FILED U.S. COURT OF AP P EALS E LEV EN T HC IRC U IT JAN 24, 2007 THOMAS K. KAH

N CLERK [ DO NO T P UB L I S H] I N THE UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS F O R T H E E L E V E N T H C IR C U IT

________________________ N o. 06- 13399 N on -A rgum entC al endar

________________________ D . C. D o c k e tN o . 0 4 - 0 0 1 1 7 - CV - J - 3 2 M CR C E D R I C J O N E S , P e titio n e r - A p p e lla n t, v ersu s J A M E S M C D O N O U G H , A T T O RN E Y G E N E R A L O F F L O R I D A , R e s p o n d e n ts - A p p e lle e s .

________________________ A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f orthe M i ddl e D i s tr i c tof F l or i da

_________________________ ( Jan u ar y 24, 2007) B efo re A N D E R S O N , D U B IN A an d B A R K E T T , C i rcu i tJu d g es. P E R C U R I A M:2

C e d r ic J o n e s ( “J o n e s ” ) , a F lo r id a s ta te p r is o n e rp r o c e e d in g th r o u g h c o u n s e l, ap p e a ls th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s d e n ia l o f h is 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 h ab e a s c o rp u s p e titio n . T he di stri ctcourtgrant ed a c ert i fi ca t e of app ea l abi l i ty a s t o “ w hether tri al c ouns e l ’ s pe r f

orm a nc e w a s de f

i c i e ntf orf a i l i ng t o obj e c tt o a j ury i ns truc t i on c o n c e rn in g e f

f o r ts to e v a d e p r o s e c u tio n .” O n ap p e a l, J o n e s a r g u e s th a t h is c ouns e l ’ s f

a i l ur e t o r e l y upon Fe n e lo n v . S ta te , 594 S o. 2d 292 ( F l a . 1992) ( hol di ng tha ta j ury i ns truc t i on on c ons c i ous ne s s of gui l tba s e d on e vi de nc e of f lig h t w a s a n im p e r m is s ib le ju d ic ia l c o m m e n t o n th e e v id e n c e ) , w h ile o b je c tin g to a s pe c i a l j ury i ns truc t i on on s uborna t i on of pe r j ury , c ons t i tut e d i ne f

f e c t i ve as si st ance of coun se l un der Str i c kland v . W as hi ngton , 4 6 6 U .S . 6 6 8 , 1 0 4 S . C t. 20 52 (198 4). Jones a rgues thathe has s at i sf i ed the Str i c kland

s ta n d a r d b e c a u s e h is coun se l ’ s per form ance w as defi ci ent , and there i s are as on abl e probabi l i ty that pres ervat i on of the Fe ne lon i s s u e wo u l d h a v e r e s u l t e d i n a n e w tr i a l o n ap p e a l . He ar gu es thatthe di stri ctcourtun re as on abl y app l i ed the Str i c kland s ta n d a r d . We r e v i e w de no vo a di s tr i c tc our t ’ s de ni a l of a § 2254 habe a s c orpus p e titio n . C o n klin v . Sc h o fie ld , 36 6 F . 3d 11 91 , 11 99 (11th C i r. 20 04 ). W here a c l a i m w a s a dj udi c a t e d on the m e r i t s i n s t a t e c our t , f e de r a l c our t s m a y notgr a nt habeas re l i ef

un l es s the st at e c ou rt ’ s dec i si on “ w as contra ryt o, or i nv ol ved an unr e a s onabl e appl i c a t i on of , c l e a r l y e s t abl i s he d F e de r a l l a w , a s de t e r m i ne d by the3

S u p r e m e C o u r t o f

th e U n ite d S ta te s .” 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 ( d ) ( 1 ) . A s w e e xpl a i ne d i n P utm an v . H e ad , “[ t]h e ‘c o n tr a ry to ’ a n d ‘u n r e a s o n ab le ap p li ca ti o n ’ clau se s o f § 2 2 5 4 (d )( 1 ) a re se p ar ate b as es fo r r ev iew in g a s tate co u rt’s d e c is io n s .” 2 6 8 F .3 d 1 2 2 3 , 1 2 4 1 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 1 ) . A st at e c ou rtdeci si on i s “ contra ryt o” cl ea rl y e st abl i shed fe dera l l aw i f e i the r( 1) the s t a t e c our tappl i e d a rul e tha tc ontr a di c t s the gove rni ng la w s e t f o r th b y S u p r e m e C o u r t c a s e la w , o r( 2 ) w h e n f a c e d w ith m a te r ia lly in d is tin g u is h ab le f a c ts , th e s ta te c o u r t a rr iv e d a t ar e s u lt di ff er entfr om thatre ac hed i n a S up re m e C ou rtca se .

. . . A s ta te c o u r t c o n d u c ts a n “u n r e a s o n ab le ap p lic a tio n ” o f c le a r ly e s t abl i s he d f

e de r a l l a w i f

i ti de nt i f i e s the c orr e c tl e ga l rul e f r om S u p r e m e C o u r t c a s e la w b u t u n r e a s o n ab ly ap p lie s th a t ru le to th e f a c ts of the pe t i t i one r ’ s c a s e . . . . [ or ] unr e a s onabl y e xt e nds , or un re as on abl y dec l i nes t o ext end, a l egal pri nci pl e f rom S up re m e C ou rt c a s e la w to a n e w c o n te x t. I d. (c i t at i on om i tt ed). I n d e c id in g w h e th e rth e s ta te c o u r t ap p lie d f e d e r a l la w in a n u n r e a s o n ab le m a n n e r , w e c o n s id e rw h e th e rth e s ta te c o u r t’s ap p lic a tio n w a s o b je c tiv e ly u n r e a s o n ab le . W

el l i n g to n v. Mo o re , 3 1 4 F . 3 d 1 2 5 6 , 1 2 6 1 ( 1 1 th C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) . “ [ A] fed eral h ab eas co u rtm ay n o ti ssu e th e w ri tu n d er th e reaso n ab l e ap p l i cat i o n cl au se s i m pl y be c a us e tha tc our tc onc l ude s i n i t s i nde pe nde ntj udgm e nttha tthe r e l e va nt s t a t e - c our tde c i s i on appl i e d c l e a r l y e s t abl i s he d f e de r a l l a w e rr one ous l y or i ncorrec t l y. R ather, thatappl i ca t i on m ustal so be un re as on abl e. ” W i l l i am s v .4

T ay lor , 5 2 9 U .S . 3 6 2 , 4 1 1 1 2 0 S . C t. 1 4 9 5 , 1 5 2 2 ( 2 0 0 0 ) . I n a ddi t i on, s t a t e c our t s ne e d note xpl a i n the i rm e r i t s rul i ngs t o qua l i f y f or d e f e r e n c e u n d e rth e A n tite rr o r is m a n d E f f e c tiv e D e a th P e n a lty A c t ( “A E D P A ” ) . W ri g h t v. Sec’y f

o r th e D ep ’t

o f C o rr. , 2 7 8 F .3 d 1 2 4 5 , 1 2 5 5 ( 1 1 th C ir . 2 0 0 2 ) . “A ll th a t is r e q u ir e d u n d e r§ 2 2 5 4 ( d ) ( 1 ) is a n a d ju d ic a tio n o n th e m e r its , n o t af u ll s ta te courtop i ni on . ” P a rker v. Sec’y f o r th e D ep ’t

o f C o rr. , 3 3 1 F .3 d 7 6 4 , 7 7 6 ( 1 1 th C i r. 20 03 ). “ E ven a sum m ary, un expl i ca t ed re j ec t i on of a f

eder al cl ai m qu al i fi es as an adj ud i ca t i on ent i t l ed t o d ef er ence un der § 22 54 (d). ” H e r r i ng v . Se c ’

y f orthe D ep ’t o f C o rr. , 3 9 7 F .3 d 1 3 3 8 , 1 3 4 7 ( 1 1 th C ir .) , cert deni ed , 1 2 6 S . C t. 1 7 1 ( 2 0 0 5 ) . W hen a conv i ct ed defendantcl ai m s thathi s c ou nsel ’ s a ss i st ance w as in e f f e c tiv e , th e d e f

e n d a n t m u s t s h o w th a t ( 1 ) c o u n s e l’s p e r f o r m a n c e w a s d e f

ic ie n t, a n d ( 2 ) th e d e f

ic ie n t p e r f

o r m a n c e p r e

ju d ic e d th e d e f

e n s e . Str i c kland , 46 6 U . S . at 68 7, 10 4 S . C t . at20 64 . “ F or perf orm ance t o b e def

i ci ent , i tm ustbe es t abl i shed tha t , i n l i ghtof

a l l the c i r c um s t a nc e s , c ouns e l ’ s pe r f or m a nc e w a s out s i de the w i de ra ng e of profes si on al com pet ence . ” P utm an , 2 6 8 F .3 d a t 1 2 4 3 . W e a r e h ig h ly de f e r e nt i a l i n r e vi e w i ng c ouns e l ’ s pe r f or m a nc e , a nd m us tut i l i z e the s tr ong p r e s u m p tio n th a t c o u n s e l’s p e r f o r m a n c e w a s r e a s o n ab le . Cha nd l erv. U ni ted Stat es , 21 8 F . 3d 13 05 , 13 14 (11th C i r. 20 00 ) ( e n banc ). “[B ]eca u se co u n se l’ s cond ucti s pre sum ed re as on abl e, for apet i t i on ert o sho w thatthe cond uctw as5

unr e a s onabl e , a pe t i t i one rm us te s t abl i s h tha tno c om pe t e ntc ouns e l w oul d ha ve t aken the ac t i on thathi s c ou nsel di d t ake. ” I d. a t 1 3 1 5 . U n d er th e p rej u d i ce p ro n g , th e d efen d an tm u stsh o w “ th atth ere i s a r e a s onabl e pr obabi l i ty tha t , butf orc ouns e l ’ s unpr of

e s s i ona l e rr or s , the r e s ul tof the proceedi ng w ou l d h ave been di ff er ent . ” Str i c kland , 4 6 6 U .S . a t 6 9 4 , 1 0 4 S . C t. 20 68 . W e have not ed thati n the cont extof re qu es t s f or habeas re l i ef

predi ca t ed upon i ne f

f e c t i ve a s s i s t a nc e of

c ouns e l by s t a t e pr i s one r s , the pe t i t i one rm us tdo m ore than sat i sf

y the Str i c kland

s ta n d a r d . R uthe r

f or d v . Cr os by , 385 F . 3d 1300, 13 09 (11th C i r. 20 04 ). T he pet i t i on erm ustal so show thatthe st at e c ou rt“ appl i ed Str i c kland

t o the fa ct s of hi s c as e i n an o bj ec t i vel y unrea sonabl e m anner. ” I d. ( c i t i ng B e l l

v . C one , 53 5 U . S . 68 5, 69 9, 12 2 S . C t . 18 43 , 18 52 (200 2). W e have hel d thatre as on abl y e ff ec t i ve re pres ent at i on do es no ti ncl ud e a r e qui r e m e ntt o m a ke a r gum e nt s ba s e d on pr e di c t i ons of how the l a w m i ght d e v e lo p . S

p a zi a n o v. S i n g l eta ry , 36 F . 3d 10 28 , 10 39 (11th C i r. 19 94 ). E ven i f a c l a i m ba s e d upon a n a nt i c i pa t e d c ha nge i n the l a w i s r e a s onabl y a va i l abl e a tthe t i m e c ouns e l f

a i l e d t o r a i s e i t , s uc h f

a i l ur e doe s notc ons t i tut e i ne f f e c t i ve a s s is ta n c e . See P i t t

s v . C ook , 92 3 F . 2d 15 68 , 15 73 -74 (11 th C i r. 19 91 ). A s a n i ni t i a l m a tt e r , the s t a t e c our tde c i s i on i s e nt i t l e d t o de f e r e nc e unde rthe A E D P A b ec au se itw as an ad ju d icatio n o n th e m er it s. D es p it e th e s tate trial co u rt’s6

l a c k of a n e xpl a na t ory opi ni on, J one s i de nt i f i e d Str i c kland

as the control l i ng l aw go verni ng i neff

ec t i ve as si st ance of coun se l cl ai m s bef ore the court , and the court ac k n o w led g ed co n sid er in g an d re v iew in g Jo n es ’s claim s. T h u s, th e s tate co u rt’s de c i s i on w a s notc ontr a ry t o Str i c kland . M o r e o v e r , th e s ta te tr ia l c o u r t’s d e c is io n w a s n o t a n o b je c tiv e ly unr e a s onabl e appl i c a t i on of c l e a r l y e s t abl i s he d f

e de r a l l a w . T he tr i a l tr a ns c r i pt sh o w s th at Jo n es ’s co u n se l d ido b ject to th e s p ec ial j u ry in stru ctio n . T h u s, Jo n es ’s sol e c on t ent i on i s thatthe obj ec t i on w as no tspec i fi c e no ug h b ec ause hi s tri al c ouns e l di d note xpl i c i t l y r e l y upon the rul e i n Fe ne lon . H o w e v e r , J o n e s a d m its thatno F l ori da appel l at e c as e has ext ended the Fe ne lon re stri ct i on on j ury i ns truc t i ons w i th r e s pe c tt o e vi de nc e of f l i ghtt o a c a s e tha ti nvol ve s e vi de nc e of subo rnat i on . A cc ordi ng l y, i tca nn otbe sa i d thatthe st at e tri al court ’ s dec i si on w as an obj ec t i vel y unrea sonabl e app l i ca t i on of Str i c kland w hen i tfoun d thatthe fa i l ure t o argue the Fe ne lon r e s tr i c t i on on j ury i ns truc t i ons r e s pe c t i ng f l i ghtdi d not c o n s titu te in e f

f e c tiv e a s s is ta n c e w h e n o b je c tin g to a s u b o rn a tio n in s tru c tio n . T here fore , i ti s unn ec es sa ryt o add re ss the se cond pron g o f Str i c kland , n a m e ly w he the rJ one s ’ s c ouns e l ’ s c onduc tpr e j udi c e d hi s de f

e ns e , be c a us e J one s di d not es t abl i sh thathi s c ou nsel w as defi ci entun der the fi rs tpron g o f Str i c kland . T he st at e c ou rt ’ s dec i si on denyi ng Jones’ s post -c on vi ct i on m ot i on w as7

nei ther c on tra ryt o, no r a n u nrea sonabl e app l i ca t i on of, cl ea rl y e st abl i shed fe dera l l aw , and the di stri ctcourtdi d n oterr i n d enyi ng habeas re l i ef . AF F I RME D.