NUMBER 13-11-00278-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

 

NOE DE LOS SANTOS, JOE AVALOS,

RUDY RIVERA, AND RUBEN VAIZ, Appellants,

v.

CITY OF ROBSTOWN, ROBSTOWN 

IMPROVEMENT DEVELOPMENT 

CORP., RODRIGO RAMON, AND 

ARMANDO GONZALEZ, Appellees.

 

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4

of Nueces County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

Appellants Noe De Los Santos, Joe Avalos, Rudy Rivera, and Ruben Vaiz appeal 

the trial court’s order granting a plea to the jurisdiction in favor of appellees City of 

Robstown (City), Robstown Improvement Development Corporation (RIDC), Rodrigo 
2

Ramon, the City’s mayor, and Armando Gonzalez, the RIDC’s president.1 By two issues 

which we reorganize as four, appellants contend that: (1) the City and the RIDC waived 

immunity under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA); (2) the trial court erred in 

granting the City’s plea to the jurisdiction on appellants’ claim that the City’s ordinance 

was not valid; (3) the trial court erred in granting the plea to the jurisdiction on appellants’ 

ultra vires claims; and (4) the trial court erred in granting appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction 

and dismissing appellants’ claims when their pleadings did not demonstrate incurable 

defects. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 13, 2010, appellants filed their original petition for declaratory 

judgment complaining of an ordinance that appellees planned to adopt for the issuance of 

certificates of obligation (certificates). Appellants argued that appellees’ action, which 

would authorize the issuance of certificates without voter approval, conflicted with the 

Robstown City Charter (City Charter), which provides, in relevant part, “that no bonds of 

the [C]ity shall ever be issued without a vote of the people, except refunding bond[s] 

which may be issued without a vote.” Appellants requested (1) a declaration that the 

City’s issuance of certificates without prior voter approval would be in violation of the City 

Charter, and (2) an injunction enjoining the City from issuing certificates without prior 

voter approval. Appellants claimed standing without the need to demonstrate a 

particularized injury because they were taxpayers, seeking equitable relief for what they 

alleged was the illegal expenditure of public funds.

 

1

It is undisputed that appellants are taxpayers of the City, which is a home rule municipality.
3

The same day appellants filed their original petition, Robstown’s City Council 

adopted Ordinance No. 1034, which authorized the issuance of certificates of $5.6 million 

dollars for the construction of a new city hall.2 The City claimed that the state legislature 

authorized its action in the Certificate of Obligation Act (the Act). See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T 

CODE ANN. §§ 271.041-.065 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011). Section 271.044(b) of the Act 

provides that certificates may be authorized by an ordinance adopted by the City’s 

governing body. See id. § 271.044(b) (West 2005). In addition, section 271.047(a) sets 

out that the City may use this subchapter regardless of any provision in its charter to the 

contrary. See id. § 271.047(a) (West 2005). The City argued, therefore, that the 

issuance of the certificates did not require voter approval. The ordinance provided for 

the payment of the certificates and pledged the revenues from annual ad valorem taxes,

levied against all taxable property in the City, sufficient to provide for the payment of the 

interest on and principal of the certificates. The ordinance additionally secured the 

payment of the certificates “by and payable from a limited pledge of the net revenues of 

the [C]ity’s waterworks and sewer system.” 

On November 8, 2010, appellees filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to a plea to the 

jurisdiction, in which they asserted the following: (1) appellants lack standing because 

their original petition was improperly premised on alleged future legislative action—the 

City’s planned adoption of an ordinance authorizing the issuance of certificates; (2) 

appellants failed to allege a justiciable controversy in their original petition because the 

legal basis of their declaratory action is expressly negated by section 271.044(b) of the 

Act; (3) appellants assert no allegations against the RIDC, Mayor Ramon, or RIDC 

 

2

Appellants also claim that the City further intends to use the bond proceeds to demolish the 

present city hall and transform it into a parking lot for the new city hall.
4

President Gonzalez; and (4) appellants’ claims are barred by either sovereign or 

legislative immunity. The trial court heard appellees’ motion to dismiss on January 27, 

2011.

At the January 27 hearing, the trial court granted appellants leave to file an 

amended petition. In their amended petition, appellants again complained of the City’s 

“action in authorizing the certificates of obligation” as “a willful violation of an express 

prohibition of the City’s charter.” Appellants continued to argue that, as taxpayers, they 

had standing because they were challenging illegal expenditure of public funds. 

Appellants asserted new allegations, which are summarized as follows:

• The City Council is violating the Act by using bond proceeds to demolish the 

present city hall when section 271.0461 of the Act provides that such bond 

proceeds may only be used when demolishing dangerous structures;

• The City has failed to comply with the statutory requirements for 

reimbursement;

• Any payment of the certificates from sanitary sewer system fees is an illegal 

tax; and

• The City cannot bind the RIDC to pay on the certificates for forty years without 

the creation of an interest and sinking fund.3

Appellants requested a declaration that the City is not authorized to issue certificates

 

3

Appellants apparently have a typographical error in their pleadings because they set out that “the 

City of Robstown cannot bind the development corporation to pay on the certificates of obligation for a 

period of 40 years with the creation of an interest and sinking fund as required by the Texas Constitution.” 

(Emphasis added.) We read this allegation to be “with[out] the creation of an interest and sinking fund.” 

See City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 139-140 (Tex. 2011) (quoting TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5) 

(“Our Constitution ordains that ‘no debt shall ever be created by any city, unless at the same time provision 

be made to assess and collect annually a sufficient sum to pay the interest thereon and create a sinking 

fund of at least two per cent. thereon.’”).
5

without prior voter approval. Appellants also asked that the declaratory judgment 

address their ultra vires claims.

Appellees filed no amended or supplemental motion to dismiss addressing 

appellants’ amended petition. Rather, at the hearing when the trial court asked if 

appellees’ counsel “want[ed] time to replead or do something?”, he answered,

[W]e’d like to proceed on the matters that were brought forth in the—that are 

contained—if the [c]ourt is going to grant leave—that are contained in the 

original petition . . . —there’s no justiciable controversy putting aside the 

standing because the original claim and their lynchpin claim is saying, “City 

of Robstown, City Council, you can’t enter into these—this five million dollar 

contract for certificates of obligation because the charter says no.” Your 

[H]onor, [the] certificates of obligation [act], which was passed in 1971 by 

the Texas Legislature[,] specifically sets forth under 271.044 says a 

municipal—a home rule municipality such as Robstown may use this 

subchapter regardless of any provision in the municipality’s charter due 

to—. . . . That’s the lynchpin . . . of my argument, Judge.

Appellees claimed that the same argument applied to appellants’ amended petition, and 

therefore, there was no justiciable controversy as to those claims either. After hearing 

appellees’ response, the trial court stated, “[W]ith respect to the pleadings on 

file . . . [appellants] do not have standing.” It entered the following order:

After considering Defendants, CITY OF ROBSTOWN (“CITY”), 

ROBSTOWN IMPROVEMENT DEVELOPMENT CORP. (“RIDC”), RODRIGO RAMON 

(“RAMON”) AND ARMANDO GONZALEZ (“GONZALEZ”) Motion to Dismiss/Plea to 

the jurisdiction for Lack of Jurisdiction, and the response, if any, and 

arguments of counsel, and after receiving evidence in open court, the court 

finds that the Motion is well founded.[

4

]

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss/Plea to the Jurisdiction for Lack of Jurisdiction is in all things

GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ claims and causes of action against Defendants 

are dismissed with prejudice. for lack of standing.

.

[

5

]

 

4

The order states that the trial court received evidence in open court. However, our review of the 

reporter's record reveals that no evidence was admitted at the hearing.

5

The words “for lack of standing” were hand-written on the order.
6

The trial court issued no findings of fact or conclusions of law. This appeal followed.

II. CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY AND THE RIDC

A. Immunity

By their first issue, appellants contend that the City and the RIDC waived immunity 

under the UDJA. Although appellees pleaded sovereign immunity as a defense in their 

answer to appellants’ suit and argued it as part of their motion to dismiss, the trial court 

granted the plea to the jurisdiction based on lack of standing, not immunity. 

Nonetheless, the issue is properly before us because immunity impacts subject-matter 

jurisdiction and may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Manbeck v. Austin Indep. 

Sch. Dist., No. 11-0429, 2012 Tex. LEXIS 747, at *3-4 (Tex. Aug. 31, 2012) (per curiam) 

(“[T]he defense of sovereign immunity from suit sufficiently implicates subject[-]matter 

jurisdiction . . . that the defense may be raised for the first time on appeal.”). We review 

this immunity question de novo. See Tex. Dep’t of Transportation v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 

618, 620-22 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam).

“[S]overeign immunity bars UDJA actions against the state and its political 

subdivisions absent a legislative waiver.” Id. (citing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 

S.W.3d 366, 368-70 (Tex. 2009)). The UDJA expressly waives immunity by providing 

that persons may challenge the validity of ordinances or statutes and contemplates that 

governmental entities must be joined in suits to construe their legislative 

pronouncements. Tex. Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of Dequeen, 325 S.W.3d 

628, 634 (Tex. 2010) (citing Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex. 

1994); Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 373 n.6); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 

37.006(b) (West 2008) ("In any proceeding that involves the validity of a municipal 
7

ordinance or franchise, the municipality must be made a party and is entitled to be heard, 

and if the statute, ordinance, or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney 

general of the state must also be served with a copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be 

heard.").

Construing appellants’ action against the City as a challenge to the validity of an 

ordinance, we conclude that the City’s immunity has been expressly waived. See Tex. 

Lottery Comm'n, 325 S.W.3d at 634; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 

37.006(b). However, we agree with appellees that appellants have made no such claims 

against the RIDC.6 Therefore, appellants have asserted no basis for the RIDC’s waiver 

of immunity on appellants’ validity claims. Accordingly, we sustain the first issue as to 

the City and overrule it as to the RIDC.

B. Lack of Standing

By their second issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the 

City’s plea to the jurisdiction and in dismissing their ordinance-validity challenge against

the City for lack of standing.

A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000), overruled on other 

grounds, Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004); see Tex. 

Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). It “is a dilatory plea, the 

purpose of which is generally to defeat an action ‘without regard to whether the claims 

asserted have merit.”’ Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 

(Tex. 2012) (quoting Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 554).

 

6

As discussed in Section III, appellants alleged ultra vires claims against the RIDC through its 

president, Armando Gonzalez.
8

Standing is an element of a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tex. Ass’n of 

Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Tex. 1993). The general test for 

standing requires that there (a) shall be a justiciable controversy between the parties, 

which (b) will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought. See Brooks v. 

Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 163-64 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 

446; City of San Benito v. Ebarb, 88 S.W.3d 711, 720 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, 

pet. denied) (citing Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995)). A 

real and substantial controversy involving a genuine conflict of tangible interests and not 

merely a theoretical dispute must exist to constitute a justiciable controversy. Ebarb, 88 

S.W.3d at 720 (citing Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W. 2d at 467). Because the question of 

standing is a legal question, we review it de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 

964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).

Appellants pleaded that they were entitled to declaratory relief because of a 

conflict between the City Charter and the Act. Appellants assert that when there is a 

conflict, the City is bound to abide by the City Charter, which, in this case, sets out that the 

City cannot issue certificates without voter approval. In response, the City relies on 

sections 271.044(b) and 271.047(a) of the Act. Section 271.044(b) provides that “[a]

home-rule municipality may use this subchapter regardless of any provision in the 

municipality’s charter to the contrary.” TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 271.044(b). 

Section 271.047(a) of the Act further provides that certificates may be authorized by an 

ordinance adopted by the governing body of a municipality. See id. § 271.047(a). The 

City asserts that based on these provisions, the Act specifically controls over the City 

Charter provision to the contrary, and, thus, there is no justiciable controversy.
9

The trial court apparently agreed with the City and concluded that appellants 

lacked standing to sue the City because no justiciable controversy existed between the 

parties. See Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 164-65. However, this case is before us on a plea 

to the jurisdiction with respect to standing, not the merits of the underlying claim. Based 

on our de novo review of the standing question, see Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928 (Tex. 

1998), appellants have presented a real and substantial controversy involving a genuine 

conflict of tangible interests. See Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 164-65; Ebarb, 985 S.W.2d at 

153.

Appellants have asked the trial court to determine the validity of an ordinance by 

declaring that the City was “not authorized to issue the certificates without voter 

approval,” while the City has asked the trial court to determine that the City was 

authorized to do so pursuant to sections 271.044(b) and 271.047(a) of the local 

government code. The conflict is not merely a theoretical dispute. See Ebarb, 985 

S.W. 2d at 153. And a declaratory judgment, not a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, will 

resolve this controversy. See Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 164-65; Ebarb, 985 S.W.2d at 153. 

Therefore, without regard to whether appellants’ asserted claims have merit, see Garcia, 

372 S.W.3d at 635, we conclude that appellants have met the general test for standing. 

See Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 164-65. The trial court erred in granting the City’s plea to the 

jurisdiction for lack of standing. We sustain appellants’ second issue as to appellants’ 

ordinance-validity claim against the City.

III. CLAIMS AGAINST MAYOR RAMON AND RIDC PRESIDENT GONZALEZ

In their third issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the plea 

to the jurisdiction on their ultra vires claims against Mayor Ramon and RIDC President 
10

Gonzalez, the responsible government actors. In their attempt to invoke the district 

court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, appellants claim standing as taxpayers who are 

seeking relief for illegal expenditures of public funds. They also assert that the ultra vires 

exception to sovereign immunity applies to their claims brought against Mayor Ramon 

and RIDC President Gonzalez. 

A. Applicable Law

1. Standing

Unless standing is conferred by statute, taxpayers must show as a rule that 

they have suffered a particularized injury distinct from that suffered by the 

general public in order to have standing to challenge a government action 

or assert a public right. But in Texas law there is a long-established 

exception to this general rule: a taxpayer has standing to sue in equity to 

enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds, even without showing a 

distinct injury.

 

Bland Indep. School Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 556 (citations omitted); see Hendee v. Dewhurst, 

228 S.W.3d 354, 373-74, 378-79 & n.31 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (op. on 

reh’g); see also San Patricio Muni. Water Dist. v. City of Corpus Christi, No. 

13-10-00272-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 262, at *16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 13, 

2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

“The authorities[, also,] make a distinction between suits by a taxpayer to recover 

public funds already illegally expended and suits to restrain the illegal expenditure of 

public funds.” Kordus v. Garland, 561 S.W.2d 260, 262-63 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1978, 

writ ref’d n.r.e.); see Osborne v. Keith, 142 Tex. 262, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1944); 

Zimmelman v. Harris County, 819 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, 

no writ). As long as the public money has not yet been spent, the taxpayer is considered 

to have a justiciable interest in ensuring that the money not be spent illegally. See Bland 
11

Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 556 (“‘When a taxpayer brings an action to restrain the 

illegal expenditure . . . of tax money he sues for himself, and it is held that his interest in 

the subject-matter is sufficient to support the action . . . .’“ (quoting Hoffman v. Davis, 128 

Tex. 503, 100 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1937)). The Texas Supreme Court has explained 

that this distinction rests upon a balancing of taxpayers’ interests in restraining illegal 

spending of their tax dollars with the interest in avoiding disruption of governmental 

operations. See id. at 555-58.

2. Ultra Vires Exception to Immunity7

The ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity “permits a plaintiff to sue a state 

official in his official capacity (thereby binding the State through its agent) for prospective 

injunctive or declaratory relief to restrain the official from violating statutory or 

constitutional provisions.” Texans Uniting for Reform & Freedom v. Saenz, 319 S.W.3d 

914, 920 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-73, 

377).

Sovereign immunity does not bar such [ultra vires] suits because, in 

concept, [nondiscretionary, ministerial] acts of state officials that are not 

lawfully authorized are not considered to be acts of the State, and the 

remedy of compelling such officials to comply with the law, while binding on 

the State, “do[es] not attempt to exert control over the [S]tate [but] 

attempt[s] to reassert the control of the [S]tate.”

Id. at 920 (quoting Heinrich, 284 S.W. 3d at 372-73). In an ultra vires action, the 

governmental entity remains immune from suit. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-73. 

 

7

Although appellants’ amended petition does not include the term “ultra vires,” it is clear that their 

suit is, in substance, an ultra vires suit because it seeks to compel the City’s and the RIDC’s compliance 

with statutory provisions. The underlying nature of appellants’ ultra vires claims against Ramon and 

Gonzalez and the relief they seek is directly related to whether Ramon and Gonzalez acted outside the 

scope of their statutory authority. Appellants ultimately desire to compel a government official to perform 

some act that they consider to be nondiscretionary (to comply with statutory provisions). This is relief that 

falls within the ultra vires rationale. See Tex. Dep’t of Trans. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011);

City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009).
12

Instead, “the proper defendant in an ultra vires action is the state official whose acts or 

omissions allegedly trampled on the plaintiff’s rights, not the state agency itself.” Sefzik,

355 S.W.3d at 621 (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-73).

Like taxpayer standing, immunity for an ultra vires act is only a waiver with respect 

to restraining prospective governmental expenditures. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 376. A 

suit brought under the ultra vires waiver of governmental immunity cannot be used to 

obtain monetary relief for past damages from such acts. See id. at 374-76.

B. Discussion

1. Allegations

In their amended petition, appellants alleged the following:

[T]he Robstown City Council is further in violation of the Certificates of 

Obligation Act because it intends to use the bond proceeds for the 

demolition of the present city hall. However, [s]ection 271.0461 of the Act 

provides that certificates may be issued by any municipality for the payment 

of contractual obligations to be incurred [only] in demolishing dangerous 

structures;

. . . .

[T]he City has transferred bond proceeds to its general account despite its 

failure to comply with the statutory requirements for reimbursement;

. . . .

The City intends to pay for the certificates of obligation from the levy of ad 

valorem taxes and from a lien on and pledge of the revenues from the City’s 

sanitary sewer system. However, the revenues from the City’s sanitary 

sewer system are already pledged for payment of revenue bonds issued in 

1992. Additionally, the City’s sewer service is part of the City’s exercise of 

police power because it involves the City’s power to protect the public 

health, safety, comfort and welfare, which services fall within the City’s 

exercise of its police power. . . . When charging a fee for the exercise of its 

police power, the fee charged by the City must be in amounts reasonable 

[sic] necessary for such purposes. . . . If the fee charged by the City bears 

no reasonable relationship to the cost incurred by the City, and if the fee 

goes to support City services or merely to raises [sic] funds for the City, then 
13

the fees is [sic], by definition, [an illegal] tax;

. . . .

The City . . . intends to pay one-third of annual payments on the certificates 

. . . from the [RIDC]. However, the City . . . cannot bind the development 

corporation to pay on the certificates . . . for a period of 40 years with[out 

the] creation of an interest and sinking fund as required by the Texas 

Constitution.

Through these allegations, appellants sought declaratory relief in order to restrain 

appellees from violating a statute or the constitution by spending public funds illegally 

through the certificates of obligation. Although the trial court gave appellees an 

opportunity to respond, they did not do so. Instead, they took the position that no 

justiciable controversy existed as to the new claims as well.

2. Standing

Construing the amended petition liberally in favor of appellants, as we must in this 

plea to the jurisdiction proceeding, and looking to their intent, see City of Houston v. 

Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 141 (Tex. 2011), appellants have alleged that the intended 

use of the money to pay for the certificates of obligation is an illegal expenditure of funds. 

Appellants appear to be bringing this suit against Mayor Ramon and RIDC President 

Gonzalez to restrain the illegal expenditure of tax money; to restrain future expenditures 

that are not lawfully authorized. The allegations are not premised on the City’s adoption 

of an ordinance authorizing the issuance of certificates without voter approval. Rather, 

the allegations are premised on the officials’ acts or omissions, which “allegedly trampled 

on [appellants’] rights.” See Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621 (citing Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 

372-73).
14

Therefore, to the extent that the public money has not yet been spent, appellants 

have a justiciable interest in this case, a justiciable interest in ensuring that the money is 

not spent illegally. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 S.W.3d at 556. Accordingly, we 

conclude appellants have taxpayer standing as to these ultra vires allegations. See Tex. 

Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.

3. Immunity

Appellants further contend that they identified Mayor Ramon as the City’s official 

responsible for the ultra vires actions alleged in their amended pleading because his 

ministerial duties are set out in the charter and in statutes. Appellants complain that the 

City’s allegedly illegal actions, through Mayor Ramon, pledged revenues from the sewer 

systems to issue the certificates of obligation for the construction of a new city hall and not 

for a sewer treatment or collection project. Appellants assert that they also made ultra 

vires allegations against Mayor Ramon related to the City’s financial condition, such as 

the transfer of bond funds to the City’s general account without complying with statutory 

requirements for reimbursement.

In addition, appellants assert that the RIDC, through its president, performed 

nondiscretionary acts unauthorized by law. For example, they claim that through 

Gonzalez’s actions long-term debt was created without establishing an interest and 

sinking fund, funds were encumbered without voter approval, and public funds were 

transferred without authority to the City’s general fund to pay for the construction of a new 

city hall.

Based on the above, we conclude that Mayor Rodriguez and RIDC President 

Gonzalez are not immune from appellants’ lawsuit, which includes claims intended to 
15

bring future acts into compliance with the statute and the constitution and to restrain 

prospective governmental expenditures. Appellants invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction

when they alleged such ultra vires conduct against Mayor Rodriguez and RIDC President 

Gonzalez, each in his official capacity.

4. Summary

Having concluded that appellants have standing to sue and that immunity has 

been waived with regard to appellants’ ultra vires claims against Mayor Ramon and RIDC 

President Gonzalez, we sustain appellants’ third issue.8

IV. CONCLUSION

We reverse the order of the trial court granting appellees’ motion to dismiss and 

their plea to the jurisdiction as to appellants’ claims against the City that involve the 

validity of the ordinance and their ultra vires claims against Mayor Ramon and RIDC 

President Gonzalez. We remand those claims to the trial court for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

Delivered and filed the 13th

day of December, 2012.

 

8

Because we have sustained appellants’ dispositive issues, we need not address the remaining 

issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.