NO. 17-0818

=========================================================== 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

=========================================================== 

In re VCC, LLC, VRATSINAS CONSTRUCTION CO., NATO GARCIA D/B/A 

NATO GARCIA COMPANY, AND PHI SERVICE AGENCY, INC., Relators

========================================================== 

From the 93rd Judicial District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas

Cause No. C-1269-16B,

Honorable Rudy Delgado, presiding

=========================================================== 

RESPONSE TO THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

=========================================================== 

Lorien Whyte Anthony F. Constant

lorienwhyte@pozzaandwhyte.com office@constantlawfirm.com

State Bar No. 24042400 State Bar No. 04711000

Dan Pozza 800 N. Shoreline Blvd., Ste. 2700 S

danpozza@pozzaandwhyte.com Corpus Christi, TX 78401

State Bar No. 16224800 (361) 698-8000 Office

POZZA & WHYTE, PLLC. (361) 887-8010 Fax

239 East Commerce Street

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Telephone: 210-226-8888

Facsimile: 210-222-8477

Attorneys for Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent School District

FILED

17-0818

12/22/2017 11:17 AM

tex-21458098

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................................................................................. 1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY....................................................................................... 2

ARGUMENT............................................................................................................. 4

A. The petition for writ of mandamus has been

rendered moot by the trial court’s willingness to

move the trial to February 5, 2018........................................................ 4

B. The remaining unbriefed complaints should not

remain pending before this Court.......................................................... 7

1. The unbriefed discovery complaints do not

present any error that is subject to mandamus

review.......................................................................................... 7

a. Orders related to “49 million emails”

(Tabs 16-17 of relators’ Amended

Emergency Motion).......................................................... 7

b. Remaining discovery orders (Tabs 9-

15 of relators’ Amended Emergency

Motion). ............................................................................ 9

c. Joinder Order. ................................................................. 11

2. There is no reason to continue this

proceeding based on numerous unspecified

discovery complaints. ...............................................................12

3. It is not judicially efficient to maintain an

extraordinary writ on the Court’s docket

when the only briefed issue addressed in the

petition for writ of mandamus is moot......................................13

PRAYER..................................................................................................................15

TRAP 52.3(J) CERTIFICATION............................................................................17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................18
iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Case(s) Page(s)

Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 

951 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) ..........................................15

In re Allied Chem. Corp.,

227 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) .............................................6 

In re Bernard, 

99 S.W.3d 929

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding)............................ 5 

In re County of El Paso, 

104 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.—EI Paso 2003, orig. proceeding)...................... 5 

In re Duncan, 

62 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding) ..... 5 

In re Fackrell, 

No. 12-10-00086-CV, 2010 WL 3232250 

(Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 17, 2010, orig. proceeding) ..................................... 5 

In re Home State County Mut. Ins. Co.,

No. 12-07-00062-CV, 2007 WL 1429584

(Tex. App.—Tyler May 16, 2007, orig. proceeding) ................................................ 5 

In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,

166 S.W.3d 732, (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) ............................................ 5 

In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,

148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) ...........................................13
iv

In re Scoggins Const. Co., Inc.,

No. 13-08-00548-CV, 2008 WL 4595202

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 15, 2008, mand. denied) .......................... 12 

Walker v. Packer,

827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) ....................................10, 13

Rules Page(s)

Tex. R. App. P. 52.1................................................................................................. 14

Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e)............................................................................................14

Tex. R. App. P. 56.2................................................................................................... 6 
1 

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS: 

Real Party in Interest, Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent School District (Pharr 

ISD) files this Response to the Petition for Writ of Mandamus as follows:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Briefed Issue

Pharr ISD is unopposed to granting the relief requested by relators in their sole

briefed issue. Relators request that this court “direct the trial court to (1) vacate its

rulings denying Relators’ motions for continuance, (2) continue the trial setting to

February 5, 2017[sic], (3) issue a new scheduling order...” Petition at 30. The trial

court has indicated its willingness to move the trial setting to February 5, 2018, and

Pharr ISD is unopposed. 

The Unbriefed Issues

Relators have indicated in their Supplemental Petition for Writ of Mandamus that 

they intend to mandamus nine orders they have attached to their Amended 

Emergency Motion should this Court order full briefing on the merits. Amended 

Emergency Motion Tabs 9-17. Relators also list one unbriefed issue regarding joinder 

in their petition for writ of mandamus. However, none of the orders that have been 

issued by the trial court require correction via mandamus review. Pharr ISD 

addresses the unbriefed issues in Section B, 1. 
2 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 5, 2017, relators VCC, LLC, Vratsinas Construction Co., Nato 

Garcia d/b/a Nato Garcia Company, and Phi Service Agency, Inc. (“relators”) filed the 

underlying petition for writ of mandamus. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The 

following day, on October 6, 2017, relators filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary 

Relief Arising from Hurricane Harvey. See Emergency Motion for Temporary Relief.

The Emergency Motion requested a stay of: (1) the discovery deadline; (2) the 

November 27 trial setting; and (3) any further ruling by the trial court regarding 

deadlines (unless it grants a continuance until February 5, 2018). Id. at 18.

On October 30, 2017, relators filed an Amended Emergency Motion for 

Temporary Relief Arising from Hurricane Harvey. See Amended Emergency Motion.

The Amended Motion added a request that this Court stay “the October 25 

order regarding the 49 million emails.” Id. at 23 (October 25, 2017 order found in 

Tab 14 of Relators’ Amended Motion). 

On October 31, 2017, this Court issued an order that stayed the following: (1) the 

trial court order issued October 24, 2017, Third Amended Discovery Control Order and 

Trial Setting for Southwest Early College High School, and (2) the trial court order 

issued October 25, Order on Motion to Compel, Supplemental Motion to Compel, and 

First Amended Supplemental Motion to Compel. October 31, 2017 Order. The order 
3 

also requested that real parties in interest file a response to the petition for writ of

mandamus. Id. 

On November 2, 2017, Pharr ISD filed in the trial court a Motion to Enter 

Proposed Fourth Amended Discovery Control Order and Trial Setting, requesting that 

the trial date be moved to February 5, 2018. Supp. Mandamus Record Tabs 6, 8. Shortly 

after Pharr ISD filed its request asking for the February 5, 2018 trial setting, relators 

filed a Supplement to Petition for Writ of Mandamus in this Court, informing this Court 

of their intent to add multiple other complaints relating to the discovery rulings if this 

Court grants briefing on the merits. See Supplement to Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

On November 13, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Pharr ISD’s motions. 

Supplemental Mandamus Record Tab 9. The trial court indicated its desire to move the 

trial date to February 5, 2018, but was concerned that it did not have the authority to do 

so due to this Court’s October 31, 2017 order granting the stay. At that time, the trial 

court declined to sign the order. Id. at 44. 

On November 14, 2017, Pharr ISD filed a Motion to Clarify this Court’s 

October 31, 2017 Order Granting Stay, Or, Alternatively, Motion to Lift Stay In Part. 

After this Court ordered relators to file a response, and Pharr ISD subsequently filed 

a reply in support of the motion, this Court issued a Revised Stay Order on 

December 15, 2017. December 15, 2017 Order. The revised order provided that: 

“The trial court is also stayed from issuing further discovery and trial deadlines 
4 

pending further order of this Court.” Id. As a result, Pharr ISD files this Response to 

the Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

ARGUMENT

A. The petition for writ of mandamus has been rendered moot by the trial

court’s willingness to move the trial to February 5, 2018.

The basis of relators’ petition for writ of mandamus was that the trial court erred 

by not continuing the trial setting to February 5, 2018 and entering a new scheduling 

order. Petition at 30. Specifically, relators limited their request to the following: 

“Relators respectfully request that this Court grant their Petition for Writ of Mandamus 

and direct the trial court to (1) vacate its rulings denying Relators’ motions for 

continuance, (2) continue the trial setting to February 5, 2017[sic], (3) issue a new 

scheduling order, and (4) grant Relators’ motion for leave to file a third-party petition 

against Armko Industries, Inc.” Id. 

And, on October 30, 2017 in their Amended Emergency Motion, relators 

reiterated their position: “Granting a stay of the discovery deadline and the trial 

setting—and ultimately granting mandamus relief—will cure much of this harm. It will 

allow the affected law firms [sic] fully recover from the storm. It will allow the parties 

to complete the necessary depositions and to review and process the millions of emails.” 

Amended Emergency Motion at 17-18. The trial court has indicated its intent to give 
relators the very relief they sought via mandamus from the court of appeals and now

this Court. The petition for writ of mandamus is now moot.

Texas courts have consistently held that a mandamus is moot when a trial court 

vacates or sets aside the order made the basis of a petition for writ of mandamus. See, 

e.g., In re Fackrell, No. 12-10-00086-CV, 2010 WL 3232250, at *4, n.4 (Tex. App.—

Tyler Aug. 17, 2010, orig. proceeding) (“a trial court can render a petition for writ 

of mandamus moot by withdrawing the order at issue.”); In re Home State County 

Mut. Ins. Co., No. 12-07-00062-CV, 2007 WL 1429584, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler 

May 16, 2007, orig. proceeding) (same); In re County of El Paso, 104 S.W.3d 741, 

743 (Tex. App.—EI Paso 2003, orig. proceeding) (dismissing mandamus proceeding 

as moot after trial court vacated order that formed the basis of the petition for writ of 

mandamus); In re Bernard, 99 S.W.3d 929, 929 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding) (same); In re Duncan, 62 S.W.3d 333, 334 (Tex. App.

—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding) (same). The trial court has indicated its 

willingness to do so if allowed by this Court. 

And, this Court has been clear that “[a] case becomes moot if a controversy ceases 

to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.” 

In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). 

The controversy over the trial date is now over since the trial court is willing to give 

relators the only date they have ever asked for: February 5, 2018. Granting mandamus

5 
6 

relief at this point would be useless and unavailing, which is an improper use of a 

petition for writ of mandamus. See In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 666 

(Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). Therefore, the trial court should be allowed to 

grant the February 5, 2018 trial date and the petition for writ of mandamus should 

be dismissed as moot pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.2. 

Relators have never requested from the trial court any trial date other than 

February 5, 2018. Relators have also never pinpointed a specific trial date beyond 

February 5, 2018 for this Court to consider. In their Amended Emergency Motion, they 

simply argued: “In their mandamus petition, Relators seek a writ directing the trial court 

to grant a continuance to the February 5, 2018 back-up trial date. Given everything that 

has transpired in the last three weeks, even that date may not be enough. But the most 

important thing is to stay what is currently happening in Hidalgo County.” Amended 

Emergency Motion pg. 3, n.2.

Therefore, the only request that has ever been made to the trial court and this 

Court is to move the trial setting to February 5, 2018. There is no request that has been 

refused that could support mandamusing the trial court and ordering a trial setting 

beyond February 5, 2018.
7 

B. The remaining unbriefed complaints should not remain pending

before this Court.

The only issue briefed in the petition for writ of mandamus pertains to the trial

setting. Petition at 11. Relators’ second issue presents an unbriefed complaint that the 

trial court failed to grant relators’ motion for leave to file a third-party petition against 

the company Armko. Id. But relators’ unbriefed complaints do not end there. Shortly 

after Pharr ISD requested the new trial setting of February 5, 2018, relators filed a 

supplement to their petition for writ of mandamus, attempting to expand this Court’s 

review to an unspecified number of discovery rulings should this Court grant briefing 

on the merits. See Supplement to Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

1. The unbriefed discovery complaints do not present any error

that is subject to mandamus review.

Relators’ Supplement to Petition for Writ of Mandamus indicates relators intend 

to incorporate the orders attached to their Amended Emergency Motion if this Court 

orders full briefing on the merits. (Relators attached orders labeled Tabs 9-17 to their 

Amended Emergency Motion). However, none of the rulings that resulted in 

those orders warrant mandamus relief. 

a. Orders related to “49 million emails” (Tabs 16-17 of

relators’ Amended Emergency Motion).

In their Amended Emergency Motion, relators complained that there were “49 

million emails” they needed to review. Amended Emergency Motion 13-14. However, 
8 

the “49 million emails” that have been generated by Pharr ISD are the result of 

two orders entered by the trial court at the request of relators. On October 3, 2017, 

relators were made aware that the searches relators requested generated 49 million 

emails. Supp. Mandamus Record Tab 3 (October 3, 2017 letter from Pharr ISD 

indicating relators’ search terms generated over 49 million emails). Then, on 

October 10, 2017 the trial court entered the first order which required Pharr ISD “to 

conduct electronic searches of the term provided by VCC’s counsel at the hearing of 

August 21, 2017 and in the letter of September 22, 2017 and provide the required 

(non-privileged) documents to counsel for VCC on or before 5:00 p.m. on 

October 2, 2017 in either paper or electronic form.” Supp. Mandamus Record 

Tab 4 (Tab 16 of relators’ Amended Emergency Motion). The second order, 

entered on October 18, 2017, granted relators’ “Motion to Compel E-Mails” and 

ordered Pharr ISD to produce “any and all e-mails found by implementing the 160 

search terms that Plaintiff, VCC, LLC, provided to Defendant, Pharr-San Juan 

Alamo Independent School District on September 22, 2017.” Id. at Tab 5 (Tab 17 of 

relators’ Amended Emergency Motion); Tab 10, Exhibit A, pg. 375 (September 22, 

2017 letter from relators with 160 search terms that returned millions of emails); 

Tab 2 (Pharr ISD’s response to September 22, 2017 request for production). 

Both orders were submitted by relators to the trial court requesting they be 

signed and entered. Tabs 4 & 5. Pharr ISD produced the original documents by 

providing direct access to the server holding the archives. Tabs 2 & 10. 
9 

The “49 million emails” are the direct result of the trial court granting relators the very 

relief they asked for, ordering production of seven years of archived emails on the 

District’s server using 160 terms chosen by relators. Id. Therefore, the unbriefed 

complaint regarding the “49 million emails” does not present any abuse of discretion.

b. Remaining discovery orders (Tabs 9-15 of relators’

Amended Emergency Motion).

The orders found at Tabs 9-15 of relators’ Amended Emergency Motion all 

sustain an objection to an identical request for production for “All documents and 

communications regarding...” or “related to” or “reflecting” something where 

“document” includes all personal text, email, and internet messages of all of Pharr ISD’s 

thousands of employees. Amended Emergency Motion Tabs 9-15.

1

 Tabs 9 through 14 

are the individual rulings on the objections, and Tab 15 is the order that encompasses 

all of the individual rulings. Id. All of the orders sustain the same objection to the same 

requests which defined “document” as:

The term ‘document’ also includes any electronically stored 

information including text messages; emails from all email 

accounts, whether personal or for work; data; wall postings; and 

images sent and/or received via any social networking or internet 

site, including Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. 

1 Note that the October 25, 2017 order that was the subject of relators’ Amended Emergency Motion 

to Stay, and subsequently this Court’s stay entered on October 31, 2017, merely sustained objections 

to relators’ requests for production. Amended Emergency Motion Tab 14. 
10

Supp. Mandamus Record pg. 7, Tab 1; Tab 12 (Pharr ISD's Response to First 

Request for Production). The request requires respondent to read each text message 

and email to determine if it resulted from the category in the request. There was 

no error in sustaining the objection. Nothing about these orders requires correction. 

Relators are asking this Court to freeze the trial court’s discretionary ability to 

manage its own docket and evolve with a fluid case when it has shown a willingness to 

accommodate the parties. Relators want to deprive the trial court of its role and 

substitute this Court as the discovery master over the myriad of discovery matters that 

may need to be addressed in this case.

Those types of discovery matters are properly relegated to the trial court. Yet, 

relators would like this Court to step in and become the parties’ trial court. Relators 

should not be permitted to deprive the trial court of its role and flood this Court with all 

of the discovery issues that are appropriately within the trial court’s discretion and that 

are not the subject of this mandamus proceeding.

This Court has long held that without imposing significant restrictions on 

mandamus review, “appellate courts would ‘embroil themselves unnecessarily in 

incidental pre-trial rulings of the trial courts’ and mandamus ‘would soon cease to be 

an extraordinary writ.’” Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 (citing Braden v. Downey, 811 

S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1991)). That is exactly what relators are seeking.
11

c. Joinder Order.

Relators provide the following in their Issues Presented:

(Unbriefed Issue) The joinder deadline (April 7) passed before the 

parties had taken any depositions in the case. In early August, two 

of the school district’s experts testified at depositions that a third 

party—Armko Industries, Inc.—potentially shared responsibility 

for its alleged damages. Armko was the consultant who inspected, 

approved, and warranted the “building envelope” for the schools at 

issue. Within a week after the depositions, Relators filed a motion 

for leave to file a third-party petition against Armko. Did the trial 

court abuse its discretion by denying the motion for leave?

Petition at 11. 

However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it made its ruling on 

the joinder issue. VCC deliberately chose not to join Armko even though on April 7, 

2017 (which was also the joinder deadline) relators designated Armko as a responsible 

third party. Supp. Mandamus Record Tab 11. Relators’ petition indicates that in early 

August two witnesses testified that Armko “potentially shared responsibility for 

its alleged damages.” Petition at 11. But clearly back in April of 2017 relators 

already knew that Armko “potentially shared responsibility for [the] alleged 

damages” since relators designated Armko as a responsible third party. The trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing a joinder deadline in a discovery control 

order when VCC knew Armko was a responsible third party who “potentially 

shared responsibility for [the] damages” at the time of the joinder deadline. 
12

Furthermore, a complaint regarding the trial court’s denial of the motion for leave 

to file a third-party petition against Armko is not subject to mandamus review. See, e.g., 

In re Scoggins Const. Co., Inc., No. 13-08-00548- CV, 2008 WL 4595202, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 15, 2008, mand. denied). 

2. There is no reason to continue this proceeding based on

numerous unspecified discovery complaints.

It is unclear which rulings relators intend to challenge and how many of them 

there are since the complaints have never been briefed to this Court. Relators have failed 

to adequately describe the additional issues they intend to incorporate in this 

extraordinary writ should this Court order briefing on the merits. In their Supplemental 

Petition, relators inform this Court that “Relators file this supplement to clarify that their 

petition for writ of mandamus presents the issues stated in their original petition, as well 

as all issues and orders discussed in and attached to their amended emergency motion.” 

Supplement to Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2. However, even the 

Amended Emergency Motion is unclear as to what rulings will be challenged.2 As 

previously discussed, there are no less than nine orders attached to the Amended 

Emergency Motion, most of which are never even mentioned relators' motion. 

2 On page 2 of their Amended Emergency Motion, relators indicate their intent to challenge

several discovery rulings.” Amended Emergency Motion at 2, n.1. 

Then, on page 13, relators assert: “VCC believes that many if not all of these rulings 

constitute an abuse of discretion and will include challenges to some of them in this 

original proceeding should the Court ask for briefing on the merits.” Amended Emergency 

Motion at 13. 
13

Relators are attempting to use what is a very limited issue before this Court (the 

denial of a motion for continuance) and turn it into a vehicle by which they can ask this 

Court to consider a number of “discovery rulings” and a ruling on a motion for leave to 

file a third-party petition. None of which have been properly identified nor briefed for 

this Court.

The current proceeding is brought on by the filing of an extraordinary writ where 

relators have the high burden of establishing the trial court abused its discretion and that 

relators lack an adequate remedy by appeal Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–

40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see also In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 

S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). The lack of identification of the 

specific issues and the lack of briefing on the infinite number of issues leaves this 

Court without the ability to even make a threshold determination as to 

whether this extraordinary review is warranted. 

3. It is not judicially efficient to maintain an extraordinary writ on

the Court’s docket when the only briefed issue addressed in the

petition for writ of mandamus is moot.

Relators contend that for the sake of judicial efficiency “those issues” should be 

part of this mandamus proceeding rather than to file a concurrent proceeding in the court 

of appeals. Supplement to Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2. Relators provide no 

support for this Court to continue on its docket unbriefed and unidentified complaints 

when the only briefed complaint has been rendered moot. Relators simply cite to Texas 
14

Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.1(e). Id. However, Rule 52.1 addresses the 

commencement of a petition for writ of mandamus with the clerk and the appropriate 

caption that is necessary. Tex. R. App. P. 52.1. There is no subsection “(e)” in Rule 

52.1. 

To the extent relators intended to cite to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 

52.3(e), which addresses the Court’s jurisdiction, there is no basis here to skip the court 

of appeals and retain the proceeding on this Court’s docket when the sole issue before 

the Court is now moot and the remaining issues are not identified or briefed. Rule 

52.3(e) requires that a petition be presented to the court of appeals before being filed in 

the Supreme Court, unless there is a compelling reason not to do so. Tex. R. App. P. 

52.1. There are no “compelling reasons” here for this Court to retain this petition on its 

docket and address the unidentified, unbriefed, and unknown number of issues, since 

the sole basis of the petition is now moot. There is nothing efficient about retaining a 

case on the Court’s docket and requiring Pharr ISD to respond to unrelated issues.

In their Amended Emergency Motion to Stay, relators cited Gen. Motors Corp. 

v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) when referring to the

“other error” they intend to later address. Amended Emergency Motion at 21, n.6. To 

the extent relators’ reliance on this Court’s opinion in General Motors is to argue 

additional issues should be decided in this mandamus proceeding, General Motors is 

unpersuasive. In General Motors, this Court determined that there were “special 
15

circumstances” that warranted the Court issuing mandamus relief from the trial court’s 

order denying a jury trial since it was already issuing mandamus relief on the improper 

crash-test order. See Gen. Motors, 951 S.W.2d at 477. This Court should not be lured 

into deciding unrelated and unbriefed issues that are not typically subject to mandamus 

especially when the sole issue that was the subject of the petition is now moot.

PRAYER

Pharr ISD requests this Court deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 

Alternatively, Pharr ISD requests this Court either reconsider its stay order and 

authorize the trial court to reset the trial date to February 5, 2018 without the issuance 

of mandamus relief, or issue a limited and conditional writ directing the trial court to 

set the case for February 5, 2018. Relator further requests that all other relief requested 

be denied. Relator further prays for any additional relief to which it may be entitled. 

/s/ Lorien Whyte

POZZA & WHYTE, PLLC

Dan Pozza

State Bar No. 16224800 

Lorien Whyte

State Bar No. 24042440 

239 East Commerce Street San 

Antonio, Texas 78205 (210) 226-

8888 – Phone

(210) 222-8477 – Fax

lorienwhyte@pozzaandwhyte.com
16

Juan J. Hinojosa

State Bar No. 09701400

THE HINOJOSA LAW FIRM, P.C.

612 West Nolana Ave., Ste. 410

McAllen, Texas 78504

Telephone: (956) 686-2413

Fax: (956) 686-8462

jjhinojosa@bizrgv.rr.com

Rose Vela

State Bar No. 16958050 

224 Calle Cenzio

Brownsville, TX 78520

(956) 248-7673 Office

Rose.vela@me.com

Rene Ramirez

State Bar No. 16475600

2918 South Jackson Rd., Ste. 200 

McAllen, Texas 78503

(956) 783-7880 Office

(956) 783-7883 Fax

rramirezlaw@me.com

Pruett Moore, III

State Bar No. 14362225

555 N. Carancahua Street, Suite 1400 

Corpus Christi, TX 78401

(361) 888-9100 Office

(361) 888-9199 Fax

pmooreiii@sbcglobal.net
17

Anthony F. Constant 

State Bar No. 04711000

800 N. Shoreline Blvd., Ste. 2700 S Corpus 

Christi, TX 78401

(361) 698-8000 Office

(361) 887-8010 Fax

office@constantlawfirm.com

Attorneys for Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Independent 

School District

TRAP 52.3(J) CERTIFICATION

I certify that I have reviewed Real Parties in Interest’s Response to the Petition 

for Writ of Mandamus and have concluded that every factual statement in the petition 

is supported by competent evidence included in the record before this Court.

/s/ Lorien Whyte

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this document complies with the typeface and word-count 

requirements set forth in the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. This document was 

prepared with Microsoft Word, and that, according to that program’s word-count 

function, the sections covered by TRAP 9.4(i)(1) contain 3648 words using 14-point 

typeface for all text, except for footnotes which are in 12-point typeface, which is less 

than the word count allowed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(D).

/s/ Lorien Whyte
18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on December 22, 2017, a true and correct copy of the 

above and foregoing Response was forwarded via electronic transmission, to: 

The Honorable Rudy Delgado

Hidalgo County Courthouse

100 N. Closner

2nd Floor

Edinburg, Texas 78539

Jessica Z. Barger

Bradley W. Snead

Wright & Close, LLP

One Riverway, Suite 2200

Houston, Texas 77056

Gil P. Peralez

Chris Franz

Peralez Franz, LLP

1416 W. Dove Ave.

McAllen, Texas 78504

Patrick E. “Gene” Blanton 

Stephen C. Bolline II

Slates Harwell, LLP

1700 Pacific Avenue, Suite 3800

Dallas, Texas 75201-4761

Keith N. Uhles 

Esteban Delgadillo 

55 Cove Circle

Brownsville, Texas 78251
19

Andrew J. McCluggage 

Pierce T. Cox

Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, L.L.P. 

One Riverway, Suite 1400

Houston, Texas 77056

David Funderburk 

Diane Davis

Funderburk Courtois LLP 

2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 1000

Houston, Texas 77019

/s/Lorien Whyte