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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re A. E. GRAHAM, Minor . October 10, 2016

No. 332240 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 14-516109-NA

Before: S TEPHENS , P.J., and S AAD and M ETER , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent mother appeals as of right from the trial court ord er terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (parent fail ed to provide proper care or custody), (h) (incarceration of p arent for more than two years) , and (j) (child will be at risk of harm if returned to respondent’s care). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

AE came into care in March 2014 after respondent was arrested and charged with seconddegree murder. In May 2015, respondent was convicted and sente nced to 15 to 30 years in prison with her earliest release date being May 2029. Petition er filed a petition for permanent custody in November 2015 seeking to terminate respondent’s pare ntal rights due to her lengthy prison sentence making her unable to provide proper care for th e child. The petition alleged that respondent failed to maintain suitable housing, obtain a legal source of income, and was unable to obtain employment due to he r incarceration. Respondent part icipated in a treatment plan during the three months she was out on house arrest but those s ervices were terminated upon her incarceration. The trial court found statutory grounds to term inate respondent’s p arental rights to AE due to respondent being incarcerated for a period exceeding two years making her unable to provide proper care and cust ody of the child. Respondent appea ls.

II. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

Respondent first argues that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that sufficient evidence supported terminating her parental rights under MCL 71 2A.19b(3)(g), (h) and (j). We disagree.

In a termination proceeding, pe titioner has the burden of prov ing at least one statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo , 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). If petitioner establishes a statutory ground for termination, the trial court-2- must terminate parental rights if termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court reviews “for clear error a trial court’s factual fin dings as well as its ultimate determination that a statutory ground for termination of parent al rights has been proved by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Mason , 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010); MCR 3.977(K). Further, this Court reviews for clear error the tria l court’s decision on the best-interest issue. In re JK , 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). Clear error occurs i f “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Mason , 486 Mich at 152; In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).

Respondent’s parental rights we re terminated under MCL 712A.19 b(3)(g), (h), and (j), which provide:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a ch ild if the court finds, by clear and convinc ing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide pro per care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation th at the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable tim e considering the child’s age.

(h) The parent is imprisoned for such a period that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period exceeding 2 years, and t he parent has not provided for the child’s proper care and custody, and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

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(j) There is a reasonable lik elihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.

In her brief on appeal, respondent does not contest terminatio n of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) and so we do not address it. Terminat ion of respondent’s parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (h) because resp ondent was unable to provide proper care of the child and her imprisonment would deprive the child of a normal home life for a period exceeding two years. At the time of the adjudication respondent was in jail awaiting criminal trial on murder charges, and she admitted being unable to care for her children. Respondent was convicted of second-degree murder in May 2015 an d sentenced to a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment, which prevented her from caring for her children herself. Respondent failed to make arrangements for this child during he r incarceration, and her deplorable living conditions before the children’s removal sugg ested that, even if she were released sooner, respondent woul d be in no position to plan for the children. Respondent also had a history of substance abuse for which she received service s between 2007 and 2012. Three of respondent’s children were born positive for marijuana.-3- Respondent never sufficiently addressed any of the issues that brought the children into care because services were terminated in May 2015 when she was convicted of second-degree murder. Respondent never worked out her anger issues, improved her parenting skills, achieved emotional stability in therapy, or obtained suitable housing an d employment. Because respondent would be unable to parent due to her incarceration f or a period exceeding two years and she was unable to provide pro per care of the child, termina tion of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) an d (h) was proper.

Contrary to respondent’s claim, petitioner did not fail to inv olve her in the reunification process and the trial court did not terminate parental rights s olely because respondent was incarcerated. Respondent was presented with a treatment plan t hat she worked on during her brief release from jail betw een February 2015 and May 2015 whil e she was awaiting trial. There was no indication that respondent w as not provided with a meani ngful opportunity to participate. 1 Rather respondent did not have sufficient time to work on ser vices and address the issues because of her incarceration. She could not provide a h ome to the child and did not have employment to support the child. Respondent would be incarcera ted for a period exceeding two years and, unlike in In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, termination did not result from respondent’s “mere present inability to personally care for [her] children a s a result of incarceration.” Id . at 160. The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights b ecause she was not a fit parent and could not provide a sta ble or safe home.

Respondent also argues that a permanent plan for the child wit h her maternal aunt should have been considered. She doe s not, however, indicate what the plan was. Guardianship was not a permanent solution for a four-year-old child

III. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent next argues that the trial court erred by concludin g that terminating her parental rights was in her child ’s best interests. We disagree

. Once a statutory ground for termination is established, the tr ial court shall order termination of parental rights if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). Here, the record amply supports the trial court’s best-interest decision. As the trial court properly found, the minor child needs permanency. Because respondent will be incarcerated for at least 15 years, she will not be able to pro vide it. It is in the child’s best interests to be raised by a ca regiver who can meet her needs an d provide a home environment free of criminality and substan ce abuse. Given respondent’s hi story with drugs and crime, there is no evidence she can provide such an environment. Although, as respondent argues, the evidence shows that respondent h ad a strong bond with her child , the evidence also showed that

1 Petitioner generally must make r easonable efforts to rectify t he respondent’s problems through a service plan. See In re Fried , 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). Petitioner must still make reasonable efforts even when the respondent is incar cerated. In re Mason , 486 Mich at 152. The failure to make reasonable efforts can affect whether there was sufficient evidence to terminate parental rights. In re Rood , 483 Mich 73; 763 NW2d 587 (2009).-4- the child had anxiety around her phone calls with respondent. Any bond the child had with respondent was not more important than the child’s safety and w ell-being.

Respondent argues that the trial court’s failure to explicitly address whether termination of parental rights was appropria te in light of the child’s rela tive placement renders the factual record inadequate and requires reversal. This argument is with out merit. The trial court is required to consider the best interests of each child individua lly and “to explicitly address each child’s placement with relatives at the time of the termination hearing if applicable.” In re Olive/Metts, Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 44; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). In its written fin dings, the trial court specifically found that the child was placed with a relative who was willing to provide the long-term care the child desperately needed. The child has been in foster care for a significant period of time and is at an age where permanency is essential for continued growth and development. Thus, the trial court did not err in its best -interest determination.

Affirmed.

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens /s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Patrick M. Meter