J-S59026-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

BRYAN J. THOMPSON, :

:

Appellant : No. 301 WDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 2, 2015,

Court of Common Pleas, Cambria County,

Criminal Division at No. CP-11-CR-0000545-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2015

Appellant, Bryan J. Thompson (“Thompson”), appeals from the order 

entered on February 2, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas, Cambria 

County, denying his petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”).1 For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

The PCRA court provided the following summary of the factual and 

procedural history:

On June 3, 2014, Thompson entered a guilty plea 

to one count of [d]efiant [t]respass[1] and was 

sentenced, inter alia, to serve twelve (12) months 

probation with a furlough to inpatient drug and 

alcohol treatment. Following release from treatment 

Thompson was to be returned to the Cambria County 

Prison unless he had pre-approved housing waiting 

for him. The Court was clear that he would be 

returned to county prison after treatment unless he 

had an approved residence waiting. As part of his 

 

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.
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plea agreement the Commonwealth nolle prossed the 

remaining charge of [d]isorderly [c]onduct thirty-one 

(31) days after sentencing.

On August 28, 2014, a probation violation bench 

warrant was issued for Thompson on the basis that 

he had left his residential treatment at White Deer 

Run prior to completing the program and failed to 

contact the Cambria County Probation Office to 

approve his residence as required. Thompson was 

apprehended in Westmoreland County on October 1, 

2014, and a hearing on the bench warrant was held 

October 31, 2014, at which time it was alleged that 

he was in violation of his original probation for failure 

to complete treatment, failure to have his residence 

approved, and having new charges filed. The 

hearing was continued to permit Thompson the 

opportunity to present evidence that he had 

completed the program, that he was released from 

it, that he had [a] residence to return to, and that 

acting upon belief that he could return home he did 

just that. Thompson was remanded to the prison 

following the October 31st hearing due to not having 

a residence. Further, the [c]ourt indicated that if 

Thompson could establish he completed the program 

and had a residence he would be released forthwith.

A further hearing was held November 21, 2014, 

at which time no evidence was presented to support 

Thompson’s claim and he was found in violation of 

his probation and sentenced to complete a ninety 

(90) [day] treatment program at Peniel after which 

he was to be returned to the prison at which time 

the matter would be revisited. Failure to complete 

the program or leaving the program would be 

considered a further violation.

_____________________

[FN1]

 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b)(1)(i).

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/7/15, at 1-2 (footnote included in original) (citations 

omitted).
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On December 15, 2014, Thompson filed a PCRA petition pro se 

alleging that the trial court illegally modified his sentence after the 

sentencing hearing. Attorney Timothy Burns was appointed as counsel on 

December 23, 2014 and filed an amended PCRA petition on January 26, 

2014. In the petition, Thompson alleged that he was serving an illegal 

sentence because the trial court changed a condition of his sentence without 

a proceeding on the record to reflect the modification. Thompson specifically 

assailed the portion of the sentencing order that required him to return to 

the Cambria County Prison after completing inpatient treatment rather than 

allowing him to be directly released from treatment to a street address he 

was to provide to the court as the trial court stated during the sentencing 

hearing.

The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on February 2, 2015 and 

denied Thompson’s petition by order on that same day. On February 9, 

2015, Thompson filed a timely notice of appeal, raising one issue for our 

review:

1. The [PCRA] [c]ourt erred in finding that it did not 

change [Thompson’s] sentence when on the record 

at [Thompson’s] sentencing, the [c]ourt stated 

[Thompson] would be released from a drug 

treatment center directly to his home address (if he 

had a home address) which was in contradiction to 

the [c]ourt’s sentencing order which indicated that 

he would be returned to the Cambria County Prison 

after completing his time at a drug treatment center. 

The [c]ourt failed to make this change [to] 
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[Thompson’s] sentence on the record; thus 

constituting an illegal sentence.

Thompson’s Brief at 3. 

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court's findings of fact, and whether the PCRA 

court's determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Wantz, 

84 A.3d 324, 331 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Phillips, 

31 A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011)). A PCRA petitioner must establish the 

claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 

925 A.2d 167, 169 (Pa. 2007).

In this case, Thompson contends that he is serving an illegal sentence 

because the trial court’s sentencing order contradicted the trial court’s 

statements at the sentencing hearing. Thompson’s Brief at 7-10. Thompson 

specifically assails that portion of the trial court’s order, which provides: “the 

Defendant shall be released into short-term inpatient residential treatment. 

Upon successful completion of that treatment the Defendant shall be 

returned to the Cambria County Prison so that the above case can be 

addressed.” Id. at 7-8; Order, 6/5/14. Thompson argues that this portion 

of the order contradicts the statements made by the trial court during the 

sentencing hearing, specifically pointing to the notes of testimony wherein

the trial court stated: 

When you are done with treatment, if you have a 

residence to go to that has a number on the door 
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and a street address at the mailbox, you will be 

released from the treatment center directly to the 

street address. If you do not have a residence, you 

will be returned to jail until you do because I can’t 

supervise you out in no man’s land. Okay[?]

Thompson’s Brief at 7; N.T., 6/3/14, at 5. Thus, Thompson asserts that the 

trial court’s order improperly modified the sentence after the sentencing 

hearing to require him to return to prison upon completion of treatment and 

is therefore illegal. Thompson’s Brief at 10.

In its written opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania 

Rule of Appellate Procedure, the PCRA court determined that Thompson’s 

argument that the sentence was illegal was meritless. PCRA Court Opinion, 

4/7/15, at 5. The PCRA Court first concluded that Thompson’s argument 

was in error because he “violated the terms of [the] original sentence when 

he left the White Deer Run treatment facility prior to completing the program 

and going to an unapproved residence resulting in the issuance of [a] bench 

warrant for his arrest.” Id. at 4. 

The PCRA court further concluded that:

[t]he [c]ourt’s sentence on June 3rd did not indicate 

that he would be released directly from treatment to 

his home; indeed the sentence was such that the 

residence has to be approved by the probation office, 

which would preclude such a result. The June 5th

Order is the [c]ourt’s standard order when 

furloughing a defendant to drug treatment. It is 

designed to ensure that a defendant has not only 

completed the program but that they have 

completed all other sentencing requirements prior to 

their release. Here that would include that 
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Thompson had a confirmed address to be released 

to. Accordingly, this order did not modify his 

sentence in anyway [sic] but served as a means of 

ensuring compliance with that sentence.

Id. at 4-5. After our review of the record, we find that the record supports 

the PCRA court’s determination. 

First, we conclude that the record supports the PCRA court’s 

determination that Thompson’s argument is meritless because he was not 

returned to prison based on the alleged modification to the sentencing order. 

Instead, the record reflects that Thompson failed to complete a treatment 

program and failed to provide an address of a residence to which he could be 

released. Id. at 2; N.T., 10/31/14, at 5-6. As Thompson does not dispute 

that he was required to complete a treatment program and provide an 

address of a residence in order to be released from prison, Thompson has 

not established that he is serving an illegal sentence. 

Second, we find that the record belies Thompson’s claim that the trial 

court illegally modified the sentence. While Thompson relies on the trial 

court’s statements at the sentencing hearing that he would be released 

directly from the treatment center, the record reflects that the trial court 

also stated, “When he is done [with treatment], he’s coming back to jail 

because you do not get released unless you have a home where we know 

where to supervise you. ... I am not just opening the gate and chasing him 

around for his costs and fines.” N.T., 6/3/14, at 4. These statements are 
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conflicting with the trial court’s subsequent statements that he would be 

released directly to a residence if he provided the street address. See id. at 

5. The trial court’s intentions upon Thompson’s release from the treatment 

program were therefore ambiguous.

In Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466 (Pa. Super. 2011), this 

Court held, that “[i]f ... a trial court’s stated intentions during the sentencing 

hearing are ambiguous, then the terms of the sentence in the sentencing 

order control[.]” Id. at 473. “Oral statements made by the sentencing 

court, but not incorporated into the written sentence signed by the court, 

are not part of the judgment of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 

A.3d 997, 1010 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 

A.2d 1235 (Pa. 1994)).

In this case, the sentencing order clarifies the trial court’s intention by 

specifying that Thompson was to return to prison upon successful completion 

of inpatient treatment until the case could be addressed. The trial court did 

not modify its sentence after the sentencing hearing, but rather, clarified the 

procedure for releasing Thompson to a residence “as a means of ensuring 

compliance with that sentence.” PCRA Court Opinion, 4/7/15, at 5. As the 

written judgment of sentence prevails over the trial court’s stated intentions, 

we conclude that Thompson’s legality of sentencing claim is meritless.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/28/2015