NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE 

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CHAINE M., Appellant, 

v.

PAMELA R., CHARLES R., T.R., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0090 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JS507438 

The Honorable James P. Beene, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Robert D. Rosanelli, Phoenix 

Counsel for Appellant 

Curry Law Office, PLC, Chandler 

By Andrea Curry 

Counsel for Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 
CHAINE M. v. PAMELA R., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Chaine M. (Mother) appeals from the termination of her 

parental rights to T.R. (Child). For the following reasons, we affirm the 

severance order. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 Child was born in 2008. When Child’s parents divorced in 

2012, the family court suspended Mother’s parenting time because she was 

incarcerated and the court expressed concerns about Child’s safety in 

Mother’s care. The decree of dissolution specifically noted that the father 

(Father) requested sole custody of Child because Mother “has been using 

drugs, is unstable in her living conditions, suffers from mental illness and 

is refusing to take her medication, is violent and has threatened violence 

against [Child].” The family court also stated that Mother had endangered 

Child on several occasions, including one instance when Child was “found 

outside the home walking around without supervision.” Finding that 

“Mother’s mental health issues [were significant factors] in determining 

child custody,” the family court awarded sole custody of Child to Father. 

¶3 Several months after the divorce, Child’s paternal 

grandparents, Pamela and Charles R. (Appellees), were appointed as 

Child’s permanent guardians in juvenile court.1 Appellees petitioned to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights in 2013, citing abandonment under 

Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) section 8-533.B.1 (West 2014)2 and 

Mother’s mental illness, mental deficiency, or history of chronic abuse of 

dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol pursuant to A.R.S. § 8–

533.B.3 (West 2014). 

¶4 At the severance hearing, Appellees testified that they wanted 

to adopt Child and they had discussed adoption with Father. They further 

testified that Father would voluntarily consent to the adoption, but they 

were prepared to petition for severance if Father did not consent. 

¶5 Appellees further testified that Mother had a long history of 

mental illness and substance abuse. Mother threatened them in 2011 by 

writing on an envelope sent from the Maricopa County jail that she wanted 

 

1 Father is not a party to this appeal. 

2 We cite to the current version of applicable statutes when no 

revisions material to this decision have since occurred. 
CHAINE M. v. PAMELA R., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

“to shoot [their] brains out and eat them for lunch.” Appellees believed 

severance was in Child’s best interests because in their care, Child was 

“safe,” “thriving,” “in a stable environment,” and because Mother’s mental 

health issues would likely continue. Additionally, Appellees testified that 

they pursued severance to ensure Child could go to a good home if they 

became unable to care for her. 

¶6 Mother did not testify but admitted at the conclusion of the 

hearing that she had “made many mistakes in the past,” had a “bi-polar 

disorder” that caused “ups and downs in [her] life if gone untreated,” had 

a “chemical addiction,” and was “unable and unsafe to parent, if in [her] 

addiction.” Mother also stated she was “one year clean and sober” and 

seeking treatment. Mother did not present any other evidence or 

testimony. 

¶7 The juvenile court granted severance, finding clear and 

convincing evidence of abandonment and Mother’s mental illness and 

chronic substance abuse. The court also found that severance would be in 

Child’s best interests. Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction 

pursuant to A.R.S §§ 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1, and -2101.A (West 2014). 

DISCUSSION 

¶8 Mother contends on appeal that the juvenile court’s findings 

were clearly erroneous. Terminating parental rights has two elements. 

First, clear and convincing evidence must establish one of the statutory 

grounds in A.R.S. § 8-533.B. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 

246, 249, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 682, 685 (2000). Second, the juvenile court must find 

by a preponderance of evidence that severance is in the child’s best 

interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288, ¶ 42, 110 P.3d 1013, 1022 

(2005). In reviewing a termination order, we will not reweigh the evidence, 

and view all evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile 

court’s rulings. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 440, ¶ 12, 

323 P.3d 720, 723 (App. 2014). We will affirm the juvenile court’s findings 

unless no reasonable evidence supports them. Id.

¶9 We first conclude that clear and convincing evidence 

established the juvenile court’s findings under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.3, which 

justifies termination of parental rights when: 

[T]he parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities 

because of mental illness, mental deficiency or a history of 

chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or 
CHAINE M. v. PAMELA R., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

alcohol and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 

condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period. 

¶10 Here, the record supports the juvenile court’s findings of 

mental illness and chronic substance abuse with reasonable grounds to 

believe the conditions would continue. Mother admitted that these 

conditions made her an unfit parent when left untreated. Further, the 

record indicates Mother is unpredictable in seeking treatment for her 

mental health issues. Mother was hospitalized for her mental health 

conditions as recently as February 2014, which required the severance 

proceeding to be delayed for over a month. 

¶11 Although Mother stated at the severance hearing that she was 

“one year clean and sober,” the record indicates Mother was incarcerated 

five months before the severance hearing for a probation violation 

involving marijuana. Mother was also cited for eleven disciplinary 

infractions by the Department of Corrections over the course of several 

incarcerations in 2013, including one instance of criminal damage and three 

instances of indecent exposure. Furthermore, Mother repeatedly attempted 

to disobey the order in the dissolution decree precluding her from 

contacting Child, and she presented no evidence of compliance with the 

decree that established prerequisites for reinstating her parenting time. 

Mother did attempt to have her parenting time reinstated by filing a 

petition for a hearing in October 2012. Her petition was dismissed, 

however, when both she and Father failed to appear at the return hearing 

after being ordered to appear.3 This evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

conclusion that Mother is unable to discharge her parental responsibilities 

because of mental illness and substance abuse, and reasonable grounds 

exist to believe Mother’s conditions will continue.4

¶12 Mother argues that the mere existence of mental illness or a 

history of substance abuse does not sufficiently demonstrate an inability to 

 

3 The appellate record contains only Mother’s October 2012 petition 

for a hearing, but we take judicial notice of the family court’s orders 

regarding Mother’s petition. See Regan v. First Nat. Bank, 55 Ariz. 320, 327, 

101 P.2d 214, 217 (1940) (“courts [may] take judicial notice of other actions 

involving similar parties and issues.”). 

4 Because we conclude Mother’s history of mental illness and chronic 

substance abuse was established by clear and convincing evidence, we do 

not address the juvenile court’s finding of abandonment under A.R.S. § 8-

533.B.1. 
CHAINE M. v. PAMELA R., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

discharge parental responsibilities. Mother further asserts that no evidence 

shows that her past diagnoses and substance abuse deprives her of a 

present ability to effectively parent a child. We agree that the mere 

existence of a past mental illness diagnosis or history of substance abuse is 

insufficient as clear and convincing evidence of present inability. See Appeal 

in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 558, 748 P.2d 

785, 787 (App. 1988) (noting that proof of a clear and convincing statutory 

ground for severance “must also show that [the] ground somehow deprives 

the parent of the ability to effectively care for the child.”). However, the 

juvenile court, as the fact finder, must determine not only whether past 

mental illness or substance abuse exists, but also whether the evidence 

establishes “reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue 

for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533.B.3. 

¶13 Here, the juvenile court specifically found that Mother was 

unable to discharge her parental responsibilities based on the evidence 

presented and “[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition 

will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.” The evidence 

indicates that not only was Mother diagnosed with mental health and 

substance abuse problems, but also that these conditions had previously 

endangered Child and would continue in the future. Based on the evidence 

presented, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that Mother’s 

conditions continued to deprive Mother of an ability to care for Child. 

Accordingly, we will not reverse the juvenile court, which was “in the best 

position to weigh the evidence, judge credibility of the parties, observe the 

parties, and make appropriate factual findings.” Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 351, ¶ 31, 312 P.3d 861, 867 (App. 2013) (quoting 

In re Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No. 93511, 154 Ariz. 543, 546, 744 P.2d 455, 458 

(App. 1987)). 

¶14 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s finding that 

severance was in Child’s best interests, arguing that the evidence failed to 

establish that severance would benefit or remove a harm to Child. Finding 

that terminating parental rights is in a child’s best interests requires a 

juvenile court to conclude “either that the child will benefit from the 

termination of the relationship or that the child would be harmed by 

continuation of the relationship.” James S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 

Ariz. 351, 356, ¶ 18, 972 P.2d 684, 689 (App. 1998). Making a best interests 

determination necessarily obliges the juvenile court to balance the 

fundamental liberty interest a parent has to control and care for his or her 

child and the child’s fundamental interest in a “normal family home.” Kent 

K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 34, 110 P.3d at 1020 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 

U.S. 745, 759 (1982)). 
CHAINE M. v. PAMELA R., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

¶15 Mother asserts that the juvenile court’s best interests 

determination is legally insufficient in the same way as the vacated 

termination order in Jose M. v. Eleanor J., 234 Ariz. 13, 316 P.3d 602 (App. 

2014). Mother specifically contends that Appellees’ adoptive plan “would 

not establish an increase in stability and permanency” to the extent 

necessary to justify severance. Mother’s reliance on Jose M., however, is 

misplaced. In Jose M., Mother sought to terminate Father’s parental rights 

so that her fiancé could adopt the child. Id. at 15, ¶ 8, 316 P.3d 602. The 

juvenile court terminated Father’s rights and this court reversed and 

remanded. Id. at 14, ¶ 1, 316 P.3d 603. 

¶16 In Jose M., this court vacated the termination order because 

the juvenile court misunderstood the record in finding abandonment by 

clear and convincing evidence under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.1. The order was not 

terminated because there was a legally insufficient determination of best 

interests. Id. at 17, ¶ 19, 316 P.3d at 606. Although this court addressed the 

termination order’s best interests finding, it did so to note that an adoptive 

plan requiring severance of one parent’s rights to allow adoption by the 

fiancé of the other parent “without more, [would] not establish an increase 

in stability and permanency for [the child] to the degree necessary to 

demonstrate a benefit warranting severance[.]” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 18, 

¶ 23, 110 P.3d at 607. 

¶17 Unlike the parent appealing the severance order in Jose M., 

more evidence supported the best interest in this case than just an adoptive 

plan – specific evidence shows that Mother is unable to parent and provide 

a safe environment for Child. Although Child’s living arrangements would 

remain as they are currently, Appellees’ stated interest in adopting Child is 

not the sole evidence that severance is in Child’s best interests. Mother’s 

actions and patterns of behavior have previously endangered Child’s 

safety, and those same patterns persist in Mother’s life. Based on the 

preponderance of evidence, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that 

terminating Mother’s parental rights would benefit or prevent harm to 

Child, and we will not disturb that finding on appeal. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. at 

440, ¶ 12, 323 P.3d at 723. 
CHAINE M. v. PAMELA R., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

7 

CONCLUSION 

¶18 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.