i i i i i i



### CON CU RR ING A ND DISS ENT ING OP INION

No
. 04 -0 8- 00 75 7- CV DISCOVER P ROP ERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COM P ANY , Appellant
v . Cha rl e s TA TE , Appellee Fr om the 45th J udicial District Court, Be x ar County , Texas

Trial Court No. 2007-CI -11318 Honora ble Ba rbar a Ha nson Nellermoe , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Concurringand dissenting opinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J une 24, 2009 Irespe ctfully dissent from the majority ’s hol ding beca use I believe the L eg islature intended for th e d e te r

mi n a ti o n o f w h e th e r to aw ar d a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s an d th e a mo u n t to b e aw arde d under section 408.221(c ) of the T exas Worker’s Compensation Ac t to be made by the trial cour

t, and not a jury . Whil e the Te x as Supreme Court ha s said the question of attorn ey ’s fe es is “g ener ally ” a qu e sti on fo r t he jur y , in thi s in sta nc e , I be lie ve se c tio n 4 08 .2 21 dir e c ts o the rw ise . H ow e ve r, Iwo uldCon c u r r i n g a n d Di s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 2- rema nd to the trial court f

or fur ther proc eeding s beca

use I believe a party who requests a full plena ry or evide ntiary

hear ing on the rea sonablene ss and nece ssity of attorne y ’s fe es under

section 408.221 is entitled to one.

AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER SECTIO N 408.221 Se c tio n 4 08 .2 21 pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: (a) An attorne y ’s fee, i n cl u ding a conting ency

fee , for r epre senting a cla imant b e f o r e th e d iv is io no r

c o u rt u n d e r th is s u b ti tle must be approve d by the commissioner or

c ou rt . (b) Ex cept a s otherwise pr ovided, an attorney ’s fee under this sec tion is based on the attorney ’s time a

nd expenses acc ording to written evidenc e pr ese nte d to the division or

c ou rt . Ex cept a s provided by S u b s ection (c) . . ., the a t t o r n e y’ s f e e s h a l l b e p a i d

f r o m t h e c l a i m an t ’ s r e c o v e r y. (c) An insuranc e carrie r that see ks judicial review under Subcha

pter G, Chapte r 410, of a f

inal decision of the a

ppeals pa n el reg ardingcompensa bility or elig ibilit y fo r, o r the amount of, income or de ath bene fits is li able f or rea sonable a

nd nece ssary

attorney ’s fe es as provided by Subsection (d) i n cu rred by

the claimant a s a re sult of the insurance car rier’ s appea l if the claiman t p r e v a il s o n an is s u e o n w h ic h ju d ic ia l r e v ie w is s o u g h t by the insurance car

rier . . . I f the c arr i er appea ls mult iple issues and the c laimant preva ils on some, but not all, of the issues appea led, the cour t shall apportion and awa rd fee s to the claimant’s attorney only for the issues on whi ch the claimant pre vails. I n making that apportionment, thec ou rt s ha ll c on sid e r the fac tors presc ribed by

Subsection (d) . . . . (d) I n approvingan attorne y ’s fee under this sec tion, the commissioner or c ou rt shall consider : (1) the time and labor require d; (2) the novelty

and diffic ulty

of the que stions invol ved; ( 3 ) t h e s k i l l r e qu i r e d

t o p e r f o r m t h e l e g a l s e r

v i c e s p r o p e r l y; (4 ) the fe e c us tom ari ly c ha rg e d in the loc a lity

fo r simi lar l e g a l se rv ic e s; ( 5 ) t h e a m o u n ti n v o l v e d i nt h e c o n t r o v e r s y; (6) the bene fits to the claimant t h at the attorne y is responsible for secur ing; a

nd (7 ) the e xpe ri e nc e and a bil ity of the a tto rn e y

pe rf or min g the se rv ic e s.

. . .Con c u r r i n g a n d Di s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 3- (i) Ex cept a s provided by Subsection (c)
. . ., an attorne y ’s fe e may not exceed 2 5 p e r c e n to f

t h e c l a i m an t ’ s r e c o v e r

y. T EX . L A BOR C ODE ANN . § 408.221 (Ve rnon 2006) ( emphasis adde d). As the majority

corr ectly n o t es , we must construe section 408.221 as a whole rather than iso la tin g pa

rt ic ula r w or ds or

ph ra se s f ro m th e statut or

y c on te xt; Tex. De

p’t of Transp. v. Cit

y of Sunset Valley , 14 6 S.W. 3d 63 7, 64 2 (T e x. 20 04 ); Kroger Co. v. Keng , 2 3 S. W. 3 d 3 4 7 , 3 4 9 ( T e x. 2000); and we must “ presume that ever y word in a statute has bee n used for a purpose and that eve ry word ex cluded was excluded for a purpose.” Cornyn v. UniverseLife Ins. Co. , 988 S.W .2d 376, 379 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied). T he Te x as S u p reme Court has long inter prete d section 408.221 as v es t i n g t h e trial court with the sole discre tion to award a nd deter mine the amount of attorney ’s fe es, eve n in case s tried to a jury
. See Tex. Employer’s Ins. Ass’n v . Motley , 491 S.W .2d 39 5, 39 7 ( Te x. 19 73 ); Tex. Employ er’s Ins. Ass’n v. Hatton , 152 Tex. 199, 255 S .W.2d 848, 849 (1953). I do not be lieve this interpr etation should c hang e mere ly beca use the L eg islature ame nded
se c t i o n 4 0 8
. 2 2 1 t o a d d s u b s e c t i o n ( c )
. I n f

a c t , w h e n t h e L e g i s l a tu r e a d d e d s u b s e c t i o n(c ), it
c on tin ue d to dir e c t th a t thec ou rt shall consider the fac tors presc ribed in subse ction (d). Also, when
c on str uin g a statut e , we mus t no t g ive on e pr ov isi on a me anin g ou t of ha rm on y or inc on sis te nt w ith other provisions. See Tex. Dep’ t of Tr ansp. v. Needham , 82 S.W .3d 314, 318 (Tex. 2002). Nothing i nt h e w o r d i n g o f

s e c t i o n4 0 8
. 2 2 1 , i ni t s e n t i r e t y, o r i n s u b s e c t i o n s ( c ) o r ( d ) , m o r e s p e c i f

i c a l l y, indicates the L eg islature intended the commissioner or trial cour t to determine attorney ’s fe es under subsection (a ), but a jury

to determine attorney ’s fe es under subsection (c ). The majority ’s hol ding that a jury must determine the r easona bleness and ne cessity

of the fee s is premised on its conclusion that provisions authorizing the re cover y of a claimant’s attorney ’sCon c u r r i n g a n d Di s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 4- fee s under se ction 408.221(c) must be interpre ted “in view of . . . Supreme Court pre cede nt
rec og nizi ng the g ener al right to a jury deter mination of the rea sonable amount of attorney ’s fe es.” Ibelieve the case s upon which the majority relies are disti ng uishable. I n City of Garland v. Dallas Mo rn ing Ne ws , 22 S.W .3d 351 (Tex. 2000), t he Tex as S upreme Court considere d whether the trial judge , and not a jury , deter mines the amount of attorney ’s fee s under the Texas Public I nformation Ac t, w hic h p ro vid e d at th e tim e of the de c isi on

a s f oll ow s: (a) I n an ac tion broug ht under Sec tion 552.321 [sui t for wr it of mandamus under the Act] .
. . , the court may assess costs of l itigation and rea sonable attorney fee s incurre d by

a plaintiff or

defe ndant who substantially preva ils. (b) In exercising its discreti o n u n d er this sec tion, the court shall consider whether the conduc t of t h e go v ernme ntal body had a r easona

ble basis in law and whether the litigation wa s broug ht in good f aith. See Act of

May 27 , 1 99 9, S.B . 1 85 1 § 29 , 7 6th L e g ., R.S. (c od if

ie d at T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE ANN . § 552.323 (Ve rnon 2004))
. The Da llas Morning News argued that by including the “cour

t” lang uag e and omitting a ny provision for a jury deter

mination, the L eg islature indicate d its int ent that sec tion 552.323 required the trial judg e to deter

mine the amount of attorney ’s fe es. 22 S.W.3d at 367. The Court disag ree d, and held that, beca

use subsec tion 552.323(a) state s the trial cour t “may ” asse ss attorney ’s fe es, “the trial judg e decide s whether to a war d attorney ’s fee s under the Act.” Id. Howeve r, ac knowledg ing that “sec tion 552.323 does not dictate how to deter mine the attorney ’s fees amount, ex cept that the
awa rd mus t be ‘r e a so na

ble ’, ” the Court

re lie d o n it s in te rp re ta tio n o f simi lar statut or y langua g e in Bocque t v. Herring , 972 S
. W
. 2 d 1 9 (Tex . 1998), and state d “[i] n g ener al, the re asonable ness of statutory attorney ’s fe es is a jury

question.” Id. (c i t i n g Bocque t , 972 S.W .2d at 21).Con c u r r i n g a n d Di s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 5- I n Bocque t , the i ssue before the Court was “what st andar d is
. . . an award of attorney fee s [under the Dec laratory

J udg ment Act] to be review ed on appeal
. ” 9 7 2 S.W .2d at 20. The A ct p ro v i des that in any

proce eding under the Act, “the court may awa rd costs and r easona

ble and
nece ssary attorney ’s fe es as a

re e quitable and just.” T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 37.009 (Ve rnon 2008). The Supreme Court f irst held that the Dec laratory J udg ment Act “a ffor ds the trial
c ourt a me a sure of

dis c re tio n in de c idi ng wh e the r to a wa rd a tto rn e y fe e s or no t” be c a us e the Ac t di d

“ n o tr e qu i r e anaw a

r d o f a t t o r n e y f e e s t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p art y. R a t h e r , i t p r o v i d e s t h a tt h e c o u rt‘ m ay’
awa rd attorney

fee s.” Bocque t , 972 S.W .2d at 20. Noting that two of the four limit ations imposed
on the t rial court’s discretion we re that fee s must be rea sonable a nd nece ssary , the Court then held, “[i] n g ener al, ‘[t] he re asonable ness of a ttorney ’s fe es, t he re cover y of which is author ized by
. . . sta tut e , i s a

qu e s t i o no f

f a c tf o r t h e j u r y ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o n ’ ” an d

“ t h a tf e e s m u s tb e n e c e s s ar

y , is likewise a f

act que stion.” Id. at 21 (c itation omit ted). Ibelieve the wording of the statutes considere d by the Supreme Court in City of Garland and Bocque t is the distinguishing f

actor . Neither the Texas Public I nformation Ac t nor the De clar atory J udg ment Act st ate how to deter mine the amount of attorney ’s fees. Section 408.221 of the Te x as Worker’s Compensation Ac t, on the ot her hand, specific ally direc ts either the c ommissi oner or the
c ou rt to (1) appr ove the attorney ’s fe es, (2 ) co n sider wr itten evidence of the attorney ’s time and expenses, (3) c onsider seve n fac tors with reg ard to the reasonablene ss and necessity of the fe es, and (4) if n ec es s ar y , apportion t he fe es. See T EX . L A BOR C ODE ANN . § 408.221(a) , (b), ( c), ( d). Ac c or din g ly , I

do no t be lie ve the Sup re me Court ’s state me nt t hat “ [i] n general , th e re a so na ble ne ss of st atutory attorney ’s fees i s a jury question” controls the issue he re a nd, instead, the attorney ’s fe esCon c u r r i n g a n d Di s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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1 ... A s t he m ajo ri t y notes , a plenary heari ng i nvo l ves wi t ness es present i ng t est i m o ny i n co urt or b y de p o si t i o n, a n d thu s su b je c t t o c ro ss-e x a m ina tio n , ra the r th a n b y a ff id a v it. Jac k B. A ngl i n C o. v. Ti pps , 8 4 2 S.W
. 2 d 26 6 , 26 9 (T ex. 1 9 9 2 ).

- 6- issue under se ction 408.221 is for the trial c ourt to determine. See City o f Garland , 22 S.W .3d at 3 6 7 (c i t i n g Bocque t , 972 S.W .2d at 21) (e mphasis added)
. For the re asons stated a

bove, I would hold that the deter minati o n of whe ther to aw ard attorney ’s fe es and the “re ason able a nd nece ssary” amount to be a war ded under

section 408.221 must be made by either the commissioner or t he trial court, a nd not a jury
. See also I

ns. Co. of Penn.
v . M ur o , No. 05-07-00279, 2009 WL 620990, at *6 (Te x . App.—Dallas Ma r. 12, 2009, pet. filed) (holding that, even unde r a fee -shifting scheme and wher e rea sonablene ss a nd nece ssity of attorne y ’s fee s is c ontested, it wa s not ne cessa ry for claimant to obta in jur y finding s with reg ard to he r aw ard of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s) ; Transcontinental Ins. v. Crump , 274 S.W .3d 86, 100-02 (Te x . App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2008, pet. fil ed) ( jury trial on attorney ’s fe es not constitutionally require d in worker ’s comp e ns a tio n c a se ); Dean Foods Co. v. Ande rson , 1 7 8 S
. W
. 3 d 4 4 9 , 4 5 5 ( T e x. A p p . —

Am a ri llo 2005, pet. denied) (“A ttorney ’s fe es must be appr oved by TWCC or the trial c ourt and must be base d upon the attorne y ’s time and expense a s evidenc ed by written docume nt at i o n . . . . Howeve r, the
manner and amount of the awa

rd of attorney ’s fe es is within the trial court’s discr etion.”). PL ENARY HEA RI

NG 1 The trial c ourt awa

rded attorney ’s fe es base d on opposing a ffidavits with o u t h ear ing the te sti mony of any

wi tne ss. On

a pp e a l, D isc ov e r P ro pe rt

y & Ca su a lty

I ns ur anc e Com

pa ny a sse rt s it
was e ntitled to a plenary hear ing, i.e. , a full evide ntiary hear ing, on the conteste d i s s u e of the
rea sonablene ss and nec essity of the fe es aw arde d to Charles Tate . Iag ree .Con c u r r i n g a n d Di s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 7- Section 408.221 does not addre ss whether the trial court must conduct a plena ry hear ing when attorney ’s fee s are disputed; the only require ment is that “ an attorney ’s fee under this sec tion [be] based on the attorney ’s time and expenses ac cordingto wri tte n e v idenc e pr ese nte d to the division or c ourt.” T EX . L A BOR C ODE ANN . § 40 8. 22 1( b) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . I do no t in te rp re t th is
se c tio n a s p ro hib iti nga

fu ll e vid e nti ary he ari ng , if re qu e ste d, a t w hic h w itn e sse s are su bje c t to c ro ssexamination. Se c tio n 4 08 .2 21 do e s n ot s ta te the tr ia l c ourt sh ou ld d e c ide the a mou

nt of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in a summary

fashion. When the reasonablene ss and nec essity of attorne y ’s fe es is contested, I believe the trial cour

t, upon reque st, must conduct “a plenar y hear ing, that is, a hear ing at which witnesses prese nt sworn t es timony in person or by

deposition rather

than by aff idavit” “to dete rmine the disputed fac ts.” See Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps , 842 S.W .2d 266, 269 (Tex. 1992) (holding , “trial
c ourt may su mma ri ly de c ide wh e the r t o c omp e l arb itr a tio n o n th e ba si s o f a ff ida vit s, ple a din g s, discovery , and stipulatio n s . Howeve r, if the mate rial fa cts nec essar y to determine the issue are controve rted, by an opposi ng aff idavit or otherwise admissible evidence , the trial cour t must conduct an evide ntiary

hear ing to de termine the disputed mate rial fa ct s . ”) . Also, “[e]ven when dec iding controve rted mate rial fa cts in a matter f or which th e L eg islature has pr escr ibed summary dispositi on,
we r equire trial courts to c onduct an evidentiar y hear ing to r esolve those disputed fac ts.” Gene ral Motors Corp. v. Bloyed , 916 S.W .2d 949, 958 (Tex. 1996) (re manding to trial cour t fo r plena ry hear ing on a

pproving class ac tion settlement). There fore , “[g]iven the heig htened r esponsibility of the trial court in appr oving [the aw ard of attorne y ’s fe es under

Texas L abor Code se cti on 408.221], . . . a plenary hear ing, w ith the opportunity

for que stioning by

the cour t and vigorous cross-examination by counsel . . . should beCon c u r r i n g a n d Di s s e n t i n g Opi n i on 04
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- 8- the g ener al rule.” Id. He re , n e ith e r p art y wa s a ff or de d th e op po rt

un ity to c ro ss- e xami ne any

wi tne ss; there fore , Ido not believe the disputed issue of whether the re quested fe es we re n ec es s ar y and
rea sonable could be determined i n a summary fashion. Se e Ma rk

e r v . G ar c ia , 185 S.W .3d 21, 27
n. 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 20 05 , no pe t.) (h old ing that th e “ c re dib ili ty of the Ga rc ia s is lik e ly

to be a dis po sit ive fa c tor

in t he re so lut ion

of the c a se ; th e refo re, the a ff ida vit s w ou ld n ot s up po rt

a
su mma ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f t he Ga rc ia s b e c a us e the a ff

ida vit s w ou ld n ot c on c lus ive ly e sta bli sh that the prope rty

was to be used as the Gar cias’ residenc e.”)
. Acc ording ly , Iwould rema nd for the trial court to c onduct a full evidentiar y hear ing on the attorne y ’s fe es issue. B eca use I would rema

nd the c a us e to t he tr ia l c ourt , I

c on c ur in t he jud g me nt.

Sandee B ry an Mar ion , J ustice