J-A08032-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: JANET L. BRUNERMER

APPEAL OF: JANET L. BRUNERMER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1056 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-MD-0000152-2021

IN RE: JANET L. BRUNERMER

APPEAL OF: JANET L. BRUNERMER

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:

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1057 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-MD-0000146-2021

IN RE: JANET L. BRUNERMER

APPEAL OF: JANET BRUNERMER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1058 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-MD-0000147-2021
J-A08032-22

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IN RE: JANET L. BRUNERMER

APPEAL OF: JANET BRUNERMER

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:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1059 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-MD-0000148-2021

IN RE: JANET L. BRUNERMER

APPEAL OF: JANET L. BRUNERMER

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:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1060 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-MD-0000149-2021

IN RE: JANET L. BRUNERMER

APPEAL OF: JANET L. BRUNERMER

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1061 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-MD-0000150-2021

IN RE: JANET L. BRUNERMER

APPEAL OF: JANET L. BRUNERMER

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1062 WDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-03-MD-0000151-2021
J-A08032-22

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BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: APRIL 19, 2022

Janet L. Brunermer (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order entered 

in the Armstrong County Court of Common Pleas denying her petition for 

review of 13 consolidated private criminal complaints. The complaints alleged 

that four employees of Apollo Borough, Pennsylvania committed perjury, false 

swearing, witness intimidation, and obstruction of justice1in connection with 

Appellant’s prior zoning citation for owning a vacant building.

2

 On appeal, 

Appellant alleges the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the 

Commonwealth to dismiss each of her private criminal complaints. We affirm. 

The trial court indicates in its September 8, 2021, opinion that it relies 

on its August 3, 2021, memorandum, which summarized the underlying facts 

and procedural history of this case as follows:

Each of [Appellant’s] petitions refers to several cases, all of 

which relate to [her] citation in 2018 for a violation of 

Apollo[’s] . . . vacant building ordinance. A hearing on the 

citation initially was held on October 25, 2018, before Magisterial 

District Judge (“MDJ”) J. Gary DeComo, who found [Appellant] 

guilty of violating the ordinance. She appealed to [the trial c]ourt 

and, after a summary appeal hearing on June 24, 2019, she again 

was found guilty. 

In the interim period between the hearings, [Appellant]

submitted several Right to Know Law (“RTKL”) requests to Apollo 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4902(a), (b), (e), 4903(a), (b), 4952(a)(3), (a)(4), 5101.

2 Neither the trial court’s opinion nor the parties’ briefs provides a citation for 

the underlying local zoning ordinance Appellant violated. This does not impact 

our review.
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seeking documents related to the vacancy ordinance and its 

enforcement. [Appellant] challenged Apollo’s response to several

of those requests before the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records 

(“OOR”) and in four mandamus actions filed in [the trial c]ourt. 

[Appellant] later filed a fifth mandamus action seeking 

enforcement of other OOR determinations regarding RTKL 

requests she submitted to Apollo in 2020.[FN 1] 

[

FN 1 Appellant] twice appealed her summary conviction for 

violating Apollo’s vacancy ordinance. Both appeals were 

dismissed prior to any disposition on the merits.

[On] December [23,] 2020 and February [2,] 2021, 

[Appellant] submitted to the Commonwealth a total of [44] private 

criminal complaints for approval. The complaints allege certain 

crimes committed by several Apollo employees and/or contractors 

1) at the summary hearing before MDJ DeComo, 2) at the 

summary appeal hearing before [the trial c]ourt, [ ] 3) in 

responding to [Appellant’s] RTKL requests[, and (4) in responding 

to Appellant’s freedom of information act (FOIA) request.3]

Trial Ct. Op., 8/3/21, at 1-2.

This appeal concerns 13 of the private criminal complaints. Specifically,

Appellant filed three complaints against Apollo Police Chief Jared Kier, alleging 

he committed perjury at both the MDJ and trial court hearings, when he stated 

Appellant owned a vacant building and the prior owners were also cited for 

violating a vacancy ordinance. Trial Ct. Op. 8/3/21, at 6, 8. Appellant also

filed three complaints against Zoning Officer Brenda Troup, for allegedly 

committing perjury at Appellant’s trial court hearing for stating Appellant 

owned a vacant building and that she gave Appellant information regarding 

____________________________________________

3 We note the trial court does not specifically mention Appellant’s FOIA request 

in its initial recitation of facts. However, the trial court does address 

Appellant’s FOIA request in its analysis.
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the vacancy ordinance. Id. at 9. Next, Appellant filed two complaints against 

Apollo Borough Manager Cynthia McDermott, alleging she committed perjury 

and false swearing at Appellant’s MDJ hearing when she testified that 

Appellant owned a vacant building, and the prior owners were also cited for 

violating a vacancy ordinance. Id. at 10. Lastly, Appellant filed five 

complaints against Borough Secretary Deanna Shupe, alleging she committed 

witness intimidation and obstructed justice when she did not adequately 

respond to Appellant’s RTKL and FOIA requests. Id. at 12-14.

The trial court summarized:

The Commonwealth disapproved all of [Appellant’s]

complaints, concluding [ ] that each of them lacked prosecutorial 

merit. [Appellant] thereafter filed a “Complaint in Petition for a 

Writ of Mandamus” against Armstrong County District Attorney 

Kathleen M. Charlton. See CP-03-MD-0000036-2021. The [trial 

c]ourt dismissed the complaint at that case number and directed 

[Appellant] to instead file petitions for review under Pa.R.Crim.P. 

506(B)(2) [(if Commonwealth disapproves the complaint, it shall 

provide reasons, and affiant may petition the court of common 

pleas for review of the decision). Appellant] then filed the instant 

petitions on June 21, 2021.

[FN 1]

 The petitions collectively seek 

review of 13[FN 2] private criminal complaints.

______________________

[

FN 1] Although [Appellant’s husband] also is a plaintiff in all of the 

related civil mandamus actions, only [Appellant] is listed as a 

complainant in the private criminal complaints under review.

[

FN 2] Although each of the seven petitions requests review of two 

private criminal complaints, there are in fact only a collective total 

of 13 complaints attached to the petitions.

Trial Ct. Op. 8/3/21, at 2. 

After Appellant petitioned the trial court to review 13 of her dismissed

complaints, the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to “clarify its reasons 
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for” dismissal. Trial Ct. Op. 8/3/21, at 2-3. The Commonwealth indicated 

“that it declined to further investigate or approve all of the private criminal 

complaints for both legal and policy reasons.” Id. at 3. The Commonwealth 

stated specifically that none of the complaints set forth a prima facie case, the 

number of complaints and delay in filing of them “call their underlying merit 

into question,” “the original 44 complaints were submitted together on two 

dates in December 2020 and February 2021, making investigation 

impossible[,]” Appellant had civil remedies available to her, and the 

Commonwealth “does not, as a matter of policy, become involved in municipal 

ordinance disputes[.]” Id. 

On August 3, 2021, the trial court issued a single order denying

Appellant’s petitions requesting review. Appellant filed timely notices of 

appeal for each docket number.

4

 Although the trial court did not issue a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) order, on September 29, 2021, Appellant filed concise 

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4 Appellant has thus complied with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 

(Pa. 2018). See Walker, 185 A.3d at 977 (separate notices of appeal must 

be filed when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one trial 

court docket), overruled in part, Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 

477 (Pa. Dec. 22, 2021) (reaffirming that Pa.R.A.P. 341 requires separate 

notices of appeal when single order resolves issues under more than one 

docket, but holding Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits appellate court to consider 

appellant’s request to remediate error when notice of appeal is timely filed). 
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statements of errors complained of on appeal at six of the seven dockets.

5

 

That same day, this Court sua sponte consolidated Appellant’s appeals. 

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Whether the trial court erred and abused its[ ] discretion in the 

disapproving the seven private criminal complaints[? sic.]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

We first note our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a petition 

to review the Commonwealth’s disapproval of a private criminal complaint: 

“[T]he appellate court will review the trial court’s decision for an error of law. 

As with all questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo and 

the appellate scope of review is plenary.” In re Miles, 170 A.3d 530, 534 

(Pa. Super. 2017).

We further note Appellant’s pro se arguments are not entirely clear and 

seem to confuse issues. Nevertheless, we glean the following claims. 

Appellant avers the Commonwealth dismissed her private criminal complaints 

without providing her “any legal evaluation of her reasoning[.]” Appellant’s 

Brief at 22. Appellant insists the Commonwealth has “a statutory 

responsibility to advise [ ] the reasoning behind [ ] disapproval.” Id. at 23. 

Appellant maintains her private criminal complaints set forth prima facie cases 

____________________________________________

5 Though Appellant states in each of her six 1925(b) statements the trial court 

ordered her to file a 1925(b) statement on August 3, 2021, it does not appear 

the trial court issued this order. See Appellant’s Concise Statements of Errors 

Complained of On Appeal, 9/29/21, at 1. The trial court did, however, deny 

her petitions for review of private criminal complaints on August 3, 2021. 

Order, 8/3/21. 
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for each alleged violation and as such, warranted the Commonwealth to 

pursue further investigation. Id. at 24. Appellant argues “Apollo Borough 

employees . . . have lied to [her,] committed perjury[, and have filed] false 

attestations [sic].” Id. at 26. 

Appellant raises further arguments in her “summary of the argument” 

section of her brief. There, she accuses Police Chief Kier, Borough Manager 

McDermott, Zoning Officer Troup, and Borough Secretary Shupe of “lying on 

the witness stand, withholding evidence, and obstructing justice[.]” See

Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant asserts these witnesses testified to various 

things but does not present any further argument. Appellant has also filed a 

reply brief. We conclude no relief is due.

A private criminal complaint must successfully establish a prima facie

case against the alleged perpetrator. Miles, 170 A.3d at 534-35 (citations 

omitted).

[E]ven if the facts recited in the complaint make out a prima facie

case, the district attorney cannot blindly bring charges, 

particularly where an investigation may cause him to question 

their validity. Forcing the prosecutor to bring charges in every 

instance where a complaint sets out a prima facie case would 

compel the district attorney to bring cases he suspects, or has 

concluded via investigation, are meritless. The public prosecutor 

is duty bound to bring only those cases that are appropriate for 

prosecution. This duty continues throughout a criminal 

proceeding and obligates the district attorney to withdraw charges 

when he concludes, after investigation, that the prosecution lacks 

a legal basis.

The district attorney is permitted to exercise sound discretion to 

refrain from proceeding in a criminal case whenever he, in good 

faith, thinks that the prosecution would not serve the best 

interests of the state. This decision not to prosecute may be 
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implemented by the district attorney’s refusal to approve the 

private criminal complaint at the outset.

Miles, 170 A.3d at 534-35.

“It is well-settled that, if the Commonwealth disapproves a private 

criminal complaint, the complainant can petition the Court of Common Pleas 

for review . . . .” In re Private Crim. Complaints of Rafferty, 969 A.2d 

578, 581 (Pa. Super. 2009). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 506(A) (private criminal 

complaint “shall be submitted to an attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall 

approve or disapprove it without unreasonable delay”), (B)(2). 

When the Commonwealth denies a private criminal complaint “on a 

hybrid of legal and policy considerations,” the trial court reviews this decision 

for an abuse of discretion. Miles, 170 A.3d at 534-35. As stated above, this 

Court will then review the trial court’s decision for an error of law. “As with 

all questions of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo and the 

appellate scope of review is plenary.” See id. at 534. 

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines perjury under Subsections (a), 

(b), and (e) as follows:

(a) Offense defined — A person is guilty of perjury, a 

felony of the third degree, if in any official proceeding he makes a 

false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or 

affirms the truth of a statement previously made, when the 

statement is material and he does not believe it to be true.

(b) Materiality — Falsification is material, regardless of the 

admissibility of the statement under rules of evidence, if it could 

have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding. It is no 

defense that the declarant mistakenly believed the falsification to 

be immaterial. Whether a falsification is material in a given factual 

situation is a question of law.
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* * *

(e) Inconsistent statements — Where the defendant 

made inconsistent statements under oath or equivalent 

affirmation, both having been made within the period of the 

statute of limitations, the prosecution may proceed by setting 

forth the inconsistent statements in a single count alleging in the 

alternative that one or the other was false and not believed by the 

defendant. In such case it shall not be necessary for the 

prosecution to prove which statement was false but only that one 

or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to be 

true.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4902(a), (b), (e).

The crime of false swearing is defined as follows:

(a) False swearing in official matters — A person who 

makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or 

swears or affirms the truth of such a statement previously made, 

when he does not believe the statement to be true is guilty of a 

misdemeanor of the second degree if:

(1) the falsification occurs in an official proceeding; or

(2) the falsification is intended to mislead a public servant 

in performing his official function.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4903(a)(1)-(2).

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines intimidation of witnesses or 

victims, in part, as:

(a) Offense defined. — A person commits an offense if, 

with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct will 

obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the 

administration of criminal justice, he intimidates or attempts to 

intimidate any witness or victim to:

* * *

(3) Withhold any testimony, information, document or 

thing relating to the commission of a crime from any law 

enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge[, or]
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(4) Give any false or misleading information or 

testimony or refrain from giving any testimony, information, 

document or thing, relating to the commission of a crime, 

to an attorney representing a criminal defendant.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(a)(3)-(4).

A person obstructs administration of law or other government functions 

when they

intentionally obstruct[ ], impair[,] or pervert[ ] the administration 

of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical 

interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other 

unlawful act . . .

18 Pa.C.S. § 5101.

Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant 

statutory and case law, we conclude the trial court’s August 3, 2021, opinion 

thoroughly addresses and properly disposes of Appellant’s claim on appeal. 

Accordingly, we rest on its well-reasoned bases. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5-8

(regarding Appellant’s private criminal complaints that Police Chief Kier

committed perjury in testifying that Appellant owns a vacant building that was 

previously “cited as vacant while owned by [Appellant’s] predecessor[,]” 

Appellant’s accusations do “not suggest that [he] or any other individuals 

knowingly lied”), 9-10 (pertaining to Appellant’s private criminal complaints 

that Zoning Officer Troup committed perjury for testifying that she sent 

Appellant an information packet that included Apollo’s vacancy ordinance,

Appellant merely challenged a nonmaterial disagreement about the receipt of 

the information, and the question of whether Appellant was in violation of an 

Apollo vacancy ordinance was properly decided by the trial court at her 
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summary proceeding), 10-11 (in reference to Appellant’s private criminal 

complaints that Borough Manager McDermott also committed perjury and 

false swearing by stating Appellant violated the vacancy ordinance and the 

previous owners were cited for owning a vacant building, Appellant did not 

establish a prima facie case as she merely disagreed with Borough Manager

McDermott’s statement), 11-15 (regarding Appellant’s private criminal 

complaints that Borough Secretary Shupe committed intimidation of a witness 

or obstruction of administration of law, Appellant does not allege how Shupe’s 

responses to her RTKL and FOIA requests violate Subsection 5101, but instead 

alleges Shupe’s responses were inadequate, and further Appellant “alleges no 

facts establishing that Shupe intended to obstruct” court proceedings or 

“intentionally withheld any information” as Subsections 4952(a)(3) and (a)(4) 

require), 7-9, 11-12, 14-15 (furthermore, the trial court determined the 

Commonwealth’s policy considerations were independently valid and sufficient 

to support dismissal of each private criminal complaint). As we agree with 

the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis, we affirm the order denying 

Appellant’s petitions for review.

We direct that a copy of the trial court’s August 3, 2021, opinion be filed 

along with this memorandum, and attached to any future filings of this 

memorandum.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/19/2022