If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

August 24, 2023

v No. 361970

Wayne Circuit Court

RANDON MCMEEKINS, LC No. 19-008103-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and MARKEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321, and 

second-degree child abuse, MCL 750.136b(3). He was sentenced to 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment 

for the manslaughter conviction and 6 to 10 years’ imprisonment for the child-abuse conviction. 

The 10-year minimum sentence for the manslaughter conviction reflected a 49-month upward 

departure from the minimum sentence guidelines range. Defendant appeals by right the trial 

court’s decision to depart from the guidelines range when imposing sentence and the extent of the 

departure. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the death of BP while he was in defendant’s sole care. At the time 

of his death, BP was two years old, and his mother, Ashanti Potter, was in a relationship with 

defendant, who was not the child’s biological father. Defendant would occasionally babysit BP 

when Potter was at work. On September 26 and 27, 2019, defendant babysat BP at Potter’s house

while she was at work. At trial, Potter testified that she was potty training BP in September 2019,

and that although BP was doing well with the training, he occasionally had accidents. Toward the 

end of her work shift on the morning of September 27, 2019, Potter’s manager informed her that 

BP was in the hospital. Potter called defendant, and he confirmed that he was at the hospital with 

BP. Defendant told Potter that BP was having trouble breathing. When Potter arrived at the 

hospital, BP had already died. On observing BP’s body, Potter noticed “indentations” on BP’s 

chest that “looked like a . . . handprint.” Additionally, Potter testified that defendant had “hit [BP] 

in his chest once before” because BP had been screaming. When Potter asked defendant what had 
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happened to BP, defendant told her that BP fell off the toilet onto the bathroom floor and started 

crying. BP had difficulty breathing so defendant took BP to the hospital. Defendant later admitted 

to Potter that he struck BP in the chest. Defendant told Potter that he attempted to perform CPR 

on BP and that was “how [BP’s] heart got ruptured.”

Detroit Police Department Officer Nicholas Blackwell testified that defendant informed 

him at the hospital that BP had been using the toilet at Potter’s home while defendant was in 

another room. Defendant then heard a “thud” and found BP on the floor of the bathroom. 

Defendant told Officer Blackwell that he attempted to perform CPR on BP and then drove him to 

the hospital when he realized that the CPR efforts were not working. At the police station later 

that same day, defendant admitted to hitting BP in the chest, and he was subsequently arrested.

Dr. Teresa Nguyen, the medical examiner who performed BP’s autopsy, observed injuries 

to BP’s head, chest, back, and genitalia. Externally, BP had contusions on his left forehead, 

abrasions on his ear, and five contusions on his chest. Internally, BP suffered severe hemorrhaging

within his neck and a rupture of the right atrium of his heart. Dr. Nguyen opined that BP’s injuries 

were caused by “a significant amount of force . . . applied to the chest.” Dr. Nguyen testified that 

BP’s death was ruled a homicide because “the blunt trauma to the chest, and the other injuries, 

could not have been done by [BP himself].”

Defendant testified on his own behalf. According to defendant, on the morning of the 

incident, he woke BP up and told him to use the bathroom. BP then went into the bathroom, and 

defendant went to a separate room to get clothes for BP. Defendant testified that BP was potty 

training at the time, so defendant did not supervise BP while he was in the bathroom. Defendant 

did not hear BP open the lid to the toilet, so he went back to the bathroom to check on him. 

Defendant then saw that BP had urinated on himself. Defendant conceded that he “popped him”

with an “open hand” and put BP on the toilet. Defendant left the bathroom to retrieve BP’s clothes 

but returned when he heard BP start to cry. When he reentered the bathroom, defendant could see 

that BP had fallen “facing the . . . back of the toilet.” Defendant picked up BP, called his name, 

and splashed water on his face. Defendant testified that BP was unresponsive, and defendant 

attempted to perform CPR. Defendant then took BP to the hospital without calling 911. At the 

hospital, defendant told the staff that BP had hit his head and was not breathing. 

On cross-examination, defendant testified that he “popped [BP] for peeing on the floor”

and that it “was a disciplinary act.” Defendant also asserted that BP never fell off the toilet. 

Defendant admitted that BP was “fine” before defendant popped him. Defendant testified that he 

did not tell the hospital staff or the officer at the hospital that he had hit BP because he “did not 

believe that [BP] bein[g] popped contributed to the case, or the reason, of why [BP was injured].”

The jury was presented with four counts to consider with respect to the verdict form. 

In regard to Count I, the jury could find defendant guilty of first-degree felony murder, guilty of 

the lesser offense of second-degree murder, or not guilty. The jury ultimately could not come to a 

unanimous verdict as to Count I. Count II concerned a charge of first-degree child abuse, and the 

jury could find defendant guilty or not guilty of first-degree child abuse. The jurors rendered a 

verdict of not guilty. With respect to Count III, the jury could find defendant guilty or not guilty

of involuntary manslaughter. The jury found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Count 

IV concerned a charge of second-degree child abuse, and the jury could find defendant guilty or 
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not guilty of second-degree child abuse. The jurors found defendant guilty of second-degree child 

abuse.

Defendant was sentenced on June 1, 2022. His minimum sentence guidelines range for the 

involuntary-manslaughter conviction was 36 to 71 months’ imprisonment. In pertinent part, the 

trial court imposed a sentence of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the manslaughter conviction, 

which amounted to a 49-month upward departure. The trial court explained its ruling as follows:

Now, uhm, the Court’s allowed to take into account, not only the actual 

conviction, but the evidence. And I, I think the evidence, uhm, in this case, speaks 

as loud, or even louder than the actual convictions. [Defendant] never told the truth, 

about what happened. He, he first made up a story. And then, changed it. But even 

the changed story wasn’t the truth. And then, not even the version he gave, on the 

witness stand, the, the version . . . ended up being that he smacked him in the chest, 

with a, with a back of his hand. That wasn’t the whole truth. Now, I, I almost can’t 

blame the defendant for not telling the whole truth, because if he did, he would have 

to admit that he committed multiple assaults on this young man. The rupture of his 

heart was bad enough. What kind of force does it require to hit a two year old child,

and rupture his heart? But that, it wasn’t even that. There’s a recapitulation in the 

pre-sentence report, the autopsy found that the child had bruising on the inside of 

his chest; a ruptured right heart, with a large amount of blood in the heart cavity; 

hemorrhages on the both sides of his neck muscles; bruises on his scrotum . . .; 

bruises on the left side of his head; and an unknown injury to his right cheek, and 

behind the right ear lobe. Caused by one blow? Not possible. It was caused by 

multiple blows. And so, I’m, you know, I’m really, you know, I understand why 

[defendant] can’t admit to that, because, he would have to be . . . admitting to a 

vicious attack on this young man. And that’s what it was. Born out of anger, about 

potty training. I’m sure that, uhm, many people involved in this case, uh, the family 

would, uhm, there are a number -- let me put it a different way. There are a number 

of factors that go into what is a proper sentence. And, uh, I have never felt that 

revenge, retribution, by itself, is a controlling factor. Because where, where does 

that get us? Somebody said, if you, when you plan revenge, dig two graves. But 

there’s something that resembles revenge, which, in the Court’s view, is a 

legitimate consideration. And the way I phrase it, that a Judge, particularly in a 

serious case, should take into consideration the assuagement, I say, of the legitimate 

indignation, of the victim, the victim’s family, and the public. The point being, not 

so much that we’re just here to put people in jail, and lock them up, to satisfy the, 

the Judge’s anger, or -- but the point is, is that the victim, now the victim’s dead in 

this case. But the victim’s family, and the public at large, needs to feel that there’s, 

some justice has been accomplished. That the end result, in some way, 

counterbalances the extreme, the extreme conduct, the viciousness of the conduct, 

whatever it happens to be, in the particular case. Otherwise, there’s no confidence 

in the justice system. That, alone, is an important part. And it just seems to the 

Court that, that consideration leaps out at us, in this case. We have a defendant, 

regardless of what kind of a, a life he lived before that, who committed a brutal, 

and vicious attack on a two year old. A helpless two year old. For what reason? Out 
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of anger. At a potty incident? It just seems to the Court that the community deserves 

not to be appalled, as a result of such a case. Tell you the truth, I think that 

[defendant], in, in some way, is -- should be grateful for the result of this case. 

There’s no need to make the decision, but it could be argued that the verdict would 

have justified a verdict of first degree felony murder in this case. And it’s quite 

possible that the conviction of manslaughter was a compromise. The sentencing 

guidelines are useful, but they are mute statistics, that cannot take into account the 

. . . full reality of the particulars, in every given instance. There, they are a, a 

remarkful, remarkable tool, and often useful. But, uhm, there are times that they’re 

simply inadequate to account for the vagaries of any particular case. And for these 

reasons, the Court is going to diverge from the guidelines. . . . . [Reformatted.]

 Defendant appeals by right his sentence for the offense of involuntary manslaughter.

II. ANALYSIS

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DEPARTURE PRINCIPLES

This Court reviews for reasonableness “[a] sentence that departs from the applicable 

guidelines range.” People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). In People v 

Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d 327 (2017), our Supreme Court provided 

elaboration on the “reasonableness” standard, stating:

[T]he proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness is 

whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the “principle of 

proportionality” set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 

(1990), “which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to 

the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.”

Factual findings related to a departure must be supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence and are reviewed for clear error. People v Lawhorn, 320 Mich App 194, 208-209; 907 

NW2d 832 (2017). For purposes of sentencing, “a court may consider all record evidence, 

including the contents of a PSIR,[1] plea admissions, and testimony presented at a preliminary 

examination.” People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015).

The key test is not whether a sentence departs from or adheres to the guidelines range but 

whether the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the matter. Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 

472. “The premise of our system of criminal justice is that, everything else being equal, the more 

egregious the offense, and the more recidivist the criminal, the greater the punishment.” People v 

Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 263; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). Sentencing judges are “entitled to depart 

from the guidelines if the recommended ranges are considered an inadequate reflection of the 

proportional seriousness of the matter at hand.” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 661. A sentence within 

the guidelines might be disproportionality lenient. Id. “Where a defendant’s actions are so 

 

1 PSIR stands for presentence investigation report.
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egregious that standard guidelines scoring methods simply fail to reflect their severity, an upward 

departure from the guidelines range may be warranted.” People v Granderson, 212 Mich App 

673, 680; 538 NW2d 471 (1995).2 In People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 126; 933 NW2d 314 

(2019), this Court indicated that the factors that may be considered by a trial court under the 

proportionality test include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately 

considered by the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such 

as the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s 

misconduct while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the 

defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.]

“[A] trial court must justify the sentence imposed in order to facilitate appellate review, 

which includes an explanation of why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense 

and the offender than a different sentence would have been.” People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App 

490, 525; 909 NW2d 458 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “When fashioning a 

proportionate minimum sentence that exceeds the guidelines recommendation, a trial court must 

justify why it chose the particular degree of departure.” People v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 318; 754 

NW2d 284 (2008). We note that our Supreme Court has now held “that due process bars 

sentencing courts from finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant engaged in 

conduct of which he was acquitted.” People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 629; 939 NW2d 213 (2019).

B. DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION

Defendant argues that the 10-year minimum sentence for the manslaughter conviction was 

unreasonable and disproportionate. In examining the trial court’s ruling, we discern the following 

reasons for the upward departure: defendant’s continuous and repeated lies regarding what 

happened; the sheer brutality and viciousness of the crime involving a two-year-old child and 

extensive bodily injuries, some of which were horrific; simple justice; the appalling reason that 

drove defendant’s conduct, i.e., a potty accident by a two-year old who was just learning to use a 

toilet; and the inadequacy of the guidelines in light of the vagaries of the case. We conclude that 

in light of the full nature of the crime perpetrated by defendant, the 10-year minimum sentence 

imposed by the court was patently reasonable given that it was proportionate to the seriousness of 

the circumstances surrounding the offense. Dr. Nguyen testified that there was a significant 

amount of force employed against BP that caused a rupture of the atrium. Dr. Nguyen further 

observed:

[T]here were multiple areas of the hemorrhage, and the soft tissue, 

surrounding that area. There was hemorrhage within the right atrium, as well as 

hemorrhage by the superior vena cava, and the right brachiocephalic vein, which 

 

2 We emphasize, however, that although the guidelines are no longer mandatory, they remain a 

highly relevant consideration for purposes of exercising sentencing discretion, and trial courts must 

consult and take into account the guidelines when imposing sentence. Lockridge, 498 Mich at 

391.
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are vessels of the heart. There was also hemorrhage, or bleeding, uhm, seen, on the 

thymus gland. 

Defendant’s actions were sufficiently egregious such that the guidelines simply failed to account 

for the severity of his conduct. A minimum sentence just under six years, which was the top end 

of the guidelines range, could certainly be deemed disproportionality lenient. 

Defendant, appearing to make a Beck argument without citing the opinion, complains that 

the trial court believed that the jury’s verdict was a mistake. We initially note that defendant was 

not acquitted of first-degree or second-degree murder. See Beck, 504 Mich at 629. Regardless, 

the court expressly remarked that it was not deciding whether a first-degree felony murder verdict 

was justified. The court merely mentioned that defendant should be grateful that he was not 

convicted of murder, and we agree with that assessment. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the 

trial court did not rule that it was departing from the guidelines because the jury’s verdict was a 

mistake. Defendant contends that the trial court failed to justify the extent of the upward departure

or explain why the imposed minimum sentence was more proportionate than one within the 

guidelines range. Although the trial court did not use precise express language on those two 

matters when articulating the reasons for the departure, the court’s thoughtful explanation for the 

departure made clear, perhaps only implicitly, that the 10-year minimum sentence was more 

proportionate than a guidelines sentence and that a four-year departure was appropriate because of 

the egregious brutality of the crime, defendant’s incessant lying, and the appalling reason for the 

assault. We conclude that resentencing is unwarranted. 

We affirm. 

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Jane E. Markey