alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

December 28, 2011 

d1219 

Order 

 

December 28, 2011 

143139(51) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 143139 

 COA: 295980 

Wayne CC: 09-011041-FC 

DARRYL ANTHONY JOHNSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s September 

26, 2011 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order 

was entered erroneously.
## PART 2204 -- RULES IMPLEMENTING THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT

**Subpart A -- General Provisions**

**§ 2204.101 Scope of this part.**

The Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504 (called “EAJA” in this part), provides for the award of attorney or agent fees and other expenses to eligible individuals and entities who are parties to certain administrative proceedings (called “adversary adjudications”) before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.  An eligible party may receive an award when it prevails over the Secretary of Labor, unless the Secretary's position in the proceeding was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust.  Alternatively, an eligible party, even if not a prevailing party, may receive an award under 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(4) when it successfully defends against an excessive demand made by the Secretary.
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

September 24, 2019

No. 04

- 19

- 00580

- CR

Cheryl STEVENSON
, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019CR6195 Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant Cheryl Stevenson entered into a plea bargain with the State, and pled nolo contendere to the charged offense

. The trial court imposed sentence in accordance with the agreement and signed a certificate stating this “ is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal. ” See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2). Stevenson timely filed a notice of appeal. The cler k ’ s record, which includes the trial court ’ s r ule 25.2(a)(2) certification and a written plea bargain agreement, has been filed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d). This court must dismiss an appeal

“ if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of ap peal has not been made part of the record. ” Id

.

The clerk ’ s record establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2). The record al so appears to support the trial court ’ s certification that Stevenson does not have a right to appeal. See Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that court of appeals should review clerk ’ s record to determine whether trial court ’ s c ertification is accurate).

Appellant is hereby given notice that this appeal will be dismissed pursuant to r ule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless an amended certification showing that Stevenson has the right to appeal is made part of the appellate record by Octob er 15, 2019

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); Daniels v. State , 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, order), disp. on merits, No. 04

- 03

- 00176

- CR, 2003 WL 21508347 (July 2, 2003, pet. ref ’ d) (not designated for publication).We order all appellate deadlines suspended until further order of the court. We further order the clerk of this court to serve copies of this order on the attorneys of record and the court reporter

.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 24th day of September, 2019

.

___________________________________ LUZ ESTRADA
, Chief Deputy Clerk
Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We
consent to the reference to our firm under the caption "Selected Consolidated Financial Data" and to the incorporation by reference in the following Registration
Statements:



of
our reports dated March 11, 2009, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Acme Packet, Inc. and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of Acme
Packet, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2008.

|                                     |  |                      
|------------------------------------ |  | ---------------------
|Boston, Massachusetts
March 11, 2009 |  | /s/ Ernst & Young LLP

---



QuickLinks
```

[Congressional Record Volume 155, Number 6 (Monday, January 12, 2009)]
[Daily Digest]
[Page D29]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

Committee Meetings
  No committee meetings were held.

Joint Meetings
  No joint committee meetings were held.
```
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

November 20, 2019

ERRATA

______________________

Appeal Nos. 2019-1368, 2019-1369

SANOFI-AVENTIS DEUTSCHLAND GMBH,

Appellant

v.

MYLAN PHARMACEUTICALS INC.,

Appellee

Decided: November 19, 2019 

Non-Precedential Opinion

_____________________

Please make the following change:

On page 20, footnote 4, line 2, “decision” is changed to 

“decisions”
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lawrence Pollard, Appellant.

[631 NYS2d 765]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.), rendered July 26, 1993, convicting him of murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a *738new trial is ordered. The facts have been considered and determined to have been established.

The defendant contends that the trial court improperly rejected defense counsel’s reasons for peremptorily challenging two white jurors as pretextual. Based upon our reading of the record, we agree.

Determining whether a party has exercised peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors for reasons that implicate equal protection concerns is a three-step process. First, the movant must allege sufficient facts to raise an inference that the respondent has exercised peremptory challenges for discriminatory purposes. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the movant to articulate a gender-neutral or race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the proffered reasons are pretextual *(see, People v Allen,*86 NY2d 101; *see also, Hernandez v New York,*500 US 352; *Batson v Kentucky,*476 US 79; *People v Kern,*75 NY2d 638, *cert denied*498 US 824). The trial court is in the best position to determine if the reasons offered are neutral or merely pretextual *(see, Hernandez v New York, supra; People v Dixon,*202 AD2d 12).

As to one prospective juror, defense counsel, in exercising a peremptory challenge, explained that she had previously served as a juror in a criminal case which, like the instant case, involved accessorial liability, and that she remembered the charge given in that case as to such liability. In denying the peremptory challenge, the court stated, "otherwise, all jurors who are in a murder case would not be able to sit on another murder case”.

The trial court’s determination was erroneous under the third step described in *People v Allen (supra).*Since all that is required is that the challenged party offer a gender-neutral or race-neutral explanation, that burden was met, and the explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause *(see, People v Allen, supra).*

In light of our determination, we need not decide whether the reason proffered by defense counsel with regard to any other juror who was seated over his objection was pretextual *(see, People v Benson,*184 AD2d 517).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not *739against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]). O’Brien, J. P., Santucci, Joy and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30, 1999
(UNAUDITED) AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-Q FOR
THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1999.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          23,927
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      144
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                25,399
<PP&E>                                          11,893
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,020
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  34,446
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            6,694
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            13
<OTHER-SE>                                      23,982
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    34,446
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,137
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   12,402
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (275)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (6,675)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (6,675)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,675)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.52)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.52)


</TABLE>
No. 91-5967.

#### Wills *v.*Whitley, Warden, et al.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

MAURICE BAILEY,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 217 WAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 23rd day of December, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of China Ivy School, Inc. (the "Company") does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in that Form 10-KSB fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.   Dated: March 28, 2007/s/ Yongqi ZhuYongqi Zhu
Chief Executive Officer
H. R. 1210 

One Hundred Fifteenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Wednesday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and eighteen 

An Act 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 122 W. 

Goodwin Street, Pleasanton, Texas, as the ‘‘Pleasanton Veterans Post Office’’. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. PLEASANTON VETERANS POST OFFICE. 

(a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States Postal 

Service located at 122 W. Goodwin Street, Pleasanton, Texas, shall 

be known and designated as the ‘‘Pleasanton Veterans Post Office’’. 

(b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, regulation, 

document, paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

referred to in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference 

to the ‘‘Pleasanton Veterans Post Office’’. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
p. 1 

# OAR Box 

# 1796 Prepped by Keeia Richards



### Document

Number: 

# 46 ) V-A-0 2 Docket Number: 

# A-90-3 7

Printed 10/31/20084:20:37

PM Sheet 46 of 107P. 2 

## R-qo-2 n

UNITE D STATE S ENVIRONMENTA L PROTECTIO N AGENC Y

WASHINGTON , D.C . 2046 0

Februar y 28 , 200 3 OI-TK I 1 AI RAN D RADIAT

K 

### 3 200 3 EP A AIP Dea r Stat e an dLocal Agencies : Thi s lette r

i s t o informyo u tha t

th e Environmenta l Protectio n Agenc y (EPA ) ha s promulgate drevision s t o th e Federa l Implementatio n Plan (FIP) portion s o f Stat e Implement; ! Plan s (SIP ) i

n 4 0 CF RPar

t 52 , Subpart s (C ) throug h (DDD) . Thes e revision s wil l incorporat e b y referenc e i n th e FIP' s th e change s t o th e Federal Preventio n o f Significan t

Deterioratio n (PSD ) program(containe di n 4 0 CF R§ 52.21 ) tha t w e publishe do n Decembe r 31 , 2002 . 6 7 Fed . Reg . 80186 . Th e Federal Registe r wil l publis h anotic e o f

thi s actio n withi n th e nex t te w days . Th e Decembe r

31 , 2002 , notic e i

n th e Federal Registe r

mad e change s t o th e applicability o f th e PS D an dnonattainmen t Ne w Sourc e Revie w programs . W e originall y propose dthes e change s i n 1996 , 6 1 F

R38250 . That

Federa l Registe r

notic e als o include daproposa l t o includ e th e change dapplicability approache s i n Part 5 2 regulation s governin g Federal permittin g programs . W e ar e no w takin g fina l actio n o n this portio n o f th e proposa l dealin g with th e Par t 5 2 regulation s b y revisin g th e paragrap h reference s i n th e FIP' s t o b e consisten t with th e curren t regulation s a

t 4 0 CF RPar

t 52.21 . Th e Administrato r signe dth e final actio n o n February 28 , 2003 . Notic e o f this final actio n ma y no t b e publishe di

n th e Federal Registe r

before Marc h 3 . 2003 , whic h i s th e effectiv e dat e o f th e revise dFederal PS D program . Therefore , w e ar e notifyin g affecte dgovernmenta l entitie s o f thes e change s b y letter . A cop y o f th e Federal Registe r notic e i s attache dfo

r your infonnation . I

f yo u hav e any question s abou t this Federal Registe r notic e o r th e revise dFedera l PS D program , pleas e contac t Lyn n Hutchinso n a

t (919 ) 541-579 5 o r

b y electroni c mai l a

t hutchinson.lynn@epa.gov . W e loo k forwardt o workin g wit h yo u t o ensur e asmooth transitio n t o th e revise dFederal PS D program . Sincerely . Isl Jeffrey R . Holmstea d Assistan t Administrato r
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# Dunford Charts Alliance Progress in South Korea

By Jim GaramoneDoD News, Defense Media Activity

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#### Fischer, Respondent, vs. Landisch, Appellant.

*December 8, 1930*

January *13, 1931.*

*255
      *Roland J. Teske*of Milwaukee, for the appellant.

*Lawrence J. Timmerman*of Milwaukee, for the respondent.

Wickhem, J.

Sub. (1), sec. 101.31, Wisconsin Statutes, reads as follows:

> “No person doing business in this state shall use the term ‘architect’ as a part of his business name or title or in any way represent himself to be an architect, without a certificate of registration, as provided in this section.”

It is defendant’s contention that plaintiff, who concededly was not a registered architect, by assuming to do work usually performed by an architect, brought himself within the operation of this section and is not entitled to recover compensation for services of an architectural character. We cannot agree with this contention. Plaintiff did not use the term “architect” as a part of his business name or title, nor did he in any way represent himself to be an architect, nor is there any evidence tending to show that the defendant supposed him to be an architect. The evidence is perfectly clear that defendant knew that plaintiff was a contractor and builder.

Appellant relies upon *Hickey v. Sutton,*191 Wis. 313, 210 N. W. 704. This case is clearly distinguishable. In the *Hickey Case*the plaintiffs did represent that the draughts-man of the plans was an architect, and that is the circumstance which governs the case. The court quotes with approval from *Sherwood v. Wise,*132 Wash. 295, 232 Pac. 309. In the *Sherwood Case*the plaintiff had represented himself to be an architect, and the court denied recovery. It was there said:

> “We are not holding that an owner may not employ a builder to construct a building for him without the services *256of an architect, but are only holding at this time that one who holds himself out to be and assumes the title of architect and contracts for his services as such, without being licensed as this law requires, cannot recover compensation for such services, because in so holding himself out and in so contracting he violates this law.”

It is considered that the section here involved is clearly distinguishable from statutes which prohibit the rendering of services of a specified character without first obtaining a license. The evident purpose is the protection of the public from misrepresentation and deceit, and its prohibition is no broader than is called for by this purpose.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
American Financial Corporation Form 10-K for December 31, 1997 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                        $231,227
<SECURITIES>                                11,299,878<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                                  691,005
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,737,982
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                        480,745
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,625
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,311,704
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,737,982
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,052,902
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               331,655
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              87,155
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                333,764
<INCOME-TAX>                                   125,227
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            208,537
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (7,147)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  $201,390
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0<F2>
<FN>
<F1>Includes an investment in investees of $201 million.
<F2>Not applicable since all common shares are owned by American Financial
Group, Inc.
</FN>


</TABLE>
#### Brown (John), Respondent, vs. Haertel and another, Appellants.

*September 14*

October *11, 1932.*

For the appellants there was a brief by Fisher, *Cashin & Reinholdt*of Stevens Point, and oral argument by *R. T. Reinhotdt.*

*353For the respondent there was a brief by *Stone & Park*of Wausau, attorneys, and *Goggins, Brazeau & Graves*of Wisconsin Rapids of counsel, and oral argument by *Theo. W. Brazeau*and *Patrick T. Stone.*

Owen, J.

This is a companion case to that of Marion Brown against the same defendants, decided herewith *(ante,*p. 345, 244 N. W. 630). John Brown was the owner of the car which was being driven by his wife, Marion Brown. He brings this action to recover damages sustained by his automobile as a result of the collision. While the record does not disclose tangible evidence from which it can be determined whether the car was driven by Marion Brown upon his business so that, while driving the car, she was acting as his agent, upon the doctrine of *Enea v. Pfister,*180 Wis. 329, 192 N. W. 1018, it must be so held. Her negligence is therefore imputed to him, and this case must take the same course as that of Marion Brown.

*By’the Cotirt.*— Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.