Filed 7/22/14 CERTIFIED FOR PART IAL PUBLICATION *
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. LEOPOLDO CHAVEZ et al., Defendants and Appellants. D061946

(Super. Ct. No. SCD228929)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joan P. Weber, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Kimberly J. Grove, unde r appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Leopoldo Chavez. Laura G. Schaefer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant Edward Elias.

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts I through V and VII of the Discussion.2 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Annie Featherman Fraser , Deputy Attorneys Ge neral, for Plaintiff and Respondent. A jury convicted defendants and appellant s Leopoldo Chavez an d Edward Elias of two counts of first degree murd er (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) 1 and found true the special circumstances of robbery-murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) and multiple murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury further foun d that Chavez and Elias were armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 1 2022, subdivision (a)(1 ). Following their convictions, the court sentenced Chavez an d Elias to two cons ecutive terms of life imprisonment each, without the po ssibility of parole, plus an additional consecutive year.
The court later recalled the se ntences to consider whether to impose a lesser punishment under section 190.5, subdivisio n (b), because Chavez and Elia s were under the age of 18
at the time of their offenses. After a furthe r hearing, the court d eclined to modify the

sentences. Chavez and Elias appeal, contending that the evidence was insu fficient to convict them of first degree murder or to supportthe special circumstances findings. They further contend that (1) the court erred in instructing the jury using a modified version of CALCRIM No. 376, (2) the court erred by not in structing the jury re garding the natural and probable consequences doctrine, (3) th e prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments, (4) the sentences of life imprisonment w ithout the possibility of parole violate the Eighth Amendment of the United Stat es Constitution because they

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.3 were juveniles at the time of their offenses, and (5) the c ourt erred by imposing parole
revocation fines. With two exceptions, we reject defendants' contentions on appeal. As we set forth more fully below, the 20- and 23-year-old vi ctims were sailors en listed in the United States Navy, one of whom was driving a br and new Toyota pickup truck. The victims were murdered at a location where young adults, including othe r Navy personnel and their friends, frequently gathered to drink, listen to music and socialize around a number of bonfires. Multiple witnesses recalled th at Chavez, who was 17 at the time of the killings, was at the scene of the bonfires sh ortly before the murder s took place. The witnesses also uniformly recalle d that Chavez was in the company of at least one other teenager or young adult a nd that Chavez and his compan ion were acting in a very aggressive and threatening ma nner toward other Navy personne l and their friends present at the bonfires. Four days after the murd ers, Chavez was stopped in Tijuana, Mexico while driving the 20-year-old vi ctim's new Toyota pickup truck. Importantly, some years after the murders, investigators were able to match DNA retrieved from the pants pocket of the 20-year-old victim with Chavez's DNA.
The witnesses' identification of Chavez as being presen t at the bonfires shortly before the murders, his possession of the tr uck following the murders, and his DNA in the pants pocket of one of the victims, ma ke a strong case Chavez participated in the truck robbery and the killings. With respect to Elias, who was also 17 at the time of the murders, the record is sufficient to sustain his conviction and the sp ecial circumstances findings. Within just a few hours after the killings, investigators fo und a cigarette butt at the scene of the4 murders among items that had been taken out of the Toyota truck. Later, investigators were able to match DNA on the cigarette bu tt with Elias's DNA. Elias's DNA was also found on a cup recovered from inside the vic tim's truck when it was stopped in Tijuana
after the murders. In additio n to the DNA on the cup, E lias's fingerprints were found
both inside and outside of the truck. The cigarette butt Elias left at the scene of the murder s, with ash still attached, very near items discarded from the truck and recovered very shortly after the murders, places Elias at that location at or near the tim e of the murders. Elias's DNA, found in the cup retrieved from the truck, and his fingerpri nts, found both inside and outside of the truck, place Elias in the truck with Chavez shor tly after the time it wa s stolen and near the time of the killings. These circumstances support the conclusion Elias was Chavez's companion at the bonfires and an active participant in the robbery and killings. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to support Chavez's and Elias's murder convictions as well as the jury's fe lony-murder and multip le-murder special circumstances findings. We also reject defe ndants' claims that they were prejudiced by instructional error and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct.
Because defendants were sentenced before Miller v. Alabama (Ala.Crim.App. 2010) 63 So.3d 676, certiorari granted June 25, 2012, ___ U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 2455] ( Miller) and People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354 ( Gutierrez ) were decided and,
because the record here does no t show that the trial court ha d the opportunity to directly consider the ultimate issue pres ented in those cases, we reve rse the life sentences without possibility of parole and remand for resentencing in light of Miller and Gutierrez . We also agree the trial court erred in imposing parole revocation fines.5 FACTS
A. The Palms Bonfires Early in the autumn of 1 993, a large area of undeveloped land located near the
intersection of Interstate 805 and Palm Aven ue in southern San Diego County was known as "the Palms." The Palms was for the most part barren dirt and, on a fairly regular basis, it was the site of multiple si multaneous bonfires attended by various groups of young adults. Navy personnel and their friends wh o frequented a country western club located on a local Navy base, Anchors and Spurs, ofte n met at the Palms after Anchors and Spurs closed for the night and socialized together around one or more of the bonfires. On the night of September 24, 1993, a number of people from Anchors and Spurs attended a party at the Palms where there were two Anchors and Spurs bonfires.
Witnesses estimated that the nu mber of attendees ranged from 20 to 50 people. At the party, people smoked cigare ttes, drank beer, and mingled. It was very foggy. Two United States Navy sailors, 23-year-o ld Keith Combs (Combs) and 20-yearold Eugene "Cliff" Ellis (Ellis), were presen t at the Anchors and Spurs bonfires. Both young men carried wallets, base passes a nd military identifica tion. Combs smoked exclusively Marlborough cigarettes. That night, Ellis drove a brand new white Toyota pi ckup truck, which he had recently purchased with financial help from his father. Ellis's truck had fewer than 1,000
miles on the odometer. Ellis and Combs arrived at the Palm s with two other sailors at approximately 7:30 p.m. but went back to their base with their two companions around 11:00 p.m. Once back at the Navy base, Ellis and Combs decided to re turn to the Palms.6 When they returned to the party, Ellis parked his tr uck with the back bumper facing one of the Anchors and Spurs bonfires. B. Aggressive and Un comfortable Behavior During the hour between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., members of the Anchors and Spurs party had experiences ranging from uncomf ortable to distressing at and near where Ellis parked his truck.
1. Behmke About 4:00 a.m., Barbara Behmke drove an Anchors and Spurs partygoer to the Balboa Naval hospital. Behmke 's acquaintance had been in a fight at one of the bonfires and was bleeding. Behmke stayed at the hosp ital for a short period but returned to the Palms to look for a friend and find a jacket sh e had left at one of the bonfires. When Behmke returned to the site of the bonfires, she encountered four yo ung Hispanic males. Two of the young men approached her. Behmke was later able to identify Chavez as one of the two young men. Chavez made sexua l gestures and remarks that made Behmke very uncomfortable. Accordin g to Behmke, in response to her uncomfortable encounter with Chavez and his companion, she got in her truck and immediately left the area.
2. Duvall Justin Duvall was also an enlisted member of the Navy and at the Anchors and Spurs bonfires on the morning of September 25, 1993. Arou nd 5:00 a.m., two teenagers approached Duvall. 2 Duvall was later able to iden tify Chavez as one of the two teenagers who approached hi m. The pair asked Duvall for beer. One of the two

2 A third teenager was with the other two before any words were exchanged, but he did not approach Duvall.7 teenagers had his hand behind his back in a manner that Duvall felt was very threatening. When Duvall declined to gi ve them beer, Chavez and hi s companion re sponded "you fucking cowboys, we don't like your music." After Chavez and his companion returned to their own bonfire, Duvall immediately left the Palms with his friends. According to Duvall, he left immediately after his encount er with Chavez and hi s companion because: "I felt uncomfortable. I knew something wasn't right. That's when I decided we better
leave."
3. Forde Stephen Forde was parked next to, and within four to five feet of, Ellis's truck at the Anchors and Spurs bonfire. On that ev ening, Forde was 18 years old and, like Combs and Ellis, an enlisted member of the Navy. Forde was concerned about and keeping an eye on a friend who was somewhat intoxicated. Forde noticed two teenage males, one of whom he was able to identify as Chavez, sitt ing in a vehicle about 15 feet outside the circle of cars at the Anchors and Spurs bon fire. Chavez and his companion caused Forde to be concerned. They were laughing, and something about their mannerisms made
Forde feel that he needed to move away from the vehicle the teenagers were in and get to the other side of the bonfire. Forde though t Chavez and his companion were acting like
"smart asses." When Chavez got out of the vehicle he wa s in and walked toward the rear of the vehicle, Forde moved to the opposite side of the bonfire. Forde left the Palms
about 5:00 a.m.
4. Kowalow At approximately 5:00 a.m., Kristeen Ko walow saw three young men drive up to the Anchors and Spurs bonfire in a light-colored pickup truck with a camper shell. They8 appeared to be Hispanic. Tw o of the young men got out of the vehicle, hung out at the back of their vehicle and began talking to Kowalow. When Kowalow was shown a photographic lineup, she testified that Ch avez's photograph looked familiar. The two young men were dressed in ba ggy clothing, and their attitude made people in Kowalow's group nervous; because of how the two young men made them feel, Kowalow and her friends left the Palms bonfires around 5:00 a.m. When Kowalow left, the only people remaining at the bonfire were two sailors a nd the three young men in the light-colored pickup truck. The only vehicles left were the light-colored pickup truck and a newer white pickup truck. Kowalow later told inve stigators the pictures of Ellis and his truck
looked familiar.
5. Macy Mary Macy and three friends were also at the Anchors and Spurs bonfire where Ellis had parked his truck. Although defendants' trial took pl ace almost 19 years after the murders, Macy had a distinct memory of Ellis's truck becaus e: "It was brand new, and I was admiring it, that that was the type of truc k that I liked, that I would like to buy." About 5:00 a.m., Macy suddenly realized ju st about everyone appeared to have left the bonfire party. She had a "bad feeli ng." Macy told her companions "we need to get out of here. Something is going on." He r companions got into Macy's vehicle. As Macy started to get into the dr iver's side of her car, a light-colored pickup truck with a camper shell pulled up next to her. Two you ng men were inside. One rolled a window down, and the two spoke to her in English but with what she believed were Hispanic accents. The two young men made Macy nervous, and she igno red them and left with her9 friends. When Macy was leavin g, she noticed that only Ellis 's brand new truck was still at the Anchors and Spurs bonfire. Sh e did not see Ellis or Combs. C. Crime Scene and Investigation Between 7:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m., a woma n and her daughter were searching the
Palms area for their son and brother and discovere d the bodies of Combs and Ellis. Ellis's new pickup truck was no longer in the area.
1. Examination of Remains Ellis's and Combs's bodies were in the dirt about 16 feet apart at the site of an extinguished bonfire. Their bodie s were pointed in the same di rection, nearly parallel to each other and angled slightly towa rd each other at the heads. Ellis was found face-up. His body had fre sh abrasions and bruises on his face and right lower leg, including a scratch on his face below his eye. There was also an abrasion on the back of his head or upper part of his neck that was not caused by a bullet wound. Ellis's clothing was uncharacteristically dish eveled, with his shir t untucked an d his belt undone. A U.S.S. Constellati on ball cap was found lying betw een Ellis's feet. It was crumbled and had dried vegeta tion on it, as if someone had stepped on it. Blood was found on the ground on the vege tation area near Ellis and on hi s shirt. He also had dried vegetation stuck to his face. Because of the positioning of the body and location of blood, investigators c oncluded that he was initially face -down after bein g shot and had
been rolled over onto his back be fore his body was discovered. 3

3 At trial, Chavez offered expert testim ony that Ellis was facedown for an extended period time, minutes or hours, before being rolled over.10 Combs was found lying face-do wn on the ground, with dirt kicked up on his pant leg and arm.
Post mortem examination of the bodies revealed that each had suffered three fatal gunshot wounds, six shots in total, all fire d by a single gun. Ellis had an entrance gunshot wound in his chest; he also had a gu nshot wound at his forehead and one in his
back. The shot to Ellis 's chest was accomplished at a dist ance. The shot to his head was made at very close range, with in approximately an inch. E llis was alive at the time of
each shot. Combs was shot at close range, at three or four inches, in the middle of his back close to his spine. This fractured the left si de of his spine and rib and perforated the aorta and left lung. He was also shot in the top of his head and at his left temple. Two of the projectiles were recovered from his brain. Co mbs was also still alive when each shot was inflicted, but any one of the wounds woul d have caused his death within minutes.
The coroner testified that Ellis and Combs died at some point between 1:20 a.m. and 5:20 a.m.
2. Crime Scene DNA At the scene of the killings, on the gr ound between the bodies and clustered together within several square feet, investig ators found various car care accessories that appeared to be from Ellis's truck, includ ing a can of Armor All tire foam, a can of polishing compound, a scrub brush, a map, and a college brochure with Ellis's fingerprints on it. The items were collected by investigators as a single evidentiary item, item 6. A white shoe box was among the items from Ellis's truck identified in item 6, and it appeared the other items in item 6 had, at one point, been in the shoe box.11 Within the area where investigators found the items identified in item 6, and near the scrub brush, investigators also found a recently smoked cigarette butt. The butt was from a Marlborough cigarette, the brand Combs smoked. It was collected separately as evidence item 7. The item 7 cigarette butt wa s 11 feet from Ellis's foot and 17 feet 8 inches from Combs's foot. The cigarette butt had ash still attached. Despite many footprints in the area and next to the bodies, no dust, dirt, footprints or tire tracks were on the cigarette butt, leading investigators to co nclude it had recently been dropped there. Subsequent DNA testing revealed Elias was a major contributor to DNA found on the item 7 cigarette butt. 4 Additional, more sophisticated DNA testing revealed that the cigarette may have been smoked by as many as two other persons. A second Marlborough cigarette butt, identi fied as evidence item 8, was found two feet two inches north of Combs. It had Co mbs's DNA on it. Like the first cigarette butt with Elias's DNA on it, this second cigarette butt also appeared recently smoked, as it had ash and a bit of paper remaining yet no footprin ts, dirt or dust on it. This cigarette butt was also believed to have been recently left at the scene. Investigators also collect ed "touch" DNA samples fro m Ellis's pants pockets. Chavez was found to be a major DNA contributor to those samples. Investigators were unable to find either Combs's or Ellis's walletor their military iden tification, which they
would have needed to re turn to their Navy base.

4 Although investigators colle cted evidence at th e scene for DNA testing, the testing itself did not take place until more than a decade later after testing methods had improved.12 3. Recovery of Ellis's Toyota Truck Four days after the murders of Combs a nd Ellis, Chavez was fo und driving Ellis's pickup truck in Tijuana, Mexico. Neither th e locks nor the ignition had been forced, and the keys were found in the truck. Inves tigators recovered fingerprints from both Chavez
and Elias on various surfaces of the interiorand exterior of the truck. Chavez's fingerprints were found on the driver's side door, the driver 's side mirror, the rearview mirror, the exterior passenger side cab and front fender, and the fr ont hood. Elias's fingerprints were found on the passenger side door and window, the rearview mirror, the rear sliding window, and the front hood. E lias's fingerprints were also found on a juice bottle in the truck. A red cup was found in the truck as well, and testing showed that both Chavez and Elias were major DNA contributor s to samples recovered from the cup. Chavez's DNA was also recovered fro m a bloody bandage in the truck
DISCUSSION
I
A Chavez and Elias contend that the evid ence is insufficient to support their convictions. "The applicable standard of review is well settled: '"To determine the sufficiency of the evid ence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most fa vorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of so lid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."' [Citations.] '"'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding13 does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.'"' [Citations.] The standa rd of review is the same when the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial eviden ce. [Citation.]" ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4t h 73, 104.) "In resolving claims involving the suffici ency of evidence, a reviewing court must determine 'whether, after view ing the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.) "[T]he relevant question on appeal is not whether we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether any rational trier of fact could have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ." ( People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 1117, 1127 ( Perez ).) When conducting this review, "[t]he appe llate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact th e trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence." ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053 ( Kraft ).) However, mere speculation or conjecture is in sufficient to create a reasonab le inference or support a finding of fact. ( People v. Marshall , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 35.) Evidence that gives rise only to a suspicion of guilt is likewise insufficient. ( Ibid. ) At trial, the prosecution argued that Chav ez and Elias were guilty of first degree murder through either (1) aiding and abetting the deliberate, premeditated murders of Combs and Ellis or (2) aiding and abetting a ro bbery that resulted in their deaths. We
will affirm the convictions if either of th e prosecution's theories are supported by the evidence. (See People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 645 ["when a prosecutor argues two theories to the ju ry, one of which is factually suffi cient and one of which is not, the
conviction need not be reversed , because the reviewing court must assume th at the jury14 based its conviction on the theory supported by the evidence"].) Because we conclude that the evidence supports the convictions under the latter th eory, we need not consider the former. ( Ibid .) "All murder . . . which is committed in the perpet ration of, or attempt to perpetrate, . . . robbery . . . is murder of the first degree." (§ 189; see People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 115 [" One who unlawfully kills a human being during the commission of a robbery or an attempted robbe ry is guilty of first degree murder under the felony-murder rule."].) Li ability for first degr ee murder under the felony-murder rule
extends to both the actual kille r and, under certain circumst ances, his accomplices. "Our cases establishing the complicity of a nonkiller in a felony murder have . . . uniformly required, at a minimum, that the accompli ce have been, at the time of the killing, a conspirator or aider and abettor in the felony." ( People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 723 ( Pulido ).) "[A]n aider and abettor is a person w ho, 'acting with (1 ) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.'" ( People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259.) As our Supr eme Court has explained, "[t]he aider and abettor doctrine merely makes aiders and abe ttors liable for their accomplices' actions as well as their own. It obviates the necessity to decide who was the aider and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent each played which role." ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120.) "A person may aid and abet a criminal offense withou t having agreed to do so prior to the act. [Citations.] In fact, it is not necessary that the primary actor expressly15 communicate his criminal purpose to the defe ndant since that purpose may be apparent from the circumstances. [Citati ons.] Aiding and abetting ma y be committed 'on the spur of the moment,' that is, as instantaneously as the criminal act it self. [Citation.]" ( People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531-532.)
B Chavez contends that subs tantial evidence does not support his conviction under the felony-murder theory because there is no evidence showing that Chavez participated in the robbery before Comb s and Ellis were murdered. 5 The felony-murder rule will not apply "even where a cofelon committed the killing during a r obbery, if the nonkiller did not join the felony until after the killing occurred." ( People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 200.) Here, however, the evidence suppor ts a finding that Chavez was a participant in the robbery prior to the murders of Co mbs and Ellis. Three witnesses identified Chavez at the Anchors and Spurs bonfires prio r to the killings. Chavez, accompanied by several other males, acted in an aggressi ve and discomforting manner towards the partygoers in the early morning hours before the robbery and murders. Chavez and his companions were still there when all of the partygoers except Combs and Ellis had left. When one partygoer tried to re turn to the bonfire to retrie ve her jacket, Chavez made
sexual remarks to her and scared her off. Wh en Combs and Ellis were alone with Chavez and his companions, they we re robbed and murdered. Chavez himself went through

5 In his opening brief, Chavez argued that substantial evidence did not support his conviction under the theory that he was liable for the murders of Combs and Ellis because they were the na tural and probable consequences of the theft of Ellis's truck. As discussed in part III, post , the prosecution did not argue this theory at trial. On reply, Chavez acknowledges that the A ttorney General is not pursuin g this theory on appeal. We therefore need not address it.16 Combs's pants pockets and took possession of Ellis's truck, which Chavez still had four days later. This evidence supports a finding that Chavez was part of the robbery from the beginning. (See People v. Hodgson (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 566, 576 ( Hodgson ) ["The direct evidence of the defendant's nonp articipation until after the killing in Pulido distinguishes that case factually from the present case."].) Chavez's conviction was not based on specul ation, as Chavez contends. (See, e.g., People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 669 ["An infere nce is not reasonable if it is based only on speculation."]; People v. Lewis (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 136, 149 ["A conviction based on . . . pure speculation and guess-work cannot stand."].) The finding that Chavez aided and abetted the robbery of Combs and Ellis is the rati onal product of reason applied to the ample evidence ty ing Chavez to the scene of the cr ime, the body of Combs, and the fruits of the robbery itself. The murders of Combs and Ellis were logically and temporally related to the underlying robber y, and the evidence supports a finding that their killings aided the robber y by subduing Combs and Ellis so that Chavez and his companions could steal their wall ets, Ellis's truck, and whatev er else of value they could find. (See People v. Cavitt , supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 196.) Substantial evidence therefore supports Chavez's convictions.
C Elias likewise contends ther e is insufficient ev idence to support his conviction. Elias argues that the cigarette butt found at th e scene and the forensic evidence recovered
from Ellis's truck do not lead to the reasonable inference that Elias aided and abetted the robbery. Elias's argument re lies, in large part, on a miss tatement of the applicable standard of review. Elias argues that his convi ctions cannot stand if the evidence is as17 consistent with guilt as with another rationa l conclusion that points to innocence. (See People v. Flores (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 764, 769 ["it is elementary law that circumstances relied upon to establish the guilt of one accuse d of crime must be consistent with that hypothesis and inconsistent with any ot her rational conclusion"].) However, this principle is not a correct statement of law to be applied on appeal. "'Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a de fendant if it finds that circum stantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convin ced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "'If the circumst ances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a re versal of the judgment.'"'" ( People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 961.) "Nor may a conviction be set aside
because evidence is su sceptible of two reasonable infe rences, one looking to guilt and another to innocence." ( People v. Lewis , supra , 222 Cal.App.2d at p. 149.) Viewing the entire record in the light mo st favorable to the prosecution, and drawing all reasonable inferences from the evid ence in support of the conviction, as we must, we conclude substantial evidence s upports Elias's convictions. Our Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919 ( Bean ) is instructive. In that case, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence suppo rting his convictions
for two discrete murders. Th e evidence tying the defendant to one of the murders bears some similarity to th e evidence here: "A pair of su nglasses bearing what the People's experts identified as defendant's fingerprints wa s found next to the b ody of Eileen Fox,
and the defendant admitte d owning a pair of similar sung lasses. In addition there was18 evidence that defendant had been seen, possibl y observing the house, in the past; that he was living nearby with his sister; and that he was familiar with the shortcut from the location at which the automobile, purse, an d wallet were discarded to the Florin Meadows apartments." ( Id. at pp. 933-934, fns. omitted.)
With other evidence of the victim's condition, the Supr eme Court found sufficient evidence to support the defendant's first degree murder conviction and "the jury's
conclusion that the murder was committed in the perpet ration of a burglary and a robbery." ( Bean , supra , 46 Cal.3d at p. 934.) The evidentiary si milarity between Bean and the instant case supports the conclusion Elias participated in the killings and robber y. Here, just as in Bean , forensic evidence on a small, portable object places Elias at the scene of the crime. (See Bean , supra , 46 Cal.3d at p. 933.) While Elias was not specifically identifie d by any witness as one of Chavez's companio ns that night, it is reasonable to infer that he was there based on the cigarette butt and the forensic evidence recovered from Ellis 's truck. Elias's fingerprints were recovered from multiple interi or and exterior surfaces on the truck, as were Chavez's, and DNA from both Chavez and Elias was recovered from the same cup
inside the truck. Elias claims that no evid ence of the relationship between Chavez and Elias was introduced, but the forensic evid ence recovered from the truck demonstrates that they were known to each other. Moreover, the evidence ty ing Elias to the fruits of the robbery is arguably stronger than th e evidence considered sufficient in Bean. Elias's fingerprints and DNA were r ecovered from Ellis's truck, whereas the evidence in Bean showed only that the defendant was familiar with a route ne ar where certain stolen goods were discarded. (See Id. at p. 934.) Elias's attempt to distinguish Bean on the facts is19 unpersuasive, as the evidence here is in fact more incrimina ting than the evidence considered by the Supreme Court in Bean

. Although the jury conv icted the defendant in Bean of first degree murder as the perpetrator of the robbery and murder, the re asonable inferences drawn in that case from the evidence apply equally to the aiding and abetting theory of liability pursued by the prosecution here. Indeed, the purpose of aiding a nd abetting liability is to "obviate[] the necessity to decide who was the aider and ab ettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent each play ed which role." ( People v. McCoy , supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 1120; see People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 433 ["th e doctrine . . . '"snares all who intentionally contribute to the accomplishment of a crime in the net of criminal liability defined by the crime, even though the actor does not pers onally engage in all of the elements of the crime"'"].)
"Factors relevant to a determination of whether defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting include: presence at the scene of th e crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense." ( People v. Singleton (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 488, 492.) Considering these factors, and viewed as a whole, the evidence points to Elias's complicity and supports his conviction. Alt hough Elias contends th ere is "no evidence" of his actions or intent that night, it is re asonable to infer that Elias was present with Chavez at the Anchors and Spurs bonfires pr ior to the robbery an d murders, that he
waited with Chavez until Combs and Ellis we re alone, that he assisted Chavez and potentially others in robbing and murdering Combs and Ellis (or was the perpetrator himself), and that he then left the scene with Chavez in E llis's stolen truck. These
inferences arise out of the consistent testim ony of witnesses that Chavez was present at20 the bonfires with one or more companions , separate DNA recovered at the crime scene
which showed that Chavez an d Elias had been present, a nd the DNA and fingerprints found in Ellis's truck, which showed that both defendants were occupants of the truck. Elias's culpability is reinforced by a large quantum of evidence which shows that at least two perpetrators were needed to accomplish the robbery and double murder. Witnesses testified that Ellis parked his truc k with its rear facing the bonfire, where his body and Combs's body were later found. Al though the bodies of Ellis and Combs were 16 feet apart, their location, their paralle l positioning and the lo cation of the items removed from the truck and dumped on the gr ound support the conc lusion that Ellis and
Combs were killed on either side of the truc k. Combs's body was found on what would have been the passenger side of Ellis's new truck; Ellis's body, parallel to Combs's body, was found on what would have b een the driver's side of the truck, the same side where the accessory items from the truck and the broc hure were found afte r being removed from the truck and dropped on the gr ound. The condition of Ellis's body supports an inference he had been in a fight before he was killed. His face and neck ar ea had contusions. His leg had been injured. His clothing was un characteristically disheveled, and there was plant debris on his face. Given the distance between the bodies, the likelihood the truck was between them and the fact one of the victims engaged in a physical fight before being killed, it is difficult to conclude that only one person was able to subdue, fight and
kill both victims. Although a mere spectator may not be liable for aiding and abetting, and mere knowledge of a perpetrator's unlawful purpose is insuffici ent, in light of all the
circumstantial evidence in the record, Elias's contention that his role might have been so21 limited is speculation. (See People v. Nguyen , supra , 21 Cal.App.4th at pp. 529-530.)
As the court in People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616 st ated on an analogous record: "Under these circumstances, it is immaterial that the evidence was silent as to which defendant actually shot [the victim]; it is virtually inconceivable that the one who did not shoot him did not aid and abet the shooting." ( Id . at p. 626.)
Elias contends that th is case is similar to People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, in which the Supreme Court concluded the evidence was insuffi cient to support a defendant's conviction of first degree murder. We disagree. In that case, an eyewitness offered potentially exculpatory testimony tendin g to show that the defendant was not one
of the individuals she had seen at the scene of the crime. ( Id. at p. 696.) Although the defendant's fingerprint was fo und in the house where the ro bbery and murder occurred, the defendant had been a gue st there in the past. ( Id. at p. 697.) The Supreme Court explained, "The highly specul ative and equivocal identifica tion testimony and the solitary fingerprint of some unknown vintage do not constitute evid ence which is 'reasonable, credible and of solid value -- such that a r easonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" ( Ibid. ) Here, the eviden ce tying Elias to the crime is more robust, including, in pa rticular, the recently smoked Marlborough cigarette butt found between th e victims' bodies very shortly after they were killed and powerful evidence of Elias's pres ence with Chavez in Ellis's stolen truck. Importantly,
unlike the record in People v. Trevino , here there is no arguably exculpatory evidence in
the record.
We likewise conclude that th e evidence in the record he re is more compelling than
the evidence found insuffi cient in the various authorities c ited by Elias in his briefing.22 (See People v. Flores , supra , 58 Cal.App.2d at pp. 766-76 8 [evidence consisted of defendant's fingerprint on rear view mirror of stolen car]; Birt v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 934, 938 [evidence c onsisted of defendant's fingerp rint on cigarette lighter in rental van used in robbery].) Substantia l evidence supports Elias's convictions.
II
A Chavez and Elias further contend that th e evidence is insuffici ent to support the jury's special circumstances findings of multiple murders a nd robbery-murder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3) & (17).) We revi ew the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's special circumstances finding s in the same manner as the evidence supporting a conviction. "'"In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a special circumstance"--as for a conviction--"the question we ask is whet her, after viewing the ev idence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyo nd a reasonable doubt."' [Citati ons.] 'In a case, such as the present one, [where the finding is] base d upon circumstantial evidence, we must decide whether the circumstances reasonably ju stify the findings of the trier of fact, but our opinion that the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding would not warrant reve rsal of the judgment. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" ( People v.
Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 39 ( Cain ).)23 B 6 "[A] finding of guilt of two murders, at least one of which is first degree murder, conclusively establishes the truth of the specia l circumstance for the actual killer . . . . (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) As to the aider and abettor who did not actually kill the victims, however, the special circumstance requires an additional finding that he harbored an intent to kill. (§ 190.2, subd. (c).)" ( People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 110, fn. 6; see
also People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1150 ["wh en the defendant is an aider
and abetter rather than the actual k iller, intent must be proved"].) Here, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Chavez and Elias
intended to kill Combs a nd Ellis. Chavez and Elias went to an isolated location, either
armed themselves or with ar med accomplices, and waited for Combs and Ellis to be left alone as the Anchors and Spurs party wou nd down. Combs and Ellis were young Navy men who were capable of resis ting robbery by a group of teen agers. It is reasonable to
infer that Chavez and Elias knew that their group was armed a nd that they intended to use deadly force against Combs and Ellis in order to r ob them. Once Chavez and Elias confronted Combs and Ellis, it is likely th at Chavez and Elias were concerned that Combs and Ellis would identify th em and either killed the vic tims themselves or intended for their accomplices to do so. "In light of this evidence, a rational jury could c onclude

6 Although in order to subj ect defendants to a sentence of life without possibility of parole we need only sustain one of the jury 's special circumstances findings, we consider both of them. We do so because we recognize that defendants' convictions are subject to further review both in our state courts and in federal court. Our re view of both findings will assist those courts in making an approp riate disposition in the event they disagree with our analysis of one special ci rcumstance finding but not the other.24 beyond a reasonable doubt defend ant[s] intended to kill the victims in order to prevent them from identifying [them]." (See Cain , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 40.) Moreover, the location and condition of th e bodies, including the fresh abrasion found on Ellis, provide a reasonable basis to infer that Chavez, Elias, and their accomplices collectively restrained and subdue d Combs and Ellis in order to kill them. When a witness returned to the bonfire to retrieve her ja cket and interrupted them, either shortly before or after they killed Combs and Ellis, Chavez made sexual remarks to the witness and scared her off. After the killings , Chavez went throu gh Combs's pockets for valuables, someone turn ed Ellis's body over, and Chavez (likely with Elias) drove away in Ellis's truck. Viewing th e record as a whole, we conc lude that substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Chavez and Elias intended to kill Combs and Ellis. Elias argues that "[t]here was no eviden ce of planning, no evidence that the participants knew the shooter was armed, a nd no evidence of what occurred during the shooting or what Elias did during the shoo ting." However, "'[c]ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.]" ( Bean , supra , 46 Cal.3d at p. 933.) On appeal, we "presume[] in support of th e judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence." ( Kraft , supra , 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) We do not
examine the record for direct evidence on specific issues. Rather, we consider whether
the evidence as a whole would be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. "Even if we might have made contrary factual findings or drawn different inferences, we are not pe rmitted to reverse th e judgment if the circumstances reasonably justify those found by the jury. It is the jury, not the appellate25 court, that must be convinced beyond a reas onable doubt. Our taskand responsibility is to determine whether that finding is s upported by substantial evidence." ( Perez , supra , 2 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) Here, as we have disc ussed, we conclude that the jury's finding is supported by substantial evidence. Chavez's argument relies on extensive qu otations from the prosecution's closing argument. Chavez contends th at the prosecutor's theory of intent was speculative and unsupported. "It is elementary , however, that the prosecutor's argument is not evidence and the theories suggested are not the exclus ive theories that may be considered by the jury." ( Perez , supra , 2 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) Regardless of the prosecution's stated theory of intent in closing arguments, we conclude that the evidence supports the jury's finding
of intent to kill here. The jury's inference that Chavez and Elias intended to kill Combs and Ellis, where
the evidence shows that Chav ez and Elias waited for Comb s and Ellis to be alone, confronted them in an armed group in the early morning hours at an isolated location, and overpowered them in circumstances showing that multiple individuals were involved, resulting in their violent and brutal deaths, is based on neither spec ulation nor guesswork. It is the rational product of reason applied to the direct forensic and eyewitness evidence admitted by the trial court. Substantial ev idence supports the ju ry's multiple murder finding.
C "In order to support a fi nding of special circumstances murder, based on murder
committed in the course of ro bbery, against an aider and abettor who is not the actual killer, the prosecution must show that the aider and abettor had intent to kill or acted with26 reckless indifference to human life while acti ng as a major participant in the underlying felony. (§ 190.2, subds. (c), (d).)" ( People v. Proby (1998) 60 Cal.App. 4th 922, 927, fn. omitted ( Proby ).) Because a finding of intent to kill is sufficient to su pport this special circumstance, our conclusion that the evidence supports such an intent in the preceding section applies here as well. In the alterna tive, we conclude thatthe evidence supports a finding that Chavez and Elias acted with reckless indifference to human life while acting as major participants in th e underlying felony, robbery. "'[R]eckless indifference to human life' is commonly understood to mean that the defendant was subjectively aware that his or her participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death." ( People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 577.) Evidence tending to support a finding of reckle ss indifference includes choosing to flee the scene of the crime rather than assisting the victim or calling for aid. ( People v. Smith (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 914, 927 [defendant "chose to flee rather than going to [victim's] aid or summoning help"]; Proby , supra , 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 930 ["defendant made no attempt to assist the victim who was shot but just went on looting the safe and left the premises"]; Hodgson , supra , 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 580.) Know ledge that a defendant's accomplices are armed likewise tends to support a finding of reckless indifference. (See Hodgson , at p. 580 ["Appellant had to be aware use of a gun to effect the robbery presented a grave risk of death."]; see also People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 617.) Based on the evidence, and reasonable in ferences drawn therefrom, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasona ble doubt that Chavez and E lias knew that they or their accomplices were armed when they confronted Combs and Ellis in order to rob them. The evidence further shows that, following the murder s, neither Chavez nor Elias came to27 the aid of the victims or interrupted their robbery to render assistance. Substantial evidence therefore supports the jury's finding of reckless indifference. Elias argues that the shots happened "likely in rapid su ccession" and, thus, Elias could not have gained an appr eciation for what was happening. Elias cites no evidence in support of his assertion, and we are not awar e of any support in the record. Moreover, even if the killings happened quickly, such a fact does not preclude a finding of reckless
indifference based on other circumstances. Elias further argues that there is "no evidence" of his actions during the robbery. However, as explained in more detail ante , we find this argument unpersuasive because our standard of review mandates that we look beyond the direct evid ence to circumstantial eviden ce, as well as all reasonable
inferences that can be draw n from the evidence in support of the jury's finding. ( Cain , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 39; Kraft , supra , 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) As to the second prong, a "'"major par ticipant"'" includes one of a small group of accomplices acting in concert. ( People v. Smith , supra , 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 928; Hodgson , supra , 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 579-580.) Here, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Chavez and Elias were part of a small group that robbed and murdered Combs and Ellis and, thus, "major participant[s]," based on the ey ewitness accounts of Chavez and his companions that night. ( Hodgson , at pp. 579-580.) Chavez and Elias also benefited more notably than ot hers because they enjoyed the use of Ellis's truck. (See Proby , supra , 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 931 ["the common meaning of 'major' also includes 'notable or conspicuous in e ffect or scope'"].) Substantia l evidence supports the jury's finding that Chavez and Elias were ma jor participants in the robbery.28 III In his opening brief, Chavez contends thatthe trial court erred by not instructing the jury on an additio nal theory of aiding and abetting liability, th e natural and probable consequences doctrine, with CALCRIM No. 403. Chavez's argument appears to be based on a misapprehension of the prosecution's theories at trial, which di d not include liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Instead, the prosecution argued that Chavez and Ellis were liable for first degree murder either as aiders and abettors of the deliberate and premeditated murder of Combs and Ellis or as aiders and abettors of a robbery, during which Combs and Ellis were murdered. Chavez did not request an instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine at trial. "[I]nstructional errors, howev er, are reviewable on appeal to the extent they 'affect[] [a defe ndant's] substantial ri ghts.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247.) Chavez does not explain how his substantial rights could be affected by the court's failure to instruct the jury on an add itional, alternative th eory of culpability. The jury here convicted Chavez of first degree murder based on the two theories unambiguously presented: premeditated murder and felony murder. Even if we accept Chavez's assumption that a natural and probab le theory had been advanced, instructing the jury on an ad ditional theory by whic h Chavez could be convi cted of first degree
murder would not have affected those convictions. In any event, even if Chavez had not forfeited this claim of error, any allege d error was harmless because there was no
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached a di fferent result had they been presented with an additional, alternative theory of first degree murder culpability. (See
Id. at p. 249.)29 IV Chavez and Elias contend that the trial c ourt erred in instruc ting the jury with a modified version of CALCRI M No. 376, over their objec tion, as follows: "If you conclude that the defendant knew he po ssessed property and you conclude that the property had in fact been re cently stolen, you may not convi ct the defendant of Murder based on those facts alone. However, if you also find that supporting evidence tends to prove his guilt, then you may conclude that the evidence is su fficient to prove he
committed Murder. "The supporting evidence need only be slight and need not be enough by itself to prove guilt. You may consider how, wher e, and when the de fendant possessed the property, along with any other relevant ci rcumstances tending to prove his guilt of
Murder. "Remember that you may not convict the defendant of any crime unless you are
convinced that each fact essen tial to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved be yond a reasonable doubt." Chavez and Elias argue that it was error for the court to re fer to "murder" in this instruction because the lega l principle embodie d by CALCRIM No. 37 6 applies only to theft-based offenses such as robbery, burg lary, or receiving stolen property. (See People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 755.) In People v. Barker (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1166, this court held that it wa s error to include the crime of murder in the prior pattern jury instruction based on this principle (CAL JIC No. 2.15) because the same natural and logical inferences that link the possession of stolen property with theft-based offenses do not apply in the same way to the crime of murder. ( Barker , at pp. 1175-1176; see People30 v. Prieto , supra , 30 Cal.4th at pp. 248, 249 ["We find Barker persuasive and hold that the trial court's application of CA LJIC No. 2.15 to nontheft offe nses like rape or murder was improper."].) The Attorney General conced es that the trial court here erred. The issue presented is thus whether the trial court's error was prejudicial. An instructional error is prejudicial if, "'after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' [the reviewing cour t] is of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 ( Watson ); see People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 376 [holding that Watson applies to analogous instructional error].) "The Watson standard provides that an error is harmless unless the appellant shows it is reasonably probable a re sult more favorable to the appellant would have been reached had th e error not occurred." ( People v. Harden (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 848, 859.) Here, Chavez and Elias argue that instructin g the jury with the modified version of CALCRIM No. 376 lowered the prosecution's bur den of proof and provided an improper evidentiary pinpoint instruction that was prejudi cial given the evidence presented at trial. Elias further argues that this instruction wa s prejudicial because his possession of stolen property was allegedly unclear. In view of the totality of the instructions provided, we disagree with Chavez and
Elias's contention that the instruction's re ference to "slight corroborating evidence" lowered the prosecution's burden of proof. As given, the instruction itself contained the following admonition directly af ter its reference to "slight corroborating evidence": "Remember that you may not convict the defendant of any crime unless you are31 convinced that each fact essen tial to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty of that crime has been proved beyond a reasonable do ubt." Any confusion the jury may have had was resolved promptly by that clear and express statement of the prosecution's
burden in the instruction itself. Moreover, the court fully and correctly instru cted the jury regarding the elements of the charged offens es and the prosecution's burden of proof in other instructions. Even without the expr ess admonition at the close of CALCRIM No. 376, those instructions alone were sufficient to ensure thatthe jury would not misapply the burden of proof in this case. ( People v. Barker , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1177 ["we can find no possibility su ch instruction [i.e., CALJIC No. 2.15] suggested that the jury need not find a ll the statutory elements of murder had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt"]; People v. Gamache , supra , 48 Cal.4th at p. 376.) The instruction's specific reference to possession of stolen property, and the inferences that "may" be drawn therefrom, also was not prejudicial error. Additional instructions provided the jury with the appropriate weight to be placed on circumstantial evidence, the scope and effect of permissi ble inferences from th e evidence, and the responsibility of the jury to weigh the eviden ce independently. We find it unlikely that the jury ignored these additio nal instructions in favor of the modified version of CALCRIM No. 376 given here. 7 CALCRIM No. 376 instructs the jury that they "may"
find certain evidence sufficient to find a defe ndant guilty. It does not contradict the

7 Chavez argues that prejudice is shown by the prosecutor's reference to stolen property in her closing ar gument. However, the prosecutor's statement ("Recent possession of stolen property is a circumstan ce you can and should consider in finding the facts of this case") is vague and does no t emphasize any of the features of CALCRIM No. 376 to which Chavez and Elias object.32 additional instructions that place bounds on the jury's c onsideration of evidence. Chavez's reliance on authority where a court ga ve expressly inconsistent or erroneously mandatory instructions is th erefore unpersuasive. (See LeMons v. Regents of University of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 869, 878; Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U. S. 307, 322.) We likewise find unpersuasive Elias's ar gument that the court's use of CALCRIM No. 376 was prejudicial because the eviden ce of his "possession" of the truck was
uncertain. In People v. Rubio (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 757, the court held that when a defendant's possession of stolen property was "an open question," CALJIC No. 2.15
should not be used b ecause it "assumed that the evidence establishe d, without dispute, defendant's possession of stolen property." ( Rubio , at p. 768.) At the time, however, CALJIC No. 2.15 was materially different than the instruc tion given here. CALJIC No. 2.15 stated, "'The mere fact that a person wa s in conscious possession of recently stolen property is not enough to justify his convi ction of the crime charged . . . .'" ( Rubio , at p. 767.) By contrast, CALCRIM No. 376 phra ses the predicate findings conditionally and emphasizes the jury's responsib ility for any such findings: " If you conclude that the defendant knew [he] possessed property and you conclude that the property had in fact been recently [stolen] . . . ." (Italic s added.) The concerns expressed in Rubio and, later,
in People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 40 -41, thus have no applic ation to the instruction
at issue here. In light of the substantial circumstantia l evidence admitted at trial tending to prove Chavez and Elias's guilt, the fo rensic evidence tying Chavez and Elias to the crime scene and the victims, and the foregoi ng discussion of the potential effects of the trial court's
erroneous use of CALCRIM No. 376 here, we conclude it is not reasonably probable that33 a result more favorable to Ch avez and Elias would have been reached in the absence of this instructional error. (See Watson , supra , 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Although the court's application of CALCRIM No. 3 76 to the crime of murder was error, as the Attorney General concedes, the error was harmless in this case.
V Elias contends that the prosecuto r committed prejudicial misconduct during closing arguments. The prejudicial misconduct alleged by Elias falls in to four categories: (1) arguing facts not in evidence; (2) appe aling to the sympathy of the jury; (3) expressing an improper pers onal belief in defendants' guilt; and (4) disparaging defendants' expert witness. We address each category in turn.
A "[S]tatements of facts not in evidence by th e prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury constitute misconduct." ( People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Cal.2d 719, 724.) "Although prosecutors have wide latitude to draw inferences from th e evidence presented at trial, mischaracterizing th e evidence is misconduct." ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823.) The first series of alleged misstatements identified by Elias reflect the prosecutor's argument that Ellis was shot afte r Combs, that Ellis tried to escape, and that Ellis fought with multiple perpetrators and was restrained. Elias points outcorrectly that there was no direct evidence or expert testimony regarding th e sequence of shots or signs of struggle. The scope of permissible argument, however, is broader. "'It is settl ed that a prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. Th e argument may be vigorous as long as it
amounts to fair comment on th e evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or34 deductions to be drawn th erefrom. [Citations.]'" ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567.) The prosecutor's comments in th is instance were reasonable inferences from the evidence admitted. Ellis ha d several abrasions on his neckand leg, one of which was fresh. His belt was undone, and his clothes we re uncharacteristically disheveled. From these facts, the prosecutor c ould reasonably infer that Ellis had been involved in a struggle, tried to flee, and was restrained. Fi nally, eyewitnesses testified that up to four people were with Chavez that night, so it is reasonable to infer that they were also
involved in the robber y and murder. Though Elias argues that other inferences are also possible, the prosecution may argue its own inte rpretation of the evidence so long as it is reasonable. ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1026.) The second series of alleged misstat ements identified by Elias reflect the prosecutor's argument that Elias planned the ro bbery and that Elias was armed. Again,
we find no misconduct. The evidence showed that Chavez and his group were at the Palms for some time prior to th e robbery. While there was no direct evidence of a plan, the presence of Chavez and his group at the b onfires prior to the robbery, the fact that their group was armed, and the ro bbery itself give rise to the reasonable inference that the robbery was planned rather than occurring spont aneously. While Elias contends that the prosecution claimed he was personally armed, the prosecutor's argument was that "they took a loaded gun with them" to the Palms area. She did not specifically identify Elias. Since Combs and Ellis were shot, and all reasonable inferences point to a group consisting of at least Chavez and Elias as the shooter or shooters, the prosecutor's statement was a proper comment on the record. ( People v. Wharton , supra , 53 Cal.3d at p. 567.)35 We can discern no misconduct in the allege d misstatements identif ied by Elias. In light of our conclusion, we need not considerwhether Elias forfeited his claims of error on appeal by failing to object or whether E lias's counsel was ineffective by failing to make such objection.
B In her closing argument, the prosecutor described Combs and E llis as "young men who had come to San Diego to serve their country." She also referred to Ellis's college pamphlet, arguing that "that's th e kind of guy he [was], trying to better himself, serve his country -- [¶] . . . [¶] -- go to college." The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to the latter comment. No objection was made to the former. Elias contends on appeal that the prosecutor's st atement that Ellis and Combs "s erve[d] their country" when they were killed was an improper app eal to the jury's sympathy. (See People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1130.) In Kipp , the prosecutor argued to the jury, during the guilt phase of a capital trial, that the jury should "'think for a moment about what [murder] means. A living, breathing huma n being had all of that taken away.'" ( Id. at p. 1129.) The court held that "[ t]he prosecutor's argum ent, inviting the jury to reflect on all that the victim had lost through her death, wa s an appeal for sympat hy for the victim, and therefore it was improper . . . ." ( Id. at p. 1130.) Here, the prosecutor's statement that Comb s and Ellis "serve[d] their country" does
not invite such an emotional response from the jury. A prosecutor is not "required to discuss his view of the case in clinical or detached detail." ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 463.) Such a mild comment on the victims' military service, which was36 relevant to a number of issues in the case , does not improperly appeal to the jury's sympathy and was not misconduct.
C The prosecutor also argued, in closing, th at "[n]obody was there to witness it. The witnesses are dead. But just as my heart is beating in my chest, those two men stopped the heartbeats of Keith and Cliff." Defens e counsel did not object to the prosecutor's statement. Elias argues on appeal that th e prosecutor expressed an improper personal belief in Chavez's and Elias's guilt. "A prosecutor may not expr ess a personal opinion or belief in the guilt of the accused when there is a substantial danger that the jury will view the comments as based on information other than evidence adduced at trial." ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 447.) "The general rule is that improper vouching for the strength of the prosecution's case '"involves an attempt to bol ster a witness by reference to facts outside the record."' [Citation.] Thus , it is misconduct for prosecutors to vouch for the strength of their cases by invoking their personal prestig e, reputation, or depth of experience, or the prestige or reputation of their office, in support of it. [Citations.] Specifically, a prosecutor's reference to his or her own experience, comparing a defendant's case negatively to others the prosecutor knows abou t or has tried, is improper. [Citation.] Nor may prosecutors offer their personal opinions when they are base d solely on their experience or on other facts outsi de the record. [Citations.]" ( People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206-207.) Elias argues that the context of the prosecutor's statement, made after the prosecutor presented her theory of how the crim e occurred, created a substantial risk that37 the jury interpreted the statement as bei ng based on facts outside the record. We disagree. While the prosecutor did vouch for her case, neither the content nor the context of the prosecutor's statement indicated to the jury that her belief in Chavez's and Elias's guilt was based on anything other than the fa cts admitted in eviden ce. The prosecutor repeatedly referenced the facts and evidence in the record during her closing argument and argued the prosecution's view of the reas onable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
We discern no error or misconduct under these circumstances. Again, in light of our conclusion, we need not address issues of forfe iture or ineffective as sistance of counsel.
D The prosecutor addressed the defense e xpert witness, Lisa Dimeo, in closing argument as follows: "And I have to comment on the expert. How can I not? You can hire somebody and have them come in here and say anything." Defense counsel objected
but was overruled. Elias contends that the prosecutor's comments improperly implied that defense counsel or the expert improperly fabricated evidence. "[C]ounsel is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness may accordingly be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the evidence, that a witness's testimony is unbelievable, unsound, or even a patent 'lie.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162.) However, "[ i]t is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of fabricating a defense [citati ons], or to imply that counsel is free to deceive the jury [citation]. Su ch attacks on counsel' s credibility risk fo cusing the jury's attention on irrelevant matters and diver ting the prosecution from its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasona ble inferences therefrom. [Citations.]" ( People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.)38 Although we are reluctant to definitively declare error, given the mild and fleeting nature of the prosecutor's remark, it is possibl e that a juror could re asonably interpret the statement "[y]ou can hire somebody and have them come in here and say anything" as an implicit attack on the credibility of counsel, who hired th e expert, rather than a critique
based on the evidence. If it was error, however, it was harmle ss given the nature of the remark, the context in the prosecution's closi ng statement, the relative unimportance of the defense expert's testimony (see fn. 3, ante ), and the substantial evidence of Chavez and Elias's guilt introduced at trial. It is not "reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing part y would have been reached in the absence of the error." (See Watson , supra , 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
VI As we have noted, the trial court se ntenced Chavez and Elias each to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, without possibility of parole, plus an additional consecutive year. The trial court initially sentenced Chav ez and Elias to life without possibility of parole because it erroneously believed it had no other sentencing options. When advised by the prosecutor that it had disc retion to sentence defendants to terms of 25 to life under section 190.5, subdivision (b), th e trial court conducted a further hearing and provided defendants an opportunity to argue and pres ent evidence of mitigating
circumstances. At the conclusion of the sec ond sentencing hearing, the court declined to modify defendants' sentences. 8

8 In declining to modify its impositi on of consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole, the trial court stated: "This is not an easy one, folks. Judges frequently think we need more discretion in the law. Then sometimes having discretion makes this job a lot more difficult.39 Relying on Miller and Gutierrez , Chavez and Elias argue that because they were both juveniles at the time of the murders, the trial court e rred in imposing life sentences without the possibility of paro le and their cases should be reversed and remanded for resentencing. We agree that Gutierrez requires defendants' sent ences be reversed and

"I said at the [initial] sentencing I' d be hard-pressed to come up with a more callous murder than what thes e two gentlemen engaged in. To take the life of two young navy men at the prime of their life, fighting with distinction for their country, and to annihilate them execution-style, right through the head, over a truck is about as low as it gets, folks. And I know the family members back there love these two gentlemen, but on the date in question, they couldn't have tr eated a dog worse than they treated these two young men, and that's a fact. I mean, I have seen hundreds of murders, and this was as callous as you get. "These defendants had juvenile offenses. This was a classic gang record. Juvenile offenses, repeated juvenile viola tions prior to this offense. They get away w ith this crime when it occurs. Do th ey change their lives? Do they get out and decide, 'Okay, now I'm going to make something out of my life'? Both of these defendants had adult felony offenses, Mr. Chavez for robbery, Mr. Elias for attempted robbery, as well as other offenses, and parole violati ons. So [the prosecutor] is correct. These are not two gentlemen who had one terri ble night and then led a crime-free life after that. "The flip side is, these two gentle men have family members and community support that is rare for this court to see, and those of you that have been in my court a lot know that with young people, I tend to try to think about sec ond chances. So I am telling you, I have been wrestling with this one . I have been thinking about it a lot. "I just think at the end of the day -- I c ould have lived with th e juvenile record if after this execution-style double homicide th ese men had been crime-free, but given the violent crimes after this double homicide, it justdoesn't seem right to me. I just -- I can't justify it. And I know there has been a hiatus recently in criminality, but I just keep thinking about these two victims and that th ey were killed young, a young vibrant time in their life, when they had so mu ch of their life to look forward to. A nd I keep thinking about the one victim's wife. He was a newlyw ed and his life -- his wife's life is over. I mean, we all heard her speak. She'll neve r be the same mentally, physically. That murder destroyed her existence. And the other victim's fa mily, the mother and father adored that young boy, and they'll never recover from it, their only son. "So I think at the end of the day, if yo u look at this supplemental probation report, [the prosecutor] is right. You just can't co me up with anything in mitigation, and every single circumstance aggravates the situation. So the court stands by my prior ruling and will decline to modi fy the sentence."40 that the trial court must resentence th em considering the views expressed in Miller and Gutierrez

. A. Miller
In Miller , the United States Supreme Court c onsidered mandatory life sentences without the possib ility of parole imposed on two 14-year-old boys who were responsible for separate murders in separate states. On e of the boys, Kuntrell Jackson, was an aider and abettor in the 1999 robbery of a vide o store in Arkansas during which one of Jackson's two accomplices shot and killed the sales clerk at the video store. After his case was transferred to adult court, Jack son was convicted of felony murder and aggravated robbery and, under Arkansas law, the trial court sentenced him to a mandatory life sentence withou t the possibility of parole. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Jackson then brou ght a state habeas petition in which he argued that, in light of his age at the time of th e crimes, the mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole was crue l and unusual punishment. The state trial court dismissed Jackson's petition, and its dismissal was affi rmed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. In 2003, the other 14-year-o ld boy, Evan Miller, went to a neighbor's house in Alabama with a friend and spent the nigh t smoking marijuana and drinking with the neighbor. Earlier in the evening, the neighbor had made a drug deal with Miller's mother. When the neighbor passed out, Miller attempted to steal the neighbor's wallet; during the attempted theft, the neighbor woke up and st arted choking Miller. Miller's friend hit the neighbor with baseball bat and, when the ne ighbor released Miller, Miller picked up the bat and beat the neighbor unconscious. M iller and his friend then set fire to the neighbor's trailer to cover up their crime. The neighbor died from his injuries and smoke41 inhalation. Miller's case was also transferre d to adult court, and he was convicted of murder in the course of arson, which, in Alabama, carries a mandatory sentence of life without the possib ility of parole. On a ppeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Miller's argument that, considerin g his age at the time of the crime, the mandatory life sentence w ithout possibility of parole was cruel and unusual. The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the judgment dismissing Jackson's state habeas proceeding and from the judg ment affirming Miller's conviction and reversed both cases for resentencing. The court found that mandatory life sentences for juveniles offended two strands of the court's sentencing jurisprudence: a group of cases which found that the severe punishments of capital punishment and mandatory life without the possib ility of parole in nonhomicide cas es, may not be imposed on certain classes of criminals, such as juveniles, pe rpetrators of nonhomicide offenses, or the mentally retarded (see, e.g., Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 67-75; Kennedy v.
Louisiana (2008) 554 U.S. 407; Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304), because those punishments are disproportionate to the culp ability of members of those classes; and a second related line of cases which require that before capital punishment or its equivalent may be imposed, sentencing aut horities must consider the par ticular characteristics of the defendant and the details of the offense. ( Miller , supra , 567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2463-2464].) With respect to the punishment of juvenile s, the court stated: "'[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.' [Citation.] It is a time of immatu rity, irresponsibility, 'impetuousness[,] and recklessness.' [Citatio n.] It is a moment and 'condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.'42 [Citation.] And its 'signature qu alities' are all 'transient.'" (Miller , supra , 567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2467].) The court found its reasoning in Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 "esp ecially on point." ( Miller , at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2467].) "There, a 16-year-old shot a police officer poin t-blank and killed him. We invalidated his death sentence because the judge did not consider evidence of his neglectful and violent family background (including his mother's drug abuse and hi s father's physical abuse)
and his emotional disturbance. We found that evidence 'particularl y relevant'--more so
than it would have been in the case of an ad ult offender. [Citation.] We held: '[J]ust as the chronological age of a minor is itself a re levant mitigating factor of great weight, so must the background and mental and emoti onal development of a youthful defendant be duly considered' in assessing his culpability. [Citation.]" ( Ibid .) Thus, the court found that mandatory lif e sentences without the possibility of parole were invalid: "Such mandatory penalties, by their na ture, preclude a sentencer from taking account of an offender's ag e and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it. Under these sc hemes, every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other--the 17-year-old and the 14-yea r-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a st able household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each juvenile (includi ng these two 14-year-o lds) will receive the same sentence as the vast majority of ad ults committing similar homicide offenses." ( Miller , supra , 567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at pp. 2467-2468].) In particular, the court found the mandatory ch aracter of the life sentences was disproportionate and hence invalid because it deprived the sentencing judge of the oppo rtunity to consider: (1) the juvenile's age and its inhere nt impact on the juvenile's culpability; (2) th e juvenile's43 familial and social circumstances; (3) th e circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of the juve nile's participation in the o ffense; (4) the impact of the juvenile's youthf ulness on his ability to deal with law enforcement officers and prosecutors as well as effectiv ely assist in his own defense; and (5) "the possibility of
rehabilitation even when the circ umstances most suggest it." ( Miller , at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2468].) In light of its longstanding views about the diminished culpability of youthful offenders and their heightened capacity for change, the court stated: "[W]e think appropriate occasions for sent encing juveniles to the harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty [we have noted] of distinguishing at this early age between 't he juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.' [Citations.] Althou gh we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we requi re it to take into ac count how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." (Miller , supra , 567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct . at p. 2469], fn. omitted.)
B. Gutierrez
In Gutierrez , our Supreme Court considered two juvenile defendants who had been sentenced to life terms without the possib ility of parole. In the first case, Andrew Lawrence Moffett participated in an armed robbery. When Moffett and his codefendant were fleeing the scene of the robbery, his co defendant shot and killed a police officer. Moffett was 17 years old at the time of the killing, and he was fo und guilty of felony
murder and sentenced to life w ithout the possibility of parole . In the second case, Luis44 Angel Gutierrez, who was 17, was living with his aunt and uncle. Early one morning, after his uncle left for work, Gutierrez went into his aunt's bedroom, where, in the course of attempting to rape her, he stabbed her to death. Gutie rrez was convicted of murder with a special circumstance fi nding the murder was committed during a rape or attempted rape. Gutierrez was also sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Like Chavez and Elias, Moffett a nd Gutierrez were sentenced before Miller was decided and under the provisions of section 190.5. Section 190. 5 gives a trial court
discretion to sentence a defendant who is conv icted of first degree murder with special circumstances and was between the ages of 16 and 18 at the time of the subject crime to life without the possibility parole or a term of 25 years to life. At the time Moffett and Gutierrez were sentenced, section 190.5 had be en repeatedly interpreted as imposing a presumptive sentence of life without the possib ility of parole, subject to a determination by the trial court that there was good reason to impose the less severe sentence of 25 years to life. (See People v. Guinn (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1141-1142 ( Guinn ).)
In Gutierrez , the Supreme Court found that the presumption established in Guinn was inconsistent with the principles set forth in Miller . "'Treating [life without parole] as the default sentence takes the premise in Miller that such sentences should be rarities and turns that premise on its h ead, instead placing the burde n on a youthful defendant to affirmatively demonstrate that he or she de serves an opportunity for parole." (See Gutierrez , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1379.) Because section 190.5 may be construed as creating no presumptive sentence, and such a construction is more consistent with Miller , the court overruled Guinn and the other cases that had ad opted the presumption and held "that section 190.5(b) confers discretion on the sentencing court to impose either life45 without parole or a term of 25 years to life on a 16- or 17-year-old juvenile convicted of special circumstances murder, with no presumption in favor of life without parole." ( Gutierrez , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387.)
The court further held that in consid ering whether to impose a life sentence without possibility of parole, a sentencing court must consider the five factors
enumerated in Miller : (1) the inherent impact of the juvenile's age on his culpability; (2) the juvenile's home and family environmen t; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense; (4) the juvenile's ability to deal with law enforcemen t officers and prosecutors as well as effectively assist in his own defens e; and (5) the possibility of rehabilitation. ( Gutierrez , supra , 58 Cal.4th at pp. 1389-1390.) In considering disposition of both cases, the court in Gutierrez presumed that both sentencing courts had followed the law as interpreted by Guinn and its progeny and that both courts had therefore erroneously treated a sentence of life without possibility of parole as required by section 190.5, unle ss good reason to impose the less severe option of 25 years to life existed. ( Gutierrez , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1390.) The court further found that this presumed e rror required a remand for rese ntencing because: "Although
the trial courts in these cases understood that they had some discretion in sentencing, the records do not clearly indicate that they woul d have imposed the same sentence had they been aware of the full scope of their discretion. Because the trial courts operated under a governing presumption in favor of life without parole, we cannot say with confidence what sentence they would have impos ed absent the presumption." ( Gutierrez , at p. 1391.) In remanding both cases for resentencing, the court, reiterating Miller , stated: "The question is whether each can be deemed, at the time of sentencing, to be irreparably46 corrupt, beyond redemption, and thus unfit ev er to reenter society, notwithstanding the 'diminished culpability and great er prospects for reform' th at ordinarily distinguish juveniles from adults. [Citation.]" ( Ibid .) C. Analysis
Chavez and Elias were both sentenced before either Miller or Gutierrez were decided. Thus, the trial court did not condu ct the analysis required by those cases and imposed sentence at a time Guinn compelled a presumption in favor of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Although the record may support the trial court's decision to impose life sentences without the possibility of parole, because at the time th e sentences were imposed the trial
court did not have the benefit of either Miller and Gutierrez and was bound by the invalid presumption that the life sentences without th e possibility of parole should be imposed, 9 we consider the narrow question of whether the guidance provided by Miller and Gutierrez would have altered the trial court's sentencing choices.
There are circumstances in the record th at suggest resentencing, even with the guidance provided by Miller and Gutierrez , will not lead the trial court to impose a more
lenient sentence on either defend ant: the trial court found that in first isolating Ellis and

9 The record is silent w ith respect to whether th e trial court applied the Guinn presumption. As we have noted, un der similar circumstances the court in Gutierrez applied the presumption that, unless a record otherwise indicates, a trial court knew and followed governing law. (See Gutierrez , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1390, citing People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336. 361.) The Atto rney General argues that, given the fact that the trial court was initially unaware of the express discreti on provided by section 190.5, we should interpret its silence with respect to the presumption as an indication that it was also unaware of th e presumption provided by Guinn and the cases that followed Guinn . We decline to do so. We see no end to the mischief that would arise were we to interpret a completely silent reco rd as indicating that a trial did not follow the law.47 Combs, and then, acting together, executing th em, defendants were as callous a pair of murderers as she had seen in her lengthy caree r; although given the op portunity to present evidence in mitigation in the trial court, neither defendant provided information that might limit their culpability or show how commission of these cr imes was related to their relative youthfulness and, on appeal, neither suggest that on remand they would be able to provide such mitigating evid ence; and finally, the trial cour t, in apparently determining the murders were less the product of youth than of defendants' malevolent characters, placed a great deal of emphasis on the fact th at in the years imme diately following the murders, Chavez and Elias con tinued to lead a life of crim inality. These circumstances are independent of the presumption overruled in Gutierrez and suggest that, on remand, the trial court, even with the benefit of Gutierrez , may impose the harshest possible
sentence on defendants. However, as the court's holding in Gutierrez makes plain, before we can affirm these severest of possible sentences for a juven ile crime, we have confidence that the trial court, fully informed of its discretion, would have im posed those sentences. (See Gutierrez , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.) This lead s us to the ultimate question posed by
the courts in both Miller and Gutierrez , which the trial court here must answer: did these crimes reflect transient immaturity or irreparable corruption? ( Miller , supra , 567 U.S. at p. ___ [132 S.Ct. at p. 2469]; Gutierrez , at p. 1378.) As we read Miller and Gutierrez , the enumerated factors are not ends in them selves but rather are, when considered together in a reasoned manner, the useful and necessary means by which a sentencing
court must determine whether transient immatur ity requires some degree of leniency or irreparable corruption must be punished as severely as possible. (See Miller , at p. ___48 [132 S.Ct. at p. 2469]; Gutierrez , at p. 1378.) There is nothing in the record which
indicates that the trial court itself directly considered this ultimate question. Because the record is silent on this ultimate issue, we can not say we are convinced as to how the trial court would exercise its discretion and, thus, we are compelled to remand for resentencing.
VII Chavez and Elias argue, and the Attorn ey General agrees, that the parole revocation fine imposed by the court under section 1202.45 should be stricken because their sentences preclude the possibility of parole. (See People v. Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1183 ["When there is no parole eligibility , the fine is clearly not applicable."].) We agree as we ll and, on remand, the trial cour t is directed to modify the judgment accordingly.
DISPOSITION We reverse imposition of the life sentence s without possibility of parole and the parole revocation fines imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45 and remand for resentencing consistent with the views we ha ve expressed. In all other respects, the judgments are affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:

M C DONALD, J.

AARON, J.