P. 1



# OAR Box 1830 Prepped by Ollie Stewart



### Document

Number: 

# 27 ) IV-B-2 3
Docket Number: 

# A-87-1 1

Printed 11/13/20087:20:52 AM Sheet 2 7 of 232____________ _P. 2



### 3 May , 199 3

Attache dthre e document s whic hwer e originall y withel dfromFOI A RI N 6938-9 1 unde r

th e deliberativ e proces s exemption , bu t wer e late r released : 29

. EP A Staf

f Assessment : Evaluatio n o f NHTSA' s Jul y 199 1 Repor t

"An Assessmen t

of th e Safet y o f

Onboar d Refuelin g Vaop r

Recover y Systems. " 1 5 pages . 09/23/91

. 30

. Brie f

Summar y of

evap/onboar dfir e safet y issues

. 1 2 pages . 07/22/91

. 42

. Brie f

Summar y o f

evap/onboar dfir e safet y issues

. 1 2 pages . 07/22/91

.P. 3 

# 2 4

EP A STAF F ASSESSMEN

T 9/23/9 1 Evaluatio

no f NHTSA' s Jul y

199 1 Repor t "A nAssessmen t o f th

e Safet y o f Onboar

d Refuelin

g Vapo r Recover

y System* " I . Introductio

n jI n July

1991 , th

e Nationa l Highwa y Traffi c Safet

y Administratio

n(NHTSA ) release

d a stud

y entitled , "A

nAssessment of th e Safet y o f Onboar

d Refuelin

g Vapo r Recover

y Systems. " Th

e stud y conclude

d tha t onboar

d system

s woul d resul t i

na nincreas e i

n safet y risk an

d thu s hav

e a negativ

e impac t o

nmotor vehicl e safety . Thi s document evaluate s th e NHTS A study . It consist s of a discussio

no f NHTSA' s state d objective s an

d th e implicatio

nof thes e objective s wit hrespec t to producin g a definitiv

e findin

g o n safet y (Sectio

nII) , a summar

y an d analysi s o f ke

y NHTS A finding s (Sectio nIII) , an

d finally , a brie f discussio nof overal l conclusion s (Sectio nIV ) .

II . Stud

y Objective s an

d Definitiv

e Findin

g

A a i n th e previou s stud

y o f onboar

d syste m safet y performe

d for NHTS A

b y Arthur D . Littl e (ADL) , thi s repor t lackamthe* ^ substanc e fro

m whic ha determinatio nconcernin

g th e safety

issu e ca nb e made . Th

e state d purpos e o f th

e repor t identifie s wh y th e repor t i s foundationall y deficient init s assessment o f safet y risk . NHTS A

state s o

npag e 2 : "Whil e man

y factor s entere

d th e assessment , th

e principa l issue s addresse

d were :
o Compare

d t o th e ris k o f injur

y i ncurrent moto r vehicles , woul d a nORV R syste m increas e safet

y risk ?
o I s the assessmen t o f ORV Rsafety

based upo

na nevaluatio

n o f system

s whichare developed t o the point the y ar e capabl e o f mas s productio ni nmoto r vehicles ? Tha t is , i s ther e uncertainty concernin

g ORV Rsyste m desig nan d operation , an

d henc e eve

ngreate r concern s about CRV R safety? "
o Ar e othe r alternative s availabl e t o achiev e th e objectiv

e o f refuelin

g vapor contro l and , i f so , wha t are thei r safet y risk s compare

d t o ORVR? "

Th e firs t guestio

nindicate s tha t NHTSA' s assessment focuse d o nestablishin

g whethe r onboar

d system

s increas e motor vehicl eP. 4 r \

safet yrisk

. Characterizatio n o f th e magnitud e o f an ypotentia l safet yrisk s wa s no t a goa l o f th e NHTS Astudy
. Instead NHTS A focuse d on describin g th e failur e mode s fro mwhic h a

n increas e i n ris k i s possible

. This , howeve r doe s no t g o fa r enough
. T o simpl y lis t th e problem s tha t ma yoccu r i n a systemi s inconsisten t wit h goo d engineerin g practice

. Withou t a n estimatio n o f a failur e mode' s probabilit yo f occurrence , a n evaluatio n o f it s th e consequences , an

d some consideratio n o f potentia l remedies , i t i s impossibl e t o mak e usefu l conclusion s abou t safet yris k becaus e failur e mode s wit h extremel ysmal l probabilitie s o r consequence s canno t b e considere d ground s fo r decidin g tha t a potentia l ris k i s unreasonable
. Th e second questio n refer s t o prototyp e developmen t o f onboar d systems
. NHTS Astate s tha t uncertaint yconcerning ORV R syste m desig n an

d operatio n i n prototyp e vehicle s woul d resul t i n greate r concern s abou t ORV

R systems
. I t i s beyond reaso n t o sugges t tha t manufacturer s mus t hav e full ydevelope d system s capabl e o f mas s productio n befor e a rul e requiring onboar d system s ha s bee n finalized

. I f suc h a lin e o f reasoning i s take n t o it s logica l conclusion , al l futur e automotiv e technologie s pos e unacceptabl e safet yrisk s because , currently , ther e i s uncertaint yconcerning prototyp e developmen t o f al l futur e technologies

. NHTSA' s treatmen t o f th e prototyp e issu e a s on e o f th e principa l onboar

d safet y concern s implie s tha t NHTS A believe s tha t manufacturer s are havin g a lot o f troubl e designin g workabl e onboar d systems . Thi s misplaced emphasi s make s i t difficul t t o regard.the-stud

y a s ar

_unbiased - assessmen t o f the safety . iiiuaig^ - associate

d wit honboar

d refuelin

g vapo r recover

y systems . Th e third question' s relevanc y i s predicate

d o nNHTSA' s apparent positio

ntha t an

v increas e i nsafet y ris k fro

m onboar d system s i s a nunreasonabl e ris k i f a saf e alternativ e contro l technolog

y (suc ha s Stage I I controls ) i s available . Thi s ma y b e a passabl e argument inth e contex

t o f Sectio

n202(a)(4 ) o f th

e Clea nAi r Act , whichdirect s EP A t o conside r alternativ e technologie s i nevaluatin g safety . O

nthe othe r hand , i t woul d hardl y see m reasonabl e t o allo w a nunquantified , possibl y minute , increas e i nsafet

y ris k t o forc e th

e disregar

d o f th

e Clea nAi r Act' s mandat e for onboar d controls . NHTSA' s pre-occupatio n with thi s approachals o take s awa y fro m the primar

y purpos e o f thei r study—th e assessmen t o f the safet y o f onboar

d systems . Furthermore , th

e repor t assume s tha t Stage I I control s are th e onl y alternativ

e t o canister-based onboar d technology , failin g t o eve

n mentio nbladde r an

d diaphrag

m technologies . Th e Stage I I v

s onboar d issu e i s discussed i

nmor e detai l inSectio nII I below
.P. 5

III . Summar

yan d Analysi s o f NHTS ASafet yIssue s A
. Summar

yo f NHTS ASafet yIssue s Th e essentia l point s o f th e safet yconcern s describe d i n th e Finding s an

d Conclusion s sectio n o f th e NHTS Arepor t are : 1
. Ther e ar e n o ORV R prototype s whic h satisf yal l performanc e an

d safet ycriteria

. 2
. ORV

R system s wil l b e muc h mor e comple x tha n curren t evaporativ e systems
. 3
. Vapo r coul d b e release d fro mline s an

d connection s during refuelin g an

d caus e a fire

. Th e vapo r flo w rat e wil l b e muc h large r tha n i n curren t evaporativ e systems
. Testing show s a flame 2- 3 fee t i n lengt h i s possible

. 4
. i n us e experienc e show s increas e i n fir e ris k fro m evaporativ e controls
. 5
. Testin g indicate s tha t curren t evaporativ e canister s ca n los e thei r integrit yan d resul t i n significan t self

sustainin g fire s i n th e presenc e o f an ignitio n source . ORV R system s wil l stor e muc h mor e vapo r i n canister s tha n curren t evaporativ

e systems . 6 . Stag e I I i s a saf e alternativ e —therefor e an yincreas e i n onboar

d safet y ris k i s unreasonable . 2.:*r«"
.P. 6

3
. Analysi s o f NHTS ASafet yIssue s I • Lac k o f Prototyp e Vehicle s I n Octobe r 199 0 an d Apri l 1991 , NHTS Asen t informatio n request s t o th e majo r U.S
. an d .foreig

n aut o manufacturers , askin g fo r informatio n o n a variet yo f issue s relate d t o onboard , including ORV

R systemprototyp e development , tes t results , vapo r flo w rates , etc
. NHTSA' s primaryconclusio n base d o n th e informatio n supplie d b yth e manufacturer s an d o n prototyp e testing conducte d i n th e pas t is : NHTS AConcern : NHTS Astate s o n pag e 23 : "Ther e ar e n o ORV R prototype s tha t can functio n satisfactoril yunde r al l operating condition s an d ca n mee t curren t evaporativ e an d tailpip e emissio n requirements

. Further , n o manufacturer , th e API , no r EP Aha s reporte d o n a singl e vehicl e tha t ha s bee n fitte d wit h an ORV R system , o f an

ydesign , t o a vehicl e tha t wil l mee t th e mor e stringen t tailpip e an d enhance d evaporativ e emission s requirement s o f th e 199 0 Clea n Ai r Ac t Amendments. " Analysi s

• Promisin

g prototype s exist : NHTSA' s statement tha t "ther e are n o ORV Rprototype s tha t ca nfunctio

nsatisfactorily " i s untru e i ntha t i t implie s tha t the y kno w tha t al l existin

g prototype s wil l fail ; i nactuality promisin

g prototype s do e.i misimmWox ^ example , the EP

A Vehicl e Based Simpl e Syste m (VBSS ) prototype might hav

e passed test s inhig h ambient temperatur e condition s ha d thos e test s beenconducted . NHTSA' s surve y o f th e manufacturer s showe d tha t a large numbe r o f prototype s hav e bee nbuilt , includin

g 5 6 b y Genera l Motor s alone . I t seem s unlikel y

tha t a corporatio

nwithth

e engineerin

g expertis e o f G M woul d hav

e continue

d development i f al l attempt s were unsuccessful . Finally , althoug hNHTSA' s surve y of manufacturer s turned u p 3 manufacturer s wit hprototype s whic h hav e passed the FMVS S 30 1 test , NHTS A faile d t o not e thi s a s a positiv

e sig ntha t saf e onboar

d design s ar e possible .

• Faulty

logic : Th

e abov e statement appear s t o impl ytha t ther e i s caus e fo

r safet y concer nbecaus e manufacturer s hav e no t developed ORV

Rprototype s whichhav e beenprove

nt o satisf

y al l current an

d planned performanc e an d safet y criteria . Thi s reasonin

g i s fault

y i n severa l respects . First , ther e i s no aut o industr

y incentiv

e t o perfec t prototype s fo r th e purpos e o f a regulator

y decision , no r woul d on e expec t tha t informatio

no nsuccessfu l prototype s woul d b e released . Second , fully

operationa l prototype s canno t b e expecte

d t o exis t befor e a rul e i s finalized . Third , th e othe r emission sP. 7

system s referre

d t o abov e (enhance

d evaporativ

e an d tighter tailpip e controls ) hav

e not bee

nfully

developed ; thus i t woul d b e difficul t fo

r a nonboar

d prototype t

o pas s standard s fo r thes e systems , an d indeed , fe

w vehicle s of an

y sort hav

e don e so . Additionally , Congres s provided fou r year s leadtim

e t o develo

p fully functiona l systems , a s wa s requeste d b y som e manufacturers . Th e fac t that al l test s hav e not bee

n conducte

d canno t b

e use d t o conclud

e tha t manufacturer s ar e incapabl e o f developin g prototype s that ca nfunctio

n satisfactorily . I nfact , i

nrelatio

nt o thei r require d implementatio

ndate , onboar

d system

s ar e farther alon

g i n thei r developmen t tha nmos t other ne

w systems .

• | Discussio

no f prototype testin g misleading : NHTS A stated : "I

n al l case s tha t hav

e bee nreporte

d wher e vehicle s wer e teste d i nhig hambien

t temperatures , th e vehicle s experience d fue l spitback , prematur e nozzl e shutoff , fue l expulsion , an d liqui d fue l enterin

g th e canister. " However , o nth e nex t page , NHTSA discusse s tw

o chart s tha t "summariz e al l ORV Rtestin

g that NHTSA i s awar e o f throug hJuly o f 1991, " remarkin g that : "It 1 i s noteworth

y tha t almos t n

o test s are recorde d o nth e chart fo r hig hambient temperatur e testing. "

• Well-know

nrelevan t materia l i s neglected : Sectio nV I o f th

e NHTSA Stud y include s ove r a page o f ver y negativ

e discussio

n o nthe 198 7 Buic k LeSabr e outfitte d wit ha

nonboar

d syste m b y API . API' s improve d design , presented inSA E pape r #90015 5 an d claimed b

y the paper' s author s t o resolv e th e problem

s raise d b y NHTSA , i s no t evenmentioned . Furthermore ^ NHTS A dismisse s the essentiall y flawles s performanc e o f th e EP A vehicl e b

y pointin

g t o th e lack o f hig

htemperatur e testin g a s a shortcoming .
2 . Complexit

y Complexit

y ha s beena major issu e wit honboar

d syste m safet y sinc e releas e o f the Augus t 198 7 NPRM . I t i s a particularl y difficul t issu

e t o addres s becaus e i t broadl y encompasse s th

e entir e desig

no f onboar

d systems . No t surprisingly , concern s arisin g fro m complexity

hav e beennumerous , includin g possibl e increased incidenc e o f cras hfire s due t o greate r number s of component s an

d connection s an

d increase

d chanc e o f failur e durin g operatio

ndu e t o desig

ndefects , tampering , improper maintenance , an d manufacturin

g error . NHTS A Concern : Regardin

g cras hsituation s NHTS A state s o

npag e 29 : "Base

d o n th e result s o f al l testin g an d evaluatio

nconducte

d t o date , productio

nORV Rsystem

s wil l be muc

hmor e comple

xtha ncurren

t evaporativ

e systems . Thi s increase d complexit

y lead s to th

eP. 8

following safet yconcerns : Th e increas e i n th e numbe r o f part s an d connection s wil l mak e ORV

R system s mor e vulnerabl e t o failur e i n collision s an

d norma l use . Some ORV

R components , suc h a s fille r pip e nozzl e sealing device s an

d vapo r ven t valves , wil l nee d t o b e place d i n area s o f potentia l collisio n damage , adding t o th e likelihoo d o f fue l an d vapo r releas e i n collisions

. Thes e sealing device s an d valve s ar e necessary , sinc e testin g ha s show

n tha t simple r system s canno t perfor m adequately
. Man yORV R component s wil l b e large r an d therefor e mor e difficul t t o locat e i n area s les s likel yt o sustai n damag e i n collisions... " Regardin g non-cras h situations , NHTS Astate s o n pag e 8 : "Becaus e th e ORV

R systemha s mor e components , ther e i s 1 increase d opportunit yfo r failure , whic h ca n increas e safet y ris k du e t o desig n an d manufacturin g errors , tamperin g an d poo r maintenance. " Analysis : Muchwork ha s bee ndone o nth e complexit

y issu e inth e past . NHTS A introduce s nothin g ne w o nthi s issu

e an d infac t neglect s som e important point s an d pas t results : •••-*?-*-.>.•*.- , D A assessment : EPA' s "Summar y an d Analysi s o f Comment s Regardin

g th e Potentia l Safet

y Implication s o f Onboar d Vapor Recover y Systems " (Augus t 1988 ) indicate d n o increased safet

y ris k due t o complexit y i nvariou s evaporativ e syste m designs . NHTS A faile d t o addres s thi s analysis . Battell e study : Th e Battell e stud

y o f th e complexit

y issue , based o

na failur e mode s an d effect s analysis , foun d tha t ther e wa s littl e differenc e inoveral l ris k betweenonboar d contro l equipped vehicle s an d current vehicles . Althoug hth e analysi s di d no t conside r al l operationa l situations , suc ha s purge , thi s repor t i s stil l o f value . Battell e successfull y answered ADL' s criticism s o f Battelle' s analysi s i na repor t complete

d unde r contrac t wit hAPI . NHTS A fail s t o eve n acknowledg e Battelle' s work . I f NHTS A disagree s withth e work , reason s shoul d b e given . Complexity

doe s no t necessaril y lea d t o increase

d risk : I

n it s repor t prepared fo r NHTS A i nJun e 1989 , eve

nADL concede

d tha t "increase

d complexit

y doe s ten

d t o increas e risks , bu t doe s no t hav

e t o increas e ris k an d ca ninfac t reduc e risk.' 'P. 9

Degre e o f complexit y unknown : Becaus e productio n vehicle s hav e no t bee n built , ther e i s stil l som e questio n a s t o ho w comple x productio n system s wil l actuall ybe
. EPAha s show n wit h it s Vehicl e Base d Simpl e Systemprototyp e progra mtha t simple r system s ar e a t leas t possible

. Experienc e wit hvapo r contro l systems : Pas t experienc e wit h evaporativ e systems , a s wel l a s th e consultatio n wit h NHTSA , ha s helpe d t o identif yman yo f th e possibl e failur e mode s associate d wit h onboar d systems
. I n a respons e t o a NHTSA' s question s abou t th e safet yo f ORV R systems , Toyota' s respons e iwas : "I n regar d t o th e safet yproblem s o f ORVR , w e wil l giv e ou r cooperatio n t o NHTSA . I t is , however , verydifficul t t o sho w th e risk s o f ou r systemconcretel yo r quantitatively

. Frankly , i f certai n safet yrisk s appea r concretely , our experience d engineer s can the n modif yth e desig n t o eliminat e th e problem. " Exaggerated statement s concernin g complexity : NHTSA state d tha t "sealing device s an d valve s ar e necessary , sinc e testing ha s show

n tha t simple r system s canno t perfor

m adequately. " Thi s i s flatl yuntrue
. Although som e system

s hav e performe

d poorly , ther e are promisin g prototype s whic hus e a simpl e system . Th

e testin

g ha s no t show

ntha t th

e EP A prototyp

e perform s poorly . Also , NHTS A state s tha t "man y ORV R component s wil l be large r an d therefor e mor e difficul t t o locate" . Th

e caniste r i s the onl y component tha t wil l b e mor e difficul t t o locat e due t o increase d size . Leadtime : I f ther e i s an y questio

nabout complexit

y bein g a safet y issue , the automaker s hav e fou r year s t o develo

p an d tes t thei r system

s incooperatio

nwi^ hNHTS A

t o ensur e syste

m safet y an d integrity . NHTS A made no mentio

no f thi s i nth

e study . Remedies : NHTSA' s analysi s ignore s th e fac t tha t concern s abou t risk s relate

d t o complexit

y ca nb e largely

resolve

d throug heithe r engineerin g solution s or FMVS S desig nor tes t standards .
3 . Vapo r Releas e Purine Refuelin g

NHTS A Concern : NHTS A state s o

npag e 29 : "Durin

g th e refuelin

g process , vapo r flo w fro m th e fue l tan

k t o th e ORV Rcaniste r fo

r vapor storag

e ca nb e 4 5 t o 6 5 gram s pe r minute . Thi s i s muchhighe r tha n evaporativ

e flo w rates , whichrarel y excee d 6 t o 8 gram

s per minut e an

d ar e generall y

les s tha

n1 gra m pe r minute . Shoul d thi s vapo r escape , due t o a desig nor manufacturin

g error ,P.1 0

improper maintenance , o r tampering , uncontrolle d vapor woul d flo w int o th

e engin

e compartment o

r under th

e vehicl e an

d ignite , shoul d a

nignitio

nsourc e b

e present. " Analysi s Desig nsolutions : Onboar d system

s ca nb e designe

d suc htha t th e caniste r i s locate d i nth e rear o f th

e vehicle . Severa l manufacturer s hav

e design s whichd

o so . Canister s ca

nals o b

e attache d t o th

e fue l tan

k itself , a s wa s demonstrate d i na n AP I prototype vehicle . I nsuc hdesigns , th

e refuelin

g vapor lin e t o th

e caniste r woul d be relativel y shor t o

r possibl y eliminated , confinin g th e flo w of vapor t o a shor t distanc e an d awa y fro m ignitio

nsources . I

naddition , prope r material s choice s fo

r canisters , vapor lines , an d connector s coul d hel p t o minimiz e potentia l problems . Thes e approache s woul d minimiz e tampering , los s o f integrity , improper maintenance , etc . NHTS A

doe s not mentio

nth e possibility

of desig

n solutions . Servic e statio

nfir e ris k reduced : Presently , vapor s escap e uncontrolled indirec t proximity t o th e pum p operator . Shoul d a noperator b e smoking , fire coul d result . Onboar d system

s woul d provid e th

e sam e benefi t inreducin g thes e fires-tha t NHTS A attribute s t o Stage II . Furthermore , onboar d system

s woul d contro l thi s refuelin g vapor , no t jus t i nnonattainment area s a s woul d Stag e II , bu t nationwide . Oddly , NHTS A appears^ ' t o trea t th

e escape o f refuelin g vapor s a s i t currentl y occur s (withou t control ) a s a

nacceptabl e event whil e i t treat s escap e o f the sam

e vapor s fro

m a leakin

g onboar

d syste m a s ; unacceptable . Flo w rate s misleading : I ncontras t t o evaporativ e vapo r flow , th e highe r flo

w rate s associate

d wit honboar

d control s (45 - 6 5 grams/min ) ar e onl y experienced durin

g the refuelin

g event , whichi s a ver

y smal l percentage o f tota l drivin g time . Lac k o f ignitio

nsources : Hig

honboar

d syste

m vapor flow

s occur onl y

durin g refueling , whenthe vehicl e i s parked , s o tha t th e onl y

likel y ignitio

nsourc e for a leakin g onboar

d vapo r lin

e woul d be a hot exhaus t system . Th e Fir e Protectio

n Handboo k published b

y th e Nationa l Fir e Protectio nAssociatio

n state s tha t " a ho t exhaus t pip e seldo m ignite s a flammabl e mixtur e eventhoug hth e surfac e temperatur e ma y b e considerabl y

abov e th e ignitio

ntemperature. " I

nfact , i

nth e la brepor t included a s Appendi xII I o f the study , NHTS A state s tha t the

y had problems ignitin g the flowin

g vapor s usin

g a standar d ho t plate , s o the y switche

d t o a modified heatin g coil . The

y mak e n o mentio

no f thi s inth

e bod y o f th e report , instea d implyin

g tha t th

e heatin

g coi l rathe r tha

nth e ho t 8P.1 1

plat e i s on e o f th e "ignitio n source s characteristi c o f the moto r vehicl e environment. " (page 1 0 o f th e study)
. Nothin g proven : Th e jet s o f burnin g gasolin e vapo r create d i n th e NHTS Atest s provid e an impressiv e demonstration

. However , the lac k o f correlatio n betwee n th e tes t condition s an d i n us e condition s negate s th e valu e o f thi s demonstration

. I t prove s tha t jet s o f gasolin e vapo r wil l bur n whe n ignited

.
Evaporativ e SystemFir e Ris k

NHTS AConcern : NHTS Astate s o n pag e 15 : "O n th e basi s o f assessing rea l worl d acciden t data , ther e i s a n associatio n o f fir e ris k wit h evaporativ e contro l system
. Tha t is , th e ris k o f fir e increase s whe n vehicle s ar e equippe d wit h evaporativ e systems
. Thi s finding complement s th e result s o f laboratorytesting describe d i n th e previou s section , whic h indicate d th e increase d fir e ris k o f evaporativ e systems. " Analysis : Becaus e n o full ydeveloped onboar d system s wer e availabl e fo r evaluation , an d "sinc e onboar d system s wil l contai n component s simila r t o existin

g evaporativ

e systems, • NHTS A

decided to^pexform*^ ' a statistica l analysi s o f historica l fir e rate s associate d wit h th e introductio n o f evaporativ e system s int o vehicles

. Thi s analysi s resulte d i n a findin g tha t evaporativ e equippe d vehicle s experience d a "statisticall ysignifican t increas e o f 2 7 percent " i n cras h repor t fir e rate s compare d t o pre-evaporativ e equippe d vehicles

. Ninety-fiv e percen t confidenc e limit s wer e place d a t 6 an d 5 3 percent
.

• Evidenc e o f actua l caniste r fire s i s scarce : I n th e pas t 2 0 years , experienc e indicate s tha t evaporativ e canister s hav e performed safel y

in-use

. NHTS Aha s n o recor d o f seriou s injur y o r deat hoccurrin g fromcaniste r fire s i n cras h o r non cras hsituations

. Manufacturer s indicate d i n thei r response s t o NHTSA' s reques t fo r informatio n tha t the ykno w o f veryfe w caniste r relate d fires

.

• No actio

ntake nwit hexistin g evaporativ

e controls : A2 7 percen t increas e i n fire s du e t o evaporativ e control s i s a verydramati c finding

. Th e summaryrepor t containe d i n Appendi x I V

implie s tha t man

ylive s coul d b e save d eac h yea r i f step s wer e take n t o reduc e evaporativ e systemfir e hazards
. I t woul d b e difficul t t o justif yan yclaim s tha t th e ver y limite d evaporativ e system-relate d recall s t o dat e hav e solve dP.1 2

thi s problem
. Th e fac t tha t NHTS Aha s no t take n suc h step s immediatel yi s indicativ e o f th e lac k o f confidenc e NHTS A place s i n th e analysis

. NHTS A admit s analysi s limited : NHTSA' s ow n statement s i n th e repor t regarding th e limitation s o f thi s analysi s includ e discussio n of : (1 ) th e lac k o f informatio n i n cras h report s establishing a causa l lin k t o evaporativ e systems , (2 ) th e us e o f onl y3 model-year s o f data , (3 ) th e ag e o f th e vehicle s involved , an

d (4 ) th e low confidenc e interva l o f th e estimate d increas e i n risk

. Othe r Limitations : I n additio n t o th e limitation s discusse d b yNHTS Ai n it s report , on e coul d poin t ou t that : (1 ) i t involve s onl ycrashe s o f fairl yol d cars , mostl y9 t o 1 5 year s o f age , an

d therefor e introduce s th e likelihoo d o f mor e vehicle-specifi c irregularitie s i n th e data , an d (2 ) i t came fro monl y4 states
. On e o f th e reason s give n fo r neglecting ;som e states ' dat a wa s "stat e fil e no t availabl e a t NHTSA" , despit e th e fac t tha t pas t evaluation s o n thi s issu e hav e use d readily-accessibl e dat a fro m1 4 differen t states
. Conclusion s draw

ndespit e numerou s limitations : It i s od d tha t th e analysi s repor t itself , provided a s a nappendix , doe s no t mentio

nan y limitation s inth

e dat a use

d inth e analysis . Despit e it s misgivings , NHTS A doe s no t refut e an y o f th e methodolog

y or finding s o f the analysis . Instea d these finding s ar e used a s a basi s for the negativ e conclusion s drawn-o n onboar

d syste m safety . I t i s ver

y likely thairth

e 27^ * percen t increas e i s a produc t o f th e statistica l metho d use d rather thanth

e data . A

plo t o f relevant data , includin g tha t use d b y NHTSA , exhibit s n o suc htrend , a s show

ni nth

e accompanyin

g figure . Recal l description s inconsistent : Ever y month , NHTSA

release s a consume r advisor y whichcontain s a lis t o f aut o safet y recalls . Thes e advisorie s identify the make an

d mode l of th

e vehicl e or equipmen t involved , wit ha brie f descriptio nof th e safet y problem . Insom

e cases , th

e descriptio

nprovided i n the monthl y

consume r advisor

y i s suspiciousl y

differen t tha

n th e descriptio

nprovided i nAppendi xI o f th e NHTS A safet y report , whichlist s manufacturer' s safet y defec t recall s involvin

g "emission s contro l system s components " o r resulting "fro m th e effect s o f th

e evaporativ

e emission s contro l syste m o nvehicl e performance. " Fo r example , unde r NHTS A campaig

n numbe r 89V054 , the consume r advisor y describe s th

e defec t a s follows : "Descriptio

no f Defect : Clos e proximity o f certai nhose s t o hig hhea t emitte

d fro m th e catalyti c converte r woul d caus e th

e hos e t o deteriorate .

1 0V3 P.1 3



## Fire Rates i

n Passenge rCarCrashe s by State andVehicl e Model Yea r (1982-8 7 data)

-_ J om 

## o

< 

### o o O 5 M-RYLAN D

4 - V3

- .

_ _ 3 1 ) ."5 2

_ _ > AYERAC E M_CHIOAN~ ^



# mmi -

I9 M 196 9 197

0 197 1 

## Vehicl e Mode

l Yea r 197

2 197

3

Fir s Rates * I n Passenge r Ca r Crashe s b y Stat s an d Vehlci s Mode l Year* * MODEL YEA R 196 8 196 9 197 0 197 1 197 2 197 3 pre-av g post-av g % chang e OHI O

6.2 1 5.3 1 5.1 7 5.4 6

- 5.6 0 5.1 7 5.5 6 5.4 1 -2. 7 MARYLAN D MICHIGA N

4.95 6.8 0 5.1 3 4.7 8 4.6 4 4.5 4 2.8 9

3.3 0 3.3 8 3.9 2 3.5 9 3.3 4 5.6 3 j 3.1 9 4.65 1 3.6 2 -17. 3 13. 4 ILLINOI S 1.44 1.35 1.2 5 1.3 0 0.9 7 1.35 1.35 1.2 1 -10. 4 INDIAN A

1.2 8 1.5 7 2.1 9 1.72 1.6 5 1.3 0 1.6 8 1.5 6 -7. 3 AVERAG E

3.3 5 3.6 6 3.4 2 3.4 4 3.2 9 3.1 4 3.4 8 3.2 9 •5. 5 'Fires/100 0 Passenge rCar s i n Accident s "1982-8 7 Dat a fro m NHTS AReport "Moto rVehicl e Fire s i n Traffi cCrashe s an d th e Effect s o f th e Fue l Syste m Integrit yStandard " Novembe r199 0 (DO T H S 80 7 675 ) Dat a fro m NHTS ATabl e 2- 2 foun d o n p
. 2-1 1P.1 4

Consequenc e o f Defect : Thi s coul d resul t i n a sudde n los s o f power , creating th e possibilit yo f a rea r en d crash
. Correctiv e Action : Instal l a hea t shiel d ove r th e catalyti c converte r t o protec t th e hose s fro mhea t deterioration. " On th e othe r hand , th e summar yo f NHTS Acampaign numbe r 8 9V05 4 provide d i n th e NHTS Arepor t describe s th e defec t i n th e following manner : "During operatio n i n hig h ambien t temperatures , whe n larg e quantitie s o f evaporativ e emission s wer e burne d i n th e exhaus t system , th e catalyti c converte r overheate d causin g vehicl e fires

. Alarg e hea t shiel d wa s installe d t o protec t hose s i n th e area. " Othe r NHTS Arecal l campaign s ar e describe d similarl yi n th e NHTS Arepor t (se e recall s 89V106 , 88V090 , 88V100 , 87V040 , 87V155 , an

d 83V108 )
.

Caniste r Fire s i n Laborator y Testin g

NHTS A Concern : NHTS A state s o

npag e 10 : "A

t vapo r level s o f 5 0 percen t saturatio

nan d abov e (level s routinel y expected) , a caniste r whichloose s it s integrity , suc ha s i na crash , wil l resul t i n a significant fir e whenexpose d .t o a nignitio

nsourc e representativ

e o f th e moto r vehicl e operatin g environment. " NHTS A als o state s o

npag e 10 : "ORV

R canisters , whic h wil l receiv e muchhighe r vapor flo w rate s an

d tota l vapor mas s tha n existin g evaporativ

e systems , woul d resul t i na nincrease

d safet y ris k compare

d t o existin

g evaporativ

e canisters. " Analysis ; Teete r wer e no t representativ e o f in-us e conditions : Th e majority

o f NHTSA' s test s involve d highl y

saturate

d canisters . Productio

nsystem

s are size

d accordin

g t o th

e workin

g capacity , roughl y

5 0 percen t o f saturatio ncapacity . I f NHTSA' s goa l wa s t o tes t a t caniste r loadin

g level s routinel y
: expected , a s implied , i t used the wron g range o f canister loadings . I

nfact , th

e limite

d testin

g done at loading s mor e typica l o f properl y designed canister s appear s t o indicat e tha t fire s woul d no t occur . Man y vehicl e component s burni f ignited : I t i s n o surpris e 1 2P.1 5

; that th

e test s sho

w tha t fire wil l occu r i f a loade

d canister i i s brokeno

r melted ope

nan d ignited . Test s involvin g othe r vehicl e component s constructe d o f combustibl e material s woul d sho w similar fires . Th e proximity

o f ignitio

nsource s an

d th e likelihoo

d o f event s i s th

e mor e pertinent question . It i 3 notabl e tha t th

e testin

g showe

d n o fire s cause

d b y th e !pendulu

m impac t itself , thu s refutin g claim s tha t evaporativ

e an d onboar

d canister s ar

e "firebombs" .

• Canister s ca nb e placed i

nsecur e locations : Man y manufacturer s hav

e indicate

d tha t canister s woul d b e placed in th e rear o f th

e vehicle , suc

ha s near th

e fue l tank . I

nthi s 1 locatio

ncanister s woul d b e bette r protected fro m crash impact .
• |Stronger o r substitut e material s ca nb e used : I f canister ' integrity

i s reall y

a concern , manufacturer s ca nconstruc t the m o f stronge r material s t o resis t los s o f integrit y o r us e ;som e type o f mes ht o reduc e spillage o f caniste r content s i n th e event o f rupture . Preformed carbo nmatri xmaterial s ca n be use d instea

d o f granulate

d form s t o eliminat e spillage .

• Lac k o f supportin g material : Appendi xII I i s th e complet e la

b repor t fo

r the caniste r fire testin g discusse

d i nSectio

nI V o f the NHTS A

report . Th

e repor t lack s the informatio n on e woul d normall y

expec t ina la

brepor t t o allo

w duplicatio

no f the tests . I t als o contain s som e seriou s discrepancie s i nthe informatio

ntha t i t doe s provide . Fo r example , tes t 3 1 required 120. 4 gram s o f vapo r t o saturat e the tes t cs-tjattex ^ Tes t 34A , usin

g th e sam e caniste r at almos t th e sam e initia l weight , needed onl y 90. 3 gram

s t o reac

hsaturation . N

o explanatio

ni s given .
6 . Staoe I I A s a Saf e Alternativ e NHTS A Concern : NHTS A state s o

npag e 27 : "Becaus e o f the uncertainty associated wit hORV Rsafet

y an d informatio

n whichsuggest s safety concern s exis t wit hthes e systems , i t i s impossibl e t o quantif y

th e absolut e magnitude o f the increas e i nsafet y ris k associated wit hORV Rsystems. " The y als o contend , "However , b y contrastin

g th e potentia l safet y risk s o f ORV

Ragains t th

e safet

y risk s o f other alternative s t o achiev e th e sam e objectiv

e o f ORV

Rsystems , i t i s possibl e t o make a mor e informe d conclusio

nconcernin

g ORV R safety. " NHTS A present s Stage I I a s suc ha nalternative , statin g o n pag e 28 : "Implementatio no f Stage I I woul d negat e th e nee d fo r 1 3P.1 6

ORV Rsystems , sinc e th e objectiv

e of capturin

g refuelin

g vapor s woul d b

e accomplished. " Analysis : ORV Rsystem

s safet y i s th*.consultatio n issue : A

grea t amoun

t of effor t ha s bee

nexpende

d b y NHTSA attemptin

g t o compare th

e safet y o f onboar

d system

s t o tha t of Stage II . A mor e relevant compariso ni s th

e safet

y of a refuelin

g even t involvin

g a conventiona l vehicl e v s tha t o f a

nonboar

d equippe d vehicle . Othe r viabl e technologie s ignored : NHTSA' s approac hassume s tha t a findin

g o f increase

d ris k fro

m onboar

d systems , combine d wit ha findin

g o f n o o r decrease

d ris k fro

m Stage II , provide s a basi s fo r negatin

g th e Clea nAi r Ac t mandat e fo r onboar d controls . However , NHTSA only examine s canister-base d onboar d technolog

y i nit s study , ignorin g bladde r an

d diaphrag

m technologies . ORV Rsystem

s provid e added benefit s nationwide : Stage I I controls , inpreventin g th e escap e o f mos t o f th

e refuelin

g vapor , ca

nreduc e th

e ris k o f servic e statio nfire . Th

e Decembe r 198 8 Battell e study , "Servic e Statio nRefuelin

g Ris k Assessment, " support s this , pointin g ou t tha t Californi a ma y account for jus t 3.5 % o f al l publi c servic e statio nfire s i n whichgasoline i s identifie d a s the type o f materia l ignited . Considerin

g tha t 10.9 % o f al l gasoline consumptio noccur s there- , i t appear s tha t California' s Stage I I progra m may*%e*at* ^ leas t partiall y

responsibl e fo

r reducin

g th e incidenc e o f servic e statio

nfires . However , onboar d system

s woul d provide thi s benefi t t o a

neve ngreate r extent (eve ni f control s wer e limite d t o ligh

t dut y vehicles) , considerin g tha t federa l Stage I I control s woul d no t appl y outside o f the nonattainment area s an

d woul d als o no t apply t o the man

y exempte

d servic e station s i nthe nonattainmen t areas . Maximizin g th e reductio

n o f ai r toxic s woul d als o favor onboar d controls . The stud y credit s Stage I I for thi s safet y ris k reductio

nbut make s n

o mentio no f the ver

y obviou s onboar

d benefi t i

nthi s regard .

1 4P.1 7

IV
. Conclusion s The NHTS Asafet ystud yi s no t a definitiv e finding o n the safet yo f onboar d refueling vapo r recoverysystems
. I t doe s no t provid e enough informatio n o n a singl e majo r finding t o conclud e tha t onboar d system s wil l pos e a n unreasonabl e ris k t o moto r vehicl e safety
. NHTS Astate s o n pag e 3 o f thei r repor t tha t "I t woul d b e desirabl e t o b e abl e t o fin d tha t ORV

R system s hav e a specific , quantifiabl e effec t o n th e ris k o f injur yo r fatality

. Suc h a specifi c quantificatio n is , however , no t possible

. Ther e i s n o factua l dat a o n whic h t o bas e th e absolut e quantificatio n o f ris k an d th e estimat e o f casualties. " Thi s statemen t i s a goo d summar y o f th e repor t findings

. Th e stud ymake s n o attemp t t o determin e jus t ho w bi g th e safet yris k is , eve n i n th e broades t o f terms
. Neithe r th e study' s speculativ e argument s abou t complexit yan d prototyp e developments , no r it s analytica l findings , base d o n doubtfu l statistica l method s an d lab testing wit h littl e correlatio n t o rea l worl d conditions , give s muc h basi s fo r a definitiv e finding

. NHTSA' s difficult yi n quantifyin g it s conclusio n o f increase d ris k create s th e impressio n tha t perhap s thi s increase d risk , i f i t exist s a t all , i s s o smal l a s t o b e los t "i n th e noise. " Als o quit e notabl e i s NHTSA' s tota l lack o f attentio nt o th e possibility

o f desig

nan d technolog

y improvement s i ndealin g with the potentia l problems the y identify . Many-o f thes e improvement s woul d requir e no advance s i ntechnology ; som e are alread

y contemplate

d b y manufacturers . Finally , the report' s genera l lac k o f objectivity , manifested inmisleadin g an d exaggerate

d statement s an d analysis , an

d a complet e neglec t o f contrar y dat a an

d opinions , warrant s a genera l lac k o f confidenc e i n the technica l accurac yo f NHTSA' s study
. Thi s furthe r reinforce s the conclusio n tha t th e stud yi s no t a definitiv e finding o n onboar d systemsafety
.

1 5P.1 8 

### •T,0


## Brie f Summar

y o f evap/onboar d fir e safety issue s 7/22/9 1
•Lac k o f statistica l significanc e i n FAR S data
. Du e t o th e smal l siz e o

f th e FAR S databas e an d th e eve n smalle rnumbe rof fire s involve d i n fata l crashes , smal l variation s i n th e numbe ro f accidents reporte d influenc e th e fir e rate

. Thi s prevent s us e o f thi s dat a t o fin d specifi cvehicl e componen t failure s as theyrelat e t o causin g fires

. Ou rstatistica l analysi s show s that an ychange s i n th e year s that evaporativ e control s were implemente d ar e wel l withi n th e nois e o

f th e data

. NHTS

A has gon e o n th e record sayin g that FAR S i s to o smal l an d lack s sufficien t detai l t o suppor t suc h specifi cconclusions

. Anothe rproble m wit h th e FAR S databas e (an d mos t states ) i s that i t di d not begi n unti l 1975

. Usin g matche d dat a th e vehicle s bein g studie d ar e seve n t o thirtee n year

s old , an d muc h o

f th e flee t has alread ybee n scrapped

. •State dat a indicate s decreasin g fir e rates
. Stat e dat a (Ml , MA , OH , IL , I A& more ) sho wdecreasin g fir e rate s a s evaporative control s were implemented

. Thi s dat a include s a samplin g o f al l collisions , no

t jus t fata l accidents

. : I t doesn' t loo k like NHTS

Acoul d us e thi s dat a t o prove that evaporativ e system s w^r e unsafe , bu t the yma yb e abl e t o se e differen t trend s i f th e dat a wa s matche d fo rvehicl e age
. •Caus e an d Effect A s mentione d above , NHTSAdoe s not believe that FAR S ca n b e use d t o pinpoin t source s o f vehicl e fires
. I

f the y asser t tha t th e ris e i n 1970-7 1 wa

s du e t o th e introductio n of evaporativ e controls , the yshoul d b e abl e t o explai n th e othe rfluctuation s i n th e rate
. Othe rthing s changin g at th e sam e tim e ma yhave cause d al l o rpar

t of th e chang e I n fire rates

. Thes e coul d b e thing s that change d i n th e productio n model-yea rvehicles , o r thing s tha t cause d vehicle s produce d a t differen t time s t o se e i n us e conditions

. 

# flkre S U oM

» ^ CM. DHerSkk dak.-

•Toi l Fin, s 

# iP.1 9



## Outlin e o

f evap/onboar d fir e safety issue s 7/22/9 1
•Lac k o f statistica l signrflcance/nois e I n FAR S dat a -Relativ e errors : -ho whav e thing s change d ove rth e sam e period ? -Absolut e errors : -variatio n i n rat e o f 1 (1/1000 ) mean s = 20-3 0 fatal fire s ove rth e lif e o f th e fleet

. (5 % variatio n ou t o f 200 0 i s 1 0 accidents )

- a reportin g errp ro f 1 -2/y racros s th e entir e natio n woul d caus e thi s amoun t o f noise

. -Statistic s sho wtha t pr e (68-70 ) an d pos t (7 1 -73 ) eva p ar e o f th e sam e populatio n a t 99.9 % confidenc e leve l fo rbot h matche d an d unmatche d dat a -I f NHTS Acanno t mak e definitiv e statisticall ysignifican t findin g fo r301 , ho wca n the ymak e a findin g o n eva p fires?—se e quote s t o demonstrat e this

. -Th e dat a availabl e doe s no t exten d fa renoug h bac k i n tim e t o cove rth e earl y year s o f th e pre-eva p models

. Whe n th e dat a i s matche d fo rvehicl e age , onl y thos e o f ag e 7-1 3 year s ar e availabl e an d muc h o f th e flee t i s of f th e road

. -Tal k t o TerryNewel l t o ge t number s o n flee t -Som e stat e dat a di d begi n earlie r(S C 71 , WA70) , bu t ther e i s verylittl e availabl e data

. —to o smal l o f database s -include s rollover s -2- 4 accident s =1000 accident s -Thi s ma yb e th e onl ydat a available , an d therefor e mus t b e used , bu t i t i s no t robus t enoug h t o mak e a definitiv e finding o n ho wa certai n technolog yaffectsjr e rates

. "*" " •Stat e dat a Indicate s decreasin g fir e rate s -MA , Ml , OH , IL , I Adat a al l sho wdecreasin g fir e rate s a s eva p was implemented

. -Stat e dat a include s dat a fo ral l collisions , no t jus t fata l accidents

. -NHTS Amayconcentrat e thei reffort s o n stat e dat a (b ymatchin g fo rvehicl e ag e i t ma ysho wn o chang e o rincreasin g fir e rates

. -NHTS Ama yals o us e individua l recal l campaign s o rothe rinvestigations rathe r tha n whol e flee t analysis

. -W e nee d t o tak e a close rloo k a t wha t th e stat e dat a ha s i n it—ho w ha s i t bee n manipulated ? —don' t hav e ra wdat a M^tw^fc/iL -Doesn' t loo k

lik e NHTS Acoul d us e stat e dat a i n thei rfavor

- •Caus e an d Effec t -I f suppose d cause/effec t ca n b e foun d fo revap/fire s i n 71 , wha t cause s produce d th e change s i n 75 , 77 , 81 , 8 8 etc. ? -Ther e ar e n o hint s o f problem s wit h evap
. system s causin g fire s -safet yassociation s -recall s -manufacturer' s complaint s t o EP A -Whe n stricte reva p an d exhaus t emissio n requirement s wer e implemente d i n '81 , fir e rate s wen t down

.P.2 0

-Th e 197 1 eva p tes t procedur e i s ver ydifferen t tha n curren t test—use d los s trap s rathe rtha n SHED—make s extrapolatio n t o onboar d mor e difficul t -Evap

. was designe d fo r9 ps i RV P fuel , bu t thi s was exceeded—ma yhav e le d t o problems

. Currentl yRV P i s se t at 9 psi—wil l no t hav e th e sam e problems

. Othe rthing s tha t wer e changin g a t th e sam e time : cause s o f nois e

-Electrica l systems-no t muc h -Engin e horsepowe r* * 197 2 -Ca rsize s ** , bu t stil l bi g -Spee d limi t (55 ) 197 4 V -Fue l Volatilit y* * (graph ) -Drivin g Pattern s -Ai rConditionin g Graph s 1

. FAR S dat a 1975-8 8 • * sho wvariabilit yi n dat a 2

. FAR S dat a 68-7 0 v
. 71-7 3 (matche d an d unmatched )
* • sho wscatte ri n dat a fro m yea rt o yea r 3

. Stat e dat a **

show s downwar d tren d 4

. Sout h Carolin a & Washingto n dat a -^oldes t dat a 5

. Gasolin e Volatilit yTrend s • * sho wincreasin g RV PP.2 1

NHTS A COMMENT S O

N ANALYSI S O

F FIR E DAT A Excerpt s fro

mlette r t o Do n R
. Clay , SPA , fro mDian e Steed , NHTSA , Octobe r 24,'1988
. Pag e 3 : "You r analysi s attempt s t o refut e comment s tha t th e adde d complexit yo f onboar d system s coul d lea d t o an increas e i n fire s b

yreviewin g cras h fir e rate s o f curren t productio n evaporativ e contro l systems
. Yo u conclud e tha t suc h control s "have ha d n o discernibl e effec t o n vehicl e fires. " W e disagree

. Th e incidenc e o f crash-related fire s i s smal l an d nationa l dat a system s are no t designed t o detec t change s i nth e incidenc e o f relativel y infrequen t event s (i.e . cras hfires)

. Thu s w e woul d onl yconclud e tha t an ychang e i n th e incidenc e o f suc h fires , i f any , i s smal l — no t tha t i t i s nonexistent. " (bol d added ) Pag e 5 : "W

e agre e tha t i t i s ofte ndifficul t t o pinpoin t the source s o f vehicl e fire s involvin g fue l systems . A s EPA ha s stated , the difficultie s ar e du e t o a relativel y

smal l acciden t dat a bas e size ; ou r FAR S an

d NAS S dat a file s ar e no t designed for identifyin

g fue l syste

m component failure s i nfire s (o r an y othe r specifi c vehicl e system s malfunction) , etc . Therefore , i t i s difficul t t o prove a relationshi p betweencurren t evaporativ e vapo r contro l system

s and increased risk s o f fire s i nfue l systems. " (bol d added ) Pag e 15 : "Usin

g FAR S t o conclude tha t evaporativ e control s had n o effec t o

nfir e rate s i s incorrect . The FAR S file^ha * insufficien t detai l t o suppor t sucha nimplie

d conclusion . An

y increas e i nfire s due t o evaporativ e control s woul d b e expected t o b e smal l i ncompariso nt o tota l cras hfire-related death s an d coul d easil y b e los t i nyear-to-yea r variation . W e believ

e tha t you

r analysi s show s onl ytha t fata l crash-relate d fire s wer e no t significantl yincrease d wit h th e introductio n o f evaporativ e controls
. I t doe s no t an d ca n not , usin g thi s file , addres s th e prevalenc e o f injurie s o r incidenc e o f fire. " (bol d added )

Based o nNHTSA' s pas t position , i t doe s no t appea r likel y tha t NHTS A wil l bas e an

yconclusion s concernin g th e safet yo f onboar d system s o n a n analysi s o f FAR S data
. Instead , NHTS Awil l probabl y mak e conclusion s base d o n specifi c acciden t report s an d o n it s pas t recal l dat a and investigation s relate d t o evaporativ e controls : Pag e 5 : " ANHTSA-sponsore d contract , ("Stud yo f Moto r Vehicl e Fires, " JDat

a Link , Inc. , Fina l Report , NHTS ADocke t No
. 73-20-GR

085 , February1988) , conclude d tha t mor e in-dept h analysi s o f availabl e dat a i s needed ; fo r example , a revie w o f hard-copy acciden t report s t o relat e fue l system componen t failure s an d vehicl e fires

. Th e Dat a Link repor t als o recommende d tha t acciden t dat a o f specifi c model s shoul d b e analyze d fo r evaluatin g componen t an d desig n attribute s o f th e fue l system s involve d i n fires. "P.2 2



## Fire Rate s i n Fata l Passenge rCa rAccident s b y Vehicl e Mode l Yea

r (1975-8 8 FAR S data ) (NHTSA )

25 si C u T 3
' 3 2 0

' J < 3 o | 1 5 st U J J 1 0

>

o ' ' ' ' ' ' : ' ' ' i t i i i t i t t 1 ' ' ' ' ' • •i i

•IM I IM S IN I IM T IM I l*TI \m W J Iff ) no \m nn nm im tm m \n* i«

_m

- <*«*5S*5i?5** V ^.-;.. ' " ^ Vehicl e Model YearP.2 3



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b y Mode l Year

(1975-8 6 FAR S Data ) (FaAA )

196 8 196

9 197

0 1971 Mode l Year 197 2 197

3 ~«_W>MSK i '-'. i S S



## 197 o I97 A 197 2 19?3 &MTCk£

D MTCH£

D 22

. q - /

24. 8 2'/.- T 

# a t 9 _24,0

_

-2 ^P.2 4



# Fir e Rate s i n Passenge rCa rCrashe s b y Stat e an dVehicl e Mode

l Yea r (1982-8 7 data

) (NHTSA)

7 -

Vehicle Mode l Yea r -.t^KSJSrjt^JJ^jg^SP ? 

## \ V 

# ^r

2. 1P.2 5

Fir e Rate s fo r Ca r Collision s an d Rollover s b y Mode l Yea r Sout hCarolin a(1971-85) , Washington (1970-85 ) (FaAA)

V3 C o 

# I 3

" o U o o o

^ ^ • » V ) t ) Sout

h Carolin a

Washington

196 8 196 9 197 0 197 1 Mode l Yea r 1972 197 3 ;-j?T»5aiC_: -



# £ TP.2 6



### Statistica l Compairsio n o f Pr e an d Pos

t Eva p Fir

e Rate s 1975-8 6 Matche dfor

Vehicl e Ag e FAR S Dat a

1 0 2

0 3 0 Fires/100 0 Fata

l Accidents -1 0

«P.2 7

0.0 7 

## Statistica l Comparisio n o f Pr e an d Post Eva p Fire Rate s 1975-8 6 Unmatched FAR S Dat a

1 0 : o 30 4 0

Fires/100 0 Fata

l AccidentsP.2 8


# Gasolin e Volatilit

yTrend s
Fro m"Moto r Gasolines

. Winte

r 1974-75 , Summe

r 1987 " 1 4

1 3

1 2

_ , > C

_

1 0

-•—•—•— t

- __s * :•• ^HW^ ;

A » • » •

_ I I I ! I ! I I I I ! I I 196 6 196 7 196 8 196 9 197 0 197 1 197 2 197 3 197 4 197 3 197 6 197 7 197 8 197 9 198 0 198 1 198 2 198 3 198 4 198 3 W8 6 198 7 Calenda r Yea rAnalysi s o

f Varianc e (ANOVA ) o n FAR S dat a obtaine d i n th e FaA Adocumen t HypothiwisHo : mu1=mu2 : (i e th e tw o sample s ar e fro m th e sam e population. )
Matche d Dat a (fo rvehicl e age ) Mode l ye a Tes t Yea r 197 5 197 6 197 7 197 8 197 9 198 0 198 1 198 2 198 3 198 4 198 5 19<3 G

mea n std s 68-7 0
grandmen r gmnd-.lr )

MS E MST r 140.002 5 f -, F.05.1.1 2 F.01.1.1 2 F.001,1,1 2 r196 8

21.6312 1 20.8101 1 1 6 4626 4 22.2432 6 25.3837 1 23.130 3 24.9759 8

22.0910 3 2.99440 8 23.7018 8 5.77659 6 25.5282 2 5.73535 8

302143 8 70.0462 3 4.63661 5 4 7 5 9 3 3 18.6 4 196 9
20.9013 7 17.421 6 21.3333 3 22.5933 2 21.6606 5 37.7952 8 17.8970 9

22.8003 8 6.89106 5 197 0

18.0481 3 17.745 3 25.2032 5 25.691 7 30.4726 4 31.4309 3 34.907 6

26.2142 2 6.59072 2 71-7 3 197 1

1 8 6457 3 26.7857 1 20.4899 8 27.690 7 30.9704 1 3 7 8726 8 26.5654 6

27.0029 5 6.41437 6 27.3545 7 5.20189 4

70.0462 3 197 2

234712 8 25.0347 7 3 0 4168 2 35.3058 2 1 7 1253 8 32.2147 7 344202 9
28.2841 6 6.64823 7 197 3

24.6949 4 26.2390 7 24.9396 6 27.9787 7 2 9 7780 2 27.7392 5 26.0663 5 26.7765 8 1.82032 3

f=4.64»-F'therefor e accep t H o tha t mu l = mu 2 Unmatche d Dat a Model yea j Tes t Yea r 197 5 197 6 197 7 197 8 197 9 I96 0 198 1 196 2 198 3 196 4 196 5 198 6
mea n std s 68-7 0
gran d

MS E MST r 2.28745 8 f - F.05.1.2 0 F.01.1.2 0 F
. 001.1.2 0 196 8

216312 1 2 0 8101 1 1 6 4626 4 222432 6 25.3837 1 23.130 3 2 4 9759 8 3£4324 3 26.6903 9 20.449 9 23.746 7 45.0450 5 25.2501 4 7.3513 1 25.7093 7 7.40615 9 25.6876 1 6.85654 8

47.6511 7 1.14372 9 0.04800 4 4.3 5 8. 1 14.8 2 196 9 18.6393 3 20.9013 7 17.421 6 21.3333 3 22.5933 2 21.6606 5 37.7952 8 17.8970 9 35.6294 5 21.1161 4 44.1176 5 31.8906 6 25.9163 2 8.99599 3 197 0

1 8 0149 6 24.1561 9 18.0481 3 17.745 3 252032 5 25.691 7 30.4726 4 31.4309 3 34.907 6 24.6360 6 25.1968 5 3 6 0360 4 25.9616 4 6.26184 2 71-7 3 197 1

21.7849 6 21.0999 7 23.7000 4 18.6457 3 26.7857 1 20.4899 8 27.690 7 30.9704 1 37.8726 8 26.5654 6 26.2812 1 43.0769 2 27.0803 1 725301 7 26.0658 5 6.36012 2

1.14372 9 197 2

19.9875 1 18.4264 4 23.0746 2 22.6436 5 23.4712 8 25.0347 7 30.4168 2 35.3058 2 17.1253 8 3Z2147 7 34.4202 9 40.5679 5 26.8907 7 7.49394 5 197 3

20.374 9 17.6754 2 18.4471 4 23.0002 6 23.7837 8 24.6949 4 26.2390 7 24.9396 6 27.9787 7 29.7780 2 27.7392 5 26.0663 5 24.2264 6 3.79298 5

f=.0480< F therefor e accep t H o tha t mu 1 = mu 2P.3 0



## Brie f Summar

y o f evap/onboar d fir e safety issue s 7/22/9 1
•Lac k o f statistica l significanc e i n FAR S data
. iDu e t o th e smal l siz e o

f th e FAR S databas e an d th e eve n smalle rnumbe ro f fire s involve d i n fata l crashes , smal l variation s i n th e numbe ro f accidents reporte d influence th e fir© , rate

. Thi s prevent s us e o f thi s dat a t o fin d specifi cvehicl e componen t failure s as the yrelat e t o causin g fires

. Ou rstatistica l analysi s show s that an ychange s i n th e year s that evaporativ e control s were implemente d ar e wel l withi n th e nois e of th e data

. NHTS A has gon e o n th e recor

d sayin g that FAR S i s to o smal l an d lack s sufficien t detai l t o suppor t suc h specifi cconclusions

. Anothe rproble m wit h th e FAR S databas e (an d mos t states ) i s that i t di d not begi n unti l 1975

. Usin g matche d dat a th e vehicle s bein g studie d ar e seve n t o thirtee n year

s old , an d muc h o

f th e flee t has alread ybee n scrapped

. •State dat a Indicate s decreasin g Ar e rates
. Stat e dat a (Ml , MA , OH , IL , I A& more ) showdecreasin g fir e rate s as evaporative control s were implemented

. Thi s dat a include s a samplin g of ai l collisions , not jus t fata l accidents , i t doesn' t loo k like NHTS

Acoul d us e thi s dat a t o prove that evaporative system s were unsafe , bu t the yma yb e abl e t o se e differen t trend s i f th e dat a was matche d fo rvehicl e age
. •Caus e an d Effect ' As mentione d above , NHTS Adoe s not believe that FAR S ca n b e use d t o pinpoin t source s of vehicl e fires

. I f the yasser t that th e ris e i n 1970-7 1 wa s du e t o th e introductio n of evaporativ e controls , the yshoul d b e abl e t o explai n th e othe rfluctuation s i n th e rate

. Othe rthing s changin g at th e sam e tim e ma yhave cause d al l o rpar

t of th e chang e i n fir e rates

. Thes e coul d b e thing s that change d i n th e productio n model-yea rvehicles , o r thing s tha t cause d vehicle s produce d at differen t time s t o se e differen t i n us e conditions

.P.3 1



## Outlin e of evap/onboar d fir e safet y issue s 7/22/9 1
•Lac k o f statistica l significance/nois e i n FAR S dat a -Relative errors : -ho whave thing s change d ove rth e sam e period ? -Absolut e errors : -variatio n i n rat e o

f 1 (1/1000 ) mean s * 20-3 0 fata l fire s ove rth e lif e o f th e fleet

. (5 % variatio n ou t o f 200 0 i s 1 0 accidents )

- a reportin g erro rof 1 -2/y racros s th e entire natio n woul d caus e thi s amoun t of noise

. -Statistics sho

wthat pre (68-70 ) an d post (7 1 -73 ) eva p ar e o f th e sam e populatio n a t 99.9 % confidenc e leve l fo rbot h matche d an d unmatche d dat a -I f NHTS Acannot mak

e definitiv e statisticall ysignifican t findin g fo r301 , ho wca n the ymak e a findin g o n eva p fires?—se e quote s t o demonstrat e this

. -Th e dat a availabl e doe s not exten d fa renoug h bac k i n tim e t o cove rth e earl y year s o f th e pre-eva p models

. Whe n th e dat a i s matche d fo rvehicl e age , onl y thos e of ag e 7-1 3 year

s ar e availabl e an d muc h o

f th e flee t i s of

f th e road

. -Tal k t o Terr yNewel l t o get number

s o n fleet

. -Som e stat e dat a di d begi n earlie r(S C '71 , W A70) , bu t there i s ver

ylittl e availabl e data , —to o smal l o

f database s -include s rollover s -2- 4 accident s =100 0 accidents -Thi s ma yb e th e onl ydat a available , an d therefore mus t b e used , bu t i t i s no

t robust enoug h t o mak

e a definitiv e findin g o n ho wa certai n technolog yaffect s fir e rates

. •State dat a Indicate s decreasin g fir e rate s -MA , Ml , OH , IL , I A dat a ai l sho wdecreasin g fir e rate s as eva p was implemented

. -Stat e dat a include s dat a fo raj i collisions , not jus t fata l accidents

. -NHTSAma

yconcentrat e thei reffort s o n stat e dat a (bymatchin g fo rvehicl e ag e i t ma yshown o chang e o rincreasin g fir e rates

. -NHTSAma

yals o us e individua l recal l campaign s o rothe rinvestigation s rathe r tha n whol e flee t analysis

. -W e nee d t o take a close rloo k at what th e stat e dat a ha s i n it—ho w ha s i t bee n manipulated ? —don' t have ra wdat a -Doesn' t loo k

like NHTS

Acoul d us e stat e dat a i n thei rfavor—ma ytwis t dat a •Caus e an d Effect -I f suppose d cause/effec

t ca n b e foun d fo revap/fire s i n '71 , what cause s produce d th e change s i n 75 , 77 , 81 , 8 8 etc: ? -There are n o hints o

f problem s wit h evap
. system s causin g fire s -safet yassociation s -recall s -manufacturer' s complaints t o EP A -insuranc e institut e -Whe n stricte reva p an d exhaust emissio n requirements were implemente d i n '81 ,P.3 2

fir e rate s wen t down

. -Th e 197 1 eva p tes t procedure i s ver ydifferen t tha n curren t test—use d los s trap s rathe rtha n SHED—make s extrapolatio n to onboar d mor e difficul t -Evap

. was designe d fo r9 ps i RV P fuel , bu t thi s was exceeded—ma yhav e le d to problems

. Currentl yRV P i s se t a t 9 psi—wil l not have th e sam e problems

. •Othe r thing s that were changin g a t th e sam e time : cause s o f nois e -Electrica l systems-not muc h -Engin e horsepowe r** 1972 -Ca rsize s ** , bu t stil l bi g -Spee d limi t (55 ) 197

4 -Fue l Volatilit

y* (graph ) -Drivin g Pattern s -Ai rConditionin g * •Graph s 1

. FAR S dat a 1975-8 8 • » sho wvariabilityi n dat a 2

. FAR S dat a 68-7 0 v
. 71-7 3 (matche d an d unmatched )
• * showscatte ri n dat a fro m yea rt o yea r 3

. Stat e dat a - * shows downwar d tren d 4

. Sout h Carolin a & Washingto n dat a -^oldes t dat a 5

. Gasolin e VolatilityTrend s • * sho wincreasin g RV PP.3 3

NHTS A COMMENT S O

N ANALYSI S O

F FIB S DAT

A Excerpt s fro

mlette r t o Do n R
. Clay , EPA , fro mDian e Steed , NHTSA , Octobe r 24 , 1988
. Pag e 3 : "Your analysi s attempt s t o refut e comment s tha t th e adde d complexit yo f onboar d system s coul d lea d t o an increas e i n fire s b

yreviewin g cras h fir e rate s o f curren t productio n evaporativ e contro l systems
. Yo u conclud e tha t suc h control s "have ha d n o discernibl e effec t o n vehicl e fires. " W e disagree

. Th e incidenc e o f crash-related fire s i s smal l an d nationa l dat a system s are no t designed t o detec t change s i nthe incidenc e o f relativel y infrequen t event s (i.e . cras hfires)

. Thu s w e woul d onl yconclud e tha t an ychang e i n th e incidenc e o f suc h fires , i f any , i s smal l — no t tha t i t i s nonexistent. " (bol d added ) Pag e 5 : "W

e agre e tha t i t i s oftendifficul t t o pinpoin t the source s o f vehicl e fire s involvin g fue l systems . A s EPA ha s stated , the difficultie s ar e due t o a relativel y smal l accident dat a bas e size ; ou

r FAR S an

d NAS S dat a file s are no t designed fo r identifyin

g fue l syste

m component failure s i nfire s (o r an y othe r specifi c vehicl e system s malfunction) , etc . Therefore , i t i s difficul t t o prove a relationshi p betweencurrent evaporativ e vapor contro l system

s an d increased risk s o f fire s i nfue l systems
. " (bol d added ) Pag e 15 : "Using FAR S t o conclud e tha t evaporativ e control s ha d n o effec t o n fir e rate s i s incorrect

. Th e FAR S fil e ha s insufficien t detai l t o suppor t suc ha nimplie

d conclusion . An

y increas e i nfire s due t o evaporativ e control s woul d b e expected t o b e smal l i ncompariso nt o tota l craa

hfire-related death s an d coul d easil y b e los t i nyear-to-yea r variation . W e believ e tha t you r analysi s show s onl ytha t fata l crash-relate d fire s wer e no t significantl yincrease d wit h th e introductio n o f evaporativ e controls
. I t doe s no t an d ca n not , usin g thi s file , addres s th e prevalenc e o f injurie s o r incidenc e o f fire. " (bol d added )

Base d o n NHTSA' s pas t position , i t doe s no t appea r likel ytha t NHTS Awil l bas e an yconclusion s concernin g th e safet yo f onboar d system s o n a n analysi s o f FAR S data
. Instead , NHTS Awil l probabl y mak e conclusion s base d o n specifi c acciden t report s an d o n it s pas t recal l dat a an

d investigation s relate d t o evaporativ e controls : Pag e 5 : " ANHTSA-sponsore d contract , ("Stud yo f Moto r Vehicl e Fires, " Dat a Link , Inc. , Fina l Report , NHTS ADocke t No
. 73-20-GR

085 , February1988) , conclude d tha t mor e in-dept h analysi s o f availabl e dat a i s needed ; fo r example , a revie w o f hard-copy acciden t report s t o relat e fue l system componen t failure s an d vehicl e fires

. Th e Dat a Link repor t als o recommende d tha t acciden t dat a o f specifi c model s shoul d b e analyze d fo r evaluatin g componen t an d desig n attribute s o f th e fue l system s involve d i n fires. "P.3 4

^ uy/3 -««FAR S data

) (NHTSA )

Vehicle Mode

l Yea r



# J* 8



# - * As k m di^U h M J «_ ~ i t


# *• « stLiri nfr^ &&P.3 5



## Fire Rate s i n Fata l Passenge rCa rAccident s

by Mode l Yea r (1975-8 6 FAR

S Data ) (FaAA)

1968 196 9 197 0 197 1 Mode l Yea r 1972 1973



# M 49 & i% 9 19T&

- 

# m\ 197 2 197 3 ftlMICITO 

## 2i

. q - j 2-2
. T - 

# ^i-*-
. -24. 8 75*
. O 

## ^3. 3 MTCHE D

2 1 ^

• ^

. 6" 2TK * 1e. £ lif t 1tf£S W ((^^H^CCakleyyar) ,



## "li e <M > * ^*» A

## W « UwoleU l a

l

S 3

# Fire Rate s i n Passenge rCa rCrashe s

b y Stat e an dVehicle Mode

l Yea r (1982-8 7 data

) (NHTSA )

O ' ' ' L ' I— | I)IIIIIIIIIIII I l

_ IW 4 I W 1* » 194 9 197 0 197 1 197 1 1^7 3 197 4 197 3 197 * 197

7 197 1 197

9 19
—191 1 19 » I9 U I9 M 191 ] I9 M 191 7 t Vehicle Model Yea

r 

## i t 

# 1ksb U cfefe

. MwctW

. IH-l U k

fe^* «-«* l dfc

; 4 ewytri W c* H

2. 1P.3 7



### Fir e Rate s fo rCa rCollision s an d Rollover s b yMode l Yea r Sout hCarolin a(1971-85) , Washington (1970-85 ) (FaAA)

196 8 196 9 197 0 197 1 Model Yea

r 1972 1973



### al l We
. 6s k w e W
. S C 4* 9 lrw* W r«J t



# 5 "P.3 8



### Statistica l Compairsio n o f Pr e an d Pos

t Eva p Fir

e Rate s 1975-8 6 Matchedfo

r Vehicle Age FAR

S Dat a 0.0 9
0.0 8
0.0 7
0.0 6 h
0.0 5
0.0 4
0.0 3
0.0 2 -
0.0 1 -
0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0

Fires/100 0 Fata

l Accidents 4 0 5 0



# »' * «r_f U sW i -f U 4 * nejck

l m Siiu c A m set
.P.3 9

0.0 7 

## Statistica l Compariso n o f Pr e an d Pos

t Ev a p 

## Fir

e R at e 1975-8 6 Unmatrh ^ n A D c * V ^Mr e^ate S Unmatche dFAR S Dat a

Fires/100 0 Fata

l Accident s 

# lj< > ^ 5 W U

^ on^e U f?W

5Analysi s o f Varianc e (ANOVA ) o n FAR S dat a obtaine d i n th e FaA A documen t

HypothesisHo : mu1=mu2 : (i e th e tw o sample s ar e fro m th e sam e population. )
Matche d Data (fo rvehicl e age ) Model yea r196 8 Tes t Yea r 197 5 197 6 197 7 197 8 197 9 198 0 198 1 198 2 198 3 198 4 198 5 198 6
mea n std s 68-7 0 grandmct-u n gnvK-st d

MS E MST r 140.092 5 f = F.05,1.1 2 F.01.1,1 2 F.001,1,1 2 21.6312 1

20.8101 1 16.4626 4 22.2432 6 25.3837 1 23.130 3 24.9759 8

22.0910 3 2.99440 8 23.7018 8 5.77659 6 25.5282 2 5.73535 8

30.2143 8 70.0462 3 4.63661 5 4.7 5 9.3 3 18.6 4 196 9
20.9013 7 17.421 6 21.3333 3 22.5933 2 21.6606 5 37.7952 8 17.8970 9

22.8003 8 6.89106 5 197 0

18.0481 3 17.745 3 25.2032 5 25.691 7 30.4726 4 31.4309 3 34.907 6

26.2142 2 6.59072 2 71-7 3 197 1

18.6457 3 26.7857 1 20.4699 8 27.690 7 30.9704 1 37.8726 8 26.5654 6

27.0029 5 6.41437 6 27.3545 7 5.20189 4

70.0462 3 197 2

23.4712 8 25.0347 7 30.4168 2 35.3058 2 17.1253 8 32.2147 7 34.4202 9
28.2841 6 6.64823 7 197 3

24.6949 4 26.2390 7 24.9396 6 27.9787 7 29.7780 2 27.7392 5 26.0663 5 26.7765 8 1.82032 3

f_4.64< F therefor e accep t H o tha t mu 1 = mu 2 Unmatche d Dat a Mode l yea r 196 8 Tes t Yea r 197 5 197 6 197 7 197 8 197 9 198 0 198 1 198 2 198 3 198 4 198 5 198 6
mea n std s 68-7 0
gran d

MS E MST r 2.28745 8 f = F.05.1,2 0 F.01.1,2 0 F.001,1,2 0 21.6312 1

20.8101 1 16.4626 4 2Z2432 6 25.3837 1 23.130 3 24.9759 8 32.4324 3 26.6903 9 20.449 9 23.746 7 45.04505 25.2501 4 7.3513 1 25.7093 7 7.40615 9 25.8876 1 6.85654 8

47.6511 7 1.14372 9 0.04800 4 4.3 5 8. 1 14.8 2 198 9 18.6393 3 20.9013 7 17.421 6 21.3333 3 22.5933 2 21.6606 5 37.7952 8 17.8970 9 35.6294 5 21.1161 4 44.1176 5 31.8906 6 25.9163 2 8.99599 3 197 0

18.0149 6 241561 9 18.0481 3 17.745 3 25.2032 5 25.691 7 30.4726 4 314309 3 34.907 6 24.6360 6 25.1968 5 36.0360 4 25.9616 4 6.26184 2 71-7 3 197 1

21.7849 8 21.0999 7 23.7000 4 18.6457 3 26.7857 1 20.4899 8 27.690 7 30.9704 1 37.8726 8 26.5664 6 26.2812 1 43.0769 2 27.0803 1 7.25301 7 26.0658 5 6.36012 2

1.14372 9 197 2

19.9875 1 18.4264 4 23.0746 2 22.6436 5 23.4712 8 25.0347 7 30.4168 2 35.3058 2 17.1253 8 32.2147 7 34.4202 9 40.5679 5 26.8907 7 7.49394 5 197 3

20.374 9 17.6754 2 18.4471 4 23.0002 6 23.7837 8 24.6949 4 26-990 7 24.9396 6 27.9787 7 29.7780 2 27.7392 5 26.0663 5 24.2264 6 3.79298 5

f=».0480< F therefore accep t H o tha t mu 1 a mu 2 

## H» 5 b\V JUS U GOM *

oP.4 1


# Gasolin e VolatilityTrend s

_ * Fro mNIPER' s "Moto

r Gasolines " 1 5

1 4

1 3

" 3 1 2 winter .

I I

1 0

' ' •I I I— I I I I 1— J I 1 1 L

_ i9« IM T IM I iw tm ICT

I an im ir

w i m m* \m w

n \<m am m i m m > I M IM

J K M IM T 19

— am iw o Calenda r Yea r



## i l « ffof l sk^ i <} L iWOf o |w l VkUil.* ^ U & W i^f e U^ U fefc t* t 

### ^ fc* l b \ 

# Life W* (At. 

# t