United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued February 28, 2007

Decided April 18, 2007

Before

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

No. 06-3212

RICHARD BOLTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SUPREME COURT OF 

WISCONSIN, SHIRLEY S.

ABRAHAMSON, Chief Justice, JON

P. WILCOX, Justice, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Eastern

District of Wisconsin.

No. 06 C 549

Charles N. Clevert, Jr., 

Judge.

O R D E R

Richard Bolte, an attorney admitted to practice law in Wisconsin, was

publicly reprimanded by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for engaging in the

unauthorized practice of law in Colorado. He responded by filing a federal lawsuit

naming as defendants the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, its justices and the person

who reported his unauthorized practice. Mr. Bolte seeks to void both the reprimand

and a related state-court judgment from Colorado. The district court dismissed for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 06-3212 Page 2

In 1994, Mr. Bolte entered into a contract in Colorado with Carol Koscove. In

this contract Mr. Bolte agreed to review the royalties due Koscove under a mineral

lease between her and an oil company. At the time Mr. Bolte contracted with

Koscove, he was an inactive member of the Wisconsin Bar. Mr. Bolte began

performing under the contract, and he later obtained permission from the United

States District Court for the District of Colorado to appear pro hac vice in a federal

lawsuit Koscove brought against the oil company. The parties eventually settled,

but Koscove refused to pay Mr. Bolte the entire amount he billed under their

contract. In 1996, Koscove sued Mr. Bolte in a Colorado court for recission of their

contract, arguing that he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Colorado

and thus the contract was unenforceable. In 2001, the Colorado Court of Appeals

issued a final decision rescinding the contract and ordering Mr. Bolte to return the

money he had been paid.

Mr. Bolte then brought suit in the Western District of Wisconsin against

Koscove, her lawyers, the Colorado judge who presided over the recision action and

the county in which the judge sat. See Bolte v. Koscove, No. 05-2774, 2005 WL

3113460, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 22, 2005). Mr. Bolte claimed that the Colorado

judgment rescinding his contract with Koscove deprived him of property without

due process, interfered with his contractual rights, and denied him his right to

practice law. Id. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

476, 482-83 (1982); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). We

affirmed that judgment. See Bolte, 2005 WL 3113460 at *1-2. We also sanctioned

Mr. Bolte under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 for filing a frivolous appeal. 

Id. at *2.

Meanwhile, Koscove submitted a grievance against Mr. Bolte in Wisconsin. 

In 2003, the Office of Lawyer Regulation in Wisconsin initiated disciplinary

proceedings against Mr. Bolte for the unauthorized practice of law in Colorado. In

2005, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin issued a final disciplinary decision finding

that Mr. Bolte had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law that was not

incident to his pro hac vice admission to the District of Colorado, and that he had

transferred property to avoid collection on the judgment Koscove obtained in

Colorado. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bolte, 699 N.W.2d 914 (Wis.

2005). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin publicly reprimanded Mr. Bolte and

required him to pay the costs of his disciplinary proceeding.

Mr. Bolte then filed this suit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. He claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and its justices lacked

jurisdiction over the disciplinary proceeding and thus violated his federal

constitutional rights by issuing the reprimand. He alleges, too, that Koscove was a
No. 06-3212 Page 3

“collaborator and joint actor” with the justices. Additionally, Mr. Bolte names

Koscove and the justices in supplemental, state tort claims based on their roles in

his disciplinary proceeding. Mr. Bolte seeks to void both the reprimand issued in

Wisconsin and the Colorado judgment. He also seeks damages. 

The district court dismissed the complaint. The court reasoned that it lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court also

concluded, in the alternative, that the justices are absolutely immune from suit, and

that Mr. Bolte’s claims against Koscove are barred by his prior federal action. 

On appeal, Mr. Bolte contends that the district court has subject-matter

jurisdiction to entertain his challenge to the reprimand issued by the Supreme

Court of Wisconsin. He argues, essentially, that the Wisconsin court had no

jurisdiction to sanction conduct that occurred outside the state, and that RookerFeldman does not bar review of a judgment entered without jurisdiction. And, he

adds, his challenge to the reprimand is not foreclosed by doctrines of immunity or

preclusion. Mr. Bolte says nothing in his brief about the dismissal of his claims

related to the Colorado judgment, or about any of his supplemental state-law

claims. Accordingly, all of those claims are abandoned. See Blise v. Antaramian,

409 F.3d 861, 866 n.3 (7th Cir. 2005).

This appeal lacks merit. Mr. Bolte effectively asked the district court to

review and overturn the final decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in

precisely the manner an appellate court would. But, under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, federal courts other than the Supreme Court do not have appellate

jurisdiction over state courts, see Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 461 (2006); Rooker,

263 U.S. at 415-16; Holt v. Lake County Bd. of Comm’rs, 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir.

2005); Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1993), and thus cannot entertain

suits brought by state-court losers to review or modify a final decision of a state

court, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005);

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 482-83; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16; Holt, 408 F.3d at 336;

Leaf v. Supreme Court Wis., 979 F.2d 589, 596 (7th Cir. 1992). We have recognized

that an attorney disciplinary proceeding is a judicial proceeding that falls within

Rooker-Feldman. See Johnson v. Supreme Court of Ill., 165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th

Cir. 1999); Leaf, 979 F.2d at 597; see also Feldman, 460 U.S. at 478-81 (holding that

state-court ruling on plaintiff’s ability to waive participation in bar exam was

judicial).

It is irrelevant that Mr. Bolte has couched his complaint as a civil rights

action because the suit nevertheless seeks an injunction preventing enforcement of

the reprimand against Mr. Bolte. Such relief would amount to a reversal of the

final judgment of the Wisconsin court. See O’Malley v. Litscher, 465 F.3d 799, 802,
No. 06-3212 Page 4

804 (7th Cir. 2006); Holt, 408 F.3d at 336; Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754-55; see also Long

v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 561 (7th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing claim

alleging injury caused by state-court judgment from claim alleging independent

prior injury that state court failed to remedy). It is also irrelevant that Mr. Bolte

has sued the justices and Koscove individually, because these claims are premised

upon the individuals’ roles in the procurement of the reprimand and share the goal

of undoing its effect. See O’Malley, 465 F.3d at 802; Holt, 408 F.3d at 335-36;

Johnson, 165 F.3d at 1141; Ritter, 992 F.2d at 753-54; Leaf, 979 F.2d at 598.

The district court’s dismissal of Mr. Bolte’s complaint is affirmed.