically, she argues that the jurisdictional findings, inso far as they related to her conduct, were facially insufficient and should be stricken from the petition. She further claims th at she received both statutorily and constitutionally defective notice of the detention and jurisdiction hearings
in these matters and that the juvenile court’ s dispositional order s were not supported by
substantial evidence. And

— with respect to all t hre e of her sons

— she ass erts that she was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 1 In addition, mother challenges by writ petition the juvenile court’s December 15, 2014, decision to terminate her reunification services with respect to S.H. and C.H. an d to refer the two boys for a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 In particular, mother maintains that the juvenile court erred in refusing t o grant a continuance of the December 2014 hearing at wh ich her
reunification services were terminated so that she could testify. She further argues that
the reunification services provided to her were not reasonable

. Having carefully
reviewed the record in all of these matters, we see no error requiring reversal of any of the challenged findings and orders . W e thus affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional

1 Mother’s oldest son, C.C. (born November 2005), was initially part of the same dependency action as S.H. and C.H. However, on February 7, 2014, the juvenile court bifurcated C.C.’s case from that of the other two minors. C.C. was subsequently placed out of state with his previously noncustodial father, Anthony C., and, on May 22, 2014, C.C.’s dependency case was dismissed with full legal and physical custody of the minor granted to his father. Mother’s timely appeal from this termination and custody ord er is part of these consolidated proceedings. In contrast, by order dated January 6, 2015, we denied mother’s motion to construe her notice of appeal from the dispositional orders of S.H. and C.H. to include C.C., as the notice of appeal was not timely wi th respect to the oldest minor. Thus, the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders made in C.C.’s dependency action are not at issue in this appeal.

2 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. All rule references are to the California Rules of Court. On our own motion, we consolidated these matters for decision on May 12, 2015.3

findings and di spositional orders with respect to S.H. and C.H., affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating C.C.’s dependency action, and deny mother’s writ petition

. I. BACKGROUND
A

. Establishment of Dependency Proceedings
On June 17 , 2013, the San Joa quin County Human Services Agency (San Joaquin) filed a dependency petition with respect to the t hree minors who are the subjec t of these proceedings, alleging that the boys were at risk of harm due to filthy and hazardous conditions in the family home, mother’s ongoi ng mental health issues, her past drug use , and the sexual abuse of C.C. by Joshua C., the alleged father of S.H. a nd C.H. Sp e cifically, i n May 2013

— after mother called 911 stating that she was going into labor
with C.H.

— the Stockton Po lice Department responded to mother’s ho me and discovered

numerous unsafe conditions, including: boxes stacked up all around the front room; broken and dirty couches; the smell of rotting food, garbage, and fecal matter; kitchen counters full of old, moldy food; cockroaches and other bugs in the oven; garbage and
soiled d iape rs on the kitchen floor; and bot tles of pesticide and a knife lying within reach
of the minors. Mother had videos of various traps and poison plugs placed around her home and “thousands of cockroaches scattering on the wall.” C.C. reported that
cockr oaches crawled in hi s ears and, according to mother , the cockroaches were “in

‘ everything , ’ ” crawled all over her food, and fell from the ceiling on them. She admitted that her adjoining neighbor had a similar problem, but was able to maintain it better. In March 2013, 10

- month

- old S.H. had been seen at a clinic for scabies and a staph
infe ction. Additionally, the petition alleged that mother suffers from schizophrenia and depression and had past issues with medication compliance and possible drug abu se

. For instance, i n 2005 , s he tested positive for cocaine and h eroin during prenatal visits while she was pregnant with the oldest minor, C.C. During this timeframe, her prenatal care was sporadic and she had stopped taking he r psychotropic medication

. Mother was also reported to be noncompliant with her psychotropic medication at the birth of S.H. in
2012. Moreover , s he tested posit ive for opiates both at S.H.’s birth and at an emerge ncy4

room visit two weeks earlier

. Mother’s explanation was that she “ ‘thought a friend g ave her a Vicodin.’ ” Finally, the petition included allegations that Joshua C. was currently under investigation by the Stockton Police Department for the sexual abu s e of C

. C. In particu l a r, Joshua, who had been living in the family home, was accused of a n incident during which he reportedly forced C.C. to the floor, closed the door, pulled down the boy’s pants, pushed his penis into the minor’s buttocks, and grabbed the minor’s pen is.
When C.C. tried to fl ee, Joshua held the boy by his throat and warned him n ot to tell

anyone. Joshua no longer lived with the family, but was instead living in San Francisco with his parents. The social worker initially made contact with mother while she was in the hospita l with newborn C.H. Mother admitted that her home was dirty, but minimized the situation and indicated that she was planning on moving. Mother also confirmed her diagnosis of schizophrenia and depression, indicating that she took medication to treat
thes e issues. Sh e further stated that, due to the sexual abuse of C.C. by Joshua, the family was in “ ‘witness protection’ ” and that she had gotten a restraining order against Joshua , who she described as having mental health issues . Mother additionally rep orted that she
home schooled 7

- year

- old C.C. because she did not “ ‘trust public schools’ ” and liked to be with him at all times. Later, however, she stated that she was looking into su mmer school because she did not want C.C. home all summer. Mother re ported that her two
older children wer e with her sister, but she did not know her sister’s address and could not reach her by telephone. The soci a l worker agreed to follow up with her during the
next week and see the home. Thereafter, mother reported a new address (Gateway Court) , but multiple attem pts to contact her by phone, at her old address (Kelley Drive) , at Gateway Court and through
her Victim Witness worker proved unsuccessful. On May 30, 2013, the social worker
made another unsucce ssful attempt to contact mother at Kelley Drive. At that time, she noted a blanket hang ing from the front window, stacks of plastic bags of clothing visible from the window, and a barking dog inside. After she left a business card asking mother5

to call, she received a voicemail from mother approximately 15 minutes la ter claim ing that she had not been home when the social worker came by. Later that day, both mother’s Victim Witness worker and her sister confirmed that mother still resided at the Kelley Drive address. Apparently, the Gateway Court address that mother had reported belonged to her sister. However, when the social worker requested a welfare check that evening at the Kelley Drive residence , the officer reported that there was still no answer. The next da y another home contact was attempted, but , again, no one answered the door.
The so cial worker left mother a message on June 4, 2013, stating that a home visit was urgent a nd that if mother did not call back that day the soci a l worker would refer the
matter to determine if further action was warranted. Mot her did leave a message on
June 4 , com p laining that she was being “ ‘wrongfully evicted,’ ” that nobody was helping her, and that she did not have time to meet with the social worker. The social wor ker responded with a message stating that she needed to see the children and that she could not help mother if mother would not answer her door. The social worker finally spoke to
mother later that same day. Mother again claimed that she was being wrongf ully evicted and stated that she had to have everything out of her ho me by June 6. She further indicated that she was staying with relatives and that she could not meet with the social
worker until June 6. She would not disclose the address of the se rela tives, however, and, throughout the conversation, talked about “ ‘here’ ” in a way that seemed to indicate that she was actually at the Kell e y Drive residence. The social worker explained to mother that, if she did not answer her door on June 6, the matte r would be staffed for further
intervention. On June 5, 2013, mother left a message for the social worker stating that she
needed to reschedule t he June 6 m eeting because she had found a place to l ive and was moving. She also stated that she was tired and needed “ another week. ” Wh en the so c i a l
worker went to the Kell e y Drive address the next day, no one answered the door, but there were still bags of clothing in the front window and some belongings outside of the
residence. The social worker left a card asking mother to call. Later that day, she also
left mother a voicemail explaining that mother needed to provide her new address if she6

was moving. On June 8, 2013, mother left a voicemail for the social worker stating that
she still had not moved, did not know when she would move, and did not know when she
could meet with the social worker. Thereafter , o n June 11, 2013, the social worker
learned that mother had not taken newborn C.H. to the doctor since their release from t he hospital. Rather, she had failed to attend the May 20 appointment that had been scheduled for her, and had not called to reschedule.
Th us, on June 11, 2013, the social worker left a message for mother, informing her that the matter was being referre d to the juvenile court a nd th at she would be called with the date, time, and location of the detention hearing. Mother did not respond. In its report filed in connection with the petition, San Joaquin chronicled mother’s unresponsiveness and l ack of coo peration a nd asked the juvenile court to detain the minors from mother’s care

. A detention hearing was first scheduled for June 17, 2013, the same date on which the petition an d related report were filed. At that hearing, the social worker indicated th at she had left two voicemails on mother’s cell phone, with no response. A copy of the petition was also left at the front door of mother’s Kell e y Drive residence shortly after
2:00 pm on June 17. The matter was continued to June 20, 2013 , so that furthe r effort s at notifying mother could be made. At the June 20 hearing, the social worker reported that
mother had received telephone notice of the June 17 hearing, stating: “I left a voicemail for her Thursday, Friday [ , ] and she did call me back Friday at 7:30 in the evening, and so she did get the notice

. But court was Monday and I hadn’t retrieved that voicemail yet. I didn’t have proof she got the voicemail. ” (Italics added.) In addition, with respect to
notice for the continued hearing, counsel for San Joaquin reported: “We then sent additional notice, actually sent a text message to the mother for today’s hearing. Mother responded to that, questioning wh y she needed to be at the hearing. There were messages
bac k and forth. She was told you must be at the hearing. We can arrange transportation for you . . . .” On this basis, the juvenile court concluded that notice had been given to mother as required by law. It then proceeded with the hearing in her absence, ordering
the children detained and the appropriate w arrants issued so that the minors could be7

taken into protective custody once they were found . The matters were continued to July 2, 2013, for jurisdiction. On July 2 , mother again failed to appear an d the children had not been located

. Counsel for San Joaquin indicated that an absent parent search had been conducted which
revealed that mother’s last known address was still the Kelley Drive residence. Thus, the social worker had served a copy of the petition by leaving it on the door at Kelley Drive. The trial judge expressed doubt as to this method of service, stating: “You know, I’m not sure if leaving this petition on the front doorstep is valid service .” It therefore continued
the matters to Ju ly 23, 2013, so that further attempts at service could be made. On July 8, 2013, the social worker mailed a notice of hearing to mother for the July 23 date to both the Kelley Drive residence and to Joshua C.’s San Francisco address, as she suspected
that the couple might have gotten back together . The notices were sent by first class
mail. Although mother again failed t o appear for the July 23, 2013 hearing, Joshua C. was present. The court confirmed his status as the alleged father of S.H. and C.H. a nd ordered paternity testing. When asked about mother’s whereabouts, Joshua C. responded: “I heard she’s, um, you know, like in San Francisco, maybe in the Hayes Street or downtown.” A ccording to Joshua, he had not actually seen or heard from
mother sin ce he was served with the restraining order. Thereafter, b ased on the mailed notice to mother, the juvenile court proceeded in her absence, finding the al legations in the petition true. A dispositional hearing was scheduled for August 2 0 1 3 and then
continued to November 21, 2013, as the whereabouts of the minors remained unknown.
B

. Transfer and D ispositional Matters Subsequently, w hile disposition in these matters was pending, mother and he r three children were located at a shelter in San Francisc o and the minors were detained on October 29, 2013. At her first juvenile court appearance on November 4, 2013, an attorney was appointed for mother and she indicated that she was currently living in Alameda County. After continuing the matt er to verify mother’s address , the juvenile8

c ourt transferred the proc eedings to Alameda County on November 13, 2013, so that disposition cou ld be completed in mother’s county of residence

. On January 6, 2014, the Alameda County juvenile court accepted t he cases on

t ransfer from San J o a quin County

. Mother appeared at this hea ring with retained counsel, Steph en Chong, and contested the recommended dispositional orders. Thus, the matters were continued to February 7, 2014, for a contested hearing. In the meantime,
th e court ordered mother to complete a psychological evaluation and submit to weekly random drug testing. Supervised visita t ion was authorized for mother a minimum of once per week. In its report filed in connection with the January 6 hearing, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) recommended that reunification services be provided to mother with respect to S.H. and C.H., but that C.C. be placed with his father and dependency dismissed with an appropriate custody order. Mother was reported to be cooperative and communicative, but denied she was to blame for the state of her Kelley Drive residence. Exhibiting some symptoms of paranoia, she claimed that her previous landlord and Joshua C. had “ ‘set her up’ ” so that her children would be remov ed. Indeed, even after being evicted, she felt the previous landlord was following her and working with Joshua. Mother also denied that she had absconded with the children when she ceased contact with San Joaquin , claiming that she was just trying to kee p her
children safe from Joshua. 3 According to mother, she had been treated for mental health issues since she was a young adult, but had never been psychiatrically hospitalized. By her repo rt, she was taking Seroquel for schizophrenia a nd bipolar diso rder and was taking “ ‘a lot of it’ ” lately due to the situation with her children. Her pill bottle, however, indicated that it had last been refilled in early November and, as of December 23, 2013, she still had two pills remaining

. The Agency made ref errals for mother to appropriate m ental health services

.

3 It bears repeating at this point, however, that Joshua was actually living in San Francisco when mother relocated there with the children.9

C.C.’s father , Anthony C., confirmed that mother had been previously diagnosed
with schizophrenia , bipolar disorder, and depression. He stated that he could not maintain his relationship with moth er due to her psychological issues. According to Anthony C., w hen they lived together, mother would often carry on full conversations
with herself and was “ very paranoid. ” Indeed , Anthony C. reported that mother kept
C.C. out of school after she was told that she could not stay and monitor him throughout the day in kindergarten

. Anthony C. also stated that, when he and mother were dating in San Francisco, she smoked crack cocaine and would prostitute herself to obtain the drug. Finally, Anthony C. repor ted that he tried to maintain his relationship with C.C. through visits and phone calls, bu t that mother would try to impede their relationship . When he did go to the family home to visit C.C., he observed the house to be “ ‘filthy’ ” and
cluttered with b oxes and debris. When they were removed from their mother, t he minors had been placed together
in foster care

. The Agency reported that S.H. suffered from emotional disturbances, such as regularly head butting the wall and hitting, pinching, or kicking others. He had displayed similar behaviors while with his mother, and had a large scar on h is forehead due to the persistent head butting. When he was frustrated and angry, S.H. was not consolable and would scream “very loudly” for long periods of time. In addition, an IEP was being sought for C.C. because he had not attended formal schooling since kindergarten and could not read or write.
After the foster parents disclos ed being overwhelmed caring for both S.H. and the infant C.H. and requested that the minors be removed, the three children were placed together with their maternal great

- au nt and her husband on January 24, 2014. As mother resided in the same apartment complex, she was able to have daily supervised contact
with the minors. In the Agency’s opinion, however, the children would not be safe if
returned to their mother due to he r history of absconding with them in San Joaquin County and her denial about the reasons for their removal. In addition, mother’s untreated mental health issues impacted her judgment and decision making . Finally, the Agency believed that mother’s history of cocaine abuse required further assessment.10

While disposition was pending, mother set up initial appointments for individual therapy, psychiatry services, and drug testing. Her first drug test on January 8, 2014, was
too diluted to be tested. Tests on January 18 and 21 were negative. The extent of mother’s medication compliance, however, remained unclear. After making initial
contact with Pathways to Wellness (Pathways), the clinic recommended by the Agency for psychiatric services, mother failed t o follow through and then chose to set up an initial appointment with an alternate clinic. Moreover, s he had received emergency medication
from a th i r d clinic in December 2013, and also indicated she would be following up with that provider

. When asked b y the social worker in January 2014 to bring her medications
in for review, she failed to do so

. Because mother had been without consistent psychiatric care for some time, the Agency opined that “it appears highly important that
she establish herself with ongoing psychiatry services for continuity of care.” Mother also completed her psychiatric evaluation , which confirmed that she was dealing with “current significant emotional difficulties.” At the time of the evaluation,
mother indicated that she was hearing th e voices of her children and had a history of hearing v oices since she was a teenager. Moreover, testing rev ealed that mother was presently experiencing a severe level of depression. In addition, t he evaluator concluded that mother “displays s evere impairment in her ability to form accurate impressions of herself and others where she misinterprets the actions and intentions of others and perceives events in a distorted manner causing difficulty anticipating the consequences of her actions, faul ty judgment, and undermining her adjustment . Her confusion separating reality and fantasy will lead to previse adjustment difficulties and make the demands of everyday living difficult without assistance, and the degree of her impairment may meet
the crit eria for a psychotic disturbance.” The doctor recommended individual therapy, parenting classes, and a b st inence from illegal substances. I mportantly , she also stressed the need for compliance with an appropriate course of psychotr o p ic medication.
On February 7, 2014, the Agency requested that C.C.’s dependency action be bifurcated from the dependencies of S.H. and C.H. , and the juvenile court granted this request. Thus, o n February 18, 2014, the juvenile court conducted a dispositional hearing11

with r espect to C.C. only at which

— over the objection of mother

— the minor was declared to be a juvenile court dependent, removed from mother’s custody, and placed in the home of his previously non custodial father under a plan of family maintenance. 4 In separat e proceedings on February 18, the juvenile court found Joshua C. to be the presumed father of both S.H. and C.H. and authorized supervised visitation between
Joshua and the two minors. On March 12, 2 0 1 4, disposition with respect to S.H. and C.H. was again continued. A contested dispositional hearing was finally held on April 7, 2014, with respect
to S.H. and C.H. In connection with that hearing, the Agency filed an addendum report

to update the court regarding the parents ’ current reunification efforts . Specifically, with respect to mother, on February 19, 2014, she finally attended her first appointment at Pathways for monthly medication evaluation and monitoring. However, despite being reminded by the social worker, mother arrived so late for her Ma rch 19, 2014, Pathways appointment that she could not be seen. She informed the doctor that she would no longer be using Pathways because her primary care physician would be monitoring her
medication. In addit ion, mother stopped seeing D r

. Goodlow for in dividual therapy in
mid

- February 2014, claiming that she had not been able to reach the therapist and that,
when she arrived for a scheduled appointment , he was not there. Dr. Goodlow, in contrast, indicated that it was mother who failed to attend the app ointment. On February 27, t he social worker reminded mother of Dr

. Goodlow’s contact information (mother said that she had lost it) and ask ed her to resume therapy

. I n February and March 2014, according to the addendum report, mother had five negative drug tests, one no show, one test positive for alcohol, and two tests positive for prescribed back pain medication. Finally, visitation with the minors continued in the home of the caregivers with no reported concerns. In fact, since being placed with th e maternal great

- aunt, S.H.’s negative behaviors had reportedly improved, although he was still “a lot to manage.”

4 As previously stated, a notice of appeal was not timely filed with respect to these dispositional orders.12

At the contested hearing on April 7, a letter was admitted from Dr. Goodlow which indicated that mother was currently engaged in therapy, but had attended only two sessions in February a nd March 2014. In addition, mother testified regarding her
medication compliance , stating that she had a current prescription for Seroquel from her primar y care physician and took the medication as prescribe d. On cross

- examination, however, mother explained why she had 25 milligram tablets for a prescription of 200 milligrams per day as follows: “I don’t take Seroquel during the day. If I take it , I take 200 milligrams at night, if I need it , 200 milligram s. I take the s m a ller pills because I
have children. And if it’s too much or too sedating and

— you know, I don’t take 200 milligrams

. ” (Italics added.) Mother also indicated that in the past (most recently in late
2013 during the pendency of these proce edings ) she has tried to wean herself o ff the drug, but would not do so again unless instructed to. Both Agency counsel and counsel for the minors argued that mother’s failure to stabilize her medications and participate regularly in therapy placed the minors at
substantial risk of harm. Mother’s attorney, in contrast, argued vigorously that nothing in mother’s current situation represented an actual risk of harm to the children such that removal of the minors from her custody was warranted. He asked e ither for voluntary supervision pursuant to section 360, subdivision (b), family maintenance services, or permission for mother to reside with the current caregivers and have unmonitored contact
with the children. In the end, the juvenile court took the ma tter under advisement so that
it could further consider relevant evidence and case law. On April 14, 2014 , the court entered dispositional orders for S.H. and C.H. Specifically, the court declared the two boys to be juvenile court dependents, removed

t hem from their parents’ care, and ordered reunification services for both mother and
Joshua C. In finding that the minors would be at substantial risk of harm if left in the care of their mother, the court indica ted that it was “very concerned” with the r esults of mother’ s psychological evaluation as described above. The court noted that the evaluating doctor recommended that mother continue her psychotropic medication s and therapy and that the evidence in the case showed that mother was i nconsistent in b oth13

areas. T he court concluded as follows: “ It is the Court’ s opinion that the mother is not stable at this time, that the mental condition that allowed her home to be in the condition that it was in which caused the Court in San Joaquin County to take jurisdic tion of this case still exists.” Mother filed a timely notice of appeal wit h respect to the juvenile
court’ s April 14, 2014, dispositional orders for C.H. and S.H

. C

. Reunification Efforts
In an interim review report filed in July 2014, the Age ncy related that mother was generally engaged in the reunification services ordered by the juvenile court , with varying levels of success. As previously stated, she had completed her psychological evaluation. She had also begun a parenting class and repo rted that she was attending weekly therapy, although the social worker had been unable to verify her attendance with the therapist, Dr. Goodlow, despit e numerous attempts. In addition, while mother failed to attend five out of eight drug tests, the tests that she did take revealed no non

prescription medications. Mother, however, had been inconsistent in attending regular sessions wi th the doctor at Pathways. Af

t er informing the doctor on March 24 that she would no longer be using Pathways because her primary care physician was monitori ng her medication, she contacted the Pathways doctor on May 30, 2014, stating that she needed a medication
refill. She then missed scheduled appointments on June 11, 18 and 24, before finally being seen on June 27, 2014. Noting that mother’s engagement with Pathways had been minimal, the Agency stressed that it was “vital” for mother “to engage with this valuable service.” In the meantime, the minors were doing well in the home of their maternal great

aunt. In fact, according to the social worker, the minors were “clearly connected” to their caretaker and she was doing a “great job” providing for them. Since mother lived in the same apartm ent complex as the maternal great aunt, she was having supervised visitation with C.H. and S.H. every morning and evening , with no concerns reported. At the interim review hearing on July 16, 2014, the juvenile court continued the
case for a six

- mont h r eview. In additio n

— after a hearing in chambers

— the court granted14

the motion of mother’s attorney, Stephen Chong, to withdraw as her attorney of record

. A new attorney was appointed for mother. Unfortunately, by the time of the six

- month review in October 2014, mother’s situation had substantially deteriorated. Indeed, on the day after the interim review hearing in July , the police were called out to the apartment complex w h ere the minors
reside d after a physical altercation betwe e n mother and the m aternal great

- uncle (Mr. L.). Reportedly, mother spanked C.H. after he climbed out of his crib and then told Mr. L. that she had done nothing to cause the minor’s crying. Mr. L. became angry at mothe r for lying, at which point mother confessed that she had spanked C.H. Mother then reportedly came after Mr. L. while he was holding C.H., and he had to block her punches to shield the minor. Eventually, he grabbed mother’s hair to hold h er away from him and the baby. Subsequently, the maternal great

- aunt reported the spanking incident to the social worker. She also indicated that she was concerned about mother’s mental health as “ ‘she appeared to be acting crazy.’ ” In particular, the maternal great

- aunt disclosed that mother had told her that if she “ ‘had a gun she would kill the kids and this whole situation would go away.’ ” As a result, the social worker planned to move mother ’s supervised visitation to a neutral setting. However, this change did not immediately

oc cur

. Instead, the maternal great

- aunt reported numerous issues with mother during
visits as they continued in the caregiver’s home

. Specifically, according to the maternal great

- aunt , mother would not change diapers during visits, w ould go outside to use her cell phone and fail to monitor the minors, would watch TV rather than attending to the minors, and would put the children in the crib rather than playing with them.
The social worker met with mother in August 2014 and spoke wi th her at length regarding what she needed to do to reunify with her children. Mother at first became defensive, stating that she didn’t have any mental health issues and was capable of caring for the minors. Ultimately, however, she agreed that she did have some mental health concerns. The social worker pointed out what a great opportunity mother had living only15

25 yards from the minors and suggested that mother try to work with the maternal great

aunt on ways to become more involved in her children’s l ives. On September 8, 2014, at 2:30 am, however, the police were again called to the home of the maternal great

- aunt, looking for mother. Several relatives reported that mother was locked in a cousin’s bathroom next door and had called the police from there. After this second incident with the police, the maternal great

- aunt asked that the minors
be moved because she felt overwhelmed by mother’s behaviors. A meeting was set for September 11 to discuss the placement of the children. Although mother was given notice of this meeting and indicated that she would attend, she did not appear. Instead, she left the social worker 11 different messages that day on a range of topics. And, during the actual meeting, the maternal great

- aunt received

numerous m essages and texts from mother begging her t o leave the meeting as it did not concern her. A decision was made to immediately take the minors back into custody. Later that day

— after mother learned that the minors had been removed from the home of
the mate rnal great

- aunt

— she reportedly threatened to kill the social worker. T he family called the police bec a u se of mother’s out

- of

- control behaviors, and mother was subsequently placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold pursuant to section 5150. 5 The minors were placed with their paternal grandmother the next day. As a result of this
inciden t, mother was asked to leave the residence s he had been sharing with a relative , and she was told that

— should she return to the property

— the police would be c ontacted. In addition, b oth the aunt and the social worker expressed interest in filing restraining
order s against mother.

5 This statute provides, in relevant part, that “[w] hen a person, as a result of a mental health disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer

. . . or professional person designated by the county may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into custody for a period of up to 72 hours for assessment, evalua tion, and crisis intervention, or placement for evaluation and treatment in a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment and approved by the State Department of Health Care Services. ”16

With respect to her reunification obligations during this time period , mother continued to report seeing her thera pist on a weekl y basis. Unfortunately , the social worker had still not been able to confirm this, after leaving more than six messages for Dr. Goodlow asking for a progress letter. In addition, mother completed her parenting class obligation. Mother also submitted to drug testing five times since the completion of the interim review report, with three no shows. On August 4, 2014, she tested positive for methamphetamine. According to mother, she did not know how she could have tested positive for this drug, but report ed that she went to a bar with friends and “could have ‘popped something.’ ” However, mother again tested positive for methamphetamine on September 11 after her detention pursuant to section 5150

. Most importantly, mother continued to be inconsistent w ith her appointments at Pathways for medication evaluation and monitoring. She failed to appear for several appointments and was routinely three or four hours late for the appointments that she did attend, such that it was “ ‘just by luck of the draw’ ” t hat the doctor had been able to see
her. Moreover, Pathways reported that it was only prescribing two medications for mother, substitutes for Zoloft and Seroquel. However, mother told the social worker on
several occasions that her medications had change d, and she had prescriptions for a number of other drugs, including methadone and buspirone. Additionally , according to mother, after she had an allergic reaction to the buspirone, she took a “red pill” and a “white pill” given to her by a cousin. The wh ite pill was Xanax, but she did not know what the red pill was. Noting that mother was not maintaining her proper medication and had ingested non

- prescribed medications as well as illegal substances, t he social worker expressed serious concern for mother’ s mental stability. Indeed , a fter her detention pursuant to section 5150 on September 11 , mothe r went to Pathways, appearing disoriented, dishe ve led , and under the influence. When she was told abou t a new treatment plan and dia gnosis, she appeared angry, refused to sign the plan, and walked
out of the office.
In its six

- month review report, the Agency requested that mother’s reunification services be continued for 60 days. It emphasized that mother needed to attend all of he r17

scheduled medication appointments and follow the recommendations of her service providers. It also recommended that mother enroll in a dual diagnosis program to
stabilize her mental health concerns and address any substance abuse issues. If mother
coul d not substantially engage in her case plan in the addition al time granted , the Agency

wou ld then recommend termination of reunification and referral of the minors for a permanency planning heari ng

. For her part, mother wan ted her children returned. She reported to the social worker that she had an order from a judge granting custody of all three minors to her and would leave messages for the social worker wondering why C.C.
had not been returned to her care . She did not share the soc i a l worker’s concern s regarding her mental health, but indicated that she was in significant physical pain from a slipped disk and would need surgery.
At the six

- month hearing on October 1, 2014, the matter was continued to deal
with restraining order issues and because th e Agency’s recommendation was contested, apparently by counsel for the minor s

. The minute order for November 6, 2014, states that
both restraining orders against mother were granted through November 6, 2017. It also notes continuance of an issue regardin g mother’s use of a “comfort dog” in court. Thereafter, at a hearing on November 19, 2014, the court issued an order expressly prohibiting mother from bringing her comfort dog to court, “unless she could provide the court with acceptable written proof tha t the dog is a service dog, not just a comfort dog.” Any such proof was required to be submitted prior to the next hearing. In addition, at the November 19 hearing, the Agency indicated that it intended to submit a new report to the court, recommending t ermination of mother’s reunification serv ices. Given this change,
minor s ’ counsel withdrew his request for a contested hearing, but the hearing date was
maintained so that mother and Joshua C. could contest the Agency’s new recommendation.
On November 21, 2014, the Agency filed an addendum report recommending
termination of reunification services and the setting of a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for S.H. and C.H. The boys remained in the home of their paternal grandmother. Th e social worker detailed the many referrals being made to18

support the minors in their new placement in another county , including attempts to set up therapeutic visitation with mother. In addition, the social worker provided a copy of the progress report on mother’s individual therapy that had finally been received from
Dr. Goodlow on September 29, 2014. According to Dr. Goodlow, mother had been working hard to meet her treatment goals. However, while she had made “marked progress,” she continued “to nee d treatment and a lot of work on understanding how her behaviors and decisions have adversely impacted her children’s safety and physical health.” Dr. Goodlow further noted that mother had missed her September 12, 2014, appointment (the day after her dete ntion under section 5150) and he had not been able to
reach her to reschedule.
At the start of the 6

- month

- review hearin g on December 15, 2014 , mother was
p resent outside of the courtroom with her support dog. She did not have documentation
that the d og was a service dog, rather than just an emotional support animal , despite the fact that the court had previously made clear that such evidence would be required to admit the dog to the courthouse. According to mother, she previously had a service dog
id entification card , which she showed to court security when she first came to the
courthouse for the case, but she had since lost it. She believed that she had been allowed to bring the dog inside for previous hearings because security had seen the identif i cation at some point. The c ourt questioned mother’s version of events, indicating that it did not recall the dog being present until the last few hearings , when it had become an issue. Citing concerns about the length of the full

- day trial and the lack of evidence that mother’s dog had any spe cific training to deal with physical or psychological disabiliti es, the juvenile court judge gav e mother the choice of leaving the dog outside or declining to participate in the hearing. Mother chose to leave the c ou rthouse with her dog. Thereafter, mother’s attorney called the social worker to testify regarding the services provided t o mother in the case. Although mother had not visited with the minors since they were placed with their paternal grandmother on Se ptember 12, 2014, the social worker described his efforts to establish supervised or therapeutic visits for h er. He reported two attempts to set up supervised visits for mother in July and October 2014,19

where mother failed to show for the nec essary orientations. The social worker additionally stated that he and mother discussed s witching therapists because
Dr. Goodlow was so difficult to reach, but mother “really liked” Dr. Goodlow and no change was made. The soc i a l worker acknowledge d that mother had given him a new address in San Francisco in early October. She had also provided a telephone number in Las Vegas, stating that she would be working there as well. He did not make any new
referrals for mother based on he r reported change in res idence ; nor did she ask him for

any

. In addition, the social worker discussed mother’s medication compliance , characterizing it as a consta nt concern. He stated, for example, that mother reported taking methadone on and off, but he could never get an u nderstanding of who prescribed it or how much was pre scribed for how long. In his opinion, in order to appropriately parent the minors, mother would need to “get a good sense of her mental health status and the meds that she needs and really show a signif icant time period where she’s able to process some of the Agency’s concerns about her ability to be a parent for these children

a nd their needs.” At the end of the social worker’s testimony, mother’s attorney asked to continue
the matter so that mother c ould be available to testify. Both Agency counsel and counsel for the minors objected, citing lack of good cau se. The court denied the continuance request, indicating that the hearing had been set for some time and that mother had the
choice to leave her dog ou tside and be present, but chose instead to leave

. After an
extended discussion of the relevant timelines in thi s matter , mother’s attorney argued
that t he Agency failed to provide mother with reasonable services. The juvenile court continued the case to December 18, 2014, for decision. On December 18, the juve nile court concluded that reasonable services had been provided to mother. However, it found that mother had not made any substantive progress in her court

- ordered treatment programs and did not have a “clean, healthy, stable, and safe home” in which to maintain the children. In particular, noting the instability in mother’s medication situation, the fact that she had been involuntarily20

detained in September pursuant to section 5150, and a “marked change in her overall
de meanor and appearance” in the courtroom, the juvenile court found mothe r to be currently mentally unstable. It did not see a substantial probability that further services
would lead to a return of the minors to mother within statutory timeframes. It therefore terminated mother’s reunification services and referred both chil dren for permanency planning pursuant to section 366.26. Mother subsequently filed a timely notice of her intent to file a writ petition, and the petition itself was filed on February 5, 2015. (Rules 8.450(e), 8.452.)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Adequacy of Juri sdictional Finding We begi n by dismiss ing mother’s contention that the alleg ations set forth in the dependency petition filed in this matter fail to support a finding under subdivision (b) of
section 300 with respect to her conduct

. 6 As chronicled above, the petition alleged that
the minors were at risk of harm due to the filthy and hazardous conditions in the family home; mother’s mental health issues and history of medication noncompliance; mother’s past history of substance abuse; the unavailability of the minors’ fathers; the substantiated sexual abuse of C.C. by Joshua C.; and mot her’s failure to make herself and her home available to the Agency. As to her conduct, mother argues: (1) that she was aware that the house was unsanitary and was planning to move; (2) that there was no nexus between the conditions in the home and any harm to the minors; (3) that she was the nonoffending parent with respect to the sexual abuse and was reported to be protective and appropriate

6 Pursuant to subdivision (b)(1) of section 300, a child falls within the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court if: “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or ne gligent failure of the child’ s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’ s mental i llness, developmental disabi lity, or substance abuse .”21

with the minors in response to t hat abuse; (4 ) that harm may not be presumed from the mere fact of mental illness; (5) that the allegations of past substance abuse were stale and did not support a finding of potential harm to the minors ; and (6) that there was no nexus between mother’s f

ailure to make herself available to the Agency and any harm to the
minors. Given these circumstances, mother contends that

— as to her

— the petition did not support a jurisdictional finding pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). As previously stated, mother was neither present nor represented by counsel at the juri s diction hearing and therefore did not object to the suffic iency of the allegations involving her in the juvenile court. The parties disagree as to whether m other’s cha llenge
to the sufficiency of the petition should therefore be deemed forfeited. (See , e.g., In re
David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1636

- 1640 ( David H. ) [noting split in authority, but concluding that a challenge to the facial suffic i ency of a petitio n is subject to forfeiture].) W e decline to reach this issue , h owev e r, because we determine that mother’s
contentions fai l for a more fundamental reason: Under the facts of this case, she has not present ed a justic iable controversy

. “It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable issue.” ( In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489 ( I.A. ).) Pursuant to this doctrine of justiciability, “ ‘ “ [a] judicial tribunal ordinarily may consider and determine only an existing controversy, and not a moot

que stion or abstract proposition. . . . [A]s a general rule it is not within the function of the court to act upon or decide a moot question or speculati ve, theoretical or abstract question or proposition, or a purely academic question, or to give an advisory opinion on
such a question or proposition. . . . ” ’ [Citation.] An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ reli ef

— that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.” ( Id. at
p. 1490.) In sum , if mother cannot advance “a present, concrete, and genuine dispute as to which the court can grant effecti ve relief,” her argument is not a valid subject for

ap p e l late review

. ( Id. at p. 1489 .)22

In this regard, we note that, in dependency proceedings, jurisdiction is taken over children, not parents. ( I.A. , supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491 ; see In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 202

- 203 .) Thus, “ a jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of
either parent bring [the child] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent.” ( In re Alysha S. (1996 ) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397 ; see In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
438 , 451 [“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a
minor co mes within the dependency court’ s jurisdiction, a reviewing cour t can affirm the juvenile court’ s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need no t consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence

. ”] ) In the present case, jurisdiction was appropriately established over C.H. and S.H. based on the allegation that their father sexually a bused their half

- sibling, C.C. Because mother does not challenge the jurisdictional findings involving Joshua C.’s sexual abuse, any decision that we might render regarding the allegations involving her would not result in a reversal of the juvenile court ’s jurisdictional order. Thus, it appears that mother has not presented us with a justiciable controversy. In fact, mother concedes that, even if the allegations related to her conduct were
stricken in this case , the petition would still establ ish juri sdiction over C.H. and S.H.
based on the sex ual mis conduct of Joshua C. N evertheless , she asks us to exercise our discretion to review the matter , arguing that “ ‘ the outcome of the appeal could be “ the
dif ference between [her] being an ‘ offending ’ parent versus a ‘ non

- offending ’ parent, ” a finding that could result in far

- reaching consequences with respect to these and future dependency proceedings. ’ ” (See In re Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 613 ( Quentin H. ).) It is true that several courts have used this argument as a justific ation for reaching the merits of a jurisd ictional challenge that would otherwise not be deemed j usticiable. (See, e.g., Id. at p. 613; In re D.P. (201 4 ) 225 Cal.App.4th 89 8 , 902; In re
Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.A pp.4th 754, 762

- 769 .) Division One in the First District, in23

contrast, refused to apply this rationale where the parent failed to suggest “a single specific leg al or practical consequence” from the jurisdictional finding , “either within or outside the dep endency proceedings.” ( I.A. , supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1493

- 1495.) Here, mother posits that the jurisdictional findings were prejudicial to her because the sustained allegations formed the basis for her reunification plan, against which her

progre ss would be measured. In addition, s he correctly observes that failure to comply with the components of her reunification plan could lead to the continued removal of the
minors from her care and , ultimately, to termination of her parental rights. “[A]
reuni fication plan ‘ “ must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique f acts relating to that family .” ’ ” ( In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172 ( Basilio T. ).)
It is true that subdivision (d) of section 362 provides that “[t]he program in which a parent or guardian is required to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.” However, that same section grants the juvenile co urt broad discretion to “direct any reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the child who is the subject of any proceedings under this chapter as the court deems necessary and proper . . . .” (§ 362, subd. (d).) And, importantly, “the juvenile c ourt is not limited to the content of the sustained petition when it considers what dispositional orders would be in the best
interests of the children. [Citation.] Instead, the court may consider the e v i d ence as a whole. ” ( In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Ca l.A pp.4th 297, 311 ( Briana V. ) .) “In fact, there need not be a jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent upon whom the court imposes a dispositional order.” 7 ( Id. at p. 311. ) T hus, whether the petition allegations

7 Mother’s argument to the contrary

— that a reunification plan must be based on a problem which caused the court to assume jurisdiction over the child

— is incorrect and based on a misreading of Basilio T

. In that case, the court held that it was error to include a substance abuse component in a reunification plan where there was no evidence of substance abuse. ( Basilio T ., supra , 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 172

- 173.) Indeed, citing section 366.21, subd. (e), the court expressly recognized that, if such evidence arose later in the dependency, inclusion of a substance abuse component in the reunification plan would be proper even though a substance abuse allegation was not contained in the petition. ( Id . at pp. 161, 173, fn. 9.)24

involving mother were insuffic i ent in and of themselves to support a finding under section 300, subdivision (b) is simply irrelev ant under the circumstances of this case, as the juvenile court was free to consider any avai lable evidence regarding mother’ s situation and its impact on the minors when developing her reunification plan , whethe r or not that evidence was contained in the petition

. Further, s ince mother does not contest the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction in this case, it appears that her quarrel is really with the court’s dispositional
order removing the minors from her care . We consider mother’s challenge with respect to this dispositional order elsewhere in this opinion. For our purposes here, we note only that in dependency proceedings “the burden of proof is substantially greater at the dispositional phase than it is at the jurisdictional phase if the minor is to be removed from his or her home.” ( Basilio T. , supra , 4 Cal.A pp.4th at p. 169.) Specifically, a jurisdictional finding need only be made by a prepo nderance of the evidence. ( Ibid. ) In contrast, a dependent child cannot be removed from the home of a parent at disposition unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that, inter alia, “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well

- being of the minor if the minor were returned home, ” and there are no

reas onable alternative means to protect the minor

. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1) ; rule 5.695(d)(1);

see In re H.E. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 710, 718

- 723 ( H.E. ) .) Thus, since the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings in this case were insufficient to support the later removal
order , 8 the question whether these jurisdictional findings and the allegations in the petition perta ining to mother were, in themselves, sufficient to support a finding under
section 30 0, subdivision (b), was irrelev ant to the court’s dispositional order which was
based on a review of all relevant evidence . (§ 358, subd. (b); Briana V. , supra , 236

8 Of course, the jurisdictional facts do provide some evidence supporting the court’s dispositional order. Mother, however

— with one minor exception that was acknowledged by the Agency prior to disposition

—has never argued that the juri sdictional allegations are untrue. Rather, her focus has been and continues to be on the sufficiency and import of those allegations under the juvenile court law.25

Cal.A pp.4th at p. 311 .) Under these circumstances, we decline mother’s invitation to decide the abstract legal proposition that she has presented for our consideration

. B. Notice Issues Mother next urges us to conclude that her statutory and due process righ ts to notice were violated because she received defective notice of the detention and jurisdiction hearings in this matter . Until parental rights have been terminated, the dependency statutes require that both parents be given notice at each step in the

p roceedings. (§ 302, subd. (b); see David B. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1019 ( David B. ).) Indeed, at each dependency hearing, the juvenile court is required to “determine whether notice has been given as required by law and must make

an appropriate finding noted in the minutes.” (Rule 5.534(l).) In addition to these statutory notice requirements, due process demands that a parent be afforded with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived of the companionship , care, custody, and management of his or her child, ( In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688

- 689.) Since adequate notice provides “vitally important procedural protections that are essential to ensure the fairness of dependency proceedings,” a defect
in n otice “is a most serious issue, potentially jeopardizing the integrity of the entire judicial process.” ( In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 747, 754 ( Wilford J. ).) On the other hand, “ ‘[i]t is not always possible to litigate a dependency case with all parties present. The law recognizes this and requires only reasonable efforts to search for and notice missing parents. Where reasonable efforts have been made, a dependency case properly proceeds.’ ” ( In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 18 2 ( J.H. ).) We have detailed with some specificity the circumstances surrounding the filing of the petition in this case and will not recount them here. It suffices to say that the clear import of the record in this matter is that mother was actively atte mpting to avoid San Joaquin’s intervention by evading contact with the social worker and refusing access by
that worker to either her home or her children. Mother’s statements regarding moving were equivocal at best and her last comment about moving th at is contained in the record
i s a June 8, 2013, message to the social worker statin g that she still had not moved and26

did not know when she would m ove

. O n June 6, 2013, the social worker left mother a voicemail explaining that mother needed to provide her n ew address if she was moving

. On June 11, 2013, the social worker left a n additional message for mother, informing her that the matter was being referred to the juvenile court and that mother would be called with the date, time, and location of the detent ion hearing. Mother did not respond. Thereafter, m other received actual notice of the initial June 17 , 2013 detention hearing date by telephone, and notice of the June 17 hearing , along with a copy of the petition , were left on the front door of the Ke lley Drive residence on June 17 . Mother also received actual notice via text message of the June 20 continued detention hearing
date and declined to attend , even though she was told she must be present and that San Joaquin would ar range transportation. T he record discloses no further contact with mother between the June 20, 2013, detention hearing and the July 23, 2013, jurisdictional hearing. However, m other was served with notice of the July 23 hearing by first class mail on July 8. This notice was se nt both to the Kelley Drive residence and to Joshua C.’s residence in San Francisco. In addition, an absent parent search was conducted which concluded that mother’s last known address was still Kelley Drive. Mother argues that San Joaquin’s attempts to notice her for the detention hearing were defective under section 290.2, subdivision (c), which requires 10

- day notice by first class mail followed by personal service if the parent fails to appear. She further contends that the absent parent search cond ucted prior to jurisdiction was inadequate because San Joaquin knew that mother was no longer living at Kelley Drive and failed to contact her
sister in an attempt to obtain her current location. In addition, Joshua C., who appeared at the July 23 hearing , stated that he heard mother was “like in San Francisco, maybe in the Hayes Street or downtown. ” Yet the court accepted service on mother at Kelley Drive
and went forward with the jurisdictional hearing. We do not accept all of mother’s factual conclu sions as to what San Joaquin knew or didn’t know about mother’s whereabouts during this timeframe. Moreover, w e seriously doubt that due process was offended by the juvenile court’s decision to proceed with the detention hearing after mother received actual notice of that hearing and27

declined to partic i pate. And , when mother

— aware of the proceedings involving her
children

— failed to provide forwarding information to the social worker and, in fact, arguably absconded with her children in an attempt to avoid involvement with the juvenile court, it is not clear what further obligations San Joaquin had to search for he r. Ultimately, howe ver, we need not decide whether any statutory or due process notice
violations occurred in this case because we conclude that , to the extent that any such errors did take place , they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, whe re

— as here

— there have been attempts to serve a parent with adequate notice, any “errors in notice do not automatically require reversal but are subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice.” ( J.H. , supra , 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1 83.) With respect to the detention hearing, the record is clear that mother received actual notice of the proceedings, was told why she needed to be there, was informed that
she was required to attend, and was offered transportation. Yet she declined t o participate in the hearing. Under such circumstances , it seems exceedingly unlikely that any further noticing on the part of San Jo aquin would have changed this outcome. Moreover, findings and orders made at a detention hearing are generally rendered m oot by later jurisdictional and dispositional determinations. (See In re David H. , supra , 165 Cal.App.4th at p p . 1634

- 1635 ; Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 755, fn. 10; In re Raymond G. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 964, 967; Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenil e Cou rts Practice and Procedure (2015) § 2.190[1], p. 2

– 644 .) Here, the juvenile court’s initial
detention order was superseded by the dispositional order on April 14, 2014, which formally remov ed both C.H. and S.H. from mother’s care. Mo ther was present with counsel during this hearing and vigorously co ntested removal. Thus, any noticing error with respect to the detention hearing was manifestly harmless. With respect to the jurisdic tional hearing, mother argues that the noticing defect s were not harmless because the petition allegations regarding her were facially insufficient, did not allege any risk of harm to the minors, and should have been stricken from the petition. She further claims that her presence and appointment of competen t counsel w ere necessary to ensure that these challenges to the petition were placed before28

the juvenile court. Of course, mother’s argument here must fail for the same reasons we have previously concluded that her jurisdictional challenges do not present a justiciable controversy. Even if she had been present, represented by competent counsel, and managed to strike all of the allegations pertaining to her from the petition, jurisdiction
would still have been established based on the sexual abuse of C.C. by Joshua C. Moreover, the juvenile court would have been free to consider all relevant evidence at disposition (where mother was present and represented by counsel) when determining
whether to remove the minors from her care, whether or not the allegatio ns were contained in the petition and/or independently established jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b). Since there is no evidence that providing mother with any further notice would have actually changed the outcome at jurisdiction or any sub sequent hearing , we find any error in this regard harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Suf

ficiency of Dispositional Removal Order As mentioned above, mother also challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing S.H. and C.H. from her care. Specifically , she argues that removal of the
minors was erro neous because : (1) she was the nonoffending parent with respect to the allegations of sexual abuse ; and (2) her mental health status was an insufficient basis for concluding that the minors would be at substantial risk of harm if placed in her physical custody

. While we do not necessarily disagree with mother’s assessment of her status with respect to the sexual abuse al legations, we need not reach this issue as we conclude that removal was appro priate based on mother’s unstable mental health situation. As stated above, i n order to remove a d ependent child from a parent’s home , there must be clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the chi ld’s health, safety, or physical or emotional well

- being that cannot be eliminated by reasonable

means. ( In re J.C. (2014) 233 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 ( J.C. ); H.E. , supra , 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 718

- 723.) “ ‘ A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a potential detriment to the child if he or
she remain s with the parent. [Citation.] “ The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of29

the statute i s on averting harm to the child.” [Citation.] The court may consider a parent’ s past conduct as well as present circumstances. ’ ” ( In re A.S. (2011) 202
Cal. A pp.4th 237, 247.) However, “[h]arm to the child cannot be presumed from the mere
fact of menta l illness of the parent.” ( In re Jamie M . (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 540.)
Rather , “[t] he social worker must demonstrate with specificity how the minor has been o r will be harmed by the parents’ mental illness .” ( Id. at p. 542; see also id . at p. 540 [p roper basis for ruling includes “ specific examples of the manner in which the [parent’s] behavior has and will adversely affect the child or jeopardize the child’s safety ” ].) With respect to a removal finding , “[o] ur review on appeal follows the ordinary
rules for substantial evidence, notwithstanding that the finding below had to be made by clear and convincing evidence.” ( H.E. , supra , 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 723

- 724; J.C. , supra , 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 6.) “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorab le to the finding, and presuming in its support the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce, we ask whether any rational trier of fact could have made the finding by the requisite standard. [Citation.] Mere support for a contrary conclu sion is not enough to defeat the finding [citation]; nor is the existence of evidence from which a different trier of fact might find otherwise in an exercise of discretion [citation].” ( H.E. , supra , 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 724.) Here, the juve n ile court

— when concluding that continued removal of the minors was appropriate

— indicated that it was “very concerned” with the results of mother’s psychological evaluation. That evaluation confirmed that mother was dealing with “current significant emotional diffic ulties,” including a severe level of depression. Moreover, it was the expert opinion of the evaluator that mother “displays severe impairment in her ability to form accurate impressions of herself and others where she misinterprets the actions and intenti ons of others and perceives events in a distorted manner causing difficulty anticipating the consequences of her actions, faulty judgment, and undermining her adjustment. Her confusion separating reality and fantasy will lead to previse adjustment difficu lties and make the demands of everyday living difficult without assistance, and the degree of her impairment may meet the criteria for a30

psychotic disturbance.” Thus, the psychological evaluation disclosed specific ways in
which mother’s current mental he alth issues placed the children at risk of harm, including her faulty judgment, inability to app r opriately inte r pret the world around her, and difficulty meeting the demands of everyday living. Further, the evidence at disposition did not simply reveal th at mother had a mental illness; it also showed that she had a history of medication non compliance and was currently not consistent ly following t he treatment plan that had been recommended for
her

. Specifically, the juvenile court found that mother was inc onsistent both with her individual therapy an d with her medication regimen , and substantial evidence supports
this conclusion. With respect to individual therapy, the letter submitted by her therapist at the April 7 hearing indicated that mother , while engaged in weekly therapy, had attended only two sessions in February and March 2014. With respect to her medication, mother’s own testimony indicated that she was receiving prescriptions f rom different doctors and deciding for herself on a daily b asis how much of the medication to take

. In
its January 2014 dispositional report, the Agency indicated that mother claimed to be taking “ ‘a lot’ ” of her medication recent ly due to the situation with he r children.
H owev er , her pill bottle indicated th at it had last been refilled in early November and, as of December 23, 2013, she still had two pills remaining. On December 26, 2013, she
went to a third cl inic and obtained an emergency seven

- day supply of Zyprexa. She was
told to return within the week , but did not. Finally, s he did not bring her prescription bottles to the social worker in January 2014 when asked to do so. Thus, there were ample facts in the record from which to conclude that mother was currently not stable on her
medication.
In a ddition

— although there was no evidence that mother’s new living situation was unsafe or unsanitary

— the juvenile cour t reasonably concluded that it was mother’s
mental health issues which had allowed the hazardous condit ions to develop in the family
home in San Joaquin County and that tho se issues had not been resolved. As the court
stated: “It is th is Court’s opinion that the mother is not stable at this time, that the mental
condition that allowed her home to be in the condition that it was in which cau sed the31

Court in San Joaquin County to take jurisdiction of this case still exists.” Moreover , at the time San Joaquin intervened, the evidence in this matter showed actual detriment, danger, and neglect in the home as opposed to simple clutter or chronic messiness: garbage and dirty diapers littered the kitchen floor; bottles of pesticide and a knife were lying within reach of the minors; the home was infested with cockroaches, which got in the food, fell from the ceiling, and crawled in C.C.’s ears; the front room was full of stacked boxes; and the kitchen counters were full of old, moldy food. (Cf. In re Kimberly
F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4t h 519, 526

- 527 ; In re Paul E. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 996, 1005

- 1006 .) Further, 10

- month old S.H. had been treated for scabies and a staph infection in March 2013 and presented with significant emotional disturbance as he regularly head
butted the wall and hit, pinched, and kicked others without apparent trigger. Eight

- year

old C.C. was reportedly unable to read or write. And, at the time that the petition was filed, mother had fai led to take newborn C.H. to the doctor since their release from the hospital , despite the fact that an appointment had been scheduled for her. Given all of these facts, i t was reasonable to conclude that the minors would be at similar risk of harm
if returned to mother. Finally, although the court considered opt ions other than r emoval

— such as monitoring mother’s compliance under a family maintenance plan

— it u l t imately
concluded that removal was warranted. As detailed above, significant evidence suggested that, at the time of the dispositional hearing in April 2014, mother’s ment al
health situation had not stabilized. Moreover, although mother was at that time cooperating with the Agency, albeit inconsistently, she had failed to cooperate with San Joaq uin at the commencement of the case, absenting herself and the minors for signi ficant periods of time and hindering San Joaquin’s ability to ensure that C.H. and
S.H. were free from harm. These facts provide ample basis for the juvenile court’s implied conclusion that there we re no reas onable means to protect the minors short of
the ir continued removal

. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); see H.E. , supra , 169 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 718

- 723.)32

For all of these reasons, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing C.H. and S.H. from mother.
D. Ineffective Assistance Claim Mother’s next argument

— that her dependency counsel was ineffective

— is easily dismissed given our previous holdings in this matter. Pursuant to section 317.5, subdivision (a), “[a]ll parties who are represented by counsel at dependency proceedings shall be entitled to competent counsel.” (See also In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.A pp.4th 1635, 1662 ( Kristin H. ).) Moreover, there is a constitutio n al right to effec tive assistance of counsel in certain juvenile dependency hearing s where the termination of parental rights may result . ( Kristin H. , supra , 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 1659 ; In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1705

- 1707 .) To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the burden is on mother “t o establish both that counsel’ s repre sentation fell below

p revailing professional norms and that, in the absence of counsel’ s failings, a more favorable result was reasonably probable.” ( In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287,
292

- 293 ( Daisy D. ) ; In re Diana G. ( 1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1479.) In addition, a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable on direct appeal (rather than by writ of habeas corpus) only “ where ‘there simply could be no satisfactory explanation’
for trial counsel’s action or inaction.” ( In re Dennis H. (2001) 88 Cal.A pp.4th 94, 98,
fn. 1 ( Dennis H. ) .) Here, mother contends that her retained attorney in Alameda County, Mr. Chong,

was ineffective for failing to challenge the jurisdictional findings made in San Joaquin County without proper notice to her and while her whereabouts were unknown. However, we have concluded in this opinion that jurisdiction in this case would have been established irrespective of any challenge to the allegations in the petition involving
mother. 9 We have further opined that any errors in noticing mother for the detention and

9 Mother chastises Mr. Chong for arguing at disposition that the jurisdictional findings

we re insufficient to establish a present risk of harm to the three minors rather than moving to have those findings set aside or voided. This, however, was exactly what any competent attorney should have done. As we have previously stated, jurisdiction ove r33

jurisdictional hearings in this matter were harmless. Thus, these arguments were not likely to have succeeded at trial, and their lack of merit provides a more than satisfact ory explanation as to why counsel did not press them in the court below. No attorney is required to raise unmeritorious arguments “simply to ‘create a record impregnable to assault for claimed inadequacy of counsel.’ ” ( In re Angel R. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4 th 905, 910.)
Mother also claims that Mr. Chong was ineffective because he failed to file a notice of appeal in a timely manner from C.C.’s dispositional hearing on February 18,
2014

. It is clear that Mr. Chong intended to file such a notice of appeal because he filed a combined notice for all three minors on April 25, 2014, after the conclusion of the April 14, 2014, dispositional hearing for C.H. and S.H. While the notice was obvio us ly timely

a s to C.H. and S.H., it was beyond the 60

- day time limit with respect to C.C. (See rule
8

. 406(a)(1).) We cannot extend this time limit, and our “[a]ppellate jurisdiction to review an appealable order is dependent upon a timely notice of appea l.” ( In re Elizabeth G. ( 1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1331 ; rule 8.406(c) .) Thus, it is clear that, in failing to file a timely notice of a ppeal with respect to C.C., Mr. Chong’s representation of mother fell below p revailing professional norms . (See Dais y D. , supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 292

- 293.) Moreover, there is manifestly no satisfactory explanation for Mr. Chong’s failure in this regard. (See Dennis H. , supra , 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 98, fn. 1.) However, an attorney’s representation is deemed ineff ective only if, in the absence of counsel’ s failings, a more favorable result was reasonably probable . ( Daisy D. , supra , 144 Cal.App.4 th at pp. 292

- 293.) As previously indicated, we have rejected mother’s challenges to the jurisdictional findings with re spect to C.H. and S.H. We have also
concluded that the juvenile court’s dispositiona l order removing C.H. and S.H. from mother’s care was supported by substantial evidence. Since C.C.’s arguments with

these minors was established based on the sexual abuse of C.C. by Joshua C. Thus, mother’s only available argument was a dispositional one

— that the evidence in the record was insufficient to justify removal of the minors from her custody. Mr. Chong arg ued this vigorously at both dispositional hearings.34

respect to jurisdiction and disposition would have be en identical to those advanced for
the other two minors , even if Mr. Chong had timely filed C.C.’s notice of appeal, it is not reasonably probable that mother would have obta i ned a more favorable result. Thus,
there was no i neffective assistance

. E. Denia l of Continuance Under Section 352
In her writ petition, mother argues that the juvenile cou rt erred in refusing her attorney ’ s request for a continuance of the December 15, 2014, contest ed review hearing

. As stated above, mother arrived at the December 15 hearing with her support dog and

— despite the juvenile court’s prior order expressly requiring appropriate proof

—had no documentation that the dog was a service dog rather than an untra ined emotional support
animal. The court refused to allow the dog in to the courtroom , and , as a result, mother chose not to participate in the hearing. Thereafter, mother’s attorney requested a continuance so that mother could be present to testify. Agency counsel objected , arguing
that there was no t go od cause to suppor t the continu a n ce. Minor’s counsel also opposed the continuance request, citing the young age of the minors, their need for permanence, and the length of time that the matter had already been continued. In the end, t he court denied the motion, stating: “This hearing was set sometime ago. It was set to take place all day and, as we previously discussed on the record, this whole issue with the dog and the choices that the mother had today, she had the choice of leaving the dog outside and being herself he re present in the courtroom and she apparently chose to leave. So the Court is not going to continue the matter to another day.” Mother contends that the juvenile court’s refusal to grant a continuance under these circumstances was an abuse of
discretion and a violation of her due process right to be heard. Continuances in juvenile dependency cases , however, are expressly discouraged
and should be difficult to obtain. ( Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242; In re Emily L. (1989) 21 2 Cal.App.3d 734, 743 ( Emily L. ).) Indeed, throughout the dependency statutes, “we find the admonition to accelerate proceedings so that the child is not kept ‘in limbo’ any longer than necessary.” ( Emily L. , supra , 212 Cal.App.3d at

p. 743.) Thus, p urs uant to section 352, a continuance may be granted only upon a35

showing of good cause and only if it is not contrary to the interests of the minor. ( § 352, subd. (a); see rule 5 .550(a).) W hen considering the interests of the minor, a juvenile

court must “giv e substantial weight to a minor’ s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a).) Ultimately, a juvenile court has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a continuance, and a reversal of that decision is warranted only upon proof that an abuse of discretion occurred. ( Ibid. ; In re
Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 605.)
We see no abuse of discretio n here. First, the juvenile court had a reasonable basis for distinguishing between service dogs and support dogs when determining which animals would and would not be allowed in the courtroom. As the court expressed it: “So in terms of the record, as f ar as the Court is concerned about th is distinction between service dogs and support dogs, a service dog, as the Court understands it, is a dog that has specific training and has training to deal with whatever the problem may be with its owner, be it psych ological, physical, something of that nature. A support dog is a dog that provides psychological support or other types of support for the owner but does not have specific training.” The court was understandably concerned about having an untrained dog in the courthouse for an all day hearing. Thus , while perhaps other

so l u tions might have been reached in ot her courtrooms, the judge’s decision in this case
was not an irrational one. Second, Mother was clearly aware that there was an issue with bringing her dog to court and that evidence of the dog’s status as a service animal would be required before it would be allowed into the courtroom. When mother was present in court on
November 6, 2014, the “[i]ssue re: allowing mother to bring ‘comfort’ dog to c ourt” was
continued. Thereafter, at a hearing on November 19, 2014, the court issued an order expressly prohibiting mother from bringing her comfort dog to court, “unless she could provide the court with acceptable written proof that the dog is a service dog, not just a comfort dog.” Any such proof was required to be submitted prior to the next hearing.36

Although mother was not listed as pres ent at the November 19 hearing, her attorney was present and mother clearly had been in contact with h im regardin g the
matter, as he was ordered to submit proof of the dog’s status prior to the next hearing.
M other claimed that she previously had a service dog identification card, but had lost it. As her attorney informed the court: “[My] client and I have discuss ed it. She’s found a number of difficulties trying to obtain the records she needs to get the documentation reissued for her dog. But that was my understanding as well, that the Court wanted to review some records and we have not been able to produce the m. My client has no records at the present time. And it was documented, in fact, the Court had asked that I
share when I received them with all counsel and the Court and, again, I haven’t been able to find anything along the lines of what the Court had a sked for and you did make your position very clear.” We are not unsympathetic to mother’s reluctance to leave her dog unattended
outside of the courthouse . However, the situation was one of her own making. S he knew
in advance that bringing the dog to court without the appropriate paperwork would be problematic . S he could easily have left the dog at home or brought a third party to monitor the dog while she was inside the court house for this very important hearing regarding the welfare of her two youngest children

. Her decision to do neither did not constitute good cause for a continuance. And “[w] hen a parent is absent without good cause at a properly noticed hearing, the court is en titled to proceed in the parent’ s absence.” ( In re Vanessa M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1121, 1131.) Finally, an d equally fatal to mother’ s position, she made no argument in the juvenile court that a continuance would advance the interests of C.H. and S.H. On appeal, she claims that the childre n would have benefitted from continuing the matter so that she could testify because

— w hen making difficult decisions

— a juvenile court can only be helped by having all relevant information before it. While mother’ s input would, of course, have been prefera ble, we see no abuse of discretion in declining to continue the matter further. The young age of the minors, the length of time that they had already
been in out

- of

- home care, the fact that they were on their third plac ement, mother’s past37

inconsistency i n attend ing court hearings, her current observed decline in mental functioning, the multiple prior continuances in the case, and the relatively low probability that mother would supply crucial additional evidence of which her attorney was unaware
if availa ble and allowed to testify all support the juvenile court’s implied conclusion that
further continuance of this matter would not have be en in the best interest s of the
children. 10

F. Re a sonable Services As a final matter, mother argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her
reunification services because reasonable services were not provided to her by the Agency

. (See, e.g., § 366.21, subd. (e) [the court “shall continue” a case to a 12

- month permanency hearing if the court finds at the six

- month hearing that reasonable services have not been provided] ; id ., subds. (f) & (g)(1) [continuance of case from 12

- month to
18

- month hearing where reasonable services have not been provided] .) Specifically,
mother claims that her reunificati on services were unreasonable because: (1) the Agency did not offer her transportation or other assistance to help her get to her appointments on time; (2) the Agency did not provide her with housing assistance after she lost her housing in September 2014; (3) the Agency failed to meet mother at her cognitive level and/or refer her to a therapist appropriate for someone with her level of functioning; (4) the Agency failed to make a referral to a dual diagnosis program; and (5) no visitation
occurred with C. H. and S.H. from mid

- September through mid

- December , 2014

. The adequacy of a reunification plan and the reasonableness of the reunification efforts made by a child welfare agency must be judged according to the circumstances of each case. ( Robin V. v. S uperior Court (1995) 33 Cal.A pp.4th 1158, 1164.) Further,

“ [i]n almost all cases it will be true that more services could have been provided more

10 We are similarly unconvinced by mother’s additional assertion

— that the minors would not have been prejudiced by a continuance because they were placed with their paternal grandmother who wished to prov ide them with a permanent home should reunification fail. The possibility of future permanence is, by definition, impermanent. These minors had already been moved once from a stable relative placement due to the erratic behavior of their mother.38

frequently and that the se rvices provided were imperfect.” ( In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547 ( Misako R. ); see Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969 .) Thus, when considering the adequ acy of reunification services, “ [t]he standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but wh ether the services were reas onable under the circumstances.” ( Misako R., supra , 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547 ; see Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425

- 1426 .) In particular, t o support a finding that reasonable serv ices were offered o r provided, “ the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems,
maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan , and
made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult (such as helping to provide transportation and offering more intensive rehabilitation
services where others h ave failed).” ( In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414 .) We review a reasonable services finding for substantial evidence. ( Angela S. v. Superior
Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762 .) And, under the present facts, we have no difficulty concluding that substantial evidence supports the juvenile cou rt’s finding that the services offered or provided to mother were reasonable. At disposition, the Agency appropriately identified the problems which led to
mother ’s loss of custody as her mental health issues and pos sible substance abuse . The
reunificati on plan adopted for mother contained numerous services designed to remedy these problems, including: individual th erapy ; drug testing; psychotropic medication evaluation and monitoring; participation in a psychological evaluation, includ ing follow through with all tre a t ment recommendations; and supervised visitation. The psychological evaluation completed by m other supported the need for each of the se identified services and also suggested parenting education. The Agency made the necessary referrals for a ll of the recommended services and maintained reasonable
contact with mother

. In addition, a fter mother’s situation began to deteriorate and she tested positive for methamphetamines on two occasion s, the Agency suggested that39

mother participate in a dual diagnosis program. A referral to a program was never made , however, because the court terminated mother ’ s reunification services. Under these circumstances, mother’s failure to make meaningful progress towards reunification had , in our view, little to do with the services provided by the Agency and everything to do with mother’s own refusal to acknowledge and consistently treat her significant mental
health issues. Moreover, a lthough the Agency did not provide mother with specific transport ation or other assistance to get to all of her appointments on time, mother never
asked for any help with transportation. And, indeed, she was able to complete many
tasks

— such as parenting classes, her psychological evaluation, and some drug testing

— with out any assistance. 11 With respect to housing , again, there is no evidence in the
record that mother nee ded or requested housing support

. Finally, mother speculates that the Agency did not take into account her cognitive limitations or refer her to a ther apist
who understood her limited level o f functioning. Once more, there is no evidence of this in the record. To the contrary, the soc i a l worker was presumably aware of the contents of the psych ological evaluation which disc ussed mother’s cognitive chall enge s. Moreover, Dr. Goodlow indicated that mother was making “marked progress” in therapy, and mother indicated that she “really liked” her therapist. Thus, there was no evidence the
referral to Dr. Goodlow was improper. We conclude with the oft repeat ed admonition
that

— w ith respect to each of these purport ed reuni fication deficiencies

— i f mother felt during the reunification period that the services offered to her were inadequate, she had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile cour t in formulating a better plan. (See In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal .A pp.4th 404, 416.) Mother’s lack of visitation with the minors from mid

- September through mid

December, 2014, however, is more troublesome . We agree with mother that visitation is

an e ssential component of any reunification plan. (See In re Mark L. (2001) 94
Cal. A pp.4th 573, 580.) However, visitation must be “consistent with the well

- being of

11 The r ecord does disclose instances where she was reminded of her appointments by the social worker or service providers.40

the child,” and “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child. ” (§ 362.1, subds. (a)(1)(A) & (B).) At the beginning of the reunification period in this case, mother was in the enviable position of residing in the same apartment complex with C.H. and S.H. She was therefore able to engage in supervised visitation w ith the minors each morning and evening. In July 2014, however, mother had an altercation with one of the minors’ relative caregivers and reported to another caregiver that if she “ ‘had a gun she would
kill the kids and this whole situation would go away .’ ” The social worker attempted to move the supervised visitation to a more neutral setting at that time, but mother failed to attend the required orientation. Then, on September 11, 2014, the minors were removed from their relative placement due to the erratic behavior of mother and placed with another relative in a different county. In connection with this placement change, mother made death threats against the social worker. Another orientation for supervised
visitation was scheduled for mother on S eptember 30, 2014, but mother again failed to
attend. At the time of the contested review hearing on December 1 5 , 2014, mother was on a waiting list for therapeutic visitation. The social worker thought that, at that point, the minors needed the support provided by therapeutic visitation services

. The social worker
had also called San Francisco’s child welfare agency in an attempt to uncover additional local visitation resources, bu t had not received any assistance . Thus, no visitation had
occurred sin ce the minor’s plac e ment change in mid

- September. Under these circumstances, we find the lack of visitation unfortunate , but understandable. It was mother’s own actions which led to the placement change. Moreover, third

- party supervised visitation was made available to her twice and she failed to attend the necessary orientations. Mother a rgu es that the Agency should have , itself, supervised the visits . However, given mother’s threats of extreme violence against
both the social worker and her childre n , use of a neutral and professional third

- party visitation se rvice appears to have been a reasonable means of attempting to ensure the41

safety of these young children . Thus, despite the interruption in mother’s visitation, we find that the services off

ere d to her were reasonable.

I I I. DIS POSITIO N
T he juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders with respect to
S.H. and C.H. are affirmed as is the juvenile court’s order terminating C.C.’s dependency action. In addition, mother’s writ petition is denied on the merits. (See § 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C), (4)(B).) The stay of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing previously granted by this court on March 4, 2015, is lifted upon the finality of this opinion.42 _________________________ REARDON, ACTING P. J.

We concur:

_________________________ RIVERA, J.

_________________________ STREETER, J.43

In re C.H. A141655, A141984, A143907