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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 7, 2017 

v No. 328474 

Wayne Circuit Court 

ALVIN PERRY JORDAN, LC No. 15-000968-01-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and STEPHENS and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 A jury convicted defendant, Alvin Perry Jordan, of first-degree premeditated murder, 

MCL 750.316(1)(a), first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), armed robbery, MCL 

750.529, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 

750.227b.1 The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole for each murder conviction, and to 15 years to life imprisonment for the robbery 

conviction, those sentences to be served concurrently, but consecutive to a two-year term of 

imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand 

for resentencing on his armed robbery conviction, and for correction of the judgment of sentence 

to specify one conviction for first-degree murder, supported by two different theories. 

 Defendant’s convictions arise from the December 29, 2014 shooting death of Will 

Wright, who was shot and killed during a robbery after a drug sale. Testimony at trial indicated 

that Wright went to an apartment building to sell narcotic pills to Tanzania Corbin, the mother of 

defendant’s girlfriend. After the sale, as Wright was exiting the building, he was approached by 

defendant. According to a witness, Lee Butler, the two men struggled over a gun. Defendant 

prevailed and Wright attempted to run away, but defendant shot him in the back. Defendant 

thereafter went through Wright’s pockets and then left. 

 Both Corbin and Wright’s friend, Nathan Lemons, who had accompanied Wright to the 

apartment building, denied that Wright was armed with a gun. Corbin also denied seeing 

defendant with a gun on the date of the offense, but admitted seeing him with a gun the day 

 

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 The jury acquitted defendant of an additional count of felonious assault. 
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before. According to Corbin, after she heard two gunshots outside her apartment, defendant 

returned to her apartment and told her that he had shot Wright. Defendant removed his jacket, 

placed it in a closet, and then left. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and seized a hooded 

sweatshirt during a search of Corbin’s apartment. The sweatshirt contained blood, and DNA 

testing confirmed that the blood matched Wright’s DNA. Defendant was also identified as a 

“possible contributor” to DNA taken from blood found under fingernail clippings from Wright’s 

left hand. 

I. SELF-DEFENSE 

 On appeal, we first address defendant’s argument that defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to request a jury instruction on self-defense, despite alluding to such a theory during his 

closing argument. Because defendant did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a 

motion for a new trial or request an evidentiary hearing, our review of this issue is limited to 

errors apparent from the record. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 

(2000), citing People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 

 Whether a person has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question 

of fact and constitutional law. People v Jordan, 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). 

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that: (1) counsel’s 

representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and (2) but for counsel’s 

deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would 

have been different. People v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 669; 821 NW2d 288 (2012), citing 

Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688-694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). This 

Court presumes that defense counsel rendered effective assistance and exercised reasonable 

professional judgment in all significant decisions. Vaughn, 491 Mich at 670. Defendant must 

“overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s performance was born from a sound trial 

strategy.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). Because defendant 

bears the burden of demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice, he necessarily bears 

the burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 

600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). 

 Whether to request a particular jury instruction can be a matter of trial strategy, and 

counsel is given wide discretion with regard to matters of strategy. People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 

636, 644-645; 664 NW2d 159 (2003); People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d 557 

(2007). Although defense counsel discussed Butler’s testimony that he saw two men wrestling 

over a gun, counsel used this testimony, not to argue self-defense, but to argue that defendant 

could not be guilty of premeditated or felony-murder, and, at most, was guilty only of seconddegree murder due to the lack of time to premeditate. Counsel also argued that the prosecution 

had not shown that defendant took anything from Wright. Counsel further argued that someone 

else, perhaps a bystander, could have taken the gun after the shooting. 

 We cannot conclude that counsel’s decision to pursue this line of strategy, and to not 

request a self-defense instruction, was objectively unreasonable, particularly considering the lack 

of evidence supporting a legally viable claim of self-defense. A person is entitled to use deadly 

force in self-defense if the person honestly and reasonably believes “that he is in imminent 

danger of death or great bodily harm and that it is necessary for him to exercise deadly force[.]” 
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People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 119; 649 NW2d 30 (2002). A person who acts as the initial 

aggressor cannot be found to have acted in justifiable self-defense. People v Guajardo, 300 

Mich App 26, 35-36, 43; 832 NW2d 409 (2013). Apart from Butler’s testimony describing an 

actual struggle for the weapon, very little other evidence supported a finding that defendant acted 

in self-defense. Indeed, the great body of evidence directly refuted such a theory. Although 

Butler described a struggle over the gun, he also stated that the gun was never in Wright’s hands 

while the two men were wrestling. Moreover, Butler testified that after defendant prevailed in 

the struggle, Wright was trying to run away when defendant shot him. The physical evidence 

confirmed that Wright was shot in the back from a distance of more than two feet, at an angle 

consistent with someone bent over trying to run away. Lemons stated that Wright was unarmed, 

and Corbin similarly stated that she had never seen Wright with a gun. Lemons also testified that 

it was defendant who approached Wright as Wright was exiting the apartment building after the 

drug sale. No evidence indicated that Wright approached or attacked defendant, or acted as an 

initial aggressor in the confrontation with defendant. Defendant did not testify about his own 

version of the shooting, or offer any witnesses who were supportive of a self-defense claim. 

 Given this evidence, counsel’s strategy to attack the element of premeditation and to 

argue the lack of evidence of an underlying felony to support the felony-murder charge was not 

objectively unreasonable. Moreover, to the extent that the testimony describing a struggle over 

the gun could be deemed minimally sufficient to support a self-defense instruction, considering 

the lack of other evidence supporting a self-defense claim, and the body of evidence refuting any 

legal claim of self-defense, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have 

been different if a self-defense instruction had been requested and given. Therefore, defendant 

was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request the instruction.2

II. DEFENDANT’S LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES 

 Defendant argues that his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole violates the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment 

considering his age, 18 years, at the time of the offense. Because defendant did not challenge the 

constitutionality of his mandatory life sentence in the trial court, this issue is unpreserved. 

Accordingly, we review this issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People 

v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). 

 As defendant observes, in Miller v Alabama, 567 US ___ ; 132 S Ct 2455, 2460; 183 L 

Ed 2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that a sentence of “mandatory life 

without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” The Court explained the 

 

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 We also reject any suggestion that defense counsel improperly conceded defendant’s guilt of 

second-degree murder during counsel’s closing argument. Initially, we note that counsel 

specifically stated that he was not making such a claim. Regardless, the decision whether to 

concede guilt on a lesser is a matter of trial strategy, which this Court will not second-guess. 

People v Emerson (After Remand), 203 Mich App 345, 349; 512 NW2d 3 (1994). 
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rationale behind drawing a distinction between 18-year-old offenders and their younger 

counterparts, stating: 

To recap: Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of 

his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, 

impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking 

into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from 

which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or 

dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including 

the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer 

pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been 

charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated 

with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors 

(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys . . . . 

And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation 

even when the circumstances most suggest it. [Id., 132 S Ct at 2468.] 

 On appeal, defendant urges this Court to extend the holding in Miller to 18-year-old 

offenders. As discussed by this Court in People v Skinner, 312 Mich App 15, 23-27; 877 NW2d 

482 (2015), the Miller decision represents a culmination of several decisions by the United States 

Supreme Court over the last 30 years that have gradually eased the automatic imposition of harsh 

sentencing for young offenders. As noted in Skinner, these decisions are based on the perceived 

differences between juvenile offenders and those who have reached the age of majority. Id. at 

23-27. In contrast, defendant points only to a study noting that young adult brains share common 

risk-taking or impulse control features with those of juveniles. Defendant’s study does support a 

position that, globally, mandatory life sentences for young offenders who have not reached full 

brain development is somehow unfair, or that the distinction between a 17-year-old and an 18-

year-old is somehow “pure legal fiction.” Any philosophical merit to defendant’s position aside, 

defendant points to no legal authority to support his position. Accordingly, we decline 

defendant’s invitation to extend Miller to 18-year-old offenders. The trial court did not violate 

the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by adhering to the demarcation 

between those who have attained the age of 18 years and those under 18 years of age, and by 

thereby imposing the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for defendant’s 

conviction of first-degree murder. 

 We agree with defendant, however, that the trial court erred by entering a judgment of 

sentence reflecting two convictions and two life sentences for first-degree murder. Although the 

jury found defendant guilty of both first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony 

murder, because the two convictions arise from the death of a single victim, they violate the 

double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. People v Long, 

246 Mich App 582, 588; 633 NW2d 843 (2001). Accordingly, we remand for modification of 

the judgment of sentence to specify a single conviction of first-degree murder supported by two 

theories: premeditated murder and felony murder. Id.; People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App 218, 

220-221; 581 NW2d 744 (1998). 

III. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF 
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 Defendant raises additional issues in a pro se supplemental brief filed pursuant to 

Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4. 

A. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 

 Defendant challenges the admission at trial of (1) photographs of him that were obtained 

from his cell phone, and (2) the hooded sweatshirt recovered by the police during their search of 

Corbin’s apartment. Defendant argues that each of these items should have been excluded as 

evidence because they were obtained through an illegal search. Defendant acknowledges that he 

never challenged the admissibility of this evidence in the trial court, leaving the issues 

unpreserved. Therefore, our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial 

rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. To constitute a “plain” error, the error must be “clear or 

obvious.” Id. Defendant further argues, however, that defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to seek suppression of this evidence. Because defendant did not raise an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim in an appropriate motion in the trial court, review of that issue is 

limited to errors apparent from the record. Snider, 239 Mich App at 423. 

 “In general, searches conducted without both a warrant and probable cause to believe 

evidence of wrongdoing might be located at the place searched are unreasonable per se.” 

Lavigne v Forshee, 307 Mich App 530, 537; 861 NW2d 635 (2014). Unless an exception 

applies, evidence that has been seized in violation of the constitutional prohibition against 

unreasonable searches and seizures must be excluded from trial. Id. at 537-538; People v 

Chowdhury, 285 Mich App 509, 516; 775 NW2d 845 (2009). 

 Defendant correctly asserts that a warrant is generally required before the police may 

lawfully search a suspect’s phone. Riley v California, ___ US ___; 134 S Ct 2473, 2494-2495; 

189 L Ed 2d 430 (2014); People v Gingrich, 307 Mich App 656, 665-666; 862 NW2d 432 

(2014). Although defendant argues that the police unlawfully searched his phone, he points to 

no evidence addressing the circumstances under which the police obtained the photos or other 

data from his phone. The lower court record discloses that plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to 

admit photos obtained from defendant’s cell phone. Plaintiff’s brief in support of that motion 

specifically states that “[a] search warrant was executed on the contents of Defendant’s cell 

phone that resulted in 692 images being recovered.” Defendant never challenged the veracity of 

that statement, and he has presented nothing on appeal to indicate that this assertion is false or 

inaccurate, that the referenced warrant was somehow defective, or to establish any other 

irregularity. Because the record indicates that the cell phone photos were obtained pursuant to a 

search warrant, and defendant has not presented anything to suggest otherwise, we conclude that 

defendant has failed to demonstrate a plain error related to the seizure or admission of the cell 

phone photographs. Furthermore, absent any basis for concluding that the cell phone photos 

were illegally obtained, defendant’s related ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot 

succeed. Counsel is not required to raise a meritless issue. People v Moorer, 262 Mich App 64, 

76, 683 NW2d 736 (2004). 

 Defendant also challenges the admission of the hooded sweatshirt that the police 

recovered during a search of Corbin’s home shortly after the offense. “One established 

exception to the general warrant and probable cause requirements is a search conducted pursuant 

to consent.” People v Borchard–Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 294, 597 NW2d 1 (1999). “The 
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consent exception to the warrant requirement allows a search and seizure when consent is 

unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.” People v Frohriep, 247 Mich App 

692, 702; 637 NW2d 562 (2001) (quotation omitted). Defendant lacks standing to assert this 

issue. “The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is personal, and the right 

cannot be invoked by a third party.” People v Mahdi, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ 

(2016); slip op at 5. Therefore, defense counsel’s stipulation to the sweatshirt’s admission was 

not ineffective assistance and we deny defendant’s request for a remand on this issue. 

 

B. JURY VERDICT FORM 

 Defendant next argues that the jury verdict form was defective because it did not allow 

the jury to choose a “general not guilty” option in which it could find defendant not guilty of all 

charges. Defendant acknowledges that there was no objection to the verdict form at trial. Thus, 

this issue is unpreserved and our review is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial 

rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. We find no merit to this issue. 

 Defendant correctly observes that “a criminal defendant is deprived of his constitutional 

right to a jury trial when the jury is not given the opportunity to return a general verdict of not 

guilty.” People v Wade, 283 Mich App 462, 467; 771 NW2d 447, lv den 486 Mich 909 (2009). 

However, this is not what occurred here. The jury verdict form used at trial presented the jury 

with the following options for count 1, first-degree premeditated murder: 

____ NOT GUILTY 

OR 

____ GUILTY OF HOMICIDE –MURDER FIRST DEGREE-PREMEDITATED 

OR 

____ GUILTY OF THE LESS SERIOUS OFFENSE OF HOMICIDE- MURDER 

SECOND DEGREE [Jury verdict form, p 1.] 

Similar options, including a specific “not guilty” option, were provided for each of the other 

charged offenses. The verdict form clearly provided the jury with the option of finding 

defendant “not guilty” of each charged offense. Thus, there was no error, plain or otherwise. In 

addition, because defense counsel is not required to raise a meritless issue, Moorer, 262 Mich 

App at 76, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the verdict form. 

C. ARMED ROBBERY SENTENCE 

 Defendant also argues, and we agree, that the trial court erred when it imposed a sentence 

of 15 years to life for defendant’s armed robbery conviction. The trial court’s sentence violates 

MCL 769.9(2), which provides that “[t]he court shall not impose a sentence in which the 

maximum penalty is life imprisonment with a minimum for a term of years included in the same 

sentence.” A violation of MCL 769.9(2) renders a sentence wholly invalid and requires 
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resentencing de novo. People v Parish, 282 Mich App 106, 108; 761 NW2d 441 (2009). 

Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s invalid sentence for armed robbery and remand for 

resentencing on that offense. 

 We affirm defendant’s convictions, but vacate his sentence for armed robbery and 

remand for resentencing on that offense, and remand for correction of the judgment of sentence 

to specify a single conviction for first-degree murder, supported by two different theories. We 

do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause