Filed 4/4/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re J.G., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

2d Juv. No. B287487

(Super. Ct. No. 17JV00334)

(San Luis Obispo County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.G.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

The internet is a source of great knowledge and 

communication of ideas. Unfortunately, it can be used for 

purposes which are not so wonderful. Here the trial court 

required a juvenile to consent to a search of electronic devices as 

a correctional tool in the juvenile’s reformation and 

rehabilitation. It seems obvious that the juvenile court is trying 

to keep the juvenile from accessing information which may kindle 

his interest in racial hatred and bigotry. This is such a laudable 

goal that it is difficult to see the merit in academic counter 
2

arguments. Resolution of the issue should not turn on an 

academic analysis of privacy considerations and the relationship 

to terms and conditions of juvenile probation. Rather, the 

approach should be a practical one to serve this juvenile who is in 

need of monitoring for his own good. This kid is in trouble. He 

needs guidance. He does not need to access racial hatred which 

is so readily available on the internet. 

J.G. participated in a fist fight at his school and, 

when a teacher tried to stop the fight, used a racial slur against 

that teacher. He called the teacher a “nigger.” He admitted in 

juvenile court that he committed the misdemeanor of disturbing 

the peace on school grounds. (Pen. Code, § 415.5, subd. (a)(1).)1

The juvenile court judge granted probation on several conditions, 

including the condition that his electronic devices would be 

subject to search. Appellant contends the electronic search 

condition bears no relationship to his offense and is 

unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.

Facts

In March 2017, appellant, who was then 15 years old, 

got into a fight on school grounds. A teacher stepped in to stop 

the fight. Appellant pushed the teacher away using a racial slur 

in the process. Appellant admitted disturbing the peace on school 

grounds. The probation report reflected numerous past instances 

in which appellant displayed “defiant behavior,” used aggressive 

or threatening language, refused to do work, or was disruptive in 

class. Appellant also admitted to using marijuana. 

The trial court granted probation on a number of 

conditions, including that appellant shall, “Submit any electronic 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise stated.
3

device, used to store or transmit digital information, that you 

own, possess or control, to a search of any source of electronic 

data identified below, at any time, with or without probable 

cause, by a peace officer, and provide the peace officer with any 

passwords necessary to access the data source specified.” Sources 

of electronic data identified in the probation condition are limited 

to: text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, 

email accounts, social media accounts and internet browsing 

history. The probation order further provides that the 

“rehabilitative and/or supervisory concerns addressed by this 

search term include the following: [¶] Drug/alcohol use or drug 

sales[,] [¶] Threats of violence toward others.” 

Contentions

Appellant contends the electronic search condition 

bears no relationship to his offense and is unconstitutionally 

overbroad. Respondent contends the condition is reasonable 

because it relates to potential future criminality and that the 

condition is not overbroad. We note that similar issues regarding 

electronic search probation conditions are pending in the 

California Supreme Court. (In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241 

Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 7, 2016, S230923; see also 

People v. Bryant (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 396, review granted June 

28, 2017, S241937; People v. Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122, 

review granted Dec. 14, 2016, S238210; In re J.E. (2016) 1 

Cal.App.5th 795, review granted Oct. 12, 2016, S236628.)

Standard of Review

We review the court’s imposition of a probation 

condition for abuse of discretion. (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 

Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.) We review constitutional challenges to 
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probation conditions de novo. (In re M.F. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 

489, 495.)

Discussion

Reasonableness. “Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 730, subdivision (b) ‘authorizes the juvenile court to 

“impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it 

may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be 

done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward 

enhanced.” A juvenile court enjoys broad discretion to fashion 

conditions of probation for the purpose of rehabilitation and may 

even impose a condition of probation that would be

unconstitutional or otherwise improper so long as it is tailored to 

specifically meet the needs of the juvenile.’ [Citation.]” (In re 

J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 753-754.) Because juveniles are 

deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than 

adults, the trial court has even greater latitude in formulating 

the terms of juvenile probation. (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 

Cal.App.4th 902, 909-910.) “The reasonableness and propriety of 

the imposed condition is measured not just by the circumstances 

of the current offense, but by the minor's entire social history. 

[Citation.]” (In re J.B., supra, at p. 754.)

The juvenile court’s discretion is not, however, 

unlimited. We will consider a probation condition invalid only if 

it: “‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was 

convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, 

and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably 

related to future criminality . . . . ’” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 

Cal.3d 481, 486.) All three prongs must be satisfied before we 

will invalidate a probation condition. (Ibid, fn. 1; see also In re 

D.G. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 47, 52.)
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A probation condition may be justified because it 

reasonably relates to future criminality. As our Supreme Court 

explained in People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375 (Olguin), a 

probation condition “that enables a probation officer to supervise 

his or her charges effectively is . . . ‘reasonably related to future 

criminality’” (id. at pp. 380-381), even if the condition “has no 

relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted[.]” 

(Id. at p. 380.) 

We conclude the electronic search condition at issue 

here was reasonable. Appellant admitted that he disturbed the 

peace by engaging in a fight at school and using a racial slur 

toward a teacher. He had prior discipline for “defiant behavior,” 

using threatening language and being disruptive in class. The 

conditions of his probation require him to refrain from using 

drugs, threatening others with violence and visiting school 

grounds without prior approval. We conclude the electronic 

search condition is reasonable because it will allow law 

enforcement to monitor appellant’s compliance with these 

conditions.

Overbreadth. Appellant contends the electronic

search condition is overbroad. We disagree. “A probation 

condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional 

rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the 

condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally 

overbroad.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890; see also 

Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 384.) A juvenile court does, 

however, have wider latitude in drafting probation conditions for 

juveniles than for adults. “‘This is because juveniles are deemed 

to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and 

because a minor’s constitutional rights are more 
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circumscribed. . . .’ [Citation.] Whether a probation condition is 

unconstitutionally overbroad presents a question of law reviewed 

de novo. [Citation.]” (In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 

297.)

The probation condition at issue here permits law 

enforcement to search text messages, voicemail messages, social 

media accounts, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts and 

internet browsing history. These methods of communication are 

reasonably likely to reveal evidence of appellant’s compliance 

with other probation conditions, including those that prohibit 

drug and alcohol use and threats of violence against others. 

Limiting the search condition to these forms of digital 

communication reduces the likelihood that law enforcement will 

access medical records, financial information or other data 

unrelated to criminal activity. We conclude the probation 

condition is not overbroad.

Conclusion

The judgment is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

I concur:

PERREN, J.
1

TANGEMAN, J.:

I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes the 

condition is justified because “it will allow law enforcement to 

monitor [J.G.’s] compliance with [probation] conditions.” (Maj. 

opn. ante, at p. 5.) That rationale includes every probationer, 

regardless of their offense or social history. It casts too wide a 

net to pass muster under In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749 or 

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481.

The probation condition at issue in this case has been 

the subject of several published appellate court decisions. The 

holdings in those cases are not consistent, and our Supreme 

Court has granted review in some of those cases. (Maj. opn. ante, 

at p. 3.) 

Courts consistently hold that juvenile courts enjoy 

broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation for 

rehabilitation purposes, so long as specifically tailored to meet 

the needs of the juveniles. (In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 753-754.) They also agree that that discretion “is not 

unlimited.” (In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 912.) 

“Courts have ‘consistently held that juvenile probation conditions 

must be judged by the same three-part standard applied to adult 

probation conditions under Lent.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) 

Indisputably, the first two prongs of Lent are 

satisfied here. The electronic search condition bears no 

relationship to J.G.’s crime of disturbing the peace on school 

grounds or his social history. And “the typical use of electronic 

devices and social media is not itself criminal.” (In re Erica R., 

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.)

The majority relies on the third prong, reasoning that 

future criminality can be monitored with an electronic search 
2

condition. But that is true for every probationer. This rationale 

does not justify the condition where nothing in the offense or 

social history shows a predisposition to use electronic devices in 

connection with criminal activity.

This case is like In re Erica R., supra, 240 

Cal.App.4th 907, in which the defendant juvenile admitted to 

misdemeanor possession of Ecstasy, and the court imposed a 

similar electronic search probation condition. In its holding 

striking the condition, our colleagues in the First Appellate 

District, Division Two, wrote: “There is nothing in the record 

regarding either the current offense or [appellant’s] social history 

that connects her use of electronic devices or social media to 

illegal drugs. In fact, the record is wholly silent about 

[appellant’s] usage of electronic devices or social media.” (Id. at 

p. 913.) The same is true here. Accordingly, the Erica R. court 

held that because no evidence existed to show a predisposition to 

use electronic devices in connection with criminal activity, “‘there 

is no reason to believe the current restriction will serve the 

rehabilitative function of precluding [appellant] from any future 

criminal acts.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; accord, In re J.B., supra, 242 

Cal.App.4th 749.)

The dual justifications advanced by the majority in 

this case for upholding this condition—that a minor’s rights are 

circumscribed and that the condition will allow law enforcement 

to monitor J.G.’s compliance with other probation conditions—

strike at the core of the holdings in In re J.B. and Lent. “[I]t is no 

exaggeration to say that many of the [vast numbers of American 

juveniles] who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital 

record of nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to 

the intimate.” (Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 395.) It is 
3

therefore difficult to fathom any case in which an electronic 

search probation condition would not pass the test used by the 

majority here. That result would eviscerate the holdings of In re 

J.B. and Lent and render them meaningless.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

TANGEMAN, J.
Charles Crandall, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Law Offices of David R. Greifinger and David R. 

Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Chung Mar, Analee J. Brodie, David 

Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.