[Cite as In re A.P., 2012-Ohio-4965.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CHAMPAIGN COUNTY 

IN THE MATTER OF : 

: Appellate Case No. 2012-CA-18 

A.P., a minor child : 

 : Trial Court Case No. 2009-JG-36 

: 

: 

: (Juvenile Appeal from 

: (Common Pleas Court) 

: 

: 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 26th day of October, 2012. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

DARRELL L. HECKMAN, Atty. Reg. #0002389, Harris, Meyer, Heckman & Denkewalter, 

LLC, One Monument Square, Suite 200, Urbana, Ohio 43078 

Attorney for Appellant 

KATHY ELLISON, Atty. Reg. #0033808, 265 Talbott Tower, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

Attorney for Appellee 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HALL, J. 

{¶ 1} A.P. (“Father”) appeals from the trial court’s judgment entry modifying a 

shared-parenting plan for the parties’ minor child but retaining appellee, R.D. (“Mother”), as 
the residential parent for school purposes. 

{¶ 2} Father advances two related assignments of error on appeal. First, he contends 

the trial court erred in finding no “change in circumstances” to support modification of the 

residential parent for school purposes. Second, he claims the trial court erred in failing to 

designate him the residential parent for school purposes where such a designation was in the 

best interest of the child. For her part, Mother has not filed an appellate brief. 

{¶ 3} The record reflects that Father and Mother were never married. Mother gave 

birth to A.P. in 2005. The parties filed a shared-parenting plan, which the trial court adopted 

in 2009. Among other things, it designated Mother the residential parent for school purposes. 

At that time, Father and Mother maintained separate residences in the Urbana area. In August 

2011, Mother moved roughly thirty miles to Huber Heights. Although she rented an apartment 

there, Mother primarily resides in the home of her fiancé and his four children, who range in 

age from five to fifteen. Following her move, Mother enrolled A.P. in kindergarten in Huber 

Heights. 

{¶ 4} In November 2011, Mother moved to modify the shared-parenting plan. She 

asserted that the existing plan had become impractical and required an excessive number of 

exchanges of the child. Mother also noted that her move had complicated the logistics of the 

exchanges. Among other things, Mother’s proposal gave Father parenting time on alternating 

weekends and from Monday evening until Wednesday morning. In December 2011, Father 

also moved to modify the shared-parenting plan. He argued that Mother’s proposal 

excessively removed A.P. from his extended family in Urbana. Father requested to be 

designated the residential parent for school purposes and proposed his own parenting-time 

schedule. 
[Cite as In re A.P., 2012-Ohio-4965.]

{¶ 5} Ultimately, the parties resolved most of their differences and agreed on the 

terms of a revised shared-parenting plan. The revised plan contained modified living 

arrangements for A.P. In essence, it granted “Parent 1” primary parenting time during the 

school year, while giving “Parent 2” primary parenting time in the summer. The parties agreed 

to have the trial court determine which parent would be Parent 1 (the residential parent for 

school purposes) and which would be Parent 2. See Doc. #11 at Exh. A. The trial court held a 

March 30, 2012 evidentiary hearing to resolve that issue. 

{¶ 6} At the hearing, Mother testified and presented testimony from her fiancé and 

her mother. Father testified and presented testimony from both of his parents. The trial court 

also conducted an in-camera interview of A.P., who was six years old at the time. Based on 

the evidence presented, the trial court found “[t]hat except for the agreement to modify 

[shared parenting], no change in circumstances has occurred that makes it necessary to modify 

the residential parent for school purposes to serve the best interests of the child.” (Doc. # 11 at 

1). As a result, the trial court adopted the modified shared-parenting plan and declined to 

change the residential parent for school purposes, designating Mother as Parent 1 and Father 

as Parent 2. Father timely appealed. 

 {¶ 7} This court has recognized that a trial court may not modify the designation of a 

residential parent for school purposes under a shared-parenting plan without finding that a 

change in circumstances has occurred and that such modification is in the best interest of the 

child. Sutton v. Sutton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24108, 2011-Ohio-1439, ¶ 9, ¶ 13-14. In 

making these determinations, a trial court enjoys broad discretion. Id. at ¶ 18. We will not 

reverse a trial court’s determination regarding a change in circumstances or the best interest of 

the child absent an abuse of that discretion. Id.
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{¶ 8} In his assignments of error, Father argues (1) that the trial court erred in finding no 

change in circumstances and (2) that A.P.’s best interest required the trial court to designate 

him the residential parent for school purposes. The alleged change in circumstances Father 

cites is Mother’s uprooting of A.P. from his home town and network of family and friends in 

Urbana and her relocation to Huber Heights, where she and A.P. reside with her fiancé and his 

children from a prior marriage. Father argues that while relocating alone may not be a 

sufficient change in circumstances, a relocation that disrupts a child’s relationship with 

extended family can be sufficient. With regard to the best-interest issue, Father asserts that the 

child’s best interests are served by designating him the residential parent for school purposes 

because Urbana is A.P.’s home and is where the child’s best friend and relatives live. 

{¶ 9} Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to 

designate Father the residential parent for school purposes. As an initial matter, it is not clear 

to us that the trial court found no change in circumstances at all. Rather, the trial court found 

“no change in circumstances * * * that makes it necessary to modify the residential parent for 

school purposes to serve the best interests of the child.” (Doc. #11 at 1). This language 

suggests the trial court actually found a change of circumstances but determined that the 

change did not affect the best interest of the child. The trial court’s subsequent explanation 

lends support to this interpretation. It reasoned: 

While it is true that the mother changed her residence address since the 

prior Agreed Shared Parenting Plan, that is not sufficient to warrant any 

modifications. All those who testified indicated that the additional distance was 

not an issue and that both parents and their respective families could remain 
5

active in the child’s life. 

Further, the father indicates that the mother’s introduction of a fiancé 

and his children [is] a change for the child. However, he also has a new 

significant other who has children, so both parents have introduced new people 

into the life of their child. With parents who are no longer a couple, this is the 

natural course of events and not a change in circumstances such as to warrant a 

modification, particularly where there is no showing of any impact on the 

child. 

(Id. at 1-2). 

{¶ 10} In any event, we reach the same conclusion regardless of whether the trial 

court found no change in circumstances or found a change in circumstances but nevertheless 

determined that the best interest of the child did not support modifying the residential parent 

for school purposes. The only difference is that Father’s argument fails at the first step of the 

analysis under the former scenario, whereas his argument fails at the second step under the 

latter scenario. The evidence supports the trial court’s finding either way. 

{¶ 11} A statutorily required change in circumstances “must be a change of 

substance, not a slight or inconsequential change.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 

418, 1997-Ohio-260, 674 N.E.2d 1159. “In determining whether a ‘change’ has occurred, we 

are mindful that custody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions a trial 

judge must make. Therefore, a trial judge must have wide latitude in considering all the 

evidence[.]” Id.

{¶ 12} This court has held that relocation alone is not a sufficient change in 
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circumstances to justify modification of a custody determination. In re A.N., 2d Dist. Greene 

Nos. 2010 CA 83, 2011 CA 7, 2011-Ohio-2422, ¶ 27. In the In re A.N. case, the father argued 

that the mother’s move from Fairborn to Huber Heights, coupled with her work schedule, 

constituted a change in circumstances that supported a custody modification. This court 

disagreed. It noted that the mother and maternal grandmother remained available to care for 

the child most of the time. With regard to the relocation, this court noted that the relatively 

short move had provided some benefits for the mother and that the child “had adjusted to the 

change in home and schools well, making new friends and maintaining good grades.” Id. As a 

result, we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the father’s complaint for 

custody. Id. at ¶ 28. 

{¶ 13} Conversely, in Gartin v. Gartin, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2011-CA-74, 

2012-Ohio-2232, we affirmed a trial court’s finding that a change in circumstances had 

occurred where the mother moved an hour away, began living with a boyfriend, and placed the 

child in a new school. We reasoned that the trial court properly could have found a change in 

circumstances based solely on the fact that the mother had started living with her boyfriend, 

who the evidence showed posed a danger to the child. Id. at ¶ 9-10. 

{¶ 14} This court’s decisions in In re A.N. and Gartin illustrate two key points: (1) 

the importance of the particular facts in a case and (2) the wide latitude a trial court enjoys in 

evaluating those facts. In our view, the trial court here reasonably could have concluded that 

Mother’s relatively short move from Urbana to Huber Heights, even when viewed in 

conjunction with her act of living with a boyfriend, did not constitute a change of “substance” 

or consequence. The record supports a finding that Mother’s move of roughly thirty miles, 
7

although inconvenient, will not prevent A.P.’s extended family in Urbana from remaining 

active in his life. The record also supports a finding that A.P. has adjusted to residing with 

Mother’s fiancé and his children and that A.P. is excelling academically. Finally, the record 

supports the trial court’s finding that Father has begun a relationship with a woman who has 

two children of her own. Although Father is not living with this woman, the trial court 

correctly noted that he too has introduced new people into A.P.’s life. In any event, even if we 

were to find that Mother’s move and her change in living arrangements did constitute a 

change in circumstances, the foregoing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that it was 

not necessary to “modify the residential parent for school purposes to serve the best interests 

of the child.” (Doc. #11 at 1). 

{¶ 15} It is well settled that a reviewing court will not reverse a custody 

determination unless a trial court has acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously. Thomas 

v. Thomas, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009 CA 88, 2011-Ohio-2977, ¶ 24. In most cases, an abuse 

of discretion will arise from decisions that are unreasonable. Id. “‘A decision is unreasonable 

if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision. It is not enough that 

the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning 

process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would 

support a contrary result.’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place 

Community Redevelopment, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). 

{¶ 16} In the present case, the trial court’s decision is supported by a sound reasoning 

process. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in its refusal to modify the shared-parenting 

plan to designate Father the residential parent for school purposes. Father’s assignments of 
8

error are overruled, and the judgment of the Champaign County Common Pleas Court is 

affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J., and DONOVAN, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Darrell L. Heckman 

Kathy Ellison 

Hon. Lori L. Reisinger