Some personal identifiers have been redacted for privacy purposes.

 United States of America

 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

 1120 20th Street, N.W., Ninth Floor

 Washington, DC 20036-3457

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v. OSHRC DOCKET Nos.

20-1029, 20-1030, 20-1031, 20-1032, & 20-1042

JUAN G. QUEVEDO-GARCIA,

Respondent.

APPEARANCES:

For the Complainant:

Alexander M. Kondo, Senior Trial Attorney

B. Carina De La Paz, Trial Attorney

U.S. Department of Labor

New York City, New York

For the Respondent:

Richard P. Galler, Esquire

Hackensack, New Jersey

BEFORE: William S. Coleman

U. S. Administrative Law Judge

DECISION AND ORDER

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the sole issue remaining to 

be decided, which may be stated as follows: 

Issue: Does a genuine dispute of material fact exist on whether the 

evidence does, or does not, constitute “clear and convincing 

evidence” to hold the Respondent, Mr. Quevedo-Garcia, personally 

liable for OSHA violations and penalties that have been assessed 

against his closely-held company (BB Frame LLC) by piercing the 

corporate veil of that company?
2

Decision: The whole of the evidence on the cross-motions permits 

only one reasonable conclusion––that the evidence is clear and 

convincing that BB Frame LLC has not operated as an entity 

separate from Quevedo-Garcia and that he has abused the 

company’s corporate form to circumvent the Occupational Safety 

and Health Act of 1970 (Act or OSH Act) and avoid the Act’s 

expressed purpose and policy. The Secretary is therefore entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law that the company’s corporate form 

should be disregarded to hold Quevedo-Garcia personally liable for 

the company’s OSHA violations and penalties.

Accordingly, as set forth below, the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and 

the Secretary’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.

FACTS

(Of Which No Genuine Dispute Has Been Shown)

The evidentiary material considered on the cross-motions for summary judgment reflects

no genuine dispute as to the following facts:

Quevedo-Garcia and Related Closely-Held Companies

1. The Respondent, Mr. Juan G. Quevedo Garcia (Quevedo-Garcia or Respondent), is an 

individual whose primary residence is [redacted], Palisades Park, New Jersey (Quevedo-Garcia

Residence). (Exs. 1 & 4 to Declaration of Alexander Kondo, Oct. 15, 2021 [Kondo Decl.]) 

2. Quevedo-Garcia was originally cited along with BB Frame LLC (BB Frame) for the 

violations and proposed penalties that remain here alleged against Quevedo-Garcia alone. As to 

BB Frame, the alleged violations and penalties subsequently became final orders against it, as 

detailed infra.

BB Frame LLC (BB Frame)

3. BB Frame was organized as a New Jersey limited liability company on April 13, 2017 

and was voluntarily dissolved about 42 months later, on November 19, 2020. (Exs. 9 & 10 to 

Kondo Decl.). Quevedo-Garcia owned 70% of BB Frame and was its only officer, serving as its 
3

president. Quevedo-Garcia’s sister, Magda Quevedo-Garcia, was the only other member of BB 

Frame, owning 30%. (Exs. 7 & 8 to Kondo Decl.; Quevedo-Garcia Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Sept. 23, 2021 [Quevedo-Garcia Mot.] ¶ 10). BB Frame maintained its principal office 

and place of business at the Quevedo-Garcia Residence. (Ex. 4 to Kondo Decl.). 

4. BB Frame was a construction contractor engaged mainly in framing small to medium 

sized residential structures. (Exs. 4 & 31 to Kondo Decl.; Quevedo-Garcia Mot. ¶¶ 1 & 10). 

5. Quevedo-Garcia was the only person authorized to hire, terminate, direct, train or 

discipline employees of BB Frame. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.). Quevedo-Garcia was the only 

person to sign contracts, work orders, and service agreements with customers on behalf of BB 

Frame. (Ex. 4 to Kondo Decl.). Quevedo-Garcia was the only person authorized to withdraw 

money from the bank accounts of BB Frame. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.).

6. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence relating to BB Frame’s 

formation, operations, and dissolution in support of his motion for summary judgment was 

substantially impeded by Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against 

compulsory self-incrimination, which Quevedo-Garcia first formally asserted through counsel on 

July 16, 2021, and which he has thereafter maintained. (As described infra in the Discussion, the 

undersigned sustained Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege in orders 

that denied discovery motions filed by the Secretary.)

Frame Q LLC (Frame Q)

7. Frame Q LLC (“Frame Q”) was organized as a New Jersey limited liability company 

on January 21, 2013 with Quevedo-Garcia as the sole owner and its president. (Exs. 2, 3, 31 to

Kondo Decl.; Quevedo-Garcia Mot. ¶ 1). Frame Q maintained its principal office and place of 

business at the Quevedo-Garcia Residence. (Exs. 2, 3, & 4 to Kondo Decl.). Frame Q was 

voluntarily dissolved on April 7, 2019. (Exs. 5 & 6, Kondo). 
4

8. Frame Q was a construction contractor engaged mainly in framing small to medium 

sized residential structures. (Exs. 4 & 31 to Kondo Decl.; Quevedo-Garcia Mot. ¶ 1). 

Quevedo-Garcia was the only person authorized to hire, terminate, direct, train or discipline 

employees of Frame Q. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.). Quevedo-Garcia was the only person to sign 

contracts, work orders, and service agreements with customers on behalf of Frame Q. (Ex. 4 to 

Kondo Decl.). Quevedo-Garcia was the only person authorized to withdraw money from the bank 

accounts of Frame Q. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.).

BM Frame LLC (BM Frame)

9. BM Frame LLC (BM Frame) was organized as a New Jersey limited liability company 

on December 24, 2019 with two members––Quevedo-Garcia (75% owner) and Hector F. Roca 

(25% owner). (Exs. 1, 11 & 12 to Kondo Decl.). At the time of its formation, BM Frame sought 

and obtained authorization from the State of New Jersey to operate under the alternate name of 

“BB Frame.” (Exs. 12 & 13 to Kondo Decl.).

10. BM Frame sought and obtained a license from the State of New Jersey as a home 

improvement contractor and is engaged in framing small to medium sized residential structures. 

(Exs. 12 & 29 to Kondo Decl.). BM Frame maintains its principal office and place of business at 

the Quevedo-Garcia Residence. (Ex. 12 to Kondo Decl.).

11. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence relating to BM Frame’s 

formation and operations in support of his motion for summary judgment was substantially 

impeded by Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 

self-incrimination.

Q Properties LLC, Q Properties II LLC, and Q Nails Boutique LLC

12. Q Properties LLC (Q Properties) is a limited liability company formed on February 

5, 2018, with an address at the Quevedo-Garcia Residence. Quevedo-Garcia owns 60% and his 
5

sister Magda owns 40%. Q Properties is in the business of renting and selling real estate. (Exs. 1, 

3 & 14 to Kondo Decl.).

13. A company named Q Properties II LLC (Q Properties II) has an address at the 

Quevedo-Garcia Residence. (Kondo Decl. ¶ 16). There is no information in the record regarding 

the identity of the owners of Q Properties II, but in 2020, BM Frame issued checks totaling $18,000 

payable to Q Properties II, as described infra.

14. A company named Q Nails Boutique LLC (Q Nails) is a limited liability company 

solely owned by Quevedo-Garcia’s sister, Magda. In the spring of 2020, Quevedo-Garcia wrote 

four checks from BM Frame’s checking account totaling $11,600 for the apparent benefit of 

Q Nails, as described infra. (Ex. 36 to Kondo Decl.).

15. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence relating to Q Properties, 

Q Properties II, and Q Nails in support of his motion for summary judgment was substantially 

impeded by Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 

self-incrimination.

Citations and Proposed Penalties Precipitating These

Consolidated Cases (Nos. 20-1029, et al).

16. These five consolidated cases involve five separate citations that were originally 

issued to both BB Frame and to Quevedo-Garcia. The five citations alleged a total of 33 separate 

violations of construction industry workplace safety and health standards codified in 29 C.F.R. pt. 

1926, that are alleged to have occurred over a period of about three months from December 5, 

2019 to March 2, 2020. Of the 33 alleged violations, thirteen were classified as serious, twelve 

were classified as repeat, and eight were classified as willful. Among the alleged repeat and willful 

violations were the following:

a. All five citations alleged either a willful or a repeat violation of fall protection in 
6

residential construction standard, codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(13). 

b. All five citations alleged either a willful or a repeat violation of the eye and face 

protection standard codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.102(a)(1).

c. Three of the five citations alleged repeat violations of the head protection standard 

codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.100(a).

d. The citations collectively set forth nine alleged violations of the Stairways and Ladders 

standard codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926, subpt. X. Three of those alleged violations were classified 

as repeat violations, and two others were classified as willful violations.

17. The five citations proposed penalties totaling $2,004,225. The details of each of these 

five citations are described in following ¶¶ 18–53.

Case 20-1029

(Inspection 1450621 Opened on Dec. 5, 2019)

18. On December 5, 2019, a compliance safety and health officer (CO) from the area 

office of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in Hasbrouck Heights, New 

Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1450621 at a residential construction site in Cliffside 

Park, New Jersey at 700 Palisades Avenue. BB Frame was engaged in construction activities at 

this worksite at this time. BB Frame’s president, Quevedo-Garcia, was present at the worksite and 

spoke with the CO.

19. Quevedo-Garcia told the CO that the name of his business doing the construction 

work was Frame Q and that the employees at the site were Frame Q employees. He said this even 

though Frame Q had been formally dissolved eight months earlier in April 2019. Two trucks 

present at the worksite displayed logos for Frame Q on the sides and rear of the trucks, and at the 

time of the inspection the registered owner of at least one of the trucks remained Frame Q. 

(Sydenstricker Decl. ¶¶ 13–15).
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20. About four months after the inspection, in April 2000, an attorney for 

Quevedo-Garcia informed OSHA that Frame Q was out of business. (Sydenstricker Decl.). OSHA 

determined thereafter that BB Frame was the company performing the construction work at the 

site on December 5, 2019 (although the evidence of record does not reveal how OSHA arrived at 

this determination).

21. On June 2, 2020, OSHA issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty to both the 

company, BB Frame, and to the individual, Quevedo-Garcia. The citation identified BB Frame to 

be doing business as “Frame Q LLC.” The citation alleged also that BB Frame was the successor 

company of Frame Q. The citation against BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia alleged nine violations

(four classified as serious, three as willful, and two as repeated). The citation proposed penalties 

totaling $520,860.

22. The citation alleged that the two “repeated” classifications were predicated on prior 

violations by Frame Q that had become final orders in 2017. 

23. One of the alleged willful violations cited the standard for fall protection in residential 

construction, which is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(13), alleging two separate instances 

that had occurred on December 5 and on December 6. 

24. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia timely contested the citation and proposed penalties,

and the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission)

subsequently docketed the matter and assigned it docket number 20-1029. The Secretary then 

filed a complaint alleging that both BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia “are employers within the 

meaning of section 3(5) of the Act” and realleging against both BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia 

all the violations and proposed penalties described in the citation. The complaint alleged further 

that Quevedo-Garcia “as owner and principal of both BB Frame LLC and Frame Q LLC, abused 
8

the corporate form in an attempt to evade liability for prior violations” of the OSH Act. (Compl.

¶ II & III, Aug. 27, 2020).

25. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia duly filed a joint answer that generally denied the 

allegations of the complaint. In the joint answer, BB Frame expressly denied that BB Frame was 

the successor company to Frame Q, and Quevedo-Garcia expressly denied any personal liability 

for the violations alleged. (Answer, Sept. 11, 2020). The joint answer interposed “separate 

defenses” as follows (among others not described): (a) “BB Frame is not a successor to Frame Q, 

but is separate and a distinct corporation,”, (b) “[Quevedo-Garcia] individually has no liability and 

no relationship of any kind, nor responsibility to” the Complainant, and (c) “Any relationship by 

and between [Respondents] and [Complainant] were corporate in nature and not personal.”

26. BB Frame later withdrew its notice of contest respecting case number 20-1029 (as 

well as its notices of contest in the four other cases with which it has been consolidated, as reflected 

in the caption). (Withdrawal, Apr. 5, 2021). After that withdrawal, the undersigned issued an 

order severing BB Frame from case 20-1029 and further severing BB Frame from the four other 

cases with which case 20-1029 was consolidated. Upon BB Frame’s severance from case 20-1029, 

the claims against BB Frame were assigned to a newly opened Commission case with docket 

number 21-0635. 

27. As a result of BB Frame’s withdrawal of its notice of contest in case 20-1029, the 

violations and proposed penalties set forth in the citation issued to BB Frame on June 2, 2020 that 

arose out of inspection 1450621 became a final order against BB Frame in case 21-0635 on August 

23, 2021.

28. After the severance of BB Frame from case 20-1029 (and the consolidated cases 

reflected in the caption) Quevedo-Garcia remained the sole respondent. The parties executed a 
9

formal stipulation in which Quevedo-Garcia expressly agreed to “waive[] any defense to the 

Citations and Notifications of Penalty other than the defense that [he] should not be held liable for 

the Citations and Notifications of Penalty in his individual capacity.” (Stipulation, May 22, 2021). 

Case 20-1030

(Inspection 1470364 Opened on Dec. 31, 2019)

29. On December 31, 2019, a CO from OSHA’s area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New 

Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1470364 at a residential construction site in Fort Lee, 

New Jersey at 2400 6th Street. BB Frame was engaged in construction activities at this worksite 

at this time. BB Frame’s president, Quevedo-Garcia, was present at the worksite and spoke with 

the CO. The same trucks that displayed logos of Frame Q that were present at the Cliffside Park 

worksite on December 5, 2019, were present at the Fort Lee worksite. (Sydenstricker Decl.). 

30. On June 2, 2020, after having been informed by an attorney for Quevedo-Garcia that 

Frame Q was no longer in business, OSHA issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty to both 

the company, BB Frame, and to the individual, Mr. Quevedo-Garcia. The citation identified BB 

Frame to be doing business as “Frame Q LLC.” The citation alleged also that BB Frame was the 

successor company of Frame Q LLC. The citation alleged two serious, three willful, and one 

repeat violations and proposed penalties totaling $433,146. The citation alleged that the 

classification for the “repeat” violation was predicated on a prior violation by Frame Q that had

become a final order in 2017. One of the alleged willful violations cited the standard for fall 

protection in residential construction, codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(13). 

31. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia timely contested the citation and proposed penalties, 

and the Commission subsequently docketed the matter and assigned it docket number 20-1030. 

The Secretary then filed a complaint setting forth allegations substantially identical to those

described supra in ¶ 24 in connection with case 20-1029. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia duly 
10

filed a joint answer that was identical to the joint answer filed in case 20-1029 described supra in 

¶ 25. 

32. BB Frame later withdrew its notice of contest respecting case number 20-1030 and 

the other four consolidated cases reflected in the caption above. (Withdrawal, Apr. 5, 2021). After 

that withdrawal, the undersigned issued an order severing BB Frame from case 20-1030 and from 

the other consolidated cases. Upon BB Frame’s severance from case 20-1030, the claims against 

BB Frame were assigned to a newly opened Commission case with docket number 21-0636. The 

violations and proposed penalties set forth in the citation issued to BB Frame on June 2, 2020 that 

arose out of inspection 1470364 became a final order against BB Frame in case 21-0636 on August 

23, 2021. 

33. After the severance of BB Frame from case 20-1030 (and the consolidated cases 

reflected in the caption) Quevedo-Garcia remained the sole respondent. The parties executed a 

formal stipulation in which Quevedo-Garcia waived all defenses other than the defense that he 

should not be held personally liable as described supra in ¶ 28.

Case 20-1042

(Inspection 1470345 Opened on Jan. 7, 2020)

34. On January 7, 2020, a CO from OSHA’s area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New 

Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1470345 of a residential construction site in Cliffside 

Park, New Jersey at 671 Grove Avenue. BB Frame was engaged in construction activities at this 

worksite. BB Frame’s president, Quevedo-Garcia, was present at the worksite and spoke with the 

CO. The same trucks displaying logos of Frame Q that were present at the two BB Frame

worksites in December 2019 as described above were present at the Grove Avenue worksite. 

(Sydenstricker Decl.). 

35. On June 2, 2020, after having been informed by an attorney for Quevedo-Garcia that 
11

Frame Q was no longer in business, OSHA issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty to both 

the company, BB Frame, and to the individual, Mr. Quevedo-Garcia. The citation identified BB 

Frame to be doing business as “Frame Q LLC.” The citation alleged one serious and four repeat 

violations and proposed penalties totaling $405,588. 

36. The citation alleged that the classifications for the three “repeat” violations were 

predicated on prior violations by Frame Q that had become final orders in 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, 

and 2019. One of the alleged repeat violations cited the fall protection in residential construction 

standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(13), and averred that Frame Q had violated that standard eight 

times before in separate violations that had become final orders between October 3, 2013 and

February 6, 2019, and further that five of those prior violations of Frame Q had been classified as 

repeated and two had been classified as willful.

37. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia timely contested the citation and proposed penalties, 

and the Commission subsequently docketed the matter and assigned it docket number 20-1042. 

The Secretary then filed a complaint setting forth allegations substantially identical to those 

described supra in ¶ 24 in connection with case 20-1029. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia duly 

filed a joint answer that was identical to the joint answer filed in case 20-1029 described supra in 

¶ 25.

38. BB Frame later withdrew its notice of contest respecting case number 20-1042 and 

the other four consolidated cases reflected in the caption above. (Withdrawal, Apr. 5, 2021). After 

that withdrawal, the undersigned issued an order severing BB Frame from case 20-1042 and from 

the other consolidated cases. Upon BB Frame’s severance from case 20-1042, the claims against 

BB Frame were assigned to a newly opened Commission case with docket number 21-0639. The 

violations and proposed penalties set forth in the citation issued to BB Frame on June 2, 2020 that 
12

arose out of inspection 1470356 became a final order against BB Frame in case 21-0639 on August 

23, 2021. 

39. After the severance of BB Frame from case 20-1042 (and the consolidated cases 

reflected in the caption) Quevedo-Garcia remained the sole respondent. The parties executed a 

formal stipulation in which Quevedo-Garcia waived all defenses other than the defense that he 

should not be held personally liable as described supra in ¶ 28. 

Case 20-1031

(Inspection 1464272 Opened on Feb. 20, 2020)

40. On February 20, 2020, a CO from OSHA’s area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New 

Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1464272 of a residential construction site in Palisades 

Park, New Jersey at 20 West Central Boulevard. BB Frame was engaged in construction activities 

at this worksite. BB Frame’s president, Quevedo-Garcia, was present at the worksite and spoke 

with the CO. The same trucks that displayed logos of Frame Q that were present at the BB Frame’s 

worksites on December 5 & 31, 2019, and on January 7, 2020, as described above were present at 

this worksite on February 20, 2020. (Sydenstricker Decl.).

41. On June 2, 2020, after having been informed by an attorney for Quevedo-Garcia that 

Frame Q was no longer in business, OSHA issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty to both 

the company, BB Frame, and to the individual, Mr. Quevedo-Garcia. The citation identified BB 

Frame to be doing business as “Frame Q LLC.” The citation alleged one serious, one willful, and 

two repeat violations and proposed penalties totaling $274,892. 

42. The violation alleged to have been “willful” cited the fall protection standard for 

residential construction, which is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(13). That willful citation 

item alleged that the company Frame Q LLC had violated that standard seven times previously, 

with those violations having become final orders in 2017, 2018, and 2019, and with all seven of 
13

those prior violations having been classified as either willful or repeat violations. 

43. The citation alleged that the classifications of the two “repeat” violations were

predicated on prior violations by Frame Q that had become final orders in 2017, 2018, and 2019. 

44. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia timely contested the citation and proposed penalties, 

and the Commission subsequently docketed the matter and assigned it docket number 20-1031. 

The Secretary then filed a complaint setting forth allegations substantially identical to those 

described supra in ¶ 24 in connection with case 20-1029. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia duly 

filed a joint answer that was identical to the joint answer filed in case 20-1029 described supra in 

¶ 25.

45. BB Frame later withdrew its notice of contest respecting case number 20-1031 and 

the other four consolidated cases reflected in the caption above. (Withdrawal, Apr. 5, 2021). After 

that withdrawal, the undersigned issued an order severing BB Frame from case 20-1031 and from

the other consolidated cases. Upon BB Frame’s severance from case 20-1031, the claims against 

BB Frame were assigned to a newly opened Commission case with docket number 21-0637. The 

violations and proposed penalties set forth in the citation issued to BB Frame on June 2, 2020 that 

arose out of inspection 1464272 became a final order against BB Frame in case 21-0637 on August 

23, 2021. 

46. After the severance of BB Frame from case 20-1031 (and the consolidated cases 

reflected in the caption) Quevedo-Garcia remained the sole respondent. The parties executed a 

formal stipulation in which Quevedo-Garcia waived all defenses other than the defense that he 

should not be held personally liable as described supra in ¶ 28.

Case 20-1032

(Inspection 1466351 Opened on Feb. 28, 2020)

47. On February 28, 2020, a CO from OSHA’s area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New 
14

Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1466351 of the same residential construction site that 

was the subject of inspection 146427 (case 20-1031) in Palisades Park, New Jersey at 20 West 

Central Boulevard. BB Frame was again engaged in construction activities at this worksite. 

Quevedo-Garcia was again present at this worksite. The same trucks displaying logos of Frame Q 

that were present at the same worksite on February 20, 2020, as described above were present at 

the worksite on February 28, 2020. (Sydenstricker Decl.).

48. On June 2, 2020, after having been informed by an attorney for Quevedo-Garcia that 

Frame Q was no longer in business, OSHA issued a Citation and Notification of Penalty to both 

the company, BB Frame, and to the individual, Mr. Quevedo-Garcia. The citation identified BB 

Frame to be doing business as “Frame Q LLC.” The citation alleged five serious, one willful, and 

three repeat violations and proposed penalties totaling $369,739. 

49. The citation alleged that the classifications for the three “repeat” violations were 

predicated on prior violations of OSHA standards by Frame Q that had become final orders in 

2017, 2018, and 2019. 

50. One of the alleged willful violations cited the standard for fall protection in residential 

construction, which is codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(13), alleging two separate instances 

that had occurred on February 28 and March 2, 2020. 

51. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia timely contested the citation and proposed penalties, 

and the Commission subsequently docketed the matter and assigned it docket number 20-1032. 

The Secretary then filed a complaint setting forth allegations substantially identical to those 

described supra in ¶ 24 in connection with case 20-1029. BB Frame and Quevedo-Garcia duly 

filed a joint answer that was identical to the joint answer filed in case 20-1029 described supra in 

¶ 25.
15

52. BB Frame later withdrew its notice of contest respecting case number 20-1032 and 

the other four consolidated cases reflected in the caption above. (Withdrawal, Apr. 5, 2021). After 

that withdrawal, the undersigned issued an order severing BB Frame from case 20-1032 and from 

the other consolidated cases. Upon BB Frame’s severance from case 20-1032, the claims against 

BB Frame were assigned to a newly opened Commission case with docket number 21-0638. The 

violations and proposed penalties set forth in the citation issued to BB Frame on June 2, 2020 that 

arose out of inspection 1466351 became a final order against BB Frame in case 21-0638 on August 

23, 2021. 

53. After the severance of BB Frame from case 20-1042 (and the consolidated cases 

reflected in the caption) Quevedo-Garcia remained the sole respondent. The parties executed a 

formal stipulation in which Quevedo-Garcia waived all defenses other than the defense that he 

should not be held personally liable as described supra in ¶ 28.

Thirteen Final Orders Against Frame Q LLC

Alleged to Support “Repeat” and “Willful” Classifications Alleged Here

54. From February 2013 to July 2018, officials from OSHA’s area office in Hasbrouck 

Heights, New Jersey, conducted thirteen inspections of Frame Q worksites. CO Stuart 

Sydenstricker was the lead OSHA official on seven of those inspections, during which he directly 

explained OSHA safety requirements to Quevedo-Garcia. CO Sydenstricker specifically 

explained the requirement that workers utilize certain fall protection measures, and each time 

Quevedo-Garcia indicated that he understood this requirement. Nevertheless, on multiple 

occasions during those inspections, Quevedo-Garcia said that he intentionally does not require the 

employees to utilize compliant fall protection measures because he did not consider those measures 

to be worth the expense. (Sydenstricker Decl. ¶ 7). 

55. Each of the thirteen inspections of Frame Q worksites resulted in the OSHA area 
16

office issuing to Frame Q a separate Citation and Notification of Penalty relating to each 

inspection. Twelve of those thirteen citations ultimately became final orders in which all the 

citations and proposed penalties became final orders as they had been originally issued. (One of 

the thirteen citations did not result in the complete affirmance of the citation items and proposed 

penalties as originally issued, but rather resulted reduced penalties and the reclassification of one

violation pursuant to the terms of a formal settlement agreement, as described infra in ¶ 57.) 

Altogether, the thirteen citations established 40 violations of certain construction industry 

workplace safety and health standards codified in 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926. Of those 40 violations, 

twenty-one were classified as serious, seventeen were classified as repeated, and two were 

classified as willful. Those 40 violations included the following:

a. Eight violations of the fall protection in residential construction standard codified at 29 

C.F.R. § 1926.501(b)(13), five of which were repeat violations and two of which were willful 

violations.

b. Twelve violations of personal protective equipment standards pertaining to eye, face, 

and head protection. Nine of those twelve violations were repeat violations.

c. Ten violations of the “Stairways and Ladders” standard codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926, 

subpt. X.

d. Nine violations of the “Scaffolds” standard codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1926, subpt. L.

Two of those nine violations were repeat violations.

56. The penalties arising out of the thirteen citations totaled $777,609. Of that amount, 

Frame Q has paid $4,800 that had been assessed in connection with an inspection conducted in 

August 2013 as described infra at ¶ 58. Frame Q did not pay any of the remaining sum of $772,809

either before or after its voluntary dissolution on April 7, 2019. (Sydenstricker Decl.). A summary 
17

of those thirteen prior inspections and resulting citations issued to Frame Q between February 2013 

and January 2019 are set forth infra in ¶¶ 57–69.

57. Inspection 897001 of Frame Q Worksite. On February 26, 2013, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 897001 of a 

residential construction site in Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey at 31 New Street, where Frame Q 

was building a porch on an existing residential structure. On June 19, 2013, OSHA issued a 

citation and notification of penalty that alleged three violations. Frame Q contested the citation 

and proposed penalties, and the Commission’s Executive Secretary docketed the matter and 

assigned it docket number 13-1603.1

 Frame Q entered into a formal settlement agreement on 

February 21, 2014, that became a final order of the Commission on April 28, 2014, wherein 

Frame Q accepted three serious violations and associated penalties that totaled $4,180 that were

payable in ten equal monthly installments. Frame Q did not pay the agreed penalties. 

1 The description of certain details respecting the citation involved in Commission case 

13-1603 is based on taking judicial notice of the docket filings in that Commission case. See 

Copomon Enters., LLC, 24 BNA OSHC 2177, 2179 n. 1 (No. 13-0709, 2018) (ALJ) (taking 

judicial notice of documents filed in a different Commission proceeding). Those documents, and 

other documents pertaining to the underlying inspection, are known to both the Secretary and 

Quevedo-Garcia.

This judicial notice is taken subject to either party’s opportunity to show the contrary. See

5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (providing that “[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material 

fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an 

opportunity to show the contrary”); Fed. R. Evid. 201(e) (providing that if judicial notice is taken 

“before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard”); L & L Painting Co., 

Inc., 22 BNA OSHC 1346, 1352 (No. 05-0050, 2008). 

Either party may exercise the opportunity to show the contrary by requesting to do so prior 

to the date the undersigned’s decision and report is to be filed with the Commission’s Executive 

Secretary for docketing pursuant to Commission Rule 90(b)(2). [That date is identified in the 

cover letter under which this decision is being served on the parties pursuant to Commission Rule 

90(a)(2). 29 C.F.R. § 2200.90.] If either or both parties file such a request, the undersigned will 

not transmit the report to the Executive Secretary for docketing on the date identified, but rather 

may schedule further proceedings as appropriate.
18

(Sydenstricker Decl.).

58. Inspection 927166 of Frame Q Worksite. On August 5, 2013, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 927166 of a 

residential construction site in Paramus, New Jersey at 224 Diane Place. Frame Q was engaged in 

construction activities at this worksite. On August 28, 2013, OSHA issued a citation and 

notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged two serious violations and proposed penalties 

totaling $4,800.2 Frame Q did not contest the citation and paid the proposed penalty of $4,800, 

which is the only penalty for any established violations of OSHA standards that Frame Q has paid. 

(Sydenstricker Decl.). 

2 The findings regarding inspection number 897001 are based in part on taking judicial

notice of information retrieved from OSHA’s public website where OSHA publishes certain 

information about its numbered inspections (most recently accessed on February 22, 2022, at

osha.gov/pls/imis/InspectionNr.html). See United States v. Garcia, 855 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 

2017) (observing that courts “routinely take judicial notice of information contained on state and 

federal government websites”). The foundational documents on which this publicly posted 

information is based are known to both the Secretary and Quevedo-Garcia but were not presented 

on the cross motions for summary judgment. Cf. Dukane Precast, Inc. v. Perez, 785 F.3d 252, 254 

(7th Cir. 2015) (in judicial review a Commission decision, the court of appeals “discovers on [its] 

own” certain facts that were published on a municipality’s public website that the court said it 

“would have liked the parties to tell us”). 

Judicial notice of these facts is taken subject to either party’s opportunity to show the 

contrary. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (providing that “[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice 

of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, 

to an opportunity to show the contrary”); Fed. R. Evid. 201(e) (providing that if judicial notice is 

taken “before notifying a party, the party, on request, is still entitled to be heard”); L & L Painting 

Co., Inc., 22 BNA OSHC 1346, 1352 (No. 05-0050, 2008). 

Either party may exercise the opportunity to show the contrary by requesting to do so prior 

to the date the undersigned’s decision and report is to be filed with the Commission’s Executive 

Secretary for docketing pursuant to Commission Rule 90(b)(2). [That date is identified in the 

cover letter under which this decision is being served on the parties pursuant to Commission Rule 

90(a)(2). 29 C.F.R. § 2200.90.] If either or both parties file such a request, the undersigned will 

not transmit the report to the Executive Secretary on the date identified, but rather may schedule 

further proceedings as appropriate.
19

59. Inspection 955187 of Frame Q Worksite. On January 16, 2014, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 955187 of a 

residential construction site in Teaneck, New Jersey at 368 Edgewood Avenue. Frame Q was 

engaged in construction activities at this worksite. On July 11, 2014, OSHA issued a citation and 

notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged one repeat and three serious violations and proposed 

penalties totaling $23,320. Frame Q did not contest the citation or proposed penalties and 

consequently they became a final order pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act. Frame Q has not paid 

the imposed penalties. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 2, supra, [as to judicial notice of OSHA 

website information]).

60. Inspection 983958 of Frame Q Worksite. On January 24, 2014, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 983958 at the 

same residential construction site in Teaneck, New Jersey at 368 Edgewood Avenue that had been 

the subject of inspection 955187, which is described in the preceding paragraph. Frame Q was 

engaged in construction activities at this worksite. On July 16, 2014, OSHA issued a citation and 

notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged one repeat and two serious violations and proposed 

penalties totaling $20,680. Frame Q did not contest the citation and consequently it became a final 

order pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act. Frame Q has not paid the imposed penalties. 

(Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 2, supra, [as to judicial notice of OSHA website information]).

61. Inspection 979064 of Frame Q Worksite. On March 3, 2014, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 979064 of a 

residential construction site in Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey at 18 Skyline Drive. Frame Q was 

engaged in construction activities at this worksite. On June 17, 2014, OSHA issued a citation and 

notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged one repeat and four serious violations and proposed 
20

penalties totaling $14,520. Frame Q did not contest the citation and consequently it became a final 

order by operation of law on July 23, 2014, pursuant to section 10(a) of the Act. By letter dated 

November 23, 2016, Frame Q sought to challenge this final order by filing with the Commission 

a notice of contest. The Commission’s Executive Secretary treated this to be a “late notice of 

contest” and docketed the matter, assigning it case number 16-2015. By decision dated September 

22, 2017, a Commission Judge issued an order dismissing Frame Q’s late notice of contest. The 

order of dismissal became a final order of the Commission on October 25, 2017. Frame Q has not 

paid the imposed penalties. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 1, supra [as to judicial notice of 

Commission case files]).

62. Inspection 1052385 of Frame Q Worksite. On January 23, 2015, a CO from OSHA’s

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1052385 of a 

residential construction site in Paramus, New Jersey on Sherwood Drive. Frame Q was engaged 

in construction activities at this worksite. On April 28, 2015, OSHA issued a citation and 

notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged two serious violations and proposed penalties 

totaling $4,400. By letter dated November 23, 2016, Frame Q sought to challenge the citation and 

proposed penalties by filing a notice of contest. The Commission’s Executive Secretary treated 

this to be a “late notice of contest” and docketed the matter, assigning it case number 16-2011. 

Frame Q contended in part that it had never been served with the citation. After conducting an 

evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2017, a Commission Judge issued a decision and order on 

February 5, 2018, determining in part that (a) the citation had become a final order by operation 

of law under section 10(a) of the Act, (b) Frame Q had failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to 

relief from this final order, and (c) dismissing Frame Q’s notice of contest. The order of dismissal 

became a final order of the Commission on March 8, 2018. Frame Q has not paid the imposed 
21

penalties. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 1, supra [as to judicial notice of Commission files]).

63. Inspection 1042114 of Frame Q Worksite. On February 24, 2015, a CO from 

OSHA’s area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 

1042114 of a residential construction site in Mahwah, New Jersey at 27 Maple Avenue. Frame Q 

was engaged in construction activities at this worksite. On June 22, 2015, OSHA issued a citation 

and notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged one serious, one willful, and one repeat

violation, and proposed penalties totaling $20,680. By letter dated November 23, 2016, Frame Q 

sought to challenge the citation and proposed penalties by filing a notice of contest. The 

Commission’s Executive Secretary treated this to be a “late notice of contest” and docketed the 

matter, assigning it case number 16-2010. Frame Q contended in part that it had never been served 

with the citation. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2017, a Commission 

Judge issued a decision and order on February 5, 2018, determining in part that (a) the citation had 

become a final order by operation of law under section 10(a) of the Act, (b) Frame Q had failed to 

demonstrate that it was entitled to relief from this final order, and (c) dismissing Frame Q’s notice 

of contest. The order of dismissal became a final order of the Commission on March 8, 2018. 

Frame Q has not paid the imposed penalties. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 1, supra [as to judicial 

notice of Commission files]).

64. Inspection 1071019 of Frame Q Worksite. On April 22, 2015, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1071019 of a 

residential construction site in Fort Lee, New Jersey on Abbott Boulevard. Frame Q was engaged 

in construction activities at this worksite. On October 5, 2015, OSHA issued a citation and 

notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged one serious and two repeat violations, and that

proposed penalties totaling $13,640. By letter dated November 23, 2016, Frame Q sought to 
22

challenge the citation and proposed penalties by filing a notice of contest. The Commission’s 

Executive Secretary treated this to be a “late notice of contest” and docketed the matter, assigning 

it case number 16-2012. Frame Q contended in part that it had never been served with the citation. 

After conducting an evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2017, a Commission Judge issued a 

decision and order on February 5, 2018, determining in part that (a) the citation had become a final 

order by operation of law under section 10(a) of the Act, (b) Frame Q had failed to demonstrate 

that it was entitled to relief from this final order, and (c) dismissing Frame Q’s notice of contest. 

The order of dismissal became a final order of the Commission on March 8, 2018. Frame Q has 

not paid the imposed penalties. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 1, supra [as to judicial notice of 

Commission files]).

65. Inspection 1076348 of Frame Q Worksite. On June 8, 2015, a CO from OSHA’s area 

office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1076348 of a 

residential construction site in Palisades Park, New Jersey at 462 Second Street. Frame Q was 

engaged in construction activities at this worksite. On August 10, 2015, OSHA issued a citation 

and notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged one willful and two repeat violations, and that 

proposed penalties totaling $25,080. By letter dated November 23, 2016, Frame Q sought to 

challenge the citation and proposed penalties by filing a notice of contest. The Commission’s 

Executive Secretary treated this to be a “late notice of contest” and docketed the matter, assigning 

it case number 16-2013. Frame Q contended in part that it had never been served with the citation. 

After conducting an evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2017, a Commission Judge issued a 

decision and order on February 5, 2018, determining in part that (a) the citation had become a final 

order by operation of law under section 10(a) of the Act, (b) Frame Q had failed to demonstrate 

that it was entitled to relief from this final order, and (c) dismissing Frame Q’s notice of contest. 
23

The order of dismissal became a final order of the Commission on March 8, 2018. Frame Q has 

not paid the imposed penalties. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 1, supra [as to judicial notice of 

Commission files]).

66. Inspection 1113701 of Frame Q Worksite. On December 22, 2015, a CO from 

OSHA’s area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 

1113701 of a residential construction site in Fort Lee, New Jersey at 1010/1006 Morningside Lane. 

Frame Q was engaged in construction activities at this worksite. On February 16, 2016, OSHA 

issued a citation and notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged two repeat violations and 

proposed penalties totaling $18,920. By letter dated November 23, 2016, Frame Q sought to 

challenge the citation and proposed penalties by filing a notice of contest. The Commission’s 

Executive Secretary treated this to be a “late notice of contest” and docketed the matter, assigning 

it case number 16-2014. Frame Q contended in part that it had never been served with the citation. 

After conducting an evidentiary hearing on September 18, 2017, a Commission Judge issued a 

decision and order on February 5, 2018, determining in part that (a) the citation had become a final 

order by operation of law under section 10(a) of the Act, (b) Frame Q had failed to demonstrate 

that it was entitled to relief from this final order, and (c) dismissing Frame Q’s notice of contest. 

The order of dismissal became a final order of the Commission on March 8, 2018. Frame Q has 

not paid the imposed penalties. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 1, supra [as to judicial notice of 

Commission files]).

67. Inspection 1149505 of Frame Q Worksite. On April 23, 2016, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1149505 of a 

residential construction site in Palisades Park, New Jersey at 119 Abbot Avenue. Frame Q was 

engaged in construction activities at this worksite. On September 28, 2016, OSHA issued a citation 
24

and notification of penalty that alleged two repeat violations and proposed penalties totaling 

$222,697. Frame Q timely contested the citation and proposed penalties, and the Commission’s 

Executive Secretary docketed the matter and assigned it docket number 16-1737. Frame Q 

formally withdrew its notice of contest by notice dated February 5, 2018, and a Commission Judge 

approved the withdrawal by order dated February 20, 2018. Consequently, the citation and 

proposed penalties became a final order on March 22, 2018. Frame Q has not paid the imposed 

penalties. (Ex. 16 to Kondo Decl.; Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 1 supra [as to judicial notice of 

Commission files]).

68. Inspection 1264265 of Frame Q Worksite. On April 3, 2017, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1264265 of a 

residential construction site in Fort Lee, New Jersey at 2475 Sixth Street. Frame Q was engaged 

in construction activities at this worksite. On September 25, 2017, OSHA issued a citation and 

notification of penalty that alleged two serious and two repeat violations and proposing penalties 

totaling $153,241. Frame Q timely contested the citation and proposed penalties, and the 

Commission’s Executive Secretary docketed the matter and assigned it docket number 17-2030. 

After Frame Q failed to timely file an answer to the Secretary’s complaint, a Commission Judge 

issued an order to show cause to Frame Q directing Frame Q to show cause why it should not be 

held in default. Frame Q did not formally respond to the order to show cause. However, Frame 

Q’s attorney informally advised the Commission on June 20, 2018 that Frame Q had “closed its 

business” and that Frame Q would not file any formal response to the order to show cause. The 

Commission Judge thereafter filed an order of default affirming the citation and proposed 

penalties. The order of default became a final order on August 8, 2018. Frame Q has not paid the 

imposed penalties. (Ex. 18 to Kondo Decl.; Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 1 supra [as to judicial 
25

notice of Commission files]).

69. Inspection 1329463 of Frame Q Worksite. On July 11, 2018, a CO from OSHA’s 

area office in Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey, opened OSHA inspection number 1329463 of a 

residential construction site in Palisades Park, New Jersey at 417 Third Street. Frame Q was 

engaged in construction activities at this worksite. On January 4, 2019, OSHA issued a citation 

and notification of penalty to Frame Q that alleged one serious and three repeat violations and 

proposed penalties totaling $261,451. Frame Q did not contest the citation and consequently it 

became a final order pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act. Frame Q has not paid the imposed 

penalties. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnote 2, supra [as to judicial notice of OSHA website 

information]).

70. The penalties imposed on Frame Q in the thirteen inspections from 2013 to 2018 

totaled $777,609. Of that sum, Frame Q paid only $4,800. (Sydenstricker Decl.; footnotes 1 and 

2, supra).

71. The last day that Frame Q made payroll disbursements to employees was on June 1, 

2018, when it issued payroll checks to seven individuals. (Ex. 24 to Kondo Decl.). Frame Q made 

no payroll disbursements after June 1, 2018. (Ex. 24 to Kondo Decl.). OSHA’s last inspection of 

a Frame Q worksite was opened about six weeks later, on July 11, 2018, which resulted in the 

issuance of a citation to Frame Q on January 4, 2019 that Frame Q did not contest. 

72. Quevedo-Garcia caused Frame Q to be dissolved on April 7, 2019, which was about 

ten weeks after the last of the described thirteen citations issued to Frame Q became a final order.

73. In its federal tax return for tax year 2018, which was dated four days after Frame Q 

was formally dissolved in April 2019, Frame Q reported gross receipts of $528,895 and total 

income of $366,528. After deductions from the total income figure for expenses such as 
26

compensation of officers and salaries and wages, Frame Q reported a positive business income of 

$14,464 for tax year 2018. The 2018 tax return reflects a balance sheet liability for “accounts 

payable” at the beginning of the tax year of $303,318 but by the end of the year that balance sheet 

liability had been reduced by 44% to $170,807. (Ex. 2 to Kondo Decl.). There is no evidence 

regarding the components of this balance sheet liability for accounts payable, or the identity of the 

creditors. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence relating to the 2018 balance 

sheet liabilities for accounts payable in support of his motion for summary judgment was 

substantially impeded by Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against 

compulsory self-incrimination.

74. On February 6, 2019, the Office of the United States Attorney for the District of New 

Jersey (USAO-NJ) brought a civil action in federal district court against Frame Q to collect 

$473,178 in unpaid OSHA penalties relating to eight of the citations issued to Frame Q (the six 

late contests plus the citations that resulted from inspections 1149505 and 1264265). The civil 

action also sought $205,325.01 in interest and fees. 

75. On April 7, 2019, two months after the collection action was filed, Quevedo-Garcia 

caused Frame Q to be voluntary dissolved. About four weeks later, on May 3, 2019, the USAO-NJ

filed a voluntary dismissal of its collection action after concluding that Frame Q could not be 

successfully served with the summons and complaint because it had been dissolved. (Jordan Anger 

Decl.).

76. According to interrogatory responses that Quevedo-Garcia verified, Frame Q’s only 

assets upon its dissolution in April 2019 were three trucks that were to be “transferred with loans”

to BB Frame. (Ex. 4 to Kondo Decl.). At least one of those vehicles remained officially registered 

to Frame Q during the underlying inspections of BB Frame’s worksites involved here. (Ex. B to 
27

Sydenstricker Decl.).

77. In Frame Q’s certificate of dissolution filed on April 7, 2019, Quevedo-Garcia 

represented that “[a]ll assets have been discarded and have been applied to creditors or distributed 

to members.” (Ex. 6 to Kondo Decl.). There is no evidence respecting the extent to which the 

liquidation of Frame Q’s assets reduced the balance sheet liability for accounts payable that was 

reported at the end of tax year 2018. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence on 

this matter of fact in support of his motion for summary judgment was substantially impeded by 

Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. 

78. Quevedo-Garcia caused Frame Q to be dissolved at least in part to avoid collection 

of unpaid penalties of $772,809 that resulted from OSHA inspections of Frame Q worksites. 

(Quevedo-Garcia Mot. ¶¶ 6–9). 

79. Prior to Frame Q’s formal dissolution April 2019, Quevedo-Garcia discontinued 

framing operations through Frame Q and transitioned all of Frame Q’s framing operations to BB 

Frame. Frame Q’s employees began working for BB Frame doing the same type of construction 

work and in the same locale as Frame Q. (Exs. 4, 24, 25, 31 to Kondo Decl.).

BB Frame LLC (BB Frame)

80. On April 13, 2017, Quevedo-Garcia caused BB Frame to be formed; its certificate of 

formation did not identify any member(s) of the company. (Ex. 9 to Kondo Decl.; Sydenstricker 

Decl. ¶ 10). BB Frame was formed ten days after OSHA had opened inspection number 1264265, 

which was the twelfth of the thirteen inspections of Frame Q worksites described supra in ¶ 68.) 

On September 4, 2018, about 17 months after BB Frame had been formed, Quevedo-Garcia filed 

an amendment to BB Frame’s certificate of formation that identified himself and his sister, Magda 

Quevedo-Garcia, as BB Frame’s only members. (Ex. 22, Kondo Decl.).

81. In mid-2018, Quevedo-Garcia transferred $20,000 from Frame Q to BB Frame by 
28

issuing three checks from Frame Q’s bank account (dated respectively on June 20, July 21, and 

August 2, 2018). He signed these checks as the agent of Frame Q and he then endorsed on behalf 

of BB Frame for deposit into BB Frame’s bank account. (Exs. 21 & 31 to Kondo Decl.). 

82. All seven individuals who had received a payroll disbursement from Frame Q on June 

1, 2018 (which was Frame Q’s final payroll disbursement before it was formally dissolved about 

ten months later) began to receive payroll disbursements from BB Frame starting on June 8, 2018. 

(Exs. 24 & 25 to Kondo Decl.). Four of those seven individuals continued to receive payroll 

disbursements from BB Frame through December 20, 2019, which was the date of BB Frame’s

final payroll disbursements. (Payroll disbursements from BB Frame to the other three individuals 

ended respectively on 6/22/18, 3/29/2019 and 6/28/2019, apparently because each had left BB 

Frame’s employment on or before those respective dates.) (Ex. 25 to Kondo Decl.). The day of 

BB Frame’s final payroll disbursements (December 20, 2019) was fifteen days after OSHA had

opened the first of the five inspections of BB Frame worksites that precipitated these consolidated 

matters. (Ex. 25 to Kondo Decl.).

83. On March 12, 2019, less than four weeks before Quevedo-Garcia would cause

Frame Q to be voluntarily dissolved, Quevedo-Garcia caused BB Frame to apply for a home 

improvement contractor license with the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, Division of 

Consumer Affairs (DCA). (Ex. 8 to Kondo Decl.). About eleven weeks later, on May 29, 2019, 

DCA issued to BB Frame a New Jersey home improvement contractor license. (Ex. 23 to Kondo 

Decl.).

84. Prior to the OSHA inspections that precipitated these consolidated matters, BB Frame 

used its business checking account for BB Frame operations, including issuing payroll checks. 

Beginning November 25, 2019, that checking account had a consistently negative balance, causing 
29

the bank to force the account closed on March 25, 2020. (Ex. 28 to Kondo Decl.).

85. BB Frame did not make any payroll disbursements in 2020. (Exs. 1 & 25 to Kondo 

Decl.) In 2020, Quevedo-Garcia caused payroll disbursements for framing projects, including the 

projects involved in the last four of the five underlying inspections here, to be made by BM Frame. 

(Exs. 1, 11, 25 & 29 to Kondo Decl.).

86. BB Frame used the three trucks that Frame Q had used in the operation of its framing 

business, even though at least one of those vehicles remained registered in the name of Frame Q 

over the course of the underlying inspections. (Ex. B to Sydenstricker Decl.; Ex. 4 to Kondo 

Decl.).

87. Quevedo-Garcia expressly and falsely held out to OSHA officials during the first of 

the underlying inspections that precipitated these consolidated cases that Frame Q was the 

company performing work at the inspected construction sites and that the workers were employees 

of Frame Q. (Sydenstricker Decl. ¶ 14). Quevedo-Garcia did not disclose to OSHA officials that 

Frame Q had been dissolved and that the employees present at the first of the five inspections were 

employees of BB Frame. Until April 2020, when an attorney for Quevedo-Garcia informed OSHA 

that Frame Q was out of business, OSHA held the false understanding that the employees present 

for the five underlying inspections were Frame Q employees. (Sydenstricker Decl. ¶ 12). 

88. Prior to the issuance of the citations at issue here on June 2, 2020, OSHA concluded 

that BB Frame, not the dissolved Frame Q, was the corporate entity performing the construction 

work at all five of the worksite inspections. Consequently, the citations identified “BB Frame LLC 

d/b/a Frame Q LLC, as successor to Frame Q LLC” as the cited employer (as well as QuevedoGarcia individually). The separate complaints filed by the Secretary in each of these five matters 

continued with this description of BB Frame as both (a) “doing business as” Frame Q, and (b) 
30

being a successor company to Frame Q. 

89. On November 19, 2020, Quevedo caused BB Frame to be voluntarily dissolved. This 

was twelve weeks after the Secretary had filed separate complaints in each of the above captioned 

matters seeking to affirm all citation items and proposed penalties against both BB Frame and 

Quevedo-Garcia. (Ex. 10 to Kondo Decl.).

90. There is no evidence that BB Frame had crippling debt when Quevedo-Garcia caused 

it to be dissolved, which occurred before the penalties proposed against BB Frame became final 

orders. The only evidence of BB Frame’s indebtedness at the time of its dissolution is its 2019 tax 

return which states that at the end of the tax year it had balance sheet liabilities totaling $21,754

(exclusive of a balance sheet liability of $27,500 for “capital stock,” which would have been owing 

to Quevedo-Garcia and his sister as the only owners of the company). The two balance sheet 

liabilities identified that totaled $21,754 were “accounts payable” of $1,557 and “other current 

liabilities” totaling $20,197 that were not itemized in the return. (Ex. 7 to Kondo Decl.). 

91. Quevedo dissolved BB Frame not because of overwhelming debt but rather to avoid 

collection of any of the OSHA penalties that had been proposed against BB Frame in the 

underlying citations (but that had not become final orders against BB Frame at the time of its 

dissolution). The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence relating to 

Quevedo-Garcia’s reasons for dissolving BB Frame in support of his motion for summary 

judgment was substantially impeded by Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment 

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

BM Frame LLC (BM Frame)

92. On December 24, 2019, about three weeks after OSHA had opened the first of the 

five inspections involved in these consolidated cases, Quevedo-Garcia caused BM Frame to be 
31

formed, with Quevedo-Garcia owning 75% and one Hector F. Roca owning 25%.

3 (Exs. 11 & 13

to Kondo Decl.) The declared planned activity of the new company was “miscellaneous 

construction & repair.” (Exs. 13 & 26 to Kondo Decl.).

93. Two days later, on December 26, 2019, Quevedo-Garcia caused to be filed with the 

State of New Jersey a certificate of alternate name that authorized BM Frame to do business as 

“BB Frame” even though BB Frame continued to exist as a New Jersey limited liability company. 

(Exs. 13 & 26 to Kondo Decl.).

94. About four weeks later, on January 23, 2020, BM Frame applied for a home 

improvement contractor license with the State of New Jersey. The application lists the name 

“BB Frame” as another “name[ ] under which [BM Frame] does business.” (Ex. 12 to Kondo 

Decl.). 

95. On or about December 31, 2019, BM Frame opened a business checking account 

under the name “BM Frame LLC TA [i.e., “trading as”] BB Frame,” making an initial deposit of 

$500. (Ex. 27 to Kondo Decl.). 

96. Beginning in January 2020, BM Frame’s checking account was used as the primary 

account for deposits and disbursements for construction projects. In the month of January 2020, 

there were eleven deposits made into the account that totaled $162,600 and 97 withdrawal 

transactions that totaled $135,318. (Exs. 27 & 30 to Kondo Decl.). The record does not disclose 

the sources of the deposits to the bank account. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present 

3 The record does not reflect Mr. Roca having been associated with any other companies 

controlled by Quevedo-Garcia and does not indicate what, if any, involvement Mr. Roca had in 

the operations of BM Frame. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence relating to 

Mr. Roca’s role in the formation and operation of BM Frame was substantially impeded by 

Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory 

self-incrimination.
32

evidence relating to the sources of these deposits was substantially impeded by Quevedo Garcia’s 

invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.

97. Starting in January 2020 and continuing to early August 2020, the employees who 

supplied labor for construction projects performed by BB Frame and/or BM Frame were paid out 

of BM Frame’s business checking account. (Sydenstricker Decl. ¶¶ 14–21; Exs. 27, 29 & 30 to 

Kondo Decl.). From January 10, 2020 through August 16, 2020, BM Frame made payroll 

disbursements totaling $185,980 to eleven individuals. (Exs. 27, 29 & 30 to Kondo Decl.). Six of 

the eight employees who had been on BB Frame’s payroll through December 2019 received 

payroll disbursements in 2020 drawn on BM Frame’s business checking account. 

Quevedo-Garcia’s sister, who was a 30% owner of BB Frame but had not received any payroll 

disbursements from BB Frame’s business checking account, receives payroll disbursements from 

BM Frame in 2020 that totaled $17,100. (Exs. 25 & 29 to Kondo Decl.).

98. In a letter from the attorney for Quevedo-Garcia dated November 12, 2020 to an 

attorney for the Secretary, the attorney provided a copy of a paycheck written to Quevedo-Garcia 

dated January 13, 2020 that was drawn on BM Frame’s checking account. The attorney 

represented that Quevedo-Garcia was currently employed by BM Frame, and he erroneously 

represented that Quevedo-Garcia was not a “principal” of BM Frame. (In truth, Quevedo-Garcia 

owned 75% of the company).4

 (Exs. 4 & 30 to Kondo Decl.). 

99. In a letter from the attorney for Quevedo-Garcia to an attorney for the Secretary dated 

June 21, 2021, the attorney stated that “BM Frame is a closed business.” (Ex. F to Sec’y’s Mot.

4 The attorney is presumed not to have made a knowing misrepresentation to counsel for 

the Secretary. There is no indication that the attorney knew that Quevedo-Garcia had caused BM 

Frame to be formed or that Quevedo-Garcia was its majority owner. The record does not reflect 

the point in the litigation when the Secretary became aware that Quevedo-Garcia had created BM 

Frame and was its majority owner.
33

to Compel, July 7, 2021). No other information was provided regarding the closing of BM Frame. 

The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence on this matter of fact in support of his 

motion for summary judgment was substantially impeded by Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his 

Fifth Amendment privilege in July 2021.

100. In Quevedo-Garcia’s verified interrogatory responses in November 2020, he falsely 

represented that he was not an “owner, member, partner, shareholder, officer, and/or director” of 

any companies other than Frame Q and BB Frame, both of which he declared in had been “closed.” 

(Ex. 4 to Kondo Decl.). In a later verified interrogatory response in April 2021, Quevedo-Garcia 

continued to falsely represent that he had no ownership interest or leadership position in any other 

business organizations other than Frame Q and BB Frame. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.). 

Other Alter Ego Theory Factors

Capitalization and Solvency 

101. BB Frame’s 2019 federal tax return reflects the company had a balance sheet liability 

of $27,500 for “capital stock” at both the beginning and the end of the tax year. (Ex. 7 to Kondo 

Decl.). 

102. BB Frame never owned real property. (Exs. 4 & 7 to Kondo Decl.). Except for 

trucks, BB Frame never owned tools or equipment valued more than $200. BB Frame utilized 

three trucks in its business, at least one of which remained registered to Frame Q, although BB 

Frame depreciated multiple vehicles on its 2019 federal tax return (and BM Frame depreciated one 

vehicle on its 2020 federal tax return). (Exs. 4, 7 & 11 to Kondo Decl.; Sydenstricker Decl.).

103. BB Frame’s business checking account had a negative balance throughout the course

of the five OSHA inspections that precipitated these consolidated matters. (Ex. 28 to Kondo 

Decl.). 

104. BB Frame’s tax return for tax year 2019 reported gross receipts of $388,533 and total 
34

income of $297,087. The 2019 tax return reflects an ordinary business loss of $1,181, after making 

deductions from total income that included deducting $127,500 in compensation to 

Quevedo-Garcia. (Ex. 7 to Kondo Decl.). 

105. BM Frame’s federal tax return for tax year 2020 indicates that at the beginning of the 

tax year it had no balance sheet liability for capital stock but at the end of the tax year it had a 

balance sheet liability for capital stock of $42,000. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present 

evidence relating to the source of the funds for this stated capitalization of BM Frame was 

substantially impeded by Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against 

compulsory self-incrimination.

106. In BM Frame’s federal tax return for tax year 2020, the company reported gross 

receipts of $426,451 and a total income of $235,066. The tax return reflects ordinary business 

income of $12,464, after making deductions from total income that included $75,000 in 

compensation to Quevedo-Garcia. (The 25% owner of BM Frame, Hector Roca, received no 

compensation in 2020). (Ex. 11 to Kondo Decl.). Quevedo-Garcia reported his proportionate 

share of BM Frame’s ordinary business income of $12,464 in 2020 on his personal tax return for 

tax year 2020. (Ex. 1 to Kondo Decl.). 

107. In a verified interrogatory response, Quevedo-Garcia stated that both Frame Q and 

BB Frame were “closed due to debt and insufficient income.” (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.). 

108. Quevedo-Garcia caused BB Frame to be voluntarily dissolved at least in part to avoid 

collection of the proposed penalties of $2,004,225. Those proposed penalties later became final 

orders against BB Frame after BB Frame had been voluntarily dissolved. (Quevedo-Garcia Mot.

¶¶ 11–14; Anger Decl.). The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence relating to the 

reasons that Quevedo-Garcia determined to dissolve BB Frame was substantially impeded by
35

Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory selfincrimination.

Corporate Officers, Formalities and Corporate Records

109. Quevedo-Garcia was BB Frame’s president and its only officer. BB Frame’s other 

member, Magda Quevedo-Garcia, had no role in the operation of the company. (Exs. 4 & 31 to 

Kondo Decl.). 

110. BB Frame held no formal meetings of its two members. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.).

111. BB Frame maintained no operating agreement, by-laws, resolutions, amendments, 

meeting minutes, or meeting memoranda. (Exs. 4, 5 & 32 to Kondo Decl.).

112. Most of the contracts into which BB Frame entered with suppliers and other 

contractors were verbal agreements only. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.).

Siphoning of Corporate Funds

113. As indicated supra in ¶ 12, Quevedo-Garcia and his sister Magda own a company 

called Q Properties LLC (Q Properties) that has its principal office at the Quevedo-Garcia 

Residence. Quevedo-Garcia owns 60% and Magda owns 40%. (Exs. 1, 3 & 14 to Kondo Decl.).

Q Properties is in the business of renting and selling real estate, and in its 2020 federal tax return 

it reported receiving rents from residential real estate with the address 54 Lincoln Avenue, 

Cliffside Park, New Jersey. Quevedo-Garcia did not identify his ownership interest in Q Properties

in his verified responses to two sets of interrogatories (responses dated Nov. 20, 2020 and Apr. 26, 

2021), but rather in those responses he falsely represented that he did not have an ownership 

interest in any companies other than Frame Q and BB Frame. (Exs. 4 & 31 to Kondo Decl.). The 

attorney for Quevedo-Garcia later falsely represented to counsel for the Secretary in a letter dated 

June 21, 2021 that Q Properties “is not and was not owned” by Quevedo-Garcia. (Ex. F to Sec’y’s 

Mot. to Compel, Jul 7, 2021). (It is presumed that Quevedo-Garcia’s attorney was unaware of the 
36

falsity of that representation when he made it.) 

114. Between August 2, 2018 and July 11, 2019, Quevedo-Garcia caused $84,600 to be 

transferred from BB Frame to Q Properties by issuing the following checks written on BB Frame’s 

business checking account (Ex. 33 to Kondo Decl.):

a. Check dated August 2, 2018 for $44,000. In the check’s “memo” line, Quevedo-Garcia 

handwrote the words “Profits.” 

b. Check dated August 6, 2018 for $9,600. In the check’s “memo” line, Quevedo-Garcia 

handwrote what appears to be the words “2 Months Deposit Rent and one month rent at” 54 

Lincoln Avenue, Cliffside Park. 

c. Check dated April 25, 2019 for $26,000. In the check’s “memo” line, Quevedo-Garcia 

handwrote the word “Profits 2018.” 

d. Check dated July 1, 2019 for $7,000. The check’s “memo” line reflects the handwritten 

words “Monthly garage rent.” 

e. Check dated July 11, 2019 for $8,000. The check’s “memo” line reflects the 

handwritten words “Rent for May & June garage at 54 Lincoln Ave Cliffside Park.” 

115. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence of greater detail regarding 

the reasons for these disbursements to Q Properties described in the preceding ¶ 114(a)–(e) in 

support of his motion for summary judgment was substantially impeded by Quevedo-Garcia’s 

invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege.

116. After depleting BB Frame’s checking account in late 2019 and beginning to use 

BM Frame’s business checking account for deposits and disbursements relating to corporate

construction activities, Quevedo-Garcia also began to use BM Frame’s checking account to make

some payments that lack any apparent connection to the corporate framing work, as follows:
37

a. By check dated April 20, 2020, Quevedo-Garcia caused to be transferred to 

Q Properties the sum of $2,000. (Ex. 34 to Kondo. Decl.).

b. By five checks written between April and August 2020, Quevedo-Garcia caused to be 

transferred a total of $18,000 to Q Properties II (a company that is described supra in ¶ 13). (Ex. 

35 to Kondo Decl.). One of those checks was for the sum of $11,000 and the memo line of the 

check bore the handwritten note “Loan to Q Properties II LLC.” Another check had no notation 

in the memo line. Three checks totaling $7,000 bore handwritten notations in their respective 

memo lines indicating they were for rent payments for real property in Fairview, New Jersey at 

[redacted]. (Quevedo-Garcia testified in another Commission proceeding in September 2017 that

he had resided at that address in Fairview, New Jersey [Ex. 17 at 8 to Kondo Decl.].)

c. In the spring of 2020, Quevedo-Garcia wrote four checks from BM Frame’s checking 

account totaling $11,600 for the apparent benefit of Q Nails (a company that is described supra at 

¶ 14). Two checks that were payable to Q Nails totaled $5,900 and reflect the handwritten word 

“loan” in their memo lines. Another check payable to Q Nails in the sum of $3,000 has no entry 

in the memo line. The fourth check in the sum of $2,700 is payable to an individual (whose name 

not reflected in any other documentation of record) and in the memo line is handwritten the words 

“June rent for Q Nail Boutique.” (Ex. 36 to Kondo Decl.).

117. The Secretary’s ability to discover and present evidence of greater detail regarding 

the reasons for the disbursements from BM Frame’s bank account described in the preceding 

¶ 116(a)–(c) in support of his motion for summary judgment was substantially impeded by 

Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege.

118. While Quevedo-Garcia moved monies from BB Frame and BM Frame bank accounts 

to other family-owned businesses, and he also disbursed monies from those accounts for the benefit
38

of those other companies, in some instances other family-owned businesses disbursed their funds 

for the apparent benefit of BB Frame, as described below. 

a. The application fee for BB Frame’s home improvement license was paid in March 2019

by a check drawn on the bank account of Q Nails. (Ex. 8 to Kondo Decl.). 

b. An electronic payment in the amount of $2,470.32 for BB Frame’s state payroll taxes 

for the fourth quarter of 2019 was made on January 30, 2020 from a bank account of Q Nails. (Ex. 

37 to Kondo Decl.).

119. From June 2018 through August 7, 2020, Quevedo-Garcia caused himself to be paid 

a salary of $2,500 per week from the payroll accounts of BB Frame and BM Frame. (Exs. 7, 25, 

29 & 33 to Kondo Decl.).

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment Standard & Procedures

Commission Rule 40(j) provides that Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule

56) governs motions for summary judgment in Commission proceedings. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.40(j). 

Rule 56(a) provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” 

In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute of material fact, “the substantive 

evidentiary standards that apply to the case” apply also to assessment of the evidence on motion 

for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (Liberty Lobby), 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)

(ruling that the substantive evidentiary standard of “clear and convincing evidence” for a libel 

claim must be applied in adjudicating a motion for summary judgment on that claim).

The moving party has the initial burden to show the absence of any genuine dispute 

concerning any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (Celotex), 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)
39

(discussing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)). If the moving party discharges

the initial burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then the non-moving 

party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. Thus, when 

faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must 

“present affirmative evidence” that shows there is a genuine dispute for trial. Id. at 257. Such 

“affirmative evidence” includes “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits or declarations, stipulations ... admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” as 

described in Rule 56(c)(1)(A). Manua's, Inc., 27 BNA OSHC 1469, 1472-73 (No. 18-1059, 2018) 

(nonmovant cannot overcome summary judgment merely based on the possibility that material 

facts it has not yet identified exist but instead must present facts essential to justify its opposition), 

aff'd, 948 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

Rule 56(e) sets forth the potential consequences of a non-moving party’s failure to make 

the required affirmative showing of specific facts in response to a properly supported motion for 

summary judgment:

(e) Failing to Properly Support or Address a Fact. If a party fails 

to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address 

another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court 

may ... 

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; 

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting 

materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that 

the movant is entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

For a party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment to show the 

existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the evidentiary material favoring the non-moving 

party must be sufficient to permit a finder of fact to find in the non-moving party’s favor. Liberty 
40

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. But if that evidentiary material “is merely colorable, or is not significantly 

probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted). A mere 

combination of “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation” will 

not defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion. Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 

426 (1st Cir. 2006).

In considering a motion for summary judgment a court is “required to resolve all 

ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom 

summary judgment is sought.” Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir.

1997); see also Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255 (1986) (the “evidence of the non-movant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor”), and Ford Motor Co., 23 BNA 

OSHC 1593, 1594 (No. 10-1483, 2011) (stating that “a judge is not to decide factual disputes,” 

but rather must “determine whether any such disputes exist”). “[N]ot only must there be no genuine 

dispute as to the evidentiary facts, but there must also be no controversy as to the inferences to be 

drawn from them.” Ford Motor, 23 BNA OSHC at 1594, citing Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ. 

of City Sch. Dist. of City of Olean, 667 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1991). 

When, as here, both parties move for summary judgment, “each party’s motion must be 

independently evaluated under” these same principles. Ford Motor, 23 BNA OSHC at 1594. “A 

judge is not obligated to grant judgment as a matter of law to either side, and may deny both 

motions.” Id. 

Establishing “Employer” Status Based on Alter Ego Theory

Where civil penalties under the Act have been assessed against a corporate employer for 

that corporate employer’s violation of OSHA standards, the Commission has authority under the 

Act to “pierce the corporate veil” to hold an individual (or a different business organization) 

responsible for the corporate employer’s violations and responsibility for resulting penalties. 
41

Altor, Inc., 23 BNA OSHC 1458 (No. 99-0958, 2011); see also United States v. Cusack, 806 F. 

Supp. 47, 51 (D.N.J. 1992) (determining that the corporate structure of an employer may be 

disregarded to impose criminal liability on an individual as an “employer” under section 17(e) of 

the Act upon proof that the individual’s “role in a corporate entity (particularly a small one) may 

be so pervasive and total that [the individual] is in fact the corporation and is therefore an 

employer” subject to criminal liability under section 17(e)). 

Whether to pierce the corporate veil to find an individual (or other entity) to be an 

“employer” as defined in the Act involves the application of federal common law that articulates

an “alter ego” theory of liability. See United States v. Pisani (Pisani), 646 F.2d 83, 88 (3d Cir. 

1981). In the Third Circuit, which is one of the courts to which judicial review of a final decision 

of the Commission in this matter may be sought, the substantive evidentiary standard of proof to 

establish alter ego liability is “clear and convincing evidence.”5

 Trustees of Nat. Elevator Indus. 

Pension, Health Benefit & Educ. Funds v. Lutyk (Lutyk), 332 F.3d 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2003). 

“The ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard is the intermediate burden of proof, in 

between ‘a preponderance of the evidence’ and ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Araujo v. 

N. J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc. (Araujo), 708 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2013). The quality of 

evidence for meeting the “clear and convincing” standard is such evidence as shows that “the 

truth” of the facts claimed is “highly probable.” Id., quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 

310, 316 (1984). 

5 One Commissioner has noted that the Third Circuit’s “clear and convincing evidence” 

standard of proof for alter ego liability “does not appear to be the norm in other circuits.” Altor, 

23 BNA OSHC at 1480 n. 7 (Comm’r Atwood) (dissenting from Commission’s decision that alter 

ego liability was not proven).
42

The federal common law analysis for piercing a corporate veil has two prongs:

(1) determining whether “a company has not operated as an entity separate from its shareholders,” 

and (2) determining whether “the situation presents an element of injustice or fundamental 

unfairness.” Altor, 23 BNA OSHC at 1461, citing Pisani, 646 F.2d at 88. 

In considering the first prong, which pertains to determining whether “a separate corporate 

personality no longer exists,” id., the Commission has noted that the Third Circuit “weighs several 

factors” as follows:

(1) gross undercapitalization; (2) insolvency; (3) failure to observe 

corporate formalities; (4) non-payment of dividends; (5) siphoning 

of funds of the corporation by the dominant stockholder; (6) nonfunctioning of other officers or directors; (7) absence of corporate 

records; and (8) corporation acts as a mere facade for the operations 

of the dominant stockholder or stockholders. 

Id.

6 The Third Circuit has observed that these factors do not constitute “elements of a rigid test,” 

Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 194, and indeed do not constitute a “test” at all, but rather are considered “to 

determine whether the debtor corporation is little more than a legal fiction.” Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 

197. The Third Circuit has noted further that the factors do not constitute “the exclusive approach 

to corporate veil piercing.” Am. Bell Inc. v. Fed'n of Tel. Workers of Pa. (Am. Bell), 736 F.2d 879, 

886 (3d Cir. 1984).

6 The D.C. Circuit is another court to which Quevedo-Garcia may seek judicial review of 

a final order of the Commission in these proceedings under section 11 of the Act. In Labadie Coal

Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the D.C. Circuit articulated a two-prong test for 

alter ego liability that echoes the test described by the Third Circuit in Pisani: 

(1) is there such unity of interest and ownership that the separate 

personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist?; 

and (2) if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, will 

an inequitable result follow? Relevant to the first question is the 

issue of the degree to which formalities have been followed to 

maintain a separate corporate identity. The second question looks 

to the basic issue of fairness under the facts.
43

The second prong of the Third Circuit’s analysis—that the situation presents an element of 

injustice or fundamental unfairness—includes situations in which disregarding the corporate form 

would “prevent circumvention of a statute or avoidance of a clear legislative purpose.” Pisani, 

646 F.2d at 88 (concluding the Medicare statute would be circumvented if the corporate form were 

not disregarded to hold an individual responsible for Medicare overpayments that had been made 

to the corporation), citing United States v. Normandy House Nursing Home, Inc. (Normandy 

House), 428 F. Supp. 421 (D. Mass. 1977) disapproved on a different issue, United States v. 

Hughes House Nursing Home, Inc., 710 F.2d 891, 894 (1st Cir. 1983); see also Altor, 23 BNA 

OSHC at 1461 n. 6 (noting that the Third Circuit and New Jersey have similar “tests” for piercing 

the corporate veil, and observing that the New Jersey approach involves determining “whether 

recognizing the corporate form would perpetuate fraud or injustice, or otherwise circumvent the 

law”); Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 758 n. 95 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that among the situations 

in which federal courts have disregarded the corporate form “are those wherein the corporate 

fiction would enable circumvention of a statute”). The Third Circuit has noted further that piercing 

the corporate veil may be in order “when recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public 

policy.” Am. Bell, 736 F.2d at 886, quoting Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1967).

“It is valid to organize a corporation for the purpose of avoiding personal liability.” Pardo 

v. Wilson Line of Washington, Inc., 414 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Indeed, the very name 

given to the kind of business entity that is involved here––limited liability company––indicates as 

much. Moreover, “the mere fact than an individual is the sole stockholder of a corporation will 

not by itself make him liable as the alter ego of the corporation.” Normandy House, 428 F. Supp.

at 424; accord DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co. (DeWitt Truck), 540 F.2d 

681, 685 (4th Cir. 1976) (“the mere fact that all or almost all of the corporate stock is owned by 
44

one individual or a few individuals, will not afford sufficient grounds for disregarding 

corporateness”). 

Accordingly, “penetration of the corporate veil is a step to be taken cautiously,” Quinn v. 

Butz, 510 F.2d at 759, and analysis “must start from the general rule that the corporate entity should 

be recognized and upheld, unless specific, unusual circumstances call for an exception.” Zubik v. 

Zubik, 384 F.2d at 273; accord Am. Bell 736 F.2d at 886 (“court may only pierce the veil in 

‘specific, unusual circumstances’, lest it render the theory of limited liability useless”), and Altor, 

23 BNA OSHC at 1461 (“corporate entity should be recognized and upheld unless specific, 

unusual circumstances call for an exception”). 

“In deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, courts are basically concerned with 

determining if equity requires that the shareholders’ traditional insulation from personal liability 

be disregarded and with ascertaining if the corporate form is a sham, constituting the facade for 

the operations of the dominant shareholder.” Kaplan v. First Options of Chi., Inc. (Kaplan), 19 

F.3d 1503, 1521 (3d Cir. 1994), aff'd, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), quoting Wheeling–Pittsburgh Steel 

Corp. v. Intersteel, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1054, 1057 (W.D.Pa.1990). “In short, the evidence must 

show that the corporation's owners abused the legal separation of a corporation from its owners 

and used the corporation for illegitimate purposes.” Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1521.

“[T]he requirements for corporate veil piercing are demanding ones” to be sure, Altor 23 

BNA OSHC at 1461, but proof of “fraudulent intent” is not an essential component of establishing 

alter ego liability under federal common law. Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 194 (“our test does not require 

proof of actual fraud as a prerequisite for piercing the corporate veil”); accord, DeWitt Truck, 540 

F.2d at 684 (“proof of plain fraud is not a necessary element in a finding to disregard the corporate 
45

entity”), citing Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 

92, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“fraud is not a prerequisite in a suit to disregard a corporate fiction”). 

In DeWitt Truck, the Fourth Circuit noted that circumstances justifying “disregard [of] the 

corporate fiction ... vary according to the circumstances of each case, and every case where the 

issue is raised is to be regarded as sui generis to be decided in accordance with its own underlying 

facts.” 540 F.2d at 684 (internal footnotes omitted).

Quevedo-Garcia’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Because it is the Secretary’s burden to prove alter ego liability, for Quevedo-Garcia to 

prevail on his motion for summary judgment on the Secretary’s alter ego claim, he must show 

initially “that there is an absence of evidence to support the [Secretary’s] case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. 

at 325 (1986). Quevedo-Garcia can satisfy this initial burden by showing that there exists no clear 

and convincing evidence that would support findings in favor of the Secretary on the material facts. 

See Rule 56(c)(1)(B) (one method of demonstrating that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed is by 

“showing ... that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact”). 

Quevedo-Garcia’s motion for summary judgment fails to satisfy the initial burden of 

showing that the Secretary will be unable to produce clear and convincing evidence to impose alter 

ego liability. Quevedo-Garcia’s motion appears grounded at least in part on the proposition that 

proof of fraud is essential to imposing alter ego liability. (See Quevedo-Garcia Mot. ¶¶ 21–22). 

However, as noted earlier, proof of fraudulent intent is not essential to establishing alter ego 

liability under federal common law. Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 194.

In any event, in the Secretary’s cross-motion for summary judgment (which served also as 

the Secretary’s response to Quevedo-Garcia’s cross-motion), the Secretary produced clear and 

convincing evidence that would support a finding that Quevedo-Garcia acted with some fraudulent 

intent: Quevedo-Garcia falsely told an OSHA official who conducted at least some of the 
46

underlying inspections that the corporate entity performing the work at the inspected worksites

was Frame Q.

7

 But Quevedo-Garcia knew that this representation was false. He had caused 

Frame Q to be dissolved months earlier, and he knew that his own salary and the employees’ 

wagers were being paid from the bank accounts of either BB Frame or BM Frame. In addition to 

affirmatively misrepresenting that the employer on site was Frame Q, Quevedo-Garcia also failed 

to disclose to inspecting OSHA officials the material fact that the corporate entity performing the 

construction work was BB Frame (and/or BM Frame, which had been formed on December 24, 

2019). The only reasonable inference from Quevedo-Garcia’s intentional misrepresentation and 

failures to disclose a material fact is that he was attempting to deceive OSHA officials and thwart 

them in accurately identifying the corporate employer that was doing the construction work at 

these worksites. 

As described supra in Facts ¶ 6, Quevedo-Garcia invoked his Fifth Amendment right 

against compulsory self-incrimination during the discovery phase of this litigation.8 In a non7 CO Sydenstricker’s Declaration is clear and convincing evidence that Quevedo-Garcia 

harbored some fraudulent intent in his communications with inspecting OSHA officials. 

Quevedo-Garcia has presented no evidentiary material to controvert that component of the 

declaration and there is otherwise no evidentiary material in the record on the cross-motions to 

establish a genuine dispute of that stated fact as is set forth in Sydenstricker’s declaration. It is 

therefore undisputed for purposes of the cross-motions that Quevedo-Garcia misrepresented to 

OSHA officials that Frame Q was the corporate entity doing the construction work. See Rule 

56(e)(2) (“If a party ... fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact ... the court may 

... consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”).

8 Papers of record in this matter show that Quevedo-Garcia was charged in state court in 

New Jersey on December 19, 2019 with the following criminal charges: 

• third degree crimes of intent to evade tax liability of $87,927.05 for both tax years 2017 

and 2018;

• third degree crime of failing to report $824,857.76 in income for tax year 2017;

• third degree crime of failing to report $985,892.40 in income for tax year 2018;

• third degree crime of conspiracy to commit structuring with the purpose of promoting or 

facilitating engaging in conduct with purpose to evade state and federal transaction 

reporting requirements regarding currency transactions by breaking down at least 
47

criminal matter such as this, Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege 

allows the drawing of adverse inferences for his refusal to respond to probative evidence offered 

$424,000 in currency into smaller sums of cash on at least 52 separate occasions then 

deposited at two different financial institutions on multiple dates between or about April 

2018 to September 2019;

• second degree crime of conspiracy to commit money laundering by engaging in 

transactions involving property known or which a reasonable person would believe to be 

derived from criminal activity with the intent to facilitate or promote criminal activity by 

cashing 661 checks at a check casher in the aggregate of at least $5.7 million then 

structuring deposits into at least two separate financial institutions in the name of another 

person or persons or entities for the purpose of facilitating or promoting New Jersey tax 

offenses;

• first degree crime of money laundering respecting the sum of $5.7 million (as described

in preceding bullet item).

Quevedo-Garcia’s sister has been charged with the same crimes that are described in the 

last three charges in the above list of charges lodged against Quevedo-Garcia. Both 

Quevedo-Garcia and his sister have filed applications to be admitted to a pre-trial intervention 

program. (See material filed by counsel for Respondent under cover of letter dated July 28, 2021).

Quevedo-Garcia first formally invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege through counsel in 

a filing made on July 16, 2021, which his counsel re-affirmed in a letter dated July 28, 2021, both 

of which were filed with the Commission in opposition to discovery motionsfiled by the Secretary. 

Although the parties originally agreed that the Secretary would depose Quevedo-Garcia, 

Quevedo-Garcia later reneged upon invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege. The Secretary then 

filed a motion for leave to take Quevedo-Garcia’s deposition, but the undersigned essentially 

sustained Quevedo Garcia’s assertion of the privilege and denied the motion in an order dated 

August 13, 2021. That same order similarly sustained Quevedo-Garcia’s assertion of the Fifth 

Amendment privilege with respect to responses to certain interrogatories. Another order dated 

October 5, 2021 similarly upheld Quevedo-Garcia’s assertion of the privilege in denying the 

Secretary’s motion that requests for admissions that Quevedo-Garcia had refused to admit or deny 

be deemed admitted.

Quevedo-Garcia’s invocations of the privilege were sustained principally on the ground 

that his framing business had links to the financial crimes of which he stands charged. See Hoffman 

v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951) (stating that the privilege must be sustained if it is not 

“perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case ... that the 

answer(s) cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate”). Despite the invocation of the Fifth 

Amendment privilege, the Secretary obtained some relevant documentation in Quevedo-Garcia’s

responses to requests to produce documents, in declarations by Quevedo-Garcia made in his 

verified responses to interrogatories, and by subpoenaing financial documents from an accountant 

and from two banks. 
48

against him. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (Palmigiano) (“[T]he Fifth 

Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to 

testify in response to probative evidence offered against them”); Rad Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & 

Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 1986). But before any such adverse inference may be drawn, 

the record must contain independent evidence to support any negative inference. See United States 

v. Stelmokas (Stelmokas), 100 F.3d 302, 311 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Thus, as long as there was 

independent evidence to support the negative inferences beyond the invocation of the privilege 

against self-incrimination, the inferences could be drawn”); Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 318 

(observing that the entry of judgment based only on the invocation of the privilege and “without 

regard to the other evidence” exceeds constitutional bounds). 

Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege permits the inference here 

that if he were asked why he falsely represented to OSHA officials that the employer at the 

construction sites was Frame Q, that his responses would lend support to the Secretary’s alter ego 

claim. 

If Quevedo-Garcia’s motion had met the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of 

clear and convincing evidence to pierce the corporate veil of BB Frame, then to defeat 

Quevedo-Garcia’s motion the Secretary would have been required to “present affirmative 

evidence” that would be sufficient to support findings in favor of the Secretary on the material 

facts. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257 (1986) (“[T]he plaintiff, to survive the defendant’s motion, 

need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor”). As is next 

discussed, the Secretary’s opposition to Quevedo-Garcia’s motion (which was combined with his 

cross-motion for summary judgment) sets forth ample facts to support findings in favor of the 

Secretary on the facts that are material to the alter ego claim. But more significantly, the 
49

Secretary’s cross-motion establishes that the Secretary is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

on the claim that Quevedo-Garcia is an employer under an alter ego theory of liability and is

personally responsible for BB Frame’s violations and the resulting imposed penalties, as is 

discussed next. 

Secretary’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Secretary’s motion seeks judgment as a matter of law that Quevedo-Garcia was an 

“employer” as defined in section 3(5) of the Act and thus subject to the compliance requirements 

of section 5(a) and liable for penalties assessed under section 17(a)–(d). 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(5), 

654(a), 666(a)–(d). 

The Secretary argues that Quevedo-Garcia was an “employer” under two different but 

somewhat related theories. The Secretary argues first that Quevedo-Garcia was the statutory 

employer of the employees at the construction sites under the common law agency analysis set 

forth in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden (Darden), 503 U.S. 318 (1992). The Secretary argues 

second that Quevedo-Garcia was a statutory employer of the employees at the construction sites 

under a common law alter ego analysis that the Commission recognized in Altor, 23 BNA OSHC 

1458.

Both theories would achieve the Secretary’s objective of imposing personal liability on 

Quevedo-Garcia. Under alter ego theory, Quevedo-Garcia’s liability under the citations would be 

coextensive with BB Frame’s liability (which has been established by final orders in Commission 

cases 21-0635, 21-0636, 21-0637, 21-0638, and 21-0639). See Altor, 23 BNA 1548 (affirming 

certain citations and penalties against two corporations that constituted a “single employer,” but

determining the evidence was insufficient to support finding that two individuals who operated 

those corporations were also employers under an alter ego theory).
50

In contrast, Quevedo-Garcia’s liability under Darden would conceptually preclude holding 

BB Frame liable for the same violations and penalties (all of which have now become final orders 

against BB Frame).9

 See, e.g., Froedtert Mem. Lutheran Hosp., Inc. (Froedtert), 20 BNA OSHC

1500, 1508 n. 4 (No. 97-1839, 2004) (utilizing the common law agency doctrine of Darden in 

determining that a hospital was the employer of temporary housekeepers who worked at the 

hospital on referral from temporary employment agencies; expressly deciding not to adjudicate an 

alternative “joint employment” theory of liability in which both the hospital and the temporary 

employment agencies would be deemed to be statutory employers of the temporary housekeepers).

Statutory Employer Analysis under Darden

In determining whether an entity has an employment relationship with an identified worker

to the exclusion of some other entity, “the Commission has consistently applied the common law 

agency doctrine” set forth in Darden. FreightCar Am., Inc., No. 18-0970, 2021 WL 2311871, at 

*2 (OSHRC, Mar. 3, 2021) (applying Darden in ruling that the Secretary had failed to prove that 

a parent company was the statutory employer of certain workers whose wages were paid by the 

parent’s subsidiary company); All Star Realty Co., 24 BNA OSHC 1356, 1358-59 (No. 12-1597,

2014) (applying Darden factors in assessing whether two individuals, who were not otherwise 

identified to be employees of any other entity, were statutory employees of the cited company). 

The common law agency doctrine of Darden “incorporate[s] traditional agency law criteria 

for identifying master-servant relationships.” 503 U.S. at 319. The Court in Darden identified the 

following factors as being “relevant to this inquiry”:

the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 

location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the 

9 The Commission’s rules of procedure permit the assertion of incongruous alternative 

theories of liability. See 29 C.F.R. § 2200.30(e) (allowing parties to “state as many separate claims 

or defenses that it has regardless of consistency”).
51

parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 

projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion 

over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 

party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part 

of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party 

is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax 

treatment of the hired party.

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24. The Commission has noted “that there is no precision to the weighing 

of all of these factors.” Froedtert, 20 BNA OSHC at 1508. 

The evidentiary material presented on the cross-motions reflects genuine disputes of 

material fact respecting whether the workers at the construction sites had a master-servant 

relationship with Quevedo-Garcia to the exclusion of BB Frame. For example, the workers’ wages

were disbursed from corporate bank accounts. (Exs. 24, 25 & 29 to Kondo Decl.). Also, corporate 

entities obtained liability insurance and worker’s compensation insurance respecting the workers. 

(See insurance documentation filed by Quevedo-Garcia in opposition of Secretary’s motion dated 

Oct. 28, 2021). While Quevedo-Garcia was the only individual authorized to hire, terminate, 

direct, train or discipline the workers at the various construction sites, on this record there are

genuine disputes of fact about whether he exercised that authority as an agent of BB Frame or as 

a de facto sole proprietor. The whole of the evidence is susceptible of differing inferences on 

whether it was Quevedo-Garcia, not BB Frame (or BM Frame), that had a conventional 

master-servant relationship with the workers at the construction sites under a Darden analysis, thus 

precluding granting summary judgment to the Secretary on this theory. See Ford Motor, 23 BNA 

OSHC at 1594.

Alter Ego Analysis of Altor

The preceding conclusion that genuine disputes of material fact exist with respect to the 

Secretary’s Darden theory does not preclude reaching a different conclusion on the Secretary’s 
52

alter ego theory. As previously noted, unlike statutory employer status under Darden that

identifies a single employer to which an identified employee has a master-servant relationship, 

alter ego theory involves assigning statutory employer status with respect to an identified employee 

to more than a single employer. Specifically, under alter ego theory, statutory employer status 

with respect to the same employee(s) is assigned to both (1) a corporate employer, and (2) an 

individual or other business organization for whom the corporate employer is an alter ego. See, 

e.g., Altor, 23 BNA OSHC at 1461 (recognizing applicability of alter ego theory for holding

individuals liable for a corporate employer’s violations and penalties under the Act, but concluding 

the evidence was insufficient to establish alter ego liability on the individuals). The Secretary

seeks to hold Quevedo-Garcia responsible for the same violations and penalties that have become 

final orders against BB Frame in Commission cases 21-0635, 21-0636, 21-0637, 21-0638, and 

21-0639. Assigning statutory employer status under the Act to more than one employer as to the 

same employees is a permissible outcome under alter ego theory.

For the Secretary to prevail on his cross-motion for summary judgment on alter ego theory, 

he must make an initial showing that the only reasonable conclusion arising from the summary 

judgment record is that it constitutes “clear and convincing evidence” to impose alter ego liability 

on Quevedo-Garcia. If the Secretary succeeds in making this initial showing, Rule 56 does not 

permit Quevedo-Garcia to “rest upon mere ... denials of his pleading,” but rather he “must set 

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248. 

To make such a showing, Quevedo-Garcia must cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 

stipulations ... admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” that demonstrate the 
53

existence of a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Manua's, 27 BNA 

OSHC at 1472-73. 

Although alter ego liability entails a multifactored analysis, and “every case where the issue 

is raised is ... sui generis to be decided in accordance with its own underlying facts,” Dewitt Truck, 

540 F.2d at 684, in a proper case summary judgment may be granted to the party that is alleging 

alter ego liability. See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Quickstuff, LLC, No. CV 14-6105, 2016 

WL 7231605, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2016) (granting summary judgment to the plaintiff on its 

claim to pierce corporate veil of an LLC). An analysis of the record on summary judgment under 

the two-pronged analysis for alter ego liability follows. 

First Prong of Alter Ego Analysis: 

Eight Factors Concerning the Existence of a Separate Corporate Personality

Gross Undercapitalization

Undercapitalization of a corporate entity is a factor in alter ego analysis to prevent 

shareholders from retaining the profits of the business “without having any real capital in the 

undertaking” and therefore risking nothing of their own. DeWitt Truck, 540 F.2d at 689; see also 

Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Lay-Com, Inc., 580 F.3d 602, 612 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f the 

shareholders do not invest enough equity, such that the corporation is undercapitalized, there is no 

basis for rewarding them by limiting their liability, and, in fact, doing so would only encourage 

risky behavior”). Assessing the adequacy of capitalization generally involves looking to the initial 

capitalization at the time of organization, but “[s]ubsequent capitalization may also be relevant to 

[the] inquiry,” in that “evidence of inadequate subsequent capitalization may be indicative of initial 

undercapitalization.” Matter of Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 709, 717 (5th Cir. 1980). Also, “proof 

of subsequent undercapitalization may be further proof of inequitable conduct, such as actions of 

gross mismanagement, self interest, and the like.” Id. at 718.
54

The only direct evidence of BB Frame’s initial capitalization is contained in its 2019 

federal tax return which states that the company had a balance sheet liability of $27,500 for “capital 

stock” at both the beginning and the end of the tax year. (Ex. 7 to Kondo Decl.). Quevedo-Garcia 

certified in BB Frame’s certificate of dissolution filed with the state of New Jersey in November 

2020 that “all assets have been discarded and have been applied to creditors or distributed to its 

members.”10 (Ex. 10 to Kondo Decl.). 

There is no direct evidence respecting the level of capitalization that is appropriate for a 

company of BB Frame’s size, business activity, and location. Cf. Altor, 23 BNA OSHC at 1462 

(noting “there is no evidence as to the amount of capital required for a similarly sized company in 

the same industry” as the subject corporations); Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 198 (noting the absence of 

evidence respecting the amount of capital necessary to engage in the corporate activity involved). 

Thus, with respect to the “gross undercapitalization” factor, the record on the motion for summary 

judgment does not support alter ego liability.

11 Cf. Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 196–98 (imposing alter ego 

liability even though the evidence did not establish gross undercapitalization). 

10 Assuming the information on the tax return and on the certificate of dissolution to be 

true, then by the time that BB Frame was dissolved in November 2020 the $27,500 representing 

capital stock had been liquidated either by paying creditors or being distributed to the owners––

Quevedo-Garcia and his sister.

11 The lack of evidence on this factor may be due at least in part upon Quevedo-Garcia’s 

invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege in pre-hearing discovery and the consequent 

thwarting of the Secretary’s efforts to obtain relevant information, as previously described. 

Nevertheless, there is no independent evidence in the record respecting the degree of capitalization 

appropriate for a company of BB Frame’s size, business activity, and location, and thus drawing 

an adverse inference from Quevedo-Garcia’s silence is not permissible. See Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 

at 311.
55

Failure to Observe Corporate Formalities;

Absence of Corporate Records

BB Frame held no meetings of members, so of course there are no corporate records that 

would evidence such meetings, such as minutes or corporate resolutions. (Exs. 31 & 32 to Kondo 

Decl.). BB Frame had no operating agreement (which is the equivalent of corporate by-laws for 

an LLC). (Ex. 32 to Kondo Decl.). According to Quevedo-Garcia, BB Frame’s contracts with 

other contractors or suppliers were mostly oral contracts grounded in “longtime relationship 

between the parties.” (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.). 

Quevedo-Garcia acknowledges that “there is evidence of a failure to observe corporate 

formalities,” though he contends that there is no evidence that this failure was “malicious” or 

involved an “effort to defraud OSHA or the Secretary.” (Quevedo-Garcia Mot. 8). Accepting as 

true for purposes of analysis that there was no malicious or fraudulent intent attached to 

BB Frame’s failure to observe corporate formalities, the absence of such formalities nevertheless 

bears on whether Quevedo-Garcia, as the sole officer of BB Frame and its majority owner, took 

measures for BB Frame “to maintain a separate corporate identity,” which is the crux of the first 

prong of alter ego analysis. Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d at 97 (observing that “the 

formalities are themselves an excellent litmus of the extent to which the individuals involved 

actually view the corporation as a separate being”); Altor, 23 BNA OSHC at 1461 (noting that the 

first prong of alter ego analysis pertains to determining whether “a separate corporate personality 

no longer exists”). The “disregard of corporate formalities or failure to maintain corporate 

records” may justify piercing the corporate veil “if it is also shown that a corporation's affairs and 

personnel were manipulated to such an extent that it became nothing more than a sham used to 

disguise the alter ego's use of its assets for his own benefit.” Kaplan, 19 F.3d at 1521; but cf. 

Zubik, 384 F.2d at 271 n. 4 (stating the “lack of formalities in a closely-held corporation has often 
56

not been found to have much consequence”), cited by the Commission in Altor, 23 BNA OSHC at 

1462, n. 10 (noting that the “Third Circuit has afforded varying weight to a closely held company’s 

failure to observe corporate formalities”).

One prominent instance of a combined failure to observe corporate formalities and to 

maintain corporate records is that BB Frame adopted no resolution authorizing the company to

transfer to Q Properties (another LLC of which Quevedo-Garcia and his sister were the only 

members) any of the five checks totaling $84,600 that were issued over a 12-month period in 2018 

and 2019. (Ex. 33 to Kondo Decl.). A reasonable inference from such substantial transfer of funds 

from one closely-held company to another is that the transfers were not in furtherance of the 

transferring company’s corporate purpose. Quevedo-Garcia has not argued that the record on the 

motion permits any other reasonable inference, and he has certainly not presented any evidentiary 

material that would support an opposing inference. Having presented no such evidence as Rule 

56 requires that he do to address the Secretary’s evidence supporting that inference, that reasonable 

inference is deemed undisputed for purposes of the motion pursuant to Rule 56(e)(2). Moreover, 

Quevedo-Garcia’s declared refusal based on his Fifth Amendment privilege to respond to 

questions permits the adverse inference that his responses to questions regarding these cash 

transfers from BB Frame to Q Properties would support the Secretary’s claim for alter ego liability. 

See Stelmokas, 100 F.3d at 311. 

Non-functioning of Other Officers and Directors 

The “non-functioning of other officers and directors” factor does not weigh in support of 

alter ego liability. Although Quevedo-Garcia’s sister was 30% owner of BB Frame, she had no 

legal duty to have any role in the operations of the company. The record on summary judgment 

reflects that only Quevedo-Garcia, as BB Frame’s president and its only officer, had operational 

or managerial responsibilities. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.).
57

Non-payment of Dividends

As to the “non-payment of dividends” factor, BB Frame has made no cash distributions of 

profits (which is an LLC’s equivalent of a corporate dividend) to either of its two members. (Ex. 

31 to Kondo Decl.). 

The absence of any distribution of profits (i.e., dividends) is not by itself generally accorded 

much weight for piercing the corporate veil of a closely-held company. Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 196 

(noting that non-payment of dividends by a closely-held corporation is “not unusual, and not a 

strong factor in favor of piercing the corporate veil of such a company”); accord Altor, 23 BNA 

OSHC at 1462; but cf. Lutyk, 3332 F.3d at 196 (noting that “many jurisdictions actually hold that 

the payment of dividends at a time when a corporation is insolvent favors piercing the corporate 

veil”).

While BB Frame made no cash distributions to its two members, BB Frame paid 

Quevedo-Garcia a weekly salary of $2,500 from June 8, 2018 through December 20, 2019 (for a 

total of $202,500 over that period). After that, from January 10, 2020 to August 8, 2020, 

Quevedo-Garcia received a weekly salary of $2,500 that was disbursed from BM Frame’s 

checking account. BB Frame’s other member, Magda Quevedo-Garcia, received no salary or 

wages from BB Frame, but she did receive $17,100 in wages from BM Frame over 19 weeks in 

2020. (Exs. 7, 25 & 27 to Kondo Decl.). 

The “failure to pay dividends while paying substantial sums, whether by way of salary or 

otherwise, to the dominant stockholder, all fitting into a picture of basic unfairness,” may be 

appropriately considered in determining whether to impose individual liability under an alter ego 

theory. DeWitt Truck, 540 F.2d at 687. 

Here, there is no evidence that Quevedo-Garcia’s $2,500 weekly salary was unreasonable 

for the president of a company of BB Frame’s size, business activity, and location. There being 
58

no independent evidence in the summary judgment record indicating the salary to be unreasonable, 

no adverse inference is made based on Quevedo-Garcia’s invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege 

and refusing to be deposed and subject to questioning respecting the reasonableness of his salary. 

See Stelmokas, 100 F.3d at 311.

Siphoning of Funds;

Insolvency

In its 2019 federal tax return, BB Frame reported gross receipts of $388,553 and a total 

income of $297,087. After deductions from this total income figure (which included a deduction 

of $127,500 in compensation to Quevedo-Garcia) the tax return reflected an ordinary loss of 

$1,181 for the year. (Ex. 7 to Kondo Decl.). 

BB Frame’s business checking account had a balance of over $20,000 on November 1, 

2019. But by the end of that month the account had a negative balance. The account continued to 

maintain a negative balance in varying amounts until the bank forced the account closed in March 

2020, when the account had a negative balance of $1,830.77. (Ex. 28 to Kondo Decl.). 

The first of the underlying inspections here was opened in early December 2019, before 

Quevedo-Garcia formed BM Frame, but at a time when BB Frame had no money in its bank 

account. Over the duration of the five underlying inspections here, BB Frame was a shell of a 

company, with no assets of significant value other than trucks (at least one of which remained 

registered to Frame Q, and all of which continued to display Frame Q’s logo). 

BB Frame’s bank account had become depleted in November 2019 in part because 

BB Frame had transferred $84,600 to Q Properties between August 2018 and July 2019 (as 

previously addressed in the discussion pertaining to the failure to observe corporate formalities). 
59

After forming BM Frame in late December 2019, Quevedo-Garcia began financing the 

framing business entirely using BM Frame’s bank account.

12 (Exs. 27 & 28 to Kondo Decl.). In 

the month of January 2020, there were eleven deposits made into BM Frame’s account totaling 

$162,600 and 97 withdrawal transactions totaling $135,318. (Exs. 27 & 30 to Kondo Decl.). (The 

summary judgment record does not reflect the sources of any of the deposited funds.) 

While there is no 2020 tax return in the record for BB Frame, there is one for BM Frame

for that tax year. In tax year 2020, BM Frame reported gross receipts of $426,451, total income 

of $235,066, and ordinary business income of $12,464. (Ex. 11 to Kondo Decl.). 

BB Frame’s insolvency throughout the period of the five underlying inspections was a 

consequence of Quevedo-Garcia’s transfer of the financing of framing operations from 

BB Frame’s bank account to BM Frame’s bank account. There is no evidence in the summary 

judgment record that BM Frame was ever insolvent. It is reasonably inferable that BM Frame’s 

solvency and profitable operations in 2020 were achieved at the expense of the solvency of 

BB Frame, which Quevedo-Garcia choreographed to insolvency in 2019. Quevedo-Garcia has 

pointed to no affirmative evidence to controvert this reasonable inference. 

After Quevedo-Garcia began using BM Frame’s bank account to conduct BB Frame’s 

framing business, he began causing money from BM Frame’s bank account to be disbursed to 

other family-owned companies. The record on the motion for summary judgment is devoid of 

evidence that these payments were in furtherance of the corporate operations of either BB Frame 

or BM Frame. Given the absence of any affirmative evidence offered by Quevedo-Garcia in 

12 The only exception to BM Frame’s complete financing of framing operations that is 

apparent in the summary judgment record is that on January 30, 2020, a payment of $2,470.32 for 

BB Frame’s payroll taxes for the fourth quarter of 2019 was disbursed from a bank account of 

Q Nails, which is owned by Quevedo-Garcia’s sister, who also owned 30% BB Frame. (Ex. 37).
60

opposition to the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment to indicate that these disbursements 

were for a legitimate corporate purpose, the only reasonable inference to draw from the evidence 

is that the disbursements did not benefit BB Frame. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Moreover,

Quevedo-Garcia’sinvocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege and his declared refusal to respond

to questions that would pertain to such transfers of funds permits the adverse inference that the 

purposes of those cash transfers would support the Secretary’s alter ego claim. See Stelmokas, 100 

F.3d at 311. 

Corporate Form a Mere Façade

for Operations of Quevedo-Garcia 

While evidence that a company is a mere façade for the operations of a dominant member 

is not essential to piercing the company’s corporate veil, Lutyk, 332 F.3d at 194, there is abundant 

evidence here indicating exactly that. 

As previously described in connection with other factors, before depleting BB Frame’s 

bank account in November 2019, Quevedo-Garcia caused BB Frame and BM Frame to transfer 

cash to other family businesses for no discernable corporate purpose benefiting BB Frame. The 

$84,600 transferred from BB Frame to Q Properties is the most prominent example. That transfer 

of monies is compelling evidence that BB Frame was not a legal entity separate from QuevedoGarcia, but rather that Quevedo-Garcia operated BB Frame as if it were an interchangeable 

extension of himself, manipulating BB Frame for his own purposes and not for the company’s 

benefit. 

Quevedo-Garcia’s transitioning the financing of framing operations from BB Frame’s bank 

account to BM Frame’s bank account in early 2020, after OSHA had begun to inspect BB Frame 

worksites, echoed the transition that Quevedo-Garcia had implemented in 2018 when, after many 

of the proposed penalties against Frame Q had become final orders, he transitioned the framing 
61

business from Frame Q to BB Frame, even though all the while he continued to hold out the name 

“Frame Q” as the company involved in its construction projects. He went as far as to falsely tell 

an OSHA inspector during the first of the five underlying inspections here that Frame Q was the 

corporate entity performing the framing work at the inspected site. 

Quevedo-Garcia argues that “Frame Q closed its business some years ago, after it became 

fundamentally insolvent due to a variety of contracts, debts, lease agreements and monies owed to 

OSHA for fines and penalties.” (Quevedo-Garcia Mot. 5). The only evidence of any such debt 

(other than the OSHA penalties) is Frame Q’s 2018 tax return that reflected a balance sheet liability 

for accounts payable at the end of the tax year in the amount of $170,807. However, that figure

was 44% less than the accounts payable liability of $303,318 stated to have existed twelve months 

earlier at the beginning of that tax year. The 2018 tax return’s “accounts payable” entry at the end 

of the tax year was the only significant balance sheet liability reflected on the return (other than a 

$25,000 liability for capital stock, which Frame Q would have owed to Quevedo-Garcia as the sole 

owner). Frame Q’s balance sheet liability for accounts payable at the end of 2018 represented 

18% of its indebtedness for the combined figures for accounts payable and the unpaid OSHA 

penalties. In view of Frame Q’s apparent success in reducing by 44% its balance sheet liability 

for accounts payable between January 1 and December 31, 2018, after having collected gross 

receipts of $528,895 that year, Frame Q has not shown that its claimed insolvency was 

substantially the result of any debt except the debt that resulted from the imposed OSHA penalties. 

Quevedo-Garcia having failed to properly address the Secretary’s assertion of fact, there exists no 

genuine dispute of material fact that Quevedo-Garcia caused Frame Q to be dissolved and its 

framing business transferred to BB Frame to avoid collection of Frame Q’s of liability for the 

imposed penalties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Paystaffing, LLC, 
62

No. 16-CV-1128-CCC-JBC, 2017 WL 773877, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2017) (finding that 

allegations that the business of one company was transferred another company, with both 

companies being owned by the same individual, essentially alleges that the companies were merely 

a façade for the operations of that individual). 

The same conclusion holds with respect to Quevedo-Garcia’s transitioning the financing 

of BB Frame’s framing operations from BB Frame’s bank account to BM Frame’s bank account, 

a process that commenced after the first underlying inspection here was opened. While 

Quevedo-Garcia argues that BB Frame was “closed due to circumstances which were wholly 

unrelated to OSHA and/or its citations and ultimate fines,” (Quevedo-Garcia Mot. 6), he points to 

no evidence that BB Frame was closed for any reason other than the underlying OSHA inspections 

and resulting citations and substantial proposed penalties. Other than the liability for capital stock 

(which BB Frame owed to Quevedo-Garcia and his sister), BB Frame’s 2019 tax return reflected 

balance sheet liabilities at the end of the tax year of about $22,000 against gross receipts of 

$388,553 out of which Quevedo-Garcia had been paid a salary of $127,500. (Ex. 7 to Kondo 

Decl.). The information on the tax return does not depict a company in financial distress as of the 

end of the tax year 2019, even though by that time Quevedo-Garcia had depleted BB Frame’s bank 

account in apparent preparation for financing framing operations entirely from BM Frame’s newly 

opened bank account.

Quevedo-Garcia’s argument that BB Frame was “closed due to circumstances which were 

wholly unrelated to OSHA and/or its citations and ultimate fines” might be interpreted to insinuate 

obliquely that the criminal charges filed against him in December 2019 were a factor in the

decision to close BB Frame (though the company was not dissolved until almost one year later). 

(Quevedo-Garcia Mot. 6). There is no evidence presented to support any such argument, and the 
63

argument would be inconsistent with BM Frame having operated profitably in 2020, as reflected 

by its 2020 tax return. The only reasonable inference from the evidence presented by the Secretary 

in support his cross-motion for summary judgment was that Quevedo-Garcia began financing BB 

Frame’s business operations with BM Frame’s resources to avoid having to pay penalties that he 

reasonably expected would be proposed against BB Frame arising out of the underlying 

inspections here, and that Quevedo-Garcia later caused BB Frame to be dissolved for that same 

reason. Quevedo-Garcia has not addressed the Secretary’s assertions of these facts with evidence 

tending to show the contrary, and so those facts are considered undisputed for purposes of the 

cross-motions for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Moreover, Quevedo-Garcia’s 

invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege and declared refusal to respond to questions that would 

be posed to him regarding the transitioning of the framing business among the various corporate 

entities permits the adverse inference that his responses to questions regarding those transitions 

would support the Secretary’s claim for alter ego liability. See Stelmokas, 100 F.3d at 311. 

Second Prong of Alter Ego Analysis: An Element of Injustice –

Circumvention of Statute/Avoidance of Clear Legislative Purpose

The facts about which there is no genuine dispute show in clear and convincing fashion 

that it was the decisions, actions, and inactions of Quevedo-Garcia that resulted in Frame Q being 

determined to have committed forty violations of construction industry standards in thirteen 

inspections over the course of about 66 months from 2013 to 2018. Seventeen of those forty

violations were classified as repeated violations and two were classified as willful violations. As 

the only individual with the authority to direct, train or discipline employees of Frame Q (Ex. 31 

to Kondo Decl.), the requisite state of mind to support the willful classifications was necessarily 

that of Quevedo-Garcia, whose state of mind was imputed to Frame Q. Kaspar Wire Works, Inc.,

18 BNA OSHC 2178, 2181 (No. 90-2775, 2000) ("The hallmark of a willful violation is the 
64

employer's state of mind at the time of the violation"), aff'd, 268 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Cont'l 

Roof Sys., Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 1070, 1071 (No. 95-1716, 1997) (“Where the requisite state of 

mind is manifested through the actions of supervisory employees, it is imputed to the employer to 

the same extent as would be a supervisor's knowledge of violative conditions”). During 

inspections of Frame Q construction sites, Quevedo-Garcia acknowledged understanding that

Frame Q employees were not complying with fall protection requirements, and he stated expressly 

that he had decided not to require the employees to implement compliant fall protection measures 

because he did not regard such measures to be worth the expense. (Sydenstricker Decl.).13 

In April 2017 Quevedo-Garcia caused BB Frame to be created ten days after OSHA opened

the twelfth of the thirteen inspections of Frame Q construction sites (inspection 1264265). In the 

summer of 2018, after most of the penalties proposed against Frame Q had become final orders,

Quevedo-Garcia began to transfer money from Frame Q’s bank account to BB Frame’s bank 

account, and he started using BB Frame’s bank account exclusively to pay employee wages and 

his own weekly salary of $2,500. (Exs. 21 & 25 to Kondo Decl.). In January 2019, OSHA issued 

the last of Frame Q’s thirteen citations, proposing penalties of $261,451. The next month, in 

February 2019, the government brought a civil action against Frame Q in federal district court to 

collect some of the unpaid penalties that had become final orders. The next month, in March 2019,

Quevedo-Garcia applied for a home improvement contractor license for BB Frame, and the month 

after that he formally dissolved Frame Q, thereby successfully thwarting the collection action that 

had been filed against Frame Q just two months earlier. 

13 The Secretary’s evidence asserting this fact was not addressed by Quevedo-Garcia in his 

response to the Secretary’s motion as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), so it is deemed undisputed 

for purposes of the cross-motions pursuant to Rule 56(e)(2). 
65

After dissolving Frame Q and rendering the unpaid penalties of $772,809 essentially 

uncollectable, Quevedo-Garcia continued operating the framing business that Frame Q had 

conducted since 2013 through BB Frame. He operated BB Frame’s framing business in precisely 

the same fashion that he had operated Frame Q’s business––by knowingly allowing or instructing

BB Frame employees (who had formerly been Frame Q employees [see Exs. 24 & 25 to Kondo 

Decl.]) to work without complying with applicable workplace safety standards. The five 

inspections here of BB Frame construction sites that were conducted over about a three-month 

period from December 2019 through February 2020 resulted in BB Frame ultimately being 

determined to have committed 33 violations of construction industry standards, with twelve

violations classified as repeated and eight classified as willful, resulting in penalties of $2,004,225 

that later became final orders against BB Frame. As the only person with authority to direct, train 

or discipline employees of BB Frame, the requisite state of mind to support the willful 

classifications against BB Frame was necessarily Quevedo-Garcia’s state of mind, which was 

imputed to BB Frame. (Ex. 31 to Kondo Decl.). Quevedo-Garcia caused BB Frame to be 

dissolved prior to those violations and penalties becoming final orders against BB Frame in August 

2021, thus effectively making any portion of those penalties uncollectable from the now dissolved 

BB Frame. 

The only reasonable inference from Quevedo-Garcia’s actions in forming, operating, and 

dissolving BB Frame, is that he consciously used its corporate form to evade personal 

responsibility and liability for chronic and intentional violations of applicable workplace safety 

standards. Although Quevedo-Garcia argues that the corporate transitions and maneuverings were 

“wholly unrelated to OSHA,” he has presented no evidentiary material that would controvert this 

reasonable inference, and so that inference is considered undisputed for purposes of the cross-
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motions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The whole of the evidence on the cross-motions supporting this 

finding is clear and convincing evidence, which is to say that it highly probable that this finding is 

true. Araujo, 708 F.3d at 159 (“clear and convincing evidence” is such evidence as shows that 

“the truth” of the facts claimed is “highly probable”). Moreover, Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of 

the Fifth Amendment privilege and declared refusal to respond to questions that would pertain to 

his formation, operation, and dissolution of BB Frame permits the adverse inference that his 

responses would lend support to the Secretary’s alter ego claim. See Stelmokas, 100 F.3d at 311. 

Among the means that the Act advances Congress’s declared “purpose and policy ... to

assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working 

conditions” is by “providing an effective enforcement program.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(10). 

Penalties for violations are a key part of that enforcement program, and “are meant to inflict 

pocket-book deterrence.” Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 268 F.3d 1123, 1132 (D.C. 

Cir. 2001). “The purpose of a penalty is to achieve a safe workplace, and penalty assessments, if 

they are not to become simply another cost of doing business, are keyed to the amount an employer 

appears to require before it will comply.” Quality Stamping Prods. Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1927, 

1930 (No. 91-414, 1994), citing D & S Grading Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 899 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir.

1990). 

Here, Quevedo-Garcia obdurately refused to enable and instruct employees of BB Frame 

to comply with applicable workplace safety standards. The increased frequency of inspections

and likelihood of progressively more severe sanctions were ineffective in inducing him to enable 

and instruct BB Frame employees to comply with applicable standards. Instead of bringing the 

company into compliance, Quevedo-Garcia simply continued operating BB Frame just as he had 

operated Frame Q, by consciously and routinely flouting applicable standards. This disregard of 
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mandatory standards, which are designed to provide workers safe and healthful working 

conditions, likely gave BB Frame an unfair competitive advantage over construction employers

that comply with those standards. See State Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 16 BNA OSHC 1155, 1161

(No. 90-1620, 1993) (consolidated) (“A primary goal of the Act was to eliminate any competitive 

disadvantage that a safety-conscious employer might suffer by requiring that every employer 

comply with the applicable OSHA standards”); accord Walker Towing Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 

2072, 2079 n. 11 (No. 87-1359, 1991).

Quevedo-Garcia had previously succeeded in avoiding having Frame Q pay almost all the 

penalties that had been assessed against it. His creation of BM Frame just weeks after OSHA 

began inspecting BB Frame construction sites in December 2019 appears to have been calculated 

maneuver to continue BB Frame’s business through BM Frame (but while still “doing business 

as” BB Frame) and to continue flouting applicable standards while insulating himself from 

personal liability for the resulting violations and penalties. Quevedo-Garcia’s invocation of the 

Fifth Amendment privilege and his declared refusal to respond to questions that would pertain to 

reasons for creating BM Frame and transferring the funding of framing operations from

BB Frame’s bank account to BM Frame’s bank account permits the adverse inference that his 

responses to such questions would support the Secretary’s alter ego claim. See Stelmokas, 100 

F.3d at 311.

Quevedo-Garcia’s domination of companies that serially flouted applicable workplace 

standards and his decisions to dissolve two of those companies to avoid collection of any portion 

of the over $2.7 million in imposed unpaid penalties circumvents the OSH Act and defeats its clear 

legislative purpose of assuring safe and healthful working conditions for workers. The only 

reasonable inference on the cross-motions for summary judgment is that the evidence is clear and 
68

convincing that Quevedo-Garcia dominated BB Frame and abused its corporate form to 

circumvent the OSH Act and to avoid the Act’s stated legislative purpose and policy. Disregard 

of BB Frame’s corporate form to hold Quevedo-Garcia personally liable for the company’s 

violations and resulting penalties is necessary to prevent the continued or renewed circumvention 

of the OSH Act and avoidance of the Act’s expressed legislative purpose and policy.

Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports Piercing Corporate Veil

The evidence considered on the cross-motions constitutes clear and convincing evidence 

that Quevedo-Garcia abused BB Frame’s corporate form to circumvent the OSH Act and defeat 

its expressed legislative purpose and policy. The Secretary’s motion for summary judgment thus 

presents clear and convincing evidence to support piercing the corporate veil of BB Frame. There 

is no reasonable view of the evidence that supports a contrary conclusion. Quevedo-Garcia has 

not addressed the Secretary’s properly supported motion by producing or citing to other materials 

in the record (such as documents, depositions, interrogatory answers, affidavits, and the like as 

described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)) that indicates the contrary. The Secretary is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56(a) & 56(e)(3) that Quevedo-Garcia was a statutory

employer of the BB Frame employees so that he is personally responsible and liable for the 

violations alleged in the underlying citations and the corresponding proposed penalties.

ORDER

The foregoing decision constitutes findings of fact and conclusions of law on all material 

issues of fact, law, and discretion in accordance with Commission Rule 90(a)(1). 29 C.F.R. 

§ 2200.90(a)(1). 

The Respondent, Juan G. Quevedo-Garcia, having expressly stipulated to “waive[] any 

defense to the Citations and Notifications of Penalty other than the defense that [he] should not be 

held liable for the Citations and Notifications of Penalty in his individual capacity,” and having 
69

now been adjudicated to be personally liable for those citations and penalties, it is ORDERED as 

follows:

1. Case 20-1029. The Citation and Notification of Penalty issued to Quevedo-Garcia on 

June 2, 2020 arising out of inspection number 1450621 is AFFIRMED in its entirety and the 

proposed penalties totaling $520,860 are ASSESSED.

2. Case 20-1030. The Citation and Notification of Penalty issued to Quevedo-Garcia on 

June 2, 2020 arising out of inspection number 1470364 is AFFIRMED in its entirety and the 

proposed penalties totaling $433,146 are ASSESSED.

3. Case 20-1031. The Citation and Notification of Penalty issued to Quevedo-Garcia on 

June 2, 2020 arising out of inspection number 1464272 is AFFIRMED in its entirety and the 

proposed penalties totaling $274,892 are ASSESSED.

4. Case 20-1032. The Citation and Notification of Penalty issued to Quevedo-Garcia on 

June 2, 2020 arising out of inspection number 1466351 is AFFIRMED in its entirety and the 

proposed penalties totaling $369,739 are ASSESSED.

5. Case 20-1042. The Citation and Notification of Penalty issued to Quevedo-Garcia on 

June 2, 2020 arising out of inspection number 1470345 is AFFIRMED in its entirety and the 

proposed penalties totaling $405,588 are ASSESSED.

SO ORDERED.

_/s/William S. Coleman__________

WILLIAM S. COLEMAN

Administrative Law Judge

DATED: March 8, 2022