In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18‐1682

MATTHEW LABREC,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

LINDSAY WALKER, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:16‐cv‐00774‐jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 24, 2020

____________________

Before FLAUM, ROVNER, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Matthew LaBrec brought an action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of Wisconsin Depart‐

ment of Corrections employees, alleging that they violated his

rights under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.   

Specifically, LaBrec, who is an inmate, alleged that the de‐

fendants were aware that his cellmate posed a danger to him

and that they failed to protect him from that cellmate. The dis‐
2 No. 18‐1682

trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the defend‐

ants and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the state claims that LaBrec also brought. LaBrec now appeals

that grant of summary judgment. He also appeals the district

court’s denial of his request for appointed counsel. We review

the court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Sinn v. Lem‐

mon, 911 F.3d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 2018). As for the denial of the

request for counsel, we review the court’s decision only for

abuse of discretion. Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir.

2014).  

The plaintiff and defendants present different accounts of

what LaBrec communicated to them and to the doctors at Psy‐

chological Services.  However, in considering the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, the district court was re‐

quired to take all evidence, including reasonable inferences

from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Sinn, 911 F.3d at 419.  The facts underlying the Eighth Amend‐

ment claim, in the light most favorable to LaBrec and credit‐

ing his version over that of the defendants for the purpose of

the summary judgment motion, are as follows.  

LaBrec was an inmate housed at Columbia Correctional

Institute, a maximum security institution. His conduct report

history included prior assaults on inmates and staff, and on

July 20, 2016, he was involved in an incident that resulted in

his transfer from General Population to the Restricted Hous‐

ing Unit. In that incident, LaBrec threw a chair after he be‐

came upset that his phone call was disconnected upon the ex‐

piration of his allotted phone time, and began kicking and

pounding on the control center windows and refused to go

back to his cell. He received a conduct report for that incident

and was transferred that night to the Restricted Housing Unit
No. 18‐1682 3

where he was placed in a cell with Patrick McNeely.  McNeely

was in the Restricted Unit following a conduct report for as‐

sault involving McNeely and his prior cellmate.  

LaBrec was designated a “pair with care” inmate, which

means that the security staff needed to take extra care in eval‐

uating the choice of cellmates for him.  Because of that status,

the Psychological Services Unit was supposed to be consulted

prior to assigning a cellmate with LaBrec, but that consulta‐

tion never occurred before LaBrec was placed with McNeely.

LaBrec informed the defendants repeatedly of his status as a

“pair with care” inmate.    

The morning following his transfer to the cell with

McNeely, LaBrec demanded—and was allowed—to see Dr.

Julia Persike in the Psychological Services Unit. LaBrec in‐

formed Persike that McNeely was talking about beating up

his last cellmate and that LaBrec felt intimidated by it and did

not feel safe with McNeely. LaBrec further told Persike that

McNeely was “acting very unstable, he would get all worked

up, talking really fast, shaking his head back and forth,raising

his voice and cursing,” and that McNeely was “acting crazy”

and “displaying very erratic behavior.”  LaBrec Separate Ap‐

pendix (“App.”), LaBrec Prosposed Findings of Facts at A110

¶ 5 and Declaration of LaBrec A121 ¶¶ 19, 20.  Persike and

LaBrec discussed both the safety issue and McNeely’s history

of methamphetamine use as reasons for moving LaBrec from

that cell assignment.    

Persike discussed with defendants Joshua Craft and Debra

Wilson, who were correctional officers, his conversation with

LaBrec and the concerns with LaBrec’s cellmate situation.

They then proposed a move to a different cell with a different

cellmate. LaBrec asked them to move him as soon as possible
4 No. 18‐1682

as he feared he was unsafe. Despite their assurance, however,

he was not moved by the end of their day shift. LaBrec con‐

veyed to defendants Jason Chatman, the second‐shift ser‐

geant, and correctional officer Dustin Meeker, who were

working the night shift, that he was supposed to be moved

and did not feel safe in the cell with McNeely. When it became

apparent to LaBrec that he would not be moved that night, he

had an anxiety attack and began crying and asking for help.

Security staff called Psychological Services, and Dr. Schwenn

came to LaBrec’s cell and spoke with LaBrec. LaBrec asked to

be pulled out of the cell to discuss the problem confidentially,

but that request was denied so he spoke with Schwenn cell‐

side. LaBrec informed Schwenn that he did not feel safe in the

cell with McNeely and that he was supposed to be moved.

Schwenn asked LaBrec to be specific as to what would hap‐

pen, and LaBrec explained he was unable to be more specific

as he could not predict his cellmate’s actions. No action was

taken to transfer him to a different cell.  

The following morning, LaBrec again sought help from

Psychological Services, this time meeting with Dr. Dan Norge

and conveying his concerns. LaBrec subsequently spoke with

defendant Lindsay Walker, the Unit Manager, as part of a

conduct report meeting, and again explained that he did not

believe that he was safe in his cell with McNeely. Walker de‐

nies that LaBrec informed her that he felt unsafe, and states

that if he had told her that he felt at risk of harm from his cell‐

mate during that meeting, she would not have returned him

to the cell. Throughout that time, LaBrec repeatedly informed

the defendants that the “pair with care” protocol was not fol‐

lowed with his cellmate assignment.  
No. 18‐1682 5

LaBrec was not reassigned to a different cellmate, and at

2:30 a.m. on July 24—three days after the initial assignment to

that cell—McNeely and LaBrec were involved in an alterca‐

tion in their cell in which McNeely stabbed LaBrec with a pen

behind his left ear, in the back, and in his left shoulder.  Both

inmates received conduct reports for the assault, and

McNeely was transferred to the most restrictive housing unit,

RHU‐1, whereas LaBrec remained in a cell in the mid‐level

restricted housing, RHU‐2.  A search of the cell following the

assault revealed a note from McNeely in which McNeely set

forth his intention to stab LaBrec.   

It is well established that prison officials face a duty to pro‐

tect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners

and that the failure to protect can violate the Eighth Amend‐

ment.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).  The prohi‐

bition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth

Amendment “obligates prison officials to ‘take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of ... inmates.’” Sinn, 911

F.3d at 419, quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.   

A prisoner seeking to establish a violation of that Eighth

Amendment right must show that the prison official was de‐

liberately indifferent to an excessive risk to the prisoner’s

health or safety, which includes both an objective and subjec‐

tive component. Id.; Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480 (7th

Cir. 2015); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.  First, the harm to which the

prisoner was exposed must be an objectively serious one.

Sinn, 911 F.3d at 419.  The parties do not dispute that this cri‐

terion is met. Second, the prison official must have actual, not

merely constructive, knowledge of the risk to be liable.   Id.  

This requires that the official “’must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
6 No. 18‐1682

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that infer‐

ence.’” Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480, quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;

Sinn, 911 F.3d at 419.  “Whether a prison official had the req‐

uisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact sub‐

ject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference

from circumstantial evidence ... and a factfinder may con‐

clude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the

very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842;

Gevas, 798 F.3d at 480. Because a prison official’s duty under

the Eighth Amendment is to ensure “reasonable safety,”

prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to in‐

mate health or safety can nevertheless escape liability if they

responded reasonably to the risk, whether or not the harm

was ultimately averted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844‐45.   

Only the second part of the test is at issue here, which is

whether LaBrec failed to present sufficient evidence to allow

the inference that the prison officials had the requisite

knowledge to act with deliberate indifference. The district

court concluded that the allegations of the threat to LaBrec

were too vague and generalized to meet that standard be‐

cause LaBrec failed to explain why he felt unsafe.

The court considered, in turn, the evidence that McNeely

had assaulted his prior cellmate, that LaBrec was classified as

a “pair with care” prisoner, that LaBrec told the defendants

that he did not feel safe and McNeely was acting crazy, and

that McNeely wrote a note to officers that stated that he was

going to stab LaBrec. First, the court stated that even if it as‐

sumed that all the defendants were aware that McNeely had

assaulted his prior cellmate, that would not show the defend‐

ants knew of a substantial risk that McNeely would assault

LaBrec as well. The court reasoned that many prisoners have
No. 18‐1682 7

engaged in aggressive or violent behavior and therefore an

assailant must have an unusually violent history to require

prison officials to treat him specially. The court held that in

general one previous fight is insufficient to indicate a prisoner

was unusually violent. For its conclusion, the court relied on

Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2011), arguing that in

Owens officials were not held liable even though they knew

the same prisoners had been involved in an altercation earlier.   

The court next considered LaBrec’s status as a “pair with

care” prisoner. The court questioned the significance of that

status, stating that neither side suggested he was therefore a

member of a vulnerable group. Even assuming, however, that

LaBrec was a vulnerable prisoner, the court concluded that

would not be enough to show that the prison officials knew

that McNeely posed a substantial risk to LaBrec’s safety.  

The court then turned to LaBrec’s communications of the

threat to the defendants. The court deemed LaBrec’s state‐

ment that he “did not feel safe” to be too generalized to con‐

vey a threat because LaBrec was not specific as to why he was

not safe.  The court contrasted LaBrec’s statement with that of

the plaintiff in Gevas, in which the plaintiff told the defendant

that his cellmate had threatened that “something crucial was

going to happen,” and concluded that LaBrec’s statements

were not nearly as specific. The court concluded that a pris‐

oner must explain the basis for the belief that he is in danger

in order to distinguish cases in which the prisoner is simply

discontented or paranoid.    The court further dismissed

LaBrec’s statement that McNeely was “acting crazy,” again

noting that Labrec did not allege that he told the defendants

anything specific about what McNeely was doing. The court

further reasoned that “[w]ithout more context, a statement
8 No. 18‐1682

that the cellmate was ‘acting crazy’ could mean nothing more

than that the cellmate was engaging in irritating but harmless

behavior.” Dist. Ct. Op., LaBrec Opening Brief Appendix

(hereinafter simply “Dist. Ct. Op.”) at 9.  The court concluded

that it was no more informative than other statements courts

have deemed too ambiguous.  

The last evidence considered by the court was the discus‐

sions that LaBrec had with the nondefendant prison staff

members such as Dr. Persike. The court stated that LaBrec had

not cited any evidence that the information provided to Per‐

sike was communicated to the defendants, and therefore it

was irrelevant. Similarly, the court did not consider the note

found in the cell in which McNeely expressed his intention to

stab LaBrec, because it was found only after the assault oc‐

curred.

Because we review de novo, we need not address the dis‐

trict court’s opinion. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770

(7th Cir. 2008). But the defendants’ arguments mirror the

analysis used by the district court, and therefore we briefly

address the reasoning to highlight some of the problems pre‐

sented by the arguments not only in the district court’s opin‐

ion but in the briefs. The conclusions of the district court are

problematic in that the court considered each factor in isola‐

tion, rather than in combination with each other. As we will

discuss, the overall context is the relevant focus, and that

must include consideration of all of the factors as a whole ra‐

ther than as discrete, independent components.

In addition, the court in analyzing our prior cases, dis‐

missed evidence if it did not fit the fact pattern in those cases.

Courts analyzing the fact patterns in prior cases must be care‐

ful not to interpret those cases as a checklist of the evidence
No. 18‐1682 9

that must occur in each case.  We held as much in Sinn, noting

that we are not constrained by the fact patterns of prior cases,

and the determination that threats to a specific detainee by a

specific source does not thereby equate with a requirement of

such evidence in another case. Sinn, 911 F.3d at 421. In Sinn,

we recognized that numerous cases had held that an inmate’s

articulation of a perceived threat was too vague or general‐

ized to establish the defendant’s subjective knowledge, but

“our analysis in those cases about the specificity of the in‐

mate’s complaint was but one part of the greater analysis re‐

garding the defendants’ subjective knowledge.” Id.  We noted

that “[t]he reason the specificity of an inmate’s complaint mat‐

ters is because that complaint is often the only information a

prison official has of the treatment or conditions the inmate is

experiencing. Failure‐to‐protect claims are predicated on a

prison official’s subjective knowledge, though, not just the

ability of an inmate to write detailed complaints.” Sinn, 911

F.3d at 422; Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1028‐29 (7th Cir.

2018) (noting that “prisoners do not threaten each other with

the level of detail the judge demanded”). We must consider

the context of the perceived threat as a whole, and whether

the evidence, circumstantial, documentary or otherwise, was

sufficient to indicate that the officials were aware of the sub‐

stantial risk.  

That can be shown in a variety of ways, including but not

limited to an articulation of a specific threat, the obviousness

of a risk, or the realities of prison gang conduct. See e.g. Gevas,

798 F.3d at 481 (defendants informed of a specific threat in‐

cluding the identity of the individual threatening him, the na‐

ture of the threat, and the context for it); Sinn, 911 F.3d at 422

(reasonable to infer that the defendant had subjective
10 No. 18‐1682

knowledge of a threat even though the identity of the individ‐

ual attacker could not be ascertained because the defendant

was aware of the patterns of gang violence and the specific

risk Sinn faced from the Vice Lords); Horshaw, 910 F.3d at 1029

(“[p]risoners do not need ‘advance knowledge of every detail

of a future assault’ to show that they faced a serious risk;’”

communication of an anonymous warning sufficient where

gang context rendered it believable);  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842

(knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact “subject

to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from

circumstantial evidence ... and a factfinder may conclude that

a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact

that the risk was obvious”).

The common thread in all of our cases is that the circum‐

stances as a whole must be considered. Therefore, the Owens

court’s conclusion that the single incident between the in‐

mates was insufficient to apprise the guards of a substantial

risk of harm does not indicate a single act of prior violence

can never suffice. In Owens, the incidents between Owens and

his cellmates, first Gordon and then Autin, both occurred only

after a month of the two sharing a cell without any incident,

and involved relatively minor altercations—between Owens

and Gordon involved a single punch and between Owens and

Autin involved Autin swinging at Owens but not landing a

punch. 635 F.3d at 953. One cannot conclude from Owens that

a single violent incident does not indicate an inmate is violent;

in each case, the entire context must be considered, including,

for instance, as in Owens, the entire history of the cellmates,

and the severity of the actions and likelihood of a future

threat.
No. 18‐1682 11

Here, the nature of the communications between LaBrec

and the defendants is disputed, with LaBrec and the prison

officials presenting starkly different stories. The defendants

repeatedly base their arguments on their version of the facts,

recognizing but not always crediting the plaintiff’s version.

But on summary judgment, we do not resolve such credibility

differences. Because it is the defendants who seek summary

judgment, we consider the evidence, including all reasonable

inferences, in the light most favorable to LaBrec, and in that

context the district court improperly granted judgment forthe

defendants.

First, LaBrec’s alleged communications in this case do not

present the type of vague, generalized expression of danger

that has been deemed insufficient. LaBrec did not allege that

he believed that he was in danger in his cellblock generally

without any particular basis such as gang affiliation, nor did

he state that he was fearful of living with any cellmate. He

identified this particular cellmate as presenting an immediate

danger to himself and identified the basis for that belief by

explaining that it was based on McNeely’s behaviorin the cell.

He explained that McNeely was unstable and was acting

crazy. That is specific enough to at least raise the specter of a

serious risk of harm. See Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868, 873‐74

(8th Cir. 2007) (complaints to guard that cellmate who had

just been assigned to him was deranged and threatened him

and seeking an immediate, urgent reassignment was suffi‐

cient to survive summary judgment as to the guard’s subjec‐

tive knowledge of the risk); compare Olson, 750 F.3d at 713

(inmate’s claim that his cellmate Russell was dangerous be‐

cause Russell was not taking prescribed medications and was

hearing voices was contradicted in that the guards reported

that Russell was taking the medications and Russell had no
12 No. 18‐1682

history of violence). In fact, Walker, the Unit Manager,

acknowledged that such a communication would warrant ac‐

tion, stating that if LaBrec had informed herthat he felt he was

at risk of harm from his cellmate she would not have returned

him to his cell but would have moved him to another cell and

worked with unit security staff to investigate. Walker did not

recall LaBrec raising any such safety concerns, but that would

be a factual dispute not resolvable on summary judgment. Fi‐

nally, LaBrec provided even more detail in his sworn declara‐

tion filed with the court, stating that he communicated that

McNeely was “acting very unstable, he would get all worked

up, talking really fast, shaking his head back and forth,raising

his voice and cursing,” and “displaying very erratic behav‐

ior.”1 That specific description of the abnormal behavior

added credence to his claim that he faced a safety risk.  

The district court was dismissive of that characterization

of McNeely’s behavior, stating that LaBrec did not provide

specifics of what McNeely was doing, and that “[w]ithout

more context, a statement that the cellmate was ‘acting crazy’

could mean nothing more than that the cellmate was engag‐

ing in irritating but harmless behavior.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 9. In

the context here, it is questionable whether it would even be

a reasonable inference that LaBrec’s complaint of crazy, er‐

ratic and unstable behavior referenced only irritating but

harmless behavior, given that LaBrec simultaneously stated

                                                  1 The district court noted that LaBrec failed to include in his brief or

his proposed findings of fact the allegations as to McNeely’s behavior, but

held that the allegations would be insufficient even if the court overlooked

the failure to follow the court procedure. Given that LaBrec was proceed‐

ing pro se and that his request for counsel was denied, we agree that the

better approach is to consider the facts attested to in his Declaration.
No. 18‐1682 13

that he felt unsafe and needed to be moved from the cell. But

we need not go that far.  The relevant question is whether a

reasonable jury could infer that LaBrec’s statement that

McNeely was acting crazy and erratic and that he felt unsafe

communicated that McNeely presented a threat to his safety

and apprised the defendants that McNeely presented a risk of

serious harm. LaBrec does not need to demonstrate that the

jury would be compelled to draw that conclusion, only that it

could.    Gevas, 798 F.3d at 482.   A reasonable jury certainly

could interpret LaBrec’s statement as to McNeely’s behavior

as communicating that McNeely presented a danger to

LaBrec.  

But we need not consider whether LaBrec’s communica‐

tion of McNeely’s behavior alone is sufficient to demonstrate

that McNeely presented a danger to LaBrec – and to apprise

the defendants of that danger ‐‐ because the other surround‐

ing circumstances lend further credence to his claim that he

was in danger. Taken together, the evidence establishes that

LaBrec communicated the threat to his safety  ‐‐ identifying

the behavior that led him to believe he was in danger ‐‐ and

the surrounding circumstances supplied a context that ren‐

dered the threats plausible.  See Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481 (hold‐

ing that a jury could infer that defendants were subjectively

aware of the danger when Gevas identified the individual

threatening him, the nature of the threat and supplied context

that rendered the threat plausible). First, LaBrec’s cellmate,

McNeely, was in that restrictive housing unit following an in‐

cident in which McNeely assaulted his prior cellmate. See Ric‐

cardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2004) and Olson, 750

F.3d at 713 (both noting that one factor for a guard in deter‐

mining whether a threat is credible is whether the person al‐

leged to present the threat had a prior history of violence or
14 No. 18‐1682

conflicts with other inmates). Second, LaBrec’s claim that he

was in danger was not a passing reference, but a repeated and

insistent plea. He went to Psychological Services—the unit

tasked with handling cell assignments—three times in a

three‐day period to express his fears for his safety and his

need to transfer. When his request for a transfer was not

granted and he realized he was not going to be transferred out

of the cell with McNeely that night, LaBrec had an anxiety at‐

tack causing Dr. Schwenn from Psychological Services to

come to LaBrec’s cell and attend to him. Those repeated, in‐

sistent pleas for a transfer and the physical manifestation of

his anxiety lend credibility to his claim that he believed

McNeely presented a threat, and no countervailing factors ne‐

gated that scenario. And finally, LaBrec was under a “pair

with care” designation that recognized the potential for a

problem with cellmate pairings, and the required psycholog‐

ical consultation prior to assigning an inmate had never oc‐

curred, thus circumventing the process that would have

helped ensure that the cellmate placement did not present a

danger.  See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 915 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“deliberate indifference can be predicated upon knowledge

of a victimʹs particular vulnerability ... or, in the alternative,

an assailantʹs predatory nature ....”).

All of those factors considered above are the types of con‐

siderations that this court has deemed relevant in assessing

failure to protect claims by prisoners under the Eighth

Amendment.   The defendants argue that LaBrec failed to pre‐

sent evidence that such contacts with Psychological Services

were unusual or that LaBrec had anxiety attacks rarely. Fur‐

ther, the defendants claim that there is no evidence in the rec‐

ord as to whether the “pair with care” designation was pro‐

vided because LaBrec was particularly vulnerable as opposed
No. 18‐1682 15

to particularly dangerous. But the defendants point to no ev‐

idence in the record, let alone undisputed evidence, that such

use of Psychological Services was routine or that the “pair

with care” designation is issued to inmates who present a par‐

ticular danger. In fact, the only evidence in the record as to

the meaning of the “pair with care” designation is that it re‐

quires a psychological consultation prior to assigning a cell‐

mate, and that no such consultation occurred here. The argu‐

ments posed by the defendants as to the inferences that

should be drawn from the evidence belong at the trial phase,

not on summary judgment where all inferences must be taken

in favor of the non‐moving party. LaBrec does not need to ne‐

gate all contrary interpretations of the evidence. Defendants

are free to argue that placed in a different context, those visits

were not unusual enough to apprise the defendants that he

was in real fear of McNeely. On the record before us now,

however, the evidence set forth by LaBrec would be sufficient

to allow a jury to infer that those circumstances evidence a

real threat of harm, and that the defendants witnessing

LaBrec’s complaints and the surrounding circumstances

would be aware of that risk of harm.  The factual inferences

must be considered in combination, not in isolation from each

other. Our cases are clear that the focus is on the circum‐

stances as a whole in determining whether there is a factual

dispute as to subjective knowledge.

But that does not end our inquiry, because we must con‐

sider each defendant individually and determine whether the

facts allegedly known to that defendant are sufficient. There

is evidence in the record that all defendants were aware of the

pair with care designation which was not followed, LaBrec’s

complaints that he was not safe in his cell with McNeely, and

his resort to Psychological Services. At least three defendants,
16 No. 18‐1682

Walker, Craft, and Wilson, were aware of McNeely’s assault

on his prior cellmate, and Craft and Wilson were informed

that LaBrec described McNeely as acting crazy and exhibiting

erratic behavior. At least two defendants, Chatman and

Meeker, were aware of LaBrec’s anxiety attack when not

transferred. Finally, LaBrec attested that at least two defend‐

ants, Craft and Wilson, determined that he should be trans‐

ferred, but then failed to complete that transfer, and Walker

also stated that if LaBrec had complained that he felt unsafe

as he asserts in this case, Walker would have moved him to

another cell while the claim was investigated.  

As to two defendants, Chatman and Meeker, the court

properly granted summary judgment. The evidence taken in

the light most favorable to LaBrec shows only that Chatman

and Meeker were aware that LaBrec claimed he did not feel

safe with McNeely, that he was designated a pair‐with‐care,

that he visited with Psychological Services and that he had an

anxiety attack. Those defendants therefore were unaware of

some of the other surrounding circumstances that could ren‐

der plausible LaBrec’s claim of a threat to his safety, such as

the description of McNeely’s behavior or the fact that he was

moved to restrictive housing after an assault involving his

prior cellmate. That is insufficient to allow an inference that a

substantial risk of serious harm existed and that they in fact

recognized that risk.  

As to the remaining three defendants, that context that

would render the claim of a risk of harm more plausible is

present. The case as to Walkeris close, but sufficient to survive

summary judgment. The record demonstrates that Walker

was aware that LaBrec claimed he did not feel safe with

McNeely, that he was designated a pair‐with‐care, and that he
No. 18‐1682 17

visited with Psychological Services seeking a transfer. In con‐

trast to Chatman and Meeker, Walker also was aware that

McNeely was transferred to restrictive housing following an

assault involving his prior cellmate. Therefore, LaBrec’s claim

of feeling unsafe was rendered plausible not only by the con‐

sistency and intensity of his requests to Psychological Ser‐

vices, but also by the awareness that McNeely had recently

been involved in an assault incident with his prior cellmate.

In fact, Walker does not argue that he did not find the com‐

plaint of a risk of harm plausible. To the contrary, he argues

that if LaBrec had indeed communicated that complaint to

him, he would have removed LaBrec from that cell and inves‐

tigated the matter. In light of the pair with care designation

that already should have alerted the defendants to the need

for scrutiny of potential cellmates prior to assignment, those

facts are sufficient to meet the standard.  

That is true as well for the final defendants, Craft and Wil‐

son. The evidence in the record, if believed, could demon‐

strate that they were aware that LaBrec complained that he

was not safe in a cell with McNeely, that he engaged with Psy‐

chological Services to address that problem and seek a trans‐

fer, that he was designated a pair‐with‐care, and that

McNeely was in restrictive housing following an assault in‐

volving McNeely’s prior cellmate; evidence in the record also

indicates that they were informed of the substance of LaBrec’s

conversation with Dr. Persike which included LaBrec’s claim

that McNeely was acting crazy and displaying very erratic be‐

havior. As previously discussed, in light of all of that evi‐

dence, a jury could reasonably infer that the defendants pos‐

sessed a subjective awareness of a serious risk to LaBrec, and

failed to take the minimal, reasonable action of inquiring fur‐

ther and investigating the situation. See Sinn, 911 F.3d at 422
18 No. 18‐1682

(such subjective knowledge necessitates that the prison offi‐

cial take reasonable responsive actions); Farmer, 511 U.S. at

844 (“prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk

to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if

they reasonably responded to the risk, even if the harm ulti‐

mately was not averted”). Had they investigated LaBrec’s

claim that McNeely posed the threat, they might have ob‐

served the troubling behavior of which LaBrec complained,

or have found the Interview Request form in the cell, filled

out by McNeely, in which McNeely stated that he planned on

stabbing LaBrec. Based on the facts and circumstances taken

in the light most favorable to LaBrec, summary judgment is

not appropriate.  

The remaining issue raised by LaBrec on appeal concerns

the district court’s denial of his request for counsel. We review

a district court’s determination whether to grant or deny

counsel only for abuse of discretion. Olson, 750 F.3d at 711. In

Olson, we noted that two questions are relevant to such a re‐

quest for counsel: whether the plaintiff made a reasonable at‐

tempt to obtain counsel or was effectively precluded from do‐

ing so, and whether the plaintiff is competent to litigate the

case himself, considering the complexity of the case and the

plaintiff’s capabilities. Id.  

LaBrec argued that he was not capable of handling the

case himself because he has mental health issues, he has lim‐

ited access to the library because he is housed in disciplinary

separation status, and he has been unable to take depositions.

As to his mental health issues, he stated in the motion for ap‐

pointment of counsel that he suffered from a number of men‐

tal illnesses but that the one that is most detrimental to his
No. 18‐1682 19

ability to pursue his case is Attention Deficit Disorder. He fur‐

ther argued to the district court that a lawyer would be help‐

ful for settlement discussions and at trial.

The district court considered those arguments and en‐

gaged in the proper analysis in denying counsel. First, the

court held that LaBrec had shown that multiple lawyers de‐

clined to represent him. As to the second part of the analysis,

the court held that plaintiff was capable of effectively repre‐

senting himself. As an initial matter, the court noted that

LaBrec had cited no evidence as to any mental health impair‐

ment, but assumed for the purpose of its decision that such

impairments exist. The court held, however, that LaBrec’s

summary judgment motion showed no signs of any impair‐

ment. The court noted that “LaBrec’s summary judgment sub‐

missions show that he is intelligent, understands law and pro‐

cedure, and is capable of conducting discovery, explaining his

version of events in a declaration, and making legal argu‐

ments in a brief.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 12. In fact, the court con‐

cluded that LaBrec’s summary judgment filings “were clear

and thorough, showing skill and knowledge well above that

of the average pro se litigant.” Id. The court further held that

LaBrec’s housing status did not adversely impact him because

additional legal research would not have aided him. Finally,

the court held that LaBrec failed to identify why depositions

would be necessary given his personal knowledge of most of

the relevant facts and in light of his use of written discovery

and his failure to identify any questions he was unable to ask

in that discovery.  

The court therefore properly considered LaBrec’s request,

but determined that he was capable of handling the case him‐

self in light of his abilities and the complexity of the case. We
20 No. 18‐1682

noted in Olson, 750 F.3d at 711, that “[d]istrict courts are ...

placed in the unenviable position of identifying, among a sea

of people lacking counsel, those who need counsel the most,”

and that determination rests in the district court’s discretion.

“[O]ur job is to ensure that the district court applied the

proper legal standards without abusing that discretion.” Id.

That standard is met here. The district court recognized the

appropriate legal standards and applied them to LaBrec’s re‐

quest. There is no basis to conclude that the court abused its

discretion in that determination.  

Accordingly, the decision of the district court denying the

request for counsel is AFFIRMED. The decision granting sum‐

mary judgment is AFFIRMED as to Defendants‐Appellees Ja‐

son Chatman and Dustin Meeker and is REVERSED as to the

remaining Defendants‐Appellees, Joshua Craft, Debra Wil‐

son, and Lindsay Walker, and the case is REMANDED forfur‐

ther proceedings.