J-S66033-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

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JAMES WILLIAM BRANCH,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 759 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 1, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Civil Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008065-2014 

BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED DECEMBER 09, 2015

James William Branch (Appellant) appeals the judgment of sentence 

imposed after he was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and one 

count of resisting arrest. We affirm.

We offer the following summary of the evidence produced at the nonjury trial on April 1, 2015. The events leading up to the charges against 

Appellant occurred in the early morning hours of May 9, 2014 in an area of 

McKeesport that was considered a “high crime, high drug area.” N.T., 

4/1/2015, at 16. A police officer observed a “large amount of marijuana [in 

a van located] in the 1600 block of Soles Street.” Id. A woman came out of 

a nearby residence claiming it was her van. A man went fleeing from the 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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back of the residence. The officers in the area set up a perimeter in the 

blocks surrounding that area. 

While setting up the perimeter, Officer Floyd Gault became aware of a 

“disturbance” nearby. Id. at 13. Specifically, he “observed a man put his 

head through the [front] window of a house” resulting in a broken window. 

Id. He classified the disturbance as being “a fight or something of that 

nature.” Id. at 14. Officer Gault radioed for backup. Officer Gault 

approached the house and saw a man, later identified as Andre Wiggins, 

come out of the side door. Officer Gault pointed his gun at Wiggins and 

“ordered him to the ground where he was detained in handcuffs.” Id. at 16. 

Wiggins told police that “his mother’s boyfriend[, later identified as 

Appellant,] was causing the disturbance.” Id. at 17. Another police officer 

was in the front of the house and saw a man, later identified as Appellant, 

inside the house holding a female, later identified as Yvonne Delphine RiniWiggins, “in a chokehold.” Id. Officer Derek Stitt observed Appellant with 

his hands around Rini-Wiggins’ neck and she was “screaming.” Id.

Several police officers, including Officer Gault, proceeded to knock on 

the front door of the house. Eventually, Appellant came to the door. 

According to Officer Gault, Appellant exhibited “an aggressive manner” and 

the other police officer “performed a takedown maneuver.” Id. at 18. 

Officer Gault testified that Appellant “had obvious injuries from putting his 

head through the window.” Id. at 19. After the other police officer 
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performed the takedown maneuver, Officer Gault informed Appellant he was 

under arrest for “simple assault, domestic violence.” Id. at 20. Officer Gault 

then testified Appellant “immediately started fighting with officers, flailing 

around the whole entire time, his hands, his feet. Several officers were 

struck.” Id. Appellant also kept saying, “[I]s this all you guys got[?]” Id. 

Officer Gault testified that he was struck during this incident. He also 

testified that the three other officers present were struck. According to 

Officer Gault, the incident lasted “probably 15 minutes.” Id. at 21. Once 

Appellant was safely in custody, which occurred after ten minutes of trying 

to get Appellant into the police vehicle, Appellant was transported to UPMC 

McKeesport for treatment of head injuries. Rini-Wiggins met officers at the 

hospital. Officer Gault testified that he observed “redness maybe to her 

neck[.]” Id. at 40. 

Rini-Wiggins testified for the defense. She testified that she called to 

her son because she believed somebody was breaking into the home. She 

heard a “crash of glass” and then she stepped on glass as she was opening 

the front door. Id. at 81. Appellant came to the front door and was 

“snatched backwards” by a police officer. Id. at 83. She further testified 

that she had not been assaulted by anyone in the home. Additionally, she 

testified that Appellant did not assault any of the police officers and that 

Appellant was “totally unconscious.” Id. at 90. She testified that at one 
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point Appellant had his arms around her because they were “praying” 

because she believed they were going to die. Id. at 78.

Appellant testified that he was disabled and had limited mobility due to 

two accidents which resulted in surgery. Appellant testified that he and RiniWiggins were “in the bedroom having ... cortis, coitus, whatever” when they 

heard someone trying to break into the house. Id. at 141. The two went 

downstairs, Appellant put his arms around Rini-Wiggins in prayer, and then 

they saw glass break. Appellant tried to stop Rini-Wiggins from opening the 

front door because he did not know who was outside. Appellant then 

testified that he was “snatched” when he opened the door, then “thrown to 

the ground,” “kicked,” and “punched.” Id. at 145. Appellant further testified 

that he “was tased to the point where [he lost] consciousness.” Id.

Appellant was charged with four counts of aggravated assault,1one 

count of simple assault,2and one count of resisting arrest. Prior to trial, the 

Commonwealth added a count of disorderly conduct to the criminal 

information. On April 1, 2015, Appellant proceeded to a non-jury trial on all 

charges. The trial court found Appellant guilty of two counts of aggravated 

assault and one count of resisting arrest. Appellant was found not guilty on 

 

1 The four officers were the victims with respect to these charges.

2 Rini-Wiggins was the victim with respect to this charge.
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two counts of aggravated assault,3simple assault, and disorderly conduct. 

Appellant was sentenced the same day to a term of two years of probation 

on each count of aggravated assault to run concurrently to each other. 

Appellant was not penalized further for the resisting arrest conviction.

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion which was denied by the 

trial court. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The trial court ordered 

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Appellant timely filed a concise statement, and the trial court issued an 

opinion.

On appeal, Appellant challenges both the weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain his convictions. However, before we reach Appellant’s 

arguments, we consider the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant has 

waived these issues on appeal. The trial court suggests that Appellant’s 

concise statement, which generally challenges the sufficiency and weight of 

the evidence, “falls short of what is required in a 1925(b) statement.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 7/6/2015, at 4. The trial court states that Appellant’s 

bald allegations concerning sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence do not provide any guidance as to which elements were 

lacking proof and how the weight of the evidence did not support 

the verdict rendered in this case. These allegations are too 

vague and ... this [c]ourt believes that these issues are waived 

for appellate review.

Id. 

 

3 These two counts were with respect to the two police officers who testified 

at trial. The Commonwealth did not call the other two police officers to 

testify.
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“In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on 

appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must state with specificity the 

element or elements upon which the appellant alleges that the evidence was 

insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 

2013). However, given the straight-forward nature of this case, we decline 

to find waiver. See Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 1058 (Pa. 2007) 

(reversing Superior Court’s finding of waiver based upon lack of specificity in 

concise statement where review was not hampered thereby). Nonetheless, 

upon examination of his arguments, it is clear that Appellant is entitled to no 

relief.

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is 

whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact[-]finder to find every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may 

not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of 

the fact-finder. ... Moreover, in applying the above test, the 

entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Helsel, 53 A.3d 906, 917-18 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 877 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations omitted)).

Instantly, Appellant was convicted of both aggravated assault and 

resisting arrest. We examine Appellant’s arguments with respect to each 

one, beginning with resisting arrest. 
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“A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the 

intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or 

discharging any other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily 

injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or 

requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. 

“[A] valid charge of resisting arrest requires an underlying lawful arrest, 

which, in turn, requires that the arresting officer possess probable cause.” 

Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. 1999). 

Appellant contends that because the arrest was not lawful, the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain this conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 16. 

Specifically, Appellant suggests that because Officer Gault did not see 

“[Appellant] choking anyone,” there was no probable cause to arrest him. 

Id. at 17.

“The police have probable cause where the facts and circumstances 

within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 

committed.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 

2007). Moreover, “a person is guilty of assault if he ... attempts to cause or 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). 

Officer Rich testified that he observed Appellant choking Rini-Wiggins. 

He testified that he saw Appellant’s hands “[r]ight around her neck.” N.T., 
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4/1/2015, at 47. He testified that the choking lasted “[s]everal seconds[.]” 

Id. Based on this testimony, the evidence was sufficient to establish that 

the police officers had probable cause to believe Appellant committed simple 

assault and therefore had authority lawfully to arrest Appellant. 

Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 

conviction for aggravated assault. Specifically, he argues that the testimony 

from the Commonwealth’s witnesses was inconsistent and that Appellant 

lacked the requisite intent to commit this crime. Appellant’s Brief at 18. 

“A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he ... attempts to cause or 

intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, 

employees or other persons enumerated in subsection (c), in the 

performance of duty[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(3). A police officer is one 

such person. Id. at (c)(1). Moreover, in “a prosecution for aggravated 

assault on a police officer the Commonwealth has no obligation to establish 

that the officer actually suffered a bodily injury; rather, the Commonwealth 

must establish only an attempt to inflict bodily injury, and this intent may be 

shown by circumstances which reasonably suggest that a defendant 

intended to cause injury.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 560 

(Pa. Super. 2011).

Instantly, both Officer Gault and Officer Rich testified that Appellant 

repeatedly struck them while they were trying to arrest Appellant and get 

him into the police car. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain 
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this conviction. See Brown, supra (holding that appellant attempted to 

cause bodily injury to police officer who was arresting him when he flailed 

his arms and struck the officer repeatedly).

With respect to both convictions, Appellant also challenges the weight 

of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. 

The decision of whether to grant a new trial on the basis of a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is necessarily committed 

to the sound discretion of the trial court due to the court’s 

observation of the witnesses and the evidence. A trial court 

should award a new trial on this ground only when the verdict is 

so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. A 

motion alleging the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence should not be granted where it merely identifies 

contradictory evidence presented by the Commonwealth and the 

defendant. Our review on appeal is limited to determining 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 

motion for a new trial on this ground.

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 396 (Pa. 2011) (citations 

omitted). “Not merely an error in judgment, an abuse of discretion occurs 

when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, 

as shown by the evidence on record.” Commonwealth v. Handfield, 34 

A.3d 187, 208 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cain, 29 

A.3d 3, 6 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

We do not have the benefit of an opinion from the trial court in this 

case; however, the trial court did offer its rationale for its verdict on the 

record. With respect to its verdict for aggravated assault, the trial court set 

forth the following.
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Two officers testified about this matter in a way that in the 

[trial court’s] view establishes aggravated assault. Remember, 

on a police officer aggravated assault is simple assault on a 

police officer who’s acting in accordance with his duties. It’s not 

the old aggravated assault which requires serious bodily injury. 

That still exists for non-police officers and other non-specified 

persons. So this was a chaotic situation. I want the 

Commonwealth’s witnesses and the Commonwealth’s attorney to 

listen to me. Because of the chaos that everybody agrees 

happened in this case in one form or another, the [trial court] 

has reasonable doubt as to the officers who did not testify. I’m 

not saying that it didn’t happen to them or did happen to them. 

I’m saying that because of the chaos involved in this, that an 

officer who says we were all in this free-for-all, I accept that’s 

what happened from his point of view, but that same officer 

can’t say and so Officer Jones who didn’t testify, unless he says I 

saw [Appellant] actually strike him in the face and cause him 

bodily injury, unless he says something that specific, I have a 

reasonable doubt as to those counts.

Accordingly, we heard from Officer Gault, and we heard 

from Officer ... Rich. But as to Officer Stitt and Officer Eastman, 

I did not hear from them specifically as to what their roles were 

in this, it causes me to have doubt. 

N.T., 4/1/2015, at 182-83.

Thus, the trial court found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault with 

respect to the two officers who testified and not guilty of aggravated assault 

with respect to the two officers who did not testify. Because this was a nonjury trial and because the trial court denied the post-sentence motion, the 

verdict clearly did not shock the trial court’s sense of justice. We discern no 

abuse of discretion in its conclusion.

With respect to Appellant’s resisting arrest conviction, the trial court 

offered the following.
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Now, the officers only need probable cause to make the 

arrest, even if it turns out that that is not what happened, the 

officers have probable cause at the time they decide there’s a 

reason to make an arrest. They hear a commotion in this house. 

I do not accept that they just picked this house out of the blue to 

start a problem with somebody who[] lived in that house. I 

don’t accept that. They’re looking for a bad guy involved with 

drugs. They’re on a stakeout in a sense waiting to see if he 

comes in their direction. They hear a problem, they hear voices. 

They probably hear, if there’s some consistency here, 

[Appellant] yelling there’s somebody trying to break in. They 

probably hear it. ... They probably hear Miss Rini-Wiggins 

screaming oh, my God, we’re going to die. They look in and see 

[Appellant] with his hands around her neck, not choking 

perhaps, but it looks like it. What in the heck is going on here. 

We got a domestic. What do they do, walk away? They’re not 

going to do that and they’re not allowed to do that. So they say 

there’s something going on, that’s not what we’re here for, but 

there’s something going on here. We have to act, we’re required 

to act. So they tried to do their jobs at that point. They had 

probable cause to pursue it and it’s their duty to pursue that if 

they think a man is beating up on a woman. Turns out that 

probably wasn’t what was happening. But it sure sounded like it 

and looked like it to them. So they did their duty. 

***

[Appellant] resisting. There’s no way they’re going to tase 

him and take ten to 15 minutes to beat the crap out of him as 

your witness said on the front porch if he’s unconscious during 

that time. They’re just not. It’s unreasonable for the [trial 

court] to conclude these officers are going to keep pounding on a 

guy who’s unconscious. It’s unreasonable. He was fighting, 

maybe he didn’t see they were police, maybe he did. Hard to 

say. But they were announcing, his own other witnesses saw 

them as police officers in uniform. So from the [trial court’s] 

point of view, I don’t find it credible that he doesn’t know he’s 

dealing with police. ... So [Appellant] resisted, in my view, a 

lawful arrest. He fought with two police offers who testified, he’s 

guilty of aggravated assault as to those two police officers and 

resisting arrest.

Id. at 184-86.
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Once again, because this was a non-jury trial and because the trial 

court denied the post-sentence motion, the verdict clearly did not shock the 

trial court’s sense of justice. We discern no abuse of discretion in its 

conclusion. Thus, there is no basis for this Court to conclude that the verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/9/2015