NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of:

NADINE BEAUMONT, Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.

DAVID BEAUMONT, Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0426 FC

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0642 FC

(Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. L8015DO201907142

The Honorable Kenneth Gregory, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED 

COUNSEL

Silk Law Office, Lake Havasu City

By Melinda Silk

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

Law Office of Heather C. Wellborn PC, Lake Havasu City

By Heather C. Wellborn, Alyssa N. Oubre

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

FILED 11-10-2022
BEAUMONT v. BEAUMONT

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Nadine Beaumont ("Wife") and David Beaumont ("Husband") 

challenge several rulings in the decree dissolving their marriage. We vacate

the finding that the stocks in a joint trust account are community property, 

the spousal-maintenance award, the expert-witness-fee award, and the 

child-support order. We remand for reconsideration of these issues but 

affirm all other rulings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties married in 2003 in Pennsylvania and have one 

minor child, born in 2004. Wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage in 

2019 and the superior court held a two-day trial in 2020. 

¶3 Before the marriage, Husband acquired two parcels of real 

property in Pennsylvania that he later deeded to a community property 

trust. There are oil and gas leases on these parcels that pay monthly 

royalties in varying amounts. For the 17 months before the trial, the 

royalties paid an average of $5,000 a month. The superior court concluded 

that the Pennsylvania properties and the royalties they generated were 

community property. Finding no competent evidence of their value, the 

court ordered the parties to hold the parcels as tenants in common and 

share equally in any royalties. 

¶4 At the time of the trial, Wife was 60 years old. She requested 

spousal maintenance in the form of half the royalties for life, but if her share 

of the royalties was less than $3,500 in any given month, Wife asked for 

Husband to make up the difference. Husband, on the other hand, opposed 

any award of spousal maintenance. The superior court awarded Wife 

spousal maintenance of $1,000 per month until May 2025, when she will be 

65. The court also entered a current child support order and ordered 

Husband to pay past child support.

¶5 The community owned three businesses: Wise Steward, Back 

to Basics, and Complete Accounting and Tax, Inc. During the two-day trial, 
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3

each party called an expert to testify to the value of the businesses. The 

superior court accepted the conclusion of Wife's expert that only Wise 

Steward had any value. The court found Wise Steward was worth $264,000

and awarded all three businesses and their assets and liabilities to Husband

with an equalization payment of $132,000 to Wife. 

¶6 Wife asked to keep the marital home and pay Husband for his 

share of the equity. Husband did not oppose this if Wife could refinance 

the mortgage and remove his name from the debt, but the parties could not 

agree on the appropriate valuation date for determining Husband's interest 

in the equity. The court ordered the home sold and the equity divided 

equally. Further, if the parties could not agree to a broker or sales price, the

court ordered them to use Husband's broker and list the home for "at least 

$599,900." 

¶7 During the marriage, Wife inherited stocks from her father. A 

few years later, she transferred some of those stocks into a joint trust

account, while leaving others in trust accounts in her name only. The 

parties disputed whether the stocks in the joint trust account were 

community or separate property. The superior court found they were 

community property because Wife gifted these stocks to the community. 

Wife was awarded the joint trust account and ordered to pay Husband an 

equalization payment of $151,585, which was 50% of the account value on 

the date of service. 

¶8 After the superior court made its rulings but before entry of 

the final decree, Husband sought to hold Wife in contempt for not 

complying with the order to sell the home. The court entered the final 

decree and separately set an order to show cause hearing on the contempt 

petition. Wife filed a timely notice of appeal. She also moved to stay 

execution of the decree, which Husband opposed. Husband then crossappealed from the decree. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-

2101(A)(1).

¶9 While the appeal and cross-appeal were pending, the parties 

disputed the need for a supersedeas bond. Husband filed a second petition 

for contempt relating to Wife's alleged transfer of funds from the joint trust

account. The court addressed all these issues at an evidentiary hearing on 

September 16, 2021. 

¶10 At the hearing, the parties agreed that rather than post a 

supersedeas bond, Wife would refinance the mortgage on the marital home

into her name within 90 days. They agreed to hold the house as tenants in 
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common until the appeal is resolved. Each party agreed to pay half the 

mortgage for 90 days; after that, Wife was responsible for the mortgage 

payments. Husband will be reimbursed for the mortgage payments he 

made when he receives his share of the equity. After hearing from two real 

estate brokers, the court found the fair market value of the marital home on

September 16, 2021, was $689,000, with a mortgage balance of $312,500. The 

parties agreed to determine Husband's share of the equity based on these 

figures, pending the outcome of the appeal. Neither party appealed from 

this post-decree ruling. 

DISCUSSION

I. Stocks in the Joint Trust Account.

¶11 The stocks were Wife's separate property when she inherited 

them. A.R.S. § 25-213(A). But separate property can be transmuted into 

community property by agreement, gift, or commingling. In re Marriage of 

Cupp, 152 Ariz. 161, 164 (App. 1986). The superior court found that Wife 

intended to gift the stocks to the community when she transferred them 

from her separate trust account to a joint trust account. Wife argues the 

stocks are her separate property. The classification of property as separate 

or community is a question of law we review de novo. Bell-Kilbourn v. BellKilbourn, 216 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 4 (App. 2007).

¶12 When separate funds are placed into a joint account, there is 

no presumption that the owner of the funds intended to gift half of the 

funds to the other spouse. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 132 Ariz. 44, 46 (1982)

(citing A.R.S. § 14-6103(A), now § 14-6211). Placing separate funds into a 

joint account suggests, but does not conclusively prove, an intent to gift.

Grant v. Grant, 119 Ariz. 470, 472 (App. 1978); see also A.R.S. § 14-6211(A)

(noting funds in a joint account "belong[] to the parties in proportion to the 

net contribution of each to the sums on deposit unless there is clear and 

convincing evidence of a different intent" (emphasis added)).

¶13 The superior court found "it more likely than not" that Wife 

intended to gift her separate property stocks to the community by 

depositing them into a joint trust account. However, the deposit of separate 

funds into a joint account does not indicate a gift absent clear and convincing 

evidence of such an intent. Stevenson, 132 Ariz. at 46. The court did not 

apply the clear-and-convincing legal standard for finding a gift. Ordinarily, 

determining whether a spouse intended a gift is a question of fact subject to 

a clearly erroneous standard of review. Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 

595, ¶ 11 (App. 2017). But the court abuses its discretion when it misapplies 
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the law or relies on incorrect legal standards. Hammett v. Hammett, 247 Ariz. 

556, 559, ¶ 13 (App. 2019). Here, the court applied an incorrect legal 

standard. As a result, we vacate the finding that the stocks are community 

property and remand for reconsideration.

II. Orders Regarding the Marital Home.

¶14 The decree ordered the parties to sell the marital home and 

divide the net proceeds equally. If the parties could not agree on a broker

or listing price, the court ordered the home listed with Husband's broker 

for "at least" $599,900. We review the allocation of community property for 

an abuse of discretion. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 4. 

¶15 Wife concedes the superior court had discretion to order the 

sale of the home. She argues the court abused its discretion here because 

Husband agreed she could have the home as long as he was paid his share 

of the equity and taken off the mortgage. Contrary to Wife's assertion, the 

parties did not reach an enforceable agreement. At the time of trial, Wife 

had not yet refinanced the home; nor did she offer conclusive evidence that 

she could do so. Based on this speculative evidence, and absent an 

enforceable agreement, the court was within its discretion to order the 

parties to sell the home and divide the proceeds equally. 

¶16 Although Wife apparently refinanced the mortgage after the 

decree, that was not the situation at the time of trial. We review the superior 

court's ruling based on the record at the time of trial. See GM Dev. Corp. v. 

Cmty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 4 (App. 1990) (noting appellate court 

review is "limited to the record before the trial court"). When the superior 

court made its ruling, there was no evidence showing that Wife had 

refinanced the home or demonstrating her ability to do so. Moreover, Wife 

waived any argument related to refinancing by raising it for the first time 

in her reply brief. See Johnson v. Provoyeur, 245 Ariz. 239, 243, ¶13 n.5 (App. 

2018) (noting that issues first raised in a reply brief are generally considered 

waived).

¶17 Wife also argues the superior court ignored the effect of 

selling the marital home on the child. Any harm to the child from the sale 

of the home was for the court to weigh against the parties' property 

interests. See Dole v. Blair, 248 Ariz. 629, 633, ¶ 14 (App. 2020) (noting courts

may consider the children in deciding which party should be awarded a 

piece of property, but "may not impinge on either party's property 

interests"). We will not reweigh these considerations on appeal. Hurd v. 

Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009).
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¶18 The superior court's under advisement ruling ordered the 

parties to list the home for $599,900. Wife contends the court improperly 

changed that ruling when it added that the home should be listed for "at 

least" $599,900 in the final decree. The addition of this language in the final 

decree was not improper. It is reasonable to infer that the court added this 

language so that the parties could benefit from any subsequent market 

increase. Indeed, Husband provided two market analyses showing the 

home's value had increased nearly $75,000 between September 2019 and 

November 2020. Wife did not refute this evidence. The language is 

equitable because the court ordered the parties to pay the mortgage using 

funds in a community bank account so they will share equally in any 

increase in value. Because there was no agreement for Wife to buy out 

Husband's interest at a certain price, the court did not abuse its discretion 

by ordering the home sold for at least $599,900.

¶19 The superior court was also within its discretion to order the 

parties to use Husband's broker absent an agreement. Husband's broker 

provided the only comparative market analysis. Wife did not provide an 

alternative broker or method of selecting among competing brokers. We 

find no abuse of discretion. 

III. Post-Decree Ruling on the Marital Home.

¶20 In post-decree proceedings, the parties reached several 

agreements about the home. They agreed to hold title as tenants in common

pending appeal and in lieu of Wife posting a supersedeas bond. Consistent 

with this agreement, Wife refinanced the mortgage into her name. The 

superior court incorporated this agreement into a post-decree order. After 

hearing from both parties' real estate brokers, the court found the home's 

value was $689,000 on September 16, 2021. 

¶21 Wife cannot rely on these post-decree events to argue that the 

order to sell the home was an abuse of discretion. See supra ¶ 15. At the 

time of trial, there was no such agreement, and Wife had not refinanced the 

mortgage. And neither party appealed from the post-decree order finding 

the home was worth $689,000 on September 16, 2021. The superior court 

issued that order in response to post-decree agreements, which do not 

impact the issues raised in this appeal. For this reason, we do not address 

the "issue presented for review on consolidated appeal."

IV. Business Valuation.

¶22 The superior court accepted the opinion of Wife's expert and 

found that only one of the community businesses—Wise Steward—had any 
BEAUMONT v. BEAUMONT

Decision of the Court

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value. The court found that Wise Steward had a value of $264,000 as of 

March 31, 2020. The court awarded Husband the three businesses and all 

business bank accounts, assets, and liabilities; and awarded Wife an 

equalization payment of $132,000. 

¶23 The valuation of assets is a factual determination. See In re 

Marriage of Molloy, 181 Ariz. 146, 150 (App. 1994). We will affirm the 

superior court's determination if reasonable evidence supports it. Id. at 152. 

The record supports the finding that Wife's expert provided a reasonable 

valuation and sufficiently refuted the issues raised by the opposing expert. 

¶24 On cross-appeal, Husband argues the superior court's 

valuation improperly included a "bad debt" Back to Basics owed Wise 

Steward. Husband's expert would deduct this "bad debt" from Wise 

Steward's receivables, thereby lowering its value. According to Wife's 

expert, this would not affect the overall valuation of both businesses. As 

Wife's expert explained, if the "bad debt" was deducted from Wise 

Steward's accounting, it would have to be added back to the accounting for 

Back to Basics. The court was within its discretion to weigh these 

competing expert opinions. See Hurd, 223 Ariz. at 52, ¶ 16 (noting that 

appellate courts do not reweigh conflicting evidence). 

¶25 Husband also argues that the court abused its discretion by 

not ordering the business sold as he proposed. Because Husband cited no 

authority or facts to support this argument, it is waived. See ARCAP 

13(a)(7); In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 64-65, ¶ 6 (2013). Similarly, Wife 

argues, without citations to the record, that the court did not address two 

bank accounts related to Complete Accounting and Tax, Inc. This argument

is also waived. Id.

V. Bank Accounts and the $10,000 Equalization Payment.

¶26 There were two community personal bank accounts at Wells 

Fargo: a checking account and a money market account. The superior court 

ordered the parties to close the checking account and equally divide the 

$1,300 remaining on deposit. The funds in the money market account came 

from the monthly oil and gas royalties. The court ordered the parties to 

continue paying the mortgage from the money market account until they 

sold the home or the funds were depleted. 

¶27 There was also a BBVA account Husband opened in his name 

after the date of service. The only bank statement related to this account 

showed a balance of $28,500 as of October 2020. The court awarded the 

BBVA account to Husband. To equalize the various bank accounts, the 
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court ordered Husband to pay Wife $10,000, finding this amount was 

equitable because Wife had exclusive use of the marital home during the 

proceedings, and the mortgage was paid with community funds (the 

royalties) during that time. 

¶28 Wife argues the $10,000 equalization payment is inequitable;

conversely, Husband argues Wife was not entitled to any equalization 

payment. We will affirm the allocation of community property absent an 

abuse of discretion. Bell-Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. at 523, ¶ 4. 

¶29 Since the date of service, both parties paid their personal 

expenses from the community royalties. Husband also ran personal 

expenses through the businesses. According to Wife, this resulted in 

Husband spending more than his share of the community income during 

the proceedings. Wife also argues that Husband kept all the business 

revenue and did not pay any spousal maintenance or child support during 

the proceedings. In contrast, Husband argues Wife deserved no

equalization payment because she spent more than her share of the royalty 

income. 

¶30 Earnings paid to a spouse after service of the petition are that 

spouse's separate property. See A.R.S. § 25-213(B) (property acquired after 

service of a petition for dissolution is that party's separate property). The 

evidence showed that the funds with BBVA were Husband's post-service

earnings.

¶31 Nonetheless, the businesses were community property, so 

Wife may have been entitled to any profits the businesses generated in 

excess of Husband's reasonable compensation. See Schickner v. Schickner,

237 Ariz. 194, 199, 201, ¶¶ 22, 30 (App. 2015). There was, however, no 

evidence showing such additional profits. Thus, the record does not show 

that Husband improperly retained any community business revenue above

his reasonable compensation.

¶32 Wife argues it is impossible to determine the business 

revenues because Husband did not disclose all the relevant bank 

statements. Yet Wife relied on her expert's business valuation opinion 

despite his admissions that some statements were missing and not every 

personal expense Husband ran through the business was calculated. Wife 

cannot complain about these limitations on one hand but ignore them on 

the other. We find this issue waived.

¶33 Husband contends Wife was not entitled to $10,000 because 

his calculations show she spent more than he did from the community 
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account. However, his calculations did not include any supporting 

documentation. He also attributed the mortgage and some of the child's 

expenses to Wife which skewed her spending. And Husband will receive 

his share of the community funds that were spent on the mortgage when 

he is paid his share of the equity. 

¶34 On this record, we cannot find the allocation of the bank 

accounts and $10,000 equalization payment was inequitable. When viewed 

as a whole and in the light most favorable to upholding the decree, we find 

$10,000 was reasonable. There is no evidence that Husband improperly 

retained business revenues. And Wife did not prove exactly how much 

more community funds Husband spent during the proceedings than she 

spent. Therefore, Wife cannot fault the court for estimating an equitable 

equalization payment based on the record presented. We affirm the 

allocation of the community and business bank accounts and the equitable 

equalization payment. 

VI. Spousal Maintenance.

¶35 The superior court awarded Wife $1,000 a month in spousal 

maintenance from May 1, 2021, until she turns 65 in May 2025. Husband 

argues that Wife was not entitled to any spousal maintenance. Wife 

contends she was entitled to spousal maintenance from the start of the 

proceedings in June 2019, and that the amount is insufficient. We review 

an award of spousal maintenance for an abuse of discretion and will affirm 

if there is any reasonable evidence to support the award. Helland v. Helland,

236 Ariz. 197, 202, ¶ 22 (App. 2014).

A. Spousal Maintenance Eligibility.

¶36 A party is eligible for an award of spousal maintenance if she 

qualifies under any one of the five factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-319(A). In re 

Marriage of Cotter, 245 Ariz. 82, 86, ¶ 10 (App. 2018). The superior court 

found Wife eligible for spousal maintenance based on two factors: (1) the 

parties had a marriage of long duration and Wife is of an age that may 

preclude employment at a level of self-sufficiency, A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(5),

and (2) Wife significantly reduced her income or career opportunities for 

Husband's benefit, A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(4). 

¶37 The evidence supports the finding that Wife significantly 

reduced her income or career opportunities for Husband's benefit. See 

A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(4). Wife was 60 years old at trial and last worked as a 

massage therapist in 2009. When the parties moved to Arizona, she left the 

workforce to care for the family while Husband traveled extensively for 
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work. Nothing in the record showed that Wife could obtain adequate 

employment given her health or the time gap since she last worked. 

¶38 Because the record supports the finding that Wife qualified 

for spousal maintenance under § 25-319(A)(4), we affirm the conclusion that 

Wife was eligible for spousal maintenance. Cotter, 245 Ariz. at 86, ¶ 10

(noting a party need only qualify under one factor to be eligible for spousal 

maintenance). 

B. Amount and Start Date of the Award.

¶39 Because we vacated the ruling that the joint trust account is 

community property and remanded for reconsideration of this significant 

asset, the superior court must reconsider the amount and duration, if any, 

of the spousal maintenance award. Although we express no opinion on the 

merits of this question, the court should reconsider the factors in § 25-319(B) 

on remand. Accordingly, we do not address the arguments as to those 

factors. We vacate the award of spousal maintenance and order the 

superior court to reconsider the appropriate spousal maintenance award, if 

any, on remand.

VII. Wife's Expert Witness Fees.

¶40 The superior court ordered Husband to pay $8,000 of Wife's 

business valuation expert fees because Wife prevailed on this issue. The 

court also found Husband's position on the business valuation was 

unreasonable and not supported by an independent and certified business 

appraisal. Although the court did not cite a statute, we presume it relied 

on A.R.S. § 25-324, which authorizes an award of "the costs and expenses of 

maintaining or defending" a dissolution or custody proceeding. We review 

this award for an abuse of discretion. See Breitbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 

74, 83, ¶ 35 (App. 2007).

¶41 The fact that Wife prevailed on the business valuation does 

not support the award of expert witness fees. "[Section] 25-324 does not 

establish a prevailing party standard for awarding fees and costs." Id. at 84, 

¶ 39. Because the superior court relied on an incorrect legal standard, we 

vacate the order. On remand, the superior court may reinstate the fee 

award if it determines that Husband's position was unreasonable 

independent of Husband's decision not to obtain an independent and 

certified business appraisal. 
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VIII. Past Child Support.

¶42 In addition to a prospective child support order, the superior 

court ordered Husband to pay past child support from July 1, 2019, to April 

30, 2021. Husband argues this was an abuse of discretion because Wife used 

community property royalties for the child's expenses. We review child 

support awards for an abuse of discretion and accept the findings of fact 

unless clearly erroneous. Engel v. Landman, 221 Ariz. 504, 510, ¶ 21 (App. 

2009). 

¶43 Under A.R.S. § 25-320(B), the court must order retroactive 

child support if it finds, as here, (1) there is no previous order for child 

support, and (2) a current child support order is appropriate. Simpson v. 

Simpson, 224 Ariz. 224, 225-26, ¶¶ 7, 9 (App. 2010). Thus, the court was 

required by § 25-320(B) to order past child support.

¶44 In determining the amount of the past child support order, 

the court could consider any amount Husband paid for temporary or 

voluntary support. A.R.S. § 25-320(B). Husband did not pay any temporary 

or voluntary support directly to Wife. Nevertheless, Husband argues that

past child support is not warranted because the parties used the community 

royalties for their living expenses during the proceedings. According to

Husband, he effectively paid voluntary support because Wife spent more 

than her half of the royalty income. Even if we make the rather tenuous 

assumption that this constitutes a "voluntary payment" of child support by 

Husband, it is not clear that Wife spent more than her share of the 

community funds. See supra ¶ 32. Given the conflicting evidence, we 

cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding that Husband was not 

entitled to credit for any "voluntary support." 

¶45 Because we are vacating and remanding for the superior court 

to reconsider the appropriate spousal-maintenance award, we also vacate 

and remand the child-support award to allow the court to recalculate child 

support to account for any change in spousal maintenance. See Guidelines 

§ XVII(A) (2022).

IX. Attorney Fees On Appeal.

¶46 Both parties request attorney fees and costs on appeal under 

A.R.S. § 25-324. After considering the relevant factors, we decline to award 

attorney fees without prejudice. The superior court may consider any 

requests for fees on remand, including fees incurred on appeal, pending the 

outcome of this litigation. The award of costs on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-

342 shall also be determined pending the result on remand. 
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CONCLUSION

¶47 We vacate the ruling that the joint trust account is community 

property and the award of Wife's expert witness fees and remand for 

reconsideration. We also vacate the award of spousal maintenance but 

affirm that Wife is eligible for support under § 25-319(A)(5). The court shall

reconsider an appropriate spousal maintenance award and recalculate 

child support on remand. All other rulings in the decree of dissolution are 

affirmed.