1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-22-00245-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF N.E.

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On Appeal from the 279th District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. F-234,867

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her four-yearold son, N.E.1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory 

grounds exist for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination of her 

parental rights would be in the best interest of the child.

2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (F), (K), (N), (O), (P), (2). 

1 To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms to refer to the 

children and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2 The trial court had previously terminated the parental rights of the unknown 

father of N.E. 
2

Mother’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination 

cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and 

explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The 

attorney represented to the Court that she gave Mother a copy of the Anders brief 

she filed, notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief, and provided Mother a 

copy of the appellate record. The Court notified Mother of her right to file a pro se 

response and of the deadline for doing so. Mother did not file a response with the 

Court.

We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by 

Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) 

(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, 

no pet.). Based on our review, we have found nothing that would arguably support 

an appeal and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178 

S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion 

that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible 

error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of 
3

Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it 

unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford 

v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. We 

deny the motion to withdraw filed by Mother’s court-appointed appellate attorney 

because the right to counsel in suits seeking the termination of parental rights 

extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 107.016(2)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). Accordingly, the 

obligation of Mother’s counsel to Mother has not been discharged. See In re P.M., 

520 S.W.3d at 27. Should Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court 

of Texas, her counsel’s obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that 

satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27-28.

AFFIRMED.

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 LEANNE JOHNSON

Justice

Submitted on December 28, 2022

Opinion Delivered January 12, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.