2022 UT 27

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

Appellant,

v.

UTAH INLAND PORT AUTHORITY, STATE OF UTAH,

GOVERNOR SPENCER J. COX, in his official capacity,*

and ATTORNEY GENERAL SEAN D. REYES, in his official capacity,

Appellees.

No. 20200118

Heard: April 21, 2021

Filed June 29, 2022

On Direct Appeal

Third District, Salt Lake City

The Honorable James Blanch

No. 190902057

Attorneys:

Samantha J. Slark, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Evan S. Strassberg and Steven J. Joffee, Cottonwood Heights, for 

appellee Utah Inland Port Authority 

Melissa A. Holyoak, Solic. Gen., Stanford E. Purser, Deputy Solic. 

Gen., David N. Wolf and Lance Sorensen, Asst. Att‘ys Gen.,

Salt Lake City, for appellees State of Utah, Cox, and Reyes

Attorneys for amici curiae: Jayme L. Blakesley, Salt Lake City, for 

Law Professors and International Municipal Lawyers Association; 

Evangeline A.Z. Burbidge, San Francisco, California, and Michael D. 

Zimmerman, Troy L. Booher, and Cameron Diehl, Salt Lake City, for 

Utah League of Cities and Towns; J. Mark Ward, South Jordan, for 

Beaver, Box Elder, Carbon, Davis, Duchesne, Emery, Garfield, Iron, 

Juab, Kane, Millard, Piute, Sanpete, Sevier, Tooele, Uintah, Utah, 

Washington, Wayne, and Weber Counties.
SALT LAKE CITY v. UTAH INLAND PORT AUTHORITY

Opinion of the Court

2

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court in 

which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE PEARCE, JUSTICE PETERSEN

and JUSTICE HAGEN joined.

JUSTICE HIMONAS participated in the oral argument in this case

but retired before the court‘s opinion was finalized;

JUSTICE DIANA HAGEN** participated in his stead.

____________________________________________________________

* Salt Lake City Corporation originally named Governor Gary 

Herbert as a party acting in his official capacity. The Court has 

substituted Governor Spencer Cox, acting in his official capacity, for 

Herbert under rule 38 of our rules of appellate procedure. Utah R. 

App. Proc. 38(d)(1) (―When a public officer is a party to an appeal or 

other proceeding in an official capacity and during its pendency 

dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does not 

abate and the public officer's successor is automatically substituted 

as a party.‖).

** JUSTICE DIANA HAGEN became a member of the Court on May 

18, 2022, but sat as a visiting judge prior to her confirmation.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶1 The Utah Inland Port Authority Act provides the legislative 

framework for developing an inland port in northwest Salt Lake 

City, West Valley City, and Magna. In so doing, the Act requires that 

these municipalities adopt specific zoning regulations and 

permissions favorable to developing the inland port. It also directs 

certain taxes collected within Salt Lake City‘s northwest quadrant, 

West Valley City, and Magna to the project.

¶2 Salt Lake City challenged four provisions of the Act, asserting 

that they violate the Uniform Operation of Laws and Ripper clauses 

of the Utah Constitution—by seizing control of the port area and tax 

revenue from it and from the two other municipalities. The district 

court rejected the City‘s claims, and the City filed this appeal.

¶3 We affirm the dismissal of the City‘s challenges to the zoning 

provisions. We hold that the challenged zoning provisions do not 

violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause because they are 

rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. And we 

conclude that the zoning provisions do not delegate municipal 

functions in violation of the Ripper Clause. As for the City‘s 

challenges related to the tax provisions, we do not reach the merits 

of those claims in today‘s decision. Recent amendments to the Act 
Cite as: 2022 UT 27

Opinion of the Court

3

may have rendered these claims moot. We accordingly issue an 

accompanying order for supplemental briefing. We direct the parties 

to submit supplemental briefing on (1) whether the City‘s challenges 

to the tax provisions are moot; and (2) if the challenges to these 

provisions are not moot, whether these provisions ―interfere‖ with 

―municipal money.‖

I

¶4 An inland port is a logistics and distribution hub that receives, 

processes, and disseminates a range of goods through various modes 

of transportation.1 Government leaders and business interests have 

long contemplated developing an inland port in Utah, but interest 

has waxed and waned over the years. Recently, however, various 

infrastructure developments in northwest Salt Lake City made an 

inland port feasible.2 And potential stakeholders took notice. Several 

landowners approached the City with plans to develop an inland 

port on private land in the area. The state legislature eventually

enacted the Utah Inland Port Authority Act in 2018. See UTAH CODE

§§ 11-58-101 to 901 (2018). The Act identifies approximately 16,000 

acres as ―authority jurisdictional land‖—including about one-fifth of 

the total geographic area of Salt Lake City (roughly 13,000 acres).3

_____________________________________________________________

1 See Natalie Gochnour, Salt Lake Inland Port Market Assessment, 

UNIV. OF UTAH KEM C. GARDNER POL‘Y INST. RESEARCH BRIEF 6 (Aug. 

2016), https://gardner.utah.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/IPBrief-PRESS2.pdf (explaining that an inland port is ―a site located 

away from traditional land, air, and coastal borders that contains a 

portfolio of multimodal transportation assets and the ability to allow 

global trade to be processed and altered by value-added services as 

goods move through the supply chain‖) [hereinafter Inland Port 

Market Assessment].

2 Three developments renewed interest in an inland port: 

(1) Union Pacific Railroad built a hub for different modes of 

transportation close to Salt Lake City International Airport; (2) the 

airport began a multi-billion-dollar expansion; and (3) the Utah State 

Prison moved near the airport with an agreement to spend hundreds 

of millions of dollars on infrastructure necessary to support the 

prison—including roads, water, sewage, and electricity.

3 The Act also identifies land in West Valley City and Magna. See 

UTAH CODE § 11-58-102 (2022), amended by H.B. 433 (2022 General 

Session); Electronic Shapefile Addendum to H.B. 2001 Utah Inland 

(continued . . .)
SALT LAKE CITY v. UTAH INLAND PORT AUTHORITY

Opinion of the Court

4

The inland port‘s development is overseen by the Utah Inland Port 

Authority (UIPA). UTAH CODE § 11-58-202 (2022), amended by H.B. 

443 (2022 General Session). UIPA is governed by an eight member 

board. Id. § 11-58-302(1)–(3). There are five voting members 

appointed by various state government officials, two nonvoting 

members with ―expertise in transportation and logistics,‖ and one 

more nonvoting member who is also a member of the Salt Lake City 

Council. Id.

¶5 Three sets of provisions of the Act are relevant to this appeal. 

First, the Act mandates that any municipality containing authority 

jurisdictional land ―shall allow an inland port as a permitted or 

conditional use‖ under its zoning ordinances. Id. § 11-58-205(5)(a). 

Second, it provides that ―[t]he transporting, unloading, loading, 

transfer, or temporary storage of natural resources may not be 

prohibited on the authority jurisdictional land.‖ Id. § 11-58-205(6). 

Third, it identifies two primary sources of public funding for the 

inland port: (a) redirecting a percentage of property taxes collected 

on authority jurisdictional land to UIPA, id. § 11-58-601; and 

(b) distributing a portion of sales and use taxes collected on 

authority jurisdictional land to the port authority, id. § 11-58-602; 

id. § 59-12-205(2).

¶6 The City took issue with each of these provisions. And it sued 

UIPA and the State in 2019, asserting that the Act ran afoul of the 

Uniform Operation of Laws Clause and Ripper Clause of the Utah 

Constitution. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, 

and the district court granted UIPA‘s motion and dismissed the 

City‘s suit, holding that the Act did not violate either constitutional 

provision. Specifically, it found that the Act did not violate the 

Uniform Operation of Laws Clause since, under our decision in 

Merrill v. Utah Labor Commission, 2009 UT 26, 223 P.3d 1089, the 

provisions were reasonably related to a legitimate legislative 

purpose. It also determined that the Act did not violate the Ripper 

 

Port Authority Amendments (2018 Second Special Session), UTAH 

STATE LEG., https://le.utah.gov/~2018S2/bills/static/HB2001.html

(follow ―Shape file‖ hyperlink); see also Interactive Map Addendum 

to H.B. 2001 Utah Inland Port Authority Amendments (2018 Second 

Special Session), UTAH STATE LEG., https://le.utah.gov/

~2018S2/bills/static/HB2001.html (follow ―Interactive Map‖ 

hyperlink).
Cite as: 2022 UT 27

Opinion of the Court

5

Clause as the challenged provisions were directed mandates, not 

improper delegations of municipal power to UIPA.

¶7 The City has challenged the dismissal of these claims on this 

appeal. In assessing the viability of the City‘s arguments, we take 

account of a ―strong presumption‖ of the constitutionality of state 

statutes. Maxfield v. Herbert, 2012 UT 44, ¶ 15, 284 P.3d 647 (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). We recognize the ―[b]road 

deference‖ that is afforded to the legislature in ―assessing the 

reasonableness of its classifications [under the Uniform Operation of 

Laws Clause] and their relationship to legitimate legislative 

purposes.‖ State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 23, 254 P.3d 183 (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). And we review the dismissal 

of the City‘s claims on summary judgment under a de novo standard 

of review. See Rossi v. Univ. of Utah, 2021 UT 43, ¶ 22, 496 P.3d 105.

II

¶8 The City claims that the district court erred in concluding that 

the challenged provisions of the Utah Inland Port Authority Act do 

not violate the state constitution. It asserts that the Act ran afoul of 

the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause by singling out Salt Lake 

City, West Valley City, and Magna, and treating them differently 

than other municipalities in the state. And it contends that the State 

has delegated municipal functions and interferes with municipal 

money in violation of the Ripper Clause.

¶9 We affirm the dismissal of the City‘s challenges to the zoning 

provisions. The City has failed to establish that the zoning 

provisions‘ disparate treatment of three municipalities is not 

rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective. And the Act 

does not delegate zoning or land-use authority to UIPA, so its 

zoning and land-use provisions do not run afoul of the Ripper 

Clause.

¶10 We stop short of reaching the merits of the City‘s challenges 

to the tax provisions, however, on the ground that recent 

amendments may have rendered these claims moot. Instead, we 

retain jurisdiction over these claims and ask the parties to submit 

supplemental briefs addressing the City‘s claims challenging 

sections 601 and 602 of the Act.

A. Uniform Operation of Laws Clause

¶11 The district court dismissed the City‘s Uniform Operation of 

Laws Clause claim, concluding that although the Act created 

classifications of municipalities, the classifications passed muster 

under rational basis review. The City challenges this holding. It 
SALT LAKE CITY v. UTAH INLAND PORT AUTHORITY

Opinion of the Court

6

contends that the Act runs afoul of the Uniform Operation of Laws 

Clause in singling out three cities and treating them differently from 

all other municipalities in Utah. And it asserts that such disparate 

treatment is unwarranted because these three cities alone share the 

burden of a statewide project.

¶12 We affirm the dismissal of the City‘s challenges to the zoning 

provisions. The City has failed to carry its burden of showing that 

these provisions are not rationally related to a legitimate legislative 

purpose in violation of the Ripper Clause. We do not reach the 

merits of the City‘s Uniform Operation of Laws challenges to the tax 

provisions, however, on the ground that recent amendments to the 

Act may have rendered these claims moot. We retain jurisdiction 

over these claims and order the parties to submit supplemental 

briefing.

1. Zoning Regulations

¶13 The Uniform Operation of Laws Clause requires that ―[a]ll 

laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.‖ UTAH CONST.

art. I, § 24. The historical understanding of this clause is not in line 

with its modern interpretation. ―Historically, uniform operation 

provisions were understood to be aimed not at legislative 

classification but at practical operation.‖ State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, 

¶ 34, 308 P.3d 517 (emphases omitted). Rather than being ―viewed as 

a limit on the sorts of classifications that a legislative body could 

draw in the first instance,‖ uniform operation clauses originally were 

seen as ―rule[s] of uniformity in the actual application of such 

classifications.‖ Id. Legislative classifications were thus viewed as 

permissible as long as no one was exempted from them. See id. ¶ 34 

& n.7 (explaining that uniform operation of laws clauses were meant 

to protect against the ―creation of special privileges or exemptions‖

instead of functioning as ―miniature equal protection clauses‖

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

¶14 The modern formulation has drifted from this 

understanding. Our case law has ―treat[ed] the requirement of 

uniform operation as a state-law counterpart to the federal Equal 

Protection Clause.‖ Id. ¶ 35. We have set out a three-step test for 

determining whether a law meets this requirement. We ask 

―(1) whether the statute creates any classifications‖; ―(2) whether the 

classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly 

situated‖; and (3) if so, ―whether the legislature had any reasonable 

objective that warrants the disparity.‖ Count My Vote, Inc. v. Cox, 

2019 UT 60, ¶ 29, 452 P.3d 1109 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).
Cite as: 2022 UT 27

Opinion of the Court

7

¶15 We begin by asking whether the zoning provisions of the Act

create a classification. While section 205 does not mention any 

municipalities by name, it does create two classes: (1) municipalities 

that contain ―authority jurisdictional land‖ and are required to have 

certain zoning regulations and (2) those that do not contain 

―authority jurisdictional land‖ and may choose to permit such 

zoning and land uses. UTAH CODE §§ 11-58-102(2), -205(5)(a), -205(6). 

Salt Lake City, West Valley City, and Magna are the only 

municipalities containing authority jurisdictional land. So the Act 

creates a classification—in distinguishing between one class 

consisting of these three municipalities and a second consisting of all 

other municipalities in the state.

¶16 We next ask whether the zoning provisions impose disparate 

treatment on similarly situated entities. Clearly there is disparate 

treatment—only Salt Lake City, West Valley City, and Magna fall 

within the Act‘s classification for municipalities with ―authority 

jurisdictional land‖ and are subject to the statute‘s zoning 

requirements. See id. § 11-58-205(5) (requiring cities containing 

authority jurisdictional land to adopt zoning ordinances that ―allow 

an inland port‖); id. § 11-58-205(6) (barring such cities from 

prohibiting ―[t]he transporting, unloading, loading, transfer, or 

temporary storage of natural resources‖ on the authority 

jurisdictional land).

¶17 We nonetheless conclude that subsections 205(5) and 205(6) 

withstand scrutiny under our three-part test. We assume without 

deciding that under the second step Salt Lake City, West Valley City, 

and Magna are ―similarly situated‖ to all other municipalities in the 

state. See Count My Vote, Inc., 2019 UT 60, ¶ 39. And we base our 

decision on the third step of the uniform operation analysis—on the 

conclusion that the legislature had a ―reasonable objective‖

warranting the disparity in treatment under the Act. See id. ¶ 29

(citation omitted and internal quotation marks omitted); supra ¶ 14. 

Our final inquiry in the uniform operation test is subject only to 

―rational basis‖ review, since the legislature‘s classification does not 

involve a suspect classification or implicate a fundamental right. See 

Taylorsville City v. Mitchell, 2020 UT 26, ¶ 37, 466 P.3d 148 (citation 

omitted). And the City has failed to carry its burden of showing that 

the statute‘s disparate treatment is not rationally related to a 

legitimate legislative purpose. See id. ¶ 43.

¶18 The Act‘s ―statewide public purpose‖ is ―to maximize the 

long-term economic and other benefit for the state.‖ UTAH CODE

§ 11-58-201(3)(a). Economic studies underlying the Act projected that 
SALT LAKE CITY v. UTAH INLAND PORT AUTHORITY

Opinion of the Court

8

an inland port could create thousands of jobs, develop natural 

resource extraction industries, and make Utah a bigger player in the 

global economy.4 These are legitimate objectives. And the 

classification is reasonably related to furthering them—by clearing 

the way for the port by requiring these cities to ―allow an inland 

port‖ and preventing them from prohibiting activities necessary to 

operate it. UTAH CODE §§ 11-58-205(5), -205(6).

¶19 We uphold the constitutionality of the zoning provisions on 

these grounds. We hold that the City has failed to carry its burden of 

establishing that subsections 205(5) and 205(6) of the Act run afoul of 

our three-part test on uniform operation.

2. Tax Provisions

¶20 The legislature amended the Act after oral argument in this 

court. And the 2022 amendments add a layer of classification to the 

tax provisions—in designating Salt Lake City as the ―primary 

municipality,‖ establishing different tax treatment for ―exempt 

area[s]‖ within the City, and granting it the power to enter into 

certain agreements with UIPA that alter the percentage of redirected 

funds and designate their uses.5 The amendments also grant the City 

the power to agree—or not—to the redirection of any property tax 

funds beginning in 2023. UTAH CODE §§ 11-58-601 to 604; id. § 11-58-

601(9) (―Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, 

beginning with the first tax year that begins on or after January 1, 

_____________________________________________________________

4 See Inland Port Market Assessment, supra note 1, at 6; CAMBRIDGE 

SYSTEMATICS, INC & GLOB. LOGISTICS DEV. PARTNERS, INC, UTAH 

INLAND PORT – FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS (2017), https://

inlandportauthority.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/UIP-FeasibilityAnalysis.pdf [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE SYSTEMATICS]. See generally SALT 

LAKE CNTY. DEP‘T OF TRANSP., HOUS., & ECON. DEV., SALT LAKE 

COUNTY GLOBAL TRADE & INVESTMENT PLAN (2017), 

https://inlandportauthority.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/globaltrade-investment-plan1.pdf (developed in cooperation with the 

Brookings Institution and JP Morgan Chase‘s joint Global Cities 

Initiative, although all conclusions and recommendations are those 

of Salt Lake County).

5 UTAH CODE §§ 11-58-601(1)(b), —601(1)(h), -601(6), -604(2) 

to -604(6); Utah Inland Port Authority Amendments, H.B. 443 (2022 

General Session) (effective Mar. 21, 2022). We cite the most recent 

version of the statute unless stated otherwise.
Cite as: 2022 UT 27

Opinion of the Court

9

2023, the authority may not use the portion of property tax 

differential generated by a property tax levied by a primary 

municipality on the exempt area unless the primary 

municipality . . . entered into an agreement [with UIPA].‖) These 

statutory changes may moot the City‘s claims under the Act‘s tax 

provisions.6

¶21 A case becomes moot when the ―controversy‖ before the 

court is ―eliminated,‖ ―rendering the relief requested impossible or 

of no legal effect.‖ Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated 

Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 14, 289 P.3d 582 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). This may occur as a result of changes in 

the practical or legal relationship between the parties—as by repeal 

or amendment of the law under review. Such changes may deprive 

the court of the ability ―to order a remedy that will have a 

meaningful impact on the practical positions of the parties.‖ Id. ¶ 24. 

And that could render the case moot—by making our disposition of 

the claims that were preserved in the district court and argued on 

appeal ―purely advisory.‖ Id. ¶ 15.

¶22 These concerns may be implicated here. The City has

requested only forward-looking relief from this court—in asking us 

to strike down the tax provisions of the Act as unconstitutional. But 

the City‘s claim and arguments are aimed at a version of the 

statute—and a classification scheme—that is no longer in effect. The 

2022 amendments changed the classification of the City by granting 

the City special tax treatment and negotiating power with UIPA. 

UTAH CODE § 11-58-601, -601(9), -604; supra ¶ 20. So a decision by this 

court about the constitutionality of the Act‘s old classification may 

not ―have a meaningful impact on the practical positions of the 

parties‖ under the amended statute. Utah Transit Auth., 2012 UT 75, 

¶ 24. Our ruling, in other words, may have ―no legal effect.‖ Id. ¶ 14;

see also In re. J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Utah 1982) (holding that an 

_____________________________________________________________

6 Neither party has filed a suggestion of mootness. 

See UTAH R. APP. P. 37(a) (―Any party aware of circumstances that 

render moot one or more of the issues presented for review must 

promptly file a  ̳suggestion of mootness‘ in the form of a motion 

under Rule 23.‖). The court, however, ―may also raise the issue of 

mootness sua sponte to further a core judicial policy of limiting the 

scope of its power to issues in controversy.‖ In re Adoption of L.O., 

2012 UT 23, ¶ 7, 282 P.3d 977 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).
SALT LAKE CITY v. UTAH INLAND PORT AUTHORITY

Opinion of the Court

10

amendment to a statute moots an appeal ―when the amendment 

actually prevents the requested judicial relief from affecting the 

rights of the litigants‖ (citation omitted)).

¶23 For this reason we decline to reach the merits of these claims 

in today‘s decision. Instead we issue an accompanying order 

requiring the parties to submit supplemental briefing on whether the 

City‘s uniform operation challenges to sections 601 and 602 are moot 

and should be dismissed—without prejudice to the City‘s right to 

refile a challenge to the constitutionality of the amended provisions

of the Act.

B. Ripper Clause

¶24 The district court also rejected the City‘s Ripper Clause 

claim. It held (1) that the challenged provisions were not delegations 

of municipal power but direct legislative mandates; and (2) that even 

if the statute delegated power, it did not implicate any municipal

function in light of the statewide interests at stake.

¶25 The City challenges these conclusions, asserting that the Act 

effects an unconstitutional delegation of municipal power in 

requiring inland-port-friendly zoning ordinances and in prohibiting

interference with the transportation and storage of natural resources. 

See UTAH CODE § 11-58-205(5)(a) (requiring regulated municipalities

to adopt zoning ordinances that ―allow an inland port as a permitted 

or conditional use‖ on authority jurisdictional land within its 

boundaries); id. § 11-58-205(6) (barring municipalities from 

prohibiting the ―transporting, unloading, loading, transfer, or 

temporary storage of natural resources‖ on authority jurisdictional 

land). It also asserts that the funding provisions of the Act interfere 

with municipal money. See id. § 11-58-601 (requiring the redirection 

of a percentage of property taxes collected on authority jurisdictional 

land to UIPA); id. § 11-58-602 and § 59-12-205(2) (requiring the 

distribution of a portion of sales and use taxes collected on authority 

jurisdictional land to the port authority).

¶26 We affirm the dismissal of the City‘s challenges to the zoning 

mandates under the controlling terms of the Ripper Clause. But we 

do not reach the merits of the City‘s Ripper Clause challenges to the 

tax provisions. Instead we retain jurisdiction over these claims and 

order the parties to submit supplemental briefing. We direct the 

parties to address whether the 2022 amendments to the Act moot the 

City‘s section 601 and 602 claims under the Ripper Clause. And we 

ask the parties to provide additional briefing on the issue of whether 

the provisions ―interfere‖ with ―municipal money.‖
Cite as: 2022 UT 27

Opinion of the Court

11

1. Zoning Regulations

¶27 The Ripper Clause provides that

[t]he Legislature shall not delegate to any special 

commission, private corporation or association, any 

power to make, supervise or interfere with any 

municipal improvement, money, property or effects, 

whether held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to 

select a capitol site, or to perform any municipal 

functions.

UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 28. This provision has nothing to say about 

the propriety of a legislative mandate directed at a municipality. It 

speaks only to the delegation of authority—in prohibiting the 

legislature from delegating the ―power to make, supervise or 

interfere with any municipal improvement, money, property or 

effects‖ or delegating the power ―to levy taxes, to select a capitol site, 

or to perform any municipal functions.‖ Id.

¶28 The Act‘s zoning provisions withstand scrutiny on the 

ground that they do not delegate power to any outside group or 

entity. To ―delegate‖ is to ―[e]ntrust (a task or responsibility) to 

another person, typically one who is less senior than oneself.‖7 Here 

the legislature is not ―entrusting‖ UIPA with the task or 

responsibility of enacting certain zoning ordinances. The Act 

requires that Salt Lake City, West Valley City, and Magna ―allow an 

inland port,‖ UTAH CODE § 11-58-205(5)(a), and prohibits them from 

outlawing the ―transporting, unloading, loading, transfer, or 

temporary storage of natural resources‖ on authority jurisdictional 

land, id. § 11-58-205(6). These are legislative mandates directed at 

municipalities. So under the plain language of the Ripper Clause, the 

zoning regulations are constitutional. We uphold the zoning use and 

non-interference provisions of the Act on this basis.8

_____________________________________________________________

7 See Delegate, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition

/delegate (last visited June 10, 2022); see also Delegate, 

DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/delegate 

(last visited June 10, 2022) (defining ―delegate‖ as ―to commit 

(powers, functions, etc.) to another as agent or deputy‖).

8 This narrow holding makes it unnecessary for us to reach other 

arguments pressed by the City on appeal. We need not and do not 

articulate a basis for deciding whether a given activity qualifies as 

(continued . . .)
SALT LAKE CITY v. UTAH INLAND PORT AUTHORITY

Opinion of the Court

12

2. Tax Provisions

¶29 As noted above, the state legislature amended the Act after 

we held oral argument in this case. Supra ¶ 20 & n.5. The 

amendments make substantive changes to the funding provisions,

including adding two related sections. See UTAH CODE § 11-58-601 to 

604. It appears to us that these amendments may moot the City‘s 

Ripper Clause claims as to the tax provisions.

¶30 As explained above, statutory revisions may render a case

moot where they make it impossible for us ―to order a remedy that 

will have a meaningful impact on the practical positions of the 

parties.‖ See supra ¶ 21. And, as with the zoning provisions, the City 

challenges a version of the statute that is no longer in effect. The 2022

amendments make substantial changes to the challenged tax 

provisions of the Act. They recognize the City as the ―primary 

municipality‖ and grant it the power to enter into certain agreements 

with UIPA that alter the percentage of redirected funds and 

designate their uses.9 They also grant the City the power to agree—

or not—to the redirection of any property tax funds beginning in 

2023. UTAH CODE §§ 11-58-601 to 604; id. § 11-58-601(9) 

(―Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, beginning 

with the first tax year that begins on or after January 1, 2023, the 

authority may not use the portion of property tax differential 

generated by a property tax levied by a primary municipality on the 

exempt area unless the primary municipality . . . entered into an 

agreement [with UIPA].‖). And these amendments may alter the 

effect of our disposition of the City‘s Ripper Clause challenge to the 

Act‘s pre-amendment tax provisions—since, for example, the City 

now has a voice in the use or allocation of certain tax funds.

 

―municipal,‖ or for assessing whether a given entity amounts to a 

―special commission, private corporation or association.‖ Our case 

law is more than a little muddled on these questions. See Tribe v. Salt 

Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); Salt Lake City v. Int’l Ass’n of 

Firefighters, Locals 1645, 593, 1654 & 2064, 563 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 

1977); City of West Jordan v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 767 P.2d 530 (Utah 

1988). And we leave for another day the matter of how to reconcile 

the disparate strands in our case law with the controlling text of the 

Utah Constitution.

9 UTAH CODE §§ 11-58-601(1)(b), -601(1)(h), -601(6), -604(2) to 

604(6); Utah Inland Port Authority Amendments, H.B. 443 (2022 

General Session) (effective Mar. 21, 2022).
Cite as: 2022 UT 27

Opinion of the Court

13

¶31 For these (and perhaps other) reasons, a decision by this 

court about redirection of tax revenue under the pre-amendment 

version of the Act may not ―have a meaningful impact on the 

practical positions of the parties.‖ Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of 

Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 24, 289 P.3d 582. In other 

words, our ruling about the earlier tax scheme may have ―no legal 

effect‖ under current law. See id. ¶ 14. With this in mind, we ask the 

parties to submit supplemental briefs on whether the 2022 

amendments moot the City‘s section 601 and 602 claims under the 

Ripper Clause, on points set forth in a supplemental briefing order 

issued herewith.

¶32 We acknowledge the possibility that our concerns about 

mootness may be alleviated by the parties‘ briefing. And we ask for 

supplemental briefing on the merits in light of that possibility.

¶33 Specifically, we ask the parties to present supplemental 

briefing on the question whether the tax revenue at issue is

―municipal money.‖ The City claims that the tax provisions violate 

the Ripper Clause because they ―delegate‖ the power to ―interfere‖

with ―municipal money.‖ But this claim implicates some significant

nuances that have been briefed by the parties only in passing. We 

highlight some specific dimensions of these nuances in our 

supplemental briefing order. And we note that we will reach the 

merits only if we decide that the City‘s claims are not moot.

III

¶34 We affirm the dismissal of the City‘s challenges to the 

unamended zoning provisions of the Utah Inland Port Authority 

Act. But we decline to reach the City‘s challenges to the tax 

provisions of the Act. Instead we ask for supplemental briefing on 

the mootness and merits questions noted above.