PRELIMINARY PRINT 

Volume 598 U. S. Part 2 

Pages 432–448 

OFFICIAL REPORTS 

OF 

THE SUPREME COURT 

May 18, 2023 

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF 

reporter of decisions 

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NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before 

the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter 

of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, 

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. 
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432 OCTOBER TERM, 2022 

Syllabus 

POLSELLI et al. v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 

the sixth circuit 

No. 21–1599. Argued March 29, 2023—Decided May 18, 2023 

The Internal Revenue Service has the power to issue summonses to pursue unpaid federal taxes and the people who owe them. When the IRS 

issues a summons, it must generally provide notice to any person identifed in the summons, 26 U. S. C. § 7609(a)(1). Anyone entitled to such 

notice may then bring a motion to quash the summons, § 7609(b)(2)(A). 

But when the IRS issues a summons “in aid of the collection of . . . an 

assessment made . . . against the person with respect to whose liability 

the summons is issued,” no notice is required, § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). 

In this case, the IRS entered official assessments against Remo 

Polselli for more than $2 million in unpaid taxes and penalties. Revenue Offcer Michael Bryant issued summonses to three banks seeking 

fnancial records of several third parties, including petitioners, who then 

moved to quash the summonses. The District Court concluded that, 

under § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i), no notice was required and that petitioners 

therefore could not bring a motion to quash. The Sixth Circuit affrmed, fnding that the summonses fell squarely within the exception in 

§ 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to the general notice requirement. 

Held: The Court rejects petitioners' argument that the exception to the 

notice requirement in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies only if the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the accounts or records summoned by the 

IRS. Pp. 438–445. 

(a) The statute sets forth three conditions to exempt the IRS from 

providing notice in circumstances like these. First, a summons must 

be “issued in aid of . . . collection,” § 7609(c)(2)(D). Second, it must aid 

the collection of “an assessment made or judgment rendered,” § 7609(c) 

(2)(D)(i). Third, a summons must aid the collection of assessments or 

judgments “against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued,” § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). The statute does not mention legal 

interest, much less require that a taxpayer maintain such an interest 

for the exception to apply. Pp. 438–439. 

(b) Petitioners' arguments in support of their proposed legal interest 

test do not convince the Court to abandon an ordinary reading of the 

notice exception. Petitioners frst contend the phrase “in aid of the 

collection” refers only to inquiries that “directly advance” the IRS's collection efforts, which a summons will not accomplish unless it is targeted 
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Cite as: 598 U. S. 432 (2023) 433 

Syllabus 

at an account containing assets that the IRS can collect to satisfy the 

taxpayer's liability. This argument ignores the typical meaning of “in 

aid of.” To “aid” means “[t]o help” or “assist.” A summons that may 

not itself reveal taxpayer assets that can be collected may nonetheless 

help the IRS fnd such assets. 

Petitioners next argue that if § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) is read to exempt from 

notice every summons that helps the IRS collect an “assessment” 

against a delinquent taxpayer, there would be no work left for the second exception to notice, found in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(ii), to do. Clause (ii) 

exempts from notice any summons “issued in aid of the collection 

of . . . the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fduciary of 

any person referred to in clause (i).” The two clauses apply in different 

circumstances: clause (i) applies upon an assessment, while clause (ii) 

applies upon a fnding of liability. In addition, clause (i) concerns delinquent taxpayers, while clause (ii) concerns transferees or fduciaries. 

As a result, clause (ii) permits the IRS to issue unnoticed summonses 

to aid its collection from transferees or fduciaries before it makes an 

offcial assessment of liability. Pp. 439–443. 

(c) The Court does not dismiss any apprehension about the scope of 

the IRS's power to issue summonses and does not defne the precise 

contours of the phrase “in aid of the collection.” The briefng by the 

parties and the question presented focus only on whether § 7609(c) 

(2)(D)(i) requires that a taxpayer maintain a legal interest in records 

summoned by the IRS. The answer is no. Pp. 443–445. 

23 F. 4th 616, affrmed. 

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Jackson, J., fled a concurring opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, post, p. 445. 

Shay Dvoretzky argued the cause for petitioners. With 

him on the briefs were Parker Rider-Longmaid, Kyser 

Blakely, Raza Rasheed, Maurice A. Rose, and Jerry 

Abraham. 

Ephraim A. McDowell argued the cause for respondent. 

With him on the brief were Solicitor General Prelogar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Hubbert, Deputy Solicitor 

General Gannon, Francesca Ugolini, and Michael J. 

Haungs.* 

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the Center for 

Taxpayer Rights et al. by Melissa Arbus Sherry, Amy Feinberg, Eric J. 

Konopka, and David D. Cole; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
434 POLSELLI v. IRS 

Opinion of the Court 

Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the 

Court. 

For as long as Americans have had to pay taxes, at least 

some have tried to avoid them. And for as long as Americans have avoided taxes, the Internal Revenue Service and 

its predecessors have tried to collect them. As an old joke 

goes: “I believe we should all pay taxes with a smile. I tried 

but they wanted cash.” 

Congress has given the IRS considerable power to go after 

unpaid taxes. One tool at the Service's disposal is the authority to summon people with information concerning a delinquent taxpayer. But to safeguard privacy, the IRS is 

generally required to provide notice to anyone named in a 

summons, who can then sue to quash it. Today's case concerns an exception to that general rule. 

I 

To pursue unpaid taxes and the people who owe them, 

“Congress has granted the Service broad latitude to issue 

summonses.” United States v. Clarke, 573 U. S. 248, 250 

(2014). Among other things, the IRS may issue a summons 

to “determin[e] the liability” of a taxpayer or “any transferee 

or fduciary” for unpaid taxes. 26 U. S. C. § 7602(a). The 

IRS also may serve a summons to “collec[t] any such liability.” Ibid. These summonses can extend to third parties 

beyond the taxpayer under investigation. Tiffany Fine 

Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U. S. 310, 315–316 (1985). 

Accordingly, the IRS may request the production of “books, 

papers, records, or other data” from “any person” who 

States of America by Carter G. Phillips and William R. Levi; for the 

Institute for Justice by Paul Sherman, Joshua Windham, and Robert E. 

Johnson; for the National Taxpayers Union Foundation by Tyler Martinez 

and Joseph D. Henchman; and for The Rutherford Institute et al. by Michael B. Kimberly, Ethan H. Townsend, John W. Whitehead, Clark M. 

Neily III, and Matthew P. Cavedon. 

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Opinion of the Court 

possesses information concerning a delinquent taxpayer. 

§ 7602(a)(2). 

Given the breadth of this power, Congress has imposed 

certain safeguards. The IRS must generally give “notice of 

the summons” to “any person . . . identifed in the summons.” 

§ 7609(a)(1). Anyone entitled to notice can bring a motion 

to quash the summons. § 7609(b)(2)(A). And the Internal 

Revenue Code provides district courts with “jurisdiction to 

hear and determine any proceeding” concerning a motion to 

quash, § 7609(h)(1), thereby waiving the sovereign immunity 

of the United States, see FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 290 

(2012). 

There are, however, exceptions to the notice requirement. 

As relevant, the IRS need not provide notice to a person 

“who is identifed in the summons,” § 7609(a)(1), if the summons is: 

“issued in aid of the collection of— 

“(i) an assessment made or judgment rendered 

against the person with respect to whose liability the 

summons is issued; or 

“(ii) the liability at law or in equity of any transferee 

or fduciary of any person referred to in clause (i).” 

§ 7609(c)(2)(D). 

In other words, the IRS may issue summonses both to determine whether a taxpayer owes money and later to collect 

any outstanding liability. When the IRS conducts an investigation for the purpose of “determining the liability” of a 

taxpayer, § 7602(a), it must provide notice, § 7609(a)(1). But 

once the Service has reached the stage of “collecting any 

such liability,” § 7602(a)—which is a distinct activity—notice 

may not be required, § 7609(c)(2)(D). 

II 

For multiple years between 2005 and 2017, Remo Polselli 

underpaid his federal taxes. App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a–66a. 

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436 POLSELLI v. IRS 

Opinion of the Court 

After investigating, the IRS determined that Mr. Polselli 

was liable for the unpaid amounts and other penalties, and 

entered offcial assessments against him totaling more than 

$2 million. Id., at 66a. Revenue Offcer Michael Bryant 

then set out to collect the money, and he developed a few 

leads in his search for assets that Mr. Polselli may have been 

concealing. Bryant focused on bank accounts belonging to 

Mr. Polselli's wife, petitioner Hanna Karcho Polselli. Ibid. 

Bryant also knew that Mr. Polselli had paid nearly $300,000 

toward part of his outstanding tax liability from an account 

owned by Dolce Hotel Management, LLC, and surmised that 

Mr. Polselli might have control over funds belonging to that 

company. Id., at 67a. To further his investigation, Bryant 

issued a summons under § 7602 to the law frm Abraham & 

Rose, PLC, where Mr. Polselli had long been a client. Ibid. 

But the frm produced no records in response, stating that it 

“did not retain any of the documents requested.” Ibid. 

Bryant then issued several additional summonses seeking 

records concerning Mr. Polselli. Bryant issued one summons to Wells Fargo, requesting the fnancial records of both 

Mrs. Polselli and Dolce Hotel Management. Id., at 70a–71a. 

He also issued summonses to JP Morgan Chase and Bank of 

America, seeking among other things “[c]opies of all bank 

statements” relating to Mr. Polselli and petitioners Jerry R. 

Abraham, P. C., and Abraham & Rose, PLC. Id., at 78a– 

79a, 85a–86a. Bryant did not provide notice to any of the 

third parties named in the three summonses. But the banks 

did, and Mrs. Polselli, Jerry R. Abraham, and Abraham & 

Rose fled motions to quash in Federal District Court. 

The District Court dismissed the case for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, reasoning that the IRS did not need 

to provide notice. Polselli v. United States, 2020 WL 

12688176, *4 (ED Mich., Nov. 16, 2020). The District Court 

credited Bryant's assertions that “the purpose of his investigation [was] to locate assets to satisfy Mr. Polselli's existing 

assessed federal tax liability and that the IRS issued the 

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Opinion of the Court 

summonses in question to aid in the collection of these assessed liabilities.” Ibid. Because the Code excluded petitioners from the required notice, there was no waiver of sovereign immunity, and the District Court therefore lacked 

jurisdiction to entertain the motions to quash. Id., at *5. 

The Sixth Circuit affrmed in a divided opinion, reasoning 

that no notice was required because “the summonses at issue 

fall squarely within the exception listed in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i).” 

Polselli v. Department of Treasury–IRS, 23 F. 4th 616, 623 

(2022). Before the Sixth Circuit, petitioners had argued in 

favor of a rule—previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit— 

requiring that a taxpayer have “some legal interest or title 

in the object of the summons” for the notice exception to 

apply. Ip v. United States, 205 F. 3d 1168, 1175 (2000). To 

decide whether a taxpayer maintains a suffcient legal interest “in the object of the summons,” the Ninth Circuit considers “whether there was an employment, agency, or ownership relationship between the taxpayer and third party.” 

Viewtech, Inc. v. United States, 653 F. 3d 1102, 1106 (2011). 

But the Sixth Circuit below rejected the Ninth Circuit's legal 

interest test, concluding that it was contrary to the plain 

language of § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). 23 F. 4th, at 625. The panel 

below instead held that “as long as the third-party summons 

is issued to aid in the collection of any assessed tax liability 

the notice exception applies.” Id., at 624 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In so concluding, the Sixth Circuit aligned 

itself with both the Seventh and Tenth Circuits. See Davidson v. United States, 149 F. 3d 1190 (CA10 1998) (Table); 

Barmes v. United States, 199 F. 3d 386 (CA7 1999) (per 

curiam). 

Judge Kethledge dissented. He acknowledged that an ordinary reading of the statute exempted the summonses from 

notice but thought the statutory context compelled a narrower construction. As an initial matter, Judge Kethledge 

expressed concern that the panel's reading of the notice exception risked “a signifcant intrusion upon the privacy of 

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438 POLSELLI v. IRS 

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. . . account holders.” 23 F. 4th, at 631. He argued that an 

ordinary reading of the frst exception to notice would render 

the second exception—codifed in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(ii)—“superfuous.” Ibid. To avoid that, Judge Kethledge would have 

narrowed the frst exception by adopting the legal interest 

test from the Ninth Circuit. We granted certiorari to resolve the division among the Circuits. 598 U. S. ––– (2022). 

III 

The question presented is whether the exception to the 

notice requirement in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies only where a 

delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in accounts or records summoned by the IRS under § 7602(a). A straightforward reading of the statutory text supplies a ready answer: 

The notice exception does not contain such a limitation. 

A 

The statute sets forth three conditions to exempt the IRS 

from providing notice in circumstances like these. First, 

a summons must be “issued in aid of . . . collection.” 

§ 7609(c)(2)(D). Second, it must aid the collection of “an assessment made or judgment rendered.” § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). 

By “assessment,” the Code “refers to the offcial recording 

of a taxpayer's liability.” Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl, 

575 U. S. 1, 9 (2015); see also Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 

100 (2004). Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) does not excuse notice, 

therefore, until the IRS makes an offcial assessment or a 

judgment has been rendered with respect to a taxpayer's 

liability. Third, a summons must aid the collection of assessments or judgments “against the person with respect to 

whose liability the summons is issued.” § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). 

This requirement links the subject of the assessment or judgment with the subject of the collection effort—they must 

concern the same delinquent taxpayer. None of the three 

components for excusing notice in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) mentions 

a taxpayer's legal interest in records sought by the IRS, 

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much less requires that a taxpayer maintain such an interest 

for the exception to apply. 

Had Congress wanted to include a legal interest requirement, it certainly knew how to do so. The very next provision—also enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976— 

requires the IRS to “establish the rates and conditions” for 

reimbursing costs “incurred in searching for, reproducing, or 

transporting” information sought by a summons. § 7610(a) 

(2); see 90 Stat. 1702. But the IRS may not provide reimbursement if “the person with respect to whose liability the 

summons is issued has a proprietary interest in” the records 

“to be produced.” § 7610(b)(1). We assume that Congress 

“acts intentionally and purposely” when it “includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U. S. 

369, 378 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The fact 

that the exception to the reimbursement provision expressly 

turns on a taxpayer's “proprietary interest” in records summoned by the IRS strongly suggests that Congress deliberately omitted a similar requirement with respect to the notice exception in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). And here the provision 

in question is not just in the “same Act”—it is in the adjacent 

section, having been enacted in the same Public Law. 

B 

Petitioners advance two primary arguments in support of 

their proposed legal interest test, neither of which convinces 

us to abandon an ordinary reading of the notice exception. 

First, petitioners adopt a narrow defnition of “in aid of 

the collection.” In their view, the phrase refers only to inquiries that “directly advance” the IRS's collection efforts. 

Brief for Petitioners 21. A summons will not directly advance those efforts, they contend, unless it is targeted at an 

account containing assets that the IRS can collect to satisfy 

the taxpayer's liability. And, petitioners say, the only way 

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440 POLSELLI v. IRS 

Opinion of the Court 

ible assets is if the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest 

in the targeted account. 

This argument does not give a fair reading to the phrase 

“in aid of the collection.” According to petitioners, the 

phrase requires that a summons produce collectible assets. 

But to “aid” means “[t]o help” or “assist.” American Heritage Dictionary 26 (1969). Petitioners agree. See Brief for 

Petitioners 21 (“aid” means to “support,” “help,” or “assist”). 

Even if a summons may not itself reveal taxpayer assets that 

can be collected, it may nonetheless help the IRS fnd such 

assets. 

Consider this case. The IRS's investigation “suggest[ed] 

that Mr. Polselli often uses other entities to shield assets 

from the Internal Revenue Service.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 

68a. Bryant suspected, for instance, that Mr. Polselli was 

using Dolce Hotel Management as an alter ego, and also that 

he might have access to and use of Mrs. Polselli's bank accounts. Based on those leads, Bryant initially requested 

that Abraham & Rose produce “cancelled checks, wire transfer/credit documents, and all other instruments used by 

Mr. Polselli to pay the firm.” Id., at 67a. Whether 

Mr. Polselli maintains a “legal interest” in those records—a 

confounding question, see Viewtech, 653 F. 3d, at 1106—is 

neither here nor there. The IRS could not, of course, use 

records of canceled checks and the like to satisfy Mr. Polselli's tax defciency. But if those records showed that money 

from Dolce Hotel Management was used to pay Mr. Polselli's 

account at Abraham & Rose, or to pay others through Abraham & Rose, that could aid in collecting funds from Dolce 

Hotel Management to help pay Mr. Polselli's debt to the IRS. 

Or the Service could use those records to try to identify 

other alter egos—besides Dolce Hotel Management—where 

Mr. Polselli might have hidden assets. 

By the same token, the summonses Bryant issued to the 

three banks sought records to “identify . . . entities whose 

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Opinion of the Court 

ship” and “bank accounts associated with such entities.” 

App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a. As with the request Bryant issued to Abraham & Rose, even if the three bank summonses 

did not reveal bank accounts in which Mr. Polselli has a legal 

interest, they could lead to assets parked elsewhere that the 

IRS could collect to satisfy his $2 million liability. 

IRS investigations are much like any other: A detective 

might order forensic testing or speak to witnesses to help 

identify a culprit, even if those activities are unlikely—in and 

of themselves—to solve the crime. Similarly, documents in 

the accounts belonging to Mrs. Polselli or Dolce Hotel Management may be a step in a paper trail leading to assets 

owned by Mr. Polselli. Everyday tasks illustrate the same 

point: A recipe might help a chef shop for needed groceries, 

even though more steps are required before dinner will be 

ready. By confating activities that help advance a goal with 

activities sure to accomplish it, petitioners ignore the typical 

meaning of “in aid of.” 

Petitioners next argue that the exception provided in 

clause (i) must be read narrowly so as to avoid making entirely superfuous the exception found in clause (ii). Clause 

(i) excuses notice when the IRS issues a summons “in aid of 

the collection of . . . an assessment made or judgment rendered against” the delinquent taxpayer. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). 

Clause (ii) exempts from notice any summons “issued in aid 

of the collection of . . . the liability at law or in equity of any 

transferee or fduciary of any person referred to in clause 

(i).” § 7609(c)(2)(D)(ii). We ordinarily aim to “giv[e] effect 

to every clause and word of a statute.” Microsoft Corp. v. 

i4i L. P., 564 U. S. 91, 106 (2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). If clause (i) already exempts from notice every 

summons that helps the IRS collect an “assessment” against 

a delinquent taxpayer, petitioners argue, there would be no 

work left for clause (ii) to do. Adding a “legal interest” requirement, on the other hand, would cabin the scope of clause 

(i), leaving some purpose for clause (ii). 

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Opinion of the Court 

But this argument overlooks two differences between 

clause (i) and clause (ii). First, clause (i) is applicable upon 

an assessment, while clause (ii) is applicable upon a fnding 

of liability. Under the Code, a taxpayer's “liability” for unpaid taxes arises before the IRS makes an offcial “assessment” of what the delinquent taxpayer owes. See § 6203 

(“The assessment shall be made by recording the liability of 

the taxpayer . . . .”); see also United States v. Galletti, 541 

U. S. 114, 122 (2004) (assessment refers to “the calculation or 

recording of a tax liability”). Although an assessment may 

“trigge[r] levy and collection efforts,” Hibbs, 542 U. S., at 

101, the Code does not require in all cases that the IRS make 

a formal assessment before attempting to collect an outstanding tax liability. See §§ 6501(c)(1)–(3) (authorizing the 

IRS to bring “a proceeding in court for collection of [a] 

tax . . . without assessment” in situations involving false returns, willful attempts to evade taxes, and failures to fle 

a return). 

Second, petitioners' argument overlooks that clause (i) and 

clause (ii) are addressed to different entities. Clause (i) concerns assessments or judgments against a taxpayer—“the 

person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued.” § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). Clause (ii), in contrast, concerns 

the liability of a “transferee or fduciary.” § 7609(c)(2)(D)(ii). 

That the notice exception distinguishes between taxpayers 

and their fduciaries or transferees should come as no surprise. The Code elsewhere separately empowers the IRS to 

collect outstanding tax liabilities from taxpayers, on the one 

hand, and from transferees or fduciaries, on the other. See 

§ 6901. The Code also differentiates between taxpayers and 

their fduciaries or transferees in empowering the IRS to 

issue summonses in the frst place. See § 7602(a). 

These distinctions—between liability and assessment or 

judgment, and between taxpayers and their transferees or 

fduciaries—are not just academic. They show that the second notice exception found in clause (ii) applies in situations 

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Opinion of the Court 

where clause (i) may not. To dispense with notice, clause 

(i) requires that there be “an assessment made or judgment 

rendered against the person with respect to whose liability 

the summons is issued.” § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). By contrast, 

clause (ii) does not impose the same conditions. It instead 

authorizes the IRS to issue a summons in aid of collecting a 

“liability at law or in equity,” and refers specifcally to the 

liability of any “transferee or fduciary” of the delinquent 

taxpayer. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(ii). As a result, clause (ii) permits the IRS to issue unnoticed summonses to aid its collection from transferees or fduciaries before it makes an “offcial recording of a taxpayer's liability.” Direct Marketing 

Assn., 575 U. S., at 9. “That may not be very heavy work 

for the phrase to perform, but a job is a job, and enough to 

bar the rule against redundancy from disqualifying an otherwise sensible reading.” Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. 250, 258 

(2000); see also Nielson v. Preap, 586 U. S. –––, ––– (2019) (a 

clause that “still has work to do” is not superfuous). 

Clause (ii) addresses an additional potential problem as 

well. Delinquent taxpayers sometimes declare bankruptcy 

or otherwise discharge debt. When they do so, the Government may not be able to collect “an assessment made or 

judgment rendered against the” taxpayer. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). 

In those situations, clause (i) may not apply, for a summons 

cannot be “issued in aid of” an impossible collection effort. 

§ 7609(c)(2)(D). But clause (ii) may nevertheless permit the 

IRS to issue unnoticed summonses to collect the “liability” 

of the taxpayer's transferee or fduciary. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(ii). 

IV 

Petitioners also emphasize the privacy concerns that led 

Congress to enact the notice requirement in the frst place. 

They highlight that “Congress enacted § 7609 in response to 

two decisions in which we gave a broad construction to the 

IRS's general summons power.” Tiffany Fine Arts, 469 

U. S., at 314. In Donaldson v. United States, 400 U. S. 517 

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444 POLSELLI v. IRS 

Opinion of the Court 

(1971), we considered whether the employee of a company to 

which the IRS had issued a summons could intervene to prevent his employer's compliance with the Service's request. 

Id., at 527. We concluded that the employee had no right to 

do so. Id., at 530. And in United States v. Bisceglia, 420 

U. S. 141 (1975), we approved an IRS summons issued to a 

bank “for the purpose of identifying an unnamed individual 

who had deposited a large amount of money in severely deteriorated bills,” concluding that the IRS had not abused its 

authority. Tiffany Fine Arts, 469 U. S., at 315 (characterizing Bisceglia). 

Donaldson and Bisceglia help explain why Congress enacted § 7609, which establishes a baseline rule requiring the 

IRS to provide notice and which authorizes anyone entitled 

to notice to move to quash a summons. § 7609(a). But neither case obliges us to read the notice exception in § 7609(c) 

(2)(D)(i) more narrowly than its terms provide. We think 

the history highlighted by petitioners supports a contrary 

conclusion. That Congress proved acutely aware of our prior 

decisions supports a plain reading not only of the general 

notice requirement, but also of the specifc exception the 

statute provides. 

We do not dismiss any apprehension about the scope of the 

IRS's authority to issue summonses. As we have said, “the 

authority vested in tax collectors may be abused, as all 

power is subject to abuse.” Bisceglia, 420 U. S., at 146. 

Tax investigations often involve the pursuit of sensitive records. In this case, for instance, the IRS sought information 

from law frms concerning client accounts. And even the 

Government concedes that the phrase “in aid of the collection” is not “limitless.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The Government proposes a test turning on reasonableness: So long as 

a summons is “reasonably calculated to assisting in collection,” it can fairly be characterized as being issued “in aid 

of” that collection. Id., at 26; see also id., at 36 (“[T]he third 

party should have some fnancial ties or ha[ve] engaged in 

fnancial transactions with the delinquent taxpayer.”). 

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Jackson, J., concurring 

This is not, however, the case to try to defne the precise 

bounds of the phrase “in aid of the collection.” The parties 

did not argue, and the panel below did not decide, the contours of that phrase. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 

222–223 (1983). In addition, both the briefng by the parties 

and the question presented focus only on whether the exception provided in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) requires that a taxpayer 

maintain a legal interest in records summoned by the IRS. 

For the reasons we have given, the answer is no. 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 

is affrmed. 

It is so ordered. 

Justice Jackson, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, 

concurring. 

The Court holds today that there is no “legal interest” 

limitation on the ability of the Internal Revenue Service 

to summon records without notice under 26 U. S. C. 

§ 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). I agree. I write to emphasize two points 

I believe are critical to understanding that, despite our rejection of this particular limit, the summoning power of the IRS 

under that provision is circumscribed nonetheless. 

First, while the need for effcient tax administration is certainly important and Congress has given the agency lots of 

attendant authority, the default rule when the IRS seeks 

information from third-party recordkeepers under this statute is notice. The IRS can summon “any books, papers, records, or other data” that “may be relevant or material to” 

determining a taxpayer's liability or collecting unpaid tax. 

§§ 7602(a)(1)–(2). And it can issue such summonses to “any 

. . . person the [IRS] may deem proper.” § 7602(a)(2) (emphasis added). But, as a general matter, when the IRS issues a summons pursuant to this authority, the agency must 

provide notice to “any person . . . identifed in the summons” 

and to whom “any portion of [the requested] records” relate. 

§ 7609(a)(1) (imposing notice requirement as the “general” 

rule). 

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446 POLSELLI v. IRS 

Jackson, J., concurring 

Notice is not a mere formality. In the context of tax administration, it serves an important function. Providing notice ensures that, when the IRS comes calling, the implicated 

interests are balanced. On one hand, the notice requirement permits the IRS to summon recordkeepers for the information it needs, without imposing overly burdensome 

procedural hurdles or inviting excessive delay. See, e. g., 

§ 7609(a)(2) (allowing the IRS to serve notice by mail); 

§ 7609(b)(2) (setting time limitations on fling a motion to 

quash). On the other hand, notice—and the concomitant 

right to judicial review—empowers persons whose information is at stake to enlist assistance from the courts, as 

needed, to prevent the agency from overreaching. § 7609(b); 

see also Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc. v. United States, 469 U. S. 

310, 320–321 (1985). 

To be sure, Congress has also recognized that there might 

be situations, particularly in the collection context, where 

providing notice could frustrate the IRS's ability to effectively administer the tax laws. For instance, upon receiving 

notice that the IRS has served a summons, interested persons might move or hide collectable assets, making the 

agency's collection efforts substantially harder. 

That is where the exception at § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) comes in. 

In such circumstances, § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) prevents notice from 

tipping the balance entirely in favor of the delinquent taxpayer, at the expense of the IRS. But, depending on whose 

information the summons seeks (for example, an innocent 

third party's), or the nature of the requested records, it 

might not be reasonable to conclude that providing notice 

would frustrate the IRS's tax-collection goal. And when 

that is the case, it might unjustifably tip the scales in the 

other direction (i. e., entirely in the IRS's favor) to allow the 

IRS to proceed without notice just because its delinquency 

resolution process has entered the collection phase. 

In other words, the statute's balancing of interests indicates that Congress did not give the IRS a blank check, so 
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Cite as: 598 U. S. 432 (2023) 447 

Jackson, J., concurring 

to speak, to do with as it will in the collection arena. Thus, 

in my view, courts must not interpret § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) as 

if that agency has been gifted with boundless authority. 

Treating the IRS's power to issue unnoticed summonses as 

effectively unlimited permits the exception to devour the 

rule, upsetting the statute's calibration. 

Second, and similarly, it is hard for me to believe that, 

in the context of a default-notice system, Congress would 

intentionally insert an exception that could so dramatically 

upend its objectives. Read too broadly, § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) 

would presumably permit the IRS to summon anyone's records without notice, no matter how broad the summons is or 

how potentially intrusive that records request might be, so 

long as the agency thinks doing so would provide a clue to 

the location of a delinquent taxpayer's assets. 

Imagine, for example, a delinquent taxpayer who routinely 

visits his local mom-and-pop dry cleaning business. Imagine also that the IRS suspects this delinquent taxpayer 

sometimes uses credit cards with different names. Under a 

broad reading of § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i), I suppose the IRS could 

issue a summons to the dry cleaner's bank without notice to 

the dry cleaner, seeking years of the dry cleaner's fnancial 

records. The agency might believe that having the entirety 

of that business's fnancial information would aid its taxcollection efforts—even though the taxpayer has no known 

fnancial interest in that business, or any special relationship 

with the business's owners—because knowing what methods 

of payment (or aliases) the taxpayer regularly uses could 

help the agency track down the taxpayer's assets. And it 

might intend to sift through the requested haystack of the 

business's bank records in order to fnd the needle of the 

taxpayer's transaction information. 

For their part, the dry cleaner's owners would probably 

look askance at having all of their fnancial records requisitioned and reviewed in this manner. But, without notice, 

they cannot object to the summons's scope or work with the 
448 POLSELLI v. IRS 

Jackson, J., concurring 

IRS (and the court) to provide the records that most likely 

involve the delinquent taxpayer or his aliases. The owners 

would have to rely on the recipient of the summons (the 

bank) to articulate their privacy concerns and negotiate with 

the agency. Yet there is no guarantee under the statute 

that the bank will do that, and even if it does, how is the 

bank supposed to identify which credit cards may have been 

used by the delinquent taxpayer over a multiyear period? 

This situation seems to me to be the kind of circumstance 

in which Congress would not have intended to prevent the 

dry cleaning business from attempting to protect its interests. And, in my view, reading § 7609 to require notice— 

and the potential for judicial oversight—in relation to such 

attenuated tax-collection activities is entirely consistent with 

the statutory scheme. Conversely, allowing the agency to 

sidestep oversight of its broad summons power by not providing notice in these kinds of situations undermines the important aims of the default-notice system. 

The bottom line is this: As I read the statute, the IRS is 

not necessarily exempt from notice obligations any time a 

tax-delinquency matter enters the collection phase. Rather, 

the exception in § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) merely refects Congress's 

determination that, in some situations, requiring the agency 

to provide notice in connection with its tax-collection efforts 

would undermine the balance that the statute strikes with 

its default-notice requirement. Consequently, I believe that 

both courts and the IRS itself must be ever vigilant when 

determining when notice is not required. Doing so properly 

involves a careful fact-based inquiry that might well vary 

from case to case, depending on the scope and nature of the 

information the IRS seeks. 

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Reporter’s Note 

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication 

and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination 

makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of 

publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of 

the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and 

who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was 

argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may 

include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant 

punctuation. The following additional edits were made: 

p. 432, line 4, “§ 7609(a)(1) ' ” is replaced with “26 U. S. C. § 7609(a)(1)”