This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 34,094 4 SABASTIANO BERSANE, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY 7 James M. Hudson, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender 12 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 172 {1} Defendant has appealed from a conviction for aggravated battery on a 1 household member (great bodily harm). Wepreviously issued a notice of proposed 2 summary disposition in which we proposed to uphold the convicti on. Defendant has 3 filed a memorandum in opposition. After dueconsideration, we remain unpersuaded. 4 We therefore affirm. 5
{2} Defendant has raised a single issue, contending that the district court erred in 6 excluding evidence of the victim’s historic methamphetamine use. [DS 11; MIO 6] 7 Relying on the right to confrontation, he con tinues to assert that he should have been 8 permitted to cross-examine the victim on this subject for the purpose of attacking her 9 perceptions and memory of the pertinent events. [DS 11; MIO 6-10] 10
{3} Below, the district court considered De fendant’s offer of proof outside the 11 presence of the jury. [MIO 3- 4] The victim admitted that she and Defendant had used 12 methamphetamine for approximately two y ears, up to and including two days prior 13 to the events out of which Defendant’s convi ction arose. [MIO 4] However, the victim 14 “was adamant that her drug use did not affect her memory.” [MIO 4] We find no 15 indication that Defendant pres ented any further evidence, sc ientific or otherwise, to 16 rebut the victim’s assertion. [DS 3-11; MIO 1-10] After hearing the victim’s 17 testimony, the district court ruled that de fense counsel had failed to lay a sufficient 18 foundation to show that the victim’s meth amphetamine use affected her memory or 193 perception of the events in question, and also concluded that the evidence of the 1 victim’s methamphetamine use was more prejudicial than probative. [MIO 4] 2
{4} We remain unpersuaded that the distri ct court erred. As we previously 3 observed, in light of the victim’s “adamant” assertion that her drug use did not affect 4 her memory, the district court could reas onably have conclude d that any probative 5 value was substantially outwe ighed by prejudicial effect. See, e.g., State v. Meadors , 6 1995-NMSC-073, ¶¶ 31, 33, 121 N.M. 38, 908 P.2d 731 (upholding the district 7 court’s limitation of cross-examination concerning the extent of the victim’s drug 8 abuse, in light of its limited probative value and the prejudicial eff ect of the evidence); 9 State v. Trujillo , 2012-NMCA-112, ¶ 54, 289 P.3d 238 (concluding that proffered 10 evidence of the victim’s drug dealing and/or consumption was properly excluded as 11 more prejudicial than probative). Although we understand Defendant to suggest that 12 the district court should have weighed the evidence differently, [MIO 8-10] we 13 decline to second-guess the district court’s assessment. See generally State v. Garcia , 14 2005-NMCA-042, ¶ 50, 137 N.M. 315, 110 P.3d 531 (observing that the district 15 courts are afforded “great discretion in balancing the prejudicial impact of [evidence] 16 against its probative value” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 174 {5} In closing, we acknowledge that the limitations imposed on the scope of cross1 examination in this case implicated De fendant’s constitutional rights. [MIO 6-10] 2 However, the right to confrontation is not unlimited. 3 [T]rial judges retain widelatitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is 4 concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based 5 on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion 6 of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or 7 only marginally relevant. . . . [T]h e Confrontation Clause guarantees an 8 opportunity for effective cross-examin ation, not cross-examination that 9 is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might 10 wish. 11 State v. Montoya , 2014-NMSC-032, ¶ 47, 333 P.3d 935 (internal quotation marks and 12 citation omitted). In light of the marginal relevance and prejudicial effect of the 13 evidence in question, we conclude that the reasonable limitations imposed on cross14 examination in this case did not violate Defendant’s constitutional right to 15 confrontation. 16
{6} Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and in the notice of proposed 17 summary disposition, we affirm. 18
{7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 19

_______________________________________ 20 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 21 WE CONCUR: 225 1 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 2

3 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 4