NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTOPHER HARBRIDGE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-55841 

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-04486-GW-AS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 1, 2018**

Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Christopher Harbridge, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the 

district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation and 

other constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We 

review de novo. Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (summary 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

OCT 3 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-55841 

judgment and dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 

F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We may 

affirm on any basis supported by the record. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 

1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Dismissal of Harbridge’s claims regarding the hearing on the Rules 

Violation Report and resulting discipline (claims 1-4, 6) was proper because 

Harbridge failed to allege facts sufficient to state any claim. See Wilhelm, 680

F.3d at 1121 (a complaint must state a plausible claim to relief to survive screening 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). First, Harbridge failed to allege membership in a 

protected class to support his equal protection theory. See Barren v. Harrington, 

152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (To state a Fourteenth Amendment 

equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege “that the defendants acted with an 

intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a 

protected class.”). Second, Harbridge failed to allege facts linking the alleged 

retaliation and his protected speech. See Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (“[M]ere speculation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not 

sufficient.”). Third, Harbridge failed to allege facts showing any denial of the due 

process protections to which he was entitled as part of the disciplinary proceedings.

See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (requirements of due process 

are satisfied if “some evidence” supports disciplinary decision); Wolff v. 
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McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-71 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements 

for prison disciplinary proceedings); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566 (“Prison 

officials must have the necessary discretion . . . to refuse to call witnesses [for 

reasons such as] irrelevance [or] lack of necessity . . . .”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harbridge’s 

retaliation claim based on a single missed meal because Harbridge failed to raise a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the denial of the meal was because of 

Harbridge’s protected speech. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (elements of retaliation claim in the prison context).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harbridge’s 

retaliation claims based on his confinement during disciplinary detention (claims 

7-9) because Harbridge failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to 

whether defendants did not have a legitimate correctional purpose for confiscating

Harbridge’s personal items during disciplinary detention and denying him outdoor 

exercise. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (legitimate 

penological goals includes “preserving institutional order and discipline”). The 

district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mr. Markarian’s declaration. 

See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1224 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Evidentiary rulings 

made in the context of summary judgment motions are reviewed for abuse of 

discretion . . . .”). We reject as unsupported by the record Harbridge’s additional 
4 15-55841 

conclusory allegations regarding the conditions of confinement during disciplinary 

detention.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harbridge’s 

conditions of confinement claim because Harbridge failed to raise a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered an extreme deprivation. See 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“[O]nly those deprivations denying the 

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the 

basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Harbridge’s claims of supervisory 

liability, including his claims against the California Correctional Peace Officers 

Association, because Harbridge failed to allege facts showing direct involvement 

or a sufficient causal connection between the actions of supervisors and the alleged 

constitutional violations. See Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 

2013) (requirements for supervisory liability). The district court properly 

dismissed Harbridge’s claim based on respondeat superior because there is no 

vicarious liability under § 1983. See id.

The district court properly dismissed Harbridge’s due process claims based 

on a dysfunctional prison grievance system because Harbridge did not have a 

protected liberty interest in any particular grievance system. See Ramirez v. 
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Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no protected liberty interest in any 

particular grievance system).

The district court properly dismissed Harbridge’s claims regarding the 

grievance system at Pleasant Valley State Prison for improper venue. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(b) (listing grounds for venue and explaining that a civil action 

should be brought in the judicial district in which a substantial portion of the 

events giving rise to the claim occurred). 

The district court properly dismissed Harbridge’s retaliation claim against 

Porter and Nungary because Harbridge failed to allege facts sufficient to state a 

claim. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68.

The district court dismissed Harbridge’s retaliation claim against Reed in its 

initial screening order before any response by the defendants on the ground that

Harbridge failed to allege an adverse action that chilled his speech. Harbridge, 

however, alleges that Reed threatened him with a prison transfer if he continued to 

write letters of complaint, which is sufficiently adverse to state a retaliation claim 

even if the threat was never carried out. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 

(9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he mere threat of harm can be an adverse action, regardless of 

whether it is carried out because the threat itself can have a chilling effect.”). 

Harbridge was not required to plead facts showing that his speech was actually 

chilled, only that the threat would chill a “person of ordinary firmness.” Id. at 
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1271 (“an objective standard governs the chilling inquiry”). We reverse and 

remand for further proceedings as to Harbridge’s claim against Reed only.

We do not consider any arguments that Harbridge fails to raise in his 

opening brief, and we reject Harbridge’s contention that he properly raised issues 

by referencing his briefs before the district court. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. 

Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the court cannot 

“manufacture arguments for an appellant” (citation omitted)).

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.