UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4211

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT CHRISTOPHER PARKS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, 

Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:08-cr-00291-NCT-1)

Submitted: March 28, 2011 Decided: August 4, 2011

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY JOHNSON & LAWSON, LLP, Greensboro, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. John W. Stone, Jr., Acting 

United States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Robert Christopher Parks was convicted by a jury of 

possessing firearms after having been convicted of a felony, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and sentenced to 41 

months of imprisonment. He appeals, claiming, first, that his 

civil rights had been restored and, second, that the district 

court’s denial of his defense of entrapment by estoppel 

constituted a denial of his right to due process. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm.

Parks was convicted in North Carolina state court in 

1988 of a felony drug offense and sentenced to five years 

imprisonment, with all five suspended, and placed on supervised 

probation. Parks’ sentence was discharged on November 18, 1991; 

it is undisputed that he was not pardoned and his conviction was 

not overturned. In November 2007, officers with the Rockingham 

County, North Carolina, Sheriff’s Department executed a search 

warrant at Parks’ residence and retrieved a number of firearms. 

At trial, Parks argued that he believed that his civil rights 

had been restored and, therefore, he lawfully owned the guns at 

issue. In support of his defense, Parks attempted to introduce 

into evidence a 1997 order issued by a North Carolina state 

district court that directed the return of a certain firearm to 

the “rightful owner.” The district court disallowed the 
3

admission of this evidence and refused to instruct the jury on 

entrapment by estoppel. 

Parks first argues that, under North Carolina law, his 

civil rights had been restored and, therefore, he was lawfully 

entitled to own a firearm. In determining whether state law 

provides that a defendant’s civil rights have been restored, we 

look “to the whole of state law.” See United States v. McLean, 

904 F.2d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 1990). North Carolina law restores 

to convicted felons some civil rights upon release from prison. 

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 13-1 (2009). Upon his discharge in 1991, 

Parks regained his “rights of citizenship,” including his rights 

to vote, hold office, and serve jury duty. N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§§ 163-55(a)(2) and 9-3; see McLean, 904 F.2d at 217 n.1. 

However, Parks did not immediately regain his right to possess a 

firearm upon his release. At that time, North Carolina’s Felony 

Firearms Act prohibited convicted felons from possessing 

firearms for five years after release from prison. N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-415.1(a) (1975) (amended 1995). 

In 1995, North Carolina amended the Felony Firearms 

Act to “replace the five-year temporary handgun disability with 

a permanent ban on the possession of handguns and certain other 

firearms by ex-felons[,]” regardless of the date of conviction. 

United States v. Farrow, 364 F.3d 551, 554 (4th Cir. 2004); see

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1(a) (1995). Under the pre-1995 
4

statute, Parks’ right to possess firearms would have been 

restored on November 18, 1996. However, Parks’ rights were not 

restored on that date due to the intervening amendment of the 

statute. Moreover, this court has held that the retroactive 

application of amended North Carolina Felony Firearms Act 

complete ban on felon firearm possession does not violate the Ex 

Post Facto Clause. Farrow, 364 F.3d at 555. Finally, Parks’ 

mistaken belief that his right to own a firearm had been 

restored is not a defense to a § 922(g) offense. United 

States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 1997); United 

States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Parks also asserts that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying his request to present his evidence in 

support of a defense of “entrapment by estoppel.” A criminal 

defendant may assert an entrapment by estoppel defense when the 

government affirmatively assures him that certain conduct is 

lawful, the defendant thereafter engages in the conduct in 

reasonable reliance on those assurances, and a criminal 

prosecution based upon the conduct ensues. See Raley v. Ohio, 

360 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1959). To be able to assert the defense, 

however, a defendant has to show more than “vague or even 

contradictory” statements by the government; “he must 

demonstrate that there was ‘active misleading’ in the sense that 

the government actually told him that the proscribed conduct was 
5

permissible.” United States v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936, 939 

(4th Cir. 1997). (internal citation omitted). Because Parks’ 

evidence failed to establish the elements of the defense, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his 

request to introduce the state court order into evidence or to 

instruct the jury on the entrapment by estoppel defense.

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED