J-S07026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SAMMIE CAMPBELL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 578 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 15, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013197-2008.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J: FILED JUNE 6, 2023

Sammie Campbell appeals pro se from the order denying his second 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-46. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history

through Campbell’s direct appeal as follows:

On or about October 30, 2007, [Campbell] was arrested and 

was charged with inter alia attempted murder and conspiracy to 

commit murder for the September 12, 2007 shooting that 

occurred on Mifflin Street. [Campbell], along with his coconspirators Markeem Vicks and Maurice Wilkerson, were involved 

in two related shooting battles between rival gangs in South 

Philadelphia.

The first of these (“the Mifflin Street shooting”) occurred 

around 3:00 p.m. on the 400 and 500 blocks of Mifflin Street, a 

quiet residential block. Later that evening, [Campbell] and his coconspirators took part in a second gunfight that occurred on or 
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around the 500 block of Moore Street (“the Moore Street 

shooting”). The second gun battle targeted Anthony Alonzo Reid, 

who suffered multiple near-fatal gunshot wounds.

In 2010, [Campbell] was convicted of attempted murder 

and related charges in a non-jury trial[.] That conviction was 

vacated, and the case was remanded for a new trial, following 

PCRA litigation in which [Campbell] alleged that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate or present Erlene Muirhead, 

[Campbell’s] girlfriend, as an alibi witness.

In between [Campbell’s] original 2010 trial and his retrial in 

2015, the victim, [Reid], was killed in another shooting. 

Additionally, Wilkerson and Vicks pled guilty to their roles in [the 

Moore Street shooting] and admitted that they participated in a 

conspiracy together with [Campbell] to attack Reid.

In 2015, represented by new counsel, [Campbell] was retried before this court and a jury. At that trial, the Commonwealth 

presented the testimony of Wilkerson and Vicks, including their 

guilty pleas. [Reid’s] testimony from the 2010 trial was read into 

the record, as Reid was unavailable to testify in person due to his 

death. [Campbell] called [Muirhead] as an alibi witness.

On December 15, 2015, the jury convicted [Campbell] of 

attempted murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an 

instrument of crime, relating to the Moore Street shooting, which 

targeted [Reid]. [Campbell] was acquitted of all charges relating 

to the Mifflin Street shooting.

[Campbell] filed a timely direct appeal raising three claims: 

(1) that the trial court erred in expressing skepticism toward 

[Vicks’] testimony; (2) that the prosecutor committed misconduct 

in cross-examining [Muirhead] about why she failed to come 

forward as an alibi witness immediately; and (3) that the trial 

court abused its discretion by admitting two recorded prison

conversations involving [Wilkerson].

The Superior Court rejected all three of [Campbell’s] claims 

as meritless and affirmed the judgment of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Campbell, 996 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [Campbell’s] petition for 

allowance of appeal on August 6, 2018.

Rule 907 Notice, 1/6/22, at 1-2 (unnumbered) (formatting altered).
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The PCRA court summarized the subsequent procedural history as 

follows:

[Campbell] initiated PCRA proceedings on September 15, 

2018. New counsel was appointed to represent him. After 

conducting an independent review of the record and determining 

that three were no meritorious issues to be raised, counsel filed a 

no-merit brief and petition to withdraw pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

On May 20, 2019, after reviewing the Finley letter, issuing 

notice of its intent to dismiss under Rule 907, and considering 

[Campbell’s] pro se responses to both the Finley letter and the 

907 notice, this court formally dismissed the PCRA petition. 

[Campbell] did not file an appeal.

Rule 907 Notice, 1/6/22, at 2 (unnumbered) (formatting altered).

On September 6, 2019, Campbell filed the PCRA petition at issue, his 

second. Thereafter, several pro se filings and changes of counsel followed. 

Ultimately, privately-retained counsel entered his appearance, and, on 

September 7, 2021, filed a “Second Amended/Supplemental PCRA Petition” 

on Campbell’s behalf. In this amended petition, Campbell raised the following 

four claims: 1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial 

due to the prosecution’s belated disclosure of evidence concerning Muirhead 

and Officer Nancy Morley; 2) that the trial court erred in permitting Campbell’s 

two cases to be joined for trial; 3) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to object to the admission of Wilkerson and Vicks’ guilty pleas a trial; and 4) 

that the jury’s verdict was “an affront to the incontrovertible physical facts 

doctrine.” Amended Petition, 9/7/21, at 7.
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On January 6, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of 

its intent to dismiss Campbell’s petition without a hearing because the issues 

he raised, although arguably waived, were nonetheless without merit. The 

court explained:

Despite [Campbell’s] argument to the contrary, these claims 

are partially or entirely waived. While [Campbell’s] second 

petition was initiated within the one-year window set forth by 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), and is therefore timely, it is a second 

petition. [Campbell] had the opportunity to raise all of these 

issues on direct appeal and/or during his first PCRA petition and 

he did not do so. His claims are therefore waived.

In order to evade waiver, [Campbell] would have to be able 

to show that prior counsel was ineffective for failing to raise and/or 

preserve the underlying substantive claims. However, as all of 

[Campbell’s] claims are substantively without merit, he cannot 

make this showing.

Rule 907 Notice, 1/6/22, at 3 (unnumbered) (formatting altered). The PCRA 

court then went on to provide a detailed explanation for this conclusion. See 

id. at 1-5 (unnumbered).

This timely pro se appeal followed. The PCRA court did not require 

Pa.R.A.P. compliance. Campbell raises the following issues, which we have 

reordered as follows:

I. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion by denying 

[Campbell] relief and failing to hold a hearing for trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to request a 

cautionary instruction and/or mistrial when the 

Commonwealth introduced both [co-conspirator’s] 

guilty pleas as substantive evidence against [him], 

violating his due process rights to a fair trial?

II. Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion when it failed 

to grant relief and hold a hearing for trial counsel’s 
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failure to request a curative instruction and/or mistrial 

for the Commonwealth’s discovery violation for not 

disclosing (trial by ambush) rebuttal impeachment 

(school records) evidence of alibi witness, violating 

[Campbell’s] due process rights to a fair trial.

III. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for not raising trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to preserve for 

direct review, and request a curative instruction 

and/or mistrial for the inflammatory and prejudicial 

admission of [co-conspirator Wilkerson’s] jail calls, 

violating [Campbell’s] due process rights to a fair trial.

IV. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for not raising trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness for not investigating 

[and/or] presenting impeachment evidence 

concerning Detective Edward Tolliver, violating 

[Campbell’s] rights to a fair trial (due process).

Campbell’s Brief at 7.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA is to ascertain whether “the determination of the PCRA court 

is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings 

in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without 

a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no 

genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant 

is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no 

legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings. 

To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a 

petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he 

raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in 

his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court 

otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing. 
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Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

In this appeal Campbell continues to claim that this is his first PCRA. 

Although he contends that in a previous filing he only sought to compel the 

Commonwealth to file private criminal complaints against certain detectives 

and police officers, the court treated the filing as a PCRA petition. Further, 

the PCRA court appointed counsel, and, in seeking to withdraw, first PCRA 

counsel informed the court that his review of the record revealed no issue that 

would warrant post-conviction relief. See PCRA Counsel Letter, 2/6/19 at 1. 

Nevertheless, because Campbell has cited Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 

A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), and his claims of ineffectiveness of both PCRA counsel 

are raised in some fashion, we will address the merits of his issues.

Each of Campbell’s issues involve a layered claim of ineffectiveness. To 

obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective, 

a petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's 

ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth 

v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009). “Generally, counsel’s 

performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will 

only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id. 

This requires the petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is 

of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 
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action or inaction; and (3) counsel’s act or omission prejudiced the petitioner. 

Id. at 533.

In making a layered claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner “must 

properly argue each prong of the three-prong ineffectiveness test for each 

separate attorney.” Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa. 

Super. 2012). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical 

inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective 

did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. 

Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010). “If that attorney was 

effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to 

raise the underlying issue.” Id. 

In his first issue, Campbell asserts that the PCRA court erred and/or 

abused its discretion when it rejected his claim that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to request a mistrial and/or cautionary instruction after 

his co-conspirators guilty pleas were introduced into evidence. According to 

Campbell, contrary to his alibi, these guilty pleas placed him at the scene and 

were used as substantive evidence against him. Campbell’s Brief at 23.

The PCRA court found no merit to this claim. The court first placed 

Campbell’s claim in context:

Prior to [Campbell’s] trial, both Wilkerson and Vicks pled 

guilty to criminal conspiracy and related charges stemming from 

the Moore Street shooting. During both plea colloquies, the 

prosecutor read a statement of facts that indicated that 

[Campbell] was present at the Moore Street shooting, and both 
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Wilkerson and Vicks agreed with that statement of facts. Neither 

man, however, made any independent confession or statement 

implicating [Campbell] as part of their guilty plea colloquies. At 

[Campbell’s] trial, both Vicks and Wilkerson were called as 

witnesses, and their guilty pleas were read into evidence. 

However, while both men acknowledged their own guilt, they also 

both testified that [Campbell] was not present. Vicks said that 

“Me and Wilkerson were there that night and we did some 

shooting. [Campbell] was nowhere in sight. He wasn’t there; 

that’s the truth.” Wilkerson testified that he and Vicks discussed 

shooting [Reid], armed themselves after that discussion, and shot 

at Reid together, but that “[Campbell] wasn’t there at all. At all.”

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 14 (citations omitted).

Next, the court explained why the guilty pleas were properly admitted 

and why there was no basis for trial counsel to object:

Because both Vicks and Wilkerson testified that [Campbell] 

was not present at the Moore Street shooting, but had previously 

stipulated to his presence under oath during their guilty pleas, 

their pleas were admissible as prior inconsistent statements under 

Pa.R.E. 803.1(1)(A) (providing that a prior statement by a 

declarant-witness is admissible where it is inconsistent with that 

declarant-witness’s trial testimony, and the prior statement was 

given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury). There was, 

accordingly, no basis for trial counsel to object to the admission 

of those statements, because they were clearly admissible under 

Pa.R.E. 803.1(1)(A)

Additionally, because evidence that Wilkerson and Vicks 

pled guilty to the Moore Street shooting was essential to the 

defense theory that they alone were responsible for Reid’s 

shooting, and that [Campbell] had not be involved or even present 

on the scene, there was a reasonable strategic basis for trial 

counsel to refrain from objecting to the admission of those pleas. 

The defense argument relied on Vicks and Wilkerson taking 

responsibility for the crime, and therefore absolving [Campbell] of 

any involvement. [Campbell] cannot show that trial counsel acted 

unreasonably by failing to object to the admission of Vicks[’] and 

Wilkerson[’s] pleas. There was a clear strategic reason for the 

defense to want the jury to hear about the guilty pleas, and the 

pleas were plainly admissible under the rules of evidence. Absent 
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their pleas, the defense theory of the case would have lost much 

of its persuasive force. As previously stated, [Campbell] cannot 

establish that he was prejudiced, and counsel cannot be found 

ineffective for failing to make a frivolous objection.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 14-15 (footnote omitted; citation corrected).

Moreover, as to Campbell’s argument regarding the necessity of a 

curative instruction or motion for mistrial, the PCRA court explained why 

Campbell’s reliance on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Boyer, 891 A.2d 1265 (Pa. 2006), this Court’s decision in Commonwealth 

v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149 (Pa. Super. 2004), and Commonwealth v. Geho, 

302 A.2d 463 (Pa. Super. 1973) was misplaced:

[Campbell] argues that [the above cases] concluded that, 

where one or more of several charged defendants plead guilty, it 

is incumbent upon the trial judge to give adequate and clear 

cautionary instructions to the jury to avoid “guilt by association” 

as to the remaining defendant. Therefore, according to 

[Campbell], a new trial is warranted since no such instruction was 

given, and no objection as made by trial counsel. This argument 

also fails.

Here, [Campbell] relies on [Geho, supra,] in support of his 

claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness. However, the primary concern 

[in] Geho is not present in [Campbell’s] case. Geho involved a 

scenario in which three defendants were being jointly tried before 

a jury. Midway through the trial, two of the three co-defendants 

changed their pleas to “guilty” in the presence of the jury. The 

trial then proceeded solely against Geho. The trial court advised 

the jury that they were not to be concerned with, or influenced 

by, the two co-defendants’ guilty pleas, but to consider Geho’s 

guilt strictly based on the trial evidence.

In Geho, the co-defendants’ guilty pleas were 

unaccompanied by any substantive evidence. The sole concern 

was that the jury would interpret co[-]defendant’s guilty pleas, in 

and of themselves, as proof of Geho’s guilt. Here, by contrast, 

Wilkerson and Vicks were not [Campbell’s] co-defendants before 

this jury. Wilkerson and Vicks’ guilty pleas were introduced not 
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simply to show that they had pled guilty, but because their prior 

inconsistent statements were admissible as substantive evidence. 

See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 155 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (introduction of co-defendant’s guilty plea “was appropriate 

because it was used to introduce [other admissible] evidence”). 

Furthermore, as previously discussed, evidence concerning 

Wilkerson and Vicks’ guilty pleas was crucial to the defense theory 

of the case.

While evidence of a co-defendant’s guilty plea might 

ordinarily be viewed with caution, due to the risk that the jury 

might improperly impute the co-defendant’s guilt to the defendant 

on trial, in this case, evidence of the other two co[-]defendants 

guilty pleas was the bedrock of the defense argument. Thus, while 

a cautionary instruction might have been preferable out of an 

abundance of caution, its absence cannot have prejudiced 

[Campbell]. His entire defense hinged on the fact that two of his 

co-defendants had pled guilty to the Moore Street shooting and, 

after acknowledging their own guilt, had testified that [Campbell] 

was not there. Under these circumstances, there was little risk 

that the jury would improperly attribute the co-defendants’ guilt 

to [Campbell].

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 15-17 (citation and some emphasis omitted).

Finally, the PCRA court concluded Campbell was also not prejudiced 

because, if any error occurred in failing to give a cautionary instruction, the 

error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Campbell’s guilt:

[A]ny error in the absence of a cautionary instruction was 

harmless because there was considerable other evidence of 

[Campbell’s] guilt. Before his death, [Reid] gave a police 

statement in which he identified [Campbell] by name as one of 

the three men who shot him on the night of September 12, 2007. 

He also identified [Campbell’s] photograph as being that of one of 

the men who shot him and explained the motive of the crime to 

police. Gihad Topping, Reid’s friend, also witnessed the shooting 

and identified [Campbell], by both name and picture, to police as 

one of the perpetrators. Topping told police that [Campbell] was 

“from 7th Street,” that they had had prior violent altercations, and 

that he had known [Campbell] “for about three years.”
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This was a case in which [Campbell] was identified by 

multiple eyewitnesses, including the victim, as one of the 

shooters. The witnesses knew [Campbell] by name, and their 

accounts were consistent across multiple details, such as the 

make and color of Wilkerson’s burgundy Chevy Impala, [Reid] 

having been told to “take his fucking hands out of his pockets” 

before the shooting, and the fact that Wilkerson drove away after 

this interaction, then returned in a different vehicle with his coconspirators to shoot at Reid. Any error concerning the lack of a 

cautionary instruction was therefore harmless. See 

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d at 155 (although it was 

error to admit a co-defendant’s guilty plea without a cautionary 

instruction, that error was harmless, where there was a proper 

basis for admitting the plea and the other evidence of guilt was 

overwhelming). Under the totality of the circumstances, it is 

apparent that the lack of a cautionary instruction regarding the 

jury’s consideration of the co-conspirators’ guilty pleas was not 

prejudicial. Because [Campbell] could not have been prejudiced 

by trial counsel’s inaction, this argument fails. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 17-18 (citations omitted).

Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s thorough discussion 

of why Campbell’s first issue does not warrant post-conviction relief. The 

defense theory at trial clearly was to use Wilkerson and Vicks’ testimony to 

Campbell’s advantage. Indeed, as noted by the Commonwealth and not 

disputed by Campbell, trial counsel informed the court that he had 

subpoenaed these two men and intended to present them as defense 

witnesses had the Commonwealth not called them first. See Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 11 n.6 (citing N.T., 12/9/15, at 272). Further, while Campbell claims 

that his name was not “redacted” from the factual basis given for the guilty 

pleas, such redaction is only required to protect defendants from out-of-court 

statements made by a non-testifying codefendant at a joint trial. See,
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generally, Commonwealth v. Brown, 925 A.2d 147 (Pa. 2007). Such is 

not the case here, as both Wilkerson and Vicks had previously pled guilty and 

were subject to cross-examination by trial counsel. 

Moreover, contrary to Campbell’s claim, the guilty pleas were properly 

admitted as substantive evidence of his participation in the conspiracy to shoot 

Reid. See Commonwealth v. Pitner, 928 A.2d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 

2007) (holding that a co-defendant’s prior statements relevant to his own 

guilty plea were admissible as substantive evidence because they were 

inconsistent with co-defendant’s trial testimony and he was subject to crossexamination).

Finally, our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion 

that any error in failing to give a cautionary instruction was harmless, given 

the overwhelming evidence of Campbell’s guilt. Thus, Campbell’s first issue 

fails.

In his second issue, Campbell asserts that the PCRA court erred by 

dismissing without a hearing his claim that trial counsel should have objected 

and/or asked for a cautionary instruction or mistrial based upon the 

Commonwealth’s discovery violation with regard to impeachment evidence 

involving Muirhead, his alibi witness. According to Campbell, this late 

disclosure essentially caused a “trial by ambush,” which prejudiced him.

The PCRA court found no merit to this claim. Once again, the court first 

placed the claim in context:
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At trial, [Campbell] presented [Muirhead] as both an 

eyewitness to the Mifflin Street shooting and an alibi witness to 

the Moore Street shooting. Muirhead testified that she, 

[Campbell], and a fiend of theirs were on the 400 block of Mifflin 

Street when their car broke down and they were attacked by an 

unknown shooter. Although her testimony placed [Campbell] as 

present on the scene at that shooting, Muirhead said that he was 

not armed and never fired any bullets of his own. She also 

testified that [Campbell] could not have been present at the Moore 

Street shooting, because he was with her at a friend’s house in 

Sharon Hill, Pennsylvania, watching movies and having sex all 

night. As part of her testimony, Muirhead testified that on 

September 12, 2007, she was enrolled in the 10th grade at Furness 

High School. After witnessing the shooting on Mifflin Street, she 

had an altercation with a group of girls who attacked her. 

According to Muirhead she “got kicked out of school [the following 

day] for the incident. They said I was an endangerment to the 

school because of the incident.” A week later, she said, she 

transferred to Overbrook High School.

On rebuttal, the prosecution called a school official to testify 

that Muirhead’s school record did not reflect any disciplinary 

action, that she was never suspended or expelled, and that she 

did not miss any required attendance days in the month of 

September. According to school records, Muirhead did not 

transfer to Overbrook High School until October 24, 2007.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 9-10 (paragraph break added; citations 

omitted).

The PCRA court then rejected Campbell’s claim that he was ambushed 

at trial:

Despite his argument to the contrary, nothing in the 

transcript suggests that trial counsel was ambushed by either the 

school official’s testimony or the documents supporting that 

testimony. [Campbell] has offered no citations to the record or 

other evidence to support his contention that the evidence was 

“withheld until after the trial began,” or that trial counsel was 

surprised by the late disclosure. To the contrary, the record shows 

that the prosecution had spoken with trial counsel about the 

rebuttal witness and had provided the supporting documents in 
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advance, and that trial counsel was able to cross-examine the 

witness extensively about gaps in those records. Thus, not only 

does the record fail to support [Campbell’s] argument, but it 

shows that trial counsel was able to effectively cross-examine the 

witness, and that any delay that may have existed in the 

prosecution’s disclosure of that information (although not actually 

established that there was any delay) did not prejudice the 

defense.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/19/22, at 10-11 (citations omitted).

Our review supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that Campbell’s claim 

of late disclosure had no support in the record. On the contrary, Campbell 

does not dispute the Commonwealth’s contention that it informed the trial 

court that it had given trial counsel documents relevant to the rebuttal of 

Muirhead’s trial testimony, and trial counsel “did not suggest that he had not 

seen them before, let alone that he was unfamiliar with their substance.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 19 (citing N.T., 12/14/15, at 75-79). Instead, 

Campbell relies upon a question he asked counsel about a “pile of papers” that 

appeared on the defense table to support his claim that the Commonwealth 

had not given trial counsel the discovery until that very moment. See 

Campbell’s Brief at 53. Campbell’s claim is not persuasive given the PCRA 

court’s conclusion that trial counsel effectively cross-examined the witness. 

Thus, Campbell’s second issue fails.

In his third issue, Campbell asserts that PCRA counsel was ineffective 

for failing to challenge prior counsel’s failure to preserve for direct review, the 

claim that trial counsel should have requested a curative instruction and/or 
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mistrial after the Commonwealth introduced into evidence two prison phone 

calls allegedly made by Wilkerson. 

On direct appeal, Campbell claimed that the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting into evidence portions of two phone calls in which 

Wilkerson and others discussed efforts to silence or pressure witnesses. In 

the first recording, Wilkerson and his mother discussed his mother’s 

confronting Reid and/or Topping at the courthouse and asking, “did you come 

here to snitch?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 15 (citing N.T., 12/9/15, at 258). 

In the second recording Wilkerson and an unidentified person discussed 

Wilkerson’s desire to “bury the rat” and “get off” as a result. Id. (citing N.T., 

12/9/15, at 262).

Campbell argued on appeal that the second recording was not 

authenticated because Wilkerson denied recognizing his voice, and that both 

recordings were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial because they did not 

mention Campbell. Although this Court rejected Campbell’s claim regarding 

authentication, we concluded that the claim regarding the relevancy and 

prejudicial nature of the recorded evidence was waived because Campbell 

failed to “move for a mistrial or request a curative instruction or any other 

relief based on the prejudicial nature of the recorded evidence[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Campbell, 179 A.3d 600 (Pa. Super. 2017), nonprecedential decision at 25.
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Our standard of review regarding the admission of evidence is well 

settled: “It is well settled that the admissibility of evidence is a matter 

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and may be reversed only 

upon a showing that the court abused that discretion.” Commonwealth v. 

Wynn, 850 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). As our 

Supreme Court has summarized:

Appellate courts typically examine a trial court’s decision 

concerning the admissibility of evidence for abuse of 

discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be found merely 

because an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion, but requires a result of manifest 

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or 

such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. Typically, 

all relevant evidence, i.e., evidence which tends to make the 

existence or non-existence of a material fact more or less 

probable, is admissible, subject to the prejudice/probative 

value weighing which attends all decisions upon admissibility. 

See Pa.R.E. 401; Pa.R.E. 402[.]

Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 136-37 (Pa. 2007). 

The Commonwealth contends that both recordings were properly 

admissible even though neither call mentioned Campbell. As to the first call, 

the Commonwealth argues that attempts by Wilkerson’s mother and others to 

pressure and/or intimidate Reid and Topping was admissible to explain why, 

contrary to their pretrial statements, neither Reid nor Topping identified any 

of the perpetrators of the shooting. Further, as to both calls, the 

Commonwealth contends they demonstrated Wilkerson’s “bias against the 

Commonwealth and its witnesses, and therefore that his trial testimony 
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purporting to exculpate [Campbell] was less credible than his statements 

during his guilty plea colloquy.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 17.

We agree that these phone calls were admissible. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 159, 164 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(acknowledging courts have “permitted the Commonwealth to engage in a line 

of questioning designed to reveal that a witness changed his testimony fear if 

the consequences of testifying truthfully”); Commonwealth v. Collins, 702 

A.2d 540, 544 (Pa. 1997) (holding the evidence of efforts to influence a 

witness are admissible to help explain why the witness changed his or her 

version of the pertinent facts); Pa.R.E. 607(a) (providing that the “credibility 

of any witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the 

witness”). Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, see supra, 

Campbell cannot establish that evidence of these phone calls prejudiced him. 

Thus, Campbell’s third issue warrants no post-conviction relief.

By order entered October 4, 2022, this Court granted Campbell’s 

application to correct brief and strike from the record the fourth issue in his 

brief. In this issue he asserted that second PCRA counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance for declining to pursue a claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for 

not impeaching Detective Tolliver with evidence allegedly showing that in 

2007, the detective allegedly committed misconduct in Campbell’s unrelated 

case in which he pled guilty to third-degree murder.
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On December 8, 2022, Campbell filed with this Court an application for 

remand in which he recasts his claim regarding Detective Tolliver as a violation 

of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), due to the Commonwealth’s 

suppressing information about Detective Tolliver in the unrelated case. 

According to Campbell, even though he pled guilty, evidence of Detective 

Tolliver’s supposed dishonesty and bias toward him in that case would have 

been important impeachment evidence in this case. 

Campbell has failed to establish any basis for remand. It appears that 

Campbell knew of the alleged misconduct as early as 2015 and, therefore 

could have raised it in his first PCRA petition. More fundamentally, Campbell 

provides no evidence to support his claim that the detective invented a nonexistence witness in his other case. Thus, we deny Campbell’s motion for 

remand. 

In sum, because the PCRA court correctly rejected Campbell’s layered 

claims of ineffectiveness and a evidentiary hearing was not necessary, we 

affirm the PCRA court’s order denying him post-conviction relief.

Motion for remand denied. Order affirmed.
J-S07026-23

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2023