****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modificationandtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service andinthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************ORLANDO MARTINEZ v. ADMINISTRATOR,

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

ACT, ET AL. (AC 37958)
Alvord, Prescott and Mihalakos, Js. Argued October 18, 2016—officially released January 24, 2017 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Hon. Joseph H. Pellegrino, judge trial

referee.)
Thomas P. Clifford III , assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Philip M. Schultz, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (named defendant).
Orlando Martinez, self-represented, the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion MIHALAKOS, J. The defendant Administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act1 appeals from the judgment ofthe trial court sustaining the appeal by the plaintiff, Orlando Martinez, and reversing the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review (board) denying benefits to the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) disregarded the factual findings of the board although no motion to correct was filed as required by Practice Book § 22- 4, and (2) determined that the board abused its discretion in concluding that the plaintiff engaged in wilful misconduct. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court. The following facts, as found by the appeals referee (referee) and adopted by the board,2 are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiffworked as afull-time machine operator for Polar Industries, Inc. (employer), for approximately twenty years. The employer does not grant sick pay for its employees, but it does pays its employees for days spent attendingjury duty. On October 21, 2013, the plaintiffwas scheduled to attendjury duty at the Superior Court in Waterbury and reported to the courthouse that morning. Jury duty, however,
was cancelled as of 9 a.m. on October 21. Instead of reporting to work, the plaintiff went home from the courthouse because he was not feeling well. He fell asleep and did not awake until 5:40 p.m., after his shift had ended.
When the plaintiffarrived at work at 8 a.m. on October 22, 2013, he did not inform anyone in management, including the employer’s manager of administration, MichaelAccuosti, thatjurydutyhadbeencancelledand thathe hadgone home fromthe courthouse because he did not feel well. At approximately 10 a.m., Accuosti approached the plaintiff regarding his October 21 absence, and the plaintiff told Accuosti that he had attendedjuryduty. TheplaintiffdidnotinformAccuosti at that time, either, that jury duty had been cancelled. Accuosti knew, however, thatjury duty had been cancelled for all people scheduled on October 21, 2013,3 and, by approaching him, gave the plaintiffan opportunity to voluntarily admit the cancellation. Thereafter, Accuosti told the plaintiffthat he was discharged from the employer for dishonesty related to his failure to inform the management team that jury duty had been cancelled. Following his termination, the plaintifffiled an application for unemployment compensation benefits. On November21, 2013,thedefendantruledthattheplaintiff
was disqualified from receiving benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (B)4 and Section 31- 236-26a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.5 Specifically, the defendant determined that theemployer had discharged the plaintiff for ‘‘deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard ofthe employer’s interests as he deliberately lied to his employer about his attendance atjury duty until he was pressed into giving
a correct answer.’’ The plaintiff filed a timely appeal
on December 2, 2013, and a hearing was held before a referee. On January 13, 2014, the referee affirmed the defendant’s decision. The plaintifffiled atimely appeal to the board on January 29, 2014. On March 14, 2014, the board adopted the referee’s findings of facts, with limited modifications and additions, and affirmed the referee’s decision.
The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b. The defendant filed a motion forjudgment asking the court to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal. The defendant argued that the facts found reasonably supported the board’s decision, that the law was correctly applied to the facts, and that
no motionto correctthe findings oftheboardwasfiled. The court denied the defendant’s motion and determined that the board’s ‘‘conclusion that the [plaintiff]
was guilty ofwilful misconduct was an abuse ofdiscretion.’’ Accordingly, the court sustained the plaintiff’s appeal and reversed the decision of the board. This appeal followed.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly disregarded the factual findings of the board, notwithstanding the plaintiff having failed to file a motion to correctinaccordancewithPracticeBook § 22-4. Specifically, the defendant argues that ‘‘[i]t is the board’s finding of facts, in the absence of a motion to correct, to which the court was bound in determining whether
or not the board’s conclusions from those facts were reasonable,’’ andthat‘‘thecourtimproperlyadjudicated questions of fact, and substituted its own conclusions for those of the board.’’ We agree. Pursuant to § 31-249b, ‘‘any finding of the referee or the board shall be subject to correction only to the extentprovidedbysection22-9oftheConnecticutPracticeBook.’’ PracticeBook § 22-9 (a) specifiesthat‘‘[t]he courtdoesnotretrythefactsorhearevidence. Itconsiders no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose ofdetermining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether therewasanyevidencetosupportinthelawthe conclusions reached. It cannot review the conclusions of the board when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.’’
Practice Book § 22-4 provides the mechanism forthe correction of the board’s findings. It states that ‘‘[i]f the [plaintiff] desires to have the finding of the board corrected, he or she must, within two weeks after the record has been filed in the superior court

. . . filewiththeboardamotionforthe correctionofthefinding and with it such portions of the evidence as he or she deems relevant and material to the corrections asked for

. . . .’’ ‘‘A plaintiff’s failure to file a timely motion [to correct] the board’s findings in accordance with [Practice Book] § 22-4 prevents further review of those facts found by the board.

. . . In the absence of a motion to correct the findings of the board, the court is not entitledto retrythe facts orhearnew evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Resso v. Administrator, UnemploymentCompensationAct, 147Conn. App. 661, 665, 83 A.3d 723 (2014).
Inthepresentcase, theplaintifffailedto file amotion to correct with the board, a necessary prerequisite to
a challenge of the board’s findings. Despite no motion beingfiled, the court, inexaminingtheboard’sdecision, reviewed the evidence to determine its sufficiency and its credibility, andthen substituted its own conclusions for those of the board. Specifically, the court determined that there was no finding that, ifjury duty was cancelled, the employer required its employees to return to work. In addition, the court determined that the record did not indicate whether the plaintiff went to the court and was toldjury duty was cancelled or at whattimetheplaintiffwastoldjurydutywas cancelled. Moreover, the court determined that Accuosti’s knowing thatjury dutywas cancelled on October 21 because he looked it up on thejudicial branch website was not credible.6 Absent a motion to correct, the court did not have the authority to attack the findings of the board and make these new findings.
II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly determined that the board abused its discretion in concluding that the plaintiffhad engaged in wilful misconduct. Specifically, the defendant argues that the record is replete with sufficient evidence to support board’s finding of wilful misconduct, and that the trial court applied and incorrect standard of review and improperly concluded that the plaintiff’s discharge violated public policy as set forth in General Statutes § 51-247a. We agree. We first set forth the standard of review and the relevant legal principles. ‘‘General Statutes § 31-249b provides claimants with the right to appeal a decision oftheboarddenyingunemploymentcompensationbenefitsto the Superior Court. To the extentthatan administrative appeal, pursuantto General Statutes § 31-249b,
concerns findings offact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board

. . . . The court must not retry the facts nor hear evidence.

. . . If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether theadministrative action resulted from an incorrect application ofthe lawto the facts found or couldnotreasonably or logically have followed from such facts. Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains theultimateobligationtodeterminewhethertheadministrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or anabuse ofdiscretion.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)Ressov.Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 147 Conn. App. 664–65.
The determination of eligibility for unemployment compensationbenefits is made pursuantto the statutes and regulations governing the program. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits ‘‘if, in the opinion ofthe administrator, the individual has been discharged

. . . for

. . . wilful misconduct in the course ofthe individual’s employment

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (2) (B). Wilfulmisconductis definedas ‘‘deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest,
or a single knowing violation of a reasonable and uniformly enforced rule or policy of the employer, when reasonably applied, provided such violation is not a result of the employee’s incompetence and provided further, in the case ofabsences from work, ‘wilful misconduct’ means an employee must be absent without either good cause for the absence or notice to the employer which the employee could reasonably have provided under the circumstances for three separate instances within a twelve-month period.

. . .’’ General Statutes § 31-236 (a) (16); see also Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 31-236-26a.
In the present case, the court determined that the facts inthe record, as foundbythe referee and adopted with modifications by the board, and the evidence submitted were insufficient to establish a finding ofwilful misconduct. Specifically, the court determined that ‘‘there are not facts or evidence submitted that there
was a rule of the employer that if an employee was called for jury duty or that ifjury duty was cancelled that the employee must report that to the employer and/or return to work. There was no evidence of such
a rule or that the [plaintiff] knew that he should have informed his employer that jury duty was cancelled and/or return to work.’’ The court, therefore, determined that the board abused its discretion in determining that the plaintiff’s actions constituted wilful misconduct.
After a thorough review of the certified record, we are persuaded that the conclusion of the referee and the board that the plaintiff’s discharge was the result ofan act ofwilful misconduct reasonably and logically could have followed from the facts found in this case. The board found that the plaintiff’s October 21 jury duty was cancelled and that he subsequently did not report to work or contact his employer. The board alsofound that the following day the plaintiff arrived at workat 8 a.m., and, despite being giventhe opportunity earlyinhis shiftto tell management ofthe cancellation, the plaintiff did not inform his employer thatjury duty had been cancelled. Instead, he told Accuosti that he had attended jury duty, and only admitted that it had been cancelled when he was latertold byAccuosti that Accuosti had learned of the cancellation. Moreover, the board found that the plaintiff was aware that the employer would pay the plaintiff if the employer believed that the plaintiff had attended jury duty.7
The plaintiffdid not inform Accuosti ofthe cancellation when prompted, but instead chose to engage in deceptive conduct that he knew would result in his receiving pay for October 21. The plaintiff, by failing to inform his employer thatjury duty had been cancelled, deprived his employer of an opportunity to protect its
own interests and acted in a manner inconsistent with the standards of behavior reasonably expected by his employer. See Regs., Conn. StateAgencies § 31-236-26a. The boardreasonably couldhave concluded, therefore, thattheplaintiffintentionally engagedinwilfulmisconduct in deliberate disregard of the employer’s interest and was consequently ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits. Accordingly, our review of the record persuades us that the decision of the board that the plaintiff’s actions amounted to wilful misconduct was logically supported by the evidence, andwasnotunreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, oranabuse of the board’s discretion.
We nextbrieflyaddress the court’s improperapplicationofthepublicpolicycontainedwithintheprovisions of § 51-247a. The court found that ‘‘public policy and the provisions of

. . . § 51-247a preclude an employer from discharging an employee who responds to a summons for jury duty. The [plaintiff] in this matter did respond to a jury summons, did report to the courthouse, andthen was later discharged byhis employer.’’ Pursuant to § 51-247a, an employer cannot discharge
anemployeeforrespondingto asummonsforjuryduty. The present case, however, is not a case of employer retaliation against the plaintiff for attending jury duty. In fact, in its decision, the board clearly found that the dischargewasnotrelatedtotheplaintiff’sabsencefrom work on October 21. Instead, at issue was whether the plaintiff’s dishonesty about the reason for his absence, claiming that he had attended jury duty, met the standard for wilful misconduct.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded withdirectiontorenderjudgmentaffirmingthedecision of the Employment Security Board of Review.
In this opinion the otherjudges concurred.

1 The plaintiff’s employer, Polar Industries, Inc., and the Employment Security Appeals Division Board of Review were named as defendants, but did not appear before the trial court and have not participated in this appeal. We, therefore, refer in this opinion to the Administrator of theUnemployment Compensation Act as the defendant.

2 The board adopted the referee’s findings with one modification and

one addition.
3 Accusoti knew of the cancellation because he had looked it up on the judicial branch website.

4 General Statutes § 31-236 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An individual shall be ineligible for benefits

. . . (2)

. . . (B) if, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has been discharged

. . . for

. . . wilful misconduct in the course of the individual’s employment

. . . .’’

5 Section 31-236-26a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part: ‘‘In order to establish that an individual was discharged or suspended for deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employer’s interest, the Administrator must find all of the following: ‘‘(a) Misconduct. To find that any act

. . . is misconduct the Administrator must find that the individual committed an act

. . . which was contrary to the employer’s interest, including any act

. . . which is not consistent with the standards of behavior which an employer, in the operation of his business, should reasonably be able to expect from an employee. ‘‘(b) Deliberate. To determine that misconduct is deliberate, the Administrator must find that the individual committed the act

. . . intentionally or with reckless indifference forthe probable consequences ofsuch act

. . . . ‘‘(c) Wilful Disregard of the Employer’s Interest. To find that deliberate misconduct is in wilful disregard ofthe employer’s interest, the Administrator much find that: ‘‘(1) the individual knew or should have known that such act

. . . was contrary to the employer’s expectation or interest; and ‘‘(2) at the time the individual committed the act

. . . he understood that the act

. . . was contrary to the employer’s expectation or interest and he

was not motivated or seriously influenced by mitigating circumstances of

a compelling nature.

. . .’’

6 In its order, the court states that theplaintiff’s knowing ofthe cancellationbecause he lookeditup onthejudicialbranchwebsite wasnot credible. It was Accuosti, however, that looked up the cancellation, not the plaintiff. Irrespective ofthe error, the court did not have the authority to review the credibility of the evidence.

7 In its decision, the board relied in part on a prior decision, Hafersat v. Veam Division, Dept. of Labor, Employment Security Appeals Division, Broad of Review Case No. 12-BR-02 (February 6, 2002). In Hafersat, the board found that the claimant engaged in deliberate misconduct by falsely claiming that he attended jury duty in order the receive a day’s pay or preserve sick and vacation time for future use, and thus, the claimant was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.