NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER HARBRIDGE,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 15

- 55841
D.C. No. 2:07

- cv - 04486

- GW

- AS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 1, 2018 **
Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN , Circuit Judges

. Christopher Harbridge , a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation and other constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo

. Doe v. Abbott Labs. , 57 1 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009) (summary

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 3 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 55841

judgment and dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Wilhelm v. Rotman , 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A)

. We may affirm on any basis supported by the record

. Gordon v. Vir tumundo, Inc. , 575 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 2009) . W e affirm in part, reverse in part , and remand. Dismissal of Harbridge’s claims regarding the hearing on the Rules Violation Report and resulting discipline (claims 1

- 4, 6) was proper because Harbridge failed to allege facts sufficient to state a ny claim

. See Wilhelm , 68 0 F.3d at 1121 ( a complaint must state a plausible claim to relief to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A ). First, Harbridge failed to allege membership in a
pr otected class to support his equal protection theory. See Barren v. Harrington , 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) ( To state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege “that the defendants acted with an intent or purpo se to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” )

. Second, Harbridg e failed to allege facts link ing the alleged retaliation and his protected speech. See Wood v. Yordy , 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (“ [M] ere specu lation that defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient.”). Third, Harbridge failed to allege facts showing any d enial of the due process protections to which he was entitled as part of the disciplinary proceedings

. See Superintendent v. Hill , 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports disciplinary decision); Wolff v.3 15

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McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539, 563

- 71 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary proceedings) ; see also Wolff , 418 U.S. at 566 ( “Prison officials must have the necessary discretion

. . . to refuse to call witnesses [for reasons such as] irrelevance [or] lack of necessity . . . .”)

. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harbridge’s retaliat ion claim based on a single missed meal because Harbridge failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the denial of the meal was because o f Harbridge’s protected speech. See Rhodes v. Robinson , 408 F.3d 559, 567

- 68 (9th Cir. 2005) (elem ents of retaliation claim in the prison context). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harbridge’s retaliation claims based on his confinement during disciplinary detention (claims
7

- 9) because Harbridge failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants did not have a legitimate correctional purpose for confiscating Harbridge’s personal items during disciplinary detention and denying him outdoor exercise. See Barnett v. Centoni , 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) ( legitimate penological g oals includes “preserving institutional order and discipline ”) . The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mr. Markarian’s declaration. See Bias v. Moynihan , 508 F.3d 1212, 1224 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Evidentiary rul ings made in the context of summary judgment motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion

. . . .”)

. We reject as unsupported by the record Harbridge’s additional4 15

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conclusory allegations regarding the conditions of confinement during disciplinary detention. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Harbridge’s conditions of confinement claim because Harbridge failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he suffered an extreme deprivation. See Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) ( “[O] nly those deprivations denying the
mi nimal civilized measure of life’ s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. ” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) )

. The district court pr operly dismissed Harbridge’s claims of supervisory liability , including his claims against the California Correctional Peace Officers Association, because Harbridge failed to allege facts showing direct involvement or a sufficient causal connection between the actions of supervisors and the alleged constitutional violations. See Crowley v. Bannister , 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (requirements for supervisory liability). The district court properly dismissed Harbridge’s claim based on respondeat super ior because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983. See id. The district court properly dismissed Harbridge’s due process claims based on a dysfunctional prison grievance system because Harbridge did not have a protected liberty interest in any part icular grievance system. See Ramirez v.5 15

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Galaza , 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no protected liberty interest in any particular grievance system). The district court properly dismissed Harbridge’s claims regarding the grievance system at Pleasant Valle y State Prison for improper venue. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (listing grounds for venue and explaining that a civil action should be brought in the judicial district in which a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claim occurred). The dist rict court properly dismissed Harbridge’s retaliation claim against Porter and Nungary because Harbridge failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim

. See Rhodes , 408 F.3d at 567

- 68. The district court dismissed Harbridge’s retaliation claim against Reed in its initial screening order before any response by the defendants on the ground that Harbridge failed to allege an adverse action that chilled his speech . Harbridge , however, alleg es that Reed threatened him with a prison transfer i f he continued to write letters of complaint , which is sufficiently adverse to state a retaliation claim even if the threat was n ever carried out. See Brodheim v. Cry , 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he mere threat of harm can be an adverse action, regardless of whether it is carried out because the threat itself can have a chilling effect .” ). Harbridge was not required to plead facts showing that his speech was actually chilled, only that the t hreat would chill a “person of ordinary firmness.” Id. at6 15

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1271 (“an objective standard governs the chilling inquiry”). W e reverse and remand for further proceedings as to Harbridge’s claim against Reed only. We do not consider any arguments that Harbridg e fails to raise in his opening brief

, and we reject Harbridge’s contention that he properly raised issues by referencing his briefs before the district court

. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington , 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that th e court cannot “manufacture arguments for an appellant” (citation omitted)).
E ach party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part , REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.