2019 IL App (1st) 190159-U 

FIRST DIVISION

December 9, 2019 

No. 1-19-0159 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

BARBARA ANDERSEN f/k/a Barbara Gimbel, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

RICK GIMBEL, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

) 

 Appeal from the 

 Circuit Court of 

 Cook County 

 No. 09 D 1514 

The Honorable 

Edward Arce, 

 Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court. 

Presiding Justice Griffin and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in all respects.

¶ 2 Petitioner Barbara Andersen appeals from the circuit court’s judgment modifying her and 

respondent Rick Gimbel’s parenting time for their two minor children following a bench trial 

during postdissolution of marriage proceedings.1 On appeal, Barbara identifies several issues for 

our review, including whether the circuit court (1) erred in modifying Barbara’s parenting time; 

1

At the time of the circuit court’s judgment, the parties’ son, who was born in August 2001, was 17 

years old. He has now turned 18 years old. Barbara’s appellate brief acknowledges that the circuit court’s 

judgment relative to her parenting time for her son is now moot. 
No. 1-19-0159 

2 

(2) abused its discretion on a number of discovery issues; (3) properly denied her request for child 

support and maintenance; (4) erred by ordering her to pay fees relative to a child evaluation; 

(5) erred by ordering that she transfer Bright Start 529 education savings accounts (Bright Start 

accounts)2 to Rick; (6) “properly rejected ethical and due process arguments;” and (7) properly 

allowed Rick’s counsel, Arthur Newman, to tender the child evaluator’s report to the Illinois 

Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) in response to Barbara’s disciplinary 

complaint against Newman. 

¶ 3 Barbara’s appellate brief contains serious deficiencies that result in the forfeiture of all of 

her arguments on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment in all 

respects. 

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 At the outset, we observe that the statement of facts in Barbara’s appellate brief violates 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. May 25, 2018), as it does not set forth “the facts 

necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or 

comment.” Her statement of facts is biased in her favor and omits virtually all the evidence that 

was before the circuit court that is unfavorable her, which does not accurately describe the 

proceedings below. We therefore disregard Barbara’s statement of facts and set forth the following 

facts that are supported by the record on appeal.3

2

According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, “A 529 plan is a tax-advantaged savings 

plan designed to encourage saving for future education costs. 529 plans, legally known as ‘qualified tuition 

plans,’ are sponsored by states, state agencies, or educational institutions and are authorized by Section 529 

of the Internal Revenue Code.” SEC, An Introduction to 529 Plans, https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/

investor-publications/investorpubsintro529htm.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2019). 

3

We also observe that Barbara’s statement of facts includes numerous footnotes in which she 

purports to make “offers of proof.” There is nothing in the record to suggest that these “offers of proof” 

were made in the circuit court. We therefore disregard any and all “offers of proof” in Barbara’s appellate 

brief.
No. 1-19-0159 

3 

¶ 6 Barbara and Rick were married in 1995. Barbara is a licensed attorney4 and Rick is an 

emergency room physician. Their marriage produced two children: a son, born in August 2001, 

and a daughter, born in January 2004. Barbara filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in 

February 2009. A judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered in May 2009, which 

incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement (MSA) and a parenting agreement. Under 

the MSA, each party waived their right to maintenance from one another. The parties agreed that 

the amounts contained in the Bright Start accounts “shall be considered as the joint and equal 

contributions by Barbara and Rick despite the fact that Barbara is listed as the ‘account owner’ of 

these accounts.” Under the parenting agreement, the parties agreed to have joint care, custody, and 

control of their children. They agreed to have equal rights and responsibilities regarding rearing 

and overall well-being of their children, as well as decision-making over their children’s education, 

healthcare, religious training, extracurricular activities, and other matters. An agreed parenting 

schedule was attached to the parenting agreement. The parties agreed to rotate custody of the 

children every four days to accommodate Rick’s work schedule. Sometime in late 2010, Rick 

remarried. 

¶ 7 In September 2011, Barbara filed a motion for child support, asserting that her financial 

situation had changed. In November 2011, Rick, through counsel, filed a petition seeking sole 

custody of the children. The petition made numerous allegations, including that Barbara 

(1) repeatedly refused to communicate with him regarding the children and scheduling issues; 

(2) was hostile toward him when she did communicate; (3) repeatedly failed to take the children 

to scheduled activities that occurred during her parenting time and had never attended any doctor

or dentist visits for the children; (4) refused to pay her share of the children’s expenses; and 

4

Barbara has represented herself through all the dissolution and postdissolution proceedings.
No. 1-19-0159 

4 

(5) made disparaging remarks about him to the children. The circuit court, on its own motion, 

appointed a child representative for the parties’ children. Rick ultimately withdrew the petition for 

sole custody and Barbara withdrew her motion for child support. The circuit court entered an 

agreed order that the parties would seek counseling to privately resolve future coparenting 

disputes. The child representative was discharged, and the matter was removed from the circuit 

court’s status call. 

¶ 8 In August 2015, Barbara filed a motion to clarify the parties’ parenting agreement 

concerning communication with the children. Barbara asserted that she “does not accept emails/cell phones [sic] from [Rick] due to his continued harassment pursuant to same. (All 

communications are to be via U.S. Mail. [Barbara] has filed police reports against [Rick].)” 

Barbara asserted that Rick, who had purchased cell phones for the children, had taken the children 

on vacation and “directed the children to leave their cell phones at home,” depriving Barbara from 

speaking to her children “for the last several weeks.” Rick, acting pro se, responded to the motion

and acknowledged that he purchased cell phones for the children in order to communicate with 

them while they were in Barbara’s custody, as Barbara had cancelled her home phone service and 

had blocked his number on her cell phone. He asserted that Barbara had destroyed one child’s cell 

phone and threatened to do the same to the other child’s phone. He asserted that Barbara had called 

his employer to allege that Rick was harassing her. He admitted taking the children on vacation 

for 12 days and directing the children to leave their cell phones at home but denied that Barbara 

had not been able to communicate with the children during that time. Attached to his response was 

a police report documenting an incident in May 2014 in which Barbara told police that she had 

smashed one of the children’s phones and threw it in the trash. Also attached to Rick’s response 
No. 1-19-0159 

5 

were e-mails between him and Barbara regarding the vacation, and e-mails sent during the vacation 

from the parties’ daughter to Barbara. 

¶ 9 Also in August 2015, Barbara filed a motion asserting that Rick had engaged in “harassing 

and manipulative conduct” by e-mailing her about the children and seeking payments from her for 

the children’s activities. She requested that the circuit court order Rick “communicate all matters 

relative to the judgment and/or joint parenting agreement to [Barbara] via U.S. Mail only” and 

order Rick to stop sending her e-mails. 

¶ 10 On September 10, 2015, Barbara was arrested and subsequently indicted on two counts of 

stalking and one count of harassment by telephone, where Rick was the alleged victim. The 

criminal court judge ordered that Rick have temporary sole custody of the children and that the 

temporary custody order could be modified by either the criminal court or the domestic relations 

court. The State’s attorney eventually dropped two of the charges against Barbara and the matter 

proceeded to a bench trial, resulting in a verdict of not guilty. The parties have not directed our 

attention to the portions of the record that contain much detail about the criminal proceeding. 

¶ 11 In September and October 2015, the parties filed numerous petitions seeking various 

relief.

5 After a hearing at which both Barbara and Rick testified, the circuit court entered orders 

restoring the four-day custody rotation schedule, denying Rick’s request for supervised visitations 

between Barbara and the children, and prohibiting both parties from speaking “in a demeaning or 

derogatory matter about the other to or in the presence of the minor children.” The circuit court 

entered an order of protection in favor of Rick that required Barbara to stay away from him, refrain

from contacting him by any means, and have no contact with Rick’s employer, family members, 

5

Barbara continued to represent herself, while Rick obtained new counsel. 
No. 1-19-0159 

6 

his wife’s family, or the babysitter hired by Rick for the children. Barbara was also prohibited 

from removing the children from Illinois or concealing them within Illinois.

¶ 12 In January 2016, Barbara filed a verified petition seeking sole custody of the parties’ son. 

The petition made numerous allegations against Rick and asserted that their son wanted to live 

solely with Barbara. Their son’s name and signature appeared on the verification page of the 

petition. Rick responded by filing an emergency petition to terminate Barbara’s parenting time or, 

in the alternative, have Barbara’s parenting time be supervised, alleging that Barbara’s petition 

contained several derogatory statements against Rick, and that Barbara violated the parties’ mutual 

obligation to avoid speaking about the other in a demeaning or derogatory manner to the children

by having their son verify Barbara’s petition. Following a hearing, the circuit court found that 

Barbara’s conduct in having the parties’ minor son verify Barbara’s pleading constituted a “serious 

endangerment of the minor child[.]” The circuit court suspended Barbara’s parenting time until 

further order of court, and stated that it would consider a report from the court-appointed child 

representative at the next hearing to determine whether to modify the suspension order. The circuit 

court eventually modified its order to allow Barbara supervised visitation with the children. In 

April 2016, the circuit court permitted Barbara to have unsupervised visitation with the children 

for 3 1⁄2 hours one night per week and for 24 hours each weekend. 

¶ 13 The parties filed numerous petitions regarding their custody rights, with Rick seeking sole 

custody and Barbara seeking to restore custody and visitation to the four-day custody rotation. The 

circuit court appointed an evaluator, Phyllis Amabile, M.D., a board certified psychiatrist and 

licensed physician,

6 for the children under section 604.10(b) of the Illinois Marriage and 

Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/604.10 (West 2016)). After reviewing 

6

Dr. Amabile is also a licensed attorney, although her license to practice law is voluntarily inactive.
No. 1-19-0159 

7 

voluminous documents and conducting interviews of the parties and their children, Dr. Amabile 

issued her report on July 20, 2017. The circuit court ordered that Dr. Amabile’s report “shall not 

be disclosed to any third party without leave of court.” In September 2017, Barbara was granted 

leave to retain her own child evaluator, but subsequently indicated that she would not be calling

her retained child evaluator to testify at trial. In March 2018, the circuit court granted Rick’s 

motion to release Dr. Amabile’s report for the limited purpose of disclosing the report to the ARDC 

as part of a disciplinary complaint filed by Barbara against Rick’s attorney, Arthur Newman. 

¶ 14 The circuit court held a trial on the parties’ competing petitions over the course of several 

days. The circuit court heard testimony from the parties, Dr. Amabile, and other witnesses, and 

admitted dozens of exhibits from both parties into evidence, including Dr. Amabile’s 58-page 

report.

7 During trial, the parties stipulated that Rick “shall hereafter have the sole decision-making 

responsibility in connection with decisions made as to [the children] as to [sic] those relating to 

(1) education, including school and tutors; (2) health, including medical, dental[,] and 

psychological needs; (3) religion; and (4) extracurricular activities.” The stipulation provided that 

it should “not be construed as an admission and/or declaration against interest by Barbara[.]” 

¶ 15 On September 24, 2018, the circuit court entered a written parental allocation judgment. 

The circuit court gave significant weight to Dr. Amabile’s findings and recommendations, finding 

her report to “be substantive, detailed[,] and instructive as to the dynamics in this family.” The 

circuit court observed that “[t]here is no evidence in the record to support [Barbara’s] statement in 

her [r]esponse to [Rick’s] [c]losing [a]rgument that ‘she (Amabile) is out of touch with reality’ 

and ‘she writes lengthy, ill-researched, biased[,] and misquoted reports.’ ” 

7

Dr. Amabile’s report was filed in this court under seal. We observe that pages 33-37 of the report 

have not been included in the record on appeal, which appear to be portions of the report detailing Dr. 

Amabile’s interviews with the children. Neither party acknowledges this omission, and there is no

explanation as to why those pages have not been included.
No. 1-19-0159 

8 

¶ 16 The circuit court then discussed the applicable factors in section 602.7(b) of the Marriage 

Act (750 ILCS 5/602.7(b) (West 2016)) to determine an allocation of parenting time and made the 

following findings: As to the first factor—the wishes of the parents (id. § 5/602.7(b)(1))—Rick 

wanted greater parenting time, while Barbara wanted to return to the four-day rotation schedule. 

As for the wishes of the children (id. § 5/602.7(b)(2)), both children “expressed a preference to 

return to the four-day on, four-day off schedule. The children clearly enjoy their time with both 

parents and wish that to continue.” In the 24 months preceding the parties’ modification petitions 

(id. § 5/602.7(b)(3)), the parties shared caretaking functions, while Rick was more engaged in 

disciplining the children and was solely responsible for making medical decisions. As for the 

interaction and interrelationship of the children with their parents (id. § 5/602.7(b)(5)), Barbara 

had endangered the parties’ son by having him sign her petition for sole custody (see supra ¶ 12), 

which “showed extremely poor judgment and an insensitivity to the effect it would have on [him].”

Regardless, “there is no question that the children love their mother and enjoy their time with her,” 

which was established through Barbara’s testimony and Dr. Amabile’s report. Any adjustment the 

children’s home, school, and community (id. § 5/602.7(b)(6)) would be minimal. 

¶ 17 The circuit court found that section 602.7(b)(7), which concerns “the mental and physical 

health of all individuals involved” (id. § 5/602.7(b)(7)) was “a substantial factor in this case.” The 

circuit court observed that both children “were deeply disturbed by the circumstances regarding 

this litigation and the relationship between their parents.” The mental health of the children had 

“improved substantially” through “the efforts of court appointed therapists.” Dr. Amabile 

recommended continued therapy and Rick was “more supportive of continued therapy and is more 

likely to insure [sic] that therapy takes place.” As for the parents, the circuit court found “Dr. 

Amabile’s uncontroverted testimony is that [Barbara] suffers from a mental health disorder or 
No. 1-19-0159 

9 

disorders.” The circuit court quoted Dr. Amabile’s report, in which she wrote that “[m]ost of the 

difficulties this family has experienced during the past seven or eight years are a consequence of 

significant, untreated mental illness in [Barbara]. Her episodic symptoms have caused all four of 

them instability, emotional upheaval, and consequences from her poor judgment and poor impulse 

control.” The circuit court observed that while Barbara disputed Dr. Amabile’s finding, “there is 

no evidence in the record to the contrary concerning [Barbara’s] mental health.” 

¶ 18 Next, the circuit court considered “the willingness and ability of each parent to place the 

needs of the child ahead of his or her own needs.” Id. § 5/602.7(b)(12). The circuit court observed 

that that a four-day rotating custody schedule required a substantial level of cooperation and 

communication, and that the evidence showed Rick had “attempted to communicate with [Barbara] 

concerning the needs of the children and [Barbara] has rebuffed those efforts.” The circuit court 

observed that Barbara testified “that she believes no communication is necessary in a four-day 

rotating schedule.” The circuit court found that “the children’s best interests are not served by a 

four-day rotating schedule between parents who do not communicate.” As for the willingness and 

ability of each parent to encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent 

and the child (id. § 5/602.7(b)(13)), “the ferocity of [Barbara’s] communications to [Rick], [the] 

children[,] and third parties clearly establishes that [Rick] is more capable of encouraging a close 

and continuing relationship between the children and [Barbara]. [Barbara] considers any form of 

communication between [Rick] and the children during her parenting time to be harassment.” 

¶ 19 The circuit court stated that it had considered all of the factors in section 602.7 of the 

Marriage Act “and finds that the children’s best interest would be served by modifying the 

parenting time provisions of the Joint Parenting Agreement and awarding [Rick] the majority of 

the parenting time.” The circuit court modified the parties’ parenting time to give Rick “sole legal 
No. 1-19-0159 

10 

custody, control[,] and education of the minor children.” Barbara was given parenting time every 

other weekend, starting after school on Friday through 9:00 p.m. Sunday, and every Wednesday 

after school until 9:00 p.m. The circuit court also allocated the parties’ parenting time for school 

breaks, vacation time, holidays, the parties’ birthdays, and imposed various restrictions on the 

parties regarding their conduct in front of, and concerning, the children. The circuit court also 

ordered Rick to pay $12,240 and Barbara to pay $10,494 “as and for [the] [c]hild [r]epresentative 

attorney’s fees.” 

¶ 20 Rick filed two postjudgment motions to modify the September 24, 2018, judgment. First, 

he argued that the circuit court did not address the parties’ allocation of fees for Dr. Amabile’s 

trial testimony, and he sought to modify the judgment to reflect that Barbara was required to 

reimburse him for the $4000 he previously paid to Dr. Amabile for her presence at trial. Second, 

he sought an order modifying certain aspects of the parties’ allocation of parenting time, and to 

account for the fact that Barbara was moving residences, which would affect details of how the 

parties obtained custody of the children. 

¶ 21 On December 20, 2018, the circuit court addressed the postjudgment motions, as well as 

other matters that had not yet been addressed. First, the circuit court ordered that the parties would 

each pay Dr. Amabile $2500 for her trial testimony, and ordered Barbara to reimburse Rick $1500, 

as he had already paid Dr. Amabile $4000. Second, the circuit court modified the details of the 

parties’ custody to account for the location of Barbara’s new residence. Third, the circuit court 

addressed an unadjudicated petition to modify the parties’ MSA. Rick sought an order directing 

either the child representative or “or any other responsible party, including himself” to hold the 

Bright Start accounts for the benefit of the children. The circuit court found that “the children’s 

Bright Start accounts which were established prior to the marriage to be a resource of the children, 
No. 1-19-0159 

11 

not of either party.” The circuit court ordered that Rick would hold the accounts for the benefit of 

the children. Finally, the circuit court granted Rick’s pending motion to dismiss Barbara’s pending 

request for maintenance, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-

619 (West 2016)). The circuit court found that under the judgment for dissolution of marriage, 

Barbara had “permanently waived and released her rights to maintenance[,]” and thus dismissed 

her request with prejudice. 

¶ 22 Barbara filed a timely notice of appeal on January 22, 2019, from the September 24, 2018, 

and December 20, 2018, judgment orders.8

¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24 On appeal, Barbara identifies a host of issues for our review. We find that all of her 

arguments are forfeited. The argument section of Barbara’s appellate brief is difficult to follow, 

does not clearly define the issues she is raising, and is devoid of any argument supported by 

citations to authority and the record on appeal, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (requiring that an appellant’s brief “contain the contentions of the 

appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied 

on.”). Points raised in an appellate brief that are not supported by citations to relevant authority do 

not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) and are forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (“Points not argued are 

forfeited[.]”); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005). “A reviewing court is entitled to have 

issues clearly defined with relevant authority cited.” In re Marriage of Bates, 212 Ill. 2d 489, 517 

(2004). “Arguments that do not comply with Rule 341(h)(7) do not merit consideration on appeal 

8

Barbara’s notice of appeal was timely because the 30th day after December 20, 2018, was January 

19, 2019, which was a Saturday. The courts were closed the following Monday, January 21, 2019, in 

observance of Martin Luther King, Jr. Day. 
No. 1-19-0159 

12 

and may be rejected by this court for that reason alone.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders, 2015 

IL App (1st) 141272, ¶ 43. 

¶ 25 Here, Barbara’s near complete failure to develop and advance any cohesive or coherent

legal argument supported by citations to the record and to relevant authority results in forfeiture 

of all her appellate arguments. The only authority she cites in her brief pertain to the standards of 

review for—and for general principles of law regarding—due process, statutory construction,

modification of child custody orders, amendments to pleadings, and the attorney-client privilege, 

but she does not tailor any of those authorities to fit her arguments in any manner. We briefly 

describe the issues raised in the argument section of Barbara’s appellate brief.

¶ 26 Barbara devotes a portion of her argument section to attacking Dr. Amabile’s evaluation 

of Barbara and the thoroughness of Dr. Amabile’s evaluation in general, but does not offer any

specific legal argument as to how her contentions are relevant to our review of the circuit court’s 

judgment. We have no basis from which to conclude that Barbara is entitled to any appellate relief 

on this issue. 

¶ 27 She includes a section titled “The Lack of Proof Relative to the January 2016 Petition” that 

consists primarily of a series questions and haphazard statements that do not engage any of the 

circuit court’s findings on any issue relevant to its modification of the parties’ parenting time. It is 

entirely unclear what legal arguments Barbara is attempting to advance and, therefore, we have no 

basis from which to conclude that Barbara is entitled to any appellate relief on this issue. 

¶ 28 Barbara then turns to a theme that is well-documented in the record on appeal: her belief 

that Rick and his counsel used Rick’s connections with Glenview police officers to engage in a 

pattern of harassment, culminating in “frivolous” criminal charges against her as part of ploy to 

question her mental health and to eliminate her child custody rights. Barbara frequently accused 
No. 1-19-0159 

13 

Rick of using his position as an emergency room physician to foster relationships with Glenview 

police officers and accused him of using those connections to harass her by having the police sent 

to her home on numerous occasions. In her appellate brief, she accuses Rick and his counsel of 

using both the criminal charges and the no contact order provision of her conditions of bail in the 

criminal court to demonstrate in these postdissolution proceedings that she refused to communicate 

with Rick regarding custody matters. She fails to substantiate any of her allegations with citations 

to the record, and ultimately fails to offer any legal argument directed at the circuit court’s 

judgment at issue in this appeal. We have no appropriate basis from which to conclude that Barbara 

is entitled to any appellate relief on this issue. 

¶ 29 Barbara argues that there was no evidence presented about her mental health prior to her 

arrest and asserts that the circuit court erred by “refus[ing] to limit the hearing to prepetition 

allegations.” Barbara, however, does not identify what petition she is referring to. She argues that 

Rick and his counsel “were trying to manipulate” the children’s therapists “to advocate to [Dr.] 

Amabile that [Rick] be granted greater custody rights.” She asserts that Rick had communications 

with the children’s therapists, and that the child representative encouraged the therapists to 

communicate with Dr. Amabile. Her line of argument is confusing and disjointed, and she 

ultimately fails to advance a legal argument directed at any specific ruling or judgment by the 

circuit court. We have no basis from which to conclude that Barbara is entitled to any appellate 

relief on this issue.

¶ 30 Next, she contends that “it was error for her to lose parenting time with her daughter on the 

basis of the affidavit she had her son sign.” In doing so, she blames Rick for “put[ting] [her] in the 

position to have the need for such an affidavit.” She asserts that there was no other evidence of 

any endangerment to the children. While this borders on a legal argument—presumably directed 
No. 1-19-0159 

14 

at the circuit court’s finding with respect to section 602.7(b)(5) that she endangered her son (supra

¶ 16)—she makes no express argument that the finding was against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. She makes no argument that her conduct was appropriate and identifies no evidence in 

the record tending show that her decision to have her minor son verify a pleading, without an 

attorney or any form of adequate representation, did not constitute a form of endangerment. We 

also note that as to the section 602.7(b)(5) factor, the circuit court observed that “there is no 

question that the children love their mother and enjoy their time with her.” Supra ¶ 16. We have 

no basis from which to conclude that Barbara is entitled to any appellate relief on this issue. 

¶ 31 Barbara “asks this [c]ourt to examine the rulings surrounding” Rick’s and Newman’s 

attorney-client privilege. She asks us to find that the circuit court “erred in barring [Barbara] from 

asking for communications and testimony as to Newman’s role/‘advice’ to [Rick] relative to the 

criminal case, including but not limited to the charges and the effort to revoke [her] bond.” Her 

theory, apparently, is that Newman was giving Rick legal advice to harass Barbara by filing 

criminal charges against her. She invites us to “contemplate” the circuit court’s “involvement in 

the ARDC matter,” and asserts that the circuit court erred by allowing “a layperson custody 

evaluator’s report[9] to be tendered to the ARDC so as to distract them from seriously investigating 

[Barbara’s] [Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct] 8.4(g) complaint.” Once again, Barbara fails 

to provide any citations to the record on appeal as what circuit court rulings on attorney-client 

privilege matters she is complaining of, and she fails to cite any authority to support her 

contentions. She fails to explain how the circuit court’s decision to release Dr. Amabile’s report 

for the purpose of providing it to the ARDC was an abuse of the circuit court’s discretion. We have 

9

Barbara is apparently referring to Dr. Amabile’s report. 
No. 1-19-0159 

15 

no basis from which to conclude that Barbara is entitled to any appellate relief on any of these 

issues. 

¶ 32 Next, Barbara identifies three circuit court rulings on financial matters that she believes are 

erroneous. First, she contends that the circuit court erred by ordering her to turn over the Bright 

Start savings accounts to Rick. She asserts that she “owns and had solely personally funded” those 

accounts. Second, she argues that the circuit court erred by ordering her to pay $11,494 for Dr. 

Amabile’s fees, which she contends was inappropriately sought by the child representative and 

was excessive. Third, she contends that she should not have to pay any portion of Dr. Amabile’s 

fee for testifying at trial. None of these arguments are developed or supported by citations to the 

record or to any authority. We have no basis from which to conclude that Barbara is entitled to any 

appellate relief on any of these issues. 

¶ 33 Finally, Barbara asserts that the circuit court erred in denying with prejudice her request 

for maintenance from Rick. She asserts that “[h]ere, [Rick]/Newman take the position that 

[Barbara] has been mentally unwell since the time of the divorce. If this [c]ourt decides to accept 

that story, does that not mean that [Barbara’s] waivers of child support and maintenance are void 

for want of mental capacity?” She neither develops nor advances any legal argument on this issue. 

We have no basis from which to conclude that Barbara is entitled to any appellate relief on this 

issue.

¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 35 We are fully cognizant of the sensitive nature and deep personal and societal importance 

of parenting time, as well as the careful procedures crafted by our legislature that must be followed 

before modifying parenting time against the wishes of one parent. Here, the circuit court’s 

modification of the parties’ rights following a trial was the result of a reasoned decision applying 
No. 1-19-0159 

16 

section 602.7 of the Marriage Act to the facts before it. Barbara has not adequately identified or 

directed our attention to any legal deficiencies in the circuit court’s modification orders, and 

nothing on the face of either the orders or the record on appeal strikes us as outside the bounds of 

reason or the law. The condition of Barbara’s appellate brief leaves us with no choice but to find 

her arguments forfeited and to affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 

¶ 37 Affirmed.