PGE COMMENTS ON DEQ’S PROPOSED REVISIONS TO 

ITS REGIONAL HAZE RULES 

7/30/2010

Portland General Electric Company (“PGE” or “Company”) appreciates this opportunity to 

comment on the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality’s (“DEQ” or “Department”) 

preliminary revisions to its Regional Haze rules. As you know, the rules are the result of the 

federal requirement that Oregon develop an implementation plan for regional haze (the 

“Regional Haze Plan”) for submittal to EPA and approval into the State Implementation Plan 

(“SIP”). The Regional Haze Plan must include a determination of Best Available Retrofit 

Technology (“BART”) for each BART-eligible source in the state that emits any air pollutant 

which may reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to visibility impairment in any 

mandatory Class I area. 40 CFR § 51.308(e)(1)(ii). The federal Clean Air Act contains specific 

criteria for establishing BART and these criteria are carried over into the regulations. In 

developing these regulations, EPA also promulgated guidelines to be used by the states in 

developing BART determinations. These guidelines, found in 40 CFR § 51 Appendix Y, contain 

the majority of the detail regarding how BART determinations are to be conducted. 

What follows is a summary of developments thus far in the BART determination rulemaking 

process for PGE’s Boardman Power Plant, PGE’s assessment of the draft control options 

described in DEQ’s June 28 announcement and invitation for public comment, and our proposed 

resolution to problems associated with those options. We will also address concerns DEQ raised 

with respect to the alternative 2020 plan PGE proposed in the petition submitted to DEQ on 

April 2, 2010. 

As we review the technical details of potential control solutions, however, it’s important that we 

not lose sight of why we are revisiting this issue. After all, the EQC has already adopted rules 

that would allow PGE to resolve all current emissions requirements for the plant and continue 

operation for at least the next 30 years, an outcome that extensive modeling confirms would be a 

responsible, cost effective course of action to serve our customers. We have chosen not to leave 

it at that, however, because PGE and numerous customer and key stakeholder groups have 

agreed that it would be possible to achieve an even better outcome for both our customers and 

the environment if the DEQ rules are revised to allow us to instead meet Regional Haze 

objectives through a combination of interim controls and early plant closure.1

 1

 Early closure, as referenced herein, is the cessation of coal as a fuel source for the 

Boardman plant. PGE is evaluating other technologies for use at the Boardman site, including 

biomass. 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 2 

The reason for doing this, if we’re able to finalize an acceptable amendment to the rules, is to 

achieve the best solution we can for our customers. This also gives us an opportunity, however, 

to set a remarkable national precedent for Regional Haze regulation and, for that matter, for 

general air quality regulation of coal-fired generating plants nationwide. 

Although a few coal-fired plants in the United States have recently been slated for closure and 

replacement, none of the plants involved to date match Boardman’s age, size, level of efficiency 

or role in a utility generating fleet (i.e. a baseload resource). In short, PGE and its stakeholders 

have stepped forward to match a pragmatic resource decision on behalf of customers with a 

forward-looking policy precedent that could have a significant impact on the nation’s efforts to 

reduce air pollution in general and carbon emissions in particular. 

We believe DEQ should consider this combination of pragmatism and precedent as it seeks an 

appropriate solution in this matter. Specifically: 

 Given the substantial discretion and flexibility the states have under the BART 

requirements of CAA § 169A,2

 Oregon clearly has the authority to develop a reasonable 

path to plant closure. An innovative approach along the lines of what PGE has proposed 

would be consistent with Regional Haze regulations while also offering a valuable 

example for other utilities and states to follow. This could result in tremendous 

cumulative national air quality benefits that potentially dwarf the results of any action 

Oregon could take by itself. 

 In order to achieve an attractive national precedent, however, DEQ must balance the 

considerable long term benefits of closing a coal-fired power plant of this size with the 

near-term need to mitigate costs to customers, maintain the reliability of the electric 

power grid, and reduce the economic impact of closure on communities surrounding the 

 2 "H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-564 (1977), reprinted in 3 Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, A 

legislative History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, at 535 (1978) [hereinafter "1977 

Legislative History"]. The "agreement" to which the Conference Report refers was an agreement to reject 

the House bill's provisions giving EPA the power to determine whether a source contributes to visibility 

impairment and, if so, what BART controls should be applied to that source. See id. At 533-35. Pursuant 

to the agreement, language was inserted to make it clear that the states - not EPA - would make these 

BART determinations. See id. at 533-35; see also H.R. Res. 4151, 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in 1977 

Legislative History at 1985, 2325-30. The Conference Report thus confirms that Congress intended the 

states to decide which sources impair visibility and what BART controls should apply to those sources. 

American Corn Growers et al. v. EPA, 291 F. 3d 1 (D.C. cir. 2002)
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 3 

plant. Failure to do this would instead establish a precedent that greatly reduces the 

incentive for utilities, state regulators, and stakeholder groups to seek collaborative 

emissions control solutions based on early plant closure. 

In our comments below, PGE offers suggestions on how to address key provisions of the 

Regional Haze rules and the BART guidelines to accomplish a reasonable 2020 closure of the 

Boardman Power Plant. Specifically, we propose operation on reduced sulfur coal, low-NOx 

burners, modified overfire air and selective non-catalytic reduction (“SNCR”) through 2020 with 

a pilot study of Dry Sorbent Injection (“DSI”) technology. Contingent on the results of pilot 

testing, PGE would commit to meeting a 0.4 lb SO2/MMBtu limit through 2020 using DSI. If 

this option is considered BART, DEQ would need to provide a procedure for establishing an 

alternative SO2 limit if PGE’s pilot testing demonstrated that operation of DSI could not reach 

0.4 lb SO2/MMBtu, when operating in conjunction with SNCR and the mercury controls, without 

resulting in an increase in the hourly capacity to emit particulate matter or triggering PSD for 

PM2.5 (assuming the same level of operation currently reflected in the Boardman Plant’s plant 

site emission limits). 

We remain mindful that if an acceptable amendment to the 2009 Regional Haze rules cannot be 

achieved, our most responsible course of action remains full implementation of controls and 

continued operation of the plant to serve our customers through at least 2040. While this would 

be an unfortunate and unnecessary outcome, we believe that it will still be the best plan available 

to us if the other options described by DEQ are carried through as drafted to the final rule 

amendments. 

DEQ and the EQC have discretion under § 169A to achieve a balanced and reasonable outcome 

that will benefit both the environment and utility customers. We urge the agency to approach this 

issue with that flexibility in mind, remembering that ultimately the rules are intended to achieve 

results that will make both environmental and economic sense to the people we serve. We look 

forward to working with you to take advantage of this opportunity to set an important national 

precedent. 

1. Background
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 4 

On November 2, 2007, PGE submitted a BART analysis for its coal-fired power plant located in 

Boardman, Oregon (the “Boardman Plant”).3 Sources in existence on August 7, 1977 and that 

both fall into one of the designated source categories and have the potential to emit more than 

250 tons per year of a haze-causing pollutant are required to determine BART if they cause or 

contribute to visibility impairment in a mandatory Class I area. 40 CFR § 51.308(e). DEQ 

previously determined that the Boardman power plant was in existence, as that term is defined in 

the federal Regional Haze program, on August 7, 1977.4 The Boardman Plant emits more than 

250 tons per year of NOx, SO2 and PM, is in one of the designated source categories and was 

determined by the Department to cause visibility impairment in at least one mandatory Class I 

area. Therefore, PGE engaged an extensive group of experts that assisted the Company in 

preparing a BART determination for the Boardman Plant. This report was submitted to DEQ on 

November 2, 2007 and subsequently supplemented in response to dozens of questions posed by 

various state and federal agencies and interested third parties. The team of experts concluded 

that if the Boardman Plant were operated through 2040, BART constituted a set of NOx, SO2 and 

PM limits reflective of the installation of new low-NOx burners with a modified overfire air 

system for NOx control and the installation of a semi-dry scrubbing system with fabric filters for 

SO2 and PM control. PGE concluded that due to the long lead time and complex engineering 

challenges the Company needed five years from the date that the Regional Haze SIP is approved 

in order to engineer, bid, procure, install and start up the SO2 controls. Federal law authorizes 

DEQ to allow up to five years from the date EPA approves the Regional Haze SIP. 40 CFR § 

51.308(e)(1)(iv). 

On December 1, 2008, the Department issued the proposed Boardman Plant BART proposal for 

public comment. The proposal included new regulations that would require the installation of 

 

3

 The Foster-Wheeler boiler is identified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as 

acid rain program ORISPL code 6106. 

4

 40 CFR § 51.301 defines “in existence on August 7, 1977” as “meaning that the owner or 

operator has obtained all necessary preconstruction approvals or permits required by Federal, 

State, or local air pollution emissions and air quality laws or regulations and either has (1) begun, 

or caused to begin, a continuous program of physical on-site construction of the facility or (2) 

entered into binding agreements or contractual obligations, which cannot be cancelled or 

modified without substantial loss to the owner or operator, to undertake a program of 

construction of the facility to be completed in a reasonable time.” 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 5 

the controls proposed by PGE, but on an expedited schedule. In addition, the Department 

proposed to require that PGE install selective catalytic reduction (“SCR”) in 2017. 

PGE submitted comments on DEQ’s proposal introducing the concept of shutting down the 

Boardman Plant boiler before the end of its projected life and, based on the reduced plant life, 

eliminating some or all post-combustion controls depending on the shutdown date. 

On June 19, 2009, the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission (“EQC”) adopted the 

Regional Haze Plan. The Regional Haze Plan includes new regulations (OAR 340-223-0030) 

imposing NOx, SO2 and PM limitations reflective of BART and applicable to the Boardman 

Plant boiler. The NOx regulations require compliance by July 1, 2011 and the SO2 and PM 

regulations require compliance by July 1, 2014. The Regional Haze Plan also includes new 

regulations (OAR 340-223-0040) imposing additional NOx limits reflective of the Reasonable 

Progress (“RP”) requirements of Clean Air Act Section 169A. The RP regulation requires 

compliance by July 1, 2017. These requirements are summarized below in Table 1. 

Table 1 

Oregon Regional Haze Plan Requirements for Boardman Plant Boiler 

Limit (Assumed Control*) Installation Deadline Authority 

0.28 lb NOx/MMBtu—30 day rolling 

average 

0.23 lb NOx/MMBtu—annual average 

(Low-NOx Burners/Overfire Air) ** 

7/1/2011 BART 

0.12 lb SO2/MMBtu—30 day rolling 

average 

0.012 lb PM/MMBtu—average of 

source test runs 

(Semi-Dry Scrubber) 

7/1/2014 BART 

0.070 lb NOx/MMBtu 

(SCR) 

7/1/2017 Reasonable 

Progress 

* BART constitutes emission limits, not specific controls. The assumed control is 

provided for illustrative purposes only. 

** If combustion controls do result in a showing of compliance by July 1, 2012 and 

DEQ grants an extension of the compliance deadline to July 1, 2014, the NOx limit 

changes to 0.23 lb/MMBtu as a 30 day rolling average. 

In adopting these BART/RP requirements, the EQC and DEQ acknowledged PGE’s request for 

consideration of a boiler shutdown, but stated that early closure would need to be addressed in 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 6 

future submittals. In Chapter 10 of the Regional Haze Plan, DEQ acknowledged that the cost of 

future greenhouse gas regulation in context with costs associated with the regional haze SO2 and 

NOx controls for the Boardman Plant boiler “could be significant and may require PGE to 

evaluate cost-benefit factors affecting the future of the Boardman Plant, as part of the Oregon 

Public Utility Commission Integrated Resource Plan process.”5 In Chapter 12, DEQ also stated 

that “should PGE determine that the impact and cost of carbon regulations will require the 

closure of the PGE Boardman Plant, PGE may submit a written request to the Department for a 

rule change.”6 Thus PGE could petition DEQ for reconsideration of the BART and RP rules if 

external factors such as carbon regulation would result in early plant closure. 

On April 2, 2010, PGE petitioned the EQC to amend OAR 340-223-0030 and -0040 in 

accordance with the invitation in the Regional Haze Plan. As the Department has acknowledged, 

DEQ has no authority under the BART requirements to require early closure of a plant. 

However, a source does have the ability to offer to accept a federally enforceable condition to 

cease plant operations by a date certain either to avoid BART (by the closure date being no later 

than 5 years after EPA approval of the Regional Haze Plan into the SIP) or to be accounted for in 

the BART determination itself. For example, EPA stated in the preamble to the BART 

implementation rules: 

“With regard to BART-eligible sources not being in operation for the 

duration of the program, a State, in making BART determinations, is 

explicitly directed by the CAA to account for the remaining useful 

life of a source.” 70 Fed. Reg. 39125 (July 6, 2005) 

The remaining life of the plant is a separate and freestanding criterion as well as a component of 

the economic impacts analysis in the BART determination process. In its April 2, 2010 petition, 

PGE proposed to accept a 2020 plant closure date. PGE accompanied the petition with a 

complete BART analysis that took into account the 2020 closure proposal and concluded that if 

the Boardman Plant closed in 2020, BART constitutes the use of reduced sulfur coal (for SO2

control) and new low NOx burners with modified overfire air (for NOx control). BART for 

particulate was the continued use of the electrostatic precipitator (ESP). 

On June 17, 2010, the EQC denied PGE’s petition and directed the Department to commence 

rulemaking to determine other alternatives to the current BART/RP requirements in the Regional 

 5

 Regional Haze Plan at p. 155. 

6

 Regional Haze Plan at p. 202. 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 7 

Haze Plan. The Department has released a preliminary proposal for informal comment that 

would provide the following three options in addition to the existing rules: 

DEQ BART Revision Proposal 

Table 2 

 2011 NOx 2014 SO2 2017 NOx Closure Date 

Existing Rules LNB/MOFA SD Scrubber SCR 2040+ 

DEQ Option 1 LNB/MOFA/SNCR SD Scrubber --- 2020 

DEQ Option 2 LNB/MOFA/SNCR DSI --- 2018 

DEQ Option 3 LNB/MOFA --- --- 5 years after SIP 

approval (2016?) 

The new alternative options were supported by a draft BART analysis that PGE believes contains 

errors and incorrect assumptions that materially distort its conclusions. For that reason, PGE is 

submitting the following comments to identify and correct the errors so that the proposed rule 

that is placed out on formal notice more accurately reflects the statutory BART process and EPA 

guidance. 

2. Evaluation of Errors in DEQ’s BART Analysis

PGE has reviewed DEQ’s proposed BART analysis and three additional BART options. While 

PGE appreciates the Department’s willingness to think in terms of alternatives to the current 

regional haze requirements, PGE believes that there are numerous errors in the Department’s 

BART analysis that result in erroneous conclusions. While our analysis is not yet complete, we 

are submitting the following comments identifying a number of errors in the Department’s 

analysis. 

Plant Closure Assumption is Invalid

One of the most fundamental errors that we believe affects the Department’s BART analysis 

relates to the assumption in Option 2 that the plant will close in any year other than 2020 or 

2040, i.e., the end of the Boardman Plant’s useful life.7

 As the Department has previously 

 7

 For ease of reference, 2040 is referred to throughout this document as the end of the 

Boardman Plant’s useful life. However, it is possible that the plant could ultimately operate for a 

longer period of time—particularly if the controls envisioned by the current BART rules are 

installed. By using 2040 as a reference point, PGE makes no commitment to cease operating the 

(...continued) 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 8 

acknowledged, Section 169A of the Clean Air Act does not provide DEQ or the EQC the 

authority to set a closure date for the Boardman Plant. PGE can volunteer to accept a premature 

closure and then DEQ is required to take that into account in determining BART. EPA stated: 

 “[A] State, in making BART determinations, is explicitly directed by 

the CAA to account for the remaining useful life of a source. Thus, 

States may factor into their reasonable progress estimates those shutdowns that are required and effected in permit or SIP provisions.” 70 

Fed. Reg. 39103, 39125 (July 6, 2005). 

In considering closure dates other than 2020 and 2040 in establishing BART, DEQ is acting 

outside of its jurisdictional authority. We note that this is not the case in relation to Option 3 as 

that option simply states that if PGE does not install BART on Boardman within 5 years after 

SIP approval, the Boardman Plant must cease operation or face enforcement. This approach is 

consistent with EPA’s clear statement in the 2005 BART rule preamble where it stated: 

 “We believe that the CAA mandates consideration of the remaining 

useful life as a separate factor, and that it is appropriate to consider in 

the analysis the effects of remaining useful life on costs. We believe 

that, because the source would not be allowed to operate after the 5- 

year point without such controls, the option for providing flexibility 

would not create a loophole for sources. Moreover, any source 

operating after this point without BART controls in place would be 

subject to enforcement actions for violating the BART limit. For any 

source that does not agree to shut down before the 5-year point, the 

State should identify a specific BART emission limit that would apply 

after this point in time.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 39127. 

 For that reason, we request that DEQ not propose a BART option that anticipates a 2018 closure 

of the Boardman Plant. PGE has never offered such a closure date and DEQ lacks legal 

authority to impose such a requirement. 

 

(...continued) 

Boardman Plant in 2040. Any decision as to the useful life of the Boardman Plant would need to 

be reviewed by the Oregon Public Utilities Commission. 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 9 

The Department Failed to Identify Technically Feasible Controls

In its April 2, 2010 BART analysis, PGE identified the use of reduced sulfur American coal as 

an interim control for consideration as BART. In its draft BART analysis, the Department added 

two additional interim technologies, DSI and the use of Indonesian coal. We do not contest that 

these two technologies should be listed in Step 1 of the BART analysis as “available retrofit 

control technologies.” However, both technologies should be eliminated in the second stage as 

not being technically feasible. 

The importation of Indonesian coal is technically infeasible as an interim BART control. As 

DEQ acknowledges in its second bullet on page 20 of the Department’s draft BART analysis, it 

would be infeasible for PGE to import Indonesian coal to the west coast of the U.S. There are no 

existing port facilities that could accommodate these shipments. Setting aside the profound 

policy reasons why the Department should not be requiring Oregon consumers to pay for the 

importation of coal from a country with a questionable history of mine reclamation, worker 

safety and environmental protections (let alone a country that the U.S. government has labeled a 

haven for terrorism),8 it is technically infeasible to actually transport the coal into any west coast 

port and, from there, to the Boardman Plant.9

 In addition, managing shipments around the 

Indonesian monsoon season is a real issue, which has resulted in price increases and curtailment 

of coal supply under supply contract force majeure provisions.10 Lastly, there is no 

demonstration that the Indonesian coal is of acceptable quality to even be burned in the 

Boardman Plant boiler. Therefore, the use of Indonesian coal should be removed from the 

possible interim control options at Step 2, based on technical infeasibility. 

Similarly, there is no basis for concluding that DSI, as proposed, is technically feasible. EPA 

stated in its 2005 BART rule preamble what was required in order for a technology to be 

considered technically feasible. Specifically, EPA stated: 

 8

 See, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_2052.html#safety

9

 We note that the two plants identified by DEQ as having utilized imported Indonesian 

coal are located on the east coast and have associated importation facilities that are not available 

in the Western U.S. 

10 See, e.g., http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/indonesian-coal-prices-up-as-raincurbs-supply/372199; also see, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSJAK42062020100427
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 10 

 “Control technologies are technically feasible if either (1) they have 

been installed and operated successfully for the type of source under 

review under similar conditions, or (2) the technology could be 

applied to the source under review. Two key concepts are important 

in determining whether a technology could be applied: ‘‘availability’’ 

and ‘‘applicability.’’ As explained in more detail below, a technology 

is considered ‘‘available’’ if the source owner may obtain it through 

commercial channels, or it is otherwise available within the common 

sense meaning of the term. An available technology is ‘‘applicable’’ 

if it can reasonably be installed and operated on the source type under 

consideration. A technology that is available and applicable is 

technically feasible. 70 Fed. Reg. at 39165. 

It is clear that DSI is not an applicable technology, as that term is defined by EPA. As the 

Department acknowledges in its BART analysis, 

 “DSI has been demonstrated in practice on smaller coal-fired boilers 

(<100 MW). It has not been demonstrated on larger boilers...” DEQ 

Draft BART Analysis at page 6. 

The Department seeks to distance itself from this acknowledgement by suggesting that DSI has 

never been installed on a boiler as large as that at the Boardman Plant because nobody has ever 

wanted to. However, that does not change the fact that there is no demonstration project 

showing that DSI can be used on a long term basis for a boiler the size of the Boardman Plant 

boiler. Absent such a demonstration, DEQ cannot unilaterally impose DSI on the Boardman 

Plant as BART. By contrast, PGE could agree to serve as a demonstration project for DSI, but 

would only be able to do so if appropriate alternative emission limits were included within the 

rule to protect PGE if DSI turned out not to be cost-effective, compatible with the mercury 

controls, permittable, or able to achieve significant levels of SO2 control. 

An additional reason not considered by DEQ in its BART analysis is whether under recent 

regulatory changes a DSI system is permittable. Even if DSI were assumed to be able to achieve 

the SO2 reductions suggested by the Department, the technology is not technically feasible if it 

would be impossible for PGE to obtain a permit to install and operate the technology. As the 

Department has acknowledged, EPA will be withdrawing its PM10 surrogacy policy that has 

allowed sources to be permitted under PSD without having to evaluate PM2.5. Therefore, DEQ is 

requesting that the EQC adopt as an emergency rule at its August meeting provisions that would 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 11 

establish the baseline year for PM2.5 as 2007 or 2006 (unless a prior year can be established as 

better representing normal conditions), a 10 ton/year significant emission rate, a PM2.5 PSD 

increment and a PM2.5 significant impact level. Under these regulations, the installation of DSI 

would trigger PSD for PM2.5 if it resulted in PGE requiring a plant site emission limit (“PSEL”) 

in excess of its 2006/2007 actual PM2.5 emission rate by 10 tons per year or more. PGE has 

estimated that DSI would require the addition of approximately 4 tons/hour of reagent powder 

into the boiler exhaust upstream of the ESP. Assuming 8,000 hours of operation per year, this 

would equate to 32,000 tons of particulate being introduced into the exhaust gas annually. The 

additional burden imposed on the particulate control device (ESP) could cause it to lose 

efficiency at collecting the smaller particles, thus likely resulting in an increase in PM2.5

emissions in excess of 10 tons per year. 11 PGE’s preliminary modeling indicates that at the 

anticipated level of increased PM2.5 emissions associated with DSI, the Boardman Plant would 

cause a PM2.5 increment and/or NAAQS exceedance thus making the DSI technology 

unpermittable. Because it could not be lawfully operated, the DSI technology is not technically 

feasible. We note that this aspect of DSI operation would not have been identified in relation to 

the small boilers that have employed the technology for two reasons. First, the smaller boilers 

would have had a proportionately smaller level of PM2.5 emissions. Second, any boiler that 

already has a permit would have obtained it while EPA’s PM10 surrogate policy was still in 

effect. Therefore, these boilers would not have had to evaluate PM2.5 impacts. As a result, the 

previous permitting of the smaller boilers is not a basis for concluding that the Boardman Plant 

boiler could pass permitting review for DSI installation. 

DSI by itself is similarly not technically feasible as it could not be installed and achieve 

compliance with the applicable New Source Performance Standard (“NSPS”). The applicable 

boiler NSPS, Subpart Da, imposes a particulate limit of 0.015 lb/MMBtu heat input. 40 CFR § 

60.42Da(c)(2). This limit is triggered by modifications that occur after February 28, 2005. A 

modification occurs if there is physical change that results in a statistically significant change in 

particulate emissions. 40 CFR § 60.14. If PGE installed DSI, the evidence overwhelmingly 

shows that a statistically significant increase in the hourly capacity to emit particulate would 

 11 By means of reference, Section 7.2 of the BART analysis states that without DSI 

approximately 66 percent of the Boardman Plant’s particulate emissions are PM2.5. This equates 

to 275 tons per year of PM2.5 emissions in the baseline period based on the emission rates 

identified in Table 2-3. A 3.5 percent increase in PM2.5 emissions as a result of adding over 

32,000 tons per year of fine particulate (i.e., adsorbent) into the stack exhaust appears likely to 

result in a 10 ton per year increase in PM2.5. 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 12 

occur. Therefore, PGE would be required to comply with the 0.015 lb/MMBtu limit, which the 

ESP would be incapable of doing with 4 tons per hour of reagent being added to the inlet gas. 

Therefore, DSI could not be installed and maintain compliance with the Subpart Da NSPS limits. 

Therefore, this technology cannot be considered technically feasible. 

For the reasons outlined above, both the importation of Indonesian coal and the installation of 

DSI should be eliminated at Step 2 of the BART analysis. 

DEQ Wrongly Evaluated the Cost Impacts of Imported Indonesian Coal and DSI

While PGE believes that imported Indonesian coal and DSI are both technically infeasible, we 

have prepared comments on the defects in the cost impact analysis as if the technologies were 

technically feasible. To be perfectly clear, DEQ and other readers of these comments should not 

conclude that because we are making these comments on cost impacts that we consider either 

technology technically feasible. 

 Imported Indonesian Coal is Not Cost-Effective Even if It Were Technically Feasible

Imported Indonesian coal is unequivocally not cost-effective. As noted above, there are no 

receiving facilities in the western U.S. that would be capable of receiving, unloading and 

reloading the coal into unit trains. Therefore, were imported Indonesian coal considered 

technically feasible, it would be necessary to construct an entire unloading and reloading facility, 

including storage structures, capable of handling the volume of coal needed to fuel the Boardman 

Plant. Land would either have to be acquired or leased to facilitate this new infrastructure. All 

this would cost hundreds of millions of dollars. PGE would further need to secure rights over the 

rail lines that connect the deepwater port capable of handling a coal laden ship to Boardman. 

This would involve additional costs. Constructing these facilities and bringing them on line 

could likely not be completed by 2014 given the land acquisition, permitting and siting processes 

that would be involved. In addition, PGE estimates the initial capital cost would be in exess of 

$100 million and the annual operational costs would be $275-$300 million. The biggest cost 

component in the annual operational costs is the delivery of the Indonesian coal, which is over 

3.5 times higher than domestic options. It may also be necessary, given the potential for political 

instability in Indonesia, to stockpile considerable amounts of coal in case of interruption in 

supply due to terrorism, labor unrest or political upheaval. This introduces both a direct 

operating cost as well as a significant risk which imposes an additional cost of replacement 

power if the Indonesian mine cannot deliver as promised. None of these potential costs have 

been included in the operational cost amounts described above. It is extraordinarily speculative 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 13 

to think that the Oregon Public Utilities Commission would consider such an investment and 

fueling approach to be prudent and in the best interests of PGE’s customers. In short, DEQ’s 

BART analysis does not incorporate the extreme economic impacts associated with importing 

Indonesian coal. Including these costs demonstrates that even if the importation of Indonesian 

coal were technically feasible, that the direct and incremental cost-effectiveness of the emission 

reductions would be too extreme to consider this option BART. 

 DSI is Not Cost-Effective Even if It Were Technically Feasible

Similarly there are fundamental flaws in DEQ’s cost-effectiveness analysis of DSI. The 

Department’s BART analysis assumed that the installation of DSI would require “only” a $52.2 

million investment and an annual operational cost of only $2.6 million. However, this cost fails 

to take into account the fact that the installation of DSI could trigger PSD for PM2.5. As a result, 

the Department’s BART analysis fails to identify the costs associated with PSD compliance. As 

a result, even if DSI were considered technically feasible and were capable of being permitted, 

the costs associated with maintaining PM2.5 emissions below the increment and NAAQS could 

render the technology not cost-effective. 

 Semi-Dry Scrubbing Cost-Effectiveness Numbers in DEQ BART Analysis Understate 

True Cost

Since the adoption of the Regional Haze Plan, PGE engaged Sargent & Lundy (“S&L”), an 

internationally recognized engineering company with extensive expertise in designing and 

contracting semi-dry scrubbing systems for coal-fired power plants. S&L has assembled a new 

detailed cost analysis for the construction and operation of a semi-dry scrubbing system for the 

Boardman Plant. Based on S&L’s assessment, the true cost of controlling SO2 emissions with a 

semi-dry scrubber are higher than what was identified in the prior BART analysis by 

approximately 30 percent. If the capital and operating costs are adjusted, then the Department’s 

estimate of direct cost-effectiveness would increase to over $6,500/ton and incremental costeffectiveness would increase to near $9,000/ton. Of course, as discussed further below, these 

costs as expressed in dollars per ton, while being singularly relevant in the BART context, do not 

show the true cost effectiveness with respect to PGE’s customers. Installing a very expensive 

semi-dry scrubber for six and a half years and then shutting it down is not in the best interests of 

customers, and does not achieve the balance of environmental benefit, maintaining the reliability 

of the electric power grid, and reducing the economic impact of closure to employees at the plant 

and the communities in which they live and work.
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 14 

 The Department’s BART Analysis Fails to Account for Replacement Resource Cost

The Department’s BART analysis is also flawed in that it fails to account for the cost to PGE and 

its customers of the loss of the Boardman Plant. In a typical BART analysis, DEQ would 

account exclusively for the capital and operating cost of controls and divide that number by the 

avoided emissions to calculate the cost of control. However, what PGE proposed in its April 2, 

2010 BART analysis was anything but a typical BART approach. Instead, PGE proposed to shut 

the Boardman Plant down at least 20 years before the end of its operating life. The Boardman 

Plant is one of the lowest cost thermal resources in PGE’s portfolio. By agreeing to shut the 

plant down at least 20 years early, PGE is taking on a significant additional cost and foregoing a 

valuable opportunity. There is a cost associated with relinquishing Boardman’s low-cost 

baseload generation capacity that must be accounted for as PGE must continue to supply the 

amount of electricity that its customers demand. 

The Department’s cost-effectiveness evaluation of its Option 2 must recognize the costs 

associated with premature retirement of the boiler. These include the incremental replacement 

costs associated with closing the Boardman plant sooner than it would otherwise be closed. 

There are considerable costs that DEQ has not taken into account in evaluating the cost 

effectiveness of the premature closure options. In addition, in evaluating the cost of a BART 

option that includes a premature shutdown for a regulated utility, such as PGE, the agency 

cannot look at just the costs associated with the source under scrutiny. PGE is required by law to 

ensure that whenever one of its customers needs electricity, that power is available.12 PGE does 

not have the option of telling customers that it is exiting the market and they must find other 

means of satisfying their electricity needs. PGE does not have excess generating capacity and is 

actually facing potential supply shortages even without the Boardman Plant closing. As a result, 

the closure of any generation asset must include the cost of finding a replacement. To replace 

that power, PGE’s lowest cost and lowest risk option may be to spend millions of dollars on a 

natural gas fired power plant.13 Dispatch costs on a megawatt-hour basis may also be 

significantly higher for a natural gas replacement resource replacing Boardman. The DEQ 

BART analysis already recognizes additional replacement power costs of $50 per megawatthour, which could result in excess of $200 million of dollars of additional costs on an annual 

 12 ORS 757.020. 

13 Preliminary estimates are approximately $700-800 million in 2010 dollars for a 

replacement natural gas plant constructed in 2021. 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 15 

basis. Nowhere does the Department reflect these direct costs of closure in its cost-effectiveness 

analysis. 

The Department should take into account the direct costs associated with the premature closure 

of the Boardman Plant as well as the replacement resource needed to backfill the Boardman 

Plant’s generation after closure, and recognize that the use of reduced sulfur coal through 2020 in 

conjunction with low NOx burners and modified overfire air constitutes BART. If it were not 

for PGE’s commitment to close the Boardman Plant 20 years early, the additional costs of 

replacement generation to cover the Boardman Plant’s output would not be incurred. Therefore, 

there is a direct but-for causation that requires that these replacement costs be factored into any 

assessment of the cost-effectiveness of control scenarios that involve the premature closure of 

the Boardman Plant. PGE is proposing to incur these costs so long as the capital costs associated 

with the final years of operation are not excessive. However, if DEQ adds the $350 million 

capital cost and $9 million per year operating cost of semi-dry scrubbers to the costs associate 

with operating the Boardman Plant through 2020, then this option far exceeds any costeffectiveness threshold. 

Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) analyses conducted under the Oregon Public Utility 

Commission (OPUC) show that it would be ridiculous for PGE to invest that much of its 

customers’ money in controls that would only run for 6.5 years. The reason that the 

Department’s analysis does not comport with the analysis before the OPUC is that DEQ has 

failed to account for all of the costs in evaluating its Option 1. When the additional costs 

associated with closing the Boardman Plant and accelerating a replacement source of electricity 

is included in the cost, as it must be, then the cost of Option 1 far exceeds $10,000/ton. This 

more complex evaluation of the control/closure costs associated with the Boardman Plant is 

being evaluated in PGE’s IRP. The reason that the IRP analysis generates the conclusion that the 

most prudent approach is to operate the Boardman Plant through 2020 using reduced sulfur coal 

as proposed by PGE below is because it takes into account the true cost of the alternative 

options. 

Including the cost of both the controls and the replacement asset when evaluating the costeffectiveness of an option is a concept familiar to everyone. If you have an older but reliable car 

you will not just evaluate the cost of a repair when determining whether to proceed with an 

investment. If the engine fails on a car that you had planned to drive for 6 more years and you 

need to evaluate whether to pay for the $1,000 fix that will give the car 3 more years of life or 

the $2,000 fix that will allow the car to run the full 6 years of its remaining life, you would not 

say that the two options are equal because they each result in a cost of $333 per year of vehicle 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

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life. You would necessarily have to account for the costs associated with accelerating the 

replacement of the vehicle. This includes the large capital investment in the new vehicle. 

Nobody would think for a moment that the only consideration was the cost of the repair itself. 

Likewise, in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of an option that includes shuttering the Boardman 

Plant before the end of its useful life, DEQ must take into account the additional costs associated 

with accelerating the replacement of a replacement resource. When those costs are added in the 

semi-dry scrubbing option with 2020 closure which DEQ already refers to as only “marginally 

cost effective” then it is clear that Option 1 is actually not cost-effective. Similarly, when the 

replacement costs as well as the additional control and permitting costs associated with DSI are 

considered, as they must be, then that cost also exceeds the cost-effectiveness threshold chosen 

by DEQ ($7300/ton), even if one considers DSI technically feasible. 

 The Department’s Cost-Effectiveness Threshold is Too High

The Department’s choice of a $7,300/ton cost-effectiveness threshold is excessively high and 

improperly distorts the BART analysis. The Department identified a $7,300/ton costeffectiveness threshold in the BART analysis but offers no legitimate basis for this figure. Other 

BART analyses across the country have employed significantly lower cost-effectiveness 

thresholds. In discussions with DEQ, they have identified the basis of the $7,300/ton costeffectiveness threshold as the BART determination for a Minnesota facility. However, as the 

Department acknowledges at page 18 of its BART analysis, most other BART analyses apply a 

cost-effectiveness threshold of $3,000/ton and the Minnesota BART analysis that DEQ relied on 

was changed prior to finalization and applies a cost-effectiveness threshold of less than 

$4,000/ton. Thus the Department’s own BART analysis documents support that it lacks a basis 

for the $7,300/ton cost-effectiveness threshold it is applying. The Department also points to a 

preliminary assessment from New Mexico where the permitting authority said that for a power 

plant affecting 16 Class I areas that the appropriate cost-effectiveness threshold was between 

$5,946 and $7,398. By the Department’s own logic the New Mexico facility (San Juan) should 

have a higher cost-effectiveness threshold as compared to the Boardman Plant because the New 

Mexico plant affects more Class I areas than the Boardman Plant. However, the Department 

mischaracterizes the San Juan BART analysis as if it were complete when it is currently a 

proposed determination and subject to further public review and comment . Also, the costeffectiveness numbers that DEQ references for the San Juan BART analysis were for NOx and 

not for SO2. The preliminary assessment of a different state in relation to a facility with a much 

bigger footprint that includes 6 national parks is not a basis for DEQ to adopt the New Mexico 

authority’s work in progress as binding in Oregon. The Department fails to identify a single 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 17 

final BART determination that relied on a cost-effectiveness threshold as high as the one it is 

proposing. 

 DEQ Failed to Adequately Take Into Account Incremental Costs

DEQ’s BART analysis is also inconsistent with the agency’s legal authority in that it fails to 

adequately take into consideration the incremental cost of the technologies that it is proposing in 

Option 1. The BART rules that DEQ stated it was following in developing the Boardman Plant 

BART analysis specify that both the direct cost-effectiveness and the incremental costeffectiveness must be evaluated. Nonetheless, the Department ignores the incremental costeffectiveness in making its BART determination. Even if one assumed that the costs evaluated 

by the Department were accurate (and we demonstrated above that they are not) and the 

Department’s cost-effectiveness threshold is appropriate (and we demonstrated above that it is 

too high), the incremental cost-effectiveness for Option 1 is excessive. The Department openly 

acknowledges this in its BART report for the new options, but then appears to ignore it.14 As 

adjusted by the updated price data from S&L showing a 30% increase in price, the correct 

incremental cost is near $9,000/ton, which is significantly higher than the Department’s 

$7,300/ton threshold. Ignoring the excessiveness of this cost is clearly inconsistent with the 

process established by EPA and accepted by DEQ for establishing what constitutes BART. The 

Department should revise its BART analysis to reflect its own process and thereby eliminate 

semi-dry scrubbing as BART under Option 1. 

 DEQ Failed to Account for the Energy and Environmental Impacts of DSI

The Department’s BART analysis is flawed in that it identifies that DSI could result in 

environmental impacts and yet fails to fully explain or in any way account for those in reaching 

its Option 2 BART determination. As the Department openly recognizes in multiple places 

within its BART analysis (e.g., Table 11), the use of DSI likely will result in an increase in 

particulate emissions. However, the Department makes no attempt to estimate the extent of this 

impact. As we explain above, the emissions increase associated with DSI is significant and will 

most certainly result in the Boardman Plant having to undergo PSD for PM2.5. Similarly, the 

Department’s BART analysis documents that the use of DSI will impair the efficiency of the 

Boardman Plant’s mercury controls. Again, there is no attempt to quantify this impact or to 

explain why it is acceptable to require a technology that could result in increased mercury 

 14 See Draft Boardman Power Plant BART Report at page 11. 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

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emissions. The Department must quantify and take into account in deciding to require DSI as a 

component of Option 2 the potential ramifications from the requirement to use DSI at the 

Boardman Plant. 

 Visibility Assessment Fails to Account for the Benefits of Early Closure

The Department’s assessment of the visibility improvements associated with each option is 

flawed in that it fails to take into account the years of visibility improvement associated with 

premature closure. The table provided at page iv of the Department’s BART analysis identifies 

that its Option 1 would result in an additional reduction of 7,700 tons of visibility impairing 

pollutants and that Option 2 would result in an additional reduction of 14,900 tons of visibility 

impairing pollutants. However, nowhere in its analysis does the Department make reference to 

the tens of thousands of tons of visibility impairing pollutants that the environment will not see if 

PGE is allowed to shut the Boardman Plant in 2020. Even if the Boardman Plant installs semidry scrubbers, twenty years of SO2 emissions amounts to over 58,000 tons of SO2. The 

Department completely fails to take into account the enormous reduction in emissions associated 

with early closure. This is a fundamental flaw in the BART analysis. When these reductions are 

properly taken into account a 2020 closure option with the implementation of reduced sulfur 

coal, SNCR, and low NOx burners and modified overfire air as discussed below is clearly the 

best BART option. 

 DEQ Failed to Conduct a Complete Modeling Analysis for its Proposed Options

The Department has no basis to support its Option 1 and Option 2 BART proposals in the 

absence of having performed complete visibility modeling for those options. One of the 

bedrocks of the BART process is to assess the visibility improvements associated with each 

option under consideration. In developing its BART alternatives, the Department failed to 

conduct a complete modeling analysis and the limited analysis that it did perform contains errors. 

 The Department’s BART Assessment Fails to Take into Account The Rate of Progress at 

the Affected Class I Areas

In preparing its BART analysis, the Department failed to consider where the Class I areas are in 

relation to their uniform rates of progress (the “glide paths”) and how the options will accelerate 

compliance with those options. Fourteen Class I areas are within 300 km of the Boardman Plant. 

Consistent with the statutory goal of reducing the worst haze conditions to natural levels by 

2064, glide paths have been developed for each Class I area. This allows comparison of the 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

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projected progress towards the statutory goal against the uniform rate of progress that defines the 

glide path. PGE acknowledges that to some extent BART exists independent of the glide paths 

in that BART is required regardless of the progress towards the statutory goal. However, if a 

Class I area has projected impacts for the next several decades that will be far in excess of its 

glide path, then it may be appropriate to impose a higher cost-effectiveness threshold or 

otherwise hold a source impacting that Class I to a higher standard. On the other hand, where the 

Class I area is on course to achieving its uniform rate of progress goals over the next ten years, 

then a lower cost-effectiveness threshold is appropriate. With any option that requires the 

premature closure of the Boardman Plant, there will be a substantial movement of the nearby 

Class I areas towards the statutory visibility goal. 

 A BART Determination Requiring Use of Reduced Sulfur Coal, Low NOx Burners, 

Modified Overfire Air and 2020 Closure is Approvable by EPA

The Department has inaccurately suggested on multiple occasions that reduced sulfur coal, low 

NOx burners, modified overfire air and 2020 closure is not a BART determination that could be 

approved by EPA. This statement is incorrect. Three reasons were given for why such a BART 

determination could not be approved by EPA: (1) Lack of enforceability of a closure 

requirement, (2) Absence of interim control measures, and (3) Excessive cumulative impacts. 

We address each of these three objections below. 

 Enforceability of Closure Requirement 

As the Department acknowledges in its BART options analysis, there is no basis for the 

argument that a Boardman Plant closure date could not be made enforceable. DEQ’s Options 1, 

2 and 3 plus PGE’s proposed 2020 solution discussed below all contemplate the early closure of 

the Boardman Plant and if PGE chooses to accept such an early closure, all contemplate 

effectuation by a regulatory requirement. Such a requirement would, of course, be an 

enforceable permit condition, subject to penalties. So long as such a requirement is included in 

the State Implementation Plan there is absolutely no credibility to an argument that such a 

requirement is not both state and federally enforceable. 

 Absence of Interim Controls 

PGE acknowledges that any BART determination that rests upon premature plant closure must 

also include an analysis of whether any interim controls can be imposed, consistent with BART, 

to limit emissions prior to the shutdown. For this reason, in its April 2, 2010 BART analysis 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

Page 20 

PGE included an analysis of interim controls. SO2 emissions are directly related to sulfur 

content in the coal delivered to PGE. PGE is currently permitted to emit up to 1.2 lb 

SO2/MMBtu heat input. Coal sulfur content varies year-to-year, with the SO2 emissions 

frequently running significantly higher than the baseline period defined for the BART analysis. 

Therefore, PGE evaluated and ultimately proposed the use of reduced sulfur coal thereby 

decreasing the allowable SO2 emission rate by 50 percent. 

The Department inappropriately dismissed PGE’s proposed reduction of the SO2 emission rate 

from 1.2 lb/MMBtu to 0.6 lb MMBtu. In its proposed BART analysis, the Department states that 

as compared to the baseline period the implementation of reduced sulfur coal would “only” 

achieve a 0.43 dV of visibility improvement. This is an inaccurate statement for two reasons. 

First, the maximum reduction in visibility impacts as a result of shifting to reduced sulfur coal as 

compared to the baseline period is 0.50 dV, occurring at Mt Hood (an 18.6 percent 

improvement). This is a significant improvement. However, this understates the benefits of 

reduced sulfur coal in that there are benefits across all 14 Class I areas evaluated, as well as the 

Columbia Gorge. PGE objects to the use of cumulative impacts as an inaccurate and misleading 

means of evaluating visibility impacts or benefits. However, if one were to sum the visibility 

improvements across the fourteen Class I areas, it would amount to 3.85 dV in visibility 

improvement. Second, evaluating SO2 reductions in relation to the baseline modeling period 

distorts the overall benefits of reduced sulfur coal. Currently PGE can and does emit SO2 at 

levels significantly higher than the visibility assessment baseline used by DEQ while operating 

in compliance with its air permit. Reducing the SO2 permit limit to 0.6lbs/MMBTu is 

significantly lower than the industry standard and it could restrict the coal available to PGE and 

increase the price at which the fuel can be obtained. Dismissing the coal restriction as not being 

an interim control because lower sulfur coal happened to have been utilized during the BART 

baseline period is in error. PGE 's only control of the sulfur content in supply contracts is to 

specify a target and maximum level. During the BART baseline period, the coal deliveries 

varied based on what happened to be delivered by the mines, capped by a sulfur level of 1.2 

lbs/MMBtu. The department should consider the fact that coal is not a refined fuel that can be 

delivered at a specific sulfur level. Reducing a permit limit and requiring Boardman to limit the 

type of coal combusted in the boiler is a real reduction, and a method of SO2 control that should 

be recognized as a robust interim control measure. 

The Department, in its BART analysis, considered two additional interim controls, the 

importation of Indonesian coal and the use of DSI. As explained above and acknowledged by 

DEQ in its BART analysis, there is no rational basis for requiring the importation of coal from 

Indonesia. As is also explained in detail above, the Department failed to account for potential 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

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cost, permitting issues, and technical feasibility associated with the use of DSI. When these are 

taken into account, then the use of DSI is swiftly eliminated from contention as an interim 

control as well. In the absence of any other viable interim controls, there is no basis for 

suggesting that PGE did not consider all viable interim measures and that PGE’s proposed 

interim control is inadequate. 

 Excessive Cumulative Impacts 

The final, and equally indefensible, suggestion for why EPA would not find PGE’s April 2, 2010 

BART analysis “approvable” was that it did not take into account the cumulative impacts across 

all Class I areas. This approach was used by DEQ in its BART analysis. The clear wording of 

the Clean Air Act as well as longstanding EPA and DEQ precedent weigh against this type of an 

assessment. For decades, EPA and DEQ have been performing visibility assessments. Each of 

these assessments has been performed on a Class I by Class I area basis. DEQ has never applied 

a cumulative assessment that aggregated all impacts across all Class I areas within the radius of 

impact. Making such a profound change at this time from an established agency means of 

addressing visibility may require rulemaking on DEQ’s part. 

The cumulative approach that DEQ is suggesting also ignores the reality of how human beings 

perceive visibility. No single individual would be able to perceive visibility impacts across all 

14 Class I areas within the 300 km radius of impact. Yet the cumulative approach essentially 

assumes that such simultaneous observation of visibility impacts in multiple Class I areas can 

and does occur. Furthermore, the cumulative approach distorts the temporal element of visibility 

impact assessment. On any given day the Boardman Plant will impact only a subset of the Class 

I areas and such impacts change day to day and even over the course of the day. Aggregating the 

impacts as DEQ suggests both distorts and exaggerates the true impact of the Boardman Plant. 

Conversely, this approach overstates the benefits associated with particular control technologies. 

The truth of this statement is best shown by two examples. If a control achieved a tenth of a 

deciview of improvement at ten different Class I areas, the cumulative evaluation approach 

would suggest that a significant improvement resulted. However, a tenth of a deciview of 

improvement is far below the level that the human eye can detect. Second, under the cumulative 

approach the benefits would double if a single Class I area were divided into two. Similarly, 

improvements achieved at Goat Rocks Wilderness area and Mt Rainier National Park would be 

counted twice even though the reduction at one necessarily carries with it the reduction at the 

other due to their proximity in relation to the Boardman Plant. Such an approach makes no sense 

and generates bad policy decisions. This approach is even worse when developed into a 

cumulative dollars per deciview evaluation approach. Such an approach arbitrarily inflates the 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

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projected visibility improvements and underrepresents the costs associated with any 

improvement. 

EPA has generally expressed concerns about relying too heavily on the “dollars per deciview” 

metric in making a BART determination. The 2005 BART guidelines acknowledge that this is 

one means of evaluating BART options. However, as EPA has previously stated, “given the 

significant difficulties in developing a meaningful method for calculating $/dv, EPA does not 

recommend its use as the sole factor in making a BART determination and would likely not 

approve a SIP based on that basis.” EPA Region 7 Letter to Nebraska DEQ; June 26, 2009. 

DEQ is acting inconsistently with this guidance by overly relying on the approach of evaluating 

BART options based on cumulative impacts and a dollars per deciview metric. 

3. PGE’s Proposed Resolution

For the reasons stated above, the Department’s BART analysis is fundamentally flawed and that 

neither Option 1 nor Option 2 can be considered BART. When the Department’s BART analysis 

is corrected and the true costs of the different options are evaluated, it is clear that operation on 

reduced sulfur coal, low-NOx burners, modified overfire air and SNCR through 2020 constitutes 

BART. However, while DSI cannot be required as BART without adequate consideration of its 

cost-effectiveness, and due to its likely inability to be permitted at the level of operation 

anticipated by DEQ and the absence of long term experience with the technology on boilers 

similar to the Boardman Plant boiler, PGE is willing to commit to a pilot study of the 

technology. Based on that pilot study, PGE would determine the highest level of reagent 

injection that could occur in conjunction with the other controls without causing a significant 

increase in PM2.5 emissions and without impairing the ability to reduce mercury emissions by at 

least 90 percent. Contingent on the results of the pilot testing, PGE would commit to meeting a 

0.4 lb SO2/MMBtu limit through 2020 using DSI. If this option is considered BART, DEQ 

would need to provide a procedure for establishing an alternative SO2 limit if PGE’s pilot testing 

demonstrated that operation of DSI could not reach 0.4 lb SO2/MMBtu, when operating in 

conjunction with SNCR and the mercury controls, without resulting in an increase in the hourly 

capacity to emit PM or triggering PSD for PM2.5 (assuming the same level of operation currently 

reflected in the Boardman Plant’s plant site emission limits). If this showing can be made, then 

the 0.4 lb SO2/MMBtu would apply starting on July 1, 2014. If the showing cannot be made, 

then DEQ would provide a mechanism for establishing an alternative BART SO2 limit based on 

the pilot test at the highest level of control that can reliably be achieved without increasing the 

hourly capacity to emit PM or triggering PSD (but no higher than 0.6 lb/MMBtu). The analysis 

of the pilot test results and any procedure for establishing an alternative BART SO2 limit would 
Mr. Brian Finneran 

July 30, 2010 

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be based on the Boardman Plant operating at the same levels currently reflected in the Boardman 

Plant’s plant site emission limits. Closure, in 2020, would be enforced through a state and 

federally enforceable permit condition, subject to penalties for noncompliance.

4. Conclusion

PGE appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Department’s BART determination in 

advance of the Fiscal Impacts Advisory Committee meeting. Any requirement that the Company 

install hundreds of millions of dollars worth of control equipment and then recover those costs 

over a short remaining plant life and then pay for replacement generation thereafter has a 

profound impact on our customers. At a time when our customers, and Oregon itself, struggle to 

manage through the Great Recession and any increase in rates is greeted with concern, we 

believe that it defies common sense to require an investment that could reach $400 million and 

then require that the plant shut down at least 22 years early. Such an approach does not appear 

prudent and would be viewed by small and large business owners, commercial entities and 

residential customers as a significant and unreasonable impact. Emphasizing again what we 

stated above, if an acceptable amendment to the 2009 Regional Haze rules cannot be achieved, 

our most responsible course of action remains full implementation of controls and continued 

operation of the plant to serve our customers through at least 2040. As unfortunate and 

unnecessary an outcome as this may be, we believe that it will still be the best plan available to 

us if the other options described by DEQ are carried through to the final rule amendments as 

drafted. Therefore, we believe the best approach is to proceed with a BART determination that 

matches the elements described in Section 3 above.