Filed 10/29/19 by Clerk of Supreme Court 

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE 

OF NORTH DAKOTA 

2019 ND 262

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee 

v. 

Michelle Renee Vetter, Defendant and Appellant 

No. 20190054

Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial 

District, the Honorable Cynthia M. Feland, Judge. 

AFFIRMED. 

Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice. 

Marina Spahr, Assistant State’s Attorney, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and 

appellee. 

Irvin B. Nodland, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellant. 

Paul R. Emerson, Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, N.D., for amicus 

curiae State of North Dakota. 
1 

State v. Vetter 

No. 20190054 

Tufte, Justice. 

[¶1] Michelle Vetter appeals from an order deferring imposition of sentence 

entered after a jury convicted her of child abuse. On appeal, Vetter asks this 

Court to take judicial notice of filings from her divorce case against the 

complainant. She also argues the definition of “bodily injury” in N.D.C.C. 

§ 12.1-01-04 is unconstitutionally vague. Finally, she argues the evidence at

trial was insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. We affirm.

I 

[¶2] On the evening of November 15, 2017, Vetter, her then-husband, and 

their eight-year-old daughter, B.V., were sitting on the couch in their home. 

While playing together, B.V. bumped Vetter in the nose. In response, Vetter 

hit B.V. in the side with a closed fist. Days later, Vetter’s husband discovered 

bruising on B.V.’s side and reported the incident to law enforcement. 

[¶3] The State charged Vetter with child abuse. The complaint alleged Vetter, 

“who is the parent of B.V. . . . , struck B.V. causing pain and bruising.” Vetter 

moved to dismiss, arguing the definition of “bodily injury” under N.D.C.C. 

§ 12.1-01-04 is unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion.

[¶4] The case proceeded to trial, which was held in August 2018. At trial, B.V. 

testified that her mother struck her with a closed fist, which caused stomach 

pain. Vetter’s ex-husband testified that he observed the incident. The jury 

convicted Vetter of child abuse, and the district court deferred imposition of 

sentence. Vetter now appeals. 

II 

[¶5] Vetter asks us to take judicial notice of certain filings from her divorce 

case against the complainant in this case. Under N.D.R.Ev. 201(b)(2), a court 

may judicially notice an adjudicative fact “that is not subject to reasonable 

dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 
2 

[¶6] The jury found Vetter guilty in August 2018, and the order deferring 

imposition of sentence was entered January 2019. The filings Vetter asks us to 

judicially notice were entered April and June 2019. These are not facts that 

were available to the district court below, and they are the subject of 

reasonable dispute. Vetter’s request that we take judicial notice is denied. 

III 

[¶7] Vetter argues the statute under which she was convicted, N.D.C.C. § 14-

09-22, and by reference, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(4), is unconstitutionally vague.

Specifically, she challenges the inclusion of “pain” in the definition of “bodily

injury,” because it does not put parents on adequate notice of what conduct is

proscribed.

Whether a law is unconstitutional is a question of law, which is 

fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37, ¶ 23, 763 

N.W.2d 761. A law is not unconstitutionally vague if: (1) the law 

creates minimum guidelines for the reasonable police officer, 

judge, or jury charged with enforcing the law, and (2) the law 

provides a reasonable person with adequate and fair warning of 

the prohibited conduct. State v. Brown, 2009 ND 150, ¶ 33, 771 

N.W.2d 267. A law is “not unconstitutionally vague ‘if the 

challenged language, when measured by common understanding 

and practice, gives adequate warning of the conduct proscribed 

and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for fair administration 

of the law.’” Holbach, at ¶ 24 (quoting In re Disciplinary Action 

Against McGuire, 2004 ND 171, ¶ 19, 685 N.W.2d 748).

Interest of D.D., 2018 ND 201, ¶ 12, 916 N.W.2d 765. 

[¶8] We conclude N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22 is not unconstitutionally vague. Section 

14-09-22, N.D.C.C., in relevant part, proscribes a parent willfully inflicting

“bodily injury” on her child. This section references the definition of “bodily

injury” in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(4), which includes “any impairment of

physical condition, including physical pain.” Vetter does not argue that pain

was inflicted in the course of parental discipline. This definition is broad

because willful infliction of physical pain on one’s child includes a wide range
3 

of conduct. But the boundary between proscribed and non-proscribed conduct 

gives sufficient guidance to those tasked with enforcing the law. 

[¶9] The statute also puts a reasonable person on adequate notice as to what 

conduct constitutes child abuse. We have said that “[p]ain, which is a 

qualifying, but not necessary, circumstance of bodily impairment under 

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(4), is a phenomenon of common experience and

understanding.” State v. Hannah, 2016 ND 11, ¶ 9, 873 N.W.2d 668. Measured

by common understanding and practice, the definition of “bodily injury” under

N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(4) gives adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and

marks boundaries sufficiently distinct for fair administration of the law.

Therefore, we conclude N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22 is not unconstitutionally vague.

IV 

[¶10] Vetter argues there was insufficient evidence to find her guilty of child 

abuse. 

In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we review the 

record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence that could 

allow a jury to draw a reasonable inference in favor of the 

conviction. State v. Kinsella, 2011 ND 88, ¶ 7, 796 N.W.2d 678 

(quoting State v. Wanner, 2010 ND 121, ¶ 9, 784 N.W.2d 143). “The 

defendant bears the burden of showing the evidence reveals no 

reasonable inference of guilt when viewed in the light most 

favorable to the verdict.” Id. We do not reweigh conflicting 

evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

State v. Truelove, 2017 ND 283, ¶ 7, 904 N.W.2d 342.

[¶11] The State charged Vetter with child abuse under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22, 

which provides, in relevant part: 

[A] parent, adult family or household member, guardian, or other

custodian of any child, who willfully inflicts or allows to be inflicted

upon the child mental injury or bodily injury, substantial bodily

injury, or serious bodily injury as defined by section 12.1-01-04 is

guilty of a class C felony.
4 

“Bodily injury” is defined as “any impairment of physical condition, including 

physical pain.” 

[¶12] We conclude the evidence presented at trial supports the jury’s guilty 

verdict. Vetter did not dispute that she is B.V.’s parent. B.V. testified that 

Vetter hit her in the side, causing stomach pain. Vetter’s ex-husband testified 

that he saw Vetter punch B.V. with a closed fist. The State introduced 

photographs of bruising on B.V.’s side. A jury could reasonably conclude from 

the manner and severity of Vetter’s hit that the act was willful. Reviewing this 

evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and giving it all reasonable 

inferences, we conclude a rational fact finder could conclude this evidence was 

sufficient to convict Vetter of child abuse beyond a reasonable doubt. 

V 

[¶13] We affirm the order deferring imposition of sentence, concluding that 

Vetter has not demonstrated N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(4) is unconstitutional and

that the evidence was sufficient to find Vetter guilty of child abuse. 

[¶14] Jerod E. Tufte

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jon J. Jensen

Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.