United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-10122

Summary Calendar

Candace Searcy, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Orchard National Title, 

Defendant—Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:21-CV-1910

Before Davis, Smith, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Plaintiff-Appellant, Candace Searcy, appeals the district court’s order 

remanding this matter to state court as improperly removed. She also 

requests this Court to consider her motions for default judgment filed in state 

and federal court. Because the district court’s remand order is not reviewable 

as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), we DISMISS the appeal.

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 3, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 22-10122 Document: 00516595722 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/03/2023
No. 22-10122

2

Searcy filed suit in Dallas County District Court against Orchard 

National Title and Courtney Anthony, a real estate broker. She asserted 

claims for breach of contract, fraudulent price gouging, and malpractice in 

connection with a residential real estate contract. Searcy subsequently

removed her action to federal court on the grounds that she would be unable 

to receive justice in state court. The district court adopted the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation that the case be remanded as “improperly 

removed.”1

In her appellate brief, Searcy raises no legal arguments challenging the 

basis for the district court’s remand order, nor does she cite to any legal 

authority indicating that the district court’s decision to remand was 

erroneous. Instead, Searcy argues that she is entitled to a default judgment 

under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21 because the defendants never 

answered her lawsuit. 

Notwithstanding Searcy’s failure to identify any error by the district 

court, this Court must first examine the basis of its jurisdiction to review the 

district court’s remand order. See Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th 

Cir. 1987) (“This Court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction, on its own 

motion, if necessary.”). “Congress has severely circumscribed the power of 

federal appellate courts to review remand orders.” See Schexnayder v. Entergy 

La., Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2004). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(d), prohibits our review of a remand order that is based “on either a 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure.” 

1 As noted by the magistrate judge, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that “any civil 

action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original 

jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the 

United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is 

pending.” (emphasis added).

Case: 22-10122 Document: 00516595722 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/03/2023
No. 22-10122

3

Schexnayder, 394 F.3d at 283; see § 1447(d). “This bar to review applies even 

if the order might otherwise be deemed erroneous.” Price v. Johnson, 600 

F.3d 460, 462 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 

The remand order was based on a defect in the removal procedure and 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, under § 1441(a), a plaintiff is 

not authorized to remove an action to federal court. Moreover, although 

Searcy asserted federal question jurisdiction, she included only state law 

causes of action in her complaint; and she pleaded no facts supporting 

diversity jurisdiction. Consequently, under § 1447(d), we lack jurisdiction to 

review the district court’s remand order.

Based on the foregoing, this appeal is DISMISSED.

Case: 22-10122 Document: 00516595722 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/03/2023