BEFORE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

Secretary of Labor, 

Complainant, 

v. OSHRC Docket 13-0224 

A.H. Sturgill Roofing, Inc., 

Respondent. 

Brief on Review of Amici Curiae,

The Utility Line Clearance Coalition, 

The Tree Care Industry Association, 

The United States Postal Service, and 

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 

Counsel for Amici Curiae

OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 

Arthur G. Sapper, Esq. 

Melissa A. Bailey, Esq. 

1909 K Street NW, Suite 1000 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

(202) 263-0270; arthur.sapper@ogletree.com 

Lucas J. Asper, Esq. 

The Ogletree Building, 300 North Main Street, Suite 500 

Greenville, SC 29601 
Table of Contents 

I. The Amici Curiae and Their Interest ................................................................... 1

II. Argument ............................................................................................................... 4

A. The Secretary Proposes An Inappropriate Definition of the 

“Hazard.” ................................................................................................... 4

1. What Was the “Hazard” Here? ................................................... 5

2. Was A Hazard Proven Here? ...................................................... 8

B. The Record Does Not Show That The Alleged Hazards Were 

“Likely” to Cause Death or Serious Physical Harm. ......................... 15

C. The Secretary Failed to Prove a Hazard That is “Recognized” by 

the Employer or Its Industry. ................................................................ 23

1. The Judge Erroneously Held and the Secretary 

Erroneously Argues That It Is Enough To Recognize 

Mere “Heat” As A Hazard. ....................................................... 23

2. The Record Contains Insufficient Evidence of 

Recognition. ................................................................................. 24

D. The Record Fails to Show that The Employer Should Have 

Known With Reasonable Diligence of the Alleged Hazard to 

M.R. or Other Employees. ...................................................................... 27

1. The Inquiries Implicitly Required By the Secretary’s 

Position Would Have Potentially Placed Sturgill in 

Violation of the ADA and ADEA. ............................................ 28

E. The Record Does Not Clearly Enough Show The Likely Utility 

and Feasibility of The Acclimatization Demanded by the 

Secretary. .................................................................................................. 34

III. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 35

Certificate of Service ....................................................................................................... 22
Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks. 

ii

Table of Authorities 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 

840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,138 S.Ct. 924 (2018) ...........................................17 

Baroid Div. of NL Indus., Inc. v. OSHRC, 

660 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1981) ..................................................................................................5 

Cal. Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC, 

517 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1975), aff’g 1 BNA OSHC 1305 (No. 14, 1973). ............................15 

Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 

578 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................29 

Compass Environ., Inc., 

23 BNA OSHC 1132 (No. 06-1036, 2010), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1164 (11th Cir. 

2011) ........................................................................................................................................16 

Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 

333 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................29 

Davey Tree Expert Co., 

25 BNA OSHC 1933 (No. 11-2556, 2016) ..........................................................................1, 2 

Duriron Co., Inc., 

11 BNA OSHC 1405 (No. 77-2847, 1983) ............................................................................15 

EEOC v. Massachusetts, 

987 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1993) .....................................................................................................30 

EEOC v. Murray, Inc., 

175 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) .......................................................................31, 32 

Emory H. Mixon, 

1 BNA OSHC 1500 (No. 403, 1973) (dissenting opinion) ................................................21 

Epter v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 

127 F. Supp. 2d 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ...................................................................................30 
Table of Authorities (cont’d) Page 

iii 

* Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Pet. Inst., 

448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion) .........................................................................20, 23 

* Industrial Glass, 

15 OSHC 1594 (No. 88-0348, 1992) ......................................................................................11 

* Kastalon Inc., 

12 BNA OSHC 1928, 1931-32 (No. 79-3561, 1986) ............................................................20 

Kropp Forge Co. v. Secr’y of Labor, 

657 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1981) ....................................................................................................6 

Miller v. Whirlpool Corp., 

807 F. Supp. 2d 684 (N.D. Ohio 2011) .................................................................................32 

Natkin & Co., 

1 BNA OSHC 1204 (No. 401, 1973) .....................................................................................22 

Pegasus Tower, 

21 BNA OSHC 1190 (No. 01-0547, 2005) ..............................................................................4 

Pelron Corp., 

12 BNA OSHC 1833 (No. 82-388, 1986) ................................................................................6 

Portland Stevedoring Co., 

1 BNA OSHC 1250 (No. 5, 1973) .........................................................................................21 

Rohr v. Salt River Proj. Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 

555 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................32 

Seaworld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, 

748 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................................22 

Southwestern Acoustics & Specialty, Inc., 

5 BNA OSHC 1091 (No. 12174, 1977) .................................................................................28 

Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 

197 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1999) ............................................................................................28, 29 

Tacoma Boatbuilding Co., 

1 BNA OSHC 1309 (No. 6, 1973) .........................................................................................21 
Table of Authorities (cont’d) Page 

iv 

United States v. Rivera, 

131 F.3d 222 (1st Cir. 1997) (en banc) ...................................................................................17 

Wieland-Werke AG v. United States, 

31 C.I.T. 1884 (2007), aff’d, 290 F. App’x 348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..........................................17 

Wright v. Ill. Dept. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 

798 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................................29, 30 

Statutes 

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) ..........................................................................................................28 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) ...................................................................16 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(e)....................................................................12 

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 559 ..........................................................................9 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a .......................................28, 30, 34 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. .........28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 

Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-325 ..........................28 

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, P.L. 91-173, formerly 

codified at 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. .........................................................................................31 

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (“OSH 

Act”). .................................................................................................................................19, 31 

OSH Act § 5(a) ....................................................................................................................21 

OSH Act § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), the General Duty Clause 

(“GDC”) .......................3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35 

OSH Act § 17(j) ...................................................................................................................21 

OSH Act § 17(k) ..........................................................................................16, 17, 20, 21, 22 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ........................................................33 
Table of Authorities (cont’d) Page 

v 

Regulations 

29 C.F.R. Part 1975, “Coverage of Employers Under the Williams‐Steiger

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.” .................................................................19 

29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.14(c) .....................................................................................31, 33 

29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) ..................................................................................................................31 

29 C.F.R. § 1910.134(a)(2) ...........................................................................................................32 

29 C.F.R. § 1910.134(c)(1)(ii) .......................................................................................................32 

29 C.F.R. § 2200.71 .........................................................................................................................9 

79 Fed. Reg. 20315, 20342 (2014) .................................................................................................1 

81 Fed. Reg. 68504 (Oct. 2016) .....................................................................................................2 

Legislative History 

Advisory Committee Note on FED.R.EVID. 201(a) ..................................................................16 

H. CONF. REP. 1765, 91st CONG. 4, 33 (Dec. 16, 1970) ..............................................................20 

H.R. 16785, 91ST CONG. 6-7 (1970) (as introduced) .................................................................18 

H.R. 16785, 91ST CONG. 47 (1970) (as reported) .......................................................................19 

H.R. 19200, 91st CONG. (1970) ...................................................................................................19 

S. 2193, 91ST CONG. 6-7 (Nov. 17, 1970) (as passed) ................................................................19 

SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL 

SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, 92D CONG. (1971) ........................................................19 

Court Rules 

FED.R.EVID. 801(c) ..........................................................................................................................9 

FED.R.EVID. 802 ..............................................................................................................................9 

FED.R.EVID. 803(18) .......................................................................................................................9 
Table of Authorities (cont’d) Page 

vi 

Other Authorities 

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), 

HEAT STRESS AND STRAIN: TLV® PHYSICAL AGENTS DOCUMENTATION

(7th ed. 2017) ....................................................................................................................12, 32 

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1981) ...........................................................................17, 18 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) ..........................................................................17, 18 

EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical 

Examinations of Employees under the ADA, No. 915.002 (July 27, 2000), 

available at www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html ..........................29, 33 

GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS: HOW TO KNOW WHEN NUMBERS 

DECEIVE YOU 33 (2002) ..........................................................................................................23 

Jari M. Nisula, Modern Approach For Integrating Safety Events In A Risk 

Management Process (2015) ...................................................................................................22 

JOHN DIXON, MODERN DIESEL TECHNOLOGY: HEATING, VENTILATION, AIR 

CONDITIONING & REFRIGERATION 28 (2014) ........................................................................24 

LYNNAE D. STEINBERG, WHAT IS HEAT ENERGY? 11 (2018) ......................................................24 

MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW (2018) ........................15, 21 

MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY

available at www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hazard; and 

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/likely ...........................................................16, 18 

MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014) .......................................16, 18 

NIOSH, CRITERIA FOR A RECOMMENDED STANDARD: OCCUPATIONAL 

EXPOSURE TO HEAT AND HOT ENVIRONMENTS (REVISED CRITERIA 2016)

available at www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2016-106/pdfs/2016-106.pdf ........................11, 32 

OSHA, FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL CPL-02-00-160 (Aug. 2, 2016) available 

at www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-00-160.pdf ..........................16, 21, 22 

OSHA, TECHNICAL MANUAL, Section III, Ch. 4, available at 

www.osha.gov/dts/osta/otm/otm_iii/otm_iii_4.html ......................................................12 
Table of Authorities (cont’d) Page 

vii 

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2018) ..................................................................................17, 18 

PODOFILLINI ET AL. (EDS), SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF COMPLEX ENGINEERED 

SYSTEMS 3551-3559 (London, 2015) .....................................................................................23 

RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1987) ........................................................................17, 18 

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986) ............................................17, 18 

Note: For readability, URL’s are not set out in the text but are set out in the table above. 

In the text, URL’s are used to create hyperlinks in blue. 
Brief on Review of Amici Curiae, The Utility Line Clearance 

Coalition, The Tree Care Industry Association, The United States 

Postal Service, and The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 

America 

___________________________________________ 

I.The Amici Curiae and Their Interest 

The Utility Line Clearance Coalition (“ULCC”) represents the interests of ten 

companies engaged in line-clearance tree trimming for electric utility, municipal, 

and commercial customers.1 ULCC member companies employ over 37,000 

workers to perform about ninety percent of all such work in the United States. 

The ULCC has participated widely in occupational safety and health matters. 

For example, it has participated in numerous OSHA rulemakings (e.g., “Electric 

Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; Electrical Protective 

Equipment; Final Rule,” 79 Fed. Reg. 20315, 20342 (2014) (noting comments)), and 

it has submitted amicus curiae briefs, such as in Davey Tree Expert Co., 25 BNA 

OSHC 1933 (No. 11-2556, 2016). The ULCC has, like the Tree Care Industry 

Association, worked directly with OSHA-approved state plans, such as those in 

1

 The ULCC is composed of Asplundh Tree Expert, LCC; The Davey Tree Expert 

Company; Lewis Tree Service, Inc.; Lucas Tree Experts, Inc.; McCoy Tree Surgery, 

Inc.; Nelson Tree Service, Inc.; Penn Line Service, Inc.; Townsend Tree Service, 

Inc.; Trees, Inc.; and Wright Tree Service, Inc. 
2 

California, Maryland and Virginia, to help craft arborist-specific safe work practice 

standards. 

The Tree Care Industry Association (“TCIA”) is a trade association comprised 

of about 2,500 employers nationally. Its members provide tree care services for 

homeowners as well as commercial, municipal and utility clients, and together 

employ over 100,000 arborists and other workers. 

The TCIA is active in regulatory matters affecting workplace safety. For 

example, it actively participates on the ANSI committee that crafts ANSI Z133, 

Safety Requirements in Arboricultural Operations. It submitted an amicus curiae brief 

in Davey Tree Expert Co., 25 BNA OSHC 1933 (No. 11-2556, 2016); has urged OSHA 

to adopt a standard for tree care operations; and has submitted comments in 

OSHA rulemakings, such as OSHA Docket No. OSHA-2012–0007, Standards 

Improvement Project-Phase IV, 81 Fed. Reg. 68504 (invited, Oct. 4, 2016), as well as 

the rulemaking noted above. And, like the ULCC, the TCIA has worked directly 

with state plans to help them craft arborist-specific safe work practice standards. 

The United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) is a self-supporting, 

independent federal agency. It is the only delivery service that reaches every 

residential and business address in the United States and its territories. In 2017, 

the Postal Service served 157.3 million delivery points and delivered 149.5 billion 
3 

pieces of mail. With more than half a million employees, the Postal Service is one 

of the nation’s largest employers. The Postal Service is committed to ensuring the 

safety of its employees, including the prevention of heat-related illnesses. 

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (“Chamber”) is 

the world’s largest business federation. It represents 300,000 direct members and 

the interests of more than three million companies and professional organizations 

of every size, in every industry sector, and from every region of the country. The 

Chamber represents its members in matters before Congress, the Executive Branch 

and the courts, and thus regularly files amicus curiae briefs regarding issues of 

concern to the nation’s business community. 

Amici and their members value their employees and their safety. However, as 

part of the regulated community subject to OSHA enforcement, they have 

significant concerns about OSHA’s application of the General Duty Clause, 

29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (“GDC”), to heat exposure. As this case and other GDC heatillness cases show, the Secretary has taken a broad, undisciplined approach to the 

GDC, one that leaves employers without any practical guidance for how much 

heat is too much, or what can and should be done to protect employees and avoid 

citation. Such citations also fail to faithfully and consistently apply the limitations 

that Congress placed on the GDC. For example, such citations commonly reflect 
4 

the supposition that, just because some level of heat was recognized as hazardous, 

a hazard was “recognized” at whatever level harm might or did occur. This 

ignores a key issue—whether the condition that allegedly occurred on the date of 

the alleged violation was recognized to be hazardous. Amici therefore argue that 

the Commission should ensure that application of the various GDC elements is 

internally consistent and adheres to congressional intent. 

II.Argument 

A GDC violation requires (1) a “hazard” that is (2) ”recognized” by the 

employer or its industry as (3) likely to cause death or serious physical harm, and 

(4) that can be prevented by measures that are feasible and useful (i.e., would 

materially reduce the hazard). See, e.g., Pegasus Tower, 21 BNA OSHC 1190, 1191 

(No. 01-0547, 2005). 

A. The Secretary Proposes An Inappropriate Definition of the “Hazard.” 

A key term in the GDC is “hazard.” The “hazard” in a GDC case must not 

only be defined in a way that comports with congressional intent, and to reflect 

conditions or practices over which the employer can reasonably be expected to 

exercise control (see note 2 below), but in a way that maintains logical consistency 

with other GDC elements. As we shall show, the Secretary’s brief consistently 

fails to do that. 
5 

The Secretary’s argument gets off on the wrong foot by arguing that a 

“hazard” is a “condition that creates or contributes to an increased risk that an 

event causing death or serious bodily harm to employees will occur.” Sec.Br. 9 

(emphasis added), quoting Baroid Div. of NL Indus., Inc. v. OSHRC, 660 F.2d 439, 

444 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Sec.Br. at 10 (“hazard” because of “increased” risk of 

heat illness). 

By this logic anything that merely “increases” a risk is a “hazard.” But any 

motion, any activity, even walking on a level surface, increases risk. That cannot 

be the standard. Congress wrote the GDC to govern a narrow class of cases, not to 

outlaw risk. As we more fully explain in Part II.B beginning on page 15 below, for 

a finding of “hazard” to comport with the teachings of the U.S. Supreme Court, 

the resultant risk must be at least “significant.” To comport with the word 

“likely” in the GDC, the hazard must be “likely” to cause death or serious physical 

harm. 

1. What Was the “Hazard” Here? 

The citation describes the hazard of “excessive” heat. That term as a regulatory 

criterion is useless. It tells employers nothing, for it fails to state how much heat is 
6 

excessive and for whom.2 It also fails to pose the relevant question—whether the 

conditions upon which the Secretary collectively relies constitutes a “hazard.” 

The Secretary argues that a hazard existed largely because employee M.R. 

developed heat stroke and died. “[T]hat M.R. developed a fatal heat illness after 

working in the rooftop heat conditions is strong evidence that these conditions 

were hazardous.” Sec.Br. 9. But employee M.R. died also, the Secretary’s expert 

witness testified, because “the work site exposed him to high heat, environmental 

exposures, and that combined with his elderly age, lack of acclimatization, 

preexisting conditions, all combined together to cause a heat stroke.” Tr. 98-99. 

Those preexisting conditions included congestive heart failure, kidney deficiency 

requiring dialysis, hepatitis C infection, and anemia. Tr. 122, 158. Thus, the 

alleged hazard here is not merely “heat” but includes the factors that combined to 

cause his death. Those include M.R.’s pre-existing conditions as well as his 

exposure to heat under the following conditions: 

1. The ground-level temperature at 10:53 a.m. was 83 degrees. 

2 See Pelron Corp., 12 BNA OSHC 1833 (No. 82-388, 1986) (hazards must be 

“defined in a way that . . . identifies conditions or practices over which the 

employer can reasonably be expected to exercise control.”); cf. Kropp Forge Co. v. 

Secr’y of Labor, 657 F.2d 119, 122-23 (7th Cir. 1981) (requirement for “effective” 

hearing conservation program “does not give reasonable notice”). 
7 

2. The temperature on the roof was ten degrees hotter than that at ground 

level. 

3. The relative humidity was 55 percent. 

4. The employees were working in direct sunlight. 

5. The employees were performing the following work: 

a. For employees other than M.R.: Tearing off the existing roof (a 

rubber roofing membrane over a layer of Styrofoam insulation); 

cutting the rubber pieces (weighing up to ten pounds each) and the 

Styrofoam pieces (weighing one or two pounds) and cutting them 

into smaller pieces; loading them into a cart and moving the cart to 

the roof edge; and installing a new roof. 

b. For employee M.R.: Throwing discarded roofing materials 

(weighing up to ten pounds each) over a 39-inch high parapet wall 

for five hours with only one 15-minute break for water, while 

wearing a black sweater and black pants, while being 60 years old, 

without recent acclimation to working in the above conditions, and 

with the above-noted physical conditions. 

To maintain internal consistency, therefore, the Commission must apply this 

same understanding of the “hazard” to other GDC elements—for example, when 

it inquires into whether the roofing industry or Sturgill “recognized” 

(a) conditions 1-5.a as together posing a “hazard” as to employees other than M.R.; 

and (b) conditions 1-5.b as together posing a “hazard” as to employee M.R.; and 

into whether those “hazards” were “causing or likely to cause death or serious 

physical harm.” 
8 

2. Was A Hazard Proven Here? 

Regardless of whether the unique circumstances of M.R.’s health might allow 

the conclusion that he was exposed to a hazard in this unusual case, the broad 

holding and rationale used by the Judge and the Secretary to find a hazard clearly 

goes too far. 

a. The Documents Submitted By the Secretary Do Not Prove A 

“Hazard.” 

The Secretary argues not only that the activities of Sturgill’s employees on the 

roof posed an “increased” risk (Sec.Br. 10, top) but that the Commission should 

treat as “further evidence” of a “hazard” that the National Weather Service’s “heat 

index at the job site exceeded OSHA’s threshold for implementation of a heat 

illness prevention plan . . . .” Id., first full paragraph. 

The Secretary’s first argument—that the other employees’ outdoor activities 

(roof removal and installation) posed an “increased” risk—is, as shown in part 

II.A above, insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a hazard under the GDC. 

The Secretary’s second argument—the National Weather Service’s “heat index at 

the job site exceeded OSHA’s threshold for implementation of a heat illness 

prevention plan—relies on two documents, complainant’s exhibit four, “Heat: A 

Major Killer,” published by the National Weather Service (NWS) on its web site, 

and complainant’s exhibit five, a series of information sheets published on 
9 

OSHA’s web site that includes a section entitled, “Using the Heat Index to Protect 

Workers.” 

Amici submit that ordinarily such documents would not properly be 

considered to prove a hazard in a GDC heat stress case because they are not 

admissible for this purpose under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which apply to 

Commission proceedings (29 C.F.R. § 2200.71), and which equally bind the 

Secretary and employers.3 Such documents are hearsay as defined by FED.R.EVID. 

801(c)—that is, out-of-court statements relied upon for the truth of the matter 

asserted (and, as documents, inherently not subject to cross-examination)—and 

therefore excluded by FED.R.EVID. 802. They would not qualify under any hearsay 

exception, such as FED.R.EVID. 803(18), unless perhaps they were relied upon by 

an expert witness and established as reliable, and even then they would “not [be] 

received as an exhibit.” Under the rules, the evidence would be supplied, if at all, 

by the expert—not the document and, implicitly, not its non-testifying author. 

To avoid public misunderstanding as to the role those documents play in this 

case and might play in future heat stress cases, the Commission should make clear 

that it is examining them here solely because they were admitted into evidence 

3

 APA § 559 states in part that, “requirements or privileges relating to evidence or 

procedure apply equally to agencies and persons.” 
10 

without objection, that it is not passing on their admissibility, and that a serious 

question might be raised as to their admissibility. 

On the merits, the Commission should hold, for the following reasons, that the 

probative value and reliability of the two documents to prove a “hazard” is 

insufficiently established on the record: 

• The documents do not state facts but conclusions. They do not state why

certain heat index values belong in a “caution” category and why others belong in 

a “danger” category. They do not state what science or knowledge they are based 

on, or provide a way to judge their reliability. Instead of providing facts about the 

hazardousness of certain heat conditions, they set out what appear to be 

prescribed as binding norms. Reliance on such conclusory documents would 

permit OSHA and other agencies to, through mere publication, arrogate to 

themselves the Commission’s adjudicatory role. 

• A crucial portion of at least one of the documents—the heat index bands in 

the NWS document, “Using the Heat Index to Protect Workers”—was “modified” 

by OSHA “for use at worksites.”4 The modifications and their appropriateness are 

unstated and thus impossible to judge. 

4

 The NWS document states, “The NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration, a sister agency of the NWS] [heat index] bands have been 
11 

• The documents do not indicate what level of risk they considered 

significant enough to present a hazard, nor do they indicate whether their 

“advisory” “guidance”5 incorporates a safety margin and, if so, how wide it is. 

This is crucial in a GDC case, lest conditions be treated as hazardous even when 

they are not. Industrial Glass, 15 OSHC 1594, 1603 (No. 88-0348, 1992) (heat stress 

case, discussing safety margins).6

• They do not indicate whether the NOAA heat index (which, the Secretary 

maintains, uses a dry-bulb temperature reading) validly indicates a heat hazard in 

modified.” Although the statement is in the passive and thus does not indicate 

who modified the bands, NIOSH’s criteria document states that, “The risk level–

related measures in Table C-1 have been modified by OSHA for use on worksites.” 

NIOSH, CRITERIA FOR A RECOMMENDED STANDARD: OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO 

HEAT AND HOT ENVIRONMENTS (REVISED CRITERIA 2016), APPENDIX C, “NOAA’S 

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE HEAT INDEX,” p. 158 (DHHS (NIOSH) Pub. 2016-106) 

(emphasis added). 

5

 Ex. C-5, in the portion entitled, “Using the Heat Index: A Guide for Employers,” 

states: “This guidance is advisory in nature . . . . It is not a standard or regulation 

. . . .” The portion entitled, “Using the Heat Index to Protect Workers,” states that 

it sets out a “guide.” 

6

 The Commission there stated: “While it would be very appropriate for the 

Secretary to include a safety margin in an OSHA standard, the presence of a safety 

margin in the documents she relied on to prove a hazard here gives us 

reservations as to whether evidence that the limits in the NIOSH document were 

exceeded would, in fact, prove that there was a hazard.” 
12 

the ordinary work environment or whether a wet-bulb measure, which, unlike a 

dry-bulb measure, takes wind into account, should have been used instead.7

• The NOAA heat index has been criticized by the American Conference of 

Governmental Hygienists (ACGIH) as “not appropriate to occupational 

exposures.” Citing a scientific study, the ACGIH states that the heat index is not 

“predictive of heat stress exposure” unless “the relationship between the Heat 

Index and a conventional method of exposure assessment has been established for 

a particular environment . . . .”8

Even to the extent that these documents were relied upon the Secretary’s 

expert witness, Dr. Theodore Yee, he did not testify how he used these documents 

to reach a conclusion. 9 For example, he did not attribute M.R.’s death to 

7

 The Commission officially notice under APA § 556(e) that this is a subject of 

debate, which the Secretary could not dispute. See NIOSH, CRITERIA at p. 109, 

§ 9.1.1 (“Dry bulb temperature is easily measured, but its use when the 

temperature is above the comfort zone is not justified, except for work situations 

where the worker is wearing completely vapor- and air-impermeable 

encapsulating protective clothing.”). OSHA’s TECHNICAL MANUAL, Section III, 

Ch. 4, appears to favor the wet-bulb technique, calling the NWS heat index a 

“screening tool” and the wet bulb technique “more accurate”). The American 

Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), HEAT STRESS AND 

STRAIN: TLV® PHYSICAL AGENTS DOCUMENTATION (7th ed. 2017), uses the WBGT 

as the unit for its TLV at p. 3, Table 2. 

8

 ACGIH, HEAT STRESS AND STRAIN at 18. 

9

 Tr. 81: “There is another reference from the NOAA website, entitled Heat a 
13 

conditions having been rated in a particular way by the heat index; the first 

mention of the heat index in his testimony came on cross-examination (Tr. 101-106, 

125). Instead, he testified that, to determine the cause of death, he “reasoned 

backwards” from M.R.’s 105°F body temperature, then eliminated all causal 

factors except ambient heat.10

As to employees other than M.R., the Secretary claims that Dr. Yee testified 

that, while a person’s age and other conditions may affect his tolerance for heat, 

the conditions at the Sturgill worksite “increased the risk” of a “range of heat 

major killer and another reference from the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention entitled Heat stress.” Q Are these references reliable sources in the 

occupational medicine community. A Yes.” Tr. 82: “Q Dr. Yee, based on your 

education, training, and experience, in review of the medical records in this matter 

and review of the scientific references that you discussed earlier and to a 

reasonable degree of scientific certainty, did you reach a conclusion and cause of 

M.R.’s heat stroke in this matter? A Yes. Q And what is your opinion in this 

matter? A My opinion is that M.R. died from heat stroke.” 

10 Tr. 139-140 (cross-examination): “Q Isn’t it true that you worked backwards 

from the medical evidence, and, in fact, started out with the assumption that there 

was 105-degree temperature and something had to cause that and it was more 

likely than not that it was heat stress that caused that, that’s how you went 

through the deducti[ve] reason[ing] processes . . . . A Yeah, but I look at 

everything. You start with a differential and you look at all the causes that could 

have caused heat stress and then you start eliminating or adding potential causes. 

I eliminated everything else. It was environmental conditions.” 

This backwards logic is common in the record. E.g., Tr. 99: “Q ... Isn’t it 

true that M.R. was not exposed to excessive heat on August 1? A He was exposed 

to enough heat to cause the heat stroke he sustained.” 
14 

illnesses, from heat exhaustion in younger workers to heat stroke in in older 

workers,” citing Tr. 155, 157-59. More precisely, Dr. Yee testified that (1) younger 

workers recover from heat illnesses at a higher percentage than older ones (not 

that the cited conditions exposed younger workers to heat illness in the first place); 

and (2) it would be “possible” for workers over age 60 without preexisting 

conditions to get heat stroke. He specifically testified that he “can’t honestly say 

whether it’s more likely than not but it’s certainly possible.” 

The problem with those assertions are their relevance. First, as discussed 

above, merely “increasing” a risk cannot suffice to show a “hazard.” Second, that 

serious physical harm is “possible” does not satisfy the GDC’s requirement that 

the hazard be “likely” to cause such harm. See Part II.B below. Third, amici are 

unable to find record evidence that employees other than M.R. came to the task 

without acclimatization. Fourth, nothing in Dr. Yee’s testimony relies on or 

appears to be based on the documents touted by the Secretary. In sum, the 

documents have insufficient indicia that they are reliable and probative enough to 

infer that a certain heat index is necessarily a “hazard” to all employees within the 

meaning of the GDC. 
15 

B. The Record Does Not Show That The Alleged Hazards Were “Likely” to 

Cause Death or Serious Physical Harm. 

The Judge found here a hazard “likely” to cause death or serious physical 

harm. JD 13. She stated, however, that under the case law, the issue is not 

whether the hazard was likely to cause a heat-related injury or illness. “Instead,” 

she stated, the issue is “whether there is a likelihood that death or serious physical 

harm could result if an accident occurs” (emphasis added), citing Duriron Co., Inc., 

11 BNA OSHC 1405, 1407 (No. 77-2847, 1983). 

The Secretary argues likewise, claiming that he “does not have to show that an 

injury is likely to occur but instead that death or serious physical harm could 

result if an accident occurred.” Sec.Br. at 15, citing Duriron, 11 OSHC at 1407 

(emphasis added)). He therefore states that it is enough that “heat exposure can

cause serious harm . . . .” (Emphasis added). Thus, instead of a hazard posing the 

requisite probability of harm, an intervening event—an “accident”—would pose 

it, even if the accident itself is not substantially probable to occur.11 The argument, 

11 E.g., Cal. Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC, 517 F.2d 986, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1975) 

(“accident resulting in death or serious injury [need only be] possible, . . . even if 

not probable”), aff’g 1 BNA OSHC 1305 (No. 14, 1973); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 14:3, p. 498 (2018) (decisions 

“consistently” hold that “it is not necessary . . . that there is a substantial 

probability that an accident will occur” but that “an accident is possible”). 
16 

like OSHA’s Field Operations Manual (“FOM”), effectively equates the GDC’s 

probability element with the test for whether a violation is “serious” under section 

17(k). See OSHA, FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, CPL-02-00-160, Ch. 4, § III.B.7.a, 

p. 4-14 (Aug. 2, 2016) (“This element . . . is virtually identical to the substantial 

probability element of a serious violation under Section 17(k)”)12; Compass Environ., 

Inc., 23 BNA OSHC 1132, 1136 (No. 06-1036, 2010) (section 17(k) discussion), aff’d, 

663 F.3d 1164, 1168 (11th Cir. 2011). 

This conflation of “likely” in the GDC with “substantial probability” in section 

17(k) is inconsistent with the GDC’s text and legislative history, and contrary to 

Supreme Court precedent, for it means that the GDC would apply to a mere 

possibility of harm. 

We start with the GDC’s words. They state that a “hazard” must be “causing 

or likely to cause” death or serious physical harm. The word “likely” means 

“having a high probability of occurring or being true : very probable,”13 or at least 

12 The Commission should take official notice of the FOM under 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) 

because it is cited here to evince a legislative, not an adjudicative, fact. See 

generally Advisory Committee Note on FED.R.EVID. 201(a) (“Legislative facts . . . 

are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process . . . 

in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court . . . .”). 

13 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 721 (11th ed. 2014); MERRIAMWEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY (current). 
17 

“probable.”14 “The definitions of the adverb ‘likely’ [as “probable”] are consistent, 

clear and strong[.]” United States v. Rivera, 131 F.3d 222, 231 (1st Cir. 1997) (en 

banc). See also Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(“probable.”), cert. denied,138 S.Ct. 924 (2018). And “likely” does not mean 

“possible.” Wieland-Werke AG v. United States, 31 C.I.T. 1884, 1890 (2007), aff’d, 

290 F. App’x 348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“not ambiguous”; quoting dictionaries, citing 

cases). 

Yet, under the Secretary’s approach, the GDC can apply—indeed, will almost 

always apply—to a mere possibility of death or serious physical harm, for if one of 

two factors is a mere possibility, their product can be no greater. Even if that were 

a correct interpretation of section 17(k), it cannot be a correct view of “likely” in 

the GDC. Unlike section 17(k), the GDC does not use the word “could.” It does 

not speak of an intervening event such as an “accident”; it requires the “hazard” 

14 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1310 (1986) (adv., “in all 

probability : probably”; adj., “of such a nature or so circumstanced as to make 

something probable,” “having a better chance of . . . occurring than not”); 

AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 757 (1981) (adv., “probably”); RANDOM HOUSE 

DICTIONARY 1114 (2d ed. 1987) (adv., “probably”; adj., “probably or apparently 

destined”); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2018) (“probably,” adv., “probable,” 

adj.); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“probable . . . Showing a strong 

tendency; reasonably expected <likely to snow>.”) 
18 

to directly cause the requisite probability. It requires more than a “substantial” 

probability; it requires that harm be “likely.” The Secretary’s approach is 

therefore inconsistent with the GDC’s plain language. 

The Secretary’s approach is inconsistent with the GDC’s text in another 

respect: It is inconsistent with the element of probability (that is, risk) that is 

inherent in the very meaning of the key word “hazard.”15

The Secretary’s reading is also inconsistent with the GDC’s legislative history, 

in which GDC versions that lacked the word “likely” were twice rejected, first in 

the House and then in conference committee. In the House, the Daniels bill 

proposed a very broad general duty—to provide “safe and healthful” 

employment.16 This language was included in the committee bill reported to the 

15 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 572 (11th ed. 2014) (“a source of 

danger”; “chance, risk”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY (current) (“a source 

of danger”; “the effect of unpredictable and unanalyzable forces in determining 

events : chance, risk”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1041 

(1986) (“an adverse chance : danger, peril”); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 605 

(1981) (“A danger; peril; risk”); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 879 (2d ed. 1987) (“an 

unavoidable danger or risk, even though often foreseeable,” “something causing 

unavoidable danger, peril, risk, or difficulty”); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2018) 

(“A chance happening; an unpredictable outcome”; “A risk of loss or harm posed 

by something; a possibility of danger or an adverse outcome”); BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[d]anger or peril”). 

16 H.R. 16785, 91ST CONG. 6-7 (1970) (as introduced) (“Each employer—(1) shall 

furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which is 
19 

House floor17 but was opposed as unduly vague.18 The House thus adopted19 the 

Steiger-Sikes substitute,20 which, to make the GDC language “limited and ... more 

specific,”21 used the term “likely.”22 Although the Senate had passed a bill lacking 

the word “likely,”23 “[t]he House provision was adopted” by the conference 

safe and healthful[.]”), in SEN. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, 92D CONG. 721, 726-727 (1971) 

(“Leg. Hist.”). 

17 H.R. 16785, 91ST CONG. 47 (1970) (as reported), Leg. Hist. at 939. 

18 E.g., Leg. Hist. at 980 (floor remarks of Rep. Smith) (committee bill GDC “too 

broad and vague and could subject employers to unfair harassment”; substitute’s 

language imposes “a more restrictive duty, . . . much more reasonably enforceable 

and subject to fair interpretation by enforcement bodies and employers alike.”); id. 

at 982 (floor remarks of Mr. Anderson) (“this language is so broad, general, and 

vague as to defy practical interpretation[,] let alone responsible enforcement”; 

advocates provision with “likely” as “specific”). 

19 Leg. Hist. at 1117. 

20 H.R. 19200, 91st CONG. (1970), Leg. Hist. 763. 

21 Leg. Hist. at 992 (floor remarks of Mr. Steiger). The OSH Act is often known as 

“the Williams‐Steiger Act.” E.g., 29 C.F.R. Part 1975, “Coverage of Employers 

Under the Williams‐Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.”

22 Leg. Hist. at 1094 (“causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical 

harm”). 

23 S. 2193, 91ST CONG. 6-7 (Nov. 17, 1970) (as passed), Leg. Hist. 534-35 (“free from 

recognized hazards so as to provide safe and- healthful working conditions”), Leg. 

Hist. at 534-35. 
20 

committee.24 A word adopted after two legislative efforts should not be construed 

into meaninglessness. 

The Secretary’s argument also makes no sense as a construction of a regulatory 

provision, and especially makes no sense under the Act. The GDC calls upon the 

Commission to, in cases not governed by OSHA standards, fashion an ad hoc rule 

to govern an employer’s behavior. As such, it must reflect the strictures that the 

Act puts on the imposition of regulatory burdens upon employers. The Supreme 

Court has clarified that the Act “was not designed to require employers to provide 

absolutely risk-free workplaces,” a significant risk of harm must be shown before 

a standard can be adopted. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Pet. Inst., 

448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Benzene Case) (plurality opinion). Construing the GDC to 

guard against a mere possibility of harm is thus inconsistent with the Act. 

Kastalon Inc., 12 BNA OSHC 1928, 1931-32 (No. 79-3561, 1986) (relying on Benzene 

Case). 

Section 17(k)’s definition of “serious” is also an unsuitable model for 

construing the word “likely” in the GDC. Unlike the GDC, section 17(k) does not 

distinguish between violations and non-violations—that is, between conditions 

24 H. CONF. REP. 1765, 91st CONG. 4, 33 (Dec. 16, 1970), Leg. Hist. 1154, 1157, 1186. 
21 

that require abatement and those that do not. Instead, it distinguishes only 

between violations that require a mandatory penalty (“serious” violations) and 

those that do not (“other than serious” violations). The duty to comply imposed 

by OSH Act § 5(a) draws no distinction between “serious” and “other than 

serious” violations. 

Moreover, the case law defining “substantial probability” under section 17(k) 

was aimed at an even narrower purpose—to end litigation over a trivial penalty 

issue. In the Act’s early days, parties were litigating and judges were deciding 

whether violations were “serious.” But the issue was nearly inconsequential 

because the two kinds of violations cannot differ in gravity25 and, thus, except for a 

penny, not in penalty amount.26 This wasteful pursuit did not end until the 

25 This is so because the “gravity” element of section 17(j) (unlike section 17(k)) 

encompasses both the probability of an accident and the probability of injury in 

the event of an accident. Tacoma Boatbuilding Co., 1 BNA OSHC 1309, 1311 n. 6 

(No. 6, 1973). (Thus, “it is quite possible for a serious violation to be of low gravity 

and a nonserious violation to be of high gravity.” MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW § 14.3, p. 499 (2018); see also OSHA, FIELD 

OPERATIONS MANUAL, CPL-02-00-160 (Aug. 2, 2016), at, e.g., p. 6-4, Ch. 6, § III.A.4.a 

(referring to “low gravity” and “high gravity” serious violations).) The penalty 

would be, but for a penny, the same because all other section 17(j) penalty 

elements would be the same. 

26 Emory H. Mixon, 1 BNA OSHC 1500, 1501 (No. 403, 1973) (dissenting opinion) 

(not “a dime’s worth”); Portland Stevedoring Co., 1 BNA OSHC 1250 (No. 5, 1973) 

(dissenting opinion) (“academic exercise”). 
22 

announcement of the probability test in Natkin & Co., 1 BNA OSHC 1204, 1205 

(No. 401, 1973). But none of that history or reasoning applies under the GDC, 

which unlike section 17(k), has regulatory consequences, often industry-shaking 

ones. E.g., Seaworld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 

The Secretary in his brief does not rely on the phrase “is causing” in the GDC 

to argue that the GDC’s probability element was met because heat stroke “is 

causing” the required harm. The FOM at Ch. 4, § III.B.7.b, page 4-14, suggests that 

the Secretary might take the position that the likelihood element was satisfied here 

because, “An actual death or serious injury resulted from the recognized hazard, 

whether immediately prior to the inspection or at other times and places[.]” This 

would effectively construe the phrase “is causing” to mean “caused once.” But 

that would be inconsistent with the GDC’s wording, which uses a present 

participle phrase in its present progressive tense (is causing), not a past tense 

(caused), to connote a currently ongoing series of injuries or deaths. The 

Secretary’s view would also result in the GDC being applied in the absence of a 

significant risk, for it is not logically possible to judge the significance of a risk 

from a single event.27 For the GDC to make logical sense, and to comport with the 

27 E.g., Jari M. Nisula, Modern Approach For Integrating Safety Events In A Risk 

Management Process (2015) (“conceptual flaw”; “likelihood of recurrence” “is not a 
23 

Benzene Case, 448 U.S. 607, the phrase must connote a probability commensurate 

with the “likely” element—to apply to hazards evinced by a series of recent events 

close enough in time that one can judge the significance of the risk and determine 

that it is commensurate with the alternative “likely” element. 

In sum, the Commission should hew to the GDC’s text, and require that the 

allegedly hazardous conditions pose a high probability, or be probable, of causing 

serious injury or death. Inasmuch as the Judge did not so find, and the parties 

may not have been on notice that such evidence would be required, a remand 

should be offered on that issue; if the offer is not accepted, the citation item should 

be vacated. 

C. The Secretary Failed to Prove a Hazard That is “Recognized” by the 

Employer or Its Industry. 

1. The Judge Erroneously Held and the Secretary Erroneously Argues 

That It Is Enough To Recognize Mere “Heat” As A Hazard. 

The Judge found that the Secretary proved the recognition element of a GDC 

violation because both Sturgill and the roofing industry recognized “heat” as “a 

feature of a single event. It is a feature of an event family”), in PODOFILLINI ET AL.

(EDS), SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF COMPLEX ENGINEERED SYSTEMS 3551-3559 

(London, 2015); GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS: HOW TO KNOW WHEN 

NUMBERS DECEIVE YOU 33 (2002) (single-probability event not falsifiable; “can 

never be proven wrong”). 
24 

hazard for employees engaged in roofing work.” JD 12 (emphasis added). The 

Secretary takes the same approach. Sec.Br. 13 (hazard of “heat” recognized). 

This approach is wrong. The issue cannot be whether “heat” in the abstract 

was recognized as a hazard because it was not mere “heat” that the Secretary 

alleged here or the record shows was the “hazard.” That hazard was conditions 1-

5.a (as to employees other than M.R.) and conditions 1-5.b (as to M.R.). Moreover, 

everything contains “heat.”28 To maintain logical consistency, what must be 

shown to have been “recognized” as a hazard is not “heat” in the abstract but those

conditions. The Secretary’s approach to the recognition issue exemplifies the 

internally inconsistent and undisciplined approach to the GDC that amici

mentioned above. 

2. The Record Contains Insufficient Evidence of Recognition. 

Amici suggest that, correctly viewed, there is insufficient evidence that Sturgill 

or its industry recognized conditions 1-5.a or 1-5.b on the PNC roofing project, on 

or about August 1, 2012, as hazards. 

28 E.g., LYNNAE D. STEINBERG, WHAT IS HEAT ENERGY? 11 (2018) (“All objects have 

heat energy . . . .”); JOHN DIXON, MODERN DIESEL TECHNOLOGY: HEATING,

VENTILATION, AIR CONDITIONING & REFRIGERATION 28 (2014) (“everything contains 

some heat (except at absolute 0”)). 
25 

As to the roofing industry, the Secretary points to publications of the National 

Roofing Contractors Association—toolbox talk outlines and a pocket safety guide. 

The toolbox talk outlines speak of temperatures “in the 90’s and the 100’s,” and of 

“extremely high” temperatures. The pocket safety guide speaks only of “hot 

weather” and “[t]oo much heat.” None of the documents identify the conditions 

here as a hazard. 

As to Sturgill, the Secretary argues only that Sturgill was aware that roofing 

work in hot weather posed an “increased” risk. Sec.Br. 14-15. But that is just as 

fallacious as the assertion that a condition is a “hazard” if it causes merely an 

“increase” in risk. See page 5 above. An employer can recognize that conditions 

might cause a risk to increase without recognizing that the conditions would 

increase them to the point that a hazard exists (let alone a hazard causing or likely 

to cause death or serious physical harm). What the Act requires to be recognized 

is not an “increase” in risk but a “hazard.” The Secretary’s approach ignores 

whether one recognized that the “increase” was high enough to constitute a 

“hazard.” 

a. An Employer’s Taking of Measures Against Heat Is 

Insufficient Evidence of Recognition. 

The Secretary correctly observes that Sturgill took precautions—the provision 

of coolers of water and the scheduling of rest breaks—that were tailored to the 
26 

particular conditions at the job site on the date of the alleged violation. From that, 

he argues that Sturgill was aware that the cited work posed a hazard of heat 

illness. That may be a correct argument in some cases, but it is not correct here. 

An employer’s provision of certain measures—say, tight-fitting chemical goggles 

or fall harnesses—might well be taken as evidence that the employer recognized 

that the conditions under which the employees were expected to use them 

constituted a hazard. Such inferences are logical, however, only when those 

measures have only one purpose—protection against hazards. 

But that is not necessarily true—and is only rarely true—of heat-related 

measures. An employer might provide cold water, shade, air conditioning, break 

times, etc., to enhance the comfort and efficiency of its work force without also 

having recognized that the particular temperature and work conditions they face 

together present a “hazard.” The employer might well provide these measures 

because thirsty, hot and tired employees work less efficiently than those who are 

not. As OSHA’s own publication (Ex. C-5) states, “Water. Rest. Shade. The work 

can’t get done without them.” Or a conscientious employer might provide those 

measures because it fears that a heat hazard is present. Or, as is usually the case in 

the real world, the employer can contingently provide those things for both 

reasons—comfort and efficiency up to a point, and prevention of heat illness if the 
27 

temperature and associated conditions should go beyond that point and present a 

hazard. 

The evidence here, however, does not show that Sturgill provided these 

measures because it recognized, as to any employee, that that point had been 

reached. Therefore, Sturgill’s taking of those measures is alone insufficient on this 

record to establish that it “recognized” that the site conditions presented a 

“hazard.” 

D. The Record Fails to Show that The Employer Should Have Known With 

Reasonable Diligence of the Alleged Hazard to M.R. or Other Employees. 

The Judge found, and the Secretary agrees, that Sturgill knew of the 

“hazardous condition” largely because it knew that M.R. had not been 

acclimatized to “heat.” 

Once again, the Secretary uses one approach to the “hazard” element when 

analyzing one GDC element but a different approach when analyzing another 

element. As to employee M.R., the Secretary argues that a “hazard” existed 

because he died. But employee M.R. died, we are told, because he was exposed to 

certain heat conditions, and he was 60 years old and he had certain health 

conditions (including lack of acclimatization). Those were the physical conditions 

that together caused the death on which the Secretary relies to prove a “hazard” as 

to M.R. If logical consistency is to be maintained, the Secretary must show the 
28 

employer’s knowledge, before the alleged violation, of those physical conditions—

not just one of them. Southwestern Acoustics & Specialty, Inc., 5 BNA OSHC 1091 

(No. 12174, 1977) (knowledge pertains to the “physical conditions which constitute 

a violation”). On that point, however, the Secretary is silent. 

1. The Inquiries Implicitly Required By the Secretary’s Position 

Would Have Potentially Placed Sturgill in Violation of the ADA 

and ADEA. 

The Secretary’s position that Sturgill should have known of M.R.’s pre-existing 

conditions would have required Sturgill to make inquiries that are prohibited 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (ADA) 

as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 

110-325, or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (ADEA). 

“[A]n employer’s discretion to order employees to undergo [medical] 

examinations is hardly unbounded.” Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 

804, 811 (6th Cir. 1999). The ADA states that employers “shall not require a 

medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether 

such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of 

the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and 

consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). But the EEOC 

states that for medical examinations or inquiries to be “job-related and consistent 
29 

with business necessity,” an employer must have a reasonable belief, based on 

objective evidence, that: (1) an employee’s ability to perform essential job 

functions is impaired by a medical condition; or (2) an employee may pose a direct 

threat due to a medical condition.29 “An employer bears the burden of 

establishing that an examination is consistent with business necessity, and that 

burden is ‘quite high.’” Wright, 798 F.3d at 523 (quoting Conroy v. N.Y. State Dep’t 

of Corr. Servs., 333 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 2003)). Moreover, the belief must be 

reasonably based on objective evidence and not mere speculation. “Courts . . . 

require that an employer provide ‘significant evidence that could cause a 

reasonable person to inquire as to whether an employee is still capable of 

performing his job.’” Wright, 798 F.3d at 523 (quoting Sullivan, 197 F.3d at 811). 

Here, no evidence suggests that Sturgill had an objective basis to conclude that 

M.R. was not capable of performing his job. M.R.’s age alone was far from 

sufficient to constitute the “significant evidence” that courts have consistently 

required employers to provide to justify medical examination or inquiries of 

29 EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations 

of Employees under the ADA, No. 915.002 (July 27, 2000); see also Wright v. Ill. Dept. of 

Child. & Fam. Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 523 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Coffman v. Indianapolis 

Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559, 565 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
30 

current employees. Wright, 798 F.3d at 523. Requiring employees to submit to 

medical examinations or inquiries based on their age alone would have violated 

the ADEA, as there is no evidence that age is a bona fide occupational 

qualification for the position that M.R. held.30 Employers “cannot comply with the 

ADEA prohibition that no employer may discriminate against any individual 

because of age . . . while at the same time requiring employees [based on age 

alone] to pass an annual medical examination [or submit to similar medical 

inquiries] as a condition of continued employment.”31

The Secretary argues that Sturgill could, however, have avoided liability under 

the ADA because OSHA permitted Sturgill to make medical inquiries of M.R. to 

determine whether he required heat acclimatization. But that is not so clear that it 

demonstrates that Sturgill was not reasonably diligent in thinking otherwise. The 

Secretary’s argument applies only where the challenged action—here, the medical 

examination or inquiry—”is required or necessitated by another Federal law or 

30 See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 987 F.2d 64, 68-74 (1st Cir. 1993) (invalidating as 

ADEA violation a Massachusetts statute requiring state employees 70 years old or 

older to pass medical examination as condition of continued employment) ; see also 

Epter v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 127 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“where an 

employer believes a medical examination is required for a particular position, the 

test cannot be age-based unless there is a powerful case supporting such disparate 

treatment.”). 

31 EEOC v. Massachusetts, 987 F.2d at 74. 
31 

regulation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (emphasis added); see also EEOC v. Murray, Inc., 

175 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1066 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (“The admittedly few courts that 

have considered this provision have accepted it as a complete defense to an ADA 

claim, as long as the defendant could show that the action was, in fact, required by 

another Federal law.”) (emphasis added). There are no Federal laws or regulations, 

OSHA or otherwise, that expressly required or necessitated the medical 

examination or inquiry of M.R. Moreover, the federal “standards” referenced in 

the ADA regulations and interpretive guidance contemplate well-established 

standards that are easily understood and applied: 

Such standards may include Federal safety regulations that regulate 

bus and truck driver qualifications, as well as laws establishing 

medical requirements for pilots or other air transportation personnel. 

These standards also include health standards promulgated pursuant to the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Federal Coal Mine Health 

and Safety Act of 1969, or other similar statutes that require that 

employees exposed to certain toxic and hazardous substances be 

medically monitored at specific intervals. 

29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.14(c) (emphasis added). 

The GDC does not even approach the level of specificity contemplated by this 

EEOC guidance. In addition, employers are not free to just inquire of an employee 

as to his or her medical condition; the inquiry would have to be so constructed 

that the result would be “a specific limitation that would preclude all individuals 

with the condition from” the work. EEOC v. Murray, 175 F. Supp.2d at 1066-67 
32 

(emphasis added). Aside from the inability of medical science to be that prescient 

with respect to heat stress, no such “specific limitation” can be extracted from the 

GDC, which provides no specificity at all. See Rohr v. Salt River Proj. Agric. Imp. & 

Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2009) (employer sought to comply with 

§ 1910.134(a)(2) (“protect [employee] health”) and § 1910.134(c)(1)(ii) (“medical 

evaluation”) by itself prescribing screening criteria; held, OSHA standards so 

“broad” that employer’s criteria not compelled by law). While OSHA may 

approve and support the medical inquiries it proposes, “approving certain 

medical questions is not the same as requiring them.” Miller v. Whirlpool Corp., 

807 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (rejecting employer’s reliance on GDC 

compliance as ADA defense); see also Murray, Inc., 175 F. Supp.2d at 1066-67 

(rejecting employer’s contention that GDC constituted ADA defense and required 

categorical exclusion of employees with certain medical conditions from driving 

forklifts).32

32 Part of the practical problem employers face when running this regulatory 

gauntlet is that no guidance document tells employers in advance what conditions 

are hazardous or measures would be protective for older or infirm workers, and 

yet avoids ADA/ADEA liability. The NWS document states, unhelpfully, that “the 

severity of heat disorders tends to increase with age.” The OSHA documents do 

not even say that, and seem to veer away from any mention of age or infirmity. 

The ACGIH document at 13 discusses age but states that it ”must be interpreted 

carefully,” without much else. And the NIOSH document at 20 seems to endorse 
33 

Accordingly, the only way in which roofing employers can conduct the 

medical inquiries or examinations suggested by the Secretary is if they can show 

that they are job-related and consistent with business necessity under the ADA 

framework discussed above.33 Inasmuch as the record is devoid of the objective 

evidence necessary for Sturgill to have made such a determination, the Secretary’s 

approach would have placed Sturgill squarely in the cross-hairs of a claim under 

the ADA. At the very least, Sturgill cannot be held to have lacked reasonable 

diligence, and be penalized, in attempting to navigate through the murky 

age discrimination: It suggests using an age-related maximum heart rate 

adjustment to determine work duties. 

33 See the EEOC’s interpretive guidance, which provides as follows: 

[The ADA’s provision on medical examinations and inquiries] 

permits periodic physicals to determine fitness for duty or 

other medical monitoring if such physicals or monitoring are 

required by medical standards or requirements established by 

Federal, State, or local law that are consistent with the ADA 

and this part (or in the case of a Federal standard, with section 

504 of the Rehabilitation Act) in that they are job-related and 

consistent with business necessity.

29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. § 1630.14(c) (emphasis added). Thus, medical examinations 

or inquiries of current employees must always remain “job-related and consistent 

with business necessity,” id., and “standards or requirements established by 

federal, state, or local law” are just one way of showing consistency with business 

necessity. 
34 

intersection of three amorphous statutes—the GDC, the ADA and the ADEA—

completely lacking in interpretive guideposts regarding heat stress. 

E. The Record Does Not Clearly Enough Show The Likely Utility and 

Feasibility of The Acclimatization Demanded by the Secretary. 

The Judge found and the Secretary argues that a “formal” acclimatization 

program would have been a feasible and useful abatement measure. Sturgill 

argues, however, that it did implement an acclimatization program—”formal” or 

not—and that it was adequate under the circumstances. 

It is hard to see why the argument is wrong. Although Sturgill’s 

acclimatization program was informal, it appeared to include in substance all the 

elements one would expect, including giving M.R. lighter tasks on his first day of 

work—the key element of such a program. Moreover, the Commission should 

view the testimony against Sturgill’s program with skepticism. Dr. Yee testified 

that the acclimatization steps that Sturgill argues it followed here were 

“inadequate” because M.R. died.34 That does not follow. That the program did 

not prevent a death does not mean that the employer did not do what the Act 

34 Tr. 138: “Q If A.H. Sturgill did the six things that you told me here today, 

would you consider that to be an adequate acclimatization program? A . . . In the 

end he ended up dying of heat stroke. That doesn’t happen every day on every 

work site and certainly with not every worker in the country or the state, so 

whatever was done was not adequate. . . .” 
35 

required. A safety measure need not be perfect to comply with the Act, for it must 

protect against significant risks, not all risks, and, under the GDC, it must protect 

against hazards “likely” to cause death or serious physical harm, not all hazards. 

Implicitly requiring employers to implement perfect measures is neither feasible 

nor required by the Act. 

III.CONCLUSION 

The Judge’s decision should be reversed and the citation item vacated or, if the 

“likelihood” issue is thought controlling, a remand on that issue should be offered. 

Counsel for Amici Curiae

OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C. 

Arthur G. Sapper, Esq. 

Melissa A. Bailey, Esq. 

1909 K Street NW, Suite 1000 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

(202) 263-0270; arthur.sapper@ogletree.com 

Lucas J. Asper, Esq. 

The Ogletree Building, 300 North Main Street, Suite 500 

Greenville, SC 29601 
Certificate of Service 

I certify that all parties have consented to filing and service of papers through the EFile system, and on May 14, 2018, the foregoing was so served on: 

Robert T. Dunlevey, Jr., SENIOR COUNSEL

TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP 

40 NORTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1700 

DAYTON, OH 45423-1029 

Email: rdunlevey@taftlaw.com 

Scott Glabman, Esq. 

Orlando J. Pannocchia, Esq. 

Office of the Solicitor 

U.S. Department of Labor 

200 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room 

S-4004 

Washington, DC 20210 

Glabman.Scott@dol.gov 

Bradford T. Hammock 

Tressi L. Cordaro 

JACKSON LEWIS P.C. 

10701 Parkridge Blvd., Suite 300 

Reston, VA 2019 

HammockB@jacksonlewis.com 

Tressi.cordaro@jacksonlewis.com 

Cynthia L. Rice 

California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. 

1430 Franklin Street, Suite 103 

Oakland, CA 94612 

crice@crla.org 

Javier J. Castro 

California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. 

145 East Weber Avenue 

Stockton, CA 95202 

jcastro@crla.org 

Ronald J. Melton 

California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. 

449 Broadway Street 

El Centro, CA 92243 

rmelton@crla.org 

Victoria L. Bor 

Sue D. Gunter 

SHERMAN DUNN, P.C. 

900 Seventh Street, N.W. Suite 1000 

Washington, D.C. 20001 

Phone: (202) 785-9300 

Fax: (202) 775-1950 

bor@shermandunn.com 

gunter@shermandunn.com 

/s/Arthur G. Sapper 

Arthur G. Sapper 

33714520.9