United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 2, 2018*

Decided November 2, 2018 

Before 

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-2167 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JASON M. STOKER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 3:17-CR-30101-DRH-1 

David R. Herndon, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

After a police officer died during a high-speed chase while pursuing Jason Stoker 

for dealing drugs, Stoker pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. 

He was sentenced to 180 months in prison, 29 months above the high end of his 

guidelines range. On appeal, he contends that his sentence is substantively 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the appellant 

waived oral argument, and we agree that the briefs and record adequately present the 

facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED.

R. CIV. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 18-2167 Page 2 

unreasonable. Because of the aggravating circumstances of the case, including Stoker’s 

role in the officer’s death, we affirm. 

Stoker was part of a drug ring that sold “ice,” a pure form of methamphetamine. 

One night, as Officer James Brockmeyer saw Stoker driving, he tried to stop Stoker 

because he suspected that Stoker was driving on a suspended license. Stoker, who had 

ice in his car, fled and a high-speed chase followed. During the chase, as Stoker evaded 

the officer, Officer Brockmeyer lost control of his car, crashed, and died. 

Stoker later pleaded guilty to distributing more than 50 grams of 

methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). (He also faces charges in state 

court for Officer Brockmeyer’s death.) Stoker conceded that his relevant conduct for 

sentencing included handling between 150 and 500 grams of ice, and the presentence 

investigative report, to which he did not object, calculated that he was responsible for 

356 grams of ice. The district judge calculated a guideline range of 121 to 151 months’ 

imprisonment. Stoker asked for a sentence at the bottom of this range; the government 

responded that a higher, within-guidelines range would be appropriate. 

The judge sentenced Stoker to 180 months’ imprisonment—29 months above the 

range—because in his view the Guidelines did not “adequately represent what occurred 

in this case.” The judge cited many reasons, both in court and in his written statement 

of reasons, for the sentence. Most prominently, the judge highlighted that Officer 

Brockmeyer’s death resulted from Stoker’s conduct. The judge also noted that, beyond 

the death, “this was a very serious offense” because “[i]ce is particularly dangerous,” 

and Stoker was responsible for nearly seven times the amount of ice required to trigger 

the statutory minimum of 120 months in prison. What is more, Stoker had been arrested 

over 20 times, convicted over a dozen times, and had four convictions for assault or 

battery involving “violent physical actions.” This history displayed a “complete lack of 

recognition that other persons are entitled to be free from his anger.” The judge found 

that Stoker’s “actions in dealing illegal drugs and undertaking such a tragically reckless 

and deliberate effort to escape arrest demonstrate an escalation of [his] criminal 

behavior” and left “stunningly horrendous” devastation in the community. 

Stoker argues on appeal that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, but we 

disagree. We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard, and we will uphold the sentence so long as the district judge 

offered adequate reasons, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Wade, 

890 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2018). The judge did so here at sentencing by discussing the 

nature and circumstances of Stoker’s offense, recounting Stoker’s criminal history at 
No. 18-2167 Page 3 

length, and evaluating the impact that the crime and Officer Brockmeyer’s death had on 

the community. Moreover, in the written statement of reasons, which this court also 

looks to in evaluating a judge’s sentencing rationale, see United States v. Pankow, 884 F.3d 

785, 791 (7th Cir. 2018), the judge repeated what he had stated at the sentencing hearing: 

he based his upward variance on the death that Stoker caused. The judge thus more 

than adequately justified the above-guidelines sentence. See Wade, 890 F.3d at 633–34; 

United States v. McKinney, 543 F.3d 911, 912, 914 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding 293-month 

sentence with 188 to 235-month range where defendant with significant criminal history 

fled from police). 

Stoker resists this conclusion, asserting that the district judge made two errors in 

evaluating the § 3553(a) factors to sentence him above the guidelines range, but we are 

not persuaded by his argument. First, the judge found that his offense involving ice was 

“very serious,” even though in Stoker’s view the guidelines range already reflect the 

drug type and quantity. See United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Stoker is correct that the Guidelines treat high-quantity, ice-related crimes more 

severely than crimes involving smaller amounts or less pure methamphetamine. We 

may therefore assume that the drug and its quantity might not alone suffice to justify a 

sentence above the guidelines range. See United States v. Castaneda, No. 18-1541, 2018 

WL 5093031 (7th Cir. Oct. 19, 2018); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). But the judge commented on 

the drug and quantity in explaining why he was rejecting Stoker’s request for a sentence 

at the bottom of the guidelines range. He observed that Stoker distributed nearly seven 

times the amount of ice needed to trigger the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ 

imprisonment, which was a mere one month below the low end of the guidelines range. 

The judge’s written statement of reasons reiterates why he sentenced Stoker above the 

range: he cited the officer’s death as the reason for Stoker’s above-guidelines sentence, 

not the nature or quantity of the drug. We therefore see no problem with the judge’s 

comments about the nature and quantity of the drugs. 

Second, Stoker contends the district judge erroneously concluded that he had 

become more dangerous over time. But the judge accurately traced Stoker’s convictions, 

including his four convictions for assault and battery, and reasonably concluded that 

Stoker’s criminal history culminating in his current behavior showed that he had 

become increasingly menacing. His participation in a high-volume drug conspiracy that 

attracted police attention, exacerbated the region’s drug problem, and led to the loss of 

life an officer’s life all support the judge’s finding. The judge therefore reasonably 

sentenced Stoker based on sound conclusions. 

AFFIRMED