IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 66 / 04-1114 

Filed July 14, 2006 

ROBERT JAMES GRANT, 

 Appellant, 

vs. 

IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, 

 Appellee. 

________________________________________________________________________ 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Mark J. 

Smith, Judge. 

 Appeal from district court judgment affirming dismissal of 

administrative agency appeal on grounds of issue preclusion. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

 Natalie Hope Cronk of Johnston & Nathanson, P.L.C., 

Cedar Rapids, for appellant. 

 Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tabitha Gardner, 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. 
2

CADY, Justice.

 This appeal is from a district court’s ruling on a petition for judicial 

review of an administrative agency decision. The Iowa Department of 

Human Services dismissed an application to correct a child abuse report 

on grounds of issue preclusion. The district court affirmed. Upon our 

review, we reverse the district court judgment and remand for further 

proceedings. 

 I. Background Facts and Proceedings 

Robert Grant and Linda Jensen had a tumultuous, rollercoaster 

relationship. They were married in 1991, followed by periodic episodes of 

discontent and reconciliation. In November 2000, Robert filed for divorce 

for the second time, and a custody battle ensued over their two sons, 

Robert Jr. and Samuel. Robert Jr., known as Bo, was born in 1995. 

Samuel, known as Sam, was born in 1997. He has Down syndrome. 

The dissolution trial was eventually scheduled for July 2002. 

 In August 2001, during the pendency of the dissolution, Linda filed 

a petition for relief from domestic abuse in district court. Linda and 

Robert entered into a consent agreement resulting in a protective order 

entered by the district court that granted Linda temporary custody of Bo 

and Sam, with visitation on alternating weekends to Robert. The 

visitation exchange was set up to take place at a police station, and 

Robert exercised his visitation at a local motel. 

 Following a weekend visit in October 2001, Bo reported that Robert 

became angry after Bo and Sam started to argue. Robert responded by 

grabbing Bo by the shoulder and throwing a toy truck that struck Sam 

on the head. Bo also reported that Robert kicked him in the groin after 

he objected to his father’s behavior. The incident was subsequently 
3

reported to the state Department of Human Services (DHS). The DHS 

promptly conducted a comprehensive investigation and assessment. 

 The DHS filed a founded assessment report on November 8, 2001. 

The child protection worker who conducted the investigation prepared 

the report that determined the incident met the definition of child abuse 

based on Robert’s failure to provide proper supervision of children under 

his care.1 The report indicated Robert denied the incident occurred, and 

 1Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(d) defines “child abuse,” in part, to include 

[t]he failure on the part of a person responsible for the care of a child to 

provide for the adequate food, shelter, clothing or other care necessary 

for the child’s health and welfare when financially able to do so or when 

offered financial or other reasonable means to do so. 

Iowa Code § 232.68(2)(d) (2001); see also Iowa Admin. Code r. 441—175.21 (“ ‘Denial of 

critical care’ is the failure on the part of a person responsible for the care of a child to 

provide for the adequate food, shelter, clothing or other care necessary for the children’s 

health and welfare when financially able to do so, or when offered financial or other 

reasonable means to do so and shall mean any of the following: (1) Failure to provide 

adequate food and nutrition to the extent that there is danger of the child suffering 

injury or death. (2) Failure to provide adequate shelter to the extent that there is danger 

of the child suffering injury or death. (3) Failure to provide adequate clothing to the 

extent that there is danger of the child suffering injury or death. (4) Failure to provide 

adequate health care to the extent that there is danger of the child suffering injury or 

death. A parent or guardian legitimately practicing religious beliefs who does not 

provide specified medical treatment for a child for that reason alone shall not be 

considered abusing the child and shall not be placed on the child abuse registry. 

However, a court may order that medical service be provided where the child’s health 

requires it. (5) Failure to provide the mental health care necessary to adequately treat 

an observable and substantial impairment in the child’s ability to function. (6) Gross 

failure to meet the emotional needs of the child necessary for normal development. (7) 

Failure to provide for the proper supervision of the child to the extent that there is 

danger of the child suffering injury or death, and which a reasonable and prudent 

person would exercise under similar facts and circumstances. (8) Failure to respond to 

the infant’s life–threatening conditions (also known as withholding medically indicated 

treatment) by providing treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration and 

medication) which in the treating physician’s reasonable medical judgment will be most 

likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all conditions, except that the term 

does not include the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, 

hydration, or medication) to an infant when, in the treating physician’s reasonable 

medical judgment any of the following circumstances apply: the infant is chronically 

and irreversibly comatose; the provision of the treatment would merely prolong dying, 

not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant’s life–threatening 

conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; the provision of 
4

further stated that Robert believed Bo fabricated the event due to 

improper influences from Linda and a male friend. The child protection 

worker found Bo to be credible based on a variety of factors, and 

concluded Robert failed to properly supervise the two boys by “a 

preponderance of evidence.” The report also concluded the incident was 

not minor, and that Robert was the alleged perpetrator in a prior founded 

child abuse report in November 2000. The prior report involved an 

assault incident between Robert and a stepchild. Consequently, the 

current report was placed in the state child abuse central registry. 

 Based on the event that occasioned the child abuse report, Linda 

filed an application in the domestic abuse proceeding to modify the terms 

of the visitation so as to limit Robert to supervised visits with Bo and 

Sam. The application for modification was set for hearing before the 

district court, and both Linda and Robert were represented by counsel. 

 The district court modified the visitation provided under the 

protective order by written order on December 7, 2001. It found the 

incident reported by Bo “took place” and that Robert “demonstrated 

inappropriate anger” that endangered the children. The court found Bo’s 

report was consistent, detailed, and credible. To the contrary, the court 

found Robert’s denial was “implausibl[e]” and “hollow.” 

________________________ 

the treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the 

treatment itself under the circumstances would be inhumane.”); id. (“ ‘Proper 

supervision’ means that supervision which a reasonable and prudent person would 

exercise under similar facts and circumstances, but in no event shall the person place a 

child in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health, or cruelly or unduly 

confine the child. Dangerous operation of a motor vehicle is a failure to provide proper 

supervision when the person responsible for the care of a child is driving recklessly, or 

driving while intoxicated with the child in the motor vehicle. The failure to restrain a 

child in a motor vehicle does not, by itself, constitute a cause to assess a child abuse 

report.”). 
5

 On March 5, 2002, Robert filed a written statement with the DHS 

claiming the report and assessment were erroneous. He requested that it 

be corrected. Robert claimed the report should be changed from 

“founded” to “not confirmed” and be removed from the central registry for 

four reasons: (1) Bo fabricated the incident due to manipulative 

influences by Linda; (2) there was insufficient evidence of a physical 

injury to Bo or Sam; (3) Robert does not fit the profile of a child abuser; 

and (4) employees at the motel where the visitation took place reported 

Robert was an attentive father to the boys. Additionally, Robert asserted 

that he submitted to a polygraph examination that revealed he truthfully 

answered questions about the alleged incident. 

 The DHS denied the correction request, and Robert sought review 

through the state inspection and appeals procedure. The DHS asserted 

Robert was precluded from seeking to change the conclusion in the 

report from “founded” to “not confirmed” because the district court 

decision previously determined the incident occurred as reported by Bo. 

The DHS sought to dismiss the request. 

 An administrative law judge issued a proposed ruling dismissing 

the request. The director of the Department of Human Services 

subsequently adopted the ruling as a final decision. 

 Robert then sought judicial review of the DHS decision from the 

district court. The district court affirmed the agency action based on 

issue preclusion. 

 Robert appealed, and raised three grounds of error. First, he 

claimed the doctrine of issue preclusion did not apply because there was 

no identity of issues between the modification-of-visitation proceeding in 

district court and the request to correct the abuse report before the 
6

administrative agency. Second, he claimed issue preclusion did not 

apply because a statute gave him the right to an evidentiary hearing on 

his request to correct the abuse report. Finally, he claimed issue 

preclusion did not apply under an exception to the rule, based on the 

legislature’s specific allocation of jurisdiction to the DHS to correct child 

abuse assessments. 

 II. Standard of Review 

Chapter 17A governs our review. We may only interfere with the 

agency’s “decision if it is erroneous under one of the grounds 

enumerated in the statute, and a party’s substantial rights have been 

prejudiced.” Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006) (citing 

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)). We are bound by the agency’s findings of fact

“if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Id.

(citing Excel Corp. v. Smithart, 654 N.W.2d 891, 896 (Iowa 2002); Iowa 

Code § 17A.19(10)(f)). “[T]he question on appeal is not whether the 

evidence supports a different finding than the finding made by the 

commissioner, but whether the evidence ‘supports the findings actually 

made.’ ” Id. (quoting St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 649 

(Iowa 2000)). In contrast, we are not bound by the agency’s 

interpretation of the law and “may substitute our interpretation for the 

agency’s.” Id. (citing Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 604 

(Iowa 2005)). Finally, while “[w]e allocate some degree of discretion” to 

the agency in its application of the law to the facts, we may reverse if the 

agency’s application of the law to the facts was affected by “irrational 

reasoning; failure to consider relevant facts; or irrational, illogical, or 

wholly unjustifiable application of law to the facts.” Id. (citing Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(c), (i), (j), (m)). 
7

 Whether the elements of issue preclusion are satisfied is a question 

of law. See Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 709 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Iowa 2006) 

(reviewing decision as to applicability of doctrine of issue preclusion for 

correction of errors at law); Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 699 N.W.2d 54, 61 

(Wis. 2005) (“Whether issue preclusion is a potential limit on litigation in 

an individual case is a question of law . . . .”); accord Bartlett v. Dep’t of 

Revenue ex rel. Bartlett, 125 P.3d 328, 330 (Alaska 2005); Smith v. 

U.S.R.V. Props., LC, 118 P.3d 127, 130 (Idaho 2005); Simpson v. Chi. 

Pneumatic Tool Co., 693 N.W.2d 612, 616 (N.D. 2005). Therefore, we are 

not bound by the agency’s decision on this issue, and may substitute our 

own interpretation of the law for the agency’s. See Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(c) (stating a reviewing court may reverse agency action if it 

is “[b]ased upon an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law whose 

interpretation has not clearly been vested by a provision of law in the 

discretion of the agency”). 

 III. Issue Preclusion 

Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, “prevents parties from 

relitigating issues previously resolved in prior litigation if certain 

prerequisites are established.” Comes, 709 N.W.2d at 117 (citing Hunter 

v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981)). We have 

identified four elements that must be satisfied in order for the prior 

determination to have preclusive effect in a subsequent proceeding. They 

are: 

“(1) the issue concluded must be identical; (2) the issue must 

have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) the 

issue must have been material and relevant to the 

disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination 

made of the issue in the prior action must have been 

necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.” 
8

Id. at 118 (quoting Hunter, 300 N.W.2d at 123); see also Restatement 

(Second) of Judgments § 27, at 250 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or law 

is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and 

the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is 

conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the 

same or a different claim.”); id. § 29, at 291 (“A party precluded from 

relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in accordance with §§ 27 

and 28, is also precluded from doing so with another person unless the 

fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the 

first action or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity 

to relitigate the issue.”). 

 In considering the application of the doctrine, it is important to 

observe that it applies to both legal and factual issues. We have said 

“where a particular issue or fact is litigated and decided, the judgment 

estops both parties from later litigating the same issue. The entire 

premise of issue preclusion is that once an issue has been resolved, 

there is no further fact-finding function to be performed.” Colvin v. Story 

County Bd. of Review, 653 N.W.2d 345, 348-49 (Iowa 2002) (citations 

omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. c (“An issue 

on which relitigation is foreclosed may be one of evidentiary fact, of 

‘ultimate fact’ (i.e., the application of law to fact), or of law.”). 

 While a request to correct data and findings in an abuse report can 

present a variety of legal and factual issues that may prevent a party 

from satisfying the first element of issue preclusion, in this case, Robert 

only sought to challenge the finding by the DHS that the incident 

occurred as described by Bo. Thus, the issue raised by Robert in the 

proceeding to correct the assessment was factual in nature, and dealt 
9

with credibility—did the incident occur as described by Bo? Although 

the modification of the visitation proceeding presented different legal 

issues, the same predicate factual issue raised by the request to correct 

the child abuse assessment was presented—did the incident occur as 

described by Bo? Accordingly, the identity of the factual issues supports 

application of the doctrine of issue preclusion under the circumstances 

of this case, as long as the other elements are met.2 

 Notwithstanding, as with most principles of law, the doctrine of 

issue preclusion is not without exceptions. See Restatement (Second) of 

Judgments § 28, at 273-74 (“Exceptions to the General Rule of Issue 

Preclusion”). Even when all elements of the doctrine are satisfied, there 

are circumstances when it will not be applied to prevent relitigation of an 

issue. 

 We have recognized an exception to the doctrine when the 

allocation of jurisdiction between two courts or adjudicative bodies 

justifies a new determination of the issue by the body given jurisdiction 

over an action. Heidemann v. Sweitzer, 375 N.W.2d 665, 667-68 (Iowa 

1985). This exception has been fully stated in Restatement (Second) of 

Judgments section 28(3): 

Although an issue is actually litigated and determined 

by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is 

essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a 

subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in 

the following circumstances: 

. . . . 

 2The other three elements—that the issue was raised and litigated, material and 

relevant, and necessary and essential—are not challenged by Robert on appeal. 

Therefore, we do not address them and assume without deciding they are met. See 

ALCOA v. Musal, 622 N.W.2d 476, 479-80 (Iowa 2001) (“It is a well-established rule of 

appellate procedure that ‘[t]he scope of appellate review is defined by the issues raised 

by the parties’ briefs.’ Issues not raised in the appellate briefs cannot be considered by 

the reviewing court.” (Citations omitted.)). 
10

(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by 

differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures 

followed in the two courts or by factors relating to the 

allocation of jurisdiction between them . . . .” 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(3), at 273. 

 A comment to the Restatement rule explains that the exception 

applies to situations in which issue preclusion is “asserted in an action 

over which the court rendering the prior judgment would not have had 

subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. cmt. d, at 279. The comment further 

explains that the exception does not apply to every incident when a court 

in the first action does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 

second action, but only when there are special reasons to exclude 

application of the issue preclusion doctrine. See id. (“In many such 

cases, there is no reason why preclusion should not apply; the 

procedures followed in the two courts are comparable in quality and 

extensiveness, and the first court was fully competent to render a 

determination of the issue on which preclusion is sought. In other cases, 

however, there may be compelling reasons why preclusion should not 

apply.”). One such reason is when “the legislative allocation of 

jurisdiction . . . may have been designed to insure that when an action is 

brought to determine a particular issue directly, it may only be 

maintained in a court having special competence to deal with it.” Id. 

The comment states: 

In such instances, after a court has incident[al]ly determined 

an issue that it lacks jurisdiction to determine directly, the 

determination should not be binding when a second action is 

brought in a court having such jurisdiction. The question in 

each case should be resolved in the light of the nature of 

litigation in the courts involved and the legislative purposes 

in allocating jurisdiction among the courts of the state. 

Id.
11

 The situation presented in this case is the subject of this exception. 

Although the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide initial 

requests to correct child abuse reports, it decided an issue of fact in the 

course of exercising its jurisdiction in a parallel court proceeding that was 

subsequently presented to an administrative agency in the course of 

exercising its jurisdiction to hear and decide requests to correct child 

abuse reports. 

 We adopted and applied this exception in Heidemann v. Sweitzer, 

where a finding by a district court in a suppression hearing in a criminal 

case that an arresting officer failed to comply with the implied consent 

procedures was asserted to preclude relitigation of the same factual issue 

by a hearing officer in a Department of Transportation (DOT) hearing to 

revoke a driver’s license for refusal to submit to a chemical test under the 

implied consent law. Heidemann, 375 N.W.2d at 666-67. We found that 

the legislature specifically vested the DOT with jurisdiction to revoke a 

driver’s license for refusal to submit to testing pursuant to the implied 

consent procedure by enacting chapter 321B, and that this grant of 

specific jurisdiction was a recognition “that the department has special 

competency to resolve the relatively narrow issues which arise in such 

license revocation proceedings.” Id. at 668. We found the 

decisionmaking authority given to the DOT by the legislature would be 

undercut by applying the doctrine of issue preclusion based on a parallel 

criminal proceeding that happened to rule on a factual issue concerning a 

law enforcement officer’s compliance with the statutory procedure for 

requesting a driver to submit to a chemical test. Id. Thus, we must 

decide if the legislature similarly designed the child abuse statute to 

enable the DHS to decide issues presented in an action to correct a child 
12

abuse assessment even though they may have previously been decided in 

a parallel court proceeding. 

 Our legislature enacted the child abuse statute after it recognized 

“[c]hildren in this state are in urgent need of protection from abuse.” 

Iowa Code § 232.67. In order “to provide the greatest possible protection 

to victims or potential victims of abuse,” the legislature established a 

comprehensive system of child abuse reporting, assessment, and 

rehabilitation. Id. The legislature also placed the DHS at the forefront of 

this protective net, and assigned it myriad critical responsibilities and 

duties to perform. See generally id. chs. 232, 235A. One such duty 

involves the receipt and assessment of child abuse reports, as well as the 

maintenance of a central registry of founded child abuse assessments. 

See id. § 232.71B(1)(a) (“If the department determines a report constitutes 

a child abuse allegation, the department shall promptly commence an 

appropriate assessment within twenty-four hours of receiving the 

report.”); id. § 235A.14(1) (“There is created within the state department 

of human services a central registry for child abuse information.”); id.

§ 232.71D(3) (stating founded child abuse reports shall be placed on the 

central registry). The primary purpose of the assessment by the DHS is 

to protect the child named in the report, and a secondary purpose is to 

provide services. Id. § 232.71B(1)(b). The purpose of a central registry of 

founded child abuse reports is to help increase the ability of the State to 

confront the problem of child abuse and help identify victims or potential 

victims of abuse through a “single, statewide source of child abuse data.” 

Id. § 235A.12. 

 Under this statutory scheme, the DHS promptly conducts an 

assessment of every report alleging child abuse. Id. § 232.71B(1)(a). The 
13

assessment involves a comprehensive investigation and evaluation by a 

child protection worker, followed by a written assessment report. Id. 

§ 232.71B(4) (assessment process); id. § 232.71B(11) (assessment report). 

The assessment process has numerous statutory requirements and 

components, and can involve the input of a multidisciplinary team, as 

well as others. Id. § 232.71B(4)-(10). An assessment of founded child 

abuse means the name of the child, the alleged perpetrator, and the 

pertinent assessment data, are placed on the central registry. Id. 

§ 232.71D(3). 

 The comprehensive nature of the assessment process reveals the 

importance of accurate assessments. The existence of a central 

depository of the assessments to be used by various persons and 

agencies to combat child abuse also gives rise to separate legislative 

concerns for the safeguarding of the rights of others and the need for a 

fair and efficient assessment and registry system. See id. § 235A.12 

(“[V]igorous protection of rights of individual privacy is an indispensable 

element of a fair and effective system of collecting, maintaining and 

disseminating child abuse information.”). To this end, the legislature 

provided for a means for those who are the subject of a child abuse report 

to examine and request the correction of data or findings of an 

assessment claimed to be erroneous. Id. § 235A.19. If a timely request is 

filed, 

[t]he department shall provide the subject with an 

opportunity for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to chapter 

17A to correct the data or the findings, unless the 

department corrects the data or findings as requested. The 

department may defer the hearing until the conclusion of a 

pending juvenile or district court case relating to the data or 

findings. 

Id. § 235A.19(2)(b). 
14

Considering the statutory scheme and important goals sought to 

be addressed, we think our legislature would not have given the DHS the 

responsibility to assess child abuse reports and maintain a central 

registry of the assessments without recognizing that the DHS possesses a 

special competency to carry out these duties consistent with the 

legislative goals. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 cmt. d, at 

279 (stating that issue preclusion should not prevent relitigating an issue 

within the special competency of the decisionmaker in the second 

action). Likewise, the legislature would not have given the DHS the 

important duty to determine and correct errors in assessments without 

recognizing the existence of a special competency to perform this 

responsibility. Thus, it is evident that our legislature designed the 

correction process so that issues relating to the correction of erroneous 

matters in assessment reports would be decided by the DHS. Cf. 

Heidemann, 375 N.W.2d at 668 (“The legislature by enacting chapter 

321B has specifically vested the department with jurisdiction to revoke a 

driver’s license for refusal to submit to chemical testing under Iowa’s 

implied consent statute, thereby recognizing that the department has 

special competency to resolve the relatively narrow issues which arise in 

such license revocation proceedings. The department’s administrative 

decision-making authority should not be undercut by the fortuitous 

circumstance that a parallel criminal proceeding may result in an 

evidentiary ruling concerning compliance with implied consent 

requirements.”). 

 Moreover, the nature of the statutory proceeding to correct an 

erroneous assessment reveals that the DHS should not be deprived of the 

ability to decide issues presented in the course of a correction hearing 
15

that it might otherwise be precluded from deciding under a judicial 

doctrine because the issue happens to have been decided in a previous 

proceeding before another adjudicative body. The purpose of the 

legislative grant of jurisdiction to the DHS under section 235A.19(2)(b) to 

hear claims to correct data in an assessment is to correct error. Yet, the 

judicial doctrine of issue preclusion was not created and is not used to 

preclude relitigation of an issue because the decision was correct. 

Instead, it has an entirely different focus. It precludes relitigation of an 

issue not because it was correctly decided, but rather to protect litigants 

from the vexation of relitigating issues and to promote judicial economy 

by preventing unnecessary litigation of issues previously decided. State 

ex rel Casas v. Fellmer, 521 N.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Iowa 1994); see Robert 

C. Casad & Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata: A Handbook on Its Theory, 

Doctrine, and Practice 113 (2001) (“The doctrine of issue preclusion rests 

on the premise that one court should be as capable as any other to 

resolve issues in dispute. Once a judgment resolves the issues after the 

adversary system of adjudication has run its full and fair course, the 

issues should not again be open to dispute by the same parties in any 

court. Issue preclusion not only accords with the dictates of fairness but 

also serves the interests of economy of judicial effort, fosters the certainty 

and stability of repose, and tends to prevent the anomalous situation, so 

damaging to public faith in the judicial system, of two authoritative but 

conflicting answers being given to the very same question.”); Allan D. 

Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion 8-12 (1969) (listing as purposes of issue 

preclusion, finality, prevention of harassment, efficient use of the courts, 

and prestige of the courts/consistency). The doctrine of issue preclusion 

applies even if the prior decision was wrong. See Gail v. W. Convenience 
16

Stores, 434 N.W.2d 862, 863 (Iowa 1989) (“The res judicata 

consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits are not 

altered by the fact the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a 

legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.” (citing Federated 

Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 2428, 69 

L. Ed. 2d 103, 108-09 (1981))). Thus, the statutory correction procedure 

established by the legislature serves the goal of ensuring that the 

assessment data is correct, and this statutory goal is inconsistent with 

the doctrine of issue preclusion. The important public interest in 

maintaining correct records demands that the application of the doctrine 

of issue preclusion not be used to prevent the DHS from correcting 

assessment reports. 

 This conclusion is further supported by the language of the statute 

that permits the DHS to “defer the hearing” to correct an assessment 

“until the conclusion of the pending juvenile or district court case relating 

to the data or findings.” Iowa Code § 235A.19(2)(a). Clearly, the 

legislature understood that courts could be litigating issues of child 

abuse covered in a DHS assessment during the same time the DHS may 

be asked to correct an error in the assessment, and it permitted the DHS 

to “defer the hearing” on the correction request until a decision in the 

court action. Yet, this discretion to defer the correction hearing does not 

mean the agency must defer the correction decision to the courts. We 

have previously recognized in Heidemann that an agency with special 

competency and jurisdiction to decide particular matters should give 

weight to prior court decisions on the same issues presented before the 

agency, but the agency must ultimately decide the issue based on the 

power granted by the legislature. See Heidemann, 375 N.W.2d at 668 
17

(“ ‘Perhaps some weight should be given to the decision handed down by 

the court, but certainly the agency has the right to exercise the power 

given to it by the legislature.’ ” (quoting Allan D. Vestal, Preclusion/Res 

Judicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 Geo. L.J. 857, 886-87 

(1966))). The court decision can be an aid to assist the agency in its goal 

to maintain accurate records, and we think our legislature had this 

concept in mind when it authorized the DHS to delay a hearing on a 

correction request until the conclusion of a parallel court proceeding. 

 In the end, the legislative policies and goals are best served by 

allowing the DHS to correct its own assessment of a child abuse report 

free from the doctrine of issue preclusion. The DHS should consider all 

timely claims of error by those who are the subject of a child abuse report 

and decide all issues presented by a correction request. Consequently, 

we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case to the 

DHS for a hearing on the request to correct the assessment. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.