Reversed and Remanded and Opinion Filed August 22, 2024 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-24-00532-CV 

GREYSTAR STUDENT HOUSING GROWTH AND INCOME FUND OP, 

LP, GREYSTAR DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LP, GREYSTAR 

DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL, LLC, ET AL., Appellants 

V. 

BRITTNEY NOVA, ET AL., Appellees 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-23-03924-B 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Pedersen, III, and Carlyle 

Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness 

In this interlocutory appeal, we must decide whether the trial court correctly 

determined venue is proper in Dallas County. Nova1

 sued the Greystar Appellants, 

United Forming, Inc. (UFI), Drew Kelley, and Clint Bordner (together, Appellants) 

1

 Appellees are Brittney Nova, Individually and as Dependent Administrator and Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Michael Delgado and Personal Representative and Next Friend of E.D., 

Minor Child, Michael Croce, and Tanya Delgado. We refer to Appellees together as “Nova,” unless 

otherwise indicated. 
 –2– 

in Dallas County.2

 Appellants moved to transfer the case to Travis County, asserting 

improper venue in Dallas County. The trial court denied Appellants’ motions. 

Appellants raise a single issue on appeal, claiming the trial court erred in denying 

their motions to transfer. After reviewing the record, we agree. We conclude Nova 

did not establish venue is proper in Dallas County, while Appellants established 

venue in Travis County. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case 

with instructions to transfer to Travis County. 

BACKGROUND 

This suit arises from the unfortunate death of Michael Delgado. On March 2, 

2023, Delgado was riding his bicycle near a construction site on Rio Grande Street 

in Austin, Texas. As Delgado was riding, he was struck by a large piece of debris 

that was allegedly blown off the construction above. Delgado was seriously injured, 

and he died two days later. On March 31, 2023, Brittney Nova, individually, as 

administrator of Delgado’s estate, and as personal representative of Delgado’s minor 

child, and Tanya Delgado (Michael’s mother) sued several defendants in Travis 

County probate court for the events leading to Delgado’s death.3

 

2

 The “Greystar Appellants” are: Greystar Student Housing Growth and Income Fund OP, LP; 

Greystar Development Group, LP; Greystar Development Central, LLC; Greystar GP II, LLC; Greystar 

Real Estate Partners, LLC; Greystar Worldwide, LLC; Greystar Investment Group, LLC; GREP Texas, 

LLC; Greystar Development and Construction, L.P.—Union on 24th Contractor Series; Greystar 

Development & Construction, L.P.; GEdR at Union on 24th, LLC; GEdR at Union on San Antonio, LLC; 

Greystar Development, LLC; GREP General Partner, LLC, (named as Greystar Real Estate Partners GP, 

LLC); Drew Kelley; and Clint Bordner. We exclude from this list defendant Greystar Management 

Services, LLC, because they are not properly before this Court, as we explain below. 

3

 The original defendants were B&D Contractors, Inc., Haegelin Wehmeyer Construction, Ltd., 

Lehne Construction, Inc., and Sun Star Services, LLC. 
 –3– 

In that suit, plaintiffs alleged proper venue in Travis County because “all or a 

substantial part of the events, acts and/or omissions giving rise to this lawsuit 

occurred in Travis County.” Plaintiffs alleged various negligent acts, including 

failing to secure the construction site, failing to take precautionary measures against 

high winds, and failing to implement, enforce, or follow safety policies and 

standards. 

The plaintiffs later nonsuited the Travis County suit and filed the present suit 

in Dallas County on June 23, 2023. Plaintiffs added Michael Croce (Delgado’s 

father) as a claimant. Plaintiffs added as defendants the Greystar Appellants, UFI, 

Landmark Construction Management, LLC, Drew Kelley, and Clint Bordner. 

 In the Dallas County original petition, Nova removed all references to Austin 

or Travis County. Nova generally alleged “[a] substantial part of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Dallas County” and “[o]ne of more of 

Defendants’ principal offices are located in Dallas County.” Beyond these general 

statements, Nova did not make any allegations specifically tying the incident or any 

defendant to Dallas County. Regarding the Greystar entities, Nova alleged each has 

a “principal place of business in Texas.” Regarding UFI, Nova alleged it is a foreign 

company “licensed to do business in the State of Texas.” 

The facts section of Nova’s Dallas County petition again alleged Delgado was 

struck and killed by a piece of debris that fell from a construction site during high 

winds. Nova alleged the defendants ignored wind and weather advisories and failed 
 –4– 

to take precautions. However, the petition omitted any reference to the location of 

the accident. Nova again alleged negligence and gross negligence by the defendants 

in failing to properly secure the job site and follow safety standards, among other 

acts. However, none of the factual or legal allegations discuss any acts, events, or 

omissions occurring in Dallas County (or Travis County). 

Appellants filed motions to transfer venue in response. Therein Appellants 

alleged venue was not proper in Dallas County because Nova had not sufficiently 

pleaded venue facts, had not established a substantial part of the events or omissions 

giving rise to Nova’s claims had occurred in Dallas County, and had not established 

any named defendant had a principal office in Dallas County. Appellants requested 

the court transfer the case to Travis County because at least one defendant had a 

principal office there and all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving 

rise to Nova’s claims occurred in Travis County. Appellants also argued the case 

should be transferred to Travis County based on the convenience of the parties and 

the interests of justice. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(b). Appellants 

attached Nova’s original Travis County petition to the motions to transfer. 

Nova filed an omnibus response to the motions to transfer. Nova primarily 

argued at least one of the defendants has a principal office in Dallas County, 

supporting venue there. Nova attached evidence in support, relying heavily on 

deposition and trial testimony in a prior Dallas County case involving certain 

Greystar entities. Nova also attached contracts related to that prior case and 
 –5– 

screenshots from Greystar and UFI websites describing some employees and offices. 

Nova argued the employees’ prior testimony supported they are “decision makers” 

in a Greystar office in Dallas County, making venue appropriate there. Nova further 

argued the court should not transfer the case based on convenience. Nova 

alternatively requested the court continue the hearing on the motions to transfer to 

allow venue-related discovery. 

Appellants replied, arguing Nova failed to properly plead venue facts or bring 

forth evidence any defendant had a principal office in Dallas County to support 

venue. The trial court held a hearing on the motions on December 15, 2023. The trial 

court deferred ruling, and in the interim, Nova amended her petition three times, 

adding numerous defendants. On April 19, 2024, the trial court signed an order 

denying Appellants’ motions to transfer venue. This appeal followed. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(b) (permitting interlocutory appeal of trial court’s 

venue determination in multi-plaintiff suits). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In an interlocutory appeal of a trial court’s venue ruling under Section 15.003 

of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the appellate court must “determine 

whether the trial court’s order is proper based on an independent determination from 

the record and not under either an abuse of discretion or substantial evidence 

standard.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(c)(1). Accordingly, our review is 

de novo. Deere & Co. v. Bernal, No. 05-22-00916-CV, 2023 WL 195547, at *3 
 –6– 

(Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 17, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). In conducting this 

review, we consider the entire record, including any evidence presented at the 

hearing. Id. 

ANALYSIS 

I. Proper Appellants 

Before discussing the merits, we must address the proper parties to this appeal. 

In their notice of appeal and briefing, the Greystar Appellants included “Greystar 

Management Services, LLC.” However, this defendant was added in Nova’s First 

Amended Petition, filed more than two months after the hearing on the other 

Greystar defendants’ motions to transfer. Furthermore, this defendant is not included 

in the caption or the body of the order denying the motions to transfer that gives rise 

to this interlocutory appeal. There is nothing in the record to indicate the trial court 

intended to include Greystar Management Services, LLC in its order denying the 

motions to transfer. 

The filing of a notice of appeal invokes the appellate court’s jurisdiction over 

all “parties to the trial court's judgment or order appealed from.” TEX. R. APP. P.

25.1(b) (emphasis added). Greystar Management Services, LLC is not a party to the 

trial court’s order forming the basis of this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE § 15.003(b) (permitting interlocutory appeal of trial court’s venue 

determination in multi-plaintiff suits). There is no basis for Greystar Management 

Services, LLC’s appeal, and we lack jurisdiction over that defendant. Accordingly, 
 –7– 

we dismiss for want of jurisdiction the appeal as to Greystar Management Services, 

LLC. 

II. The Trial Court Erred in Denying the Motions to Transfer Venue 

In their sole issue, Appellants contend the trial court erred in denying their 

motions to transfer venue. After reviewing the record, we agree. 

A. Venue 

Under the relevant portions of the venue statute, all lawsuits shall be brought: 

(1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; [or] 

(3) in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the 

defendant is not a natural person. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(a)(1), (3). When there are multiple 

plaintiffs, as here, each must independently establish proper venue. TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE § 15.003(a).

Generally, the plaintiff’s choice of venue cannot be disturbed if the suit is 

initially filed in a county of proper venue. Deere & Co., 2023 WL 195547, at *2 

(citing Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (Tex. 1994)). 

Once the defendant specifically challenges the plaintiff’s choice of venue, the 

plaintiff has the burden to present prima facie proof that venue is proper in the county 

of suit. Id. (citing TEX.R.CIV. P. 87(3)(a); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d 

233, 239 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. dism’d)). A plaintiff satisfies this burden 

“when the venue facts are properly pleaded and an affidavit, and any duly proved 
 –8– 

attachments to the affidavit, are filed fully and specifically setting forth the facts 

supporting such pleading.” Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); Roach v. Jackson, 

No. 05-20-00762-CV, 2020 WL 7258061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 10, 2020, 

pet. denied) (mem. op.)). This prima facie proof is not subject to rebuttal, crossexamination, impeachment, or disproof. Id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Johnson, 473 

S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied)). 

However, if the plaintiff fails to discharge its burden, the right to choose a 

proper venue passes to the defendant, who must then prove venue is proper in the 

defendant’s chosen county. Id. (citing In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212, 216 

(Tex. 1999); Ford Motor Co., 473 S.W.3d at 928.). Venue is determined based on 

the facts existing at the time the cause of action that is the basis of the suit accrued. 

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.006; Ford Motor Co., 473 S.W.3d at 930. 

Furthermore, the trial court must base its venue determination on the last timelyfiled pleading prior to the hearing on the motion to transfer. See In re Stephens, No. 

05-20-00833-CV, 2021 WL 1904324, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 12, 2021, orig. 

proceeding) (citing In re Hardwick, 426 S.W.3d 151, 157 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding)). 

B. “Principal office” 

Nova primarily relies on subsection (a)(3) of the general venue statute to argue 

one or more of the defendants have a principal office in Dallas County. TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(a)(3). “Principal office” means: “a principal office of 
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the corporation, unincorporated association, or partnership in this state in which the 

decision makers for the organization within this state conduct the daily affairs of the 

organization. The mere presence of an agency or representative does not establish a 

principal office.” Id. § 15.001(a). 

A corporation may have more than one principal office in this state. Deere & 

Co., 2023 WL 195547, at *2 (citing In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 217). 

However, even though “a principal office” suggests there can be more than one 

office, the word “principal” indicates some sort of primacy. Id. To establish venue 

based on a principal office, the plaintiffs must show the employees in the county 

where the lawsuit was filed (1) are “decision makers” for the company, and (2) have 

“substantially equal responsibility and authority” relative to other company officials 

within the state. Id. (citing Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d at 240). “Decision makers” who 

conduct the daily affairs are different kinds of officials than agents or 

representatives, and “daily affairs” does not mean relatively common, low-level 

management decisions. Id. That person need not be a C-suite person but must be 

higher than a low-level manager who makes only routine, non-policy decisions. In 

re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 217, 220–21. And, a principal office cannot be 

clearly subordinate to and controlled by another Texas office. Roach, 2020 WL 

7258061, at *7 (citing In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 221). 

Importantly, “[a] party cannot prove a prima facie case that a county has a 

principal office without evidence of the corporate structure and the authority of the 
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officers in the county of suit as compared with the remainder of the state.” In re Mo. 

Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220. 

To determine whether Nova met her burden to show proper venue in Dallas 

County based on a defendant having a principal office there, we begin by reviewing 

Nova’s original petition, the operative pleading at the time of the hearing on the 

motion to transfer. See In re Stephens, 2021 WL 1904324, at *6. Therein, Nova 

summarily pleaded “One or more of Defendants’ principal offices are located in 

Dallas County.” Nova did not allege any specific defendant had a principal office in 

Dallas County. Instead, Nova alleged several of the defendants have “a principal 

place of business in Texas.” (emphasis supplied). The only other references to Dallas 

are the allegations that some of the Greystar defendants could be served with process 

through their registered agent, CT Corporation System, in Dallas. 

 Nova did not allege any specific facts connecting the suit to Dallas County. 

The petition does not identify an office of any named defendant in Dallas County or 

allege any facts to show that any such office is a principal office. It does not allege 

any specific defendant has “decision makers” in Dallas County or conducts its daily 

affairs from an office there, as opposed to another office in Texas. Nova generally 

alleged defendants ignored warnings about the potential for high winds and failed to 

take precautions. Nova then alleged “Greystar” failed to ensure construction 

equipment and job sites are properly secured in adverse weather. Nova alleged the 

defendants were negligent in various respects, e.g. “failing to properly maintain their 
 –11– 

job site,” “failing to properly monitor the weather conditions at the job site,” and 

“failing to follow safety regulations and industry standards designed to protect 

against falling debris, equipment, and/or tools.” However, Nova ascribed this 

conduct to defendants collectively, without specifying any acts by any decision 

makers of any specific entity in Dallas County. 

Appellants argue Nova’s venue pleadings are so woefully deficient they do 

not meet Rule 87’s pleading requirements for venue. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3) (“All 

venue facts, when properly pleaded, shall be taken as true unless specifically 

denied...Prima facie proof is made when the venue facts are properly pleaded and 

an affidavit, and any duly proved attachments to the affidavit, are filed fully and 

specifically setting forth the facts supporting such pleading.”) (emphasis added). 

Appellants contend the pleadings are so deficient we should reverse on that basis 

alone. However, we need not decide the issue, as we conclude that, even if Nova 

sufficiently pleaded venue facts, she did not present prima facie proof of venue upon 

challenge by Appellants. 

In response to the motions to transfer, Nova submitted evidence to attempt to 

show a Greystar entity or UFI have a principal office in Dallas County. Nova relied 

heavily on deposition excerpts, trial testimony, and documents from the Flores case 

involving a 2019 crane collapse in Dallas.4

 Nova pointed to deposition testimony 

4

 Mason Flores et al. v. Bigge Crane and Rigging et al., No. CC-19-04006-B (Dallas Co. Ct. at Law 

No. 2). 
 –12– 

from Laird Sparks in Flores wherein Sparks stated he is the Senior Managing 

Director of Development for “Greystar,” but did not explain what specific Greystar 

entity is referenced. Sparks further testified his office is in Irving, and his job is to 

go out and look for sites to develop new projects. Nova asserted Sparks’s office is 

located “at the Greystar regional office in Irving, Texas” and included a footnote 

reference to a Greystar webpage purporting to establish that fact. However, a review 

of that web link reveals Greystar has offices in Austin, Dallas, Houston, and San 

Antonio.5

 

To show Sparks is a “decision maker,” Nova argued Sparks is often selected 

to serve as vice president for Greystar entities and sign contracts on their behalf. In 

support, Nova attached contracts from other projects bearing Sparks’s signatures as 

vice president for “GS Gabriella Holding, LLC,” “Gabriella Greystar, LLC,” 

“Gabriella Nationwide, LLC,” and “Gabriella Tower, LLC.” However, none of these 

entities are named defendants in this suit, and none of the cited testimony explains 

Sparks’s authority referenced to a named defendant in this case. Instead, these 

contracts relate to other Greystar entities involved in the Flores litigation. Nova 

argues these activities in Flores imply Sparks must have “companywide authority” 

on the “development side” of the Greystar entities and there must not be any other 

Greystar official with greater authority. Nova’s assertions are little more than 

5

 An exhibit attached to Nova’s response shows a similar screenshot indicating offices in at least 

Austin and Dallas and suggesting an office in San Antonio. Furthermore, at the hearing on the motion to 

transfer venue, Nova’s counsel acknowledged “Greystar” had an office or employees in Houston. 
 –13– 

surmise and conjecture and do not constitute probative evidence. See Marathon 

Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 728 & n.7-8 (Tex. 2003). 

On appeal, Nova cites to many other portions of Sparks’s deposition 

testimony in the Flores suit. While Sparks’s deposition was attached to Nova’s 

response to the motion to transfer, Nova did not cite or rely on many of the deposition 

excerpts it now relies on in this Court. However, even considering those excerpts, 

this additional testimony is not probative on whether any Greystar defendant had a 

principal office in Dallas County. Again, Sparks’s testimony relates to his role in 

developing the property in the Flores litigation, involving a 2019 incident for a 

Dallas County property. The testimony does not reveal the corporate structure of any 

named Greystar defendant or the authority of Sparks or his employer with respect to 

the other Greystar offices in Texas. In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220.6

Nova next relied on trial testimony from Toni Eubanks in the Flores case and 

screenshots from webpages related to Eubanks. Eubanks testified she worked for 

“Greystar Property Management” as of June 9, 2019, the date of the crane accident 

6

 Three months after the hearing on the motion to transfer venue, Nova filed a motion to compel 

venue discovery responses from the Greystar defendants. Nova attached a declaration by Sparks filed in the 

Flores suit. In that declaration Sparks states he is the Senior Managing Director – Development at Greystar 

Development & Construction, LP and lists an Irving address. This was not part of Nova’s response to the 

motion to transfer venue, though Nova relies on it in this Court to support its “principal office” argument. 

However, if even considered by the trial court or this Court, the declaration does little more than establish 

Sparks’s employer, title, and an Irving address. It speaks nothing as to that entity’s corporate structure, the 

Irving office’s relation to other Texas offices, or the primacy or subordination of the Irving office. See In 

re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220. And, the declaration was executed in April 2022, more than one 

year prior to the incident in this case. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.006; Ford Motor Co., 473 

S.W.3d at 930 (venue is determined based on the facts existing at the time the cause of action that is the 

basis of the suit accrued).
 –14– 

in Flores. “Greystar Property Management” is not a named defendant in Nova’s 

original petition (or any other petition). It is unclear whether “Greystar Property 

Management” is a distinct entity or a subdivision of some other Greystar entity. At 

the time of her Flores trial testimony (April 21, 2023), Eubanks indicated she 

currently works for “Greystar Real Estate Partners under the property management 

owner.”7

 She further testified that in 2019 she was the executive director over the 

“central territory” for the management company.8

 She stated she is not a “low-level 

person at Greystar.” At that time (2019), Eubanks was in charge of Texas, and 

several other states with the property management company. The webpage 

screenshots describe Eubanks as “Executive Director at Greystar” with a “DallasFort Worth Metroplex” descriptor. 

As with Sparks, we find the evidence relied upon by Nova with respect to 

Eubanks is not probative. Initially, we note the testimony of Eubanks in the Flores

case describes her position and authority in 2019. We are required to examine venue 

facts at the time the cause of action accrued. TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 15.006. 

Thus, the relevant date for determination of a principal office in Dallas County is 

March 2, 2023, when the accident occurred. Furthermore, even if that trial testimony 

7

 Two named defendants here include the phrase “Greystar Real Estate Partners”—Greystar Real 

Estate Partners GP, LLC and Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC. It is unclear whether Eubanks’s reference 

to “Greystar Real Estate Partners” means one of these named defendants. Regardless, it does not affect our 

analysis. 

8

 Sparks’s deposition testimony indicated that in 2019, Eubanks worked in the same Irving office 

with Sparks. 
 –15– 

supports that Eubanks was a decision maker at one of the named Greystar defendants 

in March 2023, the evidence is not probative on any particular Greystar entity’s 

corporate structure or the authority of Eubanks or her employer with respect to the 

other Greystar Texas offices. In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220. Similarly, 

the screenshots leave only surmise and speculation as to Eubanks’s specific 

employer, her authority, or the authority of any Greystar office. See id. 

Nova also included a screenshot from a Greystar website for Lance Hanna 

designating him as “Managing Director – U.S. Central Development.” Nova asserted 

Hanna “appears to work in Dallas County.” Nova similarly included a screenshot for 

Alaina Emley, which designates her as “Managing Director – Revenue 

Management.” Nova argued “it seems clear that at least one Greystar defendant has 

a principal office in Dallas County.” However, neither of these screenshots are 

probative on which named defendant Hanna or Emley worked for, their specific job 

duties or authority, the corporate structure of any Greystar entity, or the relationship 

or authority of any Greystar office with respect to any other. See In re Mo. Pac. Ry. 

Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220. 

In its response to the motions to transfer, Nova further argued defendant UFI 

“appears to have a principal office in Dallas County.” Nova again relied on a 

webpage screenshot, this time from www.unitedforming.com. The screenshot shows 

three employees and their purported titles: “Jose Rodriguez – Dallas-Fort Worth 

Area Safety Manager; Luis Paniagua – Austin Area Safety Manager; and Armando 
 –16– 

Urbina – Dallas-Fort Worth Area Manager.” Nova did not provide any evidence 

specifying whether UFI even has an office in Dallas County, the corporate structure 

of UFI, or the authority of any UFI office compared to another. Nova again relies on 

speculation to conclude UFI has a principal office in Dallas County. 

 None of the foregoing evidence meets the supreme court’s requirements to 

establish any named defendant had a principal office in Dallas County. In re Mo. 

Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220-21 (that one division superintendent who was 

identified by defendant railroad as a “decision maker” had office in plaintiffs’ chosen 

county was insufficient to establish that chosen county was location for a principal 

office for railroad in comparison with responsibility and authority exercised by 

railroad officials elsewhere in state, as required to establish prima facie case for 

venue); Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d at 242-44 (plaintiffs in case against railroad did not 

demonstrate that superintendent and senior manager in Dallas divisions had 

authority substantially equal to others in the state; although plaintiffs proved the 

Dallas divisions did not report to Harris County office, this did not support a 

conclusion that the superintendent and senior manager had comparable authority to 

the executives in Harris County, therefore plaintiffs failed to establish prima facie 

that Dallas County was a “principal office” for the railroad). 
 –17– 

Nova relies largely on our decisions in Roach v. Jackson9

 and Deere & Co. v. 

Bernal10 in support of its argument. We find these cases distinguishable. Roach 

involved a single corporate entity, Estes Express Lines with sixteen Texas shipping 

terminals, two of which were located in Dallas County. Id. at *1. Estes argued it had 

no principal office in Texas at all. Id. at *5. Estes’s corporate representative 

(Sanderson) testified he officed at the Dallas terminal. Id. at *6. Sanderson provided 

specific testimony on the corporate structure of Estes. Id. Sanderson also detailed 

his role as district manager and that he directed the various Texas shipping terminals, 

including their managers and activities and was the “go-to” person in Texas for the 

terminal managers. Id. Sanderson supervised Estes’s activities in a three-state region 

including the drivers used on a daily basis to deliver freight and ways to control 

costs. Id. 

Sanderson also testified that a regional vice-president (Collins) officed at the 

Dallas terminal and was the highest-ranking Estes employee in Texas. Id. Sanderson 

explained Collins directed the district operations managers and made decisions for 

Estes on a day-to-day basis according to guidelines given by the Virginia corporate 

office. Id. Sanderson also testified there were no other Texas terminals with more 

district or regional managers making decisions on behalf of Estes in Texas. Id. at *7. 

9

 Roach v. Jackson, No. 05-20-00762-CV, 2020 WL 7258061 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 10, 2020, 

pet. denied) (mem. op.). 

10 Deere & Co. v. Bernal, No. 05-22-00916-CV, 2023 WL 195547, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 17, 

2023, pet. denied). 
 –18– 

This Court concluded Sanderson and Collins were “higher level functionaries” that 

performed duties sufficient for decision-maker status, and the plaintiffs’ evidence 

showed no other Texas office had higher level management authority than or control 

over the Dallas office. Id. at *8. 

Deere also involved a single corporate entity that was sued in Dallas County 

based on the presence of a large regional distribution center there. Deere & Co., 

2023 WL 195547, at *1. Affidavit and deposition testimony described the corporate 

structure and operations of Deere in Texas. Id. at *4-6. The manager of the Dallas 

regional distribution center supervised over fifty employees, including several 

supervisors, was responsible for a large facility, and served Deere dealerships and 

customers in several states. Id at *6. The manager did not have a Texas supervisor. 

Id. at *1. Based on this evidence, this Court concluded the plaintiffs established the 

distribution center’s manager was a decision maker. Id. at *6-7. And, the evidence 

also supported the Dallas facility was not clearly subordinate to and controlled by 

another Deere office in Texas. Id. at *7. Accordingly, this Court concluded plaintiffs 

established Deere had a principal office in Dallas County for venue purposes. Id. 

The evidence here is not comparable to that in Roach or Deere. Even if the 

evidence showed Sparks, Eubanks, Hanna, or Emley are “decision makers,” there 

was no distinct testimonial or documentary evidence on the corporate structure of 

any of the named Greystar defendants, other than vague references to Greystar 

“affiliates” in the Flores case. And, there was no evidence addressing the 
 –19– 

relationship of any Greystar entity’s Irving office to the other Texas Greystar offices 

or the comparable authority of any of the Texas offices or employees. Neither was 

there evidence of the corporate structure of UFI, its decision makers, or their relative 

authority. 

 Accordingly, we conclude Nova did not provide prima facie proof the 

Greystar Appellants or UFI has a principal office in Dallas County. See In re Mo. 

Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 220-21; Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d at 242-44.

C. “Substantial part of the events or omissions” 

Nova also argues venue in Dallas County is proper because they alleged a 

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred there. 

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(a)(1). Our inquiry concerning the 

applicability of Section 15.002(a)(1) involves identifying the claims and then 

determining whether all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise 

to those claims occurred in Dallas County. Rush Truck Centers of Texas, L.P. v. 

Sayre, No. 05-23-00775-CV, 2023 WL 8270236, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 

2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). This provision limits the number of counties where venue 

can be maintained to those with a substantial connection with the lawsuit. Velasco 

v. Texas Kenworth Co., 144 S.W.3d 632, 634 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). 

We analyze whether the evidence shows the actions or omissions at issue are 

materially connected to the cause of action. Moveforfree.com, Inc. v. David Hetrick, 

Inc., 288 S.W.3d 539, 542 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing 
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KW Constr. v. Stephens & Sons Concrete Contractors, 165 S.W.3d 874, 882 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. denied); Chiriboga v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

96 S.W.3d 673, 680 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.)). 

Here, in her original petition, Nova stated: “A substantial part of the events or 

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Dallas County.” Other than tracking 

the statutory language, there are no allegations tying any acts or omissions in Dallas 

County to Nova’s claims. In the fact section of the petition, Nova describes that 

debris fell from a hi-rise construction project and struck Michael Delgado, resulting 

in his death. However, Nova curiously omits the locations of the construction project 

and Delgado at the time of the incident. Nova alleges there were wind and weather 

advisories in place at the time, but again provides no location details. Nova then goes 

on to allege the defendants were negligent in failing to perform the work in a safe 

manner, failing to monitor the weather, and failing to follow safety regulations and 

industry standards, among other acts. Again, however, Nova does not allege, even 

generally, where these acts or omissions occurred. There is no reference to any city 

or county, much less Dallas County. 

In the response to the motion to transfer venue, Nova did not point to any 

evidence supporting that a substantial part of the events or omissions occurred in 

Dallas County. Appellants contend Nova abandoned her reliance on Section 

15.002(a)(1) to establish venue. On appeal, Nova points to portions of Sparks’s 

testimony discussed above, and testimony from a superintendent (Brian Shrupsha) 
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for a Greystar entity in the Flores suit. We need not decide whether Nova abandoned 

her reliance on Section 15.002(a)(1) because even considering the evidence she now 

points to on appeal, it does not provide prima facie proof to support that a substantial 

part of the events or omissions occurred in Dallas County. 

Shrupsha’s testimony vaguely references policies in the Flores suit that may 

or may not have contributed to that incident (which occurred in Dallas in June 2019), 

with no indication of any relation to this construction-related incident (March 2023). 

Furthermore, none of Shrupsha’s cited testimony describes any act or omission by 

any named defendant in the present case. Shrupsha does not identify any specific 

office location from which any purported policies originated. Similarly, Sparks’s 

cited testimony references acts or omissions in the Flores suit, with no connection 

to the events or omissions leading to Delgado’s injury and death. Any contrary 

assertion by Nova requires surmise, suspicion, and conjecture, none of which 

constitutes probative evidence. See Marathon Corp., 106 S.W.3d at 728 & n.7-8. 

Ultimately, Nova did not provide prima facie proof that a substantial part of 

the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in Dallas County. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(a)(1); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3). 

D. Venue is proper in Travis County 

Because Nova did not come forward with prima facie proof to support venue 

in Dallas County, the burden shifted to Appellants to show venue is proper in their 
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chosen county (Travis County). In re Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 998 S.W.2d at 216; Ford 

Motor Co., 473 S.W.3d at 928. 

In their motions to transfer, Appellants alleged this case arises out of 

Delgado’s death in Austin. Relying in part on Nova’s petition filed in the Travis 

County probate court, Appellants described how Delgado was riding his bicycle near 

a construction site in Austin when high winds blew a piece of debris off a building 

under construction. The debris struck Delgado, killing him. Appellants alleged Nova 

then filed suit in Travis County against several defendants (except the Greystar 

entities), then retained new counsel, nonsuited the Travis County case, and refiled 

the suit in Dallas County, adding numerous defendants, including the Greystar 

entities.11 

Importantly, Nova did not specifically deny Appellants’ venue allegations that 

the incident occurred in Austin. We take properly pleaded venue facts as true unless 

they are specifically denied by the adverse party. TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); see 

GeoChem Tech Corp. v. Verseckes, 962 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. 1998). Furthermore, 

at the hearing on the motion to transfer, Nova’s counsel conceded Delgado was 

11 Appellants attached to their motion to transfer venue a file-stamped copy of Nova’s original petition 

in Travis County Probate Court, filed March 31st, 2023. The facts therein alleged in detail that on March 

2, 2023, Delgado was riding his bicycle near a “Greystar” construction site on Rio Grande Street in Austin 

when he was struck by a large piece of construction debris that had fallen from the site due to high winds. 

Nova alleged Austin news weather reports and other media had warned of severe weather, including high 

winds, and that various defendants had ignored weather warnings and failed to keep the construction site 

secure and safe. While statements in petitions from a non-suited case do not typically qualify as judicial 

admissions, we note the Travis County petition here as part of our consideration of the entire record and 

because it supports Appellants’ venue allegations. 
 –23– 

killed in Travis County and “[t]here’s no doubt some of the activities that took place 

were in Travis County...it happened in Austin.” Nova also admits in her appellate 

brief that the accident occurred in Austin.12 

We conclude Appellants properly pleaded venue facts, not specifically denied 

by Nova, that indicate a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to 

Nova’s claims occurred in Travis County. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 

15.002(a)(1). Other portions of the record support that conclusion. Accordingly, 

Appellants met their burden to show venue is proper in Travis County. TEX. R. CIV.

P. 87(2). We conclude the trial court erred in denying Appellants’ motions to transfer 

venue. We sustain Appellants’ sole issue. 

III. Nova’s Request for Continuance 

Nova argues that even if the trial court erred in ruling on the motions to 

transfer venue, this Court should remand to permit additional venue discovery 

because Nova moved for a continuance on that basis. We decline to grant such relief 

for several reasons. 

First, we question our jurisdiction to grant Nova’s requested relief because 

Nova did not file a notice of appeal complaining of the trial court’s denial of its 

motion for continuance. A party who seeks to alter the trial court’ s judgment or 

other appealable order must file a notice of appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c). The 

12 We also note an affidavit in the record from a co-defendant, B&D Contractors, Inc., indicates the 

project forming the basis of this suit was located in Travis County. 
 –24– 

appellate court may not grant a party who does not file a notice of appeal more 

favorable relief than did the trial court except for just cause. Id.

Assuming Nova filed a proper motion for continuance (discussed below), the 

trial court did not expressly rule on the motion but instead proceeded with the 

hearing, and later denied Appellants’ motions to transfer venue. We have previously 

recognized when a party moves to continue a hearing but the trial court conducts the 

hearing or rules on its substance, the trial court impliedly overrules the motion for 

continuance. See Favour Leasing, LLC v. Mulligan, No. 05-13-01000-CV, 2014 WL 

4090130, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 19, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court 

implicitly denied motion for continuance when it proceeded with the special 

appearance hearing and denied the special appearance); U.S. Terra Corp. v. First 

Nat. Bank of Park Cities, No. 005-95-01374-CV, 1996 WL 601717, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas Oct. 16, 1996, no writ) (not designated for publication) (by conducting 

the hearing on defendant’s special appearance, the trial court impliedly overruled 

plaintiff’s motion for continuance to conduct discovery). 

Here, by conducting the hearing and issuing a ruling on the motions to transfer 

venue, the trial court impliedly denied Nova’s motion for continuance. Nova did not 

challenge that ruling by notice of appeal. However, as appellees, Nova would have 

us grant greater relief than the trial court. In the absence of a proper appeal to this 

Court, we decline to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c); Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 

141 S.W.3d 158, 171 (Tex. 2004) (respondent did not preserve for review the issue 
 –25– 

of its authority to unilaterally amend deed restrictions and increase assessments, 

where it did not file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment, did not seek 

a cross-appeal, and did not petition supreme court for review on the point). 

Second, the record does not reflect Nova filed a proper motion for 

continuance. Generally, a motion for continuance must set out sufficient cause, 

supported by affidavit. TEX. R. CIV. P. 251. If a continuance is sought in order to 

pursue further discovery, the motion should be supported by affidavit and describe 

the evidence sought, explain its materiality, and show the party requesting the 

continuance used due diligence to obtain the evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 252; see WalMart Stores Texas, LP v. Crosby, 295 S.W.3d 346, 356 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, 

pet. denied). A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for 

continuance that does not meet the requirements of Rule 252. Id. Here, Nova did not 

file a motion for continuance supported by affidavit. Its request for continuance 

appeared within its response to Appellants’ motion to transfer.13 The request did not 

provide any detail regarding the requested discovery, but merely cited Rule 88 

(permitting discovery relevant to venue determination). Nova did not describe the 

evidence sought, explain its materiality, or show she used due diligence to obtain the 

evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 252. Generally, when movants fail to comply with the 

rules’ requirements that the motion for continuance be “supported by affidavit,” we 

13 Nova attached an affidavit to its response to the motion to transfer, but that affidavit merely proved 

up the attachments to the response. It did not address the need for a continuance. 
 –26– 

presume the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Villegas 

v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986). 

Third, even if Nova had filed a proper motion for continuance, we question 

Nova’s diligence in obtaining relevant venue evidence. Appellants filed their 

answers and motions to transfer venue on August 25, 2023. The hearing for the 

motions was set for December 15, 2023. However, the record reflects Nova did not 

serve any venue-related discovery until three days prior to the December 15th 

hearing. Furthermore, at that hearing Nova did not object to proceeding with the 

hearing and did not assert she needed more time to conduct venue discovery. Three 

months after the hearing, Nova moved to compel Appellants to respond to the venuerelated discovery served in December. The trial court denied the motions to transfer 

venue a few days before the hearing on the motion to compel. The record does not 

support Nova diligently pursued discovery on venue. See Bridgestone/Firestone, 

Inc. v. Thirteenth Ct. of Appeals, 929 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1996) (orig. 

proceeding) (trial court could reasonably have concluded plaintiffs had, but did not 

diligently pursue, an opportunity to obtain discovery on venue). For these reasons, 

we reject Nova’s request to remand for additional venue-related discovery. 

CONCLUSION 

The trial court erred in denying Appellants’ motions to transfer venue to 

Travis County. Even if Nova properly pleaded venue facts, upon challenge by 

Appellants, Nova did not provide prima facie proof venue is proper in Dallas 
 –27– 

County. Nova did not provide probative evidence any named defendant had a 

principal office in Dallas County or that a substantial part of the events or omissions 

giving rise to the claims occurred in Dallas County. Conversely, Appellants pleaded 

venue facts—not specifically denied by Nova—that venue is proper in Travis 

County, and the record supports that conclusion. Furthermore, Nova is not entitled 

to a continuance to pursue additional venue-related discovery. Accordingly, we 

reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to transfer 

Appellants’ case to Travis County. We dismiss for want of jurisdiction the appeal as 

to Greystar Management Services, LLC. 

240532F.P05 

 

/Robbie Partida-Kipness/

ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS 

JUSTICE 
 –28– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

GREYSTAR STUDENT HOUSING 

GROWTH AND INCOME FUND 

OP, LP, GREYSTAR 

DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LP, 

GREYSTAR DEVELOPMENT 

CENTRAL, LLC, ET AL., 

Appellants 

No. 05-24-00532-CV V. 

BRITTNEY NOVA, ET AL., 

Appellees 

 On Appeal from the County Court at 

Law No. 2, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-23-03924-

B. 

Opinion delivered by Justice PartidaKipness. Justices Pedersen, III and 

Carlyle participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court with 

instructions to transfer Appellants’ case to Travis County. 

 It is further ORDERED that the appeal as to Greystar Management 

Services, LLC is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. 

 

 It is ORDERED that Appellants GREYSTAR STUDENT HOUSING 

GROWTH AND INCOME FUND OP, LP, GREYSTAR DEVELOPMENT 

GROUP, LP, GREYSTAR DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL, LLC, ET AL. recover 

their costs of this appeal from Appellees BRITTNEY NOVA, ET AL. 

Judgment entered this 22nd day of August 2024.