### IN THE COURTOFAPPEALS OFTHE STATE OFWASHINGTON DIVISION ONE In the Matterofthe Marriage of 

### ) No. 79298-9-I 

### ) HARWINDER SINGH, 

### )

Respondent, 

### ) and 

### ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION RAJDEEPKAUR, 

### ) FILED: March 16, 2020

Appellant. 

### )

PER CURIAM

— Rajdeep Kaurappeals an orderdismissing her motion to vacate a decree of dissolution. Kaurcontends herex-husband, HarwinderSingh, forged hersignature on the petition fordissolution, decree of dissolution, and findings offact and conclusions of law. She furthercontends the court denied her due process during the hearing on her motion to vacate. We affirm. FACTS On March 26, 2016, Rajdeep Kaurand Harwinder Singh married in Surrey, Canada. Thereafter, Kaur and Singh resided in Bellingham, Washington. In 2016, Kaur moved out ofthe couple’s Bellingham home and moved in with herfamily in Canada. Singh subsequentlycompleted dissolution paperwork and arranged to present itto Kaur.No. 79298-9-1/2
On October 1, 2016, Singh sent a text message to Kaur, “When are you readyto sign [?]. I’m bringing the docs.”1 Kaur replied, “I’m ready.”2 On October9, 2016, Singh traveled with several of his family members to Canada to present Kaurwith the dissolution paperwork. According to Kaur, Singh assaulted and threatened herduring his visit and police arrested him. On October 11 Singh’s family members convinced Kaurto sign andjoin in the petition for dissolution. On February 15, 2017, Singh presented a proposed stipulated decree of dissolution and findings offact and conclusions of lawforentrywith the court. The court signed the decree ofdissolution and findings offacts and conclusions of law. On April 21, 2017, the Whatcom County chiefdeputy clerk e-mailed copies ofthe decree ofdissolution and findings offact and conclusions of lawto both parties.On September6, 2017, Kaurfiled a motion to “cancel divorce,” arguing Singh forged hersignature on the petition fordissolution, decree ofdissolution, and findings offact and conclusions of law.3 Kaur stated she was “readyto invest in [a] forgery analysis report and prove thatthose signatures are not [hers].”4 In response, Singh filed two declarations from family members who had accompanied him to Canada on October 9, 2016 and who had witnessed Kaur

1 Ex. 1. 2 Id.

~ Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 38-39. 4CPat26.

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sign the dissolution paperwork. Singh also filed a declaration denying any alleged fraud and stating that Kaur continued to harass him regarding the divorce. Singh added that he remarried in April 2017, and that Kaur “made complaints against [him] to the Indian Authorities that [he] was involved in bigamy.”5 In a memorandum in which he characterized Kaur’s motion as a CR 60(b)(4) motion to vacate based on fraud, Singh argued thatthe evidence failed to demonstratefraud. During the initial hearing on Kaur’s motion, the parties agreed to nominate, and have the court appoint, a handwriting expert under ER 706. Atthe next hearing, Singh and Kaur nominated handwriting experts. The court asked Kaur ifshe had read the provisions of ER 706. She replied she had not, and the court continued the hearing to October20, 2017. The court confirmed thatthe parties would payforthe expert and thatthe courtwould take their financial situations into consideration. On October20, the court again continued the hearing to appoint a handwriting expert due to issues with service and the parties’ inabilityto agree on an expert. On November8, 2017, the court issued an orderto show cause why Jacqueline Joseph should not be appointed as the court’s expertwitness. On

5CPat48.

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November 15, 2017, the court appointed Joseph and notified the parties “the expense ofthe expertwould be burdensome to both parties.”6 On June 12, 2018, following a hearing, the court concluded that neither party could contributefinanciallyto Joseph’s $1 500 retainer. The courtfound adequate cause to proceed without an expert and entered an orderdirecting Kaur to setthe matterforan evidentiary hearing. Atthe hearing, Kaur called herselfand herfatherto testify. Singh did not testify or call witnesses. The court dismissed the motion to vacate, finding “ample evidence

. . . thatthis signature [on the petition fordissolution] matches multiple signatures” Kaur identified as being herown.7 Kaur appeals. ANALYSIS RAP Violations We first address Singh’s contention that Kaur’s appeal should be dismissed forfailing to complywith our Rules ofAppellate Procedure (RAP). “[P]ro se litigants are bound bythe same rules of procedure and substantive Jaw as attorneys.”8 Failure to complywith the RAP and related case law may preclude review.9 For example, arguments unsupported by references to the

6 CP at 118-120. 7kLat66-67. 8Westberq v. All-Purpose Structures Inc., 86 Wn. App. 405, 411, 936 P.2d 1175 (1997).

~ State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn.App. 442, 452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999).

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record or citation to authority need not be considered.1° Appellate 

### courts are not required to search the record to locate portions relevantto a litigant’s arguments.11 And conclusory claims presented without meaningful argument need not be considered.12 Kaur’s opening briefviolates these principles. The “Argument” section of her brief is wholly inadequate and violates RAP 10.3(a)(6), which requires “argument in support ofthe issues presented for review, togetherwith citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts ofthe record.” Kaur’s argument section cites no legal authority or relevant parts ofthe record and contains no meaningful legal analysis. RAP I0.3(a)(5) requires the appellant’s briefto include “[a] fairstatement of the facts and procedure relevantto the issues presented for review, without argument. Reference to the record must be included for each factual statement.” Kaur’s statement ofthe case contains no references to the record. To the extent her “Summary ofArgument” is intended to function as a statement ofthe case, it too lacks any references to the record. Under RAP 10.3(a)(8), “[a]n appendix may not include materials not contained in the record on reviewwithout permission from the appellate court.” The appendixto Kaur’s opening brief contains documents outside the record on

10 Cowiche Canyon Conservancyv. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

11 Mills v. Park, 67Wn.2. 717, 721, 409 P.2d 646 (1966). 12 State v. Rafay, 168 Wn.App. 734, 843, 285 P.3d 83 (2012).

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appeal. Kaurdoes not demonstrate grounds forsupplementing the record on appeal under RAP 9.11. Taken together, these omissions are fatal to Kaur’s appeal. In addition, her arguments on appeal are meritless. Handwriting Expert Kaur contendsthe court erred in failing to provide a handwriting expertto testify atthe evidentiary hearing. Under ER 706(a) and (b), the court may appoint
an expertwitness, and [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the [expert’s] compensation shall be paid bythe parties in such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manneras other costs.~131 Expert appointments under ER 706 are reviewed forabuse ofdiscretion.14 Here, the trial court appointed an expert, but concluded the partieswould be responsible for compensating him. When it became clearthat neither party could paythe expert, the court proceeded without one. The court’s actions were consistent with ER 706, and Kaurfails to demonstrate otherwise. Due Process Kaur claims she was denied procedural due process, arguing that she did not receive a reasonable opportunityto examine witnesses. Kaur claims she

13 ER 706(b); Moorev. Snohomish County, 112 Wn.2d 915, 922, 774 P.2d 1218 (1989). 14 In re Welfare ofAngelo H., 124 Wn. App. 578, 588, 102 P.3d 822 (2004).

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‘didn’t get any chance to examine the original Petitioner Harwinder Singh and any otherwitnesses from his side.”15 The record does not supportthis claim. Atthe outset ofthe evidentiary hearing, the court asked Kaur ifshe intended to call witnesses. She responded she would call herself and herfather. After Kaur and herfathertestified, the court asked, “[Djo you have any other witnesses today?”16 Kaur responded, “No.”17 Singh was present atthe hearing and did not present anywitnesses. Kaur had a full and fair opportunityto examine Singh and chose notto. There was no due process violation. Motion to Vacate Kaurcontends the court abused its discretion in denying her motion to vacate. We review a court’s decision on a motion to vacate for abuse of discretion.18 A court abuses its discretion ifthe decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.19 “An abuse ofdiscretion exists onlywhen no reasonable person would take the position adopted bythe trial court.”2° In dissolution cases, courts are “extremely reluctantto vacate a decree”

15Appellant’s Br. at 2. 16 RP (Nov. 14, 2018) at 65-66
17 Id. at 66. 18 In re Marriage of Shoemaker, 128 Wn.2d 116, 120-21, 904 P.2d 1150 (1995).19 Mayerv. Sto Indus., Inc., 156 Wn.2d 677, 684, 132 P.3d 115 (2006) (quoting Associated Mortg. lnv’rs v. G. P. Kent Constr. Co., 15 Wn. App. 223, 229, 548 P.2d 558 (1976)).

20 Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 710, 161 P.3d 345 (2007).

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because “[t]he emotional and financial interests affected by [dissolution] decisions are best served byfinality.”21 CR 60(b)(4) authorizes vacation forfraud, misrepresentation, orother misconduct. Here, Kaur moved to vacate the decree on the ground that itwas obtained byfraud. But she failed to carry her burden ofestablishing fraud by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.22 Kaurtestified that she did not sign the dissolution papers. But she conceded thatthe signatures on her passports were consistentwith the signatures
on the dissolution documents signed October 11. She further conceded thatthe signatures on her September6, 2017 note for motion, motion, and declaration admitted as Exhibit 3 matched her passportsignature. In addition, text messages between Singh and Kaur about signing documents, which Kaur claimed were about cardocuments, were admitted as an exhibit. The courtfound no evidence had been presented ‘to give the court any basis forquestioning the [authenticity ofthe] signature on the petition for dissolution and the findings offacts and conclusions of lawthatwere presented to the court in Novemberof2016.” On the other hand, the courtfound “ample evidence” thatthe allegedlyforged signatures matched multiple signatures that Kaur admitted were hers. The court also determined that both Kaur and herfather

21 AlIen v. Allen, 12 Wn. App. 795, 798, 532 P.2d 623 (1975); In re Marriage of Landrv, 103 Wn.2d 807, 809, 699 P.2d 214 (1985). 22 Baddeleyv. Seek, 138 Wn. App. 333, 339, 156 P.3d 959 (2007).

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gave inconsistent answers during theirtestimony. The record supports these findings. Because Kaurfailed to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her motion to vacate the dissolution decree. Affirmed.

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