******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
TOWN OF CANTON v. CADLE PROPERTIES

OF CONNECTICUT, INC.

(SC 19225)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued January 6—officially released May 19, 2015

Daniel J. Krisch, with whom was Kenneth R. Slater,

Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

Eric H. Rothauser, with whom were Jay B. Weintraub and, on the brief, John L. Bonee III, for the appellee (intervening defendant).
Opinion

McDONALD, J. This certified appeal requires us to

consider whether General Statutes § 12-163a, under

which a court may appoint a receiver of rents when

real property taxes due to a municipality are delinquent,

authorizes the receiver to: (1) evict a tenant from the

property in the event of a default; (2) lease the property

to a new tenant; and (3) use legal process to collect

back rent allegedly due. The Appellate Court concluded

that none of these acts falls within the scope of a receiver’s authority under the statute. See Canton v. Cadle

Properties of Connecticut, Inc., 145 Conn. App. 438,

450–58, 77 A.3d 144 (2013). We conclude that § 12-163a

does authorize a receiver to use legal process to collect

rent due prior to the date of the receiver’s appointment,

but we agree with the Appellate Court’s conclusions in

all other respects. Accordingly, we affirm in part and

reverse in part the Appellate Court’s judgment, which

had reversed in part the judgment of the trial court

insofar as that court had modified the receivership

orders to confer authority to undertake the three aforementioned actions.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and

procedural history. The defendant, Cadle Properties of

Connecticut, Inc. (Cadle), is the owner of real property

in Canton (property).1 After Cadle effectively abandoned the property, which is allegedly environmentally

contaminated, the plaintiff, the town of Canton (town),

filed a petition seeking the appointment of a receiver

of rents pursuant to § 12-163a. The petition alleged that

Cadle had failed to pay real property taxes due to the

town in the amount of $362,788.59, plus interest and

lien penalties, for a total amount due of $884,263.04.

The petition further alleged that, during all relevant

periods, the property was occupied by a Volkswagen

dealership owned by M & S Associates, LLC (tenant),

which had a legal obligation to pay rent to Cadle.2 The

court, having found that Cadle owed the town taxes

in the amount of $358,220.04, granted the petition to

appoint the receiver, and issued orders authorizing the

receiver to collect all rents or use and occupancy payments due with respect to the property.

After the receiver served the tenant with a notice

to quit possession of the property on the ground of

nonpayment of rent, the tenant filed a motion to intervene in the town’s action against Cadle in order to

challenge the receiver’s authority to take legal action

against it. Shortly thereafter, the receiver filed a motion

to modify the receivership order to authorize it to pursue an eviction of the tenant in the event of nonpayment

of rent, to lease the property to a new tenant, and to

use all legal process to collect back rent. Prior to acting

on the tenant’s pending motion to intervene, the court

granted the receiver’s motion to modify without

objection.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the tenant’s

motion to intervene in the action. The tenant then filed

a motion to remove the receiver, asserting, inter alia,

that the receiver had exceeded its authority under § 12-

163a by serving it with a notice to quit and by bringing

an action to collect back taxes and prior rents. The

court denied the motion for removal, reasoning that,

because the receiver acts in the owner’s stead, it would

not be constrained from collecting back rent or evicting

a nonpaying tenant through legal process. The court

noted, however, that its order did not authorize the

receiver to collect any back taxes owed by the tenant.3

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the tenant claimed,

inter alia, that the trial court improperly had denied

its motion to remove the receiver because the court

exceeded its authority under § 12-163a when it modified

its order to allow the receiver to evict the tenant, to

secure a new tenant, and to bring an action against the

tenant for all rents due, including back rents allegedly

owed. Id., 450. The Appellate Court agreed. That court

concluded that the receiver’s responsibilities are prescribed in § 12-163a and cannot be expanded by the trial

court. Id., 454. Those duties, according to the Appellate

Court, are limited to collecting rents that in turn are to

be used to pay taxes and utilities due after the date of

the receiver’s appointment. Id., 455–58. Although the

Appellate Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous as to the receiver’s authority to collect back rent,

it reasoned that a construction limiting the collection

of rent to that which is due after the receiver’s appointment was more harmonious with the receiver’s authority to pay only those taxes and utilities due after the

date of the receiver’s appointment. Id., 457–58. Accordingly, the Appellate Courtreversed the trial court’s judgment insofar as it had granted the receiver’s motion

to modify the receivership orders, but it affirmed the

judgment insofar as it had denied the tenant’s motion

to remove the receiver. Id., 458. The town’s certified

appeal to this court followed. See Canton v. Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc., 310 Conn. 941, 79 A.3d

893 (2013).

The scope of a receiver’s authority under § 12-163a

is a question of statutory construction subject to plenary

review and well established principles. See General

Statutes § 1-2z (setting forth plain meaning rule); Teresa

T. v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 734, 742, 865 A.2d 428 (2005)

(‘‘[w]hen a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we

also seek interpretive guidance from the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding

its enactment, the legislative policy it was designed to

implement, the statute’s relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same

general subject matter’’).

Section 12-163a (a) sets forth the circumstances

under which a municipality may seek the appointment
of a receiver of rents and the authority vested in the

receiver upon such appointment. That subsection provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any municipality may petition

the Superior Court or a judge thereof, for appointment

of a receiver of the rents or payments for use and

occupancy for any property for which the owner, agent,

lessor or manager is delinquent in the payment of real

property taxes. . . . The receiver appointed by the

court shall collect all rents or payments for use and

occupancy forthcoming from the occupants of the

building in question in place of the owner, agent, lessor

or manager. The receiver shall make payments from

such rents or payments for use and occupancy, first

for taxes due on and after the date of his appointment

and then for electric, gas, telephone, water or heating

oil supplied on and after such date. The owner, agent,

lessor or manager shall be liable for such reasonable

fees and costs determined by the court to be due the

receiver, which fees and costs may be recovered from

the rents or payments for use and occupancy under the

control of the receiver, provided no such fees or costs

shall be recovered until after payment for current taxes,

electric, gas, telephone and water service and heating

oil deliveries has been made. The owner, agent, lessor or

manager shall be liable to the petitioner for reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs incurred by the petitioner,

provided no such fees or costs shall be recovered until

after payment for current taxes, electric, gas, telephone

and water service and heating oil deliveries has been

made and after payments of reasonable fees and costs

to the receiver. Any moneys remaining thereafter shall

be used to pay the delinquent real property taxes

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 12-163a (a).

We begin with the principal dispute in this appeal,

namely, whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the receiver may not collect back rent due,

but only rent that is due after the receiver’s appointment. The crucial sentence in § 12-163a (a) provides:

‘‘The receiver appointed by the court shall collect all

rents or payments for use and occupancy forthcoming

from the occupants of the building in question in place

of the owner, agent, lessor or manager.’’ We agree with

the Appellate Court that this sentence is ambiguous,

especially as to the meaning of the term ‘‘forthcoming.’’

See Canton v. Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc.,

supra, 145 Conn. App. 455. Nonetheless, we are persuaded that the more logical and compelling construction is the broader reading of the statute.

We put considerable weight on the fact that the statute refers to ‘‘all rents,’’ rather than simply ‘‘rent.’’ See

General Statutes § 12-163a (a). The words ‘‘all’’ and

‘‘rents’’ (plural), individually and collectively, support

the broadest possible reading. Indeed, it is difficult to

ascribe any other logical meaning to the phrase ‘‘all

rents’’ and still give full effect to both terms. ‘‘All’’ does

not modify ‘‘occupants.’’ Therefore, we cannot reason-
ably construe it to mean the collection of rent from

every occupant. Rather, the term all rents suggests multiple kinds or sources (type or temporal) of rent. The

fact that the receiver is to collect all rents ‘‘in place

of the owner,’’ who undoubtedly would be entitled to

collect past and presently due rent, lends further support to the broader construction. See General Statutes

§ 12-163a (a). Although the term ‘‘forthcoming’’ does

not clearly convey past and presently due, at least one of

the various definitions of that term would be consistent

with that meaning. See, e.g., The American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language (3d Ed. 1992)(defining forthcoming as ‘‘[a]vailable when required or as

promised’’); Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d

Ed. 1993) (defining forthcoming as ‘‘ready or available

when required or expected’’).

We are mindful of the fact that, in other receivership

schemes referenced in § 12-163a, the legislature used

terms that more plainly include past due rent. See General Statutes § 12-163a (e) (requiring receivership proceedings initiated pursuant to General Statutes §§ 47a14a to 47a-14h or pursuant to General Statutes §§ 47a-56

to 47a-56i to take priority over receivership established

under § 12-163a); General Statutes § 47a-14d (b) (1)

(providing for ‘‘the rents due on the date of entry of

such judgment and rents to become due subsequent

thereto from all occupying such property [to] be deposited with a receiver’’); General Statutes § 47a-56d (c)

(‘‘[t]he receiver shall collect the accrued and accruing

rents’’). Nonetheless, we are persuaded that the use

of the term ‘‘all rents’’ effectively conveys the same

substance. To the extent that this phrase is ambiguous,

we note that the sponsor of the bill enacted as § 12-

163a referred to the bill as applying to back rent. See

Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Planning and

Development, Pt. 1, 1995 Sess., p. 50, remarks of Representative Robert D. Godfrey; see also Public Acts 1995,

No. 95-353, § 1.

Finally, we observe that § 12-163a (a) authorizes the

receiverto collectrents ‘‘in place of the owner,’’ without

indicating or limiting the means by which the receiver

may do so. As such, it seems reasonable to infer that

the statute authorizes the receiver to use the legal

means that otherwise would have been available to the

owner to collect such unpaid obligations.4

To the extent that the Appellate Court assumed that

reading § 12-163a as limiting the receiver’s authority to

the collection of rent due subsequent to its appointment

would be more consistent with other authority conferred on the receiver, the predicate for its conclusion

was flawed. Specifically, the Appellate Court determined that the statute authorizes the receiver to pay

only those tax and utility bills that are due on or after

the date of the receiver’s appointment. See Canton v.

Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 145 Conn.
App. 457–58. It therefore reasoned that imposing a similar temporal limit on the receiver’s collection of rent

was the most harmonious construction. Id. The Appellate Court appears to have overlooked the fact that

§ 12-163a (a) sets forth an order of priority of payment,

under which payment is made: ‘‘first for taxes due on

and after the date of [the receiver’s] appointment and

then for electric, gas, telephone, water or heating oil

supplied on and after such date’’; next, for the fees and

costs of the receiver and the petitioner’s attorney; and

finally, that ‘‘[a]ny moneys remaining thereafter shall

be used to pay the delinquent real property taxes

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 12-163a

(a); cf. Southern Connecticut Gas Co. v. Housing

Authority, 191 Conn. 514, 527, 468 A.2d 574 (1983) (citing similar language in General Statutes § 16-262f as

setting ‘‘statutory priority which allocates collected

rentals to arrearages only after current charges, receivership fees, and attorney’s fees have first been paid’’).

Thus, because the receiver may use rents collected to

pay taxes that became delinquent before its appointment, our obligation to harmonize the various terms of

a statute to achieve a consistent outcome; see Stewart

v. Watertown, 303 Conn. 699, 711, 38 A.3d 72 (2012);

does not counsel in favor of a construction limiting the

receiver’s authority to the collection of rent due on or

after the receiver’s appointment.

Having determined that the receiver may collect past

due rent, we turn to the question of whether § 12-163a

confers additional authority on the receiver to evict a

defaulting tenant and to lease the premises to a new

tenant. A review of the statute reveals that the only

authority expressly conferred on the receiver is to

undertake the following actions: (1) collect funds; and

(2) make payments. There is no authority to evict a

tenant or to enter into a new lease. Although § 12-163a

(a) authorizes the receiverto collect use and occupancy

payments, which arise after a notice to quit has been

served on a tenant; see Waterbury Twin, LLC v. Renal

Treatment Centers–Northeast, Inc., 292 Conn. 459, 473

n.18, 974 A.2d 626 (2009);5

the statute does not authorize

the receiver to cause such a notice to be served (or

reference chapter 830 of the General Statutes

addressing landlord remedies), to take possession of

the property, or to undertake any other action in the

owner’s stead with respect to the property except collecting payment from the building’s occupants. Indeed,

the authority conferred under § 12-163a is quite narrow

in comparison to some other receivership statutes. Cf.

General Statutes § 42-110f (receiver shall have power

to take property into his possession and to sell, convey

and assign same); General Statutes § 52-505 (receiver

shall be vested with property to manage and use for

benefit and support of members of certain associations,

communities or corporations); General Statutes § 52-

509 (receiver to hold business and all property, real
and personal, belonging to partnership); Connecticut

Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, 231 Conn. 441, 446, 650

A.2d 551 (1994) (noting with respect to § 16-262f, on

which § 12-163a is modeled,6

that ‘‘wide-ranging equitable and discretionary principles that govern rent receiverships in ordinary mortgage foreclosure proceedings’’

do not apply).

Moreover, because there is no indication in § 12-163a

that the legislature has conferred the extraordinary

authority on the receiver to enter into a contract with

a new tenant that would bind the owner of the property,7

it would make no sense to construe the reference to

use and occupancy payments as implicitly authorizing

the receiver to evict the tenant. It is only when both

actions may be taken that the receiver would be able

to collect payments. That authority must rest with the

owner, who has every incentive in the usual case to

evict and replace a defaulting tenant in order to remedy

the deficiency and regain access to the rental income.

Therefore, the authority to collect use and occupancy

payments, reasonably construed, simply ensures that,

if a lease has expired or an owner has served a notice

to quit on a tenant, either before or after the receiver’s

appointment, the receiver may collect payments for use

and occupancy, just as it may collect rent payments.

Thus, the text of the statute weighs heavily against a

construction permitting a receiver appointed under

§ 12-163a to evict a defaulting tenant and to lease the

premises to a new tenant.

To the extent that the reference to use and occupancy

payments gives rise to any ambiguity as to the receiver’s

authority to evict a defaulting tenant, we find no persuasive evidence in the legislative history that the legislature intended to confer such authority. That history

makes clear that the legislature intended to provide a

less drastic, expensive and time-consuming mechanism

than foreclosure to recover delinquent taxes, as it

already had afforded to utility companies to collect

delinquent utility payments. See Conn. Joint Standing

Committee Hearings, supra, pp. 50–51, 53, remarks of

Representative Godfrey; id., pp. 124–26,remarks of Eric

Gottschalk, corporation counsel forthe city of Danbury.

The only authority referenced in that history vis-a ́-vis

the property is the collection of rent. See id., pp. 50–

51, 124–26.

Because we conclude that the receiver is authorized

to use legal process to collect past due rent, we disagree

with the town’s contention that, in the absence of

authority to replace a defaulting tenant with one that

will provide a consistent revenue stream to discharge

the tax obligations, ‘‘§ 12-163a would be a toothless

lion, able to roar, but not bite.’’ Moreover, the town’s

argument erroneously assumes that the property owner

generally lacks an incentive to regain the income produced from its rental property. It is doubtful that the
legislature had in mind the unusual circumstances of

abandoned rental property at issue in this case. To the

extent that the town believes that greater authority is

essential to vindicating its interests, especially in cases

like the present one, in which the owner has abandoned

the property and purported environmental contamination makes foreclosure of the property an impractical

alternative; see, e.g., General Statutes § 12-157; General

Statutes § 12-181 et seq.; its recourse lies with the legislature.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed only

as to the reversal of the trial court’s judgment granting

the receiver’s motion for modification allowing the collection of back rent allegedly due and the case is

remanded to that court with direction to affirm the trial

court’s judgment in that respect; the judgment of the

Appellate Court is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion ROGERS, C. J., and PALMER,

ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js., concurred.

1 Cadle did not appear in the trial court, and neither Cadle nor Boardwalk

Realty Associates, LLC, which was appointed as receiver by the trial court,

are parties to this appeal. For convenience, we refer to Boardwalk Realty

Associates, LLC, generically as the receiver in this opinion.

2 The lease between Cadle and the tenant expired in 2001. The tenant

represented to the trial court that it thereafter continued to occupy the

premises on a month to month oral lease, but did not place in escrow rent

due after Cadle ‘‘essentially disappeared.’’

3 The tenant conceded before the trial court that, under its original lease

with Cadle, it had agreed to include certain taxes due to the town in its

payments to Cadle.

4 As we explain in footnote 5 of this opinion, when an owner causes a

notice to quit to be served on a tenant, such an action is not used to collect

past due rent, but to recover possession of the premises.

5

‘‘[A]fter a notice to quit possession has been served, a tenant’s fixed

tenancy is converted into a tenancy at sufferance. . . . A tenant at sufferance is released from his obligations under a lease. . . . His only obligations

are to pay the reasonable rental value of the property which he occupied

in the form of use and occupancy payments . . . and to fulfill all statutory

obligations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury Twin, LLC v.

Renal Treatment Centers–Northeast, Inc., supra, 292 Conn. 473 n.18; see

also General Statutes § 47a-3c (‘‘[i]n the absence of agreement, the tenant

shall pay the fair rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling

unit’’). We note, however, that a notice to quit is itself not a method by

which an owner collects or receives rents, but rather is a legal mechanism

to regain possession of the premises from the defaulting tenant.

6 See Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, supra, pp. 49–50, remarks

of Representative Godfrey (explaining as sponsor of bill, subsequently codified as § 12-163a, that bill ‘‘gives municipalities the same kind of power we

currently give to utilities, which can petition for receivership of rent for

back payment of electric, water, power,’’ referring to § 16-262f).

7

In addition to the absence of any express authority for the receiver to

enter into a new lease, the statute provides no basis to infer a permissible

term for such a lease, thus leaving questions as to whether it would be

limited to some presumed period of the receivership or beyond that period.