COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Overton 

Argued by teleconference 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1498-98-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 DECEMBER 1, 1998 

SHAMAAL L'TURE BENJAMIN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

Timothy J. Hauler, Judge 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Steven D. Benjamin (Betty Layne DesPortes; 

Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C., on brief), for 

appellee. 

 A grand jury indicted Shamaal L'Ture Benjamin for capital 

murder, first degree murder, three counts of malicious wounding, 

and five counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony. 

 On appeal, the Commonwealth contends the trial judge erred in 

granting Benjamin's pretrial motion to suppress a statement 

Benjamin made during a police interrogation. See Code 

§ 19.2-398. Benjamin cross-appeals two issues the trial judge 

decided adversely to him. For the reasons that follow, we affirm 

the trial judge's order. 

 I. 

 The evidence at the suppression hearing proved that on the 

night of November 14, 1997, the police received information that 

a person known as "Sha" had been involved in a double homicide in 

Chesterfield County. The police also learned that Sha lived in 
- 2 - 

an apartment "off of Hull Street" and had driven a stolen Nissan 

automobile. When the police arrived at the apartment complex 

early on November 15, 1997, they saw the stolen automobile. 

 Several police officers set up surveillance around the 

automobile. Sergeant Smith told Detective Ivey to detain anyone 

who entered the car. He specifically advised Detective Ivey to 

be on the lookout for a suspect named Sha, who was believed to be 

a fifteen to eighteen-year-old male. Detective Ivey later 

learned that Sha lived in one of the apartments in the building 

at 1408 Clarkson Road. He understood that Sha was somehow 

involved in a homicide but did not know the nature of Sha's 

involvement or whether a firearm was involved. 

 Detective Hensley, who was part of the surveillance team, 

was informed that the automobile had been involved in a double 

homicide, that it possibly was driven and occupied by four males 

involved in the homicides, and that a high-caliber semiautomatic 

rifle had been used in the incident. He testified that the 

officers had been told to look for Rosheen Waller, who was known 

by the name "Shaw." 

 At 9:30 a.m., a person entered the automobile and attempted 

to drive off. Because of a spiking device the officers placed on 

a tire, the tire flattened. However, before the officers could 

respond, the person exited the automobile and walked around the 

apartment building in the direction of apartment 1408 A. The 

officers were unable to identify the person but they proceeded to 
- 3 - 

apartment 1408 A. 

 When the officers arrived at the apartment, they knocked at 

the door, believing Waller resided there. Benjamin's mother 

responded to the knock on the door. Seeing Benjamin in the 

apartment, Detective Hensley asked him to identify himself. 

Benjamin said he was "Shamaal Benjamin." The officers told 

Benjamin they were looking for "Rosheen Waller, going by the 

nickname Shaw." When Benjamin told them Waller lived elsewhere, 

the officers left Benjamin's residence to search for Waller. 

 As the officers looked throughout the apartment complex, 

Christopher Thomas entered the stolen automobile. Detective Ivey 

and other officers detained Thomas and asked if his name was Sha. 

 Thomas denied being Sha, said Sha had just walked past them to 

apartment 1408 A, and told the officers they could verify 

Thomas's identity by asking his cousin in apartment 1408 B. 

Thomas's cousin confirmed his identity. 

 Detective Ivey and several officers returned to apartment 

1408 A and told Benjamin's mother they were looking for her son. 

 Detective Ivey testified that when Benjamin's mother opened the 

door, he and another officer breached the doorway, stepped over 

the threshold of the front door, and asked to speak to her son. 

Detective Ivey saw Benjamin in the room and told Benjamin to come 

with him. When the officers took Benjamin outside, Thomas 

pointed to Benjamin and said, "That's Shaw." Detective Ivey then 

placed handcuffs on Benjamin. 
- 4 - 

 Detectives Carroll and Church interrogated Benjamin at the 

Chesterfield Police headquarters. By stipulation, a videotape of 

the custodial interrogation was entered into evidence at the 

suppression hearing. The trial judge watched the videotape as 

Detective Church testified concerning his reading of the Miranda

form and the interrogation of Benjamin. Detective Church 

testified that Benjamin's facial expressions, body language, and 

tone of voice never indicated to him that Benjamin did not 

understand everything that occurred during the interrogation. 

Benjamin confessed his involvement in the shooting incident. 

 In granting Benjamin's motion to suppress his statement, the 

trial judge made extensive findings. With regard to Benjamin's 

Fourth Amendment claim, the trial judge found that the officers' 

initial seizure of Benjamin in his apartment was a warrantless 

arrest. He also found that sufficient probable cause for the 

arrest "was developed just prior and contemporaneously" to the 

seizure. However, the trial judge found that the officers did 

not have consent to enter Benjamin's residence and that no 

exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. Thus, the 

judge found that Benjamin's arrest was unlawful and constituted 

an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

 With regard to Benjamin's Fifth Amendment claim, the trial 

judge found "as a matter of fact that the Miranda [rights 

advisal] . . . was done . . . in an unintelligible manner." 

Although the trial judge found that Benjamin's statement was not 
- 5 - 

a product of any police coercion, intimidation, threats, or 

promise of leniency, he found that Benjamin did not verbally 

acknowledge any understanding of the Miranda rights and that 

Benjamin did not waive his Fifth Amendment rights. He found that 

"any waiver of rights was not given freely, intelligently and 

voluntarily with full knowledge of the meaning and effect of the 

waiver that was being solicited." 

 As to Benjamin's Sixth Amendment claim, the trial judge 

found that Benjamin's request for counsel, "if it was made," was 

unintelligible and ambiguous. 

 II. 

 Our review of the trial judge's ruling on the motion to 

suppress is governed by the following standards: 

 [T]he burden is on the appellant to show that 

the trial court's decision constituted 

reversible error. We view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. We 

review the trial court's findings of 

historical fact only for "clear error," but 

we review de novo the trial court's 

application of defined legal standards to the 

particular facts of a case, such as 

determinations of reasonable suspicion and 

probable cause. Whether a defendant 

"invoked" his Miranda right[s] . . . during 

custodial interrogation and whether he 

"waived" [these] . . . right[s] are 

determined by applying judicially declared 

standards. 

Quinn v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 702, 712-13, 492 S.E.2d 470, 

475-76 (1997). 

 Evidence in the record clearly supports the trial judge's 
- 6 - 

finding that Detective Church's reading of the Miranda rights 

form to Benjamin was unintelligible. The videotape of the 

interrogation was stipulated to be evidence. The detective's 

reading of the statement was so jumbled and unintelligible that 

the trial judge remarked, "Is he speaking in tongues?" 

Significantly, only when the detective is reading from the form 

is his diction unintelligible. The videotape demonstrates that 

the detective's other statements and questions to Benjamin, both 

before and after the unintelligible reading from the form, are 

clear and understandable. Upon review of the evidence, we hold 

that the trial judge's factual findings concerning the Miranda

rights are not plainly wrong. Indeed, those findings are clearly 

supported by the evidence. 

 "[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly 

informed [of the Miranda rights]." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436, 471 (1966). 

 "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, 

whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming 

from custodial interrogation of the defendant 

unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 

safeguards effective to secure the privilege 

against self-incrimination," commonly known 

as Miranda warnings. "Failure to give 

Miranda warnings prior to custodial 

interrogation requires suppression of any 

illegally obtained statements." 

Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 194, 503 S.E.2d 233, 

236 (1998) (citations omitted). The manner in which the 

detective read the statement to Benjamin was so unintelligible 

that it was functionally equivalent to not reading to Benjamin 
- 7 - 

the Miranda rights. 

 Furthermore, based on the evidence in the record, the trial 

judge did not err in ruling that the Commonwealth did not meet 

its "burden of proving that the defendant knowingly [, 

voluntarily,] and intelligently waived the constitutional 

privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel." 

Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 249, 252, 349 S.E.2d 161, 163 

(1986). The record establishes that after the detective read 

unintelligibly from the form, he showed Benjamin a form which 

asked, "Do you understand the rights that have been explained to 

you?" The detective then told Benjamin to write "Yes" if he read 

and understood English. The trial judge noted the following: 

 Now, he says to the young man, he says to him 

on the tape, he said, "do you read and 

understand English?" And then he says, 

"Write "yes" there." . . . . 

 It doesn't tell him he's waiving his rights. 

 He says, "Sign yes here." It says that I've 

read to you these rights, doesn't say that 

you understand these rights, it says that you 

understand and read English. That's not what 

the form says. 

 I find nowhere during the course of this 

taping that there was an active waiver, 

assuming that what he did was a full and 

complete rights advisal. Where did he waive 

those rights, by signing this? 

Upon our review of the evidence and the facts as found by the 

trial judge, we hold that the Commonwealth failed to bear its 

burden of proving Benjamin made a knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. 
- 8 - 

 In view of our holding, which affirms the trial judge's 

order suppressing the statement as a violation of Benjamin's 

Fifth Amendment rights, we need not address the Commonwealth's 

further contention that the trial judge erroneously based the 

suppression order on the additional grounds that Benjamin was 

unlawfully arrested in his home without a warrant and without 

exigent circumstances to justify the entry. For the same reason, 

we need not address Benjamin's contentions that he clearly 

invoked his right to counsel during the interrogation and that 

the trial judge erred in finding that the police had probable 

cause to arrest him. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the trial judge's order 

suppressing the evidence. 

 Affirmed.