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	PACOM Before the House Appropriations Committee Remarks 
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        <h1 class="title">PACOM Before the House Appropriations Committee Remarks </h1>
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    <div><b>By Commander, US Pacific Command, Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, III</b> <span class="date">/ Published March 18, 2015</span></div>
    <span class="dateline-text"></span>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">Presenter: Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander, U.S., Pacific Command:  Chairman Frelinghuysen, Congressman Visclosky, and
distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to address the committee.
This will be my fourth and final opportunity to provide an Indo-Asia-Pacific
assessment since taking command of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) in
March 2012. For over three years, I have had the extraordinary privilege to
lead Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians
selflessly serving our nation. These dedicated men and women and their families
are doing an amazing job and I am proud to serve alongside them.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">In concert with allies and partners, USPACOM balances
historical and cultural factors against modern day political and economic
events in an ever-evolving effort to manage friction and conflict in the most
militarized region in the world. These actions are designed to defend the
homeland, strengthen and modernize our alliances and partnerships, maintain
access to areas of common interest, counter aggression, prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and defeat violent extremism.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">What follows is my assessment of the region’s security
environment, including the current and future challenges and opportunities for
USPACOM forces. My testimony includes an update on major areas of concern in
the security environment, allies and partners in the region, building and
strengthening relationships, and maintaining an effective and assured presence.</span> </p>
<o:p>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">Security Environment<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The Indo-Asia-Pacific remains one of the most dynamic
regions on earth. It is vital to U.S. economic and security interests, and
activities in the region will shape much of our nation’s future. The region
encompasses 52% of the earth’s surface and is composed of 83% water and 17%
land. Over half of the people on the planet reside on that 17% of land, and by
the middle of the century, the Indo-Asia-Pacific will potentially contain 70%
of the world’s population. This high population density coupled with
destabilizing factors such as natural disasters, climate change, ideological
radicalism, and population migration will continue to put immense pressure on
regional governments. Contained in the thirty-six nations in USPACOM’s area of
responsibility are the world’s two largest economies after the U.S. (China and
Japan), and five smallest economies. The region also contains the world’s most
populous nation (China), the largest democracy (India), the largest Muslim-majority
(Indonesia), and the smallest republic (Nauru). It contains seven of the ten
largest standing militaries, five nuclear nations, and five of the U.S.’s seven
mutual defense treaty alliances. The socioeconomic diversity and population
density throughout the USPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) create strategic
long-term challenges. These challenges include: political instability, social
inequality, poverty, increased sensitivity to climate change and natural
disasters, risk of pandemic disease, and epidemic drug use and distribution.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
In addition to these challenges, the U.S. must continue to
deter North Korean provocation, ensure access to air and sea lanes, encourage
peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in the East and South China
Seas, respond to natural disasters and theater health issues, check the flow of
violent extremists from the Middle East to violent extremist organizations
(VEOs) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, address transnational crimes, monitor an
increasingly active Russia, and constructively engage a rising China. Despite
all of the challenges, the theater possesses opportunities for the U.S., its
allies, and its partners. In order to capitalize on these opportunities, foster
the region’s economic potential, and provide the security and stability
necessary to protect areas of common interest, USPACOM remains engaged.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The Indo-Asia-Pacific requires stable political institutions
to effectively govern and prosper. Overall, but with notable exceptions, the
countries of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region are more politically stable than in
previous years. The general health of democratic institutions across the region
is evidenced by several critical leadership transitions which occurred last
year. Successful, peaceful participatory elections occurred in India and
Indonesia. Sri Lanka achieved a peaceful transition of power following its
January election. Fiji took a major step toward moving past its 2006 military
coup by holding elections last September. Citizens in many countries were able
to peacefully protest without fear of oppressive action. While these activities
are reassuring, challenges remain. For example, Thailand’s military coup
removed a democratically elected administration, and interim leaders have yet
to restore a democratic government.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">North Korea:</span></b>
North Korea remains the most dangerous and unpredictable security challenge.
The regime continues its aggressive attitude while advancing its nuclear
capability and ballistic missile programs. While the international community
continues to urge North Korea to live up to its international obligations and
return to authentic credible negotiations under the Six-Party Talks framework,
North Korea has unfortunately shown no willingness to seriously discuss its
denuclearization commitments and obligations, and additional nuclear tests
remain possible. It is expected that North Korea will continue to showcase
ballistic missile development (to include mobile intercontinental ballistic
missiles and intermediate range Musudan missiles) and conduct launches in
direct violation of several United Nations Security Council Resolutions (such
as the short-range ballistic missile launches in March 2015). North Korea
already announced its intent to conduct “annual and regular” drills to advance
this prohibited capability.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Additionally, North Korea demonstrated the will to employ
cyber techniques to impose costly damage to civilian companies, as was
demonstrated in the high-profile attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. North
Korean cyber actors continue to conduct cyber actions against South Korean
military and civilian networks. USPACOM remains concerned about the destructive
nature of this state sponsored cyber-attack targeting a commercial entity and
its employees in the United States. These actions demonstrate North Korea’s
disregard for international norms. North Korea’s actions are beyond the bounds
of acceptable state behavior in cyberspace.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Territorial and
Maritime Issues:</span></b> Territorial and maritime issues in the East and South
China Seas, if not handled properly, may negatively impact stability in the
regional and the security environment. The claimants' use of maritime law
enforcement vessels to enforce their claims has largely kept these issues out
of the military sphere, despite a steady increase in military air and sea
patrols. While no country appears to desire military conflict, an escalation
due to a tactical miscalculation cannot be ruled out.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
In the East China Sea, Japan and China both claim
sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. While the United States does not take a
position on ultimate sovereignty over the islands, it has long recognized
Japanese administration of them. China’s behavior in the area has resulted in
close encounters at sea, aggressive Chinese air intercepts of Japanese
reconnaissance flights, inflammatory strategic messaging, and the no-notice
declaration of a Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The South China Sea issues are complex. Six claimants
(China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines) have
overlapping claims in the South China Sea. As the South China Sea claimants’
populations and economies continue to grow, access to the oil, gas, minerals,
and fisheries within the South China Sea becomes more important. Claimants
appear to be asserting their claims through increased maritime patrols, outpost
and facility construction, and land reclamation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
China has the broadest claim with its self-proclaimed
“Nine-Dash line” that covers almost the entire South China Sea. China’s lack of
clarity with regard to its South China Sea claims, and China’s attempts to
unilaterally enforce its ambiguous claims, has created uncertainty in the
region. Any use of the nine-dash line by China to claim maritime rights not
based on claimed land features would not align with international law. The
international community would welcome China to clarify or adjust its nine-dash
line claim and bring it into accordance with the international law of the sea,
as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
To achieve its long-term goals in the region, China is
executing a strategy that includes expanding outposts in contested areas
through land reclamation on South China Sea features, taking actions to prevent
other nations from establishing / maintaining outposts, exploring for natural
resources in disputed waters, and increasing its naval and air forces’ presence
through exercises and patrols. China’s aggressive land reclamation and
construction projects at eight South China Sea military outposts include new
buildings, more capable berthing space for ships, and presumably an airfield on
the Fiery Cross Reef (China’s largest reclamation project). Although land
reclamation cannot, for example, change a submerged feature into a natural
island that generates any legal entitlements to maritime zones, the completion
of these projects will give China the ability for greater presence, increase
dwell time for military and coast guard assets, and expand the areas covered by
surveillance and area-denial systems. Examples of activities supporting China’s
long-term strategy include attempts to block resupply missions to the small
Philippine garrison at Second Thomas Shoal and exclude Philippine and other
fishermen from the disputed Scarborough Reef. Last year, China also moved a
China National Offshore Oil Corporation drilling platform into Vietnam’s
claimed Exclusive Economic Zone resulting in a tense standoff between
Vietnamese and Chinese maritime assets substantially increasing the possibility
of miscalculation between the two countries.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The U.S. does not take a position on issues of sovereignty
with respect to territorial claims in the East and South China Sea, but we do
insist that all maritime claims must be derived from land features in
accordance with international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention. The U.S. also continues to emphasize the importance that maritime
and territorial disagreements be resolved peacefully in accordance with
international law and opposes the use of intimidation, coercion, or force to
assert claims. An example of such an attempt at peaceful resolution is the
Philippines’ arbitration against China under the Law of the Sea Convention that
is being heard by a tribunal in The Hague. Of note, China has refused to
participate in this arbitration to date.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Natural Disasters</span></b>:
The Indo-Asia-Pacific accounted for over 40% (1,690 incidences) of the world’s
reported natural disasters during the period between 2004 and 2013, and,
because of the region’s coastal population density, these disasters were
particularly deadly, claiming more than 700,000 lives. The Pacific Rim's
tectonic plate structure produces its well-known Ring of Fire, which regularly
triggers earthquakes, volcanoes, and tsunamis. Weather extremes and anomalies
continue to plague the region. Understanding the scope and severity of
long-term climate change, unexpected climate shocks, and climate variability
events such as El Nino are shared global challenges.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
In addition to seismic and climate challenges, areas of
large populations, dense living conditions, and poor sanitary conditions in the
region create optimal conditions for the rapid spread of human- or animal-borne
diseases. To address these challenges, USPACOM focuses on pre-crisis
preparedness with training and exercises. For example, many of the lessons
learned and preparedness measures implemented after Typhoon Haiyan (Operation
Damayan, November 2013) resulted in less damage and loss of life when Typhoon
Hagupit passed over the Philippines last December. U.S. forces regularly train
with allies and partners on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
operations and stand ready to respond in support of interagency partners to a
natural disaster or the frequent vectors of disease that plague the region.
Regional information sharing and rapid response to health crises are improving,
but the danger remains high. USPACOM will continue to focus on improving
pre-crisis preparedness and working with allies and partners in the region to
ensure an effective response when an event occurs.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Violent Extremism:</span></b>
The ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq attracts foreign fighters from countries
throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Current assessments indicate approximately
1,300 foreign personnel fighting alongside the self-proclaimed Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant are from the Indo-Asia-Pacific. A small number of these
combat-experienced fighters who return home could enhance the capability of
regional extremist networks within the most densely populated areas of the
world. In South Asia, partner nations maintain pressure on extremist networks
but face a persistent threat from transnational groups that continue adapting
to shifting geopolitical factors, competition among global extremist groups,
and counterterrorism actions by the U.S. and its regional allies. Al-Qa’ida’s
increased rhetoric focused on South Asia and the announcement of a new
affiliate, “Al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent,” suggest Al-Qai’da will focus
resources on uniting established terrorist groups to engage in jihad in South
Asia. Lashkar-e Tayyiba and other Pakistan-based groups continue fighting in
Afghanistan, but they will likely shift some of their operational focus to the
Indian Subcontinent in the next one to three years as Coalition forces
drawdown. In Southeast Asia, regional partners maintain persistent pressure on
extremist networks; however, competing security priorities in the region,
coupled with the sensationalism of developments in the Middle East, have
pressurized counter-terrorism attention. Extremist groups are increasingly
interconnected and the region remains a potential safe haven, facilitation hub,
and area of operations for extremists.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Proliferation Issues: Rapidly developing technology
manufacturing sectors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have in many states
outpaced the concurrent development of those states’ effective export controls.
The region includes some of the busiest maritime and air ports in the world
with shipments of proliferation concern likely passing through these ports
almost daily. These shipments include dual-use items—commercial items
controlled by the nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical/biological weapons
control regimes, others covered by associated catch all controls—manufactured
in or re-exported from states with spotty export control enforcement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Iran built its robust nuclear infrastructure and advanced
its ballistic missile systems with materials that passed through the USPACOM
AOR; North Korea continues to procure for its nuclear and ballistic missile
programs—and proliferate conventional arms for revenue generation—using a
network of individuals and entities throughout the region. PACOM engages
regional partners in capacity-building activities designed to improve export
controls and interdiction capabilities in the region. In August 2014 PACOM
hosted personnel from 31 nations as part of the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) Exercise Fortune Guard, which marked the beginning of a
six-year series of exercises that various “expert” nations in the region will
host. (New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea and the United
States) Exercises such as Fortune Guard provide nations a forum to demonstrate
the intention to act and share the best tactics against proliferators,
emphasizing a whole-of-government approach to confront this complex challenge.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Transnational
Crime:</span></b> There is a growing trend for regional human and drug trafficking
organizations to operate as global enterprises. In addition to the devastating
impact widespread drug use has on a society, the revenue generated from these
illicit activities fund terrorists and Violent Extremist Organizations.
Methamphetamine and amphetamine-type stimulants continue to be the primary drug
threat in the USPACOM AOR. The majority of Methamphetamine available in the
United States comes from Mexico, primarily across the South West Border Region,
and an estimated 90% of the precursor chemicals used to produce Mexican
Methamphetamine comes from China. Further, the annual volume of Methamphetamine
seizures made along the United States South West Border Region has exceeded
Cocaine seizures in the past three years.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Nearly 21
million victims of human trafficking are estimated worldwide and nearly
two-thirds are from Asia, with India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand
among the countries with the highest number of victims. Women and children –
especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors – are the most
vulnerable demographics. Roughly a quarter end up in the commercial sex trade,
while others are forced into difficult and dangerous positions in factories,
farms, or as child soldiers. Still others are bound to families as domestic
servants. Human trafficking victims often suffer physical and emotional abuse
and social stigmatization while being denied their basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms. While awareness is rising, much remains to be done to
combat this particularly heinous crime. USPACOM forces build partnership
capacity and share intelligence in order to combat these transnational threats.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Russian Intent:</span></b><span style="line-height: 115%; font-size: 11.5pt;"> Russia is reasserting itself
politically and militarily in the Pacific. In the USPACOM AOR, Russian Navy and
Long Range Aviation operational tempo have recently increased significantly,
but not above Cold War levels. Though challenged by maintenance and logistical
issues, Russian Navy cruisers, destroyers and frigates have increased their
operations and reach. The Russian Pacific Fleet sent ships to support
operations in the Middle East and Europe, while Russian ships from the Baltic
and Black Sea Fleets deployed into the Asia-Pacific. Russian BEAR bombers and
reconnaissance aircraft regularly fly missions in the Sea of Japan and continue
operations as far east as Alaska and the west coast of the continental U.S. The
anticipated fielding later this year of Russia’s newest class of nuclear
ballistic missile submarine (Borei-class SSBN) and upgrades to Russia’s
land-based ballistic missiles will modernize Moscow’s nuclear capability in the
Asia-Pacific. Russian ballistic missile and attack submarines remain active in
our region. Russia aims to demonstrate military capabilities commensurate with
its Pacific interests: ensuring Russian sovereignty, sovereign rights, and
jurisdiction in the Asia-Pacific, strengthening its sphere of influence, and
projecting a credible deterrent force.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="line-height: 115%; font-size: 11.5pt; text-decoration: underline;">Chinese Military Modernization and
Strategic Intent: </span></b></span><span style="line-height: 115%; font-size: 11.5pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">Recent statements by senior PRC leaders, such as PRC President Xi
Jinping, suggest that the PRC may be attempting to advance a vision for an
alternative security architecture in Asia that affords Beijing increased
influence in the region and diminishes the role of the United States. This
Chinese view was highlighted in Shanghai last summer at the Conference on
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia. At the conference,
President Xi Jinping called on all of Asia to support the development of a new
security order centered on China. The proposed new order also requires a
curtailment of alliance-strengthening diplomacy, of which the “U.S. Rebalance
to Asia” is noted as the greatest offender. China is proposing an alternative
strategy to regional security issues where the U.S. plays, at best, a
deferential role.    <br />
</span><span style="line-height: 115%; font-size: 11.5pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-latin; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA;"><br />
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
China is engaged in a comprehensive military modernization program to
transform its forces into a high-tech military capable of conducting complex
operations. Many of China’s initiatives are intended to develop capabilities to
deter or counter third-party intervention in regional contingencies. These
anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities are focused on controlling access
and freedom of operations in vast portions of the air and maritime domains, as
well as space and cyberspace. These include a series of sophisticated and
increasingly long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,
air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and kinetic and non-kinetic
counter-space systems. China is also making significant advances in electronic
warfare capabilities, which are contributing to the A2AD challenge.</span></span></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">China continues an aggressive ship building program to
produce and field advanced frigates, destroyers, and the first in-class
cruiser-sized warship. Chinese shipyards are also producing newer, more capable
submarines as they inactivate older submarines, resulting in a fleet that is
not growing substantially in number but is significantly more capable. Advances
in China’s strategic capabilities remain significant. China now has three
operational JIN-class ballistic missile submarines (Type 094), and up to five
more may enter service by the end of the decade. The JIN-class submarine
carries the JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missile with a range capable of
reaching the U.S. and will give China its first credible sea-based nuclear
deterrent. Nuclear deterrence patrols will likely commence this year. Lastly,
we expect China to soon begin constructing an indigenous aircraft carrier.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">China is using computer network exploitation capabilities to
support intelligence collection to advance its defense and high-tech
industries. Through a sophisticated cyber program, China is generating insights
on U.S. security policies, defense networks, logistics, and military
capabilities.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
As the Chinese military modernizes its capabilities and
expands its presence in Asia, U.S. forces are drawn into closer and more
frequent contact and the risk of an accident or miscalculation increases. This
places a premium on efforts to increase mutual understanding and trust in order
to reduce risk. The Chinese Navy is more frequently operating in the Indian
Ocean, expanding the area and duration of operations and exercises in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, and periodically venturing into other
non-traditional areas, as exemplified by recent port visits to Europe. The
complexity of the regional and global security environment, as well as China’s
military advancements, necessitates a continuous dialogue between the U.S. and
Chinese militaries to expand practical cooperation where national interests
converge and discuss areas where goals diverge, especially during periods of
friction.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Allies and Partners<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The U.S.’ five treaty allies in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are:
Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. In addition to
U.S. treaty alliances, the U.S. continues to strengthen existing partnerships
and build new relationships to advance common interests and address shared
concerns. U.S. allies and key partners in the theater play a fundamental role
in addressing the security challenges. Strengthening and modernizing alliances
and partnerships is a top USPACOM priority.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Australia:</span></b>
Australia continues to be a close, steadfast, and effective ally in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific. The alliance anchors peace and stability in the region, and
Australia has taken a leading role in addressing regional security and
capacity-building issues, including lead roles in Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief events. Australia is also a key contributor to global security,
including counter-ISIL efforts in Iraq and the Resolute Support mission in
Afghanistan. With the ongoing implementation of the Force Posture Initiatives,
which provide expanded opportunities for bilateral and multilateral engagement,
the Marine Rotational Force- Darwin successfully completed its third rotation
while increasing its presence from 250 to 1,177 U.S. Marines. The U.S. Air
Force is increasing its rotation of aircraft to Australia. In addition to the
Force Posture Initiatives, the U.S. and Australia are identifying additional
opportunities to increase collaboration in counter-terrorism, space, cyber, and
integrated air missile defense and regional capacity building. Australia is
procuring a number of high-tech platforms that will increase interoperability
such as the F-35 Lightning II, P-8 Poseidon, C-17 Globemaster III, and EA-18G
Growler aircraft as well as Global Hawk UAVs and MH-60R helicopters. To ensure
greater synchronization and integration, the Australian Government provides a
General Officer and a Senior Executive to USPACOM, as well as another General
Officer to U.S. Army Pacific, as tangible examples of a mutual commitment to
the alliance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Japan:</span></b> The
U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong and productive through both countries’
shared commitment to a full range of military capabilities with expanding
responsibility for training, exercises, interoperability, and bilateral
planning. Japan's 2013 National Security Strategy and the 1 July 2014 cabinet
decision on collective self-defense are positive developments and indicators of
Japan’s ability and willingness to assume a greater role in the regional
security architecture. The Abe administration will submit implementing
legislation to the National Diet during its spring session, and debate is
expected to conclude in summer 2015. The US-Japan Guidelines for Defense
Cooperation are being revised, and that process will conclude with public
presentation of the Guidelines in the near future. We are hopeful that Japan’s
upcoming legislative changes support new and expanded forms of cooperation.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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U.S. Forces Japan continues to build its close relationship
with the Japanese Joint Staff to enhance interoperability and information
sharing through realistic training, exercises, and bilateral planning. USPACOM
will continue to maintain a robust military presence in Japan to meet future
security challenges and encourage greater trilateral military engagements with
the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
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Efforts continue toward improving US-Japan-ROK trilateral
coordination in response to North Korean provocative behavior. The December
2014 signature of the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement
is a positive first step toward greater information sharing on North Korean
missile and nuclear threats.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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As Japan increases its defense spending, it is procuring a
number of high-tech platforms that will increase interoperability such as the
F-35 Lightning II aircraft, MV-22 Ospreys, and the Global Hawk UAV, as well as
upgrading existing AEGIS destroyers with the latest BMD capability and
constructing two additional AEGIS destroyers (for a total of eight BMD capable
platforms). Each North Korean ballistic missile provocation validates the
investment of the AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan to provide ISR against missile
threats. Last year's addition of the second radar in Japan and forward
deploying two additional BMD capable ships will enhance our ability to defend
our ally and the region, as well as provide early warning of missile threats to
the U.S. homeland. Lastly, Japan continues to make significant infrastructure
investments in country that complement the realignment of U.S. Marines from
Okinawa to Guam including expanding the airfield and associated facilities at
Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and construction of the Futenma Replacement
Facility. It is important that these initiatives remain on track.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Philippines:</span></b>
The U.S.-Philippine alliance remains a positive source of strength and regional
stability. Building upon the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the U.S. and the Government of the
Philippines was signed last April. Through enhanced U.S. rotational presence,
the EDCA provides expanded opportunities to conduct theater security
cooperation activities and supports the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
as it shifts focus from internal security to external defense. Full EDCA
implementation awaits the outcome of a case before the Philippine Supreme
Court, where deliberations could last into this summer.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
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After more than a decade, the Joint Special Operations Task
Force created to counter Violent Extremist Organizations in the Philippines
will stand down and the AFP will sustain that mission. Training and advising
objectives that were set to address organizations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group
and Jemaah Islamiyah have been met. Although the Task Force is standing down, a
small USPACOM footprint will remain embedded in the Philippines to continue
working with the AFP leadership and planning staffs. The AFP has demonstrated
an increased capacity and capability to handle domestic threats inside their
country, but USPACOM will remain committed to supporting and advising the AFP
at the operational level.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Competing claims in the South China Sea continue to be a
source of friction and instability. China continues large-scale land
reclamation around disputed features. Furthermore, periodic resupply and troop
rotations to the small Philippine outpost at Second Thomas Shoal (also known as
Ayungin Shoal) are well-known points of contention with the Chinese government.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Republic of Korea:</span></b>
The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance remains strong and vital, and
enduring for over six decades. Our militaries integrate complementary
capabilities and enhance the relationship with honest and frank dialogue.
During the most recent annual discussions, the U.S. and ROK agreed to delay
wartime operational control transfer and adopt a conditions-based approach,
rather than a calendar-based deadline. The U.S. and ROK intend to modernize the
alliance to better inform the development or acquisition of Alliance
capabilities required to address future threats from North Korea.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
USPACOM will continue to work with the ROK to address the
North Korean threat. North Korea continues to be a challenge due to
provocations and uncertainty, which are viewed as a threat to peace and
stability in the region. The ability to rapidly respond to aggression with
combined U.S.-ROK-Japan capabilities is the best way to ensure deterrence and
maintain regional stability. Trilateral cooperation will improve each
participant’s understanding of the mutual challenges and shared opportunities
that exist in and around the Korean Peninsula.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Thailand:</span></b>
As Thailand is the oldest U.S. alliance partner(182 years), the U.S. values its
friendship with the people of Thailand. The Thai military’s decision to suspend
its constitution and assume control of the civilian government has impacted
that relationship. Military engagements and exercises have been appropriately
adjusted in a whole of government response to the coup, pending a return to a
democratically-elected government. USPACOM will continue to demonstrate
commitment to the U.S.’ ally while reinforcing democratic values and ideals.
The annual COBRA GOLD exercise co-sponsored with the Royal Thai Armed Forces is
an important multi-lateral warfighting training event. This year’s exercise was
significantly limited in scope and scale in response to the Thai coup, and
heavily focused on humanitarian assistance activities.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">India:</span></b>
Last year, India held the largest election in its history. With new leadership
in place, India is energizing the U.S.-India strategic partnership. Prime
Minister Modi has focused India’s foreign policy on building strong regional
cohesion in South Asia. India’s two decade-long “Look East Policy” has resulted
in growing partnerships with Southeast Asian countries.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The U.S. military remains heavily engaged with New Delhi’s
military, having conducted 69 major exercises in the past five years. The
Indian Navy continues its strong participation in multilateral exercises
including INDRA with Russia, MALABAR with the U.S. and Japan, and RIMPAC with
23 navies from across the Indo-Asia-Pacific. India’s participation in these
exercises signals their commitment as a regional security provider.
Additionally, over the past three years the U.S. has been India’s largest
defense trading partner. Through military modernization, robust defense trade (C-17s,
C-130Js, and P-8Is, among other items), and a growing network of defense
partnerships, India is asserting its role as an important regional actor
determined to protect common interests and ensure free access to economically
vital sea lanes, although with respect to military activities, India still
asserts a security interest in its EEZ that does not conform to the law of the
sea.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Indonesia:</span></b>
Indonesia is a capable security partner in Southeast Asia, and is increasingly
focused on its role as a regional power, which USPACOM continues to support as
a main pillar of mil-mil engagement. Presidential elections last July
demonstrated a commitment to democratic principles, and the August opening of
Indonesia’s new Peace and Security Center to train regional partners on
peacekeeping operations reinforces its position as a leader in security
assistance. A growing area of cooperation with Indonesia is defense trade,
which includes the sale of AH-64E Apache helicopters and initial delivery of
F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft. Indonesia remains concerned about maintaining
security and stability in the South China Sea. While their Chief of Defense has
articulated a zero-war policy in the South China Sea, there are signs they are
increasingly concerned over China’s so-called nine dash line overlapping with
part of their claimed EEZ. While Indonesia continues a foreign policy rooted in
the Non Aligned Movement, USPACOM has seen significant gains in security
cooperation activities. Indonesia will continue to balance its partnership with
the U.S. with other nations such as Russia and China, but security cooperation
with the U.S. remains a top priority.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">New Zealand:</span></b>
New Zealand is a respected voice in international politics and a recognized
leader in Oceania that shares common security concerns with the U.S., such as
terrorism, transnational crime, and maritime security. Military-to-military
relations and defense engagements with New Zealand continue to improve, and the
U.S. and New Zealand executed the second series of annual bilateral defense
dialogues last year. New Zealand’s establishment of a Consulate General in
Honolulu has also provided additional opportunities for USPACOM and New Zealand
to engage on issues of mutual interest. This new Consulate General addition to Hawaii
is timely as the U.S. celebrates the 100th Anniversary of ANZAC with New
Zealand and the Australians this year.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Oceania:</span></b>
Maintaining our close partnerships in Oceania is important to national
security. The provisions included in the Compacts of Free Association with the
Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
Republic of Palau are important mechanisms that guide the relationships. The
U.S. meets its defense obligations to these nations through defense planning
and preparation. In return, these compact agreements provide assured access to
the three Compact Nations and their associated 5.5 million square kilometers of
Pacific in a contingency situation. They also give the U.S. authority to grant
or deny access to another nation’s military forces, which allows the
maintenance of a clear strategic line of communication across the Pacific. The
U.S.’s continued commitment to defend the Compact Nations and to partner with
other Pacific island countries sends a strong message throughout the region and
reinforces its commitment to the Pacific Rebalance.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Fiji currently has its first democratically elected
government since its military coup in 2006. In 2015, Fiji will re-enter into
regional forums (e.g., Pacific Island Forum) and have new opportunities for
engagement with the U.S. Several other countries (Papua New Guinea, the Solomon
Islands, and Vanuatu) may face government reorganizations over the next year.
These events may set back specific projects but will not likely impact stability
or affect overall U.S. engagement.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Climate change will continue to be an important issue across
the Oceania region. This year’s forecasted El Nino event will likely result in
drought and increased tropical cyclone activity. The Republic of Marshall
Islands will almost certainly face water shortage resulting in requests for aid
or disaster declarations under the Compact of Free Association. Fiji, Kiribati,
the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga will
likely face similar situations. The December 2014 United Nations Climate Change
Conference addressed the impact of rising sea levels - a keen interest to
Pacific Island Nations.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Singapore:</span></b>
Singapore continues its important role in regional security initiatives.
Singapore’s role as a ‘Major Security Cooperation Partner’ is underscored by
longstanding support of U.S. naval forces. For example, USS Freedom completed a
ten month deployment in 2013, and USS Fort Worth is currently on a 16 month
deployment. These forward forces contribute to naval readiness and partner
capacity building and enable rapid response to many crises, including Operation
Damayan in the Philippines and Air Asia recovery efforts. Additionally,
Singapore’s Changi Naval Base remains a key enabler to providing critical
support to the USS Fort Worth and other forward operating forces.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">U.S. – China:</span></b>
In light of an increasingly complex regional and global security environment,
including advances in China’s military capabilities and its expanding military
operations and missions, the overall U.S. approach to China calls for a
continuous dialogue between the armed forces of both countries to expand
practical cooperation where national interests converge and to constructively
manage differences through sustained and substantive dialogue. As a key
element, the U.S.’s military engagement with China, within the guidelines of
the 2000 NDAA, benefits the region, improves transparency, and reduces risk of
unintended incidents, contributing to overall regional stability. The U.S.
military has increased the depth of engagement with China in recent years and
executed over 50 bilateral and numerous multilateral engagements last year.
While these engagements are critical to improving transparency and reducing
risk, the U.S. military must continue to take a pragmatic approach as the U.S.
attempts to help integrate China into the existing security architecture.
China’s military investments, including A2AD capabilities, focused on the
ability to control access and deny freedom of operations in vast portions of
the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains raise concerns. The U.S. will
need more transparency and understanding of Chinese intentions in order to
minimize friction and avoid miscalculation or conflict in the future. Absent
greater transparency from China, its ambiguous dashed-line claim, military
modernization efforts and aggressive land reclamation in the South China Sea
have significant implications for regional stability and the current security
architecture.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Over the past year, the U.S. and China have agreed to
mechanisms such as the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on Notification of
Major Military Activities and Rules of Behavior (RoB) for Safety of Air and
Maritime Encounters, designed to underscore and reinforce existing
international law and standards while improving transparency, building trust,
and reducing risk of unintended incidents. The surface-to-surface encounters
annex of the RoB CBM was signed last year and the air-to-air annex is scheduled
to be completed by the end of this year. These new Rules of Behavior are
non-binding and capture existing legal rules and standards. Additionally, the
U.S. and China continue to use the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement
meetings to discuss safety in the maritime domain and avoid crises. As China
continues to grow its military capacity and capability and operate further from
its territory, these mechanisms become more important.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Both militaries have had success addressing areas of common
interest, such as counter piracy, military medicine, and HA/DR. Some of the
most successful engagements were focused on military medical cooperation and
shared health concerns. For example, the USPACOM surgeon hosted Chinese
counterparts in Hawaii and Washington, DC, which resulted in concrete
opportunities for continued military medical cooperation focused on Disaster
Response, Pandemic and Emerging Infectious Diseases, and Soldier Care. In January
2015, the PLA hosted the USPACOM Surgeon and component surgeons for a highly
successful reciprocal visit. Demonstrating China’s increasing ability to
operate beyond the Western Pacific and a successful engagement on an area of
common concern, last December, U.S. and Chinese ships conducted counter piracy
exercises in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. China’s participation
in international efforts to address these problems and to operate and exercise
with the U.S. and its allies and partners in a manner consistent with
international law and standards is welcomed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Building and Strengthening Relationships<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The future security and prosperity of the Indo-Asia-Pacific
depends upon building bilateral and multilateral relationships. Strong relationships,
facilitated by a U.S. forward presence, advance common interests and address
shared threats. USPACOM strengthens relationships with U.S. allies and partners
through security cooperation and capacity building, bilateral and multilateral
approaches, and senior leader engagement.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Security
Cooperation and Capacity Building:</span></b> USPACOM enhances interoperability
and information sharing with allies and partners in order to cooperatively
address regional challenges. USPACOM’s Security Cooperation approach is focused
on building partner readiness, assisting with partner capability gaps,
identifying partner shortfalls, and addressing the most critical capacity
shortfalls. Last year, USPACOM identified C4ISR as a top priority for Security
Cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK) and contributed to the U.S.
supporting the ROK purchase of Global Hawk – a High Altitude UAV platform that
will help close the gap in some of the security challenges on the Korean
Peninsula. Supporting USPACOM’s approach to addressing partner capability and
capacity shortfalls will reduce risk, effectively use Security Cooperation and
Assistance resources, and maintain the momentum to bring the right capabilities
into the AOR.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
As mentioned earlier, the progress the Republic of the
Philippines continues to make in addressing violent extremists groups inside
their country is a testament to building capacity in USPACOM’s foreign internal
defense efforts. USPACOM is also building capacity to counter drug trafficking
in the AOR through Joint Interagency Task Force – West (JIATF-W) engagements
with China. Through a partnership with the Internal Revenue Service, JIATF-W
has leveraged Department of Defense counternarcotic authorities to open up an
additional avenue of cooperation with Chinese officials by providing anti-money
laundering training linked to counterdrug efforts. These efforts are only just
beginning, but show promise in improving communication, cooperation, and
information sharing on significant criminal enterprises operating in both the
U.S. and China.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Lastly, increasing international representation at the
USPACOM headquarters has improved collaboration with allies and partners and
created a more agile and effective command and control architecture. The new
USPACOM model integrates sixteen foreign exchange officers and liaison officers
from six countries and facilitates a seamless transition from routine business
to crisis. Included in these numbers are three foreign exchange Flag Officers
and Senior Executives in key billets on the USPACOM staff.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Bilateral and
Multilateral Approaches:</span></b> With the exception of North Korea, USPACOM
continues to build and strengthen bilateral relationships with all of the
nations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. USPACOM maintains a close link with the five
U.S. treaty allies and other partners in the region through a series of formal
bilateral mechanisms. In Australia, key engagements stem from the ANZUS treaty
obligations, guided by USPACOM’s premier bilateral event with Australia, the
Military Representatives Meeting. Similarly, USPACOM’s military to military
relationship with Japan is guided annually by the Japan Senior Leader Seminar,
which USPACOM utilizes to ensure the bond with Japan remains strong. USPACOM
continues to rely on the alliance with the Republic of Korea to maintain peace
and stability in Northeast Asia, and the annual Military Committee and Security
Consultative Meetings are the preeminent bilateral mechanism to guide this
alliance forward. Each year, USPACOM co-hosts the Mutual Defense Board and
Security Engagement Board with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to discuss
ways this critical alliance can modernize to meet 21st-century challenges.
Lastly, USPACOM depends on annual Senior Staff Talks with Thailand to address
shared regional security concerns while reinforcing U.S. commitment to
democratic principles.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Similar bilateral mechanisms exist with partners throughout
the USPACOM AOR, including Bilateral Defense Discussions with Indonesia,
Vietnam, and others, as USPACOM continues to foster bilateral ties to enhance
regional stability. Bilateral mechanisms with allies and partners form the
strategic foundation of the security architecture that ensures peace and
stability while defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. </span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">While
bilateral mechanisms remain important, USPACOM continues to emphasize
multilateral approaches. USPACOM works with regional forums such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to encourage multilateral
relationships that build trust, prevent misperceptions that can lead to
conflict, and reinforce international standards of conduct. For example,
USPACOM arranges an annual Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) Conference as its premier
multilateral engagement tool for candid discussions with 20-plus Chiefs of
Defense in the region. Each year the CHOD Conference alternates between USPACOM
and a co-host country; Brunei hosted last year’s successful conference. The
2015 CHOD Conference will be held in Hawaii and is designed to promote
multilateral cooperation and provide a forum for the theater’s military leaders
to share regional and global perspectives on common challenges. USPACOM also
participated in other multilateral events in the region, such as the Fullerton
Forum and Shangri-La Dialogue, to encourage multilateral solutions to shared
challenges, as well as provide a venue for continued dialogue and strengthening
security partnerships in the region. <span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
One of the
most important multilateral forums in the theater is ASEAN. The ten member
states in ASEAN, under the chairmanship of Myanmar last year and Malaysia this
year, seek to improve multilateral security activities and advance stability in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Approximately $5.3 trillion of global trade ($1.2
trillion is U.S.) passes through ASEAN waterways each year. The ten member
states of ASEAN form the fourth largest U.S. export market and fifth major
trade partner. ASEAN continues to address common threats in the region
including Maritime Security, Terrorism, Transnational Crimes, Cyber Security,
and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. ASEAN demonstrated during
past disasters, such as Typhoon Haiyan and the Malaysian Flight 370 search
operations, that practical cooperation among member states can enable civilian
and military agencies to be more effective and efficient.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Last
April, Defense Secretary Hagel hosted the ten ASEAN Defense Ministers, the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA),
and other non-government organizations in Hawaii to discuss disaster response
and maritime security. UNOCHA hosted an Integrated Civil-Military Regional
Response Planning Workshop for Large-Scale International Disaster Relief last
October and the USPACOM staff will continue the maritime security dialogue by
hosting a Maritime Domain Awareness discussion this May. USPACOM will continue
supporting ASEAN as it builds regional tools and forums such as the ASEAN
Economic Community by the end of 2015. Additionally, there is hope that the
ASEAN members and China can conclude a binding and enforceable Code of Conduct
mechanism for the South China Sea. </span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The Daniel K.
Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) also contributes to
multilateral engagements and rules-based security governance. Through its
executive education courses, workshops, and sustained alumni engagement
activities, the Center contributes to the USPACOM Theater Campaign Plan by
building U.S. and partner nation capacities. Success stories include the
APCSS-facilitated development of Papua New Guinea’s first-ever national security
policy, a framework for an Indonesian defense white paper, and Bangladesh’s
first comprehensive maritime security strategy proposal. Additionally, APCSS
helped with the successful completion of Nepal’s disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration program for dealing with Maoist ex-combatants, and the
signing of an inter-party agreement to overcome political crisis—both led by a
core group of APCSS alumni. </span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;"><b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Senior Leader
Engagement:</span></b> USPACOM and its components leverage senior leader visits to
increase dialogue on issues of shared concern, build and strengthen
relationships, and convey U.S. commitment to the region. Each year, hundreds of
senior military and government leaders address security challenges through
counterpart visits which greatly enhance understanding, interoperability, and
trust. Examples of senior leadership engagements in the Indo-Asia-Pacific over
the past year include:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• The President attended the G-20 Summit in Australia, the
Republic Day ceremony in India, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in
China, and the East Asia Summit in Burma.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• The President also increased engagements in the theater to
strengthen alliances in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and
to deepen ties with Malaysia.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• The Secretary of State visited the Republic of Korea; China;
and Indonesia. He also traveled to India for the 5th Strategic Dialogue
Conference; to Burma for a series of ASEAN discussions; Australia for annual
Ministerial Consultations; and the Solomon Islands.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense held a 2+2
meeting with their ROK counterparts in Washington.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• The Secretary of Defense traveled to Japan for bilateral
security discussions; Mongolia and Singapore for key leadership meetings; India
for defense consultations; Australia for AUSMINs and to sign the Force Posture
Agreement; and China for Confidence Building Measure discussions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs toured the Changi
facilities in Singapore; participated in security and military discussions in
Vietnam (first CJCS to visit since 1971); Australia for the Defense Chiefs
Strategic Dialogue conference and bilateral events; and both Japan and the
Republic of Korea for key counterpart visits.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
These senior leader engagements are critical to identifying
opportunities and addressing security challenges in the region. Additionally,
Congressional delegations to the theater are of significant benefit.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p align="center" class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Effective and Assured Presence<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Effective and assured presence of USPACOM forces is required
to meet the challenges and opportunities within USPACOM’s AOR. As strategic
warning timelines decrease, early identification of potential crises is key to
rapidly assessing and shaping events. It also places a premium on robust,
modern, agile, forward-deployed forces, maintained at high levels of readiness.
Assured presence is supported by posturing forward-deployed forces, fielding
new capabilities and concepts, addressing critical gaps, and maintaining
readiness in order to defend the homeland, strengthen and modernize our
alliances and partnerships, maintain access in the air and maritime domains,
counter aggression, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and violent extremism.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Posture:</span></b>
Sustaining effective and forward presence begins with having the necessary
military infrastructure and access to support forward-stationed and rotational
forces. USPACOM’s posture effectively communicates U.S. intent and resolve to
safeguard U.S. national interests, strengthen alliances and partnerships,
maintain an assured presence in the region, prevent conflict, and if necessary,
respond rapidly and effectively across the full range of military operations.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
USPACOM faces three key challenges related to force posture.
The first is operating in an AOR that covers 52% of the earth’s surface. The
vast distances complicate ISR, movement/maneuver, and sustainment, and require
a geographically distributed force laydown to rapidly respond to crisis. The
second challenge is the growth of military capabilities in the region. The
Indo-Asia-Pacific is the most militarized region in the world. Maintaining the
ability to defend strategic national security interests in an increasingly
complex and lethal environment requires a force posture that is operationally
resilient. Finally, expanding access to regions in South and Southeast Asia
requires access and forward staging arrangements that are politically
sustainable. In support of USPACOM’s objectives, the military services and our
allies and partners are making investments to improve U.S. force posture.
Examples of these investments are:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Construction in Iwakuni, Japan to allow a carrier air wing
to relocate from Atsugi<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Expanding base facilities and capabilities in Okinawa for
Futenma replacement<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Operationalizing Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
with the Philippines<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Expanding future capabilities through construction at Camp
Humphreys, ROK<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Reinforcing Guam’s munitions and fuels piers at Apra
Harbor<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Implementing Force Posture Initiatives through troop
rotations and, ultimately, facility upgrades and construction in Darwin,
Australia<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Building hardened C2 and aircraft shelters at Andersen
AFB, Guam<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Installing and fortifying fuel nodes, manifolds, and lines
in Guam and Japan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Implementing rotational forces through USFK<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Developing divert options and training ranges in the
Northern Marianas Islands<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Dredging port facilities to requisite depths to allow pier
operations in Naha, Japan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
These posture investments are part of USPACOM’s holistic
infrastructure investment strategy and are key to continued mission success.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Much of the supporting infrastructure in the Pacific and on
the West Coast of the U.S. mainland was established during World War II and
during the early years of the Cold War. The infrastructure now requires
investment to extend its service life. The military services continue to invest
in sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) to provide quality
facilities to support service members and their families; however, during times
of austere budgets, the military services struggle to maintain infrastructure
SRM funding levels. These forced decisions undermine the significant investment
in facilities made by DoD and Host Nation Funded Construction programs over
past decades.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Reduced SRM funding will negatively impact the ability to
bring new forces and capabilities into the theater and maintain critical
infrastructure. The U.S. and the theater benefit from the significant levels of
investment made by allies and partners. For example, the Republic of Korea is
significantly contributing to the cost of keeping U.S. Forces on the Korean
Peninsula. The Government of Japan has committed up to $3.1 billion to help
realign U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and other locations and $4.5 billion
to expand the airfield and associated facilities at Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)
Joint Military Training initiative (CJMT) is an important posture undertaking.
CNMI remains strategically important as a forward and sovereign U.S. location
with lease rights until 2033 and extendable to 2083. When the U.S.-Japan
Defense Policy Review Initiative moves approximately 4,700 U.S. Marines from
Japan to Guam, the CJMT will enable this U.S. Marine force to train and
maintain operational readiness. Specifically on the island of Tinian, the CJMT
initiative will provide live-fire ranges and training areas. The CJMT will
optimize future training ranges for joint and combined exercises with allies
and foreign forces. As a part of aviation resiliency initiatives, divert and
alternate air fields are also being explored on the islands of Saipan and
Tinian along with other locations in the broader Western Pacific.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Forward Deployed
Forces:</span></b> The tyranny of distance, which defines the USPACOM AOR,
requires forward deployed forces to engage with allies and partners, respond
rapidly to crisis or contingencies, defend the homeland, and reinforce U.S.
commitment to the region. To increase USPACOM’s forward deployed forces and
capabilities, the military services are:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Rotationally deploying Navy Littoral Combat Ships into
Singapore<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Forward deploying two additional ballistic missile
defense-capable surface ships to Japan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Increased deployments and rotations of E-8 JSTARS, E-3
AWACS, and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye in theater<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Replacing the USS George Washington with the more capable
USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier in Japan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Installing an advanced radar in Australia<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Continuing to deploy and operate F-22s in theater<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Completing a second ballistic missile defense radar in
Japan<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Stationing additional submarines in Guam<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Improving rotational force presence in the Philippines,
Singapore, and Australia<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">New Systems and
Operating Concepts:</span></b> Crafting new concepts and fielding new systems is
fundamental to employing a credible force. For example, the military services
are:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Replacing P-3 maritime patrol aircraft with newer and more
capable P-8s<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Deploying tilt rotor aircraft for Marines and Special
Forces and new unmanned capabilities throughout the AOR<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Forward stationing High Speed Vessels and Mobile Landing
Platforms in the USPACOM AOR<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Introducing Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air
Aegis Destroyers<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Expanding the U.S. Army Pacific Pathways deployment
concept<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
• Preparing for F-35 Joint Strike Fighters deployment with
maintenance hubs in Japan and Australia<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Addressing
Critical Capability Gaps:</span></b> The most technical, high-end military
challenges are in the USPACOM AOR, and are growing. While many improvements to
posture, forward deployed forces, capabilities, and concepts have been made to
address these challenges, there are a number of mission sets and enablers that
require continuous focus and attention. These include areas such as Undersea
Warfare, Intelligence/Surveillance/Reconnaissance, space, battle management,
command and control, cyber, munitions, Ballistic Missile Defense and Integrated
Air and Missile Defense systems, and capacity shortfalls in theater enablers
such as petroleum redistribution and lift.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Undersea Warfare is a mission set that requires constant
attention to maintain a decisive advantage. Of the world’s 300 foreign
submarines, roughly 200 are in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region; of which, 150
belong to China, North Korea, and Russia. Countries operating these systems
view the platforms as a mechanism to affect the balance of power in their
favor. Even small navies that possess submarines hold a distinct advantage over
a navy without the capability.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
There is a significant leap underway in the
Indo-Asia-Pacific in undersea capability as newer submarines replace older variants.
In the past few years, Singapore, India, Vietnam and Malaysia have all received
modern diesel submarines and China is on a modernization path to improve the
lethality and survivability of its attack submarines with the introduction of
quiet, high-end, diesel-powered and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia is also
modernizing its existing fleet of Oscar-class multi-purpose attack nuclear
submarines (SSGNs) and producing their next generation Yasen-class SSGNs.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
In addition to attack submarines, there are important
developments underway that will increase Chinese and Russian strategic
deterrent patrol capability and capacity. China has three operational JIN-class
ballistic missile submarines and up to five more may enter service by the end
of the decade. Additionally, Russia is planning to field its newest Borei-class
nuclear ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific later this year. Submarine
detection and tracking is a complex problem set and will continue to be one of
the most important functions of naval forces. A continued and sustained
investment in the U.S. nuclear submarine force, advanced Undersea Warfare
technologies, capabilities and capacity, and readiness is necessary to outpace
the growing challenges.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Persistent and deep-look ISR capabilities and supporting
architecture are required to prevent strategic surprise, assess the security
environment, and support actions that impose cost or defeat potential
adversaries. Although ISR capacity and capabilities have increased, significant
capacity issues remain. Efforts to mitigate ISR capacity issues, as well as
develop new capabilities, are ongoing. Additionally, an ISR processing,
exploitation, and dissemination enterprise that is interoperable and shared
with Allies and Partners is important. Without a concerted effort to continue
advancing U.S. capabilities, the U.S. risks missing key indications and
warnings in an environment where situational awareness affects decision space.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
Satellite communications (SATCOM) is an essential enabler to
exercise Command & Control (C2) and enabling ISR. Satellite space continues
to grow increasingly congested and contested, and adversaries continue
developing means to curtail access to space-enabled capabilities. A resilient
space-based command, control, and ISR architecture remains a USPACOM priority.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
</span>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin: 0in 0in 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: 16px;">
There is a growing need to sustain and modernize airborne
early warning systems to execute multi-mission, multi-domain integrated command
and control. The cruise missile, air, and UAV threats in the USPACOM AOR require
robust, long range Battle Management, Command and Control (BMC2) and Wide-Area
Surveillance (WAS) platforms capable of operating in a contested environment.
Developing and modernizing the capabilities within the BMC2 and WAS platforms
to track and operate in a communications contested or degraded environment is
necessary to meet the challenges of future operational environments in the
Pacific; these platforms must be interoperable with military services,
partners, and allies.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Related, the Joint Information Environment (JIE) increments
I and II have the potential for consolidation of each military services’
command, control, communication, and computers programs. JIE II will further
strengthen collective cyber security and defense posture in the region, improve
staff efficiency and support, and strengthen interagency and international
relationships. JIE II will require an information infrastructure adaptable
enough to accommodate multiple security classification levels with the
interoperability and sharing capability to maximize mission effectiveness. JIE
II is a necessary next step to mitigate the risk posed by persistent cyber
threats. These threats continue to grow.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Increased cyber capacity and use, especially by China, North
Korea, and Russia, underscore the growing requirement to evolve our command,
control, and operational structure authorities. In order to fully leverage the
Cyber domain, Combatant Commanders require an enduring theater cyber
operational command resourced to provide regional cyber planning, integration,
synchronization, and direction of cyberspace forces. The theater cyber
operational command will provide direction of operations against increasingly
capable threats in coordination with USCYBERCOM, the interagency, and allies
and partners. USPACOM sees a future where Joint Force Cyber Component Command
(JFCCC) are aligned regionally under Combatant Commands. JFCCCs will provide
staffing and expertise required to oversee persistent operations and defense of
theater information networks, synchronization of cyber risk assessments and
intelligence, and development of flexible cyber effects.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Munitions are a critical component of combat effectiveness
and readiness. A number of munitions improvements in lethality, production, and
precision are required. There is a growing need for ship-to-ship and
air-to-ship munitions to allow U.S. forces to defeat an aggressor from greater
range. Specifically, there are troubling gaps in Anti-Surface Warfare
capability and readiness that compel the accelerated fielding of a long range
anti-ship missile. A long-range stand-off weapon, such as the Defense Advanced
Research Programs Agency / Office of Naval Research developed Long Range
Anti-Ship Missile, will meet the urgent need for an offensive anti-surface warfare
capability against combatants in a contested environment. There is also a need
for advancements in the air-to-air realm and for Hard Target Munitions
capabilities to engage hardened targets that are growing in numbers and
complexity. Area Effects Munitions are required to prevent open space
aggression. Lastly, along with lethal munitions, non-lethal capabilities can
prove equally valuable in supporting USPACOM’s strategy and deterrence.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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With North Korea continuing to advance its ballistic missile
capabilities, USPACOM will continue its efforts in maintaining a credible,
sustainable ballistic missile defense. The recent deployment of long range
second TPY-2 radar to Japan (December 2014) along with THAAD on Guam achieving
full Fully Operational Capability further enhanced U.S. homeland defense
capabilities which are required to protect key regional nodes from aggressive
action. In addition, over the last year the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea,
and Australia have had better coordination and information sharing. USPACOM
looks forward to continuing our work with our regional IAMD partners and
expanding our ballistic missile defense cooperation and information sharing.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Equally important to having the right equipment and
capabilities is the capacity of critical logistics. The time and distance
required to move assets across the Pacific make it an imperative to preposition
and secure munitions. Dedicated sealift must be adequately funded to posture
munitions, fuel, and other supplies within theater. Agile, responsive, and
sustained operations demand a resilient network of capabilities to deploy and
sustain USPACOM forces. USTRANSCOM’s prepositioning strategy has emphasized
positioning equipment and materiel afloat to optimize flexibility, ensure rapid
responses to crises, and provide force presence; however, USPACOM still does
not have enough lift to satisfy all operational requirements.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Readiness:</span></b>
Fundamental to USPACOM’s mission is the ability to deter aggression and prevail
in crisis. USPACOM’s readiness is evaluated against its ability to execute
operational and contingency plans, which places a premium on forward-deployed,
ready forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations’
militaries and follow-on forces able to respond to operational contingencies.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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USPACOM maintains forward-deployed ready forces as credible
deterrents, to support and defend national security interests, and to provide
assurance and protection to allies and partners. Forward deployed forces, west
of the International Date Line, remain responsive and relevant to mitigating
risk in the event of escalating regional security events and greatly benefit
from training with allies and partners in a complex environment. Ready,
forward-deployed forces increase decision space and decrease response time,
bolster allies’ and partners’ confidence, and reduce the chance of
miscalculation by potential adversaries. However, redistribution of global
forces that lead to moving forces out of the Indo-Asia-Pacific diminishes
USPACOM’s impact and effectiveness. Additionally, short-notice redeployment of
USPACOM’s ready, forward deployed forces to fill emergent requirements to other
areas of operation increases risk to our nation’s Indo-Asia-Pacific interests
and objectives.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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In addition to concerns with the forward deployed forces,
there are troubling readiness trends associated with follow-on forces. The
ability of the U.S. to surge and globally maneuver ready forces has
historically been an asymmetric advantage that is now diminishing. Over the
past year, the U.S. has been forced to prioritize the readiness of
forward-deployed forces, at the expense of the readiness of follow-on-forces
and critical investments needed to outpace emerging threats. A lack of ready
surge forces resulting from high operational demands, delayed maintenance
periods, and training limitations will limit responsiveness to emergent
contingencies and greatly increases risk.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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Budget reductions and uncertainty directly impact operations
and combat readiness. Fiscal constraints disrupt the predictable, persistent
funding needed to organize, train, and equip a ready force. Fiscal uncertainty
degrades and disrupts long-term engagement opportunities with strategic
consequences to U.S. relationships and prestige. Resource pressures have
triggered deferrals in exercises, operations, and senior leader engagement
opportunities; have introduced regional doubt; and compound the risk to U.S.
interests in the region. As the Service Chiefs recently testified, continuation
of sequestration will further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce
readiness of forces needed for contingency response, forego procurement of new
platforms and weapon systems and further downsize weapons capacity...all of which
are required for success in the USPACOM AOR. I am in full agreement with their
assessments and remain deeply concerned about the growing risk to U.S.
interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<b style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;">Conclusion<o:p></o:p></b></span></p>
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It has been over three years since the President announced
the U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. The Rebalance is focused on modernizing
and strengthening treaty alliances and partnerships through cooperative
agreements, building partner capacity, and increasing regional cooperation,
interoperability, and security capabilities. From the military perspective, the
U.S. is accomplishing what it set out to do and the Rebalance is working.
However, fiscal uncertainty resulting from the Budget Control Act could arrest
progress and place some initiatives at risk. Building on the positive momentum
of the Rebalance to the Pacific is critical to protecting U.S. interests in the
region. Thank you for your continued support to USPACOM and our men and women,
and their families, who live and work in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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