Filed 12/16/21 P. v. Talkington CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID RICHARD TALKINGTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

D077674

(Super. Ct. No. SCD280382)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Frederic L. Link, Judge. Affirmed in part; remanded for resentencing.

Denise M. Rudasill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, 

Michael Pulos and Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 

and Respondent.
2

In response to a 911 call about an apparent domestic dispute, police 

found defendant David Richard Talkington inside male victim Stacy C.’s 

bloody, 216-square-foot single-room-occupancy (SRO) apartment unit. 

Talkington had no visible injuries, but Stacy was bleeding profusely from his 

face, had a stab wound to his calf, and was in immense pain from two broken 

vertebrae. Both men initially told police Stacy had suffered a seizure, but 

Stacy later told hospital staff he had been jumped by strangers, before finally 

telling police Talkington had burst into his apartment and beaten and 

stabbed him. Stacy explained he initially lied because Talkington told him to 

do so or he would cut Stacy’s head off. 

Talkington was charged with attempted murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664, 

187, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), burglary of 

an inhabited dwelling (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), making a 

criminal threat (§ 422), and attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting 

a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). Most of the charges carried great bodily injury 

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) enhancement 

allegations. The jury found Talkington guilty of the assault, criminal threat, 

and dissuasion counts, and found the attendant enhancement allegations 

true. The jury acquitted him on the remaining counts. The trial court denied 

probation, and sentenced Talkington to six years in prison. 

Talkington asserts three categories of error on appeal. First, he 

contends the trial court erred prejudicially by allowing witnesses to testify 

about hearsay statements Stacy (who ultimately testified at trial) made to 

them about what had happened. Second, he contends the prosecutor erred 

during closing argument by commenting indirectly on the fact Talkington did 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code, except in 

Discussion part I, where they are to the Evidence Code.
3

not testify at trial, and by improperly shifting the burden of proof to the 

defense. Finally, Talkington contends the court erred at sentencing by failing 

to consider his potential military service-related traumatic brain injury (TBI) 

and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in deciding whether to grant 

probation and whether to impose a lower term sentence. (§§ 1170.9, 1170.91; 

see People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 831 (Panozo).)

As we will explain, we find no prejudicial evidentiary error and no

prosecutorial error. However, because the record is ambiguous as to whether 

the trial court considered Talkington’s potential TBI or PTSD in making its 

discretionary sentencing choices, we will remand for resentencing. In all 

other respects, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Prosecution Case

Stacy and Talkington met eight or nine months before the incident, 

when Stacy was staying at Father Joe’s Village for a few nights and saw 

Talkington there. Stacy characterized their relationship as 

“acquaintance[s].” 

About four months before the incident, Stacy moved into a 216-squarefoot unit in an SRO apartment complex. At some point, Talkington moved 

into the same complex. Stacy testified he gave Talkington a TV and other 

personal property in exchange for Talkington helping Stacy move some other 

belongings into his apartment. After that, Talkington went to Stacy’s unit 

only “about three times” to borrow change, a cigarette, or a drink. 

Stacy’s “pretty good friend[ ]” and neighbor, April, testified she never 

saw Stacy and Talkington “hanging out together,” and she did not believe 

they were friends. April was not friends with Talkington, and would only 
4

“see him in passing.” She once overheard Talkington tell another neighbor he 

had been a Navy SEAL. 

About three days before the incident, Stacy—an admitted alcoholic—

sought medical assistance to attempt once again to get sober. He was 

prescribed Librium (a controlled substance used to mitigate seizures and 

withdrawal symptoms) on the condition that he have friends bring him the 

medication and soup three times per day. April and another friend and

neighbor, Chantal, agreed to help Stacy. 

April and Chantal described Stacy’s condition as he was detoxing as 

“very weak,” “very sick,” and “shaky.” Despite his medication, he was having 

seizures and trouble moving about. The day before the incident, he was able 

to walk, but the day of it, “all of a sudden he couldn’t.” 

On the day of the incident, April checked on Stacy around 9:45 or 10:00 

a.m. “He looked very sick” and “very pale”; “had been throwing up all over 

the bed”; “was wrapped up very tight like a cocoon in a blanket”; and needed 

April’s help getting to the bathroom. April asked Stacy for his apartment key 

so she or Chantal could check on him later, but Stacy did not know where his 

key was so he told her he would leave the door unlocked. 

Around 2:45 p.m., Stacy’s neighbor Robert was walking down the 

apartment hallway when he “heard an argument” with “raised voices” inside 

Stacy’s apartment. Robert thought one voice was male and the other female. 

He heard the male voice say in a serious and “[v]ery aggravated” tone, “I will 

kill you.” Robert “stopped for a second sort of in disbelief of what [he] heard,” 

and “then a few seconds later” heard the male voice say in a serious tone, 

“ ‘I’m an ex Navy SEAL; I can and will kill you.’ ” The other voice in the room 

“sounded kind of muffled and quiet,” so Robert “couldn’t discern anything 

that was being said.” Robert “was afraid someone was serious about killing 
5

someone else,” so he reported the incident to the apartment manager and 

called 911. A recording of his 911 call was played at trial. 

In response to Robert’s call, San Diego Police Officers Garrett Kain and 

Paul Yi were dispatched to Stacy’s apartment. Officer Kain activated his 

body-worn camera when he arrived at the complex, and portions of the

footage were played at trial. 

Officer Kain knocked on Stacy’s door and identified himself as a police 

officer. Talkington responded from inside, “Yeah, he uh . . . sorry, he had a 

seizure . . . Yeah, he had a seizure . . . .” Talkington unlatched the deadbolt 

and opened the door, repeated that Stacy had had a seizure, and requested 

that the officers call an ambulance. Officer Kain saw that Stacy had blood on 

his face and body, lacerations on his face, a laceration or puncture wound on 

his calf, and a swollen eye. Stacy appeared to be in an “incredible” amount of 

pain. Talkington did not appear to have any injuries, but had blood on him. 

Stacy and Talkington both told Officer Kain that Stacy had had a seizure. 

Officer Kain directed the men to step into the hallway while he quickly 

searched the apartment to make sure no one else was inside. The officer did 

not find anyone or any weapons inside, but he saw blood on various areas of 

the floor, including a large pool next to Stacy’s bed and on his mattress. 

Based on the “alarming” amount of blood, Officer Kain became “concerned 

that this might not be just a seizure” and that he “wasn’t being told the truth 

as to what happened.” He “could tell something was wrong”—Stacy “look[ed] 

scared” and Talkington “seemed nervous.” 

Paramedics and more police officers responded to the scene. Officer 

Kain did not question Stacy further at the scene because he did not want to 

interfere with the paramedics. But the officer followed Stacy to the hospital 

“to see if [he] would tell . . . a different story if he was away from Mr. 
6

Talkington.” Stacy “seemed less scared at the hospital,” but “he was in 

incredible pain” that prevented him from answering some questions. Stacy 

did not tell Officer Kain or hospital personnel that he had been involved in a 

fight. When Officer Kain asked Stacy “specifically” if Talkington “did this to 

him,” Stacy responded, “ ‘You know I can’t tell you that.’ ” When asked to 

explain why he could not discuss it, Stacy said, “ ‘I can’t talk to you about 

what happened. They will kill me.’ ” He “refused to elaborate on who did this 

to him.” 

Stacy received several stitches over his left eye and in his right calf, 

and he was diagnosed with two broken vertebrae. He also had cuts on his 

forehead and nose, and his left eye was swollen and bruised. 

The day after the incident, Stacy began staying at his friend April’s 

apartment so she could tend to him. He appeared to be in “[v]ery much” pain, 

and was “[v]ery, very scared.” April testified Stacy “was shaking, terrified, 

[and] having nightmares when he did sleep. He was screaming that he’s 

going to come back and get me.” 

At some point the day after the incident, Stacy spoke to the apartment 

manager, Kierra G. Kierra had gone to Stacy’s apartment when police 

responded to the incident, and she had seen Talkington “putting something 

underneath Stacy’s head, and he was talking to him.” She had seen Stacy 

and Talkington smoke cigarettes together in the apartment courtyard, and, 

despite “get[ting] into a little argument from time to time,” she thought they 

were friends. 

Kierra testified that the day after the incident, Stacy told her “he lied 

[the day before] about what happened and that he was terrified and didn’t 

want to go back to his apartment.” Stacy told her that “Talkington wasn’t 

there to help. He was the one who actually attacked [Stacy].” Stacy seemed 
7

scared, and asked to move apartments because he “didn’t feel safe.” Stacy 

asked Kierra not to call the police, but she did anyway. 

That day, San Diego Police Detective Matthew Knutson was assigned 

to the case. He reviewed the responding officers’ reports, body-worn camera 

footage, and photographs. The detective was aware Stacy initially told the 

responding officers he had a seizure, and that at the hospital he changed his 

story to “being jumped by someone who he didn’t know.” The detective went 

to April’s apartment to talk to Stacy “to confirm his new story” about 

Talkington attacking him. April was present during the interview, which 

Detective Knutson acknowledged was “not common” police practice. 

It was “very hard” for Detective Knutson to get a statement because 

Stacy “was terrified” and “concerned” about speaking to the police, and was in 

so much pain. 

Detective Knutson testified before Stacy at trial, and related to the jury 

the version of events Stacy reported to him. Stacy said he had become 

acquainted with Talkington a few months earlier at Saint Vincent, but 

stopped associating with him after Talkington started making weird 

statements. At the time of the incident, they were not friends and did not 

speak. 

On the day of the incident, Stacy heard “banging” on the door, and 

invited the person in. Talkington flung the door open and flew into the room 

holding a pocketknife. The knife was silver, had holes and a serrated blade, 

and was about eight to 10 inches long when opened. 

Stacy told Detective Knutson that Talkington jammed the knife into his 

eyebrow above his left eye, told him he was going to cut his eye out and kill 

him, and then stabbed him in the eye. Talkington also punched Stacy about 

15 times, hitting him so hard his back broke. Stacy reported that Talkington 
8

instructed him to tell the police “that it was a seizure,” or “he was going to 

cut his head off.” Stacy told the detective “he absolutely believed” this threat, 

and further believed “that, had the police not knocked on the door when they

did, he would have been dead.” Stacy said this was why he initially lied to 

the police and told them he had had a seizure. 

Based on his investigation, Detective Knutson instructed uniformed 

police officers to arrest Talkington. One of the arresting officers 

photographed Talkington’s body and observed no injuries. The photos were 

shown to the jury. Searches of Stacy’s and Talkington’s phones found no 

apparent communications between them. Based on a statement Talkington 

made while in a holding cell (the substance of which was not communicated

to the jury), Detective Knutson searched Stacy’s apartment and found a knife 

behind a microwave in the kitchenette. The knife matched the description 

Stacy had given, except that the blade was not serrated. There were blood 

spots on the handle and blade. 

Detective Knutson submitted the knife for DNA testing to try to 

“determine whose DNA was where on the knife” to help “determine who was 

holding it.” DNA analysis showed very strong support that there was a twoperson mixture of DNA contributed by Stacy and Talkington. Samples from 

the blood spot on the blade, the handle (avoiding visible blood), and the blade 

(avoiding visible blood) revealed mixtures of 65/35, 84/16, and 98/2, with 

Stacy being the major contributor in each. 

Stacy testified at trial after Officer Kain, April, Chantal, and Detective 

Knutson. Stacy was “terrified” of Talkington while testifying, and admitted 

to drinking a single 12-ounce can of beer at 2:00 a.m. the day of his testimony 

because he could not sleep. Stacy described the incident, and the days 

leading up to it, in substantially similar fashion as the other prosecution 
9

witnesses. He added that when Talkington entered the apartment, 

Talkington “said something about a CD or a DVD” and began strangling 

Stacy with the blanket he was wrapped in. Stacy owned thousands of CDs 

and DVDs, but had no idea what Talkington was talking about. 

Stacy testified Talkington taunted him, threatened to cut off his nose, 

and actually cut his nose. Stacy said Talkington used one hand to strangle 

him with the blanket, and the other to alternate between punching him and 

sticking him with the knife. As Stacy lifted his leg to free himself from the 

“stranglehold,” Talkington stabbed him in the back of the leg. Stacy said he 

was “begging for [his] life” and “sounded like a girl whimpering.” Stacy said 

the ordeal lasted 15 to 30 minutes. 

Stacy testified he initially lied to the police at the apartment because 

he believed Talkington’s threat that he would cut off Stacy’s head if he did 

not lie. He lied again at the hospital, saying he “got jumped by three or four 

people,” because he knew Talkington was not yet in police custody. 

Stacy testified Talkington had one knife during the assault; Stacy did 

not own it and had never seen it before; and the only part of the knife Stacy 

touched was the blade when Talkington was stabbing him with it. 

Defense Case

Talkington did not present an affirmative defense case. Instead, he 

focused on Stacy’s credibility and conflicting explanations of what happened, 

and his argumentative, profane, and bizarre demeanor while testifying. 

Talkington also argued April and Chantal were “extremely biased” 

because they were friends with Stacy, while the apartment manager (who 

contradicted their testimony about Stacy and Talkington being friends) “ha[d] 

no dog in this show.” 
10

The defense also emphasized that Stacy had drunk a beer the morning 

he testified, and that the doctor who diagnosed Stacy with broken vertebrae 

testified that a person experiencing alcohol withdrawal might have mental 

confusion and mood changes.

Verdicts and Sentencing

The jury found Talkington guilty of assault with a deadly weapon 

(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), making a criminal threat (§ 422), and attempting to 

dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)); and not 

guilty of attempted murder (§§ 664, 287, subd. (a)) and burglary of an 

inhabited dwelling (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). As to the 

assault and criminal threat convictions, the jury found true that Talkington 

personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally 

inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). 

The trial court sentenced Talkington to six years in prison. 

DISCUSSION

I. No Prejudicial Evidentiary Error

Talkington contends the trial court erred by allowing Officer Kain, 

April, Detective Knutson, and Kierra to testify about hearsay statements 

Stacy made about what happened.2 The Attorney General maintains the 

testimony was admissible as hearsay or nonhearsay evidence of Stacy’s 

fearful state of mind, which was relevant to both the criminal threat count 

and to explain Stacy’s conduct in initially lying about what happened. For 

reasons we will explain, we find no prejudicial error.

2 The Attorney General contends Talkington forfeited these challenges 

because, although he objected generally on hearsay grounds when each topic 

was initially raised, he did not object again to the specific testimony he 

challenges on appeal. We decline to find a forfeiture because the trial court’s 

repeated rulings made it clear that further objection would have been futile. 
11

 Legal Principles

“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of its 

content.” (People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 831; see Evid. Code,3

§ 1200, subd. (a).) “Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls under an 

exception.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674 (Sanchez); § 1200, 

subd. (b).) “ ‘The proponent of hearsay has to alert the court to the exception 

relied upon and has the burden of laying the proper foundation.’ ” (People v. 

Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 822.)

“[A] statement ‘offered for some purpose other than to prove the fact 

stated therein is not hearsay.’ ” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 674; see 

People v. Superior Court (Couthren) (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1019 [“A 

statement not offered for its truth is, definitionally, not hearsay.”].) Evidence 

offered for a nonhearsay purpose is still subject to exclusion on other grounds, 

such as relevance or undue prejudice. (See People v. Ortiz (1995) 38 

Cal.App.4th 377, 389 (Ortiz); People v. Kovacich (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 863, 

889 (Kovacich).) When nonhearsay evidence is admitted as such, it is 

advisable to give a limiting instruction to prevent the jury from considering 

the evidence for its truth. (Ortiz, at p. 389; Kovacich, at p. 889; People v. 

Wang (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1080, fn. 9; § 355 [“When evidence is 

admissible . . . for one purpose and is inadmissible . . . for another purpose, 

the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and 

instruct the jury accordingly.”].) However, absent a request, the trial court 

generally is not required to give a limiting instruction. (People v. Hajek and 

Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1229 (Hajek); People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 

401, 479 (Cowan).) 

3 Undesignated statutory references in Discussion part I are to the 

Evidence Code.
12

Testimony about a victim’s out-of-court statement reflecting his or her 

state of mind can be either hearsay or nonhearsay. (People v. Riccardi (2012) 

54 Cal.4th 758, 823 (Riccardi).) “The threshold determination is whether the 

proffered statement is . . . being offered to prove the truth of its contents.” 

(Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 389.) 

If offered for its truth, section 1250 provides a hearsay exception for a 

statement reflecting the declarant’s then existing state of mind or physical 

condition, provided the declarant’s state of mind is relevant to a disputed

issue at trial. (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 410.) Evidence admitted 

under this exception is subject to section 1252, which renders otherwise 

admissible hearsay inadmissible “if the statement was made under 

circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.” Evidence 

admitted under this exception is admitted for its truth as to the declarant’s 

state of mind. (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 907.) 

Statements about past conduct do not fall within this hearsay 

exception. (See § 1250, subd. (b) [“This section does not make admissible 

evidence of a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 

believed.”]; Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 823; People v. Deeney (1983) 145 

Cal.App.3d 647, 652 [“ ‘Ed hit me with a rolled up newspaper’ ” was not “a 

statement of physical condition” because “a statement of how a mental or 

physical condition was caused is not a declaration of either a then existing or 

previously existing state of mind or physical condition. It is a statement of 

the declarant’s memory of an event.”]; People v. Rincon (2005) 129 

Cal.App.4th 738, 751 [state of mind exception applied to detective’s testimony 

about victim’s “bare reference to being wounded in the ankle,” but not to the 

detective’s testimony about the victim’s statement he “had been shot in the 

ankle ‘as a result of a gun battle’ ” at a specific location, because these details 
13

were inadmissible “evidence of the declarant’s memory of the conditioncausing event”].)

Thus, for example, although a victim’s out-of-court statement “ ‘I am 

afraid of John,’ is hearsay if offered to prove that the declarant fears John,” 

the statement is nevertheless admissible for its truth under section 1250 if 

the victim’s “state of mind is relevant” to an issue in the case. (Ortiz, supra, 

38 Cal.App.4th at p. 390; see Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 822 [victim’s 

“statements that she was ‘terrified’ of defendant . . . were hearsay evidence 

because they were offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted—that 

she feared defendant”].)

“In contrast, a statement which does not directly declare a mental 

state, but is merely circumstantial evidence of that state of mind, is not 

hearsay. It is not received for the truth of the matter stated, but rather 

whether the statement is true or not, the fact such statement was made is 

relevant to a determination of the declarant’s state of mind.” (Ortiz, supra, 

38 Cal.App.4th at p. 389; see Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823; 

People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 232.) “[A]n out-of-court statement 

describing the declarant’s fear is not inadmissible simply because it also 

contains the reason for that fear, i.e., that the defendant had threatened the 

declarant.” (Kovacich, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 887; see People v. Brooks

(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39 (Brooks) [testimony about victim’s “statements that 

defendant had threatened to kill her” was admissible nonhearsay because the

statements “were relevant circumstantial evidence that she was afraid of 

defendant”]; Riccardi, at p. 823 [victim’s “indirect declarations of her state of 

mind” that “contained descriptions or assessments of defendant’s conduct 

that engendered [the victim]’s fear or altered her conduct—e.g., ‘[Defendant] 

kidnapped me at gunpoint’ . . . were not hearsay to the extent they were 
14

admitted to prove circumstantially [the victim]’s state of mind or conduct”]; 

Ortiz, at pp. 385, 391 [victim’s statements that the defendant “would make 

panting noises outside the bathroom door” while she bathed, “had intruded 

on her when she was in the shower,” and that he had sexually assaulted her 

“would have been inadmissible as hearsay,” but were admissible as 

nonhearsay as “relevant circumstantial evidence” of victim’s state of mind].) 

We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including “its 

determination of issues concerning the hearsay rule,” for an abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 590.)

We will examine the challenged testimony in the order the witnesses 

testified at trial.

 Officer Kain

Talkington contends the trial court erred by allowing Officer Kain to 

testify that Stacy told him at the hospital, “I can’t talk to you about what 

happened. They will kill me.” The Attorney General maintains there was no 

error because the testimony was admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of 

circumstantially establishing Stacy’s state of mind, and in any event, because 

the defense “opened the door” to this testimony during cross-examination. 

We agree with the Attorney General.

1. Background

On direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Officer Kain 

generally about his observations upon arriving at the crime scene. The 

officer described the alarming amount of blood, which caused him to 

immediately doubt Stacy’s and Talkington’s initial claims that Stacy had 

merely suffered a seizure. The prosecutor did not ask Officer Kain to relate 

any statements by Stacy that implicated Talkington or cast doubt on the 

seizure claim.
15

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Officer Kain specifically 

about the content of his interview of Stacy at the hospital. Counsel asked, 

“Would it be fair to say that [Stacy] did not tell you that there had been this 

big fight between him and [Talkington] an hour or two before?” The officer 

responded, “He did not say that.” 

On redirect, the prosecutor asked Officer Kain whether he had asked 

Stacy “specifically if [Talkington] did this to him.” When the officer 

responded that he had, the prosecutor asked how Stacy responded. Defense 

counsel objected on hearsay grounds, which the trial court overruled. Officer 

Kain testified Stacy responded with “something along the lines of ‘You know I 

can’t tell you that.’ ” 

On recross, defense counsel asked Officer Kain, “Would it be fair to say 

that during the conversation you heard between the medical personnel and 

[Stacy], [Stacy] still did not say that [Talkington] came in, assaulted him, and 

attacked him with a knife?” Officer Kain responded that Stacy “did not say 

those specific words, no.” 

Finally, on further redirect, the prosecutor asked, “Did you hear [Stacy] 

say why he couldn’t explain what happened?” Officer Kain responded that 

Stacy said, “ ‘I can’t talk to you about what happened. They will kill me.’ ” 

Talkington contends this statement constitutes erroneously admitted 

hearsay.

2. Analysis

The trial court did not err in admitting Officer Kain’s challenged 

testimony because it was nonhearsay that circumstantially proved Stacy’s 

fearful state of mind. The statement was not offered for its truth—that is, 

that someone would, in fact, kill Stacy if he talked about what happened—

rather, it was offered to prove circumstantially that Stacy believed someone 
16

would kill him if he talked about what happened. This is classic nonhearsay. 

(See Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 39 [testimony about victim’s “statements 

that defendant had threatened to kill her” were admissible nonhearsay]; 

Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 390 [a statement “offered merely to prove 

the victim believed [the defendant] to be dangerous . . . is not offered for its 

truth (thus not hearsay) but merely as circumstantial evidence of the 

declarant’s mental state”].) And it was relevant both to establish an element 

of the criminal threat count,4 and to explain Stacy’s conduct in not initially 

disclosing that Talkington had attacked him. Although it would have been 

advisable to give a limiting instruction, the trial court was not required to do 

so because Talkington did not request one. (See Hajek, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 

p. 1229; Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 479.)

Even if Officer Kain’s testimony would otherwise have been 

inadmissible hearsay, the defense rendered it admissible by opening the door 

to it on cross-examination and recross. “Under the doctrine of ‘opening the 

door,’ one party may render otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible by 

introducing the topic selectively such as to leave a misleading impression.” 

(People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513, 553; see People v. Harris (2005) 

37 Cal.4th 310, 335 [“the jury is entitled to know the context in which the 

[selectively presented] statements . . . were made”]; People v. Sanders (1995) 

11 Cal.4th 475, 520 [where defense counsel elicited portions of an 

investigative interview with a witness, the prosecutor was permitted to 

inquire into the context of the statements on redirect examination of the 

witness and cross-examination of the investigator]; People v. Zapien (1993) 

4 The criminal threat offense requires proof that the victim was in 

“sustained fear” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228), which 

“refers to a state of mind” (People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 

1349).
17

4 Cal.4th 929, 959.) Defense counsel’s questioning of Officer Kain about only 

a portion of his interview of Stacy at the hospital would have left the jury 

with the misleading impression that Stacy said nothing to explain why he 

gave varying accounts of what had happened. Thus, to provide the jury a 

fuller context regarding the reasons for Stacy’s conduct, the prosecutor was 

entitled to ask Officer Kain about other statements Stacy made during that 

same interview.

 April

Talkington contends the trial court erred by admitting April’s 

testimony for the truth of the matter that Stacy “was screaming” during 

nightmares “that he’s going to come back and get me.” We conclude the 

testimony was properly admitted as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of 

Stacy’s fearful state of mind. 

The challenged testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered to 

prove that anyone was, in fact, “going to come back and get [Stacy].” Rather, 

it was offered to prove that Stacy believed at some level that someone would 

do so, which reflected Stacy’s fearful state of mind. (Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th 

at p. 39; Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) As noted, Stacy’s mental 

state was relevant both to establish an element of the criminal threat count, 

and to explain Stacy’s conduct in not initially disclosing that Talkington had 

attacked him. Thus, the challenged testimony was admissible nonhearsay. 

And although it would have been advisable to give a limiting instruction to 

that effect, the trial court was not required to do so because Talkington did 

not request one. (See Hajek, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1229; Cowan, supra, 50 

Cal.4th at p. 479.)

April’s testimony about Stacy’s sleep talk may have been objectionable 

on other grounds, such as relevance (§§ 210, 350) or undue prejudice (§ 352). 
18

But Talkington did not object on any such ground below, as required to 

preserve the challenge for appeal. (§ 353; see People v. Dykes (2009) 46 

Cal.4th 731, 756 [“trial counsel’s failure to object to claimed evidentiary error 

on the same ground asserted on appeal results in a forfeiture of the issue on 

appeal”].)

 Detective Knutson

Before Stacy testified, Detective Knutson testified at length (about five 

pages in the reporter’s transcript) about the entire substance of his interview 

of Stacy the day after the incident. The trial court appears to have admitted 

this testimony for its truth under a hearsay exception for prior consistent 

statements. (§§ 1236, 791.) Talkington contends this exception does not

apply, and that Detective Knutson’s testimony was otherwise inadmissible

hearsay. The Attorney General implicitly concedes the prior consistent 

statements exception does not apply, but maintains “the statements 

describing Stacy’s fear and pain were admissible under the hearsay exception 

to prove Stacy’s state of mind (§ 1250), and the statements describing 

[Talkington]’s attacks and threats were admissible as nonhearsay 

circumstantial evidence of Stacy’s state of mind.” 

We accept the Attorney General’s concession. The trial court erred by 

admitting Stacy’s out-of-court statements for their truth through Detective 

Knutson under the prior consistent statement exception. By statute, the 

exception applies only when a prior consistent statement “is offered after” the 

credibility of a witness’s “testimony at the hearing” has been challenged. 

(§ 791, italics added.) Because Stacy had not yet “testi[fied] at the hearing” 

(ibid.), his prior statements were not admissible under this exception.

Nevertheless, we agree with the Attorney General that Detective 

Knutson’s testimony was admissible on other grounds. (See Brooks, supra, 3 
19

Cal.5th at p. 39 [“ ‘ “[W]e review the ruling, not the court’s reasoning and, if 

the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.” ’ ”].) One statement (that 

Stacy “was terrified”) was admissible for its truth as evidence of Stacy’s then 

existing state of mind. (§ 1250.) And the balance of the statements about the 

attack and threats were admissible as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of 

Stacy’s fearful mental state or to explain his conduct. 

Because so much of the circumstantial evidence consisted of Stacy’s 

recounting of past events, which was not admissible for its truth, it 

“present[ed] an elevated danger of prejudice if the jury [was] unable to 

distinguish between the truth of the matters asserted and the inferences 

concerning [Stacy]’s state of mind.” (Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 823.) 

This danger was further elevated by the lack of a limiting instruction. But 

based on our thorough review of the record as a whole, we conclude the 

admission of the challenged testimony did not prejudice Talkington.

1. Background

After Kierra called the police, Detective Knutson interviewed Stacy “to 

confirm his new story.” When the prosecutor asked Detective Knutson, 

“What did [Stacy] tell you—what did he say happened?”, defense counsel 

objected on hearsay grounds, which the trial court overruled. 

Detective Knutson then testified in detail about Stacy’s statements. It 

began with Stacy’s detox protocol, which explained why he left his door 

unlocked. The detective then described Talkington’s entry into the 

apartment and assault on Stacy. Next, the detective recounted Stacy’s 

statements about Talkington’s threat that he would cut Stacy’s head off if he 

did not tell the police he had had a seizure. After relating these details, the 

detective testified about Stacy’s description of how he and Talkington met 

and how they had become estranged. The detective then returned to Stacy’s 
20

comments about Talkington’s threat, which Stacy said he believed, and that 

he further believed he would have been dead if the police had not arrived 

when they did. Stacy told the detective he initially lied about what happened 

because Talkington threatened to kill him if he did not lie. 

At the first recess after this testimony, defense counsel renewed his 

hearsay objection in detail, stating, “I have to adamantly object about 

Detective Knutson being able to go through the whole story of what [Stacy] 

told him. I can understand if [Stacy] testified—” The court interjected, 

“Look, [Stacy]’s coming in. We’ll see what [he] has to say. You know, if he 

doesn’t come in, it all gets struck. All right. But the victim’s coming in. [He]

has a right to say it, and you can cross-examine. I’m sure it will be fine.” 

As noted, Stacy ultimately testified at trial consistently with Detective 

Knutson’s recounting. 

2. Analysis

Talkington appears to concede that one of Stacy’s statements to 

Detective Knutson falls within the hearsay exception for then existing state 

of mind: that “he was terrified” because “Talkington was right there, and 

he’d been told if he spoke to police that [Talkington] was going to kill him.” 

We agree that Stacy’s statement that “he was terrified” falls within the 

exception, and was therefore admissible for its truth. (See Ortiz, supra, 38 

Cal.App.4th at p. 390 [exception applies to “[t]he statement: ‘I am afraid of 

John’ ”]; Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 822 [exception applies to victim’s 

“statements that she was ‘terrified’ of defendant”].) The remainder of this 

portion of the statement was admissible as circumstantial evidence of Stacy’s 

fearful mind, but not for its truth.

The remainder of Stacy’s statements to Detective Knutson describing 

Talkington’s assault and threat were admissible as nonhearsay 
21

circumstantial evidence of Stacy’s fearful state of mind, which was relevant 

to both an element of the criminal threat count and to explain Stacy’s 

conduct. (See Brooks, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 39; Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 

p. 823; Kovacich, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 887; Ortiz, supra, 38 

Cal.App.4th at p. 385.) As nonhearsay, Stacy’s narrative was not admitted 

for its truth, and should have been accompanied by a limiting instruction to 

that effect.5 (Riccardi, at p. 823.) And although the wholesale introduction 

of nonhearsay testimony narrating past conduct “present[ed] an elevated 

danger of prejudice” (Riccardi, at p. 823), we are satisfied on our review of the 

evidentiary record as a whole that no prejudice occurred. We explain why in 

part I.F., post.

 Kierra 

Talkington contends the trial court erred by allowing the apartment 

manager, Kierra, to testify that Stacy told her the day after the attack that 

he was afraid and wanted to change apartments because Talkington “was the 

one who actually attacked [him].” Talkington acknowledges in his appellate 

briefing that “some of the statements may have been relevant as 

circumstantial evidence [Stacy] was afraid of [Talkington],” but he maintains 

the court nonetheless erred by failing to give a limiting instruction. We agree

the testimony was admissible as nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of 

Stacy’s fearful state of mind. And we conclude Talkington’s admitted failure 

to request a limiting instruction forfeited the issue for appeal. (See Hajek, 

supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1229; Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 479.) We are not 

persuaded by Talkington’s suggestion that it would have been futile to 

5 Talkington’s failure to request such an instruction was excusable in 

light of the trial court’s apparent admission of the testimony for its truth 

under the prior consistent statement exception. 
22

request a limiting instruction in light of the trial court’s prior ruling 

admitting Detective Knutson’s testimony for its truth under the prior 

consistent statement hearsay exception. The trial court’s prior rationale 

related to different testimony from a different witness about different 

statements.

 No Prejudice

Even assuming it was error to admit Detective Knutson’s narrative 

testimony containing nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of Stacy’s fearful 

state of mind, we conclude the error did not prejudice Talkington.

First, Detective Knutson’s testimony was rendered cumulative by 

Stacy’s subsequent testimony recounting substantially the same narrative, as 

well as by the properly admitted nonhearsay testimony by Officer Kain, 

April, and Kierra establishing Stacy’s fearful state of mind. The erroneous 

admission of evidence ordinarily is not prejudicial when it is cumulative of 

other properly admitted evidence. (See Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 829 

[no prejudice where erroneously admitted hearsay “was cumulative to [other] 

properly admitted evidence”]; People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 818, 

fn. 29 [assuming admission of hearsay statements was erroneous, their

“admission could not have been prejudicial by any standard because they 

were identical to [other statements properly admitted], and were therefore 

cumulative”]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 153 [erroneous admission 

of declarant’s prior out-of-court statements “was harmless” where “it was 

merely cumulative” of other witness’s testimony].) 

We are unpersuaded by Talkington’s assertion that Stacy’s “bizarre,” 

“evasive,” “threatening,” “rude,” and “profane” demeanor while testifying 

rendered him “unquestionably” noncredible. The prosecutor and defense 

counsel both addressed Stacy’s testifying demeanor during their closing 
23

arguments, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on relevant 

factors to consider in determining witness credibility. (See CALCRIM No. 

226 [stating in part, “You alone must judge the credibility or believability of

the witnesses,” and enumerating factors to consider in doing so].) The fact 

the jury did not convict Talkington on all counts suggests the jury did not 

accept Stacy’s testimony uncritically. 

Second, there was other abundant evidence of Talkington’s guilt. A 

disinterested neighbor testified he heard a fight inside Stacy’s apartment. 

This included a death threat by someone claiming to be a former Navy SEAL, 

which April had heard Talkington claim to be on another occasion. When 

Officer Kain arrived at the scene, Talkington unlocked the deadbolt on 

Stacy’s door, corroborating Stacy’s testimony that Talkington locked the door 

when he entered the apartment. Officer Kain testified that the alarming 

amount of blood at the scene (visible in trial exhibits in the appellate record)

immediately “made [him] concerned that this might not be just a seizure.” 

Kierra testified she saw Talkington lean over Stacy in the hallway and say 

something to him. There was very strong support to conclude that 

Talkington’s DNA and Stacy’s blood were on a knife hidden behind the 

microwave in Stacy’s kitchen, which Detective Knutson found only in 

response to an unspecified statement Talkington made during a custodial 

interview. And defense counsel acknowledged in closing argument that 

Talkington had lied to the police at the crime scene. 

In light of this compelling evidence of Talkington’s guilt, we find 

unpersuasive his contention that the jury hearing Stacy’s story from 

Detective Knutson before hearing it from Stacy improperly “pre-bolstered” 

Stacy’s credibility. Nor do we find it reasonably probable the jury would 
24

otherwise have reached more favorable verdicts for Talkington. Thus, any 

evidentiary error was not prejudicial.

II. No Prosecutorial Error

Talkington contends the following passage from the prosecutor’s 

rebuttal closing argument “amounted to an indirect comment on 

[Talkington]’s failure to testify and a shifting of the burden of proof onto” the 

defense:

“The third thing that I want you to focus on is the victim’s 

injuries. Defense counsel got up and did not give you one 

other reasonable explanation for how Stacy . . . got a stab 

wound on his leg, two separate fractured vertebrae, a black 

eye, a cut above his eye, a cut on his nose. These, again, 

are physical, tangible pieces of evidence that cannot be 

explained other than what Stacy . . . told you.” 

We conclude Talkington forfeited this challenge by failing to assert it 

during trial. And even if it were not forfeited, the challenge lacks merit

because the prosecutor’s comments were fair comment on the state of the 

evidence.

 Background

The prosecutor reminded the jury at the outset of her closing argument

that she bore the burden of proving her case beyond a reasonable doubt. She 

acknowledged Stacy’s demeanor at trial was unconventional, but she urged 

the jury to consider not only his testimony, “but also how all the . . . physical 

evidence, other witnesses’ testimony, [and] circumstantial evidence . . . 

corroborates and supports” his testimony. 

Defense counsel began his closing argument by observing that Stacy 

and Talkington are the “only two people on the face of this earth who know 

what really happened in that small apartment.” Counsel acknowledged 

Talkington had lied to the police. But counsel also repeatedly attacked 
25

Stacy’s credibility, and repeatedly reminded the jury that Talkington had 

elected to exercise his constitutional right to not testify and to instead rely on 

the state of the evidence and the prosecution’s failure to meet its burden. 

Defense counsel specifically cited CALCRIM No. 355 (“Defendant’s Right Not 

to Testify”) as “the law as [the trial court] has given it to you.”6 

Defense counsel also minimized Stacy’s injuries, observing that none 

were in the area of vital organs; he was “not going to bleed to death from” the 

cut on his calf that required only a few stitches; and “a reasonable 

interpretation” for the cut over Stacy’s eye was that it “was actually a punch 

that split his eyebrow open,” rather than a knife wound. 

Defense counsel concluded by reminding the jury that “the burden of 

proof is not with the defense,” who “chose to not call any witnesses and to rely 

on the state of the evidence.” 

The prosecutor made five points during her rebuttal argument. First, 

she focused on “the physical evidence.” Second, she asked the jury to “focus 

on” the fact Talkington “lied at the scene . . . because he knew that he was 

guilty.” The third point was the passage Talkington challenges here:

“The third thing that I want you to focus on is the victim’s 

injuries. Defense counsel got up and did not give you one 

other reasonable explanation for how Stacy . . . got a stab 

wound on his leg, two separate fractured vertebrae, a black 

eye, a cut above his eye, a cut on his nose. These, again, 

are physical, tangible pieces of evidence that cannot be 

explained other than what Stacy . . . told you.” 

6 CALCRIM No. 355 states: “A defendant has an absolute constitutional 

right not to testify. He or she may rely on the state of the evidence and argue 

that the People have failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Do not consider, for any reason at all, the fact that the defendant did not 

testify. Do not discuss that fact during your deliberations or let it influence 

your decision in any way.”
26

Defense counsel did not object to this argument.

The prosecutor’s fourth point was “the length of the time of the attack.” 

And her final point was that the 911 call was made by a person who “has no 

dog in this fight.” 

The prosecutor twice more acknowledged during her rebuttal argument 

that she bore the burden of proving her case beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 Legal Principles

In Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 (Griffin), the United States 

Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from 

commenting, directly or indirectly, on a defendant’s failure to testify. (See 

People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339 (Bradford); People v. Lewis

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 670.) This includes “argu[ing] to the jury that certain 

testimony or evidence is uncontradicted, if such contradiction or denial could 

be provided only by the defendant, who therefore would be required to take 

the witness stand.” (Bradford, at p. 1339.) But this rule does not “bar 

prosecution comments based upon the state of the evidence or upon the 

failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call anticipated 

witnesses.” (Ibid.) The relevant inquiry is whether it is “reasonabl[y] likel[y]

that the jury would have understood [the challenged] remarks as a comment 

upon [the] defendant’s failure to testify.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 

Cal.4th 641, 727.) We independently review claims of Griffin error. (People 

v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.)

A defendant forfeits the ability to appeal a claim of Griffin error unless 

the defendant timely objected on that ground at trial and requested that the 

court admonish the jury to disregard the improper argument. (See People v. 

Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 127 (Valdez); People v. Mesa (2006) 144 

Cal.App.4th 1000, 1006-1007 (Mesa).) “The only exception is for cases in 
27

which a timely objection would have been futile or ineffective to cure the 

harm.” (Mesa, at p. 1007.)

 Analysis

1. Forfeiture

We conclude Talkington forfeited his claim of prosecutorial error by 

failing to object and request a curative admonition during the prosecutor’s 

closing argument. (See Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 127; Mesa, supra, 144 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1007.) Nothing in the appellate record indicates a timely 

objection and admonition would have been futile or ineffective.

To avoid forfeiture, Talkington claims his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object. We are not persuaded. To establish ineffective 

assistance, a defendant has the burden to show his or her counsel’s 

performance was deficient, and that he or she suffered prejudice as a result. 

(See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Mickel

(2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.) “On a direct appeal a conviction will be reversed 

for ineffective assistance of counsel only when the record demonstrates there 

could have been no rational tactical purpose for counsel’s challenged act or 

omission.” (Mesa, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1007; see People v. Hoyt

(2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.) “[D]eciding whether to object is inherently 

tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.” 

(People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502.) 

Talkington has not met his burden to establish his counsel’s failure to 

object was the result of anything other than a tactical decision. That is, his 

trial counsel “may well have been concerned that an objection for Griffin

error, even if sustained with an appropriate admonition, would have simply 

shifted the focus” to defense counsel’s failure to explain-away Stacy’s physical 

injuries and other corroborating prosecution evidence. (Mesa, supra, 144 
28

Cal.App.4th at p. 1010, fn. 4; see People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 

387 (Chatman) [“defense counsel might reasonably have chosen not to object” 

to statements in prosecutor’s rebuttal argument that “were intended to 

neutralize the defense argument”].) 

Because Talkington has not shown that his counsel’s failure to object 

constituted ineffective assistance, that failure forfeited his prosecutorial error 

claim.

2. No Error

Even if Talkington had not forfeited this challenge, it would fail on the 

merits because the jury was not reasonably likely to construe the prosecutor’s 

challenged statements as referring to Talkington’s failure to testify or 

shifting the burden to the defense.

Most importantly, the prosecutor did not comment on Talkington’s 

failure to testify—she commented on “[d]efense counsel[’s]” failure to “give

[the jury] one other reasonable explanation for” how Stacy sustained his 

extensive injuries. This was a permissible comment on the state of the 

prosecution’s evidence, which did not improperly shift the burden to the 

defense. (See Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1339.) 

Talkington maintains that because he and Stacy are the only two 

people who really know what happened, the prosecution evidence could only 

be explained away by his testimony, thus rendering the argument improper. 

We disagree. For example, defense counsel attempted to explain-away the 

evidence by arguing the laceration over Stacy’s eye was not a laceration at 

all, but “was actually a punch that split his eyebrow open.” The prosecutor’s 

challenged statement in rebuttal was fair comment on the reasonableness of 

defense counsel’s proffered explanation. (See Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 

p. 386 [“Defendant’s challenges to rebuttal must be evaluated in light of the 
29

defense argument to which it replied.”]; People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 

659, 672 [“It is permissible [for a prosecutor] to argue that the jury may 

reject . . . unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to so characterize 

a defense theory.”].) 

Talkington’s heavy reliance on People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 

438 (Medina) is misplaced. The prosecutor in Medina argued in closing that, 

of the “five percipient witnesses to what occurred at the scene of the 

murders,” only three had testified and, thus, “their testimony is unrefuted.” 

(Id. at p. 457, italics added.) Because the only two other percipient witnesses 

who could have refuted the testimony were the defendants, the Medina court 

found the prosecutor’s comment violated Griffin. (Medina, at pp. 459-460.) 

But in reaching its conclusion, the Medina court distinguished words 

and phrases like “unrefuted” and “no denial”—which “ ‘connote[ ] a personal 

response by the accused himself’ ”—from the word “explain,” which “ ‘[a]ny 

witness could’ ” do. (Medina, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 459.) This is 

consistent with the broader “distinction . . . between the permissible comment 

that a defendant has not produced any evidence, and on the other hand an 

improper statement that a defendant has a duty or burden to produce 

evidence, or a duty or burden to prove his or her innocence.” (Bradford, 

supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1340; People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 

Cal.4th 335, 387 [“a prosecutor is permitted to comment on the state of the 

evidence and the defendant’s failure to call a logical witness, despite the mere 

possibility that the statement might also be interpreted as a reference to the 

defendant’s failure to testify”].) In light of this distinction, and counsel’s and 

the court’s repeated admonitions that Talkington had no affirmative duty to 

testify or produce evidence, it is not reasonably likely that the jury construed 
30

the prosecutor’s fair comment on the state of the evidence as implying 

Talkington had such duties.

III. Remand for Resentencing

Talkington requests a remand for resentencing because the record does 

not show that the trial court considered his potential military service-related 

TBI or PTSD in exercising its sentencing discretion, as required by sections 

1170.9 and 1170.91. (See Panozo, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 828.) The 

Attorney General agrees remand is warranted in light of the ambiguous 

record on these points. We agree.

 Background

The probation officer’s report states that when Talkington was 

arrested, he “told officers he was a Navy Seal and he has ‘TBI with a brain 

injury’ and his ‘PTSD went off’ ” during the incident. Talkington told the 

probation officer he was diagnosed with a brain injury stemming from his 

service in the Navy, and that sometime after 2002 he was diagnosed with 

PTSD.

The probation officer advised that Talkington was presumptively 

ineligible for probation. And although the officer cited several factors 

favoring a grant of probation, none related to Talkington’s reported servicerelated injuries. Regarding selection of a prison term, the probation officer 

cited as a mitigating circumstance the fact that Talkington “was reportedly 

suffering from a mental condition that significantly reduced his culpability 

for the crime.” But the probation officer cited numerous factors in 

aggravation, and ultimately recommended that the court impose the upper 

term. 
31

The prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum cited several factors 

warranting denial of probation and imposition of an upper term sentence. 

The prosecutor did not cite any mitigating factors. 

Talkington acknowledged in his statement in mitigation that he was 

presumptively ineligible for probation, but argued the presumption had been 

overcome by numerous factors, including that he “indeed does suffer from 

psychological issues,” as demonstrated by the fact his “U.S. Navy records and 

Veteran’s Administration records show that he has suffered from severe

depression for many years.” Talkington conceded “it is unknown whether his 

depression played a direct role in this particular case.” As factors in 

mitigation, Talkington cited (among other things) the fact he “has suffered 

from major depressive disorder and possibly PTSD for many years,” and 

served five years in the Navy. Talkington did not cite sections 1170.9 or 

1170.91 in his statement in mitigation. 

A psychologist whose report Talkington submitted with his sentencing 

materials stated there was no indication in Talkington’s records that he had 

been diagnosed with TBI. The psychologist opined it was less likely that 

Talkington’s depression was “incurred or caused by his military service,” and 

more likely that it resulted from chronic social maladjustment. 

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel reiterated that Talkington 

has suffered from “a lot of issues over the years.” Counsel believed 

Talkington suffered from PTSD from his military service, though counsel 

acknowledged Talkington’s records were inconclusive on that point. Counsel 

also believed Talkington suffered from a service-related TBI, after which his 

“issues really began.” Counsel requested that the court place Talkington on 

probation, or impose a lower term sentence. Counsel did not mention 

sections 1170.9 or 1170.91 at the hearing.
32

The trial court noted it had reviewed all the materials submitted in 

connection with sentencing. The court stated it agreed with the jury’s 

verdicts, and found “this is not a probation case.” The court based this 

finding on Talkington’s history of violent offenses, prior felonies, and the 

violent nature of the current offense. Accordingly, the court denied 

probation. 

With regard to the sentence on the aggravated assault conviction, the 

court “select[ed] the midterm of three years as the proper term,” plus “a 

consecutive three years’ sentence” on the great bodily injury enhancement. 

The court stayed the weapon-use enhancement on the basis “it’s part of the 

crime.” The court also imposed midterm sentences on the criminal threat 

and dissuasion convictions, but stayed them under section 654. 

 Legal Principles

Under sections 1170.9 and 1170.91, the trial court is obligated “to 

consider a criminal defendant’s qualifying service-related conditions as 

mitigating circumstances in making discretionary sentencing choices.” 

(Panozo, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 831.) Section 1170.9, subdivision (a), 

provides that “[i]n the case of any person convicted of a criminal offense who 

could otherwise be sentenced to county jail or state prison and who alleges 

that the person committed the offense as a result of . . . [TBI] [or] [PTSD] . . . 

stemming from service in the United States military, the court shall, prior to 

sentencing, make a determination as to whether the defendant was, or 

currently is, a member of the United States military and whether the 

defendant may be suffering from . . . [TBI] [or] [PTSD] . . . as a result of the 

person’s service.” Under subdivision (b)(1) of this statute, “If the court 

concludes that a defendant convicted of a criminal offense is a person 

described in subdivision (a), and if the defendant is otherwise eligible for 
33

probation, the court shall consider the circumstances described in subdivision 

(a) as a factor in favor of granting probation.”

Where the court has decided to deny probation, section 1170.91, 

subdivision (a) requires further, “[i]f the court concludes that a defendant 

convicted of a felony offense is, or was, a member of the United States 

military who may be suffering from . . . [TBI] [or] [PTSD] . . . as a result of his 

or her military service, the court shall consider the circumstance as a factor 

in mitigation when imposing a term under subdivision (b) of Section 1170.”

In Panozo, this court concluded that sections 1170.9 and 1170.91 

“speak in terms that are mandatory rather than permissive” and thus, that 

they “unambiguously obligate” a sentencing court to consider a defendant’s 

service-related TBI or PTSD in making discretionary sentencing choices. 

(Panozo, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 836.) We noted in Panozo that the 

defendant’s “sentencing brief asked for probation, referenced his servicerelated PTSD, and provided documentation to support his diagnosis and 

request for treatment. And defense counsel argued extensively at sentencing 

that his client’s crimes were the byproduct of his military service, warranting 

probation or imposition of the lower term.” (Id. at pp. 837-838.) We also 

noted that although the trial court “was plainly aware that [defendant] 

served in Iraq, struggled with PTSD and alcohol use, and requested 

probation and treatment through Veterans Court,” there is no indication the 

court understood its obligation to consider that fact as a circumstance in 

mitigation when making discretionary sentencing choices. (Id. at p. 838.) 

Accordingly, we remanded the matter for resentencing because “a court’s 

compliance with the mandates of sections 1170.9 and 1170.91 cannot be 

inferred from an ambiguous record.” (Id. at pp. 836-837.)
34

 Analysis

As in Panozo, the appellate record here shows the trial court 

undoubtedly was aware that Talkington served in the U.S. Navy and may 

have sustained a service-related TBI or PTSD. And also as in Panozo, the 

record is ambiguous as to whether the trial court expressly considered those 

potential conditions when making discretionary sentencing choices. 

Accordingly, we will remand for resentencing.

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which the trial 

court should satisfy its statutory obligations under sections 1170.9 and 

1170.91. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O'ROURKE, J.