NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

TERRY J. MILLER, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees, 

v.

SHIRL A. HILL, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0851 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2015-095148 

The Honorable Joshua D. Rogers, Judge

The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART

COUNSEL

Dessaules Law Group, Phoenix

By Jonathan A. Dessaules, F. Robert Connelly

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Swenson, Storer, Andrews & Frazelle, P.C., Phoenix

By Lloyd J. Andrews

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 

FILED 3-18-2021

 
MILLER, et al. v. HILL

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Defendant/Appellant Shirl A. Hill appeals the superior 

court’s order granting Plaintiffs/Appellees motion for new trial following

a jury verdict in Hill’s favor. For reasons that follow, we affirm the court’s 

order granting a new trial as to damages, but reverse the remainder of the 

court’s order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Hill, Sona Koltookian1, and Terry J. Miller and Janet M. Miller 

(the “Millers”) are neighbors who share a common cinderblock wall (“party 

wall”) separating their properties. All three neighbors live in the Ironwood 

Village neighborhood and their properties are subject to its Covenants, 

Conditions and Restrictions (“CC&Rs”). According to the CC&Rs, a 

property owner who damages a party wall is solely responsible for the cost 

to repair it. However, if a party wall is damaged from something other than 

a property owner’s negligence, willful acts, or omissions, the cost for repair 

must be split equally between owners who share the party wall. 

¶3 In 2015, the Millers sued Hill alleging negligence and breach 

of contract for a damaged party wall. Hill denied causing the damage, but 

did not dispute that the wall was damaged or that the CC&Rs governed the 

dispute. Though not specifically pled in the complaint, at trial the Millers

introduced evidence and argued that even if Hill was not responsible for 

the damage to the party wall, she was, nevertheless, obligated to share 

equally in repair costs with the Millers pursuant to the CC&Rs. Both Hill 

and her expert witnesses conceded the obligation. 

¶4 Three verdict forms were submitted to the jury, only two of 

which addressed damages. The jury returned a verdict in Hill’s favor, 

signing the verdict form that did not address damages: “We, the Jury, duly 

empaneled and sworn in the above-entitled action, upon our oaths, do find 

1 Sona Koltookian was dismissed as a party to this action in January 2020. 
MILLER, et al. v. HILL

Decision of the Court

3 

in favor of Defendant Shirl A. Hill.” Thereafter, the court granted Hill’s 

motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

¶5 The Millers moved for a new trial arguing inter alia that the 

jury verdict was not supported by the evidence and was contrary to law.

See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(H). Following oral argument, the superior court 

issued an under advisement ruling granting the motion for new trial. The 

court agreed with the Millers, that Hill was contractually liable to share 

equally in the costs of whatever repairs to the damaged party wall were

necessary. Hill moved for clarification and requested that any order 

granting a new trial be limited to the issue of damages. In a second under 

advisement ruling, the court reasoned that where “[t]he only verdict to set 

aside is that which finds in favor of the Defendant . . . it is clear that if and 

when the case proceeds . . . no issues have been resolved.” The court 

ordered that the new trial would reopen all claims previously disposed of 

by the jury.

¶6 Hill timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. 

§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(5).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Hill argues the superior court abused its discretion by 

vacating the jury verdict and granting a new trial. Hill argues, in the 

alternative, that if a new trial is held it should be limited to the issue of 

damages. The superior court has discretion to grant a new trial if “the 

verdict, decision, findings of fact, or judgment is not supported by the 

evidence or is contrary to law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(H). “[W]e apply an 

abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court’s decision to 

grant a new trial.” McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., 228 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 16 

(App. 2011). 

¶8 Hill asserts the superior court erred in vacating the jury 

verdict where the Millers never formally pled in their complaint that Hill 

was liable for only a portion of the damages pursuant to the CC&Rs.

Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 15(b)(2), however, “permits 

theories of liability to be treated as if raised in the actual pleadings if they 

are tried by express or implied consent of the parties.” Dietz v. Waller, 141 

Ariz. 107, 112 (1984). Issues tried without objection amount to implied 

consent, and if no request to amend is made, the case will be treated as 

though the amendments were made. Gilliland v. Rodriquez, 77 Ariz. 163, 167 

(1954); see also Electrical Advertising, Inc. v. Sakato, 94 Ariz. 68, 71 (1963) 
MILLER, et al. v. HILL

Decision of the Court

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(“Failure to formally amend the pleadings will not affect a judgment based 

upon competent evidence.”). Hill never objected to the Millers’ 

presentation of evidence, or argument, regarding her obligation to split 

repair costs pursuant to the CC&Rs and even conceded such. Additionally, 

Hill had notice of the issue where it was raised multiple times at trial. See 

Electrical Advertising, Inc. 94 Ariz. at 71 (finding implied consent where the 

issue was tried without objection by plaintiff); see also Dietz, 141 Ariz. at 112 

(finding no implied consent when party was given no conceivable notice 

during pre-trial or trial proceedings of the issue). Because Hill impliedly

consented, Hill’s obligation to split repair costs was properly raised. 

¶9 In its under advisement ruling granting the motion for new 

trial, the court found: 

[t]he undisputed evidence presented at trial was that,

according to the CC&Rs, if no one was at fault for the damage

to the party wall at issue in this case, each of the property

owners are obligated to share equally in the costs to repair the

wall. . . . Thus, as a matter of law, Defendant is at least

contractually liable to share equally in the costs of whatever

repairs were determined to be necessary.

¶10 And where the jury reached a verdict without finding Hill 

liable for any damages, the court did not err in concluding that the verdict 

was unsupported by the evidence and contrary to law. 

¶11 On appeal, the Millers argue the jury verdict forms did not 

match the CC&Rs and did not give the jury the option to hold Hill at least 

50 percent liable for the cost to repair the wall. Certainly, the Millers were 

aware of the verdict forms prior to their submission to the jury; yet the 

Millers never objected to the jury verdict form. Rule 49(f)(1) provides that 

“the court may order that an informal or defective verdict be reformed . . . 

[and] [i]f the verdict is not responsive to the issue submitted to the jury, the 

court should inform the jury of the issue and require further deliberations.” 

Here, the Millers did not invoke Rule 49(f)(1). And “by not challenging the 

verdict when rendered, [the Millers] waived [their] objection to any error.” 

Trustmark Ins. Co. v. Bank One, Ariz., NA, 202 Ariz. 535, 543, ¶ 39 (App. 2002);

see also Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tallsalt, 191 Ariz. 177, 180 (App. 1997) (although 

verdict not responsive, because neither party “asked the trial court to ‘call 

the jurors’ attention thereto, and send them back for further deliberation,” 

issue waived on appeal), vacated on other grounds, 192 Ariz. 129 (1998). For 

this reason, the Millers’ argument regarding the unresponsive and 

defective nature of the verdict forms fails. 
MILLER, et al. v. HILL

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¶12 Rule 59 requires that: 

[a] new trial, if granted, must be limited to the question or

questions found to be in error, if separable. If a new trial is

ordered solely because the damages are excessive or

inadequate and if the issue of damages is separable from all

other issues in the action, the verdict may be set aside only on

damages, and must stand in all other respects.

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(e). 

¶13 A new trial can be granted solely on the issue of damages 

when liability and damages are not inextricably entwined and can be 

separated without prejudice to the parties. Martinez v. Schneider Enters., Inc., 

178 Ariz. 346, 349 (App. 1994); Englert v. Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 

21, 27, ¶ 15 (App. 2000). Here, the jury found that Hill was not negligent 

nor wholly liable for the damage to the party wall. And, the issue of 

damages is easily separable where the determination of costs and the equal 

apportionment of those costs between Hill and the Millers is all that is left 

to decide. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s order for a new trial 

but only on the issue of damages. To order otherwise would give the Millers

a second bite at the apple on the issues of negligence and breach of contract

after a jury has already found in favor of Hill on those claims. 

CONCLUSION

¶14 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

order for a new trial, but only on the issue of damages. In all other respects, 

we vacate the court’s order for a new trial and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision. We deny the Millers’ request for 

attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal.