COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

ELAINE ASANAKIS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2337-97-4 PER CURIAM 

 MARCH 10, 1998 

ICE FOLLIES & HOLIDAY ON ICE, INC. 

 AND INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE 

 STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Craig A. Brown; Ashcraft & Gerel, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 (Matthew W. Broughton; Monica L. Taylor; 

Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, on brief), for 

appellees. 

 Elaine Asanakis (claimant) contends that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission (commission) erred in finding that (1) 

absent a request for review, the deputy commissioner did not have 

jurisdiction to vacate her June 24, 1997 order dismissing 

claimant's claim for benefits after the twenty-day period for 

requesting review had expired; and (2) the sanction of dismissal 

without prejudice was proper. Upon reviewing the record and the 

briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without 

merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's 

decision. See Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). 

 So viewed, the evidence showed that claimant filed her claim 

on February 13, 1997. On March 25, 1997, employer forwarded 

interrogatories to claimant, along with a medical release 

authorization for claimant to sign to enable employer to obtain 

claimant's foreign medical records. As of April 23, 1997, 

claimant had not agreed to sign the medical release authorization 

form nor had she filed answers to employer's interrogatories. As 

a result, the deputy commissioner continued the hearing scheduled 

for May 23, 1997, rescheduling it for July 3, 1997. 

 On June 2, 1997, employer notified the deputy commissioner 

that claimant had still not provided a signed medical release 

authorization nor had she responded to employer's 

interrogatories. Employer also advised the commission that it 

had scheduled claimant's deposition for June 23, 1997. In a June 

6, 1997 letter, the deputy commissioner continued the hearing 

again "[d]ue to the claimant's failure to provide Answers to 

Interrogatories in a timely manner . . . ." The deputy 

commissioner ordered claimant to provide those answers and a 

medical release authorization by June 20, 1997, stating that 

"[f]ailure to do so will result in dismissal of the claim." The 

hearing was rescheduled for August 12, 1997. 

 Claimant did not comply with the June 6, 1997 order nor did 

she respond to the commission in any manner explaining her 

omissions. In a letter dated June 23, 1997, employer asked the 
 3 

commission to dismiss the claim. On June 24, 1997, the deputy 

commissioner entered an order dismissing the claim for benefits 

"without prejudice" due to "claimant's failure to file Answers to 

Interrogatories and Medical Release Authorization in a timely 

manner . . . ." 

 On July 1, 1997, claimant's counsel asked the deputy 

commissioner to vacate her June 24, 1997 order. Claimant's 

counsel did not dispute the conclusions that claimant had failed 

to respond to discovery and had failed to appear for her 

deposition. Claimant did not request review of the deputy 

commissioner's June 24, 1997 order within twenty days of its 

entry. On July 21, 1997, the deputy commissioner vacated her 

June 24, 1997 order. Employer moved that the deputy commissioner 

reconsider her decision and simultaneously filed a request for 

review before the full commission. 

 I. 

 In holding that the deputy commissioner was without 

jurisdiction to reconsider, amend, or vacate her June 24, 1997 

dismissal order, the commission found as follows: 

 [C]laimant filed her Claim for Benefits just 

two days short of two years subsequent to her 

accident. From that time forward, she was 

represented by counsel. Although her counsel 

has advised the Commission that she is 

sincere about her claim, nevertheless she 

failed to respond to an order of the 

Commission to answer interrogatories, to 

execute a medical release authorization, and 

to appear at a deposition. While we 

recognize that the nature of her work may 

cause the claimant to travel extensively, she 

cannot at the same time show complete 
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disregard for the orders of the Commission 

and simultaneously expect relief from its 

procedural rules. We find, therefore, 

that . . . [the June 24, 1997 dismissal] 

order is still valid. The claimant's Claim 

for Benefits is, therefore, DISMISSED without 

prejudice pursuant to the June 24, 1997, 

order. 

 Code § 65.2-705(A) requires that an application for review 

of a deputy commissioner's decision be filed with the commission 

within twenty days from the date of entry of the award. "'Absent 

. . . fraud or mistake . . . , the decisions of the commission or 

its deputy commissioners from which no party seeks timely review

are binding upon the commission.'" Sovran Fin. Corp. v. Nanney, 

12 Va. App. 1156, 1160, 408 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1991) (quoting K & L 

Trucking Co. v. Thurber, 1 Va. App. 213, 219, 337 S.E.2d 299, 302 

(1985)). Thus, absent a timely review request or an allegation 

of fraud or mistake in the procurement of an award, the 

commission loses jurisdiction over an award after twenty days 

from the date of that award. See McCarthy Elec. Co. v. Foster, 

17 Va. App. 344, 345, 437 S.E.2d 246, 247 (1993). 

 In this case, the undisputed evidence showed that claimant 

did not request review of the deputy commissioner's June 24, 1997 

order before the twenty-day period expired. In addition, 

claimant did not allege fraud or mistake in the procurement of 

the June 24, 1997 order. Accordingly, credible evidence supports 

the commission's finding that the deputy commissioner did not 

have jurisdiction to vacate her June 24, 1997 dismissal order on 

July 21, 1997, more than twenty days after entry of that order. 
 5 

 II. 

 The Rules of the Virginia Supreme Court allow trial courts 

"'broad discretion in determining what sanction, if any, will be 

imposed upon a litigant who fails to timely respond to 

discovery.'" Jeff Coal, Inc. v. Phillips, 16 Va. App. 271, 278, 

430 S.E.2d 712, 717 (1993) (quoting Woodbury v. Courtney, 239 Va. 

651, 654, 391 S.E.2d 293, 295 (1990)). These Rules specifically 

allow a trial court to strike a party's claims or defenses for 

failure to comply with a discovery order. See id. Moreover, 

"the commission has the same authority as a court to punish for 

noncompliance with its discovery orders." Id. 

 Here, credible evidence proved that employer diligently 

pursued discovery for months, to which claimant made no response. 

 In addition, claimant indisputably violated the commission's 

June 6, 1997 order without any explanation. Based upon this 

record, we cannot say that the commission abused its discretion 

in exercising its power to punish claimant for violating its 

discovery order by dismissing her claim for benefits without 

prejudice. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.