[Cite as In re K.G., 2020-Ohio-6744.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

IN RE K.G., ET AL. : 

 : No. 109590 

Minor Children : 

 : 

[Appeal by Mother, D.G.] : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 17, 2020 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case Nos. AD18904261 and AD18904262 

 

Appearances: 

Timothy R. Sterkel, for appellant 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Rachel Matgouranis, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J.: 

Appellant D.G. (hereinafter referred to as “Mother”) appeals the 

determination of the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common 

Pleas that it is in the best interest of her children K.G. and K.W. to be placed in the 

permanent custody of the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family 
Services (“CCDCFS”). Mother asks that this court reverse the juvenile court’s 

decision and remand for further proceedings.1

As required by App.R. 11.1(D), this court has expedited the hearing 

and disposition of this appeal. We affirm. 

I. Background 

On March 29, 2018, CCDCFS filed a complaint that alleged K.G. and 

K.W. to be neglected children and moved for temporary custody of K.G. and K.W. 

based in part on Mother’s lack of safe, stable housing, and substance abuse issues. 

CCDCFS moved for emergency predispositional temporary custody on April 16, 

2018, when police found Mother passed out in her vehicle that was parked on 

railroad tracks with the children inside. Mother failed the field sobriety test. Three 

weeks prior to that incident, Mother crashed into a tree with the children in the 

vehicle but there was no police report. The agency learned of the incident when one 

of the children appeared at school with $230 provided by Mother in exchange for 

the child’s secrecy about the crash and Mother’s intoxication. The motion was 

granted at the emergency hearing the same date. 

The adjudication and disposition hearing was held on June 20, 2018. 

The children were adjudicated neglected and were committed to the temporary 

 1 The older sibling of the children, who attained the age of 18 years old shortly after 

the permanency proceeding, was also committed to permanent custody during the 

proceedings. J.C. No. AD18902287. Pursuant to Mother’s amended notice of appeal in 

this case, the instant challenge relates only to custody of the two younger children. 
custody of CCDCFS. Mother was represented by counsel at all proceedings. The 

motion was amended on December 6, 2019, to add an alleged father of K.W. 

CCDCFS moved for permanent custody on February 11, 2019, and on 

April 2, 2019,2 Mother was arraigned, advised of her legal rights, and executed a 

waiver of service. The matter was tried on February 4, 2020. Mother was 

represented by counsel, A.L., father of the elder child was represented by counsel 

and a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), L.R., alleged father of K.G., was represented by 

counsel, and the children were represented by counsel and a GAL. W.W., the father 

by affidavit of K.W., did not respond to or participate in any of the agency activities 

or court proceedings. Another individual, S.F., was identified as the potential 

biological father of K.W. immediately prior to the permanent custody trial but had 

not taken a paternity test. 

Social Worker Linda Yeldell (“Social Worker Yeldell”) testified on 

behalf of CCDCFS. The children’s GAL also addressed the court. The trial court 

determined that Mother and the fathers of the children were unable to care for the 

children, cited the facts underlying the determination, and acknowledged that no 

other interested person had filed or been identified in a motion for legal custody. 

The children desired to remain in the foster home where they have been happy and 

thriving. The case worker and GAL for the children recommended permanent 

custody and adoption, and the trial court granted permanent custody to CCDCFS. 

 2 The transcript is erroneously dated April 12, 2019. 
Mother appeals. 

II. Assignments of Error 

Mother proffers the following assignment of errors: 

I. The trial court committed error when it failed to comply with the 

mandatory requirements of Juv.R. 37 and R.C. 2151.35. 

II. The trial court committed error when it proceeded with the 

permanent custody hearing without complying with 25 U.S.C. 

1912. 

III. The trial court committed error when it denied Appellant’s 

request to continue. 

IV. The trial court committed error when it terminated Appellant’s 

parental rights and granted permanent custody to CCDCFS. 

III. Discussion 

A. Juv.R. 37 and R.C. 2151.35 

Mother argues in the first assigned error that the trial court 

committed error when it failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of 

Juv.R. 37 and R.C. 2151.35. 

Juv.R. 37(A) provides in relevant part: 

 (A) Record of proceedings. 

The juvenile court shall make a record of adjudicatory and dispositional 

proceedings in abuse, neglect, dependent, unruly, and delinquent 

cases; permanent custody cases; and proceedings before magistrates. 

In all other proceedings governed by these rules, a record shall be made 

upon request of a party or upon motion of the court. The record shall 

be taken in shorthand, stenotype, or by any other adequate mechanical, 

electronic, or video recording device. 

R.C. 2151.35(A)(2) provides: 

A record of all testimony and other oral proceedings in juvenile court 

shall be made in all proceedings that are held pursuant to section 
2151.414 of the Revised Code or in which an order of disposition may 

be made pursuant to division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised 

Code, and shall be made upon request in any other proceedings. The 

record shall be made as provided in section 2301.20 of the Revised 

Code. 

The record includes: (1) the April 16, 2018 transcript of proceedings 

on the complaint and emergency motion for predispositional temporary custody; 

(2) the June 20, 2018 adjudication and disposition hearing where the children were 

declared neglected and temporary emergency custody awarded to CCDCFS; (3) the 

April 12, 2019 proceedings to advise Mother of her constitutional rights and to 

ensure Mother’s understanding of the motion to modify temporary custody to 

permanent custody; and (4) the February 5, 2020 permanent custody proceedings. 

The complete transcripts for the adjudicatory and dispositional 

proceedings are in the record. “Neither Juv.R. 37 nor R.C. 2151.35 make any 

mention of recording pretrials or scheduling conferences.” In re D.H., 177 Ohio 

App.3d 246, 2008-Ohio-3686, 894 N.E.2d 364, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.). 

The first assignment of error is overruled. 

B. 25 U.S.C. 1912 

 Mother argues that the trial court failed to comply with the Indian 

Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25 U.S.C. 1912. 

In order to invoke the provisions of the ICWA, there must be a 

preliminary showing that a custody proceeding involves an “Indian 

child.” In re Williams, 9th Dist. [Summit] Nos. 20773 and 20786, 

2002-Ohio-321, ¶ 22. An “Indian child” is defined as “any unmarried 

person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an 

Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is 

the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe[.]” 25 U.S.C. 

1903(4). The party who asserts the applicability of the ICWA bears the 
burden of proving that a child meets the statutory definition of an 

“Indian child.” Williams at ¶ 22. To meet this burden, the party 

asserting the applicability of the ICWA must do more than raise the 

possibility that a child has Native American ancestry. See In re B.S., 

184 Ohio App.3d 463, 2009-Ohio-5497, 921 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 63 (8th 

Dist). 

In re: A.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99057, 2013-Ohio-1802, ¶ 41. 

 The record reflects multiple inquiries by the trial court. 

Court: And since you’ve had the case has mother reported any 

Native American ancestry for herself of the children? 

Agency: No. 

Court: Have you discovered any Native American ancestry for 

either of the fathers? 

Agency: No. 

 (Tr. 15-16.) 

 CCDCFS also addressed ICWA during direct examination of the 

CCDCFS intake and extended social workers respectively: 

Counsel: Have any of the parents reported any Native American 

Ancestry? 

Witness: No. 

Counsel: For themselves or the children? 

Witness: No. 

Counsel: Have they been asked? 

Witness: In the staffing they were asked. 

Counsel: And what did they say? 

 Witness: No. 

 * * * 
 Counsel: Have you learned through the course of your investigation 

whether any of the parents have Native American 

Ancestry? 

Witness: No. 

(Tr. 13, 36.) 

As further clarification, the trial court inquired: 

Court: [Counsel for Mother], just so the record’s clear, does your 

client have any Native American Ancestry? 

 Counsel: No, your honor. 

(Tr. 42.) 

The trial court asked Mother directly at the April 2, 2019 hearing: 

Court: Okay. And final question, to the best of your knowledge 

do you or your children have any Native American 

ancestry? 

Mother: No. 

(Tr. 8.) 

 Finally, the trial court’s journal entry and findings of fact for 

permanent custody of each child provides that “the child is not a member of a 

federally recognized Indian tribe, and is not in the custody of an Indian custodian.” 

Journal entry Nos. 0913175575 and 0913175557, pg. 3 (Feb. 18, 2020). 

 The second assigned error is overruled. 

C. Continuance 

 Mother also cites as error the trial court’s refusal to continue the trial 

due to the alleged delivery of approximately 400 plus pages of discovery the day 

before trial. We do not find error here. 
Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s determination of whether 

to grant a continuance is not subject to reversal. In re K.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 81843, 2003-Ohio-1847, ¶ 10. An abuse of discretion equates to an 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable decision. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 

Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

Also, 

[U]nder Juv.R. 23, “[c]ontinuances shall be granted only when 

imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties.” In addition, 

Loc.R. 35(C) of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile 

Division, provides: 

No case will be continued on the day of trial or hearing except for good 

cause shown, which cause was not known to the party or counsel prior 

to the date of trial or hearing, and provided that the party and/or 

counsel have used diligence to be ready for trial and have notified or 

made diligent efforts to notify the opposing party or counsel as soon as 

he/she became aware of the necessity to request a postponement. This 

rule may not be waived by consent of counsel. 

In re A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109239, 2020-Ohio-3373, ¶ 28. 

 The trial court thoroughly addressed this matter on the record. A 

review of that record reveals that approximately 250 pages were erroneously 

provided to Mother but were actually related to the eldest child’s father’s inability to 

care for that child. Provision of the documents was delayed due to the father’s 

refusal to sign a release. 

Counsel for CCDCFS explained that the remaining documents were 

duplicates of Mother’s treatment and counseling records that were originally 

delivered in October: 
With regards to the discovery, [Mother’s counsel] was provided with 

Mother’s most recent treatment records in October. 

I subsequently subpoenaed those records to see if she had re-engaged, 

if there was anything additional, and they sent me the same exact 

records again except with a certification page saying these are the 

records from them. 

I decided, although they were the exact same records that were already 

provided, that I would drag those in and do it as one account just so 

that — * * * 

I would provide the children discovery just in case I decided to submit 

the ones with the updated certification page as an exhibit instead of the 

other ones. 

He was provided with all of the records in October for Mother’s 

treatment. * * * 

 I explained to him yesterday and I pulled it up and showed him that it 

is the same records. 

In fact, I believe there’s been no new things that (inaudible) I think it 

was 2018. 

 I explained that to him. He seemed to understand at the time that 

these were just updated and that he has had these records for months. 

(Tr. 9-10.) 

 CCDCFS added that several pages of recent activity logs were 

provided but denied Mother’s claim that the agency had an ongoing obligation to 

supplement discovery. Mother last requested discovery in April 2018, and the 

agency voluntarily updated the information “multiple times.” (Tr. 11.) 

I was reviewing updated activity logs myself for preparation for trial 

and out of courtesy I took the time to redact and send them to him. 

He was not entitled to those documents. There has been no discovery 

request, but I provided them recently as I was presenting them out of 

courtesy. 
 (Tr. 12.) 

CCDCFS is correct. “[T]here is no requirement that disclosures or 

witness lists be updated pursuant to Juv.R. 24.” In re J.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 84368, 2004-Ohio-6024, ¶ 25. In fact, “‘[a]bsent a motion to compel, the trial 

court in juvenile proceedings does not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence not 

previously disclosed by the state.’” Id., quoting In re Gilbert, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA86-10-144, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 8876, at *11 (Sept. 28, 1987). 

In additional support for the continuance claim, Mother argued that 

an alleged blood relative had recently come forward though no motion regarding the 

purported relative was before the trial court. In fact, the existence of the individual 

came to light on January 22, 2020, just days before trial. The trial court advised that 

“all proceedings” do not stop “because at the last minute somebody found somebody 

who could be a custodian?” (Tr. 24.) In addition, CCDCFS stated that the individual, 

if eligible, would only be considered for custody of the eldest child. 

 Mother also offered that the defense had “relaxed preparation” for 

the trial by “[n]ot going through all those documents” because the defense 

understood that the proceedings were only going to move forward regarding the 

older sibling. (Tr. 23.) Counsel for CCDCFS explained that Mother’s counsel 

inquired about the agency moving forward at trial for the elder sibling who would 

attain the age of eighteen years old approximately two weeks after the scheduled 

trial. Counsel was advised that permission for a continuance for any of the children 

required approval of the agency. CCDCFS declined. 
 CCDCFS counsel expounded that the cited discussion had just 

occurred the previous afternoon: 

It’s not like I cut off his ability to prepare for trial for months thinking — 

I mean, this is just affecting a few-hour window the day before trial, so 

it shouldn’t have had any effect on whether he could relax his 

preparation. 

(Tr. 26-27.) The trial court ruled. “Okay. I have heard enough. The motion for 

continuance is denied. We will go forward on all three [children].” (Tr. 27.) 

 We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion. 

 The third assigned error is overruled. 

D. Permanent Custody Award 

Parents have a constitutionally protected, fundamental interest in the 

management, custody, and care of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 

66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). “We recognize, however, that 

termination of parental rights is ‘the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a 

criminal case.’” In re J.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98546, 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66, 

quoting In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368, 776 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 14. 

A parent’s right to raise a child is not absolute and it is “‘always subject 

to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to 

be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting 

In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979). 

CCDCFS filed for permanent custody on the ground that the children 

have been neglected. A neglected child is one “[w]ho lacks adequate parental care 

because of the faults or habits of the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian.” 
R.C. 2151.03(A)(2). Under R.C. 2151.03(A)(3), a neglected child is one “[w]hose 

parents, guardian, or custodian neglects the child or refuses to provide proper or 

necessary subsistence, education, medical or surgical care or treatment, or other 

care necessary for the child’s health, morals, or well-being.” R.C. 2151.03(A)(3). 

 R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) authorizes a trial court to grant permanent 

custody to an agency where a child has been adjudicated neglected, dependent, or 

abused. The trial court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that: 

(1) “the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable 

time or should not be placed with either parent” pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E); and 

(2) “permanent commitment is in the best interest of the child” pursuant to 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.353(A)(4). 

1. Standard of Review 

To terminate parental rights and grant permanent custody to a county 

agency, the record must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence the 

following: (1) the existence of one of the conditions set forth in 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (e); and (2) permanent custody is in the best interest 

of the child. In re S.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97992, 97993, and 97994, 2012-

Ohio-4064, ¶ 27. “Clear and convincing evidence” is that quantum of evidence that 

instills in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be 

established. In re Y.V., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96061, 2011-Ohio-2409, ¶ 13, citing 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954). 
When determining the child’s best interest pursuant to 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), courts analyze the following factors: (1) the interaction and 

interrelationship of the child with others; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the 

custodial history of the child; (4) the child’s need for a legally secure placement and 

whether such a placement can be achieved without permanent custody; and 

(5) whether any of the factors in divisions R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply. 

Also, 

[a] juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody will not be 

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “if the 

record contains some competent, credible evidence from which the 

court could have found that the essential statutory elements for 

permanent custody had been established by clear and convincing 

evidence.” 

In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-1533, ¶ 62, quoting In re A.P., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16. 

The “best interest determination” focuses on the child, not the parent. 

R.C. 2151.414(C); In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 315, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th 

Dist.1994). The discretion that the juvenile court enjoys in deciding whether an 

order of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the 

utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s 

decision will have on the lives of the parties concerned. Id. at 316. 

Thus, we review “a trial court’s determination of a child’s best interest 

under R.C. 2151.414(D) for abuse of discretion.” In re V.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

Nos. 102903, 103061, and 103367, 2015-Ohio-4991, ¶ 52, citing In re L.O., 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 101805, 2015-Ohio-1458, ¶ 22. “An abuse of discretion implies that 

the court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Id., citing 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

2. Discussion and Analysis 

Mother argues that the custody award is in error because Mother 

satisfied the case plan objectives. Social Worker Yeldell was the sole agency witness 

at the permanency hearing. A number of certified exhibits that documented 

pertinent facts were admitted and are not challenged here. 

 Social Worker Yeldell was assigned to the case in March 2018. The 

agency received a report in January 2018, that Mother refused to take the elder 

sibling home from the Juvenile Detention Center, and that the younger children had 

been seen begging for money and were not being provided for. The agency had 

concerns about the housing and Mother’s substance abuse as well as the danger 

posed to the children during Mother’s two automobile accidents. 

 A case plan was formulated with the initial goal of reunification. 

Mother was required to meet substance abuse, housing, parenting practice, and 

mental health objectives. The substance abuse issues involved alcohol, cocaine, and 

marijuana. 

Mother failed to complete the intensive outpatient program 

treatment plan. Intake occurred on March 29, 2018, and discharge on October 1, 

2018. Mother continued to test positive for marijuana, alcohol, and cocaine during 

the treatment period. 
 Mother was reassessed in April 2019 and referred for inpatient 

treatment. Mother informed the inpatient agency that she had been using alcohol 

and drugs for 20 years and was diagnosed with severe alcohol, severe cannabis, and 

cocaine disorder. Mother refused to participate in the program “because she wanted 

to work.” (Tr. 40.) Mother was next referred for partial hospital treatment but also 

failed to complete the program and continued to test positive. 

In December 2019, Mother gave birth to another child. Mother 

abused substances throughout the pregnancy and custody of the infant was pending 

in a separate action. 

Mother was assessed by the mental health counseling service in 

August 2018. The provider recommended psychotherapy for Mother’s moods, 

relationship issues, unresolved trauma, and to build self-coping skills. A medication 

management assessment was also recommended. Mother did not comply with 

either recommendation. 

Mother was referred to, and completed, parenting services. The 

agency opined that Mother did not benefit from the services and questioned 

Mother’s decision-making as exemplified by Mother’s decision to engage in 

substance abuse through her pregnancy and childbirth. 

The house where Mother previously resided with the children burned 

down while she and the children were present. As of the trial date, Mother had not 

secured housing for the children and was residing with the father of the newborn 
who was convicted of assaulting Mother during the pregnancy. Mother visits with 

the children under supervision due to the ongoing positive substance abuse tests. 

The children have been placed together in a two-parent foster home 

where they are thriving, doing well in school, and participating in school activities. 

The couple is willing to adopt the children and two more foster children recently 

joined the family. Based on Social Worker Yeldell’s personal observations, the 

children and foster parents have a close bond and attend to the children’s needs. 

The children have not expressed a desire to return to Mother. 

Social Worker Yeldell acknowledged during cross-examination that 

Mother stated that she completed a substance abuse program, parenting program, 

and mental health counseling. Only the parenting class is documented, a fact 

already acknowledged by the agency. 

Social Worker Yeldell recommended that permanent custody is in the 

best interest of the children. The fathers are unable to care for the children and 

Mother is unable to remain sober or provide safe housing. 

 The GAL for the children testified that permanent custody is in the 

best interest of the children. The children have been in what is their third foster 

home for 18 months and are comfortable and doing well. 

The evidence establishes for the “best interest” purposes of 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), that the children have bonded with the foster family and 

siblings and have resided with the family for 18 months. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). The 
agency and GAL advised that the children did not express a desire to reunify with 

Mother and recommended permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). 

The trial court further found that the children have not been in the 

custody of a public children services agency or private child placement agency under 

one or more separate orders of disposition for 12 or more months of a consecutive 

22-month period. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c). Journal entry Nos. 0913175575 and 

0913175557, p. 3 (Feb. 18, 2020). In addition, the trial court determined that the 

children could not be placed with Mother and required a legally secure placement 

that could be accomplished without a grant of permanent custody. 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). 

The trial court found that the children are not Native American for 

purposes of ICWA. In addition, the trial court approved the permanency plan for 

permanent custody and adoption and rejected the concurrent plan for reunification. 

 The trial court also held that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), and (4) factors 

apply. “[T]he parent has failed to remedy the problems that initially caused the 

child[ren] to be placed outside the home.” R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). “[T]he parent has 

failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing 

the child[ren] to be placed outside the child[ren]’s home.” Id. See Journal entry 

Nos. 0913175575 and 0913175557, p. 3 (Feb. 18, 2020). 

 The trial court also found that Mother’s “chronic mental illness, 

intellectual disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency” “is so severe that 

it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the 
child[ren] at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year.” 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(2). See Journal entry Nos. 0913175575 and 0913175557, p. 3 

(Feb. 18, 2020). 

In support of R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), the trial court determined that 

Mother 

has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child[ren] by 

failing to regularly, support, visit, or communicate with the child[ren] 

when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to 

provide an adequate permanent home for the child[ren]. 

 Journal entry Nos. 0913175575 and 0913175557, p. 3 (Feb. 18, 2020). 

After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that the allegations of the motion are supported by clear and convincing 

evidence and that permanent custody is in the best interest of the children. 

Mother’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. Conclusion 

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 ____ 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, PRESIDING JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR