SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0101-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.V.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted December 5, 2018 – Decided 

Remanded by the Supreme Court June 11, 2020.

Resubmitted June 12, 2020 – Decided 

Before Judges Koblitz, Ostrer and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 13-12-1177.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michele E. Friedman, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 5, 2019

July 2, 2020
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A-0101-16T3

PER CURIAM

Our Supreme Court remanded this matter on June 11, 2020 for our 

consideration of defendant's claim of an excessive sentence. He is serving 

concurrent terms of eighteen years in prison, subject to an eighty-five percent 

parole disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,

after he pled guilty to first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1) and 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), and first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1). 

State v. J.V., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 6, 21). Defendant was 

seventeen years old when he stabbed the victim nine times and stole his cell 

phone. Id. at 3. Given our limited standard of review, we affirm the sentence.

After waiver to adult court and prior to defendant's guilty plea, the court 

conducted a three-day competency hearing. The court determined defendant 

was competent, stating: "There is no doubt that [defendant] is an impaired 

individual. There is no doubt that he is functioning in the borderline to mild 

mental retardation range." The court decided that "though, obviously limited, 

[defendant] [did] have a basic and legally adequate understanding" of the 

proceedings, standards, and consequences, and was therefore competent to stand 

trial.
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The same court that conducted the competency hearing sentenced 

defendant, finding that aggravating factors one, two, three, and nine applied. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), (2), (3) and (9). The court also found mitigating factor 

seven. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7). The court began by noting that the attack in this 

case "really [stood] out . . . . for its brutality." With respect to aggravating factor 

one, the nature and circumstances of the event, the court noted that defendant 

attacked the victim after the victim "graciously lent him his phone," and that 

defendant stabbed the victim nine times, causing serious, penetrative injuries

and long-lasting physical and emotional pain. The victim suffered permanent 

nerve damage impairing his ability to perform his job. The court found

defendant had planned the attack by virtue of bringing his knife from home. In 

light of the "brutal and very life-threatening injuries," the court found the attack 

was "brutal," "heinous," and "depraved," as compared to other attempted 

murders, and therefore aggravating factor one applied. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1 (a)(1).

As to aggravating factor two, the gravity of the harm inflicted upon the 

victim, the court again noted the victim's extensive physical injuries, as well as 

the emotional damage detailed in his victim impact statement, and his statement 

at the sentencing hearing explaining that he now lives in constant fear of 

strangers and has limited mobility and functioning. 
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With regard to aggravating factor three, the risk of committing another 

offense, the court noted that the vicious, premeditated nature of the attack gave 

it "great concern, if he was capable of this, that there is a substantial risk of 

[defendant] committing another offense." The court also acknowledged 

defendant's limited mental functioning and emotional issues, and found that "to 

the extent that [those characteristics] contributed to his behavior, if [they] did, 

then that would be part of the risk." 

For aggravating factor nine, the need for deterrence, the court found it 

"almost [did not] have to be said, but, of course, there[was] a need to deter . . . 

[defendant] specifically and . . . anyone else who would think of committing 

such an offense." 

Turning to the mitigating factors, the court found factor seven, no prior 

record, applied. In light of the unprovoked and violent nature of the attack, the 

court accorded this factor "very little weight." The court also found defendant's 

"very young" age at the time of the attack, along with his "learning disabilities, 

borderline functioning, [and] depression" to be a mitigating factor "to some 

extent." The court explained that, although defendant's mental and emotional 

limitations are not his fault, they may also have contributed to his lack of 

appreciation of the risk, which could also be an aggravating factor.
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After thoughtfully analyzing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the 

court found "[t]he aggravating factors very substantially outweigh[ed] the 

mitigating factors." It imposed the maximum sentence permitted by the plea 

agreement: eighteen years in prison with a NERA parole disqualifier, on each 

count, to run concurrently. 

In this remand, defendant's remaining excessive sentence arguments are:

THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR 

RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE SENTENCE IS 

MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND UNDULY 

PUNITIVE.

A. THE SENTENCE IMPOSED AGAINST THIS 

JUVENILE OFFENDER IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, 

BECAUSE IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT 

THE FACTORS SET FORTH UNDER MILLER V. 

ALABAMA.

[1]

 MOREOVER, THE COURT ABUSED 

ITS DISCRETION IN ASCRIBING "VERY LITTLE 

WEIGHT" TO J.V.'S UNBLEMISHED RECORD 

AND STATUS AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER.

B. THE COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED ON J.V.'S 

EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 

LIMITATIONS AS A BASIS FOR 

SIMULTANEOUSLY FINDING AGGRAVATING 

FACTOR THREE, AND WEIGHING THOSE SAME 

DEFICIENCIES IN MITIGATION TO "SOME 

EXTENT." 

C. GIVEN THAT A REMAND IS WARRANTED, 

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER THAT A 

 

1

 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION BE 

CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE RESENTENCING 

HEARING.

Our review of a trial court's sentencing determination is "deferential." 

State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 (2013). We are "bound to affirm a sentence, 

even if [we] would have arrived at a different result, as long as the trial court 

properly identifie[d] and balance[d] aggravating and mitigating factors that 

[were] supported by competent credible evidence in the record." Ibid. (quoting 

State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 489 (2005)). We may only vacate a sentence 

where: (1) "the sentencing guidelines[] were violated"; (2) the aggravating or 

mitigating factors were not "based upon competent credible evidence in the 

record"; or (3) "even though the court sentenced in accordance with the 

guidelines, nevertheless the application of the guidelines to the facts of th[e] 

case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial 

conscience." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984).

"A sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement is presumed to be 

reasonable because a defendant voluntarily '[waived] . . . his right to a trial in 

return for the reduction or dismissal of certain charges, recommendations as to 

sentence and the like.'" State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70-71 (2014) (alterations 

in original) (quoting State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 140 (App. Div. 1980)). 
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However, "[e]ven a sentence recommended as part of a plea agreement . . . may 

be vacated if it does not comport with the sentencing provisions of our Code of 

Criminal Justice." Id. at 71.

Defendant first argues that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because the court did not take

into consideration special concerns connected with defendant's youth when 

imposing "a very lengthy term of incarceration." State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 

451 (2017) (remanding for resentencing two matters where the juveniles would 

not be eligible for parole until the ages of seventy-two and eighty-five); see

Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 (identifying five factors a court should consider when 

determining whether to sentence a juvenile to life without parole). Defendant 

was two months short of eighteen years old when he committed these crimes. 

He was sentenced to eighteen years with an eighty-five percent parole 

ineligibility. Thus, he will not be eligible for parole for fifteen years and three 

months, when he is approximately thirty-three years old. While this is a long 

sentence, it is not the "practical equivalent of life [in prison] without parole," 

Zuber, 227 N.J. at 429, and the court was not obligated to consider the special 

factors set forth in Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78.
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Defendant also argues that the sentencing court erred by finding his 

intellectual and emotional challenges constituted both an aggravating and a 

mitigating factor. Defendant relies on State v. Nataluk, 316 N.J. Super. 336 

(App. Div. 1998) and State v. Nayee, 192 N.J. 475 (2007).

In Nataluk, the sentencing judge found the jury's rejection of the insanity 

defense precluded a finding that defendant's diminished mental capacity could 

be a mitigating factor. 316 N.J. at 349. We rejected this reasoning, noting that 

the State's own expert did not dispute that defendant suffered from "mental 

problems." Ibid. We held that the rejection of the insanity defense was not "the 

equivalent of a conclusion that defendant did not suffer from any mental disease 

or defect." Ibid. 

In Nayee, our Supreme Court summarily remanded the matter for 

resentencing where the trial court "refus[ed] to consider the record before it in 

respect of defendant's mental illness as a mitigating factor." Nayee, 192 N.J. at 

475. Likewise, in State v. Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496, 504 (App. Div. 2002), 

we disapproved of the trial court's refusal to find mitigating factors based on the 

"highly relevant" expert reports indicating defendant suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder, as well other conditions. 
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Our Supreme Court held in Fuentes that, although it is not impossible for 

seemingly contradictory aggravating and mitigating factors to apply at the same 

time, such an occurrence would be "exceptional" and "rare." 217 N.J. at 80 

(declining to categorically preclude a simultaneous finding of aggravating factor 

nine, the specific need to deter, and mitigating factor eight, the crime resulted 

from circumstances unlikely to recur). If the sentencing court does apply 

conflicting factors it must "explain how it reconciles those two findings," giving 

"greater detail [to] its assessment of the weight assigned to each aggravating and 

mitigating factor, and its balancing of those statutory factors as they apply to 

defendant." Id. at 81. 

Here, the court held an extensive competency hearing and was wellinformed and commented with specificity on defendant's mental health disorder 

and learning disabilities. The court found those conditions mitigating, while 

also expressing concern that defendant's emotional problems might have 

contributed to the viciousness of the attack and increase the risk of defendant 

reoffending. These concerns are not logically inconsistent.

Finally, defendant seeks a psychological evaluation upon remand for 

resentencing. We do not remand for resentencing, and a further mental health 

evaluation is unnecessary given the extensive competency hearing held by the 
10 A-0101-16T3

sentencing judge. Although the sentence was lengthy, it was not manifestly 

excessive.

Affirmed.