### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J une 25 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK

Honora ble J . Owen F orre ster, United States District Court Judge f or the Nor

thern * District of Ge org ia, sitting by desig nation. [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1348 4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 01-00003 -CV -CD L- 6 THOMAS C. PATE, NELLIE PATE , Pl ai nt iff s- App el le es , ve rs us OAKW OOD MOBILE HOMES, INC., etal., Defen da nt s, UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (J un e 25, 200 4) Before BA RKE TT and KRA VI TC H, Circuit Judges, and FO RRE ST ER , D istrict * Judg e.Nellie Pate, Pate’ s wife, wa s also awa rded da mag es for loss of consortium relate d to her 1 husband’s injuries. 2 BARKE TT , C ircuit Judg e: T he U nit ed

S ta te s a ppe al s aj udgm en t aw ar din g dam ag es to T hom as P at e (“ Pate” ) against the Occ upation al Saf ety and Hea lth Adm inistration (“ OS HA ”) 1 pur suant t o th e Fe de ra l T ort C la im s A ct ( “ FT CA ”) f

or inj ur ie s P at e suf

fe re d a s a re sul t of uns af e w ork c ondi tio ns at hi s w ork si te . T he U nit ed S ta te s c ha lle nge s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s le ga l c onc lus ionthat O SH A ’ s ne gli ge nc e in this c as e cr eate s a co gni za ble c la im und er the F T CA . B ec au se w e ag re e that the re is no b as is f or liabilityunder the facts of this case, we rever se. BACKGROUND Pate, a roofer

em ploy ed by the private roofing contractor H owar d Enter prises (“ How ard”), sustained seriou s injuries when he fell fr om the top of a m obi le -h om e on whic h he w as w orkin g a t a m obi le -h om e m anuf

ac tur ing plant i n Ge o rg i a o wn ed b y De s t i n y In du s t ri es , I n c. (“Des t i n y”). Ov era yea r b ef o re Pa t e’s ac ci de nt, ins pe ct or s f

ro m O SH A iss ue d ac itatio n a ga ins t bo th D es tin y a nd H ow ar d f or the f ai lur e to p ro vid e ad equa te f al l pr ote ct iona t the f

ac ili ty w he re P at e w as inj ur ed . T he c itatio ns i nf orm ed D es tin y a nd H ow ar d th at

the f al l pr ote ct ionPate fe ll on Febr uary 1, 1999. OSHA had inspec ted the re levant fa cilities on November 2 13 and 14 , 1 99 7. Th e c itatio ns we re iss ue d o n D e c e mbe r 1 9, 19 97 . T he re le va nt c itatio n s tate d in prominent, hig hlighted te x t: “Date B y Which Violation Mustbe Abated:12/31/97.”

3 violatio ns were to be abated within a m onth . While Destiny and How ard abated 2 som e of the hazards cited by OS HA , they

failed to abate the specif ic hazar d that l e dt o P a t e ’s i n

ju ry. For its part, OS HAwa s required, pursuant to its own regulations, to ensure the aba te m en t of

the f al l pr ote ct ionvio la tio n by ( 1) m ak ing c er

ta in tha t D es tin y and Howard certified that the hazards had been abated and (2) r equiring th at D es tin y and H ow ar d ti m el y

sub m itt ed

doc um en ts c onf

irm ing the aba te m en t of

the ha zard s. T he O SH A ins pe ct or inv olv ed in thi s c as e w as unaw ar e of the se requirem ents. Furtherm ore, when D estiny and How ard did

not pr ovi de the appropriate certification, O SH A f ailed to initi ate procedures designed to ensure th e ab at em en t h adbe en acco m pl is he d. A ft er abe nc h tr ia l, the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound that ha d O SH A f

ulf ill ed it s m andatory

responsibi lity

to ensure abatem ent, P ate’ s accident w ouldhave been pr ev en te d b ecau se th e ap pr op ria te saf et y equi pm en t wo ul d h av e b een in st al le d. A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d j udgm en t onP at e’ s be ha lf pur suant t o th e FTCA. DISCUSS ION4

W e re vie wthe appl ic at ionof the F T CAde nov o. A ndr ew s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 121 F.3d 143 0, 1438 (11th Cir. 1997 ) (internal c itations om itted). T he FT CA pr ovi de s th at

the U nit ed

S ta te s m ay

be he ld l ia

ble f or the ne gli ge nt c ondu ct

of it s em ploy ees “ in the sam e m anner and to the sam e extent as a private indiv idual unde r lik e ci rc um stanc es . ” 28 U . S. C. § 26 74. C ongr es s’ s c hie f int en t i n dr af tin g the F T CAw as not

“ to c re at e ne wc au se s of a ct ion ” but

“ sim ply to pr ovi de r edre ss fo r or din ar

y tor ts r ec ogni ze d by

state law . ” H ow el l v. U nit ed S ta te s, 932 F . 2d 915, 917 (11t h Cir. 1991 ). It w as not “ intended as a m eans to enforce f ederal statutory duties.” I d. I ndeed, “ even wher e specific behavior of f ederal e m ploy ees is r equir ed

by statut e, li ab ili ty

to the be ne fi ci ar ie s of

that st at ute m ay not be fo unde d onthe F ed er al T ort C la im s A ct if state lawr ec ogni ze s no c om para ble pr iv at e li ab il it y .” Sel lfo rs v. Un it edSta te s, 6 97 F.2d 13 62 , 13 67 (11 th Cir . 19 83 ). Thu s, i n t hi s ca se li ab il it y is no t au to m at ic al ly establ is he d b y th e fac t t ha t OSHA inspectors failed to perform their m andatory

oblig ations. T he United State s can onlybe found liable if a com parable private party

would likewise be liable under Geo rg ia law. O f co ur se , apr ivate party w oul d no t or din ar ily

be e nga ge d, a s is O SH A , in en fo rc ing c om

pli an ce w ithw orkpl ac e sa fe ty r eg ulatio ns. H ow ev er , w e ha ve re j ec te d th e posi tio n th at

the F T CAdoe s no t a ff

or d ar em edy

f or ne gli ge nc e in the5

pe rf orm an ce of

“ uni que ly

gov er nm en ta l f unc tio ns” sim

ply “ be ca use the re is no id en ti cal pri va te act iv it y

forpu rp os es of c om

pa ris on .” Howel l, 9 32 F.2d at 9 18 . W e ha ve he ld tha t the “ co m pari son of

a ct ivi tie s ne ed

not be e xa ct . ” I d. I n th is case, however, we cannot find sup port for O SH A’ s liabilityunder either the ca ses ci te d by the dis tr ic t c ourt or

und er the c los es t st at e lawa na log y , the goo d sa m ar itan do ctri ne . S ee , e . g. , I ndi anT ow ing Co . v. U nit ed S ta te s, 350 U . S. 61, 64- 65 (19 55 ); Ho well , 93 2 F .2dat 9 18 n.3 ; Se ll fo rs , 69 7 F .2dat 1 36 7. Re ly ing on Unit ed

S ta te s v. A re tz , 280 S . E . 2d 3 45 ( G a. 198 1) a nd P hil lip s v. U nited States, 956 F. 2d 10 71 (11th Cir. 1992), the district court found th at

“ unde r G eo rg ia

law , apr ivate a ct or

w ho a ssu m es apart ic ular re spon sib ili ty f or em plo y ee sa fe ty

c anbe li ab le if

he ne gli ge ntl y

dis ch ar ge s th at

r es pons ibi lity

a nd that neglig ence proxim ately causes inj uries to the em ploy ees his undertaking wa s de sig ne d to pr ote ct . ” W e do n ot f ind the se c as es appl ic ab le be ca use O SH A c an not be sa id t o have “ as sum e[ d] apart ic ular re spon sib ili ty f or e m plo y ee sa fe ty . ” Whil e O SH A ’ s la

uda ble goa l i s “ to a ssure so f ar a s po ssi ble e ve ry

w orkin g m ana nd wom an in the Nation safe and healthful working con ditio ns,” 29 U. S. C. § 651 (b), OSHA do es no t t ak e fi na l re sp on si bi li ty for ach ie vi ng th is en d. Se e 2 9 U.S.C. § 654( a) ; I rv ing v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 162 F. 3d 1 54, 169 ( 1st Ci r. 199 8) ( enbanc ) (T he Oc cupational Health and Safe ty Ac t (“ OS H A ct”) “ in no u ncertain term s, place s6

prim ary responsibi lity

for w orkplace safety

on em ploy ers, not on the feder al gove rn m en t. ”) ; G al vinv. O cc upa tio na l S af ety & H ea lthA dm in. , 860 F . 2d 1 81, 185 (5 th C ir . 198 8) ( “ the O cc upa tio na l S af ety a nd H ea lthA ct

squ ar el y pla ce s th e burden of com

pliance with w orkplace safety standards on th e em

ploy er” (e m pha sis in or igi na l) ); Cunni ngham v. U nit ed

S ta te s, 786 F . 2d 1 445, 144 7 ( 9th Ci r. 198 6) ( not ing a s part of dis cr et ion ar

y f unc tio n ana ly sis that un de r O SH A ct ,

“ [t] he em ploy er has the statutory

responsibi lity

for m aintaining a safe workplace” ); see a lso Otis Elevator C o. v. OS HRC , 581 F. 2d 10 56, 1058 (2d Cir. 1978 ) (“ ‘ Final responsibi lity for com pliance with the re quirem ents of this act rem ai ns wit h t he em

pl oyer.’ ” (q uo ti ng leg is la ti ve hi st ory )). Furthe rm or e, the tw o c as es the dis tr ic t c our t r el ie d up on are not

a na log ous. In Ar etz the G eorgia Suprem e Court found that the go vernm ent had a duty to war n th e em pl oyees o f a co nt ract orab ou t a d an ge r th e g ov ern m en t i ts el f ha d c reat ed . Inthat c as e, the gov er

nm en t i nit ia lly

m is- cl as sif

ie d aha zard ous m at er ia l a s no ndetonativ e and, when it learned the m aterial w as actually detonative, failed to w arn the ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or sto ri ng the m at er ia l. A re tz , 280 S . E . 2d at 34 8- 49. D es pit e the f

ac t tha t the gov er

nm en t pr ovi de d init s a gr ee m en t w iththe c ontra ct or that the c ontra ct or

w as not e nti tle d to r el y

on the gov er

nm en t’ s st or ag e cl as sif ic at ion s, id. a t 34 8, the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt f ound that the gov er

nm en t7

ne ve rthe le ss c oul d be he ld l ia ble be ca use it ow ed aduty to w ar n th e co ntr ac tor that i t ha d m is- cl as sif

ie d th e ha zard ous m at er ia l. I d. a t 35 0- 51 ( “ Whe re one by his ow n a ct , a lth oughw ith out ne gli ge nc e on h is p ar

t, c re at es adange ro us s itu at ion , he is unde r a duty

to re m ove the ha zard

or giv e w ar nin g of the dange r so a s to pr ev en t ot he rs fro m

be in g i nju redwher e it is reas on ab ly fores eeab le to oc cu r.”). InP at e’ s c as e, by

c ontra st, O SH A did

not it se lf “ cr eate [] adange ro us sit ua tio n. ” O SH A ins pe ct ed am anuf ac tur ing plant whe re it

f ound apr e- ex ist ing d an g er o u s s i tu at i o n . C f. Ho we l l , 9 3 2 F. 2 dat 9 1 9 (f i n d i n g th at an FA A i n s p ec t o r’s fa ilure to gr ound

or ini tiate an in ve sti ga tio n of aplane that w as sus pe ct ed of co nta ini ng c ont am inate d f ue l “ did not inc re as e the r isk

of harm und er G eo rg ia law ” be ca use the “ ins pe ct or

c au se d no suc h c hange in the c ondi tio n of thi s pl an e or it s f ue l” ). I nde ed , O SH Aa ct ed to le sse n th e dange r by

iss uin g ac itatio n st at ing that the e m

plo y er w as to ab at e the ha zard

by ac er ta in d at e. T hus, the c ur

re nt c as e is com pletely at odds with Are tz. In A retz, the governm ent had create d a danger an d f ai le d to w ar

n an e m plo y er , w ithw hom

it ha d ac ontra ct

ua l a gr ee m en t, of

the d an g er ; i n th i s ca s e, OS HA d i dn o tcr ea t e a h az ar db u tn ev er t h el es s wa rn ed Pa t e’s em plo y er that a ha zard e xis te d. Phillips is sim ilarly

distin guish able. In that case, as in Ar etz, the harm at issue occurred in the perform ance of a governm ent contract in which w ork wasWhil e some of the g overnme nt’s safe ty responsibilities derived fr om the Army Corps 3 Safety Manual, the a

pplicability

of this manual itself was inc orporated into the ag ree ment betwee n the g overnme nt and the contr actor . See Phillips , 956 F.2d at 1074; 29 C.F.R. § 52.236- 13 (1991). 8 be ing don e fo r the gov er

nm en t’ s be ne fi t. I n P hil lip s, the A rm y Co rp s of E ngi ne er s (“ Ar m y Corps”) hired an independ ent contractor to construct extension s to aircra ft hange rs on an A rm

y ba se . 956 F . 2d at 10 73. P hil lip s, a n e m plo y ee of the co ntr ac tor , w as inj ur ed

dur ing the c onstru ct ionw he n th e sc af fo lds he w as w orkin g on collapsedunder him . Id. W e found that the Arm y Corps had a duty

of car e be ca use in its c ontra ct

ua l r el at ion shi p w ithP hil lip ’ s e m plo y er it “ as sum ed

sa fe ty re spon sib ili tie s” that i t f

ai le d to dis ch ar ge w ithor din ar y c ar e. I d. a t 10 78. C iti ng to the regulation that contained the pertinent con tractual provision s, w e af firm ed the district court’ s conclusio n “ that the Arm y Corps had specific re spon sibili ties wit h re ga rdto th e co ns tru ct io n p ro ject’s s afet y .” Id. at 10 74 (ci ti ng 29 C.F.R. §

3 52. 236- 13 ( 1991 )) . F ur

the rm or e, w e not ed

that the A rm

y Co rp s m et

w iththe contractor in a “ m

utual un derstanding m eeting” in which the governm ent inform ed the contractor of som e of the saf ety procedures. See id. at 1073. T hus, there w as co nvi nc ing e vid en ce in Ph ill ips that the A rm y Co rp s c ontra ct

ua lly r et ai ne d c er

ta in sa fe ty r es pons ibi lit ie s in vol vin g th e co nstru ct ionpr oj ec t. I nde ed , a n A rm y Co rp s en gin ee r at

the pr oj ec t t es tif

ie d th at “ his of fi ce ha d th e re spon sib ili ty f or a ssuri ng9

‘ sa fe ty w ithade dic at ed

c om m itm en t t o f

re e the j ob s ite of

uns af e co ndi tio ns and activities which m ay

result in injury .’ ” Id. (em phasis add ed). Insum , P hil lip s in vol ve d th e gove rn m en t a ct ing in its c ap ac ity a s a contracting-party

and a landowner. H ad the Ar m y Corps endeavored to construct the pr oj ec t i tse lf

, the re w oul d be no que sti on tha t i t w oul d be r es pons ibl e fo r the sa fe ty c ondi tio ns o f the pr oj ec t. I n P hil lip s th e iss ue w as sim ply w he the r the A rm y Co rp s ha d de le ga te d it s sa fe ty r es pons ibi lit ie s in

hir ing ac ontra ct or

to do the construction proje ct for the A rm y Corps. W e found that un der the fa cts of that case, the governm ent indeed had retained certain r espons ibiliti es which w ere ne gli ge ntl y

c ar ri ed out . I n c ontra st t o P hil lip s, in the c as e at hand the harm

did not take pla ce on g ove rn m en t pr ope rty , the gov er nm en t di d no t c ontra ct

w iththe em pl oyer, and th e em

pl oyer was n ot pro vi di ng th e g ov ern m en t wi th a se rv ic e. In ste ad , O SH A w as a ct ing in its c ap ac ity a s ar eg ulator -e nf

or ce r to p ro m ote the welf are o f al l wo rk ers . N orm al ly , the m ost

ana log ous ap pr oa chin de te rm ini ng whe the r the gove rn m en t i s li ab le in the r eg ulator -e nf or ce r co nte xt unde r state lawis the goo d sam aritan doctrine. See How ell, 932 F. 2d at 918 & n.3. While the goo d sam aritan doc tr ine m ay

not a lw ay s be the onl y

appr opr ia te appr oa chin thi s c ont ex t, he re it is far m or e an al ogou s th anthe gov er nm en t c ontra ct

c as es . H ow ev er , e ve n th e goodTh e oth e r t wo pr on g s c le arl y

do no t a pp ly . With r e g ard

to t he fi rs t pr on gof

ana ly sis , 4 under G eorg ia law “ risk is only incre ased ‘ when a

nonhazardous condition is made ha zardous throug h the neg lige nce of a per son who cha

ng ed its condition or cause d it to be chang ed.’” Howell, 932 F .2d at 919 (quotingArg onaut Ins. Co. v. Cl ark, 267 S.E.2d 797, 799 (G a. App. 1980)). Unde r this standard, we deter mined that an F AA inspec tor’s fa ilure to g round a pla ne that was suspec ted of c ontaining c ontaminated fue l “did not increa se the risk of ha rm under Ge or g ia la w” be c a us e the “ ins pe c tor

c a us e d n o s uc h c ha

ng e in t he c on dit ion

of thi s p lane or

its fuel.” I d. The same is true in this case: OSHA only failed to e nsure the a

batement of

a pre exis ting ha zard–it did not i ncre ase the hazard. L iability simil arly cannot be established under the second pr ongbeca

use the OSH Ac t makes the e mploy er, not OSHA, r esponsible for w orkplac e safe ty . 29 U.S.C. § 654(a). 10 sa m ar itan do ctri ne c an not sup port l ia

bil ity he re . G eo rg iaha s a dopt ed the goo d sa m ar itan do ctri ne a s se t f orth i n S ec tio n 32 4Aof

the Re state m en t ( Se co nd) of T orts, w hic h st at es : One who un dertakes, gratuitous ly or for c onsid eration, to re nder se rv ic es to an oth er

w hic h he sho uld

r ec ogni ze a s ne ce ssary

f or the pr ote ct ionof

athi rd pe rs on o r his thi ngs, is subj ec t t o li ab ili ty to the thi rd pe rs on f or phy sic al harm

r es ult ing f

ro m his f ai lur e to e xe rc ise re as ona ble c ar e to p ro te ct

his und er takin g if ( a) his f ai lur e to e xe rc ise reasonable car e increa ses the risk of such harm , or (b) he has unde rt ak ento pe rf

orm aduty ow ed by the oth er to the thi rd

pe rs on, or (c) the harm

is suffere d because of re liance of the other or the third pe rs on up on th e u nd ert ak in g. H ow el l, 932 F . 2d at 91 8. P at e onl y a sse rt s th e thi rd

pr ong, 324 A (c ), a s aba sis f or li ab il it y , arg ui ng th athi s emplo y ers rel ie d o n OSHA. W e n eedon ly m ak e two

4 poin ts. F irst, there is insu fficient evidence to support a finding that Pate' s em pl oyers re li edon OSHA in th ei r fai lu re t o aba te th e h azar d. In de ed , OSHA iss ue d ac itatio n f

or the sa fe ty

vio la tio ns i t f

ound w hic h un equiv oc al ly

state d inPate fu rt he r a rgue s th at D a le y

v. Un ite d St ate s, 79 2 F .2 d 1 08 1 ( 11 th C ir . 1 98 6) su pp or ts 5 a fi nd ingof

lia bil ity . Ci tin gto G ill v. Un ite d St ate s, 42 9 F .2 d 1 07 2, 10 75 (5 th C ir . 1 97 0) , in Da l ey we fo un d th atai r t ra ff

i c c o n tro l l er s o we d

a du ty o f c ar e t o co mp l y

wi thth e go v ern m en t 's Ai r T ra ff ic Contr ol M anu a l. 7 92 F .2 d at 10 85 -8 6. Ho we ve r, Gi ll m ake s c le ar t hat li a bil ity in a ir traff ic controller

case s stems from the public’s re liance on suc h controllers. G ill, 429 F.2d at 1075 (“The United States may be liable unde r the F eder al Tort Claims Act for ne g lige nt provision of servic es upon which the public has come to rely .”). A s discussed above , under the fac ts of this case, we do not believe that Pate or his employ ers justifiably relied on O SHA’s omissions . 11 hig hli ght ed

te xt: “ D at e By

Whic h V iol at ionMu st b e Aba te d: 1 2/3 1/9 7. ” T his da te wa s m o re th an a yea r b ef o re Pa t e’s i n

ju ry. Se co n d , e v en i f f

o r s o m e r ea s o n Pa t e’s em plo y er s di d r el y

on the f ac t tha t O SH A ha d no t f

oll ow ed up i n e nsur ing ab at em en t, t hi s re li an ce wo ul d n ot be jus ti fie d u nd er t he fact s o f th is cas e. As state d a bove , the O SH A ct

pla ce s ul tim at e re spon sib ili ty on the e m

plo y er in en sur ing c om

pli an ce w ithsa fe ty

r eg ulatio ns, not

O SH A . P at e' s e m

plo y er s w oul d no t b e jus ti fie d i n re lying on OSHA’ s o m is si on s i n t he ir f ai li ng to ab at e a kno wn hazard. Cf. My ers v. United State s, 17 F. 3d 89 0, 903-04 (6th Cir. 1994)(reliance uponm ine ins pe ct or s un de r Mi ne S af ety a nd H ea lthA ct

w oul d be “ m an if

es tly unr ea sona

ble and unj ust if

ie d” “ [i ] n li ght

of the c le ar Co ngr es sio na l purp ose to en sur e that the pr im ar

y r es pons ibi lity

f or sa fe ty r em ai ns w iththe m ine ow ne rs and m iners”). 5 Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , thi s m atte r is RE V E RS E D a nd RE MA N D E D f or fu rth er p ro ceed in gs co ns is te nt he rewi th .