IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-30761

Summary Calendar

TRUDY A. BOVIE-CLARK, 

 Plaintiff—Appellant

v.

SENTRY SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY; THEODORE SADOWSKI, 

doing business as Sadowski Trucking Company; LANCE R. THOMAS, 

 Defendants—Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:12-CV-336

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant Trudy A. Bovie-Clark (“Clark”) sued Appellees Sentry Select 

Insurance Company, Theodore Sadowski, and Lance R. Thomas (“Thomas”), 

alleging that Thomas was at fault for a vehicular collision in which Clark 

sustained personal injuries. The collision occurred when Clark attempted to 

make a right turn at the intersection of South Claiborne Avenue and Poydras 

Street in New Orleans while Thomas, who was operating a commercial tractor-

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 19, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 13-30761

trailer, was making the same turn. The jury found that Thomas was not at 

fault for the accident. Clark filed motions for a new trial, for judgment as a 

matter of law, and to alter or amend the judgment. The district court denied 

those motions, and we AFFIRM.

We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of 

law, applying the same standard that the district court uses in considering the 

motion at trial. Stokes v. Emerson Elec. Co., 217 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2000). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)(1)(A), a district court must deny 

the motion unless the opposing party “has been fully heard on an issue . . . and 

a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find 

for the party on that issue[.]” See Ellis v. Weasler Eng’g, Inc., 258 F.3d 326, 

337 (5th Cir. 2001). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse 

of discretion, reversing the district court only if there is “an absolute absence 

of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” Duff v. Werner Enters., Inc., 489 F.3d 

727, 729 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, we 

review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to amend or alter judgment for abuse 

of discretion. Midland W. Corp. v. F.D.I.C., 911 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. 

1990). “Under this standard, the district court’s decision and decision-making 

process need only be reasonable.” Id.

Clark contends that there are two reasons why we should reverse the 

district court’s orders and the jury’s verdict should be vacated. First, Clark 

asserts that the jury improperly relied on evidence of faded lane dividers on 

South Claiborne when the district court’s jury instructions did not address

faded street markings or their legal effect on Thomas’s potential negligence. 

The district court properly instructed the jury, and reiterated in its response 

to the jury note, that it could consider the testimony of all witnesses, weigh 

such testimony, and draw reasonable inferences from testimony and exhibits 

in light of the jury members’ common experiences. Evidence at trial 

2

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No. 13-30761

demonstrated that the lanes on South Claiborne near the accident site were 

faded and not clearly marked. In reaching its verdict, the jury very well may 

have considered the condition of the street lane dividers, and it would have 

been in the jury’s province to do so. “Viewing all of the evidence and drawing 

all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict,” there was 

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, even without consideration of 

the faded lane markers. Vadie v. Miss. State Univ., 218 F.3d 365, 372 (5th Cir. 

2000). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motions on 

this ground.

Second, Clark argues that because Thomas maneuvered the turn onto 

South Claiborne in a manner that violated La. Rev. Stat. §§ 32:101(a)(1) and 

32:104(a) he shares at least some of the fault for the accident, and the jury’s 

verdict to the contrary is neither supported by the evidence nor consistent with 

the law and facts presented at trial. This argument is based on Clark’s 

presumption that Thomas did in fact violate Sections 32:101 and 32:104.1 

Whether Thomas violated these statutes was a question for the jury to decide, 

and the evidence presented at trial could have supported either party’s version

of events. This issue ultimately turned on the witnesses’ credibility, and as 

noted by the district court, the jury clearly found Thomas’s version of events 

more credible. Because mere dissatisfaction with the jury’s weighing of 

evidence or determination of witness credibility is not a valid ground on which 

to grant judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or alteration of the judgment, 

the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Clark’s motions.

For the reasons stated here and by the district court, the judgment of the 

district court is AFFIRMED.

1 Under Louisiana law, a driver turning right at an intersection must do so as “close

as practicable to the right-hand curb” and with “reasonable safety.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 

32:101(A)(1), 32:104(A). 

3

 

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