-1- NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0441n.06 F iled: Jun e 25, 2007 NO. 06-5043 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA,

P laintif f-App ellee,
v. ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT DARELL LE STE R, COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE Defendan t-Appellant. ____________________________________________/ BEF OR E: SUH RH EIN RI CH , C LA Y, and R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. P ER CURIAM . D are ll L e ste r (“ L e ste r” ) a pp e a ls f ro m hi s c on vic tio n f

or be inga fe lon in possession of

a fire arm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). He contends that the district c ourt err ed by permitting c ross-examination of defe nse witness Rhonda Wilson (“Wi l s o n ”) , his girlf riend, reg ardinga domestic viol ence incident i nvolving him and W ilson. He also challeng es the district
c ourt ’s imp os iti on

of a fo ur -l e ve l § 2 K2 .1 (b )( 5) e nh anc e me nt. For th e rea so ns se t f or th i n th is opinion, we AF F IRM L ester’ s conviction and sente nce. I. At L ester’ s tr ia l o nth e f

e lo nin p o s s e s s io n

o f a f ir e ar m c h ar g e , th e G o v e r

n me n t p r e s e n te d
e vid e nc e that on No ve mbe r 22 , 20 03 , of fi c e rs fr om the Me mph is Po lic e De pa rtme nt r e sp on de d to a telephone call fr om Wi lson’s niece , Kambely n Wil liams (“Willi ams”), r eportingthat L ester ha d-2-

fired thr ee shots in front of Wil son’s home. At the time the gunshots wer e fired, children from the neig hborhood we re pla

y ing on the sidewalk less than twe nty fee t from L ester. When the r esponding office rs ar

rived, they

wer e informe d by W i l s o n t h at L ester f ired the gun, and off

icer s thereupon
rec overe d a gun fitting the c aller’ s descr iption in W ilson’s house. Wil son testified as a de fense witness. Duringher dire ct testimony , Wil son deni ed telling office rs that L ester shot t h e fi rea rm. The de fense lawy er a lso asked Wilson a series of que stions reg ardingWil l i ams, who wa s the informant that tele phoned the Me mphis P olice De partment rega rdi ng L ester f

iring g unshots. The defe nse lawy er spe cifica lly probed f or re asons as to why Wil liams disli ked L ester. On cr oss-examination, the Government a lso questioned Wil s o n co n cerning rea sons why Willi a ms m ig ht dis lik e L e ste r, and a sk e d w he the r Wi lli a ms h a d a pr ob le m w ithL e ste r’ s d ome sti c abuse of Wil son. During this inqui ry , W i l s o n i n s isted that she was not be aten by L ester. T he Go ve rnme nt r e sp on de d b y qu e sti on ing he r wit

h re sp e c t to L e ste r’ s J un e 7, 20 05 arr e st f or do me sti c assault ag ainst Wi lson. Defe nse counsel objected, but the district court ove rruled the objection and instructed the jury that it c ould c onsider the Gover nment’s domestic violence inquiry only fo r t he p u r p o s e o f a s s e s s i n g W i l s o n ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y. The jury returne d a guilty

verdi ct on August 9, 2005. After finding that L ester c ommitt ed felonious re ckless enda

ng erme nt under Te nnessee law, the district court applied a f our-leve l
e nh anc e me nt r e su lti ngin a se nte nc e of

12 0 mo nth s’ imp riso nm ent
. L este r n owa pp e a ls b oth

his conviction and his sentenc e. A. L e ste r f ir st c on te nd s th a t th e Go ve rnme nt’ s c ros s-e x amina tio n o f Wi lso n o n a do me sti c-3-

violence inc ident constituted impeachme nt of Wil son on a collate ral matter using e x trinsic evidenc e, and should have been pr ohibited under F ed. R. Evid. 608(b). We re view the d istrict court’s evidentiar y ruling s for a

buse of discr etion. Se e Un ite d S tates v . Ch am be rs , 44 1 F .3 d 4 38 , 4 55 (6 th Cir. 2006). “B road discr etion is give n to district courts in de terminations of admissibili ty based on considerations of releva

nce a nd prejudice , and those de cision s wi ll not be lightly overr uled.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dix on , 413 F.3d 540, 544 ( 6th Cir. 2005)). Fe d. R. Evid. 608(b) provides that “ [s] pecif ic instance s of the conduct of a w itness, for the purpose of attacking or supporti ng the witness’ c hara cter for truthfulne ss . . . may

not be prove d by extrinsi c evide nce.” L ester’ s claim of er ror unde r Rule 608(b) la cks merit most simply beca use the Gover nment never

introduced e x trinsic evidenc e. Instead, the G overnme nt te s ted Wils on’s
c re dib ili ty by c ro ss- e xami nin g he r wi th sp e c if ic re fe re nc e s to Wils on ’s June 20 05 sw or n a ff ida vit of c omp la int

inc lud e d in an arr e st tic ke t fo r L e ste r o n a c ha rg e of do me sti c vio le nc e –b ut t

he a ff ida vit itself was n o t en t er ed i n to the evidentiar y rec ord. See U

nited States v. Drake , 932 F.2d 861, 867 (10th C i r. 1991) (“ Cross-examination questions alone . . . cannot c onstitut e extrinsic evidence .”); United States v. J

ackson , 882 F.2d 1444, 1448- 49 (9 t h C i r. 1989) (holding that g overnme nt’s ref ere nce to a

written statement wa s admissible under Rule 608(b) wh er e governme nt did not introduce extrinsi c evidenc e but instea d questioned witness about contents of docume nt). We find
no err or under Rule 608(b) wher e the Gover nment never introduced extrinsi c evidenc e re g ardingthe domestic violence incident at trial, but mere ly cross-e x amined Wilson w i t h re fer ence to the J une 2005 aff idavit. See also United States v . Markarian , 967 F.2d 1098, 1102 ( 6th Cir. 1992) (stating that Ru le 60 8( b) “ pr oh ibi ts c on tr a dic tio n [on ] co llate ra l matte rs by e xtri ns ic e vid e nc e bu t pe rm its
cross-e x amination on collater al points which are rele vant and other wise prope r”)
.-4-

Even if the G overnme nt had introduce d extrinsi c evide nce, no e rror wo u l d have be en committed beca

use Wilson’s p ri o r i nconsistent statements wer e admissible as e x trinsic evidenc e
un de r F e d. R. E vid . 6 13 (b ). Rul e 61 3( b) pr ov ide s fo r imp e a c hme nt of a wi tne ss w ith“ [e]xtr ins ic evidenc e of a

prior inconsistent statement” if “the w itness is afforde d an opportunity to expl ain or deny the same a

nd the oppos ite party is aff orded an opportunity to interrog ate the w itness thereon

. . . . ” B e c a

us e Wils on ’s sw or

n af fi davit dir e c tly

c on tr a dic te d h e r s tate me nts ma de on the sta nd in wh ic h s he de nied be ingbe ate n b y L e ste r, the Go ve rnme nt w ou ld h a ve be e n e nti re ly jus tif ie d in int ro du c ingthe a ff

ida vit fo r t he purp os e of imp e a c hin g Wils on ’s c re dib ili ty
. Of c ours e , “ [t]he re is no require ment under Rule 613 that a party who s eeks to impea ch a w itness throug h alleg ed prior inconsistent statements must present ex trinsic evidenc e to ‘support’ the impeachme nt attempt,” United S t a tes v. Gholston , 10 F.3d 384, 388 ( 6th Cir. 1993), and in this inst ance the Gover nment proper ly opted to impeach Wilson without ex trinsic evidenc e despite ha ving the option to do so. B. Se cond, L ester c laims that the domestic violence te stimony was unfa irly

prejudicia l under Fe d. R. Evid. 403. This claim also lacks mer it because the district court issued a limit ing instruc tion which spec ifically

admonished the jury

to consider Wi lson’s testimony relating to domesti c violence only for the pur

pose of de termining Wil son’s cre dibilit y . J urors a re pr esumed to have followed the instruct i o ns of the district cour t. See U nited States v. Carter , 236 F.3d 777, 787 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (“ [J] ur ie s are pr e sume d to un de rs tand and fo llo w d ir e c tio ns fr om t

he c ourt ” ); Jones v. United States , 52 7 U.S. 37 3, 39 4 ( 19 99 ); United States v. Foster , 376 F.3d 577, 592 ( 2004) (“ A cr ucial assumption underlying the sy stem of trial by jury is that jur ies will f ollow the instructions g iven them by the trial judge .”). A ccor dingly , the district court’s instruc tion “limit [ed] any possible unfair prejudice ” fr om-5-

the jury ’s use of Wilson’s testimony reg ardingacts of dome stic violence, Foster , 376 F.3d at 592, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in its Fed. R. Evid. 403 determination. L ester a lso claims error

as to the jury

instruction issued by

the district court, but since he failed to objec t to the content of the court’s jury instruction, w e revie w only for plain e rror . See Fe d. R. Crim. P . 52(b); United States v. Sav oires , 430 F.3d 376, 381 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I n any event, no
err or occ urre d beca

use the district cour

t appropriately

instructed the jury on the proper s cope of the impeachme nt evidence
. See Fe d. R. Evid. 105. C. Ne xt, L e ste r a

rgue s th a t Wils on ’s te sti mony a s it re late s to the do me sti c vio le nc e inc ide nts
wa s in a dmi ssi ble un de r F e d. R. Evi d. 40 4( b)
. Rul e 40 4( b) state s tha t “[e ]vid e nc e of oth e r c ri me s,
wr on g s, or

a c ts i s n ot a dmi ssi ble to p ro ve the char act e r o f a pe rs on in o rd e r t o s ho w a c tio n in
c on fo rm ity

the re wi th[, bu t] . . . ma

y , h ow e ve r, be a dmi ssi ble fo r o the r p ur po se s . . . .” On e purp os e for whic h prior bad a cts evidenc e may be admissible is for the impea chment of a witness with her prior inconsistent statement unde r F ed. R. Evid. 613(b). See F oster , 376 F.3d at 591-92 (stating that Rul e 61 3( b) imp e a c hme nt i s p e rm iss ibl e “ e ve n w he n th e imp e a c hin g mate ri a l in vo lve s ‘ oth e r a c ts’ of the de fenda

nt”) (c iting Gholston , 10 F.3d at 388). Her e, pursua nt to Rul e 613(b) , the Gover nment solicited testimony

from Wilson reg ardinga domestic violenc e incident involving L ester f or the purpose of

impeachingher c redibility with her prior

inconsistent statements found i n her swor n
a ff ida vit . “ Th e purp os e wa s n ot, no r c ou ld i t be , to demon strate that [L e ste r] w a s a c tin g in confor mity wi th his prior bad ac ts or char acte r. Showing that [W ilson] was be ing inc onsistent demonstrates nothingmore than that–her inconsistenc y with r eg ard to whether or not [L ester be at her].” Foster , 3 76 F .3 d at 59 1. Ac c or din g ly , w e fi nd no me ri t to L e ste r’ s cla im of e rr or un de r R ule-6-

404(b). Ev e n if the dis tr ic t court c omm itt e d e rr or

by a llo wi ngte sti mony

of do me sti c vio le nc e , it

is harmless in view of the overwhelming evidenc e of the L ester’ s g uilt. W illiams t estified that she sa w L ester hold a

nd fire a g un. Another witness testified t hat s he heard shots coming direc tly from whe re L e ste r w a s o bs e rv e d s tand ing . O ff ic e rs fo un d a

sh e ll ca sin g in the same loc a tio n, and wi th t he a id of Wilson, t hey

rec overe d the fire arm fir ed by L ester in a

closet in Wil son’s home. II. L ester a lso objects to his four- level sentence e nhance ment pursuant to § 2K2.1(b) (5), a pplied by the dis tr ic t court a ft e r fi nd ing that L e ste r co mmi tte d the state law of fe ns e of fe lon iou s r e c kle ss endang erme nt. This Cour t re v iews for clea r er ror the f actua l findings of

the district court, a

nd
a c c or ds “ du e de fe re nc e ” to i ts d e te rm inatio n th a t the U. S.S. G. § 2K 2. 1( b) (5 ) e nh anc e me nt a pp lie s. See 18 U. S.C. § 3 74 2( e ); United States v. Burk e , 345 F.3d 416, 427 ( 6th Cir. 2003). “The bur den is on the g overnme nt to prove, by a pre pon d er an ce o f the evidenc e, that a pa rticular se ntencing enhanc ement applies.” United States v. Dupre e , 323 F.3d 480, 491 ( 6th Cir. 2003). Se c tio n 2K 2. 1( b) (5 ) of the Se nte nc ing Gu ide lin e s pr ov ide s that a de fe nd ant’ s b a se of

fe ns e level should be e nhance d by four leve ls if the defe ndant used or posse ssed a f irea rm in connec tion with another felony

offe nse. This district court below a pplied this enhance ment based on L ester’ s possession of the firea

rm in c onnection with the Tenne ssee f elony of re ckless enda

ng erme nt, which is the offense of rec klessly eng ag ing in conduct “committed with a deadly wea pon” which “ place s or may place another

person in imminent dang er of death or serious bodi ly injury .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-103. “ ‘Reckle ss’ ref ers to a pe rson who ac ts reckle ssly with respec t to circumstance s surroundingthe conduc t . . . when the pe rson i s awa re of but consciously

disreg ards a

substantial and-7-

unjustifiable risk that the circ umstances e x ist or the result will occur .” Id . at § 39-11-302. Te nn e sse e la

w a llo ws ind ic tme nts fo r reck le ss e nd ang e rm e nt whe n th e e nd ang e rm e nt i s ag ainst the public at larg e. See State v . Payne , 7 S.W. 3d 25 , 2 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . B ut i f t he vic timis
c on sid e re d a s th e pu

bli c a t la rg e , th e state mus t sh owthat at th e tim e of da ng e r, th ere w a s at le a st
one member of the public prese nt a nd in the “zone of da

ng er.” Id
. “[T] he term ‘zone of dang er’ may be employ ed to def

ine that ar ea in which a reasonable probability exis ts that the defendant’s c onduct would place others in imminent dang er of death or serious bodily

injury if others we re pr esent in that
zone or are a.” Id . at 28. On appe al, L ester a

rg ues that the testimony

offe red at trial was insuff icient to support the infere nce that he fire d a gun up into the air, and in the presence of children playing near by
. But he
a lso a sse rt s tha t the Go ve rnme nt of fe re d no ev ide nc e re g ard ing the tr a je c tor y or fl ig ht o f t he bu lle ts
re la tiv e to w he re the c hil dr e n we re sta nd ing
. F ur

the rm or e , by fi ri ng a g un up int o the a ir , he c ou ld
on ly c a us e a “ me re po ssi bil ity ,” a s op po se d to a “ re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity ,” of da ng e r– ins uf

fi c ie nt t o establish rec kless endang erme nt under Te nnes s ee l aw . He c ites two Tennesse e ca ses for the proposition that a rec kless endang erme nt conviction cannot be supported under f acts in which the re is only a re mote possibili ty

of a s t ra y

bullet striking anothe r per son. Se e Sta te v . B ald win , No. 01 C01 -9 61 2- CR- 00 53 0, 19 98 WL 42 61 99 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); State v. Fox , 947 S.W .2d 865 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)
. I n Ba ldw in , the Tenne ssee Court of Crimi nal Appeals found i nsufficie nt evidenc e to support
a c on vic tio n f

or re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt a g a ins t a c us tom e r i n a

re sta ur ant wh o wa s sittin g dir e c tly behind the def

endant at the time the defe ndant dischar g ed the f irea rm. Ba ldw in , 1998 WL 426199, at *4. Althoug h the state prose cutor a rg ued that the r estaura

nt was sm all and nar

row, a nd that the-8-

bullet could have hit the c ustomer af ter ric ochetingoff a metal appliance, the court held that “mere speculation that [ the customer] might have bee n hit by the bullet is insufficient to prove be y ond a
rea sonable doubt that [the customer] was in i mminent dang er of death or serious bodily

injury .” Id. Even if the f

acts of Baldwin wer e mater ially i n d i s t i n gu i shable fr om the instant case, the
a pp lic a ble burd e n o f p ro of in a cr imi na l pro se c uti on (b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t) is, in any

e ve nt, differ ent from the sta

ndard of proof r equire d for the application of a sentenc ing e nhance ment under the Guidelines (pre pondera nce of the evidence–so long as the sentenc e does not e x cee d the statutory maxi mum). Whi le Baldwin found the e vidence insufficient to pr ove bey ond a re asonable doubt that the def endant c ommitt ed re ckless enda ng erme nt, it does not nece ssarily follow that the evidenc e wa s insufficient under a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e standard. I n an y ev en t, Baldwin is distinguishable be cause unlike the alleg ed victim of re ckless enda ng erme nt in B a ld

win , wh o was sitti ng behind the defe ndant, the victims in the instant case wer e not standing in a position opposit e, 180 deg ree s, from the tra

jectory of the bullets fire d. Rather, L ester disc harg ed a f irea rm three times up in the air while children from the neig hborhood were play ing le ss than twenty fee t away

on the sidewalk in fr ont of Wil son’s home. Acc ording to Wi lliams’ testimony , the childre n “[fell] on t he sidewalk” in response to L ester firing the g un. These c hildren we re the ref ore subjec ted to a much g reater risk of ha

rm than the c ustomer in Ba ldw in
. I n Fox , the cour

t reve rsed a

rec kless endan g e r

me nt c o nv ic ti o n

wher e the f

acts e stablished that the def endant discha

rg ed a pistol into the air or up into a tre e, but there was no evidenc e that anyone
wa s e ith e r i n the tr e e be ing fi re d upo n or out sid e the a pa rtme nt b uil din g in t

he imm e diate vic ini ty of t he defenda

nt. Fox , 947 S.W .2d at 865. Of c ourse, Fox is easily distinguishable f

rom the instant
case beca use testimony

establishes that childre n wer e in close pr ox imity to L ester when he fired the-9-

g un. Ba sed on the evidence of t he children’s close proxi mity to L ester when he f ired the gun, we wi ll d e fe r to the dis tr ic t court ’s de te rm inatio n that the by sta nd e rs we re in i mmi ne nt d ang e r o f d e a th
or ser ious bodily

injury
. Se e Un ite d Sta te

s v . Co rb in , 76 F. Ap p’ x 58 , 61 (6 th Cir . 2 00 3) ; United States v. Boyd, 4 75 F .3 d 8 75 , 8 78 -7 9 ( 7th Cir . 200 7) (h old ing that a de fe nd ant’ s a c t of

fi ri ngmul tip le shots into t he air

in a do wn t own ar ea w as suffic ient to support finding that he violated Indiana’ s fe lon iou s r e c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt l aw) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt did no t c omm it cle ar erro r i n it s deter mination that people wer e prese nt in the zone of dang er, a nd the Gover

nment has prove n the elements of f

elonious rec kless endang erme nt under Te nnessee law by a p re p o ndera

nce of the evidenc e. Thus, the district cour t’s application of the § 2K2.1(b)( 5) enha nceme nt was prope r. III . For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM both L ester’ s conviction and sente nce.