## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

Alternat ive Staffing, Inc. v. Illinoi s Departm ent of Em

ploym ent Security , 2012 IL App (1st) 113332

Appellate Court Caption AL TERNATI VE STAFF I NG, I NC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. I L L I NOI S DEPARTMENT OF EMPL OYMENT SECUR I T Y, an Administrative Ag ency of the State of I llinois ; J AY ROWEL L
, Direc tor of Employ ment Security ; and EL I Z AB ETH ARMSTR ON G, Claimant, DefendantsAppellee s.

District & N o. First District, F irst Division
Docke t No. 1-11-3332

Rule 23 Order

filed
Rule 23 Order withdrawn Opinion filed Dec ember 3, 2012

Dec ember

18, 2012
Dec ember

21, 2012

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s ti tut es no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the R epo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) The Boa rd of Review’s awa

rd of unemploy

ment benef

i t s t o claimant b as ed o n its finding that she was not discharg ed for deliberately and willfully violating plaintiff’s proce dures was reve rsed as clea rly

err oneous i n view of claimant’s hist ory of warning s about her tardiness and poor w ork per formanc e.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Co ok County
, No. 11-L -050643; the Hon. Marg are t A. Br ennan, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Reverse d.Counsel on

Appea l Wessels Sherman, of Chicag o (Sean F. Drake, of counsel), for appellant.

L isa Madig an, At torney Gene ral, of Chicag o (Michae l A. Scodro, Solicito r Ge n eral, and Valer ie Quinn, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, of counsel), f

or appe llees.

Panel J USTI CE CUNNI NGHAM delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice Hoffma n and J ustice Rochford concur red in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 P l ai n t i ff Alterna tive Staffing
, I nc. (Alternative Staffing ), discharged i t s em p l o y ee , defe ndant Eliz abeth Armstrong (Armstrong ), for miscondu ct , an d Armstrong applied for unemploy ment i nsuranc e benef

its. Armstrong ’s claim with the I llinois Depa rtment of E m p l o y ment Security (I DES) was initially denied, but on appea l, the Boa rd of Review ultimately found her elig ible for unemploy ment benef

its, and the cir cuit court of Cook County aff irmed that dec ision. Alternative Staffingnow cha lleng es that ruling on appea l. ¶ 2 Al t er n at i v e S t af fi n g m ai n t ains that Armstrong eng ag ed in misconduct wher e s h e repe atedly arr ived l ate for work a nd perf ormed poorly , and that the Board failed t o look at the series of violations and instead focuse d on only one “ ‘final ’ o r ‘t ri ggered’ event” in deter mining that Armstrong did not willful l y or deliberately violate its policy

. Alterna tive Staffing further maintains that the Boa rd failed to deter

mine whether Armstrong ’s testimony at the telephone hear ing w as cr edible. ¶ 3 On J an u ar y 11, 2010, Armstrong was hired by Alterna tive Staffing as i t s p ay ro l l ad m i n i strator. On October 28, 2010, she was terminated for m isconduct. S he then soug ht, and wa s ultim ately

awa rded, une mploy

ment insurance benef

its. ¶ 4 The recor d shows that on April 1, 2010, Armstrong rec eived a mem o randum from her
manag er, J ulie Trac ey (Mana g er Trac ey ), informing her that the swipe car d issued to her was fo r the time clock sy stem which would be eff ective April 5, 2010, that her start time o n Monday was 8 a.m. until further notice, and that she was considere d to be an hourly employ ee. I n the memorandum, Manag er Trac ey further stated that it had become appar ent that Armstrong was not content with her curr ent assig nment as pay roll administrator, that her work perf ormanc e had been less than what was anticipated when she was hired, and that she

wa s b ei ng place d on probation. Armstrong was further admonished that if there was n o immediate and dramatic turnaround in her perf o rmanc e within the next 30 working day s, Alternative Staffing would have no other option but to terminate he r e mp lo y me n t. Armstrong
wrote on the memorandum document that “[m] y discontentment is due to the fac t that there is not enoug h work to be done in a 40 hour wee k.” She signe d and dated this statement April

-2-2, 2010.

¶ 5 The rec ord fur t h er s h o ws t h at o n May 24, 2010, Armstrong was g iven an employ ee

war ning notice detailing Armstrong ’s nine tar dy /late infra ctions as follows: April 26, 2010, schedule d for 8 a .m., arrive d at 8:09 a.m. April 27, 2010, schedule d for 7 a .m., arrive d at 7:23 a.m. May 3, 2010, schedule d for 8 a .m., arrive d at 8:27 a.m. May 4, 2010, schedule d for 7 a .m., arrive d at 7:15 a.m. May 10, 2010, schedule d for 8 a .m., arrive d at 8:15 a.m. May 11, 2010, schedule d for 7 a .m., arrive d at 7:24 a.m. May 17, 2010, schedule d for 8 a .m., arrive d at 8:37 a.m. May 18, 2010, schedule d for 7 a .m., arrive d at 7:42 a.m. May 24, 2010, schedule d for 8 a .m., arrive d at 8:21 a.m. Armstrong was war

ned that the “[n] ext occur

renc e will result in a 1 wee k suspension without
pay ,” and A rmstrong signe d this noti ce on the date it was issued. ¶ 6 On J uly 20, 2010, Armstrong was issued another employ ee war ning notic e wh i ch s h e also signe d. Acc ording to this not ice, Ar mstrong w as sche duled to arr ive at wor k at 8 a.m.

on J uly 19, 2010, but did n o t arr ive until 8:50 a.m. I t was also noted that Armstrong had called and informed Manag er T racey that she would be arr iving late beca use she had overslept, and that Armstrong was advised that Alterna tive Staffing would suspend her for the next five Fr iday s. Ar m s t ro n g was also notified that the next infrac tion would result in termination. ¶ 7 On September 15, 2010, Armstrong was issued another employ ee war ning notice, which she si g ned. This notice was prec ipitated by a pay roll err or Ar m s t rong made on September 1 0, 2010, which resulted in five employ ees rec eiving an incorre ct pay ment amoun t

. On September 15, 2010, Armstrong made another pay roll err or for a client which resulted in an incorre ct pay amount for two employ ees. Armstrong was ag ain advised that a further infrac tion would result in termination of employ ment. On this notice, Armstrong wrote that she “under stood” that she should “slow down to g et my work more acc urate [ sic ],” and that she had be en told previously to “spee d up.” ¶ 8 On October 14, 2010, Armstrong rec eived an employ ee war ning notice rela ting to her 33- minute tardiness on October 11, 2010. She was also advised that she had b ee n repe atedly

war ned an d repr imanded for excessive tardiness. On October 26, 2010, Armstrong was issu ed another employ ee war ning notice, following her late arr ival at 8:20 a.m., when she was sche duled to arr ive at 8 a.m. ¶ 9 On Oc t o b er 2 8
, 2 0 1 0
, Alternative Staffing issued a letter terminating Armstrong ’s employ ment based on her repe ated tardiness and poor perf ormanc e. Alterna tive Staffing noted that Armstron g h ad been late nine times in one month, and ag ain on J uly 20, 2010, Oc t ober 14, 2010, and October 26, 2010. Alterna tive Staffing also provid ed t h at 1

Base d on th e e m

plo yee war nin g noti ce, th is sho uld be Oct obe r 1 1, 20 10. 1

-3-Armstrong ’s empl o y m en t was terminated for poor work perf ormanc e as noted in the September 15, 2010, notice

. ¶ 10 On October 31, 2010, Armstrong filed a claim for unemploy ment insurance benef

its. I n the interview conducte d on her claim, Armstrong indicated, inter alia
, that she was not awa re that her job wa s in je opardy and fur ther indica ted that she wa s having car problems during the time in question. ¶ 11 On November 10, 2010, Alterna tive Staffing sent the I DES a protest letter opposing the
g rant of unemploy

ment benef

its to Armstrong

. Alterna tive Staffing alleg ed that over a period of nin e m o n t h s , “var ious issues started to surfa ce g iving us a g rea t deal of conce rn.” Alternative Staffing alleg ed that Armstrong made numerous late night telephone calls to the presid e n t o f th e c o mp a

ny , St e v e n Swerdloff (Swerdlof f), and employ ees Manag er Trac ey and Yol anda Sappington, during which she appea red to be under the influence

. Alternative Staffing also al l ege d that Armstrong was g iven a war ning letter outlining conce rns over Armstrong ’s work perf

ormanc e, including “[a]ccura cy and overa ll discontent.” I n response to this l etter, A rmstrong stated t hat s he was bored. Alternative Staff ing f urther note d in its protest letter that Armstrong had been late 12 times and that Armstrong made various pay roll

err ors resulting in sever al employ ees being paid incorre ctly twice in two wee ks. Alternative Staffing asser

ted that she should be found ineligible for benef its based on her “continued *** disreg ard [of] prudent company policies.” ¶ 12 On Nove m b er 1 8
, 2 0 1 0
, t h e I DES found Armstrong ineligible for une mploy ment benef its, based on her discharg e for tardiness. The I DES n o t ed that Armstrong was previously war

ned by Alternative Staffing and wa s awa re of company policy
, and she was discharg ed for misconduct under section 602(A) of the Unemploy ment I nsuranc e Act (Ac t) (820 I L CS 405/ 602(A) ( West 2010)). ¶ 13 On Dec ember 15, 2010, Armstrong filed a r e q u e s t f o r r e c onsideration of the adjudicator’s deter mination. She maintained that she w a s wr o n g fully terminated due to reta liation from her employ er and that the last two dates of tardiness wer e “not under [her] control.” Armstrong maintained that she was the only black employ ee at the company and that Alternative Staffing was try

ing to make her quit. ¶ 14 A rmstrong further alleg ed that when she was switched to hourly employ ee status, s h e w a s not “fo rm al ly told the proce dures that hourly employ ees wer e not allowed [t o punch] in

ear ly ,” and she later discovere d that h er “p u n ches wer e being highly scrutinized.” She maintained that on May 10 and 11, 2010, she was p ai d i n corr ectly due to the fac t that Manag er Trac ey chang ed her password to a cce ss the softwar e prog ram, there by preve nting her from doing her job. On May 17 and 18, 2010, she had called Manag er Trac ey informing her she would be late and to note that she had worke d until 7:44 p.m. the previous night. She maintained that on J uly 19
, 2010, she overslept beca use she had taken a sleeping pill. Armst rong also alleg ed that her work err ors wer e due to Manag er Trac ey setting up employ ees w ith the wrongsocial sec urity numbers and r ates. ¶ 15 Armstrong further claimed that on October 11, 2010, h er ca r en gi n e s t opped on the
expressway , and when it was finally restar ted, s he continued on to work. S he claimed that

on October 26, 2010, her son had the car and was called into a mandatory work meeting and

-4-that she had notified her manag er. When she finally had possession of the car , the Stevenson

expressway was closed due to “extremely high rain,” winds of 61 miles per hour, and threats of a tornado

. S h e m ai n t ained that the l ast two tardy dates “were completely [ ] out of [ her] control.” ¶ 16 I n support of her appea l, Arms t ro n g attache d, inter alia
, invoice noti ces from her a uto repa ir shop which wer e dated October 13 and November 2, 2010. The invoices provided that the car “dies” sometimes. Armstrong also included a copy of a medical return- to-work note from her doctor, which indicated that she was under his car e on September 13, 2010, and that she could re turn to work the ne x t day

. ¶ 17 On Dec ember 17, 2010, the cl ai m s ad j u d icator issued a rec onsidered de termination, finding that Armstrong was elig ible for benef its from October 31, 2010. The adjudicator noted that Armstrong had provided a medical statement and auto repa ir bill for the day s she called in a

bsent, and beca

use the a ction that resulted in her discharg e wa s not de liberate or willful, she was e ligible f or bene fits. ¶ 18 On Dec ember 20, 2010, Alternative Staffing filed an appea l and re quested a telephone hear ing. On J anuar

y 5, 2011, Alterna tive Staffing ’s attorney filed an appeara n ce and documented Armstrong ’s t ardine ss from May 24 throug h October 26, 201 0
, n o t i n g a tot al of 12 late arr ivals and also 2 war nings reg arding her poor work perf ormanc e, which included the incorre ct entry of employ ees’ salarie s. Altern at i v e S taffing maintained that this documentation clea

rly indicated that Ar m strong willfully and delibera tely continued to violate its rea sonable policies. Alterna tive Staffing noted that it had only asked that Armstrong come to work on time, and h ad p rovi ded her with numerous war nings and opportunities to corr ect her behavior
, but that she decide d not to heed those wa rn i n gs or instructions. ¶ 19 On J anuar

y 11, 2011, the telephonic hear ing was held. Swerdloff
, the p re s i d en t an d

owner of Alternative Staffing
, testified that he hired Armstrong as the pay roll administrator and h er d u t i es included enter ing the hours of Alterna tive Staffing ’s employ ees onto time

car ds, auditing those rec ords, making s u re t he chec ks wer e issued and balanc ed
appropr iately
, and making sure that al l employ ees wer e paid proper ly

. Swerdloff further stated that he believed Armstrong had a drinking problem as she would come in “fog g y ” or “not all there .” She then started having tardiness problems, particula rl y o n M o nday or Tuesday
, which beca

me a larg e problem for them in g etting chec ks is s u ed o n t i m e. Armstrong ’s tardiness was first discussed with her on May 24, 2010, afte r she had been late nine times. The next tim e she w as late was J uly 19, 2010. On that day
, she ca lled Manag er Trac ey to let her know sh e h ad o v erslept and arr ived about an hour late. Ba sed on that tardiness, Alternative Staffing suspended Armstrong for a wee k without pay , but allowed her
to take five Fr iday s in a row off, rathe r than suspend her for one consec utive wee k, to limit the financial hardship to her. Swerdloff further t es tified that he terminated Armstrong due
t o “excessive tardiness and poor job perf ormanc e,” noting that Armstrong was orig in al l y hired a s an hourly

employ ee. ¶ 20 Armstrong testified that she was orig inally hired as an “exempt ” em p l o y ee wi th no attendanc e pol i cy , b u t she acknow ledg ed that Swerdloff informed her that there wer e no

-5-vacation day s, bere aveme nt day s, paid time off, or sever ance or sick pay

. Armstrong further

testified that she was awa re that if she was not on t i m e, she could be suspended or discharg ed. She explained that her start time fluctuated, that the schedule was posted on Saturday s, and that on the last wee k of work, which included October 28, 2010, she was to repor t to work at 8 a.m. on Monday and Tuesday

. The schedule was given t o her verbally

. Armstrong explained that she was late to work during the last wee k of her employ ment beca use her son had possession of her car and there was a tornado. She acknow ledg ed that she was tardy nine times as noted by Alterna tive Staffing

. I n summary , Armstrong stated that

s h e d i d n ot willfully or deliberately try to be late, and that it was her employ er’ s intent to terminate her from the time she had explained to him that there was not enoug h work to do in a 40-hour w eek. ¶ 21 On J anuar

y 12, 2011, the ref

ere e issued a decision finding that Armstrong was inelig ible for benef its. I n rea ching its decision, th e re fe re e noted that Armstrong was hired as an “exempt” employ ee and was later adjus t ed to an hourly employ ee status based on her

numerous attendanc e infrac tions and was discharg ed fo r excessive tardiness. The ref ere e found that Armstrong had been war ned and had been late more than a dozen times, that she

was awa re of her start time, but continued to be late, and did not reme dy h er at t en d an ce problems even though she was awa re that her job was in jeopar dy

. The ref ere e noted that an employ er ha s the rig ht to ex pect its employ ees to repor t to work on time, unless pre vented from doing so for some compelling rea son, that Armstrong ’s actions wer e within her control, and that her misconduct was deliberate and willful. Ba sed on the prep o n d er an ce of the evidenc e, the ref

ere e found that Armstrong ’s actions amounted to misconduct under section 602(A) of the Act a nd that she wa s disqualified from re ceiving unemploy ment benef

its. ¶ 22 On J anuar

y 21, 2011, Armstrong appea led the ref ere e’s decision. She maintained that the ref ere e err ed in finding t h at h er t ardine ss was misconduct and that she was denied a fair hear ing. Although Armstrong filed a b rief in support of her appea l, this brief was not considere d by the Board of Review (Boa rd) because it was not cer tified in writing to have been ma iled to or serve d upon Alterna tive Staffingas re quired. ¶ 23 On May 3, 2011, the Boa rd set aside the ref

ere e’s decision and found Armstrong elig ible for benef its. The Boa

rd deter mined that Armstron g wa s last late to work prior to her discharg e on October 26, 2010, due to extremely poor weather conditions and the circ umstance of

her son ha

ving posse ssion of her c ar, a nd conclude d:
“The employ er has not established by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the claimant when [she] arr ived late to work on October 26, 2010 was willfully and delib erately violating [plaintiff’s] policies and proce dures.” ¶ 24 On J une 7, 2011, Alternative Staffing filed a timely complaint for administrative revie w in the circuit court of Cook County
, alleg ing t h at t h e Board’ s decision was contra ry to the law and ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e. Alterna tive Staffing maintained that the Boa rd ignor ed documents introduced into evidenc e, as well as testimony taken at the hear ing, in arr iving at its err oneous conclusion that Armstrong was not dis ch ar g ed for misconduct under se ction 602(A) of

the Act. ¶ 25 On Aug ust 31, 2011, Altern at i v e S t af f filed a brief alleg ing that, in setting aside the

-6-ref ere e’s J anuar

y 12, 2011 dec i s i on, the Boa rd focuse d solely on the last absenc e, as a “trig g ering event,” instead of the series of absenc es leading up to her termination as well as her poor work perf

ormanc e. Alternative Staffing maintained that section 602(A) of the Act does not contemplate one final or trig g ere d event to deter mine if an individual willfully and deliberately violated a company policy
, but instead violation of this section may result from “ ‘cumulative rules violations taken as a whole, beca use the d efinit ion of misconduct includes repe ated rules violations following a war ning.’ ” I t further alleg ed that the Boa rd’s deter mination wa s clea

rly err oneous based on its fa ilure to inc lude the serie s of events that led t o Armstrong ’s employ ment termination, the evide nce of her pay roll err ors, credibility and reliability of the witnesses, and that the Boa rd err oneously relied on one trig g ering event in rea ching its decision that Armstrong was not terminate d for misconduc t. ¶ 26 The circ uit court aff irmed the Boa

rd’s decision, finding that the decision was not ag ainst the manifest weig ht of the evidenc e, contra ry to law, or clea

rly err oneous. T his appea l followed. ¶ 27 I n th i s co u rt , Al t er n at i v e S t af fi n g contends that the Boa rd’s decision was c lear ly

err oneous in that it only relied on one “trig g ering ” event, namely
, Armstrong ’s tardiness on October 26, 2010, to conclude that Armstrong di d not eng ag e in misconduct and was there fore entitled to unemploy ment benef

its. Alterna tive Staffing maintains that the Boa rd’s decision failed to take into ac count the repe ated and cumulative actions that Alterna tive Staffing relied on in making its decision to terminate Armstrong ’s em ploy ment. This included Armstrong ’s tardiness on 12 occa sions and her disreg ard of Alterna tive Staffing ’s instructions to be more ca ref ul in making pa

y roll entries. ¶ 28 I DES initially takes issue with Alterna tive S t af fi n g’s brief, claiming that it is not in compliance with I llinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (ef f. J uly 1, 2008) in that it has no statement of fac ts, fails to pinpoint citations for case s it cites, and makes statements unsupported by fac tual or leg al citations. We allowed Alterna tive Staffing t o rec tify any defic iency

by filing a supplemental brief

, which complies with Rule 341. ¶ 29 As to the substantive matter, our revie w of the administrative proce eding is limit ed to the propriety of the Boa

rd’s decision. Odie v. Departme nt of Employme nt Security
, 377 I ll. App. 3d 710, 713 (2007). Whether an employ ee was discharg ed for misconduct i s a mix ed question of fac t and law and is analy z ed under the clea

rly err oneous standard of revie w. Hurst v. Departme nt of Employme nt Security
, 393 I ll. App. 3d 323, 327 (2009). A decision is clea rl y er ro n eous if the rec ord leave s the revie wing court with the firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. AFM Messe nger Serv i ce, Inc. v. Departme nt of Employme nt Security , 198 I ll. 2d 380, 395 (2001). ¶ 30 An employ ee who is discharg ed for misc o n d u c t is ineligible for unemploy ment insurance benef its. 820 I L CS 405/602(A) (West 2010). Misconduct can be premised on either a particula r incident of a violation of an employ er’ s rules that trig g ere d th e em ploy ee’ s discharg e, or the employ ee’ s cumulative violations of the employ er’ s rules taken as a whole. Katten Muchin & Zavis v. Departme nt of Employme nt Security
, 279 I ll. App. 3d 794, 800 (1996). Alterna

tive Staffing maintains that the Boa rd fail ed t o l o o k at the series or cumulative events that led to her termination, failed to revie w all the “rule s” that Alternative

-7-Staffing had relied on in terminating Armstrong
, and failed to proper ly apply section 602(A)

of the Ac t in determining if there was misconduct. ¶ 31 We observe that section 602(A) of the Act define s misconduct as a deliberate and willful violation of an employ er’ s rea sonable rule or policy
, provided that the violation has harme d the employ er or other employ ees or has been repeated despite a war n i n g o r o t h er expli cit instruction from the employ er. 820 I L CS 405/602(A) (West 2010). Wil lful misconduct

occur s where an employ ee is awar e of a company rule a nd consciously

disreg ards it. Odie
, 377 I ll. App. 3d at 713. Har m inc ludes damag e or injury to othe r employ ees’ well-be ing or morale or to th e e mp loy er’ s operations or g oodwill, and tardiness harms an employ er beca use it disrupts the g ener al operations of the bus i n ess. W oods v. Departme nt of Employme nt Security , 2012 I LApp (1st) 101639, ¶ 21 ( citing 56 I ll. Adm. Code 2840.25(b) (2012) ). ¶ 32 Her e, the rec ord shows that Alternat i v e S t af fi ng prese nted evidenc e of a re asonable
p o l i cy reg arding timely attendanc e by its employ ees ( W oods
, 2012 I L App (1st) 10163 9
, ¶ 20), Armstrong admitted that she was awa re of this policy
, and on April 2, 2010, she signe d

a memorandum detailing the fac t that she had a swipe car d for the time clock sy stem and that she was require d to arr ive by a cer tain time. Nonethele ss, from April 26 throug h May 24, 2010, Armstrong was tardy nine times and rec eived a war ning that if the tardiness continued she would rec eive a one-w eek suspension without pay

. She was tardy ag ain on J uly 19, 2010, beca use she overslept, and rec eived a second war ning that if she was tardy ag ain she would be terminated. Notwithstanding the war ning, she arr ived late on October 11, 2010, due to car problems, and rec eived another war ning. Ag ain, two wee ks later, on October 26, 2010, she was 20 minutes late f

or work and explained that he r son had possession of her c ar a nd that by the time he returne d home with the car the expressway was closed due to sever e weather. ¶ 33 Thus, althoug h Armstrong was well awa re of her previous infra ct i o n s an d att endant

war nings, and knew that he r job was in jeopa rdy , she re peate dly

arr ived late for work. The

rec o rd re flec ts that Armstrong knew that her car was not reliable
, and that her son had possession of her car on October 26, 2010, but delibera tely chose to wait on that date, rathe r than seek a differ ent mode of transporta tion to g et to work on time. See Odie
, 377 I ll. App. 3d at 714-15. The se cumulative inc idents demonstrate a complete and conscious disreg ard of Alt ernative Staffing ’s reasonable work pol icy which required employ ee s t o b e on time. Under the Act, this constitutes willful misconduct. W oods
, 2012 I L App (1st) 101639, ¶ 20; 820 I L CS 405/ 602(A) ( West 2010). ¶ 34 The Boa

rd, howeve r, focuse d on a single “trig g ering ” incident of tardiness wher e some extenuating circ umstances exis ted, but failed to make any ref ere nce to the 11 p revious incidents of tardiness and rules violations set forth by Alterna tive Staffing
, which cumulatively fe l l wi thin the scope of misconduct under section 602(A) of the Act. Katten Muchin &Zavis , 279 I ll. App. 3d at 799. We hold, afte r revie w, that the evide nce doe s not support the Boa

rd’s deter mination. Rhoads v. Board of Trustees of the City of Calumet City Policeme n’s Pension Fund, 293 I ll. App. 3d 1070, 1076 (1997). ¶ 35 Although p o o r p er fo rm an ce an d car elessness standing alone would not make he r ineligible for unemploy

ment benef

its ( Messe r & Stilp, Ltd. v. Departme nt of Employme nt Security
, 392 I ll. App. 3d 849, 862 (2009))
, it is evident that Armstro n g’s ac tions harme d

-8-Alternative Staffing and that her repe ated tardiness constituted misconduct in connection

with her wor

k under the Act ( W

oods , 2012 I LApp (1st) 101639, ¶ 21)

. ¶ 36 Alternative Staffing further contends that the Boa rd failed to document which witnesses it found to be cre dible. The Boa rd, h o we v er , i s not require d to make such a finding

. 820 I L C S 4 0 5 / 8 0 3 (West 2010). I n any event, g iven our holding, this issue is moot. Sloan v. O’De ll , 159 I ll. App. 3d 268, 274 (1987). ¶ 37 I n sum, wher e the evid en ce s h o ws t h at Ar m s trong was g iven five warnings and a memorandum reg arding her tardiness or poor work per formanc e, the chronic nature of t he infrac tions, and the harm cause d to Alterna tive Staffing and its employ ees, we hold that the Boa rd’s decision that Armstrong di d not deliberately and willfully violate the employ er’ s policies and proce dures is clea rly err oneous. W

oods
, 2012 I L App (1st) 101639, ¶ 21; Odie, 377 I ll. App. 3d at 714-15; 820 I L CS 405/602(A) (West 2010). W e, ther ef o re , re v erse the Boa rd’s de cision awa

rding Armstrong unemploy ment benef

its.

¶ 38 Reverse d.

-9-