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WILLIAM A. STUART ET AL. v.

RICHARD M. FREIBERG

(SC 19208)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa, Robinson and

Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued October 22, 2014—officially released May 19, 2015

James A. Fulton, for the appellant (defendant).

Sandra J. Akoury, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Opinion

ROBINSON, J. This certified appeal is the latest outgrowth of a lengthy and bitter estate dispute between

brothers. The defendant, Richard M. Freiberg, appeals,

upon our grant of his petition for certification,1

from

the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing in part

the summary judgment rendered in his favor by the trial

court, Tobin, J.2 See Stuart v. Freiberg, 142 Conn. App.

684, 686–87, 69 A.3d 320 (2013). On appeal, the defendant claims that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that there existed genuine issues of material fact

as to the counts of fraud, negligent misrepresentation,

and accounting malpractice that were pleaded in the

operative complaint by the plaintiffs, William A. Stuart

and Jonathan Stuart.3 We agree and, accordingly,

reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court in part.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts

and procedural history.4 The plaintiffs and their older

brother, Kenneth J. Stuart, Jr., are the children of Kenneth J. Stuart, Sr.5

In 1991, Stuart created a living trust

and a will, with Kenneth named as trustee and executor.

At the time, Stuart owned one half of a home in Wilton,

approximately $2 million in securities and cash, and a

significant art collection that included several famous

paintings by Norman Rockwell. Most of these assets

were transferred into the living trust. Stuart’s will

instructed that, if his wife preceded him in death, upon

his own death, the trust’s principal was to be distributed

equally between his three sons.

In 1992, Stuart lost his wife and he began to show

signs of deteriorating physical and mental health. That

summer, Kenneth contacted the plaintiffs and proposed

moving Stuart’s assets from the living trust into a family

limited partnership, which, Kenneth claimed, would

yield estate tax advantages. The plaintiffs objected to

this proposal because, under the corresponding draft

partnership agreements, Kenneth would have been

granted a broad degree of control over the assets as a

general partner, while the plaintiffs would have lacked

such control as only limited partners.

Without the plaintiffs’ knowledge, on November 4,

1992, Kenneth and Stuart created a limited partnership

in which they were the sole general partners and the

plaintiffs were not partners at all. Through a series of

transactions executed the same day, virtually all of the

living trust’s assets were transferred into the limited

partnership. As a net result, when Stuart died on February 17, 1993, Kenneth assumed exclusive control over

valuable assets that the plaintiffs had expected to

inherit promptly.

A saga of legal disputes began later in 1993, starting

with the plaintiffs’ request in Probate Court to have

Kenneth removed as an estate fiduciary ‘‘immediately’’

because they doubted his ‘‘ability to carry out his . . .
role honestly and fairly.’’ This removal attempt was

unsuccessful.6

‘‘[A]lmost simultaneously,’’ Kenneth told

the plaintiffs about the limited partnership’s existence.

The plaintiffs’ misgivings deepened as the year

pressed on. Pursuant to their request, the plaintiffs

received a financial summary from Kenneth, dated

November 19, 1993, that documented expenditures

from the living trust during 1992. Upon reviewing the

financial summary, the plaintiffs saw that Kenneth had

misappropriated the trust’s funds. This prompted the

plaintiffs to file a complaint, dated December 17, 1993,

in Superior Court that alleged Kenneth unduly influenced Stuart and also breached numerous fiduciary

duties owed to them as estate beneficiaries. Stuart v.

Stuart, Superior Court, judicial district of StamfordNorwalk, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X08-

CV-02-0193031-S (June 28, 2004) (37 Conn. L. Rptr. 367),

aff’d, 112 Conn. App. 160, 962 A.2d 842 (2009), rev’d in

part, 297 Conn. 26, 996 A.2d 259 (2010). Among the

plaintiffs’ more specific allegations in this original complaint were that, during 1992, Kenneth had used the

trust’s funds to: (1) make $607,480 in various disbursements, only $88,500 of which were spent on Stuart; (2)

loan himself $83,267; and (3) purchase real estate for

his personal benefit. The plaintiffs requested as their

relief, inter alia, injunctions that would prohibit Kenneth from exercising any control over assets in the trust

or the limited partnership without their consent.

By the middle of 1994, Kenneth engaged the defendant as a certified public accountant for the first time.

The defendant’s work grew overthe years to include the

preparation of various financial statements for Stuart’s

estate and its related entities, but he was eventually

replaced in September, 2001. Throughout the defendant’s seven year engagement, the plaintiffs’ civil action

against Kenneth remained unresolved—as did the plaintiffs’ accompanying requests for injunctive relief. Only

in 2002, following an attempt to have some of the Norman Rockwell paintings sold,7 did the plaintiffs finally

obtain an injunction that barred Kenneth from exercising control over the assets related to Stuart’s estate.

In 2004, more than one decade after the plaintiffs

first initiated their civil action against Kenneth, the trial

court, Adams, J., issued its posttrial memorandum of

decision in Stuart v. Stuart, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr.

367.8

In that case, Judge Adams found that Kenneth

exercised undue influence over Stuart in creating the

limited partnership and declared it, and any asset transfers thereto, null and void. Id., 376. Further, Judge

Adams found that from at least 1992 through 2001, Kenneth had breached his fiduciary duties by utilizing assets

in the trust and the limited partnership for his personal

benefit. Id., 379. In lamenting the difficulty of quantifying Kenneth’s misdeeds, Judge Adams observed that

the plaintiffs’ forensic accounting expert had testified
at trial that the defendant’s work product was ‘‘designed

to hide, rather than disclose the truth.’’ Id., 378.

At another point, however, Judge Adams commented

on the plaintiffs’ ‘‘languorous’’ approach to the misappropriations, stating: ‘‘[The plaintiffs] were aware of

[Kenneth’s] spending what they considered to be [Stuart’s] money on himself early on. . . . Yet while a suit

was filed in 1993, no further action was taken to stop

the spending until an injunction proceeding in 2002.

Indeed, William asked [Kenneth] why he did not put all

the money in one account and spend it on himself out

of that account . . . . While not amounting to a waiver,

it was some basis for [Kenneth] to believe [that the

plaintiffs] did not object strenuously to his using the

money for basic living expenses.’’ (Citation omitted.)

Id., 389. Ultimately, Judge Adams ruled against Kenneth

and awarded monetary damages to Stuart’s estate in

the amount of $2,375,528.38—inclusive of $180,000 to

cover the forensic accounting expert’s fees.9

Id., 393.

On April 8, 2004, the plaintiffs commenced the present action against the defendant. The operative complaint10 contains the following three counts that are

relevant to this appeal:(1)fraud;(2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) accounting malpractice. See footnote

3 of this opinion. In essence, the plaintiffs alleged that

the defendant prepared inaccurate and misleading

financial statements that facilitated the misappropriation of estate funds by Kenneth. For each count, the

plaintiffs alleged, more specifically, that they suffered

financial harm because they ‘‘relied on [the defendant’s]

misrepresentations . . . in that they . . . [1] delayed

pursuing the removal of [Kenneth] from his [fiduciary]

position . . . because they believed [the defendant’s]

statements to be true, and . . . [2] delayed pursuing

their claims in Superior Court against [Kenneth] . . . .’’

The defendant subsequently moved for summary

judgment, asserting that no genuine issue of material

fact existed as to any count. In particular, the defendant

contended that the plaintiffs had not actually relied on

any of his financial statements. In support of his motion,

the defendant submitted an authenticated copy of the

plaintiffs’ original complaint in Stuart v. Stuart, supra,

37 Conn. L. Rptr. 367, as well as authenticated excerpts

from the depositions of William and Jonathan in the

present case. Jonathan testified at his deposition that,

by the middle of 1993, he had determined that Kenneth

misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars from

Stuart’s estate. Jonathan further testified that, between

1994 and 2001, he had periodically received financial

statements that the defendant had prepared. When

asked to identify which of the defendant’s financial

statements he had relied on detrimentally, Jonathan

testified that he ‘‘didn’t rely on any documents,’’ ‘‘didn’t

look at documents,’’ and ‘‘didn’t need documents to tell

[him that he] lost money.’’ For his part, William similarly
testified that, prior to initiating Stuart v. Stuart, supra,

in 1993, he had already believed that Kenneth misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars from Stuart’s

estate. Moreover, William testified that he was notfamiliar with any of the defendant’s financial statements, did

not recall receiving them, and ‘‘couldn’t have relied

on’’ them.

In their objection to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs asserted that genuine

issues of material fact existed as to each count. In

particular, they disputed the defendant’s argument that

they did not rely on his statements. In support of that

objection, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from William in which he succinctly states that he relied on the

defendant’s inaccurate financial statements, and that

this reliance resulted in a delay of the efforts to remove

Kenneth as a fiduciary. The plaintiffs did not submit

an affidavit by Jonathan in support of the objection.

Although the plaintiffs submitted other affidavits, they

did not speak to the plaintiffs’ manner of reliance.

On July 15, 2011, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court

acknowledged that the parties disputed some facts,

such as whetherthe defendant had prepared false financial statements, but determined that the plaintiffs’

claims were fatally undermined by their failure to produce any evidence that could support ‘‘their allegations

of actual reliance upon any materials produced by the

defendant.’’ As to the counts of fraud and negligent

misrepresentation, the trial court reviewed the undisputed evidence and concluded that it was ‘‘impossible

to see how the plaintiffs could have relied’’ on the defendant’s allegedly false financial statements in the manner

they described, because ‘‘the plaintiffs had already instituted an action in the Superior Court to remove Kenneth

. . . as a fiduciary of the estate before the defendant

was hired to do accounting work for the estate.’’ As to

the count of accounting malpractice, the trial court

similarly reasoned that the plaintiffs could not conceivably ‘‘demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct caused

their supposed injuries.’’ The trial court therefore determined that the plaintiffs had failed to raise a genuine

issue of material fact with respect to each count and

granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiffs’

motion for reargument.

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment to the Appellate Court, claiming that they had

presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues

of material fact with respect to each count. Stuart v.

Freiberg, supra, 142 Conn. App. 706–707. In a divided

decision, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s

award of summary judgment on the counts of the complaint that are relevant to this certified appeal. Id.,

686–87; see also footnote 3 of this opinion. Following
a review of the record, the Appellate Court first determined that the plaintiffs did not seek to remove Kenneth

as executor and trustee by commencing Stuart v. Stuart, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 367, in 1993; rather, the

plaintiffs sought different forms of injunctive relief and

yet, ‘‘for whateverreasons,’’ ‘‘appeared to tolerate’’ Kenneth continuing in his fiduciary roles ‘‘for some period

of time during the Stuart v. Stuart [supra] litigation

. . . .’’ Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 701. Moving on to the

issue of reliance, which was integral to the counts of

fraud and negligent misrepresentation, the Appellate

Court held that whether the plaintiffs ‘‘were misled into

believing the financial reports prepared by the defendant and provided during the [Stuart v. Stuart, supra]

litigation . . . [remained] to be determined in a factbased hearing.’’ Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 701. As forthe

issue of causation, which was integral to the accounting

malpractice count, the Appellate Court drew a close

comparison to reliance and then concluded that it too

was ‘‘not amenable to summary judgment because it

[was] fact bound’’ and the material facts were in dispute.

Id., 706. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed in

part the trial court’s award of summary judgment and

remanded the case for further proceedings.11 Id., 710.

This certified appeal followed. See footnote 1 of this

opinion.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the plaintiffs,

in objecting to summary judgment, did not present sufficient counterevidence of the following: (1) their reliance on his financial statements, as was necessary in

this particular case to demonstrate that a genuine issue

of material fact existed on the counts of fraud and

negligent misrepresentation; and (2) a causal connection between his financial statements and their alleged

injuries, as was necessary in this particular case to

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact

existed on the count of accounting malpractice.12 Thus,

the defendant contends that the Appellate Court

improperly reversed in part the trial court’s grant of his

motion for summary judgment. We agree, and address

each of the defendant’s claims in turn.

We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of

review. ‘‘Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary

judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

affidavits and any other proof submitted show thatthere

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the

trial court must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the

absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which,

under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle

him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party

opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary

foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact. . . . A material fact . . . [is] a

fact which will make a difference in the result of the

case. . . . Finally, the scope of our review of the trial

court’s decision to grant the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC,

306 Conn. 107, 116, 49 A.3d 951 (2012).

I

FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

Before we examine the dovetailing legal issues for

the plaintiffs’ counts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, we first observe the essential elements for

each cause of action.

To establish liability for fraud, a plaintiff must be

able to show by clear and convincing evidence that:

‘‘(1) a false representation was made [by the defendant]

as a statement of fact; (2) the statement was untrue

and known to be so by [the defendant];(3)the statement

was made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon;

and (4) the other party relied on the statement to his

detriment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 628,

910 A.2d 209 (2006); see Goldstar Medical Services,

Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 819, 955

A.2d 15 (2008) (standard of proof for claim of commonlaw fraud is clear and convincing evidence).

To establish liability for negligent misrepresentation,

a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence: ‘‘(1) that the defendant made a

misrepresentation of fact(2)that the defendant knew or

should have known was false, and (3) that the plaintiff

reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and (4) suffered pecuniary harm as a result.’’ Nazami v. Patrons

Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 280 Conn. 626; see Goldstar

Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, supra,

288 Conn. 819 (ordinary standard of proof for civil

actions is preponderance of evidence); Cohen v. RollA-Cover, LLC, 131 Conn. App. 443, 449 n.8, 27 A.3d 1,

cert. denied, 303 Conn. 95, 33 A.3d 739 (2011) (standard

of proof for claim of negligent misrepresentation is

preponderance of evidence).

A

Summary Judgment, Essential Elements, and

Materiality

The plaintiffs raise a threshold claim that it was

improper for the trial court to address the defendant’s

arguments regarding reliance that are now central to

this appeal. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that, following a determination that there were genuine disputes over material facts bearing on other essential

elements of the counts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation—for example, whether the defendant’s financial statements were false—‘‘the trial court should have
simply ceased its analysis and denied summary judgment . . . .’’ Thus, the plaintiffs argue that it was

improper for the trial court to consider, in succession,

whether any genuine issue of material fact existed as

to the essential element of reliance. We disagree.

The fundamental purpose of summary judgment is

preventing unnecessary trials. See Orenstein v. Old

Buckingham Corp., 205 Conn. 572, 574, 534 A.2d 1172

(1987) (‘‘[s]ummary judgment procedure, generally

speaking, is an attempt to dispose of cases in a manner

which is speedier and less expensive for all concerned

than a full-dress trial’’). If a plaintiff is unable to present

sufficient evidence in support of an essential element

of his cause of action at trial, he cannot prevail as a

matter of law. See, e.g., Santopietro v. New Haven, 239

Conn. 207, 225, 682 A.2d 106 (1996) (directed verdict

appropriate if evidence is ‘‘ ‘so weak’ ’’ that ‘‘the jury

could not reasonably and legally have found that the

plaintiff had proved each of [the essential] elements’’);

Furstein v. Hill, 218 Conn. 610, 627, 590 A.2d 939 (1991)

(directed verdict appropriate ‘‘when the plaintiff has

failed to produce any evidence of an essential element

of his cause of action’’).

To avert these types of ill-fated cases from advancing

to trial, following adequate time for discovery, a plaintiff

may properly be called upon at the summary judgment

stage to demonstrate that he possesses sufficient counterevidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as

to any, or even all, of the essential elements of his cause

of action. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cianfarani, 314 Conn.

521, 524–25, 107 A.3d 375 (2014) (‘‘ ‘[a] material fact

. . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the

result of the case’ ’’); Rusco Industries, Inc. v. Hartford

Housing Authority, 168 Conn. 1, 6, 357 A.2d 484 (1975)

(test for granting summary judgment ‘‘is resolved by

applying to the established facts the same criteria as

used in determining whether a party would be entitled

to a directed verdict on the same facts’’); see also Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 320,

77 A.3d 726 (2013) (‘‘[w]hen documents submitted in

support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the

nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]).

If a defendant’s well supported motion for summary

judgment shows that there is no genuine factual dispute

as to multiple essential elements of a plaintiff’s cause

of action, such that none of them reasonably could be

resolved in the plaintiff’s favor at trial, the viability of

that plaintiff’s case is not improved if he only responds

with sufficient counterevidence to call some of those

essential elements back into question. Put differently,

by raising a genuine issue of fact as to only some of

the essential elements under attack, the plaintiff has
not altered the potential outcome of his case. See Santopietro v. New Haven, supra, 239 Conn. 225. It logically

follows that, in evaluating a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, a trial court’s task does not necessarily

end upon its finding that a genuine factual dispute exists

as to one or some essential elements of a plaintiff’s

cause of action. If a defendant has substantively

addressed additional essential elements in support of

his motion, so too should the trial court in determining

whether summary judgment is appropriate.

These summary judgment principles are perhaps so

readily accepted as a matter of law in Connecticut that

our independent research failed to reveal a prior decision in which this court had the occasion to discuss

them so extensively. The principles have, however,

been embraced implicitly in decisions of this court; see,

e.g., Marinos v. Poirot, 308 Conn. 706, 710, 715–16, 66

A.3d 860 (2013) (defendants ‘‘advanced a number of

arguments’’ against count alleging unfair trade practice,

and plaintiff’s failure to produce counterevidence of

ascertainable loss alone permitted summary judgment);

DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, supra, 306

Conn. 124 (plaintiff presented counterevidence that

defect was cause of injury in premises liability action,

but failure also to present counterevidence of defendants’ notice of defect permitted summary judgment);

and have been stated more expressly in decisions of

the Appellate Court. See, e.g., Tyler v. Tyler, 151 Conn.

App. 98, 105, 93 A.3d 1179 (2014) (‘‘[s]ummary judgment

is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact

exists, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, with respect to any one element that the

plaintiff is required to prove in orderto prevail at trial’’).

We also note that the logic of this approach has ample

support in federal law, which we find persuasive in

interpreting our summary judgment rules of practice.

See Mac’s Car City, Inc. v. American National Bank,

205 Conn. 255, 260, 532 A.2d 1302 (1987) (‘‘[a]lthough

the federal rules of civil procedure and the federal

court’s interpretations thereon are not binding upon

the state courts, this court has repeatedly noted the

substantial similarity between the federal and Connecticut summary judgment procedures and has often relied

upon federal rules and case law for guidance’’). For

example, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323,

106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986), the United

States Supreme Court reasoned that ‘‘a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial’’ for the purpose of summary judgment.

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, returning to the present case, even if some

material facts were genuinely in dispute that would bear

on the preliminary essential elements of the plaintiffs’

fraud and negligent misrepresentation counts, the trial
court was still required to continue its summary judgment analysis by examining the parties’ arguments and

proffered evidence concerning other essential elements

of those counts. Accordingly, with respect to the counts

of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, it was proper

forthe trial court to consider whether any genuine issue

of material fact existed as to the plaintiffs’ essential

element of reliance—which is now a focal point on

appeal.

B

Reliance

We turn to the defendant’s claim that the Appellate

Court improperly determined that the plaintiffs’ counts

of fraud and negligent misrepresentation were not suitable for summary judgment. The defendant begins with

the observation that the plaintiffs would need to show

actual reliance on a false statement or misrepresentation of fact to prevail on their counts of fraud and

negligent misrepresentation. He further observes that

the plaintiffs’ operative complaint alleges that they

relied on ‘‘accounting reports containing false information’’ by delaying their ‘‘removal claims and Superior

Court claims against [Kenneth].’’ Hence, the defendant

argues that he made a prima facie case for summary

judgment by presenting the trial court with authenticated excerpts from the plaintiffs’ respective depositions in which they testified to not seeing, reading,

or relying on the defendant’s allegedly false financial

statements. The defendant contends that, in an attempt

to create a genuine issue of material fact that would

preclude summary judgment on the two counts in question, the plaintiffs submitted one piece of pertinent

counterevidence—William’s affidavit—that made three

sentences’ worth of false and conclusory averments

about the plaintiffs purported reliance. See footnote

14 of this opinion. Moreover, the defendant accurately

notes that the Appellate Court majority did not discuss

any of this evidence or counterevidence in reaching its

conclusions as to the counts of fraud and negligent

misrepresentation. See Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 142

Conn. App. 697–703.

In response, the plaintiffs do not dispute that the

defendant accurately depicted their deposition testimony. Rather, they argue, ‘‘the simple fact that [they]

testified that they did not ‘look’ at the reports prepared

by the defendant does not prove that they placed no

reliance on the defendant.’’ The plaintiffs maintain that

there are ‘‘methods ofreliance otherthan a basic review

of documents,’’ and emphasize that William’s affidavit

‘‘clearly speaks to the issue ofreliance,’’ ‘‘clearly state[s]

the type of reliance he made,’’ ‘‘is clear on its face,’’

and ‘‘is a clear statement of facts . . . .’’ We disagree,

and conclude that the plaintiffs did not provide an adequate evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect
to their claimed reliance.

Our review of the pleadings, affidavits, and other

proof available at the summary judgment stage firmly

convinces us that the plaintiffs’ claim of reliance is

untenable as a matter of law. This determination flows

from the following progression of events: (1) the plaintiffs filed an operative complaint that alleged that they

relied on the defendant’s false and misleading financial

statements; (2) the defendant presented deposition testimony in which the plaintiffs admitted that they never

read or reviewed his allegedly false financial statements, thus making out a prima facie case for summary

judgment;(3)the plaintiffs did not attemptto controvert

their deposition testimony; and (4) the plaintiffs did not

present sufficient counterevidence to show how they

were otherwise able to rely on a false statement or

misrepresentation of fact made by the defendant.

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ protestations, William’s

affidavit does not substantively illustrate any alternative

manner in which the plaintiffs relied on a false statement or misrepresentation of fact that the defendant

made. In his affidavit, William first averred that the

defendant ‘‘prepared reports for the [e]state and its

related entities,’’ and that he ‘‘relied on those accounting

reports.’’ William further averred that he ‘‘relied on [the

defendant], as a [c]ertified [p]ublic [a]ccountant, to provide accurate accounting information for the [e]state

and its related entities.’’ Lastly, William averred that,

‘‘[a]s a result of [his] reliance [on the defendant’s]

reports, [he] suffered pecuniary damages, as [the plaintiffs] delayed pursuing removal of [Kenneth] as [e]xecutor of the [e]state.’’13

These averments, which are referenced by the plaintiffs in support of their argument that the Appellate

Court properly determined that the fraud and negligent

misrepresentation counts were not suitable for summary judgment, closely replicate portions of the pleadings. See Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York

Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002)

(‘‘[t]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment

requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the

pleadings can warrantably be inferred’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, these averments are

conclusory, and therefore inadequate to defeat a summary judgment motion, because they do not explain

how or why the plaintiffs relied on the allegedly false

contents of the defendant’s financial statements without, by their own admission, having seen them.14 See

Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) (defining conclusory as ‘‘[e]xpressing a factual inference without stating

the underlying facts on which the inference is based’’);

see also Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Group, Inc.,

252 Conn. 789, 793–94, 749 A.2d 1144 (2000) (‘‘[a] con-
clusory assertion . . . does not constitute evidence

sufficient to establish the existence of a disputed material fact for purposes of a motion for summary

judgment’’).

Without actual reliance, reasonable reliance cannot

possibly exist.15 In this regard, the dissent charitably

attempts to provide illustrative details and gap-fillers

that the plaintiffs did not supply themselves. To begin,

the dissent draws considerable attention to the many

wrongdoings of Kenneth, as well as the allegedly fictitious entries in, and versions of, certain financial statements that the defendant prepared. While this dual

inventory may be emotionally appealing, it first speaks

to the wrong person (i.e., Kenneth), and then to the

wrong legal element (i.e., the presence of false or misleading statements of fact). When the dissent does turn

to the pertinent legal element, reliance, it posits that

‘‘William is entitled to state that he relied on the financial statements that were sent to him, if for no other

reason than to establish the fact that something was

being done regarding the estate, which lulled the plaintiffs to forbear seeking the ouster of the executor.’’ The

dissent does not acknowledge, however, that William

testified at his deposition that he was not familiar with

any of the defendant’s financial statements, did not

recall receiving them, and ‘‘couldn’t have relied on’’

them. These specific admissions must control over the

conclusory averments about reliance in the affidavit.

See Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Group,Inc., supra,

252 Conn. 793–94.

Aside from William’s affidavit, the plaintiffs do not

direct our attention to any counterevidence outside of

the pleadings that could support their essential element

of reliance.16 We therefore determine that, as a matter

of law, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that a genuine

issue of material fact existed as to their claimed reliance

on a false statement or misrepresentation of fact made

by the defendant. Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co.,

supra, 280 Conn. 628. Accordingly, we conclude that

theAppellate Courtimproperly reversed the trial court’s

rendering of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the counts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation.17

II

ACCOUNTING MALPRACTICE

We next turn to the defendant’s claim that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the plaintiffs’

count of accounting malpractice was not suitable for

summary judgment. Specifically, the defendant argues,

inter alia, that the plaintiffs’ accounting malpractice

count repeated the same allegation of reliance that

appeared within the preceding fraud and negligent misrepresentation counts. That is, with regard to the

accounting malpractice count, the plaintiffs again
alleged ‘‘that they relied on information provided to

them by [the defendant], and as a result thereof, they

(1) delayed seeking to remove [Kenneth] as a fiduciary

and (2) delayed pursuing claims against him in Superior

Court.’’ Because the plaintiffs chose to present their

accounting malpractice count in this manner, the defendant argues that it too cannot succeed, for ‘‘[w]ithout

such reliance, the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the

defendant’s conduct caused their supposed injuries.’’

In response, the plaintiffs do not advance any argument with regard to causation. Problematically, the

plaintiffs do not seem to recognize that causation, and

not reliance, is an essential element of a professional

malpractice claim. Indeed, the plaintiffs—who are represented by counsel—have not even attempted to draw

a comparison between these two legal concepts. We

therefore agree with the defendant, and conclude that

the plaintiffs did not present sufficient counterevidence

to demonstrate that there existed a genuine issue of

material fact with respect to their accounting malpractice count.

To establish liability for professional malpractice, a

plaintiff must be able to show the following: (1) a duty

to conform to a professional standard of care for the

plaintiff’s protection; (2) a deviation from that standard

of care; (3) injury; and (4) a causal connection between

the deviation and the claimed injury. See, e.g., Grimm

v. Fox, 303 Conn. 322, 329, 33 A.3d 205 (2012) (legal

malpractice); DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 297 Conn. 105, 125 n.26, 998 A.2d 730

(2010) (medical malpractice).

The essential element of causation has two components. The first component, causation in fact, requires

us to determine whetherthe injury would have occurred

but for the defendant’s conduct. Winn v. Posades, 281

Conn. 50, 56, 913 A.2d 407 (2007). The second component, proximate causation, requires us to determine

whether the defendant’s conduct is a substantial factor

in bringing about the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. That is, there

must be ‘‘an unbroken sequence of events that tied [the

plaintiff’s] injuries to the [defendant’s conduct]. . . .

This causal connection must be based upon more than

conjecture and surmise.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 56–57; see also Gordon v. Glass, 66 Conn.

App. 852, 856, 785 A.2d 1220 (2001) (‘‘[n]o matter how

negligent a party may have been, if his negligent act

bears no [demonstrable] relation to the injury, it is not

actionable’’), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 909, 789 A.2d

994 (2002).

A review of the operative complaint confirms that

the plaintiffs tailored their accounting malpractice

pleadings to the concept of reliance, rather than the

applicable concept of causation. Moreover, on appeal,

the plaintiffs continue to focus exclusively on reliance,

and have not made any discernable attempt to compare
the legal concepts of reliance and causation. Contrary

to the dissent’s approach, in our view, if the plaintiffs

are unable or unwilling to muster an argument that

would advance an essential element of their professional malpractice claim, this court should not independently undertake that task on their behalf.

We have already determined, by way of analyzing the

fraud and negligent misrepresentation counts, that the

plaintiffs did not present sufficient counterevidence to

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact

existed as to their claimed reliance on the misinformation that was allegedly contained in the defendant’s

financial statements. See part I B of this opinion. The

same type of claimed reliance formed the basis for

the plaintiffs’ accounting malpractice count, and the

plaintiffs have not presented any arguments that would

allow us to reach a different result here from that

already reached on the fraud and negligent misrepresentation counts. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court improperly reversed the trial court’s

rendering of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the count of accounting malpractice.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed with

respect to the counts of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and accounting malpractice, and the case is

remanded to that court with direction to affirm the

judgment of the trial court on those counts.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

1 We granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal limited

to the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the

trial court should not have [rendered] summary judgment on counts one

through three of the plaintiffs’ complaint because there existed genuine

issues of material fact?’’ Stuart v. Freiberg, 310 Conn. 921, 922, 77 A.3d

142 (2013).

2 Hereinafter, all references to the trial court are to Judge Tobin unless

otherwise indicated.

3 The Appellate Court concluded that there were no genuine issues of

material fact with respect to the fourth count of the operative complaint,

which alleged a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,

General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 142 Conn. App.

708–10. Thus, with respect to the fourth count only, the Appellate Court

affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id., 710. This aspect of the Appellate Court’s judgment is not at issue

in this appeal. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

4 Certain relevant background facts are derived from a memorandum of

decision that was issued by the trial court, Adams, J., in a related proceeding,

of which the Appellate Court took judicial notice in the present case. See

Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 142 Conn. App. 687 n.3, citing Stuart v. Stuart,

Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Complex Litigation

Docket, Docket No. X08-CV-02-0193031-S (June 28, 2004) (37 Conn. L. Rptr.

367), aff’d, 112 Conn. App. 160, 962 A.2d 842 (2009), rev’d in part, 297 Conn.

26, 996 A.2d 259 (2010).

5

In the interest of simplicity, we refer to Kenneth J. Stuart, Sr., by his

surname and to Kenneth J. Stuart, Jr., William A. Stuart, and Jonathan Stuart

individually by their first names. We also refer to William and Jonathan

collectively as the plaintiffs.

6

In the present action, it appears that the plaintiffs were not entirely

forthcoming about the 1993 probate proceeding, either with the trial court

or the Appellate Court. For example, in a motion to reargue filed with the

trial court after the award of summary judgment, the plaintiffs stated that

they ‘‘did not seek [Kenneth’s] removal as fiduciary until February 12, 2002,
which relief was sought in the . . . Probate Court.’’ Likewise, in their brief

to the Appellate Court, the plaintiffs stated ‘‘the first time [they] sought to

remove [Kenneth] as [a] fiduciary . . . was in 2002.’’ Such statements may

have frustrated the courts as they attempted to fully establish the timeline

for the foundational disputes between the plaintiffs and Kenneth. See Stuart

v. Freiberg, supra, 142 Conn. App. 701 (concluding that trial court ‘‘had no

evidence . . . that the plaintiffs had sought to remove [Kenneth] as a fiduciary in 1993’’).

Some frustration persists in the present appeal because the plaintiffs now

only vaguely acknowledge the 1993 probate proceeding—without providing

any express references to specific dates in their brief or any supporting

Probate Court filings in their appendix. The plaintiffs do, however: (1)

provide a supporting citation to Stuart v. Stuart, Superior Court, judicial

district of Stamford-Norwalk, Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. X08-

CV-02-0193031-S (June 28, 2004) (37 Conn. L. Rptr. 367), aff’d, 112 Conn.

App. 160, 962 A.2d 842 (2009),rev’d in part, 297 Conn. 26, 996 A.2d 259 (2010),

which mentions that Kenneth first told them about the limited partnership in

August, 1993; (2) state that the revelation by Kenneth was almost simultaneous to their initial, unsuccessful attempt to remove him as a fiduciary in

Probate Court; and (3) state that, from 1994 through 2001, they had no

removal proceedings pending against Kenneth in any court. The defendant,

for his part, does not dispute any aspect of these belated admissions.

7 This attempt to auction the Norman Rockwell paintings led to a separate

contest in the Federal District Court in the District of Connecticut over their

rightful ownership, as various publishing interests unsuccessfully claimed to

have proper title to them. See Stuart & Sons, L.P. v. Curtis Publishing Co.,

456 F. Supp. 2d 336, 341–42, 349 (D. Conn. 2006).

8

In the present action, the Appellate Court remarked that the record

‘‘provides no explicit reason for the passage of more than a decade between

the filing of the 1993 complaint and the [issuance of Judge Adams’] memorandum of decision [in Stuart v. Stuart, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 367].’’ Stuart

v. Freiberg, supra, 142 Conn. App. 689 n.4. Citing to a subsequent memorandum of decision on a postjudgment motion; see Stuart v. Stuart, Superior

Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Complex Litigation Docket,

Docket No. X08-CV-02-0193031-S (July 6, 2009); the Appellate Court stated

that Kenneth filed a bankruptcy petition ‘‘at some point during the . . .

litigation [in Stuart v. Stuart, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 367],’’ and hypothesized

that this filing had caused an automatic stay of the proceedings pursuant

to the United States Bankruptcy Code. Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 689 n.4.

Our independent research has revealed, however, that Kenneth did not

file for bankruptcy until October 6, 2005—more than one year after Judge

Adams rendered the judgment in Stuart v. Stuart, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr.

367. It follows that this bankruptcy filing does not explain why Stuart v.

Stuart, supra, lay dormant for such a prolonged period after the plaintiffs

filed their original complaint.

9 The subsequent history of Stuart v. Stuart, supra, 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 367,

does not bear on the present appeal. See, e.g., Stuart v. Stuart, 297 Conn.

26, 28, 996 A.2d 259 (2010) (addressing proper standard of proof for statutory

theft claims).

10 Prior versions of the complaint spawned various claims of defective

pleadings. See Stuart v. Freiberg, 102 Conn. App. 857, 858–59, 927 A.2d 343

(2007) (trial court improperly granted motion to strike all counts of complaint and remanding for further proceedings); Stuart v. Freiberg, Superior

Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-04-0200508-S

(July 9, 2008) (granting defendant’s subsequent motion to strike all counts

of complaint again). The parties eventually proceeded with the plaintiffs’

operative complaint dated July 23, 2008.

11 Chief Judge DiPentima dissented in part, concluding that the trial court

properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because

the uncontroverted evidence sufficiently demonstrated that there were no

genuine issues of material fact concerning reliance or causation. Stuart v.

Freiberg, supra, 142 Conn. App. 718 and n.1. Although she agreed with the

majority’s determination that the plaintiffs did not seek to remove Kenneth

from his fiduciary roles by way of Stuart v. Stuart, supra, 37 Conn. L.

Rptr. 367, Chief Judge DiPentima added that this was merely a ‘‘matter of

semantics’’ and that the plaintiffs were nonetheless already seeking to strip

Kenneth of his estate related powers before the defendant was hired as an

accountant in 1994. Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 713–15. Pointing specifically

to the defendant’s evidence proffered in support of his motion for summary

judgment, Chief Judge DiPentima reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claims of
detrimental reliance were ‘‘untenable’’ because they were both admittedly

well aware of Kenneth’s fraudulent activities months before the defendant

became involved. Id., 713–717. Chief Judge DiPentima concluded, therefore,

that the defendant made out a prima facie case for summary judgment and

that the plaintiffs thereafter failed to provide any substantive counterevidence regarding their alleged reliance. Id., 715.

12 With respect to the count of accounting malpractice, the defendant also

argues that he did not owe the plaintiffs a professional duty of care because,

inter alia, they were not his clients. Because we conclude that the plaintiffs

did not present sufficient counterevidence regarding the issue of causation

and, therefore, could not prevail on their count of accounting malpractice,

we need not address the defendant’s alternative arguments regarding a lack

of duty.

13 In an apparent effort to identify an oral statement on which he may

have relied, William also averred to having one telephone call with the

defendant, which, as best as he could recall, took place in 1997. In this

conversation, the defendant told William that he was incapable of tracking

the estate funds that Kenneth spent on himself. We are simply unable to

conceive how the plaintiffs’ fraud or negligent misrepresentation counts are

supported by the defendant’s open admission that he was not tracking

personal spending from the estate related funds by Kenneth—either standing

alone, or in conjunction with the alleged misinformation in the financial

statements. See 2 F. Harper et al., Torts (3d Ed. 2006) § 7.13, pp. 548–49

(‘‘where the recipient knows the true facts that are misrepresented or for

any reason does not believe the misrepresentation, he cannot be found to

rely on it’’ [footnotes omitted]). Similarly, the dissent has not proffered an

explanation as to how anything the defendant relayed during this telephone

call could serve as the prerequisite false statement or misrepresentation

of fact.

14 Because we conclude that William’s averments were insubstantial and

conclusory, we need not address the defendant’s argument that they should

be disregarded under the sham affidavit doctrine, which has not been

adopted by this court but is frequently employed in the federal courts. See,

e.g., Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc., 760 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.

2014) (‘‘[t]he sham issue of fact doctrine prohibits a party from defeating

summary judgment simply by submitting an affidavit that contradicts the

party’s previous sworn testimony’’ [emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted]).

We note that there is Connecticut appellate precedent holding that, if a

witness submits an affidavit that is merely inconsistent with his prior deposition testimony, ‘‘such an inconsistency is not ordinarily a ground for precluding the witness’ testimony entirely.’’ DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena,

LLC, 123 Conn. App. 583, 617, 2 A.3d 963 (2010), rev’d on other grounds,

306 Conn. 107, 49 A.3d 951 (2012); see also id. (‘‘[w]e see no reason for a

different rule to prevail in a summary judgment proceeding, particularly

given the fact that in such a proceeding the evidence is to be viewed in a

light most favorable to the nonmoving party’’). Such precedent, however,

does not relieve a party who is opposing summary judgment of the duty to

offer nonconclusory evidence that establishes the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact.

15 Having determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact presented as to the plaintiffs’ claimed reliance, with respect to the count of

negligent misrepresentation only, we need not go on to speculate whether

any manner of actualreliance would have been reasonable under the circumstances—which undisputedly show that the plaintiffs believed that Kenneth

had misappropriated hundreds of thousands of dollars from their father’s

estate before he hired the defendant to provide accounting services. See

Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 280 Conn. 626 (essential element

of negligent misrepresentation is reasonable reliance); Williams Ford, Inc.

v. Hartford Courant Co., 232 Conn. 559, 580, 657 A.2d 212 (1995)(reasonableness is normally question of fact); but see 37 Am. Jur. 2d 283, Fraud and

Deceit § 239 (2013)(‘‘[i]f, on the facts alleged in the complaint, no reasonable

jury could find that the plaintiff’s reliance was reasonable, the defendants

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law’’).

16 The plaintiffs, perhaps in an attempt to develop a new theory of reliance

that would not be thwarted by their deposition testimony or conclusory

averments, have further argued on appeal that their failure to demonstrate

that they ever absorbed the false or misleading contents of the defendant’s

financial statements should not be dispositive of their causes of action.

Specifically, the plaintiffs have adopted the position that they relied on the
defendant as an accountant in a much more general and abstract sense to

protect their assets.

The plaintiffs’ position is not persuasive for three reasons. First, though

we do not hold that a claim of fraud or negligent misrepresentation always

requires reliance on false or misleading documents, a plain reading of the

trial court record shows that, in this case, the plaintiffs were dedicated to

exactly such a theory. Cf. Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 280

Conn. 629 (‘‘[a]lthough we are mindful that our jurisprudence requires us

to interpret pleadings broadly, we must construe them reasonably to contain

all that they mean but not in such a way so as to ‘strain the bounds of

rational comprehension’ ’’). Second, as we have highlighted, claims of fraud

and negligent misrepresentation must be tethered to a false statement or

misrepresentation of fact. Id., 626–28. The defendant’s mere existence as

an accountant does not, in some metaphysical sense, amount to a false

statement or misrepresentation of fact. Third, even assuming, arguendo,

that the plaintiffs’ substituted theory of reliance could suffice, they did

not present any nonconclusory evidence to substantiate it at the summary

judgment stage. See Hoskins v. Titan Value Equities Group, Inc., supra,

252 Conn. 793–94; see also Wadia Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 27 Conn.

App. 162, 170, 604 A.2d 1339 (‘‘[m]ere statements of legal conclusions . . .

and bald assertions, without more, are insufficient to raise a genuine issue

of material fact capable of defeating summary judgment’’ [citation omitted]),

aff’d, 224 Conn. 240, 618 A.2d 506 (1992).

17 As previously noted, our conclusions ultimately render it unnecessary

for us to address whether the defendant might have owed the plaintiffs a

duty of care under the particular circumstances of this case. See footnote

12 of this opinion. The dissent, however, does reach this question for both

the negligent misrepresentation and accounting malpractice counts.

We pause here to note that, even if our own conclusions did make it

necessary to consider duty, the final outcome would be the same because

the plaintiffs have effectively abandoned their duty related arguments. On

appeal to this court, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant owed them a

duty of care because they were the intended beneficiaries of his accounting

work. This court, however, has not yet extended the intended beneficiaries

doctrine to cases involving accountants—and the plaintiffs did not deem it

worthwhile to offer a legal basis for doing so. After the plaintiffs presumed

that we would implement this doctrine and, thereby, expand the potential

scope of liability for accountants indefinitely, they then explained how the

doctrine should apply to the facts of the present case by providing exactly

one page of briefing and zero case analysis. Given this scant briefing, we

hold that the claim is abandoned. See Jackson v. Water Pollution Control

Authority, 278 Conn. 692, 711, 900 A.2d 498 (2006) (‘‘failure to brief a

crucial underlying premise precludes further review of [a] claim, which we

deem abandoned’’).

The dissent, however, devotes approximately seven pages of its opinion

to explaining why Connecticut should adopt the intended beneficiaries doctrine in cases involving accountants and, further, why the doctrine should

be availing in this particular case. See part II of the dissenting opinion.

Underthe current circumstances, we are not similarly inclined. SeeCitibank,

N.A. v. Lindland, 310 Conn. 147, 165, 75 A.3d 651 (2013) (‘‘We repeatedly

have stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that have been

improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis,ratherthan mere abstract assertion, is required in orderto avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is

asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory

attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities,

it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).