J-A16029-16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ARI ENTERPRISES, LLC IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

CYNTHIA L. MCGINLEY, AS 

ADMINISTRATRIX FOR THE ESTATE OF 

JOHN CAIACCIA AKA JOHN A. CAIACCIA

Appellee No. 1249 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order August 5, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No(s): GD-15-007636

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2016

Appellant, ARI Enterprises, LLC, appeals from the order entered on 

August 5, 2015, which sustained the preliminary objections filed by Cynthia 

L. McGinley, as administratrix for the estate of John Caiaccia a/k/a John A. 

Caiaccia (hereinafter “Defendant”), and dismissed Appellant’s complaint with 

prejudice. We vacate and remand.

On May 14, 2015, Appellant filed a complaint against Defendant, 

seeking specific performance for the sale of real property. Appellant averred 

that, on March 10, 2015, Defendant agreed to sell it certain real property, 

located at 147 43rd Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15201, Lot and Block Number 49-

B-73 (hereinafter “147 43rd Street”), for $50,000.00. Appellant’s Complaint, 
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5/14/15, at ¶ 3.1 Appellant averred that it paid Defendant the required 

$1,000.00 earnest deposit; however, even though Defendant accepted the 

earnest money, Defendant refused to deliver the real property, as per the 

agreement. Id. at ¶¶ 6-11. Appellant requested that the trial court issue an 

order directing Defendant to specifically perform under the agreement and 

deliver the real property to Appellant. Id. at Wherefore Clause.

Moreover, Appellant attached the relevant agreement to its complaint. 

In pertinent part, the agreement declares:

Agreement to Sell Real Estate

This Agreement is made on 10th of March 2015, between 

John A Caiaccia, Seller, of 147 & 144 43rd St, City of 

Pittsburgh, State of PA, and ARI Enterprises LLC, Buyer, of 

1004 Fawn Valley Dr, City of Canonsburg, State of P.A. 

15317.

The Seller now owns the following described real estate, 

located at 144 & 147 43rd St, City of Pittsburgh, State of PA. 

15201. . . .

For valuable consideration, the Seller agrees to sell and the 

Buyer agrees to buy this property for the following price and 

on the following terms:

1. The Seller will sell this property to the Buyer, free from 

all claims, liabilities, and indebtedness, unless noted in this 

Agreement.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant averred that John A. Caiaccia had owned the property while he 

lived and, on August 19, 2003, Cynthia L. McGinley was granted Letters of 

Administration for the Estate of John Caiaccia. Appellant’s Complaint, 

5/14/15, at ¶¶ 4-5.
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. . .

3. The Buyer agrees to pay the Seller the sum of $84,900 –

Cash, which the Seller agrees to accept as full payment. . . .

4. The purchase price will be paid as follows:

Earnest deposit $1,000.00

(upon signing this Agreement)

Other deposit: $54,900.00

On or before 9-9-15

Cash or certified check on $29,000.00

closing . . .

Total Purchase Price $84,900 for both

147 43rd – 50,000

144 43rd – 34,900

 84,900

5. The Seller acknowledges receiving the Earnest money 

deposit of $1000.00 from the Buyer. If Buyer fails to 

perform this Agreement, the Seller shall retain this money. 

If Seller fails to perform this Agreement, this money shall 

be returned to the Buyer or the Buyer may have the right of 

specific performance. . . . 

6. This Agreement will close on March 31, at 3:00 o’clock, 

at 428 Forbes Ave, City of Pittsburgh, State of P.A. 15219.

At that time, and upon payment by the Buyer of the portion 

of the purchase price then due, the Seller will deliver to 

Buyer the following documents:

. . .

(b) A Warranty Deed for the real estate

(c) A Seller’s Affidavit of Title

(d) A Closing Statement

. . .
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16. Seller agrees to provide Buyer with a Real Estate 

Disclosure Statement (or its equivalent that is acceptable in 

the State in which the property is located) within five [] 

days of the signing of this Agreement. Upon receipt of the 

Real Estate Disclosure Statement from Seller, Buyer shall 

have five [] business days within which to rescind this 

Agreement by providing Seller with a written and signed 

statement rescinding this Agreement. The disclosures in 

the real Estate Disclosure Statement are made by the seller 

concerning the condition of the property and are provided 

on the basis of the seller’s actual knowledge of the property 

on the date of this disclosure. . . . 

. . .

18. No modification of this Agreement will be effective 

unless it is in writing and is signed by both the Buyer and 

Seller. This Agreement binds and benefits both the Buyer 

and Seller and any successors and assigns. Time is of the 

essence of this Agreement. The acceptance of a deed by 

the Buyer shall be considered full performance of every 

obligation of the Seller under this Agreement. This 

document, including any attachments, is the entire 

agreement between the Buyer and Seller. This Agreement 

is governed by the laws of the State of Pennsylvania.

/s_[Defendant]________

Signature of Seller

. . .

/s_[Appellant]_________

Signature of Buyer

Agreement of Sale, dated 3/10/15, at 1-5 (hereinafter “the Agreement” or 

“Agreement of Sale”).

On June 22, 2015, Defendant filed preliminary objections to 

Appellant’s complaint. As Defendant claimed, “[Appellant] attached [to its 

complaint] . . . an integrated land sale agreement for two [] parcels of land, 
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but [Appellant] seeks partial specific performance as to only one parcel (147 

43rd Street . . .), [and] not the other parcel (144 43rd Street . . .).” 

Defendant’s Preliminary Objections, 6/22/15, at ¶ 2. Defendant argued that 

“Pennsylvania does not recognize a cause of action for partial specific 

performance of an integrated land sale agreement;” and, since Appellant’s 

complaint seeks “partial specific performance of an integrated land sale 

agreement,” Appellant’s complaint is legally insufficient and must be 

dismissed. Id. at ¶¶ 5-8.

Further, Defendant claimed, “[t]itle to [144 43rd Street] is held by coowners [Defendant] and William Gialanella, as tenants in common;” 

however, William Gialanella did not sign the written Agreement of Sale. Id.

at ¶¶ 11 and 13. Therefore, Defendant claimed, “the entire [Agreement of 

Sale] . . . fails under the Statute of Frauds [and] . . . is void ab initio.” Id.

at ¶¶ 14-15. 

Appellant responded to Defendant’s preliminary objections and denied 

that it sought “partial specific performance.” Rather, Appellant claimed, it 

sought specific performance for the sale of an entire, single, undivided parcel 

of property – 147 43rd Street. Moreover, Appellant noted, within the 

Agreement of Sale, the parties “clearly stat[ed] the total price for both 

parcels, as well as the apportioned prices for each parcel. The Agreement 

lists an apportioned price of $50,000.00 for the subject property, and an 

apportioned price of $34,900.00 for 144 43rd Street.” Appellant’s Response, 

7/20/15, at ¶¶ 2-6. Therefore, Appellant claimed, under the Agreement, the 
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sale of 147 43rd Street is divisible from the sale of 144 43rd Street – and 

Appellant is entitled to receive specific performance for the sale of 147 43rd

Street. Id. at ¶ 7.

Finally, Appellant responded to Defendant’s claim that the Agreement 

of Sale is “void ab initio” because William Gialanella, the purported co-owner 

of 144 43rd Street, did not sign the agreement. As Appellant argued, since 

the Agreement is severable or divisible and since it was “not seeking specific 

performance of 144 43rd Street,” “ownership of 144 43rd Street is irrelevant 

to the within action.” Id. at ¶ 11.

The trial court held argument on Defendant’s preliminary objections 

and, on August 5, 2015, the trial court entered an order sustaining the 

preliminary objections and dismissing Appellant’s complaint with prejudice. 

Trial Court Order, 8/5/15, at 1. Within its later-filed opinion to this Court, 

the trial court declared that it dismissed Appellant’s complaint first because 

William Gialanella was not a party to the Agreement and, thus, according to 

the trial court, the Agreement was void ab initio. Trial Court Opinion, 

9/29/15, at 2. Second, the trial court declared:

assuming arguendo that the Agreement was not void ab 

initio, [the trial court] did not find that the intent of the 

parties was clear. The [A]greement was for the sale of both 

parcels. So regardless of whether the contract apportions 

price terms for each parcel, Defendant’s intent may have 

been to sell “both parcels” or none. 

Id.
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Thus, even though the trial court could not determine the intent of the 

parties, the trial court concluded that the contract was not severable or 

divisible and that Appellant’s claim for specific performance failed. Id.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 13, 2015. 

However, on October 29, 2015, Appellant filed in this Court a petition for 

remand, requesting that we remand the case to the trial court because of 

newly discovered evidence. In relevant part, the petition declared:

5. Appellant’s Complaint requested a judgment directing 

[Defendant] to specifically perform under the Agreement 

with respect to 147 43rd Street only.

6. Appellant’s Complaint did not request a judgment 

directing [Defendant] to specifically perform under the 

Agreement with respect to 144 43rd Street, because the 

public records reflected that the owners of said property 

were John Caiaccia and William Gialanella.

7. [Defendant] filed preliminary objections and a brief in

support on June 22, 2015 and [] argued . . . that, “absent a 

signed writing of William Gialanella, the entire [Agreement] 

is void ab initio.”

8. The [trial court’s order] dismissed [Appellant’s] 

complaint with prejudice. According to [its opinion,] the

trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint because it agreed 

with [Defendant] that the Agreement was void ab initio. . . . 

9. Based upon the trial court’s opinion, it was obviously an 

important fact that William Gialanella was a co-owner of 

144 43rd Street but did not sign the Agreement.

10. . . . [O]n October 23, 2015[,] undersigned counsel 

learned that [Defendant] was the sole owner of 144 43rd

Street at the time that the Agreement was entered into on 

March 10, 2015. A true and correct copy of the deed to 144 

43rd Street is attached hereto as Exhibit “2” which shows 
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that title was transferred to [Defendant] on April 25, 2006 

but that the deed was not recorded until September 29, 

2015.

11. [Defendant] was aware that she was the owner of 144 

43rd Street when she entered into the Agreement with 

Appellant on March 10, 2015 and she was further aware 

that she was the sole owner during the legal proceedings, 

nevertheless, she let her attorney . . . make false 

representations in her preliminary objections and in oral 

argument to the trial court that she was not the owner of 

144 43rd Street.

12. [Defendant] has clearly committed a fraud upon the 

court by withholding material information that she was in 

fact the owner of 144 43rd Street at all relevant times.

13. As the Superior Court is not a court of record, Appellant 

is requesting that this matter be remanded back to the trial 

court so that Appellant may introduce the deed [] into the 

record for consideration by the trial court.

Appellant’s Petition for Remand, 10/29/15, at ¶¶ 5-13 (internal emphasis 

and some capitalization omitted).

On November 6, 2015, we entered an order that deferred the 

disposition of Appellant’s petition to the merits panel of this Court. Order, 

11/6/15, at 1.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following claims:

[1.] Did the trial court commit an error of law when it 

[sustained Defendant’s] preliminary objections by finding 

that the Agreement of Sale is not severable because the 

trial court failed to determine the intent of the parties and 

because the plain meaning of the Agreement and the rules 

of construction clearly show that the parties intended the 

Agreement to be severable?

[2.] Did the trial court commit an error of law when it 

[sustained Defendant’s] preliminary objections by finding 
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that the Agreement of Sale is void ab initio because the 

Agreement is severable and therefore not void ab initio as 

to 147 43rd Street?

[3.] Should this Honorable Court remand the within matter 

pursuant to the Rule 123 application for relief or petition to 

request remand that was filed with the Court on October 29, 

2015?

Appellant’s Brief at ix (some internal capitalization omitted).2

We have stated:

A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is 

properly [sustained] where the contested pleading is legally 

insufficient. Preliminary objections in the nature of a 

demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on 

the basis of the pleadings; no testimony or other evidence 

outside of the complaint may be considered to dispose of 

the legal issues presented by the demurrer. All material 

facts set forth in the pleading and all inferences reasonably 

deducible therefrom must be admitted as true.

In determining whether the trial court properly sustained 

preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine 

the averments in the complaint, together with the 

documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to 

evaluate the sufficiency of the facts averred. The impetus 

of our inquiry is to determine the legal sufficiency of the 

complaint and whether the pleading would permit recovery 

if ultimately proven. This Court will reverse the trial court’s 

decision regarding preliminary objections only where there 

has been an error of law or abuse of discretion. When 

sustaining the [preliminary objections] will result in the 

denial of claim or a dismissal of suit, [the preliminary 

objections may be sustained] only where the case [is] free 

and clear of doubt.

____________________________________________

2

For ease of discussion, we have re-ordered Appellant’s claims on appeal.
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Lugo v. Farmers Pride, Inc., 967 A.2d 963, 966 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(internal citations, quotations, and corrections omitted).

With respect to contract interpretation, our Supreme Court has held:

The fundamental rule in interpreting the meaning of a 

contract is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 

contracting parties. The intent of the parties to a written 

agreement is to be regarded as being embodied in the 

writing itself. The whole instrument must be taken together 

in arriving at contractual intent. Courts do not assume that 

a contract’s language was chosen carelessly, nor do they 

assume that the parties were ignorant of the meaning of the 

language they employed. When a writing is clear and 

unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its content 

alone.

Only where a contract’s language is ambiguous may 

extrinsic or parol evidence be considered to determine the 

intent of the parties. A contract contains an ambiguity if it 

is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and 

capable of being understood in more than one sense. This 

question, however, is not reviewed in a vacuum. Instead, 

contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject to more 

than one reasonable interpretation when applied to a 

particular set of facts. 

Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 429-430 

(Pa. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, “[i]t has 

long been accepted in contract law that an ambiguous written instrument 

presents a question of fact for resolution by the finder-of-fact, whereas the 

meaning of an unambiguous written instrument presents a question of law 

for resolution by the court.” Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County v. Cmty. Coll. 

of Beaver County, Soc. of the Faculty (PSEA/NEA), 375 A.2d 1267, 

1275 (Pa. 1977). 
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Appellant first claims that the trial court erred in holding – at the 

preliminary objection stage – that the Agreement was entire and not 

severable. We agree. 

In the case at bar, Appellant and Defendant entered into a single 

agreement for the sale of two separate properties; yet, in Appellant’s 

complaint, Appellant requested specific performance for the sale of only one 

of the properties covered by the Agreement. Under Pennsylvania law, a 

plaintiff may not receive “partial specific performance of an indivisible 

contract for the sale of land.” Jones v. Gravity Fill Serv. Station, 64 A.2d 

490, 492 (Pa. 1949). Nevertheless, in the trial court, Appellant contended 

that the Agreement was divisible and that Appellant could thus seek specific 

performance for the sale of 147 43rd Street – and yet not seek specific 

performance for the sale of 144 43rd Street. The trial court held otherwise 

and declared that the Agreement was not severable or divisible. According 

to the trial court, it concluded that the agreement was not severable 

because it “did not find that the intent of the parties was clear” regarding 

severability and that, even though the “contract apportion[ed] price terms 

for each parcel, Defendant’s intent may have been to sell ‘both parcels’ or 

none.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/15, at 2. 

As Appellant argues on appeal, the trial court concluded that the 

Agreement was not severable and yet “entirely failed to make a 

determination regarding the dispositive question – the intent of the parties.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 4. Further, Appellant claims that the trial court’s ruling 
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and determination in this case violated “the well[-]established standard of 

review for preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer.” Id. at 4-5. 

We agree and thus vacate the trial court’s order.

As our Supreme Court has held, to determine whether a contract is 

entire or severable: 

there is no bright line rule requiring that a court first find 

that the intent of the parties is unclear as to 

entirety/severability before it may look to factors such as 

the conduct of the parties and the character of the 

consideration to determine whether an agreement is entire 

or severable. The central task is to ascertain the intent of 

the parties. That intent may be apparent from the explicit 

language of the contract . . . or it may be obvious from a 

“construction” of the agreement, including the nature of the 

consideration. . . . In short, principles of construction may 

reveal the intent of the parties no less than the actual 

language addressing entirety/severability. Thus, [the 

Supreme] Court holds that, absent express language that a 

contract is entire, a court may look to the contract as a 

whole, including the character of the consideration, to 

determine the intent of the parties as to severability and 

may also consider the circumstances surrounding the 

execution of the contract, the conduct of the parties, and 

any other factor pertinent to ascertaining the parties' intent. 

The court need not make a specific predicate finding of 

ambiguity before undertaking the inquiry – indeed, if the 

contract were crystal clear as to the parties’ intent, 

severability likely would not be a contested issue.

Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445, 452 (Pa. 2001).

Here, the parties failed to include express language, in the Agreement 

of Sale, regarding the severability (or non-severability) of the contract. 

Therefore, in accordance with the Jacobs Court’s holding, a court must “look 

to the contract as a whole, including the character of the consideration, to 
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determine the intent of the parties as to severability and may also consider 

the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, the conduct of 

the parties, and any other factor pertinent to ascertaining the parties’ 

intent.” Id. Yet, as is evident, certain of these considerations lie completely 

outside of a court’s scope of review at the preliminary objection stage of the 

proceedings. Indeed, the pleadings and the four-corners of the Agreement 

here do not shed any light on the “the circumstances surrounding the 

execution of the contract,” “the conduct of the parties,” or “other factor[s] 

pertinent to ascertaining the parties’ intent” – such as the spatial 

relationship between the properties; whether the properties lie directly next 

to one another; whether the individual properties were contracted to be sold 

at fair market value; whether (or not) Defendant agreed to a discounted 

purchase price if Appellant agreed to purchase both properties; whether (or 

not) Appellant agreed to an increased purchase price if Defendant agreed to 

sell both properties; or, as the trial court notes, whether Defendant intended 

to “sell both parcels or none.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/29/15, at 2 (internal 

quotations omitted). Moreover, the “character of the consideration” is 

ambiguous as to the parties’ intent regarding severability. This is because 

Appellant and Defendant established a single price for the sale of two 

separate properties, but then apportioned the prices for the individual 

properties. See Agreement of Sale, dated 3/10/15, at ¶¶ 3-4; see also 

Brown v. Exeter Mach. Works, 60 Pa. Super. 365, 368 (1915) (“[i]f the 

part to be performed by one party consists of several distinct items and the 
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price to be paid by the other is apportioned to each item or is left to be 

implied by law, generally the contract is held to be severable”).

Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, we agree with the trial court 

that the parties’ intent regarding severability is simply not clear. Trial Court 

Opinion, 9/29/15, at 2. Given this fact, the trial court should not have 

sustained Defendant’s preliminary objections. Simply stated, the pleadings 

and the four-corners of the Agreement do not “say[] with certainty that no 

recovery is possible.” Griffin v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 843 A.2d 393, 394-

395 (Pa. Super. 2004). The trial court therefore abused its discretion when, 

at the pleadings stage, it concluded that the Agreement was not severable, 

sustained Defendant’s preliminary objections, and dismissed Appellant’s 

complaint.

With respect to Appellant’s second claim, Appellant contends that the 

trial court erred when it sustained Defendant’s preliminary objections “by 

finding that the Agreement of Sale is void ab initio because the Agreement is 

severable and therefore not void ab initio as to 147 43rd Street.” Appellant’s 

Brief at ix. We have concluded that the trial court erred in holding that the 

Agreement was not severable. Therefore, even if the Agreement is void as 

to 144 43rd Street,3 Appellant has successfully pleaded a cause of action for 

____________________________________________

3 Obviously, the averments contained in (and the exhibits attached to) 

Appellant’s Petition for Remand place grave doubt upon the determination 

that the agreement to sell 144 43rd Street is void ab initio.
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specific performance as to 147 43rd Street. Barb-Lee Mobile Frame Co. v. 

Hoot, 206 A.2d 59, 61 (Pa. 1965) (“where a contract is divisible[,] one part 

of it may be void while the other is not”) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). The trial court erred in holding otherwise.4

Petition for Remand denied as moot. Order vacated. Case remanded. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2016

____________________________________________

4 Since we are remanding this case to the trial court, we deny Appellant’s 

“Petition for Remand” as moot.