COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphr eys, Beales and Decker Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

BRUCE EDISON PARHAM OPINION BY v. Record No. 0772-14-1 J UDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER APRIL 7, 2015 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON Bonnie L. Jones, Judge Kimberly E. Karle, Assistant Pub lic Defender (Offi ce of the Public Defender, on briefs), for appellant. Craig W. Stallard, Assistant At torney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Bruce Edison Parham appeals his conviction for making a materially false statement on a form completed in conjunction with a fir earm transaction, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2:2(K). He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was aware that he was under indictment at the time that he completed the form. 1 We hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

1 The appellant’s single assignment of error re ads, “The trial cour t erred in convicting Appellant because there was insufficient evidence that Appellant willfully and intentionally made a false statement on a firearm transaction form because there was no evidence that Appellant actually knew he was under indictment at the time he filled out the form.” To the extent that the argument portion of the appellant’s brief appears to question the legal standard applied by the trial court in finding him guilty, hi s counsel clarified at oral argument that the assignment of error solely challenges the sufficien cy of the evidence to support the conviction.PUBLISHED- 2 - I. BACKGROUND 2 At the appellant’s trial for making a materially false statement on a federal form in connection with a purchase of a firearm, the Commonwealth pres ented undisputed evidence that the appellant falsely represented on a federal firearms transacti on form that he was not “under indictment or information in any court for a felo ny, or any other crime, for which the judge could imprison [him] for more than one year.” The only issue that the appellant contested at trial was whether he understood that he was under indictment at the time th at he completed the form and attested to its accuracy. Jeremy Allen Reynolds testified that on July 7, 2013, he worked as a retail clerk for Bass Pro Shops selling firearms. As part of his employment duties, Reynolds was responsible for administering federal and state firearm transac tion forms. The appellant was a customer. Reynolds stated that he gave the appellant th e firearm transaction forms and the appellant completed them. He also explained that the st ore personnel never filled out the forms for the purchasers. Over seven weeks before the appellant attemp ted to buy the firearm, he was indicted for a felony. Twelve days before the attempted purchas e, he appeared in circuit court, and his case was continued. Brenda Stokes, a Virginia State Trooper, testified that she investigated the appellant’s offense related to his application to buy a firearm. When she interviewed the appellant, he told her that the store clerk completed the applicatio n for him. The appellant admitted that he had been arrested and the case was still “pending.”

2 On appeal, we view “‘the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.’” Fritter v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 345, 351, 610 S.E.2d 887, 890 (2005) (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 406, 409-10, 517 S.E.2d 260, 261 (1999)).- 3 - After the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in -chief, the appellant moved to strike the evidence. He argued that the evidence did not pr ove that he knew that he was under indictment and, as a result, did not support a finding that his giving of a materially false statement was willful and intentional. The trial court denied the motion. In doing so, it observed that the appellant admitted that he had “a case pending,” wh ich the court described as “a term of art.” The court imputed “some understanding” to the a ppellant based on his use of the phrase. The appellant testified in his defense. He st ated that at the time he completed the firearm transaction form he “had no idea what indi ctment” meant. The appellant acknowledged, however, that he knew his court dates and that he had been charged with a felony. He also admitted that he had appeared in general distri ct court and understood th at his case had been transferred to circuit court. The appellant noted one appearance, during which his case was continued in order to appoint a new attorney. He claimed that when he completed the firearm transaction form, Reynolds “told [him] just to mark no on everything unless [he had] been convicted of a felony.” The appe llant explained that although he read the form, he did not do so carefully or completely, and instead relied on Rey nolds’ explanation of the form. In response to the court’s questions, the appellant admitted that he specifically read the portion of the form pertaining to an indictment, but added that he did not know what the word meant nor did he ask Reynolds about it. After the close of the appellant’s case, he again moved to strike the evidence. He maintained that the Commonwealth failed to prove th at he provided the untruthful information in a willful and intentional manner. He relied on Smith v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 449, 718 S.E.2d 452 (2011), to support his ar gument that the Co mmonwealth failed to show that he received notice of the indictment or understood the term. The appe llant stressed that evidence that he “didn’t know what indictment meant . . . but he answered it anyway” was not sufficient to- 4 - constitute a violation of the st atute. The Commonwealth responde d that the length of time that passed between the appellant’s indictment and hi s attempted firearm purchase, combined with the appellant’s inconsistent statements, provided circumstantial evidence sufficient to support the inference that the appellant knew that he had been indicted. The trial court denied the motion and found the appellant guilty of making a materially false statement on a form in connection with a firearm transaction, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2:2(K). The appellant was sentenced to five years in prison, with all the time suspended.
II. ANALYSIS The appellant argues that the trial court er red by finding the evidence sufficient to convict him of making a false statement in connection with a firearm transaction. Relying on Smith, 282 Va. 449, 718 S.E.2d 452, he contends that the Common wealth failed to prove that he had actual knowledge that he was under criminal indictme nt. The Commonwealth responds that Smith is distinguishable because in that case the defe ndant had not made any court appearances. This Court applies a well-established sta ndard when reviewing th e sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. We examine “‘the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.’” Fritter v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 345, 351, 610 S.E.2d 887, 890 (2005) (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 406, 409-10, 517 S.E.2d 260, 261 (1999)). In doing so, the Court “‘discard[s] all evidence of the accused that conflicts with that of the Commonwealth and regard[s] as true all credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair infere nces reasonably deducible’” from that evidence. Henry v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 30, 37, 753 S.E .2d 868, 871 (2014) (quoting Holcomb v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 339, 346, 709 S.E.2d 711, 714 (2011)).- 5 - The appellant was tried by the circuit court, sitting without a jury. Consequently, that court was the fact finder and its j udgment is afforded the same weight as a jury verdict. E.g., Preston v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 52, 57, 704 S.E .2d 127, 129 (2011). In our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we must affirm the conviction unless the trial court was plainly wrong or the conviction lacked evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; see, e.g., Maldonado-Mejia v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 49, 54, 752 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2014). The law is also clear that determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight afforded the testimony of those witnesses are matters left to th e trier of fact. Richardson v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 93, 99, 462 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1995). The fact fi nder is not required to believe all aspects of the testimony of a witness. Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8, 28, 531 S.E.2d 580, 590 (2000) ( en banc ). Instead, it may “accept the pa rts of a witness’ testimony it finds believable and reject other parts as implausible.” Id. Finally, “[i]f the ev idence is sufficient to support the conviction,” the review ing appellate court will not “substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusi ons reached by the [fact finder].” Jordan v. Commonwealth, 286 Va. 153, 156-57, 747 S.E.2d 799, 800 (2013). It is under these familiar standards that we conduct our review of this case. Code § 18.2-308.2:2(K) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person willfully and intentionally making a materially false statement . . . on such firearm transaction records as may be required by federal law, shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony.” The language of the statute reflects the General Assembly’s intent “to impos e upon the Commonwealth a very strict standard of scienter in prosecutions.” Smith, 282 Va. at 455, 718 S.E.2d at 455. The Commonwealth is required to prove “that the defendant had actual knowledge that his statement was false when he made it.” Id. (emphasis added). Stated more sp ecifically, “[t]here must be evidence to support a finding that he knew the truth bu t nevertheless intended to, and di d, utter a falsehood.” Id.- 6 - The appellant’s actual knowledge and intent are factual determinations to be decided by the trier of fact. E.g., Tooke v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 759, 766, 627 S.E.2d 533, 536 (2006); Richardson, 21 Va. App. at 99, 462 S.E.2d at 123. A defendant’s intent, due to its very nature, “may, and often must, be inferred from th e facts and circumstances in [the] particular case.” Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979). Circumstantial evidence is treated in the same manner as dire ct evidence. See Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 459, 465, 749 S.E.2d 212, 215 (2013). It “‘is as competent and is entitled to as much weight.’” Id. (quoting Salcedo v. Co mmonwealth, 58 Va. App. 525, 535, 712 S.E.2d 8, 12 (2011)). The record supports the tria l court’s conclusions that th e appellant knew that he was under indictment at the time that he completed th e form and that he willfully and intentionally provided the false answer. The evidence showed that the appellant had multiple inconsistent explanations of why he answered the question in the manner in wh ich he did. He initially told Trooper Stokes that the store clerk filled out the fo rm for him. After the clerk contradicted this earlier statement through his te stimony that the appellant comp leted the form himself, the appellant testified that he did not read the questions and simply answered all the questions on the form “no” as instructed by the clerk. During cross-examination, the appellant offered a third version of events when he conceded that he ha d specifically read the que stion asking whether he had been indicted. The fact finder was entitled to believe the store clerk and infer that the appellant’s inconsistent statements were addi tional evidence of his guilt. See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 13, 31, 733 S.E.2d 129, 138 (2012) (“‘A defendant’s false statements are probative to show he is trying to conceal his guilt, and thus [are] evidence of his guilt.’” (quoting Rollston v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 548, 399 S.E.2d 823, 831 (1991))); see also Pugliese v. Commonwea lth, 16 Va. App. 82, 92, 428 S.E.2d 16, 24 (1993)- 7 - (“[T]he fact finder is not required to believe all aspects of a defendant’s statement or testimony . . . .”). Further, the appellant admitted to Stokes that he had been arrested and that the case was still “pending.” At trial, the appellant acknowledged that at th e time he completed the form, he knew he “had been charged under warrants with a felony.” Additionally, the appellant stated that he appeared in general dist rict court and was notified that hi s case had transferred to circuit court. He knew that he “went to court” on July 26 and that his case was continued in order to appoint a new attorney to represent him. The co ntinuance order entered in to evidence reflects that the appellant received the continuance in ci rcuit court only twelve days before he attempted to buy the firearm. This evidence supports the fi ndings that the appellant was aware that he was under indictment when he completed the form a nd knew “that his statement was false when he made it.” See Smith, 282 Va. at 455, 718 S.E.2d at 455. The case upon which the appellant relie s, Smith, 282 Va. 449, 718 S.E.2d 452, does not compel a different outcome. In that case, at th e time that the defendant falsely completed the firearm transaction form, he had been arrested on a felony charge and released on bond. Id. at 452, 718 S.E.2d at 453. Although he had received a lette r from his attorney stating that his case had been certified to the gra nd jury, his lawyer had not not ified him of his subsequent indictment, which occurred only two days befo re he attempted to buy a handgun. Id. at 452, 718 S.E.2d at 453-54. Further, Smith had not been arra igned by the circuit court. Id. The Supreme Court has subsequently recognized that circumstantial evidence that a defendant knew that he or she was under indictment can overcome a claim to the contrary. See Maldonado-Mejia, 287 Va. at 56, 752 S.E.2d at 836-37. Here, consistent with the legal standa rd espoused in Smith and Maldonado-Mejia, viewing the evidence in the light most favorab le to the Commonwealth, a rational fact finder- 8 - could have concluded that the appellant had been to court and understood that he was under indictment until his case was resolved. As discussed supra , the witnesses’ testimony, combined with the evidence of the appellant’s court appear ances, provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to infer that he knew the meaning of the term “indictment” at the time he completed the federal firearm transaction form. For these reasons, the trial c ourt’s findings that the appellant knew that he was under indictment and acted inte ntionally and willfully were not plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.
III. CONCLUSION We hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the appellant intentionally and willfully made a materially false statement on a form completed in conjunction with a firearm transaction, in violation of C ode § 18.2-308.2:2(K). Consequentl y, we affirm the conviction. Affirmed.