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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Nos. 13-CF-1130 & 13-CF-1132

OMAR V. ROLLERSON & ROLITA N. BURNS, APPELLANTS,

V.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeals from the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia

(CF3-10870-12)

(Hon. Patricia A. Broderick, Trial Judge)

(Argued June 4, 2015 Decided December 17, 2015) 

Justin Murray, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein and Alice 

Wang, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant Omar V. Rollerson. 

Mindy A. Daniels for appellant Rolita N. Burns. 

Katherine M. Kelly, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth 

Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello, and Kendra D. Briggs, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before WASHINGTON, Chief Judge, EASTERLY, Associate Judge, and BELSON, 

Senior Judge.

WASHINGTON, Chief Judge: This case arises out of two altercations, taking

place on June 18, 2012, in which appellants Omar V. Rollerson (“Rollerson”) and 
2

Rolita N. Burns (“Burns”) allegedly sought to identify and punish those responsible 

for slashing Burns‟s car tires. Appellants were charged with a series of crimes as a 

result of these incidents. After a joint jury trial, Rollerson was convicted of 

first-degree burglary while armed, assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of 

possession of a firearm during a crime of violence or dangerous offense, and two 

counts of felony threats. Rollerson and Burns were both convicted of assault with 

significant bodily injury (“felony assault”). Appellants filed timely notices of 

appeal. Appellants raise the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court 

erred in denying Rollerson‟s motion to sever his trial from Burns‟s, in order to call 

her as a defense witness; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Burns‟s motion 

to sever the counts arising from the first incident (Elvans Road) from the counts of

the second incident (Bowen Road); (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support 

appellants‟ convictions for significant bodily injury; and (4) whether Rollerson‟s 

two convictions for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence should merge. 

We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. 
3

I.

On December 5, 2012, Rollerson and Burns were charged by indictment with 

several criminal offenses arising from two incidents on June 18, 2012, in Southeast 

Washington, D.C. As to the first incident, which took place on Elvans Road, 

Rollerson was charged with: (1) first-degree burglary while armed (D.C. Code §§

22-801 (a), -4502); (2) assault with a dangerous weapon (D.C. Code § 22-402) 

(“ADW”); (3) two counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence or 

dangerous offense (D.C. Code § 22-4504 (b)) (“PFCV”); (4) unlawful possession of 

a firearm by a felon (D.C. Code § 22-4503 (a)(l)) (“UF”); (5) carrying a dangerous 

weapon (D.C. Code § 22-4504 (a)) (“CDW”); and (6) threatening to injure or kidnap 

a person (D.C. Code § 22-1810) (“felony threats”). 

As to the second incident, which occurred on Bowen Road, both Rollerson 

and Burns were charged with: (1) assault with significant bodily injury (D.C. Code 

§ 22-404 (a)(2) (“felony assault”); and (2) committing a crime of violence against a 

minor (D.C. Code § 22-3611). Rollerson was individually charged with another 

count of felony threats. Appellants‟ cases proceeded to trial before the Honorable 
4

Patricia A. Broderick on July 9, 2013. 1 The jury found Rollerson guilty of 

first-degree burglary while armed, ADW, both PFCV counts, both felony threats 

counts, and felony assault, but acquitted him of CDW. The jury found Burns guilty 

of felony assault.

On September 29, 2013, the trial court sentenced Rollerson to 114 months in 

prison for first-degree burglary while armed, 30 months for ADW, 60 months for 

each PFCV conviction, and 14 months for each felony threats conviction. 

Rollerson was sentenced to 14 months for the assault with significant bodily injury 

arising out of the second incident. Rollerson‟s sentences for burglary, ADW, and 

PFCV were directed to run concurrently but consecutively to his sentence for the 

felony threats and felony assault. The trial court also sentenced Rollerson to five 

years of supervised release and a $100 fine for each conviction, totaling $700.

Burns was sentenced to 18 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised 

release. The trial court suspended the execution of Burns‟s entire sentence and 

placed her on two years of supervised probation. 

 

1

The following charges were not submitted to the jury: (1) the UF charge 

against Rollerson and (2) the committing a crime of violence against a minor charges

against Rollerson and Burns. 
5

II.

A. The Elvans Road Incident

On the night of June 17, 2012, Stefanie Harrington (“Harrington”) and her 

friend Robert Teamer (“Teamer”) were having drinks together in Harrington‟s 

apartment, located in the 2500 block of Elvans Road, Southeast. Later that

evening, Teamer and Harrington left the apartment and went outside to spend time

with her neighbors. At approximately 11:00 p.m., Teamer went back inside the 

building without Harrington, and fell asleep in her apartment. At approximately

1:00 a.m. on June 18, 2012, Harrington saw her boyfriend and female friend outside

and went out to engage them in conversation. While she was outside, Harrington 

testified that she saw Burns standing by her car and overheard her stating loudly that 

someone had flattened the tires of her car. Burns then went inside Harrington‟s 

apartment building and walked upstairs. Not long thereafter, Rollerson came out of 

the apartment and approached Harrington and her friends. Rollerson addressed

Harrington‟s boyfriend first and asked him who had flattened their car tires. 

Harrington‟s boyfriend stated that he did not know who had done it, to which 

Rollerson responded, “[O]h, you don‟t know, all right, I‟m going to be back with the 

pump,” which Harrington understood to be “his gun.” 
6

Harrington walked back inside the building and continued upstairs to her 

apartment. When she entered the building, she saw Burns coming back down the 

stairs and the two made eye contact. Harrington testified that Burns walked so 

close to her that she almost bumped into her. When Harrington stopped and turned 

around, Burns moved on but stated, “they better go in the house,” which Harrington 

perceived as a threat. After hearing Burns‟s statement, Harrington testified that she 

went into her apartment and put a kitchen knife and an empty half-pint liquor bottle 

into her purse for her protection. While inside the apartment, Harrington told 

Teamer, who had been asleep, that she thought “there was about to be something” 

and wanted him to come outside to be a witness. 

Harrington left her apartment, followed by Teamer, and saw Burns coming 

back up the stairs to the top level of the apartment where Harrington lived. 

Harrington approached Burns and said, “. . . so [w]hat you think I flattened your 

tires.” Burns replied, “yeah” and stated that because she and Harrington were 

involved in verbal altercations in the past, Harrington may have been responsible for 

the damage to her tires. Burns and Harrington continued to argue until Rollerson 

came upstairs and intervened in the argument. At some point during the altercation, 

Harrington, Teamer, Burns, and Rollerson exited the apartment and moved outside 
7

to the apartment parking lot.2 Harrington testified that after Rollerson saw the knife 

she had placed inside her purse earlier that evening, he asked her, “[W]hat you going 

to do with that?” Harrington instructed Rollerson to back away from her and he 

complied. When Rollerson retreated, Harrington tossed the knife down by a car.

After Harrington threw the knife to the ground, Rollerson retrieved it and 

approached Harrington with it. Rollerson continued to approach Harrington, until a 

man stopped him and held him back before he could reach her. Harrington testified 

that Rollerson threw the knife at her, which hit her in the arm. While Burns and 

Harrington were arguing, Teamer overheard Rollerson say, “[F]orget this, I‟m about 

to go get that.” Teamer informed Harrington that he believed Rollerson intended to 

get a weapon, and the two left and walked up to Harrington‟s apartment. 

Harrington and Teamer entered the apartment and locked the bottom lock on 

the door. Harrington then went into her bedroom to look for another weapon. 

Teamer testified that shortly thereafter, the man who he had just seen earlier that 

night in the parking lot, “busted inside the door.” According to Teamer, Rollerson 

entered the apartment and stated, “I‟m going to blow a hole in you guys,” but was 

restrained again by the same person who had held him back earlier that night.

 

2

 The transcript does not clearly reflect how this transition occurred.
8

Harrington testified that she heard a “big boom, like somebody busting in [her] 

door,” and when she stepped out of her bedroom, she saw “Omar [Rollerson] with a 

shotgun.” Harrington stated that she heard a noise, “like the impact of somebody 

being hit,” and a scream. Harrington went into the living room and saw that 

Teamer‟s face was bruised, and Rollerson had left the apartment. Teamer testified 

that before Rollerson left, he had “poked” him in the face with the shotgun. 

Harrington and Teamer called the police following the incident. Harrington told 

police about the altercation and identified Rollerson as the man who entered her 

apartment with the shotgun. On cross-examination, Teamer testified that the man

he saw in the parking lot was the same person who had come to the apartment door,

but then indicated that Rollerson (as he appeared in the courtroom at trial) did not 

look like the same man who came to Harrington‟s door the night of the burglary. 

B. The Bowen Road Incident

Later that day, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Burns approached 17-year old, 

Jasmine Patterson (“Patterson”), her boyfriend, her younger sister, and her cousins 

on the front porch of Patterson‟s apartment building at 2555 Elvans Road. 

Patterson testified that Burns approached the group and repeatedly asked if they 

knew who flattened her car tires. Patterson became upset because of the manner in 

which Burns approached her, which led to a verbal altercation between her and 
9

Burns. During the argument, Patterson‟s stepfather and mother came outside and 

became involved in the dispute. Shortly thereafter, Rollerson turned to Burns and 

said, “F that, we‟re going to get Nellie and them,” which Patterson took to mean, “he 

[was] going to get someone to come over where [she] live[d]” and fight them. 

Rollerson and Burns then walked off, got into a silver van and drove away. After 

Rollerson and Burns left, Jasmine and the rest of the group walked down Sheridan 

Road towards Patterson‟s grandmother‟s house. According to Patterson‟s 

testimony, when the group reached the intersection of Sheridan and Bowen Road, 

she saw Rollerson and Burns driving towards her. Both Rollerson and Burns exited 

the silver van, followed by five girls, whom Rollerson referred to as his nieces. 

Patterson testified that one of the girls yelled at the group as they walked, shouting, 

“F y‟all Bs going? Come back. Fight us.” Patterson stated that once the girls 

caught up with the group, one of the girls hit her and pulled her to the ground. 

While she was on the ground, she stated that Rollerson hit her in the face. Patterson 

was then hit with a log while she was on the ground. Patterson stated that Burns 

was standing off to the side for the majority of the physical altercation, but also hit 

her at some point during the fight. David Minor (“Minor”), Patterson‟s boyfriend 

at the time, arrived at the scene of the altercation and saw that Patterson had been 

injured. When Rollerson saw Minor approach, he warned him not to get involved

or he was going to “get that out of the car and smoke [him].” Minor perceived that 
10

statement as a threat that Rollerson would retrieve a weapon from the van. An older 

woman then exited the Sheridan Road apartment complex and threatened to call the 

police. Rollerson, Burns, and the five girls got into the silver van and drove 

towards Elvans Road. Patterson and the rest of the group continued on to her 

grandmother‟s house, where her grandmother called the police. Patterson spoke 

with the police when they arrived and was taken by ambulance to the hospital to 

receive stitches for the cut over her right eye. She received nine stitches in total. 

Patterson, her sister, and cousin Charnese identified Rollerson and Burns in a photo 

array as the two individuals involved in the incident. 

III.

Appellants challenge the trial court‟s denial of their respective severance 

motions and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain their convictions for felony 

assault arising from the Bowen Road incident. 

A. Rollerson’s Severance Motion

Rollerson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his 

trial from that of co-defendant Burns. For the following reasons, we agree and 

reverse and vacate his convictions as to counts 1-4 and 6 of the jury verdict and 
11

remand for a new trial. 

Before trial, Rollerson filed a severance motion arguing that severance was 

warranted because Burns‟s ability to testify on his behalf was essential to his 

defense, as she would offer exculpatory evidence regarding the charges arising from 

the Elvans Road incident. Rollerson proffered that, if his severance motion were 

granted, Burns could testify at a separate trial that Rollerson was not present during 

the argument that led to the burglary and therefore did not make statements 

indicating he was going to retrieve a weapon and confront Harrington with it. The 

government opposed the motion, and argued that Burns‟s testimony was not 

substantially exculpatory because the government possessed other independent 

evidence (the testimony of Harrington) to prove that Rollerson was present during 

the previous altercation and committed the charged offenses. The government 

stated that it would be willing to stipulate to Burns‟s proposed testimony.

Rollerson maintained that he would be severely harmed by his inability to call a live 

witness. The trial court denied Rollerson‟s motion, citing to the government‟s 

willingness to stipulate and Rollerson‟s ability to use phone records as adequate 

alternatives to Burns‟s live testimony. Ultimately, Rollerson chose not to present a 

stipulation of Burns‟s testimony, or the phone records at trial. 
12

This court reviews a trial court‟s denial of a severance motion for abuse of 

discretion. Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 40 (D.C. 2014). This court will 

reverse such a denial only if a defendant shows that he suffered “manifest prejudice” 

as a result of being tried jointly. Harrison v. United States, 76 A.3d 826, 834 (D.C. 

2013). This court recognizes a presumption that persons jointly indicted together 

should be tried together. Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1040 (D.C. 1979). 

The trial court should grant severance “„only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial 

would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury 

from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.‟” Moore v. United 

States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1056 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 

534, 539 (1993)). “[A]mong the specific trial rights that a motion for severance is 

intended to secure is the right to present a defense and call witnesses on one‟s own 

behalf.” Williams v. United States, 884 A.2d 587, 593 (D.C. 2005). 

1. Substantially Exculpatory Standard

Rollerson contends that the proposed testimony of Burns was substantially 

exculpatory under Jackson, and therefore required the trial court to grant his 

severance motion. Considering this court‟s case law, the fundamental right to a fair 

trial and the nature of the proposed testimony, we conclude the testimony had 

substantial exculpatory potential and the subsequent denial of Rollerson‟s motion to 
13

sever was an abuse of discretion. 

In deciding whether to sever based on a claim of exculpatory codefendant 

testimony, a court should consider: (1) the exculpatory nature and effect of the 

desired testimony; (2) the movant‟s desire to present the codefendant‟s testimony; 

(3) the codefendant‟s willingness to testify; and (4) the demands of judicial 

administration. See Jackson v. United States, 329 A.2d 782, 788 (D.C. 1974). The 

movant must “satisfy the court that the testimony would be exculpatory in effect and 

that the co-defendant is reasonably likely to testify.” Williams, 884 A.2d at 594. 

In assessing the exculpatory nature of a codefendant‟s proposed testimony, the 

testimony need not prove actual innocence. Id. at 595-96. Accordingly, a court 

looks to how the proposed testimony, if credited by the jury, would prove or 

disprove charged offenses. See id.; Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 130 

(D.C. 1991); King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 356-57 (D.C. 1988). A trial 

court should not rely upon credibility determinations of a codefendant‟s proposed 

testimony when assessing whether the testimony is substantially exculpatory as 

credibility determinations are reserved for the jury. See Martin, 606 A.2d at 

129-30; King, 550 A.2d at 356. 

Here, the trial court found that if presented, Burns‟s proposed testimony 
14

would be “officially” exculpatory. Rollerson contends that this finding indicates 

that the trial court established the first prong of the Jackson analysis. We agree. 

Despite the government‟s assertion that this statement was unclear, we are satisfied 

that this finding by the trial court can be most plainly read to fulfill the first element 

of Jackson, that the proposed testimony was “exculpatory in nature and effect.”

See Jackson, 329 A.2d at 788. To establish the second and third elements,

Rollerson proffered evidence that Burns would testify that Rollerson was not present 

in the parking lot during the altercation with Harrington and that she did not notify 

him of the altercation until the next morning. Additionally, Burns‟s attorney 

confirmed the veracity of the proffer and verified that Burns was willing to testify on 

Rollerson‟s behalf provided her trial was first. 

Having presented sufficient evidence of the exculpatory nature of Burns‟s 

potential testimony and her willingness to testify, we hold that the proposed 

testimony was substantially exculpatory. This court has found similar codefendant 

testimony to be substantially exculpatory and remanded accordingly, where the 

proposed evidence directly negated motive, where the only other evidence of guilt 

was the testimony of the complaining witness or arresting officer, and where the

denial of a severance motion was predicated on a credibility determination made 

before any co-defendant testimony was presented to the jury. 
15

In Martin, an appellant was prevented from introducing the testimony of a 

codefendant who pled guilty before trial because the judge believed that the 

codefendant‟s alleged inconsistent statements indicated he would be “a most 

undependable witness.” Martin, 606 A.2d at 126. Despite the inconsistencies and 

credibility flaws of the codefendant, this court determined that the testimony had 

substantial exculpatory potential because the nature of the proposed testimony went 

to the appellant‟s motivation for committing the charged offense. Id. Further, this 

court emphasized the importance of permitting the jury to hear such testimony 

because questions of credibility are reserved for the finder of fact. Id. at 129. By 

prohibiting the jury from hearing appellant‟s alternative theory for motive, presented 

through the testimony of the codefendant, this court found that the trial court erred 

and remanded for a new trial. 

Additionally, in Williams this court concluded that co-defendant testimony 

was substantially exculpatory where the appellant and a codefendant were convicted 

of several weapons offenses after police officers discovered a handgun above 

appellant‟s seat in the course of a traffic stop. Williams, 884 A.2d at 589. Based 

on the sole testimony of an arresting officer that observed appellant lean forward in 

his seat, the government contended that appellant and codefendant had constructive 
16

possession of the weapon and were both guilty of the weapons offenses. Id. at 592. 

This court found that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant‟s 

severance motion where appellant wanted to offer the testimony of the codefendant, 

the only other witness to the incident, to show that the appellant was never seen with 

the gun. Id. at 595-96. Though the trial court acknowledged the proposed 

testimony was exculpatory, this court found that it erred by failing to consider the 

relative weakness of the government case, which hinged upon the testimony of the

police officer, when deciding to deny appellant‟s motion. Id. 

Finally, in King, the appellant and a codefendant were convicted of unlawful 

distribution of PCP and marijuana. King, 500 A.2d at 350. At trial, a police 

officer testified to being sold narcotics by appellant and codefendant. Id. 

Appellant testified on her own behalf and denied any involvement in the sale of 

narcotics, claiming she was in the area to visit her child‟s school. Id. at 351. 

Arguing that the codefendant was the only person present at the transaction, besides 

the undercover officer, appellant‟s counsel maintained that the codefendant‟s 

testimony would be crucial to appellant‟s defense. Id. The trial court denied the 

motion to reopen. Id. This court remanded for a new trial holding that appellant 

was substantially prejudiced by the denial of the motion to reopen her case, as the 

co-defendant was the only other witness to the transaction. Id. at 357. Although 
17

the government argued that the codefendant lacked credibility, this court determined 

the potential incongruences of the codefendant‟s testimony did not trump the 

defendant‟s right to present a witness in his defense that planned to testify to 

exculpatory evidence. Id. at 356. 

For Rollerson, similar to the proposed testimony in Martin, Burns would have 

provided probative evidence of his intent and motive for committing the alleged 

offense had they been tried separately. See Martin, 606 A.2d at 122, 130. Id. at 

126. By requiring a stipulation in place of live testimony, the trial court foreclosed 

on the jury‟s ability to hear from Burns and determine the credibility of her

testimony and whether Rollerson lacked the motive to commit the alleged offenses 

stemming from the altercation at the apartment. In the present case, analogous to 

the court‟s analysis in Williams and King, the trial court does not appear to have 

considered the relative strength of the government‟s case in weighing the 

exculpatory nature of Burns‟s testimony, leaving the jury to rely solely on the 

testimony of the complaining witness to establish Rollerson‟s conduct during the 

Elvans Road incident. See Williams, 884 A.2d at 596. 

Notwithstanding the extension of time and potential delay in retrying these 

cases severally, the demands of judicial administration do not outweigh Rollerson‟s 
18

right to a fair trial. Similar to the court in Williams, the court‟s “concern for judicial 

efficiency” in this case cannot outweigh a criminal defendant‟s right to present 

exculpatory evidence on his behalf. Id. at 602. On these facts, we conclude that 

evidence proffered by Burns would have been substantially exculpatory under 

Jackson and constituted sufficient grounds for severing Burns‟s trial.

2. Stipulation as a Substitute to Live Testimony

Although the government contends that a stipulation as to the content of 

Burns‟s proposed live testimony would have been a sufficient alternative, this court 

has held that except in very limited circumstances, “a party may not be forced to 

accept a stipulation in lieu of testimonial or tangible evidence.” Daniels v. United 

States, 738 A.2d 240, 251-53 (D.C. 1999) (abrogated on other grounds by 

Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818 (D.C. 2006)); see also Old Chief v. 

United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188-90 (1997). In Daniels, the defense proposed 

stipulating to the content of a coroner‟s report in lieu of the medical examiner‟s live 

testimony. Id. at 249. The trial court declined to force the government to stipulate 

and this court affirmed that decision, reasoning that the medical examiner‟s live 

testimony also demonstrated that the murder was done intentionally with 

premeditation and deliberation. Id. at 252. Additionally this court concluded:
19

Live testimony or tangible evidence offers so many significant 

advantages over a stipulation that we think it would be grossly unfair 

for a court to force a party to rely on the latter rather than the former, for 

a stipulation will almost never have the same probative value and 

persuasive power as the testimony of a live witness or a tangible object.

Id. at 251. 

In Daniels, this court expressed more generally, that the substitution of live 

testimony for a stipulation was improper, primarily because of its inferior probative 

value. In this case, however, where the substitution was forced upon a criminal 

defendant, rather than the government, additional concerns about the fundamental 

right to a fair trial arise. It is well established that the right to call witnesses in one‟s 

defense carries significant constitutional implication and is a “fundamental element 

of due process of law.” Martin, 606 A.2d at 127 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 

U.S. 14, 19 (1967)); See King, 550 A.2d at 353. The fundamental nature of this 

right necessitates “close scrutiny” of any action which has the effect of

circumventing it. See id. In this case, Rollerson, a criminal defendant, was given 

one choice; to either accept a less probative stipulation in place of Burns‟s proposed 

testimony or to present no live witness testimony to prove motive or intent in his 

defense of the Elvans Road charges. Under the circumstances in this case, a new 

trial is necessary because of the trial court‟s decision to only permit a stipulation 

denied Rollerson the right to present exculpatory evidence regarding his motive 
20

through Burns‟s live testimony, which if deemed credible, would have substantially 

exculpated him. See Martin, 606 A.2d at 127.

Here, the government contends that even assuming the trial court abused its 

discretion, any abuse was harmless in light of the weight of the evidence against 

Rollerson. This argument, however, is unpersuasive because the only evidence 

offered by the government placing Rollerson in the parking lot and in the apartment 

on the night of the incident was the testimony of the complaining witness, 

Harrington. Further, Teamer, the only other person who was present at both 

locations, did not positively identify Rollerson as the individual that committed the 

assault against him. Rather, Teamer testified that the man who was involved in the 

altercation at the car was the same man that assaulted him inside the apartment, but 

not the same man he saw in the courtroom on the day of trial. The government‟s 

case, therefore, rested upon the credibility of Harrington. In attempting to 

substitute Burns‟s live testimony with the proposed stipulation, the trial court denied 

the jury the benefit of weighing the credibility of Burns against Harrington and 

therefore prejudiced Rollerson‟s right to a fair trial. 

In accord with the remedy given in Martin, King, and Williams, we remand 

Rollerson‟s convictions for a new trial in which his codefendant‟s testimony can be 
21

introduced. See Williams, 884 A.2d at 589; Martin, 606 A.2d at 129-30; King, 550 

A.2d at 356. 

B. Burns’s Severance Motion

Like Rollerson, Burns contends that the trial court erred in denying her 

severance motion because: (1) the majority of the charged conduct only related to 

Rollerson; (2) there were two separate incidents, one of which she was not charged

for; and (3) trying her case with Rollerson‟s would result in prejudice. The 

government opposed the motion, arguing Burns could not show that manifest 

prejudice resulted from a joint trial. More specifically, the government contended 

that severance was not appropriate because the crimes arose from the same joint 

“crime spree” and the jury was capable of making and made independent 

determinations of guilt aided by court instruction. The trial court denied Burns‟s 

motion, ruling that limiting instructions would be given to explain to the jury that 

evidence of the burglary and assault was admissible only in regards to Rollerson. 

During trial, Burns renewed her motion for severance, which was again denied. We 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burns‟s severance 

motion because she was not prejudiced by the joint trial.

This court will reverse such a denial only if a defendant shows that she 
22

suffered “manifest prejudice” as a result of being tried jointly. Harrison, 76 A.3d at

834. “Manifest prejudice occurs only where the evidence of a defendant‟s 

complicity in the overall criminal venture is de minimis when compared to the 

evidence against his codefendants.” Scott v. United States, 619 A.2d 917, 930 

(D.C. 1993). A defendant does not suffer manifest prejudice just because a 

significant portion of the government‟s trial evidence is applicable only to her 

codefendants. Walker v. United States, 982 A.2d 723, 729 (D.C. 2009). “This is 

so even though some of the evidence concerns prior criminal offenses or bad acts 

relating only to other codefendants.” Johnson v. United States, 596 A.2d 980, 987 

(D.C. 1991) (quoting Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 490 (D.C. 1986)). 

Thus, the inquiry is only whether the trial evidence is “so complex or confusing” that 

the jury could not make “individual determinations about the guilt or innocence of 

each defendant.” Id. “It is accepted that in any trial involving multiple 

defendants, some amount of potential prejudice is permissible if outweighed by 

considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration.” Payne v. 

United States, 516 A.2d 484, 490 (D.C. 1986). “[T]he trial court‟s role is not to 

balance on a scale the comparative weights of the evidence as to each defendant.” 

Id. The fact that a defendant would have had a better chance of acquittal had she 

been tried alone is not, by itself, grounds for concluding that severance was 

improperly denied. Medley v. United States, 104 A.3d 115, 123 (D.C. 2014).
23

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burns‟s motion for 

severance because any prejudicial effect which resulted from her joint trial did not 

rise to the level of manifest prejudice necessary to require reversal. Burns‟s 

argument that severance was appropriate because her involvement in the Elvans 

Road incident was de minimis is unavailing. Although Burns was not charged with 

crimes arising from the Elvans Road incident, Burns played a central role in the 

events that led to Rollerson‟s crimes and her actions at that event show her motive to 

commit the assault later that day as she and Rollerson continued to seek out and 

punish the person who slashed her car tires. Thus, neither Burns‟s involvement in 

the Elvans Road incident nor her role in the “criminal enterprise” as a whole was de 

minimis. 

Moreover, this is not a case that was “so complex or confusing” that the jury 

would have been unable to make “individual determinations about the guilt or 

innocence of each defendant.” Hagans, 96 A.3d at 41. Indeed, throughout the 

trial and during closing arguments, both government and defense counsel reminded 

the jury that there were two separate incidents and that Burns was not charged with 

anything that happened on Elvans Road, only the assault that occurred on Bowen 

Road. Furthermore, during trial, after the government‟s presentation of evidence 

concerning the Elvans Road incident and before its presentation of evidence 
24

concerning the Bowen Road incident, the trial court instructed the jury that “up to 

now all the evidence has been against Mr. Rollerson and the charges involving only 

Mr. Rollerson.” And, during final jury instructions, the trial court parsed the 

offenses specifically against Rollerson from those against both Rollerson and Burns, 

made clear the location of each offense, and instructed that evidence for counts 1-6 

relating to Rollerson for the Elvans Road incident could not be used in reaching 

verdicts as to counts 7 and 8 relating to the Bowen Road incident in which Burns was 

charged. These instructions properly protected Burns from manifest prejudice or 

improper use of evidence against her. See Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 

20 (D.C. 1978) (“[A]n appellate court will be extremely reluctant to reverse [a trial 

court‟s denial of severance] on grounds of prejudicial joinder when the trial court 

has minimized the prejudice through the efficacious use of cautionary 

instructions.”). Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial court acted within its 

discretion when it denied Burns‟s motion for severance.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Felony Assault

Appellants allege that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support their 

convictions of felony assault. In reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence, 

this court must determine, “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in the government‟s 
25

favor, and giving deference to the jury‟s right to determine credibility and weight, 

there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakeney v. United States, 653 A.2d 365, 369 n.3 

(D.C. 1995). The evidence need not “compel a finding of guilt” or negate “every 

possible inference of innocence.” Timberlake v. United States, 758 A.2d 978, 980 

(D.C. 2000). The government need only present some probative evidence on each 

essential element of the crime. Jennings v. United States, 431 A.2d 552, 555 (D.C. 

1981). 

Among the elements necessary to prove felony assault, the government must

establish that the defendant caused “significant bodily injury” to another person,

defined as “an injury that requires hospitalization or immediate medical attention.” 

In re R.S., 6 A.3d 854, 857 (D.C. 2010) (quoting D.C. Code § 22-404 (a)(2)). The 

threshold for such injury is “markedly less severe than that required for aggravated 

assault,” and the focus “must be on the nature of the injury itself and the practical 

need in the ordinary course of events for prompt medical attention.” Id. at 859. 

“Treatment of a higher order, requiring true medical expertise is required.” 

Quintanilla v. United States, 62 A.3d 1261, 1265 (D.C. 2013)(internal quotations

omitted).
26

Appellants claim that Patterson‟s injuries were not severe enough to 

constitute significant bodily injury. However, this court found in In re R.S., that 

under similar circumstances, the victim suffered a significant bodily injury when she 

was attacked and her resulting injuries required four to six stitches in her ear. See In 

re R.S., 6 A.3d at 859. In R.S., the victim was attacked by the defendant and other 

juveniles, who punched and kicked the face and head of the victim and caused her to 

hit her head on a metal gate that cut her ear. The victim testified that the assault 

resulted in a “laceration to her ear, a bruise on her forearm, and a scratch on the back 

of her right shoulder.” Id. at 857. This court concluded that “where the injury to 

the ear required four to six stitches and left a scar and where treatment was sought 

and administered with reasonable promptness, we have no difficulty in sustaining 

the trial court‟s conclusion that the injury met the requirement of the felony assault

statute.” Id. at 859. 

In the present case, Patterson was injured in a violent group attack, in which 

Rollerson and Burns participated. After Patterson was “jumped,” she was pushed to 

the ground, kicked and “stomp[ed] on,” punched multiple times in the face, and hit 

in the head with a log. As a result, in addition to bruises and abrasions, she suffered 

“gashes to her face” going down to the “white meat,” and was a bleeding 

“mess.” She was taken to the hospital where she received care, including nine
27

stitches. The government placed into evidence photographs of her injuries from the 

hospital as well as medical records documenting her treatment. In light of the 

evidence of Patterson‟s injuries, we are satisfied that she suffered “significant bodily 

injury” for the purposes of felony assault and therefore affirm Burns‟s and 

Rollerson‟s felony assault convictions. 

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court‟s judgment denying

Rollerson‟s severance motion, affirm his convictions on counts 7 and 8 of the jury 

verdict, vacate his convictions on counts 1- 4 and 6 of the jury verdict, and remand 

the case for a new trial on charges stemming from the Elvans Road incident. As a 

result, the issue of merger regarding Rollerson‟s PFCV convictions is mooted by the 

reversal of the aforementioned counts. As to Burns, we are satisfied both that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her severance motion and that the 

evidence was sufficient to support her conviction for felony assault. Thus, we 

affirm her conviction on appeal. 

Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.