[Cite as State v. Hood, 2017-Ohio-8920.]

STATE OF OHIO, MONROE COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

V. 

JASON G. HOOD, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

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CASE NO. 17 MO 0002 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio 

Case No. 2014-292 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee James L. Peters 

Monroe County Prosecutor 

101 N. Main Street, Rm. 15 

Woodsfield, Ohio 43793 

For Defendant-Appellant Attorney Keith Golden 

923 East Broad Street 

Columbus, Ohio 43205-1101 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

 

 

 Dated: December 4, 2017 
[Cite as State v. Hood, 2017-Ohio-8920.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jason Hood, appeals from a Monroe County 

Common Pleas Court judgment granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffappellee, the State of Ohio, on appellant’s postconviction petition. 

{¶2} On August 15, 2014, a Monroe County Grand Jury indicted appellant 

on four counts of rape of a child under 13 years of age, first-degree felonies in 

violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), and three counts of gross sexual imposition, thirddegree felonies in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). 

{¶3} Appellant initially entered a not guilty plea. But after negotiations, the 

state amended two of the rape counts to two counts of sexual battery, second-degree 

felonies in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5). It dismissed the remaining five counts 

against appellant. Appellant then entered a guilty plea to the amended charges. The 

parties also agreed to recommend a sentence of five years on each of the two sexual 

battery counts, to be served consecutively for a total sentence of ten years. 

{¶4} The trial court accepted appellant’s plea. It entered a judgment of 

conviction on November 10, 2015. The court imposed the recommended ten-year 

prison sentence. It also classified appellant as a Tier III sex offender. Appellant did 

not file a direct appeal. 

{¶5} Over a year later, on December 8, 2016, appellant filed a postconviction 

petition in the trial court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his 

counsel was ineffective in failing to request a competency evaluation and in failing to 

investigate possible DNA evidence and possible fabricated evidence. Appellant also 

asserted that due to his counsel’s ineffectiveness, he was unable to enter a knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent plea. 

{¶6} The state filed a motion for summary judgment. The state asserted that 

appellant had not demonstrated that his counsel’s performance was deficient, or that 

he was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. It also argued that 

appellant’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Finally, the state 

asserted appellant had not supported his claims with sufficient operative facts to 

establish grounds for relief. 
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{¶7} The trial court denied appellant’s petition without a hearing and granted 

the state’s motion for summary judgment. The court first stated that appellant’s 

claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court also found 

appellant failed to support his claims with sufficient operative facts to establish 

substantive grounds for relief. It noted that appellant provided only self-serving 

speculative assertions. Finally, the court determined that the record unequivocally 

showed that appellant knowingly and voluntarily entered the plea agreement. 

{¶8} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 16, 2017. He now 

raises a single assignment of error. 

{¶9} Appellant’s sole assignment of error states: 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE STATE’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH RESULTED IN THE IMPROPER 

DENIAL OF MR. HOOD’S POST-CONVICTION MOTION. 

{¶10} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

postconviction petition without holding a hearing. Appellant goes on to argue that his 

trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to investigate appellant’s claims 

that his wife was engaged in an extramarital affair and fabricated evidence against 

him. He further claims his counsel failed to investigate evidence that more than one 

source of DNA was present. Next, appellant argues his counsel was ineffective 

during plea negotiations. He claims his counsel ignored his demands to take his 

case to trial and told him that if he was convicted at trial, he would receive life in 

prison. Appellant claims he was pressured into accepting the plea. 

{¶11} A postconviction petitioner is not automatically entitled to a hearing. 

State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E .2d 169 (1982). Before granting an 

evidentiary hearing on the petition, the trial court shall determine whether there are 

substantive grounds for relief. R.C. 2953.21(C). The trial court's decision of whether 

to hold an evidentiary hearing in postconviction matters is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. State v. Haschenburger, 7th Dist. No. 08-MA-223, 2009-Ohio-6527, ¶ 43. 
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Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law; it implies the trial court acted 

arbitrarily, unreasonably or unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St .3d 

217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶12} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding 

not to hold a hearing on appellant’s postconviction petition because appellant did not 

present substantive grounds for relief in his petition. 

{¶13} Initially, however, we note that res judicata does not bar two of 

appellant’s claims here. The doctrine of res judicata provides that any issue that 

could have been raised on direct appeal, and was not, is barred in later proceedings 

and not subject to review. State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 

N.E.2d 824, ¶ 16. 

{¶14} Appellant argued in his petition that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to investigate appellant’s claims that his wife was engaged in an extramarital 

affair and fabricated evidence against him and for failing to investigate evidence that 

more than one source of DNA was present. These contentions are based on 

evidence outside of the record. “[W]hen claims of ineffective assistance are based 

on evidence outside the record, the appropriate procedure is to further develop the 

record through postconviction proceedings.” State v. Smith, 7th Dist. No. 06-BE-64, 

2007-Ohio-5244, ¶ 26. 

{¶15} Res judicata does bar appellant’s claim that he did not enter his plea 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, however. The record contains appellant’s 

signed guilty plea stating that his plea is voluntary. Additionally, as part of a direct 

appeal, appellant could have requested a transcript of his change of plea hearing. 

{¶16} Nonetheless, the trial court still had valid reason for denying appellant’s 

petition without a hearing and granting the state’s motion for summary judgment. 

{¶17} Appellant did not present substantive grounds for relief in his petition. 

When a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in a postconviction 

petition, the petitioner, in order to secure a hearing, must proffer evidence which, if 

believed, would establish not only that his trial counsel had substantially violated at 
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least one of a defense attorney's essential duties to his client but also that said 

violation was prejudicial to the petitioner. State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 114, 443 

N.E.2d 169 (1982). 

{¶18} To prove an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

appellant must satisfy a two-prong test. First, appellant must establish that counsel's 

performance has fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); 

State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), paragraph two of the 

syllabus. Second, appellant must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's 

performance. Id. To show that he has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient 

performance, appellant must prove that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the trial 

would have been different. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at paragraph three of the 

syllabus. 

{¶19} Appellant failed to provide any evidence to substantiate his allegations. 

Appellant offered only bare allegations in his petition. He did not attach any 

affidavits, not even his own self-serving affidavit, or other evidentiary materials to his 

petition in support of his claims. A petitioner merely offering bare allegations in 

support of a postconviction petition does not submit evidence that meets a minimum 

level of cogency to support the claim and, therefore, will not compel a hearing. State 

v. Short, 7th Dist. No. 96 CO 62, 1998 WL 574758, *4 (Aug. 26, 1998). 

{¶20} Based on the above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying appellant’s postconviction petition without a hearing. 

{¶21} Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 
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{¶22} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby 

affirmed. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs. 

Robb, P.J., concurs.