IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Marion Mason, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1946 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: February 19, 2016

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: May 18, 2016

Marion Mason (Claimant), pro se, petitions for review of an 

adjudication of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review denying his 

claim for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 In doing 

so, the Board affirmed the Referee’s determination that Claimant was ineligible for 

benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, 43 P.S. §802(b),2because he voluntarily 

terminated his employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. 

Finding no error by the Board, we affirm.

Claimant was employed by Consortium, Inc. as a full-time therapist 

from January 2012 until he resigned on May 22, 2015, citing harassment by his 

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §§751 –

918.10.

2

Section 402(b) states, in relevant part, that “[a]n employe shall be ineligible for compensation 

for any week ... [i]n which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of 

a necessitous and compelling nature.” 43 P.S. §802(b).
2

former supervisor. Claimant applied for unemployment compensation benefits, 

which the UC Service Center denied. Claimant appealed and the Referee 

conducted a hearing on August 13, 2015. Claimant appeared pro se and Employer 

did not participate.

Claimant testified that on April 22, 2015, he was walking down a 

hallway at work when he encountered his former supervisor, Judy Spann. As the 

two walked past each other Spann pushed Claimant from behind, causing him to 

“almost [fall] into the door.” Notes of Testimony, 8/13/2015, at 5 (N.T. __). 

Claimant continued on without comment. Later that day, Claimant passed Spann 

again as he was entering a co-worker’s office and she “swatted [him] with a stack 

of papers.” Id. Another supervisor who witnessed this incident, Jerome Wills, 

asked Spann “why did she do that, and she said because she can.” Id. Claimant 

responded “no you can’t, and don’t do it again.” Id. The next day, Claimant 

reported the incidents to his supervisor and, while the two were talking, Spann 

overheard the conversation and apologized to Claimant “in an angry way.” Id.

On April 24, 2015, Claimant submitted an incident report to 

Employer’s human resources department. He met with human resources the 

following week and was advised he would get a response within eight to ten days. 

Claimant waited 12 to 14 days for a response but did not receive one. He tendered 

his resignation on May 18, 2015. 

Claimant testified that he did not follow up with human resources 

because he assumed his resignation would provoke a response from Employer and 

because he feared a reprisal from Spann. Claimant testified that when Spann was 

his supervisor she tried to fire him but was unsuccessful. According to Claimant, 
3

Spann transferred him to a different supervisor and tried to sabotage his 

employment by increasing his caseload and criticizing his work.

The Referee found Spann’s actions did not create an intolerable work 

environment or cause reasonable concerns for Claimant’s personal safety. The 

Referee also found that Claimant did not make a good faith effort to preserve his 

employment. For these reasons, the Referee held that Claimant lacked a 

necessitous and compelling reason to terminate his employment and was ineligible 

for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law, 43 P.S. §802(b).3 Claimant appealed. 

The Board adopted the Referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and 

affirmed his order. Claimant now petitions for this Court’s review.

On appeal,4 Claimant argues that the Board erred in holding that he 

did not have a necessitous and compelling reason to quit his job. Claimant 

contends that he took every possible step to preserve his employment but felt 

compelled to resign because he feared for his life as a consequence of Spann’s 

harassing conduct. The Board counters that the circumstances were insufficient to 

justify Claimant’s resignation and that Claimant failed to take reasonable steps to 

preserve his employment. We agree.

 

3

The Referee also held that Claimant was not disqualified under Section 401(d)(1) of the Law, 

which requires that a claimant be “able to work and available for suitable work.” 43 P.S. 

§801(d)(1). That determination was not appealed.

4 Our review in an unemployment appeal is to determine whether constitutional rights were 

violated, an error of law was committed or the necessary findings of fact are supported by 

substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704; 

Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 558 A.2d 627, 

628 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).
4

In a voluntary quit case, the claimant bears the burden of proving that 

he resigned for a necessitous and compelling reason, i.e., circumstances which 

placed a real and substantial pressure on the employee to terminate employment 

and which would cause a reasonable person under like circumstances to do the 

same. Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 

Review, 558 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). Mere dissatisfaction with 

working conditions, resentment of supervisory criticism or the existence of a

personality conflict do not constitute necessitous and compelling reasons for a 

voluntary quit. Id. What constitutes a necessitous and compelling cause is a 

question of law reviewable by this Court. Craighead-Jenkins v. Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, 796 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

In any case, a claimant must also prove that he made a good faith 

effort to avoid quitting, i.e., that he acted with ordinary common sense in quitting 

and made a reasonable effort to preserve the employment relationship. Id. 

Informing one’s superiors of a co-worker’s harassing or abusive conduct is an 

example of a common sense action. Porco v. Unemployment Compensation Board 

of Review, 828 A.2d 426, 428 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). However, “[i]f the employer 

promises to take action to alleviate the problem, good faith requires that the 

employee continue working until or unless the employer’s action proves 

ineffectual.” Craighead-Jenkins, 796 A.2d at 1034.

Claimant argues that he had a necessitous and compelling reason to 

quit his job. Although Spann’s pushing Claimant and swatting him with a stack of 

papers is inappropriate conduct, we cannot conclude that this constituted an

intolerable work atmosphere under our precedent. See, e.g., Taylor v. 
5

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 378 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1977) (AfricanAmerican claimant subjected to repeated racial slurs and prejudicial treatment for 

three years); Porco v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 828 A.2d at 

426 (sales manager verbally abused and humiliated claimant at least once a week); 

Danner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 443 A.2d 1211, 1213 

n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (fellow employees, including the claimant’s foreman,

questioned him as to whether his girlfriend had had a sex change operation, and 

engaged in other verbal and physical abuse). Here, Claimant’s testimony 

demonstrated “resentment” and a “personality conflict” but not an intolerable work 

environment.

Claimant contends that he took reasonable steps to preserve his 

employment relationship, but we disagree. Claimant addressed his concerns with 

Spann’s conduct by filing an incident report and meeting with a representative of 

Employer’s human resources department. When Claimant did not receive a

response from human resources within eight to ten days as promised, he tendered 

his resignation a few days later. We agree with the Board that a person in 

claimant’s situation acting with ordinary common sense would have at least 

inquired of the status of his incident report before quitting. Good faith required 

Claimant to continue working until Employer’s action proved ineffectual. 

Craighead-Jenkins, 796 A.2d at 1034.

For all of these reasons, we affirm the Board’s adjudication.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Marion Mason, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 1946 C.D. 2015

: 

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18th day of May, 2016 the order of the 

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter, 

dated September 17, 2015, is AFFIRMED.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge