[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 12

- 14460 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:12

- cv - 22434

- FAM WACHOVIA MORTGAGE FSB, f.k.a. World Savings Bank,

Plaintiff

- Counter Defendant

- Appellee,

versus CARIDAD MARQUEZ,

Defendant

- Counter Claimant

- Appellant,

TENANT #1, et al.,

Defendants.

______________ __________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (May 28, 2013) Case: 12-14460 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 1 of 52 Before TJOFLAT , WILSON and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Wachovia Mortgage FSB (“Wachovia”) brought a mortgage foreclosure action against Caridad Marquez in the Circuit Court for Miami

- Dade County, Florida . After the Circuit Court entered a final order of foreclosure, Marquez removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida . Upon Wachovia’s motion , the District C ourt remanded the case to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Marquez then filed post

- remand motions (1) requesting a temporary restraining order, (2) filing objecti ons to the remand order, (3) seeking to amend her civil cover sheet, and (4) requesting to cancel the order to remand the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (the “motion to cancel”)

. In three separate orders, t he court denied these post

- remand motions. Marquez, proceeding pro se , now appeals. Wachovia moved this court to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction

. W e granted that motion in part, but concluded that we retained jurisdiction only to review whether the District
C ou rt had jurisdiction to consider Marquez’s post

- remand motions

. We review issues of federal subject matter jurisdiction de novo

. Bender v. Mazda Motor Corp. , 657 F.3d 1200, 1202 (11th Cir. 2011). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)( 1)(A) requires that the notice of appeal in a civil case be

Case: 12-14460 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 2 of 53 filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). “[T]imely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bow les v. Russell , 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Subsection (d) of § 1447 states that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise

. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 1 “ [O] nly remand orders issued under [28 U.S.C.] § 144 7(c) and invoking grounds specified therein like subject matter jurisdiction or untimely removal are immune from review under § 1447(d).” In re Loudermilch , 158 F.3d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1998) (brackets omitted) (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermans dorfer , 423 U.S. 336, 346, 96 S.Ct. 584, 590, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976)). Section 1447(d) “not only forecloses appellate review, but also bars reconsideration by the district court of its own remand order.” Bender , 657 F.3d at 1203. Section 1447(d)’s limita tion on review applies whether or not the remand order was erroneous. Id. at 1204.

1 Section 1447(d) contains two exceptions allowing review of remand orders in certain civil rights actions and in cases against federal officers or agencies. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Neither of these exceptions is relevant here.

Case: 12-14460 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 3 of 54 In Bender , we affirmed the D istrict C ourt’s denial of a post

- remand Rule 60(b) motion because the D istrict C ourt lacked jurisdiction after remanding the

case to the state court. Id. at 1204

. Moreover, in Loudermilch , we held that the court exceeded its jurisdictional authority by granting a post

- remand motion for reconsideration. Loudermilch , 158 F.3d at 1144, 1147. As a preliminary matter, Marquez’s notice of appeal was timely filed only as to the D istrict C ourt’s order denying her motion to cancel. S ee Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Marquez filed her notice of appeal 30 days after the entry of the order denying the motion to cancel, but more than 30 days afte r the orders denying (1) her request for a temporary restraining order and objections to the remand order and (2) her request to amend her civil cover sheet. Therefore, as to the se two orders , we lack jurisdiction. See Bowles , 551 U.S. at 214, 127 S.Ct. at 2366. The District C ourt’s denial of Marquez’s motion to cancel was proper because the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion . The court explicitly remanded the case to state court based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, f ollowing entry of this order, the court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider the remand order. Bender , 657 F.3d at 1204; Loudermilch , 148 F.3d at 1147. Alth ough the order denying Marquez’s motion to cancel did not set forth the grounds for the denial, and t hus did not state specifically that the court lacked jurisdiction, the court’s summary denial resulted in the correct outcome. See

Case: 12-14460 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 4 of 55 Bender , 657 F.3d at 1204 ; see also Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc. , 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) ( “The distri ct court’s decision may be affirmed if the result is correct, even if the [district] court relied upon an incorrect ground or gave a wrong reason.” )

. AFFIRMED , in part; DISMISSED , in part. Case: 12-14460 Date Filed: 05/28/2013 Page: 5 of 5