28: 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 

Bonorable Cerl C. l?ardfn( Jr., Seoretsrp 

Texas State Board of Dental Examiners 

311 Nomood Ruilding 

Austin, Texas 

Dear Sir: 

in 00Oaitions is 

Board. of Dental Examiners shall 

hereby authorized to refuse to 

to praotlce dentistry to any per- . 

who have been guilty, in the opinard, of violating any of the provisions of the Statutes of The State of Texas relating 

to the practioe of dentistry, or any provis,ions of 

Chapter 7 of Title 12 of the Fenal Code of the 

State of Texas, within twelve (12) ;rionths prior to 

the filing of an applioaticq for such license.' 

"Concerning this provision, Is the suthority 

therein granted to the Board discretionary or 
Donorable Oar1 C.,Hardin, Jr., Page 2 . 

mandatory3 Does the Boar&have the authority.to 

wsvle such violations and examine the applicant 

In spite of it? 

@%uust the violation have occurred within 

twelve (12) months of the filing of the application? Does this ,mean that after the expiration 

of that time, the Board must examine an applicant 

who, for fnsta,uca, practiced illegslly~in Texas 

fourteen (14) months before filing his application 

for examination? 

*Or aoes this provision mean that the Board 

must do its refusing within twelve (12) months of 

the violation? 

"Artiole 4549 of the Civil Statutes, Chepter 

9, Title 71, also covers this refusal of the Doard 

to examine an applicant. This article does not 

mention any time. limitation upon the Board's authority. Can the Doard, then, refuse to examine 

an applicant under Artlole 4549 even if the tvielve 

months have expired and bar suoh refusal under 

Article 752~ quoted above? 

ì.í l . . î 

The statutes pertinent to your inquiry are; 

Article 4549, as amended, reads iu part as follows: 

"The State Board of Dental Examiners shall 

have authority to refuse to examine any person or 

refuses to issue a lioense to any person for any 

one or more of the Solloaing causes: 

"(a) Proof of presentation to the Eoard of 

any dishonest or fake evidence of qualification 

or being guilty of any, illegality, fraud or deception in the proooss of examination, or for the 

purpose of securing, alloense. 

*(b) Proof of ahronic or habitual intosioatlon or eddiotion to drugs on the pert of the applioant. 
hcnorable Carl 0. ~Kilrdin, Jr?, Page 3 

"(0) Proof that the applioant has been guilty 

of dishonest or illegal praotioos in or connected 

with the practice of dentistry. 

Article 7520, Seotion 3, is quoted in your letter 

and was added by the,kots of 1937, 45th Legislature, p. 1346, 

chapter 501. 

Chapter 7, Title 12 of Penal Code, State of Texas, 

deals with the subject of Ventistryv, such as requiring, a 

person to obtain a license to practice dentistry (P. C., Art. 

747); to comply with .the law (P. C., Art. 74S); the reoordatlon of the license (P. C., hrt. 749); prohibiting practicing 

when license is revoked (P. C., Art, 750); license to be exhibited in the dentist office; enjoining dentists to practice 

undar ow proper name instead of a oorporate or trade name 

(2. C., Art. 752); etc. 

You desire to know whether the suthority granted 

'to the Board is discretionary ormandator~y. .It is our opinion thst these provisions (P. C., Art. 75EO and R. 3. 1925, 

Art. 4549, as amended) are discretionary and the Board can, 

in the exercise of its judgment,examine the applicant. It 

'. 

la also our opinion that the twelve months period mentioned 

In P. c.. ,Urt. 7520, maans twelve months previous to and imaedlately preoeding the date of the filing of the application. 

If the applicant had not practiced illegally in Texas for 

fourteen months precedina his application end presuming he 

POESeSS6d ell qualificstions, 

teke the examinetion. 

the Board &ould permit him to 

However, if the applicant' engaged in 

any illegal practice during .the twelve months immediately 

FreOedlng the date of his filing then it is discretionary 

81th the Board whether or not the epplicent be permitted to 

take the examination. VB ara further of the opinion that 

the time limitation mentioned In the P. C., Art. 7520, is 

ePPlicable to the quoted provisions of Art. 4549, as amended. 

The fundamental rule in the oonstruction of a statute is to give cffcot to tha intention of the Legislature 

*nd all statutes relating: to the same gorsral subjkot should 

be construed toRethor. 

)%9). 

Gram v. ~Colficld (C. A. 116 S. :'r. 2d. 

In :!c>rldo v. Clz>@z, 1~10 Tax. 71, 166 S. X. 28 125, 

it was held-at all statutes "are presumed to be enacted 

<lth full kno%:lledge of exist&e, condition of law and with 
.Honorable Carl 0. Herdin, Jr., Page 4 

reference t0 it, end are to be construed in connection with 

and in harmony with existinzT law, and their meaning is to bc 

determined in connection not onlv y:ith conm~on law and Conatitution but also with referenca t'b other statutes and court 

dooisions.N And in StanPord v. Butler (Sup. 1944), 181 S. :?. 

21 269. 153 A. L. R. 1054. the court held that uAll statutes 

b pari m?~teria are to be-construed to;let;nr as if they were 

cne law, and if it cm be catherod from a subsequent ststute 

in par1 materia, whet~meaning Legislature attaches to words 

of a former statute, this willamount to a lo~islative declaration of its meaning and will govern construction of first 

statute." 

Our Supreme Court in Natl. Surety Corp. v. Ledd 

(1938), 115 S. V. 2d 600,, 602, has said: 

"In the construction of laws, courts will 

not hesitate to con&true !?ords in ~ord6r to carry 

out the expressed. intention of'the Legisleture. 

In many cases~ the tord *may* has been construed 

. to mean 'shall', on& vice versa. The rule is 

governed by the intention expressed in the statute, 

* . ,. 

" 

The time limitation (peri,cd of forgiveness) preaorlbed in F. C., Art. 752c, is not an innovation in our jurisprudence. It has'existed from time imemorial and had its 

beginning in OUT moral teachings of forgiving our neighbor ' 

"the hurt that he hath done unto thee" (Ecclesiastes 28:2)* 

Our Penal Code, Article 2, specifically provides that "the 

objeot of punishment, is to suppress crime and reform,the offender". And in this connection, our courts have held that 

remoteness of conviction for crime protects a witnessagainst 

impeachment and "that the period of time in whioh reformation 

of the witness should be to have taken~place aeted 

Bith the beginning of his 

presumed 

P 

enal servitude". Bernard's v. 

Austin, (Dallas C. A. 1927 300 S, %, 256, 259 1.0. 

Yours very truly