## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D. , 2012 IL App (2d) 120266

Appellate Court Caption In re PARENTAGE OF SCAR L E TT Z .-D., a minor (James R.D., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ma ria Z ., Respondent-Appe llee).

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-12-0266

Filed August 30, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Petitioner had no standing under the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act or the Parenta g e Act to seek a decla ration of pare ntag e and custody of the c hild adopted i n Slovakia by the woman he was e ng ag ed
to marry , notwithstanding the fac t that the three lived toge ther as a family for sever al y ear s, since they wer e never marrie d, petitioner did not adopt the child, no steps were taken to obtain rec og nition in I llinois of the

a d o p ti on by responde nt, and there was no I llinois common law suppo r ti n g his claims.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Du Pag e County
, No. 08-F -4 5 1 ; the Hon. Timothy

J . McJoy nt, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Richard D. F elice, of L aw Of fice s, of Richard D . Fe lice, P.C., of Wheaton, Camilla B. Ta

ylor and Thomas W. Ude, Jr., both of L ambda L eg al Def ense & Education Fund, Inc., of Chica g o, for a ppellant.

J ohn Knight, of Roge r B aldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., and Ari Z

. Cohn and Fr ank M. Dicke rson I I I , both of Mayer B rown L L P, both of Chicag o, for amicus curiae , Americ an Civil L iberties Union of I llinois

.

Hug h S. Balsam a

nd Andy J . Miller, both of L ocke L ord L L P, of Chicag o, for amici curiaeChicag o Applesee d Fund f or Jus tice, F amily Equality Council, and Fa

mily Institut e at Nor

thwestern University

.

Panel J USTI CE Z ENOF F de livered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion. Presiding J ustice J org ensen and J ustice McL are n co n cu rred in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Petitioner, J ames R.D. (Ji m), appea ls from the trial court’s dismiss al under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedur e (735 I L CS 5/2-615 (West 2010) ) of his c ontrac t c laims a nd from the court’s denial, follow i n g trial, of his claims for custody
, visitation, and child support. For

the followingrea sons, we af firm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 J im and responde nt, Maria Z

. (Mar ia), be g an living tog ether as a c ouple in 1999. They beca me eng ag ed in 2000 or 2001. In ea rl y 2003, Maria went to Slovakia to visit family

. Whil e ther e, she me t Sca

rlett, a 31⁄2-year -old orphan g irl. Maria c ommenced the proce ss of adopting Scarle tt under Slovakian law. During the y ear -long adoption proce ss, Maria lived in Slovakia. Under Slovakian la w, J im was not pe rmitted to adopt Scarlett bec ause he was neither a Slovakian national nor marrie d to Maria, but he wa s i n v o l v ed in the process and
trave led to Slovakia approximately five times during that period. In 2004, Maria returne d to the United States with Scarle tt, and the parties lived toge ther with Sca rlett as a family

. The parties never marrie d, and neither took any steps to obtain rec og nition of th e adoption in I llinois . J im did not adopt S car lett. ¶ 4 By August 2008, the parties’ rel at ionship had deter iorated, and Maria moved out with Scarle tt. On August 22, 2008, J im filed a peti t i o n for decla ration of pare ntal rig hts, which the t rial court struck on Maria’ s motion. J im subsequently filed an “ Amended Motion and

-2-Petition for Adoption,” which the trial court allowed him to withdraw. On May 11, 2009, J im

filed t he action to es t ab lish pare ntag e at issue here

. In count I
, J im reque sted a declaration of par en t age and an order g ranting the parties joint leg al and phy sical custody or, alternatively
, granting him primary custody with rea sonable visitation for Maria. In count I I
, J im soug ht an equitable division of child support betwee n the parties. Counts I I I throug h VI
, en titled brea ch of oral agree ment, promissory estoppel, brea ch of implied contra ct in fac t, and brea ch of implied contra ct in law, respe ctively
, ea ch p ra y ed for relief in the form of custody , visitation, and child support determinations. ¶ 5 On May 29, 2009, Maria filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss
, alleg ing, inter alia
, that J im’s peti t i o n failed to state a cause of action beca use it did not addre ss the threshold question of J im’s standing under either section 6 01(b)( 2) of the I llinois Marr iag e and Dissolution of Marr iag e Act (Dissolution Act) (750 I L CS 5/601(b)(2) (West 2010)) or section 7 of the I llinois Parenta g e Act of 1 9 84 (750 I L CS 45/7 (West 2008)). J im filed a response , arguing that a section 2-615 m otion was not the proper vehicle to raise the issue of standing and that Maria had, there fore
, waived her standing argument. The trial court enter ed an order allowing Mar i a t o fi l e a memorandum in support of her section 2-615 motion, if she so desired. Wit hin the time allowed for that memorandum, Maria instead filed

a section 2-619 (735 I L CS 5/2-619 (West 2010)) motion t o d ismiss
, asser ting lack of

s tanding under section 601 of the Dissolution Act, based on the aff irmative matter that Scarle tt had alway s been in Maria’ s phy sical custody since her adoption. J im moved to strike Maria’ s section 2-619 motion. ¶ 6 On August 25, 2009, the trial court hear d arg ument on J im’s motion to strike Mar i a’s section 2-619 m otion. In addition to arguing that the m otion was unti mely
, J im contende d that Maria improperly raised the aff irmative defe nse of standing in her section 2-615 motion
to dismiss and had, there fore
, waived the standing defe nse. The court beg an by asking J im’s

co u n sel, “So if I let [Maria’s counsel] reple ad and rela bel it [section 2-]619, are we ri gh t back wher e we started? ” After hear ing the parties’ arguments, the court noted that “standing is the linchpin of the attac king motions that wer e up for hear ing.” The c ourt rea soned that, “whe ther it’s a 2-615 or a 2-619, I think it’s been adequately pled in a timely fashion.” The
court found that the iss u e o f s t anding was not a surprise to J im. The court conclude d that “[t] here ’s been no waiver .” The court then offe red J im the option of allowing Maria to ref ile her section 2-615 motion as a section 2-619 motion so that J im could supplement his
response “with af

fidavits and the like.” J im’s counsel aske d if a temporar y visitation order could be enter ed if they chose to reple ad, and the court said no. Maria’ s counsel re minded the court that Maria had alre ady filed the section 2-619 motion. J im then opted to acc ept the additional time offe red to submit aff idavits and file a response to Maria’ s s ec tion 2-619 motion, which he did. ¶ 7 On October 7, 2009, the trial court hear d arg ument on both o f M ar i a’ s m o t i o n s to dismiss

. The court denied Maria’ s section 2-619 motion in i t s en t i rety

. Wit h respe ct to Maria’ s section 2-615 motion, the cou rt denied the motion as t o counts I and I I

. Howeve r, the court g rante d the motion to dismiss counts I I I throug h VI
, concluding that there was no common-law cause of action for pater nity
, that the cla i m s d i d n o t meet the elements of
contra ct law, a

nd that the purporte d contra cts “c ould be void [as] ag ainst public policy .”

-3-¶ 8 Fr om that portion of the court’s October 7, 2009, order denying her section 2-619 motion

to dismiss
, Maria filed a petition for leave to appea l to this c ourt. We denied the petition as untimely

. In re Parentage of Scarlett Z-D.
, No. 2-09-1280 (2009) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 9 There afte r, the case proce eded on counts I and I I of J im’s petition. Maria filed her a nswer to J im’s petition, raising the aff irmative defe nse of standing

. The court appointed a guardia n ad litem (GAL ) and order ed the parties to attend mediation. On the GAL ’s motion, the court order ed that J im have supervised visitation with Scarle tt. Scarle tt attended counseling

. The
court appointed a cu s tody evaluator. L ater , the court appointed a visitation fac ilitator to fac ilitate visit s and make a re port of her observations. ¶ 10 Trial commence d on May 10, 2011, spanning 17 day s of testimony over 7 months. The parties prese nted extensive evidenc e. The witnesses included t h e p arties, Dr. Shapiro (the

cu stody evaluator), Dr. Warren (the visitation fac ilitator), and J oseph Be ck (the GAL ), as well as many friends, neighbors, an d re latives of the parties. Numerous exhibi ts wer e

a d mi tt e d
, including Dr. Shapiro’s custody evaluation, Dr. Warren’ s observa ti o n n o te s , f

a mi ly photogr aphs and vide os, and Scar lett’s school rec ords and a rt work. ¶ 11 The parties rested their respe ctive case s on Dec ember 1 6
, 2 0 1 1

. T h e co u rt granted Maria’ s previously filed motion for an in came ra interview of Scarle tt, and conducte d the interview that day

. On J anuar y 23, 2012, the parties submitt ed written closing arguments. On Fe bruar y 9, 2012, the court g rante d Maria’ s motion to supplement her closing arg ument with the Fe bruar

y 2, 2012, decision in In re Marriage of Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, pet. for leave to appe al pending , No. 113978 (filed Ma r. 8, 2012). ¶ 12 The trial court enter ed its wr i t t en o p i n i o n and order on Fe bruar y 29, 2012. The c ourt found that “f

or a long time dur ing and afte r the adoption of [Scarlett], J im and Maria lived toge ther with the chil d as an i n tact family unit as if they wer e bound leg ally .” The court found that J im and Maria planned and participated in the adoption toge ther and that J im paid for it all and supported Maria during the proce ss. The court found that J im never adopted Scarle tt but that the parties had d i s cu s s ed it. The court stated, “The rea sons for these inactions are basica lly unknown except for the ‘fa lling out’ J im and Maria had some time later.” The court found that, for four y ea rs o r more, Scarle tt lived with J im, called him “daddy ,” and looke d to him as a fathe r figure. The court concluded that J im was “a fit and
proper person” to have visitation or custody

. The court found that, afte r Maria separ ated from J im and took Scarle tt with her, Scarle tt “expressed a desire to co n t i n u e t o see J im[ ,] and Maria pr evente d and blocke d such conta ct.” The court believed that the GAL ’s re quest for visitation ear ly in the case ref lected Scarle t t ’s desires at that time. The court found “conside rabl e ev i d en ce that taking J im out of [S car lett’s] life in 2008 was not g ood for [her].” The court noted that Dr. Warren, who had obser ved over 50 visits betwe en J im a

nd Scarle tt, and Dr. Shapiro, who had evaluated Scarle tt, both conclude d that J im and Scarle tt share d a bond and that Maria had alienate d Scarle tt from J im. The co u rt stated that it disreg arde d the in came ra interview with Scarle tt beca use it “bec ame immediately obvious to the court that the child was committed to telling the court that she no longe r wa nt[ ed] to

see J im.” The court conclude d that Scarle tt had been “coa ched” and “cor rupted” and that these wer e not “her true thoughts.” The court said, “[I ]t is obvious that the court is unhappy

-4-with Maria’ s conduct in this case and is quite sy mpathetic to J im’s position. And more importantly
, the court is very conce rned that finding ag ainst J im will take him o u t of [S car lett’s] l ife a

nd that this will be bad f

or [her] and not in her best intere sts.” ¶ 13 S t i l l
, the court noted that it was “bound to follow the law as it exis ts now” and that, despite its conce rns reg arding best interests, it could not, under curr ent law, rea ch that issue without first finding that J im had standing

. The court observe d that “the standing issue never

rea lly chang ed in the trial

. ” T h e co u rt found that “Mar ia corr ectly argue[d] she is the sole
pare nt and J im has no statutory leg al standing .” The court also noted Maria’ s constitutional rig ht to pare nt “the wa

y she choose s–g ood or bad,” but expressed conc ern a bout Scarlett’s rig ht “to have a dece nt life .” The court rema rked that “these situations *** need leg islation badly” but that it was “without authority to invent new common[-] law theories or somehow

cre ate judicial leg islation.” The court conclude d that, espec ially under Mancine
, it had no basis to find that J im had stan d i n g. The court denied counts I and I I of J im’s petition and

vacated all of its prior orde rs re g ardingvisitation and counseling

. ¶ 14 Also on Fe bruar y 29, 2012, the trial co u rt d en i ed J i m’s oral motion for a stay of that portion of its order va catingall prior visitation and counseling order s. J im timely appea led from the court’s deni al of his petition. He subsequently filed an emerg ency motion in this
court pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rule 305(d) (ef f. J uly 1, 2004), seeking to stay the trial court’s order vaca

ting its previous order s for visitation and cou n s el i n g, which we g rante d. ¶ 15 There afte r, we g rante d leave t o t h e Am er ican Civil L iberties Union of I llinois and, jointly
, to the Family Institut e at Northwe stern University
, the Chicag o Applesee d Fund for J ustice, and the Family

Equality Council, to file briefs amici curiaein support of J im.

¶ 16 ANALYSI S ¶ 17 J im initially arg ues that the trial court err ed in deny ing cou n t I of his petition, seeking custody
, beca

use (1) Maria waived the issue of standing by failing to file a timely section 2- 619 motion, (2) Maria was equitably estopped from challeng ing J im’s standing
, beca use of her conduct in holding him out to be Scarle tt’s fathe r, and (3) he has common-law standing

. ¶ 18 We deter

mine that Maria did not waive the issue of standing

. Secti o n 6 0 1 (b ) of the Dissolu t i o n Ac t p rovides that a custody proce eding may be commence d by a pare nt (750 I L CS 5/601(b)(1) (West 2010)) or “by a person other than a pare nt *** but only if [t he child] is not in the phy sical custody of one of his pare nts” (750 I L CS 5/601(b)(2) (West 2010)). Our
supreme court has interpre ted section 601(b)( 2) as a standing require ment. In re R.L.S.
, 218 I ll. 2d 428, 434-35 (2006). Section 2 of the Parenta g e Act of 1984 provides that a “ ‘par ent 1 and child relationship’ means the leg al relationship exis ting betwee n a child and his natura l or adoptive pare nts incident t o which the law confers or imposes rig hts, privileg es, duties, and obligations.” 750 I L CS 45/2 (West 2010). In the context of a nonpare nt seeking custody under section 601(b)( 2) of the Dissolution Act, standing is a threshold issue t h at t h e t ri al

T he Di sso lut ion Actdoe s no t d ef ine th e t er m

“pa re nt. ” 1

-5-court must decide befor e proce eding to a best-intere sts deter mination. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 17; see also R.L.S.
, 218 I ll. 2d at 436 (h o l d i n g t h at section 11-5(b) of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 I L CS 5/11-5(b) (West 2004)) imposes a standing require ment that
nonpare nts must m eet be fore proce edingon the merits of a petition for guardia

nship). ¶ 19 Under section 2-615, a complaint may be dismiss ed for failure to state a cause of ac tion beca use of fac tual or leg al insufficienc y

. Cummings v. City of W aterloo
, 289 I ll. App. 3d 474, 478 (1997). “A motion to dismiss pursuant to se ction 2-619 admits the leg al sufficie ncy of

a complaint, but asser

ts aff irmative matters that avoid or defe at the alleg ations contained in the complaint.” Corcoran-Hakala v. Dowd , 362 I ll. App. 3d 523, 525 (2005). He re, Ma ria alleg ed in her section 2-615 motion that J im’s petition did not state a cause of action beca use it failed to addre ss the threshold iss u e of standing under either the Dissolution Act or the Parenta g e Act of 1984. We cannot say t h at i t was improper to raise the standing issue in a section 2-615 motion, beca use the issue was raised as a fac tual insufficienc y on the fac e of 2 the petition, namely
, that J im failed to alleg e any fac ts that w ould ha ve brought him within the purview of either the Dissolution Act or the Parenta g e Act of 1984. See Cummings
, 289 I ll. App. 3d at 479 (“ [ A] fac tually insufficient complaint fails to alleg e sufficie nt fac ts essential to the cause of action.”)

. That Maria subsequently raised lack of standing
, based on the aff irmative matter that Scarle tt was in Maria’ s phy sical custody
, in a section 2-619 motion, althoug h arguably untimely and filed without leave
, does not chang e the fac t that the issue of standing had alre ady been raised. We agree with the trial court that standing was the “linchpin” of both motions to dismiss and that “[t] here ’s been no waiver .” We note that J im does not, indeed cannot, argue that he was prejudice d, beca use, as the trial court pointed out, the issue of standing was clea rly at issue and not a surprise. Acc ording ly
, J i m ’s waiver
argument has no merit. See In re Custody of McCarthy
, 157 I ll. App. 3d 377, 380-81 (1987) (holding that, wher e there was no p re j u dice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowinga tar dy

motion to di smiss based on a def ense not ra ised in the answe r). ¶ 20 Be fore addre ssing J im’s equitable estoppel argument, we examine his centr al argument that he had common-law standing to bring his custody claim. As stated above, the standing require ment that a nonpare nt may petition for custody only if the child is not in the phy sical custody of a pare nt is a threshold issue that the trial court must decide befor e proce eding to

a best-intere sts determ i n at i on. In enac ting this standing require ment, our leg islature incorpora ted the superior rig hts doctrine into the Dissolution Act. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 15; see also R.L.S.
, 218 I ll. 2d at 434 (obser ving that the superior rig hts

We ar e awar e of cas es hol din g tha t la ck of st and ing unde r sec ti on 601( b)( 2) is an 2 af fi rmati ve def

ens e tha t is wai ved if not ra is ed in a ti m el y sec ti on 2- 619 m oti on to dis m is s. See
, e.g. , In re K.P.L.
, 304 Il l

. App. 3d 481, 487 (19 99)

. However, we ar e con vinced tha t, unde r the ci rc um st anc es pre sen te d her e, Ma ri a cou ld pro per ly ra is e st and ing in a sec ti on 2- 615 m oti on. I n any event, the tr ia l c our t h ad d is cr et ion to al low Ma ri a’ s tar dy sec ti on 2- 619 m oti on beca use it did not pre j udi ce J im.

-6-doctrine is incorpora ted into both the Dissolution Act and the Pr o b ate Act ). The superior 3 rig hts doctrine rec og nizes pare nts’ interest in the car e, custody
, and control of their children, which is “ ‘per

haps the oldest of the fundame ntal liberty interests.’ ” R.L.S.
, 218 I ll. 2d at 438 (quoting Troxel v. Granville
, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)) ; see also Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 15 (stating that the “super ior ri g hts doctrine *** holds that pare nts have the superior rig ht to car e, custody
, and control of their childre n ”)

. Fi t pare nts enjoy a presumption that they act in the best interests of their children. R.L. S

. , 2 18 I ll. 2d at 439 (citing Troxel
, 530 U.S. at 68). “[S] o long as a pare nt adequately car es for his or her children ( i.e.
, is fit), there will normally be no rea son for the State to inject itself into the private rea lm of the family to further question the ability o f t h at p ar en t to make the best decisions concerning the rea

ring of that pare nt’s children.” Troxel
, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (h o l d i n g a Washington g randpa

rent visitation statute unconstitutional as applied beca use it allowed the petitioners to proce ed straig ht to a best-intere sts analy sis without any defe renc e acc orded to the par ent’s dec ision to l imit gra ndpare nt visit ation). ¶ 21 Gene ra l l y , we re v i ew d e n o vo a t ri al co u rt ’s d eter mination on standing

. In re Guardianship of K.R.J.
, 405 I ll. App. 3d 527
, 5 3 5 (2 0 1 0 ). Although the trial court hear d extensive e vidence and made fac tual finding s, which we would revie w under the manifestweight-of-the

- e v idence standard ( K.R.J.
, 405 I ll. App. 3d at 535), the parties do not challeng e the court’s fac tual finding s. The standing issue prese nted here is purely a question of law, which we revie w de novo . See In re Av ery S. , 2012 I L App (5th) 100565, ¶

13. ¶ 22 J im does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that he lacks statutory standing . Be cause he is not Scarle tt’s biologica l or adoptive fathe r, J im does not meet the definition of a pare nt

u n d er s ection 2 of the Parenta g e Act of 1984. Neither does J im meet the standi n g require ment of section 601(b)( 2) of the Dissolution Act, since Scarle tt has alway s been in Maria’ s phy sical custody

. Rather, J im contends that he has common-law standing based on his pare nt-child relationship with Scarle tt, whether he is char acte rized as an equitable pare nt,

a de facto pare nt, or a psy cholog ical pare nt, or under the doctrine o f i n l o co parentis

. He
urg es us to decline to f

ollow the First District “trilog y” of In re Visitati on W ith C.B.L.
, 309 I ll. App. 3d 888 (1999), In re Marriage of Simmons
, 355 I ll. App. 3d 942 (2005), and Mancine , 2012 I LApp (1st) 111138, be cause the cases were wr ong ly decide d and conf

lict with our supreme court’s prec edent as well as “the v as t m aj ority of prec edent” from our appellate court. ¶ 23 C.B.L. involved a lesbian relationship during which one partne r bore a child as a result of artificia l insemination. The nonpare nt was involved in the child’s birth and in c aring for the child for 11⁄2 y ear s, until the parties separ ated. C.B.L.
, 309 I ll. Ap p

. 3 d at 889. The
nonpare nt filed sui t, seeking visitation and claiming st anding as a de facto pare nt or under the doctrine of in loco parentis

. C.B.L.
, 309 I ll. App. 3d at 889-90. The trial court dismiss ed

Sec ti on 11- 5(b ) of the Pro bat e Act grant s st and ing t o a n o npa re nt to pet it ion for 3 guardi ans hip if

th e pe ti ti one r s hows th atth e c hil d do es nothave a par ent who i s “ wil li ng and able
to m ake and car ry out day- to-day chil d ca re dec is ion s c onc ernin g the minor .” 7 55 I LCS 5/ 11- 5(b ) (W est 201 0); R.L.S. , 218 I ll . 2d at435

.
-7-the suit for lack of standing
, and the appellate court aff irmed. C.B.L.
, 309 I ll. App. 3d at 889. The appellate court held that standing to seek visitation is found only in the Dissolution Act and that the nonpare nt’s claims of common-law standing wer e there for e without merit. C.B.L. , 309 I ll. App. 3d at 894. ¶ 24 Severa l y ear s later, in Simmons
, the First District extended its holding in C.B.L. to apply
to standing to seek custody

. In Simmons
, the parties “par ticipated in a wedding cer emony ,” and the wife g ave birth following artificia l insemination. Simmons
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 945. The husband, howeve r, was a transsexual male who had been born a fema le. Simmons
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 945-46. The husband filed for dissoluti on of marria g e and soug ht custody of the child. The wife argued that the husband lacke d standing beca use the same-se x marria g e

was invalid under I llinois law and he was not the biologica l or adoptive fathe r. The trial court decla red the marria g e void ab initio
, denied the dissoluti on petition, and g rante d sole custody
to the wife. Simmons
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 946. On appea l, the husband argued, inter alia
, that

4 he had standing as an equitable or de facto pare nt. Simmons
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 946-47. The
court relied on C.B.L

. to hold that standing to seek custody is found only in the Dissolution Act, the Parenta g e Act of 1984, or the I llinois Parenta g e Act (750 I L CS 40/1 et seq. (West 5 2010)). Simmons , 355 I ll. App. 3d at 953-54. ¶ 25 Relying on Simmons , this y ear , the Fir st District, in Mancine , aff irmed the trial c ourt’s dismiss al under section 2-619 of a husband’s petition for custody for lack o f s t an ding. In Mancine
, the adoptive mother of a child, W., beca me eng ag ed to a man while she was in the
proce ss of adopting as a single pare nt. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 3. The parties inte n ded that the husband would adopt W. as a steppare nt. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 5. The parties marrie d two months a fter the wife’ s adoption was completed, and the husband beg an, but never completed, the proce ss of adopting W. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶¶ 5-6. The parties subsequently adopted a child, H., toge ther. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 6. About 16 months into the marria g e, the wife filed a petition for dissoluti on, in which she alleg ed that the parties had only one child
, H. T h e husband filed

a counter petition seeking custody of W. The wife filed a motion to dismiss
, challeng ing the husband’s standing
, which the trial court g rante d. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 9. ¶ 26 On appea l, the husband cont en d ed
, inter alia
, that he had standing as W.’s equitable
pare nt since he had been the child’s primary car etake r. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 12. The court noted that I llinois has not rec ognized the equitable pare nt doctrine. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 15 (citing In re A.K.
, 250 I ll. App. 3d 981, 986 (1993) (stating that “the theory of making a man who is not the biologica l fathe r of a child an ‘equitable
pare nt’ under cer

tain appea ling circ u

ms ta n c e s h a s n e v e r b e e n rec og nized in I llinois ”))

. Citi ng Simmons
, the court stated that “stan d i n g t o s ee k full car e and custody of a minor child is found solely within” the Dissolution Act, the Parenta g e Act of 1984, or the I llinois Parenta g e Act. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1s t ) 1 1 1 1 3 8
, ¶ 16. The court stated that the husband did not

T he cou rt grant ed visit at ion ri ghts t o t he h usb and . T he wi fe di d not con te st the visit at ion 4 ord er , an d t he a ppe ll at e c our t d id notadd re ss the is sue

. Simmo ns , 355 I ll . App. 3d a t 9 46.

T his ac t appl ie s on ly to chi ldr en b orn as a r esu lt of ar ti fi ci al in seminat ion

. 5

-8-qualify as a pare nt under section 2 of the Parenta g e Act of 1984 beca use he was neither the biologica l nor the adoptive pare nt. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 16. Th e co u rt further conclude d that the husband lacke d statutory s t an d i n g as a nonpare nt under section 601(b)( 2) of the Dis solution Act because the child was in t h e p h y s i ca l custody of hi s only leg al par ent–the wife

. Mancine , 2012 I LApp (1st) 111138, ¶¶ 17-18. ¶ 27 We agree with the rea soning and the holding of Mancine

. Under Mancine
, J im lacks both statutory standing on the fac ts and common-law standing bec au se the equitable pare nt doctrine is not rec og nized in I llinois

. J im acknow ledg es his lack of standing under Mancine
, but he urg es that Mancine was wrong ly decide d beca u s e the Dissolution Act and the Parenta g e Act of 1984 did not supplant the common law and standing is not found solely in the statutes. Ther efor e, accor ding to J im, he has common-law standing to seek c ustody . In supp o rt o f his position that the s tatutes did not supplant the common law, J im relies on In re Parentageof M.J. , 203 I ll. 2d 526 (2003). ¶ 28 In M.J

., the trial court dismiss ed a biologica l mother’s complaint seeking child support from the man who was her former para mour. M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 529. The mother alleg ed that he had orally consente d to her be ing a rtificially inseminated and had agree d to support the twin s b orn as a result. M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 530-31. Upon discovering that the man was

m arri ed
, t h e mother filed suit to establish pater nity and to impose a support obligation
, seeking relief under both the common law and under the I llinois Parenta g e Ac t (750 I L CS 40/1 et seq. (W est 2010)). M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 531. The appellate court aff irmed, but the
supreme c ourt reve rsed a s to the common-law c laims. M.J. , 203 I ll. 2d at 529. ¶ 29 The supreme court first noted I llinois ’s strong public pol i cy “r ecognizi ng the rig ht of

ever y child to the phy sical, mental, emotional, and monetary support of his or her pare nts.” M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 539. The court observe d that the I llinois Parenta g e Act, perta ining solely
t o children born as a result of artificia l insemination, contained only three sections an d included no languag e indicating an intent to prohibit common-law actions for child support. M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 539-40. The court also noted that “statutes and case law do not equivocate in imposing child support obliga tions for other children born out of wedlock.” M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 541. Ba sed on t h i s re as o ning, the court held that the I llinois Parenta g e Act did not prec lude the mother’s common-law claims for child support. M.J.
, 203 I l l

. 2 d at 541. The
court conclude d, “Our holding is limit ed to the unique circ umstances of this case .” M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 542; see Simmons
, 355 I ll. App. 3d at 952-53 (stating that, althoug h M.J. stood for the proposition that a child support action could be brought under the common-law theories of brea ch of con t ra ct an d promissory estoppel, it did not support the proposition that a custody action could be broug ht under the c ommon law). ¶ 30 We note that our supreme court expressly limit ed its holdi n g i n M. J. t o t he “unique circ umstances” prese nted there , including the purported f ather ’s financ ial support of twins born to his paramour as a r esult of ar tificial insemination to which he alleg edly consente d. See M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 530-31. We a lso note that the court in M.J. addre ssed common-law claims only for child support, not a common-law claim for cust o d y as in the prese nt case

. Moreove r, there is a vast differ ence betwee n the limit ed scope of the I llinois Parenta g e Act, perta ining only to children born as a result of artificia l insemination (see M.J.
, 203 I ll. 2d at 539 (“In considering the rea ch of the I llinois Parenta g e Act, we note that the statute contains

-9-only three sections ***.”)), and the wide scope of the Dis solution Act, addressing custody

and visitation rights of

both pare nts and nonpare nts. In the Dissolution Act, our leg islature

cre ated a c o mp r e h e n s ive scheme addre ssing the rig hts of nonpare nts to seek both custody and

v isitation, there by evincing its intent to prec lude common-law actions for cust o d y o r visitation. S ee C.B.L. , 309 I ll. App. 3d at 891 (notingthat leg islative intent to supplant the common law ca

n be shown through enac tment of detailed and compr ehensive leg islation). ¶ 31 The I llin o i s P arentag e Act took eff ect in 1984 and was amende d only once, mere ly to chang e its short title (Pub. Act 86-1475, art. 4, § 4 -2 6 (e ff

. J an. 10, 1991)). On the other hand, the Dissolution Act took eff ect in 1977 and has been amende d numerous times since then. In particula

r, section 601 was amende d to allow a steppare nt to p et i t i o n fo r custody under cer tain circ umstances (Pub. Act 90-782, § 5 (ef f. Aug

. 14, 1998)), and to allow, upon the death of one pare nt, a grandpa ren t t o petition for custody under cer tain circ umstances (Pub. Act 93-1026, § 5 (ef f. J an. 1, 2005)). Section 607, providing for visitation rights, ha s been a mended numerous times. In W ickham v. Byrne
, 199 I ll. 2d 309 (2002), our supreme court held that the g randpa rent-visitation provisions in sections 607(b)( 1 ) a nd 607(b)( 3) (750 I L CS 5/607(b)(1)
, (b)( 3) (West 2000)) wer e unconstitutional under Troxel

. W ickham
, 199 I ll. 2d at 320-21. The leg islature subsequently amende d the unconstitutional provisions, adding conditions to g ran dpare nt visitation and establishing a rebuttable presumption that

a fit pare nt’s visitation decisions are not harmful to the child’s mental, phy sical, or emotional health. Pub. Act 93-911, § 5 (ef f. J an. 1, 2005). In In re Marriage of Engelke ns , 354 I ll. App. 3d 790 (2004), the court held that the steppare nt-visitation provision in section 607(b)( 1.5) (750 I L CS 5/607(b)(1.5) (West 2002)) was unconstitutio n al u nder Troxel

. Engelke ns , 354 I ll. App. 3d at 794-95. Given our leg islature’s cre ation of a complex, detailed, and evolving scheme of cus t o dy and visitation in response to the incre ase of nontraditional families in I llinois
, we conclude that the leg islature intended to supplant the common law of custody and visitation in I llinois

. See In re Marriage of Sullivan
, 342 I ll. App. 3d 560, 564 (2003) (“The eff ect of the Dissolution Act was t o superse de and repla ce the common law with re g ard to the subject matter

it addresse d.”); C.B.L. , 309 I ll. App. 3d at 891 (holdingthat section 607 h ad s upplanted the common law of visitation in I llinois beca use the statute had “ev o l v ed from a simple, straig htforwa rd codification of the commo n l aw of pare ntal visitation to a complex and ever -g rowingstatutory provision”). ¶ 32 Moreove r, even assuming that the leg islature did not intend to supplant the common law, J im has cited no I llinois case on point that would g ive him common-law standing to pursue his custody claim. J im’s relianc e on Koelle v. Z w i r en , 2 8 4 I ll. App. 3d 778 (1996), is not persua sive. In Koelle
, the biologica l mother l i ed t o the nonpare nt (to whom she was a materna l figure, as she had lived with the nonpare nt’s fathe r in a romantic rela tionship during th e n o npare nt’s adolesc ence ), t elling him that he was her child’s biologica l fathe r. Koelle
, 284 I ll. App. 3d at 780-81. In relianc e on that statement, and on the fac t that the nonpare nt had had a sexual e ncounter with the mother when he was 21 year s old, the nonpare nt acte d

as the child’s fathe r for 8 y ear s by baby sitti ng for her, attending pare nt-teac her confe renc es, and taking the child on rec reational outings, even a family vaca tion with the mother. Koelle
, 284 I ll. App. 3d at 781-82. Ultimately
, pater nity testing was done, and, when the nonpare nt discovere d that he was not the child’s fathe r, he filed a complaint alleg ing various tort claims

-10-and an equitable claim in which he soug ht injunctive relief in th e form of visitation

privileg es. Koelle
, 28 4 I ll. App. 3d at 782. Following the trial court’s dismiss al of his complaint, the nonpar ent appe aled. Koelle , 284 I ll. App. 3d at 783. ¶ 33 T h e appellate court reve rsed the dismiss al of the equitable claim and rema n d ed wi t h d irec tions to the trial court to g rant visitation privileg es if it would be in the child’s best interests. Koelle
, 284 I ll. App. 3d at 786. Recognizi ngthat neither the Dissolution Act nor the Pare ntag e Ac t of 1984 provided grounds for the nonpare nt’s visitation claim, the court stated that “I llinois case law and g ener al principles of equity support[ed] the claim.” Koelle
, 284 I ll. App. 3 d at 784. Relying on In re Townsend
, 86 I ll. 2d 502 (1981), the court stated that “aw arding custody or visitation rig hts to a nonpare nt over the ob jection of a natura l
pare nt is permissible if it would be in the b es t interests of the child.” Koelle
, 284 I ll. App. 3d at 784. ¶ 34 We have serious doubts that Koelle
, decide d befor e Troxel
, would survive scrutiny under

a Troxel analy sis, beca

use it place d a nonpare nt on equal footing with a pare nt and completely by

passed the superior rig hts doctrine and its presumption in favor of a fit pare nt. See W ickham
, 199 I ll. 2d at 32 0 (hol ding that previous version of I llinois ’s g randparentvisitation statute was unconstitutional under Troxel beca use it put a nonpare nt on equal footing with a pare nt in contravention of the pre s u m p t i o n that fit pare nts act in the best interests of their children). And, i n fa ct , in R.L.S.
, our supreme court abrog ated Townsend and a line of pre- Troxel case s that incorre ctly held that a fi t p ar en t ’s custody rig hts are subservient to the child’s best interests, and that held that, under the Probate Act, fit pare nts

are entitled to custody

. R.L.S.
, 218 I ll. 2d at 444, 447-48 (holding that to construe the Probate Act other wise would run a foul of Troxel). ¶ 35 J im’s relianc e on In re Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d 849 (1991), is also unava i l i n g. In A s h l ey K

. , the child was taken into protec tive custody within a wee k of her birth to dru gaddicted pare nts and subsequently adjudicate d a neg lected and depende nt minor. Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d at 852-53. For the next five year s, Ashley lived with her foster pare nts, who wanted to adopt her. Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d at 851-52, 854. Due to the trial court’s “total ignor ance or total disreg ard of the Fe dera l law,” Ashley was “ca ug ht in the quag mire of the burea ucratic maze,” never rec eiving the d i s p o s i t i o nal hear ing to which she was entitled within 18 months of her place ment. Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d at 873. The trial court ultimately g rante d the biologica l pare nts’ petition t o t ra n s fer custody back to them, notwithstanding the fac t that A shley had never lived with the m a nd had never even spent a whole wee k with t h em du ri ng her entire lifetime. Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d at 874. The court’s order prec luded visitation betwee n Ashley and her foster pare nts. Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d at 851-52. ¶ 36 The appellate court reve rsed the custody judgme nt, order ed that there be visitation wit h the foster pare nts, and rema nded th e ca s e fo r a new hear ing on the biologica l pare nts’ custody petition, based on the chil d ’s b es t interests. Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d at 890-91. Although the court ref

err ed to the foster pare nts as Ashley ’s de facto pare nts ( Ashley K.
, 212 I l l

. App. 3d at 874), the court was not called upon to addre ss the issue of a nonpare nt’s standing

. Rather, the case involved the biologica l pare nts’ petition to reg ain custody of their child, who had been adjudicate d a neg lected and depende nt minor, afte r she had lived for five

-11-y ear s with her foster pare nts in a stable home ( Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d at 874). Not only

wer e the leg al issues differ ent from those in the prese nt case , but also the egreg ious fac ts of Ashley K. are clea

rly distinguishable. There
, the biologica l pare nts’ fitness was questioned,
not only as to Ashley but also as to two of their other biologica l children. See Ashley K.
, 212 I ll. App. 3d at 855-56. Her e, si nce her adoption Scarle tt has nev er l i ved apart from Maria, and Mar ia’s fitness ha s never been at issue. 6 ¶ 37 The rema ining case s J im ci t es i n s up p ort of his arg ument that he has common-law standing are also inapposite. See, e.g. , Hawkins v. Hawkins
, 102 I ll

. Ap p

. 3d 1037, 1039 (1981) (re cognizi ng that a common-law tradition of allowing g randpa rent visitation was not supplanted by an ear ly version of the Dissolution Act that did not provide for any nonpare nt visitation); Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski
, 63 I ll. App. 3d 66, 67, 73 (1978) (af firming trial court’s
g rant of phy sical custody to stepmot h er with visitation to the biologica l mother wher e the stepmother had had actua l phy sical custody of the children for over three y ear s and looking
at the Probate Act); Look v. Look
, 21 I ll. App. 3d 454, 456-57, 459 (1974) (af firming the trial court’s order g ranting custody to the g randpa rents instead of the biologica l fathe r wher e the child had lived with the grandpa rents for five year s). ¶ 38 J im further maintains that he has common-law standing based on the doctrine of parens patriae

. J im asser

ts that under this doct ri n e co u rt s have inhere nt authority to exercise jurisdiction over children, independe nt of statute. The doctrine of parens patriae rec og nizes the “ge nera l p ower and obli g ation of t he gover nment as a whole to protec t minors and the infirm” from neg lect, abuse, and fr aud. (I nterna l quotation marks omitted.) Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 36. The power was expressly incorporated into section 601(a) of the Dissolution Act (750 I L CS 5/601(a) (West 2010)). Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 37. However, t his “eme rg ency” power “is considere d extraordinary and is not intended as the basis of jurisdiction for g ener al custody disputes betwee n pare nts and others.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 37. The court in Mancine reje cted the husband’s parens patriae argument. Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶¶ 36- 37. Given that the facts in Mancine did not war rant the court’s use of its parens patriae power , we cannot say that the power is war rante d here
, wher e J im has not even alleg ed that Scarle tt is subject to neg lect or abuse. The case s cited by J im do not convince us otherwise. See, e.g. , People ex r el

. L eh man v. L ehman
, 34 I ll. 2d 286, 287 (1966) (addre ssing proper

venue as betwee n two differ ent counties); People ex rel. Vallera v. Rivera
, 39 I ll. App. 3d 775, 777 (1976) (re versing the trial court’s denial of the putative fathe r’s visitation petition (pending the mother’s pater nity suit wher e the fathe r admitted pater nity) and rema

nding for a hea ringon best interests of the child). ¶ 39 Nor can we conclude under exis ting law that Maria should have been equitably estopped from challeng ing J im’s sta n d in g

. Jim main

tain s th a t equitable estoppel applies beca use Maria

W e a r e awar e of the ord er of pro te ct ion obt ai ned by J im ex par te in 2007
, bas ed o n a n 6 inc ide nt wher ei n Ma ri a al le gedly sl app ed Sca rl et t on the b a c k o f the hea d for dis obe die nce

. However, two weeks la te r, the ord er of pro te ct ion was dis m is sed by agree m ent

. Mo re over, the tr ia l

cou rt fou nd, and nei the r par ty dis put es, tha t, al tho ugh Ma ri a and J im had dif fe re nt par ent ing st yles, wit h M ar ia bei ng str ic te r, b oth wer e good p ar ent s.

-12-actively encour ag ed J im and S car lett to form a father -child relationship and held them out

to the world as such. We revie w under the manifest-w eig ht-of-the -evide nce standard the trial court’s deter

mination that equitable estoppel did not apply

. Morgan Place of Chicago v. City of Chicago , 2012 I LApp (1st) 091240, ¶ 33. ¶ 40 Initially we note that, in Mancine
, the court reje ct ed t h e s ame argument under similar fac ts. The cour

t in Mancine

listed the fac tors nece ssary to prove e quitable estoppel: “ ‘( 1) the other

person misrepr esente d or conc eale d materia l fac ts; (2) the othe r per son knew at the time he or she made the repr esentations that they wer e untrue; (3) the party claiming estoppel did not know t h at the repr esentations wer e untrue when they wer e made and wh en they wer e acte d upon; (4) the other person intended or rea sonably

ex p ec t ed that the party claiming estoppel would act upon the repr esentations; (5) t h e party claiming estoppel rea sonably relied upon the repr esentations in g ood faith to his or her detriment; an d (6 ) t he party claiming estoppel would be prejudice d by his or her relianc e on the repr esentations if the other person is permitted to deny the truth there of.’ ” Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 26 (quoting Gedde s v. Mill Creek Country Club, Inc. , 196 I ll. 2d 302, 313-14 (2001)). The court reas o n ed t hat “[e]quit able estoppel is available only if a party has relied upon another party ’s misrepre sentation or conce alment of a materia l fac t.” Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 27 (citing McI nerney v. Charter Gol

f

, In c. , 1 7 6 I ll. 2d 482, 492 (1997))

. Be cause the husband in Mancine “knew at all times that he was not the biologica l f ather of [t he child] and that for mal adoption was necessa ry” ( Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 27), and beca

use the wife “did not misrepre sent the materia l fac t that [t he husband] would have to underg o the formal adoption proce ss in o rder to be [t he child’s] leg al pare nt” ( Mancine
, 2012 I L App (1st) 111138, ¶ 28), the court held that the d o ct ri n e of equitable estoppel wa s not available ( Mancine , 2012 I L

App (1st) 111138, ¶ 29)

. ¶ 41 As in Mancine
, J im was awar e at al l times that he was not Scarle tt’s biologica l father
, that the Slovakian adoption did not perta in to him, and that formal adoption in I llinois would be nece ssary

. J i m t es t i fi ed that it was the parties’ intent that both of them would pursue adoption of Scarle tt in this country

. He sai d t h at h e h ad initiated discussions with Maria about adoption ever

y three to six months through 2006. J im testified that Maria’ s response

was alway s positive but that she did not act upon his reque sts. He testified that, when he told Maria that he had found an attorney to handle the adoption, Maria r es p o n ded that she was busy and that she wanted a Slovakian attorney

. J im also testified that, in 2007, shortly befor e Maria and Scarle tt wer e schedule d to visit Slovakia, he had asked Maria to sign a document desig nating him as S car lett’s short-term gua rdian. He testi fi ed that he was conce rned that, “i f s o m ethi ng happene d overse as,” he would “still be able to see Scarlett and that Scar l et t would be raised” in the United States. J im further testified th at i n 2 0 08 and 2009 he had investigated hi s rig hts as t o Scarle tt under Slovakian la w and even talked to an attorney in Slovakia. He never filed any thing in S lovakia. When aske d what, if a ny thing, he had done
t o secur e United States citizenship for Scarle tt, J im replied that he himself coul d n o t d o any thing. He stated, “A ll Ican do is wor k throug h Maria.” By his own testimony , J im was clea rly awa re that he had no l ega l p arent-child relationship with Scarle tt. Maria made no misrepre sentations of fa ct as to Ji m’s leg al status in relation to Scarle tt.

-13-¶ 42 We note J im’s argument in his reply brief that, wher eas Mancine involved a child bare ly

two y ear s old, the instant case “pre sents much strong er fac tual support for equity to step in” beca use Scarle tt was with J im longe r and had alre ady suffe red abandonme nt as an orphan in Slovakia. We are quite awa re of the distinguishing fac ts pointed out by J im and are not at all indiffer ent to Sca

rlett’s situation; nonethe less, we must a ct within the bounds of the law as it ex ists. ¶ 43 In support of hi s equitable estoppel argument, J im relies on In re Marriage of Schlam
, 271 I ll. App. 3d 788 (1995). In Schlam
, the biologica l mother of a child marrie d a man when the child was about six y ear s old. Although the husband was not the child’s biologica l fathe r, the wife repr esente d him as such and even g ave the child the husband’s surname. The husband formed a close rela tionship with the child and assumed financ ial responsibility for her. The husband filed for di vorce about s ix y ear s later, a nd the par ties entere d into a joint
pare ntin g agreement, which the trial court incorporated into the judgme nt of dissoluti on. Schlam
, 2 7 1 I l l

. App. 3d at 791. For about two y ear s there afte r, the husband provided financ ially for the child and exercised his joint custody rig hts. Schlam
, 271 I ll. App. 3d at 791-92. After a dispute betwee n the parties, the husband filed a petition for a rule to show

cause , alleg ing that the wife was violating his rig hts under the joint pare nting agree ment, and the wife responde d with a petition to decla re the agree ment void ab initio

. T h e trial court g rante d the wife ’s petition, and the husband a ppeale d. Schlam , 271 I ll. App. 3d at 790. ¶ 44 T h e ap p el late court reve rsed, holding that the wife was equitabl y es t o p p ed fr o m challeng ing the joint pare nting agree ment. S ch l a m , 271 I ll. App. 3d at 794-95. The court define d equitable estoppel as arising “ ‘whe n a party , by his words or conduct, intentionally

or throug h culpable neg lige nce, induces rea sonable re li a n c e b y a n o th er on his repr esenta

tions and thus leads the other, as a result of that relianc e, to chang e his position to his detriment.’ ” Sch l a m , 2 71 I ll. App. 3d at 794 (quoting Zink v. Maple Inve stment & Dev elopment Corp.
, 247 I ll. App. 3d 1032, 1039 (1993))

. The court noted that the purpose of equitable estoppel is to “pre vent fra

ud and injusti ce.” Schlam
, 271 I ll. App. 3d at 794. The court applied estoppel to the wife beca

use, in r eliance on the wife’ s intentional r epre sentation to the trial
court that the husband would rema in a part of the child’s life, the husband obligated himself to pa y child support, provide he alth insurance , and have the child reside with him one-ha lf of ea ch we ek. Schlam , 271 I ll. App. 3d at 794. ¶ 45 Schlam is inapposite. The court in Schlam did not apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel
to prec lude the wife from challeng ing standing ; rathe r, the court held th at t h e wife was equitably estopped from challeng ing the parties’ joint pare nting agree ment. Indeed, the wife
not only had failed to raise a lack of standing but had “implicitly repr esente d to the trial court [t hat the husband] had standing to petition for joint custody” ( S ch lam
, 271 I ll. App. 3d at 796). Estoppel was based not on the wife’ s conduct in holding the husband out as the child’s fathe r, but on her conduct i n re p re senting to the trial court that joint custody was in the child’s best interests, thus implicitl y repr esenting that the husband had standing to seek joint custody

. There fore
, the husband rea sonably relied on the agree ment in a nticipating that the
pare nt-child relationship would continue. Be cause the wife’ s repr esenta tions we re made at the end of the parties’ relationship and incorporated into the trial court’s dissolution order, it was rea sonable to believe that the wife’ s repr esentations constituted her perma nent intent,

-14-b ar ring a substantial chang e in circ umstances. See 750 I L CS 5/610(b) (West 2 0 1 0 )

(providing for modification of child custody judgme nt only on “cle ar and convincing evidenc e, *** that a chang e has occur red in the circ umstances *** and that the modification is nece ssary

to serve the best interest of the child”). ¶ 46 In contra st, in the prese nt case , the evidenc e sup p o rt s t h e d et ermination that Maria’ s conduct did not rise to such a level, as she never made a ny repr esentation to the t rial court of a fathe r-d aughter rela

tionship. Instead, the repr esenta tions about which J im complains

wer e made to family

and fr iends, and pe rhaps Scarle tt’s school, while J im and Maria w ere contemplating marria g e. Maria’ s attempts to cre ate a family
, likely based on J im’s promise of marria g e, could not rea sonably induce J im to believe that, absent that marria g e, they would alway s rema in a family

. Unlike in Schlam
, Maria made no repr esentations reg arding

a continued relationship betwee n Scarle tt and J im following the parti es ’ separ ation. That Maria allowed J im to see Scarle tt for a few months following the separ ation is indicative of

a gratuitous undertaking that she had the rig ht to revoke

. See Engelke ns , 354 I ll. App. 3d at 798 (holding that the stepmother could not enfor ce her agree ment with the biologica l fathe r to all o w her visitation, despite the stepmother’s having included the child on her health insurance for y ear s in relianc e, beca use the agree ment “wa s nothing more than a g ratuitous undertaking” ). Consequently
, Maria did not misrepre sent any materia l fac t, and J im cannot be said to have rea sonably relied on Ma

ria’s c onduct prior to the se paration. ¶ 47 Nor are we persua ded that Schlam is inconsistent with Mancine

. Notwithstanding Jim’s

asser tion to the contrary
, the court in Mancine did not reje ct equitable estoppel based on a require ment that the husband show fra ud or intent to dece ive. Mancine cited Gedde s , a 2001 decision fr om our supreme court, whic h indicates that the f irst fac tor of equitable estoppel is a misrepre sentation or conce alment of a materia l fac t. The Mancine court’s conclusion that the wife was not equitably estopped fr om challeng ing the husband’s standing re flec ted the fac t that, as in the prese nt case , she had n o t misrepre sented any materia l fac t. Schlam was based on diff

ere nt fac ts, where a misrepr esentation of material f act wa s made. ¶ 48 Both J im and the I llinois ACLU, in its amicus brief, cite a litany of out-of-state case s in support of the proposition that this c ourt should r ecognize c ommon-law standing for J im’s custody claim. C as es from our sister states are not binding on this court. See Grafner v. Departme nt of Employme nt Se curity , 393 I ll. App. 3d 791, 801 (2009). Neither do we find them persua sive, beca

use Mancine is apposite I llinois law and the out-of-state case s cited are not repr esentative of I l l i n o is law, which, as we discussed above, has never rec og nized common-law stan d i n g fo r an equitable pare nt to seek custody when the child is in the phy sical custody of a fit pare nt. Mos t of t he cases cited are based on either a specific state statute g ranting standing to a nonpare nt petitioner or on well-e stablished common law within that state. See, e.g. , Mullins v. Pickle simer
, 317 S.W .3d 569 (K y

. 2 010) (holding that the biologica l mother’s former same-se x partne r had s t an d i ng to seek custody under a statute g ranting standing to a nonpare nt who has phy sical custody and was acting as a pare nt, even if the nonpar ent did so in a share d custody
, copar enting situation); C.E.W

. v. D.E.W

. , 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146 (af firming the trial court’s awa rd of pare ntal rig hts to the biologica l mother’s former same-se x partne r, wh er e t h e mother conce ded that the partne r was the child’s de facto pare nt under Maine’s common law, and reje cting the mother’s argument that

-15-under rele vant Maine statutory provisions a de facto pare nt’s rights are limit ed to visitation

only); Latham v. Schwerdtfeger
, 8 0 2 N. W .2d 66 (Ne b. 2011) (despite lack of statutory standing
, biologica l moth er ’s former same-se x partne r had standing to seek custody and visitation under the doctrine of in loco parentis , which wa s well established in Nebra ska’s

comm on law); In re Clif

ford K.
, 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005) (following the biologica l mother’s death, her same-se x partne r was awa rded custody as the psycholog ical pare nt, over the materna l g randf

ather
, under the “exceptiona l c a ses” provision of a West Virg inia statute). But cf. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.
, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (holding t h at biologica l mother’s former same-se x partne r lacke d standing to seek custody
, beca use s h e h ad not d em o n strated the mother’s unfitness or compelling circ umstances requiring a custody chang e, but holding that, based on the courts’ long -re cognized equitable power , nonpare nt could establish standing to seek visitation if she demonstrated a pare nt-like relationship with the child and a

signific ant trig g ering

event justifying sta

te interve ntion). ¶ 49 Whil e we are not unsy mpathetic to J im’s positi o n , o r i n d ee d
, t o S carlett’s situation (espe cially

havingrea d the amicus brief submit ted by the Fa mily Institut e at Nor

thwestern University
, et al

. ), not only would it be inappropriate for us to ignore ex isting I llinois law, but our doing so would likely be fra ug ht with unintended conseque nces. L eg al chang e in this complex are a of social signific ance must be the product of car eful, extensive policy debate
, sensitive not only to the evolving rea lities of nontraditional fa m i l i es and the needs of the
persons within those families, not the l ea s t o f whom are the children, but also to pare nts’ fundame ntal liberty interest embodied in the superior rig hts doctrine and its restric tion of the ability of the state to interfe re in family matt er s

. In short, the compre hensive leg islative solution demande d here must be provided by our Gene ral Assembly

. See C.B.L.
, 309 I ll. 7 App. 3d at 895. ¶ 50 J i m further contends that the trial court’s denial of his petition violates bot h h i s an d Scarle tt’s fede ral and state constituti o n a l rig hts. Specifica lly
, J im urg es that his and Scarle tt’s substantive due proce ss rig hts to “fa milial association and integ rity” wer e violated and that Scarle tt’s r ight to e qual protec tion was violated beca use she was penalized “bec ause of her birth status or her pare nts’ marital status, which ar e b ey o n d her control.” Our revie w of constitutional issues is de novo

. XLP Corp. v. Co u n t y o f Lake
, 359 I ll. App. 3d 239, 243 (2005). ¶ 51 To the extent that J im raises constitu t i o n al cl aim s on Scarle tt’s behalf
, we must reject them. The caption on J i m ’s petition states, “Scar lett [Z.-D .], A Minor Child, by J ames R.[ D.], individually
, and as n e x t friend on behalf of minor child Scarle tt [Z.-D .], Petitioners.” We note that a minor may not brin g a suit in her own name. Seve rs v. Country Mutual

One of the out

- of-stat e cas es tha t J im and amic us ci te is In re Pare nta ge of L.B. , 122 P.3d 7 161 (W ash

. 2005 ) ( en banc ), whic h invol ved a j udi ci al sol uti on. T her e, the W a s h i n gt o n Supr eme Cour t, in a m at te r of fi rs t impres si on, hel d tha t exp and ing it s comm on la w to re cognize st and ing for de fac to par ent s to see k cus tody was c o n s i s t ent wit h it s exi st ing comm on la w, and tha t the Wa shi ngton le gisla tur e, con spi cuo usl y si le nt on the m at te r, had not sup pla n t e d Wa shi ngton’ s

comm on la w. T he cou rt ado pte d a de fac to par ent age te st as del ine at ed by the Wi sco nsi n Supr eme Cour t i n In re Cust ody of H.S.H.- K. , 533 N.W. 2d 4 19, 4 21 ( Wi s. 1 995)

.

-16-Insurance Co.
, 89 I ll. 2d 515, 520 (1982); Klak v. Skellion
, 317 I ll. App. 3d 1092, 1094-95

(200 0 ). Al t h o u gh J im filed a motion to be appointed next friend, the trial court denied it based on J im’s status as a pa rty , which cr eate d a conf

lict of interest. F urthermor e, “a party has st anding to bring a constitutional challeng e only if the par ty is able t o show himself to be within the class ag g rieve d by the alleg ed unconst i t u tionality .” In re Marriage of Nienhouse
, 355 I ll. App. 3 d 146, 153 (2004). Thus, J im may not asser t Scarle tt’s constitutional rights. ¶ 52 J im’s argument reg arding his due proce ss rig hts as a pare nt beg s the question, as we have made clea r that J im has not demonstrated that he is a pare nt under I llinois law. J im’s relianc e

on Prince v. Massachusetts
, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), does not compel the conclusion that he has

a constitutional rig ht to pare ntal statu s. In Prince
, the child’s aunt and leg al guardia n challeng ed t h e constitutionalit y of Massac husetts’ child labor laws, under which she was convicted f

or sending

the nine-year -old child to distribute J ehovah’ s Wi tnesses’ literature. Prince
, 321 U.S. at 159-61. She argued that the laws violated her right to fre edom of relig ion and her due proce ss rights as a pare nt. Prince
, 321 U.S. at 164. T h e C o u rt ’s an aly sis was about pare ntal constitutional rig hts. Prince
, 321 U.S. at 165-70. Howeve r, the Court was not called upo n t o ad d re ss the aunt’s standing as a pare nt, as the aunt had lega l custody of t he child. Prince , 321 U.S. at 161. ¶ 53 J i m ci t es L eh r v. R o bertson
, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), for the propositio n t h at t h e constitutional “intere st in pr e s e r v in g th e e mo ti o n al attachme nts [children] develop with adult
pare nt figures” “der ives not nece ssarily fr o m a blood relationship but from the role the
pare ntal adult play s in a ch i l d’s life.” In Lehr
, the Court held that a biologica l fathe r’s constitutional rig hts wer e not violated by lack of n o t i ce as t o his child’s adoption by the biologica l mother’s husband wher e the fathe r had never had any signific ant relationship with the child. Lehr
, 463 U.S. at 249-50. Lehr did not addre ss the relationship betwee n a child and an adult par ent figure. ¶ 54 Finally
, J im’s relianc e on Plann e d Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth
, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), in support of his contention that b o t h p ar en t s and children have a fundame ntal rig ht to cre ate and maintain family relationships is no t we l l t ak en. In Danforth
, the Court addre ssed the constitutionalit y of Missouri’s abortion statute. Danforth
, 428 U.S. at 62-63. In holding unconstitutional the statute’s require ment that a minor obtain p ar ental consent befor e underg oing an abortion, the Court reje cted the ar gument that the provision was justified by the state’s interest in safe guarding the family unit. Danforth
, 428 U.S. at 75. Danforth said nothing a

bout a right to create or to maintain family relationships. ¶ 55 In sum, as J im conce des, he had no statutory standing to bring his claim for custody . J im has provided, and our rese arc h has reve aled, no apposite I l l inois case law rec og nizi ng common-law standing to petition for same. Th u s , as s u ming arguendo that the rele vant statutes do not supplant the common law, there simply is no I llinois common law to support J im’s position. Acc ording ly
, beca use Ji m la cks standing under the Dissolution Act and the Parenta g e Ac t of 1984, we a ffirm the tria l court’s orde r deny ing c ount Iof his petition. ¶ 56 J im also argues that the trial court err ed in dismiss ing count I I
, seeking a deter mination of child support, beca

use it was proper ly pleade d and not conting ent on any statute or finding

-17-of pare ntag e. Under the trial court’s order
, J im is not subject to paying child support. J im’s

relianc e on M.J. is misplace d. At best, under M.J.
, Maria could bring a common-law claim for child support. Howeve r, that has not happene d. Acc ording ly
, J im’s argument is without merit. ¶ 57 J im finally urg es that the dismiss al of counts I I I throug h VI was err oneous beca use they

wer e proper ly pleade d and not conting ent on a statute or a finding of pare ntag e. Our revie w of a trial court’s section 2-615 dismiss al is de novo

. Rajterowski v. City of Sycam ore , 405 I ll. App. 3d 1086, 1092 (2010). Although counts I I I through VI all sounded in contra ct, the relief
soug ht was custody
, visitation, and child support deter minations. See W

abash County v. Illinois Munici

p al Retireme nt Fund
, 408 I ll. App. 3d 924, 932 (2011) (stating that the substance of

a pleading is controlling
, not its title). Acc ording ly , these c laims are de feated by J i m ’s lack of standing
, and we aff irm the trial court’s dismiss al. See In re Marriage of Murphy
, 359 I ll. App. 3d 289, 300 (2005) (we can aff irm dismiss al for any basis supported by rec ord, re g ardle ss of trial cour t’s rea soning)

. ¶ 58 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt o f t h e ci rc u i t co u rt o f Du Pag e County is aff irmed. Given our d i s p o sition, our stay of the trial court’s Fe bruar y 29, 2012, order

vacating a ll previous order s for visitation and counse ling is her eby lifted.

¶ 59 Affir

med.

-18-