The Hon. D avid G. Tra g er, United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * New Y ork, sitting by

desig nation. 1 07-2436-cr USA v. Williams
U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT

_______________________________ August Term, 2007 (Argued: J uly

9, 2008, Reargued: Dec ember

2, 2008, Dec ided: Marc h 5, 2009)

Docke t No. 07-2436-c r

_______________________________ UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee , v. L EON WI L L I AMS, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt.

_______________________________ POOL ER and HAL L , Circuit J udg es, and TRAG ER, District J udg e. *

_______________________________ Appea l from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork (Sand, J.), convicting defe ndant L eon Willi ams of, inter a lia, (1) a drugtraff

icking crime which ca

rries a ten-y ear mandatory

minimum sentenc e under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( A) a nd (2) possession of a

firea rm in further ance of that drugtraff icking crime, a

n offe nse which c arr iesWe t ha nk amic us c ouns e l f

or the he lpf ul b ri e f a nd or a l argume nt i n th is a

pp e a l. ** 2 a five -y ear

mandatory

minimum consec utive sentenc e “[e]x cept to the e x tent that a g reater minimum sentenc e is otherwise provided by . . . any other provision of law ” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)( A)(i) . In light of United States v. Whi tley , 529 F.3d 150 ( 2d Cir.), reh’ g denied, 540 F.3d 87 ( 2d Cir. 2008), we c onclude that Williams was exempt from the five-year mandatory minimum consec utive sentenc e for the fire arm off

ense be cause he wa s alrea dy subject to the longe r ten-year

minimum sentenc e for

the pre dicate dr

ug traff icking crime. We a lso conclude that rema nd is require d pursuant to United States v. Reg alado, 518 F .3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). Af fi rm edan d

re m an d edfo r r es en t en ci n g.

ANJAN SAHNIand WI L L I AM J . HARRI NGTON , Assistant United States Attorney s (J onathan S. Kolodner and Da niel Br aun, Assistant United States Attorney s, of counsel), f

or Michae l J . Gar cia, United States A ttorney for the Southern District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, New Y ork, for Appe llee. B . A L ANSEI DL ER, Ne w Y or k, Ne w Y or

k, fo r D e fe nd antAp pe lla nt. L EWI S J . L I MAN (Micha el J . Byars, of counsel), Clea

ry Gottlieb Steen & H amilton L L P, New Yor k, New Y ork, Am ic us Cur ia e in S up po rt of De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. **

________________________________ POOL ER, Circuit J udg e: L eon Willi ams appe als from a J une 1, 2007, judg ment of convic tion and sentenc e of the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (Sand, J.). Wil liams was convicted of

a drugtraff

icking crime which ca

rried a ten-y ear mandatory

minimum sentenc e under 21 U .S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A ), and posse ssion of a fire arm in fur thera nce of that drugtraff

icking3

crime, a n offe nse which c arr ied a f ive-y ear mandatory

minimum consec utive sentenc e “[e]x cept to the extent that a gr eate r minimum sentence is otherw ise provided by . . . any other provision of law” unde r 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( 1)(A) (i). In this opini on, we a ddress whe ther the district c ourt
err ed in imposing the f

ive-y ear mandatory

minimum consec utive sentenc e under Section 924(c) (1)( A)(i) even thoug h a g reater minimum sentence w as provided f or the pre dicate dr

ug traff icking crime. In United States v. Whit ley , 529 F.3d 150 ( 2d Cir. 2008), reh’ g denied, 540 F.3d 87 ( 2d Cir. 2008), we he ld that the mandatory minimum sentenc e under Section 924(c) (1)( A) was inapplica

ble wher e the de fenda

nt was subject to a long er ma ndatory minimum sentenc e for

a
car eer criminal fire arm possession violation. We now hold that the mandatory minimum sentenc e under Sec tion 924(c)( 1)(A) is also inapplicable whe re the defe ndant is subject to a long er mandatory

minimum sentenc e for

a drugtraff

icking offe nse that is part of the same c riminal transac tion or set of oper ative fa cts as the f irea rm offe nse. We theref ore a ffirm the district c ourt’s judg ment of convic tion and rema nd to give the dis tr ic t c ourt

the op po rt

un ity to r e se nte nc e Willi ams c on sis te nt w ithour h old ingthat Will iams i s not subject to the mandatory five-year minimum under Sec tion 924(c)( 1)(A) . We also conclude th a t r e ma n d is r e qu ir e d

p ur s u an t t o U n it e d

St a te s v . Re g a la d o , 5 1 8 F
. 3 d 1 4 3 ( 2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 8 )
. We
re je c t Will iams’ s o the r c ha lle ng e s to his c on vic tio n a nd se nte nc e on

a pp e a l. BACK GR OUND At trial, the g overnme nt presente d evidenc e that on the e veningof F ebrua ry 27, 2006, two New Y ork City

Police Depa

rtment offic ers on patrol saw Willi ams standing next t o a par ked ca r on the side of the r oad, urinating. As the office rs appr oache d, they saw that inside the c ar w ere multipl e ce llular phones, wa ds of ca sh wrappe d in rubber ba nds, and a pla stic bagcontainingWilli ams h a d p re vio us ly be e n c on vic te d o f a

fe lony on Ma y 29 , 1 99 7 in

Ne w Y or k s tate 1 c ourt . 4 white re sidue, later de termined to be na rcotics. One of the off

icer s also noticed a stra

ng e odor which he a ssociated with nar cotics. L ater that evening , an inventory sear ch of the car

reve aled a hidden compar

tment containing a loade d g un, a gun mag azine, bullets, and 180 small bag s of po wd e r a nd c ra c k c oc a ine . Wil liams’ s f ing e rp ri nts we re on

the g un ma g a zine . A t tr ia l, Wi lli ams admitted that he had be en drivingthe ca r, which w as re g istered to his sister, and that the c ellular phones and c ash, which totale d $1,100, wer e his. The jury found Will iams g uilty

of three counts: (1) possessinga fire arm a fter be ing
c onvic te d o f a

fe lony , in

vio latio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g ); (2 ) p os se ssi ngwi th i nte nt t o d istri bute 1 over 50 grams of c rac k coca ine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841(a) & 841(b)( 1)(A) ; and (3) possessing a

firea rm in further ance of the drugtraff icking crime c harg ed in count two, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( 1)(A) (i). Willi ams was se ntence d principally to 130 months’ imprisonm ent
on c ount o ne (f

e lon -i n- po sse ssi on ), to r

un c on c ur re ntl y wi th a se nte nc e of

13 5 mo nth s’ imprisonment on count two (drugtraff icking ), and a

n additional consec utive five y ear s’ (60 months’) imprisonment on count three ( possession of a fir ear m in furthera

nce of drugtraff

icking ), for a total of 195 months’ imprisonment. The fe lon-in-possession conviction ca rried no ma

ndatory minimum sentenc e. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). B ut the drugtraff icking conviction ca

rried a mandatory

minimum penalty

of ten y ear s under 21 U .S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A ). B eca use Section 841(b) (1)( A) is “a ny other provision of law ” that “ oth e rw ise pr ov ide [s]” “ a g re a te r m ini mum

se nte nc e ,” 18 U. S.C. § 9 24 (c )( 1) (A ), Willi ams argues that the five -y ear

minimum for possession of a firea rm under Sec tion 924(c)( 1)(A) (i) doesAlthough Williams did not raise this ar g ument below, if his re adingof Whitl ey and the 2 “except” c lause a

re c orre ct, the plain er

ror standa rd of r eview w ould be met. See Whitley , 529 F.3d at 152 n.1. 5 not apply . Wil liams also raises va rious other c halleng es to his conviction and sente nce. DI SCU SSIO N I. Section 924(c) A. United States v. Whitley Section 924(c) provides g raduated pena lties for var ious ty pes of f irea rm use. In United States v. Whi tley , 529 F.3d 150 ( 2d Cir. 2008), reh’ gdenied, 540 F .3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), we int e rp re te d th e int

ro du c tor y “ e xce pt” c la

us e of Se c tio n 9 24 (c )( 1) (A ). Th a t su bs e c tio n p ro vid e s, 2 in p e rt ine nt p art : Exc e pt t o th e e xtent th a t a g re a te r m ini mum

se nte nc e is o the rw ise pr ov ide d b y thi s subsection or by

any other provision of law , any person who, dur ing a

nd in relation to any crime of violence or

drugtraff

icking crime ( including a crime of violence or drugtraff ickingcrime that provides for a n enhanc ed punishment if committed by the use of a

deadly or dang erous we apon or de vice) . . . uses or c arr ies a fir ear m, or who, in further ance of any such cr ime, possesses a f irea rm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for suc h crime of violence or

drugtraff

icking crime — (i ) b e se nte nc e d to a

te rm of imp ri so nme nt o f n ot l e ss t ha n 5 y e ars ; (i i) if the fi re arm

is b ra nd ish e d, be se nte nc e d to a te rm of imp ri so nme nt o f n ot l e ss than 7 y ear s; and (i ii) if the fi re arm

is d isc ha rg e d, be se nte nc e d to a

te rm of imp ri so nme nt o f n ot l e ss than 10 y ear s. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A) ( emphasis adde d). In Wh itl e y , th e de fe nd ant w a s c onvic te d o f t hr e e of fe ns e s a ll s te mmi ng

fr om t he same
arme d robber

y : (1) a H obbs Act violation, with no mandatory minimum penalty , see 18 U .S.C. § 1951; (2) an A rmed Car eer Criminal Act (“A CCA”) off ense f or possession of a f

irea rm afte r6

c onvic tio n o f t

hr e e pr ior of fe ns e s, fo r whic h th e min imum pe na lty wa s f if te e n y e ars , s e e 18 U. S.C. §§ 922(g )(1) , 924(e) ; and (3) a Section 924(c) offe nse for discharg ing a

firea rm in relation to a crime of violence, f

or which the minimum penalty was a consec utive ten y ear s, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)( A)(iii). We conc luded that the conse cutive minimum ten-y ear penalty under Sec tion 924(c) did not apply

beca use a hig her f

ifteen- y ear

minimum was imposed by the ACCA. Whit ley , 529 F.3d at 151. In r e a c hin g thi s c on c lus ion , w e re je c te d th e g ov e rnme nt’ s a rgume nt t hat th e “ e xce pt”
c la us e re late s so le ly

to t ho se fi re arm s o ff

e ns e s sp e c if

ie d in Se c tio n 9 24 (c ). I d. a t 15 3. We h e ld that the “e x cept” clause of Section 924(c ) “me ans what it li tera lly say s” – that the minimum sentenc es it require s do not apply wher e “‘ a g reater minimum sentence is other wise provided by

. . . any other provision of law .’” I d. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A)) (empha sis added). “ Any oth e r p ro vis ion

of law” inc lud e s th e AC CA . We re je c te d th e g ov e rnme nt’ s a rgume nts tha

t th is literal interpr etation of the “ except” cla use is “unsupported by

the text, design, or the pur pose of the statute, would produc e illogic al and distorted outcome s that Congr ess clea rly did not intend,
an d h a s b e e nr e

je c te d b y o th e r c ir c u it s . ” I d
. a t 1 5 5 ( c it a ti o n s an d qu o tati o nma

r k s o mi tt e d )
. We ob se rv e d th a t, “ oth e r t

ha n th e de c isi on s th a t ha

ve re wr itt e n th e ‘e xce pt’ c la us e in d if fe re nt w ay s to
esca pe its plain meaning , we a re a war e of no de cision rejec ting the liter al meaningof statutory lang uag e to the detr iment of a c riminal defe ndant.” I d. at 156; see a lso W hitley , 540 F.3d at 88. We are , of cour se, “bound by our own pre cede nt unless and until its rationale is overrule d, implicitl y or expressly , by

the Supreme Court or this cour t en banc .” Nichola s v. Goord, 430 F .3d 652, 659 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). We must t here fore deter mine whether

the question of statutory

interpre tation in this case is materially differ ent from the que stion addressedWe n ote d in Whit le y “ that th e F if

th a nd Ei g hth Cir c uit s h ave int e rp re te d th e ‘e xce pt’ 3 claus e to hav e a fi rearm s l im it ati on ,” 5 29 F.3 d at15 5-5 6 (ci ti ng Uni tedS tat es v . C ol li ns , 2 05 F. App’x 196, 198 (5th Ci r. 2006); United States v. Ala niz, 235 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 2000)), and that the Six th Circuit has cited these c ases with appr oval, see id. (citing United States v. J olivette, 257 F.3d 581, 587 ( 6th Cir. 2001)). We distinguished Alaniz and Collins by pointing out that the defe ndants in those case s, like Wi lliams, were c onvicted of na rcotics of fense s, while Whit ley wa s c onvic te d o f a

fi re arm s o ff

e ns e . I d. a t 15 7. B ut w e did no t c omm e nt o n w he the r t he F if th and Eig hth Circuits corre ctly rea d a fire arms limitation int o the “e x cept” clause
.

7 by Whit ley . There are two potentially rele vant diffe renc es – (1) in Whi tley , the long er ma ndatory min imum se nte nc e wa s p ro vid e d b y the AC CAfo r f

ir e arm s- re late d c on du c t, whil e in t his c a se , it is provided by

a non-f irea rms offe nse, and (2) in Whi tley , the long er ma ndatory minimum 3
se nte nc e un de r t

he AC CAwa s to ru

n c on se c uti ve ly with the sentenc e on the pr edicate offe nse, while in this case, the long er ma ndatory minimum sentenc e is supplied by that predic ate of

fense
. Th e g ov e rnme nt n owargue s th a t Whi tle y sh ou ld b e lim ite d to its fa c ts – tha t is , to ins tanc e s in which a de fenda

nt fac es two conse cutive mandatory minimum sentenc es for

firea rm-re lated
c on du c t r e su lti ngfr om t

he us e of a sin g le g un . T he g ov e rnme nt a g a in a rgue s th a t it s int e rp re tatio n is re qu ir e d b y the statut or

y te xt an d s tr

uc tur e , th e le g isl a tiv e his tor y , a nd to a vo id ill og ic a l a pp lic a tio ns of

the statut e . We c on c lud e tha t to a c c e pt t

he g ov e rnme nt’ s p os iti on wo uld contravene the rea soning a nd result of Whitley
. B. Statutory Text “[S] tatutory

analy sis necessa

rily beg ins with the plain meaning of a la w’s text and, absent ambig uity , will ge nera lly

end ther e.” Puello v. B CI S, 511 F.3d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 2007) ( quotation
mark s o mitte d) ; se e a lso Whit le y , 5 29 F .3 d at 15 6. Th e g ov e rnme nt a rgue s th a t th e c la

us e “[e]x cept to the e x tent that a g reater minimum sentence is other wise provided by

. . . any other provision of law,” is ambiguous be cause it only direc ts a court whe re to look for the g reater8

minimum (“a

ny other provision of law ”), a nd does not specif

y the offe nse to which the greater minimum sentenc e may

apply . See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)( A). The g overnme nt urg es that we adopt the F irst Circuit’s conclusion that the “e x cept” clause is ambiguous be cause it “does not say ‘a greater minimum sentence’ for what; y et it has to have some unde rstood ref ere nt to be intelligible.” United States v. Parker , 549 F.3d 5, 11 ( 1st Cir. 2008). The F irst Circuit rejec ted the possibilit ies that the re fer ent could be “ any other c rime re lated to this case” or “the underlying drugcrime or

crime of violence,” and held that the “ more sensible[] refer ent” is “a n additional minimum sentenc e for

an under ly ing of

fense beca

use of the pr esenc e of the firea rm.” I d. The First Circuit re asoned that Whi tley was distinguisha

ble bec ause the “dang er” in Whi tley was the po ssi bil ity

of do ub le -c ounti ng– tw o ma nd a tor y min imum c on se c uti ve fi re arm s se nte nc e s c ou ld have a pplied for c rimes involving the “ same gun.” I d. In Parker , as her e, the hig her ma ndatory minimum sentenc e wa s supplied by a drugcrime. I d. But this double-c ounting distinction finds no support in W hitley . We held in Whi tley that th e “ e x c e p t ” c l a

u s e i s n o tamb i g u o u s –

i t“ m e an s w h a ti tl i t e r a l l y s ay s . ” 5 2 9 F
. 3 d

a t1 5 8
. In Whit ley , we r ejec ted the “judicia l insertion” of the w ords “c onsecutive” and “f irea rm” into the “except” c lause. I d. at 153, 157-58. We noted that the Supre me Court had re cently “conde mn[ ed] the insertion of wor ds into a statute as ‘not fa ithful to the statutory text ,’” in United States v. Rodriquez, in which it “rejec ted the def endant’ s argument that ‘re ads [section 924(e) ] as refe rring to ‘the maxim um term of imprisonment presc ribed by law’ f or a de fenda

nt with no prior convictions that trig g er a

rec idivist enhanc ement,’ be cause ‘that is not what [section 924(e)] say s.’” 529 F .3d at 157 n.5 (quotingUnited States v. Rodriquez, 128 S. C t. 1738, 1788-89 (2008) (empha sis in original))
.9

We are not persuade d that the phra se “a ny other provision of law ” is insusceptible to a plain rea ding. T here is a discre te set of statutory offe nses which r equire mandatory minimum sentenc es – mostly

for na rcotics a nd firea rm crimes, but a lso for murder and other dang erous
wea pons. See, e.g ., 18 U.S.C. § 175c (biologic al wea pons); id. § 924 (fire arms); id. § 929 (re stricted ammunition); id. § 1111 (murder) ; id. § 2332g ( missil e sy stems); id. § 2332h (r a dio log ic a l di sp e rs a l de vic e s) ; 21 U. S.C. §§ 84 1, 84 4, 86 0, 96 0 ( dr ug s) . It is pla

us ibl e to understand the ref

ere nce to “ any

other provision of law ” to include this limit ed set of c rimes for which mandatory

minimum sentenc es apply . As amicus counse l point out, t here is no indication in t he statut or

y langua g e that Co ng re ss i nte nd e d to be mor e le nie nt t o d e fe nd ants wi th m ult ipl e convictions for f

irea rms-re lated conduc t than to defe ndants convicte d of drugtraff icking crimes or oth e r v iol e nt o ff

e ns e s, or that it int e nd e d to dr aw a

ny dis tin c tio n amon g of

fe ns e s su bje c t to minimum sentenc es. Amicus B r. at 10. The statutory

scheme supports this li tera l rea ding. Sec tion 924 is t he “Pena lties” section of Chapter

44, “F irea

rms,” of Title 18 of

the United States Code. I f Cong ress ha d intended the “except” c lause to re fer

only to punishments for firea

rms offe nses, it could simply have dr afte d that clause to rea d: “except to the extent that a g reater minimum sentence is other wise provided by this section.” Instead, Cong ress c hose the more expansive phrase , “this subsection [S ection 924(a) ] or any

other provision of law .” 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (1)( A) (e mphasis added)
. In holding that the “ except” cla use includes se ntence s for pre dicate of fense s, we do not ho ld t hat th e “ e xce pt” c la

us e is unb ound e d. Th e c la us e c arv e s o ut a

n e xce pti on

to t he g e ne ra l r

ule that “any person who, dur ing a

nd in relation to any

crime of violence or

drugtraff

icking crime . . . [and] in further ance of any such cr ime, possesses a f irea rm,” shall fa ce a

n additional mandatoryWe do not adopt an interpre tation of the statute that would limit the scope of the 4
“ e xce pt” c la

us e to c ri me s w ith in t

he same c ha

rg ingins tr

ume nt. Suc h a

n inte rp re tatio n w ou ld e le vate the fo rm

of the ind ic tme nt o r i nf

or matio n o ve r t

he su bs tanc e of

the of fe ns e s. 10 consec utive term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( 1). Thus, it is natural to rea d “any other pr ov isi on of law” to i nc lud e the pe na lty fo r t he “ c ri me of

vio le nc e or

dr ugtr a ff ic kin g c ri me ,” so lon g a s th e fi re arm

wa s p os se sse d “ duri ngand in r e latio n to ” or

“ in f ur the ra nc e of ” that pr e dic a te of fe ns e . I d. In o the r w or ds , th e “ e xce pt” c la us e inc lud e s mi nim

um s e nte nc e s f

or pr e dic a te statutory offe nses ar ising fr om the same c riminal transac tion or operative set of fa cts. An interpre tation of “a

ny other provision of law ,” to include, f or example, provisions under whic h a defe ndant was a lrea dy

sentenc ed for

a prior unr elated c rime in a pre vious case, w ould be suspect. In th is c a se , it

is und isp ute d th a t th e fi re arm po sse ssi on

that su bje c te d Wil liams t o th e pe na lty under Sec tion 924(c) a

rose f rom the same c riminal transac tion as the drugtraff icking offe nse. 4 The g overnme nt asserts that other provisions of the statute support its structural a rgument that Congr ess intended that c ourts impose a conse cutive, or non- concur rent, sente nce f

or a Sec tion 924(c) offe nse without reg ard to the se ntence imposed for the unde rlying pr edicate offe nse. Specifica lly , the statute states that (1) the g raduated pena lties set forth in Sections 924(c) (1)( A)(i)
- (iii) must be applied “in a ddition to t he punishment provided f or such c rime of violenc e or dr ug traff icking crime,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (A) ( emphasis adde d); see Par ker, 549 F .3d at 11 (c on c lud ingthat th is l angua g e re nd e rs the lit e ra l r e a din g of the “ e xce pt” c la

us e “ su sp e c t on

its fac e”) ; and (2) “[n] otwithstanding a ny other provision of law

. . . no term of imprisonment imposed on a per son under this subsection shall run c oncurr ently with any other ter m of imp ri so nme nt i mpo se d o n th e pe rs on , in c lud ingany te rm of imp ri so nme nt i mpo se d f or the c ri me of violence or drugtraff

icking crime dur ing which the fire arm wa s used, ca rried, or possessed,” 18The other statutory languag e cited by

the g overnme nt, which provides that the 5 mand a tor y min imum se nte nc e fo r t

he fi re arm

is t o b e in a dd iti on

to a ny pe na lty fo r t he pr e dic a te “cr ime of violence or drugtraff icking crime,” was not at issue in Whitl ey beca use there , the highe r mandatory

minimum sentenc e wa s provided by the ACCA offe nse, which w as not the predic ate “ crime of

violence or

drugtraff

icking crime” for pur

poses of the Sec tion 924(c) c ount. No ne the le ss, the same log ic of e xce pti on

a pp lie s. 11 U. S.C. § 9 24 (c )( 1) (D )( ii) (empha ses adde d). The g overnme nt points t o this Court’s rece nt decision in United States v. Chavez, which re lied on this langua g e to conc lude that Section 924(c ) “wa s plainly

desig ned to impose pena lties that are c umulative to the penalties imposed for other crimes.” 549 F.3d 119, 134 ( 2d Cir. 2008). To be sure , the g ener al rule of Section 924(c) is that its penalties are c umulative. But the “except” c lause is an e x ception to that rule. The g overnme nt would have the r ule swallow the exception. I n Whit ley , we r ejec ted the ar g ument that Section 924(c) (1)( D)(ii)’ s prohibition on
c o n c ur r e n tp un i s h m e n t s w o u l d

b e d i s p l a c e d

b y a l i t e r a l i n t e r

p r e t a t i o no f

th e “ e x c e p t ” c l a

u s e . If 5 the “e x cept” clause is read liter ally , and anothe r statute provide s a hig her minimum penalty , the minimum punishments set forth in the subdivisions of S ection 924(c )(1) (A) w ould never be imposed at all, and thus, there would be no conc urre nt sentence s. See Whitl ey , 529 F.3d at 158. The g overnme nt also urg es this Court to adopt the Fourth Circuit’s re asoning that the statute’s re fer ence to “any other provision of law ” is a “ safe ty valve” that “simply

rese rv[es] t he possibili ty

that another

statute or provision might impose a g reater minimum consecutive sentenc ing sc heme f

or a 924( c) violation, and [does not] negat[ e] the possibil ity of conse cutive sentenc ing in the c ircumstance s” in which the de fenda nt fac es a greater mandatory minimum sentenc e for

a pre dicate dr

ug -traf fickingor cr ime-of- violence of fense . United States v. Studifin,Studifin di d not give any example of a statutory

provision curre ntly

on the books that 6 could incre ase a

sentenc e for

a violation of Section 924(c ) but is not codified within that section. This argument must be that the “e x cept” clause allows a g reater minimum sentence in the e vent that Congr ess one da

y enac ts highe r mandatory minimum sentenc es for

Section 924(c) violations in some other sec tion of the Code. 12 240 F.3d 415, 423 ( 4th Cir. 2001). The F ourth Circuit based its conc lusion on United St ates v. 6 Al aniz, 23 5 F .3 d 3 86 , 3 89 (8 th C ir . 2 00 0) , in wh ic h th e Ei g hth

Cir c uit he ld t hat th e “ e xce pt” clause was a dded just to make the statute g rammatica lly corr ect. We re

jected that prec ise line of
rea soning in Whitley , beca use we failed to see any

g rammatica l problem with the statute abse nt the “e x cept” clause , and bec ause the argument could not explain why the statute includes “ the broad phr ase ‘ or by

any other provision of law .’” 529 F .3d at 154. C. Legislative History Th e g ov e rnme nt u

rg e s th a t w e tur

n to the le g isl a tiv e his tor

y to f ill in t he purp or te d g a p in the statutory

languag e. “O nly

if we disce rn ambiguity

do we r esort first to ca

nons of statutory construction, and, if

the meaningrema ins ambiguous, to leg islative history .” Da niel v. Am. Bd. of Emer g ency

Med., 428 F .3d 408, 423 (2d Cir. 2005) (c itations omi tted). Although w e do not fi nd the statut or

y te rm s to be ambi g uo us , w e re we to c on c lud e that th e re wa s ambi g uit y , w e wo uld follow the Supreme Court’ s directive to “ interpre t ambiguous c riminal statutes in favor of defe ndants, not prosec utors,” rather than attempt to “play the par t of a mind rea der” divining “Cong ress’s pr esumptive intent.” United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2026, 2028 (2008). See also United States v. Gr ander son, 511 U.S. 39, 53-54 (1994) ( courts must resolve a mbiguities in favor of

criminal def

endants); Cra

ndon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990) (when construinga cr iminal statute, courts are “guided by the nee d for f

air wa rning ”); McN ally

v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987) ( when c onfronted w ith “two rational re ading s of a c riminalThe g overnme nt cites one spec ific statement f rom the leg islative history that might bea

r 7 on the statutory

interpre tation question at issue here – a stateme nt that the bill had the “salutar y aspec t” of “ authorizing imposition of stiffer minimum sentences if r equire d under othe r provisions of law,” thus “ eliminat[ ing] any potential inconsistency

with other statutes.” Gov’t Supp. Br. at 17 (quoting Criminal Use O f Guns: Hea ringon S. 191, A Bill To Throttle Criminal Us e Of Guns , H e ari ngB e fo re Th e Com mitte e On Th e Judic iary , U nit e d St a te s Se nate , 1 05 th Cong. at 38 (May

8, 1997) (Statement of

Thomas Hung ar, f

ormerly of the Of fice of the Solicitor Gene ral))
. To the extent that this vague statement is consistent with the statutory text , it does not compel the g overnme nt’s interpre tation of the “e x cept” clause , beca use it beg s the question of the meaningof “pote ntial inconsistency .” 13 statute, one ha

rsher than the other , [courts] are to choose the ha rsher only when Cong ress ha s spoken in clea

r and de finite languag e”) , superse ded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, as rec og nized by United States v. Ry

bicki, 354 F.3d 124, 134 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (en ba nc). Th e g ov e rnme nt a

rgue s th a t if

Willi ams h a d b e e n s e nte nc e d b e fo re the “ e xce pt” c la us e
was a dded to the statute in 1998, he w ould have f ace d both consec utive mandatory minimum
se nte nc e s, and

be c a us e the sp on so rs of

the le g isl a tio n s tate d th a t th e ir g e ne ra l in te nt w a s to
e nh anc e pe na lti e s, Con g re ss c ou ld n ot h ave int e nd e d a n inte rp re tatio n o f t

he statut e tha

t w ou ld subject a de fenda

nt like Wi lliams to onl y

one mandatory

minimum sentenc e. The Whit ley court
ru le d th a t th e g ov e rnme nt’ s argume nt t hat th e c on g re ssi on a l pu

rp os e be hin d Se c tio n 9 24 (c ) w a s to incre ase se ntence s was insuffic ient to void the plain lang uag e of the statute. 529 F.3d at 154-55. Although Cong ress mig ht have intende d to enhanc e fire arm pe nalties, it was not “inconsistent wi th t hat pu rp os e fo r C on g re ss t o h ave pr ov ide d a se ri e s o f i nc re a se d mi nim um s e nte nc e s a

nd a lso to h ave ma de a

re a so ne d ju dg me nt t

hat w he re a

de fe nd ant i s e xpos e d to tw o mi nim um s e nte nc e s,
so me of wh ic h w e re inc re a se d b y the 19 98 ame nd e d v e rs ion , o nly the highe r m ini mum

sh ou ld apply . Indeed, suc h a sente ncingpattern se ems eminently sound.” I d. at 155. There is no reason 7The g overnme nt also argues that congressional a cquiesc ence in decisions by other 8 Circuits affirmingthe impositi on of the mandatory penalties unde r Section 924(c ), eve n wher e g reater minimum sentences a pply for dr ug traff icking , supports its int erpr etation of the statute. B ut i t is an im

pe rm iss ibl e str e tc h to dr aw a ny su c h in fe re nc e in t

his c a se , d

ue to t he re lativ e ly small number of inconsistent holding s on the issue. Cf. Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268-69 n.22 (1992) (infer ringcong ressional a g ree ment with preva iling and c onsistent interpre tation of statute by at least nine a

ppellate c ourts over 20 year s in high-pr ofile ca ses involving prose cutions of important offic ials, for e x ample, the Gove rnor of Oklahoma)
. 14 to depar t from Whitl ey ’s re asoningin Wi lliams’s case. 8 D. Ano m alo us Se nt e nc ing Re sult s A depa rture f rom the plain text of a statute is warr anted only in the rar e ca se whe re the
ano ma lou s r e su lt r ise s to the le ve l of a “ pate nt a bs ur dit y ,” se e Hu

bb ard v. Un ite d St a te s, 51 4 U .S. 695, 703 (1995) ( quotation marks omitted), or has “ no basis in rea son,” see Whit ley , 540 F.3d at 89 (quotation marks omitted). See a lso Cli nton v. Cit y of Ne w York, 524 U .S. 417, 429 (1998) ( a p p ly in g a b s ur d it y d o c tr in e w h e r e th e r e w a s “ n o p la u s ib le r e a s o n ” s u

p p o rti n g a

li mi te d p la in te xt
rea ding)
. Th e g ov e rnme nt a

rgue s th a t Will iams’ s c on str uc tio n o f t

he “ e xce pt” c la

us e re su lts in illogica l distortions of Section 924(c ). I t provides the example of a defe ndant who possessed 500 g rams of c ocaine , subjectinghim to a five-y ear minimum sentenc e under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(B ), and br andished a firea rm in further ance of that off ense, subjec ting him to a
consec utive seven- y ear

minimum sentenc e, re sulting in a mandatory minimum sentenc e of twe lve y e ars . B ut i f t

hat de fe nd ant h a d p os se sse d f ive kil og ra

ms o f c oc a ine – te n ti me s mo re – h e wo uld be subjec ted only

to the ten-y ear

minimum sentenc e under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)( A). The lower
seven- y ear

minimum for br andishing the fire arm would not apply . Thus, a def endant c ould beThe g overnme nt’s brief pr ovides two additional examples that are not anomalies per se, 9 but rather are examples of how Will iams’s interpre tation would result in disparities betwee n the minimum sentenc es that would apply to less and more se vere conduct – f or example, a ten year minimum for possessingdrug s and bra ndishing a

g un, but a twenty

y ear minimum for possessing dr ug s and dis c ha rg inga g un . Si mil ar d isp ari tie s r e su lt d ir e c tly fr om Wh itl e y ’s ho ldi ngwi th respe ct to firea

rms sentenc es, and do not re nder the literal re adingof the statute a bsurd. 15 subjected to a

lower total mandatory

minimum sentenc e for

a more sever e cr ime. 9 Whit ley made note of

this appare nt anomaly . 529 F.3d at 156. I f Whitl ey ’s holding w as limit ed to its facts, a

nd the term “ any

other provision of law ” mea nt only ACCA offense s, no anomalies would re sult. This i s beca use the a lternative ma

ndatory minimum sentenc e under the AC CAis f

if te e n y e ars , a

numbe r t hat w ou ld c on sis te ntl y

tr ump the fi ve - t o te n- y e ar m ini mum s
un de r S e c tio n 9 24 (c )( 1) (A )( i) -( iii ). Se e Whit le y , 5 29 F .3 d at 15 7- 58 (r e je c tin g the F ourt

h Circuit’s analy sis in S tudifin that an anomaly would result from imposing ACCA’s minimum sentenc e in lieu of a

ny highe r sentenc e under

Section 924(c) ). Ho we ve r, Whit le y

did no t r e ly on re a din g an A CCAlim itatio n into t he “ e xce pt” c la

us e to
re je c t th e po int

re g ard ingthe po te nti a l ano ma ly . Wh itl e y ’s pr ima ry re a so nin g is that th e ano ma ly “disappe ars upon c lose scrutiny” bec ause “ no court would be require d to sentence the fivekilogr am def

endant to only

the ten-year

minimum . That def

endant would f

ace a maximum sentenc e of life . . . . I f the ‘e x cept’ clause subjected more serious drugoffe nders to a lowe r
ma ximumse nte nc e tha

n le ss s e ri ou s d

ru g of fe nd e rs , th e Go ve rnme nt’ s a no ma ly argume nt w ou ld have so me fo rc e .” 52 9 F .3 d at 15 5. Thus , a lit e ra l r e a din g of

the statut e do e s n ot r e nd e r i t incoher ent. As this Court reinforc ed in its decision denying the petition for re hear ing: “ [t ]he lit e ra l w or din g le ave s n o d e fe nd ant u ns e nte nc e d. Ind e e d,
. . . it le ave s se nte nc ingjud g e s f re e to impose prec isely

the same numbe r of year s that the Gover nment contends should have beenMoreove r, as a micus counsel ar g ues, the United States Sentenc ing Guidelines 10 the mse lve s r e so lve the sp e c if ic ano ma ly

highli g hte d b y

the g ov e rnme nt. Un de r t he Gu ide lin e s, the low end of

the sentenc ing r ang e for

a def endant c onvicted of posse ssion of five kilog rams of coca ine, assuming no criminal history , would be twelve y ear s and seve n months, which is longer than the twelve -y ear

minimum applicable to a def endant in possession of only 500 g rams of c oc a ine . T he g ov e rnme nt’ s r e sp on se is that th e Gu ide lin e s w ou ld n ot h e lp a jud g e wh o s e e ks to sentenc e both def

endants to the lowe st possibl e sente nce a llowed by the statute. But the hy po the tic a l ju dg e c ou ld i nc re a se the se nte nc e of the de fe nd ant who wa s n ot s ub je c te d to do ub le mandatory

minimum sentenc es to ac hieve pa rity
. 16 imposed on Whi tley , but authorizes them to do so as a matter of discretion, not as a

require ment.” Whit ley , 540 F.3d at 89. 10 In any event, this purporte d anomaly results from what, in our view, is a plain re adingof the statutory

text . “I f, at the e nd of the da y , Congr ess believe s we have er red in interpr eting [t he statute], it rema ins free to corre ct our mistake.” Americ an Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 2 4 6 ( 1 9 9 5 ) ( O ’ Co n n o r , J. , c o n c ur r in g in p art a n d d is s e n ti n g in

p art) ; s e e a ls o Cl ar

k v . M arti n e z, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005). II. Williams’s Challenges to his Conviction Wil liams challeng es the suff iciency of the e vidence underly

ing his c onviction, arguing that there was no e vidence demonstratingthat he knowing ly possessed the c rac k coca ine and f irea rm that w e re re c ov e re d f

ro m th e ve hic le . In r e vie wi ngthe su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , w e mus t

“ vie w the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in the lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to t he g ov e rnme nt, and

. . . d ra w a ll
rea sonable infe renc es in its favor.” United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 ( 2d Cir. 2000). Th e ve rd ic t mu st b e su sta ine d if “ any ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h ave fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt.” J ackson v. V irg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The evidenc e pre sented at trial was suff icient to permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a
rea sonable doubt that: Wil liams possessed the fire arm (his fing erpr ints were on the g unWilli ams t e sti fi e d at tr ia l th a t hi s f ing e rp ri nts a

pp e are d o n th e g un

ma g a zine be c a

us e 11 police off icer s had hande d him the gun ma g azine at the pre cinct. In rebuttal, two police office rs testified that Will iams did not touch the wea pons at the pre cinct. The jury cer tainly could have inferr ed fr om the office rs’s testimony that Wil liams’s fing erpr ints were on the g un mag azine befor e the a

rre st and, indeed, that Wi lliams testified falsely in order to c oncea l his knowledg e of what wa s in the car ’s hidden compa rtment. 17 mag azine; it was in the ca r he w as driving ); Wil liams possessed the cr ack c ocaine with an intent 11 to d istri bute (t

he c ar h a d a

na rc oti c s o do r; the dr

ug s w e re in t

he same c omp artme nt a s th e fi re arm ; there wer e 180 small bag s containingover 150 g rams of c ocaine ; he had $1,100 a nd six cellular phones in the ca

r); and that the g un was used in c onnection with the fire arms off ense ( the gun and the dr ug s w e re fo un d in

the same hid de n c omp artme nt) . T hu s, we re je c t Will iams’ s c ha lle ng e to the suffic iency

of the e vidence
. Wil liams also argues that his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive for stipulating to the fa ct that the g un and dr ug s w e re fo un d d

ur ingan inve nto ry

se arc h o f t

he c ar f oll ow inghis arr e st. Willi ams argues that this stipul ation was inconsistent with the alleg ed theor y of the de fense : to wit, that Willi ams w a s f

ra me d b y the po lic e . We de c lin e to d e viate fr om o ur “ ba se lin e ave rs ion

to resolvingineffe ctiveness c laims on direct re view” in this ca se, bec ause the fac tual rec ord on the issue is not fully

develope d and re solution of the issue is not bey ond doubt. See United States v. Kh e dr , 3 43 F .3 d 9 6, 99 -1 00 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ) ( qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . Wil liams’ s in e ff e c tiv e ne ss claim ca n be better

develope d in the district court on a motion under 28 U .S.C. § 2255. I d. at 100. III . Re m and fo r Re se nt e nc ing Wil liams also challeng es the c onstitut ionality of the c rac k-to-powde r coc aine se ntencing ratio, which w as integ ral to the c alculation of his base offe nse leve ls and sentenc ing r ang e on the
narc otics count under the United States SentencingGuidelines. The g overnme nt conce des that the18

rec ord does not esta

blish whether the district c ourt was c og nizant of its abili ty to impose a non-Guidelines se ntence based on the disparity betwee n sentenc ing f

or cr ack a nd powder

coca ine offe nses, and that ther efor e, re mand is appropr iate pursua nt to United States v. Rega lado, 518 F.3d 143, 149 ( 2d Cir. 2008). There fore , we r emand f

or re sentenc ing pur suant to Reg alado a nd consistent with our holding that Williams i s not subject to the mandatory consec utive five-year

minimum for the firea rm conviction under

Section 924(c) . Upon re sentenc ing, Williams remains subject to the teny ear minimum statutory

sentenc e for

his drug traff

icking crime, “ and the se ntencingjudge reta ins authority to select a

ny appropr iate sente nce, c onsistent with 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a) , whether or not pursuant to the Guidelines, a bove that minimum.” Whi tley , 529 F.3d at 158 (footnote omitted). In light of our

decision to rema

nd, we r ejec t, as premature, Willi ams’s cha lleng e to the substantive
rea sonability

of his sentenc e. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm Wi lliams’s conviction and re mand to the district court for rese ntencing
.