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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re B.J. and M.B.

No. 22-0379 (Wood County 20-JA-146 and 20-JA-147)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother C.J.

1 appeals the Circuit Court of Wood County’s April 28, 2022, order 

terminating her parental rights to B.J. and M.B.

2 Upon our review, we determine that oral 

argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is 

appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

The proceedings giving rise to this appeal began in July of 2020, when the DHHR filed a 

petition alleging that petitioner was in possession of drugs and under the influence when she 

gave birth to B.J., who had to undergo nonpharmaceutical treatment for drug exposure. During 

the DHHR’s investigation, petitioner indicated that she received her mail at her father’s home in 

Belpre, Ohio, although she “confirmed she resides . . . in Parkersburg,” West Virginia, along 

with her older child, M.B. The DHHR inspected the home in Parkersburg and found many of 

M.B.’s belongings there. Additionally, petitioner indicated that she previously “signed 

guardianship [of M.B.] over to her best friend.” According to petitioner, M.B.’s legal guardian 

cared for the child in West Virginia for approximately four years while petitioner was homeless, 

although petitioner claimed to have reobtained custody of M.B. in September of 2019. 

At the preliminary hearing in July of 2020, petitioner objected to jurisdiction in West 

Virginia under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) as set 

forth in West Virginia Code § 48-20-101 through § 48-20-404. At the time, petitioner argued that 

she lived with M.B. in Ohio for at least ten months prior to the filing of the petition. Petitioner 

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Petitioner appears by counsel Nancy L. McGhee. The West Virginia Department of 

Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”) appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey 

and Assistant Attorney General Katica Ribel. Debra L. Steed appears as the children’s guardian 

ad litem.

2

We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. 

See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e). 

FILED

February 7, 2023

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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did not, however, object to the West Virginia DHHR retaining temporary custody while the 

jurisdictional issue was addressed, so the court set the matter for adjudication in the interim. 

During a hearing in August of 2020, the parties presented the court with an agreed order 

finding that Washington County, Ohio, had subject matter jurisdiction because Ohio was the 

home state of both children. According to the order, “[t]he [c]ourt heard evidence that the Ohio 

DHHR . . . declined to take this case at the time of the incident that led to the filing of the 

ratification,” but the order stressed that no court had declined such jurisdiction. This order was 

then sent to the Washington County Court of Common Pleas for a ruling on jurisdiction. 

However, by order entered on September 1, 2020, the Ohio court declined to exercise 

jurisdiction, finding that “Wood County, West Virginia, would be a more convenient forum to 

hear the issues as one child has been in foster care in West Virginia for a considerable period of 

time and the other child who was born in Wood County, West Virginia[,] . . . has been in foster 

care in West Virginia since his birth.”

In October of 2020, petitioner stipulated that her substance abuse prevented her from 

appropriately caring for the children. The court accepted the stipulation and adjudicated 

petitioner as an abusive and neglectful parent. The court then terminated her parental rights to 

both children by order entered on April 28, 2022, as a result of her continued substance abuse, 

missed drug screens, and other failures to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect at issue.

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On appeal, petitioner is clear that she is not challenging her adjudication or the termination of her 

parental rights. However, she does challenge the circuit court’s denial of her request for posttermination visitation in regard to M.B. only. In denying post-termination visitation, the court

noted that petitioner did not “make her children her number one priority,” as evidenced by the 

fact that she had recently “completely stopped drug screening.” The court noted that there was 

“some bond” between petitioner and M.B., who was then nine years old, although the court

further expressed that “at some point, [M.B.] will need to move on and achieve permanency.”

Initially, the court expressed a willingness to permit petitioner to visit M.B. in the short-term 

while “re-address[ing] that upon adoption of the child, because the child will need permanency 

and to have a new life and stable environment with a new family.” However, upon being 

reminded that petitioner had not had visits with M.B. for approximately four months, the court 

ultimately denied post-termination visitation with petitioner. Specifically, the court found that “it 

would not be in the child’s best interests to reintroduce [petitioner] into the child’s life only to, if 

the child is adopted, . . . be taking her back out.” It is from the dispositional order that petitioner 

appeals.

On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the 

circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re 

Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). On appeal, petitioner first argues that the circuit 

court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the children under the UCCJEA. However, the record 

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The court also terminated the respective fathers’ parental rights to the children. The 

permanency plan for the children is adoption in the current placement. 
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shows that an Ohio court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the children, thereby granting 

West Virginia jurisdiction under West Virginia Code § 48-20-201(a)(3).

According to West Virginia Code § 48-20-201(a),

a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination 

only if:

(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of 

the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the 

commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent from this state but a 

parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;

(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision (1) of this 

subsection, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise 

jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under 

section 20-207 or 20-208, and:

(A) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a 

person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than 

mere physical presence; and

(B) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, 

protection, training and personal relationships;

(3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) or (2) of this subdivision 

have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the 

more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under section 20-

207 or 20-208; or

(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified 

in subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.

Petitioner makes much of the fact that the Ohio court’s order acknowledged that it “may have 

jurisdiction over the children,” but this fact does nothing to bolster her position before this Court. 

Indeed, the plain language of West Virginia Code § 48-20-201(a)(3) contemplates a court having 

jurisdiction nonetheless declining to exercise that jurisdiction, which is exactly what happened

below. 

Petitioner also alleges that the Ohio court’s determination that West Virginia was the 

more appropriate forum was based upon a material mistake of fact. Specifically, petitioner takes 

issue with the Ohio court’s finding that M.B. had “been in foster care in West Virginia for a 

considerable period of time.” According to petitioner, M.B. “was not and never had been in 

foster care in West Virginia.” This argument, however, ignores the fact that at the time the Ohio 

court made this finding, M.B. had been in foster care in West Virginia for two months pursuant 

to this very proceeding.4 It is puzzling why petitioner would argue on appeal that the child was 

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Petitioner repeatedly stresses that “the child’s living arrangements after the 

commencement of the proceeding . . . are not relevant to the determination of whether the court 

has home state subject matter jurisdiction.” Syl. Pt. 7, in part, In re Z.H., 245 W. Va. 456, 859 

(continued . . . )
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not in foster care in this state when the record clearly shows that the DHHR removed M.B. from

her custody at the outset of the proceedings and placed the child in foster care throughout the 

case’s duration. Petitioner appears to be arguing that the Ohio court mistakenly believed that 

M.B. was in foster care in West Virginia before the filing of the petition, but there is nothing to 

suggest that petitioner’s interpretation of this finding is correct.5 Simply put, the Ohio court 

declined jurisdiction upon accurate facts; that M.B. had been in foster care in this state for a 

considerable period and that B.J. had been in foster care in this state for that child’s entire life.

On appeal, petitioner argues, without citation to any authority, that the circuit court 

“should have essentially remanded the [o]rder to the Ohio court with a correct statement of facts 

and asked the court to reconsider its [o]rder.” Aside from the fact that petitioner can point to no

authority permitting a circuit court to “remand” an order to a court from another state once it

declines to exercise jurisdiction, we again stress that, based upon the record before us, we will 

not accept petitioner’s interpretation of the Ohio court’s findings as erroneous. Petitioner also 

argues that the circuit court erred in failing to address jurisdiction again upon her motion at the 

dispositional hearing, but we find no merit to this argument as the matter had been settled and the 

circuit court was under no requirement to address jurisdiction anew after Ohio’s declination. 

Because the Ohio court declined jurisdiction, we find no error in the circuit court assuming 

jurisdiction pursuant to West Virginia Code § 48-20-201(a)(3), and petitioner is entitled to no 

relief. 

Having found no error in the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction, all that remains is to 

address petitioner’s argument that it was error to deny her request for post-termination visitation 

with M.B. According to petitioner, she and the child shared a strong bond that should have 

permitted her to continue visitation after termination of her parental rights. 

As we have explained, 

“[w]hen parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit 

court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation 

or other contact with the abusing parent is in the best interest of the child. Among 

other things, the circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has 

S.E.2d 399 (2021) (emphasis added). This holding has no bearing on the circuit court’s 

assumption of jurisdiction in this matter, however, as it did not do so in accordance with home

state subject matter jurisdiction, as set forth in West Virginia Code § 48-20-201(a)(1), but, rather, 

declination jurisdiction under (a)(3).

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In support of her assertion that this finding is erroneous, petitioner cites to 

correspondence between the DHHR and the Ohio court, in addition to discussion during a 

hearing before the circuit court regarding the alleged “misunderstanding.” It must be stressed, 

however, that none of the evidence to which petitioner cites demonstrates that the Ohio court

intended this finding to mean that M.B. was in foster care before the instant proceedings 

commenced. 
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been established between parent and child and the child’s wishes, if he or she is of 

appropriate maturity to make such request. The evidence must indicate that such 

visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to the child’s well being 

and would be in the child’s best interest.” Syl. Pt. 5, In re Christina L., 194 W.Va. 

446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995).

Syl. Pt. 11, In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002). As outlined above, the 

circuit court noted petitioner’s lack of effort in ensuring that she was entitled to visitation

throughout the proceedings in denying post-termination visitation, as petitioner had not visited

the child for approximately four months because she tested positive for methamphetamine. The 

court also explicitly found that visitation would not be in the child’s best interests because she 

required stability, which would be undermined by reintroducing petitioner into her life only to 

have petitioner removed again upon the child’s eventual adoption. Because the record shows that 

post-termination visitation would have been detrimental and against M.B.’s best interest, we find 

no error. 

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

April 28, 2022, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: February 7, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice William R. Wooton

Justice C. Haley Bunn