FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 10-10389

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  1:09-cr-00014-

WHA-1 BIAO HUANG,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands

William Alsup, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 13, 2012—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed August 8, 2012

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Consuelo M. Callahan, and

N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

8999
COUNSEL

George Anthony Long, Law Office of G. Anthony Long, San

Jose, Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, for defendantappellant Biao Huang.

Karon V. Johnson (argued) and James J. Benedetto (on the

briefs), Assistant United States Attorneys, Office of the

United JStates Attorney for the Districts of Guam and the

UNITED STATES v. HUANG 9001
Northern Mariana Islands, Hagatna, Guam and Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands, for plaintiff-appellee the United States of

America.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Biao Huang, a native and citizen of

China residing in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana

Islands, pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with

intent to distribute various quantities of methamphetamine,

including one quantity of more than 900 grams. The district

court sentenced Huang to 135 months in prison. Huang

appeals his sentence on the ground that he was the victim of

sentencing entrapment, which “occurs when a defendant is

predisposed to commit a lesser crime, but is entrapped by the

government into committing a crime subject to more severe

punishment.” United States v. Mejia, 559 F.3d 1113, 1118

(9th Cir. 2009). Huang also argues that he should not have

received, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5), a two-point

enhancement for an offense involving the importation of a

controlled substance, and that his sentence is substantively

unreasonable. 

Finding no error in Huang’s sentencing, we affirm the district court. Huang was not subject to sentencing entrapment

because Huang had the intent and capacity to produce more

than 900 grams of methamphetamine and acted on that intent

without hesitation. We join the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in

holding that a defendant need not be personally involved in

the importation of illegal drugs to receive the § 2D1.1(b)(5)

importation enhancement; it is enough for the government to

show that the drugs were imported. Finally, Huang’s sentence

was reasonable even though it was the same as his codefendant’s sentence; the co-defendant cooperated with the

government while Huang did not.

9002 UNITED STATES v. HUANG
BACKGROUND

In 2008, a confidential source on Saipan, in the Northern

Mariana Islands, advised agents of the Drug Enforcement

Administration (“DEA”) that he could purchase large quantities of “ice,” or mostly pure methamphetamine, from Chinese

nationals residing in the Islands. At the direction of the DEA

and other government agents, the confidential source contacted one of these nationals, who directed him to a “source

of supply” named Sheng Lian. Lian and Huang had gone to

school together in China, and later worked for a company

owned by Huang’s father, before relocating to a shared residence in Saipan.

On Huang’s assurances that the confidential source was

trustworthy, Lian met the confidential source and sold him 9.7

net grams of methamphetamine for $5,000. A few months

after this initial sale, the confidential source contacted Huang

to make another controlled buy. Huang then sold the confidential source 4.8 net grams of methamphetamine for $1,500.

A couple of months later, Huang and Lian sold the confidential source another 5.8 net grams of methamphetamine for

$1,500.

A few months after these initial transactions, the confidential source contacted Lian and explained that his (the

source’s) boss wanted to purchase large quantities of methamphetamine. Undercover agents and the confidential source

then met with Lian, who agreed to sell one of the agents 900

grams of methamphetamine for $250,000. Lian also stated he

would be willing to meet the agent’s request for ten kilograms

of methamphetamine for delivery in American Samoa and 50

kilograms for delivery in Hawaii during an initial six-month

period. Lian explained that his boss had been trafficking

methamphetamine in Saipan for twelve years, and that his

boss was the biggest dealer on the island.

Two days after this meeting, one of the undercover agents

and the confidential source met with Huang and Lian. Lian

UNITED STATES v. HUANG 9003
explained that their boss had agreed to the large shipments to

American Samoa and Hawaii and that everything was “ready

to go” for the sale of the 900 grams. The parties dispersed,

after which Huang called the confidential source and said that

he (Huang) and Lian were ready. The parties met in a hotel

room, where Lian handed over the methamphetamine. Lian,

Huang, and the two undercover agents present were arrested.

Following his arrest, Lian waived his Miranda rights and

talked about his relationship with Huang, Huang’s relationship with the confidential source, and the initial sale of 9.7

grams. Huang, in contrast, refused to cooperate.

A grand jury returned a five-count indictment against

Huang and Lian. Count One charged both defendants with

conspiracy to distribute more than 900 grams of “methamphetamine hydrochloride,” in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 846, while Counts Two through

Five charged them with possession with intent to distribute

“d-methamphetamine hydrochloride in the form commonly

known as ‘ice,’ ” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(C). Specifically, Count Two charged

Lian for 9.7 grams of “ice”; Count Three charged Huang for

4.8 grams; Count Four charged both defendants for 5.8 grams;

and Count Five charged both defendants for 947 grams. 

Lian entered into a plea agreement that provided for a sentence of 135 months. In exchange, Lian agreed to cooperate

with the government by “disclos[ing] all information with

respect to the activities of himself and his co-defendant,

Huang, Biao.” Huang, meanwhile, chose to plead guilty without the benefit of a written plea agreement. During the change

of plea colloquy, Huang and his lawyer admitted to the drug

quantities charged in the indictment.

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) set the

applicable offense level at 37, which would have yielded a

sentencing range of 210 to 262 months. Huang filed no writ9004 UNITED STATES v. HUANG
ten objections to the PSR. However, Huang did object before

and during the sentencing hearing to the PSR’s recommended

sentencing range on numerous grounds, one of which the government conceded and several of which the district court

accepted.

Two of Huang’s arguments that the district court rejected,

and that Huang raises on appeal, were: (1) Huang was a

“small” dealer whom the government induced to sell a much

larger quantity of methamphetamine, and such inducement

constituted sentencing entrapment that justified a lower sentence, and (2) a two-point importation enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5) was inappropriate because Huang did

not himself import any methamphetamine. Regarding sentencing entrapment, the district court explained that it “does

not find that the defendant’s will was overcome. The burden

is on the defendant, and the Court rejects the . . . sentence

entrapment argument by the defense.” The court added, “[t]he

defendant is accountable certainly for 911 grams of methamphetamine.” Regarding the importation enhancement, the

court explained that a “preponderance of evidence, let alone

clear and convincing evidence,” showed that Huang satisfied

the terms of the enhancement.

The court calculated Huang’s final base offense level to be

31. With a criminal history category of one, Huang’s applicable sentencing range was 108 to 135 months. See U.S.S.G.

Ch. 5, Pt. A. The district court sentenced Huang to 135

months after explaining that Huang had shown no remorse

and acted solely for profit. The court also cited the fact that

Huang had not cooperated with the government, unlike his codefendant Lian Sheng, who also received 135 months. The

district court entered judgment and Huang timely appealed. 

On appeal, Huang re-asserts two of the arguments the district court rejected: he was the victim of “sentencing entrapment” and the two-point importation enhancement was

inappropriate. Huang also argues that his 135-month sentence

UNITED STATES v. HUANG 9005
is substantively unreasonable because he received the same

sentence as Lian, who promised to cooperate but, according

to Huang, did not.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.

United States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2009).

We have not resolved whether we review a district court’s

application of the Guidelines to the facts de novo or for abuse

of discretion. See United States v. Swank, 676 F.3d 919, 921-

22 (9th Cir. 2012). However, in the context of sentencing

entrapment, we have held that a “district court was reasonable

in rejecting [the defendant’s] argument of sentencing entrapment and did not abuse its discretion.” Mejia, 559 F.3d at

1118. In this case, even applying de novo review, the outcome

does not change. Finally, if the district court correctly calculated the applicable sentencing range, we review the sentence

for reasonableness. United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755,

760 (9th Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

A. Sentencing entrapment

[1] Sentencing entrapment occurs “when a defendant is

predisposed to commit a lesser crime, but is entrapped by the

government into committing a crime subject to more severe

punishment.” Mejia, 559 F.3d at 1118. The defense of sentencing entrapment serves to prevent the government from

“ ‘structur[ing] sting operations in such a way as to maximize

the sentences imposed on defendants’ without regard for the

defendant’s culpability or ability to commit the crime on his

own.” United States v. Schafer, 625 F.3d 629, 640 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107

(9th Cir. 1994)).

9006 UNITED STATES v. HUANG
[2] A defendant “bears the burden of proving sentencing

entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence.” United

States v. Parrilla, 114 F.3d 124, 127 (9th Cir. 1997). Specifically, the defendant must show he was predisposed to commit

only a lesser crime, Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1108, i.e., that he

lacked the intent and capability to produce the larger quantity

of drugs, Mejia, 559 F.3d at 1118; United States v. Naranjo,

52 F.3d 245, 250 n.13 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States

v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1128 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a

defendant must show the government engaged in “outrageous

official conduct which caused the individual to commit a

more significant crime”). The district court must make

express factual findings regarding whether the defendant has

met his burden. United States v. Riewe, 165 F.3d 727, 729

(9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 

Where a sentencing court determines that a defendant has

met his burden of proof, the court ordinarily may grant a

downward departure from the applicable sentencing range. Id.

However, where, as here, a statutory minimum sentence

applies, the court does not have the authority to depart below

that sentence absent application of the safety valve provision

in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 or a substantial assistance motion from

the government.1 United States v. Wipf, 620 F.3d 1168, 1170

(9th Cir. 2010). In such a case, the proper course is to “decline to apply the statutory penalty provision for the greater

offense that the defendant was induced to commit, and instead

apply the penalty provision for the lesser offense that the

defendant was predisposed to commit.” Riewe, 165 F.3d at

729 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United

States v. Castaneda, 94 F.3d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1996);

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 Commentary, Application Note 12. In other

words, the court should subtract “the amount of drugs tainted

by the entrapment” and use the minimum sentence, and sen1Huang sought, and was denied, relief under the safety valve provision.

He does not appeal the district court’s ruling on this issue. 

UNITED STATES v. HUANG 9007
tencing range, that pertain to the modified drug quantity.

Riewe, 165 F.3d at 729.

In this case, Huang was charged with, and pleaded guilty

to, possession with intent to distribute more than 900 grams

of “ice,” a methamphetamine mixture. Such offense carries a

minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum sentence of

life. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). If the district court were

to subtract, on account of sentencing entrapment, the 900

grams in Count One and the 947 grams in Count Five of the

indictment, leaving only the 10.6 grams charged in Counts

Three and Four, Huang would have faced a statutory minimum sentence of only five years. 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(B)(viii).

Huang, however, did not meet his burden of showing sentencing entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence.2

Huang twice sold five to six grams, and Lian ten grams, of

methamphetamine to the government’s confidential source. A

few months after the last of these sales, Lian readily agreed

to sell an undercover agent 900 grams for $250,000, and to

provide “initial” shipments of ten kilograms to American

Samoa and 50 kilograms to Hawaii. Lian bragged that “their”

methamphetamine came from the biggest dealer on Saipan,

who in turn got it from China. Huang’s complicity in Lian’s

actions and statements was evidenced by the fact that, when

the time came to exchange the drugs and money, Huang made

the call to the undercover agent. Huang then accompanied

Lian to the meetings. The district court also heard proffered

testimony from a DEA agent that Lian said something to the

effect of “500 [grams] is small for us;” that Huang never

expressed reluctance (in fact, “it seemed like they were laugh2The government argues that a defendant waives his sentencing entrapment claim as a matter of law where he pleads guilty and admits to the

quantity of drugs charged in the indictment. We need not decide this issue

because Huang’s sentencing entrapment claim, even if it is not waived,

fails on the facts. 

9008 UNITED STATES v. HUANG
ing and having a good time”); and that during the time it took

to seal the 900-gram deal “it was [Lian and Huang] who

repeatedly contacted the confidential source in an attempt to

get that deal completed.” 

[3] Huang offered no evidence that he was, in his words,

a “novice or inexperienced dealer.” Indeed, the only three

facts that could support his claim of sentencing entrapment

are that: (1) the undercover agent, not Huang or Lian, initiated

the 900-gram sale and pursued it through a series of calls; (2)

the only other methamphetamine sales Huang is known to

have made involved small quantities; and (3) Huang was

merely present when Lian first talked about dealing in large

quantities. However, Huang and Lian showed only enthusiasm and wherewithal once the agent suggested the larger deal;

Huang introduced no evidence that the smaller sales he was

caught making were typical; and Huang actively participated

in the 900-gram sale after Lian set it up. There is no evidence

of the type of reluctance and inducement present in cases

where we have found sentencing entrapment. See United

States v. McClelland, 72 F.3d 717, 726 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995)

(affirming district court’s entrapment finding where defendant

was emotionally vulnerable and resisted government agent’s

repeated efforts to convince him to kill his wife); Naranjo, 52

F.3d at 251 (suggesting entrapment might exist where DEA

had no evidence defendant previously engaged in drug trafficking, defendant resisted undercover agent’s repeated efforts

to buy large quantity of cocaine, and defendant could not pay

for large quantity); Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1105, 1108 (finding

entrapment where undercover agent and confidential informant, motivated by a possible lower sentence for his own

crimes, insisted over defendant’s reluctance that he sell an

unusually large quantity of drugs for an inflated price). 

In short, Huang failed to prove that he lacked the intent and

capability to produce and sell 900 grams of methamphetamine, Mejia, 559 F.3d at 1118; Naranjo, 52 F.3d at 250 n.13,

or that the government engaged in “outrageous official conUNITED STATES v. HUANG 9009
duct” that overcame his predisposition to sell only smaller

amounts, Schafer, 625 F.3d at 639-40 (quotation marks and

citation omitted). Instead, the evidence shows only Huang’s

“complete willingness to proceed, even as the size of the proposed transaction[s] increased over the course” of time.

United States v. James, 487 F.3d 518, 529 (7th Cir. 2007). On

this record the district court properly rejected Huang’s claim

of sentencing entrapment.

Huang nonetheless raises two objections to the district

court’s ruling. He first argues that the district court did not

make the specific factual findings required when the court

rejects a sentencing entrapment claim. See Riewe, 165 F.3d at

729 (remanding where district court did not expressly reject

sentencing entrapment claim and instead said only that the

PSR “correctly calculate[d] the sentencing guidelines” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parrilla, 114 F.3d at 128

(remanding where defendant disputed PSR’s factual statements and district court “never drew any explicit conclusions

about the factual support for Parrilla’s sentencing entrapment

claim”); Naranjo, 52 F.3d at 251 (remanding where it was

unclear “what findings the district court relied on in finding

Naranjo predisposed to cocaine dealing,” especially given the

absence of any real evidence of such predisposition). Here,

however, the district court plainly stated that it did “not find

that the defendant’s will was overcome. The burden is on the

defendant, and the Court rejects the . . . sentence entrapment

argument by the defense.” In addition, Huang did not dispute

the PSR’s findings and the district court expressly attributed

the large quantity of methamphetamine to Huang, saying

“[t]he defendant is accountable certainly for 911 grams of

methamphetamine.” These statements, although not pellucid,

adequately explained the district court’s rationale for rejecting

Huang’s sentencing entrapment claim. 

[4] Second, Huang argues that the district court erred by

not analyzing his sentencing entrapment claim using the five

factors identified in McClelland, 72 F.3d at 722. However,

9010 UNITED STATES v. HUANG
even if the McClelland factors are applicable, Huang was not

the victim of sentencing entrapment.3 While the government

initially suggested the 900-gram deal, government agents did

not provide undue incentives and Huang was a known drug

dealer who agreed without hesitation to the larger sale for

profit. No matter what test applies, Huang fails to show that

the district court erred in rejecting his sentencing entrapment

claim.

B. Importation enhancement

[5] The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level

enhancement in the applicable sentencing range if, among

other things, “the offense involved the importation of amphetamine or methamphetamine or the manufacture of amphetamine or methamphetamine from listed chemicals that the

defendant knew were imported unlawfully.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(5)(A).4 The district court concluded that this

enhancement was appropriate by at least a preponderance of

the evidence.

[6] Huang argues that § 2D1.1(b)(5) requires the government to show that Huang himself imported the methamphetamine. However, by its plain language, § 2D1.1(b)(5) applies

to any “offense” that “involved” the importation of methamphetamine.5

 In contrast, other enhancements under § 2D1.1 apply

3These factors are: “(1) the character and reputation of the defendant;

(2) whether the government made the initial suggestion of criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit; (4)

whether the defendant showed any reluctance; and (5) the nature of the

government’s inducement.” McClelland, 72 F.3d at 722. “Although none

of these factors is controlling, the defendant’s reluctance to engage in the

criminal activity is the most important.” Id. McClelland applied these factors as a test for the predisposition element of the defense of legal entrapment, not as a test for sentencing entrapment. See id. 

4The § 2D1.1(b)(5) enhancement previously was found at

§ 2D1.1(b)(4). 

5There is no dispute that the methamphetamine Huang and Lian sold

was imported from China. 

UNITED STATES v. HUANG 9011
only to a “defendant” who “unlawfully imported or exported

a controlled substance” or who “was directly involved in the

importation of a controlled substance.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(3), (b)(14)(C). If the Sentencing Commission had

intended to limit § 2D1.1(b)(5) to defendants who personally

imported methamphetamine, it would have used the more

restrictive language it included in these other enhancements.

Cf. In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“[W]e . . . presume that if Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, Congress acted intentionally in that exclusion.”). 

[7] Following this reasoning, the two circuits that have

considered Huang’s argument have rejected it. See United

States v. Rodriguez, 666 F.3d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Even

if we accept Rodriguez’s narrower interpretation of ‘importation,’ it means only that she did not import the drugs, not that

her possession did not involve importation. The scope of

actions that ‘involve’ the importation of drugs is larger than

the scope of those that constitute the actual importation.”);

United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 784 (11th Cir.

2007) (holding that § 2D1.1(b)(5) does not “apply to only

those defendants who themselves transport methamphetamine

across the border”). We agree with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits that a defendant need not be personally involved in the

importation of illegal drugs to receive an enhancement under

§ 2D1.1(b)(5); it is enough for the government to show that

the drugs were imported.

[8] Huang also contends that he had to know (but did not)

that the methamphetamine he sold was imported. Whether

§ 2D1.1(b)(5) requires such knowledge is an open question.

See, e.g., Rodriguez, 666 F.3d at 947. As in Rodriguez, we

need not settle this issue here because Huang knew the source

of the methamphetamine. Id. The record shows that: (1) Lian

and Huang were childhood friends who left China together

and who lived and worked together in Saipan; (2) Lian told

the confidential source and undercover government agents

9012 UNITED STATES v. HUANG
that “their” methamphetamine came from China; and (3)

Huang was directly involved with Lian in selling most of the

methamphetamine at issue in this case, and also sold some on

his own. These facts establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Huang knew he was selling imported methamphetamine.6

See United States v. Romero-Rendon, 220 F.3d 1159,

1160-61 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the government must

prove factors enhancing a sentence by a preponderance of the

evidence, and that district court can rely on an unchallenged

PSR to find this burden met). 

[9] Finally, Huang argues that there was no basis for

applying the importation enhancement because he was not

charged with “any importation or manufacturing offense”

under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960, or 963. However, we see no

reason why the enhancement cannot apply to the offenses proscribed by 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, so long as the offense

“involved the importation of,” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5)(A), a

“controlled” or “counterfeit” substance, 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1)-(2). Indeed, courts repeatedly have upheld the

enhancement for convictions secured only under those provisions. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 666 F.3d at 946; Perez-Oliveros,

479 F.3d at 781. Thus, we hold that the § 2D1.1(b)(5) importation enhancement may be applied to a defendant convicted

under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and/or 846, even if he is not also convicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960, or 963.

6Huang faults the district court for failing to make any specific factual

findings to support the enhancement. However, the court adopted the “Offense Conduct” facts set forth in the PSR and appropriately concluded that

they established that Huang qualified for the enhancement by at least a

preponderance of the evidence. See Fed R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A) (“At sentencing, the court . . . may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact.”); United States v. Hernandez-Guardado,

228 F.3d 1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that district court may

adopt PSR’s factual findings where they are supported by the record). 

UNITED STATES v. HUANG 9013
C. Substantive reasonableness

Federal sentences must be procedurally and substantively

reasonable. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th

Cir. 2008) (en banc). When a district court’s “ ‘discretionary

decision accords with the [Sentencing] Commission’s view of

the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of

cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable.’ ” Id. at

994 (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)).

Huang argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is the same sentence imposed on Lian, his codefendant. According to Huang, he should have received a

lower sentence because Lian promised to cooperate with the

government but “did not fulfill his obligation,” while Huang

“did not make any false promises” or “breach any promise”

to the government. 

The record belies Huang’s argument. Lian entered into a

plea agreement in which he agreed to cooperate with the government, while Huang chose to plead guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement. The PSR explained that Lian

cooperated with the government by talking about his relationship with Huang, Huang’s relationship with the confidential

source, and the initial sale of 9.7 grams. At sentencing, the

government also proffered the testimony of a DEA agent that

Lian was “fully cooperative from day one.” Huang, in contrast, “declined and refused to provide any information concerning the offenses” despite “opportunities to cooperate and

be interviewed.” Huang presented no evidence to contradict

the PSR or the government’s proffer.

The district court adopted the PSR’s findings and “accept[ed] the proffer by the investigating officer that Mr. Lian,

Sheng put himself in [a] somewhat different position in terms

of . . . his efforts to cooperate.” The district judge then reasonably concluded that Lian “has the more righteous position, in

9014 UNITED STATES v. HUANG
my opinion, having received 135 months, because at least he

agreed to cooperate and be truthful to some extent.” 

[10] Although Huang does not explain what “false” promises Lian allegedly made to the government, he argued during

the sentencing hearing that Lian provided less than the full

cooperation required by his plea agreement when he “declined

to identify the source” of the methamphetamine he and Huang

sold. However, the district court recognized that Lian’s cooperation was “limited,” and, in any event, the limits of Lian’s

cooperation do not change the fact that Lian cooperated while

Huang did not. The district court reasonably relied on

Huang’s lack of cooperation in sentencing Huang.

CONCLUSION

The district court properly sentenced Huang. Huang has not

shown that he was the victim of sentencing entrapment; he

had the intent and capacity to sell 900 grams of methamphetamine and acted on that intent without hesitation. The district

court properly applied the U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5) sentencing

enhancement for an offense involving the importation of

drugs because the government was not required to show that

Huang himself imported the methamphetamine he sold. There

was no dispute the methamphetamine was imported from

China, and Huang more likely than not knew of the methamphetamine’s origin. Finally, Huang’s sentence, as compared to

Lian’s, is reasonable given that Lian cooperated with the government while Huang did not. The district court’s judgment

is AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. HUANG 9015