UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES W. HUGGINS, JR., as 

Personal Representative of the

Estate of Charles Walter Huggins,

III,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 03-2333

DON WEIDER, Sergeant; SHANE

LUCAS, Deputy; HENRY DUKES,

Reserve Deputy; MELVIN SEBOE,

Captain,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CA-02-2361-3-17)

Submitted: June 25, 2004

Decided: August 3, 2004

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

William Gary White, III, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.

William H. Davidson, II, Kenneth P. Woodington, DAVIDSON,
MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina;

Vinton D. Lide, Lexington, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Plaintiff Charles W. Huggins, Jr., personal representative of his

son, Charles Walter Huggins, III ("the decedent"), timely appeals the

district court’s order granting summary judgment to Defendants in his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action arising out of the death of the decedent.*

This case arises from unfortunate events that occurred on July 19,

2000. On that date, Plaintiff received a telephone call from the decedent during which the decedent threatened to set fire to several properties. Plaintiff alerted the Lexington County Sheriff’s Department

("LCSD") to the decedent’s threats. Several officers, including Defendants Don Weider, Shane Lucas, Henry Dukes, and Melvin Seboe

(collectively, "Defendants"), all of the LCSD, were then informed of

the decedent’s threats. Defendants encountered the decedent in the

woods behind his house. The decedent was armed with two knives

that he alternatively held against his own chest and held in a manner

threatening to the Defendants. Defendants repeatedly instructed the

decedent to put the knives down so that he could come out of the

woods and seek medical help. The decedent refused to release the

knives, instead telling Defendants that they would have to kill him.

Eventually, the decedent advanced on Weider while holding the two

knives in the air. Weider warned the decedent not to take another step

*The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and

dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s state law wrongful death and survival actions. Plaintiff does not appeal this decision. 

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or Weider would be forced to shoot. The decedent then took one to

two more steps towards Weider, and Weider shot the decedent. Lucas

and Dukes both saw the decedent continue to advance after Weider

fired his weapon. They then both fired on the decedent. Shortly thereafter, the decedent was pronounced dead at a nearby hospital. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint, asserting Defendants violated the decedent’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants moved

for summary judgment, contending that their use of deadly force was

objectively reasonable. After a hearing, the district court granted

Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff now appeals. 

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Higgins

v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir.

1988). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). We view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A mere scintilla of proof, however, will not suffice to prevent summary judgment; the question is

"not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any

upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the

party" resisting summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A claim that a police officer used excessive force in attempting to

make an arrest is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Force

is not excessive if it is objectively reasonable under the circumstances

facing the officer, without regard to his underlying intent. Id. at 397.

An officer may use deadly force when he has good reason to believe

that the suspect presents a threat of serious physical harm to himself

or others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Under Graham, a court must focus on the moment that force was used.

Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 791-92 (4th Cir. 1991). Actions

prior to that moment are not relevant in evaluating whether the force

used was reasonable. Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir.

1996). 

HUGGINS v. WEIDER 3
Here, the sole issue is whether Defendants’ use of force was objectively reasonable. Defendants encountered a man in the woods with

two knives whose actions indicated he was prepared to use them

against Defendants. The decedent refused to drop the knives after

repeatedly being instructed to do so. The decedent then advanced on

Weider after expressly being warned not to come any closer. After

Weider shot the decedent, Dukes and Lucas saw the decedent continue to advance on Weider, prompting each to fire their weapons. At

the moment Defendants Dukes, Lucas and Weider used deadly force

against the decedent, each had an objectively reasonable fear that the

decedent presented a serious threat of physical harm. Therefore, the

district court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants

Weider, Dukes and Lucas. Moreover, because Plaintiff’s claim

against Seboe was predicated on his position as a supervisor, Plaintiff’s claim against him must also fail. There can be no liability under

§ 1983 on the part of a supervisory official in the absence of a constitutional violation on the part of those supervised. See Young v. City

of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 579 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that a § 1983

failure-to-train claim cannot be maintained against a supervisor when

there has been no underlying constitutional violation). 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary

judgment to Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

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