FILED

October 1, 1996

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

AUGUST SESSION, 1996

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) No. 03C01-9510-CC-00321

Appellee )

) BLOUNT COUNTY

vs. )

) Hon. D. Kelly Thomas, Jr., Judge

JOHN RUSSELL TURNER, )

) (DUI)

Appellant )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Mack Garner Charles W. Burson

District Public Defender Attorney General and Reporter

318 Court Street

Maryville, TN 37801 Michael J. Fahey, II

Assistant Attorney General

Mary Ann Queen,

Legal Assistant

Criminal Justice Division

450 James Robertson Parkway

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Michael L. Flynn

District Attorney General

Charles Carpenter

Asst. District Attorney General

Blount County Courthouse

Maryville, TN 37801

OPINION FILED: 

AFFIRMED

David G. Hayes

Judge
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OPINION

The appellant, John Russell Turner, appeals from his conviction by a jury

for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The Circuit Court of Blount

County sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days

incarceration in the county jail and suspended all but five days. On appeal, the

appellant contends that the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to support a

conviction, because the State failed to prove that he intended to operate a

vehicle.

After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

Shortly after midnight, on December 31, 1994, Officer Ruskey of the

Maryville Police Department observed two individuals stagger across the public

parking lot adjoining the “Coffee Shop,” an establishment which serves alcoholic

beverages, and enter a vehicle. By the time the officer approached the vehicle,

the lights were on and the engine was running. The vehicle, however, remained

stationary. The appellant was seated behind the steering wheel, and a female

occupied the passenger seat. The appellant and his companion admitted to

Officer Ruskey that they had been drinking. The appellant failed to satisfactorily

perform three field sobriety tests. An intoximeter test, subsequently administered

at the police station, reflected a breath alcohol level of .28 percent. Ruskey

testified that there was no doubt in his mind that the appellant was intoxicated on

the night in question and that the appellant’s ability to operate a vehicle “was

very impaired.”

At trial, the appellant admitted that he was intoxicated when he entered
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his vehicle. However, although the appellant conceded that he was seated

behind the steering wheel when the officer approached his vehicle and that he

had his car keys “out,” he denied starting the engine or turning on the car’s

headlights. Moreover, the appellant denied any intent to drive his vehicle from

the parking lot. He explained that, earlier that evening, he had called his nephew

and had asked his nephew to drive him home, because he knew that he was too

intoxicated to drive. According to the appellant, he was simply awaiting his

nephew’s arrival when approached by Officer Ruskey. The appellant’s nephew

also testified at trial and confirmed that he had been called by his uncle and

asked to drive him home. After deliberating, the jury found the appellant guilty of

driving under the influence.

ANALYSIS

The appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. Tenn. Code Ann. §

55-10-401(a) (1993) provides: “It is unlawful for any person or persons to drive or

to be in physical control of any automobile ... on any ... premises which is

generally frequented by the public at large, while under the influence of any

intoxicant ... .” The appellant concedes that he was under the influence of an

intoxicant at the time of his arrest and that, technically, he was in physical control

of his vehicle, which was located in a public parking lot. However, despite the

absence of any language in the drunk driving statute requiring a culpable mental

state, the appellant asserts that the crime of driving under the influence requires

an intent to operate a vehicle. 

In support of his argument, the appellant relies upon Tenn. Code Ann. §

39-11-102(b)(1991) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(b) and (c) (1991). Tenn.

Code Ann. § 39-11-102(b) provides that “[t]he provisions of parts 1-6 of this

chapter apply to offenses defined by other laws unless otherwise provided by
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law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301 provides:

(b) A culpable mental state is required within this title unless the

definition of an offense plainly dispenses with a mental element.

(b) If the definition of an offense ... does not plainly dispense with a

mental element, intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to

establishes the culpable mental state.

“The provisions of [the criminal code] shall be construed according to the

fair import of their terms, including reference to judicial decisions and common

law interpretations, to promote justice, and effect the objectives of the criminal

code.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-104 (1991). In determining the application of

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-102(b) and 39-11-301(b) and (c) to the driving while

intoxicated statute, we note that this court has previously observed that there is

no culpable mental state required for guilt of driving under the influence. State v.

Fiorito, No. 03C01-9401-CR-00032 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, November

27, 1995). See also State v. Mabe, No. 03C01-9402-CR-00051 (Tenn. Crim.

App. at Knoxville, October 25, 1994)(“we doubt that the offense [of driving under

the influence] requires as an element that the defendant have the specific intent

to drive the vehicle, in addition to having physical control”). Indeed, considering

our supreme court’s decision in State v. Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn.

1993), the definition of the offense of driving under the influence “plainly

dispenses with a mental element.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301. In

Lawrence, our supreme court, in construing the meaning of “physical control,”

remarked:

It is our opinion that the Legislature, in making it a crime to be in

physical control of an automobile while under the influence of an

intoxicant, “intended to enable the drunken driver to be

apprehended before he strikes.” We agree with the observation

that “[a] motor vehicle is recognized in the law as a dangerous

instrumentality when in the control of a sober person; in the control

of a drunk, the dangerous instrumentality becomes lethal. 

Therefore ... the court [should interpret] the drunk driving statute in

a way that [keeps] drunks from behind the steering wheels of motor

vehicles, even when the drunk need[s] to ‘sleep it off.’”

Lawrence, 849 S.W.2d at 765 (emphasis added). Contrast State v. Love, 897
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S.W.2d P.2d 626, 628-630 (Ariz. 1995). In other words, in enacting the driving

while intoxicated statute, the legislature desired not only to prohibit the operation

of a vehicle by an intoxicated individual, but also to remove from the inebriated

the option of operating a vehicle. Accordingly, the supreme court quoted with

approval the following language:

“We believe that an intoxicated person seated behind the steering

wheel of a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the

public. The danger is less than where an intoxicated person is

actually driving a vehicle, but it does exist. The defendant when

arrested may have been exercising no conscious violation with

respect to the vehicle, still there is a legitimate inference to be

drawn that he placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and

could have at any time started the automobile and driven away.” 

Id. at 765 n.2 (citing Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla.

1975))(emphasis added). 

Thus, by defining the offense of driving under the influence to encompass

the mere physical control of a vehicle, the legislature clearly signaled its intention

to create a crime imposing strict liability. It is for the legislature to determine

whether the public injury threatened by those driving under the influence is so

great as to justify imposition of strict liability. 

While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a

necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and

this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the

statutory definition did not in terms include it, there has been a

modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes

the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement. 

It is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court. It

has been objected that punishment of a person for an act in

violation of law when ignorant of the facts making it so, is an

absence of due process of law. But ... the State may in the

maintenance of a public policy provide “that he who shall do them

shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense

good faith or ignorance.”

United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-252, 42 S.Ct. 301, 302

(1922)(citations omitted).

We note that, in order to illustrate his argument, the appellant in his brief

poses several hypothetical situations, including the scenario in which an
1An objective of the criminal code is to “give fair warning of what conduct

is prohibited, and guide the exercise of official discretion in law enforcement, by

defining the act and the culpable mental state which together constitute an

offense.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-101(2) (1991). Although the driving while

intoxicated statute eliminates the necessity for a culpable mental state, the

statute does not eliminate the necessity for some “act.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-

10-401(a); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-102(b); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(b).

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intoxicated and unconscious individual is carried to his car by his companions

and left in the vehicle, resulting in his subsequent discovery by a police officer.

However, in general, a minimum requirement for criminal liability is the

performance of a voluntary act. See Model Penal Code § 2.01 (1985).1

 A

voluntary act is a bodily movement performed consciously as a result of effort or

determination. Id. Accordingly, in order to be subject to criminal liability under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-401(a), a defendant would have to voluntarily place

himself in physical control of his vehicle.

In this case, it is undisputed that the appellant voluntarily placed himself in

physical control of his vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. 

Therefore, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259

(Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 743 (1995); Tenn. R. App. P.

13(e). See also State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied,

507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368 (1993); State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410

(Tenn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 1429 (1984).

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

____________________________________
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DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

CONCUR:

_________________________________

JOE B. JONES, Presiding Judge

_________________________________

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge