Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1408-CR-370 | February 20, 2015 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Keytron W. Johnson

Bunker Hill, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Keytron W. Johnson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 20, 2015

Court of Appeals Cause No.

02A05-1408-CR-370

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

Cause No. 02D04-0004-CF-232

The Honorable Frances C. Gull 

Judge

Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A05-1408-CR-370 | February 20, 2015 Page 2 of 5

Case Summary

[1] Keytron Johnson appeals the denial of his request for educational credit time. 

We reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] Johnson raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly 

denied his motion without a hearing.

Facts

[3] In 2001, Johnson pled guilty to Class A felony burglary and was sentenced to 

thirty-five years. On July 11, 2014, Johnson filed a pro se petition seeking 

credit time for his completion of various education programs. The petition 

alleged that he had completed the programs and that the Department of 

Correction (“DOC”) failed to award him credit time for such. In his 

memorandum of law in support of his petition, Johnson claimed the DOC did 

not respond to his written requests for credit time or his appeals. On July 29, 

2014, before the State responded, the trial court denied the motion without a 

hearing. Johnson now appeals.

Analysis

[4] Johnson argues that the trial court improperly denied his petition for 

educational credit time. In response, the State contends that, because Johnson 

failed to show what administrative remedies were available, “it is impossible for 

[Johnson] to prove that he exhausted his available remedies.” Appellee’s Br. p. 
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6. The State goes on to argue, “since the DOC did not respond to [Johnson’s] 

applications or appeals, it is unlikely that he actually exhausted his available 

remedies. Accordingly, the [trial court] court did not have jurisdiction, and this 

appeal should be dismissed.” Id. 

[5] The State relies on Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), 

trans. denied, in which a panel of this court dismissed an appeal challenging the 

failure to award educational credit time reasoning that the petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies deprived the post-conviction court of subject 

matter jurisdiction. In Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1256 (Ind. 2008), our 

supreme court clarified “that post-conviction proceedings are the appropriate 

procedure for considering properly presented claims for educational credit 

time.” Further, to properly present a claim, the petitioner must follow the 

Indiana Post-Conviction Relief Rules and, if the petition is not the first petition 

for post-conviction relief, the rules for filing successive petitions must be 

followed. Young, 888 N.E.2d at 1256-57. Without clearly addressing the issue 

of subject matter jurisdiction, the Young court cited Members for the proposition 

that, to prevail on a claim presented via post-conviction procedures, a petitioner

must establish to the post-conviction court that he or she exhausted his 

administrative remedies. Id. 1257. 

[6] Thus, based on Young, Johnson’s petition for educational credit time should be 

treated as a post-conviction relief petition, not as a free-standing challenge to his 

sentence. Nevertheless, dismissal is not appropriate because we do not believe

that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies implicates the subject matter 
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jurisdiction of post-conviction courts. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 19 

N.E.3d 757, 760 (Ind. 2014) (explaining “that the exhaustion of administrative 

remedies under AOPA is a procedural error and does not implicate the trial 

court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”); K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 

2006) (observing that the question of subject matter jurisdiction involves a 

determination of whether a court has jurisdiction over the general class of 

actions to which a particular case belongs and that “characterizing other sorts of 

procedural defects as ‘jurisdictional’ misapprehends the concepts.”). The State 

makes no claim that post-conviction courts generally lack the authority to 

determine educational credit time claims, and we decline to dismiss the appeal 

on that basis.

[7] As for the State’s claim that Johnson did not establish he exhausted his 

administrative remedies, the State offers no authority for the proposition that 

exhaustion of administrative remedies must be proven in a petition. It may 

very well be that Johnson has not exhausted his administrative remedies. 

However, Johnson should be afforded the opportunity to establish such, and the 

State should have the opportunity to respond before the post-conviction court 

rules on the petition. See Wilson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003) (remanding with instructions to allow the State the opportunity to 

respond to a request for educational credit pursuant to Indiana Post-Conviction 

Relief Rule 1(4)(a)). Thus, the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s petition was 

premature and contrary to the procedure set forth in the post-conviction rules. 
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Conclusion

[8] Johnson’s petition for educational credit time should be treated as a postconviction relief petition. As such, the trial court’s denial of his claim was 

premature, and it should be addressed in accordance with the post-conviction 

rules. We reverse and remand.

[9] Reversed and remanded.

May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.