This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 CITI MORTGAGE, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8 v. NO. 30,686 9 RICARDO S. GIRON, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY 12 Donald C. Schutte, District Judge 13 Holland & Hart, LLP 14 Larry J. Montano 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Ricardo S. Giron 18 Las Vegas, NM 19 Pro Se Appellant 20 MEMORANDUM OPINION 21 KENNEDY, Judge. 22 Defendant appeals the district court’s order enforcing sale of his property. We 23 issued a notice of proposed summary disposition proposing summary affirmance. 242 Defendant has responded with a memorandum in opposition, which we have duly 1 considered. We remain unpersuaded, and affirm the district court. 2 The relevant facts are as follows. Pl aintiff sought and was granted judgment 3 on the pleadings in its foreclosure action agai nst Defendant. The district court entered 4 judgment of foreclosure against Defendant on September 9, 2008. [RP 809-810] 5 Defendant appealed to this Court, and weaffirmed the judgment of foreclosure in 6 Citimortgage v. Giron , No. 29,008 (N.M. Court App. February 18, 2010). [RP 1078] 7 On June 16, 2010, after the case was remanded, Defendant filed a motion to 8 reconsider, in which he asked the district court to reverse its judgment of foreclosure. 9 [RP 1129] The district court declined to reconsider the foreclosure judgment on the 10 basis that the issue was determined in a prior appeal. [RP 1199] 11 We affirm the district court. The validity of the foreclosure judgment was 12 determined in the prior appeal, and De fendant was precluded from relitigating the 13 foreclosure judgment on remand under the law of the case doctrine. See Scanlon v. 14 Las Cruces Pub. Sch. , 2007-NMCA-150, ¶ 7, 143 N.M . 48, 172 P.3d 185 (alterations 15 omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Under the law of the case 16 doctrine, if an appellate court has considered and pa ssed upon a question of law and 17 remanded the case for further proceedings, th e legal question so resolved will not be 18 determined in a different manner on a subsequent appeal.”); see also State v. Gage , 19 2002-NMCA-018, ¶ 21, 131 N.M. 581, 40 P.3d 1025 (filed 2001) (noting the 20 “hard-and-fast rule that the law of the case established on appeal binds the district 213 court on remand under the appellate court mandate”). Accordingly, the district court 1 did not err in refusing to reconsider the foreclosure judgment. 2 In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant argues that the law of the case 3 doctrine is inapplicable in this case. Defendant argues that the foreclosure judgment 4 is the subject of the present appeal and that the only issue before this Court in the prior 5 appeal was whether the district court properly entered judgment on the pleadings. 6 [MIO 2-3] We disagree, as the two are inseparable. While it is true that this Court 7 reviewed the district court’s entry of j udgment on the pleadings in the prior appeal, 8 that judgment is clearly a judgment of fo reclosure on the mortgaged property. [RP 9 810] See Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison , 113 N.M. 231, 237, 824 P.2d 1033, 10 1039 (1992) (noting that an initial judgment of foreclosure is final and appealable, 11 notwithstanding the necessity for further proceedings to enforce the judgment and 12 supervise the sale of the mortgaged prope rty). Defendant appealed this final 13 appealable order, to this Court. As Defendant had already unsuccessfully appealed 14 the foreclosure judgment, he was precl uded from again arguing the validity of the 15 foreclosure judgment on remand. The matter was already decided, and we reject 16 Defendant’s argument that the judgment on the pleadings was not a final order of 17 foreclosure. It was. 18 Defendant also continues to assert in his memorandum in opposition that the 19 district court erred in denying his claim fo r a homestead exempti on. [MIO 3-4] We 20 disagree for two reasons. First, Defendantwas not entitled to a homestead exemption 214 because our statutes do not allow an exemp tion to apply to the recorded lien of a 1 mortgagee, in this case Citibank. See NMSA 1978, Section 42-10-11 (1971) (stating 2 that the provisions of Section 42-10-9 do not apply to “taxes, garnishment, recorded 3 liens of mortgagees or lessors or recordedliens of laborers or materialmen for labor 4 or materials furnished for the constructi on or repair of the dwelling house.”). 5 Additionally, Defendant failed to assert his entitlement to an exemption in his 6 answer to the foreclosure action. We th erefore hold that any claim to a homestead 7 exemption was waived. NMSA 1978, Sec tion 39-4-15 (1933) requires the exemption 8 be filed as a part of Defendant’s answ er to the foreclosure suit. Our courts 9 accordingly have held that failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the exemption. 10 Grygorwicz v. Trujillo , 2008-NMCA-040, ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 704, 181 P.3d 696, rev’d on 11 other grounds , 2009-NMSC-009, 145 N.M. 650, 203 P.3d 865; Speckner v. Riebold , 12 86 N.M. 275, 278, 523 P.2d 10, 13 (1974). In his memorandum in opposition, 13 Defendant again asserts that this Court did not affirm the foreclosure judgment in the 14 prior appeal because the district court did not enter the foreclosure judgment until after 15 it entered the order confirming the sale. [MIO 4] However, for the reasons discussed 16 above, we reject this argument. 17 Defendant also argues that his assertion of a homestead exemption is timely, 18 citing to Grygorwicz . [MIO 11-13] We disagree that Grygorwiczsupports 19 Defendant’s position. In Grygorwicz , the defendant timely asserted his homestead 20 exemption in his answer to the foreclosure action. Id. , 2008-NMCA-040, ¶ 2. 215 Grygorwicz did not involve an assertion of a homestead exemption made after the 1 foreclosure judgment was affirmed on appeal. As Defendant did not assert a 2 homestead exemption in his answer to the foreclosure action and waited until after the 3 judgment was affirmed on appeal, any clai m to a homestead exemption is waived. 4 Defendant also continues to argue inhis memorandum in opposition that the 5 district court erred in rejecting his argumen ts regarding the fair market value of the 6 property. [MIO 5-7] Defendant also ar gues that Plaintiff failed to respond to his 7 motion in which he alleged that the fair market value of the property was $372,929. 8 [MIO 6, 8] We disagree. Defendant submitted evidence to the district court of an 9 appraisal of the property done in 1999 that estimated the fair market value of the 10 property at $275,000. [RP 1156] Defendant also submitted an affidavit in which he 11 alleged that the fair market value of the property was $372,929, based on his 12 unsubstantiated estimation of a 3% increase in value per year over the next eleven 13 years. [RP 1146] 14 To the extent that Defendant argues that the district court was compelled to 15 accept his valuation outright or because Plaintiff did not dispute it, we disagree. 16 Defendant had the burden to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief. See Armstrong 17 v. Csurilla , 112 N.M. 579, 593, 817 P. 2d 1221, 1235 (1991) (stating that the party 18 seeking to vacate a judicial sale has the bur den to establish that the sale price was 19 inadequate). The eleven-year-old appraisal of the property thatDefendant submitted 20 to the district court did not establish the fair market value of the property in 2010. 216 Additionally, we do not believethat Defendant’s affidav it estimating the fair market 1 value of the property at $372, 929, is compet ent evidence of the value of the property. 2 We therefore hold that the district court di d not err in refusing to consider Defendant’s 3 arguments regarding the fair market value of the property. See Brown v. Trujillo , 4 2004-NMCA-040, ¶ 34, 135 N.M. 365, 88 P.3d 881 (rejecting the defendant’s 5 argument that the price paid at foreclosur e was significantly belo w the market value 6 of the property where the debtor providedno evidence of the market value of the 7 property). 8 For these reasons and those stated in our initial notice of proposed disposition, 9 we affirm the district court. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

__________________________________ 12 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 13 WE CONCUR : 14

___________________________ 15 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 16

___________________________ 17 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 18