Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1709-CR-2112 | February 20, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

P. Jeffrey Schlesinger

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Alexander Marvel Jones,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 20, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1709-CR-2112

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, 

Judge

The Honorable Natalie Bokota, 

Judge Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause No.

45G01-1701-F2-2

Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Alexander Marvel Jones (“Jones”) challenges his five-year sentence, imposed 

after Jones pleaded guilty to Criminal Recklessness, as a Level 5 felony.1

[2] We affirm.

Issues

[3] Jones presents the following issues:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

him; and

II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] On January 1, 2017, Adrian Ortiz (“Ortiz”) was parking in Hammond when 

another vehicle parked behind his. Eriec Campbell (“Campbell”) was driving 

the other vehicle, and Jones was a passenger. Campbell exited the vehicle, 

approached Ortiz, and then fired several shots into Ortiz’s vehicle. Ortiz began 

to drive off, at which point Jones shot toward the rear of the vehicle.

 

1

Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-2(a), -2(b)(2)(A).
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[5] In the wake of the shooting, Jones faced three felony counts: Attempted 

Murder, as a Level 1 felony;2 Attempted Robbery Resulting in Serious Bodily 

Injury, as a Level 2 felony;3 and Attempted Armed Robbery, as a Level 3 

felony.4 Jones and the State reached a plea agreement whereby the State would 

amend the charging information to include a charge of Criminal Recklessness, 

as a Level 5 felony—to which Jones would plead guilty—and the State would 

move to dismiss the remaining counts. Jones later pleaded guilty pursuant to

the plea agreement. Thereafter, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, and 

sentenced Jones to five years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

[6] Jones now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Abuse of Discretion

[7] The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is between one year and six years, 

with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6. Where, as here, the 

trial court has imposed a sentence within the statutory range, the sentence “is 

subject to review only for abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g. The trial court abuses its discretion if its 

 

2

I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1.

3

I.C. §§ 35-42-5-1, 35-41-5-1.

4

Id.
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decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before it, or the reasonable deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id.

[8] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-3, “[b]efore sentencing a person for a 

felony, the court must conduct a hearing to consider the facts and 

circumstances relevant to sentencing.” If, upon the hearing, the court identifies 

aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances, the court must enter a 

“statement of the court’s reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes.” 

I.C. § 35-38-1-3. In its sentencing statement, the trial court need not identify 

every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, but it is obligated to “identify all 

significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 

490 (emphasis added). Moreover, the trial court is not obligated to explain why 

it did not find a circumstance to be significantly mitigating. Id. at 493.

[9] On appeal, “[a]n allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a 

mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence 

is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. Nonetheless, even 

where a trial court has failed to identify a significant mitigating circumstance, 

we will not remand for resentencing unless “we cannot say with confidence that 

the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly 

considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491.

[10] In sentencing Jones, the trial court identified two mitigating circumstances: that 

Jones had completed programs while in jail and that Jones was helpful to his 

elderly mother. The court gave the latter factor “relatively low weight” because 
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Jones had committed several crimes while living with his mother, and Jones 

had made plans to move out of state. App. Vol. II at 72. The trial court also 

identified aggravating circumstances, including Jones’s criminal history (three 

felony convictions and six misdemeanor convictions), and Jones’s continued 

engagement in unlawful behavior after receiving leniency in prior criminal 

matters. Moreover, the trial court gave “moderate weight” to the impact on 

Ortiz, who was severely injured when Campbell shot into the car, and who 

suffered from fear, anxiety, and depression due to the incident. Id. at 73.

[11] Jones argues that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by failing to 

identify certain mitigating circumstances, including his decision to plead guilty. 

“[T]he significance of a guilty plea as a mitigating factor varies from case to 

case.” Anglemyer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ind. 2007), on reh’g. “For 

example, a guilty plea may not be significantly mitigating when it does not 

demonstrate the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility . . . or when the 

defendant receives a substantial benefit in return for the plea.” Id. Moreover, a 

guilty plea may not be significantly mitigating if it appears to be more likely the 

result of pragmatism than acceptance of responsibility and remorse. Id.

[12] Here, Jones’s decision to plead guilty appears to have been pragmatic, in that 

the State agreed to seek dismissal of three counts that carried greater sentencing 

exposure. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by not 

identifying the decision to plead guilty as a significant mitigating circumstance.
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[13] Jones next argues that the court should have determined that his remorse was a 

significant mitigating circumstance. “Remorse, or lack thereof, by a defendant 

often is something that is better gauged by a trial judge who views and hears a 

defendant’s apology and demeanor first hand and determines the defendant’s 

credibility.” Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also

Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 535 (Ind. 2002) (“Without evidence of some 

impermissible consideration by the court, we accept its determination of 

credibility.”). Here, the trial court made equivocal remarks regarding Jones’s 

credibility: at one point, the trial court stated that it “believe[d]” Jones was 

sincere, Tr. Vol. II at 50, but it later remarked that it “hop[ed]” Jones was

sincere. Id. at 51. Thus, it appears that the court was not fully convinced of 

Jones’s credibility, and we are not persuaded that the trial court abused its 

discretion by not identifying remorse as a significant mitigating circumstance.

Inappropriate Sentence

[14] Although a trial court may have acted within its discretion in sentencing a 

criminal defendant, the Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate 

review and revision of the selected sentence. Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6. This 

authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides 

that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” The appropriateness of a sentence “turns on ‘myriad . . . factors that 

come to light in a given case,’” Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017) 
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(quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)), and the principal 

role of our review “is to attempt to leaven the outliers.” McCain v. State, 88 

N.E.3d 1066, 1067 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). We begin our “analysis with 

‘substantial deference to the trial court’s sentence,’ then ‘independently 

examine’ the defendant’s offenses and character.” Taylor, 86 N.E.3d at 165 

(quoting Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015)).

[15] Regarding the offense, we observe that the legislature selected an advisory 

sentence of three years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-6. As to the nature of the offense, 

while Ortiz was driving to safety after Campbell shot him, Jones fired at Ortiz’s

vehicle. Jones argues that his shots did not strike Ortiz or the vehicle, yet Jones 

placed Ortiz—and anyone else nearby—in danger. Moreover, in asking us to 

revise his sentence, Jones attempts to minimize his actions, arguing that he was 

intoxicated and thought Campbell was in danger. Jones asserts that although 

he “knowingly fired at the vehicle, he believed he was justified in doing so 

thereby mitigating the nature of the offense.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. However, 

we are not inclined to disturb the sentence based on this extraordinary belief.

[16] As to the character of the offender, Jones has accumulated six misdemeanor 

convictions and three felony convictions. Jones argues that none of his felonies

were for violent acts. Jones also argues that he accepted responsibility by 

pleading guilty and that he expressed remorse prior to being sentenced—actions 

that generally reflect positively on his character. However, in previous criminal 

matters, Jones has had his probation revoked, and he violated the terms of his 

conditional discharge in Illinois. Thus, despite the prior leniency afforded to 
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him, Jones has continued to make poor decisions—including the decision to 

carry a weapon and drink alcohol to the point that he could personally 

rationalize shooting at another vehicle. Moreover, although it appears that 

Jones is a helpful son, Jones committed several crimes while living with his 

mother, despite the support network Jones has with his law-abiding family. 

Ultimately, Jones has had several opportunities to reform his behavior, but has 

continued to engage in criminal activity that this time put others in danger.

[17] After evaluating the nature of the offense and Jones’s character, we are not 

persuaded that the five-year sentence is inappropriate.

Conclusion

[18] The trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion, and the sentence is not 

inappropriate.

[19] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.