Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 225 / Tuesday, November 22, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 72091 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same novel or unusual 

design feature, or should any other 

model already included on the same 

type certificate be modified to 

incorporate the same novel or unusual 

design feature, the special conditions 

would also apply to the other model 

under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The model DA–40NG will incorporate 

the following novel or unusual design 

features: Electronic engine control 

system. 

Discussion 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the model 

DA–40NG. Should DAI apply at a later 

date for a change to the type certificate 

to include another model incorporating 

the same novel or unusual design 

feature, the special conditions would 

apply to that model. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 23–10–03–SC for the Diamond 

Aircraft Industries, model DA–40NG, 

airplane was published on September 7, 

2011 (76FR 55293). No comments were 

received, and the special conditions are 

adopted as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the model 

DA–40NG. Should DAI apply at a later 

date for a change to the type certificate 

to include another model incorporating 

the same novel or unusual design 

feature, the special conditions would 

apply to that model. 

Under standard practice, the effective 

date of final special conditions would 

be 30 days after the date of publication 

in the Federal Register; however, as the 

certification date for the Diamond 

Aircraft Industries (DAI), model DA– 

40NG airplane is imminent, the FAA 

finds that good cause exists to make 

these special conditions effective upon 

issuance. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of airplane. It is not a rule of general 

applicability, and it affects only the 

applicant who applied to the FAA for 

approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and 

symbols. 

Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 

44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.17; and 14 CFR 

11.38 and 11.19. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for the Diamond 

Aircraft Industry GmbH model DA– 

40NG with the installation of the Austro 

Engine GmbH model E4 aircraft diesel 

engine. 

1. Electronic Engine Control 

a. For electronic engine control 

system installations, it must be 

established that no single failure or 

malfunction or probable combinations 

of failures of Electronic Engine Control 

(EEC) system components will have an 

effect on the system, as installed in the 

airplane, that causes the loss-of-thrustcontrol (LOTC), or loss-of-power-control 

(LOPC) probability of the system to 

exceed those allowed in part 33 

certification. 

b. Electronic engine control system 

installations must be evaluated for 

environmental and atmospheric 

conditions, including lightning. The 

EEC system lightning and High-Intensity 

Radiated Fields (HIRF) effects that result 

in LOTC/LOPC should be considered 

catastrophic. 

c. The components of the installation 

must be constructed, arranged, and 

installed so as to ensure their continued 

safe operation between normal 

inspections or overhauls. 

d. Functions incorporated into any 

electronic engine control that make it 

part of any equipment, systems or 

installation whose functions are beyond 

that of basic engine control, and which 

may also introduce system failures and 

malfunctions, are not exempt from 

§ 23.1309 and must be shown to meet 

part 23 levels of safety as derived from 

§ 23.1309. Part 33 certification data, if 

applicable, may be used to show 

compliance with any part 23 

requirements. If part 33 data is to be 

used to substantiate compliance with 

part 23 requirements, then the part 23 

applicant must be able to provide this 

data for their showing of compliance. 

Note: The term ‘‘probable’’ in the context 

of ‘‘probable combination of failures’’ does 

not have the same meaning as in AC 

23.1309–1D. The term ‘‘probable’’ in 

‘‘probable combination of failures’’ means 

‘‘foreseeable,’’ or (in AC 23.1309–1D terms), 

‘‘not extremely improbable.’’ 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on October 

28, 2011. 

John Colomy, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–28616 Filed 11–21–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–1037; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NE–30–AD; Amendment 39– 

16872; AD 2011–24–08] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca 

S.A. Makila 1A2 Turboshaft Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

A helicopter experienced an inadvertent 

activation of the 65% N1 (gas generator 

speed) back up control mode. 

The subsequent technical investigations 

carried by Turbomeca revealed that an N2 

(power turbine speed) sensor harness wire 

crimping discrepancy was at the origin of 

this event. Further quality investigations 

performed with the supplier led to the 

conclusion that N2 sensor Part Number (P/N) 

0 301 52 001 0 whose Serial Numbers (S/N) 

are between S/N 242 and S/N 339 inclusive 

are potentially concerned by the same 

manufacturing discrepancy. 

This condition, if not corrected, could lead 

to the inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 

back up mode and consequently to 

significant power loss on one or more or both 

engines installed on the same helicopter, 

potentially resulting in an emergency landing 

of the helicopter. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent 

inadvertent activation of the backup 

control mode, which could result in 

engine power loss and emergency 

landing of the helicopter. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

December 7, 2011. 


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72092 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 225 / Tuesday, November 22, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by December 22, 2011. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail 

address above between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (phone: 

(800) 647–5527) is the same as the Mail 

address provided in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, 

Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine 

& Propeller Directorate, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; 

email: james.lawrence@faa.gov; phone: 

(781) 238–7176; fax: (781) 238–7199. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2011–0147, 

dated August 5, 2011 (referred to after 

this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe 

condition for the specified products. 

The MCAI states: 

A helicopter experienced an inadvertent 

activation of the 65% N1 (gas generator 

speed) back up control mode. 

The subsequent technical investigations 

carried by Turbomeca revealed that an N2 

(power turbine speed) sensor harness wire 

crimping discrepancy was at the origin of 

this event. Further quality investigations 

performed with the supplier led to the 

conclusion that N2 sensor Part Number (P/N) 

0 301 52 001 0 whose Serial Numbers (S/N) 

are between S/N 242 and S/N 339 inclusive 

are potentially concerned by the same 

manufacturing discrepancy. 

This condition, if not corrected, could lead 

to the inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 

back up mode and consequently to 

significant power loss on one or more or both 

engines installed on the same helicopter, 

potentially resulting in an emergency landing 

of the helicopter. 

For the reasons described above, this AD 

requires replacement of affected N2 sensor 

harnesses with serviceable parts. This AD 

also prohibits the installation of non 

serviceable N2 sensor harnesses on an 

engine. 

You may obtain further information by 

examining the MCAI in the AD docket. 

Relevant Service Information 

Turbomeca has issued Service 

Bulletin 298 77 0817, Version B, dated 

August 23, 2011. The actions described 

in this service information are intended 

to correct the unsafe condition 

identified in the MCAI. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of France and is 

approved for operation in the United 

States. Pursuant to our bilateral 

agreement with the European 

Community, EASA has notified us of 

the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are issuing this 

AD because we evaluated all 

information provided by EASA and 

determined the unsafe condition exists 

and is likely to exist or develop on other 

products of the same type design. This 

AD requires replacement of the affected 

N2 sensor harnesses with N2 sensor 

harnesses eligible for installation. 

FAA’s Determination of the Effective 

Date 

Since no domestic operators use this 

product, notice and opportunity for 

public comment before issuing this AD 

are unnecessary. Therefore, we are 

adopting this regulation immediately. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not precede it by notice and 

opportunity for public comment. We 

invite you to send any written relevant 

data, views, or arguments about this AD. 

Send your comments to an address 

listed under the ADDRESSES section. 

Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2011–1037; 

Directorate Identifier 2011–NE–30–AD’’ 

at the beginning of your comments. We 

specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

this AD. We will consider all comments 

received by the closing date and may 

amend this AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact with FAA 

personnel concerning this AD. Using the 

search function of the Web site, anyone 

can find and read the comments in any 

of our dockets, including, if provided, 

the name of the individual who sent the 

comment (or signed the comment on 

behalf of an association, business, labor 

union, etc.). You may review the DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement in the 

Federal Register published on April 11, 

2000 (65 FR 19477–78). 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 225 / Tuesday, November 22, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 72093 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2011–24–08 Turbomeca S.A.: Amendment 

39–16872; Docket No. FAA–2011–1037; 

Directorate Identifier 2011–NE–30–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes 

effective December 7, 2011. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to Makila 1A2 turboshaft 

engines, all serial numbers. 

(d) Reason 

(1) This AD results from mandatory 

continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of another 

country to identify and correct an unsafe 

condition on an aviation product. The MCAI 

describes the unsafe condition as: 

A helicopter experienced an inadvertent 

activation of the 65% N1 (gas generator 

speed) back up control mode. 

The subsequent technical investigations 

carried by Turbomeca revealed that an N2 

(power turbine speed) sensor harness wire 

crimping discrepancy was at the origin of 

this event. Further quality investigations 

performed with the supplier led to the 

conclusion that N2 sensor Part Number (P/N) 

0 301 52 001 0 whose Serial Numbers (S/N) 

are between S/N 242 and S/N 339 inclusive 

are potentially concerned by the same 

manufacturing discrepancy. 

This condition, if not corrected, could lead 

to the inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 

back up mode and consequently to 

significant power loss on one or more or both 

engines installed on the same helicopter, 

potentially resulting in an emergency landing 

of the helicopter. 

(2) We are issuing this AD to prevent 

inadvertent activation of the backup control 

mode, which could result in engine power 

loss and emergency landing of the helicopter. 

(e) Actions and Compliance 

(1) Unless already done, do the following 

actions. 

(2) For engines equipped with N2 sensor 

harnesses, P/N 0 301 52 001 0, whose S/Ns 

are between S/N 242 and S/N 339 inclusive, 

do the following: 

(i) If an affected P/N is installed on each 

of the 2 (two) engines of the helicopter, then 

within 10 flight hours (FHs) after the 

effective date of this AD, replace one N2 

sensor harness with an N2 sensor harness 

that is eligible for installation, and within 50 

FHs after the effective date of this AD, 

replace the second harness with an N2 sensor 

harness that is eligible for installation. 

(ii) If an affected P/N is installed only on 

1 (one) engine of the helicopter, then within 

50 FHs after the effective date of this AD, 

replace the affected N2 sensor harness with 

an N2 harness that is eligible for installation. 

(3) After the effective date of this AD, do 

not install in an engine any N2 sensor 

harness, P/N 0 301 52 001 0, whose S/N is 

between S/N 242 and S/N 339 inclusive, 

unless the part has ‘‘SB 0815’’ marked on the 

identification plate. 

(4) After the effective date of this AD, do 

not install in a helicopter an engine equipped 

with an N2 sensor harness, P/N 0 301 52 001 

0, whose S/N is between S/N 242 and S/N 

339 inclusive, unless the part has ‘‘SB 0815’’ 

marked on the identification plate. 

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

The Manager, Engine Certification Office, 

FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Use 

the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19 to 

make your request. 

(g) Related Information 

(1) Refer to MCAI EASA AD 2011–0147, 

dated August 5, 2011, and Turbomeca 

Service Bulletin No. 298 77 0817, for related 

information. Contact Turbomeca; 40220 

Tarnos, France; phone: 33–05–59–74–40–00; 

fax: 33–05–59–74–45–11; for a copy of this 

service information. 

(2) Contact James Lawrence, Aerospace 

Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, 

Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New 

England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 

01803; email: james.lawrence@faa.gov; 

phone: (781)–238–7176; fax: (781) 238–7199, 

for more information about this AD. 

(h) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

November 9, 2011. 

Peter A. White, 

Manager, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–30061 Filed 11–21–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 71 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1016; Airspace 

Docket No. 11–ACE–6] 

RIN 2120–AA66 

Amendment of VOR Federal Airways 

V–81, V–89, and V–169 in the Vicinity 

of Chadron, NE 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This action amends the legal 

description of the VHF omnidirectional 

range (VOR) Federal airways V–81, V– 

89, and V–169 in the vicinity of 

Chadron, Nebraska. The FAA is taking 

this action because the Chadron VOR 

distance measuring equipment (DME), 

included as part of the V–81, V–89, and 

V–169 route structure, is being renamed 

the Toadstool VOR/DME to avoid 

confusion with Chadron Airport that 

shares the same identifier. 

DATES: Effective Dates: 0901 UTC, April 

5, 2012. The Director of the Federal 

Register approves this incorporation by 

reference action under 1 CFR part 51, 

subject to the annual revision of FAA 

Order 7400.9 and publication of 

conforming amendments. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Colby Abbott, Airspace, Regulations and 

ATC Procedures Group, Office of 

Airspace Services, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone: (202) 267–8783. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

The Rule 

This action amends Title 14 Code of 

Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 71 by 

amending the legal description of VOR 

Federal Airways V–81, V–89, and V– 

169, in the vicinity of Chadron, NE. 

Currently, V–81, V–89, and V–169 

include the Chadron, NE, [VOR/DME] as 

part of their route structure. The 

Chadron VOR/DME and the Chadron 

Airport share the same name and 

identifier (CDR), but are located 

nineteen nautical miles apart. A 

navigation facility and airport having 

the same name and identifier causes 

frequent confusion to air traffic 

automation systems, as well as pilot/ 

controller communications. To 

eliminate confusion, and a potential 

flight safety issue, the Chadron VOR/ 

DME is renamed the Toadstool VOR/ 

DME and assigned a new facility 

identifier (TST). All VOR Federal 


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