### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 30761 Summary Calendar

TRUDY A. BOVIE

- CLARK,

Plaintiff

— Appellant

v. SENTRY SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY; THEODORE SADOWSKI, doing business as Sadowski Trucking Company; LANCE R. THOMAS,

Defendants

— Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:12

- CV

- 336

Before REAVLEY, JONES, and PRADO , Circuit Judges

. PER CURIAM : * Appellant Trudy A. Bovie

- Clark (“Clark”) sued Appellees Sentry Select Insurance Company, Theodore Sadowski , and Lance R. Thomas (“Thomas”), alleging that Thomas was at fault for a vehicular collision in which Clark sustained personal injuries. The collision occurred when Cla rk attempted to make a right turn at the intersection of South Claiborne Avenue and Po ydras Street in New Orleans while Thomas , who was operating a commercial tractor

-

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED May 19, 2014 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-30761 Document: 00512634138 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/19/2014No. 13

- 30761 trailer, was making the same turn. The jury found that Thomas was not at fault for the accident . Clark filed motions for a new trial, for judgment as a matter of law, and to alter or amend the judgment . The district court denied
th o se motions, and w e AFFIRM.
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of
law , applying the same standard that the district court uses in considering the
motion at trial

. St okes v. Emerson Elec. Co. , 217 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2000 ). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 (a)(1)(A) , a district court must deny
the motion unless the opposing party “ has been fully heard on an issue

. . . and a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue[.]” See Ellis v. Weasler Eng’g, Inc. , 258 F.3d 326, 337 (5th Cir. 2001). We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, reversing the district court only if there is “an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” Duff v. Werner Enters., Inc. , 489 F.3d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. Similarly, we review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to amend or alter jud gment for abuse of discretion

. Midland W. Corp. v. F.D.I.C. , 911 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th Cir. 1990). “Under this standard, the district court’s decision and decision

- making process need only be reasonable.” Id. Clark contends that there are two reasons why we should reverse the district court’s orders and the jury’s verdict should be vacated. First, Clark
asserts that the jury improperly relied on evidence of faded lane dividers on South Claiborne when the district c ourt’s jury instructions did not address faded street markings or their legal effect on Thomas’s potential negligence.
The district court properly instructed the jury , and reiterated in its response to the jury note, that it could consider the testimony of all witnesses, weigh such testimony, a nd draw reasonable inferences from testimony and exhibits in light of the jury members’ common experience s

. Evidence at trial 2 Case: 13-30761 Document: 00512634138 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/19/2014No. 13

- 30761
demonstrated that the lanes on South Claiborne near the accident site were faded and not clearly marked. In reaching its verdict , t he jury very well may have considered the condition of the street lane dividers, and it would have been in the jury’s province to do so. “Viewing all of the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict , ” t he re was sufficient evidence to support the jury’ s verdict, even without consideration of the faded lane markers. Vadie v. Miss. State Univ. , 218 F.3d 365, 372 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Clark’s motions on
this ground. Second, Clark argues that because Thomas maneuvered the turn onto South Claiborne in a manner that violated La. Rev. Stat. §§ 32:101(a)(1) and 32:104(a) he shares at least some of the fault for the accident, and the jury’s
verdict to the contrary i s neither supported by the evidence nor consistent with
the law and facts presented at trial. This argument is based on Clark’s presumption that Thomas did in fact violate Sections 32:101 and 32:104. 1 Whether Thomas violated these statutes was a question for the jury to decide, and the evidence presented at trial could have supported either party’s version of events

. This issue ultimately turned on the witnesses’ credibility , and as noted by the district court, the jury clearly found Thomas’s version of events more credible. Because mere dissatisfaction with the jury’s weighing of
evidence or determination of witness credibility is not a valid ground on which to grant judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or alteration of the judgment,
the district c ourt did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Clark’s motions.
For the reasons stated here and by the district court, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1 Under Louisiana law, a d r iver turning right at an intersection must do so as “close as practicable to the right

- hand curb” and with “reasonable safety.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:101(A)(1), 32:104(A). 3 Case: 13-30761 Document: 00512634138 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/19/2014