RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3872-17T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.G.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and 

D.L.J., Sr.,

Defendant.

____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF D.L.J., Jr.,

a Minor.

____________________________

Submitted January 8, 2019 – Decided January 25, 2019

Before Judges Suter and Geiger.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-3872-17T4

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, 

Docket No. FG-01-0044-17.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Louis W. Skinner, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Iraisa C. Orihuela-Reilly, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for the minor (Melissa R. Vance, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant E.G.1appeals from an April 13, 2018 judgment of guardianship 

terminating her parental rights to her son, D.L.J., Jr., presently eleven years old. 

On January 22, 2018, D.L.J., Jr.'s father, D.L.J., Sr., made an identified 

surrender of his parental rights to D.L.J., Jr. to the child's paternal aunt and 

uncle, T.D.B. and R.B., and does not appeal from the judgment. After a twoday guardianship hearing, during which E.G. and two witnesses testified, Judge 

W. Todd Miller terminated E.G.'s parental rights, finding that the Division of 

 

1

 Pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d), we use initials to protect the confidentiality of the 

participants in these proceedings.
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Child Protection and Permanency (Division) satisfied all four prongs of the best 

interests standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing 

evidence.

2

 

On appeal, E.G. contends the Division failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence the four-prong statutory standard. After reviewing the 

record and applicable legal principles, we reject E.G.'s contentions and affirm 

substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Miller in his comprehensive 

oral and written opinions. 

 

2

 These four prongs are:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to 

be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child 

or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child 

and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm 

may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family 

parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological 

harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help 

the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination 

of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
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In essence, E.G. argues there was no clear and convincing evidence to 

prove all four prongs of the statutory best interests test. E.G. asserts the record 

shows she successfully raised two other children and that D.L.J., Jr.'s wishes 

were "all but ignored." She contends there is no substantial and credible 

evidence in the record to show she harmed D.L.J., Jr. She also contends the 

Division "was manipulating the situation beginning when [D.L.J., Jr.] was 

placed with [T.D.B.]" She claims the Division's "actions throughout their 

involvement indicate that adoption was their goal from the beginning." E.G's 

arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion, beyond the 

following comments. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Judge Miller's opinions reviewed the evidence in great detail. A summary 

will suffice here. D.L.J., Jr. is an eleven-year-old boy who has been out of the 

care of his mother since she refused to comply with the Division's requests that 

she participate in services in 2016.3 He was removed from E.G.'s custody after 

he had missed 109 days of school and was tardy an additional ten days. He was 

behind academically when he was removed. He had no bed and was smoking 

 

3

 E.G. has a long history with the Division dating back to 2005. In 2006, she 

pleaded guilty to abuse and neglect of a child, N.J.S.A. 9:6-3.
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cigarettes that were allegedly "dipped in embalming fluid." D.L.J., Jr. has 

resided with his paternal aunt and uncle since shortly after his initial removal.

The Division presented unrebutted expert testimony of Dr. Alan Lee, a 

forensic psychologist, who testified E.G. is cognitively limited and has 

significant mental illness. E.G.'s full scale I.Q. is 53, placing her in the lowest 

one percent. She reads at a fourth grade level. Her Global Assessment of 

Functioning (GAF)4 was 32, reflecting a moderate to severe level of impairment. 

E.G.'s diagnostic impression included the following mental disorders: 

Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (NOS) (Provisional), Rule out 

Schizophrenia, Rule Out Organic Mental Disorder, Rule Out Bipolar Disorder, 

Impulse Control Disorder NOS, History of Substance Abuse (Collateral 

History), Mild Mental Retardation (Provisional), Rule Out Borderline 

Intellectual Functioning, Reading Disorder NOS, and Personality Disorder NOS 

with Borderline Anti-Social Traits. E.G. has disturbed thinking and perception 

of reality. Her prognosis is poor for lasting change.

 

4

 "The GAF score is on an objective scale of zero to one hundred, with ten 

representing a homicidal or suicidal individual and one hundred representing 

someone who is functioning normally." State v. J.T., 455 N.J. Super. 176, 193 

n.8 (App. Div. 2018). It is used by mental health clinicians and physicians to 

rate the social, occupational, and psychological functioning of adults.
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Dr. Lee concluded E.G. is not able to function as a minimally adequate 

parent for D.L.J., Jr., based on her mental health issues, maladaptive personality 

and character traits, and impairment of her cognitive and intellectual 

functioning. 

Over a significant period, E.G. repeatedly failed to cooperate with the 

Division's efforts to provide treatment and services.

5

 Her visitation with D.L.J., 

Jr. was sporadic.6 The Division's expert's unrebutted opinion was that E.G. 

could not minimally parent D.L.J., Jr. now or in the foreseeable future, was 

unable to provide a safe and stable home for D.L.J., Jr., and did not and cannot 

nurture him. E.G.'s bond with D.L.J., Jr. was ambivalent and insecure. On the 

other hand, there was a low risk of psychological or emotional harm if D.L.J., 

Jr.'s relationship with E.G. was severed. 

The Division's expert further opined D.L.J., Jr. has a positive and secure 

bond with his resource parents who provide a positive, nurturing, and secure 

home for him. There is a significant risk D.L.J., Jr. will suffer severe 

 

5

 E.G. repeatedly missed service appointments, including multiple substance 

abuse evaluations and two psychological evaluations. 

6

 E.G. had no visits with D.L.J., Jr. between June 2016 and January 2017. She 

attended only four visits with D.L.J., Jr. between February 2017 and April 2017. 
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psychological or emotional harm if his relationship with T.D.B. or R.B. is 

severed. 

As to credibility, Judge Miller found E.G.'s testimony "to be unreliable 

due to her unresolved mental health deficits." Her testimony was "confused, 

evasive, and non-responsive to questions." She displayed poor recall. The 

majority of her testimony "was completely at odds" with the testimony of the 

Division's expert or caseworker and the documented record. The judge stated 

"[s]he appeared 'off' to the untrained eye." 

Judge Miller found Dr. Lee's testimony to be unbiased and "convincing, 

reliable and credible in regards to his psychological and bonding opinions." The 

judge concluded "[h]is testimony was clear, precise, and corroborated by the 

Division's case notes and records," and "was not impeached during crossexamination." Judge Miller also found the testimony of caseworker Stephanie 

Martinez credible.

E.G. contends there is no substantial and credible evidence showing she 

harmed D.L.J., Jr. As recognized by Judge Miller, harm is not limited to 

physical abuse or neglect of children. Mental illnesses can be so serious and 

debilitating that they render a parent "unable to adequately care for and raise the 

children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 439 
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(App. Div. 2001) (citing In re Guardianship of R.G. & F., 155 N.J. Super. 186, 

194 (App. Div. 1977)).

Our review of Judge Miller's decision is limited and deferential. In re 

Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). We will not disturb a trial 

judge's factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial credible 

evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 

(2014). We defer to the judge's evaluation of witness credibility, and to his 

expertise in family court matters. Id. at 552-53. Because the record contains 

substantial credible evidence to support Judge Miller's findings, there is no basis 

for us to disturb his well-reasoned decision. While we do not doubt that E.G.

loves her son, she is not capable of caring for him by providing a safe and stable 

home for him. D.L.J., Jr. needs, and is entitled to, the security of a permanent 

home, with his resource parents, who wish to adopt him. D.L.J., Jr. wanted to 

be adopted by them if he was unable to return to his mother.

Affirmed.