Filed 1/13/14 P. v. Alvarez CA4/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RAMON ALVAREZ,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G047466

 (Super. Ct. No. 10CF2001)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, 

William R. Froeberg, Judge. Affirmed.

Ellen M. Matsumoto, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and 

Barry Carlton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * *
2

INTRODUCTION

In June 1998, the body of Ruben Leal was discovered in the backyard of a 

house in Santa Ana; Leal had died as a result of a gunshot wound to the head. Fourteen 

years later, defendant Ramon Alvarez was convicted of Leal’s murder, largely on the 

testimony of Craig Gonzales, a jailhouse informant, who claimed defendant had 

confessed to Gonzales that he had committed the crime. Defendant appeals from the 

conviction, claiming Gonzales’s history of being an informant in a court case in Nevada 

was exculpatory evidence the prosecution was obligated to disclose to him, pursuant to 

Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady). Defendant also argues the trial court 

erred by denying his motion for a new trial because the evidence that Gonzales had 

previously been an informant would have established he committed perjury during 

defendant’s trial, destroying Gonzales’s credibility and resulting in a more favorable 

result. Finding no merit in defendant’s arguments, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

About 9:00 a.m. on June 28, 1998, police officers responded to a suspicious 

circumstances call at 2220 South Halladay Street in Santa Ana; a neighbor had called to 

report possible gunfire. During a welfare check at the home, the officers found a dead 

body in an inflatable child’s pool in the backyard shed. Ice, a crucifix, and a bag 

containing the victim’s brain were in the pool with the body. The officers also found 

trash bags nearby, which were full of dirt, blood, brain matter, and grass. Divots in the 

ground near the shed appeared to have been made by a shovel or pickaxe. Blood spatter 

and brain matter were everywhere, and flies buzzed around.

A single shell casing from a high-powered assault rifle was found in the 

backyard. Also located in the backyard were a BMX-type bicycle with metal spikes on 

the pedals, a pair of size 10 Nike shoes, a bottle of bleach, and a small plastic cup, similar 
3

in kind to those used to scoop powdered detergent. The backyard hose was running when 

the police arrived.

Inside the house, the police officers kicked open a locked bedroom door. 

Three young men (including Marcos Castaneda, an F-Troop gang member whose 

moniker was Sleepy, and Raul Beltran, an F-Troop associate) were lying on the bed, and 

defendant was kneeling in front of one of the beds, as if he were praying; defendant was 

not wearing shoes or socks.

The victim was identified as Ruben Leal, an F-Troop gang member whose 

moniker was Oso. Leal had died as a result of a gunshot wound to the right side of his 

head. Black soot visible on the inner surface of Leal’s scalp and a crescent-shaped 

inward bevel at the entry site indicated the muzzle of the gun was touching or was very 

close to Leal’s head when the shot was fired. It could not be determined whether Leal 

was standing, kneeling, or lying down when he was shot. No murder weapon was ever 

found.

The forensic pathologist who conducted Leal’s autopsy testified that people 

who commit suicide with a high-powered rifle normally place the muzzle under their 

chin, in their mouth, or at their abdomen. The pathologist had never seen anyone kill 

himself or herself by firing a rifle into the side of his or her head.

When interviewed by the police in June 1998, defendant said he had arrived 

at the house on South Halladay Street by bicycle 10 to 20 minutes before the police 

arrived. Defendant claimed that he did not notice anything out of the ordinary, even 

when he went to the backyard to smoke a cigarette, and that he did not see a dead body. 

He told the police he had heard Leal’s death had been a suicide. Near the end of the 

interview, defendant refused to “say anything about what happened to the body because 

he wasn’t going to put his life in jeopardy.” The shoes found in the backyard were close 

to defendant’s shoe size. The shoes might have been cleaned with detergent and/or 

bleach; no blood or DNA was found on them.
4

Seven-year-old Jason Luna lived at the house on South Halladay Street 

with his mother and three sisters. Luna told the police he was sleeping in his bedroom 

when he heard a gunshot from the backyard. Luna got out of bed and went into the living 

room; defendant, Castaneda, Luna’s mother, and two other women were there. Luna’s 

mother was crying and saying, “oh, my God,” and Castaneda was making phone calls, 

trying to figure out what to do with the body. Luna saw a lot of blood in the bathroom. 

He saw Castaneda remove some bandage-type material from the bathroom, which Luna

assumed Castaneda took to where the body was. Raul Beltran arrived a little while later, 

and left with one of the women. They returned a few minutes later with three bags of ice; 

Luna assumed the ice was for the body.

Luna told the police that he had not seen a gun in the house that evening, 

but that defendant kept an assault-type rifle in the house for protection against rival gang 

members. Luna said he believed defendant was his mother’s boyfriend. At trial, which 

occurred 14 years after the shooting, Luna claimed he did not know who defendant was 

and he could not remember the events surrounding the shooting. Shortly before trial, 

Luna told investigators that he had told the truth to the police when he was seven years 

old.

To avoid compromising the investigation, the police did not release all the 

details of the crime to the public. The press release revealed that the body was found in a 

pool with ice. The press release did not mention the type of weapon used, that the victim 

was shot in the head, that the murder weapon had not been found, or that brain matter 

was packed in bags.

In January 1998, Craig Gonzales shared a cell with defendant at Chino state 

prison for about a week. Several months later, in late June 1998, Gonzales and defendant 

were again briefly housed together at the Santa Ana jail. Gonzales testified that while in 

the Santa Ana jail, defendant told Gonzales he was in jail for a murder that happened at 

his girlfriend’s house. Defendant said the victim was someone he knew, who “wasn’t 
5

supposed to be there and he knew better.” Defendant told Gonzales he had shot the 

victim in the head with an AK-47 rifle, then put the body in a shed with ice on it to keep 

it from smelling. He said the shot blew out the victim’s brain, and he had had to pick up 

the pieces of brain matter, which he placed in bags; the bags were put with the body. 

Defendant also said he had to get the tissue and blood that had soaked into the dirt. He

told Gonzales “they” had talked about saying the victim had shot himself. (“They”

referred to defendant and a female, whose name defendant did not share with Gonzales.) 

Defendant said the gun used in the shooting would never be found, based on where they 

got rid of it.

F-Troop was a criminal street gang on June 28, 1998. A gang expert 

testified that F-Troop is one of the oldest, largest, and most violent gangs in Orange

County. Both defendant and Leal were F-Troop members. In 1998, Luna’s mother’s 

house was well known as an F-Troop house, at which F-Troop members congregated. 

The gang expert testified that he had investigated gang-related shootings at that house on 

more than one occasion.

The gang expert testified that guns are a gang’s “bread and butter.” Gang 

members use guns to commit crimes, and use them offensively and defensively against 

rival gang members. Gang members refer to all assault rifles as “AK’s.” It is common 

for gang members to get rid of “hot” or “burned” guns, meaning those guns that have 

been used to kill and for which the police are searching.

The gang expert also testified that respect is a key concept in gang culture

because respect equals fear. Gangs believe they earn respect by inciting fear due to their 

level of violence. Disrespect must be answered with an act of retaliation. While it is not

common for a gang member to kill a member of his own gang, it can happen in retaliation 

for an act of disrespect. The killing of Leal would benefit his own gang, F-Troop, by 

sending a message to the community that the gang would even kill one of its own 
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members who stepped out of line, increasing the gang’s reputation for violence, and 

theoretically bringing them more respect in the community.

In defense, Karina Lopez, Leal’s girlfriend, testified that the night he was 

killed, Leal had gone to a party with Castaneda and two females. Leal later called Lopez 

and asked her to bring his shoes to the house on South Halladay Street. When she 

arrived, Lopez took the shoes to the shed in the backyard, where Leal was. As Lopez was 

trying to leave, Leal grabbed her by the hair, and began hitting and punching her. Lopez 

had never seen Leal act that way, and thought he might be on drugs. Lopez left to go 

home about 2:00 a.m.

Sylvia Beltran, who lived at the South Halladay Street house and was 

defendant’s cousin, woke up when she heard Lopez’s calls for help. Sylvia Beltran saw 

Leal beating Lopez, and testified Leal was “all drugged” up. Sylvia Beltran separated 

Leal from Lopez, and tried to calm Leal down. After 1:00 a.m., Sylvia Beltran went back 

to sleep on the sofa in the living room. Sometime between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., she woke 

up to the sound of a gunshot. She saw Leal lying in the backyard, not moving. Luna’s 

mother and another woman at the house, Josie, told Sylvia Beltran that Leal had hit Josie 

in the mouth. Luna’s mother refused to call the police because she did not want to lose

her house. Sylvia Beltran called her brother Raul Beltran, and also called defendant. 

Raul Beltran showed up about 6:00 a.m., and defendant showed up between 8:30 and 

9:00 a.m. Sylvia Beltran testified defendant was not at the house when Leal was shot.

Defendant was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), with 

sentencing enhancement allegations that he personally used a firearm (id., § 12022.5, 

subd. (a)), and that the murder was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 

association with a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).1 A jury convicted 

 

1

 Defendant was originally charged with an additional count of street terrorism. 

(Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a).) That count was dismissed on the People’s motion 

because it was filed after the statute of limitations had run.
7

defendant of second degree murder, and found the sentencing enhancement allegations to 

be true. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; 

the trial court denied the motion. Defendant was sentenced to 15 years to life in state 

prison on the murder charge, plus a consecutive sentence of 10 years for the firearm 

enhancement. Because of the true finding on the gang enhancement, defendant was 

ordered to serve a minimum of 15 years. Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I.

THE PROSECUTION DID NOT HAVE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN ITS POSSESSION,

AND, THEREFORE, COULD NOT HAVE VIOLATED BRADY.

Defendant contends that the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence of 

Gonzales’s prior history of being an informant was Brady error in violation of his right to 

due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

2 We 

apply an independent standard of review. (People v. Salazar (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1031, 

1042.)

3

“‘The federal due process clause prohibits the prosecution from suppressing 

evidence materially favorable to the accused. The duty of disclosure exists regardless of 

good or bad faith, and regardless of whether the defense has requested the materials. 

 

2

 Defendant does not separately argue any violation of Penal Code section 1054.1, 

subdivision (e), which provides: “The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the 

defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and information, if it is in 

the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in 

the possession of the investigating agencies: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Any exculpatory evidence.”

3

 Defendant did not specifically argue in the trial court that there was a violation 

of Brady when he moved for a new trial. The Attorney General, however, does not 

contend defendant forfeited the issue. A claim that the prosecution violated Brady may 

be raised for the first time on appeal, if it presents a pure question of law to be 

determined based on undisputed facts. (People v. Gutierrez (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 

1463, 1471, fn. 5.) 
8

[Citations.] The obligation is not limited to evidence the prosecutor’s office itself 

actually knows of or possesses, but includes “evidence known to the others acting on the 

government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” [Citation.] [¶] For Brady

purposes, evidence is favorable if it helps the defense or hurts the prosecution, as by 

impeaching a prosecution witness. [Citations.] Evidence is material if there is a 

reasonable probability its disclosure would have altered the trial result. [Citation.] 

Materiality includes consideration of the effect of the nondisclosure on defense 

investigations and trial strategies. [Citations.] Because a constitutional violation occurs 

only if the suppressed evidence was material by these standards, a finding that Brady was 

not satisfied is reversible without need for further harmless-error review. [Citation.]’

[Citation.]” (People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 64.)

“A prosecutor’s duty under Brady to disclose material exculpatory evidence 

extends to evidence the prosecutor—or the prosecution team—knowingly possesses or 

has the right to possess. The prosecution team includes both investigative and 

prosecutorial agencies and personnel. [Citation.] . . . [A] prosecutor has a duty to learn of 

favorable evidence known to other prosecutorial and investigative agencies acting on the 

prosecution’s behalf, including police agencies. The scope of the prosecutorial duty to 

disclose encompasses exculpatory evidence possessed by investigative agencies to which 

the prosecutor has reasonable access. [Citation.] [¶] A prosecutor has a duty to search 

for and disclose exculpatory evidence if the evidence is possessed by a person or agency 

that has been used by the prosecutor or the investigating agency to assist the prosecution 

or the investigating agency in its work. The important determinant is whether the person 

or agency has been ‘acting on the government’s behalf’ [citation] or ‘assisting the 

government’s case.’ [Citation.] [¶] Conversely, a prosecutor does not have a duty to 

disclose exculpatory evidence or information to a defendant unless the prosecution team 

actually or constructively possesses that evidence or information. Thus, information 

possessed by an agency that has no connection to the investigation or prosecution of the 
9

criminal charge against the defendant is not possessed by the prosecution team, and the 

prosecutor does not have the duty to search for or to disclose such material.” (People v. 

Superior Court (Barrett) (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314-1315.) “The prosecution has 

no general duty to seek out information from other agencies or sources that might be 

beneficial to the defense, except for information that is reasonably accessible to the 

prosecution and not to the defendant. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1318-1319.)

This case turns on whether the information regarding Gonzales’s previous 

experience as an informant in Nevada was within the constructive possession of the 

prosecution in this case. In response to defendant’s pretrial request for discovery, the 

Orange County District Attorney’s Office provided an information report reading, in 

relevant part, as follows: “On October 5, 2010, District Attorney Investigator 

John Kenney checked law enforcement resources to determine if Craig Gonzales had a 

background as an informant in California and other states there was none [sic]. [¶] 

Craig Gonzales has no history as an informant in Orange County per the Orange County 

District Attorney’s Office.” (Some capitalization omitted.) 

In the motion for a new trial, defendant’s trial counsel detailed the rather 

tortuous process by which he finally obtained the information regarding Gonzales’s 

participation as an informant in a Nevada state court proceeding. The declaration in 

support of the motion for a new trial included reference to the unsuccessful search 

performed by a private investigator hired by defendant’s trial counsel, as well as the 

Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department’s statement that it had no documents 

responsive to a subpoena seeking information on Gonzales as an informant. When 

defendant’s trial counsel’s office reviewed the hearing history of each case in Gonzales’s

lengthy history, it discovered a motion that had been decided on the same day as 

Gonzales was sentenced in one case. Defendant’s trial counsel’s office then asked the 

Sacramento County Superior Court clerk’s office to retrieve the documents relating to 

that hearing from storage. After the files were retrieved from storage, an attorney copy 
10

service obtained Gonzales’s motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero)

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and the opposition thereto.

4

 In the opposition brief, the following 

information appears: “The Probation Department recommended a sentence of 2 years 

state prison for the defendant [(Gonzales) on charges of violating Penal Code 

sections 502, subdivision (c), and 530.5, to which Gonzales pled guilty]. Before 

judgment and sentence, [Gonzales] was released to Nevada state court. [Gonzales] went 

to law enforcement with information on a sexual assault and testified at trial for 

prosecution in Nevada. [Gonzales] received [a] favorable letter from Nevada 

prosecutor.”5

On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecution had access to and 

searched “their all-state database for informant evidence.” Defendant fails to provide this 

court with any evidence that such an all-inclusive database exists, or that it would have 

provided the information defendant sought. The key information here was buried in the 

middle of an opposition to a People v. Superior Court (Romero) motion; it does not 

provide a definitive statement as to Gonzales’s status as a jailhouse informant or “snitch,”

and the opposition brief was not identified by the Sacramento County Sheriff’s 

Department as responsive to defendant’s subpoena. All of these facts are evidence that 

even if an all-state database exists, it might not be able to provide the information sought.

None of the cases defendant cites on appeal requires that the prosecution, in 

order to fulfill its obligations under Brady, seek or confirm information from any 

resource other than those actively involved in the current prosecution. (See Kyles v. 

Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 437 [“the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any 

 

4

 People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at page 530, provides that 

a trial court may strike a defendant’s strike priors for sentencing purposes in furtherance 

of justice.

5

 Defendant admits nothing in the record establishes conclusively that Gonzales 

was testifying based on another inmate’s jailhouse confession to him in the Nevada state 

case.
11

favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, 

including the police”]; In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879 [“any favorable evidence 

known to the others acting on the government’s behalf is imputed to the prosecution”].) 

“[T]he prosecution ‘has no general duty to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that 

might be beneficial to the defense.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 

460.) 

Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude the 

information about Gonzales’s testimony in the Nevada case was not subject to disclosure 

by the prosecution under Brady. The Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department was not 

working on behalf of the Orange County District Attorney’s Office in this case. The 

prosecution had no duty to seek out or obtain the evidence of Gonzales’s testimony in the 

Nevada case. Therefore, defendant’s due process rights were not violated because of an 

alleged failure to provide information regarding Gonzales’s previous experience as an 

informant. 

If the prosecution had failed to turn over exculpatory evidence in its 

possession (actual or constructive), we would next determine whether the information 

that was withheld was material. Exculpatory evidence is material if there is a reasonable 

probability that, had it been disclosed to the defense, the result at trial would have been 

different. (In re Miranda (2008) 43 Cal.4th 541, 575.) Defendant claims that evidence 

of Gonzales being an informant in Nevada would have allowed defendant to attack 

Gonzales’s credibility by showing (1) Gonzales had perjured himself when he testified he 

had not previously been an informant; (2) he was an experienced, professional 

government informant; and (3) he had a motive to lie to obtain favorable treatment from 

the government. As discussed in more detail, post, the jury heard evidence regarding 

Gonzales’s lengthy criminal history (which included theft and fraud-related crimes), and 

evidence from which any reasonable juror would infer that Gonzales had, despite his 

protestations to the contrary, previously been a government informant in Fort Worth, 
12

Texas. In light of this record, it is not reasonably probable that evidence Gonzales also 

had been an informant in Nevada would have changed the result in this case.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE.

“A trial court may grant a new trial motion ‘[w]hen new evidence is 

discovered material to the defendant, and which he could not, with reasonable diligence, 

have discovered and produced at the trial.’ ([Pen. Code,] § 1181, subd. (8).) In ruling on 

such a motion, the trial court considers several factors: ‘“‘1. That the evidence, and not 

merely its materiality, be newly discovered; 2. That the evidence be not cumulative 

merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause; 

4. That the party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at 

the trial; and 5. That these facts be shown by the best evidence of which the case 

admits.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 

1151.) “A new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence is looked upon with 

disfavor. We will only disturb a trial court’s denial of such a motion if there is a clear 

showing of a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)

6

Defendant contends that the evidence of Gonzales’s previous experience as 

an informant would have proven Gonzales committed perjury at defendant’s trial. The

trial court found the evidence would not have proven any perjury on the part of Gonzales. 

Gonzales testified as follows, when questioned by defendant’s trial counsel:

 

6

 Defendant’s motion for a new trial was based on the lack of sufficient evidence 

to support the conviction, as well as two items of newly discovered evidence—the 

evidence of Gonzales’s previous experience as an informant and evidence of an audio 

recording of the police interview of Luna the day after the shooting, which defendant 

argued was inconsistent with the summary of the interview included in contemporaneous 

police reports. On appeal, defendant pursues his argument only as to Gonzales’s role as 

an informant in the Nevada case.
13

“Q . . . Mr. Gonzales, have you ever testified for the district attorney’s 

office before?

“A No.

“Q Are you telling us that this is the first time you’ve ever testified for the 

district attorney?

“A Here, yes.

“Q You’ve never been an informant before?

“A Are you talking about here? No.

“Q Anyplace, Sacramento, Fort Worth.

“A No, either place.

“Q You turned in some Black Guards that said they were going to make a 

break out of prison, right?

“A No.

“Q You didn’t do that?

“A It wasn’t Black Guards.

“Q What were they?

“A And it wasn’t with any court. It was just in the prison while I was at 

Fort Worth, there were two inmates that were getting ready to go back to San Diego and 

they had an escape plan. They were gonna kill both guards that took them.

“Q So you snitched on them?

“A I told them what was going on.

“Q You were an informant then?

“A If that’s what you want to call it. If that’s what you want to call it.

“Q What do you call it?

“A Saving their lives.

“Q By snitching?

“A Okay.”
14

We agree with the trial court that Gonzales did not commit perjury in his 

testimony regarding his history as an informant. Gonzales was clearly being evasive in 

his responses to defendant’s counsel’s questions, but that does not necessarily equate to 

perjury.

The evidence regarding Gonzales’s previous experience as an informant 

would not have been material, in any event. The following testimony was provided by 

Gonzales regarding his criminal history:

“Q How long have you been presently incarcerated right now?

“A Since 2003.

“Q And you’re serving a sentence. How long of a sentence is that?

“A 19 years, eight months.

“Q And when were you sentenced to that particular time?

“A February, 2008.

“Q And what was that for?

“A It was for possession of narcotics, possession for sales, forgery—a 

couple counts of forgery, fraud, and bad checks.

“Q And there must have been some sentencing enhancements on top of 

that to get all the way up to that 19-year range.

“A Right. Because I had prior dope cases, drug cases and got three-year 

enhancements for each one plus a prior strike that I had from 1989. [¶] . . . [¶]

“Q You have been in and out of custody most of your adult life, is that a 

fair statement?

“A Yes. Almost all of my adult life.

“Q Share with us some of the types of other crimes that you’ve been 

convicted [of committing] over the years.

“A In 1989 I was convicted of unarmed bank robbery. I’ve been convicted 

of drug cases, identity theft, second-degree burglary, forgery, and I think that’s about it.
15

“Q In your adult life how much time do you think you’ve spent out of 

custody?

“A Well, since 1989 I’ve . . . spent about two-and-a-half years.

“Q Out of custody?

“A Out of custody.” 

Given the evidence of Gonzales’s informing in Fort Worth and his criminal 

history, including many theft and fraud-related crimes, it is not reasonably probable that 

the jury’s verdict would have been different if evidence that Gonzales had been an 

informant in the Nevada case had been offered. The trial court did not err in denying the 

motion for a new trial.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

ARONSON, J.