UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6653

WILLIAM EUGENE WEBB,

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

JOE DRIVER, Warden; MR. MARTINEZ, Acting Warden; MR. 

ORSOLITS, Assoc. Warden, DR. JORGES VAZQUEZ; DR. HERMAN 

BRANSON; DR. RICHARD RAMIREZ,

 Defendants – Appellees,

and

MR. GREENWALL, Food Service Administrator; MS. DEBRA 

BRADLEY, Supervisor of Education; HAROLD BOYLES,

 Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey, 

Chief District Judge. (3:07-cv-00062-JPB)

Submitted: January 17, 2013 Decided: January 24, 2013

Before MOTZ, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Eugene Webb, Appellant Pro Se. Alan McGonigal, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for 
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Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

William Eugene Webb appeals from the jury’s verdict 

for Defendants in his Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) suit, finding that 

Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Webb’s medical 

needs regarding his hernia. Webb also appeals various 

preliminary district court orders. We have reviewed the record 

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm 

substantially for the reasons stated by the district court. 

Webb v. Driver, No. 3:07-cv-00062-JPB (N.D.W. Va. July 8, 2011; 

July 29, 2011; Aug. 9, 2011; Jan. 18, 2012). In addition, we 

briefly consider certain of Webb’s appellate claims not 

addressed in detail by the district court.

Webb challenges the district court’s denial of his 

request for an interlocutory appeal regarding the performance of 

his appointed attorney. A district court may certify for appeal 

an order not otherwise appealable should the court find that 

there is a controlling issue of law on which there is a 

difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal would 

materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). As an initial matter, Webb provides 

no authority supporting the conclusion that the denial of a 

request for an interlocutory appeal is itself an appealable 

order. Moreover, even if it were, the order at issue does not 
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satisfy the requirements of § 1292(b). There is no difference 

of opinion on the question of whether an indigent litigant has a 

constitutional right to assistance of counsel in a civil suit. 

See Sanchez v. United States, 785 F.2d 1236, 1237 (8th Cir. 

1986). Further, an immediate appeal would likely not have had 

an effect on the timeline of the litigation, as Webb shows no 

likelihood that he would have succeeded in an interlocutory 

appeal. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying 

Webb’s request for an interlocutory appeal.

Next, Webb challenges the exclusion of certain 

documents as irrelevant. While the order Webb cites in his 

informal brief does not provide any reasoning or describe the 

documents excluded, Webb claims in his informal brief that the 

district court erred in excluding evidence of his acid reflux

disease (“GERD”), as well as his “actual hernia and scars.” 

However, although Webb contends on appeal that his GERD was 

related to his hernia, he failed to provide any evidence 

connecting the two conditions in district court. Moreover, 

regarding his scars, Webb failed to show any medical evidence of 

permanent damage, rendering his present appearance irrelevant. 

As such, Webb has failed to show any abuse of discretion by the 

district court. See United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 

(4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review).
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Without citing any specific motions or orders, Webb 

challenges the district court’s failure to investigate his 

allegations that Defendants were retaliating against him during 

the pendency of his case. In one of his motions, Webb claimed 

that prison officials were arranging for prisoners to assault 

him and that he had been denied postage and legal resources. 

The district court required the United States Attorney’s office 

to “make the necessary arrangements to provide the pro se 

plaintiff with sufficient postage and photocopy capabilities.”

At trial, Webb complained about his treatment in his 

then-current Mississippi prison. The district court informed 

Webb that it had no control over prisons located outside the 

Northern District of West Virginia. The court noted that it 

would entertain motions should Webb need additional time or 

assistance with prosecuting his case but that it would not 

otherwise get involved. On appeal, Webb presents his claim in a 

conclusory manner and does not provide any evidence that the 

conditions of which he complained were orchestrated by the 

Defendants. Further, he does not aver that Defendants’ alleged 

retaliation prejudiced his case.

We conclude that, even assuming for the sake of 

argument that the district court was under some sort of duty to 

investigate, any failure to do so is irrelevant to the issues in 

this case. Webb is free to bring another suit addressing his 
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mistreatment during the time of the pendency of this case should 

he believe that such treatment violated his rights. However, 

absent any allegations that Defendants’ actions impacted his 

instant suit, his assertions of retaliation have no bearing on 

his appeal.

Finally, Webb challenges the district court’s recess 

of ten days in the middle of the trial, its refusal to question 

the jury upon their return to ensure that their integrity was 

not breached, and the court’s refusal to permit the jury to have 

transcripts of Defendant Orsolits’ testimony even though the 

jury requested them. Webb provides no details or cites to the 

record, he fails to show how the transcripts would have altered 

the jury’s verdict, and he fails to make any showing that the 

jury was compromised.

Our review of the record shows that the court had to 

recess the trial based upon another, previously scheduled trial. 

Moreover, it appears that the court believed the trial would be 

over in three days, making any recess unnecessary, but that 

instead Webb took three days to present his case. Our review of 

the transcript reveals that Webb’s pro se case was presented in 

a lengthy and repetitive manner. In fact, the jury requested 

that the court put a time limit on closing arguments. In 

addition, Webb did not object to the recess.
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Based on our review of the record, the district 

court’s recess of ten days, while not ideal for the presentation 

of Webb’s case, was not intentional and resulted from a 

lengthier trial than the parties anticipated. Webb’s 

allegations of prejudice are merely speculative, and he provides 

no specifics as to items or details that would be hard for the 

jury to remember. Likewise, he proffers nothing to support his 

assertions that the jury was compromised during the recess. 

Finally, Webb failed to object to the court’s refusal to 

transcribe Orsolits’ testimony, and he makes no specific 

argument as to how this testimony would have altered the jury’s 

verdict. Given Webb’s conclusory arguments and his failure to 

preserve his claims for appeal, we find that his claims are 

without merit.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. We deny Webb’s motions to compel transcripts as 

moot and deny his motion for appointment of counsel. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED