### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A pr il 25, 200 6 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . CHARLOTT E STE PHENS
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 75690 Mar y Beth Leibow itz, Judge

No. E2005-01925-CC A-R9- CD - F iled October 13, 2006

J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., co n cu rr i n g.

I agre e that princ iples of double jeopa rdy would be off

ended upon the defe ndant’s retria l for sec ond deg ree murder be cause the re cord doe s not support the trial cou rt ’s finding of manifest nec essity

and bec ause the defe ndant, ostensibly at leas t , d i d not consent to the orde r of mistrial. I write this c oncurring opinion be cause this latter issue – the def endant’ s lack of c onsent – g ave me g reat pause.

I n S ta te v . Mounce , 85 9 S. W.2 d 3 19 (T e nn . 1 99 3) , o ur su pr e me c ou rt

e ff ic ie ntl y e luc idate d th e princ ipl e s g ov e rn ing the iss ue of re tr ia l f oll ow ing mis tr ia l:
[R ]etrial may

be permitted if t h e d ef endant consented to the te r mi n a ti o n o f th e p r o c e e d in g a t is s u e

. “ I n s u c h a c a s e the ac cused has deliber ately

elec ted to f

oreg o his right to have g uilt or innocence determined by

the first trier

of fa ct.”

Ad dit ion a lly , a

re tr ia l is pe rm itt e d whe rethe reis a “ ma nif e st
nece ssity ” for

the dec laration of the mistrial, reg ardle ss of the defe ndant’s consen t or objec tion. . . .W hen the mistrial is decla red beca use of a manifest nec essity , double jeopar dy is not violated when the def en d an t i s retrie d, even if he objec ted to the mistrial. The g ranti ng of a mis tr ia l is wi thi n the so un d disc re tio n of the tria l c ou rt , which will n o tbe disturbed on a ppeal a bsent a finding of abuse of discretion.

Id. at 321-22 (citations omitted). Thus, retria l is not barred w hen either manifest nec essity

require s the mis tr ia l or

the def endant c onsents to the mistrial order.-2- I n the pre sent ca se, the majority opinion ably

explains t hat th e re cord doe s not support a finding of manife st nece ssity . “It is only when ther e is no fea sible and just alternative to halting the proc eeding s that a manife st nece ssityis shown.” Mounce , 859 S.W .2d at 322. I am unper suaded that the problem c aused by Offic er Vi ney ard’ s testimonycould not have be en re dresse d by an apt jury instruction.

Th e qu e sti on of

the de fe nd a nt’ s la c k o f c on se nt to the mis tr ia l or de r i s n ot a s e a sil y resolved a s the defe ndant would like. When Offic er V iney ard te stified that he aske d fo r a sea rch
war rant, the de fendant obje cted. Assuming that the office r’s testimony was inadmissible based upon the tr ia l c ou rt ’s pr e tr ia l ruli ng , only tw o p ra c tic a l so lut ion s w e rea va ila ble : T he tr ia l c ou rt

c ou ld redr ess the def

endant’ s g rieva nce by

aptly instructing the jury

to avoid any

prejudicia l rea ction to the testimony , or i t could decla re a mistrial. I

acknow ledg e that the de fendant declar ed that he did not want a de cla ra t i o n o f m i s trial. On the other hand, he ne ver a sked for an instruction. (Indeed, the sta te re qu e ste d a

c ur a tiv e ins truc tio n. ) R a the r, the de fe nd a nt m ov e d th e c ou rt the n a ndthe re to dismiss the case. I am mindful that this mot ion came during , and not af ter, the state ’s ca se-in-c hief.

De sp ite the de fe nd a nt’ s p ro test s, the c ir c ums ta nc e s sm a c k s tr on g ly of his int e nt t o provoke a mistrial without accounta b i l i ty . I f I could fe el conf

ident that such wa s the defe ndant’s be nt i n this c a se , I wo uld ho ld that he co ns e nte d to the mis tr ia l. I n othe r wo rd s, a de fe nd a nt s ho uld be a cc o u n table for

an implied consent to a de clar ation of mistrial when his “r esponses a ppear calc ulated to enc ourag e the tria l court to g rant a mistrial, without m aking his consent express.” Sta te
v . Ca rl E rsk ine W

hite , 3 69 N. W.2 d 3 01 , 3 04 , ( Min n. App. 19 85 ). Th e re c or d d oe s n ot s up po rt a finding that the state g oaded the defe ndant into supporting a mistrial, see O regon v. Kenne dy , 456 U.S. 667, 676, 102 S

. C t

. 2083, 2089 (1983), and in that circumstanc e, and if the def endant ha d impliedly consente d to a declaration of a mistrial, I would have affirmed t he trial court’s de nial of the def endant’ s motion t o dismiss

.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE