[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-13376

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00126-MCR-HTC

CHRISTOPHER G. PARKER, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

MARK T. ESPER, 

Secretary of Defense, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(May 19, 2021)

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Christopher Parker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order 

granting the government’s motion for summary judgment on his discrimination 

claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Age Discrimination Employment Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112. The 

district court ruled that the Defense Commissary Agency—an agency of the 

Department of Defense—could not be liable for the alleged discrimination because 

it was not Mr. Parker’s joint employer. The government has moved for summary 

affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule. Mr. Parker has not responded to the 

motion and has not filed his brief.

Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, such 

as “situations where important public policy issues are involved or those where 

rights delayed are rights denied,” or where “the position of one of the parties is 

clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the 

outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is 

frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 

An appeal is frivolous if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier 

v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002). 

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. See Josendis v. 

Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011). Pro se 

pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings 

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drafted by attorneys. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). 

However, “a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary 

judgment standards of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to a fact material 

to his case in order to avert summary judgment.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 

670 (11th Cir. 1990). Where there are no genuine issues of material fact, a court 

may decide whether an entity is a joint employer, in lieu of a jury. See Virgo v. 

Riviera Beach Assoc., Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1360 (11th Cir. 1994). 

In analyzing the joint employment question, a court considers the totality of 

the circumstances to determine whether an employer-employee relationship exists. 

See Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 405 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir. 1968). Two entities 

are joint employers when they have contracted in good faith and “co-determine” the 

essential terms of employment. See Virgo, 30 F.3d at 1360. In determining whether 

an entity is a person’s employer, we consider whether the employment took place 

on the alleged employer’s premises, how much control the alleged employer 

asserted, and the extent to which the alleged employer had the power to modify 

employment conditions. See Morrison v. Magic Carpet Aviation, 383 F.3d 1253, 

1255 (11th Cir. 2004). Indirect control is insufficient to deem an entity a joint 

employer. See id. at 1256. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Parker, there is no 

substantial question about the proper outcome of the case. Mr. Parker did not 

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respond to the government’s motion for summary judgment, and the district court 

correctly granted the government’s motion on the ground that the DCA was not Mr. 

Parker’s joint employer. See Groendyke, 406 F.2d at 1162. Though Mr. Parker’s 

employment did take place on the DCA’s premises—the DCA operates the Hurlburt 

Field Commissary where Mr. Parker worked—the remaining Morrison factors 

support the conclusion that the DCA was not Mr. Parker’s joint employer. 

First, the DCA did not exert much control over Mr. Parker. Mr. Parker 

admitted in his pre-complaint questionnaire that the DCA only assigned him duties 

“at times,” but that the Brevard Achievement Center assigned the bulk of his job 

responsibilities—including his schedule and work hours. Additionally, Mr. Parker 

contracted with the BAC, not the DCA, for his employment. This supports the 

conclusion that the DCA did not exert control over Mr. Parker as an employee, 

despite occasionally assigning him tasks, because indirect control is insufficient to 

make the DCA a joint employer. See Morrison, 383 F.3d at 1256. 

Second, Mr. Parker did not present facts to create a jury question on whether 

the DCA had the power to modify his employment conditions. Mr. Parker earned 

and requested leave from the BAC. Moreover, the BAC performed his performance 

evaluations, and the BAC was responsible for handling any disciplinary actions. 

Furthermore, Kevin Hennelly (the director of the Equal Employment Office at the 

DCA) attested in his affidavit that the DCA was not involved in the decision to 

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terminate Mr. Parker, and Mr. Parker checked on his questionnaire that he was not 

a federal employee. 

Third, there is no substantial question that the district court did not err in 

denying Mr. Parker’s motion to compel and motion for an enlargement of time in its 

omnibus order. There is no legal mechanism that allowed the district court to compel 

payment of fees for the purpose of acquiring hearing transcripts. To the extent that 

Mr. Parker is appealing an unnamed order declining appointment of counsel, 

appointment of counsel in civil cases is only warranted in cases with exceptional 

circumstances, which Mr. Parker has yet to demonstrate exists in his case. See Poole 

v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987). 

In sum, there is no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, as the 

DCA was not Mr. Parker’s joint employer. Although the employment took place on 

the DCA’s premises, Mr. Parker did not present facts to create jury questions on 

whether the DCA exerted control over him or whether the DCA had the power to 

modify his employment conditions. See Morrison, 383 F.3d at 1255. Additionally, 

there is no substantial question that the district court did not err in denying Mr. 

Parker’s motion to compel and motion for an enlargement of time. Accordingly, the 

government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED and its motion to stay 

the briefing schedule is DENIED as moot. 

AFFIRMED.

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