Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 26, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 93199 

and accessibility, where all employees 

are treated with dignity and respect. 

While GSA is not aware of any specific 

instances where language in this FMR 

part has been used to discriminate 

against an employee, GSA believes it is 

important to prevent any potential 

discrimination or the appearance of it. 

Consistent with the American 

Psychological Association (APA) Style 

Guide, 7th Edition, Publication Manual 

Section 5.5 guidance on ‘‘Gender and 

Pronoun Usage’’, GSA is replacing 

gender-specific pronouns, such as he, 

she, his, or her, with more inclusive 

terminology. 

II. Discussion of the Final Rule 

A. Summary of Significant Changes 

This final rule removes gender-based 

pronouns from this FMR part and 

replaces them with more inclusive 

language. The grammatical and 

technical changes do not alter any 

definition, operation, or interpretation 

of the FMR. 

B. Expected Cost Impact to the Public 

There is no expected cost imposed 

upon the public as a result of this rule 

since the changes are technical. 

III. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 

14094 

Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 

(Regulatory Planning and Review) 

directs agencies to assess all costs and 

benefits of available regulatory 

alternatives and, if regulation is 

necessary, to select regulatory 

approaches that maximize net benefits 

(including potential economic, 

environmental, public health and safety 

effects, distributive impacts, and 

equity). E.O. 13563 (Improving 

Regulation and Regulatory Review) 

emphasizes the importance of 

quantifying both costs and benefits, of 

reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, 

and of promoting flexibility. E.O. 14094 

(Modernizing Regulatory Review) 

amends Section 3(f) of E.O. 12866 and 

supplements and reaffirms the 

principles, structures, and definitions 

governing contemporary regulatory 

review established in E.O. 12866 and 

E.O. 13563. The Office of Management 

and Budget’s Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has 

determined that this rule is not a 

significant regulatory action, and 

therefore, was not subject to review 

under Section 6(b) of E.O. 12866. 

IV. Congressional Review Act 

OIRA has determined that this rule is 

not a ‘‘major rule’’ under 5 U.S.C. 

804(2). Title II, Subtitle E of the Small 

Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act of 1996 (codified at 5 

U.S.C. 801–808), also known as the 

Congressional Review Act or CRA, 

generally provides that before a rule 

may take effect, unless excepted, the 

agency promulgating the rule must 

submit a rule report, which includes a 

copy of the rule, to each House of the 

Congress and to the Comptroller General 

of the United States. This rule is 

excepted from CRA reporting 

requirements prescribed under 5 U.S.C. 

801, as it relates to agency management 

or personnel under 5 U.S.C. 804(3)(B). 

V. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

This final rule will not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities 

within the meaning of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq. This 

final rule is also exempt from the 

Administrative Procedure Act pursuant 

to 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2) because it applies 

to agency management or personnel. 

Therefore, an Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis was not performed. 

VI. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act does 

not apply because the changes to the 

FMR do not impose recordkeeping or 

information collection requirements, or 

the collection of information from 

offerors, contractors, or members of the 

public that require the approval of the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) under 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq. 

List of Subjects in 41 CFR Part 102–117 

Freight, Government property 

management, Moving of household 

goods, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements, Transportation. 

Robin Carnahan, 

Administrator of General Services. 

For the reasons set forth in the 

preamble, GSA amends 41 CFR part 

102–117 as set forth below: 

PART 102–117—TRANSPORTATION 

MANAGEMENT 

■ 1. The authority citation for 41 CFR 

part 102–117 continues to read as 

follows: 

Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3726; 40 U.S.C. 

121(c); 40 U.S.C. 501, et seq.; 46 U.S.C. 

55305; 49 U.S.C. 40118. 

■ 2. Revise the section heading for 

§ 102–117.240 to read as follows: 

§ 102–117.240 What is my agency’s 

financial responsibility to an employee who 

chooses to move all or part of their HHG 

under the commuted rate system? 

* * * * * 

§ 102–117.295 [Amended] 

■ 3. Amend § 102–117.295 by, in 

paragraph (b), removing the words ‘‘his/ 

her’’ from the second sentence. 

[FR Doc. 2024–27565 Filed 11–25–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

49 CFR Parts 571 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2023–0021] 

RIN 2127–AM37 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standards; Automatic Emergency 

Braking Systems for Light Vehicles 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; response to petitions 

for reconsideration. 

SUMMARY: This document grants parts of 

petitions for reconsideration of a May 9, 

2024, final rule that adopted Federal 

Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) 

No. 127, ‘‘Automatic Emergency Braking 

for Light Vehicles,’’ which requires 

automatic emergency braking (AEB), 

pedestrian automatic emergency braking 

(PAEB), and forward collision warning 

(FCW) systems on all new light vehicles. 

This final rule clarifies requirements 

applicable to FCW visual signals and 

audio signals, corrects an error in the 

test scenario for obstructed pedestrian 

crossing the road, and removes 

superfluous language from the 

performance test requirement for lead 

vehicle AEB. This notice denies other 

requests in the petitions. This document 

also denies a petition for 

reconsideration, which is treated as a 

petition for rulemaking because it was 

received more than 45 days after 

publication of the rule. 

DATES: 

Effective: January 27, 2025. 

Compliance date: Compliance with 

FMVSS No. 127 and related regulations, 

as amended in this rule, is required for 

all vehicles by September 1, 2029. 

However, vehicles produced by smallvolume manufacturers, final-stage 

manufacturers, and alterers must be 

equipped with a compliant AEB system 

by September 1, 2030. 

Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions 

for reconsideration of this final action 

must be received not later than January 

10, 2025. 

ADDRESSES: Correspondence related to 

this rule, including petitions for 


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1 49 CFR 553.35, 553.37. 

2Alliance for Automotive Innovation, Docket No. 

NHTSA–2023–0021–1071. 

3Toyota Motor North America, Docket No. 

NHTSA–2023–0021–1074. 

4 Volkswagen Group of America, Docket No. 

NHTSA–2023–0021–1073. 

5Scuderia Cameron Glickenhaus, Docket No. 

NHTSA–2023–0021–1078. 

6Hyundai Motor Group, Docket No. NHTSA– 

2023–0021–1072. 

7Autotalks, Docket No. NHTSA–2023–0021– 

1075. 

reconsideration and comments, should 

refer to the docket number set forth 

above (NHTSA–2023–0021) and be 

submitted to the Administrator, 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical issues: Mr. Markus Price, 

Office of Crash Avoidance Standards, 

Telephone: (202) 366–1810, Facsimile: 

(202) 366–7002. For legal issues: Mr. Eli 

Wachtel, Office of the Chief Counsel, 

Telephone: (202) 366–2992, Facsimile: 

(202) 366–3820. The mailing address for 

these officials is: National Highway 

Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New 

Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 

20590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Background and Executive Summary 

II. Petitions for Reconsideration Received by 

NHTSA and Analysis 

A. No Contact 

B. Multiple Trials 

C. Equipment Requirement 

D. Unlimited Preconditioning and Test 

Runs 

E. Malfunction Indicator Lamp 

F. Deactivation 

G. Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test 

Correction 

H. FCW Auditory Signal 

I. FCW Visual Signal 

J. Cost Estimates 

K. Brake Pedal Robot 

L. Manual Transmission 

M. Small-Volume Manufacturers 

III. Petition for Rulemaking Received by 

NHTSA and Analysis 

A. Include V2X 

IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices 

V. Regulatory Text 

I. Background and Executive Summary 

In November 2021, the Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law (BIL), enacted as the 

Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 

(Pub. L. 117–58), was signed into law. 

BIL directed the Secretary of 

Transportation to promulgate a rule to 

establish minimum performance 

standards with respect to crash 

avoidance technology and to require 

that all passenger motor vehicles 

manufactured for sale in the United 

States be equipped with forward 

collision warning (FCW) and automatic 

emergency braking (AEB) systems that 

alert the driver if a collision is imminent 

and automatically apply the brakes if 

the driver fails to do so. 

In accordance with BIL, NHTSA 

issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) (88 FR 38632) in June 2023, 

followed by a final rule (89 FR 39686) 

in May 2024, establishing FMVSS No. 

127, ‘‘Automatic Emergency Braking 

Systems for Light Vehicles.’’ This 

FMVSS requires AEB, including 

pedestrian AEB (PAEB), systems on 

light vehicles. In addition to the 

mandate in BIL, the final rule was also 

issued under the authority of the 

National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 

Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act). Under 

49 U.S.C. chapter 301, the Secretary of 

Transportation is responsible for 

prescribing motor vehicle safety 

standards that are practicable, meet the 

need for motor vehicle safety, and are 

stated in objective terms. The 

responsibility for promulgation of 

FMVSSs is delegated to NHTSA. 

The final rule includes four 

requirements for AEB systems for both 

lead vehicles and pedestrians. First, 

there is an equipment requirement that 

vehicles have an FCW system that 

provides an auditory and visual signal 

to the driver of an impending collision 

with a lead vehicle or a pedestrian. The 

system must operate at any forward 

speed greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) 

and less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) for 

a warning involving a lead vehicle, at 

any forward speed greater than 10 km/ 

h (6.2 mph) and less than 73 km/h (45.3 

mph) for a warning involving a 

pedestrian. Similarly, the final rule 

includes an equipment requirement that 

light vehicles have an AEB system that 

applies the brakes automatically when a 

collision with a lead vehicle or 

pedestrian is imminent. The system 

must operate at any forward speed that 

is greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and 

less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) for AEB 

involving a lead vehicle, and at any 

forward speed greater than 10 km/h (6.2 

mph) and less than 73 km/h (45.3 mph) 

for PAEB. 

Second, the AEB system is required to 

prevent the vehicle from colliding with 

the lead vehicle or pedestrian test 

devices when tested according to the 

standard’s test procedures. These track 

test procedures have defined 

parameters, including travel speeds up 

to 100 km/h (62.2 mph), that ensure that 

AEB systems prevent crashes in a 

controlled testing environment. 

Third, the final rule includes two 

false activation tests. 

Finally, the final rule requires that a 

vehicle must detect AEB system 

malfunctions, including performance 

degradation caused solely by sensor 

obstructions, and notify the driver of 

any malfunction that causes the AEB 

system not to meet the minimum 

proposed performance requirements. If 

the system detects a malfunction, or if 

the system adjusts its performance such 

that it will not meet the requirements of 

the finalized standard, the system must 

provide the vehicle operator with a 

telltale notification. 

The final rule applies to vehicles 

manufactured on or after September 1, 

2029. An additional year is provided for 

small-volume manufacturers. 

Petitions for Reconsideration Received 

NHTSA regulations allow any 

interested person to petition the 

Administrator for reconsideration of a 

rule. Under NHTSA’s regulations, 

petitions for reconsideration must 

provide an explanation why compliance 

with the rule is not practicable, is 

unreasonable, or is not in the public 

interest. Additionally, petitions must be 

received within 45 days of the 

publication of the final rule. Untimely 

petitions for reconsideration are 

considered to be petitions for 

rulemaking. The Administrator may 

consolidate petitions relating to the 

same rule.1

NHTSA received petitions for 

reconsideration from the Alliance for 

Automotive Innovation (the Alliance),2

Toyota Motor North America (Toyota),3

Volkswagen Group of America 

(Volkswagen),4 and Scuderia Cameron 

Glickenhaus, LLC (Glickenhaus).5

NHTSA also received a letter from 

Hyundai Motor Group (Hyundai), styled 

as a ‘‘supplemental comment,’’ that 

provides its perspective on FMVSS No. 

127, which we have considered in this 

response to the petitions for 

reconsideration.6 NHTSA also received 

a petition from Autotalks that NHTSA is 

treating as a petition for rulemaking 

because it was received more than 45 

days after publication of the final rule.7

The petitions requested a variety of 

amendments to FMVSS No. 127. These, 

and NHTSA’s reasoning and response to 

each petitioned-for item, are 

summarized below and discussed in 

detail in the respective sections of the 

preamble of this notice. 

Summary of Responses to the Petitions 

for Reconsideration 

In response to these petitions, NHTSA 

is granting in part and denying in part. 

The changes made to FMVSS No. 127 

are summarized as follows. 


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8Chrysler Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 

(6th Cir. 1972) (Chrysler). 

9 Id. at 671, 673. 

• FMVSS No. 127 contains an 

equipment requirement that AEB 

systems activate the service brakes 

when a collision is imminent and that 

they operate under certain conditions. It 

also contains a performance test 

requirement for lead vehicle AEB that 

contains similar language. Petitioners 

requested definitions for the terms 

‘‘operate’’ and ‘‘imminent.’’ NHTSA is 

amending the language in the 

performance test requirement to remove 

refence to ‘‘imminent’’ from the 

performance test requirement for lead 

vehicle AEB, to clarify that the 

performance test does not evaluate AEB 

activation timing. NHTSA is not 

providing a definition for ‘‘operate’’ 

because the definition of ‘‘automatic 

emergency braking system’’ in the final 

rule sufficiently describes how an AEB 

system operates. NHTSA is not 

providing a definition for ‘‘imminent’’ 

because the term is used consistent with 

its plain meaning. 

• FMVSS No. 127 contains a test 

scenario that, when tested with very 

narrow vehicles at the extreme of the 

tolerances allowed by the test condition, 

resulted in a stringency beyond that 

intended by NHTSA. This final rule 

amends the test scenario to ensure the 

correct level of stringency. 

• FMVSS No. 127 contains 

specifications for the FCW visual signal 

location. Petitioners requested 

additional clarity. This final rule 

amends the regulatory text to clarify 

these specifications. 

• FMVSS No. 127 contains 

requirements for the FCW audio signal, 

including that in-vehicle audio must be 

suppressed when the FCW auditory 

signal is presented. Petitioners 

expressed several concerns about the 

clarity and objectivity of these 

requirements as well as test conditions. 

This final rule clarifies these 

requirements by stating the location of 

the microphone, additional vehicle 

conditions under which testing will 

occur, and amending the definitions to 

simplify the requirement for 

suppression. 

This rule also denies the petitions 

with regards to several other requested 

amendments. These are as follows. For 

the items for which petitioners restate 

arguments made during the comment 

period for FMVSS No. 127, the reasons 

given for denial are the same as those 

stated in the final rule. 

• The performance requirement for 

both lead vehicle and pedestrian AEB 

testing is collision avoidance (referred 

to throughout the final rule and this 

document as ‘‘no contact’’). Petitioners 

requested relaxation of this requirement 

to allow contact at low speeds, 

specifically requesting 10 km/h (6.2 

mph). NHTSA is rejecting this request 

because the no contact requirement is 

practicable and meets the need for 

safety. 

• Petitioners requested that multiple 

test runs be allowed to achieve the no 

contact performance requirement (for 

example, that vehicles must pass on 5 

out of 7 test runs) to account for 

variability. Petitioners noted that 

FMVSS No. 135, which regulates light 

vehicle brake systems, allows multiple 

test runs to meet some of the 

performance requirements. NHTSA is 

rejecting this request because FMVSS 

No. 127 testing is distinct from FMVSS 

No. 135 testing such that not allowing 

multiple test runs in FMVSS No. 127 is 

practicable and meets the need for 

safety. 

• FMVSS No. 127 test scenarios state 

that the vehicle can be driven for any 

amount of time. Additionally, it does 

not place a cap on the number of tests 

that could be run on any given subject 

vehicle. Petitioners expressed concern 

that this standard would allow 

excessive driving or testing of vehicles 

to wear out components such that they 

can no longer meet the performance 

required by the standard. NHTSA finds 

further specification is unnecessary 

because the test does not evaluate the 

endurance or durability of wear parts 

and will not be used in such a manner. 

• FMVSS No. 127 requires that 

vehicles illuminate a malfunction 

identification lamp (MIL) upon 

detection of a malfunction or if the AEB 

system adjusts its performance such that 

it is below the performance required by 

the standard. Petitioners requested 

additional specificity regarding the 

terminology in this requirement as well 

as a test procedure. NHTSA is rejecting 

this request because the requirement 

meets the Safety Act as written. 

• FMVSS No. 127 does not permit 

installation of a manual control with the 

sole purpose of deactivating the AEB 

system. It does contain a provision 

allowing automatic deactivation in 

certain situations. Petitioners requested 

permission to install a manual 

deactivation control, as well as 

modifications to the automatic 

deactivation provision. NHTSA is 

rejecting this request because the final 

rule already addresses petitioners’ 

concerns. 

• Petitioners stated that NHTSA did 

not fully consider costs associated with 

compliance. No change is needed in 

response to this request because the 

final rule fully considered the costs 

associated with compliance. 

• Volkswagen requested additional 

specifications for the brake pedal robot 

used in testing with manual brake 

application. NHTSA is rejecting this 

request for the reasons stated in the May 

9, 2024 final rule. 

• Petitioner Glickenhaus requested 

the AEB requirements not be applicable 

to vehicles with manual transmission. 

NHTSA is rejecting this request because 

vehicles equipped with manual 

transmissions and AEB are widely 

available. 

• Petitioner Glickenhaus requested 

additional flexibility for very small 

volume manufacturers. NHTSA is 

rejecting this request because AEB 

systems are available for purchase and, 

in the case that a manufacturer is unable 

to acquire systems, the exemption 

processes in the Safety Act may provide 

relief. 

II. Petitions for Reconsideration 

Received by NHTSA and Analysis 

A. No Contact 

The final rule requires that, when 

tested according to the procedures 

therein, the subject vehicle not collide 

with the test device (vehicle test device 

or pedestrian mannequin). The test data, 

discussed at length in the final rule, 

demonstrates that this requirement is 

practicable. A tested vehicle was able to 

meet the performance requirements in 

the final rule and recent NHTSA testing 

revealed significant improvement 

throughout much of the fleet in a 

relatively short time. These facts show 

that compliance by 2029 is practicable. 

In the final rule we also emphasized 

that practicability must be viewed from 

the perspective that under the Safety 

Act, NHTSA has the authority to issue 

standards that are technology-forcing.8

That is, NHTSA is empowered under 

the Safety Act to issue safety standards 

that ‘‘impel automobile manufacturers 

to develop and apply new technology to 

the task of improving the safety design 

of automobiles as readily as possible’’ 

such that they ‘‘require improvements 

in existing technology or which require 

the development of new technology, 

and is not limited to issuing standards 

based solely on devices already fully 

developed.’’ 9 NHTSA acknowledged 

that the final rule is technology-forcing, 

but emphasized that the standard is 

practicable and no single current 

vehicle must meet every requirement for 

an FMVSS to be considered practicable 

under the Safety Act. 

Petitioners requested reconsideration 

on two broad grounds: first that the nocontact requirement is not practicable, 


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10The obstructed pedestrian crossing road 

scenario is discussed in detail in Section II.G, 

‘‘Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test Correction,’’ 

of this notice. 

11 In March 2016, NHTSA and the Insurance 

Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) announced a 

commitment by 20 manufacturers representing 

more than 99 percent of the U.S. light vehicle 

market to include low-speed AEB as a standard 

feature on nearly all new light vehicles not later 

than September 1, 2022. As part of this voluntary 

commitment, manufacturers are including both 

FCW and a crash imminent braking (CIB) system 

that reduces a vehicle’s speed in certain rear-end 

crash-imminent test conditions. 

12NHTSA–2023–0021–1076. 

13Additionally, in the final rule we emphasized 

several other reasons that inform the practicability 

of selecting a no contact requirement over a 

requirement that allows contacts, such as testing 

repeatability and costs associated with replacing or 

repairing test vehicles and test devices. 

and second that it does not meet the 

need for safety. 

1. Practicability and Test Data 

a. PAEB and AEB Test Data 

The Alliance stated that NHTSA has 

not demonstrated that the no contact 

requirement is practicable for the fleet. 

Other than the simulation data for the 

obstructed pedestrian crossing road 

scenario, the Alliance did not present 

any new data or analysis regarding the 

practicability of requiring collision 

avoidance in AEB compliance testing 

that the agency had not previously 

considered.10 The Alliance noted that 

the final rule states that NHTSA agrees 

with the IIHS’s comment to the NPRM 

that some current AEB systems are 

already completely avoiding collisions 

under the proposed AEB testing. The 

Alliance added, however, that IIHS did 

not test any vehicles at speeds faster 

than 70 km/h (43.5 mph), and only three 

out of the six tested vehicles could 

avoid the lead vehicle target in all of the 

test runs. It also stated that NHTSA 

conceded that no vehicle in its 2020 

AEB research was able to meet all the 

performance requirements of the final 

rule for lead vehicle and PAEB systems. 

It also pointed out that for lead vehicle 

AEB systems, NHTSA’s MY 2023 

research showed that only one vehicle 

could avoid contact in each test speed 

and scenario, but even that vehicle did 

not avoid contact on every test run at 

the most stringent condition. The 

Alliance argued that a single vehicle’s 

ability to meet the required tests some 

of the time does not support NHTSA’s 

conclusion that the no-contact 

requirement is practicable. The Alliance 

also stated that the vehicles used in 

NHTSA’s 2023 testing don’t support the 

final rule because those vehicles were 

designed only to meet the performance 

levels stated in the 2016 voluntary 

commitment.11

The Alliance stated the agency’s 

analysis of test data demonstrate 

variation in performance that was not 

accounted for in the final rule. The 

Alliance stated that the final rule did 

not consider whether variability 

between vehicles or testing locations 

would make compliance more 

challenging by dictating the design 

margin that manufacturers need to meet 

to comply with the requirement. The 

Alliance reasoned that NHTSA’s 

evaluation (in the FRIA) of the 

variability in time-to-collision (TTC) at 

brake activation demonstrates that this 

variability is meaningful and 

demonstrates variation in performance. 

The Alliance noted that NHTSA 

research that was conducted with three 

vehicles at the speed range from 16 km/ 

h (9.9 mph) to 40 km/h (24.9 mph) 

showed a variation of at least 0.15 

seconds in TTC at brake activation. 

Agency Analysis 

The test data demonstrates that the 

rule is practicable. In its petition, the 

Alliance acknowledged that NHTSA 

had considered all available information 

and test results from the agency’s 

research and studies conducted by 

stakeholders such as IIHS. It also 

acknowledged that a tested vehicle was 

able to meet the performance 

requirements, despite not being 

designed to meet the requirements of 

the final rule. Additionally, the vehicle 

that was able to meet the requirements 

had a sales price below the market 

average, indicating that the 

requirements could be met without 

expensive new technologies. 

NHTSA’s recent testing also marked 

significant progress compared to its 

earlier research from 2020. The positive 

trend in AEB technology was further 

supported by IIHS, which highlighted 

substantial improvements between the 

2023 and 2024 model years in the 

stationary lead vehicle test at 70 km/h 

(43.5 mph).12 Notably, the percentage of 

vehicles avoiding the target in all test 

runs increased from 10 percent to 56 

percent. These data all show that 

meeting the requirements of this rule by 

September 2029 is practicable.13

Additionally, the Alliance’s framing 

of vehicle and test location variability 

and our FRIA estimates is 

unconvincing. Variability between 

vehicles in the same model line and 

year (vehicle-to-vehicle variability) is 

determined by the manufacturer, subject 

to the requirement that every vehicle it 

sells meet the minimum safety 

performance. NHTSA has no reason to 

believe that the vehicles we tested had 

superior performance to other vehicles 

in the same model line and year. Also, 

vehicle-to-vehicle variability is a 

consideration for all FMVSS, and the 

Alliance provided no information to 

indicate that there is an issue unique to 

AEB. Additionally, variation in brake 

activation timing between 

manufacturers is contemplated by the 

structure of the rule. The final rule does 

not dictate brake activation timing, 

brake force, or any other aspects of AEB 

performance other than that the subject 

vehicle not make contact with the test 

device. 

Regarding variability across test 

locations, FMVSS No. 127 specifies all 

the needed conditions to inform 

manufacturers of how we will test. 

These conditions were proposed in the 

NPRM, and commenters did not raise 

conditions that were not included that 

would affect test outcomes. Finally, the 

variability analysis in the FRIA is our 

attempt to connect the idealized test 

conditions to the real world when 

conducting benefits analyses. NHTSA 

understands that in the real world there 

will be variability that cannot be tested 

in an efficient way through an FMVSS, 

which informs our benefits calculations. 

However, such analysis should not be 

used to determine the types of results 

achievable in an idealized testing 

environment. For these reasons, NHTSA 

will not grant reconsideration. 

b. FMVSS No. 135 Test Data 

The Alliance stated that the final rule 

improperly relied on the agency’s 

evaluation of FMVSS No. 135 test 

results, which showed that braking 

performance of nearly all tested vehicles 

was much better than what the FMVSS 

requires. The Alliance stated that the 

evaluation reflects that manufacturers 

build compliance margins into their 

design for FMVSS compliance and does 

not support the agency’s conclusion that 

the no-contact requirement is 

practicable. Furthermore, the Alliance 

stated that test results from FMVSS No. 

135 testing are not comparable to AEB 

performance because the final rule 

requires performance from both the 

service brakes and a perception system, 

whereas FMVSS No. 135 evaluates only 

service brake performance. Also, the 

Alliance stated that the maneuvers in 

FMVSS No. 135 tests are conducted 

with a human driver putting muscular 

effort into the brake pedal. In contrast, 

there is no human input when testing 

the AEB system. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA’s use of FMVSS No. 135 test 

results was justified. As an initial 

matter, those results were not the 

primary results upon which the agency 


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14NHTSA’s 2023 Light Vehicle Automatic 

Emergency Braking Research Test Summary, Docket 

No. NHTSA–2023–0021–1066; NHTSA’s 2023 Light 

Vehicle Pedestrian Automatic Emergency Braking 

Research Test Summary, Docket No. NHTSA–2023– 

0021–1068. 

15The low impact speeds on the system that did 

not avoid contact on all trials suggests that slight 

tuning of that AEB to the requirements of FMVSS 

No. 127 is needed to meet the standard. 

16NHTSA’s 2022 Light Vehicle Automatic 

Emergency Braking Research Test Summary, Docket 

No. NHTSA–2023–0021–0005. 

17NHTSA’s 2023 Light Vehicle Automatic 

Emergency Braking Research Test Summary, Docket 

No. NHTSA–2023–0021–1066. 

determined that the requirements are 

practicable. They were used largely to 

show that the braking performance 

needed to meet the requirements in the 

final rule is present in the current fleet 

without the need for changes, especially 

with regard to heavier vehicles for 

which there were limitations on 

available test data. The results indicated 

that the brake performance of most 

vehicles surpasses the performance 

requirements set by FMVSS No. 135. 

While the results of these tests might 

not show exactly how the braking 

systems will perform under automatic 

actuation that does not involve human 

muscular inputs, they do demonstrate 

that braking performance is more than 

sufficient to permit compliance with the 

final rule. Indeed, we do not need to 

rely on FMVSS No. 135 test data to 

demonstrate actuation performance 

because AEB systems currently on the 

road and tested by NHTSA actuate the 

service brakes without human driver 

inputs and demonstrate the performance 

needed to meet FMVSS No. 127. 

Therefore, we disagree with the 

Alliance’s contention that the final rule 

misused the FMVSS No. 135 test results. 

c. Test Speeds and Headway 

Toyota, Volkswagen, and the Alliance 

expressed concern regarding the 

practicability of high maximum test 

speeds and no contact. The Alliance 

stated that NHTSA’s data illustrate the 

difficulties in complying with the 

decelerating lead vehicle test with both 

the lead and subject vehicles traveling at 

50 mph (80 km/h) at any headway 

between 12 and 40 meters (S7.5.1(a), 

S7.5.2(b)(2), S7.5.3(a) and S7.5.3(d) of 

the final rule). To address this issue, the 

Alliance petitioned NHTSA to consider 

reducing the maximum test speed for 

the AEB and PAEB requirements and 

adjust the headway requirements. The 

Alliance claimed that the 2023 

additional AEB research in the final rule 

evaluated only the test condition with a 

12-meter headway and did not provide 

any test data to support the lead vehicle 

decelerating test with headways greater 

than 12 meters. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA is not reducing the maximum 

test speeds or adjusting the headway 

requirements for the test scenarios. 

Petitioners’ requests for test speed 

reduction were addressed in the final 

rule, and headways above 12 meters are 

practicable. 

Regarding test speeds, NHTSA’s 2023 

research showed multiple vehicles 

avoided contact on most tests regardless 

of scenario and test speed.14 Further, 

one vehicle avoided contact on all lead 

vehicle AEB and PAEB tests except on 

three of the five lead vehicle 

decelerating tests, where it impacted the 

lead vehicle at approximately 5 km/h or 

less. 15 That vehicles not designed to 

meet the standard are already capable of 

doing so demonstrates that the 

performance test requirements are 

practicable. 

Regarding headway for the lead 

vehicle decelerating test, the headway 

ranges selected are consistent with those 

used by Euro NCAP and NHTSA 

incorporated the test ranges for speed 

and headways to ensure AEB system 

robustness under a range of situations. 

NHTSA tested 2022 model year vehicles 

with headways of 40 m with and 

without manual brake application at 50 

km/h and 80 km/h, and with a lead 

vehicle deceleration of 0.4 g and 0.5 g.16

During that testing, multiple vehicles 

avoided contact in almost all lead 

vehicle decelerating test scenarios and 

one vehicle avoided contact in all 

scenarios. Additionally, the shorter 

headway tests are generally more 

stringent than tests with larger 

headways. In our 2023 testing, one 

vehicle tested by NHTSA avoided 

contact in the 80 km/h lead vehicle 

deceleration test in all trials with a 12 

m headway, and another vehicle 

avoided contact on 2 out of 5 runs,17

suggesting that avoiding contact under 

less stringent test conditions is 

practicable. Based on our test data, the 

requirements are practicable and will 

not be adjusted. 

2. Meet the Need for Safety 

Petitioners requested reconsideration 

of the no contact requirement, stating 

that it could lead to unintended 

consequences such as increased false 

positives and a rise in rear-end 

collisions. A false positive describes 

AEB system brake applications in 

circumstances where there is no crashimminent situation, such as braking in 

the absence of a true obstacle. 

a. Sufficiency of Analysis of False 

Positives 

The Alliance stated that NHTSA has 

not adequately considered whether 

meeting the no-contact performance 

requirement will generate false positives 

and that NHTSA ‘‘should have 

attempted to quantify this risk’’ and 

assessed why those disbenefits are 

reasonable to accept. The Alliance 

suggested that a false positive in 

FMVSS-compliant AEB vehicles could 

induce rear-end collisions with vehicles 

that are not equipped with rulecompliant AEB systems. The Alliance’s 

petition included simulation data 

indicating that a vehicle complying with 

the final rule must respond within 0.35 

seconds to avoid contact in one of the 

obstructed pedestrian crossing 

situations, which it argues is beyond the 

reaction ability of human drivers that 

may be behind these vehicles. It claimed 

that this discrepancy will likely result 

in a rear-end crash. Furthermore, 

according to the Alliance, increases in 

relative speed may heighten the 

likelihood of false positives due to the 

need for earlier prediction and 

intervention. The Alliance stated that 

NHTSA acknowledged that false 

positives could generate problems with 

public acceptance of AEB technology. It 

also stated that NHTSA dismissed this 

concern in the final rule without 

demonstrating that the final rule’s 

requirements will not significantly 

impact the rate of false positives, and 

without understanding that the final 

rule demands effectively different 

systems from those currently installed 

in vehicles. The Alliance did not 

suggest any specific alternative. 

Toyota claimed that the requirements 

in the final rule will likely lead to an 

increase in false positives and can create 

driving behavior that neither the driver 

of the subject vehicle nor the drivers of 

surrounding vehicles will find natural 

or predictable, resulting in safety 

disbenefits. It stated that due to high 

maximum testable speeds, AEB will 

need to activate earlier to avoid a 

collision, and while a system can be 

designed to better account for curves in 

the road or parked cars, systems cannot 

be designed to predict what drivers in 

lead vehicles intend to do. Regarding 

PAEB, Volkswagen claimed that because 

pedestrians may change their travel path 

to avoid a collision themselves, AEB 

activations that initiate early to avoid a 

potential collision will result in rear end 

collisions with the stopping vehicle. 

Agency Response 

Petitioners’ statements were largely 

speculative. In support of these 


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18Petitioner’s simulation data provided regarding 

the obstructed pedestrian crossing test is discussed 

in Section G. 

19 In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, 

Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 

U.S. 29, 51–52 (1983), the Court recognized that 

‘‘[i]t is not infrequent that the available data does 

not settle a regulatory issue and the agency must 

then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts 

and probabilities on the record to a policy 

conclusion. Recognizing that policymaking in a 

complex society must account for uncertainty, 

however, does not imply that it is sufficient for an 

agency to merely recite the terms ‘substantial 

uncertainty’ as a justification for its actions.’’ See 

also Public Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA, 374 F.3d 1251, 

1261–62 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

20Light Vehicle AEB FRIA, Docket No. NHTSA– 

2023–0021–1069, at 252 (FRIA). 

21FRIA at 252. Petitioners argue that this analysis 

is unconvincing because of the timeline of fleet 

turnover. However, the moment of 100 percent fleet 

adoption is not the only relevant timeline. Table 

218 in the FRIA shows cumulative exposure by 

year. By year 6, we anticipate that 50 percent of the 

fleet will have rule-compliant AEB such that 

concerns about additional rear-ends derived from 

false activations will be significantly abated. 

22 89 FR 39686, at 39732; FRIA at 47. 

23FRIA at 47. 

24We also disagree with the petitioners’ 

conclusions about these hypothetical scenarios. If 

the driver of the following vehicle maintains the 

safe distance required by law, a collision with the 

rule-compliant subject vehicle would not occur. 

Additionally, as we noted in the final rule, if an 

AEB activation of the subject vehicle leads to a 

collision with the following vehicle in a true 

positive situation, we believe that the AEB 

activation effectively reduces the likelihood of 

multiple collisions in a single crash. The AEB 

system would prevent the subject vehicle from 

colliding with an obstacle—whether another 

vehicle or a pedestrian—in its path. 

25Nothing in the final rule prevents systems from 

relaxing braking once an imminent collision is no 

longer present or from designing AEB systems with 

algorithms that suppress AEB activations in certain 

circumstances such as after a substantial steering 

input or the application of additional throttle. 

However, when tested according to the procedures 

specified in the rule, the system must operate to 

avoid a collision. 

arguments, they did not present any 

new data or analysis beyond what the 

agency had already considered.18

Petitioners have failed to provide data 

demonstrating the likelihood of an 

increase in false positives or the 

magnitude of the increase, nor is 

NHTSA aware of any source of such 

data. 

Under the Administrative Procedure 

Act (APA) and the Safety Act, NHTSA’s 

obligation is not to eliminate 

uncertainty. Courts have repeatedly 

emphasized that the agency’s job is to 

acknowledge uncertainty, explain the 

available evidence, and offer a ‘‘rational 

connection between the facts found and 

the choice made.’’ 19 In coming to its 

determination, NHTSA dealt with each 

of the principal uncertainties and 

resolved them to the degree possible. In 

some cases, the requisite decisions were 

necessarily based on imperfect data and 

were inherently judgmental or 

predictive in part. The obligation to 

make such decisions and resolve such 

uncertainties is an integral part of 

NHTSA’s mandate under the Safety Act 

and the APA. Our determination under 

the Safety Act, which was based on 

several factors including the available 

test data, was that collision avoidance 

was practicable and that any risk of 

increased false positives and rear 

collisions did not outweigh the benefits 

of the rule. Therefore, considering the 

data available and applying our expert 

judgment about the unquantifiable 

aspects of the rule, we selected the 

option that best meets the need for 

safety. 

NHTSA acknowledged the 

uncertainties and explained our 

reasoning throughout the rulemaking 

effort. In the FRIA, we noted that there 

is insufficient data to quantify the 

frequency and dynamics of false 

positive scenarios.20 We explained that 

the analysis had limitations regarding 

crash scenarios and parameters beyond 

those reflected in testing. We recognized 

from our testing that performance is 

variable and false positives do occur on 

current systems. However, this 

uncertainty, on its own, does not 

demonstrate that false positives would 

become more frequent under the final 

rule. 

We also explained that it is not 

possible to anticipate an exhaustive list 

of other possible real-world scenarios 

that systems would face and continually 

repeat testing to establish a robust 

estimate of the frequency of false 

positive occurrence. Based on this 

reasoning and test results, the analysis 

in the FRIA considered false positive 

rates to be the same under the final rule 

as they are in the current fleet. These 

false positives are therefore included in 

the analysis, but do not contribute to 

costs or benefits in the rule. The FRIA 

acknowledged that removing that 

assumption would reduce the 

magnitude of the estimated safety 

impacts. However, as the estimated 

benefits from the final rule are 17 to 21 

times greater than the costs, it is 

unlikely that disbenefits from 

incremental false positives resulting in 

an increase in rear-end crashes would 

render the rule not cost-beneficial. 

Despite these limitations, we 

nonetheless considered the problem 

qualitatively and addressed it to the 

extent possible. We emphasized that 

because market penetration of AEB is 

very high, incremental disbenefits 

resulting from all applicable vehicles 

having rule-compliant lead vehicle AEB 

would be insignificant.21 We also 

emphasized our belief that false 

positives would not occur in welldesigned AEB systems, especially with 

the integration of supplemental 

technologies. These technologies can 

include providing sufficient redundancy 

or continuously receiving and updating 

information regarding a vehicle or 

pedestrian as the vehicle approaches. 

Additionally, we did not simply 

disregard risks of false activations due 

to the speculative nature of the risks. 

We incorporated two false positive 

testing scenarios to establish a 

minimum level of system functionality 

in avoiding such events. We noted that, 

while certainly not comprehensive, we 

selected these scenarios because we 

believe they represent the most common 

scenarios systems will encounter and 

they address known engineering 

challenges for existing AEB systems.22

Furthermore, we also emphasized 

many possible benefits from the rule 

that the analysis also could not quantify. 

These include safety benefits associated 

with crash scenarios and parameters 

outside of those reflected in agency 

testing, safety benefits from avoiding 

secondary crashes, safety benefits from 

preventing or mitigating crashes with 

other vulnerable road users or animals, 

and property damage and traffic 

congestion avoided.23

In contrast, the petitioners simply 

asserted speculative disbenefits based 

on theoretical scenarios. The Alliance, 

for example, presented simulation data 

to support the possibility of rear-end 

collisions that could occur if a vehicle 

has a false positive with a human driver 

behind it, but it did not provide any 

evidence that the false positive events 

themselves would occur in greater 

frequency or severity under the final 

rule compared to no requirement or an 

alternative requirement.24 Additionally, 

Volkswagen asserts that ‘‘no contact’’ 

‘‘will undoubtably lead to higher false 

positive rates’’ in scenarios in which a 

pedestrian changes their travel path 

following the onset of braking, and 

Toyota made a similar claim with 

regards to lead vehicle AEB.25 When 

considering the balance of costs and 

benefits, petitioners seek to place greater 

weight on speculative and 

unquantifiable disbenefits without 

considering the added benefits which 

may also be obtained. These assertions 

are insufficient to demonstrate that the 

speculative disbenefits outweigh the 

benefits of a no contact requirement. 

Without sufficient information to fully 

quantify either, it is not unreasonable 

for NHTSA, in its expert judgment and 

in consideration of the Safety Act’s 


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26 89 FR 39686, at 39732. 

27See, e.g., Tesla, Part 573 Safety Recall Report, 

No. 21V–846, Unexpected Activation of Automatic 

Emergency Brake, available at https://static.

nhtsa.gov/odi/rcl/2021/RCLRPT-21V846-7836.PDF. 

28See, e.g., NHTSA, Opening Resume: 

Engineering Analysis EA 24–002, Inadvertent 

Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https:// 

static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-EA24002- 

11766P1.pdf; NHTSA, Opening Resume: 

Preliminary Evaluation PE 24–008, Inadvertent 

Automatic Emergency Braking, available at https:// 

static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-PE24008- 

10868.pdf; NHTSA, Opening Resume: Preliminary 

Evaluation 24–013, Inadvertent Automatic 

Emergency Braking, available at https://static.

nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2024/INOA-PE24013-12241.pdf; 

NHTSA, Opening Resume: Preliminary Evaluation 

23–017, Inadvertent Automatic Emergency Braking, 

available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2023/ 

INOA-PE23017-10785.pdf. 

29See, e.g., NHTSA, Opening Resume: DP 19– 

001, Defect Petition for False Automatic Emergency 

Braking, available at https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/ 

inv/2019/INOA-DP19001-5499.PDF. NHTSA also 

often receives customer complaints regarding the 

issue through Vehicle Owner Questionnaire 

submissions. 

30See 49 U.S.C. 30116 et seq.; 49 U.S.C. 30102; 

see also 49 U.S.C. 30118 (establishing that general 

recall notification responsibilities apply to all 

defects and is not based on design intent). 

31 65 FR 30680, 30705 (May 12, 2000). The same 

approach is true for FMVSS No. 127: the fact that 

vehicles manufactured before the new FMVSS takes 

affect may have AEB systems that do not meet the 

new standards (or perhaps do not have AEB at all) 

does not mean those earlier vehicles have safetyrelated defects simply because they do not meet the 

new standards. 

32Hyundai also discussed this issue in its letter. 

focus on safety, to select the option that 

maximizes possible safety benefits. 

b. Defect Authority 

The Alliance stated that it is 

insufficient for NHTSA to address false 

positives through the agency’s safety 

defect authority. The Alliance stated 

that false positives are an unwanted side 

effect, similar to an issue experienced 

with early higher-powered airbag 

technology, which NHTSA needs to 

address through rulemaking to amend 

the performance requirements rather 

than through recalls. The Alliance 

argued that after the new FMVSS, ‘‘[i]t 

is not sufficient, or fair,’’ to continue to 

‘‘address ‘false positives’ through 

[NHTSA’s] safety defect authority.’’ This 

argument primarily stemmed from the 

Alliance’s claim that, due to current 

limitations in AEB technology, 

increasing the sensitivity of an AEB 

system to meet the performance 

requirements of the new FMVSS would 

increase the likelihood that the AEB 

system would also erroneously detect 

obstacles where none exist. 

Agency Analysis 

The Alliance’s arguments do not 

support reconsideration of the final rule 

for several reasons. 

First, the variability of false positive 

scenarios lends itself to the more 

individualized review of real-world 

operation that the defects process 

allows. As we noted, the final rule 

included two false activation test 

scenarios, but these are not 

comprehensive for eliminating 

susceptibility to false activations.26 The 

best forum for such an individualized 

review is NHTSA’s defects authority, 

which can accommodate investigations 

that consider the reasonableness of the 

potential safety risks in light of all of the 

facts and circumstances. In contrast, an 

FMVSS sets a static performance 

requirement for all systems. Therefore, 

the defects authority is an appropriate 

avenue for addressing false positive 

events. 

Second, there is an established 

precedent of both NHTSA and 

manufacturers addressing false positive 

AEB events through safety recalls. In the 

past, vehicle manufacturers have filed 

recalls based on the safety risk that, for 

example, has been described as ‘‘[i]f the 

AEB system unexpectedly activates 

while driving, the risk of a rear-end 

collision from a following vehicle may 

increase.’’ 27 Likewise, NHTSA has 

undertaken multiple defect 

investigations of potential safety risks 

arising from false activations of AEB 

systems.28 The public has similarly 

raised concerns about the safety risks 

associated with AEB false activations, 

requesting NHTSA apply its safety 

defect authority to the issue.29 This 

established practice demonstrates that 

using the defects authority to address 

false positives has been effective and 

workable, and the Alliance does not 

explain why it will not continue to be 

under the final rule. 

Third, the Alliance’s petition suggests 

that current technical limits in AEB 

equipment, such as sensor range or 

definition, would make it unfair for 

NHTSA to act on safety risks that were 

a byproduct of manufacturer efforts to 

meet the performance requirements of 

the new FMVSS. However, in striving to 

protect the public, the Safety Act 

requires manufacturers to remedy all 

unreasonable safety risks in their 

vehicles, regardless of the reason for 

their origin. A manufacturer’s good 

intention is not a defense to a recall.30

Fourth, the false positive risks that 

petitioners raise are speculative. No 

petitioner or commenter has identified 

an aspect of the new FMVSS that will 

cause future defects related to false 

positives. At most, the Alliance has 

identified challenges with existing AEB 

technology that could lead some 

manufacturers to inadvertently be 

imprecise or overinclusive when 

calibrating the sensitivity of their AEB 

systems to meet the new FMVSS. The 

Alliance has not suggested that these 

errors in implementation would be 

impossible to eliminate or mitigate once 

they became apparent. 

Finally, the Alliance’s example of 

early, ‘‘high-powered’’ air bags is an 

inapt analogy. Early versions of air bags 

deployed with a fixed amount of force 

that posed a risk of injury to occupants. 

These risks were not an occasional 

byproduct of those air bags but were 

inherent to the forces generated when 

those air bags deployed as quickly as 

needed to meet the performance 

requirements of the original air bag 

FMVSS. As air bag technology 

improved, air bags became capable of 

modulating the force of their 

deployment to limit the injurious 

potential of their inflation. When 

updating the FMVSS to require 

advanced air bags, NHTSA noted that 

‘‘the fact that we are requiring 

manufacturers to provide improved air 

bags in new vehicles does not mean that 

earlier vehicles that do not meet the 

new requirements have a safety-related 

defect.’’ 31 By contrast, an AEB false 

positive (such as braking in the absence 

of a true obstacle) is not a behavior 

required by the final rule. Rather, it is 

at most an accidental engineering failure 

from trying to design an AEB system 

with sufficient sensitivity to meet the 

performance standard. In fact, AEB false 

positives are more like the safety defects 

posed by air bag inflator ruptures. These 

occur when, in an effort to design air 

bag systems capable of meeting the 

intense inflation demands of the 

FMVSS, engineering failures cause 

ruptures which project debris. In the 

same way, even assuming the Alliance 

is correct that the performance demands 

of the final rule may sometimes result 

in faulty AEB system designs that are 

susceptible to false positives, those false 

positives are a failure in the 

implementation of the AEB system, not 

an inherent performance characteristic 

of the standard. 

For these reasons, no reconsideration 

is needed on this issue. 

c. Comparison to a Standard That 

Allows Low-Speed Contact 

To address false positive risks and 

practicability concerns, Volkswagen and 

Toyota petitioned for the consideration 

of allowing a low-speed contact, such as 

up to 10 km/h (6.2 mph).32 They present 

two justifications. First, they make a 

novel assertion, not raised during the 

NPRM comment period, that NHTSA 

implicitly accepts contacts under 10 

km/h because the final rule does not 


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33Hyundai, in its letter, argued that a 10 km/h 

minimum allowable collision speed would preserve 

the safety benefits of the rule because contacts 

under that speed are unlikely to result in serious 

injuries or fatalities. One comment discussed in the 

final rule stated similarly. 89 FR 39686, 39272. 

34We have been consistent in our belief that 

collisions under 10 km/h present a safety risk. In 

the NPRM, we noted that ‘‘not requiring PAEB to 

be active below 10 km/h (6.2 mph) should not be 

construed to preclude making the AEB system 

active, if possible, at speeds below 10 km/h (6.2 

mph). In fact, the agency anticipates that 

manufacturers will make the system available at the 

lowest practicable speed.’’ 88 FR 38632, at 38667. 

35NHTSA–2023–0021–0005, Table 3. 

36This ties the benefits calculations directly to a 

vehicle’s observed test performance. In contrast, 

fully calculating the benefits of a standard that 

allowed contact would require adjusting the best 

performer away from the test data. This would 

involve assumptions about best performance under 

the rule that are not tied to observed performance 

and reduce the accuracy of the benefits 

calculations. 

37 Injury risk data used in this paragraph is 

presented in the FRIA, Table 131. The table and this 

data are rounded to the nearest hundredth. The true 

figures are as follows: at a maximum contact speed 

of 5 mph, approximately 0.4 percent of collisions 

would result in fatality, 75 percent would result in 

minor injury, 4 percent in moderate injury, and 0.7 

percent in serious injury. These descriptions 

correspond to the maximum abbreviated injury 

scale (MAIS) categories, described on pages 238– 

239 of the FRIA. Minor injuries can include nonsuperficial injuries, including those with long term 

effects such as whiplash, and moderate injuries 

include a fractured sternum. 

38Petitioners suggested allowing contact at up to 

10 km/h, which would correspond to a roughly 6 

mph impact speed. The data in the FRIA is 

organized by miles-per-hour, so for this response 

we discussed injuries in the impact speed range 

closest to but below this figure, which is 0–5 mph. 

39Although this discussion is new analysis in 

response to the petitions for reconsideration, we 

note that this analysis uses only data already in the 

FRIA and uses no proprietary statistical methods. 

In the FRIA, PAEB is considered in crossing path 

and along path scenarios. For along path scenarios, 

we assume that all pedestrian impacts would be 

avoided under a no contact requirement, so 

allowing contact would distribute those incidents 

that would have been avoided across each injury 

severity category by the percentage of injuries 

associated with each severity at the selected contact 

require AEB systems to operate at 

speeds 10 km/h and below. Second, 

Toyota claims that NHTSA’s analysis 

did not establish how no contact meets 

the need for safety in comparison to 

low-speed contact alternatives.33

Agency Analysis 

Petitioners’ arguments do not support 

reconsideration of the final rule. As an 

initial matter, NHTSA’s analysis fully 

considered this issue and the relevant 

alternatives in the rulemaking. In the 

NPRM, we sought comment on 

alternatives to the no contact 

requirement, specifically regarding 

allowing low-speed contact in on-track 

testing for both PAEB and lead vehicle. 

We received extensive comment both in 

support of and against allowing contact 

at low speeds. In the final rule, the 

agency disagreed that a low-speed 

approach fully resolved the safety 

problem, emphasizing that no contact 

provides maximum safety benefits and 

aligns with the Safety Act. We reiterated 

that striking a person with a vehicle is 

unacceptable at any speed under any 

conditions, and the analysis in our FRIA 

supports that conclusion. We believe 

the data and analysis in the final rule 

and the FRIA demonstrate the safety 

basis upon which ‘‘no contact’’ was 

selected over low-speed alternatives. 

Therefore, we are not amending the 

final rule on these bases. However, as 

petitioners have presented a new 

framing of the argument regarding the 

10 km/h (6.2 mph) activation threshold, 

we take this opportunity to highlight the 

data and analysis that supports the final 

rule to respond to the points raised by 

petitioners. 

Petitioners present a false equivalency 

between the activation threshold and 

contact speeds. Activation of an AEB 

system while moving below 10 km/h is 

a different scenario from continuing to 

move at up to 10 km/h after an 

activation has already occurred. The 

impact speed is part of the in-operation 

performance of the system. That is, once 

an AEB system detects an imminent 

collision with a vehicle or pedestrian, 

we anticipate that the systems will 

remain active as long as the imminent 

collision risk persists. The AEB 

minimum activation speed, on the other 

hand, is selected as a design 

specification. Petitioners attempted to 

conflate these circumstances, which is 

unpersuasive. 

Additionally, the activation threshold 

exists to ensure practicability, not 

because no safety concerns exist below 

that speed.34 When discussing PAEB 

testing in the NPRM, for example, we 

noted that the lower bound was chosen 

based on a tentative conclusion, 

corroborated by our 2020 testing and 

testing on vehicles from model years 

2021 and 2022, that PAEB systems may 

not offer consistent performance at 

speeds below 16 km/h (9.9 mph) and 

that 10 km/h (6.2 mph) is consistent 

with Euro NCAP’s testing lower bound. 

In addition to those stated in prior 

notices, there are several other reasons 

for the practicability concerns that 

justify a distinction between 10 km/h as 

an activation threshold and as a 

maximum contact speed in testing. 

First, at speeds below 10 km/h, the 

driver has more time to re-engage and 

apply the brakes to avoid the collision 

without AEB intervention. Second, AEB 

systems can have difficulty operating in 

very tight spaces and at low speeds such 

as in crowded parking garages, where 

manoeuvres at low speed may need to 

occur in crash-imminent scenarios. 

Third, certain vehicles to which the 

regulation applies may need to push 

objects while operating at low speeds. 

Finally, our testing and data collection 

showed both that no systems operated at 

speeds under 5 km/h (3.1 mph), and 

that some vehicles that performed well 

in high-speed testing did not operate 

under 10 km/h (6.2 mph).35 These data 

suggest design challenges specific to 

low-speed operation. NHTSA 

considered these factors and determined 

that it was practicable to require only 

that systems operate above 10 km/h. 

Therefore, the activation threshold and 

whether to allow an impact speed have 

distinct considerations that justify 

different approaches. 

Furthermore, no contact better meets 

the need for safety in comparison to a 

regulation that allows low-speed 

contact. The data and analysis in the 

FRIA show that allowing for contact, at 

any speed, results in less safety benefits 

than are achieved by the final rule. In 

analyzing the capabilities of AEB 

technology, at least one vehicle tested 

was able to meet the no contact 

requirement in each scenario. Therefore, 

the benefits in the FRIA represent the 

level of safety associated with the best 

performer.36 The injury risk curves in 

the FRIA represent the likelihood of 

injury based on impact speed. In 

general, the likelihood of injury, and 

more severe injuries or fatalities, 

increases with respect to contact speed. 

And, although there are limits to the 

precision of the conclusion that can be 

drawn due to data limitations, the injury 

risk curves show that allowing for 

contact at any speed results in less 

safety benefits than are achieved by the 

best performer. NHTSA’s analysis 

therefore fully considered this issue. 

The PAEB data clearly show that a 

low-speed contact alternative would 

achieve substantially less safety than no 

contact.37 Even at the lowest impact 

speeds of 0–5 mph, there is a 75 percent 

chance of minor injury, 4 percent 

chance of a moderate severity injury, 

and a 1 percent chance serious injury or 

worse. Furthermore, at even the next 

impact speed group, there is a non-zero 

probability of a fatality.38 NHTSA 

considered these risks in deciding that 

no contact in PAEB testing meets the 

need for safety. 

By applying these percentages to the 

PAEB data across the injury severity 

categories in the estimated benefits of 

the final rule, we find significant 

benefits to a no contact standard.39


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speed. For crossing path scenarios, even under a no 

contact requirement there are situations in which 

pedestrians enter the path of the vehicle with 

insufficient time for detection and braking to avoid 

the collision. Therefore, the expected effect of 

allowing contact should account for a reduced 

number of both avoided and mitigated injuries. 

40Performing the same analysis as used in this 

paragraph on contacts up to 10 mph yields 

additional lost benefits of only 0.7 percent. This 

result suggests that most of the safety benefits lost 

from a low-speed contact option are lost in the 

contact allowance. 

41FRIA, Table 108. 

42FRIA at 761 (the example begins on p. 763). 

Note that it appears some of the values in FRIA 

Table 317, which summarizes input parameters, 

appear to be incorrect. Table 317 stated that the 

TTC Duration(s) were 2.01 for each FCW scenario. 

The correct values are as follows: Status quo (SQ) 

Lead Vehicle Stopped (LVS) of 2.01, SQ Lead 

Vehicle Moving (LVM) of 2.09, SQ Lead Vehicle 

Decelerating (LVD) of 2.14, Best performer (BP) LVS 

of 2.06, BP LVM of 2.12, and BP LVD of 2.23. 

43FRIA, Tables 225 and 251. Note that these crash 

estimates were not used to estimate benefits. The 

target population used to estimate benefits for lead 

vehicle AEB and PAEB included several filters to 

best reflect the real-world crashes that 

corresponded with the test scenarios and 

conditions. 

44The Alliance also noted that, if NHTSA 

provides sufficient relief regarding the no contact 

requirement, then this relief may not be necessary. 

45Not all the tests in FMVSS No. 135 use 

multiple trials. Those that do include: S7.5. Cold 

effectiveness; S7.6. High speed effectiveness, S7.7. 

Stops with Engine Off, S7.8. Antilock functional 

failure, S7.9. Variable brake proportioning system 

functional failure, and S7.11. Brake power unit or 

brake power assist unit inoperative (System 

depleted). These afford up to six test runs to achieve 

the required performance. 

Allowing contact at low speeds would 

lead to 2,192 additional minor injuries, 

31 moderate injuries, 3 serious injuries, 

and 1 fatality annually. Monetized, this 

change results in $179.1 million 

comprehensive economic benefits lost, 

or 4.9 percent of the PAEB benefits 

generated by the final rule.40 This is a 

sizable impact, and one that NHTSA 

considers meaningful. Indeed, $179.1 

million of comprehensive economic 

benefits is larger than those of many 

entire safety rules we issue. 

For lead vehicle AEB, the low-speed 

injury data in the FRIA has more 

limitations than that for PAEB. The 

relatively small number of severe 

injuries that occur in rear-end collisions 

at low speeds compared to those that 

occur in high speed collisions causes 

implausible analytical results that limit 

the precision of the conclusions that can 

be drawn about the exact level of safety 

benefit obtained at low impact speeds. 

Nonetheless, the available data 

demonstrate that benefits would be lost 

with a contact standard and the general 

magnitude of those lost benefits. 

The injury data in the FRIA show that 

allowing contact at any speed reduces 

the safety benefits.41 At a relative 

contact speed of 10 mph (the difference 

between striking vehicle speed and 

struck vehicle speed), the probability of 

minor injury increases to 21.9 percent, 

moderate injuries to 0.9 percent, serious 

injuries to 0.7 percent, and even 0.1 

percent chance of a fatality. In fact, even 

at a relative contact speed of just 1 mph 

(contact at 2 mph), there is a 3.5 percent 

chance of minor injury and a 0.4 percent 

chance each of moderate and serious 

injuries. The FRIA contains an example 

calculation to show how these figures 

are derived and factor into NHTSA’s 

benefits analysis.42

The data and analysis in the FRIA 

show that while low-speed collisions 

are less likely to result in severe or fatal 

injuries, reducing the number of injuries 

that are less severe can carry large safety 

benefits due to the large volume of those 

injuries. As the final rule states, 

between 2016 and 2019, there were an 

average of 1.75 million rear-end crashes 

annually (and nearly 55,000 frontal 

crashes with a pedestrian). Even small 

changes in injury risk can have sizable 

impacts across that volume of 

collisions.43 Additionally, even injuries 

classified as less severe in the data 

cause serious harm, and these injuries, 

such as whiplash, can carry long-term 

effects. In the final rule, the agency 

concluded that although the data is 

limited, it plainly indicates that a no 

contact standard achieves greater safety 

benefits than a standard that allows 

contact. 

In contrast to the data collection and 

analyses done by NHTSA, petitioners 

suggest that NHTSA should prioritize 

speculative disbenefits from false 

positives over the demonstrable safety 

benefits that a no contact requirement 

achieves. Petitioners did not provide 

any new information or data that was 

not already considered by the agency 

during the development of the final rule 

in response to public comments 

suggesting that a low-speed alternative 

would better meet the need for safety. 

Nor did they provide, at any stage in the 

rulemaking, compelling information 

regarding the increase in false positives 

that they fear or evidence that a no 

contact requirement will result in such 

an increase while allowing a 10 km/h 

(6.2 mph) contact speed would not. 

Although we recognized that there are 

unquantifiable aspects, NHTSA was 

well within its responsibilities to 

consider this risk but to weight more 

heavily the demonstrable safety benefits 

achievable by a no contact requirement. 

The Safety Act entrusts NHTSA with 

this responsibility and to exercise its 

judgment, and we did so. Therefore, no 

reconsideration is necessary, and we 

deny the request for reconsideration to 

allow low-speed contact. 

B. Multiple Trials 

The final rule requires that the test 

vehicle meet the performance test 

requirements in any test run and does 

not allow multiple test runs in which 

the vehicle is only required to meet the 

required performance in a percentage of 

the runs. Petitioners requested that the 

standard be amended to incorporate 

multiple test runs to allow a vehicle to 

meet the performance requirement in 

some but not all runs, and provided 

several reasons discussed below. 

1. Comparison to FMVSS No. 135 and 

Forms of Variability 

Petitioners argued that the final rule 

did not account for the variabilities in 

testing. They requested FMVSS No. 127 

be amended to be similar to FMVSS No. 

135, which allows for compliance to be 

determined based on multiple test runs. 

Petitioners suggested several variations, 

including passing 5 out of 7 runs (which 

is similar to NCAP), passing 3 out of 5 

runs, and a requirement that if the 

vehicle fails the first run it must pass 

three subsequent runs.44

The Alliance stated that existing 

braking standards, specifically FMVSS 

No. 135, acknowledge the inherent 

variability in vehicle braking systems 

that make it unreasonable to evaluate 

performance based on a single test run. 

The Alliance suggested that since AEB 

is a braking system, it has these 

variations, which raise practicability 

concerns when a test requirement does 

not allow for multiple test trials. These 

variations derive from both foundational 

braking mechanisms and additional 

variability from sensing and perception 

responses. Therefore, the Alliance 

argued that NHTSA failed to recognize 

that FMVSS No. 127 deviates from its 

established practice of permitting 

multiple test runs for braking standards. 

Moreover, it claims that NHTSA did not 

provide any explanation in the final rule 

for departing from this longstanding 

precedent. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA received comment on and 

fully considered the issue of multiple 

trials during the rulemaking. The 

arguments raised in the petitions do not 

justify allowing multiple test trials. 

That multiple test runs are used in 

FMVSS No. 135 does not mean that 

multiple test runs are necessary for 

FMSS No. 127. There is a critical 

difference between FMVSS No. 135 and 

FMVSS No. 127 that justifies a different 

approach.45 The purpose of FMVSS No. 


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46 49 CFR 571.135, S2. 

47 50 FR 19751. 

48 60 FR 6431. 

49 80 FR 36050. 

50 In making this argument, the Alliance is 

suggesting that NHTSA cannot rely on FMVSS No. 

135 tests to show the practicability of the no contact 

requirement because these tests will have superior 

braking performance to FMVSS No. 127 tests due 

to added muscular effort from the driver. This claim 

is discussed in the ‘‘no contact’’ section, above. 

135 is to ensure safe braking 

performance, and its testing is designed 

to test braking performance of the 

vehicle.46 It uses multiple test runs to 

account for the variability in the ability 

of the human test driver to maximize 

the braking capabilities of the vehicle. 

The agency published the first NPRM 

for what would become FMVSS No. 135 

in 1985. In that NPRM, the agency 

stated that ‘‘[t]he purpose of specifying 

multiple stops is to enable test drivers 

to achieve a vehicle’s best 

performance.’’ 47 That preamble further 

stated that it normally took test drivers 

three or four stops to achieve the best 

possible braking performance. NHTSA 

has also rejected incorporation of 

multiple test runs into the standard for 

the ‘‘hot stop’’ test because NHTSA 

found in its testing that the human test 

drivers were capable of achieving the 

needed performance for the test, and the 

test needed to occur while the brakes 

were at temperature.48 Additionally, in 

FMVSS No. 126, an example of a 

standard where NHTSA found a single 

test run to be sufficient, the sine-withdwell test provides for only one test run 

at each steering-wheel amplitude and 

rotation direction combination. Further, 

in the final rule establishing FMVSS No. 

136, ‘‘Electronic stability control 

systems for heavy vehicles,’’ NHTSA 

stated that FMVSS No. 136 allows 

multiple attempts to maintain the lane 

for J-turn testing to ensure that the ESC 

system activates before the vehicle 

becomes unstable instead of imposing a 

requirement that it activate prior to 

instability to ‘‘account for driver 

variability and possible driver error in 

conducting the manoeuvre. Absent 

driver error, we do not expect any 

vehicle equipped with currentgeneration ESC systems to leave the lane 

during any J-turn test.’’ 49 These 

examples make clear that a standard 

that permits multiple test trials is 

justified where testing may be affected 

by variability in a human test driver’s 

ability to apply a full brake application. 

It may be the case that, because it allows 

multiple test trials to accommodate 

human test drivers, FMVSS No. 135 

accommodates the other forms of test 

variability cited by petitioners. 

However, this result is an ancillary 

effect of the standard’s design, not its 

purpose. 

In contrast to FMVSS No. 135, the test 

procedures in FMVSS No. 127 test the 

AEB system and do not use human test 

drivers to actuate the brakes. Even for 

tests that include manual brake 

application, the test procedure specifies 

use of a braking robot and the 

performance specifications on how the 

brake must be actuated for the test. No 

variability from human operation 

contributes to test outcomes in FMVSS 

No. 127. 

Indeed, the Alliance, in attempting to 

argue that FMVSS No. 135 test results 

are not informative of AEB system 

performance, acknowledged this 

distinction is meaningful. It claimed 

that test conditions in FMVSS No.’s 135 

and 127 ‘‘are fundamentally different 

such that FMVSS No. 135 results are not 

indicative of AEB performance’’ because 

tests conducted under FMVSS No. 135 

are ‘‘conducted with a human driver 

putting muscular effort into the brake 

pedal.’’ 50 This distinction justifies 

NHTSA’s decision not to use multiple 

test runs. 

a. Specific Forms of Variability Raised 

by Petitioners 

Petitioners cited several forms of 

variability that they argue justify 

multiple test runs or render the standard 

impracticably stringent. The Alliance, 

for example, cited wear and tear of 

pedestrian test dummies, design of 

pedestrian test dummies, and headlamp 

aim as aspects specific to AEB system 

performance that can impact testing. It 

also emphasized track conditions that 

contribute to stopping distance 

variability, such as the age and 

degradation of the asphalt since it was 

last resurfaced, the type of aggregate 

used on the test track, and other 

variables. The Alliance also noted that 

compliance tests are conducted at any 

number of test tracks throughout the 

United States, which the Alliance 

claimed further amplifies variability of 

the test by contributing their own 

unique characteristics. It also noted 

ambient environmental effects such as 

cloud cover (or intermittent cloud 

cover), dust, debris, pollen effects, 

recent rainfall, and noise factors. It also 

stated that the road surface friction 

decreases as the road surface 

temperature increases, and provided a 

figure that shows road surface friction 

around 0.98 at a temperature of 2 

degrees C and decreasing to around 0.92 

at 50 degrees C, and that these 

variations in ambient conditions can 

translate into about 8–10 feet (2.5–3m) 

or more variation in absolute stopping 

distance on a given test surface. It also 

raised vehicle conditions, such as tire 

burnish, brake burnish, brake wear and 

brake bleed, which amplify these 

environmental effects. The Alliance 

stated that these factors (ambient 

conditions, vehicle conditions, and 

track conditions) support the reason 

why FMVSS No. 135 accommodates 

outcome variability by using multiple 

trials, justify using multiple trials, or 

justify a change in the no contact 

requirement. 

The Alliance stated that NHTSA’s 

data demonstrate the challenges of 

avoiding contact in every test that result 

from their cited variability. The Alliance 

emphasized that no test scenario 

showed that all tested vehicles could 

meet the performance requirements for 

lead vehicle AEB on every test run. 

Starting at 64 km/h (40 mph), fewer 

than half of the tested vehicle met the 

performance requirements in all the test 

trials. The Alliance further stated that, 

while the research conducted tests only 

up to 72 km/h (45 mph), at which only 

two models avoided contact, the 

standard requires compliance with lead 

vehicle AEB test at speeds up to 100 

km/h (62 mph) without demonstrating 

the feasibility and practicability at those 

higher speeds. It also referenced PAEB 

testing, for which at the lowest tested 

speed (16 km/h (9.9 mph)), vehicles 

failed in over 25 percent of the test runs. 

At speeds of 65 km/h (40.4 mph) in dark 

conditions, the Alliance stated that no 

tested vehicle could comply with the 

requirements 100 percent of the time. 

The Alliance reasoned, therefore, that 

NHTSA’s test data indicates that most 

vehicles do not meet the standard’s 

requirements, and the agency has not 

provided any analysis demonstrating 

why these data or other information 

prove the practicability of avoiding 

contact on every test run. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA disagrees that the types of 

variability raised by petitioners make 

the rule impracticable or justify 

multiple test runs. 

First, several of these types of 

variability would not be resolved if 

FMVSS No. 127 allowed multiple test 

runs. For example, test track conditions, 

headlamp aim, and the differences 

between the pedestrian test device and 

real pedestrians, which do contribute to 

variability in AEB system performance, 

do not contribute to variability in 

performance across multiple test runs in 

the same place with the same test 

devices. The test track is relatively 

consistent across runs. Differences in 

the pedestrian test device and a real 

pedestrian may contribute to variable 


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51The Alliance also petitioned for more 

specificity regarding ‘‘visibility’’ in the test 

condition. We provided a thorough discussion of 

this requirement and the reasons for not providing 

additional specificity in the NPRM and final rule. 

52Chrysler, supra footnote 9. 

performance between the real world and 

the test track, but it does not contribute 

to variability across multiple runs with 

the same test device. Therefore, 

allowing multiple runs would not 

resolve these concerns. 

Additionally, other variabilities raised 

by petitioners are resolved by other 

aspects of the FMVSS. The test 

conditions, including temperature 

range, are generally consistent with 

those of existing FMVSSs, such as 

FMVSS No. 135, which have proven 

effective over time in resolving many 

issues raised by petitioners, such as 

concerns with thermal effects on the 

surface friction of the test track. 

Additionally, the test procedures state 

that headlamps will be aimed per 

manufacturers’ instructions and that 

testing will not occur during periods of 

precipitation or when visibility is 

affected by fog, smoke, ash, or 

particulates, which resolves many 

concerns regarding AEB system 

performance variability.51 The 

Alliance’s concerns about the test 

dummies are also unfounded. Dummy 

wear and tear will not contribute to test 

performance variability because the test 

procedures specify the conditions for 

the test devices used. 

The Alliance’s discussion regarding 

vehicle and test track variability is not 

persuasive because it relies on studies 

conducted with test vehicles not 

specifically designed to meet the 

requirements of the final rule. We 

anticipate the variability between 

vehicles designed to comply with an 

FMVSS will be relatively small and will 

depend on the compliance margins set 

by manufacturers according to their risk 

acceptance strategies. 

Regarding petitioners’ claims that the 

current state of AEB technology means 

that multiple test runs are necessary for 

the standard to be practicable, we note 

that in the agency’s 2023 research one 

tested vehicle was able to avoid contact 

on most runs, which marked significant 

progress compared to the 2020 testing. 

This and other improvements in AEB 

technology over time support the 

conclusions made in the final rule that 

these requirements are practicable 

within the allowed lead time. Under the 

Safety Act, the agency is empowered to 

issue safety standards that require 

advancements in existing technology or 

require development of new 

technology.52 Given the developmental 

trajectory, the agency does not find 

arguments based around the 

performance of existing AEB systems to 

be a persuasive argument for multiple 

trials. 

b. System Maturity 

The Alliance stated that the final rule 

claimed that multiple trials are not 

necessary for mature systems. It argued 

that NHTSA incorrectly assumed that 

AEB technologies are mature, in part 

because AEB systems introduced under 

the 2016 voluntary commitment were 

not designed to meet the performance 

requirements of the final rule. The 

Alliance also referenced the FRIA— 

which stated that because many AEB 

systems do not meet the rule’s 

requirements there will be significant 

benefits to the new rule-compliant AEB 

systems—to argue that the agency 

cannot consider an existing AEB system 

installed under the 2016 commitment to 

be mature while simultaneously 

claiming significant benefits from the 

new systems required by the final rule. 

The Alliance also stated that rulecompliant AEB systems should be 

considered new or in development. It 

concluded that therefore these systems 

are not mature and should be allowed 

to demonstrate compliance through 

multiple test trials. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA is unpersuaded by the 

Alliance’s reframing of the issue. The 

fact that a current system can meet the 

requirements of the standard shows that 

the technology is mature—vehicles on 

the road today have the requisite 

technology to comply with the rule. The 

benefits estimates assess the 

improvements in outcomes generated 

when the entire fleet becomes compliant 

in comparison to the status quo 

baseline. As we explained in the FRIA, 

the status quo baseline is the average 

performance of the vehicles included in 

NHTSA’s testing. Therefore, the benefits 

claimed are representative of mature 

systems being required throughout the 

fleet. 

Therefore, no reconsideration is 

needed. NHTSA denies the petitions for 

reconsideration regarding multiple trials 

and will not adjust the final rule to 

incorporate multiple test trials. 

C. Equipment Requirement 

The final rule includes an equipment 

requirement that light vehicles have an 

AEB system that applies the brakes 

automatically at any forward speed that 

is greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and 

less than 145 km/h (90.1 mph) when a 

collision with a lead vehicle is 

imminent, and at any forward speed 

greater than 10 km/h (6.2 mph) and less 

than 73 km/h (45.3 mph) when a 

collision with a pedestrian is imminent. 

It also includes a performance test 

requirement that, when tested according 

to the procedures in the rule, the subject 

vehicle provides a forward collision 

warning and subsequently applies the 

service brakes automatically when a 

collision with a lead vehicle is 

imminent such that the subject vehicle 

does not collide with the lead vehicle. 

The Alliance stated that the final rule 

lacks objectivity because NHTSA has 

not established performance 

requirements for the equipment 

required by final rule. It notes that while 

the rule requires the lead vehicle AEB 

and PAEB systems to operate at speeds 

up to 145 km/h (90.1 mph) and 73 km/ 

h (45.3 mph) respectively, it does not 

define the term ‘‘operate,’’ Additionally, 

the Alliance argues, although the 

preamble to the final rule indicated that 

the systems would apply brakes when a 

collision is imminent, NHTSA did not 

define an imminent crash. To address 

these concerns, the Alliance requested a 

supplemental notice of proposed 

rulemaking (SNPRM) proposing 

objective performance requirements, 

including specifying what it means to 

‘‘operate’’ the equipment and defining 

when a crash is ‘‘imminent.’’ 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA is not incorporating 

definitions for ‘‘operate’’ or ‘‘imminent’’ 

and is not incorporating a test 

procedure. However, NHTSA is making 

one clarifying edit to remove reference 

to ‘‘imminent’’ in the performance test 

requirement for lead vehicle AEB. 

NHTSA does not believe that it is 

necessary to provide a definition of or 

test procedures for the term ‘‘operate’’ in 

the regulatory text because the final 

rule’s definition of AEB clarifies how an 

AEB system operates. FMVSS No. 127 

defines ‘‘Automatic Emergency 

Braking’’ as ‘‘a system that detects an 

imminent collision with vehicles, 

objects, and road users in or near the 

path of a vehicle and automatically 

controls the vehicle’s service brakes to 

avoid or mitigate the collision.’’ The 

definition of FCW provides similar 

clarity regarding FCW operation. 

Additionally, the requirement that these 

systems ‘‘operate’’ is explicitly tied to 

the test conditions in S6, Test 

Conditions, of FMVSS No. 127. In 

considering the meaning of ‘‘operate’’ in 

the context of the performance 

requirements applicable to AEB 

systems, the final rule provides 

sufficient clarity that manufacturers can 

certify with reasonable care that their 

systems ‘‘operate’’ in the circumstances 


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53 49 U.S.C. 30129 note. 

54Miriam-Webster defines ‘‘imminent’’ as ‘‘ready 

to take place; happening soon.’’ https://

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

imminent?utm_campaign=sd&utm_

medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (accessed on 8/ 

28/24). For an analogous determination, see 81 FR 

85478, Vehicle Defect Reporting Requirements. In 

this NPRM, we specified a location that is 

‘‘accessible’’ for an information label pursuant to 

the section 31306 of the Moving Ahead for Progress 

in the 21st Century Act. We noted that while the 

statute did not explicitly require us or the 

manufacturer to determine the location, selecting a 

standardized location would best serve the purpose 

of the statute by facilitating repeated consumer 

access to the information. We also referenced the 

dictionary definition of the term ‘‘accessible.’’ 

55See, e.g., Ard v. O’Malley, 110 F.4th 613, 617 

(4th Cir. 2024). 

56 88 FR at 36832, at 38655; see also 72 FR 17235, 

17299 (Apr. 6, 2007) (discussing the understeer 

requirement in FMVSS No. 126). The NPRM also 

explained how we might approach information 

gathering and enforcement of this requirement. The 

final rule also discussed NHTSA’s authorities 

regarding equipment requirements in response to 

comment regarding activation speed. 89 FR 39686, 

39712–14. 

57Specifically, test procedures state that prior to 

the test the subject vehicle is driven at any speed, 

in any direction, on any road surface, for any 

amount of time. 

58See, e.g., FMVSS No. 108, S14.9.3.6, Turn 

signal flasher durability test; FMVSS No. 111, 

S5.5.7, Durability and S14.3, Durability test 

procedures; FMVSS No. 139, S6.3 Tire Endurance; 

and FMVSS No. 209, S4.2(d) and S5.1(d), which 

establish a test for the resistance of seat belt 

webbing to abrasion. 

59S5.3.7, Water absorption and whip resistance 

(‘‘A hydraulic brake hose assembly, after immersion 

in water for 70 hours (S6.5), shall not rupture when 

run continuously on a flexing machine for 35 hours 

(S6.3).’’). 

required by the final rule. Therefore, no 

definition is needed. 

Regarding the definition of 

‘‘imminent’’ as used in the equipment 

requirements, no regulatory definition is 

needed. Certainly, not all of the terms in 

a regulation must be explicitly defined. 

Here, the term ‘‘imminent’’ comes from 

the regulatory mandate in BIL.53 In BIL, 

Congress chose not to define the term, 

and we interpret this provision of BIL to 

use the plain meaning of the word 

‘‘imminent.’’ 54 Manufacturers may refer 

to the plain meaning when certifying 

their vehicles to the equipment 

requirements.55 Additionally, the term 

is sufficiently clear in context, and its 

meaning is discernable from close 

review of the performance requirements 

and test procedures in the rule, such as 

the set of testable ranges specified. 

However, we are making a clarifying 

change to the performance test 

requirement. In its petition, the Alliance 

appears to conflate equipment 

requirements and performance 

requirements. The final rule and NPRM 

distinguished between them and 

explained how the equipment 

requirement supplements the 

performance requirement.56 The 

equipment requirement, explicitly 

mandated in BIL, does not have an 

associated performance test and 

compliance with it is not evaluated 

based on performance testing. On the 

other hand, compliance with the 

performance requirements is evaluated 

through the performance testing laid out 

in the final rule. Critically, these tests 

do not evaluate the activation timing of 

the AEB or FCW systems (other than 

that FCW should not activate after AEB). 

Rather, the performance criterion is 

contact with the test device (for AEB) 

and whether FCW activated. We 

therefore left to manufacturers the 

discretion to determine when to apply 

the brakes and provide the FCW, so long 

as their determination is not clearly 

erroneous. 

To resolve any confusion, we are 

amending the performance test 

requirement for lead vehicle AEB in 

S5.1.3 to remove the phrase ‘‘when a 

collision with a lead vehicle is 

imminent.’’ The purpose of this change 

is to clarify the distinction between the 

performance requirements and 

equipment requirements in FMVSS No. 

127 and does not substantively alter the 

requirements as described in the 

preamble. In fact, because NHTSA’s 

testing will not evaluate AEB and FCW 

timing, and the test scenarios 

themselves create crash-imminent 

scenarios, this language was superfluous 

in the performance test requirement. 

This change also aligns the text of S5.1.3 

with the performance test criteria for 

PAEB (S5.2.3), which does not contain 

that phrase. Although the preamble of 

the final rule explained this approach, 

the change discussed here makes it clear 

in the regulatory text. Finally, following 

the change, the term ‘‘imminent’’ only 

remains in the equipment requirement. 

Therefore, no performance test 

procedure is needed to evaluate 

compliance. 

Therefore, we are amending FMVSS 

No. 127 to resolve confusion in the 

requirements. However, we are denying 

the petitions for reconsideration 

regarding issuing an SNPRM to establish 

a test procedure for equipment 

requirements or providing a definition 

for ‘‘operate’’ and ‘‘imminent.’’ 

D. Unlimited Preconditioning and Test 

Runs 

The final rule does not explicitly 

place a limit on the amount of pretest 

driving a vehicle may undergo and it 

does not place a maximum limit on the 

number of test runs a vehicle may be 

put through.57

The Alliance requested 

reconsideration, arguing that unlimited 

pretest driving of a subject vehicle is 

inconsistent with repeatable, objective 

test procedures. It also argued that the 

agency could accrue thousands of miles 

on the test vehicle, degrading the tires 

and other wear components, before 

running the compliance test. Petitioners 

expressed concern that manufacturers 

would have no way to predict what the 

agency’s pretest driving scenarios will 

do to the subject vehicle, making it 

impossible to certify compliance. 

Similarly, it stated that, under the test 

procedures as written, a vehicle can be 

tested unlimited times until one failed 

test trial occurs, in which case the 

vehicle would be non-compliant. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA is not granting 

reconsideration on this issue for two 

reasons. First, the purpose of FMVSS 

No. 127 testing is not to be an 

endurance or durability test, but a test 

of as-new hardware. This purpose is 

apparent in the structure of the rule 

compared with several other FMVSSs. 

When there are endurance and/or wear 

requirements in the FMVSSs, these 

requirements are apparent (i.e., they are 

titled ‘‘durability’’ or ‘‘endurance’’ tests) 

or are specifically written to indicate 

minimum required durability limits.58

For example, FMVSS No. 106 contains 

a water absorption and whip resistance 

requirement, which identifies both the 

length of time the hose sample will be 

submerged under water, and how long 

the hose sample will be flexed.59 There 

are numerous other examples in FMVSS 

No. 106 and other FMVSSs of this style 

of endurance testing that establishes a 

minimum durability performance. 

FMVSS No. 127 contains no such 

provisions. It was not written to, and is 

not intended to, set endurance or wear 

limits on the base equipment making up 

the AEB system. Instead, FMVSS No. 

127 is intended to ensure a minimum 

level of performance of AEB systems. 

The only expected wear on the 

components is what is necessary for 

establishing a repeatable test, which is 

specified in the test procedures (i.e., 

brake burnishing). In the event that wear 

and tear result in an apparent noncompliance during agency testing, the 

agency would not consider these tests 

valid. The Agency has demonstrated, 

through decades of testing, the 

competency to determine if wear is the 

source of an apparent non-compliance, 

be it by conducting additional testing, 

disassembly and visual inspection, and 

other similar methods. Finally, any 

specific limits on preconditioning 

driving time or test runs would be 


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arbitrary. Therefore, given that that 

FMVSS No. 127 does not establish an 

endurance or durability test, NHTSA 

determined it is not necessary to specify 

such limits. 

Second, manufacturers 

misunderstand the purpose of the 

pretest conditioning language. The 

initial conditions contained in S6, S7, 

S8, and S9, are written to prevent 

designing the AEB system to sense 

specific pre-conditions of the test. They 

are not intended to enable the agency to 

conduct durability testing. For instance, 

petitioners expressed concern that the 

standard states that the agency will 

drive the vehicle in any direction for 

any amount of time prior to the start of 

the test. However, additional conditions 

listed in S6 state that consumable fluids 

(including fuel), or battery charge for 

electric vehicles, will be between 5 and 

100 percent. Additionally, the 

initialization conditions state that the 

vehicle will be driven at a speed of 10 

km/h or higher for at least one minute 

prior to testing and subsequently the 

starting system is not cycled off prior to 

testing. Because the starting system is 

cycled off during fuelling, these 

conditions provide a practical and 

realistic limit on the amount of time the 

agency can drive the vehicle during 

preconditioning prior to any single test. 

Therefore, petitioners’ concerns 

regarding ‘‘unlimited pretest driving’’ 

are misplaced. 

As such, reconsideration is 

unnecessary to resolve petitioners’ 

concerns. Therefore, NHTSA declines to 

amend the final rule on this issue. 

E. Malfunction Indicator Lamp 

The final rule requires that vehicles 

must detect AEB system malfunctions 

and notify the driver of any malfunction 

that causes the AEB system not to meet 

the minimum proposed performance 

requirements. 

The Alliance and Volkswagen stated 

that the requirement that the 

malfunction indicator lamp (MIL) 

illuminate under all malfunction 

conditions, including sensor 

degradation, and under all possible 

conditions of ‘‘adjustments in 

performance’’ lacks objectivity and 

practicability. The Alliance petitioned 

NHTSA to issue an SNPRM that would 

define each malfunction requiring MIL 

illumination and include an associated 

test procedure. It did not provide any 

additional data or analysis beyond what 

has already been considered in 

comments to the NPRM. 

The Alliance noted that while the 

requirement for activating a MIL in the 

event of a malfunction in an AEB 

system is consistent with other 

FMVSSs, the final rule neither explicitly 

defines malfunction nor provides the 

associated test procedures. Several 

petitioners requested an objective 

definition of ‘‘malfunction.’’ The 

Alliance pointed out that FMVSS No. 

135 specifies conditions for MIL 

activation, and FMVSS No. 138 

provides malfunction conditions and 

test procedure for the tire pressure 

monitoring system. In contrast, it stated, 

‘‘malfunction’’ in FMVSS No. 127 is not 

defined and could include sensor 

degradation, which exceeds typical MIL 

illumination requirements in the 

FMVSSs. It stated that without a clear 

definition, manufacturers may 

determine a malfunction at their 

discretion and adjust AEB performance 

to any performance level, including 

complete deactivation, that does not 

meet the requirements of the final rule. 

The Alliance stated that if its 

interpretation is correct, the standard 

should clearly specify the allowance to 

adjust AEB systems, including complete 

deactivation, during a defined 

malfunction state. 

Additionally, the Alliance stated that 

NHTSA did not establish an objective 

test procedure for automatically 

detecting system changes that may affect 

AEB performance. The Alliance stated 

that the requirement to detect vehicle 

owner’s modifications that could render 

the AEB system non-compliant is 

boundless and lacks specific, objective 

performance criteria and test 

procedures, unlike other FMVSSs. For 

example, FMVSS No. 138 provides 

specific test procedures where the MIL 

must illuminate when an incompatible 

tire is installed. In contrast, the final 

rule does not limit or specify the types 

of owner modifications that may trigger 

MIL illumination, making it 

unreasonable to expect manufacturers to 

anticipate and develop detection 

strategies for every possible 

modification scenario. It stated that, as 

a result, the MIL requirement is not 

objective. 

Toyota petitioned for reconsideration 

of MIL requirements and incorporated 

the Alliance’s petition into its own. 

Additionally, Toyota provided a 

description of its understanding of the 

malfunction requirements. It read the 

requirements to allow discretion to the 

manufacturer to design a malfunction 

detection feature—including what 

elements to monitor and what is 

considered a malfunction. It also stated 

that if a malfunction is identified, the 

standard permits the manufacturer, at 

its discretion, to adjust the performance 

of the vehicle such that it will not meet 

the requirements specified in 

paragraphs S5.1, S5.2, or S5.3, including 

completely deactivating the AEB 

system, and illuminate the telltale. It 

said it understood the agency’s intent to 

be that manufacturers must design 

vehicles with a malfunction detection 

feature, and that the vehicle must 

display a telltale when a malfunction is 

detected and allow the vehicle to adjust 

the performance of the AEB system or 

deactivate it in response to 

malfunctions. 

Toyota agreed with NHTSA that 

malfunctions should be detected based 

on the system design. Toyota argued 

that if the AEB system cannot be 

deactivated in cases of performance 

degradation, such as from sensor 

misalignment, it could result in falsepositive activations potentially creating 

safety disbenefits. However, it 

nonetheless argued that the malfunction 

detection requirements are unclear and 

requested reconsideration. It noted that 

NHTSA had rejected suggested language 

from Bosch regarding malfunction 

detection on the basis that it was not 

workable for an FMVSS and lacked 

objectivity. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA will not adjust the 

malfunction detection requirements. 

NHTSA considered comments on 

malfunction detection in the final rule. 

Petitioners broadly expressed confusion 

about the term ‘‘malfunction’’ and about 

what conditions the indicator lamp 

must illuminate. However, Toyota, in its 

petition, correctly summarized the 

requirements, indicating that it 

understood the requirement as written. 

Nonetheless, we respond to certain 

issues raised in the petitions to clarify 

our intent. 

Toyota is correct that, when a 

malfunction is detected, the system is 

permitted to reduce functionality and it 

must show the telltale. The intent 

behind the requirement is for systems to 

self-diagnose issues that cause them to 

perform at a level below that required 

by the FMVSS, adjust performance as 

the system determines is appropriate, 

and alert the operator. In contrast to 

how petitioners describe the 

requirement, the standard does not 

require AEB systems to detect all 

possible conditions (or owner 

modifications) that could reduce 

functionality. Rather it requires the 

system to be able to make detections 

regarding malfunctions and conditions 

that cause performance degradations, 

allows the system to adjust performance 

if it makes such a detection, and 

requires the system to alert the operator 

if such an adjustment is made. 

As is customary with NHTSA’s 

standards, the laboratory compliance 


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60 49 CFR 571.138. 

test procedures will specify how 

NHTSA intends to run its compliance 

test regarding illumination of a 

malfunction telltale. However, NHTSA 

is not specifying these in the regulation. 

The conditions under which the 

malfunction lamp are required to 

illuminate are sufficiently defined in the 

FMVSS, which is enough information 

for manufacturers to certify to the 

requirement. Although NHTSA is also 

not specifying in the regulatory text how 

an internal malfunction is generated, 

test procedures for MIL requirements 

typically involve creating an obvious 

failure condition, such as disconnecting 

the power source to the system, and 

determining if the MIL illuminates. 

NHTSA will not specify instances of 

‘‘malfunction.’’ NHTSA received and 

fully considered comment on this issue. 

The range of possible malfunctions is 

sufficiently broad that such an approach 

would be unlikely to meet the need for 

safety because it would omit many 

possible malfunctions from the MIL 

requirement. As Toyota stated, what 

constitutes a malfunction is specific to 

the design of each AEB system, and 

manufacturers are best positioned to 

determine when a circumstance exists 

that causes performance to be impeded. 

Furthermore, petitioners are incorrect 

when they state that the MIL 

requirement is not objective or 

practicable because the term 

‘‘malfunction’’ is not given a regulatory 

definition. The MIL requirement in 

FMVSS No. 127 is stated in objective 

terms. It ties the requirement to 

illuminate the MIL upon performance 

adjustment to the performance 

requirements for AEB systems. These 

performance requirements are stated in 

objective terms. The MIL requirement is 

therefore also stated in objective terms. 

Finally, the Alliance attempts to 

reference the MIL requirement in 

FMVSS No. 138 as a contrasting 

example of a MIL requirement that is 

objective. However, FMVSS No. 138, 

like FMVSS No. 127, does not provide 

an explicit definition of ‘‘malfunction,’’ 

instead applying the performance 

requirement ‘‘to a malfunction that 

affects the generation or transmission of 

control or response signals.’’ 60 The 

approach undertaken in FMVSS No. 127 

is analogous: it specifies the AEB system 

performance requirements, stated in 

objective terms, as the relevant 

comparison. Therefore, no 

reconsideration is necessary. NHTSA is 

denying the petitions for 

reconsideration on this issue and is not 

changing the MIL requirements from 

those stated in FMVSS No. 127. 

F. Deactivation 

The final rule includes an explicit 

prohibition against manufacturers 

installing a control designed for the sole 

purpose of deactivation of the AEB 

system, except in certain cases relating 

to law enforcement. The final rule does, 

however, allow for controls that have 

the ancillary effect of deactivating the 

AEB system, such as during low-range 

four-wheel drive configurations, when 

the driver selects ‘‘tow mode,’’ or when 

another vehicle system is activated that 

will have a negative ancillary impact on 

AEB operation. It also allows for 

automatic deactivation in the 

malfunction circumstances described in 

the previous section. 

1. Manual Deactivation 

The Alliance and Volkswagen 

petitioned NHTSA to allow manual 

deactivation of the AEB system. 

Petitioners pointed out scenarios in 

which they state that AEB operation can 

be inappropriate or potentially 

hazardous. These include racetrack 

usage, off-road driving that requires 

manoeuvring around obstacles, off-road 

driving without low range or gear 

options, road infrastructure causing 

false positives, support vehicles for 

cycling races, and similar situations or 

dynamic driving events involving 

interactions with other vehicles. The 

Alliance also raised several scenarios 

where vehicles are used on public roads 

but under non-normal conditions, such 

as during parades, car shows, or sport 

events where vehicles are operated in 

close proximity to pedestrians and other 

vehicles. Petitioners stated that the 

automatic deactivation provision is 

inadequate to address these scenarios. 

The Alliance noted that, since AEB 

systems might not automatically 

differentiate between tracks or parking 

lots and public roads, they could 

potentially intervene during dynamic 

driving manoeuvres, disrupting the 

driver and posing a risk to nearby 

vehicles. Moreover, the Alliance noted 

concerns about the ‘‘automatic 

deactivation only’’ approach for 

installed equipment, using snowplows 

as an example, stating that the final rule 

does not cover all potentially unsafe 

scenarios. For instance, installing 

equipment like a roof-mounted kayak, 

canoe, or ski rack with parts 

overhanging the front windshield could 

cause sensors to detect shapes that 

might not lead to a malfunction but 

could inadvertently trigger AEB 

operation. Thus, it requested that 

drivers have the ability to disable AEB 

systems to resolve these circumstances. 

The Alliance also requested 

expansion of the language in S5.4.3 of 

the final rule, which applies only to 

vehicles operating in a low-range fourwheel drive configuration, to include 

certain modern vehicle configurations, 

like those with all-wheel drive system 

without a transfer case or electrical 

vehicles using only electric motors or a 

combination of combustion-driven axles 

and electric motors, which may not 

have a low-range system but are still 

capable of off-road operations. Thus, the 

Alliance argued, NHTSA should 

broaden the applicability of S5.4.3 to 

include vehicles operating in any offroad mode or mode designated to the 

driver as appropriate for low-speed offroad operations. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA will not adjust the 

requirements regarding deactivation. 

NHTSA received and considered 

comments on automatic and manual 

deactivation of AEB systems. After 

consideration of those comments, 

NHTSA determined that allowing 

automatic deactivation pursuant to the 

circumstances in S5.4.2.2 would be 

practicable and most effectively meet 

the need for safety because it allows for 

controls that have the ancillary effect of 

deactivating the AEB while preventing 

installation of a control with the sole 

purpose of enabling driver disablement 

of AEB systems. NHTSA believes that 

the current regulatory text, which 

allows AEB deactivation ‘‘when another 

vehicle system is activated that will 

have a negative ancillary impact on AEB 

operation,’’ is sufficiently broad to 

encompass the vehicle types that the 

Alliance raises. Furthermore, the 

purpose of S5.4.3 is to exempt vehicles 

that have four-wheel drive modes, 

selected by mechanical controls that 

cannot be automatically reset 

electrically, from the requirement that 

any AEB deactivation be reset by the 

ignition cycle. For other vehicles (such 

as those with all-wheel drive), the 

agency expects that AEB will reactivate 

when the vehicle is in a drive mode that 

allows for AEB activation, and when the 

vehicle’s ignition/power is cycled on/ 

off. 

Petitioners’ stated concerns about 

operation of vehicles with no manual 

AEB deactivation in unusual 

circumstances do not justify 

reconsideration. As we discussed in the 

final rule regarding front-mounted 

equipment, a well-designed AEB system 

will be able to detect and automatically 

deactivate to accommodate roofmounted equipment such as kayaks or 


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61 49 U.S.C. 30102. 

ski racks that may overhang the front 

windshield. We are also unpersuaded 

by requests that the final rule allow 

manual deactivation to account for 

various racing or track scenarios. The 

allowance in S5.4.2.2 provides relief for 

some of these vehicles. Additionally, 

our requirements apply to motor 

vehicles, which the Safety Act defines 

as a vehicle ‘‘manufactured primarily 

for use on public streets, roads, and 

highways.’’ 61 Therefore, if a 

manufacturer chooses to produce a 

racing vehicle designed for use on 

public roads it must meet the minimum 

safety requirements. The fact that it may 

be used in a racing environment does 

not in and of itself justify a manual 

deactivation feature. Manufacturers may 

design racing vehicles not for use on 

public roads that do not meet the 

FMVSS. 

2. UNECE Regulation No. 152 

Volkswagen and the Alliance 

requested reconsideration of the 

agency’s decision to disallow a manual 

deactivation feature based on data 

submitted by Volkswagen. Petitioners 

stated that data collected in Europe 

showed that, among a fleet of over 

30,000 UNECE Regulation No. 152 

compliant vehicles which collectively 

took more than 12 million trips, only 0.2 

percent of the vehicles deactivated their 

AEB systems more than 10 times. 

According to petitioners, this data 

indicates that less than 0.005 percent of 

all trips involved AEB deactivation and 

that while drivers did use the manual 

deactivation feature, they did so very 

rarely. Thus, they argued that allowing 

the manual deactivation feature, with 

appropriate multi-step procedures to 

prevent inadvertent deactivation, would 

not significantly diminish the overall 

benefits of AEB systems. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA is unpersuaded that the data 

provided by Volkswagen demonstrates 

that NHTSA should adopt the approach 

taken by UNECE Regulation No. 152. 

Generally, the driving environment 

(road and lane design, etc.) and driver 

habits in the United States differ 

substantially from those in Europe, and 

there is also significant variation within 

European nations. These differences 

may result in differences in how drivers 

interact with AEB technology. The 

petitioners did not present evidence that 

data from the European market 

accurately represents driver behaviour 

in the U.S. market. In view of the safety 

concerns expressed in the final rule and 

by commenters, harmonization alone is 

an insufficient justification for allowing 

a control to deactivate the AEB system. 

As a result, we will not adopt the 

UNECE Regulation No. 152 approach. 

Therefore, no reconsideration is 

necessary. NHTSA is denying the 

petitions for reconsideration regarding 

amending the automatic deactivation 

provision or the restriction on installing 

a manual deactivation control. 

G. Obstructed Pedestrian Crossing Test 

Correction 

The final rule contains a test scenario 

in which an obstructed pedestrian 

enters the path of the vehicle from the 

right. 

In its petition for reconsideration, the 

Alliance argued this performance test 

requirement demonstrates that the final 

rule is impracticable. The Alliance 

asked NHTSA to reduce the maximum 

test speed and align the headways more 

closely with the results of NHTSA’s 

testing. 

The Alliance provided a case study of 

a narrow vehicle avoiding contact with 

the test mannequin using the boundary 

conditions specified in the rule and 

realistic vehicle stopping dynamics (a 

peak braking acceleration of 0.9 g and 

an initial braking rate of 3 g/s). The 

Alliance stated in its analysis that, when 

using nominal tolerances on the 

location of the vehicle test device 

relative to the subject vehicle 

positioning, the vehicle with a width of 

1570 mm (61.8 in) had approximately 

0.35 seconds to identify the crossing 

pedestrian and begin braking. However, 

in its analysis, when that same subject 

vehicle was at the maximum distance 

away from the intended travel path, and 

the vehicle test device was located as 

close to the side of the subject vehicle, 

only 0.15 seconds were available to 

react to the crossing mannequin. The 

Alliance stated that a response time of 

0.15 seconds is beyond the capabilities 

of any AEB system and is not 

practicable. 

Agency Analysis 

Agency calculations confirmed the 

issue raised by the Alliance regarding 

the perception time in obstructed 

pedestrian testing at the maximum 

allowable test tolerances. However, the 

agency does not agree that this finding 

is an indication of the standard’s 

fundamental impracticability. 

Therefore, NHTSA is amending the 

requirement to align with the intent of 

the scenario to ensure that the specified 

tolerances do not result in an 

unintentionally stringent test. 

The final rule specified that subject 

vehicles would nominally be a meter 

away from the side of the vehicle test 

device when performing obstructed 

pedestrian testing. As the Alliance 

highlighted, the tolerance of the subject 

vehicle relative to the intended travel 

path (+/- 0.15 m), and the tolerance of 

the vehicle test device relative to the 

side of the subject vehicle (+/- 0.1 m) 

could add up such that the minimum 

distance could be 0.75 m instead of the 

intended 1 m. The reduction of the 

intended distance between the vehicle 

and the pedestrian mannequin by 25 

percent has a significant impact on how 

much time the system has to determine 

whether to initiate braking. 

Additionally, as the Alliance 

highlighted, because we were primarily 

determining the vehicle test device 

location relative to the side of the 

subject vehicle, the narrower the 

vehicle, the less time that vehicle has to 

perceive the obstructed pedestrian and 

decide to begin braking. For narrower 

vehicles, this scenario renders the test 

more stringent than NHTSA intended. 

To address the issue, the agency is 

adjusting how the tolerances are defined 

in S8.3.3, so that at most, the vehicle 

test device is not less than 1.0 m away 

from the 0 percent overlap point (the 

right side of the vehicle). For vehicles 

up to 2.05 m (79.5 in) wide, which is a 

majority of passenger cars, the left side 

of the vehicle test device will be no less 

than 2.2 m away from the intended 

travel path. This standard places the left 

side of the vehicle test device at least 

1.15 m away from the right side of the 

subject vehicle, which accounts for the 

+/- 0.15 m lateral tolerance of the 

subject vehicle relative to the intended 

travel path prior to braking. To make 

sure testing is consistent, and to make 

sure that testing stringency does not 

increase for vehicles wider than 2.05 m 

(79.5 in), the left side of the vehicle test 

device will be no less than 1.15 m away 

from the subject vehicle. 

Therefore, NHTSA is amending the 

specifications for the obstructed 

pedestrian crossing test. 

H. FCW Auditory Signal 

1. FCW Auditory Signal Requirements 

The final rule requires the FCW 

auditory signal to have a high 

fundamental frequency of at least 800 

Hz, a tempo in the range of 6–12 pulses 

per second, and a duty cycle in the 

range of 0.25–0.95, and a minimum 

intensity of 15–30 dB above the masked 

threshold. 

The Alliance stated that the 

requirements related to the auditory 

signal lack specificity and were 

therefore not objective. The Alliance 

stated that the threshold sound level 

largely depends on the ambient noise at 


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62This report is the same as the one used as a 

basis for eye midpoint location set in FMVSS No. 

111. 

a given moment in time and conditions 

such as vehicle speed and engine, tire/ 

road, and wind noise. It concluded that 

for the requirement to be objective, 

NHTSA must clearly define several key 

characteristics, including the test 

conditions under which both the 

ambient noise and the masked threshold 

are measured as well as the 

methodology to measure and compute 

the sound level of the FCW warning and 

the noise separation amount (i.e., 5 dB). 

The Alliance also stated that there may 

need to be exceptions for high ambient 

noise conditions, such as convertibles 

with an open top. 

Volkswagen similarly commented that 

additional information relating to 

compliance testing is needed such as 

details of the means and conditions for 

measuring the reference noise level to 

which the regulation will compare the 

FCW auditory signal and inquired 

whether the vehicle’s windows would 

be open and/or HVAC system would be 

active during the testing. The Alliance, 

as part of its comments regarding the 

audio suppression requirement (the 

remainder of which are discussed in the 

next subsection), also requested 

additional conditions regarding the 

‘‘masked threshold’’ and how it will be 

assessed. Volkswagen also questioned 

the meaning of ‘‘quietest level’’ in the 

masked threshold definition and how to 

measure it. It further asked whether 

masked threshold would be determined 

based on a person with normal hearing 

or impaired hearing. 

Agency Analysis 

In response to petitions, NHTSA is 

incorporating additional description of 

the conditions in which the FCW 

auditory requirements must be met, 

detailing the location of the sound 

measurement device, and replacing 

‘‘masked threshold’’ with ‘‘average noise 

level inside the vehicle.’’ We are 

incorporating them to ensure clarity and 

to facilitate compliance. 

We are adding several specifications 

to the FCW auditory requirement. First, 

that the auditory signal requirements 

must be met at the highest SV test speed 

(which is 100 km/h). Second, we are 

specifying that the audio requirements 

are met with all vehicle openings 

closed. This language is intended to 

clarify for certifying entities that during 

the test, openings such as the windows, 

doors, hood, rear hatch, and trunk will 

be closed, as will convertible tops. 

Third, the provision now states that all 

subject vehicle sound-producing 

systems or functions are set to off, other 

than those necessary for performing 

testing under the rule. This language is 

intended to describe systems such as the 

HVAC, windshield wipers, and turn 

signals, which produce noise that may 

impact measurement of sound inside 

the vehicle, but which are not necessary 

for testing. These additions provide 

significant clarity regarding the 

conditions under which the signal will 

be measured. The FMVSS already states 

that FCW must operate under the 

conditions in S6, which includes items 

that may impact the in-vehicle sound 

environment, such as the environmental 

conditions, road conditions, subject 

vehicle conditions, and equipment. 

Therefore, those conditions will not be 

further specified. 

NHTSA is also incorporating the 

intended sound measurement location, 

adjacent to a 50th percentile male 

driver’s right ear tragion point. This 

point is identified in the anthropometric 

data from a NHTSA-sponsored study of 

the dimensions of 50th percentile male 

drivers seated with a 25-degree seatback 

angle (‘‘Anthropometry of Motor 

Vehicle Occupants’’).62 The tragion is an 

anthropometric point situated in the 

notch just above the tragus of the ear 

and is located 614 mm vertically above 

the H point (hip location of a driver in 

the driver seating position), 185 mm aft 

of the H point, and 83 mm to the right 

of the H point. 

We are also simplifying the baseline 

sound level against which the FCW 

auditory signal intensity is compared by 

replacing the term ‘‘masked threshold’’ 

with ‘‘average noise level inside the 

vehicle.’’ We are also incorporating a 

description of how that level will be 

determined: by measuring the noise 

level inside the vehicle over a 5-second 

period under the conditions described 

above. This change resolves items raised 

by petitioners regarding defining 

additional aspects of the ‘‘masked 

threshold’’ as well as Volkswagen’s 

petition regarding the hearing ability of 

the reference driver by simplifying the 

measurement to focus solely on the 

noise level inside the vehicle. 

Therefore, NHTSA is incorporating 

these three changes to clarify the 

requirements applicable to the FCW 

auditory warning. 

2. In-Vehicle Audio Suppression 

Requirement 

The final rule required that in-vehicle 

audio that is not related to a safety 

purpose or safety system (i.e., 

entertainment and other audio content 

not related to or essential for safe 

performance of the driving task) must be 

muted, or reduced in volume to within 

5 dB of the masked threshold during 

presentation of the FCW auditory signal. 

The Alliance requested 

reconsideration of the requirement. The 

Alliance and Volkswagen stated that the 

requirement lacked objectivity and a 

corresponding test procedure. The 

Alliance requested that NHTSA 

eliminate the requirement or issue an 

SNPRM proposing to define the audio 

sources that must be suppressed and 

‘‘safety purpose or safety system’’ 

sounds that are not required to be 

suppressed. It also asked NHTSA to 

propose performance requirements 

defining the threshold for when the 

audio suppression must begin, with an 

associated test procedure. Finally, the 

Alliance argued that NHTSA did not 

adequately consider consumer 

satisfaction concerns with the 

suppression requirement and that 

consumers may be unaccustomed to it, 

believing their audio is not working or 

seeking to disable the audio suppression 

feature. 

a. Types of Sounds that Must be 

Suppressed 

The Alliance stated that the phrase 

‘‘not related to a safety purpose or a 

safety system’’ contains undefined terms 

that are not explained except with a 

parenthetical reference to 

entertainment. The Alliance, in its 

petition, noted that audio suppression 

systems cannot distinguish between 

certain content that may or may not 

have a safety purpose: for example, a 

radio broadcast of a talk show host 

versus a radio broadcast of an 

emergency weather alert. It noted that 

the language may result in suppression 

of broadcasts of FEMA’s Integrated 

Public Alert and Warning System, 

which the Alliance noted was 

established by Executive Order 13407 to 

ensure that the public has access to 

critical alerts about weather and other 

emergencies. Petitioners also requested 

that NHTSA provide definitions 

indicating which audio sources must be 

suppressed and which do not. The 

Alliance mentioned examples for which 

it was not sure whether the suppression 

requirement would apply, such as the 

HVAC, defroster, seat belt reminder 

alarms, intelligent speeding assist 

indicators, and road departure alerts. 

Agency Analysis 

In response to this petition, NHTSA is 

amending the language to clarify that 

the requirement is to suppress audio not 

related to a crash avoidance warning. 

The intent of the requirement was to 

ensure that auditory signals unrelated to 

the vehicle’s crash avoidance response 

in an imminent crash avoidance 


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63The examples used by the petitioners, 

including ‘‘seat belt reminder alarms,’’ ‘‘intelligent 

speeding assist indicators,’’ and ‘‘road departure 

alerts,’’ should be evaluated by the manufacturer 

based on their propensity to assist a driver in 

avoiding a crash. While NHTSA could have chosen 

to state that, for example, audio from systems other 

than ‘‘Advanced Driving Assistance Systems 

(ADAS)’’ should be muted, the term ‘‘ADAS’’ has 

only been in use for approximately a decade and 

may describe a broader array of alerts than is 

appropriate. 

64https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 

audio (accessed 7/29/2024). 

65https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/ 

english/audio (accessed 7/29/2024). 

66For example, Cambridge Dictionary defines 

‘‘presentation’’ as a noun meaning ‘‘the act of giving 

or showing something, or the way in which 

something is given or shown.’’ https://dictionary.

cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/presentation 

(accessed 7/31/2024). 

scenario would not interfere with the 

driver’s perception of the FCW and 

thereby hinder their opportunity to 

intervene and avoid a crash. Given that 

petitioners’ concerns appear to be 

regarding vagueness, NHTSA is 

clarifying the requirement to reference a 

more specific set of audio signals that 

should not be suppressed: in-vehicle 

audio that is ‘‘not related to a crash 

avoidance system warning.’’ 63 NHTSA 

is also removing the explanatory 

parenthetical associated with ‘‘safety 

purpose or safety system,’’ as it is no 

longer applicable. This change also 

resolves concerns with systems being 

able to distinguish between regular and 

emergency broadcasts, because 

emergency broadcasts are not related to 

a crash avoidance system warning and 

would therefore need to be suppressed. 

Regarding the Alliance’s question 

whether a vehicle’s HVAC system and 

window defrosting system should be 

considered in-vehicle audio, they 

should not. In-vehicle audio is to be 

understood to refer to auditory signals 

and content produced or transmitted by 

the vehicle for the purpose of 

communicating information, 

entertainment, or other purpose not 

related to or essential for safe 

performance of the driving task. 

Although the regulation does not define 

‘‘audio,’’ NHTSA’s understanding of the 

term is consistent with its plain 

meaning. For example, Webster’s 

dictionary defines the noun, ‘‘audio,’’ to 

refer to ‘‘an audio signal.’’ 64 Cambridge 

Dictionary defines the noun ‘‘audio’’ to 

mean ‘‘a sound recording, or recorded 

sound.’’ 65 These definitions suggest 

‘‘audio’’ to refer to purposeful sounds 

emitted to communicate or provide 

some form of information (including 

entertainment). Noise stemming from 

the operation of HVAC systems or 

windshield defrosters would not be 

considered ‘‘in-vehicle audio.’’ On the 

other hand, auditory navigation 

instructions are considered audio and 

are subject to the suppression prevision. 

Therefore, the regulation is clear as 

written. 

The arguments regarding consumer 

acceptance are not persuasive. An FCW 

alert is only required in a crashimminent scenario, and the muting of 

in-vehicle audio would be accompanied 

by the FCW audio signal. In such a 

crash-imminent scenario, it is not 

evident that the muting of in-vehicle 

audio would be of any concern to a 

driver. 

Additionally, in responding to this 

petition, NHTSA examined 15 model 

year 2016–2024 light vehicle models 

from 12 manufacturers to determine 

whether in-vehicle audio muting during 

FCW presentation was employed. Of 15 

models examined, 11 models from 10 

manufacturers were found to mute invehicle audio during FCW presentation. 

A twelfth vehicle (2022 Hyundai 

Tucson) reduced the volume of invehicle audio during FCW presentation. 

Three models did not appear to mute or 

reduce the volume of in-vehicle audio 

during FCW presentation (2022 Honda 

Odyssey, 2023 Nissan Pathfinder, and 

2022 Subaru Outback). Aside from invehicle audio suppression during FCW, 

in-vehicle audio suppression under 

other circumstances is already present 

vehicles today as well. For example, 

some current vehicles mute in-vehicle 

audio while the vehicle’s transmission 

is in reverse gear. Audio sources in the 

vehicle can also be muted by apps on a 

phone connected to the vehicle, such as 

the Ring app (camera motion 

notifications will mute vehicle audio 

sources) and the Waze navigation app, 

which mutes vehicle audio sources 

while audio route instructions and other 

app-based verbal information is 

provided. Given the ubiquity of 

suppression of in-vehicle audio during 

FCW presentation, as well as other 

vehicle features and phone apps that 

suppress the vehicle’s entertainment 

system and other in-vehicle audio, the 

petitioner’s contention that customers 

will find the required audio suppression 

during FCW presentation to be 

unfamiliar and cause dissatisfaction is 

not compelling. 

b. FCW Presentation and Suppression 

Timing 

The Alliance stated that the 

suppression requirement is not objective 

because it lacks a definition of 

‘‘presentation,’’ and information 

regarding when the FCW must present 

or when suppression of in-vehicle audio 

must occur (such as whether it must 

occur immediately upon FCW 

presentation or within a specified 

period of time). It noted that NCAP, 

IIHS, and European procedures all 

contain a TTC value for when the FCW 

must present. Volkswagen and the 

Alliance also petitioned regarding the 

lack of an objective test methodology for 

the suppression requirement. 

Agency Analysis 

Petitioners’ arguments do not justify 

reconsideration on this issue. NHTSA is 

not incorporating a specified timing at 

which the FCW signal’s onset must 

occur, a definition of ‘‘presentation,’’ or 

a regulatory test procedure for 

evaluating the suppression requirement. 

FCW is required without an associated 

timing requirement because there is no 

regulatory safety need to require FCW at 

for any particular amount of time prior 

to automatic braking. Therefore, the 

FMVSS gives manufacturers flexibility 

in determining the timing of the FCW 

presentation for their vehicles. 

NHTSA will also not provide a 

definition of ‘‘presentation’’ because the 

plain meaning of the term and its use in 

context is not vague or unclear.66 The 

term is used only once in the regulatory 

text to describe the suppression 

requirement. Additionally, ‘‘FCW 

onset’’ is defined as the first moment in 

time when a forward collision warning 

is provided. In understanding the 

meaning of ‘‘presentation,’’ 

manufacturers may consider viewing 

‘‘FCW onset’’ as the moment at which 

‘‘presentation’’ begins, and that 

‘‘presentation’’ encompasses the entire 

time that the audible signal is active. 

Additionally, given the short, 

approximately 1–2 second duration of 

most FCW auditory signals, any delay in 

suppressing other audio content could 

hinder the driver’s ability to perceive 

the warning. As such, onset of the 

muting of in-vehicle audio should be 

simultaneous with the onset of the FCW 

auditory signal. There is no reason to 

believe, and petitioners did not suggest, 

that AEB systems are incapable of 

sending concurrent commands to 

initiate both FCW presentation and 

muting of in-vehicle audio or that 

response times for sending commands 

to initiate the FCW and the suppression 

would be different. Therefore, NHTSA 

does not expect substantial delay in 

suppression. 

Regarding a test procedure, the 

changes in this rule resolve many of the 

questions petitioners had regarding 

vehicle state and sound measurement 

such that manufacturers have clear 

guidance on the suppression 

requirement. Therefore, no additional 

test procedure will be added. However, 


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67Pursuant to 49 CFR 553.37, and in accordance 

with 5 U.S.C. 553, the Administrator has the 

discretion to make a final decision or seek further 

comment when reconsidering a rule. 

for clarity below we describe 

straightforward and readily apparent 

steps we expect to take in evaluating the 

requirement. 

NHTSA anticipates recording and 

evaluating audio data during the 

performance of the test scenario 

including the activation of FCW, and 

manufacturers may reasonably certify to 

the suppression requirement by using 

any of the required test scenarios while 

audio content subject to the muting 

requirement is playing (e.g., music). The 

first opportunity to measure the muted 

or reduced audio level would be during 

the period after the first FCW auditory 

signal pulse and before the start of the 

second pulse. Sound level would be 

recorded beginning some time before 

the onset of FCW and through the end 

of FCW presentation. Recorded audio 

data would be analyzed to extract sound 

level (in dB) values during the FCW 

pulse and the period between the first 

and second FCW auditory signal pulse. 

The sound level between pulses would 

be analyzed to demonstrate that the 

sound level had been reduced to the 

required level of within 5 dB of the 

average noise level inside the vehicle. 

For these reasons, no reconsideration 

is needed on this issue. 

I. FCW Visual Signal 

The final rule states that the FCW 

visual signal must be located within an 

ellipse that extends 18 degrees vertically 

and 10 degrees horizontally of the driver 

forward line of sight based on the 

forward-looking eye midpoint (Mf) as 

described in S14.1.5. of FMVSS No. 111. 

It also requires that the signal include 

the crash pictorial symbol in SAE J2400 

and that the visual signal be red and 

steady burning. 

Both the Alliance and Volkswagen 

stated that the requirements are 

insufficient to be objective or for 

evaluating compliance and requested 

several revisions to the rule. The 

Alliance requested that NHTSA issue an 

SNPRM to propose performance 

requirements and test procedures. 

In response to the petitions, NHTSA 

has determined that reconsideration is 

warranted on some of the items and is 

making changes to the regulatory text to 

ensure clarity in the requirements. 

However, comment was sought on these 

issues in the NPRM, and NHTSA has 

determined that no additional 

opportunity for comment is necessary, 

as explained in section IV. Rulemaking 

Analyses and Notices.67 Therefore, 

NHTSA will not issue an SNPRM, and 

is finalizing the changes herein. 

1. FCW Visual Signal Size 

In its petition, the Alliance stated that 

the FCW visual signal requirements do 

not define the size of the FCW symbol. 

NHTSA is not incorporating a size 

requirement for the FCW visual signal 

because there is no need for such a 

requirement. Not specifying a minimum 

or maximum FCW visual signal size 

provides manufacturers some flexibility 

in how the symbol is implemented for 

their system. 

2. Dimensions of the FCW Visual Signal 

Location Elliptical Area 

Volkswagen requested clarification of 

the regulatory language regarding the 

required location of the FCW visual 

signal. Volkswagen noted that 

S5.1.1(b)(1) of the regulation states that 

‘‘[t]he visual signal must be located 

within an ellipse that extends 18 

degrees vertically . . . of the driver 

forward line of sight,’’ but that it is not 

clear whether this language means ± 18 

degrees or ± 9 degrees from the driver’s 

line of sight. 

NHTSA grants reconsideration on this 

issue and is amending the regulation to 

provide clarity. The regulatory language 

was intended to specify an elliptical 

cone extending ±18 degrees vertically 

and ±10 degrees horizontally from the 

driver’s line of sight. Therefore, a plusminus sign will be added. 

3. Clarify Whether the FCW Visual 

Signal Needs To Be Fully Within the 

Ellipse 

Volkswagen stated that the 

requirements were unclear as to 

whether the entire FCW visual icon or 

only a portion of it must be located 

within the bounds of the elliptical cone. 

Reconsideration is justified on this 

issue. NHTSA intended the regulation 

to require that the required FCW symbol 

must be presented fully within the 

defined elliptical area and is updating 

the regulatory text to reflect this intent. 

NHTSA is incorporating the word 

‘‘symbol’’ after ‘‘visual signal’’ in the 

S5.1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the symbol is 

what must be located within the 

specified area. If a manufacturer chooses 

to provide any additional visual 

warning components (e.g., illuminating 

the perimeter of the instrument panel, 

or surrounding the symbol with an 

illuminated, color-shaded shape), the 

additional components are not required 

to be located within the specified 

elliptical area. 

4. Reference to FMVSS No. 111 

The Alliance and Volkswagen stated 

that S5.1.1(b) of the final rule requires 

the visual signal to be located in an 

ellipse formed around the forwardlooking eye midpoint of the driver ‘‘as 

described in S14.1.5 of FMVSS No. 111’’ 

but does not specify the driver seat 

position and seat back angle or the 

steering wheel adjustment like FMVSS 

No. 111 does. 

Reconsideration is justified on this 

issue. Although explicitly stating these 

details is not essential because to 

accurately locate the driver eye 

midpoint ‘‘test reference point’’ as 

defined in FMVSS No. 111 S14.1.5 it is 

necessary to follow the ‘‘Driver Seat 

Positioning’’ specifications in S14.1.2.5, 

NHTSA is changing the regulatory text 

for clarity to refer to S14 of FMVSS No. 

111 instead of only S14.1.5. This change 

incorporates the relevant information 

from FMVSS No. 111. 

J. Cost Estimates 

The Alliance argued that the agency 

did not adequately consider the costs of 

the requirements, including 

consideration of the disbenefits that 

might be induced by the new standard. 

It requested that NHTSA revise its cost 

assessment to consider more realistic 

assessments of the hardware additions 

and other changes that will be required 

by the final rule, as well as identify and 

quantify the disbenefits in terms of 

increased rear-end collisions and other 

crashes that will be induced by the final 

rule, at least for several more years. In 

its petition, the Alliance argued that the 

conclusions in the FRIA are not based 

on the rulemaking record or on the facts 

in the market and led NHTSA to 

substantially underestimate the costs of 

compliance with the new standard. 

Based on a survey of its members, the 

Alliance stated that the additional costs 

to make current systems compliant 

range from $200 per vehicle on the low 

end to $4,200 per vehicle on the high 

end. The Alliance also claimed that 

NHTSA mischaracterized a meeting 

NHTSA had with Robert Bosch LLC 

(Bosch) regarding the percentage of 

vehicles in the fleet that may need 

hardware improvements. 

Volkswagen stated the cost analysis as 

reported in the FRIA does not represent 

the true cost of the final rule. For 

example, Volkswagen argued, the 

requirements of the final rule cannot be 

reasonably met with existing vacuum 

brake systems, and the PAEB 

requirements under conditions of 

darkness may necessitate infrared 

cameras. It stated that NHTSA did not 


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68One possible result of this assumption is that 

the cost analysis may in fact overestimate those 

incremental hardware costs because some vehicle 

manufacturers may add an additional camera at a 

lower cost than radar. 

69 Docket No. NHTSA–2023–0021–1077. The 

letter states that the 5 percent figure ‘‘is a significant 

misunderstanding and/or mischaracterization of the 

information provided by Bosch’’ and that Bosch 

was describing only a rough estimate of the share 

of Bosch-supplied AEB systems in the U.S. market 

that are mono-camera. Bosch also emphasized, both 

in the presentation given to NHTSA and in its 

comments on the NPRM, that certain models may 

require significant hardware updates such as 

improved sensors as well as computing power and/ 

or improved brake systems. 

70The sensitivity analysis in the FRIA for 

hardware considered the case in which 10, 20, or 

50 percent of new light vehicles would need either 

an additional camera or radar to meet the 

requirements. 

71FRIA at 40. 

72FRIA, Table 267. The Alliance’s stated 

concerns with the relevance of this test data are 

discussed in Section II.A.1.b ‘‘FMVSS No. 135 Test 

Data’’ of this notice. 

account for the costs for additional 

hardware in its analysis. 

Agency Analysis 

The Alliance and Volkswagen’s 

claims that the final rule did not 

adequately consider costs in 

improvements in AEB technology are 

mistaken. The Alliance’s cost estimates 

are not correct estimates of the cost of 

compliance with the final rule because 

they include the cost of including headup display (HUD) and lidar, neither of 

which are required to meet the 

requirements and account for a large 

portion of that higher estimate. 

Additionally, the final rule fully 

considered the cost concerns raised by 

petitioners. NHTSA sought and received 

comment regarding hardware costs. 

Comments did not indicate the 

incremental cost associated with 

additional hardware commenters 

believed was necessary to achieve the 

requirements or the percentage of new 

light vehicles that they believe would 

require additional hardware. 

Nevertheless, the cost analysis in the 

FRIA accounted for a small number of 

new light vehicles that may need 

additional hardware for their existing 

AEB systems, such as an additional 

camera or radar, by including the 

incremental cost of adding radar to five 

percent of new light vehicles.68 The 

Alliance disputed the 5 percent figure, 

noting that the information NHTSA 

received from Bosch suggests larger 

improvements are needed, and NHTSA 

received a letter from Bosch clarifying 

the figure.69 NHTSA appreciates 

Bosch’s clarification. However, even if 

NHTSA accepts for the sake of argument 

that the incremental cost estimate 

undercounts that percentage of new 

light vehicles that need additional 

improvements in computing power or 

sensing technologies, NHTSA’s analysis 

fully considered these costs because the 

FRIA also included a sensitivity 

analysis.70 The sensitivity analysis 

found that even in the case that 50 

percent of new light vehicles would 

need to add radar to their current 

hardware and all new light vehicles 

needed a software upgrade, the final 

rule would remain highly net beneficial. 

The FRIA also includes a breakeven 

analysis that estimates the per-vehicle 

cost at which net benefits would be 

zero. Therefore, NHTSA’s cost and 

benefits estimates for AEB system 

hardware and software were sufficient 

to support the final rule. 

NHTSA’s analysis also considered 

comments and the available data 

regarding whether the final rule would 

necessitate improvements in vehicles’ 

foundational braking system and found 

that it would not. The agency found that 

vehicles subject to the final rule would 

already be equipped with brakes that 

give them the braking capabilities to 

meet the performance requirements 

specified in the final rule.71 The FRIA 

discussed a summary of the braking test 

results from FMVSS No. 135 testing.72

In all cases, vehicles covered by the 

final rule exceed the minimum 

requirements of the braking standards. 

The results further indicate that baseline 

vehicles already have the braking 

capabilities necessary to meet the 

minimum requirements for AEB. 

Additionally, NHTSA believes that the 

most cost-effective way (lowest cost 

option) for manufacturers to meet the 

requirements of FMVSS No. 127 is 

through tunning and calibration of the 

AEB systems rather than through 

increased braking capacity or additional 

brake hardware such as electrohydraulic brake actuators. As NHTSA’s 

analysis focuses on the lowest cost 

option that is estimated to be capable of 

meeting the final rule and the lowest 

cost option does not necessitate 

increased braking capacity, the costs 

incurred by increasing the foundational 

braking system were not considered. 

That being said, the agency provides 

flexibility in how manufacturers 

construct their AEB systems to meet the 

requirements and they may well choose 

to include brakes with increased 

capabilities. At any rate, the breakeven 

and sensitivity analyses demonstrate 

that even with significant per-vehicle 

hardware costs beyond those estimated 

in the FRIA, the final rule would remain 

cost-beneficial. 

Lastly, petitioners simultaneously 

claim that the final rule is impracticable 

but also that the requirements can only 

be met if certain hardware 

improvements are made. Given that the 

final rule would be economically 

practicable even with sizable increases 

in compliance costs, these statements 

are contradictory. Indeed, petitioners’ 

claims regarding cost support the notion 

that the final rule is practicable by 

acknowledging the availability of 

technologies that can enable vehicles to 

meet the requirements. 

Therefore, no reconsideration is 

necessary. NHTSA is denying the 

petitions for reconsideration regarding 

NHTSA’s cost estimates. 

K. Brake Pedal Robot 

The final rule specified how the brake 

pedal force is applied during testing 

conducted with manual brake 

application. It left to the manufacturer 

the discretion to select the braking 

method that NHTSA will use when 

NHTSA tests the manufacturer’s 

vehicles. 

Volkswagen requested 

reconsideration of the decision not to 

provide specifications for the brake 

pedal robot used in the manual braking 

tests. It stated that differences in test 

equipment between the agency’s test 

contractors and the vehicle 

manufacturer could lead to 

inconsistencies in performance. 

NHTSA received comments on this 

issue (including from Volkswagen) and 

responded to them in the final rule. 

NHTSA clarified that the rule does not 

require use of a specified braking robot. 

The final rule specifies the brake pedal 

force application during testing, leaving 

it to the manufacturer’s discretion to 

select the braking method for NHTSA’s 

testing of its vehicles. The specification 

is sufficient to ensure test repeatability, 

especially given manufacturers’ lengthy 

experience with braking robots in AEB 

testing. Since the petitioner did not 

present any new information that would 

warrant reconsidering the agency’s prior 

conclusion, no reconsideration is 

necessary, and we are denying the 

petition for reconsideration regarding 

the brake pedal robot specifications. 

L. Manual Transmission 

Glickenhaus petitioned NHTSA to 

reconsider and amend the standard to 

only require FCW (i.e., not AEB) for 

vehicles with manual transmission. 

Glickenhaus stated that substantial 

slowing or stopping from highway 

speeds in a vehicle with a manual 

transmission will stall the vehicle 

without manually shifting or engaging 

the clutch. It stated that sudden 

unnecessary braking caused by the final 

rule will cause a vehicle with a manual 


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73 In its petition, Petitioner may have intended to 

state ‘‘manual’’ instead of ‘‘automatic’’ here. 

Regardless, our response to the petitioned-for 

request is the same. 

74https://www.caranddriver.com/features/ 

g20734564/manual-transmission-cars/ (accessed 

August 26, 2024); https://www.caranddriver.com/ 

features/g15379070/manual-transmission-suv/ 

(accessed August 26, 2024). 

75https://automobiles.honda.com/civic-type-r# 

(accessed August 26, 2024). 

76https://www.ford.com/suvs/bronco/comparemodels/?gnav=footer-shop (accessed August 26, 

2024). 

77https://www.nissanusa.com/vehicles/sportscars/nissan-z/specs-trims.html, accessed August 26, 

2024. 

78 89 FR 39686, 39727. 

79 Id. at 39726–27, 39729, 39737. 

transmission to stall, thereby reducing 

the functionality of the brakes. A stalled 

vehicle, Glickenhaus stated, can create 

an unreasonable risk if the vehicle is on 

the highway and cannot move out of the 

way. Further, Glickenhaus stated that 

NHTSA’s existing standards have a 

precedent of differentiating 

requirements and testing procedures for 

manual transmissions from those for 

automatic transmissions where the 

technology requires. Glickenhaus 

provided examples of those standards 

and what it stated are the relevant 

sections. Additionally, Glickenhaus 

stated that one FMVSS testing facility it 

works with confirmed that whenever it 

runs AEB tests on any vehicle with an 

automatic transmission,73 the vehicle 

always stalls. Glickenhaus also stated 

that its manual gearbox supplier 

confirmed that will always be the case, 

and that this stalling could damage the 

drivetrain. Glickenhaus further stated 

that NHTSA recognizes that vehicle 

stalling, especially when unexpected at 

highway speeds, is a ‘‘substantial’’ 

hazard. Glickenhaus also stated that 

drivers using manual transmissions are 

more likely to be paying closer attention 

to the road than drivers of vehicles with 

cruise control, or any level of ‘‘self 

driving’’ vehicle functionality. 

Glickenhaus’s petition stated that 

requiring only FCW for manual 

transmissions could increase safety by 

warning drivers while allowing them to 

place the vehicle into neutral or press 

the clutch to avoid stalling while 

braking. 

Agency Analysis 

NHTSA is unpersuaded that the 

technical limitations of AEB with 

manual transmission vehicles justifies 

excluding them from the AEB 

requirement. Our review of the fleet 

shows that AEB technology already 

exists for manual transmissions. 

Therefore, no reconsideration is needed. 

There are many light vehicles sold in 

the US which still offer manual 

transmission as an option or standard.74

Several vehicles equipped with manual 

transmissions, such as the 2024 Honda 

Civic Type R,75 2024 Ford Bronco 76 and 

2024 Nissan Z,77 also come with AEB 

and PAEB as a standard feature. Due to 

the wide availability of technology from 

various suppliers with AEB and manual 

transmissions, NHTSA is not persuaded 

that only manual application of the 

clutch can prevent a stall. 

NHTSA is also unpersuaded that 

drivers of manual transmission vehicles 

are more engaged such that excluding 

them from the AEB requirement would 

be justified. As noted in the final rule, 

the timing of AEB and PAEB events do 

not always allow sufficient time for the 

driver to react and apply the brakes 

when a FCW is presented, regardless of 

the level of driver engagement. 

Therefore, no reconsideration is 

necessary. NHTSA is denying the 

petition for reconsideration regarding 

requiring only FCW for vehicles with a 

manual transmission. 

M. Small-Volume Manufacturers 

The final rule did not alter 

requirements for small-volume 

manufacturers but allowed an 

additional year for compliance for 

small-volume manufacturers. 

Glickenhaus, which produces around 

30 vehicles annually subject to the final 

rule, petitioned for reconsideration of 

the requirements for small-volume 

manufacturers, stating that the standard 

would cause substantial financial 

hardship. Glickenhaus stated it had 

contacted Tier 1 suppliers about AEB 

systems and was informed that the 

hardware for these systems is typically 

developed by larger manufacturers, and 

there is not a baseline set of hardware 

and software available for Glickenhaus 

to develop an AEB system for its very 

low volume vehicles. It noted that 

developing AEB hardware takes years, 

and the software calibration requires 

millions of miles of driving. 

Glickenhaus claims it cannot produce 

enough cars and drive them long 

enough to gather the necessary data to 

create compliant hardware and software 

for its very low volume vehicles. 

Therefore, according to Glickenhaus, 

unless Tier 1 suppliers develop starting 

packages for small-volume 

manufacturers, it would be impossible 

to develop a rule compliant AEB system 

within the lead time provided. 

Glickenhaus further emphasized the 

challenges of software development, 

vehicle testing, and calibration miles, 

which it considers nearly impossible to 

achieve within the given timeframe, 

even with an additional year. It argued 

out that some manufacturers have spent 

over 20 years developing and testing 

AEB systems, and that the costs of 

developing software and hardware for a 

driving automation system, including 

AEB functions, can exceed $ 10 billion 

annually—figures that the petitioner 

cannot manage. 

Agency Analysis 

The agency initially proposed that the 

requirements would not apply to smallvolume manufacturers until one year 

after the compliance date set for other 

manufacturers. NHTSA received more 

than 1,000 comments on the NPRM, 

including input from sensor developers 

that indicated that the technologies 

required to meet the standard are 

already available.78 In the final rule, the 

agency provided additional lead time 

for all manufacturers and continued to 

provide small-volume manufacturers an 

additional year beyond other 

manufacturers. Given the comments we 

received and the availability of these 

systems, we expect that small-volume 

manufacturers will be able to source 

rule-compliant AEB systems for their 

vehicles from existing technologies 

without incurring undue expenses in 

research and development.79

However, we acknowledge that there 

could be specific situations in which it 

may be particularly challenging for 

small-volume manufacturers to source 

systems. Without additional technical 

information regarding why Tier 1 

suppliers could not provide AEB 

systems to the petitioner, we cannot 

provide further analysis regarding their 

circumstances. However, if the 

petitioner believes that the standard will 

cause substantial financial hardship and 

it has attempted to comply with the 

standard in good faith, it may be able to 

seek a temporary exemption pursuant to 

49 U.S.C. 30113 and 49 CFR part 555, 

subject to a determination that an 

exemption is consistent with the public 

interest. 

Therefore, no reconsideration is 

necessary. NHTSA is denying 

Glickenhaus’s petition for 

reconsideration of the requirements for 

small-volume manufacturers. 

III. Petition for Rulemaking Received 

by NHTSA and Analysis 

A. Include V2X 

In addition to the petitions for 

reconsideration discussed above, 

NHTSA also received a petition from 

Autotalks on June 26, 2024. Pursuant to 

49 CFR 553.35, petitions for 

reconsideration must be received ‘‘not 

later than 45 days after publication of 


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80 49 CFR 553.35(a). 

81 88 FR 80685. 

82 89 FR 39686. 

83These regulations grant to the Administrator 

the authority, consistent with 5 U.S.C. 553b(B), to 

issue a final decision in response to petitions for 

reconsideration without further proceedings or with 

opportunity for further comment as the 

Administrator deems appropriate. 

the rule in the Federal Register.’’ 

Additionally, the regulation states that 

‘‘[p]etitions filed after that time will be 

considered as petitions filed under Part 

552 of this chapter.’’ 80 Part 552 governs 

petitions for rulemaking. Although 

Autotalks’s petition requested revision 

of the final rule, given that Autotalks’s 

petition was received by NHTSA more 

than 45 days after publication of the 

final rule, NHTSA will treat that 

petition as a petition for rulemaking. 

Pursuant to Part 552, when deciding 

on a petition for rulemaking the agency 

conducts a technical review of the 

petition, which may consist of an 

analysis of the material submitted, 

together with information already in 

possession of the agency. In deciding 

whether to grant or deny a petition, the 

agency considers this technical review 

as well as appropriate factors, which 

include, among others, allocation of 

agency resources and agency priorities. 

In its petition, Autotalks requests 

incorporating a V2X transmitter to the 

lead vehicle and activating it during the 

lead deceleration test with a 12-meter 

gap (Table 1 to S7.1). Autotalks argues 

that this requirement will allow the 

tested vehicle to use V2X to 

complement its sensors. Autotalks 

provides technical information 

regarding the capabilities and 

availability of V2X technology. 

1. NHTSA’s Consideration of the 

Petition and Decision 

NHTSA has conducted an analysis of 

Autotalks’s petition and, after careful 

consideration, has decided to deny the 

petition and will not initiate rulemaking 

proposing to require the installation and 

use of a V2X transmitter in lead vehicle 

deceleration AEB testing with 12-meter 

headway, for the reason stated below. 

In November 2023, NHTSA withdrew 

a proposed rule which had proposed to 

establish a new FMVSS mandating V2V 

(vehicle-to-vehicle) communication 

technology in all new light vehicles.81

After reviewing comments on the 

NPRM, NHTSA determined that, 

although V2V and V2X technologies 

may improve safety and offer innovative 

services to consumers, significant 

analysis would be needed before 

determining whether a new V2V 

standard is appropriate, and, if so, what 

that standard would encompass. 

NHTSA’s position has not changed 

since then and Autotalks has not 

provided information to change that 

position. Therefore, NHTSA will not 

initiate a rulemaking to require V2X 

technologies in AEB systems as a result 

of this petition. As we stated in the 

November 2023 withdrawal notice, 

NHTSA will continue to monitor the 

development of this technology for 

possible future vehicle safety 

applications. 

2. Conclusion 

In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 30162 

and 49 CFR part 552, the petition for 

rulemaking from Autotalks is denied. 

IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices 

This rule is a non-significant rule for 

purposes of Executive Order (E.O.) 

12886, as supplemented by E.O. 13563 

and amended by E.O. 14094, and will 

not impose any significant costs or have 

impacts beyond those analyzed in the 

final rule published on May 9, 2024.82

DOT has determined that the regulatory 

analyses conducted for the May 9, 2024 

final rule remain applicable to this 

action. DOT makes these statements on 

the basis that this final rule makes 

technical or clarifying changes to 

FMVSS No. 127 as established in the 

May 9, 2024 final rule. In addition, this 

final rule is not expected to impact the 

estimated costs and benefits detailed in 

the final regulatory impact analysis 

included in the docket listed in 

beginning of the final rule published on 

May 9, 2024. 

NHTSA finds it has good cause to 

make these changes without notice and 

comment pursuant to the 

Administrative Procedure Act (APA, 5 

U.S.C. 551, et seq.). Section 553(b)(B) of 

the APA provides that, when an agency 

for good cause finds that notice and 

public procedure are impracticable, 

unnecessary, or contrary to the public 

interest, the agency may issue a rule 

without providing notice and an 

opportunity for public comment. The 

May 2024 final rule is the product of an 

extensive administrative record with 

opportunity for public comment on the 

issues discussed in this final rule. The 

changes in this final rule are made in 

response to petitions for reconsideration 

submitted to NHTSA in response to and 

docketed in the record of the May 2024 

final rule in accordance with 49 CFR 

553.35 and 49 CFR 553.37.83 In 

response to those petitions, NHTSA 

makes only clarifying changes to the 

May 2024 final rule to align the 

regulatory text with the explanatory 

material in the preamble of that final 

rule. 

Specifically, NHTSA removes the 

term ‘‘imminent’’ from the performance 

test requirement. This change resolves a 

point of confusion expressed by 

petitioners and aligns the regulatory text 

with the intent of the May 2024 rule as 

expressed in the preamble by clarifying 

that the performance test does not 

evaluate AEB activation timing. NHTSA 

also amends a test scenario in FMVSS 

No. 127 highlighted by petitioners that, 

when tested with very narrow vehicles 

at the extreme of the tolerances allowed 

by the test condition, resulted in a 

stringency beyond that intended by 

NHTSA. NHTSA makes that 

amendment to ensure the correct level 

of stringency. Petitioners also requested 

clarification of the specifications in 

FMVSS No. 127 for the FCW visual 

signal location. NHTSA amends the 

regulatory text to clarify these 

specifications. Petitioners also 

expressed concerns about the clarity 

and objectivity of the requirements and 

test conditions in FMVSS No. 127 for 

the FCW audio signal. NHTSA clarifies 

these requirements by stating the 

location of the microphone and 

additional vehicle conditions under 

which testing will occur, as well as 

amending the definitions to simplify the 

requirement for suppression. 

Given the above, NHTSA finds that 

additional comment on the changes 

herein made in response to petitions for 

reconsideration of the May 2024 final 

rule is unnecessary. 

Congressional Review Act 

The Congressional Review Act, 5 

U.S.C. 801 et. seq., as added by the 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides 

that before a rule may take effect, the 

agency promulgating the rule must 

submit a rule report, which includes a 

copy of the rule, to each House of the 

Congress and to the Comptroller General 

of the United States. NHTSA will 

submit a report containing this rule and 

other required information to the U.S. 

Senate, the U.S. House of 

Representatives, and the Comptroller 

General of the United States prior to 

publication of the rule in the Federal 

Register. This rule does not meet the 

criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be 

considered a major rule. 

V. Regulatory Text 

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571 

Motor vehicles, Motor vehicle safety, 

Rubber and rubber products. 


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93220 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 228 / Tuesday, November 26, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

In consideration of the foregoing, 

NHTSA is amending 49 CFR part 571 as 

set forth below. 

PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR 

VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 571 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 

30117 and 30166; delegation of authority at 

49 CFR 1.95. 

■ 2. Section 571.127 is amended by: 

■ a. Removing the definition of ‘‘masked 

threshold’’ from S4; 

■ b. Revising S5.1.1(a)(3) and (4), 

S5.1.1(b)(2), S5.1.3. and S8.3.3(g). 

The revisions read as follows: 

§ 571.127 Standard No. 127; Automatic 

emergency braking systems for light 

vehicles. 

* * * * * 

S5.1.1. * * * 

(a) * * * 

(3) The auditory signal as measured 

adjacent to a 50th percentile male 

driver’s right ear (tragion) must have an 

intensity of 15–30 dB above the average 

noise level inside the vehicle when 

measured over a 5-second period under 

the range of test conditions specified in 

S6, at 100 km/h, with all vehicle 

openings closed, and all subject vehicle 

audio and sound-producing systems or 

functions that are not necessary for 

performing tests pursuant to the 

conditions in S6 and the procedures in 

S7, S8, S9 of this standard set to off. 

(4) In-vehicle audio that is not related 

to a crash avoidance system warning 

must be muted, or reduced in volume 

during presentation of the FCW auditory 

signal to within 5 dB of the average 

noise level inside the vehicle (as 

measured in S5.1.1(a)(3)), for the 

duration of the first between-pulse 

period of the FCW auditory signal under 

the range of test conditions specified in 

S6, at 100 km/h, with all vehicle 

openings closed, and all subject vehicle 

audio and sound-producing systems or 

functions that are not necessary for 

performing tests pursuant to the 

conditions in S6 and the procedures in 

S7, S8, S9 of this standard set to off. 

(b) * * * 

(1) The visual signal symbol must be 

located within an ellipse that extends 

±18 degrees vertically and ±10 degrees 

horizontally of the driver forward line of 

sight based on the forward-looking eye 

midpoint (Mf) as described in S14 of 49 

CFR 571.111. 

* * * * * 

S5.1.3. Performance test requirements. 

The vehicle must provide a forward 

collision warning and subsequently 

apply the service brakes automatically 

such that the subject vehicle does not 

collide with the lead vehicle when 

tested using the procedures in S7 under 

the conditions specified in S6. The 

forward collision warning is not 

required if adaptive cruise control is 

engaged. 

* * * * * 

S8.3.3. * * * 

* * * * * 

(g) Two vehicle test devices are 

secured in stationary positions parallel 

to the intended travel path. The two 

vehicle test devices face the same 

direction as the intended travel path. 

One vehicle test device is directly 

behind the other separated by 1.0 ± 0.1 

m. The frontmost plane of the vehicle 

test device furthermost from the subject 

vehicle is located 1.0 ± 0.1 m from the 

parallel contact plane (to the subject 

vehicle’s frontmost plane) on the 

pedestrian test mannequin. The left side 

of each vehicle test device is no less 

than 2.2 m to the right of the vertical 

plane through the intended travel path. 

The left side of each vehicle test device 

is no less than 1.15 m to the right of the 

vertical plane parallel to the plane 

through the intended travel path tangent 

to the 0 percent overlap point. 

* * * * * 

Issued in Washington, DC, under authority 

delegated in 49 CFR 1.95 and 49 CFR Part 

501. 

Jack Danielson, 

Executive Director. 

[FR Doc. 2024–27349 Filed 11–25–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration 

50 CFR Part 622 

[Docket No. 211217–0261; RTID 0648– 

XE473] 

Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of 

Mexico; 2024 Commercial and 

Recreational Accountability Measure 

and Closures for Gulf of Mexico Lane 

Snapper 

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries 

Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Temporary rule; closure. 

SUMMARY: NMFS implements an 

accountability measure (AM) for the 

lane snapper commercial and 

recreational sectors in the exclusive 

economic zone (EEZ) of the Gulf of 

Mexico (Gulf) for the 2024 fishing year 

through this temporary rule. NMFS 

projects that the 2024 stock annual 

catch limit (ACL) for Gulf lane snapper 

has been reached. Therefore, NMFS 

closes the commercial and recreational 

sectors for Gulf lane snapper on 

November 26, 2024, and they will 

remain closed through December 31, 

2024. These closures are necessary to 

protect the Gulf lane snapper resource. 

DATES: This temporary rule is effective 

from 12:01 a.m., local time, on 

November 26, 2024, through December 

31, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Frank Helies, NMFS Southeast Regional 

Office, 727–824–5305, Frank.Helies@

noaa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NMFS 

manages the Gulf reef fish fishery, 

which includes lane snapper, under the 

Fishery Management Plan for the Reef 

Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico 

(FMP). The FMP was prepared by the 

Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management 

Council (Council), approved by the 

Secretary of Commerce, and is 

implemented by NMFS under the 

authority of the Magnuson-Stevens 

Fishery Conservation and Management 

Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) through 

regulations at 50 CFR part 622. All lane 

snapper weights discussed in this 

temporary rule are in round weight. 

The current stock ACL for Gulf lane 

snapper was implemented on October 

18, 2024, and is 1,088,873 lb (493,904 

kg) (50 CFR 622.41(k)) (89 FR 76438, 

September 18, 2024). As specified in 50 

CFR 622.41(k), if the sum of the 

commercial and recreational landings 

reaches or is projected to reach the stock 

ACL, NMFS will close the commercial 

and recreational sectors for the 

remainder of the fishing year. Based on 

latest landings estimates, which were 

available in October 2024, NMFS has 

determined that the stock ACL for Gulf 

lane snapper has been reached. 

Accordingly, this temporary rule closes 

the commercial and recreational sectors 

for Gulf lane snapper effective at 12:01 

a.m., local time, on November 26, 2024, 

and both sectors will remain closed 

through the end of the current fishing 

year on December 31, 2024. 

During the commercial and 

recreational closures, all harvest or 

possession in or from the Gulf EEZ of 

lane snapper is prohibited. The 

prohibition on possession of Gulf lane 

snapper also applies in Gulf state waters 

for a vessel issued a valid Federal 

charter vessel/headboat permit for Gulf 

reef fish. During the closures, the 

operator of a vessel with a valid 

commercial vessel permit for Gulf reef 

fish having lane snapper on board must 


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