#### Baldwin, Respondent, vs. Frisbie and another, Appellants.

*March 14*

April *11, 1916.*

*Fraudulent conveyances: Husband and wife: Estates of decedents: Creditors’ action: Receivers: Rights of widow who colluded in fraud: Reimbursement for debts paid by her: Allowances: Parties: Administrator: Appeal: Dismissal.*

1. Where, a few days prior to his death, a husband, without consideration and with intent to defraud his creditors, transferred his real and personal property to his wife, Who knew his purpose and colluded with him to carry it out, and his estate was insufficient to pay his debts, judgment was properly entered pursuant to secs. 3835, 3836, Stats. 1915, declaring such transfer void as to creditors of the decedent and subjecting the property to the payment of his debts; and, the administration of the estate having been closed and the administrator discharged, a receiver of said property in the hands of the wife was properly appointed.

2. Although in such case the widow paid some of the debts of the decedent out of her individual estate, her connection with the fraudulent transfer deprives her of all right to reimbursement out of the proceeds of a sale by the receiver of the property so transferred.

3. Having elected not to claim her allowances when the husband’s estate was being administered, the widow is not, under the circumstances above stated, entitled to have such allowances-made to her out of the property involved in the fraudulent transfer.

4. The administrator of the husband’s estate, having been duly discharged, was not a proper party to the creditor’s action, and an appeal by him from the judgment setting aside the fraudulent transfer and appointing a receiver is dismissed.

Appeal from a judgment and an order of tbe circuit court for Oconto county: W. B. QuiNLAN, Circuit Judge.

*Affirmed as to one appellant; dismissed as to the other.*

*27Tbe action was brought to set aside a transfer of real estate and personal property on tbe grounds of fraud and a total failure of consideration.

In April, 1911, and prior thereto, Marion G-. Erisbie, deceased, owned and operated a machine shop at the village of Gillett. In April, 1911, he executed to his wife, *Addie G.*Frisbie, one of the defendants in this action, a quitclaim deed whereby he conveyed all of his real estate and assigned all of his personal property to her for the consideration of “one dollar and other valuable consideration.” The real estate so conveyed consisted of the land with a machine shop, and the personal property so assigned consisted of all personal property, including portable sawmill, saw belts, and engine. This quitclaim deed was witnessed and acknowledged and was duly recorded on the 25th day of April, 1911. At this time the deceased was heavily indebted. On April 22, 1911, four days after the execution and delivery of the deed, he died intestate. The defendant *Addie G. Frisbie*had title to the homestead prior to this time. On June 14, 1911, *F. G. Smith*was appointed special administrator of the estate, and on September 13, 1911, he was appointed general administrator and duly qualified as such.

The plaintiff with others presented his claim to the county court against the estate and their claims were duly allowed on September 28, 1912. On September 6, 1913, upon a showing that the estate in the hands of the administrator was insufficient to pay the debts of the intestate and that the administration had been completed, *F. G.*Smith, the administrator, was discharged from his trust.

The defendant *Addie G. Frisbie*received the proceeds of an insurance policy upon the life of her deceased husband amounting to $2,000. She paid about $1,500 out of her separate property to the creditors of her deceased husband, whose claims were not presented against his estate. The real estate conveyed to her by this quitclaim deed had been mortgaged and has been sold, since the husband’s demise, *28under foreclosure, and a deficiency judgment was entered in tbe foreclosure suit against *Addie G. Frisbie.*

On March 30, 1914, tbe court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and also denied defendant’s motion for a new trial on March 31st. Judgment was awarded and entered on May 4, 1914, setting aside tbe conveyance and transfer of the property to *Addie G. Frisbie*and appointing a receiver to sell tbe personal property conveyed to her and apply tbe proceeds on decedent’s debts. On June 1, 1914, tbe court made an order denying an application of tbe widow to assign to her tbe personal property of tbe deceased then in her possession as and for her support and tbe support of their minor children during tbe administration of tbe decedent’s estate in tbe county court and as and for an allowance as widow of tbe deceased, and to modify tbe judgment accordingly, and to vacate that part of tbe judgment appointing a receiver. From such judgment and order this appeal is taken.

For tbe appellants tbe cause was submitted on tbe brief of *E. 0. Smith.*

For tbe respondent there was a brief by *George*Crawford, and oral argument by *F. M. Wylie.*

Siebeckee, J.

Tbe findings of tbe trial court are fully sustained by tbe evidence and cannot be disturbed on this appeal. It is clearly estáblished that tbe plaintiff was a creditor of tbe estate of Marion G. Frisbie, deceased; that bis claim bad been duly allowed against decedent’s estate by tbe county court; that plaintiff and other creditors whose claims have been allowed against tbe estate by tbe county court have not received payment of their claims from tbe administrator of decedent’s estate because such administrator bad no property of tbe estate to apply in payment of tbe same, and that tbe administration proceedings have been closed and tbe administrator, *E. 0.*Smith, has been discharged from bis trust. *29The court also' found that Marion G. Frisbie conveyed his real ánd personal property to his wife, the defendant *Addie C. Frisbie,*by quitclaim deed and without consideration a few days prior to his death with the intent to defraud his creditors, and that his wife had knowledge of his intent in making-such conveyance and that she colluded with him to carry out such purpose. Upon this state of the case the court properly awarded judgment pursuant to secs. 3835 and 3836, Stats. 1915, declaring this deed of transfer of such property null and void as to the creditors of the deceased and subjecting the property to the payment of the debts of the deceased. In the light of this state of the case the court properly appointed a receiver, with the usual powers and duties, to take possession of the decedent’s property in the hands of *Addie G. Frisbie,*subject it to sale, and apply the proceeds of such sale in payment of the debts of the deceased under the direction •of the court.

The contention that the widow should in equity be allowed to participate in the proceeds of the sale of this property because she had applied a portion of her individual estate in payment of her husband’s debts cannot be sustained. Since ■she was actively involved in the fraud of her husband she lost all equities that she may have had to participate in this property as one standing in the shoes of the original creditor. *Sommermeyer v. Schwartz,*89 Wis. 66, 61 N. W. 311; *Bank of Commerce v. Fowler,*93 Wis. 241, 67 N. W. 423; *Zimmerman v. Bannon,*101 Wis. 407, 77 N. W. 735. Her connection with the fraudulent transaction deprives her of all claim to any of the property- involved in the transaction to reimburse herself for moneys expended by her in reliance on the fraudulent transfer.

Her petition, after judgment in the action, for an allowance out of this property for her support and the support of their minor children during administration of the estate and for a widow’s allowance out of her husband’s estate, was prop*30erly denied. It appears that sbe elected not to claim these allowances when tbe administration of tbe estate was bad in county court. Under tbe circumstances it must be beld that sbe has not shown any grounds for relief from her election in these matters.

Tbe record shows that tbe administration proceedings have been closed and that tbe administrator has been duly discharged from bis trust. Under these circumstances tbe defendant *F. C.*Smith, as administrator, has no interest in this litigation and hence is in no way concerned in tbe controversies of this action. He is not a proper party to tbe litigation and tbe action should have been dismissed as to him. He therefore is not aggrieved by tbe judgment and is not entitled to appeal therefrom to this court.

Tbe appeal from an order denying tbe application of the defendant *Addie 0. Frisbie*for modification of tbe judgment and to grant her support and an allowance as widow of Marion GL Erisbie and to vacate tbe appointment of a receiver as therein determined, presents no additional question to those we have already considered. Upon these considerations it follows that tbe judgment and tbe order made after judgment must be affirmed as against tbe defendant *Addie Q.*Frisbie, and that tbe appeal of *F. 0. Smith*as administrator must be dismissed.

*By the Court.*— It is so ordered.