FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SENECA INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Third-Party-PlaintiffAppellant,

v.

STRANGE LAND, INC.; U.S. BANK

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

Defendants-Appellees,

v.

BELFOR USA GROUP, INC., DBA

Belfor Property Restoration,

Third-Party-Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-16011

D.C. No.

3:14-cv-00381-

LRH-WGC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 17, 2017*

San Francisco, California

Filed July 5, 2017

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Ronald M. Gould,

Circuit Judges, and Edward F. Shea,** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

SUMMARY***

Colorado River Abstention

The panel vacated the district court’s order staying an

action, pursuant to Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976), against Strange

Land, Inc. pending the decision in a parallel state court

proceeding; and remanded to the district court for further

proceedings.

In July 2014, Seneca Insurance Company, Inc. filed a

complaint against Strange Land and U.S. Bank in the instant

federal action seeking a declaration of insurance obligations. 

In October 2014, Belfor USA Group, Inc. filed an action in

Nevada state court seeking compensation for its repair work

from Strange Land as the property owner and Seneca as the

policy issuer.

The panel held that the district court correctly chose to

analyze Strange Land’s request for abstention in the federal

** The Honorable Edward F. Shea, Senior United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 3

action under the Colorado River framework because Seneca

sought remedies beyond declaratory judgment. The panel

rejected Strange Land’s argument that the more lenient

abstention test from Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277

(1995), and Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S.

491 (1942), should apply. 

The panel evaluated the eight factors in assessing the

appropriateness of a Colorado River stay or dismissal. The

panel held that the district court’s application of Colorado

River abstention was an abuse of its narrow discretion

because the case was not “exceptional” so as to warrant

disregarding the obligation of a federal court to exercise its

jurisdiction. 

COUNSEL

John P. Skalak, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker

LLP, Las Vegas, Nevada, for Plaintiff-Third-Party-PlaintiffAppellant.

William R. Ginn, Patrick R. Leverty, and Vernon E. Leverty,

Leverty & Associates Law CHTD, Reno, Nevada, for

Defendant-Appellee Strange Land, Inc.
4 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Seneca Insurance Company, Inc. (“Seneca”) appeals the

district court’s order staying its action against Strange Land,

Inc. (“Strange Land”) pending the decision in a parallel state

court proceeding. In situations of concurrent state and federal

jurisdiction over a controversy, a district court must exercise

its jurisdiction unless “exceptional circumstances . . .

serv[ing] an important countervailing interest” are present. 

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,

424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). The district court examined

several Colorado River factors and concluded that a stay of

the federal proceedings was justified “for the sake of wise

judicial administration.” We disagree, vacate the stay order,

and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I.

We recount only the factual and procedural history of this

insurance dispute necessary to consider the district court’s

abstention order. Strange Land owns a building in Reno,

Nevada. In 2013, Strange Land obtained a commercial

insurance policy from Seneca to cover the property for risk of

loss up to $2 million. U.S. Bank, National Association (“U.S.

Bank”) holds a mortgage on the property and is an additional

loss payee on the policy. Between May 4, 2013 and February

25, 2014, Strange Land made four property damage claims

under its Seneca policy. Belfor USA Group, Inc. (“Belfor”)

repaired the property damage; in return, Strange Land

promised that Belfor would be entitled to the insurance

proceeds. After invoicing Strange Land for its work and

failing to receive any compensation for the repairs, Belfor
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 5

caused a Notice of Lien to be recorded on the property on

May 16, 2014. Belfor alleges that it notified Seneca that

Strange Land had assigned to Belfor its rights to the insurance

proceeds, though Seneca asserts that it was unaware of

Belfor’s request for payment. Seneca’s federal complaint

alleges that, upon investigating Strange Land’s claims,

Seneca concluded that Strange Land had made material

misrepresentations in its policy application. Therefore

Seneca sought to rescind the policy and disclaimed

responsibility for the claims. According to Belfor, Seneca

rejected Belfor’s request for reimbursement.

On July 21, 2014, Seneca filed a complaint against

Strange Land and U.S. Bank in the instant suit (the “Federal

Action”). Seneca described the “Nature of [the] Action” as

“an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

section 2201 and 28 U.S.C. section 2202, to determine the

rights and duties” among the parties. Seneca sought, inter

alia, a “declaration” rescinding the policy because of Strange

Land’s misrepresentations, a judgment of indemnity against

Strange Land, and damages exceeding $75,000 “for

recoupment of monies wrongfully paid to defendant on the

first property claim.”

On October 10, 2014, Belfor filed an action in the Second

Judicial District Court in Nevada (the “State Action”),

seeking compensation for its repair work from Strange Land

as the property owner and Seneca as the policy issuer. In

response, Seneca alleged its affirmative defenses,

crossclaims, and counterclaims in the State Action. Seneca

also filed a third-party complaint for interpleader and

declaratory relief against Belfor in the Federal Action and

moved to dismiss or stay the State Action in light of the

pending Federal Action. On February18, 2015, Strange Land
6 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

filed a request for abstention in the Federal Action, which the

district court granted on April 22, 2015. Seneca timely

appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction to review a Colorado River stay

order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Moses H. Cone

Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 9–13

(1983). “Whether the facts of a particular case conform to the

requirements for a Colorado River stay or dismissal is a

question of law which we review de novo.” Smith v. Cent.

Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir.

2005). If we conclude that the Colorado River requirements

have been met, we then review for abuse of discretion the

district court’s decision to stay or dismiss the action. See

R.R. St. &Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir.

2011). “[D]iscretion must be exercised within the narrow and

specific limits prescribed by the [Colorado River] doctrine.” 

Id. (second alteration in original).

III.

We first consider Strange Land’s argument that the more

lenient abstention test from Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,

515 U.S. 277 (1995), and Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of

America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942), should apply because

Seneca’s suit seeks only declaratory relief. See Brillhart,

316 U.S. at 495 (“Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as

well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a

declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a

state court presenting the same issues, not governed by

federal law, between the same parties.”). So long as the suit

seeks more than merely declaratoryrelief, however, the entire
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 7

action should be analyzed under the Colorado River

framework. “[I]f the same action contains claims for both

monetary and declaratory relief, the district court should not,

as a general rule, remand or decline to entertain the claim for

declaratory relief.” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 976–77 (internal

quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a suit

exclusively seeks declaratory relief, we ask “whether there

are claims in the case that exist independent of any request

for purely declaratory relief, that is, claims that would

continue to exist if the request for a declaration simply

dropped from the case.” Snodgrass v. Provident Life &

Accident Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 1163, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 1998).

The district court correctlychose to analyze the abstention

motion under the Colorado River framework. It is true, as

Strange Land notes, that Seneca’s complaints describe the

Federal Action as “an action for declaratory judgment

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2201 and 28 U.S.C. section

2202, to determine the rights and duties” between Seneca and

Strange Land. Yet in its prayers for relief against Strange

Land in the original and amended complaints, Seneca has

consistently requested “a declaration rescinding the policy of

property insurance,” “a declaration of the Court voiding the

policy . . . based upon breach of contract and material

misrepresentations,” and “damages, in an amount exceeding

$75,000, for recoupment of monies paid to defendant on the

first property claim.”

Seneca’s filings thus have unfailingly sought damages,

bringing its suit squarely within the Colorado River

framework. Moreover, though certain of the prayers for relief

in the Federal Action have been framed as seeking

“declarations” by the court, Seneca is in fact pursuing

rescission of the contract based on Strange Land’s alleged
8 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

misrepresentations—thereby altering the relationship of the

parties—and not simply requesting that the court “announce[]

the rights and obligations of the parties.” See Robert S.

Thompson et al., Remedies: Damages,Equity, and Restitution

10 (4th ed. 2009); see also James M. Fischer, Understanding

Remedies 6 (3d ed. 2014) (“The essential feature of

declaratory relief is that it does not compel an immediate,

specific obligation to do something. . . . The full effect of the

remedy lies in its educative value and the further remedy of

a follow up action to enforce the rights, duties, and

obligations recognized by the court . . . .”). Those prayers for

“declaratory” relief, in addition to the explicit request for

damages, therefore also seek non-declaratoryremedies. Even

if the request for a declaration to determine the rights and

duties of the parties dropped out of the lawsuit, the other

remedies sought would afford an independent basis for the

Federal Action. Because Seneca seeks remedies beyond

declaratory judgment, the district court correctly applied the

Colorado River standard.

IV.

We next consider whether the district court properly

stayed the Federal Action pending resolution of the State

Action based on Colorado River. “Abstention from the

exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” 

Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813. Generally “the pendency of an

action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning

the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction . . . .” 

Id. at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme

Court has emphasized that the federal courts have a “virtually

unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given

them,” including in cases involving parallel state litigation. 

Id. “Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 9

justified . . . only in the exceptional circumstances where the

order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly

serve an important countervailing interest.” Id. at 813

(internal quotation marks omitted). Under “exceedingly rare”

circumstances, Smith, 418 F.3d at 1033, “considerations of

wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of

judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of

litigation,” may counsel in favor of abstention, Colo. River,

424 U.S. at 817 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Colorado River and its progeny provide a multi-pronged

test for determining whether “exceptional circumstances”

exist warranting federal abstention from concurrent federal

and state proceedings. We evaluate eight factors in assessing

the appropriateness of a Colorado River stay or dismissal:

(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over

any property at stake; (2) the inconvenience of

the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid

piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the

forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether

federal law or state law provides the rule of

decision on the merits; (6) whether the state

court proceedings can adequately protect the

rights of the federal litigants; (7) the desire to

avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether the

state court proceedings will resolve all issues

before the federal court.

R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 978–79. These factors are not a

“mechanical checklist”; indeed, some may not have any

applicability to a case. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16.

Rather, as instructed by the Supreme Court, we examine them
10 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

in “a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities

of the case at hand.” Id. at 21. Moreover, we must carefully

balance the important factors, “with the balance heavily

weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 16. 

The underlying principle guiding this review is a strong

presumption against federal abstention: “[O]ur task in cases

such as this is not to find some substantial reason for the

exercise of federal jurisdiction by the district court; rather, the

task is to ascertain whether there exist ‘exceptional’

circumstances, the ‘clearest of justifications,’ that can suffice

under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that

jurisdiction.” Id. at 25–26. “Any doubt as to whether a factor

exists should be resolved against a stay, not in favor of one.” 

Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1369 (9th

Cir. 1990). We address in turn each Colorado River factor as

it applies to this case.1

A. Jurisdiction over a res.

The district court concluded that the first Colorado River

factor, whether either court was the first to assert jurisdiction

over property at stake, “is neutral because neither court has

asserted such jurisdiction.” Although Belfor has recorded a

notice of lien on the property and lien priority as to litigants

other than Seneca and Strange Land may be an issue in the

State Action, neither the federal nor the state court has

assumed jurisdiction over any property the ownership of

which is in dispute. Indeed, the concerns that animate this

factor are not implicated here because there is no possibility

that the parallel proceedings will result in inconsistent

1 Because the district court and the parties agreed that the relative

convenience of the state and federal courts is not implicated, we do not

address that factor.
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 11

dispositions of a single res. See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S.

at 819 (“[T]he concern in such instances is with avoiding the

generation of additional litigation through permitting

inconsistent dispositions of property.”); see also Donovan v.

City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 412 (1964); Princess Lida of

Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 467 (1939). Any

disposition of the property in the State Action will have no

bearing on the resolution of the Federal Action, where Belfor

has not raised its lien priority claim. As such, we agree with

the district court that this Colorado River factor is neutral.

B. Avoidance of piecemeal litigation.

A substantial factor in the Colorado River analysis is

whether there are special concerns associated with resolving

the issues in a piecemeal fashion via parallel proceedings. 

“Piecemeal litigation occurswhen different tribunals consider

the same issue, thereby duplicating efforts and possibly

reaching different results.” Am. Int’l Underwriters

(Philippines), Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 1253, 1258

(9th Cir. 1988). A general preference for avoiding piecemeal

litigation is insufficient to warrant abstention, however. Any

case in which Colorado River is implicated will inevitably

involve the possibility of “conflicting results, piecemeal

litigation, and some duplication of judicial efforts,” which are

the “unavoidable price of preserving access to . . . federal

relief.” Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines,

925 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1991) (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, there must be

exceptional circumstances present that demonstrate that

piecemeal litigation would be particularly problematic. See

Madonna, 914 F.2d at 1369 (“A correct evaluation of this

factor involves considering whether exceptional

circumstances exist which justify special concern about
12 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

piecemeal litigation. . . . This case involves ordinary contract

and tort issues and is thus unlike Colorado River where

important real property rights were at stake and where there

was a substantial danger of inconsistent judgments.”). 

Colorado River itself involved multi-state regulation of water

rights in the Southwest, where water remains scarce, such that

inconsistent dispositions of those rights could trigger further

litigation. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. 819–20 (“The clear

federal policy evinced by [the McCarran Amendment] is the

avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river

system.”).2

The district court here reasoned that because “this case

involves multiple defendants, numerous claims, and crossclaims, that all present complex state tort and insurance

issues,” the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation “weighs in

favor of abstention.” The district court misconstrued the

piecemeal litigation factor because it failed to identify any

special concern counseling in favor of federal abstention,

such as a “clear federal policy” of avoiding “piecemeal

adjudication of water rights” expressed via federal legislation

“recogniz[ing] the availability of comprehensive state

systems for adjudication of water rights.” Id. at 819. 

Multiple defendants, claims, and cross-claims are routine in

adjudications of tort and insurance disputes—they are the

stuff of diversity jurisdiction. Nothing about this dispute

2 The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, waived federal

sovereign immunity in suits adjudicating the ownership or administration

of water rights. The Supreme Court interpreted the amendment to indicate

a congressional policy recognizing “the availability of comprehensive

state systems for adjudication of water rights as the means for achieving”

the goal of avoiding piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river

system. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 819.
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 13

evinces a special or important rationale or legislative

preference for resolving these issues in a single proceeding.

C. The order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction.

In determining the order in which the state and federal

courts obtained jurisdiction, district courts are instructed not

simply to compare filing dates, but to analyze the progress

made in each case “in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a

view to the realities of the case at hand.” Cone Mem’l Hosp.,

460 U.S. at 21. The district court is well positioned to

understand the relative progress of each case in this practical

way. Here, the district court concluded that, “[b]ecause

neither case has progressed significantly further than the

other, and the federal action was filed more than two months

prior to the state action, this factor weighs against

abstention.” There was significant activity in each case by

the time the district court reviewed the abstention motion, but

neither court had resolved any foundational legal claims. As

a result, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the

cases had progressed equivalent amounts, such that this factor

does not weigh in favor of abstention. Strange Land’s

arguments to the contrary—in which it contends that the State

Action was the “first filed” because Seneca amended its

original complaint and that this weighs heavily in favor of

abstention—lack merit.

D. The rule of decision.

Under Colorado River, we consider “whether federal law

or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits” (the

“rule of decision” factor). R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 978. The

“presence of federal-law issues must always be a major

consideration weighing againstsurrender” of jurisdiction, but
14 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

“the presence of state-law issues may weigh in favor of that

surrender” only “in some rare circumstances.” Cone Mem’l

Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added); see also Meredith v.

City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943) (“Congress

having adopted the policy of opening the federal courts to

suitors in all diversity cases involving the jurisdictional

amount, we can discern in its action no recognition of a

policy which would exclude cases from the jurisdiction

merely because they involve state law or because the law is

uncertain or difficult to determine.”). That state law provides

the rule of decision supports abstention only when the state

law questions are themselves complex and difficult issues

better resolved by a state court; it is not enough that a state

law case is complex because it involves numerous parties or

claims. See R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 980–81 (concluding that the

source of law factor is “neutral” where the complexity of the

action “stems from the number of policies and insurers, not

from the type of [state] law involved in the action”). Cases

implicating only “routine issues of st ate

law—misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach

of contract—which the district court is fully capable of

deciding” do not entail “rare circumstances” counseling in

favor of abstention. Madonna, 914 F.2d at 1370.

The district court concluded that the rule of decision

factor “weighs heavily in favor of abstention” because “[a]ll

claims in this case are brought pursuant to state law.” As

discussed above, the court also noted elsewhere that “this

case involves multiple defendants, numerous claims, and

cross-claims, that all present complex state tort and insurance

issues.” In so doing, the district court disregarded our

precedent requiring “rare circumstances” for this factor to

weigh in favor of abstention and failed to explain why the

relevant legal claims are “complex.” We do not find “rare
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 15

circumstances” in this litigation. Rather, this is a

straightforward insurance dispute through which an insurer

seeks declaratory judgment, equitable relief, and damages

against its insured, while a third-party vendor seeks from

several parties compensation for past repair work. As in

Madonna and R.R. Street, the claims ultimately boil down to

arguments about misrepresentation, fraudulent inducement,

detrimental reliance, breach of contract, and rescission, none

of which raises the “rare circumstances” required for the rule

of decision factor to weigh toward abstention.3

E. Adequacy of the state forum and parallelism of the suits.

Under Colorado River, we consider both “whether the

state court proceedings can adequately protect the rights of

the federal litigants” (the “adequacy” factor) and “whether the

state court proceedings will resolve all issues before the

3 Strange Land cites the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011

et seq., as further support for the district court’s abstention decision. We

agree that this act “was an effort by Congress to protect states’ primary

regulatory role over the insurance industry,” Elliot v. Fortis Benefits Ins.

Co., 337 F.3d 1138, 1142 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003), and that it “includes an

express reverse preemption provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b),” Hawthorne

Savings F.S.B. v. Reliance Ins. Co. of Ill., 421 F.3d 835, 842 (9th Cir.

2005). Yet Strange Land offers no support for its suggestion that states’

primary authority to regulate the business of insurance affects federal

courts’ ability to evaluate insurance disputes arising under state law. 

Strange Land’s argument amounts to an assertion that federal courts

cannot properly apply state insurance law, something federal courts

routinely do. This argument lacks merit. Cf. id. at 841–44, 848–49

(“[T]he policy of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was to leave the regulation

of insurers to the states[;] it did not intend to divest federal courts of the

right to apply state law regarding the regulation of insurers in appropriate

diversity proceedings.” (quoting Grimes v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 857 F.2d

699, 702 (10th Cir.1988))).
16 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

federal court” (the “parallelism” factor). See R.R. St.,

656 F.3d at 978–79. The adequacy factor looks to whether

the state court might be unable to enforce federal rights. See,

e.g., Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26–27 (finding state

proceedings might be inadequate because it was unclear

whether state courts would compel arbitration under the

Federal Arbitration Act); Madonna, 914 F.2d at 1370 (“This

factor involves the state court’s adequacy to protect federal

rights, not the federal court’s adequacy to protect state

rights.” (citing Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26)). The

parallelism factor provides that “the existence of a substantial

doubt as to whether the state proceedings will resolve the

federal action precludes a Colorado River stay or dismissal.” 

R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 982 (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 28 (“When a district

court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, it

presumably concludes that the parallel state-court litigation

will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt

resolution of the issues between the parties. If there is any

substantial doubt as to this, it would be a serious abuse of

discretion to grant the stay or dismissal at all.”). Though

“exact parallelism . . . is not required,” substantial similarity

of claims is necessary before abstention is available. Nakash

v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989).

In short, the adequacy factor pertains to whether there is

an impediment to the state court protecting the litigants’

federal rights, while the parallelism factor considers whether

the parallel proceedings address “substantially similar”

claims. Each factor is more relevant when it counsels against

abstention, because while inadequacy of the state forum or

insufficient parallelism may preclude abstention, the

alternatives never compel abstention. See Cone Mem’l Hosp.,

460 U.S. at 25–26; Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817.
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 17

The district court apparently analyzed these factors in the

same section of the order, titled, “Whether the State

Proceeding is Adequate to Protect the Parties’ Rights.” This

section describes the parties and claims being raised in each

forum before explaining that “although both forums are likely

to adequately protect the rights of the parties, the state court

action is most likely to promote complete and prompt

resolution of the issues between the parties” and “Seneca

simply has not raised any reasons why the state court action

would not protect its rights.” The district court concluded

that “[t]his factor therefore weighs in favor of abstention.” 

Yet sufficiently similar claims are a necessary precondition

to Colorado River abstention and should not, absent more,

add weight to the balance in favor of abstention. The district

court thus read the “parallelism” factor incorrectly: 

Parallelism is necessary but not sufficient to counsel in favor

of abstention. Both the adequacy and parallelism factors here

are neutral, as neither provides “the clearest of justifications”

warranting the surrender of federal jurisdiction. Cone Mem’l

Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25–26.

F. The avoidance of forum shopping.

When evaluating forum shopping under Colorado River,

we consider whether either party improperly sought more

favorable rules in its choice of forum or pursued suit in a new

forum after facing setbacks in the original proceeding. See

Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1417 (finding forum shopping where,

after three-and-a-half years of litigation in a case that was

progressing to its detriment, one party sought a “new forum

for [its] claims”); Am. Int’l Underwriters, 843 F.2d at 1259

(finding forum shopping where, after two-and-a-half years, a

party “abandon[ed] its state court case solely because it

believe[d] that the Federal Rules of Evidence [we]re more
18 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

favorable to it than the state evidentiary rules”). It typically

does not constitute forum shopping where a party “acted

within his rights in filing a suit in the forum of his choice,”

Madonna, 914 F.2d at 1371, even where “[t]he chronology of

events suggests that both parties took a somewhat

opportunistic approach to th[e] litigation,” R.R. St., 656 F.3d

at 981. See also id. at 982 (“[W]e are cautious about labeling

as ‘forum shopping’ a plaintiff’s desire to bring previously

unasserted claims in federal court.”).

The record does not reflect that either party engaged in

improper forum shopping. Nothing indicates that either side

sought to manipulate the litigation or behaved vexatiously to

wind up in the forum of its choosing. Both parties’

arguments to the contrary lack merit. Seneca suggests,

without substantiation, that the opposing parties are colluding

to delay the Federal Action and accelerate the State Action. 

But the fact that various parties to the Federal Action have

tried to dismiss Seneca’s complaint does not indicate abuse

of the litigation process; indeed, Seneca amended its

complaint repeatedly in response to those motions to dismiss,

suggesting that the motions were at least worthy of response.

Strange Land similarly makes several meritless

arguments, some of which are contradictory, in support of its

view that Seneca has improperly forum shopped. If credited,

Strange Land’s arguments would suggest that Seneca seeks

to litigate exclusively in both federal and state courts. 

Strange Land initially describes Seneca’s Federal Action as

an “offensive reactive suit,” indicating that Seneca filed in

federal court because it anticipated being sued in a

nonremovable state court action. But this argument is

credible only if a state court suit Strange Land filed against

Seneca would have been nonremovable. At the beginning of
SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND 19

the litigation, the parties Seneca identified and brought into

the litigation were Strange Land (incorporated and

headquartered in Nevada), U.S. Bank (incorporated and

headquartered in California), and itself (incorporated and

headquartered in New York). Even assuming that Seneca

also deemed Belfor (incorporated in Colorado and

headquartered in Michigan) to be a necessary party, any

insurance recovery suit Strange Land might have brought

against Seneca in Nevada state court would have been

removable by Seneca to Nevada federal court. There is thus

no reason to think Seneca filed the Federal Action to avoid

being brought into a nonremovable state court suit.

At the same time, Strange Land argues that Seneca’s

choice to raise claims in the State Action constitutes forum

shopping because Seneca prefers not to be held to the higher

federal pleading standard. If Seneca preferred to be in state

court and was “forum shopping” to get there, it would

presumably have filed its original action in state court; not

requested that the state court postpone its proceedings; and

not opposed federal abstention. Such behavior would be

irrational if Seneca’s goal was to wind up in state court under

more favorable pleading standards. Thus, neither party has

a viable claim that the other engaged in forum shopping.

V.

“To determine whether a [Colorado River] stay is

warranted, the relevant factors must be balanced, with the

balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of

jurisdiction.” Madonna, 914 F.2d at 1372 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Most of the Colorado River factors in this

case are neutral or favor the exercise of jurisdiction by the

district court. The reasons that the district court offered to
20 SENECA INS. CO. V. STRANGE LAND

justify abstention—that the parallel proceedings will involve

piecemeal disposition of the issues, that state law provides the

rule of decision, and that the state proceeding is better suited

to promote resolution of all the issues among the parties—are

likely to be present in nearly every instance of concurrent

state and federal suits where state law provides the rule of

decision. These concerns “do not create the ‘exceptional

circumstances’ required for Colorado River deference

because they are present to this degree in many instances of

parallel federal-state litigation.” Id.; see also Neuchatel Swiss

Gen. Ins. Co., 925 F.2d at 1195. The Federal and State

Actions are parallel disputes occurring in multiple fora and

concerning substantially the same issues. Nothing about this

case is “exceptional” so as to warrant disregarding the

“virtually unflagging obligation” of a federal court to exercise

its jurisdiction. The district court’s application of Colorado

River was an abuse of its narrow discretion, essentially

transforming the strong presumption against abstention into

a presumption in favor of abstention where state law issues

predominate. We therefore VACATE the stay order and

REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.

VACATED; REMANDED.