[Cite as State v. Lloyd, 2015-Ohio-3636.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WARREN COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2015-05-038 

 

 : O P I N I O N

 - vs - 9/8/2015 

 : 

DAMON SHAWN LLOYD, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. 06 CR 23706 

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael Greer, 500 Justice Drive, 

Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for plaintiff-appellee 

Damon Shawn Lloyd, #A547349, Chillicothe Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 5500, 

Chillicothe, Ohio 45601, defendant-appellant, pro se 

 RINGLAND, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Damon Shawn Lloyd, appeals from a decision of the 

Warren County Court of Common Pleas modifying his sentence and denying his motion for 

resentencing. 

{¶ 2} Following a bench trial, Lloyd was found guilty of one count of murder in 

violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) with a firearm specification. He was sentenced to 15 years to life 
Warren CA2015-05-038

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in prison with a consecutive three-year prison term for the firearm specification, along with 

various financial sanctions. 

{¶ 3} Years later, Lloyd filed a motion for resentencing based on a void judgment. 

Therein, Lloyd argued the portion of his sentence relating to costs, fees and restitution was 

void because the trial court failed to advise him that he could be ordered to perform 

community service if he failed to pay those financial sanctions. The trial court vacated that 

portion of Lloyd's sentence related to costs, court-appointed counsel fees and other fees, but 

otherwise denied Lloyd's motion for resentencing. 

{¶ 4} Lloyd now appeals, raising three assignments of error for review. For ease of 

discussion, the assignments of error will be discussed out of order. 

{¶ 5} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION, WHEN IT VIOLATED R.C. 2929.19(B)(6), WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 

FAILED TO PROVIDE, BEFORE IMPOSING A FINANCIAL SANCTION UNDER SECTION 

2929.18 OF THE REVISED COSE, THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHALL CONSIDER THE 

OFFENDER'S PRESENT AND FUTURE ABILITY TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF THE 

SANCTION OR FINE. 

{¶ 7} Lloyd's original judgment entry of sentence stated: "Defendant is ordered to pay 

any restitution, all prosecution costs, court appointed counsel costs and any fees permitted 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.18(A)(4), for which execution is hereby ordered." However, the entry 

did not set forth the amount of restitution to be paid. The court also declined to check the 

box finding Lloyd capable of paying restitution. The state argues that the doctrine of res 

judicata bars Lloyd from raising the issue of restitution where he could have raised it on direct 

appeal. 

{¶ 8} We find that the restitution order was contrary to statute. R.C. 2929.18 
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provides that an offender may be ordered to pay restitution and sets out several 

requirements should the court impose restitution, including requiring the court to determine at 

sentencing the amount of restitution to be paid. The imposition of restitution in the judgment 

entry of sentence without such a determination was contrary to statute, and therefore, void. 

State v. Gipson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2011-02-015, 2011-Ohio-5747, ¶ 14. Accordingly, 

the doctrine of res judicata does not bar Lloyd from arguing that the trial court erred in 

imposing restitution. 

{¶ 9} In denying Lloyd's motion for resentencing, the trial court found that it had 

"declined to find the Defendant has or is reasonably expected to have the means to pay the 

financial sanctions" in the original judgment entry of sentencing. A review of the original 

judgment entry of sentencing confirms that finding. The trial court has thus acknowledged 

that it did not intend to order Lloyd to pay any financial sanctions. Therefore, the trial court's 

restitution order is hereby vacated. 

{¶ 10} Lloyd's second assignment of error is hereby sustained to the extent the 

imposition of restitution in the original judgment entry of sentence was void. 

{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION, WHEN IT VIOLATED R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(A), WHEN THE TRIAL COURT 

FAILED TO NOTIFY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AT "SENTENCING" ON MARCH 

29TH, 2007 THAT FAILURE TO PAY COURT COSTS, RESTITUTION, AND ANY AND ALL 

PROSECUTION COSTS, AND COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL COSTS COULD RESULT 

IN AN ORDER REQUIRING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO PERFORM COMMUNITY 

SERVICE "UNTIL JUDGMENT IS PAID OR UNTIL THE COURT IS SATISFIED THAT THE 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPROVED SCHEDULE." 

SEE: R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(A). 
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{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 3: 

{¶ 14} TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, IN VIOLATION 

OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, FOR 

FAILING TO "OBJECT" TO THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF COURT COSTS, 

RESTITUTION, AND ANY AND ALL PROSECUTION COSTS, AND COURT APPOINTED 

COUNSEL COSTS AS THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT NOTIFY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

MR. LLOYD, THAT HIS FAILURE TO PAY ANY AND ALL COSTS MAY RESULT IN THE 

COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO PERFORM COMMUNITY 

SERVICE "UNTIL THE JUDGMENT IS PAID OR UNTIL THE COURT IS SATISFIED THAT 

THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPROVED SCHEDULE." 

SEE R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(A). 

{¶ 15} The trial court's entry, dated April 9, 2015, vacated "the order for the Defendant 

to pay costs, court-appointed counsel fees and other fees." As the trial court has vacated 

that portion of Lloyd's sentence regarding costs, and this court has vacated that portion of 

Lloyd's sentence regarding restitution under the second assignment of error discussed 

above, Lloyd's arguments under the first and third assignments of error are rendered moot. 

Accordingly, Lloyd's first and third assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶ 16} Judgment affirmed as modified to reflect that the restitution order is vacated. 

PIPER, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.