JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General 

Supreme Court Buildlng 

P. 0. Box 12548 

Austin, TX. 75711- 2548 

512l475.2501 

Telex QlW74.1387 

Telecopier 51214750258 

714 Jackson, Suite 700 

Dallas. TX. 752024508 

2141742-8944 

4824 Alberta Ave.. Suite 1W 

El Paso, TX. 799052793 

91515333454 

r 

Jo1 Texas. suite 700 

tkw,ton, TX. 77002-3111 

713/223-W 

806 Broadway. Sulte 312 

Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479 

8081747-5238 

4309 N. Tenth. Suite B 

McAllen, TX. 78501-1885 

512mE2&47 

200 Main Plaza. Suite 400 

San Antonio, TX. 782052797 

5121225.4191 

An Equal OpportunityI 

Attlrmatlve Action Employer 

The Attorney General of Texas 

Au:?Just 13, 1984 

Honorable John L. Hu~chison 

Banaford County Attorney 

P. 0. Box 506 

Spearman. Texas 7!W81 

Opinion No. JM-191 

Re: Whether a county may 

lease a building to a district 

appraisal office for a nominal 

consideration 

Dear Mr. Ziutchison: 

You have requested our opinion as to whether Aansford County may 

purchase land for the construction of an office building to be leased 

to the Hansford County Appraisal District. You have informed us that 

the appraisal district has proposed a contract whereby the county 

would construct an office building and lease it to the appraisal 

district under a lcase-purchase agreement. The building would be 

constructed with county funds at an approximate cost of $125,000, for 

the sole purpose of providing office space to the appraisal district. 

You ask whether 1:tle county is authorized to enter into such a 

contract. 

The Interlocal Cooperation Act, article 4413(32c), V.T.C.S., 

permits local gwernmente to contract among themselves for 

governmental servic:cs "which all parties to the contract are legally 

authorized to perfcrm." Sec. 4(b). The Interlocal Cooperation Act in 

itself does not :,nfer upon a governmental body any additional 

substantive auth0rj.t.y to perform particular acts. Thus, we must look 

to substantive law to determine whether the county is authorized to 

enter into the cont,ract at issue here. 

An appraisal tl:.strict is a political subdivision responsible for 

appraising propert]' values for the use of every taxing unit within the 

appraisal district-r! boundaries , which generally coincide with county 

lines. Although a lumber of statutes authorize a couauissioners court 

to provide office buildings for county purposes and to lease the 

unneeded portions 'to private persons or to other public agencies, the 

statutes do not permit a county to construct a facility for the sole 

use of another pol:l~:icsl subdivision , regardless of whether the county 

is adequately comp<nlsated for the cost of construction. 

A commissionr:rs court is required to provide and to keep in 

repair "all necegic;ary public buildings." V.T.C.S. art. 2351(7). 

Article 1603, V.TWC.S., provides that the commissioners court shall 

"provide a court h,ylse and jail for the county, and offices for county 

p. 835 
Honorable John L. Hutchison - I’age 2 (JM-191) 

officers.” Appraisal district officials are not county officers and 

thus are not entitled to of::‘:ice space provided by the county under 

this statute. 

Article 2370, section 1. V.T.C.S., permits the commissioners 

court to provide buildings at the county seat other than the 

courthouse “for carrying on such other public business as may be 

authorized by the Commissionc:z 8 Court .” This statute also authorizes 

the commissioners court to lease or rent any part of these buildings 

not necessary for public use. Article 2370b. V.T.C.S., authorizes the 

county to “purchase” or “cxlstruct” office buildings “to properly 

house all county and district offices and all county and district 

courts” whenever the commissioners court “determines that the county 

courthouse is not adequate” Eor that purpose. In our opinion, the 

context of article 2370b cl’?.%rly indicates that the term “district” 

refers to judicial district I,ather than to a “district” of any kind 

whatsoever, Thus, article :!:170b does not authorize the purchase or 

construction of office build L:rgs for the purpose of housing officials 

of an appraisal district. 

A commissioners court has only those powers specifically 

conferred by statute. Can,PLes v. Laughlin, 214 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 

1948). In Attorney Gene=-Opinion O-1952 (1940), this office held 

that the county’s authorit:? to provide necessary public buildings 

under article 2351 did not, empower the county to pay for the 

construction of a building to be rented to the Texas National Guard 

and other non-county governmental agencies. On the basis of this 

decision, we conclude that E. commissioners court is not authorized to 

purchase land and provide for: the construction of a building for the 

sole purpose of providing office space to an appraisal district. 

Of course, if the coun::r were to purchase land and construct an 

office building for legiti~lte “county purposes,” it could then lease 

unused space in that building to the appraisal district. 

SUMMARY 

A county is not. authorized to purchase land and 

construct a building solely for use of an 

appraisal district. 

Very truly your LA-/~ . 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

I *I 

I 

-. 

TOM GREEN 

First Assistant Attorney General 

p. 836 
i 

Bonorable John L. Rutchiroa - Page 3 ml-191) 

DAVID R. RICHARDS 

Executive Assistant Attorney (heral 

Preparerby David Brooks 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

. 

Rick Gilpin, Chairman 

David Brooks 

Colin Carl 

Susan Garrison 

Jim Moellinger 

Nancy Sutton 

p. 837