J-S06026-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRIAN KRAIDMAN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 713 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 19, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000045-2015

BEFORE: MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED APRIL 18, 2017

Appellant appeals from the judgment of sentence of eleven-and-onehalf to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by eight years of 

probation imposed January 19, 2016, following a jury trial resulting in his 

conviction for theft by unlawful taking, theft by deception, and receiving 

stolen property.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. Appellant 

was employed by Krapf Coaches, Inc. (“Krapf”) from 2007 until he was 

terminated in September 2014 due to allegations that Appellant may have 

stolen a large amount of cash from the company. See Trial Ct. Op. (TCO), 

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*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3921(a), 3922(a)(1), and 3925(a).
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7/27/2016, at 5. Appellant worked as general manager of a Krapf 

subdivision known as Rover Community Transportation (“Rover”). Notes of 

Testimony (N.T.), 7/28/2016, at 16, 18. Rover is a form of public transit 

that primarily serves the elderly and individuals with a disability. N.T., 

10/19/2016, at 15. The pick-ups can be scheduled by reservation only. 

Individual fares are predetermined based on mileage and subsidized by the 

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). Id. at 15-16; TCO 

at 5. When a passenger boards the bus, he or she pays the predetermined 

fare to the driver. N.T., 10/19/2016, at 16. 

Due to Krapf receiving subsidies for the Rover program, Krapf 

was required to keep an accounting and to submit a total of the 

discounted fares collected. Once submitted, PennDOT would 

then calculate the reimbursement due to Krapf. In 2013, 

PennDOT audited the Rover program and found significant 

shortfalls in the fares collected. 

TCO at 5. 

In 2013, PennDOT advised Rover to implement a new system called 

Ecolane that streamlined the mileage calculations based on GPS signals and 

pickup data, making it easier, for auditing purposes, to calculate and keep 

track of the fares paid. Id. The drivers had a tablet that would tell them 

which passengers to pick up each day and how much money should be 

collected for each individual passenger. See N.T., 1/7/2015, at 7. Krapf 

also implemented a system to reconcile the fares daily with the rider logs. 

TCO at 5. At the end of the day, the driver would count all money, checks, 

and coins collected and fill out a fare reconciliation sheet noting the total 
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amount. N.T., 1/7/2015, at 7-8. A dispatcher would verify the amount. Id.

at 8. Coins were recounted by machine. Id. The paper currency and fare 

reconciliation slip were placed into a ziplock bag and deposited into a 

partitioned drop safe that could only be accessed by someone who knew the 

code and had the key to access the interior. See id.

As general manager, Appellant had unfettered access to the safe. He 

was responsible for managing the fares collected: emptying the ziplock bags, 

and sorting the cash, checks, fare reconciliation sheets, and coin slips. Id.

at 9. Once sorted, these items would go into a Tupperware bin and were 

stored in Appellant’s office. Id. 

Appellant’s assistant, Paul Sell, testified at trial that Appellant would 

give him a Tupperware bin so that Mr. Sell would run the money through the 

cash counter, wrap it up in groups of $100, write the final amount on a postit note, and return the money to the cash safe in Appellant’s office. See

N.T., 10/20/2016, at 193-196. Mr. Sell testified that each week Appellant 

would give him cash, usually in a reusable shopping bag, along with a 

deposit ticket and direct him to deposit it at TD Bank, twenty minutes away. 

Id. at 197-198.

Appellant’s ex-wife Donna Kraidman also testified for the prosecution 

at trial. Appellant married Ms. Kraidman in July 1994, and they had two 

children. See N.T., 10/22/2016, at 715-716. In 2011, Appellant obtained a 

divorce decree from Mexico and married his second wife. Id. at 716. Ms. 

Kraidman and Appellant did not have a formal child support arrangement. 
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See N.T., 10/21/2013, at 408. 

In April 2013, when Ms. Kraidman lost her job as a finance manager, 

Appellant agreed orally to pay her $2,100 per week. See id. at 409. 

Appellant told her that he received a raise at work and that he was being 

paid “under the table.” Id. at 421. The money was deposited in cash into 

their joint checking account at TD Bank. See id. at 567. Ms. Kraidman 

regularly kept track of Appellant’s deposits in an electronic spreadsheet. Id.

at 409, 412. 

Around September 4, 2014, an external auditor was investigating 

Rover due to approximately $78,000 of missing cash deposits. See id. N.T., 

10/21/2013, at 444-47. The Chief Financial Officer (CFO) expressed his 

concern in multiple emails to Appellant; however, Appellant delayed in 

scheduling a meeting with him and stopped showing up to work. See id. at 

454. The CFO searched Appellant’s office and found no money in the safe or 

cash closet. See id. at 456-457. Appellant eventually met with the CFO, 

but Appellant was unable to provide missing documentation, such as the 

reconciliation sheets, or provide an explanation for the missing cash 

deposits. See id. at 462-63; N.T., 10/20/2015, at 148-52. 

On September 16, 2014, Ms. Kraidman sent Appellant an email at 

work saying that he was over $37,000 behind on payments. N.T., 

10/21/2013, at 413. Attached to the email was the spreadsheet created to 

keep track of Appellant’s deposits into their joint account. Id. at 414; 

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 53. According to Ms. Kraidman’s calculations, 
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Appellant deposited $120,133.50 in actual cash into their joint checking 

account between April 12, 2013, and September 3, 2014. See N.T., 

10/22/2016, at 560; N.T., 10/21/2013, at 411. According to Krapf, 

however, Appellant’s salary remained $82,000 per year over this period. 

See id. at 467. 

Following a five-day jury trial in October 2014, Appellant was 

convicted of theft by unlawful taking, theft by deception, and receiving 

stolen property. Appellant was sentenced as described above on January 

19, 2016. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis, which was granted. Due to administrative delay in appointing 

counsel, the court extended the time for Appellant to file his notice of 

appeal. Appellant timely appealed in March 2016. Appellant subsequently 

filed a timely, court-ordered 1925(b) statement in April 2016. The court 

issued a responsive opinion. 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

I. Did the Commonwealth fail to produce sufficient evidence 

to support guilty verdicts of Theft by Unlawful Taking, 

Theft by Deception and Receiving Stolen Property when its 

circumstantial evidence showed that [Appellant] acquired 

had [sic] possession of funds during the course of his 

employment at the Krapf bus company and that others had 

equal access to the funds prior to the discovery that some 

of the money had not been properly deposited in the 

company’s bank account?

II. Did the trial court deprive [Appellant] of due process in 

sustaining the Commonwealth’s attorney’s objections to 

defense counsel’s attempt to cross-examine [A]ppellant’s 

ex-wife Deborah Kraidman regarding whether she and her 
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bank complied with the reporting requirements for cash 

deposits of $10,000.00 or more, and whether she reported 

[Appellant’s] alleged deposits into her bank account as 

taxable income?

Appellant's Br. at 2-3.

In his first issue, Appellant purports to challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence presented at trial. However, the Commonwealth urges us to find 

this claim waived because Appellant failed to properly preserve the issue in 

his 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth's Br. at 6-7. We agree. 

As this Court observed in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 

1231, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2015):

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that Rule 1925 is 

a crucial component of the appellate process, which is intended 

to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues 

which the parties plan to raise on appeal. When an appellant 

fails adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought 

to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its 

preparation of a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues. 

In other words, a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow 

the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional 

equivalent of no Concise Statement at all.

In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence on appeal, an appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement must 

state with specificity the element or elements upon which the 

appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient. Such 

specificity is of particular importance in cases where, as here, 

the appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which 

contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In this case, Appellant’s 1925(b) statement simply declared, in 
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boilerplate fashion, that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

convictions for theft by unlawful taking, theft by deception, and receiving 

stolen property. See Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement, 4/1/2016. Appellant’s 

failure to specify the element or elements of any of these convictions “upon 

which the evidence was insufficient” renders Appellant's sufficiency of the 

evidence claim waived on appeal. Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 

254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 

A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted)).

Further, it is of no moment that the trial court addressed Appellant’s 

sufficiency claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

The Commonwealth's failure [to object to the defect in the Rule 

1925(b) statement] and the presence of a trial court opinion are 

of no moment to our analysis because we apply Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) in a predictable, uniform fashion, not in a selective 

manner dependent on an appellee's argument or a trial court's 

choice to address an unpreserved claim. Thus, we find 1925(b) 

waiver where appropriate despite the lack of objection by an 

appellee and despite the presence of a trial court opinion. 

Tyack, 128 A.3d at 261 (quoting Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257 (internal 

citations omitted)). Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency claim is waived.

Second, Appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because 

the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of Donna Kraidman. 

See Appellant's Br. at 19-21. Appellant contends that the court erred in 

limiting cross-examination because (1) Ms. Kraidman’s credibility may have 

been determinative of the jury’s verdict and (2) he had no other way to offer 

evidence that she may have failed to report the deposits as taxable income. 
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See Appellant's Br. at 21. On that basis, Appellant maintains that he should 

receive a new trial. Id. Appellant’s argument is without merit.

Our standard of review is as follows. The right to cross-examine 

adverse witnesses in a criminal case derives from the Confrontation Clause 

of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 630 (Pa. 2010); see U.S. CONST.

amend. VI. “Although the right of cross-examination is a fundamental right, 

it is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. 

Super. 2016).

A trial court has discretion to determine both the scope and the 

permissible limits of cross-examination. Commonwealth v. 

Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1230 (Pa. 2009). The trial judge's 

exercise of judgment in setting those limits will not be reversed 

in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion, or an error of 

law. Commonwealth. v. Birch, 616 A.2d 977, 978 (Pa. 1992) 

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 335 (Pa. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

“In this Commonwealth, cross-examination is ordinarily limited to 

matters brought out on direct examination, except where the examiner is 

seeking to show bias.” Commonwealth v. Lobel, 440 A.2d 602, 605 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). “A defendant has a fundamental right to present evidence 

provided that the evidence is relevant and not subject to exclusion under 

one of our established evidentiary rules.” Commonwealth v. McGowan, 

635 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1993) (citation omitted). Relevant evidence “tends 

to prove or disprove some material fact, or tends to make a fact at issue 
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more or less probable.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 71 

(Pa. 2014) (citing McGowan, 635 A.2d at 115). 

However, “[t]he right of confrontation does not permit ‘fishing 

expeditions.’” Rosser, 135 A.3d at 1088.

The trial court may place reasonable limits on defense 

counsel's cross-examination of a prosecution witness “based on 

concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that 

is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” [Delaware v.] Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). “Generally speaking, the 

Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 

cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 

whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” 

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985).

Van Arsdall articulates two inquiries for determining whether 

a limitation on cross-examination violates the confrontation 

clause.” First, we inquire whether the limitation prejudiced the 

examination of that particular witness. In other words, absent 

the limitation, would the jury have received a “significantly 

different impression” of the witness's credibility? [Van Arsdall, 

475 U.S.] at 679–80. Second, if there was error, we must 

determine whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; 

if so, reversal is not warranted. Id. at 681.

Rosser, 135 A.3d at 1088. “Without such limits, unchecked crossexamination on a theory of bias may unfairly prejudice the opposing party’s 

case and only bring forth ‘marginally relevant’ evidence.” Id. at 1088-89 

(quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679) (citation omitted). 

Here, Appellant’s attorney, Mr. Stretton, cross-examined Ms. Kraidman 

regarding her compliance with bank reporting requirements and whether she 

reported the cash deposited into her account as taxable income:
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MR. STRETTON: Now if you were getting these cash deposits 

from [Appellant] you’re aware under the 

law when you get $10,000 you got to file 

forms with the bank for cash deposits?

COMMONWEALTH: Objection, relevance, improper question.

COURT: How is it relevant, Mr. Stretton?

MR. STRETTON: Questioning the veracity of this, why she 

didn’t follow bank regulations.

COMMONWEALTH: On that basis I renew my objection for 

relevance, Your Honor

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. STRETTON: Did you make any effort to file with any 

agency any document that would evidence 

receipt from your husband of these 

payments that you now contend in this 

spreadsheet that you received from him?

MS. KRAIDMAN No.

MR. STRETTON: Did you report this income, these monies as 

–

COMMONWEALTH: Objection, relevant per your earlier ruling 

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. STRETTON: Do you have anything at all that you filed 

tax wise, bank wise, any document at all 

that shows that [Appellant] was giving you 

cash deposits along the lines you’[ve] 

suggest[ed] in your spreadsheet and [in] 

your testimony today with you or available?

MS. KRAIDMAN: I don’t have anything, any bank deposit 

slips, saying that he is the one who put it in 

there.

MR. STRETTON Your Honor, I have no other questions.
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N.T., 10/21/2015, at 430-31. 

According to the trial court, Appellant’s proposed line of questioning 

was irrelevant and its effectiveness “marginal at best and therefore not 

protected by the Confrontation Clause.” Trial Court. Op., 7/27/2016, at 15. 

We agree. Although Ms. Kraidman’s testimony may have been 

determinative to the outcome of Appellant’s case, Appellant fails to explain 

how either of these inquiries is relevant. See McGowan, supra. 

Appellant’s claim that the questions were targeted to impeach Ms. 

Kraidman’s credibility or veracity is not persuasive. 

Preliminarily, we note that Appellant arguably obtained answers to 

these questions when he asked Ms. Kraidman if she had “any document at 

all that shows [Appellant] was giving [her] cash deposits.” N.T., 

10/21/2015, at 431. Her answer indicated to the jury that she did not have 

any deposit slips that would prove Appellant made the deposits into her 

checking account. Nevertheless, the proposed line of questioning is not a 

proper method of challenging Ms. Kraidman’s credibility to show bias or 

improper motive for her testimony. Appellant does not articulate how bankreporting requirements have any relevant, factual basis, or reveal a motive 

to fabricate or bias. See Rosser, 135 A.2d at 1088 (noting that defendant 

has right to confront an adverse witness with “verifiable fact that supports 

the defense,” not to engage in a “fishing expedition” or solicit “marginally 

relevant evidence”); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-79 (discussing 
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how jury should be allowed consider facts/events that furnished the witness 

a motive for favoring the prosecution in their testimony). Whether Ms. 

Kraidman reported the deposits as income is only marginally relevant at best 

and her possible falsification of taxes was immaterial to the outcome of 

Appellant’s case. See Lobel, 440 A.2d at 605-606 (noting that 

Pennsylvania’s restrictive view of cross-examination “holds that the crossexaminer is free to ask about any subject relevant to any issue in the case” 

or “where the examiner is seeking to show bias”). The court may limit 

cross-examination of this nature that is only marginally relevant at best, 

especially where a party is unable to lay a proper evidentiary foundation. 

Moreover, Appellant had an opportunity to conduct an effective crossexamination to impeach Ms. Kraidman’s credibility without any need to 

question her about bank reporting or her possible tax evasion. He 

successfully cross-examined Ms. Kraidman, to the extent that she admitted 

the following: (a) that she was angry with Appellant; (b) that she had access 

to other cash from her parents’ estates; (c) that she never saw Appellant 

make any deposits; (d) that she had no deposit slips reflecting who made 

the deposits; and (e) that her testimony was the only nexus between the 

large cash deposits and Appellant. See TCO at 15-16. Thus, Appellant fails 

to suggest how the jury would have received a “significantly different 

impression” of Ms. Kraidman’s credibility absent the limitation. Rosser, 135 

A.3d at 1088 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679-80). Therefore, the 
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court’s limitation on cross-examination did not prejudice Appellant, nor 

hinder his ability to conduct an effective cross-examination. See Rosser, 

135 A.3d at 1088.

We discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in that regard. 

Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/18/2017