Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : DONALD S. EDWARDS GREGORY F. ZOELLER Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana GARY R. ROM Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

REX A . CLARK, ) ) Appellant

- Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 03A04

- 1109

- CR

- 485 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW CIRCUIT COURT The Honorable Stephen R. Heimann, Judge Cause No. 03C01

- 1104

- FD

- 1982
April 4, 2012 MEMORANDUM D ECISION
- NOT FOR PUBLICATION SHARPNACK, Senior Judge2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Rex Clark appeals his sentence for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Ind. Code § 35

- 44

- 3

- 3(a)(3) (2010), and Class D felony receiving stolen auto parts, Ind. Code § 35

- 43

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- 2.5(c) (1991). We affirm.
ISSUE S Clark raises two issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Clark

. II. Whether Clark’s sentence is inappropriate.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In April 2011, Clark was driving a truck he knew to be stolen when a police officer in a marked car ordered him to st op. Clark refused to stop, fled the officer, a nd was ultimately apprehended. The State charged Clark with Class D felony resisting law enforcement, Ind. Code § 35

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- 3(a)(3), (b)(1)(A), Class D felony receiving stolen auto parts, and Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, Ind. Code § 9

- 2 4

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- 2 (2000). Clark pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class D felony receiving stol en auto parts, and in exchange the State agreed to dismiss the Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended c ount and to forego filing a habitual offender charge. At sentencing, the trial court found no mitigators and identified th e following aggravators: ( 1) Clark’s lengthy criminal history; (2) that he was on probation at the time of the offenses; (3) that he ha d violated his probation numerous times; and (4) that his treatment outside of a penal facility ha d been inef fective. The trial court sentenced Cl ark3

to 300 days in the Bartholomew County Jail for the Class A misdemeanor and a consecutive two and a half years in the Department of Correction for the Class D felony. Clark now appeals his sentence.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. ABUSE OF DISCRETION Clark contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him. Subject to the review and revise power discussed below, sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discre tion. Anglemyer v. State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g , 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. One way a trial court abuse s its discretion is by entering a sentencing statement that omits a mitigating circumstance that is clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration. Id

. at 490

- 91. Clark argues that the trial court should have found his guilty plea as a mitigator. A defendant who pl eads guilty deserves some mitigating weight to be afforded to the plea. Anglemyer , 875 N.E.2d at 220 (citing McElroy v. State , 865 N.E.2d 5 84, 591 (In d. 2007)). However, a trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion by failing to recognize a defendant’s guilty plea as a significant mitigating circumstance. See id. at 22 0

- 21 . A guilty plea does not rise to the level of significant mitigation where the defendant has received a substantial benefit from the plea or where the evidence against4

the defendant is such that the decision to plead guilty is more likely the result of pragmatism than acceptance of responsibility and remorse

. I d. at 221

. In return for Clark’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended count and to forego filing a habitual offender charge . In addition, Clark pleaded guilty to resisting law enforcement as a Class A
mi sdemeanor instead of the Class D felony originally charged . Because Clark received a substantial benefit from the plea, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find his guilty plea as a mitigator. See Edrington v. Stat e , 909 N.E.2d 1093, 1100

- 01 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) ( trial court was not obliged to find guilty plea as mitigator where , in exchange for plea of guilty to two Class A f elonies, State dismissed a third Class A felony charge and agreed to recommend concurrent s entences), trans. denied

. II. INAPPROPRIATE SENTENCE Clark next contends that his sentence is inappropriate. Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitutio n authorize independent appellate review and revision of sentences through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Reid v. State , 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007) (citing Anglemyer , 868 N.E.2d at 491) . The defendant has the burden of persuading us that his5

senten ce is inappropriate. Id. (citing Childress v. State , 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)). We first look to the statutory ranges established for the classes of the offenses. Clark pleaded guilty to a Class A m isdemeanor and a Class D felony. The statutor y range for a Class D felony is between six months and three years, with the advisory sentence being one and a half years. Ind. Code § 35

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- 7(a) (2005). For a Class A misdemeanor, a person may not be imprisoned for more than one year. Ind. Code § 35

- 50

- 3

- 2 (1977). The trial court sentenced Clark to 300 days for the Class A misdemeanor and a consecutive two and a half years for the Class D felony. We next look to the nature of the offenses and Clark’s character. As to the nature of the offenses, the factual basis provided at Clark’s guilty plea hearing shows only that
Clark drove a truck he knew to be stolen , and when a police officer in a marked car ordered him to stop, he refused to do so and instead fled the officer

. While the nature of the offen ses is not particularly egregious compared to similar offenses, Clark’s character alone justifies the sent ence imposed by the trial court. Clark has an extensive juvenile record, which resulted in commitments to a juvenile correctional facility and the De partment of C orrection. Clark, who i s twenty

- nine years old , has a n adult record that includes felon y convictions for escape, theft, and possession of methamphetamine. His misdemeanor convictions include resisting law enforcement, false informing, crimin al trespass, invasion of privacy, carrying a handgun without a license, driving while suspended, public intoxication, and conversio n. Clark has previously been placed on probation but has had that probation revoked and terminated6

unsuccessfully numerous t imes. He committed the instant offenses while on probation and while charges for theft, attempted theft, and criminal tr espass were pending against him. Clark’s chara cter shows a blatant disregard f or the law. Clark nonetheles s argues that consecut ive s entences are inappropriate and cites Kocielko v. State , where a different panel of this Court noted that “a sentence must reflect the episodic nature of the crimes committed.” 943 N.E.2d 1282, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Bowling v. State , 560 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ind. 1990)) , trans. denied

. The defendant in that case was given concurrent sentences for t wo counts of se xual misconduct with a minor where the crimes were committed against a single v i ctim in a single confrontation. We concluded that concurr ent sentences fairly reflected the episodic nature of the crimes. Id. Here, Clark claim s that consecutive sentences are inappropriate because his crimes of receiving stolen auto parts and resisting law enforcement were also of an episodic nature. The fac tual basis provided at the guilty plea hearing , however, does not indicate how long Clark had the stolen truck before the police officer attemp ted to pull him over. It is thus unclear whether the crimes were of an episodic nature. Further, unlike Kocielk o , where there was a single victim, Clark’s crimes were against separate victims. Receiving stolen auto parts was an offense against the owner of the truck while resisting law enforcement was an offen se against public administration

. See Cardwell v. Stat e , 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008) (“Whether the counts involve one or multiple victims is highly relevant to the decision to impose consecutive sentences . . . .”); s e e also Serino
v. State , 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2003) (“[W]hen the perpetrator commi ts the same7

offense against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem necessary to vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts against more than one person.”)

. Kocielko is therefore inapposite. Clark has failed to persu ade us that his sentence is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we affirm Clark’s sentence. ROBB, C.J., and BARNES, J., concur.