alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 932

To prevent Federal agencies from pursuing policies of unjustifiable nonacquiescence in, and relitigation of, precedents established in the Federal

judicial courts.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 30, 1999

Mr. CAMPBELL introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To prevent Federal agencies from pursuing policies of unjustifiable nonacquiescence in, and relitigation of, precedents established in the Federal judicial courts.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. PROHIBITING INTRACIRCUIT AGENCY NON4 ACQUIESCENCE IN APPELLATE PRECEDENT.

5 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the

6 ‘‘Federal Bureaucracy Accountability Act of 1999’’.

7 (b) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 7 of title 5, United

8 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol9 lowing:
2

•S 932 IS

1 ‘‘§ 707. Adherence to court of appeals precedent

2 ‘‘(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), an agency

3 (as defined in section 701(b)(1) of this title) shall in civil

4 cases, in administering a statute, rule, regulation, pro5 gram, or policy within a judicial circuit, adhere to the ex6 isting precedent respecting the interpretation and applica7 tion of such statute, rule, regulation, program, or policy,

8 as established by the decisions of the United States court

9 of appeals for that circuit. All officers and employees of

10 an agency, including administrative law judges, shall ad11 here to such precedent.

12 ‘‘(b) An agency is not precluded under subsection (a)

13 from taking a position, either in administrative or litiga14 tion, that is at variance with precedent established by a

15 United States court of appeals if—

16 ‘‘(1) it is not certain whether the administra17 tion of the statute, rule, regulation, program, or pol18 icy will be subject to review exclusively by the court

19 of appeals that established that precedent or a court

20 of appeals for another circuit;

21 ‘‘(2) the Government did not seek further re22 view of the case in which that precedent was first es23 tablished, in that court of appeals or the United

24 States Supreme Court, because—
3

•S 932 IS

1 ‘‘(A) neither the United States nor any

2 agency or officer thereof was a party to the

3 case; or

4 ‘‘(B) the decision establishing that prece5 dent was otherwise substantially favorable to

6 the Government; or

7 ‘‘(3) it is reasonable to question the continued

8 validity of that precedent in light of a subsequent

9 decision of that court of appeals or the United

10 States Supreme Court, a subsequent change in any

11 pertinent statute or regulation, or any other subse12 quent change in the public policy or circumstances

13 on which that precedent was based.’’.

14 (c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections

15 for chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, is amended

16 by adding at the end the following new item:

‘‘707. Adherence to court of appeals precedent.’’.

Æ
#### OLIVER LAMBE et al. v. H. M. LOVE et al.

*Appeal*— Roads.

1. An appeal lies from the action of the Board of County Commissioners confirming the report of a jury laying out a road, notwithstanding there was no appeal from the original order allowing the road and appointing a jury to locate it.

2. An appeal from a refusal to dismiss, before final judgment, is premature.

This was a petition to have a public road and ferry established, -heard before *Mclver, J.,*at Spring Term, 1891, of Chatham Superior Court.

The prayer of the petitioner was allowed. The jury laid out the road, assessed damages and made their report to the County Commissioners, who confirmed the same. Thereupon the respondents appealed to the Superior Court. In the latter Court the appellants (petitioners) moved to dismiss the appeal, “upon the ground that the defendants (respondents) should have appealed from the order of the Commissioners establishing the public road, fixing the termini and directing the Sheriff to summon a jury of freeholders to lay off said road, and that the defendant could not appeal from the order confirming the report of the j urors.” The Court denied the motion, and the petitioners, having excepted, appealed.

*Messrs. John Manning*and *J. 8. Manning,*for plaintiffs.

*Mr. T. B. Womack,*for defendants.

Merrimon, C. J.:

It may be that the respondent was satisfied with the order of the County Commissioners directing the laying out of the public road, and he did not desire to appeal from such order, but he may have been dissatisfied for good cause with the action of the jury in some material *306respect, and that of the County Commissioners in confirming their report. The jury may not have been a lawful one; they may have proceeded improperly in the execution of the order, or in assessing damages to the prejudice of the respondent. If so, and their report was improperly confirmed, he had the right to appeal, and it was the duty of the Superior Court to hear and determine the matter according to law. What we have said is in no sense in conflict with what is said and decided in *McDowell*v. *Insane Asylum,*101 N. C., 656. It may, and frequently does, happen that the principal, and in a legal sense, final, judgment or order in an action or proceeding is erroneously executed. In such case the complaining party has the right to appeal, certainly when and as soon as the execution of the order or judgment is completed and acted upon by the Court. The Court, therefore, properly denied the motion.

Moreover, an appeal did not lie from the denial of a motion to dismiss the appeal. .The appellants should have assigned error in the record to be considered on appeal from the final judgment. *Wilson*v. *Lineberger,*82 N. C., 412; *Railroad v. Richardson, Id.,*343; *West*v. *Reynolds,*94 N. C., *333; Davis*v. *Ely,*100 N. C., 283; *State*v. *Warren, Id.,*489.

Judgment affirmed.
ex106.htm


Exhibit 10.6






Jia Zhou Chemical


Proxy Letter























PROXY LETTER

















I, [   ] (identity card number: [   ]), hereby irrevocably agree and entrust any person designated by Zibo Costar Information Consulting Co., Ltd. (the “WFOE Representative”) as my authorized proxy to exercise the following authority within the term of this Proxy Letter:







The WFOE Representative is hereby authorized to exercise all shareholder’s decision rights in Zi Bo Jia Zhou Chemicals Co., Ltd. (“Jia Zhou”), which are entitled to me under the laws and the articles of association of Jia Zhou, including but not limited to sell or transfer of all or part of the shares of Jia Zhou owned by me and, act as the authorized representative, to appoint and elect legal representative, director, general manager and other senior officers of Jia Zhou on behalf of me.







The precondition for above entrustment and authorization is that the authorizee shall be a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, and that Zibo Costar Information Consulting Co., Ltd. has consented such entrustment and authorization. In case Zibo Costar Information Consulting Co., Ltd. issues a written notice of dismissing or replacing WFOE Representative, I will immediately withdraw my entrustment and authorization to the former WFOE Representation, and make the same entrustment and authorization as provided herein to another PRC citizen designated by Zibo Costar Information Consulting Co., Ltd..







This Power of Attorney shall be come into effect from the execution date hereof.

















Signed by:







Date:
# Official Journal C 145/2020

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 145 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6330 April 2020 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 145

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6330 April 2020

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | |
| | |
| | Council |
| 2020/C 145/01 | Council Decision of 28 April 2020 appointing the members of the Scientific and Technical Committee | 1 |

Contents

page

Council

2020/C 145/01

Council Decision of 28 April 2020 appointing the members of the Scientific and Technical Committee

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellant,

v.

DYLAN RAY STEWART,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-4123

_____________________________/

Opinion filed October 5, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Santa Rosa County.

Ross M. Goodman, Judge.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, 

Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The State appeals a downward departure sentence imposed by the trial court 

after Appellee entered an unconditional nolo contendere plea to multiple counts in 

five separate cases. The State argues, and Appellee concedes, that the statutory 
2

grounds relied upon by the trial court for the downward departure sentence were 

not supported by competent substantial evidence. Nevertheless, Appellee argues 

that we should affirm his sentence because the record contains evidence of a nonstatutory ground for a downward departure sentence. We reject this tipsycoachman argument because the ground asserted by Appellee on appeal was not 

discussed below and, thus, the State did not have an opportunity to rebut or oppose 

this ground. See State v. Hodges, 151 So. 3d 531, 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). 

Accordingly, we reverse Appellee’s sentence and remand for resentencing at 

which the trial court may again impose a downward departure sentence if there is 

evidence to support a legally-valid ground. See Bryant v. State, 148 So. 3d 1251, 

1258 (Fla. 2014). However, because Appellee pled unconditionally to the 

offenses, he has no basis upon which to seek to withdraw his plea. See State v. 

Jerry, 19 So. 3d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing.

ROBERTS, WETHERELL, and ROWE, JJ., CONCUR.
----

----

|  | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, our financial condition and result of operations. |
|--|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                         |                                                                    |                                       |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                                         | WORLDS.COM,                INC.(Registrant)                        |
|                                         |                                                                    |                                       |
| Date: March                4, 2008 | By:                                                      | /s/ Thomas                Kidrin |
|                                         | Thomas                KidrinChief                Executive Officer |
#### W. B. WRIGHT and wife v. R. M. McCORMICK and others.

*Practice--Aetion to Recover Land*— Partition.

Where in an action for the recovery of land the plaintiff showed titles under proper proceedings in partition and the defendant admitted possession ; *Meld,*that plaintiff was entitled to recover.

( *Wrigid*v. *McCormick,*69 JSf. O. 14, cited'and approved.)

Civil AotioN to recover Possession of Land, tried at-Spring Term, 1877, of CumberlaNd Superior Court, before McKoy, *J.*

The plaintiffs read in evidence a petition, order of partition, appointment of commissioners, and an order confirming their report in the case of the'present plaintiffs against Bun-can McCormick, the devisor of the present defendants, and under whom the defendants claim the land in dispute. See .69 N. C. 14. The description of the land in the complaint-was the same as in said petition, decree and report of commissioners.

*159Tbe defendants adtíiitted that they were in possession of' tbe land at tbe time tbe action was brought! and tbe plaintiffs demanded possession of .tbe same upon' tbe ground that it was allotted to them in tbe said proceeding for partition.His Honor gave judgment for tbe plaintiffs and the defendants appealed.

*Messrs. McRae $ Broadfoot*and *N. W. Ray,*-for plaintiffs-

*Messrs. Guthrie $ Carr, B. Fuller*and *Neill McKay,*for defendants.

Reade, J.

The feme plaintiff and the devisor of the defendants were tenants in common of a tract of land; and under proper proceedings bad in Court, partition of the land was made between them, allotting to each a share in severalty. An appeal was taken to this Court upon the objection by the defendants that the commissioners bad divided the wrong tract of land, but the description in the complaint- and in the report were identical, and the objection was held to be “ captious and frivolous.” *Wright*v. *McCormick,*69 N. C. 14.

The devisor of the defendants • died before the final confirmation of the report of the commissioners and the defendants were made parties defendant, and the report of partition was confirmed and a proper decree made.

The complaint states that since that time the defendants-have taken possession of the land allotted to plaintiffs. The answer denies every thing and claims title and admits possession, “sole seizin.” Seizin in deed, as this must be taken to be, is possession. the plaintiffs’ proof of title — the record of partition before stated — was complete, and the defendants’ possession was admitted. The plaintiffs were clearly entitled to recover.

There is no error.

Pee. Curiam. Judgment affirmed'.
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 211 (Thursday, October 31, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 86855]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-25292]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

POSTAL SERVICE


Product Change--Priority Mail Express, Priority Mail, and USPS 
Ground Advantage[supreg] Negotiated Service Agreement

AGENCY: Postal Service<SUP>TM</SUP>.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the 
Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services 
contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail 
Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

DATES: Date of required notice: October 31, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sean C. Robinson, 202-268-8405.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The United States Postal Service[supreg] 
hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on 
October 23, 2024, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a USPS 
Request to Add Priority Mail Express, Priority Mail & USPS Ground 
Advantage[supreg] Contract 528 to Competitive Product List. Documents 
are available at www.prc.gov, Docket Nos. MC2025-150, K2025-148.

Sean C. Robinson,
Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.
[FR Doc. 2024-25292 Filed 10-30-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE
F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Gyanendra Patra v. Clare Schoene and Adam E. Hampton

Appellate case number: 01

- 22

- 00277

- CV

Trial court case number: 20

- DCV

- 271333

Trial court: 400 th District Court of Fort Bend County

Appellant, Gyanendra Patra, has filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief.” Appellant requests a thirty

- day extension for filing his appellant’s brief “due to his counsel’s family death and personal illness.” In his motion, appellant notes that, on May

11 , 2022, appellant was notified by this Court that the time for filing a brief had expired, and the appeal was subject to dismissal if a brief wasn’t filed on or before May 23, 2022. Appellant argues that “[i]t would be manifestly unfair and unjust” for th e appeal to be dismissed for want of prosecution “simply due to his counsel’s personal issues.”

Appellant’s brief was initially due to be filed on October 7, 2021. When no brief was timely filed, appellant was first notified by this Court that the appea l was subject to dismissal on October 19, 2021. On November 15, 2021, appellant filed a motion for extension of time requesting that his deadline for filing a brief be extended “until [thirty] days after the full court reporter transcript has been filed” to include the transcript for the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial. The supplemental reporter’s record was filed, and appellant’s motion was granted, extending the deadline to file his brief to December 13, 2021. Again, no brief was filed.

A ccordingly, on December 21, 2021, appellant was again notified that the time for filing appellant’s brief had expired, and that his appeal was subject to dismissal for want of prosecution. Because appellant failed to respond to the Court’s December 21, 20 21 notice, on May 11, 2022, appellant was notified a third time that his appeal was subject to dismissal if he failed to file a brief on or before May 23, 2022. On May 23, 2022, appellant

filed his motion for extension.

The motion does not include a certi ficate of conference stating whether appellees, Clare Schoene and Adam E. Hampton are opposed to the relief requested in appellant’s

motion. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 10.1(a)(5).We grant appellant’s motion for extension of time to file h is brief

. Appellant’s

brief must be filed with this Court on or before June 22, 2022, which is 191 days after the first extended deadline for appellant to file his brief, December 13, 2021 . Accordingly, no further extensions will be considered , and the failure to file a brief by June 22, 2022 will result in the appeal being dismissed for want of prosecution.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: _

/s/ April Farris

______________________________________  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date:

___ June 7, 2022

___
1

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3195

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Rayvell Vann, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 4, 2004

Filed: June 10, 2004

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Rayvell Vann challenges the sentence the district court1

 imposed upon his

guilty plea to conspiring to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and

1344. On appeal, his counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

At sentencing, over Vann’s objection, the district court added 3 levels to

Vann’s offense level for being a manager or supervisor of criminal activity involving
-2-

5 or more participants. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). Vann’s total offense level of 18

resulted in a Guidelines imprisonment range of 57-71 months. After granting the

government’s substantial-assistance downward-departure motion, the district court

sentenced Vann to 36 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release, and

ordered him to pay restitution. On appeal Vann argues that the district court

erroneously applied the aggravating-role enhancement.

We conclude that the issue is unreviewable, however, because Vann’s

departure sentence is below the applicable Guidelines range, with or without the

enhancement. See United States v. Baker, 64 F.3d 439, 441 (8th Cir. 1995)

(challenge to enhancement unreviewable where defendant received sentence below

applicable Guidelines range with or without enhancement); United States v. Wyatt,

26 F.3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (challenge to enhancement

unreviewable where sentence was downward departure from Guidelines range that

would have resulted if defendant had prevailed); United States v. Dutcher, 8 F.3d 11,

12-13 (8th Cir. 1993) (extent of downward departure unreviewable regardless of

district court’s reasons for refraining from departing further; rejecting argument that

allegedly erroneous Guidelines “starting point” caused court to depart insufficiently).

Having found no nonfrivolous issues after reviewing the record independently

under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), we affirm. We also grant counsel’s

motion to withdraw.

______________________________
# C_2020182EN.01000601.xml

| 2.6.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 182/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

2.6.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 182/6

---

Opinion of the Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions given at its meeting on 10 February 2020 concerning a draft decision in Case AT.40528 – MELIÁ (Holiday Pricing)

Rapporteur: France

(2020/C 182/05)

1.

The members (7 Member States) of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission that Melia’s vertical contracts with tour operators as outlined in the draft decision restricted active and passive sales for hotel accommodation and constitute a restriction of competition by object within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

2.

The members (7 Member States) of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission’s assessment in the draft decision as regards the duration of the infringement.

3.

The members (7 Member States) of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission that the anticompetitive conduct covered by the draft decision does not meet the conditions for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU and Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement.

4.

The members (7 Member States) of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on the addressee of the draft decision.

5.

The members (7 Member States) of the Advisory Committee agree with the Commission on the final amount of the fine, including its reduction based on point 37 of the 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003.

6.

The members (7 Member States) of the Advisory Committee recommend the publication of its opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

---