# FILED July 24, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CRI MINAL APPEA LS OF TENNESSEE ATJA CKSON JULY SES SION, 1997 KENNETH CULP, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9608-CC-00268 ) Ap pella nt, ) ) ) LAUDERDALE COUNTY VS. ) ) HON. JOSEPH H. WALKER STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE ) Appell ee. ) (Post- Convict ion)

ON AP PEA L FROM THE J UDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY
FOR THE APP ELLA NT : FOR THE APPELLEE : KENNETH CULP, PRO SE JOHN KNOX W ALKUP Route 1, Box 330 Attor ney General and Reporter Tiptonv il le, TN 38079-9775 CLINTON J . MORGAN Assist ant Attor ney General 450 James Robertson Par kway Nashvil le, TN 37243-0493 ELI ZABETH RI CE Dist ri ct Attor ney General 302 MarketStreet , P.O. Box 562 Somervil le, TN 38068
OPINION FILED ________________________ AFFI RMED DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE1 See Tenn . Code A nn. § 40-30-20 2 and -206 (b) (Supp. 1996 ). -2- 

# OPINION

The Peti ti oner, Kenneth Culp , appeal s as of ri ght pursuant t o Rule 3 ofthe Tennessee Rules of Appellat e Procedure from the tr ial co urt ’s deni al o f his peti ti on for po st-co nviction relief. The Peti ti oner f il ed a pro se petition for po stconvi cti on rel iefon June 6, 1996. On June 14, 1996, t he tr ial courtdismis sed the peti ti on wit hout conducti ng an evi denti ary hear ing, fi nding t hat i t was bar red by the stat ute of l imitat ions. 1 W e affirm the jud gm ent o f the trial c ourt.

On Octob er21, 1 992 , the P etitione r was con victed by a L aud erda le C oun ty jury of t he sale ofcoc aine , a schedul e II controll ed substan ce. He was sent enced as a Ran ge III p ersi stentoff ender t o thi rte en yearsimpri sonment wit h the Departmentof C orre ction . A pa nel o f th i s Co urtaff ir med his convi cti on on February 2, 19 94. See Sta te v. K en ne th C ulp , C.C.A . No. 02 C0 1-930 7-C C 00133, Lau derd ale C oun ty(Tenn. Crim. App. , Jackson, Feb. 2, 1994) . The Pe titioner d id no t file for pe rm ission to ap pea l to our sup rem e co urt.

On Jun e 6, 1996, the Pet it ioner fi led a pet it ion f or post -convi cti on rel ief which is t he subject ofthe cas e sub judice . In the pe tition , he arg ue d th at h is tr ial counsel ren de red ine ffec tive a ssis tan ce , tha t the tria l co urt erre d in re fusin g to all ow impeachment of a wit ness wit h evi dence of pr iorcri minal c onvi cti ons, and thatthe jury in stru ctio n o n re as on ab le d ou bt w as un co ns titutio na l. The trial court found that t he petit ion was barred by t he statute ofli mitati ons and dism issed i t2Itappears f rom the order of di smissal t hat t he tr ial courtcit ed inco rrectdates i n deter mining whetherthe pet it ion f or post -convi cti on rel iefwas barred by t he stat ute ofli mitati ons. The Pet it ioner has severalconvi cti ons other than t he one chal lenged in t his pet it ion. The tri al court ci ted t he ap plic ab le d ate s f ro m the Pe tition er ’s c on vic tion for es ca pe rat he r th an for the sa le o f c oc ain e. It is clear , however , t hat t he Peti ti oner i s chall enging his cocai ne convi cti on. Because a ll of t he rel evant inf ormation p erta ini ng to t he cocai ne convi cti on is contai ned wit hin t he record , we are able to consi der the Pe tition er ’s a pp ea l fro m the ord er of d ism iss al. A ltho ug h th e tr ial ju dg e c ited inc or re ct d ate s in arri vin g at hi s decisi on to di smiss the pet it ion, we conclu de thathis d eter minati on thatthe pet it ion was barr ed b y the sta tute o f limita tions w as n eve rthele ss c orre ct. -3- wit hout conducti ng an evi denti ary hear ing. 2 Itis f rom the t ri al cou rt ’s order of dismissal t hat the Peti tioner appeals.

The Peti ti oner cont ends thatthe t ri al courterred in f indi ng thathis pet it ion forpost- convi cti on rel iefwas barred by t he stat ute ofli mitat ions. At t he ti me the Pe tition er’s convi cti ons bec am e fina l, the sta tute o f limitation s ap plicab le to po stconvi cti on proceedings was three ye ars. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102 ( repeal ed 199 5). Th e thre e-ye ar sta tute o f limitation s wa s su bse que ntly sh orten ed to one yearby t he new Post- Convict ion Procedure Act , whi ch took ef fecton May 10, 1995. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-201 et seq. (Supp. 1996). At t he ti me the new Act took effec t, the previ ous three-year stat ute ofli mitat ions had not ex pired for the Pe titioner.

Ofcourse, the new Post -Convi cti on Pro cedure Actgovernsthi s peti ti on and all peti ti ons fi led aft er May10, 1 995
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-201 et seq. (Su pp. 1 996 ). This Act provi des, i n pert inentpart , t hat “ notwi thst anding any otherprovisi on of thi s p artto t he contrary, any person havi ng ground f or rel ief recogni zed un de r this partshall have atleastone (1) year f rom May 10, 1 995 , to file a peti ti on or a moti on to reopen a peti ti on under t his part. ” Compil er’ s Notes to Tenn. Code An n. § 4 0-30 -201 (Su pp. 1 996 ) (referr ing to Acts 1995, ch. 207, § 3). Because the previ ous three-year stat ute ofli mitat ions had not expi red f or-4-

the Peti ti oner atthe t ime the new Acttookeffect , his righ t to pe tition for p ostconvi cti on rel iefsurvi ved und er the new Act. See Betsy J ane Pen dergra st v. Sta te , C.C. A. No . 01C 01-9 607 -CC -002 89, R uthe rford C oun ty(Te nn. C rim. A pp., Nashvil le, Ma y 17, 1 997 ); cf. Do yle C arter v. S tate , C.C. A. No. 01C0 1- 951 1- CC00398, Da vidso n C oun ty (Te nn. C rim. A pp., N ash ville, Feb . 12, 1 997 ); Eri c C. Pendlet on v. State , C. C.A. No. 01C01-9604- CR-00158, Davi dson County (Tenn. Cr i m. Ap p., N ash ville, Feb . 12, 1 997 ); Wa lla ce Butl er v. RickyBell , Warden , C.C. A. No. 02 C01 - 95 10 - CC- 00 29 7, Fa ye t t e Co un t y ( Ten n. Cr i m. App., Jackson, No v. 19, 1 996 ); Joh nny L. Bu tler v. Sta te , C.C.A. No. 02C01-9509-CR-00289, She lby Cou nty (Te nn. C rim. Ap p., Jacks on, D ec. 2, 19 96).

As a resul t, the Pet it ioner had one year

from the eff ecti ve dat e ofthe new Ac t, Ma y 10 , 19 95 , to file for p os t-co nvic ti on rel ief
. See Co m piler’s N otes to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 201 (Supp. 1996) ( ref erri ng to Acts 1 995 , ch. 207 , § 3); Tenn. Co de An n. § 40 -30 -20 2(a ) (S up p. 1 99 6). H e fil ed his p etition fo r pos tc onvi cti on rel iefon June 6, 1996, shortl y afterthe ex pirati on of t he one- yea r peri od. Accordi ngly , we concl ude thatthe t ri al court cor rect lyfound t hat t he petit ion was barred by t he statute ofli mitati ons.

In addit ion, we pointout t hat one ofthe Pet it ione r’ s con ten tion s in h is peti ti on forpost- con vi cti on rel ief , t hat t he tr ial courterred in refusi ng to al low impeachment of t he undercov er agentinv olv ed in the dr ug sale wit h evi dence of pri orcri minal c onvi cti ons, was raised on d irect a ppe al to this Co urt. See Cu lp , C.C. A. No. 02C01-9307- CC-00133, sl ip op. at 2. That issue was ful lyaddressed on direc t app eal a nd w as fo und to be witho ut m erit. Id. at 2- 3. Asa res ult , we3 W e note t hat t he actualjury i nstru cti on is not i ncluded in t he record . The quot ed inst ructi on com es fr om the p etition fo r pos t-con viction re lief and the m em oran dum filed in su ppo rt of it. -5- conclude thatthe Peti ti oner’ s chal lenge t o the t ri al court’ s evi denti ary r uli ng was prev ious ly dete rm ined
. See Ten n. Co de A nn. § 4 0-30-2 06(h) (S upp . 1996 ).

The Peti ti oner ar gues in the al ter nati ve t hat i f hi s peti ti on was barred by t he statu te ofli mitat ions, his c lai m that t he jury i nstr ucti on on reasonabl e doubtwas unconsti tut ional fi ts wi thi n an enumerated e x cepti on to t he one-ye ar st atut e of lim itatio ns. The rel evant stat utory prov isi on provi des an except ion t o the oney ea rstat ute ofli mitat ions where the “ clai m in the pe ti ti on is ba sed upon a f inal rul ing of an appel lat e court establ ishi ng a const it uti onal r ightthatwas not recogni zed as exi sti ng at t he ti me of tr ial , i f r etrospecti ve appl icat ion ofthatri ght is requi red. ” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 202(b)( 1) (Supp. 1996) . The prov isi on does, how ever, requ ire thatany pet it ion ass ert ing suc h a clai m be fil ed wit hin one yearof t he rul ing of t he higheststat e appell ate court orthe Uni ted St ates Su prem e C ourt e stab lishing the c ons titutiona l right. Id.

The Petit ioner’ s content ion that the jury instructions a t his trial were unconsti tut ional focuse s on “m oral certainty” language i ncluded in t he inst ruct ion on rea so na ble doubt. Accordi ng to t he peti ti on for post- convi cti on relief, the jury was instruct ed as foll ows: Re as on ab le doubt i s thatdoubtengendered byan inv esti gati on of all the proof i n the case and an in abil ity aftersuch i nvest igat ion t o let the mind resteasil y upo n the certai nty of gui lt . Reasonabl e doubt does not mean a capt ious, possi ble, or im agin ary d oub t. Abs olute certa inty of guil t i s n ot de manded by the l aw to conv ictof any cri minal charge, but moral certa inty is req uired and this ce rtainty is requi red as to eve ry p ropo sit ion ofproofrequi sit e to cons ti tut e the off ense. 3-6-

He contends thatequati ng “moral cert ainty” wi th “ beyond a r easonable dou b t” viola ted his due process ri ghts byimpermiss ibl y l oweri ng the St ate’ s burden of proo f as to h is gu ilt.

The Peti ti oner ci tes sev eral cases i n suppo rt of hi s argument t hat t he rea so na ble doubtjury in stru ctio n w as un co ns titutio na l. Am ong those c ases are Vict orv. Nebraska , 5 11 U. S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed. 2d 583 (199 4), Cage
v. Louisi ana , 498 U. S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 32 8, 112 L.Ed.2 d 339 (1990 ), and Rickman
v. Dutton , 864 F. Supp. 686 ( M.D. Tenn. 199 4). He argues t hat thi s li ne of cas es establ ished a new cons titutional principle that jury instru cti ons such as t he one giv en in hi s case vi olat e due proc ess gua rante es. A s a re sult, he contendsthat his cha lleng e to th e jury in struc tion fits w ithin the exce ption to th e stat ut e of limitations listed at T enn esse e Co de A nno tated se ction 40 -30-20 2(b)(1).

It is t rue t hat t he Unit ed Stat es Supreme Court hasbeen critic al of t he conti nued use of the “mo ral certainty” langu age in reaso nab le doub t jury instru cti ons. See Vict or , 114 S. Ct. at1248. Yet , nei therthe Uni ted St ates Su pr eme C ourt n or an y Te nne sse e sta te co urt ha s he ld tha t a refe renc e to “moral cert ainty” w ithin a reasonable doubt jury inst ructi on is per se un co ns titutio na l. Rather, court s must l ook to t he entire cha rge to deter mine ifthe “moral cert ainty” l anguage was pl aced in a context i n whi ch the jury w ou ld und ersta nd th at the phra se m ean t certa inty with respect to hu m an a ffairs. See Sta te v. N ich ols , 877 S.W .2d 7 22, 7 34 (T enn . 199 4), cert . deni ed , 5 13 U. S. 1114, 115 S.C t. 909, 130 L. Ed.2d 791 (199 5); Pe ttyjohn v. State , 885 S. W .2d 364, 365- 66 (Ten n. Cri m . App . 1 994). W e therefor e do not bel iev e thatthe Cage and Vict orli ne ofcases est abl is hes a ne w co ns tit uti onal r ule f or pur poses of-7-

Tennessee Co de A nno tated sec tion 4 0-30 -202 (b)(1 ). See Charles W alt on W ri ght v. State , C.C.A . No. 01 C0 1-9 5 06-CR-00211, Davidson County (Tenn. Crim. App. , Nashvi ll e, Mar. 20, 1997) , sl ip op. at 10, perm. t o appeal f il ed (May 20, 1997). Accordi ngly , t he Peti ti oner’ s chal lenge t o the reason abl e dou bt jury inst ruct ion, like th e o the r ch alle nges rai sed in h is pet it ion f or post -convi cti on reli ef, was barred by the one-year st atute of li mitati ons.

Mo reover, even i f t he Peti ti oner’ s chal lenge t o the reasonable doubtjury inst ruct ion were c onside red on its merits, we do no t believe he would be enti tl ed to post- convi cti on rel ief . I n Vict or , t he Uni te d St at es Su preme C ourtrul ed that the phrase “moral cert ainty” may hav e lostit s histori cal meani ng and that m ode rn juri es, unaware ofthe historical m ean ing, m ight und erstand “mo ral certainty” to mean som eth ing less than the high leve l ofdeter minati on consti tut ional lyrequi red in crim inal ca ses . Vict or , 114 S. Ct. at1246-48. W hil e expres sing c ri ti cism ofthe conti nued use of the “mo ral certainty” phrase, the Courtdid nothold t hat i t was ne ce ssa rily const itutio na lly invalid. Id. Instead , as we stated a bove , the Co urt looked to th e fu ll jury char ge to det ermine i f t he phrase was p laced i n such a conte xt thata jury woul d underst and thatitmeant cert ainty wi th r espect to human affai rs. Id. The Cou rt has expressed pa r t i cu l arco nc er n o ve rt he us e o ft he t er ms “grave uncert ainty” and “act ual subs tant ial doubt”in conj un cti on wit h “moral certa inty.” See Cage , 498 U. S. at41, 111 S.Ct. at329-30 (holdi ng that t he use ofthe thre e p hra se s to ge the r co uld be in terpre ted b y a rea son able juror to all ow a fi nding ofguil t based on a degree ofproof be low that req uired by d ue pro cess ).

In t he case sub judice , i t does notappear t hat t he addit ional ter ms found ob jec tion ab le in Cage were includ ed in the jur y cha rge. F urth ermore, consider ing-8-

the entire jury cha rge, we are sati sfi ed thatthe reasonabl e doubt j ury i nstr ucti on conve ye d the proper lev el ofevi denti ary c ert ainty tocomport wi th t he due process guarant ees of t he Unit ed Stat es and T ennes see Constituti ons. Tennessee cou rts h ave rep ea ted ly up he ld re as on ab le d ou bt ju ry inst ruct ions simil arto the one given in the p rese nt ca se. See Nic ho ls , 877 S. W .2d at 734; Petty john , 885 S.W .2d a t 366 ; State v . Ha llo ck , 875 S. W .2d 285, 294 (Tenn. Cr i m. Ap p. 19 93); Te rry Sh ann on K ime ry v. Sta te , C.C.A. No. 03C0 1- 951 2- CC00412, Greene County (Tenn. Cri m. App ., Kn oxville, Ja n. 28 , 199 7), perm . to appeal denied (Tenn. 1997). Thus, the f ull jury char ge giv en in t he Pe tition er’s case did not v iolat e his due process ri ghts u nder ei therthe Uni ted St ates or Tennessee Consti tut ions even t hough itcontai ned the “moral cert ainty” phrase.

We do note t hat, as the Pet it ioner point s out, a jury i nstr ucti on simi larto t he one given i n the present case w as found to be unconst it uti onal i n Rickm an v. Dutton , 864 F.S upp . 686 , 709 -10 (M .D. T enn . 199 4). T he Petiti oner’s rel iance on thi s case, however, is notwell -fo unded. Thi s Court i s notbound by t he federal distr ictcou rt’s de cision with re gard to the con stitution ality of t he reasonabl e doubt jury inst ruct ion. Inst ead, we are requi red t o fol low onl y th e app lic ab le consti tut ional rul ings ofthe Uni ted St ates Su prem e C ourt. See State v. McKay , 680 S.W .2d 4 47, 4 50 (T enn . 198 4), cert. denied , 470 U. S. 1034, 105 S.Ct. 1412, 84 L.Ed .2d 7 95 (1 985 ); State v. Bow ers , 673 S. W .2d 887, 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 198 4).

Forthe reasons setforth i n the di scussi on above, we concl ude thatthe t ri al court did not er r in summarilydism is sing the p etition fo r pos t-con viction re lief. W e the refore affirm the jud gm ent o f the trial c ourt.-9- ____________________________________ DAVI D H. WELLES, JUD GE

CONCUR:

___________________________________ JOE B. JONE S, PRES I DI NG JU DGE

___________________________________ JOE G. RI LEY , JUD GE