Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 2 / Monday, January 5, 2015 / Notices 233 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Louis Farrell, Director, Student and 

Exchange Visitor Program, MS 5600, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, 500 12th Street SW., 

Washington, DC 20536–5600; email: 

sevp@ice.dhs.gov, telephone: (703) 603– 

3400. This is not a toll-free number. 

Program information can be found at 

http://www.ice.gov/sevis/. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

What action is DHS taking under this 

notice? 

The Secretary of Homeland Security 

is exercising authority under 8 CFR 

214.2(f)(9) to extend the suspension of 

the applicability of certain requirements 

governing on-campus and off-campus 

employment for F–1 nonimmigrant 

students whose country of citizenship is 

Syria and who are experiencing severe 

economic hardship as a direct result of 

the civil unrest in Syria since March 

2011. See 77 FR 20038 (April 3, 2012). 

The original notice was effective from 

April 3, 2012 until October 3, 2013. A 

subsequent notice provided for an 18- 

month extension from October 3, 2013 

through March 31, 2015. See 78 FR 

36211 (June 17, 2013). Effective with 

this publication, suspension of the 

employment limitations is extended for 

18 months from March 31, 2015 until 

September 30, 2016. 

F–1 nonimmigrant students granted 

employment authorization through the 

notice will continue to be deemed to be 

engaged in a ‘‘full course of study’’ for 

the duration of their employment 

authorization, provided they satisfy the 

minimum course load requirement 

described in 77 FR 20038. See 8 CFR 

214.2(f)(6)(i)(F). 

Who is covered under this action? 

This notice applies exclusively to F– 

1 nonimmigrant students whose country 

of citizenship is Syria and who were 

lawfully present in the United States in 

F–1 nonimmigrant status on April 3, 

2012, under section 101(a)(15)(F)(i) of 

the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(F)(i); and 

are— 

(1) Enrolled in an institution that is 

Student and Exchange Visitor Program 

(SEVP)-certified for enrollment of F–1 

students, 

(2) Currently maintaining F–1 status, 

and 

(3) Experiencing severe economic 

hardship as a direct result of the civil 

unrest in Syria since March 2011. 

This notice applies to both 

undergraduate and graduate students, as 

well as elementary school, middle 

school, and high school students. The 

notice, however, applies differently to 

elementary school, middle school, and 

high school students (see the discussion 

published at 77 FR 20040, available at 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012- 

04-03/pdf/2012-7960.pdf, in the 

question, ‘‘Does this notice apply to 

elementary school, middle school, and 

high school students in F–1 status?’’). 

F–1 students covered by this notice 

who transfer to other academic 

institutions that are SEVP-certified for 

enrollment of F–1 students remain 

eligible for the relief provided by means 

of this notice. 

Why is DHS taking this action? 

The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) took action to provide 

temporary relief to F–1 nonimmigrant 

students whose country of citizenship is 

Syria and who experienced severe 

economic hardship because of the civil 

unrest in Syria since March 2011. See 

77 FR 20038 (April 3, 2012). It enabled 

these F–1 students to obtain 

employment authorization, work an 

increased number of hours while school 

was in session, and reduce their course 

load, while continuing to maintain their 

F–1 student status. 

Syria continues to experience civil 

unrest, with many people still displaced 

as a result. The United Nations reported 

in late September 2014 that 

approximately 6.4 million Syrians are 

internally displaced. A number of 

violent extremist groups have factored 

prominently in the conflict and pose a 

danger to civilians. In early 2014, the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL) emerged as one of the most 

significant radical Islamist fighting 

forces. The al-Nusra Front (also known 

as the Jabhat al Nusra) represents the 

interests of al-Qaeda in Syria. These 

Jihadist groups have engaged in 

indiscriminate attacks including 

bombings and suicide attacks 

throughout Syria. Various other radical 

Islamist organizations have been 

actively engaged in armed resistance in 

Syria. Furthermore, economic sanctions 

imposed by the international 

community have negatively affected the 

whole of the Syrian economy. Given 

conditions in Syria, affected students 

whose primary means of financial 

support comes from Syria may need to 

be exempt from the normal student 

employment requirements to be able to 

continue their studies in the United 

States and meet basic living expenses. 

The United States is committed to 

continuing to assist the people of Syria. 

DHS is therefore extending this 

employment authorization for F–1 

nonimmigrant students whose country 

of citizenship is Syria and who are 

continuing to experience severe 

economic hardship as a result of the 

civil unrest since March 2011. 

How do I apply for an employment 

authorization under the circumstances 

of this notice? 

F–1 nonimmigrant students whose 

country of citizenship is Syria who were 

lawfully present in the United States on 

April 3, 2012, and are experiencing 

severe economic hardship because of 

the civil unrest may apply for 

employment authorization under the 

guidelines described in 77 FR 20038. 

This notice extends the time period 

during which such F–1 students may 

seek employment authorization due to 

the civil unrest. It does not impose any 

new or additional policies or procedures 

beyond those listed in the original 

notice. All interested F–1 students 

should follow the instructions listed in 

the original notice. 

Jeh Charles Johnson, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2014–30868 Filed 1–2–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9111–28–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Office of the Secretary 

[Docket No. DHS–2014–0076] 

Privacy Act of 1974; Department of 

Homeland Security Transportation 

Security Administration—DHS/TSA– 

019 Secure Flight Records System of 

Records 

AGENCY: Privacy Office, Department of 

Homeland Security. 

ACTION: Notice Privacy Act System of 

Records. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of 

Homeland Security proposes to update 

and reissue a current Department of 

Homeland Security system of records 

titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland 

Security/Transportation Security 

Administration—DHS/TSA–019 Secure 

Flight Records System of Records.’’ This 

system of records allows the Department 

of Homeland Security/Transportation 

Security Administration to collect and 

maintain records on aviation passengers 

and certain non-travelers to screen such 

individuals before they access airport 

sterile areas or board aircraft, in order to 

identify and prevent a threat to aviation 

security or to the lives of passengers and 

others. TSA is reissuing this system of 

records to update the categories of 

records to include records containing 

risk-based assessments generated by 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

234 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 2 / Monday, January 5, 2015 / Notices 

1 78 FR 55270 (Sept. 10, 2013). 

2A PNR contains details about an individual’s 

travel on a particular flight, including information 

provided by the individual when making the flight 

reservation. Though the content of PNRs varies 

among airlines, PNRs may include: (1) Passenger 

name; (2) reservation date; (3) travel agency or 

agent; (4) travel itinerary information; (5) form of 

payment; (6) flight number; and (7) seating location. 

See DHS/TSA–017 Secure Flight Test Records, 70 

FR 36320 (June 22, 2005). Some PNR data collected 

by aircraft operators provide evidence of potential 

security risks, and other data provide indications of 

low security risk. Other PNR data are security 

neutral. 

3SFPD is full name, gender, date of birth, redress 

number or Known Traveler number, passport 

information (if applicable), reservation control 

number, record sequence number, record type, 

passenger update indicator, traveler reference 

number, and itinerary information. 49 CFR part 

1560. 

4 72 FR 48392. 

5 72 FR 63711. 

6 77 FR 69491. 

7 In addition to overseas threats from foreign 

terrorists, people and places in the United States 

were becoming targets, and Americans joined the 

ranks of terrorists. The 1993 and 1995 bombings of 

the World Trade Center in New York, and the 

Federal Building in Oklahoma City, respectively, 

were clear examples of the shift, as was the 1996 

conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to bomb 

American airliners over the Pacific Ocean. 

8Executive Order 13015, White House 

Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, 61 FR 

43937 (Aug. 22, 1996). 

9White House Commission on Aviation Safety 

and Security, Final Report to President Clinton, 

February 12, 1997, found at www.fas.org/irp/threat/ 

212fin∼1.html (hereinafter Report). 

10 Id. at section 3.7. 

11 Id. at section 3.19. The Commission noted that 

the U.S. Customs Service (now U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection) successfully used such a system 

to better focus its resources and attention. 

12The FAA implemented CAPPS pursuant to its 

general authority to prescribe regulations ‘‘to 

protect passengers and property on an aircraft 

operating in air transportation or intrastate air 

transportation against an act of criminal violence or 

aircraft piracy.’’ 49 U.S.C. 44903(b). 

13See Report at section 3.24. 

aircraft operators using data in their 

Computer-Assisted Passenger 

Prescreening Systems (CAPPS). These 

CAPPS assessments are used in riskbased analysis of Secure Flight and 

other prescreening data that produces a 

boarding pass printing result for each 

passenger. This change identifies 

additional passengers who may be 

eligible for expedited screening at 

airport security checkpoints. This 

updated system will continue to be 

included in the Department of 

Homeland Security’s inventory of 

record systems. Additionally, this notice 

includes non-substantive changes to 

simplify the formatting and text of the 

previously published notice. 

DATES: Submit comments on or before 

February 4, 2015. This updated system 

will be effective upon publication 

except that the change to the categories 

of records will be effective 30 days after 

date of publication in the Federal 

Register. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by docket number DHS– 

2014–0076 by one of the following 

methods: 

• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–343–4010. 

• Mail: Karen L. Neuman, Chief 

Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, 

Department of Homeland Security, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

Instructions: All submissions received 

must include the agency name and 

docket number for this rulemaking. All 

comments received will be posted 

without change to http://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. 

Docket: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or 

comments received, please visit http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

general questions, please contact: Peter 

Pietra, Privacy Officer, TSA–36, 

Transportation Security Administration, 

601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 

20598–6036; email: TSAPrivacy@

dhs.gov. For privacy questions, please 

contact: Karen L. Neuman, Chief Privacy 

Officer, Privacy Office, Department of 

Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

In accordance with the Privacy Act of 

1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS)/

Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) proposes to update and reissue a 

current DHS system of records titled, 

‘‘DHS/TSA–019 Secure Flight Records 

System of Records.’’ This system of 

records notice was last updated on 

September 10, 2013.1

TSA is modifying DHS/TSA–019 by 

adding Computer-Assisted Passenger 

Prescreening System (CAPPS) 

assessments received from aircraft 

operators to the Categories of Records. 

CAPPS assessments are the product of a 

risk analysis of passenger name records 

(PNR) 2 and other information 

associated with flight reservations that 

aircraft operators collect in the ordinary 

course of business. These PNRs and 

other data provide risk indications and 

are used to assess passenger risk on a 

per flight basis. The CAPPS assessment, 

in turn, is used in the risk-based 

analysis of Secure Flight Passenger Data 

(SFPD) 3 and other prescreening data 

that produce a boarding pass printing 

result for each passenger. The early use 

of CAPPS by aircraft operators was to 

identify passengers other than those on 

watch lists who merited additional 

screening. TSA now will incorporate the 

CAPPS assessment to identify low-risk 

passengers who may be eligible for 

expedited screening in airports with 

TSA Pre✓® lanes. By receiving a CAPPS 

assessment (as opposed to the 

underlying data used to arrive at that 

assessment), TSA obtains important 

security value from information without 

receiving all the underlying data that are 

generated when individuals make their 

flight reservations. 

TSA established the Secure Flight 

system of records and published the 

System of Records Notice (SORN) in the 

Federal Register on August 23, 2007.4

TSA updated and republished the 

SORN in the Federal Register on 

November 9, 2007,5 on November 19, 

2012,6 and on September 10, 2013. 

Background on CAPPS 

In response to the changing threat of 

terrorism,7 President Clinton 

established the White House 

Commission on Aviation Safety and 

Security (Commission) in 1996.8 In its 

final report,9 the Commission 

recognized that aviation security is a 

national security issue and 

recommended that the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) ‘‘work with 

airlines and airport consortia to ensure 

that all passengers are positively 

identified and subjected to security 

procedures before they board 

aircraft.’’ 10 Specifically, the 

Commission recommended that the 

FAA, ‘‘based on information already in 

[air carriers’] computer databases,’’ 

leverage that industry investment by 

separating passengers ‘‘into a very large 

majority who present little or no risk, 

and a small minority who merit 

additional attention.’’ 11 The 

Commission supported the development 

and implementation of automated 

passenger screening systems such as the 

system then under development by the 

FAA and Northwest Airlines. 

Following the Commission’s report, 

CAPPS was created by the FAA 12 to 

serve as a feasible alternative to 

conducting the Commissionrecommended 100 percent checked 

baggage matching and explosive 

detection screening.13 CAPPS was 

designed ‘‘to exclude from the 

additional security measures the great 

majority of passengers who are very 

unlikely to present any threat and, 

conversely, to identify passengers to 

whom heightened security measures 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 2 / Monday, January 5, 2015 / Notices 235 

14See FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 

Security of Checked Baggage on Flights Within the 

United States, 64 FR 19220, 19221 (April 19, 1999). 

15These evaluation criteria were reviewed by the 

Department of Justice, id. at 19224–25, and 

implemented in consultation with aircraft 

operators. 

16 Id. FAA funds subsidized a substantial portion 

of the aircraft operators’ cost for development of the 

core CAPPS system, which was provided to eight 

lead operators (six separate Computer Reservation 

Systems), all smaller operators associated with the 

lead operators (e.g., regional feeder airlines), plus 

19 other regional and national aircraft operators that 

collectively served approximately 95 percent of 

domestic airline passengers. Id. at 19222. 

17Pub.L. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001). 

18 In section 136 of ATSA (codified at 49 U.S.C. 

44903(j)(2)(C)), Congress directed that aircraft 

operators use CAPPS or any successor system to 

screen all aircraft passengers, not just those who are 

checking bags. See also TSA Notice of rulemaking 

status, Security of Checked Baggage on Flights 

Within the United States; Certification of Screening 

Companies, 67 FR 67382, 67383 (Nov. 5, 2002). In 

addition, ATSA continued in effect all ‘‘orders, 

determinations, rules, [and] regulations’’ of the FAA 

‘‘until modified, terminated, superseded, set aside, 

or revoked in accordance with law by the [TSA 

Administrator], any other authorized official, a 

court of competent jurisdiction, or operation of 

law.’’ See ATSA, section 141(b). ATSA also 

explicitly recognized the continuance of CAPPS 

when it exempted CAPPS from the requirement that 

the screening of passengers and property before 

boarding flights originating in the United States be 

carried out by a Federal Government employee. See 

49 U.S.C. 44901(a). 

19Pub. L. 108–458, 118 Stat. 3638 (Dec. 17, 2004). 

A genesis for IRPTA was the report of the The 

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States (the 9/11 Commission), which 

recommended that TSA perform watch list 

matching using the ‘‘larger set of watch lists 

maintained by the Federal Government,’’ and that 

screening issues associated with CAPPS be elevated 

for high-level attention and addressed promptly by 

the government. See Final Report of the National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States, page 393 (July 22, 2004). 

20The TSC maintains the Federal Government 

watch lists, including the terrorism watch list 

known as the TSDB. The TSC was established by 

the Attorney General in coordination with the 

Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the 

Secretary of Defense. The Attorney General, acting 

through the Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), established the TSC in support 

of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 

(HSPD–6), dated September 16, 2003, which 

required the Attorney General to establish an 

organization to consolidate the Federal 

Government’s approach to terrorism screening and 

to provide for the appropriate and lawful use of 

terrorist information in screening processes. 

21 73 FR 64018 (Oct. 28, 2008). 

22For a discussion of Secure Flight risk-based 

analysis, see the September 10, 2013 Secure Flight 

SORN update at 78 FR 55270, and the Privacy 

Impact Assessment for Secure Flight, DHS/TSA/

PIA–018(f) (Sept. 4, 2013), found at http://

www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/

privacy-pia-tsa-secure-flight-update-09042013.pdf. 

23TSA, however, remains authorized to obtain 

such data for transportation security purposes 

under TSA’s general compliance and enforcement 

authorities, such as TSA’s authority to inspect 

aircraft operators to ensure compliance with 

security programs and TSA regulations (49 U.S.C. 

114(f)(7), 49 CFR 1544.3); and TSA’s authority to 

issue subpoenas and orders for the production of 

information (49 U.S.C. 40113(a) and 46104, 49 CFR 

503.203(a)). TSA also collects the SFPD required to 

be provided under the Secure Flight Rulemaking. 

24See www.homelandsecurity.org. 

should be applied.’’ 14 The FAA 

evaluated whether PNR and other data 

associated with flight reservations that 

the aircraft operator collected in the 

ordinary course of business provided 

indicators of high security risk or low 

risk, or whether the data were risk 

neutral.15 Aircraft operators ran CAPPS 

in their reservation systems for 

originating passengers who checked 

bags prior to passenger boarding using 

the FAA-set standards for assessing 

these data.16 When a CAPPS assessment 

raised security concerns the aircraft 

operator either screened the passenger’s 

checked baggage using FAA-certified 

explosives detection equipment, or 

matched the bag to the passenger to 

ensure that the passenger’s checked 

baggage was not transported aboard an 

airplane unless that passenger was 

aboard the same airplane and flight. 

TSA was created in 2001 with the 

enactment of the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act (ATSA),17

and assumed responsibility for the 

CAPPS program from the FAA.18

CAPPS continued to be operated by U.S. 

aircraft operators pursuant to the TSAmandated Aircraft Operator Standard 

Security Program (AOSSP). Under this 

program, and prior to the 

implementation of Secure Flight, 

airlines were required to check 

passenger reservation data against watch 

lists. A CAPPS assessment indicating 

risk above a pre-set threshold required 

enhanced screening for passengers who 

were not on a watch list. For those 

passengers requiring additional 

screening as a result of their CAPPS 

assessment, the aircraft operator added 

the additional screening instruction to 

the boarding pass and TSA would 

perform the additional screening. As 

with the FAA, TSA did not receive the 

underlying PNR or associated 

reservations information. The additional 

screening included enhanced physical 

searches of individuals and their carryon bags at the checkpoint. 

The Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

(IRTPA) was enacted in December 

2004.19 Section 4012(a)(1)–(2) of IRPTA 

directed TSA and DHS to assume the 

function of comparing aircraft operator 

passenger information to data in the 

Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) 

maintained by the Terrorist Screening 

Center (TSC) from aircraft operators.20

TSA promulgated its Secure Flight 

Program regulations consistent with this 

statutory directive.21 By November 

2010, TSA fully assumed the watch list 

matching function from aircraft 

operators and air carriers in Secure 

Flight. Since that time, CAPPS has not 

been used to determine whether 

additional screening is warranted for 

certain passengers. Notably, however, 

IRTPA did not remove or amend the 

statutory requirement for aircraft 

operators to use CAPPS. Accordingly, 

the statutory and regulatory authorities 

for the use of CAPPS remain. 

Use of CAPPS Assessments in Secure 

Flight Risk-Based Analysis 

TSA plans to incorporate a CAPPS 

assessment generated by aircraft 

operators into its Secure Flight riskbased analysis of passenger and other 

prescreening data as part of ongoing 

efforts to enhance aviation security by 

identifying appropriate security 

screening for aviation travelers.22 The 

CAPPS assessments are designed to 

enhance TSA’s analysis of passenger 

security risk and enable TSA to make 

better passenger risk decisions. The 

incorporation of a CAPPS assessment 

into the Secure Flight risk-based 

analysis program with Secure Flight 

Passenger Data (SFPD) and other 

prescreening data is consistent with 

Congress’s direction in ATSA to use 

CAPPS in passenger screening. CAPPS 

assessments generated by aircraft 

operators continue to rely on 

information collected by those operators 

in the ordinary course of business. 

Secure Flight does not receive the 

underlying data that are used for the 

CAPPS assessment.23

TSA has taken a number of steps to 

review the security value of CAPPS data 

including evaluating whether certain 

CAPPS data are indicative of low-risk 

passengers. First, TSA worked with its 

airline partners to re-assess the security 

value of the individual CAPPS data 

elements. This effort resulted in refining 

CAPPS data elements. Second, TSA 

engaged the Civil Aviation Threat 

Working Group (CATWG), which is 

composed of analysts from various 

Federal Government agencies and led by 

a representative from the National 

Counterterrorism Center, to provide its 

assessment of the security value of 

CAPPS data. The CATWG provided its 

report of findings and recommendations 

in September 2013, which further 

refined the security value assigned to 

CAPPS data elements. Third, TSA asked 

the Homeland Security Studies and 

Analysis Institute 24 (a federally-funded 

research and development center) to 

review its approach to risk-based 

security screening including the use of 

CAPPS assessments. In March 2014, the 

Institute endorsed TSA’s approach for 

mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES

236 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 2 / Monday, January 5, 2015 / Notices 

25A Known Traveler Number means ‘‘a unique 

number assigned to an individual for whom the 

Federal government has conducted a security threat 

assessment and determined does not pose a security 

threat.’’ 49 CFR 1560.3. 

26Passengers who are eligible for expedited 

screening are referred to a TSA Pre✓® lane where 

they typically are permitted to leave on their shoes, 

light outerwear, and belt, to keep their laptop in its 

case, and to keep their 3–1–1 compliant liquids/gels 

bag in a carry-on. TSA Pre✓® lanes are available at 

more than 118 airports nationwide. See http://

www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck/airlines-airports. 

27Another potential outcome of Secure Flight 

risk-based analysis is that the addition of a CAPPS 

score may result in a passenger receiving standard 

screening who otherwise may have been eligible for 

expedited screening, or receiving enhanced 

screening instead of standard screening. 

conducting Secure Flight risk-based 

analysis and recommended that TSA 

continue to strengthen this analysis by 

including CAPPS assessments. Finally, 

TSA reviewed its plans to use CAPPS 

assessments with senior officials from 

the Department of Homeland Security 

Offices of Privacy, Civil Rights and 

Liberties, and General Counsel. TSA 

further refined the security value 

assigned to CAPPS data elements based 

on input from these offices. These 

offices found that CAPPS assessments 

may be used as part of the Secure Flight 

risk-based analysis while also protecting 

passengers’ privacy, civil rights, and 

civil liberties. In addition, these DHS 

offices will review CAPPS operations on 

an on-going basis, including the risk 

value assigned to individual CAPPS 

data elements, to assure CAPPS’s 

continued security value, its connection 

to evolving security threat information, 

and its adherence to privacy, civil 

rights, civil liberties, and legal 

principles. 

Currently, the Secure Flight passenger 

prescreening system has watch lists of 

high-risk individuals and uses these 

lists to issue boarding pass printing 

results, e.g., selectee screening or ‘‘do 

not board’’ instructions. TSA also has 

lists of low-risk individuals who have 

been issued known traveler numbers 

(KTN) 25 that makes them eligible for 

expedited screening. These individuals 

may receive a boarding pass printing 

instruction that enables them to use 

TSA Pre✓® lanes.26 TSA also uses riskbased analysis of SFPD and other 

prescreening data to make screening 

determinations (e.g., to determine 

whether a passenger is eligible for 

expedited screening). The addition of 

CAPPS assessments to existing Secure 

Flight risk-based analysis will 

strengthen the risk assessment and 

increase the confidence level in the 

determination that a passenger is a 

lower risk and eligible for expedited 

screening.27

The CAPPS assessment that a 

passenger receives for any given flight 

may change on the next flight because 

of the range of CAPPS data and the 

associated security risks and benefits. 

After these changes are implemented, 

passengers who are a match to a watch 

list will continue to receive appropriate 

enhanced screening. For all other 

passengers, the Secure Flight passenger 

prescreening computer system conducts 

a risk-based analysis of passenger data 

using: (1) The SFPD (including KTN) 

that TSA already receives from aircraft 

operators pursuant to Secure Flight 

regulations; (2) the CAPPS assessments; 

(3) frequent flyer designator codes that 

aircraft operators submit to TSA; and (4) 

other prescreening data available to 

TSA. The Secure Flight risk-based 

analysis determines whether passengers 

receive expedited, standard, or 

enhanced screening, and the results are 

indicated on the passenger’s boarding 

pass. 

No one will be denied the ability to 

fly or to enter the sterile area of an 

airport based solely on the results of the 

Secure Flight risk-based analysis, 

including the use of a CAPPS 

assessment in that analysis. 

II. Privacy Act 

The Privacy Act embodies fair 

information practice principles in a 

statutory framework governing the 

means by which the Federal 

Government agencies collect, maintain, 

use, and disseminate individuals’ 

records. The Privacy Act applies to 

information that is maintained in a 

‘‘system of records.’’ A ‘‘system of 

records’’ is a group of any records under 

the control of an agency from which 

information is retrieved by the name of 

an individual or by some identifying 

number, symbol, or other identifying 

particular assigned to the individual. 

The Privacy Act defines ‘‘individual’’ as 

U.S. citizens and lawful permanent 

residents. As a matter of policy, DHS 

extends administrative Privacy Act 

protections to all individuals where 

systems of records maintain information 

on U.S. citizens, lawful permanent 

residents, and visitors. 

Below is the description of the DHS/ 

TSA–019 Secure Flight Records System 

of Records. 

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a(r), 

DHS has provided a report of this 

system of records to the Office of 

Management and Budget and to 

Congress. 

System of Records 

Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS)/Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA)–019. 

SYSTEM NAME: 

DHS/TSA–019 Secure Flight Records. 

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: 

Unclassified; Sensitive Security 

Information. 

SYSTEM LOCATION: 

Records are maintained at the 

Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA), 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, 

VA, and at other secure TSA facilities in 

Annapolis Junction, Maryland and 

Colorado Springs, Colorado. Records 

may also be maintained at the secured 

facilities of contractors or other parties 

performing functions under the Secure 

Flight program. 

CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS COVERED BY THE

SYSTEM: 

(a) Individuals who attempt to make 

reservations for travel on, who have 

traveled on, or who have reservations to 

travel on a flight operated by a U.S. 

aircraft operator; or a flight into, out of, 

or overflying the United States that is 

operated by a foreign air carrier; or 

flights operated by the U.S. 

Government, including flights chartered 

or leased by the U.S. Government; 

(b) Non-traveling individuals who 

seek to obtain authorization from an 

aircraft or airport operator to enter the 

sterile area of an airport; 

(c) For flights that TSA grants a 

request by the operators of leased or 

charter aircraft with a maximum take-off 

weight over 12,500 pounds to screen the 

individuals using Secure Flight, the 

following individuals: (1) Individuals 

who seek to charter or lease an aircraft 

with a maximum take-off weight over 

12,500 pounds or who are proposed to 

be transported on or operate such 

charter aircraft; and (2) owners or 

operators of such chartered or leased 

aircraft; 

(d)(1) Known or suspected terrorists 

identified in the Terrorist Screening 

Database (TSDB) maintained by the 

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC); and 

(2) individuals identified on classified 

and unclassified governmental 

databases such as law enforcement, 

immigration, or intelligence databases; 

(e) Individuals who have been 

distinguished from individuals on a 

watch list through a redress process or 

by other means; and 

(f) Individuals who are identified as 

Known Travelers for whom the Federal 

Government conducted a security threat 

assessment and determined that they do 

not pose a security threat. 

CATEGORIES OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM: 

(a) Records containing passenger and 

flight information (e.g., full name, date 

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of birth, gender, redress number, known 

traveler number, passport information, 

frequent flyer designator code or other 

identity authentication or verification 

code obtained from aircraft operators, 

and itinerary); records containing 

assessments generated by aircraft 

operators under the Computer-Assisted 

Passenger Prescreening System 

(CAPPS); records containing the results 

of risk-based analysis in the TSA 

passenger prescreening system 

including boarding pass printing results; 

records containing information about 

non-traveling individuals seeking access 

to an airport sterile area for a purpose 

approved by TSA; and records 

containing information about 

individuals who seek to charter, lease, 

operate or be transported on aircraft 

with a maximum take-off weight over 

12,500 pounds if TSA grants the request 

of an aircraft owner or operator to use 

Secure Flight; 

(b) Records containing information 

from an individual’s form of 

identification or a physical description 

of the individual; 

(c) Records obtained from the TSC of 

known or suspected terrorists in the 

TSDB; and records regarding 

individuals identified on classified and 

unclassified governmental watch lists; 

(d) Records containing the matching 

analyses and results of comparisons of 

individuals to the TSDB and other 

classified and unclassified 

governmental watch lists. 

(e) Records related to communications 

between or among TSA and aircraft 

operators, airport operators, owners or 

operators of leased or charter aircraft 

with a maximum take-off weight over 

12,500 pounds, TSC, law enforcement 

agencies, intelligence agencies, and 

agencies responsible for airspace safety 

or security regarding the screening 

status of passengers or non-traveling 

individuals and any operational 

responses to individuals identified in 

the TSDB; 

(f) Records of the redress process that 

include information on known 

misidentified persons, including any 

Redress Number assigned to those 

individuals; 

(g) Records that track the receipt, use, 

access, or transmission of information as 

part of the Secure Flight program; 

(h) Electronic System for Travel 

Authorization status code generated by 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) for international travelers; and 

(i) Records containing information 

about individuals who are identified as 

Known Travelers. 

AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE SYSTEM: 

49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 44901, 44903, 

and 44909. 

PURPOSE(S): 

The Secure Flight Records system are 

used to identify and protect against 

potential and actual threats to 

transportation security and support the 

Federal Government’s counterterrorism 

efforts by assisting in the identification 

of individuals who warrant further 

scrutiny prior to boarding an aircraft or 

seek to enter a sterile area or who 

warrant denial of boarding or denial of 

entry to a sterile area on security 

grounds. It is also used to identify 

individuals who are lower-risk and 

therefore may be eligible for expedited 

security screening at the airport 

checkpoints. These functions are 

designed to facilitate the secure travel of 

the public. 

ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE

SYSTEM, INCLUDING CATEGORIES OF USERS AND

THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES: 

(1) To the TSC in order to: (a) 

Determine whether an individual is a 

positive identity match to an individual 

identified as a known or suspected 

terrorist in the watch list; (b) allow 

redress of passenger complaints; (c) 

facilitate an operational response (if one 

is deemed appropriate) for individuals 

who are a positive identity match to an 

individual identified as a known or 

suspected terrorist in the watch list; (d) 

provide information and analysis about 

terrorist encounters and known or 

suspected terrorist associates to 

appropriate domestic and foreign 

government agencies and officials for 

counterterrorism purposes; and (e) 

perform technical implementation 

functions necessary for the Secure 

Flight program. 

(2) To contractors and their agents, 

grantees, experts, consultants, and 

others performing or working on a 

contract, service, grant, cooperative 

agreement, or other assignment for DHS, 

when necessary to accomplish an 

agency function related to this system of 

records. Individuals provided 

information under this routine use are 

subject to the same Privacy Act 

requirements and limitations on 

disclosure as are applicable to DHS 

officers and employees. 

(3) To aircraft operators, foreign air 

carriers, airport operators, the 

Department of Transportation, and the 

Department of Defense or other U.S. 

Government agencies or institutions to 

communicate individual screening 

status and facilitate an operational 

response (where appropriate) to 

individuals who pose or are suspected 

of posing a risk to transportation or 

national security. 

(4) To owners or operators of leased 

or charter aircraft to communicate 

individual screening status and 

facilitate an operational response (where 

appropriate) to individuals who pose or 

are suspected of posing a risk to 

transportation or national security. 

(5) To the appropriate federal, state, 

local, tribal, territorial, or foreign, 

agency regarding or to identify 

individuals who pose, or are under 

reasonable suspicion of posing a risk to 

transportation or national security. 

(6) To the Department of Justice (DOJ) 

or other Federal agencies for purposes of 

conducting litigation or administrative 

proceedings, when: (a) The Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS), or (b) any 

employee or former employee of DHS in 

his or her official capacity, or (c) any 

employee or former employee of DHS in 

his or her individual capacity where the 

DOJ or DHS has agreed to represent the 

employee, or (d) the United States or 

any agency thereof, is a party to the 

litigation or proceeding or has an 

interest in such litigation or proceeding. 

(7) To the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA) or 

other Federal agencies pursuant to 

records management inspections being 

conducted under the authority of 44 

U.S.C. 2904 and 2906. 

(8) To a congressional office in 

response to an inquiry from that 

congressional office made at the request 

of the individual. 

(9) To the Government Accountability 

Office or other agency, organization, or 

individual for the purposes of 

performing authorized audit or 

oversight operations, but only such 

information as is necessary and relevant 

to such audit and oversight functions. 

(10) To the appropriate federal, state, 

local, tribal, territorial, or foreign agency 

responsible for investigating, 

prosecuting, enforcing, or implementing 

a statute, rule, regulation, or order 

regarding a violation or potential 

violation of civil or criminal law, 

regulation, or order when such 

disclosure is proper and consistent with 

the performance of the official duties of 

the person making the disclosure. 

(11) To international and foreign 

governmental authorities in accordance 

with law and formal or informal 

international agreements when such 

disclosure is proper and consistent with 

the performance of the official duties of 

the person making the disclosure. 

(12) To appropriate agencies, entities, 

and persons when (a) TSA suspects or 

has confirmed that the security or 

confidentiality of information in the 

system of records has been 

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238 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 2 / Monday, January 5, 2015 / Notices 

compromised; (b) TSA has determined 

that as a result of the suspected or 

confirmed compromise there is a risk of 

harm to economic or property interests, 

identity theft or fraud, or harm to the 

security or integrity of this system or 

other systems or programs (whether 

maintained by TSA or another agency or 

entity) that rely upon the compromised 

information; and (c) the disclosure made 

to such agencies, entities, and persons is 

reasonably necessary to assist in 

connection with TSA’s efforts to 

respond to the suspected or confirmed 

compromise and prevent, minimize, or 

remedy such harm. 

(13) To appropriate federal, state, 

local, tribal, or foreign governmental 

agencies or multilateral governmental 

organizations, including the World 

Health Organization, for purposes of 

assisting such agencies or organizations 

in preventing exposure to or 

transmission of communicable or 

quarantinable disease or for combating 

other significant public health threats; 

appropriate notice will be provided of 

any identified health threat or risk. 

DISCLOSURE TO CONSUMER REPORTING

AGENCIES: 

None. 

POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING, 

RETRIEVING, ACCESSING, RETAINING, AND

DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM: 

STORAGE: 

Records are maintained at the 

Transportation Security Administration, 

601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA, 

and at other secure TSA facilities in 

Annapolis Junction, Maryland and 

Colorado Springs, Colorado. Records 

also may be maintained at the secured 

facilities of contractors or other parties 

that perform functions under the Secure 

Flight program. The records are stored 

on magnetic disc, tape, digital media, 

and CD–ROM, and may also be retained 

in hard copy format in secure file 

folders or safes. 

RETRIEVABILITY: 

Data are retrievable by the 

individual’s name or other identifier, as 

well as non-identifying information 

such as itinerary. 

SAFEGUARDS: 

All records are protected from 

unauthorized access through 

appropriate administrative, physical, 

and technical safeguards. The system is 

also protected through a multi-layer 

security approach. The protective 

strategies are physical, technical, 

administrative, and environmental in 

nature and provide role-based access 

control to sensitive data, physical access 

control to DHS facilities, confidentiality 

of communications, including 

encryption, authentication of sending 

parties, compartmentalizing databases; 

auditing software and personnel 

screening to ensure that all personnel 

with access to data are screened through 

background investigations 

commensurate with the level of access 

required to perform their duties. 

Information in this system is 

safeguarded in accordance with 

applicable rules and policies, including 

any applicable TSA and DHS automated 

systems security and access policies. 

The system will be in compliance with 

Office of Management and Budget and 

National Institute of Standards and 

Technology guidance. Access to the 

computer system containing the records 

in this system of records is limited to 

those individuals who require it to 

perform their official duties. The 

computer system also maintains a realtime audit of individuals who access the 

system. 

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL: 

Records relating to an individual 

determined by the automated matching 

process to be neither a match nor a 

potential match to a watch list are 

destroyed within seven days after 

completion of the last leg of the 

individual’s directional travel itinerary. 

Records relating to an individual 

determined by the automated matching 

process to be a potential watch list 

match are retained for seven years after 

the completion of the individual’s 

directional travel itinerary. Records 

relating to an individual determined to 

be a confirmed watch list match are 

retained for 99 years after the date of 

match confirmation. 

Lists of individuals stored in Secure 

Flight, such as individuals identified as 

Known Travelers and individuals who 

have been disqualified from eligibility 

to receive expedited screening as a 

result of their involvement in certain 

security incidents, are deleted or 

destroyed when superseded by an 

updated list. 

SYSTEM MANAGER AND ADDRESS: 

Secure Flight Mission Support Branch 

Manager, Transportation Security 

Administration, TSA–19, 601 South 

12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598–6019. 

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE: 

To determine whether this system 

contains records relating to you, write to 

the Freedom of Information Act Office, 

Transportation Security Administration, 

TSA–20, 601 South 12th Street, 

Arlington, VA 20598–6020. 

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES: 

Requests for records access must be in 

writing and should be addressed to the 

Freedom of Information Act Office, 

Transportation Security Administration, 

TSA–20, 601 South 12th Street, 

Arlington, VA 20598–6020. Requests 

should conform to the requirements of 

6 CFR part 5, subpart B, which provides 

the rules for requesting access to Privacy 

Act records maintained by DHS. The 

envelope and letter should be clearly 

marked ‘‘Privacy Act Access Request.’’ 

The request should include a general 

description of the records sought and 

must include the requester’s full name, 

current address, and date and place of 

birth. The request must be signed and 

either notarized or submitted under 

penalty of perjury. Some information 

may be exempt from access provisions. 

An individual who is the subject of a 

record in this system may access those 

records that are not exempt from 

disclosure. A determination whether a 

record may be accessed will be made at 

the time a request is received. 

Individuals who believe they have 

been improperly denied entry by CBP, 

refused boarding for transportation, or 

identified for additional screening may 

submit a redress request through the 

DHS Traveler Redress Program 

(‘‘TRIP’’). See 72 FR 2294 (Jan. 18, 

2007). TRIP is a single point of contact 

for individuals who have inquiries or 

seek resolution regarding difficulties 

they experienced during their travel 

screening at transportation hubs such as 

airports and train stations, or crossing 

U.S. borders. Through TRIP a traveler 

can correct erroneous data stored in 

Secure Flight and other data stored in 

other DHS databases through one 

application. Additionally, for further 

information on the Secure Flight 

program and the redress options please 

see the accompanying Privacy Impact 

Assessment for Secure Flight published 

on the DHS Web site at www.dhs.gov/

privacy. Redress requests should be sent 

to: DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry 

Program (TRIP), TSA–901, 601 South 

12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598–6036 

or online at http://www.dhs.gov/trip. 

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES: 

Same as ‘‘Notification Procedure’’ and 

‘‘Record Access Procedure’’ above. 

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES: 

Information contained in the system 

is obtained from U.S. aircraft operators, 

foreign air carriers, the owners and 

operators of leased or charter aircraft 

with a maximum take-off weight over 

12,500 pounds who request TSA 

screening, the TSC, TSA employees, 

airport operators, Federal executive 

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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 2 / Monday, January 5, 2015 / Notices 239 

branch agencies, Federal judicial and 

legislative branch entities, State, local, 

international, and other governmental 

agencies, private entities for Known 

Traveler program participants, and the 

individuals to whom the records in the 

system pertain. 

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM: 

No exemption will be asserted with 

respect to identifying information, or 

flight information, obtained from 

passengers, non-travelers, and aircraft 

owners or operators. 

This system, however, may contain 

records or information recompiled or 

created from information contained in 

other systems of records, which are 

exempt from certain provisions of the 

Privacy Act. For these records of 

information only, in accordance with 5 

U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2), TSA claims 

the following exemptions for these 

records or information from subsections 

(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); 

(e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and 

(8); (f); and (g) of the Privacy Act of 

1974, as amended, as necessary and 

appropriate to protect such information. 

Certain portions or all of these records 

may be exempt from disclosure 

pursuant to these exemptions. 

Dated: December 10, 2014. 

Karen L. Neuman, 

Chief Privacy Officer, Department of 

Homeland Security. 

[FR Doc. 2014–30856 Filed 1–2–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–05–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Office of the Secretary 

[Docket No. DHS–2014–0065] 

Privacy Act of 1974; Department of 

Homeland Security/U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement—013 Alien 

Health Records System of Records 

AGENCY: Privacy Office, Department of 

Homeland Security. 

ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act System of 

Records. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of 

Homeland Security proposes to update 

and rename a Department of Homeland 

Security/U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement system of records notice 

now titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland 

Security/U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement—013 Alien Health Records 

System of Records.’’ This system 

maintains records that document the 

health screening, examination, and 

treatment of aliens arrested by the 

Department of Homeland Security and 

detained by U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement for civil 

immigration purposes in facilities where 

care is provided by the ICE Health 

Service Corps. With the publication of 

this updated system of records, several 

changes are being made: (1) New 

categories of records have been added; 

(2) new routine uses have been added to 

allow the Department of Homeland 

Security to share information from the 

system; and (3) additional information 

has been added to clarify the process 

regarding notification of and access to 

records. This updated system will be 

included in the Department of 

Homeland Security’s inventory of 

record systems. 

DATES: Submit comments on or before 

February 4, 2015. This updated system 

will be effective February 4, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, 

identified by docket number DHS– 

2014–0065 by one of the following 

methods: 

• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–343–4010. 

• Mail: Karen L. Neuman, Chief 

Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, 

Department of Homeland Security, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

Instructions: All submissions received 

must include the agency name and 

docket number for this notice. All 

comments received will be posted 

without change to http://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. 

Docket: For access to the docket to 

read background documents or 

comments received, please visit http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

general questions, please contact Lyn 

Rahilly (202–732–3300), Privacy Officer, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement. For privacy questions, 

please contact Karen L. Neuman (202– 

343–1717), Chief Privacy Officer, 

Privacy Office, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Washington, DC 

20528. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

In accordance with the Privacy Act of 

1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS)/U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) proposes to update and rename a 

current DHS system of records titled, 

‘‘DHS/ICE–013 Alien Health Records 

System of Records.’’ 

DHS is updating and renaming the 

DHS/ICE–013 Alien Health Records 

System of Records to add new categories 

of records and routine uses, to provide 

additional information regarding the 

retention of records about minors, and 

to clarify the process regarding 

individual notification of and access to 

records. This system of records was 

previously titled DHS/ICE–013 Alien 

Medical Records System of Records. 

This system of records is maintained by 

the ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC), a 

division within ICE’s Enforcement and 

Removal Operations (ERO) office. (Note: 

IHSC was previously named the 

Division of Immigration Health Services 

(DIHS).) This system of records 

maintains medical, mental health, and 

dental records that document the 

medical screening, examination, 

diagnosis, and treatment of aliens whom 

ICE detains for civil immigration 

purposes in facilities where medical 

care is provided by IHSC. It also 

maintains information about prisoners 

of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) 

who are housed in a detention facility 

operated by or on behalf of ICE pursuant 

to an agreement between the USMS and 

ICE, and where medical care is provided 

by IHSC. IHSC provides necessary and 

appropriate medical, mental health, and 

dental care to ICE detainees. IHSC 

medical staff may also procure 

consultation, diagnostic, treatment, or 

procedural services IHSC deems 

necessary and appropriate from external 

health care providers in facilities 

outside of IHSC. Medical information is 

typically shared with other health care 

providers to ensure a detainee’s 

continuity of care. For individuals with 

infectious diseases of public health 

significance, their information may be 

shared with public health officials in 

order to prevent exposure to or 

transmission of the disease. 

New categories of records have been 

added to the DHS/ICE–013 Alien Health 

Records System of Records to provide a 

more complete list of the types of 

records in the system. These include: 

payment authorizations for care 

provided to detainees by external 

healthcare providers and healthcare 

facilities; evaluation records, including 

records related to mental health 

evaluations; records related to medical 

grievances filed by detainees; and 

detainees’ medical or healthcare records 

received from external healthcare 

providers. Additionally, new routine 

uses have been added to allow ICE to 

share information from the system of 

records. Below is a summary of the new 

routine uses and their corresponding 

letter: 

U. To courts, magistrates, 

administrative tribunals, opposing 

counsel, parties, and witnesses, in the 

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