An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-404

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 2 December 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Onslow County

No. 12 CRS 54423

DARREN LYCELL SKINNER

Defendant

______________________________

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Onslow County

Nos. 12 CRS 54424-25

HARRY D. NORTHINGTON, JR.

Defendant

Appeal by defendants from judgments entered 20 December 

2013 by Judge Jack W. Jenkins in Onslow County Superior Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 September 2014.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by David W. Boone, Special 

Deputy Attorney General, and M. Denise Stanford, Assistant 

Attorney General, for the State.

Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Narendra K. Ghosh, for defendantappellant Darren Lycell Skinner.

Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Paul M. Green, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant Harry 

D. Northington, Jr.

DAVIS, Judge.
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Darren Lycell Skinner (“Skinner”) and Harry D. Northington, 

Jr. (“Northington”) (collectively “Defendants”) appeal from 

their respective convictions for extortion and nonfelonious 

obstruction of justice. Northington also appeals from his 

convictions for second-degree kidnapping and conspiracy to 

commit second-degree kidnapping. After careful review, we 

conclude that Defendants received a fair trial free from 

prejudicial error.

Factual Background

The State’s evidence at trial tended to establish the 

following facts: On the evening of 15 June 2012, Jane Roe1

(“Roe”) went to the home of Sarah Baglioni (“Baglioni”) to 

babysit Baglioni’s two children. Roe arrived at the house at 

approximately 10:45 p.m., and Baglioni, her boyfriend Chris 

Jones (“Jones”), and another woman, Brittany Morgan, left

shortly afterward to go to Alexander’s, a local nightclub. The 

children went to sleep, and Roe went outside on the porch to 

smoke marijuana and drink a shot of liquor. She then went back 

inside, turned on the TV, and fell asleep on the couch in the 

 

1 A pseudonym is used throughout this opinion to protect the 

privacy of the victim and for ease of reading.
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living room. When Roe woke up, Baglioni had returned, and Roe 

overheard her informing someone over the telephone that a safe 

was gone. Approximately five minutes later, Jones arrived at 

the house and began questioning Roe about the safe’s 

whereabouts. When Roe explained that she had been asleep and 

did not know where the safe was, Jones repeatedly hit her in the 

face. Jones then picked up a kitchen knife and threatened to 

stab her. Roe maintained that she did not know where the safe

was, and Jones informed her that “one of his boys was coming 

over . . . [and] he was kind of crazy.” Jones referred to the 

person as “Moisture,” a nickname that Roe later discovered 

belonged to Northington.

When Defendants arrived at the house, Northington ordered 

that Roe be placed in the bathroom. Roe complied because she 

was afraid of Defendants and Jones. At that point, Northington, 

Jones, and Skinner — who went by the nickname “Menace” —

followed her into the bathroom. Northington “smack[ed]” Roe’s 

face with a butcher knife and then proceeded to place the tip of 

the knife to the back of her head, telling her that if she did 

not tell him where the safe was he was going to cut through the 

back of her head like “how butter slices.” Northington told Roe 

to take off her clothes, and when she complied, he ran the 
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butcher knife up and down her body and told her he was going to 

slit her throat.

Northington instructed Roe to touch herself, causing Roe to 

fear that he was going to rape her. Jones then told Northington 

“that it was enough” and allowed Roe to put on her clothing. 

After Roe dressed, Skinner told her if she told anyone what 

happened, he would be the last person she saw from “the other 

end of the barrel.” Northington told her that if she talked to 

anyone, they would come to her house and rape and kill her in 

front of her son and his father. Before she was allowed to 

leave, she was warned that she “was going to be followed home, 

to make sure [she] didn’t stop at the police station.” Roe left

the residence and drove straight to the home of her son’s 

father.

The next day, Roe told her mother and younger sister about 

these events. Roe’s mother urged her to tell the police, but 

Roe refused at first because of Defendants’ warning that they 

would kill her if she told anyone what had happened. She agreed 

to go to the hospital at around 10:00 p.m. that night because 

her head was hurting. Two law enforcement officers interviewed 

Roe at the hospital, took a statement, and photographed the 

injuries to her face and body.
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On 12 February 2013, an Onslow County grand jury indicted 

Defendants on charges of first-degree kidnapping, felony 

conspiracy, extortion, and felonious obstruction of justice. 

The grand jury also returned bills of indictment charging 

Skinner with simple assault and charging Northington with 

assault with a deadly weapon.2 The cases were joined, and a jury 

trial was held beginning on 16 December 2013.

On 20 December 2013, the jury returned verdicts finding 

Skinner guilty of nonfelonious obstruction of justice and 

extortion and not guilty of all remaining charges. The jury 

found Northington guilty of nonfelonious obstruction of justice,

extortion, second-degree kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit 

second-degree kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Skinner to 

a presumptive-range term of 21 to 35 months imprisonment for 

extortion and 120 days imprisonment for nonfelonious obstruction 

of justice to begin at the expiration of the first sentence. 

The trial court consolidated Northington’s kidnapping and 

conspiracy offenses and sentenced him to a presumptive-range 

term of 33 to 52 months imprisonment. The trial court 

consolidated the extortion and nonfelonious obstruction of 

justice offenses and sentenced Northington to 21 to 35 months 

 

2 The State later dismissed the assault charges against both 

Defendants.
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imprisonment following the expiration of the first sentence. 

Defendants gave notice of appeal in open court.

Analysis

On appeal, Defendants contend that the trial court erred in 

denying their motions to dismiss the obstruction of justice 

charges based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Northington 

also argues that the trial court committed plain error in its 

instructions to the jury. We address each argument in turn.

I. Obstruction of Justice

Defendants argue that their charges for obstruction of 

justice should have been dismissed because “there was no 

evidence that [Defendants’] conduct actually hindered the 

administration of justice.” We disagree.

When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to 

dismiss for insufficient evidence, this Court must determine de 

novo “whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each 

essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense 

included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator . 

. . .” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 

(citation omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L.Ed.2d 150 

(2000). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
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conclusion. Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable 

to the State with every reasonable inference drawn in the 

State’s favor.” State v. Lucas, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 758 

S.E.2d 672, 676 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

In In re Kivett, 309 N.C. 635, 670, 309 

S.E.2d 442, 462 (1983), our Supreme Court 

confirmed that “[o]bstruction of justice is 

a common law offense in North Carolina” that 

was not abrogated by Article 30 of Chapter 

14 of the General Statutes, which sets out 

statutory “obstruction of justice” offenses. 

The Court then adopted the following 

definition of the common law offense: “‘At 

common law it is an offense to do any act 

which prevents, obstructs, impedes or 

hinders public or legal justice. The common 

law offense of obstructing public justice 

may take a variety of forms . . . .’” Id. 

(quoting 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 

1,2 (1978)).

State v. Wright, 206 N.C. App. 239, 241, 696 S.E.2d 832, 834-35 

(2010). Thus, in order to survive Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss the obstruction of justice charges, the State was 

required to present substantial evidence that Defendants 

“committed an act that prevented, obstructed, impeded, or 

hindered public or legal justice.” State v. Cousin, ___ N.C. 

App. ___, ___, 757 S.E.2d 332, 338, disc. review denied, ___ 

N.C. ___, 762 S.E.2d 446 (2014).

At trial, Roe testified that both Defendants threatened her 
-8-

life if she spoke with law enforcement officers or anyone else 

about what had happened to her. Specifically, Skinner told her 

if she told anyone what happened, he would be the last person 

she saw from “the other end of the barrel,” and Northington said 

that if she talked to anyone, they would come to her home and 

rape and kill her in front of her son and his father. She 

further testified that once she was finally permitted to leave 

Baglioni’s house, Defendants and Jones told her that she “was 

going to be followed home, to make sure [she] didn’t stop at the 

police station.” Roe stated that she drove by the police 

station that evening and thought about stopping to report the 

crimes committed against her but decided against it “because 

they told [her] they were going to kill [her], and [she] didn’t 

want to put [her] family or [her]self in any more danger.”

Roe testified that the next day, she spoke to her mother, 

who urged her to speak to the police but that she “didn’t want 

to go” and “wasn’t going to tell anybody” based on the threats 

Defendants made to her. That night, Roe acquiesced to her 

mother’s request that she go to the hospital to seek treatment 

for her injuries. Her mother then informed her that two law 

enforcement officers were going to be there and would want to 

talk to her about what happened. It was only then that Roe gave 
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a statement and allowed the officers to photograph the injuries 

to her face and body.

Taken in the light most favorable to the State, Roe’s 

testimony that because of Defendants’ threats she delayed 

notifying law enforcement personnel about the crimes committed 

against her for approximately 18 hours constitutes substantial 

evidence that Defendants committed an act which prevented, 

obstructed, impeded or hindered public or legal justice. See 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 623 (11th ed. 2005)

(defining “impede” as “to interfere with or slow the progress 

of”); id. at 588 (defining “hinder” as “to make slow or 

difficult the progress of”; “to hold back”; or “to delay, 

impede, or prevent action”). Thus, because there was 

substantial evidence of each essential element of obstruction of 

justice and that Defendants were the perpetrators, we conclude 

that the trial court properly denied Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss.

II. Jury Instructions

Northington also argues that the trial court’s jury 

instructions concerning the charge of felonious conspiracy were 

improper “because the doctrine of acting in concert, applied to 

the conspiracy charge, had the effect of eliminating the 
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requirement of a specific agreement to commit kidnapping.” He

admits that he failed to object to the jury instructions at 

trial and that our review is consequently limited to determining 

whether the alleged instructional error rose to the level of 

plain error.

Under the plain error standard, 

defendant must show that the instructions 

were erroneous and that absent the erroneous 

instructions, a jury probably would have 

returned a different verdict. The error in 

the instructions must be so fundamental that 

it denied the defendant a fair trial and 

quite probably tilted the scales against 

him. It is the rare case in which an 

improper instruction will justify the 

reversal of a criminal conviction when no 

objection has been made in the trial court. 

In deciding whether a defect in the jury 

instruction constitutes plain error, the 

appellate court must examine the entire 

record and determine if the instructional

error had a probable impact on the jury’s 

finding of guilt.

State v. Smith, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 736 S.E.2d 847, 850-51 

(2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Northington points to the following portion of the trial 

court’s instructions as the basis for his plain error argument:

The defendant, Harry D. Northington, 

Jr., has been charged with feloniously 

conspiring to commit first-degree 

kidnapping.

For a defendant to be guilty of a 

crime, it is not necessary that the 
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defendant do all of the acts necessary to 

constitute the crime. If two or more 

persons join in a common purpose to commit 

felonious conspiracy, each of them, if 

actually or constructively present, is 

guilty of a crime and also guilty of any 

other crime committed by the other, in 

pursuance of the common purpose to commit 

felonious conspiracy, or as a natural and 

probable consequence thereof.

The trial court then instructed the jury as to the elements of 

conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping. Northington 

contends that by instructing on the theory of acting in concert 

in conjunction with conspiracy to commit first-degree 

kidnapping, the trial court permitted the jury to find him 

guilty of conspiracy “based on mere guilt by association with 

Jones.” He asserts that the acting in concert component of the 

instruction eviscerated the requirement of a specific agreement 

to commit kidnapping and instead allowed a finding of guilt

based simply on proof that Northington shared a common purpose 

with Jones to “conspir[e] to commit some unspecified unlawful 

act.” We disagree.

After explaining the elements of conspiracy to commit 

first-degree kidnapping, the trial court continued its 

instructions as follows:

If you find from the evidence, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that on or about the 

alleged date, the defendant, Harry D. 
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Northington, Jr., agreed with Chris Jones 

and Darren Skinner to commit first degree 

kidnapping and that the defendant, Harry D. 

Northington, Jr., and those persons 

intended, at the time the agreement was 

made, that it would be carried out, it would 

be your duty to return a verdict of guilty 

as to the defendant, Harry D. Northington, 

Jr. If you do not so find, or have a 

reasonable doubt as to one or more of these 

things, you would not return a verdict of 

guilty of felonious conspiracy to commit 

first-degree kidnapping as to the defendant, 

Harry D. Northington, Jr., but will 

determine whether he is guilty of felonious 

conspiracy to commit second-degree 

kidnapping.

For you to find the defendant, Harry D. 

Northington, Jr., guilty of felonious 

conspiracy to commit second-degree 

kidnapping, the State must prove three 

things, beyond a reasonable doubt. First, 

that the defendant, Harry D. Northington, 

Jr., and Chris Jones and Darren Skinner 

entered into an agreement. Second, that the 

agreement was to commit second-degree 

kidnapping.

Second-degree kidnapping is the 

unlawful removal of a person from one place 

to another, without that person’s consent, 

for the purpose of terrorizing that person.

And third, that the defendant, Harry D. 

Northington, Jr., and Chris Jones and Darren 

Skinner intended that the agreement be 

carried out at the time it was made.

If you find from the evidence, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that on or about the 

alleged date, the defendant, Harry D. 

Northington, Jr., agreed with Chris Jones 

and Darren Skinner to commit second-degree 
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kidnapping and that the defendant, Harry D. 

Northington, Jr., and those persons intended 

at the time the agreement was made that it 

would be carried out, it would be your duty 

to return a verdict of guilty as to the 

defendant, Harry D. Northington, Jr. If you 

do not so find, or have a reasonable doubt 

as to one or more of these things, it would 

be your duty to find the defendant, Harry D. 

Northington, Jr., not guilty.

These instructions, when viewed in their entirety, make 

clear that in order to find Northington guilty of conspiracy to 

commit kidnapping, the jury was required to determine that he

specifically (1) entered into an agreement with his coconspirators (2) to commit a kidnapping (3) that they intended 

to carry out at the time the agreement was made. See State v. 

Roach, 358 N.C. 243, 304, 595 S.E.2d 381, 420 (2004) (“[W]hen 

instructions, viewed in their entirety, present the law fairly 

and accurately to the jury, the instructions will be upheld.”); 

see also State v. Canady, 191 N.C. App. 680, 689, 664 S.E.2d 

380, 385 (2008) (“When reviewing jury instructions, it is not 

enough for the appealing party to show that error occurred in 

the jury instructions; rather, it must be demonstrated that such 

error was likely, in light of the entire charge, to mislead the 

jury.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), disc. 

review denied, 363 N.C. 132, 673 S.E.2d 662 (2009).

Although an instruction on the theory of acting in concert 
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generally permits a finding of guilt when the defendant does not 

complete each particular act constituting the crime himself but 

rather shares in a common purpose to commit the crime with his 

co-perpetrators, we believe that the instructions here —

considered in their totality — were sufficiently clear in 

informing the jury that it was required to find that Northington

himself entered into an agreement with others to commit a 

kidnapping. See State v. Ledwell, 171 N.C. App. 328, 333, 614 

S.E.2d 412, 415 (“The crime of conspiracy is an agreement to 

commit a substantive criminal act . . . .”), disc. review 

denied, 360 N.C. 73, 622 S.E.2d 624 (2005). Moreover, we note 

that the jury ultimately found Northington guilty of conspiracy 

to commit second-degree kidnapping, and the trial court only 

included an instruction on acting in concert in its charge on 

conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping. Thus, assuming —

without deciding — that the challenged portion of the jury 

instructions was erroneous, we conclude that Northington has 

failed to show plain error.3

 

3 Northington also appears to make a brief argument that his 

conviction for conspiracy to commit second-degree kidnapping 

must be set aside because “[he] alone stands convicted of 

conspiracy” since Skinner was acquitted of the offense and the 

State voluntarily dismissed the conspiracy charge against Jones. 

While “[t]he general rule is that if all participants charged in 

a conspiracy have been legally acquitted, except the defendant, 
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Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Defendants 

received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and DILLON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

 

then the inconsistent charge or conviction against the sole 

remaining defendant must be set aside[,] . . . . the dismissal 

of a charge[] pursuant to a plea agreement does not constitute 

an acquittal at law.” State v. Saunders, 126 N.C. App. 524, 

527-28, 485 S.E.2d 853, 855 (1997). Thus, because Jones and 

Skinner were not both acquitted of conspiracy, the trial court 

was not required to set aside Northington’s conspiracy 

conviction. See State v. Essick, 67 N.C. App. 697, 701, 314 

S.E.2d 268, 271 (1984) (“In the absence of acquittals of all 

named co-conspirators, the defendant’s conviction will stand.”).