23-6040-cr

United States v. Peralta

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL 

RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A 

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE 

FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

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BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 21st day of March, two thousand twenty-four. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT D. SACK,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

MICHAEL H. PARK, 

 Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Appellee, 

 v. 23-6040-cr

RAMON PERALTA, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR APPELLEE: DEREK WIKSTROM, Assistant United States 

Attorney (Marcia S. Cohen and Hagan 

Scotten, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

on the brief), for Damian Williams, United 

States Attorney for the Southern District of 

New York, New York, New York.
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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: KENDRA L. HUTCHINSON, Federal Defenders 

of New York, Inc., Appeals Bureau, New 

York, New York. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court, entered on January 3, 2023, is AFFIRMED. 

Defendant-Appellant Ramon Peralta appeals from the district court’s judgment of 

conviction following his guilty plea to one count of knowingly making a false statement in a 

matter within the jurisdiction of the government of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001(a)(2), and one count of the assimilated state misdemeanor of forcible touching, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 13 and New York Penal Law § 130.52(1). The convictions arose from 

Peralta’s lying to Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents about having had sexual 

contact with a female employee (“Victim-1”) as a civilian food-services supervisor at the United 

States Military Academy at West Point, New York, and his sexual assault of a different female 

employee (“Victim-2”) under his supervision. The district court sentenced Peralta principally to

sixty months’ imprisonment on the false statement count, which was above the advisory range of 

thirty-seven to forty-six months for that crime under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(the “Guidelines”), to be followed by three years’ supervised release. On appeal, Peralta’s sole 

challenge is to the substantive reasonableness of his sixty-month sentence. We assume the 

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which 

we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. 
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We review claims of substantive unreasonableness for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Gates, 84 F.4th 496, 504–05 (2d Cir. 2023). Under this deferential standard, “we do not 

consider what weight we would ourselves have given a particular factor [at sentencing]”; rather, 

“we consider whether the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned 

it under the totality of circumstances in the case.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 

(2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal citation omitted). A sentence is therefore substantively 

unreasonable only if “affirming it would damage the administration of justice because the 

sentence imposed was shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter 

of law.” United States v. Park, 758 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We apply this standard even when the sentence constitutes a variance from the 

advisory Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). However, “the district 

court’s justification for a non-Guidelines sentence must be ‘sufficiently compelling to support 

the degree of the variance.’” United States v. Ceasar, 10 F.4th 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). 

Peralta argues that “[t]he district court’s reasons for the upward variance—from a range 

of 37 to 46 months, to 60 months—do not bear the weight of the substantial deviation.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 15–16. We disagree.

The district court carefully and thoroughly discussed its compelling reasons for the 

above-Guidelines sentence with specific references to the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). In particular, the district court explained that a Guidelines sentence was insufficient 

“because it does not account for the seriousness of the conduct in this case”—namely, sexually 

assaulting Victim-2 and lying to FBI agents about sexual contact with Victim-1. App’x at 151; 
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see also id. at 149 (emphasizing that sexual assault is “a serious crime, because it victimizes 

people not only in the moment but for the rest of their lives” and “there’s no question that the 

victims in this case do feel victimized and even years after the fact harbor genuine anger and 

genuine hurt and genuine pain”). That determination was fully supported by the record, 

including the statements by the two victims at sentencing. Victim-1 addressed Peralta directly, 

stating that she felt “violated” and “disrespected” by Peralta, and that she was “never gonna 

heal” and was “sick of” the pain he had caused. Id. at 136. Victim-2 also spoke directly to 

Peralta, stating: “[W]hat you did to me was not right. I was hurt. . . . There was not one day at 

the job that you didn’t harass me. You used your power to, to manipulate everything at that job 

and to make it hell.” Id. at 137. She further explained the impact of Peralta’s conduct: “I lost 

myself. I lost my innocence. I lost my adulthood. I lost everything. For you to question what 

you did to me, how dare you?” Id. at 138. The district court therefore acted well within its 

discretion in concluding that the seriousness of Peralta’s criminal conduct, under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A), warranted an above-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Coppola, 671 

F.3d 220, 254 (2d Cir. 2012) (concluding that “[the defendant] can hardly show that his criminal 

conduct was not sufficiently severe to bear the weight assigned it under the totality of the 

circumstances”).

The district court also noted Peralta’s lack of genuine remorse, as reflected in the 

substance and tone of his statement at the sentencing, as well as his smirk while the district court 

was commenting on his lack of remorse. The district court further explained that “from the 

minute these incidents happened, [Peralta] has been in denial of them, and he lie[d] to 

investigators about what happened, and . . . even today doesn’t seem to be willing to accept how 
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much he hurt these two women.” App’x at 151. Although Peralta challenges the district court’s 

reliance on “what it perceived as [his] attempts to evade responsibility,” Appellant’s Br. at 16, 

we discern no basis to disturb the district court’s assessment regarding Peralta’s lack of remorse, 

especially given a sentencing judge’s unique ability to make such assessments based on his or 

her observations of and interactions with the defendant at sentencing. See United States v. Jones, 

531 F.3d 163, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that deference on a sentencing appeal derives, 

in part, from the district court’s “unique ability” to make individualized assessments at 

sentencing by “hear[ing] all the evidence relevant to sentencing, mak[ing] credibility 

determinations, and interact[ing] directly with the defendant”); accord United States v. Zhuang, 

270 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam). In addition, the district court considered the need 

for general deterrence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), reasoning that “[p]eople have to 

understand [that] . . . when there’s an investigation, they’re not going to lie about it, because 

those investigations cannot be obstructed.” App’x at 150–51; see United States v. Davis, 82 

F.4th 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2023) (explaining that Section 3553(a)(2)(B) “requires courts to factor in 

the need for a sentence to provide adequate general deterrent value”). 

On this record, we conclude that the Section 3553(a) factors upon which the district court 

relied “can bear the weight assigned [them] under the totality of circumstances in the case,” 

Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191, and the sixty-month sentence was not “shockingly high . . . or 

otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law,” Park, 758 F.3d at 200 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Peralta points to various mitigating factors—including his difficult upbringing, 

family circumstances, and lack of a criminal history—that he asserts supported a lower sentence. 

The district court, however, considered these mitigating factors and noted that its sentence would 
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have been even higher in the absence of such factors. Given the overall reasonableness of the 

sixty-month sentence, Peralta’s disagreement with the district court’s weighing of certain Section 

3553(a) factors does not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Davis, 82 F.4th at 203 (“[T]he 

weight to be afforded any sentencing factor is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the 

sentencing judge and is beyond our review, so long as the sentence ultimately imposed is 

reasonable.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

In sum, the district court’s sentence was substantively reasonable. 

* * * 

We have considered Peralta’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court