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This document is no longer maintained. Please see the U.S. Refining/Marketing section of Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers for more recent

information.

The U.S. Petroleum Refining and Gasoline Marketing Industry

Update of Selected Tables and Figures Available (last updated August 19, 2004)

Overview of Domestic Petroleum Refining and Marketing

The U.S. refining and marketing industry has been characterized by unusually low product margins, low profitability, selective retrenchment, and substantialrestructuring

throughout the decade of the 1990's. Costs involved in complying with environmental laws have grown substantially during the period and have also affected the

profitability of the domestic industry. (Note 1) Profitability (measured by rate of return on investment) from the refining operations of domestic petroleum companies has

varied widely, even before the 1990's (Figure 1). Consequently, refiners' abilities to recoup their investment have been impaired.

However, the profitability of U.S. refining and marketing during 1997 was the highest since 1989, when the return on investment from these operations last exceeded 10

percent (Figure 1). Refiners were able to achieve their high level of profitability partly because of events of 1997 (such as lower energy costs) and partly because of

efforts and developments over the last several years (such as lower marketing costs). (Cost-cutting through a number of downstream mergers, as well as the formation

of a number of downstream alliances and joint ventures, also underlie the current profitability in downstream operations. For a more extensive discussion of these

developments, see the section entitled "Recent StructuralChanges in U.S. Refining:Joint Ventures, Mergers, and Mega-Mergers.")

The experience of the majors illustrates financial developments in U.S. refining and marketing. The average price received by the U.S. majors for refined petroleum

products fell by 4 percent between 1996 and 1997. Motor gasoline prices registered a slight 1-percent decline, with most of the overallrefined products price decline

attributable to other products. (Note 2) This pattern of price change reflected the relatively greater growth in demand for transport fuels, due to generally strong

economic growth, and a drop in demand for heating fuels, due to mild winter weather in 1997. (Note 3)

In total, the U.S. majors more than survived these price reductions and the resulting reduction in their revenues as their costs of purchased materials and products

(mainly crude oil costs) fell by more than the overall decline in refined product prices. Consequently, gross margins (refined product revenues less raw material and

product purchases divided by refined product sales volume) were substantially higher in 1997 than in 1996 and were the highest since 1992 (after adjusting for inflation).

(Note 4)

Although gross margins were at their highest levelsince 1992, the primary reason that net refined product margins (petroleum product revenues minus all out-of-pocket

refining and marketing expenses divided by refined product sales volume) were so high during 1997 was that majors also reduced their operating costs by 6 percent

between 1996 and 1997. This reduction was part of a longer-term trend. All categories of operating costs (such as marketing, energy, and other costs to operate

refineries) have been reduced since 1990, a stated goal of the U.S. majors for several years including 1997. (Note 5)

Marketing costs were reduced by 28 percent between 1990 and 1997 and by 5 percent during 1997 (Table 1). The reduction in marketing costs is partially due to

many of the U.S. majors divesting themselves of their credit card operations and undertaking other cost reduction efforts during the 1990's. (Note 6) Additionally, the

U.S. majors reduced their number of branded outlets by 34 percent over the same period of time, becoming more regional in their approach to marketing, a move that

led to reduced expenses.

The U.S. majors reduced energy costs by 24 percent between 1990 and 1997 and by almost 6 percent between 1996 and 1997. Many of these are utilizing

cogeneration to provide at least some of their electricity needs. (Note 7) Thus, although the gross refined product margin fell by 21 percent between 1990 and 1997,

the net refined product margin increased by almost 1 percent over the same period because of the substantialreduction in costs (Table 1). (Note 8)

In total, the U.S. majors' refined product margin increased by almost 70 percent between 1996 and 1997. Although the refined product margin increased for all groups

of U.S. majors (ranked by the size of total energy assets), the largest U.S. majors led with an increase of 108 percent. The group ofsmallest companies closely

followed the group of largest companies with an increase of 76 percent. Trailing was the group of mid-sized companies, which had an increase of 33 percent. (Note 9)

Upgrading Capacity: Sophisticated Refiners
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Upgrading Capacity: Sophisticated Refiners

May Buy Low, Sell High

Starting in the late 1970's and continuing to the present, the U.S. majors have invested heavily in their refineries in order to utilize heavier, more sulfurous crude oils as

inputs. Over the same period, the U.S. majors have invested in upgrading their refineries to produce greater proportions of lighter, higher valued products, particularly

motor gasoline (Table 2). The actualreturns to these investments depend not only on the levels of input and product prices, but also can be strongly affected by the

differences in prices of light and heavy petroleum products and high and low quality crude oils.

A refinery with a large capital investment directed toward processing lower quality crude oils will do better financially than less versatile refineries when the difference in

price between high quality crude oils and low quality crude oils is large. Similarly, a refinery that has been upgraded to produce a larger yield of light products will do

better than a less sophisticated refinery when the difference between lighter products (e.g., motor gasoline) and heavier products (e.g., residualfuel oil) is large.

Part of the reason for the uptick in profitability in 1997 appears grounded in the refinery upgrades that the U.S. majors have made. The upgrades have increasingly

enabled the U.S. majors to process relatively lower quality crude oil. In 1996 and 1997, the spread between high quality and low quality crude oil increased, reversing a

prior five-year trend (Figure 2), a move that generally favored the majors' typically upgraded refinery.

The upgrades also resulted in proportionately more valuable light products as well as greater quantities through the addition of downstream processing units such as

catalytic cracking and catalytic reforming units. (Note 10) The difference between the selling price for light products and the selling price for heavier products (Note 11)

has increased over the past few years after narrowing during the early 1990's (Figure 3). (Note 12) The increase in quality price spreads from 1995 to 1997 has

favored upgraded refineries and contributed to the recent upswing in the profitability of the U.S. majors' U.S. refining/marketing operations.

Further impetus to upgrade the refineries of the U.S. majors has been provided by the creation of joint ventures with several non-U.S. producers of crude oil.

Venezuela's Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), Mexico's PEMEX, (Note 13) and, more recently, Norway's Statoil(Note 14) have allied themselves with U.S.

refiners. For example, CoastalCorporation and PdVSA formed a joint venture to operate Coastal's Corpus Christirefinery. (Note 15) The refinery will process heavy

crude produced in Venezuela by the joint venture. (Note 16) Similarly, Phillips Petroleum plans to construct a 58,000-barrels-per-day (b/d) coker unit and related

facilities in Venezuela to allow heavy, sour Venezuelan crude to be upgraded (i.e., transformed into lighter crude oil). In addition to making a long-term agreement to

provide crude oil to the refinery, in some cases crude oil producers have provided a portion of the funding for refinery upgrades needed to enhance the refiner's ability to

manufacture light petroleum products. (Note 17) (See the section "Recent StructuralChanges in U.S. Refining:Joint Ventures, Mergers, and Mega-Mergers" for a more

extensive discussion of the recent wide use of joint ventures in U.S. petroleum refining.)

Domestic refinery capacity has also expanded through conventional projects (e.g., adding a catalytic cracking unit) and through debottlenecking (Note 18) investments,

which are marginal investments that increase throughput and thereby effectively create additionalrefining capacity from the same physicalstructure. The additional

capacity gained through debottlenecking is termed "capacity creep." (Note 19) Total U.S. crude oil distillation capacity has increased substantially since 1990 (by more

than 340,000 b/d) as a result of both conventional investments and debottlenecking investments. This capacity expansion was achieved even with the closing of 41

refineries with more than 1.1 million b/d of crude distillation capacity (Table 3). As a result, capacity per operating refinery increased by 28 percent (to 97,060 b/d)

over the 1990 to 1998 period.

Environmental Issues and Costs

Refining investment in recent years has been driven largely by the environmentalrequirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA90). The CAAA90

required a phased reduction in vehicle emissions of regulated pollutants, met primarily through the use of reformulated gasoline. Phase 1 of CAAA90 required refiners to

produce oxygenated gasoline by November of 1992. Low-sulfur dieselfuel was required by October 1993. By January 1, 1995, reformulated gasoline had to be

available. Thus, consistently through the first half of the 1990's, domestic refiners were faced with deadlines for new products requiring new capital investment.

Since reaching a decade peak in 1992 of $5.2 billion, domestic refining capital expenditures by the major U.S. oil companies have fallen an average of 15 percent per

year, reaching the decade's low point in 1996 at $2.1 billion. Correspondingly, investment related to pollution abatement also peaked in 1992 and has since declined,

according to information from the American Petroleum Institute. (Note 20)

Nonetheless, compliance with environmentalregulations will most likely continue to affect domestic refiners. One recent environmentalrestriction affecting the U.S.

downstream petroleum industry was the December 22, 1998 deadline for upgrading or replacing underground storage tanks installed at marketing outlets prior to

December 22, 1988. (Note 21) Although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the regulation in 1989, an estimated 20,000 outlets (Note 22) (about 11

percent of total U.S. outlets according to the latest National Petroleum News survey (Note 23)) had not completed the necessary work by the December 22, 1998

deadline. A grace period announced by EPA just prior to the deadline has led to criticism by some trade associations and created uncertainty concerning the end of the

grace period as well as what, if any, penalties will be assessed for non-compliance. (Note 24)

Two other significant environmental considerations facing U.S. refiners are Phase 2 CAAA90 reformulated motor gasoline (RFG) requirements and the growing public

opposition to the use of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). In order to meet Phase 2 RFG requirements U.S. refiners will incur numerous expenses and make

substantial investment (see "Demand and Price Outlook for Phase 2 Reformulated Gasoline, 2000" for a more extensive discussion of the effects of these requirements).

MTBE is an additive that increases the oxygen content of motor gasoline, causing more complete combustion of the fuel and less pollution. A relatively inexpensive way

for petroleum refiners to meet Phase 1 CAAA90 RFG requirements was to blend MTBE into the motor gasoline. Since late March 1999 California's governor has

called for a 3-year phase-in of a ban on the use of MTBE (Note 25) and U.S. representatives and senators from California and New Jersey have proposed similar

Federal legislation (Note 26). If MTBE were banned in California and other states, the effects could be widespread and highly variable. For example, California motor

gasoline prices could increase substantially as more costly alternatives to MTBE are utilized, which at least initially will be imported from other regions of the United

States, exposing California to production and price variability from those regions (Note 27).

Another interesting development related to the environment is the announcement of two partnerships between major U.S. oil companies and U.S. auto manufacturers to

"... develop cleaner and more efficient fuels." (Note 28) The partnerships willfocus on improved conventionalfuels in addition to alternate fuels such as fuel cells and
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"... develop cleaner and more efficient fuels." (Note 28) The partnerships willfocus on improved conventionalfuels in addition to alternate fuels such as fuel cells and

natural gas.

Recent Structural Changes in U.S. Refining: Joint Ventures, Mergers, and MegaMergers

Joint ventures are one of the mechanisms that the major U.S. oil companies (U.S. majors) have used to consolidate their downstream (Note 29) petroleum operations.

Such deals may provide these companies with a way of reducing their costs by sharing assets and operations without some of the problems of a full-scale merger of the

two companies involved. (In addition to forming downstream joint ventures and alliances in the United States, some of the U.S. majors also are forming alliances

abroad. (Note 30)

The largest of recently completed domestic joint ventures combines the U.S. refining and marketing assets of Texaco, Star Enterprise (a joint venture between Texaco

and Aramco, the Saudi Arabian state oil company), and Shell Oil(the U.S. subsidiary of Royal Dutch/Shell). The joint venture was announced in late 1996 and resulted

in the creation of two companies, Equilon Enterprises L.L.C. and Motiva Enterprises L.L.C. (in January and May, 1998, respectively). Equilon consists of the

companies' western and midwestern U.S. operations as well as their nationwide trading, transportation, and lubricants businesses. (Note 31) Part of the consent

agreement with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission reduced Equilon's assets. (Note 32) In particular, Texaco agreed to sell 60 retail outlets in southern California and

Hawaii(Note 33) and Shell Oil agreed to sell its Anacortes, Washington refinery (108,200 barrels per day (b/d) capacity). (Note 34) Motiva consists of the companies'

eastern and Gulf Coast U.S. operations (with the exception of Shell's Deer Park, Texas refinery, which also is operated as a joint venture between Shell Oil and the

state oil company of Mexico, Petroleos Mexicanos).

The resulting ventures has combined assets with a book value of approximately $10 billion. Equilon has 7 refineries with a total crude oil distillation capacity of

approximately 846,000 b/d and slightly more than 9,000 retail outlets in 32 states. Motiva has 4 refineries with a total crude oil distillation capacity of 819,000 b/d and

almost 14,000 retail outlets in 27 states. (Note 35) Overall, the Texaco-Star-Shell alliance is anticipated to reduce the aggregate operating costs of the companies by

$800 million annually. (Note 36)

As ofJanuary 1, 1998, USX-Marathon Group, a subsidiary of the USX Corporation, and Ashland Oil, an affiliate of Ashland Inc., merged their downstream assets into

a joint venture (called Marathon Ashland Petroleum L.L.C.). USX-Marathon Group is operating the joint venture and is the majority partner with a controlling interest

of 62 percent. (Note 37) The venture has a combined refining capacity of 924,300 b/d (Note 38) and more than 3,000 retail outlets. (Note 39) The joint venture is

anticipated to result in savings of $200 million annually in operating costs.

Other joint ventures are more limited in their scope, involving a single refinery with each partner having a 50-percent share of the venture. As with the larger ventures,

they too are aimed at reducing costs either through reducing or eliminating redundancies, reducing logistical costs, or reducing unused capacity.

Amerada Hess and Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the state oil company of Venezuela, formed a refinery joint venture in 1998. Hess provided its St. Croix,

Virgin Islands 495,000 b/d refinery, (Note 40) receiving $62.5 million in cash and a 10-year note in the amount of $562.5 million. A delayed coking unit will be

constructed at the refinery. The resulting joint venture company, Hovensa L.L.C., signed a long-term supply contract with PdVSA under which it willreceive 155,000

b/d of Venezuelan crude with another 115,000 b/d of heavy Venezuelan crude after the delayed coking unit is completed. (Note 41)

Mobil and Citgo (the wholly-owned U.S. affiliate of PdVSA) formed a joint venture during 1997 to operate Mobil's Chalmette, Louisiana refinery beginning in 1998.

Mobil contributed the 159,000 b/d refinery (Note 42) and PdVSA will contribute at least part of the crude oil processed at the refinery. (Note 43)

Along the same lines, in late 1998 Phillips Petroleum and PdVSA finalized a refinery joint venture involving Phillips' 200,000 b/d Sweeny, Texas refinery. (Note 44)

Phillips and PdVSA will each own 50 percent of a $450-million, 58,000 b/d coking unit scheduled to be operational by the end of 2000. The unit upgrades the

refinery's ability to process heavy crude oil. (Note 45) Additionally, PdVSA willsupply as much as 165,000 b/d of heavy Venezuelan crude oilfor processing at the

refinery.

With the announcement of two mega-mergers, the year 1998 was one of the more eventful years in U.S. petroleum history. The first was the acquisition of the U.S.-

based Amoco Corporation by the UK-based British Petroleum, resulting in the creation of BP Amoco p.l.c., at the time the second-largest oil company in the world

behind Royal Dutch/Shell. However, if the second merger, Exxon's acquisition of the MobilCorporation (both U.S.-based companies), is approved by regulatory

authorities, it willresult in the creation of world's largest oil company.

The merger of BP and Amoco was approved on December 30, 1998 by the U.S. Federal Traded Commission, subject to a consent agreement. The consent

agreement required the sale of 9 terminals and 134 retail outlets, mostly in the southeastern United States, and guaranteed 1,600 independent branded outlets the

opportunity to change brands should they wish. BP stockholders received ownership of 60 percent of the resulting company, BP Amoco p.l.c. (Note 46) The two

companies produced a total of 1.89 million barrels of crude oil and natural gas liquids (3 percent of world production (Note 47)) and 5.66 billion cubic feet of natural

gas (7 percent of world production (Note 48)) per day during 1997. Also during 1997 the merging companies sold 4.5 million barrels per day of petroleum products

through 27,200 outlets worldwide (15,960 of which were in the United States and constituted 9 percent of all domestic motor gasoline retail outlets (Note 49)). The

companies reported combined revenues of $108 billion and net income of $7.3 billion from assets valued at $53 billion. (Note 50)

On December 1, 1998, Exxon announced that it had signed a merger agreement with Mobil that would create the world's largest oil company with $80 billion of assets.

The two companies had joint revenues of $203.1 billion during 1997, resulting in net income of $11.8 billion. The companies had worldwide crude oil and natural gas

liquids production of 2.5 million barrels (Note 51) (3 percent of world production (Note 52)) and 10.9 billion cubic feet of natural gas production per day (14 percent

of world production (Note 53)). Also during 1997 the two companies sold 8.7 million barrels per day of petroleum products through 48,500 motor gasoline retail

outlets (15,900 of which were in the United States and amounted to 9 percent of all domestic motor gasoline retail outlets (Note 54)).

In addition, during 1997 and 1998 substantial mergers have occurred between independent refiners and marketers in the United States, and the resulting companies also

appear to be interested in pursuing joint ventures. For example, in October 1998 the independent refiner/marketer Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (UDS), which

acquired Total Petroleum North America in 1997 (including 3 refineries and more than 2,100 marketing outlets), announced a joint venture with Phillips Petroleum.

(Note 55) However, the venture was abandoned in March 1999 when the firms could not reach agreement on the final terms. (Note 56) This effort represented Phillips'
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(Note 55) However, the venture was abandoned in March 1999 when the firms could not reach agreement on the final terms. (Note 56) This effort represented Phillips'

second unsuccessful attempt to form a downstream joint venture. In 1996, Phillips' attempt to form a downstream joint venture with DuPont/Conoco was thwarted, as

the companies were unable to agree on the value of the assets each would contribute to the venture. (Note 57)

Thus, as the 1990's draw to a close, distinctions in downstream petroleum operations between the majors and the independents are substantially less than at the outset

of the decade. (See the section "U.S. Downstream Independents Acquire National Prominence" for more extensive discussion of the reduced differences between the

U.S. majors and independent refiners.)

Consolidation of Marketing Operations

Gasoline marketing in the United States has undergone dramatic changes over the past 15 years. The major U.S. oil companies have refocused their marketing

operations, narrowing their focus to those regions in which they have had the most success, i.e., the greatest profitability or the greatest market share.

The average decline in states of operation per major oil company was from 32 states in 1984 to 23 states in 1997, a decline of 28 percent. However, this decline is only

part of the consolidation story, as the majors also have substantially fewer branded outlets. The majors' branded outlets declined from 92,344 in 1984 to 33,753 in

1997, a 63-percent decline. (Note 58) The 5-percent average annual decline in the number of the majors' branded outlets between 1991 and 1997 was much greater

than the 2-percent average annual decline in the total number of U.S. gasoline stations (regardless of ownership) between 1991 and 1997. (Note 59) In other words, as

a result of consolidating and refocusing their gasoline marketing efforts, the majors have closed gasoline stations at a rate more than twice as fast as the national average.

In contrast to the majors, foreign-owned and independent refining and marketing companies have expanded their scope of operations, either through the acquisition of

refineries, outlets, or both. For example, Citgo, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Venezuelan state oil company PdVSA, has expanded its operations from 31 states in

1984, just prior to its 1986 acquisition by PdVSA, to 48 states in 1997, an increase of 55 percent. Similarly, the Connecticut-based Tosco has gone from retail

operations in no states in 1990 (they only had wholesale operations) to 37 states in 1997. (Note 60) (See the section "U.S. Downstream Independents Acquire

National Prominence" for a more extensive discussion of the expansion of foreign-owned and independent U.S. refiners during the 1990's.)

U.S. Downstream Independents Acquire

National Prominence in the 1990's

Significant Redistribution of Refining Assets

Due to a long period of low profitability in the refining/marketing line of business, the U.S. majors began a process during the 1990's ofselective refining/marketing

divestiture. In 1990, the U.S. majors (including their joint ventures) held 72 percent of U.S. refining capacity. The independent refiner/marketers who pursued

acquisition growth strategies in the 1990's (the "fast-growing independent refiners") then held only 8 percent of domestic capacity, with 20 percent being held by all

other refiners. By October 1998, the U.S. majors' share of domestic crude distillation capacity had fallen to 54 percent (60 percent including their joint ventures), and

the fast-growing independent refiners had earned their name by increasing their share to 23 percent, an almost threefold increase. The remaining capacity (18 percent) is

still held by all other refiners (Figure 4).

The majors' divestitures of downstream assets created opportunities for smaller, independent U.S. refiner/marketers to acquire domestic refineries and petroleum

marketing outlets and to move into market areas formerly dominated by the U.S. majors. (For the purposes of this discussion, an independent refiner/marketer is one

that has no significant crude oil production.)

The first independent to acquire a refinery from a U.S. major was Tosco Corporation, who acquired Exxon's 200,000 b/d Bayway, New Jersey refinery in April 1993.

(Note 61) Several other independents subsequently pursued a similar acquisition and growth strategy. As a result, a large amount of the U.S. majors' refining and

marketing assets changed hands in the 1990's.

An examination of the data indicate that the U.S. majors have added some capacity to the refineries that they retained, and other capacity gains have been made by the

same independent refiner/marketers who undertook a growth strategy in the 1990's. Among independent refiners, growth has been largely concentrated in the following

group of companies:Citgo/PDV America, Clark Refining and Marketing, Ultramar Diamond Shamrock, Koch Industries, Tesoro Petroleum, Tosco Corporation, and

Valero Energy (Figure 5). (Note 62) As a group, these companies owned 12 refineries with a combined refining capacity ofslightly more than 1.3 million barrels per

day in 1990, about 8 percent of total U.S. refining capacity. (Note 63) By October 1998, the companies owned a total of 29 refineries with a combined refining

capacity of approximately 3.7 million barrels per day, about 23 percent of total U.S. refining capacity (Figure 4). (Note 64)

The near tripling of the refining capacity of this group was largely accomplished through acquisition of refining capacity (88 percent), 66 percent of which was acquired

from the U.S. majors (Table 4). Acquisitions by Tosco (since April 1993) include six refineries from the majors (Exxon-1, BP-2, and Unocal-3) with a totalrefinery

capacity of 747,000 barrels per day (b/d). Since the 1996 merger of Ultramar with Diamond Shamrock, (Note 65) the resulting company (Ultramar Diamond

Shamrock) has acquired Total Petroleum's distillation capacity of 141,600 b/d. (Note 66) UDS also attempted to gain control of Phillips Petroleum's 345,000 b/d

capacity through the formation of a new Ultramar-Phillips joint venture, Diamond 66. (Note 67) However, agreement by both companies on the final terms of the

venture could not be reached and the venture was abandoned in March 1999. The rate of refining capacity acquisition in the United States was especially high during

1998, as thirty-three percent of the capacity acquired between 1991 and 1998 was acquired during 1998 alone.

Gasoline Marketing Operations Also Redistributed

Not only has the crude distillation capacity of the fast-growing independent refiners grown markedly since 1990, so too has their presence in gasoline retailing, as

measured by number of motor gasoline retail outlets. In contrast to the U.S. majors, the fast-growing independent refiners have expanded their scope of operations,

both through acquiring and building new outlets. The number of branded outlets of the fast-growing independent refiners nearly doubled from 1990 to 1997, to 25
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both through acquiring and building new outlets. The number of branded outlets of the fast-growing independent refiners nearly doubled from 1990 to 1997, to 25

thousand (Table 5). Rather than consolidating the geographic scope of their gasoline marketing networks (the concentration strategy pursued by the majors), the fastgrowing independent refiners have expanded their scope. For those independent refiners owning gasoline outlets in 1997, the average number ofstates in which they

retail gasoline increased from 14 states in 1990 to 24 states in 1997.

Recent gasoline marketing acquisitions by independents include Tosco, which has added approximately 2,000 outlets (632 from BP and 1,317 from Unocal) since April

1993. Additionally, in 1996 Tosco acquired the Circle K convenience store chain and its 1,900 gasoline outlets. Prior to this acquisition, Tosco had owned relatively

few convenience store operations. Also, the 1996 merger of Ultramar (which had 420 outlets in California in late 1996) and Diamond Shamrock (which had 1,324

retail outlets in eight different Midwestern States) merged with Ultramar created Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (UDS). Since then, UDS has acquired Total Petroleum

(with a total of 560 outlets), (Note 68) but failed in attempts to create joint ventures with Petro-Canada in 1998, and with Phillips Petroleum in 1999. (Note 69)

Despite these two recent setbacks, the significance of UDS and, more generally, the group of fast-growing independent refiner/marketers in the U.S downstream

petroleum industry has become greater during the 1990's.

NealC. Davis, Energy Information Administration, April 1999

For information on EIA short-term forecasts, see the projections in EIA's Short-Term Energy Outlook. Longer-term forecasts can be found in EIA's Annual Energy

Outlook and International Energy Outlook. Links to these and other EIA publications can be found on EIA's web site.

To be automatically notified via e-mail of updates to this report and to other Energy Finance products, click here, enter your e-mail address, place a check mark (by

left-clicking) in the box beside "Financial and Industry Analysis," and then press the button labeled "subscribe." You will then be notified within an hour of any updates.

This document was prepared by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the independent statistical and analytical agency of the Department of Energy. The

information herein should not be construed as advocating or reflecting any policy position of the Department of Energy or any other organization.

Related EIA Documents

See Energy Information Administration, "The U.S. Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry" (June 28, 1999), for a review of the domestic upstream petroleum industry.

Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 1997, DOE/EIA-0384(97) (Washington, DC, July 1998).

Energy Information Administration, "Financial Performance: Low Profitability in U.S. Refining and Marketing," (November 3, 1997).

Energy Information Administration, "The Impact of EnvironmentalCompliance Costs on U.S. Refining Profitability," (November 3, 1997).

Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual 1997 (pdf format), DOE/EIA-0219(97) (Washington, DC, April 1999).

Energy Information Administration, Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers 1997 (pdf format) (DOE/EIA-0206(97)) (Washington, DC, January 1999).

Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1997, Volume 1, DOE/EIA-0384(97/1) (Washington, DC, June 1998).

Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1, DOE/EIA-0384(96/1) (Washington, DC, June 1997).

Energy Information Administration, Privatization and Globalization of Energy Markets (DOE/EIA-0609) (Washington, DC, October 1996).

Energy Information Administration, "Why Do Motor Gasoline Prices Vary Regionally? California Case Study," (June9, 1998).

Endnotes

1. See "Financial Performance: Low Profitability in U.S. Refining and Marketing," for a more complete discussion of domestic refining and marketing profitability

over the last several years.

2. Energy Information Administration, Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers 1997 (PDF-format), DOE/EIA-0206(97) (Washington, DC, January

1999), Table 12.

3. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook (April 8, 1999), Table A2.

4. Energy Information Administration, Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers 1997 (PDF-format) , DOE/EIA-0206(97) (Washington, DC January

1999), Figure 13.

5. For example, see Exxon Corporation, Annual Report 1997, (October 25 1998), pp. 1 and 3; and CoastalCorporation, "Refining, Marketing, and Chemicals"

(October 25, 1998), p. 2.

6. This trend continued through 1997 as Texaco reported that it received $13 million for the sale of its credit card operation. See Texaco, 1997 Annual Report, p.
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6. This trend continued through 1997 as Texaco reported that it received $13 million for the sale of its credit card operation. See Texaco, 1997 Annual Report, p.

31.

7. For example, during 1997 both Exxon and Phillips mentioned in their annualreports that cogeneration plants had been completed at refineries, or were under

construction. See Exxon Corporation, 1997 Annual Report, p. 12 and Phillips Petroleum, 1997 Annual Report, p. 16.

8. Financial Analysis Team, Office of Energy Markets and End Use, Energy Information Administration, FinancialReporting System.

9. Energy Information Administration, Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers 1997 (PDF-format), DOE/EIA-0206(97) (Washington, DC, January

1999), Table 14.

10. Catalytic cracking is the refining process of breaking down the larger, heavier, and more complex hydrocarbon molecules into simpler and lighter molecules.

Catalytic cracking is accomplished by the use of a catalytic agent and is an effective process for increasing the yield of gasoline from crude oil. Catalytic cracking

processes fresh feeds and recycled feeds. A fresh feed is crude oil or petroleum distillates, which are being fed to processing units for the first time. A recycled

feed is one that is continuously fed back for additional processing. Catalytic reforming is a refining process using controlled heat and pressure with catalysts to

rearrange certain hydrocarbon molecules, thereby converting paraffinic and naphthenic type hydrocarbons (e.g., low-octane gasoline boiling range fractions) into

petrochemicalfeedstocks and higher octane stocks suitable for blending into finished gasoline. Catalytic reforming is reported in two categories, low pressure and

high pressure. A low-pressure unit operates with less than 225 pounds per square inch gauge (measured at the outlet separator) and a high-pressure unit operates

with 225 (or more) pounds per square inch gauge. See Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1997, Volume 1, DOE/EIA-0340(97)/1

(Washington, DC, June 1998), pp. 126-127.

11. Higher quality products are those such as motor gasoline, jet fuel, and aviation gasoline. Alternatively, lower quality products are those such as residualfuel oil.

12. The quality cost spread is the difference between the prices of higher quality (i.e., lighter and sweeter) crude oil and lower quality (i.e., heavier and more sour)

crude oil. The relative viscosity of crude oil is determined by its API gravity. Light crude generally has an API gravity of 38, or greater. Heavy crude oil has an

API gravity of 22, or less. Intermediate crude has an API gravity that falls between 22 and 38. The amount ofsulfur in crude oil determines whether the crude is

considered sweet (i.e., it has a low percentage of its weight contributed by sulfur), or sour (i.e., it has a high percentage of its weight contributed by sulfur).

13. PEMEX has a prospective joint venture with Mobil involving the Beaumont, Texas refinery, which has a capacity of 157,500 b/d. See Petroleum Intelligence

Weekly, Volume 37, Number 23 (June 8, 1998), p. 3.

14. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Volume 37, Number 24 (June 15, 1998), p. 8.

15. "Venezuela: US Operations," IAC (SM) Newsletter Database, Arab Press Service Organisation, APS Review Downstream Trends, Volume 49, Number 25

(December 22, 1997).

16. Hillary Durgin, "CoastalCorp. Says It Intends To Make Canadian Acquisitions," The Houston Chronicle (May 8, 1998), p. 2.

17. Products such as such as motor gasoline, jet fuel, and dieselfuel.

18. Debottlenecking investments are upgrades to one or more parts of a refinery that thereby allow fuller use of other parts of the refinery without making any direct

changes to them. Such relatively inexpensive investments in a refinery may result in substantial increases in the capacity of the refinery.

19. Capacity creep is the increased capacity of refining units resulting from debottlenecking investments.

20. American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Industry Environmental Performance 6th AnnualReport (pdf format) (Washington, DC).

21. MitchelBenson, "Gas Stations Imperiled by Tank Law," The Wall Street Journal (February 11, 1998), p. CA1.

22. Gas Stations Face Closure on EPA Tank Rules Today," The Wall Street Journal (December 22, 1998).

23. National Petroleum News, Volume 90, Number 8 (mid-July 1998), p. 124.

24. "Associations Oppose Delay in EPA's UST Rule," Oil and Gas Journal, Volume 97, Number 1 (January 4, 1999).

25. "Calif Gov Davis Orders Ban of Fuel Additive MTBE," Dow Jones Newswires (March 25, 1999).

26. "N.J. Congressman Introduces Bill to Ban Use of MTBE," Dow Jones Newswires (April 12, 1999).

27. Hart's Oxy-Fuel News, Volume 11, Number 12 (March 29, 1999).

28. "Ford, Mobil To Make Cleaner Fuels," Associated Press (March 5, 1998).

29. Downstream petroleum refers to petroleum refining, marketing, and transportation. However, transportation (chiefly pipelines and marine transport) is omitted

from this discussion.

30. See Energy Information Administration, Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers 1997 (PDF-format), DOE/EIA-0206(97) (Washington, DC,

January 1999) for a discussion of one of the most significant of the foreign alliances. In particular, see the Chapter 3 Highlight entitled "BP-Mobil Alliance of

European Refining Operations."

31. Shell Oil owns 56 percent of Equilon and Texaco has a 44-percent share. See "Shell, Texaco, and SaudiRefining Inc. Announce Approval of Eastern/Gulf U.S.

Downstream Alliance: Motiva Enterprises,"Business Wire (May 2, 1998).

32. Shell Oil, 1997 Annual Report, p. 52 and Texaco, 1997 Annual Report, p. 20.
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33. Shell/Texaco Seeking Buyer of 60 U.S. Gas Stations,"Reuters World News Service (July 7, 1998).

34. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1 DOE/EIA-0340(96)/1 (Washington, DC, June 1997), Table 40.

35. Shell, Texaco, and Saudi Aramco Announce Formation and Operational Start-Up of Motiva Enterprises,"Business Wire (July 2, 1998).

36. Hillary Durgin, "Marketing, Refining Pact Signed; Texaco, Aramco, Shell Teaming Up," The Houston Chronicle (May 28, 1998), p. 1.

37. "Ashland, Marathon Ink Merger Agreement After FTC Clears Deal," Octane Week, Volume 12, Number 49 (December 15, 1997).

38. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1 DOE/EIA-0340(96)/1 (Washington, DC, June 1997), Table 40.

39. National Petroleum News, Volume 90, Number 8 (mid-July 1998), p. 47.

40. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1 DOE/EIA-0340(96)/1 (Washington, DC, June 1997), Table 40.

41. "Amerada Hess Announces Establishment of Refinery Joint Venture with Petroleos de Venezuela," PR Newswire (November 2, 1998).

42. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1 DOE/EIA-0340(96)/1 (Washington, DC, June 1997), Table 40.

43. MobilCorporation, 1997 Annual Report, p. 42.

44. "Phillips, PdVSA Agree to Build Coker at Phillips' Sweeny, Texas Complex," Phillips News Release (November 2, 1998).

45. "Phillips, Corpoven Sign Principles of Agreement To Build New Coker," Phillips News Release (August 22, 1997).

46. Tom Doggett, "U.S. Approves BP-Amoco Merger, Seeks Divestitures,"Reuters (December 30, 1998).

47. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual 1997 (PDF-format), DOE/EIA-0219(97) (Washington, DC, April 1999), Table G1.

48. British Petroleum, BP 1997: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 1998), p. 23.

49. National Petroleum News, Volume 90, Number 8 (mid-July 1998), pp. 44, 124.

50. BP Amoco, p.l.c., "BP and Amoco Merge to Enter Global Top Trio of Oil Majors (August 11, 1998)."

51. Exxon Corporation, "Exxon and Mobil Sign Merger Agreement (December 1, 1998)."

52. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Annual 1997 (PDF-format), DOE/EIA-0219(97) (Washington, DC, April 1999), Table G1.

53. British Petroleum, BP 1997: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 1998), p. 23.

54. National Petroleum News, Volume 90, Number 8 (mid-July 1998), pp. 44, 124.

55. "Ultramar Diamond Shamrock and Phillips Petroleum to Form Joint Venture Creating Largest Independent Refining and Marketing Company in North America,"

Phillips News Release (October 8, 1998).

56. "Phillips, UDS Scratch Diamond 66 Plans," The Oil Daily, Volume 49, Number 55 (March 23, 1999).

57. "Conoco CEO Sees Company Going It Alone in U.S. Downstream," Dow Jones News Service (November 10, 1997).

58. Energy Information Administration, Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers 1997 (pdf format), DOE/EIA-0206(97) (Washington, DC, January

1999), Table B30; and Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-28 (FinancialReporting System).

59. National Petroleum News, Volume 90, Number 8 (mid-July 1998), p. 120 and National Petroleum News, Volume 84, Number 7 (mid-June 1992), p. 119.

60. National Petroleum News, Volume 77, Number 7 (mid-June 1985), pp. 44-51 and National Petroleum News, Volume 90, Number 8 (mid-July 1998), pp.

44-52.

61. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1993 Volume 1 (DOE/EIA-0340(93)/1) (Washington, DC, June 1994), Table 49.

62. During 1996 Ultramar and Diamond Shamrock merged, forming Ultramar Diamond Shamrock.

63. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1990, Volume 1, DOE/EIA-0340(90)/1 (May 1991, Washington, DC), Tables 36 and 39.

64. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1 DOE/EIA-0340(96)/1 (June 1997, Washington, DC), Tables 36 and 40 and

Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1997, Volume 1, DOE/EIA-0340(97)/1 (June 1998, Washington, DC), Table 38.

65. Ultramar also had substantialCanadian operations that became part of Ultramar Diamond Shamrock after the merger. Ultramar owned a 150,000 b/d refinery in

Quebec, and a total of 1,341 retail outlets in Canada. Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1 DOE/EIA-0340(96)/1

(Washington, DC, June 1997), Table 40; and National Petroleum News, Volume 88, Number 8 (Mid-July 1996), p. 80.

66. Alan Kovski, "BP quitting Northwest with sale of refinery, outlets to Tosco," The Oil Daily, Volume 43, Number 187 (September 29, 1993), p. 3; Robin Sidel,

"Tosco to Stay on Growth Track,"Reuters Financial Service (February 16, 1996); and "Ultramar to Announce Purchase of Total U.S. Assets,"Reuters Financial
4/7/2014 The U.S. Petroleum Refining and Gasoline Marketing:

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"Tosco to Stay on Growth Track,"Reuters Financial Service (February 16, 1996); and "Ultramar to Announce Purchase of Total U.S. Assets,"Reuters Financial

Service (April 15, 1997); Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1 DOE/EIA-0340(96)/1 (Washington, DC, June

1997), Table 49; and Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1997, Volume 1, DOE/EIA-0340(97)/1 (Washington, DC, June 1998),

Table 38.

67. "Ultramar Diamond Shamrock and Phillips Petroleum to Form Joint Venture Creating Largest Independent Refining and Marketing Company in North America,"

Business Wire (October 9, 1998).

68. Alan Kovski, "BP quitting Northwest with sale of refinery, outlets to Tosco," The Oil Daily, Volume 43, Number 187 (September 29, 1993), p. 3; Robin Sidel,

"Tosco to Stay on Growth Track,"Reuters Financial Service (February 16, 1996); and "Ultramar to Announce Purchase of Total U.S. Assets,"Reuters Financial

Service (April 15, 1997); Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1996, Volume 1 DOE/EIA-0340(96)/1 (Washington, DC, June

1997), Table 49; and Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual 1997, Volume 1, DOE/EIA-0340(97)/1 (Washington, DC, June 1998),

Table 38.

69. "Phillips, UDS Scratch Diamond 66 Plans," The Oil Daily, Volume 49, Number 55 (March 23, 1999).

Text last modified:June 1999

File last modified:January 22, 2008

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neal.davis@eia.doe.gov

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