Filed 12/7/20; Opinion on transfer from Supreme Court

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

GULF OFFSHORE 

LOGISTICS, LLC et al.,

 Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

VENTURA COUNTY, 

 Respondent,

CLAUDE NORRIS et al.,

 Real Parties in Interest.

2d Civil No. B298318

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2016-

00484144-CU-OE-VTA)

(Ventura County)

OPINION ON REMAND

This case returns to us after the California Supreme Court 

directed us to reconsider our prior opinion in light of Ward v. 

United Airlines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 732 (Ward) and Oman v. 

Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 762 (Oman). In our prior 

opinion, we held Louisiana law governed the employment 

relationships at issue here. After considering the Supreme 

Court’s recent guidance on the matter, we now conclude that 

California law applies and that the trial court correctly denied 
2

petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we deny 

the petition for writ of mandate. 

Petitioners, Louisiana-based employers Gulf Offshore 

Logistics, LLC and JNB Operating, LLC, employed real parties in 

interest, non-California residents, to work as crew members on a 

vessel that provided maintenance services to offshore oil 

platforms. The vessel was docked at a California port and sailed 

through California waters to the platforms, which are located 

outside the state’s boundaries.

Crew members alleged that petitioners violated numerous 

provisions of California’s wage and hour laws, including those 

relating to minimum wage and overtime, providing meal and rest 

periods, maintaining accurate work records and providing 

complete wage statements. Petitioners moved for summary 

judgment on the theories that Louisiana rather than California 

law governed these employment relationships and that the 

federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) preempted California 

law with respect to these employees. The superior court denied

the motion because petitioners had not “demonstrated that 

Louisiana law should apply” or that California law has been 

preempted.

Petitioners sought a writ of mandate directing the superior 

court to vacate its order denying the motion for summary 

judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion. We 

issued an order to show cause and temporarily stayed all trial 

court proceedings. In our prior opinion, we applied a conflict of 

laws analysis and concluded that Louisiana law governed 

because that state had more significant contacts with the parties 

and a greater interest in regulating the employment 

relationships at issue.
3

After the Supreme Court granted review and transferred 

the matter back to us, we vacated our prior opinion and received 

supplemental briefs from the parties. We now conclude that 

California law applies and that the trial court correctly denied 

the motion for summary judgment. 

Facts

Petitioners own and operate the Adele Elise, a vessel that 

provided services to oil platforms located off the California coast. 

The crew members represent a class of persons who were 

employed by petitioners to work on the Adele Elise after July 14, 

2012. They allege petitioners failed to comply with numerous 

provisions of California’s wage and hour laws.

Petitioners are limited liability companies formed under 

Louisiana law. Every member of both companies is also a 

Louisiana resident. The companies have their headquarters in 

Louisiana and the Adele Elise, the vessel on which crew members

were employed, is registered in that state. Although the Adele

Elise operated for a time in the Gulf of Mexico, it was 

repositioned to the Pacific Ocean in March 2011 and remained 

there until October 2017. 

Petitioners’ administrative functions are performed at their 

headquarters in Louisiana. Each former crew member traveled 

to Louisiana to apply in person for a job and to interview for that 

job. They also completed and acknowledged receipt of 

employment-related documents in Louisiana. Staff at petitioners’ 

Louisiana office made arrangements to transport the crew 

members to and from the vessels to which they were assigned. 

The crew members worked on the Adele Elise from March 

2011 when it was repositioned from the Gulf of Mexico to the 

Pacific Ocean. In October 2017, the vessel left California. 
4

Between 2011 and 2017, the Adele Elise was docked at Port 

Hueneme. While stationed at Port Hueneme, the Adele Elise 

traveled through the Santa Barbara Channel to deliver supplies 

and pick up refuse from four oil platforms located in federal 

waters off the California coast. Between July 2012 and May 

2015, the Adele Elise made approximately three trips each week 

to the oil platforms. After an oil spill occurred in May 2015, the 

average number of weekly trips declined.

The crew members are a class that is represented by three 

named members: Claude Norris, Douglas Kwaw and James 

Musgrove. None of the named class representatives resides in 

California. Norris, a resident of Texas, was employed as an ablebodied seaman aboard the Adele Elise while it was stationed at 

Port Hueneme for 571.5 days from June 2013 to January 2016. 

Norris was paid a flat daily rate for his services, ranging from 

$140 to $350 per day. Kwaw, a resident of Ohio, was employed as 

an able-bodied seaman aboard the Adele Elise while it was 

stationed at Port Hueneme for 580.5 days between July 2013 and 

August 2015. He was paid a flat daily rate for his services, 

ranging between $265 to $350 per day. Musgrove, a resident of 

Mississippi, was employed as an engineer aboard the Adele Elise 

while it was stationed at Port Hueneme for 471.5 days between 

August 2013 and February 2016. He was paid a flat daily rate 

for his services, ranging between $310 to $750 per day. The 

employment of each class representative was terminated only 

because of a reduction in force. The crew members’ wage and 

hour claims were made after their employment was terminated.

The crew members who were employed as able bodied 

seamen typically worked a “hitch” of 42 days on and 21 days off. 

Those employed as engineers worked 21 days on and 21 days off. 
5

Each employee would travel by air from the airport closest to the 

crew member’s home in Texas, Ohio, and Mississippi to Los 

Angeles, where they were shuttled to the vessel in Port 

Hueneme. At the end of their hitch, the employees would be 

shuttled back to the Los Angeles airport and flown back to their

home states. Administrative employees of petitioners, who were 

located in Louisiana, made travel arrangements for the crew

members. 

Once they arrived at the vessel, the crew members were not 

permitted to leave the vessel without permission for the 

remainder of their hitch. Occasionally, they were asked to 

disembark when the vessel was in port, to run errands or pick up 

supplies. They worked at least 12 hours per day each day of their 

hitch, whether the vessel was docked at Port Hueneme or 

underway to or from the platforms. The job duties of crew 

members who were employed as deckhands and able-bodied 

seamen included handling tow and mooring lines, securing the 

vessel to docks and wharves, assisting in loading and unloading 

supplies, equipment and cargo, assisting with pumping water 

and fuel, cleaning the vessel and lifeboats, standing lookout, food 

preparation and cleaning the galley, repairing machinery and 

equipment, and performing other maintenance tasks such as 

painting, sanding, chipping and scraping the vessel. 

Other crew members were employed as engineers. These 

employees’ job duties included general engine maintenance, 

changing the engine oil, servicing the engine, pumping mud and 

chemicals off the vessel on the platforms, receiving fuel for the 

vessel and fueling the vessel on the platforms. 

While docked at Port Hueneme, the Adele Elise would sail 

through the Santa Barbara Channel to deliver supplies to, and 
6

pick up refuse from four oil platforms. The vessel left from, and 

returned to the same port; it did not travel to other states. 

Travel time from port to the first platform was 

approximately 7 hours. After servicing the first platform, the 

vessel would travel to the second, third and fourth platforms and 

then back to Port Hueneme. The journey from the fourth 

platform to Port Hueneme typically took about 8 hours. The 

entire round trip lasted about 24 hours.

The port of Port Hueneme is located within the State of 

California while the oil platforms are located outside the state’s 

boundaries. On its route to and from the platforms, the Adele 

Elise sailed both inside and outside of California’s state 

boundaries. The parties dispute how much time the Adele Elise 

spent outside the state. It is undisputed, however, that between 

March 2011 and October 2017, the Adele Elise docked exclusively 

at Port Hueneme, California.

Discussion

Territorial Reach of California Law

As our Supreme Court explained in Tidewater Marine 

Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557 (Tidewater), 

federal law defines California’s territorial boundaries more 

narrowly than does California state law. Under California’s state 

law definition of its own boundaries, “the entire Santa Barbara 

Channel is within the state.” (Id. at p. 564.) Under federal law, 

“the central portion of the Santa Barbara Channel is not within 

the state.” (Ibid.) “In defining California’s federal law 

boundaries, Congress did not, however, suggest that California 

lacked power to regulate conduct outside those boundaries and 

within broader state law boundaries.” (Ibid.) To the contrary,

“California employment laws implicitly extend to employment 
7

occurring within California’s state law boundaries, including all 

of the Santa Barbara Channel,” unless “the operation of federal 

law were at issue, as for example if federal law conflicted with 

state law.” (Id. at p. 565.) 

In Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th 732, our Supreme Court 

considered whether California residents who work for an airline 

based outside California and who perform most of their work in 

airspace outside California are nevertheless entitled to wage 

statements that comply with Labor Code section 226.1 Ward

concluded that the question whether the employees are entitled 

to “California-compliant wage statements depends on whether 

their principal place of work is in California.” (Ward, supra, at p. 

740.) For employees who do not perform a majority of their work 

in any one state, “this test is satisfied when California serves as 

their base of work operations, regardless of their place of 

residence or whether a collective bargaining agreement governs 

their pay.” (Ibid.) 

Noting that section 226 “is part of a matrix of laws 

intended to ensure workers are correctly and adequately 

compensated for their work,” the court inferred “that the relevant 

geographic connection for purposes of determining what state law 

applies is where the work occurs.” (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 

753.) Under this test, California wage and hour laws apply “to 

workers who perform all or most of their work in the 

jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 754.) “For interstate transportation 

workers and others who do not work more than half the time in 

any one state, we conclude this principle will be satisfied if the 

worker performs some work here and is based in California, 

1 All statutory references are to the Labor Code.
8

meaning that California serves as the physical location where the 

worker presents himself or herself to begin work.” (Id. at p. 755.)

Ward rejected the employer’s contention that federal law 

should apply because the workers spend the majority of their 

time in federally regulated airspace. “[I]n the absence of any 

federal action, we have no reason to think applying California 

law would encroach on federal prerogatives, nor any reason 

rooted in considerations of comity to conclude the Legislature 

would have preferred that workers based in California go 

unprotected by section 226.” (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 757.) 

Finally, the court declined to “place weight” on the state of the 

employees’ residence, where they receive their wages, or where 

they pay taxes. (Id. at p. 758.) These factors are not, by 

themselves, determinative because California statutes may apply 

to non-residents who perform work in this state. (Ibid.; see also 

Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1191, 1197

(Sullivan)..) 

Following Ward, Oman, supra, 9 Cal.5th 762, held that 

“California’s wage statement laws apply only to flight attendants 

who have their base of work operations in California, and that 

the same is true of California laws governing the timing of wage 

payments.” (Id. at p. 770.) The class of flight attendants at issue 

in Oman included both residents of California and non-residents. 

None of the class members worked more than half the time in 

California, or in any other state. (Id. at p. 773.) Thus, the 

question whether class members were entitled to Californiacompliant wage statements “hinges on whether they were based 

for work purposes in California.” (Ibid.) The same standards 

apply to section 204, which governs the timing of wage payments. 

(Oman, supra, at p. 778.) 
9

Our Supreme Court noted in Oman that the employer’s 

status as a nonresident corporation “does not foreclose the 

application of state law, ” because section 226 “contains no 

exemption based on the employer’s location.” (Oman, supra, 9 

Cal.5th at p. 773.) California’s “power to protect employees 

within its borders is not limited by whether the worker might be 

a nonresident or might be employed by a nonresident entity. . . . 

If employees are based for work purposes in California, that is 

sufficient to trigger the requirements of section 226, regardless of 

where their employer resides.” (Ibid.) 

Ward and Oman establish that California’s wage and hour 

laws apply to workers who perform all or most of their work in 

California. (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 754.) For workers who 

perform work in multiple jurisdictions, this test is satisfied if the 

worker performs some work in California and is based here, 

“meaning that California serves as the physical location where 

the worker presented himself or herself to begin work.” (Id at p. 

755.) Neither the residence of the worker nor the location of the 

employer is relevant to this analysis. (Oman, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 

p. 773.)

Here, the crew members of the Adele Elise performed the 

majority of their work within the boundaries of California. The 

port of Port Hueneme, where the Adele Elise was docked, and the 

entire Santa Barbara Channel are inside the state. (Tidewater,

supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 564; see also Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 

751 [employees at issue in Tidewater, who were California 

residents employed on a maintenance vessel docked at Port 

Hueneme, “did work exclusively in California . . . .”].) Under 

Ward and Oman, the crew members are entitled to the protection 
10

of California law because they performed all or most of their work 

in this state.

We note that, unlike the vessels at issue in Tidewater, the 

Adele Elise also sailed outside of California’s boundaries and into 

international waters. This circumstance does not alter our 

conclusion. The Adele Elise was docked at Port Hueneme and

crew members were on duty while the vessel was in port. The 

vessel returned exclusively to Port Hueneme after visiting each of 

the oil platforms. On its journey, the Adele Elise sailed through 

the Santa Barbara Channel, which is located in California. Crew 

members were on duty and working during those voyages. Work 

performed in California’s territorial waters is subject to 

California employment law even though the waters are also 

within federal territorial boundaries. (Ward, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 

p. 751; Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 565-566, 578-579.)

California law governs the employment relationships at issue 

here because California served as the base for the crew members’

work operations, all or most which were performed in California. 

(Ward, supra, at pp. 740, 754.) 

Conflict of Laws

In our prior opinion, we applied the conflict of law analysis 

outlined in Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th 1191, and concluded that 

Louisiana, rather than California law, governs petitioners’ 

employment relationship with the crew members. “‘First, the 

court determines whether the relevant law of each of the 

potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular 

issue in question is the same or different. Second, if there is a 

difference, the court examines each jurisdiction’s interest in the 

application of its own law under the circumstances of the 

particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists. 
11

Third, if the court finds that there is a true conflict, it carefully 

evaluates and compares the nature and strength of the interest of 

each jurisdiction in the application of its own law “to determine 

which state’s interest would be more impaired if its policy were 

subordinated to the policy of the other state” [citation], and then 

ultimately applies “the law of the state whose interest would be 

the more impaired if its law were not applied.”’ [Citations.]” (Id.

at pp. 1202–1203; see also Chen v. Los Angeles Truck Centers,

LLC (2019) 7 Cal.5th 862, 867-868.)

Our prior opinion concluded that Louisiana had a greater 

interest in regulating these employment relationships because 

the employers were based in Louisiana and many of the 

administrative aspects of the employment relationship were 

centered in that state. In this regard, we were mistaken. Oman

clarifies that the relevant consideration is the location in which 

work is performed. Here, that location is California. Other 

considerations, such as the residence of the employees or the 

location of the employer, are not relevant. (Oman, supra, 9 

Cal.5th at p. 773.) Thus, California law applies here because the 

crew members’ work was performed in California. Louisiana law 

does not apply for the same reason: the crew members did not 

perform work in Louisiana. 

Preemption

Petitioners urge us to conclude that the federal Fair Labor 

Standards Act (FLSA) and “general maritime law” preempt

California’s wage and hour regulations with respect to the crew 

members. We conclude there is no preemption.

“Preemption may occur in three situations: (1) where the 

federal law expressly so states, (2) where the federal law is so

comprehensive that it leaves ‘“no room” for supplementary state 
12

regulation,’ or (3) where the federal and state laws ‘actually 

conflict[].’” (Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 567.) As our 

Supreme Court explained in Tidewater, the FLSA does not 

expressly preempt state employment laws, nor does it contain 

any provision that actually or implicitly conflicts with California 

statutes. (Id. at pp. 567-568.) In sum, there is “no evidence that 

Congress intended the FLSA’s seamen exemption to preempt 

state law.” (Ibid.; see also Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass’n v. 

Aubry (9th Cir. 1990) 918 F.2d 1409, 1425 [FLSA does not 

preempt California overtime provisions as applied to Californiaresident-seamen].)

For the same reason, we reject petitioners’ contention that 

“general maritime law” preempts California law. Tidewater held 

that the FLSA does not preempt state law for California 

residents employed as seamen in the Santa Barbara Channel. 

Ward and Oman instruct that the residence of the employee is 

not determinative because California law also applies to nonresident employees who perform most of their work within 

California. The crew members at issue here perform most of 

their work in California. Tidewater’s holding, that federal law 

does not preempt California law for California residents who 

work in the Santa Barbara Channel, thus applies with equal 

force to these non-residents who work in the same location.

Disposition

The petition for writ of mandate is denied. The order to 

show cause is discharged and the stay heretofore issued is 

dissolved. Real parties shall recover their costs.
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CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

PERREN, J. 

TANGEMAN, J.
Vincent J. O'Neil, Jr., Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld and Gregory W. Knopp; 

Phelps Dunbar and Jolee Land; and David M. Korn for 

Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Rothschild & Alwill and Kristi D. Rothschild for Real 

Parties in Interest.