[Cite as State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-1378.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 108333 

 v. : 

 

MARSHALL WILLIAMS, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 9, 2020 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-18-634683-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Marc D. Bullard, and Frank Romeo 

Zeleznikar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and 

David M. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.: 

Defendant-appellant, Marshall Williams (“Mr. Williams”), appeals 

his guilty plea and conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

I. FACTS 
On December 7, 2018, a grand jury returned an eight-count 

indictment against Mr. Williams and his wife, Shawnte Williams (“Ms. Williams”), 

for an offense dated November 16, 2018. Mr. Williams was 41 years old at the time 

of the offense; Ms. Williams was a few days short of 41 years old. The couple lived 

together and have children and grandchildren. 

Mr. Williams was charged with the following: trafficking in violation 

of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a first-degree felony (Count 1); drug possession in violation 

of R.C. 2925.11(A), a first-degree felony (Count 2); trafficking in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2), a fifth-degree felony (Count 3); drug possession in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A), a fourth-degree felony (Count 4); drug possession in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A), a fifth-degree felony (Count 5); and possessing criminal tools in 

violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), a fifth-degree felony (Count 6). All six counts included 

forfeiture specifications. 

Ms. Williams was indicted on Count 6 and two other charges: 

permitting drug abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.13(A) and (B), fifth-degree felonies 

(Counts 7 and 8). As with the other counts, Counts 7 and 8 included forfeiture 

specifications. 

On December 27, 2018, Mr. and Ms. Williams initially pled not guilty 

to the charges. Thereafter, they agreed to a joint plea deal. At the plea hearing on 

January 23, 2019, Mr. Williams withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty to an 

amended Count 1 and the as-indicted Count 4. As amended, Count 1 included the 

forfeiture specifications, but the weight of the drug was reduced from “equals or 
exceeds one hundred grams” to 27-100 grams. As indicted, Count 1 carried with it 

a mandatory 11-year sentence based on the weight of the drugs. As amended, Count 

1 required a mandatory sentence between 3 to 11 years and a mandatory fine of 

$10,000, with a discretionary fine up to $20,000. Count 4 was a felony-four charge 

of drug possession in violation of R.C. 2925.11. The state nolled Counts 2, 3, 5, and 

6 against Mr. Williams. 

Ms. Williams also entered a guilty plea at the same hearing on 

January 23, 2019, after previously pleading not guilty on December 27, 2018. She 

pled guilty to possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A) (Count 6). 

The state nolled Counts 7 and 8. 

The trial court held a group-plea hearing at which five defendants 

were present, two of which were Mr. and Ms. Williams. The other three defendants 

were present for unrelated cases. The trial court instructed the defendants 

collectively as follows at the plea hearing: 

I’m going to be asking a series of questions. Each defendant must 

answer in a loud, clear voice. If you do not have a loud, clear voice, you 

can use the microphone that’s in front of you. If I have to ask you to 

speak up or to speak more clearly, I’m going to take that as a sign of 

disrespect to this court, which I will consider at a later time. 

The court then instructed the defendants to answer in a particular 

order and further explained: 

The court reporter has to take this down in an organized fashion, and 

he can only take one voice at a time. So wait for the person before you 

to finish their answer. I may ask a follow-up question of that person. 

Wait till we are done until it goes to you, okay? 
The court instructed Mr. Williams to answer second among the five 

defendants. Mr. Williams and the other defendants represented that they 

understood the court’s instructions. Later during the plea hearing, the court 

directed a question to Mr. Williams specifically and he answered. The court then 

corrected itself and had the defendants answer in the order it originally prescribed: 

COURT: Now, were the forfeitures, pleas also done of your own free 

will and desire, Mr. Williams? 

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. 

COURT: First, Mr. Ogletree? 

Mr. Ogletree was another defendant in an unrelated case at the plea 

hearing who was to answer first according to the trial court’s initial instructions. 

On February 27, 2019, a month after the plea hearing, the trial court 

sentenced Mr. and Ms. Williams. They each addressed the court at the sentencing 

hearing. Ms. Williams apologized to the court. Mr. Williams stated that he accepted 

responsibility for his actions, but requested leniency after explaining that he had a 

difficult childhood and that he was only trying to raise money to pay for surgeries 

Ms. Williams required in addition to other household and family expenses. He also 

stated: “I really - - I’m really truly glad, you know, this happened because I was 

looking for a way out. * * * I just want to be right. I just want to make things right.” 

In response, the trial court reviewed Mr. Williams’s record and 

estimated that he had made at least 700 drug sales to members of his community, 

noting that he had been selling drugs since as early as 2000. The court further 

underscored the gravity of Mr. Williams’s actions in the following exchanges: 
COURT: Okay. But you know, you know it’s bad enough that you don’t 

give it to your kids. 

MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, ma’am. 

COURT: That’s a monster in my book, you know? You say I didn’t 

know it was so bad. Of course I wouldn’t believe that at this stage. But 

you got 700 sales, and I really doubt there were only two people buying 

700 times. 

* * * 

COURT: Sir, do you think it would be okay if I went out and sold drugs 

to your kids and your family members so that I could buy my kids 

whatever they want? 

MR. WILLIAMS: No, ma’am, that is not - - 

COURT: That is what you did. 

The court sentenced Mr. Williams to nine years on Count 1 and 

eighteen months on Count 4 to be served concurrently. The court also imposed the 

mandatory minimum fine of $10,000 in connection with Count 1 and ordered the 

forfeiture of two vehicles, two digital scales, eight cell phones, and $14,630. In 

addition, the court ordered five years of mandatory postrelease control. Ms. 

Williams was sentenced to five years of probation. 

The same counsel jointly represented Mr. Williams and Ms. Williams 

at the plea hearing and at the sentencing. This appeal follows. 

Mr. Williams asserts the following four assignments of error: 

Assignment of Error One 

Mr. Marshall Williams was denied due process when the trial court 

imposed a vindictive sentence that was not supported by the record in 

violation of R.C. 2929.11, 2929.12, the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I Section 10 of the 

Ohio Constitution and Ohio Crim.R. 32. 
Assignment of Error Two 

The trial court erred when it did not determine that the defendant 

understood the nature of the offenses, the effects of the plea, and that 

he was waiving certain constitutionally guaranteed trial rights by 

pleading guilty in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I Section 10 of the 

Ohio Constitution and Ohio Crim.R. 11. 

Assignment of Error Three 

The accused was denied due process and his right to counsel in 

violation of U.S. Constitution Amendments V, VI, and XIV; and Ohio 

Constitution Art. I, Section 10. 

Assignment of Error Four 

Mr. Marshall Williams was denied effective assistance of counsel in 

violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and Article 1, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution when his 

attorney failed to file an indigency affidavit to waive the mandatory fine 

and when counsel continued to represent codefendants despite a clear 

conflict. 

Each of appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. 

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

A. The sentence was not vindictive. 

Mr. Williams argues in his first assignment of error that he was 

denied due process because his sentence was vindictive. Mr. Williams contends that 

the trial court imposed a 9-year sentence as punishment for his answering out of 

turn at the plea hearing a month earlier. He further contends that the 9-year 

sentence was vindictive because: the sentencing range for his crimes was 3 to 11 

years; the prosecution did not request a particular sentence; and Mr. Williams 

argued for leniency, stating that he planned to use the money obtained in connection 

with his crimes to pay for surgery for Ms. Williams. 
“A sentence that is vindictively imposed on a defendant because he or 

she exercised a constitutional right is contrary to law.” State v. Williams, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 108275, 2020-Ohio-269, ¶ 55, citing State v. Rahab, 150 Ohio St.3d 

152, 2017-Ohio-1401, 80 N.E.3d 431, ¶ 8. “When reviewing a sentence for 

vindictiveness, we begin by presuming that the trial court considered the proper 

sentencing criteria.” Id., citing Rahab at ¶ 19. “We then review the record for 

evidence of actual vindictiveness.” Id. “We will reverse the sentence only if we 

clearly and convincingly find the sentence is contrary to law because it was imposed 

as a result of actual vindictiveness on the part of the trial court.” Id., quoting Rahab 

at ¶ 19. 

Here, the record does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that 

the trial court based its sentence on actual vindictiveness. To the contrary, before 

imposing a 9-year sentence instead of the maximum 11, the trial court properly 

considered Mr. Williams’s prior record, the impact of his crimes on the community, 

his knowledge regarding the perils of drug use, and his expressed remorse. See R.C. 

2929.11 and 2929.12. See also Rahab at ¶ 32. 

Mr. Williams asserts that the trial court’s admonition to Mr. Williams 

and the other defendants to speak loudly, clearly, and one at a time during the plea 

hearing reveals actual vindictiveness because the court also warned that if anyone 

failed to speak loudly, clearly, and one at a time, the court would “take that as a sign 

of disrespect to this court, which I will consider at a later time.” The record does not 

support this theory. The court did not admonish Mr. Williams for answering before 
the other defendant during the plea hearing and never referenced the incident 

during sentencing. Based on our review, Mr. Williams simply answered a question 

after the trial court directly addressed him and the record does not indicate that the 

trial court vindictively sentenced Mr. Williams for doing so. 

During sentencing, the trial court reviewed Mr. Williams’s criminal 

record. It cited three prior incidents while Mr. Williams was a juvenile and 

numerous incidents thereafter. The trial court also addressed Mr. Williams’s 

request for leniency based on his apparent intention to use money from drug sales 

to pay for his wife’s surgeries and noted that CareSource Health Insurance, not Mr. 

Williams, would pay for the surgeries. The court also considered the number of sales 

Mr. Williams had made, calculating as many as 700, and the harm, including 

possible deaths, he caused to his customers and the community. Although the trial 

court could have imposed an 11-year sentence and $20,000 fine for the amended 

Count 1, it imposed a lesser 9-year sentence and the mandatory minimum $10,000 

fine. 

Ms. Williams, who was charged with fewer offenses, received a 

sentence of five years’ probation. That Ms. Williams received a lesser sentence does 

not demonstrate vindictiveness towards Mr. Williams, but merely reflects Ms. 

Williams’s lesser-involvement in the charged crimes. Whereas Ms. Williams faced 

three charges and pled guilty to one, Mr. Williams faced six charges and pled guilty 

to two, one of which carried a mandatory prison sentence and fine. Mr. Williams 

likely would have faced a significantly longer sentence had he not agreed to the plea 
deal and instead been found guilty of the six as-indicted counts — including Counts 

2, 3, 5, and 6 that the state nolled as part of the plea deal — rather than only the 

amended Count 1 and as-indicted Count 4. 

Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. 

B. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11. 

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Williams argues that the trial 

court’s procedure at the plea hearing was insufficient to assure that Mr. Williams 

was making his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the court used 

a group-plea hearing. We disagree. 

A defendant’s plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily for the plea to be constitutional under the United States and Ohio 

Constitutions. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 1996-Ohio-179, 660 N.E.2d 

450. “Ohio Crim.R. 11(C) was adopted in order to facilitate a more accurate 

determination of the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea by ensuring an adequate 

record for review.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). 

The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to ensure that the trial court conveys 

certain information to a defendant so that he or she can make a voluntary and 

intelligent decision regarding whether to plead guilty or no contest. State v. Harris, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108529, 2020-Ohio-805, ¶ 13, citing State v. Ballard, 66 

Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981). 

We review whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) de 

novo. Id. at ¶ 14. In reviewing the record, appellate courts must consider the totality 
of the circumstances to determine whether the plea hearing complied with Crim.R. 

11(C). Id. 

Crim.R. 11(C) states: 

In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea 

of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without 

first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the following: 

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 

penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible 

for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions 

at the sentencing hearing. 

(b)Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant 

understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that 

the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment 

and sentence. 

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant 

understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to 

jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have 

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s 

favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be 

compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

“Trial courts must strictly comply with the provisions concerning the 

constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), but only substantial 

compliance is required for the provisions concerning nonconstitutional rights set 

forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b).” Harris at ¶ 16, citing State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio 

St. 3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶ 12. “Substantial compliance means that 

under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the 

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” Id., quoting State v. Nero, 56 

Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). 
During the plea hearing on January 23, 2019, the trial court obtained 

pleas from Mr. Williams and four additional defendants in a group-plea setting. The 

court first positioned the defendants in a specific order and instructed the 

defendants to answer in that order throughout the proceeding. The court then 

directed questions to all of the defendants and elicited responses from each 

defendant individually. There is no prohibition on a trial court conducting a groupplea hearing. State v. Hawkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108057, 2019-Ohio-4162, ¶ 

19, citing State v. Strimpel, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106129, 2018-Ohio-1628, ¶ 12. 

Based on a review of the record, we find the totality of the 

circumstances demonstrates that the trial court complied with all aspects of Crim.R. 

11 and that Mr. Williams subjectively understood the implications of his guilty pleas 

and the rights he would waive upon entering guilty pleas. 

Because the record demonstrates that Mr. Williams’s plea was 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, his second assignment of error is 

overruled. 

C. The trial court had no duty to inquire about the dual 

representation and the record does not reveal an actual conflict 

adversely affected counsel’s performance. 

Mr. Williams argues in his third assignment of error that he was 

denied due process and his right to counsel. He contends that his conviction should 

be vacated because the trial court failed to ensure that his counsel, who also 

represented Ms. Williams, explained any potential conflict of interest before 

allowing the matter to proceed. 
“In reviewing a conflict of interest claim, we must resolve two distinct 

issues. First, we must determine whether the trial court had a duty to investigate 

the potential conflict of interest.” Cleveland v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

105545, 2018-Ohio-1522, ¶ 12, citing State v. Ingol, 89 Ohio App.3d 45, 48, 623 

N.E.2d 598 (9th Dist.1993). Second, “[i]f the duty to inquire did not arise, then we 

must determine whether an actual conflict occurred that adversely affected counsel’s 

ability to represent the defendant.” Id. See also Cleveland v. Brewer, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 108365, 2020-Ohio-_ _ _, ¶ 4. 

First, the record does not indicate any special circumstances by which 

the trial court knew or reasonably should have known that a particular conflict 

existed of which it had a duty to inquire. “Where a trial court knows or reasonably 

should know of an attorney’s possible conflict of interest in the representation of a 

person charged with a crime, the trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire 

whether a conflict of interest actually exists.” State v. Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d 304, 

311, 1992-Ohio-48, 595 N.E.2d 878. Because the attorney representing multiple 

defendants is in the best position to determine whether a conflict of interest exists 

or might develop, it is reasonable for a trial court to assume, in the absence of special 

circumstances, that there is no conflict or that the defendants knowingly accepted 

any risk of conflict. State v. Ermekeil, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 63703 and 63704, 

1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4433, 8 (Sept. 16, 1993), citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 

335, 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). 
This court has previously considered whether a trial court had a duty 

to inquire about the dual representation of a husband and wife. In one such case, 

we found that the trial court did not err in failing to inquire about dual 

representation where the appellant did not raise any objections to the trial court 

regarding the dual representation of himself and his common-law wife. Ermekeil at 

8, 12. In another case, we found that the trial court erred by not explaining the risks 

of dual representation to husband and wife defendants where the husbandappellant expressed reservations about the dual representation to the trial court. 

State v. Haugabrook, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103693, 2016-Ohio-5838, ¶ 17. 

Neither Mr. Williams nor Ms. Williams raised any objections or 

reservations to the dual representation. Instead, they each separately expressed 

their understanding about their cases and satisfaction with their counsel to the trial 

court at the plea hearing. 

Moreover, the joint plea deal would not have given the trial court 

reason to know of a particular conflict because the plea benefitted both Mr. and Ms. 

Williams. Without the plea deal, Mr. Williams faced a mandatory minimum 

sentence of 11 years on Count 1 and the potential for a longer sentence based on the 

four counts against him that the plea deal nolled. With the plea deal, the amended 

Count 1 allowed for a discretionary sentence between 3 and 11 years. Mr. Williams 

ultimately received a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum sentence he 

faced without the plea deal. 
The plea deal also nolled two felony-five charges against Ms. Williams 

so that she only faced a charge for possessing criminal tools (Count 6). Facing just 

the single charge, Ms. Williams received five years’ probation. Although a serious 

sentence, probation will nevertheless allow Ms. Williams to find employment, 

attend to her health, and return to their family home and grandchildren. As the 

record does not demonstrate any special circumstances by which the trial court 

knew or reasonably should have known that a particular conflict existed, the trial 

court need not have inquired about the dual representation. 

However, “[w]e note that the Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel secures to a criminal defendant both the right to competent 

representation and the right to representation that is free from conflicts of 

interest.” Haugabrook at ¶ 8, citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 

1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 

86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). Accordingly, “the better practice is to make a prompt inquiry 

and advise each defendant of his or her right to effective assistance of counsel, 

including separate representation.” Ermekeil at 9. 

Second, we do not find that an actual conflict occurred that adversely 

affected counsel’s ability to represent Mr. Williams. “To establish an actual conflict, 

a defendant must show: (1) the existence of some plausible alternative defense 

strategy or tactic that might have been pursued and (2) that the alternative defense 

was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney’s other loyalties 
or interests.” State v. Hale, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107646, 2019-Ohio-3276, ¶ 65, 

citing State v. Gillard, 78 Ohio St.3d 548, 553, 1997-Ohio-183, 679 N.E.2d 276. 

Mr. Williams contends that he and Ms. Williams required separate 

counsel because they faced different charges that would have necessitated different 

and “potentially conflicted” legal defenses, strategies, and tactics. However, Mr. 

Williams’s plea deal was a package plea deal that benefitted both him and Ms. 

Williams and the record does not disclose any demonstration of an actual conflict of 

interest that adversely affected his counsel’s performance. Harris, 2020-Ohio-805 

at ¶ 19 (trial court had no duty to inquire further about conflict of interest where 

defendant failed to direct appellate court to a specific instance in the record 

demonstrating an actual conflict). 

Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

D. Mr. Williams was not deprived of effective assistance of 

counsel. 

In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Williams argues that counsel 

was ineffective in two ways. He first contends counsel was ineffective for failing to 

file an indigency affidavit to seek waiver of the mandatory fine associated with Count 

1. Second, Mr. Williams contends counsel was ineffective for jointly representing 

him and Ms. Williams. 

Our review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. State v. 

Korecky, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108328, 2020-Ohio-797, ¶ 20, citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Because we 

presume licensed attorneys are competent, the party claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel bears the burden of proving that counsel was ineffective. Id., citing State 

v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). 

A defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to claim prejudice by 

ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the ineffective assistance 

of counsel caused the plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

Korecky at ¶ 19. After entering a guilty plea, a defendant can only show prejudice by 

demonstrating a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 

performance, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 

trial.” Id. at ¶ 20. 

Mr. Williams does not argue or present any evidence that he would 

not have pled guilty but for counsel’s actions and because the record does not 

support such a conclusion, we overrule this assignment of error. See Univ. Hts. v. 

Zaccaro-Hoffman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108575, 2020-Ohio-113, ¶ 9 (no 

ineffective assistance of counsel where appellant-defendant failed to demonstrate 

that but-for counsel’s performance, she would not have pled no contest). 

As discussed, the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11. Mr. Williams 

received a full plea hearing and the record demonstrates he entered a knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea as part of a package plea deal that also 

benefitted Ms. Williams. He represented to the trial court that he was not forced to 

plead guilty when asked if there were any threats or promises made to encourage 

the entry of a guilty plea. He also represented that he was satisfied with the 

representation he received from his counsel. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. 
Williams reiterated that he takes responsibility for his actions. In exchange for 

pleading guilty to the amended Count 1 and the as-indicted Count 4, Mr. Williams 

avoided a mandatory 11-year sentence and the state nolled Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6 

against him. The joint plea deal also allowed his wife, who was in very poor health, 

to plead guilty to only one of the three charges against her for which she received 

probation with no prison sentence. In sum, the record does not demonstrate a 

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s alleged deficiencies, Mr. Williams 

would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 

Accordingly, Mr. Williams’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to 

the trial court for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, A.J., and 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR