This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 CITY OF RIO RANCHO, 2 Petitioner-Appellee, 3 v. No. 31,494 4 MARIO URIBE, 5 Respondent-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY 7 John F. Davis, District Judge 8 City of Rio Rancho 9 James C. Babin, City Attorney 10 Gina R. Manfredi, Assistant City Attorney 11 Kenneth J. Tager, Assistant City Attorney 12 Rio Rancho, NM 13 for Appellee 14 Mario Uribe 15 Rio Rancho, NM 16 Pro se Appellant 17 MEMORANDUM OPINION 18 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 192 Defendant appeals his conviction for speeding. In our second notice, we 1 proposed to affirm the conviction. De fendant has timely responded. We have 2 considered his arguments and not being persuaded, we affirm. 3 In our second notice, we pointed out that there was other evidence than solely 4 visual observation from which to conclude that Defendant was traveling at between 5 31 and 35 miles per hour over the speed limit. We pointed to the testimony of the 6 police officer who was stationary at th e time that Defendant drove past on his 7 motorcycle. The officer testified that he followed Defendant and was pacing him at 8 a speed of 60 miles per hour. 9 Defendant responds that the police officer’s testimony should be given no credit 10 because it was physically impossible. [MIO 2-3] It does not appear that Defendant 11 presented this alleged physical impossibility to the fact finder. See State v. Varela , 12 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 25, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280 (stating that in order to preserve 13 an issue for appeal, defendant must make a timely objection that specifically apprises 14 the trial court of the nature of the cl aimed error and invokes an intelligent ruling 15 thereon). This Court will not consider evidence that was never presented to the 16 district court as fact finder. See Campos Enters., Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co., 17 1998-NMCA-131, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 691, 964 P.2d 855 (stating that appellate courts 18 review only those matters that were presented to the trial court)

. 193 Even if Defendant did cross-examine the police officer and question the 1 physical possibility of his testimony, it is for the fact finder to resolve conflicts in the 2 testimony and determine where the truth lies. See State v. Sutphin , 107 N.M. 126, 3 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988) (holding that determining credibility and weighing 4 evidence are tasks entrusted tothe trial court sitting as fact-finder and the trial court 5 was free either to disbelieve Defendant’s alle gations or to reject the inference he asked 6 the court to draw). Testimony by a witne ss whom the fact finder has believed may be 7 rejected by an appellate court only if there is a physical impossibility that the 8 statements are true or the falsity of th e statement is apparent without resort to 9 inferences or deductions. State v. Sanders , 117 N.M. 452, 457, 872 P.2d 870, 875 10 (1994). Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not 11 justify the reversal of a judgment. State v. Till , 78 N.M. 255, 256, 430 P.2d 752, 753 12 (1967). 13 Here, we cannot say that the officer’s testimony was inherently improbable. He 14 could have put his vehicle in gear and chased after Defendant and his speedometer 15 could have recorded 60 miles per hour. There was no evidence presented regarding 16 how far the officer chased Defendant and without that eviden ce, this Court cannot 17 conclude that the officer’s testimony was phys ically impossible. The district court as 18 fact finder could have decided to believethe officer’s testimony regarding how he 194 determined what speed Defendant was trav eling. We conclude that there was 1 sufficient evidence presented to establish that Defendant was speeding more than 30 2 miles per hour over the limit. 3 For the reasons stated herein and in the second notice of proposed disposition, 4 we affirm. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

7 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 8 WE CONCUR: 9

10 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 11

12 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 13