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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

November 29, 2016 

v No. 328097 

Shiawassee Circuit Court 

MONICA MARIE STEVENS, LC No. 14-006595-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: RONAYNE KRAUSE, P.J., and O’CONNELL and GLEICHER, JJ. 

O’CONNELL, J. (dissenting). 

 I respectfully dissent. I write simply to state that regarding departure sentences, People v 

Steanhouse, 313 Mich App 1, 48; 880 NW2d 297 (2015), is in conflict with People v Lockridge, 

498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). As such, this Court is required to follow the strictures as 

set forth in the Supreme Court’s Lockridge opinion. By following the strictures as set forth in 

the Lockridge opinion, the defendant is not entitled to a remand for a Crosby hearing, United 

States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005). I would affirm the well-reasoned decision of the 

learned trial court. 

 This case involves a departure sentence. It does not involve an Alleyne1

 challenge, nor 

does it involve a challenge to the mis-scoring of the guidelines. In such instances, Lockridge

compels us to review the defendant’s sentence for plain error. If no error occurs, no remand is 

necessary. In the present case, no error has occurred. In my opinion, it defies logic to remand a 

case for resentencing when the offense variables (OVs) are not mis-scored, when no valid 

Alleyne challenge exists, and when the trial court stated valid reasons for why its chosen sentence 

was more proportionate to both the offense and the offender. 

 This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to depart upward from the sentencing 

guidelines for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. People v Masroor, 313 

Mich App 358, 373; 880 NW2d 812 (2015). The trial court abuses its discretion when its 

sentence is not proportional under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990), and 

its progeny. Id. at 373-374. 

 

1 Alleyne v United States, 570 US ___; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013). 
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 In imposing a departure sentence that exceeded the guideline range by nine months, the 

trial court stated that the recommended sentence did not “adequately handle[] this matter” and 

that it would fashion an “appropriate” sentence. The trial court explained that the guidelines did 

not adequately account for defendant’s extensive history of alcohol-related crimes, including five 

prior convictions of operating while intoxicated, that defendant’s blood alcohol content was three 

times over the legal limit, or that defendant had “previous and persistent failure to 

rehabilitate . . . .” Stevens had participated in five previous courses of alcohol abuse counseling 

but continued to drink. Finally, the trial court noted that Stevens did not admit responsibility for 

the crime and was not likely to be rehabilitated. The trial court specifically stated that its 

sentence “is more proportionate to this offense, because it accurately reflects the aggravating 

factors I’ve already discussed, and the need to impose a more severe sanction than those you’ve 

already faced.” 

The recommended guidelines range for Stevens’s sentence was 0 to 13 months’ 

imprisonment. The trial court exceeded the guideline range by nine months and sentenced 

Stevens to a term of 22 to 90 months’ imprisonment. In my opinion, this was a reasonable and 

well-deserved sentence. 

 The Lockridge question at issue in this case is whether Stevens, a fifth-time multiple 

drunk driving offender, is entitled to be resentenced or at least entitled to a remand for a Crosby

hearing. The answer to this question depends on whether Stevens can show plain error in her 

sentencing process. On appeal, Stevens does not contest the scoring of her guidelines, nor can 

she establish plain error. I therefore conclude that Lockridge addresses this issue perfectly: 

Stevens is not entitled to be resentenced. 

 In this case, I would adopt the identical reasons to apply as stated in my dissent in People 

v Shank, 313 Mich App 221; 881 NW2d 135 (2015) (O’CONNELL, J., dissenting), as follows: 

If a defendant does not challenge the scoring of his or her offense variables 

(OVs) at sentencing on Alleyne grounds, our review is for plain error affecting 

that defendant’s substantial rights. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392. In this case, 

Shank did not challenge the scoring of his OV scores on Alleyne grounds. Our 

review is for plain error. 

 To be entitled to relief under plain-error review, a defendant must 

show that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id. 

at 393. The Lockridge court aptly stated the application of the plain error 

doctrine in cases—like Shank’s—in which the defendant did not preserve an 

Alleyne challenge below and the trial court departed upward: 

Because [the defendant] received an upward departure sentence 

that did not rely on the minimum sentence range from the 

improperly scored guidelines (and indeed, the trial court 

necessarily had to state on the record its reasons for departing 

from that range), the defendant cannot show prejudice from any 

error in scoring the OVs in violation of Alleyne. [Id. at 394 

(emphasis altered).] 
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 If a defendant’s minimum sentence involved an upward departure, that 

defendant “necessarily cannot show plain error . . . .” Id. at 395 n 31. “It 

defies logic that the court in those circumstances would impose a lesser sentence 

had it been aware that the guidelines were merely advisory.” Id. 

 In this regard, the Steanhouse court’s decision to remand in that case was 

contrary to the precepts of stare decisis. As in Lockridge, the trial court in 

Steanhouse departed upward from the recommended sentencing range. 

Steanhouse, 313 Mich App at 42. The defendant in Steanhouse, like the 

defendant in Lockridge, did not challenge the scoring of his OVs on Alleyne 

grounds. Id. The Court of Appeals in Steanhouse recognized that the 

defendant could not establish a plain error under Lockridge. However, the 

Court proceeded to review the defendant’s sentence and remand for 

resentencing anyway, directly contrary to the language of Lockridge providing 

that the Lockridge defendant was not entitled to resentencing under the exact 

same circumstances. 

 I would follow Lockridge without declaring a conflict panel. The reason 

is simple—this Court need not convene a conflict panel to follow a rule 

articulated by the Supreme Court, even if a decision of this Court conflicts with 

the Supreme Court’s decision. Charles A Murray Trust v Futrell, 303 Mich 

App 28, 49; 840 NW2d 775 (2013). Until the Supreme Court’s decision is 

overruled by the Supreme Court itself, the rules of stare decisis require this 

Court to follow the Supreme Court’s decision. Paige v Sterling Heights, 476 

Mich 495, 524; 720 NW2d 219 (2006). This Court simply “does not have the 

authority to recant the Supreme Court’s positions.” Murray Trust, 303 Mich 

App at 49. Under the rule of stare decisis, this Court must follow a decision 

of the Supreme Court even if another panel of this Court decided the same 

issue in a contrary fashion. Id. Because Steanhouse ignored the clear directives 

of the Michigan Supreme Court, it is against the rules of stare decisis to follow 

the procedures in that case. I cannot in good conscience violate the rules 

articulated in Lockridge. 

 A remand under United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005), is 

used to determine whether prejudice resulted from an error. People v Stokes, 

312 Mich App 181, 200-201; 877 NW2d 752 (2015). The Lockridge court 

stated that no prejudice could result from the type of “error” involved in this 

case. Shank cannot show plain error; therefore, he is not entitled to relief. I 

conclude that a Crosby remand is not appropriate or necessary in this case. [Id. at 

228-230 (footnote omitted).] 

 I would affirm the trial court’s well-reasoned decision in this matter. The sentence is 

proportionate both to the crime and the offender. No OVs have been mis-scored in violation of 
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the Alleyne decision. No plain error has occurred. It is clearly a waste of judicial resources to 

remand this case to the trial court.2

 

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell 

 

2

 This Court’s recent opinion in People v Ambrose, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ 

(2016), slip op at 6, further supports my position: 

Further, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred in scoring OV 9, we 

would conclude that resentencing is not required. Under People v Lockridge, 498 

Mich 358, 364-365; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), a trial court’s departure from a 

defendant’s recommended sentencing guidelines range is reviewed by this Court 

for reasonableness. Defendant has not challenged the trial court’s departure from 

the guidelines as unreasonable. In light of the facts of this case, the trial court’s 

lengthy articulation of its reasons for departing from the guidelines, and the minor 

extent of the departure, we hold that the departure was reasonable. Although in 

People v Biddles, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d___ (2016) (Docket No. 

326140); slip op at 4, we recently clarified the distinction between [People v 

Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 92; 711 NW2d 44 (2006)] errors and Lockridge errors, 

Biddles did not deal with an upward departure, and we do not read Biddles as 

requiring remand for a Francisco error when we have determined (as here) that a 

sentencing departure is reasonable under Lockridge and the sentence “did not rely 

on the minimum sentence range from the improperly scored guidelines” at issue. 

Lockridge, 498 Mich at 394; see also People v Mutchie, 468 Mich 50, 52; 658 

NW2d 154 (2003) (holding that it was unnecessary to determine if a scoring error 

in OV 11 existed and required resentencing when the sentences imposed were 

departures “above the recommended range in any event, and the court expressly 

stated” the reasons for the departure).