# Official Journal C 164/2019

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 164 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6213 May 2019 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 164

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6213 May 2019

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Court of Justice of the European Union |
| 2019/C 164/01 | Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union | 1 |

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Justice of the European Union

2019/C 164/01

Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

Official Journal of the European Union

1

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| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | COURT PROCEEDINGS |
| | CDJ |
| 2019/C 164/02 | Case C-700/18 P: Appeal brought on 7 November 2018 by Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 12 October 2018 in Case T-416/18, Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. v European Commission | 2 |
| 2019/C 164/03 | Case C-722/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 19 November 2018 — KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k. v Porr S.A. | 2 |
| 2019/C 164/04 | Case C-745/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 27 November 2018 — JA v Skarb Państwa, represented by the Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Prezes Rady Ministrów, Minister Sprawiedliwości and Minister Finansów | 3 |
| 2019/C 164/05 | Case C-779/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich (Poland) lodged on 12 December 2018 — Mikrokasa SA, Gdynia, and Revenue Niestandaryzowany Sekurytyzacyjny Fundusz Inwestycyjny Zamknięty, Warsaw v XO | 4 |
| 2019/C 164/06 | Case C-824/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 28 December 2018 — A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa | 5 |
| 2019/C 164/07 | Case C-3/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 3 January 2019 — Asmel società consortile a.r.l. v ANAC — Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione | 6 |
| 2019/C 164/08 | Case C-11/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 7 January 2019 — Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea v Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova | 7 |
| 2019/C 164/09 | Case C-14/19 P: Appeal brought on 10 January 2019 by the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 25 October 2018 in Case T-286/15: KF v SatCen | 8 |
| 2019/C 164/10 | Case C-15/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 10 January 2019 — A.m.a — Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA v Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti — Co.La.Ri. | 9 |
| 2019/C 164/11 | Case C-16/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Poland) lodged on 2 January 2019 — VL v Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie | 10 |
| 2019/C 164/12 | Case C-25/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała v Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen | 11 |
| 2019/C 164/13 | Case C-26/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Modena (Italy) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Azienda USL di Modena v Comune di Sassuolo | 11 |
| 2019/C 164/14 | Case C-28/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 16 January 2019 — Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust and Others | 12 |
| 2019/C 164/15 | Case C-61/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Orange Romania SA v Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal | 13 |
| 2019/C 164/16 | Case C-62/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Star Taxi App SRL v Unitatea Administrativ Teritorială Municipiului București prin Primarul General and Consiliul General al Municipiului București | 14 |
| 2019/C 164/17 | Case C-70/19 P: Appeal brought on 30 January 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 21 November 2018 in Case T-587/16, HM v European Commission | 15 |
| 2019/C 164/18 | Case C-75/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Specializat Mureș (Romania) lodged on 31 January 2019 — MF v BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA Paris Sucursala București and Secapital Sàrl | 16 |
| 2019/C 164/19 | Case C-84/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Szczecin — Prawobrzeże i Zachód w Szczecinie (Poland) lodged on 31 January 2019 — Profi Credit Polska S.A. v QJ | 17 |
| 2019/C 164/20 | Case C-85/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria v RK | 18 |
| 2019/C 164/21 | Case C-86/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — SL v Vueling Airlines S.A. | 19 |
| 2019/C 164/22 | Case C-114/19 P: Appeal brought on 8 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 29 November 2018 in Case T-811/16, Di Bernardo v Commission | 20 |
| 2019/C 164/23 | Case C-133/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 19 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.S. v État belge | 21 |
| 2019/C 164/24 | Case C-136/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.M. v État belge | 21 |
| 2019/C 164/25 | Case C-137/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.O. v État belge | 22 |
| 2019/C 164/26 | Case C-152/19 P: Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by Deutsche Telekom AG against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission | 23 |
| 2019/C 164/27 | Case C-154/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Eparchiako Dikastirio Larnakas (Cyprus) lodged on 22 February 2019 — Cyprus Central Authority v GA | 24 |
| 2019/C 164/28 | Case C-172/19 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-739/17 Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) and Others v European Commission | 25 |
| 2019/C 164/29 | Case C-192/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 27 February 2019 — Rensen Shipbuilding BV, other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane | 27 |
| 2019/C 164/30 | Case C-194/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 28 February 2019 — H. A. v État belge | 27 |
| 2019/C 164/31 | Case C-197/19 P: Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Mylan Laboratories Ltd, Mylan, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-682/14: Mylan Laboratories and Mylan v Commission | 28 |
| 2019/C 164/32 | Case C-198/19 P: Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-679/14: Teva UK Ltd and Others v Commission | 29 |
| 2019/C 164/33 | Case C-199/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 27 February 2019 — RL sp. z o.o., having its seat in Ł. v J.M. | 30 |
| 2019/C 164/34 | Case C-200/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Trgovački sud u Zagreb (Croatia) made on 1 March 2019 — INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE d.d. and Others v LUBJANSKA BANKA d.d. | 31 |
| 2019/C 164/35 | Case C-202/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-111/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission | 32 |
| 2019/C 164/36 | Case C-203/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission | 33 |
| 2019/C 164/37 | Case C-204/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd,Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-53/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission | 34 |
| 2019/C 164/38 | Case C-205/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission | 36 |
| 2019/C 164/39 | Case C-212/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 6 March 2019 — Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation v Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo | 37 |
| 2019/C 164/40 | Case C-213/19: Action brought on 7 March 2019 — European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland | 38 |
| 2019/C 164/41 | Case C-215/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finland) lodged on 8 March 2019 — Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö | 39 |
| 2019/C 164/42 | Case C-233/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 18 March 2019 — B v Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS) | 40 |
| | GCEU |
| 2019/C 164/43 | Case T-433/16: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Pometon v Commission (Competition — Agreements and concerted practices — European steel abrasives market — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement — Price coordination throughout the EEA — Chronologically staggered hybrid procedure — Presumption of innocence — Principle of impartiality — Charter of Fundamental Rights — Evidence of the infringement — Single and continuous infringement — Restriction of competition by object — Duration of the infringement — Fine — Exceptional adjustment of the basic amount — Obligation to state reasons — Proportionality — Equal treatment — Unlimited jurisdiction) | 42 |
| 2019/C 164/44 | Case T-766/16: Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (State aid — Aid granted by Spain to certain professional football clubs — Guarantee — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market — Advantage — Obligation to state reasons) | 43 |
| 2019/C 164/45 | Case T-582/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Boshab and Others v Council (Common Foreign and Security Policy — Restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo — List of persons and entities subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and to the prohibition of entry and transit — Inclusion of the names of the applicants on the list — Rights of defence — Right to be heard — Obligation to state reasons — Manifest error of assessment — Right to effective judicial protection) | 43 |
| 2019/C 164/46 | Case T-725/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Clestra Hauserman v Parliament (Public works contracts — Tendering procedure — Works relating to the ‘Removable partitioning — doors’ of the project to extend and modernise the Parliament’s Konrad Adenauer Building in Luxembourg — Rejection of a tenderer’s bid — Award of the contract to another tenderer — Obligation to state reasons — Abnormally low tender — Manifest error of assessment — Non-contractual liability) | 44 |
| 2019/C 164/47 | Case T-787/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Parfümerie Akzente v EUIPO (GlamHair) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark GlamHair — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)) | 45 |
| 2019/C 164/48 | Case T-829/17: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Coesia v EUIPO (Representation of two oblique red curves) (EU trade mark — Application for an EU figurative mark representing two oblique red curves — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001)) | 46 |
| 2019/C 164/49 | Case T-105/18: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 –Deray v EUIPO — Charles Claire (LILI LA TIGRESSE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark LILI LA TIGRESSE — Earlier EU word mark TIGRESS — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) | 46 |
| 2019/C 164/50 | Case T-265/18: Judgment of the General Court of 27 March 2019 — Biernacka-Hoba v EUIPO — Formata Bogusław Hoba (Formata) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark Formata — Earlier international figurative mark Formata — Relative ground for invalidity — Article 60(1)(a) and Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Rule 37 of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) — Conditions governing the representation of the earlier mark — Rule 19 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 7 of Delegated Regulation 2018/625) — Legitimate expectations — Reimbursement of the costs of representation — Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001 and Rule 94 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001)) | 47 |
| 2019/C 164/51 | Case T-276/18: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Julius-K9 v EUIPO — El Corte Inglés (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark K9 UNIT — Earlier EU figurative mark unit — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) | 48 |
| 2019/C 164/52 | Case T-239/18: Order of the General Court of 18 March 2019 — SKS Import Export v Commission (Action for annulment — Free movement of capital — Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CTF) — Directive (EU) 2015/849 — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/212 — Inclusion of Tunisia on the list of high-risk third countries — Inadmissibility) | 49 |
| 2019/C 164/53 | Case T-410/18: Order of the General Court of 15 March 2019 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission (Action for annulment — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Market in metal packaging — Decision to open an investigation — Act not open to challenge — Inadmissibility) | 50 |
| 2019/C 164/54 | Case T-503/18: Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Haba Trading v EUIPO — Vida (vidaXL) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Withdrawal of the opposition — No need to adjudicate) | 50 |
| 2019/C 164/55 | Case T-75/19: Order of the General Court of 13 March 2019 — Comune di Milano v Parliament and Council (Declining of jurisdiction) | 51 |
| 2019/C 164/56 | Case T-1/19: Action brought on 7 January 2019 — CJ v Court of Justice of the European Union | 52 |
| 2019/C 164/57 | Case T-136/19: Action brought on 1 March 2019 — Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission | 53 |
| 2019/C 164/58 | Case T-148/19: Action brought on 7 March 2019 — PKK v Council | 55 |
| 2019/C 164/59 | Case T-163/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Mersinis v ESMA | 56 |
| 2019/C 164/60 | Case T-164/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — AQ v eu-LISA | 57 |
| 2019/C 164/61 | Case T-166/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Bronckers v Commission | 58 |
| 2019/C 164/62 | Case T-175/19: Action brought on 18 March 2019 — Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft v EUIPO (eVoter) | 59 |
| 2019/C 164/63 | Case T-180/19: Action brought on 26 March 2019 — Bibita Group v EUIPO — Benkomers (Beverage bottles) | 60 |
| 2019/C 164/64 | Case T-336/18: Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Eagle IP v EUIPO — Consolidated Artists (LILLY e VIOLETTA) | 61 |
| 2019/C 164/65 | Case T-470/18: Order of the General Court of 21 March 2019 — Telenet v Commission | 61 |

V   Announcements

COURT PROCEEDINGS

CDJ

2019/C 164/02

Case C-700/18 P: Appeal brought on 7 November 2018 by Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 12 October 2018 in Case T-416/18, Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. v European Commission

2

2019/C 164/03

Case C-722/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 19 November 2018 — KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k. v Porr S.A.

2

2019/C 164/04

Case C-745/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 27 November 2018 — JA v Skarb Państwa, represented by the Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Prezes Rady Ministrów, Minister Sprawiedliwości and Minister Finansów

3

2019/C 164/05

Case C-779/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich (Poland) lodged on 12 December 2018 — Mikrokasa SA, Gdynia, and Revenue Niestandaryzowany Sekurytyzacyjny Fundusz Inwestycyjny Zamknięty, Warsaw v XO

4

2019/C 164/06

Case C-824/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 28 December 2018 — A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa

5

2019/C 164/07

Case C-3/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 3 January 2019 — Asmel società consortile a.r.l. v ANAC — Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione

6

2019/C 164/08

Case C-11/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 7 January 2019 — Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea v Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova

7

2019/C 164/09

Case C-14/19 P: Appeal brought on 10 January 2019 by the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 25 October 2018 in Case T-286/15: KF v SatCen

8

2019/C 164/10

Case C-15/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 10 January 2019 — A.m.a — Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA v Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti — Co.La.Ri.

9

2019/C 164/11

Case C-16/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Poland) lodged on 2 January 2019 — VL v Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie

10

2019/C 164/12

Case C-25/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała v Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen

11

2019/C 164/13

Case C-26/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Modena (Italy) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Azienda USL di Modena v Comune di Sassuolo

11

2019/C 164/14

Case C-28/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 16 January 2019 — Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust and Others

12

2019/C 164/15

Case C-61/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Orange Romania SA v Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal

13

2019/C 164/16

Case C-62/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Star Taxi App SRL v Unitatea Administrativ Teritorială Municipiului București prin Primarul General and Consiliul General al Municipiului București

14

2019/C 164/17

Case C-70/19 P: Appeal brought on 30 January 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 21 November 2018 in Case T-587/16, HM v European Commission

15

2019/C 164/18

Case C-75/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Specializat Mureș (Romania) lodged on 31 January 2019 — MF v BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA Paris Sucursala București and Secapital Sàrl

16

2019/C 164/19

Case C-84/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Szczecin — Prawobrzeże i Zachód w Szczecinie (Poland) lodged on 31 January 2019 — Profi Credit Polska S.A. v QJ

17

2019/C 164/20

Case C-85/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria v RK

18

2019/C 164/21

Case C-86/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — SL v Vueling Airlines S.A.

19

2019/C 164/22

Case C-114/19 P: Appeal brought on 8 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 29 November 2018 in Case T-811/16, Di Bernardo v Commission

20

2019/C 164/23

Case C-133/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 19 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.S. v État belge

21

2019/C 164/24

Case C-136/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.M. v État belge

21

2019/C 164/25

Case C-137/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.O. v État belge

22

2019/C 164/26

Case C-152/19 P: Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by Deutsche Telekom AG against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission

23

2019/C 164/27

Case C-154/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Eparchiako Dikastirio Larnakas (Cyprus) lodged on 22 February 2019 — Cyprus Central Authority v GA

24

2019/C 164/28

Case C-172/19 P: Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-739/17 Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) and Others v European Commission

25

2019/C 164/29

Case C-192/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 27 February 2019 — Rensen Shipbuilding BV, other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

27

2019/C 164/30

Case C-194/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 28 February 2019 — H. A. v État belge

27

2019/C 164/31

Case C-197/19 P: Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Mylan Laboratories Ltd, Mylan, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-682/14: Mylan Laboratories and Mylan v Commission

28

2019/C 164/32

Case C-198/19 P: Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-679/14: Teva UK Ltd and Others v Commission

29

2019/C 164/33

Case C-199/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 27 February 2019 — RL sp. z o.o., having its seat in Ł. v J.M.

30

2019/C 164/34

Case C-200/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Trgovački sud u Zagreb (Croatia) made on 1 March 2019 — INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE d.d. and Others v LUBJANSKA BANKA d.d.

31

2019/C 164/35

Case C-202/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-111/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

32

2019/C 164/36

Case C-203/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

33

2019/C 164/37

Case C-204/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd,Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-53/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

34

2019/C 164/38

Case C-205/19 P: Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

36

2019/C 164/39

Case C-212/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 6 March 2019 — Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation v Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo

37

2019/C 164/40

Case C-213/19: Action brought on 7 March 2019 — European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

38

2019/C 164/41

Case C-215/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finland) lodged on 8 March 2019 — Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

39

2019/C 164/42

Case C-233/19: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 18 March 2019 — B v Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS)

40

GCEU

2019/C 164/43

Case T-433/16: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Pometon v Commission (Competition — Agreements and concerted practices — European steel abrasives market — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement — Price coordination throughout the EEA — Chronologically staggered hybrid procedure — Presumption of innocence — Principle of impartiality — Charter of Fundamental Rights — Evidence of the infringement — Single and continuous infringement — Restriction of competition by object — Duration of the infringement — Fine — Exceptional adjustment of the basic amount — Obligation to state reasons — Proportionality — Equal treatment — Unlimited jurisdiction)

42

2019/C 164/44

Case T-766/16: Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission (State aid — Aid granted by Spain to certain professional football clubs — Guarantee — Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market — Advantage — Obligation to state reasons)

43

2019/C 164/45

Case T-582/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Boshab and Others v Council (Common Foreign and Security Policy — Restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo — List of persons and entities subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and to the prohibition of entry and transit — Inclusion of the names of the applicants on the list — Rights of defence — Right to be heard — Obligation to state reasons — Manifest error of assessment — Right to effective judicial protection)

43

2019/C 164/46

Case T-725/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Clestra Hauserman v Parliament (Public works contracts — Tendering procedure — Works relating to the ‘Removable partitioning — doors’ of the project to extend and modernise the Parliament’s Konrad Adenauer Building in Luxembourg — Rejection of a tenderer’s bid — Award of the contract to another tenderer — Obligation to state reasons — Abnormally low tender — Manifest error of assessment — Non-contractual liability)

44

2019/C 164/47

Case T-787/17: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Parfümerie Akzente v EUIPO (GlamHair) (EU trade mark — Application for EU word mark GlamHair — Absolute ground for refusal — Lack of distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

45

2019/C 164/48

Case T-829/17: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Coesia v EUIPO (Representation of two oblique red curves) (EU trade mark — Application for an EU figurative mark representing two oblique red curves — Absolute ground for refusal — No distinctive character — Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) — Obligation to state reasons — Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001))

46

2019/C 164/49

Case T-105/18: Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 –Deray v EUIPO — Charles Claire (LILI LA TIGRESSE) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU word mark LILI LA TIGRESSE — Earlier EU word mark TIGRESS — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

46

2019/C 164/50

Case T-265/18: Judgment of the General Court of 27 March 2019 — Biernacka-Hoba v EUIPO — Formata Bogusław Hoba (Formata) (EU trade mark — Invalidity proceedings — EU figurative mark Formata — Earlier international figurative mark Formata — Relative ground for invalidity — Article 60(1)(a) and Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 — Rule 37 of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) — Conditions governing the representation of the earlier mark — Rule 19 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 7 of Delegated Regulation 2018/625) — Legitimate expectations — Reimbursement of the costs of representation — Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001 and Rule 94 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001))

47

2019/C 164/51

Case T-276/18: Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Julius-K9 v EUIPO — El Corte Inglés (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for EU figurative mark K9 UNIT — Earlier EU figurative mark unit — Relative ground for refusal — Likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

48

2019/C 164/52

Case T-239/18: Order of the General Court of 18 March 2019 — SKS Import Export v Commission (Action for annulment — Free movement of capital — Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CTF) — Directive (EU) 2015/849 — Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/212 — Inclusion of Tunisia on the list of high-risk third countries — Inadmissibility)

49

2019/C 164/53

Case T-410/18: Order of the General Court of 15 March 2019 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission (Action for annulment — Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Market in metal packaging — Decision to open an investigation — Act not open to challenge — Inadmissibility)

50

2019/C 164/54

Case T-503/18: Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Haba Trading v EUIPO — Vida (vidaXL) (EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Withdrawal of the opposition — No need to adjudicate)

50

2019/C 164/55

Case T-75/19: Order of the General Court of 13 March 2019 — Comune di Milano v Parliament and Council (Declining of jurisdiction)

51

2019/C 164/56

Case T-1/19: Action brought on 7 January 2019 — CJ v Court of Justice of the European Union

52

2019/C 164/57

Case T-136/19: Action brought on 1 March 2019 — Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission

53

2019/C 164/58

Case T-148/19: Action brought on 7 March 2019 — PKK v Council

55

2019/C 164/59

Case T-163/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Mersinis v ESMA

56

2019/C 164/60

Case T-164/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — AQ v eu-LISA

57

2019/C 164/61

Case T-166/19: Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Bronckers v Commission

58

2019/C 164/62

Case T-175/19: Action brought on 18 March 2019 — Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft v EUIPO (eVoter)

59

2019/C 164/63

Case T-180/19: Action brought on 26 March 2019 — Bibita Group v EUIPO — Benkomers (Beverage bottles)

60

2019/C 164/64

Case T-336/18: Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Eagle IP v EUIPO — Consolidated Artists (LILLY e VIOLETTA)

61

2019/C 164/65

Case T-470/18: Order of the General Court of 21 March 2019 — Telenet v Commission

61

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| | Corrigenda |
| --- | --- |
| 2019/C 164/66 | Corrigendum to the notice in the Official Journal in Case T-45/19 ( OJ C 122, 1.4.2019 ) | 62 |

Corrigenda

2019/C 164/66

Corrigendum to the notice in the Official Journal in Case T-45/19 ( OJ C 122, 1.4.2019 )

( OJ C 122, 1.4.2019 )

62

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| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Justice of the European Union

| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/1 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/1

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Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2019/C 164/01)

Last publication

OJ C 155, 6.5.2019

Past publications

OJ C 148, 29.4.2019

OJ C 139, 15.4.2019

OJ C 131, 8.4.2019

OJ C 122, 1.4.2019

OJ C 112, 25.3.2019

OJ C 103, 18.3.2019

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

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V Announcements

COURT PROCEEDINGS

CDJ

| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/2 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/2

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Appeal brought on 7 November 2018 by Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. against the order of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) made on 12 October 2018 in Case T-416/18, Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.) and Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. v European Commission

(Case C-700/18 P)

(2019/C 164/02)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellants: Hungary Restaurant Company Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. (Hungary Restaurant Company Kft.), Evolution Gaming Advisory Kft. (represented by: P. Ruth, Rechtsanwalt)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

By order of 14 March 2019, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Seventh Chamber) dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellants to bear their own costs.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/2 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/2

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Poland) lodged on 19 November 2018 — KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k. v Porr S.A.

(Case C-722/18)

(2019/C 164/03)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: KROL — Zakład Robót Wodno-Kanalizacyjnych Sp. z o.o., S.k.

Respondent: Porr S.A.

Question referred

Does EU law, in particular recitals 13, 20 and 22 of Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (1) and Article 18 TFEU laying down the principle of non-discrimination, permit the possibility of excluding compensation for late payment in respect of transactions financed in whole or in part by the EU Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, which follows from Article 4(3)(c) of the Ustawa o terminach zapłaty w transakcjach handlowych (Law on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions)?

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(1)  OJ 2000 L 200, p. 35.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/3 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/3

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Najwyższy (Poland) lodged on 27 November 2018 — JA v Skarb Państwa, represented by the Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Prezes Rady Ministrów, Minister Sprawiedliwości and Minister Finansów

(Case C-745/18)

(2019/C 164/04)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Najwyższy

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: JA

Respondent: Skarb Państwa, represented by the Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Prezes Rady Ministrów, Minister Sprawiedliwości and Minister Finansów

Question referred

Should Articles 73 and 78(a) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (1) and the preceding Article 11.A(1)(a) and 11.A(2)(a) of Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes — Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, (2) understood in the light of the general principles of a Member State’s liability to provide compensation for damage, as established in the case-law of the Court of Justice (including, in particular, in the judgments of 19 November 1991, Francovich and Others, C-6/90 and C-9/90, EU:C:1991:428; and of 5 March 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame and Others, C-46/93 and C-48/93, EU:C:1996:79), be interpreted as meaning that, with effect from 1 May 2004, they give rise to an obligation on a Member State which acceded to the European Union on that date to lay down regulations providing for the granting to a trustee in bankruptcy or insolvency of remuneration increased by the amount of value added tax (VAT) payable on that remuneration?

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(1)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

(2)  OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/4 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/4

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich (Poland) lodged on 12 December 2018 — Mikrokasa SA, Gdynia, and Revenue Niestandaryzowany Sekurytyzacyjny Fundusz Inwestycyjny Zamknięty, Warsaw v XO

(Case C-779/18)

(2019/C 164/05)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy w Siemianowicach Śląskich

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Mikrokasa SA, Gdynia, and Revenue Niestandaryzowany Sekurytyzacyjny Fundusz Inwestycyjny Zamknięty, Warsaw

Defendant: XO

Questions referred

| 1. | Should the provisions of Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, as amended, (1) in particular Articles 3(g), 10(1) and 22(1) thereof, be interpreted as precluding ‘non-interest credit costs’, determined as a lump sum in accordance with the statutory calculation formula set out in Article 36a of the ustawa z dnia 12 maja 2011 r. o kredycie konsumenckim (Dziennik Ustaw z 2018 r., poz. 993, tekst jednolity) (Law of 12 May 2011 on Consumer Credit) (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 993, consolidated text) (the Law on Consumer Credit), from being distinguished from the ‘total cost of the credit to the consumer’, as defined in that directive, in a manner that enables the actual non-interest credit costs borne by the loan provider to be concealed from the consumer? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Should the provisions of Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, as amended, (1) in particular Articles 3(g), 10(1) and 22(1) thereof, be interpreted as precluding ‘non-interest credit costs’, determined as a lump sum in accordance with the statutory calculation formula set out in Article 36a of the ustawa z dnia 12 maja 2011 r. o kredycie konsumenckim (Dziennik Ustaw z 2018 r., poz. 993, tekst jednolity) (Law of 12 May 2011 on Consumer Credit) (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 993, consolidated text) (the Law on Consumer Credit), from being distinguished from the ‘total cost of the credit to the consumer’, as defined in that directive, in a manner that enables the actual non-interest credit costs borne by the loan provider to be concealed from the consumer?

| 2. | Should the provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as amended, (2) in particular Articles 1(2), 6(1) and 7(1) thereof, be interpreted as precluding a review of the terms of consumer credit agreements with respect to the conditions set out in Article 3 of that directive in so far as it includes ‘non-interest credit costs’, the criteria for determining which are described in Article 36a of the Law on Consumer Credit? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Should the provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as amended, (2) in particular Articles 1(2), 6(1) and 7(1) thereof, be interpreted as precluding a review of the terms of consumer credit agreements with respect to the conditions set out in Article 3 of that directive in so far as it includes ‘non-interest credit costs’, the criteria for determining which are described in Article 36a of the Law on Consumer Credit?

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(1)  OJ 2008 L 133, p. 66.

(2)  OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/5 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/5

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (Poland) lodged on 28 December 2018 — A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J. v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa

(Case C-824/18)

(2019/C 164/06)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: A.B., C.D., E.F., G.H., I.J.

Respondent: Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa

Questions referred

| 1. | Should Article 2 TEU, in conjunction with the third sentence of Article 4(3), Articles 6(1) and 19(1) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 9(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC and the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that
  an infringement of the rule of law and of the right to an effective remedy and to effective judicial protection occurs in a situation where the national legislature, in granting the right of appeal to a court in individual cases concerning service in the office of judge of the court of last instance of a Member State (the Supreme Court), stipulates that a decision made during the selection procedure preceding the submission of a motion for appointment to the position of judge of the aforementioned court is final and effective where not all parties to the selection procedure have appealed against the decision made with respect to the joint consideration and assessment of all candidates for Supreme Court judges, who also include a candidate not interested in appealing that decision, namely a candidate indicated in the motion for appointment to the aforementioned position, which as a result:






  — | undermines the effectiveness of the remedy and the competent court’s ability to carry out a genuine review of the aforementioned selection procedure? |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Should Article 2 TEU, in conjunction with the third sentence of Article 4(3), Articles 6(1) and 19(1) TEU, in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 9(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC and the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that

an infringement of the rule of law and of the right to an effective remedy and to effective judicial protection occurs in a situation where the national legislature, in granting the right of appeal to a court in individual cases concerning service in the office of judge of the court of last instance of a Member State (the Supreme Court), stipulates that a decision made during the selection procedure preceding the submission of a motion for appointment to the position of judge of the aforementioned court is final and effective where not all parties to the selection procedure have appealed against the decision made with respect to the joint consideration and assessment of all candidates for Supreme Court judges, who also include a candidate not interested in appealing that decision, namely a candidate indicated in the motion for appointment to the aforementioned position, which as a result:

—

undermines the effectiveness of the remedy and the competent court’s ability to carry out a genuine review of the aforementioned selection procedure?

| — | and, where the scope of that procedure also includes those positions of judges of the Supreme Court to whose holders the new lower retirement age has been applied without leaving the decision on whether to take advantage of the lower retirement age to the sole discretion of the judge concerned, in the context of the principle of the irremovability of judges — where it is found that this principle has been thereby undermined — also has an impact on the scope and outcome of the judicial review of the aforementioned selection procedure? |
| --- | --- |

—

and, where the scope of that procedure also includes those positions of judges of the Supreme Court to whose holders the new lower retirement age has been applied without leaving the decision on whether to take advantage of the lower retirement age to the sole discretion of the judge concerned, in the context of the principle of the irremovability of judges — where it is found that this principle has been thereby undermined — also has an impact on the scope and outcome of the judicial review of the aforementioned selection procedure?

| 2. | Should Article 2 TEU, in conjunction with the third sentence of Article 4(3) and Article 6(1) TEU, in conjunction with Articles 15(1) and 20, in conjunction with Articles 21(1) and 52(1), of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in conjunction with Articles 2(1), 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC and the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that
  an infringement of the rule of law, of the principle of equal treatment and of equal and indiscriminate access to public service — service in the office of judge of the Supreme Court — occurs in a situation where, although the right of appeal to a competent court in individual cases concerning service in the office of judge of the aforementioned court has been granted, as a consequence of the criteria for the finality of the decision described in the first question, the appointment to a vacant position of judge of the Supreme Court may take place without the competent court conducting a review of the aforementioned selection procedure where such a review is initiated, and the absence of such a review, by infringing the right to an effective remedy, infringes the right of equal access to public service, thereby undermining objectives of general interest? And does not a situation in which the composition of the body in a Member State whose purpose is to safeguard the independence of the judiciary (the National Council of the Judiciary), and before which the procedure concerning service in the office of judge of the Supreme Court takes place, is designed in such a way that representatives of the judiciary in that body are elected by the legislature undermine the principle of institutional balance? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Should Article 2 TEU, in conjunction with the third sentence of Article 4(3) and Article 6(1) TEU, in conjunction with Articles 15(1) and 20, in conjunction with Articles 21(1) and 52(1), of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in conjunction with Articles 2(1), 2(2)(a) and 3(1)(a) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC and the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, be interpreted as meaning that

an infringement of the rule of law, of the principle of equal treatment and of equal and indiscriminate access to public service — service in the office of judge of the Supreme Court — occurs in a situation where, although the right of appeal to a competent court in individual cases concerning service in the office of judge of the aforementioned court has been granted, as a consequence of the criteria for the finality of the decision described in the first question, the appointment to a vacant position of judge of the Supreme Court may take place without the competent court conducting a review of the aforementioned selection procedure where such a review is initiated, and the absence of such a review, by infringing the right to an effective remedy, infringes the right of equal access to public service, thereby undermining objectives of general interest? And does not a situation in which the composition of the body in a Member State whose purpose is to safeguard the independence of the judiciary (the National Council of the Judiciary), and before which the procedure concerning service in the office of judge of the Supreme Court takes place, is designed in such a way that representatives of the judiciary in that body are elected by the legislature undermine the principle of institutional balance?

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/6 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/6

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 3 January 2019 — Asmel società consortile a.r.l. v ANAC — Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione

(Case C-3/19)

(2019/C 164/07)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Asmel società consortile a.r.l.

Respondent: ANAC — Autorità Nazionale Anticorruzione

Questions referred

| 1. | Does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) of Legislative Decree No 163 of 12 April 2006, which restricts the autonomy of municipalities to entrust [procurement] to a central purchasing body to only two organisational models (the union of municipalities, if it already exists, or a consortium to be established between municipalities), infringe EU law? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) of Legislative Decree No 163 of 12 April 2006, which restricts the autonomy of municipalities to entrust [procurement] to a central purchasing body to only two organisational models (the union of municipalities, if it already exists, or a consortium to be established between municipalities), infringe EU law?

| 2. | In any event, does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) of Legislative Decree No 163 of 12 April 2006 which, read in conjunction with Article 3(25) of that legislative decree, regarding the organisational model based on consortia of municipalities, excludes the possibility of creating entities governed by private law, such as a consortium under ordinary law whose members include private entities, infringe EU law, in particular the principles of free movement of services and of opening up to competition as far as possible in the field of public service contracts? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In any event, does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) of Legislative Decree No 163 of 12 April 2006 which, read in conjunction with Article 3(25) of that legislative decree, regarding the organisational model based on consortia of municipalities, excludes the possibility of creating entities governed by private law, such as a consortium under ordinary law whose members include private entities, infringe EU law, in particular the principles of free movement of services and of opening up to competition as far as possible in the field of public service contracts?

| 3. | Lastly, does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) which, if interpreted in the sense of allowing consortia of municipalities that are central purchasing bodies to operate in a territory corresponding to that of the participating municipalities as a whole, and so, at most, to the provincial territory, limits the scope of operation of those central purchasing bodies, infringe EU law, in particular the principles of free movement of services and of opening up to competition as far as possible in the field of public service contracts? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Lastly, does a provision of national legislation, such as Article 33(3a) which, if interpreted in the sense of allowing consortia of municipalities that are central purchasing bodies to operate in a territory corresponding to that of the participating municipalities as a whole, and so, at most, to the provincial territory, limits the scope of operation of those central purchasing bodies, infringe EU law, in particular the principles of free movement of services and of opening up to competition as far as possible in the field of public service contracts?

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/7 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/7

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 7 January 2019 — Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea v Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova

(Case C-11/19)

(2019/C 164/08)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Azienda ULSS No 6 Euganea

Respondent: Pia Opera Croce Verde Padova

Questions referred

| 1. | Where both parties concerned are public bodies, do recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) and Articles 10 and 12(4) thereof preclude the applicability of Article 5 of Veneto Regional Law 26/2012, in conjunction with Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 thereof, on the basis of the public-public partnership referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 5(6) of Legislative Decree 50/2016 and 15 of Law 241/1990? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Where both parties concerned are public bodies, do recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU (1) and Articles 10 and 12(4) thereof preclude the applicability of Article 5 of Veneto Regional Law 26/2012, in conjunction with Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 thereof, on the basis of the public-public partnership referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 5(6) of Legislative Decree 50/2016 and 15 of Law 241/1990?

| 2. | Where both parties concerned are public bodies, do recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 10 and 12(4) thereof preclude the applicability of the provisions of Veneto Regional Law 26/2012, on the basis of the public-public partnership referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 5(6) of Legislative Decree 50/2016 and 15 of Law 241/1990, in the limited sense of placing the contracting authority under an obligation to give the reasons for the decision to award the contract for the provision of ordinary patient transport services by way of tender procedure rather than by direct award of the contract? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Where both parties concerned are public bodies, do recital 28 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 10 and 12(4) thereof preclude the applicability of the provisions of Veneto Regional Law 26/2012, on the basis of the public-public partnership referred to in Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 5(6) of Legislative Decree 50/2016 and 15 of Law 241/1990, in the limited sense of placing the contracting authority under an obligation to give the reasons for the decision to award the contract for the provision of ordinary patient transport services by way of tender procedure rather than by direct award of the contract?

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(1)  Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ 2014 L 94, p. 65).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/8

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Appeal brought on 10 January 2019 by the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 25 October 2018 in Case T-286/15: KF v SatCen

(Case C-14/19 P)

(2019/C 164/09)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellant: European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) (represented by: A. Guillerme, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: KF, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the judgment under appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the judgment under appeal;

| — | order the applicant in first instance to bear all the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the applicant in first instance to bear all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In its appeal, SatCen relies on the following grounds:

| — | the General Court erred in law in the finding that it has jurisdiction to rule on the heads of claim submitted by the applicant, as it (i) did not assess if the factors forming the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction were met and it (ii) erroneously interpreted the principle of equal treatment. |
| --- | --- |

—

the General Court erred in law in the finding that it has jurisdiction to rule on the heads of claim submitted by the applicant, as it (i) did not assess if the factors forming the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction were met and it (ii) erroneously interpreted the principle of equal treatment.

| — | the General Court erred in law in the finding that the General Court’s jurisdiction to rule on this dispute is based on article 263 and 268 TFEU; |
| --- | --- |

—

the General Court erred in law in the finding that the General Court’s jurisdiction to rule on this dispute is based on article 263 and 268 TFEU;

| — | the General court distorted the facts in examining KF’s claims as regards the conduct of the administrative inquiry; |
| --- | --- |

—

the General court distorted the facts in examining KF’s claims as regards the conduct of the administrative inquiry;

| — | the General Court erred in law interpreting article 1, annex IX of the SatCen’s Staff Regulations and the concept of the rights of the defence. |
| --- | --- |

—

the General Court erred in law interpreting article 1, annex IX of the SatCen’s Staff Regulations and the concept of the rights of the defence.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/9 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/9

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 10 January 2019 — A.m.a — Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA v Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti — Co.La.Ri.

(Case C-15/19)

(2019/C 164/10)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: A.m.a. — Azienda Municipale Ambiente SpA

Cross-appellant: Consorzio Laziale Rifiuti — Co.La.Ri.

Questions referred

| 1. | Do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31/EC (1) preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 transposing those provisions of [EU law] into national law apply retroactively, with the result that pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate are subject, unconditionally, to the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation, in particular in so far as they extend the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31/EC (1) preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 transposing those provisions of [EU law] into national law apply retroactively, with the result that pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate are subject, unconditionally, to the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation, in particular in so far as they extend the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years?

| 2. | In particular, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31, which provide that Member States must take ‘measures to ensure that all of the costs involved in the setting up and operation of a landfill site, including as far as possible the cost of the financial security or its equivalent referred to in Article 8(a)(iv), and the estimated costs of the closure and after-care of the site for a period of at least 30 years shall be covered by the price to be charged by the operator for the disposal of any type of waste in that site’ and ‘measures in order that landfills which have been granted a permit, or which are already in operation at the time of transposition of [that directive], may. continue to operate’ respectively, preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate, where the measures implementing those obligations, in particular in relation to those landfill sites, are limited in Article 17 of that legislative decree to the provision of a transitional period and do not include any measure seeking to limit the financial impact of the extension on the ‘permit holder’? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In particular, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31, which provide that Member States must take ‘measures to ensure that all of the costs involved in the setting up and operation of a landfill site, including as far as possible the cost of the financial security or its equivalent referred to in Article 8(a)(iv), and the estimated costs of the closure and after-care of the site for a period of at least 30 years shall be covered by the price to be charged by the operator for the disposal of any type of waste in that site’ and ‘measures in order that landfills which have been granted a permit, or which are already in operation at the time of transposition of [that directive], may. continue to operate’ respectively, preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate, where the measures implementing those obligations, in particular in relation to those landfill sites, are limited in Article 17 of that legislative decree to the provision of a transitional period and do not include any measure seeking to limit the financial impact of the extension on the ‘permit holder’?

| 3. | Moreover, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31 preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 also apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate as regards the financial burden resulting from the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation and, in particular, from the extension of the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years, by imposing that burden on the ‘permit holder’ and thereby legitimising the adjustment — to the detriment of that permit holder — of the costs set out in the commercial agreements regulating [waste] disposal activities? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Moreover, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31 preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 also apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate as regards the financial burden resulting from the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation and, in particular, from the extension of the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years, by imposing that burden on the ‘permit holder’ and thereby legitimising the adjustment — to the detriment of that permit holder — of the costs set out in the commercial agreements regulating [waste] disposal activities?

| 4. | Lastly, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31 preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 also apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate as regards the financial burden resulting from the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation and, in particular, from the extension of the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years, given that — in order to determine that financial burden — account must be taken not only of waste to be deposited as from the entry into force of the provisions transposing those provisions of EU law into national law but also of waste already deposited prior to that entry into force? |
| --- | --- |

4.

Lastly, do Articles 10 and 14 of Directive 1999/31 preclude the interpretation upheld by the appeal court, according to which Articles 15 and 17 of Legislative Decree 36/2003 also apply to pre-existing landfill sites which already have permission to operate as regards the financial burden resulting from the obligations laid down by those provisions of national legislation and, in particular, from the extension of the period of responsibility for after-care from 10 to 30 years, given that — in order to determine that financial burden — account must be taken not only of waste to be deposited as from the entry into force of the provisions transposing those provisions of EU law into national law but also of waste already deposited prior to that entry into force?

---

(1)  Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste (OJ 1999 L 182, p. 1).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/10 |
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13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/10

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie (Poland) lodged on 2 January 2019 — VL v Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie

(Case C-16/19)

(2019/C 164/11)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Krakowie

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: VL

Respondent: Szpital Kliniczny im. dra J. Babińskiego Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Krakowie

Question referred

Should Article 2 of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (1) be interpreted as meaning that the differing treatment of individual members of a group distinguished by a protected characteristic (disability) amounts to a breach of the principle of equal treatment if the employer treats individual members of that group differently on the basis of an apparently neutral criterion, and that criterion cannot be objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the measures taken in order to achieve that aim are not appropriate and necessary?

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(1)  OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/11 |
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13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/11

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu (Poland) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała v Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen

(Case C-25/19)

(2019/C 164/12)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Okręgowy w Poznaniu

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Corporis Sp. z o.o., established in Bielsko-Biała

Defendant: Gefion Insurance A/S, established in Copenhagen

Question referred

Should Article 152(1) and (2), in conjunction with Article 151, of Directive 2009/138/EC (1) and recital 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 (2) be interpreted as meaning that the representation of a non-life insurance undertaking by an appointed representative includes the receipt of a document which initiates court proceedings for damages in respect of a road traffic accident?

---

(1)  Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ 2009 L 335, p. 1).

(2)  Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents), and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 (OJ 2007 L 324, p. 79).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/11 |
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13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/11

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Modena (Italy) lodged on 15 January 2019 — Azienda USL di Modena v Comune di Sassuolo

(Case C-26/19)

(2019/C 164/13)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Commissione tributaria provinciale di Modena

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Azienda USL di Modena

Defendant: Comune di Sassuolo

Questions referred

| 1. | Is Article 9(8) of Legislative Decree No 23 [of 14 March 2011], which allows Italian national health service bodies an exemption from IMU [single municipal tax] for real estate which they own and whose intended purpose is exclusively the performance of statutory tasks, consistent with Article 107 TFEU, which prohibits State aid ‘in any form’, if that national legislation is interpreted as meaning that the tax advantage is also available to an AUSL [a local public body providing healthcare services] which leased a property to a public-private commercial company (51 % owned by that body) which, in that property, provides healthcare services in competition with other hospitals that are entirely privately owned, thus giving rise to a tax advantage which may be classified as State aid that distorts the rules of the free market? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is Article 9(8) of Legislative Decree No 23 [of 14 March 2011], which allows Italian national health service bodies an exemption from IMU [single municipal tax] for real estate which they own and whose intended purpose is exclusively the performance of statutory tasks, consistent with Article 107 TFEU, which prohibits State aid ‘in any form’, if that national legislation is interpreted as meaning that the tax advantage is also available to an AUSL [a local public body providing healthcare services] which leased a property to a public-private commercial company (51 % owned by that body) which, in that property, provides healthcare services in competition with other hospitals that are entirely privately owned, thus giving rise to a tax advantage which may be classified as State aid that distorts the rules of the free market?

| 2. | Does the Italian tax ruling provided for by Article 11 of Law No 212 [of 27 July 2000] — which precludes an interpretation of Article 9(8) of Legislative Decree No 23, by analogy with the case-law of the Italian Supreme Court concerning the ICI [Municipal Tax on Immovable Property], to the effect that the IMU exemption does not apply to an AUSL when the property is used by a public limited company in which that public body also has a holding and which provides healthcare services there in competition with other entirely privately owned commercial companies which also provide healthcare services, thus giving rise to a tax advantage which may be classified as State aid that distorts the rules of the free market — comply with the Treaty, specifically Article 107 TFEU, which prohibits State aid ‘in any form’? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Does the Italian tax ruling provided for by Article 11 of Law No 212 [of 27 July 2000] — which precludes an interpretation of Article 9(8) of Legislative Decree No 23, by analogy with the case-law of the Italian Supreme Court concerning the ICI [Municipal Tax on Immovable Property], to the effect that the IMU exemption does not apply to an AUSL when the property is used by a public limited company in which that public body also has a holding and which provides healthcare services there in competition with other entirely privately owned commercial companies which also provide healthcare services, thus giving rise to a tax advantage which may be classified as State aid that distorts the rules of the free market — comply with the Treaty, specifically Article 107 TFEU, which prohibits State aid ‘in any form’?

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/12 |
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13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/12

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 16 January 2019 — Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust and Others

(Case C-28/19)

(2019/C 164/14)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants: Ryanair Ltd, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust

Respondents: Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato ‒ Antitrust, Ryanair Ltd, Ryanair DAC

Questions referred

| 1. | Is the second sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an online check-in fee and an ‘administration fee’ for credit card purchases, which are additional to the price of the ticket, and the VAT applied to air fares and to optional supplements for national flights, fall within the category of unavoidable, foreseeable or optional price supplements? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is the second sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (1) to be interpreted as meaning that an online check-in fee and an ‘administration fee’ for credit card purchases, which are additional to the price of the ticket, and the VAT applied to air fares and to optional supplements for national flights, fall within the category of unavoidable, foreseeable or optional price supplements?

| 2. | Is the fourth sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 to be interpreted in the sense that the word ‘optional’ covers price supplements which the majority of consumers are able to avoid? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is the fourth sentence of Article 23(1) of Regulation No 1008/2008 to be interpreted in the sense that the word ‘optional’ covers price supplements which the majority of consumers are able to avoid?

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(1)  Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast) (OJ 2008 L 293, p. 3).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/13 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/13

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Request for a preliminary ruling from Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Orange Romania SA v Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal

(Case C-61/19)

(2019/C 164/15)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Tribunalul București

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Orange Romania SA

Defendant: Autoritatea Națională de Supraveghere a Prelucrării Datelor cu Caracter Personal

Questions referred

| 1. | For the purposes of Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, (1) what conditions must be fulfilled in order for an indication of wishes to be regarded as specific and informed? |
| --- | --- |

1.

For the purposes of Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, (1) what conditions must be fulfilled in order for an indication of wishes to be regarded as specific and informed?

| 2. | For the purposes of Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, what conditions must be fulfilled in order for an indication of wishes to be regarded as freely given? |
| --- | --- |

2.

For the purposes of Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, what conditions must be fulfilled in order for an indication of wishes to be regarded as freely given?

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(1)  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/14 |
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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/14

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul București (Romania) lodged on 29 January 2019 — Star Taxi App SRL v Unitatea Administrativ Teritorială Municipiului București prin Primarul General and Consiliul General al Municipiului București

(Case C-62/19)

(2019/C 164/16)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Tribunalul București

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Star Taxi App SRL

Defendants: Unitatea Administrativ Teritorială Municipiului București prin Primarul General and Consiliul General al Municipiului București

Questions referred

| 1. | Are the provisions of Directive 98/34/EC (1) (Article 1(2)), as amended by Directive 98/48/EC, (2) and of Directive 2000/31/EC (3) (Article 2(a)), which state that an Information Society service is a ‘service. provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services’, to be interpreted as meaning that an activity such as that carried on by Star Taxi App SRL (namely a service consisting in putting taxi passengers directly in touch, via an electronic application, with taxi drivers) must be regarded specifically as an Information Society and collaborative economy service (bearing in mind that Star Taxi App SRL does not fulfil the criteria for being a transport undertaking considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union in paragraph 39 of its judgment in Case C-434/15 with reference to Uber)? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Are the provisions of Directive 98/34/EC (1) (Article 1(2)), as amended by Directive 98/48/EC, (2) and of Directive 2000/31/EC (3) (Article 2(a)), which state that an Information Society service is a ‘service. provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services’, to be interpreted as meaning that an activity such as that carried on by Star Taxi App SRL (namely a service consisting in putting taxi passengers directly in touch, via an electronic application, with taxi drivers) must be regarded specifically as an Information Society and collaborative economy service (bearing in mind that Star Taxi App SRL does not fulfil the criteria for being a transport undertaking considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union in paragraph 39 of its judgment in Case C-434/15 with reference to Uber)?

| 2. | In the event that [the application operated by] Star Taxi App SRL is to be regarded as an Information Society service, do the provisions of Article 4 of Directive 2000/31/EC, of Articles 9, 10 and 16 of Directive 2006/123/EC (4) and of Article 56 TFEU entail the application of the principle of the freedom to provide services to the activity carried on by Star Taxi App SRL? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, do those provisions preclude rules such as those set out in Articles I, II, III, IV and V of Hotărârea Consiliului General al Municipiului București nr. 626/19.12.2017 (Decision No 626 of the General Council of the Municipality of Bucharest of 19 December 2017) (‘CGMB Decision No 626/2017’) amending and supplementing CGMB Decision No 178/2008 approving the framework regulation for the organisation and operation of local public taxi services, the regulations governing that service and the concession agreement for the delegated management of that service? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In the event that [the application operated by] Star Taxi App SRL is to be regarded as an Information Society service, do the provisions of Article 4 of Directive 2000/31/EC, of Articles 9, 10 and 16 of Directive 2006/123/EC (4) and of Article 56 TFEU entail the application of the principle of the freedom to provide services to the activity carried on by Star Taxi App SRL? If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, do those provisions preclude rules such as those set out in Articles I, II, III, IV and V of Hotărârea Consiliului General al Municipiului București nr. 626/19.12.2017 (Decision No 626 of the General Council of the Municipality of Bucharest of 19 December 2017) (‘CGMB Decision No 626/2017’) amending and supplementing CGMB Decision No 178/2008 approving the framework regulation for the organisation and operation of local public taxi services, the regulations governing that service and the concession agreement for the delegated management of that service?

| 3. | In the event that Directive 2000/31/EC applies to the service provided by Star Taxi App SRL, are restrictions imposed by a Member State on the freedom to provide Information Society services which make the provision of such services conditional on the possession of an authorisation or licence valid measures derogating from Article 3(2) of Directive 2000/31/EC in accordance with Article 3(4) of that directive? |
| --- | --- |

3.

In the event that Directive 2000/31/EC applies to the service provided by Star Taxi App SRL, are restrictions imposed by a Member State on the freedom to provide Information Society services which make the provision of such services conditional on the possession of an authorisation or licence valid measures derogating from Article 3(2) of Directive 2000/31/EC in accordance with Article 3(4) of that directive?

| 4. | Do the provisions of Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 (5) preclude the adoption, without first notifying the European Commission, of regulations such as those set out in Articles I, II, III, IV and V of CGMB Decision No 626/2017 amending and supplementing CGMB Decision No 178/2008 approving the framework regulation for the organisation and operation of local public taxi services, the regulations governing that service and the concession agreement for the delegated management of that service? |
| --- | --- |

4.

Do the provisions of Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 (5) preclude the adoption, without first notifying the European Commission, of regulations such as those set out in Articles I, II, III, IV and V of CGMB Decision No 626/2017 amending and supplementing CGMB Decision No 178/2008 approving the framework regulation for the organisation and operation of local public taxi services, the regulations governing that service and the concession agreement for the delegated management of that service?

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(1)  Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (OJ 1998 L 204, p. 37).

(2)  Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998 amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (OJ 1998 L 217, p. 18).

(3)  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’) (OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1).

(4)  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).

(5)  Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (codification) (OJ 2015 L 241, p. 1).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/15 |
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13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/15

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Appeal brought on 30 January 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 21 November 2018 in Case T-587/16, HM v European Commission

(Case C-70/19 P)

(2019/C 164/17)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: T.S. Bohr and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: HM

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 21 November 2018 in Case T-587/16, HM v Commission; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 21 November 2018 in Case T-587/16, HM v Commission;

| — | refer the case back to the General Court; |
| --- | --- |

—

refer the case back to the General Court;

| — | reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

reserve the costs of the proceedings at first instance and on appeal.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The Commission relies on two grounds of appeal.

The first ground of appeal, which consists of three parts, alleges that the General Court erred in law as regards the division of competences between the selection board and the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO).

In the first part of that ground of appeal, the Commission submits that the General Court erred in its legal categorisation of the contested measure, that is to say, EPSO’s decision of 17 August 2015 not to submit the appellant’s request for review to the selection board on the ground of delay. That notification was made in the context of the competence conferred on EPSO by Section 3.1.3. of the General Rules governing competitions to conduct all correspondence with candidates.

In the second part, the Commission argues that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of the General Rules. Section 3.4.3. of those General Rules should not to be read only in conjunction with Section 3.1.3., but also in the light of the wording and purpose of Section 3.4.3., which grants EPSO the competence to conduct the internal review procedure.

The third part alleges an error in law in the interpretation of Article 7 of Annex III to the Staff Regulations. The notification in question constitutes an administrative measure to ensure the application of uniform standards in competitions in accordance with the first paragraph of that article. It also corresponds to EPSO’s role of assisting the selection board, as noted by the General Court in the judgment in Case T-361/10 P, Commission v Pachtitis. (1)

The second ground of appeal alleges that the General Court erred in law in the interpretation of the plea concerning the lack of competence of the author of the measure. In the present case, the General Court failed to examine whether, if the error concerning lack of competence had been corrected, a measure with the same or a different content would have been taken. In the absence of such an examination, the General Court could not annul the contested measure.

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(1)  ECLI:EU:T:2011:742.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/16 |
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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/16

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunalul Specializat Mureș (Romania) lodged on 31 January 2019 — MF v BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA Paris Sucursala București and Secapital Sàrl

(Case C-75/19)

(2019/C 164/18)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Tribunalul Specializat Mureș

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: MF

Respondents: BNP Paribas Personal Finance SA Paris Sucursala București and Secapital Sàrl

Questions referred

| 1. | Do the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC [of 5 April 1993] on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) in particular recitals 12, 21 and 23 and Article 6(1), Article 7(2) and Article 8 thereof, preclude national courts from adopting an interpretation according to which a consumer may not, in the context of opposing enforcement (which in national law is a special action that may be brought only under certain restrictive conditions and within a certain time limit after enforcement proceedings have been commenced), rely on the existence of unfair terms in a credit agreement which he has concluded with a seller or supplier (that credit agreement constituting, under national law, the enforceable instrument on the basis of which the enforcement proceedings have been commenced against the consumer) for the reason that such a ground is inadmissible in that type of action, the national legislation providing instead for an action pursuant to ordinary law, not subject to any time limit, by means of which a consumer may at any time apply for a declaration of the existence of unfair contractual terms, which will thus not be binding, even though the judgment on such an action may not have any direct consequences for the enforcement proceedings, there being a risk that enforcement will be completed before the judgment in the action pursuant to ordinary law is obtained? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Do the provisions of Council Directive 93/13/EEC [of 5 April 1993] on unfair terms in consumer contracts, (1) in particular recitals 12, 21 and 23 and Article 6(1), Article 7(2) and Article 8 thereof, preclude national courts from adopting an interpretation according to which a consumer may not, in the context of opposing enforcement (which in national law is a special action that may be brought only under certain restrictive conditions and within a certain time limit after enforcement proceedings have been commenced), rely on the existence of unfair terms in a credit agreement which he has concluded with a seller or supplier (that credit agreement constituting, under national law, the enforceable instrument on the basis of which the enforcement proceedings have been commenced against the consumer) for the reason that such a ground is inadmissible in that type of action, the national legislation providing instead for an action pursuant to ordinary law, not subject to any time limit, by means of which a consumer may at any time apply for a declaration of the existence of unfair contractual terms, which will thus not be binding, even though the judgment on such an action may not have any direct consequences for the enforcement proceedings, there being a risk that enforcement will be completed before the judgment in the action pursuant to ordinary law is obtained?

| 2. | If the first question is answered in the affirmative, do those same provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC preclude a provision of national law which sets a time limit of 15 days from the date of communication of the first enforcement measures (that time limit being mandatory and a matter of public policy, and failure to comply with it entailing the dismissal of the action for having been brought out of time) within which period a consumer opposing enforcement (a debtor against whom enforcement is being exercised) may argue the unfair nature of contractual terms in a credit agreement concluded with a seller or supplier, bearing in mind that the same regime applies under national law to the making of similar objections that will be treated as arguments in defence on the merits, and also bearing in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, national courts are under an obligation to consider, of their own motion, whether contractual terms are unfair, once they have at their disposal the necessary elements of fact and law to do so? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the first question is answered in the affirmative, do those same provisions of Directive 93/13/EEC preclude a provision of national law which sets a time limit of 15 days from the date of communication of the first enforcement measures (that time limit being mandatory and a matter of public policy, and failure to comply with it entailing the dismissal of the action for having been brought out of time) within which period a consumer opposing enforcement (a debtor against whom enforcement is being exercised) may argue the unfair nature of contractual terms in a credit agreement concluded with a seller or supplier, bearing in mind that the same regime applies under national law to the making of similar objections that will be treated as arguments in defence on the merits, and also bearing in mind that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, national courts are under an obligation to consider, of their own motion, whether contractual terms are unfair, once they have at their disposal the necessary elements of fact and law to do so?

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(1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/17 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/17

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy Szczecin — Prawobrzeże i Zachód w Szczecinie (Poland) lodged on 31 January 2019 — Profi Credit Polska S.A. v QJ

(Case C-84/19)

(2019/C 164/19)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy Szczecin — Prawobrzeże i Zachód w Szczecinie

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Profi Credit Polska S.A.

Defendant: QJ

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 (1) be interpreted as precluding the application of the provisions of the directive in regard to the examination of the fairness of individual contractual terms concerning non-interest credit costs, in the case where the legislative provisions in force in a Member State impose an upper limit on those costs by providing that non-interest credit costs arising from a consumer credit agreement are not payable in excess of the maximum non-interest credit costs calculated in the manner prescribed by law or the total amount of the credit? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 1(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 (1) be interpreted as precluding the application of the provisions of the directive in regard to the examination of the fairness of individual contractual terms concerning non-interest credit costs, in the case where the legislative provisions in force in a Member State impose an upper limit on those costs by providing that non-interest credit costs arising from a consumer credit agreement are not payable in excess of the maximum non-interest credit costs calculated in the manner prescribed by law or the total amount of the credit?

| 2. | Must Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 be interpreted as meaning that a non-interest cost incurred and paid by a borrower together with a loan, in addition to interest, related to the conclusion of the agreement and the granting of the loan itself (in the form of a fee, commission or otherwise), as a term of that agreement, is, if expressed in plain intelligible language, not subject to the assessment expressed in that provision in the context of its unfairness? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 be interpreted as meaning that a non-interest cost incurred and paid by a borrower together with a loan, in addition to interest, related to the conclusion of the agreement and the granting of the loan itself (in the form of a fee, commission or otherwise), as a term of that agreement, is, if expressed in plain intelligible language, not subject to the assessment expressed in that provision in the context of its unfairness?

| 3. | Must Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 be interpreted as meaning that contractual terms which introduce various types of costs associated with the granting of a loan are not expressed ‘in plain intelligible language’ if they do not explain in return for what specific services they are charged and do not allow the consumer to determine the differences between them? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Must Article 4(2) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 be interpreted as meaning that contractual terms which introduce various types of costs associated with the granting of a loan are not expressed ‘in plain intelligible language’ if they do not explain in return for what specific services they are charged and do not allow the consumer to determine the differences between them?

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(1)  Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/18 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/18

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria v RK

(Case C-85/19)

(2019/C 164/20)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Galicia

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria

Respondent: RK

Question referred

Are a provision in a collective agreement and an employer’s practice, pursuant to which, for the purposes of remuneration and promotion, the length of service of a part-time female employee whose working hours are ‘distributed vertically’ over the whole year is to be calculated solely on the basis of time actually worked, contrary to Clause 4(1) and (2) of the Framework Agreement on part-time work [annexed to] Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997, (1) and to Articles 2(1)(b) and 14(1) of Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast)? (2)

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(1)  Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC (OJ 1998 L 14, p. 9).

(2)  Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (OJ 2006 L 204, p. 23).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/19 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/19

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona (Spain) lodged on 6 February 2019 — SL v Vueling Airlines S.A.

(Case C-86/19)

(2019/C 164/21)

Language of the case: Spanish

Referring court

Juzgado de lo Mercantil n.o 9 de Barcelona

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: SL

Defendant: Vueling Airlines S.A.

Question referred

Where the loss of a suitcase has been established, must the airline compensate the passenger in each and every case with the maximum compensation limit of SDR 1 131, since that is the most serious of the situations provided for in Articles 17(2) and 22(2) of the Montreal Convention of 28 May 1999, or is that maximum compensation limit one which can be adjusted by the court, including in the event of loss of a suitcase, in the light of the circumstances, so that the amount of SDR 1 131 will be awarded only if the passenger establishes, by whatever means are permitted in law, that the value of the items and personal effects he was carrying in the checked baggage, and of those which he had to purchase to replace them, came to that limit, or, failing that, may other criteria be taken into account, such as, for example, the weight of the suitcase or whether the baggage was lost on the outbound or return journey, for the purposes of assessing the non-material damage caused by the inconvenience arising from the loss of the passenger’s baggage?

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/20 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/20

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Appeal brought on 8 February 2019 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 29 November 2018 in Case T-811/16, Di Bernardo v Commission

(Case C-114/19 P)

(2019/C 164/22)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: B. Mongin, G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings: Danilo Di Bernardo

Form of order sought

| — | Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 29 November 2018 (Seventh Chamber), Di Bernardo v Commission, T-811/16; |
| --- | --- |

—

Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 29 November 2018 (Seventh Chamber), Di Bernardo v Commission, T-811/16;

| — | Refer the case back to the General Court; |
| --- | --- |

—

Refer the case back to the General Court;

| — | Reserve the costs incurred at first instance and on appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

Reserve the costs incurred at first instance and on appeal.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The first plea, which concerns paragraphs 41 to 53, last sentence, of the judgment under appeal, alleges an error of law in the definition of the extent of the selection board’s obligation to state reasons in a decision not to include a candidate on a reserve list. In the first place, the Commission submits that the General Court departed from the established case-law of the Court of Justice, which distinguishes the decisions relating to the examination of applications such as those relating to the candidate’s qualifications or experience from decisions relating to the assessment of candidates’ merits following participation in the tests. In the first case, the selection board must indicate the specific information which is missing from the application, taking into account the qualifications required by the notice of competition. Whether in its initial decision or in its response to the request for review, in the present case the selection board satisfied the conditions laid down by the case-law; the General Court infringed that case-law by extending its review to the selection criteria adopted by the selection board and by requiring the selection board to decide on all the information provided in the application form. The fact that the selection board gave reasons for its decision in response to request for review does not extend that obligation to state reasons. In the second place, the General Court confused the requirement to state reasons, whatever its value, with whether the statement of reasons is well founded, which is a question of the substantive legality of the decision taken.

The second plea, which concerns paragraphs 37 to 38 and 53 to 56 of the judgment under appeal, alleges an error in law which consists in disregarding the court’s duty to determine, of its own motion, compliance with the obligation to state reasons. The General Court departed from the settled case-law according to which, where the statement of reasons is inadequate, additional clarification may still be brought in the course of the proceedings, which remove the basis of the plea for annulment alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons. By excluding the possibility to supplement the statement of reasons where there is an ‘almost complete’ lack of the statement of reasons and by assimilating the ‘almost complete’ lack of the statement of reasons with a complete lack of the statement of reasons, the General Court has made an additional statement of reasons in the course of the proceedings impossible. Such assimilation has no basis in the case-law of the Court of Justice. By limiting the possibilities of rectification in the course of the proceedings, the General Court limited the role of the court which could have been, in the circumstances of the present case, to prevent annulment of the contested decision for breach of the obligation to state reasons.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/21 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/21

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 19 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.S. v État belge

(Case C-133/19)

(2019/C 164/23)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: B.M.M., B.S.

Defendant: État belge

Questions referred

| 1. | In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor? |
| --- | --- |

1.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor?

| 2. | Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC be interpreted as precluding an action for annulment, brought against the refusal of a right to family reunification of a minor child, being held to be inadmissible on the ground that the child has attained his majority during the judicial proceedings, since he would be deprived of the possibility of securing a determination of his action against that decision and there would be a breach of his right to an effective remedy? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC be interpreted as precluding an action for annulment, brought against the refusal of a right to family reunification of a minor child, being held to be inadmissible on the ground that the child has attained his majority during the judicial proceedings, since he would be deprived of the possibility of securing a determination of his action against that decision and there would be a breach of his right to an effective remedy?

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(1)  OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/21 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/21

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.M., B.M. v État belge

(Case C-136/19)

(2019/C 164/24)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: B.M.M., B.M.

Defendant: État belge

Questions referred

| 1. | In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor? |
| --- | --- |

1.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law and not to render it impossible to benefit from the right to family reunification which, in the second applicant’s submission, is conferred on her by Article 4 of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) must that provision be interpreted as meaning that the sponsor’s child may enjoy the right to family reunification when he attains his majority during the judicial proceedings against the decision which refuses him that right and which was taken when he was still a minor?

| 2. | Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC be interpreted as precluding an action for annulment, brought against the refusal of a right to family reunification of a minor child, being held to be inadmissible on the ground that the child has attained his majority during the judicial proceedings, since he would be deprived of the possibility of securing a determination of his action against that decision and there would be a breach of his right to an effective remedy? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC be interpreted as precluding an action for annulment, brought against the refusal of a right to family reunification of a minor child, being held to be inadmissible on the ground that the child has attained his majority during the judicial proceedings, since he would be deprived of the possibility of securing a determination of his action against that decision and there would be a breach of his right to an effective remedy?

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(1)  OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/22 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/22

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 20 February 2019 — B.M.O. v État belge

(Case C-137/19)

(2019/C 164/25)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: B.M.O.

Defendant: État belge

Question referred

Must Article 4(1)(c) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, (1) read where appropriate with Article 16(1) of that directive, be interpreted as requiring that third country nationals, in order to be classified as ‘minor children’ within the meaning of that provision, must be ‘minors’ not only at the time of submitting the application for leave to reside but also at the time when the administration eventually determines that application?

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(1)  OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/23 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/23

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Appeal brought on 21 February 2019 by Deutsche Telekom AG against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission

(Case C-152/19 P)

(2019/C 164/26)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Deutsche Telekom AG (represented by: D. Schroeder and K. Apel, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Slovanet, a.s.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14 in so far as it dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-827/14 in so far as it dismisses the action;

| — | annul, in whole or in part, Commission Decision C(2014) 7465 final of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom) as corrected by Commission Decisions C(2014) 10119 final and C(2015) 2484 final of 16 December 2014 and 17 April 2015 in so far as it relates to the appellant or, in the alternative, annul or further reduce the fines imposed on the appellant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul, in whole or in part, Commission Decision C(2014) 7465 final of 15 October 2014 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 TFEU and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39523 — Slovak Telekom) as corrected by Commission Decisions C(2014) 10119 final and C(2015) 2484 final of 16 December 2014 and 17 April 2015 in so far as it relates to the appellant or, in the alternative, annul or further reduce the fines imposed on the appellant;

| — | in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration;

| — | order the Commission to pay all the costs arising from the present proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay all the costs arising from the present proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant relies on four grounds in support of its appeal.

First, the General Court incorrectly interpreted the legal principle according to which it is necessary, for a refusal of access, that the access sought is indispensable for activity on a downstream market and, consequently, failed to apply that principle and thereby incorrectly applied it.

Secondly, the General Court misinterpreted and misapplied the legal principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company only where the parent company has actually exercised a decisive influence.

Thirdly, the General Court failed to apply and thereby incorrectly applied the legal principle that the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company only where the subsidiary has carried out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by its parent company.

Fourthly, the General Court incorrectly applied the legal principle that the right to be heard must be respected in administrative proceedings.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/24 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/24

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Eparchiako Dikastirio Larnakas (Cyprus) lodged on 22 February 2019 — Cyprus Central Authority v GA

(Case C-154/19)

(2019/C 164/27)

Language of the case: Greek

Referring court

Eparchiako Dikastirio Larnakas (Cyprus)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Cyprus Central Authority

Defendant: GA

Questions referred

| 1. | Should the independence from the executive of a public prosecutor’s office which issues a European arrest warrant in accordance with the applicable national law be judged by its role in the relevant national legal system? If not, by what criteria should its independence from the executive be judged? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Should the independence from the executive of a public prosecutor’s office which issues a European arrest warrant in accordance with the applicable national law be judged by its role in the relevant national legal system? If not, by what criteria should its independence from the executive be judged?

| 2. | Is the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office, which forms part of the executive, rather than the judiciary, under national German law, is part of the structure of the Ministry for Justice and is required to prosecute criminal offenders where it considers appropriate, having appraised all the evidence, both incriminating and exculpatory, sufficiently independent an authority involved in the dispensation of criminal justice to qualify as a ‘judicial authority’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 (1) on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Is the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office, which forms part of the executive, rather than the judiciary, under national German law, is part of the structure of the Ministry for Justice and is required to prosecute criminal offenders where it considers appropriate, having appraised all the evidence, both incriminating and exculpatory, sufficiently independent an authority involved in the dispensation of criminal justice to qualify as a ‘judicial authority’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 (1) on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States?

| 3. | If the answer is in the affirmative, should the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office also be operationally independent from the executive in respect of all cases handled by it and by what criteria should that operational independence be judged? |
| --- | --- |

3.

If the answer is in the affirmative, should the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office also be operationally independent from the executive in respect of all cases handled by it and by what criteria should that operational independence be judged?

| 4. | Given that, under German law, a European arrest warrant issued by the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office is subject to incidental — rather than direct — judicial review, by challenging the alert entered in the Schengen Information System (SIS) once the European arrest warrant concerned has been issued, is a European arrest warrant issued by the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office a ‘judicial decision’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision that is compatible with the principle of mutual recognition enshrined in Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision? |
| --- | --- |

4.

Given that, under German law, a European arrest warrant issued by the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office is subject to incidental — rather than direct — judicial review, by challenging the alert entered in the Schengen Information System (SIS) once the European arrest warrant concerned has been issued, is a European arrest warrant issued by the Hamburg Public Prosecutor’s Office a ‘judicial decision’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision that is compatible with the principle of mutual recognition enshrined in Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision?

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(1)  2002/584/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States — Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework Decision (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/25 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/25

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Appeal brought on 22 February 2019 by Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-739/17 Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) and Others v European Commission

(Case C-172/19 P)

(2019/C 164/28)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Appellant: Association européenne du charbon et du lignite (Euracoal) (represented by: W. Spieth and N. Hellermann, Rechtsanwälte)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Deutscher Braunkohlen-Industrie-Verein e.V., Lausitz Energie Kraftwerke AG, Mitteldeutsche Braunkohlengesellschaft mbH, eins energie in sachsen GmbH & Co. KG

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| 1. | a) | set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 13 December 2018 in Case T-739/17; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 13 December 2018 in Case T-739/17;

| b) | declare the action admissible; and
  in the event that the Court of Justice concludes that it is appropriate for it to issue a decision, in accordance with the form of order retained in its entirety from the application of 7 November 2017,






  — | annul Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1442 of 31 July 2017 establishing the best available techniques (BAT) conclusions under Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on large combustion plants, (1) to the extent to which, by that decision, BAT associated emissions levels (BAT-AELs) were accepted and set for NOx emissions (Article 1, Section 2.1.3 of the Annex, Table 3) and mercury emissions (Article 1, Section 2.1.6 of the Annex, Table 7) which result from the combustion of coal and/or lignite; |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

declare the action admissible; and

in the event that the Court of Justice concludes that it is appropriate for it to issue a decision, in accordance with the form of order retained in its entirety from the application of 7 November 2017,

—

annul Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/1442 of 31 July 2017 establishing the best available techniques (BAT) conclusions under Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on large combustion plants, (1) to the extent to which, by that decision, BAT associated emissions levels (BAT-AELs) were accepted and set for NOx emissions (Article 1, Section 2.1.3 of the Annex, Table 3) and mercury emissions (Article 1, Section 2.1.6 of the Annex, Table 7) which result from the combustion of coal and/or lignite;

| — | in the alternative, annul Implementing Decision 2017/1442 in its entirety; and |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, annul Implementing Decision 2017/1442 in its entirety; and

| — | order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the European Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings;

| c) | if and to the extent that the Court of Justice finds that it is not appropriate for it to issue a decision in respect of the form of order referred to in 1.b) above, refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for a decision; |
| --- | --- |

c)

if and to the extent that the Court of Justice finds that it is not appropriate for it to issue a decision in respect of the form of order referred to in 1.b) above, refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union for a decision;

| 2. | order the European Commission to pay the costs of the appeal. |
| --- | --- |

2.

order the European Commission to pay the costs of the appeal.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

The appellant relies on the following two grounds of appeal.

First, the order of the General Court is based on a procedural error, which adversely affects interests of the appellant (the second situation of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union), and also infringes certain general principles of EU law. In its order, the General Court failed to consider the appellant’s submission, which was relevant to the decision, in which it stated that its capacity to sue is derived from an infringement of the appellant’s procedural standing, which it had in the context of the relevant exchange of information regarding the development of the BAT conclusions, which were challenged in the action in question. Not only was the appellant an actual party to the procedure, but it also had a specific and defendable legal position, which guaranteed it a particular procedural standing. These grounds alone give the appellant the capacity to sue. The order of the General Court contains no examination, assessment or other such reasoning concerning the appellant’s submission in that regard. This constitutes an infringement of the obligation to state reasons under the first sentence of Article 36 in combination with the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 81 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. This substantiates the existence of a procedural error and, equally, an infringement of the general EU law principles of the right to effective legal protection and the right to a fair hearing.

Second, the order of the General Court also infringes EU law in the sense referred to in the third situation of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute. By its order, the General Court wrongly dismisses the appellant’s action as inadmissible. The General Court misapplied EU law when it failed to find that the appellant’s personal status satisfied the conditions for the admissibility of an action in the form of a qualified interest as referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Its qualified interest and the resulting legal standing flow from the disregard for its procedural standing, which it had in the context of the procedure for the development of the BAT conclusions, which formed the subject of the action. Not only was the appellant an actual party to that procedure, but it also had a specific and defendable legal position, which gave it a particular procedural standing. This therefore conferred on it a right of action, as it concerned the enforcement of its procedural rights. These procedural guarantees protecting the appellant were disregarded by the Commission when it developed the BAT conclusions, in particular in so far as it limited the appellant’s right to be heard and its right to be a party to a procedure and failed to comply with its obligation to evaluate. Consequently, the dismissal of the action as inadmissible is based on a misapplication of EU law.

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(1)  OJ 2017 L 212, p. 1.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/27 |
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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/27

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam (Netherlands) lodged on 27 February 2019 — Rensen Shipbuilding BV, other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

(Case C-192/19)

(2019/C 164/29)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Gerechtshof te Amsterdam

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Rensen Shipbuilding BV

Other party: Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Douane

Question referred

Additional note 1 to Chapter 89 of the Combined Nomenclature provides that (inter alia) the CN subheadings 89012010 and 89019010, entitled ‘Seagoing’, are to be taken to apply only to vessels that are designed as seagoing. What should be understood by the term ‘seagoing’ in this context?

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/27 |
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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/27

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (Belgium) lodged on 28 February 2019 — H. A. v État belge

(Case C-194/19)

(2019/C 164/30)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: H. A.

Defendant: État belge

Question referred

Must Article 27 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (1) (recast), considered alone or in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as requiring a national court, in order to guarantee the right to an effective remedy, to take into consideration, where appropriate, circumstances arising subsequent to a ‘Dublin transfer’ decision?

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(1)  OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/28 |
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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/28

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Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Mylan Laboratories Ltd, Mylan, Inc. against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-682/14: Mylan Laboratories and Mylan v Commission

(Case C-197/19 P)

(2019/C 164/31)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Mylan Laboratories Ltd, Mylan, Inc. (represented by: C. Firth, S. Kon, C. Humpe, Solicitors, V. Adamis, advocate)

Other party: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-682/14 Mylan Laboratories Ltd and Mylan Inc. v European Commission insofar as it dismisses their application to annul the Decision of the Commission of 9 July 2014 (1) in Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier) insofar as it concerns the applicants; or |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court in Case T-682/14 Mylan Laboratories Ltd and Mylan Inc. v European Commission insofar as it dismisses their application to annul the Decision of the Commission of 9 July 2014 (1) in Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier) insofar as it concerns the applicants; or

| — | annul or substantially reduce the fine; and/or |
| --- | --- |

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annul or substantially reduce the fine; and/or

| — | refer the case back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice; and |
| --- | --- |

—

refer the case back to the General Court for determination in accordance with the judgment of the Court of Justice; and

| — | order the Commission to pay the appellants’ legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter and any other measures that the Court of Justice considers appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the appellants’ legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter and any other measures that the Court of Justice considers appropriate.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the appellants rely on five grounds of appeal supported by the following pleas.

| 1. | First Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that Matrix and Les Laboratoires Servier were potential competitors at the time of the settlement.
  First plea: The General Court was wrong to conclude that the Commission was entitled to consider that Matrix and Niche could be classified as potential competitors on the basis of the Niche/Matrix Agreement.
  Second plea: The General Court misapplied the legal test for potential competition in reaching the conclusion that Matrix and Servier were potential competitors at the time of entering into the Settlement. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that Matrix and Les Laboratoires Servier were potential competitors at the time of the settlement.

First plea: The General Court was wrong to conclude that the Commission was entitled to consider that Matrix and Niche could be classified as potential competitors on the basis of the Niche/Matrix Agreement.

Second plea: The General Court misapplied the legal test for potential competition in reaching the conclusion that Matrix and Servier were potential competitors at the time of entering into the Settlement.

| 2. | Second Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that the settlement had the object of restricting competition.
  First plea: The General Court has erred in finding that a patent settlement can have the object of restricting competition even though the terms of that settlement are within the scope of the patent.
  Second plea: The General Court has erred in deriving the existence of a restriction of competition by object from the alleged inducement represented by the payment made by Servier to Matrix.
  Third plea: The General Court erred in the manner in which it inferred the existence of an inducement from the payment received by Matrix. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that the settlement had the object of restricting competition.

First plea: The General Court has erred in finding that a patent settlement can have the object of restricting competition even though the terms of that settlement are within the scope of the patent.

Second plea: The General Court has erred in deriving the existence of a restriction of competition by object from the alleged inducement represented by the payment made by Servier to Matrix.

Third plea: The General Court erred in the manner in which it inferred the existence of an inducement from the payment received by Matrix.

| 3. | Third Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in declining to rule on the Commission’s classification of the settlement as a restriction of competition by effect. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in declining to rule on the Commission’s classification of the settlement as a restriction of competition by effect.

| 4. | Fourth Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that Mylan Inc. exercised decisive influence over the conduct of Matrix during the relevant period. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth Ground of Appeal: The General Court erred in law in finding that Mylan Inc. exercised decisive influence over the conduct of Matrix during the relevant period.

| 5. | Fifth Ground of Appeal: The General Court has infringed Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 (2) and the principles of nullum crimen nula poena sine lege, and legal certainty in finding that a fine could be imposed on the appellants. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth Ground of Appeal: The General Court has infringed Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003 (2) and the principles of nullum crimen nula poena sine lege, and legal certainty in finding that a fine could be imposed on the appellants.

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(1)  Summary of Commission Decision of 9 July 2014 relating to a proceeding under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier)) (notified under document C(2014) 4955), OJ 2016, C 393, p. 7

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003, L 1, p. 1

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/29 |
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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/29

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Appeal brought on 28 February 2019 by Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber) delivered on 12 December 2018 in Case T-679/14: Teva UK Ltd and Others v Commission

(Case C-198/19 P)

(2019/C 164/32)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Teva UK Ltd, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe BV, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd (represented by: D. Tayar, avocat, A. Richard, avocate)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Generic medicines Association AISBL (EGA), European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

| — | accept the appeal and declare the action admissible; |
| --- | --- |

—

accept the appeal and declare the action admissible;

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 12 December 2018 in case T-679/14; |
| --- | --- |

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set aside the judgment of the General Court of 12 December 2018 in case T-679/14;

| — | refer the case back to the General Court for a new decision to be taken, unless the Court considers that it is sufficiently well informed to annul Commission Decision COMP/AT.39612 (1)‘Perindopril (Servier)’ of 9 July 2014insofar as it finds that Teva UK limited, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe B.V. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited infringed Article 101 of the TFEU and cancel the fine imposed Teva UK limited, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe B.V. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, and |
| --- | --- |

—

refer the case back to the General Court for a new decision to be taken, unless the Court considers that it is sufficiently well informed to annul Commission Decision COMP/AT.39612 (1)‘Perindopril (Servier)’ of 9 July 2014insofar as it finds that Teva UK limited, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe B.V. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited infringed Article 101 of the TFEU and cancel the fine imposed Teva UK limited, Teva Pharmaceuticals Europe B.V. and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited, and

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings, including the costs incurred by the appellants before this Court and before the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

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order the Commission to pay the costs of these proceedings, including the costs incurred by the appellants before this Court and before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants put forward three pleas in law to support their request:

| 1. | The General Court erred in law in the standard applied to assess whether Teva was a potential competitor to Servier. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The General Court erred in law in the standard applied to assess whether Teva was a potential competitor to Servier.

| 2. | The General Court erred in law in finding that the agreement was restrictive of competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The General Court erred in law in finding that the agreement was restrictive of competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU.

| 3. | The General Court erred in law in its application of Article 101(3) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The General Court erred in law in its application of Article 101(3) TFEU.

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(1)  Summary of Commission Decision of 9 July 2014 relating to a proceeding under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Case AT.39612 — Perindopril (Servier)) (notified under document C(2014) 4955) (JO 2016 C 393, p. 7).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/30 |
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C 164/30

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi (Poland) lodged on 27 February 2019 — RL sp. z o.o., having its seat in Ł. v J.M.

(Case C-199/19)

(2019/C 164/33)

Language of the case: Polish

Referring court

Sąd Rejonowy dla Łodzi-Śródmieścia w Łodzi

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: RL sp. z o.o., having its seat in Ł.

Defendant: J.M.

Questions referred

| 1. | Should Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, (1) as transposed into the Polish legal order by Article 4(1) of the Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 2013 r. o terminach zapłaty w transakcjach handlowych (Law of 8 March 2013 on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions) (consolidated text: Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 2019, item 118), be interpreted as meaning that contracts the characteristic performance of which consists in providing a temporary right to use goods in exchange for rent (for instance, lease or rental agreements) must also be regarded as transactions which lead to the delivery of goods or the provision of services for remuneration (commercial transactions)? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Should Article 2(1) of Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions, (1) as transposed into the Polish legal order by Article 4(1) of the Ustawa z dnia 8 marca 2013 r. o terminach zapłaty w transakcjach handlowych (Law of 8 March 2013 on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions) (consolidated text: Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 2019, item 118), be interpreted as meaning that contracts the characteristic performance of which consists in providing a temporary right to use goods in exchange for rent (for instance, lease or rental agreements) must also be regarded as transactions which lead to the delivery of goods or the provision of services for remuneration (commercial transactions)?

| 2. | If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, should Article 5 of Directive 2011/7/EU, as transposed into the Polish legal order by Article 11(1) of the Law of 8 March 2013 on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions, be interpreted as meaning that an agreement that the debtor is to make periodic payments, also in the case where the contract is concluded for an indefinite term, is tantamount to the parties to a commercial transaction agreeing on a payment schedule providing for instalments? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, should Article 5 of Directive 2011/7/EU, as transposed into the Polish legal order by Article 11(1) of the Law of 8 March 2013 on Payment Terms in Commercial Transactions, be interpreted as meaning that an agreement that the debtor is to make periodic payments, also in the case where the contract is concluded for an indefinite term, is tantamount to the parties to a commercial transaction agreeing on a payment schedule providing for instalments?

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(1)  OJ 2011 L 48, p. 1.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/31 |
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C 164/31

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Trgovački sud u Zagreb (Croatia) made on 1 March 2019 — INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE d.d. and Others v LUBJANSKA BANKA d.d.

(Case C-200/19)

(2019/C 164/34)

Language of the case: Croatian

Referring court

Trgovački sud u Zagreb

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: INA-INDUSTRIJA NAFTE d.d., CROATIA osiguranje d.d., REPUBLIKA HRVATSKA, Croatia Airlines d.d., GRAD ZAGREB, HRVATSKA ELEKTROPRIVREDA d.d., HRVATSKE ŠUME d.o.o., KAPITAL d.o.o. u stečaju, PETROKEMIJA d.d., Đuro Đaković Holding d.d., ENERGOINVEST d.d., TELENERG d.o.o., ENERGOCONTROL d.o.o., UDRUGA POSLODAVACA U ZDRAVSTVU, HRVATSKI ZAVOD ZA MIROVINSKO OSIGURANJE, ZAGREBPČANKA-POSLOVNI OBJEKTI d.d., BRODOGRADILIŠTE VIKTOR LENAC d.d., INOVINE d.d., MARAT INŽENJERING d.o.o., GOYA — COMPANY d.o.o., METROPOLIS PLAN d.o.o., Dalekovod d.d., INFRATERRA d.o.o., Citat d.o.o., STAROSTA d.o.o., METALKA METALCOM d.o.o., I.Š, B.C., Z.N., D.G., M.R., A.T.

Defendant: LUBJANSKA BANKA d.d.

Questions referred

| 1. | Bearing in mind that the defendant neither participated in the conclusion of the agreements with the other co-owners nor consented to that which was agreed, must Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that the defendant’s obligation — which is established by law but which, as regards the amount, final date for payment and other details, is determined by common agreement by the owners who represent more than half of the shares in the joint ownership of the building — must be regarded as a contractual obligation? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bearing in mind that the defendant neither participated in the conclusion of the agreements with the other co-owners nor consented to that which was agreed, must Article 7(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that the defendant’s obligation — which is established by law but which, as regards the amount, final date for payment and other details, is determined by common agreement by the owners who represent more than half of the shares in the joint ownership of the building — must be regarded as a contractual obligation?

| 2. | Must Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that the failure to perform an obligation established by law with regard to the other co-owners of the building, who may seek performance of that obligation by judicial means, should be regarded as a tort, delict or quasi-delict, particularly having regard to the fact that the defendant’s failure to perform a legal obligation can give rise to additional harm (aside from the financial loss from the reserve fund) both for the other co-owners and for third parties? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that the failure to perform an obligation established by law with regard to the other co-owners of the building, who may seek performance of that obligation by judicial means, should be regarded as a tort, delict or quasi-delict, particularly having regard to the fact that the defendant’s failure to perform a legal obligation can give rise to additional harm (aside from the financial loss from the reserve fund) both for the other co-owners and for third parties?

| 3. | Taking into consideration that, in the present case, the obligation in question arises from the fact that the defendant is the owner of commercial premises in which it carries out activities, namely, premises in which a branch is situated, must Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that this is a dispute relating to the operation of branches, agencies or any other establishment? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Taking into consideration that, in the present case, the obligation in question arises from the fact that the defendant is the owner of commercial premises in which it carries out activities, namely, premises in which a branch is situated, must Article 7(5) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 be interpreted as meaning that this is a dispute relating to the operation of branches, agencies or any other establishment?

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/32 |
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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/32

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Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-111/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

(Case C-202/19 P)

(2019/C 164/35)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, Δικηγόρος, G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, B. Byrne, Solicitor)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-111/15; and |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-111/15; and

| — | annul Articles 1(2), 2(4), 3, 4 and 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1226 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Articles 1(2), 2(4), 3, 4 and 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1226 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event

| — | order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-111/15 before the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-111/15 before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants submit that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following g rounds.

First, the General Court misapplied Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights of defence of the appellants in the proceedings before the Commission. The General Court: erred in drawing a distinction between the specific rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter and the general right to good administration provided in Article 41(1) of the Charter; erred in finding that the rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter do not apply in State aid investigations; erred in finding that there is a conflict between Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; and erred in finding that the appellants could merely be considered as a source of information in the investigation.

Second, the General Court violated Article 107(1) TFEU by misinterpreting the notion of advantage. The General Court: erred in concluding that there is no hierarchy of methodologies for applying the market economy operator (‘MEO’) test between the comparative analysis and other methods; erred in finding that the Commission was entitled to depart from the comparative analysis and reject the comparative evidence submitted by the appellants; and erred in concluding that, when applying the incremental profitability test, it is not necessary for the Commission to satisfy itself that the expected incremental costs and expected incremental non-aeronautical revenues reflect how an MEO would have operated the airport.

Third, the General Court erred in its assessment of imputability to the State by: affirming that there was no need to specify whether the joint operator of the airport ‘SMAC’ was a public undertaking; not applying the Stardust Marine indicators to distinguish between autonomy and imputation; and failing to provide a sufficient statement of reasons for doing so.

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(1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1226 of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33963 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by France in favour of Angoulême Chamber of Commerce and Industry, SNC-Lavalin, Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services (notified under document C(2014) 5080) (JO 2015, L 201, p. 48).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/33 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/33

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Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/15: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

(Case C-203/19 P)

(2019/C 164/36)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, Δικηγόρος, G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, B. Byrne, Solicitor)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/15; and |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/15; and

| — | annul Article 1(1), 1(2) and (insofar as these concern Articles 1(1) and 1(2)) Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1227 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.22614 (C 53/07), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Article 1(1), 1(2) and (insofar as these concern Articles 1(1) and 1(2)) Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1227 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.22614 (C 53/07), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event

| — | order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-165/15 before the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-165/15 before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants submit that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following grounds.

First, the General Court misapplied Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights of defence of the appellants in the proceedings before the Commission. The General Court: erred in drawing a distinction between the specific rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter and the general right to good administration provided in Article 41(1) of the Charter; erred in finding that the rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter do not apply in State aid investigations; erred in finding that there is a conflict between Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; and erred in finding that the appellants could merely be considered as a source of information in the investigation.

Second, the General Court violated Article 107(1) TFEU by misinterpreting the notion of advantage. The General Court: erred in concluding that there is no hierarchy of methodologies for applying the market economy operator (‘MEO’) test between the comparative analysis and other methods; erred in finding that the Commission was entitled to depart from the comparative analysis and reject the comparative evidence submitted by the appellants; and erred in concluding that, when applying the incremental profitability test, it is not necessary for the Commission to satisfy itself that the expected incremental costs and expected incremental non-aeronautical revenues reflect how an MEO would have operated the airport.

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(1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1227 of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.22614 (C 53/07) implemented by France in favour of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Pau-Béarn, Ryanair, Airport Marketing Services and Transavia (notified under document C(2014) 5085) (JO 2015, L 201, p. 109).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/34 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/34

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Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd,Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-53/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

(Case C-204/19 P)

(2019/C 164/37)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, Δικηγόρος, G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, B. Byrne, Solicitor)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-53/16; and |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-53/16; and

| — | annul Articles 1, 4, 5 and 6 of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/633 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33961 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Articles 1, 4, 5 and 6 of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/633 (1) of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33961 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event

| — | order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-53/16 before the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-53/16 before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants submit that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following grounds.

First, the General Court misapplied Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights of defence of the appellants in the proceedings before the Commission. The General Court: erred in drawing a distinction between the specific rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter and the general right to good administration provided in Article 41(1) of the Charter; erred in finding that the rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter do not apply in State aid investigations; erred in finding that there is a conflict between Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; and erred in finding that the appellants could merely be considered as a source of information in the investigation.

Second, the General Court violated Article 107(1) TFEU by misinterpreting the notion of

advantage. The General Court: erred in concluding that there is no hierarchy of methodologies for applying the market economy operator (‘MEO’) test between the comparative analysis and other methods; erred in finding that the Commission was entitled to depart from the comparative analysis and reject the comparative evidence submitted by the Appellants; erred in concluding that, when applying the incremental profitability test, it is not necessary for the Commission to satisfy itself that the expected incremental costs and expected incremental nonaeronautical revenues reflect how an MEO would have operated the airport; and erred by finding that decreased profitability, rather than lack of profitability, is sufficient for a finding of aid.

Third, the General Court erred in its assessment of imputability to the State by: considering that the operator of the airport — ‘SMAN’ — was an ‘organ of the State’; not applying the Stardust Marine indicators; and failing to provide a sufficient statement of reasons for doing so. The General Court also erred by wrongly affirming that the decisions of the private company VTAN were imputable to the State.

---

(1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2016/633 of 23 July 2014 on State aid SA.33961 (2012/C) (ex 2012/NN) implemented by France in favour of Nîmes-Uzès-Le Vigan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Veolia Transport Aéroport de Nîmes, Ryanair Limited and Airport Marketing Services Limited (notified under document C(2014) 5078) (JO 2016, L 113, p. 32).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/36 |
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Appeal brought on 1 March 2019 by Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/16: Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services v Commission

(Case C-205/19 P)

(2019/C 164/38)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Appellants: Ryanair DAC, formerly Ryanair Ltd, Airport Marketing Services Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, I.-G. Metaxas-Maranghidis, Δικηγόρος, G. Berrisch, Rechtsanwalt, B. Byrne, Solicitor)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

| — | set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/16; and |
| --- | --- |

—

set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 December 2018 in Case T-165/16; and

| — | annul Article 1(4), and 2 to 4 of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/287 (1) of 15 October 2014 on State aid SA.26500 — 2012/C (ex 2011/NN, ex CP 227/2008), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Article 1(4), and 2 to 4 of Commission Decision (EU) 2016/287 (1) of 15 October 2014 on State aid SA.26500 — 2012/C (ex 2011/NN, ex CP 227/2008), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event

| — | order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-165/16 before the General Court. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in Case T-165/16 before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellants submit that the judgment under appeal should be set aside on the following grounds.

First, the General Court misapplied Article 41 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights of defence of the appellants in the proceedings before the Commission. The General Court: erred in drawing a distinction between the specific rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter and the general right to good administration provided in Article 41(1) of the Charter; erred in finding that the rights in Article 41(2) of the Charter do not apply in State aid investigations; erred in finding that there is a conflict between Article 41(1) and (2) of the Charter and Articles 107 and 108 TFEU; and erred in finding that the appellants could merely be considered as a source of information in the investigation.

Second, the General Court violated Article 107(1) TFEU by misinterpreting the notion of advantage. The General Court: erred in concluding that there is no hierarchy of methodologies for applying the market economy operator (‘MEO’) test between the comparative analysis and other methods; erred in finding that the Commission was entitled to depart from the comparative analysis and reject the comparative evidence submitted by the appellants; and erred in concluding that, when applying the incremental profitability test, it is not necessary for the Commission to satisfy itself that the expected incremental costs and expected incremental non-aeronautical revenues reflect how an MEO would have operated the airport.

---

(1)  Commission Decision (EU) 2016/287 of 15 October 2014 on State aid SA.26500 — 2012/C (ex 2011/NN, ex CP 227/2008) implemented by Germany for Flugplatz Altenburg-Nobitz GmbH and Ryanair Ltd (notified under document C(2014) 7369) (JO 2016, L 59, p. 22).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/37 |
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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Conseil d’État (France) lodged on 6 March 2019 — Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation v Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo

(Case C-212/19)

(2019/C 164/39)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Conseil d’État

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Ministre de l’Agriculture et de l’Alimentation

Respondent: Compagnie des pêches de Saint-Malo

Questions referred

| 1. | Must the Commission’s decision of 14 July 2004 (1) be interpreted as declaring that only the reductions in employers’ contributions are incompatible with the common market, on the ground that the reduction in employees’ contributions do not benefit the undertakings and therefore cannot fall within the scope of Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or as also declaring the reductions in employees’ contributions to be incompatible? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must the Commission’s decision of 14 July 2004 (1) be interpreted as declaring that only the reductions in employers’ contributions are incompatible with the common market, on the ground that the reduction in employees’ contributions do not benefit the undertakings and therefore cannot fall within the scope of Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or as also declaring the reductions in employees’ contributions to be incompatible?

| 2. | In the event that the Court finds that the Commission’s decision is to be interpreted as also declaring the reductions in employees’ contributions to be incompatible, must the undertaking be regarded as having received the full amount of those reductions or only a part thereof? In the latter case, how is that part to be assessed? Is the Member State required to order recovery from the employees concerned of the part of the aid from which they benefited? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In the event that the Court finds that the Commission’s decision is to be interpreted as also declaring the reductions in employees’ contributions to be incompatible, must the undertaking be regarded as having received the full amount of those reductions or only a part thereof? In the latter case, how is that part to be assessed? Is the Member State required to order recovery from the employees concerned of the part of the aid from which they benefited?

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(1)  Commission Decision of 14 July 2004 concerning certain aid measures applied by France to assist fish farmers and fishermen (2005/239/EC) (OJ 2005 L 74, p. 49).

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Action brought on 7 March 2019 — European Commission v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

(Case C-213/19)

(2019/C 164/40)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn, F. Clotuche-Duvieusart, Agents)

Defendant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that:






  1. | by failing to enter into the accounts the correct amounts of customs duties and to make available the correct amount of traditional own resources and VAT-based own resources in respect of certain imports of textiles and footwear from the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 8 of Council Decision 2014/335 (1), Articles 2 and 8 of Council Decision 2007/436 (2), Articles 2, 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13 of Council Regulation 609/2014 (3), Articles 2, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 17 of Council Regulation 1150/2000 (4), Article 2 of Council Regulation 1553/89 (5), as well as Article 105(3) of Council Regulation 952/2013 (6), and Article 220(1) of Council Regulation 2913/92 (7);
  as a consequence of its failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 325 and 310(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 3 and 46 of Regulation 952/2013, Article 13 of Council Regulation 2913/92, Article 248(1) of Commission Regulation 2454/93 (8), Article 244 of Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/2447 (9), and Articles 2(1)(b) and (d), 83, 85-87 and 143(1)(d) and (2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (10);
  The corresponding traditional own resources losses to be made available to the Union budget (minus collection costs) amount to:






  — | EUR 496,025,324.30 in 2017 (until 11 October 2017 included); |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

—

declare that:

1.

by failing to enter into the accounts the correct amounts of customs duties and to make available the correct amount of traditional own resources and VAT-based own resources in respect of certain imports of textiles and footwear from the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 8 of Council Decision 2014/335 (1), Articles 2 and 8 of Council Decision 2007/436 (2), Articles 2, 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13 of Council Regulation 609/2014 (3), Articles 2, 6, 9, 10, 11 and 17 of Council Regulation 1150/2000 (4), Article 2 of Council Regulation 1553/89 (5), as well as Article 105(3) of Council Regulation 952/2013 (6), and Article 220(1) of Council Regulation 2913/92 (7);

as a consequence of its failure to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, Articles 325 and 310(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Articles 3 and 46 of Regulation 952/2013, Article 13 of Council Regulation 2913/92, Article 248(1) of Commission Regulation 2454/93 (8), Article 244 of Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/2447 (9), and Articles 2(1)(b) and (d), 83, 85-87 and 143(1)(d) and (2) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC (10);

The corresponding traditional own resources losses to be made available to the Union budget (minus collection costs) amount to:

—

EUR 496,025,324.30 in 2017 (until 11 October 2017 included);

| — | EUR 646,809,443.80 in 2016; |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 646,809,443.80 in 2016;

| — | EUR 535,290,329.16 in 2015; |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 535,290,329.16 in 2015;

| — | EUR 480,098,912.45 in 2014; |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 480,098,912.45 in 2014;

| — | EUR 325,230,822.55 in 2013; |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 325,230,822.55 in 2013;

| — | EUR 173,404,943.81 in 2012; |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 173,404,943.81 in 2012;

| — | EUR 22,777,312.79 in 2011. |
| --- | --- |

—

EUR 22,777,312.79 in 2011.

| 2. | by failing to provide full information required by the Commission services necessary for establishing the amount of TOR losses, and by not providing as requested the content of the legal assessment of HMRC's legal department or the motivation of the decision that led to the cancellation of the established customs debts, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and Articles 2(2) and (3)(d) of Council Regulation 608/2014 (11); and |
| --- | --- |

2.

by failing to provide full information required by the Commission services necessary for establishing the amount of TOR losses, and by not providing as requested the content of the legal assessment of HMRC's legal department or the motivation of the decision that led to the cancellation of the established customs debts, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and Articles 2(2) and (3)(d) of Council Regulation 608/2014 (11); and

| — | order the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Despite repeated warnings about the risk of fraud by OLAF and the Commission, the United Kingdom failed to put in place risk-based approaches in customs control to prevent the release into free circulation of undervalued goods into the Union (specifically, footwear and textiles exported from the People’s Republic of China) until 12 October 2017. As a result of that inaction in the face of repeated warnings, the United Kingdom failed to take the risk-based measures required under the Union’s customs and own resources legislation. That failure to take appropriate action also affected the correct application of the Union’s VAT rules. There have been exceptionally high losses to the Union budget caused by the United Kingdom’s breach of Union law and the resulting levels of imports of undervalued goods to that Member State. Because the United Kingdom did not follow the Commission's recommendations, in contrast to other Member States, the United Kingdom attracted more undervalued trade. Those exceptionally high losses also affected drastically fair burden-sharing among Member States, as they had to be compensated by correspondingly higher GNI contributions by the other Member States to the Union.

---

(1)  2014/335/EU, Euratom: Council Decision of 26 May 2014 on the system of own resources of the European Union (JO 2014, L 168, p. 105).

(2)  2007/436/EC,Euratom: Council Decision of 7 June 2007 on the system of the European Communities’ own resources (JO 2007, L 163, p. 17).

(3)  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 609/2014 of 26 May 2014 on the methods and procedure for making available the traditional, VAT and GNI-based own resources and on the measures to meet cash requirements (Recast) (JO 2014, L 168, p. 39).

(4)  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000 of 22 May 2000 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom on the system of the Communities' own resources (JO 2000, L 130, p. 1).

(5)  Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89 of 29 May 1989 on the definitive uniform arrangements for the collection of own resources accruing from value added tax (JO 1989, L 155, p. 9).

(6)  Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (JO 2013, L 269, p. 1).

(7)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (JO 1992, L 302, p. 1).

(8)  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code (JO 1993, L 253, p. 1).

(9)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (JO 2015, L 343, p. 558).

(10)  Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (JO 2006, L 347, p. 1).

(11)  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 608/2014 of 26 May 2014 laying down implementing measures for the system of own resources of the European Union (JO 2014, L 168, p. 29).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/39 |
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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Korkein hallinto-oikeus (Finland) lodged on 8 March 2019 — Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

(Case C-215/19)

(2019/C 164/41)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellant: Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö

Other party: A Oy

Questions referred

| 1. | Are Articles 13b and 31a of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 (1) of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112/EC (2) on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1042/2013 (3) of 7 October 2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards the place of supply of services, to be interpreted as meaning that computing centre services of the type at issue in the main proceedings, with which a trader provides its customers with equipment cabinets in a computing centre for holding customers’ servers together with ancillary services, are to be regarded as the leasing or letting of immovable property? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Are Articles 13b and 31a of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 (1) of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2006/112/EC (2) on the common system of value added tax, as amended by Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1042/2013 (3) of 7 October 2013 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards the place of supply of services, to be interpreted as meaning that computing centre services of the type at issue in the main proceedings, with which a trader provides its customers with equipment cabinets in a computing centre for holding customers’ servers together with ancillary services, are to be regarded as the leasing or letting of immovable property?

| 2. | If the first question is answered in the negative, are Article 47 of VAT Directive 2006/112/EC and Article 31a of the aforementioned Implementing Regulation nevertheless to be interpreted as meaning that a computing centre service of the type at issue in the main proceedings is to be regarded as a service connected with immovable property, the place of supply of which is the location of the property? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the first question is answered in the negative, are Article 47 of VAT Directive 2006/112/EC and Article 31a of the aforementioned Implementing Regulation nevertheless to be interpreted as meaning that a computing centre service of the type at issue in the main proceedings is to be regarded as a service connected with immovable property, the place of supply of which is the location of the property?

---

(1)  OJ 2011 L 77, p. 1.

(2)  OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1.

(3)  OJ 2013 L 284, p. 1.

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Liège (Belgium) lodged on 18 March 2019 — B v Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS)

(Case C-233/19)

(2019/C 164/42)

Language of the case: French

Referring court

Cour du travail de Liège

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: B.

Defendant: Centre public d’action sociale de Liège (CPAS)

Question referred

Must Articles 5 and 13 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, (1) read in the light of Articles 19(2) and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Article 14(1)(b) of that directive, read in the light of the judgment in Case C-562/13, delivered on 18 December 2014 by the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber), be interpreted as endowing with suspensive effect an appeal brought against a decision ordering a third-country national suffering from a serious illness to leave the territory of a Member State, in the case where the appellant claims that the enforcement of that decision is liable to expose him to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his state of health:

| — | without it being necessary to examine the appeal, its mere introduction being sufficient to suspend the enforcement of the decision ordering the third-country national to leave the territory of that Member State; or |
| --- | --- |

—

without it being necessary to examine the appeal, its mere introduction being sufficient to suspend the enforcement of the decision ordering the third-country national to leave the territory of that Member State; or

| — | following a marginal review as to whether there is an arguable complaint, lack of grounds for inadmissibility or whether the action brought before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium) is manifestly unfounded; or |
| --- | --- |

—

following a marginal review as to whether there is an arguable complaint, lack of grounds for inadmissibility or whether the action brought before the Conseil du contentieux des étrangers (Council for asylum and immigration proceedings, Belgium) is manifestly unfounded; or

| — | following a full and comprehensive judicial review carried out by the labour courts in order to determine whether the enforcement of that decision is indeed liable to expose the appellant to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his state of health? |
| --- | --- |

—

following a full and comprehensive judicial review carried out by the labour courts in order to determine whether the enforcement of that decision is indeed liable to expose the appellant to a serious risk of grave and irreversible deterioration in his state of health?

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(1)  OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98.

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GCEU

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Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Pometon v Commission

(Case T-433/16) (1)

(Competition - Agreements and concerted practices - European steel abrasives market - Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement - Price coordination throughout the EEA - Chronologically staggered ‘hybrid’ procedure - Presumption of innocence - Principle of impartiality - Charter of Fundamental Rights - Evidence of the infringement - Single and continuous infringement - Restriction of competition ‘by object’ - Duration of the infringement - Fine - Exceptional adjustment of the basic amount - Obligation to state reasons - Proportionality - Equal treatment - Unlimited jurisdiction)

(2019/C 164/43)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Pometon SpA (Maerne di Martellago, Italy) (represented by: E. Fabrizi, V. Veneziano and A. Molinaro, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: P. Rossi and B. Mongin, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application based on Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision C(2016) 3121 final of 25 May 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls Article 2 of Commission Decision C(2016) 3121 final of 25 May 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives); |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls Article 2 of Commission Decision C(2016) 3121 final of 25 May 2016 relating to a proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39792 — Steel Abrasives);

| 2. | Sets the amount of the fine imposed on Pometon SpA at EUR 3 873 375; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Sets the amount of the fine imposed on Pometon SpA at EUR 3 873 375;

| 3. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 4. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 371, 10.10.2016.

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Judgment of the General Court of 20 March 2019 — Hércules Club de Fútbol v Commission

(Case T-766/16) (1)

(State aid - Aid granted by Spain to certain professional football clubs - Guarantee - Decision declaring the aid incompatible with the internal market - Advantage - Obligation to state reasons)

(2019/C 164/44)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Applicant: Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD (Alicante, Spain) (represented by: S. Rating and Y. Martínez Mata, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: G. Luengo, B. Stromsky and P. Němečková, Agents)

Intervener in support of the applicant: Kingdom of Spain (represented by: initially A. Gavela Llopis and M.J. García-Valdecasas Dorrego, subsequently by M.J. García-Valdecasas Dorrego, Agents)

Re:

Action under Article 263 TFEU seeking annulment of Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) implemented by Spain for Valencia Club de Fútbol, SAD, Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD and Elche Club de Fútbol, SAD (OJ 2017 L 55, p. 12).

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) implemented by Spain for Valencia Club de Fútbol, SAD, Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD and Elche Club de Fútbol, SAD, in so far as it concerns Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) implemented by Spain for Valencia Club de Fútbol, SAD, Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD and Elche Club de Fútbol, SAD, in so far as it concerns Hércules Club de Fútbol, SAD;

| 2. | Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Hércules Club de Fútbol; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders the European Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Hércules Club de Fútbol;

| 3. | Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Kingdom of Spain to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 6, 9.1.2017.

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Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Boshab and Others v Council

(Case T-582/17) (1)

(Common Foreign and Security Policy - Restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities in view of the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - List of persons and entities subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and to the prohibition of entry and transit - Inclusion of the names of the applicants on the list - Rights of defence - Right to be heard - Obligation to state reasons - Manifest error of assessment - Right to effective judicial protection)

(2019/C 164/45)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicants: Évariste Boshab (Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the seven other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to the judgment (represented: initially by P. Chansay Wilmotte, A. Kalambay Ndaya and P. Okito Omole, and subsequently by T. Bontinck, M. Forgeois, P. De Wolf and A. Guillerme, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented: initially by M. Veiga and B. Driessen, and subsequently by B. Driessen and J.-P. Hix, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application on the basis of Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/904 of 29 May 2017 implementing Article 9(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1183/2005 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against persons acting in violation of the arms embargo with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2017 L 138 I, p. 1), and of Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2017/905 of 29 May 2017 implementing Decision 2010/788/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (OJ 2017 L 138 I, p. 6), in so far as those acts concern the applicants.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr Évariste Boshab and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Évariste Boshab and the other applicants whose names are listed in the annex to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 374, 6.11.2017.

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Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Clestra Hauserman v Parliament

(Case T-725/17) (1)

(Public works contracts - Tendering procedure - Works relating to the ‘Removable partitioning - doors’ of the project to extend and modernise the Parliament’s Konrad Adenauer Building in Luxembourg - Rejection of a tenderer’s bid - Award of the contract to another tenderer - Obligation to state reasons - Abnormally low tender - Manifest error of assessment - Non-contractual liability)

(2019/C 164/46)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Clestra Hauserman (Illkirch-Graffenstaden, France) (represented by: J. Gehin, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament (represented by: V. Naglič and B. Schäfer, acting as Agents)

Re:

First, claim under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of the Parliament’s decision of 24 August 2017 adopted in the context of tendering procedure INLO-D-UPIL-T-16-AO8 concerning Lot 55, entitled ‘Removable partitioning — doors’, of the project to extend and modernise the Parliament’s Konrad Adenauer Building in Luxembourg, rejecting the applicant’s bid and awarding the contract to another tenderer and, second, claim under Article 268 TFEU for compensation in respect of the loss allegedly suffered by the applicant.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Clestra Hauserman to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Clestra Hauserman to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament.

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(1)  OJ C 13, 15.1.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/45

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Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 — Parfümerie Akzente v EUIPO (GlamHair)

(Case T-787/17) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for EU word mark GlamHair - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))

(2019/C 164/47)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Parfümerie Akzente GmbH (Pfedelbach, Germany) (represented by: O. Spieker, A. Schönfleisch and M. Alber, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 September 2017 (Case R 82/2017-2), relating to an application for registration of the word sign GlamHair as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Parfümerie Akzente GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Parfümerie Akzente GmbH to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 32, 29.1.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/46

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Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Coesia v EUIPO (Representation of two oblique red curves)

(Case T-829/17) (1)

(EU trade mark - Application for an EU figurative mark representing two oblique red curves - Absolute ground for refusal - No distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001) - Obligation to state reasons - Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001))

(2019/C 164/48)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Coesia SpA (Bologna, Italy) (represented by: S. Rizzo, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: L. Rampini, acting as Agent)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 September 2017 (Case R 1272/2017-5), regarding an application for registration of a figurative sign representing two oblique red curves as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Coesia SpA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Coesia SpA to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 63, 19.2.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/46 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/46

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Judgment of the General Court of 26 March 2019 –Deray v EUIPO — Charles Claire (LILI LA TIGRESSE)

(Case T-105/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark LILI LA TIGRESSE - Earlier EU word mark TIGRESS - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2019/C 164/49)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: André Deray (Bry-sur-Marne, France) (represented by: S. Santos Rodríguez, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: P. Sipos and D. Walicka, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Charles Claire LLP (Weybridge, Surrey, United Kingdom)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 December 2017 (Case R 1244/2017-2), concerning opposition proceedings between Charles Claire and Mr Deray.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr André Deray to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr André Deray to pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 134, 16.4.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/47

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Judgment of the General Court of 27 March 2019 — Biernacka-Hoba v EUIPO — Formata Bogusław Hoba (Formata)

(Case T-265/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU figurative mark Formata - Earlier international figurative mark Formata - Relative ground for invalidity - Article 60(1)(a) and Article 8(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 - Rule 37 of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 (now Article 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625) - Conditions governing the representation of the earlier mark - Rule 19 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 7 of Delegated Regulation 2018/625) - Legitimate expectations - Reimbursement of the costs of representation - Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001 and Rule 94 of Regulation No 2868/95 (now Article 109 of Regulation 2017/1001))

(2019/C 164/50)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Illona Biernacka-Hoba (Aleksandrów Łódzki, Poland) (represented by: R. Rumpel, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Walicka, acting as Agent)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Formata Bogusław Hoba (Aleksandrów Łódzki, Poland)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 13 February 2018 (Case R 2032/2017-4), relating to invalidity proceedings between Ms Biernacka-Hoba and Formata Bogusław Hoba

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 February 2018 (Case R 2032/2017-4), in so far as it ordered Ms Ilona Biernacka-Hoba to pay the costs incurred by Formata Bogusław Hoba for the purposes of the invalidity proceedings and the appeal and fixed the amount of the costs that Ms Biernacka-Hoba had to pay to Formata Bogusław Hoba at EUR 1000, and alters that decision to the effect that Ms Biernacka-Hoba must not be ordered to pay such a sum; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 February 2018 (Case R 2032/2017-4), in so far as it ordered Ms Ilona Biernacka-Hoba to pay the costs incurred by Formata Bogusław Hoba for the purposes of the invalidity proceedings and the appeal and fixed the amount of the costs that Ms Biernacka-Hoba had to pay to Formata Bogusław Hoba at EUR 1000, and alters that decision to the effect that Ms Biernacka-Hoba must not be ordered to pay such a sum;

| 2. | Dismisses the action as to the remainder; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dismisses the action as to the remainder;

| 3. | Orders each party to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders each party to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/48

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Judgment of the General Court of 28 March 2019 — Julius-K9 v EUIPO — El Corte Inglés

(Case T-276/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU figurative mark K9 UNIT - Earlier EU figurative mark unit - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001)

(2019/C 164/51)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Julius-K9 Zrt (Szigetszentmiklós, Hungary) (represented by: G. Jambrik, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: A. Lukošiūtė and by H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: El Corte Inglés, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J.L. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 February 2018 (Case R 1432/2017-2) relating to opposition proceedings between Hipercor, SA and Julius-K9.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 February 2018 (Case R 1432/2017-2); |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 22 February 2018 (Case R 1432/2017-2);

| 2. | Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Julius-K9 Zrt; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders EUIPO to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Julius-K9 Zrt;

| 3. | Orders El Corte Inglés, SA to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders El Corte Inglés, SA to bear its own costs.

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(1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/49 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/49

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Order of the General Court of 18 March 2019 — SKS Import Export v Commission

(Case T-239/18) (1)

(Action for annulment - Free movement of capital - Prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CTF) - Directive (EU) 2015/849 - Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/212 - Inclusion of Tunisia on the list of high-risk third countries - Inadmissibility)

(2019/C 164/52)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Société Kammama Saber (SKS) Import Export (Sousse Jaouhara, Tunisia) (represented by: H. Chelly, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: V. Di Bucci, A. Bouquet and T. Scharf, acting as Agents)

Re:

Action based on Article 263 TFEU seeking the annulment of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/212 of 13 December 2017, amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards adding Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, and Tunisia to the table in point I of the Annex (OJ 2018 L 41, p. 4).

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed as inadmissible. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed as inadmissible.

| 2. | Société Kammama Saber (SKS) Import Export shall pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Société Kammama Saber (SKS) Import Export shall pay the costs.

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(1)  OJ C 231, 2.7.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/50

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Order of the General Court of 15 March 2019 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission

(Case T-410/18) (1)

(Action for annulment - Competition - Agreements, decisions and concerted practices - Market in metal packaging - Decision to open an investigation - Act not open to challenge - Inadmissibility)

(2019/C 164/53)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicants: Silgan Closures GmbH (Munich, Germany), Silgan Holdings, Inc. (Stamford, Connecticut, United States) (represented by: H. Wollmann, D. Seeliger, R. Grafunder and V. Weiss, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission (represented by: T. Christoforou, B. Ernst, G. Meessen, C. Vollrath and L. Wildpanner, acting as Agents)

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Commission Decision C(2018) 2466 final of 19 April 2018, by which the Commission initiated a proceeding under Article 101 TFEU in case AT.40522 — Pandora.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | There is no need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Council of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

2.

There is no need to adjudicate on the applications to intervene submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Council of the European Union.

| 3. | Silgan Closures GmbH and Silgan Holdings, Inc., shall bear their own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Silgan Closures GmbH and Silgan Holdings, Inc., shall bear their own costs and pay the costs incurred by the European Commission.

| 4. | The Federal Republic of Germany and the Council shall bear their own costs relating to the applications to intervene. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Council shall bear their own costs relating to the applications to intervene.

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(1)  OJ C 285, 13.8.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/50 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/50

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Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Haba Trading v EUIPO — Vida (vidaXL)

(Case T-503/18) (1)

(EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Withdrawal of the opposition - No need to adjudicate)

(2019/C 164/54)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Haba Trading BV (Utrecht, Netherlands) (represented by: B. Schneiders and A. Brittner, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: D. Gája and H. O’Neill, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: Vida AB (Alvesta, Sweden)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 12 June 2018 (Case R 190/2016-5), relating to opposition proceedings between Vida AB and Haba Trading BV.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action.

| 2. | Haba Trading BV is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Haba Trading BV is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO).

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(1)  OJ C 373, 15.10.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/51 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/51

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Order of the General Court of 13 March 2019 — Comune di Milano v Parliament and Council

(Case T-75/19) (1)

(Declining of jurisdiction)

(2019/C 164/55)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Applicant: Comune di Milano (represented by: F. Sciaudone, M. Condinanzi and A. Neri, lawyers)

Defendants: European Parliament (represented by: L. Visaggio, I. Anagnostopoulou and A. Tamás, acting as Agents) and Council of the European Union (represented by: M. Bauer, F. Florindo Gijón and E. Rebasti, acting as Agents)

Re:

First, claim under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Regulation (EU) 2018/1718 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 amending Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 as regards the location of the seat of the European Medicines Agency (OJ 2018 L 291, p. 3), and, second, claim for a decision allegedly adopted by the Council on 20 November 2017 to be declared ineffective.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The General Court declines jurisdiction in Case T-75/19 in order to enable the Court of Justice to rule on the action. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The General Court declines jurisdiction in Case T-75/19 in order to enable the Court of Justice to rule on the action.

| 2. | The decision on the Comune di Milano’s request that the present action be determined under an expedited procedure is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The decision on the Comune di Milano’s request that the present action be determined under an expedited procedure is reserved.

| 3. | The costs are reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The costs are reserved.

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(1)  OJ C 112, 25.3.2019.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/52 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/52

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Action brought on 7 January 2019 — CJ v Court of Justice of the European Union

(Case T-1/19)

(2019/C 164/56)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: CJ (represented by: V. Kolias, lawyer)

Defendant: Court of Justice of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare contrary to the Treaties the failure of the defendant to anonymize procedural documents referring to him by name and published on the world wide web by the General Court and the former Civil Service Tribunal, subsidiarily its failure to make nominal versions of such documents inaccessible to world wide web search providers; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare contrary to the Treaties the failure of the defendant to anonymize procedural documents referring to him by name and published on the world wide web by the General Court and the former Civil Service Tribunal, subsidiarily its failure to make nominal versions of such documents inaccessible to world wide web search providers;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and arguing in particular:






  — | that the applicant has brought actions against his former employer before the former Civil Service Tribunal and the General Court; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 20 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and arguing in particular:

—

that the applicant has brought actions against his former employer before the former Civil Service Tribunal and the General Court;

| — | that procedural documents of those actions have been published referring to the applicant by name and are accessible to world wide web search providers like Google; |
| --- | --- |

—

that procedural documents of those actions have been published referring to the applicant by name and are accessible to world wide web search providers like Google;

| — | that accessibility to such search providers facilitates the profiling of the applicant by any Internet user in the world, including current and any prospective employers; |
| --- | --- |

—

that accessibility to such search providers facilitates the profiling of the applicant by any Internet user in the world, including current and any prospective employers;

| — | that from such profiling arises the risk of discrimination against the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

that from such profiling arises the risk of discrimination against the applicant;

| — | that the Court of Justice of the European Union has decided to anonymize by default published procedural documents for all requests for a preliminary ruling relating to natural persons and received after 1 July 2018; |
| --- | --- |

—

that the Court of Justice of the European Union has decided to anonymize by default published procedural documents for all requests for a preliminary ruling relating to natural persons and received after 1 July 2018;

| — | that the anonymization of published procedural documents for any other type of action under the Treaties remains at the absolute discretion of the judicature of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

—

that the anonymization of published procedural documents for any other type of action under the Treaties remains at the absolute discretion of the judicature of the European Union,

| — | that the natural persons involved in requests for a preliminary ruling brought before the Court of Justice after 1 July 2018 and the applicant are not treated equally. |
| --- | --- |

—

that the natural persons involved in requests for a preliminary ruling brought before the Court of Justice after 1 July 2018 and the applicant are not treated equally.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court has breached Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and arguing in particular:






  — | that the purpose of publishing procedural documents is, in the words of the Court of Justice, to ‘guarante[e] that citizens are informed and have the right to open courts’; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the General Court has breached Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and arguing in particular:

—

that the purpose of publishing procedural documents is, in the words of the Court of Justice, to ‘guarante[e] that citizens are informed and have the right to open courts’;

| — | that to achieve that purpose it is unnecessary to publish versions of procedural documents referring to the applicant by name or, subsidiarily, to make such versions accessible to world wide web search providers like Google; |
| --- | --- |

—

that to achieve that purpose it is unnecessary to publish versions of procedural documents referring to the applicant by name or, subsidiarily, to make such versions accessible to world wide web search providers like Google;

| — | that the failure of the General Court to end such practice infringes Articles 4(1)(c) and 5(a) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), subsidiarily Articles 4(1)(c) and 5(a) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council. (2) |
| --- | --- |

—

that the failure of the General Court to end such practice infringes Articles 4(1)(c) and 5(a) of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), subsidiarily Articles 4(1)(c) and 5(a) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council. (2)

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(1)  Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1).

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/53 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/53

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Action brought on 1 March 2019 — Bulgarian Energy Holding and Others v Commission

(Case T-136/19)

(2019/C 164/57)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD (Sofia, Bulgaria), Bulgartransgaz EAD (Sofia), Bulgargaz EAD (Sofia) (represented by: K. Struckmann, lawyer, M. Powell and A. Kadri, Solicitors)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | adopt the measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry specified in section 3.6 of the application, or any other such measures as the Court deems necessary; |
| --- | --- |

—

adopt the measures of organisation of procedure or measures of inquiry specified in section 3.6 of the application, or any other such measures as the Court deems necessary;

| — | annul in whole or in part the Commission decision C(2018) 8806 final, of 17 December 2018, relating to proceedings under Article 102 of TFEU (AT.39849 — BEH Gas); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul in whole or in part the Commission decision C(2018) 8806 final, of 17 December 2018, relating to proceedings under Article 102 of TFEU (AT.39849 — BEH Gas);

| — | annul or reduce the level of the fine imposed; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul or reduce the level of the fine imposed;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on seven pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached essential procedural requirements, thus infringing the applicants’ rights of defence. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached essential procedural requirements, thus infringing the applicants’ rights of defence.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s definition of the relevant market is vitiated by errors of law and fact, and by a failure to conduct a market analysis and state adequate reasons. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s definition of the relevant market is vitiated by errors of law and fact, and by a failure to conduct a market analysis and state adequate reasons.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s finding that Bulgargaz EAD, as one of the applicants, or the applicants together, held a dominant position on the market for capacity services, is vitiated by errors of law and in its appreciation of the facts. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s finding that Bulgargaz EAD, as one of the applicants, or the applicants together, held a dominant position on the market for capacity services, is vitiated by errors of law and in its appreciation of the facts.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision infringes the European Union treaties by failing to establish, to the requisite standard, that the conduct described in the contested decision amounts to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, in light of errors in its application of the law and in its appreciation of the facts. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision infringes the European Union treaties by failing to establish, to the requisite standard, that the conduct described in the contested decision amounts to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, in light of errors in its application of the law and in its appreciation of the facts.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s findings as to the duration of the alleged infringement are vitiated by errors of law and in its appreciation of the facts. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision’s findings as to the duration of the alleged infringement are vitiated by errors of law and in its appreciation of the facts.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law, alleging that by adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 (1), the EU treaties were infringed, in the process. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that by adopting a decision pursuant to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 (1), the EU treaties were infringed, in the process.

| 7. | Seventh plea in law, alleging that the fine should be annulled or reduced in light of the contested decision’s failure to adhere to the defendant’s fining guidelines, or alternatively in the exercise of the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction pursuant to Article 261 TFEU on the basis that the fine is in all the circumstances disproportionate to the conduct being sanctioned. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that the fine should be annulled or reduced in light of the contested decision’s failure to adhere to the defendant’s fining guidelines, or alternatively in the exercise of the Court’s unlimited jurisdiction pursuant to Article 261 TFEU on the basis that the fine is in all the circumstances disproportionate to the conduct being sanctioned.

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(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/55 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/55

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Action brought on 7 March 2019 — PKK v Council

(Case T-148/19)

(2019/C 164/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (represented by: A. van Eik and T. Buruma, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/25 of 8 January 2019 (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant (whereas the applicant disputes that Kadek and Kongra Gel are its aliases); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/25 of 8 January 2019 (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant (whereas the applicant disputes that Kadek and Kongra Gel are its aliases);

| — | in the alternative, warrant a less onerous measure than continued listing on the European Union terrorist list; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, warrant a less onerous measure than continued listing on the European Union terrorist list;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs with interest. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs with interest.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since the applicant could have not been qualified as a terrorist organisation as defined in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001. (2)

  The defendant would have failed to establish that the applicant is a structured group acting in concert to commit terrorist attacks. Moreover, the bulk of the acts mentioned in the statement of reasons cannot be attributed to the applicant, are not included in the limitative list of acts in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and/or cannot seriously damage a country. Finally, the aim of the applicant was not a ‘terrorist aim’ as defined in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. In particular, this aim must be considered in light of the armed conflict for self-determination. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since the applicant could have not been qualified as a terrorist organisation as defined in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001. (2)

The defendant would have failed to establish that the applicant is a structured group acting in concert to commit terrorist attacks. Moreover, the bulk of the acts mentioned in the statement of reasons cannot be attributed to the applicant, are not included in the limitative list of acts in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and/or cannot seriously damage a country. Finally, the aim of the applicant was not a ‘terrorist aim’ as defined in Article 1(3) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP. In particular, this aim must be considered in light of the armed conflict for self-determination.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant because no decision by a competent authority, as required by Article 1(4) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, would have been taken. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant because no decision by a competent authority, as required by Article 1(4) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, would have been taken.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since the defendant would have not conducted any proper review as required by Article 1(6) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.
  The statement of reasons would have not shown that any proper review has taken place, both on the national level and by the defendant itself. No due regard is paid to the information provided by the applicant in previous procedures regarding the peace process, the fight against Daesh and the autocratic developments in Turkey. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant since the defendant would have not conducted any proper review as required by Article 1(6) of Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP.

The statement of reasons would have not shown that any proper review has taken place, both on the national level and by the defendant itself. No due regard is paid to the information provided by the applicant in previous procedures regarding the peace process, the fight against Daesh and the autocratic developments in Turkey.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant as the decision would have not complied with the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity.
  In particular, the diaspora of Kurds is disproportionally hurt by the listing. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant as the decision would have not complied with the requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity.

In particular, the diaspora of Kurds is disproportionally hurt by the listing.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant as it does not comply with the obligation to state reasons in conformity with Article 296 TFEU.
  The General Court in its judgment of 15 November 2018, PKK v Council (T-316/14, EU:T:2018:788), came to a similar conclusion based on the exact same statement of reasons. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant as it does not comply with the obligation to state reasons in conformity with Article 296 TFEU.

The General Court in its judgment of 15 November 2018, PKK v Council (T-316/14, EU:T:2018:788), came to a similar conclusion based on the exact same statement of reasons.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant because it would have infringed the applicant’s right of defence and its right to effective judicial protection.
  In particular, the defendant would have ignored the judgment of 15 November 2018, PKK v Council (T-316/14, EU:T:2018:788), and the proceedings leading up to it. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that Council Decision 2019/25 is void insofar as it concerns the applicant because it would have infringed the applicant’s right of defence and its right to effective judicial protection.

In particular, the defendant would have ignored the judgment of 15 November 2018, PKK v Council (T-316/14, EU:T:2018:788), and the proceedings leading up to it.

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/25 of 8 January 2019 amending and updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, and repealing Decision (CFSP) 2018/1084 (OJ L 6, 9.1.2019, p. 6).

(2)  Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 93).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/56 |
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13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/56

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Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Mersinis v ESMA

(Case T-163/19)

(2019/C 164/59)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Michail Mersinis (Athens, Greece) (represented by: P. Pafitis, lawyer)

Defendant: European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the defendant’s decision of 23 May 2018 not to select the applicant for the post of senior legal officer in respect of the vacancy ESMA/2017/VAC19/AD7. |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the defendant’s decision of 23 May 2018 not to select the applicant for the post of senior legal officer in respect of the vacancy ESMA/2017/VAC19/AD7.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging unlawful composition of the selection committee. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging unlawful composition of the selection committee.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging the exercise of bias in favour of the candidate selected for the post in question. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the exercise of bias in favour of the candidate selected for the post in question.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/57 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/57

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Action brought on 14 March 2019 — AQ v eu-LISA

(Case T-164/19)

(2019/C 164/60)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: AQ (represented by: L. Levi and N. Flandin, lawyers)

Defendant: European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of eu-LISA of 8 May 2018 which terminates the applicant’s employment contract at eu-LISA without notice together with, in so far as necessary, the decision of eu-LISA of 4 December 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of eu-LISA of 8 May 2018 which terminates the applicant’s employment contract at eu-LISA without notice together with, in so far as necessary, the decision of eu-LISA of 4 December 2018 rejecting the applicant’s complaint;

| — | order the defendant to pay compensation for the harm suffered by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay compensation for the harm suffered by the applicant;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging a procedural irregularity and the violation of the rights of the defence and in particular the right to be heard. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging a procedural irregularity and the violation of the rights of the defence and in particular the right to be heard.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging the breach of Articles 16 and 48 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the breach of Articles 16 and 48 of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty to state reasons.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty of care. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the duty of care.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 31 and 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of Articles 31 and 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law, alleging an abuse of power. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging an abuse of power.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/58 |
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13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/58

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Action brought on 14 March 2019 — Bronckers v Commission

(Case T-166/19)

(2019/C 164/61)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Marco Bronckers (Brussels, Belgium) (represented by: P. Kreijger, lawyer)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of the Commission of 10 January 2019 under Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 (1) rejecting the applicant’s confirmatory application for access to documents mentioned in the minutes of the Joint Committee on Spirit Drinks established under the Agreement between the European Community and the United Mexican States on the mutual recognition and protection of designations for spirit drinks; (2) |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of the Commission of 10 January 2019 under Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 (1) rejecting the applicant’s confirmatory application for access to documents mentioned in the minutes of the Joint Committee on Spirit Drinks established under the Agreement between the European Community and the United Mexican States on the mutual recognition and protection of designations for spirit drinks; (2)

| — | order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs incurred by the applicant. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs incurred by the applicant.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of the access request misapplies Article 4(1)(a), third indent, of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, and/or infringes Article 296 TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of the access request misapplies Article 4(1)(a), third indent, of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, and/or infringes Article 296 TFEU.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of the access request misapplies Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 and/or infringes Article 296 TFEU, as the Commission has not shown that access to all of the requested documents undermines commercial interests of the Consejo Regulador del Tequila (CRT) or its members. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of the access request misapplies Article 4(2) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 and/or infringes Article 296 TFEU, as the Commission has not shown that access to all of the requested documents undermines commercial interests of the Consejo Regulador del Tequila (CRT) or its members.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission wrongly found that the applicant failed to show an overriding public interest in disclosure. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the Commission wrongly found that the applicant failed to show an overriding public interest in disclosure.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of partial access misapplies Article 4(6) and/or Article 4(7) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, and/or infringes Art. 296 TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the Commission’s rejection of partial access misapplies Article 4(6) and/or Article 4(7) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, and/or infringes Art. 296 TFEU.

---

(1)  Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p.43).

(2)  See Council Decision of 27 May 1997 concerning the conclusion of an Agreement between the European Community and the United Mexican States on the mutual recognition and protection of designations for spirit drinks (OJ 1997 L 152, p. 15).

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/59 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/59

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Action brought on 18 March 2019 — Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft v EUIPO (eVoter)

(Case T-175/19)

(2019/C 164/62)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft eV (Munich, Germany) (represented by: L. Grenz, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Trade mark at issue: Registration of EU word mark eVoter — Registration No 17 900 152

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 January 2019 in Case R 1983/2018-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred those incurred in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs, including those incurred those incurred in the proceedings before the Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Breach of EUIPO’s administrative practice; |
| --- | --- |

—

Breach of EUIPO’s administrative practice;

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/60 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/60

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Action brought on 26 March 2019 — Bibita Group v EUIPO — Benkomers (Beverage bottles)

(Case T-180/19)

(2019/C 164/63)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Bibita Group SHPK (Tirana, Albania) (represented by: C. Seyfert, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Benkomers OOD (Sofia, Bulgaria)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Proprietor of the design at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Design at issue: Community design No 3797 091-0001 (Beverage bottles)

Contested decision: Decision of the Third Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 14 January 2019 in Case R 1070/2018-3

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | declare the contested Community design registered under No 3797 091-0001 invalid, on all the grounds set in the application; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the contested Community design registered under No 3797 091-0001 invalid, on all the grounds set in the application;

| — | order the defendant and the proprietor to pay the procedural costs relating to the proceedings before the Third Board of Appeal, pursuant to Article 190 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant and the proprietor to pay the procedural costs relating to the proceedings before the Third Board of Appeal, pursuant to Article 190 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court;

| — | order EUIPO and the potential other party to the present proceedings to pay the entirety of the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the potential other party to the present proceedings to pay the entirety of the costs of the proceedings.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Articles 6(1) and 25(1)(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Articles 6(1) and 25(1)(d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/61 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/61

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Order of the General Court of 19 March 2019 — Eagle IP v EUIPO — Consolidated Artists (LILLY e VIOLETTA)

(Case T-336/18) (1)

(2019/C 164/64)

Language of the case: English

The President of the Ninth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 268, 30.7.2018.

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| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/61 |
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Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/61

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Order of the General Court of 21 March 2019 — Telenet v Commission

(Case T-470/18) (1)

(2019/C 164/65)

Language of the case: English

The President of the First Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

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(1)  OJ C 364, 8.10.2018.

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Corrigenda

| 13.5.2019 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 164/62 |
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13.5.2019

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 164/62

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Corrigendum to the notice in the Official Journal in Case T-45/19

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 122 of 1 April 2019
  )

(2019/C 164/66)

On page 20, the notice in the Official Journal in Case T-45/19, Acron and Others/Commission should read as follows:

‘Action brought on 24 January 2019 — Acron and Others v Commission

(Case T-45/19)

(2019/C 164/66)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: Acron PAO (Veliky Novgorod, Russia), Dorogobuzh PAO (Dorogobuzh, Russia), Acron Switzerland AG (Baar, Switzerland) (represented by: T. De Meese, J. Stuyck and A. Nys, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | annul the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1703 of 12 November 2018; and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1703 of 12 November 2018; and

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs;

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached its international obligations, which amounts to a breach of the Treaty and it failed to provide sufficient motivation by finding that the Russian Federation was not complying with its World Trade Organisation obligations.
  The applicants submit that the defendant would have failed to take into account the Russian Federation’s accession to the World Trade Organisation as relevant to the change in the calculation of the dumping margin of the applicants. The defendant would be under the obligation to take into account the commitments made by the Russian Federation regarding the price of gas when investigating the interim review of the duties applicable to the import of ammonium nitrate. Since the defendant would have argued that the Russian Federation would not have been complying with its own Protocol of Accession, the defendant would have acted in breach of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Article II of World Trade Organisation Antidumping Agreement. In failing to do so, it would have breached its international obligations, which amounts to a breach of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the defendant breached its international obligations, which amounts to a breach of the Treaty and it failed to provide sufficient motivation by finding that the Russian Federation was not complying with its World Trade Organisation obligations.

The applicants submit that the defendant would have failed to take into account the Russian Federation’s accession to the World Trade Organisation as relevant to the change in the calculation of the dumping margin of the applicants. The defendant would be under the obligation to take into account the commitments made by the Russian Federation regarding the price of gas when investigating the interim review of the duties applicable to the import of ammonium nitrate. Since the defendant would have argued that the Russian Federation would not have been complying with its own Protocol of Accession, the defendant would have acted in breach of Article VI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and Article II of World Trade Organisation Antidumping Agreement. In failing to do so, it would have breached its international obligations, which amounts to a breach of the Treaty.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant made a manifest error of assessment and failed to provide sufficient motivation, resulting in the breach of the rights of defence of the applicants by finding that the change of circumstances invoked by the applicants was not of a lasting nature.






  — | The applicants submit that, within the scope of the second plea, there would be two separate grounds for annulment of the contested decision. Both grounds relate to the erroneous conclusion that the change of circumstances was not of lasting nature. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the defendant made a manifest error of assessment and failed to provide sufficient motivation, resulting in the breach of the rights of defence of the applicants by finding that the change of circumstances invoked by the applicants was not of a lasting nature.

—

The applicants submit that, within the scope of the second plea, there would be two separate grounds for annulment of the contested decision. Both grounds relate to the erroneous conclusion that the change of circumstances was not of lasting nature.

| — | In any case, the defendant would have breached its obligation of motivation under Article 296 TFEU by failing to motivate the contested decision in a clear and unequivocal fashion. |
| --- | --- |

—

In any case, the defendant would have breached its obligation of motivation under Article 296 TFEU by failing to motivate the contested decision in a clear and unequivocal fashion.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant infringed Articles 19(2) and 20(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as well as the applicants’ rights of defence and provided for a lack of legal certainty by failing to provide its dumping calculation.






  — | The defendant would have failed to disclose the final calculation of the dumping margin to the applicants, even though that calculation served as the basis for the findings relating to the continuation and existence of dumping, the lasting nature of the change of circumstances, and also the termination of the partial interim review. If the defendant would have communicated the calculation, it would have allowed the applicants to defend their rights more effectively with regard to the dumping calculation and the findings of dumping as a whole, including the argument relating to the calculation methodology used in the original investigation, which could have had a significant impact on their legal situation. |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the defendant infringed Articles 19(2) and 20(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as well as the applicants’ rights of defence and provided for a lack of legal certainty by failing to provide its dumping calculation.

—

The defendant would have failed to disclose the final calculation of the dumping margin to the applicants, even though that calculation served as the basis for the findings relating to the continuation and existence of dumping, the lasting nature of the change of circumstances, and also the termination of the partial interim review. If the defendant would have communicated the calculation, it would have allowed the applicants to defend their rights more effectively with regard to the dumping calculation and the findings of dumping as a whole, including the argument relating to the calculation methodology used in the original investigation, which could have had a significant impact on their legal situation.

| — | The applicants submit that the defendant would have infringed Article 19(2) and Article 20(2) of Regulation 2016/1036, the applicants’ rights of defence and the principle of legal certainty by failing to provide the applicants with a meaningful summary of the evidence collected during the investigation or the considerations on the basis of which the defendant proposed to amend the applicants’ anti-dumping margin. The applicants submit that by refusing to provide them with its dumping margin calculation, the defendant would have infringed the applicants’ rights of defence and would have breached the principle of legal certainty.’ |
| --- | --- |

—

The applicants submit that the defendant would have infringed Article 19(2) and Article 20(2) of Regulation 2016/1036, the applicants’ rights of defence and the principle of legal certainty by failing to provide the applicants with a meaningful summary of the evidence collected during the investigation or the considerations on the basis of which the defendant proposed to amend the applicants’ anti-dumping margin. The applicants submit that by refusing to provide them with its dumping margin calculation, the defendant would have infringed the applicants’ rights of defence and would have breached the principle of legal certainty.’

---