## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-1477

___________ William F. Glover, * * Appellant, * * App eal from the United States Distric t v. * Court for the Eastern District of Missouri

. * McDonnell Douglas Corporation, * * Appellee. * *

___________ Submitted: March 17, 1998 Filed: July 29, 1998

___________ Before BEAM, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circui t Judges.

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge. William F. Glover claims that the d istrict court erred in calculating his back pay award. We do not reach Glover's arguments, but remand for recalculation of the award.

I. BACKGROUND-2-

This age discrimination case has a long history that need not be repeated here. See Glover v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 12 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 1994). This appeal-3-

involves only the district co urt's calculation of the back pay due after a jury found that McDonnell Douglas had discriminated when it discharged Glover. After an ap peal, this action was remanded for entry of judgment and calculation of Glover's award. See id. at 849. The district court entered judgment on Januar y 7, 1994. After more than a year, and following repeated prodding by the district court, the parties filed a joint stipulation of fact s and areas of disagreement. The parties requested leave to submit brie f memoranda on the issues a bout which they differed. Months passed. When nothing was filed, the district court contacted counsel, and set a deadline for the filing of briefs. Glover's coun sel again sought extensions, but then failed to file a brief. The distric t court u ltimately calculated Glover's award without the benefit of a brief from Glover. Nineteen days later, Glover filed the first of a flurry of motions disputing the district court's computation of his back pay award on numerous grounds. The district court denied those motions, and Glover appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Glover asserts that the district court made six separate errors in computing his back pay awa rd. We will not consider the merits of these allegations, however , because Glov er failed to present his arguments to the district court. We have ofte n explai nedthat arguments not presented to the court below will not be considered o n appeal. See, e.g. , Roth v. G.D. Searle & Co. , 27 F.3d 1303, 1307 (8 th Cir. 1994). The record sho ws that the district court repeatedly solicited Glover's input regarding back pay. When Glover f

ailed to respond, the district court was free to rely on McDonnell Doug las's brief, the joint report, and its own considerable expertise in fashioning a n award. Glove r argues that his neglect should be excused because his counsel at th e time was undergoing exigent persona l circumstances. We disagree. "A party chooses counsel at his or her peril." Comiskey v. JFTJ Corp. , 989 F.2d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir.-4-

1993) (quotation omitted). Having chosen an advocate to speak on his behalf, Glover is bound by counsel's actions. See Link v. Wabash R.R. , 370 U.S. 6 26, 633-34 (1962).
Glover's failure to bri ef his position on the appropriate remedy calculation does not, however, excuse the district court's obligation to determine the back pay awar d ac curately. The district court correctly ruled that back pay should be calculated b y subtra cting Glover's interim earnings from the salary he would have drawn if he stil l worked a t McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g. , Coleman v. City of Omaha , 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983). We review a district court's back pay award for clear error as to factual findings. S ee Goff v. USA Truck, Inc. , 929 F.2d 429, 430 (8th Cir. 1991). In this case , the district court committed error as a result of a poorly drafted join t stipulation.
I n the stipulation, the parties listed the gross wages Glover would have earned from 1991-1994 had he not been terminated. They then listed Glover's actual earnings for each of those years. The parties did not tally the difference between the actual and lost earnings, either annually or in the aggregate. Immediately following these lists of figures, th e joint report states, "$6,087.00 is due Plaintiff on the wages lost since [the verdict]." The district court apparently i nterpreted this as a stipulation that Glover had lost a total of $6,087 from 1991-1994. However, this figure was meant to represen t post-judgment interest. See Jt. App. at 42-43. Thus, the district court's calculation is erroneous in its use of $5,948. as Glover's l ost post-verdict income. We remand to the distri ctcourt for the sole purpose of recalculating Glover's lost post-verdict incom e using the figures supplied in the stipulation.
III. CONCLUSION Although we decline to address any of Glover's arguments on appea l, we remand this case to the district court for recalculation of Glover's lost post-verdict income.-5-

A true copy. ATTEST: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.