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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48839-2021 

STATE OF IDAHO,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

RODNEY CARLTON HARRELL,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Boise, September 2022 Term

Opinion filed: November 9, 2023 

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 

The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

Nevin, Benjamin & McKay LLP, Boise, for Appellant. Dennis A. Benjamin 

argued. 

Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kenneth K. 

Jorgensen argued. 

 

ZAHN, Justice.

Rodney Carlton Harrell appeals his judgment of conviction for trafficking in 

methamphetamine, trafficking in marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Harrell argues

his convictions should be vacated because: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress, and (2) the district court erred in denying his objection to the reduction of peremptory 

challenges imposed by this Court’s emergency order adopted in response to the COVID-19 

pandemic. For the reasons stated below, we affirm Harrell’s judgment of conviction. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the outset, the incident in this case involved the arrest of three occupants of a pickup 

truck—Harrell, Stonecypher, and Mosca. This Court resolved Stonecypher’s related appeal 

involving the denial of his motion to suppress in State v. Stonecypher, 170 Idaho 156, 508 P.3d 
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1230 (2022). Both cases involve the same incident; therefore, we incorporate here the facts 

described in our decision in Stonecypher:

In May 2020, Idaho State Police Corporal Seth Green observed Stonecypher 

driving a lifted pickup truck east on I-90 in Kootenai County without mudflaps as 

required by Idaho Code section 49-949. The pickup also lacked license plates, and 

a temporary license in the rear window appeared to have been altered. Green pulled 

over Stonecypher and spoke with him and his passengers, Tabatha Mosca and 

Rodney Harrell, during the ensuing stop. Green noticed items in the cab of the truck 

that he associated with illegal drug activity and observed that each of the occupants 

displayed physical indications of recent drug use.

While waiting for the results of the warrant check from dispatch, Green 

asked the three about their travels. Green found the explanation for their trip to be 

incongruous and, because their story involved returning from a visit with a person 

actively sick with COVID-19, he suspected the story was designed to dissuade him 

from pursuing the stop further.

At about eight minutes into the stop, Green told the occupants that he 

suspected drug activity and began to ask them if they had any drugs or 

paraphernalia in the pickup. Green's questions were interrupted when dispatch 

informed Green that the license and warrant check were clear. Green then resumed 

his questions and the three denied that there were any illegal drugs in the pickup. 

Eventually, a K-9 unit arrived and the drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of 

illegal drugs. A subsequent search of the pickup uncovered more than three and a 

half pounds of marijuana, more than 200 grams of methamphetamine, drug 

paraphernalia, firearms, and ammunition.

Id. at 158, 508 P.3d at 1232.

The State charged Harrell with one count of trafficking in methamphetamine pursuant to 

Idaho Code section 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), one count of trafficking in marijuana pursuant to Idaho

Code section 37-2732B(a)(1)(A), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia pursuant to 

Idaho Code section 37-2734A(1). The State also alleged that Harrell was subject to a persistent 

violator sentencing enhancement because he had previously been convicted of at least two other 

felony offenses. Harrell moved to suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop because “the 

extension of the stop and the warrantless search of the vehicle by law enforcement was [sic] 

unlawful and without legal justification, therefore [sic] in violation of the Fourth Amendment to 

the Constitution of the United States and Article I § 17 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho.” 

The State opposed the motion to suppress and argued that Green’s observations provided a 

reasonable suspicion to “expand the purpose of the traffic stop to include a drug investigation” and 

that the search of the vehicle was lawful because the dog sniff provided probable cause.
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The district court denied the motion to suppress. The district court explained that the 

purpose of the encounter switched from investigation of potential traffic infractions to a drug 

trafficking investigation early on in the stop. The district court found that the arresting officer’s 

observations of the torch lighter, along with the physical mannerisms of the occupants, sufficiently

provided him with reasonable suspicion to change the purpose of the stop and call for a canine 

unit. Additionally, the district court concluded that the drug dog’s alert provided probable cause 

to search the vehicle. The district court further concluded that there was no unlawful extension of 

the stop because the arresting officer’s observations gave him reasonable suspicion to expand the 

purpose of the stop. 

Harrell’s trial was rescheduled several times due to the COVID-19 pandemic. During the 

pandemic, this Court issued a series of emergency orders governing trial proceedings. The orders 

set forth several deviations from our rules of criminal procedure, including a reduction in the 

number of peremptory challenges in certain criminal cases. Harrell filed a pre-trial written 

objection to the reduced number of peremptory challenges. 

At the time the district court decided Harrell’s motion, our October 8, 2020 Amended Order

governed trial proceedings. It also reduced the number of peremptory challenges:

b. Peremptory challenges allotted to each side, being procedural mechanisms and 

not substantive rights, shall be modified as follows:

i. Pursuant to I.C.R. 24(d), if the offense charged is punishable by 

death and the state is seeking a death sentence when voir dire 

commences, each party, regardless of the number of defendants, is 

entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. 

ii. Pursuant to I.C.R. 24(d), in all other felonies, each party, regardless 

of the number of defendants, is entitled to three peremptory 

challenges; however, if there are co-defendants and the court 

determines that there is a conflict of interest between them or among 

them, the court may allow one additional peremptory challenge 

(total of four), and permit them to be exercised separately (e.g. two 

each), or jointly.

Am. Order re: Jury Trials ¶ 9(b) (Idaho Oct. 8, 2020). The district court overruled Harrell’s

objection and, in accordance with this Court’s Order, allowed each side to have only three 

peremptory challenges because Harrell’s criminal charges were not punishable by death. The jury 

convicted Harrell on all charges. Harrell then admitted that he had been convicted of eight prior 

felony offenses, which was sufficient to invoke the application of the persistent violator sentencing 

enhancement.
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For count one, trafficking in methamphetamine greater than 200 grams, the district court 

sentenced Harrell to a unified term of life imprisonment, with 10 years fixed. The district court 

noted that the sentence on count one included the enhancement for being a persistent violator. For 

count two, trafficking in marijuana one pound or more, the district court sentenced Harrell to a 

unified term of five years, with all five years fixed. For count three, the crime of possession of 

drug paraphernalia, the district court sentenced Harrell to 354 days in the local jail. The court 

ordered that the three sentences be served concurrently. Harrell timely appealed his conviction. 

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Whether the district court erred in denying Harrell’s motion to suppress.

2. Whether the district court erred in denying Harrell’s objection to the reduction of 

peremptory challenges.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This Court applies a bifurcated standard when reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress. 

State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408, 283 P.3d 722, 725 (2012). “This Court will accept the trial 

court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but will freely review the trial court’s

application of constitutional principles to the facts found.” Id. “Findings of fact are not clearly 

erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 

804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009) (citing State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659, 152 P.3d 16, 

20 (2007)). It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the credibility of the witnesses, 

weigh conflicting evidence, and draw factual inferences. Id.

We review constitutional questions de novo. State v. Smalley, 164 Idaho 780, 783, 435 P.3d 

1100, 1103 (2019).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The district court did not err when it denied Harrell’s motion to suppress.

Harrell’s arguments are similar to those raised by Stonecypher in his related appeal. We 

rejected those arguments in Stonecypher and Harrell’s arguments provide no reason for us to depart 

from that analysis here. See State v. Stonecypher, 170 Idaho 156, 508 P.3d 1230 (2022). For the 

reasons stated in our decision in Stonecypher, we affirm the district court’s decision denying the 

motion to suppress. See id.
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B. The district court did not err when it denied Harrell’s objection to the reduction of 

peremptory challenges.

Harrell argues the district court erred in overruling his objection to the reduction in the 

number of peremptory challenges he received because the Idaho Constitution and the United States

Constitution both guarantee him ten peremptory challenges. We affirm the district court’s decision

because neither constitution guarantees a specific number of peremptory challenges.

1. The Idaho Constitution’s right to jury trial does not incorporate a specific number of 

peremptory challenges.

Harrell argues that Article I, sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, when read 

together, afford Idaho citizens a right to ten peremptory challenges. In support of this contention, 

he relies primarily on the fact that territorial statutes in effect at the time the Idaho Constitution 

was adopted provided ten peremptory challenges for defendants facing life in prison. Harrell also 

argues that the right to peremptory challenges has roots in the common law, which supports his 

position that the Idaho Constitution incorporated this right. 

The State asserts that this Court had the inherent power to issue its emergency order 

concerning peremptory challenges because the number of challenges available to a criminal 

defendant is procedural rather than substantive. The State also points out that the question before 

this Court is whether the number of peremptory challenges a criminal defendant receives is 

constitutionally protected; the question is not whether there is a constitutional right to any 

peremptory challenges. Finally, the State asserts Harrell failed to adequately support his argument 

in his opening brief because he did not address the standard for reversable error announced in State 

v. Cox, 169 Idaho 14, 490 P.3d 14 (2021).

The district court’s analysis of the issue began by acknowledging this Court’s October 8, 

2020 Amended Order. The court then stated that “I do think that the [c]ourt needs to make a record 

as to its ruling and not simply rely on the order issued by the Idaho Supreme Court.” The district 

court concluded that peremptory challenges are a “state-created means to the [c]onstitutional end 

of an impartial jury and a fair trial[.]” The district court also noted it had not “heard any real 

demonstration of prejudice” as required by Idaho caselaw. The court further observed that the 

October 8, 2020 Amended Order stated that the number of peremptory challenges allotted to either 

side is a procedural issue rather than a substantive right. On these bases, the district court overruled 

Harrell’s objection to the number of peremptory challenges he received under the October 8, 2020 

Amended Order. 
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Harrell’s argument requires us to interpret the scope of the Idaho Constitution’s jury trial 

provisions. Harrell asserts that, when read together and in conjunction with Idaho’s territorial 

statutes, sections 7 and 13 of Article I of the Idaho Constitution guarantee a defendant ten 

peremptory challenges. Both provisions are in the first section of our constitution, entitled the 

“Declaration of Rights.” Article I, section 7 is titled “Right to Trial by Jury” and states: 

The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions, three-fourths of 

the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all cases of 

misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict. A trial by jury may be 

waived in all criminal cases, by the consent of all parties, expressed in open court, 

and in civil actions by the consent of the parties, signified in such manner as may 

be prescribed by law. In civil actions the jury may consist of twelve or of any 

number less than twelve upon which the parties may agree in open court. Provided, 

that in cases of misdemeanor and in civil actions within the jurisdiction of any court 

inferior to the district court, whether such case or action be tried in such inferior 

court or in district court, the jury shall consist of not more than six.

Article I, section 13 is titled “Guaranties in Criminal Actions and Due Process of Law” and states:

In all criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right to a speedy and 

public trial; to have the process of the court to compel the attendance of witnesses 

in his behalf, and to appear and defend in person and with counsel.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; nor be compelled in 

any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or 

property without due process of law.

Neither provision expressly mentions peremptory challenges. We therefore must determine what 

the founders intended to encompass within the statement “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain 

inviolate[.]”

This Court has interpreted the language, “shall remain inviolate” in Article I, section 7 as 

preserving the right to a jury trial as it existed when the Idaho Constitution was adopted. State v. 

Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 886, 292 P.3d 273, 277 (2013) (“The constitutional right of trial by jury 

has been interpreted by this Court to secure that right as it existed at common law when the Idaho 

Constitution was adopted.”). The resolution of Harrell’s argument on appeal requires us to

determine whether the right to jury trial as it existed at the time the Idaho Constitution was adopted

guaranteed a criminal defendant a specific number of peremptory challenges. We utilize several 

resources when interpreting whether the Idaho Constitution protects certain rights:

Typically, one of the best resources for interpreting the Idaho Constitution 

is the compilation of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 

of Idaho 1889 (I.W. Hart ed., 1912). [State v. Clarke, 165 Idaho 393, 397, 446 P.3d 

451, 455 (2019)]. Article 1, Section 17, however, was adopted without debate. Id.
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Thus, “[i]n the absence of the words of the framers, rights guaranteed by the state 

constitution are ‘examined in light of the practices at common law and the statutes 

of Idaho when our constitution was adopted and approved by the citizens of 

Idaho.’” Id. (quoting State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 392, 670 P.2d 463, 493 

(1983)). However, as we noted in State v. Clarke, while “preexisting statutes and 

the common law may be used to help inform our interpretation of the Idaho 

Constitution, . . . they are not the embodiment of, nor are they incorporated within, 

the Constitution. To hold otherwise would elevate statutes and the common law 

that predate the Constitution’s adoption to constitutional status.” Id. Therefore,

“[w]hen construing the Idaho Constitution, ‘the primary object is to determine the 

intent of the framers.’” Id. (citation omitted).

State v. Lancaster, 171 Idaho 236, 242, 519 P.3d 1176, 1182 (2022) (all but first alteration in 

original).

The Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho do not address 

whether the number of peremptory challenges was intended to be a constitutionally protected 

aspect of the right to a trial by jury or the guaranties in criminal cases. Rather, the debate 

concerning the right to trial by jury focused on whether juries should be required to render a 

unanimous decision. E.g., 1 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho 

1889, at 146–61, 235–60 (I. W. Hart ed., 1912). 

Turning to the common law practices at the time our constitution was adopted, the earliest 

known process for challenging jurors can be found in Roman Law. Hans Zeisel & Sheri Seidman 

Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal 

District Court, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 491, 491 n.1 (1977). In 104 B.C., the Lex Sevilia permitted both 

the accused and the accuser in a criminal case to call 100 “judices,” and each could reject 50 from 

the others’ list, leaving 100 to try the case. Id. In 7 B.C., the Roman emperor Augustus Caesar 

issued an edict concerning capital cases, which directed that fifty prospective jurors be drawn, onehalf Roman and one-half Greek, and permitted the prosecutor to dismiss one from each group and 

the accused to dismiss three, provided the accused did not dismiss only Romans or Greeks. Id.

The first use of peremptory challenges in England was by prosecutors between the years 

1250 and 1300. Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges: A Call for Change Through 

Comparative Analysis, 32 Hastings Int’l & Compar. L. Rev. 363, 364 (2009). At that time, 

prosecutors could remove as many jurors as they wanted. Id. Defense counsel were later permitted 

to exercise peremptory challenges as well. Id. The defense, however, was limited to thirty-five 

peremptory challenges while the prosecution was permitted an unlimited number. Id. By 

Blackstone’s time, defendants were still provided thirty-five peremptory challenges. 4 William
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Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 353, 354 (1769). King Henry VIII later reduced 

this number to twenty, which remained until the mid-nineteenth century. Zeise & Diamond, 30 

Stan. L. Rev., at 491 n.1.

The American colonies largely adopted the common law provisions concerning jury trials, 

including the use of peremptory challenges. April J. Anderson, Peremptory Challenges at the Turn 

of the Nineteenth Century: Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in 

Practitioners’ Trial Manuals, 16 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties 1, 17 (2020). However, neither 

the federal Constitution nor the Bill of Rights mention them, despite argument from some delegates 

that they should be included. Id. at 17–18.

In 1790, the new United States Congress included peremptory challenges in its first 

criminal law—the Crimes Act of 1790. 1 Cong. Ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 118. The Act granted 

twenty peremptory challenges to criminal defendants charged with certain capital felonies, and 

thirty-five peremptory challenges to defendants charged with treason. Id. Following the adoption 

of the Crimes Act, judicial decisions expanded the right to peremptory challenges and, by 1870, 

almost all states granted both the defense and the prosecution discretion to use a specific number 

of peremptory challenges. Wilson, 32 Hastings Int’l & Compar. L. Rev., at 366.

During the nineteenth century, most states gave the prosecution fewer peremptory 

challenges than those allotted to the criminal defendant. Anderson, 16 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ.

Liberties, at 18–19. For example, John Proffatt wrote in his 1877 treatise that the prosecutor 

typically had half of the number of peremptory challenges than the defendant enjoyed. Id. at 19. 

In 1853, Virginia did not grant the prosecutor any peremptory challenges. Id. During the second 

half of the nineteenth century, states began codifying peremptory challenges in statute and 

extended them to misdemeanor trials and civil trials. Id. By 1889, ten states allowed two 

peremptory challenges in civil trials, eleven states allowed three challenges, nine permitted four 

challenges, and one allowed five challenges. Id.

The Idaho Territory similarly codified peremptory challenges during the latter half of the 

nineteenth century. In 1864, Idaho’s territorial statutes provided twenty peremptory challenges to 

defendants facing death or life imprisonment. Rev. Stat. § 334 (Idaho Terr. 1864). In 1887, just 

three years prior to the adoption of Idaho’s Constitution, the territorial legislature reduced the 

number of peremptory challenges for defendants facing death or life in prison to ten and permitted 

the Territory five challenges. Rev. Stat. § 7830 (Idaho Terr. 1887). On a trial for any other offense, 
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the defendant was entitled to six challenges and the Territory was permitted three. Id. In the event 

that several defendants were tried together, Idaho’s territorial statutes did not grant each defendant 

ten peremptory challenges, but instead required them to join together in making the ten challenges. 

Rev. Stat. § 7816 (Idaho Terr. 1887).

After considering this history, we hold that, while the common law demonstrates 

widespread use of peremptory challenges, the practices involving the use of challenges differed 

from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. There is no evidence that the common law uniformly guaranteed

criminal defendants a specific number of challenges. The history recited above reveals that, while 

the states largely codified a right to peremptory challenges, they differed in the number of 

challenges granted. The common law therefore did not require a specific number of peremptory

challenges to ensure that a defendant received an impartial jury. 

Our conclusion is also supported by Idaho’s history as reflected in its territorial statutes. 

Just three years before Idaho’s citizens ratified the state constitution, Idaho’s territorial legislature 

reduced the number of peremptory challenges provided to a criminal defendant by more than half. 

It also required criminal defendants to share those peremptory challenges. This meant that the 

number of peremptory challenges granted to a defendant differed depending on whether the 

defendant was tried alone or with co-defendants. If the common law at that time guaranteed a 

criminal defendant a specific number of peremptory challenges, one would not expect to see the 

territorial legislature changing the number of peremptory challenges or requiring co-defendants to 

share them. For all of the reasons discussed above, we reject Harrell’s appeal and hold that the 

Idaho Constitution does not guarantee a criminal defendant a specific number of peremptory 

challenges.

We also note that Harrell has not asserted on appeal that a single biased juror was 

empaneled, nor has he argued on appeal that a juror should have been removed for cause. Harrell 

has not shown that the reduction from ten to three peremptory challenges diminished or adversely 

impacted his right to an impartial jury. 

2. The United States Constitution does not provide a criminal defendant the right to any 

peremptory challenges.

Harrell also argues that he has a right to ten peremptory challenges under the United States

Constitution’s Due Process Clause. He asserts that Idaho Code section 19-2601, which provides 

criminal defendants with ten peremptory challenges when facing death or life in prison, created a 

constitutionally protected right that could not be altered without due process. Harrell concedes this 
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argument was raised for the first time on appeal. Still, he maintains the Court should consider this 

issue under the fundamental error doctrine. 

The State argues Harrell has failed to demonstrate fundamental error. First, the State 

maintains Harrell has not proved his constitutional rights were violated because there is clear 

federal caselaw holding that the federal constitution does not provide a right to peremptory 

challenges. Second, the State argues Harrell has failed to prove this error was clear or obvious 

based on the record. Finally, the State asserts that Harrell has not shown the alleged deprivation 

affected his substantial rights. 

If a defendant failed to object to an alleged constitutional violation at trial and is raising

the issue for the first time on appeal, this Court can only consider it if the alleged violation amounts 

to fundamental error. State v. Alvarado, 168 Idaho 189, 195–96, 481 P.3d 737, 743–44 (2021)

(citing State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019)). Under the fundamental 

error doctrine,

(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant’s unwaived 

constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without 

the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 

including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; and 

(3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant’s 

substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the 

outcome of the trial proceedings.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010) (footnote omitted).

Relevant to the first prong of the fundamental error doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution guarantees that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, 

or property, without due process of law[.]” The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 

certain property and liberty interests are entitled to due process protection. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of 

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985). These interests are “not created by the 

Constitution. Rather, they are created, and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.” Town of Castle Rock v. 

Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The United States Supreme Court has “long recognized” that “peremptory challenges are 

not of federal constitutional dimension.” United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 

(2000) (citations omitted). Indeed, “[s]tates may withhold peremptory challenges ‘altogether 

without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial.’” Rivera v. 
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Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 152 (2009) (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992)). This 

Court recently recognized this principle: “the existence and scope of a peremptory challenge right 

is a matter of state law.” Cox, 169 Idaho at 18, 490 P.3d at 18.

Under his due process theory, Harrell attempts to distinguish United States Supreme Court 

precedent by arguing that Idaho Code section 19-2601, which provides criminal defendants with 

ten peremptory challenges when facing death or life in prison, created a constitutionally protected

right to ten peremptory challenges that could not be altered without due process. What Harrell fails 

to appreciate is that the United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he right to exercise 

peremptory challenges in state court is determined by state law.” Rivera, 556 U.S. at 152 (emphasis 

added). Thus, the “Court repeatedly has stated that the right to a peremptory challenge may be 

withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair 

trial.” McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added). 

Harrell also fails to grapple with the fact that the United States Supreme Court has rejected 

due process challenges to the loss of peremptory challenges under state law. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 

487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988); Rivera, 556 U.S. at 156–62. In so doing, the United States Supreme Court 

emphasized that “the ‘right’ to peremptory challenges is ‘denied or impaired’ only if the defendant 

does not receive that which state law provides.” Ross, 487 U.S. at 89. While Harrell correctly notes 

that Idaho Code section 19-2601 identifies a specific number of peremptory challenges, he does 

not address or otherwise dispute this Court’s conclusion in our October 8, 2020 Amended Order 

that peremptory challenges are procedural mechanisms rather than substantive rights. We have 

long recognized that when a matter is one of procedure, this Court’s rule will prevail over a 

conflicting statute. State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992). While our 

October 8, 2020 Amended Order was not a rule, it was enacted pursuant to this Court’s inherent 

authority to regulate the procedure in Idaho’s trial courts. Id. Because Harrell has not challenged 

our conclusion that peremptory challenges are procedural mechanisms or this Court’s inherent 

authority to regulate all matters of procedure in Idaho’s trial courts, our October 8, 2020 Amended 

Order is the operative document for determining “that which state law provide[d]” Harrell. 

At the time of Harrell’s jury trial, this Court’s October 8, 2020 Amended Order provided 

Harrell with three peremptory challenges. He does not dispute that he did, in fact, receive three 

peremptory challenges at his jury trial. As such, Harrell received what he was entitled to under 

state law. We hold that Harrell has failed to demonstrate a violation of his federal due process 
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rights and has therefore failed to establish the first prong of the fundamental error doctrine. Given 

this conclusion, we need not address the remaining elements of the fundamental error doctrine in 

order to affirm the district court’s ruling.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm Harrell’s judgment of conviction. 

Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices BRODY, STEGNER, and MOELLER CONCUR.