Docket No. 89076–Agenda 15–January 2001.

ROBERT EUGENE WEBSTER, Appellant, v. EDWIN

								 								HARTMAN, Appellee.

Opinion filed April 19, 2001.

	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

	Plaintiff, Robert Eugene Webster, filed a personal injury

action against defendant, Edwin Hartman, in the circuit court of

Sangamon County. Several years later, the circuit court granted

defendant’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement against

plaintiff and dismissed plaintiff’s cause of action with prejudice.

Plaintiff appealed. The appellate court affirmed the order of the

circuit court, holding that, absent a sufficient record on appeal, it

must presume that the order of the circuit court enforcing the

settlement agreement was in conformity with the law and had a

sufficient factual basis. 309 Ill. App. 3d 459, 460. The appellate

court also held that, regardless of where the burden of proof may

lie in the trial court, the burden of providing a sufficient record on

review always lies with the party who is claiming that the trial

court erred: in this case, the plaintiff. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 461. We

granted plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal and now affirm the

judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

	On February 10, 1994, plaintiff sued defendant for injuries he

allegedly sustained during an automobile collision at an

intersection in Springfield, Illinois, in February 1992. Litigation

ensued until 1998, when, according to the court docket, the “case

settled.”

	Prior to settlement, the common law record indicates, the

parties repeatedly quarreled over discovery issues. During a three-

year period, defendant filed multiple motions to compel discovery

responses. On December 6, 1995, defendant filed a motion for

judgment resulting from plaintiff’s failure to comply with a

discovery order entered by the trial court. Two weeks later,

plaintiff’s attorney, with permission of court, withdrew as counsel

for plaintiff. Plaintiff’s attorney withdrew because “[plaintiff] has substantially failed to fulfill obligations to me and has made it

unreasonable [sic] difficult for my firm to represent him, in particular, my client has failed to communicate and respond to

correspondence in a timely manner and has failed to follow

instructions and act upon affiant’s advice.” Approximately one

month later, a second attorney, Kevin Harris, entered his

appearance for plaintiff. Defendant withdrew his motion for

judgment. On December 2, 1996, Harris moved to withdraw as

counsel for plaintiff because “[p]laintiff’s failure to assist counsel

by providing information imperative to his case precludes

counsel’s effective representation.” The court granted Harris’

motion to withdraw, and again, defendant filed a motion for

judgment on the basis that no attorney entered an appearance in

the action.

	On February 20, 1997, at the scheduled hearing on

defendant’s motion for judgment, a third attorney represented

plaintiff. The common law record is void of information regarding

the proceedings at this hearing. Briefs by the parties indicate that

the motion was either withdrawn or continued for hearing and

never argued. Notwithstanding, plaintiff’s lawsuit continued and

defendant filed supplemental interrogatories on April 14, 1997.

Plaintiff failed to answer these interrogatories and defendant,

again, moved to compel plaintiff to answer them.

	Prior to June 1997, plaintiff’s second attorney, Harris,

returned as counsel for plaintiff. The date of his return is unclear

but not disputed by the parties. After June 1997, Harris appeared

on behalf of plaintiff at various court hearings, is listed as

plaintiff’s counsel on various court documents, signed and filed

multiple court motions, and is listed as the recipient of discovery

served by defendant.

	The trial court initially set the case for a jury trial on

November 19, 1997. By agreement of both parties, the matter was

continued to January 12, 1998. On December 23, 1997, plaintiff

moved to continue the trial a second time. Harris appeared before

the court for a hearing on plaintiff’s motion to continue. The trial

court entered a case management order specifying, in part, the

following schedule: (1) plaintiff to disclose opinion witnesses by March 15, 1998; (2) all discovery to be concluded by September

15, 1998; and (3) cause set for docket call September 1998.

	After the close of discovery, on September 23, 1998, plaintiff

moved to amend the case management order to extend discovery

to January 1, 1999. Plaintiff claimed that his referral to five new

treating physicians warranted additional time to conduct discovery

and evidence depositions. Specifically, plaintiff sought to depose

Dr. Charles Aprill of the Magnolia Clinic in New Orleans,

Louisiana, and Dr. Stephen Pneda of the Memorial Medical Center

Pain Management Clinic in Springfield, Illinois. Defendant

responded with a motion to “set a trial date certain,” a motion to

compel, and a motion to bar plaintiff’s expert testimony.

Defendant argued that the case inactivity, the age of the case,

plaintiff’s failure to seek the extension prior to the discovery cut-

off, and plaintiff’s continued failure to comply with discovery

warranted an order setting a trial date certain, as well as an order

barring plaintiff’s experts. On October 6, 1998, the trial court

granted defendant’s motion to “set a trial date certain,” motion to

compel, and motion to bar expert testimony. The court further

denied plaintiff’s motion to amend the case management order.

	On November 5, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider

the trial court’s order denying his motion to amend the case

management order and extend discovery. In support of this

motion, plaintiff attached a copy of a report by Dr. Aprill. In this

report Dr. Aprill diagnosed plaintiff with “Tired Neck Syndrome.”

Plaintiff argued that the trial court should reconsider its previous

order and extend expert discovery because this report contained

the “first definitive diagnosis” causally relating his symptoms to

the accident.

	The trial court docket states that five days later, on November

10, 1998, the “case settled.” On November 13, 1998, defendant

filed a motion to enforce settlement stating: “[a]fter receiving the

court’s ruling [the October 6, 1998, order barring plaintiff from

offering any opinion testimony] this matter was settled for

$10,000.00.” Defendant sought to enforce settlement through the

court because plaintiff failed to execute and return dismissal and

release documents. On December 7, 1998, Harris and counsel for

defendant appeared in court for a hearing on defendant’s pending motion to enforce settlement. The Sangamon County docket entry

for this hearing states, “Present attorneys Koepke and Harris.

Cause called for hearing on defendant’s motion to enforce

settlement. Motion allowed. Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider

denied. Case dismissed with prejudice. Cause stricken.”

	On January 5, 1999, plaintiff filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on the basis that he did not agree to the settlement. The

appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. 309 Ill.

App. 3d 459. The appellate court explained that it had no record

of the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant’s motion to

enforce settlement and no basis for holding that the trial court’s

finding–that settlement occurred–was against the manifest weight

of the evidence. 309 Ill. App. 3d at 460. The appellate court also

held that the defendant-appellee had no burden to ensure that a

complete record was filed in the reviewing court. 309 Ill. App. 3d

at 461. The appellate court denied the petition for rehearing and

this court allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.

2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

	Plaintiff first argues that the appellate court misapprehended

the sufficiency of the record on review. Both parties argue we

should review this issue under the manifest error standard of

review. Typically, the manifest error standard is appropriate to

review findings of fact made by a trial judge. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998); Reese v. E.M. Melahn, 53 Ill. 2d 508, 512-13 (1973). In this instance, however, there is no record

to review the basis for the trial court’s determination. The question

is a legal one–whether in the absence of a record the appellate

court correctly held that it must presume the trial court’s holding

had a sufficient legal and factual basis. Accordingly, we review

such legal questions de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 388.

	This court has long held that in order to support a claim of

error on appeal the appellant has the burden to present a

sufficiently complete record. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). In fact, “[f]rom the very nature of an appeal it is

evident that the court of review must have before it the record to

review in order to determine whether there was the error claimed by the appellant.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391. Where the issue on appeal relates to the conduct of a hearing or proceeding, this issue

is not subject to review absent a report or record of the proceeding.

Instead, absent a record, “it [is] presumed that the order entered by

the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient

factual basis.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.

	In Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389 (1984), defendant’s motion to vacate judgment was denied by the trial court.

Defendant failed to present a complete record of the hearing on

review. Specifically, the record was devoid of a transcript or report

of the proceedings, a bystander’s report, or an agreed statement of

facts (166 Ill. 2d Rs. 323(c), (d)). This court held that “[a]s there

[was] no transcript of the hearing on the motion to vacate here,

there is no basis for holding that the trial court abused discretion

in denying the motion.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.

	Similarly, in Skaggs v. Junis, 28 Ill. 2d 199 (1963), this court rejected the argument that where the record lacks information of

evidence presented at a hearing, we must assume none was heard

and that the court’s order, therefore, was improper. Instead, we

held that “it is presumed that the court heard adequate evidence to

support the decision that was rendered” unless the record indicates

otherwise. Skaggs, 28 Ill. 2d at 201-02.

	In the instant case, the record contains no transcript of the

hearing on defendant’s motion to enforce settlement, no report of

the proceedings, no bystander’s report, and no agreed statements

of facts. 166 Ill. 2d Rs. 323(c), (d). Additionally, plaintiff never

filed a response to defendant’s motion to enforce settlement or a

motion to reconsider the order granting that motion. As such, we

know only that on December 7, 1998, counsel for both parties

were present and that the “cause was called for hearing on

defendant’s motion to enforce settlement.” We do not know what

evidence or arguments were presented at that hearing. We do not

know the basis for the trial court’s decision. We do know,

however, that the trial court granted defendant’s motion.1 Under these circumstances, as correctly held by the appellate court, we

will presume that the trial court heard adequate evidence to

support its decision and that its order granting defendant’s motion

to enforce settlement was in conformity with the law. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92; Skaggs, 28 Ill. 2d at 201-02.

	Plaintiff urges this court to consider the statements in his pro se notice of appeal in determining the sufficiency of the record on review and as evidence that the trial court judgment was against

the manifest weight of the evidence. We decline to do so. Plaintiff

states in his notice of appeal that “no *** settlement was agreed to

by either the plaintiff or his attorney.” A notice of appeal is filed

in the trial court after the trial court rules. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303. The

purpose of the notice of appeal is not to place new “evidence” into

the record. Its purpose is more limited–to preserve the right of

review. Regardless of the veracity of statements contained in a

notice of appeal, these statements are not usable as evidence. To

consider a notice of appeal as evidence a court of review would

make credibility determinations to assess its trustworthiness and

accuracy. This outcome directly conflicts with well-established

precedent of this court. The trial court “as the trier of fact *** in

a position superior to a court of review” makes determinations

based on the evidence and weighs the credibility of participants to

the litigation. Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 352, 356 (1967).

	Plaintiff also requests this court consider evidence regarding

the January 24, 2000, disbarment of his attorney, Harris, for

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,

as evidence that plaintiff did not give Harris authority to settle.

Essentially, plaintiff argues that because Harris engaged in

wrongful conduct in other litigation, his conduct must have been

deceitful or fraudulent when he represented plaintiff. We cannot

make such an assumption. This court will not reverse a trial

court’s decision on the basis of speculation and conjecture. Harris was disbarred for conduct unrelated to this litigation and

subsequent to the December 7, 1998, hearing on defendant’s

motion to enforce settlement. This information was not available

to the trial judge when he made his determination, as the

disbarment occurred one year after the trial court granted

defendant’s motion to enforce settlement.

	Plaintiff cites People v. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d 481 (1999), as support for the proposition that defendant’s burden in the trial

court to establish the opposing counsel’s authority to settle extends

to the appeal. Specifically, plaintiff argues that it is defendant’s

burden to provide a sufficient record on appeal to show that Harris

had authority to settle.

	Plaintiff incorrectly relies on McDuffee to support this proposition. In McDuffee a defendant filed a motion for substitution of judge seven days after his first appearance in court.

The State opposed the motion as untimely, arguing that the

defendant learned the identity of the judge 22 days before he filed

his motion to substitute judge by receipt of a mailed trial docket.

The record on appeal did not contain the trial docket letter

allegedly mailed to the defendant. The trial court denied the

defendant’s motion as untimely, and the decision was affirmed on

appeal. We reversed the appellate court and held that absent

evidence in the record to show the defendant had knowledge of the

trial judge before his first appearance, his motion to substitute

seven days after his first appearance was within the statutorily

required 10-day period. McDuffee, 187 Ill. 2d at 491.

	McDuffee is inapposite because it does not address extending a party’s trial court burden to the appellate stage. Rather, it stands

for the proposition that a reviewing court cannot look beyond the

record and speculate on what may have occurred in the trial court.

A court of review is limited to the record before it. In McDuffee, there was no evidence in the record that a trial docket letter existed

or was ever mailed. This court refused to speculate and find that

the defendant had knowledge of the judge’s identity 22 days

before he filed his motion to substitute. Instead, based on the

record one could only discern that defendant first learned the

judge’s identity when he appeared seven days before he filed his

motion. Likewise, this court will not look beyond the record on appeal to find that plaintiff’s attorney lacked his authority to settle.

There must be evidence in the record that his attorney, Harris,

lacked authority.

	The defendant’s burden of proof in the trial court is not at

issue. On appeal it is always the appellant’s burden to provide the

court of review with a sufficient record in order to establish error. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. Plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden.

	In light of the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to address

plaintiff’s additional contention. The judgment of the appellate

court is affirmed.

Affirmed.