FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2022-4126

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DOUG CANTREL HEATH,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

William E. Davis, Judge.

June 19, 2024

ROWE, J.

Doug Cantrel Heath appeals his convictions for first-degree 

murder and attempted first-degree murder while possessing a 

firearm. He argues that the trial court erred when it denied his 

motion to continue, allowed the admission of testimony about prior 

incidents of domestic violence, and imposed the costs of 

prosecution. As to the third issue, we affirm for the reasons stated 

in Parks v. State, 371 So. 3d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023). As to the 

other issues, we affirm for the reasons explained below.

Procedural History

Heath, Martesha Williams Johnson, and Jasmine Webb were 

implicated in the first-degree murder of T.B. and the attempted 
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first-degree murder of D.W. Webb agreed to testify against Heath 

and Johnson, who were scheduled to be tried together.

During a case management hearing in September 2022, 

Heath orally moved to continue the trial until January 2023. At 

the same time, Johnson asserted her speedy trial rights and 

demanded a trial in October 2022. The State objected to Heath’s

motion for continuance because a joint trial would benefit the 

victims’ families. The court granted Johnson’s speedy trial request, 

and it set the joint trial for the October term. The court denied 

Heath’s motion for continuance but invited Heath to file a written 

motion advocating for separate trials.

Heath’s counsel responded to the court’s invitation by filing a 

written motion for continuance and severance. In support of the 

motion to continue the trial, counsel listed fifteen witnesses she 

asserted that she needed to depose before trial. She explained that 

she did not have time to prepare for an October trial because she 

had another trial scheduled at the end of September and other

previously scheduled court appearances. As to the severance of the 

trials, counsel argued that severance was necessary to preserve 

Johnson’s speedy trial rights and Heath’s right to a fair trial.

In October, the parties appeared again before the court. 

Heath’s counsel informed the court that she had deposed six of the 

fifteen witnesses identified in the written motion for continuance. 

She maintained that the testimony of the remaining witnesses 

might be crucial if they observed the shooting, and explained that 

she still needed to verify some of the information provided to the

police. 

The State responded that the remaining witnesses had been 

interviewed by the police and their statements could be found in 

police reports. When Heath’s counsel argued that the trial should 

be continued because she had another trial scheduled during the 

October term, the prosecutor offered to continue the other case so 

that Heath and Johnson could be tried together. Based on these 

arguments, the trial court again denied the motion to continue.

A week later, Heath’s counsel moved for a continuance for 

third time. The trial court denied the motion. Heath’s counsel 
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moved for a continuance a fourth time, arguing that she tried to 

depose two potential eyewitnesses (James Carter and Willie Hall), 

but both failed to appear. The State responded that it had not 

deposed those witnesses either. The trial court denied the motion 

to continue and explained that Heath’s counsel would have ample 

time to talk to witnesses at trial before they testified.

Trial

Heath, Johnson, and Webb were involved in a three-person 

romantic relationship. Heath and Webb were together for about 

fifteen years and had three children together. Johnson became 

involved with the couple a few months before the shooting. Then,

when Webb and Heath took a break in their relationship, Webb

began a sexual relationship with D.W.

When Heath learned about Webb’s relationship with D.W., he 

became enraged. Heath took Webb’s mobile phone from her and 

used it to call D.W. Heath demanded to know if D.W. had been 

involved with Webb. D.W. was hosting a barbecue at his house 

when he received the call. D.W. denied involvement with Webb 

until he heard what sounded like someone hitting Webb and her 

crying in the background. D.W. then admitted having been 

involved with Webb. Heath became angrier and told D.W. that he 

knew where D.W. lived. 

After ending the call with D.W., Heath grabbed his guns and 

placed them in his black Nissan truck. Although Webb insisted 

that she did not know what Heath was planning, she rode with 

him to Johnson’s home and heard Heath call Johnson to ask for 

her gun clip. After Heath and Webb arrived at Johnson’s home, the 

trio departed in two vehicles: Heath drove his truck, and Johnson 

and Webb followed in Johnson’s minivan. Two of Johnson’s 

children were passengers in the minivan. The group stopped at a 

convenience store. There, Webb got out of Johnson’s minivan to 

ride with Heath.

Heath used the location data on Webb’s phone to locate and 

drive to D.W.’s home. As the two vehicles neared the home, they 

stopped and left Johnson’s minivan—along with her children—on 

the side of the road. Webb then drove Heath’s truck. Johnson was 
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in the front passenger seat, and Heath was in the back seat. Heath 

told Webb to drive slowly as they passed D.W.’s house. Webb then 

saw Heath shooting an AR-15 out of the back window of the truck. 

Johnson was jumping up and down with excitement saying, “shoot, 

daddy, shoot.” Webb stated that she sped away when Heath 

started shooting. 

D.W. testified that he saw a black Nissan truck drive by his 

house, and then he heard gunshots. He avoided injury by diving to 

the ground. But T.B., who was visiting D.W.’s home for the 

barbecue, suffered a gunshot wound to his arm and chest. T.B. died 

at the scene. D.W. said the shooting occurred about an hour after 

he argued with Heath on the phone. 

The jury found Heath guilty of first-degree murder and 

attempted first-degree murder while possessing a firearm. The 

court sentenced him to consecutive life terms in prison with a tenyear mandatory-minimum term on the attempted murder 

conviction. This timely appeal follows.

Analysis

Heath argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his 

motions to continue, and (2) allowing the admission of testimony 

about prior incidents of domestic violence between Heath and 

Webb. We review both issues for an abuse of discretion. See 

Madison v. State, 132 So. 3d 237, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) 

(reviewing for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for 

continuance); Ivey v. State, 374 So. 3d 924, 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) 

(reviewing for an abuse of discretion the admission of collateral 

crime evidence). 

Motion to Continue

When ruling on a motion to continue based on an assertion of 

insufficient time to prepare for trial, a trial court should consider 

these factors, sometimes referred to as the McKay factors:

1) the time available for preparation, 2) the likelihood of 

prejudice from the denial, 3) the defendant’s role in 

shortening preparation time, 4) the complexity of the 
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case, 5) the availability of discovery, 6) the adequacy of 

counsel actually provided and 7) the skill and experience 

of chosen counsel and his pre-retention experience with 

either the defendant or the alleged crime.

McKay v. State, 504 So. 2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Even 

so, counsel and the trial court are not required to “engage in an 

elaborate discussion of caselaw; instead, a trial court’s exercise of 

discretion need only be based on consideration of the McKay

factors.” Madison, 132 So. 3d at 242. This court will not reverse an 

order denying a motion for continuance for failure to discuss the 

McKay factors when the record reflects that the trial court 

considered the factors. Id. at 243. As explained below, the record 

supports the trial court’s denial of Heath’s motions.

First, defense counsel had adequate time to prepare for trial. 

She had represented Heath for over sixteen months when she 

moved for a continuance. 

Second, Heath failed to show a likelihood of prejudice if the 

trial court did not continue the trial. Defense counsel first 

identified a long list of witness she insisted she needed to depose. 

By the time she moved for a fourth continuance, she had deposed 

six of the fifteen. Even though defense counsel could not depose 

every possible witness, she spoke to those she had not deposed 

before they testified. She then affirmed to the court that she was 

“satisfied” after speaking to those witnesses.

Third, there is no sign that Heath shorted defense counsel’s 

preparation time. “[T]he right to a preparation period sufficient to 

assure at least a minimal quality of counsel . . . is not absolute but 

at some point must bend before countervailing interests involving 

effective administrative of the courts.” McKay, 504 So. 2d at 1282. 

Fourth, this was a complicated case considering the State 

presented over twenty witnesses and Heath faced a mandatory life 

sentence if convicted.

Fifth, discovery was available and adequate. Heath points to 

two portions of the transcript to show that he did not have all the 

discovery: (1) when defense counsel could not locate a search 
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warrant in her file, and (2) when defense counsel stated that she 

just received Heath’s certified driving record and vehicle 

registration from the State. But as to the first incident, defense 

counsel admitted that Heath’s defense was not prejudiced by the 

lack of the search warrant. And as to the second one, the State 

used the driving record only to show that Heath was the registered 

owner of a black Nissan truck. Defense counsel conceded that it 

was not a surprise that the State had documentation to prove that 

the truck was registered to Heath. 

Last, as to the sixth and seventh factors, nothing in the record 

reflects that defense counsel was inexperienced, unskilled, or 

provided ineffective assistance. Indeed, the State argued in its 

objection to Heath’s motion that defense counsel “is an experienced 

trial attorney with years of experience trying very serious cases for 

both the State of Florida and as counsel for criminal Defendants . 

. . .”

When considering the McKay factors in the context of the 

record here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied the Heath’s motion to continue the trial.

Collateral Crime Evidence

Heath argues next that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it allowed the State to admit evidence of past incidents of 

abuse or violence between him and Webb. We find no abuse of 

discretion by the trial court because the domestic violence evidence 

was inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses. 

There are two categories of admissible evidence of uncharged 

crimes: “similar fact evidence and dissimilar fact evidence.” 

Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930, 945 (Fla. 2017) (quotations 

omitted). “Similar fact evidence is governed by the requirements 

and limitations of section 90.404, and dissimilar fact evidence is 

governed by the general rule of relevancy set forth in section 

90.402.” Victorino v. State, 23 So. 3d 87, 98–99 (Fla. 2009).

Dissimilar fact evidence is admissible to “establish[] the 

relevant context in which the [charged] criminal acts occurred.” 

Caruso v. State, 645 So. 2d 389, 394 (Fla. 1994). This includes
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“evidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable from the 

crime charged, or evidence which is inextricably intertwined with 

the crime charged . . . .” Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 968 (Fla. 

1994). The evidence is admissible both because it is relevant and 

because it is an “inseparable part of the act which is in issue . . . .

[I]t is necessary to admit the evidence to adequately describe the 

deed.” Id. The evidence is admissible because “it is a relevant and 

inseparable part of the act which is in issue. . . . [I]t is necessary 

to admit the evidence to adequately describe the deed.” Id.

(quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.17 (1993 

ed.)).

Dissimilar fact evidence will be considered inextricably 

intertwined with the charged crime when the evidence is 

“necessary to (1) ‘adequately describe the deed’; (2) provide an 

intelligent account of the crime(s) charged; (3) establish the entire 

context out of which the charged crime(s) arose; or (4) adequately 

described the events leading up to the charged crime(s).” 

Richardson v. State, 338 So. 3d 1106, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) 

(quoting Macomber v. State, 254 So. 3d 1098, 1100–01 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2018)). 

The State is allowed to admit dissimilar fact evidence that 

“paints an accurate picture of the events surrounding the crimes 

charged.” Id. (quoting Truehill, 211 So. 3d at 945). Even so, when

establishing its case, the State cannot “make the evidence of other 

crimes the feature of the trial or . . . introduce the evidence solely 

for the purpose of showing bad character or propensity.” Id. And 

thus, dissimilar fact evidence may be excluded if its probative 

value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Id. at 1118.

In this case, the State sought to introduce evidence about 

violence between Heath and Webb to establish the motive behind 

the shooting and Webb’s participation. The testimony Heath 

challenges on appeal includes testimony by Webb and Webb’s 

sister about domestic violence between Heath and Webb. Webb’s 

sister described the relationship between Heath and Webb as 

tumultuous. She was concerned that Heath would become 

physically violent with Webb. Webb then testified that she was 

afraid of Heath because he had hit her; she claimed that Heath 
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headbutted her on the day of the shooting. Webb feared Heath due 

to his violent nature and felt compelled to follow his instructions.

The testimony by Webb and her sister was properly admitted 

as dissimilar fact evidence. Evidence of the nature of Webb’s 

relationship with Heath—including the past acts of domestic 

violence—was inextricably intertwined with the shooting. The 

evidence was necessary to explain (1) why Webb felt compelled to 

admit to Heath that she had been in a sexual relationship with 

D.W., (2) Heath’s reaction after learning about that relationship, 

(3) why Webb agreed to go with Johnson and Heath to D.W.’s 

home, and (4) why, contrary to Heath’s theory, Webb was not the 

mastermind behind the shooting. 

In short, the testimony about domestic violence between 

Heath and Webb provided context for the events leading to the 

shooting and explained Webb’s involuntary participation in the 

shooting. The evidence was relevant and properly admitted as 

dissimilar fact evidence because it was inextricably intertwined 

with the charged offense. See Hayes v. State, 338 So. 3d 1123, 1131 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“Stated another way, the evidence was 

necessary to establish the entire context out of which the charged 

crimes arose and adequately describe the events leading up to the 

charged crimes.”).

Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighed any 

prejudice to Heath. See Truehill, 211 So. 3d at 947 (explaining that 

when it comes to admission of dissimilar fact evidence, “[e]ven the 

most heinous and numerous crimes have been allowed as 

inextricably intertwined and found to have probative value that 

outweighed prejudice to the defendant”). Because the dissimilar 

fact evidence was relevant and its probative value outweighed any 

prejudice to Heath, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when 

it allowed the State to admit the testimony about Heath’s violent 

relationship with Webb.

We, therefore, AFFIRM Heath’s convictions and sentences.

LEWIS and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Kasey Helms Lacey, 

Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina Day Piotrowski, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.