COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

July 28, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP147 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV169

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

PETITIONER,

 PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

 V.

CHRISTOPHER ALLAN HIGGINS,

 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Ashland County: 

JOHN P. ANDERSON, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Christopher Higgins appeals from a circuit court 

order granting a ten-year domestic abuse injunction with a firearms restriction,
No. 2019AP147

2

entered in favor of his former girlfriend. We conclude the court’s order was 

supported by sufficient evidence, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Higgins and Dorothy1 were involved in a sexual relationship from 

June until October, 2018. The relationship included “rough sex,” and they also 

regularly sent each other sexually explicit text messages and nude photographs. 

On October 7, 2018, an argument ensued after Dorothy viewed Higgins’ cellphone 

messages and saw correspondence with other women. Dorothy felt Higgins was 

lying to her and having outside relationships. Higgins allegedly did not leave 

Dorothy’s house after she asked him, prompting her to call the police. 

¶3 Dorothy subsequently filed a petition for a temporary restraining 

order, which the Ashland County circuit court granted. Following a permanent 

injunction hearing, the court ordered a ten-year domestic abuse injunction with a 

firearms restriction. Higgins now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶4 Whether to grant a domestic abuse injunction presents a mixed 

question of fact and law. See Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶23, 312 

Wis. 2d 435, 752 N.W.2d 359. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they 

are clearly erroneous. WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). When reviewing the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the issuance of an injunction, we will not reverse the 

 

1

 Although this is a civil case, pursuant to the public policy underlying WIS. STAT. RULE

809.86 (2017-18), we have chosen to refer to the petitioner using a pseudonym. All references to 

the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 2019AP147

3

circuit court unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the petitioner, is so 

lacking in probative value that no trier of fact acting reasonably could have found 

that the petitioner satisfied his or her burden of proof. See Wittig v. Hoffart, 2005 

WI App 198, ¶19, 287 Wis. 2d 353, 704 N.W.2d 415. In this regard, whether the 

facts as found by the circuit court are sufficient to satisfy the statutory standards 

governing the issuance of a domestic abuse injunction is a question of law that we 

review independently. Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶23.

¶5 The decision whether to grant an injunction is a matter within the 

circuit court’s discretion, and our review “ultimately is limited to whether that 

discretion was properly exercised.” Id. Because the exercise of discretion is so 

essential to the circuit court’s functioning, we will look for reasons to sustain its 

discretionary rulings. Id., ¶24.

¶6 In order to issue a domestic abuse injunction, a circuit court must 

find there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in, 

or based upon prior conduct of the petitioner and the respondent may engage in, 

domestic abuse of the petitioner.”2 WIS. STAT. § 813.12(4)(a)3. Ordinarily, the 

duration of such an injunction can be no longer than four years. 

Sec. 813.12(4)(c)1. However, a court may exceed this limit and “order that the 

injunction is in effect for not more than 10 years if the court finds, by a 

preponderance of the evidence ... that ... [t]here is a substantial risk that the 

 

2

 As relevant here, “domestic abuse” is defined as: “[i]ntentional infliction of physical 

pain, physical injury or illness”; “[i]ntentional impairment of physical condition”; “[a] violation 

of [WIS. STAT.] s. 940.32 [i.e., stalking]”; or “[a] threat to engage in the [preceding] conduct.” 

WIS. STAT. § 813.12(1)(am). 
No. 2019AP147

4

respondent may commit [an] intentional homicide ... against the petitioner.” 

Sec. 813.12(4)(d)1.a.

¶7 In the present case, Higgins does not challenge the circuit court’s 

decision generally to issue a domestic abuse injunction. He instead challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to issue a ten-year injunction, contending “[t]he 

evidence before the Circuit Court did not, as a matter of law, establish there was a 

substantial risk that Mr. Higgins would commit first- or second-degree homicide

against the Petitioner.” Higgins also argues the court erroneously exercised its 

discretion by failing to consider relevant factors before ordering the injunction,

and by giving too much weight to one factor. 

¶8 We reject Higgins’ assertion that the appellate record is insufficient 

to support the facts upon which the circuit court exercised its discretion in granting 

the ten-year injunctive relief. Based upon the testimony at the permanent 

injunction hearing, the court found that approximately one month after the 

relationship began, Higgins’ behavior “became more possessive, slightly more

violent.” The court found that, by the end of August 2018, Higgins “takes ... a lit 

cigarette, places it before her skin saying he wants to brand her, and then makes 

the comment that he’d rather use some type of a cattle prod, branding, something 

to that effect.” The court further found that later that night, Higgins approached 

Dorothy, “backed her up to a post on the front porch, placed both hands on her 

neck and choked her, told her that he wanted to see the fear in her eyes. He held 

her until she couldn’t breathe ....” 
No. 2019AP147

5

¶9 Dorothy also testified that Higgins stated “a couple of times” that “if 

he ever saw me with another man he would kill us both.”3 The circuit court 

specifically noted, in this regard, that Higgins threatened to kill Dorothy and that 

he did not deny making that threat: “[T]here is one allegation that has gone, for all 

practical purposes as I can see from the testimony, uncontradicted ... and that is 

the ... threat to kill.” The court also stated:

[I]s it reasonable for me to believe that, if I see you with 

another man I’ll kill you both? Is that reasonable for me to 

believe? Oh yeah, that’s very reasonable for me to believe. 

Extremely reasonable for me to believe under these facts. 

And, therefore, not only am I satisfied that there’s 

reasonable grounds to believe that, based upon the prior 

conduct of the petitioner and the respondent, the respondent 

has either engaged in or may engage in domestic abuse. 

And because of that threat—and it was uncontradicted—

I’m satisfied, because it was uncontradicted, there’s a 

substantial risk that the respondent may commit first or 

second degree homicide based on that threat. And, 

therefore, this injunction can go up to ten years ....

¶10 Higgins contends the circuit court gave too much weight to Higgins’ 

“single omission” during his testimony—namely, that he “did not say any magic 

words denying a threat [to kill].” Higgins also argues the court failed to consider 

other factors. Specifically, Higgins asserts Dorothy did not allege that Higgins 

had ever injured her with a firearm, attempted to injure her with a firearm, or 

threatened her in any way with any type of firearm. Higgins also contends the 

court failed to consider evidence that Dorothy “was the aggressor or was not 

 

3

 Dorothy also testified that Higgins had a hunting rifle next to the nearby door “from 

hunting ... the day before.” Dorothy further testified, “As he was going out the door he grabbed 

his gun, which was next to the door, and said that he was going to kill the police officers, and that 

he would be going to prison for a long time ....” 
No. 2019AP147

6

forthcoming with the circuit court.” He further argues Dorothy’s testimony was 

unsubstantiated. 

¶11 Higgins’ arguments fail. As an initial matter, Higgins’ arguments 

seem to misapprehend the applicable legal standard. In particular, he seems to 

conflate the petitioner’s burden of proof regarding a ten-year domestic abuse 

injunction—i.e., a preponderance of the evidence—with the elements required for 

the offense—i.e., that there is a substantial risk the respondent may commit an 

intentional homicide against the petitioner. To be clear, the petitioner must prove 

that the risk of homicide is substantial, but the existence of that type of risk only 

needs to be shown as being more likely than not. See WIS. STAT.

§ 813.12(4)(d)1.a. This burden of proof is considered the lowest. See Marquez v. 

Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, ¶37, 341 Wis. 2d 119, 815 N.W.2d 314.

¶12 A greater impediment to Higgins, however, is our standard of 

review, which requires that we provide “due regard” for the circuit court’s 

superior opportunity to evaluate witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. 

See WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). In most instances, when acting as fact finder, the 

circuit court is considered the ultimate arbiter of witness credibility. Johnson v. 

Mertz, 95 Wis. 2d 141, 152, 289 N.W.2d 813 (1980). We find no basis to reject 

the circuit court’s credibility determinations in this case—in particular regarding 

the threats to kill. Dorothy also testified regarding Higgins’ access to firearms and 

specifically stated she was aware that Higgins had two shotguns. As a result, the 

court appropriately scheduled a firearms surrender hearing and ordered Higgins to 

surrender his firearms within forty-eight hours. Furthermore, Higgins’ remaining 

arguments appear to be merely that the court did not reach competing inferences 

from the evidence in Higgins’s favor. Here too, if more than one reasonable 

inference may be drawn from the credible evidence, we must accept the inference 
No. 2019AP147

7

drawn by the circuit court. Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 

250, 274 N.W.2d 647 (1979). 

¶13 In all, the transcript of the injunction hearing shows by a 

preponderance of the evidence that there was a substantial risk Higgins may 

commit an intentional homicide against Dorothy. The circuit court therefore 

properly exercised its discretion by ordering that the domestic abuse injunction 

would remain in effect for ten years with a firearms restriction. 

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.