The Honor able John R. Adams, Uni t ed S tates District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. J ac qu ly nis th e c o r

r e c t s p e ll in g o f

d e f e n d an t Ja c qu ly

nT u b b s ’ s f ir s t n a me , w h ic h w as 1 incorre ctly

spelled as Jacqueline by

plaintiff when she filed this case
. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0540n.06 F iled: Septem ber 3, 2008 No. 06-2194 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
TAMI WOODWO RTH SAL ENS, Ancillary and Persona l Represe ntative of the Estate of Keith Geor g e Church, de cea sed, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. JACQ UE L I

NE TU B B S, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : MOORE and COOK, Circuit Judges, a nd ADAMS, District J udg e.

*
CO OK , Ci rc uit

Judg e . Jac qu ly

n T ub bs a

pp e a ls pro se from an adver se gra nt of summary 1 jud g me nt i n th is d ive rs ity a c tio n f or br e a c h o f i mpl ie d c on tr a c t. Appellee Tami Woodworth Salens, Ancillary and Persona l Represe ntative of the Estate of Ke ithGe or g e Churc h, de c e a se d, fi le d a c o m p l a i nt a g a i n s t T u b b s c la imi ngbr e a c h o f i mpl ie d c on tr a c t, unjust enrichment, and c onditional g ift, seekingmonetary and dec laratory

relief . The district cour

t initially denied Tubbs’ s motion for summary judgme n t , but later modified its order followingSalens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-2- su pp lem ent al br ie fi ng , g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt i n p art

to t he Es ta te and

in p art to T ub bs
. There afte r, the district cour t entere d a judg ment resolving all of the claims in the litigation. For the
re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

I. Appellee ’s dec edent, Ke ith Georg e Church, a citizen of the United King dom, a nd Tubbs, a Michig an resident, beg an communicating over the I nterne t in the fall of 1999. There afte r, Church and Tubbs deve loped a long -distance re l at ionship buil t on written corr espondenc e, telephone contac ts, and sever al in-per son visit s . C h urch a nd Tubbs beca

me eng ag ed in Fe bruar

y 2000, pla nn ingto b e marr ie d in

L a s V e g a s in

July 20 00 . T wo mon ths be fo re the e ng a g e me nt, Churc h p a id off $4,100 of

Tubbs’s cr edit car d debt. He also g ave Tubbs an eng ag ement ringthat he purc hased for $7,274.42 in F ebru ary 2000. On Marc h 15, 2000, he deposited $194,852.56 in Tubbs’s ba nk
acc ount to fund the purcha se of land and a r esidential home located at 3865 S. Sandusky Road, Peck, Michig an. Tubbs testified that she did not supply any money for the pur chase of the home a nd that Church instructed he r to place title in both of their n am es. In April 2000, the re al prope rty was convey ed to “Ke ith G. Church, a single man and J acquly n J
. Tubbs, a single woman as joint tenants.” Churc h late r d e liv e re d c e rt a in p e rs on a l be lon g ing s to the Mic hig an h ome , in c lud inga fa mil y heirloom diamond ring worth $4,560. Tubbs moved into the home in April 2000.
On J une 5, 2000, Tubbs e- mailed Church stating that their relationship wa s over a nd that the ring s and pape rwork on the house we re in he r attorne y ’s possession. Acc ording to Tubbs, she wasSalens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-3- horrifie d afte r see ing Churc h’s “bizarre and abnor mal behavior ” on the I nterne t. He led a “risque lifesty le as a

cross[-]dresser a

nd bi-sexual.” (Appe llant’s Br . 2) Tubbs re jected Churc h’s demands to repa y the $4,100 and to return the eng ag ement ring, his personal proper ty , and her

interest in the Michig an home. On July 24, 2000, Church died in Eng land.
Ov e r f our y e ars la te r, Churc h’ s E state fi le d a div e rs ity su it se e kin g to r e c ov e r t he pr op e rt

y Tubbs ref used to retur

n. Tubbs moved for summar y judgme nt, and the district cour t denied her motion, prompti ng responsive suppleme ntal briefing . There afte r, the district cour t ent er ed an
a me nd ed or de r g ra

nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt su a s

po nte , in pa rt to t he Es ta te and

in p art to T ub bs
. Be cause this amended order left the claim for damag es unresolved, this c ourt reje cted a s prematur e an appe al of th at non-final or der. F ollowing a n off- rec ord telephone confe renc e with counse l for both parties, the c ourt enter ed a f inal judgme nt entitling the Estate to: the ring s or a money judgme nt for their values; the re al prope rty , partitioned as a matter of l aw t o ac co unt for its appre ciation; complete r ight, title, intere st, and possession of the land a nd residential home, fre e and c lear of any claim, rig ht, titl e, or interest of Tubbs; and a money judgme nt in the amount of $75,000 (the amount of Tubbs’s home equity mortg ag e), less cre dits to Tubbs of $13,000 for prope rty taxes she paid from 2000 throug h 2 0 0 5 , o r a modified money judgme nt in the amount of $62,000. The district cour t ruled that unde r the proba te exception to diversity

juris d i cti on, it lacked f

eder al subject matter jurisdiction to decide whe ther a provision of Church’s w ill re l eased the alleg ed $4,100 debt; the court ther efor e g rante d summary judgme nt to Tubbs for this claim. This appea l followed.Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-4- II.
For her pro se appellate arguments, Tubbs say s that the district court only considere d when the g if ts w e re ma de , ig no ri ngChurc h’ s mi sc on du c t du ri ngthe e ng a g e me nt a

nd a ft e r t he re la tio ns hip
wa s o ve r. Churc h’ s r e sp on sib ili ty fo r t he br ok e n e n g a g e me nt, sh e re a so ns , s ho uld pr e c lud e his e state from re cover ing the g ifts and home. She also denies any express or implied contrac t betwee n Church and her for r epay ment or re turn of the pr operty if the marr iag e did not take plac e.
A. Standard of Review
We revie w de novo a dis trict court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt. Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co. , 532 F.3d 469, 482 ( 6th Cir. 2008). Su m m ar y judgme nt is proper whe re “ there is no ge nuine iss ue a s to a ny

ma te ri a l f

a c t and
. . . the mov ant is en tit le d to judg me nt as a ma tte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. Civ. P . 56(c) . I n considering a mot ion for summ ary judgme nt, the di strict court must construe the
e v i d e n c e a n d

dr aw a l l r e a s o n a

b l e i n f e r e n c e s i nf

a v o r o f t h e n o n m o v i n g p art y. M a ts u s h it a E le c. Indus. Co. v. Z

enith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The inquiry is “whethe r the e vidence prese nts a sufficie nt disa g ree ment to r equire submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one party must preva il as a matter of la w.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986).
We note that Tubbs does not c halleng e the district c ourt’s proce dural decision to enter summary judgme nt for the Estate su a s po nte . I f s he ha d, we wo uld fi nd no pr oc e dura l e rr or

be c a us eSalens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-5- Tu bb s h a d ampl e no tic e and

op po rt un ity to r e sp on d to the pr os pe c t of su mma ry jud g me nt. Af

te r a ll, it was she who f

irst moved for summary

judgme nt, setting off

a del u ge of cross-brie fing from the pa rt ie s. As we have sa id, g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt “i n favo r o f a n o pp os ingpa

rt y wh e n o ne pa

rt y ha s ma de a

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt .
. . may

no t be a s d e tr ime nta l si nc e the mov ingpa rt y is at l east aware that the issue has be en ra ised.” Em plo y e rs In s. of W

au sa u v . P e tro le um Sp e c ial tie s, Inc. , 69 F.3d 98, 105 ( 6th Cir. 1995). Tubbs filed two brief s even a fter the district court denie d her motion for summary judgme nt, a nd the court responde d to the se arguments with an amende d order
. Tu bb s d id n ot o bje c t on

e ith e r l a c k- of

-n oti c e or op port un it y -to- re sp on d g ro un ds . A s th e on ly deponent, Tubbs c ould rea di l y m ar s h al t he evide nce a nd addre ss all the issues considere d by the
c ourt , s o th e c ourt

a c te d w e ll w ith in i ts d isc re tion in de c idi ngto g ra nt s umm ary

jud g me nt a g a ins t her a nd for the E state.
B. Engageme nt Ring
Tubbs rec eived a $7,274.42 eng ag ement ring from Church, but testified that she no long er possessed it; she “thre w it over the br idge in Elk Creek River.”
Tu bb s a c kn ow le dg e s th a t Mi c hig an la w c a te g or ize s e ng a g e me nt ri ng s a s c on dit ion a l g if ts, rathe r than outrig ht g ifts, be cause of their sy mbolic w eig ht. I n Mey er v. M itnick , 625 N.W.2d 136 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. 20 01 ), the Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls he ld that “[b]e c a us e the e ng a g e me nt r ingis a conditional g ift, when the condition is not fulfilled t he ring or its value should be re turned to the donor no matter w ho broke th e en gagement or ca used it to be broken.” Id . at 139. That is, aSalens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-6- “dete rmination of who owns the e ng ag ement ring following termination of the eng ag ement does not require a dete rmination of which pa rty was at fault.” Id
. a t 13 7. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt th us pro per ly deter mined that the Estate is e ntitled to rec over the eng ag ement ring or its $7,274.42 va l u e from Tubbs as a matter of Michig an law.
C. Re al Pro

pe rty
Tubbs corr ectly observe s that the M ichig an courts have not y et dec ided whethe r conditional g if t pr inc ipl e s a

pp ly to r e a l pr op e rt

y c on ve y anc e s. I n d ive rs ity c a se s, the fe de ra l c ourt

mus t a pp ly state law in ac corda

nce w ith the controlling de cisions of the state’ s highe st court. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). I f the state’s highe st c ourt has not addre ssed the issue, the fede ral c ourt must attempt to ascerta in how that court would rule if it were fac ed with the issue. United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. SST Fitness Corp. , 3 0 9 F. 3 d 9 1 4 , 9 1 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Grantham & Mann, Inc . v. Am. Safe ty Prods., Inc. , 831 F.2d 596, 608 ( 6th Cir. 1987)). The f eder al cour

t looks to all available data, including the dec isional law of the state ’s lowe r co u rts, the majority rule of other jurisdictions, restatements of la w, and law

revie w commentar ies in making this determination. Id
. Predicting how the Michig an Supreme Court w ould r ule if it were fac ed with the issue, the district court held:
C onsistent with Mey er , Tyranski [ v. Piggins , 2 0 5 N
. W
. 2 d 5 9 5 , 5 9 6

– 9 7 ( M ic h. Ct. App. 1973)], and Featherston [ v . S te inh off , 5 7 5 N
. W. 2 d 6 , 9 ( M ic h Ct
. A p p . 1 9 9 7 ) ],Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-7- as we ll as the out-of state c ases cited by Estate, this court finds that, if fa ced w ith the iss ue , th e Mic hig an Su

pr e me Court

wo uld ho ld t hat a g if t of real pr op e rt

y ma de in c on te mpl a tio n o f m arr iage t o th e an tic ipate d d on e e sp ou se may be e nf or c e d a s a conditional g ift that must be returne d to the donor upon proof of an e x press or imp lie d in

fa c t c on tr a c t. Appellant’s JA 199–200.
As the case s cited by

the district court c onfirm, at lea st three c ourts have r estored the entire proper ty interest to an e x -par

tner who inc urre d the full down pay ment and other initial expenses of home owner ship. See Nicholson v. Johnston , 855 A.2d 97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) ( holding that the down pay ment and settl ement costs paid by one joint tenant of re al estate constituted a conditional g if t to the oth e r j oin t te na

nt, his fi anc é e , c on tin g e nt u po n a marr ia g e oc c ur

ri ng ); Fanning v. Iv ersen , 535 N.W.2d 770 (S.D. 1995) (aw ardingthe entire interest in the real estate to the te nant in common wh o ma de the fu ll d own pay men t in c on te mpl a tio n o f m arr ia g e ); Aronow v. Silver , 538 A.2d 851 (N.J. S uper. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (same ).
An d th e se c a se s p ro vid e no su pp or t fo r Tu bb s’ s vie w that fa

ult ou g ht to be ar on the ri g ht t o reta in gif ts of rea l property

made in conte mplation of marria g e. F or example, in Aronow , a Ne w Jer se y c ourt de c lin e d to inq

uir e int o f a ult , r e a so nin g : “ I t do e s n ot ma tte r wh o bro ke the e ng a g e me nt. A per son may have the best rea sons in the world for so doing. T he important thing is that the g ift
was c onditional and the condition was not fulfilled.” Id. at 852 (interna l quotatio n marks and
c itatio n o mit te d) . T he c ourt he ld t hat up on the te rm inatio n o f a n e ng a g e me nt, g if

ts m a de in contemplation of a called- off marriag e shoul d be returned to the donor; acc ording ly , it awar ded theSalens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-8- e nti re int e re st i n a c on do min ium to a te na nt in co mmo n who ha d mad e the e nti re do wn pa y me nt i n
c on te mpl a tio n of marr ia g e . Gi ve n the tr e nd of oth e r jur isd ic tio ns ho ldi ng that a g if t of re a l pr op e rt

y made in contem p lation of marr iag e to the anticipated donee -spouse is a c onditional gift, a nd Mic hig an’ s no- fa

ult a pp ro a c h to e ng a g e me nt r ing s, the Mic hig an Su pr e me Cou

rt c ou ld r e a so na

bly be expected to e x tend that appr oach to other prema rital g ifts.
The c ritical question then, as note d by the dissent, is wh et h er T ubbs’s summary judgme nt
e vid e nc e ra ise d a

g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t a s to wh e the r C hurc h’ s g if t of the re a l pr op e rt

y
cre ated a n implied-in-fac t contrac t condi t i o n al upon marria g e. That is, did Tubbs present any
e vid e nc e to c on tr a dic t th e Es ta te ’s sh ow ing that Chu rc h bo ug ht the re a l e state int e nd inghe r t o r e ta in the deede d half-inter est only if she marrie d him? Construing the summar y judgme nt evidence in her fa vo r, a s w e mus t, w e c on c lud e that sh e did no t.
Am p l e e v i d en ce s u gges t s t h at t h e gi ft o f t h e r ea l p ro p er t y wa s co n d i t i o n ed

u p o nt h e m arri age of Tubbs and Churc h. Church paid the f ull purch as e p ri ce, while Tubbs paid nothing. When deposed, Tubbs testified that both she and Church int ended the proper ty to serve as a ma

rital home, descr ibin g i t as “a pla ce f or me a nd [Tubbs’s daug hter] and him to live.” I ndeed, he r testimony
co n s i s t en t l y

re fe rr edt o t h e c o u

p l e l i v i n g toge the r in the home. One e x am p l e: “[ W] hen we g ot marrie d, y ou know, that this was our home a nd that Iwas t o k ee p i t up.” Appe llee’s JA 110. An oth e r i s f

ound in a n e -m a il T ub bs se nt C hurc h a ft e r t he y bo ug ht t he ho me :Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-9- You made the decision to propose t o me when you did, and also about buy ing the ho me wh e n y ou did , be c a us e it wa s . . . jus t w hat w e wa nte d in a ho me on ly

thi ngis y ou had to purc hase it rig ht away to g et i t, or wait to find something else l ater , and y ou and I decide d this wa s it. And it is a love ly house and I ’m sure w e both will be v e r y h a p p y when we do someday moveinto it and make it our home
. Appellee ’s J A 141 (e mphasis added)
. On the oth e r h and , T ub bs pr ov ide s li ttl e to n o e vid e nc e tha t th e pr op e rt

y wa s an o utr ig ht g if

t. She g ains no g round with the argument that Church’s unde rstanding of joint tenancy law—i.e., that proper ty passes to a joi nt tenant upon the co-tenant’s death—supports her c laim of an unc onditional g ift. At the time the parties spe cified howthe re al prope rty was to be t i t l ed , Church assumed the marria g e would take place
. I n disag ree ing w ith the gr ant of summary judgme nt, the dissent detects a linge ring fac t ual iss ue fr om a

fe w e qu ivo c a l st a te me nts in Tu bb s’ s de po sit ion te sti mony . Th e fi rs t st a te me nt c a me wh e n c ouns e l f

or the Es ta te a sk e d, “ Wou ld it be a fa ir state me nt to s ay . . . th a t th e pla c ingof

the tit le in y our name was c onditional upon y our marry ing him? ” Tubbs re sponded, “Well, we w ere g oing to g e t m ar

r ie d , y e s . ” A p p e ll e e ’ s JA 1 1 6
. Wh e n c o u n s e l th e n u s e d h e r r e s p o n s e in p o s in g h is n e xt qu e sti on : “ So, that w a s a c on dit ion of pu tti ngy our n a me —, ” Tu bb s in te rr up te d, “ No , it

wa sn ’t a condition. He just wanted my name on it and we , at some point, we wer e g oing to g et marr ied. B ut there was no c ondition. I mean, sure , I planned on marry ing him, I loved him.” Appellee ’s J A 116.Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-10- Th e dis se nt r e a ds thi s e xch ang e a s e vid e nc e that Churc h int e nd e d to g ive Tu bb s th e ho us e as a g ift, but we rea d it a s Tubbs stating a leg al conclusion—that the proper ty was not a c onditional g ift—and then unde rmining that stance w ith a further elaboration, which pa ired the joint dee d and the intent to marry
. When questioned furthe r by Estate’s c ounsel, Tubbs n o t o n l y failed to offer a ny specific , su pp or tin g fa c ts, sh e e sse nti a lly

re tr e a te d: Q: So, wo uld

n’ t it be a fa ir state me nt to sa

y thi s w a s a

c on dit ion

of havin g y our n a me on the dee d? A: Ic an’ t ans we r t

hat. Q: But a ssuming y ou wer en’t g oing to ma rry him, he would not have put y our name on the dee d, would he? A. Idon’t know. I don’t know what he w as doing the whole time bec ause he ended up to [b e ] a b ig lia

r a bo ut e ve ry

thi ng . So , I

have no ide a . I

jus t c an’ t ans we r t

hat. Appellee ’s J A 117.
Ev e n if Tu bb s h a d n ot r e tr e a te d o n h e r a rgume nt t

hat C hurc h g a ve he r t

he pr op e rt

y
un c on dit ion a lly , s he wo uld sti ll n e e d s pe c if

ic su pp or tin g facts to for e sta ll s umm ary jud g me nt. Ar e nd alev . Ci ty

of M e mp his , 519 F.3d 5 8 7 , 605 (6th Cir. 2008) (“ I n order to survive summary jud g me nt, Pla int if

f c ann ot r e ly

on c on je c tur e or c on c lus or

y a c c us a tio ns . . . . Co nc lus or y a sse rt ion s, supported only

b y P l aintiff’s own opinions, ca nnot withstand a motion for summary judgme nt.”); Stalbosky v. Be lew , 205 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2000) (vag ue and conclusory statement insufficie ntSalens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

We j oin the dis se nt i n n oti ngthat th e dis tr ic t court art ic ulate d the wr on g sta nd ard wh e n it 2 sa id t hat th e Es ta te “ pr e se nte d s uf fi c ie nt f a c ts t o s up po rt

a fi nd ing ” of

a c on dit ion a l a g re e me nt. Salens v. Tubbs , No. 2:2004cv75069, at 10 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 7, 2006). Reversa l is not warra nted, howeve r, becau s e t h e district cour t supplied the corr ect f

ormulation when it said that “a fede ral district court may

g rant summary

judgme nt
. . . wher e, as here , there is no ge nuine issue of mate rial fac t.” Id . at 4. -11- to c ounte r a

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt) ; Su mm e rv ill e v . R os s/A bb ott Lab s. , 187 F.3d 638, at *4 (6th Cir. 1999) (table ) (c onclusory alleg ations in affidavit were not sufficient to withstand par ty ’s motion for summary

judgme nt).
The dissent e spouses just the sor t of “meta phy sical doubt,” Ma tsu sh ita , 475 U.S. at 586, or “mer e exis tence of a scinti l l a o f e v i d en ce,” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, that should not preclude
su mma ry jud g me nt. Gi ve n th e state of the re c or d b e fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , n o “ re a so na ble jur y c ou ld return a verdic t for [Tubbs] ,” makingthis c ase a ppropriate for summary -judg ment resolution. Id. 2 at 248.
D. Ot

he r P e rso na l P ro

pe rty
Tubbs contends that Churc h’s other g ifts of personal proper ty too wer e unconditional. But oth e r t h ang e n e r a l l y

a t t a c k i n g t h e n o - f

a u l ta p p r o a c h , T u

b b s f a i l s t o d e v e l o p an y

ar g u m e n t s to challeng e the de termination that Church’s pe rson al -p ro p er t y gi ft s d ep en d edo nt h e c o u

p l e’ s m arri age. We thus affirm the district court’s judgme nt that the Estate is e ntitled to rec over from Tubbs any of Church’s pe rsonal prope rty stored withi n the M ichig an home, including a $4,560 family heirloom diamond ring or its value.Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-12- III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
.Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-13- KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge, dissenting. I a m wri tin g in d iss e nt b e c a us e Ithink that Tami W oodworth Salens (“Salens”) , repr esenting the estate of Ke ith Georg e Church (“Churc h”), ha s not satisfied the summary -judg ment standard w ith respec t to her cla im reg ardingthe disputed rea l pr operty
. The district c ourt err ed in a war ding summary judgme nt sua sponte in favor of Salens, and the majority err oneously

aff irms that awar d. The majority

appea rs to ag ree with the district c ourt’s predic tion that, that “if fa ced w ith the iss ue , th e Mic hig an Su

pr e me Court

wo uld ho ld [in ac c or da

nc e wi th the tr e nd

in o the r j ur isd ic tio ns ] that a g ift of rea l property made in conte mplation of marria g e to the anticipated donee spouse may be enf orce d as a co nditional gift that must be re turned to the donor upon pr oof of a n express or implied in fact contra ct.” Dist. Ct. Order of 3/7/06 at 9. Ido not disa g ree with this pre diction, but Inote that the extension of the conditi onal-g ift doctrine from the gift of an eng ag ement ringto the g if t of oth e r f or ms o f p ro pe rt

y inv olv e s a

su btl e sh if t in ana ly sis . The Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls fol lo w s o th e r

ju r is d ic ti o n s in

v ie w in g th e g if

t o f ane n g a g e me n t r in g a s c a te g o r ic a ll y c o n d it io n al beca use of the sy

mbolic meaning of the ring
. Mey er v . Mi tnick , 6 25 N. W.2 d 1 36 , 1 39 (M ic h. Ct. App. 2 0 0 1 ). By

contra st, to determine whe ther other ty pes of g ifts made duringthe eng ag ement period a re similarly

conditional, even thoug h they lack the inhe rent sy

mbolism of an e ng ag em ent ring , courts eva luate the c ircumstance s and intentions surrounding these g ifts. See, e .g. , Nicholson v. Johnston , 8 55 A. 2d

97 , 1 02 (P a . Su

pe r. Ct. 20 04 ); Aronow v. Silver , 5 3 8 A
. 2 d 8 5 1 , 8 5 2

- 5 4 ( N
. J. Sup e r. Ct. Ch. Di v. 19 87 ). Thus , th e inq uir y int o w he the r C hurc h ma de the g if t of the re a l pr op e rt

y to J acque line Tubbs conditional on their marr iag e involves a f actua l as well as a

leg al deter

mination.Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

Although the majority in its footnote 2 purports to distance itself fr om this m istake, the tenor 1 of the majority

is to view the evi d en ce in the light most favora ble to Salens and to minimiz e the w e i g h to f T u b b s ’ s t e s t i m o n y. -14- We must review the district cour t’s g rant of summary judgme nt sua spont e accor ding to two distinct standards. “The s u b s t an ce o f the district cour t’s decision is revie wed de novo under the normal standar ds for summary judgme nt.” Sh e lby Cou nty He alt h Care Cor

p. v . S ou the rn Cou nc il of Indus. W

orkers He alth & W

elfare Trust Fund , 203 F.3d 926, 931 (6th Cir. 2000). “The district
c ourt ’s pr oc e dura l de c isi on to e nte r su mma ry jud g me nt su a sp on te , h ow e ve r, is r e vie we d f or a bu se of discre tion.” Id. “[A] district court may enter summary judgme nt sua sponte in c erta i n l imited cir c u ms ta n c e s , ‘ s o lo n g a s th e lo s in g p arty w a s o n n o ti c e th a t [i t] h a d to c o me f o r w ar d w it h a ll of [i ts] evidenc e.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Salehpour v. Univ. of Tennessee , 159 F.3d 199, 204 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. de nied , 526 U.S. 1115 (1999)).
I n the circumstances of this case , althoug h the di strict court satisfied its proce dural burde n, Ibelieve that from a substantive pe rspec tive the district court erre d in g ranting summary judgme nt on Salens’s cla im reg ardingthe re al prope rty . As the majority explains, bec ause J acque line Tubbs (“Tubbs” ) her self had f

irst moved for summary judgme nt Tubbs had notice that she should present all her e vidence . There fore , the district court did not abuse its discre tion in consideringsummary jud g me nt. Th e ma

jor ity op ini on and the dis tr ic t c ourt , h ow e ve r, mis take nly have take n th e fa c ts i n the l ight most favor able to Salens and have wrong ly conclude d that if Salens has produc ed suff icient evidenc e to find in her f avor, the n summary

judgme nt for Salens i s appropriate. “Summary 1Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-15- judgme nt is proper if the evidenc e, taken in the light most favor able to the nonmoving party , shows that there are no g enuine issues of materia l f act a nd that the moving pa

rty is entitled to a judgme nt
as a matter of law .” Macy v. Hopk ins County Sch. Bd. of Educ. , 484 F.3d 357, 363 ( 6th Cir.), c e rt. denied , --- U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct. 201 (2007); Fe d. R. Civ. P
. 5 6 (c ). Be ca use Tubbs is treated as the nonmoving pa

rty in this case , when we are revie wing a sua sponte g rant of summar y judgme nt for Salens, we a

re obligated to ta

ke the fac ts in the light most favor able to Tubbs. Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am. , 102 F.3d 810, 816- 17 (6th Cir . 1996) (de terminingthat a sua sponte g rant of summar y jud g me nt to the pa

rt y tr e a te d a s the mov ing pa rt y “ wa s n ot p ro pe r b e c a

us e , ta kin g the e vid e nc e in the light most favor able to the [party treated as the nonm oving party ], there [we]re g enuine issues of mater ial fac t”).
The cr i t i ca l q u estion is whether Tubbs ha s cre ated a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t that Church’s g ift of the re al prope rty did not create an implied-in- fa ct contra ct, in which the g ift was conditional upon Tubbs and Church’ s marria g e. The evidenc e militating in favor of a finding that the re al prope rty

constituted a gift from Church to Tubbs conditional upon their marr iag e includes the fa cts that Church pa id for the pur chase of the propert y an d that Tubbs did not supply any financ ial consideration for the proper ty
. Fur thermore , Tubbs testified at her deposition that both she and Church intende d the prope rty to serve a s a marital home: “ The only thi n g that was discussed
a bo ut t his is that whe n we g ot marr ie d, y ou kn ow , tha t this wa s our ho me and that I wa s to ke e p it up.” J.A. at 110 (Tubbs Dep. at 44).Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-16- Ev ide nc e a lso e xists , h ow e ve r, that Chur c h in te nd e d th e ho me a s a g if t, i nd e pe nd e nt o f h is future ma rriag e to Tubbs. T h e f

o ll o wing exchang e at Tubbs’ s deposition took place betwe en counse l fo r S a le ns a nd

Tu bb s: Q. Would i t be a f

air stateme nt to say , so there is no que stion[ ,] t hat the placingof the tit le in your n a me wa s c on dit ion a l up on y ou marr y inghim ?
A. Wel l, w e we re g oin g to g e t ma rr ie d, y e s. Q. So, that was the condition of putting your name
—
A. No , it

wa sn ’t a c on dit ion . H e jus t wante d my name on it an d we , at so me po int , we we re g oing to g et marr ied. B ut there w as no c o n d i t i o n . I mean, sure , I pla nn e d o n ma

rr y inghim , I

lov e d h im.
J .A. at 116 (Tubbs D ep. at 50) . Tubbs’s answers show both that she anticipate d marry ing Churc h and that Church g ave her the house as a g ift, but do not show that Church conditioned the g ift of the house upon their marria g e. I n response to further questioning by

Salens’s counse l, Tubbs reiterated t h a ts h e d i d

n o tb e l i e v e C h u r c h m a d e a c o n d i t i o n a l g i f

to f t h e r e a l p r o p e rt y: Q. So, wouldn’t it be a fair s t at em en t t o say this was a condition of having your name on the de ed?
A. Ic an’ t ans we r t

hat. Q. But assuming y ou wer en’t g oing to ma rry him, he would no t h av e p u t y our name on the de ed, would he?Salens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-17- A. Idon’t know. I

don’t know what he was doing t h e whole time be cause he ended up to [be] a big liar about eve ry

thing. So, I

have no ide a. I

ju s t can’ t ans we r t hat.
J .A. at 117 (Tubbs D ep. at 51). Thoug h they do not lack ambig uity , the above exchang es amount to e vid e nc e that, a c c or din g to T ub bs , th e g if t of the ho us e wa s n ot c on dit ion a l.
Fur thermore , Tubbs’s testimony shows that Church knew

the conse quence s of joint tenancy when he decide d to include Tubb s ’s name as well as his own on the title to the prope rty . Tubbs testified t hat real-estate age nts “explained every thing in these pa

pers to [Church] before he signe d. . . . they wanted to make sure that [Church] knew . .
. what he was doing and he said, y es, this is how it’s g oing to be written up.” J .A. at 112 (Tubbs Dep. at 46). Tubbs subsequently testified that the
rea l-estate a g ents explained “that over here [i n the Unit ed S tates] if there wer e two name s on a dee d, two names on a

deed a nd one passe d awa

y , it goe s to the other one . He [Church] knew eve ry thing.” J.A. a t 11 8 ( Tu

bb s D e p. a t 52 ). F ina lly , Tu bb s de nie s e ve r e nc oura g ing Churc h to inc lud e he r n a me on the title, on the basis that they would soon be marr ied. I n co n cl u s i o n , alt houg h the evidenc e sug g ests that Church made the g ift of the re al prope rty in part motivated by the fac t that he purporte d to love Tubbs and wa s eng ag ed to her, the evidence is not conclusive that Church made the g ift of the home conditional upon the e ventuality of his marria g e to Tubbs. See Aronow v . Silver , 538 A.2d 8 5 1 , 8 5 2 -53 (N.J . Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (quoting w ith approval the holding of A lb a n ese v . In de lic ato , 51 A.2d 110, 110-11 (N.J. D. C t. 1947), t hat although a plaintiff would not have g iven the de f e n d an t a “ d inn e r r in g ” h a d th e y n o t b e e n e n g a g e d , th e “ d inn e r r in g ” c o n s ti tute d s imply “aSalens v. Tubbs

No. 06-2194

-18- tok en o f t he love a

nd aff ection which pla intiff bore f or the de fenda

nt” and did not constitute an implie d ly c o n d it io n a l g if

t b e cause the ring lacke d the inhere nt “sy mbolic meaning ” of a

n eng ag ement ring ). The majority ’s fe eble r espon se that all of this is merely a scintilla of evide nce should be
rec og nized for what it is—a blatant weig hing of the evidenc e that is appropriate only for the tr ier of fac t. Tubbs has cre ated a

g enuine issue of materia l f act that Churc h did not condition the gift of the home upon their marr iag e. The district court er red in g ranting summary

judgme nt to Salens on her cl ai m re gar d i n g t h e r ea l p ro p er t y an d t h e m aj o ri t y

co mp o u n d s t h at erro r b y af fi rm i n g.
I n conclusion, I

would reve rse the g rant of summa ry judgme nt for Salens re g ardingthe dis pu te d r e a l pr op e rt

y and re mand fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. Th e re fo re , I dis se nt.