89052 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2024 / Notices 

Document description ADAMS accession No. 

Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50–397, License Amendment Request to Revise 

Columbia Generating Station Emergency Plan, dated January 30, 2024.

ML24030A844. 

Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50–397, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Columbia Generating Station Emergency Plan, dated March 20, 2024.ML24081A193. 

Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50–397, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Columbia Emergency Plan, dated September 10, 

2024.

ML24254A366. 

Energy Northwest, Columbia Generating Station, Docket No. 50–397, Supplement to Response to Request for 

Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Columbia Emergency Plan, dated 

September 24, 2024.

ML24269A254. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘‘Criteria for Preparation 

and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness,’’ NUREG–0654/FEMA–REP–1, 

Revision 2, dated December 2019.

ML19347D139. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Nuclear Energy Institute, ‘‘Alternative Guidance for Licensee 

Emergency Response Organizations,’’ dated June 12, 2018.

ML18022A352. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear 

Plants: Regarding Columbia Generating Station,’’ NUREG–1437, Supplement 47, Volume 1, dated April 2012.

ML12096A334. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear 

Plants: Regarding Columbia Generating Station,’’ NUREG–1437, Supplement 47, Volume 2, dated April 2012.

ML12096A336 (Package). 

Dated: November 5, 2024. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Mahesh Chawla, 

Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch IV, 

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2024–26109 Filed 11–8–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–352; 50–353; NRC–2024– 

0194] 

Constellation Energy Generation LLC; 

Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 

and 2; Exemption 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing an 

exemption in response to letter dated 

February 17, 2023, as supplemented by 

letters dated July 21, 2023, July 31, 

2023, August 16, 2023, and May 28, 

2024. Constellation Energy Generation 

LLC (Constellation, the licensee) has 

requested exemption from specific 

requirements for reduction of risk from 

anticipated transients without scram 

(ATWS) events for light-water-cooled 

nuclear power plants. Constellation is 

the holder of the Renewed Facility 

Operating License Nos. NPF–39 and 

NPF–85, which authorize the operation 

of Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 

and 2 (Limerick). 

DATES: This document was published in 

the Federal Register on November 12, 

2024. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2024–0194 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2024–0194. Address 

questions about Docket IDs in 

Regulations.gov to Stacy Schumann; 

telephone: 301–415–0624; email: 

Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For technical 

questions, contact the individual listed 

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT section of this document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS 

accession number for each document 

referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) 

is provided the first time that it is 

mentioned in this document. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Michael Marshall, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415– 

2871; email: Michael.Marshall@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

Constellation is the holder of the 

Renewed Facility Operating License 

Nos. NPF–39 and NPF–85, which 

authorize the operation of Limerick 

Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. The 

facilities consist of boiling water 

reactors (BWRs) located in Montgomery 

County, Pennsylvania and is located 

next to the Schuylkill River. 

By letter dated February 17, 2023, as 

supplemented by letters dated July 21, 

2023, July 31, 2023, August 16, 2023, 

and May 28, 2024, Constellation has 

requested exemption from specific 

requirements of section 50.62 of title 10 

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR), ‘‘Requirements for reduction of 

risk from anticipated transients without 

scram (ATWS) events for light-watercooled nuclear power plants.’’ A 

publicly available version of each letter 

is in ADAMS under Accession Nos. 

ML23052A023, ML23202A219, 

ML23212B105, ML23228A094, and 

ML24149A211, respectively. 

Constellation specifically requests an 

exemption from the requirements of 10 

CFR 50.62(c)(3) and the automatic 

activation requirements of 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(4) and (c)(5) for a period of 30 

days before the calendar year 2027 

refueling outage for Unit 2 and for a 

period of 30 days before the calendar 

year 2026 refueling outage for Unit 1. In 

conjunction with this exemption request 

the licensee submitted an associated 

license amendment request (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML23052A023) to add 

operational constraints to the limiting 

conditions of operations in the technical 

specifications (TSs) for each Limerick 

unit to be in effect during each 

respective exemption period to ensure 

that there is no increase in the potential 


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consequences of an ATWS. In the 

license amendment request, the licensee 

also described additional ATWS 

mitigation strategies (i.e., compensatory 

measures) they will implement in 

addition to the TS changes. Specifically, 

in Attachment 7 of the license 

amendment request, the licensee stated, 

‘‘With the additional compensatory 

measures being taken, the same level 

ATWS mitigation protection will be 

achieved during the 30-day RRCS 

demolition period when the automatic 

systems designed to meet compliance 

with 10 CFR 50.62 ATWS requirements 

are out of service.’’ 

II. Request/Action 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.62, the 

Commission’s regulations establish 

specific ATWS mitigation requirements 

for nuclear power plants, with 

paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5) 

applicable to BWRs like Limerick Units 

1 and 2. The systems that are required 

are to be operational are the alternate 

rod injection (ARI) system, the 

automatic activation of the standby 

liquid control system (SLCS), and 

equipment to trip the reactor coolant 

recirculation pumps automatically 

under conditions of an ATWS. 

Constellation requested an exemption 

from all requirements for ARI capability 

in 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3) and only from the 

automatic response capability in 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(4) for SLCS and in 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(5) recirculation pumps trip 

(RPT) for a period of 30-days prior to the 

calendar year 2027 refueling outage for 

Unit 2 and the calendar year 2026 

refueling outage for Unit 1. During each 

30-day period prior to the refueling 

outage, referred to by Constellation as 

the 30-day redundant reactivity control 

system (RRCS) demolition period, 

Constellation will begin upgrading the 

RRCS by demolishing the existing 

analog system and replacing it with a 

new digital system which will be 

completed during the refueling outage. 

To support RRCS demolition period, 

Constellation submitted a license 

amendment request to temporarily 

modify certain TS limiting conditions 

for operation to: (1) not require 

operability of certain automatic 

initiation features of ATWS equipment 

that are in the scope of work being 

performed, and (2) establish operating 

condition that ensure that there would 

be no increase in the consequences of an 

ATWS event should one occur during 

the 30-day RRCS demolition period. In 

addition, they also requested that 

certain surveillance requirements 

related to the ATWS features within the 

scope of work not be required during 

the RRCS demolition period. The 

limiting condition for operation changes 

temporarily limit the maximum reactor 

thermal power during the 30-day RRCS 

demolition period based on 

combination of operating parameters. 

Specifically, the maximum power at 

which the plant is limited based on the 

number of out of safety relief valves, the 

ability to manually initiate SLCS within 

five minutes, a minimum suppression 

pool water level, and the operability of 

the reactor water level 3 recirculation 

runback system. The operational 

constraints identified by Constellation 

for each identified maximum thermal 

power limit are listed in the following 

table. 

EXEMPTION’S OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS FOR A PERIOD OF 30-DAYS

Maximum reactor thermal 

power 

Maximum number of 

SRVs out of service 

Manual initiation time for 

SLCS 

(minutes) 

Minimum suppression 

pool water level 

(feet) 

Additional system credited 

90% .................................. 0 5 23 Level 3 Recirculation Runback. 

87% .................................. 0 5 22 Level 3 Recirculation Runback. 

84% .................................. 1 5 22 Level 3 Recirculation Runback. 

In addition, as stated in their license 

amendment request, as evaluated by 

NRC staff in the safety evaluation (SE) 

to the license amendment request (LAR) 

to reduce the risk from a potential 

ATWS event during the 30-day period, 

the licensee will implement additional 

ATWS mitigation strategies to provide 

an equivalent level of ATWS protection 

to their normal automatic ATWS 

mitigation capability. 

III. Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemption from the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: 

(1) the exemptions are authorized by 

law, (2) will not present an undue risk 

to public health or safety, (3) are 

consistent with the common defense 

and security; and (4) when special 

circumstances are present, as defined in 

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2). This exemption 

would allow Constellation to 

temporarily disable the ARI, and the 

automatic activation of the SLCS and 

recirculation pumps at Limerick so that 

digital upgrades can be made leading up 

to the refueling outages of each unit. 

A. The Exemption Is Authorized by Law 

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, does not require any specific 

systems to reduce the risk from ATWS 

events. These systems are required by 

NRC regulation. The intent of the 

regulations requires systems to mitigate 

the ATWS conditions, should they 

occur. The NRC staff has determined 

that granting the exemption will not 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, NRC 

regulations, or any other laws. 

Therefore, the requested exemption is 

authorized by law. 

B. The Exemption Presents no Undue 

Risk to Public Health and Safety 

The NRC requires that an exemption 

demonstrate that it does not present 

undue risk to public health and safety 

if it is granted. Constellation provided 

an analysis that with the proposed 

systems offline, the lower power limit, 

the manual activation of the SLCS and 

the recirculation runback pumps, that 

the disabling of the ATWS mitigation 

measures will not present undue risk to 

public health and safety. The disabling 

of automatic ATWS mitigation systems 

for 30-days potentially increases the 

severity of an ATWS event should it 

occur within the window. An ATWS 

that is not successfully mitigated could 

result in core damage due to excessive 

heat generation. ATWS events are 

unlikely events that are expected to 

occur once or more during an operating 

reactor’s service life. The proposed 

changes to the reactor systems do not 

change the likelihood of an ATWS event 

occurring. The consequences of an 

ATWS can vary from a minor event that 

can be addressed with the available 

protection systems, to more severe that 

require more significant measures 

leading to a sudden shutting down of a 

nuclear reactor, if necessary to protect 

the core from damage. 

The proposed ATWS mitigation 

strategies and TS limits presented by the 

licensee in the analysis in its LAR in 


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attachment 4 (propriety) and attachment 

5 (non-proprietary) demonstrate an 

effective strategy to mitigate the 

potential severity increase caused by 

disabling some of the automatic 

functions of the reactor protection 

system so that there is no net increase 

in the consequences of an ATWS during 

the 30-day RRCS demolition period. The 

NRC staff verified in the SE to the LAR 

that the analysis demonstrates that the 

consequences of the ATWS are not 

increased with the associated 

operational constraints included in the 

temporary modifications to the limiting 

conditions for operation (LCOs) 

proposed in the associated LAR to this 

exemption during the 30-day RRCS 

demolition period. Based on a review of 

the licensee’s analysis as documented in 

the SE to the associated LAR to this 

exemption, the NRC staff has 

determined that the requested 

temporary exemption, with the 

licensee’s compliance with the TS 

limiting conditions of operation 

requested by the licensee in the LAR, 

presents no undue risk to public health 

and safety. 

C. The Exemption Is Consistent With the 

Common Defense and Security 

The requested exemption does not 

change safeguards and security 

programs at Limerick. Constellation 

stated those programs will remain in 

full effect during the 30-day RRCS 

demolition period exemption time 

periods in calendar year 2027 for Unit 

2 and in calendar year 2026 for Unit 1. 

Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the 

action is consistent with the common 

defense and security. 

D. Special Circumstances 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 

special circumstances are present when 

application of the regulation in the 

particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR 50.62 is that there are 

systems available to operators to 

sufficiently mitigate the consequences 

of an ATWS event, that are reliable, 

independent and diverse from the 

reactor trip system. This is made clear 

in 49 FR 26040 as it states ‘‘The 

equipment required by this amendment 

(10 CFR 50.62(c)) is for the purpose of 

reducing the probability of unacceptable 

consequences following anticipated 

operational occurrences.’’ The systems 

that are required by 10 CFR 50.62 at 

BWRs are an alternative rod insertion 

system, automatic SLCS, and automatic 

reactor coolant recirculation pump trip 

system. 

In 49 FR 26041, the Commission 

provided that some operating nuclear 

power plants licensed to operate prior to 

August 22, 1969, may be granted a 

permanent exemption from these 

requirements if they can demonstrate 

that their risk from an ATWS is 

sufficiently low. The Commission 

provided guidance for the factors that it 

determined to be important to this such 

as, power level, unique design features 

that could prevent or mitigate the 

consequences of an ATWS, or the 

remaining plant lifetime. The 

Commission has granted these 

exemptions for plants licensed to 

operate prior to 1969 based on the 

finding that the risk from an ATWS is 

sufficiently low and therefore was not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule for Haddam Neck 

(55 FR 10124) and Yankee Nuclear 

Power Station (53 FR 20704). While 

Limerick Units 1 and 2 were licensed to 

operate after August 22, 1969, they are 

seeking a temporary, not a permanent 

exemption from these requirements. The 

NRC staff notes that this 30-day RRCS 

demolition period is temporary in 

nature, one time per unit, and that the 

resulting RRCS modifications to 

upgraded, digital systems will restore 

permanent, full compliance with 10 

CFR 50.62(c)(3)–(5) afterwards. This 

temporary nature of the exemption 

aligns with the factor the Commission 

considered to be important to grant a 

permanent exemption of ‘‘the remaining 

plant lifetime.’’ In addition, the licensee 

has proposed in the associated LAR to 

impose operational controls including 

restrictions on the power level of the 

plant during the 30-day RRCS 

demolition period, which in part is used 

by the licensee in its analysis to 

demonstrate that there is no net increase 

in the severity of an ATWS. This aligns 

with the factor of ‘‘power level’’ 

identified by the Commission as an 

important factor in granting such an 

exemption from the ATWS rules 

because the power level of Limerick 

Units 1 and 2 will be limited by the 

plant’s TS during their respective 30- 

day RRCS demolition period. Finally, 

while the licensee has not identified any 

unique design features at Limerick Units 

1 and 2, it has proposed unique limiting 

conditions of operations such as reactor 

power less than or equal to 90% RTP, 

all 14 SRVs operable, and suppression 

pool water level greater than or equal to 

23 feet. If suppression pool water level 

is less than 23 feet, but greater than 22 

feet, reactor power must be reduced to 

less than 87%. If one SRV becomes out 

of service reactor power must be further 

reduced to less than or equal to 84% 

RTP. If two SRVs become inoperable or 

suppression pool water level drops 

below 22 feet then LCO 3.3.4.1 would 

apply, and the licensee would have one 

hour to restore at least one ATWS 

Recirculation Pump trip system to 

operable status within one hour or place 

the plant in Startup Mode within the 

next six hours as required by Limerick 

TS Action 3.3.4.1.e. The licensee has 

demonstrated in its analysis that by 

implementing these limiting conditions 

for operations, results in no net increase 

in the severity of an ATWS event. 

Finally, while the rule requires 

automatic systems, the licensee has 

demonstrated that the relevant human 

factors can sufficiently mitigate an 

ATWS event in the analysis, as 

documented by NRC staff in the SE to 

the associated LAR. The NRC staff finds 

that the relevant human factors are 

appropriate for a temporary exemption 

from the requirement for automatic 

systems because the licensee has 

demonstrated that the temporary 

limiting conditions for operation 

provide sufficient time margin in the 

event of an ATWS for manual actuation 

of these systems to provide the same 

level of ATWS mitigation as the 

automatic systems required by 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(3)–(5), as evaluated by NRC 

staff in the SE to the LAR associated 

with this exemption. Therefore, the NRC 

staff finds that the risk of an ATWS is 

sufficiently low in support of this 

temporary exemption request, using the 

factors the Commission identified for 

certain nuclear power plants, not 

including Limerick Units 1 and 2, to be 

granted permanent exemptions from the 

ATWS requirements in 10 CFR 50.62(c). 

Specific to the application of the rule 

to Limerick, NRC staff notes that the 

Limerick updated final safety analysis 

report (UFSAR) and Tech Spec Bases 

provides specific descriptions of each 

system. As described in the UFSAR 

Section 4.6.1.2.5.4 for Limerick, the 

purpose of the alternative rod insertion 

system as required by 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(3) is to provide independent 

solenoid valves to bleed air from the 

scram valve pilot air header on low 

water level or high dome pressure in the 

reactor pressure vessel when detected 

by the RRCS to increase the reliability 

of control rod insertion. As described in 

the UFSAR Section 9.3.5 and TS 3/4.1.5 

and associated TS basis for Limerick, 

the purpose of the automatic SLCS as 

required by 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) is to 

provide a backup capability for bringing 

the reactor from full power to a cold, 

Xenon-free shutdown, assuming that the 

withdrawn control rods remain fixed in 

the rated power pattern. As described in 


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the UFSAR Section 7.1 and 7.6 and TS 

3/4.3.4 and associated TS basis for 

Limerick, the purpose of the automatic 

reactor coolant recirculation pump trip 

system as required by 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(5) is to provide a means of 

limiting the consequences of the 

unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram 

during an anticipated transient. 

The NRC staff notes that for 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(3), the specific application of 

the rule over these temporary 30-day 

exemption periods is not necessary to 

achieve the purpose as stated in 

Limerick’s UFSAR section 4.6.1.2.5.4 

here because the compensatory actions 

to manually start the SLCS will provide 

the required negative reactivity to 

mitigate the ATWS. For 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(4)–(5), the NRC staff notes that 

the licensee has demonstrated that the 

reactor operator’s manual actuation of 

these systems will be able to provide the 

same level of ATWS mitigation as the 

automatic systems during the 30-day 

RRCS demolition period with the 

associated limiting conditions for 

operation, as evaluated by NRC staff in 

Section 3.4 ‘‘Walkthroughs’’ in its SE to 

the LAR associated with this exemption. 

Therefore, the specific application for 

automatic actuation of the systems 

required by the rule over these 

temporary 30-day exemption periods is 

not necessary to achieve the purposes as 

stated in Limerick’s UFSAR sections 

9.3.5, and TS 3/4.1.5 for 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(4) and as stated in Limerick’s 

UFSAR Section 7.1, 7.6, and TS 3/4.3.4 

for 10 CFR 50.62(c)(5). 

Application of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3)–(5) 

during 30-day RRCS demolition period 

is not necessary to achieve the 

underlying purpose of the rule as 

Constellation stated that since the 

provided analysis shows that when the 

operational constraints of the lower 

power limit, a higher number of 

operable safety relief valves, an 

additional non-credited automatic 

action (recirculation pump runback), 

and manual activation of the SLCS 

system within a 5-minute time frame, an 

ATWS condition can be successfully 

mitigated using existing procedures. 

The NRC staff’s independent review of 

the analysis provided that the 

comparable level of ATWS mitigation 

protection to the required systems in 10 

CFR 50.62(c)(3)–(5) can be achieved 

with these proposed operational 

constraints and that the mitigation 

measures provide sufficient time margin 

for an operator to respond to an ATWS 

event in place of the required automatic 

systems for the limited period of the 30- 

day RRCS demolition period. Therefore, 

the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.62(c)(3)–(5), including the specific 

underlying purposes of each system as 

described in the Limerick UFSAR and 

Tech Spec Bases, are achieved by the 

licensee’s implementation of additional 

ATWS mitigation strategies identified in 

the LAR associated with this exemption 

and compliance with the TS limiting 

conditions of operations proposed in 

LAR while the licensee turns off the 

ACI, automatic SLCS, and automatic 

RTP during the 30-day RRCS demolition 

period. Accordingly, compliance with 

the specific requirements of 10 CFR 

50.62 is not necessary during the 

proposed 30-day RRCS demolition 

period to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The NRC staff finds 

that special circumstances are present 

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). 

Constellation also proposed that 10 

CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(vi) as additional special 

circumstances that are applicable to the 

exemption request. The NRC staff has 

considered their applicability but found 

that the circumstances discussed above 

in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) were adequate 

to address the necessity of special 

circumstances for the exemption 

request. 

E. Environmental Considerations 

The NRC’s approval of the exemption 

to 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(5) 

belongs to a category of actions that the 

NRC, by rule or regulation, has declared 

to be a categorical exclusion, after first 

finding that the category of actions does 

not individually or cumulatively have a 

significant effect on the human 

environment. Specifically, the 

exemption is categorically excluded 

from further environmental analysis 

under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). 

Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), the 

issuance of an amendment to a license 

for a reactor under part 50 or part 52 

that changes a requirement or issuance 

of an exemption from the requirement of 

any regulation of 10 CFR is a categorical 

exclusion provided that: 

• The proposed action involves the 

exemption from a requirement for the 

use of a facility component located 

within the restricted area, as defined in 

10 CFR part 20; 

• The exemption involves no 

significant hazards consideration. The 

basis for the NRC staff’s determination 

is discussed in the no significant 

hazards consideration published in the 

Federal Register on October 27, 2023 

(88 FR 73883); 

• There is no significant change in 

the types or significant increase in the 

amounts of any effluents that may be 

released offsite. There are no additional 

quantities nor changes in effluents 

proposed to be released based on the 

proposed action; 

• There is no significant increase in 

individual or cumulative public or 

occupational radiation exposure. All 

manual actions are proposed to be 

conducted from the main control room 

and no local actions are required based 

on information provided by 

Constellation in its letter dated August 

16, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML23228A094). The main control room 

is shielded and staffed 24 hours a day 

under normal circumstances; 

Therefore, NRC staff has determined 

that these exemptions are categorically 

excluded from environmental review 

pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), and 

therefore no environmental assessment 

or environmental impact statement 

needs to be prepared in connection with 

the proposed exemption request. 

IV. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the NRC has determined 

that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 

exemption is authorized by law, will not 

present an undue risk to public health 

and safety, and is consistent with the 

common defense and security. Special 

circumstances are also present at 

Limerick to justify the exemption. 

Therefore, the NRC hereby grants 

Constellation exemptions from all 

requirements for ARI capability under 

section 10 CFR 50.62(c)(3) and only 

from the automatic response capability 

of 10 CFR 50.62(c)(4) for SLCS and 10 

CFR 50.62(c)(5) for RPT for a period of 

30-days prior to the 2027 refueling 

outage for Unit 2 and the 2026 refueling 

outage for Unit 1 (also referred to by 

Constellation as the 30-day RRCS 

demolition period) while operating each 

respective Unit in accordance with the 

TS limiting conditions for operation and 

the additional ATWS mitigation 

strategies requested in the associated 

LAR to this exemption request dated 

February 17, 2023, as supplemented by 

letters dated July 21, 2023, July 31, 

2023, August 16, 2023, and May 28, 

2024. The exemption is authorized by 

law, will not present an undue risk to 

the public health and safety, and is 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants 

Constellation a one-time exemption 

from 10 CFR part 50, section 50.62(c)(3) 

and only the automatic response 

capability of sections 50.62(c)(4) and 

50.62(c)(5) during the 30-day RRCS 

demolition period to support the 

installation of the digital upgrade at 

Limerick. 

Dated: November 5, 2024. 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
89056 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 12, 2024 / Notices 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Bo Pham, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 2024–26075 Filed 11–8–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 72–26; NRC–2024–0185] 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company; 

Diablo Canyon Independent Spent Fuel 

Storage Installation; Environmental 

Assessment and Finding of No 

Significant Impact 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice; issuance. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is considering the 

renewal of Special Nuclear Materials 

(SNM) License No. SNM–2511 for the 

Diablo Canyon (DC) Independent Spent 

Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) located 

in San Luis Obispo County, California. 

If approved, under the renewed license 

SNM–2511, Pacific Gas and Electric 

Company (PG&E) will be able to 

continue to operate the DC ISFSI for an 

additional 40 years. The NRC staff has 

prepared an environmental assessment 

(EA) for this proposed license renewal 

in accordance with its regulations. 

Based on the EA, the NRC has 

concluded that a finding of no 

significant impact (FONSI) is 

appropriate. Therefore, in accordance 

with NRC regulations, preparation of an 

environmental impact statement (EIS) is 

not warranted for the proposed action. 

The NRC staff also is conducting a 

safety evaluation of the proposed 

license renewal. 

DATES: The EA and FONSI referenced in 

this document are available on 

November 12, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2024–0185 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to 

https://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2024–0185. Address 

questions about Docket IDs to Stacy 

Schumann; telephone: 301–415–0624; 

email: Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly 

available documents online in the 

ADAMS Public Documents collection at 

https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 

adams.html. To begin the search, select 

‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, at 

301–415–4737, or by email to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS 

accession number for each document 

referenced in this document (if it is 

available in ADAMS) is provided in the 

‘‘Availability of Documents’’ section. 

• NRC’s PDR: The PDR, where you 

may examine and order copies of 

publicly available documents, is open 

by appointment. To make an 

appointment to visit the PDR, please 

send an email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov 

or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415– 

4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern 

time (ET), Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Isaac Johnston, Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 

301–415–5649, email: Isaac.Johnston@

nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The NRC is considering a request 

from PG&E to renew license SNM–2511 

for the DC specifically-licensed ISFSI 

located in San Luis Obispo County, 

California. PG&E is requesting to renew 

license SNM–2511 for the DC ISFSI for 

an additional 40-year period. The 

current license expiration date was 

March 22, 2024, and PG&E submitted 

the license renewal application in 

accordance with paragraphs 72.42(b) 

and (c) of title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR). Accordingly, the 

license is in timely renewal. If 

approved, PG&E would be able to 

continue to possess and store spent 

nuclear fuel at the DC ISFSI in 

accordance with the requirements in 10 

CFR part 72, ‘‘Licensing Requirements 

for the Independent Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive 

Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater than 

Class C Waste’’ for an additional 40 

years. 

The NRC staff has prepared an EA as 

part of its review of this license renewal 

request in accordance with the 

requirements of 10 CFR part 51, 

‘‘Environmental Protection Regulations 

for Domestic Licensing and Related 

Regulatory Functions.’’ Based on the 

EA, the NRC staff has determined that 

an EIS is not required for this proposed 

action and a FONSI is appropriate. The 

NRC staff is also conducting a safety 

evaluation of the proposed license 

renewal request pursuant to 10 CFR part 

72 and the results will be documented 

in a separate Safety Evaluation Report 

(SER). 

II. Summary of Environmental 

Assessment 

Description of the Proposed Action 

The proposed action is the review and 

approval, if appropriate, of PG&E’s 

request to renew the SNM–2511 license 

for the DC specifically-licensed ISFSI 

for a 40-year period. The ISFSI consists 

of storage pads, a cask transfer facility, 

an onsite cask transporter, and the 

Holtec International HI–STORMTM 100 

dry cask storage system. License SNM– 

2511 allows PG&E to use four different 

multipurpose canisters (MPC), which 

are part of HI–STORMTM 100 System, to 

store the spent nuclear fuel from the 

Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). 

Currently, only the MPC–32 is in use at 

the DC ISFSI. 

Purpose and Need for the Proposed 

Action 

The purpose and need for the 

proposed action is to provide an option 

for continued temporary dry storage of 

spent nuclear fuel generated by 

operations of two nuclear power 

generating units (Units 1 and 2) at the 

DCPP. This dry storage option would be 

needed until an interim or a permanent 

facility (or facilities) is available for 

offsite disposition of the spent nuclear 

fuel. 

The DC ISFSI was constructed to store 

spent nuclear fuel associated with DCPP 

Units 1 and 2 through the current 

operating licenses, which expire in 

November 2024 and August 2025, 

respectively. License SNM–2511 

currently allows PG&E to store up to 

4,400 spent nuclear fuel assemblies in 

up to 140 HI–STORMTM 100SA 

overpacks at the DC ISFSI. This is 

sufficient space for all spent nuclear 

fuel that would be generated by Units 1 

and 2 through their current license 

terms. However, this approved amount 

of storage does not include any fuel that 

would be generated by Units 1 and 2 

beyond their current license terms. The 

DCPP is currently in timely renewal and 

would operate past the current license 

term dates while the NRC considers 

PG&E’s DCPP license renewal request. 

Regardless of the NRC’s ultimate 

decision on the DCPP license renewal 

request, the storage capacity of the DC 

ISFSI would not change unless PG&E 


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