COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

January 9, 2024

Samuel A. Christensen

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2023AP630 Cir. Ct. No. 2020TP51

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

IN RE THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO H. C. J.,

A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

R. G.,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

J. J.,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Chippewa County: 

STEVEN H. GIBBS, Judge. Affirmed. 
No. 2023AP630

2

¶1 GILL, J.1 Jacob2appeals from an order terminating his parental 

rights to his son, Hank, based upon a continuing denial of periods of physical 

placement or visitation pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4).3 Jacob argues that the 

circuit court erred by concluding he was “denied” periods of physical placement 

based upon his stipulation in a family law action that he would have no custody or 

physical placement of his son until further order of the court. He also argues that 

his due process rights were violated because his parental rights were terminated 

without a hearing on his fitness as a parent. We reject Jacob’s arguments and 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Jacob and Rita were married and had a son, Hank, who was born in 

November 2015. In May 2016, a criminal action was commenced against Jacob

for sexual assault of an unrelated child. Jacob and Rita divorced in December 

2016. In April 2017, Jacob was convicted of second-degree sexual assault of a 

child, exposing genitals to a child, and causing a child between the ages of thirteen 

and eighteen to view sexual activity. 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2021-22). All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.

2

 For ease of reading, we refer to the appellant, the child, and the associated family 

members in this confidential matter using pseudonyms, rather than their initials.

3

 Cases appealed under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.107 are “given preference and shall be 

taken in an order that ensures that a decision is issued within 30 days after the filing of the 

appellant’s reply.” RULE 809.107(6)(e). Conflicts in this court’s calendar have resulted in a 

delay. It is therefore necessary for this court to sua sponte extend the deadline for a decision in 

this case. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.82(2)(a); Rhonda R.D. v. Franklin R.D., 191 Wis. 2d 680, 

694, 530 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1995). Accordingly, we extend our deadline to the date this 

decision is issued. 
No. 2023AP630

3

¶3 In June 2017, prior to Jacob being sentenced, Jacob and Rita 

addressed previously reserved divorce issues, including the issue of Hank’s 

custody and physical placement. Jacob and Rita presented a stipulated custodial 

agreement to the circuit court which stated that “[Rita] shall have sole legal 

custody of the parties’ minor child, [Hank].... [Rita] shall have sole and primary 

physical placement of the child. [Jacob] shall have no placement time with the 

minor child until further order of the [c]ourt.” The court incorporated this 

custodial agreement, in its entirety, into a supplemental divorce judgment. The 

following day, Jacob was sentenced in his criminal case to six years’ initial 

confinement followed by six years’ extended supervision. 

¶4 In December 2020, Rita petitioned the circuit court to terminate 

Jacob’s parental rights. Based upon the supplemental divorce judgment, Rita 

asserted that Jacob’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds of 

continuing denial of periods of physical placement and failure to assume parental 

responsibility pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) and (6), respectively. Jacob 

moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the supplemental divorce judgment did 

not constitute a “denial” of physical placement as required by § 48.415(4). The

court rejected the motion to dismiss, stating that the supplemental divorce 

judgment was entered in an action affecting the family, thereby satisfying 

§ 48.415(4). 

¶5 In July 2022, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, where the circuit 

court was tasked with determining whether there were grounds to terminate 
No. 2023AP630

4

Jacob’s parental rights to Hank.

4

 In its decision, amongst other things, the court 

quoted the supplemental divorce judgment, which granted sole physical placement 

of Hank to Rita; noted that Hank’s placement had not been modified since the 

supplemental divorce judgment was entered; and thereby found—by clear and 

convincing evidence—that there were grounds to terminate Jacob’s parental rights 

due to continuing denial of periods of physical placement or visitation pursuant to 

WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4).

5

 The court then found Jacob to be an unfit parent 

pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.424(4).6 The court subsequently conducted a 

dispositional hearing, determined that it was in Hank’s best interests to terminate 

Jacob’s parental rights, and granted the petition to terminate Jacob’s parental 

rights. 

¶6 Jacob filed a motion for reconsideration, again arguing that the 

stipulated custodial agreement was not a denial of physical placement and thus 

could not satisfy WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4). Jacob further argued that terminating his 

parental rights pursuant to § 48.415(4) violated his due process rights, as the 

circuit court’s order terminating his parental rights did not allege unfitness. The 

court denied Jacob’s motion, stating that Rita had proved by clear and convincing 

 

4

 “Wisconsin has a two-part statutory procedure for the involuntary termination of 

parental rights.” Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶24, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856. In 

the first step, the grounds phase, a fact finder must determine whether the petitioner has 

established the existence of one or more of the statutorily enumerated grounds for a termination 

of parental rights. See WIS. STAT. § 48.424(1)(a). In the second step, the dispositional phase, the 

circuit “court is called upon to decide whether it is in the best interest of the child that the parent’s 

rights be permanently extinguished.” Steven V., 271 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27.

5

 The circuit court concluded that Rita did not prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that Jacob failed to assume parental responsibility. Rita does not challenge this ruling on appeal,

and, therefore, we do not discuss this ground further. 

6

 WISCONSIN STAT. § 48.424(4) provides that “[i]f grounds for the termination of 

parental rights are found by the [circuit] court or jury, the court shall find the parent unfit.”
No. 2023AP630

5

evidence that the requirements in § 48.415(4) were satisfied and that the court was 

therefore required to find Jacob an unfit parent. Jacob now appeals. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 Jacob argues that he was not “denied” placement as required by WIS.

STAT. § 48.415(4) because he stipulated to the custody and placement agreement

underlying the supplemental divorce judgment and because the supplemental 

divorce judgment allows Jacob to have placement upon “further order of the 

[c]ourt.” Jacob further argues that § 48.415(4) is unconstitutional as applied to 

him because the statute deprives him of the fundamental right to parent his child 

without a hearing regarding his fitness as a parent. We reject Jacob’s arguments 

and affirm. 

¶8 Whether the circuit court erred by concluding that the supplemental 

divorce judgment is a “denial” of physical placement under WIS. STAT.

§ 48.415(4) is a question of statutory interpretation. See State v. Perry, 215 

Wis. 2d 696, 706-07, 573 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1997). Statutory interpretation 

presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Nowell v. City of Wausau, 

2013 WI 88, ¶19, 351 Wis. 2d 1, 838 N.W.2d 852.

¶9 “[S]tatutory interpretation ‘begins with the language of the statute. 

If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.’ Statutory 

language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 

technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special 

definitional meaning.” State v. ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 

WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted). Statutory 

language should be “interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
No. 2023AP630

6

but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 

statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46. 

¶10 WISCONSIN STAT. ch. 48 does not define the word “denial,” see WIS.

STAT. § 48.02; and we therefore turn to the plain meaning of the word within its 

statutory context. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶45-46. Jacob’s parental rights 

were terminated under WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4), continuing denial of periods of 

physical placement or visitation, which requires showing both

(a) That the parent has been denied periods of physical 

placement by court order in an action affecting the family 

or has been denied visitation under an order under [WIS.

STAT. §§] 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 938.345, 938.363 or 

938.365 containing the notice required by [WIS. STAT.

§§] 48.356(2) or 938.356(2).

(b) That at least one year has elapsed since the order 

denying periods of physical placement or visitation was 

issued and the court has not subsequently modified its order 

so as to permit periods of physical placement or visitation.

Sec. 48.415(4).

¶11 This court has clarified that “the first usage of ‘or’ in [WIS. STAT.

§] 48.415(4)(a) separates the paragraph into two self-contained clauses, one 

pertaining to family court orders and the other applicable to juvenile court orders.” 

Kimberly S.S. v. Sebastian X.L., 2005 WI App 83, ¶7, 281 Wis. 2d 261, 697 

N.W.2d 476. Here, the clause relevant to the termination of Jacob’s parental 

rights is the clause pertaining to family court orders. WISCONSIN STAT.

§ 767.001(1) defines “[a]ction affecting the family” to include divorce actions and

actions “[c]oncerning periods of physical placement or visitation rights to 

children.” Sec. 767.001(1)(c), (k). 
No. 2023AP630

7

¶12 Jacob stipulated to not having physical placement of Hank as a part 

of Jacob and Rita’s divorce case. Consequently, the stipulation—and the 

subsequent supplemental divorce judgment—occurred in an action affecting the 

family. Further, it is uncontested that at the time the circuit court found grounds to 

terminate Jacob’s parental rights, more than one year had passed since the 

supplemental divorce judgment was entered. 

¶13 Subject to limitations not relevant to this appeal, WIS. STAT.

§ 767.34(1) permits the parties in a divorce action, subject to the circuit court’s 

approval, to “stipulate ... for the support of children, or for legal custody and 

physical placement.” However, a “stipulation under this provision is ‘merely a 

recommendation jointly made by [the parties in a divorce action] to the court 

suggesting what the judgment, if granted, is to provide.’” Hottenroth v. Hetsko, 

2006 WI App 249, ¶12, 298 Wis. 2d 200, 727 N.W.2d 38 (alteration in original; 

citation omitted). “When a court adopts a stipulation, it ‘does so on its own 

responsibility, and the provisions become its own judgment.’” Id., ¶25 (citation 

omitted). 

¶14 It is uncontested that Jacob stipulated to the custody and placement

agreement that provided him with no physical placement of Hank. This 

stipulation, however, was merely a recommendation to the circuit court and had no 

effect by itself. See id., ¶12. It was not until the court adopted the stipulation and 

incorporated it into its supplemental divorce judgment that the stipulation went 

into effect and became binding. See id., ¶¶12-13. The supplemental divorce 

judgment, with the incorporated stipulated custody and placement agreement, had 

the effect of denying Jacob physical placement of Hank. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the court’s supplemental divorce judgment was a court order in an 
No. 2023AP630

8

action affecting the family denying Jacob periods of physical placement, as 

required by WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4)(a).

¶15 Jacob contends that the plain meaning of “denied” “suggests some 

kind of adverse order[] against a parent’s request for placement.” Jacob defines 

“denial” as a “refusal to satisfy a request or desire.” Denial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 

DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/denial (last visited 

Jan. 3, 2024). Instead of denying him placement, Jacob argues that the 

supplemental divorce judgment merely “allocated [physical placement of Hank] 

solely to Rita in light of Jacob’s incarceration and ‘until further order of the 

[c]ourt.’” In support of this argument, Jacob notes that the supplemental divorce

judgment did not use the word “denied.”

¶16 We are not persuaded by Jacob’s argument. We first note that WIS.

STAT. § 48.415(4) does not require that a circuit court in an action affecting the 

family specifically use the words “denial” or “denied” for its orders to effectuate a 

denial of physical placement. We decline to impose a requirement that the court 

use specific language that the statute does not require. See State v. Brown, 2020 

WI 63, ¶¶27-28, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 584 (“The law generally rejects 

imposing ‘magic words’ requirements.”) (citations omitted). Rita argues, and we 

agree, that Merriam-Webster also defines “denial” as a “negation” and that the 

supplemental divorce judgment negated Jacob’s rights to physical placement of

Hank. See Denial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/denial (last visited Jan. 3, 2024). 

The supplemental divorce judgment provided Jacob with “no placement time 

with” Hank and awarded sole placement to Rita. The only way for Jacob to obtain 

placement of Hank—without violating the court order—would have been for him 
No. 2023AP630

9

to petition the court to modify physical placement. Thus, the supplemental 

divorce judgment had the effect of denying Jacob physical placement of Hank.

¶17 Jacob next argues that he was not “denied” physical placement under 

WIS. STAT. § 45.415(4) because the term “denial of physical placement” has a 

special meaning in WIS. STAT. ch. 767 and it requires the circuit court to find that 

“physical placement rights would endanger the child’s physical, mental, or 

emotional health.” See WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(b). In support of this argument, 

Jacob notes that § 767.41(4)(cm) states, “If a court denies periods of physical 

placement under this section, the court shall give the parent that was denied 

periods of physical placement the warning provided under [WIS. STAT. §] 48.356.” 

Jacob then notes that § 48.356 requires the court to “orally inform the 

parent ... who appear[s] in court of any grounds for termination of parental rights 

under [§] 48.415 which may be applicable and of the conditions necessary for the 

child ... to be returned to the home.” See § 48.356(1). Jacob also argues that 

“denial,” as applied to a stipulated custodial agreement, would have required the 

parties to stipulate that physical placement of Hank with Jacob would endanger 

Hank’s physical, mental, or emotional health. 

¶18 We first note that Jacob’s argument—that WIS. STAT. ch. 767’s 

definition of “denial of placement” applies to WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4)—has 

previously been rejected by this court. See Kimberly S.S., 281 Wis. 2d 261, 

¶¶8-12 (“To the extent that [the father] is arguing that the legislature would not 

enact statutes that treated similar situations differently, we repeat that the 

legislature unambiguously did just that in ... § 48.415(4). The remedy here, if any 

is needed, is legislative, not judicial.”). Further, even if Jacob were correct in 

arguing that the definition “denial of physical placement” in WIS. STAT.

§ 767.41(4)(b) is linked to termination of parental rights proceedings, Jacob was 
No. 2023AP630

10

not denied physical placement under § 767.41(4). Rather, the circuit court 

approved Jacob and Rita’s custodial stipulation regarding Hank’s physical 

placement pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 767.34(1).

¶19 WISCONSIN STAT. § 767.34, while containing some limitations on 

the types of stipulations the circuit court may approve, contains no provision 

mandating the court to give a parent who is denied physical placement the warning 

required under WIS. STAT. § 48.356. Similarly, § 767.34 contains no language—

either directly or by citing to WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)—requiring parties to 

stipulate that physical placement of a child with a parent would be harmful to the 

child in order for a court’s adoption of a stipulated agreement to qualify as a denial 

of placement. Thus, in the absence of statutory language supporting Jacob’s

contentions, we reject his argument. See Fond Du Lac County v. Town of 

Rosendale, 149 Wis. 2d 326, 334, 440 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1989) (“One of the 

maxims of statutory construction is that courts should not add words to a statute to 

give it a certain meaning.”). 

¶20 Jacob also argues that relying on the custody and placement

agreement within the supplemental divorce judgment to conclude that the 

requirements in WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) were satisfied would lead to an absurd 

result. In support, Jacob presents a hypothetical situation where a parent serving 

in the military is deployed overseas for an indeterminate amount of time, thus 

resulting in an order granting sole physical placement to the other parent and 

exposing the serving parent to having their parental rights terminated. We reject 

this argument. 

¶21 WISCONSIN STAT. § 767.34(3)(b) states that a circuit court “may 

approve a stipulation for legal custody and physical placement that includes 
No. 2023AP630

11

modifications to legal custody or physical placement upon the occurrence of a 

specified future event that is reasonably certain to occur within 2 years of the date 

of the stipulation.” Notably, this paragraph does not indicate that stipulations 

without such a time limitation are void. Regardless of the above, any parent’s 

stipulation would not result in the automatic termination of his or her parental 

rights. The termination of parental rights action would simply proceed to the 

second phase of the proceedings, where the court must consider the child’s best 

interests, including whether the child has a substantial relationship with the parent 

and the duration of the parent’s separation from the child. WIS. STAT. § 48.426(3). 

We note that, in the present case, Jacob had approximately four years in which he 

could have petitioned the circuit court to amend the order, and like in the above 

hypothetical, Jacob had the opportunity to prove to the court that termination of 

his rights was not in Hank’s best interest regardless of the supplemental family 

law order, but failed to do so.

7

¶22 We now turn to Jacob’s argument that WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) is 

unconstitutional as applied to him. Jacob argues that § 48.415(4) violates his due 

process rights because his parental rights were terminated without a hearing on his 

fitness as a parent. 

¶23 “Whether a statute is constitutional presents a question of law that 

we review de novo.” Dane Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. P.P., 2005 WI 32, ¶14, 

279 Wis. 2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344. “A party challenging a statute’s 

 

7

 We also note that, when an order of physical placement is modified due to a service 

member being called to active duty in the military, WIS. STAT. § 767.451(3m) requires that the 

“the allocation of periods of physical placement and, if applicable, physical placement schedule 

that were in effect before the modification are reinstated immediately upon the service member's 

discharge or release from active duty.” 
No. 2023AP630

12

constitutionality bears a heavy burden to overcome the presumption of 

constitutionality.... [A] party ... must demonstrate that the statute is 

unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., ¶18. It is undisputed that Jacob 

has a fundamental liberty interest at stake; and thus, WIS. STAT. § 48.415(4) must 

withstand strict scrutiny. See P.P., 279 Wis. 2d 169, ¶20. “[T]o withstand strict 

scrutiny, a statute must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. 

Here, the compelling state interest is to protect children from unfit parents. 

Accordingly, the statutory scheme at issue must be narrowly tailored to advance 

the State’s interest in protecting children from unfit parents.” Id. 

¶24 As-applied constitutional challenges question the constitutionality of 

a statute “on the facts of a particular case or [as applied] to a particular party.” 

State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶10 n.9, 323 Wis. 2d 377, 780 N.W.2d 90 (citation 

omitted). “‘In an as-applied challenge, the constitutionality of the statute itself is 

not attacked; accordingly, the presumption that the statute is constitutional 

applies....’ However, while we presume the statute is constitutional, ‘we do not 

presume that the State applies statutes in a constitutional manner.’” Mayo v. 

Wisconsin Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶56, 383 Wis. 2d 

1, 914 N.W.2d 678 (citations omitted). 

¶25 Jacob correctly notes that he “is entitled to a hearing on his fitness as 

a parent before his children [are] taken from him.” See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 

U.S. 645, 649 (1972). However, Jacob misunderstands the Wisconsin termination 

of parental rights process, insomuch as the grounds phase of the termination of 

parental rights proceedings is a hearing on a parent’s fitness. See Sheboygan 

Cnty. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Tanya M.B., 2010 WI 55, ¶¶50-52, 325 

Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 369 (“WIS[CONSIN] STAT. ch. 48 reflects” that “the due 

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that proof of parental 
No. 2023AP630

13

unfitness be shown by clear and convincing evidence.”). WISCONSIN STAT.

§§ 48.415 and 48.424(4) require the circuit court to find a parent unfit if the 

petitioner proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that grounds exist for the 

termination of parental rights. 

¶26 In the instant case, a hearing was held to determine whether there 

were grounds to terminate Jacob’s parental rights. Jacob had the right to—and 

did—present evidence at that hearing regarding his fitness as Hank’s parent. At 

the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that Rita had proved by clear 

and convincing evidence that there were grounds to terminate Jacob’s parental 

rights. Based on that finding, and pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.424(4), the court 

found Jacob unfit as a parent. Thus, we reject Jacob’s argument that his parental 

rights were terminated without a hearing. See B.L.J. v. Polk Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 153 Wis. 2d 249, 255-56, 450 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1989) (“A parent 

whose rights are terminated under § 48.424(4) has received more than adequate 

protection by the prescribed process of termination of parental rights.”).

¶27 Jacob also argues that the circuit court’s finding of unfitness violated 

his due process rights because the finding was impermissibly based solely on his 

incarceration. Our supreme court has previously concluded that:

[A] parent’s incarceration is not itself a sufficient basis to 

terminate parental rights. Other factors must also be

considered, such as the parent’s relationship with the child 

and any other child both prior to and while the parent is 

incarcerated, the nature of the crime committed by the 

parent, the length and type of sentence imposed, the 

parent’s level of cooperation with the responsible agency 

and the Department of Corrections, and the best interests of 

the child.
No. 2023AP630

14

Kenosha Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶50, 293 Wis. 2d 

530, 716 N.W.2d 845.8 

¶28 In its written decision after the grounds trial, the circuit court 

directly addressed Jacob’s concern that its finding of unfitness was impermissibly 

based solely on his incarceration. The court quoted the above language from 

Jodie W., noted that the main reasons that Rita wanted to terminate Jacob’s 

parental rights were his “crimes, convictions, and incarceration,” and then 

addressed each of the factors listed in Jodie W. Specifically, the court noted that

[e]vidence showed [that Jacob] initially had a relationship 

with [Hank] when he was a very young child. Then, 

[Jacob] was convicted of 2nd degree sexual assault of child 

(not his own child), exposing genitals to a child, and 

causing a child 13-16 to view sex activity. He was 

sentenced to 6 years in prison and is expected to be 

released on extended supervision in 2023. It appears that 

[Jacob] has cooperated with the Department of Corrections. 

During his incarceration, he has tried to keep in touch with 

[Hank] by writing him. [Rita] has asked him to stop 

writing.

The court was also aware that Jacob co-parented another child while incarcerated. 

¶29 Although the circuit court did not provide a detailed analysis of the 

Jodie W. factors, nor specify how they relate to Hank’s best interests, we search 

the record to support the court’s findings. Given the court’s comments and 

decision, we infer the court found that Jacob was unfit to continue to parent Hank 

 

8

 We note that Kenosha County Department of Human Services v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 

93, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845 was a case where the ground for termination of parental 

rights was continuing need of protection or services rather than continuing denial of periods of 

physical placement or visitation. See id., ¶8; WIS. STAT. § 48.415(2). We assume without 

deciding that the Jodie W. factors apply to the ground of continuing denial of periods of physical 

placement or visitation. 
No. 2023AP630

15

based upon the nature of Jacob’s crimes, coupled with the length of his 

incarceration, and lack of ongoing communication with Hank. Thus, the court 

considered the additional factors set forth by our supreme court. Cf. id., ¶¶52-55

(Termination of parental rights reversed due to the circuit court improperly 

deeming the parent unfit “solely by virtue of her status as an incarcerated person 

without regard for her actual parenting activities or the condition of her child”); 

Kia M.E. v. Jerome E.O., No. 2009AP2383, unpublished slip op. ¶¶15-19 (WI 

App Dec. 3, 2009)9(Termination of parental rights based upon denial of periods of 

physical placement reversed due to the court’s written order clearly providing that 

the sole reason for denying physical placement was because the parent was

incarcerated). Regardless, the termination of Jacob’s parental rights was not based 

solely on his incarceration but, rather, on the facts noted above as well as the 

supplemental divorce judgment based on the custody and placement agreement 

that Jacob stipulated to. Accordingly, we reject Jacob’s argument that the court 

impermissibly found him unfit as a parent based solely on his incarceration.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

 

9

 Unpublished opinions authored by a single judge and issued on or after July 1, 2009, 

may be cited for their persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(b).