The Honor able Ar thur J . Tarnow , United States District J udg e for th e Ea stern District of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0111n.06 F iled: F ebruary 9, 2007 Nos. 05-1542, 05-1632 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee , v. ROBERT S. AL EXAND ER and TYRONE MCKI

NSEY CL ARK, Ap pe lla nts
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : GI L MAN and SUTTO N, Circuit J udg es; and TARNO W, Dist rict Judge. *
S UTTON , Ci rc uit

Judg e . Ajur

y fo un d Ro be rt

Al e xan de r guil ty

of be inga fe lon in possession of a fir ear

m, and Ty

rone Clar k pleade d g uilty

to the same c harg e. I n sentenc ing Al e xan de r, the di st ri c t c ourt tr e a te d h is p ri or

c on vic tio n f

or c arr yinga c on c e a le d w e a

po n a s a

“ vio le nt f

e lony ” un de r t

he Ar me d Ca re e r C ri min a l A c t. Alex and er di d not o bje c t to thi s char acte rization of his concea led-we apon cha rg e bef ore the district court, but he does so now. As the district court did not commit plain err or i n adopting this interpre tation of the Ac t—the courts ar e divided on the issue—and as the district cour t otherwise imposed re asonable sentenc es on both men,
we a ff ir m.Nos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 2 - I. Early in the morning of June 15, 2004, the Grand Rapids Poli ce D epar tment dispatched two office rs to respond to a c omplaint that severa l individuals were tre spassing on the front porch of a house. When they

arr ived, the poli ce found Robert Alexander a nd Ty rone Clar k sitti ng on the front ste ps. Th e off

ic e rs e xpla ine d w hy

the y we re the re and

a sk e d th e tw o me n to ide nti fy the mse lve s. Although Alexander g ave his r eal na me, Clark g ave the name “ Corey Denson.” One of

the offic ers returne d to the patrol cr

uiser, ra n t h e names throug h its computer sy stem and discover ed (a fter revie wing a photo index of previously arr ested individuals in the county ) that Corey

Denson wa s Ty ro ne Cla rk . T he of

fi c e r a lso saw that th e re we re thr e e ou tst and ingwa rr ants fo r C lark ’s arr e st.
When the office rs attempted to arre st Clark, he re sisted. During the ensuingstrug g le, Clark dr o p p e d a s e mi a u to mati c p is to l o nth e s te p s n e ar A le xan d e r

an d y e ll e d “ Sh o o t ’ e m. Sh o o t ’ e m, Cu z. Shoot, shoot.” J A 30. Alexander picked up the gun, place d it behind his leg a nd stood up. Both of the offic ers immediately

drewtheir firearms and told Alex ander to “Drop the g un.” JA 35. About ten sec onds later, Alex ander place d the gun on a ne arby ledg e. The office rs ar

rested both Ale x ander
and Cla rk , a ft e r wh ic h the y fo un d (o n Cl ark ) a ma g a zine wi th t

hr e e ro un ds of

a mmunit ion

a lon g wi th
sever al roc ks of cr ack c ocaine
. A fe dera l gr and jury

indicted Alexander f

or violating the fe dera l felon-in-posse ssion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), a

nd a jury found him g uilty

of the c harg e. At his sentenc i n g hear ing, the district court re cog nized that Alex ander had twice pleade d g uilty

to possessing c ocaine with intentNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 3 - t o d istribute, Mic h. Comp. L aws § 333.7401(2)( a)( iv), and once pleade d g uilty to c arr y i n g a
conce aled we apon, Mich. Comp. L aws § 750.227. Concluding that Alexander ha d committed three “violent fe lonies” under

the Arme d C are er Criminal Ac t, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the district cour t imp os e d a

18 8- mon th se nte nc e . At the e nd of the he ari ng , th e c ourt g a ve Al e xan de r a

n o pp or tun ity to object to his sentence , which he de clined to do.
A fe dera l gr and jury indicted C lark on a felon-in- possession char g e as w ell as a c harg e for possessing cra ck cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Clark pleade d g uilty to the fe lon -i n- p o s s e s s i o nc h ar g e an d t o a r e d u c e d c h ar g e o f

p o s s e s s i o no f

c r a c k c o c a i n e , 2 1 U
. S.C. § 8 44 (a ). No tin g that Clar k ha d “o ne of the mos t extra or din ary re c or ds of c on vic tio ns and

arr e sts for somebody

24 y ear s old that I ’ve e ver se en,” JA 33, the district court concluded that a sentence wi thi n th e g uid e lin e ra

ng e wa s n e c e ssa

ry “ to a c hie ve the int e nd e d c on se qu e nc e s of [the 18 U. S.C. § 3553(a) ] factors,” JA 34. The district cour t also noted that “g iven his y o u ng ag e and the fac t [C lark] hasn’t done a

lot of time in the past, it a lso a ppear s as if a sente nce at the bottom end of the g uidelines rang e would .
. . be appropriate in this case .” J A 35. The court sentenc ed Clark to 110 months’ imprisonment. Befor e conc luding the he aring , the district court offere d Clark an opportunity

to object to his sentence , which he de clined to do.
II. When a litigant fails to voic e a claim at trial but doe s so on appea l, w e revie w the ar g ument for plain err or. Fe d. R. Crim. P. 52( b). I n conducting that revie w, we must fir st de cide whe ther ther eNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 4 - is “(1) e rror , (2) that is plain, and ( 3) that af fec t[ s] s ubstantial rig hts.” Johnson v. U nited States , 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). “I f all three condition s ar e m et, an appellate court may

then exercise its discre t i o n t o n o t i ce a forf eited er ror, but only

if (4) the err or seriously aff ects the f airne ss, integr ity , or publi c re putation of judicial proce eding s.” Id. (interna l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ; se e als o Un ite d S tates v . Ko e be rle in , 161 F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir. 1998).
A.
Alexander a

rg ues that the district cour t erre d in sentencinghim u n d er t h e Armed Car eer Cr imi na l A c t. U nd e r t

he Ac t, a pe rs on who vi ol ate s the fe lon -i n- po sse ssi on statut e , 1 8 U .S. C. § 922(g ), and w ho “has three previous convictions
. . . for a violent felony

or a se rious drugoffe nse, or bot h, committed on occa sions differ ent from one another .
. . shall be fined . . . a nd imprisoned not less than fiftee n y ear s,” id. § 924(e) (1). Alexander c oncede s that he has c ommitt ed two “se rious drugo f f e n s e s , ” b u t h e c o n te n d s th a t t h e c r im e o f

c ar r yin g a c o n c e a le d

w e a p o nis n o t a

“ v io le nt felony .” B eca

use Alexander did not ra ise this argu m en t b el ow, plain-e rror revie w g overns our
re so lut ion of it.
A “violent fe lony ,” t h e Ac t s ay s, is “any crime punishable by

imprisonment for a ter

m exceeding one y ear , . . . that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened us e of phy sical forc e ag ainst the person of another ; or (ii) is bur g lary , arson, or extorti on, involves use of
e xplos ive s, or

oth e rw ise inv olv e s con du c t th a t pr e se nts a se ri ou s p ote nti a l r isk

of ph y sic a l in

jur y to another .” 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 4 (e )( 2 )( B) . Under Michig an law, one violates the conc eale d-ca rryNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 5 - prohibition by

“ca rry [i ng ] a pistol conce aled on or about his or her

person, or , whether

conce aled or otherwise, in a

vehicle ope rate d or occupied by the person . . . without a license to ca rry the pistol as provided by

law.” Mic h. Comp. L aws § 750.227(2). Our sister circ uits have rea ched c onflicting conclusions on the point. Com pa re Uni ted St at es v . W

hit fie ld , 907 F.2d 798, 800 ( 8th Cir. 1990) (“A lthough carr

y ing [ a concea led] wea

pon may involve a continuing risk t o others, the ha rm is not so immediate as to pre sent a ser ious risk of phy sical injury to another.” ) (inter

nal quotation marks and bra ckets omitted), with U n i t e d S t a t e s v . H all , 7 7 F. 3 d

3 9 8 , 4 0 1 (1 1 t h C i r. 1 9 9 6 ) ( “C arry i n g a
conce aled we apon is conduc t that poses s erious potential risk of phy sical i njury and, so, fa lls under the definition of violent felony .”). A nother pa nel of our c ourt, see United States v. Flores , No. 06- 1152 (6th Cir.), argued

J an. 24, 2007, has the issue in front of it in a case that doe s not involve plainerr or re view.
B e c a us e no on e su g g e s t s t

h a t c a r r yinga c on c e a le d w e a

po n c ome s w ith in t

he Ac t’ s f ir st c la us e (the “ threatened use of phy sical forc e” clause ), the question is w hether car rying a conc eale d wea

pon “involves conduc t that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” I n construing this clause , we have found the foll owing state-law violations to satisfy the requirement: re taliation for pa st action, see Un ite d S tates v . S awy e rs , 409 F. 3 d 732, 742–43 (6th Cir. 2005), “e scapingor attempting to e scape while conf ined in a county workhouse or jail,” United States v. Houston , 187 F.3d 593, 594 ( 6th Cir. 1999), sexual battery , see United States v. Mac k, 53 F.3d 126, 128 ( 6th Cir. 1995), and attempted kidnaping by dece ption, see United States v. Kaplansky , 42 F.3d 320, 323–24 (6th Cir. 1994) (e n banc)
.Nos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 6 - Th is c a te g o r

y , w e h av e h e ld , a ls o in c lu d e s c r im e s th a t, e v e n a b s e n t a s e r io u s p o te n tial for violent confrontation, show an inhere nt disreg ar d for human life —making them simil ar to the
enumer ated c rimes of burgl ar y , arson, e x tortion or the use of e x plosives. As a re sult, invol untary manslaug hter is a

“violent fe lony ” under

the Act, see Un ite d S

tates v . S an de rs , 9 7 F .3 d 8 56 , 8 60 (6 th C i r . 1 9 9 6 ) , e v e nt h o u g h t h e v i c t i m ’ s d e a t h n e e d n o t r e s u l tf

r o m a v i o l e n tc o n f

r o n t a t i o n . S i m i l ar l y,
our unre ported c ases have found criminally neg lige nt homicide, United States v. Flee nor , No. 05- 6444, 2007 WL 30785, at *2 (6th Cir. J an. 4, 2007), and attempted involuntary manslaug hter, see Un ite d S tat es v. Z ab awa , 1 34 F . App ’x 60 , 6 5– 66 (6 th C ir . Jun e 7, 20 05 ), to b e “ vio le nt f e lon ie s” beca use ea ch re quires that the offe nder commit a criminally neg lige nt act that re sults in t he victim’s death.
We have su g g e ste d that gr and larc e ny un de r Te nn e sse e law m ig ht n ot b y its e lf e nc omp a ss sufficie ntly

dang erous c onduct, but that g rand larc eny while in posse ssion of a firea rm does pre sent a “se rious potential risk” of violenc e bec ause “ the fire ar m ’s very prese nce c reates the po ssi bil ity

—th e ri sk

—th a t th e of

fe nd e r w ill us e the fi re arm if he me e ts w it h re sis tanc e or is detec ted.” United States v. Se aton , 45 F.3d 108, 112–13 ( 6th C i r. 1 9 9 5 ). And we have he ld that possessin g a we apon duringa flig ht from authorities poses a “ser ious potential risk of phy sical injury . . . to any one with whom the fl ee i n g person may come into contac t.” United States v. Sa nd e rs , 470 F.3d 616, 621 ( 6th Cir. 2006).
I nformed by

these prec edents and the lang uag e of the Act, we do not think that a conce aledwea pon conviction rises to the leve l of a “ violent felony .” Fi rst , car rying a conceale d wea

pon doesNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 7 - not present the sa

me deg ree of risk as the enumer ated crimes. Unlike burglar y or extortion, carry

ing
a conc eale d wea

pon without a license doe s not ty pically eng ende r a viol ent conf

rontation—or for that ma tt e r an y c o n f

r o n tati o n a t a ll
. A n d w h e n a p e r s o n c ar r ie s a c o n c e a le d w e a

p o n , h e does not sh owan inhe re nt d isr e g ard fo r h uma n li fe , w hic h c on tr a sts wi th t he ars on ist or us e r o f e xplos ive s, who ra rely can c ontrol the damag e ca used by the cr ime.
Second, th e e nume r a

t e d “ v i o l e nt f e l o n i e s ”

—

b u r g l a r y , a r s o n , e xt o rt ion , u se of

e xplos ive s— a ll ty pi cal ly requ ir e the of

fe nd e r t o e ng a g e in a c tiv e c on du c t. Jus t a s an in div idu a l w ho me re ly possesses explos ives or po sse sse s a match w ould not commit a “violent felony , ” so an individual
w h o m e r e l y possesses a conc eale d wea p o n wo u l d n o t s eem to commit such a c rime. See United States v. Olive r , 2 0 F .3 d 4 15 , 4 18 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 4) (“ Th e se [en

ume rate d] o ffen ses each

manif e st aff irmative, over

t and ac tive conduct in which the dang er posed to others . . . is fa r more thr eate ning in an immediate sense .”). For simil ar rea sons, se vera l c ircuits have he ld that a fe lon-in-possession offe nse, a c rime simi l ar t o conce aled possession, does not pre sent a risk suff icient to war

rant classification as a “violent fe lony .” See, e .g. , Oliver , 2 0 F .3 d at 41 8; United States v. Garc ia-Cruz , 97 8 F .2 d 5 37 , 5 43 (9 th C ir . 1 99 2) ; United States v. Doe , 960 F.2d 221, 224–26 ( 1st Cir. 1992). And the Un ite d St a te s Se nte nc ingCom mis sio n h a s in dic a te d th a t th e term “ c ri me of vio le nc e ” us e d in the SentencingGuidelines (a nd define d simil arly

to “violent felon y ” u nder the Armed Car eer Criminal Act) “doe s not include the off ense of unlawful po ssession of a fir ear m by a fe lon.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a ) cmt. 1.Nos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 8 - Thi rd , it is odd t o label ca rry ing a conce aled we apon a “violent felony” whe n sever al States

e x pr essl ype rm it the ir re sid e nts to d o th a t ve ry

thi ng . Take the fo ur State s w ith in t he Sixth C ir c uit
. Three of them—Kentucky , Michig an, Ohio—g ener ally prohibit the car

rying of a conc eale d wea

pon,
see Ky . Rev. Stat. § 527.020; Mich. Com p. L aws § 750.227; Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.12, but eac h State allows its citiz ens to ac quire a license to do so under c erta in circumstanc es, see Ky . Re v. Stat. § 2 37 .1 10 (d e sc ri bin g the pr oc e ss f or ob ta ini ng a

lic e ns e “ to c arr

y c on c e a le d f

ir e arm s o r o the r d e a dly
wea pons”); Mich. Comp. L aws § 28.425b (de scribing the proc ess for “obtain[ing] a license to c arr

y
a conc eale d pistol”); Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.125 (setting forth licensingrequire ments for c arr y ing
a c o n ce al edh an d gu n ). T h e f o u rt h S t at e— T en n es s ee
— go es o n e s t e p fu rt h er . T h er e, ca rry i n g a
c on c e a le d w e a

po n ( wi tho ut a

pe rm it) i s no mor e a

c ri me tha

n p os se ssi ngany

fi re arm (w ith ou t a permit). See Te nn . Co de §§ 39 -1 7- 13 07 , 3 9- 17 -1 30 8; se e als o id. § 39-17-1351 (setting forth the
re qu ir e me nts fo r obt a ini ng a pe rm it)
. I n mar ke d co ntr a st, the se State s do n ot e xpre ssl y pe rm it the ir residents to obtain license s to commit burglar y , arson or

extor t ion. And to the extent li cense s are available to use explosi ves, that is only to use them in discrete c ircumstance s, not in most parts of the State . O dd e r s til l, many ind ivi du a ls c on vic te d o f t he of fe ns e me re ly

wi ll h a ve fa ile d to ne g oti a te the bure aucr acy

that controls conc eale d handgun permits; there is no rea son to think t hat these f elons
are e sp e c ia lly

da ng e ro us to s oc ie ty

no r t o th ink

tha t Co ng re ss i nte nd e d th e m to se rv e , at a min imum, fiftee n y ear s’ imprisonment if later c aug ht with a g un. The g overnme nt urg es us to follow the Eleve nth Circuit, which held that ca rry ing a conce aled
we a po n is su bs tanti a lly

mor e da ng e ro us tha

n be ing a fe lon -i n- po sse ssi on and the re fo re a mou

nts toNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 9 - a “violent f

elony ” under

the Act. In Un ite d S

tates v . H all , 77 F.3d 398 ( 11th Cir. 1996), the c ourt found that “[a] substantial differe nce—in ter ms of the likelih o o d o f immediate violenc e flowing from the c rime—exists betwee n” the c rimes, bec ause “ car rying a conce aled we apon re q u i re s the
we a po n to be
. . . o n o r a

bo ut t he pe rs on ,” wh e re a s “ fo r s imp le [fe lon -i n- ]pos se ssi on —[th e fi re arm ] need not be found on or about the de fenda nt,” id. at 402 n.4. The g overnme nt bolsters this reasoning by arguin g tha

t, u nli ke “ me re po sse ssi o n , ” c o n c e a l m e nt “ e m b o l d e n s t h e pe rs on wh o is surr e pti tio us ly
arm e d w iththe we a

po n” and ke e ps by sta

nd e rs “ un awa

re of the po te nti a l danger lo omingin t he ir surrounding s.” Gov’t B r. at 15. As an initial matter , most pe ople, we suspect, would pref er to take their cha nces w ith a non-fe lon car

rying a conceale d wea

pon than wit h a felon car

rying a wea

pon that is plainly visible. But eve n if we g rant for the sake of

argument that car

rying a conce aled we apon is more dang erous than the offe nse of felon-in- possession, what would this prove ? The g overnme nt has not contende d that the fe lon-in-possession offe nse itself pre sent s a “se rious potential risk of phy sical injury

to another.” And this argumen t d o es not show that car rying a conce aled we apon wi t h o u t a l i c e n s e p o s e s t h e s a m e t y p e an d d e g r e e o f r i s k i n h e r e n t i n b u r g l ar y an d e xt o rt i o n , or

in
ars on and c ri me s invo lvi ngthe us e of e xplos ive s. Shepard v. United States , 544 U.S. 13 (2005), more over, pr ohibits us from turning to the details of Alex ander ’s previous conviction as set out in the pre sentenc e re port, see id. at 26 (limiting inq uir ie s und e r the Ar

me d Ca re e r C ri min a l A c t to “ the te rm s o f t he c ha rg ingdo c ume nt, the te rm s of a ple a a g re e me nt or tr ans c ri pt of c oll oq uy be tw e e n ju dg e and

de fe nd ant .
. . or

to s ome c omp ara

bleNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 10 - judicial rec ord”)
. We thus may premise our decision onl y on the s tatutory definition of the c rime, Mic h. Com

p. L aws § 7 50 .2 27 (2 ), no t on Al e xan de r’ s sp e c if

ic c on du c t in

vio latin g it. Although the district court er red in labe ling Ale x ander ’s prior c onviction for ca rry i n g a
conce aled we apon a “ violent fe l o n y ” u n der the Armed Car eer Criminal Act, the er

ror wa s not “plain.” U ntil today , the questi o n p re s ented—whether c arr ying a conce aled we apon is a “ violent felony” for purposes of the Act—wa s an open one in our circ uit, see United States v. Flores , 1 18 F. App’x 49, 54 ( 6 th

Ci r . D e c . 1 7 , 2 0 0 4 ) , an d it w a s o n e o nw h ic h o u r

s is te r c ir c u it s w e r e d iv ide d,

c om pa re W hit fie ld , 907 F.2d at 800, with Hall , 77 F.3d at 401–02. The conf licting pr ece dents on the question at hand show that the err or was not plain. See United States v. Barrow , 118 F.3d 482, 49 2 ( 6th Cir
. 19 97 ) (“ [I ]n lig ht [of ] t he c ir c uit sp lit
. . . a

nd the la c k o f d e fi nit ive pr e c e de nt i n th is Cir c uit , th e e rr or

wa s n ot ‘ pla in. ’” ); United States v. W illiams , 53 F.3d 769, 772 ( 6th Cir. 1995) (“[A]
c ir c uit sp lit

pr e c lud e s a

fi nd ingof

pla in e rr or .” ); Un ite d S

tates v . B lan dfo rd , 3 3 F .3 d 6 85 , 7 12 (6 th Cir. 1994) (“B eca

use the . . . issue h as d i v i d ed our sister cir cuits, we c annot see that the district court’s a lleg ed er

ror . . . wa s a ‘plain’ one . . . .”)
. B.
Clark cha lleng es the proc edura l reas o n ablene ss of his sentence , claiming that the district court “ based its sentenc e solely on Mr. Clark’s prior criminal re cord” and neg lected the rema ining
se nte nc ingfa c tor s f

ound in 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ). Cla rk Br. at 8. B e c a

us e Cla rk did no t r a ise thi s issue below, eve n afte r the district cour t asked his counse l whether he had a ny objections to theNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 11 - sentenc e, we revie w the cla im for plain er ror. See United States v. Harden , 195 F. App’x 382, 385 (6th Cir. Aug . 16, 2006) (r ev i ew i n g sentenc e for plain err or bec ause de fenda nt “did not raise the iss ue of the pr oc e dura l ina de qu a c ie s of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s se nte nc ingde te rm inatio n” ); United States

v . Ca rro ll , 1 89 F . App ’x 45 0, 45 4 ( 6th Cir . July 19 , 2 00 6) (s a me ); U

n i t e d S t a t es v . W ill is , 1 76 F. App’x 653, 656–57 (6th Ci r. Apr. 20, 2006) (same)
. No pla i n e r

r o r o c c u r r e d
. T o e n s u r e r e a s o n a

b l e s e n t e n c i n g , w e r e qu i r e a d i s t r i c tc ou rtto
a pp re c ia te the a dv iso ry

natur e of the g uid e lin e s, to c a lc ulate the a pp ro pr iate g uid e lin e s r ang e and to consider that rang e along side the other r eleva nt statutory

fac tors. Un ite d S

tates v . D av is , 458 F.3d 4 9 1 , 4 9 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ). T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt i nt h i s i n s t an ce p ro p er l y ca l cu l at edt h e gu i d el i n es ra n ge ( 1 1 0

– 1 3 7 m o n t h s ) , 1 8 U
. S
. C
. § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) ( 4 ) , an d n o t e d t h a tt h e r an g e w a s “ a dv i s o r y . ” J A 3 3
. In finding that a guidelines sentenc e wa s “nec essar y [] to comply

with the [st atut o ry ] p u rposes,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the dist ri ct court ex amined the c riminal “history . . . of the de fenda

nt,” id. § 3 55 3( a )( 1) , n oti ngthat Cla rk ha d “ on e of the mos t e xtra or din ary re c or ds of c on vic tio ns and

arr e sts for somebody

24 y ear s old that I ’ve e ver se en,” JA 33, that “Clark didn’t re ally serve any

thing meaning ful when he was a juvenile,” id. , and that afte r Clark had violated proba tion as an adult, “he went on to commit 18 more adult convic tions,” J A 34. This history showed, the dis trict court conclude d, that Clark did not appre ciate “ the nee d to follow the rules,” id. , so a g uidelines sentenc e
wa s ne e de d to “ pr omo te re sp e c t f or the law, ” 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a )( 2) (A ), and to “ pr ote c t th e pu

bli c from fur ther c rimes of the de fenda nt,” id. § 3553(a) (2)( C).Nos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 12 - Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

g a ve he e d to the “ natur e a nd c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he of fe ns e ,” 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a )( 1) , n oti ngthat a lth ou g h Cl ark a dmi tte d r e sp on sib ility for po sse ssi ngdr

ug s, he sti ll objected to the g overnme nt’s char acte rization that he was d ea l i n g drug s—even thoug h “he ha d a digital sc ale with him that he disca rded, a nd the drug s [found on him ] were . . . pa ckag ed for sale.” J A 34. The c ourt thus was “not c onvinced that [Clark was] even willing t o step up to the plate for the conduc t that resulted in this particular arr est.” Id.
The district cour

t analy zed the “cha

rac teristics of the de fenda nt,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)( 1), when it not ed that Clark was “appa rently an articulate guy , and the letter that he wrote to the Court is a c tua lly

we ll d on e ,” JA 34 . Cl ark t hu s had “th e abil ity , b ut n ot t he de sir e . . . to c on fo rm his conduct to socie ty ,” id. , so that a within-g uidelines sentenc e was neede d to “promote re spect for the law,” 18 U .S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (A). T he court also rec og nized that “g iven [ Clark’s] y oung ag e and the fac t that he hasn’t done a lot of time in the past,” J A 35, a sentence at the bot tom of the g uidelines rang e would be “ sufficie nt . . . to comply with the [st atutory ] purposes,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The c ourt also consider ed “the kinds of sentenc es available ,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) , noting that probation wa s not appropriate. And the c ourt tailored Clark’ s sentenc e to his particular “ history and cha rac teristics.” The court re commended that C l ark “rec eive substanc e abuse treatment and
vo c a tio na l tr a ini ng ,” JA 35 ; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (D), r equire d that Clark under g o “a pr og ram of testing and tre atment for substance abuse as dire cted by the probation officer ,” JA 36, and order ed that Clark “r efr ain from a ll use of alcoholic be vera g es” “ [g]iven his re cord a nd his drug problems,” id. I n rec og nition of Clark’s financ ial and family situations, the district c ourt order ed t h at C larkNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 13 - “per form 100 hours of

community

service . . . in lieu of a fine, ” an d that “[a]fter pay ment of the specia l assessment, the oblig ation to pay child support shall take p re ce d en ce to all other financ ial obligations im posed by

this judgment.” Id. I n view of the district cour t’s thoroug h examination of the evidenc e bef

ore it in conne ction with the statutory fac tors, we a

re ha rd-pr essed to find a

ny err or in the district court’s re asoning , let alone a plain one.
III
. That leaves one othe r issue—Alexander’ s claim that his trial counsel provide d i n ef fe ct i ve assistance in failing to object when the di strict court e nhance d his sentence under the Armed Car eer Criminal Act on, among other g rounds, the theor y that his conce aled- car

ry violation amounted to a violent felony . As Alexander a cknowledg es, “this Court is reluctant to h ea r cl ai m s of ineff ective
a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l on

dir e c t a pp e a l—a nd ri g ht ful ly so .” Al e xan de r B r. a t 13 ; see Massaro v. United States , 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). The question, howeve r, is whether this is one of those rar e instance s i n wh ich it is appropriate on direc t appea l to entertain a n ineffe ctive-a ssistance claim—per

haps bec ause the under ly ing que stion seems to present a pure issue of

law, per haps beca use re solution of the issu e could have a r elatively prompt eff

ect on Ale x ander ’s re lease from prison, or per

haps bec ause both re asons apply here
. Duringoral a rg ument, the cour

t asked c ounsel fo r the g ov e rnme nt wh e the r, if Al e xan de r w e re ri g ht a

bo ut t he c on c e a le d- c arr

y iss ue bu t st ill c ou ld
no t pr e va il i n v ie w of the re qu ir e me nts of pla in er ro r, the g ov e rnme nt wo uld fo rc e him to l iti g a te his ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e c la im o r w ou ld s imp ly a c qu ie sc e to a ne w se nte nc ing he ari ng . T o h is c re dit , the g overnme nt’s counsel a cknowledg ed that, if indee d a conce aled- car ry offe nse was not a “ violentNos. 05-1542, 05-1632

United States v. Alex ander

- 14 - felony ,” the United States would look car efully at whether i t would permit Alexander to obtain re

sentenc ing w ithout waiting t o deter mine whether

it was compelled to do so on the ba sis of an ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e ru lin g fr om o ur

c ourt or the dis tr ic t c ourt
. Un de r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s, we wi ll n ot ad dr e ss the ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e c la im at th is p oin t. Couns e l f or Al e xan de r a

nd the g ov e rnme nt a

re ur g e d to dis c us s w he the r, in l ight of our r uli ng , it makes sense to require Alexander to see k an inef fec tive-assistance ruling from o u r co u rt or the district court (throug h a §2255 petition) bef ore he may

obtain a second sentenc ing he aring . To the extent the parties ar e unable to res o l v e t h e issue betwee n themselves, Alexander is urg ed to file a tim e ly pe tit ion fo r r e he ari ngre g ard ingour f a ilure thu s f

ar t o re a c h his ine ff

e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e c la im and to explain in som e deta il why we should g rant relief. The gove rnment at that point will be given an equa l opportunity

to file a brie f explaining its contra ry position.
I V.
F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.