[Cite as Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 303, 2012-Ohio-5380.] 

HOLMES, APPELLANT, v. CRAWFORD MACHINE, INC., ET AL., APPELLEES. 

[Cite as Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc., 

134 Ohio St.3d 303, 2012-Ohio-5380.] 

Workers’ compensation—R.C. 4123.512(F)—Once a claimant’s right to 

participate in the workers’ compensation fund has been established, a 

trial court does not abuse its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by 

awarding the claimant reimbursement for costs related to the conditions 

for which the trier of fact determined the claimant was ineligible to 

participate in the fund. 

(No. 2011-2040—Submitted August 21, 2012—Decided November 27, 2012.) 

CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Crawford County, 

No. 3-11-12, 2011-Ohio-5741. 

__________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

When a claimant’s right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund is 

established on appeal, R.C. 4123.512(F) requires the trial court to award 

the claimant his or her costs. The trial court is not required to apportion 

costs based on the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition. 

__________________ 

MCGEE BROWN, J. 

{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to resolve a conflict between the Third 

and Tenth District Courts of Appeals. The issue is whether after a claimant’s 

right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund has been established, a trial 

court abuses its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) when it awards the claimant 

his or her costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact determined the 

claimant was ineligible to participate in the fund. We hold that when a claimant’s 
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right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund is established on appeal, 

R.C. 4123.512(F) requires the trial court to award the claimant his or her costs. 

R.C. 4123.512 requires the trial court to use “the effort expended” as the criterion 

for setting the amount of the award. Thus, we hold that under R.C. 4123.512, a 

trial court is not required to apportion costs based on the outcome of a particular 

claim and/or condition. Accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by 

awarding costs under R.C. 4123.512(F) when it reimburses a claimant for costs 

incurred on appeal without regard to the outcome of a particular claim and/or 

condition. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} Appellant, Jeff Holmes, filed a workers’ compensation claim 

against appellee Crawford Machine, Inc., for multiple conditions. Holmes alleged 

that while he was working on a machine and using a tool to tighten wires, he was 

jolted with electricity for approximately 30 seconds. An Ohio Bureau of 

Workers’ Compensation administrator allowed Holmes’s claim for electriccurrent effects and sprain of left shoulder/arm, and Crawford Machine appealed. 

After reviewing the appeal, a district hearing officer vacated the administrator’s 

order and disallowed Holmes’s claim. Holmes appealed. Upon consideration of 

the matter, a staff hearing officer vacated the district hearing officer’s order and 

granted Holmes’s injured-worker claim on the following conditions: (1) leftshoulder strain, (2) electrical shock, (3) low back strain, (4) left-rotator-cuff tear, 

(5) left-posterior-shoulder dislocation, and (6) abrasion of right fifth finger. 

Crawford Machine appealed this order, but an administrative appeal was refused 

by the Industrial Commission. 

{¶ 3} Pursuant to R.C. 4123.512, Crawford Machine appealed the staff 

hearing officer’s order to the Crawford County Court of Common Pleas. And 

Holmes filed a petition and complaint on appeal seeking participation in the State 

Insurance Fund for all his injuries and an award of attorney fees and costs. 
January Term, 2012 

3 

Crawford Machine filed an answer denying the assertions in Holmes’s complaint 

that would entitle him to participate in the fund and asking that Holmes’s 

complaint be dismissed with prejudice at Holmes’s cost. The Ohio Bureau of 

Workers’ Compensation filed a similar answer. 

{¶ 4} The case was tried before a jury in February 2011. In accordance 

with the verdicts of the jury, the trial court held that Holmes was entitled to 

participate in the Ohio Workers’ Compensation system for the condition of 

“abrasion right fifth finger” but was not entitled to participate for the other 

conditions that had been allowed by the staff hearing officer. Thereafter, Holmes 

filed a motion for attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of the appeal. 

Crawford Machine opposed the motion, arguing that Holmes was not entitled to 

reimbursement of his attorney fees or costs, because he had not incurred any 

attorney fees or costs in relation to his fifth-finger-abrasion condition. The trial 

court granted Holmes’s motion and ordered that Holmes’s attorney be paid $4,200 

in attorney fees and that Holmes be reimbursed for costs in the amount of 

$7,551.23. 

{¶ 5} Crawford Machine appealed from the judgment granting attorney 

fees and costs, and Holmes appealed from the judgment allowing one, but not all, 

of his claims. The Third District Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. The 

court upheld the judgment allowing only one claim, and that issue is not before us 

in this case. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment ordering attorney fees 

and costs and remanded the matter. The court further held that its judgment in the 

consolidated appeal was in conflict with the judgment rendered in Hollar v. 

Pleasant Twp., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-250, 2003-Ohio-6827, on the issue of 

reimbursement of costs under R.C. 4123.512(F), and it certified the conflict to this 

court. We certified the following issue: 
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“When a claimant/employee petitions the common pleas 

court to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for multiple 

claims/conditions and the trier of fact finds that the 

claimant/employee is entitled to participate in the fund for at least 

one of those claims/conditions but not all of the claims/conditions, 

does the trial court abuse its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by 

taxing an opposing party attorney’s fees and costs that are strictly 

related to the claims/conditions for which the trier of fact 

determined that the claimant/employee was ineligible to participate 

in the fund?” 

131 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2012-Ohio-896, 962 N.E.2d 802, quoting the court of 

appeals’ entry. For the reasons that follow, we answer the question in the 

negative and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 6} R.C. 4123.512(F) provides for the reimbursement of the “cost of 

any legal proceeding,” including attorney fees, incurred by a claimant who 

prevails on a workers’ compensation appeal. R.C. 4123.512(F); Schuller v. 

United States Steel Corp., 103 Ohio St.3d 157, 2004-Ohio-4753, 814 N.E.2d 857. 

Reimbursement for these costs “is subject to the trial court’s determination of 

their reasonable necessity to the presentation of the claimant’s appeal.” Kilgore v. 

Chrysler Corp., 92 Ohio St.3d 184, 188, 749 N.E.2d 267 (2001); see also R.C 

4123.512(F). R.C. 4123.512(F) states: 

The cost of any legal proceedings authorized by this 

section, including an attorney’s fee to the claimant’s attorney to be 

fixed by the trial judge, based upon the effort expended, in the 

event the claimant’s right to participate or to continue to participate 
January Term, 2012 

5 

in the fund is established upon the final determination of an appeal, 

shall be taxed against the employer or the commission if the 

commission or the administrator rather than the employer 

contested the right of the claimant to participate in the fund. The 

attorney’s fee shall not exceed forty-two hundred dollars. 

{¶ 7} We have previously explained that R.C. 4123.512(F) is a provision 

intended to protect a claimant who is forced to litigate an appeal. “[T]he 

legislative intent behind [R.C. 4123.512(F)] * * * is that ‘a claimant’s recovery 

shall not be dissipated by reasonable litigation expenses connected with the 

preparation and presentation of an appeal.’ ” Schuller at ¶ 10, quoting Moore v. 

Gen. Motors Corp., Terex Div., 18 Ohio St.3d 259, 262, 480 N.E.2d 1101 (1985). 

Since claimants in this position incur out-of-the-ordinary expenses in order to 

establish their right to participate in the fund, which are expenses that other 

claimants do not incur, R.C. 4123.512(F) provides a financial award to a 

successful claimant so that he or she can retain more of the recovery. See Kilgore 

at 187. This policy behind the statute and our cases interpreting the statute focus 

not on the outcome of the particular claims raised by a claimant, but instead on 

the cost of litigating the appeal. Schuller at ¶ 13 (stating that costs “directly 

related to a [claimant’s] appeal” are reimbursable expenses); Kilgore at 187-188 

(discussing certain costs as a “litigation expense”). 

{¶ 8} The issue certified to this court is whether after a claimant’s right 

to participate in the workers’ compensation fund has been established, a trial court 

abuses its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by awarding the claimant 

reimbursement for costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact 

determined the claimant was ineligible to participate in the fund. The Third 

District Court of Appeals determined that a trial court’s decision to reimburse 

costs under R.C. 4123.512(F) that were related only to unsuccessful claims and/or 
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6 

conditions is an abuse of discretion. Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc., 3d Dist. 

No. 3-11-12, 2011-Ohio-5741, ¶ 65-80. In Hollar, however, the Tenth District 

Court of Appeals concluded that if a claimant is successful with at least one of his 

claims, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding the claimant all of 

his costs under R.C. 4123.512(F). Hollar, 2003-Ohio-6827, at ¶ 19-20. 

Resolution of this matter requires only that we look to the plain language of the 

statute. 

{¶ 9} R.C. 4123.512(F) applies specifically to a claimant who is 

adjudged on appeal to be eligible to participate in the fund. In other words, the 

event that triggers the availability of reimbursement under R.C. 4123.512(F) is the 

establishment on appeal that a claimant has the right to participate or continue to 

participate in the fund. The section does not delineate additional factors that must 

be satisfied by the claimant. In fact, language referring to allowed or nonallowed 

conditions is not found anywhere in the section. 

{¶ 10} We must apply the section in a manner consistent with the plain 

meaning of the statutory language; we cannot add words. State ex rel. Burrows v. 

Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 78, 81, 676 N.E.2d 519 (1997). We would 

impermissibly add language to the statute if we were to hold that a claimant must 

be reimbursed for costs only when his or her right to participate or to continue to 

participate in the fund is established upon the final determination of an appeal and

when the costs are related to a particular claim and/or condition. 

{¶ 11} Therefore, we hold that the plain language of R.C. 4123.512(F) 

requires a trial judge to order reimbursement of costs to a claimant for any legal 

proceeding authorized under R.C. 4123.512 once the claimant’s right to 

participate or to continue to participate in the workers’ compensation fund is 

established on appeal. When a claimant’s right to participate in the fund is 

established, the trial court is not required under R.C. 4123.512(F) to apportion 

costs based on the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition. 
January Term, 2012 

7 

{¶ 12} The trial court’s determination of the reimbursement award must 

be based on the criterion set forth in the statute. R.C. 4123.512(F) requires that 

the costs be “fixed by the trial judge, based upon the effort expended.” Applying 

common grammar and usage to the statutory language, we conclude that the 

statute requires the award of costs to be based on the effort spent by the 

claimant’s attorney in litigating the appeal. The trial court must make this 

determination and set the reimbursement award accordingly. 

{¶ 13} We have said that a trial court must make a determination that such 

costs are reasonable. See Schuller, 103 Ohio St.3d 157, 2004-Ohio-4753, 814 

N.E.2d 857, at syllabus. However, we refuse to hold that courts should use the 

outcome of a claimant’s particular claim to determine whether the “effort 

expended” on appeal on that claim was reasonable. The outcome of an appeal is 

not the conclusive indicator of whether effort was reasonably expended on a 

claimant’s behalf. Under R.C. 4123.512, reasonable expenses are those “bearing 

a direct relation to a claimant’s appeal that lawyers traditionally charge to 

clients.” Kilgore, 92 Ohio St.3d at 188, 749 N.E.2d 267. 

{¶ 14} The plain language of R.C. 4123.512(F) requires a trial judge to 

order reimbursement to a claimant for costs, including attorney fees up to $4,200, 

if the claimant’s right to participate in the fund is established or upheld on appeal. 

In this case, Holmes was adjudged to be entitled to participate in the fund for a 

fifth-finger abrasion. Therefore, pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(F), the trial court was 

required to reimburse him for his costs, including attorney fees, associated with 

his appeal. Since R.C. 4123.512(F) does not require an apportionment of these 

costs based on the outcome of Holmes’s particular conditions, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion when it made no such division of costs. Accordingly, we 

answer the certified-conflict question in the negative and reverse the judgment of 

the court of appeals. 

 
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III. Conclusion 

{¶ 15} The plain language of R.C. 4123.512(F) requires a trial judge to 

order reimbursement of costs to a claimant for any legal proceeding authorized 

under R.C. 4123.512 once the claimant’s right to participate or to continue to 

participate in the workers’ compensation fund is established on appeal. 

Apportionment of these costs is not required under the statute. R.C. 4123.512 

requires the trial court to use “the effort expended” as the criterion for setting the 

amount of the award. Therefore, once a claimant’s right to participate in the 

workers’ compensation fund has been established, a trial court does not abuse its 

discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by awarding the claimant reimbursement for 

costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact determined the claimant 

was ineligible to participate in the fund. 

Judgment reversed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and LANZINGER, JJ., 

concur. 

O’DONNELL and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 

__________________ 

O’DONNELL, J., dissenting.

{¶ 16} Respectfully, I dissent. 

{¶ 17} In my view, R.C. 4123.512(F) does not require an employer to pay 

the costs and fees associated with a claimant’s unsuccessful workers’ 

compensation claims. In this case, although Holmes had been entitled to 

participate in the workers’ compensation fund only for an abrasion on his finger, 

the trial court awarded $7,551.23 in costs and $4,200 in attorney fees incurred for 

other unsuccessful claims. Because the statute does not permit this award, I 

would affirm the appellate court’s judgment. 

 
January Term, 2012 

9 

Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 18} Jeff Holmes, an employee of Crawford Machine, Inc., sought 

workers’ compensation benefits for injuries allegedly arising from a July 2009 

industrial accident. The Industrial Commission allowed his claims for left 

shoulder strain, electrical shock, low back strain, left rotator cuff tear, left 

posterior shoulder dislocation, and an abrasion of the right fifth finger. Crawford 

Machine appealed the allowance to the common pleas court, and after a trial, a 

jury found that Holmes could participate in the workers’ compensation fund, but 

only for the abrasion on his right fifth finger, disallowing all the other claims. 

Holmes appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. 

{¶ 19} Subsequently, the trial court awarded Holmes $7,551.23 in costs 

and $4,200 in attorney fees based on his right to participate in the workers’ 

compensation fund for the abrasion on his finger. The Third District Court of 

Appeals reversed that award, holding that Crawford Machine could not be 

required to pay costs and fees that were not related to Holmes’s successful claim 

for benefits. The Third District certified that its holding conflicted with the 

holding in Hollar v. Pleasant Twp., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-250, 2003-Ohio-6827. 

We accepted the certified conflict and ordered the parties to brief the following 

question: 

“When a claimant/employee petitions the common pleas 

court to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for multiple 

claims/conditions and the trier of fact finds that the 

claimant/employee is entitled to participate in the fund for at least 

one of those claims/conditions but not all of the claims/conditions, 

does the trial court abuse its discretion under R.C. 4123.512(F) by 

taxing an opposing party attorney’s fees and costs that are strictly 

related to the claims/conditions for which the trier of fact 
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10 

determined that the claimant/employee was ineligible to participate 

in the fund?” 

131 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2012-Ohio-896, 962 N.E.2d 802, quoting the court of 

appeals’ entry. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 20} In Ward v. Kroger Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005-Ohio-3560, 830 

N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 10, we explained that a workers’ compensation claim constitutes 

the recognition of an employee’s right to participate in the workers’ compensation 

fund “for a specific injury or medical condition, which is defined narrowly, and it 

is only for that condition, as set forth in the claim, that compensation and benefits 

provided under the [Workers’ Compensation Act] may be payable.” (Emphasis 

added.) We stated in Ward that each alleged injury or condition “must be 

considered as a separate claim for purposes of R.C. 4123.511 and 4123.512.” Id. 

at ¶ 11. 

{¶ 21} Relevant to the certified question in this appeal is R.C. 

4123.512(F), which provides for the award of costs and fees associated with a 

successful claim for workers’ compensation benefits and which states: 

The cost of any legal proceedings authorized by this 

section, including an attorney’s fee to the claimant’s attorney to be 

fixed by the trial judge, based upon the effort expended, in the 

event the claimant’s right to participate or to continue to 

participate in the fund is established upon the final determination 

of an appeal, shall be taxed against the employer or the 

commission if the commission or the administrator rather than the 

employer contested the right of the claimant to participate in the 
January Term, 2012 

11 

fund. The attorney’s fee shall not exceed forty-two hundred 

dollars. 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶ 22} R.C. 4123.512(F) does not authorize the award of costs and fees 

incurred in bringing unsuccessful claims. Each claimed injury represents a 

separate claim for the right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund, and 

the legislature intended that a court award only those costs and fees that relate to 

the specific injury entitling the employee to participate. In its enactment of R.C. 

4123.512(F), the General Assembly did not intend to shift the costs of litigating 

unsuccessful claims to employers; rather, it intended only that workers not bear 

the costs of seeking to participate for legitimate injuries occurring in the 

workplace, and it therefore limited reimbursement to successful claims. Thus, the 

General Assembly did not intend to require employers to pay costs and fees for 

claims on which they prevailed. 

{¶ 23} Further, R.C. 4123.512(F) affords discretion to a trial court to 

award the costs and fees of any legal proceedings authorized by R.C. 4123.512, 

but only if the award is reasonable and is based upon the effort expended, and if 

the right to participate in the fund has been established. Thus, in Schuller v. 

United States Steel Corp., 103 Ohio St.3d 157, 2004-Ohio-4753, 814 N.E.2d 857, 

syllabus, we held that an expert witness’s fee for live in-court testimony is a 

reimbursable cost of legal proceedings pursuant to R.C. 4123.512(F), subject to a 

trial court’s determination that the fee is reasonable. And in Cave v. Conrad, 94 

Ohio St.3d 299, 762 N.E.2d 991 (2002), syllabus, we held that “reasonable

videotaped deposition expenses may be taxed as costs and awarded to a successful 

workers’ compensation claimant in an action brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.512.” 

(Emphasis added.) 
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{¶ 24} In this case, the jury found Holmes entitled to participate in the 

workers’ compensation fund only for an abrasion on his right fifth finger, an 

injury treated on site with a bandage. And although Holmes’s expert did not 

examine this finger or base an opinion on it, the trial court awarded Holmes the 

expert’s fee. This award, in my view, is therefore unreasonable and not based on 

the effort expended. Nor is it reasonable to award $7,551.23 in costs for an injury 

that consisted of a small abrasion treated by a bandage. 

{¶ 25} Thus, the trial court awarded costs and fees that are not related to 

the injury for which Holmes is entitled to participate in the workers’ 

compensation fund but rather were incurred to pursue unsuccessful claims. 

Because these costs and fees are neither reasonable nor based on the effort 

expended on the successful claim, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate 

court. 

CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg Co., L.P.A., Jennifer L. Lawther, Jerald A. 

Schneiberg, and Stacy M. Callen, for appellant. 

Oldham Kramer and Barbara A. Knapic, for appellee Crawford Machine, 

Inc. 

Michael DeWine, Ohio Attorney General, and Alexandra T. Schimmer, 

Solicitor General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, Elisabeth A. 

Long, Deputy Solicitor, and Kevin J. Reis and Colleen C. Erdman, Assistant 

Attorneys General, for appellee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. 

Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton, and Chelsea J. Fulton, urging 

reversal for amici curiae Ohio Association of Claimants’ Counsel and Ohio 

Association for Justice. 

Oldham Kramer and Barbara A. Knapic, urging affirmance for amicus 

curiae Ohio Manufacturers’ Association. 
January Term, 2012 

13 

Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, and Michael J. Hickey, 

urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 

Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., and Thomas R. Sant, urging affirmance for 

amicus curiae Ohio Chapter of the National Federation of Independent Business. 

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, urging 

affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association. 

______________________