NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

In re the Matter of:

DEBORAH D. CAMPBELL BUDZISZEWSKI, Petitioner /Appellant
,

v.

MITCHELL CLEMENT BUDZISZEWSKI, Respondent /Appellee

.

__________________________________ KIRK JAMES CAMPBELL, et al.
, Joined Parties /Appell ants

.
No. 1 CA

- CV 21

- 0 5 40 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2019

- 013200 FN2018

- 070108 The Honorable Lisa Ann VandenBerg
, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Law Office of Katherine Kraus PLLC, Peoria By Katherine Kraus Counsel for Petitioner

/Appellant

Sundberg & Mousel
, Phoenix By Gary Sundberg Counsel for Respondent/Appellee FILED 8-25-20222

Michael J. Shew LTD

. , Phoenix By Michael J. Shew Counsel for Joined Parties /Appellant s

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

F U R U Y A , Judge:

¶1 Deb orah D. Campbell Budziszewski (“Wife”) challenge s the amended decree dissolving her marriage to Mitchell Clement Budziszewski (“Husband”). Joined t hird parties, Kirk James Campbell, Clint James Campbell, and Kelynn Campbell (“Joined Parties”), challenge th e amended decree and the order declining to set aside the order join ing them as parties to the dissolution action

. For the reasons stated below, t he property allocation in the amended decree is affirmed in part and vacate d in part

. We reverse t he $50,000 j udgment an d remand for reconsideration

. We affirm the order joining the third parties but vacate the portion of the amended decree affecting the Joined Parties’ property rights and remand for further proceedings as to the Joined Parties.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Preliminarily, we note that m any of Wife’s factual assertions are not properly supported by the record. For example, her explanation for failing to appear at the hearing is supported only by an unverified fil ing. On appeal, we consider only those facts properly supported by the record on appeal. See ARCAP 11(a)

. ¶3 Husband and Wife married in 1986 and both had children from previous relationships. In August 2018, Husband began living in a care home as a result of his memory problem s and need for daily assistance. The next month , Wife p etition ed for dissolution and submit ted a consent decree and accompanying M arital S ettlement A greement ( “ the Agreement ” ) , signed by Husband and Wife

. She asserted that both parties lived at the marital hom e on Flower Street ( “ the Flower P roperty ” )

. The Agreement stated that Wife owned the Flower Property and Husband would sign a quit claim deed transferring ownership to Wife. TheBUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

3 Agreement award ed the Flower P roperty to Wife and other property in Navajo County to Husband

. Under t he Agreement, e ach party received their personal property as “ mutually agreed
, ” and Wife was awarded three Bank of America (“BOA”) accounts and the only vehicle
, a 2015 Nissan. Husband received one B O A account . The parties waived any interest in each other’s retirement accounts and agreed Husba nd would pay Wife $1,000 a month to “ equitably equalize” the community assets

. Per t he Agreement , Wife was assigned the debt from three cr edit cards (Citi #2339, BOA Visa #7551, Sears #4281 ) , and the parties were both res ponsible for debt from a fourth credit card ( Cit i Visa debt ( # 9727) )

. Wife was responsible for the 2018 tax preparation costs , but she would receive 100% of any refund or pay 100% of any tax liability

. On February 12, 2019, t he superior court signed the consent decree
, which incorporated the Agreement.

¶4 Shortly thereafter , Wife called one of Husband’s adult daughter s and said the daughter needed to take over his care. Wife did not mention the divorce or that Husband had been living in a care home. Once Husband’s family took over his care, they learned of the divorce and the terms of the Agreement. H usband’s daughter, Michelle Eh r ler, acting as hi s guardian and conservator ( “ the Conservator ” ), moved to set aside the Agreement. The Conservator alleged that the Agreement was unfair, procured by fraud and misrepresentation, and void because Husband was incompetent when he signed it

. Wife denied the allegations

. A t oral argument , Wife and the Conservator appeared with counsel , and W ife did not object when the Conservator waived Husband’s presence. The superior court set aside the Agreement , finding that Wife failed to show how the unequal p roperty allocation was fair and equitable

. ¶5 In the meantime, the Conservator filed a civil complaint against Wife
, alleging she violated the Adult Protecti ve Services Act ( “ APSA”) , by exploiting Husband, who was a vulnerable adult. See Ariz

. Rev

. Stat

. (“ A.R.S. ”) §§ 46

- 455 and

- 456

. Specifically, the Conservator alleged that Wife caused Husband to disclaim his interest in t he Flower P roperty and sign the Agreement
, which deprived him of his property rights . She also alleged that Wife isolated Husband fr om family members and spent community funds on herself and her own family and not for the benefit of the community. The Co nservator moved for partial summary judgment arguing Wife exploited Husband while he was a vulnerable adult in violation of A.R.S. § 4 6

- 456. The court denied the summary judgment motion , finding a number of factual disputes, including whether Husband had diminished capacity when he signed the Agreement.BUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

4 ¶6 Over Wife’s objection, t he court granted the Conservator’s motion to consolidate the APSA action with the family court proceedings

. After the court set a trial date , it cautioned the parties that failure to appear at the trial or submit a joint pretrial statement may result in sanctions under Arizona Rules of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 76.2 , which “ may include the C ourt proceeding by default based on the evidence presented by the appearing party.” Wife’s counsel withdrew a few months later.

¶7 Shortly after Wife’s counsel withdrew, the Conservator moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment motion. The Conservator argued she did not have to show that Husband lacked capacity , as long as he was a vulnerable adult and there was no factual dispute as to that issue

. Wife did not respond
, and t he court granted the motion

. The court found that m edical records from A ugust 2017 show ed that Wife and a doctor suspected Husband ha d dementia and Alzheimer’s

. Therefore, it concluded that t here was no dispute Husband was a vulnerable adult and Wife “occupied a fiduciary position” to Husband when he signed the quit claim deed to the Flower P roperty

. Th e court set aside the quit claim deed and f ound Wife violated her fiduciary duty to Husband

. The issue of APSA damages was added to the upcoming evidentiary hearing in the dissolution

. ¶8 The court held another status conference before the hearing
, where it repeated the consequences for failing to appear or submit a pretrial
statement . It stated that all exhibits submitted before trial w ould be summarily admitted if there was no specific objection st ated in the pretrial
statement

. Wife did not object when the court granted the Conservator’s request to waive Husband’s appearance at the upcoming hearing

. ¶9 Wife did not appear at the evidentiary hearing on March 16, 2021. The court found no good cause for Wife’s failure to appear and proceeded by “default.” The court reviewed Husband ’s amended pretrial statement and trial memorandum and admitted all 54 exhibits offered on Husband’s behalf and ordered the Conservator to prepare a form of order.

¶10 About two weeks after the hearing, Husband moved to join Wife’s adult sons and her granddaughter , alleging that Wife “fraudulently transferred community funds” to them in violation of a preliminary injunction. Although Hu sband served t he Joined Parties , t he court g ranted the motion before they responded
, citing only Wife’s failure to respon d

. T he Joined Parties subsequently objected

.BUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

5 ¶11 Over objections from Wife and the Joined P arties , the court entered the amended decree lodged by Husband

. The a mended d ecree awarded each party their separate property
, and Wife was ordered to
return a glider swing to Husband as his separate property by September 15, 2021 or pay $5,000. Wife was assigned the debt owed on three credit cards

as of October 9, 2018

— the community ter mination date. The court found Wife was responsible for any charges on the Citi card (#3632) she opened after October 9, 2018. Husband was assigned any tax liability for having a C iti Visa (#9727) balance written off.

¶12 For his interest in the community, the court awarded Husband a judgment of $112,789.91 and awarded seven specific items of community property to Wife. In addition to th e judgment representing the property allocation, the court further entered a $50,000 judgment against Wife “for concealment of community property, for violation of the preliminary injunction[,] and for excessive and abnormal expenditures[.]” The court also ordered that Wife’s interest in the present value of Husband’s Tenneco pension ($13,559.14) and her survivor annuity ($18,650.60) would offset these judgments. The amended decree awarded Husband $21,688.78 in attorneys’ fees and costs in addition to $1,350 in
cost s for calculating the present value of the Tenneco pen sion and annuity

. ¶13 On the APSA claim
, the court awarded Husband $134,000 in damages, but because a portion of these damages duplicated the property allocation, Wife was credited an amount equal to the community property judgment ($112,789

. 91). Wife was addi tionally assessed $20,000 in statutory double damages and $40,000 in punitive damages under A.R.S. §§ 46

- 456(B), (F) , and

- 455(H)(4).

¶14 As to the Joined Parties, the court “declared” that any community funds transferred to them were “fraudulent conveyances[, ]” and that Husband could pursue collection from the Joined Parties. But the court found the amended decree was only binding on Husband and Wife

. In a separate order, the court concluded that joinder was proper but agreed that the Joined Parties had not been given sufficient notice or opportunity to participate in the proceedings until after the hearing. Nonetheless, the court found this did not warrant relief because the Joined Parties would have an opportunity to be heard before the court entered orders directly affecting them or their property. The court concluded that the amended decree involved only Wife and Husband’s marital property, not the Joined Parties’ separate property.BUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

6 ¶15 Wife and the Joined Parties timely appealed , and w e have jurisdiction purs uant to A.R.S. § § 12

- 120.21 ( A)(1) and

- 2101(A) (1)
, (2)

.
DISCUSSION

I. The Superior Court Did Not Err b y Holding the Evidentiary Hearing in Wife’s Absence Under t he Circumstances Here

.

A. The Rules Governing Default Proceedings Do Not Apply

. ¶16 Wife argue s the supe rior court erred by holding the evidentiary hearing in her absence because it did not follow the proper procedure for default proceedings under Rules 44 and 44. 2

. However, the court entered the a mended d ecree under Rule 76.2 as a sanction for Wife ’s failure to appear without good cause

. Imposition of this sanction was preceded by m ultiple pre

- hearing orders caution ing that failure to appear or file pretrial statements could result in the court proceeding by “default.”

¶17 Properly characterized
, the procedure employed by the court
was not a “default” within the meaning of Rules 44 and 44.2. See Gillette v. Lanier, 2 Ariz. App. 66, 68

– 69 (1965) (citing Coulas v. Smith, 96 Ariz. 325, 328 (1964) )

. Rule s 44 and 44.2 apply when a party does not respond

. B y contrast, Wife responded and had previously participated in the proceedings
, but failed to appear at the evidentiary hearing or submit a pretrial statement. Whe n a party has responded in the proceedings, the court c an not enter a judgment on default. I d. at 6 9 ( citing Coulas, 96 Ariz. at 328 ) . Instead, the court may proceed to hear evidence from the party who is present and render the appropriate judgment if that party has established its right to the judgment. Id

. ¶18 Here, after repeatedly warning Wife of the consequences of failing to appear a nd comply with disclosure orders, the court did not err when it proceeded in Wife’s absence
, admitted Husband’s exhibits
, and
enter ed a judgment on the merits

. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law. P. 76.2(b)(6).

¶19 Using parallel reason ing , we further reject Wife’s argument that the amen d ed decree violated Rule 44.1(a)(1) because it awarded Husband relief that differed from her petition. Rule 44.1 does not apply here. Thus, that Rule cannot justify a finding of error as argued.

¶20 Nonetheless, evidence in the record must support the

a mended d ecree. See Charles I. Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp. , 213 Ariz. 344, 350, ¶ 17 (App. 2006) (noting that when no evidence in the record support s the superior court’s conclusion, such deficiency constitutes abuseBUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

7 of d iscretion ). Wife contends the court could not enter a decree without taking testimony

. Although no party testified, t he court still received over 50 exhi bits with no objection. By failing to appear at the hearing or object to the pretrial statement, Wife w aived any objections to the exhibits offered at the hearing

. See State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 382 (1975) (“A failure to object to incompetent or inadmissible evidence constitutes a waiver to question the same matter on appeal.”); Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 103, ¶ 24 (App. 2007) (holding failure to object to exhibits at trial waives issue on appeal). A ccordingly, we review the record to determine if it supports the a mended d ecree.

II. The Record S upport s the Community Property Allocation , But Not the $50,000 Judgment or the $5,000 Judgment for Husband’s Separate Property

. ¶21 Wife argues the court did not equitably divide the community property and debts and failed t o assign each spouse their separate property. D issolution proceeding s are governed by statute. In re Marriage of Waldren, 217 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 8 (2007)

. The court is required by A.R.S. § 25

- 318(A) to divide community property equitably and assign each party his or her separate property. Wife’s failure to appear and contest the evidence presented did not relieve the court of this duty. Accordingly, we revie w the amended decree to determine if it is fair and equitable as required by § 25

- 318(A)

. ¶22 Wife generally argue s the property allocation was not fair and equitable

. She specifically challenge s the $5,000 judgment for Husband’s swing and the $50,000 punitive jud gement. However, a ssuming Wife’s mention of “duplicative awards [
, ] and damages and amounts which were not well

- pled” refers to the APSA damages, her assertion lacks any
sup porting argument or citation of authority . A ccordingly
, we do not consid er it. Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85, 93, ¶ 50 (App. 1998) (citing A RCAP former 13(a)(6) , now 13(a)(7) ).

¶23 Tur n ing to the property allocation
, w e review the court ’ s ruling for an abuse of discretion. Bell

- Kilbourn v. Bell

- Kilbourn, 216 Ariz. 521, 523, ¶ 4 (App. 2007)

. We will affirm the court’s ruling if it is supported by reasonable evidence and view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding that ruling. See Vincent v. Nelson, 238 Ariz. 150, 155, ¶ 17 (App

. 2015)

. An abuse of discretion occurs when the record is “ ‘ devoid of competent evidence to support the decision [,]’ ” or when the court commits an error of law in the process of reaching a discretionary conclusion. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 19 (App. 2009) ( quotation omitted)

.BUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

8 ¶24 Contrary to Wife’s contention, the court did not rel y solely on Husband’s pretrial stat ement and trial memorandum. The court was aware of its duty to make an independent determination and findings. A nd

a ccording to the court, it did not view the avowals made by the Conservator’s attorney as evidence ; rather
, it considered the exhibits
, plead ing s (which included Wife’s deposition testimony)
, an d Husband’s pretrial statement and trial m emorandum. Under Rule 76.2( b)(1), (2), and (6) , the court had the discretion to consider the facts as stated in Husband’s pleadings and enter a ruling on the meri ts in Wife’s absence.

¶25 The original Agreement and Husband’s pretrial statement identified several community assets and debts. T he a mended d ecree equally divided those assets by awarding Wife the community assets in her possession and ordering her to pay Husband for his share of those assets. Specifically, the court determined that Wife owed Husband $112,789.91 for his share of (1) the Flower P roperty ; (2) the Niss an ; (3) the 2018 tax refunds ; (4) $3,000 representing three payments made to Wife under the Agreement ; (5) the BOA checking account # 5570 ; ( 6 ) the BOA money market account # 0057 ; and ( 7 ) Wife’s BOA retirement account s

. ¶26 The admitted exhibits show (1) the proceeds from the Flower P roperty totaled $ 172,865.10 ; (2) the parties received about $4,300 in tax refunds for 2018 ; and (3) the combined balances of all three BOA accounts (including Wife’s IRA) was about $36,144 on October 9, 2018. The Nissan

was owned outright
, and the record shows it s value ranged from $7,450 to $ 15,025. Wife admitted at her deposition that she paid herself $2 ,000 in March and April 2019 from Husband’s s ocial security and s eparate property retirement benefits. Thus, the recor d supports the finding that Husband’s share of the community assets is at least $112,789.10. The court also equally divided the community ’s interest in Husband ’s Tenneco pension and survivor annuity

. It was within the court’s discretion to offset Wife ’s in terest in this asset to satisfy the property allocation judgment.

¶27 The court ordered Wife to pay the debt owed on three credit cards as of October 9, 2018. The balance owed on two of the cards was approximately $4,324. A lthough the Sears card had a balance of nearly $200 in February 2019, the record does not show what the balance was on the date the community terminated. The court also found Wife responsible for any charges on the Visa credit card she opened after October 9, 2018. Husband was assigned any tax liability for having a Citi Visa credit card balance written off. However, there was no evidence showing how much the tax liability might be, so this is purely speculative. The court did notBUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

9 explain why it was fair and equitabl e to order Wife to pay an additional $4,500 in community debt more than Husband

. ¶28 Husband suggests the overall allocation was fair and equitable because of Wife’s excessive and abnormal expenditures and her violation of the preliminary injunction. Indeed, A .R.S. § 25

- 318(C) allows the court to consider a spouse’s excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment
, or the fraudulent disposition of community property. See also Martin v. Martin , 156 Ariz. 452 , 455

– 56 (1988)

. W ife’s use of community credit cards solely for her benefit post

- petition is a valid reason to allocate the additional debt to Wife
, and given the court’s findings and the evidence in this record regarding Wife’s conduct as outlined above, we affirm the pro perty allocation for this reason

. See Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486, 489, ¶ 11 (App. 1998) ( explaining an appellate court may infer additional findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to uphold the decree if they are reasonably supported by the evidence and do not conflict with express findings).

¶29 However, beyond allocati ng more community debt to Wife, the court also imposed a $50,000 judgment for Wife’s “concealment of community property, for violation of the preliminary injunction and for excessive and abnormal expenditures.” T h e court imposed this sanction, in part, because Wife gave her adult sons $160,000 from the Flower P roperty sale s proceeds and kept the 2018 tax refunds and a portion of Husband’s social security and other benefits. B ut t he court already o rder ed Wife to pay Husband for his share of the se assets as part o f the $112,789.10 judgment

. See Martin, 156 Ariz. at 456

. The court cannot i mpose a penalty or sanction in the form of a separate judgment beyond the property allocation because “[p]roperty may not be distributed in order to reward one party or punish the other.” Hatch v. Hatch, 113 Ariz. 130, 133 (1976)

. ¶30 Nor does t he fact that Wife breached her fiduciary duty to Husband , without more, support th e $50,000 judgme nt. The court considered this particular conduct in relation to the A PSA claim and damages award, which Wife has not appealed. But t he court may not consider marital misconduct except for the reasons stated in A.R.S. § 25

- 318(C)

. I d.

¶31 The court granted Hus band the $50,000 judgment because Wife allow ed her adult son to live rent

- free in the Flower P roperty for three months. T here is no evidence in this record , however, of the Flower Property’s fair rental value that support ed a $50,000 judgment for waste of a community asset.BUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

10 ¶32 The court further found Wife violated the preliminary injunction by spending $9,58 4.59 for her granddaughter’s college tuition between August 2018 and February 2019 and by keeping the 2018 tax refunds and a portion of Husband’s social security and retirement benefits

. T he court has inherent authority and discretion to sanction a party for violating a preliminary injunction. See A.R.S. § 25

- 315(A)(5) ; Green v. Lisa Frank, Inc., 221 A riz. 138, 149

– 50, ¶ 29 (App. 2009)

. But the sanction is disproportionate to the violation because Wife must pay Husband his share of the same tax refunds and social security benefits in the property allocat ion

. And to the extent the $50,000 judgment is intended as a sanction for violation of the preliminary injunction beyond the relief granted elsewhere in the court’s decree

— and notwithstanding the great degree of discretion afforded the court in imposing that penalty

— the basis for imposition of such a substantial penalty warrant s much clearer findings and explanation than what was stated. Thus, w e conclude t he court’s
pro ffered rationale for the $50,000 judgment is inadequate to support that sanction and otherwise incon sistent with the statutes governing dissolution proceedings and unsupported by evidence

. See Hatch, 113 Ariz. at 133

. Accordingly, w e vacate the $50,000 judgment ordered in the amended decree at ¶ L and remand for reconsideration consistent with this decision

. ¶33 Wife also challenges t he order that she ret urn Husband’s gl i der swing by a certain date or pay him $5,000. The only evidence relating
to this item is a photograph of a swing at a residence. At her deposition, Wife testified that the swing was Husband’s separate property, but she claimed Husband g ave it away because it was beyond repair. There was no evidence of the swing’s value. In addition
, the court had “no jurisdiction to grant a money judgment against one spouse for damage to th e separate property of the other spouse in a dissolution proceeding.” Weaver v. Weaver
, 131 Ariz. 586, 587 (1982)

. Therefore, w e vacate the order that Wife pay Husband $5,000 if she fails to return Husband’s swing.

III. The Joined Parties A re Aggrieved But Cannot Raise Arguments on Behalf of Wife

. ¶34 The Conservator argues that the Joined Parties are not aggrieved by the amended decree
, and therefore lack standing to appeal the amended decree

. The Conservator moved to dismiss the Joined Parties’

a ppeal on the grounds that they were not aggrieved. Another panel of this court denied that motion, concluding that the Joined Parties were aggrieved by both the amended decree and the separate order ruling on their objection. Thus, we do not revisit that i ssue here

.BUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

11 ¶35 Al though the Joined Parties are aggrieved, they do not have standing to raise issues Wife did not raise herself

. In re Estate of Friedman, 217 Ariz. 548, 552, ¶ 11 (App. 2008) (citing Goglia v. Bodnar, 156 Ariz. 12, 18 (App. 1987) ). Thus, we do not consider the Joined Parties’ arguments that
t he court erred by (1) setting aside the Agreement ; (2) granting the motion to reconsider summary judgment ; (3) failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing ; (4) failing to continue the hearing ; and (5) ch aracterizing the Flower P roperty as comm unity property

. Like Wife, the Joined Parties argue the evidence does not support the amended decree

. We have already addressed t hat argument , and the Joined Parties cannot make additional arguments that Wife did not raise

. Id.

IV. The Joined Parties Were Denied Due Process

. ¶36 The Joined Parties argue they were denied due process b ecause the court g ran ted Husband’s motion to join them before they had an opportunity to r espond and because they had no opportunity to participate in the evidentiary hearing

. We agree.

¶37 Due process issues are legal issues and review ed de novo

. Mack v. Cruikshank , 196 Ariz. 541, 544, ¶ 6 (App. 1999)

. Due process requires the court “afford the parties ‘an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Volk v. Brame , 235 Ariz. 462, 468, ¶ 20 (App. 2014) ( quotation omitted).

¶38 The court found the Joined Parties were not provided notice or an opportunity to participate in the evidentiary hearing . The court

a cknowledged that the Joined Parties should be given an opportunity to be heard before it enters an order directly affecting them or their property. But
t he court found no due p rocess violation because the amended decree, specifically ¶ U, was only binding on Husband and Wife.

¶39 T he court may join parties as necessary for it to exercise its authority. A.R.S. § 25

- 314(D). If a party in a dissolution proceeding transfers property to a third party, Rule 37(c) authorizes the c ourt to join the
trans feree . And Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Civil Rule”) 20(a)(2) permits joinder of a p arty if any right to relief is asserted against them with respect to , or arising out of
, the same transaction and there are common questions of fact or law. See Rule 33(c) (joinder motions in family court are considered under the C ivil R ules). Thus, the court’s joinder was not error.
¶40 Although the court proper l y joined the J oined P arties based on Husband’s allegations that Wife transferred community funds to them, the joinder must still be consistent with due process. T he issue here is theBUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

12 timing of the motion and whether it deprive d the Joined Parties of due
process because they were denied an opportunity to appear at the hearing

. Husband did not move for joinder until after the hearing , but he knew in March 2020

— one year before the hearing

— that Wife transferred funds to the Joined Parties. “Elementary principles of d ue process require that before any person may have a valid judgment entered against him, that person must have reasonable notice and an opportunity to appear and defend .” Garn v. Garn, 155 Ariz. 156, 159 (App. 1987). Having been added after the hearing, th e Joined Parties were not afforded reasonable notice or opportunity to appear and defend.

¶41 Husband co ntends the Joined Parties were not prejudiced because the decree is not binding on the m and does no t impact their rights until the court enters an order aff ecting them or their property. We disagree. T he amended decree authoriz es Husband to pursue collection from the Joined Parties

. Nothing in the amended decree prevents Husband from immediately attempting to collect from the Joined Parties

. It is, therefore, a specific order directly affecting the Joined Parties ’ property rights

. ¶42 Separately, a lthough we presume it was not the court’s intent to allow such expansive application, t he broad language in ¶ U of the amended decree is further problematic because it appears to authorize Husband to collect community funds transferred to the Joined P arties at any time during marriage. The amended decree declares that transfers of community property by Wife “before and after February 13, 2019” are fraudulent conveyances. As written, th is language allow s Husband to impermissibly collect any community funds that Wife ever gave the Joined Parties. And because Husband did not assert a claim under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, see A.R.S . §§ 44

- 1001 to

– 1010, we must further presume the finding that Wife made fraudulent conveyances was instead related to the waste claim under A.R.S. § 25

- 318(C)

. Having failed to plead a statutory fraudulent transfer claim, Husband cannot assert that claim against the Joined Parties in this proceeding.

¶43 Joinder may have been appropriate, but the amended decree did more than simply allow joinder. It authorized collection proceedings for an amount that may exceed the disputed community funds. Because the hear ing resulted in a decree that affect s the Joined Parties’ property rights, due process required that they have an opportunity to appear before entry of th e amended decree

. See Heinig v. Hudman
, 177 Ariz. 66, 70 (App. 1993) (holding wife’s due process rights were violated when judgment against husband was converted to judgment against both husband and wife following proceeding at which wife was not a party). Although the JoinedBUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

13 Parties objected before the court entered the am ended decree, they were deprived of any opportunity to participate in the hearing where evidence was presented to support the amended decree , or to contest which community property given to them by Wife was fraudulently transferred

. This does not satisfy d ue process. Accordingly, we vacate ¶ U in the

amen d ed decree and remand to allow the Joined Parties to appear before entry of a judgment that affects their property rights. However, t his remand is not an opportunity for the Joined Parties to raise any defenses or issues that Wife failed to assert in the prior litigation

.

V. The Parties Agree the Correct Interest Rate I s 4.2 5 %.

¶44 The parties agree on appeal that the amended decree should be corrected to reflect a 4.25% inte rest rate

. See A.R.S. § 44

- 1201(B) (providing that interest on judgment shall be lesser of ten percent or one percent plus the prime rate 1 ).

ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL

¶45 Wife requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal under A.R.S. § § 25

- 324 and 12

- 341

. H usband requests costs on appeal from Wife under § 12

- 341

. After considering the financial resources of the parties and the reasonableness of their positions on appeal, i n the exercise of our discretion, we order Husband and Wife to pay their own attorneys’ fees. However, Wife is entitled to her costs on appeal under § 12

- 342(A).

¶46 The Joined Parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs under § 25

- 324

. Husband seeks attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal from the Joined Parties under § 25

- 324 and the APSA

. Because Husband did not assert the APSA claims against the Joined Parties, he is not entitled to fees or costs under § 46

- 455(H)(4)

. Additionally, w e lack the necessa ry financial information to determine if t he Joined Parties or Husband are entitled to fees under § 25

- 324 . Accordingly, each party shall pay their own attorneys’ fees. B ecause we are remanding for reconsideration, we cannot yet determine if Husband o r the Joined Parties are entitled to costs under § 12

- 34 2(A) and instruct the superior court on remand to award costs on appeal consistent with this statute

.
CONCLUSION

¶47 We affirm the allocation of community property and de bt in the amended decree. We vacate the $50,000 judgment against Wife and

1 Historical Prime Rate (jpmorganchase.com)

.BUDZISZEWSKI v. BUDZISZEWSKI/CAMPBELL Decision of the Court

14 remand for reconsideration in a manner consistent with this decision. We vacate the $5,000 judgment for Husband’s swing

. On remand, the superior court shall modify the amended decree to reflect the correct statutory interest rate . Finally, we vacate ¶ U in the amen d ed decree and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision as to the Joined Parties.