S10852 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE December 10, 2008 

If we fail to act, years from now some 

future Professor Bernanke, now Chairman of the Fed, will study our actions 

and will absolutely marvel at the 

missed opportunity—trillions of dollars 

committed to the financial sector, tens 

of billions denied the manufacturing 

sector, with millions of people losing 

their jobs on top of the more than 1 

million who have already been laid off 

this year. If we fail to act, we will commit one of the biggest economic sins of 

omission in our history. 

Majority Leader REID is absolutely 

right to insist that we stay here as 

long as we need to get this job done. 

Let’s make it a truly merry Christmas 

in millions of living rooms in 

Lordstown, in Walton Hills, in Toledo, 

in Dayton, in Sharonville, in Mansfield, in towns all across the State. 

I yield the floor. 

f 

EXTENSION OF MORNING 

BUSINESS 

Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I ask 

unanimous consent to extend morning 

business until 4 p.m. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. 

MCCASKILL). Without objection, it is so 

ordered. 

Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 

clerk will call the roll. 

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. 

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I 

ask unanimous consent that the order 

for the quorum call be rescinded. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

f 

EXTENSION OF MORNING 

BUSINESS 

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I 

further ask unanimous consent that 

the period for morning business be extended beyond 4 o’clock, and that I be 

permitted to speak in morning business 

for up to 15 minutes. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without 

objection, it is so ordered. 

f 

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL 

Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I 

have sought recognition for a few purposes. First, I ask unanimous consent 

that my statement regarding U.S. policy toward Israel be printed in the 

RECORD. 

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the 

RECORD, as follows: 

U.S. POLICY REGARDING ISRAEL

I have sought recognition to address the 

subject of United States policy regarding 

Israel and the Mideast peace process as we 

look forward to a new Administration and a 

new Congress next year. It is my expectation 

that the United States will maintain the 

close, strong relationship with Israel based 

on U.S. national interests, especially security interests, and our close cultural and historic ties with Israel. 

While efforts are being made to bring 

democratic institutions to Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel is the only democracy in the region with our shared values. The record 

shows the U.S. vigorously supports a close 

relationship with Israel for good reason. 

Since the accords between Israel and Egypt 

in 1978, the United States has given substantial foreign aid to those two countries to improve their security and to promote the Mideast peace process. Since my election in 1980, 

I have voted for aid to Israel in the amount 

of $81.6 billion, consisting of $28.8 billion in 

economic aid—including $1.3 billion to resettle Jewish refugees—and $52.8 billion in military aid. In the case of Egypt, I have supported $35.2 billion in military aid and $23.9 

billion in economic aid. 

The importance of Israel as a strategic 

U.S. ally has motivated the U.S. to place 

special emphasis on Israel’s security, part of 

which is promoting the Middle East Peace 

Process. During my 28 years in the Senate, I 

have traveled to many foreign countries in 

connection with my membership on the Intelligence Committee, which I chaired in the 

104th Congress, and my membership on the 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 

Operations, where I am now the longest serving Republican on the Subcommittee. 

As part of these travels, I have visited 

Israel 25 times and Syria 17 times with a 

view to assisting on a peace treaty between 

those two countries. As I see it, the key to 

such an accord is the Golan Heights captured 

by Israel in the 1967 War. Syria has long 

sought a return of the Golan. Only Israel can 

decide for itself whether its interests warrant returning the Golan to Syria for significant reciprocal concessions. Obviously, the 

strategic considerations are vastly different 

now than they were in 1967 since rockets can 

easily fly over the Golan. If Israel could rely 

on Syrian commitments to allow Lebanon to 

function as a sovereign nation, stop assisting 

Hezbollah and withdraw support for Hamas, 

Israel might conclude it was in its interest 

to return the Golan to Syria. 

Israel and Syria were reportedly very close 

to a pact in 1995 when Yitzhak Rabin was 

Prime Minister and in 2000 when Ehud Barak 

was Prime Minister. Diplomacy has produced 

some results many thought impossible. Negotiations with North Korea have reduced 

that nation’s nuclear threat although that 

situation remains volatile and uncertain. Negotiations have moved Libya’s Muammar 

Qaddafi from horrendous acts of terrorism, 

including the blowing up of Pan Am 103 and 

bombing of a Berlin discotheque, resulting in 

the murder of US military personnel, to a 

willingness to negotiate and reform. Libya 

made reparations in excess of $1,000,000,000 

and abandoned plans to design nuclear weapons in order to be admitted to the family of 

nations. 

My studies and travel in the region lead 

me to believe that next year may be the 

right time to secure an Israeli-Syrian Peace 

Treaty if the new Administration aggressively pursues that objective. 

As I prepare to travel to Israel and Syria 

in the next several weeks, I have reviewed 

my Senate activities on this subject. I think 

it would be useful to list some of the steps I 

have taken so that my colleagues and others 

will understand my reasons for optimism and 

so that the incoming Obama Administration 

will have my thinking in setting its course 

on foreign relations in the Mideast. 

I first became deeply involved in an Israeli 

security issue shortly after being elected in 

1981 regarding the proposed sale of E–3A airborne warning and control system (AWACS) 

aircraft by the U.S. to Saudi Arabia. President Reagan notified the Congress that he 

intended to sell Saudi Arabia $8.5 billion in 

arms—which at the time would have been 

the largest weapons transfer in U.S. history—including 5 AWACS aircraft and 101 

sets of conformal fuel tanks for F–15 aircraft. 

I opposed the sale on the grounds that it undercut the Camp David accords. I wrote to 

President Reagan in August 1981 to urge him 

not to proceed with the proposed sale, and on 

October 28, 1981 I said on the Senate floor: 

‘‘Until the Saudis are prepared to embrace 

the principles of the Camp David accords and 

support the United States on this cornerstone of United States-Mideast foreign policy, it is my judgment that they should not 

be rewarded with the AWACS and the F–15 

enhancement. . . . By focusing on the special 

United States-Saudi relationship . . . the administration has already moved a step away 

from the best hope for a Middle East peace— 

the Camp David accords and the now-reinstated autonomy talks between Egypt and 

Israel.’’ 

I was one of 12 Republican senators to vote 

for a resolution disapproving the proposed 

arms sale. The resolution was rejected 48–52. 

The same policy that led me to oppose the 

sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia has guided 

my actions throughout my Senate career on 

Israeli security issues. Before being elected 

to the Senate in 1980, I visited Israel in 1964, 

1969 and 1980. My first visit as a United 

States Senator came in September 1982. During my 1982 visit I met with Prime Minister 

Menachem Begin, Labor Party leader 

Shimon Peres, and other Israeli leaders. I 

urged Prime Minister Begin to discuss with 

President Reagan the issue of a Mideast 

peace. I understood the two differed on what 

approach to take, but as I said on the Senate 

floor following my trip: 

‘‘As I [saw] it, there [were] major misunderstandings which could be resolved, or 

at least clarified, by personal diplomacy between these two men of good will.’’ 

Prime Minister Begin and I also spoke about 

my meeting with Lebanese President-elect 

Bashir Gemayel who was assassinated shortly after I visited him in his Beirut office in 

September 1982. I said that I saw some hope 

of Lebanese unification, and Prime Minister 

Begin stressed that a peace treaty with Lebanon was very important to Israel. 

I returned to Israel in May 1983 and met 

with Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister 

Moshe Arens, and Labor leader Shimon 

Peres. Prime Minister Begin stressed his desire to secure the delivery of F–16’s to Israel 

before the scheduled date of 1985, saying that 

the planes were crucial for Israel’s security. 

Following my meetings in Israel, I traveled 

to Egypt, where I met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. As I stated in my trip 

report: 

‘‘I began [the meeting] by conveying Prime 

Minister Begin’s respects as Prime Minister 

Begin asked me to do, and President Mubarak responded about his esteem for Prime 

Minister Begin, saying that the Prime Minister was a man of his word and also . . . 

tough.’’’ 

I pursued a discussion with President Mubarak on the question of further negotiations 

between Israel and Egypt in pursuance of the 

principles of the Camp David accords. 

In October 1983, I was an original cosponsor 

of legislation introduced by Senator Daniel 

Patrick Moynihan that would have required 

that the U.S. Embassy in Israel and the residence of the American Ambassador to Israel 

be located in Jerusalem. Hearings were held, 

but the legislation was not passed by the 

Senate. 

I made my first trip to Syria in 1984 and 

met Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara. Following the lead of Congressman Stephen Solarz on an important issue, I urged the Foreign Minister to permit Syrian Jewish