### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE

KEN YA DA VIS v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 78866 Ray Jenkins, Ju dge

No. E2004-02053-CC A-R3- HC - F iled May 23, 2005

The pe titioner, Keny a Da vis, appea ls from the trial court's or der dismi ssing his petition for writ of habea s corpus. The state has f iled a motion reque sting that thi s court affirm the trial court' s denial of re lief pursua nt to Rul e 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appea ls. The petitioner has f ailed to establish that he is entitled to habea s corpus re lief. Ac cording ly , the state' s motion is g rante d and the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt Aff irm ed P ur sua nt to Rul e 20 , R ule s o f the Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J .J ., joined.

Albert Ne wman, Jr., Knox ville, Tennesse e, for the Appellant, Ke ny a Da vis.

Paul G . Su mme rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T urne r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Ra nd a ll E. Ni c ho ls, Di stric t A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Z a ne Sc arl e tt, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the A ppellee, State of Tenne ssee.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

The re cord r efle cts that the petit ioner pleaded g uiltyand wa s convicted of misdemeanor the ft on Dec ember 10, 1991. He r ece ived a six m onth sentence , suspended e x cept f or six teen day s serve d. The pe titioner asserts that in De cembe r 1990, he f urther ple aded g uiltyto three misdemeanor larc eny
c ha rg e s f or wh ic h h e state s su sp e nd e d tim e -s e rv e d se nte nc e s we re a lso imp os e d. No dir e c t app e a ls

wer e take n. On J anuary 20, 2004, the petit ioner filed a pro se petit ion for writ of habea s corpus. At t he outset, the pe titioner stated that he is pre sently serving a fe dera l sentence that he asse rts was

e nh a nc e d a s a

re su lt o f his state c ou rt

c on vic tio ns . T he pe tit ion e r c la ime d th a t he e nte re d h is g uil ty pleas without the advic e of c ounsel or plea ag ree ments, that he was not a dvised of his constitutional ri g hts , th e natur e of

the c ha rg e s or the pu nis hme nt be fo re e nte ri ng the ple a s, a nd that the ind ic tme nts

or wa rra nts were constitutionallydefe ctive. The trial court appointed counsel to the petit ioner, but no amende d petition was filed. On August 19, 2004, the t rial court summarily dismiss ed the pe tition. The pe titioner, throug h counsel, timely appea led.-2-

I nitially , we a g ree with the state that the pe tition i s subject to di s m i s s al for failure to mee t the statutory require ments for pursuing state habea s corpus relief

. See T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101 - 29-21- 13 0. Th e pr oc e du ra l re qu ir e me nts fo r ha be a s cor pu s re lie f ar e ma nd a tory

a ndmus t be sc ru pu lou sly followed. Archer v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 165 (Tenn. 1993). Other than that convicting him for theft, the pe titioner did not attach to hi s p et i t i o n copies of the challeng ed judg ments or g ive a

sa tis fa c tory re a so n fo r the ir abs e nc e

. Se e T. C.A

. § 2 9- 21 -1 07 (b )( 2) . T he pe tit ion e r f urthe r f a ils to state whe ther the le g ality

of the re straint has or ha s not been pre viously adjudg ed and whe ther or not previous applications for habe as corpus relief have been made. See T.C.A. § 29-21-107( b)(3) , (4).

Be fore this court t h e p eti tioner ar g ues only that he is being “re strained” by his Tennessee judgme nts for habe as cor pus purposes by

virtue of the fac t that the y are being used to enha nce the fe de ra l se nte nc e he is p re se ntl y se rv ing . O ur

su pr e me c ou rt

ha s ex pres sly

re je c te d th is a

rg ume nt. I n H ic kman v . St a te , 1 53 S.W. 3d16 , 1 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) , th e c ou rt he ld:

[A] person is not " restrained of liberty " f or purpose s of the habe as cor pus
s t at u t e u n l es s t h e c h al l en ged j u d gm en ti t s el f i m p o s es a r es tra i n tu p o n t h e p et i t i o n er 's fre edom of a ction or movement. Us e o f t he cha lleng ed judg ment to enhanc e the

se nte nc e imp os e d o n a

se pa rate c on vic tio n is no t a

re str a int of lib e rt y su ff ic ie nt t o permit a ha

beas c orp u s ch al leng e to the orig inal conviction long afte r the sente nce on the orig inal conviction has e x pired

As noted, while a ll of the cha lleng ed judg ments have n o t b een provided, it would appea r that the pe tit ion e r’ s p ur

po rt e d mi sd e me a no r s e nte nc e s impo se d in19 90 a nd19 91 are fu lly e xpir e d. I n s ho rt , the pe tit ion e r h a s mad e no sh ow ing that he is cur re ntl y imp ri so ne d or re str a ine d of his lib e rt y wi thi n the meaning of Code sec tion 29-21-101. Moreove r, the pe titi o n er ’s claims do not merit relief beca use eve n if proven, the y

would rende r the judg ments voidable rather than void a nd are thus proper ly the subject of a

petition for post-conviction relief. Howeve r, construing the petition as one for post-c onviction relief in the pr esent c ase is not an option because the thre e-y ear limit ations period in effe ct under

the forme r post-convic tion procedur e ac t has expire d

. S ee T.C.A. § 40-30-102 (1990)( repe aled) . For

eac h of these r easons, the trial court prope rly dismiss ed the pe tition.

Up o n d u e c o n s id e r a ti o n o f th e p le a d in g s , th e r e c o r d
, a n d th e ap p li c ab le la w , th e c ourt conclude s that the p et i t i o ner ha s not established that he is entitled to habea s corpus re lief. Acc ording ly , the state’s motion is gr anted. The judgme nt of t he trial c ourt is affirmed in acc ordanc e with Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R.