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Filed 6/20/13 Gallant v. City of Alameda CA1/3 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION THREE 

ANN MARIE GALLANT, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

CITY OF ALAMEDA, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A133777 

 (Alameda County 

 Super. Ct. No. RG11590505) 

 Defendant City of Alameda (the city) appeals from an order denying its special 

motion to strike the complaint of plaintiff Ann Marie Gallant as a strategic lawsuit 

against public participation pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure,1

 section 425.16 

(hereafter referred to as SLAPP statute or anti-SLAPP statute). The trial court 

determined that the complaint was not based on petitioning or free speech activity 

protected by section 425.16. We disagree, and accordingly, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Ann Marie Gallant was formerly employed as interim city manager, 

pursuant to a written employment contract, for a minimum period of 24 months, 

commencing April 1, 2009 and ending March 31, 2011. At a December 28, 2010, public 

meeting, the city council voted to “terminate” Gallant’s contract. 

 

1

 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 
2

 Under the complaint’s causes of actions, designated “Labor Code § 1102.5(b)2

”; 

Labor Code § 1102.5(c),3

” “declaratory relief,” and “breach of contract,” Gallant alleged 

her employment had been “terminated” because (1) she refused to participate in illegal 

activity; and (2) she disclosed information pertaining to illegal activity to government 

agencies regarding a city council member. She also alleged the reported city council 

member had influenced two other council members to vote to terminate her contract. 

Gallant also alleged the city council’s vote to terminate her contract violated section 2-2 

of the city charter4 and paragraph two of the employment contract.5 Because Gallant’s 

 

2

 Labor Code section 1102.5, section (b), reads: “An employer may not retaliate 

against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement 

agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information 

discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation or noncompliance with a 

state or federal rule or regulation.” 

3

 Labor Code section 1102.5, section (c), reads: “An employer may not retaliate 

against an employee for refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a 

violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of noncompliance with a state or federal 

rule or regulation.” 

4

 Section 2-2 of the city charter reads: “(A) The following offices are hereby 

established and the incumbents thereof shall be appointed or removed by a vote of a 

majority of the full Council: City Manager, City Attorney, City Clerk. [¶] (B) During a 

period of ninety days immediately following the date of installation of any person newly 

elected to the Council at a regular or special municipal election or of any person newly 

appointed to the Council, the Council shall take no action, whether immediate or 

prospective, to remove, suspend, request the resignation of, or reduce the salary of, the 

incumbents in the aforementioned appointive offices.” 

5

 Paragraph two of the contract reads: “Interim City Manager shall be hired as a 

limited term employee for a minimum period of twenty four (24) months, commencing 

April 1, 2009 and ending March 31, 2011, unless extended by mutual agreement. Such 

extensions shall be in 90 day increments, at the commencement of which the City council 

shall initiate its selection and recruitment procedure for the appointment of a permanent 

City Manager. [¶] Should the City council elect to delay its executive search for a City 

Manager, or elect not to select a candidate at the term of this agreement, this agreement 

shall automatically renew in 90 days increments as provided herein until such time as the 

City council has selected a permanent City Manager or until such time as the City 

provides the Interim City Manager with timely notice of non-renewal. The City council 

shall provide the Interim City Manager with written notice of non-renewal at least 90 

days prior to the initial Termination Date or any succeeding Termination Date.” 
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contract had not been properly terminated, she alleged the city was obligated to continue 

to pay her but it had stopped paying her on or about April 1, 2011. Gallant sought a 

declaration to resolve the parties’ “actual controversy” relating to the validity of the city 

council’s vote to terminate her contract on December 28, 2010, and damages for loss of 

pay and benefits, continuing to accrue until 90 days after the city complied with the 

termination terms of the employment contract. 

 After filing its answer, the city filed a special motion to strike the complaint, 

which was opposed by Gallant. After a hearing, the trial court issued a written order 

denying the city’s special motion to strike the complaint. The court explained: 

“Plaintiff’s claims arise from the City of Alameda’s termination of her employment 

contract rather than any petitioning or free speech activity protected by the anti-SLAPP 

statute. Because the Court finds that the complaint does not arise from protected activity 

within the meaning of [section] 425.16, the Court need not reach the issue of whether 

plaintiff has made a sufficient showing on the merits of her claims.” The city now timely 

appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

 Section 425.16, subdivision (b), states, in pertinent part: “(1) A cause of action 

against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of 

petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution 

in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the 

court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the 

plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” “[T]he word ‘person’ as used in section 425.16, 

subdivision (b) must be read to include a governmental entity.” (Bradbury v. Superior 

Court (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1114.) 

 We review the trial court’s order denying the city’s special motion to strike under 

section 425.16 de novo. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325.) “[A] special 

motion to strike involves a two-part inquiry. First, the defendant must make a prima 

facie showing that a cause of action arises from an act in furtherance of his or her 

constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. 
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[Citations.] If such a showing has been made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 

demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. [Citation.] If the plaintiff fails to 

carry that burden, the cause of action is ‘subject to be stricken under the statute.’ ” 

(Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 280-281.) 

 The SLAPP statute’s protected activity is broadly defined to include “(1) any 

written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial 

proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral 

statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 

legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by 

law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a 

public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in 

furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right 

of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (e).) “[A] defendant moving to strike a cause of action arising from a statement 

made before, or in connection with an issue under consideration by, a legally authorized 

official proceeding need not separately demonstrate that the statement concerned an issue 

of public significance.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 

Cal.4th 1106, 1123, fn. omitted.) Instead, “the statutory remedy afforded by section 

425.16 extends to statements and writings of governmental entities and public officials on 

matters of public interest and concern that would fall within the scope of the statute if 

such statements were made by a private individual or entity.” (Vargas v. City of Salinas

(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1, 17.) 

 In analyzing the first prong of the section 425.16 analysis, “courts must be careful 

to distinguish allegations of conduct on which liability is to be based from allegations of 

motives for such conduct. ‘[C]auses of action do not arise from motives; they arise from 

acts.’ [Citation.] ‘The statute applies to claims “based on” or “arising from” statements 

or writings made in connection with protected speech or petitioning activities, regardless 

of any motive the defendant may have had in undertaking its activities, or the motive the 

plaintiff may be ascribing to the defendant’s activities.’ ” (People ex rel. Fire Ins. 
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Exchange v. Anapol (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 809, 823.) Also, “[t]he anti-SLAPP 

statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the 

defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability – and whether that 

activity constituted protected speech or petitioning.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 82, 92 (Navellier).) Thus, regardless of the labeled causes of action, Gallant 

“cannot avoid operation of the anti-SLAPP statute by attempting through artifices of 

pleading, to characterize an action as a garden variety tort or contract claim when in fact 

the claim is predicated on protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Hylton v. Frank E. 

Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271-1272.) 

 We agree with the city that the overarching premise of all of Gallant’s causes of 

action is the termination of her employment contract, which is protected conduct under 

the anti-SLAPP statute as either a “written or oral statement or writing made before a 

legislative . . . proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,” or a 

“written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under 

consideration or review by a legislative . . . body, or any other official proceeding 

authorized by law.” (§ 425.16, subds. (e)(1) & (2).) As Gallant concedes in her 

responsive brief, her retaliation and breach of contract claims, and request for declaratory 

relief, “would have no basis in the absence of” the city’s alleged actions taken in 

connection with the termination of her employment itself. (Tuszynska v. Cunningham

(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 257, 270 (Tuszynska); cf. Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities 

Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611, 624 (Martin) [court concluded gravamen of 

plaintiff’s complaint was one of racial and retaliatory discrimination, not an attack on 

agency’s chief executive officer or evaluations of plaintiff's performance as an 

employee]; Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. 1105 Alta Loma Road 

Apartments, LLC (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1284 [court concluded gravamen of 

complaint was discrimination, not exercise of defendant’s protected speech].) Thus, 

because the city’s decision to terminate Gallant’s employment constitutes “the gravamen, 

principal thrust, and core injury-producing conduct underlying [Gallant’s] . . . claims” 
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(Tuszynska, supra, at p. 270), the lawsuit “falls squarely within the ambit of the antiSLAPP statute’s ‘arising from’ prong” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 90).6

 

 Gallant’s reliance on McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, 

Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, and Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154 

Cal.App.4th 154, is misplaced as neither case concerns a municipality’s protected activity 

as defined in section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).7 Additionally, the McConnell

court’s statement that “no one would suggest that a statement or writing firing an 

employee is protected First Amendment activity” (175 Cal.App.4th at p. 180), 

misconstrues the issue before us. “[T]he salient question in this case is not whether 

[defendant’s] acts are protected as a matter of law under the First Amendment of the 

United States Constitution in some other context, but whether they fall within the 

statutory definition of conduct that the Legislature deemed appropriate for anti-SLAPP 

motions.” (Schaffer v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 992, 

1001 (Schaffer).) “The moving defendant’s burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts 

of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of 

petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection 

with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, 

Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon Enterprises), italics added.) 

 

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 To avoid the application of the anti-SLAPP statute, Gallant asks us to consider the 

events before December 28, 2010, which explain that the motive for her termination was 

“retaliatory” unprotected conduct. But, Gallant confuses “a defendant’s alleged injuryproducing conduct with the unlawful motive the plaintiff is ascribing to that conduct.” 

(Tuszynska, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 271.) “ ‘[C]onduct alleged to constitute breach 

of contract may also come within constitutionally protected speech or petitioning.’ ” (Id. 

at p. 269.) Gallant is “positing a ‘false dichotomy between actions that target “the . . . 

performance of contractual obligations” and those that target “the exercise of the right of 

free speech.” ’ ” (Ibid., quoting Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 92.) 

7

 In her opening brief, Gallant also refers us to Kapler v. City of Alameda, which 

was then pending review in Division One of this court. However, since the filing of the 

parties’ briefs, our colleagues in Division One have decided Kapler in a nonpublished 

opinion. (Sept. 6, 2012, A133001) [nonpub. opin.].) Consequently, we do not rely on or 

further discuss this case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(e)(1) & 8.1115(a).) 
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 We also see no merit to Gallant’s argument that the anti-SLAPP statue has not 

been applied to wrongful termination claims. “ ‘There is simply no authority for creating 

a categorical exception [from the anti-SLAPP law] for any particular type of claim 

. . . .’ ” (People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) 

“ ‘ “Considering the purpose of the [anti-SLAPP] provision, expressly stated, the nature 

or form of the action is not what is critical but rather that it is against a person who has 

exercised certain rights” [citation]. “The Legislature recognized that ‘all kinds of claims 

could achieve the objective of a SLAPP suit—to interfere with and burden the 

defendant’s exercise of his or her rights.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘Nothing in the statue itself 

categorically excludes any particular type of action from its operation, and no court has 

the “ ‘power to rewrite the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention which 

is not expressed.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Given these pronouncements, and the Legislature’s 

express reminder that anti-SLAPP motions should be ‘construed broadly’ (§ 425.16, 

subd. (a)), we do not find room to except claims involving [wrongful termination] from 

the reach of the statute.” (Beach v. Harco National Ins. Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 82, 

91.) 

 In sum, we conclude the city met its burden of showing that the complaint’s 

causes of action were based on “constitutional free speech and petitioning activity as 

defined in the anti-SLAPP statute[],” and “arose from activity protected by the antiSLAPP statute.” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 95; italics added.) Whether the city’s 

conduct “was wrongful” is a matter Gallant must “support in the context of the discharge 

of [her] burden to provide a prima facie showing of the merits of [her causes of action].” 

(Paul for Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1367, disapproved on other 

grounds in Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 68, fn. 5). 

 The parties ask us to address whether Gallant met the second prong of the section 

426.15 analysis, namely, whether she met her burden of establishing a reasonable 

probability of prevailing on her claims by producing “evidence that would be admissible 

at trial.” (Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. v. Fitzgibbons (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 

515, 527.) However, the trial court did not rule on the city’s numerous written objections 
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challenging Gallant’s proffered evidence, the appellate record does not include Gallant’s 

written responses, if any, to the city’s evidentiary objections, and she has not specifically 

addressed the objections in her responsive brief. “Rulings on the evidentiary objections 

are necessary before the trial court or this court can determine whether [Gallant] has 

presented admissible evidence that demonstrates a probability of prevailing on the merits 

of her claims. . . . ‘ “Trial courts have a duty to rule on evidentiary objections.” 

[Citation.] When that duty is not performed, appellate courts are left with the nebulous 

task of determining whether the ruling that was purportedly made was within the 

authority and discretion of the trial court and was correct.’ ” (Martin, supra, 198 

Cal.App.4th at p. 630.) Given the procedural posture of this case, we conclude it is more 

appropriate to remand the matter to the trial court so that it may rule on the outstanding 

evidentiary and substantive issues in the first instance. (Birkner v. Lam, supra, 156 

Cal.App.4th at p. 286.) 

DISPOSITION 

The November 10, 2011, order denying defendant’s special motion to strike is 

reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal. 

 _________________________ 

 Jenkins, J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

McGuiness, P. J. 

_________________________ 

Siggins, J.