J-A22033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

CHRISTINE LIOTTA, CHESTER A. JR. 

& BRENDA KROKOSKI, ERNEST F. & 

DARLA J. KEMPER, CYNTHIA G. 

SMITH, DENIS C. & PAMELA A. 

WAGNER, DAVID DIETZ, DAWN R. 

CAIARELLI, KATHLEEN M. BEITH AND 

MARLIYN CONTI

v.

ROBERT FOSTER HAWKINS AND 

INDE LEE HAWKINS

Appellants

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 321 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered March 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County

Civil Division at No(s): Civil No. 814-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: July 16, 2024

Appellants, Robert Foster Hawkins and Inde Lee Hawkins, appeal from

the order entered in the Venango County Court of Common Pleas, enjoining 

Appellants from using their property as a short-term rental. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this 

case as follows: 

[Appellants and Appellees] are all owners of lots located on 

River Drive in Sandycreek Township, Venango County, 

Pennsylvania. All ten lots in question abut the Allegheny 

River and were previously owned by Edward H. Culbertson 

and Ruth A. Culbertson. Commencing in the 1960’s, the 

Culbertsons subdivided this large tract of land into smaller 

lots along the river. The various deeds submitted into 
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evidence refer to a specific lot number or numbers from the 

plan known as “Bucktail Trails” originally surveyed in 1963 

and revised in 1980.

Vehicular access to the lots is by a private road, namely 

River Drive owned by the Franklin Belmar Drive Road 

Association, Inc. [(“Road Association”)]. All the lot owners 

are members of the Road Association. River Drive ... is 

described in seven of the deeds submitted as an 

appurtenance to the parcels conveyed as a means of 

ingress, egress and regress to and from Liberty Street, City 

of Franklin, Pennsylvania. The deeds also set forth annual 

payments for use and maintenance of the road. An eighth 

deed simply states, subject to all the restrictions, leases, 

covenants, agreements, R-O-W and easements conveyed in 

or granted in prior instruments. A ninth deed states, subject 

to exceptions, reservations, conditions, right of way, and 

reservations as are contained in prior deeds in the chain of 

title....

[Appellants] purchased real property at 1094 River Drive, 

Franklin, Pennsylvania via deed dated September 29, 2019. 

The land was described in the deed as “Lots number 20 and 

20A on that certain Plan of Lots designated ‘Bucktail 

Trails’”....

Thirteen months after purchase, [Appellants] began 

advertising their property through Airbnb for short-term 

rental. Neighbors brought to the attention of [Appellants] 

that they were in violation of the zoning code. [Appellees]

requested a hearing before the Township board of 

supervisors. The board found the use of the premises was 

the equivalent of a Bed and Breakfast and was a permissible 

conditional use. A conditional use permit was granted.

[On September 29, 2021, Appellees filed a complaint 

seeking enforcement of a restrictive covenant in Appellants’ 

deed to enjoin Appellants from operating an Airbnb on their 

property. Appellees alleged that] the operation of a shortterm rental by [Appellants] at 1094 River Drive violates the 

use and building restrictions set forth in the deeds the 

Culbertsons created for the plan of lots known as “Bucktail 

Trails.” The restrictive use and building requirements set 

forth in [Appellants’] deed [is as] follows:
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Subject also to the covenants and restrictions that the 

above described premises shall be used for residential 

and noncommercial recreational purposes only and no 

buildings shall be erected or used thereon except a 

private dwelling and a private garage; and that no 

house trailer, bus or vehicle, or former vehicle, shall 

be, used on said premises for dwelling purposes and 

these covenants shall be considered and construed as 

covenants running with the land.

Six of [Appellees’] deeds contain the same verbatim 

restriction. One deed restricts the use of the land to noncommercial recreational purposes only, as building of any 

kind for residential, commercial, business or industrial use 

was restricted.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/2/23, at 1-3). 

On July 14, 2022, the court conducted a non-jury trial. Appellee Ernest 

Kemper testified that he and his wife have owned the property directly next 

to Appellants’ property for ten years. The Kempers reside at their River Drive

home for approximately seven to eight months out of the year. During the 

remaining months, they typically visit the River Drive property every other 

week. Mr. Kemper testified that one of the incentives to purchasing this 

property was the restrictive covenant contained in the deeds, restricting the 

use of the properties to residential, non-commercial use. Mr. Kemper testified 

that he and his wife did not want to invest into a community with a high 

turnover of people. 

Since Appellants have begun renting their property on Airbnb, Mr. 

Kemper has noticed new renters entering and leaving Appellants’ property 

nearly daily. Some renters stay for a few days, but the vast majority stay for 
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one day at a time. The renters often bring pets, which has increased the level 

of noise in the neighborhood. It has also increased the vehicular traffic in the 

neighborhood, as renters and cleaning services are constantly arriving and 

leaving the property. Some of the renters have trespassed on the Kempers’ 

property to launch kayaks into the river, which is particularly concerning to 

Mr. Kemper because he is worried that someone may be injured on his 

property. Mr. Kemper testified that the constant rotation of unknown 

individuals in Appellants’ property has made him uneasy and has resulted in 

him changing the way that he utilizes his property. He now ensures that 

everything on his property is always locked and no longer feels comfortable 

allowing his young grandchildren to play outside without an adult present. 

Appellee Christine Liotta testified that she has owned a property on River 

Drive since 2006. She stated that she was aware of the restrictive covenants 

affecting the properties on the road when she purchased her property. Ms. 

Liotta’s understanding of the covenants at the time of purchase was that she 

would be purchasing a home on a private road in a gated, residential 

community. This was a motivating factor in her purchase of the property. 

River Drive is a private road that is gated at two access points. It is owned 

by the Road Association, and Ms. Liotta serves as the Vice President of the 

Association. All residents along the road pay dues for the maintenance of the 

road. The dues were raised from $350.00 to $400.00 in recent years. Many 

properties have garages that are across the street from their properties, so it 
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is very common for residents to walk back and forth on the road. Children

also often play on the road. Ms. Liotta recalled that when her children were 

growing up, she generally felt comfortable letting them play out of her sight 

because it was a gated, residential community and she generally knew 

everyone that would be entering the area. 

Ms. Liotta testified that prior to Appellants’ use of their property as an 

Airbnb, there were very few strangers coming down the street other than 

delivery trucks. Since the Airbnb has been operating, many unknown renters

use the road. The Road Association has had to increase their liability insurance 

due to the increased exposure to liability from many individuals using the road

who are unfamiliar with the area, particularly in icy, winter conditions. Ms. 

Liotta also now feels the need to lock everything on her property, a practice 

she did not have before the Airbnb, because of the influx of unknown people 

into the neighborhood.

Jeffery Superak testified that he has owned a property on River Drive

since 1991 and has resided in that property as his primary residence since 

2004. He has not noticed an influx of traffic on the road since Appellants 

began their Airbnb. He stated that he does not feel unsafe in the neighborhood 

due to the Airbnb renters. Mr. Superak testified that he has also recently 

begun listing his house on Airbnb and acknowledged that he has a potential

financial interest in the outcome of this case. 

Appellant Robert Hawkins, Jr. testified that he purchased the property 
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on River Drive in 2019 with the intention of eventually living there full-time 

when he and his wife retire. He began utilizing the property as an Airbnb in 

October of 2020. He restricted the listing to individuals above the age of 25 

and he does not allow for any parties to be held at the property. He also 

generally only permits renters who have a five-star rating on Airbnb to stay 

at the property. The maximum occupancy permitted at the property is eight 

individuals and renters typically stay for three to four nights per stay. 

Additionally, the only person who comes to clean the residence between 

renters is Mr. Hawkins’ sister. 

Mr. Hawkins stays at the property with his family for approximately six 

to eight weeks a year. While he is staying there, he has noticed other 

residents throwing parties and many guests coming in and out of the 

neighborhood. On cross-examination, Mr. Hawkins acknowledged that he was 

aware of the language of the restrictive covenant in the deed at the time that 

he purchased the property. He acknowledged that none of the Airbnb renters

are using the property as their primary residence. He further agreed that his 

Airbnb listing’s occupancy rate is high, and he is generating income from the 

venture. Appellant Inde Hawkins testified largely in line with Mr. Hawkins’

testimony. 

On March 2, 2023, the court entered an order enjoining Appellants from 

using their property as a short-term rental. On March 10, 2023, Appellants 

timely filed a post-trial motion claiming, inter alia, that they had already 
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booked Airbnb renters through June 2023 and the renters would be unfairly 

prejudiced by the court’s order. On March 13, 2023, the court amended its 

prior order to defer the commencement of the injunction until June 30, 2023. 

On March 17, 2023, Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal and a voluntary 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Appellants raise the following issues for our review: 

Did the trial court err in speculating the Culbertons’ reasons 

for placing the restrictive covenants in the deed for the real 

property situated in the “Bucktail Trails” subdivision despite

there being no evidence produced at trial concerning this 

alleged fact? 

Did the trial court err in determining that short-term rentals 

are not used for residential and/or recreational purposes? 

Did the trial court err in finding that most of the residents in 

the “Bucktail Trails” subdivision use their homes as their 

full-time residence despite there being no evidence

produced at trial concerning this alleged fact? 

Did the trial court err in finding that the use of a home in 

the “Bucktail Trails” subdivision as an Airbnb constitutes a

commercial use, when in fact, said home is being used for

residential purposes? 

Did the trial court err in finding that short-term rentals

violate the restrictive covenants contained in [Appellants’] 

deed, as that term is nowhere present in the covenant? 

(Appellants’ Brief at 5-6). 

In their issues combined, Appellants assert that the court made several 

findings of fact that were speculative in nature and unsupported by the 

evidence at trial. Specifically, Appellants argue that there was no evidence 

presented regarding the Culbertons’ intent in initially placing the restrictive 
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covenants in the deeds and the court erred by inferring the intent without 

evidentiary support. Appellants further contend that the court’s conclusion 

that most of the residents on River Road are full-time residents is unsupported 

by the record because Ms. Liotta testified that only 18 of the 41 properties 

had full-time residents and the remaining residents use their property for only 

portions of the year. 

Additionally, Appellants assert that the restrictive covenant’s plain

language as it relates to the use of the property as a short-term rental is 

ambiguous and as such, all ambiguities should be resolved in Appellants’ favor 

as the property owners. Appellants claim that the covenant in the deed was 

intended to maintain a residential neighborhood and prevent the operation of 

businesses such as restaurants, hotels and boating tours on the properties. 

Appellants insist that the operation of an Airbnb is substantially different from 

such ventures because the renters are using the property in a traditionally 

residential manner. Appellants conclude that the court erred in finding that 

the use of their property as an Airbnb violates the restrictive covenant in their 

deed, and this Court must vacate the order enjoining Appellants from 

operating a short-term rental on their property. We disagree. 

This Court’s scope and standard of review on appeal following a bench 

trial is well-settled:

Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial 

verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial 

court are supported by competent evidence and whether the 

trial court committed error in any application of the law. The 
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findings of fact of the trial judge must be given the same 

weight and effect on appeal as the verdict of a jury. We 

consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict 

winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its findings of 

fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record 

or if its findings are premised on an error of law. However, 

where the issue...concerns a question of law, our scope of 

review is plenary. The trial court’s conclusions of law on 

appeal originating from a non-jury trial are not binding on 

an appellate court because it is the appellate court’s duty to 

determine if the trial court correctly applied the law to the 

facts of the case.

Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1075 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal denied, 650 

Pa. 122, 199 A.3d 340 (2018). Additionally: 

In a non-jury trial, the factfinder is free to believe all, part, 

or none of the evidence, and the Superior Court will not 

disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations. 

Assessments of credibility and conflicts in evidence are for 

the trial court to resolve; this Court is not permitted to 

reexamine the weight and credibility determinations or 

substitute our judgments for those of the factfinder. The 

test is not whether this Court would have reached the same 

result on the evidence presented, but rather, after due 

consideration of the evidence the trial court found credible, 

whether the trial court could have reasonably reached its 

conclusion. 

Gutteridge v. J3 Energy Grp., Inc., 165 A.3d 908, 916 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“As a general matter, restrictive covenants on the use of land interfere 

with an owner’s free use and enjoyment of real property and, therefore, are 

not favored by the law.” Vernon Twp. Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v. 

Connor, 579 Pa. 364, 374, 855 A.2d 873, 879 (2004). Nevertheless, 

restrictive covenants are legally enforceable. See id. As such, restrictive 
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covenants “are to be strictly construed against persons seeking to enforce 

them and in favor of the free and unrestricted use of property.” Pocono 

Summit Realty, LLC v. Ahmad Amer, LLC, 52 A.3d 261, 269 (Pa.Super. 

2012). “[N]othing short of a ‘plain disregard’ of the restrictive covenant’s 

express terms can create violation of the covenant.” Id. 

“When the restrictive covenant is unambiguous, the Court’s review is 

limited to the confines of the covenant.” Id. Regarding the interpretation of 

the language in a restrictive covenant, our Supreme Court has held:

It is a fundamental rule of contract interpretation that the 

intention of the parties at the time of contract governs and 

that such intent must be ascertained from the entire 

instrument. This same principle of contract law is equally 

applicable to the interpretation of restrictive covenants. 

In order to ascertain the intentions of the parties, restrictive 

covenants must be construed in light of: (1) their language; 

(2) the nature of their subject matter; (3) the apparent 

object or purpose of the parties; and (4) the circumstances 

or conditions surrounding their execution. Typically, we will 

enforce a restriction if a party’s actions are in clear defiance

of the provisions imposed by the covenant. Moreover, we 

will enforce a restrictive covenant where it is established 

that the restriction is still of substantial value to the owners 

of the restricted tract. 

Vernon Twp. Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc., supra at 375, 855 A.2d at 879-

80 (internal citations omitted). 

Instantly, the trial court determined that the restrictive covenant in 

Appellants’ deed is intended to prohibit the use of the property for any 

commercial, non-residential purposes. The court further decided that the 

operation of a short-term rental such as an Airbnb violates the restriction as 
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stated. Contrary to Appellants’ assertions, we do not see any ambiguity in 

the plain language of the restrictive covenant. The covenant clearly restricts 

the use of the property to residential and non-commercial recreational use. 

Appellants have not noted anything in the record which calls into question the 

plain meaning of these words. See Baumgardner v. Stuckey, 735 A.2d 

1272, 1275 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 684, 751 A.2d 183 

(2000) (holding that restrictive covenant restricting use of properties to 

residential purposes is not ambiguous and clearly prohibits any commercial 

uses of the properties). As such, the real dispute in this matter is whether 

the use of the property to operate an Airbnb is a violation of the unambiguous 

terms of the restrictive covenant. In making its determination, the trial court 

analyzed the Vernon factors to interpret the language of the covenant: 

In construing the use restriction, the court must ascertain 

the intent by examining the language of the covenant in 

light of the subject matter thereof, the apparent purpose of 

the parties and the conditions surrounding execution of the 

covenant.

First, we look to the express words used in the instant 

covenant and rely upon their ordinary meaning. 

Particularly, the words “residence”, “private dwelling”, and 

“noncommercial recreational purposes”. Black’s Law 

Dictionary, seventh edition defines residence as “a place 

where one actually lives.” Merriam-Webster, (11th Edition,

Copyright 2009), defines residence as “the act or fact of 

dwelling in a place for some time; the place where one 

actually lives as distinguished from one’s domicile or place 

of temporary sojourn.” Merriam-Webster defines residential 

as a neighborhood restricted to or occupied by residences.

[This] Court held that the phrase “used for residential and

recreational purposes only” “expressly creates a use 
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restriction. ‘Residence’ in its popular as well as its dictionary 

sense, means a place of abode, it is where one lives, either 

alone, or with one’s family, the family is the generally 

recognized unit. ‘Recreation’ is understood to denote a 

pastime affording relaxation and enjoyment. The parties 

use of the limiting term ‘only’ makes their intent to prohibit 

all contrary uses apparent.” [Morean v. Duca, 430 A.2d 

988, 990 (Pa.Super. 1981) (internal citations omitted).] 

The Court in Morean held [that] commercial ventures “are 

clearly violative of the restriction.” [Id.]

Black’s Law defines a “dwelling” as a residence or abode and

“private” as relating to or belonging to an individual. 

Whereas Merriam-Webster defines “dwelling” as a house

where people live. However, its definition of “private”

restricts the use to a particular person, group or class. Our 

Supreme Court held [that the words] “private dwelling 

house” [have] a more restricted meaning than that 

attributed to “dwelling house” or “single dwelling”. [See

Taylor v Lambert, 279 Pa. 514, 516, 124 A. 169, 170

(1924).] It not only restricts business ventures, the words

restrict the dwelling to a “single, private and personal”

dwelling. [Id. at 517, 124 A. at 170.]

Second, we look at the deed as a whole and the 

circumstances surrounding the execution of the covenant to 

ascertain the apparent purpose of the parties, and from this

and the plain meaning of the words in the covenant answer 

the question ... regarding the allowance of short-term 

rentals under the covenant.

The Culbertsons possessed prime waterfront property that 

stretched along the arcs of the Allegheny river bank, giving 

them access to the river along the entire tract of land. This 

land could have been developed as recreational with public 

docks for mooring, riverside restaurants, boat rentals and 

guided boating excursions along the river. The intent of the 

Culbertsons in creating the ‘Bucktail Trails’ subdivision is 

evident from the deeds. Each deed submitted into evidence 

references the plan of lots known as “Bucktail Trails”.

Access to each lot is by a private road which is described as 

an appurtenance to the parcels or lots conveyed. The 

private road is further described as the sole means of

ingress and egress to the lots for which the lot owners must 
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pay an annual fee for use and maintenance. In addition, 

the Culbertsons set forth building and use restrictions in 

each deed.

The intent of the restrictions was to create a classic 

residential neighborhood that is tidy and pleasing to the eye. 

House trailers, buses, and vehicles were strictly prohibited

for use as premises or for dwelling purposes. Any building 

erected must be a private dwelling and private garage and 

used as such. It is further evident that the intent was to

create a neighborhood restricted to residences where one 

actually lives as distinguished from one’s place of temporary 

sojourn. The plain meaning of “used for residential and noncommercial recreational purposes only” clearly establishes 

the Culbertsons’ intent to exclude all other uses including 

commercial ventures.

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The use restriction in question concerns the nature of 

occupancy of the homes as affecting the health, welfare and 

comfort of the neighbors.... It creates a residential 

neighborhood in which residents develop a sense of 

community and shared commitment to that community. 

Acquaintanceship with neighbors also creates a sense of 

safety. [Mr. Hawkins] testified that the average stay for his

renters through Airbnb is three to four nights. The sense of 

stability and neighborhood peace is lost through the 

frequent transient nature of these rentals.

The neighborhood has not changed and the general purpose 

of the restriction has not changed. [Appellees] relied on the 

restrictive covenant when purchasing their homes. The 

restrictive covenant set forth in [Appellants’] deed was for 

[their] benefit and the benefit of [Appellees] who are 

seeking to enforce the restriction.... To allow short-term 

rentals would result in the loss of the benefit originally 

promised under the restrictive covenant. 

(Trial Court Opinion at 5-8). 

The record supports the court’s analysis. See Milby, supra. The court 

did not speculate as to the Culbertsons’ intent in drafting the restrictive 
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covenants but rather ascertained their apparent intent using the Vernon

factors and the evidence in the record. The court looked to the location and 

history of the properties, the language in the various deeds submitted into 

evidence, and testimony from the parties regarding the characteristics of the 

neighborhood and the historic use of the properties. The court further found 

support in common definitions of the language used in the deed, and this

Court and our Supreme Court’s prior holdings regarding similar terminology 

in restrictive covenants. Accordingly, we find no merit to Appellants’ claims 

that the court’s findings were speculative and unsupported by the record.1 

Additionally, Appellants cite no authority to support their claim that the 

operation of an Airbnb is residential and not commercial. Our Supreme Court’s 

analysis in Slice of Life, LLC v. Hamilton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 652 

Pa. 224, 207 A.3d 886, (2019), regarding short-term rentals as it relates to 

violation of residential zoning ordinances is instructive on this point.

2

 In Slice 

____________________________________________

1 Appellants further claim that the trial court erroneously found that most 

residents of the River Drive properties are full-time residents. Nevertheless, 

Appellants fail to cite to a place in the record where the court made such a 

finding. Additionally, our review of the record confirms that the court did not 

rely on such a finding in making its ultimate determination. As such, this claim 

is without merit. 

2 We recognize that the Slice of Life, LLC Court interpreted language specific 

to the relevant zoning ordinance in that case and as such, its determinations 

are not dispositive in the instant matter. Nevertheless, the Court evaluated

whether a short-term rental is a permissible use of a property located in an 

area that is zoned for residential use and discussed whether the characteristics 

of short-term rentals align with traditional residential use of properties. As 

such, we find the Court’s analysis to be relevant and instructive here. 
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of Life, LLC, our Supreme Court evaluated whether the operation of a shortterm rental in an area that was zoned residential was a permissible use. As 

in this case, the property owner in Slice of Life, LLC argued that although 

they generate income from short-term rentals, their property was being used 

as a single-family dwelling by the renters and such use differed from the 

operation of a traditional hotel or motel. See id. at 236-37, 207 A.3d at 894. 

The Court rejected this argument, deciding that short-term rentals are purely 

transient in nature because the renters use the property for only a few days 

at a time. Id. at 252, 207 A.3d at 903. The Court further decided that 

transient use of a property does not align with the use of a property as a 

single-family dwelling and as such, the short-term rental was not a permissible 

use of the property in the residential zoned district. Id. Additionally, the 

Court held the fact that short-term rentals were not specifically prohibited by 

the zoning ordinance was not dispositive because “[t]he requirement that 

courts strictly construe a zoning ordinance does not mean that they must 

ignore uses that clearly fall outside those that are permitted by the ordinance.” 

Id.

Here, the trial court’s analysis aligns with our Supreme Court’s analysis 

in Slice of Life, LLC. Appellants agree in their brief that the language of the 

restrictive covenant is intended to restrict the use of the property to singlefamily residential homes and non-commercial recreational purposes. (See

Appellants’ Brief at 22, 30). Mr. Hawkins testified that he generates income 
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from using his home as an Airbnb. He further acknowledged that the renters 

stay for a few days at a time, typically for vacation, and do not consider the 

property their permanent residence. The trial court determined that such

transient use of the property was prohibited by the restrictive covenant, which 

limited use to residential and non-commercial recreational purposes. 

Additionally, the fact that the covenant did not specifically restrict the 

operation of short-term rentals does not signify that it is a permissible use. 

See Slice of Life, LLC, supra. The court determined that the transient use 

of the property as a short-term rental is not a residential or non-commercial 

recreational use of the property. On this record, and under the specific facts 

of this case, we cannot say the court erred in determining that Appellants’ use 

of their property as an Airbnb is a violation of the restrictive covenant in their 

deed.

3

 See Milby, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Order affirmed. 

____________________________________________

3 We note that the trial court also classified a “short-term rental” as a rental 

less than six months, suggesting that the restrictive covenant prohibited

renting the property for any term less than a six-month duration. (See Trial 

Court Opinion at 8-9). We depart from this portion of the trial court’s 

reasoning, as the sole issue before the trial court was whether Appellants’ use 

of their property as an Airbnb with a duration of approximately 3 to 4 days at 

a time violated the terms of the restrictive covenant. As such, the trial court’s 

statements to this effect are dicta and the court’s determination in this regard 

is not controlling on the parties or any other litigation pertaining to this 

restrictive covenant. See In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 140, 79 A.3d 1073, 1081 

(2013) (stating that statements by court are binding precedent only when

they relate to issues actually raised, argued and adjudicated, and where 

decision was necessary to determination of case).
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DATE: 07/16/2024