IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-10575

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

PEDRO MUNOZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Consolidated with No. 18-10583

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

PEDRO MUNOZ RUIZ, also known as Pedro Carrillo, also known as Luis A. 

Ruiz, also known as Luis Alberto Ruiz, also known as Pedro Ruiz, also known 

as Pedro Martinez, 

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:10-CR-61

USDC No. 4:17-CR-230

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 12, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Before BENAVIDES, HIGGINSON, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Pedro Munoz appeals the 151-month sentence imposed on his guilty plea 

conviction for possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance. See

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Additionally, he appeals the 24-month 

revocation sentence imposed on the related revocation of his term of supervised 

release on an earlier conviction for illegal reentry. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). 

The district court ordered that these sentences be served consecutively. We 

affirm both sentences.

Ordinarily, we review an original sentence for reasonableness in light of 

the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 46, 49-50 (2007). In reviewing for reasonableness, we “merely ask[ ]

whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 351 (2007). We ordinarily review a revocation sentence to determine if it

is plainly unreasonable in light of certain sentencing factors set forth in 

§ 3553(a), asking whether the district court abused its discretion. See United 

States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843-44 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Under the bifurcated review process adopted in Gall, we first examine 

whether the district court committed procedural error. See 552 U.S. at 51. We 

employ a bifurcated process in the revocation context as well, applying the 

revocation abuse-of-discretion standard in analyzing the substantive 

reasonableness of a revocation sentence after examining for procedural error. 

See Miller, 634 F.3d at 842-43. But review of any claim is for plain error if “the 

defendant has the opportunity to seek vindication of [his] rights in district 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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court” but fails to avail himself of that opportunity. Puckett v. United States, 

556 U.S. 129, 136 (2009).

The parties disagree about the standard of review applicable to the 

claims that the district court did not consider Munoz’s arguments for 

downward variances and for concurrent sentences and did not adequately 

explain its sentences and consequently that the sentences are procedurally 

unreasonable. Munoz did not preserve his procedural arguments. See, e.g., 

United States v. Rouland, 726 F.3d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 2013). However, he has 

shown no error at all and thus no plain error. See United States v. Teuschler, 

689 F.3d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 2012). We need not decide whether plain error 

applies to his challenge to substantive reasonableness, as Munoz does not 

prevail under the ordinary standard. See United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 

519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008). 

A sentencing judge need not state “explicitly that he . . . heard and 

considered” every argument the defendant made. Rita, 551 U.S. at 359. The 

records in these consolidated cases make clear that the “sentencing judge 

listened to each argument.” Id. at 358. The record shows also that the district 

court considered the presentence report’s ample evidence of Munoz’s extensive 

criminal history. Additionally, the district court remarked that its sentences 

were appropriate in light of applicable factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

Those remarks constituted an adequate explanation of the sentences in these 

cases and of the reasons for rejecting, knowingly but implicitly, any downward 

variance. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 345; see also United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 

511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). 

With respect to substantive reasonableness, a within-guidelines 

sentence “is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 

554 (5th Cir. 2006). Also, a presumption of substantive reasonableness 

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attaches to a revocation sentence within the policy statement advisory range. 

United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Munoz’s suggestion that we reweigh the § 3553(a) factors is unavailing. 

See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In light of the district court’s thorough review of the 

records and recitation of the reasons justifying the sentences, Munoz offers no 

adequate basis for forgoing application of the presumption of reasonableness 

that attaches to each and for supplanting each with a sentence of this court’s 

choice. See id. 

Nor does Munoz succeed in overcoming his failure to show that either 

sentence is unreasonable in its own right by attacking the cumulative 

sentence. The district court’s decision to order that the sentences be served 

consecutively was authorized by statute and recommended by the Sentencing 

Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) & comment. (n.4), p.s. 

Given the deference owed the sentencing court, we see no reason to disturb the 

district court’s exercise of its discretion.

AFFIRMED.

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