2018 IL App (1st) 161323 

No. 1-16-1323 

FIRST DISTRICT 

December 10, 2018 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

of Cook County. 

No. 09 CR 18310 

CALEB CHARLESTON, ) 

) Honorable 

) Dennis J. Porter 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE GRIFFIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Pierce and Walker concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant Caleb Charleston was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) 

(West 2008)) for his participation in a drive-by shooting and sentenced to a 75-year term of 

imprisonment. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. See People v. Charleston, 2015 

IL App (1st) 130936-U. Defendant’s sentence, however, was vacated, and his case was 

remanded for a resentencing hearing because the trial court improperly considered as substantive 

evidence a witness’s hearsay statement that the victim was killed because he cooperated with 

authorities. The trial court conducted a new sentencing hearing and sentencing him to a 60-year 

term of imprisonment, which represented a 15-year reduction from the previous sentence 

imposed. 

¶ 2 Defendant appeals his sentence. He argues that it is excessive and violates the 

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) as applied 

to him. We affirm. 
 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Defendant Caleb Charleston was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) 

(West 2008)) for his participation in a drive-by shooting. He was originally sentenced to a 75­

year term of imprisonment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20 (West 2008); id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i). The 

State presented the following evidence at his trial. 

¶ 5 On June 7, 2009, defendant drove by a location in Chicago as his passenger, co-defendant 

Jeffrey Allen (Allen), fired 17 shots at victim Patrick Stribling (Stribling). Not all of the 17 shots 

were fired at the same time. When Stribling was first located, Allen fired four or five shots at 

him. Stribling was hit and fell to the ground. An eyewitness described Stribling as panicked and 

crawling to get away. Defendant pulled away, circled the block and returned. Allen fired a dozen 

more shots at Stribling. Stribling died. The car used in the shooting was found abandoned a short 

time later, and apparently, someone had attempted to set it on fire. The car turned out to have 

been stolen five days earlier. 

¶ 6 This court affirmed defendant’s conviction on appeal. See Charleston, 2015 IL App (1st) 

130936-U. However, defendant was granted a new sentencing hearing because the trial court had 

improperly considered as substantive evidence a witness’s hearsay statement that Stribling was 

killed because he cooperated with authorities in a separate murder case. On remand, the trial 

court was ordered to consider (1) the witness’ hearsay statement “for what it is and determine 

what weight to give it, if any” and (2) defendant’s age in light of recent “legal and psychological 

developments” regarding youthful offenders. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. Defendant was an adult (18 years old) 

when he committed the crime. 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

¶ 7 At the time of his resentencing, defendant was 25 years old. He presented no witnesses, 

and neither did the State. Instead, the parties relied on argument and both referenced evidence 

presented at defendant’s initial sentencing hearing. Defendant gave a statement in allocution. 

¶ 8 The State argued that defendant was an adult when he committed the offense. Before 

turning 18, he received probation for a residential burglary, went on to steal a car when he turned 

18, and, while he was on probation for that offense, committed the instant offense of first degree 

murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)). The State emphasized the manner in which 

Stribling was killed and argued that, given the nature of the offense, the sentence imposed was 

warranted. 

¶ 9 Defendant argued that he received no infractions while in prison. He was raised without a 

father or proper role model and had a drug habit when he committed the offense. Defendant 

attended high school through the tenth grade and was on his school’s basketball team. 

Throughout his time in prison, he kept his familial and community ties. 

¶ 10 In allocution, defendant stated that he had matured mentally, physically, and spiritually 

while in prison. He mentioned wanting to “fight harder” for himself, but acknowledged that his 

offense affected his family. Defendant said he was “[t]ruly sorry for [Stribling’s] family” and 

what his “loved one’s have endured and [are] still enduring.” He further stated that “[Stribling’s] 

life was stolen from him,” but mentioned that his life was “stolen from me in a way.” Defendant 

told the trial court “I’ll have another chance to prove my innocence,” but emphasized that he was 

“not destined for a life of crime.” 

¶ 11 The trial court explained the basis for its sentencing determination. The trial court stated 

that it would “ignore” the previously relied upon hearsay statement and then turned to consider 

the evidence presented at defendant’s trial. Stribling’s killing, the trial court noted, was “as cold3 
 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

blooded a killing I have ever seen in this courtroom I’ll tell you that right now.” The car used in 

the shooting was stolen and someone had attempted to set it on fire, which indicated to the trial 

court that there had been “prior planning.” The trial court considered defendant’s criminal 

history and stated, “the fact you had as much criminal history as you did at your young age is a 

damning statement to this court.” 

¶ 12 As for defendant’s statement in allocution, the trial court found that defendant had asked 

for mercy, but had not expressed remorse. Defendant’s statement and actions, overall, 

demonstrated “a lack of respect for the rights of strangers.” The trial court resentenced defendant 

to a 60-year term of imprisonment, which represented a 15-year reduction from the previous 

sentence imposed. See Charleston, 2015 IL App (1st) 130936-U, ¶ 2. 

¶ 13 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which was denied. This appeal 

followed. Defendant argues that the trial court focused too heavily on the retributive aspects of 

punishment and failed to consider his age and rehabilitative potential when it fashioned his 

sentence. He further claims that the trial court improperly considered his failure to admit guilt as 

a factor in aggravation. Defendant also contends that, in light of his age of 18 when he 

committed the offense, his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 

Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) as applied to him. 

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 15 The issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial court’s sentencing determination was an 

abuse of discretion and (2) whether the sentence imposed is unconstitutional as applied. 

¶ 16 Criminal penalties must be determined according to the seriousness of the offense and 

with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11 

(“[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the 

4 
 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship”). The legislature and judiciary play a 

dual role in achieving these objectives; the legislature prescribes the permissible sentencing 

ranges for criminal offenses, and the trial court fashions the appropriate sentence within the 

statutory range. People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 206 (1984); People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 

(1999). A sentence imposed within the statutory range is presumed to be proper and will not be 

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Butler, 2013 IL App (1st) 120923, ¶¶ 30-31. 

An abuse of discretion is found when a sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose 

of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. ¶31. 

¶ 17 The sentence imposed here was within the statutory range prescribed by the legislature. 

The applicable sentencing range for defendant’s offense was 35 to 75 years because he 

committed first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)) while armed with a firearm. 

See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20 (West 2008) (20 to 60-year sentencing range for first degree murder); 

see also id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(i) (mandatory 15-year enhancement). Accordingly, we presume the 

sentence is proper and review it for an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 18 Defendant seeks first-prong plain error review because he failed to raise his arguments in 

a postsentencing motion. See People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178 (2005) (plain error doctrine 

allows a reviewing court to reach a forfeited error affecting substantial rights where the evidence 

was so closely balanced that the jury’s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not 

the evidence). We first determine whether an error occurred. See People v. Garner, 2016 IL App 

(1st) 141583, ¶ 28 (first step in the plain-error analysis is to determine whether an error 

occurred). 

¶ 19 We hold that the trial court’s sentencing determination was not an abuse of discretion. 

The trial court considered defendant’s rehabilitative potential and determined that the seriousness 

5 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

of the offense and other aggravating factors warranted the sentence imposed. People v. Tye, 323 

Ill. App. 3d 872, 890 (2001) (although the trial court is required to consider defendant’s 

rehabilitative potential, it is not required to give greater weight to that factor than to the 

seriousness of the offense or other aggravating factors). 

¶ 20 We first note that the trial court gave due consideration to the mitigating factors. See 

People v. Peoples, 2015 IL App (1st) 121717, ¶ 112 (a minimum sentence is not necessarily 

warranted simply due to the presence of some mitigating factors). The trial court considered the 

fact that defendant had not received any infractions or reprimands while incarcerated and 

determined that defendant’s adjustment to his present circumstances mitigated in his favor. It 

considered defendant’s presentence investigation report and found that defendant had showed 

“concern” for his family members and recognized the impact his incarceration had upon them. 

Contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court also duly considered defendant’s age, though it 

may not have considered this factor in the manner defendant had intended. 

¶ 21 Defendant’s primary contention on appeal is that the trial court failed to consider his age 

as a mitigating factor and as conclusive of his rehabilitative potential. He argues that his brain 

was “still developing” at 18 years of age and that his commission of the offense was 

characteristic of the “transient immaturity” and “wild and impulsive behavior” attendant to 

youth, not criminality. Defendant’s argument is unavailing. 

¶ 22 There is no evidence in the record to support defendant’s contentions that his commission 

of the offense was solely attributable to his age or that this factor alone is conclusive of his 

rehabilitative potential. At his resentencing hearing, defendant called no witnesses and presented 

no evidence of his rehabilitative potential from an objective, medical, or scientific standpoint. A 

review of the record reveals that defendant only mentioned his age in passing. 

6 
 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

¶ 23 We find that the trial court did take defendant’s age into account when it sentenced him 

and made explicit references to his youth. Because defendant was an adult when he committed 

first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)), the trial court was not required to 

consider the sentencing factors applicable to juveniles or to treat his age as a factor that mitigated 

in his favor. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016) (listing additional factors to be considered in 

mitigation when sentencing a juvenile); see also 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1 (West 2008) (listing factors 

to be considered in mitigation when sentencing an adult). An adult defendant’s age is but one 

factor for consideration when a trial court fashions an appropriate sentence. Although defendant 

here may have been close in age to a juvenile when the offense was committed, that fact, 

standing alone, does not render his sentence excessive. People v. Decatur, 2015 IL App (1st) 

130231, ¶ 16 (“no reported authority holds that an adult defendant’s relative youth, standing 

alone, renders a sentence longer than the statutory minimum excessive”). 

¶ 24 Here, the trial court’s consideration of defendant’s age coincided with what it considered 

to be a pattern of criminality that started when defendant was a juvenile and continued into 

adulthood. The trial court stated that defendant had been placed on probation for residential 

burglary as a juvenile and, upon attaining 18 years of age, stole a car, was again placed on 

probation, and then committed the offense of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 

2008)). The trial court was not required to overlook these facts and attribute past instances of 

criminality to defendant’s age alone. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3) (West 2008) (allowing trial 

court to consider history of prior delinquency or criminal activity); see also People v. Trimble, 

220 Ill. App. 3d 338, 354 (1991) (consideration of delinquency adjudications in adult sentencing 

hearings is proper). 

7 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

¶ 25 It is clear from the record that the trial court found the nature and seriousness of 

defendant’s offense to be of primary concern. People v. Flores, 404 Ill. App. 3d 155, 159 (2010) 

(the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant are 

factors that govern rehabilitative potential). At defendant’s resentencing hearing, the trial court 

recalled the evidence presented at trial. Defendant’s passenger fired multiple shots from a car 

and hit his victim. Rather than drive away, defendant circled the block and returned so that his 

passenger could “put nine more in him because he wasn’t quite dead yet.” 

¶ 26 In the trial court’s mind, Stribling’s killing was “as cold-blooded a killing I have ever 

seen in this courtroom.” The court made note that the evidence indicated “prior planning” 

because “the car used was stolen and it was very shortly thereafter found in an attempt to burn 

the car destroying any evidence that might be in it.” The trial court’s decision to focus on the 

seriousness of defendant’s offense was not improper. See People v. Horta, 2016 IL App (2d) 

140714, ¶ 43 (the seriousness of the offense remains the most important consideration when 

fashioning a criminal sentence). 

¶ 27 The trial court further considered defendant’s rehabilitative potential when he gave his 

statement in allocution. See People v. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d 516, 528 (1986) (“ ‘[a] defendant’s 

truthfulness or mendacity while testifying on his own behalf, almost without exception, has been 

deemed probative of his attitudes toward society and prospects for rehabilitation and hence 

relevant to sentencing’ ” (quoting United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50 (1978))). The trial 

court listened to defendant’s statement and found that, in “tenor” and content, it demonstrated a 

lack of remorse and “utter exclusion of concern for innocent people who [sic] come across your 

path.” The trial court determined that defendant was not repentant and expressed that it did not 

believe defendant was innocent. A lack of remorse and the failure to show a penitent spirit may 

8 
 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

properly be considered in determining sentences. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d at 529. The trial court was at 

liberty to make these determinations and to express its belief that defendant was guilty. 

¶ 28 Defendant argues that “the judge explicitly considered [defendant’s] claim of innocence 

in his allocution statement as a factor in aggravation.” He further claims that his protestation of 

innocence was the “main reason for the judge’s imposition of a lengthy sentence.” Defendant’s 

arguments are unavailing. 

¶ 29 The trial court was at liberty to express its belief that defendant was guilty, and it was 

free to consider defendant’s protestation of innocence and lack of remorse as indicative of his 

character and prospects for rehabilitation. People v. Abrams, 2015 IL App (1st) 133746, ¶ 36 (a 

defendant’s insistence on his innocence and lack of remorse tellingly indicate his character and 

prospects for rehabilitation). A trial court is not prohibited from considering a defendant’s 

protestation of innocence and lack of remorse as factors in aggravation so long as its decision to 

treat those factors as such is not automatic or arbitrary. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d at 529. Further, it is 

well settled that a defendant’s protestation of innocence may send a strong message to the trial 

court that he or she is “an unmitigated liar and at continued war with society.” Id. at 528. 

¶ 30 The trial court here was not bound to adopt a particular interpretation of defendant’s 

statement in allocution, but was rather free to determine the message it conveyed. Defendant 

stated that he “should have been more vocal with [the trial court] and the attorney that 

represented me.” He asked that his sentencing enhancement be removed and mentioned that the 

hearing was not “the reversal of the trial he was looking for but it’s a step in the right direction.” 

Defendant further stated, “it’s messed up how many how street violence in Chicago has taken so 

many lives. [Stribling’s] life was stolen from him and how I feel my life was stolen from me in a 

9 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

way but I’ll have another chance to try to prove my innocence.” We find the trial court’s 

consideration of defendant’s statement to be anything but improper. 

¶ 31 We also reject defendant’s argument that the trial court’s purported “distaste” for this 

court’s remand for resentencing played a role in its sentencing determination. We find that the 

trial court complied with this court’s order. It ignored the witness’s hearsay statement (though it 

did not have to do so) when weighing the relevant factors and imposing defendant’s sentence 

(Charleston, 2015 IL App (1st) 130936-U, ¶ 37 (“[t]he trial judge should consider Williams’ 

statement for what it is and determine what weight to give it, if any”)) and gave due 

consideration to defendant’s age. 

¶ 32 Considering the record as a whole, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

fashioned defendant’s sentence. The sentence imposed was not at variance with the spirit and 

purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Ward, 113 Ill. 2d 

at 526-27 (the reviewing court should not focus on a few words or statements of the trial court; 

rather, the determination of whether or not the sentence was improper must be made by 

considering the entire record as a whole). Accordingly, we find no plain error because no error 

occurred. 

¶ 33 Defendant challenges the constitutionality of his sentence and argues that it violates the 

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him. Ill. Const. 1970, art. 

I, § 11. We review this issue de novo. People v. Davis, 2015 IL App (1st) 121867, ¶ 7 (whether a 

statute violates the proportionate penalties clause is a question we review de novo). 

¶ 34 Defendant claims that, in light of his age of 18, his sentence is so cruel, degrading, and 

wholly disproportionate to the offense of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)) 

that it shocks the moral sense of the community. People v. Brown, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1116, 1118 

10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

No. 1-16-1323 

(2007). To support this contention, defendant relies on precedent that does not apply to him: 

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that the eighth amendment prohibits 

mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles who commit murder); Graham v. Florida 

560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that the eighth amendment prohibits mandatory life-withoutparole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders); People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 10 

(extending the prohibition in Miller to mandatory sentences that cannot be served in a juvenile’s 

lifetime). These cases involve mandatory sentences imposed upon juvenile defendants, whereas, 

here, defendant received a discretionary sentence for a crime he committed as an adult. 

Accordingly, these cases do not apply here. 

¶ 35 The following cases similarly fail to support defendant’s contention that his sentence is 

unconstitutional as applied: People v. Harris, 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, aff’d in part, rev’d in 

part, 2018 IL 121932, People v. House, 2015 IL App (1st) 110580, and People v. Williams, 2018 

IL App (1st) 151373. These cases involved mandatory sentences imposed by the legislature. The 

trial court here properly exercised its discretion and reduced defendant’s previous sentence by 15 

years. 

¶ 36 Accordingly, defendant’s cited authority does not apply to him, and he has made no 

showing that the evolving science on juvenile maturity relied upon in Miller and its progeny 

applies to his specific facts and circumstances. He presented no evidence at his resentencing 

hearing, an evidentiary hearing was not conducted, and the trial court made no factual findings. 

Defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenge must fail. 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 38 Accordingly, we affirm. 

¶ 39 Affirmed. 

11