[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2016-Ohio-7894.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 104243

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

RONELLE TAYLOR 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-13-580285-A and CR-14-591206-A 

BEFORE: Keough, P.J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Boyle, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 23, 2016 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Brian R. McGraw 

55 Public Square, Suite 2100 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Melissa Riley 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ronelle Taylor, appeals his sentence following a guilty 

plea. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} In December 2013, Taylor was indicted under Cuyahoga C.P. No. 

CR-13-580285 with four counts of drug trafficking, three counts of drug possession, and 

one count of possessing criminal tools. All charges were felonies of the fifth degree. In 

December 2014, Taylor was named in a five-count indictment filed under Cuyahoga C.P. 

No. CR-14-591206, charging him with drug trafficking with a juvenile specification 

(first-degree felony), drug possession (second-degree felony), possessing criminal tools 

(fifth-degree felony), and two counts of endangering children (first-degree 

misdemeanors). 

{¶3} Taylor entered into a plea agreement in both cases. In Case No. 

CR-13-580285, he pleaded guilty to two counts of drug trafficking and possessing 

criminal tools. In Case No. CR-14-591206, Taylor pleaded guilty to an amended count 

of drug trafficking, which carried a mandatory prison sentence, and one count of 

endangering children. All remaining charges in both cases were dismissed. 

{¶4} In Case No. CR-13-580285, Taylor was sentenced to one year in prison on all 

three counts, to run concurrently to each other. In Case No. CR-14-591206, the court 

imposed a seven-year sentence on the drug trafficking offense, and to time served on the 

endangering children offense. The trial court ordered the sentences in both cases to run 

consecutively to each other, for a total prison term of eight years. 
{¶5} In his delayed appeal, Taylor raises two assignments of error. 

I. Consecutive Sentences 

{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Taylor contends that the trial court erred and 

lacked sufficient justification to impose consecutive sentences. Specifically, he asks this 

court to find that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that consecutive 

sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and to the danger he 

poses to the public. 

{¶7} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that when reviewing felony sentences, a 

reviewing court may overturn the imposition of consecutive sentences where the court 

“clearly and convincingly” finds that (1) “the record does not support the sentencing 

court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),” or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to 

law.” 

{¶8} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides that in order to impose consecutive sentences, 

the trial court must find that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public 

from future crime or to punish the offender, (2) such sentences would not be 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the conduct and to the danger the offender poses to 

the public, and (3) one of the following applies: 

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the 

offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed 

pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or 

was under postrelease control for a prior offense. 

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or 

more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the 

multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses 

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct. 

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime 

by the offender. 

{¶9} Compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires the trial court to make the 

statutory findings at the sentencing hearing, which means that “‘the [trial] court must note 

that it engaged in the analysis’ and that it ‘has considered the statutory criteria and 

specifie[d] which of the given bases warrants its decision.’” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio 

St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio 

St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999). Further, the reviewing court must be able to 

discern that the record contains evidence to support the findings. State v. Davis, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 102639, 2015-Ohio-4501, ¶ 21, citing Bonnell at ¶ 29. A trial court is not, 

however, required to state its reasons to support its findings, nor is it required to give a 

rote recitation of the statutory language, “provided that the necessary findings can be 

found in the record and are incorporated in the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37. 

{¶10} In this case, the trial court made the requisite R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings in 

support of its imposition of consecutive sentences. Additionally, the record supports 

these findings. 

{¶11} In making the first finding, the court stated that it was 

[r]unning the cases consecutively because I believe that it’s necessary to 

protect the public from future crime. Being a heroin salesman has created 

a major epidemic and caused many, many deaths in our community. I also 

consider consecutive sentences necessary to punish you. Other judges have 
given you as much as four years. It didn’t stop you from selling dangerous 

drugs to our community. 

(Tr. 134.) 

{¶12} In making the second finding, the trial court stated that consecutive 

sentences are “not disproportionate to the seriousness of your conduct. As I ‘ve said, it’s 

caused many deaths in our community, heroin has.” (Tr. at id.) Furthermore, during the 

sentencing colloquy, the trial court noted that Taylor had been in prison approximately 

five times for drug offenses, with the first yielding a six-month sentence, and the most 

recent being a four-year sentence. (Tr. 129.) The court noted that the prison terms did 

not “teach [Taylor] anything” because he continued in his course of conduct when he was 

subsequently charged with additional drug-related offenses. The court stated that his 

prior four-year prison sentence did not teach him anything — “You come out, you 

continue to sell drugs in our neighborhoods. You continue to be a monster. You steal 

people’s lives and futures. You steal people’s children or you steal people’s parents or 

spouses because you steal their futures, don’t you?” (Tr.130.) 

{¶13} Finally, the trial court satisfied the third finding by noting that for at least in 

Case No. CR-13-580285, he was on postrelease control when he committed the offenses. 

Additionally, the court stated that 

at least two or more of these offenses were committed as one course of 

conduct, a continuing course of conduct of selling heroin and other 

dangerous drugs to our community. And, of course, the history of your 

criminal conduct, which I’ve gone over, demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by you. 

(Tr. 135.) 
{¶14} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court made the appropriate 

consecutive sentence findings and engaged in the analysis required under R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4). We cannot “clearly and convincingly” find that the record does not 

support the court’s findings. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court for the 

court to issue a new sentencing journal entry, nunc pro tunc, to incorporate in the journal 

entry the statutory findings the trial court made at sentencing. See Bonnell at syllabus. 

Taylor’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. Sentencing Comments 

{¶15} After the trial court reviewed Taylor’s extensive criminal history, which was 

mostly drug-related offenses dating from 1999, lack of employment history, lack of 

education, and continued course of selling drugs, the trial court noted that the shortened 

prison sentences that he received previously did not teach him anything. Instead, he 

continued to sell drugs in the neighborhoods and continued to be a “monster.” (Tr. 130, 

133.) 

{¶16} In his second assignment of error, Taylor contends that the trial court 

abdicated its neutral function when it concluded that Taylor was a “monster” and 

sentenced him accordingly. Taylor contends that the trial court’s characterization of him 

as a monster deprived him of a fair sentence. 

{¶17} “Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that ‘[a] judge shall 

perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently.’” State v. Bonnell, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91785, 2009-Ohio-2721, ¶ 6. 
“The term ‘bias or prejudice,’ when used in reference to a judge, ‘implies a 

hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or favoritism toward 

one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a fixed anticipatory 

judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open state 

of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.’ 

Id., quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956), 

paragraph four of the syllabus. 

{¶18} In Bonnell, this court addressed a similar scenario in where the trial judge 

allegedly referred to Bonnell as a “monster” in off-the-record proceedings before 

sentencing — remarks that were not acknowledged by the trial judge. This court 

concluded that the trial court’s characterization of Bonnell as a “monster” did not prove 

that the judge was biased or partial when the record showed that the trial judge was 

acquainted with the facts of the case, had the benefit of a presentence report and 

sentencing memorandum, and considered the statements made by all parties. This court 

held that while the judge should have kept her impression of Bonnell to herself, the 

record did not support that the imposed sentence was inherently unfair. Id. at ¶ 9 

{¶19} Much like in Bonnell, the record here does not support that the sentence 

imposed was unfair. The trial judge presided over both proceedings for over a year, was 

acquainted with the facts of the case, had the benefit of reviewing the presentence 

investigation report, and heard statements from the prosecutor, defense counsel, and 

Taylor. The sentencing colloquy between the trial judge and Taylor was considerable, 

where Taylor admitted that the prison sentences previously imposed did not deter his 

continued conduct of selling drugs, including heroin. The trial court’s use of the term 
“monster” was made after the court considered all the facts, including mitigation 

evidence. The record does not support that the trial court acted with bias or prejudice 

when it characterized Taylor as a monster; the record supports the trial court’s decision to 

impose more than the mandatory minimum sentence was based on Taylor’s criminal 

history and undeterred conduct. 

{¶20} However, as admonished in Bonnell, trial judges should keep their personal 

characterizations of a defendant or of a defendant’s conduct to themself “rather than open 

[themself] to the kind of complaint raised in this appeal.” Id. at ¶ 8. 

{¶21} Taylor’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶22} Judgment affirmed; remanded for the issuance of a nunc pro tunc sentencing 

journal entry. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and 

MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR