NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 13

- 3 0 61

___________ DAPHNE R. CHANDLER ,

Appellant

v. UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2

- 1 2

- cv - 05127 ) District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

May 19, 2014 Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT , Circuit Judges

( F iled: May 20, 2014 )

___________ OPINION

___________ PER CURIAM Daphne R. Chandler appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing her amended civil rights complaint

. We will affirm.2 I

. In 201 2 , Daphne R. Cha ndler filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Eas tern District of Pennsylvania, which she later amended. 1 In the complaint as amended, Chandler claimed that the University of Pennsylvania (“the University”) engaged in discrimi natory hiring practices in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In particular, she asserted that (1) she applied for a post

- doctoral fellowship within the University’s Positive Psychology Center (“the Center”) ; (2) her application and supporting materials demon strated that she was qualified for the position; (3) she had been informed by an unidentified University staff member that she possessed “strong qualifications”; (4) she was the s ole African

- American candidate; and (5) the University’s Affirmative Action a nd Equal Opportunity Programs Office informed her
that “one of the finalists [for the position] was a ‘Caucasian’ male, and that the other finalist may or may not have been a female whose race may or may not have been Caucasian.” The University filed a mo tion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Chandler failed to present a prima facie case of race discrimina tion. The University asserted that Chandler’s application materials did not demonstrate her exp erience with “large

- scale data sets,” as required by the job description. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice ,

1 The District Court dismissed her initial complaint without prejudice upon the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.3

finding that Chandler’s application materials did not demonstrate that she was qualified for the positio n. Chandler timely appealed from the District Court’s order

. II. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and review de novo the District Court’s dismissal of Chandler’s claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Dique v. N.J. State Police , 603 F.3d 181, 185, 188 (3d Cir. 2010). “We will affirm a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we determine that t he plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution , L.L.C. , 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may affirm the District Court on any grounds supported by the record. See Nicini v. Morra , 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000)

. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
III. Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are generally evaluated acco rding to the burden

- shifting framework articulated in McDon nel l Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)

. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. , 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999)

. Under th e McDonne l l Douglas framework, Cha n d ler bore the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of a § 1981 violation b y showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for the position; (3) she was not hired for that position ; and (4 ) the University failed to hire her under circumstances giving rise to “an4

inference of unlawful discrimination s uch as might occur when the position is filled by a person not of the protected class.” See id. at 410

- 11. 2 We agree with the District Court that Chandler failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of § 1981

. The job descript ion published by the University asked for candidates to submit a curriculum vitae (“CV”) , two

- page statement of interest, and at least three references, and it specified that experience with “large

- scale data sets using advanced statistics” was required. Although Chandler conceded that “her experience with ‘large

- scale data using advanced statistics’ is not readily apparent from the CV,” she asserted that the publications she submitted as supplements to her application adequately demonstrated her skills

. Chandler further argued that she had spoken with a University staff member who told her that she had not been hired for the position “despite [her] strong qualifications.” She also detailed a meeting she had with the University’s Affirmative Action and Eq ual Opportunity Programs Office, during which she was informed that she was the only African

- Americ an candidate for the fellowship , that the Center had made the hiring decision based on a review of all candidates’ CV’s and statement s of interest , that the Center determined that Chandler did not possess the requ isite qualifications for the fellowship, and that the “candidate

2 If she had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination , the burden would then have sh ifted to the University to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for her termination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)

. Chandler would then have had an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason for her termination offered by the defendants was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of5

selections were made without regard to race or ethnicity.” B ecause neither her CV nor her statement of interest demonstrated that she possessed the requisite experience with “large

- scale data sets, ” Chandler did not establish that she was actually qualified for the position

. W e will therefore affirm the District Court ’s order dismissing Chandler’s amended complaint with prejudice

.

Phila. , 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).