93162 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 26, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

(8) You may view this material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 

Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(9) You may view this material at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations, or email fr.inspection@

nara.gov. 

Issued on November 20, 2024. 

Peter A. White, 

Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate 

Management Division, Aircraft Certification 

Service. 

[FR Doc. 2024–27591 Filed 11–25–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2024–1692; Project 

Identifier MCAI–2024–00050–T; Amendment 

39–22878; AD 2024–22–07] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; De Havilland 

Aircraft of Canada Limited (Type 

Certificate Previously Held by 

Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited 

Model DHC–8–401 and –402 airplanes. 

This AD was prompted by a report of an 

in-flight event where isolation valve 

caution messages were received. This 

AD requires inspecting the fuse/shuttle 

valve serial numbers, and replacing 

certain fuse/shuttle valves, as specified 

in a Transport Canada AD, which is 

incorporated by reference (IBR). The 

FAA is issuing this AD to address the 

unsafe condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective December 

31, 2024. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of December 31, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: 

AD Docket: You may examine the AD 

docket at regulations.gov under Docket 

No. FAA–2024–1692; or in person at 

Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 

5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this final rule, the mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information 

(MCAI), any comments received, and 

other information. The address for 

Docket Operations is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

Material Incorporated by Reference: 

• For Transport Canada material 

identified in this AD, contact Transport 

Canada, Transport Canada National 

Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra 

Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, 

Canada; telephone 888–663–3639; email 

TC.AirworthinessDirectivesConsignesdenavigabilite.TC@tc.gc.ca. 

You may find this material on the 

Transport Canada website at 

tc.canada.ca/en/aviation. 

• You may view this material at the 

FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, 

Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 

216th St., Des Moines, WA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 206–231–3195. 

It is also available at regulations.gov 

under Docket No. FAA–2024–1692. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Gabriel Kim, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 

Westbury, NY 11590; telephone: 516– 

228–7300; email: 9-avs-nyaco-cos@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain De Havilland Aircraft of 

Canada Limited Model DHC–8–401 and 

–402 airplanes. The NPRM published in 

the Federal Register on June 21, 2024 

(89 FR 51988). The NPRM was 

prompted by AD CF–2024–01, dated 

January 11, 2024, issued by Transport 

Canada, which is the aviation authority 

for Canada (Transport Canada AD CF– 

2024–01) (also referred to as the MCAI). 

The MCAI states that an in-service event 

was reported where the crew received a 

number two isolation valve (ISO #2) 

caution message followed by a number 

one isolation valve (ISO #1) caution 

message. The landing gear was extended 

via an alternate extension system as the 

crew prepared for landing. Upon 

landing, the crew used the emergency 

brake to stop the airplane. The airplane 

stopped safely within the runway limits. 

Subsequent maintenance activity 

discovered an external leak from the 

main landing gear (MLG) brake 

assembly, and it was found that the 

fuse/shuttle valve assembly did not 

function properly. Further investigation 

revealed that the fuse/shuttle valve 

assembly failure resulted from a factory 

assembly error, which occurred on a 

limited number of fuse/shuttle valves. 

The assembly error can cause valve 

deformation leading to premature wear, 

and eventually fuse/shuttle valve 

failure. This condition, if not corrected, 

could result in the loss of powered 

landing gear extension/retraction, 

outboard and inboard spoilers, nose 

wheel steering, and normal braking, and 

possibly a runway excursion. 

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to 

require inspecting the fuse/shuttle valve 

serial numbers, and replacing certain 

fuse/shuttle valves, as specified in 

Transport Canada AD CF–2024–01. The 

FAA is issuing this AD to address the 

unsafe condition on these products. 

You may examine the MCAI in the 

AD docket at regulations.gov under 

Docket No. FAA–2024–1692. 

Discussion of Final Airworthiness 

Directive 

Comments 

The FAA received a comment from 

Air Line Pilots Association, 

International (ALPA). The following 

presents the comment received on the 

NPRM and the FAA’s response to the 

comment. 

Request To Reduce Compliance Time 

ALPA stated the compliance time of 

8,000 flight hours or 48 months 

whichever occurs first after the effective 

date of the proposed AD is excessive for 

such unsafe condition, that could result 

in the loss of powered landing gear 

extension/retraction, outboard and 

inboard spoilers, nose wheel steering, 

normal braking, and possibly a runway 

excursion. The FAA infers that ALPA is 

requesting the FAA reduce the 

compliance time. 

The FAA does not agree with the 

request. The FAA has determined that 

Transport Canada’s compliance time 

calculation is adequate. The low 

probability of a critical event is due to 

the single occurrence and high flight 

hours. In addition, multiple isolation 

valves can effectively mitigate hydraulic 

fluid leaks. After considering all the 

available information, the FAA has 

determined that the compliance time, as 

proposed, represents an appropriate 

interval of time in which the required 

actions can be performed in a timely 

manner within the affected fleet, while 

still maintaining an adequate level of 

safety. Additionally, the FAA notes that 

there has been only one event of an inservice aircraft, and in that event, the 

aircraft landed safely. With only one 

event and the high amount of flight 

hours in the fleet, the probability of the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 26, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 93163 

unsafe condition occurring is low. It is 

possible that all the systems listed in 

this AD could fail simultaneously; 

however, that is unlikely. Aircraft 

hydraulic systems typically have an 

isolation valve, which in this case was 

activated and annunciated. The 

isolation valve was effective, and 

although hydraulic fluid leaked, the 

hydraulic pressure remained at normal 

levels. This AD has not been changed 

regarding this request. 

Clarification of Unsafe Condition 

Paragraph (e) of the proposed AD 

states the FAA is issuing this AD to 

address certain fuse/shuttle valves. The 

FAA has revised paragraph (e) of this 

AD to state the FAA is issuing this AD 

to address failure of certain fuse/shuttle 

valves to clarify it is the failure of the 

fuse/shuttle valves that could lead to the 

unsafe condition. 

Conclusion 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country and is approved for operation in 

the United States. Pursuant to the FAA’s 

bilateral agreement with this State of 

Design Authority, it has notified the 

FAA of the unsafe condition described 

in the MCAI referenced above. The FAA 

reviewed the relevant data, considered 

the comment received, and determined 

that air safety requires adopting this AD 

as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on this product. Except for 

minor editorial changes, and the change 

described previously, this AD is 

adopted as proposed in the NPRM. 

None of the changes will increase the 

economic burden on any operator. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

Under 1 CFR Part 51 

Transport Canada AD CF–2024–01 

specifies procedures for inspecting the 

fuse/shuttle valve serial numbers, and if 

any fuse/shuttle valve assemblies with 

the listed serial numbers are found, 

replacing the affected fuse/shuttle 

valves. 

This material is reasonably available 

because the interested parties have 

access to it through their normal course 

of business or by the means identified 

in ADDRESSES section. 

Costs of Compliance 

The FAA estimates this AD affects 54 

airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA 

estimates the following costs to comply 

with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS FOR REQUIRED ACTIONS

Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 .............................................................................................. $0 $85 $4,590 

The FAA estimates the following 

costs to do any necessary on-condition 

action required based on the results of 

any required actions. The FAA has no 

way of determining the number of 

aircraft that might need this oncondition action: 

ESTIMATED COSTS OF ON-CONDITION ACTIONS

Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

5 work-hours × $85 per hour = $425 per fuse/shuttle valve ....................................... $64,453 per fuse/shuttle valve assembly $64,878

The FAA included all known costs in 

its cost estimate. According to the 

manufacturer, however, some or all of 

the costs of this AD may be covered 

under warranty, thereby reducing the 

cost impact on affected operators. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701: General requirements. Under 

that section, Congress charges the FAA 

with promoting safe flight of civil 

aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

rulemaking action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive: 


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93164 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 26, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

2024–22–07 De Havilland Aircraft of 

Canada Limited (Type Certificate 

Previously Held by Bombardier, Inc.): 

Amendment 39–22878; Docket No. 

FAA–2024–1692; Project Identifier 

MCAI–2024–00050–T. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective December 31, 2024. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to De Havilland Aircraft 

of Canada Limited Model DHC–8–401 and 

–402 airplanes, certificated in any category, 

as identified in Transport Canada AD CF– 

2024–01, dated January 11, 2024 (Transport 

Canada AD CF–2024–01). 

(d) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 27, Flight Controls; 29, 

Hydraulic Power; and 32, Landing Gear. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by a report of an 

in-flight event where isolation valve caution 

messages were received. The FAA is issuing 

this AD to address failure of certain fuse/ 

shuttle valves. The unsafe condition, if not 

addressed, could result in the loss of 

powered landing gear extension/retraction, 

outboard and inboard spoilers, nose wheel 

steering, normal braking, and possibly a 

runway excursion. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Requirements 

Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this 

AD: Comply with all required actions and 

compliance times specified in, and in 

accordance with, Transport Canada AD CF– 

2024–01. 

(h) Exceptions to Transport Canada AD CF– 

2024–01 

(1) Where Transport Canada AD CF–2024– 

01 refers to its effective date, this AD requires 

using the effective date of this AD. 

(2) Where Transport Canada AD CF–2024– 

01 refers to hours air time, this AD requires 

using flight hours. 

(i) Additional AD Provisions 

The following provisions also apply to this 

AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, International 

Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or 

responsible Flight Standards Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the International Validation 

Branch, mail it to the address identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any 

approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 

principal inspector, or lacking a principal 

inspector, the manager of the responsible 

Flight Standards Office. 

(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any 

requirement in this AD to obtain instructions 

from a manufacturer, the instructions must 

be accomplished using a method approved 

by the Manager, International Validation 

Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or De 

Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited’s 

Transport Canada Design Approval 

Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO, 

the approval must include the DAOauthorized signature. 

(j) Additional Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Gabriel Kim, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 

410, Westbury, NY 11590; telephone: 516– 

228–7300; email: 9-avs-nyaco-cos@faa.gov. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Transport Canada AD CF–2024–01, 

dated January 11, 2024. 

(ii) [Reserved] 

(3) For Transport Canada AD CF–2024–01, 

contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada 

National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra 

Drive, Nepean, Ontario K1A 0N5, Canada; 

telephone 888–663–3639; email 

TC.AirworthinessDirectives-Consignes

denavigabilite.TC@tc.gc.ca; website 

tc.canada.ca/en/aviation. 

(4) You may view this material at the FAA, 

Airworthiness Products Section, Operational 

Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des 

Moines, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

206–231–3195. 

(5) You may view this material at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, 

visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ 

ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. 

Issued on October 28, 2024. 

Victor Wicklund, 

Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness 

Division, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2024–27593 Filed 11–25–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

15 CFR Parts 738, 740, 742 and 774 

[Docket No. 241113–0293] 

RIN 0694–AJ63 

Implementation of Additional Controls 

on Pakistan 

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Department of Commerce. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and 

Security (BIS) is amending the Export 

Administration Regulations (EAR) by 

imposing new licensing requirements 

on exports, reexports, and transfers (incountry) to and within Pakistan of 

certain items identified on the 

Commerce Control List (CCL) that are 

not currently subject to a license 

requirement when destined for Pakistan. 

This change is being made to ensure 

that such transactions receive U.S. 

government review to reduce the risk of 

diversion to an end use or end user of 

concern. 

DATES: This rule is effective November 

25, 2024, except for amendatory 

instruction 6, which is effective 

November 25, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

questions on this rule, contact Philip 

Johnson at RPD2@bis.doc.gov or (202) 

482–2440. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

BIS implements export controls on 

dual-use and certain munitions items 

(commodities, software, and technology) 

under the EAR (15 CFR parts 730–774) 

to advance U.S. national security and 

foreign policy interests. Among other 

controls, the EAR restricts the export, 

reexport, and transfer (in-country) of 

items based on their classification on 

the CCL (supp. no. 1 to 15 CFR part 774) 

and relevant reason(s) for control (see 15 

CFR part 742) applicable to the country 

of destination, as generally determined 

by the Commerce Country Chart (supp. 

no. 1 to 15 CFR part 738). BIS also 

maintains end-use and end-user 

controls pursuant to part 744 of the 

EAR, including controls on transactions 

involving less-sensitive items 

designated as EAR99, and controls that 

apply to specific activities of U.S. 

persons. Additionally, BIS maintains 

embargoes and special controls 

pursuant to part 746 of the EAR. With 

respect to Pakistan, BIS maintains a 

combination of CCL-based, end-use, and 

end-user controls. The end-use controls 


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