1 In The 

### Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ NO . 09 -22- 00245
- CV

__________________ IN THE INTEREST OF N.E.

__________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 279 th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. F-2 34 , 867

__________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her four

- year old son, N.E. 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of her parental rights would be in the best interest of the child

. 2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b) (1) (D), (E), (F), (K), (N), (O), (P), (2)

.

1 To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the children and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 2 The trial cou rt had previously terminated the parental rights of the unknown father of N.E.2 Mother’s appointe d attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T. , 161 S.W.3d 728, 730

- 31 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont 2005, no pet.) ( Anders procedures apply in parental

- rights termination cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The attorney represented to the Court that she gave Mother a copy of the Anders brief she filed, notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief, and provided Mother a copy of the appellate record. The Court notified Mother of her right to file a pro se response and of the deadline for doi ng so. Mother did not file a response with the
Court. We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by Mother’s court

- appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders , 386 U.S. at 744 ); Bledsoe v. S tate , 178 S.W.3d 824, 826

- 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C. , 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2009, no pet.). Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks m erit. See Bledsoe , 178 S.W.3d at 827

- 28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirem ents of Texas Rule of3 Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C. , 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re

- brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford
v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by Mother’s court

- appointed appellate attorney because the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights extends through the exhaustio n or waiver of all appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(2)(B); In re P.M. , 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). Accordingly, the obligation of Mother’s counsel to Mother has not been discharged. See In re P. M. , 520 S.W.3d at 27. Should Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, her counsel’s obligation can be me t “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27

- 28.
AFFIRMED.

_________________________ LEANNE JOHNSON Justice Submitted on December 2 8 , 2022 Opinion Delivered January 12, 2023 Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.