FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROSS DRESS FOR LESS, INC., a

Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff-Counter-DefendantAppellant,

v.

MAKARIOS-OREGON, LLC, an

Oregon limited liability company,

Defendant-Counter-ClaimantAppellee,

and

WALKER PLACE, LLC, an Oregon

limited liability company; CHARLES

W. CALOMARIS; KATHERINE

CALOMIRIS TOMPROS; JENNIFER

CALOMIRIS,

Defendants.

No. 21-35106

D.C. No.

3:14-cv-01971-SI
2 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

ROSS DRESS FOR LESS, INC., a

Delaware corporation,

Plaintiff-Counter-DefendantAppellee,

v.

WALKER PLACE, LLC, an Oregon

limited liability company,

Defendant,

and

CHARLES W. CALOMARIS;

KATHERINE CALOMIRIS TOMPROS;

JENNIFER CALOMIRIS,

Defendants-Appellants,

MAKARIOS-OREGON, LLC, an

Oregon limited liability company,

Defendant-Counter-ClaimantAppellant.

No. 21-35132

D.C. No.

3:14-cv-01971-SI

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 10, 2022

Portland, Oregon

Filed July 8, 2022
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON 3

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Morgan Christen, Circuit

Judges, and Frederic Block,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Christen

SUMMARY**

Jury Trial

The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling granting

defendant-appellee Makarios-Oregon, LLC’s motion to

withdraw its demand for a jury trial in a diversity action

involving the parties’ lease obligations.

Plaintiff Ross Dress for Less, Inc. sued Makarios seeking

declaratory relief regarding its end-of-lease obligations in

connection with Ross’s lease of the Richmond Building, as to

which Makarios had received an assignment of rights and

thereafter acted as Ross’s landlord. Makarios filed

counterclaims against Ross and demanded a jury trial on its

counterclaims. In January 2016, Ross filed a document

waiving its right to a jury trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 38. In

November 2018, Makarios moved to withdraw its jury

demand. Ross argued it was entitled to rely on Makarios’s

request for a jury. Makarios argued that because Ross waived

its right to a jury when it entered into the Richmond Building

* The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

lease, Ross could not object to Makarios’s withdrawal of its

jury demand or to take advantage of the general rule that

parties must consent to a bench trial after a proper jury

demand is made. The district court held a four-day Phase II

bench trial and entered judgment in favor of Makarios.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) provides that a proper jury trial

demand “may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 39 requires trial by jury “on all issues demanded”

unless the parties stipulate or the “court, on motion, or on its

own, finds that on some or all of those issues there is no

federal right to a jury trial.”

Because jurisdiction in the district court was based on

diversity of citizenship, Oregon substantive law and federal

procedural law governed.

Ross contended that the district court erred by allowing

Makarios to unilaterally withdraw its demand for a jury trial

because Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d) and 39(a) required Ross’s

consent. Neither party argued that the waiver in Section

13.04 of the lease was unknowing or involuntary, but the

parties disagreed on the scope of the provisions. First,

applying Oregon law, the panel held that the ordinary

meaning of Section 13.04 was clear and it established that

Ross waived its right to a jury trial on counterclaims filed by

Makarios. The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling as to

waiver. Second, the panel rejected Ross’s argument that even

if it contractually waived its jury trial right, it was still

entitled to rely on Makarios’s jury demand under Rules 38(d)

and 39(a). The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion

that Rules 38 and 39 did not apply because Ross had no right

to a jury trial by virtue of its waiver in Section 13.04 of its

lease. The panel held that typically, the combination of Rules
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON 5

38(d) and 39(a) prevents a party from unilaterally

withdrawing its jury demand, even when no other party has

requested a jury trial. Although the right to rely on another

party’s jury demand is not unlimited, the exceptions to the

Rules did not apply here. 

The panel resolved the bulk of the issues on appeal in a

concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL

Gregory D. Call (argued) and Tracy E. Reichmuth, Crowell

& Moring LLP, San Francisco, California; Joel A. Parker,

Rebecca Boyette, and Sara Kobak, Schwabe Williamson &

Wyatt PC, Portland, Oregon; for Plaintiff-CounterDefendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Molly K. Honoré (argued), Paul S. Bierly, and Jeffrey M.

Edelson, Markowitz Herbold PC, Portland, Oregon, for

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
6 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Ross Dress for Less, Inc. appeals the

district court’s ruling granting defendant-appellee MakariosOregon, LLC’s motion to withdraw its demand for a jury

trial. Ross argues the district court erred because Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39 generally allow a party to

rely on another party’s jury demand without having to file its

own demand. Ross further argues that the Rules require that

parties consent before the court may conduct a bench trial if

a proper jury demand has been made. Because Ross waived

its right to a jury trial in its lease with Makarios, we affirm

the district court’s ruling.

I

This appeal arises from Ross’s lease of the Richmond

Building, a five-story property located at 600 SW Fifth

Avenue in Portland, Oregon. The basement, first floor, and

second floor of the Richmond Building are connected by

concrete slabs to the same floors of the adjacent Failing

Building, a twelve-story structure on the National Register of

Historic Places. In September 1996, Ross assumed all rights

in the leases for the Richmond and Failing Buildings. Ross’s

lease for both buildings expired on September 30, 2016. 

From 1986 to 2017, the Calomiris family owned the

Richmond Building. Makarios-Oregon is an entity associated

with the Calomiris family. Makarios received an assignment

of all rights to the lease of the Richmond Building in 2011,

and thereafter acted as Ross’s landlord.
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON 7

The lease for the Richmond Building was a “triple-net

lease,” meaning Ross, as tenant, was responsible for all taxes,

insurance, and other expenses related to the building’s

operation, maintenance, and repair. Ross paid $34,000

annually in rent for the entirety of its lease. Four provisions

of the lease are at the center of the parties’ dispute. Two

governed Ross’s end-of-lease obligations: Section 16.01

required Ross to surrender the property “in good order,

condition, and repair, except for reasonable wear and tear,”

and Section 16.02 required Ross to “make such alterations to

the building then erected on the demised premises as . . .

necessary to constitute such building an entirely independent

and self-sufficient structure.” The other two provisions are

relevant to the jury demand issue. Section 13.04 of the lease

provided that “[t]he Tenant waives all right to trial by jury in

any summary or other judicial proceedings hereafter

instituted by the Landlord against the Tenant in respect to the

demised premises.” Section 26.01 stated that “the terms,

conditions, covenants, provisions and agreements herein

contained shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the

Landlord, its successors and assigns, and the Tenant, its

successors and assigns.”

In December 2014, Ross sued Makarios and then-owner

of the Failing Building, Walker Place, in the United States

District Court for the District of Oregon seeking declaratory

relief regarding its end-of-lease obligations for the Richmond

and Failing Buildings. Ross asked the district court for a

declaratory judgment establishing that: (1) Ross was only

obligated to perform the work necessary to physically

separate the Richmond and Failing Buildings; (2) the work

Ross proposed to Makarios and Walker Place was sufficient

to satisfy its lease obligations; (3) Ross was not obligated to

perform additional work demanded by the landlords; and
8 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

(4) the landlords could not withhold consent to Ross’s

proposed plans. Ross’s complaint also demanded a jury trial.

Both defendants filed counterclaims against Ross alleging

breach of contract and requesting a declaratory judgment

regarding Ross’s end-of-lease obligations. Makarios

demanded a jury trial on its counterclaims. The parties

agreed to bifurcate the case into two phases: in Phase I, the

parties were to litigate their declaratory relief claims, and

their remaining claims and damages were to be litigated in

Phase II. In January 2016, Ross filed a document attesting

that it “waives its right to a jury trial under the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 38, as to any issue in this case for which

a right to a jury trial exists.” The minutes for a March 2016

status conference with the district court memorialized that

“all parties waived their rights to a jury trial on all claims and

counterclaims” and the court would conduct a “bench trial,

rather than a jury trial.” But it appears the court interpreted

these waivers to apply only to Phase I of the bifurcated claims

because subsequent entries on the district court’s docket

indicate the court anticipated Phase II would be tried to a

jury.

At the conclusion of the Phase I bench trial, the district

court denied in part and granted in part the parties’ requests

for declaratory judgment. The court ruled that Ross’s

proposed plans to comply with its surrender obligations were

insufficient, but it also ruled that Ross was not required to

comply with the full scope of work the landlords demanded. 

The court retained jurisdiction to address the parties’

remaining claims and to calculate damages in Phase II. Both

defendants filed amended counterclaims against Ross in April

2017, and both demanded a jury trial on those claims. Ross’s
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON 9

answers to the amended counterclaims also included a jury

demand.

In September 2017, Ross entered into a global settlement

agreement with Walker Place. Thereafter, multiple entries on

the district court’s docket reflect the court’s plan to hold a

jury trial on Makarios’s counterclaims against Ross. But in

November 2018, Makarios moved to withdraw its jury

demand. The district court received briefing on the motion

from both parties. In its opposition, Ross argued it was

entitled to rely on Makarios’s request for a jury and that

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39,

Makarios could not withdraw its demand unless Ross

consented. See Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp

Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining Rules

38 and 39 are “designed to allow parties to rely upon the jury

demand of other parties to the same case” without having to

file their own demand). According to Makarios, because

Ross waived its right to a jury trial when it entered into the

Richmond Building lease, Ross had no ability to object to

Makarios’s withdrawal of its jury demand or to take

advantage of the general rule that parties must consent to a

bench trial after a proper jury demand is made, see, e.g., U.S.

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th

Cir. 2016).

The district court conducted a telephonic hearing on

Makarios’s motion in December 2018, and in an oral ruling

the court granted Makarios’s motion. The court reasoned that

Section 13.04 of the lease included “an unequivocal and

voluntary and knowing waiver . . . by the tenant and its

successors, including Ross, to a jury trial.” The court

acknowledged that Rules 38 and 39 generally allow a party to

rely on another party’s jury demand, but explained that
10 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

because the lease included a waiver of the tenant’s right to a

jury trial, Ross could not invoke the protections of the Rules

to oppose Makarios’s withdrawal of its demand. “[I]n order

to eliminate any potential risk of prejudice to Ross” for

having to prepare for a bench trial, the district court

authorized Ross to reopen any depositions and to substitute

any of its expert witnesses.

In December 2019, the court held a four-day Phase II

bench trial. The district court entered final judgment in favor

of Makarios for $2,931,829 in January 2021. Ross timely

appealed, andMakarios cross-appealed. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The bulk of the issues on

appeal are resolved in a concurrently filed memorandum

disposition. Here, we affirm the district court’s order

granting Makarios’s motion towithdraw its jury trial demand.

II

Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of

law that we review de novo. Thomas v. Or. Fruit Prods. Co.,

228 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2000); Jensen, 835 F.3d at 1106. 

We also review de novo “the district court’s interpretation of

contract provisions,” but we review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error. OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Hass Indus.,

Inc., 634 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2011). Because

jurisdiction in the district court was based on diversity of

citizenship, Oregon substantive law and federal procedural

law govern. See Feldman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660,

666 (9th Cir. 2003). When applying Oregon substantive law,

we are bound by decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court. See

In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Where there is no Oregon Supreme Court decision on point,

we must use “intermediate appellate court decisions,
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON 11

decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and

restatements as guidance” to decide how the Oregon Supreme

Court would rule. Id. at 1239.

III

Ross contends the district court erred by allowing

Makarios to unilaterally withdraw its demand for a jury trial

because Rules 38(d) and 39(a) required Ross’s consent. 

Makarios maintains that Ross cannot take advantage of Rules

38 and 39 because, pursuant to the terms of the parties’ lease,

Ross waived its right to a jury trial in any proceeding initiated

by the landlord. We must decide: (1) whether Ross waived

its right to a jury trial pursuant to Section 13.04; and, if so,

(2) whether Ross is nevertheless entitled to rely on Rules 38

and 39 to oppose Makarios’s withdrawal of its jury demand.

A

“Because the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right

guaranteed to our citizenry by the Constitution,” we “indulge

every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Solis v.

County of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Pradier v. Elespuru, 641 F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir.

1981)). A federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction

applies federal procedural law to determine the validity of a

jury trial waiver, unless the underlying state law is more

protective than federal law. See In re County of Orange,

784 F.3d 520, 530–31 (9th Cir. 2015). Like federal law,

Oregon law permits a party to waive its constitutional right to

a jury trial by knowing and voluntary agreement. See Hays

Grp., Inc. v. Biege, 193 P.3d 1028, 1029–30 (Or. Ct. App.

2008). Neither Ross nor Makarios argue the waiver in
12 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

Section 13.04 of the lease was unknowing or involuntary, but

the parties do disagree on the scope of the provision.

Section 13.04 provides that “[t]he Tenant waives all right

to trial by jury in any summary or other judicial proceedings

hereafter instituted by the Landlord against the Tenant in

respect to the demised premises.” Oregon’s three-part test for

contract interpretation governs our interpretation of this

provision. See Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Or.

1997). “First, the court examines the text of the disputed

provision, in the context of the document as a whole. If the

provision is clear, the analysis ends.” Id. If the contractual

provision is ambiguous, the court moves to the second step

and examines extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. Id.

at 1022. If that step does not resolve the ambiguity, the court

proceeds to the last step and “relies on appropriate maxims of

[contract] construction.” Id.

Oregon courts routinely rely on dictionary definitions at

the first step to understand the “ordinary meaning” of a

contract’s terms. See id. To understand the meaning of the

term “proceeding” as it applies in Section 13.04, both parties

quote Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “proceeding”

to include:

1. The regular and orderly progression of a

lawsuit, including all acts and events between

the time of commencement and the entry of

judgment. 2. Any procedural means for

seeking redress from a tribunal or agency. 

3. An act or step that is part of a larger action. 

4. The business conducted by a court or other

official body; a hearing.
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON 13

Proceeding,BLACK’SLAWDICTIONARY(11th ed. 2019). The

Oregon Court of Appeals has also cited with approval Black’s

definition of the term “judicial proceeding,” as meaning “any

court proceeding; any proceeding initiated to procure an order

or decree, whether in law or in equity.” Baldwin v. Seida,

441 P.3d 720, 725 (Or. Ct. App. 2019) (alterations and

emphases omitted). Cf. Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d

1197, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that a deposition fell

within the meaning of a “judicial proceeding,” as defined in

the Sixth Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary).

Ross argues Section 13.04’s waiver does not apply to the

present dispute because Ross was the first to file suit and

Section 13.04 only applies to proceedings initiated by the

landlord. We are not persuaded. The ordinary meaning of

“judicial proceeding” compels a broader interpretation of

Section 13.04 than the one Ross advocates. Makarios can

fairly be said to have initiated judicial proceedings when it

filed counterclaims against Ross because, like Ross, it too

invoked a “procedural means for seeking redress” from the

court by filing its own claims. See Proceeding, BLACK’S

LAWDICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). At bottom, Section 13.04

unequivocally states the tenant “waives all right to trial by

jury in any . . . judicial proceedings . . . .”

The ordinary meaning of Section 13.04 is clear and it

establishes that Ross waived its right to a jury trial on

counterclaims filed by Makarios. Because the ordinary

meaning of the disputed provision is unambiguous, we need

not engage in the latter two steps of Oregon’s three-part test

for contract interpretation. See Yogman, 937 P.2d

at 1021–22. And because the parties do not dispute whether
14 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

Ross’s waiver was knowing and voluntary, we affirm the

district court’s ruling as to waiver.1

B

Next, Ross argues that even if it contractually waived its

jury trial right, it was still entitled to rely on Makarios’s jury

demand per Rules 38(d) and 39(a). Rule 38(d) provides that

a proper jury trial demand “may be withdrawn only if the

parties consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d). Rule 39(a) requires

trial by jury “on all issues so demanded” unless the parties

stipulate or “the court, on motion or on its own, finds that on

some or all of those issues there is no federal right to a jury

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(1)–(2).

Ross argues that it was entitled to rely on Makarios’s

proper demand for a jury trial and that Rules 38 and 39

preventedMakarios fromunilaterallywithdrawing its demand

because the parties did not stipulate to a bench trial and the

court did not find that no right to a jury trial exists. The

district court concluded Rules 38 and 39 did not apply

because Ross had no right to a jury trial by virtue of its

waiver in Section 13.04 of its lease. The precise function of

Rules 38 and 39 in the scenario presented here appears to be

an issue of first impression in our court.

1 The parties did not raise, and the district court did not address,

Ross’s January 2016 filing in the district court stating that Ross waived

“its right to a jury trial under [the] Federal Rule[s] . . . as to any issue in

this case for which a right to jury trial exists.” As noted, some entries on

the district court docket that post-date the parties’ March 2016 status

conference indicate the court was contemplating that Phase II would be

tried to a jury. Because Section 13.04 was a knowing and voluntary

waiver, we need not decide whether the January 2016 filing constituted a

separate waiver of Ross’s right to a jury trial.
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON 15

A party is generally entitled to rely on another party’s

original jury demand and need not file their own. See U.S.

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th

Cir. 2016). Typically, the combination of Rules 38(d) and

39(a) prevents a party from unilaterally withdrawing its jury

demand, even when no other party has requested a jury trial. 

Cf. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir. 1990) (en

banc) (“Rule 39(a) is designed to protect against some

careless statement or ambiguous document being held to be

a waiver when one was not intended.”). But the right to rely

on another party’s jury demand is not unlimited. For

example, we have said the right extends only to issues that the

original demand actually covered. See, e.g., Cal. Scents v.

Surco Prod., Inc., 406 F.3d 1102, 1105–08 (9th Cir. 2005)

(explaining a party bringing claims may not rely on another

party’s jury demand unless those claims “turn on the same

matrix of facts” or “concern [] the same general area of

dispute” as the claims on which a demand was originally

made (alterations in original) (first quoting Las Vegas Sun,

Inc. v. Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 1979); and

then quoting In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 23 (9th Cir.

1982))).

We have recognized at least two other exceptions to these

Rules. First, a party may consent to the unilateral withdrawal

of a jury demand through its conduct, and thereby waive its

right to rely on the protections of Rules 38(d) and 39(a). See

Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d

1292, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 1983). “Once a party demonstrates

through its actions that it has not relied on another’s jury

demand in failing to file its own, the reason for allowing it to

object when another side unilaterally seeks to withdraw its

demand dissolves.” Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522,

1532 (9th Cir. 1995). For example, we will decline to enforce
16 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

Rules 38 and 39 “when the party claiming the jury trial right

is attempting to act strategically—participating in the bench

trial in the hopes of achieving a favorable outcome, then

asserting lack of consent to the bench trial when the result

turns out to be unfavorable to him.” Solis v. County of Los

Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2008). And in White,

we explained that a party who “vigorously” argues its case to

a judge “can only be ascribed to knowledgeable

relinquishment of the prior jury demand” and cannot later

object that its case was tried to the bench. See 903 F.2d

at 700, 703. In contrast, one’s “[r]eluctant participation in a

bench trial” does not amount to waiver of their right to a jury. 

Solis, 514 F.3d at 956.2

Separately, we have recognized that the circumstances

under which Rule 39(a) allows a jury demand to be

withdrawn are not unlimited. Jensen cautioned that Rule

39(a) applies “[a]s long as there is a federal right to a jury

trial” in the first place. 835 F.3d at 1107. The plain language

of Rule 39 requires this exception because it provides that a

court may order a bench trial if it “finds that on some or all

. . . issues there is no federal right to a jury trial.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 39(a)(2).

Two cases involving jury demands are particularly

instructive. First, in Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d

472 (9th Cir. 1994), we affirmed a district court’s ruling

2 This exception does not apply after trial begins because at that point

“other reliance interests come into play.” Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1532. Once

trial is underway, we enforce Rule 39(a)’s withdrawal procedures strictly. 

See id. (“[O]nce trial begins, a party may no longer unilaterally withdraw

its jury demand; other parties are entitled to rely whether they have waived

their rights or not, and withdrawal may occur only in compliance with the

language of Rule 39(a).”).
ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON 17

rejecting a Jones Act plaintiff’s attempt to rely on the

defendant’s jury trial demand, id. at 479. We reasoned that

the federal court’s sole basis for jurisdiction was the Jones

Act claim and the defendant did not have the right to demand

a jury trial for the Jones Act claim. Id. at 476–77 (explaining

defendant “had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to

demand a jury trial,” and thus its demand could “not have

been made ‘as provided in Rule 38’ for purposes of Rule

39”).

Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1986),

is a case on which both Makarios and the district court relied. 

There, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s decision to

allow the plaintiff to unilaterally strike its jury demand, over

the defendant’s objection, after the plaintiff amended his

complaint to remove the only basis for a jury trial. Id.

at 1213–17. Consistent with our court’s interpretation of

Rule 39(a), the Fifth Circuit explained that Rule 39(a)’s

consent requirement generally serves to protect the rights of

a party who did not make the initial jury demand, but Rule 39

does not grant that party “any new or independent right to a

jury trial; it simply protects rights to a jury trial that the [nonrequesting party] may have been granted elsewhere.” Id.

at 1215–16.

The district court’s ruling in this case is analogous to the

Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Rachal, and is also consistent with

our precedent and our practice of interpreting the Rules “in a

manner consistent with their underlying purpose.” Reid

Bros., 699 F.2d at 1305. We therefore affirm the district

court’s interpretation of Rules 38 and 39. We also affirm its

ruling that the application of Rules 38 and 39 here did not

entitle Ross to a jury trial after Makarios withdrew its

demand because the parties’ lease included a waiver of the
18 ROSS DRESS FOR LESS V. MAKARIOS-OREGON

tenant’s right to a jury trial in proceedings initiated by the

landlord.

AFFIRMED.