Filed 2/22/24 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JASON RIDDICK et al.,

Plaintiffs, CrossComplainants, and 

Respondents,

v.

CITY OF MALIBU et al.,

Defendants, CrossDefendants, and Appellants.

 B323731

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 21SMCP00655)

 ORDER MODIFYING

 OPINION AND DENYING

 PETITION FOR

 REHEARING

 [NO CHANGE IN 

 JUDGMENT]

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c), it is 

ordered that the opinion filed on February 1, 2024, is modified as 

follows:

1. On page 4, section B, in the first sentence of the

second paragraph, after “plaintiffs,” add the next chronological 

footnote:
2

Among other documents in support of their 

application, plaintiffs submitted a December 7, 2020, letter that 

attached a copy of an April 21, 2020, memorandum from the 

executive director of the Coastal Commission regarding 

implementation of the recent ADU law stating that “the 

construction or conversion of an ADU . . . directly attached to an 

existing single-family residence would qualify as an exempt 

improvement to a single-family residence. (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 

14, § 13250(a)(1).) Guest houses and ‘self-contained residential 

units,’ i.e., detached residential units, do not qualify as part of a 

single-family residential structure, and construction of or 

improvements to them are therefore not exempt development. 

(Cal. Code Regs, tit. 14, § 13250(a)(2).)” (Emphasis omitted.)

2. On page 6, the second line, at the end of the partial 

sentence, after “application.”, add:

Plaintiffs attached, among other exhibits, two 

publications from the Coastal Commission: (1) an April 18, 2017, 

memorandum stating that “[t]o qualify as an exempt 

improvement to a single-family dwelling, an ADU must be 

contained within or directly attached to the existing single-family 

structure;” and (2) the April 21, 2020, memorandum referenced 

above stating that an ADU “directly attached to an existing 

single-family residence would qualify as an exempt improvement 

to a single-family residence.”
3

3. On page 6, at the end of the first full paragraph that 

begins “On May 10, 2022, . . .”, add:

Plaintiffs also acknowledged a January 2022 Coastal 

Commission publication that reconsidered its position in favor of 

exemptions for attached ADUs, but maintained that the 

Commission’s new reasoning was flawed and that the 

interpretation of the City’s LCP was a matter of law for the court 

to determine.

4. On page 13, at the end of the first full paragraph that 

begins “Finally, the wording . . .”, add the next chronological 

footnote:

The City also advocates deference to the Coastal 

Commission’s January 2022 publication reconsidering its prior 

position in favor of exemptions for attached ADUs. That 

guidance, however, contradicted prior Commission publications 

supporting plaintiffs’ application, including the April 21, 2020, 

memorandum from its executive director. Despite plaintiff’s’ 

urging, the City ignored the Commission’s prior guidance on the 

issue during the application process; it was not until this 

litigation arose that it adopted a more deferential posture 

towards such agency interpretations. Given the Commission’s 

inconsistent positions on the issue within a relatively short 

timeframe, we decline the invitation to afford judicial deference 

to its most recent position on the issue. (See Henning v. 

Industrial Welfare Com. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1262, 1278 [“[I]n the 

abstract, a current administrative interpretation would 

ordinarily be entitled to great weight. [Citation.] But when . . . 
4

the construction in question is not ‘a contemporaneous 

interpretation’ of the relevant statute and in fact ‘flatly 

contradicts the position which the agency had enunciated at an 

earlier date, closer to the enactment of the . . . statute[,]’ it cannot 

command significant deference”].)

The petition for rehearing is denied. There is no change in 

the judgment.

_________________________________________________________

RUBIN, P. J. MOOR, J. KIM, J.
Filed 2/1/24 (unmodified opinion)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

JASON RIDDICK et al.,

Plaintiffs, CrossComplainants, and 

Respondents,

v.

CITY OF MALIBU et al.,

Defendants, CrossDefendants, and Appellants.

 B323731

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 21SMCP00655)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.

Best Best & Krieger, Trevor L. Rusin, Greg W. Kettles, 

Patrick Donegan, and John Natalizio, for Defendants, CrossDefendants, and Appellants.

Pacific Legal Foundation, David J. Deerson, for Plaintiffs, 

Cross-Complainants, and Respondents.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

The City of Malibu (the City) denied plaintiffs’1 permit 

application to add an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) to their 

residence under state ADU standards.

2 Plaintiffs petitioned the 

trial court for relief and obtained an order directing the City to 

process the proposed ADU as exempt from coastal development 

permit (CDP) requirements.

On appeal, defendants3 contend the trial court 

misinterpreted the City ordinance governing exemptions from the 

state’s CDP requirement. In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs argue 

that, because they established a right to a permit under state 

ADU standards as a matter of law, the court should have ordered 

the permit to issue forthwith. We affirm the judgment in its 

entirety.

1 Plaintiffs are Jason and Elizabeth Riddick, and Renee 

Sperling, Elizabeth’s mother.

2 The Legislature found and declared that California has a 

severe housing crisis and that ADUs provide “additional rental 

housing stock” in single-family residential zones and are thus “an 

essential component of California’s housing supply.” (Gov. Code,

§ 65852.150, subd. (a)(4), (5), (8).) Government Code section 

65852.2 establishes state standards under which ADU permit 

applications must receive ministerial approval, including 

standards for parking, height, setback, landscape, architectural 

review, and maximum unit size.

3 Defendants are the City, the Malibu City Council, and the 

Malibu Planning Department.
3

II. BACKGROUND

A. Coastal Development Regulatory Framework

“The [California] Coastal Act [of 1976 (Coastal Act; Pub. 

Resources Code, § 30000)4] is a comprehensive scheme governing 

land use planning for the entire coastal zone of California. 

[Citation.] . . . With certain exceptions, ‘any person wishing to 

perform or undertake any development in the coastal zone must 

obtain a [CDP] “in addition to obtaining any other permit 

required by law from any local government or from any state, 

regional, or local agency . . . .”’ [Citations.] The Coastal Act 

authorizes exemptions from the CDP requirement for certain 

minor developments such as improvements to existing single 

family residences and other structures. (§ 30610.)

“The Coastal Act requires local governments to develop

local coastal programs [(LCPs)], which consist of a land use plan

and a local implementation plan. [Citation.] ‘Once the California 

Coastal Commission certifies a local government’s [LCP], and all 

implementing actions become effective, the commission delegates 

authority over [CDPs] to the local government.’ [Citation.]” 

(Venice Coalition to Preserve Unique Community Character v. 

City of Los Angeles (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 42, 47–48.)

All properties in the City are located within the coastal 

zone as defined by the Coastal Act and are therefore subject to its 

provisions, including the CDP requirement for proposed 

4 All further statutory references are to the Public Resources 

Code unless otherwise indicated.
4

developments within that zone.

5 The Coastal Commission 

certified the City’s LCP in 2002. (City of Malibu v. Coastal 

Commission (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 549, 554.) Chapter 13 of 

that LCP established the process for the review of all 

development within the City’s coastal zone to ensure that it is 

consistent with the provisions of the Coastal Act. Section 13.4.1 

of that chapter (section 13.4.1) exempts “[i]mprovements to 

existing single-family residences” from the requirement of a CDP, 

with certain exceptions. The interpretation of that section’s 

exemption is at the core of the dispute between the parties.

B. Plaintiffs’ Permit Application

The Riddicks own and occupy, along with their children, a 

single-family residence in the City. To accommodate Sperling’s

move into the residence, the family decided to construct “a small 

[ADU] attached to [the] residence . . . .” On July 10, 2020, they 

applied for a permit to build “a new 414 square foot [ADU and a]

157 square foot addition” to the existing residence that included a 

new primary bathroom.

On June 7, 2021, following communications between the 

City and plaintiffs, the City’s planning commission adopted a 

resolution denying plaintiffs’ request for an ADU permit. The 

commission concluded that a CDP was required for the project 

and refused to approve one, finding that the project did “not 

conform to the LCP as it violates residential development 

standards for required minimum rear and side yard setbacks and 

5 The parties agree that the state’s ADU standards do not 

“supersede or in any way alter or lessen the effect or the 

application of the [Coastal Act].” (Gov. Code, § 65852.2, subd. (l).)
5

maximum allowed [total development square footage] and [total 

impervious lot coverage].”

On June 28, 2021, plaintiffs appealed the commission’s 

denial of their requests for an ADU permit. On August 19, 2021, 

the City council held a noticed public hearing on the appeal and 

made findings in support of a resolution to deny the appeal.

On September 2, 2021, plaintiffs resubmitted plans to the 

City, advising that the new plans contained a modification:

“[T]here will be no addition to the primary residence. Instead, 

the proposed space originally put forth as an addition to the 

primary residence is now designated as part of the ADU.”

(Emphasis omitted.)

On October 8, 2021, plaintiffs’ counsel sent an e-mail to the 

City, emphasizing that the revised project was exempt from the 

CDP requirement and therefore entitled to ministerial review

and approval.

On October 25, 2021, the City attorney responded that the 

proposed project required a CDP, without specifically addressing 

plaintiffs’ modified plans.

C. Petition for Writ of Mandate

On November 18, 2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint against 

defendants asserting causes of action for: Writ of administrative 

mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5); traditional writ of mandate 

(id., § 1085); declaratory relief (id., § 1060); and violation of the 

Housing Accountability Act (Gov. Code, § 65589.5). The cause of 

action for traditional mandate asserted that defendants had a 

clear, present, and ministerial duty to review and approve 

plaintiffs’ ADU permit application, and plaintiffs had a clear, 
6

present, and beneficial right to approval of their permit

application.

On May 10, 2022, plaintiffs filed an opening brief in 

support of their petition. On their claim for traditional mandate, 

plaintiffs argued that, under section 13.4.1, their ADU project 

was exempt from the CDP requirement and should therefore be 

processed and approved ministerially under state ADU standards 

(Gov. Code, § 65852.2).

On June 10, 2022, defendants filed their opposition brief. 

On the traditional mandate claim, defendants argued that their 

interpretation of section 13.4.1 was entitled to deference and they 

did not have a legal duty to process plaintiffs’ permit application 

under Government Code section 65852.2 because that section 

specified that it did not “alter or lessen” the Coastal Act’s CDP 

requirements.

In reply, plaintiffs argued that the City’s interpretation of 

section 13.4.1 was not entitled to deference because: The 

unambiguous language of that section exempted attached ADUs 

from the CDP requirement; the City had no comparative 

interpretive advantage over the trial court; and there was no 

indication in the record that the City’s interpretation was 

carefully considered or long-held and consistent.

D. Ruling on Traditional Mandate Claim

On July 25, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the 

claims asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint and then took the matter 

under submission. The next day, the court issued a “Final 

Ruling” granting plaintiffs’ claim for traditional mandate.
7

On the issue of giving deference to the City’s interpretation

of section 13.4.1, the trial court explained that “the proper 

interpretation of the [section] is a question of law for the [c]ourt’s 

independent interpretation. The [c]ourt is certainly not bound by 

the City’s (or Commission’s) interpretation. Furthermore, the 

City’s interpretation is not a long-standing opinion on this issue. 

In fact, the City (and Commission) ha[ve] admittedly reversed 

course with this decision. These circumstances weigh against 

finding deference.”

On whether the language of section 13.4.1 unambiguously 

exempted plaintiffs’ project from the CDP requirement, the trial 

court concluded that “the plain language of the statute fits 

[plaintiffs’] interpretation far better than the City’s 

interpretation.” On the relief to be granted, the trial court stated, 

“Plaintiffs requested . . . that the [c]ourt compel [defendants] to 

‘ministerially approve’ the revised ADU under [Government 

Code] section 65852.2. However, the court cannot grant the 

requested relief to compel approval. The [r]ecord does not show 

that the City improperly denied the application on a ministerial 

basis. Instead, the City indicated [it] would not review the 

application at all. . . . [Plaintiffs] only justify that the City must 

decide the application within 60 days from the date it receives a 

completed application pursuant to Government Code section 

65852.2. The [c]ourt does not order the City to grant or approve 

the application since the only prior determination was that the 

application required a CDP.”

On September 19, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment 

granting plaintiffs’ cause of action for traditional mandate and 

directing the City “to process [plaintiffs’] application in 

compliance with the [c]ourt’s July 26, 2022, Final Ruling 
8

attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A.’” The judgment also denied each of 

plaintiffs’ other causes of action.

On September 22, 2022, defendants filed a notice of appeal 

from the judgment and, on October 26, 2022, plaintiffs filed their 

notice of cross-appeal.

III. APPEAL

A. Traditional Mandate6

“Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a), . . . 

empowers courts ‘to compel a public agency or officer to perform a 

mandatory duty.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] [Traditional m]andamus is 

appropriate to compel a ‘ministerial’ act, that is, ‘“an act that a 

public officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in 

obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without regard to 

his [or her] own judgment or opinion concerning such act’s 

propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists. . . . 

[Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Put another way, a 

ministerial act is one ‘“‘[w]here a statute or ordinance clearly 

defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing 

body must take,’”’ thus ‘“‘eliminat[ing] any element of 

6 “‘To state a cause of action for a [traditional] writ of 

mandate, one must plead facts showing (1) a clear duty to act by 

the defendant; (2) a beneficial interest in the defendant’s 

performance of that duty; (3) the defendant’s ability to perform 

the duty; (4) the defendant’s failure to perform that duty or abuse 

of discretion if acting; and (5) no other plain, speedy, or adequate 

remedy exists.’ [Citation.]” (Los Angeles Waterkeeper v. State 

Water Resources Control Bd. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 230, 265

(Waterkeeper).)
9

discretion.’”’ [Citation.]” (Waterkeeper, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 265–266, fn. omitted.)

B. Standard of Review

The interpretation of a local ordinance is a legal issue 

subject to our de novo review. (Brookside Investments, Ltd. v. 

City of El Monte (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 540, 548, fn. 4.)

C. Statutory Interpretation

The primary issue in this appeal involves the proper 

interpretation of the language in subdivision (A) of section 13.4.1. 

The City reads that section to exclude both attached and 

detached ADUs from the CDP exemption for improvements to 

existing single-family residences. Plaintiffs maintain that the 

section exempts all improvements directly attached to existing 

single-family residences, including attached ADUs, from the CDP 

requirement and that only detached ADUs are excluded from the 

CDP exemption.

Section 13.4 of the City’s LCP—entitled “EXEMPTIONS 

FROM AND DE MINIMUS WAIVERS OF [CDPs]”—states 

that “[t]he projects described in [s]ections 13.4.1 through 13.4.9 

are exempt from the requirement to obtain a [CDP] . . . .” Section 

13.4.1 then provides: “13.4.1 Exemptions for Improvements 

to Existing Single-Family Residences [¶] A. Improvements 

to existing single-family residences except as noted below in 

(B).[7] For purposes of this section, the terms ‘Improvements to 

7 The parties agree that the proposed ADU does not fall 

within any of the classes of development listed in subdivision (B).
10

existing single-family residences’ includes all fixtures and 

structures directly attached to the residence and those structures 

normally associated with a single family residence, such as 

garages, swimming pools, fences, storage sheds and landscaping 

but specifically not including guest houses or accessory selfcontained residential units.”

We review ordinances under the same rules of construction 

that we review statutes. (Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of 

Carson Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd. (1999) 70 

Cal.App.4th 281, 290.) “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur 

fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so 

as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory 

language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do 

not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the 

statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope 

and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the 

enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow 

its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in 

absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the 

statutory language permits more than one reasonable 

interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the 

statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.’ 

[Citation.]” (Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 

165–166.)
11

1. Deference to the City’s Interpretation

Defendants maintain that we should give “great deference”

to their interpretation of section 13.4.1 and adopt it unless clearly 

erroneous. Plaintiffs counter that because both the plain text 

and legislative history support their view of the statute, the 

City’s interpretation is entitled to “little-to-no deference . . . .”

“To the extent we are engaging in statutory interpretation, 

‘we must give deference to [an agency’s] interpretations, but not 

to the exclusion of other tools of statutory construction.’” (ACCO 

Engineered Systems, Inc. v. Contractors’ State License Bd. (2018) 

30 Cal.App.5th 80, 87.) As the court in Yamaha Corp. of America 

v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 (Yamaha)

explained, “Where the meaning and legal effect of a statute is the 

issue, an agency’s interpretation is one among several tools 

available to the court. Depending on the context, it may be 

helpful, enlightening, even convincing. It may sometimes be of 

little worth. [Citation.] Considered alone and apart from the

context and circumstances that produce them, agency 

interpretations are not binding or necessarily even authoritative. 

. . . ‘The standard for judicial review of agency interpretation of 

law is the independent judgment of the court, giving deference to 

the determination of the agency appropriate to the circumstances 

of the agency action.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p.7–8.)

We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, 

defendants’ interpretation of section 13.4.1 is not entitled to 

deference. As explained below, neither the language of section 

13.4.1, subdivision (A) nor its legislative history are ambiguous;

thus there is no need to defer to defendants’ interpretation. 

(Advanced Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 196 
12

Cal.App.4th 338, 350; Department of Industrial Relations v. 

Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Board (2018) 26 

Cal.App.5th 93, 106.)

Moreover, even if there was some ambiguity concerning the 

meaning of the text, it is not composed of “‘technical, obscure, 

complex, open-ended’” language “‘entwined with issues of fact, 

policy, and discretion’” that would require resort to defendants’ 

specialized expertise. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 12.) 

Defendants therefore “enjoy[] no comparative advantage over a 

generalist court in interpreting the legal text at issue.” 

(California Veterinary Medical Association v. City of West 

Hollywood (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 536, 556.)

Furthermore, the record does not reflect that defendants’ 

interpretation was the result of careful consideration by senior 

agency officials or that defendants consistently maintained their 

interpretation, especially over a long period of time. (See 

Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 13.) Instead, defendants’ 

interpretation appears to be a matter of first impression, initially 

made by planning department staff in response to plaintiffs’ 

attached ADU proposal. Indeed, there is no indication in the 

record that City planning officials carefully deliberated and 

weighed the decision to require a CDP in this case and nothing to 

suggest that they had been confronted with the same or a similar 

issue in the past and consistently determined that a CDP was 

required. (See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Board of 

Equalization (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 338, 352 [deference 

appropriate if the agency determination is not “adopted ad hoc as 

a litigating position in this case only,” but rather is one the 

agency has maintained “consistently for at least 20 years”].)
13

Finally, the wording of the statute at issue was not crafted 

by City planning officials in response to some unique local 

conditions or considerations, such that they would be in the best 

position to understand and explain its meaning. As discussed 

below, that language was adopted in 2002 as part of the City’s 

LCP as mandated under the Coastal Act (§§ 30500–30526; Pacific 

Palisades Bowl Mobile Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 

55 Cal.4th 783, 794).) And, it appears to be based, almost 

verbatim, on an implementing regulation promulgated by the 

Coastal Commission. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 13250, subd. (a).) 

Thus, City officials would be in no better position than a court of 

this state when interpreting the Coastal Commission’s intent in 

adopting that regulation.

2. Plain Meaning of Section 13.4.1

We agree with the trial court that, under the plain meaning 

rule, the language of section 13.4.1, subdivision (A) includes 

attached ADUs in the class of improvements to existing singlefamily residences that are exempt from the CDP requirement. 

The title and first sentence of the subdivision establish that 

improvements to existing single-family residences are exempt as 

a class, “except those noted below in (B).” That language is broad 

and subject only to the exceptions in subdivision (B), none of 

which is implicated here.

The next sentence defines “improvements” broadly, and 

consists of two distinct categories of structures: (1) all structures 

directly attached to the residence, and (2) other structures 

normally associated with a single-family residence, such as 

garages and swimming pools. The first category of 
14

improvements, all “directly attached” structures, is unqualified

and therefore evinces an intent to exempt any such attached 

improvements. The second category, structures “normally 

associated” with single-family residences, is qualified by a list of 

four examples of detached structures that are included in the 

definition and, in the final clause of the definition, a specification 

of two types of detached structures that are deemed excluded.

Under that bifurcated definition, the specification of 

excluded structures in the final clause of subdivision (A) modifies 

and applies only to “normally associated” structures, and not to 

the first category of “structures directly attached . . . .” The 

common sense reading of the two separate categories suggests 

that the drafters of subdivision (A) intended to differentiate 

between attached structures and normally associated detached 

structures, with all of the former being exempt from the CDP 

requirement and most of the latter also being exempt, unless 

they specifically qualify as either a guest house or an accessory 

self-contained residential unit. When, as here, “the language is 

clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it 

necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature . . . .” 

(Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.)

3. Legislative History

Even if the language of section 13.4.1, subdivision (A) was

susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the legislative 

history in the record8 confirms our interpretation that ADUs 

8 The City did not provide any historical documents 

demonstrating its intent in enacting section 13.4.1. Nor did it 

include such documents for the Coastal Commission regulation 
15

directly attached to existing residences are exempt from the CDP 

requirement. “It is an established principle that where statutory

language is unambiguous, a court is precluded from considering

legislative history. (See, e.g., People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th

1106, 1111 [‘If the language contains no ambiguity, we presume 

the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the

statute governs. [Citation.] If, however, the statutory language

is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, we can 

look to legislative history in aid of ascertaining legislative

intent[ ]’].) . . . [T]he plain meaning rule does not prohibit a court 

from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute

comports with its purpose. [Citation.] Courts have therefore 

considered legislative history even in cases where the text of a

statute is clear; but only to confirm the interpretation already 

apparent from the plain language, not to advance an alternative 

meaning. [Citations.]” (Huff v. Securitas Security Services USA, 

Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 755.)

As noted, the language of section 13.4.1, subdivision (A) 

was taken almost verbatim from the Coastal Commission 

regulations9 implementing section 30610, subdivision (a). That 

upon which section 13.4.1 is modeled, namely, California Code of 

Regulations, title 14, section 13250, subdivision (a).

9 Defendants do not deny that section 13.4.1 was taken from, 

and closely mirrors, the language of a Coastal Commission 

regulation that defines improvements to existing single-family 

residences; but they insist that certain variations in syntax,

paragraph structure, and language between the LCP section and 

the state regulation demonstrate the City’s intent to exclude 

attached ADUs from the category of attached structures excluded 

from the exemption of the CDP requirement.
16

section of the Coastal Act provides: “Notwithstanding any other 

provision of this division, no [CDP] shall be required pursuant to 

this chapter for the following types of development and in the 

following areas: [¶] (a) Improvements to existing single-family 

residences; provided, however, that the commission shall specify, 

by regulation, those classes of development which involve a risk 

of adverse environmental effect and shall require that a [CDP] be 

obtained pursuant to this chapter.”

The Coastal Commission’s definition of the term 

“[i]mprovements to existing single-family residences,” as used in 

section 30610, subdivision (a), is set forth in California Code of 

Regulations, title 14, section 13250, subdivision (a) which 

provides: “(a) For purposes of . . . section 30610[, subdivision] 

(a), where there is an existing single-family residential building, 

the following shall be considered a part of that structure: [¶] 

(1) All fixtures and other structures directly attached to a 

residence; [¶] (2) Structures on the property normally 

associated with a single-family residence, such as garages, 

swimming pools, fences, and storage sheds; but not including 

guest houses or self-contained residential units; and [¶] 

(3) Landscaping on the lot.”

That definition makes clear that there are two distinct 

categories of improvements that qualify as exempt by dividing 

them into two separately numbered paragraphs. Paragraph (1) 

states that “all” structures “directly attached” to existing 

residences are among those exempt. Paragraph (2) then states 

that other structures “on the property,” meaning those not 

directly attached to the residence, are also exempt if they are 

normally associated with single-family residences and similar to 

the four types of detached structures listed as examples. But 
17

paragraph (2) then expressly excludes from the second category of 

detached structures only guest houses and self-contained

residential units.

Under the Coastal Commission definition, directly attached 

structures, including ADUs, are exempted from the types of 

developments that require CDPs under the Coastal Act. We 

therefore reject defendants’ contention that in enacting section 

13.4.1 of the LCP—as mandated by the Coastal Act—the City 

harbored an unexpressed intent to alter materially the meaning 

and effect of the regulation upon which it is based. The minor 

differences in language between the two provisions do not 

support a reasonable inference that the City had any such intent. 

And, as explained, the difference in the paragraph composition 

shows that the original drafters of the regulation meant what 

they said: Directly attached structures of all types are exempt.

4. Harmonizing Section 13.4.1

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ interpretation of 

subdivision (A) of section 13.4.1 is internally inconsistent with 

certain language in the subdivision itself and at odds with other 

provisions of the statutory scheme of which it is part. According 

to defendants, “[t]o adopt [that] interpretation would lead to 

absurd results.”

Defendants’ only example of internal inconsistency is based 

on the second category of exempt structures, namely, those 

normally associated with single-family residences. According to

defendants, the final clause of subdivision (A) cannot be read to 

apply only to “normally associated” structures because guest 

houses and accessory self-contained residential units are not 
18

normally associated with single family residences; instead, they 

are a “rare addition to a home . . . .” But their assertion is 

contrary to the plain language of the long-standing Coastal 

Commission definition, which expressly includes guest houses 

and accessory self-contained residential units in the category of 

structures normally associated with single-family residences. 

(Cal. Code Regs, tit. 14, § 13250, subd. (a)(2).) Thus, reading 

section 13.4.1 to include guest houses and accessory selfcontained residential units among the types of detached 

structures normally associated with single-family residences 

comports with the Coastal Commission’s understanding of those 

types of structures and does not render section 13.4.1 internally 

inconsistent.

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ interpretation of 

section 13.4.1, “to exempt attached guest houses and accessory 

self-contained residential units[,] also nullifies some of the 

language of section 13.13.1 [of the City’s LCP].”10 According to 

10 Section 13.13.1 provides: “A. The planning manager may 

process consistent with the procedures in this chapter any [CDP] 

application for the specific uses identified below, except a 

proposed [CDP] that is appealable or is within the Commission’s 

continuing jurisdiction as defined in Chapter 2 of the Malibu LIP 

(Definitions). [¶] 1. Improvements to any existing structure; [¶] 

2. Any single-family dwelling; [¶] 3. Lot mergers; [¶] 4. Any 

development of four dwelling units or less that does not require 

demolition, and any other developments not in excess of 

[$100,000] other than any division of land; [¶] 5. Water wells. 

[¶] 6. Driveways or access road improvements required by the 

fire department . . . .

“B. Notwithstanding any other provisions of the LCP, 

attached or detached second dwelling units shall be processed as 

administrative permits, except that the approval of such permits 
19

defendants, under that section both “‘attached and detached 

second dwelling units, i.e., guest houses and accessory selfcontained residential units’” require administrative CDPs. They 

therefore conclude that, to “interpret section 13.4.1[, subdivision] 

(A) to exempt attached second dwelling units . . . would 

effectively delete the term ‘attached’ in section 13.13.1[, 

subdivision (B)].”

Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the language of section 

13.4.1 can be reasonably construed to harmonize with section 

13.13.1, which does not state that attached guest houses and 

accessory self-contained residential units require CDPs. Instead, 

subdivision (A) provides that the planning manager (as opposed 

to the planning commission) “may” process any CDP permit 

application for the types of projects listed in subparts 1 through 

6, including “[i]mprovements to any existing structure.” 

Subdivision (B) specifies that applications for “attached or 

detached second dwelling units” “shall” be processed by the 

planning manager as administrative CDPs. The section does not

define when a CDP is required for a particular type of 

improvement. Instead, it provides the administrative process by 

which a permit application will be processed—as between the 

planning commission and the planning manager—in the event a 

proposed improvement requires a CDP. By comparison, section 

13.4.1 provides that some improvements to single-family 

residences, as defined in subdivision (A), do not require a CDP, 

while others, as listed in subdivision (B), must receive such 

permits. Thus, section 13.13.1, dealing only with the latter types 

shall be appealable to the Coastal Commission if the project is 

located in the appealable zone. [Citations.]”
20

of projects, does not conflict with section 13.4.1 as interpreted by 

plaintiffs.

Defendants further contend that plaintiffs’ interpretation 

would “effectively delete the term ‘attached’ from the definitions 

of ‘guest house’ and ‘second unit’” in section 2.111 of the City’s 

LCP. But they do not adequately develop this one-sentence 

contention or explain why the general definitions at the 

beginning of the LCP, including the definition of “second unit,”

must be harmonized with a specific section defining those 

improvements to single-family residences that are exempt from 

the CDP requirement. (See People v. Rodriguez (2022) 79 

Cal.App.5th 637, 642 [although courts must attempt to 

harmonize different statutory sections, that analysis is limited to 

“statutory sections relating to the same subject” and only “to the 

extent possible”].)

Finally, defendants argue that it would be inconsistent 

with the LCP statutory scheme to exempt attached accessory selfcontained residential units from the CDP requirement as the 

LCP seeks generally to require “‘any development’” proposed in 

the City to be reviewed pursuant to that process and most of the 

exemptions from that process are for projects that “neither 

11 Section 2.1 defines “guest house” as: “[A]ttached or 

detached living quarters on the same premises as a single family 

residence for the use of family members, guests or employees of 

the occupants of such residence, containing no kitchen facilities 

and not rented or otherwise used as a separate dwelling.” It 

defines a “second unit” as: “an attached or detached residential 

dwelling unit which provides complete independent living 

facilities for one or more persons. It shall include permanent 

provisions for living, sleeping, eating, cooking, and sanitation on 

the same parcel as the single family dwelling is situated.”
21

intensify use nor significantly expand development.” According 

to defendants, because attached ADUs increase intensity of use, 

“[i]t would make no sense for the [LCP] to exempt [them] from 

the [CDP] requirement while requiring projects with equal or 

smaller increases in intensity of use, including detached ADUs, to 

obtain a [CDP].”

Under subdivision (B) of section 13.4.1, certain classes of 

development are not exempt from the CDP requirement if “they 

involve a risk of adverse environmental impact” including 

improvements (such as attached ADUs) to single-family 

structures in locations, such as on a beach or in a wetland. That 

provision, when read together with the plain language of 

subdivision (A), reflects a policy choice to treat single-family 

residences located in environmentally sensitive areas differently 

from residences in other areas of the coastal zone.

Although the wisdom of such policy choices is often subject 

to debate, that is not a factor which we may consider in 

interpreting section 13.4.1. Given the plain meaning of the 

language used by the Legislature, we assume that it meant what 

it said, without questioning the policy determinations reflected in 

that language.

IV. CROSS-APPEAL

Plaintiffs contend that, under the trial court’s order 

requiring the City to review and approve their permit application 

under applicable state ADU standards, there is no dispute that 

they are entitled to have the permit issued, without further 

submissions on their part of any kind. According to plaintiffs, the 

City has not adopted its own ADU ordinance and is therefore 
22

bound to follow the state default standards in Government Code 

section 65852.2.12 As plaintiffs view the record, their pending 

application meets all of those required state standards.

A. Procedural Background

In their cause of action for traditional writ of mandate, 

plaintiffs alleged that they had a “right to ministerial review and 

approval of their revised ADU proposal” and were “entitled to an 

order directing the City to accept the revised ADU proposal for 

ministerial review and to approve the same within the time limit 

mandated by [s]tate law.” In their prayer, they confirmed the 

extent of the relief they sought on that cause of action: A “writ of 

traditional mandate compelling [defendants] to ministerially 

approve [their] revised ADU application . . . pursuant to 

Government Code [s]ection 65852.2.”

Following the hearing on plaintiffs’ traditional writ of 

mandate claim, the trial court issued a July 26, 2022, final ruling 

on that claim granting it and ruling that “[plaintiffs] only justify 

that the City must decide the application within 60 days from the 

12 Government Code section 65852.2, subdivision (b)(1) 

provides, in pertinent part: “When a local agency that has not 

adopted an ordinance governing accessory dwelling units in 

accordance with subdivision (a) receives an application for a 

permit to create or serve an accessory dwelling unit pursuant to 

this subdivision, the local agency shall approve or disapprove the 

application ministerially without discretionary review pursuant 

to subdivision (a). The permitting agency shall either approve or 

deny the application to create or serve an accessory dwelling unit 

. . . within 60 days from the date the permitting agency receives a 

completed application . . . .”
23

date it receives a completed application pursuant to Government 

Code section 65852.2. The [c]ourt does not order the City to 

grant or approve the application since the only prior 

determination was that the application required a CDP.”

On August 31, 2022, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce

judgment, seeking a determination that “their updated ADU 

application [was now] complete and that the City must decide the 

application within 60 days from August 17, 2022, the date of its 

completion.” Based primarily on factual matters that occurred 

after the trial court’s final ruling, plaintiffs urged the court to 

construe and enforce its ruling by entering a subsequent order 

finding that plaintiffs had submitted a completed application and 

ordering the City to review it under appropriate standards by 

October 16, 2022.

On September 19, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment 

on its final ruling that granted the request for traditional 

mandate and directed defendants “to process [plaintiffs’] 

application in compliance with the [c]ourt’s July 26, 2022, Final 

Ruling attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A.’”

On October 26, 2022, plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal 

from this judgment only.

On November 9, 2022, the trial court issued a minute order 

denying plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the court’s final ruling. 

Plaintiffs did not separately appeal that postjudgment order.
24

B. Analysis

In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs argue that they were 

entitled to a permit within 60 days of their completed application, 

which they claim was October 16, 2022. Plaintiffs’ arguments in 

their cross-appeal therefore appear to arise from matters that 

occurred following the final ruling on which the judgment is 

based, such as their efforts to submit the additional information 

and payment they deemed necessary to complete their ADU 

application.13 Because, however, their cross-appeal is limited to

the judgment, and not taken from any separate postjudgment 

ruling on enforcement, the matters they urge us to adjudicate are 

not properly before us on the cross-appeal. We therefore affirm 

the judgment.

13 Ordinarily, a complaint speaks only as to matters which 

occurred as of the date it was filed; matters occurring after filing 

are raised by a supplemental complaint. (See Foster v. Sexton

(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1032.)
25

V. DISPOSTION

The judgment is affirmed in its entirety. The parties are to 

bear their own costs on appeal.

KIM, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

MOOR, J.