ELD-004 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-1880

__________

WILLIAM F. KAETZ,

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; 

EDUCATIONAL CREDIT MANAGEMENT CORP.; LAW OFFICES OF KENNETH 

L. BAUM; *EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.; PRICE MEESE 

SHULMAN & D'ARMINIO; TRANSUNION; SCHUCKIT & ASSOCIATES; 

*EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC; *CLARK HILL PLC; SEYFARTH 

SHAW, LLP; KENNETH L. BAUM; CAMILLE R. NICODEMUS; WILLIAM R. 

BROWN, ESQ.; DOROTHY A. KOWAL; ROBERT T. SZYBA; BORIS 

BROWNSTEIN, ESQ.

*(Amended pursuant to Clerk Order of 6/22/23)

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-03469)

District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty

____________________________________

Submitted on Appellees’ Motion for Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

May 23, 2024

Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PORTER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 11, 2024)

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2

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

I.

William F. Kaetz, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint. For the following 

reasons, we grant the Appellees’ motion and will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

judgment. 

II.

In June 2022, Kaetz initiated a civil rights complaint in the District of New Jersey 

against the United States of America and the United States Department of Justice, the 

Educational Credit Management Corp., three credit reporting agencies, several law firms, 

and various lawyers, based upon their involvement in a 2016 action brought by Kaetz in 

the District of New Jersey, see Kaetz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., D.N.J. Civ. No. 2:16-

cv-09225, affirmed Kaetz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 20-2592, 2022 WL 996422 

(3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2022) (“2016 Action”). The 2022 Complaint challenges (1) the 

constitutionality of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), the Bankruptcy Code provision excepting 

student loan debt from discharge; and (2) the Defendants’ conduct in the 2016 Action, 

including claims of fraud, fraud on the court, and other violations and requests for 

injunctive relief. 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
3

All Defendants filed motions to dismiss and Kaetz responded by filing cross 

motions to strike as well as oppositions to the motions. On March 30, 2023, the District 

Court entered an order denying Kaetz’s motions to strike and granting the Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss. Specifically, the Court granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss 

on collateral estoppel grounds as to his constitutional challenge to the Bankruptcy Code 

and for failure to state a claim as to his remaining claims. The District Court’s order 

dismissed Kaetz’s claims barred by collateral estoppel with prejudice and dismissed the 

remaining claims without prejudice. The day after the Court entered its order, Kaetz filed 

a timely motion to set aside the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, and subsequently filed 

a timely notice of appeal. On January 4, 2024, the Court denied Kaetz’s post-judgment 

motion. He thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial, which was 

also denied.1

Appellees United States of America and United States Department of Justice 

(“Federal Appellees”) moved for summary affirmance in this Court and Appellees 

Experian Information Solutions, Inc., Equifax Information Services, LLC, and Trans 

Union, LLC (“CRA Appellees”) later joined the motion. Appellant subsequently filed 

several motions in this Court, including requests for an injunction, to strike the motion for 

summary affirmance, and for judicial notice.

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), the scope of this 

appeal does not encompass the District Court’s January 4, 2024 order denying Kaetz’s 

motion to set aside the judgment or its April 10, 2024 order denying reconsideration of 

the prior denial. Kaetz did not file a notice of appeal, or amended notice of appeal, after 

the Court entered those orders.
4

III.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Application of collateral 

estoppel is a question of law,” over which we exercise plenary review, Szehinskyj v. 

Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2005), as we do over an order of dismissal for 

failure to state a claim, see Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). We may 

summarily affirm a District Court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial 

question. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

IV.

We agree with the District Court that Kaetz’s constitutional challenge to 11 U.S.C. 

§ 523(a)(8) is barred by collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue 

preclusion, “prevents the re-litigation of a factual or legal issue that was litigated in an 

earlier proceeding.” Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 2016). Collateral 

estoppel is appropriate where: “(1) the identical issue was decided in a prior 

adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the 

bar is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the 

party against whom the bar is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 

in question.” In re Bestwall LLC, 47 F.4th 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Hesketh, 

828 F.3d at 171).

This test is easily satisfied with respect to Kaetz’s challenge to the 

constitutionality of § 523(a)(8). First, as the District Court correctly noted, the identical 

issue was decided in the prior adjudication, as the District Court in the 2016 Action 
5

specifically addressed and rejected Kaetz’s argument that § 523(a)(8) was 

unconstitutionally vague. Kaetz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 2:16-cv-09225, 2019 

WL 4745289, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019) (dismissing complaint); Kaetz v. Educ. 

Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 2:16-cv-09225, 2020 WL 3542382, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2020) 

(denying reconsideration); Kaetz v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 20-2592, 2022 WL 

996422, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2022) (affirming judgment). Second, there was a final 

judgment on the merits since the District Court dismissed the claim with prejudice and 

the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Third, Kaetz was clearly a party to the 2016 

Action as he was the claimant. Fourth, Kaetz had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 

the issue in question, both in the District Court and on appeal.

V.

We further agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Kaetz’s remaining claims 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. These claims include: (1) 

Bivens claims for constitutional violations under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments; (2) fraud; (3) fraud on the court; (4) intentional infliction of emotional 

distress; (5) “misconduct,” for which Kaetz contends the Court should issue sanctions 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; and (6) injunctive relief.

As the District Court noted, Kaetz brought his complaint against three groups of 

defendants; (1) the United States, (2) federal agencies, and (3) private parties. Bivens

actions, however, only authorize suits against federal officials in their individual 

capacities. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994). Accordingly, Kaetz’s failure to 

name specific federal officials as defendants and to allege their personal involvement 
6

constituted a fatal defect to his Bivens claim. Because the defendants are not proper 

defendants under Bivens, the District Court properly dismissed this claim.

Regarding Kaetz’s fraud claim, we agree with the District Court’s interpretation of 

Kaetz’s allegations in support of this claim, explaining that the allegations “consist[] of 

nothing beyond a disagreement with the prior court’s legal interpretation” and are based 

on an argument that “all Defendants, by virtue of their involvement in the 2016 Action, 

must have committed fraud merely because the Court did not rule in his favor.” Compl.,

Dkt No. 122, at 18. These allegations fall far short of stating a claim for fraud. See

Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 367 (N.J. 1997) (describing the 

elements for a fraud claim); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring that fraud be pleaded 

with particularity).

Kaetz’s complaint includes the same, deficient, allegations for his fraud on the 

court claim. In order to state a claim for fraud on the court, a plaintiff must allege, “(1) 

an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; 

and (4) in fact deceives the court. Herring v. U.S., 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005). We 

have previously made clear that such allegations must constitute “egregious misconduct . 

. . such as bribery of a judge or jury or fabrication of evidence by counsel.” Id. (quoting 

In re Coordinated Petrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d 180, 195 

(8th Cir. 1976)). We agree with the District Court that Kaetz failed to meet this 

demanding standard. The purportedly fraudulent acts that Kaetz identified in his 

complaint are merely legal disagreements with the proceedings in the 2016 Action and do 

not constitute egregious misconduct. 
7

Kaetz additionally asserts a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (“IIED”). Such a claim requires allegations demonstrating that, inter alia, the 

defendant’s conduct was so “extreme and outrageous . . . as to go beyond all possible 

bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 

community.” Juzwiak v. Doe, 2 A.3d 428, 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (quoting 

Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc’y, 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)). Here, as the 

District Court concluded, Kaetz failed to allege facts sufficient to plausibly demonstrate 

that Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct. Rather, the conduct 

described in the complaint concerns ordinary litigation-related conduct, which does not 

by itself rise to the level of outrageous conduct.

Finally, to the extent Kaetz intended to assert a claim for “misconduct” under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the District Court correctly dismissed such claim as a 

private right of action under Rule 11 does not exist.

VI.

For these reasons, we grant the Appellees’ motion and will summarily affirm the 

District Court’s judgment.2

2 Kaetz’s motion to withdraw his motions for judicial notice is granted. His 

remaining motions are denied.