Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1501-CR-37 | August 26, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Hilary Bowe Ricks

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kevin Singh,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 26, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A04-1501-CR-37

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Sheila A. Carlisle, 

Judge, and The Honorable Stanley 

Kroh, Commissioner

Cause No. 49G03-1403-FC-11782

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A04-1501-CR-37 | August 26, 2015 Page 2 of 9

Statement of the Case

[1] Kevin Singh appeals the habitual offender enhancement to his sentence 

following his conviction for, among other things, stalking, as a Class C felony. 

The only issue he raises for our review is whether he knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily waived his right to have a jury determine his status as an

habitual offender. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 11, 2014, the State charged Singh with, among other things,

1

stalking, as a Class C felony. On July 25, 2014, the State filed a Motion 

Seeking Permission to Belatedly File Habitual Offender Enhancement and, on 

the same day, the trial court granted the motion. The trial court held an initial 

hearing on August 22, 2014, at which it explained to Singh the meaning of the

habitual offender sentence enhancement and the possible penalties. Singh 

stated that he understood that information. 

[3] At a pretrial conference held on September 23, 2014, Singh filed a Waiver of 

Trial by Jury which stated, in relevant part:

2. I have read this form[] and consulted with my attorney 

regarding the issue of waiving my right to a jury trial.

 

1 The State also charged Singh with seven counts of intimidation, each as a Class D felony, and thirty counts 

of invasion of privacy, each as a Class A misdemeanor. However, the State dismissed some of these counts, 

and the trial court merged the remaining intimidation and invasion of privacy counts with the stalking count 

due to double jeopardy concerns.
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3. I understand that[,] as the Defendant in this criminal case, I 

have a right to trial by jury[] and that this right is guaranteed by 

the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Indiana.

4. I understand that a jury trial means that . . . jurors . . . would 

be selected . . . to sit and listen to all of the evidence presented[]

and then decide whether I am guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 

or not guilty of the charges filed against me in this cause.

5. I understand that no one can take away my right to a jury trial 

unless I freely and voluntarily waive that right, and I understand 

that[,] once I waive my right to a jury trial, the waiver is final and 

I cannot get the right back.

6. I understand that if this waiver is accepted by the Court I will 

not have a trial by jury[] and that this case will be set for a trial 

before a Judge who will hear all of the evidence and then decide 

whether I am guilty or not.

Appellant’s App. at 120. Upon receiving this waiver, the trial court placed 

Singh under oath and questioned Singh’s understanding of the waiver as 

follows:

[THE COURT:] Have you had enough time, Mr. Singh, to talk 

with Mr. Tompkins, your attorney, about these two documents,

[2]

waiver of trial by jury?

[THE DEFENDANT:] I have, Your Honor.

 

2 At the pre-trial conference, Singh filed two waiver-of-jury-trial documents, one for the case at bar and one 

for a separate, unrelated case pending before the same trial court. The substantive content of the waivers 

were identical.
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[THE COURT:] Okay. And after reading them, you’ve also 

placed your signature here on the second page?

[THE DEFENANT:] Correct.

[THE COURT:] Do you believe that you understand these two 

pleadings?

[THE DEFENDANT:] I fully understand.

[THE COURT:] Okay. And I see they are identical. They are 

just filed on two separate cases. And what you’re advising the 

Court then is that you wish to waive your constitutional right to a 

jury trial on these two cases and have the case heard as a court 

trial rather than a jury trial?

[THE DEFENDANT:] Correct.

[THE COURT:] And do you believe that’s in your best interest 

in how to resolve these two cases?

[THE DEFENDANT:] I do, Judge. I fully understand.

[THE COURT:] Okay. And the Court notes that both attorneys 

have also signed.

Tr. at 19-20. The Court then found that Singh had made a knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary waiver of his right to trial by jury. 

[4] The bench trial began on October 17, 2014, and was continued to November 

25, 2014, at which time the trial court found Singh guilty of stalking, as a Class 

C felony. The court noted that the habitual offender issue still needed to be 

resolved, and the attorney for Singh requested that they “come back and do the 

habitual as part of the sentencing.” Id. at 249. The trial court granted that 
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request, and noted the habitual offender sentence enhancement would “proceed 

to the court trial” on December 12, 2014. Id. at 253.

[5] On December 12, 2014, the court conducted a continuation of the bench trial, 

wherein Singh stipulated to the prior convictions offered by the State to 

establish his eligibility for habitual offender enhancement. In return, the State 

agreed that Singh’s total sentence would be limited to “a cap of fourteen years

on the overall sentence.” Id. at 256. The court noted the parties’ agreement 

and concluded that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Singh 

was an habitual offender. 

[6] On January 9, 2015, the trial court sentenced Singh to six years on the stalking 

count, with four years suspended. The court enhanced that sentence by six 

years of executed time due to the habitual offender determination, for a total 

sentence of twelve years, with four years suspended and eight years executed. 

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Singh argues that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his 

right to a jury trial on the habitual offender determination. “The United States 

and Indiana Constitutions guaranty the right to trial by jury.” Dixie v. State, 726 

N.E.2d 257, 258 (Ind. 2000) (footnotes omitted); see U.S. Const. amend. 

VI (guaranteeing “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury” in 

all criminal prosecutions); Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13 (guaranteeing the right to “a 

public trial, by an impartial jury,” in all criminal prosecutions). The right to a 
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jury trial applies to habitual offender proceedings. Hogan v. State, 966 N.E.2d 

738, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. A criminal defendant is presumed 

not to waive this right unless he affirmatively acts to do so. Id. It is 

fundamental error to deny a defendant a jury trial unless there is evidence of the 

defendant’s knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the right. Id. A

defendant must express his personal desire to waive a jury trial, and such 

personal desire must be apparent from the trial court’s record. Poore v. State, 

681 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind. 1997). 

[8] There is no question that Singh filed a written, signed waiver of jury trial. A 

defendant’s filing of such a signed document demonstrates a personal desire to 

waive the right to a jury. Johnson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 491, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). And “a lawyer’s signature on a waiver implies that the defendant acted 

upon the advice and information of legal counsel.” Id.; see also Poore, 681 

N.E.2d at 207 (“[A] defendant’s understanding may be inferred when he and 

his attorney both sign a written waiver of the jury trial right and file it in open 

court.”). Both Singh and his attorney signed Singh’s written jury-trial waiver,

and it explicitly states that Singh consulted with his attorney about the waiver. 

This demonstrates Singh’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury 

trial. 

[9] Moreover, a knowing jury-trial waiver can be demonstrated by a court record of 

advisement on the waiver of jury trial and a colloquy in open court. See, e.g., 

McSchooler v. State, 15 N.E.3d 678, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the 

defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowingly made where 
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defendant was advised of his right to trial by jury and he expressed a personal 

desire on the record to waive that right). Here, the court placed Singh under 

oath and questioned him thoroughly about his understanding of the jury 

waiver. Singh testified that he had spoken with his attorney about the waiver, 

that he “fully” understood the jury waiver, that he wished to waive a jury trial 

on the case and have “the case heard as a court trial rather than a jury trial,” 

and that he believed the waiver was the best way to resolve his case. Tr. at 19-

20. Singh also testified that he “waived jury not only to not waste the Court’s 

time and resources” but also because he thought his case was “better suited for 

a bench trial.” Id. at 302. Singh’s familiarity with the judicial process is not 

surprising, given his criminal history.3 See, e.g., McSchooler, 15 N.E.3d at 683 

(finding that the defendant’s “somewhat extensive criminal history makes it 

likely that he knew very well what a jury was and what it meant to waive a jury 

trial.”). Singh’s testimony evinces his understanding of the waiver of his right 

to a jury trial in his case.

[10] But Singh argues that his waiver was not intelligent because he did not know 

the waiver applied to the habitual offender determination. We addressed this 

precise issue in Pryor v. State, 949 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), where 

we held that a jury-trial waiver that applied to “the case” was sufficient to 

encompass all stages of the proceedings, including the habitual offender phase. 

In Pryor, as in the case at bar, the defendant claimed that his written jury-trial 

 

3

Singh had at least two prior Class D felony convictions.
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waiver was invalid because he had not been advised that a waiver on the 

charged offenses also constituted a waiver on his habitual offender 

determination. Yet, as in the case at bar, Pryor’s waiver stated that it applied to 

“the case”:

Here, Pryor executed a waiver acknowledging his right to have a 

jury hear “his case” and asking that “this case” be set for trial by 

the court. Pryor affirmed to the court that he understood his 

right to have a jury hear his “case” and that he wanted a judge to 

hear the “case” instead. At the time of the waiver submission 

and colloquy, the State had filed all charges including the 

habitual offender count. The court had also convened a hearing 

on the State’s notice of filing of habitual offender charge. Pryor 

was thus aware that his “case” included a habitual offender 

allegation and, upon conviction, would involve a habitual 

offender status determination. . . . The advisement’s application 

to Pryor’s “case” sufficed to encompass all stages of the 

proceedings including the habitual offender phase. We therefore 

cannot say that Pryor’s advisement was deficient nor that his jury 

trial waiver was involuntary, unknowing, or unintelligent.

Id.; see also Johnson, 6 N.E.3d at 497 (holding that, where the defendant’s 

written jury trial waiver only listed one of the charges against him, it was still a 

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury on all counts in 

his case where the written wavier asked that the case be tried to the court).

[11] Here, as in Pryor, the written waiver states that Singh will not have a trial by 

jury, and that “this case” will be set for a trial before a judge. Appellant’s App. 

at 120. Moreover, Singh’s written waiver was filed approximately two months 

after the State had filed its information charging him as an habitual offender, 
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and approximately one month after the court had conducted an initial hearing 

at which it explained to Singh the meaning of the habitual offender sentence 

enhancement and the possible penalties. And, after the filing of the waiver but 

before the hearing on the habitual offender enhancement, the trial court 

explicitly stated that the habitual offender sentence enhancement would 

“proceed to the court trial” on December 12, 2014. Tr. at 253. Thus, as in 

Pryor, Singh was aware that “the case” included a habitual offender 

determination. Cf. Jones v. State, 810 N.E.2d 777, 779-80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)

(holding that the defendant did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 

waive his right to a jury trial on an habitual offender determination where his 

waiver of jury trial was made before the habitual offender information had been

filed). The record establishes that Singh’s waiver of his right to jury trial was 

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent as to all stages of the proceedings in his 

case. Accordingly, we affirm his sentence.

[12] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.