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 2021 IL App (5th) 190532 

 NO. 5-19-0532 

 IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JACOB WENDLING, as Administrator of the ) Appeal from the

Estate of Ann Van Dyke, ) Circuit Court of 

 ) Clay County. 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. 19-L-4 

 ) 

CHAD MILNER and CLAY COUNTY, ) Honorable 

 ) Michael D. McHaney, 

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

 Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Vaughan concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 

 OPINION

¶ 1 The plaintiff, Jacob Wendling, as administrator of the estate of Ann Van Dyke, filed a 

wrongful death and survival action against the defendants, Chad Milner and Clay County. The 

plaintiff alleged that the decedent, Ann Van Dyke, died as a result of the defendants’ willful and 

wanton misconduct in failing to respond to a 9-1-1 call for emergency assistance in breach of their 

duties under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (Domestic Violence Act) (750 ILCS 

60/101 et seq. (West 2018)). The defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 

2018)) and argued, in part, that they had absolute immunity from liability under section 4-102 of 

the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act)

(745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2018)). The defendants also argued that the plaintiff failed to allege

NOTICE

Decision filed 05/12/21. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Peti ion for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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any facts to indicate that the defendants knew, or had reason to believe, that the decedent’s 9-1-1 

call involved domestic violence and, therefore, failed to show that the limited liability provision 

in section 305 of the Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS 60/305 (West 2018)) applied in this case. 

The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On 

appeal, the plaintiff argues that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to show that the failure of the

defendants to render emergency assistance to the decedent constituted actionable, willful, and 

wanton conduct under section 305 of the Domestic Violence Act. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The following factual allegations are taken from the plaintiff’s complaint. On May 2, 2018, 

at 3:56 p.m., a 9-1-1 call was placed from the landline phone at the decedent’s residence. The 9-1-1 

operator who answered the call did not receive any response from the caller. The operator remained 

on the line for several seconds, attempting to elicit a response from the caller and to assess the 

nature of the call, before disconnecting.

1 At 3:57:20 p.m., the operator called the decedent’s 

landline and received a busy signal. The operator then reported the open-line call to the dispatcher 

for the Clay County Sheriff’s Department.

¶ 4 Defendant Chad Milner, a deputy employed by the Clay County Sheriff’s Department, was 

on duty that day. According to the plaintiff’s complaint, Milner heard the dispatcher’s 

communication concerning the open-line call, but he did not immediately respond. At 5:11 p.m. 

that same day, Milner called the decedent’s landline, but no one answered. Milner then drove to 

the decedent’s residence, a five-minute drive from the sheriff’s department, without notifying the 

dispatcher. When Milner arrived at decedent’s residence, he received no response from anyone 

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This type of call is commonly referred to as an “open-line” call.
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within the residence,so he returned to the sheriff’s department. At approximately 5:53 p.m., Milner 

decided to return to the decedent’s residence. This time, he notified the dispatcher. At 6:15 p.m., 

Milner entered the decedent’s home and found her body. The decedent had been shot more than 

one time. The plaintiff alleged that the fatal shot was inflicted on or after 4:15 p.m. 

¶ 5 On April 17, 2019, the plaintiff filed a survival and wrongful death action2 against the 

defendants, arising from Milner’s failure to respond to the decedent’s 9-1-1 call. Counts I and II 

of the complaint were brought against Milner and alleged that he was grossly negligent in failing 

to respond to the dispatcher’s communication regarding an emergency call, that he recklessly

failed to follow the policies and procedures of Clay County or best police practices, that he 

recklessly chose to work on a traffic accident case rather than respond to a 9-1-1 call that came 

from a residence less than five minutes from the station, and that he acted with reckless disregard

of the health and well-being of the decedent. Counts III and IV alleged that defendant Clay County

was liable for Milner’s willful and wanton misconduct based on a theory of respondeat superior. 

¶ 6 On May 7, 2019, the defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss the complaint under 

section 2-619.1 of the Code. In support of their motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the 

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2018)), the defendants argued that section 4-102 of the Tort 

Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2018)) provided absolute immunity from liability for 

the acts and omissions alleged in the complaint, that section 4-102 immunity extended to both the 

failure to provide police services and the adequacy of those services, and that section 4-102 

contained no exception for willful and wanton conduct. The defendants also moved to dismiss 

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A survival action allows for the recovery of damages for the injuries and the conscious pain and 

suffering sustained by the deceased up to the time of death. See 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2018). An action 

under the Wrongful Death Act allows for the recovery of damages for pecuniary losses, including loss of 

companionship, society, and consortium, suffered by the surviving spouse and next of kin. 740 ILCS 180/2 

(West 2018). 
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counts III and IV of the complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 

2018)), arguing that Clay County could not be held liable for the actions of Milner under a theory 

of respondeat superior because Milner was not an agent or employee of the county. 

¶ 7 On June 20, 2019, the plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss the complaint. The plaintiff argued that the limited liability provision in section 305 of the 

Domestic Violence Act, rather than the absolute immunity provision in section 4-102 of the Tort 

Immunity Act, applied in this case. The plaintiff asserted that, under the plain language of section 

305, a law enforcement officer may be held liable for willful and wanton misconduct in rendering 

emergency assistance or otherwise enforcing the Domestic Violence Act. He argued that section 

305 contained no requirement of subjective knowledge by law enforcement that a person was 

being, or had been, abused by a family or household member. The plaintiff also claimed that the 

complaint contained sufficient allegations to invoke application of the limited liability provision 

in section 305 of the Domestic Violence Act. The plaintiff argued that when presented with facts 

showing that an open-line 9-1-1 call was made from a landline and that the 9-1-1 operator received 

a busy signal upon calling back the landline, Milner should have reasonably concluded that the 

call involved a domestic situation, that the caller was in distress and unable to speak, and that an 

urgent response was necessary. The plaintiff did not address the defendants’ contention that counts 

III and IV should be dismissed because Milner was not an agent or employee of Clay County. 

¶ 8 The defendants filed their reply on July 10, 2019. Therein, the defendants noted that the

plaintiff failed to allege any facts indicating that Milner or the Clay County Sheriff’s Department 

knew or had reason to believe that the 9-1-1 call made from the decedent’s landline involved 

domestic violence, and therefore, the duty to render assistance under the Domestic Violence Act 

was not implicated. The defendants argued that, under the plaintiff’s interpretation of section 305, 
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a law enforcement officer or agency could be subjected to limited liability any time a 9-1-1 call 

was made and the call ultimately turned out to involve domestic violence, regardless of whether 

the law enforcement officer or agency had reason to believe that the call involved domestic 

violence. 

¶ 9 The defendants’ motion to dismiss was called for hearing on November 8, 2019. After 

considering the oral and written arguments of counsel, the circuit court granted the defendants’

motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with 

prejudice. This appeal followed. 

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that he alleged sufficient facts to establish that defendant 

Milner committed an actionable breach of his duty under section 305 of the Domestic Violence 

Act (750 ILCS 60/305 (West 2018)), when he failed to respond to the 9-1-1 call and render

emergency assistance to the decedent. The plaintiff further claims that in dismissing the complaint, 

the circuit court improperly concluded that the plaintiff could not establish the defendants’ liability 

for willful and wanton conduct under section 305, in the absence of factual allegations indicating 

that defendants knew or had reason to believe that the decedent was a person being abused, 

neglected, or exploited by a family or household member. 

¶ 12 In this case, the circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to 2-

619(a)(9) of the Code. A motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) admits the 

legal sufficiency of the complaint and asserts that an affirmative matter or defense outside the 

complaint bars or defeats the clause of action. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2018); Van Meter v. 

Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367 (2003). Immunity is an affirmative matter properly 

raised in a motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(9). Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 367. A court’s 
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decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) is reviewed de novo. Van Meter, 

207 Ill. 2d at 368. 

¶ 13 This case also presents a question of statutory interpretation. When interpreting a statute, 

the court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Moore 

v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 479 (2006); Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). The most reliable 

indicator of legislative intent is the language used in the statute, and that language must be given 

its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177. In interpreting a statute, a court 

will evaluate the statute as a whole, with each provision being construed in connection with every

other provision. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 388-89 (1996). A court will not 

depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions 

that conflict with the express legislative intent. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 389. Questions of statutory 

construction are also reviewed de novo. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177-78. 

¶ 14 The Illinois Constitution of 1970 established that the immunity enjoyed by public entities 

and public employees applies only to the extent provided for by the General Assembly. Ill. Const. 

1970, art. XIII, § 4. Accordingly, the legislature may both grant and limit the immunity of 

defendants. Lacey v. Village of Palatine, 232 Ill. 2d 349, 360 (2009). Under the Tort Immunity 

Act, a public entity or public employee is provided with absolute immunity for the failure to 

provide police protection services, failure to prevent the commission of a crime, failure to detect 

or solve a crime, or failure to make an arrest. 745 ILCS 10/4-102, 4-107 (West 2018). However, 

the legislature granted limited immunity to law enforcement officers acting in good faith in 

rendering emergency assistance or otherwise enforcing the Domestic Violence Act. 750 ILCS 

60/305 (West 2018). Thus, in cases in which the Domestic Violence Act is implicated, the limited

immunity in section 305 of the Domestic Violence Act applies over the absolute immunity in 
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sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act. Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at 488-89; Lacey, 232 Ill. 

2d at 360-61. 

¶ 15 The Domestic Violence Act provides “a comprehensive statutory scheme for reform of the 

legal system’s historically inadequate response to domestic violence.” Moore, 219 Ill. 2d at 488-

89. It begins with the directive that the Act “shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 

underlying purposes.” 750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2018). It then provides a statement of those 

underlying purposes, which include recognizing that domestic violence is a serious crime; 

supporting the efforts of victims of domestic violence to prevent further abuse; clarifying the 

responsibilities and supporting the efforts of law enforcement officers to provide immediate, 

effective assistance and protection for victims of domestic violence, recognizing that officers often 

become the secondary victims in domestic violence incidents; and expanding civil and criminal 

remedies for victims of domestic violence. 750 ILCS 60/102(1), (4), (5), (6) (West 2018). The 

Domestic Violence Act next identifies the persons protected and those include any person abused 

by a family or household member. 750 ILCS 60/201(a) (West 2018). 

¶ 16 As part of the comprehensive statutory scheme, the Domestic Violence Act sets forth 

certain duties and responsibilities of law enforcement officers to effectively assist and protect 

victims of domestic violence. 750 ILCS 60/301 et seq. (West 2018). These responsibilities include 

establishing and implementing proper arrest policies, maintaining data, and preparing reports 

regarding incidents of domestic violence. See 750 ILCS 60/301.1, 302, 303 (West 2018). 

¶ 17 Additionally, section 304 of the Domestic Violence Act delineates the responsibilities of 

law enforcement officers to assist victims of domestic violence. 750 ILCS 60/304 (West 2018). 

Section 304(a) provides that “[w]henever a law enforcement officer has reason to believe that a 

person has been abused, neglected, or exploited by a family or household member, the officer shall 
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immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, neglect, or exploitation,” including 

arresting the abuser and transporting the victim to a medical facility for treatment or to a place of 

safety. (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 60/304(a) (West 2018). 

¶ 18 Section 305 limits law enforcement liability to willful and wanton breaches of duty. 750 

ILCS 60/305 (West 2018). Section 305 provides as follows: 

“Any act of omission or commission by any law enforcement officer acting in good faith

in rendering emergency assistance or otherwise enforcing this Act shall not impose civil 

liability upon the law enforcement officer or his or her supervisor or employer, unless the 

act is a result of willful or wanton misconduct.” (Emphases added.) 750 ILCS 60/305 (West 

2018). 

The limited liability of law enforcement is a direct expression of the legislature’s intent “to 

reconcile the strongly worded purposes of the Act—primarily the protection of and assistance to 

victims of abuse,” while recognizing that law enforcement officers performing their legal duties 

“should not be held civilly liable when their efforts to enforce the Act fall short, unless the conduct 

in question can be viewed as willful or wanton.” (Emphasis in original.) Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 

168 Ill. 2d 312, 322 (1995). 

¶ 19 Section 304 and section 305 of the Domestic Violence Act work in concert. Moore, 219 

Ill. 2d at 489. Section 304 establishes an immediate duty to act when a law enforcement officer 

has reason to believe that a person has been abused by a family member. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 

323-24. Section 305 grants law enforcement officers immunity for acts or omissions that result 

from “ ‘good faith’ ” efforts in rendering emergency assistance. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 322. 

However, a law enforcement officer is subject to liability when that officer has engaged in willful 
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and wanton conduct3 in breach of a statutory duty to a victim of domestic violence. Moore, 219 

Ill. 2d at 489. Accordingly, in construing the responsibilities and liabilities set forth in sections 304 

and 305 together, and considering the intent and purposes of the legislation, we find that in order 

to invoke the protections of the Domestic Violence Act, including the liability provisions in section 

305, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if proven, would establish that the law 

enforcement officer had some knowledge or reason to believe that the person in need of assistance 

was a victim of domestic violence within the meaning of the Domestic Violence Act.

¶ 20 In Calloway, our supreme court was called upon to consider whether the allegations in the 

plaintiff’s complaint were adequate to state an actionable cause under the Domestic Violence Act. 

168 Ill. 2d at 318. After finding that there was no cause of action for negligence under the Act, the 

supreme court determined that the express limitation on liability in section 305 did not apply if the 

act or omission alleged was a result of willful and wanton misconduct. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 

322. The supreme court found that potential liability was derived from the statutory duties

expressed in section 304, which stated that law enforcement officers having reason to know of the 

abuse shall immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d 

at 323-24. The court then recognized a cause of action for civil damages if the injured party can 

show “that he or she is a person in need of protection under the Act, the statutory law enforcement 

duties owed to him or her were breached by the willful and wanton acts or omissions of law 

enforcement officers, and such conduct proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.” Calloway, 168 Ill. 

2d at 324. 

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Willful and wanton conduct indicates that an action was done with an “actual intention” to cause 

harm, or if not intentional, “with a conscious disregard or indifference” for the safety others. (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Burke v. 12 Rothschild’s Liquor Market, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 451 (1992); see 

also 745 ILCS 10/1-210 (West 2018). 
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¶ 21 Next, the supreme court considered the plaintiff’s complaint and found that the complaint 

contained factual allegations indicating that the law enforcement officers knew that the plaintiff

was a person in need of protection under the Act. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 325. The plaintiff alleged 

that the officers were aware that she had obtained an order of protection against her husband. The 

plaintiff further alleged that she notified the law enforcement officers on the morning of the 

incident that her husband had a gun and was threatening her at her place of employment and the

officers did nothing to enforce the order of protection or intervene after being informed of the 

husband’s continuing abuse. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 325. The supreme court determined the 

Domestic Violence Act imposed a duty upon the officers to promptly undertake all reasonable 

steps to assist the plaintiff, a person protected by the Act, when they learned of her husband’s 

threatening conduct and ongoing violation of the order of protection. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 326. 

Taking the well-pleaded allegations and reasonable inferences as true for purposes of the motion 

to dismiss, the supreme court concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a claim for willful 

and wanton misconduct under the Act. Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 325-26. 

¶ 22 In Beyer v. City of Joliet, 392 Ill. App. 3d 81, 83 (2009), the court was asked to consider 

whether the plaintiff’s complaint adequately pleaded a willful and wanton failure to act on the part 

of the police under the Domestic Violence Act. There, the plaintiff alleged that the victim called 

the police several times to report that her husband was threatening her with physical harm and 

mentally abusing her by reminding her of the presence of guns in the house. The plaintiff further 

alleged that in the hours before the victim’s death, three different police officers responded to her 

calls for help and each time left without engaging in any investigation or offering to either help 

decedent obtain an order of protection or take her to a place of safety. After reviewing the 
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complaint, the court concluded that the plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts that, if proven, would 

invoke the protections of the Domestic Violence Act. Beyer, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 86-87. 

¶ 23 In Sneed v. Howell, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1149 (1999), the plaintiff alleged that the victim’s exhusband had repeatedly threatened her and that the victim had obtained an order of protection

against him. The plaintiff further alleged that during the two-week period prior to the victim’s

death, the victim made repeated reports to the police that her ex-husband was stalking her and that

he slashed her tires. There were also allegations indicating that the victim had reported that her exhusband was watching her outside her workplace on the day before her death and that the police 

took no action to stop the repeated violations of the order of protection. Sneed, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 

1152. Upon considering whether the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint fit within the 

responsibilities and liabilities of the Domestic Violence Act, this court found that the plaintiff had

alleged sufficient facts that could result in a determination of willful and wanton conduct on the 

part of the police officers. Sneed, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 1159. 

¶ 24 In determining whether the allegations in a complaint were adequate to invoke the limited 

liability provision in section 305, our courts have considered whether the plaintiff alleged facts 

indicating that the law enforcement officers had some information or reason to know that the 

person needed the protections of the Domestic Violence Act. See Calloway, 168 Ill. 2d at 325; 

Beyer, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 86-87; Sneed, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 1158-59. Our supreme court has made 

it clear that the Domestic Violence Act does not impose a general, open-ended duty to protect 

victims of domestic violence, regardless of whether the police have reason to know that their 

services may be required. See Lacey, 232 Ill. 2d at 365. 

¶ 25 In this case, the plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to show that defendant Milner or the 

Clay County Sheriff’s Department knew, or had reason to believe, that the decedent’s 9-1-1 call 
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involved domestic violence or that the decedent was a person in need of protection under the 

Domestic Violence Act. There are no allegations that Milner, or the sheriff’s department, had been 

called to the decedent’s residence on a prior occasion because of an incident involving domestic 

violence or a violation of an order of protection. The 9-1-1 call provided no indication or 

information as to the nature of the emergency, and the open-line call, by itself, did not provide 

reason to believe that it involved domestic violence under the facts of this case. After reviewing 

the allegations in the complaint, we conclude that the plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts that, if 

proven, would invoke the limited liability provision of the Domestic Violence Act. 

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 In this case, the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to invoke the protections of the 

Domestic Violence Act, and the circuit court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint 

with prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

¶ 28 Affirmed.
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No. 5-19-0532 

Cite as: Wendling v. Milner, 2021 IL App (5th) 190532 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clay County, No. 19-L-4; the 

Hon. Michael D. McHaney, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys 

for 

Appellant: 

Jarrod P. Beasley, of Kuehn, Beasley & Young, P.C., of 

Belleville, for appellant. 

Attorneys 

for 

Appellee: 

Gerard W. Cook and Joyce A. Pollack, of 

O’Halloran Kosoff Geitner & Cook, LLC, of Northbrook, for 

appellees.