United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 18, 2010 Decided May 28, 2010 

No. 08-5119 

ABDULWAHAB NATTAH, LEAD PLAINTIFF IN A CLASS OF TITAN 

EMPLOYEES, 

APPELLANT

v. 

GEORGE W. BUSH, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:06-cv-00700-RCL) 

 Abdulwahab Nattah, appearing pro se, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant. 

 Marina Utgoff Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for federal appellees. With her on the brief was R. 

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

 John F. Scalia argued the cause for appellee L-3 

Services, Inc. With him on the brief was Matthew H. 

Sorensen. 
2 

 Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and 

BROWN, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

 BROWN, Circuit Judge: Pro se appellant Abdulwahab 

Nattah challenges the district court’s order granting, inter 

alia, L-3 Communications Titan Group’s1 (L-3) motion to 

dismiss and dismissing his complaint with prejudice as to all 

defendants and all claims. We affirm the district court’s order 

in part, but remand for further proceedings on Nattah’s 

non-monetary claims against the Secretary of the Army and 

his breach of contract claim against L-3. 

I 

 These are the relevant facts as Nattah alleges them in his 

amended complaint. Sometime before January 17, 2003, 

Nattah, who claims he is a dual citizen of Libya and the 

United States, attended a “career fair” for applicants to L-3, at 

which individuals who claimed they had authority to contract 

on behalf of L-3 offered Nattah a job as an Arabic language 

interpreter. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92, 281, Nattah v. Bush, No. 

06-cv-00700 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2008). The L-3 agents 

informed Nattah he would work only in Kuwait, would be 

housed in a luxury air-conditioned apartment building with 

access to restaurants and stores, and “under no circumstances” 

would be sent to Iraq. Id. ¶¶ 22, 93–94, 280. The agents also 

told Nattah he could be fired only for misconduct, lack of 

work due to termination or dimunition of L-3’s contract with 

the United States government, or dereliction of duty. 

 

1

 Although several different names have been used throughout the 

proceedings in this case, it appears the correct current entity name 

is L-3 Services, Inc. 
3 

Id. ¶¶ 22, 95. In reliance on L-3’s promises, Nattah accepted 

the employment offer. Id. ¶¶ 96, 282. On January 17, 2003, 

he signed a letter from L-3 providing further detail about his 

employment but stating the letter should not be construed as 

an employment contract. Id. ¶¶ 23, 97, 283; (J.A. 61–62). 

Upon arriving in Kuwait, Nattah alleges he was sequestered in 

a military encampment located in the desert and required to 

live in a tent with forty soldiers, eat distasteful food, and live 

under substandard conditions. First Am. Compl. ¶ 99. He 

further alleges that after spending two months in Kuwait, L-3 

“sold [him] as a slave to the [U.S.] military,” id. ¶ 101, who 

took him to Iraq and forced him to serve on the front line of 

the Iraq invasion, id. ¶¶ 25, 101–03, 291. During that period, 

Nattah suffered nerve damage from close artillery explosions 

that caused hearing loss and other medical problems. Id. 

¶¶ 34, 112. Nattah was examined at a clinic in Iraq and 

travelled to Germany for additional treatment. Id. ¶ 112. 

After Nattah’s departure, L-3’s Deputy Director for 

Operations visited Nattah’s barracks in Iraq and informed the 

soldiers housed there Nattah was on leave without pay and 

“did not belong there anymore.” Id. ¶ 114. Several weeks 

later Nattah was transferred to another German hospital, 

where he underwent two surgeries. Id. ¶ 117. He was 

discharged from the hospital on July 23, 2003, and traveled 

back to the United States the following day. Id. 

 Nattah filed his complaint in the district court on April 

19, 2006. He alleged twenty separate claims against multiple 

defendants, including former President George W. Bush, 

former Vice President Richard Cheney, former Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Six Unknown United States 

Government Employees,” and L-3. On January 30, 2007, the 

district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss 

Nattah’s claims against Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld. L-3 

filed a motion to dismiss on March 12, 2007. On November 
4 

28, 2007, while L-3’s motion to dismiss was still pending, 

Nattah filed a motion to vacate the district court’s January 30, 

2007 order and sought leave to amend his complaint to add a 

new federal defendant—Francis Harvey, then-Secretary of the 

Army—and to pursue additional claims against the six 

unknown federal employees. Nattah claimed he had not 

previously been able to determine which agency—the 

Department of Defense or the Department of the Army—had 

employed the individuals responsible for his alleged 

abduction into slavery. He filed a proposed amended 

complaint along with his motion for leave to amend. The 

amended complaint alleged claims against, among other 

defendants, Secretary Harvey, “Six Unknown United States 

Government Employees,” L-3, and the Iraqi National 

Congress. It included claims of slavery, intentional infliction 

of emotional distress, fraud, breach of contract, and alleged 

violations of the Geneva Convention, Hague Convention, and 

United Nations Charter, as well as several other claims based 

on state and foreign law. 

 The district court granted Nattah’s motion for leave to 

file an amended complaint in part, denied his motion to join 

additional defendants, denied his motion to vacate, and 

granted L-3’s motion to dismiss. Nattah v. Bush, 541 F. 

Supp. 2d 223, 226 (D.D.C. 2008). The district court also, on 

its own motion, refused to allow Nattah to add the Iraqi 

National Congress, Dr. Ahmed Chalabi, and the 

pseudonymous intelligence source “Curveball” as defendants. 

Id. at 231. This appeal followed. 

II 

 On appeal, Nattah does not contest every holding of the 

district court; we consider only those that he does and agree 

with two of his claims of error. 
5 

A. Nattah’s motion for leave to join Secretary Harvey 

 Nattah challenges the district court’s denial of his motion 

for leave to join former Secretary of the Army Francis 

Harvey. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1), a plaintiff may 

amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, anytime 

“before being served with a responsive pleading.”2 FED. R.

CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A) (2007). In this case, none of the 

defendants filed an answer to Nattah’s complaint. L-3 filed a 

motion to dismiss, but “a motion to dismiss is not a 

responsive pleading for the purposes of Rule 15.” James v. 

Hurson Assocs., Inc. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000). Because Nattah therefore was entitled as a matter 

of right to amend his complaint to add Secretary Harvey as a 

defendant, it was error for the district court to refuse to 

consider the claims he added. See id. However, not all such 

errors require remand. See id. “[A] district court need not be 

made to reconsider an amended complaint that fails to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted, or that would 

otherwise fail as a matter of law. . . . [N]o remand is 

necessary if the amended complaint would not survive a 

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6).” Id. We therefore consider whether the amended 

 

2

 Effective December 1, 2009, Rule 15(a) was amended to provide 

that a plaintiff may amend his complaint once “as a matter of 

course” within twenty-one days after the complaint is served or, if 

the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 

within twenty-one days after service of a responsive pleading or a 

motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. FED. R.

CIV. P. 15(a)(1) (as amended). In all other cases, a party may 

amend its pleading only with the written consent of the opposing 

party or leave of the court. Id. at 15(a)(2). 
6 

claims against Secretary Harvey would survive a motion to 

dismiss. 

 Nattah brings several claims against Secretary Harvey: 

violation of the Geneva Convention (Count III); slavery 

(Count V); right to travel (Count VI); and violations of 

international law (Count XIX). The district court held 

Nattah’s claims against Secretary Harvey would not survive a 

motion to dismiss because “the Government is immune from 

suit and has not explicitly waived immunity,” Nattah, 541 F. 

Supp. 2d at 231. The court’s reasoning overlooks section 702 

of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, waiving 

sovereign immunity for claims “seeking relief other than 

money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an 

officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official 

capacity or under color of legal authority.” For each claim 

brought against Secretary Harvey, Nattah seeks injunctive, 

declaratory, and equitable relief in addition to monetary relief. 

First Am. Compl. at 84–88. Moreover, as the federal 

Appellees concede, Nattah’s claims are made against the 

Secretary in his official capacity. See Clark v. Library of 

Cong., 750 F.2d 89, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“With respect to 

claims for non-monetary relief, the 1976 amendments to 

§ 702 of the [APA] eliminated the sovereign immunity 

defense in virtually all actions for non-monetary relief against 

a U.S. agency or officer acting in an official capacity.”); see 

also Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

Sovereign immunity therefore does not protect the Secretary 

from Nattah’s non-monetary claims. 

The only other defense the federal Appellees raise to 

Nattah’s claims against Secretary Harvey, albeit halfheartedly, is that Nattah’s pleadings are insufficient. Fed. 

Appellees Br. at 17. They argue his pleadings are vague and 

do not establish any basis for any claims against the 
7 

Secretary. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 

1951–54 (2009)). Although Nattah does not mention 

Secretary Harvey by name in each individual count of his 

amended complaint, we conclude his pleadings are sufficient. 

See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5 (stating Nattah brings Counts III, 

V, and VI against “all defendants”), 237 (stating “Army 

Intelligence officers” were aware Nattah would not 

voluntarily go into Iraq), 269 (stating the “United States 

Military” denied Nattah’s right to travel), 355 (stating 

defendant Harvey violated Nattah’s rights by requiring him to 

violate international law). 

Because Nattah’s non-monetary claims against Secretary 

Harvey would survive a motion to dismiss—at least on the 

grounds relied upon by the district court and the federal 

Appellees—we remand for further proceedings on those 

claims. 

B. Nattah’s breach of contract claim against L-3 

Nattah brings a number of claims against L-3. The district 

court granted L-3’s motion to dismiss all of them. Nattah, 

541 F. Supp. 2d at 233. We review the district court’s 

dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. See Muir v. 

Navy Fed. Credit Union, 529 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). Addressing only the claims Nattah raises on appeal, 

and accepting as true all factual allegations contained in his 

complaint, see id., we conclude Nattah’s breach of contract 

claim is sufficient. 

Nattah contends he entered into an oral contract with L-3 

at a “career fair.” First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92–96, 281–84. He 

alleges agents of L-3 outlined the terms of employment and 

promised: (1) he would be provided certain benefits, 

including air-conditioned housing; (2) he would be required to 
8 

work only in Kuwait; (3) he would not be sent to work in a 

war zone, including Iraq; and (4) he could be fired only for 

misconduct, lack of work due to termination or dimunition of 

L-3’s contract with the U.S. government, or dereliction of 

duty. Id. ¶¶ 22, 95. He alleges L-3 subsequently breached the 

contract by failing to provide him the fringe benefits promised 

under the contract and by selling him to the U.S. military for 

service in Iraq. Id. ¶¶ 291–92. On appeal, L-3 argues Nattah 

makes contradictory allegations because he alleges he had an 

oral contract with L-3, yet he specifically states he signed an 

employment contract. L-3 Br. at 33–35. In the alternative, L3 argues Nattah’s pleadings are not sufficient to state a breach 

of contract claim under Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544 (2007), and Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, since he does not 

name which individuals made the alleged oral contract or 

establish they had authority to contract on behalf of L-3. L-3 

Br. at 36–37. The district court concluded Nattah could not 

rely on the alleged oral contract. Nattah, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 

236. 

As an initial matter, the fact Nattah signed an offer letter 

from L-3 is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of 

an oral contract. To be sure, the alleged oral contract between 

Nattah and L-3 may be contradicted by the offer letter to the 

extent Nattah was promised orally he could be terminated 

only for cause since the offer letter describes the relationship 

between L-3 and Nattah as “voluntary.” (J.A. 62). The offer 

letter, however, is silent as to the benefits Nattah alleges L-3 

promised him (such as housing and meals), and, although 

Nattah did refer to the letter as a “contract” at least once in his 

amended complaint, First Am. Compl. ¶ 97, he also correctly 

acknowledged the letter explicitly stated it did not constitute 

either an express or implied contract. Id. ¶¶ 23, 283; (J.A. 

62). Moreover, contrary to the argument of L-3’s counsel, an 

at-will employer does not possess a unilateral right to 
9 

retroactively reduce or revoke contractually agreed-upon 

benefits that have already vested. See 19 RICHARD A. LORD, 

WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:36 (4th ed. 2010) (at-will 

employer may not retroactively deprive employee of vested 

rights, including employee benefits); see also Progress 

Printing Co., Inc. v. Nichols, 421 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Va. 1992) 

(“[T]he [at-will] employer retains the right to alter 

[employment and benefit] policies at any time, although rights 

which have already vested in the employee are enforceable 

for the period of time during which those rights existed.”). 

Modification of an at-will employment contract does not 

extinguish either the employee’s original contract or his right 

to sue for its breach. See WILLISTON § 54.36. Thus, even 

assuming Nattah was an at-will employee, L-3 might 

nonetheless be obligated to provide promised benefits. 

Second, we conclude Nattah’s amended complaint 

sufficiently describes his claim. Nattah alleges “[a]gents of 

defendant [L-3]” conveyed to him the terms of the oral 

contract, which included luxury apartment accommodations 

in Kuwait and assurances he would not be sent to Iraq. First 

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93–94. L-3 attempts to use Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, and Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, to enunciate a blanket 

rule that requires a plaintiff to plead every conceivable fact or 

face dismissal of his claim. L-3 Br. at 37. L-3, however, 

points to no language in Twombly or Iqbal requiring a 

plaintiff to identify by name which employee(s) made the 

agreement when pleading a breach of contract claim. See 

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (stating “Rule 8 . . . does not require 

‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). Moreover, Nattah 

alleges with specificity the several terms of the oral contract 

and how L-3 breached those terms. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92–103. 
10 

Accordingly, we conclude Nattah’s complaint states a claim 

against L-3 for breach of its oral contract with Nattah. 

C. Nattah’s other claims against L-3 

Two of Nattah’s other claims against L-3 warrant brief 

discussion. First, although the district court granted L-3’s 

motion to dismiss all claims, see Nattah, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 

233, the court did not expressly address Nattah’s claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against L-3 

(Count VIII). However, since we review the district court’s 

decision granting L-3’s motion to dismiss de novo, we are not 

required to remand the issue merely because the district court 

failed to consider it. See, e.g., Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 

1028, 1041 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Gerber v. Norton, 294 

F.3d 173, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Although Nattah brings his 

IIED claim under Iraqi and Kuwaiti law, he does not address 

the elements of the claim under either law. His pleading 

consists of a single sentence stating he “incorporates 

paragraphs 1–95 above by reference.” First Am. Compl. 

¶ 278. Those paragraphs, primarily discussing the U.S. 

government’s alleged deception involving weapons of mass 

destruction in Iraq, fail to satisfy FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). We 

therefore conclude Nattah’s IIED claim was properly 

dismissed. 

Second, the district court dismissed Nattah’s fraud claim 

against L-3 (Count IX) because his “assertions fail[ed] to set 

out with particularity a plausible claim for fraud,” as required 

by FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Nattah, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 236. We 

may affirm the district court’s decision “on the basis of ‘any 

grounds which . . . support [it].’” In re Swine Flu 

Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 880 F.2d 1439, 1444 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989). We therefore need not decide whether Nattah’s 

pleadings are sufficient since his claim is barred by the statute 
11 

of limitations. The statute of limitations for fraud claims in 

Virginia—where Nattah alleges the fraud occurred—is two 

years from the time the fraud was or reasonably should have 

been discovered. VA. CODE §§ 8.01–243(A), –249(1). Even 

assuming Nattah’s claim did not accrue until June 2003, the 

date he alleges he was released from the military hospital in 

Germany, First Am. Compl. ¶ 117; Appellant Br. at 12, he did 

not file his initial complaint until April 2006, well over two 

years later. (J.A. 10). 

With respect to Nattah’s other claims against L-3, his 

claims against the “Six Unknown Government Employees,” 

and his motion for leave to file an amended complaint joining 

certain Iraqi defendants, we affirm for the reasons set forth in 

the district court’s memorandum opinion of March 31, 2008. 

III 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in 

part, and remand for such proceedings as may be required, 

consistent with this opinion, on Nattah’s non-monetary claims 

against the Secretary of the Army and his breach of contract 

claim against L-3. 

So ordered.