PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22
- 2252

DEDRE V. FEYIJINMI , Plaintiff − Appellant ,

v. STATE OF MARYLAND CENTRAL COLLECTION UNIT , Defendant

– Appellee

.

------------------------------ NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY ATTORNEYS , Amic us Supporting Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Maryland , at Baltimore

. Richard D. Bennett , Senior District Judge. ( 1:22−cv−00904−RDB )
Argued : December 5 , 2023 Decided: June 28, 2024

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, HARRIS and HEYTENS , Circuit Judges

. Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Harris and Judge Heytens joined.

ARGUED: Marie Lott Pharaoh, Greenwood, Mississippi, for Appellant. Susan Christine Scanlon, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anthony G. Brown, Attorney General, OFFICE OF USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 1 of 172 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Peter Goldberger, Ardmore, Pennsylvania, for Amici Curiae

. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 2 of 173 DIAZ, Chief Judge: Dedre Feyijinmi filed an adversary proceeding in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy case

s eeking to discharge a restitution debt

. But under the Bankruptcy Code , a debt “ for restitution

. . . included in a sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime” isn’t disc hargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3). Feyijinmi insists, however, that this provision d oesn’t apply to her because she
wasn’t convicted under Maryland law. Alternatively, she a rgues that the debt was discharged because the state of Maryland identified the debt as dischargeable court fee s on its proof of claim

. The bankruptcy court r ejected these arguments , and the district court affirmed

. For the reasons below , we do too.

I.
A. In 2006, Feyijinmi was found guilty in Maryland state court of welfare fraud and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. As allowed under state law, the court deferred the entry of conviction and placed her on three years’ supervised probation. The court also ordered $14,487 in restitution , plus the statutory collection fee

. It recorded and indexed the restitution as a civil judgment. Fey i jinmi paid $890 before the court discharged her from probation

. T he S tate then transferred her outstanding balance to its Central Collection Unit

. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 3 of 174 A Maryland state court subsequently expunged Feyijinmi’s criminal records

. 1 But
F e yijinmi’s restitution obligation survived. So t he court converted the judgment of restitution in to a civil matter and granted the S tate ’s motion to garnish Feyijinmi’s wages to pay down her balance

. B. A year later , Fey i jin mi petitioned for C hapter 13 bankruptcy. She schedule d the
C entral Collection Unit as a creditor

. The State filed a proof of claim for $16,00 8 .80

. In the “Basis for Claim” section of the form , the State wrote, “Court Ordered fees

. ” J.A. 11.
It also attached a statement of the claimed amount

. 2 Feyijinmi informed the State that its claimed amount wasn’t correct and provided proof of her restitution payments

. So the State f iled an amended proof of claim for $7 , 275.33. Again, it stated that the basis for the claim was “Court Ordered F ees , ” J.A. 15 , and attached another statement of the claimed amount. It also attached the j udgment of

r estitution from Feyij i nmi’s criminal proceeding

. Feyijinmi didn’t object to the State ’ s amended proof of claim, and t he bankruptcy
court later confirmed Feyijinmi’s plan

. Feyijinmi made all plan payments , through which the State received $787.49. The court the n entered an order of discharge.

1 As a result, certain information about her criminal proceedings isn’t available.

2 When a claim includes interest, fees, expenses, or other charges in addition to the principal amount, the creditor must attach an itemized statemen t of the claimed amount to its proof of claim . Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001( c)(2)(A)

. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 4 of 175 The court’s order explained that “[ s ] ome debts are not discharged” and listed examples , including “debts for restitution

. . . included in a sentence on debtor’s criminal conviction.” J.A. 2 8

. It also advised Feyijinmi that “[b]ecause the law is complicated, you should consult an attorney to determine the exact effect of the discharge in this case.” J.A.
28

. The court later closed the bankruptcy case.
C. Then the State notified Feyijinmi tha t she had an outstanding restitution debt

. Feyi jinmi objected , arguing that the debt was discharged through bankruptcy. But the State claimed that under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3), any debt “ for restitution . . . included in a
sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime ” isn’t dischargeable.
So Feyijinmi reopened her bankruptcy case and filed an adversary proceeding to obtain a dischargeability determination. The bankruptcy court held that Feyijinmi’s restitution was nondischargeable under § 1328(a)(3)

. It determined that the term “conviction” includes a determination of guilt

— whether by a court’s finding or a defendant’s guilty plea

— a nd a “sentence” includes probatio n granted before judgment. Thus, Feyijinmi’s probation before judgment qualifie d as a conviction because Maryland law permits such disposition only when there’s a finding of guilt

. The bankruptcy court also held that the State’s labeling the debt as court fees (which are dischargeable) on its proof of claim had no legal effect

. The district court agreed, and this appeal followed. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 5 of 176 II.
W e review the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy court de novo, applying the same standard s that the district court applied. Copley v. United
States , 959 F.3d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 2020)

. Thus, “ we review the bankruptcy court ’ s legal conclusions de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and any discretionary decisions for abuse of discretion .” Id.
A

. Feyijinmi makes two arguments on appeal. First, that her restitution was dischargeable because it was neither a consequence of a “conviction” nor “included in a sentence,” as those words are used by § 1328(a)(3). And s econd, that the bankruptcy court should have treated the debt as dischargeable because the State labeled it as court fees on its proof of claim. We reject both arguments.
1

. Once a Chapter 13 debtor completes her plan payments, all debts provided for in the plan are discharged . 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). But the Bankruptcy Code excludes certain debts from discharge. As relevant here, § 132 8 (a)(3) excludes any debt “for restitution

. . . included in a sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime.” Feyijinmi claims that this section of the Code doesn’t exclude her restitution debt from discharge because (1) she was n’t convicted and (2) the restitution wasn’t part of a
sentence. To start, we must determine whether a probation

- before

- judgment disposition in
Ma ryland state court constitutes a “conviction ” under § 1328(a)(3). B ecause the USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 6 of 177 Bankruptcy Code does n’t say otherwise, t he definition of “conviction ” under § 1328(a)(3 ) is a matter of federal law, even though the predicate offense and punishment are matters of state law. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc. , 460 U.S. 103, 111

– 12 (1983) , superseded by statute , Firearm s Owners’ Protection Act , Pub. L. No. 99

- 308 , 10 0 Stat. 449 ; cf. Yanez

Pop p v . INS , 998 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining that this proposition from
Dickerson remains good law). The Code doesn’t define “conviction.” A nd n either this court nor our sister circuits have defined the s tatutory term

. 3 But we have some guidance f rom the Supre me Court.
In Dickerson , the Court considered whether a n expunged state probation

- be for e judgment disposition , imposed after the defendant pleaded guilty, constitutes a conviction under federal gun control laws. 460 U.S. at 105 , 110

– 11. T he Court held that “a plea of guilty and its notation by the state court , followed by a sentence of probation , ” equates to a conviction under the statute s
. Id. at 114

. It explained that although there’s “no written adjudication of guilt ” in a deferred judgment, a defendant can’t be placed on probation unless the court “deem[s] him to be guilty of a crime.” Id. at 113

– 14

. T hat determination of guil t

— whether entered upon a jury’s verdict, a court’s finding in a bench trial, or a defendant’s plea

— i s what Congress intended to include as a “conviction

. ” Id

.

3 The Tenth Circuit has held that § 1328(a)(3) doesn’t include restitution ordered under an adjudication of juvenile delinquency. Colo. Jud. Dep’t v. Sweeney ( In re Sweeney ), 492 F.3d 1189, 1191 (10th Cir. 2007). But that court’s precedent established that juvenile delinquency, as defined by federal law, is “an adjudication of status

— not a criminal conviction.” Id. (cleaned up). So it didn’t need to define “conviction” as used in § 1328(a)(3). USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 7 of 178 The Court reasoned that Congress has specifically limited “conviction” in other
statutes to include only those in which the court entered a formal judgment

. Id. at 112 n.6

. And the rel evant legislative history show ed that Congress intended to broadly keep firearms out of the hands of “risky people”

— a presumption that depends on the fact that the underlying offense occurred

. Id. at 112

– 14 , 112 n.6. The Court also held that a state’s expungement of the defendant’s deferred judgment d idn’t nullify his conviction for purposes of the statute s
. Id. at 114

– 15. The Court explained that e xpungement doesn’t alter the underlying determination of guilt. Id. And it reasoned that i n other statutes, Congress has expressly said that a “conviction” doesn’t include deferred judgments later expunged

. Id. at 118. S o t o give effect to state expungements where Congress has said nothing would “seriously hamper” the federal
statutes ’ enforcement. See i d. at 121

– 22

. Several courts (including ours) have applied Dickerson ’s reasoning when defining “conviction” in other federal statutes. See Aldaco v. RentGrow, Inc. , 921 F.3d 685, 687

– 88 (7th Cir. 2019) (cataloging cases). The cases hold tha t unless Congress expressly provides otherwise in the statute, a “conviction” includes probation

- before

- judgment dispositions, even if expunged. See, e.g. , United States v. Campbell , 980 F.2d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1992) ( holding that a n expunged deferred sentence was a “conviction” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement) ; United States v. Bridges , 741 F.3d 464, 467

– 71 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a nolo contendere plea with adjudication withheld was a “conviction” u nder the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act [SORNA] ). USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 8 of 179 A pplying Dickerson ’s reasoning, a b ankruptcy appellate p anel has defined “conviction ” for purposes of § 1328(a)(3) as including “ a plea of guilty followed by a sentence of probation, despite the absence of the formal entry of a conviction by the criminal court .” Wilson v. Cumis Ins

. Soc ’y ( In re Wilson ), 252 B.R. 739 , 742 ( B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000)

. We too follow Dickerson ’s reason ing to reach the same conclusion. The term “conviction” as used in § 1328(a)(3) includes a determination of guilt

— whether upon trial or guilty plea

— f ollowed by a sentence of probation, even without the formal entry of a conviction

. W e find more support for our hold ing in Congress’s response to a pair of Supreme Court decisions addressing restitution in state court proceedings.
In Kelly v. Robinson , the Supreme Court held that restitution imposed as a condition of probation in state court isn’t dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. 479 U.S. 36, 52

– 53 (1986). That chapter generally excludes from discharge any debt “for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture” that’s “for the benefit of a governmental unit” and “not compensation for actual pecuniary loss.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).
But the Court later held in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport that restitution imposed as a condition of probation in state court is dischargeable in a Chapter 13 proceeding. 49 5 U.S. 552, 564 (1990), superseded by statute , Criminal Victims Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101

- 581, 104 Stat. 2865. At the time, § 1328(a) discharged “all debts , ” with narrow exceptions for certain long

- term and divorce

- related debts

. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1984) (amended 1990)

. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 9 of 1710 Congress promptly responded by amending § 1328(a) to except restitution from discharge

. See Criminal Victims Protection Act § 3, 104 Stat. at 2865

. And t he amendment’s legislative history shows that Congress intended to prevent federal bankruptcy proceedings from invalidat ing restitution ordered in state proceedings. See S. Rep. No. 101

- 434, at 7 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4065, 4071 (explaining that the amendment invalidates Davenport and has the “ effect of barring the use of chapter 13 by convicted criminals seeking to discharge court

- ordered restitution payments ”) ; H.R. Rep. No. 101

- 681, pt. 1, at 165 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472 , 6570 (explaining that the amendment invalidates Davenport and ensures that “ no debtor with criminal restitution obligations will be able to discharge them through any bankruptcy proceeding ”). Nothing in that history suggests that Congress wanted to limit § 1328(a)(3)’s reach based on the ultimate disposition of the state proceeding that imposed the restitution. A nd as noted in Dickerson , Congress has elected to carve out such exceptions in other statutes

. See 460 U.S. at 11 1

– 12 , 112 n.6

. Had it wanted to do so for § 1328(a)(3), it c ould ha ve done so expressly. Congress has not, so we will not.
2. Applying these legal principles, we hold that Feyijinmi’s “ probation before judgment ” adjudication is a “conviction ” under § 1328(a)(3)

. Under Maryland law , w hen a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of a crime, the court may “stay the entering of judgment, defer further proceedings, USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 10 of 1711 and place the defendant on probation before judgment.” Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 6

- 220(b) (1)

. T he records from Feyijinmi’s Maryland state court proceedings aren’t available

. But we know that for Feyijinmi to be placed on probation before judgment, a court first needed to find her guilty

. See Howard Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Linda J. , 869 A. 2 d 404, 4 10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)

. And that ’s all that is required for the state disposition to qualify as a “conviction” under § 1328(a)(3). That Maryland doesn’t consider probation before judgment to be a “conviction” under state law is irrelevant

. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 6

- 220( i ) ( 3) ( explaining that a defendant’s discharge upon her completion of probation before judgment “s hall be without judgment of conviction and is not a conviction for the purpose of any disqualification or disability imposed by law because of conviction of a crime ”). Again, federal law governs the definition of “conviction” in § 1328(a)(3). Cf. Dickerson , 460 U.S.
at 111

– 12

. And for good reason. Applying the federal definition p romotes “ national uniformity ,” id. at 112 , and wards off “anomalous and unfair results,” Yanez

- Popp , 998 F.2d at 235 (cleaned up).
It also doesn’t matter that the Maryland court struck its guilty finding when it granted Feyijinmi probation before judgment

. We rejected this same argument in Yanez

Popp

. See 998 F.2d at 237. As we explained the re , “[s]triking the guilty finding did not mean the facts supporting the finding no longer exist ed ; it merely rewarded petitioner for USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 11 of 1712 good behavior during probation by technically erasing his conviction for reasons unrelated to its validity on the merits.” Id. The state’s decision to expunge Feyi jinmi’s criminal records is similarly of no import. Cf. Dickerson , 460 U.S. at 11 4

– 15 (explaining that “ expunction does not alter the legality of the previous conviction ” and merely means that the state “ has provided a means for the trial court not to accord a conviction certain continuing effects under state law ”). What matters is that Feyijinmi was found guilty by a Maryland state court , which in turn means that Feyijinmi suffered a “conviction” under § 1328(a)(3).
3. As a fallback argument, Feyijinmi claims that even if her probation before judgment
is a “conviction , ” her restitution wasn’t “included in a sentence.” According to Feyijinmi, a sentence can’t exist without a final judgment. And because probation before judgment in Maryland precludes the entry of a final judgment, she argues, her restitution wasn’t ordered as part of a sentence. Not so

. B ecause the Code doesn’t define “sentence , ” federal law again controls

. Cf.
Dickerson , 460 U.S. at 111

– 12. And we think it’s clear that as used in § 1328(a)(3),
“sentence” means the consequences resulting from a determination of guilt. See , e.g. , Bernstein v. United States , 254 F. 967, 968 ( 4th Cir. 1918) (“ In a legal sense, the sentence is the punishment fixed for the offense of which the accused has been convicted

. . . . ”) ; USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 12 of 1713 Sentence , Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “sentence” as “the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer ”). 4
A deferred judgment followed by probation is a “sentence ” under § 1328(a)(3). That’s because “probation is a penal consequence .” See Bridges , 741 F.3d at 469 ( holding that probation assigned following a withhel d adjudication was a sentence for purposes of a SORNA regulation). There’s no indication that Congress intended any other meaning of “sentence” for purposes of § 1328(a)(3). To the contrary, i n amending the statute to “correct the effect ” of Davenport , Congress intended to codify Kelly 5 and make “criminal restitution obligations nondischargeable in Chapter 13, as they currently are in Chapter 7.” H.R. Rep.
No. 101

- 681, pt. 1, at 164. Thus, it follows that § 1328(a)(3) at least encompasses restitution that arises from the circumstances co nsidered in Kell y . And t here, restitution was ordered in a state probation

- before

- judgment disposition, after the defendant pleaded guilty to lar ceny
. Kelly , 479 U.S. at 38

– 39

.

4 It’s true that we’ve said that “a criminal judgment includes both a conviction and its associated sentence” and thus a “final judgment in a criminal case means sentence.” Woodfolk v. Maynard , 857 F.3d 531, 542 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). But t hat a judgment requires a sentence doesn’t mean that a sentence requires a judgment. In any event, Woodfolk addressed the time at which a judgment becomes final for purposes of the statute of limitations for a habeas petition , see id. at 536, 539

— a statute and definition distinct from § 1328(a)(3). So i t doesn’t bind us here.

5 Recall that Kelly held that restitution isn’t dischargeable in Chapter 7 proceedings. 479 U.S. at 52

– 53. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 13 of 1714 Accordingly, we find that Feyijinmi’s restitution

— ordered in a probation

- before

judgment disposition after a Maryland state court found her guilty of welfare fraud

— was “included in a sentence ” under § 1328(a)(3). We also reject Feyiji nmi’s claim that her restitution was no longer a sentence when the debt was transferred to Maryland’s C entral Collection Unit and later converted to a civil matter

. Just as expungement doesn’t alter the legality of a “conviction,” a state’s decision to enforce restitution as a civil judgment “does not divest the restitution obligation of its identity as part of a criminal sentence.” Ulwelling v. Dick Wehner Crane Serv., Inc. ( In re Ulwelling ) , 133 F.3d 923, 923 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision)

. 6
B. We next address Feyijinmi’s argument s related to the State’s labeling the debt as “Court Ordered F ees” on its proof of claim. First, she argues that in so doing , the State waived its right to collect the debt post

- discharge. Second, she argues that the bankruptcy court needed to determine whether the State’s actions prejudice d Feyijinmi before it declared the debt nondischargeable

. We are not persuaded

.

6 Nor was the bankruptcy court required to hold a plenary hearing to determine the correct interpretation of § 1328(a)(3). See Appellant’s Br. at 23

. Feyijinmi doesn’t explain why such a hearing was necessary when the meaning of § 1328(a)(3) is a question of law, and there was no dispute that Feyijinmi was ordered to pay restitution as a condition of her probation before judgment

. Cf. Hensley v. Alcon Lab’ys, Inc. , 277 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the need for a plenary hearing before enforcing a settlement when there’s a dispute about the settlement’s existence or terms ). USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 14 of 1715 1.
To begin , there’s no basis for waiver because the State’s proof of claim sufficiently characterized the debt as restitution

. A creditor may file a proof of claim to participate in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a). The proof of claim must “conform substantially to the appropriate Official Form.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(a) . If the claim ed amount includes interest or fees in addition to the principal amount , the creditor must include an itemized statement of th o se expenses. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(c)(2)(A). The State adhered to this process. And t o the extent that the proof of claim was ambigu ous , it was cleared up by the attach ed restitution order, entitled “Judgment of Restitution.” J.A. 18 ; see In re Avery , 272 B.R. 718, 72 3

– 24 ( Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002) (finding that although the proof of claim was “silent about the amount and classification of the claim,” the attachments “made up for this paucity of detail and dispelled any doubt” about the debt’s nature)

. I f Feyijinmi need ed more information about the debt or its characterization , she could have objected to the claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (a). We also think it clear that restitution debts are nondischargeable without any action by the creditor. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) ( providing that certain debts are nondischargeable only if the bankruptcy court makes such a determination upon the creditor’s request), with 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (3) (providing that restitution is nondischargeable, without qualification). Indeed, a restitution creditor isn’t even required to file a proof of claim to collect on the debt post

- discharge

. Cf. Kelly , 479 U.S. at 39 , 53 USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 15 of 1716 ( determining that restitution is nondischargeable in Chapter 7, even though the creditors didn’t file proofs of claim); Aguiluz v. Bayhi ( In re Bayhi ) , 528 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2008) (“ [ P ] er se non - dischargeable [ debts ] “need not be claimed in b ankruptcy proceedings to remain completely immune from discharge

. ”).
So we reject any notion that the State waived its right to collect restitution by doing something (filing a proof of claim) it had no duty to do

. 2. We also reject Feyijinmi’s claim of prejudice. According to Feyijinmi, the State essentially amended its proof of claim when it characterize d the debt as nondischargeable restitution post

- discharge , given that it originally characterized the debt as dischargeable court fees

. S he claims that the bankruptcy court shouldn’t have allowed the amendment without first considering any prejudice to her. See, e.g. , In re City of Caps

. , Inc. , 55 B.R. 634, 637 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985) ( explaining that the bankruptcy court must consider whether the debtor would be “unduly prejudiced” before allowing an amendment to a proof of claim (cleaned up) ).
But the State’s proof of claim properly characterized the debt as restitution

. In any event, we fail to see how Feyijinmi was prejudiced. When assessing prejudice in this context, courts ordinarily consider facts tending to show “ bad faith or unreasonable delay in filing the amendment, impact on other claimants, reliance by the debtor or creditors

. . . and change of the debtor ’ s position .” Id. No such fact s appear in this record. So Feyijinmi’s prejudice claim fails. USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 16 of 1717 * * * For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED USCA4 Appeal: 22-2252 Doc: 47 Filed: 06/28/2024 Pg: 17 of 17