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	PACOM House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Prepared Statement 
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        <h1 class="title">PACOM House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, Prepared Statement </h1>
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                 alt="In this file photo, Defense Secretary Ash Carter speaks with Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III at U.S. Pacific Command headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii April 12, 2015. Three days later, Locklear joined other Defense Department leaders on Capitol Hill for a hearing on maintaining the U.S. military’s technological edge. "
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                <div class="image-title">Asia-Pacific Shift Creates Opportunities, Security Needs</div>
                <div class="image-caption">In this file photo, Defense Secretary Ash Carter speaks with Navy Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III at U.S. Pacific Command headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii April 12, 2015. Three days later, Locklear joined other Defense Department leaders on Capitol Hill for a hearing on maintaining the U.S. military’s technological edge. </div>
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    <div><b>By Commander, US Pacific Command, ADM Samuel J. Locklear, III</b> <span class="date">/ Published April 15, 2015</span></div>
    <span class="dateline-text"></span>
    <span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;">Chairman Thornberry,
Congressman Smith, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to
address the committee. This will be my fourth and final opportunity to provide
an Indo-Asia-Pacific assessment since taking command of United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM) in March 2012. For over three years, I have had the
extraordinary privilege to lead Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast
Guardsmen, and civilians selflessly serving our nation. These dedicated men and
women and their families are doing an amazing job and I am proud to serve
alongside them. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;">In concert with allies and
partners, USPACOM balances historical and cultural factors against modern day
political and economic events in an ever-evolving effort to manage friction and
conflict in the most militarized region in the world. These actions are
designed to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships,
maintain access to areas of common interest, counter aggression, prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeat violent extremism. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;">What follows is my assessment
of the region’s security environment, including the current and future
challenges and opportunities for USPACOM forces. My testimony includes an
update on major areas of concern in the security environment, allies and
partners in the region, building and strengthening relationships, and
maintaining an effective and assured presence. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;">Security Environment<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;">The Indo-Asia-Pacific remains
one of the most dynamic regions on earth. It is vital to U.S. economic and
security interests, and activities in the region will shape much of our
nation’s future. The region encompasses 52% of the earth’s surface and is
composed of 83% water and 17% land. Over half of the people on the planet
reside on that 17% of land, and by the middle of the century, the
Indo-Asia-Pacific will potentially contain 70% of the world’s population. This
high population density coupled with destabilizing factors such as natural
disasters, climate change, ideological radicalism, and population migration
will continue to put immense pressure on regional governments. Contained in the
thirty-six nations in USPACOM’s area of responsibility are the world’s two
largest economies after the U.S. (China and Japan), and five </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">smallest economies. The region also
contains the world’s most populous nation (China), the largest democracy
(India), the largest Muslim-majority (Indonesia), and the smallest republic
(Nauru). It contains seven of the ten largest standing militaries, five nuclear
nations, and five of the U.S.’s seven mutual defense treaty alliances. The
socioeconomic diversity and population density throughout the USPACOM area of
responsibility (AOR) create strategic long-term challenges. These challenges
include: political instability, social inequality, poverty, increased
sensitivity to climate change and natural disasters, risk of pandemic disease,
and epidemic drug use and distribution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">In addition to
these challenges, the U.S. must continue to deter North Korean provocation,
ensure access to air and sea lanes, encourage peaceful resolution of
territorial and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas, respond to
natural disasters and theater health issues, check the flow of violent
extremists from the Middle East to violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific, address transnational crimes, monitor an increasingly
active Russia, and constructively engage a rising China. Despite all of the
challenges, the theater possesses opportunities for the U.S., its allies, and
its partners. In order to capitalize on these opportunities, foster the
region’s economic potential, and provide the security and stability necessary
to protect areas of common interest, USPACOM remains engaged. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The
Indo-Asia-Pacific requires stable political institutions to effectively govern
and prosper. Overall, but with notable exceptions, the countries of the Indo-Asia-Pacific
region are more politically stable than in previous years. The general health
of democratic institutions across the region is evidenced by several critical
leadership transitions which occurred last year. Successful, peaceful
participatory elections occurred in India and Indonesia. Sri Lanka achieved a
peaceful transition of power following its January election. Fiji took a major
step toward moving past its 2006 military coup by holding elections last
September. Citizens in many countries were able to peacefully protest without
fear of oppressive action. While these activities are reassuring, challenges
remain. For example, Thailand’s military coup removed a democratically elected
administration, and interim leaders have yet to restore a democratic
government. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">North
Korea:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">North Korea remains the most
dangerous and unpredictable security challenge. The regime continues its
aggressive attitude while advancing its nuclear capability and ballistic
missile programs. While the international community continues to urge North
Korea to live up to its international obligations and return to authentic
credible negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework, North Korea has
unfortunately shown no willingness to seriously discuss its denuclearization commitments
and obligations, and additional nuclear tests remain possible. It is expected
that North Korea will continue to showcase ballistic missile development (to
include mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate range
Musudan missiles) and conduct launches in direct violation of several United
Nations Security Council Resolutions (such as the short-range ballistic missile
launches in March 2015). North Korea already announced its intent to conduct
“annual and regular” drills to advance this prohibited capability. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Additionally,
North Korea demonstrated the will to employ cyber techniques to impose costly
damage to civilian companies, as was demonstrated in the high-profile attack on
Sony Pictures Entertainment. North Korean cyber actors continue to conduct
cyber actions against South Korean military and civilian networks. USPACOM
remains concerned about the destructive nature of this state sponsored
cyber-attack targeting a commercial entity and its employees in the United
States. These actions demonstrate North Korea’s disregard for international
norms. North Korea’s actions are beyond the bounds of acceptable state behavior
in cyberspace. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Territorial
and Maritime Issues:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">
</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Territorial and
maritime issues in the East and South China Seas, if not handled properly, may
negatively impact stability in the regional and the security environment. The
claimants' use of maritime law enforcement vessels to enforce their claims has
largely kept these issues out of the military sphere, despite a steady increase
in military air and sea patrols. While no country appears to desire military
conflict, an escalation due to a tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">In the East
China Sea, Japan and China both claim sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. While
the United States does not take a position on ultimate sovereignty over the
islands, it has long recognized Japanese administration of them. China’s
behavior in the area has resulted in close encounters at sea, aggressive
Chinese air intercepts of Japanese reconnaissance flights, inflammatory
strategic messaging, and the no-notice declaration of a Chinese Air Defense
Identification Zone in the East China Sea. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The South
China Sea issues are complex. Six claimants (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan,
and the Philippines) have overlapping claims in the South China Sea. As the
South China Sea claimants’ populations and economies continue to grow, access
to the oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries within the South China Sea becomes
more important. Claimants appear to be asserting their claims through increased
maritime patrols, outpost and facility construction, and land reclamation. <br />
<br />
</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">China has the
broadest claim with its self-proclaimed “Nine-Dash line” that covers almost the
entire South China Sea. China’s lack of clarity with regard to its South China
Sea claims, and China’s attempts to unilaterally enforce its ambiguous claims,
has created uncertainty in the region. Any use of the nine-dash line by China
to claim maritime rights not based on claimed land features would not align
with international law. The international community would welcome China to
clarify or adjust its nine-dash line claim and bring it into accordance with
the international law of the sea, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> <br />
</o:p></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">To achieve its
long-term goals in the region, China is executing a strategy that includes
expanding outposts in contested areas through land reclamation on South China
Sea features, taking actions to prevent other nations from establishing / maintaining
outposts, exploring for natural resources in disputed waters, and increasing
its naval and air forces’ presence through exercises and patrols. China’s
aggressive land reclamation and construction projects at eight South China Sea
military outposts include new buildings, more capable berthing space for ships,
and presumably an airfield on the Fiery Cross Reef (China’s largest reclamation
project). Although land reclamation cannot, for example, change a submerged
feature into a natural island that generates any legal entitlements to maritime
zones, the completion of these projects will give China the ability for greater
presence, increase dwell time for military and coast guard assets, and expand
the areas covered by surveillance and area-denial systems. Examples of
activities supporting China’s long-term strategy include attempts to block
resupply missions to the small Philippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal and
exclude Philippine and other fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. Last
year, China also moved a China National Offshore Oil Corporation drilling
platform into Vietnam’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone resulting in a tense
standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese maritime assets substantially
increasing the possibility of miscalculation between the two countries. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The U.S. does
not take a position on issues of sovereignty with respect to territorial claims
in the East and South China Sea, but we do insist that all maritime claims must
be derived from land features in accordance with international law as reflected
in the Law of the Sea Convention. The U.S. also continues to emphasize the
importance that maritime and territorial disagreements be resolved peacefully
in accordance with international law and opposes the use of intimidation,
coercion, or force to assert claims. An example of such an attempt at peaceful
resolution is the Philippines’ arbitration against China under the Law of the
Sea Convention that is being heard by a tribunal in The Hague. Of note, China
has refused to participate in this arbitration to date. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Natural
Disasters:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The Indo-Asia-Pacific accounted for
over 40% (1,690 incidences) of the world’s reported natural disasters during
the period between 2004 and 2013, and, because of the region’s coastal
population density, these disasters were particularly deadly, claiming more
than 700,000 lives. The Pacific Rim's tectonic plate structure produces its
well-known Ring of Fire, which regularly triggers earthquakes, volcanoes, and
tsunamis. Weather extremes and anomalies continue to plague the region.
Understanding the scope and severity of long-term climate change, unexpected
climate shocks, and climate variability events such as El Nino are shared
global challenges. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">In addition to
seismic and climate challenges, areas of large populations, dense living
conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in the region create optimal
conditions for the rapid spread of human- or animal-borne diseases. To address
these challenges, USPACOM focuses on pre-crisis preparedness with training and
exercises. For example, many of the lessons learned and preparedness measures
implemented after Typhoon Haiyan (Operation Damayan, November 2013) resulted in
less damage and loss of life when Typhoon Hagupit passed over the Philippines
last December. U.S. forces regularly train with allies and partners on
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and stand ready to
respond in support of interagency partners to a natural disaster or the
frequent vectors of disease that plague the region. Regional information
sharing and rapid response to health crises are improving, but the danger
remains high. USPACOM will continue to focus on improving pre-crisis
preparedness and working with allies and partners in the region to ensure an
effective response when an event occurs. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Violent
Extremism:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The ongoing conflict in Syria and
Iraq attracts foreign fighters from countries throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Current assessments indicate approximately 1,300 foreign personnel fighting
alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant are from the
Indo-Asia-Pacific. A small number of these combat-experienced fighters who
return home could enhance the capability of regional extremist networks within
the most densely populated areas of the world. In South Asia, partner nations
maintain pressure on extremist networks but face a persistent threat from
transnational groups that continue adapting to shifting geopolitical factors,
competition among global extremist groups, and counterterrorism actions by the
U.S. and its regional allies. Al-Qa’ida’s increased rhetoric focused on South
Asia and the announcement of a new affiliate, “Al-Qa’ida in the Indian
Subcontinent,” suggest Al-Qai’da will focus resources on uniting established
terrorist groups to engage in jihad in South Asia. Lashkar-e Tayyiba and other
Pakistan-based groups continue fighting in Afghanistan, but they will likely
shift some of their operational focus to the Indian Subcontinent in the next
one to three years as Coalition forces drawdown. In Southeast Asia, regional
partners maintain persistent pressure on extremist networks; however, competing
security priorities in the region, coupled with the sensationalism of
developments in the Middle East, have pressurized counter-terrorism attention.
Extremist groups are increasingly interconnected and the region remains a
potential safe haven, facilitation hub, and area of operations for extremists. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Proliferation
Issues: Rapidly developing technology manufacturing sectors in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific region have in many states outpaced the concurrent
development of those states’ effective export controls. The region includes
some of the busiest maritime and air ports in the world with shipments of
proliferation concern likely passing through these ports almost daily. These
shipments include dual-use items—commercial items controlled by the nuclear,
ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons control regimes, others
covered by associated catch all controls—manufactured in or re-exported from
states with spotty export control enforcement. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Iran built its
robust nuclear infrastructure and advanced its ballistic missile systems with
materials that passed through the USPACOM AOR; North Korea continues to procure
for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs—and proliferate conventional
arms for revenue generation—using a network of individuals and entities
throughout the region. PACOM engages regional partners in capacity-building activities
designed to improve export controls and interdiction capabilities in the
region. In August 2014 PACOM hosted personnel from 31 nations as part of the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which marked
the beginning of a six-year series of exercises that various “expert” nations
in the region will host. (New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea
and the United States) Exercises such as Fortune Guard provide nations a forum
to demonstrate the intention to act and share the best tactics against
proliferators, emphasizing a whole-of-government approach to confront this
complex challenge. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Transnational
Crime</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">: There is
a growing trend for regional human and drug trafficking organizations to
operate as global enterprises. In addition to the devastating impact widespread
drug use has on a society, the revenue generated from these illicit activities
fund terrorists and Violent Extremist Organizations. Methamphetamine and
amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the primary drug threat in the
USPACOM AOR. The majority of Methamphetamine available in the United States
comes from Mexico, primarily across the South West Border Region, and an
estimated 90% of the precursor chemicals used to produce Mexican
Methamphetamine comes from China. Further, the annual volume of Methamphetamine
seizures made along the United States South West Border Region has exceeded
Cocaine seizures in the past three years. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Nearly 21
million victims of human trafficking are estimated worldwide and nearly
two-thirds are from Asia, with India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and
Thailand among the countries with the highest number of victims. Women and
children – especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors – are the
most vulnerable demographics. Roughly a quarter end up in the commercial sex
trade, while others are forced into difficult and dangerous positions in
factories, farms, or as child soldiers. Still others are bound to families as
domestic servants. Human trafficking victims often suffer physical and
emotional abuse and social stigmatization while being denied their basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms. While awareness is rising, much remains to be
done to combat this particularly heinous crime. USPACOM forces build
partnership capacity and share intelligence in order to combat these
transnational threats. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Russian
Intent:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Russia is reasserting itself
politically and militarily in the Pacific. In the USPACOM AOR, Russian Navy and
Long Range Aviation operational tempo have recently increased significantly,
but not above Cold War levels. Though challenged by maintenance and logistical
issues, Russian Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates have increased their
operations and reach. The Russian Pacific Fleet sent ships to support operations
in the Middle East and Europe, while Russian ships from the Baltic and Black
Sea Fleets deployed into the Asia-Pacific. Russian BEAR bombers and
reconnaissance aircraft regularly fly missions in the Sea of Japan and continue
operations as far east as Alaska and the west coast of the continental U.S. The
anticipated fielding later this year of Russia’s newest class of nuclear
ballistic missile submarine (Borei-class SSBN) and upgrades to Russia’s
land-based ballistic missiles will modernize Moscow’s nuclear capability in the
Asia-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain active in
our region. Russia aims to demonstrate military capabilities commensurate with
its Pacific interests: ensuring Russian sovereignty, sovereign rights, and
jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening its sphere of influence, and
projecting a credible deterrent force. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Chinese
Military Modernization and Strategic Intent: </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Recent statements by senior PRC
leaders, such as PRC President Xi Jinping, suggest that the PRC may be
attempting to advance a vision for an alternative security architecture in Asia
that affords Beijing increased influence in the region and diminishes the role
of the United States. This Chinese view was highlighted in Shanghai last summer
at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. At
the conference, President Xi Jinping called on all of Asia to support the
development of a new security order centered on China. The proposed new order
also requires a curtailment of alliance-strengthening diplomacy, of which the
“U.S. Rebalance to Asia” is noted as the greatest offender. China is proposing
an alternative strategy to regional security issues where the U.S. plays, at
best, a deferential role. <br />
<br />
</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">China is engaged in a comprehensive military modernization
program to transform its forces into a high-tech military capable of conducting
complex operations. Many of China’s initiatives are intended to develop
capabilities to deter or counter third-party intervention in regional
contingencies. These anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities are focused on
controlling access and freedom of operations in vast portions of the air and
maritime domains, as well as space and cyberspace. These include a series of
sophisticated and increasingly long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic
missiles, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kinetic
counter-space systems. China is also making significant advances in electronic
warfare capabilities, which are contributing to the A2AD challenge. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">China
continues an aggressive ship building program to produce and field advanced
frigates, destroyers, and the first in-class cruiser-sized warship. Chinese
shipyards are also producing newer, more capable submarines as they inactivate
older submarines, resulting in a fleet that is not growing substantially in
number but is significantly more capable. Advances in China’s strategic
capabilities remain significant. China now has three operational JIN-class
ballistic missile submarines (Type 094), and up to five more may enter service
by the end of the decade. The JIN-class submarine carries the JL-2 submarine
launched ballistic missile with a range capable of reaching the U.S. and will
give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence
patrols will likely commence this year. Lastly, we expect China to soon begin
constructing an indigenous aircraft carrier. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">China is using
computer network exploitation capabilities to support intelligence collection
to advance its defense and high-tech industries. Through a sophisticated cyber
program, China is generating insights on U.S. security policies, defense
networks, logistics, and military capabilities. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">As the Chinese
military modernizes its capabilities and expands its presence in Asia, U.S.
forces are drawn into closer and more frequent contact and the risk of an
accident or miscalculation increases. This places a premium on efforts to
increase mutual understanding and trust in order to reduce risk. The Chinese
Navy is more frequently operating in the Indian Ocean, expanding the area and
duration of operations and exercises in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
and periodically venturing into other non-traditional areas, as exemplified by
recent port visits to Europe. The complexity of the regional and global
security environment, as well as China’s military advancements, necessitates a
continuous dialogue between the U.S. and Chinese militaries to expand practical
cooperation where national interests converge and discuss areas where goals
diverge, especially during periods of friction. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Allies and Partners</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The U.S.’ five
treaty allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are: Australia, Japan, Republic of
Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. In addition to U.S. treaty alliances, the
U.S. continues to strengthen existing partnerships and build new relationships
to advance common interests and address shared concerns. U.S. allies and key
partners in the theater play a fundamental role in addressing the security challenges.
Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships is a top USPACOM
priority. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Australia:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Australia continues to be a close, steadfast, and
effective ally in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The alliance anchors peace and
stability in the region, and Australia has taken a leading role in addressing
regional security and capacity-building issues, including lead roles in
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief events. Australia is also a key
contributor to global security, including counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and the
Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. With the ongoing implementation of the
Force Posture Initiatives, which provide expanded opportunities for bilateral
and multilateral engagement, the Marine Rotational Force- Darwin successfully completed
its third rotation while increasing its presence from 250 to 1,177 U.S.
Marines. The U.S. Air Force is increasing its rotation of aircraft to
Australia. In addition to the Force Posture Initiatives, the U.S. and Australia
are identifying additional opportunities to increase collaboration in
counter-terrorism, space, cyber, and integrated air missile defense and
regional capacity building. Australia is procuring a number of high-tech
platforms that will increase interoperability such as the F-35 Lightning II,
P-8 Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, and EA-18G Growler aircraft as well as
Global Hawk UAVs and MH-60R helicopters. To ensure greater synchronization and
integration, the Australian Government provides a General Officer and a Senior
Executive to USPACOM, as well as another General Officer to U.S. Army Pacific,
as tangible examples of a mutual commitment to the alliance. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Japan:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong and productive
through both countries’ shared commitment to a full range of military
capabilities with expanding responsibility for training, exercises,
interoperability, and bilateral planning. Japan's 2013 National Security
Strategy and the 1 July 2014 cabinet decision on collective self-defense are
positive developments and indicators of Japan’s ability and willingness to
assume a greater role in the regional security architecture. The Abe
administration will submit implementing legislation to the National Diet during
its spring session, and debate is expected to conclude in summer 2015. The
US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation are being revised, and that process
will conclude with public presentation of the Guidelines in the near future. We
are hopeful that Japan’s upcoming legislative changes support new and expanded
forms of cooperation. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">U.S. Forces
Japan continues to build its close relationship with the Japanese Joint Staff
to enhance interoperability and information sharing through realistic training,
exercises, and bilateral planning. USPACOM will continue to maintain a robust
military presence in Japan to meet future security challenges and encourage
greater trilateral military engagements with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and
Australia. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Efforts
continue toward improving US-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination in response to
North Korean provocative behavior. The December 2014 signature of the
US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement is a positive first
step toward greater information sharing on North Korean missile and nuclear
threats. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">As Japan
increases its defense spending, it is procuring a number of high-tech platforms
that will increase interoperability such as the F-35 Lightning II aircraft,
MV-22 Ospreys, and the Global Hawk UAV, as well as upgrading existing AEGIS
destroyers with the latest BMD capability and constructing two additional AEGIS
destroyers (for a total of eight BMD capable platforms). Each North Korean
ballistic missile provocation validates the investment of the AN/TPY-2 radars
in Japan to provide ISR against missile threats. Last year's addition of the
second radar in Japan and forward deploying two additional BMD capable ships
will enhance our ability to defend our ally and the region, as well as provide
early warning of missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Lastly, Japan continues
to make significant infrastructure investments in country that complement the
realignment of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam including expanding the
airfield and associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and
construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility. It is important that these
initiatives remain on track. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Philippines:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The U.S.-Philippine alliance remains a positive source
of strength and regional stability. Building upon the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the U.S. and
the Government of the Philippines was signed last April. Through enhanced U.S.
rotational presence, the EDCA provides expanded opportunities to conduct
theater security cooperation activities and supports the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) as it shifts focus from internal security to external
defense. Full EDCA implementation awaits the outcome of a case before the
Philippine Supreme Court, where deliberations could last into this summer. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">After more
than a decade, the Joint Special Operations Task Force created to counter
Violent Extremist Organizations in the Philippines will stand down and the AFP
will sustain that mission. Training and advising objectives that were set to
address organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah have
been met. Although the Task Force is standing down, a small USPACOM footprint
will remain embedded in the Philippines to continue working with the AFP
leadership and planning staffs. The AFP has demonstrated an increased capacity
and capability to handle domestic threats inside their country, but USPACOM
will remain committed to supporting and advising the AFP at the operational level.
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Competing
claims in the South China Sea continue to be a source of friction and
instability. China continues large-scale land reclamation around disputed
features. Furthermore, periodic resupply and troop rotations to the small
Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (also known as Ayungin Shoal) are
well-known points of contention with the Chinese government. <br />
<br />
</span><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Republic
of Korea:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK)
alliance remains strong and vital, and enduring for over six decades. Our
militaries integrate complementary capabilities and enhance the relationship
with honest and frank dialogue. During the most recent annual discussions, the U.S.
and ROK made arrangements to delay wartime operational control transfer and
adopt a conditions-based approach, rather than a calendar-based deadline. The
U.S. and ROK intend to modernize the alliance to better inform the development
or acquisition of Alliance capabilities required to address future threats from
North Korea. <br />
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">USPACOM will
continue to work with the ROK to address the North Korean threat. North Korea
continues to be a challenge due to provocations and uncertainty, which are
viewed as a threat to peace and stability in the region. The ability to rapidly
respond to aggression with combined U.S.-ROK-Japan capabilities is the best way
to ensure deterrence and maintain regional stability. Trilateral cooperation
will improve each participant’s understanding of the mutual challenges and
shared opportunities that exist in and around the Korean Peninsula. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Thailand:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">As Thailand is the oldest U.S. treaty partner (182
years), the U.S. values its friendship with the people of Thailand. The Thai
military’s decision to suspend its constitution and assume control of the
civilian government has impacted that relationship. Military engagements and
exercises have been appropriately adjusted in a whole of government response to
the coup, pending a return to a democratically-elected government. USPACOM will
continue to demonstrate commitment to the U.S.’ ally while reinforcing
democratic values and ideals. The annual COBRA GOLD exercise co-sponsored with
the Royal Thai Armed Forces is an important multi-lateral warfighting training
event. This year’s exercise was significantly limited in scope and scale in
response to the Thai coup, and heavily focused on humanitarian assistance
activities. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">India:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Last year, India held the largest election in its
history. With new leadership in place, India is energizing the U.S.-India
strategic partnership. Prime Minister Modi has focused India’s foreign policy
on building strong regional cohesion in South Asia. India’s two decade-long
“Look East Policy” has resulted in growing partnerships with Southeast Asian
countries. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The U.S.
military remains heavily engaged with New Delhi’s military, having conducted 69
major exercises in the past five years. The Indian Navy continues its strong
participation in multilateral exercises including INDRA with Russia, MALABAR
with the U.S. and Japan, and RIMPAC with 23 navies from across the
Indo-Asia-Pacific. India’s participation in these exercises signals their
commitment as a regional security provider. Additionally, over the past three
years the U.S. has been India’s largest defense trading partner. Through
military modernization, robust defense trade (C-17s, C-130Js, and P-8Is, among
other items), and a growing network of defense partnerships, India is asserting
its role as an important regional actor determined to protect common interests
and ensure free access to economically vital sea lanes, although with respect
to military activities, India still asserts a security interest in its EEZ that
does not conform to the law of the sea. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Indonesia:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Indonesia is a capable security partner in Southeast
Asia, and is increasingly focused on its role as a regional power, which
USPACOM continues to support as a main pillar of mil-mil engagement.
Presidential elections last July demonstrated a commitment to democratic
principles, and the August opening of Indonesia’s new Peace and Security Center
to train regional partners on peacekeeping operations reinforces its position
as a leader in security assistance. A growing area of cooperation with Indonesia
is defense trade, which includes the sale of AH-64E Apache helicopters and
initial delivery of F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. Indonesia remains concerned
about maintaining security and stability in the South China Sea. While their
Chief of Defense has articulated a zero-war policy in the South China Sea,
there are signs they are increasingly concerned over China’s so-called nine
dash line overlapping with part of their claimed EEZ. While Indonesia continues
a foreign policy rooted in the Non Aligned Movement, USPACOM has seen
significant gains in security cooperation activities. Indonesia will continue
to balance its partnership with the U.S. with other nations such as Russia and
China, but security cooperation with the U.S. remains a top priority.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">New Zealand:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">New Zealand is a respected voice in international
politics and a recognized leader in Oceania that shares common security
concerns with the U.S., such as terrorism, transnational crime, and maritime
security. Military-to-military relations and defense engagements with New
Zealand continue to improve, and the U.S. and New Zealand executed the second
series of annual bilateral defense dialogues last year. New Zealand’s
establishment of a Consulate General in Honolulu has also provided additional
opportunities for USPACOM and New Zealand to engage on issues of mutual
interest. This new Consulate General addition to Hawaii is timely as the U.S.
celebrates the 100</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 8pt;">th </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Anniversary of ANZAC with New Zealand
and the Australians this year. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Oceania</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">:</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> Maintaining our close partnerships in Oceania is
important to national security. The Compacts of Free Association with the
Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
Republic of Palau are important agreements that guide the relationships. The
U.S. defense obligations to these nations are reflected in our defense planning
and preparation. In return, these compact agreements provide assured access to
the three Compact Nations and their associated 5.5 million square kilometers of
Pacific in a contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant
or deny access to another nation’s military forces, which allows the
maintenance of a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific. The
U.S.’s continued commitment to defend the Compact Nations and to partner with
other Pacific island countries sends a strong message throughout the region and
reinforces its commitment to the Pacific Rebalance. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Fiji currently
has its first democratically elected government since its military coup in
2006. In 2015, Fiji will re-enter into regional forums (e.g., Pacific Island
Forum) and have new opportunities for engagement with the U.S. Several other
countries (Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu) may face
government reorganizations over the next year. These events may set back
specific projects but will not likely impact stability or affect overall U.S.
engagement. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Climate change
will continue to be an important issue across the Oceania region. This year’s
forecasted El Nino event will likely result in drought and increased tropical
cyclone activity. The Republic of Marshall Islands will almost certainly face
water shortage resulting in requests for aid or disaster declarations under a
subsidiary agreement to the Amended Compact of Free Association. Fiji,
Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and
Tonga will likely face similar situations. The December 2014 United Nations
Climate Change Conference addressed the impact of rising sea levels - a keen
interest to Pacific Island Nations. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Singapore:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Singapore continues its important role in regional
security initiatives. Singapore’s role as a ‘Major Security Cooperation
Partner’ is underscored by longstanding support of U.S. naval forces. For example,
USS Freedom completed a ten month deployment in 2013, and USS Fort Worth is
currently on a 16 month deployment. These forward forces contribute to naval
readiness and partner capacity building and enable rapid response to many
crises, including Operation Damayan in the Philippines and Air Asia recovery
efforts. Additionally, Singapore’s Changi Naval Base remains a key enabler to
providing critical support to the USS Fort Worth and other forward operating
forces. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">U.S. –
China:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">In light of an increasingly complex
regional and global security environment, including advances in China’s
military capabilities and its expanding military operations and missions, the
overall U.S. approach to China calls for a continuous dialogue between the
armed forces of both countries to expand practical cooperation where national
interests converge and to constructively manage differences through sustained
and substantive dialogue. As a key element, the U.S.’s military engagement with
China, within the guidelines of the 2000 NDAA, benefits the region, improves
transparency, and reduces risk of unintended incidents, contributing to overall
regional stability. The U.S. military has increased the depth of engagement
with China in recent years and executed over 50 bilateral and numerous
multilateral engagements last year. While these engagements are critical to
improving transparency and reducing risk, the U.S. military must continue to
take a pragmatic approach as the U.S. attempts to help integrate China into the
existing security architecture. China’s military investments, including A2AD
capabilities, focused on the ability to control access and deny freedom of
operations in vast portions of the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains
raise concerns. The U.S. will need more transparency and understanding of
Chinese intentions in order to minimize friction and avoid miscalculation or
conflict in the future. Absent greater transparency from China, its ambiguous
dashed-line claim, military modernization efforts and aggressive land
reclamation in the South China Sea have significant implications for regional
stability and the current security architecture. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Over the past
year, the U.S. and China have agreed to mechanisms such as the Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs) on Notification of Major Military Activities and Rules
of Behavior (RoB) for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, designed to
underscore and reinforce existing international law and standards while
improving transparency, building trust, and reducing risk of unintended
incidents. The surface-to-surface encounters annex of the RoB CBM was signed
last year and the air-to-air annex is scheduled to be completed by the end of
this year. These new Rules of Behavior are non-binding and capture existing
legal rules and standards. Additionally, the U.S. and China continue to use the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings to discuss safety in the
maritime domain and avoid crises. As China continues to grow its military
capacity and capability and operate further from its territory, these
mechanisms become more important. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Both
militaries have had success addressing areas of common interest, such as
counter piracy, military medicine, and HA/DR. Some of the most successful
engagements were focused on military medical cooperation and shared health
concerns. For example, the USPACOM surgeon hosted Chinese counterparts in
Hawaii and Washington, DC, which resulted in concrete opportunities for
continued military medical cooperation focused on Disaster Response, Pandemic
and Emerging Infectious Diseases, and Soldier Care. In January 2015, the PLA
hosted the USPACOM Surgeon and component surgeons for a highly successful
reciprocal visit. Demonstrating China’s increasing ability to operate beyond
the Western Pacific and a successful engagement on an area of common concern,
last December, U.S. and Chinese ships conducted counter piracy exercises in the
Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. China’s participation in international
efforts to address these problems and to operate and exercise with the U.S. and
its allies and partners in a manner consistent with international law and
standards is welcomed. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Building and Strengthening
Relationships</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The future
security and prosperity of the Indo-Asia-Pacific depends upon building
bilateral and multilateral relationships. Strong relationships, facilitated by
a U.S. forward presence, advance common interests and address shared threats.
USPACOM strengthens relationships with U.S. allies and partners through
security cooperation and capacity building, bilateral and multilateral
approaches, and senior leader engagement. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Security
Cooperation and Capacity Building:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">USPACOM
enhances interoperability and information sharing with allies and partners in
order to cooperatively address regional challenges. USPACOM’s Security
Cooperation approach is focused on building partner readiness, assisting with
partner capability gaps, identifying partner shortfalls, and addressing the
most critical capacity shortfalls. Last year, USPACOM identified C4ISR as a top
priority for Security Cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and
contributed to the U.S. supporting the ROK purchase of Global Hawk – a High
Altitude UAV platform that will help close the gap in some of the security
challenges on the Korean Peninsula. Supporting USPACOM’s approach to addressing
partner capability and capacity shortfalls will reduce risk, effectively use
Security Cooperation and Assistance resources, and maintain the momentum to
bring the right capabilities into the AOR. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">As mentioned
earlier, the progress the Republic of the Philippines continues to make in
addressing violent extremists groups inside their country is a testament to
building capacity in USPACOM’s foreign internal defense efforts. USPACOM is
also building capacity to counter drug trafficking in the AOR through Joint Interagency
Task Force – West (JIATF-W) engagements with China. Through a partnership with
the Internal Revenue Service, JIATF-W has leveraged Department of Defense
counternarcotic authorities to open up an additional avenue of cooperation with
Chinese officials by providing anti-money laundering training linked to
counterdrug efforts. These efforts are only just beginning, but show promise in
improving communication, cooperation, and information sharing on significant
criminal enterprises operating in both the U.S. and China. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Lastly,
increasing international representation at the USPACOM headquarters has
improved collaboration with allies and partners and created a more agile and
effective command and control architecture. The new USPACOM model integrates sixteen
foreign exchange officers and liaison officers from six countries and
facilitates a seamless transition from routine business to crisis. Included in
these numbers are three foreign exchange Flag Officers and Senior Executives in
key billets on the USPACOM staff. </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-family: "Calibri","sans-serif"; font-size: 11pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; page-break-before: always;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Bilateral and Multilateral Approaches:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">With the exception of North Korea, USPACOM continues
to build and strengthen bilateral relationships with all of the nations in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM maintains a close link with the five U.S. treaty
allies and other partners in the region through a series of formal bilateral
mechanisms. In Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treaty
obligations, guided by USPACOM’s premier bilateral event with Australia, the
Military Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM’s military to military
relationship with Japan is guided annually by the Japan Senior Leader Seminar,
which USPACOM utilizes to ensure the bond with Japan remains strong. USPACOM
continues to rely on the alliance with the Republic of Korea to maintain peace
and stability in Northeast Asia, and the annual Military Committee and Security
Consultative Meetings are the preeminent bilateral mechanism to guide this
alliance forward. Each year, USPACOM co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board and
Security Engagement Board with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to discuss
ways this critical alliance can modernize to meet 21</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 8pt;">st</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">-century challenges. Lastly, USPACOM depends on annual Senior
Staff Talks with Thailand to address shared regional security concerns while
reinforcing U.S. commitment to democratic principles. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Similar
bilateral mechanisms exist with partners throughout the USPACOM AOR, including
Bilateral Defense Discussions with Indonesia, Vietnam, and others, as USPACOM
continues to foster bilateral ties to enhance regional stability. Bilateral
mechanisms with allies and partners form the strategic foundation of the
security architecture that ensures peace and stability while defending U.S.
interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">While bilateral
mechanisms remain important, USPACOM continues to emphasize multilateral
approaches. USPACOM works with regional forums such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to encourage multilateral relationships that
build trust, prevent misperceptions that can lead to conflict, and reinforce
international standards of conduct. For example, USPACOM arranges an annual
Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference as its premier multilateral engagement tool
for candid discussions with 20-plus Chiefs of Defense in the region. Each year
the CHOD Conference alternates between USPACOM and a co-host country; Brunei
hosted last year’s successful conference. The 2015 CHOD Conference will be held
in Hawaii and is designed to promote multilateral cooperation and provide a
forum for the theater’s military leaders to share regional and global
perspectives on common challenges. USPACOM also participated in other
multilateral events in the region, such as the Fullerton Forum and Shangri-La
Dialogue, to encourage multilateral solutions to shared challenges, as well as
provide a venue for continued dialogue and strengthening security partnerships
in the region. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">One of the
most important multilateral forums in the theater is ASEAN. The ten member
states in ASEAN, under the chairmanship of Burma last year and Malaysia this
year, seek to improve multilateral security activities and advance stability in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Approximately $5.3 trillion of global trade ($1.2
trillion is U.S.) passes through ASEAN waterways each year. The ten member
states of ASEAN form the fourth largest U.S. export market and fifth major
trade partner. ASEAN continues to address common threats in the region
including Maritime Security, Terrorism, Transnational Crimes, Cyber Security, and
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. ASEAN demonstrated during past
disasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan and the Malaysian Flight 370 search
operations, that practical cooperation among member states can enable civilian
and military agencies to be more effective and efficient. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Last April,
Defense Secretary Hagel hosted the ten ASEAN Defense Ministers, the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), and
other non-government organizations in Hawaii to discuss disaster response and
maritime security. UNOCHA hosted an Integrated Civil-Military Regional Response
Planning Workshop for Large-Scale International Disaster Relief last October
and the USPACOM staff will continue the maritime security dialogue by hosting a
Maritime Domain Awareness discussion this May. USPACOM will continue supporting
ASEAN as it builds regional tools and forums such as the ASEAN Economic
Community by the end of 2015. Additionally, there is hope that the ASEAN
members and China can conclude a binding and enforceable Code of Conduct
mechanism for the South China Sea. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The Daniel K.
Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) also contributes to
multilateral engagements and rules-based security governance. Through its
executive education courses, workshops, and sustained alumni engagement
activities, the Center contributes to the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan by
building U.S. and partner nation capacities. Success stories include the
APCSS-facilitated development of Papua New Guinea’s first-ever national
security policy, a framework for an Indonesian defense white paper, and
Bangladesh’s first comprehensive maritime security strategy proposal.
Additionally, APCSS helped with the successful completion of Nepal’s
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for dealing with Maoist
ex-combatants, and the signing of an inter-party agreement to overcome
political crisis—both led by a core group of APCSS alumni. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Senior
Leader Engagement:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">
</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">USPACOM and its
components leverage senior leader visits to increase dialogue on issues of
shared concern, build and strengthen relationships, and convey U.S. commitment
to the region. Each year, hundreds of senior military and government leaders
address security challenges through counterpart visits which greatly enhance
understanding, interoperability, and trust. Examples of senior leadership
engagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific over the past year include: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The President attended the G-20 Summit in Australia, the Republic Day ceremony in India, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in China, and the East Asia Summit in Burma. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The President also increased engagements in the theater to strengthen alliances in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and to deepen ties with Malaysia. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The Secretary of State visited the Republic of Korea; China; and Indonesia. He also traveled to India for the 5</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 8pt;">th </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Strategic Dialogue Conference; to Burma for a series of ASEAN discussions; Australia for annual Ministerial Consultations; and the Solomon Islands. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense held a 2+2 meeting with their ROK counterparts in Washington. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The Secretary of Defense traveled to Japan for bilateral security discussions; Mongolia and Singapore for key leadership meetings; India for defense consultations; Australia for AUSMINs and to sign the Force Posture Agreement; and China for Confidence Building Measure discussions. <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs toured the Changi facilities in Singapore; participated in security and military discussions in Vietnam (first CJCS to visit since 1971); Australia for the Defense Chiefs Strategic Dialogue conference and bilateral events; and both Japan and the Republic of Korea for key counterpart visits. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">These senior
leader engagements are critical to identifying opportunities and addressing
security challenges in the region. Additionally, Congressional delegations to
the theater are of significant benefit. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; page-break-before: always;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Effective and Assured Presence</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Effective and
assured presence of USPACOM forces is required to meet the challenges and
opportunities within USPACOM’s AOR. As strategic warning timelines decrease,
early identification of potential crises is key to rapidly assessing and
shaping events. It also places a premium on robust, modern, agile,
forward-deployed forces, maintained at high levels of readiness. Assured
presence is supported by posturing forward-deployed forces, fielding new
capabilities and concepts, addressing critical gaps, and maintaining readiness
in order to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and
partnerships, maintain access in the air and maritime domains, counter
aggression, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
violent extremism. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Posture:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Sustaining effective and forward presence begins with
having the necessary military infrastructure and access to support
forward-stationed and rotational forces. USPACOM’s posture effectively
communicates U.S. intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national interests,
strengthen alliances and partnerships, maintain an assured presence in the
region, prevent conflict, and if necessary, respond rapidly and effectively
across the full range of military operations. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">USPACOM faces
three key challenges related to force posture. The first is operating in an AOR
that covers 52% of the earth’s surface. The vast distances complicate ISR,
movement/maneuver, and sustainment, and require a geographically distributed
force laydown to rapidly respond to crisis. The second challenge is the growth
of military capabilities in the region. The Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most
militarized region in the world. Maintaining the ability to defend strategic
national security interests in an increasingly complex and lethal environment
requires a force posture that is operationally resilient. Finally, expanding
access to regions in South and Southeast Asia requires access and forward
staging arrangements that are politically sustainable. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">In support of
USPACOM’s objectives, the military services and our allies and partners are
making investments to improve U.S. force posture. Examples of these investments
are: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Construction in Iwakuni, Japan to allow a carrier air wing to relocate from Atsugi <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Expanding base facilities and capabilities in Okinawa for Futenma replacement <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Expanding future capabilities through construction at Camp Humphreys, ROK <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Reinforcing Guam’s munitions and fuels piers at Apra Harbor <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Implementing Force Posture Initiatives through troop rotations and, ultimately, facility upgrades and construction in Darwin, Australia <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Building hardened C2 and aircraft shelters at Andersen AFB, Guam <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Installing and fortifying fuel nodes, manifolds, and lines in Guam and Japan <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Implementing rotational forces through USFK <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Developing divert options and training ranges in the Northern Marianas Islands <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Dredging port facilities to requisite depths to allow pier operations in Naha, Japan <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">These posture
investments are part of USPACOM’s holistic infrastructure investment strategy
and are key to continued mission success. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Much of the
supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on the West Coast of the U.S.
mainland was established during World War II and during the early years of the
Cold War. The infrastructure now requires investment to extend its service
life. The military services continue to invest in sustainment, restoration, and
modernization (SRM) to provide quality facilities to support service members
and their families; however, during times of austere budgets, the military
services struggle to maintain infrastructure SRM funding levels. These forced
decisions undermine the significant investment in facilities made by DoD and
Host Nation Funded Construction programs over past decades. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Reduced SRM
funding will negatively impact the ability to bring new forces and capabilities
into the theater and maintain critical infrastructure. The U.S. and the theater
benefit from the significant levels of investment made by allies and partners.
For example, the Republic of Korea is significantly contributing to the cost of
keeping U.S. Forces on the Korean Peninsula. The Government of Japan has
committed up to $3.1 billion to help realign U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam
and other locations and $4.5 billion to expand the airfield and associated
facilities at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Joint Military Training
initiative (CJMT) is an important posture undertaking. CNMI remains
strategically important as a forward and sovereign U.S. location with lease
rights until 2033 and extendable to 2083. When the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy
Review Initiative moves approximately 4,700 U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam,
the CJMT will enable this U.S. Marine force to train and maintain operational
readiness. Specifically on the island of Tinian, the CJMT initiative will
provide live-fire ranges and training areas. The CJMT will optimize future
training ranges for joint and combined exercises with allies and foreign
forces. As a part of aviation resiliency initiatives, divert and alternate air
fields are also being explored on the islands of Saipan and Tinian along with
other locations in the broader Western Pacific. <br />
<br />
</span><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Forward
Deployed Forces:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">
</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The tyranny of
distance, which defines the USPACOM AOR, requires forward deployed forces to
engage with allies and partners, respond rapidly to crisis or contingencies,
defend the homeland, and reinforce U.S. commitment to the region. To increase
USPACOM’s forward deployed forces and capabilities, the military services are: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Rotationally deploying Navy Littoral Combat Ships into Singapore <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Forward deploying two additional ballistic missile defense-capable surface ships to Japan <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Increased deployments and rotations of E-8 JSTARS, E-3 AWACS, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in theater <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Replacing the USS George Washington with the more capable USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in Japan <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Installing an advanced radar in Australia <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Continuing to deploy and operate F-22s in theater <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Completing a second ballistic missile defense radar in Japan <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Stationing additional submarines in Guam <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Improving rotational force presence in the Philippines, Singapore, and Australia <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">New
Systems and Operating Concepts:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Crafting
new concepts and fielding new systems is fundamental to employing a credible
force. For example, the military services are: <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Replacing P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with newer and more capable P-8s <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Deploying tilt rotor aircraft for Marines and Special Forces and new unmanned capabilities throughout the AOR <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Forward stationing High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing Platforms in the USPACOM AOR <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Introducing Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air Aegis Destroyers <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Expanding the U.S. Army Pacific Pathways deployment concept <o:p></o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
    <li><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Preparing for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters deployment with maintenance hubs in Japan and Australia </span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></li>
</ul>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Addressing
Critical Capability Gaps:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">The
most technical, high-end military challenges are in the USPACOM AOR, and are
growing. While many improvements to posture, forward deployed forces,
capabilities, and concepts have been made to address these challenges, there
are a number of mission sets and enablers that require continuous focus and
attention. These include areas such as Undersea Warfare,
Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance, space, battle management, command and
control, cyber, munitions, Ballistic Missile Defense and Integrated Air and Missile
Defense systems, and capacity shortfalls in theater enablers such as petroleum
redistribution and lift. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Undersea
Warfare is a mission set that requires constant attention to maintain a
decisive advantage. Of the world’s 300 foreign submarines, roughly 200 are in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific region; of which, 150 belong to China, North Korea, and
Russia. Countries operating these systems view the platforms as a mechanism to
affect the balance of power in their favor. Even small navies that possess
submarines hold a distinct advantage over a navy without the capability. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">There is a
significant leap underway in the Indo-Asia-Pacific in undersea capability as
newer submarines replace older variants. In the past few years, Singapore,
India, Vietnam and Malaysia have all received modern diesel submarines and
China is on a modernization path to improve the lethality and survivability of
its attack submarines with the introduction of quiet, high-end, diesel-powered
and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia is also modernizing its existing fleet
of Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear submarines (SSGNs) and producing
their next generation Yasen-class SSGNs. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">In addition to
attack submarines, there are important developments underway that will increase
Chinese and Russian strategic deterrent patrol capability and capacity. China
has three operational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines and up to five
more may enter service by the end of the decade. Additionally, Russia is
planning to field its newest Borei-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines
in the Pacific later this year. Submarine detection and tracking is a complex
problem set and will continue to be one of the most important functions of
naval forces. A continued and sustained investment in the U.S. nuclear
submarine force, advanced Undersea Warfare technologies, capabilities and
capacity, and readiness is necessary to outpace the growing challenges. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Persistent and
deep-look ISR capabilities and supporting architecture are required to prevent
strategic surprise, assess the security environment, and support actions that
impose cost or defeat potential adversaries. Although ISR capacity and
capabilities have increased, significant capacity issues remain. Efforts to
mitigate ISR capacity issues, as well as develop new capabilities, are ongoing.
Additionally, an ISR processing, exploitation, and dissemination enterprise
that is interoperable and shared with Allies and Partners is important. Without
a concerted effort to continue advancing U.S. capabilities, the U.S. risks
missing key indications and warnings in an environment where situational
awareness affects decision space. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Satellite
communications (SATCOM) is an essential enabler to exercise Command &
Control (C2) and enabling ISR. Satellite space continues to grow increasingly
congested and contested, and adversaries continue developing means to curtail
access to space-enabled capabilities. A resilient space-based command, control,
and ISR architecture remains a USPACOM priority. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">There is a
growing need to sustain and modernize airborne early warning systems to execute
multi-mission, multi-domain integrated command and control. The cruise missile,
air, and UAV threats in the USPACOM AOR require robust, long range Battle
Management, Command and Control (BMC2) and Wide-Area Surveillance (WAS)
platforms capable of operating in a contested environment. Developing and
modernizing the capabilities within the BMC2 and WAS platforms to track and
operate in a communications contested or degraded environment is necessary to
meet the challenges of future operational environments in the Pacific; these
platforms must be interoperable with military services, partners, and allies. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Related, the
Joint Information Environment (JIE) increments I and II have the potential for
consolidation of each military services’ command, control, communication, and
computers programs. JIE II will further strengthen collective cyber security
and defense posture in the region, improve staff efficiency and support, and
strengthen interagency and international relationships. JIE II will require an
information infrastructure adaptable enough to accommodate multiple security
classification levels with the interoperability and sharing capability to
maximize mission effectiveness. JIE II is a necessary next step to mitigate the
risk posed by persistent cyber threats. These threats continue to grow. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Increased
cyber capacity and use, especially by China, North Korea, and Russia,
underscore the growing requirement to evolve our command, control, and
operational structure authorities. In order to fully leverage the Cyber domain,
Combatant Commanders require an enduring theater cyber operational command
resourced to provide regional cyber planning, integration, synchronization, and
direction of cyberspace forces. The theater cyber operational command will
provide direction of operations against increasingly capable threats in
coordination with USCYBERCOM, the interagency, and allies and partners. USPACOM
sees a future where Joint Force Cyber Component Command (JFCCC) are aligned
regionally under Combatant Commands. JFCCCs will provide staffing and expertise
required to oversee persistent operations and defense of theater information
networks, synchronization of cyber risk assessments and intelligence, and
development of flexible cyber effects. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Munitions are
a critical component of combat effectiveness and readiness. A number of
munitions improvements in lethality, production, and precision are required.
There is a growing need for ship-to-ship and air-to-ship munitions to allow
U.S. forces to defeat an aggressor from greater range. Specifically, there are
troubling gaps in Anti-Surface Warfare capability and readiness that compel the
accelerated fielding of a long range anti-ship missile. A long-range stand-off
weapon, such as the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency / Office of Naval
Research developed Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, will meet the urgent need for
an offensive anti-surface warfare capability against combatants in a contested
environment. There is also a need for advancements in the air-to-air realm and
for Hard Target Munitions capabilities to engage hardened targets that are
growing in numbers and complexity. Area Effects Munitions are required to
prevent open space aggression. Lastly, along with lethal munitions, non-lethal
capabilities can prove equally valuable in supporting USPACOM’s strategy and
deterrence. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">With North
Korea continuing to advance its ballistic missile capabilities, USPACOM will
continue its efforts in maintaining a credible, sustainable ballistic missile
defense. The recent deployment of long range second TPY-2 radar to Japan
(December 2014) along with THAAD on Guam achieving full Fully Operational
Capability further enhanced U.S. homeland defense capabilities which are
required to protect key regional nodes from aggressive action. In addition,
over the last year the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia have
had better coordination and information sharing. USPACOM looks forward to
continuing our work with our regional IAMD partners and expanding our ballistic
missile defense cooperation and information sharing. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Equally
important to having the right equipment and capabilities is the capacity of
critical logistics. The time and distance required to move assets across the
Pacific make it an imperative to preposition and secure munitions. Dedicated
sealift must be adequately funded to posture munitions, fuel, and other
supplies within theater. Agile, responsive, and sustained operations demand a
resilient network of capabilities to deploy and sustain USPACOM forces.
USTRANSCOM’s prepositioning strategy has emphasized positioning equipment and
materiel afloat to optimize flexibility, ensure rapid responses to crises, and
provide force presence; however, USPACOM still does not have enough lift to
satisfy all operational requirements. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Readiness:</span></b><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"> </span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Fundamental to USPACOM’s mission is the ability to
deter aggression and prevail in crisis. USPACOM’s readiness is evaluated
against its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which places
a premium on forward-deployed, ready forces that can exercise, train, and
operate with our partner nations’ militaries and follow-on forces able to
respond to operational contingencies. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">USPACOM
maintains forward-deployed ready forces as credible deterrents, to support and
defend national security interests, and to provide assurance and protection to
allies and partners. Forward deployed forces, west of the International Date
Line, remain responsive and relevant to mitigating risk in the event of
escalating regional security events and greatly benefit from training with
allies and partners in a complex environment. Ready, forward-deployed forces
increase decision space and decrease response time, bolster allies’ and
partners’ confidence, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential
adversaries. However, redistribution of global forces that lead to moving
forces out of the Indo-Asia-Pacific diminishes USPACOM’s impact and
effectiveness. Additionally, short-notice redeployment of USPACOM’s ready,
forward deployed forces to fill emergent requirements to other areas of operation
increases risk to our nation’s Indo-Asia-Pacific interests and objectives. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">In addition to
concerns with the forward deployed forces, there are troubling readiness trends
associated with follow-on forces. The ability of the U.S. to surge and globally
maneuver ready forces has historically been an asymmetric advantage that is now
diminishing. Over the past year, the U.S. has been forced to prioritize the
readiness of forward-deployed forces, at the expense of the readiness of
follow-on-forces and critical investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A
lack of ready surge forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed
maintenance periods, and training limitations will limit responsiveness to
emergent contingencies and greatly increases risk. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Budget
reductions and uncertainty directly impact operations and combat readiness.
Fiscal constraints disrupt the predictable, persistent funding needed to
organize, train, and equip a ready force. Fiscal uncertainty degrades and
disrupts long-term engagement opportunities with strategic consequences to U.S.
relationships and prestige. Resource pressures have triggered deferrals in
exercises, operations, and senior leader engagement opportunities; have
introduced regional doubt; and compound the risk to U.S. interests in the
region. As the Service Chiefs recently testified, continuation of sequestration
will further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce readiness of
forces needed for contingency response, forego procurement of new platforms and
weapon systems and further downsize weapons capacity...all of which are required
for success in the USPACOM AOR. I am in full agreement with their assessments
and remain deeply concerned about the growing risk to U.S. interests in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p align="center" class="Default" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;">Conclusion</span></b><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 11.5pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNoSpacing" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Calibri;"><span style="font-size: 11.5pt;">It has been over three
years since the President announced the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The
Rebalance is focused on modernizing and strengthening treaty alliances and
partnerships through cooperative agreements, building partner capacity, and
increasing regional cooperation, interoperability, and security capabilities.
From the military perspective, the U.S. is accomplishing what it set out to do
and the Rebalance is working. However, fiscal uncertainty resulting from the
Budget Control Act could arrest progress and place some initiatives at risk.
Building on the positive momentum of the Rebalance to the Pacific is critical
to protecting U.S. interests in the region. Thank you for your continued
support to USPACOM and our men and women, and their families, who live and work
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.</span><o:p></o:p></span></p><br />
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