NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 06a0878n.06 Filed: De cembe r 5, 2006 No. 06-5132 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , Plaintif f-Appellee

, On Appea l from the v. United States District Court for the Western District of Te nnessee F EN I S E WI N H I LL , Defendant-

Appellant
.

______________________________ Be fore : KENNEDY , COL E and COOK, Circ uit J udg es KENN EDY, J. Fe nis Ewin Hill (her einaf ter “ defe ndant”) seeks r eview of his sentence , a sse rt ingthat (1) the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in c la ssi fy inghim a s an a rm e d c are e r c ri min a l pu

rs ua nt t o § 4B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines, and (2) the sentenc e was not “re asonable ” within the meaning of United States v. Book

er . We find that defe ndant’s objec tion to his c hara cter ization as an ar med
car eer criminal is not properly

before t h i s co u rt for disposition, and the sentenc e pre scribed w as
rea sonable in view of

the district court’s c onsideration of the purposes of punishment de clar ed in § 35 53 (a )( 2) . T hu s, we a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt
.

BACK GR OUND On J uly 27, 2 0 0 3 , d e fenda

nt threate ned B rocknie Br ay with a fire arm a

nd attempted to abduc t her. D efe ndant pled guilty on May 12, 2004, t o ch arge s of Attempted Espec ially Ag g ravated Ki dn a pp ingand

Ag g ra vate d A ssa

ul t. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

se nte nc e d h im t o s ixte e n y e ars fo r t ho seTh e dis tr ic t ju dg e did re a dju st t he sent e nc e to 2 21 -m on ths imp ri so nme nt i n r e sp on se to 1 counsel’s indication that defenda nt w as entitled to fourtee n-months’ cre dit at the time of the sentenc e, rather than thirtee n-months as previously calc ulated. 2 of fe ns e s. On

May 26 , 2 00 4, de fe nd ant p le d guil ty to t he of fe ns e of be ing a convic te d f

e lon in possession of a fir ear

m shipped in interstate commer ce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) . The presc ribed ra

ng e for this offe nse i s 21 to 27 months. Howeve r, because the district court found that defe ndant h ad four pr evious “violent fe lony ” convic tions, it cate g orized him as an ar med ca ree r criminal subject to a minimum of fiftee n-y ear s impriso n m en t pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). As such, the Guide lines rang e applica ble to defe ndant was 188 t o 235 months. The district court
se nte nc e d d e fe nd ant to 222 -m on ths imp ri so nme nt, thr e e -ye ars su pe rv ise d r e le a se , p art ic ipatio n in a mental he alth and sex offende r treatment prog ram, a nd drugand alc o h o l ab u s e testing and treatment. Def endant f iled a timely appea l, in which he asser ted that the district cour

t (1) over stepped its authority when it de termined whether his past convictions constituted “violent felonies” for the purposes of 18 U .S.C. § 924(e) ; ( 2) double-c ounted substantially related episodes as separ ate violent of fe ns e s an d

w r o n g l y c h ar a c t e r i z e d

o n e o f h i s p a s tc o n v i c t i o n s a s v i o l e n t ; ( 3 ) m i s c a l c u l a t e d h is of fe ns e le ve l and c ri min a l his tor y sc or e ; and (4 ) imp os e d imp ro pe r c on dit ion s re g ard ing his supervised r elea se. This court a ffirme d the d i s t rict cour t’s classification of the defe ndant as a n “ar med ca ree r cr iminal” but vaca

ted the sentenc e and r emande d the ca se for rese ntencingin light of the Supreme Court’s inter vening dispositi on of United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). On Dec ember 6, 2005, the district c ourt held the rese ntencing hear ing, w here it reinstated the pr evious
s e n t e n c e , s t a t i n gt h a ti tw a s a p p r o p r i a t e e v e nt h o u g ht h e G u i d e l i n e s h a d b e e nm a d e a dv i s o r

y. 13

De fe nd ant a

rgue s o n ap peal th at hi s r e se nte nc ingdid no t c omp or

t w iththe po st- Booke r sentenc ing r eg ime beca

use the di s t ri ct cour

t failed to ensur e that the se ntence was “ sufficie nt, but
no t g re a te r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry , to c omp ly

wi th t he purp os e s [of punis hme nt], ” a s r e qu ir e d b y 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ). De fe nd ant a lso pr e se rv e s h is o bje c tio n a s to the a uth or ity of the dis tr ic t c ourt

to a sse ss
se nte ncing e nh anc e me nts . H ow e ve r, his c ouns e l ha s a c kn ow le dg e d th a t c a se law i n th is c ir c uit
curr ently fore closes his argument reg ardingthe validity of the e nhance ment, and this court re jected this very argument in defe ndant’s pre vious appea l. Un ite d States v. H ill , 15 0 F
. Ap p’ x 41 6, 41 9 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 5) (u

np ub lis he d) ; see United States v. Beasle y , 4 42 F .3 d 3 86 , 3 91 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; se e als o Un ite d S tates v . B ar

ne tt , 398 F.3d 516, 524- 25 (6th Cir. 2005). As no fur ther e x p l an at i o n of our reje ction of this argument i s nece ssary , we will devote our discussion to reviewingthe
rea sonablene ss of the sentenc e. AN AL YSI S Def endant a sserts t hat t he sentence imposed is unrea sonable because the di strict court fa iled to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as inter prete d in United States v. Forem an , 436 F.3d 638, 644 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) , r e qu ir ingthat “ a se nte nc e [be ] su ff

ic ie nt, bu t no t g re a te r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry , to c omp ly
w i t h t h e p u rp o s es ” o f s en t en ci n g. Fo l l o wi n g United States v. Book er , c o u rts mu s t e xami n e the sentenc ing g oals expressed in § 3553(a) in addition to the Guidelines themselves whe n sentenc ing defe ndants. Booke r , 543 U. S. at 259 -6 0. Se c tio n 355 3( a ) ins tr uc ts the se nte nc ingc ourt

to “ imp os e
a se nte nc e su ff

ic ie nt, bu t no t g reate r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry , to c omp ly

wi th t he purp os e s se t f

or th i n para g raph ( 2) of this subsection.” Par ag raph ( 2) re quires that the c ourt consider : the ne e d f or the se nte nc e imp os e d– (A ) t o r e fl e c t th e se ri ou sn e ss o f t he of fe ns e , to pr omo te re sp e c t f

or the law, and

to p ro vid e jus t pu

nis hme nt f

or the of fe ns e ; ( B ) t o aff ord ade quate de terre nce to c riminal conduct; (C) to prote ct the public fr om4

further crimes of the def endant; and ( D) to provide the defe ndant with neede d e du c a tio na l or

vo c a tio na l tr a ini ng , me dic a l c are , o r o the r c or re c tio na l tr e a tme nt i n the most effe ctive manne r. I n United States v. W

illiams , t h i s c o u rte mp h a s i z e d i t s r e f u s a l t o i n t e r

p r e t B o o ker

to require sentenc ing c ourts to e ng ag e in a “ ritualistic incantation” of the statutory

fac tors to avoid rema

nd or
reve rsal. 4 3 6 F. 3 d 7 0 6, 709 (6th Cir. 2006). Howe ver, de fenda nt corre ctly

notes that, in United States v. Forem an , th e c ourt e xpla ine d th a t “ W

illiams does not mean that a sentenc e within the Gu ide lin e s is re a so na

ble if the re is n o e vid e nc e that the dis tr ic t c ourt fo llo we d it s st a tut or

y mand a te to ‘impose a sente nce suf ficient, but not g reater than ne cessa ry ’ t o co m p l y wi t h the purposes of sentenc ing in se ction 3553(a) (2).” United States v. Fore man , 436 F.3d at 644. Ultimately , this court is tasked with ensur i n g that the district court ha s articulate d its consideration of § 3553( a) to a n extent that prese rves our ability to revie w t he sentence for re asonable ness. United States v. Mc Bride , 434 F.3d 470, 478 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Her e, the tra

nscripts of the dist ri ct cour t’s proce eding s, both from the initial sentencing hear ing a nd the re sentenc ing he aring , reve al that the judg e ca ref ully considere d the purposes of punishment articulated in § 3553( a)( 2) when deter mining def

endant’ s sentence . At the initial sentenc ing, on September 14, 2004, the district court a rticulated its conc ern w ith the seriousness of defe ndant’s cr iminal conduct, explai n i n g t o defe ndant, “You’ re be ing se ntence d to this sentence beca use y ou possessed a gun af t er t h i s l ong , violent history of fe lonies.” See§ 3553(a) (2)( A). Al tho ug h th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on sid e re d th e g ra

vit y of th ese of fe ns e s, wh e n v ie we d in

iso latio n, to
wa rr ant a lon g e r t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt, the c ourt no te d th e a g e of

the de fe nd ant, ult imate ly de te rm ini ngthat a sh or

te r s e nte nc e wo uld

pr ov ide a de qu a te de te rr e nc e be c a us e it w ou ld “ e ff

e c tiv e ly5

take [him ] out

of the c ri min a l bu si nes s unti l [he wo uld be ], ho pe fu lly , to o o ld t o c on tin ue the se violent felonies.” See§ 3553(a) (2)( C). Whil e the district court expressed hope that the defe ndant would survive be y ond the term of his se nte nc e and re tur

n to the c omm

un ity a ft e r i ts s e rv ic e , it

e xpla ine d th a t th e de fe nd ant “ [wo uld have] to c ontrol [hi s] ac tions be tter than [he had] done in the past.” See § 3553(a) (2)( B) . The c ourt provided c onditions of supervised re lease that would aff ord the de fenda

nt correctional tre atment tailored to his needs, ma

ndating participation in drug a nd alcohol testing and tre atment and menta l hea l t h an d s ex offender

treatment, in addition to recommending that defe ndant take a dvantag e of ang er ma nag ement cour ses and se x offe nder c ourses available in prison. See§ 3553(a) (2)( D). At the re sentenc ing he aring , the district court wa s simil arly conscie ntious in ensuring that it “impose[d] a sente nce sufficient, but not g reater than nece ssary , to comply with the purposes set forth in p ar a g r a

p h ( 2 ) [o f § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) ]. ” Wh e nd e te r mi n in g th e a

p p r o p r iate p u n is h me n t, th e court ref lected upon the violent, sex ual nature of the c onvictions, ex pressinga conc ern that “sexual predators don’t g ener ally cure themselves or get cu red” and subseque ntly concludingthat, “g iven the leng th of this sentence and the nature of [ the] convictions, it’s clear that prison is the only option that is available.” See § 3553(a) (2)( A), (B ). The r esente ncingcourt c arr ied out the mandate of § 3553(a) when it c ontemplated “what messag e [to] send to other pe ople in our community who want to poss ess fire arms af

ter they are convicted of

felonies,” thus indicating c onsideration of the need for the se ntence to refle ct the ser iousness of the off ense, pr omote respe ct for the law, and a ffor d adequate deter

renc e ag ainst commission of such offe nses. See§ 3 55 3( a )( 2) (A ), (B ). Re fe rr ingto de fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e sp e c if ic a lly , the d is tr ic t c ourt

pr oc la ime d th a t “ [the de fe nd ant w a s] e xac tly wh a t Co ng re ss h a d in

min d w he n the arm e d care e r cr imi na l pro vis ion wa s p a sse d” and

that “ [p]e op le6

who have long, violent histories g et punished worse for possessingg uns t han those who don’ t,”
su g g e sti ng that the c ourt c on sid e re d the pr op ri e ty of the punis hme nt a

nd c on c lud e d th a t it

wa s ju st. See § 3553(a) (2)( A). As d ef en d ant’s sente ncingand re sentenc ing r efle ct ca ref ul consideration of the purposes of

punishment ex presse d in § 3553(a)( 2), we are not willing to say that the sentenc e the district court pre scribed w as unre asonable
. CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.