COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

GLORIA ANN NORTHCRAFT DeWALD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0388-97-1 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY 

 FEBRUARY 3, 1998 

ANDREW ALFRED DeWALD 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 

 Henry M. Schwan for appellant. 

 Moody E. Stallings, Jr. (Kevin E. 

Martingayle; Stallings & Richardson, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Gloria DeWald (wife) appeals a decree of the trial court 

adjudicating the issues of spousal support and equitable 

distribution, complaining that the court erroneously failed to 

consider all factors specified by Code § 20-107.1 in fixing 

support and denied wife a marital interest in the savings plan of 

her husband, Andrew DeWald (husband). Because we are unable to 

fully determine the classification and valuation of relevant 

property interests of the parties, we must reverse and remand for 

further consideration by the trial court. 

 There are three basic steps that a trial 

judge must follow in making an equitable 

distribution of property. "The court first 

must classify the property as either 

[separate, marital, or part separate and part 

marital property]. The court then must 

assign a value to the property based upon 

evidence presented by both parties. Finally, 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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the court distributes the property to the 

parties, taking into consideration the 

factors presented in Code § 20-107.3(E)." 

Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 403, 424 S.E.2d 572, 576 

(1992) (citation omitted). "The burden is always on the parties 

to present sufficient evidence to provide the basis on which a 

proper determination can be made and the trial court . . . must 

have that evidence . . . before determining to grant or deny a 

monetary award." Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 517, 347 

S.E.2d 134, 139 (1986). 

 "In reviewing an equitable distribution award on appeal, we 

recognize that the trial court's job is a difficult one. 

Accordingly, we rely heavily on the discretion of the trial judge 

in weighing the many considerations and circumstances that are 

presented in each case." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 132, 137, 

354 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987) (citing Rexrode v. Rexrode, 1 Va. App. 

385, 394-95, 339 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1986)). However, "[i]n making 

an equitable distribution award, formulating the award must go 

beyond mere guesswork. There must be a proper foundation in the 

record to support the granting of an award and the amount of the 

award." Stumbo v. Stumbo, 20 Va. App. 685, 693, 460 S.E.2d 591, 

595 (1995) (citations omitted). 

 Here, the commissioner's report fails to fully specify the 

marital, separate and hybrid interests of the parties in all 

properties in dispute, with attendant values, including 

particulars of the savings plan and residence and related 
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transmutation/tracing issues. Indeed, the commissioner declared 

it "impossible to determine what is the marital value of the 

[savings] plan," funds from which enhanced the value of the home. 

 Nevertheless, both the commissioner and the trial court 

concluded that an equitable distribution award was appropriate, 

disagreeing on the correct sum. Under such circumstances, we are 

unable to conduct a proper appellate review of the disputed award 

and must reverse the decree and remand for further consideration 

by the court, guided by Code § 20-107.3.1

 

 Because factors pertinent to spousal support are related to 

any equitable distribution award, we likewise reverse and remand 

the decree of spousal support for adjudication in accordance with 

Code § 20-107.1. See Stumbo v. Stumbo, 20 Va. App. 685, 694, 460 

S.E.2d 591, 595 (1995) (citation omitted). 

 Reversed and remanded.

 

 1Our disposition does not presuppose that the present award 

is erroneous but results only from our inability to conduct a 

proper appellate review.