UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4607

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ALFREDO HERNANDEZ NUNEZ, a/k/a Alfredo Nunez Henandez,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior

District Judge. (4:03-cr-70042-JLK-4)

Submitted: February 19, 2015 Decided: March 4, 2015

Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Christine Madeleine 

Lee, Research and Writing Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Anthony 

P. Giorno, First Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Alfredo Hernandez Nunez appeals the thirty-month sentence 

imposed following the revocation of his supervised release term. 

On appeal, Nunez challenges both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence. Finding no error, plain or 

otherwise, we affirm.

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United 

States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will 

affirm a revocation sentence that is within the prescribed 

statutory range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider

whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable, employing the same general considerations applied 

during review of original sentences. Id. at 438. In this 

initial inquiry, we “take[] a more deferential appellate posture 

concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than 

reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.” United 

States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). If we find the sentence unreasonable, 

we then must determine whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657. 

A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally 

reasonable if the district court considered the Sentencing 

Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the 18 
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U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors applicable to the supervised 

release revocation context, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439, and provided sufficient explanation for 

the sentence imposed, see United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 

544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). While a district court must explain 

its sentence, the court “need not be as detailed or specific 

when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing 

a post-conviction sentence.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547. A 

revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district 

court stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should 

receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. 

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. 

On appeal, Nunez asserts that the district court’s 

explanation for the sentence was inadequate to support the 

upward variance sentence it imposed. He also argues that the 

circumstances of the release violations and Nunez’s criminal 

history were an inadequate basis for imposing an upward variance 

sentence that was run consecutively to the state and federal 

sentences imposed for the crimes underlying his release 

violations. 

We find these arguments unpersuasive. The court’s 

statements clearly express concern for Nunez’s pattern of 

criminal behavior, his failure to be deterred by prior sentences 

and removal proceedings, and the likelihood that he would
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reoffend. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an 

upward variance sentence on this basis. Moreover, while Nunez 

challenges the reasonableness of the court’s decision to run his 

sentence consecutively to his other sentences, we conclude that 

this decision is reasonable. See USSG § 7B1.3(f), p.s.; United 

States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 208 (6th Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED