18

- 2953 Doucoure v. Barr BIA A 095 862 113 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**



## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER**  **FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED**  **AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX**  **OR AN ELECTR ONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION**  **“ SUMMARY ORDER**  **” ). A**  **PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.** 
**At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals** 1 **for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Mar**  **shall** 2 **United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of**  3 **New York, on the 2**  **2 n**  **d d**  **a y of**  **D e**  **c e**  **m b**  **e r**  **, two thousand twenty**  **.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JOSÉ A. CABRANES,** 7 **REENA RAGGI,** 8 **SUSAN L. CARNEY,** 9 **Circuit Judges.** 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **MAKAN DOUCOURE ,**  13 **Petitioner ,**  14 15

**v. 18** 
**- 2953**  16 **NAC** 17 **WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES**  18 **ATTORNEY GENERAL ,**  19 **Respondent .**  20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER :**  Genet Getachew , Law Office of 23 Genet Getachew, Brooklyn , NY

. 24 25 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Jeffrey Bossert Clark , Acting 26 Assistant Attorney General ; 27 Brianne Whelan Cohen , Senior 28 Litigation Counsel ; Robbin K. 292 Blaya , Trial Attorney, Office of 1 Immigration Litigation, United 2 States Department of Justice, 3 Washington, D C. 4
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 5
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 6
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petitio n for review 7

is DENIED

. 8

Petitioner Makan Doucoure , a native and citizen of 9

Mauritania , seeks review of a September 26, 2018 , decision of 10

the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Makan D o ucoure, 11

No. A 095 862 113 (B.I.A. Sept. 26, 2018 )

. We assume the 12
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 13
history in this case. The applicable standards of review are 14

well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey , 546 F.3d 15

138, 168

– 69 (2d Cir. 2008). 16

Doucoure moved to reopen his proceedings based on his 17
support for an anti

- slavery activist group while in the United 18

States and the Mauritanian government’s persecution of anti

19

slavery groups. It is undisputed that Doucoure’s motion to 20
reopen was untimely and num ber barred because it was his 21
second motion to reopen filed more than 14 years after he was 22

ordered removed

. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 233 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although t he time and numerical 1
limitations do not apply if the motion is to reop en 2
proceedings in order to apply for asylum “based on changed 3
country conditions arising in the country of nationality or 4
the country to which removal has been ordered, if such 5

evidence is material and was not available and would not have 6

been discovered o r presented at the previous 7
proceeding , ” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. 8

§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) , substantial evidence supports the BIA’s 9

conclusion that Doucoure failed to establish a material 10

change related to the continued practice of slavery and 11
suppression of anti

- slavery groups in Mauritania since his 12
2004 proceedings, s ee In re S

- Y

- G

- , 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 13
(BIA 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a 14
motion to reopen demonstra tes a material change in country 15
conditions that would justify reopening, [the agency] 16
compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with 17

the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits 18
hearing below.”). 19

At the time of his merits he aring in 2004, Doucoure 20

submitted evidence describing the l ong history of slavery in 214 Mauritania , that the Mauritanian government had banned or 1
refused to authorize several political parties, including 2

anti

- slavery non

- governmental organizations, and that the 3

government had detained the leader of an anti

- slavery 4

activist group. The evidence he submitted in su pport of 5
reopening described similar conditions of the continued 6
practice of slavery despite its illegality, the suppression 7

of anti

- slavery groups, and the arrest and imprisonment of 8

support ers who campaign for abolitionist movements. B ased 9

on this recor d, the BIA was not compelled to conclude that 10
conditions in Mauritania had materially worsened. See 8 11
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“the administrative findings of fact 12
are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be 13

compelled to conclude to the contr ary”); Jian Hui Shao , 546 14

F.3d at 168

– 69. Accordingly, we find n o abuse of discretion 15

in the BIA’s denial of Doucoure’s motion to reopen as untimely 16

and number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i), 17

(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3). 18

Because th is basis for the denial of the motion to reopen 19
is dispositive, we do not reach the BIA’s alternate ruling 20
that Doucoure failed to establish prima facie eligibility for 215 relief. See INS v. Abudu , 485 U.S. 94, 104

– 05 (1988) (agency 1

may deny untime ly motion for failure to show material change 2
or for failure to establish prima facie eligibility); INS v. 3

Bagamasbad , 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts 4
and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the 5

decision of which is unnec essary to the results they reach.”). 6
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 7

DENIED

. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 8

stays VACATED. 9

FOR THE COURT: 10 Catherine O ’ Hagan Wolfe , 11 Clerk of Court 12