21-1258-cr

United States of America v. Nolasco

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY 

FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST 

CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION 

“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON 

ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

2 Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the

18th 3 day of April, two thousand twenty-two.

4

5 Present:

6 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,

7 Chief Judge,

8 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,

9 BETH ROBINSON,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

14

15 Appellee,

16

17 v. 21-1258-cr

18

19 JUAN BONILLA, AKA A.D.A. PINTO, DOMINGO 

20 FERNANDEZ, YOEL PICHARDO, AKA YOEL ALBERTO 

21 PICHARDO GONZALEZ, AKA YOEL ALBERTO 

22 GONZALEZ PICHARDO, NASSIR MATEO, JOSE 

23 ENCARNACION, SANDY BEATO, JUAN ESPINAL,

24 GABRIEL CANO-MARTINEZ, ELOYS FERNANDEZ,

25 AKA CHAMBOA, PEDRO FERNANDEZ, AKA EL 

26 MONO, YUDRIS FERNANDEZ, AKA GUDRIS, JAVIER 

27 HERNANDEZ, AKA ROOKIE, LUIS PEREZ, RANDALL 

28 MARTINEZ, AKA RANDALL, AKA JOSE RODRIGUEZ,

29 WILTON ROSARIO, AKA WINSTON ROSARIO, HENRY 

30 FIORENTINO, FRANCISCO PRADO, AKA EL VIEJO,

31 AKA FNU LNU, MARCOS RODRIGUEZ, AKA

32 MARKITO, EMMANUEL TAVAREZ, JOSE ANTONIO 
2

1 LOPEZ SANTIAGO, AKA AMARANTE, MIGUEL 

2 TAVARES, AKA LEPIDO, NOLBERTO MOREL, AKA

3 BOONIE, JOSE TEJADA,

4

5 Defendants,

6

7 v.

8

9 NELSON NOLASCO, AKA MENOR, AKA ANGEL 

10 SOTO-CABAN,

11

12 Defendant-Appellant.

13 _____________________________________

14

15 For Appellee: DAVID KESSLER, Assistant United States Attorney,

16 (Susan Corkery & Alexander A. Solomon, Assistant 

17 United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Breon Peace, 

18 United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New 

19 York, Brooklyn, NY.

20

21 For Defendant-Appellant: ANDREW J. FRISCH, Attorney at Law, New York, NY.

22

23 Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 

24 York (Glasser, J.).

25 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

26 DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

27 Defendant-Appellant Nelson Nolasco (“Nolasco”) appeals the district court’s April 12, 

28 2021 order denying his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

29 (commonly referred to as “compassionate release”). In 2011, Nolasco pled guilty to: (1) Hobbs 

30 Act robbery conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (2) conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine, MDMA, 

31 and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), and 

32 846; and (3) brandishing and discharging a firearm in furtherance of robbery and drug trafficking, 

33 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). In 2016, after considering Nolasco’s history and the 

34 seriousness of his violent criminal activity—including multiple robberies and shootings, and an 
3

1 execution-style murder—the district court sentenced him to 420 months’ imprisonment. On 

2 February 25, 2021, Nolasco, moving pro se, requested that the district court issue an order of 

3 compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied the motion. Nolasco, 

4 now represented by counsel, appeals from the denial of the motion, arguing that the district court 

5 erred by refusing his request for compassionate release without first appointing him counsel sua 

6 sponte. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of 

7 the case, and the issues on appeal.

8 * * *

9 We review for abuse of discretion a petitioner’s claim that the district court erred in denying 

10 a motion for compassionate release pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A). See United States v. Saladino, 

11 7 F.4th 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (also reviewing questions of statutory interpretation 

12 de novo). The district court has “broad discretion” when considering such motions. United 

13 States v. Clenista, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam). The district court abuses its 

14 discretion if it “(1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a clearly erroneous 

15 assessment of the evidence, or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of 

16 permissible decisions.” Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

17 Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 

18 § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239–41, the district court “may reduce a term of imprisonment upon 

19 motion by a defendant. . . . if, ‘after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the 

20 extent that they are applicable, it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such 

21 a reduction.’” Clenista, 26 F.4th at 568 (brackets omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)); 

22 see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing factors for consideration, such as the “nature and circumstances 

23 of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” and the “need for the sentence 
4

1 imposed”). In his motion for compassionate release, Nolasco argued, among other things, that

2 his early release is justified because of his general health concerns stemming from the COVID-19 

3 pandemic (made worse by the fact that he is “slightly overweight”) and the “psychological stress” 

4 resulting from his incarceration. App’x 252. The district court, after considering Nolasco’s 

5 motion and the violent nature of his crimes, denied the motion, concluding that, “[n]ot only is there 

6 no showing of any extraordinary or compelling circumstance to warrant a moment of consideration 

7 of his petition, but the complete application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to his record would compel 

8 that it be DENIED . . . .” App’x 263–64. 

9 Nolasco principally argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by not 

10 appointing him counsel sua sponte to assist him in moving for compassionate release. We 

11 disagree. A “defendant has no right to the assistance of counsel in filing a motion for 

12 compassionate release [under § 3582].” United States v. Fleming, 5 F.4th 189, 193 (2d Cir. 

13 2021). As such, the “provision of counsel for such motions should rest in the discretion of the 

14 district court.” United States v. Reddick, 53 F.3d 462, 465 (2d Cir. 1995). And when 

15 considering a motion for compassionate release, the “apparent merits of the motion” are a 

16 “significant factor in the exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 465 n.2; see also United States v. 

17 Myers, 524 F. App’x 758, 759 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order). 

18 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not appointing counsel sua sponte.

19 At the start, the merits of Nolasco’s claim strongly disfavor compassionate release. Nolasco, who 

20 is represented by counsel on this appeal, does not challenge the Government’s assertion, both

21 below and on appeal, that his medical records show that he is generally in good health and is not 

22 subject to any of the comorbidities for COVID-19 identified by the Centers for Disease Control 

23 and Prevention. See Note (1)(A), U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Further, the serious and violent nature of 
5

1 Nolasco’s crimes, the significant amount of time remaining on his sentence, and his repeated 

2 disciplinary infractions while incarcerated strongly suggest that he is not an ideal candidate for 

3 compassionate release at this time. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also United States v. Jones, 17 

4 F.4th 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s denial of a 

5 § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion where petitioner’s offense conduct was “very serious”); United States v. 

6 Prada, 852 F. App’x 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (holding that the district court did not 

7 abuse its discretion in denying a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion based, in part, on the petitioner’s 

8 disciplinary infraction while incarcerated). Indeed, we can discern no error, much less an abuse 

9 of discretion, in the district court’s conclusions that (1) Nolasco failed to show extraordinary and 

10 compelling circumstances warranting compassionate release, and (2) the § 3553(a) factors do not 

11 favor his early release. 

12 In arguing that the district court abused its discretion, Nolasco cites to cases where district 

13 courts in this Circuit used their discretionary authority to appoint counsel to assist defendants 

14 moving for compassionate release. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Nunez, No. 87-CR-00419-

15 DC-16, 2021 WL 1668024, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2021) (Chin, J., sitting by designation)

16 (appointing counsel to assist defendant in moving for compassionate release, then granting 

17 defendant’s request for release); United States v. Garcia, No. 09-CR-330(KAM), 2021 WL 

18 1616914, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2021) (appointing counsel to assist defendant in moving for 

19 compassionate release, but ultimately denying the motion). But here, unlike the cases Nolasco 

20 cites, the apparent merits of his motion strongly disfavor compassionate release, and the district 

21 court’s decision not to appoint counsel sua sponte is certainly within the range of permissible 

22 decisions. Warren, 823 F.3d at 137. The district court did not abuse its discretion merely 
6

because other courts have appointed counsel in arguably similar situations.1 1

2 * * *

3 We have considered Nolasco’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. 

4 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

5 FOR THE COURT:

6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

1 Nolasco further claims that he was unable to adequately represent himself pro se because he is 

primarily a Spanish speaker. According to Nolasco, he was assisted by a fellow inmate who 

translated and typed the § 3582 motion on Nolasco’s behalf. He asserts that this further impeded 

his ability to adequately represent himself when moving for compassionate release. But Nolasco, 

who is represented by counsel on this appeal, does not identify any particular ways in which his 

motion was lacking because it was prepared with the assistance of another inmate, as opposed to 

solely by himself. Indeed, his motion included personalized arguments (e.g., noting his 

extradition from Spain and requesting deportation to the Dominican Republic, see App’x 252–53), 

showing at a minimum his direct involvement in the process. This, coupled with the merits of 

his motion, do not suggest that the district court abused its discretion by not appointing him 

counsel.