1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

 

 OSHRC DOCKET NO. 17-1996

ORDER ON COMPLAINANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL

This matter comes before the Court on Complainant’s Motion to Compel and for an Order 

for Depositions. Complainant contends Respondent did not provide sufficient responses to its 

discovery requests and interposed boilerplate objections without an adequate explanation of the 

basis for those objections. Respondent contends its responses to Complainant’s discovery request 

were proper; its objections were proper; and that Complainant’s requests, especially as regards the 

depositions, are not proportional to the needs of the case. 

For the most part, the Court agrees with Complainant. Respondent’s objections, both 

general and specific, are clear-cut examples of boilerplate objections, devoid of any explanation, 

and many of its answers are simply legal conclusions, devoid of any facts. Based on what follows, 

Complainant’s Motion is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. 

Standard on Motions to Compel

Commission Rule 52(b) states, “The information . . . sought through discovery may 

concern any matter that is not privileged and that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 

pending case.” 29 C.F.R. § 2200.52(b). The information sought need not be admissible at hearing 

so long as it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and is 

SECRETARY OF LABOR, 

 Complainant,

 

 v. 

NOVA SHIMMICK JOINT VENTURE d/b/a 

SHIMMICK JOINT VENTURE, and its 

successors, 

 Respondent.
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proportional to the needs of the case. Id.; see also id. § 2200.52(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). When 

another party refuses or obstructs discovery, the requesting party may apply for an order 

compelling discovery. Id. § 2200.52(f). The Court has broad discretion in this arena. See Del 

Monte Corp., 9 BNA OSHC 2136 (No. 11865, 1981). The Review Commission has stated: 

The decision whether to allow discovery is within the judge’s sound discretion. 

This sound discretion should be guided by the objective of providing a fair and 

prompt hearing to the parties. Moreover, the judge should consider the need of the 

moving party for the information sought, any undue burden to the party from whom 

discovery is sought, and, on balance, any undue delay in the proceedings that may 

occur. Given the judge’s broad discretion, a judge’s disposition of discovery

matters is reversible only if the judge’s actions constitute an abuse of discretion

resulting in substantial prejudice. 

Id. 

The party objecting to production bears the burden of substantiating its objections. See 

Oleson v. Kmart Corp., 175 F.R.D. 560, 565 (D. Kan. 1997). Merely stating that a request for 

discovery is overly broad, unduly burdensome, or harassing without an evidentiary declaration 

supporting such an objection is not adequate to sustain an objection. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co. 

Ltd. v. Comm. Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa, 2000) (citing Josephs v. Harris Corp., 

677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982)); see also A. Farber and Partners, Inc. v. Garber, 234 F.R.D. 186, 

188 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (faulting defendant for making boilerplate objections to every request for 

discovery). “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 33(b)(1)(4) (emphasis added). Otherwise, such “[b]oilerplate, generalized objections are 

inadequate and tantamount to not making any objection at all.” See Springer v. Gen. Atomics Aero. 

Systs. Inc., Case No. 16cv2331-BTM(KSC), 2018 WL 490745 at *1 (S.D. Cal. January 18, 2018) 

(slip op.) (citing Walker v. Lakewood Condo. Owners Ass’n, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D. Cal 1999)). 

The Court will address the deficiencies Complainant identified in his Motion in conjunction 

with Respondent’s responses and objections thereto. 

Respondent’s General Objections
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Prior to answering an interrogatory, request for production, or request for admission, 

Respondent prefaced each set of responses with three general objections: (1) that Respondent has 

not completed its investigation of the case and reserves the right to amend its response; (2) that 

Respondent objects “to the entire set of interrogatories . . . to the extent that it requests information 

protected by the attorney client and work-product privileges”; (3) that Respondent objects “to 

each and every interrogatory” to the extent that it seeks privileged information protected by the 

U.S. and/or California Constitutions, in particular the right of privacy. See Compl’t Motion to 

Compel, Ex. 6 at 2 (emphasis added). Further, Respondent incorporated by reference the foregoing 

general objections to each of its interrogatory responses. Id.

Generalized, non-specific objections are improper. The plain language of Fed. R. Civ. P.

33(b)(1)(4) mandates that objections be made with specificity, which requires providing some 

evidentiary basis for the objection. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co., 198 F.R.D. at 511. By their very 

nature, general objections made applicable to all discovery responses cannot be stated with 

specificity. See Springer, 2018 WL 490745 at *2. As to the first objection, Respondent does 

nothing more than reiterate its responsibility under Commission Rule 52(i) to seasonably 

supplement its prior discovery responses. As to the remaining objections, Respondent’s claims of 

privilege are also deficient according to the Federal Rules, which require “the party [to] make the 

claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not 

produced or disclosed in a manner that . . . will enable other parties to assess the applicability of 

the privilege or protection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). No such description accompanies 

Respondent’s general claims of privilege. Instead, Respondent lodges objections “to the extent 

that” the requests seek privileged information without identifying any information that is being 

withheld. Only if information or documents are actually being withheld—and the basis 

explained—is such an objection proper. Otherwise, interposing broad-stroke objections as 
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Respondent has done here is no less “ambiguous” or “harassing” than the Respondent claims 

Complainant’s requests to be. 

Because Respondent failed to proffer any basis for its General Objections, those objections 

are improper and are hereby OVERRULED both as a general matter and insofar as Respondent 

attempted to incorporate them by reference into each of its responses to interrogatories, requests 

for production of documents, and requests for admissions. 

Complainant’s Interrogatories

Complainant contends Respondent’s answers to Interrogatories 1 through 12 are deficient 

and the objections are improper. In its Motion, Complainant split these interrogatories, and the 

responses thereto, into two general categories: (1) those which requested identifying information; 

and (2) those which requested “facts upon which Respondent relies in support of” denials or 

defenses in its Answer. The Court will address the general categories and the individual requests 

insofar as Respondent’s response to a specific interrogatory differs from the others in any material 

way. 

Interrogatories 2 and 3

Interrogatories 2 and 3 seek the identity of certain employees and managers. Interrogatory 

2 seeks the identity of “all individuals responsible for stacking the I-beams”, their employer and 

supervisor, and any work rules regarding the I-beams that Respondent communicated to those 

individuals. Similarly, Interrogatory 3 seeks the identity of “all Nova Shimmick managers 

responsible for supervising the worksite . . . , including the area with stacked I-beams”, their duties 

relating to I-beam storage, and documentation related to those duties on the day in question. In 

response to these requests, Respondent interposed the same objections: (1) “Vague, ambiguous, 

and overbroad; no employee was responsible for stacking any I-beams”; and (2) “Right of 
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Privacy”.

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As to the “vague, ambiguous, and overbroad” objection, Respondent is overruled. Not 

only did Complainant define potentially ambiguous terms, he also specified a particular activity 

occurring at a particular place on a particular date. Indeed, “without waiving these objections”, 

Respondent managed to identify both employees and supervisors that were responsive to the 

interrogatories. Because Respondent failed to identify how Interrogatories 2 and 3 are vague, 

ambiguous, or overly broad, its objections are overruled. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. 

Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 856 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that party resisting discovery 

must show specifically how each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly broad, 

burdensome or oppressive).

Though Respondent provided the names and employers of each of the identified employers 

and supervisors, it appears that it did not provide “identifying” information insofar as Complainant 

requested that person’s home address and phone number. Instead, Respondent objected on the 

basis of California’s right of privacy and provided what appear to be corporate addresses and phone 

numbers, because they are virtually the same for each individual. See Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 1 (listing, 

amongst others, the right to privacy). Respondent does not explain how this state privilege applies 

to Complainant’s request, but asserts that the present case is similar to a federal diversity suit, 

which, Respondent claims, applies state law privileges. See Resp’t Opposition at 6 (citing Oaks v. 

Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D 281, 284 (C.D. Cal. 1998)). Based on its review of the relevant 

case law, the Court finds Respondent’s claim of privilege based on California’s Right to Privacy 

should yield to the needs of this case. Further, the Court also finds adequate safeguards exist to 

protect against improper disclosure.

 

1. With respect to Number 2, Respondent also claimed such information was outside of its custody and control; 

however, it withdrew that objection after further discussion with Complainant. See Resp’t Opposition at 6. 
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The California Supreme Court explained that the right of privacy enshrined in the 

California Constitution “protects the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against a 

serious invasion.” Pioneer Electronics v. Superior Court, 150 P.3d 198, 204 (Cal., 2007). Thus, 

conduct characterized as an invasion of privacy must be evaluated on the “extent to which it 

furthers legitimate and important competing interests.” Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 656 (Cal. 

1994). “[I]f intrusion is limited and confidential information is carefully shielded from disclosure 

except to those who have a legitimate need to know, privacy concerns are assuaged.” Id. Personal 

contact information of a non-party witness is “generally discoverable, and it is neither unduly 

personal nor overly intrusive.” Pioneer, 150 P.3d at 205. That is because such information is 

typically used to “identify witnesses rather than to establish facts about the existence of [private] 

relationships.” Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1254 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)

The Court finds that the identifying information requested by Complainant does not violate 

any of the identified individuals’ rights to privacy. The address and phone number of the identified 

employees and supervisors is neither unduly personal nor overly intrusive; it is only being used 

for the limited purpose of identifying witnesses to the events related this case. Further, such 

information can be protected through the entry of appropriate orders, and its dissemination is 

restricted according to the Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., SafeCard Svcs. Inc. v. SEC, 926 

F.2d 1197, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (discussing the broad privacy rights afforded to suspects, 

witnesses, and investigators). Accordingly, Respondent’s objection on the basis of the California 

Constitution’s right to privacy is overruled.2

 

2. Respondent’s reliance on Oaks v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd. is misplaced. While that case does state that federal courts 

sitting in diversity will apply state law privileges, the court also noted “the courts have frequently found that a party’s 

need for the information may outweigh whatever privacy rights, if any, another party may have.” 179 F.R.D. 281, 284 

(citation omitted). The court in Oaks was dealing with the more sensitive topic of financial information. Although 

such information is clearly within the ambit of the right to privacy, the court found that the information in question 

was crucial to a key issue and could be adequately protected by a protective order. Thus, it ordered discovery of the 

financial information. Based on this reading, Oaks supports the position taken by Complainant here. 
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Interrogatories 1 and 4 through 12

Interrogatories 1 and 4 through 12 are all of the same form: “State all facts upon which 

Respondent relies in support of” the various defenses or denials made in its Answer. Complainant 

contends Respondent’s responses are boilerplate, conclusory statements, which are not supported 

by any recitation of facts. Respondent argues its responses are appropriate in their narrative form 

and “provide the Secretary with sufficient facts to put the Secretary on notice of Respondent’s 

defense theories . . . .” Resp’t Opposition at 6. Although Respondent’s answers vary a little more 

than suggested by Complainant, the Court finds they neither constitute a narrative, nor do they 

apprise Complainant of any facts relevant to the defenses or denials asserted by Respondent.

In response to Interrogatories 1, 4, 5, and 11, Respondent answered as follows: 

Complainant will be unable to establish the existence of the alleged violation; 

Complainant will be unable to prove there was a substantial probability the alleged 

violation could result in death or serious physical injury; Respondent had no 

knowledge of the alleged violation; if it is found that a valid violation of the safety 

order existed, said violation was the result of unforeseeable actions of one or more 

employees of Respondent, actions for which Respondent should not be held 

accountable; if it is found that a violation of the safety order existed, said violation 

was the result of unforeseeable actions of one or more employees of an employer 

other than Respondent; actions for which Respondent should not be held 

accountable.

Compl’t Motion, Ex. 6 at 2–6. Although couched in terms to make it appear as a narrative, 

Respondent’s response is nothing more than a list of legal conclusions, which could have been 

reproduced as follows: (1) Complainant cannot prove it’s prima facie case; (2) the violation was 

not serious; and (3) if valid, the violation was the result of unpreventable employee misconduct of 

Respondent’s own employee or that of another employer. Complainant is already aware of 

Respondent’s defenses and denials because: (a) Respondent’s Answer already contains this 

information in substantially the same language, and (b) Complainant asked for all facts supporting 

these denials and defenses. See Resp’t Answer at 2–3. If Respondent is denying an allegation or 
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asserting an affirmative defense, it must have some facts in its possession to support such 

allegations. Complainant’s interrogatories seeking such information are proper. As they stand, 

Respondent’s responses to Interrogatories 1, 4, 5, and 11 are deficient. As indicated below, 

Respondent shall provide Complainant with facts that are responsive to the foregoing 

interrogatories.

Respondent’s answers to Interrogatories 6 and 7 are different in form, if not in substance. 

In Interrogatory 6, which asks about Respondent’s denial that the proposed penalty was 

appropriate, Respondent answers, “Complainant will be unable to establish that the proposed 

penalties were calculated correctly.” Compl’t Motion, Ex. 6 at 6. Presumably, Respondent’s 

answer to this interrogatory is premised, at least in part, on its answer to Interrogatory 1. Again, 

however, there are no facts included in Respondent’s answer to this or virtually every other 

interrogatory. Facts used to support other denials and affirmative defenses are also relevant to the 

question of penalty. Thus, when Respondent provides updated responses to the interrogatories 

discussed above, the answer to Interrogatory 6 will be a natural extension of those responses. 

With respect to Interrogatory 7, the Court perceives no deficiency based on Complainant’s 

original allegation in the Complaint, Respondent’s Answer, or the Interrogatory itself. 

Complainant has not identified any independent problem with Respondent’s answer, instead 

claiming that it was the same boilerplate answer found in 1 and 4 through 12. Clearly the answer 

to Interrogatory 7 is not similar to the others. As far as the Court can tell, Respondent’s answer to 

Interrogatory 7 is sufficient.

Respondent’s answers to Interrogatories 8, 9, 10 and 12, however, are not. Each response 

states, “Respondent had no knowledge, nor could have reasonably foreseen any of the alleged 

violative conditions.” Compl’t Motion, Ex. 6 at 6.

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 As with Respondent’s answers to 

 

3. The one exception is Interrogatory 9, which adds the following “. . . which may have been the result of actions of 
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Interrogatories 1, 4, 5, and 11, Respondent merely states a legal conclusion, e.g., that it did not 

have knowledge. Because Complainant requested facts in support of that conclusion, 

Respondent’s answers are deficient. As indicated below, Respondent shall provide Complainant 

with facts that are responsive to the foregoing interrogatories.

Complainant’s Requests for Production

The Court has already rejected Respondent’s general objections and will not re-address 

them here. Further, the Court also incorporates by reference its findings as to Respondent’s 

specific objections on the basis of vagueness, ambiguity, overbreadth, undue burden, 

oppressiveness, and harassment. See Respondent’s General Objections, p. 3, supra. Respondent 

provides no factual basis for any of these boilerplate objections, and the Court does not find the 

requests made by Complainant to be objectionable. Thus for the reasons already stated above, 

Respondent’s objections on the basis of vagueness, ambiguity, overbreadth, undue burden, 

oppressiveness, and harassment are overruled. 

Respondent makes one additional objection to the production of certain documents that 

bears discussion. In response to Requests for Production 1 through 4, Respondent states:

Respondent is unaware of the existence of any documents which may respond to 

this request, other than those documents Respondent provided to Complainant 

during the subject inspection. Those documents in Complainant’s possession are 

equally available to Complainant and will not be produced again. Production of 

items which Complainant already has in its possession is not calculated to lead to 

the discovery of relevant evidence, and is burdensome, oppressive, and harassing. 

Compl’t Motion, Ex. 6 at 10. The objection that documents are “equally available” has routinely 

been rejected by the courts. See St. Paul Reinsurance Co. Ltd., 198 F.R.D. 508, 514 (N.D. Iowa 

2000) (noting that “courts have unambiguously stated that this exact objection is insufficient to 

resist a discovery request”); Nat’l Academy of Recording Arts & Sciences, Inc. v. On Point Events, 

 

Shimmick Construction or Quanta Services, Inc. employees.” Compl’t Motion, Ex. 6 at 2–6. This does not change 

the Court’s analysis of the issue. 
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LP, 256 F.R.D. 678, 682 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing St. Paul Reinsurance for same proposition). 

Simply because documents may have been provided to Complainant during the inspection does 

not absolve Respondent of its responsibility to provide such documents if they are responsive to a 

formal request for production. Respondent will suffer no prejudice, nor undue burden, by 

producing such documents. Accordingly, Respondent shall provide ALL documents responsive to 

Complainant’s request, irrespective of whether such documents may have been provided during 

the course of Complainant’s inspection. 

Complainant’s Requests for Admissions

According to the Ninth Circuit, “The purpose of Rule 36(a) is to expedite trial by 

establishing certain material facts as true and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial.”4 Asea, 

Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981). To facilitate that goal “parties 

should not seek to evade disclosure by quibbling and objection. They should admit to the fullest 

extent possible, and explain in detail why other portions of a request may not be admitted.” 

Marchand v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 22 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 1994). “When the purpose and 

significance of a request are reasonably clear, courts do not permit denials based on an overlytechnical reading of the request.” U.S. ex rel Englund v. Los Angeles County, 235 F.R.D. 675, 684

(E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 

1992)). 

Respondent denied all of Complainant’s requests for admissions on the premise that they 

“were so vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible that Respondent cannot, in good faith, frame an 

intelligent reply other than to deny.” Resp’t Opposition at 7. Respondent also states, without 

explaining, that this conclusion “is not based on an overly technical reading of the requests.” Id. 

 

4. Although cases before the Commission apply a different procedural rule, the Court finds the purpose behind these 

rules is the same.
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Much like its responses to Complainant’s interrogatories, Respondent merely asserts that the 

requests are ambiguous without supporting that conclusion with facts or argument. Although there 

is nothing inherently wrong with denying each of the propounded requests for admission,5

Respondent’s reasons for its denials justify the Court’s intervention in this case. 

All of the requests provide concrete details, including: (1) the date: July 17, 2017; (2) the 

location: Naval Base Point Loma Fuel Pier South Dolphin; and (3) the condition: the stacked Ibeams that caused an injury to a Nova Shimmick employee. Further, each request only seeks to 

establish a single point of fact about the condition, individuals exposed to that condition, or the 

opportunity for a supervisor to observe the condition. To suggest, as Respondent does here, that 

“nearly all” of Complainant’s requests for admissions are so vague and ambiguous as to render 

them unintelligible is absurd. Complainant’s Request for Admission No. 3 illustrates the absurdity 

of Respondent’s position and the problem of asserting an objection in boilerplate fashion, without 

a supporting rationale. It states: “On or around July 17, 2017, Patrick Monahan was a Nova 

Shimmick employee.” Compl’t Motion, Ex. 5 at 8. On July 17, 2017, either Patrick Monahan was 

a Nova Shimmick employee, or he was not. There is nothing ambiguous or vague about such a 

statement, nor, insofar as the Court reads them, is there anything vague or ambiguous about the 

remaining requests for admission. 

This is not a complicated case: the condition involves a stack of I-beams that fell and 

injured someone on July 17, 2017 at Naval Base Point Loma Fuel Pier South Dolphin. 

Complainant’s requests seek Respondent’s position regarding the orientation of the I-beam stack 

and whether any particular I-beam was sticking out from it; whether employee(s)/individual(s) 

were exposed to that condition; and whether any supervisors did, or could have, observed the 

 

5. See, e.g., United Coal Companies v. Powell Const. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Where, as here, issues 

in dispute are requested to be admitted, a denial is a perfectly reasonable response. Furthermore, the use of only the 

word ‘denied’ is often sufficient under the rule.”) (citations omitted). 
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condition. These are all basic facts that do not require verbal gymnastics to answer. See Holmgren, 

976 F.2d at 580 (“Epistemological doubts speak highly of (party’s) philosophical sophistication, 

but poorly of its respect for Rule 36(a).”). Respondent’s argument that the “nearly all” of these 

requests are “so vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible” smacks of gamesmanship and is rejected. 

Complainant’s Requests for Depositions

Finally, the Court also finds that depositions of Art Mendoza, Dale Bergman, and Michael 

Comer shall be allowed. In addition to the fact that the foregoing individuals were identified as 

being responsible for safety at the worksite on the evening of the accident, the Court is also 

persuaded by Complainant’s argument that Respondent’s evasiveness in answering discovery 

provides further justification for taking depositions. Instead of engaging in a meaningful and useful 

exchange of discovery, Respondent has stonewalled Complainant’s attempts to acquire relevant 

information through its indiscriminate use of objections and vague, conclusory statements of 

“fact”. 

Furthermore, the proportionality factors in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) also support this 

conclusion. First, Respondent suggests that Complainant’s concern for a safe workplace for 

employees is somehow heavily outweighed by Respondent’s interest in maintaining a clean safety 

record, the tarnishing of which, it claims, could be fatal to its entire business operation. While 

having a “serious” violation on the books may impact Respondent’s ability to compete in the 

federal contracting process, Respondent’s concerns about the livelihood of its business on the facts 

of this case are overblown. Further, employee safety is no less vital to Respondent’s business as 

an ongoing concern. Second, while the amount in controversy is only $11,408, Complainant’s 

concerns—no less than Respondent’s—go beyond the mere question of money. Indeed, an 

employee was injured in this case. Third, with respect to the parties’ access to relevant information 

and their respective resources, the Court finds this factor supports Complainant’s request. The 
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supervisors identified above possess information about the events of July 17, 2017, and were in 

charge of safety when the accident occurred. Without their deposition testimony, Complainant will 

not be able to adequately evaluate its case. As such, the fourth factor also supports allowing the 

depositions, because the information the managers are likely to provide will be important to 

resolution of the dispute, whether at trial or through settlement. Finally, as regards the expense 

involved in conducting the depositions, the Court finds that Complainant has already assisted in 

limiting the expense by requesting only a single day of depositions for three different management 

personnel. Further, consistent with Respondent’s request, the Court finds that taking these 

depositions close to Respondent’s headquarters in Napa, California will similarly limit expenses. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it appropriate to allow depositions of the three 

managers, which shall be limited to total of one day at a mutually agreeable location in Napa, 

California. 

ORDERS

Based on the foregoing, Complainant’s Motion is AFFIRMED in part, and DENIED in 

part. Within 10 days of the date of this Order, Respondent is Ordered to:

1. Provide the contact information requested in Interrogatories 2 and 3. To the extent 

Respondent feels one is necessary, it may submit a proposed protective order to limit 

disclosure of such information.

2. Provide all facts that are responsive to Interrogatories 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. 

However, insofar as Interrogatories 1 and 11 seek similar information, Complainant shall

clarify which interrogatory seeks information regarding the prima facie elements and 

which seeks information regarding the citation’s characterization as serious. Because 

abatement does not appear to be an issue in this case, Respondent is not required to respond 

to Interrogatory 7.

3. Provide ALL documents responsive to Complainant’s requests for production of 

documents, even if said documents were already provided to Complainant during the 

inspection.

4. Provide updated responses, independent of the objections overruled herein, to 

Complainant’s requests for admission. Insofar as Respondent feels it cannot fully admit 

or deny a particular request, the Court directs Respondent to the following passage from 
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Rule 36(a): 

The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail why the 

answering party cannot admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet 

the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that 

a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an 

admission is requested, the party shall specify so much of it as true and 

qualify or deny the remainder. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4).

5. Seasonably supplement its responses to Complainant’s requests for discovery when such 

information becomes available through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 

6. Confer with Complainant to schedule the depositions of Art Mendoza, Dale Bergman, and 

Michael Comer. The depositions shall take place in Napa, California by June 15, 2018.

SO ORDERED.

Date: March 29, 2018 S/ Patrick B. Augustine 

 ____________________________________

Denver, Colorado Patrick B. Augustine

Judge, OSHRC