No. 13385 INTHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1976

TONY SOFTICH, ADMINISTRATOR LABOR STANDARDS DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY, Plaintiff and Appellant,

GERALD & BERNICE BAKER, d/b/a JERRY'S VILLAGE 

### INN,Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of theFourth Judicial District, Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant

### : Mayo Ashley argued, Helena

## ,Montana For Respondent: Mahan and Strope, Helena, Montana Philip

### WeStrope argued, Helena, Montana

Submitted: October 27, 1976 Decided:

## NOV24

## 1978Mr. Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The question in this case 

### iswhether theAdministrator of the Labor Standards Division of the Department of Labor and Industry of the stateof Montana can sue inhis own name to enforce thebonding requirements of Montana's Restaurant, Bar and TavernWage ProtectionAct. The district court held he could not. We affirm. On February 9, 1976 a complaint was filed in the district court, Missoula County, to enjoin defendant from engaging in the restaurant and bar business atBud Lake Village inMissoula County until defendant posted a bond toguarantee payment of employee wages, pursuant to section 41-2005, R.C.M. 1947. The named plaintiffwas "Tony Softich, Administrator Labor Standards Division Department of Labor and Industry". Softich signed the complaint. Subsequently, the district court dismissed the action "for the reason that plaintiff isnot a party authorized tobring the action inhis own namei1. Plaintiff appeals. The controlling statute is section 41-2008, R.C.M. 1947, which provides: "41-2008. Lessee's business enjoined untilbond filed. If any person engages in the restaurant, bar or tavern business, as lessee, without having first filed a bond as required by section 5 [41-20051 of this act, the attorneygeneral of the state of Montana, the commissioner of labor and industry of the stateof Montana, or any citizen, group of citizens or any association in the-county where the violator conducts hisbusiness may institute an action to enjoin such person from engagi*g in the business until compliance with this acthas been met." Indetermining the meaning of a statute, the intent of the legislature 

### is controlling. Section 93-401-16, R.C.M. 1947.Such intent shall firstbe determined from the plain meaning of thewords used, if possible, and if the intent can be so determined, the courts may not go further and apply any other mans of interpretation. Keller v. Smith, Mont

# . , 553 P.2d 1002, 33 St.Rep. 828; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 151Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660, and cases cited therein. The plain meaning of thewords used in the statute grant the right to institute this action to (1) the attorney general, (2) the Commissioner of Labor and Industry, and (3) any citizen, group, or association inthe county where the violator conducts his business. The administrator of theLabor Standards Division of the Department of Labor and Industry is none of these. In construing a statute, courts cannot insertwhat has been omitted. Section 93-401- 15, R.C.M. 1947. We have examined the other arguments and authorities cited by plaintiff and find that none would change the result here. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.



### - Justice

sitting forjustice Wesley 

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