SIXTH DIVISION 

October 6, 2006 

No. 1-05-0491 

CATHERINE TUCHOWSKI, ) Appeal from the 

) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County 

) 

v. ) 

 ) 

ELIZABETH M. ROCHFORD, ) Honorable 

) Jeffrey Lawrence, 

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding 

JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court: 

Catherine Tuchowski sold her home in November 2000. In 

November 2003 she sued Elizabeth Rochford, the attorney who 

represented her at the closing on her home, for legal 

malpractice. Tuchowski claimed that she did not discover until 

2003 that Rochford had included in the sale of the home a largely 

vacant adjacent lot that Tuchowski hoped to sell separately. The 

trial court held that Tuchowski should have known at the time of 

the sale that she had sold the vacant lot because the closing 

documents Tuchowski signed included references to that lot. We 

hold that Tuchowski adequately alleged facts from which a trier 

of fact could infer that Tuchowski reasonably relied on her 

attorney when she signed the documents without reading them. 

Because we cannot say as a matter of law that Tuchowski should 

have known of the sale more than two years before she filed her 

complaint, we reverse the judgment entered in favor of Rochford 

and remand for further proceedings on the complaint. 
1-05-0491

-2-

 BACKGROUND 

When Tuchowski bought a condominium in 1999, she hired 

Rochford to represent her. Rochford also represented Tuchowski's 

daughter when the daughter sold some real estate. In 2000 

Tuchowski sought to sell a house she owned in Chicago. Again she 

asked Rochford to represent her. Tuchowski owned three adjoining 

lots. The house stood on two of the lots, while the third lot 

held only a shed and an outdoor grill. In September 2000 

Bridget and Brock Merck signed a contract to purchase, for 

$575,000, the house and the two lots on which the house stood. 

In a letter to the Mercks' attorney, Rochford offered to amend 

the contract to provide for the sale of all three lots. The 

letter does not indicate that Rochford sent any copy to 

Tuchowski. 

On November 30, 2000, Tuchowski signed all the forms 

necessary to close the sale of her house. She signed a trustee's 

deed for the property. Three lines above her signature, the deed 

includes a single line that reads, in small print: 

"Permanent Real Estate Index Number(s): 10-32-120-034 / 

10-32-120-035 / 10-32-120-036." 

In October 2001 Tuchowski named Rochford successor trustee 

to take control of Tuchowski's assets in trust upon Tuchowski's 

death. 

In September 2002 Tuchowski asked Rochford about the status 

of the third lot of her property, the one which stood nearly 
1-05-0491

-3-

vacant. Tuchowski also asked for a copy of the sales contract 

for the other two lots. A year later, on September 3, 2003, 

Rochford wrote to Tuchowski that she no longer had a copy of the 

sales contract. Tuchowski obtained a copy of the contract and 

the deed from another source. 

On November 24, 2003, Tuchowski sued Rochford for legal 

malpractice and breach of contract. Two days later Tuchowski 

amended her trust to remove Rochford as successor trustee. 

Rochford moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely. The 

trial court granted the motion but gave Tuchowski leave to amend. 

 In September 2004 Tuchowski filed a second amended complaint in 

which she alleged that Rochford knew that the owners of the 

property next to the nearly vacant lot had offered Tuchowski 

$125,000 for that lot. Tuchowski was 77 years old when she 

closed on the sale of her property in November 2000. At the 

closing Rochford directed Tuchowski to sign all the documents, 

including the deed, to complete the transaction as quickly as 

possible, so that Rochford could go to a closing on another 

property. Tuchowski alleged that she did not read the deed or 

other documents. She relied on Rochford. 

Rochford supported her motion to dismiss the second amended 

complaint with her own affidavit. She swore that Tuchowski asked 

her to amend the contract for sale of the real estate to include 

the nearly vacant lot. Tuchowski answered with an affidavit in 

which she swore that she specifically instructed Rochford to 
1-05-0491

-4-

limit the sale to the Mercks to the two lots with the house. She 

never told Rochford to alter the contract to include the third 

lot. She told Rochford that other buyers had offered her 

$125,000 for the third lot. 

The trial court dismissed the second amended complaint with 

prejudice, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2000)), because the court 

found that Tuchowski failed to file her complaint within two 

years of the date on which she should have known that Rochford 

had altered the contract to make it a sale of all three lots. 

See 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 2000). The court said: 

"[Tuchowski] was at the closing, the closing documents 

are there, they describe the property that was being 

sold. *** 

*** 

*** It is her responsibility to look at the 

documents." 

Tuchowski now appeals. 

 ANALYSIS 

We review de novo the dismissal of the complaint under 

section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-

619(a)(5) (West 2000)). Paszkowski v. Metropolitan Water 

Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2004). 

 We interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light 

most favorable to Tuchowski, the nonmoving party. Paszkowski, 
1-05-0491

-5-

213 Ill. 2d at 5. The court should deny the motion to dismiss 

unless the court can say, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff 

should have known of her injury and wrongful causation more than 

two years before she filed her lawsuit. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 

(West 2000); Weidman v. Wilkie, 277 Ill. App. 3d 448, 456 (1995). 

Usually courts hold parties responsible for knowing the 

contents of documents they have signed. See Breckenridge v. 

Cambridge Homes, Inc., 246 Ill. App. 3d 810, 819 (1993). 

However, under certain circumstances, especially in cases 

involving fiduciary relationships (see Prueter v. Bork, 105 Ill. 

App. 3d 1003, 1006 (1982)), courts have excused ignorance of the 

content of such signed documents. 

In Breck v. Moore, 910 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1996), the plaintiff 

sued the attorney who represented him when the plaintiff 

purchased his home in 1981. In the complaint filed in 1990, the 

plaintiff alleged that the attorney failed to notify him of 

significant restrictions on the title to the property. The 

attorney moved to dismiss the complaint based on the statute of 

limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the 

plaintiff adequately alleged that he discovered the restrictions 

in 1989. On appeal the attorney again argued that the 

plaintiff's receipt of closing documents in 1981 put him on 

notice of the restrictions shown in those documents. The court 

held: 

"The discovery rule takes into account the 
1-05-0491

-6-

sophistication of the plaintiff in the particular area 

of knowledge. [Citations.] *** [I]t might be 

reasonable for an insured to rely on an insurance 

broker's statements about the scope of coverage, rather 

than reading and interpreting the detailed language of 

the exclusionary clauses. [Citation.] *** [The 

plaintiff] acted reasonably in relying on [his 

attorney] and the real estate agents to review the 

documents and identify problems." Breck, 910 P.2d at 

605-06. 

Illinois courts have reasoned similarly. In Melvin State 

Bank v. Crowe, 97 Ill. App. 2d 82 (1968), the defendant invested 

money in a business Crowe ran and she later signed a guarantee 

for a loan Crowe took from the plaintiff bank. The bank sued 

Crowe and the defendant to recover the loan. The defendant 

countersued to recover her investment in the business. The 

defendant testified that she did not read the papers she signed 

at the bank concerning the investment and the guarantee. Crowe, 

97 Ill. App. 2d at 89. She relied on the bank's representations 

concerning the value of the investment and the need to sign the 

other papers. Crowe, 97 Ill. App. 2d at 95. The trial court 

entered a judgment in favor of the bank on the guarantee and on 

the countersuit for the lost investment. 

On appeal the bank argued that the defendant could not avoid 

the effect of the guarantee because she had "a full opportunity 
1-05-0491

-7-

to read the instrument." Crowe, 97 Ill. App. 2d at 96. The 

appellate court answered: 

"[A] false representation by an experienced banker *** 

is calculated to disarm an inexperienced person. *** 

[I]t affirmatively appears that the judgment note was 

not explained to [the defendant]. *** [I]t is obvious 

that she did not understand the matter of the guarantee 

***." Crowe, 97 Ill. App. 2d at 96. 

The court reversed the judgment for the bank on the guarantee and 

on the countersuit, and remanded for a new trial to focus on the 

issue of the bank's fiduciary duties to the defendant. Crowe, 97 

Ill. App. 2d at 97-100. 

Here, Rochford had fiduciary duties as Tuchowski's attorney. 

 In re Marriage of Pagano, 154 Ill. 2d 174, 185 (1992). 

Tuchowski alleged that she did not read the deed and other 

documents she signed at the closing. She relied on Rochford when 

she signed those documents. Rochford told her to sign quickly 

because Rochford needed to attend another closing. After the 

closing Tuchowski did not look for the documents until September 

2002, when she asked Rochford about the status of the third lot. 

 She did not discover that she had sold the third lot until she 

obtained copies of the closing documents after September 3, 2003. 

 She filed this lawsuit in November 2003. 

Rochford stresses that when Tuchowski signed the deed she 

signed only three lines below a line that showed three separate 
1-05-0491

-8-

index numbers for the deeded property. Rochford argues that 

Tuchowski must have seen the line and she must have deduced that 

the deed gave the Mercks title to all three lots. We agree that 

the deed can support an inference that Tuchowski should have 

known, when she signed the deed, that the deed referred to all 

three lots. However, we find that some rational triers of fact 

might not reach that same inference from the evidence as a whole. 

 Taking into account the size of the typeface, Tuchowski's age 

and sophistication, and the time constraints Rochford placed on 

her, a trier of fact may believe that Tuchowski either did not 

see the line at issue, or she did not understand the special 

significance of the sequence of digits, slashes, dashes and 

spaces on that line. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that 

Tuchowski should have known, before November 2001, that contrary 

to her explicit request, Rochford added the third lot to the 

property sold to the Mercks. We find that the allegations and 

the affidavit could support a finding that Tuchowski did not know 

of the malpractice before November 2001. 

Rochford contends that we should affirm the judgment in her 

favor, without considering the statute of limitations, because 

Tuchowski did not adequately allege that Rochford breached her 

duties to Tuchowski, or that the breach proximately caused 

damages. See Sorenson v. Law Offices of Theodore Poehlmann, 327 

Ill. App. 3d 706, 707 (2002). Tuchowski attached to her 

complaint a contract in which the Mercks agreed to pay Tuchowski 
1-05-0491

-9-

$575,000 in exchange for the two lots on which her house stood. 

She told Rochford she wished to sell only the two lots to the 

Mercks. Tuchowski alleged, with supporting documents, that 

Rochford altered the contract, without providing notice to 

Tuchowski, to provide for the sale of all three lots for the same 

price the Mercks had offered for the two lots. We find the 

allegations sufficient to support an inference that Rochford 

breached her duties as Tuchowski's attorney and she breached her 

contract to represent Tuchowski's interests. 

Tuchowski alleged that her neighbors offered her $125,000 

for the third lot, and Rochford obtained nothing from the Mercks 

in exchange for the third lot. We find the allegations 

sufficient to support an inference that the breach of duties as a 

lawyer, and of the contract to represent Tuchowski, caused 

Tuchowski to lose $125,000. The complaint sufficiently states a 

cause of action for legal malpractice and breach of contract. 

The parties offered conflicting evidence concerning their 

interactions before the sale. A trier of fact who found 

Tuchowski credible could conclude that Tuchowski did not know 

before November 2001 that Rochford included the third lot in the 

sale of Tuchowski's property to the Mercks. The trier of fact 

might find that Tuchowski's reliance on her attorney provided 

reasonable grounds for failing to read the documents she signed 

at the closing. Thus, the trier of fact could conclude that 

Tuchowski filed her claims against Rochford within the period 
1-05-0491

-10-

permitted by the statute of limitations. As the complaint 

sufficiently states claims for legal malpractice and breach of 

contract, we reverse the judgment entered in favor of Rochford 

and we remand for further proceedings in accord with this 

opinion. 

Reversed and remanded.

FITZGERALD SMITH, P.J., and O'MALLEY, J., concur.