SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3132-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MILTON T. LATHAM, a/k/a

MAURICE T. BYNUM, 

SHAWN BYNUM, SHAWNEY

BYNUM and TASHAUN

BYNUM,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted March 30, 2020 – Decided April 21, 2020

Before Judges Geiger and Natali.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos: 09-12-3314 

and 09-04-1065.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel on 

the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Milton Latham appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief (PCR) after an evidentiary hearing. We affirm. 

An Essex County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. 09-04-1065 

charging defendant with third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous 

substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count one); third-degree possession 

of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(3) (count two); and 

second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 500 feet of 

public housing, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (count three).

The grand jury also returned Indictment No. 09-12-3314 charging 

defendant and a co-defendant with second-degree conspiracy to possess CDS 

with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2) (count 

one); third-degree possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a), (b) (count two);

second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

5(b)(2) (count three); second-degree possession of CDS within 500 feet of 

public housing, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1 (counts four and seven); third-degree 

possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count five); third-degree 

manufacturing and distributing CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(1) (count six); third-
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degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 (count eight); and seconddegree committing a CDS offense while possessing a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

4.1 (count nine). 

In June 2010, defendant pled guilty to counts three and nine of Indictment 

No. 09-12-3314 and count one of Indictment No. 09-04-1065. During the plea 

hearing, defendant testified that on August 30, 2008, in Newark, he possessed 

over half an ounce of crack cocaine with intent to sell it and possessed a handgun 

in his vehicle, as to Indictment No. 09-12-3314. He further testified that his codefendant had nothing to do with either the drugs or the handgun. Regarding 

Indictment No. 09-04-1065, defendant testified that on November 10, 2008, in 

Newark, he possessed crack cocaine. 

Defendant also testified that aside from the terms of the plea agreement, 

no other promises were made to him. He confirmed that no one threatened him

to plead guilty and that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. He 

acknowledged understanding that if he were convicted of another Graves Act 

offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), he faced a mandatory extended term sentence.

In September 2010, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the terms 

of the plea agreement to an aggregate five-year prison term subject to a threeyear period of parole ineligibility on Indictment No. 09-12-3314, and a 
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concurrent three-year term on Indictment No. 09-04-1065. Defendant did not 

appeal his conviction or sentence on either indictment. 

On October 13, 2018, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. Counsel was 

assigned to represent him and filed separate briefs on each indictment. 

Defendant then filed additional certifications in support of PCR. Defendant 

claims he wanted to pursue a trial but was pressured to plead guilty and 

promised, if he did so, his charges would be downgraded. He also alleged trial 

counsel told him that his guilty pleas would be considered only one conviction. 

Defendant contends he was never advised that his pleas or sentence would affect 

his sentence for subsequent convictions. 

Defendant is now in federal custody. He was classified as a career felon 

by the federal court and received an enhanced sentence because he had four 

convictions—three from these indictments and one from the federal prosecution. 

An evidentiary hearing was conducted by Judge Michael A. Petrolle on 

January 22, 2019. Defendant waived his appearance at the evidentiary hearing

and did not present any witnesses. Defendant's trial counsel, Brian Kapalin, 

testified for the State. Kapalin testified that he never told defendant he would 

receive one conviction for the three charges he was pleading guilty to. He 

explained that defendant was comfortable moving forward with the pleas and 
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satisfied with his representation. Kapalin explained that defendant faced 

extended term sentencing had he gone to trial. 

Kapalin further testified that defendant did not have any prior or pending 

federal charges while he represented him. He also testified that he would have 

proceeded to trial on the indictments had defendant desired to do so. Kapalin 

indicated defendant did not wish to appeal either indictment. 

Judge Petrolle found Kapalin's testimony to be credible. The judge found 

defendant was not told he would have only one conviction for all the charges. 

He also found defendant was not pressured to plead guilty and was well 

counseled. The judge further found that trial counsel was not obligated to advise 

defendant that his convictions would affect a future federal sentence because no 

attorney could anticipate a defendant's subsequent crimes, especially federal 

crimes. The judge also found defendant was advised of his right to appeal. 

These findings led to the conclusion that defendant failed to demonstrate that 

his pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

Based on those findings and conclusions, the judge issued an order and 

oral decision denying relief because defendant failed to establish a prima facie 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-prong test of Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984): that defense counsel's performance 
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was deficient and that, but for the deficient performance, the result would have 

been different. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contention:

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. 

LATHAM'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 

RELIEF BECAUSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 

IN FAILING TO ADVISE HIM THAT HIS 

CONVICTIONS UNDER INDICTMENTS 09-12-3314 

AND 09-04-1065 WOULD LATER ENHANCE [A] 

FEDERAL SENTENCE.

Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and 

applicable legal standards, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant 

extensive discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2) and affirm 

substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Petrolle in his oral decision. We 

add the following comments.

Although legal determinations are reviewed de novo, "[a] reviewing court 

is required to affirm the findings of the trial court if they could reasonably have 

been reached on sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. NunezValdez, 200 N.J. 129, 141 (2009). The plea transcript and PCR hearing 

testimony fully support the judge's findings and the legal consequences that flow 

from those findings. 
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A defendant has the right to be informed of the direct or penal 

consequences of his plea, but not to collateral consequences. State v. Howard, 

110 N.J. 113, 122 (1988) (citation omitted). The sentencing effect of these 

convictions on a future federal conviction was not a direct or penal consequence 

that defendant had the right to be informed of. State v. Wilkerson, 321 N.J. 

Super. 219, 224-27 (App. Div. 1999). On the contrary, it was a collateral 

consequence. Id. at 227. There is no constitutional requirement to advise a 

defendant of the collateral consequences of a plea on subsequent crimes that 

have not yet been committed. Ibid. Failure to do so is not ineffective assistance 

of counsel. 

Defendant's self-serving assertion that he wanted to pursue a trial but did 

not do so because counsel did not properly review his case, coerced him into 

pleading guilty, and told him he would have only one conviction, were not 

supported by credible evidence. 

Affirmed.