1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-15-00171-CV

____________________

IN THE INTEREST OF J.H.

________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 13-10-11650 CV 

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

After a bench trial, the trial court modified a prior order affecting the parentchild relationship and entered an order terminating the parental rights of R.H. 

(Mother or appellant)

1 to her seven-year-old son, J.H. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 

161.001 (West 2014). In two appellate issues, Mother challenges (1) the legal and 

factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of her parental rights 

 1 We identify the minor children by initials to protect their identities. See 

Tex. R. App. P. 9.8. Other members of the family are identified by either initials or 

based upon their relationship to the children. After the suit was filed, the Father 

executed an affidavit voluntarily relinquishing his parental rights to J.H. Father is 

not a party to this appeal. We reference Father in the opinion only as necessary to 

place matters in context for our appellate review of Mother’s appeal.
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under section 161.001(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code and (2) the legal and 

factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that termination of her 

parental rights is in J.H.’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(1)(O), (2). We hold the 

evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s order, and we affirm the judgment. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The 2010 Removal

In 2010, when J.H. was two years old, the Department of Family and 

Protective Services (the Department) filed an Original Petition for Protection of a 

Child, for Conservatorship, and for Termination in [a] Suit Affecting the ParentChild Relationship (the petition). In the petition, the Department requested that the 

trial court appoint the Department as J.H.’s temporary sole managing conservator

because there was “a continuing the Department alleged danger to the physical 

health or safety” of J.H. if he was not removed and that the “continuation of the 

child in the home would be contrary to the child’s welfare[.]” The Department also 

requested that the trial court appoint the Department as J.H.’s permanent sole 

managing conservator if J.H. could not be reunified with either parent or 

permanently placed with a relative or other suitable person for placement, and that 

Mother’s parental rights be terminated if reunification cannot be achieved. The 

petition alleged that the appointment of either Mother or Father as permanent 
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managing conservator would not be in J.H.’s best interest because it “would 

significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.” The 

petition was supported by an attached sworn and notarized affidavit of a Child 

Protective Services (CPS) worker, and the affidavit described the circumstances 

necessitating removal.

According to the affidavit in support of emergency removal, CPS received a 

report alleging neglectful supervision of one-year-old J.H. in April of 2009,

alleging that Mother had left her diaper bag in the lobby while at a clinic, and when 

the staff looked in the bag to determine the owner, the staff found marijuana and 

discovered the bag belonged to Mother. The affidavit stated that Mother denied 

using drugs or having knowledge of how the marijuana got into her diaper bag, and 

two weeks later Mother tested negative for illicit substances on a drug screen. 

The affidavit stated that CPS received another report in May of 2009,

alleging that J.H. was examined in an emergency room for a crushed foot, that he 

had been to the emergency room several times that year, and that while Mother

was in the hospital for sickle cell anemia, J.H. would wander the halls 

unsupervised. A CPS investigator questioned Mother about the injury to J.H.’s foot 

and Mother stated that a car ran over his foot while Mother and J.H. went to check 

the mail. According to the affidavit, during an assessment in 2009, Mother stated 
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she has sickle cell anemia and has suffered two strokes, Mother also reported that 

Mother and her siblings were removed from their mother by CPS due to medical 

neglect when they were children, and Mother would “not discuss her medical 

needs and bec[a]me[] defensive if the subject [wa]s brought up.” 

CPS received another report in August of 2009, alleging Mother physically 

abused J.H., and that during an argument between Mother and one of her sisters, 

J.H. was pushed down and hit his head. When the CPS worker arrived at Mother’s 

residence to investigate the complaint, no one was home. The worker called 

Mother’s cell phone and told her that the worker needed to see Mother and J.H. 

Mother told the worker that the worker was not allowed to show up at her 

residence without calling first and then Mother “hung up” on the worker. 

According to the affidavit, as the worker was leaving, Mother got out of a vehicle

with J.H. The worker noted that J.H. had a scratch under his right eye and a bright 

red spot on his right eyeball. Mother told the worker that the scratch was from J.H. 

fighting with his cousin who was the same age as J.H. Mother also told the CPS

worker that the spot in J.H.’s eye was from the same fight or from “Pink Eye.” 

Mother refused to let the worker take photographs of J.H. The worker witnessed 

Mother cussing at J.H., J.H. walking up stairs unassisted, and J.H. eating “old”

food. In August of 2009, one of Mother’s sisters, C.J., called the worker and 
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explained that C.J. had been appointed J.H.’s guardian and keeps J.H. on the 

weekends, but that C.J. was concerned because “every weekend he comes over 

with new marks and bruises[.]”C.J. explained that Mother told her that the marks 

and bruises were from J.H. falling. 

According to the affidavit, J.H. was voluntarily placed with one of Mother’s 

sisters, S.H., on September 10, 2009, and Mother completed a substance abuse 

assessment and began parenting classes. On January 29, 2010, the CPS worker 

made an unannounced visit to Mother’s home and could see Mother standing in the 

window and J.H. running around the living room. Mother came to the window and 

told the worker she was not going to open the door, and Mother closed the blinds. 

The affidavit further alleged the CPS worker called law enforcement, after which 

J.H. was observed to have a scab on his nose, a scab under his left eye, and a bruise 

beside his right eye. When asked how J.H. sustained the injuries, Mother 

responded that J.H. was playing with the blinds at S.H.’s home and the blinds hit 

him in the face. Mother explained that J.H. was with her because S.H. had to go 

somewhere and needed Mother to watch J.H. The CPS worker also learned that 

Mother had failed to get one of J.H.’s prescriptions refilled. 

On February 1, 2010, the trial court signed an Order for Protection of a 

Child in an Emergency and Notice of Hearing, and the order named the 
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Department as J.H.’s temporary sole managing conservator. On February 8, 2010, 

and after a full adversary hearing, the trial court signed an order naming the 

Department as J.H.’s temporary managing conservator, granting Mother and Father 

supervised visitation with J.H., and ordering Mother and Father to attend 

counseling and parenting classes, submit to drug and alcohol assessments and 

testing, and comply with their service plans during the pendency of the suit. J.H. 

was then placed with his maternal great-grandmother. As a result of an Agreed 

Final Order signed by the trial court on November 2, 2010, C.J. and R.J., J.H.’s 

aunt and uncle, were ultimately named the permanent managing conservators of 

J.H., with Mother having the right to supervised visits with J.H. 

The 2013 Removal

On October 29, 2013, after a referral alleging the neglectful supervision of 

J.H. by the aunt and uncle, sexual abuse of J.H. by an unknown perpetrator, and 

that C.J. and R.J. had stated they no longer wanted to care for J.H., the Department 

filed a petition for protection of J.H., for conservatorship, and for termination of 

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights (the 2013 Petition). The Department attached

to the 2013 Petition a Department representative’s signed and notarized affidavit in 

support of removal of J.H. from C.J.’s and R.J.’s care. The affidavit stated that 

because C.J. and R.J. “refus[ed] to accept parental responsibility for [J.H.][,]” the 
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Department was requesting to be named J.H.’s temporary managing conservator. 

The trial court signed an Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency, which 

stated that there was a danger to J.H. and appointed the Department as J.H.’s 

temporary managing conservator for the second time.

On November 6, 2013, after a full adversary hearing, the court signed a 

temporary order finding that C.J. and R.J. were unwilling and unable to provide 

J.H. a home, and the court appointed the Department as temporary managing 

conservator and Mother and Father as temporary possessory conservators with 

limited rights and duties. The order required, pursuant to section 263.106 of the 

Texas Family Code, Mother to comply with each requirement of the Department’s 

service plan during the pendency of the suit. Although represented by counsel, the 

hearing transcript and the order do not reflect that Mother attended the trial.

After hearing evidence at a bench trial in April of 2015, the trial court

entered a termination order terminating Father’s parental rights as to J.H., finding 

that such termination is in J.H.’s best interest, and that Father had executed an 

unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided 

by Chapter 161. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(K), (2). In the termination 

order the trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights as to J.H., finding 

such termination is in J.H.’s best interest, and that Mother failed to comply with 
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the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary 

for her to obtain the return of J.H., who has been in the permanent or temporary 

managing conservatorship of the Department for not less than nine months as a 

result of J.H.’s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect 

of the child. See id. § 161.001(1)(O), (2). Mother appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under 

section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code, the petitioner must establish at least 

one ground listed under subdivision (1) of the statute, and must also prove that 

termination is in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; 

In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Due process requires the petitioner to 

justify termination by clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§§ 161.001, 161.206(a) (West 2014); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 

2002). “Clear and convincing” evidence is that “measure or degree of proof that 

will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the 

truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 

(West 2014).

In a legal sufficiency review of an order terminating parental rights, the 

evidence relating to a challenged finding is reviewed “in the light most favorable to 
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the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a 

firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. 

With respect to Mother’s factual sufficiency arguments, we must “give due 

consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be 

clear and convincing.” Id. Under a factual sufficiency standard, the trial court’s 

findings are sufficient unless, based on the entire record, the disputed evidence that 

could not have been credited in favor of the finding is so significant that the trial 

court could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that the 

challenged finding was true. See id.

TESTIMONY AND OTHER EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL

The CPS caseworker assigned to the case testified that the Department had 

been the temporary managing conservator of J.H. since November of 2013. She 

stated that the Department had custody of J.H. on a prior occasion, that J.H. was 

initially removed from Mother’s care due to neglect, and that J.H.’s relatives were 

appointed permanent managing conservators. According to the caseworker, Mother

has not provided proof of completion of the following tasks required by her service 

plan: individual counseling, parenting classes, some of the random drug screens, 

maintenance of stable and appropriate housing, and maintenance and proof of 

employment. After Mother’s drug and alcohol assessment, Mother failed to 
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participate in the recommended outpatient services, individual counseling, and a 

psychiatric evaluation. According to the caseworker, although Mother claims she

has been hospitalized five to seven times for her sickle cell anemia, the caseworker

has not seen documentation of the hospitalizations and she believes Mother has

been given a fair opportunity to complete all of her services. The caseworker

testified that she told Mother that if transportation was an issue, the caseworker

could provide transportation to services. The caseworker also testified that all of

J.H.’s relatives who had been suggested as possible placements for J.H. were either 

unable or unwilling to care for J.H..

At the supervised visits that Mother attended, the caseworker observed that 

sometimes Mother appeared not to be feeling well, Mother would want to sleep 

during the visits, and would hand J.H. a phone. According to the caseworker, there 

were several visits that Mother indicated she would attend but then Mother failed 

to appear, which upset J.H. and caused him to cry and have some behavior issues 

at school. As a result of Mother’s failure to appear at visitations, the visits were 

suspended by court order in September 2014. The caseworker explained that 

Mother never brought up visitation with J.H. again or asked that visitation be 

reinstated. The caseworker testified that despite Mother’s inability to be able to 

provide J.H. with a safe and stable home, the caseworker believes that Mother
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loves J.H. According to the caseworker, she asked Mother to demonstrate a 

willingness and an ability to protect J.H. from harm, to accept the responsibility of 

being a parent, and to put J.H.’s needs ahead of her own. The caseworker testified 

that Mother has not achieved these goals. The caseworker explained that, although 

J.H. still wants to see Mother, the caseworker believes that terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to J.H. is in his best interest because J.H. needs stability and a 

family, and his behavior and demeanor are suffering because he does not have 

permanency. 

The caseworker testified that the Department’s goal for J.H. is to get him 

into an adoptive home as soon as possible. She explained that J.H. is currently in a 

foster home and, although the foster parents are agreeable to J.H. living there, they 

are not willing to adopt him.

The court-appointed special advocate (CASA) for J.H. also testified at trial. 

She stated that terminating Mother’s parental rights as to J.H. is in J.H.’s best 

interest. According to the CASA, “the first couple of visits” between Mother and 

J.H. were “really nice[,]” but then “the visits bec[a]me very inconsistent” and 

Mother would “give him her phone so he could play games and then she would go 

over to the corner, curl up, and go to sleep. Sometimes she would sleep through 

almost the entire visit.” The CASA explained that after Mother did not appear for 
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four consecutive scheduled visits, J.H. got progressively more upset, and the 

CASA “grew to be in favor of suspending the visits.” The CASA testified that after 

the visits were suspended, Mother never mentioned it again. 

The CASA agreed that, even considering Mother’s health issues, Mother

was given a sufficient opportunity to complete her services and that the CPS 

caseworker went “above and beyond” to provide services for Mother. The CASA 

was present when the caseworker offered to provide Mother transportation to 

services, and the CASA also provided her phone number to Mother in order to help 

set up transportation for Mother if necessary, but Mother never called the CASA. 

The CASA admitted that Mother appeared ill and that her health issues could have 

impacted Mother’s ability to complete services, but Mother never told the CASA 

that she was unable to participate in services because of her illness.

According to the CASA, although J.H.’s current foster parents have stated 

several times that they are willing to keep J.H. until he is adopted by another 

family, the foster parents’ inquiries about when J.H. might be leaving have 

increased as J.H.’s behavioral problems have escalated. The foster parents have

four other foster children in their home. The CASA expressed concern that J.H.’s 

placement might have to be moved in the interim. The CASA also noted that J.H.’s 

behavioral issues escalated when the other foster children in the foster home had 
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contact with their parents. The CASA attributed J.H.’s behavioral issues to his 

awareness that he does not have a permanent home or a permanent person who is 

dedicated to him. The CASA testified that the Department had recommended that 

J.H. cease contact with Mother and the CASA supported it, based on the 

recommendations from J.H.’s therapist. According to the CASA, J.H. knows he 

cannot live with Mother, and although he has mentioned to the CASA wanting to 

call his Mother on two or three occasions, he has not asked to see her. The CASA 

testified that she believed it was in the best interest of J.H. for the trial court to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights to J.H.

At trial, Father’s affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights as 

to J.H. and an order terminating Mother’s parental rights as to another child were 

also admitted into evidence. The trial court also took judicial notice of pleadings 

and certain documents in the clerk’s file, including the temporary order dated 

November 6, 2013, and the order consolidating this case with the previous case 

appointing C.J. and R.J. as permanent managing conservators for J.H.

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

In her first issue, Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to show 

that J.H. “was removed from the conservator due to abuse or neglect.” See Tex. 

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(O). Appellant does not contest that she did not 
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complete the family service plan or that J.H. had been removed from her care for 

more than nine months at the time of the termination hearing. According to 

appellant, the Department “failed to present evidence as to any abuse and neglect” 

necessitating the 2013 removal because the relatives that were appointed 

conservators of J.H. in 2010 “placed [J.H.] in the care of the Department because 

they could no longer care for him[.]”

Section 161.001(1)(O) of the Texas Family Code provides that a court may 

terminate the parent-child relationship if the parent:

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically 

established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of 

the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing 

conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services

for not less than nine months as a result of the child’s removal from 

the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child[.]

Id. The parent who fails to comply with a court order as required by subsection (O) 

need not be the same person whose abuse or neglect triggered the child’s removal. 

See In re D.R.H., 395 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); In 

re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 532 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). 

We interpret the terms “abuse” and “neglect” broadly to include risks or threats 

presented by the child’s environment. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. 

2013). Evidence of abuse or neglect submitted in an affidavit attached to a petition 

for removal, combined with unchallenged trial court findings that removal of the 
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child from the parent’s care was necessary because of a “substantial risk of a 

continuing danger” if the child returned home, provides sufficient evidence to 

establish that a child was removed from the parent’s custody under Chapter 262 for 

abuse or neglect. See id. at 248-49. 

Although J.H. was removed from the care of the relatives appointed as 

managing conservators, J.H. was originally removed from Mother’s care pursuant 

to Chapter 262. The trial court consolidated the cases and took judicial notice of 

the pleadings in the prior case. In 2009, the Department received reports that 

Mother was carrying marijuana in her diaper bag and that Mother was neglecting 

and physically abusing J.H. Mother’s sister reported her concern of new bruises 

and marks on J.H. after he was in Mother’s care. The Department received a report 

that J.H. had been seen in the emergency room several times and that he was not 

being supervised. J.H.’s original removal from Mother’s care based upon neglect 

was a precipitating event from which the modification proceeding terminating 

Mother’s parental rights began and from which J.H. was placed with his relatives. 

See generally In re B.C., No. 04-14-00744-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 4327, 

**11-12 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (In a case

where appellant-father argued the Department did not prove that the alleged abuse 

or neglect under section 161.001(1)(O) was “at the hands of a parent[,]” the trial 
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court concluded that the evidence was factually sufficient to support termination 

under subsection (O) where, although the children were subsequently removed 

from aunt’s home for abuse of one of the children, the children’s earlier removal 

from mother’s home based on neglect was the “precipitating event from which the 

termination proceedings began and from which the children were placed in Aunt’s 

home.”). Furthermore, Mother does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s 

finding that the October 29, 2013 Order for Protection of a Child in an Emergency 

(wherein the Department was appointed J.H.’s temporary managing conservator 

for the second time) was necessary because of Mother’s continued neglect. 

On this record, the trial court could have determined that, considering

evidence of Mother’s neglect of J.H. that resulted in the 2010 removal, Mother’s 

continued neglect of J.H. after he was voluntarily placed with a relative, and 

Mother’s failure to complete her service plan during the pendency of the suit, the 

Department presented clear and convincing evidence supporting termination under 

section 161.001(O). We conclude that there is sufficient evidence that Mother

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established 

the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the J.H. who had been in the 

conservatorship of the Department for more than nine months and had been 

removed due to abuse or neglect. Issue one is overruled.
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BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

In Mother’s second issue, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting the finding that termination of her parental rights is in J.H.’s best 

interest. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized a non-exhaustive list of factors 

that are pertinent to the inquiry of whether termination of parental rights is in the 

best interest of the child including: (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional 

and physical needs of the child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and 

physical danger to the child now and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the 

individuals seeking custody, (5) programs available to assist these individuals to 

promote the best interest of the child, (6) the plans for the child by these 

individuals or by the agency seeking custody, (7) the stability of the home or 

proposed placement, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate 

that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse 

for the acts or omissions of the parent. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-

72 (Tex. 1976); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307 (West 2014). No 

particular Holley factor is controlling, and evidence of one factor may be sufficient 

to support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. See In re A.P., 

184 S.W.3d 410, 414-15 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). The best interest 

determination may rely on direct or circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and 
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the totality of the evidence. See In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

With respect to the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental 

rights was in J.H.’s best interest, Mother asserts that, when considering the Holley

factors, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to overcome the 

strong presumption that J.H.’s best interest is served by not terminating Mother’s 

parental rights because both the caseworker and the CASA testified that the 

evidence showed J.H. had expressed his desires to maintain a relationship with his 

mother and siblings. Mother argues that the attorney ad litem appointed for J.H. 

advocated that termination of Mother’s rights was not in the child’s best interests; 

that the CASA testified that J.H. was struggling with his current placement due to 

lack of contact with Mother; that there is no evidence that the existing parent-child 

relationship is improper; and that Mother’s health problems affected her ability to 

complete her service plan and that “[i]t was clear to the caseworker that [Mother] 

was suffering from a chronic illness.”

The trial court could have considered the affidavits in support of the 2010 

and 2013 removals discussing Mother’s continued neglect of J.H. during the 

pendency of the case, as well as other evidence in the record including, among 

other things, the caseworker’s testimony. The trial court heard the testimony of the 
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CPS caseworker who testified that Mother had not demonstrated a willingness or 

ability to protect J.H. from harm or to put J.H.’s needs ahead of her own, that 

Mother was unable to provide J.H. with a safe and stable home, that J.H.’s

behavior and demeanor are suffering because he does not have permanency, and 

that once the visitations between Mother and J.H. ceased, Mother never brought up 

visitation again or asked that visitation be reinstated. The trial court could have 

also considered the CASA’s testimony. The CASA supported the cessation of the 

visits between Mother and J.H. after the CASA saw the detrimental effect on J.H. 

after Mother’s failure to attend the visits. The trial court also heard testimony that 

J.H.’s therapist had recommended that the visits between J.H. and Mother cease. 

The record does not support Mother’s assertion that the attorney ad litem 

“advocated” against termination. The portion of the reporter’s record from trial to 

which Mother cites on appeal for this assertion provides the following:

[Ad Litem]: I think the evidence is undisputed that the child, [J.H.],

wants contact with his mother in some form, whether by phone or in 

person. And no matter what legal vehicle will get him there, he’s 

desperate for that contact. And I think that came through in the 

witnesses that we had. He has asked me to ask you for that contact 

and that’s what I’m doing now. 

THE COURT: Want to ask you as attorney ad litem . . . .

[T]he way I see it, we have three options in most of these cases 

as well as this case: And that is, return the child to the parent or 

parents and deny the Department’s requests;
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Secondly, appoint the Department PMC without termination 

and appoint the parents possessory conservators with visitation; 

Third, terminate the parents[’] [parental rights] and appoint the 

Department PMC.

You’re advocating for the child. What does the child want?

[Ad Litem]: Your Honor, the child wants contact with his mother. He 

knows he can’t live there.

I think that Option A, returning to the parent, is unsupported 

and I think it’s realistic for the child and he knows that is not possible 

in the case at this time. So I think that’s completely off the table.

With regard to the other two, he just wants contact. Whether 

that’s done through the Department allowing contact posttermination/pre-adoption even, if an accommodation could be made to 

that sort. He wants any kind of contact he could get, even if were for 

purposes of closure or just knowing that he has the opportunity to 

speak with her.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The attorney ad litem did not advocate “against termination.” Rather, the attorney 

ad-litem merely stated that J.H. had expressed an interest in having the opportunity 

to speak to Mother after termination or pre-adoption. And, the attorney ad-litem 

testified that termination is in the best interest of J.H.

The record citation Mother provides for her contention that “[t]he CASA 

advocate also testified that the child was struggling with his current placement due 

to his lack of contact with his mother” references the CASA’s testimony that the 

dynamic in the foster home is “not very good” because the other foster children in 

the foster home have contact with their parents and J.H. “wonders why he can’t 
21

have contact with his mother.” The CASA explained that J.H.’s incidents of bad 

behavior at home or school “seem to correspond with when the other children have 

contact with their parents.” The CASA attributed J.H.’s bad behavior to his 

“awareness that he does not have a permanent home or a permanent person who is 

dedicated to him, who loves him.” The trial court heard the CASA testify that she 

had visited J.H. in the foster home once or twice a month since November 2013,

and further that J.H. did not ask the CASA about Mother until a year later, five 

months after the visitations between J.H. and Mother had ceased. And, the CASA 

testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of J.H.

With respect to Mother’s argument that her health condition resulted in 

repeated hospital stays and that it was clear to the caseworker that Mother was 

suffering from a chronic illness, the trial court could have considered the

caseworker’s testimony, along with the testimony from the CASA. According to 

the caseworker, Mother did not provide proof that her hospital stays or illness was 

the reason she was unable to complete her service plan. The CASA testified that 

she had never received any evidence from Mother that she could not participate in 

a service because she was in the hospital and that the CASA thought that Mother

was “choosing not to do what she need[ed] to do.” However, the CASA also 

explained that she overheard Mother tell the caseworker that she could not get to 
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counseling because she did not have a ride and that she was sick and could not go. 

According to the CASA, she and the caseworker had offered to arrange 

transportation for Mother on several occasions if she needed it, and that Mother did 

not provide proof that her illness was the reason for her failing to attend 

counseling. The trial court also heard the CASA testify that, even considering 

Mother’s health issues, Mother was given sufficient opportunity to complete her 

services and that the caseworker went “above and beyond to provide Mother with 

services. Furthermore, the trial court could have considered that the caseworker 

and the CASA believed it was in J.H.’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to J.H. 

After considering the relevant Holley factors, we conclude that the trial court 

reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination was in 

the best interest of J.H. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Viewing all of the evidence, 

the disputed evidence is not so significant that a reasonable factfinder could not 

have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. See id. Based on our 

review of the entire record, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm 

belief or conviction termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of 

J.H. We conclude that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to 
23

support the best interest finding. We overrule Mother’s second issue. The trial 

court’s judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

 

_________________________

 LEANNE JOHNSON

 Justice

Submitted on July 27, 2015

Opinion Delivered August 31, 2015

Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.