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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TARANI JOHNSON AND JOYCELYN 

JOHNSON

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellants

v.

BREWERY CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION 

C/O CAMCO

Appellee No. 425 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered on January 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No.: 130801012

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED MAY 13, 2015

Tarani Johnson and Joycelyn Johnson (collectively, “the Johnsons”) 

appeal the trial court’s January 10, 2014 order1that sustained the 

preliminary objections of the Brewery Condominium Association (“the 

Association”) to the Johnsons’ complaint seeking to quiet title in their favor 

to a condominium that the Association bought at a sheriff’s sale. The trial 

court agreed with the Association that the Johnsons’ suit impermissibly 

sought to collaterally attack the earlier sheriff’s sale. The Johnsons contend 

____________________________________________

1 The order is dated January 6, 2014. However, the docket reflects that 

notice of the order was transmitted to the parties pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236 

on January 10, 2014, rendering that the operative date for purpose of 

appeal.
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that this suit seeks relief that is distinct from, and therefore not precluded 

by, the prior proceedings. We disagree. Consequently, we affirm.

The trial court has provided the following lengthy factual and 

procedural history of this case:

The legal action that led to the sheriff’s sale of [a condominium 

located at 870 North 28th Street, Unit 116, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania (“the Property”),] involved [the Association] filing a 

Confession of Judgment on October 31, 2011[,] against State 

Trustee Services LLC as [t]rustee of 28th Street Silver Apple Land 

Trust [the “Trust,”] the record owner of the Property at the time. 

The Trust was formed by Appellant Tarani Johnson, who was the 

trustee and sole beneficiary of the Trust. The Confession of 

Judgment action in the amount of $48,267.16[,] was filed 

because [the Johnsons] had failed to pay condominium 

assessments for years. [The Association] executed on the 

Confession of Judgment and proceeded to the aforementioned 

sheriff’s sale on June 4, 2013. It was only after the sheriff’s 

sale took place that [the Johnsons] attempted to contest the 

Confession of Judgment.

On June 4, 2013, [the Johnsons] each filed Motions to Intervene 

in the Confession of Judgment Action. On June 24, 2013, each 

of the [Johnsons] also filed Motions to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale 

and Petitions to Open/Strike Confession of Judgment. These 

motions were all predicated on the assertion that the Property 

was never properly conveyed to the Trust, and as a result, [the 

Johnsons] continue to own the Property. This is the same 

argument presented in the instant action. On June 25, 2013, 

the Trust also filed a Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale. Thus, 

[the Johnsons] have, in their various motions, simultaneously 

asserted that the Trust never owned the Property while 

continuing to file motions in the name of the Trust, which, in and 

of itself, renders the instant [a]ppeal disingenuous. [The trial 

court] denied the Motions to Intervene by Orders dated August 

2, 2013. The rest of the Motions were denied by [the trial court] 

via Orders dated and docketed [on] August 13, 2013. [The 

Johnsons] failed to file any motions for reconsideration or 

appeals of these Orders.
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On August 12, 2013, [the Johnsons] initiated the instant action 

to Quiet Title, asserting that they still owned the Property. On 

September 14, 2013[, the Johnsons] filed a lis pendens against 

the [P]roperty. [The Association] filed Preliminary Objections to 

the Quiet Title Complaint on September 16, 2013. Before those 

Preliminary Objections could be ruled upon, on October 5, 2013, 

[the Johnsons] filed an Amended Complaint, rendering [the 

Association’s] first set of Preliminary Objections moot. On 

October 25, 2013, [the Association] then filed a new set of 

Preliminary Objections pertaining to the Amended Complaint. In 

these Preliminary Objections, [the Association] asserted, inter 

alia, that the instant action was an impermissible collateral 

attack on a valid sheriff’s sale.

[The Johnsons] filed a Response to the Preliminary Objections on 

November 17, 2013, asserting that [the Association] engaged in 

“fraudulent conduct”; that the sheriff’s sale was fraudulent and 

ineffective because the sale price differed from the price [that 

the Association] actually paid for the Property; and that the deed 

conveying the property to [the Association] was defective 

because it was voided and reissued without court approval.2 

[The Johnsons] fail, however, to provide any evidence of any 

fraud besides an unsubstantiated and unverified assertion that 

their counsel is in possession of an affidavit from an unnamed 

Sheriff’s Department Deputy Sheriff, one who is allegedly 

involved in an internal affairs unit investigation that would 

allegedly demonstrate that some form of fraud had occurred in 

this matter. This alleged document has not been provided to 

[the trial court], but instead [the Johnsons] requested that the 

document be viewed in camera. However, this “request” was 

merely made as part of Exhibit B (to the Response to Preliminary 

Objections[)], and no such formal request was ever made to this 

Court. Exhibit B is comprised entirely of the following language 

on a sheet of paper with no identifying letterhead: “The affidavit 

of the Sheriff’s Department Deputy Sheriff involved in the 

internal affairs unit investigation of this matter is in the 

possession of [the Johnsons’] counsel. Due to the fact that this 

is an active, on-going investigation involving fraud and theft 

charges that may involve other parties not yet identified, [the 

Johnsons’] counsel respectfully requests that this affidavit be 

reviewed by the court in camera and placed under seal—FOR 

JUDGE’S EYES ONLY.” Without any evidence, [the trial court] 

cannot ascertain that any fraud has occurred.

________________
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2

[The Johnsons] assert that “no sale had been completed 

as [the Association] had not paid the full price for the 

Property and had only made a deposit on the Property[,] 

despite the fact that the Deed issued by the Sheriff’s Office 

stated that [the Association] had paid the full price.” 

Response to Preliminary Objections at ¶ 14. [The 

Johnsons] also argue that “[the Association] is asserting 

ownership based upon a fraudulent [s]heriff’s [s]ale and a 

defective Deed that was voided once and reissued without 

court approval.” Id. at ¶ 39. There is no evidence in the 

record of a price discrepancy or any sort of defective deed. 

The sheriff’s deed was delivered on June 24, 2013, and the 

recording of said deed on September 17, 2013[,] shows no 

corrections. See Amended Complaint, Exh. D. These 

arguments were also made in the Amended Complaint, but 

accusations that [the Association] engaged in fraudulent 

conduct or that the sheriff’s sale was fraudulent were not 

raised until the Response to the Preliminary Objections.

[The trial court] sustained the Preliminary Objections via an 

order dated January 6, 2014[, and filed on January 10, 2014], 

striking the lis pendens and dismissing the instant action. In 

response, [the Johnsons] filed a Notice of Appeal with the 

Superior Court on February 3, 2014[.] [V]ia an order docketed 

on February 5, 2014, and pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), [the 

trial] court ordered [the Johnsons] to file a Concise Statement of 

[Errors] Complained of on Appeal . . . . [The Johnsons] did so, 

filing their [concise statement] on February 20, 2014.

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 4/15/2014, at 1-4 (citations omitted or 

modified; emphasis in original; some footnotes omitted). The trial court 

then furnished the above-excerpted opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), 

ripening the case for our consideration.

As they did in their Rule 1925(b) statement, the Johnsons assert 

seven issues for review, several of which are redundant, just as are the 

corresponding arguments. For reasons of economy, the second issue 

reproduced below incorporates four issues that separately raise identical or 
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closely related arguments. Issues one, three, and four, as set forth below, 

corresponding respectively to the Johnsons’ first, sixth, and seventh issues 

as stated, are reproduced verbatim.

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 

sustained [the Association’s] preliminary objections, dismissed 

[the Johnsons’] amended complaint[,] and struck the lis 

pendens, based upon the theories of res judicata and collateral 

estoppel[], as advanced by [the Association], since such a 

determination required the court to look at facts outside of the 

“four corners” of [the Johnsons’] amended complaint?

2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 

sustained [the Association’s] preliminary objections since the 

determination by the court was based upon facts not of record in 

the instant case, failed to draw all reasonable inferences from 

the facts set forth in the amended complaint in favor of [the 

Johnsons], and refused to review or consider the facts and 

supporting evidence presented by [the Johnsons in their answer 

to [the Association’s] preliminary objections?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it failed 

to either review in camera, or even entertain [the Johnsons’] 

request for an in camera review of, the affidavit of Deputy 

Sheriff Parsons that was referenced to [sic] by [the Johnsons] in 

support of their answer to [the Association’s] preliminary 

objections?

4. Whether the trial court demonstrated bias toward[] [the 

Johnsons] in sustaining [the Association’s] preliminary objections 

where the trial judge who decided the instant preliminary 

objections was the same judge who presided over the motions 

filed by [the Johnsons] in the prior case and allowed her opinions 

formulated against [the Johnsons] in the prior case to affect her 

decision in the instant case?

Brief for the Johnsons at 11-12.

Our well-settled standard of review of an order sustaining or denying 

preliminary objections is as follows:
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“Our standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling 

or granting preliminary objections is to determine whether the 

trial court committed an error of law. When considering the 

appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the 

appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court.” 

De Lage Landen Fin’l Servs., Inc., v. Urban P'ship, LLC,

903 A.2d 586, 589 (Pa. Super. 2006).

“Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test 

the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” When considering 

preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the 

challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all 

inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary 

objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action 

should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and 

free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove 

facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If any 

doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be 

sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the 

preliminary objections.

Hykes v. Hughes, 835 A.2d 382, 383 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted).

Haun v. Comm. Health Sys., Inc., 14 A.3d 120, 123 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citations modified). Because a demurrer tests solely the adequacy of the 

pleadings, “no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be 

considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by a demurrer.” Mellon 

Bank, N.A., v. Fabinyi, 650 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. Super. 1994). Moreover, 

“[w]hen reviewing a trial court’s disposition of preliminary objections, this 

Court is only obligated to consider as true all of the well-pleaded material 

facts set forth in the complaint. This Court is not required to accept 

allegations to the extent that they constitute conclusions of law.” 

Glassmere Fuel Serv., Inc., v. Clear, 900 A.2d 398, 404 n.2 
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(Pa. Super. 2006) (emphasis in original; citations omitted); accord Joyce v. 

Erie Ins. Exch., 74 A.3d 157, 168 (Pa. Super. 2013).

With this standard in mind, we begin our discussion with the facts as 

pleaded by the Johnsons in their amended complaint, granting them the full 

benefit of their factual averments and all favorable factual inferences

therefrom. Tarani Johnson purchased the Property on April 4, 2004. 

Amended Complaint at 1 ¶ 5 (unnumbered). By deed recorded on July 15, 

2004, Tarani Johnson conveyed a one-half undivided interest in the Property 

to her mother, Joycelyn Johnson. Id. at 1 ¶ 6. On September 18, 2007, the 

Johnsons “attempted to convey the Premises, by Quit Claim Deed, to State 

Trustee Services, LLC[,] as Trustee of 28th St. Silver Apple Land Trust 

(hereinafter “the Trust”) . . . . [The Trust] is a trust wherein [Tarani 

Johnson] is a named beneficiary.” Id. at 1 ¶ 7. In October 2011, the 

Association filed a confession of judgment against the Trust “based upon an 

alleged breach of a condominium association agreement wherein [the 

Johnsons], or the current owner of [the Property], purportedly agreed to pay 

certain fees to the [A]ssociation owed by virtue of ownership of a unit in the 

[Association’s] condominium complex.” Id. at 1-2 ¶ 8. The Association 

then voluntarily stayed execution on “the confessed judgment against the 

Trust and allowed [Tarani Johnson] to attempt to sell the [Property] through 

[a] private sale.” Id.at 2 ¶ 9. 

In August 2012, Tarani Johnson received an offer to purchase the 

Property from Sandra Wang, a vice president of the Association, through 
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Wang’s business entity. “Pursuant to that offer, [the Association] performed 

a title search on the [Property] and discovered that the Quit Claim Deed that 

attempted to convey title of the [Property] to the Trust was defective and 

failed to pass title to the Trust.” Id. at 2 ¶ 10.

Upon learning of the defective title in August 2012, [the 

Association], through its agents, attempted to have [the 

Johnsons] sign a corrective [d]eed that correctly conveyed title 

to the Trust. [The Johnsons] refused to execute that [d]eed 

and, instead, executed and recorded a corrective [d]eed, dated 

November 8, 2012[,] and recorded November 8, 2012 . . ., 

[that] conveyed title to the [Property] from the Trust to [the 

Johnsons].

Id. at 2 ¶ 11.2

Thereafter, the Association executed on the confessed judgment 

against the Trust, seeking to have the Property sold at a sheriff’s sale. 

However, the court ordered a stay of the April 2013 sale, and, on or about 

June 4, 2013, the Property was “allegedly purchased by [the Association’s] 

attorney . . . on behalf of [the Association] for $21,600[,] as evidenced by 

____________________________________________

2 Although the Johnsons attached a copy of this “corrective deed” to 

their amended complaint, it is unclear how, if they are correct that the 

Property had never been conveyed properly to the Trust, the Trust could 

have conveyed the Property back to the Johnsons. We also note that, while 

the Johnsons saw fit to attempt to clarify their individual ownership interests 

in the Property, they took no other action to address the pending confessed 

judgment or otherwise remove the obvious cloud from the title to the 

Property until after the sheriff’s sale, upon the day of which they finally 

sought untimely to intervene in that action. Furthermore, the Johnsons do 

not contend that they did not have notice of the confessed judgment or 

sheriff’s sale proceedings.
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the [d]eed from the Sheriff of Philadelphia County, dated June 24, 2013[,] 

and recorded July 18, 2013.” Id. at 2 ¶ 12. At the sheriff’s sale, the 

Association paid only $3,016 “and failed to complete the [s]heriff [s]ale 

transaction despite the fact that the [s]heriff’s [d]eed stated that the sum of 

$21,600 was paid at the time of the June 4, 2013 [sheriff’s s]ale.” Id. at 2 

¶ 13.

In the pleadings that follow these, the Johnsons assert a litany of 

putative reasons that the sale was “defective and invalid,” which consist in 

part of conclusions of law that our standard of review does not require us to 

assume are correct, including the following:

 The Association failed to pay the full price for the Property.

 The Association failed to file a writ of possession with the 

Philadelphia Sheriff before the sale.

 The Association failed to file a complaint in ejectment against 

the Trust or the Johnsons, as required by rule to effectuate 

the purchase.

 In violation of governing rules, in July 2013, the sheriff’s 

department voided the “defective” sheriff’s deed via the 

Philadelphia Department of Records, as confirmed by an 

August 2, 2013 letter from that department. Following the 

Johnsons’ commencement of this action by complaint on 

August 12, 2013, the Association “somehow obtained a 

reissuance of the June 24, 2013 defective deed” and 

rerecorded it on September 17, 2013.

Id. at 2-3 ¶¶ 13-19. In closing, the Johnsons insist that the Association 

“has no right, title or interest, at law or in equity, with respect to the 

[Property].” Id. at 3 ¶ 20. 
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In response to the amended complaint, the Association filed 

preliminary objections. Therein, they asserted that the Johnsons’ and/or the 

Trust’s rights in the Property had been extinguished by sheriff’s sale. Thus, 

the Johnsons could not commence a quiet title action under Pa.R.C.P. 10613

because the court already had determined the ownership of the property, 

rendering the instant action an impermissible collateral attack on the earlier 

sheriff’s sale. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Preliminary Objections 

by the Association at 7 (unnumbered). Because a sheriff’s sale can only be 

attacked in a collateral proceeding in the presence of fraud or for want of the 

sheriff’s authority to complete the sale, neither of which the Johnsons 

pleaded adequately within the four corners of their amended complaint, the 

Johnsons failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id.

(citing Keystone Collieries v. Mudge, 100 A. 526, 527 (Pa. 1917)).

The trial court offered two related bases for sustaining the 

Association’s preliminary objections: First, the Johnsons “have no legal 

interest in the Property since the deed to the Property was delivered to [the 

Association] following the sheriff’s sale.” Second, the Johnson’s “Quiet Title 

action is an impermissible collateral attack on said sheriff’s sale.” T.C.O. 

at 5. Because we find that the trial court’s second basis for sustaining the 

____________________________________________

3 Rule 1061 provides, in relevant part, that an action to quiet title may 

be brought “to determine any right, lien, title or interest in” property. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(2).
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Association’s preliminary objections by itself requires us to affirm the trial 

court’s ruling, we review only that aspect of its reasoning, which the trial 

court related as follows:

[T]he instant Quiet Title Action is an improper collateral attack 

on the underlying confession of judgment action. A sheriff’s sale 

and the underlying judgment normally may not be challenged in 

a collateral proceeding, including by a later action to quiet title. 

Roberts v. Gibson, 251 A.2d 799, 800 (Pa. Super. 1969) (citing

Caplan v. Kent, 76 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1950)). The acknowledgment 

of a sheriff’s deed passes valid title except in limited situations of 

fraud or where there is a lack of authority conducting a sale. 

Roberts, 251 A.2d at 801. In the instant matter, [the 

Johnsons] have attempted to assert that the sheriff’s sale was 

predicated upon fraud, but have failed to provide any evidence 

whatsoever of fraudulent activity. [The Johnsons] have 

exhausted their attempts to challenge the sheriff’s sale in the 

initial proceeding and are not entitled to continue to challenge 

the final result. 

T.C.O. at 6.

In their first and second issues, the Johnsons contend that the trial 

court committed an error of law when it sustained the Association’s 

preliminary objections on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 

They further contend that the trial court exceeded its limited review of the 

contents of the four corners of the complaint by taking judicial notice of the 

prior confession of judgment and sheriff’s sale proceedings. “[T]he trial 

court only looked to [the Johnsons’] amended complaint to identify facts that 

were related to those allegedly pled in the Confession Action. The trial court 

completely ignored the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint that 

supported the issues . . . related to the first and second Sheriff’s Deed(s).” 
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Brief for the Johnsons at 18 (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 887 A.2d 788, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2005)).

We may dispense quickly with the Johnsons’ first issue. Although the 

Association raised res judicata in its preliminary objections, the trial court 

did not purport to rule against the Johnsons on that basis. Whether a 

collateral attack on a sheriff’s sale will lie presents a distinct issue from res 

judicata, as such. Thus, the Johnsons’ first issue warrants no further 

discussion.

The Johnsons’ argument in support of their second issue, concerning 

the trial court’s taking notice of the confessed judgment and sheriff’s sale 

proceedings, fares no better. Indeed, the case they cite in support of their 

claim that the trial court erred does more to undermine their argument than 

to support it. In Kelly, this Court held that, “[w]hen considering a 

demurrer[,] a court cannot ordinarily take judicial notice in one case of the 

records of another case, whether in another court or its own, even though 

the contents of those records may be known to the court.” 887 A.2d at 791 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, this Court 

further elaborated that, if the appellant’s complaint “reference[d] . . . the 

prior action,” then “it would be appropriate for the court to take notice of it.” 

Id. Similarly, in 220 Partnership v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 650 A.2d 

1094 (Pa. Super. 1994), this Court made the following observation: 

[A] court must severely restrict the principle of judicial notice, as 

the purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the legal basis for the 

complaint, not its factual truthfulness. . . . A court, in ruling on 
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a demurrer, should refrain from noticing any fact [that] is not 

literally indisputable and which the parties could not reasonably 

raise in further pleadings or on argument at trial.

Id. at 1097 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 

general preclusion of evidence of collateral proceedings yields to allow 

“notice of a fact [that] . . . is incorporated into the complaint by reference to 

a prior court action.” Id. 

Although in this case the Johnsons omit specifically to refer to, e.g.,

certain of their and the Trust’s filings in connection with the sheriff’s sale, 

they nonetheless refer at length to the sheriff’s sale proceedings, 

incorporating all of the most critical procedural steps in that process into 

their complaint. Having introduced the facts and details of those prior 

actions in their own complaint, the Johnsons left the trial court a simple 

choice: Accept these selective references to the prior proceedings without 

further scrutiny, or take judicial notice of the proceedings in toto to provide 

context for evaluating the Johnsons’ claims relative to that prior action, 

which lay at the heart of the Johnsons’ instant quiet title action. Nothing in 

our case law suggests that one can rely pervasively upon past proceedings 

to support one’s complaint while maintaining that the trial court errs in 

considering those proceedings in their full context.4

____________________________________________

4 The Johnsons object to the trial court’s observation that they declined 

to appeal the trial court’s denial of their motions to intervene in the sheriff’s 

sale of the Property. They argue, based upon a note to Pa.R.A.P. 341, that 

they were barred categorically from doing so. See, inter alia, Brief for the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In a related contention regarding the propriety of the trial court’s 

review of the Association’s preliminary objections, and specifically the 

recurring claim that the court improperly looked outside the Johnsons’ 

pleading and made impermissible findings of disputed fact, the Johnsons 

argue that the trial court improperly assumed there was the one sheriff’s 

deed, delivered on June 2, 2013, rather than the two posited by the 

Johnsons.

The unrefuted facts presented to the trial court were the facts 

contained in the amended complaint related to the first and 

second deeds. Despite this fact, the trial court completely 

ignored these facts of record and determined that there was only 

one deed that was recorded once. It cannot be said that this 

determination by the trial court was a “reasonable inference” 

deducible from the well-pleaded material facts in the amended 

complaint since this finding is in direct contravention to the facts 

recited in the [complaint].

Brief for the Johnsons at 22 (citations omitted). These portions of the 

complaint are shot through with conclusions of law that neither the trial 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Johnsons at 21 (citing T.C.O. at 6). However, the note to Rule 341 also lists 

a series of orders that, while they are not appealable as final orders, might 

be appealed under Rules 312 (interlocutory appeals by permission) or 313 

(collateral orders). The Johnsons did not seek recourse to either of these 

provisions and do not now acknowledge these familiar methods by which 

such orders may be appealed. Accordingly, it is incorrect that the Johnsons 

could not promptly, non-frivolously have sought appellate review of the trial 

court’s denial of their motions to intervene and to open or strike the 

confession of judgment. Thus, the trial court did not err in noting that the 

Johnsons’ voluntarily declined to exhaust the potential appellate remedies 

available to them.
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court nor this court is obligated to accept as true or construe in favor of the 

complainant. See Glassmere Fuel Serv., supra.

In tandem with the Johnsons’ second issue, we also must consider 

what we have renumbered the Johnsons’ third issue. Therein, the Johnsons 

argue that the trial court improperly refused to consider a putative request 

to the court to review in camera and under seal an affidavit from an 

unnamed deputy sheriff that was attached as exhibit B to the Johnsons’ filing 

in opposition to the Association’s preliminary objections. The unsworn, 

unsigned document in question is sandwiched as exhibit B between a 

transcript of a rule to show cause hearing in the sheriff’s sale proceedings 

and a reproduction of the amended complaint. It provides in full:

The affidavit of the Sheriff’s Department Deputy Sheriff 

involved in the internal affairs unit investigation of this 

matter is in the possession of Plaintiff’s counsel.

Due to the fact that this is an active, on-going 

investigation involving fraud and theft charges that may 

involve other parties not yet identified, [the Johnsons’] 

counsel respectfully requests that this affidavit be 

reviewed by the court in camera and placed under seal—

FOR JUDGE’S EYES ONLY.

Johnsons’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Response to the 

Association’s Preliminary Objections, Exh. B (emphasis in original). 

The trial court acknowledged the existence of this attachment, but 

emphasized that the Johnsons made no proper request for the trial court to 

review any such affidavit in camera or to admit it under seal. The court 

explained that “[w]ithout any evidence, [the trial court] cannot ascertain 
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that any fraud has occurred.” T.C.O. at 3. We add to the trial court’s apt 

observation that the document itself is hopelessly vague regarding the 

putative affidavit to which it refers and offers no proffer regarding how the 

affiant would inform the Johnsons’ claims or render the Association’s 

preliminary objections unsustainable.5

This brings our discussion full circle. Labor as the Johnsons might to 

distinguish this claim from the earlier confession of judgment and sheriff’s 

sale proceedings, it is simply unreasonable, in light of the Johnsons’ 

unambiguous pleadings, to ask a court to ignore the fact that the amended 

complaint’s entire substance is comprised of a lengthy attack on the earlier 

proceedings that led to the legally consummated sheriff’s sale. That is to 

say, it must be understood as a collateral attack on the sheriff’s sale, no 

matter how elliptically fashioned. 

____________________________________________

5

In their response to the Association’s preliminary objections, the 

Johnsons cite the exhibit in support of their averments that the sheriff’s deed 

to the Property was delivered in violation of governing rules because the 

listed purchase price allegedly was not remitted in full to the sheriff. See

Johnsons’ Response to the Association’s Preliminary Objections at 3 ¶ 10, 6 

¶ 39; Johnsons’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Response to the 

Association’s Preliminary Objections at 2 (unnumbered). In none of these 

instances do the Johnsons indicate how the putative sheriff’s affidavit to 

which the exhibit refers would support those claims. Moreover, averments 

regarding the sheriff’s compliance with governing rules that the Johnsons 

neither cite nor describe are averments of law to which no deference is 

owed. Nothing in the response, the brief, or in the vague implications 

regarding what the alleged sheriff’s affidavit might say contravenes or 

disputes the fact that a sheriff’s deed for the Property was delivered to the 

Association on June 24, 2013, nearly two months before the Johnsons filed 

the instant complaint.
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About such a collateral attack, our Court has spoken clearly:

[A]n attack on a sheriff’s sale usually cannot be made in a 

collateral proceeding. In Caplan v. Kent, 76 A.2d 764 

(Pa. 1950), it was held that a sheriff’s return, regular on its face, 

could not be attacked collaterally in a bill in equity to quiet title. 

“Confirmation of a sheriff’s deed cures irregularities and defects, 

which make the sale voidable * * *.” McLanahan v. 

Goodman, 108 A. 206, 208 (Pa. 1919). In Mencke v. 

Rosenberg, 51 A. 767, 769 (Pa. 1902), the court said in 

reference to an ejectment action: “This is a proceeding 

collateral to that under which the land was sold. The 

acknowledgment of the sheriff’s deed passed a valid title to the 

purchaser, unless there was fraud or want of authority in the 

sale.” After reiterating this rule in Knox v. Noggle, 196 A. 18 

(Pa. 1938), the court added: “(T)he distinction is * * * between 

irregularities in the proceedings, misdescriptions of the property, 

the sale of several tracts as an entirety, defect of title, and 

similar objection, on the one hand, all of which are foreclosed 

as defenses by delivery of the sheriff’s deed, and, on the 

other, attacks upon the sale on the ground that it was 

unauthorized, or vitiated by fraud, in which cases the right of 

redress survives such delivery.” 196 A. at 19-20.

Roberts, 251 A.2d at 800-01 (citations modified; emphasis added).

To survive a demurrer, a plaintiff asserting fraud must plead the 

factual basis for that claim with particularity:

“In order to protect those against whom generalized and 

unsupported fraud may be levied, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure require that fraud be averred with particularity.” 

Presbyterian Med. Cen. v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 1072 

(Pa Super. 2003) (quotation marks omitted); see 

Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b).

While it is impossible to establish precise standards as to 

the degree of particularity required in a given situation, 

two conditions must always be met. The pleadings must 

adequately explain the nature of the claim to the opposing 

party so as to permit him to prepare a defense and they 
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must be sufficient to convince the court that the 

averments are not merely subterfuge.

Kelshaw, 611 A.2d at 1235 (quoting Bata v. Central Penn 

Nat’l Bank of Phila., 224 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1966)).

Youndt v. First Nat’l Bank of Port Allegany, 868 A.2d 539, 544-45 

(Pa. Super. 2005) (citations modified). 

The Johnsons’ amended complaint does not even contain the word 

“fraud” or allegations that, read in the light most favorable to the Johnsons, 

provide a factual basis upon which it might be found that the Association, 

the sheriff’s office, or anyone else privy to the events underlying this case 

committed fraud. Although allegations of “fraud” finally appear in the 

Johnsons’ response to the Association’s preliminary objections, the Johnsons’ 

bare reliance upon an unfurnished affidavit without any material proffer does 

not provide the particularity necessary to survive a demurrer.6 

Consequently, the Johnsons failed to plead a claim of fraud sufficient to 

enable them to proceed with their collateral attack on the sheriff’s sale of the 

Property.

To the extent the Johnsons’ argument sounds in what the Knox Court 

identified as a “defect of title,” it is clear that the undisputed delivery of the 

____________________________________________

6 Moreover, as the Johnsons repeatedly emphasize in other connections, 

it is the complaint alone that governs whether a demurrer will be sustained. 

Allegations of fraud and putative support for same that do not appear in the 

complaint are immaterial to the legal sufficiency of the pleading. See 

Fabinyi, 650 A.2d at 899 (“[N]o testimony or other evidence outside of the 

complaint may be considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by a 

demurrer.”).
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sheriff’s deed in this case vitiated that defect such that no collateral attack 

on the sale would lie. See T.C.O. at 5-6 (noting that the sheriff’s deed was 

acknowledged by the Association on June 24, 2013); Roberts, 251 A.2d at 

800-01 (noting that any defect of title conveyed following a sheriff’s sale is 

cured by delivery of the deed). The Johnsons provide no case law to the 

contrary, and they make no effort to preclude the application of this bedrock 

principle in the instant case. Consequently, the Johnsons’ numerous 

challenges to the trial court’s ruling fail before the limitations Pennsylvania 

courts employ to ensure that sheriff’s sales may be attacked in collateral 

proceedings only when the underlying proceedings rendered the sale void 

rather than merely voidable. See Roberts, supra. The Johnsons’ 

complaint’s factual averments, even read in the most favorable light, do not 

establish that the sale at issue was void on its face or the product of fraud. 

At most, the averments establish that the title was voidable by virtue of one 

or more defects, which were cured as a matter of law upon delivery of the 

title to the Association. Consequently, the instant action is an impermissible 

collateral attack on that sale, and the trial court did not err in so ruling.

This leaves only what we have denominated the Johnsons’ fourth 

issue. Therein, the Johnsons contend that, because they failed to achieve 

the desired result during the earlier confession of judgment and sheriff’s sale 

proceedings, which were heard before the same trial judge as the instant 

matter, the judge should have been disqualified from deciding the instant 

case. See Brief for the Johnsons at 27. Acknowledging that, typically, the 
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issue of “judicial bias” must be presented first before the trial court, the 

Johnsons attempt to sidestep this issue as follows:

[The Johnsons] were unable to raise the issue of bias before the 

trial [c]ourt since evidence of bias was not revealed until after 

the court ruled on [the Association’s] preliminary objections. 

Prior to that time, there was no reason to believe that the trial 

court’s review, and final decision, in the instant case would rely 

solely upon [the Association’s] assertions as set forth in its 

preliminary objections and upon the trial court’s findings and 

opinions developed in a prior case that did not involve [the 

Johnsons].

Id. at 27. The Johnsons go on to note that the litany of complained-of 

decisions made by the trial court—all of which we have found do not 

constitute errors of law or abuses of discretion—“demonstrate the type of 

egregious judicial misconduct proscribed by the appellate court[s]. This 

utter disregard of the facts by the trial court[] as set forth in [the Johnsons’] 

amended complaint[] clearly demonstrated bias against [the Johnsons].” 

Id. In short, the Johnsons acknowledge that nothing about the earlier 

decision by itself signaled bias, but submit that the mere fact of a second 

adverse ruling in this case does precisely that. Having found that the trial 

court’s ruling was necessitated by the law precluding collateral attacks on 

sheriff’s sales, we can conceive of no basis upon which to find that the trial 

court acted out of bias. This issue, too, lacks merit.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/13/2015