# Official Journal C 229/29 J

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
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| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 229 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6629 June 2023 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 229

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6629 June 2023

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | RESOLUTIONS |
| | Euronest Parliamentary Assembly |
| 2023/C 229/01 | Resolution on promoting governance in public institutions on the basis of political dialogue and institutional cooperation in order to increase efficiency and administrative capacity | 1 |
| 2023/C 229/02 | Resolution on capital cities: economic development and challenges in the post COVID-19 reality | 8 |
| 2023/C 229/03 | Resolution on green energy transition as a response to the current energy security challenges in the Eastern Partnership in the context of Russia’s war of aggression and occupation | 16 |
| 2023/C 229/04 | Resolution on the compatibility between vaccine programmes of the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries and their alignment | 22 |
| 2023/C 229/05 | Resolution on the strategic importance of starting EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova | 29 |
| 2023/C 229/06 | Resolution on the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine | 30 |
| 2023/C 229/07 | Resolution on supporting the path of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia towards EU membership | 33 |

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

Euronest Parliamentary Assembly

2023/C 229/01

Resolution on promoting governance in public institutions on the basis of political dialogue and institutional cooperation in order to increase efficiency and administrative capacity

1

2023/C 229/02

Resolution on capital cities: economic development and challenges in the post COVID-19 reality

8

2023/C 229/03

Resolution on green energy transition as a response to the current energy security challenges in the Eastern Partnership in the context of Russia’s war of aggression and occupation

16

2023/C 229/04

Resolution on the compatibility between vaccine programmes of the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries and their alignment

22

2023/C 229/05

Resolution on the strategic importance of starting EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova

29

2023/C 229/06

Resolution on the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine

30

2023/C 229/07

Resolution on supporting the path of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia towards EU membership

33

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EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

Euronest Parliamentary Assembly

| 29.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 229/1 |
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29.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 229/1

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Resolution on promoting governance in public institutions on the basis of political dialogue and institutional cooperation in order to increase efficiency and administrative capacity

(2023/C 229/01)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

Having regard to UN General Assembly Resolutions 68/262, 71/205, 72/190, 73/263, 74/168, 75/192, 76/179, 73/194, 74/17, 75/29 and 76/70, and to UN General Assembly Resolutions ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022, entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’, ES-11/2 of 24 March 2022, entitled ‘Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine’, and ES-11/4 of 12 October 2022, entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’,

Having regard to the EU-Eastern Partnership foreign ministers meeting of 12 December 2022,

Having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (1),

Having regard to the European Council’s decision of 23 June 2022 to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and to recognise Georgia’s European perspective,

Having regard to the EU General Affairs Council conclusions of 13 December 2022 on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, which reaffirm that the future of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and of their citizens lies within the European Union,

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 14 June 2018 on Georgian occupied territories 10 years after the Russian invasion (2),

Having regard to the joint declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit held in Brussels on 15 December 2021, as well as to the declarations from previous Eastern Partnership summits,

Having regard to the joint staff working document of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 2 July 2021, entitled ‘Recovery, resilience and reform: post 2020 Eastern Partnership priorities’ (SWD(2021) 186), their joint communication of 18 March 2020, entitled ‘Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020: Reinforcing Resilience — an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all’ (JOIN(2020) 7), and their joint staff working document of 9 June 2017, entitled ‘Eastern Partnership — 20 Deliverables for 2020: Focusing on key priorities and tangible results’ (SWD(2017) 300),

Having regard to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly resolution of 16 April 2021 on strengthening democratic processes: the role of political parties, civil society, a fair electoral environment, and free and pluralistic media (3),

Having regard to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly resolution of 9 December 2019 on Parliamentary oversight as a tool to strengthen democracy, accountability and effectiveness of state institutions in the Eastern Partner countries (4),

Having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit (5),

Having regard to the Council conclusions of 11 May 2020 on Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020,

Having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part (6), to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part (7), and to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (8),

Having regard to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part (9) (the CEPA),

Having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part (10), and to the ongoing negotiations on an enhanced agreement,

Having regard to the 12 Principles of Good Democratic Governance, as enshrined in the Strategy on Innovation and Good Governance at Local Level, endorsed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in March 2008,

Having regard to the statements by the President of the European Council of 14 December 2021, 6 April 2022 and 23 May 2022, the statement by the President of the European Council and the President of France of 4 February 2022, and the statement following the quadrilateral meeting between the President of Azerbaijan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, the President of France and the President of the European Council of 6 October 2022,

| A. | whereas good democratic governance at all levels is essential for effective economic and social progress and for building fair, stable and prosperous societies; whereas deficiencies in governance not only hamper prosperity, but can also significantly undermine a country’s resilience and security; |
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A.

whereas good democratic governance at all levels is essential for effective economic and social progress and for building fair, stable and prosperous societies; whereas deficiencies in governance not only hamper prosperity, but can also significantly undermine a country’s resilience and security;

| B. | whereas the governance situation is different in every Eastern Partnership (EaP) country, but significant improvements could be achieved in all of them, in particular by implementing reforms in public administration and the justice sector, by introducing more efficient policies to fight corruption and by enhancing transparency and democratic accountability; |
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B.

whereas the governance situation is different in every Eastern Partnership (EaP) country, but significant improvements could be achieved in all of them, in particular by implementing reforms in public administration and the justice sector, by introducing more efficient policies to fight corruption and by enhancing transparency and democratic accountability;

| C. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical landscape and changed the security dimension of the EaP; |
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C.

whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical landscape and changed the security dimension of the EaP;

| D. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has prompted three countries with EU association agreements — Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova — to submit membership applications to the European Union; whereas on 17 June 2022, the Commission published its opinions on these countries’ membership applications, recommending to the Council that all three countries be given the perspective to become members of the European Union, and recommending, in particular, that candidate status be granted to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and to Georgia once the country has addressed the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion; |
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D.

whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has prompted three countries with EU association agreements — Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova — to submit membership applications to the European Union; whereas on 17 June 2022, the Commission published its opinions on these countries’ membership applications, recommending to the Council that all three countries be given the perspective to become members of the European Union, and recommending, in particular, that candidate status be granted to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and to Georgia once the country has addressed the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion;

| E. | whereas on 23 June 2022, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and recognised Georgia’s European perspective while confirming its readiness to grant the country candidate status once the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion on Georgia’s membership application had been addressed; |
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E.

whereas on 23 June 2022, the European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and recognised Georgia’s European perspective while confirming its readiness to grant the country candidate status once the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion on Georgia’s membership application had been addressed;

| F. | whereas the process for the accession of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia will by definition change the character and functional role of the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy and will have a significant influence on the necessary political and institutional restructuring of the policies constituting the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy; |
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F.

whereas the process for the accession of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia will by definition change the character and functional role of the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy and will have a significant influence on the necessary political and institutional restructuring of the policies constituting the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy;

| G. | whereas the merit-based accession process requires these countries to undertake substantial reforms to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, in particular on the rule of law, democratic standards, fundamental rights and freedoms, and minority rights; |
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G.

whereas the merit-based accession process requires these countries to undertake substantial reforms to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, in particular on the rule of law, democratic standards, fundamental rights and freedoms, and minority rights;

| H. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has brought additional challenges, exacerbating certain systemic deficiencies while also providing an impetus for change; |
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H.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has brought additional challenges, exacerbating certain systemic deficiencies while also providing an impetus for change;

| I. | whereas in its recommendation of 23 November 2022 concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement, the European Parliament advised establishing clear deadlines for concluding negotiations with the accession countries by the end of the current decade at the latest; |
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I.

whereas in its recommendation of 23 November 2022 concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement, the European Parliament advised establishing clear deadlines for concluding negotiations with the accession countries by the end of the current decade at the latest;

| J. | whereas in its conclusions of 13 December 2022 on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, the Council recalled that the Commission had been invited to report on the fulfilment of the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinions on the respective membership applications as part of its regular enlargement package in 2023, and, without prejudice to this comprehensive regular reporting, took note of the Commission’s intention to provide an update in spring 2023; |
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J.

whereas in its conclusions of 13 December 2022 on Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process, the Council recalled that the Commission had been invited to report on the fulfilment of the conditions specified in the Commission’s opinions on the respective membership applications as part of its regular enlargement package in 2023, and, without prejudice to this comprehensive regular reporting, took note of the Commission’s intention to provide an update in spring 2023;

| K. | whereas the digital transformation offers many opportunities to improve governance and democratic participation; |
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K.

whereas the digital transformation offers many opportunities to improve governance and democratic participation;

| L. | whereas the EU and its Member States have engaged in political dialogue and institutional cooperation with, and provided support and technical assistance to, the EaP countries with a view to building capacity and helping them carry out necessary reforms; whereas such support remains important for the future and is closely linked to the EaP countries’ commitment to core EU values such as democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms; |
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L.

whereas the EU and its Member States have engaged in political dialogue and institutional cooperation with, and provided support and technical assistance to, the EaP countries with a view to building capacity and helping them carry out necessary reforms; whereas such support remains important for the future and is closely linked to the EaP countries’ commitment to core EU values such as democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms;

| M. | whereas the Russian Federation continues to blatantly violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, undermining the security, humanitarian and human rights situation and violating fundamental principles and norms of international law in Georgia’s occupied regions; |
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M.

whereas the Russian Federation continues to blatantly violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, undermining the security, humanitarian and human rights situation and violating fundamental principles and norms of international law in Georgia’s occupied regions;

| N. | whereas an environment of peace and stability is crucial for maintaining effective democratic governance; whereas greater EU involvement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the EaP region is highly desirable and recommended; |
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N.

whereas an environment of peace and stability is crucial for maintaining effective democratic governance; whereas greater EU involvement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the EaP region is highly desirable and recommended;

| 1. | Recognises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical landscape and an increasingly difficult security environment, affecting the stability and governance of the EaP countries; notes that the Russian military began a brutal assault on the people of Ukraine without provocation, without justification and without necessity, and that these aggressive actions undermine security and harm stability in the whole EaP region; acknowledges that this security threat is an unprecedented danger to the further successful development of the EaP initiative; |
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1.

| 2. | Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal occupation of Ukrainian territory and its involvement in both military action and cyberwarfare in the EaP region; reiterates the EU’s commitment to, and underlines its unequivocal support for, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the EaP countries within their internationally recognised borders, and their efforts to fully enforce those principles; |
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2.

| 3. | Strongly condemns Russia’s missile attacks on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, which have caused enormous suffering and destruction and therefore cannot be tolerated; |
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3.

| 4. | Underlines that the EU Strategic Compass, which was approved in March 2022 with a view to strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030, should be extended to the EaP region; stresses that further tailored bilateral partnerships should be implemented with like-minded countries and strategic partners, including by enhancing dialogue and cooperation, promoting participation in Common Security Defence Policy missions and operations, and supporting capacity-building; |
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4.

| 5. | Calls on the Russian Federation to fulfil its international obligations under the EU-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008, to withdraw all its military and security personnel from Georgia’s occupied territories and to allow the EU monitoring mission unhindered access to the whole territory of Georgia pursuant to its mandate; |
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5.

| 6. | Welcomes the European Council’s decision of 23 June 2022 to grant Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova the status of EU candidate country and its recognition of the European perspective for Georgia; recalls that enlargement is a merit-based process and that the three countries will be evaluated on the basis of their progress on fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, requiring their authorities to carry out substantial reforms to this end, in particular on the rule of law, democratic standards, fundamental rights and freedoms, and minority rights; welcomes, in this context, the effective and immediate steps taken by these countries to address their respective priorities; welcomes this renewed impetus for reforms in the area of governance; underlines that the enlargement policy, as a geostrategic investment of the EU, remains a strong anchor for peace, democracy, prosperity, security and stability in Europe; stresses that the peaceful resolution, on the basis of international law and good neighbourly relations, of ongoing or unresolved conflicts in the region is key to building and strengthening resilient and sustainable democracies in the EaP countries; recalls that peace and security require strong, honest and publicly accountable institutions, good governance and respect for the rule of law; strongly encourages the EaP countries to continue engaging in the relevant reforms, as only internal resilience rooted in strong and democratic institutions will allow them to develop the necessary resistance to external threats; |
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6.

| 7. | Calls on the EU institutions and the governments of the EaP countries to shape the accession process, from the very outset, in a way that ensures that it is transparent and inclusive for all citizens of the EaP countries applying for EU membership, guaranteeing them the right to participate in both parliamentary and participatory decision-making processes; |
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7.

| 8. | Reaffirms the central role played by the legislature in state systems; calls for strong and efficient parliaments to remain a basis of democracy and the rule of law; insists that parliaments’ powers of scrutiny must be strengthened and that the authority of parliaments and the ability of their members to exercise their mandates must not be limited; |
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8.

| 9. | Welcomes the fact that one of the pillars of the new agenda for the EaP, as endorsed at the December 2021 Eastern Partnership Summit, places a strong emphasis on good governance, the rule of law, security and resilient societies, underpinning the agenda’s other, investment-focused, pillar; stresses that efficient and accountable institutions are a fundamental precondition for the effective use of financial support to address all other priorities; |
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9.

| 10. | Urges the EaP countries to continue resolutely on the path of reforms to improve democratic governance and the rule of law; highlights the importance of sustained EU support for reforms to improve governance and the rule of law in the EaP countries, in particular in the context of the implementation of the association agreements and the CEPA, and encourages the continued application of the ‘more for more’ principle to stimulate progress on reforms; |
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10.

| 11. | Stresses the importance of constructive political dialogue and cooperative working relations between national political parties and insists that existing differences must be overcome in order to pursue democratic reforms, particularly in partner countries aspiring to EU accession; |
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11.

| 12. | Welcomes the positive contribution made by initiatives and instruments that provide technical assistance and support capacity-building, such as the joint EU and Council of Europe programme ‘Partnership for Good Governance’, and in particular institution-building tools such as Twinning, the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange and the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management initiative, all of which give targeted support to public administrations in partner countries; supports the continuation of such initiatives and instruments; underscores that facilitating the sharing of experiences and best practices is important for the process of democratic transition; |
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12.

| 13. | Recalls that the cornerstone of good governance is an independent judiciary, which is crucial for safeguarding citizens’ rights regardless of their nationality, gender and religion, for upholding the rule of law and a democratic form of government, and for ensuring a functioning business environment, which is vital for economic development; is concerned at the slow progress and negative tendencies in this area and stresses, in particular, the need to guarantee that all appointments, promotions and dismissals in the judiciary are entirely merit-based and made in line with international norms, without any political interference; recalls, in addition, the need to ensure the independence and autonomy of the prosecution services, which must be able to function free from political pressure; encourages Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to work resolutely towards delivering on the recommendations on judicial reform set out in the Commission’s opinions; |
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13.

| 14. | Notes that polarisation continues to define the political environment in several EaP countries and calls on all political stakeholders to unite around the key goal of ambitious democratic, judicial and anti-corruption reforms; |
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14.

| 15. | Welcomes the determination of the authorities of the Republic of Moldova to address the priorities identified in the Commission’s opinion and encourages them to continue working towards consolidating the independence and integrity of the justice sector; points out that sustained support from the EU institutions for the reform of the judiciary is essential for all EaP countries; |
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15.

| 16. | Insists that the fight against corruption and state capture must be made a priority, including by better enforcing anti-corruption legislation, ending impunity and reducing the space for corruption by means of increased transparency on matters such as public procurement and beneficial ownership; welcomes the launch of the EU4Integrity programme and the establishment of electronic asset declaration systems in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; welcomes the establishment of specialised anti-corruption bodies, particularly the High Anti-Corruption Court in Ukraine, the independent Anti-Corruption Bureau in Georgia and the system of anti-corruption institutions in Armenia; commends the steps taken by the Georgian authorities to fight corruption and notes that Georgia ranks 45th out of 180 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index; |
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16.

| 17. | Welcomes Georgia’s positive step of establishing a new, independent Anti-Corruption Bureau accountable to the Georgian Parliament and the Anti-Corruption Interagency Council, and notes that the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s main task will be to promote the fight against corruption and prevent corruption; |
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17.

| 18. | Welcomes the adoption in the Republic of Moldova of a law allowing the creation of a mechanism for the prosecution, trial and conviction in absentia of persons who are evading prosecution, as it will lead to final court sentences in a number of high-profile cases related to corruption, money laundering and other serious crimes; encourages the authorities to improve the legal framework on whistleblowers and to accelerate their work towards demonstrating progress and a solid track record on stepping up the fight against corruption; notes that in recent years, Georgia has made significant improvements to its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing system and has demonstrated a strong political commitment to fighting money laundering and terrorist financing; |
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18.

| 19. | Is seriously concerned that corruption and state capture by elites and oligarchs not only hamper economic and social development, but may also represent channels for external interference pursuing geopolitical objectives contrary to the democratic will and interests of the population; underlines the importance of curbing the influence of oligarchs and patronage networks; encourages Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to work resolutely towards delivering on the recommendations on ‘de-oligarchisation’ set out in the Commission’s opinions; acknowledges that this is a challenging process owing to the need to identify proper legal instruments to deal effectively with vested interests and oligarchic influence; nonetheless encourages the EaP countries to prioritise this issue, which is of fundamental importance to their citizens; |
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19.

| 20. | Insists that a genuine civil society is crucial for ensuring proper public scrutiny of decision-making and for promoting the social acceptability of reforms; calls for increased support for civil society organisations and the independent media, including through sustainable financing, and presses for the lifting of any restrictions on their work, including on their registration and their receipt of foreign funding; is concerned about the attacks on critical voices in the media and about politically motivated court cases against media managers; points out the vital role of independent media in every democratic society and calls on the EaP countries to intensify their efforts to safeguard media pluralism and independence, including by ensuring ownership transparency in the media market; stresses the crucial importance of maintaining the freedom of the press and freedom of speech, which are the cornerstone of European Union values and a precondition for further European integration; urges all EU and EaP states to reduce state regulation of the media and abstain from any interference in public or independent media editorials; underlines, at the same time, that Russia’s ongoing aggression has a hybrid nature and uses democratic values such as media freedom to counter democracy and spread propaganda containing false information, and stresses that the information security policies of EU and EaP countries should take this into account for the development of security strategies; |
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20.

| 21. | Reaffirms that holding free and fair elections, based on democratic principles, creates the main conditions for good and effective governance; reiterates the need to ensure that election processes comply fully with international standards, the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) and the opinions of the Venice Commission, in particular with regard to the adoption of legislative amendments concerning electoral laws and party financing; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption, with multi-party support, of amendments to the Election Code of Georgia dealing with electronic voting and party financing, in accordance with the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission; |
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21.

| 22. | Encourages further public administration reforms aimed at ensuring accountable, transparent and efficient public administration at all levels, in particular in the area of public finance management; highlights the role of EU public sector expertise, provided through peer-to-peer knowledge exchange and institutional partnerships, in building capacity in the public sector; welcomes the intention to establish an Eastern Partnership Academy for Public Administration, as set out in the joint declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit of 15 December 2021, and calls for the Academy to become operational quickly; |
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22.

| 23. | Stresses the far-reaching benefits of digitalisation in terms of enhancing good governance, transparency and the fight against corruption; notes that digital technologies can significantly facilitate citizens’ participation in and scrutiny of decision-making processes; supports the new EaP agenda’s focus on stimulating the digital transformation and e-governance in particular; |
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23.

| 24. | Regrets the decision of the Belarusian authorities to suspend their participation in the EaP; looks forward to resuming cooperation with Belarus as soon as the necessary conditions for peaceful democratic transition are in place, with a view to building on a joint agenda based on common values and shared interests; continues its engagement with and support for the citizens, civil society and independent media of Belarus; |
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24.

| 25. | Appeals to all European political families to help their sister parties in the Belarusian opposition to remain viable entities in the light of the change made by the unrecognised Lukashenka regime to the law on political parties in Belarus, and urges them to sustain active cooperation with them, regardless of whether they are registered; |
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25.

| 26. | Emphasises the need for non-discrimination against vulnerable groups, including minority groups, LGBTIQ+ persons and persons with disabilities, and for gender equality, in order to improve the representation of different groups and their socio-economic conditions and thereby foster stable and more equal societies and good governance; |
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26.

| 27. | Welcomes the fact that Armenia and Azerbaijan have confirmed their commitment to working towards a peace treaty, reasserted their commitment to the Charter of the United Nations and the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, through which they recognise each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and confirmed that this will be a basis for the work of the border delimitation commissions; welcomes the successful implementation of the civilian EU monitoring mission in Armenia along the border with Azerbaijan; welcomes the establishment of a civilian EU mission in Armenia, the ultimate goal of which is to contribute to sustainable peace in the region by reducing the number of incidents in conflict-affected and border areas in Armenia, to reduce the risk level for the population living in such areas and thereby to contribute to the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan; echoes the President of the European Council’s assertion that ensuring the appropriate distancing of forces is essential for incident prevention; welcomes the agreement on the need to proceed with unblocking transport links in the region, without extraterritorial claims; |
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27.

| 28. | Calls for a full and speedy resolution of all outstanding humanitarian issues, including the release of all Armenian detainees, the clarification of the fate of all persons who went missing or were victims of enforced disappearances during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the implementation of a UNESCO mission aimed at protecting the region’s cultural heritage; welcomes the EU’s support in humanitarian demining efforts; stresses that the rights and security of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh need to be addressed in order to ensure lasting peace in the region; |
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28.

| 29. | Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the European Parliament, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, and the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries. |
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29.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0406.

(2)  OJ C 28, 27.1.2020, p. 97.

(3)  OJ C 361, 8.9.2021, p. 1.

(4)  OJ C 134, 24.4.2020, p. 1.

(5)  OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 114.

(6)  OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(7)  OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(8)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(9)  OJ L 23, 26.1.2018, p. 4.

(10)  OJ L 246, 17.9.1999, p. 3.

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| 29.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 229/8 |
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29.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 229/8

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Resolution on capital cities: economic development and challenges in the post COVID-19 reality

(2023/C 229/02)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

Having regard to Articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as to Articles 145 to 149 (Title IX — Employment) and Articles 165 and 166 (Title XII — Education, vocational training, youth and sport) thereof,

Having regard to the development of the Eastern Neighbourhood policy since 2004 and its Eastern Partnership component since 2009 and in particular to the Commission’s progress reports on its implementation,

Having regard to the Association Agreements between the EU and Georgia (1), the EU and Moldova (2) and the EU and Ukraine (3), which set the objective of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, as well as to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Armenia (4) and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan (5),

Having regard to the decision by the European Council to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and to recognise the European perspective of Georgia,

Having regard to the Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 3 May 2011 (last amended on 26 June 2018) (6),

Having regard to the Commission and European External Action Service joint staff working document of 9 June 2017 entitled ‘Eastern Partnership — 20 Deliverables for 2020: focusing on key priorities and tangible results’ (SWD(2017) 300),

Having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the Vice-President / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 March 2020 entitled ‘Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020: Reinforcing Resilience — an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all’ (JOIN(2020) 007) and to the Council conclusions of 11 May 2020 on Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020,

Having regard to the message of the Bureau of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 12 June 2020 on the occasion of the video conference of the leaders of the Eastern Partnership of 18 June 2020,

Having regard to the joint declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit held in Brussels on 15 December 2021;

Having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the June 2020 Summit (7),

Having regard to the remarks made by European Council President Charles Michel after the Eastern Partnership leaders’ video conference of 18 June 2020,

Having regard to the 2018-2020 action plan of the Conference of the Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership,

Having regard to the resolution by the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 9 December 2019 on innovation in education and education reforms in the EU and Eastern partners’ countries: challenges and opportunities (8),

Having regard to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) adopted at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015 and in particular to Sustainable Development Goal 4 on ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all,

Having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission at the Social Summit for Fair Jobs and Growth in Gothenburg on 17 November 2017 and in particular to Pillar 1 on the right to quality and inclusive education, training and lifelong learning for everyone in order to maintain and acquire skills that enable them to participate fully in society and manage successfully transitions in the labour market,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/817 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 establishing Erasmus+: the Union Programme for education and training, youth and sport and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 (9),

Having regard to the resolution by the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 22 March 2016 on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, work experience and university diplomas within the Bologna process (10),

Having regard to the Commission staff working document of 10 June 2016 entitled ‘Analytical underpinning for a New Skills Agenda for Europe’ (SWD(2016) 195),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 10 June 2016 entitled ‘A New Skills Agenda for Europe: working together to strengthen human capital, employability and competitiveness’ (COM(2016) 381),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 7 December 2016 on improving and modernising education (COM(2016) 941),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 17 January 2018 on the Digital Education Action Plan (COM(2018) 022),

Having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 January 2018 for a Council recommendation on promoting common values, inclusive education and the European dimension of teaching (COM(2018) 023),

Having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 January 2018 for a Council recommendation on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning (COM(2018) 024),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 22 May 2018 entitled ‘Building a strong Europe: the role of youth, education and culture policies’ (COM(2018) 268),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 on achieving the European Education Area by 2025 (COM(2020) 625),

Having regard to the Council recommendation of 26 November 2018 on promoting automatic mutual recognition of higher education and upper secondary education and training qualifications and the outcomes of learning periods abroad (11),

Having regard to the Rome Ministerial Communiqué of 19 November 2020 following the ministerial meeting of the European Higher Education Area,

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 11 December 2018 on education in the digital era: challenges, opportunities and lessons for EU policy design (12),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2020 entitled ‘EUROPE 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ (COM(2010)2020),

Having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee opinion of 5 May 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States’,

Having regard to the Commission communication of 30 September 2020 entitled ‘Digital Education Action Plan 2021-2027: Resetting education and training for the digital age’ (COM(2020) 624), which builds on the 2018-2020 Digital Action Plan,

Having regard to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No 111) of 25 June 1958,

Having regard to the ILO Human Resources Development Convention (No 142) of 23 June 1975,

Having regard to the Commission proposal of 26 February 2020 for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (COM(2020)0070) and to the European Economic and Social Committee opinion of 5 May 2020 and the European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 July 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States (13),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 on a New Industrial Strategy for Europe (COM(2020) 102),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 27 May 2020 entitled ‘Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation’ (COM(2020) 456),

Having regard to the European Council conclusions of 21 July 2020, to Parliament’s resolution of 23 July 2020 on the conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting of 17-21 July 2020 (14) and to the European Council conclusions of 10 and 11 December 2020,

Having regard to the Commission report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2019 (COM(2020) 296),

Having regard to the European Investment Bank Annual Report 2018 on the Eastern Partnership Technical Assistance Trust Fund,

Having regard to the Commission proposal of 6 July 2018 to establish the ‘Digital Europe Programme 2021-2027’ (COM(2018) 434),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 to set out ‘The European Green Deal’, in particular its emphasis on strong environment, energy and climate partnerships with the Eastern Partnership states (COM(2019) 640),

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 September 2017 establishing the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), the EFSD Guarantee and the EFSD Guarantee Fund (15),

Having regard to the Commission proposal of 28 May 2020 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2020) 408),

Having regard to the UN Paris Climate Convention of 12 December 2015,

Having regard to the Commission communication of 19 January 2021 to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council entitled ‘A united front to beat COVID-19’, in particular its call to ensure access for the Eastern Partnership countries to some of the 2,3 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine secured by the EU (COM(2021) 035),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 10 March 2020 entitled ‘An SME Strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe’ (COM(2020) 103),

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2019 on foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes (16),

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 19 September 2019 on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe (17),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020) 098),

Having regard to the Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (‘ET 2020’) (18),

Having regard to the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of a Programme for the Union’s action in the field of health — for the period 2021-2027 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 282/2014 (‘EU4Health Programme’) (COM(2020) 405),

Having regard to the European Partnership Foreign Ministers meeting of 12 December 2022 under the chairmanship of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell,

Having regard to the joint staff working document entitled ‘Recovery, resilience and reform: post 2020 Eastern Partnership priorities’,

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2022 on security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy (19),

Having regard to the European Investment Bank Evaluation of the Eastern Partnership Technical Assistance Trust Fund (2010-2019),

Having regard to the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757 (revision of the EU emissions trading system),

Having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 09/2021 entitled ‘Disinformation affecting the EU: tackled but not tamed’,

Having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (20),

Having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 and 25 March 2022,

| A. | whereas the economic consequences and other repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic have had a significant impact on Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries through their effect on trade and remittances; whereas governments responded to the pandemic and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia introduced immediate prohibitions and restrictions in a number of areas; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the economic consequences and other repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic have had a significant impact on Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries through their effect on trade and remittances; whereas governments responded to the pandemic and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia introduced immediate prohibitions and restrictions in a number of areas;

| B. | whereas the European Union mobilised over EUR 2,5 billion to support Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in tackling COVID-19; whereas it also supported the deployment of COVID-19 vaccines and vaccination in the EaP (EUR 40 million) and the sharing by Member States of vaccines approved by the European Medicines Agency with EaP countries, facilitated through a Team Europe approach mechanism coordinated by Poland (EUR 35 million); |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the European Union mobilised over EUR 2,5 billion to support Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine in tackling COVID-19; whereas it also supported the deployment of COVID-19 vaccines and vaccination in the EaP (EUR 40 million) and the sharing by Member States of vaccines approved by the European Medicines Agency with EaP countries, facilitated through a Team Europe approach mechanism coordinated by Poland (EUR 35 million);

| C. | whereas Georgia was hit harder by the slowdown in tourism than any other EaP country and the impact on the Azerbaijani tourism sector was also devastating; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Georgia was hit harder by the slowdown in tourism than any other EaP country and the impact on the Azerbaijani tourism sector was also devastating;

| D. | whereas restrictions for containing the further spread of the virus had a negative impact on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); whereas in Armenia’s case, an outbreak in Yerevan meant SMEs there suffered a more destructive impact than in other communities; whereas SMEs in Azerbaijan’s major cities and in the cities of other EaP countries reported problems caused by a drop in demand, supply chain disruption and falling sales and profits; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas restrictions for containing the further spread of the virus had a negative impact on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); whereas in Armenia’s case, an outbreak in Yerevan meant SMEs there suffered a more destructive impact than in other communities; whereas SMEs in Azerbaijan’s major cities and in the cities of other EaP countries reported problems caused by a drop in demand, supply chain disruption and falling sales and profits;

| E. | whereas a drastic drop in foreign direct investment in the EaP region is affecting the region’s post-crisis recovery; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas a drastic drop in foreign direct investment in the EaP region is affecting the region’s post-crisis recovery;

| F. | whereas EUR 100 million was provided through the Team Europe support programme to help SMEs, self-employed people and others to easily access credit and boost their businesses after the crisis; whereas over EUR 200 million from existing credit lines and grants was provided to SMEs in local currencies through the EU4Business Initiative; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas EUR 100 million was provided through the Team Europe support programme to help SMEs, self-employed people and others to easily access credit and boost their businesses after the crisis; whereas over EUR 200 million from existing credit lines and grants was provided to SMEs in local currencies through the EU4Business Initiative;

| G. | whereas the educational system was severely affected during the pandemic due to an immediate transition from traditional learning approaches to online education; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the educational system was severely affected during the pandemic due to an immediate transition from traditional learning approaches to online education;

| H. | whereas the level of digital services development differs between EaP countries and discrepancies can be observed between their internet penetration rates; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas the level of digital services development differs between EaP countries and discrepancies can be observed between their internet penetration rates;

| I. | whereas the services sector was hit the hardest in the EaP countries due to lower internet penetration and a lack of cyber-commerce development; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the services sector was hit the hardest in the EaP countries due to lower internet penetration and a lack of cyber-commerce development;

| J. | whereas an overall assessment of the EaP countries reveals that cities suffered the worst and deepest economic recession, in particular those with a high concentration of population, economic activity and cases of COVID-19, while they were also worse affected by the lack of communication, closer proximity and supply chain disruptions; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas an overall assessment of the EaP countries reveals that cities suffered the worst and deepest economic recession, in particular those with a high concentration of population, economic activity and cases of COVID-19, while they were also worse affected by the lack of communication, closer proximity and supply chain disruptions;

| K. | whereas the measures adopted by the EaP countries were aligned with those taken across the EU to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on SMEs; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the measures adopted by the EaP countries were aligned with those taken across the EU to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on SMEs;

| L. | whereas measures adopted by governments to mitigate the health crisis led to the full or partial closure and suspension of many businesses, which drove up unemployment; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas measures adopted by governments to mitigate the health crisis led to the full or partial closure and suspension of many businesses, which drove up unemployment;

| M. | whereas high unemployment and low savings rates in the EaP region might lead to a prolonged economic downturn and poverty; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas high unemployment and low savings rates in the EaP region might lead to a prolonged economic downturn and poverty;

| N. | whereas economic recovery in the EaP region is expected to be a long and complex process; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas economic recovery in the EaP region is expected to be a long and complex process;

| O. | whereas large-scale liquidations and bankruptcies have been mitigated in the EaP countries through the provision of loans and short-term financing to assist SMEs during the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas large-scale liquidations and bankruptcies have been mitigated in the EaP countries through the provision of loans and short-term financing to assist SMEs during the COVID-19 pandemic;

| P. | whereas economic difficulties that were caused or exacerbated by the pandemic could further increase the unemployment rate and create additional obstacles for employability; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas economic difficulties that were caused or exacerbated by the pandemic could further increase the unemployment rate and create additional obstacles for employability;

| Q. | whereas a lack of investment in digital technology is widening the inequalities between companies, people and places; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas a lack of investment in digital technology is widening the inequalities between companies, people and places;

| R. | whereas a significant drop in consumer demand across the EaP countries, including in their capital cities, can be perceived as a long-term consequence of COVID-19; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas a significant drop in consumer demand across the EaP countries, including in their capital cities, can be perceived as a long-term consequence of COVID-19;

| S. | whereas the EaP countries should place a firm emphasis on the role of education in social and economic development; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the EaP countries should place a firm emphasis on the role of education in social and economic development;

| T. | whereas the unprovoked Russian war of aggression has had a devastating effect not only on Ukraine but on the EaP region as a whole, affecting all areas of public life, including an unforeseen impact on healthcare and societal wellbeing; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the unprovoked Russian war of aggression has had a devastating effect not only on Ukraine but on the EaP region as a whole, affecting all areas of public life, including an unforeseen impact on healthcare and societal wellbeing;

| U. | whereas the European Union has reaffirmed its commitment to the EaP and its willingness to make the EaP more flexible and tailored to the needs of partner countries; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the European Union has reaffirmed its commitment to the EaP and its willingness to make the EaP more flexible and tailored to the needs of partner countries;

| 1. | Underlines that COVID-19 had a powerful, negative impact on the capital cities of the EaP countries, affecting central and local authorities, as well as business and society; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Notes that the authorities had to find alternatives and look for solutions to minimise the widespread economic damage caused by the pandemic in EaP capital cities; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Notes that COVID-19 is one of the main factors impacting labour migration dynamics in the region; notes, in this regard, that the pandemic significantly decreased people’s mobility, which pushed up unemployment in the capital cities; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Highlights that the COVID-19 crisis led to a severe economic recession affecting economies and societies alike; notes at the same time that it represents an opportunity to rethink existing models of cooperation between different domestic and international stakeholders; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Highlights the importance of promoting multilateralism, strategic priorities and the achievement of key international commitments and objectives for education and innovation in the capital cities, including the Sustainable Development Goals, the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Notes that digital technologies for education and training will generally enhance the synergies between the economy and education and that investments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) by education and training institutions, especially those which participate in EU programmes, will bear fruit in the capital cities; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Stresses that the EU’s approach must be oriented towards supporting democratic and economic reforms and strengthening institutional and societal resilience; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Underlines the need to integrate ICTs in teaching and learning processes and to redesign education in order to move away from a model of knowledge transmission to one of knowledge co-creation in the capital cities; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Stresses that by re-training teachers and by modernising the education system to make it fit for the digital age, countries can improve the quality of their education systems; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Notes that the EaP countries can take this opportunity to accelerate their strategies and step up their investments in education and training systems in order to provide high-performance, accessible and inclusive education, including vocational education and training, lifelong learning, upskilling and reskilling; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Advocates strengthening contacts and exchanges with the EaP countries through joint projects developed at civil society level, including by providing support for young students and professionals for participating in EU education and training programmes such as Erasmus+; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Highlights the importance of the EaP countries pursuing these objectives by providing better infrastructure, connectivity and digital equipment and by training teachers to embrace technology and apply digital methodologies; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Notes that the EaP countries can enhance mobility through education and learning to foster the acquisition of key competences and experience that are crucial for active participation in the labour market and in society in general; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Stresses that educational reforms should be carefully promoted through the implementation of key programmes such as Erasmus+, Creative Europe and Horizon Europe, while the capital cities’ accumulated experience would benefit the development of peripheral regions; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Recalls that targeted financial incentives and modular learning opportunities can encourage participation in training in the EaP countries in order to boost their efforts to help low-skilled adults acquire a minimum level of literacy, numeracy and digital skills; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Highlights the need to support centres of academic and research excellence in the region by strengthening academic and educational cooperation between the EaP countries while easing the administrative burden; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Stresses that in order to prevent the detrimental effect on economic growth and development caused by younger and better-educated segments of the workforce leaving their countries of origin, the EaP countries should analyse how to manage the international mobility of highly skilled and qualified workers and share best practices; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Underlines the need to use existing online distance learning courses whenever possible, encourage education technology companies to make their resources more accessible, diversify teaching modes depending on age and capacity and encourage teacher collaboration; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Stresses that in order to produce more digital specialists, the EaP countries should strengthen the teaching of basic digital skills and competences from an early age and develop attractive higher education curricula, while improving the younger generation’s employment prospects; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Notes that special attention should be paid to ensuring equal access for children in remote areas who experience exclusion; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Stresses that in order to promote a workplace culture of gender equality and help combat all forms of discrimination, including gender stereotyping, the EaP countries need to close their gender gaps and promote more gender-sensitive teaching in schools; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Highlights the need to pay additional attention to children with disabilities by ensuring the availability of online education and educational resources; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Stresses the need for civil society actors, employer associations, social partners, academic institutions, training centres and employment agencies to identify and close the gaps between the needs of the EaP countries’ labour markets and the academic qualifications and vocational skills offered by their education and training systems; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Points out the need to equip young people with the tools and knowledge to enable them to engage in civic activism, play an active role in society and build a better future for themselves; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Stresses the need to increase assistance to the citizens of Ukraine, who are currently suffering due to the unjustified and unprovoked Russian military aggression against Ukraine; notes that, according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, between February 2022 and 20 December 2022 more than 16,6 million refugees fled Ukraine for other countries; notes also that, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, between the beginning of the war and 24 December 2022 450 children were killed and 867 wounded; observes that these data do not include data from areas where there are active hostilities; notes further that by 23 December 2022, 2 619 educational institutions in Ukraine had been damaged by bombing and shelling and another 406 had been completely destroyed; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Recalls the need for strong engagement by businesses and higher education institutions to adapt curricula and provide internships through close cooperation between education and training providers and the business sector; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Stresses the need for second-chance policies for vulnerable businesses through the establishment of a brief debt-discharge period, which would eliminate discriminatory laws against re-starters, and through the creation of dedicated guidelines and training courses; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Stresses that the modernisation of the EaP countries’ education and training systems can undoubtedly bring tangible benefits to their own citizens; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Highlights the importance of continuous financial support from EU programmes and funds with an emphasis on modern infrastructure development in order to prepare the EaP countries for future membership of the European Union; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Stresses the important role that the EU can play in supporting the EaP countries’ endeavours; commends the Eastern Partnership European School in Tbilisi, Georgia, as an important mark of the EU’s influence in the region, which provides a unique opportunity for students from the six EaP countries to achieve personal, social and professional success, based on shared core European values; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Stresses that civil society should continue to focus on targeted measures to support local civil society in its fundamental role of monitoring governments’ actions, especially their post-COVID-19 recovery policies; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Highlights that the capital cities of the EaP countries can remove barriers to learning and promote innovative and inclusive education and training for all, thereby making the European Higher Education Area a reality; |
| --- | --- |

32.

| 33. | Underlines the need to reduce the administrative burden by accelerating the implementation of e-government initiatives while providing opportunities for citizens to have access to all necessary public services; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Notes the need to create conditions for young people to study, train, work and engage in society and calls for the EU to further step up its support in this respect; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Stresses the need for investments to strengthen competitiveness and integration into EU value chains; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Highlights the creation of initiatives on cultural and democratic education with a view to boosting mobility and people-to-people contacts and achieving stronger societies through sustainable social and economic development; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Highlights the importance of improving capacity to forecast, address and respond to disinformation activities related to COVID-19 and of addressing societal resilience to the threats of propaganda, fake news and hate speech, without limiting the media’s freedom of speech; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Stresses the importance of creating more quality jobs for young people, which is particularly challenging given the structural drivers of change such as technological innovations and globalisation, in order to prevent any socio-economic consequences of a ‘brain drain’ in EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | Notes that during the COVID-19 pandemic, all EaP countries’ healthcare systems were quickly overwhelmed and therefore policymakers should increase reciprocity and the financing of public healthcare in order to increase preparedness; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | Notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the digital transition and that the EaP countries should rethink the sustainability and efficiency of current educational models; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | Stresses that the EaP countries should cooperate on sharing experiences in post-pandemic recovery policies in order to reinforce preparedness and reciprocity in the face of similar challenges in the future; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | Underlines the need for a clear framework for jobs to drive the twin transition, to ensure a recovery from the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, to strengthen sustainable competitiveness in capital cities, to ensure decent jobs and equal opportunities and to increase stability and prosperity in the region. |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | Underlines the need to bolster strategic investment for sustainable, green and circular economy growth, while improving food security in the EaP region; |
| --- | --- |

43.

| 44. | Stresses the importance of boosting economic development through measures such as increased connectivity and regional development, intra-regional trade, agriculture and rural development with a strong policy emphasis on environmental protection, so as to reinforce resilience to climate change, accelerate the shift towards a low-carbon circular economy and develop the digital economy; |
| --- | --- |

44.

| 45. | Notes the importance of enhancing technical expertise and capacity in order to introduce domestic emissions monitoring, reporting and verification frameworks in accordance with the new Enhanced Transparency Framework under the Paris Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

45.

| 46. | Welcomes the EaP Economic and Investment Plan, which is set to mobilise EUR 2,3 billion from the EU budget in grants, blending and guarantees in order to support the post-pandemic recovery and to sustainably transform the economies of the EaP countries in order to make them more resilient and integrated; notes that the plan could leverage up to EUR 17 billion in public and private investments; |
| --- | --- |

46.

| 47. | Calls on all stakeholders in the EU and the EaP countries to step up efforts to implement high-profile flagship initiatives, including projects which are intended to develop connectivity in the Black Sea, such as the Black Sea underwater electricity transmission cable and fibre-optic cable and direct ferry and feeder services between Georgia and EU Member States (Romania and Bulgaria), which would decrease transit and turnover time and make these regions more accessible; |
| --- | --- |

47.

| 48. | Recalls that the European Union will continue to support those EaP countries wishing to build their resilience and stability in the region by providing various types of cooperation and engagement, including through cyber, hybrid and other non-military means. |
| --- | --- |

48.

---

(1)  OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(2)  OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(3)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(4)  OJ L 23, 26.1.2018, p. 4.

(5)  OJ L 246, 17.9.1999, p. 3.

(6)  OJ C 198, 6.7.2011, p. 4.

(7)  OJ C 362, 8.9.2021, p. 114.

(8)  OJ C 134, 24.4.2020, p. 16.

(9)  OJ L 189, 28.5.2021, p. 1.

(10)  OJ C 193, 31.5.2016, p. 17.

(11)  OJ C 444, 10.12.2018, p. 1.

(12)  OJ C 388, 13.11.2020, p. 2.

(13)  OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 134.

(14)  OJ C 371, 15.9.2021, p. 110.

(15)  OJ L 249, 27.9.2017, p. 1.

(16)  OJ C 202, 28.5.2021, p. 25.

(17)  OJ C 171, 6.5.2021, p. 25.

(18)  OJ C 119, 28.5.2009, p. 2.

(19)  OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 70.

(20)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0406.

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| 29.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 229/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 229/16

---

Resolution on green energy transition as a response to the current energy security challenges in the Eastern Partnership in the context of Russia’s war of aggression and occupation

(2023/C 229/03)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

Having regard to the Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 3 May 2011,

Having regard to the joint declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit held in Brussels on 15 December 2021,

Having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 March 2020 entitled ‘Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020: Reinforcing Resilience — an Eastern Partnership that delivers for all’ (JOIN(2020) 7),

Having regard to the Paris Agreement on climate change, adopted on 12 December 2015 and ratified by the European Union, to which the Eastern Partnership countries are also party,

Having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019) 640) and subsequent legislative proposals and actions,

Having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 on the REPowerEU Plan (COM(2022) 230),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 20 July 2022 entitled ‘Save gas for a safe winter’ (COM(2022) 360) and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 of 5 August 2022 on coordinated demand-reduction measures for gas (1),

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1854 of 6 October 2022 on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices (2),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 13 October 2021 entitled ‘Tackling rising energy prices: a toolbox for action and support’ (COM(2021) 660),

Having regard to the respective Association Agreements between the EU and Georgia (3), Moldova (4) and Ukraine (5), and in particular their provisions on energy cooperation,

Having regard to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part (6) (CEPA), and in particular its provisions on energy cooperation,

Having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, of the other part (7), and to the ongoing negotiations on a new framework agreement,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing Energy Community, to which the three associated countries are contracting parties and Armenia is an observer,

Having regard to the work of Eastern Partnership Platform 3 on connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change, and in particular the Energy Panel,

Having regard to the resolution of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 16 April 2021 entitled ‘Towards energy efficiency, diversification and independence; addressing capacity needs for strengthening European energy policy and countering energy security threats in the Eastern Partnership’,

Having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and in particular to Goal 7 on affordable and clean energy, ‘to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’, and Goal 13 on climate action, ‘to take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts’,

| A. | whereas all people living in the EU and Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries should have access to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, provided through ambitious policies; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas all people living in the EU and Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries should have access to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, provided through ambitious policies;

| B. | whereas Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war against Ukraine and its ongoing occupation of Georgian and Moldovan territories has dramatic consequences for people across the EU and EaP countries, especially the steep rise of energy poverty and the increase of energy prices; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas Russia’s illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war against Ukraine and its ongoing occupation of Georgian and Moldovan territories has dramatic consequences for people across the EU and EaP countries, especially the steep rise of energy poverty and the increase of energy prices;

| C. | whereas Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, especially electricity infrastructure, are war crimes, and whereas cutting off men, women and children from water, electricity and heating, especially in winter, are acts of pure terror; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas Russia’s systematic attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, especially electricity infrastructure, are war crimes, and whereas cutting off men, women and children from water, electricity and heating, especially in winter, are acts of pure terror;

| D. | whereas energy security is a fundamental element of national security for EU and EaP countries; whereas it is important to increase connectivity, domestic renewable energy generation, energy efficiency and energy savings in order to enhance energy security and resilience, as well as to foster social, economic and political stability in the region; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas energy security is a fundamental element of national security for EU and EaP countries; whereas it is important to increase connectivity, domestic renewable energy generation, energy efficiency and energy savings in order to enhance energy security and resilience, as well as to foster social, economic and political stability in the region;

| E. | whereas Russia’s attempts to leverage energy exports as a tool of geopolitical coercion amount to using energy supplies as a weapon; whereas on 26 September 2022, damage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines resulted in major gas leaks in the Baltic Sea, which also constitutes an environmental attack on the EU; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas Russia’s attempts to leverage energy exports as a tool of geopolitical coercion amount to using energy supplies as a weapon; whereas on 26 September 2022, damage to the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines resulted in major gas leaks in the Baltic Sea, which also constitutes an environmental attack on the EU;

| F. | whereas the EU and EaP countries must increase their energy security while substantially decreasing their dependence on imported energy resources from third countries and end their dependence on Russia’s fossil fuel exports; whereas the EU’s dependence on Russian gas supplies has contributed to the current energy crisis; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas the EU and EaP countries must increase their energy security while substantially decreasing their dependence on imported energy resources from third countries and end their dependence on Russia’s fossil fuel exports; whereas the EU’s dependence on Russian gas supplies has contributed to the current energy crisis;

| G. | whereas in its 2017 economic security strategy, Russia identified renewable energy sources and energy efficiency technologies as one of the key threats to its economic security; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas in its 2017 economic security strategy, Russia identified renewable energy sources and energy efficiency technologies as one of the key threats to its economic security;

| H. | whereas Russia’s aggressive behaviour in the Eastern Partnership region shows the need to update the EU energy market and EaP countries’ energy policies to eliminate the dependency on fossil energy imports and fossil fuels in general, in particular from countries with authoritarian regimes; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas Russia’s aggressive behaviour in the Eastern Partnership region shows the need to update the EU energy market and EaP countries’ energy policies to eliminate the dependency on fossil energy imports and fossil fuels in general, in particular from countries with authoritarian regimes;

| I. | whereas, despite the full-scale Russian invasion of the territory of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, several countries unfortunately have not stopped their collaboration with Russia in the field of nuclear energy, thereby deepening their dangerous dependence on Russian supplies of both uranium and uranium enrichment services, as well as nuclear waste treatment; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas, despite the full-scale Russian invasion of the territory of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, several countries unfortunately have not stopped their collaboration with Russia in the field of nuclear energy, thereby deepening their dangerous dependence on Russian supplies of both uranium and uranium enrichment services, as well as nuclear waste treatment;

| J. | whereas fulfilling the Paris Agreement is a common commitment of the EU and the EaP countries; whereas the EU’s and the EaP countries’ energy policies and strategies should aim at reducing dependencies on coal, oil and gas; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas fulfilling the Paris Agreement is a common commitment of the EU and the EaP countries; whereas the EU’s and the EaP countries’ energy policies and strategies should aim at reducing dependencies on coal, oil and gas;

| K. | whereas the share of energy produced from renewable sources remains very low across the EaP countries and some EU countries, while there is considerable potential to increase that share; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the share of energy produced from renewable sources remains very low across the EaP countries and some EU countries, while there is considerable potential to increase that share;

| L. | whereas in order to achieve deep emissions reductions, the parties to the Paris Agreement have to tackle the carbon intensity of their energy systems and implement ambitious strategies for reducing dependencies on fossil fuels and to develop sustainable and cost-effective sources of energy; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas in order to achieve deep emissions reductions, the parties to the Paris Agreement have to tackle the carbon intensity of their energy systems and implement ambitious strategies for reducing dependencies on fossil fuels and to develop sustainable and cost-effective sources of energy;

| M. | whereas the European Green Deal sets different policy initiatives and ambitious targets for the EU and its Member States; whereas it is very important for EaP countries, from their perspective as EU neighbours, to deepen their dialogue with the EU regarding the expectations of the EU side, namely on the measures that need to be taken to adapt to the requirements determined by the European Green Deal and contribute to achieving its objectives; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the European Green Deal sets different policy initiatives and ambitious targets for the EU and its Member States; whereas it is very important for EaP countries, from their perspective as EU neighbours, to deepen their dialogue with the EU regarding the expectations of the EU side, namely on the measures that need to be taken to adapt to the requirements determined by the European Green Deal and contribute to achieving its objectives;

| N. | whereas the significance of the European Green Deal lies in breaking the linkage between economic growth and emissions, notably through increased investment in renewable energy sources and energy efficiency; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the significance of the European Green Deal lies in breaking the linkage between economic growth and emissions, notably through increased investment in renewable energy sources and energy efficiency;

| O. | whereas the EU’s post-COVID-19 recovery efforts aim at building a modern, resource-efficient, clean and circular economy leading to the greening of the economy and the more sustainable use of natural resources, in line with the European Green Deal; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas the EU’s post-COVID-19 recovery efforts aim at building a modern, resource-efficient, clean and circular economy leading to the greening of the economy and the more sustainable use of natural resources, in line with the European Green Deal;

| P. | whereas the development of renewable energy sources is one of the key ways to tackle the energy security and climate change challenges and to deploy cleaner sources of energy, thereby improving health and living standards across our continent and creating local jobs; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas the development of renewable energy sources is one of the key ways to tackle the energy security and climate change challenges and to deploy cleaner sources of energy, thereby improving health and living standards across our continent and creating local jobs;

| Q. | whereas energy efficiency is a crucial prerequisite for achieving Europe’s 2050 climate objectives in a cost-effective manner; whereas long-term energy savings can substantially reduce reliance on fossil fuel imports and bolster national as well as regional energy security in the EU and EaP countries; whereas the cheapest, most secure and cleanest energy is the one that is not used; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas energy efficiency is a crucial prerequisite for achieving Europe’s 2050 climate objectives in a cost-effective manner; whereas long-term energy savings can substantially reduce reliance on fossil fuel imports and bolster national as well as regional energy security in the EU and EaP countries; whereas the cheapest, most secure and cleanest energy is the one that is not used;

| R. | whereas the improvement of the EaP countries’ existing legal frameworks and their gradual approximation with EU legislation, in line with commitments made, is necessary, as is the exchange of best practices and technical know-how; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas the improvement of the EaP countries’ existing legal frameworks and their gradual approximation with EU legislation, in line with commitments made, is necessary, as is the exchange of best practices and technical know-how;

| S. | whereas the EU should support the EaP countries in assessing and addressing the impact of the European Green Deal on their energy security and trade relations with the EU and third countries; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas the EU should support the EaP countries in assessing and addressing the impact of the European Green Deal on their energy security and trade relations with the EU and third countries;

| T. | whereas the creation of additional capacity by means of domestic and foreign investments is essential in order to develop and sustainably use hydropower, wind, solar and geothermal resources in the EU and EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas the creation of additional capacity by means of domestic and foreign investments is essential in order to develop and sustainably use hydropower, wind, solar and geothermal resources in the EU and EaP countries;

| U. | whereas the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report of April 2022 indicates that new fossil fuel infrastructures are incompatible with international climate goals; whereas achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest requires phasing out fossil fuels in the energy system by 2035 at the latest; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report of April 2022 indicates that new fossil fuel infrastructures are incompatible with international climate goals; whereas achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest requires phasing out fossil fuels in the energy system by 2035 at the latest;

| V. | whereas deliberate missile and drone attacks launched by the Russian Federation have damaged or destroyed around 40 % of the critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas deliberate missile and drone attacks launched by the Russian Federation have damaged or destroyed around 40 % of the critical energy infrastructure of Ukraine;

| 1. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its ongoing occupation of Georgian and Moldovan territories, and their devastating consequences; calls for an immediate and full embargo on imports of Russian fossil fuels and uranium, and for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines to be completely abandoned, in order to stop financing Putin’s war machine with EU money; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Expresses its support for the investigation conducted by some EU Member States into the damaging of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines; calls for the findings of the investigations to be made public; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Stands in full solidarity with Ukraine and all other EaP countries who suffer as a result of Russia’s repressive and expansionist policies; calls for increased assistance to Ukraine and for it to be sustained at a substantial level in order to help its people to withstand the hardships of the winter, inflicted by Russia’s war of aggression, and for support to other EaP countries in need; condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s attacks on Ukraine with missiles and Iranian kamikaze drones, targeting the civilian population and the critical and energy infrastructure of Ukraine; calls on Russia to immediately cease these barbaric terrorist acts against the civilian population of Ukraine; states that these malfeasant acts are nothing but crimes against humanity; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Strongly condemns the actions of the Russian occupying forces on the territory of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (NPP) in the city of Energodar, as well as the unprecedented use of the facility for launching attacks against Ukrainian forces or for any other military purposes, including as shelter or storage, which not only prevent the safe operation of the plant and its regular control procedures, but also put in a grave danger the nuclear safety of the European continent and beyond; calls on the international community to take urgent measures to force Russia to release the Zaporizhzhia NPP and return it to the control of Ukraine for the sake of global security; calls on the Russian Federation to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) observers access to the Zaporizhzhia NPP to monitor the nuclear security situation and to cooperate with the IAEA; expresses deep concerns regarding the nuclear safety situation at the Astravyets NPP in Belarus, as the Belarusian authorities are not transparent and do not provide trustworthy information about events at the NPP site and have not committed to the full implementation of the recommendations made in the 2018 EU stress test report; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Expresses its full solidarity with Moldova, which is currently facing the Kremlin’s efforts to destabilise the country politically by manipulating its gas and electricity supplies; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Deplores the impacts of the ‘weaponisation’ of Russian energy supplies on households and companies, which are, as a consequence, facing high energy prices, rising social inequalities and energy and mobility poverty, as well as increased inflation, leading to unemployment, high food prices and a cost of living crisis in general; highlights the need for unprecedented solidarity among EU and EaP countries and a common response tackling the immediate challenges and preventing their reoccurrence in the future, instead of divisive unilateral actions; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Emphasises the need for a clean energy transition as the main way to increase energy security and put an end to the EU’s and EaP countries’ dependencies on fossil fuels and uranium, especially if these originate from third countries; calls on the Commission and the EaP countries, in close cooperation with European and international financial institutions, to come up with further urgent measures that would massively expand renewable energy capacity and boost strong energy efficiency and savings policies; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Recalls that about a quarter of the electricity and half of the low-carbon electricity in the EU is generated by nuclear energy; notes that while some Member States oppose nuclear energy, a number of Member States are preparing to build new nuclear power stations; reiterates that EU Member States and EaP countries remain fully responsible for deciding their own energy mix, for designing options to ensure affordable, stable and clean energy for their citizens and businesses and for choosing the most appropriate pathway to contribute to achieving the Union’s climate and energy targets, taking into account each country’s specific features and constraints; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Reiterates its support for increased energy cooperation between the EU and EaP countries, as well as among the EaP countries themselves, in particular on advancing sustainable energy production, which will enhance their energy security and resilience while protecting the environment, contributing to the achievement of climate policy goals and furthering the integration of willing partners into the European energy market; encourages the EU to consider allowing the cooperation and participation of eligible and willing EaP countries in the Energy Union; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Notes that the success of the European Green Deal, as a comprehensive strategy to transform the EU into a climate neutral economy by 2050, to a large extent depends on its power to lead by example and stimulate faster clean energy transition beyond the EU’s borders, starting with its neighbourhood; stresses the need to step up efforts on decarbonisation and environmental protection within the EU and the EaP and to pursue ambitious climate and environmental policies, in particular to meet the commitments under the Paris Agreement; calls on the governments and parliaments of EU and EaP countries to strengthen laws aimed at achieving the clean energy transition; encourages the EaP countries to develop plans, with EU support, for their participation in the European Green Deal; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Stresses the importance of establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism to ensure that ambitious EU goals do not result in carbon leakage through relocation of production or increased imports; calls for EU support to the EaP countries in order to stimulate the development of carbon pricing policies aligned with those of the EU; takes the view that revenues that may be collected by the EU in carbon fees from EaP countries should primarily be used to fund support to the decarbonisation of their economies; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Observes that energy intensity in EaP countries remains considerably higher than the EU average and highlights the enormous potential for energy savings in those countries; points to the importance of introducing and maintaining regulatory and institutional frameworks that define minimum energy efficiency standards for buildings and products, provide for incentives for the renovation of buildings and for energy efficiency in industries and SMEs, promote optimisation and modernisation of energy infrastructures, including through minimum energy efficiency criteria for public procurement, and guarantee appropriate information to consumers, including accurate metering of energy consumption, informative billing and energy audits; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Welcomes the emergency packages proposed by the Commission to address price volatility in the gas and electricity markets; believes that enhanced transparency measures and measures to address anti-competitive conduct and market abuse should be implemented on a permanent basis; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls for mandatory and higher targets for reductions in gas and electricity consumption as an immediate response to the energy crisis; welcomes the EU’s new gas storage obligations; calls on the EU to establish solidarity mechanisms in order to help countries that are particularly struggling with energy security, with a special focus on the most vulnerable citizens; stresses the importance of knowledge-sharing in order to find common ways out of the current crisis; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Stresses the crucial role of effective and extended energy storage infrastructure in improving the security of energy supply; calls for enhanced investment in the renovation of existing energy storage infrastructure, as well as for new sites to be constructed; calls for the full inclusion of EaP partners and for the construction of new joint energy storage capacities; underlines the long-term advantages of such projects for improving security of energy supply and aiding the transition to green energy, if they are constructed from the outset to be easily adaptable to the storage of green hydrogen; highlights that investing in these capacities would not only address the pressing issues generated by the current energy crisis, but would also represent an important step towards meeting shared decarbonisation objectives; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Welcomes the actions taken by the Commission and the EaP countries to mitigate the consequences of the energy crisis and prevent a worsening of the situation; calls on the Commission to explore ways to also associate the EaP countries to these initiatives, such as the common EU gas purchasing platform; underlines that any purchasing agreements need to be in line with EU climate targets regarding the quantity and duration of deliveries in order to achieve the fossil fuel phase-out by 2035 at the latest; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Notes that the development of renewable energy sources is crucial to efforts aimed at ensuring both the clean energy transition and energy independence, while also contributing to local job creation, improved air quality and citizens’ health; welcomes the establishment of a regional network on renewable energy, led by Lithuania and Georgia, under the Eastern Partnership Energy Panel; notes the use of biomass and hydropower in some EaP countries, but recalls the need to ensure their sustainability, efficiency and compliance with environmental requirements; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Emphasises the need to urgently pursue efforts to improve connectivity, starting with the full implementation of objectives previously identified within the ‘20 deliverables for 2020’ work programme endorsed at the 2017 Eastern Partnership Summit; stresses the importance of developing and financing electricity interconnections, as well as smart grids, in order to ensure the necessary infrastructure is in place to set and implement binding climate and energy targets; recalls that increased connectivity between EU and EaP countries will increase energy security and help to firmly anchor the EaP countries in Europe; calls, in the current geopolitical context, for long-term planning for and investment in sustainable interconnectivity between Ukraine and Moldova and the EU to be made a priority; calls for continued support to build technical capacity for connectivity projects such as the Georgia-Romania Black Sea submarine cable project; highlights the importance of the implementation of the project as it contributes to the strengthening of energy security in Europe and the Caucasus region and the development of the renewable energy sector, and increases transit opportunities between the regions; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Recognises the substantial financial and technical support provided to the Eastern partners by the EU, in coordination and cooperation with other international actors, promoting decarbonisation as well as connectivity; notes the importance of continuing to provide technical support to the Eastern partners to develop an enabling legal framework for investment and sustainable local initiatives on decarbonisation and renewable energy sources; welcomes in particular the work of the EU4Energy and EU4Climate initiatives, investments and policy-based loans under the Neighbourhood Investment Platform, the E5P partnership, the Covenant of Mayors and EU budget guarantees for loans from the European Investment Bank and other international financing institutions; expects the Economic and Investment Plan for the Eastern Partnership to invest in energy efficiency, renewable energy and connectivity, to monitor sustainability, and to diligently conclude ex-ante environmental impact assessments; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Points out that the energy transition needs to be fair, inclusive and cost-efficient and that it should ensure sustainability, security of supply and affordability of energy; notes that high fossil fuel prices represent additional incentives to spur investment in energy-saving and renewable energy projects; points to the need to reform energy pricing and taxation, and cut government subsidies for fossil fuels, to avoid disadvantaging renewable energy against other energy forms and giving the wrong price signals to final energy consumers; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Stresses the need to support consumer empowerment to generate, consume, store and sell energy, bearing in mind that it can help in fighting energy poverty; highlights the potential of decentralised renewable energy production which can increase the utilisation of local energy sources, increase local security of energy supply, and foster community development and cohesion; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Recalls the importance of diversifying energy supplies and decreasing dependence on energy imports from third countries, in particular Russia, in addition to improving the connectivity of the EaP countries’ energy sectors, while ensuring environmental sustainability; points in this regard to the need to develop an open, competitive and integrated energy market in eastern Europe which could lead to more opportunities for trade, investment, capacity building and joint projects in the field of renewables, smart grids and energy efficiency; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Calls for closer cooperation within the EaP on green hydrogen production and use and for the promotion of common standards on hydrogen; notes that imports of non-renewable hydrogen should be restricted in order not to undermine decarbonisation efforts; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Stresses the importance of promoting evidence-based energy policy based on comprehensive data and continuous monitoring, and encourages further EU support to strengthen the EaP countries’ administrative capacity in this area, as well as promoting the exchange of best practices between countries; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Recalls the commitments of the relevant EaP countries under the Association Agreements, the Treaty on Energy Community and the CEPA in terms of transposition of or approximation to EU energy regulations; calls on all EU and EaP countries to implement the Treaty on Energy Community in full; takes the view that additional financial support should be conditional on effectively implementing and enforcing the commitments of the EaP countries, carrying out necessary reforms and making more ambitious commitments in the context of the European Green Deal, in line with the ‘more for more’ principle; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Calls on the Council and the Member States to urgently and significantly increase their support for Ukraine in order to help it defend itself against Russian attempts to destroy critical Ukrainian infrastructure, including in the area of energy; stresses that Ukraine’s reconstruction and post-war recovery needs to focus primarily on the rebuilding of the energy system and the creation of opportunities for Ukraine to become a hub for green electricity and hydrogen exports to Europe, increasing energy resilience and furthering the sustainable energy transition, and that it also needs to take into account and address upfront the issue of sustainable interconnectivity with neighbouring EU and EaP countries, with the strong support of and solidarity from the EU and EaP countries; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the President of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, the European External Action Service, and the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries. |
| --- | --- |

27.

---

(1)  OJ L 206, 8.8.2022, p. 1.

(2)  OJ L 261 I, 7.10.2022, p. 1.

(3)  OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(4)  OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(5)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(6)  OJ L 23, 26.1.2018, p. 4.

(7)  OJ L 246, 17.9.1999, p. 3.

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| 29.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 229/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 229/22

---

Resolution on the compatibility between vaccine programmes of the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries and their alignment

(2023/C 229/04)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency (1),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 15 October 2020 on preparedness for COVID-19 vaccination strategies and vaccine deployment (COM(2020) 680),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 19 January 2021 on a united front to beat COVID-19 (COM(2021) 35),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 16 June 2021 on drawing the early lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2021) 380),

Having regard to Decision (EU) 2020/701 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on providing macro-financial assistance to enlargement and neighbourhood partners in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (2),

Having regard to the Commission report of 18 October 2021 pursuant to Article 16(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework for the issuance, verification and acceptance of interoperable COVID-19 vaccination, test and recovery certificates (EU Digital COVID Certificate) to facilitate free movement during the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2021) 649),

Having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit of 15 December 2021 (3),

Having regard to the Commission communication of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘Addressing together current and new COVID-19 challenges’ (COM(2021) 764),

Having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/1380 of 19 August 2021 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by Ukraine to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (4),

Having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/1894 of 28 October 2021 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of Armenia to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (5),

Having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/1994 of 15 November 2021 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by the Republic of Moldova to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (6),

Having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/1995 of 15 November 2021 establishing the equivalence, for the purpose of facilitating the right of free movement within the Union, of COVID-19 certificates issued by Georgia to the certificates issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/953 of the European Parliament and of the Council (7),

Having regard to the Council Recommendation of 7 December 2018 on strengthened cooperation against vaccine-preventable diseases (8),

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 21 October 2021 on EU transparency in the development, purchase and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines (9),

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (10),

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2020 on the foreign policy consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak (11),

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 19 April 2018 on vaccine hesitancy and the drop in vaccination rates in Europe (12),

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 11 February 2021 on the implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine (13),

| A. | whereas the world is increasingly connected and communicable diseases do not stop at borders, a stark reminder being the pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus (COVID-19); |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the world is increasingly connected and communicable diseases do not stop at borders, a stark reminder being the pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus (COVID-19);

| B. | whereas public health is a valued shared public good deserving special attention from decision-makers, in line with the expectations of citizens across the EU and the Eastern Partnership region; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas public health is a valued shared public good deserving special attention from decision-makers, in line with the expectations of citizens across the EU and the Eastern Partnership region;

| C. | whereas in the EU public health remains a national competence with a complementary role for the EU in health policy, however, with gradually increasing coordination between Member States in order to achieve shared benefits; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas in the EU public health remains a national competence with a complementary role for the EU in health policy, however, with gradually increasing coordination between Member States in order to achieve shared benefits;

| D. | whereas Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has triggered massive migration flows of Ukrainian war refugees to the EU, Moldova and other countries, causing serious burdens and pressures on the health systems of host countries; whereas the war has had and continues to have a detrimental effect on the Ukrainian health system; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine has triggered massive migration flows of Ukrainian war refugees to the EU, Moldova and other countries, causing serious burdens and pressures on the health systems of host countries; whereas the war has had and continues to have a detrimental effect on the Ukrainian health system;

| E. | whereas public health budgets have come under increasing strain as a result of the economic impacts of Russia’s unjustified and illegal military aggression against Ukraine, affecting both the EU and Eastern Partnership countries; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas public health budgets have come under increasing strain as a result of the economic impacts of Russia’s unjustified and illegal military aggression against Ukraine, affecting both the EU and Eastern Partnership countries;

| F. | whereas given the increasingly ambitious cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbours, rapidly expanding economic and political relations, as well as more intense people-to-people contacts, public health, in particular its cross-border aspects, is a policy area where the Eastern Partnership can serve as an appropriate framework to boost resilience to health crises and contribute to the wellbeing of all citizens based on a shared health security agenda and culture; whereas the foregoing brings about mutually beneficial outcomes and account should be taken of the lessons learnt during the management of the COVID-19 pandemic and roll-out of COVID-19 vaccines; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas given the increasingly ambitious cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbours, rapidly expanding economic and political relations, as well as more intense people-to-people contacts, public health, in particular its cross-border aspects, is a policy area where the Eastern Partnership can serve as an appropriate framework to boost resilience to health crises and contribute to the wellbeing of all citizens based on a shared health security agenda and culture; whereas the foregoing brings about mutually beneficial outcomes and account should be taken of the lessons learnt during the management of the COVID-19 pandemic and roll-out of COVID-19 vaccines;

| G. | whereas the lack of synchronised vaccination calendars among the Eastern Partnership partners, as well as varying vaccination coverage under diverging schemes, creates an imperative and an opportunity to move towards a greater degree of coherence, coordination and solidarity with the objective of bringing about shared gains both for the EU and its Eastern Partnership partners; whereas this would ultimately save lives and contribute to the wellbeing of citizens, including the most exposed and vulnerable groups; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas the lack of synchronised vaccination calendars among the Eastern Partnership partners, as well as varying vaccination coverage under diverging schemes, creates an imperative and an opportunity to move towards a greater degree of coherence, coordination and solidarity with the objective of bringing about shared gains both for the EU and its Eastern Partnership partners; whereas this would ultimately save lives and contribute to the wellbeing of citizens, including the most exposed and vulnerable groups;

| H. | whereas public health policy should aim for context-specific and locally tailored solutions with demonstrable compatibility between the Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries as part of the regional health security agenda, aiming at fostering effective cooperation and synergies among all stakeholders as a precondition to achieving targeted outcomes allowing for a desirable degree of local contextualisation, without aiming for uniform or one-size-fits-all solutions; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas public health policy should aim for context-specific and locally tailored solutions with demonstrable compatibility between the Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries as part of the regional health security agenda, aiming at fostering effective cooperation and synergies among all stakeholders as a precondition to achieving targeted outcomes allowing for a desirable degree of local contextualisation, without aiming for uniform or one-size-fits-all solutions;

| I. | whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has challenged and exposed healthcare systems in many countries, including high-income countries; whereas this is in effect a wake-up call to improve preparedness to prevent or address effectively the next communicable disease crisis; whereas this also warrants a renewed emphasis on strengthened and resilient public health systems in both the Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries to deal with future epidemics and their long-term effect on health care; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas the COVID-19 pandemic has challenged and exposed healthcare systems in many countries, including high-income countries; whereas this is in effect a wake-up call to improve preparedness to prevent or address effectively the next communicable disease crisis; whereas this also warrants a renewed emphasis on strengthened and resilient public health systems in both the Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries to deal with future epidemics and their long-term effect on health care;

| J. | whereas the recognition of the necessity and political will to step up coordination on vaccination programmes, including tackling vaccine hesitancy, dates back to before the COVID-19 pandemic, as reflected in the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council recommendation of 7 December 2018 that included guidance on tackling vaccine hesitancy, improving vaccination coverage, promoting the coordination of vaccine procurement and supporting research and innovation; whereas this recommendation also encouraged the Member States to develop and implement national vaccination plans and provided for the establishment of a European vaccination information-sharing system; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas the recognition of the necessity and political will to step up coordination on vaccination programmes, including tackling vaccine hesitancy, dates back to before the COVID-19 pandemic, as reflected in the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council recommendation of 7 December 2018 that included guidance on tackling vaccine hesitancy, improving vaccination coverage, promoting the coordination of vaccine procurement and supporting research and innovation; whereas this recommendation also encouraged the Member States to develop and implement national vaccination plans and provided for the establishment of a European vaccination information-sharing system;

| K. | whereas the Commission also launched the EU Joint Action on Vaccination programme focusing on sharing best practices on national vaccination policies and identifying technical requirements regarding electronic immunisation information systems, vaccine forecasting, prioritisation of vaccine research and development and research to address vaccine hesitancy; whereas this also involved non-EU countries (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina) but none from the Eastern Partnership region; whereas fostering this kind of cooperation and extending it to the Eastern Partnership region would bring about shared benefits; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas the Commission also launched the EU Joint Action on Vaccination programme focusing on sharing best practices on national vaccination policies and identifying technical requirements regarding electronic immunisation information systems, vaccine forecasting, prioritisation of vaccine research and development and research to address vaccine hesitancy; whereas this also involved non-EU countries (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina) but none from the Eastern Partnership region; whereas fostering this kind of cooperation and extending it to the Eastern Partnership region would bring about shared benefits;

| L. | whereas the European Parliament resolution of 19 April 2018 on vaccine hesitancy and the drop in vaccination rates in Europe; calls on the Commission to facilitate a more harmonised schedule for vaccination across the EU; whereas this resolution calls on the Member States to ensure sufficient vaccination of healthcare workers, take effective steps against the spread of misinformation and implement measures for improving access to medicines; |
| --- | --- |

L.

whereas the European Parliament resolution of 19 April 2018 on vaccine hesitancy and the drop in vaccination rates in Europe; calls on the Commission to facilitate a more harmonised schedule for vaccination across the EU; whereas this resolution calls on the Member States to ensure sufficient vaccination of healthcare workers, take effective steps against the spread of misinformation and implement measures for improving access to medicines;

| M. | whereas the association agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement each contain a chapter dedicated to health and provide for cooperation covering a wide range of areas, with the aim of improving the level of public health safety and protection of human health; |
| --- | --- |

M.

whereas the association agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement each contain a chapter dedicated to health and provide for cooperation covering a wide range of areas, with the aim of improving the level of public health safety and protection of human health;

| N. | whereas the granting of candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine, as well as the establishment of Georgia’s eligibility for EU candidate status once conditions are met, also implies a shared ambition to step up synchronisation and alignment with EU policies; |
| --- | --- |

N.

whereas the granting of candidate status to Moldova and Ukraine, as well as the establishment of Georgia’s eligibility for EU candidate status once conditions are met, also implies a shared ambition to step up synchronisation and alignment with EU policies;

| O. | whereas recent key EU policy documents all define reinforcing resilience as a key objective and there is genuine momentum in policy-making to step up cooperation in the area of public health, as reflected in the Eastern Partnership summit Joint Declaration of 15 December 2021 that committed partners to work on health resilience through improving health systems in order to improve affordability, transparency and access to health; |
| --- | --- |

O.

whereas recent key EU policy documents all define reinforcing resilience as a key objective and there is genuine momentum in policy-making to step up cooperation in the area of public health, as reflected in the Eastern Partnership summit Joint Declaration of 15 December 2021 that committed partners to work on health resilience through improving health systems in order to improve affordability, transparency and access to health;

| P. | whereas cooperation on digital vaccine certificates has accelerated, including cooperation based on mutual agreements with Eastern Partnership countries; |
| --- | --- |

P.

whereas cooperation on digital vaccine certificates has accelerated, including cooperation based on mutual agreements with Eastern Partnership countries;

| Q. | whereas the EU and World Health Organization (WHO) Europe launched the Solidarity for Health initiative and the EU launched support for COVID-19 vaccine deployment in the Eastern Partnership countries, mainly in relation to equipment, training and communication; whereas some aspects of this programme also cover Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

Q.

whereas the EU and World Health Organization (WHO) Europe launched the Solidarity for Health initiative and the EU launched support for COVID-19 vaccine deployment in the Eastern Partnership countries, mainly in relation to equipment, training and communication; whereas some aspects of this programme also cover Belarus;

| R. | whereas a specific challenge in the Eastern Partnership region is that addressing public health in temporarily occupied territories may require access by international organisations and cooperation with the de facto authorities; |
| --- | --- |

R.

whereas a specific challenge in the Eastern Partnership region is that addressing public health in temporarily occupied territories may require access by international organisations and cooperation with the de facto authorities;

| S. | whereas a common feature of most EU and Eastern Partnership countries is their acceptance of vaccination against diphtheria, polio, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B and haemophilus influenza type B during the first six months of life and against measles, mumps and rubella after one year of life and, accordingly, boosters when necessary; |
| --- | --- |

S.

whereas a common feature of most EU and Eastern Partnership countries is their acceptance of vaccination against diphtheria, polio, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B and haemophilus influenza type B during the first six months of life and against measles, mumps and rubella after one year of life and, accordingly, boosters when necessary;

| T. | whereas national vaccination strategies are tailor-made and targeted, depending on the nature and burden of a disease in a country; whereas vaccination against tuberculosis (TB) is included in national vaccination calendars for children in most countries with a high incidence of TB (40 cases per 100 000 population); |
| --- | --- |

T.

whereas national vaccination strategies are tailor-made and targeted, depending on the nature and burden of a disease in a country; whereas vaccination against tuberculosis (TB) is included in national vaccination calendars for children in most countries with a high incidence of TB (40 cases per 100 000 population);

| U. | whereas the EU mandated the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), as of 2004, to support the prevention and control of communicable diseases and foster the exchange of best practices and experience with regard to vaccination programmes; whereas the ECDC also coordinates data collection, validation, analysis and dissemination at EU level, including on vaccination strategies; |
| --- | --- |

U.

whereas the EU mandated the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), as of 2004, to support the prevention and control of communicable diseases and foster the exchange of best practices and experience with regard to vaccination programmes; whereas the ECDC also coordinates data collection, validation, analysis and dissemination at EU level, including on vaccination strategies;

| V. | whereas one of the key objectives of the partnership between the Commission and WHO Europe is the promotion of health cooperation with non-EU countries including the Eastern Partnership countries, in particular in order to improve regional and sub-regional health security, address health inequalities, bolster the resilience of health systems and strengthen cooperation between WHO country offices and EU delegations, while enhancing the partnership between the ECDC and WHO Europe in order to ensure coherent strategic approaches across the entire region; |
| --- | --- |

V.

whereas one of the key objectives of the partnership between the Commission and WHO Europe is the promotion of health cooperation with non-EU countries including the Eastern Partnership countries, in particular in order to improve regional and sub-regional health security, address health inequalities, bolster the resilience of health systems and strengthen cooperation between WHO country offices and EU delegations, while enhancing the partnership between the ECDC and WHO Europe in order to ensure coherent strategic approaches across the entire region;

| W. | whereas in September 2021 the Commission launched the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) (14) with a mandate to anticipate threats and potential health crises through intelligence-gathering and building the necessary response capacities; |
| --- | --- |

W.

whereas in September 2021 the Commission launched the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) (14) with a mandate to anticipate threats and potential health crises through intelligence-gathering and building the necessary response capacities;

| X. | whereas according to the WHO, global vaccination coverage has plateaued in recent years, dropping from 86 % in 2019 to 81 % in 2021; whereas according to the WHO, this is also due to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated disruptions over the past two years, which have strained health systems and led to 25 million children missing out on vaccination in 2021, 6 million more than in 2019 and the highest number since 2009 (15); |
| --- | --- |

X.

whereas according to the WHO, global vaccination coverage has plateaued in recent years, dropping from 86 % in 2019 to 81 % in 2021; whereas according to the WHO, this is also due to the COVID-19 pandemic and associated disruptions over the past two years, which have strained health systems and led to 25 million children missing out on vaccination in 2021, 6 million more than in 2019 and the highest number since 2009 (15);

| Y. | whereas a key takeaway from the COVID-19 pandemic has been the lack of synchronisation and smart sequencing of vaccine deliveries and their administration; whereas, however, joint EU procurement resulted in a relatively high degree of synchronisation, as well as confidence in and acceptance of vaccinations within the EU, albeit with significant variations across the Member States; |
| --- | --- |

Y.

whereas a key takeaway from the COVID-19 pandemic has been the lack of synchronisation and smart sequencing of vaccine deliveries and their administration; whereas, however, joint EU procurement resulted in a relatively high degree of synchronisation, as well as confidence in and acceptance of vaccinations within the EU, albeit with significant variations across the Member States;

| Z. | whereas Russia’s war on Ukraine has had a significant impact on the safety of vaccine transportation and the strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have had a critical impact on Ukraine’s ability to maintain a cold chain; |
| --- | --- |

Z.

whereas Russia’s war on Ukraine has had a significant impact on the safety of vaccine transportation and the strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure have had a critical impact on Ukraine’s ability to maintain a cold chain;

| AA. | whereas account should be taken of the significant shortage of healthcare professionals in Ukraine due to the mobilisation of medical personnel for the needs of the army in wartime conditions; |
| --- | --- |

AA.

whereas account should be taken of the significant shortage of healthcare professionals in Ukraine due to the mobilisation of medical personnel for the needs of the army in wartime conditions;

| AB. | whereas the Ukrainian public health system has proven resilient and able to withstand and respond appropriately to war and continues to ensure access to vaccination; |
| --- | --- |

AB.

whereas the Ukrainian public health system has proven resilient and able to withstand and respond appropriately to war and continues to ensure access to vaccination;

Stepping up cooperation and its impact in the Eastern Partnership framework for better public health outcomes, in particular as regards immunisation and the cross-border aspects of communicable diseases

| 1. | Notes that with increasing cross-border movement for the purpose of employment, trade, study and tourism in the EU, the public health benefits from vaccination also lead to tangible economic benefits; notes that this is also directly applicable for the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Recognises the potential of using the Eastern Partnership framework to strengthen a common social agenda focusing on rising vaccination coverage, addressing inequalities in accessing vaccination and fostering public prevention services; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Underlines the present diversity of legal frameworks for immunisation, including among the Member States; notes that some countries apply mandatory vaccination rules for certain diseases and merely recommendations for others; observes that these approaches may also change with time, not least due to WHO recommendations, institutional preparedness and societal acceptance; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Notes that in a handful of EU countries, vaccination rates for some diseases remain very high despite there being no obligation to vaccinate children (98 % in Sweden); |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Notes the potential shared benefits of Eastern Partnership participation and association with the activities of the European Medicines Agency, the ECDC and HERA, which aim to prevent the spread of infectious diseases in both regions; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Recognises that the EU Initiative on Health Security has provided an external dimension to the ECDC with the potential to build a vital link for achieving more coordination and alignment with non-EU countries, including in the Eastern Partnership region; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Emphasises that, coupled with the principle of devising local solutions to local challenges enshrined in the European Immunization Agenda 2030, the partnership between the EU and WHO Europe could also be a vehicle for achieving more compatibility and synergies in immunisation and vaccination programmes across Europe; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Calls for stepping up coordinated efforts to draw up a comprehensive strategy to promote a steady demand for vaccination and prevention campaigns in the EU and the Eastern Partnership for vaccine-preventable diseases; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Recommends developing more structured cooperation at institutional level on public health, for instance by establishing a regular forum for EU and Eastern Partnership health ministers and authorities, possibly in the format of yearly meetings or invitations to attend the meetings of the Council of the Health Ministers of the European Union over longer periods; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Calls for continued efforts to promote cooperation and the alignment of strategies for international cross-border health threats, most importantly pandemics, leading to a higher level of containment and stronger immunity in the future; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls for the establishment or extension of current and future joint procurement schemes and/or vaccine-sharing procedures between the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries, especially for routine vaccines, allowing for the increased production, delivery and purchase of vaccines and related medical supplies; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Recommends considering the creation of a multilateral support mechanism to diversify manufacturing capacities for vaccines in the longer term; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Is convinced of the need to promote effective and harmonised data collection and exchange on the transmission of communicable diseases by integrated immunisation information systems on vaccination accessibility and coverage (for both children and especially adult populations) as well as disease surveillance by adapting relevant institutions to bring them in line with international standards; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Calls on the EU to support and fund joint programmes to promote and support scientific research on vaccination in the Eastern Partnership countries; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Recommends funding targeted actions related to strategic communication on disease prevention and on medical professional education under the Eastern Partnership framework, for example by fostering twinning programmes between national prevention centres and by extending the Erasmus+ scheme for targeted exchanges between Eastern Partnership and EU medical professionals; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the EU and Eastern Partnership countries to strive to establish a viable system of mutual recognition of vaccination certificates (not limited to COVID-19 but also based on the successful example of digital certificates) between the Eastern Partnership countries and the EU, for example by digitalising the WHO’s international ‘Carte Jaune’, or ‘Yellow Card’; |
| --- | --- |

16.

Lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic, threats and challenges regarding the spread of certain diseases in the Eastern Partnership countries and identifying problems arising from a lack of synchronised (or WHO-led) vaccination calendars

| 17. | Acknowledges that the EU’s role in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, both via its decisive contribution to the COVAX scheme and the EU’s vaccine-sharing mechanism, proved to be useful; regrets nevertheless the slightly delayed availability of vaccines for the EU’s direct neighbours, fuelling perceptions of ‘vaccine nationalism’ and delayed EU action; notes also that this was used by other actors to sustain narratives undermining the EU’s joint efforts, for example China and Russia; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Welcomes the decisive actions by the EU and its Member States as ‘Team Europe’ in mitigating the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic through vaccine donations and financial support; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Underlines that the relationship between attitudes towards COVID-19 and other vaccines also needs to be addressed, since inadequate COVID-19 responses may also fuel vaccine hesitancy in general, resulting in potentially lower uptake of other vaccines; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls on the European External Action Service (EEAS) to assist the authorities of the Eastern Partnership countries through the East StratCom Task Force and the EU delegations in combating misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines and fostering social dialogue with the aim of reaching the target of vaccinating a minimum of 70 % of the population; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Recommends addressing the challenge of vaccine hesitancy by creating a holistic strategy to address the problem, also based on the lessons from and specific needs of the Eastern Partnership region, with an emphasis on healthcare professionals, information provided by social services to new parents and the general curriculum in schools related to health; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Stresses that higher awareness, institutional preparedness and the lessons learnt from the COVID-19 pandemic may also provide an opportunity to address other illnesses that can be brought under control by vaccination, such as vaccinating against human papillomavirus to prevent cervical cancer; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Urges the authorities of the Eastern Partnership countries to seize the opportunity and employ the COVID-19 recovery funds to modernise hospitals and improve the quality and accessibility of medical services, especially in the regions and cross-border areas; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Notes with concern that the WHO European Region saw a slight decrease in routine immunisation coverage over the 2020-21 period, with some significant gaps in some Eastern Partnership countries; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Underlines the need to focus on increasing childhood vaccination rates with a special focus on vulnerable groups in order to reduce the risk of multiple epidemics in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in countries with the weakest health systems; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Calls for the implementation of a pilot project to extend the European Child Guarantee to the Eastern Partnership countries, with the aim of ensuring children’s rights to free and high-quality health care through easy and free access to early childhood vaccinations; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support the authorities of the Eastern Partnership countries in financing and implementing ‘safe school’ operations, including providing hygiene supplies and sharing information on handwashing and other hygiene measures, as lessons learnt from the COVID-19 pandemic; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | Calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Member States to support the authorities of the Eastern Partnership countries in developing and guaranteeing contingency planning and crisis-response plans now to reduce the risk of future pandemic transmissions in schools and to minimise the impact of school closures on children and their families, especially on the poorest and most marginalised children, as well as those with severe disabilities; highlights, in this regard, the need to prioritise children in conflict-affected areas; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | Recommends establishing a specific cooperation mechanism with the relevant stakeholders (i.e. International Committee of the Red Cross, WHO) to address the issue of basic health services and immunisation in the Eastern Partnership regions considered to be temporarily occupied territories with no or limited control exerted by the de jure authorities and with the de facto authorities lacking accountability and resources, where there is a high concentration of vulnerable groups; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | Considers that the EU and its Member States, building on the assistance they have already provided to Ukraine since February 2022, should provide more vaccines and other appropriate medical treatment for communicable diseases; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | Highlights the accentuated need to supply vaccines and other medical treatment to Moldova and to the Member States hosting the highest numbers of Ukrainian refugees; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | Highlights the importance of developing an electronic healthcare system, including electronic medical records of vaccinations, especially for refugees who have had to leave their homes quickly, leaving all paper documents behind; |
| --- | --- |

32.

Harnessing the shared benefits arising from synchronised vaccination calendars

| 33. | Stresses the importance of exploring the shared benefits of coordinated action with the aim of achieving balanced implementation between locally contextualised and internationally synchronised national vaccination calendars in the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries, building on sound evidence-informed scientific input and expertise from stakeholders such as the WHO; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | Underlines the importance of appropriate accompanying public health measures and the involvement of other stakeholders, the medical profession and civil society, in particular on communication, outreach to remote and vulnerable groups and tackling vaccine hesitancy; recommends tailor-made programmes and funding for Eastern Partnership countries; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | Shares the view that the gradual scoping and landscaping of national vaccination calendars and engagement of WHO Europe with the EU and Eastern Partnership countries on the basis of evidence-informed consultation on a contextualised versus synchronised vaccination calendar will undoubtedly increase the public health benefits and further strengthen the required public trust in institutions; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | Is convinced that a higher degree of synchronisation and reliable, commonly accepted methodologies and institutional capacities for data management can also allow for the mutual recognition of vaccine certificates, reducing the need for restrictions and barriers to travel; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | Calls for the EU, its Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries to also cooperate on the issue of vaccinating pet animals, especially as some animal diseases can be easily transmitted to humans, and to cooperate and share EU Member States’ best practices on the identification and registration of pet animals; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | Instructs its Co-Presidents to forward this resolution to the President of the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, the European External Action Service, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States and the Eastern Partnership countries. |
| --- | --- |

38.

---

(1)  OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9.

(2)  OJ L 165, 27.5.2020, p. 31.

(3)  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/53527/20211215-Eastern Partnership-joint-declaration-en.pdf

(4)  OJ L 297, 20.8.2021, p. 35.

(5)  OJ L 384, 29.10.2021, p. 109.

(6)  OJ L 405, 16.11.2021, p. 23.

(7)  OJ L 405, 16.11.2021, p. 26.

(8)  OJ C 466, 28.12.2018, p. 1.

(9)  OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 99.

(10)  OJ C 316, 6.8.2021, p. 2.

(11)  OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 63.

(12)  OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 141.

(13)  OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 87.

(14)  https://ec.europa.eu/health/system/files/2021-09/hera_2021_comm_en_0.pdf

(15)  https://www.who.int/health-topics/vaccines-and-immunization#tab=tab_1

https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/immunization-coverage

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| 29.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 229/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 229/29

---

Resolution on the strategic importance of starting EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova

(2023/C 229/05)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

| 1. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, its illegal annexation of Ukrainian regions and its involvement in both military action and cyberwarfare in the Eastern Partnership region; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Recognises that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical landscape and an increasingly difficult security environment affecting the stability and governance of the Eastern Partnership countries; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Underlines that Russia’s war of aggression has fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Welcomes the European Council’s decision of 23 June 2022 to grant Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova EU candidate country status, and its recognition of the European perspective for Georgia; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Underlines that accession to the EU must take place in accordance with Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, based on respect for the relevant procedures and conditional upon the fulfilment of the established criteria, in particular the so-called Copenhagen criteria for EU membership; underlines that accession remains a merit-based process that requires the adoption and implementation of the relevant reforms by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in particular in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, market economy and implementation of the EU acquis; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Supports the European Parliament’s call for an innovative, complementary and flexible interaction between the ongoing work on the implementation of the Association Agreements already in force and the accession negotiation process, thereby allowing for the gradual integration of Ukraine and Moldova into both the EU single market and the relevant sectoral programmes, including access to EU funds in the respective areas, enabling the citizens of Ukraine and Moldova to reap the benefits of accession throughout the process rather than only on its completion; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on Ukraine, Moldova, the Commission and the Council to work towards the start of accession negotiations this year; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Similarly to the European Parliament, believes that Ukraine’s and Moldova’s membership of the EU represents a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe and that it equates to showing leadership, resolve and vision; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Considers the European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (1) to ‘establish clear deadlines for concluding negotiations with the accession countries by the end of the current decade at the latest’ to be of the utmost importance strategically. |
| --- | --- |

9.

---

(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0406.

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| 29.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 229/30 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 229/30

---

Resolution on the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine

(2023/C 229/06)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

Having regard to the Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 3 May 2011 and the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit of 15 December 2021,

Having regard to the Commission and External European Action Service joint staff working document of 2 July 2021 entitled ‘Recovery, resilience and reform: post 2020 Eastern Partnership priorities’ (SWD(2021) 186),

Having regard to Articles 3 and 17.3 of the Rules of procedure of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly,

Having regard to UN resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 entitled ‘Territorial integrity of Ukraine’, UN resolution ES-11/1 of 2 March 2022 entitled ‘Aggression against Ukraine’, UN resolution ES-11/2 of 24 March 2022 entitled ‘Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine’, UN resolution ES-11/4 of 12 October 2022 entitled ‘Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations’ and UN resolution ES-11/5 of 14 November 2022 entitled ‘Furtherance of remedy and reparation of aggression against Ukraine’,

Having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the invasion of Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation of 24 February 2022,

Having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2023 on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine (1) and to other European Parliament resolutions adopted since 24 February 2022 condemning Russian full-scale military invasion into Ukraine,

Having regard to resolution 2787-IX of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of 1 December 2022 stating that the Russian Federation’s membership of the UN is illegitimate since it was admitted to the UN in violation of Article 4 of the UN Charter and thus unlawfully appropriated the right to veto criticism of its own abuses,

| A. | whereas the Russian Federation has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked, unjustified and full-fledged war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas the Russian Federation has been carrying out an illegal, unprovoked, unjustified and full-fledged war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022;

| B. | whereas the lack of relevant and immediate reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions created preconditions for further aggression; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the lack of relevant and immediate reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions created preconditions for further aggression;

| C. | whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter, of the Final Act of the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Summit of Heads of State or Government and of the fundamental principles of international law; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter, of the Final Act of the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Summit of Heads of State or Government and of the fundamental principles of international law;

| D. | whereas thousands of civilians, including hundreds of children, have already been murdered and many more have been tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas thousands of civilians, including hundreds of children, have already been murdered and many more have been tortured, harassed, sexually assaulted, kidnapped or forcibly displaced;

| E. | whereas this inhuman conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies totally disregards international humanitarian law; |
| --- | --- |

E.

whereas this inhuman conduct by the Russian forces and their proxies totally disregards international humanitarian law;

| F. | whereas Russia’s forces have conducted deliberate indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, with devastating consequences for civilians; |
| --- | --- |

F.

whereas Russia’s forces have conducted deliberate indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, with devastating consequences for civilians;

| G. | whereas Russia’s illegal attempt to annex the territories of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine, in addition to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, are blatant violations of the goals and principles of the UN Charter and of the norms and principles in other acts of international law; |
| --- | --- |

G.

whereas Russia’s illegal attempt to annex the territories of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine, in addition to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, are blatant violations of the goals and principles of the UN Charter and of the norms and principles in other acts of international law;

| H. | whereas Russia’s approach to justifying its invasion undermines every international security agreement and creates global security challenges and the preconditions for further aggression; |
| --- | --- |

H.

whereas Russia’s approach to justifying its invasion undermines every international security agreement and creates global security challenges and the preconditions for further aggression;

| I. | whereas Russia’s hybrid war concept implies the creation of areas of conflict and instability that undermine the territorial integrity and security of the countries the Kremlin wants to take control over; |
| --- | --- |

I.

whereas Russia’s hybrid war concept implies the creation of areas of conflict and instability that undermine the territorial integrity and security of the countries the Kremlin wants to take control over;

| J. | whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine represents the most serious security threat for the Eastern Partnership, the EU and its Member States and Eastern partner countries as well as for the rules-based international order; |
| --- | --- |

J.

whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine represents the most serious security threat for the Eastern Partnership, the EU and its Member States and Eastern partner countries as well as for the rules-based international order;

| K. | whereas Russia has weaponised energy and food, blocked Ukrainian ports, interrupted global food supply chains, destroyed food security and led to food crises and starvation in Asian and African regions; |
| --- | --- |

K.

whereas Russia has weaponised energy and food, blocked Ukrainian ports, interrupted global food supply chains, destroyed food security and led to food crises and starvation in Asian and African regions;

| 1. | Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression on Ukraine, its illegal occupation of Ukrainian regions, and its involvement in both military and cyber warfare in the Eastern Partnership region; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Welcomes unprecedented sanctions imposed by the European Union and individual states against Russia, and expresses expectations for extending sanctions for energy trade in full, completely ban of supply to Russia with components for weapon or any other military purpose production and double-use goods, for imposing sanctions against companies working in financial sector or operating virtual asset that helps Kremlin to circumvent effective sanctions; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Condemns the involvement of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus in Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine and calls for further sanctions against Belarus; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Identifies corruption, money laundering and illicit funding as mechanisms to provide assistance to Russian government-connected groups supporting aggression against Ukraine and calls for greater efforts to combat them; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Underlines its unequivocal support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Eastern Partnership countries within their internationally recognised borders and its unwavering commitment and determination to defend those principles; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Condemns the fact that the Russian Federation organised illegal ‘referendums’ in regions within the internationally recognised borders of Ukraine and attempted to illegally annex the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine following the organisation of these ‘referendums’; considers these ‘referendums’ to be null and void for the international community; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Reaffirms that territorial acquisitions resulting from the threat or use of force can never be recognised as legal; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Condemns the massive and grave violations of human rights and war crimes committed by the Russian armed forces, their proxies, including in the Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Deplores the dire human rights and humanitarian consequences of the hostilities by the Russian Federation against Ukraine and expresses grave concern at the high number of civilian casualties, including women and children, at the number of internally displaced persons and refugees in need of humanitarian assistance, and at the violations and abuses committed against children; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Expresses grave concern about the impact of Russian aggression on food, energy, environmental and nuclear security globally; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Calls for an immediate cessation of the Russian Federation’s missile and drone attacks on the critical infrastructure of Ukraine and of any deliberate attacks on civilian targets, including those that are residences, schools and hospitals; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Notes with great concern that Russian missiles launched at Ukrainian civilian infrastructure occasionally enter the airspace of other sovereign states, including NATO members; calls in this respect on the internationally community to swiftly and adequately react to such blatant provocation; points out that if the international community does not react to the violation of sovereign states’ airspace, Russia will engage in further provocative actions; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, the end to the blockade of all Ukrainian ports and for the restoration of safe and freed navigation in the Black Sea and Azov region; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Insists that those responsible for crimes of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity must be held accountable; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Underscores the urgent need for the EU and its Member States, in close cooperation with Ukraine and the international community, preferably through the UN, to push for the creation of a special international tribunal to prosecute the crime of aggression against Ukraine perpetrated by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation and its allies and to find a legally sound agreed way forward on this matter; believes that establishing such a tribunal would fill the large gap in the current institutional international criminal justice set-up and should be based on the standards and principles that apply to the International Criminal Court enshrined in the Rome Statute; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls on the international community to continue providing active support and assistance to Ukraine in every possible way and in close coordination with Ukraine in order to allow Ukraine to exercise its legitimate right to defend itself, to resist and stop the aggression, to liberate its people and to regain full control over its entire internationally recognised territory; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Understands the importance of maintaining a secure environment for media freedom and calls for Russian state media or private media affiliated to persons or companies under sanctions that jeopardise European security and promote war to be identified as propaganda outlets; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Welcomes the ‘Peace Formula’ plan and encourages implementation of all its steps; welcomes the efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace and security in Ukraine and in the whole Europe; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Emphasises that Russia must provide full compensation to Ukraine for its crime of aggression, war crimes and the destruction in Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Calls for the establishment of a legal framework providing for the confiscation of sanctioned Russian assets in order to provide compensation for the victims of the war and to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Underlines the need to strengthen the hard security dimension of the Eastern Partnership countries, which would constitute a significant contribution to strengthening international peace and security; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Condemns the clear abuse of the right to veto in the Security Council by the Russian Federation; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Calls on the EU and its Member States to take further action to continue the international isolation of the Russian Federation, including with regard to Russia’s membership of international organisations and bodies such as the United Nations. |
| --- | --- |

23.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2023)0015.

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| 29.6.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 229/33 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.6.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 229/33

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Resolution on supporting the path of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia towards EU membership

(2023/C 229/07)

THE EURONEST PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY,

Having regard to the European Council’s decision of 23 June 2022 to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and recognise Georgia’s European perspective, while confirming its readiness to grant the country candidate status once the priorities specified in the Commission’s opinion on its membership application have been addressed,

Having regard to the EU General Affairs Council conclusions of 13 December 2022 on enlargement and the stabilisation and association process, which reaffirm that the future of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and of their citizens lies within the EU,

Having regard to the European Parliament recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement (1),

Having regard to the Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly of 3 May 2011 (2), the joint declaration from the Eastern Partnership Summit of 15 December 2021, as well as the declarations from all previous Eastern Partnership Summits, and the Association Agreements between the EU and Ukraine (3), Moldova (4) and Georgia (5) respectively,

| A. | whereas Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia remain unwaveringly committed to EU membership; |
| --- | --- |

A.

whereas Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia remain unwaveringly committed to EU membership;

| B. | whereas the Eastern Partnership countries that wish to join the EU face significant challenges, especially as a result of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as the other acts of aggression (including occupation) that Russia has perpetrated in the region and the hybrid threats that it poses, which are all part of its attempt to keep those countries in its sphere of influence and impede their integration with the EU; |
| --- | --- |

B.

whereas the Eastern Partnership countries that wish to join the EU face significant challenges, especially as a result of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as the other acts of aggression (including occupation) that Russia has perpetrated in the region and the hybrid threats that it poses, which are all part of its attempt to keep those countries in its sphere of influence and impede their integration with the EU;

| C. | whereas the EU’s continued support for associated countries is vital to their reform efforts; |
| --- | --- |

C.

whereas the EU’s continued support for associated countries is vital to their reform efforts;

| D. | whereas the EU’s enlargement policy has transformative power and plays an important role as a strategic investment in peace, democracy, prosperity, security and stability in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

D.

whereas the EU’s enlargement policy has transformative power and plays an important role as a strategic investment in peace, democracy, prosperity, security and stability in Europe;

| 1. | Emphasises that the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries find themselves at a critical juncture for the European security architecture and the international rules-based order; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine and reaffirms its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who have continued to demonstrate extraordinary courage and resilience in the face of unabated threats and attacks since 24 February 2022; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | Reiterates its deep concern over Russia’s occupation of the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali / South Ossetia, which are indivisible parts of Georgia, and its intensified annexation process, which together represent the first modern attempt to forcibly change the borders of a sovereign state in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | Reiterates its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia within their internationally recognised borders and supports their efforts to fully enforce those principles; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | Demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces, proxies and military equipment from the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and refrain from further threatening or violating its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; |
| --- | --- |

5.

| 6. | Calls on the EU and its Member States, as well as on the Eastern Partnership countries, to cooperate as closely as possible to stop Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, deter any further Russian aggression and uphold peace and security in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | Calls on all relevant parties to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, deter Russian aggression and protect European security; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | Recognises the Ukrainian, Moldovan and Georgian people’s commitment to their European future and their contributions to stability and security in the region; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | Commends Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s efforts in implementing reforms and encourages them to continue on this path; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | Urges their governments to continue their efforts to fight corruption and ensure the independence of the judiciary; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | Underlines the importance of fostering a culture of political pluralism and inclusion, as well as constructive political dialogue and parliamentary functions with regard to legislation, scrutiny and oversight; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | Stresses that good governance, the rule of law, a strong civil society and media freedom are essential elements for the EU accession process; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | Expresses its strong support for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s applications to join the EU, and their right to determine their own future through democratic processes; |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | Underlines that the key priorities indicated by the Commission in its opinions on Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s applications for membership of the EU, and endorsed by the European Council, must be implemented in full; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | Encourages the Commission and the EU Member States to grant Georgia candidate country status and launch accession negotiations with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | Calls for meaningful and structured dialogue with these countries on the EU accession process, taking into account the particular merits and specificities of each country; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | Encourages the peaceful resolution of unresolved conflicts through diplomatic engagement, support for reforms, democratisation and economic cooperation; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | Supports the role of solidarity lanes in promoting the integration of these countries into the European family and helping them to overcome the obstacles and challenges that may arise on their road to EU membership; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | Calls on the governments of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to implement the EU human rights sanctions regime (the ‘European Magnitsky Act’), and extend it to include sanctions for corruption crimes; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | Invites the Commission to ensure Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s orderly transition from being EU neighbours and associated countries to becoming EU accession countries; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | Invites the Commission to prepare tailored roadmaps laying solid foundations for the gradual accession of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to the EU single market, by enhancing the implementation of the Association Agreements and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas between the EU and these countries; |
| --- | --- |

21.

| 22. | Calls, in line with the recommendations that arose from the Conference on the Future of Europe, for democracy-based partnerships to be established with the aim of helping Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to adapt to the fully fledged, plural democracy and values that characterise the EU and to pave the way for their citizens’ broad and deep participation in the democratic life of the EU at European, national and local levels; stresses that such partnerships should entail the multinational exchange of best practice and serve to foster and strengthen sustainable, inclusive and participatory democracies in current and future EU Member States; calls on the Commission to provide adequate financing for such partnerships; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | Invites the Commission to further explore making existing EU financial instruments available to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, bearing in mind their new status in relation to the EU, including the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance to help them meet EU standards and fulfil the criteria for EU accession; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | Emphasises that the EU’s enlargement policy is one of the most effective mechanisms to bring peace and stability to the region; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | Encourages investments in energy, transport and digital interconnectivity between the three countries and the EU in order to enhance energy security, boost trade, investment opportunities and economic growth, increase people-to-people contact and ensure greater regional stability and security; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | Advocates the exchange of ideas, increased cultural understanding, and greater economic cooperation and integration both among Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia and between them and the EU, by removing the financial barrier of roaming charges; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | Emphasises the importance of continued cooperation between the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and the parliaments of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, in support of the countries’ EU membership goals. |
| --- | --- |

27.

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(1)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2022)0406.

(2)  OJ C 198, 6.7.2011, p. 4.

(3)  OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3.

(4)  OJ L 260, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

(5)  OJ L 261, 30.8.2014, p. 4.

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