* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________________

No. 95-60547

(Summary Calendar)

_________________________

LORI LEBLANC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHIRLEY S. CHATER,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

__________________________________________________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(4:95CV9LN)

__________________________________________________

March 21, 1996

Before JOLLY, JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Lori LeBlanc appeals the district court’s judgment, which adop t ed the magistrate judge’s

decision that substantial evidence supported the denial of LeBlanc’s request for disabilit y insurance

benefi t s. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that LeBlanc had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since January 4, 1993 and was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security

Act because her seizure disorder, arteriov eno us malformation (AVM), and complaints of fatigue,

headaches, and t ingling noises in her ears did not constitute a severe impairment. LeBlanc challenges

the legal standard which the ALJ used to reach the conclusion regarding her impairment. Finding that

the ALJ employed the correct le gal st andard and agreeing that substantial evidence supports the

ALJ’s decisions, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

FACTS2

Lori LeBlanc, born July 25, 1961, is a single mother, has a tenth-grade education, and last

wo rked as a sewing machine operator. LeBlanc applied for disability insurance benefits and

supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. She alleged that

she be came disabled as of September 21, 1987, based on a brain aneurysm. Her application was

di sapproved initially and on reconsideration because LeBlanc was working and earning more than

$500 per month at the time she filed the application. LeBlanc requested and received a hearing before

an administrative law judge (ALJ).

At the first step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that Le Blanc had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since January 4, 1993. However, at step two, the ALJ found that LeBlanc

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act b ecause her seizure disorder,

arteriovenous malformation (AVM), and complaints of fatigue, headaches, and t ingling noises in her

ears did not constitute a severe impairment. The Appeals Council denied LeBlanc's request for a

review of the ALJ's decision, and LeBlanc sought review in the district court.

The magistrate judge determined that the dec isio n o f t he Commissioner was supported by

substantial evidence and recommended that the district court affirm the decision. Upon LeBlanc's

objections to the magistrate judge's report, the district court revi ewed the record and adopted the

magistrate judge's report as the opinion of the district court. LeBlanc filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

"This Court limits its review of a denial of disability insurance benefits to two issues: (1)

whether the Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and (2) whether the Secretary's decision is

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." A nthony v. Sullivan

, 954 F.2d 289, 292

(5th Cir. 1992). Evidence is considered “substantial” when it allows a reasonable person to accept

the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion. S ee Cook v. Heckler

, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir.

1985). The claimant bears the burden of showing that she is disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act. Muse v. Sullivan , 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991).1 The standard under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) provides that an impairment is not severe if it does

not “significant ly limit [] [the claimant’s] physical or mental abilit y to do basic work activities.” S ee

also Hampton , 785 F.2d at 1311.

3 There is a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled:

1) Claimant is not presently working;

2) Claimant's abilit

y to work is signif

icant ly limited by a physical or mental

impairment or combination of impairments;

3) Claimant's impairment meets or equals a n impairment listed in the appendix to

the regulations (if so, disability is automatic);

4) Impairment prevents claimant from doing past relevant work;

5) Claimant cannot perform any other work.

Id. ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. "A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the

five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis." L ovelace v. Bowen

, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th

Cir. 1987).

LeBlanc does not dispute the application of the sequential steps per se. She argues that the

Commissioner applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that her impairment is not severe and

that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. LeBlanc contends that she suffers from

more than a slight abnormality, that the medical evidence corroborates her assertions of pain, and that

the ALJ erred in finding that her testimony at the hearing was not credible.

A. Legal Standard For Determining Disability.

This Court has set out the correct legal standard for determining whether an impairment is

severe: "an impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality [having] such

minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's abilit y

to work, irrespective of age, education or work experience." S tone v. Heckler

, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101

(5th Cir. 1985). The court held that it will be assumed that the wrong standard was applied "unless

the correct standard is set forth by reference to this opinion or another of the same effect, or by an

express statement that the construction [this court] give[s] to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) is used." I d.

at 1106; see also Anthony

, 954 F.2d at 294-95 (holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Bowen

v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137 (1987) did not alter the standard announced in Stone ). 14

The record indicates that the ALJ did no t expressly state that LeBlanc was not under a

disability as defined in Stone

. The ALJ cited 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c) but did not

indicate if he used the "slight impairment" co nstruction which S tone gives to the regulations. S ee

Hampton v. Bowen

, 785 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1986). In this case, the medical evidence raises

a question of whether a remand in light of the "slight impairment" standard would be a waste of

judicial resources. S ee id

. ("A case will not be remanded simply because the ALJ did not use `magic

words.'"). We conclude that where the evidence supports the ALJ's findings under either standard,

i t is imprudent to remand solely for the district court to chant the magical “slight imp airment”

incantation in its opinion. The result will not change and neither the court nor the parties benefit from

this mechanical act. On the other hand, if the record is not clear, or if there is any doubt whether the

evidence can satisfy both standards, remand is appropriate and necessary. Therefore, we hold that

where the record in a disa bility insurance case clearly establishes that both the S tone and CFR

st andard is satisfied, remand is not necessary even though the district court’s decision fails t o

expressly articulate the “slight impairment” standard established in Stone

.

B. Substantial Evidence.

The issue remaining before us is whether LeBlanc’s record contains substantial evidence that

satisfies both standards. "If the [Commissioner's] findings are supported by substantial evidence, they

are conclusive and must be affirmed." A nthony

, 954 F.2d at 295. "Substantial evidence is that which

is relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it must

be more than a scint illa, but it need not be a preponderance." I d. The determination of the severity

of the impairment may be based on substantial medical evidence alone. S ee Lofton v. Schweiker

, 653

F.2d 215, 217-18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 454 U.S. 1089 (1981). "A medical co ndit ion that can

reasonably be remedied either by surgery, treatment, or medication is not disabling." L ovelace

, 813

F.2d at 59. It is the task of the ALJ to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to make credibility

determinations. Id.5

We find that the ALJ's decision, using the CFR standard, was supported by substantial medical

evidence t hat LeBlanc's condition was remedied by medication. The ALJ considered LeBlanc's

medical records and witness testimony at the hearing. The medical evidence reflects that LeBlanc had

been d iagno sed in 1987 with a seizure disorder and an AVM of the parietal lobe. The seizure

di so rder was treated with Tegretol and Phenobarbital, and LeBlanc reported no seizure activity

through January 1990.

LeBlanc became pregnant and, because of her seizure disorder and AVM, elected a Cesarean

section for the delivery of a healthy male infant in August 1990. Throughout the pregnancy, LeBlanc

reported no seizures. She suffered from headaches, but she chose not to use potent medication

because she was pregnant. During follow-up examinations, LeBlanc complained of mild fatigue, but

she had no seizure activity and no problems with the Tegretol and Phenobarbital.

LeBlanc quit her job in January 1993 because she claimed that she was regularly experiencing

headaches and a ringing noise in her ears. LeBlanc’s doctor had informed her that the ringing was

a sign that LeBlanc would have a seizure if she did not cease the activity and calm down. LeBlanc’s

doctor did not order her to cease employment activity; she took this action on her own. There is no

evidence in the record showing that LeBlanc attempted to obtain less stressful employment.

After leaving her job in 1993, LeBlanc visited her physician in March and October 1993. She

reported that she continued to take her medication and that she had not experienced seizure activity.

Testimony at the hearing and a background questionnaire indicate that LeBlanc cared for her young

child and that she was able to drive. We co nclude that the ALJ’s decision is supported by the

record.

We also find no error with the conclusion that LeBlanc exaggerated her condition because

we agree that the evidence and testimony contradict LeBlanc’s claims. The frequency of LeBlanc’s

headaches has diminished while she has taken her medication. At the hearing LeBlanc admitted that

she had not had a migraine in eight months and had only two headaches in the previous six month2 We need not address LeBlanc's assertion t hat t he ALJ erred in its credibility determinations

because we are not permitted to reweigh the evidence. S ee A nthony , 954 F.2d at 295. Equally

unavailing is LeBlanc's argument that the ALJ erred in failing to elicit the testimony of a vocational

expert. The ALJ need not address each of the five steps in the sequential evaluation process after

determining that the claimant is not disabled. See Lovelace , 813 F.2d at 58.

6 period. This coupled with evidence that during her pregnancy she entirely discontinued the

medication without experiencing seizures proves that LeBlanc’s impairment is not severe.

Likewise, we find that the reco rd equally supports the ALJ’s conclusions using the “slight

impairment” standard articulated by this court in Stone

. The testimony and medical evidence establish

that LeBlanc’s condition is merely a slight abnormality that has not interfered with her abilit y to work.

Since LeBlanc began taking Tegretol and Phenobarbital, she has not experienced any seizure activity.

LeBlanc has been able to gi ve birth, provide child care, drive, and work without experiencing

seizures. We are convinced that if LeBlanc takes the medication as prescribed, the medication will

continue to minimize her headaches, migraines, and fatigue. There is nothing in the record indicating

that LeBlanc has had difficult y obtaining her medication. We find that LeBlanc’s impairment, which

has been readily treatable with medication, does not co nst it ute a “disability;” it is only a slight

impairment as defined in Stone

. 2

We can only conclude that upon remand the district court’s conclusion would remain the same

aft er expressly citing and applying the S tone standard. Under these circumstances, remand is no t

necessary.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.