United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

__________________________ 

INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________ 

2012-5030

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in case no. 10-CV-680, Senior Judge Eric G. 

Bruggink. 

_________________________ 

Decided: January 11, 2013

_________________________ 

SCOTT A. SCHIPMA, Winston & Strawn LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on 

the brief was DAVID C. ROMM. 

DAVID D’ALESSANDRIS, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendantappellee. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, 

Acting Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, 

Director, and FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR., Assistant Director. 
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 2

Of counsel on the brief was JONELLE DILLEY, Trial Attorney, Navy Litigation Office, Office of the General Counsel, 

United States Department of Navy, of Washington, DC. 

__________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges. 

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

Indian Harbor Insurance Company (“Indian Harbor”) 

appeals the final judgment of the Court of Federal Claims 

dismissing Indian Harbor’s Second Amended Complaint. 

In that complaint, Indian Harbor sought reimbursement 

under Section 330 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, Div. A, Title IU, § 330, 

106 Stat. 2315, 2371 (Oct 23, 1992), amended by Pub. L. 

No. 103-160, Div. A, Title X, § 1002, 107 Star. 1547, 1745 

(Nov. 30, 1993) (“Section 330”) for environmental cleanup 

costs associated with the development of property formerly used as a military base. The Court of Federal Claims 

determined that Indian Harbor failed to identify a “claim 

for personal injury or property” that triggered the government’s duty to indemnify under Section 330, Indian 

Harbor Insurance Co. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 239, 

240 (Fed. Cl. 2011) and, thus, dismissed the complaint 

under Rule 12(b)(6) of its rules. Because we disagree with 

the trial court’s interpretation of the requirements of 

Section 330, we reverse the decision of the Court of Federal Claims and remand for proceedings in accordance 

with this decision. 

I.

Section 330 requires the Department of Defense to indemnify subsequent owners of former military bases 

against certain claims arising from environmental contamination:
3 INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US

(a) In general--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3) and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense shall hold harmless, defend, and 

indemnify in full the persons and entities described in paragraph (2) from and against any 

suit, claim, demand or action, liability, judgment, 

cost or other fee arising out of any claim for personal injury or property damage (including death, 

illness, or loss of or damage to property or economic loss) that results from, or is in any manner 

predicated upon, the release or threatened release 

of any hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant, or petroleum or petroleum derivative as a 

result of Department of Defense activities at any 

military installation (or portion thereof) that is 

closed pursuant to a base closure law.

Section 330(a)(1). The right to indemnification extends to 

any persons or entities that acquire ownership or control 

of land formerly used as a military installation. Section 

330(a)(2). This includes states, state agencies, political 

subdivisions of a state, and any successor, assignee, 

transferee, lender, or lessee. Id. Indemnification is not 

available to entities who contributed to the release of the 

hazardous contaminants. Section 330(a)(3).

II.

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin (“MCAS Tustin”), a 

military base in southern California, was scheduled for 

realignment and closure in 1993 pursuant to the Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, 10 U.S.C. § 

2687 (2000) (“Base Closure Act”). In 1992, the City of 

Tustin, California, was designated as the Local Redevelopment Authority tasked with preparing a plan to receive,

reuse, and develop the former base. The base was official-
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 4

ly closed in 1999. The Navy, in cooperation with the 

United States Environmental Protection Agency, the 

California Environmental Protection Agency Department 

of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”), and the Santa Ana 

Regional Water Quality Control Board (“RWQCB”), 

organized an effort to investigate and clean up possible 

environmental contamination prior to transfer. This work 

culminated in a certification by the Navy that the base 

was suitable for transfer. 

The Navy then conveyed the base, via quitclaim deed, 

to the City of Tustin, California on May 13, 2002. Included in the deed were covenants guaranteeing that all 

necessary remedial action had been or would be taken by 

the government. Of relevance here, the deed included 

specific recognition of the government’s indemnification 

duties under Section 330: “2.7 Indemnification Regarding 

Transferees. The GRANTOR hereby recognizes its obligations under [Section 330].” The City of Tustin selected 

Tustin Legacy Community Partners, LLC (“TLCP”) as the 

Master Developer of the acquired property and conveyed 

and/or leased various portions of the former MCAS Tustin 

property to TLCP for residential and commercial development. Prior to TLCP’s acquisition of the property at 

issue, TLCP obtained, from Indian Harbor, insurance 

policy No. PEC0010756 (“TLCP Policy”) providing, inter 

alia, coverage for certain remediation expenses incurred 

during development of the TLCP property.

In August 2007, while surface grading certain portions of the TLCP property, TLCP discovered total petroleum hydrocarbon (“TPH”) contamination in the soil. 

TLCP notified the Navy of the contamination and, in 

September 2007, TLCP entered into a Voluntary Cleanup 

Agreement with the DTSC. The stated purpose of the 

Voluntary Cleanup Agreement was for TLCP “to obtain 
5 INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US

the best available guidance and technical oversight from 

DTSC in preparing and implementing a Site Management 

Plan (“SMP”) and, if warranted, Removal Action Workplan(s).” J.A. 42. Six months later, the RWQCB sent 

TLCP a letter responding to TLCP's notification regarding

petroleum contamination on the site. The RWQCB letter 

identified threatened contamination and stated:

the contamination at the site must be fully 

characterized, and appropriate remedial action 

must be taken. A work plan and time schedule for 

conducting these activities must be submitted, in 

accordance with State Water Resources Control 

Board (SWRCB) Resolution No. 92-49.

J.A. 34. The letter explicitly recognized the ongoing 

involvement of the DTSC and stated that the RWQCB 

had “no objection to TLCP continuing the work required 

by this letter under its existing oversight agreement with 

DTSC.” Accordingly, the RWQCB directed TLCP to 

continue working with DTSC staff to “establish appropriate cleanup goals for the soil and groundwater at the 

TLCP site, for the protection of human health and the 

environment.” J.A. 34. Discoveries of similar and/or 

related TPH contaminated soils on certain portions of 

TLCP property followed in 2007, 2008, and 2009. TLCP 

submitted its site management plan to DTSC for approval 

in August 2009. DTSC formally approved the plan, 

noting that it complied with the requirements of the 

Voluntary Cleanup Agreement between the parties. Over 

the next year, TLCP completed the majority of its remediation efforts.

Beginning in 2007, TLCP submitted claims to Indian 

Harbor under the TLCP Policy seeking reimbursement for 

costs associated with the remediation of TPH contamina-
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 6

tion. Indian Harbor complied with its obligations under 

the policy and, at the time of initiating this action, had

reimbursed TLCP an amount in excess of $5,000,000 for 

costs associated with the remediation of TPH contamination at the former MCAS Tustin. Indian Harbor requested indemnification from the Navy in a letter on July 31, 

2009. On April 14, 2010, Defendant issued a final decision denying Indian Harbor’s Section 330 Claims. 

Indian Harbor subsequently filed suit in the Court of 

Federal Claims seeking $5,331,872.09, plus interest and 

any additional amounts proven at trial, pursuant to 

Section 330. The United States moved to dismiss. Following briefing by the parties, oral argument was held on 

June 20, 2011. On June 28, 2011, the Court of Federal 

Claims granted Indian Harbor’s unopposed motion to file 

its First Amended Complaint, which clarified Count II of 

the Complaint. On July 5, 2011, the Court of Federal 

Claims granted the Defendant’s motion in part, dismissing Count I of Indian Harbor’s Complaint on grounds that 

Indian Harbor failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting 

the existence of a “claim for personal injury or property 

damage” as required under Section 330. 

In its opinion, the Court of Federal Claims focused on 

what constitutes “a claim for personal injury or property 

damage” triggering the government’s duty to indemnify 

under Section 330. Specifically, the court questioned 

whether the correspondence received by the TLCP from 

state regulators demanding that the developer remediate 

the pollution properly constituted a “claim for personal 

injury or property damage” and, in construing the terms 

of Section 330, made several interpretive findings. According to the court below, Section 330 only contemplates 

indemnification where “the owner or developer of a former 

military property is subject to some action brought 
7 INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US

against him” by a third-party. Indian Harbor, 100 Fed. 

Cl. at 243. Thus, a third-party claim for personal injury 

or property damage, “regardless of how the third-party 

allegation is denominated (a suit, claim, action, etc.) and 

regardless of how fully developed it is (a mere demand or 

a judgment)”, is a necessary predicate for indemnification 

under Section 330. In addition, the Court of Federal 

Claims determined that “a straightforward reading 

dictates that the action brought by the third-party must 

allege injury to that person or damage to his property.” 

Id. at 244 (emphases in original). The court provided the 

examples of a property developer sued by a downstream 

farmer whose water supply had been contaminated by 

toxic runoff from the developer’s land and a developer 

receiving a demand letter from home buyers subsequently 

diagnosed with cancer as being subject to indemnification 

under Section 330. Id. But the Court of Federal Claims 

emphasized that “a developer who must clean up its own 

lands that were insufficiently remediated by the government prior to transfer” is not entitled to compensation 

under the statute. Id.

The Court of Federal Claims recognized that its decision was contrary to a previous Court of Federal Claims 

holding in Richmond American Homes of Colorado, Inc. v. 

United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 376 (2007), but found that the 

court there had relied inappropriately on legislative 

history in interpreting the plain language of the statute. 

Instead, the Court of Federal Claims looked approvingly 

to a later decision in American International Specialty 

Lines Insurance Company v. United States, No. 05-1020, 

2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 481, 2008 WL 1990859 (Fed. Cl. 

Jan. 31, 2008), where the court held that a letter from the 

DTSC requiring remediation could not be the basis of a

claim under Section 330. The trial court considered 

Indian Harbor’s argument that the legislative history of 
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 8

Section 330 supported a broader reading of triggering 

claims, but determined that, as a general matter, “reference to legislative history is inappropriate when the text 

of the statute is unambiguous,” Indian Harbor, 100 Fed. 

Cl. at 244 (citing Dept. Of Housing and Urban Dev. v. 

Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132 (2002)), which it concluded was 

the case with Section 330. The court noted, moreover, 

that statements made by Senator John McCain of Arizona

on which the court relied in Richmond, had been made in 

connection with a version of Section 330 that did not 

contain language requiring a “claim for personal injury or 

property damage” as a predicate to indemnification because that clause was added to the bill by the conference 

committee, after legislators’ statements in support of the 

bill had been recorded.

After construing the statute, the Court of Federal 

Claims held that the DTSC and RWQCB’s communications with the TLCP were not “claim[s] for personal injury 

or property damage” within the meaning of Section 330. 

In so finding, the court expressly rejected Indian Harbor’s 

arguments that a state’s environmental regulatory actions designed to prevent injury to its citizens or damage 

to their property trigger indemnification under Section 

330. Specifically, the court found a distinction between a 

state enforcing a generally applicable environmental 

regulation pursuant to its police power and, as plaintiff 

argues is the case here, the state bringing a legal claim ex 

rel its citizens. Having found that Indian Harbor is not 

entitled to Section 330 indemnification, the Court of 

Federal Claims declined to consider the government’s 

argument that Indian Harbor’s initial reluctance to 

provide proper documentation regarding its claim was an 

independent basis upon which the government legitimately could refuse to indemnify TLCP for its remediation 

costs. 
9 INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US

On September 30, 2011, Indian Harbor requested 

leave to file its Second Amended Complaint, removing 

Count II of the Complaint which requested relief under 

the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980. The Court of Federal 

Claims granted Indian Harbor’s motion on October 27, 

2011 and deemed the Second Amended Complaint, which 

contains only Count I, relating to Section 330, filed as of 

that date. The Court of Federal Claims then entered final 

judgment dismissing Indian Harbor’s Second Amended 

Complaint on October 31, 2011. Indian Harbor timely 

appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1295(a)(3). 

III.

We review de novo a decision to dismiss a complaint 

for failure to state a claim under RCFC 12(b)(6), just as 

we do dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). See Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1376 

(Fed. Cir. 2009). A complaint must be dismissed under 

Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts asserted do not give rise to a 

legal remedy. Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 

1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “[A] complaint must allege facts 

‘plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)’ a 

showing of entitlement to relief.” Acceptance Ins. Cos., 

Inc. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 

(2007)). An underlying issue of statutory interpretation is 

a question of law, which we review de novo. Norfolk 

Dredging Co. v. United States, 375 F.3d 1106, 1108 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004).

When interpreting a statute, we start with the language of the statute itself. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

420, 431 (2000). We search for Congress’s intent using 
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 10

both the text and structure of the statute. Alexander v. 

Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001). In reviewing the 

statute’s text, we give the words “their ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,’ absent an indication Congress 

intended them to bear some different import.” Williams, 

529 U.S. at 431 (quoting Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 

Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997)); see also Moskal v. United 

States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“In determining the 

scope of a statute, we look first to its language, giving the 

words used their ordinary meaning.” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)). If the statute is clear 

and unambiguous, then the plain meaning of the statute 

is generally conclusive, and we give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Sullivan v. 

Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482 (1990). When the statutory 

language is ambiguous, legislative history can be useful

in determining Congressional intent. See In re Swanson, 

540 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

A. 

Indian Harbor first argues that the Court of Federal 

Claims erred in holding that a valid claim for indemnification under Section 330 must arise from a third-party

“action” against the Section 330 claimant. The government argues that the court below created no new requirement for an “action” and that the Court of Federal 

Claims expressly recognized that “a variety of procedural 

devices can trigger indemnification - a suit, claim, demand or action, liability, judgment, cost or other fee - they 

all share a common genesis.” J.A. 9. Thus, according to 

the government, the Court of Federal Claims was merely 

describing the relationship between the various clauses of 

the statute in order to elucidate the plain meaning of the 

statutory text, and used the term “action” as shorthand 
11 INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US

for the clause in Section 330 articulating the various ways 

that indemnification could be triggered.

Although the plain language of Section 330 is clear 

that there must be a “suit, claim, demand or action, 

liability, judgment, cost or other fee arising out of any 

claim for personal injury or property damage,” we find no 

support for the proposition that the claim for personal 

injury or property damage must be adversarial. Specifically, we agree with the reasoning of the Court of Federal 

Claims in Richmond, finding that a state agency’s exercise of its regulatory authority demands compliance and 

suffices to meet the requirement of a “claim” under Section 330. 75 Fed. Cl. at 393 (“Under the circumstances of 

this case, the CDPHE’s exertion of regulatory authority 

cannot be construed as a mere ‘invitation to voluntary 

action.’ The Compliance Advisory directs its recipients to 

comply now or pay the price in fines later.”) (internal 

citations omitted). Thus, we see no reading of the plain 

language resulting in the conclusion that that the 

RWQCB’s communications with TLCP do not constitute a 

“claim” under Section 330. 

The May 14, 2008, letter clearly articulates a threat 

to groundwater in the State of California, identifies the 

RWQCB as a responsible party for the protection of said 

groundwater, and provides the statutory authority for the 

RWQCB to take enforcement action “for failure to cleanup 

and abate waste discharges, and to take necessary remedial action.” J.A. 34. As Indian Harbor emphasized at 

oral argument, this letter merely represents the first step 

in which the State of California, through the RWQCB, 

enforces environmental regulations related to water 

quality. Under the California Water Code, Sections 

13304 and 13350, the RWQCB has the authority to, inter 

alia, seek injunctive relief prohibiting certain conduct or 
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 12

requiring compliance with a clean-up order, recover 

monetary damages either civilly or pursuant to the code, 

or institute its own clean-up of the affected areas and 

then seek reimbursement and penalties from TLCP.1 

Like the claimant in Richmond, TLCP was not in a position to ignore the communication from the RWQCB.

B.

The Court of Federal Claims additionally held that “a 

straightforward reading dictates that the action brought 

by the third-party must allege injury to that person or 

damage to his property” and that “Section 330 requires 

indemnification only when an entity . . . is subject to a 

third-party proceeding arising from an injury to that 

third-party or damage to its property . . . .” Indian Harbor, 100 Fed. Cl. at 244 (emphasis in original). Indian 

Harbor argues that the Court of Federal Claims erred in 

imposing an ownership requirement on the third-party

bringing the “action.” The government disagrees with 

Indian Harbor’s characterization of the court’s holding 

and asserts that the court did not create a statutory 

requirement of “ownership” but merely explained that the 

third-party claimant itself must suffer personal injury or 

property damage. The government’s characterization 

more accurately reflects the court’s decision but we nonetheless find that decision to be in error.

As with its findings regarding a proper Section 330 

third-party claimant, the Court of Federal Claims provides no justification for its requirement that the claim 

1 Likewise, because Section 330 explicitly authorizes the recovery of costs associated with “threatened release of any hazardous substance,” the RWQCB need not 

have waited for actual release of hazardous materials into 

the groundwater prior to making its claim against TLCP. 

 
13 INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US

for property damage relate to injury or damage to the 

claimant itself or the claimant’s property. We agree that 

“Section 330 would unquestionably apply to a property 

developer who was sued by a downstream farmer whose 

water supply had been contaminated by toxic runoff from 

the developer’s land” or to “a residential developer of a 

former base who received a demand letter from home 

buyers subsequently diagnosed with cancer.” Id. From 

those unsurprisingly indemnified scenarios, however, the 

Court of Federal Claims leaps to the conclusion that 

Section 330 must not apply to “a developer who must 

clean up its own lands that were insufficiently remediated 

by the government prior to transfer.” Id. We disagree. 

By its plain language, Section 330 protects a purchaser of 

the land against “cost[s] or other fee[s]” arising out of 

property damage (including economic loss) that results 

from the release or threatened release of any hazardous 

substance. Nothing in Section 330, however, requires 

that the claimant itself suffer personal injury or own the 

damaged property. As such, we see no reason why expenditures associated with remedies pursued by the 

RWQCB against TLCP—whether they be, for example, 

costs resulting from a clean-up order or imposed penalties—are not properly considered a “cost or other fee” 

within the meaning of Section 330.

C.

The Court of Federal Claims is correct that, as a general matter, “reference to legislative history is inappropriate when the text of the statute is unambiguous.” 

Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 

132 (2002). As discussed above, we find no ambiguity in 

the statute necessitating reliance on anything other than 

the plain language of Section 330. We note, however, that 

our interpretation is fully consistent with the legislative 
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 14

history surrounding the enactment of Section 330 and the 

overall statutory scheme incentivizing base transfer. As 

the Court of Federal Claims in Richmond recognized, 

looking to the interaction of Section 330 and the Base 

Closure Act, Section 330 is consistent with the Base 

Closure and Realignment Commission’s underlying 

purpose, which is to encourage economic development of 

former military facilities and their surrounding populations. Richmond, 75 Fed. Cl. at 386-87 (collecting references). “These goals can only be achieved by addressing 

the potential disincentives and environmental risks 

inherent in assuming ownership of property that was once 

used by military services.” Id.

Indian Harbor also points to statements made by 

Senator McCain in opposition to an earlier version of 

Section 330 which would have insulated the Government 

from liability rather than protect a purchaser of former 

military property. Like the court in Richmond, we find it 

useful to quote Senator McCain’s comments at length: 

Under current law, receivers of closed base property can be successfully sued for pollution caused 

by Defense Department activities. Such suits 

might include environmental cleanup orders or 

civil damage claims.

This situation is unjust and it must be remedied. 

We simply cannot ask States or businesses to assume potentially devastating liability for conditions they did not create. Moreover, the Federal 

Government has a duty to accept full and unconditional responsibility for its actions.

Last year, I introduced legislation to ensure that 

the Federal Government remains fully responsible 
15 INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US

for hazardous waste problems at military installations after base closure. The bill requires the Department of Defense to defend, hold harmless, and 

indemnify innocent receivers of the property 

against claims arising from pollution caused by 

military activities.

This protection is absolutely critical if we are to 

promote the timely and efficient transmission of 

base property to new and productive uses. How 

many States or employers are anxious to acquire 

base property without such protection?

* * *

In many cases, hazardous dumping by the military occurred prior to the enactment of our environmental laws. Such dumping probably would 

not be defined as negligent. Under the committee 

bill [proposed amendment] that would mean receivers of closed base property could not receive 

indemnification. The unfortunate result is that 

the innocent property owner pays for Uncle Sam's 

mistakes.

* * *

Mr. President, base closure is a difficult and 

traumatic period for local economies which have 

grown dependent on the employment and economic activity provided by defense installations.

We have a Federal obligation to help facilitate a 

safe and timely transfer of base property to other 

productive uses. We cannot possibly achieve that 

goal if those who would put that property to use 

must risk everything in the process.
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 16

We must do what is right - ensure, without condition, that the Federal Government will defend and 

indemnify states and employers who are sued over 

pollution caused by Federal activities. My 

amendment will accomplish that goal.

138 Cong. Rec. 25905-06 (1992). Indian Harbor also 

directs us to a letter from the Department of Defense to 

Senator McCain—made part of the congressional record—

expressing its displeasure with Section 330:

This is in reply to your letter of November 5, 1992,

to Secretary Cheney, requesting confirmation that 

the Department will apply those provisions of the 

1993 Authorization Act . . . which require the Department to indemnify certain transferees of DoD 

real property.

* * *

Quite frankly, the Department did not support either [the FY 93 Authorization Act or the FY 93 

Appropriations Act], largely because of the dramatic impact both may have on the Department's 

liability. The Department does not hesitate to 

shoulder its responsibility for cleaning up contamination. However, both Acts appear to go much 

father, perhaps effectively eliminating such legitimate limitations on the Department's liability as 

defense under the Tort Claims Act and other defenses. The wholesale shift of all risks to the Department may, unfortunately, delay the transfer 

of base closure properties until the Department 

can adequately assess its risks with regard to 

those properties.
17 INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US

Letter from David Berteau, Principal Dep. Asst. Secretary 

of Defense, to Sen. McCain (Feb. 3, 1993) 139 Cong. Rec. 

15156-57 (1993). 

Both the government and the Court of Federal Claims 

dismiss the legislative history as misleading and inapplicable. While the Court of Federal Claims is correct that 

Senator McCain’s statements refer to an earlier version of 

the statute that did not contain the phrase “claim for 

personal injury or property damage,” we, like the court in 

Richmond, find these statements—and the Department of 

Defense’s contemporaneous interpretation—useful in 

confirming our reading of the unambiguous plain language in Section 330. There is nothing to suggest that 

addition of the phrase “claim for personal injury or property damage” was intended to limit the scope of governmental indemnification in a way that ignores the original 

purpose of the Act. The Court of Federal Claims reads far 

too much into that clause; we decline to do so.2

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the Court of 

Federal Claims’ dismissal of Indian Harbor’s complaint 

and remand for proceedings in accordance with this 

opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

2 There is nothing to explain the Conference Committee’s reasoning in adding the clause. Whatever the 

intent, we read it to limit the type of damages recoverable—i.e., to exclude hedonic damages or lost profits—not 

to impose the type of third party requirements the Court 

of Federal Claims reads into it.

 
INDIAN HARBOR INSURANCE CO v. US 18

COSTS

No costs