COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

EDWARD ARDALE BRAME 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2381-97-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF 

 NOVEMBER 3, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge 

 Bobby B. Stafford (Kathryn E. Coward; The Law 

Offices of Raby & Stafford, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Edward Ardale Brame (appellant) was convicted of grand 

larceny. He contends on appeal that the Commonwealth failed to 

prove an intent to permanently deprive and a wrongful taking, 

both essential elements of larceny. We disagree and affirm the 

conviction. 

 I. 

 Appellant, through his company, Sterling Corporation, bought 

computers, fax machines, and printers for MCI. Such equipment 

was shipped directly to MCI. On November 27, 1996, appellant 

visited the MCI office located at Tyson's Corner. While there, 

he borrowed a "Compaq LT 5300" laptop computer, worth over 

$5,400, from MCI employee Ernest Lease. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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 Appellant and Lease were longtime business associates and 

personal friends. Lease testified that he did not place any 

restrictions on appellant's use of the computer because, in light 

of their friendship, he felt it unnecessary. According to Lease, 

appellant had never before removed an MCI computer from the 

building. On November 27, 1996, however, appellant took the 

computer from MCI's building. 

 Around January 1, 1997, Eric Donaldson, who was responsible 

for tracking approximately 400 computers for MCI, discovered that 

the laptop computer taken by appellant was missing. Donaldson 

and Lease notified Jeff Pomerantz, the manager at MCI responsible 

for computer inventory, of the missing computer. Pomerantz 

contacted Scott Marion, internal investigator for MCI, and they 

contacted the police. Pomerantz called appellant's business 

several times between November and late January and left messages 

regarding another matter. Appellant did not contact Pomerantz. 

 On January 29, 1997, appellant took MCI's laptop computer to 

the Maryland Exchange, a pawn shop. He provided the computer, 

and another one, as collateral for a $2,000 loan. When pawn shop 

employee Gregory Daymude "brought up the system," it showed 

appellant as the registered owner. The pawn shop was required by 

Maryland law to file a "second hand" property report. Daymude 

noted the serial numbers of the two computers on the report and 

noted next to the serial number of the computer belonging to MCI, 

"registered to Edward Ardale Brame." 
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 In mid-February, Investigator Walter of the Montgomery 

County (Maryland) Police Pawn Unit, notified Marion that the 

computer had been pawned. Walter seized the computer from the 

pawn shop and turned it over to Detective Little of Fairfax 

County. Pomerantz left a telephone message for appellant, asking 

about the pawned computer. Appellant contacted MCI and said that 

the computer had been pawned. Appellant came to MCI on February 

13, 1997, but did not return the computer. 

 Detective Little spoke with appellant on February 19, 1997. 

 Appellant told Little that he had borrowed a computer from Lease 

to send e-mail messages. Appellant said that when he had 

finished sending messages, Lease was gone. Appellant said that 

he did not want to leave the computer unattended, so he took it 

with him for "safe keeping." Appellant told Little that he kept 

it for two to three months and, in February, when he needed money 

to go to Tennessee, he pawned the computer to have money for the 

trip. According to appellant, he intended to retrieve the 

computer from the pawn shop when he returned from the trip. 

 Appellant returned to the pawn shop on February 28, 1997 and 

paid $200 interest to extend the loan for thirty days. On March 

26, 1997, appellant paid the pawn shop $1,070 in interest and 

principal. 

 Lease, who was called as a witness for appellant, testified 

that appellant was not authorized to take the computer away from 

MCI and pawn it. Lease testified that from late November to 
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mid-February, appellant never contacted him. Pomerantz and 

Marion testified that appellant did not have permission to take 

the computer or pawn it. 

 II. 

 "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. Commonwealth, 

26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted). 

 Although regulated by statute, under Code § 18.2-95, the 

crime of larceny is a common law offense.1

 See Welch v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 521, 425 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1992). 

It is defined as follows: 

 "[T]he wrongful or fraudulent taking of 

personal goods of some intrinsic value, 

belonging to another, without his assent, and 

with the intention to deprive the owner 

thereof permanently. The animus furandi must 

accompany the taking, but the wrongful taking 

of property in itself imports the animus

furandi." 

Id. at 521-22, 425 S.E.2d at 104 (quoting Dunlavey v. 

Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 524, 35 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1945)). 

 Thus, the Commonwealth must prove that the accused took the 

property with "the intention to deprive the owner permanently of 

his possession of the goods." Id. at 524, 425 S.E.2d at 105. 

Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. See Wilson v. 

 

 1Pursuant to Code § 18.2-95, grand larceny is "simple 

larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of 

the value of $200 or more . . . ." 
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Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 101, 452 S.E.2d 669, 673-74 (1995). In 

determining whether the Commonwealth has proven a specific 

intent, "the factfinder may consider the conduct of the person 

involved and all the circumstances revealed by the evidence." 

Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 

(1987). 

 Larceny also involves a "trespassory" taking. See

Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 234, 236, 435 S.E.2d 906, 

908 (1993). In Pritchard v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 559, 303 

S.E.2d 911 (1983), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[t]he 

owner of personal property may deliver it to another upon 

conditions, or in circumstances, which give the recipient bare 

custody of the property. Constructive possession remains in the 

owner." Id. at 562, 303 S.E.2d at 913 (emphasis added). The 

Court in Pritchard, gave as an example "a watch handed to a 

friend to time a race, the owner expecting its return at the end 

of the race." Id. "'A felonious conversion of another's 

property by one having bare charge or custody of it involves a 

trespass and constitutes larceny.'" Overstreet, 17 Va. App. at 

236, 435 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 23 

(1970)). 

 III. 

 Despite appellant's claims to the contrary, the 

circumstantial evidence, particularly appellant's conduct, 

established that he intended to permanently deprive MCI of the 
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laptop computer. 

 Appellant "borrowed" the laptop computer on November 27, 

1996, to access his e-mail. He took the computer from the 

building on that date, allegedly for safe keeping. After 

November 27, 1996, however, appellant did not attempt to return 

the computer to its owners or even contact MCI employees about 

his possession of the computer.2

 Instead, appellant altered the computer to show that it was 

registered to him. Then, after keeping the computer for two 

months, he took it, as if he owned it, and pawned it to finance a 

trip to Tennessee. Appellant acknowledged his actions only when 

confronted with the theft. His conduct proved larcenous intent. 

 The evidence also established the element of wrongful 

taking. Although Lease did not place any explicit restrictions 

on appellant's use of the computer, the circumstances under which 

appellant received the computer gave him bare charge or custody 

of the property. He received MCI's computer, while at MCI's 

building, in order to access his e-mail. Just as the example in 

Pritchard of a watch loaned to a friend to time a race, the owner 

expecting its return at the end of the race, the computer's owner 

expected return of the computer when appellant finished using it 

for e-mail. Appellant's retention of the computer for months, 

 

 2In appellant's statement to Detective Little, he said that 

he had attempted to return the computer to Lease on November 27. 

 However, because Lease had left the office for the day, 

appellant took the computer with him. 
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his alteration of the computer to show he was the registered 

owner, and his pawning of the computer to finance his personal 

trip, constituted "a felonious conversion" of the property "by 

one having bare charge or custody." Overstreet, 17 Va. App. at 

236, 435 S.E.2d at 908. 

 The evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant was guilty of grand larceny of the computer. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.