J. S76001/14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. :

:

ERNEST WOODALL, : No. 565 WDA 2013 

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order, February 25, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No. CP-02-CR-0008320-1996 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA AND OLSON, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 14, 2015 

 Ernest Woodall appeals, pro se, from the order of February 25, 2013, 

dismissing his serial PCRA1 petition as untimely. We affirm. 

 The facts of this case were described in a prior memorandum of this 

court: 

 On May 5, 1996, two uniformed Pittsburgh 

police officers on routine patrol in a marked wagon

noticed Appellant’s vehicle parked in the middle of

the street with the engine idling and a door open, 

blocking traffic in either direction, while he was 

standing on the sidewalk, talking to a female. One

of the police officers, Edward Dent, knew Appellant

personally from the neighborhood, and from towing 

his vehicle a week earlier. When Officer Dent asked 

him to move his vehicle, Appellant responded, “Fuck

you,” and ran to the back of the vehicle. Both 

officers followed. (See N.T. Trial, 11/9-12/04, at 

37-44). 

 

1

 Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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 In the scuffle which ensued, Appellant 

attempted to draw a .45 Glock handgun from his 

waistband, but it fell to the ground. He managed to 

run away. The police began to follow him, but 

decided to stay behind to secure the Glock, which 

was loaded and equipped with a laser sight, and 

other firearms found in Appellant’s vehicle, a 

.9 millimeter Smith & Wesson handgun, and an 

SKS assault rifle, both also loaded. (Id. at 53-56). 

The two officers radioed for back-up and prepared to 

tow the vehicle. 

 However, Appellant soon returned, this time 

with an AK-47 assault rifle, which he pointed at the 

police, saying, “I want my shit, give me my shit 

now.” (Id. at 58). When they did not comply, he 

fired at them, now six police in all, including those 

who had arrived in response to the radio call. 

Appellant then escaped. 

 The police apprehended Appellant the next 

day, but he fled the jurisdiction soon after he was

charged. He was not discovered until almost seven 

years later, when the National Crime Information 

Center informed an FBI agent assigned to the 

Pittsburgh Fugitive Task Force that there was a 

possible fingerprint match between one 

“Joseph Brown,” a/k/a “Allan Alphonso Garner,” 

recently arrested in Montgomery County, Alabama, 

and Appellant. Appellant was arrested in February,

2003, in the office of his Alabama parole officer, and 

eventually returned to Pittsburgh through the 

Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9101-9108. Following a hearing, 

the trial court denied pre-trial motions, and trial

commenced in November of 2004. 

 After the jury convicted Appellant of four 

counts of attempted homicide, six counts of 

aggravated assault, and one count of violation of the 

Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA), the trial court 

sentenced him to an aggregate term of thirty-two to

eighty years’ imprisonment. This Court affirmed the 
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judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court 

denied allowance of appeal on May 10, 2007. 

 On December 19, 2007, Appellant filed a 

timely pro se petition for PCRA relief. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel, who filed an amended 

petition. After the PCRA court filed notice of its

intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 

counsel filed a second amended petition and 

response to the notice of intent. The PCRA court 

dismissed the petition on May 4, 2009. Appellant 

filed a timely pro se notice of appeal, and the PCRA 

court appointed counsel to represent him. 

Commonwealth v. Woodall, No. 897 WDA 2009, unpublished 

memorandum at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed October 20, 2010). This court affirmed 

dismissal of appellant’s first PCRA petition on October 20, 2010. Appellant 

did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court. 

 On November 10, 2011, appellant filed a second pro se PCRA petition, 

which was dismissed without a hearing, following Rule 907 notice, on 

December 2, 2011. No direct appeal was taken from this dismissal. 

 On December 16, 2011,2 appellant filed, pro se, a petition for 

habeas corpus relief which was properly treated as a third PCRA 

 

2

 Appellant’s petition was not docketed until December 21, 2011. However, 

we are mindful of the so-called “prisoner mailbox rule,” pursuant to which a 

document is deemed filed on the date that a prisoner delivers it to prison 

authorities for mailing. Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 

1997). The record indicates that appellant’s petition was mailed from 

SCI-Dallas on December 16, 2011. (Docket #93.) 
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petition.3 On January 22, 2013, the PCRA court gave Rule 907 notice of its 

intent to dismiss the petition within 20 days without a hearing; and with no 

response forthcoming from appellant, his petition was dismissed on 

February 25, 2013. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on 

March 13, 2013. On April 15, 2013, appellant was ordered to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); appellant timely complied on May 3, 2013, and on 

May 13, 2013, the PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion. 

The standard of review for an order denying 

post-conviction relief is limited to whether the record 

supports the PCRA court’s determination, and 

whether that decision is free of legal error. The 

PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless 

there is no support for the findings in the certified 

record. Furthermore, a petitioner is not entitled to a 

PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the PCRA court 

can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine 

issue concerning any material fact and the petitioner 

is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and 

no purpose would be served by any further 

proceedings. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 945 A.2d 185, 188 (Pa.Super. 2008), 

appeal denied, 956 A.2d 433 (Pa. 2008), quoting Commonwealth v. 

Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1040 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has 

jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. 

 

3

 Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is properly treated as a 

serial PCRA petition, since the PCRA is the sole means by which a defendant 

may obtain collateral relief and subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus

with respect to remedies offered under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. 
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Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 508, 

837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (2003). The most recent 

amendments to the PCRA, effective January 16, 

1996, provide a PCRA petition, including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of 

the date the underlying judgment becomes final. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. 

Bretz, 830 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa.Super.2003); 

Commonwealth v. Vega, 754 A.2d 714, 717 

(Pa.Super.2000). A judgment is deemed final “at 

the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the 

United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). 

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness 

provisions in the PCRA allow for very limited 

circumstances under which the late filing of a 

petition will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

To invoke an exception, a petition must allege and 

prove: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously 

was the result of interference by 

government officials with the 

presentation of the claim in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or 

laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is 

predicated were unknown to the 

petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right 

that was recognized by the Supreme 

Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the 

time period provided in this section and 
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has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “As such, when a 

PCRA petition is not filed within one year of the 

expiration of direct review, or not eligible for one of 

the three limited exceptions, or entitled to one of the 

exceptions, but not filed within 60 days of the date 

that the claim could have been first brought, the trial 

court has no power to address the substantive merits 

of a petitioner’s PCRA claims.” Commonwealth v. 

Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 77, 753 A.2d 780, 783 

(2000); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

Id. at 1079-1080. 

 Instantly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allowance of 

appeal on May 10, 2007. Commonwealth v. Woodall, No. 526 WAL 2006 

(per curiam). Therefore, appellant’s judgment of sentence became final for 

PCRA purposes on or about August 8, 2007, upon expiration of the time to 

file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13, 28 U.S.C.A. (petition 

for writ of certiorari is deemed timely when it is filed within 90 days after 

denial of allocatur). Appellant filed the current petition, his third, on 

December 16, 2011, over four years later. Therefore, appellant’s current 

PCRA petition is manifestly untimely on its face. 

 Appellant does not attempt to plead and prove any of the three 

exceptions to the one-year jurisdictional time bar. Instead, he claims that 

his sentence is illegal because his four convictions of attempted homicide 

should have merged for sentencing purposes. Appellant received 
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consecutive sentences of 8 to 20 years’ imprisonment on each of the four 

counts of attempted homicide. Appellant argues that an illegal sentence is 

always subject to correction and cites 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, “Multiple 

convictions of inchoate crimes barred,” which provides: “A person may not 

be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, 

criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or 

to culminate in the commission of the same crime.” 

 Appellant is correct that the concept of merger implicates the legality 

of sentencing and is generally non-waivable (see, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Duffy, 832 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 845 A.2d 

816 (Pa. 2004)); however, such a claim is still subject to the PCRA’s time 

limitations. 

The timeliness requirements of the PCRA do not vary

based “on the nature of the constitutional violations 

alleged therein . . . . To the contrary, . . . the

PCRA’s timeliness requirements . . . are intended to 

apply to all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature 

of the individual claims raised therein.” 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 753 A.2d 

201, 202-03 (2000). Because the “PCRA’s timeliness

requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in 

nature, no court may properly disregard or alter 

them in order to reach the merits of the claims 

raised in a PCRA petition that is filed in an untimely 

manner.” 

Commonwealth v. Howard, 788 A.2d 351, 356 (Pa. 2002), quoting 

Murray, 753 A.2d at 203. Indeed, “even claims that a sentence was illegal, 

an issue deemed incapable of being waived, are not beyond the jurisdictional 
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time restrictions.” Commonwealth v. Grafton, 928 A.2d 1112, 1114 

(Pa.Super. 2007), citing Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 

1999); Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 987 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

Therefore, appellant’s illegal sentencing claim does not operate as an 

independent exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar. 

 At any rate, appellant’s argument is misplaced. His conviction of four 

separate counts of attempted homicide did not merge for sentencing 

purposes where they related to four individual victims. The record reflects 

that appellant shot at four different police officers. Appellant’s conduct was 

designed to culminate in the commission of separate and distinct crimes. 

Therefore, the convictions did not merge. See Commonwealth v. Graves, 

508 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1986) (per curiam) (conspiracy and solicitation did not 

merge where each was directed at a different end; “inchoate crimes merge 

only when directed to the commission of the same crime, not merely 

because they arise out of the same incident”); Commonwealth v. Hassine, 

490 A.2d 438, 465 (Pa.Super. 1985), overruled on different grounds, 

Commonwealth v. Schaeffer, 536 A.2d 354 (Pa.Super. 1987) (en banc) 

(sentences for conspiracy and attempt would not merge where there were 

two separate victims). 

 As appellant’s petition was untimely filed, the PCRA court did not have 

jurisdiction to consider it. The PCRA court did not err in denying appellant’s 

petition. 
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 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/14/2015