IN THE COURT OFAPPEALS OFTHE STATE OFWASHINGTON DIVISION ONE STATE OFWASHINGTON, 

## ) No. 78782-9-I 

## ) Respondent, 

## ) v. 

## ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION RYAN WILLIAM MONTANEZ, 

## ) ) Appellant. 

## ) FILED: December23, 2019 PERCURIAM

— Ryan Montanez appealsthe sentence imposed following his guilty plea to second degree assault with a firearm. Montanez contends the court erred in concluding it did not have discretion to shorten the mandatory firearm 36-month enhancement by imposing an exceptional sentence based on mitigating factors ofyouth and upbringing. He asks this court to remand for the sentencing court to exercise discretion. We affirm. On May 29, 2018, Montanez pleaded guilty to second degree assault with a firearm. In the plea agreement, he agreed to asentence recommendation of45 months confinement

-- 9 months for second degree assault plus 36 months for a mandatory firearm enhancement. Atsentencing, the courtasked whetherit had discretion to impose an exceptional sentence on the firearm enhancement based on mitigating factors such as Montanez’s age and upbringing. The prosecutortold the court it only had such discretion injuvenileNo. 78782-9-1/2

cases. Defense counsel was not sure. The court concluded it did not have discretion and imposed the 45-month sentence recommended bythe parties. Montanez appeals. DECISION Montanez contends the trial court erred in concluding it lacked discretion to reduce the mandatory firearm enhancement by imposing an exceptional sentence. Citing RCW9.94A.533(3) and State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20, 29, 983 P.2d 608 (1999), overruled on other cirounds by State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), the State maintains the court correctly ruled it lacked such discretion because Montanezwas 18 years old when he committed the offense.1 We agreewith the State.2 RCW9.94A.533 (3) (b) imposes athree-yearsentence enhancementforall class B felonies, including Montanez’s, committed with a firearm. RCW9.94A.533 (3) (e) makes the enhancement “mandatory” and requires its imposition “notwithstanding any other provision of law 

### [.1” Washington courts have recognized no exception to these statutes in adult criminal prosecutions. In State v. Brown, the Washington Supreme Court held “judicial discretion to impose an exceptional sentence does not extend to a deadly weapon enhancement in light of the absolute language” declaring such enhancements mandatory notwithstanding any other provision of law. Brown, 139 Wn.2dat29.

The State also arguesthat Montanez invited anyerror because he recommended the45-month sentence thatthe court imposed. Butas Montanez notes, the assigned errordoes not involvethe agreement between Montanez and the State, which was not binding on the court, oran erroneous statementofthe law by defense counsel. Rather, it involves the trial court’s alleged failureto recognize its alleged discretion. In any event, we need notdecide the invited errorquestion becausewe conclude therewas no error.
2We reviewquestions of lawde novo. Statev. Reeves, 184Wn. App. 154, 158, 336 P.3d105 (2014). 2No. 78782-9-1/3

Contraryto Montanez’s assertions, Statev. O’Dell, 183Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015) and State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) did not alter Brown’s holding with respectto adult offenders. In O’Dell, the defendant committed his offense ten days after his 18th birthday. Recognizing recentadvances in the scientific understanding ofadolescent cognitive and emotional development, the court wrote, “we now know that age may well mitigate a defendant’s culpability, even ifthatdefendant is overthe age of 18.” O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 695. The court remanded for a new sentencing hearing to considerwhether O’Dell’s youth diminished his culpability and justified an exceptional sentence. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at683. O’Dell did not, however, address a downward departurefrom mandato,y sentencing enhancements in adult cases. In Houston-Sconiers, the Court extended a trial court’s discretion to consider youth as a mitigating factorto mandatorysentence enhancements: Because “children are different” underthe Eighth Amendment and hence “criminal procedure laws” must take the defendants’ youthfulness into account, sentencing courts must have absolute discretion to depart as far as they want below otherwise applicable SRA ranges and/or sentencing enhancementswhen sentencingjuveniles in adult court, regardless ofhow thejuvenile gotthere. 188 Wn.2d at 9. Houston-Sconiers thus modified Brown, but only with respect to juvenile offenders. The Courtdid not modify Brown’s holding with respectto adults. Because neither O’Dell nor Houston-Sconiers authorizes enhancement reduction in adult cases, and because this court is bound by Brown, State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227 (1984) (Oncethe Supreme Court ‘has decided an issue ofstate law, that interpretation is binding on all lower courts until it is overruled by this court”), Montanez’s claim fails. In lightofourconclusion, Montanez’s claim that his counsel was 3No. 78782-9-1/4

ineffective for failing “to alert the trial court to its discretion” to reduce the firearm enhancementfails. Affirmed.
FORTHE COURT: 

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