IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2018

RENEE ANN BRADLEY V. RICHARD BRADLEY

Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Morgan County

No. 15-DV-19 Michael A. Davis, Judge

No. E2017-01626-COA-R3-CV

A husband and wife were divorced in 2016, and the divorce decree permitted the husband 

to purchase the parties’ real property, which was in the wife’s name. The parenting plan 

provided the parties the opportunity to travel domestically or abroad with their minor son. 

The husband filed a contempt petition against the wife based on her refusal (1) to provide 

information to his lender that was necessary for him to close on the purchase of the 

property and (2) to cooperate with him to renew their child’s passport when the husband 

wanted to travel with the child to Europe. The trial court found the wife in contempt on 

both grounds and awarded the husband damages. The wife appealed, arguing that she 

was not willful in refusing to cooperate with the husband’s lender. The evidence showed

that the wife believed the husband was trying to refinance her loan and add his name to 

her deed rather than purchase the property outright. We hold that the trial court erred in 

finding the wife willfully disobeyed the court’s order that she cooperate with the 

husband’s lender. We affirm the trial court’s order holding the wife in contempt for 

failing to cooperate with the husband in renewing the child’s passport.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General Sessions Court

Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN STAFFORD,

P.J., W.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.

Jeffrey Vires, Crossville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Renee Ann Bradley.

James William Brooks, Jr., Wartburg, Tennessee, for the appellee, Richard Bradley.

05/07/2018
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OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Renee Ann Bradley (“Wife”) and Richard Bradley (“Husband”) were granted a 

divorce on July 27, 2016. The parties entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement 

(“MDA”) that the trial court made a part of its final decree of divorce. The parties had 

one child who was still a minor at the time of the divorce. The parties submitted a 

permanent parenting plan to the court, and the court approved the parenting plan and 

incorporated it into the final decree. 

 

The MDA provided that the parties would sell their real property, which was in 

Wife’s name, and distribute the proceeds between them. The parties later decided to 

amend the MDA to allow Husband to purchase the real property from Wife. The trial 

court entered an Amended Final Decree of Absolute Divorce on September 6, 2016, nunc 

pro tunc for July 27, 2016. As amended, the MDA included the following paragraph:

Husband will have three (3) weeks from the date of this Agreement to 

qualify for a loan to purchase the property from Wife. If Husband

purchases the property, he must pay off the indebtedness to Farm Credit 

Services, pay Wife Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00), and pay

Wife the difference between One Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars 

($120,000.00) and the actual payoff to Farm Credit Services if the payoff is

less than One Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars ($120,000.00).

The permanent parenting plan included a provision regarding the child’s travel, 

domestically and abroad. It stated:

There will be no restriction on travel, domestic or abroad, with the minor 

child by either parent. However, both parents must follow the notice 

provisions before going abroad with the minor child.

Husband filed a contempt petition on October 5, 2016, alleging that Wife was 

refusing to cooperate with his lender to conclude the financing transaction and allow him 

to purchase the real property that was in Wife’s name. Husband amended his petition on 

March 7, 2017, to add another ground for contempt after Wife refused to cooperate with

him to renew their child’s passport. Husband asserted that Wife’s refusal constituted a 

violation of the provision of the parenting plan, quoted above. 

The trial court conducted a trial on August 4, 2017, and both Wife and Husband 

testified. The evidence revealed that Wife had a mortgage on the real property through 

Farm Credit Services, and Husband was working with RedRock Mortgage (“RedRock”) 

to obtain a loan and purchase the property from Wife. The record shows that Husband 
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was in a position to close on the property by the end of August 2016 but that Wife would 

not cooperate with RedRock and refused to provide information it requested from her. 

Wife testified that she was contacted by RedRock, and she believed that, rather 

than purchasing it outright, Husband was trying to refinance her loan by having his name 

added to her name on the deed to the property. Wife was aware of a federal lien against 

Husband that predated the parties’ marriage, and Wife was concerned that her interest in 

the property could be negatively affected if Husband’s name was added to the deed along 

with her name. Wife did not understand that RedRock was working with Husband to 

transfer the deed from her to him. When RedRock asked Wife for her payment history 

with Farm Credit Services, she refused to provide the requested information. Wife was 

questioned by Husband’s attorney and testified as follows:

Q: [Husband] had been approved for a loan, correct?

A: He was approved for something that I would have had to sign him onto 

a deed for the property.

Q: Ma’am, you would have - -

A: And that would have taken months.

Q: You would - - ma’am, you would have just had to sign a deed 

conveying the property to him at closing, wouldn’t you?

A: No. It would have been - - there would have been a discrepancy in the 

- - in the exchange of moneys at closing, because I would - - he would have 

been on the deed of the property for - - they said it could take months to get 

all of that approved. And I didn’t want that, because that made - - that 

made it an issue for me.

Wife testified that she believed she “would have stayed an owner of the property with his 

name on the deed until a loan was closed,” and that this could take months. In support of 

this belief, Wife described a conversation she had with a representative of RedRock:

She said, “You’re not going to be happy about this.” And she said, “This is 

- - this is not a purchase. You’re - - you’re going to have to sign his name 

onto the deed. And it could take up to a couple of months, okay, to get his 

name on that deed. And during that time, if something were to happen to 

you or anything, that that property, it would be an issue at that point.”

The record reveals that Husband asked Wife to sign a purchase agreement in 

September 2016 but that she did not sign an agreement until October, and that the closing 
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on the property did not take place until December 2016. Husband testified that the delay 

in closing required him to pay for an additional appraisal and to pay additional fees 

because the interest rate rose during the period of delay. 

Husband and Wife also testified about Wife’s refusal to cooperate with Husband 

to have their child’s passport renewed. Wife acknowledged that she refused to sign the 

form Husband presented her or go with him to apply for a passport in person. Wife 

testified that she was afraid Husband would take the child to the Czech Republic, which 

is where Husband was born, and that Husband would not bring the child back to the 

United States. Wife testified:

Because of his history, I was worried that if something happened again with 

the law, because I have no contact with him, he has stated he will never go

to prison, okay? And right now, he does have a federal felony. If something 

were to happen, he would be - - he would end up - - they would come after 

him, take him to prison, whatever. He said he would never go. So he would 

take my son. I was afraid he would take my son out of this country and they 

would disappear. I would never see him. He’s been threatening that since 

he was born.

Wife explained that she did not object to the child’s traveling with Husband to see 

Husband’s mother, but she refused to cooperate with Husband to renew the child’s 

passport without a court order allowing her to hold onto the passport until Husband 

needed it.1

Following the close of evidence, the trial court announced it was holding Wife in 

contempt on both issues. The court issued an order on August 9, 2017, that included the 

following findings:

2. That Petitioner obtained approval within the three week window 

permitted by the AMENDED FINAL DECREE OF ABSOLUTE

DIVORCE.

3. That Respondent willfully failed to cooperate with Petitioner and 

Petitioner’s lender between the date of approval and closing of Petitioner’s 

loan.

4. That the Respondent willfully failed to sign documents which were 

needed by Petitioner or Petitioner’s lender in order to finalize the loan.

 

1Wife admitted that she had not filed anything with the court seeking to modify the parenting plan to 

include such a provision. 
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5. That Petitioner incurred damages as a result of the delay occasioned by 

the willful conduct of Respondent.

6. That the Respondent should be found to be in contempt of court and 

damages should be awarded to Petitioner.

7. That the PERMANENT PARENTING PLAN signed by the parties and 

incorporated into the FINAL DECREE OF ABSOLUTE DIVORCE on 

July 27, 2016 was an Order of the court.

8. That the provisions of the PERMANENT PARENTING PLAN ORDER 

regarding foreign travel by the parties with their minor child were stated as 

follows:

“J. OTHER

The following special provisions apply: There will be no 

restriction on travel, domestic or abroad, with the minor child 

by either parent. However, both parents must follow the 

notice provisions before going abroad with the minor child.”

9. That the Respondent failed to abide by the provisions of the 

PERMANENT PARENTING PLAN because she willfully failed to 

cooperate with Petitioner in obtaining renewal of the passport of the minor 

child of the parties by either accompanying Petitioner to apply for renewal 

of the passport or sign the STATEMENT OF CONSENT as the nonapplying parent.

10. That the willful failure of Respondent to cooperate with Petitioner has 

delayed Petitioner’s efforts to renew the passport of the minor child and, 

therefore, has placed a restriction on the ability of Petitioner to travel 

abroad with the minor child.

11. That Respondent should be found to be in contempt for her failure to 

cooperate with Petitioner in his efforts to renew the application of the 

passport of the minor child.

12. That the Respondent has incurred attorney’s fees and expenses in 

pursuing his AMENDED PETITION against Respondent.

13. That Petitioner should be awarded his attorney’s fees and expenses, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
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A. That the Respondent, Renee Ann Bradley, shall be found to be in 

contempt of court for her failure to cooperate with Petitioner and 

Petitioner’s lender.

B. That the Respondent shall be found to be in contempt of court for her 

failure to cooperate with Petitioner in his efforts to obtain renewal of the 

passport of the minor child.

C. That the Petitioner shall have judgment against Respondent for the 

additional expenses he incurred as a result of the failure of Respondent to 

cooperate with Petitioner and Petitioner’s lender in the amount of 

$3,593.32, for which execution shall issue if necessary.

D. That Petitioner shall have judgment against Respondent for attorney’s 

fees and expenses incurred by Petitioner in pursuing his AMENDED 

PETITION in the amount of $1,967.80, for which execution shall issue if 

necessary.

E. That the Respondent, Renee Ann Bradley, shall execute the STATE OF 

CONSENT: ISSUANCE OF A U.S. PASSPORT TO A MINOR UNDER 

AGE 16.

F. That the Petitioner, Richard Bradley, shall be authorized to apply for the 

renewal of the U.S. passport for his minor child, Richard Louis Bradley, 

who is under age 16 and the presence of the minor child’s mother, 

Respondent, Renee Ann Bradley, shall not be required.

Wife appeals the trial court’s judgment finding her in contempt of court. 

II. ANALYSIS

The Tennessee General Assembly has authorized courts to “inflict punishments for 

contempts of court” in cases where a party willfully disobeys “any lawful writ, process, 

order, rule, decree, or command of such courts.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-102(3). The 

basis of Husband’s claims against Wife was that Wife had failed to comply with the 

court’s orders as set forth in the final decree of divorce, which incorporated the MDA and 

the permanent parenting plan. Husband did not specify in his petition whether he was 

seeking to have the court hold Wife in civil contempt or criminal contempt. The 

Tennessee Supreme Court has addressed contempt and the differences between civil and 

criminal contempt:

[A] contempt may either be civil or criminal in nature. Civil contempt 

occurs when a person does not comply with a court order and an action is 
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brought by a private party to enforce rights under the order that has been 

violated. Punishment for civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance 

with the court’s order and is imposed at the insistence and for the benefit of 

the private party who has suffered a violation of rights. Also, in civil 

contempt cases, the quantum of proof necessary to convict is a 

preponderance of the evidence. On the other hand, criminal contempts are 

“intended to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity and authority of 

the law, and the court as an organ of society.” Punishment for criminal 

contempt is both punitive and unconditional in nature and serves to 

adjudicate “an issue between the public and the accused.” In criminal 

contempt proceedings, the defendant is presumed to be innocent and must 

be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Doe v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 104 S.W.3d 465, 473-74 (Tenn. 

2003) (citations omitted); see also Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 12-13 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2006) (stating primary purpose of criminal contempt sanctions is to punish and 

vindicate court’s authority); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (setting forth notice requirements 

for criminal contempt).

The words “criminal contempt” do not appear in Husband’s initial petition or 

amended petition, and Husband seems to have filed his petition for the purpose of 

requiring Wife to comply with the terms of the MDA and parenting plan. Therefore, it 

appears Husband was seeking to have Wife held in civil contempt.

To succeed on a claim seeking civil contempt, a plaintiff must prove “four 

essential elements.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 

S.W.3d 346, 354 (Tenn. 2008). These elements include:

First, the order alleged to have been violated must be “lawful.” Second, the 

order alleged to have been violated must be clear, specific, and 

unambiguous. Third, the person alleged to have violated the order must 

have actually disobeyed or otherwise resisted the order. Fourth, the 

person’s violation of the order must be “willful.”

Id. at 354-55 (footnotes omitted). A party may be held in civil contempt for violating a 

court’s order even if the contemptuous conduct has ceased by the time of the hearing. 

Overnite Trasnp. Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 480, 172 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tenn. 

2005). We conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s findings of fact in support of a 

decision to hold a defendant in civil contempt, according the trial court’s findings a 

presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Lovlace v. 

Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 356-57); see

also TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d). We review a trial court’s decision to hold a defendant in 

civil contempt under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. (citing Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d 
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at 358). The Konvalinka Court addressed the abuse of discretion standard of review

thusly:

An abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays beyond the framework of 

the applicable legal standards or when it fails to properly consider the 

factors customarily used to guide that discretionary decision. State v. Lewis, 

235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn. 2007). Discretionary decisions must take the 

applicable law and relevant facts into account. Ballard v. Herzke, 924 

S.W.2d 652, 661 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, reviewing courts will set aside a 

discretionary decision only when the court that made the decision applied 

incorrect legal standards, reached an illogical conclusion, based its decision 

on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning 

that causes an injustice to the complaining party. Mercer v. Vanderbilt

Univ., 134 S.W.3d 121, 131 (Tenn. 2004); Perry v. Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 

467 (Tenn. 2003).

Konvalinka, 249 S.W.3d at 358.

Husband’s Purchase of Wife’s Property

Wife does not contest the legality of the MDA. Rather, she claims she “was under 

no obligation to assist Husband or Husband’s lender in obtaining financing for the 

purchase of the marital home.” She also claims that her non-cooperation was not 

“willful.”

The Konvalinka Court discussed the second element that must be established 

before finding a defendant in civil contempt. The Court explained that the court order at 

issue must be “clear, specific, and unambiguous.” Id. at 355. It must “expressly and 

precisely spell[] out the details of compliance in a way that will enable reasonable 

persons to know exactly what actions are required or forbidden.” Id. 

The trial court’s final decree, as amended, allowed husband three weeks to qualify 

for a loan to purchase the real property from Wife. Husband was directed to pay off the 

indebtedness to Farm Credit Services, which was Wife’s lender. The MDA that Wife 

signed contains a paragraph that specifically requires each party, at the request of the 

other, to “execute and deliver all documents and records which may be reasonably 

necessary to give full effect to this Agreement.” We disagree with Wife’s assertion that 

she was not obligated to assist Husband in obtaining financing. To the extent that she 

had information or documentation that Husband or his lender needed for him to pay off 

Wife’s loan to Farm Credit Services and/or to transfer the deed to Husband, Wife was 

required by the amended order and the MDA to assist Husband and his lender. This 

included the requirement that she give Husband or his lender information regarding the 
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amount still owing on her loan from Farm Credit Services. He could not comply with the 

terms of the amended decree without this information.

The third element of civil contempt asks whether Wife actually “disobeyed or 

otherwise resisted the order.” Id. at 354-55. The evidence is undisputed that Husband 

was unable to close at the end of August, when he initially tried to close on the purchase, 

because Wife refused to cooperate with his lender. Thus, we conclude that Wife did, in 

fact, disobey the court’s order that she comply with the terms of the MDA.

The final element Husband was required to establish before Wife could be held in 

civil contempt was that her refusal to cooperate and violation of the MDA was “willful.” 

“Willful conduct” in the context of a civil contempt proceeding has been defined as:

“acts or failures to act that are intentional or voluntary rather than 

accidental or inadvertent. Conduct is ‘willful’ if it is the product of free 

will rather than coercion. Thus, a person acts ‘willfully’ if he or she is a 

free agent, knows what he or she is doing, and intends to do what he or she 

is doing.”

Id. at 357 (quoting State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass’n Self Ins. Grp. Trust, 209 

S.W.3d 602, 612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted)). “[A]cting contrary to a 

known duty may constitute willfulness for the purpose of a civil contempt proceeding.” 

Id. (citing United States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116, 1127 (7th Cir. 1982)). 

Wife testified that when she was contacted by RedRock and asked for information 

regarding her payment history, she believed Husband was seeking to refinance her loan, 

rather than pay off her loan and purchase the property outright in his own name, and that 

she was being asked to add Husband to her deed. Wife was aware of a federal lien against 

Husband, and she was concerned that her interest in the property could be impacted if the 

lien attached to the property before Husband closed on the purchase. 

Under these circumstances, we believe the preponderance of the evidence is 

contrary to the trial court’s finding that Wife willfully disobeyed the amended order and 

terms of the MDA. The record reveals that Wife did not intend to disobey the court’s 

order. Wife understood Husband had the right to purchase her property, and she was 

ready and willing to sell the property to him free and clear. However, based on a 

conversation she had with a RedRock employee, she believed Husband was trying to 

refinance her loan rather than take out a new loan in his name alone. She was told by the 

RedRock employee, “This is not a purchase.”2 Because we find the preponderance of the 

 

2Ultimately, Husband was able to purchase the property at issue, but this did not occur until December 

2016. By that time, the interest rate on Husband’s loan had risen and Husband had to pay for another 

appraisal on the property, causing Husband to pay more than he would have had he been able to close in 
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evidence does not support the “willful” element of civil contempt, we conclude the trial 

court lacked the basis to hold Wife in contempt for disobeying the court’s order. Thus, 

we reverse the trial court’s ruling holding Wife in contempt for failing to cooperate with 

Husband and his lender between the date of approval and closing of Husband’s loan.

Renewal of Child’s Passport

Wife does not contest the legality of the parenting plan or Husband’s right to 

travel abroad with the child. However, she contends the trial court erred by imposing a 

duty upon her that was not expressly ordered under the terms of the final decree. We 

disagree. 

The parenting plan clearly states that “[t]here will be no restrictions on travel, 

domestic or abroad, with the minor child by either parent.” Wife testified that she 

understood Husband was unable to travel with the child to visit Husband’s mother in 

Europe without a valid passport. By refusing to cooperate with Husband to apply for a 

passport for the child, Wife was effectively restricting Husband’s travel abroad with the 

child. Thus, the court was not imposing a duty on Wife that was outside the terms of the 

final decree.

Wife does not argue that the trial court erred in finding that she acted willfully in 

refusing to cooperate with Husband to apply for a passport for the child. We conclude 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding Wife in contempt for refusing to 

cooperate with Husband to apply for the child’s passport. The court ordered Wife to 

execute the document giving her consent for the issuance of a passport for the child, and 

the record shows that Wife has complied with this order. The court further authorized 

Husband to apply for the passport renewal on his own, stating that the presence of Wife 

“shall not be required.”

Damages

“[D]amages are available to a party injured by a contemnor’s acts in violation of a 

court’s order.” Overnite Transp. Co., 172 S.W.3d at 511 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-

105). The trial court awarded Husband damages in the sum of $5,561.12. This amount 

includes $3,593.32 for expenses Husband incurred as a result of Wife’s refusal to 

cooperate with Husband and his lender, and $1,967.80 for attorney’s fees and expenses 

Husband incurred in pursuing his contempt petition. Because we find the trial court erred 

in holding Wife in contempt for refusing to cooperate with Husband and his lender 

between the date of the approval until the closing of the loan, we reverse all damages 

resulting from that ruling.

 

 

August.
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The only monetary damages the trial court awarded in connection with Wife’s 

refusal to cooperate with Husband to renew the child’s passport were the attorney’s fees 

Husband incurred in connection therewith.3 The exhibits introduced at trial include an 

affidavit by Husband’s attorney describing the services provided and the cost of those 

services. The affidavit does not specify how much time was spent on each ground for 

contempt, however. 

We remand this case for a determination of fees Husband incurred in pursuing his 

contempt petition against Wife for refusing to cooperate with him to apply for a renewed 

passport for the child and direct the trial court to award that amount to Husband as 

damages.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. This

matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Costs of 

appeal shall be split equally between the parties, and execution may issue if necessary.

________________________________

 ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

 

3One could debate whether the contempt was one of omission to perform a required act under Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 29-9-104, for which damages in the form of attorney’s fees are not allowed, or one of performance 

of a forbidden act under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-9-105, for which damages in the form of attorney’s fees 

are allowed. The fact is, however, that Wife did not challenge the award of attorney’s fees. She only 

challenged the contempt holding itself. Consequently, we deem the issue of whether attorney’s fees 

should have been awarded as waived.