*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
WATERS EDGE 938, LLC v. CHRISTINE

MAZZARELLA ET AL.

(AC 43489)

Elgo, Cradle and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff landlord brought a summary process action against the defendant tenant by serving a notice to quit. The defendant failed to vacate

the property by the required date, and the plaintiff filed a complaint

alleging nonpayment of rent and lapse of time. In her answer, the defendant asserted a special defense pursuant to the statute (§ 47a-23c) that

prohibits landlords from dispossessing disabled tenants residing in a

building or complex that consists of five or more units without good

cause. Even though the building in which the defendant resided consisted of only four units, she claimed that the statutory prohibition

applied because D, a member of the plaintiff, was also a member of L

Co., which owned the two unit building adjacent to her residence and,

as such, the statute should have been broadly construed to define the

two buildings as a complex that consisted of five or more units. The

trial court rejected the defendant’s special defense, concluding that

§ 47a-23c did not apply because the two buildings were not under the

same ownership and the building in which the defendant resided consisted of only four units. The trial court rendered judgment for the

plaintiff on the lapse of time count, and the defendant appealed to this

court. Held that the trial court properly concluded that § 47a-23c did

not apply to this action because the defendant did not reside in a complex

consisting of five or more units: the defendant did not contest that her

residence and the adjacent building were owned by different entities;

moreover, the defendant did not offer sufficient evidence to establish

that D had beneficial ownership of the two buildings, as, even though

D had an ownership interest in the two landlord limited liability companies that owned the buildings, no evidence was offered regarding his

control of the entities or the properties, or any profit, benefit or advantage he received from the properties, and his use of the parking lot

that was shared by both buildings when he visited the buildings was

insufficient, on its own, to establish that he had a right to the use and

enjoyment of both properties; accordingly, the two buildings did not

constitute a complex under § 47a-23c.

Argued May 12—officially released October 26, 2021

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New Britain, Housing

Session, and tried to the court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn,

judge trial referee; judgment in part for the plaintiff,

from which the named defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Nilda R. Havrilla, with whom were Myklyn Mahoney, and, on the brief, Jane Kelleher, for the appellant

(named defendant).

Johanna S. Katz, with whom was Jonathan A.

Kaplan, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. In this summary process action, the

defendant Christine Mazzarella1 appeals from the judgment rendered, following a trial to the court, in favor

of the plaintiff, Waters Edge 983, LLC. She claims that

the court improperly concluded that General Statutes

§ 47a-23c, which prohibits landlords from dispossessing

disabled tenants residing in a complex consisting of

five or more units without good cause, did not apply

to this action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff owns a four unit, multifamily building at 938 Farmington Avenue in Berlin.

The defendant has resided at 938 Farmington Avenue

since March, 2015, as a tenant. After her initial lease

expired on March 15, 2016, the defendant continued

residing at the property on a month-to-month basis.

Daniel McClutchy, a principal member of the plaintiff,

has represented the plaintiff in dealings with the defendant since the beginning of the lease. The property

adjacent to 938 Farmington Avenue is 944 Farmington

Avenue, a two unit, multifamily building. The property

at 944 Farmington Avenue is owned by Ludlow 944,

LLC (Ludlow). McClutchy is also a principal member

of Ludlow. There is a paved driveway, owned by the

plaintiff, located between 938 Farmington Avenue and

944 Farmington Avenue, leading to a parking lot used

by the tenants of both buildings. There is no structure

separating the two properties.

On June 27, 2019, the plaintiff initiated a summary

process action by serving a notice to quit on the defendant, which indicated that the defendant’s lease was

being terminated for failure to pay rent, lapse of time,

and for allowing another person to live in the unit.2

Although the notice to quit instructed the defendant to

vacate the property by July 1, 2019, she remained in

possession of the premises. On August 2, 2019, the plaintiff filed a two count complaint alleging nonpayment

of rent and lapse of time. The first count alleged that

the defendant did not pay rent due on May 1 or June

1, 2019, as required by the terms of her lease. The second

count claimed that the month-to-month lease was terminated by lapse of time and, therefore, she no longer

had privilege to occupy the premises. On August 7, 2019,

the defendant filed an answer as a self-represented

party and asserted a special defense under § 47a-23c,

which prohibits landlords from dispossessing disabled

tenants who reside in a building or complex consisting

of five or more separate units without good cause.3

The defendant indicated in her special defense that 938

Farmington Avenue, in which she resides, is a building

or complex that consists of five or more units and that

she has a physical or mental disability. On August 15,

2019, the plaintiff filed a reply denying the defendant’s

special defense.4
On September 12, 2019, both parties submitted evidence to the trial court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn, judge

trial referee. During the trial, McClutchy testified that

the defendant had lived at 938 Farmington Avenue for

four years and that the building contained four units.

He testified that the plaintiff owns 938 Farmington Avenue and that he is a principal member of the plaintiff.

He indicated that his wife may also be a member of the

plaintiff. He also testified that the building next door,

944 Farmington Avenue, was owned by Ludlow and

consists of two units. He testified that he is a principal

member of Ludlow and that his wife may be a member

of Ludlow. More specifically, he testified that he thinks

his wife may be a member of the plaintiff, Ludlow, or

both, but he could not recall. He further testified that,

other than potentially his wife, there are no other members of either the plaintiff or Ludlow.

The evidence presented at trial showed that the buildings in question are adjacent and share a common driveway and parking lot. Additionally, the defendant presented evidence that she has been diagnosed with several

mental impairments.5

On September 24, 2019, the court rendered judgment

for the plaintiff on the second count of its complaint.6

The court rejected the defendant’s special defense, concluding that § 47a-23c did not apply because the building in which the defendant resided consists of only four

units and ‘‘[t]he fact that [McClutchy] is the effective

owner of an adjacent building does not meet the five

unit test.’’

On November 26, 2019, the defendant filed a motion

for articulation seeking clarification of the court’s decision. On December 9, 2019, the court issued an articulation stating: ‘‘[Section] 47a-23c requires that the tenant

reside in a complex . . . or a building having five or

more units. Both the ‘complex’ and the ‘five or more’

provision require that the building or buildings be ‘under

the same ownership.’ Here the evidence showed that

there are adjacent buildings, but the buildings are

owned by two separate [limited liability companies

(LLCs)]. The building that the plaintiff owns consists

of four units only. That a person, McClutchy, has an

interest in both LLCs is insufficient under § [47a-23c].

That the buildings have a common driveway is also

irrelevant to the issue of ‘same ownership.’ . . . There

were two buildings owned by two different LLCs. The

plaintiff LLC owned a building consisting of four rental

units. . . . While McClutchy had ownership interests

in both LLCs, there was insufficient evidence that the

court should hold that the two LLCs should be treated

as having the same owner for the purposes of § 47a23c.’’ This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly concluded that § 47a-23c did not apply to
this action. Because the building in which the defendant

resides consists of only four units, she may only avail

herself of the protection of § 47a-23c if that building,

along with the adjacent building, can be considered a

complex. The defendant argues that the court erred in

rendering judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that

the two properties at issue did not constitute a complex

under § 47a-23c because they were not owned by the

same person or entity. We disagree.

The determination of whether the building in which

the defendant resides may be considered a complex

under § 47a-23c is a question of statutory interpretation

over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Gould v.

Freedom of Information Commission, 314 Conn. 802,

810, 104 A.3d 727 (2014). ‘‘When construing a statute,

[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give

effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In

other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied

to the facts of [the] case, including the question of

whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z

directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself

and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining

such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does

not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual

evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be

considered. . . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the

legislative history and circumstances surrounding its

enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to

implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation

and [common-law] principles governing the same general subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 810–11.

Section 47a-23c (a) (3) defines ‘‘ ‘complex’ ’’ as ‘‘two

or more buildings on the same or contiguous parcels

of real property under the same ownership . . . .’’

Although § 47a-23c does not define the phrase ‘‘under

the same ownership,’’ we are guided by the definition

of ‘‘ ‘owner,’ ’’ set forth in General Statutes § 47a-1 (e).

Section 47a-1 (e) ‘‘defines ‘[o]wner’ as ‘one or more

persons, jointly or severally, in whom is vested (1) all

or part of the legal title to property, or (2) all or part

of the beneficial ownership and a right to present use

and enjoyment of the premises and includes a mortgagee in possession.’ ’’ Hlinka v. Michaels, 204 Conn.

App. 537, 542, 254 A.3d 361 (2021).

As noted herein, the trial court determined that the

defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to prove

that the two properties were owned by the same person

or entity. The defendant does not contest the trial

court’s determination that the buildings are owned by

two separate LLCs. The defendant thus concedes that
‘‘McClutchy does not have ‘all or part of the legal title

to the property’ . . . .’’ She nevertheless argues that

the building in which she resides falls within § 47a-23c

because ‘‘McClutchy has ‘all or part of the beneficial

ownership’ and ‘a right to present use and enjoyment’

of both’’ properties.

Although the term ‘‘beneficial owner’’ is not defined

by our statutes, it has been interpreted by this court to

include ‘‘an individual who owns and controls a corporation holding legal title to premises.’’ Success, Inc. v.

Curcio, 160 Conn. App. 153, 156 n.5, 124 A.3d 563, cert.

denied, 319 Conn. 952, 125 A.3d 531 (2015); see also

Loew v. Falsey, 144 Conn. 67, 74, 127 A.2d 67 (1956)

(holding that individual who owned and controlled corporation was beneficial owner despite fact that corporation had legal title to premises). This court has also

held that beneficial ownership may be established

‘‘when [one has] the right to ‘beneficial use’ of or a

‘beneficial interest’ in real property . . . .’’ Scott v. Heinonen, 118 Conn. App. 577, 586 n.6, 985 A.2d 358 (2009),

cert. denied, 295 Conn. 909, 989 A.2d 603 (2010). This

court explained: ‘‘ ‘Beneficial use’ has been defined as

‘[t]he right to use and enjoy property according to one’s

own liking or so as to derive a profit or benefit from

it, including all that makes it desirable or habitable, as

light, air, and access; as distinguished from a mere right

of occupancy or possession.’ Black’s Law Dictionary

(6th Ed. 1990) [p. 157]. ‘Beneficial interest’ has been

defined as: ‘Profit, benefit, or advantage resulting from

a contract, or the ownership of an estate as distinct

from legal ownership or control.’ ’’ Scott v. Heinonen,

supra, 587 n.6.

Here, although the defendant offered some evidence

establishing the degree or extent of McClutchy’s ownership interests in the two LLCs, she offered no evidence

of his control of them or the properties.7 The defendant

likewise did not present evidence regarding any profit,

benefit or advantage received by McClutchy from the

properties. The only evidence presented to the court

in support of her allegation that McClutchy enjoyed a

beneficial use of the two properties was McClutchy’s

own testimony that, when he visits the properties, he

parks in whatever space is available in the parking lot

of either property. On the basis of this lone fact, we

cannot conclude that the trial court erred in concluding

that the defendant failed to prove that McClutchy was

the beneficial owner of both properties.8 Accordingly,

the court properly concluded that § 47a-23c did not

apply to this case because the defendant did not reside

in a complex consisting of five or more units.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

‘‘Kim Doe,’’ an unidentified individual who allegedly resided with Mazzarella, was named as a party in this action. She has not participated in this

appeal. Any references herein to the defendant are to Mazzarella only.

2 The notice to quit listed the defendant and Kim Doe as the occupants.
Kim Doe was originally named a defendant in the summary process proceeding but was nonappearing.

3 General Statutes § 47a-23c provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Except as

provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, this section applies to any

tenant who resides in a building or complex consisting of five or more

separate dwelling units . . . and who is . . . (B) a person with a physical

or mental disability . . . .

‘‘(b) (1) No landlord may bring an action of summary process or other

action to dispossess a tenant described in subsection (a) of this section

except [for good cause].’’

4 The plaintiff’s reply to special defenses states in its entirety: ‘‘Each of

the paragraphs contained in the [defendant’s] special defense(s), submitted

on 8/7/2019 is hereby denied.’’ At trial, the plaintiff did not contest that the

defendant has a physical or mental disability.

5 Following the trial, the parties submitted posttrial briefs to the court.

In its brief, the plaintiff argued that the court should adopt a plain meaning

approach in interpreting ‘‘under the same ownership,’’ as that phrase is used

in § 47a-23c (a) (3), to conclude that two distinct limited liability companies

cannot be the same owner of a complex. The defendant argued that the

court should interpret the statute broadly, in favor of the class of tenants

that the statute was enacted to protect. Because McClutchy is a principal

member of both companies, the defendant argued that the court should find

that the properties are under the same ownership and constitute a complex.

6 The court rendered judgment for the defendant on count one, nonpayment of rent, for reasons not relevant to this appeal.

7 The only evidence presented at trial regarding McClutchy’s degree of

ownership or control of each LLC was his own testimony. McClutchy was

asked if he was a member of the plaintiff to which he responded, ‘‘Yes.’’

Later, the following colloquy took place:

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: The other property depicted . . . what address

is that?

‘‘[McClutchy]: 944 Farmington Avenue.

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Okay. And that’s owned by what LLC?

‘‘[McClutchy]: Ludlow 944, LLC.

‘‘The Court: But you—that is one that you have an interest or somebody

has a joint—

‘‘[McClutchy]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Is it you or somebody else?

‘‘[McClutchy]: Me.

‘‘The Court: All right. So what’s your status in both [the plaintiff and

Ludlow], president of the LLC or something like that?

‘‘[McClutchy]: Correct. . . . Sole member.’’

Later in the trial, the following colloquy ensued between McClutchy and

the defendant’s counsel:

‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: And you already testified that you are the

owner and sole member of . . . Waters Edge 938, LLC?

‘‘[McClutchy]: Let me—let me just clarify. My wife may be a member. I

honestly am not sure, but she’s definitely—it’s either myself or myself and

my wife in both properties.’’

McClutchy later reiterated that he was unsure of his exact ownership

interest in each LLC and testified, ‘‘I know that my wife is involved in

the ownership of one or both of the buildings, but from a—from a legal

perspective, we’ve owned these for almost fifteen years and I just can’t

recall if she is a member of the LLC or not.’’ The testimony also revealed

that 938 Farmington Avenue and 944 Farmington Avenue have separate

deeds and, as previously stated, are owned by different LLCs.

8 Moreover, under § 47a-1, an owner must have both ‘‘beneficial ownership’’ and a ‘‘right to present use and enjoyment of the premises . . . .’’

Again, the defendant’s sole allegation supporting her contention that McClutchy has a right to the present use and enjoyment of both properties is that

he ‘‘freely uses the parking spots’’ located at both properties. When faced

with that lone allegation, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in

concluding that the defendant failed to prove that McClutchy had a right

to the present use and enjoyment of the properties.