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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46528

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GARY LEON CHAFFIN, II,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: May 12, 2020

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Richard T. St. Clair, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for felony forgery, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Chief Judge

Gary Leon Chaffin, II appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 

verdict finding him guilty of forgery. Chaffin argues the district court admitted irrelevant 

testimony at trial over Chaffin’s objection. Because any error in this case was harmless, we 

affirm the district court’s judgment of conviction.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. and Mrs. Raymond (the Raymonds) hired Chaffin to paint their home. The estimated 

cost for the paint was $3,570, and the parties agreed to split the payment into two installments. 

The Raymonds paid the first installment of $1,785 and, shortly thereafter, received an email

message from Chaffin regarding the remaining balance. The message included an invoice for the 

transaction, a receipt for the purchase of paint, and a request that the Raymonds pay the 
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remaining balance. The Raymonds paid Chaffin for the amount owed on the second installment, 

which totaled $1696.83.1

Chaffin did not complete the paint job. The Raymonds contacted the paint store listed on 

the receipt, Stan’s Paint Clinic, to inquire about the information on Chaffin’s invoice. The owner 

of Stan’s Paint Clinic explained the receipt was not generated by the store. The Raymonds 

contacted the sheriff’s department, who investigated the circumstances. Following the 

investigation, the State charged Chaffin with felony forgery, Idaho Code § 18-3601, and felony 

grand theft, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18-2407(1)(b)(1). 

The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found Chaffin guilty of felony forgery and 

acquitted him of grand theft. The district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with 

three years determinate, suspended the sentence, and placed Chaffin on probation for a period of 

three years. Chaffin timely appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

Chaffin argues the district court erred because it admitted irrelevant evidence at trial. In 

particular, Chaffin claims the testimony from Mr. Raymond regarding concerns for his family’s 

safety and syringes found at the property were not relevant to the charges of forgery and grand 

theft. The State responds the testimony was admissible, and even if it was not, any error was 

harmless.

Generally, evidence relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime 

charged is admissible. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008). 

Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence. I.R.E. 401; Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221. Whether a fact is 

of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories the parties 

presented. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). We review 

questions of relevance de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 

(1993); State v. Aguilar, 154 Idaho 201, 203, 296 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2012).

 1 In the message, Chaffin explained he secured a better price for the paint and, thus, the 

Raymonds owed $88.17 less than the original estimate. 
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The testimony at issue here was the re-direct examination of Mr. Raymond by the State. 

After direct examination and cross-examination of Mr. Raymond, the State asked Mr. Raymond 

the following question during re-direct examination: “Did--when you talked to [the Deputy], did 

you have any concerns for safety of yourself or your property?” Chaffin objected to the question 

on the grounds it was irrelevant and beyond the scope of the cross-examination. The district 

court overruled the objection and allowed the questioning to proceed. The State asked: “What 

was your concern?” Mr. Raymond answered:

We felt like anytime, if someone wasn’t there, there could be damage done 

to the property. We had seen syringes in buckets. We felt the safety for our kids 

because they were on the site at all time with us, playing around. We didn’t want 

to have them harmed by needles and stuff that were found on the property, so we 

wanted to get them disposed of properly.

Even if Mr. Raymond’s testimony was not relevant to the charges of forgery and grand 

theft, any error in admitting such testimony was harmless. Error is not reversible unless it is 

prejudicial. State v. Stell, 162 Idaho 827, 830, 405 P.3d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). With limited 

exceptions, even constitutional error is not necessarily prejudicial error. Id. Thus, we examine 

whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was harmless. See State v. Lopez, 

141 Idaho 575, 578, 114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005). A defendant appealing from an 

objected-to, nonconstitutionally-based error2 shall have the duty to establish that such an error 

occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the error is 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 

(2017). In other words, the error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be the same 

without the error. Id.

Here, any error was harmless because the result of Chaffin’s trial would have been the 

same even without Mr. Raymond’s testimony regarding his concern for safety and the syringes 

found at his property. Because the jury acquitted Chaffin of grand theft, that charge is not at 

issue on appeal. As for the charge of forgery, the jury in this case was provided the following 

instruction (Instruction No. 16):

In order for the defendant to be guilty of Forgery, the state must prove 

each of the following:

1. On or about August 10, 2017

2. in the state of Idaho

 2 Here, Chaffin objected that the State’s questioning was irrelevant and beyond the scope 

of the cross-examination. Chaffin did not claim a constitutional right was violated.
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3. the defendant Gary L. Chaffin II

4. with the intent to defraud [Mr.] Raymond

5. falsely made or forged or attempted to pass as true and genuine a false, 

altered, forged, or counterfeited writing, to-wit: a purchase receipt for 

goods from Stan’s Paint Clinic in the amount of $3269.18, knowing that 

the said receipt was false or forged.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 

must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.

A subsequent jury instruction (Instruction No. 17) explained:

An intent to defraud is an intent to deceive another person for the purpose 

of gaining some material advantage over that person or to induce that person to 

part with property or to alter that person’s position to the injury or risk of the 

person, and to accomplish that purpose by some false statement, false 

representation of fact, wrongful concealment or suppression of truth, or by any 

other artifice or act designed to deceive. 

Here, the State presented overwhelming evidence that Chaffin was guilty of forgery. 

Exhibits at trial included an email written by Chaffin to Mr. Raymond which references the 

receipt for the materials purchased, as well as an explanation that Chaffin “paid for the paint at 

Stan’s to secure the price and the better paint.” The State also admitted into evidence a copy of 

the forged receipt from Stan’s Paint Clinic for the amount of $3,269.18.

The owner of Stan’s Paint Clinic testified regarding the events in question. The owner 

explained he had access to the financial records of Stan’s Paint Clinic, performed a search of 

those records, and determined Chaffin never did business at Stan’s. The owner further testified 

he never met Chaffin and there was no record of a business transaction with Chaffin. In 

particular, the owner testified that there was no business transaction between Chaffin and Stan’s 

Paint Clinic on August 10, 2017. After examining the alleged receipt Chaffin provided to the 

Raymonds, the owner of Stan’s Paint Clinic testified the alleged receipt contained several 

inaccuracies: Stan’s Paint Clinic does not have the slogan “Exceptional Paint at Great Prices,” 

has never employed a man named “Greg,” and does not produce thermal receipts that list the 

paint information in itemized form. The owner also testified Stan’s Paint Clinic does not sell 

two of the items listed on the alleged receipt. 

The jury therefore heard substantial evidence that Chaffin was guilty of forgery, even 

absent Mr. Raymond’s testimony that he found syringes on his property and had safety concerns 

regarding Chaffin. Chaffin presented no evidence to contradict the testimony of the owner of 

Stan’s Paint Clinic or to explain the discrepancies in the alleged receipt. Therefore, the jury 
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could reasonably conclude from the evidence presented at trial that Chaffin provided Mr. 

Raymond a forged or counterfeit receipt from Stan’s Paint Clinic. To reach this conclusion, the 

jury did not need to rely on Mr. Raymond’s testimony regarding safety and syringes. The result 

of the trial would have been the same had the district court not admitted Mr. Raymond’s 

testimony. Therefore, any error in admitting Mr. Raymond’s testimony was harmless.

III.

CONCLUSION

Because any error in this case was harmless, we affirm the district court’s judgment of 

conviction.

Judge GRATTON and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.