THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Jon Smart, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2021-000987 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 

Appeal from Clarendon County 

D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 28161 

Heard November 16, 2022 – Filed June 21, 2023 

AFFIRMED 

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of 

Columbia, for Petitioner. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy W. 

Jeffrey Young, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. 

Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General 

Melody Jane Brown, Assistant Attorney General Tommy 

Evans Jr., of Columbia; Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney 

III, of Sumter, all for Respondent. 
JUSTICE FEW: Today we address whether a juvenile sentenced to life in prison 

bears any burden of proof or persuasion when seeking resentencing under Aiken v. 

Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). We hold there is no such burden—on 

either party—and the resentencing court did not impose such a burden. We affirm 

the decision of the resentencing court imposing a life sentence. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

Smart and his co-defendant, Stephen Hutto, were in custody at a Department of 

Juvenile Justice detention facility near Rimini in Clarendon County in August 1999 

when they brutally murdered a citizen volunteer who graciously allowed the boys to 

work on his family farm under his supervision as a part of their rehabilitation. Smart 

and Hutto then stole the man's truck and drove it on a violent crime spree starting in 

Rimini, to the town of Bamberg, and continuing to Myrtle Beach. After Horry 

County Police officers stopped them for a traffic violation and discovered the truck 

was stolen, Smart and Hutto led officers on a thirty-mile high-speed chase during 

which Smart fired shots at pursuing law enforcement vehicles. Smart was sixteen 

years old. For a more complete presentation of the facts, see State v. Smart (Smart 

II), 433 S.C. 651, 655-57, 861 S.E.2d 383, 385-86 (Ct. App. 2021); State v. Hutto, 

356 S.C. 384, 386-87, 589 S.E.2d 202, 203 (Ct. App. 2003). 

Smart pled guilty in 2001 to murder, armed robbery, grand larceny, criminal 

conspiracy, and escape. The plea court sentenced him to life in prison for the 

murder. Under subsection 16-3-20(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 1999), 

Smart was not eligible for parole. In 2016, Smart sought resentencing pursuant to 

Aiken. Smart v. State, 416 S.C. 583, 583, 787 S.E.2d 845, 845 (2016). A different 

circuit court again sentenced him to life without parole. Smart appealed the sentence 

on multiple grounds, including his claim the resentencing court erred by requiring 

him to show life without parole was inappropriate. The court of appeals affirmed. 

Smart II, 433 S.C. at 666, 861 S.E.2d at 391. We granted Smart's petition for a writ 

of certiorari to address his arguments the resentencing court improperly placed on 

him a burden of proof or persuasion and should have placed the burden on the State. 

II. Aiken v. Byars 

In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States held the Eighth Amendment 

prohibits mandatory life without parole sentences for homicides committed by a 

person under the age of eighteen. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489, 132 S. Ct. 

2455, 2475, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 430 (2012). In Aiken, this Court applied the 

reasoning of Miller retroactively and extended it to South Carolina's discretionary 
life without parole sentences. See 410 S.C. at 540-44, 765 S.E.2d at 575-77 (lead 

opinion); 410 S.C. at 545-46, 765 S.E.2d at 578 (Pleicones, J., concurring) ("While 

. . . the majority exceeds the scope of current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in 

ordering relief under Miller, I would reach the same result under S.C. Const. art. I, 

§ 15."). The Court emphasized the constitutional significance of youth, noting 

"Miller requires the sentencing authority 'take into account how children are 

different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to 

a lifetime in prison.'" 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. 

at 480, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424). We identified five factors from 

Miller that a circuit court must consider before sentencing a juvenile to life without 

parole. Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78, 132 S. Ct. at 2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 

423). 

III. Resentencing Procedure 

In Aiken, we effectively granted every motion for resentencing for any juvenile 

sentenced to life without parole prior to Miller and Aiken. We addressed the 

"Appropriate Procedure" in Aiken itself, 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577, and 

required "the following procedures shall be followed" in a subsequent administrative 

order, In re Admin. Ord., 415 S.C. 460, 460-61, 783 S.E.2d 534, 534 (2016). We 

now clarify that in an Aiken resentencing hearing—as with almost any other 

sentencing proceeding1

—there is no burden of proof or persuasion placed on either 

party and there is no presumption for or against any sentence. Instead, both the State 

and the defendant have a mutual burden of production to provide the resentencing 

court with any evidence and arguments they believe bear on the Aiken factors or 

otherwise relate to what should be the appropriate sentence. The sentence to be 

imposed is within the discretion of the resentencing court. See State v. Bolin, 209 

S.C. 108, 111, 39 S.E.2d 197, 198 (1946) ("The length of the prison sentence rests 

in the sound discretion of the trial Court . . . ." (quoting State v. Johnson, 159 S.C. 

165, 170, 156 S.E. 353, 354 (1930))). In exercising this discretion, the resentencing 

court may give no deference to the prior sentencing court's decision to impose life 

without parole. The resentencing court must consider all the evidence and 

1 But see S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (B) (2015) (providing that "a statutory 

aggravating circumstance" must be found beyond a reasonable doubt before 

imposing the death penalty); State v. Grooms, 343 S.C. 248, 253-55, 540 S.E.2d 99, 

101-02 (2000) (discussing a burden of persuasion in certain domestic violence cases 

under section 16-25-90 of the South Carolina Code (2015)). 
arguments presented at the resentencing hearing and impose an appropriate sentence 

without any regard to the prior sentencing court's thought process or decision. 

Smart argues the resentencing court should have placed a burden of proof or 

persuasion on the State. In Miller, the Supreme Court suggested it should be the 

"rare juvenile" who is sentenced to life without parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80, 

132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 

573, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1197, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1, 24 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

48, 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825, 841 (2010)). In Aiken—quoting 

the same discussion from Miller—this Court stated "appropriate occasions for 

sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon." 410 S.C. 

at 539, 765 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 

2d at 424). Smart relies on these statements and others to argue the State should 

bear the burden of demonstrating that a life without parole sentence is proper. We 

disagree. The Miller discussion related to "the great difficulty" sentencing courts 

face in "distinguishing" between those juveniles who do not deserve such a sentence 

and those who do. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 

424. The statements were not meant to suggest a presumption against life without 

parole or that any burden must be placed on the State.

2 

 Today we stand by what was 

essentially a prediction by this Court that when sentencing courts consider the Aiken 

factors and all the evidence that relates to those factors, because of "children's 

diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change[,] . . . appropriate 

occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be 

uncommon." Aiken, 410 S.C. at 539, 765 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 

479, 132 S. Ct. at 2469, 183 L. Ed. 2d at 424). The decision belongs to the 

resentencing court, and this Court will not recognize any presumption nor impose 

any burden of proof or persuasion. We trust our circuit judges are well-equipped to 

make the right decision in each case. 

2 See Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1318-19, 209 L. Ed. 

2d 390, 404 (2021) (holding "a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility 

is not required before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on a 

murderer under 18"). 
IV. Smart's Resentencing 

We acknowledge there is language in the resentencing court's oral ruling that could 

be understood to support Smart's claim the court placed an improper burden on him.

3 

 

After a careful review of the entire record, however, we are convinced the 

resentencing court thoroughly considered Smart's background and history in light of 

the Aiken factors. As Aiken requires, "the mitigating hallmark features of youth 

[were] fully explored," 410 S.C. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578, and the resentencing 

court imposed its life sentence de novo without any burden of proof or persuasion 

on Smart or any deference to the sentence previously imposed. 

While we do not review the substance of the resentencing court's decision to impose 

a life sentence, to explain our ruling the court followed the proper procedure under 

Aiken, we summarize the thought process the court went through in making its 

decision. We begin with a statement the resentencing court made at the conclusion 

of the hearing, "I have methodically gone through each bit of information that's been 

provided to me [and] made what I believe to be, not easy, not easy on my part, but 

made what I believe to be the right decision in this case." The record supports the 

court's statement. First, the court considered the transcript from and other evidence 

surrounding the original guilty plea to murder. The court heard extensive testimony 

from an expert psychologist who interviewed Smart several times and reviewed 

thousands of pages of his records. The court also heard testimony from four other 

witnesses the State and Smart presented regarding the circumstances of the crime 

and Smart's personal background and history. 

The court then heard arguments from the attorneys on both sides and analyzed the 

Aiken factors in light of those arguments. As an example of this analysis, the court 

compared Smart's sister's claim at the resentencing hearing that her parents ignored 

the children and exposed them to drugs with Smart's father's testimony at a family 

court juvenile delinquency proceeding before Smart was sent to Rimini. In light of 

the father's testimony—particularly his efforts to get Smart drug treatment—the 

sentencing court discounted the sister's testimony. Also, the court carefully 

considered whether Smart and Hutto planned the murder in advance or acted 

suddenly and impulsively. The State argued a map of their escape route 

3 For example, the circuit court concluded its ruling by saying, "It is with no pleasure 

at all that I affirm so to speak, or deny your client's motion and impose a life 

sentence." Based on the circuit court's in-depth consideration of the Miller factors, 

we believe this was simply a misstatement by the court. 
demonstrated the murder was planned in advance, but the court discounted the map 

because—the court appears to have concluded—it just as easily could have been 

made as part of their plans for after their eventual release. Ultimately, based on 

testimony from other juveniles to whom Smart and Hutto spoke about planning the 

murder, the court was convinced the boys planned the murder and escape in advance; 

it was not a sudden or impulsive action. The court also found Smart appreciated the 

consequences of his actions because he and Hutto hid the victim's body and 

attempted to wash the blood away from the scene. The court considered Smart's 

multiple statements to law enforcement officers, his interactions with solicitors, and 

his conduct during the guilty plea, all as indicative Smart was competent to assist 

counsel in his defense. After viewing autopsy photographs, the court noted the sheer 

brutality of the murder. The resentencing court noted the plea court entered a 

"negotiated sentence" of life in prison, as a result of which the plea court had no 

choice but to accept the negotiation or reject the plea, but stated that on resentencing 

the court was considering everything presented in the hearing in order to make its 

own choice. 

Finally, the resentencing court stated, 

I have taken all these factors into consideration, and I still 

believe it's the right decision. Will I lose sleep over it [?] 

. . . Probably so. . . . These decisions aren't easy. 

Certainly, I have tried. And I have told you all, I typed my 

own 30-page transcript in my review of all this stuff. I 

have tried to hit on each of these points in coming to this 

conclusion. Again that's not – it wasn't easy. 

In sum, it is clear from the record the resentencing court carefully considered all of 

the evidence presented at the resentencing hearing by both the State and Smart and 

correctly treated the proceeding as a de novo sentencing hearing, with no burden of 

proof or persuasion on Smart. 

V. Conclusion 

This Court's decision in Aiken requires juveniles "receive an individualized hearing 

where the mitigating hallmark features of youth are fully explored" before being 

sentenced to life without parole. 410 S.C. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578. The 

resentencing court in this case gave Smart just such an individualized hearing and 

soundly exercised its sentencing discretion without placing any burden of proof or 

persuasion on Smart nor giving any deference to the previously imposed sentence. 
AFFIRMED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Kaye G. Hearn, 

concur.