United States of America 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION 

1120 20th Street, N.W., Ninth Floor 

Washington, DC 20036-3457 

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v. OSHRC Docket No. 09-1184

DANA CONTAINER, INC.,

Respondent.

ON BRIEFS: 

Ronald Gottlieb, Appellate Attorney; Heather Phillips, Counsel for Appellate Litigation; Joseph 

M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health; M. Patricia 

Smith, Solicitor of Labor; U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC 

 For the Complainant 

John J. Coleman, III, Marcel L. Debruge, Ryan M. Aday; Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL 

 For the Respondent 

DECISION 

Before: ATTWOOD, Acting Chairman; MACDOUGALL, Commissioner. 

BY THE COMMISSION: 

Dana Container, Inc. is a New Jersey-based company that operates several industrial 

truck tank-washing facilities. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspected a 

Dana facility in Summit, Illinois, following an accident involving a Dana employee who required 

emergency medical assistance after he was found unconscious in a tank at the facility. OSHA 

issued Dana two citations alleging several serious and willful violations of the Occupational 

Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678. Most of the items alleged violations of 
2

various sections of the permit-required confined spaces (PRCSs) standard, 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1910.146.1 The Secretary proposed a total penalty of $314,000. 

The parties settled several citation items prior to the hearing, leaving five serious items 

and four willful items with a total proposed penalty of $238,000 at issue before Administrative 

Law Judge Sharon D. Calhoun. The judge affirmed two citation items as serious (Serious 

Citation 1, Item 13 and Willful Citation 2, Item 1a) and two citation items as willful (Willful 

Citation 2, Items 2 and 3). She vacated the remaining five items (Serious Citation 1, Items 10, 

11a, 11b, and 12, and Willful Citation 2, Item 1b). The judge assessed a total penalty of 

$150,000. 

Both parties petitioned for review of the judge’s decision. At issue before the 

Commission are three of the items affirmed by the judge, including the willful characterization 

of two of those items—Serious Citation 1, Item 13 (non-entry rescue system), and Willful 

Citation 2, Items 2 (testing of conditions in permit space) and 3 (entry permit preparation). Also 

at issue are four of the items vacated by the judge based on her finding that Dana complied with 

 

1

 Under the PRCS standard, an employer must “evaluate the workplace to determine if any 

spaces are permit-required confined spaces.” § 1910.146(c). A PRCS is defined as a confined 

space that has one or more of the following characteristics: 

(1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere; (2) Contains a 

material that has the potential for engulfing an entrant; (3) Has an internal 

configuration such that an entrant could be trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly 

converging walls or by a floor which slopes downward and tapers to a smaller 

cross-section; or (4) Contains any other recognized serious safety or health 

hazard. 

§ 1910.146(b). If the workplace contains PRCSs and employees will enter such spaces, the 

employer shall clearly identify these locations and “develop and implement a written permit 

space program.” § 1910.146(c)(4). The employer’s program shall protect employees from the 

hazards of PRCSs and regulate employee entry. For example, the employer must: (1) 

“Implement the measures necessary to prevent unauthorized entry;” (2) “Identify and evaluate 

the hazards of permit spaces before employees enter them;” (3) “Develop and implement the 

means, procedures, and practices necessary for safe permit space entry operations;” and (4) 

provide specified safety equipment at no cost to employees. § 1910.146(d)(1)-(4). Prior to 

entering a permit-required space, an entry permit must be prepared and authorized. 

§ 1910.146(e). Conditions within the PRCS must be tested prior to entry and during the course 

of work, see § 1910.146(d)(5)(i), and, in general, a retrieval system or method must be in place, 

see § 1910.146(k)(3). 
3

the alternate entry procedures specified in § 1910.146(c)(5)2—Serious Citation 1, Items 10 (gas 

meter maintenance), 11a (program revision/employees not protected), and 11b (program 

revision/annual permit review), and Willful Citation 2, Item 1b (specify acceptable entry 

conditions).

 For the reasons that follow, we vacate Serious Citation 1, Item 10; affirm Serious Citation 

1, Items 11a, 11b, and 13 as serious; affirm Willful Citation 2, Item 1b as serious,3 and affirm 

Willful Citation 2, Items 2 and 3 as willful. For the affirmed violations, we assess a total penalty 

of $110,500.

BACKGROUND

At Dana’s Summit facility, employees wash trailer tanks that have been used to transport 

various liquids, including hazardous materials. When a Dana customer drives an empty tank into 

Dana’s facility for cleaning, the tank is brought to one of four bays, where a Dana employee first 

drains any residual product through a valve in the bottom of the tank. The employee then 

commences the cleaning process, which involves administering cleaning agents through a 

mechanical device called a “spinner.” While standing on a catwalk that provides access to an 

opening in the top of the tank, the employee inserts the spinner into the opening, and the spinner 

sprays the cleaning agent onto the tank’s interior surfaces. The cleaning process can involve hot 

or cold water, a hot detergent wash, a hot caustic wash, a wash using a solvent, or a combination 

of these substances, depending on the contents of the tank before cleaning. After this wash, the 

employee uses the spinner again to spray rinse water into the tank, then uses steam and blow 

dryers to sanitize and dry the tank. 

On occasion, this process does not completely clean the tank. In such instances, a Dana 

employee must enter the tank to remove the remaining residue. Dana has a written “Permit 

 

2

The PRCS standard provides for alternative (less stringent than full permit procedures) entry 

procedures in cases where, essentially, the only hazard in a confined space is atmospheric, and 

the hazard can be controlled by forced air ventilation. § 1910.146(c)(5)(i). The alternative 

procedures are allowed only in cases in which specified requirements for substantiation and 

notification are met. § 1910.146(c)(5)(i)(B) and (E). If the entry operation is done using the 

alternate entry procedures, the employer does not need to meet §§ 1910.146(d) through (f) and 

(h) through (k). § 1910.146(c)(5)(i).

3

 We leave undisturbed the parties’ agreement on review that Willful Citation 2, Item 1b, if 

affirmed, should be characterized as serious, not willful as initially alleged in the citation, given 

that the judge affirmed as serious Item 1a of the same willful citation. 
4

Required Confined Space Entry Program,” which includes a provision stating that tank entry is 

allowed only if a supervisor completes and issues a permit authorizing entry. Before issuing a 

permit, a supervisor must test the tank’s atmosphere for oxygen content and for flammable and 

toxic vapors. If the supervisor issues a permit, the employee entering the tank must wear a 

harness attached to a retrieval device to enable non-entry rescue in the event of an emergency. A 

standby employee or “attendant” must be present outside the tank to monitor the entering 

employee at all times, and Dana uses blowers to continuously blow outside air into the tank 

during an entry. 

Towards the end of the overnight shift on January 28, 2009, the Dana employee 

supervising that shift’s tank washing crew (Supervisor A) began cleaning a tank that contained a 

pasty residue. He observed that the residue was not draining properly out of the bottom of the 

tank, so he decided to enter the tank to clear any obstruction. It is undisputed that Supervisor A

did not conduct any atmospheric testing, complete a permit before entering the tank, or use his 

harness and the non-entry rescue system. Once inside the tank, Supervisor A lost consciousness 

and had to be rescued by the Summit Fire Department. Emergency personnel took Supervisor A 

to the hospital where doctors diagnosed him with “Syncope and Collapse, Toxic Effect of 

Unspecified Gas, Fume, or Vapor.” Dana’s Facility Manager formally disciplined Supervisor A

in writing on the day of the accident. 

DISCUSSION

The seven alleged violations before us on review fall into two categories: (1) those based 

on Supervisor A’s entry into the tank, and (2) those for which Dana claims that it complied with 

the PRCS standard’s alternate entry procedures specified in § 1910.146(c)(5). 

I. Alleged Violations Based on Supervisor A’s Tank Entry

The Secretary alleges three violations based on Supervisor A’s conduct before and during 

his entry into the tank on the day of the accident: Serious Citation 1, Item 13, based on 

Supervisor A’s failure to attach himself to a non-entry rescue system before entering the tank, in 

violation of § 1910.146(k)(3);4 Willful Citation 2, Item 2, based on Supervisor A’s entry into the 

 

4

 Section 1910.146(k)(3) provides: “To facilitate non-entry rescue, retrieval systems or methods 

shall be used whenever an authorized entrant enters a permit space, unless the retrieval 

equipment would increase the overall risk of entry or would not contribute to the rescue of the 

entrant.” 
5

tank without first testing the conditions inside to ensure that it was safe for entry, in violation of 

§ 1910.146(d)(5)(i);5 and Willful Citation 2, Item 3, based on Supervisor A’s failure to complete 

an entry permit documenting the measures taken to ensure safe entry, in violation of 

§ 1910.146(e)(1).6

 At issue on review is the judge’s finding that Dana had knowledge of the 

conditions alleged under all three items,7 as well as her characterization of the two items as 

willful. 

A. Knowledge 

Under Commission precedent, to establish knowledge, the Secretary must prove that the 

employer knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the 

conditions constituting the violation. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., 25 BNA OSHC 1216, 1218 

(No. 10-2659, 2015). The judge concluded that Dana had actual knowledge of the violative 

conditions by imputing Supervisor A’s knowledge of his own violative conduct to Dana, citing 

Dover Elevator for the proposition that “when a supervisory employee has actual or constructive 

knowledge of the violative conditions, that knowledge is imputed to the employer, and the 

Secretary satisfies his burden of proof without having to demonstrate any inadequacy or defect in 

the employer’s safety program.” Dover Elevator, 16 BNA OSHC 1281, 1286 (No. 91-862, 

1993). 

Here, there is no dispute that Supervisor A had actual knowledge of his own misconduct. 

Thus, under Commission precedent, Supervisor A’s knowledge is imputable to Dana. However, 

the Third Circuit, one of three circuits to which this case could be appealed,8

 differs from the 

 

5

 Section 1910.146(d)(5)(i) provides: “[The employer shall] [t]est conditions in the permit space 

to determine if acceptable entry conditions exist before entry is authorized to begin.” 

6

 Section 1910.146(e)(1) provides: “Before entry is authorized, the employer shall document the 

completion of measures required by paragraph (d)(3) of this section by preparing an entry 

permit.” 

7

 The Secretary has the burden of proving: (1) the applicability of the cited standard; (2) the 

employer’s noncompliance with the standard’s terms; (3) employee access or exposure to the 

violative conditions; and (4) the employer’s actual or constructive knowledge of the violation. 

Ormet Corp., 14 BNA OSHC 2134, 2135 (No. 85-0531, 1991). Of these elements, only 

knowledge is at issue in this case. 

8

 Under the OSH Act, an employer may seek review in the court of appeals in one of potentially 

three circuits: the circuit in which the violation occurred; the circuit in which the employer's 

principal office is located; and the District of Columbia Circuit. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a). The 

Secretary may seek review in the circuit in which the violation occurred or in which the 
6

Commission, as it requires that in order to impute knowledge from a supervisor who participates 

in the violative conduct, the Secretary must prove that the supervisor’s participation was 

foreseeable by showing that the employer’s safety program was inadequate.9 Pa. Power, 737 

F.2d at 357-58; Otis Elevator Co., 21 BNA OSHC 2204, 2208 (No. 03-1344, 2007). Although 

neither the Seventh nor D.C. Circuit has indicated whether it would adopt the Third Circuit’s 

view, even under the Third Circuit’s foreseeability test we would reach the same conclusion 

because, as discussed below, we find the record shows that Supervisor A’s misconduct was 

foreseeable.10 See Otis, 21 BNA OSHC at 2207-08. 

While the judge did not analyze Dana’s safety program in the context of her knowledge 

analysis, she considered its adequacy in her analysis of Dana’s affirmative defense of 

unpreventable employee misconduct (UEM). She rejected the defense, finding that the company 

failed to take reasonable steps to discover violations of its work rules and failed to enforce those 

 

employer has its principal office. 29 U.S.C. § 660(b). This case arose in Illinois, which is in the 

Seventh Circuit, and Dana is based in New Jersey, which is in the Third Circuit. Accordingly, 

depending on the outcome, the Commission’s final order in this case may be appealed to either 

the Third, Seventh, or D.C. Circuits. 

9

 The adequacy of the employer’s safety program depends on whether the employer: (1) had 

work rules designed to prevent the violation; (2) adequately communicated those rules to its 

employees; (3) took steps to discover violations; and (4) effectively enforced the rules when it 

discovered violations. Pa. Power & Light Co. v. OSHRC, 737 F.2d 350, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1984). 

10 We also note that, in general, “[w]here it is highly probable that a Commission decision would 

be appealed to a particular circuit, the Commission has . . . applied the precedent of that circuit 

in deciding the case—even though it may differ from the Commission’s precedent.” Kerns Bros. 

Tree Serv., 18 BNA OSHC 2064, 2067 (No. 96-1719, 2000) (citation omitted). And Acting 

Chair Attwood notes that when there may be differences in the law between relevant circuits, the 

Commission may apply its own precedent. See Bethlehem Steel Corp., 9 BNA OSHC 1346, 

1349 n.12 (No. 76-3444, 1981) (consolidated); Raybestos Friction Materials Co., 9 BNA OSHC 

1141, 1143 (No. 80-2793, 1980). Moreover, in her view there is no basis here to predict the 

likelihood of an appeal or which circuit court may be the first to receive one. Commissioner 

MacDougall disagrees with Acting Chair Attwood but is of the opinion that any disagreement on 

this point is immaterial to the disposition herein because, even under applicable Third Circuit 

precedent—Commissioner MacDougall applies Third Circuit precedent in deciding this case as 

this is the circuit to which it is highly probable this decision would be appealed—there is 

agreement that the Secretary has met his burden of proof on proving the element of employer 

knowledge. See Kerns, 18 BNA OSHC at 2068-69 (Commission applied Third Circuit 

precedent, including Pennsylvania Power & Light, which stated that where employer knowledge 

is based on supervisory misconduct, the Secretary bears the burden of proving that the 

supervisor’s conduct “could have been foreseen and prevented by the employer with the exercise 

of reasonable diligence and care”) (citations omitted). 
7

rules. We agree with the judge that Dana’s safety program was inadequate because Dana did not 

effectively enforce its work rules designed to protect employees from PRCS hazards when 

violations were discovered. 

As the judge found, the record shows that Dana had work rules designed to prevent the 

violations and had communicated those rules to its employees. Dana’s program bars entry into 

“dirty” tanks, i.e., those that have not been washed. The program does allow entry into “clean” 

tanks, i.e., those that have gone through a mechanical wash, but employees must treat washed 

tanks as PRCSs. This includes requiring employees to wear a harness and attach it to a retrieval 

line to enable non-entry rescue, to test the atmospheric conditions within the tank, and to 

complete an entry permit before entering a PRCS. These rules were included in the PRCS 

training program that Dana uses to train its employees and were communicated to Dana’s 

employees, including Supervisor A. 

The record also shows that Dana had a reasonable method to discover violations of its 

rules. First, as the judge points out, Dana could readily discover such violations by reviewing 

the tank entry permits, which the Facility Manager at the Summit facility acknowledged he did. 

Second, as described in the table below, each of the 28 entry permits Dana produced to the 

Secretary had an error or omission, and 11 of those deficient permits—nearly 40%—were 

completed by Supervisor A. 
8

Tank Entry Permit Deficiencies 

Permit Number

Supervisor A 

Involved?

Lack of Post-Entry 

Air Monitoring

Duration of 

Authorization Not 

Specified

Duration of 

Authorization 

Exceeded

Entry and/or Exit 

Times Missing

No or Missing MSDS 

Review

Entrant Not Listed

Attendant Not Listed

No supervisor 

approval and/or 

permit cancellation

No Toxicity or LEL 

Levels Recorded

649 No • •

650 No • •

651 No • •

652 No • •

653 No • •

654 Yes • • • • •

655 No • •

656 No • •

657 No • •

658 No • •

659 No • • •

660 Yes • • • •

661 Yes • • •

662 Yes • • •

663 Yes • •

664 Yes • • • •

665 Yes •

666 No • • •

667 No • •

668 Yes • • • • •

669 No • • •

670 Yes • • • • •

671 No •

672 Yes • •

673 Yes • • •

674 No • •

675 No • • •

676 No • •
9

While none of these deficiencies show the specific violations at issue here with regard to 

Supervisor A’s entry, evidence relating to an employer’s entire safety program, not just those 

aspects specific to the citations at issue, is relevant to assessing the program’s adequacy for 

foreseeability purposes. See Rawson Contractors Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 1078, 1081 (No. 99-

0018, 2003) (finding employer’s failure to impose discipline for “minor” violations discovered 

by an outside consultant defeated UEM claim for supervisor’s more serious misconduct); Jensen 

Constr. Co., 7 BNA OSHC 1477, 1479 n.5 (No. 76-1538, 1979) (finding employer’s claim that it 

enforced its safety program was undermined by other instances of a failure to protect employees 

from the relevant hazard even though those other instances were beyond the scope of the 

citation). 

The deficiencies evident in all 28 tank entry permits show that employees were violating 

Dana’s safety rules.11 For instance, Dana’s PRCS program requires employees to conduct air 

monitoring subsequent to entry and record the monitoring results on the permits, yet no such 

results appear on any of the 28 permits in evidence. Both the company’s PRCS program and 

PRCS training program also state that permits must specify the duration for which they are valid, 

yet seven of the permits show entries exceeding the 20 minutes that the permits specify as the 

maximum duration—including one showing a 1-hour, 40-minute entry; one showing a 1-hour, 

30-minute entry; and one showing a 2-hour entry.12

 In addition, Dana’s PRCS training program 

requires employees to review material safety data sheets (MSDSs), but 12 permits either have no 

indication of whether MSDSs were reviewed or affirmatively indicate that they were not 

reviewed at all. Moreover, both the PRCS program and the PRCS training program require the 

 

11 Dana argues that errors on the entry permits for “clean” tanks did not make Supervisor A’s 

entry into a “dirty” tank foreseeable. But this argument misses the mark. The citation items at 

issue are not based on the fact that the tank Supervisor A entered was “dirty.” Rather, the 

citation items are based on his failure to follow PRCS procedures required both by OSHA and by 

Dana’s safety program whenever an employee enters a PRCS. Thus, the fact that these tank 

entry permits show that Supervisor A and other employees failed to follow PRCS procedures 

when entering clean tanks is sufficient evidence to support a finding that it was foreseeable 

Supervisor A and other employees would continue to disregard required PRCS procedures, 

regardless of whether they were entering a “clean” or a “dirty” tank. 

12 Two additional permits, both completed by Supervisor A, specify neither the time the tank was 

entered nor the time it was exited. Also, 10 of the 28 permits do not include the required 

language specifying the duration of authorization. The shortest entry on those permits is 45 

minutes, and of the remaining nine permits, five have 1-hour entries, three have 2-hour entries, 

and one has a 3-hour entry. 
10

entrant and the attendant to be listed on the permits before entry. Nonetheless, six permits—all 

completed by Supervisor A—do not name an entry attendant, and two additional permits, also 

completed by Supervisor A, name the attendant but not the entrant. Finally, one permit indicates 

that a Dana employee entered a dirty tank which, if true, would have been a clear violation of 

Dana’s work rule prohibiting such an entry. 

Even if the permits are only facially deficient and the required actions were in fact taken, 

the permits plainly show that employees were violating the work rules Dana had for completing 

them and, at least in some cases, indicate that employees were failing to comply with other entry 

work rules as well.13

 The Facility Manager testified that he reviewed these completed permits, 

and while that demonstrates Dana had a reasonable method of discovering deficiencies, we find 

that the Facility Manager’s failure to follow up on the permit deficiencies he observed 

demonstrates a failure to enforce the company’s program. 

Moreover, the Facility Manager never disciplined Supervisor A or anybody else for either 

the deficient permits or the violations of Dana’s safety rules evident on the face of those permits, 

lending further support to our finding that Dana failed to effectively enforce its rules. 

Furthermore, Supervisor A admitted that he violated the work rules at issue here because he “was 

tired, it was cold, and [he] wanted to try to just finish that trailer.” See Jensen, 7 BNA OSHC at 

1480 (“[T]he fact that a supervisor would feel free to breach a company safety policy is strong 

evidence that the implementation of the policy is lax.”) (citing Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. 

OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1267 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). Supervisor A’s own permits, on their face, 

show numerous violations of Dana’s work rules, and his conduct on the day of the accident is 

consistent with those previous violations, all of which support the conclusion that he did not fear 

disciplinary action for violating Dana’s safety rules. This misconduct, combined with the 

 

13 Most of the deficiencies also correspond with requirements of the PRCS standard. Given our 

conclusion below that Dana failed to qualify for the standard’s alternate entry procedures, the 

Secretary has established that these requirements were mandatory for tank entries at the Summit 

facility. See §§ 1910.146(e)(4) and (f)(3) (requiring employer to establish and document 

authorized duration of permit, which may not exceed time required to complete assigned task); 

§§ 1910.146(h)(1), (i)(1), and (j)(1) (requiring entrants, attendants, and supervisors to know 

hazards that may be faced during entry, including information on mode, signs or symptoms, and 

consequences of exposure); § 1910.146(f)(4) (requiring permits to identify authorized entrants); 

§ 1910.146(f)(5) (requiring permits to identify personnel serving as attendants). 
11

company’s apparent acceptance of deficient entry permits without repercussions, establishes that 

Dana failed to enforce its safety program.14

Accordingly, we conclude that Supervisor A’s misconduct was foreseeable, and thus his 

knowledge of his own misconduct would be properly imputable to Dana even under Third 

Circuit precedent.15

 As no other elements of the violations are at issue, we affirm Serious 

Citation 1, Item 13, and Willful Citation 2, Items 2 and 3.16

B. Characterization of Willful Citation 2, Items 2 and 3

On review, Dana challenges the judge’s willful characterization of Items 2 and 3, which 

allege violations pertaining to Supervisor A’s entry into the tank without testing the atmosphere 

 

14 In reaching this conclusion, we do not rely (as the judge did) on a statement made by the 

Facility Manager during the hearing that he “run[s] a lax discipline, documented discipline, 

because it opens the door for every employee who gets angry to pick up the phone and call 

OSHA.” We are persuaded that the Facility Manager likely made the statement out of frustration 

in response to the previous witness’s apparent willingness to change his testimony in return for 

being rehired at the facility. Indeed, the Facility Manager followed this statement with testimony 

that he has disciplined every employee who entered a dirty tank or failed to use a non-entry 

rescue system and that he has never refrained from disciplining an employee for fear the 

employee would contact OSHA or another regulatory agency. 

Moreover, we draw no adverse inferences about Dana’s enforcement efforts from its seemingly 

sparse disciplinary record. See Kerns Bros., 18 BNA OSHC at 2070 (“The evidence indicates 

that [the employer] disciplined employees on the few occasions when it found them violating 

safety rules.”). Given that Summit is a small facility with only twelve non-office employees, the 

issuance of three notices for two incidents over the 11 years preceding Supervisor A’s violative 

entry is inconclusive with respect to lax enforcement. 

15 For the same reasons that we find Supervisor A’s misconduct foreseeable, we affirm the 

judge’s rejection of Dana’s UEM affirmative defense. See Manganas Painting Co., 21 BNA 

OSHC 1964, 1997 (No. 94-0588, 2007) (“To establish th[e UEM] defense, an employer must 

show that it had: (1) established work rules designed to prevent the violative conditions from 

occurring; (2) adequately communicated those rules to its employees; (3) took steps to discover 

violations of those rules; and (4) effectively enforced the rules when violations were 

discovered.”). We note, however, that the judge considered an additional element in analyzing 

Dana’s UEM defense—“that the violative conduct of the employee was idiosyncratic and 

unforeseeable.” However, foreseeability is not an additional element; rather, it is an issue proved 

or disproved by an analysis of the four UEM elements, and only in the context of imputing a 

supervisor’s knowledge of his own misconduct to the employer in circuits, such as the Third 

Circuit, which require a showing of foreseeability. See, e.g., Pa. Power, 737 F.2d at 358-59. 

16 Dana does not challenge the characterization of Serious Citation 1, Item 13 on review and we 

find no reason to disturb the judge’s findings on this issue. See, e.g., KS Energy Servs., Inc., 22 

BNA OSHC 1261, 1268 n.11 (No. 06-1416, 2008) (affirming alleged characterization where 

issue not in dispute). 
12

and without completing a tank entry permit. “Willful violations are ‘characterized by an 

intentional or knowing disregard for the requirements of the Act or a “plain indifference” to 

employee safety, in which the employer manifests a “heightened awareness” that its conduct 

violates the Act or that the conditions at its workplace present a hazard.’ ” Barbosa Group, Inc., 

21 BNA OSHC 1865, 1868 (No. 02-0865, 2007) (citation omitted), aff’d, 296 F. App’x 211 (2d 

Cir. 2008) (unpublished). This state of mind is evident where “ ‘the employer was actually 

aware, at the time of the violative act, that the act was unlawful, or that it possessed a state of 

mind such that if it were informed of the standard, it would not care.’ ” AJP Constr. Inc. v. Sec’y 

of Labor, 357 F.3d 70, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation and emphasis omitted). 

The judge affirmed Items 2 and 3 as willful based on Supervisor A’s admission that he 

knew it was wrong to enter the tank without testing it or completing a tank entry permit.17

 We 

agree with the judge that Supervisor A’s conduct was willful. Supervisor A knew he was 

violating Dana’s safety rules and OSHA’s PRCS standard when he entered the tank without first 

testing the atmospheric conditions or completing an entry permit. As noted above, he admitted 

that he disregarded these rules because it was the end of his shift, he was tired, it was cold, and 

he “just wanted to finish that trailer.” We find that Supervisor A’s conduct shows a conscious 

disregard for known requirements of the standard, and his willful state of mind is imputed to 

Dana. See, e.g., Tampa Shipyards, Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 1533, 1539 (No. 86-0360, 1992) 

(consolidated).18

We also reject Dana’s contention that it made a good faith effort to comply sufficient to 

overcome a finding of willfulness. See, e.g., Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 17 BNA 

 

17 The judge also stated that Supervisor A “committed [the violations] with premeditation.” 

Premeditation is not an element of a willful violation; thus, we do not affirm the items as willful 

on this basis. 

18 Commissioner MacDougall finds that under Third Circuit precedent on willfulness, the record 

supports willfulness as Supervisor A’s conduct was a deliberate or intentional disregard of the 

Act. See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir. 1974) (defining a willful 

violation as “equivalent to a knowing, conscious, and deliberate flaunting of the Act[,] . . . more 

than merely voluntary action or omission—it involves an element of obstinate refusal to 

comply”), aff’d en banc, 519 F.2d 990 (3d Cir. 1975), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Atlas 

Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); see also Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. OSHRC, 622 

F.2d 1160, 1167 (3d Cir. 1980) (agreeing with DC Circuit that there is “little if any difference” 

between Third Circuit’s willful approach and other courts). 
13

OSHC 1890, 1891 (No. 92-3684, 1997) (an employer’s good faith effort to comply with the 

standard, even if the employer’s efforts were not entirely effective, can negate a finding of 

willfulness), aff’d, 131 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir. 1997). Although the company had work rules that it

communicated to its employees and submitted evidence of three instances of disciplinary action, 

the fact remains that Dana’s Facility Manager, despite admitting that he reviewed all the permits, 

never disciplined an employee for improperly completing entry permits or for the violations that 

were readily apparent on the face of the permits. While Dana’s conduct does not amount to an 

“ ‘absence of any evidence that [the employer] enforced [its] safety rules,’ ” Elliot Constr. Corp., 

23 BNA OSHC 2110, 2118 (No. 07-1578, 2012) (citation omitted), a good faith effort to comply 

requires some action when violations of safety rules are plain, as they certainly were here. 

Therefore, we affirm both items as willful.

II. Applicability of Alternate Entry Procedures and Other Alleged PRCS Violations 

A. Did Dana Meet the “Conditions” Required for Alternate Entry?

Dana asserts that it was not required to comply with the cited provisions of the PRCS 

standard because, it contends, it was entitled to rely on the alternate entry procedures specified in 

§ 1910.146(c)(5)(ii). See § 1910.146(c)(5). Reliance on the alternate entry procedures, however, 

is only available when certain prerequisites, denoted “conditions” in the standard, are met. Id. 

Section 1910.146(c)(5)(i) provides: “An employer whose employees enter a permit space need 

not comply with paragraph[] (d) . . . provided that: [alternate entry conditions (A) through (F) are 

satisfied].” Use of the alternate entry procedures is limited to PRCSs in which the only hazards 

posed are atmospheric hazards that can be controlled by ventilation. § 1910.146(c)(5)(i)(A). To 

be exempt from the full permit procedures in paragraph (d), all of the conditions detailed in 

§ 1910.146(c)(5)(i)(A)-(F) must be met.19

 

The judge found that Dana complied with all of the specified alternate entry conditions 

under § 1910.146(c)(5)(i), and therefore she vacated all four citation items that the Secretary 

alleged under paragraph (d) of the PRCS standard. For the following reasons, we find that Dana 

 

19 Because OSHA uses the term “paragraph” to refer to both paragraphs and sub-paragraphs, e.g., 

§ 1910.146(d) and § 1910.146(c)(5)(i)(A), we use “paragraph” in the same way. 
14

failed to meet the conditions set forth under paragraphs (B) and (C), and therefore conclude that 

it did not qualify for use of the alternate entry procedures.20 

Paragraph (B) requires an employer to “demonstrate that continuous forced air ventilation 

alone is sufficient to maintain that permit space safe for entry[.]” § 1910.146(c)(5)(i)(B). 

Paragraph (C) has an associated condition—an employer must “develop[] monitoring and 

inspection data that supports the demonstrations required by paragraph[] . . . [(B)] . . . .” 

§ 1910.146(c)(5)(i)(C). The judge found that Dana met the requirement in paragraph (B) 

because Dana’s tank entry procedure requires testing for hazards before entry and Dana 

“established [that] it uses continuous forced air ventilation during entry.” The judge also found 

that Dana’s tank entry permits document the monitoring and inspection data requirements of 

paragraph (C). 

Although paragraph (B) itself does not specify what sort of demonstration would be 

sufficient to show that continuous forced air ventilation alone is sufficient to maintain the permit 

space safe for entry, the preamble to the PRCS standard reflects OSHA’s concern that the 

demonstration realistically account for the critical role played by the ventilation system where 

the alternative procedures have displaced other protective measures: 

In order for the space to be considered safe, the atmosphere within the space after 

ventilation may not be expected to approach a hazardous atmosphere. This is 

necessary so that, if the ventilation shuts down for any reason (such as loss of 

power), the employees will have enough time to recognize the hazard and either 

exit the space or restore the ventilation. A guideline of 50 percent of the level of 

flammable or toxic substances that would constitute a “hazardous atmosphere” 

may be used by employers in making the determination required under 

(c)(5)(i)(B). 

Permit-Required Confined Spaces, 58 Fed. Reg. 4,464, 4,488 (Jan. 14, 1993).21 We agree with 

the Secretary that to satisfy paragraph (B) in the circumstances here, Dana had to have 

 

20 In light of this conclusion, we need not address whether the prerequisites under paragraphs (A) 

and (D) through (F) were met. See § 1910.146(c)(5)(i)(A), (D)-(F). 

21 This concern was echoed in a compliance directive in which OSHA stated that for an employer 

to demonstrate that ventilation will maintain the air inside a permit space safe for entry, and thus 

fulfill this condition, the employer should have documentation with data including: 

[v]olume of the space to be entered; [c]apacity and configuration of the 

ventilation equipment to be used; [i]dentified atmospheric hazards and potential 

hazards; [t]he sampling results from routine testing of the space from the time 
15

monitoring and inspection data, specified under paragraph (C), proving that ventilation would 

“maintain” the atmosphere inside its tanks safe for entry. See Sharon & Walter Constr., Inc., 23 

BNA OSHC 1286, 1293 (No. 00-1402, 2010) (meaning of statutory language “ ‘determined by 

reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the 

broader context of the statute as a whole.’ ”) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 

341 (1997)). 

While Dana contends that paragraph (B) has been met because its wash process renders 

tanks free from any potential hazardous atmosphere such that its use of continuous ventilation 

during entry is an additional, but unnecessary, precaution,22 the record does not support this 

claim. Randy McGough, Dana’s expert and an engineer who consults with transportation clients 

on confined space entry compliance, testified that the company’s wash process removes any 

potential hazardous atmosphere from the tanks, which he based on his “first hand evaluation of 

the procedures used to clean those tank trailers and dry [them] and . . . testing data that I’ve seen 

and . . . produced.” He did not identify the “data” to which he was referring and his only 

supporting reference appears to be a report he finalized in July 2009, in which he concluded that 

“[b]ased on a review of previous atmospheric testing results at the other Dana facilities and the 

pre-tank entry test results at the Summit terminal, the tank trailer washing procedures are found 

to be adequate to remove any potential atmospheric or dermal hazards inside the tank trailers.” 

 

ventilating has begun through final determination of acceptable entry conditions; 

and [a]tmospheric hazards created by work in the space. 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, CPL 02-00-100, Application of the PermitRequired Confined Spaces (PRCS) Standards, 29 C.F.R. 1910.146, App. E, Section (c), No. 7 

(1995). OSHA has characterized an employer’s burden under paragraph (B) as “significant.” 

See OSHA Interpretation Letter from Director John B. Miles to Verne R. Brown (Apr. 24, 1996). 

22 Dana’s additional claim that it conducts continuous testing is unsupported by the record. John 

Clarence Bean, a Dana employee who works on “safety and environmental compliance” at its 

Demopolis, Alabama, facility, testified that “at the time we’re blowing, we [are] continuously 

testing when we’re making an entry into the space.” Bean admitted, however, that he did not 

know what instruments Dana uses to perform atmospheric tests at the Summit facility. In fact, 

the record shows that at the Summit facility, Dana exclusively uses a four-gas meter with hand 

bulb aspirator, which cannot function automatically but must be squeezed manually to bring air 

into the meter’s sensors. Furthermore, the Facility Manager never stated that Dana performs 

continuous testing at the Summit facility, only that it uses continuous ventilation. He testified 

that Dana’s procedure is to test tanks before entry, maintain continuous ventilation during entry, 

and retest the atmosphere if employees remain inside the tank after an hour has passed. 
16

We find that this report is of limited value. It does not specify what past “testing results” 

McGough relied on to reach this conclusion, and, in fact, the report contains no testing data at 

all. See CPL 02-00-100, App. E., Section (c), No. 6 (describing necessary data). Furthermore, 

the report was dated July 2009, over six months after the January 2009 inspection, so we find it 

of limited value, if any, in assessing Dana’s demonstration, which paragraph (B) requires be 

made before any tank entries occur. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 4,488 (employers must satisfy the 

conditions under (c)(5)(i) “before a permit space may be entered under the alternative 

procedures”) (emphasis added). 

Dana relies on two reports prepared for Suttles Truck Leasing, whose tank-washing 

facilities Dana bought in 1999, to support its claim that the wash process used at the Summit 

facility reduces atmospheric hazards to the extent that ventilation alone is sufficient to keep its 

employees safe during entry. In relying on these reports, Dana points to McGough’s testimony 

that the wash process at Summit is not materially different from the wash process used by 

Suttles. Both of the reports—one from 1996 and the other from 1999—contain testing data 

regarding the atmospheric hazards inside tanks both before and after Suttles’ wash process. The 

1996 report suggests that Suttles’ wash process was successful at keeping toxic hazards below 

the permissible exposure limit (PEL) in tanks that employees may enter.23 The Commission 

previously considered this report in Suttles Truck Leasing, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 1953, 1966 (No. 

97-0545, 2004) (consolidated), and found, based on the report, that Suttles’ wash process purged 

any “toxic atmospheres” in the tanks at issue in that case. Dana contends that this report 

establishes that Dana’s wash process eliminated all hazards in the instant case, but we do not 

agree. As Craig Schroll, the Secretary’s expert, pointed out at the hearing, Suttles washed the 20 

tanks tested for the 1996 report using only water, while Dana often uses solvents that can, on 

their own, create atmospheric hazards. Furthermore, as Schroll noted, Dana’s wash process has a 

great deal of variability and leaves much to the discretion of its employees; for example, Dana 

relies on employees to decide to wash the tanks with water or a solvent and how long to wash 

 

23 In the 1996 report, 20 washed tanks were tested for chemical compounds identified from 

MSDSs of typical products contained in tanks cleaned by Suttles, as well as carbon monoxide, 

lower explosive limits (LELs), oxygen, and volatile organic compounds. The report states that 

two of the 20 post-wash samples exceeded the PEL for certain substances, but one of those 

samples was suspected to be a mix-up and the other was from a tank that would not require 

employee entry. 
17

and dry them. Thus, we find that the 1996 report fails to support Dana’s claim. See U.S. Postal 

Serv., 21 BNA OSHC 1767, 1775 (No. 04-0316, 2006) (“[F]inders of fact are normally accorded 

wide latitude in determining whether proffered expert testimony would be helpful . . . .”). 

The 1999 Suttles report is equally lacking. For this report, washed tanks were tested with 

newly acquired photoionization detectors (PIDs), which are more sensitive in detecting volatile 

organic compounds than Dana’s four-gas meter. The test results from the PIDs showed that two 

out of Suttles’ 20 post-wash tanks had concentrations of hazardous organic vapors above the 

PEL.24 Additionally, 11 of the 51 total tests showed some level of difference between readings 

taken in the front, middle, and rear of the tanks, and two of the 51 showed oxygen levels below

OSHA’s acceptable range.25 Thus, while the 1999 report concluded that “[t]here is minimal 

exposure to a hazardous atmosphere within a tank washed at a Suttles Truck Leasing, Inc. 

terminal,” it does not state if and how ventilation might affect this atmosphere during entry. 

(Emphasis added.) Under these circumstances, we find that the 1999 and 1996 reports do not 

demonstrate that Dana’s tank wash process removes any potential for a hazardous atmosphere—

and in fact suggests that it may not. Accordingly, neither report satisfies paragraph (B), nor 

contains monitoring and inspection data that satisfy the requirements of paragraph (C). 

In addition, we find that Dana’s reliance on pre-entry testing does not mitigate the 

limitations of Dana’s tank wash process or its variability among employees who control it. 

Because the four-gas meter used at the Summit facility is incapable of testing for all potential 

atmospheric hazards, Dana’s pre-entry testing cannot serve as a check to ensure the wash process 

sufficiently eliminates atmospheric hazards by use of ventilation alone. As Schroll explained, 

this type of meter does not measure potential volatile organic compounds individually with a 

reading based on parts per million (ppm)—it measures these compounds all together as a lower 

explosive limit (LEL) percentage. As a result, Schroll stated that it is possible to have “readings 

of significant numbers at that parts per million level and still show zero percent LEL.” Thus, 

 

24 One tank showed nitrobenzene in the “rear-top station” of the tank at 1.33 ppm (PEL is 1 ppm) 

and one showed aniline in the “rear-middle and rear-bottom stations” at 5.15 ppm and 6.45 ppm, 

respectively (PEL is 5 ppm). The report points out that these results exceed the respective PELs 

by 29% and 33% for an 8-hour exposure, but that the amount of time employees are in the tanks 

for inspections “average[s] only 10 minutes.” 

25 The acceptable range from the PRCS standard’s definition of “[h]azardous atmosphere” is 

between 19.5% and 23.5% oxygen. § 1910.146(b). The tests showed 19.3% and 19.4% oxygen. 
18

Dana’s meter might not alert employees performing pre-entry testing to volatile organic 

compounds above the PEL—a real possibility according to the 1999 Suttles report. Indeed, the 

meter’s inability to accurately report volatile organic compound levels—i.e., for purposes of 

toxicity (rather than explosive levels)—is relevant to the extent Dana must prove that no

atmospheric contaminant can be expected to approach a hazardous level during entry. See 58 

Fed. Reg. at 4,488. Accordingly, we find the pre-entry data recorded on the permits does not 

satisfy the requirements in paragraphs (B) or (C). 

Finally, we note that Dana offered no data at all analyzing the effectiveness of its 

ventilation—no results were recorded of testing conducted after employees were in a tank for 

longer than an hour, which the Facility Manager identified as an entry requirement.26

 The only 

evidence of monitoring results during an entry is another report from Suttles, which documents a 

20-minute-long tank entry test in 1997. That tank had been washed using hot water only and was 

tested multiple times for temperature, relative humidity, oxygen, and LEL from eight different 

locations throughout the 20-minute entry. The test results showed 0.0 LEL throughout the entire 

entry and oxygen levels that dropped from 20.7% to 20.4%. The report, however, does not state 

whether there was ventilation during the entry. Accordingly, we do not find that this report, or 

any other evidence in the record, supports Dana’s argument that its use of continuous ventilation 

eliminated the possibility of a hazard developing during entry. Indeed, none of this evidence 

addresses or rebuts the testimony of the Secretary’s expert that the act of scraping off residue 

remaining after the wash process “has the potential to disturb the material in such a way that it’s 

going to give off . . . potentially hazardous vapors.”27

In sum, we find that Dana did not satisfy the conditions specified in § 1910.146(c)(5)(i) 

(B) and (C) and, therefore, its contention that it could rely on the alternate entry procedures 

 

26 Even if the permits contained retesting data or other data addressing ventilation effectiveness, 

those permits would not satisfy the alternate entry requirements for that entry because, as 

discussed previously, employers must satisfy all alternate entry conditions before employees 

enter a permit space. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 4,488. If the pre-entry data showed, as Dana argues, 

that the tank wash process eliminates all hazards before entry, Dana could have relied on the data 

in previous permits to show that in subsequent entries the only hazard was an actual or potential 

hazardous atmosphere. That data by itself, however, still would not prove that continuous air 

ventilation alone is sufficient to maintain that permit space safe for entry. 

27 Schroll testified that on numerous occasions in the past he had done testing in washed tanks to 

“make assessments about residues and their potential to evolve, particularly when disturbed.” 
19

under § 1910.146(c)(5)(ii) is rejected. Accordingly, we reverse the judge’s decision to the 

contrary. We turn next to the four citation items alleging violations of the standard’s PRCS 

program requirements under § 1910.146(d). 

B. Serious Citation 1, Item 10

The Secretary alleges that Dana violated § 1910.146(d)(4)(i) by failing to provide and 

maintain testing and monitoring equipment required to comply with paragraph (d)(5)—in other 

words, Dana did not have equipment to properly test and monitor the tank’s atmosphere before 

and during entry for acceptable levels of oxygen, combustible gases, and toxic gases.28 It is 

undisputed that at the time of the inspection, Dana’s four-gas meter (the only one at the facility) 

would not “zero out” or read the correct oxygen concentration of the normal atmosphere.29 

According to the Secretary, simply turning on the meter would have alerted Dana to this

problem, so the meter’s inoperability was easily determinable with the exercise of reasonable 

diligence. See Greenleaf Motor Express Inc., 21 BNA OSHC 1872, 1875 (No. 03-1305, 2007) 

(reasonable diligence includes a duty to inspect a work area and anticipate hazards, and an 

employer is charged with constructive knowledge of a condition it could reasonably have been 

expected to detect or prevent), aff’d, 262 F. App’x 716 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); David 

Weekley Homes, 19 BNA OSHC 1116, 1119 (No. 96-0898, 2000). He further asserts that Dana’s 

own maintenance policy required calibrating the machine every 30 days and replacing the 

sensors every 60 days or sooner, but that Dana’s calibration log sheet shows, as of the inspection 

on January 28, 2009, the meter had not been calibrated since November 20, 2008—thus, for 69 

days. 

There is no evidence in the record to establish when the meter became inoperable, nor has 

the Secretary shown that reasonable diligence required Dana to assess its operability any sooner 

than it did—that is, when it was next turned on. The meter’s user manual does not specify how 

frequently it should be calibrated, stating only to “[p]lease check frequently for proper operation 

and treat the instrument with the respect due a device that can save your life.” (Emphasis 

 

28 Section 1910.146(d)(4) specifies: “Provide the following equipment (specified in paragraphs 

(d)(4)(i) through (d)(4)(ix) of this section) at no cost to employees, maintain that equipment 

properly, and ensure that employees use that equipment properly: (i) Testing and monitoring 

equipment needed to comply with paragraph (d)(5) of this section.” 

29 Dana’s maintenance employee later determined the meter’s sensors needed to be replaced and 

the device was taken out of service until it was repaired. 
20

added.) The Secretary has not shown what the manual means by “frequently,” what Dana 

considers “frequent,” or what the industry considers “frequent.” Although he points to 

McGough’s July 2009 report—prepared after the OSHA inspection—as proof that Dana’s policy 

at that time was to calibrate the meter every 30 days and replace the sensors every 60 days, there 

is no evidence establishing what Dana’s policy was at the time of the inspection. Dana’s records 

show that it usually calibrated the meter every one to two months, but we have no basis on which 

to conclude that this schedule or even 69 days was deficient. Furthermore, the record shows that 

tank entries at the Summit facility were infrequent and that the meter was not used on a daily 

basis. Under these circumstances, we find that the Secretary has not established a violation of 

§ 1910.146(d)(4)(i) and vacate Serious Citation 1, Item 10. 

C. Serious Citation 1, Items 11a and 11b

Under Item 11a, the Secretary alleges that Dana violated § 1910.146(d)(13) by failing to 

revise its PRCS program to correct deficiencies documented on tank entry permits reviewed by 

the Facility Manager, including the lack of entrant and attendant names and signatures.30

 Under 

Item 11b, the Secretary alleges that Dana violated § 1910.146(d)(14) by failing to revise its 

PRCS program once entry permits showed employees had failed to follow PRCS requirements 

when entering tanks.31

 It is undisputed that these provisions apply to the cited conditions, so the 

only remaining issues are noncompliance and knowledge. For the following reasons, we affirm 

both items. 

 

30 Section 1910.146(d)(13) provides that the employer shall “[r]eview entry operations when the 

employer has reason to believe that the measures taken under the permit space program may not 

protect employees and revise the program to correct deficiencies found to exist before 

subsequent entries are authorized.” An accompanying note reads: 

Examples of circumstances requiring the review of the permit space program are: 

any unauthorized entry of a permit space, the detection of a permit space hazard 

not covered by the permit, the detection of a condition prohibited by the permit, 

the occurrence of an injury or near-miss during entry, a change in the use or 

configuration of a permit space, and employee complaints about the effectiveness 

of the program. 

31 Section 1910.146(d)(14) provides that the employer shall “[r]eview the permit space program, 

using the canceled permits retained under paragraph (e)(6) of this section within 1 year after each 

entry and revise the program as necessary to ensure that employees participating in entry 

operations are protected from permit space hazards.” An accompanying note reads: “Employers 

may perform a single annual review covering all entries performed during a 12-month period. If 

no entry is performed during a 12-month period, no review is necessary.” 
21

Noncompliance

According to the Secretary, the deficiencies on the entry permits—particularly the 

failures to record periodic testing when staying in the tanks for over an hour and failing to 

specify an attendant—gave the Facility Manager who reviewed them “reason to believe” that 

“measures taken under [Dana’s PRCS] program may not protect employees.” As the Secretary 

also notes, under the plain language of the standard, this requires the employer to take corrective 

action. Dana responds that none of the permit deficiencies trigger the requirement to revise the 

program because they do not indicate defects in the written program itself—rather, they show 

failures to follow that program. 

We disagree. Although the Secretary has not identified any deficiency in Dana’s written 

PRCS program that correlates with the errors on the entry permits, the distinction Dana 

suggests—that implementation failures are not covered by the cited provisions—lacks merit. 

Sections 1910.146(d)(13) and (14) both require the employer to review and revise “the program” 

to ensure employees are adequately protected from PRCS hazards. The standard defines a PRCS 

program broadly as “the employer’s overall program for controlling, and, where appropriate, for 

protecting employees from, permit space hazards and for regulating employee entry into permit 

spaces.” § 1910.146(b) (emphasis added). Indeed, under § 1910.146(d), which is titled “Permitrequired confined space program (permit space program),” the first provision requires the 

employer to “[i]mplement the measures necessary to prevent unauthorized entry.” 

§ 1910.146(d)(1) (emphasis added). 

In addition, in the “Note” following § 1910.146(d)(13), one of the listed “[e]xamples of 

circumstances requiring the review of the permit space program” is of an implementation 

problem—“any unauthorized entry of a permit space”—as such entries by definition do not 

comply with the terms of a compliant program. See § 1910.146(d)(13), note; § 1910.146(b) 

(defining “authorized entrant” as “an employee who is authorized by the employer to enter a 

permit space”); § 1910.146(d)(1) (PRCS program must restrict entry to authorized entrants); see 

also 58 Fed. Reg. at 4,503 (explaining that the note accompanying paragraph (d)(13) contains 

information intended to assist employers in complying with the requirement). Finally, the very 

purpose of the cited provisions is to ensure that employees are protected from permit space 

hazards—they are not protected if they do not follow the requirements of the standard and the 

employer’s PRCS program. See §§ 1910.146(d)(13) and (14). Therefore, we find that 
22

compliance with paragraphs (d)(13) and (14) required Dana to revise its PRCS program, either 

immediately under (d)(13) once it had reason to believe the program may not be protecting 

employees, or after an annual review of the permits under (d)(14). Dana did neither. 

We also reject Dana’s argument that the Facility Manager reviewed the program 

periodically and made changes as needed, as reflected in memoranda he issued in 1997, 2003, 

and 2008. Although these memoranda discuss new work rules for entering confined spaces—

i.e., prohibiting entry into dirty tanks, prohibiting entry into tanks with nitrogen blankets, and 

prohibiting entry into tanks containing less than 20.9% oxygen—none of them address the other 

issues raised by the deficient permits; namely, staying in tanks for over an hour without periodic 

testing and entering tanks without an attendant. Thus, these memoranda were not program 

revisions that complied with the requirements of paragraphs (d)(13) and (14). Accordingly, we 

find the Secretary has shown that Dana failed to comply with the requirements of the cited 

standards. 

Knowledge

The Facility Manager acknowledged that he reviewed the entry permits, and deficiencies 

were evident on the face of these permits; yet, he did not point out errors to employees or 

discipline employees for permit violations. We find in these circumstances that not only must 

the Facility Manager have known of the permit deficiencies, he also must have known of the 

failure to revise Dana’s PRCS program in response to these deficiencies. On the record before 

us, we conclude that there is a sufficient basis for imputing to Dana the Facility Manager’s 

knowledge of the failure to revise its PRCS program to correct deficiencies documented on tank 

entry permits.

As previously noted, this case can be appealed to three different circuit courts of 

appeals—the Third, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits. Of these three circuits, only the Third Circuit 

analyzes the Secretary’s burden of proving knowledge differently when it is based on 

supervisory misconduct. Pa. Power, 737 F.2d at 357-58. Under Commission precedent, the 

Facility Manager’s knowledge of the deficiencies and his failure to revise Dana’s PRCS program 

in response to those deficiencies is imputable to Dana. See Otis, 21 BNA OSHC at 2207; 

Rawson, 20 BNA OSHC at 1080-81. We also note that this case presents an issue not raised in 

any of the circuit court foreseeability cases, all of which appear to involve misconduct at a lower 
23

supervisory level.32 Here, the Facility Manager, who has worked in this position since 1997, ran 

the day-to-day operations of the entire Summit plant, directed employees’ work (with authority 

to hire, fire, and discipline employees), and had managerial responsibility for all supervisors at 

the plant. Thus, in light of the Facility Manager’s level of authority, a foreseeability analysis 

may not be necessary. However, it appears likely that even under the Third Circuit’s

foreseeability precedent, the Facility Manager’s knowledge would have been imputable. We are 

not seeking to impute knowledge here based on an isolated incident of rogue or idiosyncratic 

supervisory misconduct; but rather, based on the Facility Manager’s high level of oversight and 

involvement in the management and policy decisions at the plant—including those involving 

written safety documents and safety training—as well as the pervasive degree of deficiencies on 

tank entry permits and the attendant failure to revise the PRCS program to correct the 

deficiencies before subsequent entries were authorized. See N. Landing Line Constr. Co., 19 

BNA OSHC 1465, 1473 n.9 (No. 96-721, 2001) (applying Fourth Circuit foreseeability analysis 

to superintendent’s “series of conscious decisions” to conclude that his actions were not “an 

isolated incident of idiosyncratic behavior”). Therefore, we find that Dana had actual knowledge 

 

32 The Third Circuit addressed the circumstances in which it is appropriate to impute a 

supervisor’s knowledge of his own violative conduct to his employer; so as to not, according to 

the court, improperly relieve the Secretary of his burden to prove the “knowledge” element of his 

case. See Pa. Power, 737 F.2d at 357-58, 359 (court declined to impute a crew leader’s 

knowledge of his own misconduct—a violation of an OSHA standard that caused his own 

death—where he had unblemished safety record). 

Cases in other circuits also requiring a foreseeability analysis similarly involve the same type of 

front-line supervisor. See, e.g., Comtran Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 722 F.3d 1304, 

1309 (11th Cir. 2013) (foreman digging in trench created five-foot-high spoil pile at edge of sixfoot-deep excavation without cave-in protection, in violation of OSHA standards); W.G. Yates & 

Sons Constr. Co., 459 F.3d 604, 605 (5th Cir. 2006) (foreman working along dangerous ledge 

without fall protection, in violation of OSHA standards); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 

OSHRC, 623 F.2d 155, 157 (10th Cir. 1980) (supervisor violated OSHA standards by not 

wearing rubber gloves as he worked on live wires, resulting in his electrocution and death); 

Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 594 F.2d 396, 397-98 (4th Cir. 1979) (experienced 

journeyman electrician foreman opened door to switch gear unit to remove an unenergized 

ground bus bar and left it open, leading to the electrocution and death of an apprentice electrician 

assisting him in his work). 
24

of the violative conditions.33 Accordingly, we affirm grouped Serious Citation 1, Items 11a and 

11b as serious.34

D. Willful Citation 2, Item 1b

In Willful Citation 2, Item 1b,35 the Secretary alleges that Dana violated 

§ 1910.146(d)(3)(i) by failing to develop and implement measures necessary for safe permit 

entry, including “specifying acceptable entry conditions.”36 Specifically, the Secretary claims 

that Dana’s written PRCS program erroneously stated that oxygen levels as low as 16.5% and 

LELs as high as 14% were acceptable for entry. Although the judge concluded that Dana did not 

have to comply with this provision because she found Dana complied with the alternate entry 

procedures, she found that Dana’s program “does not specify acceptable entry conditions.” Dana 

does not dispute that the numbers referred to in its program are incorrect, but argues that it 

provided employees with a subsequent memorandum correcting the oxygen levels and trained 

employees on the correct oxygen levels and LELs, which, it contends, satisfies compliance with 

the standard. 

We find that Dana’s efforts to correct the errors in its main PRCS program document 

through subsequent training and a memorandum are insufficient under the PRCS standard 

because the company never corrected the errors in the written PRCS program itself. Section 

1910.146(c)(4) requires a “written program,” but does not specify that it must be contained 

within one document. Therefore, we find that the Facility Manager’s memorandum correcting 

 

33 Commissioner MacDougall believes a finding of knowledge under these facts is in accordance 

with the Act. See W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 459 F.3d 604, 607 (5th Cir. 

2006) (“ ‘[T]he purposes of the Act are best served by limiting citations . . . to conduct that could 

have been foreseen and prevented by employers with the exercise of reasonable diligence and 

care.’ ” (quoting Pa. Power, 737 F.2d at 354)). 

34 We also find that Supervisor A’s entry on January 28, 2009, establishes exposure, as Dana 

assigned and expected employees to enter tanks despite knowing that permits contained errors 

requiring revisions to the PRCS program. In addition, we characterize these grouped violations 

as serious because the deficiencies on the permits could lead to inappropriate entry and, 

consequently, exposure to hazardous levels of toxic or flammable substances. OSH Act 

section 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (defining serious violation as one in which “there is a 

substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result”). 

35 See supra note 3. 

36 Section 1910.146(d)(3) states: “Develop and implement the means, procedures, and practices 

necessary for safe permit space entry operations, including, but not limited to, the following: (i) 

Specifying acceptable entry conditions . . . .” 
25

the oxygen levels is part of Dana’s overall program. However, we agree with the Secretary that 

because the uncorrected main document remained available to Dana employees, they “could 

have used and relied upon [its] erroneous specification of unacceptable entry conditions if they 

failed to remember their prior training” or consult the subsequent memorandum. Although the 

standard does not prohibit memorializing program procedures in multiple documents, we find it 

requires that there be no confusion about which information is correct. See § 1910.146(d)(3)(i) 

(requiring the employer to develop a program that specifies acceptable entry conditions). Here, 

there was incorrect, and inconsistent, written entry condition information available to employees, 

and there was no clarification regarding where the correct information was located. 

We also find that Dana’s oral training on the correct entry conditions did not negate the 

written program’s erroneous information. The cited provision requires that the acceptable entry 

conditions be specified “[u]nder the permit space program required by paragraph (c)(4).” 

§ 1910.146(d) (introductory paragraph). Because paragraph (c)(4) requires the employer to have 

a “written permit space program,” Dana had to specify the acceptable entry conditions in writing

in order to comply with § 1910.146(d)(3)(i)—communicating the correct entry conditions orally 

does not satisfy the cited requirement. § 1910.146(c)(4) (emphasis added). Under these 

circumstances, we find the Secretary has established noncompliance. 

We also find the Secretary has established knowledge. The record shows that Dana 

drafted the PRCS program and the Facility Manager admitted he knew of the deficiencies in the 

program. The Facility Manager’s knowledge is based on his actual knowledge of the contents of 

the program and its deficiencies, not on any act or omission on his part, so his knowledge does 

not present a foreseeability issue and is imputable to Dana.37 See Pa. Power, 737 F.2d at 357-58; 

Otis, 21 BNA OSHC at 2207-08. Accordingly, we affirm Willful Citation 2, Item 1b as serious. 

See supra note 3. 

 

37 We also find the Secretary has established exposure, because Dana was required to provide all 

employees with accurate written guidance for any assigned tank entries before the entries 

occurred. See Fabricated Metal Prods., Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 1072, 1074 (No. 98-1853, 1997) 

(employee exposure established by showing that “it is reasonably predictable either by 

operational necessity or otherwise (including inadvertence), that employees have been, are, or 

will be in the zone of danger”); § 1910.146(d)(3)(i). Supervisor A was assigned to clean a tank 

(which could have required entry) on January 28, 2009, with inaccurate written guidance. 
26

III. Penalties

In assessing a penalty, the Commission gives due consideration to the employer’s size, 

the gravity of the violation, the good faith of the employer, and any history of violations. OSH 

Act section 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(j). Under Commission precedent, gravity is typically the most 

important factor. Capform Inc., 19 BNA OSHC 1374, 1378 (No. 99-0322, 2001), aff’d, 34 F. 

App’x 152 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). When determining gravity, the Commission considers 

the number of exposed employees, the duration of their exposure, whether precautions could 

have been taken against injury, and the likelihood of injury. Capform, 19 BNA OSHC at 1378. 

The Commission “is the final arbiter of penalties.” Hern Iron Works, Inc., 16 BNA OSHC 1619, 

1622 (No. 88-1962, 1994), aff’d, 937 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1991) (table); see Valdak Corp., 17 

BNA OSHC 1135, 1138 (No. 93-0239, 1995) (“The Act places limits for penalty amounts but 

places no restrictions on the Commission’s authority to raise or lower penalties within those 

limits.”), aff’d, 73 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996). 

For the items she affirmed, the judge assessed the proposed maximum penalties of $7,000 

for Serious Citation 1, Item 13 and $70,000 each for Willful Citation 2, Items 2 and 3, based on 

the compliance officer’s testimony that the violations were of high gravity because the incident 

involving Supervisor A showed there was a greater likelihood of death or serious incapacitation. 

For the items vacated by the judge that we affirm on review, the Secretary proposed the 

maximum $7,000 penalty for Serious Citation 1, Items 11a and 11b and a $3,500 penalty for 

Willful Citation 2, Item 1b38 for the same reasons. 

With regard to gravity, Dana’s entry permits show that tank entry was an infrequent 

occurrence at the Summit facility and only a few employees entered the tanks. The record also 

establishes that Dana developed and implemented a written PRCS program with specific 

procedures governing any tank entry, including requirements that employees use a non-entry 

rescue system when entering a tank, test the conditions inside the tank to ensure that it is safe for 

entry, and complete an entry permit documenting the measures taken to ensure safe entry. As for 

the three violations based on Supervisor A’s entry into a dirty tank, Dana’s program specifically 

 

38 The judge characterized Willful Citation 2, Item 1a as serious and assessed a $3,500 penalty, 

and the Secretary proposes the same penalty for Item 1b, also characterized as serious. See supra

note 3. Together, the grouped penalty amounts add up to the $7,000 maximum penalty for a 

serious violation. See OSH Act section 17(b), 29 U.S.C. § 666(b). 
27

prohibited its employees from entering dirty tanks, and the fact that the tank was dirty increased 

Supervisor A’s risk of exposure. In addition, all three of the violations based on Supervisor A’s 

entry into the tank involve the actions of a single employee. Finally, with respect to Serious 

Citation 1, Items 11a and 11b, we find that the cited requirements relating to PRCS program 

revisions overlap considerably. For these reasons, we find that these violations were not of such 

high gravity to merit the statutory maximum penalty amounts. 

Accordingly, we find $3,500 an appropriate penalty for Serious Citation 1, Item 13; 

$50,000 each an appropriate penalty for Willful Citation 2, Items 2 and 3;39 $5,000 an 

appropriate penalty for grouped Serious Citation 1, Items 11a and 11b; and $2,000 an appropriate 

penalty for Willful Citation 2, Item 1b. 

 

39 In an effort to reach consensus, Commissioner MacDougall agrees with the penalty assessment 

of $50,000 each for the affirmed willful items. However, she notes that under some 

circumstances, which may be present here, the Commission may group items for a combined 

penalty, see, e.g., Omaha Paper Stock Co., 19 BNA OSHC 1584, 1591 (No. 99-0353, 2001), 

aff’d, 304 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2002) (eight PRCS violations grouped for combined penalty of 

$12,000), so long as the combined penalty does not change the number of violations charged and 

the total penalty assessed is in accordance with the statute covering willful violations, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 666(a) (for willful violations, the penalties provided in § 666 require that each willful violation 

be assessed a penalty within the range of $5,000 to $70,000); Chao v. OSHRC (Saw Pipes USA, 

Inc./Jindal United Steel Corp.), 480 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that Commission’s 

statutory authority to assess penalties requires Commission to assess appropriate penalty within 

range established by 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)). See also Hackensack Steel Corp., 20 BNA OSHC 

1387, 1394 (No. 97-0755, 2003) (as part of its penalty discretion, Commission may find it 

appropriate to assess a single penalty for distinct but potentially overlapping violations); 

Miniature Nut and Screw Corp., 17 BNA OSHC 1557, 1559-60 (No. 93-2535, 1996) (combining 

penalties for items involving violations of separate components of a hearing conservation 

program); H.H. Hall Constr. Corp., 10 BNA OSHC 1042, 1049 (No. 76-4765, 1981) (assessing a 

single penalty for overlapping violations that involved allegations that the company failed to 

reinforce a trench to protect against “superimposed loads” and failed to protect against “moving 

ground,” particularly because both violations could be abated with the proper use of trench boxes); 

Alpha Poster Serv., Inc., 4 BNA OSHC 1883, 1884 (No. 7869, 1976) (two items involving 

substantially the same violative conduct should merge into a single violation).
28

ORDER

We vacate Serious Citation 1, Item 10. We affirm Serious Citation 1, Items 11a, 11b, and 

13 as serious; Willful Citation 2, Item 1b as serious; Willful Citation 2, Items 2 and 3 as willful; 

and assess a total penalty of $110,500.

SO ORDERED.

 

 /s/ 

 Cynthia L. Attwood 

 Acting Chairman 

 /s/ 

 Heather L. MacDougall 

Dated: November 19, 2015 Commissioner 
Some personal identifiers have been redacted for privacy purposes

United States of America 

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

1924 Building - Room 2R90, 100 Alabama Street, SW 

Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3104

Secretary of Labor,

 Complainant,

 v.

 OSHRC Docket No. 09-1184

Dana Container, Inc.,

 Respondent.

Appearances: 

Margaret Sewell, Esq., and Kevin M. Wilemon, Esq., 

U. S. Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Chicago, Illinois 

For Complainant 

John J. Coleman, III, Esq., and Marcel DeBruge, Esq., 

Burr and Foreman, Birmingham, Alabama 

For Respondent 

Before: Administrative Law Judge Sharon D. Calhoun 

DECISION AND ORDER 

 Dana Container, Inc., operates several tank wash facilities throughout the United States. 

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) conducted an inspection of Dana’s 

facility in Summit, Illinois, on January 28, 2009, following local media reports that an employee 

required emergency medical assistance after being found unconscious in one of the tanks at the 

facility. 

Based upon that inspection, the Secretary issued two citations to Dana on July 24, 2009, 

alleging serious and willful violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act). 

Most of the items alleged violations of various sections of the permit-required confined spaces 

(PRCS) standard at 29 C. F. R, § 1910.146. Dana timely contested the citations. The Secretary 
2

and Dana settled several items prior to the hearing. Remaining are the following items alleging 

serious and willful violations of nine subsections of the PRCS standard: 

Item 10 of Citation No. 1 alleges a serious violation of 29 C. F. R. § 1910.146(d)(4)(i), for 

failing to ensure that testing and monitoring equipment was maintained properly. Item 11a of 

Citation No. 1 alleges a serious violation of 29 C. F. R. § 1910.146(d)(13), for failing to review 

entry operations when the employer had reason to believe that the measures taken under the PRCS 

program would not protect employees and for failing to revise the program to correct deficiencies. 

Item 11b of Citation No. 1 alleges a serious violation of 29 C. F. R. § 1910.146(d)(14), for failing 

to review and revise the PRCS program to ensure employees participating in entry operations were 

protected. Item 12 of Citation No. 1 alleges a serious violation of 29 C. F. R. § 1910.146(g)(3), 

for failing to establish employee proficiency in the duties required by the PRCS standard. Item 13 

of Citation No. 1 alleges a serious violation of 29 C. F. R. § 1910.146(k)(3), for failing to use a 

retrieval system for a non-entry rescue. The Secretary proposed a penalty of $7,000.00 each for 

Items 10, 12, and 13. The Secretary proposed a penalty of $7,000.00 for grouped Items 11a and 

11b.

Item 1a of Citation No. 2 alleges a willful violation of 29 C. F. R. § 1910.146(c)(4), for 

failing to develop and implement a written permit space entry program. Item 1b of Citation No. 2 

alleges a willful violation of 29 C. F. R. § 1910.146(d)(3)(i), for failure to specify acceptable entry 

conditions under its PRCS program. Item 2 of Citation No. 2 alleges a willful violation of 29 C. 

F. R. § 1910.146(d)(5)(i), for failing to evaluate the PRCS conditions before authorizing entry. 

Item 3 of Citation No. 2 alleges a willful violation of 29 C. F. R. § 1910.146(e)(1), for failing to 

document the completion of measures taken to ensure safe PRCS entry. The Secretary proposed a 

penalty of $70,000.00 each for Items 2 and 3. The Secretary proposed a penalty of $70,000.00 for 

grouped Items 1a and 1b. 

 The undersigned held a hearing in this case in Chicago, Illinois, from October 25 to 

October 29, 2010, and from January 10 to January 12, 2011. Dana stipulates the Commission has 

jurisdiction over the proceeding under § 10(c) of the Act, and that it is a covered business under § 

3(5) of the Act (Tr. 13). The parties have each filed a post-hearing brief1.

 Dana argues the PRCS 

 

1

Dana filed a post-hearing motion to strike portions of the Secretary’s brief. The Secretary referred, in a footnote, to 

Exhibit C-20A, which was rejected at the hearing (Secretary’s brief, p. 14, footnote 11). Dana’s motion is granted. 

References to Exhibit C-20A will not be considered. 
3

standard does not apply to the tanks in its facility. The company also asserts the affirmative 

defense of unpreventable employee misconduct on the part of the employee who entered the tank. 

For the reasons discussed below, Items 10, 11a, 11b, and 12 of Citation No 1 are vacated. 

Item 13 of Citation No. 1 is affirmed, and a penalty of $7,000.00 is assessed. Item 1b of Citation 

No. 2 is vacated. Item 1a of Citation No. 2 is affirmed as serious, and a penalty of $3,500.00 is 

assessed. Items 2 and 3 of Citation No. 2 are affirmed as willful, and a penalty of $70,000.00 for 

each item is assessed. 

Background 

 This hearing was particularly contentious. Witnesses and counsel for Dana accused each 

other of various unethical or illegal activities that are not within the purview of this court. For this 

reason, most of the employee and ex-employee witnesses will not be referred to by name. Many 

of the allegations of illicit conduct are extraneous to the issues in this case. At times, some 

allegations must be discussed as part of the credibility determination for certain witnesses. The 

following two paragraphs represent the few facts upon which the parties agree: 

 Dana cleans the interiors of stainless steel industrial tanks (also referred to as “wagons” 

and “tankers”) used to transport various commercial non-food liquid substances throughout the 

United States. Dana operates a facility in Summit, Illinois, which has been managed by 

[redacted] since 1997. Including [redacted], Dana employs fourteen employees at the Summit 

facility (Tr. 1353). Dana operates three different shifts daily (Tr. 1056). 

 After one of Dana’s customers delivers a load to its destination, the driver brings the tank 

to Dana’s facility. Its Summit facility contains five tank wash bays. Each bay has a catwalk 

structure from which employees can open the hatch at the top of the tank and visually inspect the 

interior of the tank. The hatch also serves as the entryway for an employee required to enter the 

tank. Dana’s tank washers drain the tank of any residual product (referred to as “heel”). The 

tank washers then insert a mechanical device known as a “spinner” into the tank, which moves 

from one end of the tank to the other for an initial rinsing and scrubbing with soap. Sometimes 

tank washers use solvents, including toluene, to clean the tank’s interior. After a final rinse, Dana 

considers the tank to be “industry clean,” which means the tank is clean enough to haul a new load 

without contaminating the new product. The tank washers use blow dryers to completely dry the 

tank. Occasionally an employee must enter a cleaned tank to scrape off residue left in the tank 

(Tr. 1023-1027, 1033-1036, 1545, 1565-1566). 
4

January 28, 2009, Incident 

 At the time of the hearing, Supervisor #1 had worked for Dana for six years, and had been 

a supervisor for the previous three years. He was the supervisor for the third shift, which operates 

from 11:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. (Tr. 1924). At the time in question, Supervisor #1 supervised two 

other employees on his shift, Employee #5 and Ex-Tank Washer. On January 28, 2009, at 

approximately 6:00 a.m., Supervisor #1 was in the process of washing a tank. Supervisor #1 

claims the valve of the tank was blocked, preventing the tank from draining properly. Dana’s 

normal procedure in such a situation is to back flush the valve, which usually removes the 

blockage. Supervisor #1 testified he deviated from this procedure on January 28, 2009: 

Well, I was hosing [the tank] down, and it sort of clogged up, and I know I made a 

mistake I really shouldn’t have went into [the tank], but I just went in there trying 

to clear it out for a minute, and I turned and I slipped, and I must have hit my head 

or something, and that was the last thing I remember. 

(Tr. 1595-1596). 

 Another employee discovered Supervisor #1 in the tank and called 911.2 Emergency 

personnel from the Summit Fire Department responded to the call. A news crew from a local 

television station also arrived at the site. The television station carried the story live on its 

morning news show, which is how OSHA compliance officer Jami Bachus happened to see it as 

she prepared to go to work that morning. Bachus testified: 

Well, I was headed to my office anyway. It was a regular work day. I don’t 

recall—I thought it was a Monday, but I don’t recall right now. And, I made 

reference to the appropriate people at my office location that I had heard about this 

incident. 

 And you know, there was some discussion about who would respond to 

this. I volunteered. I’m not sure if I volunteered was the only reason I ended up 

going, but, you know, it was decided that I would head to the facility. 

(Tr. 149). 

 

2

 There are significant gaps in the record concerning the circumstances of Supervisor #1’s entry into the tank, and the 

discovery of his unconscious body. Supervisor #1 was discovered at approximately 6:00 a.m. The compliance 

officer did not arrive until approximately 9:00 a.m. Dana, therefore, was in the best position to provide information 

regarding who discovered Supervisor #1, how the discovery came about, and what attempts were made to rescue him. 

None of this information was provided. At the hospital, Supervisor #1 told medical personnel he was cleaning inside 

the tank with another employee. This runs counter to the narrative Dana presented at the hearing. The undersigned 

regards Dana’s account of Supervisor #1’s entry into the tank as dubious. 
5

 Bachus arrived at Dana’s facility at approximately 9:00 a.m. (Tr. 150). By the time she 

arrived, paramedics had transported Supervisor #1 by ambulance to a hospital (Tr. 155). Bachus 

met with [redacted], Dana’s plant manager, and held an opening conference (Tr. 152). 

Approximately twenty minutes into the conference, [redacted] handed Bachus a document 

purported to be a transcript of a statement made to [redacted] by Supervisor #1 before he was taken 

away by the paramedics (Tr. 1130). The typed, unsigned document reads: 

JANUARY 28, 2009 

INCIDENT STATEMENT OF [SUPERVISOR #1] 

I WAS SETTING UP TO CLEAN A TRAILER. THE VALVE HAD A 

RESTRICTION CAUSING THE CLEANING SOLUTION NOT TO 

CIRCULATE. I PUT THE FRESH AIR BLOWER IN THE TANK AND MY 

RESPIRATOR ON AND WENT IN THE TANK TO REMOVE THE 

OBSTACLE. I SLIPPED ON SOMETHING AND APPARENTLY HIT MY 

HEAD. 

(Exh. C-14). 

[redacted] also provided Bachus with a second document, which was a written notice of 

discipline from [redacted] to Supervisor #1, which stated: 

JANUARY 28, 2009 

FROM: [redacted] 

TO: [SUPERVISOR #1] 

SUBJECT: VIOLATION OF SAFETY RULES 

ON JANUARY 28, 2009, AT APPROXIMATELY 6:00 AM YOU ENTERED A 

TANK THAT YOU KNEW DID NOT MEET SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. 

ALTHOUGH YOU PUT THE FRESH AIR LINES INTO THE TRAILER AND 

WORE YOUR RESPIRATOR, YOU APPARENTLY SLIPPED AND FELL, 

MAKING IT HARD TO BRING YOU OUT OF THE TRAILER. 

AS A SUPERVISOR, YOU OF ALL PEOPLE KNOW BETTER. YOU HAD 

NO BUSINESS ENTERING THE TRAILER AT ALL. 

YOU ARE GIVEN 3 DAYS OFF WITHOUT PAY, STRIPPED OF YOUR 

SUPERVISOR TITLE AND REQUIRED TO REDO ALL OF YOUR SAFETY 

TRAINING. 

(Exh. C-15). 

 At the hearing, Supervisor #1 denied he spoke with [redacted] after he was removed from 

the tank. Supervisor #1 did not see [redacted] until the next work day (Tr. 1601). When he was 

shown a copy of the above-quoted statement, Supervisor #1 testified, “I don’t remember saying 
6

that,” and said he was not aware [redacted] had given a copy of the statement to Bachus and 

represented to her that it was Supervisor #1’s statement (Tr. 1609). 

 This is one of many discrepancies that appear in the record, which is replete with instances 

of contradictory and conflicting statements. The testimony of some witnesses differed from their 

deposition testimony, or from their testimony on direct examination to cross examination, or 

sometimes from their immediately previous sentences. It was not uncommon for two witnesses 

present at the same event to recount the event in dramatically divergent narratives. Other 

witnesses suffered significant lapses in memory, repeatedly responding, “I don’t recall” or “I don’t 

remember” to routine questions relating to the issues. At times, some witnesses’ testimony 

seemed scripted, as they repeated certain phrases, regardless of the questions they were asked. 

This case requires a number of credibility determinations, some of which will be resolved not by 

determining who is a more credible witness, but by deciding who is the least incredible. 

 The pattern of conflicting testimony and faulty memory was set by the first two witnesses 

who appeared on the first day of the seven-day hearing. Richard Gallaga and Todd Maylath both 

worked for the Summit Fire Department at the time of the hearing, and both responded to the 911 

call on January 28, 2009. Unlike the majority of the witnesses at the hearing, Gallaga and 

Maylath are disinterested individuals with no personal stake in the outcome of this case. They 

had no motive to shade their testimony, either to protect their jobs or to undermine an ex-employer. 

They responded to the call as trained professionals, presumably less affected by emotions 

produced by the stressful situation. Yet, their testimony differs on a number of key points. 

 Richard Gallaga was the assistant chief of operations for the Summit Fire Department at 

the time of the hearing. On January 28, 2009, he had just started working his shift at 6:00 a. m., 

when the call came in requesting assistance at Dana’s facility (Tr. 45-46). The Summit Fire 

Department’s ambulance was dispatched to Dana’s facility, and Gallaga arrived shortly afterward. 

The tank at issue was parked in a bay, next to a catwalk structure. Gallaga climbed the stairs to 

the catwalk and looked down into the hatch of the tank. He observed Supervisor #1 lying at the 

bottom of the tank. Gallaga testified: 

He was laying somewhat flat on his side. Because of the way the 

dimensions are on the tank, it was like a circular cylinder type. He was lying on 

his side, looked to be moving very slowly, wasn’t talking or anything. I noticed 

that he did have a respirator around his neck area. 

(Tr. 47). 
7

 Gallaga stated that Supervisor #1 was conscious: “I saw his eyes were open. He was 

doing slow movements of both his hands and legs” (Tr. 69). When asked about Supervisor #1’s 

breathing, Gallaga stated, “I would say it was labored breathing. I mean, he was breathing, there 

was movement, eyes were open” (Tr. 82). Gallaga saw some residual product in the tank, which 

he described as gray and pasty. Gallaga recalled that Supervisor #1 was wearing a long sleeve 

shirt and work pants and boots (Tr. 71). 

The Summit Fire Department requires its employees to file a report for all emergency calls 

(Tr. 48). In the report Gallaga filed the day of the incident, his assessment of Supervisor #1 

differed somewhat from his hearing testimony: 

Subject was unconscious and not responding to verbal commands. Upon arrival 

[Gallaga] and SQ-954 crews met up with [the ambulance crew] who related that the 

man inside tanker was cleaning tanker and only had on an air purification 

respirator, regular work clothes and no safety harness or safety line. Subject was 

not responsive but slowly moving. . . Two crew members entered the tank to 

retrieve unconscious subject. 

(Exh. C-7). 

 After the crew members removed Supervisor #1 from the tank, they took him to an 

adjacent building to be “deconned,” or decontaminated. Gallaga stated that decon is “where they 

take the individual and take him to a shower unit, strip him of his clothing, what he was wearing, 

and just flood him with copious amounts of water to take away any residue or any product that he 

may still have on himself” (Tr. 60). Gallaga saw Supervisor #1 five to eight minutes after he had 

been removed from the tank. Gallaga described Supervisor #1’s condition: “As he was being 

assisted as he was coming out of the building, he seemed to be in a happy-go-lucky state, more like 

he was just confused, but indicating to all that he was fine and didn’t need any further attention of 

any sort” (Tr. 61). Supervisor #1 did not report he hit his head and was not treated for head 

injuries (Tr. 61). 

 At the time of the hearing, Todd Maylath was a firefighter-paramedic with the Summit Fire 

Department. He was the first paramedic to arrive at Dana’s facility on January 28 (Tr. 88). 

Maylath and his partner donned “turn-out gear,” (protective clothing, gloves, a face mask, and a 

self-contained breathing apparatus) because they smelled “polar solvents, alcohol-based solvents, 

a real strong odor of an alcohol solvent” (Tr. 97-98). Maylath climbed up to the catwalk and 

looked down through the hatch of the tank. He saw”[a] man face down in the product that was in 

there” (Tr. 98). Maylath testified, “[I]t was most of his face in the product. He had a respirator 
8

on. The respirator was not covering his nose and mouth completely. It appeared to be jarred 

loose from whenever he fell in the product” (Tr. 99). 

 Maylath described the man as “African-American wearing blue overalls, coveralls” 

(Tr. 98). Supervisor #1 was not wearing a harness (Tr. 109). Maylath and his partner, Jim Tolf, 

entered the tank. Maylath stated the gray product at the bottom of the tank was a foot to a foot and 

a half deep (Tr. 101). Maylath testified he flipped Supervisor #1 over so that he was on his back. 

Supervisor #1 was unconscious when he flipped him over (Tr. 102). Maylath attempted to revive 

Supervisor #1 by giving him “painful stimuli to try to see if he could come to[,] . . . what we call a 

sternum rub where you take your knuckles, and you rub on their sternum pretty hard. That’s a 

painful area, and when somebody is incoherent like that or unconscious, sometimes you can get a 

response out of them to bring them back to consciousness” (Tr. 102). Supervisor #1 did not 

respond to the sternum rub. Maylath examined Supervisor #1’s head and saw no signs of trauma 

(Tr. 125). 

Maylath and Tolf looped webbing around Supervisor #1’s body and the firefighters above 

lifted him out. Supervisor #1 was still unconscious as he was lifted out. After Maylath and Tolf 

exited the tank, Maylath saw Supervisor #1 walking down the catwalk stairs with assistance. 

Maylath stated that Supervisor #1 was “in a state of malaise, very lethargic, confused, muttering” 

(Tr. 103). 

Supervisor #1 was taken to Loyola University Medical Center. Exhibit C-16 is a copy of 

Supervisor #1’s certified medical records detailing his stay at Loyola. Under “Chief Complaint,” 

his Chart Report states: “Chemical Exposure” and “cleaning tank exposure to toluene.” The 

Chart Report states the diagnosis is “Syncope and Collapse, Toxic Effect of Unspecified Gas, 

Fume, or Vapor” (Exh. C-16, 22nd page). No mention of Supervisor #1 hitting his head, or of 

head trauma appears in the report. Dr. Mary Boyle wrote the following “History of Present 

Illness”: 

51 year old male, cleans inside of tanker trucks as occupation, states this 

morning he was in tanker and shoveling out a thicker substance that he was under 

the impression was printing ink residue. He often uses toluene in his work, he 

states this a.m. it had not been open. He wears a respirator covering his nose and 

mouth. As he worked further into the tanker, his partner turned around and found 

him passed out. He next remembers people trying to awaken him. He did not 

have any pre-syncopal symptoms and feels fine now. No prior such incidents. 

HAZMAT at scene and as per emt paperwork the FD recorded the fumes inside the 

tank to be >800ppm of toluene. Per their note he was “unconscious for about 15 
9

min prior to getting patient out of hazard.” The chemical identification sheets list 

toluene and also ethyl alcohol and ethyl silicate. Patient feels fine, no HEENT 

complaints, no skin complaints, no shortness of breath, no chest pain, no n/v/d, no 

focal neuro complaints. No cardiac hx, no sudden deaths in family, no HL. 

(Exh. C-16, 24th page). 

 With respect to Supervisor #1’s physical condition in the tank, Maylath’s testimony that 

Supervisor #1 was unconscious is credited over Gallaga’s testimony that Supervisor #1 was 

awake. Gallaga stated he responds to emergency calls “to assist in the command structure” 

(Tr. 45). He observed Supervisor #1 in the tank from the vantage point of the catwalk. He did 

not physically assist Supervisor #1 or examine him. In addition, the report Gallaga wrote up the 

day of the incident twice states Supervisor #1 was unconscious. 

 Maylath responded to the emergency call in his capacity as a paramedic. He entered the 

tank and physically assisted Supervisor #1. He turned him over, performed a sternum rub, and 

examined his head. With the assistance of Tolf, he looped webbing around Supervisor #1 so that 

he could be retrieved from the tank. Maylath was in a better position to determine that Supervisor 

#1 was unconscious. 

 The undersigned also finds that Supervisor #1’s purported statement to [redacted] (Exh. 

C-14) prior to being taken to the hospital is not credible. Supervisor #1 does not recall talking to 

[redacted] or making the statement. Neither Gallaga nor Maylath recalled seeing Supervisor #1 

talk to [redacted] prior to being taken by ambulance to the hospital. Supervisor #1 testified 

regarding his memory of events following his return to consciousness: 

The rescue people taking me out of there, down the ramp, and they started to cut my 

clothing off me, and I said, “Wait one minute,” I said, “I can take this off,” because 

I was kind of scared they was going to cut me with that thing he was cutting it with. 

And, he said, “You got to calm down, and you got to take a shower, and we’re 

going to the hospital.” And, I said, “Okay.” I went in to take a shower, and the 

ambulance person said, “Come on, you got to go,” and they took me out of there 

butt naked. 

(Tr. 1596-1597). 

It is not credible that, during this sequence of events, [redacted] was able to step in and take 

the purported statement from Supervisor #1. Supervisor #1 was surrounded by numerous 

emergency personnel focused on getting him into an ambulance and then to a hospital as quickly as 

possible. Exhibit C-14 is given no weight. 
10

ELEMENTS OF A VIOLATION 

The Secretary has the burden of establishing the employer violated the cited standards. 

To prove a violation of an OSHA standard, the Secretary must show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that (1) the cited standard applies; (2) the employer 

failed to comply with the terms of the cited standard; (3) employees had access to 

the violative condition; and (4) the cited employer either knew or could have 

known with the exercise of reasonable diligence of the violative condition. 

JPC Group Inc., 22 BNA OSHC 1859, 1861 (No. 05-1907, 2009). 

Applicability of the Cited Standard

 Section 1910.146(a) provides that the PRCS standard “contains requirements for practices 

and procedures to protect employees in general industry from the hazards of entry into 

permit-required confined spaces.” As a threshold issue, Dana contends the PRCS standard does 

not apply to the cited conditions, and thus all of the remaining items must be vacated. 

In § 1910.146(b), the following definitions of “confined space” and “permit-required 

confined space” are found: 

 Confined space means a space that: 

 (1) Is large enough and so configured that an employee can bodily enter and 

perform assigned work; and 

 (2) Has limited or restricted means for entry or exit (for example, tanks, 

vessels, silos, storage bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits are spaces that may have 

limited means of entry); and 

 (3) Is not designed for continuous employee occupancy. 

. . .

Permit-required confined space (permit space) means a confined space that has one 

or more of the following characteristics: 

(1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere; 

(2) Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing the entrant; 

(3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be trapped or 

asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor which slopes 

downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or 

(4) Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard. 

Dana argues that dirty tanks are not considered confined spaces because company policy 

prohibits employees from entering dirty tanks. The company argues that clean tanks are not 

considered permit-required confined spaces because tanks that have been washed no longer 
11

contain a potential for a hazardous atmosphere. Dana further contends that, even if clean tanks 

are considered permit confined spaces, the company has met the requirements for reclassifying the 

tanks under § 1910.146(c)(7), as well as the requirements for alternate entry under 

§ 1910.146(c)(5). 

Item 13 of Citation No. 1 and Items 2 and 3 of Citation No. 2 deal specifically with 

Supervisor #1’s entry into the dirty tank on January 28, 2009. The remaining items apply more 

generally to Dana’s tank entry procedure. There is no dispute that Supervisor #1 entered a dirty 

tank, but Dana contends it was an isolated incident that does not reflect the company’s usual 

working conditions. It must first be determined if Dana allowed its employees routinely to enter 

dirty tanks. 

Dirty Tanks 

 Dana asserts it has a long-standing rule prohibiting its employees from entering dirty tanks. 

Exhibit R-3 is purportedly a copy of a memo from [redacted] to “ALL TANK WASH 

EMPLOYEES,” dated November 8, 1997. The memo (with its odd second sentence) states: 

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES ARE YOU TO ENTER AN UNCLEANED 

TANK EVEN IF THE MONITOR INDICATES IT IS SAFE. 

THIS IS THE FIRST SAFETY MEETING UNDER MY DIRECTION AS 

FACILITY MANAGER AT SUMMIT, ILLINOIS AND THIS IS THE POLICY 

FROM NOW ON AT SUMMIT. 

(Exh. R-3). 

The Commission has determined that whether or not an employee is required to enter a 

space has no bearing on its classification as a confined space. In Cagle’s Inc., 22 BNA OSHC 

1185, 1186 (No. 98-0485, 2008), the Review Commission held that a “space with restricted egress 

and unintended for employee entry under specified circumstances constituted a confined space 

where, under those circumstances, an employee nonetheless entered the space.” 

 Here, regardless of whether or not Dana prohibited employees from entering dirty tanks, 

Supervisor #1 did, in fact, enter one. Dana concedes Supervisor #1 entered a dirty tank on 

January 28, 2009. Therefore, under Cagle’s, the tank Supervisor #1 entered was a confined 

space3. 

 

3

In order to meet the definition of a permit-required confined space, the confined space must have one or more of the 

hazardous characteristics listed in § 1910.146(b). In the present case, the Secretary contends the tanks contain or 

Continued on next page 
12

This entry, Dana contends, was perpetrated by an employee committing an unprecedented 

act of unpreventable employee misconduct. Dana presented a parade of employee witnesses 

([redacted], Clarence Bean, Employee #1, Employee #2, Employee #3, Employee #4, Employee 

#5, and Employee #6) who stated unequivocally they had never entered a dirty tank in all their 

years with Dana, and that they had never seen other employees enter dirty tanks. Supervisor #1 

admitted he entered a dirty tank on January 28, 2009, but claimed that was the only time he had 

done so. The Secretary countered with two former Dana employees, Ex-Tank Washer and 

Ex-Supervisor #2, who stated that employees routinely entered dirty tanks under the direction of 

Dana’s supervisors. 

Ex-Tank Washer 

Ex-Tank Washer did not testify at the hearing. He was working the same shift as 

Supervisor #1 the day Supervisor #1 entered the dirty tank. Bachus did not speak with Ex-Tank 

Washer during her initial inspection of Dana’s facility. After the Secretary issued the instant 

citations on July 24, 2009, Ex-Tank Washer called OSHA and asked to speak to Bachus 

(Tr. 1716). [redacted] had fired Ex-Tank Washer, and Ex-Tank Washer called Bachus to inform 

her of ongoing hazardous working conditions at the Summit facility. Bachus typed up a statement 

using information she learned from Ex-Tank Washer during the telephone call. Bachus left 

blanks in the statement when she was unsure of the facts. Later, Ex-Tank Washer came to 

Bachus’s OSHA office, where he filled in the blanks left in the statement, and then signed the 

statement (Tr. 1719). 

Ex-Tank Washer worked for Dana from October 2007 until August 14, 2009. On 

August 14, [redacted] asked Ex-Tank Washer to take a drug test because, [redacted] stated, “[A]s I 

walked past [Ex-Tank Washer] in the tank wash, I detected a very strong odor of marijuana” (Tr. 

1895). Ex-Tank Washer declined to go to the clinic Dana uses for drug tests, and [redacted] fired 

him. What happened next is disputed. 

[redacted] testified: 

[Ex-Tank Washer] was very, very angry by this time, and he was shouting 

obscenities, making accusations. He was in a very high state of anger, his 

demeanor was very frightening, his eyes were fire engine red, his veins were 

 

have the potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere. While Dana denies that its clean tanks contain hazardous 

atmospheres, it does not dispute that the dirty tanks contain or have the potential to contain hazardous atmospheres. 
13

bulging out on his neck, and he was spitting and screaming and cursing. And, he 

said, “If I lose my F’ing job over this, I’m going to F- you up, I’m going to F- 

[Supervisor #1] up, I’m going to F- the company up. 

(Tr. 1898). 

Well, the shouting and hollering continued, and I continued to edge him toward the 

door. I had to get him out of the building, and finally did get him out the door, and 

two other employees came at that time and seen there was a commotion going on, 

and they escorted him to his vehicle at which time he left the premises. 

(Tr. 1900-1901). 

 [redacted] testified he himself did not get angry, he did not use obscenities, and he did not 

push Ex-Tank Washer (Tr. 1916). [redacted] went to his office and called the Summit Police 

Department to report Ex-Tank Washer’s conduct. The officer he spoke with informed [redacted] 

that Ex-Tank Washer had already stopped by the police station (located one block from Dana’s 

facility) and had filed an assault complaint against [redacted]. A few minutes later, a police 

officer arrived at Dana’s facility and took [redacted] statement (Tr. 1901). 

 The reporting officer (R/O) filed an “Offense/Incident Report,” which states: 

R/O spoke with victim who related that when he was getting off work at 0730 

hours, his boss (offender) asked him to take a drug test. When victim asked why, 

offender for no reason became angry. Offender then grabbed victim by the throat 

choking him, then pushed him outside the door. Victim openly admitted that he 

smokes marijuana but he doesn’t do it at work. Victim also stated that other 

company employees smoke marijuana on the job which is why he questioned 

offender. 

 R/O was contacted by offender who related that he asked victim to take a 

drug test because he felt that victim was under the influence of drugs. It is 

company policy if someone refuses, he is automatically terminated. Victim 

became immediately upset, becoming belligerent towards offender. Victim 

started making threats towards offender and witnesses as well as his immediate 

supervisor [Supervisor #1] who was not present and had nothing to do with this 

occurrence. Victim was asked to leave which he refused. At this time offender 

pushed victim out of the office area through a doorway towards the outside. 

Offender states that he pushed victim in the chest and never choked him. 

Offender was advised by R/O that when victim refused to leave, he should 

have called Police. Victim advised on the procedure of signing complaints. 

(Exh. R-38). 

 When confronted with his own statement to the police that he “pushed victim in the chest,” 

[redacted] initially said he did not push him. Upon further questioning, [redacted] allowed he 

may have “urged or guided” Ex-Tank Washer by gently placing his hand on his arm, a gesture he 
14

reenacted with counsel for Dana (Tr. 1918). [redacted] could not explain why he informed the 

police officer, immediately after the incident, that he had pushed Ex-Tank Washer in the chest. 

[redacted] testified he was not arrested and was not charged with assault (Tr. 1903). 

Shortly after this altercation, Ex-Tank Washer contacted Bachus. On September 24, 

2009, Ex-Tank Washer met with Bachus and signed the statement she had prepared, based on her 

telephone conversation with him4:

I, [Ex-Tank Washer], worked at Dana Container from approximately October 5th

2007 until August 14, 2009. 

On the most recent event, [Supervisor #1] directed met to enter the dirty tank 

wagon on the week before 1-28-09. I was to enter the tank wagon to perform the 

following task: dig out old product. 

I, [Ex-Tank Washer], was instructed to enter tank wagons, which had not been 

cleaned of the residual product on numerous occasions by [Supervisor #1], my 

supervisor. 

I, [Ex-Tank Washer], witnessed my supervisor, [Supervisor #1], enter dirty tank 

wagons on numerous occasions (approximately) 3-4 times a week without 

following the necessary safety precautions including, but not limited to, the 

completion of an entry permit, performance of air monitoring and a lack of use of 

retrieval device(s) for rescue if needed. 

[Supervisor #1] was my direct supervisor and [redacted] was the Plant Manager 

and supervised myself and [Supervisor #1]. 

On January 28, 2009, I entered a dirty tank wagon with [Supervisor #1]. 

On January 28, 2009, I was directed to enter the dirty tank wagon by 

[Supervisor#1], after it airs out. 

Employee #1 witnessed [Supervisor #1] instructing me to enter the tank wagon 

without completion of a permit and air monitoring on January 28, 2009. 

On January 28, 2009, [Supervisor #1], instructed me to enter the dirty tank wagon 

to perform the assigned duties of digging out product.

I, [Ex-Tank Washer], was removed from this tank wagon by [Employee #5 and 

Employee #3] because I was unable to remove myself from the tank wagon. Mr. 

[redacted] witnessed me being rescued from the tank wagon. 

I believe that I could not remove myself from the tank wagon because I was 

adversely affected from the chemicals present in the tank wagon I had entered. 

 

4

 The italicized portions of the statement reproduced here indicate Ex-Tank Washer’s handwritten additions to the 

statement Bachus had previously typed. 
15

I was told by [redacted] and the Attorney to tell any OSHA representative the 

following about the incident that occurred on January 28, 2009: 

I do not go inside tanks. Keep replies to yes or no. Do not 

volunteer any information.

In order to keep my position of Tank Washer at Dana Container, I was required by 

[Supervisor #1] to enter tank wagons without completing any safety precautions. 

The supervision at the facility did not follow OSHA regulations when entering tank 

wagons because: Ignorant to the facts 

I complained to [Supervisor #1] on numerous occasions that I was concerned about 

my safety when entering the dirty tank wagons without following safety 

procedures. 

Employee #7 – Employee #2 heard me voice safety concerns about entering tank 

wagons on different occasions. 

I voiced my concerns for my health and safety to [redacted] on numerous occasions 

including the following: 8-14-09. 

When I voiced my concerns about not performing air monitoring or completion of 

permits prior to entering the tank wagons, [redacted] responded by: Shut my 

freaking mouth or go home. [redacted] told me to do what [Supervisor #1] says 

and if it’s not right he will re[c]tify it. 

When I voiced my safety concerns about not performing air monitoring and/or 

permits prior to entering dirty tank wagons to [Supervisor #1, Supervisor #1] 

instructed the following to me: Go in the tank and hurry up out. 

[redacted] was aware that [Supervisor #1] did not complete permits prior to 

entering dirty tank wagons. I know he was aware of this practice because: Never 

had any work permits.

I know [redacted] was aware that employees entered dirty tank wagons because: 

Anytime you write [“]hand labor[“] he, [redacted], knew that we went inside 

tanks. 

[redacted] witnessed employees enter dirty tank wagons without following the 

necessary safety precautions such as, wearing safety harnesses attached to retrieval 

devices, performing air monitoring and completion of permits. 

[Supervisor #1] never required that I complete a permit prior to entry into a tank 

wagon 1 time. The most recent time he required me to complete a permit was 

8-14-09. 

I witnessed [Employee #5] enter wagons approximately 2 times a week. 

I, [Ex-Tank Washer], was threatened with my job if I did not act what I believed to 

be unsafe, as [Supervisor #1] instructed me. 

The unsafe behavior I was required to perform at Dana Container included entering 

dirty tank wagons without performing air monitoring, without the use of rescue 

equipment and without completion of permit entry. 
16

[redacted] involvement with entering permit spaces included the following[:] 

Showing us how to fill out phony paperwork. 

[redacted] was in the facility at least 5 times per day and often viewed employees 

entering tank wagons, both clean and dirty. 

[redacted] was involved with day to day operations which involved which tank 

wagons would be entered. [redacted] often instructed employees to enter tank 

wagons. 

Employees were allowed to enter dirty tank wagons without the completion of any 

permits or air monitoring by redacted].

On average, during the night shift, employee(s) entered tank wagons approximately 

1—2 time per night and 3—4 times per week. 

I told [redacted] on various occasions that I was concerned about my safety when 

entering tank wagons without following any safety procedures. 

The last time I voiced my safety concerns to [redacted], I was fired on August 14, 

2009.

(Exh. C-40). 

Ex-Tank Washer filed an 11(c) action with OSHA, alleging [redacted] fired him after 

“voicing safety concerns” (Exh. C-41). The OSHA investigator for the 11(c) action was David 

Ward. After gathering information and interviewing witnesses, Ward recommended dismissal of 

the 11(c) complaint (Exh. R-42). 

 The Secretary subpoenaed Ex-Tank Washer to appear as a witness at the hearing. 

Ex-Tank Washer failed to appear at the hearing, and could not be located subsequently. 

 Counsel for Dana chose to pursue a slash and burn strategy in order to discredit Ex-Tank 

Washer. No stone was left unthrown as a litany of Ex-Tank Washer’s supposed character flaws 

were recited for the record. [redacted] made a number of unsubstantiated charges against 

Ex-Tank Washer. [redacted] stated Ex-Tank Washer had a record of numerous felony 

convictions for offenses including stealing copper wire, possession of drugs, armed robbery, 

aggravated robbery, aggravated battery of a police officer, vehicular invasion, and possession of 

burglary tools (Tr. 1929-1930). Other than [redacted] testimony, Dana adduced no evidence of 

these convictions. Dana also adduced no evidence explaining why the company was not troubled 

by Ex-Tank Washer’s purported criminal record during the almost two years he worked for Dana. 

It was only after Ex-Tank Washer went to OSHA that Dana developed concern about Ex-Tank 

Washer’s purported moral failings. In fact, when asked how he knew Ex-Tank Washer had a 
17

reputation for violence, [redacted] replied, “I know that because I held his job for him two different 

times, 30 days each time, for violent crimes against females” (Tr. 1915). 

 Dana enlisted employee Employee #6 to pile on the trashing of Ex-Tank Washer’s name. 

Employee #6 testified he lived in the same building as Ex-Tank Washer. Employee #6 accused 

Ex-Tank Washer of tapping into his cable lines for free TV service, ripping his screen doors, and 

jimmying his locks. People came to Employee #6’s door at all hours looking for Ex-Tank 

Washer. Plus, “[Ex-Tank Washer’s] traffic was always blocking me from getting out of my 

parking space. There were just so many things with this guy. I mean, my mail was opened” 

(Tr. 1939). When asked how he knew Ex-Tank Washer was the person responsible for the 

instances of cable tapping, screen ripping, lock jimmying, and mail opening, Employee #6 

responded, “Well, he was the only one home in the building in the daytime. Everyone else in that 

building was working the day shift” (Tr. 1939). Employee #6 also stated Ex-Tank Washer 

borrowed money from him and failed to pay it back. Employee #6 was aware Ex-Tank Washer 

on occasion bought “juice” (brand name “Possible Flush”) to “clean his system up. When it’s 

time to take a drug test, that would substitute to clean his system out” (Tr. 1941-1942). 

Ex-Supervisor #2

 [redacted] hired Ex-Supervisor #2 as the second shift (3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.) supervisor 

at the Summit facility in March 2009 (approximately two months after Supervisor #1 entered the 

dirty tank at issue) (Tr. 712). Ex-Supervisor #2 left Dana on August 16, 2010 (approximately one 

year after [redacted] fired Ex-Tank Washer). At the hearing, Ex-Supervisor #2 testified he 

observed employees enter dirty tanks “pretty much daily” (Tr. 731). He did not allow employees 

he supervised to enter dirty tanks, but he saw employees from the shift before his and the shift after 

enter the dirty tanks (Tr. 835-841). Ex-Supervisor #2 said [redacted] was aware employees were 

entering the dirty tanks: “He directed [Employee #2] to dig out a trailer that contained tar” 

(Tr. 736). 

Ex-Supervisor #2 experienced ongoing problems with tardiness and absenteeism due to his 

daughter’s serious illness. In August 2010, Ex-Supervisor #2 was in the process of negotiating 

with an auto dealership for the purchase of a new car. On August 15, 2010, Ex-Supervisor #2 

called into Dana to inform the company he would be late. Ex-Supervisor #2 testified regarding 

the ensuing events: 

[W]hat happened was I ended up receiving three days [of suspension] to go get a 

car to make sure I had transportation for my daughter because the transmission had 
18

blown up. I called [Dana] and let them know that I was going to be about two 

hours late. At 5:00 when I walked out of the dealership, my phone was ringing, 

and it was [Employee #1] saying, “[redacted] says why don’t you take three days 

off.” 

 So, I went in the next day to speak to [redacted] about it and he got irate. 

Well, what happened was, I went in and tried to talk to him about it. He said, “You 

must think I’m F-ing stupid.” 

 I said, “Sometimes I think you let guys around here blow smoke up your 

butt.” 

 With that, he got irate and jumped up and started swinging at me and 

pushing me, and shoving me all the way down the hallway and telling me to get the 

f___ out of here—excuse my language—get the f___ out of here and, you know, 

pushing me and shoving me, and the only thing I could think to say to him to get 

him to stop was, “[redacted], if you hit me, I’ll sue you. That is assault. Stop.” 

 And, he shoved me out the door, and I twisted my ankle a little bit, but, you 

know, as I was back-pedaling, I’m trying to grab my belongings out of the facility, 

and he just kept on pushing and pushing. And that was the last day I was 

employed there. 

. . .

I wasn’t terminated. I just decided to resign. 

(Tr. 715-716). 

 In [redacted] version of the events, [redacted] did not get angry, did not use obscenities, 

and did not physically touch Ex-Supervisor #2. Otherwise, [redacted] agrees that Ex-Supervisor 

#2 quit following notification that he had received a three-day suspension for attendance issues 

(Tr. 1160-1162). [redacted] stated that Ex-Supervisor #2 called him at his home the following 

Sunday night and apologized for his behavior, and asked for his job back. [redacted] testified he 

told Ex-Supervisor #2, “There is no common ground for you and I to talk about this any further” 

(Tr. 1164). Approximately two weeks later, [redacted] learned that “an unnamed disgruntled 

former employee had gone to OSHA” (Tr. 1164). This accords with Ex-Supervisor #2’s 

testimony that he called [redacted] and asked to return to Dana, and [redacted] told him his “bridge 

was burned” and refused to take him back (Tr. 863). Ex-Supervisor #2 stated he contacted OSHA 

approximately two weeks later (Tr. 868). 

Ex-Supervisor #2’s testimony was riddled with contradictions. He rarely stuck to his 

original answer to any given question. Ex-Supervisor #2 continuously elaborated, or refined, or 

backtracked from his initial responses to questions. He appeared to be attempting the difficult 

task of making damaging statements about his ex-employer while simultaneously currying favor 
19

with [redacted]. (According to [redacted], Ex-Supervisor #2 told him he considered [redacted] a 

“father figure” (Tr. 1163)). 

 As just one example, Ex-Supervisor #2 was questioned about a tank wash he performed in 

front of Dana’s expert witness, Randy McGough, so McGough could observe Dana’s entry 

procedure. The questioning regarding this innocuous incident, which had no bearing on 

Ex-Supervisor #2’s accusations of unsafe work practices against Dana, became an opportunity for 

Ex-Supervisor #2 to obfuscate the facts: 

Q. There’s a gentleman in the back of the room. Do you see him in the very 

back, back? 

Ex-Supervisor #2: Yes, sir. 

Q. Do you know who he is? 

Ex-Supervisor #2: I have no idea, sir. 

Q. Do you recall seeing him out at the Summit Terminal before? He’s an expert 

engineer, named Randy McGough? 

Ex-Supervisor #2: No, I don’t recall seeing him, sir. 

Q. Do you recall performing a tank wash while he was there so he could observe 

an entry? 

Ex-Supervisor #2: No, sir, I do not. He asked me what my procedure was. I 

didn’t perform one because he was leaving. 

Q. That wasn’t my question, but a second ago you said you don’t recall him. 

Now you do? 

Ex-Supervisor #2: Now that you’re mentioning about performing a tank wash, I 

do.

Q. Now you remember him? 

. . .

Ex-Supervisor #2: I didn’t perform a tank wash for the gentleman. He had asked 

me what my procedure was to clean a tank or I forget if there was a product that he 

might have even given me as a question to like, how would you clean such and 

such, and I told him, you know, we’re just going to enter, and he had to leave I think 

or he was on his way out as I was getting to work. 

Q. Did you finish your answer? 

Ex-Supervisor #2: Yes. 

Q. So, now you remember all that? 

Ex-Supervisor #2: Yes. 

Q. But, two minutes ago, you looked at him and said you didn’t recognize him; 

you’d never seen him before? 
20

Ex-Supervisor #2: I don’t recognize him but if that’s the gentleman you say was 

out there, I remember having a conversation with –he could have put on ten pounds 

sir. You’re talking over a year. You know, he could have put on twenty pounds. 

I don’t recall his face, sir. 

Q. Do you recall performing a tank entry while Mr. McGough was present at the 

Dana Summit Terminal? 

Ex-Supervisor #2: I don’t remember it being Mr. McGough, sir. I believe it was 

Shane. We did a demonstration as a group. We volunteered to do a 

demonstration for Shane because they needed to show that we knew how to do it, 

and I told [redacted] we had been practicing and we had been training. 

(Tr. 909-911). 

In fact, Ex-Supervisor #2 performed the tank entry at McGough’s request, and McGough 

took two photographs of Ex-Supervisor #2 as he did so (Exh. R-35; Tr. 1484-1485). 

Ex-Supervisor #2’s testimony regarding this tank entry is not pivotal in terms of evidence (the fact 

Ex-Supervisor #2 performed the tank entry demonstration is not controversial and was not 

disputed by anyone but Ex-Supervisor #2), but it is illustrative of Ex-Supervisor #2’s tendency to 

gild his responses. His testimony as a whole alternated between evasive and overly-detailed. 

Ex-Supervisor #2’s reliability as a witness was further undermined the second day of his 

testimony. Ex-Supervisor #2 first testified on October 27, 2010. At the end of the day, Marcel 

DeBruge, one of the two attorneys representing Dana, was cross-examining Ex-Supervisor #2. 

The next morning, on October 28, 2010, DeBruge resumed his cross-examination. He started by 

asking Ex-Supervisor #2 about a text message Ex-Supervisor #2 had sent from his cell phone to 

DeBruge’s cell phone the day before. The text read, “20 an hour, a hand shake from [redacted]. 

If I tell the truth up there, it will hurt him” (Tr. 829). 

Ex-Supervisor #2 testified regarding the circumstances that resulted in his text to DeBruge: 

Yesterday, when I arrived, Mr. DeBruge chased me down the hallway, and we had 

quite a lengthy conversation at the elevator about how Dana needs me, “We’re all 

friends. That’s what friends are for. I understand your daughter is sick. What 

does she have?” 

 I explained to him my daughter has neurofibromatosis. He said, “Oh yes, 

one of my colleagues at the office has that, his wife has that, and she’s constantly 

getting tumors removed from her head,” which he advised me that, no bridge is 

burned with coming back to work for Dana. [redacted] and you are good guys, 

you’re all good people.” 

(Tr. 936). 
21

 [Y]esterday, I think for lunch,[DeBruge] has been asking me to go to lunch 

with them every day to talk, and I just said, “No, no, no,” and then I started 

thinking, well, if my bridge isn’t burned, I can go back to work and provide for my 

family, and also in a way to kind of make sure those guys aren’t going to get hurt. 

I think I could do more there than I could here. 

 But, it was him saying that my bridge wasn’t burned, so I’m looking to see 

exactly where they would go in order to do what they need to cover this situation 

up.

(Tr. 938). 

 It was presented to me as one hand washes the other. 

. . .

 My understanding was that basically he wanted me to not show up. That’s 

what it was. I forgot exactly what he said. 

. . .

 To the best of what I remember was [DeBruge] had told me one hand 

washes the other and he said, “You don’t even need to show up.” You know, 

before I had started testifying, he said, “You don’t even need to show up.” 

. . .

 And, I asked him, I said, “Well, I’m under subpoena. Wouldn’t I be 

arrested?” 

 And, he says, “In my twenty years of practicing law, I’ve never heard that; 

anyone being arrested for that. . . . I was leaving at that point and he said, “Well 

think about it,” and I said, “Okay.” 

. . .

 We were bouncing back and forth. Initially, it was I could have my job 

back, and then I was obviously hoping for more. 

. . .

 [What I was trying to convey in the text was] that I get $ 20 an hour and a 

hand shake from [redacted], you know, like no hard feelings in order to go back to 

work and not testify here today. 

. . .

[If Dana had agreed to the text], [m]y wife would have come up with a case 

of postpartum depression. She had just had a child two weeks ago, so I would 

have had an emergency and go home. 

(Tr. 941-943). 

Credibility Determination Regarding the Statement of Ex-Tank Washer 

and the Testimony of Ex-Supervisor #2 

 The Secretary contends Dana’s employees routinely enter dirty tanks. This contention is 

based primarily on Ex-Tank Washer’s statement and Ex-Supervisor #2’s testimony. Dana has 

raised questions regarding their trustworthiness as witnesses. The undersigned must determine 

whether these ex-employees of Dana’s are credible. 
22

 With respect to Ex-Tank Washer, only his signed statement made at OSHA’s office is in 

evidence. Ex-Tank Washer failed to appear in response to a subpoena, and Dana was unable to 

cross-examine him. This alone would cast doubt on the reliability of his statement. The 

statement is further undermined when read in conjunction with the police report that was filed 

when Ex-Tank Washer lodged an assault charge against [redacted]. 

 In his statement made to OSHA more than a month after he was fired, Ex-Tank Washer 

stated, “I voiced my concerns for my health and safety to Mr. [redacted] on numerous occasions, 

including the following: 8-14-08. . . .The last time I voiced my safety concerns to [redacted], I was 

fired on August 14, 2009” (Exh. C-40). 

 In his statement to the police, made within minutes of his firing, Ex-Tank Washer made no 

mention of his safety concerns. Instead, Ex-Tank Washer informed the police he was fired for 

failing to take a drug test. [redacted] corroborated that Ex-Tank Washer’s refusal to take a drug 

test was the grounds for Ex-Tank Washer’s termination. It would appear that Ex-Tank Washer’s 

statement to OSHA that he was fired for raising safety concerns was a post hoc rationale designed 

to ennoble Ex-Tank Washer and damage Dana. 

Based on Ex-Tank Washer’s evasion of the subpoena and the contradiction between his 

statement to OSHA and his statement to the Summit Police Department, the undersigned finds 

Ex-Tank Washer’s statement to be unreliable. No weight will be given to Exhibit C-40. 

Ex-Supervisor #2’s testimony as a whole lacked credibility. Ex-Supervisor #2 found it 

difficult not to amend or tweak his answers as the questioning progressed. He appeared to be 

embellishing his responses, repeatedly adding details or rephrasing his answers. 

 It is, however, the introduction of the text message to DeBruge that puts Ex-Supervisor 

#2’s testimony beyond the pale. The text is evidence Ex-Supervisor #2 was willing to lie and to 

evade a subpoena as he negotiated to be rehired. Ex-Supervisor #2 essentially admitted on the 

record he could be bought. In doing so, Ex-Supervisor #2 demonstrated he was unreliable and 

untrustworthy. His testimony will not be considered when analyzing the alleged violations. 

 Without Ex-Tank Washer’s statement to OSHA and Ex-Supervisor #2’s testimony, the 

only evidence the Secretary has that a Dana employee entered a dirty tank is Supervisor #1’s entry 

on January 28, 2009. The other eight Dana employees stated they themselves had never entered a 

dirty tank, and they had never seen any other employees do so. Much of this testimony appeared 
23

coached, but the Secretary was not able to elicit contrary evidence. Based upon the record, it is 

determined that Dana’s employees did not routinely enter dirty tanks. 

Permit-Required Confined Spaces 

OSHA requires employers to have a permit-required confined space program when its 

workplace has a confined space that has or has a potential to have a hazardous atmosphere. 

Section 1910.146(b) provides: 

Hazardous atmosphere means an atmosphere that may expose employees 

to the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue (that is, 

escape unaided from a permit space), injury, or acute illness from one or more of 

the following causes: 

 (1) Flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its lower 

flammable limit (LEL); 

 (2) Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or exceeds its 

LEL; 

 (3) Atmospheric oxygen concentrations below 19.5 percent or above 23.5 

percent; 

 (4) Atmospheric concentration of any substance for which a dose or a 

permissible exposure limit is published in Subpart G, Occupational Health and 

Environmental Control, or in Subpart Z, Toxic and Hazardous Substances, of this 

part and which could result in employee exposure in excess of its dose or 

permissible exposure limit; 

 (5) Any other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous to life or 

health. 

Dana contends that because its employees enter only washed tanks at its Summit facility, 

the tanks do not have or have a potential to have a hazardous atmosphere. Therefore, Dana 

contends, the PRCS standard does not apply. 

Dana is incorrect on this point. The question of whether washed tanks are PRCSs was 

addressed by the Commission in Suttles Truck Leasing, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 1953 (Nos. 97-0545 

& 97-0546, 2004). In that case, the employer operated tank washing facilities in Creola, 

Alabama, and Columbus, Ohio. The employer (represented by the same attorneys who represent 

Dana in the instant case) argued that the PRCS standard did not apply to post-wash tanks because 

they were not PRCSs. The Commission disagreed, holding “that the tanks—both pre-wash and 

post-wash—were PRCSs.” Id. at 1960. 

Dana’s contention is rejected. The company’s washed tanks are PRCSs, and subject to the 

PRCS standard. 
24

Reclassification of PRCSs 

Dana contends it met the requirements for reclassification under § 1910.146(c)(7), which 

provides: 

A space classified by the employer as a permit-requested confined space 

may be reclassified as a non-permit confined space under the following procedures: 

(i) If the permit space poses no actual or potential atmospheric hazards and 

if all hazards within the space are eliminated without entry into the space, the 

permit space may be reclassified as a non-permit confined space for as long as the 

non-atmospheric hazards remain eliminated. 

. . .

NOTE: Control of atmospheric hazards through forced air ventilation does not constitute 

elimination of the hazards. Paragraph (c)(5) covers permit space entry where the employer can 

demonstrate that forced air ventilation alone will control all hazards in the space. 

(iii) The employer shall document the basis for determining that all 

hazards in a permit space have been eliminated, through a certification that contains 

the date, the location of the space, and the signature of the person making the 

determination. The certification shall be made available to each employee 

entering the space or to that employee’s authorized representative. 

 Dana hired Randy McGough, who prepared a report entitled “Tank Trailer Washing and 

Confined Space Entry Evaluation Report” (Exh. R-36). McGough is a professional engineer with 

extensive experience in the industrial tank wash industry. He is trained in the chemistry and 

physics relating to the evaluation of external and internal environments (Exh. R-31; 

Tr. 1438-1442). He was qualified at the hearing as an expert in chemistry, physics, and 

engineering relating to the evaluation of industrial tanks (Tr. 1445, 1463-1464). McGough 

conducted testing on one tank at Dana’s Summit facility in July 2009, and observed Dana’s wash 

and tank entry procedures there (Tr. 1443). McGough had previously observed, tested, and 

evaluated other tank wash facilities he said were operated by Dana in other locations. McGough 

found the Summit facility’s procedures were equivalent to the other facilities he had visited. 

Based upon his visit to Dana’s Summit facility, McGough concluded the following in his report: 

[T]he tank trailer testing protocols and results for the other Dana facilities are 

applicable and appropriate for use at the Summit terminal. Based on a review of 

previous atmospheric testing results at the other Dana facilities and the pre-tank 

entry results at the Summit terminal, the tank trailer washing procedures are found 

to be adequate to remove any potential atmospheric or dermal hazards inside the 

tank trailers. Since the tank trailers are empty during all entries, they contain no 

material that would have the potential to engulf an entrant. Additionally, the tank 

trailers do not have inwardly converging walls or a floor that slopes downward to a 

smaller cross-section that could trap or cause asphyxiation. 
25

(Exh. C-36, p. 6-1). 

Based on McGough’s report, Dana contends it has satisfied the requirement of 

§ 1910.146(c)(7)(i), by establishing the permit space poses no actual or potential atmospheric 

hazards. The testing, however, of the other “Dana” facilities upon which McGough relies were 

not actually Dana facilities at the time of the testing. McGough is referring to tests done at 

facilities in Demopolis and Creola, Alabama, and Columbus, Ohio, in 1996 and 1997, when the 

tank wash facilities were owned by Suttles. 

At the time of the hearing, John Clarence Bean worked in Dana’s facility in Demopolis, 

Alabama. He explained the relationship between Suttles and Dana: 

In 1998 with Suttles, the family owned a trucking company, leasing 

company, tank wash services and driver leasing. The family decided at that time 

they wanted to sell the company. Two of his sons were full grown and wanted to 

move out and do something else with their lives. He put it out that he wanted to 

sell the company, and within probably six months, we were approached by Mr. Ron 

Dana. 

We went through the process of going through the company and finding out 

what we actually owned and getting titles together and counting some of the 

equipment and counting some of the buildings, and we sold out to Mr. Ron Dana. . 

. . I was asked to move with the new company. 

(Tr. 1379-1380). 

 Craig Schroll is a self-employed consultant who testified for the Secretary. He is a board 

certified safety professional, who helped develop the PRCS standard. He is on the adjunct faculty 

for the OSHA Training Institute (Exh. C-52; Tr. 1748, 1751-1752). He was qualified as an expert 

on hazard assessments and permit-required confined spaces (Tr. 1766-1767). 

 Schroll disagreed with McGough’s opinion that tanks are no longer PRCSs after they go 

through the mechanical wash process (Tr. 1768). He believes McGough overstates the facts 

when he says all contaminants are removed in the wash process (Tr. 1769). 

The way it’s written in the reports, there is a lot of potential in the process as 

described for there to be variability based on the particular tank washer, and their 

interpretation. It’s more of a description than a procedure outlined in the reports, 

and they identify that maybe you can clean with solvent, maybe not. 

There is not any real clear identification about which leads to which wash. 

Just with water, there is cold water washing, there’s warm washing, there’s solvent 

washes, there’s caustic washes. There’s really not a lot of detail provided in terms 

of which thing is used of what process for previous material. 

(Tr. 1770-1771). 
26

 The testing to which McGough refers in his report is the testing that was at issue in Suttles, 

where the Commission found that the evaluation done at Suttles’s Columbus, Ohio, facility 

“confirmed that any toxic atmosphere in the tanks was purged during the cleaning process. . . . 

Suttles was warranted in dispensing with the testing for toxic atmospheres so long as the tanks 

were washed, dried and ventilated in accordance with the operating procedures developed in 

consultation with Dr. Ball” Id. at 1966 (emphasis in the original). Dana is attempting to 

piggy-back onto this testing conducted twelve years prior to the instant inspection, for a different 

company. As Schroll noted, the Suttles testing represents “a limited sampling from long ago” 

(Tr. 1775). 

 Dana attempts to conflate the two companies, treating them as interchangeable with regard 

to previous evaluations and interactions with OSHA. Dana argues the Secretary is equitably 

estopped from pursuing this case on the grounds the Commission found the Columbus, Ohio, 

testing could be applied to the wash tank procedures in Creola, Alabama, in the Suttles decision. 

Dana contends it is entitled to use the twelve-year old Suttles data to avoid compliance with the 

PRCS standard at its Summit facility. 

 The record shows, however, that there is no continuity between the former Suttles facilities 

in Ohio and Alabama and the current Dana facility in Summit, Illinois. The conditions of the 

Summit facility and the old Suttles facilities are not the same. McGough admitted that the tanks 

tested in 1996 and 1997 were washed with water, rather than with solvents sometimes used at the 

Summit facility. The Summit facility uses one large spinner to clean a tank, while the other 

facilities use three smaller spinners. Dana washes baffled tanks, which contain interior divisions 

as a road safety feature. The baffles create barriers for ventilation air flow. The testing done in 

1996 and 1997 did not include baffled tanks (Tr. 1521, 1551, 1776-1778). Plant manager 

[redacted] was questioned about his relationship with Suttles: 

Q. [W]hen you first started at [Dana] back in 1997, it had no relationship with 

Suttles Truck Leasing, isn’t that right? 

[redacted]: To the best of my knowledge. 

. . .

Q. Okay, now, prior to Ms. Bachus’s inspection, had you ever communicated with 

anybody at Suttles Truck Leasing regarding their cleaning procedures? 

[redacted]: I don’t believe I had. 

. . .

Q. You’ve never talked to anybody at Suttles Truck Leasing to find out if they’re 

cleaning the exact same things that you are, is that right? 
27

[redacted]: I did not speak to anybody about that, that’s right. 

Q. So, prior to Ms. Bachus doing her inspection, you didn’t have any knowledge 

as to whether or not Suttles Truck Leasing was cleaning the same types of 

chemicals that you clean at Dana Container, isn’t that right? 

[redacted]: I believe that’s right. 

Q. Now, prior to Ms. Bachus’s inspection, did you have any relationships with 

any of the other Dana Container facility managers? 

[redacted]: Not a business or job relationship. I spoke with a few of them. 

Q. Did you ever speak to them about cleaning procedures? 

[redacted]: No.

. . . 

Q. Since Ms. Bachus’s inspection, have you talked to any of the other facility 

managers at Dana across the country about their cleaning procedures? 

[redacted]: I haven’t talked directly to any of the other managers pertaining to 

cleaning methods, no. 

(Tr. 1306-1309). 

In order to meet the reclassification requirements, Dana must also document the 

certification process in accordance with § 1910.146(c)(7)(iii). [redacted] attempted at the hearing 

to equate Dana’s entry permits with the reclassification certificate, and in so doing revealed the 

company’s claim of reclassification was a litigation strategy, and not a procedure of which he, as 

plant manager, was aware: 

Q. So, you believe that you have met (iii) through the permits you’ve produced in 

this case, is that right? 

[redacted]: I believe the (iii), yes. 

. . .

Q. Have you ever given any training to your employees regarding certification of 

the reclassified space? 

[redacted]: There has been some. I didn’t personally give the training, but our 

employees have had some training pertaining to that, yes. 

Q. Okay, was that before or after Ms. Bachus’s inspection? 

[redacted]: I believe that was after. 

Q. So, before Ms. Bachus’s inspection, did you ever teach your employees about 

how to properly certify that a space has been reclassified? 

[redacted]: Our employees were doing all of this. They weren’t trained to call it 

reclassified. We’ve always been doing all of these things. 

Q. Okay, you just decided to call it reclassified later, right? 

[redacted]: I didn’t decide that. 
28

Q. You didn’t decide that. Somebody else at Dana did, right? 

[redacted]: No.

(Tr. 1230-1231). 

 The undersigned agrees with Schroll that the 1996 and 1997 testing is too remote in time to 

apply to Dana’s Summit facility. Dana has failed to establish the tanks had no actual or potential 

atmospheric hazards. The only evaluation done at Dana’s facility was performed on one tank in 

July 2009, after the incident that gave rise to this inspection occurred. Dana cannot predicate 

reclassification on data recorded a dozen years previously in a different location under different 

circumstances for a different company. Furthermore, Dana adduced no documentary evidence of 

reclassification certification, as required by § 1910.146(c)(7) (Tr. 1417). Dana has failed to prove 

reclassification. 

Alternate Entry 

 Dana contends it has met the requirements for alternate entry under § 1910.146(c)(5), 

which provides: 

An employer may use the alternate procedures specified in paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of 

this section for entering a permit space under the conditions set forth in paragraph 

(c)(5)(i) of this section. 

 (i) An employer whose employees enter a permit space need not comply with 

paragraphs (d) through (f) and (h) through (k) of this section, provided that: 

 (A) The employer can demonstrate that the only hazard posed by the permit 

space is an actual or potential hazardous atmosphere; 

 (B) The employer can demonstrate that continuous forced air ventilation 

alone is sufficient to maintain that permit space safe for entry; 

 (C) The employer develops monitoring and inspection data that supports the 

demonstrations required by paragraphs (c)(5)(i)(A) and (c)(5)(i)(B) of this section; 

 (D) If an initial entry of the permit space is necessary to obtain the data 

required by paragraph (c)(5)(i)(C) of this section, the entry is performed in 

compliance with paragraphs (d) through (k) of this section; 

 (E) The determinations and supporting data required by paragraphs 

(c)(5)(i)(A), (c)(5)(i)(B), and (c)(5)(i)(C) of this section are documented by the 

employer and are made available to each employee who enters the permit space 

under the terms of paragraph (c)(5) of this section or to that employee’s authorized 

representative; and 
29

 (F) Entry into the permit space under the terms of paragraph (c)(5)(i) of this 

section is performed in accordance with the requirements of paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of 

this section. 

 Dana adduced undisputed testimony that it used continuous forced air ventilation during 

tank entries. The Secretary argues that an employer cannot simultaneously claim that it uses 

reclassification and alternate entry for permit spaces—the two are mutually exclusive. For 

reclassification, the employer must establish the permit space “poses no actual or potential 

atmospheric hazards.” Alternate entry requires the employer to establish “that the only hazard 

posed by the permit space is an actual or potential hazardous atmosphere.” Obviously the 

employer cannot demonstrate a space poses no actual or potential atmospheric hazards, while at 

the same time demonstrating that it poses only an actual or potential hazardous atmosphere. 

Here, however, the undersigned has concluded that Dana failed to establish its washed tanks pose 

no actual or potential atmospheric hazards under § 1910.146(c)(7). Dana is permitted to pursue 

an alternative legal theory. 

 The Secretary does not dispute Dana’s claim that it used continuous forced air ventilation. 

She questions the extent of the company’s documentation in general terms. Schroll testified that 

to implement alternate entry, “the standard requires that you evaluate your ventilation. You 

would have to figure the size and configuration of the confined space that you are attempting to 

ventilate. You would have to evaluate where you’re introducing ventilation flows, how much 

you’re flowing over what period of time” (Tr. 1781). He did not state Dana’s documentation was 

inadequate. The standard does not require data with the specificity required by Schroll. It 

requires the employer to develop “monitoring and inspection data that supports the demonstrations 

required” to show “that continuous forced air ventilation alone is sufficient to maintain that permit 

space safe for entry.” 

 McGough’s report details the ventilation process for washed tanks. Washed tanks are 

ventilated regardless of whether an employee is required to enter the tank after the washing 

process. Under “Tank Trailer Washing Procedure,” McGough lists eight steps for cleaning a 

tank. After the final rinse (Step 5), the procedure states: 

Step 6: Steam lines are placed into the tank trailer along with 2-4” air hoses. The 

introduction of steam and blown air into the tank trailer serves to sanitize and dry 

the interior surface. The steam is typically applied for 10 minutes after which the 

steam lines are removed. Blown air is continually applied for an additional 15 

minutes after the steam lines are removed. 
30

Step 7: On rare occasions, a tank trailer must be entered for inspection or to 

remove any small amounts of inert material that was not removed during the 

washing process. If a tank trailer is required to be entered, the facility personnel 

follow the Tank Trailer Entry Procedure as defined in Section 4 of this report. 

After tank trailer entry and exit, the tank trailer is rinsed with water for an 

additional 2 minutes. 

(Exh. R-36). 

 The Tank Trailer Entry Procedure requires employees to fill out a tank entry permit, which 

includes monitoring for oxygen, lower explosive limit, and toxic levels of hydrogen sulfide and 

carbon monoxide. Required levels for entry are 20.9% for oxygen, 0% for lower explosive limit, 

and 0.00 ppm for toxicity. Step 10 provides: 

Tank entry person performs interior surface inspection or performs removal of any 

inert material remaining in tank trailer. During the entire time an individual is 

inside the tank trailer, verbal communication is maintained with the standby 

personnel and air is also continually blown inside the tank trailer via the 2-4” air 

hoses. 

(Exh. R-36). 

 [redacted] testified Dana runs forced air ventilation the entire duration of a confined entry 

(Tr. 1048). Bean explained the air is not ventilated from inside the facility: 

Q. Okay, then, let’s talk about continuous air—how does the air get into the tank? 

Bean: Well, you attach a hose that’s attached to a blower to the trailer, and it 

blows air into it. 

Q. And, where is the air coming from? 

Bean: It’s outside air. 

Q. Okay, and that outside air is coming from air in the facility, isn’t it? 

Bean: Outside air, outside the building. It’s pulling it through and going into the 

tank trailer. 

Q. So, you’re pulling it from outside the building? 

Bean: It’s fresh air. 

(Tr. 1544-1545). 

 Dana has established it uses continuous forced air ventilation during entry. The only 

hazard posed by the tanks is an actual or potential hazardous atmosphere.5 Dana’s tank entry 

 

5

 Section 1910.146(b) lists other hazardous characteristics of a permit-required confined space as: 

 (1) contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere; 

Continued on next page 
31

permits document the monitoring and data requirements of § 1910.146(c)(5)(i)(C) and (E). It is 

determined that Dana has established it uses the alternate entry procedures of the PRCS standard. 

 Accordingly, Dana need not comply with paragraphs (d) through (f) and (h) through (k) of 

the PRCS standard for entries made into clean tanks. The undersigned does not find Dana met the 

requirements for alternate entry with respect to Supervisor #1’s entry into a dirty tank on 

January 28, 2009. Supervisor #1 did not perform air monitoring before entering the tank, and did 

not ventilate the tank while he was in it.6 Alleged violations that occurred when Supervisor #1 

entered the dirty tank will be analyzed under the conventional requirements of the PRCS. 

 For purposes of analysis, the remaining items will be considered in three groups. In the 

first group are items alleging noncompliance with subsections found in paragraphs (d) through (f) 

and (h) through (k), issued for periods when Dana was implementing alternate entry. The second 

group consists of items issued for periods when Dana was implementing alternate entry, but the 

cited subsections are not found in paragraphs (d) through (f) and (h) through (k). The third group 

includes those items alleging violations resulting from Supervisor #1’s entry into the dirty tank on 

January 28, 2009, when Dana’s alternate entry procedure was not being implemented. 

Group 1: Alleged Violations of PRCS Subsections Found in 

Paragraphs (d) Through (f) and (h) Through (k), During 

Alternate Entry 

Item 10 of Citation No. 1: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.146(d)(4)(i) 

 Item 10 of Citation No. 1 alleges: 

On or about January 28, 2009, employees were required to enter permit required 

confined spaces. Testing and monitoring equipment needed to evaluate permit 

 

(2) Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing entrant; 

(3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be trapped or asphyxiated by inwardly 

converging walls or by a floor which slopes downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or 

(4) Contains any other recognized serious safety or health hazard. 

A hazardous atmosphere is the only permit-required confined space hazard at issue in this proceeding. 

6

In its brief, Dana states Supervisor #1 “went to the top of the tank, inserted a blower and began blowing the tank, put 

on a negative pressure respirator and harness, and without hooking off (Tr. 1599) or testing the atmosphere 

(Tr. 607-608) or completing a permit (Tr. 607-608) as he was trained, entered the tank (Tr. 1595-1596).” (Dana’s 

brief, p. 13; emphasis added). Nowhere in any of the cited transcript pages does Supervisor #1 testify that he put a 

blower in the tank. Paramedic Maylath testified there was one air hose draped over the top of the tank (not two air 

hoses as required by Dana’s own procedure) when he arrived at Dana’s facility, but there is no evidence Supervisor #1 

placed it there. It is likely Supervisor #1’s fellow employees placed it there when Supervisor #1 was discovered 

unconscious in the tank. 
32

spaces, such as, but not limited to, a hazardous gas monitor, was not maintained in 

working condition and/or properly calibrated. 

Section 1910.146(d)(4)(i) provides: 

(d) Under the permit space program required by paragraph (c)(4) of this section, the 

employer shall: 

. . .

(4) Provide the following equipment (specified in paragraphs (d)(4)(i) 

through(d)(4)(ix) of this section) at no cost to employees, maintain that equipment 

properly, and ensure that employees use that equipment properly: 

 (i) Testing and monitoring equipment needed to comply with paragraph 

(d)(5) of this section[.] 

Dana requires its employees to use a 4-gas meter to test the atmosphere of its tanks. 

Bachus asked to view the meter during her inspection. When she turned on the meter, she was 

“unable to obtain an oxygen level reading of the normal atmosphere” (Exh. C-53 through C-59; 

Tr. 214-215). [redacted] acknowledged the meter gave a faulty reading (Tr. 1143). 

Supervisor #1 did not use the meter to test the atmosphere of the dirty tank he entered on 

January 28, 2009 (Tr. 207-208). Thus, this item is analyzed under § 1910.146(c)(5)(i), which 

provides that an employer “need not comply with paragraph[ ] (d)”of the PRCS. Therefore, Dana 

was not required to comply with § 1910.146(d)(4)(i). Item 10 is vacated.7

Items 11a and 11b of Citation No. 1: 

Alleged Serious Violation of §§ 1910.146(d)(13) and (14) 

 Items 11a and 11b of Citation No. 1 allege: 

On or about January 28, 2009, the employer reviewed entry operations which 

included permits that documented entry into permit spaces. The employer failed 

to revise the program to correct deficiencies documented on the permits including, 

but not limited to, lack of entrant and attendant names and/or signatures. 

. . .

On or about January 28, 2009, the employer reviewed canceled permits which 

documented entry into permit required confined spaces. The employer failed to 

revise the permit space program when permits documented that employee(s) who 

had entered the spaces, failed to follow the requirements of a permit required 

confined space. 

 

7

Item 10 would be vacated even if Dana were required to comply with the cited standard. [redacted] testified that a 

person using the meter could not tell if it was functioning properly until the meter was turned on. If an employee did 

turn on the meter and discover it was not working, [redacted] would post a sign forbidding employees to enter tanks 

until the meter was repaired (Exh. R-5; Tr. 1046-1047). There is no evidence Dana knew the meter was faulty until 

Bachus turned it on during her inspection. 
33

 Sections 1910.146(d)(13) and (14) provide: 

(d) Under the permit space program required by paragraph (c)(4) of this section, the 

employer shall: 

. . .

 (13) Review entry operations when the employer has reason to believe that 

the measures taken under the permit space program may not protect employees and 

revise the program to correct deficiencies found to exist before subsequent entries 

are authorized[.]

 (14) Review the permit space program, using the canceled permits 

retained under paragraph (e)(6) of this section within 1 year after each entry and 

revise the program as necessary, to ensure that employees participating in entry 

operations are protected from permit space hazards. 

The Secretary contends Dana violated the cited standards because [redacted] “failed to 

review entry operations and correct deficiencies in his program after being given shoddy permits 

from his own supervisors for over a year” (Secretary’s brief, p. 79). Deficiencies include permits 

failing to list an attendant during entry, permits omitting subsequent air monitoring data, permits 

showing a failure to review MSDSs prior to entry, permits exceeding the time limit listed, and 

permits with no time of entry (Exh. C-38). 

Items 11a and 11b allege violations of paragraph (d) of the PRCS standard. Under Dana’s 

alternate entry procedure, Dana was not required to comply with §§ 1910.146(d)(13) and (14). 

Items 11a and 11b are vacated. 

Item 1b of Citation No. 2: Alleged Willful Violation of § 1910.146(d)(3)(i) 

Item 1b of Citation No. 2 alleges: 

On or about January 28, 2009, employees were required to enter permit 

required confined spaces. The employer failed to specify acceptable entry 

conditions necessary for safe permit space entry operations. 

Section 1910.146(d)(3)(i) provides: 

[The employer shall]: 

(3) Develop and implement the means, procedures, and practices necessary 

for safe permit space entry operations including, but not limited to, the following: 

(i) Specifying acceptable entry conditions. 

The Secretary contends Dana’s confined space program does not mention how a space is to 

be evaluated to determine the existence of potential hazards. The program does not specify 

acceptable entry conditions (Exh. C-20). 

Item 1b alleges a violation of paragraph (d) of the PRCS standard. Under Dana’s alternate 

entry procedure, Dana was not required to comply with § 1910.146(d)(3)(i). Item 1b is vacated. 
34

Group 2: Alleged Violations of PRCS Subsections Not Found 

in Paragraphs (d) Through (f) and (h) Through (k), During 

Alternate Entry 

Item 12 of Citation No. 1: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.146(g)(3) 

Item 12 of Citation No. 1 alleges: 

On or about January 28, 2009, employees were required to enter permit required 

confined spaces. The employer failed to ensure the employees were proficient and 

that all employees understood, and had the knowledge and skills to perform safe 

entry operations. 

 Section 1910.146(g)(3) provides: 

The training shall establish employee proficiency in the duties required by this 

section and shall introduce new or revised procedures, as necessary, for compliance 

with this section. 

 Employers using alternate entry are required to comply with paragraph (g) of the PRCS 

standard. Section 1910.146(g)(3) applies to Dana’s workplace. 

 The Secretary’s evidence in support of Item 12 is slight. She bases this allegation on 

statements employees made to Bachus during the course of her investigation. When Supervisor 

#1 came to OSHA’s office for a deposition, he was unable to correctly answer certain questions, 

including what “LEL” stood for, and stated that tank entry was appropriate at levels of “20 and 

above” for LEL and toxicity (Dana’s rule is that LEL and toxicity must be 0.000) (Tr. 1618-1619). 

Bachus also testified that Employee #5 and Employee #8 did not seem to understand the 

requirements of the PRCS standard with regard to entry and toxicity (Tr. 359). 

 At the hearing, Supervisor #1 testified he had worked the night shift at Dana immediately 

prior to going to OSHA’s office for his deposition. He stated he informed Bachus that he was 

“tired and sleepy” during his deposition (Tr. 1634). Bachus questioned Employee #5 and 

Employee #8 in English; both are Spanish speaking. She could not recall if a translator assisted 

with her questioning (Tr. 533). 

 Bachus’s testimony on this issue was tentative (this is true of her testimony as a whole). 

She qualified most of her answers, spoke in general terms, and could not recall crucial details (Tr. 

356-363, 533-534). 

 Supervisor #1 was able to answer questions competently at the hearing. Employee #5,

who testified with the aid of an interpreter, did not demonstrate a lack of proficiency in his required 

duties. The employees’ improved performance may be due to coaching prior to their 

appearances. The undersigned cannot, however, dismiss the possibility the conditions under 
35

which Bachus questioned the witnesses contributed to her perception they were not proficient. It 

is determined the Secretary has failed to establish a violation of § 1910.146(g)(3). Item 12 is 

dismissed. 

Item 1a of Citation No. 2: Alleged Willful Violation of § 1910.146(c)(4) 

 Item 1a of Citation No. 2 alleges: 

On or about January 28, 2009, the employer failed to develop or implement a 

written permit space entry program which complied with 29 CFR 1910.146. The 

employer’s written permit deficiencies included but were not limited to, complete 

purging, flushing or ventilating procedures, testing and monitoring equipment 

available for adequate evaluation of permit space conditions, and inadequate 

procedures for rescuing and summoning for rescue and emergency services. 

 Section 1910.146(c)(4) provides: 

If the employer decides that its employees will enter permit spaces, the employer 

shall develop and implement a written permit space program that complies with 

this section. The written program shall be available for inspection by employees 

and their authorized representatives. 

Employers using alternate entry are required to comply with paragraph (c) of the PRCS 

standard. Section 1910.146(c)(4) applies to Dana’s workplace. 

[redacted] provided Bachus with Dana’s written PRCS program. [redacted] stated that he 

does not hand out copies of the PRCS program to employees, but it is available for them to look at 

(Exh. C-20; Tr. 397, 1275-1276). 

Bachus found a number of deficiencies in the written program (Tr. 365-398). Perhaps the 

most egregious deficiency is paragraph 16 of the program, which provides: 

If the test indicates that the atmospheric conditions are hazardous, the 

confined space shall be purged as required in 14 above. Atmospheric conditions 

shall be termed hazardous if test shows any of the following: 

(a) The presence of oxygen below or above the breathing air range 

(16.5 to 21.9 % by volume.) 

(b) Any atmosphere with less than 19.5 % oxygen should not be 

entered without an approved self-contained breathing apparatus 

(SCBA). 

 (c) The presence of a flammable vapor. 

(Exh. C-20, p. 637) (emphasis added). 

Section 1910.146(b) defines an oxygen deficient atmosphere as “an atmosphere containing 

less than 19.5 percent oxygen by volume.” Dana’s program lists the breathing range for oxygen 

as being three full percentage points below the actual acceptable range. [redacted] acknowledged 
36

the program was incorrect, and that someone who entered a tank with 16.5% oxygen could become 

incapacitated (Tr. 986-987). [redacted] excused the inaccuracy by saying Dana trained its 

employees that 19.5 % oxygen is the correct figure (Tr. 983-984). 

[redacted] testified he believed the PRCS program was acceptable because OSHA had 

inspected Dana’s Summit facility in 2001 and had not cited the company under § 1910.146(c)(4) 

(Tr. 1331-1332). He admitted the compliance officer for the 2001 inspection never told him 

Dana’s program was “okay” (Tr. 1332-1333). “[I]t is well-established by both the Commission 

and the courts that OSHA’s failure to cite an employer during a past inspection does not, standing 

alone, constitute a lack of fair notice.” Fluor Daniel v. OSHRC, 295 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 

2002). 

The Secretary has established Dana was in noncompliance with the cited standard. Every 

Dana employee who entered a PRCS had access to the violative condition; if an employee relied 

on the PRCS program (which employees should be able to do), he could have died or sustained 

serious injuries from the oxygen-deficient atmosphere. [redacted] was aware of the error in the 

written program, and had considered deleting it, but failed to change it. 

The Secretary has established a violation of § 1910.146(c)(4). 

Willful Classification of Item 1a of Citation No. 2 

The Secretary classifies this violation as willful. 

A willful violation is one “committed with intentional, knowing or voluntary 

disregard for the requirements of the Act, or with plain indifference to employee 

safety.” Falcon Steel Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1179, 1181, 1993-95 CCH OSHA 

¶30,059, p. 41, 330 (No. 89-2883, 1993)(consolidated); A.P. O’Horo Co., 14 BNA 

OSHC 2004, 2012, 1991-93 C.H. OSHA ¶ 29,223, p. 39,133 (No. 85-0369, 1991). 

A showing of evil or malicious intent is not necessary to establish willfulness. 

Anderson Excavating and Wrecking Co., 17 BNA OSHC 1890, 1891, n.3, 1995-97 

C.H. OSHA ¶ 31,228, p. 43,788, n.3 (No. 92-3684, 1997), aff’d 131 F.3d 1254 (8th 

Cir. 1997). A willful violation is differentiated from a nonwillful violation by an 

employer’s heightened awareness of the illegality of the conduct or conditions and 

by a state of mind, i.e., conscious disregard or plain indifference for the safety and 

health of employees. General Motors Corp., Electro-Motive Div., 14 BNA OSHC 

2064, 2068, 1991-93 C.H. OSHA ¶ 29,240, p. 39,168 (No. 82-630, 

1991)(consolidated). 

A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 19 BNA OSHC 1199, 1202 (Nos. 91-0637 & 91-0638, 2000). 

 The Secretary contends Dana’s violation of § 1910.146(c)(4) is willful based on [redacted] 

acknowledgment that he knew of the PRCS program’s deficiencies, yet did not change it. 
37

Furthermore, the Secretary cited Dana for violating the same standard in 2006, following an 

inspection at Dana’s facility in Paulsboro, New Jersey (Exh. C-6). 

 It is determined the Secretary has not established willfulness with regard to this item. The 

2006 citation occurred at a different facility under different management. In addition, the 

Paulsboro facility had no written PRCS program. Although Dana’s PRCS program at issue here 

was deficient, employees were not left to rely solely on the program with no other guidance. 

During training they were informed of the correct percentage of oxygen for acceptable entry. 

[redacted] issued a memo in 2008 clarifying the acceptable oxygen percentage for entry 

(Exh. R-9). Item 1a of Citation No. 2 is affirmed as serious.

Group 3: Alleged Violations Resulting from Supervisor #1’s 

Tank Entry on January 28, 2009 

Item 13 of Citation No. 1: Alleged Serious Violation of § 1910.146(k)(3) 

 Item 13 of Citation No. 1 alleges: 

On or about January 28, 2009, an employee entered a permit required confined 

space and was not attached to a non-entry rescue system. The employee had not 

worn a full body harness with a retrieval line attached to a mechanical device for 

use in assistance of a non entry-rescue. 

 Section 1910.146(k)(3) provides: 

To facilitate non-entry rescue, retrieval systems or methods shall be used whenever 

an authorized entrant enters a permit space, unless the retrieval equipment would 

increase the overall risk of entry or would not contribute to the rescue of the entrant. 

This item is based on Supervisor #1’s entry into the dirty tank on January 28, 2009. 

Section 1910.126(k)(3) applies to Supervisor #1’s entry. 

The Secretary alleges Supervisor #1 entered the tank without wearing a harness. 

Supervisor #1 claims he was wearing a harness, but both assistant fire chief Gallaga and paramedic 

state that he was not. It is undisputed he was not attached to a retrieval line. 

Maylath entered the tank to help retrieve Supervisor #1. Maylath turned Supervisor #1 

over, administered a sternum rub to him and wrapped webbing around Supervisor #1’s body so he 

could be lifted from above. When asked if Supervisor #1 was wearing any retrieval device, 

Maylath responded, “Retrieval? No, it would be a harness. That’s why I used my webbing” 

(Tr. 109). 

In his report, Maylath wrote, “a hoisting mechanism was above the tanker, when crew 

attempted to move the mechanism above the hatch, it would not reach. While in the process of 
38

moving the mechanism over, a harness was handed to crew by a worker. Crew again looked at the 

unconscious man who had no harness on” (Exh. 7a). 

Maylath’s demeanor on the witness stand was professional and straightforward. He gave 

detailed, consistent testimony. His testimony is in accordance with the report he wrote following 

Supervisor #1’s retrieval. Maylath was a credible witness and his testimony that Supervisor #1 

was not wearing a harness is accepted. 

The Secretary has established Dana failed to comply with the terms of the standard. 

Supervisor #1 was not wearing a harness, and the hoisting mechanism above the tank would not 

reach the hatch. Even if Dana could establish Supervisor #1 was wearing his harness and the 

hoisting mechanism did reach the hatch, a violation would still be established. It is undisputed 

that Supervisor #1 was not attached to the hoisting mechanism (Tr. 1599). Dana’s argument that 

it complied with the cited standard because the hoisting device was, in fact, 50 feet long and “could 

reach anyone in the bay” (Dana’s brief, p. 82) is nonsensical. The standard unambiguously 

requires that retrieval systems be used (not just available) whenever an employee enters a permit 

space, in order “[t]o facilitate non-entry rescue.” If the hoisting device is not actually attached to 

the employee’s harness, non-entry rescue is not possible. Rather, the rescuer must also enter the 

permit space (as Maylath did here), and physically attach the employee’s harness to the hoisting 

device. 

The Secretary has established Supervisor #1’s exposure to the hazardous atmosphere in the 

tank. At the hospital, Supervisor #1 was diagnosed with toxic exposure to toluene (Exh. C-16). 

Had Supervisor #1 been attached to the hoisting device in compliance with § 1910.146(k)(3), his 

fellow employees could have retrieved him from the tank as soon as he was discovered. Instead, 

Supervisor #1 continued to lay unconscious in the tank while rescue personnel responded to the 

emergency call. 

Supervisor #1 had actual knowledge that he was entering the dirty tank while not wearing a 

harness or being attached to the hoisting device. At the time of the entry, Supervisor #1 was a 

supervisor for Dana. As such, his knowledge is imputed to Dana. Dover Elevator Co., 16 BNA 

OSHC 1281, 1286 (No. 91-862, 1993) (“[W]hen a supervisory employer has actual or constructive 

knowledge of the violative conditions, that knowledge is imputed to the employer, and the 

Secretary satisfies [her] burden of proof without having to demonstrate any inadequacy or defect 

in the employer’s safety program.”) 
39

The Secretary has established Dana committed a violation of § 1910.146(k)(3). Under 

§ 17(k) of the Act, a violation is serious “if there is a substantial probability that death or serious 

physical harm could result from” the violative condition. Here, Dana’s employees were unable to 

retrieve Supervisor #1 from the tank, and had to summon emergency personnel. Paramedics were 

required to enter the dirty tank, exposing themselves to the hazardous atmosphere. Supervisor #1 

was hospitalized. The violation is properly classified as serious. 

Item 2 of Citation No. 2: Alleged Willful Violation of § 1910.146(d)(5)(i) 

Item 2 of Citation No. 2 alleges: 

On or about January 28, 2009, an employee entered a permit required confined 

space. The employee entered without testing the conditions inside the permit 

space to ensure the space was safe for entry. 

Section 1910.146(d)(5)(i) provides: 

[The employer shall] [t]est conditions in the permit space to determine if acceptable 

entry conditions exist before entry is authorized to begin, except that, if isolation of 

the space is infeasible because the space is large or is part of a continuous system 

(such as a sewer), pre-entry testing shall be performed to the extent feasible before 

entry is authorized, and, if entry is authorized, entry conditions shall be 

continuously monitored in the areas where authorized entrants are working[.] 

This item is based on Supervisor #1’s entry into the dirty tank on January 28, 2009. 

Section 1910.126(k)(3) applies to Supervisor #1’s entry. It is undisputed Supervisor #1 did not 

test the atmosphere of the dirty tank before he entered it. Supervisor #1 was exposed to the 

hazardous atmosphere in the tank. As supervisor, Supervisor #1’s knowledge that he failed to test 

the atmosphere of the tank is imputed to Dana. The Secretary has established a violation of 

§ 1910.146(d)(5)(i). 

Item 3 of Citation No. 2: Alleged Willful Violation of § 1910.146(e)(1) 

 Item 3 of Citation No. 2 alleges: 

On or about January 28, 2009, a supervisor entered a permit required confined 

space. The supervisor failed to complete a permit which would have documented 

the measures taken to ensure safe permit space entry operations. 

 Section 1910.146(e)(1) provides: 

Before entry is authorized, the employer shall document the completion of 

measures required by paragraph (d)(3) of this section by preparing an entry permit. 

This item is based on Supervisor #1’s entry into the dirty tank on January 28, 2009. 

Section 1910.126(k)(3) applies to Supervisor #1’s entry. It is undisputed Supervisor #1 did not 

complete a permit documenting the measures he took to ensure safe permit space entry operations. 
40

Supervisor #1 was exposed to the hazardous atmosphere in the tank. As supervisor, Supervisor 

#1’s knowledge that he failed to complete the permit is imputed to Dana. The Secretary has 

established a violation of § 1910.146(e)(1). 

Employee Misconduct Defense 

Dana contends that when Supervisor #1 entered the dirty tank on January 28, 2009, he was 

engaged in unpreventable employee misconduct for which Dana is not liable. 

To establish the unpreventable employee misconduct defense, an employer must 

show that it established a work rule to prevent the violation; adequately 

communicated the rule to its employees, including supervisors; took reasonable 

steps to discover violations of the rule; and effectively enforced the rule. 

Schuler-Haas Electric Corp., 21 BNA OSHC 1489, 1494 (No. 03-0322, 2006). 

 In addition, the employer has the burden of showing “that the violative conduct of the 

employee was idiosyncratic and unforeseeable.” L. E. Myers Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1037, 1040 

(No. 90-945, 1993). Where, as here, the purported employee misconduct includes the actions of a 

supervisory employee, the employer faces a higher standard of proof. “[W]here a supervisory 

employee is involved, the proof of unpreventable employee misconduct is more rigorous and the 

defense is more difficult to establish since it is the supervisor’s duty to protect the safety of 

employees under his supervision . . . . A supervisor’s involvement in the misconduct is strong 

evidence that the employer’s safety program was lax.” Archer-Western Contractors Ltd., 15 BNA 

OSHC 1013, 1016-1017 (No. 87-1067, 1991). 

 Dana established it had work rules designed to prevent the violations committed by 

Supervisor #1 when he entered the dirty tank. Dana uses a confined spaces training program 

developed by J. J. Keller. The program includes rules requiring employees to wear harnesses and 

retrieval lines when entering a PRCS, to test the conditions before entering a PRCS, and to 

complete an entry permit before entering a PRCS (Exh. R-8, pp. 10, 14-15, 21). These rules were 

communicated to Dana’s employees, including Supervisor #1, through training (Exh. R-7). 

 Dana has failed to establish, however, that it took reasonable steps to discover violations of 

its rules. One of the best tools Dana had for discovering violations was the tank entry permits the 

company required its employees to complete before entering the washed tanks. The permits are 

each one page in length, and require minimal information to be supplied or checked off. Of the 

twenty-eight permits Dana produced to the Secretary, every one contained an error or omission 

(Exh. C-38). Eleven of the defective twenty-eight permits were filled out by Supervisor #1. 
41

None of the permits indicates that subsequent air monitoring was conducted. Permits indicated 

that work was being done for as long as three hours without subsequent air monitoring. Some 

permits noted “permit is only good for 20 minutes,” yet employees exceeded twenty minutes on 

seventeen of the permits. Supervisor #1 failed to review MSDSs prior to tank entry. His permits 

failed to identify an attendant. Some permits listed Supervisor #1 as attendant, but did not list a 

cleaner (Exh. C-38). 

 Review of the tank entry permits by [redacted] would have alerted him that Dana’s 

employees, including supervisor Supervisor #1, were failing to complete the permits properly, and 

were violating Dana’s safety rules. Dana also failed to enforce its rules. [redacted] not only 

admitted he failed to enforce Dana’s safety program, he sought to excuse it: 

Well, for myself personally, the reason why there is so little discipline—and I 

apologize if I’m out of line—but we have seen a classic example over the last two 

days of why I run a lax discipline, documented discipline, because it opens the door 

for every employee who gets angry to pick up the phone and call OSHA. 

(Tr. 1055, emphasis added). 

 One of Dana’s supervisors violated OSHA’s PRCS standard, as well as Dana’s own safety 

program. The plant manager admitted he was lax with his discipline for safety violations. Under 

these circumstances, Dana cannot establish that Supervisor #1’s conduct was either idiosyncratic 

or unforeseeable. To the contrary, it was predictable that an employee would bypass the safety 

rules when obviously deficient tank entry permits were continually accepted without 

repercussions. Dana has failed to establish its defense of employee misconduct. 

Willful Classification of Items 2 and 3 of Citation No. 2 

 The Secretary classifies Dana’s violations of §§ 1910.146(d)(5)(i) (testing of PRCS 

conditions) and (e)(1) (preparing entry permit) as willful. “The hallmark of a willful violation is 

the employer’s state of mind at the time of the violation–an ‘intentional, knowing, or voluntary 

disregard for the requirements of the Act or . . . plain indifference to employee safety.” Kaspar 

Wire Works, Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 2178, 2181 (No. 90-2775, 2000), aff’d 268 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 

2001). Supervisor #1 testified that he knew he was wrong in entering the dirty tank without 

testing it or completing a tank entry permit, but stated that it was at the end of his shift and he just 

wanted to finish it quickly, so he disregarded the safety rules in which he was trained: “I was 

tired, it was cold, and I wanted to try to finish the trailer and I made a mistake” (Tr. 1597). 
42

 It is determined that Supervisor #1’s violations of the cited standards are willful. 

Supervisor #1’s entry into the dirty tank was the result of a deliberate decision he made, and it put 

his life at risk.8 He admitted knowing it was wrong to enter the dirty tank, and he compounded the 

wrongdoing by failing to test the tank or fill out the required permit. Supervisor #1 then neglected 

to wear a harness, thus ensuring his predictable rescue was made much more difficult for 

emergency personnel. All of these violations were committed with premeditation by 

Supervisor #1. 

 “The employer is responsible for the willful nature of its supervisors’ actions to the same 

extent that the employer is responsible for their knowledge of violative conditions.” Tampa 

Shipyards, Inc., 15 BNA OSHC 1533, 1539 (Nos. 86-360, 86-469; 1992). Supervisor #1, as a 

supervisor for Dana, knowingly disregarded the requirements of §§1910.146(d)(5)(i) and (e)(1). 

He sacrificed safety for expedience. Supervisor #1’s actions present a clear-cut case of 

willfulness, which is imputed to Dana. 

Items 2 and 3 of Citation No. 2 are affirmed as willful. 

Incidental Issues

 Dana raises various incidental issues, which fall generally under the umbrella of what Dana 

refers to as “government misconduct.” The conspiracies and intrigue conjured up by Dana’s 

attorneys include Bachus’s “improper agenda,” her purported manipulation of evidence, and her 

supposed coercion of witnesses. Dana’s post-hearing brief is brimming with indignant footnotes, 

fulminating against everything from the compliance officer’s laughter during the hearing to the 

Secretary’s counsel inadvertently omitting a page from an exhibit. No incident is too small for 

Dana’s counsel to pounce on and claim as evidence of misconduct or nefarious motives. None of 

these assertions has any basis in reality and Dana’s contention is summarily dismissed. 

 Dana also asks the undersigned to reconsider her ruling that Schroll could testify as a 

rebuttal expert for the Secretary, and her admission into evidence of Ex-Tank Washer’s statement. 

The undersigned declines to do so. 

 

8

It is also likely he was complicit in putting a subordinate employee’s life at risk, since he told medical personnel at 

the hospital that he was inside the tank with another employee, who was helping him clean it out (Exh. C-16). 
43

Penalty Determination 

The Commission is the final arbiter of penalties in all contested cases. “In assessing 

penalties, section 17(j) of the OSH Act, 29 U. S. C. § 666(j), requires the Commission to give due 

consideration to the gravity of the violation and the employer’s size, history of violation, and good 

faith.” Burkes Mechanical Inc., 21 BNA OSHC 2136, 2142 (No. 04-0475, 2007). “Gravity is a 

principal factor in a penalty determination and is based on the number of employees exposed, 

duration of exposure, likelihood of injury, and precautions taken against injury.” Siemens Energy 

and Automation, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 2196, 2201 (No. 00-1052, 2005).

 Dana employed fourteen employees at its Summit, Illinois, facility. The company has 

several other facilities throughout the United States, but its total number of employees was not 

adduced at the hearing. In 2006, OSHA cited Dana for violations at its Paulsboro, New Jersey, 

facility (Exh. C-6). 

 Dana is given no credit for good faith. The record indicates Dana attempted to manipulate 

OSHA’s inspection from the time Bachus entered its facility. [redacted] handed Bachus a bogus 

statement, purportedly taken from Supervisor #1 somewhere between the time he was hoisted 

unconscious out of the dirty tank and when he was taken away by ambulance to a hospital. 

Item 13 of Citation No. 1-§ 1910.146(k)(3): The gravity of this violation is high. 

Supervisor #1 was not wearing a harness and was not attached to a retrieval device. This violation 

prolonged his exposure to the hazardous atmosphere, and caused rescue personnel to be exposed as 

well. A penalty of $7,000.00 is assessed. 

Item 1a of Citation No. 2--§ 1910.146(c)(4): The gravity of this violation is moderately 

high. Dana had a written PRCS, but it was deficient. It stated that 16.5 % was the lower 

acceptable range for oxygen. This deficiency was mitigated somewhat by Dana’s training and 

memo issued by [redacted] correcting the percentage of oxygen. A penalty of $3,500.00 is 

assessed. 

Item 2 of Citation No. 2--§ 1910.146(d)(5)(i): The gravity of this violation is high. 

Supervisor #1 entered the dirty tank without testing the atmospheric conditions. This violation 

exposed him to a hazardous atmosphere. A penalty of $70,000.00 is assessed. 

Item 3 of Citation No. 2--§ 1910.146(e)(1): The gravity of this violation is high. The 

completion of the tank entry permit is designed to ensure employees take the proper precautions 

before entering the tank. A penalty of $70,000.00 is assessed. 
44

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

 The foregoing decision constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law in 

accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

ORDER 

Based upon the foregoing decision, it is ORDERED that: 

1. Item 10 of Citation No. 1, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.146(d)(4)(i), is 

vacated, and no penalty is assessed; 

2. Item 11a of Citation No. 1, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.146(d)(13), is 

vacated, and no penalty is assessed; 

3. Item 11b of Citation No. 1, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.146(d)(14), is 

vacated, and no penalty is assessed; 

4. Item 12 of Citation No. 1, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.146(g)(3), is vacated, 

and no penalty is assessed; 

5. Item 13 of Citation No. 1, alleging a serious violation of § 1910.146(k)(3), is affirmed, 

and a penalty of $7,000.00 is assessed; 

6. Item 1a of Citation No. 2, alleging a willful violation of § 1910.146(c)(4), is affirmed 

as serious, and a penalty of $3,500.00 is assessed; 

7. Item 1b of Citation No. 2, alleging a willful violation of § 1910.146(d)(3)(i), is vacated, 

and no penalty is assessed; 

8. Item 2 of Citation No. 2, alleging a willful violation of § 1910.146(d)(5)(i), is affirmed 

as willful, and a penalty of $70,000.00 is assessed; and 

9. Item 3 of Citation No. 2, alleging a willful violation of § 1910.146(e)(1), is affirmed as 

willful, and a penalty of $70,000.00 is assessed. 

 /s/ Sharon D. Calhoun 

 SHARON D. CALHOUN 

 Judge 

Dated: February 17, 2012 

 Atlanta, Georgia