Filed 12/7/23 Toure v. Oxley CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JAMIL TOURE,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

JAMICE AMBER OXLEY,

Respondent.

 B317378

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 21STFL11506)

 ORDER MODIFYING

 OPINION AND

 DENYING PETITION

 FOR REHEARING

 [NO CHANGE IN

 JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November 7, 

2023, is modified as follows:
2

On page 4, the first sentence in the first full paragraph is 

modified to insert the word “heard” between the words 

“visitation” and “on”.

On page 8, the second sentence of the first paragraph, the 

word “associated” is deleted.

The petition for rehearing filed by Jamil Toure on 

November 21, 2023, is denied.

There is no change in judgment.

___________________________________________________________

 MOOR, J. KIM, J.

I would grant rehearing.

_____________________________

BAKER, Acting, P. J.
Filed 11/7/23 Toure v. Oxley CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JAMIL TOURE,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

JAMICE AMBER OXLEY,

Respondent.

 B317378

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 21STFL11506)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Lawrence Riff, Judge. Affirmed.

Nadine Lewis, Esq., Nadine Lewis for Petitioner and 

Appellant.

Zarmi Law and David Zarmi for Respondent.
2

Appellant Jamil Toure (Father) appeals from an order 

denying his request for a restraining order under the Domestic 

Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.) 

against respondent Jamice Amber Oxley (Mother).

1 On appeal, 

Toure contends: (1) the trial court did not understand that

accessing and deleting electronic data can constitute abuse under 

the DVPA; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

consider the totality of the circumstances; and (3) the trial court 

erred by denying the restraining order on the ground that other 

remedies were available. We find no abuse of discretion has been 

shown, and therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

Conduct During Marriage

Mother and Father married on March 23, 2019. The 

parties have a minor child, who was born in May 2019. 

Discussions between Mother and Father repeatedly escalated 

into loud verbal fights, which disturbed their child. In one 

incident, Father found the child had not been strapped into her 

car seat after a drive with Mother. Mother takes antidepressant 

medications, and in August 2020, the child had one of Mother’s 

pills in her mouth. Father believed the substance was 

1 All further statutory references are to the Family Code 

unless otherwise indicated.

2 In accordance with the standard of review, the facts are 

stated in the light most favorable to the judgment. (Curcio v. 

Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 11 (Curcio).)
3

Wellbutrin, while Mother believed it was the supplement LMethylfolate. The parties attempted therapy.

Father took photos of open bottles of antidepressant 

medications and of pills left in areas accessible to the child, 

including several pills on the coffee table. He stored the photos 

on an application that was included in a family sharing plan for 

media. 

Mother and Father allowed the daughter to watch cartoons 

on an iPad issued by Father’s employer. The iPad was signed 

into the shared family account. On about October 5, 2021, while 

Mother was sitting next to her daughter, she noticed photos of 

her medication bottles and pills popping up on the iPad that her 

daughter was using. There were also photos of Mother with her 

face contorted. Mother did not understand why these photos 

were in the photo album on the shared family plan. She did not 

need to enter a password to view the photos on the iPad. She 

deleted the photos because they were embarrassing; she wanted 

to protect her reputation and did not want the photos to be seen. 

Mother also read Father’s personal notes in an application, but 

did not delete them, and she took screenshots of communications 

between Father and his attorney that she found. 

Petition for Dissolution

On October 6, 2021, without notifying Mother of his 

intentions, Father filed for dissolution. When he picked up his 

daughter from preschool that day, he took a video of the child 
4

saying, “I don’t want to go home. I don’t want to see mommy.” 

He stored the video on the shared family account.3

Father filed an ex parte request for custody and visitation 

on October 7, 2021. Although Father did not provide notice to 

Mother, she appeared at the hearing. The trial court granted 

Father’s request and ordered temporary legal and physical 

custody of the child to Father with supervised visitation for 

Mother. While Mother was at the hearing, the child’s maternal 

grandmother (Grandmother) removed the child from her 

preschool. 

Later that day, Father went to the family home along with 

a police officer to pick up his daughter pursuant to the court 

order. Father tried to enter the home, but the locks had been 

changed. 

Grandmother told Father to go away, the child would not 

be going with him, and the court order was not legal. 

Grandmother yelled at father, “We know what you did making 

[the child] say those things.” This comment alerted Father that 

Mother had accessed his photo account. 

Mother was holding the child, but she wriggled away when 

she saw Father. Father picked her up. A friend of Father’s 

joined them. Mother, who was visibly upset, continually asked 

Father to talk to her lawyer while trying to hand him the phone 

3 Father’s evidence about the video of the child was 

inconsistent. In his declaration, he stated that he took the video 

on October 6, 2021, after picking up the child from preschool. In 

the same declaration, he stated that he noticed on October 15, 

2021, that Mother deleted videos from his account on October 5, 

2021, including the video of the child saying that she did not

want to go home and see her mother. The inconsistency with 

respect to the timing is immaterial to the issues on appeal.
5

and waving it in his face, however, he declined to speak with the 

lawyer. Eventually, Mother forcefully grabbed the child from 

Father’s arms, stating “I don’t care what the judge said.” She 

stormed off with the child. 

Mother withheld the child, despite the court order, because 

she believed the order was obtained through lies and she did not 

know what would happen if she relinquished the child. Father 

had a New York apartment and access to financial resources. 

Rather than escalate a situation that might traumatize the 

child, Father left that day. Father returned to the family home 

several times over multiple days with the police and a witness in 

order to retrieve the child, but received no response. 

On October 13, 2021, the trial court issued another order 

directing Mother to immediately deliver the child to Father. 

Father attempted to see his daughter that same day, and again 

was met with no response. 

Father noticed photos and videos that he had taken were 

missing from his account, which he suspected Mother had 

deleted. On October 15, 2021, Father received a notification on 

his electronic device that photos had been added to a folder that 

belonged to Mother. He clicked on the notification and found 

Mother had copied his photos and files, including documents that 

he was preparing for his attorney, to her own folder. He did not 

know how Mother was accessing his materials. He felt scared, 

confused, violated, and angry. He tried to copy the photos back to 

his folder to preserve them as evidence, but as he was saving 

them, Mother deleted them from his folder. 
6

Request for Domestic Violence Restraining Order

On October 21, 2021, Father filed a request for domestic 

violence restraining order (DVRO) against Mother for the 

protection of himself and the child. A temporary restraining 

order was issued. 

At an ex parte hearing on October 26, 2021, the parties 

agreed to exchange the child at the Inglewood Police Department 

later that day. The trial court also ordered the parties to meet 

and confer to enable Father to retrieve his property, but no 

discussions were held. Twenty days after the court ordered 

Mother to deliver the child to Father, Mother complied.

When Father brought the child to the family home for 

Mother’s visitation, he found his property on the sidewalk in the 

back of the house. Upset and angry, he had to take time from 

work and make multiple trips to move his property. Father’s

work-issued iPad, which Mother had used to access Father’s 

photos and documents, was returned to him. 

Hearing on Request for DVRO

A hearing was held on the request for a DVRO on 

November 18 and 29, 2021. During the proceeding, the trial 

court asked Father’s attorney to explain Father’s theory of the 

case related to deleting and transferring electronic data. Father’s 

attorney stated that online stalking, destroying electronically 

stored evidence, hacking private material, and reading materials 

subject to the attorney-client privilege constituted abuse that 

supported a restraining order under the DVPA. The attorney 
7

cited cases in which hacking into emails constituted domestic 

violence.

The trial court responded, “Right. But hacking into e-mails 

in and of itself is not abuse. Something has to flow from that; 

right? What flows from it?” The attorney explained that it was 

harassment and it disturbed Father’s peace. The court asked if it 

destroyed Father’s mental calm, and the attorney answered that 

it did. The court stated, “Could you establish that, please. [¶] 

And I just ask because . . . I look at this declaration and if 

everything in it is true, then [Mother] did some bad things that 

may have consequences for custody. There may be civil torts. 

There may be a lot of stuff that flows from this, but that’s not 

why we’re here. [¶] We’re here about a domestic violence 

restraining order and whether this gentleman needs an order of 

protection. [¶] And as I know you know, not every annoyance, 

even very serious annoyances, is abuse. Some serious 

annoyances are serious annoyances for which there may be tort 

liability, but not [DVPA] equitable relief.” 

The court later questioned Mother about her conduct in 

deleting photos taken by Father. The court commented, “I’m not 

seeing domestic violence here. I’m seeing dispute. I’m seeing 

upset. I’m seeing aggravation. [¶] From what I’ve seen and read 

yet – if there was a hack into [Father’s] sole and exclusive 

password protected account, then maybe there’s something to 

that, but that’s not what I’m hearing happened.” Father and his 

attorney explained that it was not a shared photo album, but 

rather Mother used Father’s work-issued iPad to access his 

separate applications containing his photos, his notes and 

journal, and his communications with his attorney. 
8

In closing argument, Father’s attorney argued the trial 

court should grant a restraining order based on online stalking, 

harassment, destroying personal property, and disturbing the 

peace. The attorney argued that dumping Father’s belongings on 

the sidewalk on multiple occasions without any notice and failing 

to comply with the order to relinquish the child to Father violated 

the temporary restraining order and associated custody order. 

Mother’s conduct of hacking into Father’s private work and 

personal storage accounts, intentionally destroying his electronic 

files and reading privileged information, disturbed Father’s calm 

and peace of mind. In addition, Mother’s cavalier attitude about 

the baby’s safety around supplements and medications put the 

child in danger. The child had witnessed loud, emotional 

arguments as well. 

Trial Court Ruling

The trial court denied the DVRO request. The court found 

that ultimately, Father failed to show by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Mother engaged in one or more proscribed acts 

under the DVPA. The trial court advised the parties that their 

child needed them to be able to co-parent. The court stated, “I 

am seriously concerned for this family and this little girl. I will 

tell you that the closest for me to [Father] carrying [his] burden 

of proof to prove abuse under the standard, under the DVPA[,] is 

Mother’s apparent . . . disregard of a clear court order for nearly 

two weeks. [¶] And Mother will be answering for that in a 

contempt trial, I know. [¶] So this family has a serious problem 

with the contempt trial coming up. Has a serious problem with 

the custody trial coming up. But that’s not this proceeding. This 
9

proceeding asks the question whether a restraining order after 

hearing should issue based upon proof of one or more acts of 

abuse.” 

The trial court stated the following findings: “I believe 

Father felt belittled, bullied, and yelled at. I do not find by 

preponderance of the evidence that there was coercive control or 

a destruction of his mental calm.” 

“I do not find that Mother hacked into Father’s technology. 

Mother [was] very forthright twice under oath, describing what 

she did with photographs and other materials that she deleted. 

[¶] And she will answer for that to the extent there’s an answer 

to be had with respect to any adverse inference that arises in 

family or civil proceedings concerning that. Maybe there’s no 

inference that will arise from that. But this is not [In re 

Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416

(Evilsizor)]. This is not [In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 

Cal.App.4th 1483 (Nadkarni)]. It is not a situation where 

Mother’s hacked into Father’s technology.” 

“I believe Mother’s version of events, that she saw this 

minor child with access to a shared account and saw disturbing 

things that she deleted. I acknowledge[] that she probably 

deleted them in part because . . . they would be unhelpful in a 

custody dispute later on. And she will have to answer for that in 

a custody dispute later on. [¶] But I do not find that it was 

hacking or stalking within the meaning of the DVPA. I’ve 

already said, I completely understand how upset, angry, 

confused, if that’s the right word, Father was by all of these 

events for the past several months, including . . . his property 

being left unceremoniously at the curb, which I think is very, 

very rude. And I don’t understand why that occurred. But I 
10

don’t find that it’s a violation of the [temporary restraining 

order]. [¶] [And although] I think Father was very, very upset 

and angry about it, I don’t think it destroyed his mental calm 

within the meaning of the DVPA.” 

The court found Mother’s emails to the child’s school were 

not harassment and did not disturb the child’s peace, as there 

was no evidence the child knew anything about it. The disparity 

in access to funds did not arise to the level of dominion or control 

over Father. Father’s answers and demeanor during his 

testimony led the court to conclude there was not an overbearing 

of his will, dominion, and loss of control. Father was angry, but it 

did not cross the line into the area required for a DVRO.

The court added, “I commend Father for his responsible 

parenting in not permitting . . . [a] tug-of-war involving this 

minor. [¶] The current custody order, again based upon a no 

notice ex parte for which there has not been an evidentiary 

hearing, I do find adequately protects this minor until such time 

as it is made to be a permanent order or modified. . . . The 

evidence does not lead me to conclude that this child should be a 

protected party under this DVRO. I do not think this child 

suffered abuse at the hands of Mother.” 

Father filed a timely notice of appeal. On November 1, 

2022, Mother was found guilty of 21 counts of contempt for 

willfully disobeying court orders.

4 Mother was given a suspended 

sentence of 42 hours of community service and advised that any 

future violation of court orders will result in a mandatory 

sentence to county jail.

4 Father’s request for judicial notice filed with this court on 

April 4, 2023, which includes the November 1, 2022 order in the 

contempt proceedings, is granted. 
11

DISCUSSION

Statutory Scheme and Standard of Review

A court is authorized to issue a protective order under the 

DVPA “ ‘ “ ‘to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a 

recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of 

separation of the persons involved’ upon ‘reasonable proof of a 

past act or acts of abuse.’ ” ’ ” (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 11.) “Abuse,” as defined in section 6203, includes “any 

behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 

6320.” Under section 6320, a court may issue an ex parte order 

that enjoins a party from, alongst other things, “ ‘disturbing the 

peace of the other party,’ ” which “refers to conduct that, based on 

the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or 

emotional calm of the other party.” This type of conduct can be 

committed by means including text messages, internet-connected 

devices, or “other electronic technologies.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).)

“The purpose of a domestic violence restraining order is not to 

punish past conduct, but to ‘prevent acts of domestic violence 

[and] abuse’ from occurring in the future. (§ 6220.)” (In re 

Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 117.)

On appeal, we review the denial or grant of a request for a 

DVRO under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re Marriage of 

Davila & Mejia (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 220, 226.) Additionally, we 

“review the trial court’s failure to consider evidence in issuing a 

DVRO for an abuse of discretion.” (Id.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test 

for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the 

bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably 
12

be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to 

substitute its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re 

Marriage of G. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 773, 780.) Therefore, we 

accept all evidence supporting the trial court’s findings as true 

and resolve the conflict in favor of the judgment. (Curcio, supra,

47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) If substantial evidence supports the 

trial court’s judgment, “reversal is not warranted even if facts 

exist that would support a contrary finding.” (Id.)

“ ‘ “If the [trial] court’s decision is influenced by an 

erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an 

unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not 

properly exercised its discretion under the law. [Citation.]” ’ ” 

(In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.)

However, “[e]rror on appeal must be affirmatively shown by the 

record, and ‘[w]e presume the trial court knew and properly 

applied the law absent evidence to the contrary.’ [Citation.]” 

(J.H. v. G.H. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 633, 644.)

Accessing and Deleting Electronic Files 

Father contends that the trial court erred by finding 

Mother’s actions of accessing, downloading, and deleting Father’s

electronically stored data was not abuse under the DVPA. We 

disagree.

A. Applicable Law

“Courts of Appeal have found conduct involving 

communications such as text messages, e-mail, and social media 
13

constitutes abuse under the DVPA for disturbing the petitioner’s 

peace.” (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)

In Nadkarni, the appellate court concluded a wife’s 

allegations that her husband destroyed her mental or emotional 

calm by accessing, reading, and publicly disclosing the contents of 

her confidential emails, causing her to suffer embarrassment and 

fear for her safety, sufficiently alleged abuse under the DVPA to 

support a request for a restraining order. (Nadkarni, supra, 173 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.) The definition of abuse under the DVPA 

was not limited to the infliction of physical injury or assault. (Id.

at p. 1496.) The court explained, “the plain meaning of the 

phrase ‘disturbing the peace of the other party’ in section 6320 

may be properly understood as conduct that destroys the mental

or emotional calm of the other party.” (Id. at p.1497.) The wife’s 

allegations that the conduct caused the destruction of her mental 

or emotional calm, if found to be true, could constitute disturbing 

her peace sufficient to show abuse under the DVPA. (Id. at 

pp.1498–1499)

In Evilsizor, the husband downloaded tens of thousands of 

text messages from his wife’s cell phones, as well as her personal 

notes, and filed copies of her messages with the court. (Evilsizor,

supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1420.) The wife alleged the husband 

“hacked into her Facebook account, changed her password, and 

rerouted the e-mail associated with her Facebook account to his 

own account,” and “threatened to reveal publicly more text 

messages and e-mails for leverage in the dissolution 

proceedings.” (Id. at p. 1421.) The trial court concluded that 

even if the husband legally obtained the information, an issue 

which the trial court did not resolve, the court was authorized to 

enjoin the disclosure of the information to protect the wife’s peace 
14

of mind. (Id. at p. 1424.) The appellate court affirmed the 

DVRO, concluding substantial evidence supported the trial 

court's findings. (Id. at p. 1426.)

In addition, under section 6320, disturbing the peace of 

another party includes exercising coercive control, which is a 

pattern of behavior that unreasonably interferes with free will 

and personal liberty, such as “[c]ontrolling, regulating, or 

monitoring the other party’s movements, communications, daily 

behavior, finances, economic resources, or access to services.” 

(§ 6320, subd. (c)(3).) 

B. The Trial Court’s Understanding of the Law

Father contends the trial court failed to understand that 

accessing and deleting electronic data can constitute abuse under 

Family Code section 6320, even absent illegal access. We 

conclude Father has not shown that the trial court misunderstood 

the law.

To support his contention that the trial court did not 

understand the applicable law, Father relies on the trial court’s 

statement that “hacking into e-mails in and of itself is not abuse.” 

Reviewing the statement in context, however, it is clear that the

trial court was familiar with the applicable law, cited the 

relevant cases, and meant that hacking alone was not abuse, 

because the conduct must have destroyed Father’s mental or 

emotional calm within the meaning of the DVPA. Regardless of 

whether Mother accessed Father’s files legally or illegally, if 

accessing electronic data does not illicit a disturbance of a party’s 

peace within the meaning of the DVPA, then there can be no 
15

equitable relief under the DVPA. The trial court’s analysis 

showed the court understood the applicable law.

Father also asserts the trial court failed to acknowledge

that destroying electronic data, monitoring electronic 

communications, and electronic stalking can constitute abuse 

that supports issuance of a restraining order under the DVPA. In 

support of this contention, however, Father simply recites his 

own evidence that these acts occurred. On appeal, we presume 

the trial court understood and properly applied the law. It was 

Father’s burden to affirmatively show that the trial court did not 

understand the law. In weighing the evidence, the court 

distinguished the facts of Nadkarni and Evilsizor from the facts 

of the present case, demonstrating the court’s understanding of 

the applicable law. The weight that the trial court gave the 

evidence does not demonstrate that the trial court did not 

understand the applicable law.

C. No Abuse of Discretion

Father also contends the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to find that Mother’s actions with respect to Father’s 

electronic data constituted abuse under the DVPA. We conclude 

that no abuse of discretion has been shown.

The trial court acknowledged Mother’s bad conduct in 

accessing and deleting Father’s electronic data. The court 

weighed the evidence carefully in light of the relevant case law, 

and it found Mother’s actions did not rise to the level of abuse

under the DVPA; while Father was understandably upset and 

angry, his mental and emotional calm was not destroyed within 

the meaning of the DVPA.
16

The trial court’s findings were supported by substantial 

evidence. Father provided his work-issued iPad, which was 

signed into Father’s accounts with the shared media files, for his 

family’s use. There were no legal proceedings between the 

parties when Mother noticed photos of medications and pills

popping up on an iPad that her young daughter was viewing. 

Mother deleted photos and videos that embarrassed her, looked 

through other files and read Father’s documents. Although

Mother continued to use her access to Father’s iPad to view, copy, 

and delete Father’s electronic data for a few weeks after 

proceedings commenced, she returned the iPad with his 

belongings. 

This case is distinguishable from Evilsizor and Nadkarni,

cases in which one spouse accessed the other spouse’s accounts 

without permission, publicly disclosed personal data, and a 

restraining order was necessary to prevent further disclosure of 

private information. (Evilsizor, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1425; Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1496–497).

We also note that after Father filed for dissolution and the 

parties were involved in contentious custody proceedings, Father 

used his access to the shared family media account from his own 

device to click on a notification that Mother added photos to her 

personal folder. He claimed Mother’s conduct in accessing,

monitoring, and deleting his electronic data destroyed his mental 

and emotional calm, but he had no qualms about accessing and 

reviewing electronic data in her folder, which he understood 

belonged to her. At the time of the hearing, Father’s iPad had 

been returned to him. Father, who had established the shared 

family plan, could clearly disable the plan without a restraining 

order. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
17

concluding the parties’ bad behavior with respect to electronic 

data did not rise to the level of abuse under the DVPA for which 

the protection of a restraining order was required to prevent 

future abuse.

In his briefs on appeal, Father asserts that the evidence

supported issuing a restraining order, but we view the factual 

findings in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling

under the abuse of discretion standard, not whether the evidence 

could have supported a different ruling. None of the evidence 

found to be true constituted abuse for which the trial court was 

required to issue a restraining order under the DVPA as a matter 

of law. The record reflects that the trial court carefully weighed 

the evidence based on the applicable law, and as such, we find no 

abuse of discretion. 

Totality of the Circumstances

Father also contends the trial court’s denial of a restraining 

order was an abuse of discretion considering the totality of the 

circumstances, specifically, the evidence that Mother withheld 

the child in violation of the court’s orders, violently pulled the 

child from his arms, and engaged in arguments and verbal abuse. 

We conclude that the trial court carefully weighed the evidence, 

the court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, and no 

abuse of discretion has been shown.

Family Code section 6301, subdivision (c), requires the

court to consider “the totality of the circumstances in determining 

whether to grant or deny a petition for relief.” However, when 

two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, 
18

the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision.

(In re Marriage of G., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 780.)

In this case, the trial court explained that it was a close 

decision, particularly due to Mother’s withholding of the child in 

defiance of court orders. The court acknowledged Mother’s bad 

conduct and Father’s understandable frustration. These 

comments reveal that the court carefully weighed the evidence 

and considered the totality of the circumstances that Father had 

raised. Ultimately, the court concluded that Father’s mental and 

emotional calm was not destroyed by Mother’s actions. The court 

complimented Father’s judgment to resist escalating the 

confrontation over custody on October 7, 2021, even though he 

had a court order and a police officer present to assist him, as 

well as Father’s calm demeanor in the courtroom. We cannot say 

that the trial court acted rashly without considering the totality 

of the evidence. None of the evidence that Father relies upon 

required the trial court to issue a restraining order as a matter of 

law under the circumstances of this case. Father simply seeks to 

have this court reevaluate the weight of the evidence to reach a 

different conclusion, which is not the province of the appellate 

court.

Other Available Remedies

Father contends the trial court denied his request for a

DVRO because other remedies were available. We disagree with 

Father’s characterization of the record. The trial court did not 

deny Father’s request because other remedies were available. 

The court denied the request based on the court’s finding that 

Mother’s conduct did not support issuing a DVRO under the 
19

circumstances of the case. The court explained that although the 

circumstances may allow for remedies in other proceedings, they 

failed to meet the requirements for a DVRO. In particular, 

Mother may be held accountable for destroying electronic 

evidence in the parties’ custody dispute or for violating court 

orders in the contempt proceedings. Although the court noted 

that there may be other legal remedies available to Father, the 

trial court found there was no basis to issue a restraining order 

under the DVPA after carefully weighing the facts and finding 

that Mother’s actions did not amount to a disturbance of Father’s 

peace.

DISPOSITION

The November 29, 2021 order denying the request for a 

restraining order is affirmed. Respondent Jamice Amber Oxley is 

awarded her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

I concur:

KIM, J.
Jamil Toure v. Jamice Amber Oxley

B317378

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

The opinion for the court never engages with the key 

question: whether the mental and emotional calm of Jamil Toure 

(father) and his daughter were destroyed when Jamice Oxley 

(mother) forcefully pulled the daughter out of father’s arms and 

then kept the daughter from having any contact with him for 

nearly three weeks—in violation of a court-issued custody order. 

(Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (c).) I believe there is strong evidence 

that father’s and his daughter’s peace was so disturbed (In re 

Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 120, fn. 5) 

and that there existed a risk mother would engage in further 

actions disturbing their peace in the future. I would accordingly 

hold the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to issue the 

requested restraining order.

BAKER, Acting P. J.