*

Honorable Harry W. Wellford, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for

the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 

 1A large portion of the embezzled funds came from an account

held by a church. 

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-6120.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Sheila Pickett ALLEN, Defendant-Appellee.

July 11, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Alabama. (No. CR-94-H-316-S), James Hughes Hancock,

Judge.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, COX, Circuit Judge, and WELLFORD*

,

Senior Circuit Judge.

WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge:

While working in the installment loan department at First

Alabama Bank from 1987 to 1992, defendant Sheila Pickett Allen

diverted approximately $138,000 of the bank's money into her own

accounts.1 Allen admits that, when confronted by bank officials,

she initially denied any wrongdoing and later lied about the extent

of her illegal activities. Allen eventually pleaded guilty to one

count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344.

At sentencing, the district court found that the Guidelines

called for a term of imprisonment ranging from twelve to eighteen

months, but decided to depart downward under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 on

the basis of Allen's family responsibilities. The Presentence

Report indicates that Allen is the primary caretaker of her
seventy-year-old father, who suffers from both Alzheimer's and

Parkinson's diseases. Departing five offense levels, the district

court ultimately sentenced Allen to one hour of imprisonment, to be

followed by thirty-six months of supervised release, and declined

to order any restitution or fine. The government's timely appeal

followed.

 A court must impose a sentence within the Guidelines range

"unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or

mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in

formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence

different from that described." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The

Sentencing Commission has fully considered family circumstances and

concluded that they will not ordinarily support a downward

departure. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. Thus, district courts may depart

on such grounds only in "extraordinary" cases. United States v.

Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 857,

113 S.Ct. 167, 121 L.Ed.2d 115 (1992); United States v. Cacho, 951

F.2d 308, 311 (11th Cir.1992).

 In our view, Allen's family responsibilities, though

difficult, are not extraordinary. See Mogel, 956 F.2d at 1565

(holding downward departure inappropriate where defendant had "two

minor children to support, and a mother that lives with [her]");

Cacho, 951 F.2d at 311 (holding downward departure not warranted

where defendant had four small children); United States v. Brand,

907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir.) (reversing downward departure based on

the fact that defendant was sole custodial parent of two young
 2

We note that Allen is not the only family member available

to care for her father. The Presentence Report indicates that

Allen's husband and adult son presently take care of her father

to some extent, and that Allen has a brother and another adult

child living nearby. 

children), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1014, 111 S.Ct. 585, 112 L.Ed.2d

590 (1990); United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 508-09 (6th

Cir.) (reversing downward departure based, in part, on the fact

that defendant was mother of small children), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 844, 111 S.Ct. 127, 112 L.Ed.2d 95 (1990); United States v.

Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1446 (4th Cir.1990) (finding nothing

extraordinary about defendant with three children under the age of

seven). Although the authority cited involves defendants with

small children, we see no reason to treat a defendant who is the

primary caretaker of an infirmed parent any differently. Thus, we

conclude that Allen " "has shown nothing more than that which

innumerable defendants could no doubt establish: namely, that the

imposition of prison sentences normally disrupts [familial]

relationships.' " Cacho, 951 F.2d at 311 (quoting United States v.

Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927,

110 S.Ct. 2622, 110 L.Ed.2d 643 (1990)); accord United States v.

Shortt, 919 F.2d 1325, 1328 (8th Cir.1990) (stating that family

responsibilities will not ordinarily support a downward departure,

because "[a]ll families suffer when one of their members goes to

prison").2

 Relying on United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 950 (1st

Cir.1993), Allen argues that we should defer to the district

court's judgment as to whether her family responsibilities are

extraordinary. We disagree. While Rivera admonishes appellate
courts to review departure decisions with due regard for the

district court's "superior feel for the case," it does not require

that lower courts be given free reign to decide the propriety of

departing in given cases; such unfettered discretion would lead to

return of the sentencing disparity that prompted Congress to adopt

the Guidelines in the first place.

Allen also cites United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790 (8th

Cir.1994), in support of her argument. In that case, the

five-level downward departure was held to be unreasonable and some

period of confinement was required. (The court noted also the

district court's disdain for the guidelines.) See Williams v.

United States, 503 U.S. 193, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341

(1992).

For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the district court's

sentencing judgment and REMAND this case for resentencing in

accordance with this opinion.