NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0793n.06 F iled: Novem ber 13, 2007 No. 06-5383 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT BRYAN C. JOLLEY,

P laintif f-App ellant, ON AP P EA L F RO M THE v. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN RO NNI E D . H ARV EL L, DI S TR IC T O F K EN TU CKY indiv idua llyand i n his offic ial capacity as an off

icer of the Calvert City, K entucky P olice De partm ent; CALVERT CITY, KENTUCK Y, De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ________________________________________/ BEF OR E: SUH RH EIN RI CH , G IBBO NS, and C OOK , C ir c uitJudg e s. SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Br y an C
. J olley

(“Jolley ”) a

ppeals fr om the order of the district c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt to Defe ndants Ronnie Har vell (“H arve ll”) and Calvert City , Kentucky in this § 1983 action based on an alleg edly illega l arre st. For the f

ollowing
rea sons, we AF F IRM
. I. Bac kgr ound At approximately

2:00 a.m. o n Oc t ober 6, 2002, D efe ndant Off icer Ronnie D. Har

vell, a police off icer of the Calver

t Cit y , Kentucky

Police Depa

rtment, saw a

1996 Honda stop at four -wa y sto p in tersect ion , f

or wh a t th e of

fi c e r c ha ra c te ri zed a s a “ pr olo ng e d s top ,” a

pp ro xima te ly

thi rt y
se c on ds . B e c a

us e it wa s dar

k o ut, Ha rv e ll c ou ld n ot s e e e ith e r a lic e ns e plate or

te mpo ra ry lic e ns eProcedur es for the HGN te st include holding an object such a s a fing er 12- 15 inches in fr ont 1 of the subjec t’s nose and ha ving him following it with his ey es. Pr oc e dure s f

or the on e -l e g sta

nd te st i nc lud e ini tiatin g the te st by g ivi ngve rb a l in str

uc tio ns , 2 acc o mp an ie d b y d e mo n s tr a ti o n s . F ir s t, th e o f f ic e r is to in s tr

u c t th e s u b je c t to s ta n d with his feet toge ther a nd arms down at the sides. The off icer should demonstrate. The office r should instruct the subject to, upon command, lift one leg approxim ately six inches from the g round, ar ms at his side, and while holding the position, count out loud for thirty seconds ( one thousand one , one thousand two, etc.)
. -2- ta g on the c ar. Af

te r f oll ow ingthe c ar f

or a pp ro xima te ly

1. 1 mi le s, Ha

rv e ll s ig na le d th e ve hic le to stop as it pulled into t he par king lot of a

Minit Mart. Jolle y , w ho wa s th e n n ine te e n y e ars old , wa s d ri vin g the Ho nd a . T wo oth e r youngme n in the ir la te te e ns we re in t

he ve hic le , T ra

vis Ko nr a d an d Alto n Cunn ing ham. Th e y we re a pp a re ntl y driving to the Minit Mart to purchase snacks. Upon stopping Jolley ’s ca r, Ha rvell ac tivated the in-c ar c amer a. Ha rvell then a

pproac hed the ve hic le and

a sk e d f or Jolle y ’s lic e ns e and

pr oo f o f i ns ur anc e, whi c h Joll e y pr ov ide d. Ha

rv e ll the n a sk e d Joll e y

to s te p o uts ide to t

he re ar o f t

he c ar a ft e r a lle g e dly sme lli ng mari jua na . Ha rv e ll
a lso a sk e d to se arc h th e a

uto mob ile . J oll e y ini tia lly c on se nte d but the n ch ang e d his mind . H a rv e ll then aske d J olley

to perfor m some field sobriety

tests, including the “ one-le g stand” and the “wa lkan d

- tu r n ” t e s t
. H ar

v e l l a l s o p e r f

o r m e d t h e H o r i z o n t a l G a z e N ys t a g m u s ( “ H GN ” ) t e s to nJ o l l e y. 1 Acc ording to Harve ll’s aff idavit, J olley

failed the one-le g stand test beca use, af ter instructing J olley to raise one leg off the g round and to c ount out loud to number 30, Jolley only counted to five befor e putting his foot down, and stating, “ I can’ t do it, I ’m too shaky .” Har vell stated that Jol ley

failed 2 the wa lk- and -t

ur n te st, be c a

us e he too k o nly thr e e ste ps , f a ili ngto f oll owHa rv e ll’ s in str

uc tio ns toProcedur es for the walk- and-turn te st include having the subject as sume the hee l-to-toe 3 stance , place his hands at his side, and then take nine hee l-to-toe steps down the line, tur n around, and then take nine hee l-to-toe steps bac k. The off icer demonstrates the test to the suspect, but takes only two or three steps, not the full nine. Ha rv e ll c ha rg e d Joll e y

wi th d ri vin g un de r t

he inf lue nc e of a dr ug , f ir st o ff e ns e , K y .Re v. Stat. 4 189A.101(5)( a). H arve ll did not c harg e J olley with e ither driving under the influence of alc ohol or dr ivi ng un de r t

he inf lue nc e of a c omb inatio n o f a lc oh ol a

nd a dr ug . O n th e un if

or m c itatio n, Ha

rv e ll lined out “alcohol” and cir cled “ drug .” -3- t a k e a f u l l n i n e s t e p s . H ar

v e l l n o t e d t h a t J o l l e y p a s s e d t h e H GN , w h i c h t e s t s f o r a l c o h o l u s e o n l y, 3 but a dded that he did not consider this test in his deter mination of probable c ause be cause he thoug ht J olley was unde r the influenc e of ma rijuana. After these tests, Har

vell decide d to arr est J olley for Driving Under the I nfluenc e (“ DUI ”) beca use he thoug ht J olley

was unde r the influenc e of ma rijuana. The “Uniform Citation” repor ted 4 that Har vell stopped the vehic le due to a pr olonge d stop at the corne r of Fifth and Park stree ts and that he could not see the tempora ry license ta g . Finally , Har vell re p o rt ed that he smelled burne d marijuana as he a pproac hed the ve hicle, and that J olley failed the one- leg stand and wa lk-and-tur n te sts
. J olley

and his frie nds denied that they had sm oked marijuana. Urine and blood tests found no alcohol or dr

ug s in J olley ’s sy stem. A vehicle sear ch re veale d no marijuana
. Th re e da y s a ft e r his arr e st, the loc a l ne ws pa pe r i n Ca lve rt

City , T he L a ke Ne ws , r an a fr on tpag e story

repor ting the de tails of J olley ’s ar rest. On Ma

rch 12, 2003, the DUI

char g e wa s dismis sed on the Commonwealth’s motion. On Marc h 26, 2003, at J olley ’s re quest, The L ake N ews ra n a follow-up ar

ticle re porting the drugtest results and that the DU Ichar g es had be en dismissed. A na d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e ar i n g r e g ar d i n g t h e i n c i d e n t w a s c o n d u c t e d o n N o v e mb e r 2 6 , 2 0 0 2
. In
an e xec uti ve or de r i ssu e d o n Marc h 11 , 20 03 , th e may or of Ca lve rt City fo un d “ tha

t th e so br ie ty

te sts-4-

we re po or ly

a dmi nis te re d b y Of

fi c e r Ha rv e ll, ” and

re c omm e nd e d to the c hie f o f p oli c e that H a rv e ll and other office rs re ceive training on how t o administer field sobriety tests, “in order

to avoid such situations in t he future .” The may or also found that Har vell’s decision to allow passeng er K onrad to dr ive J olley ’s car from the scene repr esente d poor judgme nt. Har vell subsequently attended suc h a tra ining c ourse. Jolle y br ou ght su it und e r 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 83 on Oc tob e r 3 , 2 00 3 a g a ins t H arv e ll, in h is ind ivi du a l and

of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s, and

Ca lve rt City , a lle g ing the y vio la te d his F ourt h and F ourt e e nth Amendment rig hts. He also broug ht sever al pende nt state claims, including malicious prosec ution, defa mation, as well as ne g lige nt supervision ag ainst Calvert City
. On Janu ary 21 , 2 00 5, the dis tr ic t court g ra nte d De fe nd ants ’ mot ion fo r s umm ary jud g me nt, concludingas a matter of law that Har vell had probable cause to arre st J olley and ther efor e no constitutional viol ation could be pr oven. Specif ically , the district court found that J olley failed two of the three sobriety tests administered by Har vell, namely

the one- leg -stand and the walk-a nd-turn,
and pa sse d o nly

the HG N t e st. Th e c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t th e “ tot a lity of the c ir c ums tance s” supporte d th e p r o b a

b le c a u s e d e te r mi n a ti o n g iv e n Jo ll e y ’ s f a il u r e o f tw o f

ie ld s o b r ie ty te sts plus Har vell’s observa

tions of the odor of marijuana and Jol ley ’s bloodshot ey es. The c ourt stated that the dispute over the marijuana odor did not matter bec ause the videotape c onfirmed Ha rvell’s re port that J olley

failed the two tests. Alternatively , the district court he ld that “[e]ven if the question of probable cause wer e a c loser one, the re is no question that the probable cause deter mination made by Ha rv e ll w ou ld b e we ll w ith in t he ra ng e of dis c re tio n th a t w ou ld a llo w h im q ual if ie d im mun ity from suit for that de termination.”-5-

On J anuar

y 31, 2005, J olley filed a motion to vacate. The district c ourt denied the motion
on Fe bruar

y 8, 2006, but a ltered its re asoning
. The court acknow ledg ed that a g enuine issue of fac t exis ted as to whether Har

vell smelled marijuana when he approa ched Jolley ’s ca r, and a lso decided, afte r re- viewing the videotape, that J olley did not fail the walk-a nd-turn test. Nonethele ss, the district
c ourt a g a in fo un d as a ma tte r of law that pro ba ble c a us e e xiste d f

or Ha rv e ll t o a rr e st Jol le y

be c a us e J olley “unequivoc ally

failed t h e one- leg stand test. Offic er H arve ll’s training indicated that if a n individual failed to complete the one-le g s t an d t es t , there was a 65% likelihood that he wa s intox icated. T his fac t alone is sufficient to allow a re asonable police off icer to determine that it was likely that Mr. J olley

had violated KRS 189A.010.” The court a dded that “[i]n hi ndsight, it appear s that th is b e lie f w a s mi sta ke n in lig ht o f t he ne g a tiv e re su lts of

Mr . Joll e y ’s blo od

and ur ine te sts
. Ho we ve r, it i s n ot i n h ind sig ht t hat the Court mus t eva luate Of fi c e r Ha rv e ll’ s dec isi on ; ra the r i t is on the basis of the fac ts know n to him at the time of the ar rest.” T he cour

t noted that “it is also not rele vant to the proba

ble ca use dete rmination” that no marijuana was late r found in the ve hicle. Jolle y pr e se nts thr e e argume nts on a pp e a l. F ir st, he c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in concludingthat Har

vell had proba

ble ca use to arr est him f

or driving under the influenc e. Second, and third, he argues that the district court e rre d in dismi ssing his cla im for malicious prosec ution and defa mation, respec tively
. II. Ana lys is This Court reviews a

district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt de novo. Hartsel v. Key s , 87 F.3d 795, 799 ( 6th Cir. 1996). Summ ary judgme nt is appropriate if there is no ge nuine issue as to a ny ma te ri a l f

a c t and the mov ingpa

rt y is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a ma tte r o f l aw. F e d. R. C iv. P. 56(c)
.-6-

A district court’s finding of probable cause is r eviewe d de novo. Da rra h v . Ci ty of O ak Pa rk, 255 F.3d 301, 312 ( 6th Cir. 2001).

A. To prove a

claim under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must establish: (1) that he was deprive d of a r ight se cure d by the Constitut ion or laws of the United States, (2) by a per son acting under c olor of state la

w. Boyk in v. Van Buren Twp. , 479 F.3d 444, 451 ( 6th Cir. 2007). Arre st without probable cause violates the F ourth Amendment. Se e Be c k v . O hio , 3 79 U. S. 89 , 9 0 ( 19 64 ); Klein v. Long , 275 F.3d 544, 550 ( 6th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has define d “proba ble ca use” a s the “fa cts and c ircumstance s within the office r' s knowledg e that ar e suff icient to warr ant a pr

udent per son, or one of re asonable caution, in believing , in the circ umstances shown, that the suspect ha s committed, is co m m i tting, or is about to commit an off ense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo , 4 4 3 U
. S
. 3 1 , 3 7 ( 1 9 7 9 )
. P r o b a b l e c a u s e r e qu i r e s o n l y t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y, not some ty

pe of “ prima fa cie” showing
. See I llinois v. Gates , 4 62 U. S. 2 13 , 2 35 (1 98 3) ; se e als o Criss v. C ity of Kent , 867 F.2d 259, 262 ( 6th Cir. 1988) (same) . “[P] robable cause deter minations involve an examination of all fac ts a nd circ umstances within an office r’s knowle dg e at the time of
an ar rest.” Esta te of

Di e tri c h v . B urro ws , 1 6 7 F. 3 d 1 0 0 7 , 1 0 1 2 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). Jolle y argue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in c on c lud ingthat H arv e ll h a d p rob a ble c a us e to
arr est Har vell for DU Ibeca

use (1) he did not fail the one -legstand field sobriety test, and that eve n if he did, (2) that fac t alone did not establish probable cause to arre st him for driving unde r the-7-

inf lue nc e of mari

jua na , n or did it ( 3) su pp or t a fi nd ingof

pr ob a ble c a us e to a rr e st u nd e r t he tot a lity of the c ircumstance s.

1. The “ DUI /Standardized Field Sobriety Testing Course Ba sic Tra ining” manual used dur ing the per iod Harve ll underwe nt his initial police officer training provides four behavior s that “ar e the most likely to be observe d in someone with a B AC [bl ood alcohol conte nt] above 0.10:” (1) swa y ing while balanc ing, ( 2) using one’s a rms for ba lance , (3) hopping , and (4) putting a fo o t down. One point is assigned f

or ea ch of the four be haviors, and the subject re ceive s four points if he c annot pe rf or m th e te st o r p uts his fo ot d ow n thre e or mor e tim e s. I f the su

bje c t r e c e ive s tw o o r m or e po int s out of a possible four , the subject is consider ed intox icated. J olley acknow ledg es that he c orre ctly rec eived one point beca

use he put his foot down after counting to the number five and stated that he could not complete the test due to being cold. J olley
asser ts that the office r there afte r fa iled to c orre ctly administer the rest of the test beca use he f ailed to “g ive instructions to pick the foot up ag ain and continue counting ” per the manual. Thus, J olley maintains that he should not have be en aw arde d an additional point. We rejec t this ar g ument. J olley does not dispute that he was able to ma intain his ba lance for only five sec onds befor e telling Har vell “I can’ t do it.” The instruction ma nual specific ally

states th a t t h e te s t i f f a il e d w h e nth e s u s p e c t ( 1 ) p u ts h is f o o t d o w nthr e e o r

mo r e ti me s , o r

( 2 ) c a nnot pe rf or m th e te st. Gi ve n Joll e y ’s state me nt, Ha rv e ll m a de a

re a so na ble jud g me nt ca ll in the fi e ld i n concludingthat there was a probability

that J olley

had committed a c rime.-8-

J olley contends that he did not fail t he one- leg -stand fie ld sobriety test beca use he w as too cold and shaky . Howeve r, Ha rvell in his affida v i t stated that he w as not instructed to provide the subject allowa

nces f or beingnervous or

cold. I n any

event, on the ni g ht in question, the temperature
was a pproxi mately

fifty deg ree s–hardly a cold night. I n short, J olley failed the one-le g stand due t o h i s ad m i t t edi n ab i l i t y t o p er fo rm t h e t es t
. An d co u p l ed wi t h t h e fa ct t h at J o l l ey s at at a s t o p s i gn
a t 2: 23 a .m. fo r a

n in or din a te a mou

nt o f t ime (t

hir ty se c on ds ), Ha

rv e ll c le arl y

ha d p ro ba

ble c a us e to
arr est J olley
. 2. Ne xt, Jolle y

c on te nd s th a t, a ssumin g he fa ile d the on e -l e g sta nd te st, Ha

rv e ll d id n ot a

rr e st him for driving under the combined influenc e of a lcohol and marijuana, but rathe r for driving unde r the inf lue nc e of mari jua na . Joll e y

c on te nd s that thi s c ou ld no t su pp or t a fi nd ingof

pr ob a ble c a us e for dr iving unde r the influenc e of alcohol beca use the manual actua lly states if an individual shows two or more c lues or fails to c omplete the one-le g stand test, about 65% of suc h subjects have a B AC above 0.10. Thus, J olley contends that the di strict court’s statement that there was a 65% likelihood tha t J ol ley was in to x ica ted du e to mar ij uan a was wro ng becau se t he fo regoi ng perc ent age was me re ly a pre diction of BA C and offe red no pr ediction of impairment due to marijuana use
. Al tho ug h th e pe rt ine nt pr ov isi on do e s no t pr ov ide g uid anc e a s to m ari jua na , it c ann ot be sa id that there is insuff

icient evidenc e to suppor

t a deter mination of probable c ause that J olley committed
a cr ime. See U

nited States v. Jone

s , 6 41 F .2 d 4 25 , 4 29 (6 th C ir . 1 98 1) (s ta tin g that pr ob a ble c a us e does not require “proof bey ond a reasonable doubt,” but simply evidenc e to establish that it is “more likely than not” that a c rime has be en commit ted). A prudent person, or one of r easona ble ca ution, making a judg ment call in the field, could have rea sonably conclude d that J olley was impaire d by-9-

some intox icant to such a deg ree that he wa s incapa ble of saf ely operatin g a m o t o r v eh i cle. A
rea sonable off

icer could have interpre ted a f ailure of the one- leg stand to i ndicate some form of impairment–whethe r marijuana or alc ohol–such that J olley could not safe ly drive a car . The leng thy de lay a t th e int e rs e c tio n, a t 2: 00 a .m. , f ur the r b utt re sse s o ur c on c lus ion

that H arv e ll’ s d e c isi on

to
arr est J olley

was supporte d by

probable cause at the time Har vell made the de cision to arre st. 3. J olley also ob j ec t s to the district court’s conc lusion that the totalit y of the c ircumstance s supported Jol ley ’s ar

rest. In his brief on appea l, J olley notes the undisputed fa cts both supporting and not supporting probable cause . Be fore the traf fic stop, J olley

stopped at a t ra ff

i c s t op for approximately

thirty seconds; on the f

lip side, J olley

proper ly stopped his automobile, made a pr oper tur n, dr ov e wi thi n th e sp e e d l im it and pr op e rl y sto pp e d th e ve hic le in t

he Min it M art

pa rk inglot
. After the traf fic stop until the time of the arr est, J olley alleg edly failed to c omplete the one- leg stand test and admittedly stated he c ould not do it. On the other hand, he had no diffic ulty in providing his driver’s lice nse, proof of insuranc e ca

rd and stepping out of the ve hicle. Also, he e x plained that his de lay at the stop w as to de frost his w indows, and he denied marijuana use. Fur ther, th e v i deo
re fl e c ts that Jolle y ’s sp e e c h w a s dis tin c t and no t sl ur re d, that hi s th ink ingand

re a so nin g we re int a c t, and that his g ait was normal. I n addition, he was w ear ing only a short-slee ved shirt, and e x plained that h e co u l d not do the one-le g -stand bec ause he was c old and shivering . Finally , the video demonstrates that he passed the walk-a nd-turn tests. Thus, J olley

contends that a

rea sonable a

nd prudent off

icer , competent a

nd proper ly

trained in DUI detec tion, would not have found proba ble ca use to arr est fo r a D UI

violation involvi ng marijuana based upon only

“a young man’s unhesitating ex planation for the 30-second s top at the-10-

intersec tion of defr osting window; ‘kind of bloodshot’ ey es, whe n y oung men had be en smoking cig are ttes in a c ar a t 2 :2 3 in th e mo r n in g ; an d f

a il u r e to c o mp le te th e o n e - le g - s ta n d te s t . . . [although] wear ing only

a short-slee ved shirt in cool weather, putting his foot down and explaining that he could not perform the test beca use of being cold and shivering .” Appellant’s Br . At 25-26. J olley further claims that Har

vell was incompe tent, as re flec ted by the fact that: (1) Harve ll failed Jolle y on the wa lk- and -t

ur n te st b a se d o n o nly

on e c lue of inc or

re c t numbe r of

ste ps , w he n at le a st two clues we re re q u i red; and (2) he allowed Konr ad to drive Jolley ’s automobile awa y from the
sc e ne wi tho ut f

ir st c he c kin g Ko nr a d’ s d

ri ve r’ s lic e ns e and a dmi nis te ri ngfi e ld s ob ri e ty te sts to h im. This argument must be rejec ted. As noted a bove, the issue is whe ther , u n d er an objec tive standard, the re was probable cause to justi fy J olley ’s ar

rest at the time of

the ar rest. Althoug h there
are c e rt a inl y

fa c ts that mi lit a te a g a ins t a fi nd ing of pro bab le ca

us e , th e re are su ff

ic ie nt f a c ts t o
su pp or t th e arr e st. We w ou ld b e ha rd -p re sse d to c on c lud e that no re a so na bly pr ud e nt o ff ic e r w ou ld have ma de the same dec ision, especially when ba lance d ag ainst the potential conseque n ces of an incorre ct call had J olley ultimately proven to be impaired. See P ierson v. Ray , 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) ( stating that “[a] pol iceman’ s lot is not so unhappy that he must choose be tween be ing char g ed with dereliction of dut y if he does not a rre st when he ha s probable c ause, a nd being mulcted in d a ma g e s if

he do e s” ). A d

ru nk dr ive r i s a se ve re thr e a t to the sa fe ty of oth e rs . Joll e y ’s ult imate innocenc e is irr el ev ant. See id. (h old ingthat a po lic e of fi c e r w ho arr e sts so me on e wi th p ro ba ble
c a us e is n ot later liab le fo r f a lse arr e st b e c a

us e the su

bje c t w a s p ro ve d inno c e nt) ; cf. Bake r v. McCollan , 4 43 U. S. 1 37 , 14 5 (1 97 9) (“ Th e Con sti tut ion do e s n ot gua

ra nte e that on ly

the g uil ty wi ll be ar rested.” ). 4.-11-

De fe nd ants argue that eve n if the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de te rm ini ngthat H arv e ll h a d p ro ba ble
c a us e to a rr e st Jol le y , it

pr op e rl y de te rm ine d th a t H arv e ll w a s e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d im mun ity . St a te actor s are entitled to qua lified immunit y unless their conduc t violated “cle arly established statutory or constit utional rig hts of which a reasonable person would have known.” Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qua lifie d i m m u nity protec ts “all but the plainly incompetent or those w ho knowing ly

violate the law.” Malley v . Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). I f “it would be c lear to a
rea sonable off

icer that h i s conduct was unlawful in the situation he c onfronted,” then qualified im m u n i t y i s i napplicable
. Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Howe ver, if “ office rs of
rea sonable c ompetence could disag ree on th[ e] issue, imm unity should be recog nized.” Malley , 475 U.S. at 341. As the district court obse rved, H arve ll’s conduct is well wit hin this rang e. Althoug h he may have made some mistakes, for the rea sons just discussed, he proper ly found probable cause . T he district court did not err

in affir ming on this alterna

tive basis. B. J olley also argues that the district cour t e rre d in dismissing malicious prosec ution c laim. He po int s o ut t

hat he ple a de d se pa

rate c a us e s of a c tio n f

or ma lic iou s p ro se c uti on

un de r b oth

the F ourt h and F ourtee nth Amendments to the United States Constit ution a nd under Kentucky law as a pende nt state cla im. A malicious prosec ution claim is not available under the Four teent h Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver , 51 0 U. S. 26 6, 26 8 (1 99 4) (p lur a lity op ini on ). Al tho ug h th e re is s ome dis pu te in this Ci rcuit whe ther a

malicious prosec ution claim is valid under the F ourth Amendment, see Mc Kin le yv . Ci ty of M an sfi e ld , 404 F.3d 418, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing case s), cert. de nied ,-12-

12 6 S. Ct. 10 26 (2 00 6) ; Ho lz v . Ci ty of S te rli ng He igh ts , 465 F. Supp. 2d 758, 769-70 (E.D . Mich. No v. 21 , 2 00 6) (s a me ); bu t se e Gr e go ry v . Ci ty of L ou isv ill e , 444 F.3d 725, 747-51 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. de nied , 1 27 S. Ct . 9 62 (2 00 7) , it do e s n ot m a tte r h e re be c a us e “ it n on e the le ss r e ma ins fi rm ly established that whe re the re is proba ble ca use to prosec ute, a § 1983 action for malicious prosec ution
w il l n o t lie.” Mc K

i nley , 4 04 F .3 d at 44 4- 45 (a nd c a se s c ite d th e re in) . Want o r l a c k o f p ro ba ble
cause is also a re quired e lement of a malicious prosec ution claim under Kentucky law. See R aine
v . D ra sin , 621 S.W .2d 895, 899 (Ky . 1981) (se tting for th elements). Joll ey ’s ar

rest for driving under the influenc e of ma

rijuana w as supported by probable cause . Thus, the implementation of cr iminal char g es ag ainst him cannot be see n as an unr easona ble prosec utorial ac tion. C. L astly , J olley

argues that the lowe r cour t e rre d in dismi ssing his cla im for def amation. J olley
c la ims that H arv e ll’ s a c tio ns c on sti tut e d de fa ma tio n whe n he re po rt e d to 911 that fie ld s ob ri e ty te sts
wer e administere d to Jolley afte r the smell of burned marijuana was detec ted, that J olley was a rre sted for DU Iafte r fa iling such te sts, and t h at J olley was then lodg ed in the He rman F ord De tention Ce nte r. Spe c if

ic a lly , Joll e y

a sse rt s th a t e ve n if

Ha rv e ll w ou ld o the rw ise be e nti tle d to abs olute immunit y for the de famatory

statements about Jol ley contained in t h e new spaper article , no pr ote c tio n e xists he re be c a us e De fe nd ants fa ile d to ple a d a ny fa c ts s up po rt ingan a ff

ir ma tiv e de fe ns e of absolute immunity

in their answe r. O nt h e c o n t r ar

y, D e f e n d an t s p l e d

t h e d e f e n s e i nt h e i r

an s w e r . ( J
. A
. 4 6

- 5 0
. ) A d d i t i o n a l l y, the Har vell’s statem en t s repor

ted that J olley

had bee n arrested

on such cha

rg es, which w as true. There fore no action for defa matory action should lie. See Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay , 627 S.W .2d 270, 273 (Ky . Ct. App. 1981) (listing elements of off ense to include defa

matory lang uag e);-13-

se e als o Bell v. Courier-J ournal & Louisvill e Times Co. , 402 S.W .2d 84, 8 7 (K y . Ct. App. 1966) (h old ing that tr

uth is a c omp le te de fe ns e to an a c tio n fo r l ibe l) ; see also Pe arce v . Courier Journal & Louisvill e Times C o. , 683 S.W .2d 633, 635 (Ky . Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the common law privileg e of newspa

pers to print fa ir and a ccur ate a ccounts of judicia l proce eding s “is not lost i f the
n ew s p ap er

fa i l s t o p ri n tt h e e x ac tfa ct s s o l o n g as wh at i t d o es p ri n ti s s u b s t an t i al l y

t ru e; ” c i t i n g Be ll). III. Conclusion F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRMED.-14-

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Concurring. Iconcur in the conclusion that Ha

rvell is entitled to qua li f i e d i m m u n i t y

b u td i s a g r e e t h a tp r o b a

b l e c a u s e e xi s t e d

f o r Jo l l e y ’ s ar

r e s t
. W h i l e i tis doubtless corre ct that there ordinarily would be proba

ble ca use to arr est an individual whose e y es
are bloodshot and who pauses long er tha n might be expected at a stop sig n and fails to c omplete a one-le g -stand test, I

am convince d, afte r re viewing the tape of this a rre st, that no rea sonable off icer could have believed that Jolley was under the influence of marijuana or alcohol. J olley ’s demea nor
and sp e e c h dur ing his rathe r pr otr a c te d exch ang e wi th Ha rv e ll ar e so str on g ly su g g e sti ve of so br ie ty as to exclu d e a re asonable conclusion that J olley was unde r the influenc e of a n intox icant. I

see nothing in the r ecor d, howeve r, that would depr ive Har vell of qualified immunit y for his mist aken and unre asonable conclusion that probable cause exis ted. Har vell’s mistakes do not rise to the leve l of in c o mp e te n c e r e qu ir e d to s tr ip h im o f th e p r o te c ti o n o f qu a li f ie d im mu n it y , an d th e re is no indication in this rec ord t hat he knowing ly violated the law. See Hunter v. Bry ant , 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) ( per curiam ) ( “ Th e qu a lif

ie d im mun ity

sta nd ard ‘g ive s ampl e ro om f

or mis take n ju dg me nts ’ by protec ting ‘ all but the plainly incompetent or those w ho knowing ly violate the law.’ ”). As to Jol le y ’s oth e r c la ims , I a g re e wi th the ma jor ity ’s re so lut ion

of the de fa ma tio n c la im. I ts disposi tion of the m alicious prosec ution claim i s corr ect a s well, under its dete rmination that there was proba

ble ca use for J olley ’s arr est. Whil e I

disag ree about the proba

ble ca use dete rmination and would aff irm the dismissal of the malicious prosecution cla im for re asons other tha n those cited by the m aj o ri t y , a leng thy

discussion of the other issues r elating to this claim in a separate opinion would serve no useful purpose
. For these re asons, I

concur in the result only
.