[Cite as State v. Lane, 2018-Ohio-5250.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : No. 18AP-88 

 (C.P.C. No. 15CR-4413)

Kaquawn C. Lane, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : No. 18AP-89 

 (C.P.C. No. 16CR-6137)

Kaquawn C. Lane, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : No. 18AP-90 

 (C.P.C. No. 17CR-8)

Kaquawn C. Lane, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

v. : No. 18AP-91 

 (C.P.C. No. 17CR-1991)

Kaquawn C. Lane, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 27, 2018 
Nos. 18AP-88, 18AP-89, 18AP-90 and 18AP-91 2 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. 

Gilbert, for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert. 

On brief: Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and 

Stephen P. Hardwick, for appellant. Argued: Stephen P. 

Hardwick. 

 

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

DORRIAN, J. 

{¶ 1} Kaquawn C. Lane, defendant-appellant, appeals the January 12 and 

January 23, 2018 judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in case Nos. 

15CR-4413 (appeal No. 18AP-88), 16CR-6137 (appeal No. 18AP-89), 17CR-8 (appeal No. 

18AP-90), and 17CR-1991 (appeal No. 18AP-91). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} On November 20, 2017, Lane accepted a plea offer from State of Ohio, 

plaintiff-appellee, in the aforementioned four cases. Pursuant to the plea offer, Lane pled 

guilty to two counts of rape with a three-year firearm specification, two counts of rape 

without a firearm specification, four counts of kidnapping without firearm specifications, 

and one count of improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. In exchange for the 

plea, the state nolled four counts of rape, two counts of aggravated robbery with firearm 

specifications, one count of robbery, and one count of aggravated menacing. The state also 

removed firearm specifications from two of the rape charges to which he pled and two of 

the kidnapping charges to which he pled. 

{¶ 3} Prior to entering the pleas, the prosecutor explained the offer and the 

potential penalties in detail. The prosecutor concluded by informing the judge if appellant 

accepts the plea offer, the possible range of prison time the court could impose would be 

"up to a possible maximum of 95 and a half years of prison time and the Tier III sex offender 

registration." (Tr. Vol. III at 6.) Lane's counsel stated the prosecutor's summary of the offer 

"as to the form and the nature of the change of plea" was correct but that he was reserving 

his comments as to the maximum potential penalty for sentencing. (Tr. Vol. III at 6-7.) The 

trial court then engaged in an extensive colloquy with Lane to ensure he was changing his 

pleas knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and with full appreciation of the 

consequences of his pleas. The court asked if Lane had an opportunity to discuss the cases 
Nos. 18AP-88, 18AP-89, 18AP-90 and 18AP-91 3 

with his counsel and if his counsel answered his questions to his satisfaction. The court 

went over each and every plea form and inquired if Lane understood the forms. The court 

specifically detailed the possible maximum penalties upon entering the pleas and also 

informed Lane which prison time was mandatory. The court reiterated several times that 

if prison time was mandatory, it could not be reduced for any reason, it would have to run 

consecutive to any other time imposed and Lane must do that time. Lane indicated he 

understood. The court reiterated that if there was anything Lane did not understand, he 

should let the court know. The court then informed Lane he had a right to a jury trial and 

all the rights attendant thereto. Lane informed the court he wished to waive his 

constitutional rights to trial, and Lane's counsel informed the court he believed his client 

was waiving his rights freely and voluntarily with a full understanding of his legal rights as 

well as the potential consequences of his plea. 

{¶ 4} Lane entered his pleas and the court ordered a pre-sentence investigation. 

Sentencing was scheduled for January 4, 2018. However, before the court proceeded to 

commence sentencing on that date, Lane expressed he wished to withdraw the pleas he had 

previously entered. In response, the court indicated Lane's counsel would have the 

opportunity to file a motion to withdraw and the state would have the opportunity to 

respond. The court then inquired whether Lane understood what could happen as a result 

of withdrawing the pleas. The court informed Lane the case would "go back to square one." 

(Tr. Vol. IV at 3.) The court stated, "the State will not put the same offer back on the table 

and [] what you're looking at then could be considerably more than what you're looking at 

now." (Emphasis added.) (Tr. Vol. IV at 4.) The court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel 

explained to Lane he faced approximately 95 to 96 years in prison if he continues with the 

plea offer; however, he faced 180-185 years if he withdraws the pleas, goes to trial and were 

found guilty. Lane's counsel clarified that the maximum prison time Lane could be exposed 

to if he withdraws the pleas is 185 years rather than 180, but observed it "[is] academic at 

that point." (Tr. Vol. IV at 5.) The court concurred stating "[a]bsolutely." (Tr. Vol. IV at 5.) 

The trial court expressed its concern that sometimes "people request to have their plea 

withdrawn because of the fact that -- well, being sentenced to an extensive period of time is 

something difficult to accept so they decide I'm going to push this off for as long as I can." 

(Tr. Vol. IV at 5-6.) The trial court then told Lane "[a]nd what ultimately will end up 

happening is that your situation will end up being worse by doing so." The court informed 
Nos. 18AP-88, 18AP-89, 18AP-90 and 18AP-91 4 

Lane he "absolutely ha[s] the right to request to withdraw [the] plea[s]. * * * But, ultimately, 

if you withdraw your plea[s] and we go back to square one, the consequences that you're 

looking at, again, will be substantially greater than what you're looking at right now." 

(Emphasis added.) (Tr. Vol. IV at 6.) 

{¶ 5} The court then took a brief recess so Lane could speak with his counsel. Lane 

returned to the courtroom and informed the court he wanted to continue with the pleas and 

wanted to proceed to sentencing. The court inquired "Okay. And no one's pressuring you 

to do that, are they? And you're doing this of your own freewill?" (Tr. Vol. IV at 7.) Lane 

responded "Yes, Your Honor." (Tr. Vol. IV at 7.) 

{¶ 6} The court then sentenced Lane to a total of 77 years in prison, 42 of which are 

mandatory years. After the court announced Lane's sentence, Lane became belligerent with 

the court and repeatedly stated he "will never get out" and he "will die in prison." (Tr. Vol. 

IV at 22; 24.) 

II. Assignments of Error 

{¶ 7} Lane timely appealed and asserts the following two assignments of error: 

[I.] The trial court erred by coercing Mr. Lane to withdraw his 

motion to withdraw his plea by incorrectly stating that Mr. 

Lane faced "substantially" more time in prison if he did not 

plead guilty. In fact, Mr. Lane faced effective life without parole 

with or without the plea agreement, and only minutes later, the 

trial court imposed a sentence of effective life without parole. 

[II.] Trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting when the 

trial court told Mr. Lane that Mr. Lane faced "substantially" 

more time in prison if he did not plead guilty. 

III. Analysis 

{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Lane argues: (1) the trial court coerced him 

into withdrawing his motion to withdraw his pleas, and (2) his pleas, as a result, were not 

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Lane states he would not be eligible for judicial release 

until he had served 60 years of his sentence and he would be 84 years old at that time. 

Therefore, according to Lane, he faced effective life without parole with or without the plea 

agreement. 

{¶ 9} In support, Lane points to State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St.3d 557, 2016-Ohio8288. In Moore, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated "[w]e see no significant difference 

between a sentence of life imprisonment without parole and a term-of-years prison 
Nos. 18AP-88, 18AP-89, 18AP-90 and 18AP-91 5 

sentence that would extend beyond the defendant's expected lifespan before the possibility 

of parole." Id. at ¶ 59. The state concurs with Lane's characterization of his sentence 

according to Moore. Nevertheless, while we do not dispute Moore, Moore does not dispose 

of nor even address the issue in this case. 

{¶ 10} Lane next argues the situation in this case is analogous to a trial court's 

misinforming a defendant about eligibility for judicial release. Lane cites to several cases 

from other districts, State v. Hollobaugh, 5th Dist. No. 11-AP-0006, 2012-Ohio-2620, ¶ 9-

16; State v. Phillips, 12th Dist. No. CA2008-05-126, 2009-Ohio-1448, ¶ 19; State v. Farley,

1st Dist. No. C-0100478, 2002-Ohio-1142; and State v. Fink, 11th Dist. No. 2006-A-0035, 

2007-Ohio-5220, ¶ 23. In these cases, the courts determined the trial courts erred in not 

correctly informing the defendant of his or her ineligibility for release or community 

control. In this case, however, the court was clear in informing Lane which potential prison 

terms were mandatory and in explaining that mandatory means he must serve that prison 

term and there is no possibility that time would be reduced. 

{¶ 11} Lane further argues the trial court misinformed him in comparing the 

potential maximum prison terms pursuant to the pleas and pursuant to a jury trial and 

finding of guilty. Lane points to the court's use of the phrase "substantially greater" to 

describe the potential prison term he faced if he went to trial and were found guilty 

compared to the potential prison term he faced if he accepted the state's plea offer. (Tr. 

Vol. IV at 6.) Lane argues he was prejudiced by the court's comparison and description of 

the maximum terms and that it was the court's use of the phrase "substantially greater" 

which resulted in Lane withdrawing his motion to withdraw. 

{¶ 12} We disagree with Lane. Careful review of the record indicates Lane was fully 

informed of the potential maximum prison terms pursuant to the pleas and pursuant to a 

jury trial and finding of guilty. The record also indicates Lane informed the court he 

understood the differences and ultimate consequences and determined to proceed with the 

pleas. The court provided Lane the opportunity to discuss the potential penalties with his 

counsel before he determined how to proceed. Finally, within minutes of the trial court 

imposing sentence, Lane became belligerent and ranted that he would never get out of 

prison and would die in prison. The timing of his outburst supports the conclusion that at 

the time he determined not to withdraw his pleas, Lane had full awareness and 

understanding of the potential for a prison sentence which would likely encompass most of 
Nos. 18AP-88, 18AP-89, 18AP-90 and 18AP-91 6 

the years of his life. Lane does not point us to any case law or other authority to support his 

arguments, and all the factors discussed above indicate Lane was not coerced into 

withdrawing his motion to withdraw his pleas and that he entered knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary pleas. 

{¶ 13} Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error. 

{¶ 14} In his second assignment of error, Lane argues his counsel was ineffective for 

not objecting when the trial court compared the potential prison terms and used the phrase 

"substantially greater." (Tr. Vol. IV at 6.) 

{¶ 15} We apply a two-part test to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio 

St.3d 136, 141-42 (1989). "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 

deficient. * * * Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense." Strickland at 687. "To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by 

counsel's deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable 

probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been 

different." Bradley at paragraph three of the syllabus. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's 

performance must be highly deferential [and] [b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in 

making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland at 689; 

Bradley at 141. 

{¶ 16} We do not find Lane's counsel's performance was deficient. As discussed 

above, we find the trial court did not coerce Lane into withdrawing his motion to withdraw 

the pleas. Furthermore, Lane's counsel informed the court his client wished to withdraw 

his pleas. He offered to the court to provide an explanation at that time or to elaborate at a 

later time determined by the court. Although he acknowledged the difference between 185 

and 180 years in prison was "academic at that point," he ensured his client had accurate 

information regarding the potential maximum sentence pursuant to jury trial and guilty 

finding. After Lane and his counsel discussed his options during recess, the court observed 

Lane had an opportunity to have a discussion with his counsel. Lane did not object to the 

court's observation or indicate otherwise. 
Nos. 18AP-88, 18AP-89, 18AP-90 and 18AP-91 7 

{¶ 17} Lane has failed to demonstrate his counsel's performance was deficient. 

Therefore, it is not necessary for us to consider whether counsel's performance prejudiced 

Lane. 

{¶ 18} Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error. 

{¶ 19} Finally, the state requests this court remand case No. 17CR-1991 (appeal No. 

18AP-91) for the limited purpose of addressing two discrepancies with the sentence: first, 

in case No. 17CR-1991, regarding the kidnapping count, the trial court stated in open court 

that the prison term for this count is 8 years, whereas the prison term on the sentencing 

entry is 9 years; second, regarding the total length of prison time imposed on all four cases, 

in open court, the trial court initially stated the total term is 72 years, however the actual 

length of prison terms calculated from the judgment entries is 77 years (or 78 years 

depending on the length of prison term in case No. 17CR-1991). The state suggests the trial 

court could either: (1) issue a nunc pro tunc entry if it intended to impose the 8-year term 

on the kidnapping as it stated in open court, or (2) hold another sentencing hearing and 

impose the 9-year term on the kidnapping sentence in Lane's presence if the court intended 

to impose 9 years. 

{¶ 20} Lane objects to the limitations on remand and argues that a nunc pro tunc 

entry would not be appropriate because the confusion between 72, 77, and 78 years makes 

it impossible from the record to determine what sentence the trial court intended to impose 

on any of the counts. 

{¶ 21} We note that although the trial court initially indicated in open court the total 

sentence equaled 72 years, the transcript reveals that in the holding cell adjacent to the 

courtroom after Lane had his outburst, with Lane and his counsel present, the court 

informed Lane it had miscalculated the total prison term. The court informed Lane that 

the total prison term was actually 77 years, not 72 years. The court also reiterated that it 

was imposing 8 years in case No. 17CR-1991. The court's reiteration of 8 years in case No. 

17CR-1991 supports the assumption that the trial court intended to impose 8 years, rather 

than 9 years as is indicated in the judgment entry in case No. 17CR-1991. Therefore, remand 

to impose a nunc pro tunc entry would be appropriate. Nevertheless, on remand, we give 

the trial court discretion, in the alternative, if it determines a nunc pro tunc entry is not 

appropriate, to hold another sentencing hearing on case No. 17CR-1991 only. We disagree 
Nos. 18AP-88, 18AP-89, 18AP-90 and 18AP-91 8 

with Lane that it is impossible to determine what the trial court intended on any of the 

counts and, therefore, we do not find it necessary to remand the other three cases. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant's two assignments of error 

and affirm the judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Upon request of 

the state, we remand case No. 17CR-1991 only for the trial court to either enter a nunc pro 

tunc entry, or hold a new sentencing hearing as it determines appropriate. 

Judgments affirmed; 

Case No. 17CR-1991 remanded with instructions. 

SADLER and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.