T en n. R

. C t

. A p p
. 1 0 st ates: 1

T h is C o u rt, w ith the c o n c u rr e n c e o f all ju d g e s p a rtic ip a ting in the c a se , m a y a ff irm , re v e rs e o r m o d ify t he act i o ns o f

t he t ri al co urt by me m o randum op i ni o n when a fo rma l op i ni o n w o u ld h ave no prec edent i a l v a l u e
. W h e n a c a s e i s de c i de d b y me mo r a n du m o pi n i on i t s h a l l be de s i g n at ed “M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N ,” s h a ll no t be pub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or rel i ed on f o r any r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 14, 200 4 S es sio n THO MAS WAYNE ST ORM v . JANE ANN STO RM Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. 1-98475 Russ Heldm an, Chan cellor

No. M2002- 02882-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Augu st 31, 2004

When th e p arti e s d iv o r c e d in 1 9 9 9 , th e y e n te r e d in to a ma r it a l d is s o lu ti o n a g r e e me nt that was inc or po rate d in to the fi na l di vo rc e de c re e
. Th a t a g re e me nt a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e a lim on y pay me nts ag ree d to “more tha n likely may have to b e m o d i fi ed ” if Husband lost his j ob or his insurance license. In this modi fication of alimony proce eding , the trial court found Husband ha d lost his j ob and wa s unable to find employment with compara ble income. The court inter prete d the MDA a s au th o r iz in g it

to r e d u c e th e a mo u n t o f

mo n th ly p a y me n ts b u t n o t t o r e d u c e th e to ta l amo u n t d u e
. We interpre t the ag ree ment as al lowing modific ation of the total oblig ation and re mand for re co n s i d er at i o n i n l i gh to f t h i s h o l d i n g.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t, Re verse d in P art, and Rem anded
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., joined. Jay R. Sl ob e y , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e llant, Th oma s Wa y ne Sto rm
. Gr a nt C . G la ssf

or d, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or theapp e lle e , Jan e An n St orm.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1 The pa rties wer e divorc ed by

order enter ed Oc tober 4, 1999. That order a pprov ed and incorporated a Ma

rital Dissolution Agre ement which pr ovided that Mr. Storm would pay Ms. StormT he cour t al s o f ound M r
. St orm was $5, 39 2 i n a r r ear s for h eal t h i ns ur anc e pr emi ums he ha d not r ei mb ur s ed 2 M s
. St or m, g av e h er a j u dg men t for t h at a mou n t , a n d or der ed t h at i t be pa i d by Au g u s t 22, 2004. -2- alimony of $6,000 per month for the first five y ear s afte r t he divorce and $5,000 per month for the next t en y ear s. The MDA specific ally provided that the a limonypayments would cea se only upon Wif e ’s de a th or the e xpir a tio n o f f if te e n y e ars , w hic he ve r o c c ur re d f ir st. Ho we ve r, theMD A a lso specific ally

provided: Both pa rties ac knowledg e that the a limonypayments ag ree d to above a re c onditioned upon Husband’s inc ome derived from ha ving and reta ini n g an ac tive insurance license in the State of

Tenne ssee and being employ ed byFr anklin Life Insuranc e Company . I f Husband lose s his posit ion with Fra nklin L ife a n d ca n n o t find other e mpl oyme nt that pr ov ide s a c omp ara bleinc ome , Wif

e is a wa rethat th e se pay me nts more than likely

may have to be modified.
At the time of the divorc e Mr. Storm wa s a reg ional manag er for the succe ssor to Franklin, AIG. At t h e e n d o f 2 0 0 1 , M r. S t o rm wa s gi v en t h e o p t i o n o f l ea v i n g t h e c o m p an y o r t ak i n g a position as an are a mana g er, a s opposed t o continuing as reg ional manag er. He opted to stay as ar ea manag er, but his income wa s reduc ed sig nificantly . He the n en t er ed int o ag ree ments with other ins ur a nc e c omp a nie s ina n atte mpt to inc re a se his inc ome . Wh e n A I G d isc ov e re d th e se a g re e me nts , it terminated its contrac t with Mr. Storm, and disputes over amounts due to and f rom AI G ar ose. Mr. Storm filed a petition t o m o d i fy his alimonyobligation due to his invol untary loss of e mpl oyme nt andinc ome . T he mot ionto mod if y wa s se t, M s. Sto rm

fi le d a pe tit ionfo r c on te mpt , and both petitions were hear d toge ther.
Th e tria l c ou rt

su bs e qu e ntl y

e nte re d an or de r fi nd ing that Mr. Sto rm ha d in vo lun tari ly

los t his e mpl oyme nt and , c on se qu e ntl y , w a s n ot i n willf ul c on te mpt . A lth ou g h th e c ou rt sp e c if ic a lly found that Mr. Storm had lost t h e j o b h e held at the time of the divorcedecr ee and could not find other e mploy ment providing compar able income , the court held that it had no authority to modify thetot a l a mou nt o f a lim on y Mr . St orm w a s o bli g a te d to pay Ms. S to rm
. How e ve r, thec ou rt a lso held that it had the authority to modify

the alim ony payments if it did not chang e the total amount du e , $ 96 0, 00 0. Ac c or din g ly , th e c ou rt low e re d th e mon thl y

a lim on y pay me nts to $ 25 00 pe r m on th be g inn ing Se pte mbe r 1 , 2 00 2, a ndfo r 3 02 mon ths the re a ft e r. On the30 3r d mo nth , M r. Sto rm is t o pay $1,000. Thus, the court lowered the amount of ea ch payment but ext ended the duration of the ob lig a tio n to make pay me nts

. The c ourt also found that Mr. Storm ha d paid $8,000 in alimony in 2002 and was $40,000 in arre ars. It gr anted Ms. Storm a judgme nt f or that amount and order ed that it be paid on or be fore Au g us t 22 , 2 00 4. Mr . St orm ha s n ot c ha lle ng e d th e arr e ara g e jud g me nt o n a pp e a l. 2T h e c o u r t fe l t p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y t w o p r o v i s i o n s i n t h e M DA p r o h i b i t i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n e x ce pt by 3

wr i t t en a g r ee men t e x ec u t ed by t h e par t i es a n d a ppr ov ed by t h e cou r t

. T h e t wo pr ov i s i on s s t at ed:
A modi f i ca t i on or w ai v er of an y of t h e pr ov i s i on s of t h i s Ag r ee men t s h al l be e f fec t i v e on l y i f

ma de i n wr i t i ng and exe cut ed wi t h t he s ame formal i t y as t hi s Agr eement , an d app r oved by t he C our t i f s uch ap p roval i s requir ed

. Fai l ure o f e i t her p art y to i nsi st up o n st ri ct p erfo rma nce o f any of t he p rovis i o ns of t hi s A gr eement s hal l not be cons t r ued as a wai ver of any s ubs equen t def aul t of t he s ame or s i mi l ar nat ur e.
A m o d ifi c a tio n o r w a ive r o f an y o f t h e p ro v isio n s o f t h is a g re e m e n t sh a ll b e e ff e c tive o n ly i f m a d e in
wr i t i n g a n d e x ec u t ed wi t h t h e s ame for mal i t y a s t h i s a g r ee men t

. Fa i l u r e of e i t h er pa r t y t o i n s i s t u pon st ri ct pe rf

o rma nce o f

any of t he p rovis i o ns o f t hi s agreem ent shal l no t be co nst rued as a wai ver of any s ubs equen t def aul t of

t he s ame or s i mi l ar na t ur e.

-3- I. M O D IF ICA TIO N O F A W ARD
Th e tria l c ou rt ’s re a so nin g is e xpla ine d in its c omm e nts ma de a t the e nd of the he ari ng
. F ir st, the court determined that the parti es had ag ree d in their MDA to a kind of a limonythat was not p u r e l y a l i m o n y in f

utu ro or re habilitative alimony . Consequently , g ener al p ri nciples allowing m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h o s e t yp e s o f

a l i m o n y d i d n o tap p l y.
Howeve r, the c ourt found that Mr. Storm’s loss of his job and inabilityto find employ ment with compara

ble income satisfied the condition incorporated i n to th eali mo n y mo d if ic ati o np r o v ision of the MDA. The court then interpre ted that provision a s allowing modification of “ ali mony p a ym e n t s ” o n l y. T h e c o u rt s t a t e d , “ It d o e s n ’ ts ay t h e a l i m o n y m a y h a v e t o b e m o d i f i e d

. Itj u s ts a ys the payments.” 3 A marital dissolution ag ree ment is subject to the same rule s of interpre tation as any other contra ct. Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 730 (Tenn. 2001). I nterpre tation of a written ag ree ment is a question of law, and we r eview a trial court’ s interpr et ati on de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Guiliano v. CLEO, Inc. , 995 S.W .2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999) . This court must review the do c ume nt ou rselv e s a ndmake ou r o wnde te rm inatio n r e g ard ing its me a nin g a ndle g a l impo rt

. Hillsboro Plaza Ent ers. v. M oon , 860 S.W .2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). “The centr al tenet of contra ct construc tion is t hat the intent of the c ontrac ting pa rties at the time of ex ecuting the ag ree ment should gove rn.” Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & W arehouse Co., Inc

. , 78 S.W .3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) . That intent is found, in the first instance, in the lang uag e of the ag ree ment itself.
The trial c ourt found t hat M r. S torm had invol untarily lost the j ob he held when the divor ce de c re e wa s e nte re d. Th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th at f ind ing . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13(d). The court a lso found that this circ umstance trigg ere d the m odification provisi on of the MDA a s in c or po rate d in to t

he de c re e . We a g re e wi th that in te rp re tatio n o f the a g re e me nt.B e c a u se o f t h e m o d ifi c a tio n p ro v isio n , w e c o n c lud e the p a rtie s d id no t i n te n d the a lim o n y to b e a lim o n y in 4

s ol i do a s a r g u e d b y M s
. S t or m. -4- Howeve r, we cannot inter pret the modification provision as cre ating a distinction betwee n the am ount of ea ch payment and the total amount due. T he parties did not ag ree that Mr. Storm wo uldpay

Ms. Sto rm

$9 60 ,0 00 . Ins te a d, the y

a g re e d th a t:
Com me nc ing Oc tob e r 1 , 19 99 , Hu sb a nd sh a ll p a y to Wi fea s a lim on y

thesu m of

Six Thousand Dollar s ($6,000) pe r month. Wi fe shall rece ive twenty -six (26) a limony payments per y ear , every other wee k, by elec tronic funds transfe r into an acc ount for which she sha ll provide Husband. During the first five ( 5) y ear s of alimony pay me nts , e a c h p a y me nt s ha ll b e fo r $ 2, 76 9. 23

. Sa id pay me nts sh a ll c on tin ue un til Wife’s death or the completion of Six ty (60) Months, whiche ver sha ll first occur. Commencing J uly

1, 2004, Husband shall pay to Wi fe as al i m o n y t h e sum of F ive thousand Dollars ($5,000) per month. Wife shall receive twe nty -six (26) a limony payments per y ear , every

other we ek, by elec tronic funds transfer into an acc ount for wh ic h s he sh a ll p ro vid e Hu sb a nd . E a c h p a y me nt s ha ll b e fo r $ 2, 30 7. 69 . Said payments shall continue until W ife’s de ath or th e co mpletion of One Hundr ed and Twenty (120) Months, whiche ver sha ll first occur. The pa rties expressly

intend that all alimony payments provided for in this parag raph are to be made e ven if Wife re -marries and shall terminate only u p o n h er death, or thec on c lus ionof

theOn e Hu nd re d a ndEi g hty Mo nth s, wh ic he ve r s ha ll o c c ur fi rs t. The pa rties ac knowledg e that the payment of alimony as set forth in this ag ree ment is the se ttl e ment of a dis pu te d c la im andsu pp orte d b y g oo d a nda de qu a te consideration. Thus, the terminolog y

of the modification provision, “a limony payments,” is the same a s that used in the provisi ons cre ating the obl igation. I nterpre ting the lang uag e the pa rties chose to use, we see no distinction betwee n the alimony obligation in tot al and the payments by which that oblig ation is to b e me t. T h e a li mo n y p a y me n ts , in to ta l a s w e ll a s in d iv id u a ll y , w e r e c o n d it io n e d on Mr. Storm’s retaining his job.
W e a g r e e w i t h t h e tr i a l c o u rtt h a tt h e p art i e s d i d n o ta g r e e t o a l i m o n y in f utu ro as that term h a s b e e n d e f

i n e d b y l a w
. C o n s e q u e n t l y, t h e p r i n c i p l e s a l l o w i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n o f a n a l i m o n y in f

utu ro awa rd upon a showing of a substantial and materia l c hang e in c ircumstance s do not apply . Howeve r, the parties did ag ree that a modification might be warranted i f one particular chang e in circ umstances occur red. Where a n MDA provides f or re solution of an issue, such as modification upon particular 4
c ir c ums ta nc e s, “ c ou rt s sh ou ld d e fe r t o th e pr ov isi on of theMD A, un le ss i t wou ld b e un c on sc ion ableB o t h pa rt i es t est i f i ed t hat at t he t i m e t he M D A was b ei ng nego t i at ed , t here was som e co ncern t hat M r. Storm 5 mi g h t l os e h i s i n s u r an ce l i ce n s e. M r
. St or m a l s o t es t i f i ed t h at h e wa s con ce r n ed h e mi g h t l os e h i s j ob. T h e modi f i ca t i on provi s i on was i ncl uded becau s e o f t hes e p ot ent i al d eve l op ment s
. A bse nt a provi s i on cove r i ng s uch a f ores eea bl e c han ge, it p ro b a b ly w o u ld n o t b e c o n sid e re d m a te ria l a n d w o u ld n o t t rig g e r a c o n sid e ra tio n o f m o d ifi c a tio n
. Bogan , 60 S. W

. 3d
a t 7 2 8 . O u r S u p re m e C o u rt h a s e n c o u ra g e d p a rtie s to a n M D A to a d d re ss re so lutio n o f issu e s the y c a n fo re se e
. Id

. at 729 n

. 5.

Fees i n act i ons t o mod i f y an exi s t i ng al i mo ny awar d a r e s ubj ect t o t he s ame cons i dera t i ons appl i cabl e t o an 6 initial a w a rd o f alim o n y. See Evans v . Evans , N o
. M 2 0 0 2 -0 2 9 4 7 -C O A -R 3 -C V , 2 0 0 4 W L 1 8 8 2 5 8 6 , at *1 9 (T e n n . C t. A p p
. A ug. 23 , 20 0 4 ) ( exp l ai ni ng t he st at ut o ry ba ses fo r f ees i n m o d i f

i cat i o n cases ). -5- to do so.” Bogan , 6 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 3 0 -3 1 , ci t i n g Towner v. Towner , 858 S.W .2d 888, 892 (Tenn. 1993). 5
B e c aus e thesp e c if ie d c ha ng e oc c ur

re d, Mr . St orm’ s a li mo nyob lig a tio n w a s su bje c t to modification. The tria l court had auth o ri t y t o m o d i fy the entire obligation. A substantial and materia l chang e of c ircumstance s trigg ering the authority of the court to modify a spousal support awa rd does not, howe ver, automatically result in a modification. It me rely allows the party seeking the modification to demonstrate that, under the circ umstances shown, a modification is appropriate. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d at 730. Actua l modification is addresse d to the trial court’s d i s cretion upon consideration of t he st atutory fac tors rele vant to an initial awar d of alimony

. Id. Howeve r, unlike in an ini tial awa

rd si tuation, the abili ty of t he obli g or spouse to provide support must be give n equal consideration to the obligee spouse’s nee d. Id

. The trial court obviously found that a reduc tion in Mr. Storm’s monthly obliga t i o n was justified under the e vidence prese nted including his substantially re d u ce d i n come. The evidenc e does not preponde rate ag ainst that finding. Additionally , “A trial court’s decision to modify support payments is given ‘ wide latitude’ w ithin it s rang e of discr etion.” Id

. at 727. Howeve r, bec ause the tria l c ou rt a c te d w iththe un de rs ta nd ing it c ou ld no t a lte r the tot a l a lim on y ob lig a tio n, the c a se sh ou ld be re manded f

or re consid er at i on by

the trial court in view of this court’s holding . The de cision whether or not to hear

new e vidence on curr ent circ umstances is left to t h e d i s cr et i o n of the trial c ou rt

. II. A TTOR N EY ’ S F EES
Mr. Storm a lso c halleng es the trial court’s awa rd of attorney ’s fee s to Ms. S torm, arg uing that she has the abili ty to pay those fee s and, si nce fee s are considere d alimony , need and ability to pay are the de te rm ini ng fa c tor s. I nd e e d, wh e re a lim on y is a wa rd e d, a n a wa

rd of a tto rn e y ’s fees “is conditioned upon a lac k of re source s to prosecute or def end a suit in g ood faith. .

. .” Langschmidt v. Langschmidt , 8 1 S

. W

. 3 d 7 4 1 , 7 5 1 (T en n
. 2 0 0 2 ), q u o t i n g Fox v . Fox , 657 S.W .2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983). The fa ctors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(d) (1), i.e ., fac tors rele vant to the court’s

6
c on sid e ratio n o f an a wa

rdof a lim on y , mu st als o be con sid e re d inthea wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Langschmidt , 8 1 S.W.3 d at 750 -5 1. Con se qu e ntl y , a spou se wi th ad e qu a te pr op e rty a ndinc omeis no t e n t i t l e d t o a n a w ar d o f a d d i t i o n a l a l i m o n y

t o c o m p e n s a t e f

o r a t t o r n e y ’ s f

e e s a n d e xp e ns e s.-6-

Inman v . Inman , 8 11 S.W. 2d87 0, 87 4 (Ten n. 19 91 ); Lindsey v. Lindsey , 976 S.W .2d 175, 181 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 7) . A s o ur c ou rt s h a ve re pe a te dly ma de c le ar, thede c isi on of wh e the r o r n ot t o awa rd fe es in support modification proc eeding s is discretionary with the trial court. Deas v . Deas , 77 4 S. W.2 d 1 67 , 1 70 (T e nn . 1 98 9) ; Sa nn e lla v . San e lla , 993 S.W .2d 73, 77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
Ho we ve r, thetria l c ou rt ’s a wa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s her e in w a s n ot b a se d o n th e se princ ipl e s. I nstead, the c ourt awa

rded fee s based upon its interpr etation of the fee provision of the MDA, whic h provided, “ Should litigation be nece ssary to e nforc e any provision of this ag ree ment, the pre vailing party shall be entitled to attorney fee s and discre tionary costs.” The c ourt found that Mr. Storm had brea ched the MDA by

failing to pay

Ms. Storm i n acc ordanc e with that ag ree ment, awa rd ed her arre ar age s , an d aw ar d ed h erfe es as t h e p re v ai l i n g p ar t y
. M r. S t o rm h as n o tch al l en ged t h e a rr ea ra ge awa rd. Whil e we ag ree with the trial court’s g ener al interpre tation of the MDA’s fe e provision, we conclude that Ms. Storm i s entitled only to that portion of her attorney ’s fe es that ar e dire ctly related to the issues on which she prevailed. On rema nd, the trial court should re -ca lculate the a war d of fe es based upon that disti nction.
III. C ONCL US I ON
This case is remande d to the trial court f or re consideration of the alimony obligation of

Mr. Storm in l ight of

our hol ding that the M DA did not constrain the c ourt’s authority to reduc e the total obligation as justified by

th e ci rc u m s t an ce s. Costs on appeal ar e taxed to the appellee , J ane A nn Sto rm
.

___________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE