III 

114TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 414 

Expressing the sense of the Senate on the actions, including the reapplication 

of waived nuclear-related sanctions, that the United States should undertake in the event of an Iranian violation of the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

APRIL 6, 2016 

Mr. LANKFORD submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION 

Expressing the sense of the Senate on the actions, including 

the reapplication of waived nuclear-related sanctions, 

that the United States should undertake in the event 

of an Iranian violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action. 

Whereas national security is a fundamental and primary responsibility of both Congress and the President; 

Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Barack Obama 

reached an agreement with Iran known as the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action, a political agreement 

among the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany (commonly referred to as the ‘‘P5+1 


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countries’’) and Iran that does not carry the force or effect of United States law; 

Whereas President Obama lifted nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iran on January 16, 2016; 

Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Obama stated, ‘‘If 

Iran violates the deal, all of these sanctions will snap 

back into place.’’; 

Whereas Congress intends to work with the President to ensure that the President’s commitment to snapping back 

sanctions in response to any violation by Iran of the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is fully enforced; 

Whereas Iran has been the beneficiary of financial assets and 

international engagement while its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

of Action has yet to be proven; and 

Whereas, given the historic and dramatic shift in longstanding United States foreign policy represented by the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the obligations and 

commitments Iran agreed to as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action must be clarified by the Senate: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, 

2 SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON IRANIAN VIOLA3 TIONS OF THE JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 

4 OF ACTION. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of the Senate— 

6 (1) that the United States should take the ac7 tions specified in subsection (b) if— 


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1 (A) Iran ever seeks, develops, manufac2 tures, or acquires nuclear weapons; 

3 (B) Iran ever engages in plutonium reproc4 essing or plutonium-related research and devel5 opment; 

6 (C) Iran violates— 

7 (i) the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera8 tion of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash9 ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 

10 (21 UST 483) (commonly referred to as 

11 the ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ or 

12 the ‘‘NPT’’); 

13 (ii) the Agreement between Iran and 

14 the International Atomic Energy Agency 

15 for the Application of Safeguards in Con16 nection with the Treaty on the Non-Pro17 liferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vi18 enna June 19, 1973 (commonly referred to 

19 as the ‘‘Comprehensive Safeguards Agree20 ment’’); 

21 (iii) its commitment to ratify by Octo22 ber 18, 2023, the Additional Protocol to 

23 the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; 

24 or 


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1 (iv) the Iranian-ratified Additional 

2 Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards 

3 Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the 

4 Subsidiary Arrangements to the Com5 prehensive Safeguards Agreement; 

6 (D) Iran installs a new natural uranium 

7 core or the original core in the Arak reactor; 

8 (E) the power of Iran’s redesigned heavy 

9 water reactor exceeds 20 MWth; 

10 (F) Iran produces any amount of weapons 

11 grade uranium or plutonium; 

12 (G) Iran pursues construction at the exist13 ing unfinished Arak heavy water reactor based 

14 on its original design; 

15 (H) Iran produces or tests natural ura16 nium pellets, fuel pins, or fuel assemblies that 

17 are specifically designed for the support of the 

18 originally designed Arak heavy water reactor, 

19 designated by the International Atomic Energy 

20 Agency as IR–40; 

21 (I) Iran does not store all existing natural 

22 uranium pellets and IR–40 fuel assemblies 

23 under the continuous monitoring of the Inter24 national Atomic Energy Agency until the mod25 ernized Arak reactor becomes operable; 


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1 (J) once the Arak reactor becomes oper2 able, Iran does not take the IR–40 fuel assem3 blies and natural uranium pellets and convert 

4 them to uranyl nitrate or exchange them with 

5 an equivalent quantity of natural uranium; 

6 (K) Iran does not make the necessary 

7 technical modifications to the natural uranium 

8 fuel production process line that was intended 

9 to supply fuel for the IR–40 reactor design, 

10 such that it can be used for the fabrication of 

11 the fuel reloads for the modernized Arak reac12 tor; 

13 (L) all spent fuel from the redesigned Arak 

14 reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime 

15 of the reactor, is not shipped out of Iran; 

16 (M) Iran operates the Fuel Manufacturing 

17 Plant to produce anything other than fuel as18 semblies for light water reactors or reloads for 

19 the modernized Arak reactor; 

20 (N) Iran does not inform the International 

21 Atomic Energy Agency about the inventory and 

22 production of the Heavy Water Production 

23 Plant or does not allow the International Atom24 ic Energy Agency to monitor the quantities of 

25 the heavy water stocks and the amount of heavy 


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1 water produced, including through visits by the 

2 International Atomic Energy Agency, as re3 quested, to the Heavy Water Production Plant; 

4 (O) Iran does not ship out all spent fuel 

5 for all future and present nuclear power and re6 search reactors; 

7 (P) Iran does not remove and keep stored 

8 at Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment 

9 plant under continuous monitoring by the Inter10 national Atomic Energy Agency— 

11 (i) all excess centrifuge machines, in12 cluding IR–2m centrifuges (during the 10- 

13 year prohibition period under the Joint 

14 Comprehensive Plan of Action); and 

15 (ii) UF6 pipework including sub head16 ers, valves and pressure transducers at 

17 cascade level, and frequency inverters, and 

18 UF6 withdrawal equipment from one of 

19 the withdrawal stations, which is currently 

20 not in service, including its vacuum pumps 

21 and chemical traps (during the 10-year 

22 prohibition period under the Joint Com23 prehensive Plan of Action); 

24 (Q) the 164-machine IR–2m cascade does 

25 not remain stored at Natanz in Hall B of the 


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1 fuel enrichment plan under the continuous mon2 itoring of the International Atomic Energy 

3 Agency; 

4 (R) the 164-machine IR–4 cascade does 

5 not remain stored at Natanz in Hall B of the 

6 fuel enrichment plan under the continuous mon7 itoring of the International Atomic Energy 

8 Agency; 

9 (S) Iran enriches, obtains, or otherwise 

10 stockpiles any uranium, including in oxide form, 

11 enriched to greater than 3.67 percent; 

12 (T) all future uranium oxide, scrap oxide, 

13 or other material not in fuel plates enriched to 

14 between 5 and 20 percent is not transferred out 

15 of Iran or diluted to a level of 3.67 percent or 

16 less within 6 months of production; 

17 (U) Iran does not abide by its voluntary 

18 commitments as expressed in its own long-term 

19 enrichment and enrichment research and devel20 opment plan submitted as part of the initial 

21 declaration described in Article 2 of the Addi22 tional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safe23 guards Agreement; 

24 (V) Iran engages in production of cen25 trifuges, including centrifuge rotors suitable for 


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1 isotope separation or any other centrifuge com2 ponents, which exceeds the enrichment and en3 richment research and development require4 ments outlined in Annex I of the Joint Com5 prehensive Plan of Action; 

6 (W) Iran does not permit the International 

7 Atomic Energy Agency the use of online enrich8 ment measurement and electronic seals, as well 

9 as other International Atomic Energy Agency10 approved and certified modern technologies in 

11 line with internationally accepted practices of 

12 the International Atomic Energy Agency; 

13 (X) Iran does not facilitate automated col14 lection of International Atomic Energy Agency 

15 measurement recordings registered by installed 

16 measurement devices and sent to the Inter17 national Atomic Energy Agency working space 

18 at individual nuclear sites; 

19 (Y) Iran does not make the necessary ar20 rangements to allow for a long-term presence of 

21 the International Atomic Energy Agency, in22 cluding issuing long-term visas, as well as pro23 viding proper working space at nuclear sites 

24 and, to the best of its effort, at locations near 

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1 national Atomic Energy Agency inspectors for 

2 working and keeping necessary equipment; 

3 (Z) Iran does not increase the number of 

4 designated International Atomic Energy Agency 

5 inspectors to at least 130 by October 16, 2016, 

6 which is the date that is 9 months after imple7 mentation day, or does not allow the designa8 tion of inspectors from countries that have dip9 lomatic relations with Iran; 

10 (AA) Iran does not apply nuclear export 

11 policies and practices in line with the inter12 nationally established standards for the export 

13 of nuclear material, equipment, and technology; 

14 (BB) Iran does not permit the Inter15 national Atomic Energy Agency access to verify 

16 that uranium isotope separation production and 

17 research and development activities are con18 sistent with Annex I of the Joint Comprehen19 sive Plan of Action; 

20 (CC) Iran engages in— 

21 (i) designing, developing, acquiring, or 

22 using computer models to simulate nuclear 

23 explosive devices; 

24 (ii) designing, developing, fabricating, 

25 acquiring, or using multi-point explosive 


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1 detonation systems suitable for a nuclear 

2 explosive device, unless approved by the 

3 Joint Commission for non-nuclear purposes 

4 and subject to monitoring; 

5 (iii) designing, developing, fabricating, 

6 acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic 

7 systems (streak cameras, framing cameras 

8 and flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the 

9 development of a nuclear explosive device, 

10 unless approved by the Joint Commission 

11 for non-nuclear purposes and subject to 

12 monitoring; or 

13 (iv) designing, developing, fabricating, 

14 acquiring, or using explosively driven neu15 tron sources or specialized materials for 

16 explosively driven neutron sources; 

17 (DD) during the 10-year period beginning 

18 on implementation day and ending on January 

19 16, 2026— 

20 (i) Iran operates, for the purpose of 

21 enriching uranium, more than 5,060 IR–1 

22 centrifuges; 

23 (ii) Iran’s enrichment capacity exceeds 

24 5,060 IR–1 centrifuge machines in 30 cas25 cades in their current configurations in 


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1 currently operating units at the Natanz 

2 Fuel Enrichment Plant; 

3 (iii) consistent with Iran’s enrichment 

4 research and development plan, Iran’s en5 richment research and development with 

6 uranium includes any centrifuges other 

7 than IR–4, IR–5, IR–6, and IR–8 cen8 trifuges; 

9 (iv) Iran conducts testing of more 

10 than a single IR–4 centrifuge machine and 

11 IR–4 centrifuge cascade of up to 10 cen12 trifuge machines; 

13 (v) Iran tests more than a single IR– 

14 5 centrifuge machine; 

15 (vi) Iran does not recombine the en16 riched and depleted streams from the IR– 

17 6 and IR–8 cascades through the use of 

18 welded pipework on withdrawal main head19 ers in a manner that precludes the with20 drawal of enriched and depleted uranium 

21 materials and verified by the International 

22 Atomic Energy Agency; 

23 (vii) research and development with 

24 uranium is not strictly limited to IR–4, 

25 IR–5, IR–6, and IR–8 centrifuges; 


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1 (viii) Iran’s uranium isotope separa2 tion-related research and development or 

3 production activities are not exclusively 

4 based on gaseous centrifuge technology; 

5 (ix) Iran engages in nuclear direct-use 

6 or nuclear dual-use procurements of com7 modities without using the procurement 

8 channel mandated by the United Nations 

9 under United Nations Security Council 

10 Resolution 2231 (2015); 

11 (x) research and development is car12 ried out in the IR–4, IR–5, IR–6, or IR– 

13 8 centrifuges in a manner that accumu14 lates enriched uranium, or Iran installs or 

15 tests those centrifuges beyond the enrich16 ment and enrichment research and devel17 opment requirements outlined in Annex I 

18 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; 

19 (xi) except as otherwise provided in 

20 subparagraph (LL), mechanical testing on 

21 up to 2 single centrifuges for each type is 

22 carried out on any centrifuge other than 

23 the IR–2m, IR–4, IR–5, IR–6, IR–6s, IR– 

24 7, or IR–8; or 


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1 (xii) Iran builds or tests any new cen2 trifuge without approval of the Joint Com3 mission; 

4 (EE) during the 15-year period beginning 

5 on implementation day and ending on January 

6 16, 2031— 

7 (i) Iran conducts uranium enrich8 ment-related activities at Fordow; 

9 (ii) Iran’s stockpile of enriched ura10 nium hexafluoride, or the equivalent in 

11 other chemical forms, exceeds 300 kg en12 riched to 3.67 percent; 

13 (iii) Iran reprocesses spent fuel except 

14 for irradiated enriched uranium targets for 

15 production of radioisotopes for medical and 

16 peaceful industrial purposes; 

17 (iv) Iran develops, acquires, or builds 

18 facilities capable of separation of pluto19 nium, uranium, or neptunium from spent 

20 fuel or from fertile targets, other than for 

21 production of radioisotopes for medical and 

22 peaceful industrial purposes; 

23 (v) Iran develops, acquires, builds, or 

24 operates hot cells (containing a cell or 

25 interconnected cells), shielded cells, or 


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1 shielded glove boxes with dimensions not 

2 less than 6 cubic meters in volume compat3 ible with the specifications set out in 

4 Annex I of the Additional Protocol to the 

5 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, un6 less approved by the Joint Commission es7 tablished by the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

8 of Action; 

9 (vi) Iran undertakes destructive post 

10 irradiation examination of fuel pins, fuel 

11 assembly prototypes, and structural mate12 rials, unless the P5+1 countries make 

13 available their facilities to conduct destruc14 tive testing with Iranian specialists, as 

15 agreed pursuant to the Joint Comprehen16 sive Plan of Action; 

17 (vii) Iran engages in producing or ac18 quiring plutonium or uranium metals or 

19 their alloys, or conducts research and de20 velopment on plutonium or uranium (or 

21 their alloys) metallurgy, or casting, form22 ing, or machining plutonium or uranium 

23 metal; 

24 (viii) Iran produces, seeks, or acquires 

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1 nium, uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (ex2 cept for use for laboratory standards or in 

3 instruments using neptunium-237); 

4 (ix) Iran installs gas centrifuge ma5 chines, or enrichment-related infrastruc6 ture, whether suitable for uranium enrich7 ment, research and development, or stable 

8 isotope enrichment, at any location other 

9 than a location exclusively specified under 

10 the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; 

11 (x) Iran conducts all testing of cen12 trifuges with uranium anywhere other than 

13 at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant or Iran 

14 conducts mechanical testing of centrifuges 

15 anywhere other than at the Pilot Fuel En16 richment Plant and the Tehran Research 

17 Centre; 

18 (xi) Iran maintains more than 1044 

19 IR–1 centrifuge machines at one wing of 

20 the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; 

21 (xii) Iran does not limit its stable iso22 tope production activities with gas cen23 trifuges to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment 

24 Plant or uses more than 348 IR–1 cen25 trifuges for such activities; 


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1 (xiii) Iran exceeds the limitations on 

2 its activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrich3 ment Plant as described in Annex I of the 

4 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; 

5 (xiv) Iran does not permit the Inter6 national Atomic Energy Agency regular ac7 cess, including daily as requested by the 

8 International Atomic Energy Agency, ac9 cess to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment 

10 Plant; 

11 (xv) Iran builds or has a heavy water 

12 reactor; 

13 (xvi) Iran does not permit the Inter14 national Atomic Energy Agency to imple15 ment continuous monitoring, including 

16 through containment and surveillance 

17 measures, as necessary, to verify that 

18 stored centrifuges and infrastructure re19 main in storage; 

20 (xvii) Iran does not permit the Inter21 national Atomic Energy Agency regular ac22 cess, including daily access as requested by 

23 the International Atomic Energy Agency, 

24 to relevant buildings at Natanz, including 


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1 parts of the fuel enrichment plan and the 

2 Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant; 

3 (xviii) any uranium enrichment activ4 ity in Iran, including safeguarded research 

5 and development, occurs anywhere but the 

6 Natanz enrichment site; 

7 (xix) Iran engages, including through 

8 export of any enrichment or enrichment re9 lated equipment and technology, with any 

10 other country, or with any foreign entity in 

11 enrichment or enrichment related activi12 ties, including related research and devel13 opment activities, without approval by the 

14 Joint Commission; 

15 (xx) the Fordow Fuel Enrichment 

16 Plant does not remain strictly a research 

17 facility, Iran conducts enrichment or re18 search and development-related activities, 

19 or Iran holds nuclear material at that 

20 Plant; 

21 (xxi) excess heavy water that is be22 yond Iran’s needs for the modernized Arak 

23 research reactor or the zero power heavy 

24 water reactor, quantities needed for med25 ical research and production of the 


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1 deuterated solutions, and chemical com2 pounds including, where appropriate, con3 tingency stocks, is not made available for 

4 export to the international market based 

5 on international prices and delivered to an 

6 international buyer; 

7 (xxii) all enriched uranium 

8 hexafluoride in excess of 300 kg of up to 

9 3.57 percent enriched UF6 (or the equiva10 lent in different chemical forms) is not im11 mediately down-blended to natural ura12 nium level or sold on the international 

13 market and delivered to an international 

14 buyer; 

15 (xxiii) Iran does not rely on only light 

16 water for its future nuclear power and re17 search reactors; 

18 (xxiv) Iran conducts enrichment re19 search and development in a manner that 

20 accumulates enriched uranium; or 

21 (xxv) Iran enriches uranium to a level 

22 exceeding 3.67 percent; 

23 (FF) during the 25-year period beginning 

24 on implementation day and ending on January 

25 16, 2041— 


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1 (i) Iran does not permit the Inter2 national Atomic Energy Agency to monitor 

3 that all uranium ore concentrate produced 

4 in Iran or obtained from any other source 

5 is transferred to the uranium conversion 

6 facility in Esfahan or to any other future 

7 uranium conversion facility that Iran 

8 might decide to build in Iran within this 

9 period; or 

10 (ii) Iran does not provide the Inter11 national Atomic Energy Agency with all 

12 necessary information so that the Inter13 national Atomic Energy Agency will be 

14 able to verify the production of the ura15 nium ore concentrate and the inventory of 

16 uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran 

17 or obtained from any other source; 

18 (GG) on or after January 16, 2024, which 

19 is the date that is 8 years after implementation 

20 day, Iran commences manufacturing IR–6 and 

21 IR–8 centrifuges with rotors, or commences 

22 manufacturing IR–6 and IR–8 centrifuges with23 out rotors at a rate of more than 200 cen24 trifuges per year for each type; 


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1 (HH) on or after January 16, 2026, which 

2 is the date that is 10 years after implementa3 tion day, Iran commences manufacturing on 

4 more than 200 complete centrifuges per year 

5 for each type; 

6 (II) Iran does not present its plan to, and 

7 seek approval by, the Joint Commission if Iran 

8 seeks to initiate research and development on a 

9 uranium metal-based fuel for the Tehran Re10 search Reactor in small agreed quantities after 

11 January 16, 2026, and before January 15, 

12 2031, which are 10 and 15 years after imple13 mentation day, respectively; or 

(JJ) during the 81 14 ⁄2 year period beginning 

15 on implementation day and ending on July 16, 

16 2024— 

17 (i) Iran conducts testing on more than 

18 a single IR–6 centrifuge machine and in19 termediate cascades for such machines and 

20 commences testing on more than 30 cen21 trifuge machines; or 

22 (ii) Iran conducts testing on more 

23 than a single IR–8 centrifuge machine and 

24 intermediate cascades for such machines or 


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1 commences testing on more than 30 cen2 trifuge machines; and 

3 (2) that— 

4 (A) Iran’s uranium enrichment and re5 search and development plans should be made 

6 public; 

7 (B) the reports of the Joint Commission 

8 and procurement requests made to the United 

9 Nations Security Council and to the Joint Com10 mission, and whether or not such requests were 

11 approved, should be made available to the pub12 lic; and 

13 (C) countries should verify the end-use of 

14 items, materials, equipment, goods, and tech15 nologies that require import authorization by 

16 the Joint Commission but are not verified by 

17 the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

18 (b) ACTIONS SPECIFIED.—The actions specified in 

19 this subsection are the following: 

20 (1) Seeking immediate reinstitution and appli21 cation of United Nations Security Council Resolu22 tions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 

23 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 

24 (2015). 


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1 (2) Seeking the immediate adoption of a United 

2 Nations Security Council resolution that directs all 

3 United Nations member states to prevent the direct 

4 or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of all 

5 items listed in subsection (a)(i) of United Nations 

6 Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) in order to 

7 prevent Iran from arming itself while its commit8 ment to international law is still in question. 

9 (3) Working with international partners of the 

10 United States to seek the immediate reapplication of 

11 the regulations of the Council of the European 

12 Union concerning restrictive measures against Iran, 

13 as in effect on October 17, 2015. 

14 (4) The immediate reapplication of the nuclear15 related sanctions waived by the United States. 

16 (5) Seeking the imposition of additional puni17 tive sanctions with respect to Iran. 

18 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

19 (1) HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM.—The term 

20 ‘‘highly enriched uranium’’ means uranium with a 

21 20 percent or higher concentration of the isotope 

22 uranium-235. 

23 (2) IMPLEMENTATION DAY.—The term ‘‘imple24 mentation day’’ means January 16, 2016. 


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1 (3) JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.— 

2 The term ‘‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’’ 

3 means the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 

4 agreed to at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran and 

5 by the People’s Republic of China, France, Ger6 many, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, 

7 and the United States, with the High Representative 

8 of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Se9 curity Policy, and all implementing materials and 

10 agreements related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan 

11 of Action. 

12 (4) P5+1 COUNTRIES.—The term ‘‘P5+1 

13 countries’’ means the United States, France, the 

14 Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, 

15 the United Kingdom, and Germany. 

16 (5) SPENT FUEL.—The term ‘‘spent fuel’’ in17 cludes all types of irradiated fuel. 

Æ 


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