UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ LADONA A. POORE, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. STANLEY GLANZ, in his individual capacity; VIC REGALADO, in his official capacity, * Defendants - Appellants. No. 16-5164 (D.C. No. 4:11-CV -00797-JED-TLW) (N.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

________________ _________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, BALDOCK and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ In 2010, detention officer Seth Bowers sexually abused th en-seventeen-yearold Ladona Poore while she was incarcerate d at the David L. Mo ss Criminal Justice Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Poore br ought Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Tulsa County sher iff, Stanley Glanz, in his individual and

* Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2 ), Vic Regalado, the current Tulsa County sheriff, is automatically substituted for former Tulsa County sheriff Michelle Robinette as an appellant.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judica ta, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consiste nt with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 5, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 official capacities, 1 alleging that the jail provided in adequate housing, staffing, and supervision for the area of the facility wh ere juvenile female inmates were housed. Following trial, the jury re turned a verdict in favor of Poore, awarding $25,000 in damages. The district court denied a post- verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) or a new trial. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Viewed in the light most favorable to Poore, the evidence shows that Glanz knew the policies he implemented with respect to juvenile female inmates creat ed an excessive risk of sexual assault and that he was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Although Glanz acknowledged that juvenile fema le inmates were at a height ened risk of sexual abuse, he chose to house them in an area of the ja il that was visually isolated, unmonitored, and often staffed by only one male officer, and where a prior incident of misconduct had occurred. He did so despite written policies intended to prevent sexual abuse that required direct supervis ion of juvenile inmates and prohibited male officers from entering the cell of juvenile female inmates alone. We c onclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury ’s conclusions that Glanz cau sed a violation of Poore’s constitutional rights and that he acted with a sufficiently cu lpable state of mind. We further conclude that the c ontours of the constitutional right at issue were sufficiently

1 After Michelle Robinette replaced Gl anz as acting Tulsa County sheriff, she took his place as the defendant with resp ect to Poore’s offi cial capacity claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). As noted in the caption, Robinette was subsequently replaced by Vic Regalado.3 clear that Glanz is not entitl ed to qualified immunity. We reject a number of other evidentiary arguments advanced on appeal. I A We review a district court’s denial of JMOL de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 2004). In c onducting this review, we cannot “weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or s ubstitute our conclusions for th[ose] of the jury.” Medl ock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “[W]e may find error only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable infe rences supporting the party for whom the jury found.” Ralston Dev. Corp. v. Unite d States, 937 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). “We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a).” M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 762 (10t h Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). If “a new trial motion asserts that the jury verdict is not supported by the evid ence, the verdict must stand unless it is clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly agai nst the weight of th e evidence.” Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1284 ( 10th Cir. 1999) (quot ation omitted). In contrast to the deferen tial standard we apply in re viewing a jury’s verdict, we review a district court’s doctrinal analysis regarding qu alified immunity de novo. Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1007 (1 0th Cir. 2003). If a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “the plaintiff has the h eavy burden of establishing: (1) that the4 defendant’s actions violated a federal constitutional or stat utory right; and (2) that the right violated was clearly esta blished at the time of the de fendant’s actions.” Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136 , 1142 (10th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty on prison officials to pr ovide humane conditions of confinement, including “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation omitted). However, this minimum standard does not impose constitutional liab ility on prison officials for every injury an inmate suffers during deten tion. First, the alleged in jury must be “sufficiently serious.” Id. at 834 (quotation omitted). It is undisputed that sexual assault satisfies this objective component of an Eighth Ame ndment claim. See Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A]n in mate has a constitu tional right to be secure in her bodily integrity and fr ee from attack by prison guards.”). Second, the prison official must have had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” amounting to “deliberate indifferenc e.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quotation omitted). Under this standard, “a pris on official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excess ive risk to inmate hea lth or safety.” Id. at 837. The official must actually be “aw are of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial ri sk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. “An official ’s failure to alleviate a signi ficant risk of which he was unaware, no matter how obvious the risk or how gross his negligence in failing to5 perceive it, is not an infliction of puni shment and therefore not a constitutional violation.” Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). This mens rea standard extends to Ei ghth Amendment claims brought against supervisors. To prevail on a supervisory liability cl aim, there mu st be an “affirmative link between the constitutional depr ivation and the superv isor’s actions.” Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Ci r. 2013) (“Keith I”). A supervisor is directly responsible for an Eighth Amendmen t violation if the plaintiff can show: “(1) personal involvement, (2 ) sufficient causal connection, and (3) culpable state of mind.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 11 85, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010). Similarly, because we have recognized that “[s]ui ng individual defendants in their official capacities under § 1983 . . . is essentially another way of pleading an action against the county or municipality they represent,” Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010) (citations om itted), an official capacity claim can only be established if the official’s own policies led to the de privation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’ t of Soc. Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 691 (1978) (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” (italics omitted)). B With this framework in mind, we turn to the evidence presente d at trial. Poore was housed at the Tulsa County jail from January to April of 2010. During that time period, she occupied one of the few cells in the north wing of the jail’s medical unit.6 The cell was located near a nur ses’ station, but curtains obscured the view from the nurses’ station to the door to Poore’s cell. The area had no surveillance cameras. Poore testified that during the early por tion of her detention, Bowers began groping her. She stated th at he entered her cell and engaged in this type of misconduct more than fifty times. The se xual abuse escalated during the course of her incarceration. Bowers watched Poore in the shower, asking if she was done and then laughing at her. He la ter exposed himself to Poor e and demanded oral sex. Bowers engaged in oral sex with her on approximately ten occasions, and sexual intercourse approximately five times. P oore did not inform jail staff of the abuse because Bowers convinced her they woul d both face consequen ces if she reported him. After Poore was released, jail offici als received a report about possible misconduct by Bowers. A material witness who had also been housed in the north wing informed an investigator , Billy Joe McKelvey, that Bowers would enter Poore’s cell and stay anywhere from five to twen ty minutes at a time. The witness also informed McKelvey that another officer kn ew about these “inappr opriate relations.” McKelvey met with the officer, who con ceded he was aware of the misconduct and agreed to write a report. However, McKelvey explained that he had to engage the officer “pretty bluntly because he did not want to provi de me this information.” During McKelvey’s investigation, two other detention officers reluctantly admitted they heard from an inmate that “an employee of the sheriff’s office was having relations with the females on the . . . north end of the medical unit.” The7 inmate explained that Bowers entered the cells of juven ile female inmates by himself and stayed for approximately twenty minut es. A juvenile fema le inmate who was housed across from P oore informed McKelvey that Bowers entered both of their cells. At the time of these events, Glanz wa s responsible for overseeing operation of the Tulsa County jail. Glan z recognized that rates of sexual abuse are much higher for incarcerated juveniles th an for incarcerated adults. He acknowledged that girls are disproportionately represented among sexua l abuse victims. And he agreed with Poore’s counsel that “youth incarcerated with adults are probably at the highest risk of sexual abuse.” Glanz further agreed that eliminating “blind spots” is key to effective supervision and that it is “c ritical” that individuals within the jail are aware that their conduct will be monitored or s ubject to surveillance. He stated that juvenile male inmates are housed in a “direc t supervision” unit because very few inmate assaults occur in such settings . Female juvenile inmates, howev er, were not placed in a direct supervision environment. Glanz conceded that this placement decision violated his own policies. He further ad mitted that jail policies pr ohibiting a male officer from entering the cell of a juvenile female alone were institute d to protect those inmates from sexual assault, and that the policy was disregarded. Glanz also admitted he wa s aware of a prior incident in which a male nurse had been watching a juvenile female inmate shower in th e medical unit. Although he conceded that better monitoring in that unit could disc ourage future incidents, Glanz8 had not made any change to the manner in which juvenile fe male inmates were supervised after th is prior incident. II A On appeal, defendants argue that P oore’s Eighth Amendm ent claim fails because she merely establis hed a generalized risk of sexual assault rather than identifying any threat Bowers posed to hersel f. But an “official’s knowledge of the risk need not be knowledge of a substantia l risk to a particular inmate, or knowledge of the particular manner in which injury might occur.” Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843). Nor must a defendant be awar e of the “specific [individual] who eventually committed the as sault . . . and it does not matter whether the risk comes from a single s ource or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an ex cessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Farm er, 511 U.S. at 843. Poore does not argue that all the inmate s in the jail faced a general risk of sexual assault. Instead, she contends that Glanz was de liberately indifferent to a specific subset of individuals incarcerated in the jail: juvenile fe male inmates housed in the north wing of the medical unit—a small, clearly define d group. At the time of the incidents at issue, there were two or three such inmate s. At most, six juvenile female inmates were present at any one time during Glanz’ s tenure. Poore presented evidence showing that Glanz was subjectively aware that these inmates were at a high risk of sexual assault and that conditions in the north wing were especially9 dangerous. The jury permissibly inferred that he was aware of the specific risk faced by Poore and other juvenile female inmates housed in the north wing. See generally Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848 (noting that “be cause of petitioner’s youth and feminine appearance,” respondents admitted that he was “likely to experi ence a great deal of sexual pressure in prison” (quotation omitted)). Defendants further argue that they cannot be liable because no juvenile female inmate housed in the north wing of the medi cal unit had ever been sexually assaulted prior to Poore. Many of our prior cases in which a supervisor was held liable for sexual misconduct involved prior instances of abuse. See, e.g., Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 915; Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179, 1182-85 (10th Cir. 200 5). But Poore did present evidence of a prior instance of sexu al misconduct in the medical unit. Glanz was aware that a male nurse employed by the jail inappropriately watched a fifteenyear-old female inmate while she showered in the medical unit. He also conceded that this type of misconduct could have been discouraged by ch anges to the jail’s monitoring policy for that ar ea. Despite his knowledge of this prior instance of sexual misconduct, Glanz did not make any changes to th e manner in which juvenile female inmates were housed or how the me dical unit was supervised, staffed, or monitored. Nevertheless, defendants argue that the shower incident was distinct enough from the events at issu e in this case that it could not establish deliberat e indifference. This argument ignores the fact that dur ing the course of Bowers’ escalating misconduct, he engaged in precisely the same action, watching Poore while she10 showered. In any event, we reject the s uggestion that the only po ssible prior incident that could have alerted jail officials to the risk Poore faced w ould be a prior sexual assault of a juvenile female inmate by a detention officer in the north wing of the medical unit. As appellants themselves point out, the popul ation of juvenile female inmates housed in the jail was very small. Defendants thus ask us to reverse a jury verdict based on the notion that, in an excee dingly small sample si ze, a prior incident must be identical rather than merely similar to the misc onduct at issue to demonstrate a sufficiently serious risk. This we cannot do. As we have previously recognized, instances of sexual assault of ten begin with lesser viola tions of prison policy and are thus “relevant to the totality of the circumstances at [a prison] that may have contributed to the sexual misconduct.” Ke ith v. Koerner, 843 F.3d 833, 842 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Keith II”). “Whether a prison official had the requisi te knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact . . . .” Fa rmer, 511 U.S. at 842. We do not suggest that the shower incident, standing alone, would place every reasonable prison offi cial on notice of a substantial risk. Instead, given the evidence presented in this case—including Glanz’s admissions of the dangers at issue— we conclude that the jury acted within its discretion when it determin ed that Glanz was subjectivel y aware of Poore’s risk of sexual assault in the north wing of the medi cal unit and that his decision to house her there evinced deliberate indifference.11 B For similar reasons, we reject the ar gument that defendant s are entitled to qualified immunity because th is court has not previously held that the precise combination of policies implemented by Glan z constituted deliberate indifference. We have recognized “it is clearly established that a prison official’s deliberate indifference to sexual abuse by prison empl oyees violates the Eighth Amendment.” Keith I, 707 F.3d at 1188. And because “a prison official’s failure to protect an inmate from a known harm may constitute a constituti onal violation,” we have further held it to be clearly established that inmates posse ss “a constitutional right to expect” that jail officials will “reasonabl[y ] protect[]” them from such abuse. Keith II, 843 F.3d at 850 (quotati on and citation omitted). Principles regarding supervisory liability in this context are also firmly established. In Dodds, we explained th at “the clearly esta blished prong of the qualified immunity inquiry asks whether the contours of the right the plaintiff claims the defendant violated are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” 615 F.3d at 1206 (quotations and alteration omitted). We concluded it was “clearly established by 2007 that officials may be held individually liable fo r policies they promul gate, implement, or maintain that deprive persons of their federally protected rights.” Id. at 1207. We have held corrections supervisors li able for failing to protect inmates from sexual abuse from staff on seve ral occasions. In Keith I, we affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to a warden following se xual misconduct by an officer toward a12 female inmate who was participating in a vocational training prog ram. 707 F.3d at 1187. We concluded that pr ior instances of sexual misc onduct and undue familiarity along with “structural policy problems” rela ting to “the vocational training program and the insufficient use of ca meras to monitor inmates and staff” suggested that the warden disregarded a substantial risk of such abuse despite being aware of the problem. Id. at 1189. In Tafoya, we concl uded that a sheriff wa s liable for failing to prevent sexual assaults at a jail for several reasons, incl uding: maintaining a staff who “did not report rapes, assaults, and ill egal activities”; fail ing to enforce a “no contact policy . . . because there was not al ways a female detention officer on duty”; and failing to fully eliminate “blind spots wh ere assaults could, and did, take place” when coupled with knowledge “that having some cameras in th e jail was not enough to deter assaults in unmonitored areas.” 516 F.3d at 918-19. And in Keith II, we identified, among other factors that put the prison warden on notice, three prior incidents of “undue familiarity” and “oppor tunities for employees to be outside of other people’s eyesight, outsi de of cameras, inside of r ooms with individual inmates” in the area of the fa cility where the incident occu rred. 843 F.3d at 841 (quotation omitted). Defendants rely heavily on our prior d ecisions holding that merely placing a female inmate in the custody of a si ngle male guard does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 12 99, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998); Hovater, 1 F.3d at 1066. In those cases, “however, a c onstitutional violation was not found because the only proof of pr ison officials’ knowledge of a substantial13 risk of serious harm to a female inmate and failure to protect was predicated on the existence of a per se viola tion of a written jail policy.” Gonzales, 403 F.3d at 1186; see also Keith I, 707 F.3d at 1190 (noting th at, in Barney, “the plaintiff presented no evidence of the actual knowledge requi red for § 1983 liabil ity for deliberate indifference” and that, in Hovater, plaintif f’s claim was based on nothing more “than the fact she was a female in mate”). In this case, Poore has identified particular conditions in the north wing of the medica l unit and adduced ev idence that enabled the jury to find that Glanz was subjectively aware that t hose conditions constituted an excessive risk. See Keith I, 707 F.3d at 1190 (rejecting relia nce on Barney and Hovater if prison official has “actual knowledge” of threat). In addition, defendants correctly point out that other facts not present in this case supported a finding of de liberate indifference in Keith I, Tafoya, and Keith II. 2 But the qualified immunity analysis is not “a scavenger hunt for prior cases with precisely the same facts”; the relevant inquiry is “whether the law put officials on fair notice that the described c onduct was unconstitutional.” Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). “We cannot find

2 Defendants place special emphasis on th e general lack of discipline at the facilities at issue in these cases, in contrast to a “ze ro tolerance” policy they contend was indisputably present at the Tulsa Co unty jail. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (official may be “free from li ability” if he “responded reasona bly to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted”). But the record does not clearly demonstrate that such a policy was enforced. See Keith II, 843 F.3d at 848 (“[E]ven with policies in place to respond to misconduct, such po licies may be empty gestures without corresponding supervision and a legitimate threat of di scipline for infractions.” (quotation and alteration om itted)). Three officers we re aware of the sexual misconduct and failed to report it until confr onted during McKelvey’s investigation. There is no evidence that these i ndividuals were ever sanctioned.14 qualified immunity wherever we have a new fact pattern.” Id. Although each of the conditions identified by Poor e taken individually would not constitute a clearly established violation of P oore’s Eighth Amendment rights, the confluence of factors in this case impels us to affi rm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. See Keith II, 843 F.3d at 840 (“[W]e must cons ider the conditions of confinement as a whole.” (quotation omitted)). A reasonable official in Glanz’s position, who had his subjective knowledge of the dangers posed by conditions in the north wing, would have been on fair notice that his conduct was unlawful. C We also affirm the distri ct court’s denial of JMOL as to Poore’s official capacity claim. Because an official capacity claim “is essentially another way of pleading an action against the county or m unicipality [the offici al] represent[s],” Porro, 624 F.3d at 1328, we consider whethe r the Monell factors are satisfied. Under that test, “a plaintiff asse rting a § 1983 claim must sh ow 1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom a nd 2) a direct causal link be tween the policy or custom and the injury alleged.” Mocek v. City of Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 933 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). A policy or custom may take a variety of forms, including: (1) a formal regulation or policy statem ent; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice that, althou gh not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well se ttled as to constitute a custom or usage with the fo rce of law; [or] (3) the d ecisions of employees with final policymaking authority . . . .15 Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 78 4, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations and alteration omitted). For th e same reasons we have concluded that the jury permissibly found Glanz liable on Poore’s supervisory liab ility claim, we uphold its verdict on her official capacity claim. A jury could have concluded in light of the evidence presented that the jail’s policy as to housing juvenile females directly caused the sexual assa ults Poore endured. 3
III Defendants also raise a number of eviden tiary challenges on appeal. A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discre tion. Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995). To warra nt a new trial, evid entiary errors must “affect a party’s substantial rights.” Tanbe rg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005). First, defendants contend that the dist rict court erred in refusing to permit Bowers to testify live, as opposed to by depos ition, at trial. It is uncontested that at the time of his deposition, and at the time of trial, Bowers resided in Illinois, much farther than one hundred miles from the dist rict court in Oklahoma. As a result, he was “unavailable” to testify at trial. See Fe d. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(B). The pretrial

3 We thus affirm the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for JMOL on both the individual and official capacity claims. For the same reasons, we affirm the denial of defendants’ motion for a new trial to the exte nt that it is grounded on insufficiency of the evidence. See Lo mpe v. Sundridge Partners, LLC, 818 F.3d 1041, 1062 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[a]s with the JMOL sta ndard, the trial court must view the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the prevailing party” when evaluating a motion for a new trial); Miller v. Eby Rea lty Grp. LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s denial of motion for JMOL or in the alternative for a new trial where the “same three issues” we re raised).16 order listed Bowers as a witness by deposi tion. However, shortly before trial, defendants sought to call him live, apparently to withdraw his prior invocations of the Fifth Amendment during the deposition. The district court reasonably concluded that such conduct would be unfairly prejudicial . See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 190- 91 (3rd Cir.1994) (noting th at “because the [Fifth Amendment] privilege may be initially invoked and later wa ived at a time when an adverse party can no longer secure the be nefits of discovery, the potential for exploitation is apparent” and t hus “belated waiver of the privilege could be unfair”). Second, defendants object to the dist rict court’s admi ssion of evidence regarding Bowers’ prior criminal history. A witness’ prior ba d acts are generally inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). However, “[a]dm ission of rebuttal evidence, particularly when the defendant ‘opens the door’ to the subject ma tter, is within the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Trout man, 814 F.2d 1428, 1450 (10th Cir. 1987). During opening statem ent, counsel for the defendants stated that Bowers had “not even a speeding ticket in his life.” We rule that the district court did not abuse its discretion in pe rmitting admission of evidence regarding Bowers’ criminal history. Third, defendants assert that the dist rict court erred in permitting Poore’s counsel to question an expert witness about another allege d sexual assault of a female inmate in the jail’s medical unit. Duri ng cross-examination, defense counsel asked questions about that witness’ deposition test imony in a case arising from the incident. On re-direct, Poore’s counsel elicited a dditional testimony regarding the other case.17 Because the district court issu ed a curative instru ction to the jury to disregard this evidence, we hold that even were it erroneously admitte d, defendants’ substantive rights were not violated as a result. Se e United States v. Morgan, 748 F.3d 1024, 1042 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that “jur ies are presumed to follow curative instructions” to di sregard evidence). Fourth, defendants argue that the district court erred in denying their motion to permit the jury to view the jail’s medical unit. “ Whether the jury is permitted to view evidence outside the courtr oom is a matter for the disc retion of the trial court.” United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 883 (10t h Cir. 1987). At trial, the jury saw photographs of the medical unit and heard evidence concer ning the structure of this portion of the jail. And by the time trial commenced, the medical unit had changed significantly from the time when Poore was incarcerated. 4 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its disc retion in denying this request. Finally, defendants argue that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the crimes Poore committed. They suggest that admiss ion of this evidence was necessary because Poore’s c ounsel cross-examined Glanz and Robinette on the jail’s policies regarding youthful offenders. By not allowing counsel to explain Poore’s status as an adult offender, defendants co ntend the district court prejudiced them.

4 Ironically, defendants moved to exclude as an improper subsequent remedial measure under Fed. R. Evid. 407 evidence that cameras had been added to the jail since Poore’s release, which the trial court granted. A jury view thus would have presumably prejudiced the defendants by re vealing to the jury the addition of cameras.18 We are not persuaded. We ighing against this limited probative value was the danger of unfair prejudice to Poore. See United St ates v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting “the introduction of evid ence” of an individua l’s “prior crimes risks significant prejudice”) (quot ation omitted). We rule th at the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing th e competing factors and excluding this evidence. 5
IV AFFIRMED

.
Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge

5 Defendants also contend that if we re verse on the merits, we must vacate the district court’s cost award. Because we reject defenda nts’ arguments on the merits, there are no grounds for us to do so.