United States of America

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

1120 20th Street, N.W., Ninth Floor

Washington, DC 20036-3457

SECRETARY OF LABOR,

Complainant,

v. OSHRC Docket No. 08-1547

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

Respondent.

ON BRIEFS:

Lisa A. Wilson and Kristen M. Lindberg, Attorneys; Heather R. Phillips, Counsel for Appellate 

Litigation; Joseph M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor of Labor for Occupational Safety and

Health; M. Patricia Smith, Solicitor of Labor; U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC

For the Complainant

Teresa A. Gonsalves and Kimberly Richardson, Attorneys; Stephan J. Boardman, Chief Counsel 

for Labor Relations; United States Postal Service, Washington, DC

For the Respondent

DECISION

Before: ROGERS, Chairman; ATTWOOD and MACDOUGALL, Commissioners.

BY THE COMMISSION:

At issue on review is a citation issued by the Occupational Safety and Health 

Administration to the United States Postal Service regarding two OSHA recordkeeping 

regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1904.29(b)(2) and (b)(3), alleging a failure to record a work-related 

illness on the forms required by 29 C.F.R. Part 1904. We conclude that the Secretary has failed 

to prove a violation of the cited regulations; thus, we vacate the portion of the citation that relates 

to the alleged failure to record at issue.

1

 

1 USPS assumes for purposes of argument that the illness was work-related. Because we decide 

this case on other grounds, we need not address this issue.
2

BACKGROUND

Employee-A, an employee of USPS at its Seattle, Washington, mail processing center,

submitted an application to USPS requesting protected leave under the Family and Medical 

Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. With the application, Employee-A submitted a 

completed copy of the Department of Labor’s Form WH-380, a health care provider certification 

for employees seeking FMLA-protected leave. In Employee-A’s WH-380, her physician 

described her illness and symptoms, and stated that she had a “serious health 

condition . . . caused by her work environment exclusively.” It is undisputed that USPS did not 

record this illness on either OSHA’s Form 300, Log of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses, or 

OSHA’s Form 301, Injury and Illness Report.

OSHA issued USPS a citation alleging two violations of the recordkeeping regulations—

one violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1904.29(b)(2) (Item 1a), and one violation of 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1904.29(b)(3) (Item 1b)—for failing to record the illness.

2

 Following a hearing, the late Chief 

Administrative Law Judge Irving Sommer affirmed the citation and assessed the $5,000 

proposed penalty.

3

 At issue on review are the implications of the confidentiality requirements of 

the FMLA’s implementing regulations, in light of an employer’s obligations under OSHA’s 

recordkeeping regulations. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judge with respect to 

Employee-A. For the remaining portion of the affirmed violation, we assess a penalty of $2,500.

DISCUSSION

USPS contends that the citation should be vacated because: (1) the confidentiality 

provision of the FMLA regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(g), requires USPS to maintain 

Employee-A’s FMLA documentation in a separate system of confidential records and precludes

USPS from recording the information about Employee-A’s illness on its OSHA log and report;

 

2

Section 1904.29(b)(2) states: “What do I need to do to complete the OSHA 301 Incident 

Report? You must complete an OSHA 301 Incident Report form, or an equivalent form, for 

each recordable injury or illness entered on the OSHA 300 Log.” Section 1904.29(b)(3) states, 

“How quickly must each injury or illness be recorded? You must enter each recordable injury or 

illness on the OSHA 300 Log and 301 Incident Report within seven (7) calendar days of 

receiving information that a recordable injury or illness has occurred.”

3

Each citation item included two instances, one based on Employee-A’s illness, and one based 

on the illness of another USPS employee. The judge affirmed both items with respect to both 

employees. Only the instances involving Employee-A’s illness are at issue on review.
3

(2) the knowledge of USPS’s FMLA Coordinator, who knew of Employee-A’s illness from the 

Form WH-380, is not imputable to USPS; and (3) there is no basis to infer that Employee A’s 

supervisor knew Employee-A had a work-related illness independent of the FMLA documents. 

Before we address the merits of USPS’s arguments, we first consider the Secretary’s claim on 

review that USPS waived its FMLA argument.

I. Waiver

The Secretary contends USPS waived its argument that FMLA confidentiality 

requirements prohibited it from recording Employee-A’s illness, because this argument was not 

included as an affirmative defense in USPS’s answer and was not asserted until USPS filed its 

post-hearing brief with the judge. Commission Rule 34(b), 29 C.F.R. § 2200.34(b)(3)-(4)

(requiring answer to “include all affirmative defenses being asserted,” and stating that failure to 

do so may “result in the party being prohibited from raising the defense at a later stage in the 

proceeding”). In the Secretary’s view, USPS’s FMLA argument should be considered an 

affirmative defense because it is “analogous” to a preemption claim under section 4(b)(1) of the 

OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1), which the Commission has long recognized as an affirmative

defense. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 17 BNA OSHC 1801, 1803, 1995-97 CCH OSHD ¶ 31,150, p. 

43,529 (No. 93-45, 1996). We disagree.

Commission Rule 34(b)(3)’s reference to affirmative defenses is to those recognized as 

such at common law—i.e., assertions raising arguments or new facts that, if proven, defeat a

plaintiff’s claim even if the allegations in the complaint are true. See Ford Motor Co. v. 

Transport Indem. Co., 795 F.2d 538, 546 (6th Cir. 1986) (“An affirmative defense raises matters 

extraneous to the plaintiff’s prima facie case.”); see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 

R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1270-1271 (3d ed. 2004); 61A Am. Jur. 2d 

Pleading § 279. Therefore, “if the defense involved is one that merely negates an element of the 

plaintiff’s prima facie case [ ] it is not truly an affirmative defense and need not be pleaded [in 

the answer].” Sanden v. Mayo Clinic, 495 F.2d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1974) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

Here, the Secretary asserts that USPS had a legal obligation to review the FMLA 

documents for OSHA recordkeeping purposes. USPS disagrees that it had such an obligation, 

asserting that the FMLA confidentiality requirements precluded it from reviewing the FMLA 

documents for OSHA recordkeeping purposes. In this respect, the parties’ arguments directly 
4

implicate the knowledge element of the Secretary’s prima facie case. See Astra Pharm. Prods., 

Inc., 9 BNA OSHC 2126, 2129, 1981 CCH OSHD ¶ 25,578, pp. 31,899-900 (No. 78-6247, 

1981) (Secretary’s prima facie burden includes establishing that “the cited employer either knew 

or could have known of the condition with the exercise of reasonable diligence”), aff’d in 

pertinent part, 681 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1982). Accordingly, we find that USPS’s FMLA argument 

is not an an affirmative defense, and is not subject to waiver as the Secretary contends.

Even if the FMLA argument were considered an affirmative defense, we find that the 

issue was “tried by the . . . implied consent of the parties and [may therefore be] treated as if 

actually raised by the pleadings.” Bill C. Carroll Co., 7 BNA OSHC 1806, 1810, 1979 CCH 

OSHD ¶ 23,940, p. 29,032 (No. 76-2748, 1979). A finding of such consent is appropriate where 

“the party who should have pled the [affirmative] defense introduces evidence in support thereof 

without objection by the adverse party . . . .” Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d 103, 107 n.7 (5th Cir. 

1981). At the hearing, USPS’s counsel asked USPS manager Kenn Messenger if FMLA 

documentation must be kept confidential by USPS’s FMLA Coordinator. The Secretary failed to 

object, even though this question sought evidence that, from the Secretary’s standpoint, was 

unrelated to any other issue in the case. Compare In re Acequia, 34 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 

1994) (“Where evidence . . . allege[d] to have shown implied consent was also relevant to the 

other issues at trial[,] [it] cannot be used to imply consent to try the [unpleaded] issue.”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Also, after USPS included the FMLA argument in its

post-hearing brief before the judge, the Secretary did not object in any way, such as by moving 

to strike the argument or requesting the opportunity to file a post-hearing reply brief. See Elliot 

Constr. Co., 23 BNA OSHC 2110, 2114, 2012 CCH OSHD ¶ 33,231, p. 56,065 (No. 07-1578, 

2012) (considering arguments that relied on information not objected to until brief on review).

Finally, the Secretary has failed to show that he suffered any prejudice resulting from our 

consideration of USPS’s FMLA argument. While he asserts that, had he known USPS would 

raise this argument, he “might have” questioned Employee-A’s work supervisor about whether 

the supervisor knew of Employee-A’s illness apart from the FMLA documents, the Secretary 

has never requested a further opportunity to present evidence of the supervisor’s independent 

knowledge of Employee-A’s illness. Bill C. Carroll, 7 BNA OSHC at 1810, 1979 CCH OSHD 

at p. 29,032. Compare Nuprecon, LP, 22 BNA OSHC 1937, 1939, 2009-12 CCH OSHD ¶ 

33,034, p. 54,384 (No. 08-1037, 2009) (prejudice where Secretary identified document he would 
5

have proffered had he been apprised applicability was in dispute). As such, we find no bar to our 

consideration of the FMLA argument.

II. Knowledge

“To meet [his] burden of establishing employer knowledge, the Secretary must show that 

the cited employer either knew or, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have known 

of the presence of the violative condition.” N&N Contractors, Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 2121, 2122, 

2000 CCH OSHD ¶ 32,101, p. 48,239 (No. 96-0606, 2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 2001). 

As discussed below, we reject the Secretary’s claim that USPS had constructive or actual 

knowledge of Employee-A’s illness because the FMLA confidentiality requirements precluded

USPS from reviewing FMLA leave-request documentation for purposes of OSHA 

recordkeeping, and the Secretary’s attempts to establish the element of knowledge by other 

means also fail.

The Secretary argues that USPS was obligated to review such information to determine if

it is required to be recorded on OSHA’s recordkeeping forms pursuant to OSHA’s recordkeeping 

regulations. USPS claims, however, that pursuant to the confidentiality provision of the FMLA 

regulations, the documentation at issue here must be kept confidential:

Records and documents relating to certifications, recertifications or medical 

histories of employees or employees’ family members, created for purposes of 

FMLA, shall be maintained as confidential medical records in separate 

files/records from the usual personnel files, and if ADA is also applicable, such 

records shall be maintained in conformance with ADA confidentiality 

requirements (see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(1)), except that:

(1) Supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions 

on the work or duties of an employee and necessary accommodations;

(2) First aid and safety personnel may be informed (when appropriate) if the 

employee’s physical or medical condition might require emergency treatment; 

and

(3) Government officials investigating compliance with FMLA (or other pertinent 

law) shall be provided relevant information upon request.

29 C.F.R. § 825.500(g) (emphasis added). In response, the Secretary contends that the opening 

part of this provision implicitly permits review and disclosure of FMLA information for OSHA 

recordkeeping purposes because, he argues, the phrase “maintained as confidential . . . records” 

is not an absolute requirement, but rather allows disclosure for certain governmental purposes. 

We disagree.
6

By its terms, the confidentiality provision set forth in § 825.500(g) prohibits disclosure of 

FMLA medical information to supervisors and managers unless the information involves 

“necessary restrictions on the work or duties of an employee and necessary accommodations”; or 

the information is necessary for “emergency treatment.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(g)(3). See 

Superior Masonry Builders, Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 1182, 1184, 2002-04 CCH OSHD ¶ 32,667, p. 

51,417 (No. 96-1043, 2003) (when determining the meaning of a standard, the Commission first 

looks to its text and structure); Blount Int’l, Ltd., 15 BNA OSHC 1897, 1902, 1991-93 CCH 

OSHD ¶ 29,854, p. 40,752 (No. 89-1394, 1992) (if provision’s wording is unambiguous, the 

plain language of the standard will govern, even if the Secretary posits a different interpretation). 

See also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000) (“[w]hen a statute limits a thing 

to be done in a particular mode, it includes a negative of any other mode”) (quoting Raleigh & 

Gaston R.R. Co. v. Reid, 80 U.S. 269, 270 (1871)). Because the provision plainly prohibits the 

use of FMLA documentation for non-excepted purposes, we conclude that such documentation 

may not be reviewed by an employer for OSHA recordkeeping purposes. See Worcester Steel 

Erectors, Inc., 16 BNA OSHC 1409, 1418-19, 1993-95 CCH OSHD ¶ 30,232, p. 41,635 (No. 

89-1206, 1993) (rejecting Secretary’s interpretation of a standard when it strains the plain 

meaning of the regulatory text).

The Secretary also contends that the express exception in subsection (g)(3) applies here, 

because the OSH Act and OSHA recordkeeping regulations constitute “other pertinent law.” 29 

C.F.R. § 825.500(g)(3). This ignores, however, that the exception’s plain language permits 

disclosure only to “government officials.” The parenthetical reference to “other pertinent law” 

simply addresses the reason government officials are seeking the documents, not to whom the 

documents may be disclosed. Here, if the FMLA-protected information were to be disclosed, it

would go beyond government officials—it would be seen by USPS personnel examining the 

FMLA documents for non-FMLA purposes; further, as required by the OSHA recordkeeping 

regulations, USPS employees and their representatives have access to the OSHA injury and 

illness records. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.35(b)(2). Therefore, this exception, like the rest of the 

provision, is unambiguous—it does not permit the disclosure of FMLA medical information for 
7

purposes of OSHA recordkeeping.

4

 See Superior Masonry, 20 BNA OSHC at 1184, 2002-04 

CCH OSHD at p. 32,667; Blount Int’l, 15 BNA OSHC at 1902, 1991-93 CCH OSHD at p. 

40,752; Worcester Steel Erectors, 16 BNA OSHC at 1418-19, 1993-95 CCH OSHD at p. 41,635.

In light of the foregoing, USPS could not review the FMLA documentation to identify OSHA 

recordable illnesses because USPS was prohibited from doing so under the FMLA regulations. 

Therefore, we conclude that the Secretary has failed to establish constructive knowledge as an 

element of its case here.

Contrary to the judge’s finding, the record also fails to establish that USPS had actual 

knowledge of Employee-A’s illness. The Secretary claims that the FMLA Coordinator who 

received Employee-A’s WH-380 (which contained a medical diagnosis of her illness and 

attributed the illness to her work) was a supervisor whose knowledge can be imputed to USPS. 

See Access Equip. Sys., Inc., 18 BNA OSHC 1718, 1726, 1999 CCH OSHD ¶ 31,821, p. 48,782

(No. 95-1449, 1999) (“[K]nowledge can be imputed to the cited employer through its 

supervisory employee.”). The judge agreed with the Secretary that the FMLA Coordinator was a 

supervisor. He also made inferences regarding the knowledge of Employee-A’s work

supervisor. We decline to find knowledge on either of these bases.

To determine whether an employee is a supervisor, the inquiry focuses on whether the 

employee directed other employees’ work activities. Am. Eng’g & Dev. Corp., 23 BNA OSHC 

2093, 2095-96, 2012 CCH OSHD ¶ 33,235, p. 56,116-17 (No. 10-0359, 2012) (imputing 

knowledge of backhoe operator who lacked authority to hire or fire but was charged with giving 

work instructions and orders to other employees); Dover Elevator Co., 16 BNA OSHC 1281, 

1286, 1993-95 CCH OSHD ¶ 30,148, p. 41,480 (No. 91-862, 1993) (“[A]n employee . . . 

empowered to direct that corrective measures be taken is a supervisor[].”). Here, while the 

FMLA Coordinator had authority to decide FMLA claims, this authority did not relate to control 

of employee work, and the record does not show that the FMLA Coordinator otherwise had the 

 

4 Because we find the regulation at issue unambiguous, deference to the Secretary’s 

interpretation is unwarranted. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1997) (deference to an 

agency’s interpretation is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous).

Commissioner MacDougall further notes that to defer to the Secretary’s position under 

circumstances such as this, involving an unambiguous regulation, would “permit the agency, 

under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.” Christensen v. 

Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
8

requisite control indicative of supervisory status. Indeed, Kenn Messenger, a USPS manager, 

testified that FMLA Coordinators have no “direct employees” and make no decisions about other 

employees’ work. Thus, the Secretary has failed to establish USPS’s actual knowledge of 

Employee-A’s illness through the FMLA Coordinator. Moreover, as indicated above, even if the 

FMLA Coordinator had been a supervisor or USPS had otherwise known of the illness from

Employee-A’s WH-380, the FMLA confidentiality requirements would have precluded 

recordation of the illness on the OSHA recordkeeping forms required by 29 C.F.R. Part 1904.5

Finally, there is no support in the record for the conclusion that Employee-A’s work 

supervisor knew of her illness from sources other than the FMLA documentation. First, despite 

the Secretary’s contention that Employee-A “likely informed her supervisor of her work-related 

illness,” there is no direct evidence that she or anyone else informed her supervisor of her illness 

or the reason for her leave request, or that the supervisor knew of it. The judge inferred such 

knowledge based on two factors: (1) a letter from the FMLA Coordinator to Employee-A about 

her leave request which, based on a notation on the letter, Employee-A’s supervisor evidently

saw, and (2) USPS’s FMLA claims procedure, under which supervisors are to be informed of 

FMLA claims and approvals related to their subordinates. However, the letter neither identified

Employee-A’s condition nor indicated whether it was work-related. Further, consistent with the 

FMLA confidentiality provision, USPS’s FMLA claims procedure does not require supervisors 

to be informed of the nature or work-relatedness of an employee’s health condition. While the 

Secretary claims for the first time on review that, as a routine matter, USPS employees reported

work-related illnesses to their supervisors, and it is thus “likely” that Employee-A did so here, 

the Secretary failed to prove such a consistent pattern of conduct that would permit this to be

 

5 Commissioner MacDougall writes separately on this point to clarify with respect to a situation 

that will frequently arise—where the individual responsible for administering an employer’s 

FMLA leave is a supervisor, such as for the many small employers that do not have multiple 

employees in various human resources positions. Irrespective of whether USPS’s FMLA 

Coordinator was a supervisor, the result here would be the same—any knowledge obtained from 

USPS maintaining Employee-A’s FMLA confidential documentation cannot be imputed to it for 

purposes of OSHA’s recordkeeping regulations and the forms required by 29 C.F.R. Part 1904. 

The FMLA’s implementing regulations, and their unambiguous confidentiality provisions, 29 

C.F.R. § 825.500(g), compel this conclusion.
9

deemed a “routine practice” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 406.6See Wilson v. 

Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 511 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that examples “numerous 

enough to base an inference of systematic conduct” are required to establish routine practice) 

(internal citations omitted). Moreover, there is no evidence that Employee-A’s supervisor ever 

observed Employee-A’s symptoms, which, in any event, would not alone indicate that they were

work-related. For these reasons, we find the judge erred in concluding that the Secretary 

established actual knowledge through Employee-A’s supervisor. Accordingly, the Secretary has 

failed to establish USPS’s knowledge of Employee-A’s illness.

ORDER

We vacate the portion of Citation 1, Items 1a and 1b, that pertains to Employee-A’s 

illness. We also agree with USPS that it is appropriate to reduce the penalty because the citation 

is affirmed with respect to only one of the two employees upon whom it was based. We 

therefore assess a penalty of $2,500.

SO ORDERED.

/s/

Thomasina V. Rogers

Chairman

/s/

Cynthia L. Attwood

Commissioner

/s/

Heather L. MacDougall

Dated: September 29, 2014 Commissioner

 

6

 This rule provides: “Evidence of . . . the routine practice of an organization . . . is relevant to 

prove that the conduct of the . . . organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with 

the . . . routine practice.” Fed. R. Evid. 406 (2009). On behalf of USPS, Messenger testified 

only to the existence of the procedure—he did not address the extent to which it was followed by 

USPS. This is insufficient evidence to meet the requirements of Rule 406.
 United Sta tes of America

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION

 1120 20th Street, N.W., Ninth Floor

 Wa shington, DC 20036-3457

SECRETARY OF LABOR, :

:

Complainant, :

:

v. : OSHRC DOCKET NO. 08-1547

:

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE (Seattle, WA), :

:

Respondent. :

Appearances: Evan H. Nordby, Esquire Stephen C. Yohay, Esquire

U.S. Department of Labor Ogletree Deakins

Office of the Solicitor Leigh Bonds, Equire

Seattle, Washington U.S. Postal Service

For the Complainant. For the Respondent.

Before: Chief Judge Irving Sommer

DECISION AND ORDER

This proceeding is before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (“the

Commission”) under section 10(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §

651 et seq. (“the Act”). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) conducted

an inspection of a facility of the U.S. Postal Service (“USPS”) in Seattle, Washington, from March

19, 2008 to May 23, 2008. As a result, on September 10, 2008, OSHA issued a citation alleging

“repeat” violations of 29 C.F.R. 1904.29(b)(2) and (b)(3) for failing to record two work-related

illnesses as required. Respondent USPS contested the citation. The hearing in this matter was held

in Seattle, Washington, on November 18 and19, 2009. Both parties have filed post-hearing briefs.

Background

The cited facility is USPS’s Processing and Distribution Center (“P&DC”) in Seattle,

Washington. The P&DC is the main USPS facility in the Seattle area for processingmail. It is a large

facilitywith highly automated processing equipment. The facility operates 24 hours a day, with three
shifts, and has about 1,200 employees. The non-supervisory workers consist of “regular” and

“casual” employees. Regular employees are represented by postal unions, and their assignments are

subject to collective bargaining agreements. Casual employees are not represented by unions, and

their work assignments vary according to factors such as mail volume, unscheduled absences, and

limits imposed by the union agreements. Union agreements also limit the percentage of casual

workers at the P&DC. (Tr. 174-77,192-95, 202, 205-06).

“N.B.” began working at the P&DC as a “Christmas casual” on November 7, 2007.1 She

worked on the night shift, which started between 10 and 11 p.m. and ended between 6:30 and 7:30

a.m., and she generally worked about 35 hours per week. At first she worked on the bar code

machine, where several supervisors told her she was doing a good job. In late December 2007, N.B.

went to see Dr. Zachariah at the Community Health Center in Federal Way, Washington, for what

she thought was the flu. Dr. Zachariah, however, said she did not have the flu but a dust allergy and

gave her a prescription for an allergy medication and an inhaler. N.B. filled the prescription at a

pharmacy in Federal Way. Her only previous allergy diagnosis had been to shrimp. (Tr. 89-94).

After the Christmas season, the P&DC cut back the number of casuals in N.B.’s work area

but kept N.B. on. She started working at other mail sorting machines in January 2008, such as the

DIOS and DBCS machines.2 N.B. requested a mask to work on the DBCS machine, due to the dust

that resulted from the mail sliding down the feeder. Cliff Wind, the casuals’ supervisor, provided

N.B. the mask, which covered her mouth and nose. (Tr. 94-96, 120).

On January 17, at 11 p.m., N.B. was assigned to be trained on the Flat Sorting Machine

(“FSM”). She stood by the machine as a co-worker showed her how to load and feed the FSM. As

the feeding process took place, N.B.’s eyes began burning, itching and watering. Her face felt hot,

like it was burning, and she also smelled a burning “rubbery” smell. These symptoms began within

10 minutes of beginning the feeding of the FSM. N.B. finished her training between 3 and 3:30 a.m.

1This decision refers to the two affected employees in this matter by their initials to

protect their privacy rights, in light of the medical information contained in the record. 

2All dates hereafter will refer to the year 2008, unless otherwise indicated.

2
During her training, she took three or four quick restroom breaks to wash her face, which helped the

symptoms. She told her co-worker about the symptoms. (Tr. 96-101, 105).

On January 20, when N.B. reported for work, Rosanna Cortez, a supervisor, assigned her to

work on the FSM. While she was feeling fine when she got to work, N.B. began to have the same

symptoms as before within 10 minutes of beginning to feed the FSM. As she continued to work on

the machine, she also began experiencing trouble breathing, as if pressure were being put on her

chest. She told her co-workers on the FSM of her symptoms, and one suggested she tell Richard Hitt,

the FSM supervisor. Since she could not leave the machine in the middle of processing a “zone,” she

continued to work but took short restroom breaks to wash her face in between zones. After finishing

the last zone, N.B. encountered Mr. Hitt as she was leaving the restroom. Mr. Hitt told her she did

not “look good,” and she told him about her symptoms from working on the FSM. Mr. Hitt took her

to see Ms. Cortez. After discussing the matter, the two supervisors at first told her to take her lunch

break. Ms. Cortez then told her that she had no more work for her that shift and that she should go

home. N.B. waited until she felt well enough to drive and then went home and used the medications

Dr. Zachariah had prescribed for her in December. The medications alleviated her symptoms, and

since she did not want to worry her husband, who had recently had a heart attack, she decided not

to call the doctor. (Tr. 102-09).

N.B. returned to work as scheduled on January 24. She asked Ms. Cortez if she needed to get

a doctor’s note for having left early on January 21. Ms. Cortez told her that since she was feeling fine

upon her return, she did not need to get a doctor’s note or other documentation. N.B. discussed with

supervisors on several more occasions the symptoms she had had while working on the FSM on

January 20 and 21. On February 7, she told Mr. Wind about the symptoms and asked to be

reassigned from the FSM for her February 10 shift. She was nonetheless assigned to the FSM on

February 10, and she asked Ms. Cortez to reassign her, citing her illness. Ms. Cortez told her they

had no one else to work there and that N.B. had to work on the FSM. Another casual traded places

with N.B. on February 10 before the feeding of the FSM began. On February 15, another supervisor

assigned N.B. to the FSM. After N.B. convinced him that she should not work there, again citing her

illness, Christine Batara, a different supervisor, questioned her about giving the supervisors a “hard

time” about working on the FSM. N.B. explained that, although she thought that the FSM was an

3
easy place to work, it made her ill. Ms. Batara indicated to N.B. that she could be terminated and

referred her to Mr. Wind, who told her that she had to either work on the FSM on February 17 and

18 or call in sick. Mr. Wind ultimatelyallowed N.B. to exchange assignments with another employee

on February 17. During her shift on February 17, N.B. asked a technician to get her a dust sample

from the FSM area so that she could try to find out what was making her sick. (Tr. 109-19).

N.B. did not work on February 18. On February 19, at the end of her shift, Mr. Wind told

N.B. that she had to go to her doctor and get documentation stating she could work everywhere in

the P&DC or she would be fired. That same day, N.B. went to her regular doctor, Joy Ziemann, in

Federal Way.

3 N.B. described her symptoms to Dr. Ziemann, including her breathing difficulty, when

she worked on feeding the FSM. She also told her doctor she had taken the allergy medications Dr.

Zachariah had prescribed. At the end of the visit, Dr. Ziemann gave N.B. a note that gave a diagnosis

of “Allergic Reaction.” The note also stated that N.B. “should not work the FSM (flat sort machine)

due to allergic reaction.” Dr. Ziemann’s records from the visit state the symptoms N.B. described,

the doctor’s medical conclusions, and the fact that Dr. Ziemann refilled the prescription for

loratadine, the allergymedication that Dr. Zachariah had prescribed. Dr. Ziemann also referred N.B.

to Franciscan Occupational Medicine for further evaluation. (Tr. 119-29; C-4A, C-4B).

N.B. visited Dr. Paul Darby of Franciscan Occupational Medicine on February 22, to begin

allergy testing. Dr. Darby took N.B.’s medical history, including the symptoms she had had while

working at the FSM. At the conclusion of the visit, he gave N.B. a note setting out a diagnosis of

“Allergic Reaction” and a “KeyObjective Finding” of “Allergic reaction, bronchospasm to machine

dust from [FSM].” Under “Other Restrictions,”the note stated: “No work with or in the area of

[FSM].” The note also stated that N.B. was not otherwise restricted and that allergy testing was

pending. N.B. took the notes from Drs. Darby and Ziemann to the P&DC on the evening of February

22. She presented the notes to Ms. Batara and Mr. Wind, and Ms. Batara initialed the notes as being

received. N.B. was not permitted to return to work, however, since the doctors’ notes did not say that

she could work on the FSM. N.B. then filled out the paperwork for, and filed, a Federal Worker

3N.B. had gone to Dr. Zacharia in December 2007 as she did not have health insurance at

that time. By February 19, she once more had health insurance and went to see her regular doctor,

who was Dr. Ziemann. (Tr. 121).

4
Compensation claim. She submitted two forms, as the first form she filed was not the proper form.

N.B. went back to Dr. Darby three times for follow-up allergy testing, but she was never diagnosed

with an allergy to a specific substance. This was because Dr. Darby’s testing was basic in-office

testing, and while he was going to refer her to another doctor for further allergy testing, those tests

would have cost from $1,000.00 to $5,000.00. N.B. was not able to pursue that testing because she

could not afford to pay for it out of her own pocket. (Tr. 128-45, 155-57; C-5A, C-5B, C-7, C-8).

OSHA initiated the inspection in this case after receiving complaints from N.B. and another

employee, “A.R.,” about the air quality in the areas where they worked in the P&DC. The OSHA

industrial hygienist (“IH”) who conducted the inspection received medical information from the two

employees indicating their doctors believed the employees were allergic to the dust in their work

areas.4 N.B. had been diagnosed as having had an allergic reaction from working with the FSM, and,

on February 22, she provided the P&DC with doctors’ notes containing this information and stating

she should not work with or in the area of the FSM. A.R., the second employee, had been diagnosed 

as having allergic rhinitis caused by the dust in her work environment. On March 6, A.R. had

submitted a Form WH-380 (completed by her doctor, Lawrence Klassen) with this information to

the P&DC to obtain leave protected under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). The form 

also indicated that the condition had caused A.R. to miss work and required leave as needed and

treatment with prescription medications. (Tr. 20, 24-30, 36-41; C-4B, C-5B, C-6B, C-11).

Based on her conversations with the employees and the medical information she received,

the IH concluded that the incidents relating to N.B. and A.R. were required to be recorded on the

P&DC’s illness/injury logs and incident reports. When she requested the P&DC’s Form 300

illness/injury logs and Form 301 incident reports, however, she discovered that neither of the

incidents had been recorded. During her inspection, the IH found no other discrepancies in the

P&DC’s illness and injury record-keeping. (Tr. 20-23, 44-45, 66-67).

4The IH was also the Area Director (“AD”) of the OSHA office, and she conducted the

inspection because her office was short-handed at that time. She performed indoor air quality

testing of the areas where the two employees worked, and she found no problems in that regard.

The P&DC also did testing, by having a consulting firm measure dust levels in various areas,

including the FSM area. R-1, the results, indicated all measured levels were well below the

permissible exposure limit. OSHA was provided a copy of R-1. (Tr. 15-16, 45-47, 54-55).

5
Admissibility of Exhibits C-11 and C-12

At the hearing, the Secretary moved to have Exhibits C-11 and C-12 admitted. USPS

objected, and I denied the motion. (Tr. 285-96). After the hearing, and upon further review of the

record in this matter, I concluded C-11 and C-12 should have been admitted. On February 2, 2010,

I issued an order admitting the documents and giving the parties an opportunity to respond. Neither

has done so, but, for completeness of record, the reasons for admitting the documents follow.

First, C-11 and C-12 clearly relate to A.R., the second employee involved in this case. C-11

and C-12 are both letters to A.R., on USPS letterhead, that address A.R.’s request for FMLAprotected leave. C-11, dated March 6, states that USPS’s Attendance Support Office had received

the Form WH-380 her doctor had completed. It also states that the form is incomplete and explains

what additional information is needed. C-11 is signed by “Fred Santiaguel, FMLA Coordinator Tour

3.” Below that signature is a “Note to Supervisor” that states: “Please have the employee sign and

date below verifying that s/he received his/her copy of this letter and return the signed copy to me.”

A.R.’s signature appears below that note, as does the date March 8. C-12, dated April 8, is from

USPS’s Human Resources, Seattle District Headquarters. About halfway down the page, C-12

provides A.R.’s “Case ID” number, describes her condition as a “Serious Health” condition, and

categorizes it as a “Chronic Condition – Allergy.” It also states: “Approved Date: 04/04/08.” C-12

additionally describes the facility’s forthcoming transition to an interactive voice response (“IVR”)

telephone system for employees to call when reporting unscheduled absences. C-12 is also signed

by “Fred Santiaguel, FMLA Coordinator – T-3.”5

Second, USPS concedes A.R. was an employee of the Postal Service and that she submitted

an FMLA leave form to USPS. (Tr. 297). Further, Kenn Messenger, the former senior manager for

distribution operations at the P&DC, testified that he had not seen C-11 and C-12 before but had

seen similar letters, that he knew the process by which application for leave under the FMLA was

made, and that he had received FMLA training as a manager with USPS. He was also familiar with

USPS’s transition to the IVR system, as described in C-12. (Tr. 278-88). Finally, AD Flack, the

OSHA IH who conducted the inspection, testified that C-11 was one of the documents that A.R. had

5The Secretary’s counsel noted at the hearing that page 2 of C-12 was not part of the

exhibit and was a mistake made when the document was being copied. (Tr. 289).

6
provided her during the inspection. (Tr. 40-41). I agree with the Secretarythat USPS cannot seriously

object based on foundation to admitting C-11 and C-12 into evidence. As the Secretary has pointed

out, the documents are from USPS’s own records and are self-authenticating.

6

(Tr. 295-96). For all

of these reasons, C-11 and C-12 were properly admitted into the record.

Admissibility of Exhibits C-4, C-5 and C-6

Exhibits C-4, C-5 and C-6 are the medical records relating to the two employees involved in

this matter, N.B. and A.R.7 As USPS notes, I denied the Secretary’s Motion in Limine to admit the

documents prior to the hearing. As USPS also notes, I expressed skepticism at the hearing about the

reliability of the information in C-5B, and the Secretary’s motion to admit that document was at first

denied. (Tr. 24-36). Later, upon further consideration, C-4A-B, C-5A-B and C-6A-B were all

admitted conditionally, subject to my determining their admissibility, relevance and reliability.

8

(Tr.

72-86, 302-03). After reviewing the entire record and the parties’ arguments in regard to these

documents, I find that the documents are admissible, relevant and reliable.

Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 803 sets out exceptions to the hearsay rule, even though

the declarant is available as a witness. FRE 803(4) provides the following exception:

Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing

medical history, or past, or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or

general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonable

pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.

6This conclusion is supported by the fact that, when the Secretary first moved for the

admission of C-11, USPS had no objection and C-11 was admitted. (Tr. 84). Later, when the

Secretary moved to have C-12 admitted, USPS objected and also asserted C-11 had not been

admitted. The Court agreed, incorrectly. USPS then objected to admitting either document, and

the Secretary’s motion to admit C-11 and C-12 was denied. (Tr. 287-96). Regardless, as USPS

initially had no objection to C-11, and since it has not responded to my order of February 2,

2010, I am persuaded of the authenticity of both C-11 and C-12.

7C-4 and C-5 relate to N.B., while C-6 relates to A.R. As the Secretary stated at the

hearing, C-4A, C-5A and C-6A are copies of the medical records from the doctors’ offices that

are certified as business records of those offices. C-4B, C-5B and C-6B are copies of the medical

records that USPS had for the employees and provided the Secretary during discovery. (Tr. 24).

8Exhibits C-7 and C-8, the Federal Worker Compensation claim forms N.B. submitted,

were also received on this basis. (Tr. 157-58).

7
As the Secretary asserts, the statements N.B. and A.R. made to their doctors in regard to the

symptoms they had experienced while working at the P&DC facility were in furtherance of their

respective diagnoses and treatments and are thus admissible for the truth of the matters asserted

therein under FRE 803(4). See U.S. v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir. 1995).9 Patient-declarants do

not have to be describing a current condition, as long as the court is satisfied the statements were

made to the doctor to be relied upon by the doctor in furtherance of medical diagnosis and treatment.10

Id. at 813. See also U.S. v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979); O’Gee v. Dobbs Houses,

Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1087-89 (2d Cir. 1978). The out-of-court statements can also relate to causation

of the injury. Yazzie, 59 F.3d at 813; Nick, 604 F.2d at 1201-02. I agree with the Secretary that the

statements N.B. and A.R. made to their doctors as to the symptoms they had had while working at

the P&DC, as reflected in the documents in issue, are admissible under FRE 803(4).

I also agree with the Secretary that the statements in the documents that reflect the doctors’

medical findings as to N.B. and A.R. are admissible. FRE 803(6), another exception to the hearsay

rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, provides for the admission of “Records of

Regularly Conducted Activity” as long as the records are properly certified by the custodian of the

records. C-4A, C-5A and C-6A are copies of the doctors’ records in this matter, and they have been

properlycertified. As the Secretarynotes, the Ninth Circuit has held that medical records are “classic”

business records admissible under FRE 803(6). U.S. v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2005).

Having found the documents admissible, I turn now to their relevance and reliability. The

documents are clearly relevant, as they support the Secretary’s assertion that N.B. and A.R. were

9As the Secretary notes, the Commission must follow the law of the Circuit Court to

which an appeal may be taken. In this case, an appeal could be taken to the Ninth Circuit.

10USPS asserts that FRE 803(4) does not apply to N.B. as her doctor visits were due

solely to the P&DC’s telling her she had to get a doctor’s note. (Tr. 148-49). R. Brief, p. 16. I

disagree. While it is clear N.B. went to the doctor in part for this reason, it is equally clear she

also wanted to “get to the bottom” of what was causing her illness. (Tr. 119, 148). And, while 

February 19 was the first doctor visit N.B. had to discuss her symptoms from working with the

FSM, patient-declarants do not need to be describing a current condition to their doctor. Finally,

N.B. testified she had not gone to the doctor after working with the FSM on January 20 as she

had used the allergy medications Dr. Zachariah had prescribed and they relieved her symptoms;

she also had not wanted to worry her husband, who had had a recent heart attack. (Tr. 103-09).

8
made ill by exposure to dust in their respective work areas and that USPS was required to record their

illnesses under the cited standards. I also find that the documents are reliable. In this regard, I note

that N.B.’s testimony, which is summarized above in the background section of this decision, was

consistent with what she told Drs. Ziemann and Darby, as reflected in C-4A and C-5A. And, her

testimony was not refuted by other witnesses who testified, as discussed below. I observed the

demeanor of N.B. as she testified, including her facial expressions and body language, and I found

her to be a credible and convincing witness. Her testimony is credited, and it supports a conclusion 

that the statements in C-4A and C-5A are reliable. A.R. did not testify. C-11 and C-12, however,

show A.R. requested FMLA-protected leave by submitting a Form WH-380 her doctor completed.

They also show that while A.R.’s request was initially found to be incomplete due to a lack of certain

information, it was approved on April 8. C-12 describes A.R.’s illness as a “Serious Health” condition

and categorizes it as a “Chronic Condition – Allergy.” C-11 and C-12, USPS’s own records, support

a conclusion that what A.R. told her doctor, as in C-6A, was reliable. Finally, there is no reason to

question the medical findings of the doctors in this case, as set out in their records.

I have considered USPS’s arguments that the statements in C-4A-B, C-5A-B and C-6A-B are

inadmissible and its further arguments indicating that the claims of N.B. and A.R. are suspect and

unreliable. See, e.g., R. Brief, pp. 16-18, 21-29. These arguments are rejected, and, as noted above,

C-4A-B, C-5A-B and C-6A are admitted and found to be relevant and reliable.

Whether USPS Violated the Cited Standards

The citation alleges that USPS violated 29 C.F.R. 1904.29(b)(2) and (b)(3) when it did not

record the incidents described above relating to N.B. and A.R. The cited standards require that OSHA

300 Log entries and 301 Incident Reports be completed “within seven (7) calendar days of receiving

information that a recordable injury or illness has occurred.” A “recordable injury or illness” is a

work-related injury or illness that results in “restricted work” and/or “medical treatment beyond first

aid,” among other possibilities. See 29 C.F.R. 1904.7(b)(1).

To prove a violation of an OSHA standard, the Secretarymust establish that: (1) the standard

applies; (2) the terms of the standard were not met; (3) employees had access to or were exposed to

the cited conditions; and (4) the employer knew or could have known of the cited conditions with the

exercise of reasonable diligence. See, e.g., Kulka Constr. Mgmt. Corp., 15 BNA OSHC 1870, 1873

9
(No. 88-1167, 1992). There is no dispute that USPS did not record the incidents relating to N.B. and

A.R. There is also no dispute that USPS received the notes described above from N.B.’s doctors, that

is, C-4B and C-5B, pp. 11-12, on February 22. Further, based on my findings supra, USPS received

the Form WH-380, completed by A.R.’s doctor, on March 6, and USPS approved A.R.’s request for

FMLA leave on April 8. See C-11, C-12. USPS contends, however, that the Secretary has not proved

the incidents were work-related illnesses required to be recorded. It also asserts that the Secretary has

not proved the knowledge element.

As to whether the incidents were work-related illnesses, as the Secretary notes, an injury or

illness is “work-related” if “events or exposures at work either caused or contributed to the problem.”

Home Depot #6512, 22 BNA OSHC 1863, 1865 (No. 07-0359, 2009) (citing Occupational Injury and

Illness Recording and ReportingRequirements: Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 5916, 5917 (Jan. 19, 2001))

(“Final Rule”). “[P]ure speculation that ‘some’ event in the workplace may have caused or

contributed to an injury or illness” is not enough. Home Depot at 1865. But, if the work itself is “a

tangible, discernible causal factor,” an injury or illness is work-related. Final Rule at 5929.

As the Secretary also notes, the standard does not require a final diagnosis of a particular

illness or exposure to a specific substance, because the record-keeping system is designed to gather

information about what may be latent trends in illnesses and injuries within the workforce. As OSHA

stated in the preamble to the Final Rule:

It is evident from the statute that Congress wanted employers to keep accurate records

of non-minor injuries and illnesses, in part, to serve as a basis for research on the

causes and prevention of industrial accidents and diseases. This research is needed,

among other reasons, to further examine and understand those occupational factors

implicated as contributory causes in injuries and diseases. To serve this purpose, the 

records should include cases in which there is a tangible connection between work and

an injury or illness, even if the causal effect cannot be precisely quantified, or weighed

against non-occupational factors. (Emphasis added).

Final Rule at 5930. The Secretary points out that the preamble to the Final Rule cites approvingly to

the Commission’s approach in General Motors Corp., 8 BNA OSHC 2036, 2039-40 (No. 76-5033,

1980). “The issue in General Motors was whether the employer was required to record respiratory

ailments of three employees, based on notations from the employees’ treating physicians that their

10
ailments were probably related to exposure to a chemical substance at work.” Final Rule at 5930. The

Commission held the illnesses recordable. General Motors at 2040.11 S. Brief, pp. 15-16.

USPS agrees with the Secretary that the “tangible, discernable causal factor” is the test to

show that an injury or illness is work-related. It urges, however, that a settlement between OSHA and

NAM, the National Association of Manufacturers, reached after NAM filed a challenge to the Final

Rule, puts the burden on the Secretary to show an injury or illness is work-related, as follows: 

Section 1904.5(b)(3) states that if it is not obvious whether the precipitating event or

exposure occurred in the work environment or elsewhere, the employer “must evaluate

the employee’s work duties and environment to decide whether or not one or more

events or exposures in the work environment caused or contributed to the resulting

condition or significantly aggravated a pre-existing condition.” This means that the

employer must make a determination whether it is more likely than not that work

events or exposures were a cause of the injury or illness, or a significant aggravation

to a pre-existing condition. If the employer decides the case is not work-related, and

OSHA subsequentlyissues a citation for failure to record, the Governmentwould have

the burden of proving that the injury or illness was work-related. (Emphasis added).12

R. Brief, pp. 12-14.

Based on the foregoing, A.R.’s illness was work-related and recordable. The Form WH-380

that her doctor completed describes A.R.’s medical condition as “allergic rhinitis and conjunctivitis

with severe eye & nose irritation/nosebleed headaches caused by her work environment exclusively.

Primarilydust as well as environmental toxins.”13

It states that the condition began “12/07 (concurrent

with assignment to present work station).” It also states A.R.’s “episodes of debilitating symptoms

11USPS asserts that the “tangible, discernable causal factor” distinguishes this case from

General Motors. I disagree. A reading of General Motors shows the Commission there rejected

General Motors’ argument that an incident was recordable only if it was “directly caused” by the

work environment. The Commission held employers must record illnesses in which the work

environment either was “a contributing factor to the illness or aggravated a preexisting

condition.” It also held that employers must record illnesses when “there is medical evidence

from personal physicians linking the illness and the occupational environment and no other

medical evidence contradicts this demonstrated relationship.” General Motors at 2040.

12USPS notes that OSHA’s website has a link to the settlement. R. Brief, p. 13, n.6. 

13There are two copies of the WH-380 in the record. One is C-6A, pp. 4-6, and the other

is C-6B, pp. 1-3. Although they are the same form, portions of the form in C-6B were evidently

“cut off” when the copies were made. The above notations are thus from the C-6A copy.

11
occur several times a week requiring to miss days to recover or leave early from work.” Finally, the

form states that A.R. will require ongoing treatment and absence from work for treatment “as needed

several times a yr.” The form describes the required regimen of continued treatment as “Rx meds.”

C-12 establishes that USPS ultimately accepted the information submitted by A.R.’s doctor, in that

it approved her request for FMLA leave on April 8. C-12 also establishes that USPS itself classified

A.R.’s illness as a serious and chronic health condition. I find that the Form WH-380 and C-12

demonstrate that A.R.’s condition was work-related and recordable.

I also find that N.B.’s illness was work-related and recordable. C-4B, the note from Dr.

Ziemann, gives N.B.’s diagnosis as “Allergic Reaction.” It also states that “she should not work the

FSM (flat sort machine) due to allergic reaction.” C-5B, pp. 11-12, the note from Dr. Darby, gives

N.B.’s diagnosis as “Allergic Reaction.” It states, under “Key Objective Finding(s),” “Allergic

reaction, bronchospasm to machine dust from Flat Sorting Machine.” It also states, under “Other

Restrictions/Instructions,” “No work with or in the area of Flat Sorting Machine.” These two

documents, in my view, show that N.B.’s illness was work-related. They also show that the illness

was recordable because N.B. was restricted in her work duties.

USPS points to certain testimony in support of its claim that N.B.’s illness was not workrelated and recordable. For example, Mr. Hitt, the FSM supervisor, testified that as he recalled, N.B.

had told him only that she was unable to continue working on the FSM. He did not recall her

describing any symptoms or being in any distress or short of breath. (Tr. 164-66). On crossexamination, however, Mr. Hitt agreed that in a phone interview with an OSHA official, he stated

that N.B. had told him the dust was excessive. He further agreed that he had written and signed C-10,

a “Memorandum to Record” dated April 11. (Tr. 169-72). C-10 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

On 21 January 2008, I had employee [N.B.], from Automation, on myAFSM 100s for

training. At that time, she approached me and informed me she was having difficulty

working on the AFSMs. She told me her eyes were affecting her.

Rosanna Cortez, a distribution operations supervisor at the P&DC, testified she recalled Mr.

Hitt bringing N.B. to her and stating that N.B. could not work at the FSM. When Ms. Cortez asked 

why, N.B. said that “she was tired, it’s heavy there, and it’s dusty.” As Ms. Cortez recalled, N.B. said

nothing about having had an allergic reaction to the FSM. Also, N.B.’s eyes did not appear to be red,

and she did not seem to be short of breath or to have any problems with her face. (Tr. 267-70). On

12
cross-examination, Ms. Cortez agreed she had written an e-mail on February 8 to other supervisors

at the P&DC that stated: “[N.B.] asked NOT TO WORK on the AFSM due to dust problems; can we

trade somebody to work for her Sunday night?” Ms. Cortez also agreed she had told an OSHA official

that N.B. had had a “pretty good job performance.” (Tr. 272-77).

Pam Cook, currently a senior manager at the P&DC, was a manager of distribution operations

at the P&DC in February2008. She testified about the automated equipment at the P&DC and the fact

that extensive maintenance, including vacuuming, is done ofthe equipment to ensure proper operation

and that the electric eyes are not obscured by dust. She said that, in her opinion, an FSM does not give

off enough dust to collect in a bag; to do so, one would need to get the dust out of the vacuum bag

a maintenance employee had filled upon vacuuming the inside of an FSM. (Tr. 173-78, 187-92).

Ms. Cook further testified that she first became aware of an employee not being able to work

on the FSM equipment in a staff meeting in which Mr. Wind reported it. She told Mr. Wind that, per

standard procedure, if the employee could not perform the full functions of her job, she would need

to provide medical documentation stating what she could or could not do. Ms. Cook next heard about

the situation when Ms. Batara called her on February 22 about the medical documentation that N.B.

had provided. After Ms. Batara read her the doctors’ notes, Ms. Cook spoke to N.B. on the phone and

told her the notes did not give her a medical rationale that allowed her to make a decision about

whether work was available for her. She also told N.B. that she would need further documentation

that would explain in detail the medical rationale for N.B. not being able to work on the FSM. Ms.

Cook noted that it was not her job to decide whether N.B. had reported a condition that was

recordable on OSHA forms; that was up to the safety office. (Tr. 196-203).

On cross-examination, Ms. Cook stated that the only documents she had seen relating to N.B.

were the doctors’ notes. She agreed the note from Dr. Darby stated, under “Other Restrictions,” “No

work with or in the area of flat sorting machine.” She also agreed that it stated: “Allergic reaction,

bronchospasm to machine dust from flat sorting machine.” SeeC-5B, p. 12. Despite these statements,

she wrote in a memo concerning N.B.: “Management is unaware of any exposure to take precautions

for.” In another memo, she wrote that: “It is a fact that [N.B.] had some allergic reaction (January 21st)

13
from ‘something.’”14 Ms. Cook repeated that Dr. Darby’s note did not provide a medical rationale as

to why N.B. could not work on the FSM. She stated that N.B. was not allowed to return to work

because she (N.B.) did not clarify her medical restrictions. She further stated that it was not her role

to question anything in the doctors’ notes; rather, she had to determine if there was anywhere in the

building she could place this particular employee. Ms. Cook agreed she had not referred N.B. to

another doctor for another medical opinion. (Tr. 222-23, 235-62). When asked if she was aware of

any non-work-related exposure that could have caused N.B.’s condition, she stated:

I don’t have any knowledge that it even occurred personally. It’s all – this is all after

the fact hearsay to me. So, no I don’t have any facts that any of it happened. I don’t

have any knowledge that anything occurred, or whether any of it’s true or untrue.

(Tr. 262).

I disagree the foregoing supports USPS’s position. While Mr. Hitt and Ms. Cortez indicated

on direct that they did not recall N.B. being in any distress or reporting any symptoms to them, their

testimony on cross-examination in essence contradicts their testimony on direct and supports the

testimony of N.B. And, Ms. Cook’s testimonyabout the extensive maintenance the P&DC equipment

undergoes, including the FSM, is no basis for concluding that the FSM does not emit dust that may

trigger an allergic reaction in some individuals, in light of contrary evidence in the record.15 Further,

while Ms. Cook testified as to her belief that N.B.’s doctors’ notes did not provide the “medical

rationale” she needed, that testimony does not establish that N.B.’s condition was not work-related

and recordable. In my view, the doctors’ notes, and especially the one from Dr. Darby, provided

USPS with a clear medical reason for the likely cause of N.B.’s illness, that is, dust from the FSM.

14The two memos, prepared in regard to N.B.’s Federal Worker Compensation Claim,

were not offered in evidence. (Tr. 235-36, 250-53).

15USPS asserts that N.B.’s asking a technician to get her some dust from the FSM was

improper, likening it to stealing. (Tr. 147). See also R. Brief, pp. 17-18. That assertion is

rejected. USPS also asserts, based on Ms. Cook’s testimony, that to obtain enough dust one

would have to get it from a vacuum bag inside the FSM. R. Brief, p. 18. That assertion is also

rejected. Ms. Cook testified that to get enough dust, it would probably need to be taken from the

vacuum bag the technician had used to vacuum inside of the FSM. (Tr. 192). N.B. testified she

asked for the dust so she could “get to the bottom” of what was causing her illness. Dr. Darby put

some of that dust on her back to see if it would cause a reaction. It did not. (Tr. 118-19, 145-46).

14
It also provided a clear restriction to prevent a recurrence of her symptoms: “No work with or in the

area of Flat Sorting Machine.” The testimony of Ms. Cook shows that she performed no actual

“evaluation” of the cause of N.B.’s illness, as set out in the OSHA/NAM settlement, which USPS has

cited. See page 11, supra. Her testimony also shows that she did not direct N.B. to get another

medical opinion. I find, therefore, that the Secretary has established that N.B.’s illness was workrelated and recordable and that USPS has not rebutted that finding.

A final argument of USPS is that N.B.’s illness was not recordable because it did not meet the

definition of “restricted work.” R. Brief, pp. 15, 22. Restricted work includes situations where, as a

result of work-related illness or injury, a physician or other licensed health care professional

recommends that the employee not perform one or more of the routine functions of his or her job. See

29 C.F.R. 1904.7(b)(4)(i). An employee’s “routine functions” are those work activities the employee

regularly performs at least once a week. See 29 C.F.R. 1904.7(b)(4)(ii).

USPS asserts that N.B.’s work on the FSM did not meet the above test because it was not

“routine.” It points out she was a casual employee with no routine assignments and that she worked

only intermittently on the FSM. R. Brief, p. 22. The Secretary notes, however, that USPS’s own

witnesses confirmed that working at the FSM was a routine duty of casual employees. Ms. Cook

testified casual employees are hired and must be available to work throughout the P&DC as needed.

(Tr. 194-96, 205-06). Mr. Hitt testified that, as the FSM supervisor, he had casuals working for him

at least weekly. (Tr. 168). And, N.B. testified that USPS tried to assign her to the FSM on multiple

occasions over two weeks in February 2008 and that she was terminated as she could not work on the

FSM. (Tr. 107-20, 135-37). S. Brief, p. 20. In view of the record, I find that N.B.’s work on the FSM

met the definition of “routine functions” and resulted in “restricted work” as set out in the standard.

Based on the foregoing, the Secretary has met the first three elements of her burden of proof.

As to the fourth element, that is, knowledge, the Secretarymust show that USPS either knew, or could

have known with the exercise of reasonable diligence, that it was required to record the incidents

relating to N.B. and A.R. As to N.B., C-4Band C-5B, pp. 11-12, are the doctors’ notes N.B. presented

to Ms. Batara and Mr. Wind on February 22. As found above, those notes were sufficient to inform

USPS that N.B.’s illness was recordable. In particular, the notes stated that she had had an allergic

reaction to the dust from her work on the FSM and that she should not work on the FSM. Ms. Batara

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and Mr. Wind were both supervisors of N.B. (Tr. 91, 131-35, 197-98, 200). Further, Kenn Messenger

testified that employees report work-related illnesses and injuries to their supervisors. (Tr. 282). And,

Pam Cook testified that it is up to the P&DC’s safety office to decide if an incident is recordable. (Tr.

203). It is reasonable to infer from this testimony that an employee’s supervisor, upon receiving

information like the notes N.B. presented, is responsible for providing the information to the safety

office. The safety office then determines if the incident is recordable. N.B.’s supervisors received her

doctors’ notes on February 22. The supervisors thus should have provided the notes to the safety

office for proper recording.

16 Because two of N.B.’s supervisors were aware of her illness due to the

doctors’ notes, their knowledge is imputable to USPS. USPS has admitted that it did not record

N.B.’s illness. It was, therefore, in violation of the cited standards as to N.B.’s illness.

As to A.R., Ifind that the Form WH-380 that A.R.’s doctor completed, so that she could apply

for FMLA leave, provided the P&DC with clear notice that A.R. had a work-related illness that was

required to be recorded. Further, C-11 and C-12, the letters from Mr. Santiaguel about her application,

establish that while her FMLA claim was initially found to be incomplete, it was approved on April

8. C-12 refers to N.B.’s condition as a “Serious Health” condition and categorizes it as a “Chronic

Condition – Allergy.”

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 C-11 indicates A.R.’s supervisor saw C-11. At the bottom of C-11, there is

a “Note to Supervisor” that asks the supervisor to have the employee sign and date the letter. A.R.’s

signature appears below the “Note” along with the date of March 8. It is thus reasonable to infer that

A.R.’s supervisor was aware of A.R.’s FMLA claim. This inference is supported by Mr. Messenger’s

testimony indicating that the employee lets her supervisor know she will be requesting FMLA leave,

after which the employee submits the Form WH-380. His testimony also indicates the form may be

16Ms. Cook, who was a supervisor over N.B., could also have passed N.B.’s information

along to the safety office, even though, as she testified, it was not her job to decide if an incident

was recordable. (Tr. 203).

17USPS suggests that only the Form WH-380 can be considered to determine if it violated

the cited standards, due to the AD’s testimony that the only document OSHA relied upon to issue

the citation as to A.R. was the WH-380. (Tr. 50-53). This suggestion is rejected. As the Secretary

points out, the Commission has held that the Secretary may introduce evidence at the hearing that

OSHA may not have actually “relied upon” when it issued the citation. N&N Contractors, Inc.,

18 BNA OSHC 2121, 2129-30 (No. 96-0606, 2000). This is particularly true here, where USPS

itself issued C-12, which shows that the P&DC approved A.R.’s FMLA application on April 8.

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given to the supervisor, who routes it to the FMLA coordinator. The FMLA coordinator decides

whether to approve the application and, if it is approved, informs the supervisor who administers the

employee’s leave of that fact.18It is also reasonable to infer that A.R.’s supervisor knew of her illness,

in that A.R., according to the WH-380, had missed work due to her illness. The evidence, therefore,

supports a conclusion that A.R.’s supervisor knew of her condition and should have reported it to the

safety office. The supervisor’s knowledge is imputable to USPS.

I also agree with the Secretary that Mr. Santiaguel, the FMLA coordinator who approved

A.R.’s application, was a supervisor for knowledge purposes in this case. Mr. Messenger testified that 

FMLA coordinators review and decide FMLA claims. He also testified that while FMLA coordinators

do not actuallysupervise anyone’s work, they are not union members and “their pay scale is executive

and administrative pay scale.” (Tr. 282-84, 293). As the Secretary notes, an employee who has been

delegated authority over other employees, even temporarily, may be considered a supervisor for

purposes of imputing knowledge. See Propellex Corp., 18 BNA OSHC 1677, 1680 (No. 96-265,

1999) (citation omitted). I conclude, consequently, that Mr. Santiaguel was a supervisor for purposes

of knowledge in this matter and that, because he reviewed and approved A.R.’s FMLA application,

his knowledge of her condition may be imputed to USPS.19

18Mr. Messenger said that upon receiving a WH-380, the supervisor does not keep a copy

of it due to HIPAA and other laws; rather, the form is kept by the FMLA coordinator. (Tr. 280).

19USPS argues that the Secretary’s construing an FMLA leave application as a potential

report of a recordable condition pursuant to OSHA’s regulations is an “ill-advised and serious

misapplication of the FMLA statute and regulations.” It notes that under the FMLA regulations,

medical certifications are to be maintained as confidential medical records and kept in files that

are separate from employee personnel files. It also notes Mr. Messenger’s testimony that, while a

supervisor may receive the FMLA application, the supervisor routes it to the FMLA coordinator

and does not keep a copy of it. R. Brief, pp. 29-32. USPS misses the point that it is responsible

for having reliable procedures in place for recording incidents as required under the Act. I have

found that the supervisor in this case had sufficient notice to report A.R.’s illness. I have further

found that Mr. Santiaguel also had sufficient notice. That A.R.’s illness was not reported, in my

view, indicates a possible problem with the P&DC’s reporting and recording procedures and is a

totally separate issue from ensuring that FMLA records are kept separate and confidential.

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Based on the foregoing, the Secretary has shown that USPS had knowledge of the illnesses

of the two employees, A.R. and N.B. She has also shown that USPS had knowledge their illnesses

were required to be reported and recorded. The alleged violations are accordingly affirmed.

Whether the Violations were Repeated

To demonstrate a “repeat” violation, the Secretarymust establish the employer was previously

cited for a violation of the same regulation or condition, or one that is substantially similar, and that

the prior citation had become final before the alleged repeat violation. Potlatch Corp., 7 BNA OSHC

1061, 1063 (No. 16183, 1979). The Secretary’s Exhibit C-3 contains copies of a number of final

orders and informal settlement agreements, and related documents, issued within the past three years

for violations of 29 C.F.R. 1904.29(b). C-3 includes final orders for violations of 29 C.F.R.

1904.29(b)(3) that were issued byOSHA’s Bellevue Area Office to otherSeattle-area USPS facilities.

USPS does not dispute that the documents contained in C-3 show a prima facie case of repeat

violations. It urges, however, that that is not the end of the inquiry and that the Secretary must also

show the actual violations in this case were substantially similar to those in C-3. R. Brief, pp. 32-34.

Upon reviewing C-3, I find that the Secretary has shown that the previous violations are substantially

similar to those in this case. In particular, several of the previous citations alleged violations of 29

C.F.R. 1904.29(b)(3) in circumstances similar to those in this case, that is, a recordable incident was

not recorded as required. The violations here were properly classified as repeat. Items 1a and 1b of

Repeat Citation,1 alleging violations of 29 C.F.R. 1904.29(b)(2) and 29 C.F.R. 1904.29(b)(3), are

affirmed as repeat violations.

Penalty Discussion

The Secretary has proposed a total penalty of $5,000.00 for Items 1a and 1b. In assessing

penalties, the Commission is to give due consideration to the gravity of the violations and to the size,

history and good faith of the employer. See Section 17(j) of the Act. The Secretary asserts that the

proposed penalty is appropriate in view of USPS’s large size and the fact that USPS has had multiple

previous violations of OSHA’s record-keeping standards. The OSHA AD who conducted the

inspection testified in this regard (Tr. 42-43). I find the proposed penalty of $5,000.00 to be

appropriate. That penalty is accordingly assessed.

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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The foregoing decision constitutes my findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is ordered that:

1. Repeat Citation 1, Items 1a and 1b, alleging violations of 29 C.F.R. 1904.29(b)(2) and 29

C.F.R. 1904.29(b)(3), is AFFIRMED, and a total penalty of $5,000.00 is assessed.

/s/

 Irving Sommer

 Chief Judge

Date: April 2, 2010

Washington, D.C.

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