NO. 94-147

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1994

ROBERT C. BARTHULE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT KARMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Rosebud,

The Honorable Kenneth R. Wilson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

John A. Hauf, Hauf & Forsythe,

Billings, Montana

For Respondent:

John Houtz, Attorney at Law,

Forsythe, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: November 17, 1994

Decided: December 20, 1994

Filed:
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff Robert C. Barthule filed a complaint in the District

Court for the Sixteenth Judicial District in Rosebud County in

which Robert Karman was named as the defendant. Barthule alleged

that he suffered an injury while working for Karman at a time when

Karman was uninsured in violation of Montana's workers'

compensation laws. The jury returned a verdict in Barthule's favor

and awarded him $35,000 as damages. Karman appeals from the

judgment entered pursuant to the jury's verdict. We affirm the

judgment of the District Court.

The issues on appeal are restated as follows:

1 . Did the District Court err when it denied Karman's motion

to change venue from Rosebud County to Yellowstone County?

2 . Did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction

of Barthule's independent cause of action against his uninsured

employer?

3 . Was Barthule's claim barred by the statute of

limitations?

4 . Was there substantial evidence to support the jury's

verdict?

5 . Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it

refused to give Karman's proposed jury instruction number ll?

6 . Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it

refused Karman's proposed special verdict form?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In December 1990, Barthule began working as a ranch hand for

Karman in Yellowstone County. Trial testimony indicated that it

was a common practice for ranch hands to help neighboring farmers

gather and brand cattle, hay, and perform other farm operations.

Barthule had, on several occasions, assisted neighbors while

employed by Karman. For several days from July 16 to July 20,

1991, Barthule helped roundup cattle on the neighboring King Ranch.

Barthule testified that on July 20, 1991, the last day of the

roundup, he injured his knee. Barthule testified that he was

riding in the back of a pickup while chasing a bull. The pickup

struck and rolled over the top of the bull. As a result, Barthule

was thrown forward. Afterward, he jumped out and helped remove the

bull from under the truck. Barthule stated that he injured his

knee either when: he fell in the truck; jumped out of the truck;

or was trying to remove the bull from under the truck. Other

witnesses recalled the incident differently and some did not recall

that Barthule injured his knee at the time or in the manner

Barthule testified.

After Barthule injured his knee, he quit working for Karman

and was paid for the work he had completed. A copy of Barthule's

last paycheck indicated that it was paid for work performed during

two-thirds of July 1991. Karman admitted that he was not insured

against workers' compensation claims during that period of time.

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his complaint. After a hearing, on March 2, 1993, the court denied

Karman's motion.

Barthule filed an independent cause of action against Karman

for failing to maintain insurance as required by Montana law.

Section 39-71-515, MCA. Section 39-71-516, MCA, provides that an

independent cause of action under § 39-71-515, MCA, must be brought

in the district court in the district where the claimant resides or

the alleged violation occurred. Section 25-2-201(l), MCA,

provides, in relevant part, that the court must grant a motion to

change venue if the county designated in the complaint is not the

proper county.

Karman argues that despite what Barthule stated in his

affidavit, Barthule resided in Mussellshell County. Karman bases

his argument on a Mussellshell County address Barthule listed on a

form filed with the Department of Labor and Industry before his

complaint was filed in District Court. The alleged injury occurred

in Yellowstone County, hence, Barthule argues venue is improper in

Rosebud County.

Venue is proper in either the county where Barthule resided at

the time his complaint was filed, or where the alleged violation

occurred. A defendant may not change venue to a different county

when a suit may be commenced in more than one county and the

plaintiff files in one of the permissible locations. See Melroe v.

Doyle (1989), 239 Mont. 524, 525, 781 P.2d 1134, 1135. Based on the

affidavit and pleadings, Rosebud County was one of the permissible

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locations for venue. Therefore, we conclude that the District

Court did not err when it denied Karman's motion to change venue.

ISSUE 2

Did the District Court have subject matter jurisdiction of

Barthule's independent cause of action against his uninsured

employer?

When we review a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, the relevant inquiry is whether the complaint

states facts that, if true, would vest the district court with

subject matter jurisdiction. Stanleyv.Holms (Mont. 1994), 883 P.2d

837, 838, 51 St. Rep. 1082, 10 8 2 ( c i t inq United States Natl. Bank of Red

Lodgev.Dept.ofRevenue (19771, 175 Mont. 205, 209, 573 P.2d 188, 190).

This determination is a question of law, therefore, we must

determine whether the District Court's interpretation of the law is

correct. InreMarriugeofBarnard (19941, 264 Mont. 103, 106, 870 P.2d

91, 93.

The District Court denied Karman's motion to dismiss, which

was based on his claim that the court lacked jurisdiction. On

appeal, Karman argues that the Workers' Compensation Court had

exclusive jurisdiction. He relies on cases that interpret statutes

other than those involved in the present case, or cases that

existed prior to the time the statutes at issue were enacted. He

also contends, based on the language in § 39-71-508, MCA, that

because Barthule initially pursued a claim with the uninsured

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employers' fund he could not later pursue an action in district

court because all remedies must be pursued at the same time.

An employee has several options for bringing claims against an

uninsured employer pursuant to § 39-71-508, MCA. That statute

provides:

An employee who suffers an injury arising out of and in

the course of employment while working for an uninsured

employer as defined in 39-71-501 . . . mav Dursue all

remedies concurrently, including but not limited to:

(1) a claim for benefits from the uninsured

employers' fund;

(2) a damage action against the employer in

accordance with 39-71-509;

(3) an independent action against an employer as

provided in 39-71-515; or

(4) any other civil remedy provided by law.

(Emphasis added.) This action was brought pursuant to § 39-71-515,

MCA. Karman argues that the l'concurrently" language in

§ 39-71-508, MCA, requires that a claimant file all of the optional

claims at the same time, and that a worker may not pursue a claim

against the uninsured employers' fund, and if dissatisfied, later

pursue any of the other remedies. The plain language of the

statute suggests otherwise.

Section 39-71-508, MCA, provides several options and states

that an employee may pursue them concurrently, which allows, but

does not require, a concurrent pursuit of remedies. Legislative

history also supports a conclusion that the remedies were designed

to increase an injured employee's options against an uninsured

employer without making them mutually exclusive. Minutes,

Legislative Hearing on HB 529 before Senate Judiciary Committee,

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March 18, 1985 at 1-2. We, therefore, conclude that the language

of § 39-71-508, MCA, does not require a claimant to file and pursue

all claims at exactly the same time, and that receipt of benefits

from the uninsured employers' fund does not bar a later district

court action.

In a related argument, Karman argues that the District Court

did not acquire jurisdiction because Barthule did not file all

pleadings with the Department of Labor and Industry as required by

§ 39-71-517, MCA. That section requires an injured employee to

serve all pleadings on the department, whether or not the

department is a party to the action. Karman pointed out Barthule's

failure to comply with this requirement in a pretrial motion.

Barthule subsequently served all pleadings on the Department and

the record reflects that the Department acknowledged service. The

Department indicated that the State would not be a party to the

action.

The purpose of this statute is to ensure that the State is

aware of its right to subrogation. That purpose was satisfied,

even though the papers were not served at the same time they were

filed in the District Court. In addition, § 39-71-517, MCA, does

not specify that failure to serve papers will divest a court of

jurisdiction. We affirm the District Court's conclusion that it

had subject matter jurisdiction.

ISSUE 3

Was Barthule's claim barred by the statute of limitations?
The question of which statute of limitations applies to the

facts in this case is a question of law which we review to

determine whether the district court's interpretation of the law

was correct. Barnard, 870 P.2d at 93. Karman relies on

§ 39-71-601, MCA, which states that "all claims must be forever

barred unless . . . presented in writing to the employer, the

insurer, or the department . within 12 months from the date of

the happening of the accident . . .'I (Emphasis added.) It

appears from the record that Barthule did file a claim with the

Department within 12 months from the date of his injury, and

therefore, complied with § 39-71-601, MCA. However, Karman argues

that Barthule's complaint in District Court also had to be filed

within 12 months pursuant to this section, and that since it was

not, it is barred as untimely.

Section 39-71-601, MCA, does not prescribe the time period

within which claims must be filed in a district court. We have

previously recognized that the independent cause of action

authorized by 5 39-71-508, MCA, is ordinarily considered a

negligence action, but strict liability may apply in certain

situations. Boekmv.AlanonClub (1986), 222 Mont. 373, 376, 722 P.2d

1160, 1162. Therefore, the tort statute of limitations of three

years applies and was satisfied. Section 27-2-204, MCA. We

conclude that Barthule's claim was not barred by the statute of

limitations.

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ISSUE 4

Was there substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict?

Our standard of review for a jury's verdict is whether there

is substantial credible evidence in the record to support it.

InterstateProd. CreditAss’nv. DeSuye (19911, 250 Mont. 320, 322-23, 820 P.2d

1285, 1287.

In support of his contentions that the verdict was not

supported by substantial evidence, Karman cites to testimony which

would have supported a finding that Barthule's injury was not work

related; and that the consequences of any injury were not

permanent. However, it is within the province of the jury to

resolve conflicts in testimony and decide the ultimate issues in

the case. SeeLackeyv. Wilson (19831, 205 Mont. 476, 478-79, 668 P.2d

1051, 1053.

1n Courserv. DurbySchoolDist. (1984), 214 Mont. 13, 692 P.2d 417,

we held that the following factors should be considered to

determine if an injury is work related:

Controlling factors repeatedly relied upon to

determine a work-related injury include: (1) whether the

activity was undertaken at the employer's request;

(2) whether employer, either directly or indirectly,

compelled employee's attendance at the activity;

(3) whether the employer controlled or participated in

the activity; and (4) whether both employer and employee

mutually benefitted from the activity. The presence or

absence of each factor, may or may not be determinative

and the significance of each factor must be considered in

the totality of all attendant circumstances.

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Courser, 692 P.2d at 419 (citation omitted). We reiterated this test

in Dale Y. TradeStreet, Inc. (19931, 258 Mont. 349, 355, 854 P.2d 828,

831-32.

Considering the totality of circumstances, there was

substantial evidence in the record from which the jury could decide

that Barthule was an employee for Karman and suffered a compensable

work related injury during the scope of his employment. Barthule

testified that he injured his knee when he was thrown forward in

the pickup, when he jumped out of the pickup, or possibly when he

struggled with the bull. Art Korenko also testified that Barthule

injured his knee while wrestling with the bull and that he thought

the bull kicked Barthule. Other witnesses observed his swollen

knee after the injury.

Testimony also indicated it was a common practice for ranch

hands to assist neighboring ranchers in various duties, and

indicated that a ranch hand is still considered an employee of his

original employer when doing so. In this situation, the ranch hand

is paid by his or her employer, not the rancher who received

assistance. Barthule had previously assisted other ranchers but

was paid by Karman. Karman paid Barthule for work for two-thirds

of July, which indicates Karman considered Barthule an employee

during the time Barthule injured his knee.

Although Karman did not force Barthule to attend the roundup,

Xarman was present and did not object to Barthule's presence, or

ask Barthule to leave the King Ranch roundup. Finally, testimony

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indicated that ranchers benefit from helping each other out, and

Barthule benefited because he was paid for his activity. This

evidence was sufficient to satisfy the totality of the

circumstances requirement.

In order to prove the elements of a claim brought pursuant to

5 39-71-515(Z), MCA, Barthule had to prove the following:

(2) In such an action, prima facie liability of the

uninsured employer exists if the claimant proves, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that:

(a) the employer was required by law to be enrolled

under compensation plan No. 1, 2, or 3 with respect to

the claimant; and

(b) the employer was not so enrolled on the date of

the injury or death.

Karman hired Barthule to work as his employee and was required

to enroll in one of the plans for workers' compensation insurance.

The evidence from the record set forth above established that

Barthule was Karman's employee and was injured within the scope of

his employment. Karman admitted that he was not insured on the

date of that injury. We conclude, therefore, that there was

substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict on the issue of

liability.

Karman also argues that if Barthule received an injury, that

injury was not a permanent injury, and therefore, not compensable.

However, there was evidence that as a result of his injury Barthule

was precluded from running, jumping, riding horses, or doing ranch

work. At the end of his healing period, his physician concluded

that he sustained permanent physical impairment. We conclude that

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there was substantial evidence to support the finding and

conclusion that Barthule's injury was permanent and compensable.

ISSUE 5

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to

give Karman's proposed jury instruction number II?

Our standard of review for discretionary trial court rulings

is whether the district court abused its discretion. Hislop v’. Cady

(1993), 261 Mont. 243, 247, 862 P.2d 388, 390. It is not

reversible error for a district court to refuse an offered

instruction unless the refusal affects the substantial rights of

the party who proposed the instruction. Cotirell v. Burlington Northern R.R.

(1993), 261 Mont. 296, 306, 863 P.2d 381, 387.

The District Court refused Xarman's proposed instruction

number 11. That instruction was based on language from Courser, as

set forth above, but did not include the totality of circumstances

language. The court questioned the parties about their preference

between Xarman's proposed jury instructions number 10 or number 11.

The court believed that number 10 was a more accurate statement of

the law, and gave number 10 instead of number 11. We agree.

Instruction number 10 set forth the elements Barthule had to

prove by a preponderance of evidence, including: (1) that he was an

employee working for Karman; (2) that he was injured and suffered

a disability as a result; (3) that the alleged injury arose out of

and was within the scope of his employment; and (4) that the injury

caused a temporary or permanent disability for which he was

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entitled to recover compensation. Karman's proposed instruction

number 11 was patterned after language in Courser, but omitted the

totality of circumstances language from that opinion, and

therefore, was an incomplete statement of the law. Because

instruction number 10 was given and adequately summarizes

Barthule's statutory burden of proof, and because number 11 was not

complete, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion when it refused Karman's proposed instruction number 11.

ISSUE 6

Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused

Karman's proposed special verdict form?

Our standard of review of a discretionary trial court ruling

is whether the district court abused its discretion. Montana Rail Link

v. Byard (1993), 260 Mont. 331, 337, 860 P.2d 121, 125. Karman

offered a special verdict form that Barthule objected to on the

basis that it was confusing. The District Court stated that it

believed the form was argumentative and too confusing. Instead,

the court used a more simple general verdict form.

The use of a special verdict form is discretionary with the

court. Rule 49(a), M.R.Civ.P.; Kinjerskiv.Lamey (1981), 194 Mont. 38,

41, 635 P.2d 566, 567. The general verdict form, in combination

with the court's instructions, adequately presented all of the

relevant issues to the jury without the danger of confusion that

could have been caused by Karman's proposed verdict form.

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