I N S I D E T H I S 

I S S U E :

Disputed Land 

Borders

2

“Coercive and 

Risky” PLA air 

intercepts

3

Humanitarian 

Assistance to 

Philippines 

4

Ulchi Freedom 

Shield 2023

5

Legal Warfare 

in DOD’s 

China Report

5

INDOPACOM 

Activates 

CLAW

6

CounterLawfare at 

NWC

7

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 

Legal Vigilance Dispatch

Promoting the Rule of Law to Ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

I S S U E 5 , F A L L N O V E M B E R 2 0 2 3

S P E C I A L 

P O I N T S O F 

I N T E R E S T :

 The PRC continues its 

pattern of concerning 

behavior during air and 

sea interactions

 U.S. continues support 

to allies and partners 

through crucial 

humanitarian aid and 

military training

 INDOPACOM counterlawfare program gains 

further institutional 

momentum

Recent reporting is highlighting 

the continued scourge of illegal, 

unreported, and unregulated 

(IUU) fishing and its impact on 

sovereign rights, ocean health, 

food security, and economic 

stability in the Indo-Pacific 

region and around the world. 

An October report in the New 

Yorker tied devastating 

environmental impacts and 

large scale human suffering to 

the PRC’s enormous fishing 

fleet. The piece describes how 

massive trawlers supported by 

sustainment vessels remain at 

sea for years at a time in large 

groups with global reach, 

without regard for fisheries 

laws, coastal state sovereignty, 

ecological sustainability, labor 

laws, or fundamental human 

rights. As reported by the New 

York Times in September, IUU 

fishing occurs alongside the 

PRC’s efforts to militarize, deny 

fisheries access, and enforce self 

defined control in the exclusive 

economic zones of other nations, 

such as the Philippines. 

The threat from IUU fishing is 

acute for Pacific Island nations

and developing economies that 

depend on fisheries for food 

security and export income, but 

the dangers of IUU fishing also 

extend shoreward, as evidenced 

by additional reporting in the 

New Yorker, which linked IUU 

fishing to the PRC-led genocide 

of Uyghur Muslims and other 

ethnic and religious groups in 

Xinjiang. The report noted that 

the PRC has forcibly put to 

work millions of Uyghurs in 

many industries, including 

global seafood processing hubs 

sustained by IUU fishing.

Under international law 

reflected in the U.N. Convention 

on the Law of the Sea, every 

flag state is obliged to prevent 

IUU fishing by vessels flying its 

flag and to comply with legal 

requirements to conserve and 

manage the environment and 

living marine resources. The 

International Tribunal for the 

Law of the Sea has opined that 

the flag state bears 

responsibility to ensure 

compliance with international 

law by its vessels and must 

exercise “due diligence” in 

taking steps to meet that 

obligation. International law 

further provides coastal states 

with exclusive sovereign rights 

over the use and benefit of the 

natural resources, to include 

fisheries, in their exclusive 

economic zones, which includes 

jurisdiction over the 

preservation and enforcement of 

those rights.

To combat IUU fishing, U.S. 

law directs a whole-ofgovernment approach led by the 

National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, 

supported by 21 federal 

departments and agencies, 

including the U.S. Department 

of Defense (DOD). In the IndoPacific, U.S. efforts are focused 

on improving maritime domain 

awareness, legal frameworks, 

enforcement, and the capacity of 

allies and partners. See 

USINDOPACOM OSJA’s 

TACAID for more information 

on U.S. efforts and legal 

considerations.

The far-reaching threat from 

IUU fishing demands a broad 

network of allies, partners, and 

interagency experts to root out 

unlawful conduct, spotlight bad 

actors, and preserve the rights 

of coastal states to use and 

benefit from their natural 

resources.

To meet this challenge, 

USINDOPACOM is working 

with allies and partners and the 

U.S. interagency to protect 

sovereignty, promote adherence 

to international law, and uphold 

the rules-based international 

order.

Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated Fishing Spurns 

International Law, Threatens Security
P A G E 2

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Disputed 

Land Borders 

Remain Cause 

for Concern

In late August, the PRC’s Ministry 

of Natural Resources released its 

so-called “standard map,” which 

drew immediate condemnation 

from the international community 

for its territorial reach and “10-

dashed line” encompassing the 

South China Sea and Taiwan. 

Much has been written over the 

years about the PRC’s legally 

baseless dashed-line claim, but 

less attention is paid to contested 

territorial claims along the PRC’s 

land borders, which are also in the 

ambit of the “standard map.” Of 

particular concern are the PRC’s 

land border disputes with India 

and Bhutan, respectively. 

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) 

has been a de facto border between 

the PRC and India since their 

1962 war, but they disagree over 

its position in at least 13 locations. 

Simmering tensions at the LAC 

have occasionally flared into 

violence. In 2020, a clash between 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

forces and Indian troops near the 

LAC in Galwan Valley resulted in 

the death of over twenty soldiers. 

Subsequent confrontations along 

the LAC in Jan 21 and Dec 22 

resulted in injuries.

The PRC is also locked in a 

protracted border dispute with 

Bhutan over Doklam, which sits 

on a strategic plateau near the trijunction of Bhutan, India, and the 

PRC. In 2017, PLA forces entered 

Doklam to construct a road, which 

prompted a response from Indian 

forces supporting Bhutan. The 

ensuing stand-off lasted more than 

two months until both sides 

agreed to withdraw. Nevertheless, 

in Apr 23, reports surfaced that 

the PRC constructed villages in 

Doklam, despite a 1998 agreement

with Bhutan in which the PRC 

“recognize[d] Bhutan’s sovereignty 

and its territorial integrity and 

agree[d] that ‘no unilateral action 

will be taken to change the status 

quo on the border.”

In an apparent attempt to 

strengthen and legitimize disputed 

territorial claims depicted in the 

“standard map,” the PRC enacted 

a Land Borders Law in 2021. Like 

other PRC domestic laws, the 

Land Borders Law contains vague 

language, providing flexibility to 

enforce in a manner that could 

threaten peace and security.

For example, as both the PRC and 

India build infrastructure along 

the LAC, the Land Borders Law’s 

prohibition on border construction 

without permission from PRC 

authorities could be a flashpoint if 

interpreted to include both sides of 

the disputed border. Moreover, the 

Land Borders Law’s emphasis on 

development of border towns and 

the role of civilian groups in 

border defense raises questions 

about the PRC’s intentions to 

expand settlement in disputed 

areas. Reports of PRC construction 

in disputed areas appear to 

corroborate these concerns while 

evoking the same “salami-slicing” 

tactics used by the PRC to advance 

its disputed maritime claims.

Upholding international law is 

necessary to maintain peace and 

security around the globe, 

particularly in areas with disputed 

land borders. USINDOPACOM 

continues to closely monitor the 

security situation surrounding the 

PRC’s land border disputes with 

India and Bhutan, respectively, 

and stands ready to cooperate with 

allies and partners to deescalate 

tensions and pursue peaceful 

dispute resolution in accordance 

with international law. See 

USINDOPACOM OSJA’s TACAID

for more information on border 

disputes and the PRC’s Land 

Borders Law. 

Disputed land borders in and around Tibet. Reuters graphic

PLA Military Buildup 2017-2020. Sim 

Tack, A Military Drive Spells Out China’s 

Intent Along the Indian Border, 

Worldview Stratfor (Sept. 22, 2020, 

10:10 GMT)
P A G E 3

In October, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 

released a trove of photos and videos of recent “coercive 

and risky” behavior by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

aircraft during intercepts of U.S. military aircraft 

operating lawfully in international airspace over the South 

and East China Seas. During a press conference, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Dr. 

Ely Ratner, noted that, “since the Fall of 2021, we have 

seen more than 180 such incidents – more in the past two 

years than in the decade before that. That’s nearly 200 

cases where PLA operators have performed reckless 

maneuvers or discharged chaff, 

or shot off flares, or 

approached too rapidly or too 

close to U.S. aircraft – all as 

part of trying to interfere with 

the ability of U.S. forces to 

operate safely in places where 

we and every country in the 

world have every right to be 

under international law.” Dr. 

Ratner added, “when you take 

into account cases of coercive 

and risky PLA intercepts 

against other states, the 

number increases to nearly 

300 cases against U.S., ally 

and partner aircraft over the 

last two years.”

Not only is the PLA’s behavior 

“coercive and risky,” it also 

raises significant legal 

questions. As previously 

discussed in Legal Vigilance 

Dispatch-Issue 2, air intercepts 

are not prohibited by international law. State aircraft may 

lawfully intercept other State aircraft for purposes such as 

identification, verification, or escort, provided the intercept 

occurs professionally, safely, and with due regard for the 

freedoms afforded to all States by international law. 

International law divides airspace between territorial 

airspace (i.e. airspace over a State’s land, internal waters, 

territorial seas, and archipelagic waters), which is subject 

to the sovereignty of a State, and international airspace, 

which is seaward of the territorial sea. In international 

airspace, all States enjoy freedoms of navigation and 

overflight, and other internationally lawful uses related to 

these freedoms. This includes military operations, 

exercises, and surveillance activities. All nations are bound 

by these airspace regimes as a matter of customary 

international law reflected in the U.N. Convention on the 

Law of the Sea. The requirement to fly with due regard for 

other nations’ aircraft operating lawfully in international 

airspace is likewise binding customary international law. 

Beyond the requirement to operate with due regard, there 

is no international law regarding aerial encounters of State 

aircraft, but there are international norms and standards 

that preserve freedoms to use international airspace as 

well as ensure safety. The International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO), a specialized agency of the United 

Nations, was established in 1947 for this specific reason. 

ICAO codified principles of international air navigation 

and establishes standards and recommended practices. 

When compatible with 

mission requirements, 

military aircraft that 

encounter each other should 

operate consistent with ICAO 

standards. Among these 

standards, ICAO outlines 

expected norms of conduct 

and procedures for executing 

air intercepts. Safe intercepts 

are typically characterized by 

controlled closure rates and 

stable station-keeping. 

Professionalism involves 

proper airmanship, nonprovocative maneuvers, and 

no overtly aggressive actions, 

words, or gestures. ICAO 

recommends that states 

develop intercept methods 

according to a “standard 

method” designed to “avoid 

any hazard for the intercepted 

aircraft.” This includes “the 

need to avoid flying in such proximity to the intercepted 

aircraft that a collision hazard may be created.”

The U.S. DOD and the PRC’s Ministry of Defense have 

agreed to Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime 

Encounters (“the ROB”) in which both sides commit to 

operating consistent with ICAO standards when engaging 

in air-to-air encounters involving their State aircraft. U.S. 

forces are trained to conduct air intercepts for lawful 

purposes, and to do so safely and professionally in 

accordance with international law, norms, and standards. 

U.S. forces also strictly adhere to the ROB during 

intercepts of PLA aircraft.

Chinese fighters intercept U.S. aircraft over the East China Sea 

and the South China Sea over the last 24 months. DoD Photos 

DOD Illuminates Trend of “Coercive and Risky”

Air Intercepts by the PLA

(continued on next page)
P A G E 4

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

The Commander of 

USINDOPACOM, Admiral John C. 

Aquilino, has repeatedly called for 

the resumption of military-tomilitary dialogue with the PLA to 

promote safety and mitigate risk of 

mishap, collision, or loss of life, but 

until recently, the PRC had declined 

to resume such talks. During a 

meeting between President Biden 

and President Xi on November 15, 

the heads of state reportedly agreed 

to resume military-to-military 

dialogue. 

Meanwhile, “coercive and risky” 

behavior by PLA aircraft persists, as 

evidenced by an incident on October 

29 where two PLA J-11 fighters 

engaged in reportedly “unsafe” 

intercepts of a Canadian H-148 

Cyclone helicopter operating 

lawfully in international airspace. 

According to a statement by the 

Canadian Armed Forces, one PLA 

jet conducted a pass over the CH148 Cyclone helicopter with little 

separation, causing the helicopter to 

experience turbulence and take 

appropriate actions to remain safe. 

Later the same day, the same 

helicopter was intercepted by 

another J-11 fighter, which 

launched flares directly in front of 

the helicopter causing the pilot to 

maneuver to avoid the flares and 

reduce the risk of ingesting a flare 

into the helicopter’s rotor and 

intakes.

See USINDOPACOM OSJA’s 

TACAID for more information on 

legal considerations associated with 

air intercepts. 

As many countries across the IndoPacific confront the devastating 

effects of climate change and 

increasingly frequent extreme 

weather events, USINDOPACOM 

continues to prioritize delivery of 

rapid foreign humanitarian assistance 

(FHA) and disaster relief. When 

Typhoon Egay hit the Philippines in 

July, U.S. Marines responded within 

24 hours, working with the Philippine 

government to deliver urgent supplies 

and partnering with Philippine 

Marines to support clean-up, while 

battling monsoon-season rain.

Under U.S. law , the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) 

is the lead federal agency for FHA. On 

average, USAID’s Bureau of 

Humanitarian Assistance responds to 

75 crises in more than 70 countries 

each year, providing food, water, 

shelter, health care, and other critical 

aid to people who need it most.

U.S. policy permits USAID to request 

support from DOD, subject to a 

disaster declaration from Department 

of State and a requirement for DOD’s 

unique capabilities. DOD is also 

permitted under its own authority to 

provide immediate lifesaving 

assistance, but continued assistance 

must have Secretary of Defense or 

Deputy Secretary of Defense approval 

within 72 hours of operations. All 

FHA missions are conducted at the 

request of a host nation (HN), or with 

the HN’s concurrence. A HN can limit 

the size, duration, or scope of FHA. 

When the international 

community responds to a disaster at 

the request of a HN, the United 

States will normally be part of an 

organized, professional humanitarian 

system consisting of many countries, 

donors, and organizations. Effective 

coordination across agencies and 

governments is essential to alleviate 

suffering of affected populations.

In three days following Typhoon Egay, 

U.S. aircraft flew roughly 5000 

miles to distribute supplies. “This is 

what we do,” said LtCol David G. 

Batcheler, Commanding Officer, 

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 

163. “The opportunity to help our 

Philippine Allies in time of need, 

especially after training together 

during an exercise, is a privilege.”

A CH-53E Super Stallion with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 is 

offloaded Aug. 3 by U.S. Marines and Filipino citizens in support of emergency 

relief efforts in the wake of a typhoon. Photo by Sgt. Sean Potter, USMC

(continued from previous page)

Humanitarian Assistance to 

the Philippines
Ulchi Freedom Shield 2023 Reinforces International law

Annual combined, joint, interagency exercise Ulchi Freedom 

Shield (UFS 23) was conducted 

by Combined Forces Command, 

United Nations Command, and 

U.S. Forces Korea from 21-31 

Aug 2023. Exercises like UFS 23 

support the 1953 Armistice 

Agreement. They highlight 

longstanding friendship between 

the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 

the United States, help solidify 

the Alliance as a linchpin of regional peace and security, and 

reaffirm the ironclad commitment of the United States to the 

defense of the ROK.

ROK and U.S. forces were joined 

by forces from Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, 

Greece, Italy, New Zealand, 

Philippines, and Thailand. In 

addition, the Neutral Nations 

Superv i sory Co mm ission 

(Sweden and Switzerland) observed the exercise, fulfilling 

duties prescribed by the Armistice Agreement. 

Rigorous scenario-based training during UFS 23 was tailored to enhance Alliance response capabilities to a range 

of emergent and diverse 

threats. UFS 23 demonstrates 

U.S. resolve to work with allies and partners to ensure 

peace and prosperity throughout the region and the continuing effort to secure a free and

open Indo-Pacific.

In October, DOD released its annual report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the 

People's Republic of China.” The congressionally mandated report “serves as an authoritative assessment on military and security developments involvng the PRC.” This year’s report spotlighted the PRC’s misuse of international and domestic law under the PLA’s “three warfares” concept, 

which includes legal warfare as a component of broader political influence operations.

Among many examples of legal warfare, the report cites to the PRC’s propagation of legally baseless maritime claims, conflation of its “One China principle” with foreign “One China” policies, 

and a “double standard” in the “interpretation and enforcement of international law” in relation 

to foreign military activities in the exclusive economic zone.

Also prevalent are illustrations of civil-military fusion activities that deliberately erode international norms as a way to complicate international response options—e.g., describing commercial 

roll-on / roll-off (RORO) ships and their potential use in a Taiwan invasion, the report says that 

“by demonstrating intent to use commercial ROROs during an 

amphibious invasion, the PLA is eroding the principle of distinction under the law of armed conflict and obscuring crucial 

lines between warships and non-warships, civilians and combatants, and civilian objects and military objectives.”

USINDOPACOM’s counter-lawfare program aims to counter 

PLA legal warfare by illuminating legal threats, building legal 

consensus, and promoting adherence to international law and 

the rules-based international order. 

Left to Right – Cpl Ahn (ROKA), 1LT Kim (ROKA), Maj Brown 

(USMC), CDR Coffin (USN), LTC Moon (ROKA), LtCol Lee 

(ROKAF), 1stLt Park (ROKAF), MAJ Yoon (ROKA)

PLA ‘Legal Warfare’ in DOD’s Report

P A G E 5
On 4 Feb 2023, the U.S. conducted a successful operation to take down a PRC high-altitude balloon (HAB) 

above its territorial sea, off South Carolina. U.S. officials stated the HAB was equipped to collect signals 

intelligence (SIGINT) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and had targeted over 40 countries. The U.S. 

Congress condemned the PRC for the “brazen violation” of U.S. sovereignty and efforts to “deceive the 

international community through false claims about its intelligence collection campaigns.”

At first, the PRC implausibly characterized its HAB as a “civilian airship” used for “meteorological” 

purposes while blaming “force majeure” for “unintended entry”. Now that time has passed and the extent of 

the PRC’s HAB program is widely known, the PRC seems to have a pivoted from one-off excuses in favor of 

sowing confusion around the idea of “near space” and the false notion that international law does not limit 

State activity above altitudes at which aircraft operate. 

CNN reported that searches on CNKI, the PRC’s largest online academic database, show PRC military and 

civilian researchers have published more than 1,000 papers and reports on “near space.” Some PRCcontrolled media have even claimed that the Outer Space Treaty and its provisions on “exploration and use 

by all states” should be applied to HAB flights. 

By propagating the existence of “near space” in various publications, the PRC likely aims to foment a grey 

zone in which to execute unlawful surveillance under a veneer of legitimacy. To be clear, there is no “near 

space” in international law – only airspace and outer space. International law does not specify where airspace ends and space begins, but all proposals demarcating the airspace-outer space divide begin at 

altitudes well above where HABs operate.

Notwithstanding the PRC’s attempts to sow confusion, HABs are aircraft under international law subject to 

the rules and norms governing safety of flight and observance of national boundaries, even in uncontrolled 

airspace above altitudes at which aircraft operate. Under international law every nation has complete and 

exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. As such, all nations may take measures within 

their respective airspace to mitigate threats posed by unlawful HAB surveillance. The measures taken by 

U.S. forces to mitigate the threat posed by the PRC’s HAB were consistent with longstanding practice of 

States exercising jurisdiction in their territories and airspace in analogous circumstances. 

USINDOPACOM’s legal position regarding HABs has been consistent and transparent. As an example, nearly a year prior to the U.S. takedown of the PRC’s HAB, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and USINDOPACOM coordinated on the use of HABs for combined maritime domain awareness during Balikatan, a 

large-scale bilateral exercise. AFP and USINDOPACOM ensured their cooperative use of HABs during Balikatan conformed to international law and standards governing navigational freedoms and safety of flight. 

Setting the Record Straight on Balloon Law

P A G E 6

USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

P A G E 6

The USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) partnered with U.S. Air Force 

judge advocates and paralegals from Andersen Air Force Base to field-test a Joint CounterLawfare Cell (CLAW) from 26 Oct to 1 Nov 2023. The CLAW exercised legal vigilance through 

identification and analysis of malign activities that challenge the rules-based international 

order, published products (e.g. TACAIDs) that illuminated developing legal issues across the 

theater, and established a contingency response center to provide legal analysis and guidance on 

emergent legal questions in real time.

Although still a nascent concept, the CLAW is envisioned as a standing legal response force 

available to augment USINDOPACOM in competition, crisis, and conflict with a range of legal 

capabilities, from research and writing to capacity building support to allies and partners. 

During the field test, CLAW legal advisors addressed dozens of complex topics and produced 

several products for distribution to partners, allies, embassies, academics, command teams, and 

legal practitioners. By focusing its legal efforts on countering unlawful activities and upholding 

the rules-based international order, the CLAW proved to be a pivotal force-multiplier in support 

of integrated deterrence. USINDOPACOM OSJA intends to incorporate legal advisors from 

allied and partnered forces into future CLAW activation cycles. 

Members of the CLAW conduct training on 

the law of armed conflict with French 

LEGAD Partners . Photo courtesy of Joint 

Counter-Lawfare Cell

USINDOPACOM Activates

Joint Counter-Lawfare Cell 
USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

What is Legal Vigilance?

Legal vigilance refers to the monitoring and assessment of the 

legal environment. Maintaining legal vigilance ensures the United 

States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) and its allies 

and partners are able to identify threats (including “legal warfare” 

by the People’s Republic of China), integrate across the combined 

joint force, and implement action to uphold the rule of law. 

The Legal Vigilance Dispatch is an informal, non-comprehensive 

survey of open-source information on the legal environment.

Unless otherwise noted, content is produced by the USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) and does not 

necessarily reflect official positions of the U.S. government.

In addition to identifying threats in the legal environment, the 

Legal Vigilance Dispatch highlights cooperative efforts by the 

United States and its allies and partners to uphold the rule of law. 

USINDOPACOM OSJA is committed to building legal partnerships and working with allies and partners to preserve peace and 

stability in the Indo-Pacific. If you have comments, feedback, or 

vignettes to share, please contact us.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 

Phone: (808) 477-6378

Email: indopacom.j06.oplaw@pacom.mil

Web: www.pacom.mil

Promoting the Rule of Law to Ensure a 

Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Counter-Lawfare in the U.S. Naval 

War College Curriculum

In October, students at the U.S. Naval War College 

(NWC) received operational law instruction as part of 

their Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course. It

included readings and presentations by a panel of 

experts on a range of legal topics, including international law, law of the sea, cyber law, and LOAC.

This year also included legal warfare and counterlawfare as a topic and featured a former member of 

the USINDOPACOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate as a panelist. NWC students gained greater understanding of malign uses of legal warfare by the 

PRC, Russia, and others. NWC students were also 

introduced to ongoing counter-lawfare efforts including USINDOPACOM’s counter-lawfare initiative to 

expose and oppose such malign activities, build legal 

consensus, illuminate lawful activities by the United 

States and its allies and partners, and uphold the 

rule-of-law. 

“Including lawfare and counter-lawfare in the JMO 

curriculum helps equip our students to exercise legal 

vigilance to identify lawfare threats, and to incorporate counter-lawfare activities into planning and operations in their future assignments,” said CAPT 

Danielle Higson, Associate Professor and JMO instructor at the NWC. Of note, the JMO course includes students from all the military services, other 

U.S. departments agencies, as well foreign officers 

including from a range of ally and partner militaries 

in the Indo-Pacific. 

U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 

DVIDS Photo by James Foehl

P A G E 7

Joint Operational Law Team

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Camp H.M. Smith

Hawaii, United States