IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-1444

Filed August 17, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHAD STEVEN LESTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Steven W. Guiter, 

District Associate Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his conviction after being found guilty of 

operating while intoxicated, arguing the State violated his right to speedy trial. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Jeremy L. Merrill of Lubinus Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kristin A. Guddall, Special 

Counsel, for appellee.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.

Chad Lester appeals his conviction after being found guilty of operating 

while intoxicated (OWI). He argues the State violated his right to speedy trial 

and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to 

dismiss on speedy trial grounds. We agree and find the district court’s failure to 

dismiss Lester’s charge constituted an abuse of discretion. We reverse Lester’s 

conviction and remand for dismissal.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On November 4, 2014, the State charged Lester by trial information with 

OWI, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2013). Also on 

November 4, 2014, Lester submitted a written arraignment and plea of not guilty, 

in which he demanded speedy trial pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 

2.33(2)(b). The district court set a pretrial conference date of December 9, 2014, 

and ordered that Lester have a substance-abuse evaluation on file with the court 

within thirty days as a term of his release. On December 9, 2014, the district 

court continued proceedings to January 6, 2015, and again ordered Lester to 

obtain a substance-abuse evaluation.

On January 6, 2015, Lester and his attorney appeared for a pre-trial 

conference as ordered. The district court scheduled dates for the final pretrial 

conference and trial. Although the record does not contain a transcript of the 

proceedings that took place that day, Lester and his attorney apparently agreed 
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to the dates that were set by the court.1 The final pretrial conference was 

scheduled for March 27, 2015; trial was scheduled for April 23, 2015. 

On January 14, 2015, Lester filed a motion to suppress, alleging the 

consent he gave to law enforcement was not valid because he impermissibly 

signed an implied consent form in red ink. The State filed a resistance to the 

motion two days later. Lester’s motion to suppress was denied as facially 

insufficient on February 13, 2015, following a hearing held on February 10, 2015. 

The parties jointly moved to continue the final pretrial conference from 

March 27, 2015, to March 31, 2015. Then, on April 13, 2015, Lester filed a 

motion to dismiss his criminal charge, alleging the State had violated his right to 

a speedy trial. In the motion, Lester noted he had filed his written arraignment on 

November 4, 2014, but had not been brought to trial within the ninety-day 

timeframe established under rule 2.33(2)(b). The State filed a resistance to 

Lester’s motion, arguing the delay was justified because Lester had failed to 

obtain a court-ordered substance-abuse evaluation and also because Lester’s 

unsuccessful motion to suppress was pending when the ninety-day cutoff came 

and went.

A hearing was held on Lester’s motion to dismiss on April 14, 2015. 

Lester briefly summarized his position. The State did the same but made the 

additional argument that the trial date had been scheduled for a date outside the 

 

1 We use the term “agreed to” in deference to the district court’s oral recitation of facts in 

its order regarding Lester’s motion to dismiss. Because we have no document signed by 

Lester agreeing to the scheduled dates, nor any actual record of what transpired at the 

January 6, 2015 pretrial conference, we have no definitive record whether the trial date 

was discussed and agreed to by Lester and his counsel, or if the trial date was 

scheduled by court administration and simply not objected to.
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ninety-day period—while still within the ninety-day period—with the “input, advice 

and consent” of Lester. Following the State’s argument, the district court ruled 

from the bench as follows:

The court has reviewed the file, the motion, and the 

resistance. The court finds that there is good cause for exceeding 

the ninety days in this case on January 6, 2015, and the defendant 

and his attorney were personally present in court and agreed to the 

entry of an order for final pretrial conference on March 27 and the 

trial date of April 23.

The court finds that good cause exists that the ninety days 

was waived by the defendant’s actions on January 6, 2015. In 

further support there’s—in further support there’s been a number of 

hearings since the January 6 date all leaving in place the April 23 

trial date.

The motion to suppress was filed. The same day it was 

filed, the court scheduled—set an order for the parties to inform the 

court of a date for the motion to suppress so any waiver or cause to 

go over the ninety days the court finds was at the respondent’s 

actions or consent so, therefore, the court is going to deny the 

motion[] to dismiss. 

Following the hearing, the district court issued an order denying Lester’s motion 

to dismiss “for reasons stated on the record and reasons set forth in [the] State’s 

resistance.”

On April 21, 2015, defense counsel filed a motion to continue the April 23, 

2015 trial date. The district court reset the trial for May 21, 2015. On May 12, 

2015, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw, citing a fundamental 

breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The district court allowed defense 

counsel to withdraw and rescheduled trial for June 18, 2015, in order to allow 

Lester’s new defense counsel time to prepare.

Lester waived his right to trial by jury and was found guilty by trial on the 

minutes on June 18, 2015. 

Lester now appeals.
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II. Standard of Review

“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based on speedytrial grounds for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907 

(Iowa 2005). The district court’s discretion narrows when speedy trial grounds 

are at issue. Id. “The discretion of the trial court to avoid dismissal is limited to 

the exceptional circumstance where the State carries the burden of showing 

good cause for delay.” State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156, 160–61 (Iowa 1975).

III. Discussion

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) provides:

If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived 

the defendant’s right to a speedy trial the defendant must be 

brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court 

must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the 

contrary be shown.

Under rule 2.33(2)(b), “a criminal charge must be dismissed if the trial does not 

commence within ninety days from the filing of the charging instrument ‘unless 

the State proves (1) defendant’s waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to 

the defendant, or (3) ‘good cause’ for the delay.’” Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 908 

(citation omitted). The only factor we consider when determining if good cause 

existed is the reason for the delay. Id. “The burden of proving an exception to 

the rule’s deadline rests squarely with the State.” State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 

201, 204 (Iowa 2001).

It is not disputed Lester demanded speedy trial on November 4, 2014.

Nor is it disputed Lester was not brought to trial within ninety days of the filing of 

the trial information. Thus, we need only determine whether the district court was 

correct in finding waiver or good cause existed to excuse the delay and allow 
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Lester’s criminal charge to survive dismissal. Lester argues the district court 

abused its discretion in determining his failure to obtain a substance abuse 

evaluation established good cause for the delay. Second, Lester argues the 

district court abused its discretion when it determined the delay was attributable 

to his unsuccessful motion to suppress and other actions. Third, he argues the 

district court abused its discretion in finding he waived his right to a speedy trial 

by acquiescing to a trial date after the ninety-day deadline.

The district court’s statements on the record indicate it denied Lester’s 

motion to dismiss primarily because it concluded Lester waived his right to a 

speedy trial when, on January 6, 2015, he agreed to the April 23, 2015 trial date 

and thereafter remained silent as to the date that had been set. However, the 

Iowa Supreme Court has “emphasized that mere acquiescence in setting a trial 

date is not sufficient to lead to a waiver of speedy trial rights.” State v. Taylor, 

___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2016 WL 3354424, at *4 (Iowa 2016). This is so because 

the State, not the defendant, “has the responsibility for bringing the defendant to 

trial within the specified period.” State v. Phelps, 379 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Iowa Ct. 

App. 1985). The State must show “an intentional relinquishment or 

abandonment of a known right or privilege” to prove waiver. Taylor, 2016 WL 

3354424, at *4 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).

Acquiescence in the setting of a trial date beyond the speedy trial period is but 

one factor “which may be considered in determining whether a defendant has 

waived his speedy trial rights.” Phelps, 379 N.W.2d at 387. “The determinative 

issue . . . is whether sufficient additional circumstances were present . . . to 
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compel a finding of waiver.” State v. Zaehringer, 306 N.W. 2d 792, 795 (Iowa 

1981).

We find the additional circumstances necessary to constitute waiver were 

lacking in this case. Aside from agreeing to the April 23, 2015 trial date, Lester 

did nothing to suggest he meant to intentionally relinquish his right to a speedy 

trial. Neither his failure to obtain the court-ordered substance-abuse evaluation 

nor his filing of a motion to suppress amounted to the kind of active participation 

in delay that has led to findings of waiver in other cases. See, e.g., Zaehringer, 

306 N.W.2d at 795–96 (where the record showed the defendant’s “active 

utilization of the entire schedule fixed by the court” included numerous motions 

filed after the expiration of the speedy trial deadline, leading our supreme court to 

conclude it was “obvious defendant neither desired nor was prepared for a 

speedy retrial”). 

As to the substance-abuse evaluation, we note Lester appears never to 

have obtained such an evaluation but eventually stood trial anyway, indicating 

that his failure to comply with the court’s order was not a circumstance that 

necessitated delay of trial. The absence of a substance-abuse evaluation does 

not amount to an additional circumstance compelling a finding of waiver. Lester’s 

motion to suppress was filed on January 14, 2015, nineteen days before the 

speedy trial deadline of February 2, 2015.2 Trial had already been scheduled for 

April 23, 2015, another eighty days past the deadline. Lester’s filling of a single 

 

2 At the hearing on Lester’s motion to dismiss, his counsel incorrectly stated the ninetyday period expired on February 6, 2015. On appeal, Lester incorrectly asserts the ninety 

days elapsed on February 3, 2015. We disregard these minor computational errors 

because they do not affect our ultimate decision.
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motion prior to the expiration of the speedy trial deadline had no effect on the 

date of his already-scheduled trial and, thus, did not constitute active 

participation in delaying his trial.

The State argues we should find waiver here because Lester did more 

than merely acquiesce to the April 23, 2015 trial date—he and his counsel were 

present in court when the trial date was chosen and agreed to it, despite their 

knowledge it was well after the speedy trial cutoff. We believe this argument is

foreclosed by the Iowa Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Taylor. 2016 

WL 3354424, at *7. In that case, after the ninety-day cutoff had already passed, 

a criminal defendant and her attorney agreed not only to a trial date beyond the 

speedy trial deadline, but also to a proffer agreement where the defendant would 

testify at another trial that would not be proceeding for “a number of months.” Id.

at *1–2. Under those facts, the two dissenting justices in Taylor echoed the 

State’s argument here:

Under our precedent, “mere acquiescence” means “a failure to 

object to a trial date beyond the period for speedy [ ]trial.” Here we 

have much more than a failure to object. Instead, as the trial court 

found, [the defendant] with the assistance of counsel verbally 

agreed to the timeframe in which her trial would occur and then 

signed off on the transcript of this verbal agreement.

Id. at *10 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). The majority viewed the 

situation differently, finding, “What the State really argues is not waiver, but mere 

acquiescence. The State suggests that by not objecting earlier, [the defendant] 

acquiesced in a later trial date. . . . But our caselaw rejects mere acquiescence 

as a basis for waiver of speedy trial rights.” Id. at *7. Our supreme court 

determined an agreement made by a defendant and her counsel to a trial date
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beyond the speedy trial deadline, plus an agreement to make a proffer for 

purposes of a plea agreement, qualifies as “mere acquiescence.” Given that 

holding, we cannot find Lester waived his right to a speedy trial on the facts now 

before us.

The State also argues, however, that even if we do not find waiver, then 

Lester’s agreement to the trial date and his motion to suppress constituted good 

cause for delay. We disagree. The State has not shown adequate reason why 

this case—an OWI charge with only three witnesses listed in the State’s minutes 

of evidence—necessitated a trial date one-hundred-and-seventy days after the 

trial information was filed. 

Even if we assume, without deciding, the State is correct that the time 

spent by the district court ruling on Lester’s motion to suppress constituted good 

cause for delaying his trial beyond the ninety-day cutoff, the State still has not 

shown good cause for the remaining delay. The district court denied the motion 

to suppress on February 13, 2015, well in advance of the April 23, 2015 trial 

date. Resolution of a pending motion to suppress has been held to justify

continuing a trial from a date within the ninety-day deadline to a date outside the 

deadline. See Miller, 637 N.W.2d at 204–05 (“In [one case], for example, the 

defendant’s filing of a motion to suppress thirty days after the trial date was set, 

and only three days prior to trial, justified good cause for a continuance beyond 

the speedy-trial deadline. Similarly, where multiple defendants’ motions to 

suppress were filed one week before trial, this court found no abuse in the trial 

court’s discretion to continue a trial six days beyond the deadline ‘to permit 

resolution of the suppression motions, which might have been dispositive of the 
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cases.’” (citations omitted)). However, the State has offered no authority to 

suggest a motion to suppress filed nineteen days before the speedy trial deadline 

constitutes good cause to justify the already-scheduled trial date of April 23, 

2015—eighty days past the deadline and sixty-nine days after the district court

issued its ruling on the motion.

Because the State violated Lester’s right to a speedy trial, we reverse his 

conviction and remand to the district court to dismiss the trial information.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.