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INLAND INS. CO. V. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL

Cite as 316 Neb. 143

Inland Insurance Company, appellant and 

cross-appellee, v. Lancaster County Board of 

Equalization, appellee and cross-appellant.

___ N.W.3d ___

Filed March 8, 2024. No. S-23-289.

1. Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Appellate review of a decision from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission shall be conducted for error appearing on the record.

2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors 

appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is 

neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.

3. ____: ____. In instances when an appellate court is required to review 

cases for error appearing on the record, questions of law are nonetheless 

reviewed de novo on the record.

4. Statutes. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning.

5. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. An appellate court 

will not look beyond a statute to determine the legislative intent when 

the words are plain, direct, or unambiguous.

6. Statutes: Intent: Appeal and Error. When interpreting a statute, 

effect must be given, if possible, to all the several parts of a statute; no 

sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as meaningless or superfluous if it can be avoided. An appellate court must look to the statute’s purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which 

best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would 

defeat it.

Appeal from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission. 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Shannon L. Doering and Luke F. Vavricek for appellant.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

03/08/2024 09:15 AM CST
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INLAND INS. CO. V. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL

Cite as 316 Neb. 143

Daniel J. Zieg, Chief Deputy Lancaster County Attorney, for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Heavican, C.J.

INTRODUCTION

Inland Insurance Company (Inland) appeals from the decision of the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) 

upholding the decision of the Lancaster County Board of 

Equalization (Board of Equalization) declining to lower the 

assessed value of real property owned by Inland. At issue 

on appeal is whether a fire caused by arson is a calamity for 

purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1307(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 

2022). We conclude that it is and reverse TERC’s decision and 

remand the cause for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Inland owned real property located at 610 S. 12th Street 

in Lincoln, Nebraska. As of January 1, 2020, the Lancaster 

County assessor had valued this real property at $793,800. 

On or about May 30 or 31, the property was damaged by fire 

caused by arson. Inland then filed a report of destroyed real 

property with the county assessor’s and county clerk’s offices 

in Lancaster County. The Board of Equalization considered 

the report but left the value of the property as assigned as of 

January 1. Inland appealed to TERC.

TERC held a hearing in Inland’s case, after which TERC 

concluded that the property was not “destroyed real property” 1

because the fire that had destroyed the property was not a 

“calamity” as defined by § 77-1307(2)(a). Inland appeals, and 

the Board of Equalization cross-appeals.

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1308 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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INLAND INS. CO. V. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL

Cite as 316 Neb. 143

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Inland assigns that TERC erred in (1) “sanctioning” the Board of Equalization’s “unlawful error of requiring 

Inland to rebut a presumption that the [Board of Equalization] 

faithfully performed its duties and then to meet a heightened 

burden of proof after the Report was filed and imposing this 

heightened standard upon Inland in derogation of the statutorily prescribed process due to Inland,” (2) determining that the 

word “calamity” did not include a “‘fire’” caused by arson, 

(3) finding there was not competent evidence to rebut the presumption that the Board of Equalization faithfully performed 

its duties and had sufficient competent evidence to make its 

determination, (4) finding that there was not clear and convincing evidence to make its determination, and (5) interpreting 

§ 77-1307 in such a manner as to create unconstitutional subclassifications of taxpayers that violate the Equal Protection 

Clauses of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions.

On cross-appeal, the Board of Equalization asserts in a 

separate cross-appeal (although it does not assign) that portions 

of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1301 (Cum. Supp. 2022), as well as 

§§ 77-1307 and 77-1308 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1309 (Cum. 

Supp. 2022), were unconstitutional.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1-3] Appellate review of a decision from TERC shall be 

conducted for error appearing on the record. 2 When reviewing 

a judgment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate 

court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, 

is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, 

capricious, nor unreasonable. 3 However, in instances when an 

appellate court is required to review cases for error appearing 

2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5019(5) (Reissue 2018).

3 Wheatland Indus. v. Perkins Cty. Bd. of Equal., 304 Neb. 638, 644, 935 

N.W.2d 764 (2019).
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on the record, questions of law are nonetheless reviewed de 

novo on the record. 4

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Inland argues that TERC erred in various ways 

when it upheld the Board of Equalization’s refusal to lower 

the assessed value of its real property. Inland first argues that 

the Board of Equalization failed to utilize the procedures set 

forth by statutes for lowering the assessed value on such property—in that Inland need only submit the appropriate request 

to the Board of Equalization, which was then obligated to 

lower its assessment. According to Inland, if the Board of 

Equalization believed that lower assessment to be incorrect, it 

was then the responsibility of the Lancaster County assessor 

to protest the valuation. Inland also argues that the property in 

question was “destroyed property,” which decreased valuation 

was caused by a “‘calamity’”—in this case, a fire caused by 

arson—and that TERC erred in various ways when finding to 

the contrary. 5

Meanwhile, the Board of Equalization has cross-appealed 

and alleges that a portion of § 77-1301 and all of §§ 77-1307 

to 77-1309 were unconstitutional as violative of the uniformity 

clause of Neb. Const. art. VIII, § 1.

Board of Equalization’s Procedure.

We turn first to Inland’s contention that the Board of 

Equalization followed an incorrect procedure when denying 

its request for a reduced valuation in its report of destroyed 

real property. Inland suggests that its due process rights were 

violated and that the procedure set forth by the statutes was 

not followed when the Board of Equalization considered and 

then denied Inland’s request for a downward valuation of 

4 Centurion Stone of Neb. v. Whelan, 286 Neb. 150, 152, 835 N.W.2d 62 

(2013).

5 See brief for appellant at 25.
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INLAND INS. CO. V. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL

Cite as 316 Neb. 143

Inland’s property. Inland contends that the governing statutes 

require the Board of Equalization to lower the value of the 

property as requested by the landowner and that if the County 

or the Board of Equalization disagreed with the new valuation, the county assessor could protest that valuation. We find 

this contention regarding the procedure to be followed without merit.

Section 77-1308 provides:

(1) If real property becomes destroyed real property 

during the current assessment year, the property owner 

shall file a report of the destroyed real property with 

the county assessor and county clerk of the county in 

which the property is located on or before July 15 of 

the current assessment year. The report of destroyed real 

property shall be made on a form prescribed by the Tax 

Commissioner.

. . . .

(3) The county board of equalization shall consider 

any report of destroyed real property received pursuant to 

this section, and the assessment of such property shall be 

made by the county board of equalization in accordance 

with section 77-1309. After county board of equalization 

action pursuant to section 77-1309, the county assessor 

shall correct the current year’s assessment roll as provided in section 77-1613.02.

And § 77-1309(1) states that “[i]f the county board of equalization receives a report of destroyed real property pursuant 

to section 77-1308, the county board of equalization shall 

adjust the assessed value of the destroyed real property to 

its assessed value on the date it suffers significant property 

damage.”

When read together, Inland argues that the requirement 

in § 77-1309 that upon receipt of a report of destroyed real 

property pursuant to § 77-1308, a board of equalization has no 

discretion but shall adjust the assessed value of the destroyed 

real property.
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INLAND INS. CO. V. LANCASTER CTY. BD. OF EQUAL

Cite as 316 Neb. 143

But Inland’s argument overlooks a separate subpart of 

§ 77-1308. Section 77-1308(3) requires that a board of equalization “shall consider any report of destroyed real property 

. . . and the assessment of such property shall be made by the 

county board of equalization.” That a board of equalization 

would be required to accept, without consideration, the position of a property owner that its property had been destroyed 

by a calamity, and further accept a revised value of the property as binding, is contrary to those statutory provisions governing the assessment of real property, which provide that the 

county board of equalization sets the value of real property. 6

We find no merit to Inland’s contention on appeal.

Destroyed Real Property Damaged by Calamity.

We turn next to Inland’s assertion on appeal that its property 

was destroyed real property damaged by a calamity within the 

meaning of the statute. We find merit to this argument.

The relevant statutes are found at §§ 77-1307 to 77-1309. 

Section 77-1307 states in part:

(1) The Legislature finds and declares that fires, earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes occur with enough frequency in this state that provision should be made to grant 

property tax relief to owners of real property adversely 

affected by such events.

(2) For purposes of sections 77-1307 to 77-1309:

(a) Calamity means a disastrous event, including, but 

not limited to, a fire, an earthquake, a flood, a tornado, 

or other natural event which significantly affects the 

assessed value of real property;

(b) Destroyed real property means real property that 

suffers significant property damage as a result of a calamity occurring on or after January 1, 2019, and before July 

1 of the current assessment year. Destroyed real property 

does not include property suffering significant property 

damage that is caused by the owner of the property[.]

6 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1502 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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Cite as 316 Neb. 143

In sum, the definition of “destroyed real property” requires 

that the property be destroyed or diminished in value due to a 

calamity. And a “calamity” includes a fire, earthquake, flood, 

tornado, or other natural disaster.

[4-6] Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary 

meaning. 7 An appellate court will not look beyond a statute 

to determine the legislative intent when the words are plain, 

direct, or unambiguous. 8 When interpreting a statute, effect 

must be given, if possible, to all the several parts of a statute; 

no sentence, clause, or word should be rejected as meaningless 

or superfluous if it can be avoided. 9 An appellate court must 

look to the statute’s purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than 

a construction which would defeat it. 10

The central dispute decided by TERC was whether a fire 

started by arson was a “calamity” under § 77-1307(2)(a). 

TERC concluded that it was not. On appeal, Inland argues that 

this was error, and based upon our reading of the statute, and 

in considering the entirety of the relevant statutes, we agree.

In defining “calamity,” § 77-1307(2)(a) explains by its plain 

terms that a “calamity” is, first and foremost, a “disastrous 

event.” The definition of “disastrous event” includes some 

natural events, but by the plain language of § 77-1307(2)(a), 

it is “not limited” to natural events. Although § 77-1307(1) 

notes that the Legislature “finds and declares” that fires, 

earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes occur with frequency in 

Nebraska, this recognition does not limit disastrous events to 

only these “events.”

TERC interpreted the listed events provided in § 77-1307(2)

(a) and concluded that the phrase “other natural event[s]” 

must mean that all listed preceding events were also natural. 

7 State v. Clemens, 300 Neb. 601, 915 N.W.2d 550 (2018).

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id.
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But in doing so, TERC reads out the language “including, but 

not limited to,” and ignores the text that provides a calamity 

is simply a “disastrous event.” In so doing, TERC effectively 

redefined a “calamity” as “a fire, an earthquake, a flood, a 

tornado, or other natural event.” But this definition does not 

conform to the law.

This conclusion is further reinforced by the last sentence 

of § 77-1307(2)(b), which excepts from the definition of 

“[d]estroyed real property” any “property suffering significant property damage that is caused by the owner of the property.” If a “calamity” did not include all disastrous events, as 

we explain above, it would be unnecessary to provide a statutory exception for damage caused by the property’s owner.

We conclude that TERC erred in limiting a “calamity” to 

only “natural events.” We reverse TERC’s decision and remand 

the cause for further proceedings. Accordingly, we need not 

address Inland’s remaining assignments of error.

Cross-Appeal.

Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-109(E) (rev. 2023) provides:

Cases Involving Constitutional Questions. A party who 

asserts that a Nebraska statute is unconstitutional under 

the Nebraska Constitution or the U.S. Constitution must 

file and serve notice thereof with the Clerk by a separate 

notice or by notice in a Petition to Bypass at the time of 

filing such party’s brief. . . . If the Attorney General is 

not already a party to an action where the constitutionality of the statute is in issue, a copy of the notice and 

brief asserting unconstitutionality must be served on the 

Attorney General within 5 days of the filing of the brief 

with the Clerk . . . . Proof of such service shall be filed 

with the Clerk.

The record in this case does not show that the Attorney 

General was served notice of the Board of Equalization’s brief, 

nor is the Attorney General a party to this action. TERC was 

noticed, but we have emphasized the requirement of “strict 
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compliance” with § 2-109(E) and have been clear that the 

Attorney General must be notified of such constitutional questions in order for this court to consider them on appeal. 11

Given this failure, we need not reach the Board of 

Equalization’s cross-appeal.

CONCLUSION

We reverse TERC’s decision and remand the cause for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings.

11 See State v. Catlin, 308 Neb 294, 953 N.W.2d 563 (2021).

Papik, J., concurring.

The majority opinion concludes that a fire caused by someone other than the property owner is a “calamity” for purposes 

of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1307(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2022), even if 

it is not a “natural event.” I agree that a fire caused by someone 

other than the property owner is a “calamity,” but for somewhat 

different reasons. I write separately to explain my thinking.

I begin with the fact that § 77-1307(2)(a) expressly defines 

“calamity” to include “a fire.” Because the statute expressly 

provides that a fire qualifies as a “calamity,” one might assume 

that this is a very straightforward case, there is nothing more 

to discuss, and all fires, including the one at issue in this 

case, qualify as a calamity. TERC found, however, that a fire 

caused by arson is not a “calamity,” because of the reference 

in § 77-1307(2)(a) to “other natural event[s].” TERC took 

the position that in order to give the phrase “other natural 

event” meaning, “calamity” must include only events caused 

by nature.

I find no fault in TERC’s attempt to avoid rendering the 

phrase “or other natural event” superfluous; indeed, a canon 

of statutory interpretation we often cite counsels as much, 

see, e.g., Dean v. State, 288 Neb. 530, 849 N.W.2d 138 
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(2014). I disagree, however, that TERC identified the only 

reasonable way to interpret and give meaning to the “other 

natural event” language of § 77-1307(2)(a). In my view, “natural event” could be understood as referring not to the cause 

of the particular event at issue, but to the type of event, i.e., 

was the property destroyed as a result of a naturally occurring phenomenon like a fire, earthquake, et cetera? Under this 

alternative interpretation, the “other natural event” language 

serves the purpose of clarifying that naturally occurring phenomena that are not expressly listed nonetheless qualify as 

“calamit[ies].”

Not only do I find the alternative interpretation of “natural 

event” textually permissible, I find it to be the superior reading. 

For one thing, by referring to “a fire, an earthquake, a flood, 

a tornado, or other natural event,” the statute seems to presuppose that each of the specifically mentioned phenomena is, 

for purposes of the statute, a “natural event.” § 77-1307(2)(a) 

(emphasis supplied). If someone refers to “works of William 

Shakespeare, Edgar Allan Poe, Emily Dickinson, or other 

great poets,” one could reasonably presume that the speaker 

considered Shakespeare, Poe, and Dickinson great poets. So 

too, it seems to me, could one presume that fires and the like 

are, for purposes of the statute, natural events.

In addition, reading “natural event” to refer to the type of 

event rather than the cause of the event avoids a major difficulty with the interpretation adopted by TERC alluded to 

above: Under that reading, “calamity” is specifically defined to 

include “a fire,” and yet, somehow, some fires are not calamities. It is difficult to square such a reading with a court’s “‘role 

to make sense rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris.’” 

Maslenjak v. United States, 582 U.S. 335, 345, 137 S. Ct. 

1918, 198 L. Ed. 2d 460 (2017) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 

West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 111 

S. Ct. 1138, 113 L. Ed. 2d. 68 (1991)).

Even assuming that both readings of “natural event” are 

reasonable and the statute is thus ambiguous, I would find in 
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favor of Inland based on the legislative statement of purpose 

codified in subsection (1) of § 77-1307. Although statutory 

policy statements and preambles cannot be used to override 

a statute’s operative language, see, e.g., In re Guardianship 

of Eliza W., 304 Neb. 995, 938 N.W.2d 307 (2020), such 

statements can be considered in “determining which of various permissible meanings the dispositive text bears.” Antonin 

Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 

of Legal Texts 218 (2012). In § 77-1307(1), the Legislature 

declared that “fires, earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes occur 

with enough frequency in this state that provision should be 

made to grant property tax relief to owners of real property 

adversely affected by such events.” The statement specifically mentions granting property tax relief to owners of real 

property adversely affected by fires, earthquakes, floods, and 

tornadoes. No mention is made of providing property tax relief 

only when those phenomena occur because of forces of nature. 

This statement of purpose, in my view, removes any lingering 

doubt as to whether a fire caused by someone other than the 

property owner is a “calamity” under the statute.

For these reasons, I concur in the majority’s decision finding that a fire caused by someone other than the property 

owner is a “calamity” for purposes of § 77-1307(2)(a).