### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 08 -0 00 87 -C V

______________________________

I N T HE MA TT ER O F J.M.

On Appea l from the County Court at L aw Gre g g County , Texas Trial Court No. 5243-J

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Moseley2 O P I N I O N After having amassed a

rathe r impressive r ecor d of off enses, J.M., a juvenile, was plac ed on probation for

felony theft of a motorcy cle. On July

7, 2008, the State filed its motion to modify the dispositi on, alleg ing that J.M. violated the terms of his probation by committing misdemeanor theft and re sisting arrest, among other violations. The trial court found sufficient e vidence supported the

a lle g a tio ns and

mod if ie d th e dis po sit ion , s e nd ingJ.M. t o th e Te xas Yo uth Com mis sio n ( TY C) . J.M. moved for a

new tria l. I n response to the motion for new trial, the trial court a g ree d that an er ror ha d been ma de in the j udg ment and reforme d its judgme nt to corr ect that e rror . J .M. then filed anothe r mot ion fo r n e w tri a l, th is ti me un succ e ssf ull y . I t is fr om t

he or de r s e nd ingJ.M. t o T YC tha t th is

a pp e a l is be ingso ug ht. On appe al, J .M. prese nts severa l points of error. First, he c halleng es the trial c ourt' s decision to modify his disposition, c ontending it was an a buse of discr etion to do so when the e vidence was leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to show that he ha d committed a cr imina l o ffense in violation of the te rm s o f h is p ro batio n. Se c ond, he c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ourt ' s o rd e r, ma int a ini ngit i s insufficiently

specific and, ther efor e, void. Finally , he lodg es two constitutional challeng es: (1) he contends the c onditions present at the TYC fa cility constit ute cr

uel and unusua l punishment, and (2) he maintains that the trial court' s decision to c ommit him to TYC, rathe r than a local or ne arby y outh fac ility , violated his rig ht to equal protec tion of the law.3

I. CHALLENGES TO SUF F ICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE A. Appli cable Law and S tandard of Review A trial court' s modification of juvenile disposition i s g overne d by Section 54.05 of the Te x as Family Code. See T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 54 .0 5 ( Ve rn on 20 08 ). Whe n a

juv e nil e ha s p re vio us ly eng ag ed in delinquent conduc t, the trial court may modify the orig inal sentenc e to commit the juv e nil e to T YC if

the tr ia l c ourt

de te rm ine s, by

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e , th a t th e juv e nil e subsequently violated a rea sonable and lawful order of the c ourt. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 54.05(f) ; In re J .P. , 1 36 S.W. 3d

62 9, 63 2 ( Te x. 20 04 ); In re T.R.S. , 1 1 5 S. W.3d 318, 32 0

– 2 1 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

2003, no pet.). Modify ing a juvenile' s probation is a decision which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, r ever sible on appea l only on a finding that the trial cour t ab u s ed t h at discretion. T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 54 .0 5; J.P. , 1 36 S.W. 3d a t 63 2; In re J

.R .C. , 2 3 6 S. W. 3 d

8 7 0 , 8 7 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 07 , n o p e t.) ; In re M.A. , 1 9 8 S. W. 3d 388, 390–91 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.). A tria l court abuse s its dis cre tion when it acts ar b i trarily or unre asonably

or without ref ere nce to guiding rules or principles. J .R .C. , 2 36 S.W. 3d

a t 87 5; M.A. , 198 S.W .3d at 391. A trial court doe s not abuse its discretion if some ev i d en ce s u p ports the dec ision. J .R .C. , 236 S.W .3d at 87 5; M.A. , 1 98 S.W. 3d

a t 39 1. Put

ano the r w ay , whe th er t

he re is f a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to support the trial cour

t's f indings is a r eleva

nt co n s i d er at i on in determining whether the trial cour

t4

abused its discre tion. J .R .C. , 23 6 S.W. 3d

a t 87 5; In re C.J.H

. , 7 9 S. W. 3 d

6 9 8 , 7 0 2 ( T e x. App.—For

t Worth 2002, no pet.). One of J .M.' s contentions on appea l is that the S tate, having pleaded both thef t and re sisting

arr est as sepa

rate alleg ations, but under the same par ag raph he ading in its m otio n t o m o d i fy , was require d to prove J.M. commi tted both offense s in violation of the terms of probation before the trial court may use t hose allegations to modify the prior dispositi on. We find no authority to support such

a po sit ion . T o the c on tr ary , a sin g le vio la tio n o f t

he c on dit ion s o f t

he juv e nil e ' s p ro batio n is sufficie nt to support a trial court' s order modify ing a

juvenile' s disposit ion. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 54 .0 5( f) ; In re J.A.D. , 3 1 S. W.3 d 6 68 , 6 71 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 0, no pe t.) ; In re S.G.V

. , No. 04-05-00605- CV, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 2688, at *9–10 (Tex. A p p.—San Antonio Apr. 5, 2006, no pet.) (me m. op.). B. Evid ence P rese nted to Trial Court Offic er Steve Bur

nette wa s off

duty and wor king in a loss-preve ntion capac ity (i.e., a s
secur ity) at a

convenie nce store when he saw J.M. and his friend, D. O. , s ec rete two bag s of pork rinds on their per sons and then re move the pork r inds (having a re tai l v alue of $3.98) from the conveni en ce store without paying f or them. B urnette pr ovided the name and addr ess of the
c on ve nie nc e sto re a nd

te sti fi e d th a t Don Ta lle y

wa s th e ow ne r o f t

hat st or e . B ur

ne tte wi tne sse d J.M. sti c k o ne ba g of

po rk ri nd s in his fr ie nd ' s sh or

ts a nd his fr ie nd

sti c k a no the r b a g in h is o wn

sh or ts and the two then e x ited the store. B urnette te stified that he first at tempted to detain D.O., w hoThe State c ontends the motion for new trial failed to pr eser

ve the issue of fa ctual suff iciency 1 fo r t his Court ' s r e vie w b e c a

us e the a sse rt ion in the mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l wa s too g e ne ra l and be c a us e defe nse counse l did not present an or al argument to the trial court c oncer ning the fac tual sufficie ncy o f th e ev i d en ce at th e he ar i n g o n t h e mo t i o n fo r ne w t ri al

. Ge n er al l y , t o b e pr es er v edfo r t h e c o u rt 's revie w, the issue of fac tual sufficie ncy of the e vidence must first be raised in a motion for new tria l to b e p r e s e r

v e d f o r th is Co u rt' s revie w. In re M.R. , 858 S.W .2d 365 (Tex. 1993) (T EX . R. C IV . P. 324(b) r equire s such). But see In re J .L.H. , 58 S.W .3d 242, 246 (Tex. A pp.—El Paso 2001, no pet.) 5 su c c e e de d in

br e a kin g loo se and

te mpo ra ri ly e sc a pin g fr om the sc e ne . J.M. re sis te d a s w e ll, bu t di d not ge t away
. Ac c or din g to B ur

ne tte ' s a c c ount o f t

he e ve nt: Ijust got ahold of [J .M.] and I g ot one cuf f on him and he starte d hitting and pushing me ba c k - - w e ll, pu sh ingme ba c k, no t a c tua lly hittin g , tr y ingto g e t awa

y fr om m e and twisting a

nd turning

. I took the one cuff that I had in my hand -- beca

use I had on e on -- and Ista rt e d p ull ingdo wn . A nd

the n I g ot i t up be hin d h im, pu sh e d h im over the back of

the ca r and g ot him handcuf

fed. I t was a little bit hard bec ause he ha d - - n ot a

ba c kp a c k, bu t a

bigba g wi th h im. Bur nette further ex plained that J .M. was using resistanc e to " pull away " f rom him. He had pla ced a cuf f on J.M .' s left wrist and wa s attempting to ge t the handcuff on the ot her wrist when J.M . beg an to pull away

from him. After

J .M. was h andcuffed a

nd controlled, he showed B urnette the leg monitor he was we aringas orde red by the juvenile cour

t in his previous disposi tion. C. Discussion J.M. c on te nd s th a t the State ' s e vid e nc e fa ile d to e sta bli sh ow ne rs hip of

the sto le n p or

k r ind s; the State, he maintains, having a lleg ed that "D

. T al l ey " w as the owne r of the c onvenienc e store, neede d to have e vidence from Tall ey on the iss ue of ow ne rs hip of the po rk ri nd s in or de r t o s us ta in the cha rg e. The State a

rg ues that t he evidence from Burnette that he was working for Talley in a 1(this preser vation require ment no longe r applies to juvenile proce eding s since proce eding rese mbles much more a

criminal proc eeding ). Th e Au sti n c ourt

a dd re sse d th e pr e se rv a tio n r e qu ir e me nt in a juve nil e c a se c omi ng to it in a similar proc edura l postur e as t h e instant ca se. See In re E.G

. , 2 1 2 S. W. 3 d 5 3 6 , 5 3 8 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). The court cited the g ener al rule found in Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedur e concer ning preser

vation of error. T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1. I t noted, howeve r, that in an appe al from a nonjury case , an appe llant may attack the leg al or fa ctual insuffic iency of the evidenc e for

the first time on appe al. E.G. , 212 S.W. 3d a t 53 8; see T EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a), ( d). Th e iss ue of

fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y wa s ra ise d in J.M.' s mo tio n f or ne w tri a l. Wh e the r i t ha d to be in orde r to be re viewed is a n issue on which si ster courts are divided. There is some persuasive a uth or ity tha t w ou ld s ug g e st that th e re wa s n o n e e d to ra ise the is su e in a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l in order to preser ve any err or. At any

rate , he did. So, to the extent that fac tual sufficie ncy is a distinct issue, rathe r than mer ely

a conside ration in deter

mining whether the trial court a bused its discretion, the issue is proper ly

befor e this Court. 6 se c ur ity c a pa c ity a t th e c on ve nie nc e sto re is s uf fi c ie nt t o s ho w t

hat B ur ne tte h a d a

g re a te r r ig ht t o po sse ssi on

of the po rk ri nd s th an d id J.M

. The State is require d to prove J.M. unl awf ully appropr iated prope rty

with intent to deprive the owner of the prope rty . T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 31.0 3 (a ) (V er n o n Supp. 2008). The Te x as P e n a l C o d e d e f

i n e s an" o w n e r " a s a

p e r s o nw h o " h a s t i t l e t o t h e p r o p e rt y, p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p r o p e rt y,

. . . o r a gr e a t e r r i gh t t o p os ses si on of t he p rop ert y th an t he act or. " T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 1.07(35) ( Ver

non Supp. 2008). The fa ct t hat Talley did not testify is of no conseque nce. Similarly , the State' s position t hat Bur nette' s testimony

showed him to have a

g reater rig ht to possession tha n J .M. is not central to the dispositi on of this issue. The State pre sented unc ontroverte d testimony that Talley

was the ow ner of the spec ific convenience store from which J.M. t ook the pork rinds a nd, as the owne r of the store , Talley had leg al possession of the pork r inds prior to the boy s' appropr iation. Burne tte testified thatAlthough J.M. does not challeng e the or der as too specific , we note that a commitment order 2 to TYC based on a

modification of probation for the violation of probation by committing a new a ct of delinquent c onduct should not recite the fac ts of the new delinquent conduct case . The order need only state that the c hild violated the first condition of his probation and, in so doin g, v i olated a rea sonable a

nd lawful orde r of the c ourt. To include the new offe nse in the order could subject the c hil d to a lo ng e r m ini mum sta y in t he c omm iss ion

wi tho ut t he fu ll d ue pr oc e ss r ig hts a ff

or de d a c hil d in an adjudication hearing

. In re S.J

. , 940 S.W .2d 332, 338–39 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ). 7 the bo y s to ok

the po rk ri nd s wi tho ut pa

y ing fo r the m (i .e ., sto le the m)

. Th e re is e vid e nc e to e sta bli sh the c ha lle ng e d e le me nt of ow ne rs hip wi th re sp e c t to the of fe ns e of the ft . A g a in, e vid e nc e of on ly
one violation of the conditions of the juvenile' s probation will support the trial court' s modification. Her e, ther e is evidenc e that J .M. committed the offense of theft. Ther e beingsufficie nt evidence that J .M. committed theft, we c onclude that the trial court did not abuse its discre tion when it modified the disposition, and we over rule the points of e rror

which cha lleng e the suff

iciency of t he evide nce and, conc urre ntly , the contention that the tria l court' s modification was a n abuse of

its discretion. II. CH AL LEN G ES TO T HE LA NG UA G E A ND VA LID ITYOF THE O RD ER A. Specif

icity of Trial Cou rt's F ind ings J .M. argues that "T he juvenile court' s finding s to r emove appellant from his home wer e not sp e c if ic e no ug h to wa

rr ant re mov a l and se nd ing to the [TY C]." Hi s con te nti on is that th e juv e nil e court' s order

was de ficient be cause it f ailed to spe cifica lly state the re asons for the modification of the prior disposition. J .M. relies c onsiderably on the proposition that "A statement to the ef fec t that 2 the cour t fin ds that the child has violated a rea sonable a

nd lawful orde r of the c ourt does no more th an t rack

th e s t a t u t o r y l a n guage of § 54 .0 5(f )." A. Y . v . S tat e , 554 S.W .2d 805, 807 (Tex. Civ.8

App.—San Antonio 1977, no writ). The A

. Y. co u rt , ci t i n g In re A.N.M. , 5 4 2 S. W. 2 d 9 1 6 , 9 1 9 ( T e x. Civ. App.—Dallas 1976, no writ), c ontinued, stating that the word " specific ally " in Section 54.04(f) "e mphasizes that t h e l egi s l ature intended the c ourt to do more than mer ely trac k the statutory lan guage." A

. Y. , 554 S.W .2d at 807. Th e Te xas F a mil y

Cod e requ ir e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt make the fo llo wi ngthr e e fi nd ing s to
re mov e the c hil d f

ro m th e ho me and

c omm it the c hil d to TY C: 1) I t is in t he child' s best interest to be plac ed outside the home. 2) Reasonable eff

orts wer e made to preve nt or eliminate the ne ed for the child' s removal from the home a

nd to make it possible for the c hild to return home. 3) The c hild in the home cannot be provided the quality of ca re a nd level of suppor

t and supervision that the child nee ds to meet the conditions of probation. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 54.05(m). The trial court' s modification order includes all three require d fi nd ing s. J.M. c omp la ins that th e me re tr a c kin g of the statut or

y languag e in t

he se fi nd ing s is insufficient a

nd that the fa ilure to elabor ate on those ma ndatory finding s is rever sible err or. I nad d i t i o nt o m ak i n g t h es e m an d at o ry fi n d i n gs , t h e t ri al co u rt 's o rd er s t at es t h e f o l l o wi n g: Th e Court

fi nd s b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e Juve nil e did e ng a g e in delinquent conduc t and the mater i al al l egations in the motion to revoke pr obation, to- wi t: H e re tof

or e , o n th e 16 th d ay

of Au g us t, 200 7, the c hil d h e re in, wa s f ound to have eng ag ed in delinquent conduct in the above styled and number ed ca use for the F ELONY offe nses of BURG LARY O F A B UILDING (2 CO UN TS) and the M ISD EM EA NO R

offe nse of T H E FT , an d on the 16th day of August, 2007, was pla c e d o n p ro batio n. Ad dit ion a lly , o n th e 29 th day of Nove mbe r, 20 07 , th e c hil d here in, wa s found to have eng ag ed in delinquent conduc t in the above styled and9

numbere d cause for the F EL ONY o ff ense of UN AU T H O RI ZE D U S E O F A VE HIC LE and the M ISD EM EA NO R offe nse of BU RG LA RYOF A V EHI CL E , and on the 29 th d ay

of No ve mbe r, 20 07 wa s pla c e d on pro batio n. Ad dit ion a lly , 2 9th day of May , 2008, the child here in, was found to have eng ag ed in delinquent conduc t in the above sty led and numbere d cause for the F ELONY offe nse of T H E FT , and on the 29th day

of May , 2008, was plac ed on probation in thi s cause under the rea sonable a

nd lawful ter

ms and conditions of

probation dete rmined by

the Court for a per iod of one (1) y ear

with I ntensive Supervision. The trial c ourt' s order

adds re asons for its finding that J .M.' s commitment to TYC i s appropr iate: I n addition, the Court commits t he child responde nt to the Texas Youth Com mission for the f ollowing r easons. Th e se ri ou sn e ss of

the of fe ns e re qu ir e s th a t th e c hil d r e sp on de nt b e pla c e d in a re strictive environme nt to [ protec t] the public. L oc a l r e so ur c e s o f t

he Court are ina de qu a te to pr op e rl y re ha bil itate the c hil d re sp on de nt. The Te x as Family Code provides, "The court shall specif ically state in the orde r its rea sons f o r m o di fy in g the d is po si ti on ." T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 5 4
. 0 5 ( i )

. C o mp l i an c e w i t h t h e se
re qu ir e me nts is m and a tor y , for su c h fin din g s "p ro vid e a ssu ra nc e that the c hil d a

nd his fa mil y wi ll be a dv ise d o f t

he re a so ns fo r [r e mov a l f ro m th e ho me ] an d .

. . be in a po sit ion to c ha lle ng e tho se
reas on s o n ap peal ." J

.L. E. v . S tat e , 571 S.W .2d 556, 557 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 1 4 t h Dist.] 1978, no writ). When a juvenile court does not c omply with the specific ity require ments, t he
re vie wi ng c ourt do e s no t re ve rs e fo r a ne w tr ia l, bu t, g e ne ra lly , re mand s ins te a d to the tr ia l c ourt wi th instructions for the juvenile judg e to re nder a proper dispositi on order

specific ally

stating the rea sons for suc h dispositi on. K.K

.H . v . S tat e , 612 S.W .2d 657, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1981, no writ); A

. Y. , 5 54 S.W. 2d

a t 80 6– 08 ; see T EX . R. A PP . P. 44.4.10

Th e mod if

y ingor de r m

us t spe c if ic a lly re c ite the c on du c t whic h pro mpt e d th e tr ia l c ourt to modify its prior order

of disposition. Se e K.W .H . v . S tat e , 596 S.W .2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.—T e xar

ka na 19 80 , n o w ri t) ; se e als o In re L.T.H. , N o . 0 3

- 0 6

- 0 0 4 3 3

- CV , 2 0 0 7 Tex. App. L EXI S 7340 (Tex. App.— Au s t i n Sept. 6, 2007, no pet.). Providing spe cific r easons f or the dispositi on provides the c hild with notice of the court' s rea sons so that the child can de termine the need f or an a ppeal. In re J

.R. , 907 S.W .2d 107, 110 (Tex. App.—Au s t i n 1995, no writ). Additionally , a re cord is cr eate d for the a ppellate c ourt to rely

on in making its dec ision about whether sufficie nt evidenc e supports the juvenile cour t's f indings a nd deter minations. In re L.R. , 67 S.W .3d 332, 336–37 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.). T h er efor e, mer ely rec iting statutory lang uag e will not be suffic ient to justi fy the juvenile cour t's r uling. In re J

.T.H. , 779 S.W .2d 954, 959 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ). However , statutory lang uag e supplemente d by additional finding s is sufficient to meet the r equire ments of t he Te x as F amily Code. See In re P. L. , 106 S.W .3d 334, 338 (Tex. App.—Dal la s 2 0 0 3, no pet.) (or der tra cking lang uag e of Sec tion 54.05 and explaining
c ourt ' s r e a so ns wa s a

pp ro pr ia te ). Th e inc lus ion of the of fe ns e and its surr ound ingc ir c ums tanc e s in an orde r consisting of mainly statutory lang uag e is sufficie nt. See J.T.H. , 779 S.W .2d at 959. Her e, the tria l court included the m andator y statutory finding s in compliance w ith Section 54.05(m). T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 54.05(m). I t also included co n s i d er able spe cific a dditional information, including virtually a complete history of J .M.' s juvenile record. The trial court' s order ,J .M. mentions the ir regularity in the written order ' s use of "Y our Petitioner," but does not 3 seem to spec if

i ca l l y co m p l ain of any

err or assoc iated with the mix -up in perspe ctive. The State, understandingthat J .M. complains of this use, asks the Court to r efor m the err ors, maintaining they are cler ical in nature and mer ely a re sult of a cut and paste approa ch to dra fting the trial cour t's or der. I nd e e d, the State ' s a

pp lic a tio n to re vo ke pr ob a tio n d oe s c on ta in su c h langua g e . Ho we ve r, sin c e J.M. do e s n ot c on te nd

the langua g e re nd e rs the or de r v oid or re pr e se nts re ve rs ibl e e rr or , we do no t a dd re ss the issue. A cl a ss C mis de me ano r is a fin e -o nly of fe ns e wh ic h is no t c on sid e re d d e lin qu e nt c on du c t; 4 i n s t ead it can be c onsidered c onduct indicating a nee d for supe rvision. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 51.03(a) , (b)( 1)(A) (Ve rnon 2008). J .M.' s contention may be a suc cessf

ul one if J.M .' s probation wer e base d on theft under fifty dollars or other

conduct indicating a

need f or super vision and if the State wer e now moving to modify the disposition by revoking that probation. Such is not the case

. He re , we are c a lle d on to re vie w a mod if ic a tio n pr oc e e din g in wh ic h the State a lle g e d that J .M. 11 havin g inc lud e d th e re qu ir e d s tatut or y langua g e and sp ecif

ic inf or ma tio n a s w e ll, is s uf

fi c ie ntl y specific . We overrule this point of er ror. B. Er r or Cl aim e d in I nc ludin g Bo th Offen se s in O ne P ar ag r aph J .M. contends that the t rial court err ed by including the offe nse of r esisting a rre st and theft of under fi fty dollars in one par ag raph, taking the position t hat such e rror rende rs the entire order
vo id. He dis tin g uis he s the tw o of fe ns e s by c or

re c tly po int ing ou t that the of fe ns e of re sis tin g a rr e st 3 is a c la ss Amis de me ano r ( punis ha ble by c on fi ne me nt) , w hil e the ft of un de r f if ty do lla rs is a c la ss C misdemeanor ( not punishable by confine ment). He continues, citing Section 54.05, which provide s that "a dispositi on based solely

on a finding that the child eng ag ed in conduc t indicating a need f or
superv is io n m ay

n o t b e m od if

ied to com mi t t he ch il d t o t he [ TYC ] ." T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 54.05(g ). F rom this, he extrapolates that since the ft on these f acts would be char ac t erized as
c on du c t in dic a tin g a

ne e d f or su pe rv isi on , th e ft

c ou ld n ot b e ba sis fo r c omm itm e nt t o T YC
. 4vio la te d th e te rm s o f h is p ro batio n b y c omm itt ingc ri min a l of

fe ns e s. So, in t

his re g ard , w he the r J.M
. could be committed to TYC if adjudicate d g uilty of one offe nse or the other ha s no bear ing on the o u t co m e o f t h i s p ro ce ed i n g. 12 The State c orre ctly

maintains that the t heft as alleg ed would properly support a modification and commitment becaus e S ection 54.05(f) per mits m odification of pr obation which has be en previously

imposed due to the commission of a fe lony offe nse. The f

elony offe nse her e is the theft of the motorcycle, the de linquent condu ct fo r wh ich J .M. was most rec ently place d on probation. See T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 54.05(f) . The State a ppropriate ly

contends that the unde rlying the ft of a moto rc y cl e wa s the rele vant fe lony for the f irst adjudication, af

ter whic h probation may be mod if ie d a nd the juv e nil e c omm itt e d b a se d o n a sh ow ingthat th e juv e nil e vio la te d a ter m of his previously

ass essed pr obation. The orig inal order imposing probation based on the de linquent conduct of

theft of the motorcy cle r equire d J .M. to obey all laws of the State, a

provision that either offe nse (e ither the c lass A misdemeanor or the c lass C misdemeanor) violate d. C. Co r r e c ti on o f P unis hm e nt Av ail abl e for The ft a s A lle ge d The trial c ourt' s order

does incorr ectly

sug g est that both offe nses ar e p u nishable by
c on fi ne me nt:The re fer ence to "( 1)" comes fr om the State' s motion i n which it alleg ed: 5 (1) On or a

bout the 27th day

of June, 2008, the said child violated a pe nal law o f t his State punis ha

ble by imp ri so nme nt or

c on fi ne me nt i n ja il, to- wi t: RE SISTI NG

ARRE ST , § 38 .0 3 o f t

he Te xas P e na l Co de , in that he did

the n an d the re , in the County of Gr e g g and State of Te xas, intentionally

or knowing ly

preve nt or obstruct S . Bur nette, a pe rson the c hil d k

ne w to b e a

pe a c e of fi c e r, fr om e ff

e c tin g an a

rr e st o f s a id juv e nil e -r e sp on de nt, by

us ing fo rc e a g a ins t sa id pe a c e of fi c e r, to- wi t: by pu sh ingsa id o ff

ic e r w ithhis ha

nd , th e sam e bei ng a

Cla ss A mis de me ano r i f c omm itt e d a s a n a du lt. On or about the 27th day

of June, 2008, the said child violated a pe nal law of thi s Stat e punis ha

ble by fi ne on ly , to wi t: T H E FT , § 31.03 of the Texas Penal code , in that he did then and there, in the County of Gre g g and State of T exas, unlawfully appropr iate, by

acquir ing a

nd otherwise e x erc ising c ontrol over, property , to-wit: food, of the va lue of le ss tha n $ 50 .0 0, fr om D . T a lle y , th e ow ne r t he re of , w ithint e nt t o de pr i v e t h e o w n e r o f t h e p r o p e rt y , t h e s a m e b e i n g a C l a ss C mis de me ano r i f c omm itt e d a s a n a du lt. 13 X e. Violation (1)[ ] i s a violation of a pena l code of Texas 5 punis ha ble by imp ri so nme nt/ c on fi ne me nt i n ja il. Th e ft of pr op e rt y the va lue of wh ic h is le ss tha n f if ty do lla rs is a c la ss C mis de me ano r, punis ha ble as such by

fine only . T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 12.23 (Ve rnon 2003), § 31.03( e)( 1)(A) (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). Th is e rr or do e s n ot a ff

e c t th e va lid ity

of the tr ia l c ourt ' s ju dg me nt b e c a us e the e vid e nc e is
su ff ic ie nt t o s ho w that J.M. c omm itt e d th e ft , a c ri min a l of

fe ns e the c omm iss ion

of wh ic h is a violation of his probation—wh et h er o r not it is a jailable of fense . The stateme nt in the order that14

bo th t he ft un der fif ty do lla rs and re sis tin g arr e st a

re punis ha

ble by c on fi ne me nt i s, ne ve rt

he le ss, inacc urate
. Th e Te xas F a mil y

Cod e a uth or ize s th is C ourt

to m od if y the jud g me nt: The a ppellate c ourt may

aff irm, reve rse, or

modi fy t h e j udg ment or orde r, including a

n order of disposition or modified disposi tion, fro m which appe al was taken. I t may

reve rse or

modify an orde r of disposition or modified order of dis po sit ion wh ile a ff

ir min g the juv e nil e c ourt

a dju dic a tio n th a t th e c hil d e ng a g e d in delinquent conduc t or conduc t indicating a need f or supervision. I t may

rema nd an or de r t hat it re ve rs e s o r m od if

ie s f or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s b y

the juv e nil e c ourt
. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 56. 0 1 (i ) (Ve rnon 2008). We have the authority to corre ct, modify , and ref orm a judg ment to make t h e re cord spe ak the truth whe n the matter ha s been c alled to our attention and we have the nece ssary information to do so. In r e K .B. , 1 0 6 S. W. 3 d

9 1 3 , 9 1 6 ( T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 20 03 , n o p e t.) ; see In re J .K. N. , 115 S.W .3d 166, 174 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003,
no pe t.) (c ourt

is aut ho ri z ed to mo dif

y juv e nil e c ourt ' s ju dg me nt) . T he a uth or ity of the a pp e llate courts to re form judg ments is not limit ed to those situations involvi ng mistakes of a c lerica l nature. Bi gle yv . S tat e , 865 S.W .2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). That said, we are authorized to and do
c or re c t th e tr ia l c ourt ' s or de r t o r e fl e c t th a t th e the ft wh ic h J.M. wa s f

ound to h a ve c omm itt e d is a class C misdemeanor . T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2(b).15

III . CO NST ITU TIO NA L C HA LLEN G ES A. Cr ue l an d Un usua l P unis hm e nt 1. J.M.'s Acc ount of His S tay at TYC At a hea ring on his moti on for ne w trial, J.M . test i fi ed to a laundry list of unpleasant
occu r r e n c e s h e h a s e xp e r ie n c e d w h il e in c ar c e r a te d a t T Y C: ( 1 ) H e w a s s o li c it e d o n four or five
occa sions to join a gang at TYC's McL ennan County Orientation and Assessment Unit. (2) He has witnessed a f

ight e very

day that he has be en ther e, althoug h he has not e ng ag ed in any himself. (3) He testified that there are usually only two staff members (usually women) to supe rvis e the twenty -five boy s in e ach unit or dormitory and that the staff acts as if they are not rea lly conce rned about the fig hting. ( 4) On seve ral oc casions, the juvenile in the bed next to J .M. threate ned to shank him wi th a fi le d- do wn

fo ur -t o- fi ve -i nc h sc re w and the n to pu t his pe nis in J.M .' s e ar. Al tho ug h J.M. repor ted the thre ats to staff membe rs , t h ey t o ok no action to re medy it. After having r eporte d the situation to t he super

v i s o r an d asking to be moved, J.M. was only moved to the other side of the room. (5) H e wa s threate ned with violence for his dec ision to not join a g ang . On cr oss-examination, J .M. confirme d t h at there are surveillance came ras installed on the premises. He sug g ests that as a result of the t hreats ag ainst him, there wa s a dormitory shakedow n, duri ngwh ic h th e sta ff

re c ov e re d f

ive sc re ws in the po sse ssi on of the pe rs on

wh o h a d thre a te ne d J.M. J .M. went on to say

that his nemesis had surr eptitiously place d one of those sc rew s under J.M.'s own be d a nd tha t th e oth e r youngman h ad been se nt t o a se c ur ity loc ku p f or tw e nty -f our h ours a s a16

disciplinary

measure . J .M. admitted that this was the only specific person with whom he ha d continued, identifiable problems. He did, howe ver, r eport more g ener al conflicts with the unwanted g angre c ru itm e nt. He te sti fi e d th a t th e c on sta nt f ig hti ngre su lts in c on sta

nt re po rt ing of tho se fi g hts

. 2. When Cond itions of Conf inem ent Can Be Cruel and Unus ual The Eighth Amendment prohibits the i nfliction of punishment that can be char acte rized as

" c ru e l and

un us ua l." U. S. C O N ST . ame nd . V I I I ; T EX . C O N ST . ar t
. I , § 1 3
. "J u v en i l e c as es , t h o u gh classified a s civil procee dings, a re qua si-crimi nal in nature and fr equently conce rn constitutional ri ghts and pro cedu res no rm all y fou nd on ly in cri mi nal law ." In re H.V

. , 2 5 2 S. W. 3 d

3 1 9 , 3 2 3 ( T e x. 2008). Due to this simil arity , we examine c ases involving claims of crue l a nd unusual punishment in the context of confinement f or cr iminal offense s for guidanc e here. Confinement i n a state- prison fac ility is a form of punishment subjec t to scrutiny under the Eig hth Amendm ent. See Rhodes v. Chapman , 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981 ). T h e E i g hth Amendment' s prohibition of cruel a nd unusual punis hme nt w a s ma de a pp lic a ble to t he state s b y

the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla

us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment. Ro bin so n v . Ca lif or nia , 3 70 U. S. 6 60 (1 96 2) ; Lad d v . S tat e , 3 S.W .3d 547, 564 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We note that the Constit ution doe s not mandate c omfortable pr isons. See Rhodes , 4 52 U. S. at 349. To da

y the Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt p ro hib its punis hme nts wh ic h, a lth ou g h n ot p hy sic a lly ba rb aro us , "i nv olv e the un ne c e ssa ry and wa nto n in fl ic tio n o f p a in, " or are g ro ssl y disproportionate to the seve rity of the c rime. Among "unne cessa ry and wa nton" inflictions of pain are those that are "totally without penologic al justification."17

Id. at 346 (citations om itted). Ther e should not be a g ross disproportionality betwee n the conditions of conf inement and the se verity

of the off

ense or condition which led to t h e co nfinement. See id. at 347. J .M. does not addre ss t h e s er i o u s n ess of the of fense s with which he wa s char g ed or the persistenc e of his conduc t that prec ipitated the order of commitment to TYC. Fur ther, the thrust of his arg ument does not adva nce the theory

that he has be en sing led ou t fo r any treatment by

TYC officia ls as any punitive measure . Rather, his alleg ations seem to rest upon the contention that the g ener ally dang erous or

frig htening conditions to which virtually all those incar cer ated at TYC are subjected dur ing the ir stay s amounts to the imposi tion of crue l and unusual punishment. Mu c h o f t he c a se law d e fi nin g the te rm " c ru e l and

un us ua l" ri se fr om ac tio ns in t or t w he re in inmates in prison situations have soug ht to recove r dama g es fr om the prison officia ls for what they have a lle g e d w e re the ir

su bje c tio n to c ru e l and unus ua l punis hme nt. Whil e no t c on tr oll ing he re , it provides some guidance in drawingthe par ameter s of the ter m "c ruel a

nd unusual." I n o rd e r t o pr ov e a c la im of Ei g hth Am e ndme nt c ru e l and unus ua l punis hme nt i n a tor t c a se ag ainst prison officia ls involvi ng the " prison-conditions" c ontext , an i n m at e mus t demonstrate: (1) that the de privation alleg ed was " sufficie ntly serious" and (2) that there was a n unnece ssary

and wanton infliction of pain. Farmer v . Brennan , 511 U.S. 825 (1994). I n case s involving a failure to pre vent har m, the plaintiff must demonstrate a n incar cer ation under c onditions posi ng a substan t i al risk of ser ious harm. Scott v. Britton , 16 S.W .3d 173, 18118

(T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 00 , no pe t.)

. I n or de r to be " [O]bj e c tiv e ly , ' su ff ic ie ntl y se ri ou s'

. . . a prison officia l's act or omission must result in the denial of the ' minimal civili zed measure of li fe's n eces si ti es. '" Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitt ed ). Al t h o ug h routine discomfort i n h e r e n ti nt h e p r i s o ne n v i r o n m e n ti s i n a d e qu a t e t o s a t i s f y anE i g h t h A m e n d m e n ti n qu i r y , o n ly

" tho se de pr ivatio ns de nying' the min ima l c ivi lize d me a sure of lif e ' s n e c e ssi tie s'
. . . a

re su ff ic ie ntl y grave t o fo rm th e bas is of an Ei ght h A m e n d m e n t vi ol ati on ." W ilson v. Seiter , 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1 9 9 1 ) ( qu o t i n g Rhodes , 452 U.S. at 347). In d eter mining whe ther a

constitutional viol ation has
oc c ur re d, we mus t c on sid e r t

he c ir c ums tanc e s, nature, and du ration of a de pr ivatio n o f t

he se
nece ssities. J

oh ns on v . Le wis , 217 F.3d 726, 731 ( 9th Cir. 2000). An inmate does ha

ve an E ighth Ame ndment rig ht to b e re as o n ab ly protec ted from the constant threat of assaults and violenc e by fellow inmates. See City of W aco v. H ester , 805 S.W .2d 80 7, 81 2– 13 (T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 1 99 0, wr it d e nie d) . Ape rv a siv e ri sk of ha rm is de e me d to e xist when inmates a

re a ssaulted by other prisoners with such fre quency that there is a rea sonable fe ar f or the ir sa fe ty a nd ja il pe rs on ne l are re a so na bly a pp ri se d of the e xiste nc e of the thr e a t to i nmate sa fe ty and the ne ed for

protec tive action. Id. a t 81 6; se e als o S tat e v . M un gia , 1 1 9 S. W. 3 d

8 1 4 , 8 1 7 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ) ( c on c lud ingno c on sti tut ion a l viol a tio n ha d oc c ur re d whe re re c or d s ho we d o nly the possibilit y

appellee may

be killed if sent to prison). I n deter mining whe ther the c onditions of confinement violate t h e E ighth Ame ndment, the courts conside r all of the c ircumstance s of incar cer ation in or der to a rrive at a de cision as to whether19

the circ umstances a ffr ont contempora ry standards of

dece ncy . Rhodes , 452 U. S. at 36 2– 63 ; Ste war t v. W inter , 669 F.2d 3 2 8 , 3 3 5

– 3 6 (5th Cir. [M iss.] 1982). The se vera l conditions that mi g ht lend themselves to finding an over all violation must have a m utually enfor cing eff ect that r esults in the deprivation of a sing le, identifiable huma n need suc h as food, wa

rmth, or exercise. W

ilson , 5 01 U. S. at 304. Her e, the e viden ce u p on which J.M. relies is primarily anec dotal, showing attempts at intimi dation by

other TYC de tainees a

nd repe ated fig hts a

mong those other de tainees, a ll of which appar ently

has ca used him to fear

for his saf

ety . He ha s not a lleg ed that he has ac tually suffe red a

ny ph y sic a l ha

rm by e ith e r ot he r d e ta ine e s o r a c tio n o n th e pa rt of TY C of fi c ia ls t o unr e a so na

bly discipline him. For the most part, people w ho ar e p ro n e t o o b ey rules and to f

ollow the g ener al mores of society are unlikely

to be housed in TYC; it is not a churc h camp. I t is li kely that J .M.' s experience is not substantially differ ent from most other persons in the custody of TYC and he is, in essence , reque sting that we find that any one who is plac ed in the custody of TYC has be en depr iv ed of constitutional rights. J.M .' s testimony and the qua

rterly repor ts conce rning the re porting of incidence s made within TYC do not e stablish a n Eig hth A mendment violation. The public has he ard that TY C ha s e xpe ri e nc e d a g oo d d e a l of

sa fe ty c on c e rn s and

pr ob le ms w ithre po rt ingof inc ide nc e s, espec ially conce rning misconduct by staff. H oweve r, J.M .' s acc ount of his treatment and experienc e in the McL ennan U nit fails t o demonstrate the evidenc e of c ruel a nd unusual punishment. Accor dingJ .M. relies a g reat deal on M

orales v. Turman , 3 6 4 F
. S u p p . 1 6 6 ( E
. D
. T e x . 1 9 7 3 )

. In 6 Mor a les , the cour

t addre ssed both widespre ad and r ampant phy sical and psycholog ical abuse by staff a t T YC , in c lud ingse g re g a tio n a nd be a tin g s a

nd the pr a c tic e of pla c ing juv e nil e s in a TY C f a c ili ty without a hear ing on the dange r t o society posed by the j uvenile. The Morales court c oncluded that the tr e a tme nt o f t

he c la ss o f j uv e nil e s r an a fo ul o f t he Ei g hth Am e ndme nt a

nd that th e pla c e me nt i n TY C c us tod

y wi tho ut a

he aringvio la te d th e juv e nil e s' ri g hts to d ue pr oc e ss. B a se d o n th e se co n cl u s i o n s , t h e c o u rt o rd er edem e r gen cy t em p o ra ry

re l i ef i n1 9 7 3 , en

j o i n i n g a n u mb er

o f T YC 's prac tices, setting forth prac tices to sc ree n prospec tive TYC staff, a nd prohibiting seg reg ation. Id. at 175–76. Ten y ear s and much li t i gat i o n later a nd afte r a virtua l overha

ul of the juvenile justice sy stem, the ca se wa s settled. See Morales v. Turman , 569 F. Supp. 332 ( E
. D. Tex . 1983). The instant case va

ries in both nature and deg ree . J .M. does not a lleg e phy sical abuse by TYC staff; he a lle g e s th e thr e a t by

oth e r i nmat es po ses a

ri sk of ha rm to h im a nd that th e sta ff

ha s f a ile d to adequately

reduc e that risk. F urther, the deg ree of a b u s e and improper proc edure prese nt in the Morales case is shocking, f ar more widespre ad and ide ntifiable than the e vi d en ce p re s ented here. We also note that the Morales case was not, a s here , based almost solely upon the per sonal ane cdotal renditions of a sing le y outh, but involved an in-depth examination of the entire TYC sy stem. 20 to J .M., he did repor

t the t hreats made fr om the other juvenile c oncer ning the shank and thre atene d sexual assault. The re cord sug g ests that at some point following his re p o rt o r reports, the staff
co n d u ct eda s ea rc h o f t h e d o rm i t o ry an d re co v er ed t h e s h an k s , o n e o f wh i ch wa s fo u n d u n d er J
. M
. 's be d. F ur the r, J.M. w a s mo ve d a

wa y fr om t hat pa rt ic ula r j uv e nil e . Whil e it is not e nti re ly c le a r, it appea rs there is a common sleeping room at the fa cility , and J.M. was moved to the other side of that
common are a. J .M.' s specific testimony conce rning the threats while in the fac ility are limit ed to the threats from this juvenile which, from the r ecor d, appea r to have been a ddresse d. His more g ener al testimony reg ardingthe g angrec ruitment provides ver y l ittle detail other than a threat of being

a c c os te d if

he did no t jo in. Th e re c or d is no t c le ar t hat he re po rt e d th os e inc ide nts
. I t appea rs that J .M.' s stay

at the fac ility has not be en a pleasa nt one ; the Constit ution does not g ua ra nte e tha t it wi ll be

. I t do e s a

pp e ar the sta ff ha s take n me a sure s to re mov e or re du c e the ri sk 6Even if J.M. satisfied the Farmer test , t h e p ro per r emedy

is likely not to allow J .M. to be 7 back on probation as he reque sts. A consti tutional violation relating to prison c onditions does not usually entitle a prisoner

to relea se, but to an injunction ag ainst the prohibited pra ctices or an orde r requiring the corr ection of unconstitutional conditions. Coo k v . H an be rry , 596 F .2 d 658 , 6 60 (5 th Cir. 1979). I n some instances, c ourts have or dere d prison officia ls to station s peci fi c numbers of g ua rd s in a re a s w he re the thr e a t of vio le nc e wa s h ig h in

or de r t o p ro te c t th e general i nmate population. See W

illiams v. Edwards , 547 F.2d 1206, 1213–14 ( 5th Cir. 1977). 21 to J .M. posed by

the threa tening juvenile. So, now that the sear ch remove d the shanks with which he was threatened and remove d J .M. awa y from that juvenile, J .M. cannot e stablish that he continues to e x perie nce a sufficie ntly serious risk of harm. Fur ther, a nd more de finitively , J .M.' s contention fails to establish that TYC officia ls did not take steps to addre ss J .M.' s conce rns for sa fety , and TYC
ca n n o tb e s ai d

t o h av e a ct edi nre ck l es s d i s re gar d o f t h e t h re at s p o s edt o J
. M
. W e o v erru l e J
. M
. 's po int of e rr or c on c e rn ingc ru e l and

unus ua l pu

nis hme nt. 7 3. F ur th e r Co nsid e r at ion s C onc e r ning Judi c ialRo le Fur ther, we are mindful of our role in the administration of justice. When r eviewingpolicies desig ned to pre serve internal orde r, discipline, and se curity , a cour t should acc ord broad defe renc e t o p ri s o n administrators re g ardingthe re asonable ness of the sc ope, the manne r, the plac e, and the justification of a pa

rticular policy

. Bl oc k

v . R uth e rfo rd , 4 68 U. S. 5 76 , 5 85 (1 98 4) ; Hay v . W aldron , 834 F.2d 481, 486 ( 5th Cir. 1 9 8 7 ). I n other wor ds, courts should play a ver y limit ed role in the administration of detention fa cilities. Block, 468 U.S. at 584.22

B. Equ al P rote ction 1. J.M.'s Contention The Equa l Protection Clause of the Fe dera l a nd State Constit utions prevents the g overnme nt fr om d isc ri min a tin g a g a ins t any pe rs on or c la ss of pe rs on s. U. S. C O N ST . ame nd . X I V; T EX . C O N ST . art . I , § 3; se e In gram v . S tat e , 124 S.W .3d 672, 677–78 (Tex. A pp.—Eastland 2003, no pet.). One
c la imi ngthat hi s r ig ht t o e qu a l pr ote c tio n o f t he law mus t sh owthat a state a c tor

int e nti on a lly discriminated ag ainst him because of hi s membership in a protected class. Henry v. Me tro. Sewer Di st. , 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990). " Unless a statute c halleng ed on equa l-protec tion gr ounds int e rf e re s wi th a

fu nd a me nta l r ig ht o r d isc ri min a te s a g a ins t a su sp e c t c la ss, we re vie w t hat st a tut e
us in g the r ati on al- bas is tes t. " Ingram , 1 2 4 S
. W
. 3 d at 6 7 7 (c i t i n g Blac k

v . S tat e , 2 6 S. W. 3 d

8 9 5 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 )) . T he ratio na l- ba sis te st pr ov ide s tha t leg isl a tio n is pre su me d to be va lid and wi ll be su sta ine d if

the c la ssi fi c a tio n d

ra wn by the statut e is r a tio na lly re la te d to a le g iti ma te state int e re st. City of C le bu rn e v . Cl eburneLiv ing Ctr

. , 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Protec tion of the public hea lth, safe ty , morals, or some other phase of the g ener al welfa re is a leg itimate state interest. Ingram , 124 S.W .3d at 678. The Ingram c ourt qu ote s: The L eg islature m ay

classify law violators and impose diff ere nt penalties, inhibitions and re strictions upon the sever al classes, provided there is a rea sonable basis for the classification. I n deter mining whe ther ther e i s a re asonable basis for the classification there is a g ener al presumption that the L eg islature has done its duty , not vio la te d th e Con sti tut ion ; and the re fo re the c la ssi fi c a tio n w ill be up he ld u nle ss i t a pp e ars , c le arl y

and wi tho ut d ou

bt, that it ha s n o r e a so na

ble ba sis of

su pp or t.J .M does not and, it seems, is not permitted to appea l a depa rture f rom the Sanction L evel 8 Assignme nt Model. T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 59.014(3) (Vernon 2008). The model is treated more as a g uide than a ma

ndatory classification scheme. In re C.C

. , 1 3 S
. W
. 3 d 8 5 4 , 8 5 8 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.). 23 Ingram , 1 2 4 S
. W
. 3 d

at 6 7 7

– 7 8 (q u o t i n g W

atts v. Mann , 187 S.W .2d 917, 9 2 4 (T ex. C iv. App.—Austin 1945, pet. ref ' d)). An equal protec tion c halleng e to the rational basis will fail "if the re is any rea sonably

conce ivable state of fac ts that could provide a rational basis for the c lassification." FCC v. Beach Comm c'ns , Inc. , 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). J .M. argues that " [O] thers who evidently have a cce ss to money

throug h county

funding are place d [at the W illoughby Center]." We h av e taken J.M.'s ar g ument as one c omplaining of the following state ac tion: the trial court' s decision to commit him to custody of TYC rather than pla cing him in another fa cility

such as the Wil loughby Center. Although J.M. arg ues that he is a me mber of a suspe ct class, he does not deve lop its application. The matter is complicated by the discussion at t he modi fication hear ing conce rning state funding. That aside, ac cordingto the Sanction L evel Assignme nt Model, the trial cour t could have been authorized to assig n J .M. a level highe r than five

. 8 Section 59.009 could be a pplied to these facts, assigning a level six sanction including commitment to TYC. The re cord be fore us sugg ests that the Will oug hby Center is a place for sa nction level five of fe nd e rs .24 2. Exa m ining F unding Co nsid e r at ion s Her e, ther e wa s some discussion reg ardingavailability of state f

unding, but nothing
conce rning J .M.' s economic status. His ability to pay any fines or r estitution does not appear to have be e n a fa c tor in t he tr ia l c ourt ' s d e c isi on

to c omm it J.M . to TY C. F un d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w e r e d i s c u s s e d a s a p art o f t h e t r i a l c o u rt ' s d e c i s i o n t o c omm it a juvenile to TYC in In re S.G. , N o . 0 4

- 0 4

- 0 0 4 7 5
- CV , 2 0 0 5 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 2 5 6 0 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio Apr. 6, 2005, no pe t.) (mem. op.). I n S.G. , the trial cour

t had ag ree d with the pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e r' s r e c omm e nd a tio n th a t pl a c e me nt at a c ounty fa c ili ty " wa s ina pp ro pr ia te be c a

us e it was 'prob ati on res ou rces .'" Id . at *11. The trial c ourt ultimately decide d that commitment to TYC
was mo re ap pro pri ate becau se "res ou rces wou ld com e fro m th e S tat e rat her th an the Co un ty ." Id. The S.G. court ex plained that such reason did not conf orm to the stated g oals of the juvenile justice code. See T EX . F AM . C ODE ANN . § 51 .0 1 ( Ve rn on 20 08 ) (s ta tin g that pr ima ry c on c e rn of

juv e nil e justice code is to provide for pr otection of public and public safe ty balanc ed with g oal of providing fo r c ar e a n d

p ro t ec t i o no f j u v en i l e wh i l e pl ac i n g an em p h as i s o n a pr o gra m o f t re at m en t , t ra i n i n g,
an d re h ab i l i t at i o n ). T h e c o u rt re v er s ed t h e tr i al co u rt 's j u d gm en t , co n cl u d i n g t h at t h e w ri t t en o rd er 's pr ima ry re a so n f or re vo c a tio n

w a s th a t th e juv e nil e ha d e xha us te d p ro batio n' s atte mpt s to re ha bil itate her. S.G. , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 2560, at *12. The re cord, how ever , showed insuffic ient evidenc e to s u p p o rt t h e t r i a l c o u rt ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t p r o b a t i o n h a d e xp e n d e d a l l r e s o u r c e s i n an e ff or t to reha bilitate the juvenile. Id.25

Unlike S.G. , the re cord he re contains sufficie nt evidenc e to support the trial cour t's de cision to place J.M. in TYC custody

. The trial court did not indicate that he made such dec ision based on any economic considerations. The discussion of funding at the hea ring here was, a s the S.G. court explained, inconsistent with the s tated goals of the juvenile justice c ode. The rec ords indicate that J .M. was no long er e ligible f or pl ace ment as a level five offe nder. The trial cour t's de cision here was
s u p p o rt edb y

re l ev an tev i d en ce , an d

t h e r ec o rds h o ws t h at t h e f u n d i n g d i s cu s s i o n , al t h o u gh inappropriate, was not the ba sis for the trial c ourt' s decision. L ooking at the trial court' s action an d co n s i d er i n g that J .M. is not a member of a suspect
c la ss, we a

pp ly the ratio na l- ba sis te st. He re , b a se d o n s e ve ra l se ri ou s f e lon ie s a nd mis de me a no rs , the tr ia l c ourt c ou ld have a ssi g ne d a sanc tio n le ve l hig he r t ha n th a t pe rm itt e d at th e sp e c if ic fa c ili ty which J.M. prefer s, providing a rational ba sis for the ac tion and classifica t i o n. Apply ing the

ratio na l- ba sis te st t o th e Sanc tio n L e ve l A ssi g nme nt M od e l in Se c tio n 5 9. 00 3 of the Te xas F a mil y Code, we de termine that the State ha s a leg itimate inter est in pr otecting the public health, saf ety , and morals. J .M. has not overc ome t he gene ral presumption that the State has not violated the U nited States or Texas Constit utions. W e over rule this point of err or. IV . CO NC LU SION Be cause the trial cour

t did not abuse i t s d i s cr et i on by modify ing J.M.'s disposition and
c omm itt inghim

to T YC , b e c a

us e the mod if

ic a tio n ord e r is suf

fi c ie ntl y sp e c if ic , a nd be c a us e J.M. has fa iled to establish that his commit ment to TYC is cruel and unusua l punishment or is a violation26

of his rig ht to equal protec tion of the law, we overr ule his points of error . J .M. is corre ct in that the modification order

contains an e rror

when it states t h at t heft, in this situation, i s punishable by confine ment; that error , howeve r, does not a ffe ct the validity of the order or the outcome of the ca se. We have a

nd do exercise the a

uthority to corre ct t he trial court' s order to refle ct that the off

ense of theft, on these f

acts, is not, as t he order st ates, punishable by confine ment. We aff irm the judg ment
as cor rec ted.

Ba iley C. Moseley J ustice Date Submitted: April 2, 2009 Date D ecide d: J une 16, 2009