Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-22-00649-CR

EX PARTE Jeremiah Jordan BROWN

From the 454th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 22-03-14361-CR

Honorable Daniel J. Kindred, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Irene Rios, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 13, 2023

AFFIRMED

In two issues, appellant Jeremiah Jordan Brown appeals the trial court’s denial of his 

pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a bail reduction. In addition to complaining 

about the trial court’s denial of his bond reduction, Brown argues in his second issue that the trial 

court’s basis for denying his bail reduction request violated his Fifth Amendment right against 

self-incrimination. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Brown, a resident of San Antonio and who was seventeen years old at the time of the 

alleged offense in February 2022, was arrested for murder. The trial court set his bail at $500,000. 

In response, Brown filed a habeas application asserting his bail was excessive, oppressive, and 

beyond his financial means. Brown’s application requested the trial court reduce his bail to a 
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reasonable amount or grant a personal bond.1 After conducting a hearing on Brown’s habeas 

application, the trial court denied his bail reduction request.

HABEAS HEARING

A. Brown’s Witnesses

Brown called three witnesses at the bail reduction hearing. Mr. James Dorsey and Mrs. 

Mertha Dorsey, a married couple, live in San Antonio; and, according to Mrs. Dorsey, she is 

Brown’s aunt. They both testified they have known Brown since he was a small child when Child 

Protective Services (“CPS”) placed him in their home following CPS’s removal from his mother. 

According to the Dorseys, Brown lived with them for a short time until Brown’s uncle took him

when Brown was a toddler. Mr. Dorsey stated he has kept in contact with Brown, but also said that 

when Brown moved to “the other side of town,” he and Mrs. Dorsey did not see Brown often. Mr. 

Dorsey did not specify when this happened, but along with Mrs. Dorsey’s testimony, it appeared 

that Brown was a young child. Mr. Dorsey also acknowledged that prior to the alleged offense, the 

Dorseys were not actively part of Brown’s life. Nonetheless, the Dorseys testified Brown could 

live with them if he was released on bond. 

The Dorseys testified that they would help pay Brown’s bail, and Mrs. Dorsey testified 

specifically about her and her husband’s income and assets. However, Mr. Dorsey stated he could 

not pay or sell his assets to pay the $50,000 or more the bond companies required for Brown’s 

currently set bail. Rather, Mr. Dorsey indicated he could pay $5,000, maybe $10,000, towards bail, 

but he would have to ask for help from other people to raise the money. To Mr. Dorsey’s 

knowledge, neither Brown nor the rest of his family have any resources to help pay his bail. 

1 Absent specific circumstances not argued here, a person charged with an offense involving violence—murder—may 

not be released on personal bond. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.03(b–2), (b–3)(2)(A). Therefore, we need not 

address Brown’s habeas application request to be released on a personal bond. 
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Mr. Dorsey testified that he owns a restaurant with a bar; and, if Brown was released, 

Brown would work for him. Additionally, the Dorseys testified they would assist Brown in 

acquiring his high school diploma or its equivalent. Both Mr. and Mrs. Dorsey assured they would 

assist Brown in complying with all the terms of his bond if released. 

Brown’s third witness, Victor Vinton, a former juvenile court education administrator with 

Bexar County and current investigator with the Hill Country Regional Public Defender’s Office, 

testified that he would assist Brown in acquiring his high school diploma if he was released. Vinton 

explained the diploma could be earned through a private school that operates remotely, which 

would allow Brown to complete it at home without being around other students. Vinton offered to 

pay for Brown’s tuition.

B. Alleged Facts about the Murder

Summarizing the Texas Rangers’ forty-five-page prosecution letter, the State and Brown’s 

counsel explained to the trial court that Brown and the victim, Elijia Alton Chandler, were together 

in San Antonio before arriving in Castroville the night of Chandler’s alleged murder. Specifically, 

according to the Rangers, Chandler, while driving his truck, shot a man five times at a gas station 

in San Antonio. Brown was a passenger in Chandler’s truck at that time and allegedly helped 

sabotage the car the man Chandler shot was driving. The man shot in San Antonio was Brown’s 

sister’s boyfriend. Brown’s sister is also the mother of Chandler’s child. 

After the shooting at the gas station, Chandler and Brown drove from San Antonio and 

stopped in Castroville, where they looked for a place to bury the gun. Brown and Chandler then 

got into an altercation. According to Brown, he told the Rangers he acted in self-defense. The State 

explained, however, Chandler “had six or seven gunshot wounds to the head from a trajectory that 

showed to the side and from the back of his head.” Brown left Chandler at the scene and took the 

gun and Chandler’s truck and drove back to San Antonio, disposing the gun along the way. Despite 
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Brown’s voluntary statement to the Rangers after being linked to Chandler and the shooting in San 

Antonio, the State argued Brown’s explanation was inconsistent with the evidence found at the 

scene.

C. Trial Court’s Ruling

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court expressed its concerns when considering 

whether to reduce Brown’s bail. Those concerns included Brown not having (1) any community

ties; (2) a job, regardless that Mr. Dorsey stated he could work at his “beer garden” because,

according to the trial court, Brown should not be working in a bar environment; (3) a driver’s 

license; and (4) a real assurance to attend proceedings despite the Dorseys’ promise to bring him

because while the Dorseys made several promises, Brown is an adult and does not have to accept 

the Dorseys’ assistance. Also, important to the trial court was that at the time of the alleged murder, 

Brown was released on bond for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, another felony offense 

alleged to have been committed in Bexar County. This fact indicated to the trial court Brown’s 

inability to follow the rules of a court. Last, the trial court commented on the violent nature of the 

crime at hand, coupled with Brown’s youth, and his apparent association with others involved in 

violent activity, causing the trial court to be concerned for the community’s safety. Based on the 

trial court’s expressed concerns, it denied Brown’s request to reduce his bail. However, the court

expressed its openness to hear additional evidence that could potentially alleviate those concerns

in the future.

DENIAL OF BAIL REDUCTION

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s pretrial bail determination for an abuse of discretion. See Ex parte

Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Ex parte Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d

160, 161 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts 
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without reference to any guiding rules or principles, i.e., in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. 

See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (citation omitted). Merely 

because we might decide a matter differently than how the trial court rules, does not demonstrate

the trial court abused its discretion. Id. We afford “almost total deference to a trial court’s 

determination of the historical facts that the record supports especially when the trial court’s fact 

findings are based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 

85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

The purpose of pretrial bail is to secure the defendant’s appearance at trial to answer the 

accusation against him. Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1980); see also Ex parte Ramirez-Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d 907, 916 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2022, no pet.). Although bail should be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the 

undertaking will be complied with, the power to require bail is not to be used so as to make it an 

instrument of oppression, and excessive bail is prohibited by our state and federal constitutions, as

well as the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Ex parte Ivey, 594 S.W.2d 98, 99 (Tex. Crim. 

App. [Panel Op.] 1980); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 13; TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 1.09, 17.15. Bail determinations are “bounded and guided by our 

state and federal constitutions and state law.” Ex parte Estrada, 398 S.W.3d 723, 724 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2008, no pet). The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate the bail set by the trial 

court is excessive. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 161.

Article 17.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure implements the constitutional right 

to bail. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15. The amount of bail is within the discretion of 

the court, judge, or magistrate setting it, but must be set in accordance with the Texas Constitution 

and the following statutory factors:
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(1) The bail shall be sufficiently high to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking 

will be complied with,

(2) The power to require bail is not to be so used as to make bail an instrument of 

oppression,

(3) The nature of the offense and the circumstances of its commission are to be considered,

including whether the offense involved violence, 

(4) The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken on this point, 

(5) The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense and the community shall be 

considered,

(6) The criminal history of the defendant, including any acts of family violence, other 

pending criminal charges, and any instances in which the defendant failed to appear in 

court following release on bail; and

(7) The citizenship status of the defendant.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(a).

Other relevant factors include: (1) the nature of the offense and possible sentence; (2) the 

defendant’s family and community ties, (3) length of residency; (4) employment history; (5) prior 

criminal record; (6) other outstanding bonds and the defendant’s compliance with previous bond 

conditions; and (7) aggravating factors involved in the alleged offense. Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849-

50.

B. Analysis

Brown argues his bail is oppressive because the bail set by the trial court effectively denies 

him bail. While acknowledging the seriousness of his charged offense and the possible punishment 

range, Brown contends his bail is incommensurate with the facts of his case, namely his claim of 

self-defense, and the evidence presented at the habeas hearing. 

We analyze the article 17.15 and the Rubac factors and weigh them as a whole to arrive at 

an appropriate and reasonable bail that will serve to assure the defendant’s presence in court. Ex 
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parte Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.). Appropriate bail is a 

fact-driven determination, and each case must be judged on its own unique facts. Id. 

1. Nature and Circumstances of the Charged Offenses; Aggravating Factors

When determining reasonable bail, the “primary factors” a trial court shall give the most 

weight to include the nature of the offense and the length of the possible sentence. See Rubac, 611 

S.W.2d at 849. In setting the amount of bail, it is appropriate to consider whether the offense 

alleged to have been committed involves violence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

17.15(a)(3)(A); Perez v. State, 897 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no pet.). If 

the offense is serious and involves a lengthy potential prison sentence, a defendant may have a 

strong incentive to flee the jurisdiction; thus, bail must be set in an amount sufficiently high to 

secure the defendant’s presence at trial. Ex parte Castillo-Lorente, 420 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Because a defendant is entitled to the presumption of 

innocence on all charges, the trial court must, when setting the amount of bail, strike a balance 

between this presumption and the State’s interest in ensuring the defendant will appear for trial.

Ex parte Melartin, 464 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

Brown was charged with murdering Chandler by shooting him. Additionally, according to 

the Texas Rangers’ prosecution letter, Brown shot Chandler six to seven times in the side and back 

of his head, then took Chandler’s truck and drove back to San Antonio, leaving Chandler’s body

where Brown shot him.

Murder is obviously a violent crime as it results in the death of an individual. Its 

commission is a first-degree felony for which the punishment range is life imprisonment or any 

term not more than ninety-nine years or less than five years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 12.32(a), 19.02(b), (c); see also Ex parte Chavfull, 945 S.W.2d 183, 186–87 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding a $750,000 bail not excessive for a defendant charged with 
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murdering individual with a firearm in the commission of a robbery); Ex parte Bartolo, No. 01-

22-00544-CR, 2022 WL 17254957, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2022, pet. 

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming a $500,000 bond for the “serious and 

violent” offense of murder). Therefore, given the seriousness of the charged offense and the 

lengthy potential sentence, this factor weighs against a determination that the bail amount set by 

the trial court is excessive.

2. Prior Criminal History and Bonds

A defendant’s criminal history must be evaluated to determine whether he presents a 

danger to the community. Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d at 69. “A court should also evaluate a defendant’s 

criminal history to discern whether such would create an inference of flight risk.” Id. Brown is 

currently on bond for another felony allegedly committed in Bexar County. While there was no 

testimony Brown has ever been convicted of a previous crime, in addition to the charge from Bexar 

County, for which he is out on bond, Brown was seventeen years old at the time of Chandler’s 

alleged murder. Moreover, Brown and Chandler were also alleged to have been involved in another

shooting in San Antonio soon before Chandler’s death. We conclude these factors weigh against a 

determination that the bail is excessive.

3. Future Safety of Victim and Community

When considering the further safety of the community in setting a defendant’s bail, the

seriousness of the charged offense should be taken into consideration. See Milner v. State, 263 

S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (explaining “the gravity and 

nature of the charges” against a defendant can indicate he presents a risk to the safety of the 

community). Moreover, “the trial court can consider that the defendant’s commission of crimes 

while released on bail warrants a bail sufficient to ensure the safety of the community[.]” Ex parte 

Brossett, 524 S.W.3d 273, 276 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. ref’d).
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Given the seriousness of the first-degree felony offense of murder for which Brown is 

charged and that Brown is accused of committing the murder while released on bail for another 

felony offense, the trial court could have reasonably found that Brown posed a danger to the 

community. Therefore, the potential danger Brown poses to the community weighs against a 

determination that the bail amount is excessive.

4. Community Ties, Residency, and Employment Record

“A defendant’s ties to the community in which he lives can be an assurance he will appear 

in court for trial.” Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d at 68. A court’s review of this factor includes an 

assessment of the defendant’s length of residency, family ties to the community, and work history. 

See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849.

As noted above, Brown provided no evidence of community ties to Medina County, rather 

he grew up in Bexar County, a neighboring county. Other than the Dorseys testifying they would 

provide Brown somewhere to live, Brown presented no evidence of a current residence. Moreover, 

Brown also presented no evidence of employment. Instead, the job Mr. Dorsey offered to provide 

Brown involved a bar-like establishment, and the trial court cautioned this type of job would likely 

not benefit Brown. Given Brown’s young age and considering these factors, they weigh against a 

determination that the bail is excessive.

5. Amount Sufficiently High to Assure Appearance But Not Oppress

Bail needs to be set sufficiently high to provide reasonable assurance the defendant will 

appear for trial. See Ex parte Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d 220, 232 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, 

no pet.). Yet, when bail is set so high that a person cannot realistically pay for it, the trial court 

essentially “displaces the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a guaranteed trial 

appearance.” Id. at 233 (internal quotations omitted). Bail may not be used as an instrument of 

oppression. See Ex parte Guerra, 383 S.W.3d 229, 233–34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no 
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pet.); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(a)(2). Bail set in a particular amount 

becomes oppressive when it assumes the defendant cannot afford bail in that amount, and when it 

is set for the express purpose of forcing the defendant to remain incarcerated. See Nimnicht, 467 

S.W.3d at 70; Ex parte Durst, 148 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no 

pet.) (explaining that when bail amount set “solely to prevent [defendant] from getting out of jail,” 

“bail [was] being used as an instrument of oppression”). Here, no evidence exists that the trial 

court set Brown’s bail amount at $500,000 for the felony offense of murder to keep him

incarcerated. See Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d at 233; Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d at 70; cf. Ex parte Harris, 733 

S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.) (Trial court stated, “I’d rather see him in jail 

than to see someone’s life taken[.]”).

Moreover, we note that the bail amount set here is akin to other cases involving a defendant 

charged with a first-degree felony offense. See Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d at 233 (reviewing the amount 

of bail set in other cases may be instructive); see, e.g., Ex parte Tata, 358 S.W.3d 392, 399 n.6

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d) (“[T]his Court has previously approved bail 

amounts ranging from $100,000 to $600,000 for first[-]degree felony offenses[.]”); Milner, 263 

S.W.3d at 148 (“In other murder cases, $500,000 for bail has been held not to be excessive.”); Ex 

parte Stocker, Nos. 14-20-00467-CR to 14-20-00469-CR, 2020 WL 7711348, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 29, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Recent 

opinions from our sister [appellate] courts support a finding that $500,000 is reasonable bail in a . 

. . murder case[.]”); Ex parte Phillips, No. 05-10-00616-CR, 2010 WL 3548739, *4 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Sept. 14, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (determining $500,000 bail was not 

excessive for first-degree murder charge).

The record lacks evidence indicating the trial court used bail as an instrument of 

oppression, and therefore, this factor weighs against a determination that the bail amount set by 
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the trial court in Brown’s case is excessive. See Montalvo v. State, 315 S.W.3d 588, 596 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“[T]he habeas corpus record . . . does not suggest that 

the trial court deliberately set bail at an excessively high level solely to prevent [the defendant]

from posting bail.”).

6. Ability to Make Bail

“The ability to make bail is to be regarded, and proof may be taken on this point.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(a)(4). “The inability of the [defendant] to pay the amount of 

bail assessed does not render any amount of bail excessive.” Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d at 68. In 

determining bail, indigence is a circumstance to be considered but is not controlling. Ex parte 

Vasquez, 558 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (“Appellant’s indigency is a circumstance 

to be considered, but it is not a controlling circumstance nor the sole criterion in determining the 

amount of bail.”). “If the ability to make bond in a specified amount controlled, then the role of 

the trial court in setting bond would be completely eliminated, and the [defendant] would be in the 

unique posture of determining what his bond should be.” Ex parte Miller, 631 S.W.2d 825, 827 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref’d).

A defendant should ordinarily offer evidence of his available resources and his 

unsuccessful attempts to post bail in the current amount. See Ex parte Dueitt, 529 S.W.2d 531, 532 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1975). “To show that he is unable to make bail, a defendant generally must show 

that his funds and his family’s funds have been exhausted.” Ex parte Castellanos, 420 S.W.3d 878, 

883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). “Unless he has shown that his funds and 

those of his family have been exhausted, a defendant must usually show that he made an 

unsuccessful effort to furnish bail before bail can be determined to be excessive.” Milner, 263 

S.W.3d at 149. “If both the defendant and his family indicate a financial inability to procure a 

surety bond, the court will not require him to do a useless thing.” Id. at 149–50 (internal quotations 
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omitted). Brown’s inability to pay the amount of bail assessed does not render the amount of bail 

excessive. See Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d at 68. 

At the time of the hearing, Brown did not provide any evidence of his ability to pay 

anything towards his bail. However, Brown was seventeen years old when the alleged offense was 

committed, turning eighteen in custody. Mr. and Mrs. Dorsey explained Brown’s other family

members could not help at all, and while the Dorseys had assets, they could not exhaust them to 

the degree sufficient to pay Brown’s present bail. We conclude Brown did not provide evidence 

of his personal finances, but evidence was provided by the Dorseys that Brown’s family had no 

resources to contribute towards his bail. And while the Dorseys offered to contribute to paying

Brown’s bail, they could not exhaust their resources.

C. Conclusion 

Brown had the burden to show that the bail amount set by the trial court was excessive. See 

Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 161. Given the balance of all the relevant 

factors discussed above, we conclude Brown failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in 

setting Brown’s bail at $500,000 for the first-degree felony offense of murder and denying 

Brown’s request to reduce his bail. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50; Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 

161. We overrule Brown’s first issue.

VIOLATION OF RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

In his second issue, Brown argues the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against 

self-incrimination by “stating that it needed to hear from [Brown] directly before it would grant a 

bond reduction.” See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Specifically, Brown claims that while the trial court

explained its reasoning for denying his bail reduction request but willingness to hear additional 

evidence in any subsequent requests, the trial court insinuated Brown would have to testify before 

it would reduce his bail.
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To the contrary, during the trial court’s explanation of its ruling, it clarified more than once 

that it was not “saying [Brown] has to testify,” or that the trial court was “going to encourage him 

to get up here and testify even for the limited purposes” of requesting a bond reduction We 

conclude the trial court did not violate Brown’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 

Brown’s second issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Brown’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Brown’s

pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. 

Irene Rios, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH