United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued January 7, 2020

Decided January 24, 2020

Before

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 18-2881

ANDREW ROBERTS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARK J. JENSEN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 17-C-629

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Andrew Roberts, a Wisconsin inmate, had a series of medical issues he felt went 

unaddressed or were mishandled by prison medical officials. Roberts sued various 

members of the Waupun Correctional Institution medical staff alleging they violated his 

Eighth Amendment rights. In Roberts’s complaint he listed as defendants “Nurse Ann 

Tabb” and “Nurse Slinger.” The case proceeded against the various defendants, 

including Ann York, whose prior names included “Ann Tabb” and “Ann Slinger.”

The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on Roberts’s

claims, including the claim against nurse Ann York. On appeal, Roberts seeks reversal 

because a different defendant he meant to sue, Mary Slinger, was never served. First we 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 18-2881 Page 2

conclude the district court has issued a reviewable final judgment. We also decide that 

because Roberts failed to properly serve Mary Slinger, request an extension from the 

district court to do so, or show good cause to extend the time for service on appeal, the 

district court’s decision should be affirmed.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Roberts sued prison guards and medical providers for deliberate indifference to 

his epididymitis, a serious testicular infection. Roberts sued defendants Jensen, “Nurse 

Ann Tabb,” (Ann York), Lyon, Schaefer, “Nurse Slinger,” Grieser, and Gernetzke for 

deliberate indifference to his medical needs based on their failure to send him to a 

doctor when he complained of his pain and the nurses’ failure to visually examine his 

testicle. As a result, Roberts’s condition worsened to the point his testicle was removed.

The district court screened the complaint and determined Roberts had stated a 

claim for relief against all the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. 1915A. The court also ordered 

that “pursuant to an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of 

Justice and this court, copies of plaintiff’s complaint and this order are being 

electronically sent ... to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on defendants 

Jensen, Tabb, Lyon, Judy, Slinger, Grieser, and Brockhouse.” Consistent with the 

complaint, the Order caption listed “Anne Tabb” and “Nurse Slinger” individually. The 

Wisconsin DOJ accepted service and appeared on behalf of all defendants except Mary 

Slinger. The acceptance of service form dated June 21, 2017 stated Ann York (named by 

Roberts as “Nurse Tabb”) was the “same as Ann Tabb and Ann Slinger.” (Dist. Ct. D.E. 

12.) Nurse Mary Slinger, therefore, was never served and did not participate in the 

case.1 The defendants mailed a copy of the acceptance of service form listing all served 

defendants to Roberts. Id. 

Before the district court, Roberts argued the Wisconsin Department of Justice and 

the district court erred by not serving Mary Slinger. Defendants explained they were 

accepting service for “Ann York,” and told the court they understood “Ann York” to be 

the same person as “Ann Slinger,” Roberts did not respond by clarifying he meant to 

1 Mary Slinger saw Roberts for one medical appointment on July 9, 2011.
No. 18-2881 Page 3

sue an additional person, “Mary Slinger.” Roberts’s complaint never mentioned “Mary” 

Slinger, and Mary Slinger actually died five years before Roberts commenced this case.2

Roberts and the defendants eventually moved for summary judgment. In 

Roberts’s motion, filed first on October 19, 2017, he referred to nurses York and Slinger 

separately among the nurses who had failed to examine him and failed to send him to a 

doctor. (Dist. Ct. D.E. 19-22.) The defendants’ motion, filed second on December 15, 

2017, addressed the allegations against Mary Slinger, but noted she was not a 

defendant. (Dist. Ct. D.E. 24-32.) In response to the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, Roberts included a footnote disputing that Nurse Mary Slinger was not a 

defendant. (Dist. Ct. D.E. 35 at 4 n.3.) Roberts claimed the defendants were attempting 

to remove Mary Slinger from the case by not accepting service for her. Id. Although 

Roberts recognized that Mary Slinger had not been served in the case, he did not 

request that Mary Slinger be served or ask for additional time to serve her. 

On July 28, 2018 the district court denied Roberts’s motion for summary 

judgment and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The district court issued 

a thorough and detailed 13-page order resolving the claims as to each of the served 

defendants. The order was captioned “Andrew Roberts, Plaintiff, v. Mark Jensen, 

Kristin Lyon, Judy Schaefer, Ann York, Samuel Grieser, and Carla Gernetzke, 

Defendants.” Roberts timely appealed.

This court originally agreed to consider this case without oral argument and 

based upon the facts and legal arguments in the briefs and record. FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(c). After reviewing the briefs and record on appeal, we requested additional 

briefing and oral argument. The previously-filed briefs were stricken, counsel was 

appointed for Roberts,3 and we ordered the parties to address the following: (1) 

because Mary Slinger was never served, whether the district court’s decision as to the 

served defendants is a reviewable final judgment under Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 

1569 (7th Cir. 1987); (2) whether any error occurred with respect to the failure to serve 

Mary Slinger, see Williams v. Werlinger, 795 F.3d 759, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2015); and (3) 

2 Per the defendants-appellees, Ann Slinger/Tabb/York is the daughter of Mary Ann 

Slinger. Both worked as nurses at the prison. Mary Slinger died in 2012. (Appellate D.E. 25, p. 

25, no. 9.)

3 On appeal this court appointed Attorney Joanna Kopczyk of the Patterson Law Firm in 

Chicago to represent Roberts. We thank Attorney Kopczyk and her firm for their able efforts

and hard work on behalf of Roberts in this case.
No. 18-2881 Page 4

whether good cause exists to grant Roberts more time to serve Mary Slinger under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) because of any potentially meritorious claim 

against her, and whether this court may reach that question.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 

Steimel v. Wernet, 823 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 2016). Although no motion for an extension 

of time to serve process was made to the district court here, such a motion is reviewed 

for abuse of discretion. Geiger v. Allen, 850 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1988); Panaras v. Liquid 

Carbonic Indus. Corp., 94 F.3d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1996). Appellate review of service time 

extensions is “deferential.” Tuke v. United States, 76 F.3d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1996).

B. The district court’s decision is a reviewable final judgment.

We first asked the parties to address whether the district court’s decision as to 

the served defendants is a reviewable final judgment. Both parties submit it is, and we 

agree. 

In Ordower, we held that a district court’s decision with respect to served 

defendants is not a reviewable final judgment if the plaintiff has an outstanding claim 

against any unserved defendants. See also Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 395 

(7th Cir. 2001) (applying Ordower). If, however, a new attempt to serve the unserved 

defendants would be untimely, and the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff from 

initiating a new suit, then the order is final because the plaintiff has no avenue for relief 

against the unserved defendant in the district court. Ordower, 826 F.2d at 1572–73. 

This case fits within that conditional statement. The district court’s July 28, 2018 

order granting summary judgment is final based on the passage of time in the 

underlying litigation. Any new attempt to serve Slinger would be untimely, see FED. R.

CIV. P. 4(m), so Roberts was not free to file an amended complaint joining Mary Slinger. 

And Wisconsin’s statute of limitations bars him from initiating a new suit, see Wisc. Stat. 

§ 893.53; Cannon v. Newport, 850 F.3d 303, 305–06 (7th Cir. 2017). That limitations period 

for the underlying complaint had run when the district court ruled on the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment.
No. 18-2881 Page 5

The district court’s judgment disposed of all claims as to all parties who were 

before the court, which Roberts acknowledges. And the district court could not have 

decided Roberts’s claims against Mary Slinger because she was never served. Because 

the district court’s decision resolved all claims properly before the court, it is final for 

purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Roberts v. Jensen, No. 17-cv-629 (E.D. Wis. 

July 28, 2018) (Dist. Ct. D.E. 40) (order granting defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment); (Dist. Ct. D.E. 41) (judgment entered in favor of defendants on the merits).

C. Failure to serve Mary Slinger

Second, we inquired whether any error occurred in the failure to serve Mary 

Slinger. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c), “[t]he plaintiff is responsible for 

having the summons and complaint served ... .” At a plaintiff’s request, the court may 

order that service be made by a U.S. marshal, deputy marshal, or another person 

appointed by the court. FED R. CIV P. 4(c)(3). The court must appoint a process server if 

the plaintiff is authorized to appear before the court, but the plaintiff must make such a 

request before the court is required to effectuate service for the plaintiff. Id.

Here, Roberts did not have Mary Slinger timely served, nor did he ask for service 

to be accomplished. The record is silent as to why Roberts did not speak up earlier 

about this failure. On three occasions Roberts was placed on notice that Mary Slinger 

had not been served: (1) Roberts would have received the acceptance of service form 

(Dist. Ct. D.E. 12) by mail shortly after June 21, 2017, which listed Ann York (same as 

Ann Slinger) but did not list Mary Slinger; (2) the Defendants’ Answer and Affirmative 

Defenses (Dist. Ct. D.E. 14) listed those defendants answering in the first paragraph, 

and Mary Slinger was not listed; and (3) the Defendants’ Objection to Dkt # 16, Judicial 

Notice (Dist. Ct. D.E. 17) listed those defendants answering in the first paragraph, and 

Mary Slinger was not listed. Once Roberts received these documents which showed 

Ann York was served but Mary Slinger was not, and that defendants’ counsel was not 

representing Mary Slinger, Roberts could have contacted the court to ask that Mary 

Slinger be served. Roberts did not do so. When Roberts was placed on notice that the 

defendants did not include Mary Slinger, Roberts was obliged to bring that fact to the 

court’s attention. The district court ordered those defendants to be served whom it was 

asked to have served. If an individual is not served, such as Mary Slinger here, it does 

not fall on the court to cure that mistake, as the plaintiff is in the best position to know 

whom that plaintiff wishes to sue.
No. 18-2881 Page 6

On appeal, Roberts provides two cases to support his argument that the court, 

despite the language of Rule 4(c)(3) and the manner in which courts have typically 

applied that language, is responsible for appointing someone to serve the parties even 

without the plaintiff’s request. Roberts cites Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 602 (7th 

Cir. 1990) and Williams v. Werlinger, 795 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2015). Both are 

distinguishable from this case, though. In Sellers, the court had already ordered service 

by the marshal and the questions at issue involved the level of information a plaintiff 

needs to provide the marshal to aid service, and what level of diligence and effort is 

required of the marshal. Sellers, 902 F.2d at 602. The scenario was the same in Williams, 

where the issue was that “[t]he district judge issued the order, but didn’t follow it up” 

after a defendant was not served. Williams, 795 F.3d at 760. Neither case supports 

Roberts’ argument here that the district court erred by “[f]ailing to take any action with 

regards to Mary Slinger,” despite his failure to request appointment for service.

As the person experiencing pain and alleging lack of treatment, Roberts knew 

best whom to sue, and thus to serve. But the name “Mary Slinger” does not appear in 

the complaint, and the first time her full name arises in the district court is in the 

defendants’ response to Roberts’s summary judgment motion. (Dist. Ct. D.E. 27 at 9 ¶ 

24.)4 Moreover, we cannot conclude the district court had reason to know that Roberts 

wanted another person served.

The Wisconsin Department of Justice has a Memorandum of Understanding with 

the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin to accept service for 

named defendants, but the Wisconsin DOJ is not appointed to conduct service upon 

defendants. (Appellees’ Suppl. App. 101-02.) Such an agreement results in efficiencies 

we applaud. But, contrary to Roberts’s argument, the agreement does not alter the 

parties’ responsibilities under the applicable federal rules. Per Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(c)(3), requesting service upon defendants remains the responsibility of the 

plaintiff, although if a plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A such as Roberts, the court must order service of process.

In the absence of Roberts’s instruction to serve Mary Slinger, we conclude the 

Wisconsin DOJ reasonably confused the identity of Ann York/Tabb/Slinger with that of 

the unnamed “Mary” Slinger, who had been deceased for over five years. Such 

confusion does not shift the burden to the defendants, or to the district court, to sort out 

4 In Roberts’s reply he disputes paragraph 24, but points to another person’s negligence 

and does not mention Mary Slinger. (Dist. Ct. D.E. 35 at 3.)
No. 18-2881 Page 7

plaintiff’s claims. Roberts had written notice for many months that Mary Slinger had 

not been served. Yet Roberts failed to timely serve Mary Slinger, bring any potential 

service problem to the court’s attention, or request that the court appoint someone to 

serve Mary Slinger on Roberts’ behalf. Those failures to bring Mary Slinger into this 

case are not the responsibility of the defendants or the district court.

D. Extension of time to serve Mary Slinger

Third, we asked whether good cause exists to grant Roberts more time to serve 

Mary Slinger because of any potentially meritorious claim against her, and whether this 

court may reach that question.

“A party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.” Pole v. Randolph, 570 

F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009); Homoky v. Ogden, 816 F.3d 448, 455 (7th Cir. 2016) (“a party 

waives the ability to make a specific argument for the first time on appeal when the 

party failed to present that specific argument to the district court”). Roberts never asked 

the district court for Mary Slinger to be served, so Roberts’s argument that good cause 

exists to grant him more time to serve her is new on appeal and thus ripe for denial.

If we reach this question, Roberts argues he should not be faulted for failing to 

timely serve Mary Slinger because others had responsibility for serving the defendants 

and never notified him she had not been served. Good cause, he argues, therefore 

justifies granting him more time to serve Mary Slinger. We disagree. 

Even if this court did reach this question, Roberts has failed to show good cause 

why an extension should be granted. See FED R. CIV P. 4(m) (service deadline will be 

extended if the plaintiff can show “good cause” and may be extended in the case of 

excusable neglect); see also Troxell v. Fedders of North Am., Inc., 160 F.3d 381, 382-83 (7th 

Cir. 1998). Attempting to show good cause, Roberts points to the Wisconsin DOJ’s 

failure to serve Mary Slinger, reiterating his belief it was the court’s duty to ensure 

timely service and his belief that the Wisconsin DOJ had been appointed by the court 

for such a purpose. As discussed above, the DOJ was only authorized to accept service, 

and Roberts failed to ask the court to appoint someone to serve Mary Slinger. 

Roberts also offers that pro se complaints are to be construed liberally and 

adjudicated on their merits, so good cause exists here. While pro se or incarcerated 

status can affect how courts address unnamed or misnamed defendants, Donald v. Cook 

Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996), this case does not present that 
No. 18-2881 Page 8

situation. Roberts does not argue he never knew the identity of Mary Slinger. Rather, he 

would have known who she was, but he simply did not have her served, did not ask the 

court to appoint a process server to serve her, or even alert the court or the other 

defendants that the acceptance of service form (Dist. Ct. D.E. 12), did not include a 

person he wanted to sue. Those facts distinguish this case from Donald, in which “the 

plaintiff face[d] barriers to determining the identities of the ... defendants.” 95 F.3d at 

555.

Because Roberts did not request an extension of time to file with the district court 

or otherwise preserve the issue for appeal, we need not reach the extension question. 

Even if we were to do so, we would decline to extend the time for service because 

Roberts has failed to show good cause on appeal why such an extension should be 

granted.

III. Conclusion

This case presents unfortunate and confusing circumstances. Given how the case 

was pleaded and progressed, that confusion was understandable, but it was not the 

responsibility of the defendants or the district court. We see nothing from which to 

conclude defendants sought to take advantage of Roberts or his pro se status, and we

find no reversible error. So we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

to, and judgment for, the defendants in this case.