J-S20013-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM HUDSON,

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 971 WDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 6, 2018

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003728-2006

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 13, 2019

William Hudson (“Hudson”) appeals from the Order dismissing his first

Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 

We affirm.

In 2006, Hudson was charged with one count each of rape, corruption 

of minors, incest, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and endangering the 

welfare of children, as well as three counts each of indecent sexual assault 

and aggravated indecent assault.

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 On January 15, 2008, a jury found Hudson

guilty of corruption of minors. The trial court granted judgment of acquittal 

as to one count each of indecent assault and aggravated indecent assault. 

The jury was unable to reach a consensus on the remaining charges. The 

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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121, 6301, 4302, 3123, 4304, 3126, 3125.
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remaining charges were withdrawn. On April 17, 2009, Hudson pled guilty to 

incest, in exchange for a sentence of 5 to 10 years in prison and a 10-year 

Megan’s Law III3registration requirement. Hudson received no further 

penalty on the corruption of minors conviction. Hudson did not file any postsentence motions or a direct appeal. 

In 2012, Hudson’s 10-year Megan’s Law III registration period was 

supplanted by the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(“SORNA”),4 which required Hudson to become a lifetime registrant. On May 

24, 2015, Hudson filed the instant pro se Petition,5 which was subsequently 

amended by counsel on November 8, 2017, seeking relief from the application 

of SORNA in lieu of his sentence under Megan’s Law III. The PCRA court 

dismissed Hudson’s Petition as being untimely filed. Hudson thereafter filed 

a timely Notice of Appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement.

On appeal, Hudson raises the following question for our review: 

“Whether [Hudson] is entitled to post-conviction relief—the striking of SORNA 

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3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9795.1 (expired).

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.

5 Hudson filed a Motion to Reinstate Appellate Rights Nunc Pro Tunc and to 

Remove Defendant from the Registration and Reporting Requirements of 

SORNA, which the PCRA court properly treated as a PCRA Petition. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of 

obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and 

statutory remedies for the same purpose.”). Because Hudson would not be 

required to comply with SORNA until his release from prison in May 2017, the 

PCRA court granted successive continuances on the issue until it was ripe for 

review upon Hudson’s release.
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registration requirements—pursuant to Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 

1189 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 925 (2018)?” Brief for Appellant 

at 1.

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. 

This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it 

is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

Before reaching the merits of Hudson’s appeal, we must first address 

whether Hudson has satisfied the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 

Section 9545 of the PCRA expressly states that a PCRA petition “shall be filed 

within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of 

direct review, including discretionary review, or at the expiration of time for 

seeking the review. Id. §9545(b)(3). “Our courts have strictly interpreted 

this requirement as creating a jurisdictional deadline.” Commonwealth v. 

Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 522 (Pa. Super. 2011). A court may not address the 

merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. 

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Hudson’s judgment of sentence became final on May 17, 2009. Under 

the PCRA, Hudson had until May 17, 2010, to file a timely PCRA Petition. 

Hudson filed the instant Petition on May 24, 2015. Thus, Hudson’s Petition is 

facially untimely. However, Pennsylvania courts may consider petitions filed 
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beyond the one-year deadline if the petitioner can explicitly plead and prove 

one of three exceptions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A petition 

invoking such an exception must be filed within 60 days6 of the date the claim 

could have been presented. Id. § 9545(b)(2). 

Hudson attempts to invoke the “newly-recognized constitutional right”

timeliness exception found at Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). As previously explained 

in Commonwealth v. Murphy, 180 A.3d 402, 405 (Pa. Super. 2018), our 

Supreme Court has held that

[S]ubsection (iii) of Section 9545[(b)] has two requirements.

First, it provides that the right asserted is a constitutional right 

that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or 

[the Pennsylvania Supreme C]ourt after the time provided in this 

section. Second, it provides that the right “has been held” by 

“that court” to apply retroactively. Thus, a petitioner must prove 

that there is a “new” constitutional right and that the right “has 

been held” by that court to apply retroactively. The language “has 

been held” is in the past tense. These words mean that the action 

has already occurred, i.e., “that court” has already held the new 

constitutional right to be retroactive to cases on collateral review. 

By employing the past tense in writing this provision, the 

legislature clearly intended that the right was already recognized 

at the time the petition was filed.

Id. (citation omitted).

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6 Section 9545(b)(2) was amended on October 24, 2018, effective in 60 days 

(i.e., December 24, 2018), extending the time for filing from 60 days of the 

date the claim could have been first presented, to one year. The amendment 

applies to claims arising on December 24, 2017, or thereafter. See Act 2018, 

Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3 (hereinafter “Act 146”). In the instant case, 

the one-year time limit of Act 146 does not apply to Hudson’s Petition, as he 

filed it prior to December 24, 2017.
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In order to avail himself of the timeliness exception found at Section 

9545(b)(1)(iii), Hudson would need to demonstrate that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has held that its ruling in Muniz applies retroactively.7 

Because our Supreme Court has not issued such a ruling, Hudson’s reliance 

on Muniz cannot satisfy the “newly-recognized constitutional right” exception 

at Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court's Order 

dismissing Hudson’s Petition as untimely filed.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/2019

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7 After Muniz, this Court, in Commonwealth v. Rivera-Figueroa, 174 A.3d 

674, 678 (Pa. Super. 2017), held that “Muniz created a substantive rule that 

retroactively applies in the collateral context.”