S10300 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE October 1, 2008 

might go to the Department of Education 

and get that funded, as opposed to sitting 

back and hoping that money comes to us.’’ 

Other ideas include appealing to foundations and seeking revenue-generating activity on the Web, making the Smithsonian’s 

extensive photography collection available 

for commercial purposes, for instance. 

‘‘We’re not looking to make a profit,’’ he 

said. ‘‘We’re just looking to recover our 

costs.’’ 

During his nearly 14 years as president of 

Georgia Tech, Dr. Clough oversaw two capital campaigns that raised nearly $1.5 billion 

in private gifts. Annual research expenditures increased to $425 million from $212 million and enrollment to more than 18,000 from 

13,000. Georgia Tech has consistently ranked 

among the nation’s Top 10 public research 

universities. 

At the Smithsonian, Dr. Clough said he 

planned to spend the next year developing a 

strategic plan ‘‘to help us get a fix on where 

we are’’ and to set fund-raising priorities. He 

said he wanted to consult people across the 

institution, with the added dividend that it 

‘‘will help restore some of the morale.’’ 

The Smithsonian needs to be lean, but it 

must maintain the basic levels of staffing 

that, for instance, allow the zoo to keep feeding the animals, Dr. Clough said. The institution’s employment levels have shrunk in 

recent years, declining by nearly 600 employees since fiscal year 1993 to the current level 

of 5,960. 

‘‘We have to stabilize it,’’ Dr. Clough said. 

‘‘We can’t be the institution we hope to be if 

we sit around and let that happen.’’ 

At the same time he understands 

Congress’s concerns and says he is ready to 

be grilled when the time arrives, perhaps 

next spring, when appropriations hearings 

are usually held. 

‘‘It’s O.K. for us to be asked our relevance 

and what we’re doing for the country,’’ he 

said. ‘‘I think we can make that case.’’ 

This article has been revised to reflect the 

following correction: An article on Monday 

about plans for the Smithsonian Institution 

outlined by G. Wayne Clough, its new chief 

executive, misstated the goal of the institution’s capital campaign. It is to raise more 

than $1 billion over five to seven years, not 

$5 million to $7 million. 

f 

KIDS ACT 

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I rise 

today to address a pressing issue that 

deserves our immediate attention: the 

improved protection of children on the 

Internet. That is why, at the beginning 

of this Congress, I authored and introduced S. 431, the Keeping the Internet 

Devoid of Sexual Predators, or KIDS, 

Act. 

The increasing popularity of social 

networking Web sites and their ready 

availability to children has made these 

sites potential hotbeds for sexual predators, who can easily camouflage themselves amidst the throng of users on 

these sites, while furtively pursuing 

their own despicable designs. In the 

21st century, just as we protect children in our physical neighborhoods, we 

must protect them in our online communities as well. The KIDS Act, S. 431, 

is a bipartisan bill that does just that. 

The KIDS Act requires convicted sex 

offenders to register their e-mail addresses, instant message names, and all 

other Internet identifiers with the National Sex Offender Registry. The Department of Justice, DOJ, would then 

make this information, on a qualified 

basis, available to social networking 

sites to compare the catalogued identifiers with those of their users. And it 

will do so in a way that carefully preserves the privacy of the users of any 

such Web site. 

The Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act, SORNA, passed as 

part of the Adam Walsh Act, granted 

the Attorney General the authority to 

require the registration of certain identifying information, 42 U.S.C. 16914(a). 

While DOJ recently exercised its authority to collect ‘‘other information 

required’’ to issue final rules concerning the collection and release of 

Internet identifiers, this legislation 

permanently mandates that certain 

Internet identifier information be required in the registration process. 

The amended bill continues to exempt Internet identifiers from public 

disclosure by States or DOJ. 

The amended legislation requires the 

Attorney General to ensure that there 

are procedures in place to notify sex offenders of changes in requirements. 

The legislation clarifies the definition of ‘‘social networking site’’ to assure that access to Internet identifiers 

is targeted to the bill’s purpose of protecting children from solicitation by 

sex offenders on social networking 

sites. Sites may obtain information 

from DOJ only if they are focused on 

social interaction and their users include a significant number of minors. A 

‘‘significant number’’ of minors, of 

course, clearly does not mean that the 

majority of users, or even a substantial 

minority, must be minors to qualify a 

Web site to participate, nor does it 

mean any particular quantity. The intent here is simply to permit the participation of any Web site that draws 

many minors; otherwise the law’s purpose and effectiveness would be undermined. 

As amended, the bill further allows 

social networking sites to employ contractors to assist with the checking 

process, but intends that these contractors will be subject to the same requirements that protect privacy interests. 

The legislation still sets out a system for checking Internet identifiers 

and includes more robust privacy protections. Web sites may obtain a list of 

offenders’ Internet identifiers from 

DOJ but only in a protected and secure 

form. Only after making a match can 

the Web site view the Internet identifier in unprotected form and request 

specific additional items of personal information about the registered sex offender. Web sites will require this additional information in order to ensure 

that people who are not registered offenders are not wrongly blocked from 

using their Web sites. 

Moreover, as a qualification for the 

use of the checking system, social networking Web sites must provide the 

Attorney General a description of policies and procedures for protecting all 

shared information and policies for allowing users the ability to challenge 

their denial of access. This mechanism 

seeks to ensure a process to identify 

and remove false positives from sex offender registries. If a Web site discovers incorrect information, the Web 

site is required to inform DOJ and the 

State registry so that they can correct 

the information. 

There is now a new section modifying 

minimum standards required for electronic monitoring units used in the 

sexual offender monitoring pilot program established under the Adam 

Walsh Act. DOJ agrees that this 

change is needed. This will open up 

program participation to many more 

States and companies. 

The legislation no longer includes 

the stand-alone criminal offense for 

knowing failure to register an Internet 

identifier. That provision was deemed 

unnecessary because existing law clearly criminalizes the failure to register 

information that the Attorney General 

requires convicted sex offenders to register under SORNA. The KIDS Act, relying on section 114(a)(7) of SORNA, 

specifically mandates that this required information include Internet 

identifiers. Thus, under the existing 

SORNA framework, as enhanced by the 

KIDS Act, failure to register Internet 

identifiers as required will be treated 

as any other registration violation 

punishable under 18 USC §2250(a)(3). 

This bill represents a vital step toward giving both law enforcement and 

businesses the tools they need to protect children from online sexual predators and toward making the Internet a 

safer place for children to communicate with their peers. 

The use of the Internet as a communications tool will continue to expand, 

and it is important that we put safeguards in place, so that our children 

can continue to benefit from advances 

in communications technology without 

putting them in harm’s way. 

I thank the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, NCMEC, 

MySpace, Facebook, Enough is 

Enough, RAINN, the American Family 

Association, the National Association 

of School Resource Officers, and the 

American Association of Christian 

Schools for endorsing the KIDS Act. I 

thank my colleagues for their support 

of this important bill and urge the 

President to sign it quickly into law. 

f 

TORTURE 

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, since 

2001, top officials in the Bush administration have secretly authorized the 

use of abusive interrogation techniques 

that in some cases have risen to the 

level of torture. In doing so, they have 

shown flagrant disregard for statutes, 

for treaties ratified by the United 

States, and for our own Constitution. 

They have misled the American people, 

undermined our values, and damaged 

our efforts to defeat al-Qaida. 

There are some who downplay the 

abusive treatment of detainees that 


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has been uncovered at Abu Ghraib, 

Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere as isolated incidents, conducted by a handful 

of rogue low-level interrogators. But 

the facts indicate where the true responsibility lies: with an administration that gave the green light to torture and a Justice Department that 

said anything goes. 

Make no mistake, torture is against 

the law. The United States is a party 

to the Convention Against Torture, the 

Geneva Conventions, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The United States Code 

criminalizes any act ‘‘specifically intended to inflict severe physical or 

mental pain or suffering.’’ And in 2005, 

Congress reiterated in the Detainee 

Treatment Act that cruel, inhumane or 

degrading treatment of detainees in 

U.S. custody is not permitted, no matter where those detainees are held. 

Notwithstanding these obligations, 

top administration officials have continuously sought and found ways to 

disregard the legal and ethical boundaries on acceptable detainee treatment. On January 25, 2002, Alberto 

Gonzales, in his capacity as counsel to 

the President, signed a memo arguing 

that Taliban and al-Qaida detainees 

were not protected by the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of 

Prisoners of War. He stated that ‘‘[i]n 

my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its 

provisions . . .’’ 

On February 2, 2002, the President 

issued an order determining that alQaida and Taliban detainees were entitled to neither prisoner of war protections under the Geneva Conventions 

nor the protections of Common Article 

Three. Gonzales also solicited from the 

Department of Justice Office of Legal 

Counsel, the now infamous ‘‘Bybee 

memo,’’ issued in August 2002, which in 

the context of the criminal prohibition 

on torture defined torture narrowly as 

the infliction of ‘‘intense pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to 

the pain that would be associated with 

serious physical injury so severe that 

death, organ failure, or permanent 

damage resulting in a loss of significant bodily function will likely result.’’ The memo also contained the extreme—and dangerous—legal theory 

that the President, as commander in 

chief, could disregard any congressional enactment that interfered with 

his ability to interrogate enemy combatants. These positions were reiterated in March 2003, when another OLC 

memo was sent to William J. Haynes, 

general counsel of the Department of 

Defense. 

And the OLC did not stop at general 

guidance. In a hearing this year before 

a House subcommittee, Steven 

Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Attorney General at OLC, confirmed 

that his office had advised the CIA that 

the regulated use of waterboarding did 

not constitute torture for purposes of 

the criminal prohibition against torture. 

High-level administration officials 

also have not hesitated to issue policies permitting abusive treatment of 

detainees. On November 27, 2002, 

Haynes sent a memo to Secretary of 

Defense Donald Rumsfeld that asked 

him to approve 15 interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay, including hooding, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, sensory deprivation, 

forced nudity, threatening detainees 

with dogs, and putting detainees in 

‘‘stress positions’’ for up to four hours. 

Rumsfeld not only approved the techniques, he added a hand-written note: 

‘‘I stand for 8–10 hours a day. Why is 

standing limited to 4 hours?’’ 

Rumsfeld later rescinded the authorization of some of these techniques for 

use at Guantanamo, and reauthorized 

the use of others. But the consequences 

of these high-level approvals were farreaching. A recent report by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General revealed that techniques authorized by Rumsfeld were 

used on detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 

both during the period they were authorized and after they had been rescinded. And such behavior was not 

limited to Guantanamo Bay. According 

to the 2004 ‘‘Review of Department of 

Defense Detention Operations and Detainee Interrogation Techniques,’’ 

known as the Church Report, the Combined Joint Task Force in Afghanistan 

also developed, authorized and implemented interrogation procedures similar to those Rumsfeld had approved in 

2002. The Church Report and the ‘‘Final 

Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations,’’ 

known as the Schlesinger Report, also 

document how, in August 2003, MG 

Geoffrey Miller was sent from Guantanamo Bay to Iraq, and brought with 

him Guantanamo policies allowing the 

use of harsher interrogation techniques. Shortly thereafter, LTG Ricardo A. Sanchez, the top military official in Iraq, formally adopted techniques heavily influenced by those in 

use at Guantanamo, such as stress positions, forced sleep adjustment, and 

the use of dogs, although some of these 

were later rescinded. 

While OLC was issuing memos effectively saying there were no legal restrictions on interrogations and highlevel officials were authorizing abusive 

techniques, there is evidence to suggest 

that interrogators on the ground were 

given very little information about exactly what was and was not permitted. 

During a Judiciary Committee hearing 

on interrogation policy in June, I 

asked Department of Justice inspector 

general Glenn Fine whether he thought 

that military interrogators had clear 

guidance on what techniques were permissible, given the administration’s 

shifting policies. He responded that 

changes in policy ‘‘didn’t always get 

down to the level of the interrogators’’ 

and that, at times, ‘‘they weren’t sure 

or aware of what exactly was authorized.’’ Likewise, the Schlesinger Report 

stated that ‘‘[t]he existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation 

technique policies contributed to the 

belief that additional interrogation 

techniques were condoned.’’ In light of 

all this, the administration’s insistence 

that low-level interrogators are solely 

to blame for incidents of detainee 

abuse simply is not plausible. 

Many individuals who were aware of 

what was happening raised concerns. 

Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote 

a January 2002 memo that weighed the 

costs and benefits of trying to evade 

the Geneva Conventions, noting that to 

do so would ‘‘reverse over a century of 

U.S. policy and practice in supporting 

the Geneva Conventions and undermine 

the protections of the rule of law for 

our troops.’’ Others raised concerns as 

well. According to the DOJ inspector 

general’s report on the involvement of 

the FBI in military interrogations, several FBI agents ‘‘became deeply concerned not only about the efficacy of 

these techniques but also about their 

legality.’’ In 2002, the FBI Director decided unequivocally that FBI agents 

would not participate in interrogations 

that used abusive techniques. In a November 7, 2002, memorandum for the 

Office of the Army General Counsel, 

Army COL John Ley stated that he believed that some of the techniques that 

the Pentagon was considering for use 

at Guantanamo Bay and that were 

later approved by Rumsfeld—could violate both the Federal criminal prohibition on torture and the Uniform Code 

of Military Justice. He expressed concern not only about the legality of the 

interrogation techniques, but also 

about eroding public support and losing 

the moral high ground. And in a hearing before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee in June, RADM Jane Dalton, who served as legal adviser to the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

from June of 2000 until June of 2003, 

testified that all four of the Armed 

Services were concerned about authorizing new interrogation techniques. 

Fortunately, in 2006 after the Detainee Treatment Act became law, the 

Department of Defense finally agreed 

it would no longer authorize the use of 

harsh interrogation techniques by military personnel, and ordered that all 

personnel follow the interrogation policies laid out in the Army Field Manual. 

I have strongly supported proposals to 

require all intelligence agencies—specifically the CIA—to do the same. For 

far too long, this administration has 

failed to abide by the law and to protect our values. The use of abusive interrogation techniques is unsupportable on moral, legal or national security 

grounds. It does not represent who we 

are as a nation, and it does not make 

America safer. 

The responsibility for the use of immoral, illegal and counter-productive 

interrogation techniques does not stop 

with the interrogators who employed 

them. It extends to those in the highest echelons of the Bush administration that sought to encourage these 


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S10302 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE October 1, 2008 

techniques, who confused interrogators 

with constantly shifting policies, and 

that ignored the many voices who told 

them that what they were doing was 

unlawful and that it was not the American way. And it extends to the President himself, who has acknowledged 

publicly that in 2003 he approved meetings of his most senior national security officials to consider and sign off on 

so-called enhanced interrogation techniques. The abuses that have occurred 

under this administration’s watch have 

constituted one of the darkest episodes 

in this Nation’s recent history. They 

have fed growing anger at and opposition to U.S. policies, and in the process 

have undermined our efforts to combat 

al-Qaida and associated extremist 

groups. The next administration will 

have to work long and hard to undo the 

damage that has been done to our 

country’s reputation and national security and to restore the rule of law. 

f 

RESOURCE FAMILY RECRUITMENT 

AND RETENTION ACT 

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I 

rise today to voice my support for the 

Resource Family Recruitment and Retention Act of 2008, which was introduced on September 16, 2008, by my 

good friend Senator BLANCHE LINCOLN

of Arkansas. This is an important piece 

of legislation, and I am proud to be an 

original cosponsor. 

I have long been a member of the 

Congressional Coalition on Adoption 

and worked in a bipartisan manner to 

support adoptive and foster parents 

and children. In 1997, I strongly advocated for the passage of the Adoption 

and Safe Families Act which has made 

a significant difference in the lives of 

vulnerable children. Since the implementation of the Adoption and Safe 

Families Act, the number of children 

adopted out of foster care has more 

than doubled. In West Virginia alone, 

more than 3,600 children have been 

adopted out of the West Virginia foster 

care system. This is a real victory for 

these children who deserve the love and 

comfort of a safe, permanent home. 

However, with more than 500,000 children still in foster care, it is clear that 

more needs to be done. This is why I 

was so pleased when the Senate passed 

the Fostering Connections to Success 

and Increasing Adoptions Act by unanimous consent. This legislation will 

provide additional support for grandparents and other relatives who provide a safe home for children in foster 

care. Additionally, this legislation will 

allow states to continue to assist older 

foster children, those who are 18, 19, 20, 

or 21 years old, so that these children 

aging out of the system do not have to 

choose between pursuing an education 

or working to prevent becoming homeless. I believe that this legislation is 

another step towards the ultimate goal 

of each child having a safe, permanent 

home. 

Senator LINCOLN’s legislation would 

also help bring us closer to this goal. A 

study conducted in 2005 by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found that one in five foster homes 

leaves the system each year. One-fifth 

of the foster parent population provides 60 to 80 percent of all foster care. 

Foster parents sacrifice in tremendous 

ways to provide a home for vulnerable 

children. The Resource Family Recruitment and Retention Act would 

support their efforts by awarding 

grants to States to improve the leadership, support, training, recruitment, 

and retention of foster care, kinship 

care, and adoptive parents. 

It is my hope that organizations and 

individuals such as Mr. Dennis Sutton 

of the Children’s Home Society of West 

Virginia, who has worked tirelessly in 

his effort to secure a home for all of 

West Virginia’s vulnerable children, 

will have the financial support to find 

and retain enough foster parents to 

make this goal a reality. Foster and 

adoptive parents will greatly benefit 

from the Resource Family Recruitment 

and Retention Act, but the big winners 

will be the children who are placed loving homes. We need to invest and focus 

on these families. 

f 

AFRICOM 

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, today 

marks the full operational launch of 

the U.S. Africa Command, known as 

AFRICOM. I have long supported the 

idea of a unified regional combatant 

command for Africa that recognizes 

the continent’s growing strategic importance for U.S. security and that is 

coordinated with other U.S. agencies. 

As I have discussed many times on the 

Senate floor, we can not pretend that 

weak and failing states, protracted violent conflicts, maritime insecurity, 

narcotics and weapons trafficking, 

large-scale corruption, and the misappropriation and exploitation of natural resources are not relevant to our 

long-term interests. At the same time, 

there are exciting economic and social 

developments underway across Africa 

that provide openings for the United 

States to help save lives, strengthen 

governance institutions, and build 

long-term partnerships. It is not a 

question of whether the United States 

needs to work proactively and collaboratively with African nations in these 

areas but a question of how we should 

do so to maximize our efficacy while 

minimizing potential backlash. 

Toward that end, the standup of 

AFRICOM presents both opportunities 

and risks. Indisputably, our Nation’s 

military strength is one of our greatest 

assets and may be necessary to deal 

with some of the emerging national 

and transnational threats, such as narcotics trafficking, piracy, and terrorism. Military training, equipping, 

and logistical support are essential to 

develop strong, disciplined national 

militaries and also strengthen regional 

peacekeeping, especially with African 

Union missions currently operating in 

Somalia and Sudan. Furthermore, in 

many postconflict societies, such as Liberia, our military expertise can assist 

in demobilization, disarmament, and 

reintegration while also helping to rebuild that country’s army. 

However, while militaries make important contributions in these areas, 

they are insufficient to address the underlying causes of violence and instability in Africa. Lasting security requires reconciling political grievances, 

improving governance, strengthening 

the rule of law, and promoting economic development: tasks for which 

our military, or any military for that 

matter, cannot be the lead. To advance 

and support those tasks, the United 

States needs to continue to invest in 

our diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and development capacities on 

the continent. We need a unified interagency approach to these challenges in 

which AFRICOM is supporting, not 

eclipsing, the work of our diplomats, 

our aid workers, and other key partners. 

I am concerned that the opposite is 

happening. Despite initial ambitions to 

have 25 percent of AFRICOM’s headquarters’ positions filled by nonmilitary staff, that number has been 

severely reduced because of resource 

and staffing limitations in civilian 

agencies. Furthermore, a report by the 

Government Accountability Office published this July stated that concerns 

persist among civilian agencies and 

nongovernmental organizations that 

the military is becoming the lead for 

U.S. policy in Africa. Even as Pentagon 

officials claim this is not their intention, it is hard to argue with the numbers. While civilian agencies operating 

abroad continue to face resource constraints, more and more resources are 

being invested in military relationships and assistance in Africa. 

Given this context, it is not surprising that some are casting 

AFRICOM’s emergence as a signal of 

further militarization of U.S. Africa 

policy. Such perceptions of militarization are dangerous and risk undermining our ability to engage local populations. As I have said many times, 

the military has a critical role to play 

in helping Africans address their security challenges, but we must be careful 

that it does not outweigh or overshadow other forms of engagement. 

This is especially true in cases where 

local security forces are engaging in 

repressive tactics or committing serious human rights abuses, such as in 

Chad or Ethiopia. In these cases, we 

run a very real risk that U.S. military 

engagement could be seen by local populations as complicit in those abuses 

and become a target of resulting grievances. Before we jump at short-term 

opportunities to exert military influence, we need to consider seriously the 

long-term risks to U.S. stature and interests. 

Mr. President, this is not to say that 

AFRICOM is not capable of such 

nuanced strategic planning and interagency coordination. I have met with 


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