No. 2--00--0003	

________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

________________________________________________________________

KNOLLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,	)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

	)	of Du Page County.

	Plaintiff-Appellant,	)

	)	No. 99--LM--3289

v.	)	No. 99--LM--3289

	)

ROBERT L. CZERWINSKI,	)	Honorable

	)	Richard A. Lucas,

	Defendant-Appellee.	)	Judge, Presiding.

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	JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

	Plaintiff, Knolls Condominium Association, appeals from the

trial court's sua sponte order dismissing plaintiff's complaint against defendant, Robert L. Czerwinski.  We reverse and remand.

	On October 18, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint in forcible

entry and detainer against defendant.  The complaint alleges that

plaintiff is entitled to possession of a certain condominium unit,

defendant has unlawfully withheld possession of the unit, and 

plaintiff is entitled to recover $2,573.26 for unpaid maintenance

assessments.  On November 8, 1999, plaintiff served the summons and

the complaint upon defendant.

	On November 23, 1999, the return date on the summons, 

plaintiff's counsel appeared in court, but defendant did not. 

Counsel for plaintiff tendered to the trial court the 30-day notice

plaintiff served upon defendant.  The 30-day notice bore a stamped

signature of plaintiff's attorney.  Appearing directly below the

stamped signature, the proof of service contained the handwritten signature of another person and was notarized.  The trial court

expressed concern about whether a stamped signature is authentic

and can properly be notarized.  Accordingly, the trial court

refused to accept the notice and dismissed the complaint sua sponte.

	On December 10, 1999, plaintiff moved for reconsideration of

the dismissal.  Plaintiff noted that the notary verified the

signature on the proof of service, not the signature on the 30-day

notice.  Also, plaintiff asserted that the stamped facsimile

signature was sufficient to comply with section 9--104.1 of the

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/9--104.1 (West 1998)). 

On December 21, 1999, the trial court stated that it would not

accept stamped signatures and denied the motion.  Plaintiff timely

appealed.

	Defendant has not filed an appellee's brief here.  Because the

record is short and the claimed error is such that we can easily

decide the issue without the aid of an appellee's brief, we will

address the merits of the appeal pursuant to First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).

	Although the trial court did not state the legal basis for its

dismissal, it essentially concluded that plaintiff's claim was

barred by other affirmative matter (an invalid 30-day notice) 

avoiding the legal effect of the claim.  Therefore, the order here

is akin to a dismissal pursuant to section 2--619(a)(9) of the Code

(735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 1998)).  Accordingly, we will review the trial court's ruling de novo.  Downey v. Wood Dale Park District, 286 Ill. App. 3d 194, 200 (1997).

	Section 9--102(a)(7) of the Code provides that a forcible

entry and detainer action may be maintained when the owner of a

condominium unit fails or refuses to pay when due his or her

proportionate share of the common expenses of the property.  735

ILCS 5/9--102(a)(7) (West 1998).  Section 9--104 of the Code

requires the person seeking possession of the property in question

to serve the occupant of the property with a demand for possession

and further provides that the "demand shall be signed by the person

claiming such possession, his or her agent, or attorney."  735 ILCS

5/9--104 (West 1998).

	Section 9--104.1(a) of the Code contains the 30-day notice

requirement.  It states that, "in case of condominium property, the

demand shall give *** the condominium unit owner *** at least 30

days to satisfy the terms of the demand before an action is filed.

*** The demand shall be signed by the person claiming such

possession, his or her agent, or attorney."  735 ILCS 5/9--104.1(a)

(West 1998).

	The pertinent statutory provisions require only that the

demand and notice be signed.  The basis for the trial court's

ruling is that "signed" must be construed solely as the equivalent

of "subscribed," i.e., handwritten.  There is no requirement that the signature on the 30-day notice be handwritten, however. 

Moreover:

	"[iI]n a variety of contexts, the law has consistently

interpreted 'signed' to embody not only the act of

subscribing a document, but also anything which can

reasonably be understood to symbolize or manifest the

signer's intent to adopt a writing as his or her own and

be bound by it.  This may be accomplished in a multitude

of ways, only one of which is a handwritten

subscription."  Just Pants v. Wagner, 247 Ill. App. 3d 166, 173-74 (1993).

	We have upheld the validity of a stamped signature in a

different context.  People v. Stephens, 12 Ill. App. 3d 215, 217-18 (1973) (search warrant was authentic even though it bore only

stamped signature of magistrate).  See also Alpine State Bank v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 733 F. Supp. 60, 63 (N.D. Ill. 1990),  rev'd on other grounds, 941 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1991) (use of stamp constituted signature endorsement).  As the recent enactment of the

Electronic Commerce Security Act (5 ILCS 175/1--101 et seq. (West 1998)) reveals, alternative forms of signatures are increasingly

accepted.  See 5 ILCS 175/5--120(a) (West 1998) ("w[W]here a rule of

law requires a signature, *** an electronic signature satisfies

that rule").

		In the absence of language in section 9--104.1 requiring that a signature be subscribed, there is no reason to depart from the

traditional legal definition of "signed."  Because there was no evidence to show that the signature was not the intended act of plaintiff's attorney, that the attorney

used a stamp does not affect the validity of plaintiff's 30-day notice.  See Stephens, 12 Ill. App. 3d at 218.  Therefore, the trial court should not have dismissed plaintiff's action.

	Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of

Du Page County and remand the cause for further proceedings.

	Reversed and remanded.

	GEIGER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.