In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 09-103L 

(Filed: January 26, 2018) 

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DANIEL and KATHY HAGGART, et al., 

For Themselves and As Representatives 

of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, 

 Plaintiffs,

 v. 

UNITED STATES,

 Defendant.

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Rails-to-trails takings case; fairness of 

settlement of class action; RCFC 23(e)

Thomas S. Stewart, Stewart Wald & McCulley LLC, Kansas City, Missouri, for plaintiffs 

Daniel Haggart and Kathy Haggart, et al. With him on the briefs were Elizabeth G. McCulley, 

Stewart Wald & McCulley LLC, Kansas City, Missouri, Steven M. Wald and Michael J. Smith, 

Stewart Wald & McCulley LLC, St. Louis, Missouri, and J. Robert Sears, Baker Sterchi Cowden 

& Rice, LLC, St. Louis, Missouri. 

Lucinda J. Bach, Trial Attorney, Natural Resources Section, Environment & Natural 

Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. 

With her on the briefs were Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Environment 

& Natural Resources Division, and Tyler L. Burgess and Sarah Izfar, Trial Attorneys, Natural 

Resources Section, Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C. 

 David C. Frederick, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC, Washington, 

D.C., for plaintiffs Gordon A. Woodley and Denise L. Woodley. With him on the briefs were 

Joanna T. Zhang, Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick, PLLC, Washington, D.C., and 

Gordon A. Woodley, Woodley Law, Kirkland, Washington. 

Michael R. Scott, Hillis Clark Martin & Peterson P.S., Seattle, Washington for plaintiff 

Cleveland Square, LLC and twenty-five others. With him on the briefs was Mary Crego 

Peterson, Hillis Clark Martin & Peterson P.S., Seattle, Washington. 

 Richard B. Sanders, Goodstein Law Group PLLC, Tacoma, Washington for plaintiffs 

Faramarz Ghoddoussi and Westpoint Properties, LLC. 
2 

OPINION AND ORDER

LETTOW, Judge. 

This rails-to-trails takings class action is once again before the court for approval of a 

settlement pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). After 

extensive proceedings in this court and an appeal to, and remand from, the Federal Circuit, 253 

class members again seek approval and enforcement of their settlement agreement entered in 

2014 with the government.1 The government, in a volte face, now opposes the previously 

executed settlement and raises a number of objections to approval of the settlement. 

BACKGROUND

This action concerns land previously held as a right-of-way by Burlington Northern and 

Santa Fe Railway Company in the State of Washington. That right-of-way was converted into a 

recreational trail pursuant to Section 208 of the National Trails System Act Amendments of 

1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11, § 208, 97 Stat. 42, 48 (codified in relevant part at 16 U.S.C. § 

1247(d)).2 In February 2009, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that this conversion constituted 

a taking of their property without just compensation. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18. A class of 521 

members, owning 659 parcels of land, was initially certified, Hr’g Tr. 129:5-6 (Dec. 18, 2017); 

see also Haggart I, 89 Fed. Cl. at 530-31,3 and then split into six subclasses. See Haggart II, 

104 Fed. Cl. 484, 487. The court then ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment, finding 

“the government liable to certain class members within Subclass Two and Categories A through 

D of Subclass Four” while also granting “the government summary judgment as to class 

claimants in Subclass Four, Category E.” Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 631 (citing Haggart III, 

108 Fed. Cl. at 70). In all other respects, summary judgment was denied: The court reserved 

some questions of ownership for trial, did not address liability for Subclasses One, Three, Five, 

or Six, and did not address issues of valuation. See Haggart III, 108 Fed. Cl. at 70. 

Starting in April of 2013, the parties engaged in extensive mediation with Senior Judge 

John Weise, eventually reaching a settlement in February 2014. See generally Joint Mot. for 

Approval of S[e]ttlement and of Notice to Class Members and Request to Set Date for Public 

Hearing, ECF No. 161. Of the 521 claimants and their 659 parcels of land, the settlement would 

 1

This case has been the subject of seven reported decisions, including six from this court 

and another from the court of appeals. See Haggart v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 523 (2009) 

(“Haggart I”); Haggart v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 484 (2012) (“Haggart II”); Haggart v. 

United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 70 (2012) (“Haggart III”); Haggart v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 

131 (2014) (“Haggart IV”), vacated and remanded sub nom. Haggart v. Woodley, 809 F.3d 1336 

(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Haggart V”); Haggart v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 628 (2017) (“Haggart 

VI”); Haggart v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 568 (2017) (“Haggart VII”).

2

The pertinent Notices of Interim Trail Use were issued by the Surface Transportation 

Board on October 27, 2008 and November 25, 2008. See Haggart I, 89 Fed. Cl. at 529. 

3

Various hearings have been held over the course of this case, including two fairness 

hearings. All citations to the hearing transcript in this opinion refer to the fairness hearing held in 

Seattle, Washington on December 18, 2017. 
3 

dismiss the claims of 268 class members and their corresponding 343 parcels, without 

compensation, and then pay $110 million to the remaining 253 class members as just 

compensation for the alleged taking of their 316 parcels, plus interest, attorneys’ fees, and 

litigation costs. See id.; Hr’g Tr. 131:10-14; Ex. M;4 see also Joint Compromise Settlement 

Agreement between Pls. and the United States (“Settlement Agreement” or “Agreement”), ECF 

No. 161-2 & Exs. A, B; Hr’g Tr. 129:5-10; Exs. K, L, M. The court held a fairness hearing in 

March 2014, approved the settlement, and entered final judgment. See generally Haggart IV, 

116 Fed. Cl. 131. In so doing, the court awarded attorneys’ fees to class counsel through a 

common fund. Id. at 148-49. 

An appeal of this court’s final judgment was sought by Mr. and Mrs. Woodley as class 

members. See generally Haggart V, 809 F.3d 1336. Although receiving just compensation 

under the settlement, the Woodleys challenged the court’s approval of the settlement on the 

ground that class counsel had not provided information in written form (oral explanations had 

been provided) that would enable class members to cross-check calculations of the settlement 

amount to be received by them individually. See id. at 1343, 1348. They also challenged the 

award of attorneys’ fees based on a common fund. See id. at 1343, 1351-59. In the appeal, the 

government abandoned the position it had taken at the fairness hearing and supported the 

Woodleys, but it did not itself file an appeal or raise any additional issues on appeal. See id. at 

1343; Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 631. The Federal Circuit vacated the approval of the 

Settlement Agreement on the ground that sufficient information in written, as contrasted to oral, 

form had not been provided to enable the Woodleys and class members generally to 

comparatively calculate their individual awards, and reversed this court’s award of attorneys’ 

fees under the common-fund doctrine. Haggart V, 809 F.3d at 1351, 1359. The case was 

remanded for further action by this court. Id. at 1359. 

To rectify the deficiency of written notice to the class, the court ordered access to 

documentary materials and re-opened discovery, ensuring that class members received “all the 

discovery [they could] possibly . . . want.” See Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 632. Of particular 

interest to the Woodleys were three spreadsheets: a summary spreadsheet “that showed 

appraisals side-by-side,” and “two other spreadsheets that had been used in the mediation 

process.” Id. All three had not previously been made available electronically; that was rectified 

during discovery. Id. 

Neither in the court of appeals nor initially before this court on remand did the parties 

consider that the Settlement Agreement itself had been set aside, vacated, or altered, except

potentially as to the allocation of individual amounts. See Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 641.5

 The 

 4

At the fairness hearing, one electronic compilation of documents made available to class 

members (Ex. F) and five documentary exhibits (Exs. K, L, M, N, and O) were admitted into the 

record. Those exhibits will be cited by letter designation without reference to the transcript of 

the fairness hearing held on December 18, 2017. One documentary exhibit was provided for the 

record earlier, and is appended to at Class Counsel’s Mot. for Approval of the Settlement and of 

Notice to Class Members and Request to Set a Date for Public Hearing, Ex. D, ECF No. 299-4. 

5

The Federal Circuit’s disposition and mandate necessarily contemplated that an 

adjustment might have to be made to the attachment to the Settlement Agreement that allocated 

the overall settlement amount to individual class members, and in any event class members’ 
4 

Federal Circuit did not address the specific terms of the Settlement Agreement. Id. On remand, 

however, the government further changed its position and filed multiple motions for 

reconsideration, all seeking invalidation of the Settlement Agreement. See generally The United 

States’ Mot. for Reconsideration of Certain Rulings on the Parties’ Cross[-]Mots. for Summary 

Judgment and Mem. in Support Thereof, ECF No. 244; The United States’ Mot. for Recons. of 

May 4, 2017 Order (ECF No. 275) Granting Pls.’ Mot. to Enforce Settlement Agreement and 

Mem. in Support Thereof, ECF No. 291. First, the government asked the court to reconsider 

determinations made in Haggart III. See Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 633. The government 

argued “that the vast majority of class members own no property interest in the railroad corridor 

and are entitled to nothing,” Haggart VII, 133 Fed. Cl. at 572 (internal brackets and ellipses 

omitted), relying on a decision by the United States District Court for the Western District of 

Washington in Kaseburg v. Port of Seattle, an indirectly related case.

6

 This court denied the 

government’s motion, determining that the Kaseburg “decision [did] not affect the Settlement 

Agreement at issue in this case.” Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 643. Second, the government 

sought “to negate the unconditional, comprehensive Settlement Agreement that the government 

executed with the class.” Haggart VII, 133 Fed. Cl. at 572. That motion was also denied 

because the court determined that the “Settlement Agreement was and remains a binding and 

enforceable contract.” Id. (quoting Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 643). 

After the parties’ remand-oriented motions practice had abated, on August 11, 2017, 

plaintiffs filed a motion for approval of the settlement. See generally Class Counsel’s Mot. for 

Approval of the Settlement and of Notice to Class Members and Request to Set a Date for Public 

Hearing, ECF No. 299. The government responded in opposition, objecting to the Settlement 

Agreement on the grounds it had raised in its prior post-remand motions. See generally United 

States’ Resp. and Obj. to Class Counsel’s Mot. for Approval of the Settlement and of Notice to 

Class Members and Request to Set a Date for Public Hearing (“Def.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 310. On 

September 25, 2017, the court issued a revised draft notice, proposing changes to the draft notice 

that had been submitted by class counsel. See generally Order of Sept. 25, 2017, ECF No. 319. 

The court’s draft was issued in advance of a hearing held on October 20, 2017, at which further 

revisions and objections to the notice were considered. After incorporating additional changes 

suggested by the parties to the proffered notice and addressing the objections raised by the 

government at that hearing, the court preliminarily approved the settlement, scheduled a fairness 

hearing, prescribed the notice to be issued to the class, and ordered class counsel to provide 

notice of both the settlement and the fairness hearing to class members. See Order of Oct. 27, 

2017, ECF No. 329; Amended Order of Oct. 30, 2017 (“Notice”), ECF No. 330. The fairness 

hearing was held on December 18, 2017 in Seattle, Washington, to enable as many class 

members as possible to attend and participate in the proceedings. 

 

ultimate compensation amounts would change due to the reversal of the award of common-fund 

attorneys’ fees. See Haggart VI, 131 Fed. Cl. at 641 & n.10.

6

See Kaseburg v. Port of Seattle, No. C14-784 JCC, 2015 WL 6449305 (W.D. Wash. 

Oct. 23, 2015) (“Kaseburg I”); Kaseburg v. Port of Seattle, No. C14-0784 JCC, 2016 WL 

4440959 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2016) (“Kaseburg II”), appeal filed, No. 16-35768 (9th Cir. 

Sept. 23, 2016). 
5 

All comments submitted by class members have been reviewed, the testimony of class 

members at the fairness hearing has been received, and the issue of approval has been fully 

briefed and argued and is ready for disposition. 

STANDARDS FOR DECISION

RCFC 23(e) states that a certified class action “may be settled . . . only with the court’s 

approval” and specifies the requisite procedures for a proposed settlement: 

(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who 

would be bound by the proposal.

(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after 

a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

(3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any agreement 

made in connection with the proposal.

(4) [Not used.]

(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval 

under this subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only with the 

court’s approval. 

RCFC 23(e)(1)-(5).7

 The court directed that notice be mailed to all class members and has held a 

fairness hearing, in accord with RCFC 23(e)(1) and (2), respectively. Disclosure of separate 

agreements was made in accord with RCFC 23(e)(3). The only remaining inquiry for the court is 

whether the Settlement Agreement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” RCFC 23(e)(2). 

 When determining the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of a class settlement, “two

areas of inquiries are paramount:” substantive and procedural fairness. See Christensen v. 

United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 625, 629 (2005). Of the two, “[t]he primary concern is the substantive 

terms of the settlement” and basic to any inquiry into substantive fairness is whether the terms of 

the settlement reasonably reflect “the likely rewards of litigation.” Id. (internal ellipse omitted) 

(quoting Weinberger v. Kedrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73-74 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.) (in turn, 

quoting Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 

U.S. 414, 424-25 (1968))). Because the court’s ability to “examin[e] . . . the settlement’s 

substantive terms” is “necessarily limited,” “attention [is] also . . . paid to” procedural fairness,

including “the negotiating process by which the settlement was reached.” Id. (quoting 

Weinberger, 698 F.2d at 73-74). Procedural fairness depends on whether the settlement resulted 

from an arms-length negotiation and whether class counsel effectively represented the class by 

possessing adequate experience and ability and by engaging in sufficient discovery. Id. 

Substantive fairness is a case-by-case inquiry with no definitive list of factors a court must apply, 

but many courts have considered some combination of the following: 

(1) The relative strengths of plaintiffs’ case in comparison to the proposed settlement, which 

necessarily take into account:

 7

Rule 23 of the Fed. R. Civ. P. is substantially similar to RCFC 23, and decisions by 

federal courts applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 are persuasive in this court. See Haggart I, 89 Fed. Cl. 

at 529 (citing Barnes v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 492, 494 & n.1 (2005)). 
6 

(a) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation; 

(b) the risks of establishing liability;

(c) the risks of establishing damages;

(d) the risks of maintaining the class action through trial;

(e) the reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible 

recovery;

(f) the reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the 

attendant risks of litigation; 

(g) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; and

 [(h) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment.]8

(2) The recommendation of class counsel, taking into account the adequacy of class 

counsel’s representation of the class. 

(3) The reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement, taking into account the 

adequacy of notice to the class members of the settlement terms.

(4) The fairness of the settlement to the entire class. 

Dauphin Island Prop. Owners Ass’n v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 95, 102-03 (2009) (citing 

cases) (considering also fairness of attorneys’ fees); see also Raulerson v. United States, 108 

Fed. Cl. 675, 677 (2013) (same); Voth Oil Co. v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 98, 103 (2012) 

(same). Courts analyze these factors in light of “‘the interest in encouraging settlements, 

particularly in class actions, which are often complex, drawn out proceedings demanding a large 

share of finite judicial resources.’” Christensen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 629 (quoting Mayfield v. Barr, 

985 F.2d 1090, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 

ANALYSIS

I. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS OF THE SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENT

As in Haggart IV, “[t]here is no evidence that the negotiating process was procedurally 

unfair.” 116 Fed. Cl. at 140. There the court determined that “[b]oth parties represent[ed] that 

negotiations were at arms-length,” each party obtained their own appraisal, “[a] compromise 

between diverging appraisal amounts was achieved through [impartial] mediation,” and “[c]lass 

counsel has extensive experience litigating rails-to-trails cases in this court[] and . . . possessed 

the requisite experience to be effective counsel.” Id. Nothing in the intervening years has 

occurred to alter the court’s assessment of the negotiations in this case. 

The sole procedural defect in the prior approval of the Settlement Agreement, as 

determined on appeal, was inadequate provision to the class of written documentation, as 

contrasted to oral explanations, of the calculations that were made on the basis of appraisals of 

representative parcels. See Haggart V, 809 F.3d at 1351. That defect has been cured. See 

Haggart VII, 133 Fed. Cl. at 575-76. Class counsel made the pertinent documentary materials 

available by electronic and other means. See Ex. F. The court also re-opened discovery to 

 8

This factor carries little weight in a case such as this one where the defendant is the 

federal government. The government in theory is understood to be able to “always withstand 

greater judgment because of Congress’s unlimited ability to tax.” Berkley v. United States, 59 

Fed. Cl. 675, 713 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
7 

ensure that all parties “had the opportunity to seek any and all relevant documents,” and 

particularly to “obtain access to the spreadsheets” that were used in the settlement mediation to 

develop the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Haggart VII, 133 Fed. Cl. at 575. All three 

“spreadsheets are available on class counsel’s website for any class member to review,” and the 

government had “attached [them] to its motion for reconsideration, making them a matter of 

public record.” Id. at 575-76. In light of this curative action, the court is once again persuaded 

that this settlement is procedurally fair.

Likewise, the Settlement Agreement is substantively fair. The court previously 

determined that the “terms of the [S]ettlement [A]greement reasonably reflect the strengths of 

the plaintiffs’ case in comparison to the proposed settlement,” and nothing has occurred to alter 

that determination. See Haggart IV, 116 Fed. Cl. at 140-41. At the first fairness hearing in this 

case, held in Washington, D.C., only three class members participated in the proceedings, and of 

the three, two objected. Id. at 138. At this juncture, all of the class members support the 

settlement. In response to the renewed notice to the class members, no objections were filed, and 

226 of the 253 class members specifically agreed and consented to their individual allocation 

amounts under the Settlement Agreement. See generally Notice of Compliance Concerning 

Class Members’ Responses to Class Action Settlement Notice, ECF No. 333. Additionally, 58 

class members appeared or were represented at the second fairness hearing in Seattle, 

Washington—and all who spoke voiced strong support for the settlement. See Hr’g Tr. 7:4 to 

10:8, 13:6 to 14:20, 21:7-21, 75:7-19; Hr’g Tr. 77:1 to 82:4, 122:17 to 127:22. 

II. THE GOVERNMENT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMEMT

The government has raised numerous objections to the fairness of the Settlement 

Agreement. These objections are ultimately unconvincing, whether considered individually or 

taken together. 

A. Objection to Any Modification of the Settlement Agreement

Three members of the class were included in the Settlement Agreement but own property 

just outside the area designated in the Notices of Interim Trail Use that gave rise to the takings 

claims. See Hr’g Tr. 57:17-23. These class members appear to have been included by a mistake

in maps prepared by a jointly retained consultant. Hr’g Tr. 58:13-15, 130:9-13. Class counsel 

proposed an amendment of the settlement to eliminate the three class members on grounds that 

their inclusion was derived from a mutual mistake. Hr’g Tr. 58:15-25. The government objects 

to any modification to the settlement, claiming that a modified agreement would cease to be 

binding upon the government and would require a return to negotiations. See Def.’s Resp. at 1; 

Notice at 4. The court simply cannot satisfy this objection in a way that is fair to the rest of the 

class. Overturning the entire Settlement Agreement to rectify an admitted mutual mistake by the 

parties would be grossly unfair to the class. So, while the mistaken inclusion of the three class 

members is unfortunate, the court will not make any changes to the Agreement but will retain the 

three class members in the group to receive awards. Hr’g Tr. 130:18 to 131:2. 
8 

B. Objection to Separate Agreements

The government objects to the fairness of the Settlement Agreement due to three separate 

agreements entered between class counsel and four class members: the Woodleys, Faramarz

Ghoddoussi, Westpoint Properties, LLC, and Annop Chaipatanapong. See Hr’g Tr. 101:13 to 

103:5. Pursuant to the agreements, these class members will receive money from class counsel

in connection with their acceptance of the Settlement Agreement. Hr’g Tr. 17:8 to 20:4, 105:14 

to 107:25, 119:13 to 120:4, Exs. I, O, and Class Counsel’s Mot. for Approval of Settlement, Ex. 

D. The government argues that these separate agreements “call for payment of part of the

statutory attorneys’ fees to four class members, [and therefore] the agreements change a line item 

in the settlement agreement[, i.e., the line “call[ing] for payment of part of the statutory 

attorneys’ fees,”] and those are material changes.” Hr’g Tr. 112:19-22. Such changes, in the 

government’s view, require that a new notice be sent to the rest of the class disclosing the 

separate agreements. See Hr’g Tr. 111:9-14. The government mischaracterizes the nature of 

these separate agreements. The agreements require that the additional compensation will come

“directly from class counsel” and not from the $110 million award. Hr’g Tr. 106:4-5; see, e.g., 

Exs. I, P, and Class Counsel’s Mot. for Approval of Settlement, Ex. D. As such, the separate 

agreements have no effect on the allocation of specific awards to the class as set out in the 

Settlement Agreement and have no effect on the payments the government will make. 

Moreover, the class is well aware of the separate agreements. The separate agreement between 

the Woodleys and class counsel was explicitly disclosed in the Notice issued to the class, see

Notice at 3, and the posture of Faramarz Ghoddoussi and Westpoint Properties LLC was also set 

out in the Notice, see id. at 3-4. The separate agreements were also made part of the record of 

the fairness hearing, and extensively addressed at the hearing. See Hr’g Tr. 17:8 to 20:4, 105:13 

to 107:25, 119:13 to 120:4, Exs. I, O, and Class Counsel’s Mot. for Approval of Settlement, Ex. 

D.

Because these separate agreements do not affect the terms of the Settlement Agreement 

itself and have been fully disclosed and addressed extensively at the fairness hearing, the court 

has considered them comprehensively and concludes that they do not render the Settlement 

Agreement unfair. 

C. Objection to Individual Contingency Fee Agreements 

Many class members have entered contingent fee agreements with class counsel. See

Def.’s Resp. at 12. These agreements were entered on an individual basis, each class member 

agreeing to pay class counsel 24% of that class member’s “gross settlement” award. See Hr’g 

Tr. 108:10-23 (describing 24% contingent fee agreements entered into by three class members as 

“consistent with other fee agreements that other class members have entered into”); Def.’s Resp. 

at 14. These contingent fee agreements are private contracts that do not directly affect the 

government’s payment of the settlement award. 

The court has limited oversight over such contingent fee agreements because it reviews 

contingent fee agreements only in the context of fairness to the class. See RCFC 23(g)(1)(C)-

(D), (h)(1)-(3)). Jurisdictionally, this court cannot enforce agreements between private parties. 

See 28 U.S.C. 1491(a). 
9 

The government objects to the settlement’s fairness in light of the individual contingent 

fee agreements. While acknowledging the limited role that the court has in reviewing the 

contingent fee agreements, the government argues that such agreements should be subject to 

“particularly close scrutiny” because they were entered into “long after the attorney-client 

relationship commenced.” Def.’s Resp. at 15 (citing Jenkins v. McCoy, 882 F. Supp. 549, 555 

(S.D. W.Va. 1995); Pete v. United Mine Workers of Am. Welfare & Ret. Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 

1275 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (additional citations omitted). This argument fails to take into 

consideration the intervening effect of the Federal Circuit’s ruling in Haggart V. Before that 

ruling, class counsel had entered into contingent fee agreements calling for 35% of the awarded 

amounts, later voluntarily reduced to 30%, to be taken from the common fund. See Haggart IV, 

116 Fed. Cl. at 138. In its ruling after the first fairness hearing, the court had reduced that 

percentage to approximately 24%. Id. at 148 & nn.19, 20. That common fund fee award was 

invalidated on appeal under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition 

Act (“Uniform Relocation Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 4654, the fee-shifting statute at issue. See Haggart 

V, 809 F.3d at 1359. Because class counsel originally entered into contingent fee agreements 

with class members at the initiation of the attorney-client relationship, and the new contingent 

fee agreements call for a lesser percentage of participating class members’ awards, the history 

and circumstances obviate some of the traditional concerns attendant to any revised or belatedly 

entered contingent fee agreements. Additionally, class members voiced support for the extensive 

work of class counsel on the case over a considerable period of time, without contemporaneous 

compensation. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 77:25 to 78:2 (“I appreciate class counsel, all their hard work, 

and the years they’ve put into this.”); Hr’g Tr. 78:20-24 ((“[M]y client as a member of the class 

is very appreciative of class counsel, and we just want to echo the sentiment that’s already been 

offered to the [c]ourt. They’ve worked remarkably hard in this whole process.”); Hr’g Tr. 81:6-8 

(“[T]hese people are doing a great job. I think we’ve all been patient, and we’re just looking 

forward to finality on this.”); Hr’g Tr. 123:11 to 124:4 (“[My client, a class member] has felt 

fully informed of this whole proceeding. The information is readily available. Class counsel’s 

made itself available at all times. If you send an email with a question, you’ll receive a response 

literally within 15 minutes every single time. The class has felt extremely well advised 

throughout the whole process . . . and that’s because of class counsel. . . . [T]he company[,a 

class member,] feels completely comfortable with the contingency-fee agreements. . . . [T]hey’ve 

incurred an immense amount of risk in bringing this matter and there’s absolutely no problem 

with . . . the bargain that was struck with class counsel.”). 

The government objects to the notice provided to the class regarding contingent fee 

agreements, Hr’g Tr. 94:4 to 95:2, arguing that the notice to the class issued on October 30, 2017 

“did[ not] provide the class with sufficient information to assess whether they thought the 

contingent-fee agreements rendered the entire settlement unfair.” Hr’g Tr. 94:14-20. The 

government asserted that the notice failed to include a warning about “potential ethical problems 

with the[] agreements” or “anything about the windfall” to class counsel and “how [those 

concerns] might affect the overall fairness of the overall settlement.” See Hr’g Tr. 95:17-24. 

This argument is unpersuasive. As the court indicated at the fairness hearing, “the individual 

class member settlement disclosure statement talks about [a class member’s] share of statutory 

attorneys’ fees,” Hr’g Tr. 95:25 to 96:10, and contingent fees have been debated in this case 

since 2014 and also specifically in the Notice sent to the class in October 2017. See Notice at 2, 

4, 7-8. The terms of the individual contingency fee agreements entered do not affect the 

distribution or amount of the settlement. The amount that any one class member would pay to 

class counsel or other counsel under an individual agreement is a matter of private contract. To 
10 

be sure, the court must consider and has considered such agreements in determining the overall 

fairness of the settlement, but the existence of these agreements was disclosed and was discussed 

at length at the fairness hearing. Class members manifestly were well aware of the agreements.

The government further objects that the contingent fee agreements result in a windfall to 

class counsel and are “simply a means of circumventing the Federal Circuit’s ruling” in Haggart 

V. See Def.’s Resp. at 14. This objection mistates the Federal Circuit’s decision in Haggart V. 

There, the appeals court held that application of the common-fund doctrine was inconsistent with 

the Uniform Relocation Act in this case, but that ruling did not extend to any private fee 

agreement, contingent or otherwise. See Haggart V, 809 F.3d at 1358-59. Indeed, to rule so 

broadly would have run the risk of conflicting with the Supreme Court’s decision in Venegas v. 

Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (1990). In Venegas, the Supreme Court stated that fee-shifting statutes, 

like the Uniform Relocation Act, “control[] what the losing defendant must pay, not what the 

prevailing plaintiff must pay his lawyer.” Venegas, 495 U.S. at 90. Further, “[w]hat a plaintiff 

may be bound to pay and what an attorney is free to collect under a fee agreement are not 

necessarily measured by the ‘reasonable attorney[s’] fee’ that a defendant must pay pursuant to a 

court order” because “statutory awards of fees can coexist with private fee arrangements.” Id. at 

88, 90. In short, although Venegas does not relieve this court of its duty to determine the 

reasonableness of the 24% contingent fee agreements as they relate to the fairness of the 

settlement, see Haggart IV, 116 Fed. Cl. at 144-45, Haggart V could not alter the Supreme 

Court’s holding in Venegas that private agreements, including individual, member-by-member 

arrangements, are consistent with fee-shifting statutes. Here, as to the reasonableness of 

contingent fees, the court believes, as it did in Haggart IV, that a 24% contingent fee is 

reasonable. See Haggart IV, 116 Fed. Cl. at 149 & n.20. 

 

In sum, the court rejects the government’s objections to the contingent fee agreements 

because the class members have been fully informed as to the agreements, as shown both by the 

renewed notice to the class and in commentary at the fairness hearing. At the fairness hearing, 

after discussion of the contingent fee agreements, many of the class members commented, noting 

their approval of the fee arrangements and expressing their concern that class counsel has not 

been paid despite eight years of work. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 125:1-5 (“I’ve been really impressed 

by our counsel all through this. I think it’s very disingenuous to talk about the bulk big number 

of their fee without also mentioning they’ve been working for eight years without 

compensation.”). The sentiment among class members in attendance was not that class counsel 

would be overpaid or that the class members were being treated unfairly, but rather that the 

government was seeking to use the issue of contingent fee agreements to stall and work against 

class members’ interests. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 124:8-23 (“I’m dismayed to hear a representative of 

my government say that I’m so incompetent and unable to inform myself, that I need protection 

. . . . And I feel honored to be represented by counsel at this table. And I don’t need every jot 

and tittle to be publically displayed. I think it’s just an attempt at further dragging this 

proceeding on. And frankly, I resent it.”), 125:6-13 (“And I also find it very disappointing that 

representatives from my government and even [sic] display of incredible arrogance, that they 

would spend their time talking about how they’re defending me and my right to be better 

informed, when I feel I’ve been incredibly well informed at the same time that they’re delaying. 

They’re certainly not looking out for my rights as they’re delaying this [further].”), 126:4-7 (“I, 

too, am really ticked that the government is spending so much time and energy in delaying this 

thing, and that’s the problem I think that people are really getting ticked off about this. There’s 
11 

no sense to it.”), 127:6-8 (“I just think that [the government is] just dragging it on, and anyway, 

that’s all I have to say.”).

D. Objection to Adjudicating Fairness and Statutory Fees Separately 

The government also objects to any use of RCFC 54(b) to bifurcate the judgments in this 

case, separating attorneys’ fee determinations from the approval of the Settlement Agreement. 

The Uniform Relocation Act contemplates the joint resolution of the merits and fees and 

expenses:

The court . . . awarding compensation for the taking of property by a Federal 

agency, or the Attorney General effecting a settlement of any such proceeding, 

shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such . . . 

settlement, such sum as will in the opinion of the court or the Attorney General 

reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, 

including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred 

because of such proceeding.

42 U.S.C. § 4654(c). But “[w]hen an action presents more than one claim for relief,” Rule 54(b) 

vests courts with discretion to “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more . . . claims.” 

RCFC 54(b). The court may do so only if it “expressly determines that there is no just reason for 

delay.” Id. The government objects to bifurcation in this case because it “would like to appeal 

the issue of attorneys’ fees, in particular, the issue of whether class counsel and other counsel are 

entitled to additional attorneys’ fees in addition to the statutory fees set forth in the [S]ettlement 

[A]greement” when it “appeal[s] the approval . . . of the [S]ettlement [A]greement.” Hr’g Tr. 

136:5-12. 

The court does not find any just reason for delay. The government has made evident that 

it intends to appeal. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr. 135:3-5, 136:5-12. Efficiency therefore favors 

addressing fees and merits separately because “attorneys’ fees will continue to accumulate 

through the appeal,” which would then necessitate multiple, redundant proceedings. See Hr’g 

Tr. 135:6-9. Moreover, class members have been waiting nine years for the resolution of this 

case and deserve a decision on the merits without having to wait for the disposition of the 

statutory attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the court will bifurcate the determination of fees from the 

merits in this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Class Counsel’s Motion for Approval of the Settlement is 

GRANTED. The clerk is directed to enter judgment in the total amount of $159,636,521.65, 

consisting of $110,000,000 in principal and $49,636,521.65 in interest as of December 18, 2017, 

for prevailing class members. Interest continues to accrue at the rate of 4.2%, compounding 

annually from the dates of the taking, October 27, 2008 and November 25, 2008, until the date of 

payment by the government. The judgment is payable to class counsel for distribution to the 

class according to the terms of the Settlement Agreement and this opinion and order. 
12 

Final judgment to this effect shall be entered under Rule 54(b) of the Rules of the Court 

of Federal Claims because there is no just reason for delay. The clerk shall issue judgment in 

accord with this disposition. 

After all proceedings respecting this settlement have been completed and the court’s 

judgment is final, the court will address attorneys’ fees and expenses under Section 304(c) of the 

Uniform Relocation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c). 

It is so ORDERED. 

s/ Charles F. Lettow 

Charles F. Lettow

Judge