## IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

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### G R E A T E R 

### H O U S T O N 

### P A R T N E R S H IP 

### , P E T IT IO N E R 

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v. 

### K E N 

### P A X T O N 

### , T E X A S 

### A T T O R N E Y 

### G E N E R A L 

### ; A N D 

### J IM 

### J E N K IN S 

### , R E S P O N D E N T S

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O N P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W F R O M T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S F O R T H E T H I R D D I S T R I C T O F T E X A S

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Argued Mar ch 25, 2015
J U S T I C E G U Z M A N delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which C H I E F J U S T I C E H E C H T , J U S T I C E G R E E N , J U S T I C E L E H R M A N N , J U S T I C E D E V I N E , and J U S T I C E B R O W N joined.
J U S T I C E B O Y D filed a dissenting opinion, in which J U S T I C E J O H N S O N and J U S T I C E W I L L E T T joined. The question prese nted here is whether a private entity opera ting like a cham

b er of commerc e is a “g overnme ntal body ” subject to public disclosure of its private business aff airs under the Texas Public I nformation Act. I n seeking to promote the public’s leg itimate interest in transpar ent
g overnme nt, the Act imposes considera ble disclosu re obliga tions on “g overnme ntal bod[i es].”
I mportantly , the s tatutory definition of “gove rnmental body ” ex tends only to “the part, section, or portion of an org anization, corpor ation, commission, committee, instit ution, or ag ency that spends

or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds .” See T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.003(1)( A)(xii) ( emphasis added)

. This ope rate s to pr event nominally private entities whose

wo rk might otherwise qualify them as de fac to public ag encie s from circ umventing th e Ac t ’sdisclosure require ments. This case require s us to decide whether the term “supported” encompa sses

private entities contra cting at arm’s leng th with the g overnme nt to provide g ener al and spec i fi c service s or whether t h e t er m proper ly includes only those entities that could not perf orm simil ar service s without publi c funds a nd, are thus, sustained—in whole or par t—by such funds. When a private entity enter s into a contra ct and rec eives g overnme nt funds in exchang e for its service s, the entity ’s rig ht to conduct its aff airs confide ntially may be in tension with the public’s rig ht to know how g overnme nt funds are spent. Transpa renc y , openness, and acc ountability in the
g overnme nt are all of fundame ntal importance

. Howeve r, these important policy objectives cannot exti ng uish the privac y rig hts properly belong ing to pr ivate business entities in T exas. By liberally

au t h o ri zing public acc ess to g overnme nt rec ords while simult aneously shielding private busines s from unwar

rante d interfe renc e, the L eg islature car efully balanc ed these conflicting interests. Mindful of the delicate equili brium betwee n these equally compelling conce rns, we conclude tha t the term “supported,” which helps define the brea dth of the Act, unambig uously includes only those enti ties at least partially sustained by public funding

. Be cause the statutory lang uage i s unambig uous, we need not consider the accura cy or vitality of the test articula ted in Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1988), which the Attorne y G e n e r a l’ s Open Records Division has tra d it io n a ll y a p plied to private entities in case s involving open-r ecor d reque sts.
H e r e , G r e a

te r H o u s to n Pa

r tn e rship, a nonprofit corpor ati o n p r o v id in g e c o n o mi c - d e v e lo p me n t

s er v i ce s t o the City and other clients pursuant to quid pro quo contra cts, contests whether it is a “g overnme ntal body ” in whole or in part. Apply ing Kneeland , the Attorney Gene ral and lower courts held that it i s. We hold, however, tha t Grea ter Houston Partne rship is not a “gove rnmental body ” under the Texas Public I nformation Act beca use it is not wholly or part i al l y sustained by

2public funds; we there fore reve rse the court of appea ls’ judgme nt and rende r judgme nt f or Gre ater Houston Partnership.
I. F actual and Proc edural Backgroun d Gre ater Houston Partnership (GHP) is a private, nonprofit corpor ation th a t p r o mo te s r e g iona l economic g rowth and an attrac tive business climate for a ten-c ounty are a cente red around Houston,
Texas. GHP’s stated purpose is to enhanc e economic prosper ity , fac ilitate business reloc ation and expansion, encour ag e international outrea ch initiatives, and provide strateg ic planning to advocate for “the improvement of commerc ial, i n d u s t ri al, ag ricultural, civic, and cultural aff airs” in the
Houston reg ion. I n further ance of this objective , GH P provides consulting, event planning , and

m ar k et i n g service s (including adver tising and marke t rese arc h) to its roug hly 2,100 member companies on a contra ctual basis. GHP also hosts numerous networking and profe ssional development events, including sever al wee kly GHP Council meeting s on t o pics rele vant to the
reg ional economy
. GHP opera tes on an an n u al b udg et of approximately $11.7 milli on, and these funds emana

te primarily from membership reve nue. I n short, GHP functions much like thousands of cha mbers of c ommerce acr oss the nation that promote municipal and r eg ional economies. Consist ent with its business model, GHP contra cted to provide consulting, event planning ,

an d marke ting service s to the City of Houston, pursuant to an “Ag ree ment for Professiona l Service s.” GHP and the City signe d simil ar ag ree ments annually for sever al y ear s, including 2007 and 2008, the time periods at issue here

. The contra cts included a “Scope of Service s” exhibi t that delineate d, under g ener al heade rs, the specific service s that GHP would provide to the City

. Under these contra cts, GHP rec eived quarte rly pay ments in arr ear s conting ent upon the City ’s approva l of perf ormanc e reports detailing the particular services GHP provided in that qu arte r. I f GHP failed

3to deliver the c ontrac ted-for service s to the City ’s satisfac tion, the contra cts authorized the City to
pay GHP for the portion of service s satisfac torily rende red. Notably , howeve r, t he two contra cts differ ed in one significant respe ct: the 2008 contra ct expressly provided that “[n] othing in this Ag ree ment shall be construed to imply that [GHP] is subject to the Texas Public I nformation Act.” The instant suit arose from a May 2008 reque st Houston-ar ea resident J im J enkins submitt ed
to GHP in which he soug ht “a copy of the chec k reg ister for [GHP] for all chec ks issued for the y ear 2007.” J enkins g rounded his reque st in the Texas Public I nformation Act (TPI A), cl aiming that “[p] ublic rec ords show that [GHP] is an org anization that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds,” and GHP is, there fore , “subjec t to the Public I nformation Act in the same

manner as a g over nmental body .” See T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.003(1)( A)(xii) (def ining “g overnme ntal body ” for

purposes of the TPI A).
GHP objected to J enkin’s reque st and did not disclose the information. GHP acknow ledg ed it rec eived public funds from the City but disag ree d it qualified as a “g overnme ntal body ” under the
T P I A beca

use the public funds wer e compensa tion for vendor service s provided pursuant t o an arm’s- leng th contra ct with the City

. The City ’s annual pay ments under the contra ct amounted to less than 8% of GHP’s total annual reve nue; member contributions, on the other hand, totaled more than
90% of its re v enue. GHP further noted that of the roug hly 2,100 companies that comprise its

m em b er s hip, only four could be descr ibed as g overnme ntal bodies. Refusing to disclose t h e
reque sted information, GHP ref err ed the matter to the Texas Attorney Gene ral as require d under the
TPI A. See id. §§ 552.301(a) , .307.
I n an informal letter ruling , the Attorney Gene ral’s Open Records Division ag ree d with
J enkins, and conclude d that GHP was a “g o v ernmental body ” subject to the TPI A’s disclosure

4requirem ents —specific ally with respe ct to the 2007 contra ct with the City

. Tex. Att’y Gen. 1 OR2008-16062; see also T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.306. I n rea chi n g t h i s conclusion, the Att orney Gene ral deter

mined that GHP’s opera tions wer e “supported” by the City beca use: (1) GHP provided
vag ue and indefinite service s to the City aimed at advanc ing the Ci t y ’s overa ll economic development; (2) GHP and the City share d a common purpos e an d o b jective cente red around the City ’s economy ; and (3) GHP provided service s traditional l y supplied by the g overnme nt. Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2008-16062.
I n response to the Attorney Gene ral’s informal ruling , GHP filed a decla ratory -judg ment action ag ainst the Attorney Gene ral seeking a dec l ar at i o n that: (1) the Attorney Gene ral lacke d jurisdiction over the dispute and (2) even if jurisdiction was proper , GHP was not a “g overnme ntal body ” under the TPI A. See T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E §§ 552.3215(e) , .321, .3 2 5 (a). Shortly afte r GHP filed suit, J enkins filed an additional reque st seeking a copy of GHP’s 2008 “disburseme nt reg isters and/or chec k reg isters,” including the number, date, pay ee name, amount, and purpose. Noting that
GHP had alre ady filed suit reg arding the 2007 chec k-re g ister reque st, the Attorney Gene ral closed the second reque st without a finding and direc ted the trial court to resolve the dispute. J en k i n s intervene d in the lawsuit shortly there afte r. See id. § 552.325 (authorizing a reque stor to intervene in the suit). After a bench trial, the trial court found GHP was a “g overnme ntal body ” supported by public funds and order ed disclosure of the 2007 and 2008 chec k reg isters. The trial court deter mined that: 2

G H P d i d n o t c l a i m a n y e x e m p t i o n s f r o m m a n d a t o r y d i s c l o s u r e a n d o n l y c h a l l e n g e d t h a t i t i s a g o v e r n m e n t a l 1 b o d y s u b j e c t t o t h e T P I A i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e
. T h e s o l e w i t n e s s w a s T r a c y e M c D a n i e l , G H P ’ s e x e c u t i v e v i c e p r e s i d e n t a n d c h i e f o p e r a t i n g o f f i c e r
. 2 D o c u m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e i n c l u d e d : s i x o t h e r c o n t r a c t s b e t w e e n G H P a n d o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d i e s e x e c u t e d a f t e r 2 0 0 8 ; t h e c o n t r a c t s b e t w e e n t h e C i t y a n d G H P f o r f i s c a l y e a r s 2 0 0 7 , 2 0 0 8 , a n d 2 0 0 9 ; G H P ’ s A r t i c l e s o f I n c o r p o r a t i o n ; 5• GHP rec eived public funds to provid e e c o n o mi c d e v e lo p me n t a n d p r o motion service s for or on behalf of the City ;

• GHP and the City share d the common purpose of economic development and promotion; and

• An ag ency -ty

pe re lationship was cre ated be tween G HP and the City of Houston.

The court of appea ls ag ree d with the trial co u rt and aff irmed its judgme nt, albeit over a strong ly worde d dissent. 407 S.W .3d at 786, 787. Finding the phrase “supported in whole or in part by public funds” a

mbiguous, the lowe r cour t relied on a

n extra-textual ana ly

tical construct known

as the Kneeland test to conclude GHP qualified as a g overnme ntal body under the TPI A. Id. at 782- 3
83. The dissent criticized the court’s relianc e on the Kneeland test, finding the statutory context unambig uously dictated only the narr ow construction of “supported” as applied to a private entity

. Id. at 788 (Jones, C.J ., dissenting)

.
On appea l to this Court, GHP advanc es three principal rea sons why it is not a “g overnme ntal body ” under the TPI A. First, GHP contends t h e p h ra s e “supported

. . . by public funds” unambig uously excludes the City ’s pay ments to GHP. Second, even if the lang uag e is ambig uous, the Court shoul d re

j ec t t h e Kneeland test beca use it is unclea

r and not g rounded in the statutory

J e n k i n s ’ s r e q u e s t s f

o r t h e 2 0 0 7 a n d 2 0 0 8 c h e c k r e g i s t e r s ; a l l f o u r q u a r t e r l y p e r f

o r m a n c e r e p o r t s G H P s u b m i t t e d t o t h e C i t y i n 2 0 0 7 ; a n d p e r f

o r m a n c e r e p o r t s G H P s u b m i t t e d t o o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d i e s i n 2 0 0 7 a n d 2 0 1 0

. D e r i v e d f

r o m a h a n d f

u l o f n a s c e n t o p e n - r e c o r d s r u l i n g s , t h e K n e e l a n d t e s t o r i g i n a t e d i n a 1 9 8 6 c a s e 3
c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r t h e N a t i o n a l C o l l e g i a t e A t h l e t i c A s s o c i a t i o n a n d S o u t h w e s t A t h l e t i c C o n f e r e n c e w e r e “ s u p p o r t e d i n w h o l e o r i n p a r t b y p u b l i c f u n d s ” u n d e r t h e T P I A ’ s p r e d e c e s s o r s t a t u t e
. S e e K n e e l a n d v
. N a t ’ l C o l l e g i a t e A t h l e t i c A s s ’ n , 6 5 0 F

. S u p p
. 1 0 4 7 ( W

. D

. T e x . 1 9 8 6 ) , r e v ’ d , 8 5 0 F

. 2 d 2 2 4 ( 5 t h C i r
. 1 9 8 8 )

. “ F i n d i n g n o d i s p o s i t i v e T e x a s j u r i s p r u d e n c e o n t h i s i s s u e , ” t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t “ c l o s e l y e x a m i n e [ d ] t h e o p i n i o n s o f t h e T e x a s A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ” a n d d i s c o v e r e d “ h e l p f

u l s i g n s , a l b e i t m i x e d s i g n a l s , i n t h e [ A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ] o p i n i o n s
. ” I d

. a t 2 2 8

. D e s p i t e a r a t h e r t e p i d e n d o r s e m e n t , a n d w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e , t h e c o u r t i d e n t i f i e d a n d a p p l i e d “ t h r e e d i s t i n c t p a t t e r n s o f a n a l y s i s i n o p i n i o n s i n t e r p r e t i n g [ t h e f u n d i n g - s o u r c e e l e m e n t ] o f t h e A c t ” t o p r i v a t e e n t i t i e s
. I d

. T h o s e “ p a t t e r n s o f a n a l y s i s ” p r o v i d e d t h e f o u n d a t i o n f

o r w h a t b e c a m e t h e t h r e e - p r o n g e d K n e e l a n d t e s t

.

6lang uag e. Third, GHP arg ues it is not “supported

. . . by public funds” even under the Kneeland test.

The Attorney Gene ral disputes all three points

. First, it contends that GHP plainly qualifies as a “g overnme ntal body ” under the TPI A; limit ing the statute’s rea ch to entities that exis t solely to car ry
out g overnme nt functions would frustra te its purpose of openness, and GHP is “supported” by public funds. Second, the Kneeland test is not only the rele vant fra mework in which to evalua te the TPI A’s application to otherwise private entities, the L eg islature has eff ectively endorse d the Kneeland test. 4 Third, the court of appea ls proper ly applied the three Kneeland elements to GHP, a “g overnme ntal body ” subjec t to reg ulation under the TPI A.
We g rante d GHP’s petition f or revie w to de termine the proper scope of the funding source element of

the TPI A’s “g overnme ntal body ” def inition.

II. Discussion
A. Background Law

The L eg islature enact ed t h e Texas Open Records Act in 1973 to incre ase g overnme nt transpar ency in the wake of public scanda ls, including a m assive st ock -f raud imbroglio known as the Sharpstown s c a

n d a l. I n 1993, the Open Records Act was rec odified without substantive revision 5

T h e L e g i s l a t u r e h a s a m e n d e d t h e T P I A s e v e r a l t i m e s w i t h o u t m a t e r i a l l y a l t e r i n g t h e f u n d i n g - s o u r c e e l e m e n t 4
o f t h e “ g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y ” d e f i n i t i o n
. S e e A c t o f

M a y 2 9 , 1 9 9 5 , 7 4 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 0 3 5 , § 2 , 1 9 9 5 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 5 1 2 7 , 5 1 2 8 ; s e e a l s o A c t o f M a y 2 0 , 1 9 9 1 , 7 2 n d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 3 0 6 , § 5 , 1 9 9 1 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 1 3 4 0 , 1 3 4 1

- 4 2 ; A c t o f M a y 1 7 , 2 0 0 1 , 7 7 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 6 3 3 , § 2 , 2 0 0 1 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 1 1 9 4 , 1 1 9 4

- 9 5 ; A c t o f A p r i l 2 3 , 1 9 9 9 , 7 6 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 6 2 , § 1 8

. 2 4 , 1 9 9 9 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 1 2 7 , 4 0 3 ; A c t o f M a y 2 4 , 2 0 0 1 , 7 7 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 0 0 4 , § 2 , 2 0 0 1 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 2 1 8 6 , 2 1 8 7 ; A c t o f M a y 2 0 , 2 0 0 3 , 7 8 t h L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 1 2 7 6 , § 9

. 0 1 4 , 2 0 0 3 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 4 1 5 8 , 4 2 1 8

.

S e e A c t o f

M a y 1 9 , 1 9 7 3 , 6 3 r d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 4 2 4 , § 1

- 1 6 , 1 9 7 3 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 1 1 1 2 , 1 1 1 2

- 1 8 ( c o d i f i e d a t 5 T E X
. R E V
. C IV
. S T A T
. a r t

. 6 2 5 2

- 1 7 a ) ; s e e g e n e r a l l y M u t s c h e r v
. S t a t e , 5 1 4 S

. W

. 2 d 9 0 5 , 9 1 0

- 1 1 ( T e x . C r i m
. A p p
. 1 9 7 4 ) ( s u m m a r i z i n g e v e n t s o f S h a r p s t o w n s c a n d a l )

. 7as the Texas Public I nformation Act. Currently codified in Chapter 552 of the Texas Gover nment 6 Code, the TPI A’s stated policy objectives are to provide acc ountability and t ra n spare ncy in
g overnme nt by establishing mechanisms t o foster public acc ess t o g overnme nt re co rds. See T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E §§ 552.001-.353. I mportantly , an entity ’s disclosure obliga tions under the TPI A hinge on whether

it is i n fac t a “g overnme ntal body .”

The TPI A defines a “gove rnmental body ” as one of t we l v e differ ent t y pes of entities. See id. § 552.003(1)( A). M o s t o f the entities listed in section 552.003(1)( A) are identified quite
prec isely ; for example, a “school district board of trustees” is statutorily define d as a “g overnme ntal body .” Id. § 552.003(1)( A)(v)

. Others are more amorphous, including the section at i s s u e here , which subjects “the part, section, or portion of an o r g a n iz a ti o n , corpor ation, commission, committee, instit ution, or ag ency that spends or that is supported in whole or in part by public funds” to the
TPI A. Id. § 552.003(1)( A)(xii). The crux of our inquiry

in this case is the meaning of “supported
in whole or in part by p u b l i c fu nds.” The proper scope of this phrase is signific ant beca use the
conseque nces of

being char acte rized as a g overnme ntal body are considera

ble. The most obvious is that under section 552.221 of the Texas Gover nment Code, a “g overnme ntal body ” must promptly produce “public information” on reque st unless an exemption from disclosure applies and is timely

asser ted. See id. §§ 552.101-.123, .221; see also Tex

. Comptroller of Pub. Acc ounts v

. Att’y Gen. 7

A c t o f M a y 4 , 1 9 9 3 , 7 3 r d L e g
. , R

. S

. , c h

. 2 6 8 , § 1 , 1 9 9 3 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 5 8 3 , 9 8 6 ( c o d i f i e d a t T E X
. G O V ’ T 6 C O D E § § 5 5 2

. 0 0 1

- . 3 5 3 )

.

T o c l a i m a n e x e m p t i o n , a g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y m u s t , w i t h i n t e n b u s i n e s s d a y s a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a r e q u e s t , s u b m i t 7
a w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t t o t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l e x p l a i n i n g w h y t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d b e w i t h h e l d a n d r e q u e s t a n A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l o p i n i o n
. T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 3 0 1 ( a ) , ( b )

. I f t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l r u l e s t h a t t h e A c t d o e s n o t e x e m p t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n f

r o m r e q u i r e d d i s c l o s u r e , t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y m u s t m a k e i t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r e q u e s t i n g p a r t y o r s e e k a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n d o e s n o t h a v e t o b e d i s c l o s e d

. I d

. § § 5 5 2

. 3 2 1 5 ( e ) , . 3 2 4 , . 3 2 5 ( a ) ; s e e a l s o C i t y o f G a r l a n d v
. D a l l

. M o r n i n g N e w s , 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 5 1 , 3 5 6 ( T e x . 2 0 0 0 )

. I f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l b o d y r e f u s e s t o d i s c l o s e t h e r e q u e s t e d i n f

o r m a t i o n , t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l m a y s e e k t o c o m p e l d i s c l o s u r e t h r o u g h a m a n d a m u s p r o c e e d i n g
. T E X
. 8of Tex. , 354 S.W .3d 336, 341-48 (Tex. 2010) (construing an exemption under the TPI A). The term

“public information” broadly inc lu d e s “ in f o r ma ti o n th a t is collecte d, assembled, or maintained under

a law or ordinanc e or in connec tion wit h t h e t ra n s action of officia l business” either: (1) “by a
g overnme ntal body ” or (2) “for a g overnme ntal bo d y an d the g overnme ntal body owns the information or ha s a rig ht of ac cess to it.” T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.002(a)

. B. Statutory Construct ion

GHP arg ues t hat as a private e ntity , it is not subject t o the TP I A’s dis closure require ments beca use it d o es not qualify as a “g overnme ntal body ” under the statute’s plain lang uag e. GHP there fore contends t h at i t is entitled to seek the privac y protec tions ty pically aff

orded to nong overnme ntal entities. Deter mining whether GHP is a “g overnme ntal body ” whose rec ords are subject t o disclosure unde r the TPI A pre sents a matter of st atutory construction that we review de

novo. City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News , 22 S.W .3d 351, 357 (Tex. 2000). When interpre ting

a statute, our primary objective is to asce rtain and g ive effect to the L eg islature’s intent without unduly restric ting or expanding the Act’s scope. City of Lorena v. BMTP Holding s , L

. P

. , 409
S.W .3d 634, 641 (Tex. 2013). We seek that intent first and fore most in the plain meaning of the text

. Id. ; see also Tex. Lottery Comm’n v. First State Bank o f DeQue en , 325 S.W .3d 628, 635 (Tex.
2010 ). “U n define d terms i n a st atute are ty pically g iven t heir ordinary meaning , but if a differe nt

or more prec ise definition is appar ent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, we apply that meaning .” TGS-NOPEC Geophy sical Co. v. Combs , 340 S.W .3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). “Howe ver,

we will not g ive an undefine d term a meaning that is out of harmony or inconsistent with other terms

G O V ’ T C O D E § 5 5 2

. 3 2 1

. 9in the statute.” State v. $1,760.00 in U.S. Currency , 406 S.W .3d 177, 180 (Tex. 2013). There fore ,

even if an undefine d term has multipl e meaning s, we rec og nize and apply only the meaning s that are consistent with the statutory scheme as a whole. Id. at 180-81. We only resor t to rules of construction or extrinsi c aids when a statu t e’ s wo rd s are ambig uous. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W .3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009). Finally , in construing the TPI A, we are mindful of the
l eg islative mandate that the TPI A be “libera lly construed in favor of g ranting a req u es t fo r information.” T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.001(b).

As an initial matter, we observe the parties’ ag ree ment that GHP is a “g overnme ntal body ” only if it, or a “par

t, se ction, or portion” of it “ is suppor ted in whole or in pa

rt by public funds.” I t is likewise undisputed that GH P re ce i v es “public funds.” The parties disag ree , howeve r, on the 8 meaning and application of the statutory phrase , “supported in whole or in part by .” GHP arg ues that the TPI A cannot rea sonably be interpre ted to apply to privately -controlled corpor ations that perf orm service s under quid pro quo g overnme nt contra cts. Acc ording to GHP, the L eg i s l at u re unambig uously intended “supported in whole or in part by public funds” to identify entities that wer e

cre ated or exis t to car

ry out g overnme nt functions and whose exis tence are maintained in whole or in part with public funds. Conversely , the Attorney Gene ral decla res the statutory lang uag e ambig uous beca

use it could rea sonably be rea d to apply to any contra ct betwee n the g overnme nt and a priva te entity . We ag ree with GHP. “Supported” is an undefine d term with multipl e and varie d dictionary definitions. Howeve r, only two of the definitions are even remotely possible as applied to the TPI A and only one of those

“ P u b l i c f u n d s ” r e f

e r s t o t h e “ f

u n d s o f t h e s t a t e o r o f a g o v e r n m e n t a l s u b d i v i s i o n o f t h e s t a t e
. ” T E X
. G O V ’ T 8 C O D E § 5 5 2

. 0 0 3 ( 5 )

. 10definitions is rea sonable when the statute is considere d as a whol e. Reading the definition of

“g overnme ntal body ” in its contextual environment—a s we are bound to do—reve als that the TPI A applies only to enti t i es acting as the functional equivalent of a g overnme ntal body that are “sustained” at least in part, by public funds. I n rea ching this conclusion, we rema in ever mindful of the statute’s liberal-c onstruction clause

. But liberal -c o n s t ruction objectives do not permit a construction of the Act untether ed fr om its st atutory mooring s.

Familiar interpre t i v e guides and established canons of construction inform our rea ding of section 552.003(1)( A)(xii). I n determ i n i n g t h e meaning of “supported

. . . by public funds,” we beg in, as we must, with the statute’s plain lang uag e. Tex. Lottery Comm’n , 325 S.W .3d at 635.
Common Eng lish words fre quently have a number of dictionary definitions, some quite abstruse and esoteric , others more compre hensible and commonplace

. See, e.g. , $1,760.00 in U.S. Currency , 406
S.W .3d at 180-81 (not i n g t h at “novelty ” has multipl e dictionary definitions). Not surprising ly , “supported,” the key term here , is subject to at least six disparate definitions in its verb form alone, with many of those including more nuance d sub-def initions

. See W E B S T E R ’ S T H I R D N E W I N T ’ L D I C T I O N A R Y 2297 (2002). By rea ding the term in context, howeve r, we can narr ow the universe of possible definitions to the most apposite. See TGS-NOPEC Geophy sical Co. , 340 S.W .3d at 439.

As alway s, we are cog nizant of the “funda mental principle of statutory co n s t ru ct ion and indeed of lang uag e itself that words’ meaning s cannot be deter mined in isolation but must be draw n from the context in which they are used.” Id. at 441. We must there fore analy ze the rea sonablene ss of eac h definition in lig ht of the statutory context. See Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc. , 438 S.W .3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014); see also R.R. Comm’n v. Tex. Citi zens for a Safe Future & Clean W ater , 336

11S.W .3d 619, 628 (Tex. 2011) (“We g ener ally avoid construing individual provisions of a statute in

isolation from the statute as a whole.”)

. The statute’s first contextual clue emer g es from the words immediately surrounding “supported.” To avoid disharmony with the rest of the statute, “supported”
must bear ref

ere nce to “public funds,” so i t i s clea r that non-monetar

y definitions of “supported” make littl e sense in c ontext

. See W E B S T E R ’ S T H I R D N E W I N T ’ L D I C T I O N A R Y 921 (2002) (def ining “funds” as “available pe cuniar y resour ces” ). Apply ing this limit ation, we winnow the field down to two potential meaning s for “ supported,” both of which ar e fa ithful to the statutory context: (1) to pay the costs of: maintain; to supply with the means of maintenanc e (as lodging , food or clothing ) or to ea

rn or f urnish funds for ma intaining; or (2) to provide a basis for the e x istence or subsistence of: se rve a s the source of mater ial or immaterial supply , nourishment, provende r, fue l, raw ma terial, or sustena nce of

.

See W E B S T E R ’ S T H I R D N E W I N T ’ L D I C T I O N A R Y 2297 (2002); accord B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 1668 (10th ed. 2009) (def ining the term “s u p p o rt ” to mean “[s] ustenanc e or maintenanc e”)

. I n statutory context, “supported” must thus mean sustenanc e, maintena nce, or both.

Another contextual clue derive s from the Act’s purpose. The statutory context indicates that all section 552.001(a) entities are either the g overnme nt or its functional equivalent. First, the statute provides the public with “complete information about the aff airs of g overnme nt and the officia l acts of public officia ls and employ ees.” T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.001(a)

. The stated purpose of permitting acc ess t o t h i s i n formation is to allow t he publi c to “re tain control over the i nstruments they have cre ated.” Id. A rea sonable definition of “supported” must be compatible with this stated
purpose. The statute also specia lly define s the term “g overnme ntal body .” I n defining that term, the
L eg islature car efully omitted any b r o a d r e f e r e n c e to private entities, instead including private entities

12insofar as t hey are “supported .

. . by public funds.” Compare i d. , with F L A
. S T A T
. § 119.011(2).

I n light of this omission, which we presume the L eg islature purposef ully selec ted, the scope of the
term “g overnme ntal body ,” as applied to private entities, must be filtered throug h the Act’s purpose and func tion of allowing acc ess to instrumentalities of g overnme nt. Thus, the Act only applies to private entities acting as the functional equivalent of the g overnme nt. See TGS-NO P E C G e o p h y s ic al
Co. , 340 S.W .3d at 439.

Def ining “supported” to mean “maintena nce” is untenable beca

use doing so risks swee ping
any private entity that rec eived any public funds within the definition of a “g overnme ntal body .” See
407 S.W .3d at 781 (citing Tex. Ass’n of Appraisal Dists., Inc. v. Hart , 382 S.W .3d 587, 591-92 (Tex. App.—Aus t i n 2 0 1 2 , no pet.)). To resur rec t the example provided by the court of appea ls, if we equate “supported” with supply ing an entity with a means by which the entity can pay for nece ssities, then even a paper vendor with hundreds of clients would qualify as a “g overnme ntal body ” mere ly by virtue of g etting paid for selling office supplies to a single state office

. See 407 S.W .3d at 781. Every company must expend funds to stay in business; it would be impossibl e to conclude that any business compensate d for providing goods or service s to a g overnme ntal entity pursuant to a quid
pro quo contra ct was not using public funds to pay for nece ssities. Thus, any entity doing business with the g overnme nt would be a “ g overnme ntal body .”
“Quid pro quo” means “[a]n action or thing that is exchang ed for another action or thing of

more or less equal value.” See B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 1443 (10t h ed

. 2 0 0 9 ). As the dissent
ag ree s, the L eg islature did not intend for the statute to rea ch entities involved in quid pro quo
trans ac t i o n s wi t h the g overnme nt, and it is undisputed that a fair rea ding of the statute cannot

13countena

nce such a result. 407 S.W .3d at 789. We reje ct any re ad ing of “supported” that would injudiciously ap p ly p u

b li c tr a n s p a r e n c y la w s to p r ivate businesses mere ly beca use they rec eive public funds under a contra ct with the g overnme nt. Acc ording ly , the “maintena nce” d efinit ion of “supported” is not tex tually viable.

I n contrast, defining “supported” as “sustenanc e” ensure s that only an entity , or its “par t, section or portion,” whose exis tence is predic ated on the continued recei p t o f g overnme nt funds would qualify as a “go v ernme ntal body .” Among the meaning s of “sustain” are “to cause to continue; to keep up; to car ry or withstand; to nourish; to preve nt from sinking or g iving way .” See
W E B S T E R ’ S T H I R D N E W I N T ’ L D I C T I O N A R Y 2304 (2002); see also B L A C K ’ S L A W D I C T I O N A R Y 1676 (10th ed. 2009) (def

ining “sustain” to mean “to nou r is h a n d e n c o urag e”)

. Apply ing this construction, the universe of private entities constituting gover nmental bodi es i s obviously more c ircumscr ibed beca use only a small seg ment of privat e en t i t i es could fairly be considere d to be sustained by the
g overnme nt. To be “sustained” by public funds s ug g ests the ex ist en ce o f a financially depende nt rela tionship betwe en the g overnme ntal body and a private entity or its subdivision r edolent of that betwee n a pare nt and child or principal and ag ent. Financ i al depende ncy need not be absolute, howeve r. Rat h er , t h e g overnme nt could be one of sever al contributing source s. But sustenance implies that if the g overnme nt cea sed to provide financ ial support, the entity would be unable t o
meet its financ ial obliga ti o n s. Unquestionably , a private entity would qualify under a financ ially depende nt construction of “supported” if it could not pursue its mission and objectives without the

rec eipt of public funds, even if that funding only partially financ ed the entity ’s endea vors. I n short,

an entity “supported” by public funds would not just rec eive g overnme nt funds; it would require

14them to opera te in whole or in part. I f we construe “supported

. . . by public funds” in this manner , 9

we must conclude GHP is not “supported” by public funds beca use it rec eives only a small portion of its reve nue from g overnme nt contra cts. And even if these g overnme nt contra cts wer e eliminated, it could continue to opera te gi v en t he substantial reve nue derive d from other non-g overnme ntal

source s. Moreove r, GHP could and would continue to promote the g rea ter Houston ec onomy to advanc e its own interests and those of its more than 2,000 non-g overnme nt members. GHP, in sum, does not requir e public funds a nd thus, is not s ustained by public funds.

Be cause only one definition fits the statutory context, we conclude t h at “supported

. . . by public funds” must be appropr iately define d to only include those entities “sustai n ed ” b y public funds—there by

ensuring that the statute encompasses only those private e ntities dependent on the public fisc to opera te as a g oing conce rn. Although not dispositi ve, our conclusion is reinfor ced by the fac t that this construction of the term “supported” is consistent with the scope and nature of the eleve n othe r ty

p e s o f entities more clea

rly descr ibed as a “g overnme ntal body ” in the same provision.
See T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.003(1)( A). The canon of statutory construction known a s noscitur a
sociis —“it is known by its associate s”—holds that the meaning of a word or phrase , espec ially one in a list, should be known by the words immediately surrounding it. See TGS-NOPEC Geophy sical
Co. , 340 S.W .3d at 441. We rely on this principle to avoid ascr ibing to one word a meaning so broad
t h at it is incommensurate with the statutory context. Acc ording ly , in evalua ting the brea dth o f “supported in whole or in part by public funds,” we may consider the scope of the enumer ated

I t i s p o s s i b l e , o f c o u r s e , t h a t a p o r t i o n o f a p r i v a t e e n t i t y c o u l d b e s u s t a i n e d b y p u b l i c f u n d s e v e n w h e r e t h e 9 p r i v a t e e n t i t y , a s a w h o l e , i s n o t

. I n s u c h i n s t a n c e s , i f t h e d e p a r t m e n t o r d i v i s i o n i s s u s t a i n e d b y p u b l i c f u n d s , t h e d i v i s i o n m a y b e s u b j e c t t o t h e T P I A ’ s d i s c l o s u r e o b l i g a t i o n s
. H e r e , G H P d i d n o t s e g r e g a t e f u n d s , a n d i t a r g u e d t h a t s u c h
s e g r e g a t i o n w o u l d b e l o g i s t i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e
. 15cate g ories prec eding it. See Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds , 202 S.W .3d 744, 750-51 (Tex. 2006)

. Of

the eleve n other examples of a “g overnme ntal body ” listed in the statutory definition of the term, two stand out as arg uably the most analog ous to a private nonprofit like GHP. Thus, we briefly consider

eac h in comparison.
First, the statute expressly identifies as a “g overnme ntal body ” the g overning b o ar d o f a nonprofit water supply or wastew ater service corpor ation that is org anized under Chapter 67 of the
Texas Water Code and exempt from ad valore m taxat i o n u nder the Texas Tax Code. See T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.003(1)( A)(ix). A nonprofit cor poration of this ty

pe is authorized t o eng ag e in

sever al traditional g overnme ntal functions, such as the rig ht to build and opera te water - and wastetrea tment fac iliti es and sell water to political subdivisions , private entities, or individuals. See T E X
. W A T E R C O D E § 67.002. Additionally , depending on the si z e of the county it serve s, a nonprofit
water or waste- water service provider may even establish and enfor ce “customer water conser vation
prac tices” throug h the assessment of “re asonable penalties as provided in the corpor ation’s tariff .”
See id. § 67.011(a) (5), (b). By virtue of their specia l powers a

nd privileg es, these nonprofit utilit y
opera tors essentially function as quasi-public corpor ations servicing the public. See Garwood I rr. Co. v. W illiams , 243 S.W .2d 453, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1951, writ ref ’d n.r.e .). The second potentially

private “ g overnme ntal body ” identified in the statute is a nonprofit
corpor ation elig ible to rec eive fede ral funding , in the form of block g rants, for anti-pover ty prog rams
at the state level. T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.003(1)( A)(xi). Under this fede ral initiative, a nonprofit
may rec eive funds if it demonstrates “expertise in providing training to individuals and org anizati o ns

on methods of eff

ectively addre ssing the needs of low-income families and communities” throug h

16a detailed application proce ss. 42 U.S.C. § 9913(c) (2) (2012); see also O F F I C E O F C M T Y
. S E R V S ., 1 0
U.S. D E P ’ T O F H E A L T H & H U M A N S E R V S ., C O M M U N I T Y S E R V I C E S B L O C K G R A N T S T A T E A N D E L I G I B L E E N T I T Y T E C H N I C A L A S S I S T A N T S E R V I C E S 16-17(2015) (listing elig ibilit y require ments). 1 1
A section 552.003(i)(A )(xi) “g overnme ntal body ” must be “author ized by t h i s state to serve a
geogra phic are a of the state.” See T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.003(1)( A)(xi). This re q u i re m en t
presuppose s that the nonprofit has a close working rela tionship with the state g overnme nt. See 10
T E X
. A D M I N
. C O D E § 5.211 (re quiring an aut horized nonprofit to submit monthly perf ormanc e
repor ts to the state ag ency

monitoring the pr og ram).

The fore g oing examples descr ibe ostensibly private entities deputized by the g overnme nt to provide service s traditionally considere d g overnme ntal prer og ativ es o r responsibi lities. Thus, al though nominally private, eac h is in fac t acting as a quasi-public entity perf orming a core
g overnme ntal function. There is a signific ant differ ence betwee n an entity of this nature and one like GHP, and our construction of “supported in whole or in part by public funds” reflec ts as m uch by captur ing only those entities acting as the functional equivalent of the g overnme nt. See Fiess , 202
S.W .3d at 751.

Our construction of the term “supported” rema ins faithful to the TPI A’s liberal-c onstruction clause

. See T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E § 552.001(b) ( “This cha pter shall be liber ally

construed in f

avor of
g ranting a reque st for information.”)

. We have consistently reco gn i z ed this clause expresses an important statement of leg islative purpose, and we continue to adher e to it today

. See, e.g. , City of

T h e f e d e r a l p r o g r a m i s c o d i f i e d a t 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § § 9 9 0 1

- 9 9 2 6 ( 2 0 1 2 ) a n d i s a d m i n i s t e r e d b y t h e U

. S

. 1 0 D e p a r t m e n t o f H e a l t h a n d H u m a n S e r v i c e s O f f i c e o f C o m m u n i t y S e r v i c e
. S e e 4 2 U

. S

. C

. § 9 9 1 2 ( 2 0 1 2 )

. A v a i l a b l e a t h t t p : / / w w w . a c f

. h h s
. g o v / g r a n t s / o p e n / f

o a / f i l e s / H H S

- 2 0 1 5

- A C F

- O C S

- E T

- 1 0 0 7

_ 1

. p d f

. 11 17Garland , 22 S.W .3d at 364 (“U nlike the [ Fr eedom of I nformation Act] , our Act contains a strong

statement of public policy favor ing public ac ce s s to g overnme ntal information and a statutory mandate to construe the Act to implement that policy and to construe it in favor of g ranting a reque st for information.”)

. Stil l, even a liberal construction must rema in g rounded in the statute’s lang uag e and cannot overw helm contextual indicators limit ing public intrusion into the private aff airs of nong overnme ntal entities. 1 2

I n sum, we define “supported in whole or in part by public funds” to include onl y those private entities or their sub-par ts sustained, at least in part, by public funds, meaning they could not perf orm the same or simil ar service s without the public funds. I f GHP (as a priv at e en t ity that

rec eives g overnme nt funds even while not being supported by them) prese nts the hard case , entities

on the ends of the spectrum—those that rec eive no g overnme nt money , and those that rec eive only
g overnme nt money

—will obviously prese nt m uch more straig htforwa rd questions. Deter

mining whether a partially funded entity qualifies as a “g overnme ntal body ” will likely require case -spec ific analy sis and a close examination of t he facts. Nonethele ss, we recog nize as a g ener al proposition that an entity , like GHP, that does not de pend on any particula r reve nue sourc e to survive—public or private —is not sust ained e ven in par t by g overnme nt funds.

T h e r e i s l i t t l e t o s u p p o r t t h e v i e w t h a t o p e n - r e c o r d s l a w s w e r e e n v i s i o n e d a s t o o l s t o p r y o p e n t h e s e n s i t i v e 1 2 r e c o r d s o f p r i v a t e e n t i t i e s o r t o f u n c t i o n a s a p r i v a t e d i s c o v e r y t o o l

. S e e N

. L

. R

. B

. v
. R o b b i n s T i r e & R u b b e r C o
. , 4 3 7 U

. S

. 2 1 4 , 2 4 2 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ( d e s c r i b i n g t h e F r e e d o m o f I n f o r m a t i o n A c t )

. I n s t e a d , w e h a v e r e c o g n i z e d : T h e T e x a s L e g i s l a t u r e p r o m u l g a t e d t h e T P I A w i t h t h e e x p r e s s p u r p o s e o f p r o v i d i n g t h e p u b l i c

“ c o m p l e t e i n f

o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e a f

f a i r s o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e o f f i c i a l a c t s o f p u b l i c o f

f i c i a l s a n d
e m p l o y e e s
. ” T h e A c t i s a i m e d a t p r e s e r v i n g a f u n d a m e n t a l t e n e t o f

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d e m o c r a c y : “ t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t i s t h e s e r v a n t a n d n o t t h e m a s t e r o f t h e p e o p l e
. ” A t i t s c o r e , t h e T P I A r e f l e c t s t h e p u b l i c p o l i c y t h a t t h e p e o p l e o f T e x a s “ i n s i s t o n r e m a i n i n g i n f o r m e d s o t h a t t h e y m a y r e t a i n c o n t r o l
o v e r t h e i n s t r u m e n t s t h e y h a v e c r e a t e d

. ”
J a c k s o n v
. S t a t e O

f f i c e o f A d m i n
. H e a r i n g s , 3 5 1 S

. W

. 3 d 2 9 0 , 2 9 3 ( T e x . 2 0 1 1 ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. 18C. Other Jurisdictions

Whil e our construction of the TPI A is suppor ted by a plain-mea

ning rea ding of the statute,

an examination of simil ar open-r ecor ds statutes from other jurisdictions is also instructive. I n states wher e open-r ecor ds acts apply to entities “supported in whole or in part by public funds,” our sister
courts have unanimously construed the phrase to ex cl u d e, as a g ener al matter, private entities

rec eiving public funds pursuant to quid pro quo ag ree ment s wi t h o u t reg ard to whether such an
ag ree ment is the entity ’s only funding source
. See, e.g. , Indianapolis Convention & Visitors Ass’n,
Inc. v. Indianapolis Newspapers , Inc ., 577 N.E.2d 208, 214 (I nd. 1991) (“I n situations involving a
q uid pro quo , that is, measure d g oods or service s g iven in exchang e for pay ment b as ed o n identifiable quantities of g oods or service s, a private entity would not be transfor med into a public entity beca

use it would not be maintained and supported b y p u b lic funds.”) ; W eston v. Carolina
Researc h & Dev

. Found ., 401 S.E.2d 161, 165 (S.C. 1991) (“[T]his decision does not mean that the [open-rec ords act] would apply to business enterpr ises that rec eive pay ment from public bodies in return for suppl y ing specific goods or service s on an arms leng t h basis.”); Adams C nty. Record v. Greater N.D. Ass’n , 529 N.W.2d 830, 836 (N.D. 1995) (“When ther e is a ba rg ained- for e x chang e of value, a quid pro quo , the entity is not supported by public funds.”)

. Additionally , even in those
states whose open-r ecor ds acts fail to define “g overnme ntal body ” or an equivalent term, our sister courts still narrowly construe the statute to include only private e ntities that have a r elationship so intertwined with the g overnme nt that they are the “func tional equivalent of a g overnme ntal ag ency .”
Mem phis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc. , 87 S.W .3d 67, 78-79 (Tenn. 2002); see also State ex

rel. Oriana House, Inc . v. Montgome ry , 854 N.E.2d 193, 198-99 ( Ohio 2006).

19Recog nizi ng the rig ht of private businesses to conduct their a f f a ir s a u tonomously , at least one
court has adopted a presumption that a private entity is not subject to an open-r ecor ds reque st absent clea r and convincing evidenc e that the private entity is the functional equivalent of a g overnme ntal body

. See, e.g. , State ex rel Oriana House, Inc. , 854 N.E.2d at 200. I n Florida , the only state whose
statute expressly includes private entities, the Florida Supreme Court narr owly interpre ted its openrec o r d s a c t to e xc lu d e p r iv a te e n ti ti e s me r e ly providing profe ssional service s to a g overnme ntal body

. See News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Schwab, Twi t t y & Hanser Architectural Group, Inc. , 596 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (F la. 1992) (construing F L A
. S T A T
. § 119.011(2))

. I n fac t, of t hose st ates with similar statutes, we have not encounte red one that has construed an open-r ecor ds act to i n cl u d e a p rivate entity providing specific and measura ble vendor service s to a g overnme ntal body , even if that entity

rec eives public funds. We find it difficult to ignor e this interpr et at i v e u niformity , espec ially considering the g ravitas of the intere sts at stake.

Our plain-mea

ning construction also comports with fed e r a l p r e c e d e nt interpre ting the fede ral analog ue—the Fre edom of I nformation Act (F OI A). See Tex. C omptroller of Pub. Acc ounts , 354
S.W .3d at 342 (noting that beca use the L eg islature modeled the TPI A on the FOI A, fede ral prec edent is persua sive in construing the Act). Und er the FOI A, “ag ency ,” the fede ral equivalent of “g overnme ntal body ,” is define d to include:

any executive depar

tment, milit ary depar

tment, Gove rnment corpor ation, Gover nment controlled corpor ation, or other e stablishment in the e x ecutive branc h of the Gover

nment (including the Ex ecutive Offic e o f the President), or any independe nt reg ulatory

ag ency
.

5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (1) (2012). I n interpre ting this broa d lang uag e, the United States Supreme Court

20held that a private en t i t y receiving fede ral funding is considere d a “g overnme nt controlled

corpor ation” and subject to FOI A disclosure require ments only if the private entity is also subjected
to “extensive, detailed, and virtually day -to-day s u p e r v is io n ” b y the g overnme nt. Forsham v. Harris , 445 U.S. 169, 180 (1980). The fede ral supervision must be “substantial

. . . and not just the exercise of reg ulatory authority nece ssary to assure compliance with the g oals of the fede ral g rant.” Id. at 180 n.11. Thus, narr owly

defining “supported in whole or in part by public funds” under Te x as law is consistent with the appr oach of other jurisdictions fea turing simil ar acts and the United States Supreme Court’s interpr etation of the f eder al ac t on which the TPI A is based.
D. Response to the D issent We briefly

addre ss some of the conte ntions in t he dissenting opinion. Rega rding statutory construction, there is littl e disag ree ment about the g uiding principles and rele vant canons involved here , and we ag ree , of course , that the canon of noscitur a sociis “ca nnot be used to rende r express statutory lang uag e meaning less.” Slip Op. at 27 (B oy d, J ., dissenting)

. We disag ree as to the proper implementation of the canon, ho weve r. The dissent asser ts that the first eleve n definitions of “g overnme ntal body ” in the TPI A s h o u l d be cabine d off from the twelfth definition of that term beca use the twelfth definition “uses specific lang uag e, inhere ntly differ ent than the lang uag e of the other definitions.” Id. at 27. The dissent, thus, arg ues that the nature of the first eleve n definitions
cannot inform the twelfth. We disag ree
. All twelve are definit i o n s o f go v ernmental bodies, and
g iven t hat t he twelfth definition is the m ost open-e nded, bli nders would be required to construe it
in isolation from it s statutory prede cessor s. Separa ting the definitions in this way would not only be artificia l, it would also deprive us of a key source of insight into t h e para meters of the more

21expansive twelfth def inition.

More signific ant, howeve r, is the dissent’s sug g estion that the sta t u t e i s ambi g uous. The dissent, building on this imprudent rea ding, would look to Attorney Ge n era l decisions and the Kneeland test for “ further g uidance .” Id. at 31. I n canva ssing the la ndscape of informa l Attorney
Gene ral ruling s and divining instruction there from, the dissent r esurr ects Kneeland ’s questionable methodology , which did the same. And as that court itself noted, even if “[o] ne may have no quarr el with the formulae ,” “th e d i re ct i o n gi ven is a mite uncer tain.” Kneeland , 850 F.2d at 228. The dissent finds Kneeland “per suasive” but we do not rea ch that analy sis beca use of our deter

mination that the statutory lang uag e unambig uously exclude s G H P f r o m q u a li f y in g a s a “g overnme ntal body .” Nonethele ss, we think it worth brief pause to note Kneeland ’s questionable foundation, as it—along with the raf

t of informal Attorney Gene ral ruling s that bookend the decision—constitute the “for ty
y ear s of leg al interpre tations” that we supposedly ignor e in today ’s opinion. Slip Op. at 3 (B oy d, 1 3
J ., dissenting)

. But many of these ruling s were informal and, as such lack any prec edential value.
Put simply , the weig ht of this leg al authority is considerab l y l es s au g ust than the dissent’s formulation implies.

Whil e the dissent p u rp o rts to reha bilitate Kneeland , its revised test is at best a partial improvement. The r evised test make s it virtually impossibl e for an entity

that provides intang ible delivera bles, such as consulting, adver tising, or leg al service s, to satisfy the “spe c if ic a n d measura

ble

T h e K n e e l a n d t e s t g a i n e d p r o m i n e n c e b y h a p p e n s t a n c e r a t h e r t h a n d e s i g n
. I t d e r i v e d f r o m a s i n g l e f

e d e r a l 1 3 d i s t r i c t c o u r t o p i n i o n b a s e d o n f i v e c o n c l u s o r y A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l o p i n i o n s w r i t t e n w i t h o u t a n y a t t e m p t t o c o n s t r u e t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e
. A f

t e r K n e e l a n d i s s u e d , t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l a d o p t e d t h e t e s t w i t h o u t f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s
. T h e r e a f t e r , t h e l o w e r c o u r t s u s e d t h e K n e e l a n d t e s t o u t o f d e f e r e n c e t o t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a l s o w i t h o u t s c r u t i n i z i n g t h e t e s t i n l i g h t o f t h e s t a t u t o r y t e x t a n d l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t e m b o d i e d t h e r e i n
. W e d e c l i n e t o d e f e r t o a t e s t c r e a t e d w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e
. 22service s” prong of the test. The dissent portray s GHP as sharing only broad, amorphous g oals with

the City

. Yet, the “broa d” contra ct lang uag e ref ere nced by the dissent actua lly ref ers to GHP’s more
g ener al overa

rching objectives (esse ntially , these statements of ob jectives function as titles under which specific obliga tions of the contra ct are delineate d). Eac h broad objective is followed by a list of specific service s GHP promised to provide to achie ve those objectives. For example, G HP w as hired “to identify new business opportunities, secur e economic incentives and incre ase outrea ch and

rec ruitment activities to the reg ion’s targ eted ke y industries to streng then the City of Houston as a competitive place to do business.” I n further ance of that objective, GHP is contra ctually obliga ted
to develop busi n es s re l ationships with the t op twenty -five companies not curr ently headqua rtere d
in the City ; cre at e and implement a business-re tention prog ram to provide quick response s to companies in the City ; and arr ang e and host ten rec ruiting trips, or “Signature Events,” for Houstonbased executives to visit targ et companies and pitch them on the City ’s business advanta g es. These service s are specific and measura ble and are the sort of quid pro quo exchang es ty pical of a vendor service s contrac t in that indust ry
. Thus, we do not believe that the monetar y pay ments due to GHP under the 2007 and 2008
ag ree ments are “g ener al or unrestric ted pay ment[s] provided to subsidiz e or underw rite the entity ’s

ac t i v i t ies” rathe r than “spec ific measura ble service s.” Id. at 34. Even the dissent admits t h at some—but not all—of GHP’s activities quali fy as “spec ific measura ble service s,” so the disag ree ment here is more a matter of deg ree than any

thing e lse.

The dissent’s revised test would also require that “the funds be i n t en d ed t o promote a
purpose, interest, or mission that the g overnme ntal and private entities share and would both pursue

23even in the absenc e of their contra ctual rela tionship.” Id. at 36. The dissent posits that a law fir m
may share a broad g oal with a client, but the firm’s interest rema ins “tra nsaction specific ” in a way that GHP’s eng ag ement is not. Id. at 38. At the risk of quibbling, we dispute that this metaphoric al dividing line is near ly that clea r or marke d. Many law firms ar e h i re d n o t mere ly for a specific litigation mat t er but rathe r to provide more enduring and wide-r ang ing counsel. And more importantly , while the dissent takes for g rante d that GHP and the City ’s in t erests are perf ectly alig ned (a nd presumably

alway s will be), that assumption is de batable. For instance, althoug h the
vast majority of cities presumably welcome financ ial investment, gro wth can prove politically divisive—just witness the debate s over g entrification that g rip many major cities ex p er i encing explos ive economic expansion. Reg ardle ss, the point is that GHP is hardly the auxil iary and mirror of the City that the dissent portray s it to be, and the proposed revision of the Kneeland test will not signific antly

clar ify this confused a

rea of the law

.
The dissent also contends that “the Court writes the wo rds ‘in part’ completely out of the statutory definitio n
. ” Id

. at 21. Nothing so drastic is occur ring here

. The statute’s “in part” lang uag e may envision a multi-divi sion entity that does business with the g overnme nt, but not uniformly and not acr oss all units. For instance, o n e ca n co n ce ptualize a subdivision of a larg e
corpor ation wholly funded by g overnme nt c ontrac ts; ne verthe less, beca use the subdivision is only a small part of the l arg e orga nization, the g overnme nt business forms a re latively small portion of the corporation’s tot al revenue. I n this scenar io, the org anization may be said to be supported “in part” by public funds. Moreove r, there may be more overla p betwee n “in part” and the neig hboring statutory lang uag e than the dissent allows. Whil e we g ener ally attempt to avoid trea ting statutory lang uag e as surplusag e, “ther e are times when redunda ncies are prec isely what the L eg i slature
24intended

. ” In re Estate of Nash , 220 S.W .3d 914, 917-18 (Tex. 2007); see also In re City of

George town , 53 S.W .3d 328, 336 (Tex. 2001) (noting that sta t u t o ry re d undancie s may mean that “the L eg islature repe ated itself out of an abundanc e of caution, for emphasis, or both”). Reg ardle ss of whether such draf

ting caution is at work here , the point r emains that there are a host of possible explanations addressing the dissent’s conc erns.
III. Conclusi on
Amidst al l t h e ar gument attempting to classify GHP as a g overnme ntal body , it is worth

rec alling prec isely what GHP is not: GHP is not a g overnme nt ag ency , no r i s it a quasi-public
ag ency specific ally listed under the Texas Gover nment Code as a “g overnme ntal body .” GHP does
not rely on its g overnme nt contra cts to sustain itself as a g oing conce rn; as all parties acknow ledg e, the g overnme nt funds it rec eives constitute a rela tively minuscule portion of GHP’s annual budg et. The only way GHP can qualify as a “g overnme ntal body ,” then, is if it can be said to be “supported in whole or in par

t by public funds.”
GHP, like countless chambe rs of commerc e nationwide, provides marke ting, c o n s ulting, and
event- planning service s to the C ity and other cl i en t s p u rs u ant t o quid pro quo contra cts. L ike t he lobby ing shops and law firms that also populate th e State pay roll, GHP share s many common objectives with the City , but without more, such share d interests can hardly transfor m a s er v ice provider into a g ov ernme nt appenda g e. A private entity eng ag ed in economica lly delicate work

s hould not be subjected to invasive disclosure require ments mere ly beca use it counts the g overnme nt

as one client among many
. Transpa renc y is a rea l conce rn , t o b e sure, and the TPI A’s liberalconstruction mandate r efle cts the depth of this intere st. But libera l construction is not tantamount

25to boundless rea ch. Yet, even if not direc tly subject to disclosure obliga tions under the TPI A, GHP’s

transac tions with the g overnme nt are hardly in a black box ; the City —which is indisputably a “g overnme ntal body ”—must disclose information re g arding its contractor s, including G HP. Apply ing the TPI A’s plain and unambig uous lang uag e, we hold that GHP is not “supported
in whole or in part by public funds” and thus is not a “g overnme ntal body ” under the TPI A. Be cause the rele vant provisions of the T P I A ar e unambig uous, we do not apply the analy sis outlined in Kneeland v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n , 850 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1986) , nor any other extratext ual construct. We there fore reve rse the court of appea ls’ judgme n t an d rende r judgme nt for
Gre ater Houston Partnership.

____________________________________ Eva M. Guzman J ustice

OPI NI ON DEL I VERED : J une 26, 2015

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