[Cite as Morris v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-612.]

{¶1} Plaintiff Kristoffer Morris has filed objections to a magistrate’s decision 

recommending judgment in favor of Defendant Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction (DRC). Without leave of court, DRC has filed a memorandum in opposition. 

I. Background 

{¶2} On March 20, 2018, Morris sued DRC, alleging that, on or about December 

10, 2017, he was assaulted by an inmate (Inmate Torrez) who was housed in the 

general population at Toledo Correctional Institution and that DRC’s negligence that 

allowed Inmate Torrez to be in the presence of Morris (an inmate in protective control) 

proximately resulted in personal injury to Morris. The case proceeded to trial before a 

magistrate. 

{¶3} On October 24, 2019, the magistrate issued a decision wherein he 

recommended judgment in favor of DRC. On Morris’s motion, the court granted an 

extension for Morris to file objections to the magistrate’s decision. On December 20, 

2019, Morris filed written objections to the magistrate’s decision with an affidavit of 

evidence. Morris presents seven objections: 

1) “The Magistrate erred when he failed to rule the Plaintiff’s status as a 

protective control inmate constitutes notice of danger of assault by general 

population inmates;” 

KRISTOFFER MORRIS 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION 

AND CORRECTION 

 Defendant

Case No. 2018-00492JD 

Judge Patrick M. McGrath 

Magistrate Gary Peterson 

DECISION
Case No. 2018-00492JD -2- DECISION 

2) “The Magistrate erred in failing to find due to the conduct of the correctional 

officers in TPU, in failing to follow accepted security practices based on 

administrative rules, policies, and general block orders, that the Defendant 

was negligent. Defendant’s Exhibit 3;” 

3) “The Magistrate erred in finding Morris not to be credible;”

4) “The Magistrate erred when he failed to find that the Defendant was negligent 

in failing to observe the obvious presence of a general population inmate 

standing in an open gate to the Jpay kiosk room, which three officers failed to 

observe, giving Torrez clear access to the Plaintiff;” 

5) “The Magistrate erred in attributing the assault to a dispute between Plaintiff 

and Inmate Torrez, when in fact there were no threats pending and the 

assault would not have occurred without the total disregard of the Defendant’s 

correctional officers in failing to enforce protective custody orders, as well as 

other rules of the institution;” 

6) “The Magistrate’s findings in regard to the security video, Defendant’s 

Exhibit B, are not justified by an examination of the video; and” 

7) “The Magistrate’s decision is contrary to law and against the weight of the 

evidence.” 

{¶4} On ODRC’s motion, the court denied ODRC’s request for leave to file a 

memorandum in opposition to Morris’s objections. However, on January 21, 2020, 

without leave ODRC filed a “Memorandum Contra To Plaintiff’s Objections To The 

Decision Of The Magistrate.” That same day—January 21, 2020—ODRC filed a copy 

of a transcript of the trial, which DRC has represented is a transcript from the first day of 

trial.1 Because ODRC filed its memorandum in opposition without leave (and thereby 

contravened this court’s order), the court determines that ODRC’s “Memorandum 

 1(Notice of Filing of Trial Transcript filed on January 21, 2020.) For the purpose of adjudicating 

Morris’s objections, besides considering Morris’s affidavit of evidence, the record, and admitted trial 

exhibits, the court has reviewed the transcript filed by DRC. 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -3- DECISION 

Contra To Plaintiff’s Objections To The Decision Of The Magistrate” of January 21, 

2020, should be stricken. 

II. Law and Analysis 

A. A trial court is required to conduct a de novo review of a magistrate’s 

decision. 

{¶5} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b) governs objections to a magistrate’s decision. 

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) provides: “A party may file written objections to a magistrate’s 

decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the court has 

adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by 

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections, any other party may also file 

objections not later than ten days after the first objections are filed. If a party makes a 

timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, the time for filing objections 

begins to run when the magistrate files a decision that includes findings of fact and 

conclusions of law.” An objection to a magistrate’s decision “shall be specific and state 

with particularity all grounds for objection.” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii). 

{¶6} If objections are filed to a magistrate’s decision, this court is required to rule 

on the objections. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). In ruling on objections, the court is required to 

“undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the 

magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the 

law.” Accord Mayle v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP541, 2010-Ohio-2774, ¶ 15 (trial court’s standard of review of a magistrate’s decision is 

de novo). A magistrate’s decision “is not effective unless adopted by the court.” 

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(a). Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(b), whether or not objections are timely 

filed, a court “may adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision in whole or in part, with or 

without modification. A court may hear a previously-referred matter, take additional 

evidence, or return a matter to a magistrate.” 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -4- DECISION 

B. ODRC is not liable for the intentional attack of one inmate by another, 

unless ODRC has adequate notice of an impending assault. 

{¶7} In Literal v. Dept. of Rehab. & Correction, 2016-Ohio-8536, 79 N.E.3d 1267 

(10th Dist.), ¶ 15-16, the Tenth District Court of Appeals set forth the law that applies in 

cases of an intentional attack of one inmate by another inmate, stating: 

To prevail on a negligence claim, [a plaintiff] must establish that 

(1) DRC owed him a duty, (2) DRC breached that duty, and (3) DRC’s 

breach proximately caused his injuries. Briscoe v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 

10th Dist. No. 02AP-1109, 2003-Ohio-3533, ¶ 20, citing Macklin v. Dept. of 

Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 01AP-293, 2002-Ohio-5069. “In the context 

of a custodial relationship between the state and its inmates, the state 

owes a common-law duty of reasonable care and protection from 

unreasonable risks of physical harm.” McElfresh v. Dept. of Rehab. & 

Corr., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-177, 2004-Ohio-5545, ¶ 16, citing Woods v. 

Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 130 Ohio App. 3d 742, 744-45, 721 N.E.2d 143 

(10th Dist.1998). “Reasonable care is that degree of caution and foresight 

an ordinarily prudent person would employ in similar circumstances.” 

McElfresh at ¶ 16. The state’s duty of reasonable care does not render it 

an insurer of inmate safety. Williams v. S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 67 Ohio 

App.3d 517, 526, 587 N.E.2d 870 (10th Dist.1990), citing Clemets v. 

Heston, 20 Ohio App.3d 132, 20 Ohio B. 166, 485 N.E.2d 287 (6th 

Dist.1985). “However, ‘once [the state] becomes aware of a dangerous 

condition[,] it must take reasonable care to prevent injury to the inmate.’” 

Watson v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-606, 2012-Ohio1017, ¶ 8, quoting Briscoe at ¶ 20, citing Williams v. Dept. of Rehab. & 

Corr., 61 Ohio Misc. 2d 699, 583 N.E.2d 1129 (1991). 

The law of this district with regard to DRC liability for an assault by 

one inmate on another has been established in a number of decisions of 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -5- DECISION 

this court including Baker v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 28 Ohio App. 3d 99, 

28 Ohio B. 142, 502 N.E.2d 261 (10th Dist.1986); Watson; and Allen v. 

Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP-619, 2015-Ohio-383. * * * In 

Watson, this court reiterated the legal standard applicable to such claims 

as follows: 

The law is well-settled in Ohio that ODRC is not liable 

for the intentional attack of one inmate by another, unless 

ODRC has adequate notice of an impending assault. 

Mitchell v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 107 Ohio App. 3d 

231, 235, 668 N.E.2d 538 (10th Dist.1995), citing Baker v. 

State, Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 28 Ohio App. 3d 99, 28 Ohio 

B. 142, 502 N.E.2d 261 (10th Dist.1986). Notice may be 

actual or constructive, the distinction being the manner in 

which the notice is obtained rather than the amount of 

information obtained. Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & 

Corr., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1052, 2010-Ohio-4736, ¶ 14. 

Actual notice exists where the information was personally 

communicated to or received by the party. Id. “Constructive 

notice is that notice which the law regards as sufficient to 

give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice.”

Id., citing In Re Estate of Fahle, 90 Ohio App. 195, 197, 105 

N.E.2d 429 (6th Dist.1950). 

Id. at ¶ 9. See also Allen at ¶ 18. 

{¶8} Thus, applying the law as set forth in Literal, in this instance DRC is not 

liable for Torrez’s intentional attack of Morris, unless DRC had adequate notice of an 

impending assault. 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -6- DECISION 

1. First-Objection Issue: Whether the magistrate erred by failing to rule 

that Morris’s status as a protective control inmate constitutes notice of 

danger of assault by general population inmates. 

{¶9} According to the affidavit of evidence submitted by Morris’s counsel, at trial 

Morris admitted on cross-examination that, although certain corrections officers were 

present, he “did not tell them he was afraid of [Inmate] Torrez or that Torrez threatened 

him. He did not use the kite system to notify the Defendant he was afraid or that he was 

threatened. Morris said he never told anyone.” (Affidavit of Evidence, ¶ 32.) And in the 

magistrate’s decision, the magistrate stated: “Indeed, there is no evidence that DRC 

was ever aware that Torres threatened to harm plaintiff.” (Magistrate’s Decision, 8.) 

{¶10} Upon independent review, the court determines that the magistrate did not 

err by failing to find that Morris’s status as a protective control inmate was sufficient to 

conclude that ODRC had adequate notice of an impending assault. The court rejects 

Morris’s proposition that an inmate’s status as a protective control inmate, as a matter of 

law, constitutes adequate notice of an impending assault by another inmate. Morris’s 

first objection is not well-taken. 

2. Second-Objection Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in failing to find 

that due to the correctional officers’ failure to follow accepted security 

practices based on administrative rules, policies, and general block 

orders, that DRC was negligent. 

Fourth-Objection Issue: Whether the magistrate erred when he failed to 

find that DRC was negligent in failing to observe the presence of a 

general population inmate standing in an open gate to the Jpay kiosk 

room. 

Fifth-Objection Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in attributing the 

assault to a dispute between Morris and Inmate Torrez and whether the 

assault would not have occurred without DRC’s correction officers’ 

failure to enforce protective custody orders, and other rules of the 

institution. 

{¶11} Morris’s second, fourth, and fifth objections raise issues of negligence and 

proximate cause. To establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff “must show 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -7- DECISION 

(1) the existence of a duty, (2) a breach of duty, and (3) an injury proximately resulting 

therefrom.” Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 

1088, ¶ 8, citing Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prod., Inc. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 15 

OBR 179, 472 N.E.2d 707. In Jeffers v. Olexo, 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 143-144, 539 N.E.2d 

614 (1989), the Ohio Supreme Court discussed proximate cause, stating: 

“Proximate cause is a troublesome phrase. It has a particular 

meaning in the law but is difficult to define. It has been defined as: ‘That 

which immediately precedes and produces the effect, as distinguished 

from a remote, mediate, or predisposing cause; that from which the fact 

might be expected to follow without the concurrence of any unusual 

circumstance; that without which the accident would not have happened, 

and from which the injury or a like injury might have been anticipated.’ 65 

C.J.S. § 103 Negligence pp. 1130-1131. * * *” Corrigan v. E. W. Bohren 

Transport Co. (C.A. 6, 1968), 408 F. 2d 301, 303. 

The rule of proximate cause “‘requires that the injury sustained 

shall be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence alleged; 

that is, such consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the 

particular case might, and should have been foreseen or anticipated by 

the wrongdoer as likely to follow his negligent act.’” Ross v. Nutt (1964), 

177 Ohio St. 113, 114, 29 O.O. 2d 313, 314, 203 N.E. 2d 118, 120, 

quoting Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern RR. Co. (1908), 78 Ohio 

St. 309, 325, 85 N.E. 499, 504. See, also, Pendrey v. Barnes (1985), 18 

Ohio St. 3d 27, 18 OBR 23, 479 N.E. 2d 383; cf. Strother v. Hutchinson

(1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 282, 21 O.O. 3d 177, 423 N.E. 2d 467. 

Accord Black’s Law Dictionary 265 (10th Ed.2014) (defining proximate cause as a 

“cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability; an act or omission that is considered 

in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on the actor”). 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -8- DECISION 

{¶12} Prison regulations “are primarily designed to guide correctional officials in 

prison administration rather than to confer rights on inmates.” State ex rel. Larkins v. 

Wilkinson, 79 Ohio St.3d 477, 479, 683 N.E.2d 1139 (1997). Violations of internal rules 

and policies, however, may be used to support a claim of negligence. Triplett v. Warren 

Corr. Inst., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-728, 2013-Ohio-2743, ¶ 10. But, even if DRC 

corrections officers acted negligently, as Morris contends, negligence is without legal 

consequence unless DRC’s purported negligence is a proximate cause of an injury. 

See Whiting v. State Dept. of Mental Health, 141 Ohio App.3d 198, 202, 750 N.E.2d 

644 (10th Dist.2001). Because in this instance DRC lacked adequate notice of an 

impending assault, a requirement for the imposition of liability on DRC for the intentional 

attack of Morris by Inmate Torrez, see Literal at ¶ 16, a legally sufficient cause is lacking 

to result in a consequence that liability should be imposed on DRC. Morris’s second, 

fourth, and fifth objections are not well-taken. 

3. Third-Objection Issue: Whether the magistrate erred in finding that 

Morris was not credible. 

{¶13} In Siegel v. Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine, 2015-Ohio-441, 28 

N.E.3d 612, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), the Tenth District Court of Appeals stated: “‘Although the 

trial court may appropriately give weight to the magistrate’s assessment of witness 

credibility in view of the magistrate’s firsthand exposure to the evidence, the trial court 

must still independently assess the evidence and reach its own conclusions.’ Sweeney 

v. Sweeney, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-251, 2006-Ohio-6988, ¶ 15, citing DeSantis v. Soller, 

70 Ohio App.3d 226, 233, 590 N.E.2d 886 (10th Dist.1990).” Thus, provided that this 

court independently assess the evidence and reach its own conclusions, it is wholly 

proper for the court to give weight to the magistrate’s assessment of the credibility of the 

testimony of the parties’ witnesses and other evidence before the court. In this case, 

the magistrate was in a position to view the witnesses, observe the demeanor of the 

witnesses, gestures of the witnesses, and the voice inflections of the witnesses. See 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -9- DECISION 

Hill v. Briggs, 111 Ohio App.3d 405, 411-412, 676 N.E.2d 547 (10th Dist.1996) (choice 

between credible witnesses and conflicting testimony rests solely with a finder of fact 

and a fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness). 

{¶14} To support a finding that the Morris’s testimony lacked credibility, the 

magistrate stated: “The video shows plaintiff, who had a razor in his right hand, moving 

his hand from side to side, right where two straight line cuts are found on his head. 

Plaintiff had no explanation for the cuts he received to his head and was unable to 

provide an explanation for why he swiped the razor after the incident. The swipe is also 

visible on the video. The magistrate cannot think of any legitimate reason why plaintiff 

would use the razor on himself and is forced to conclude that that plaintiff’s testimony 

thus lacks credibility.” (Magistrate’s Decision, 9.) 

{¶15} Upon de novo review of the evidence, the court concludes that Morris’s 

third objection, which challenges the magistrate’s credibility determination, should be 

overruled. 

4. Sixth-Objection Issue: Whether the magistrate’s findings regarding the 

security video (Exhibit B) are justified. 

The magistrate described the security video as follows: 

 Defendant also submitted video of the attack. The video shows

plaintiff being escorted to the kiosk where his hands are uncuffed and his 

legs are shackled to the stool. Two corrections officers and Torres are 

present in the area. Another inmate is escorted out of the area by one of 

the corrections officers. The corrections officer who escorted plaintiff to 

the kiosk turns way from plaintiff and moves toward his desk, which is 

located on the opposite side of a partition separating it from the kiosk. 

Immediately thereafter, Torres, who was waiting by the wall several feet 

away, approaches quickly and appears to strike plaintiff in the side of the 

head. Plaintiff falls to the ground and Torres continues to attempt to 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -10- DECISION 

punch him. Plaintiff’s right hand moves to his face and it appears plaintiff 

is gripping an object with his right hand; at no point does it appear that 

plaintiff is attempting to use the object to harm Torres or to defend himself. 

Rather, the video shows plaintiff moving his right hand back and forth 

along his head right where it was later observed that he had two straightline cuts. Finally, the video shows plaintiff transfer the object to his left 

hand where he subsequently swipes the object away. The attack lasts 

approximately five seconds. Plaintiff continues to move on the ground 

following the attack. [TPU Escort Officer] Wallace was within a few feet of 

plaintiff during the entire incident. 

(Magistrate’s Decision, 6-7.) 

{¶16} Morris contends that the video shows Torrez continuing to punch Morris in 

the head and body, that it is impossible to determine, what, if anything, Morris had in his 

hand or what he did with it, that Wallace acted promptly to stop the assault, and that it is 

impossible to conclude that a razorblade caused the two lines on Morris’s forehead or 

that Morris had the razorblade after he was struck and fell to the floor. 

{¶17} Upon independent review of the video, the court finds that Morris’s claims 

are not wholly without merit. While the video does not clearly show what, if anything, 

Morris had in hand or Morris cutting his forehead with a razor blade, the video does 

show Morris’s hand engaged in a sweeping motion after the altercation, almost as if 

Morris was swiping away an object. More importantly, however, the video does not 

show that DRC had adequate notice of an impending assault by Torrez. Indeed, the 

video shows Torrez quickly charging Morris when a corrections officer turned away from 

Morris, thereby supporting a view that corrections officers did not have notice of 

Torrez’s impending assault. 

{¶18} Morris’s sixth objection is not well-taken. 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -11- DECISION 

5. Seventh-Objection Issue: Whether the magistrate’s decision is contrary 

to law and against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶19} In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), 

discussing the concept of weight of the evidence, the Ohio Supreme Court stated: 

“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible 

evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. It 

indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to 

their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater 

amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. 

Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.’ 

(Emphasis added.) Black’s, supra, at 1594.” Thompkins further states that, when an 

appellate court reverses a trial court’s judgment on the basis that a verdict is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court 

sits as a “‘thirteenth juror’” and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of 

the conflicting testimony. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42, 102 S. Ct. at 2218, 72 L. 

Ed. 2d at 661. See, also, State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 

175, 20 Ohio B. Rep. 215, 219, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720-721 (“The court, 

reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether 

in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new 

trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the 

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”). 

Thompkins at 387. Since the Ohio Supreme Court issued Thompkins, the Ohio 

Supreme Court has recognized that the Thompson standard of review for manifest 

weight of the evidence applies in civil cases. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 

2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 17-23. 
Case No. 2018-00492JD -12- DECISION 

{¶20} Upon independent review, the court concludes that the magistrate’s 

statement that “[i]nasmuch as plaintiff failed to establish that defendant had adequate 

notice of an impending attack, plaintiff’s claim fails” is not contrary to law. Moreover, the 

court cannot conclude that the magistrate lost his way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice so that a recommendation of judgment in favor of DRC should not 

be followed. 

{¶21} Morris’s seventh objection is not well-taken. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶22} For reasons set forth above, the court concludes that ODRC’s 

memorandum in opposition filed on January 21, 2020, should be stricken and that all of 

Morris’s objections to the magistrate’s decision of October 24, 2019, should be 

overruled. 

 

 PATRICK M. MCGRATH 

Judge 

 
[Cite as Morris v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-612.]

{¶23} For reasons set forth in the decision filed concurrently herewith, the court 

sua sponte STRIKES defendant’s memorandum in opposition of January 21, 2020, and 

OVERRULES plaintiff’s objections to a magistrate’s decision of October 24, 2019. 

Because the magistrate has properly applied the law to the facts of the case, the court 

adopts the magistrate’s decision and recommendations as its own. Judgment is 

rendered in favor of defendant. Court costs are assessed against plaintiff. The clerk 

shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. 

 

 PATRICK M. MCGRATH 

Judge 

Filed January 30, 2020 

Sent to S.C. Reporter 2/21/20

KRISTOFFER MORRIS 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION 

AND CORRECTION 

 Defendant

Case No. 2018-00492JD 

Judge Patrick M. McGrath 

Magistrate Gary Peterson 

JUDGMENT ENTRY