* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-50646

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RICHARD KIEPFER, M.D.,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(SA-92-CV-357)

- - - - - - - - - -

March 7, 1997

Before Wisdom, King, and Smith, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this appeal, Kiepfer contends that (1) the consent to

search was obtained by fraud; (2) the Government’s submitting of

a proposed amended order on remand and his purported inability to

respond violated his due process; and (3) remand “should be [for]

a broad hearing on the issues approximating a de novo hearing”.

Consent to search
No. 96-50646

- 2 -

1 Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 70 F.3d 31,

33 (5th Cir. 1995).

2 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2), (a)(4)(C), Reeves v. Collins,

27 F.3d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1994). 

3 See Reeves, 27 F.3d at 177, Burroughs, 70 F.3d at 33. 

4 Studiengeselllschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616

The scope of our review on appeal following remand is

limited. The only issue for consideration is “whether the court

below reached its final decree in due pursuance of our previous

opinion and mandate”.1 Because Kiepfer failed to amend his

notice of appeal following the district court’s denial of his

Rule 59(e) motion, this court has jurisdiction over only the

issues raised by the district court’s order on remand and not

over any of the issues arising from the denial of Kiepfer's Rule

59(e) motion.2

Kiepfer’s argument that the consent to search was obtained

by fraud, having been raised in his Rule 59(e) motion, as well as

in his first appeal, is not subject to review by this court.3

Due Process

On appeal, Kiepfer contends for the first time that the

Government’s submitting of a proposed amended order when he was

unable to respond violated his due process rights, thereby

invalidating the order on remand. This argument is totally

without merit. Dr. Kiepfer was properly served with the proposed

amended order, and the district court was free to adopt the

proposed findings.4
No. 96-50646

- 3 -

F.2d 1315, 1323 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).

5 L & A Contracting v. S. Concrete Servs., 17 F.3d 106

(5th Cir. 1994). 

6 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Scope of review on remand

Kiepfer argues that if the case is remanded again, “remand

should provide for a broad relatively unlimited hearing of a de

novo nature.” Because the appeal is dismissed as frivolous, this

issue is moot.

Order on remand

Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4) requires that the argument on

appeal contain the “contentions of the appellant on the issues

presented, and the reason therefor, with citations to the

authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” 

Issues not adequately argued in the body of the brief are deemed

abandoned on appeal.5

In this appeal Kiepfer does not assign any specific error to

the district court’s order on remand, does not cite to the

record, and does not cite any authority in support of his

position. He concludes merely that the “computer records and

defendant’s evidence . . . show that many of the deficiencies

sustained against [him] were sustained in error”. Because

Kiepfer does not present any intelligible arguments regarding the

district court's order on remand, his argument is deemed

abandoned. This appeal, being entirely without merit, is

dismissed.6
No. 96-50646

- 4 -

APPEAL DISMISSED