IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-0129

Filed March 30, 2022

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER BUCK,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Grundy County, Linda M. Fangman, 

Judge.

Christopher Buck appeals the denial of his application to modify sexual 

offender registration requirements. WRIT SUSTAINED AND REMANDED. 

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget Chambers, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and May, JJ.
2

VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

Christopher Buck pled guilty to five crimes in two separate cases: three

counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, one count of lascivious acts 

with a child, and one count of indecent contact with a child. The district court 

ordered him to register as a sex offender. See Iowa Code § 692A.103 (2018). 

Buck discharged his sentences but remained on the sex offender registry. 

In time, Buck applied to modify the registration requirement under section 

692A.128 to “no longer” require him “to register at all.”1 The district court denied 

the application following a hearing.

On appeal, Buck contends: (1) “the district court’s conclusion that [he] did 

not meet the threshold requirement of being low risk should be reversed as that 

conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence” and (2) “the district court 

abused its discretion in denying [his] application for modification.” The State 

preliminarily responds that “[t]here is no right to direct appeal from” the denial of a 

modification application and, accordingly, we should dismiss the appeal. At the 

same time, the State acknowledges this court may “choose[] to treat [Buck’s] notice 

of appeal as an application for writ of certiorari.” We recently did just that. See 

State v. Todd, No. 19-2001, 2021 WL 3075756 at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 21, 2021). 

 

1 A modification application may be filed after a defendant has discharged the 

sentences precipitating placement on the registry. Fortune v. State, 957 N.W.2d 

696, 700 (Iowa 2021) (noting the defendant discharged his sentence before the 

modification application was filed); Becher v. State, 957 N.W.2d 710, 716–17 (Iowa 

2021) (noting the applicant was “off paper,” obviating the need for a stipulation 

from the department of correctional services approving of a modification); see Iowa 

Code § 692A.128(2)(d) (stating the applicant must not be incarcerated when the 

application is filed). 
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As in Todd, we will “treat [Buck]’s notice of appeal and brief as a petition for writ of 

certiorari, . . . grant the writ, and . . . proceed to the merits.” Id. 

Iowa Code section 692A.128 sets forth “threshold criteria” for modification 

of sex offender registry requirements. Fortune, 957 N.W.2d at 703. One of the 

statutory criteria is that “[a] risk assessment has been completed and the sex 

offender was classified as a low risk to reoffend.” Iowa Code § 692A.128(2)(c). 

We review the district court’s threshold determination for errors of law. Fortune, 

957 N.W.2d at 702–03, 705. The court’s findings are reviewed for substantial 

evidence. See Todd, 2021 WL 3075756, at *5. 

The district court determined “[n]one of th[e] three scores” on the risk 

assessments prepared by the department of correctional services “place[d] [Buck] 

at a low risk to reoffend.” Buck argues the court’s determination lacked substantial 

evidentiary support and amounted to error. We agree.

The department of correctional services prepared a risk assessment in 

response to Buck’s modification request. The assessment checklist contained the 

following language:

󠄀 󠄀 692A.128(2)(c). A risk assessment has been completed and 

the sex offender was classified as a low risk to reoffend. 

Neither box was checked. The report’s preparer later emailed Buck’s attorney and 

clarified that he “had neglected to note that Mr. Buck does appear to meet the 

requirements (by checking the box) of having completed the required risk 

assessments and is classified as low when considering the risk assessment 

information (692A.128(2)(c)).” He apologized “for the oversight.” Because the

assessment placed Buck at a low risk to reoffend, section 692A.128(2)(c) and the 
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remaining undisputed statutory criteria, were satisfied. See Fortune, 957 N.W.2d 

at 707 (“The district court cannot disqualify [the applicant] from eligibility for 

modification for his assessment that meets the statutory requirement for 

consideration as a low-risk offender. To the extent the district court reached a 

contrary conclusion, it committed legal error.”); Todd, 2021 WL 3075756, at *5 

(“[T]he district court erred in denying Todd’s application for modification for want 

of satisfaction of that criteria based on a mere recommendation he complete a 

[sexual offender treatment program].”). 

That does not end our analysis. “If the applicant meets the threshold 

statutory requirements, the district court proceeds to the second step, namely, 

determining, in its discretion, whether the registration requirements should be 

modified.” Fortune, 957 N.W.2d at 705. “In this second step, the district court 

should consider the statutory factors and any other factors that the district court 

finds relevant to the modification issue.” Id. The court “should consider only those 

factors that bear on whether the applicant is at low risk to reoffend and there is no 

substantial benefit to public safety in extending the registration requirements.” Id.

at 706 (gleaning statutory purpose behind Iowa’s provision from states with similar 

provisions). And “[t]he threat to public safety must be tied to the individual 

applicant and the record established in each case.” Id. The district court’s 

“second-step determination is reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 

705.

As noted, the district court held a hearing. Family members of the children 

who were abused testified against modification of the sex offender registry 

requirement. Some of the testimony focused on the nature of Buck’s crimes. The 
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district court relied on this testimony, citing the particulars of Buck’s crimes and his 

“cavalier attitude” concerning them. The district court did not have the benefit of 

Fortune, which stated reliance on the nature of the crimes came “perilously close 

to” advocating for “punishment, an impermissible goal of the sex offender 

registration.” See id. at 708. While Fortune permitted consideration of “increased 

risk based upon . . . repeated patterns of behavior,” the comparison was between 

patterns in “past offenses and present behavior.” Id. at 709. The supreme court

explained, “The provisions of sex offender registration are onerous. The direct and 

collateral consequences of sex offender registration include stigmatization, 

challenges in finding employment, restrictions on residency and movement, and 

difficulty in finding housing.” Id. A companion opinion indicated a period of time in 

the community without re-offense was a positive factor. See Becher, 957 N.W.2d 

at 717.

Because the focus here was on past crimes and past patterns of behavior, 

we sustain the writ and remand for consideration of the modification application in 

light of Fortune.

2

WRIT SUSTAINED AND REMANDED.

 

2 We reached a different conclusion in State v. Larvick, No. 20-1273, 2022 WL 

610361, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2022). We found no abuse of discretion in 

the district court’s denial of the modification application, reasoning that the court 

“focused the decision on concerns for public safety, . . . not on punishment for past 

occurrences.” Larvick, 2022 WL 610361, at *4. We also reached a different 

conclusion in State v. Seidell, No. 21-0493 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022). There, 

we noted that the district court’s fact-finding concerning Seidell’s lack of remorse 

was supported by the record.