18

- 2112 The New York Times, et al., v. Central Intelligence Agency

1 

## In the 2 

# United States Court of Appeals 3 

## For the Second Circuit 4

________ 5

6 A UGUST T ERM , 201 9 7

8 A RGUED : S EPTEMBER 6

, 201 9 9
D ECIDED : J U L Y 9

, 20 20 10

11
No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv 12

13
T HE N EW Y ORK T IMES
, M A T T H E W R O S E N B E R G , 14 Plaintiff s

- Appell ants

, 15

16

v. 17

18 C ENTRAL I NTELLIGENCE A GENCY
, 19 Defendant

- A ppellee

. 20

_ _______ 21

22 Appeal from the United States District Court 23 for the Southern District of New York. 24

________ 25

26 Before: K ATZMANN
, Chief Judge

, and W ALKER
, and P ARK
, Circuit 27 Judges

. 28

________ 29

30 New York Times and Matthew Rosenberg ( collectively, the 31

Times) brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action 32

seeking acknowledgement from the Central Intelligence Agency 332 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

(CIA) that it was aware of the existence of records regarding a covert 1

program of arming and trai ning rebel forces in Syria. Claiming that 2

such a disclosure was not required under two FOIA exemptions , the 3

CIA responded to the request with a so

- called Glomar response stating 4

that the Agency could neither confirm nor deny the existence or 5

nonexistence of such records. The Times then filed a complaint 6

asserting that certain statements made by the President and another 7

individual precluded use of the Glomar response. The parties cross

8

moved for summary judgment. The D istrict C ourt for the Southern 9

District of New York (Carter, J. ) granted summary judgment for the 10

CIA, holding that the relevant statements did not strip the CIA of the 11

two claimed exemptions because the statements did not officially 12

acknowledge or inadvertently declass ify the existence of such a 13

program. We AFFIRM. 14

C HIEF J UDGE K ATZMANN dissents in a separate opinion. 15

________ 16

17
D AVID E. M C C RAW
, The New York Times 18 Company, Legal Department, New York, NY for 19 Plaintiffs

- Appell ant s

. 20

J EANNETTE A. V ARGAS ( Benjamin H. Torrance, on 21 the brief )

, for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States 22 Attorney for Southern District of New York, NY

, 23 for Defendant

- Appell ee

. 24

25

263 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

J OHN M. W ALKER
, J R

. , Circuit Judge : 1

New York Times and Matthew Rosenberg ( collectively, the 2

Times) brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action 3

seeking acknowledgement from the Central Intelligence Agency 4

(CIA) that it was aware of the existence of records regarding a covert 5

program of arming and training rebel forces in Syria. Claiming that 6

such a disclosure was not required under two FOIA exemptions, the 7

CIA responded to the Times’ initial FOIA request with a so

- called 8

Glomar response that that the Agency could neither confirm nor deny 9

the existence or nonexistence of such records. Th e Times filed a 10

complaint asserting that certain statements made by the President 11

and another individual precluded use of the Glomar response. The 12

parties cross

- moved for summary judgment. The district court 13

(Carter, J. ) granted summary judgment for the C IA, holding that the 14

relevant statements did not strip the CIA of the claimed exemptions 15

because the statements did not officially acknowledge or 16

inadvertently declassify the exist e nce of such a program. We 17

AFFIRM. 18

BACKGROUND 19

Plaintiffs

- Appellants , the New York Times and Matthew 20

Rosenberg

, a reporter for the New York Times (collectively, the 21

Times)

, submitted a FOIA request on July 25, 2017, seeking to compel 22

disclosure by the CIA of records pertaining to a covert program 234 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

arming and training rebel forces in Syria. The FOIA request 1

specifically sought “[a]ll records and documents, including Inspector 2

General reports, related to the program to which President Trump 3

referred in a July 24, 2017 post on Twitte r.” The Twitter post stated

, 4

“The Amazon Washington Post fabricated the facts on my ending 5

massive, dangerous, and wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting 6

Assad . . . .” While President Trump did not specify the article in 7

question, the Washington Post had published an article on July 19, 8

2017, titled, “Trump ends covert CIA program to arm anti

- Assad 9

rebels in Syria, a move sought by Moscow.” The article stated that 10

“President Trump ha [d] decided to end the CIA’s covert program to 11

arm and train moderate Syrian rebels battling the government of 12

Bashar al

- Assad[.]” Additionally, during an interview with the Wall 13

Street Journal o n July 25, 2017, the day after the Twitter post

, the 14

President mentioned the “story about Syria that was in the New York 15

Times the other day ” ( before acknowledging that the story was in the 16

Washington Post ) . He then stated that the program was “not 17

something that [he] was involved in” and that the decision was 18

“made by people, not me.” 19

Separately, on July 21, 2017, United States Special Operations 20

Commander, General Raymond (Tony) Thomas

, was asked about the 21

“roll[ing] up” of a “covert program to arm [anti

- Assad rebels]” at a 22

national security conference at the Aspen Institute . In response, 235 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

Thomas said that the decision to end the program was “based on 1

assessment of the nature of the program, what we’re trying to 2

accomplish, the viability of it going forward, and [was] a tough, tough 3

decision.” 4

On August 22, 2017, the Times filed the complaint in this case

, 5

asking the district court to compel disclosure of any records 6

responsive to its FOIA request. B y letter dated August 23, 2017, the 7

CIA issued its Glomar response, 1 informing the Times that it could 8

neither confirm nor deny the exi stence or nonexistence of records 9

responsive to the request , pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3

. To 10

s upport its response

, the CIA submitted two declarations by 11

Antoinette B. Shiner, an Information Review Officer for the agency. 12

Shiner a sserted that conf irming the existence of responsive records 13

would, for instance, “ confirm th e existence and the focus of sensitive 14

1 The Glomar doctrine originated in a FOIA case, in the D.C. Circuit, involving records pertaining to the Hughes Glomar Explorer, an oceanic
research vessel. See Phillippi v. CIA

, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
In Phillippi, the CIA claimed that the “existence or n onexistence of the requested records was itself a classified fact exempt from disclosure under
... FOIA.” Id. at 1012 (emphasis added). T he CIA asserted that, “in the interest of national security, involvement by the U.S. government in the
activities whi ch are the subject matter of [plaintiff's] request can neither be
confirmed nor denied.” Id. In this Circuit, we have held that the “ Glomar
doctrine is applicable in cases where to answer the FOIA inquiry would cause harm cognizable under a[] FOIA except ion

– in other words, in cases in which the existence or nonexistence of a record is a fact exempt from disclosure under a FOIA exception.” Wilner v. Nat'l Sec. Agency , 592 F.3d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted).6 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

Agency activity that is by definition kept hidden to protect U.S. 1

government policy objectives

, ” and that denying their existence 2

would “confirm the absence of specific foreign policy objective s . . . or 3

the Agency’s inability to successfully carry out the purported 4

operational activities . . .

. ” 5

B oth parties filed for summary judgment and

, on June 29, 2018, 6

the district court granted the CIA’s motion and denied the Times’ s 7

motion. 2 The district court first determined that the Shiner 8

Declarations provided “sufficient bases for concluding that revealing 9

whether or not responsive records exist in connection with an alleged 10

program to arm and train Syrian rebels would lead to an 11

unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sou rces and methods.” 3 The 12

district court then held that: (1) the CIA’s Glomar response was 13

appropriately tethered to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3; (2) President 14

Trump’s statements did not declassify the existence of the covert 15

Syrian program; ] (3) those same sta tements did not o fficially 16

acknowledge the existence of the program and therefore did not 17

waive the CIA’s eligibility for FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3; and (4) U.S. 18

Special Operations Commander Thomas’s statements did not 19

2 N.Y. Times Co. v. Cent . Intelligence Agency , 314 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).

3 Id . at 534.7 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

independently confirm the existence of the covert government 1

program. 2

DISCUSSION 3

This case lies at the intersection of two important competing 4

interests : the need for the public to know what i ts government is 5

doing and the need to keep secret certain government activity the 6

disclosure of which could compromise national security, including by 7

revealing clandestine sources and methods used to acquire foreign 8

intelligence and to conduct covert operations. FOIA provides an 9

avenue for government transparency by making documents a vailable 10

to the public

. FOIA contains nine exemptions , however, to balance a 11

variety of governmental interests , including national security, against 12

the public interest in transparency

. Exemptions 1 and 3, at issue here, 13

exempt i nformation that is classified to protect national security 14

(Exemption 1) and i nformation that is prohibited from disclosure by 15

another federal law (Exemption 3)

. 4 T he right to claim these 16

exemptions can be waive d , however, by official statements that 17

acknowledge the existence of records pertaining to the secret activity 18

and that meet certain , specific requirements

. 19

4 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)

, 552(b)(3).8 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

T o properly invoke a Glomar response, an agency must “tether 1

its refusal to one of the nine FOIA exemptions

. ” 5 T he agency can do 2

this by submitting affidavits or declarations that provid e sufficient 3

detail as to why an exemption is appropriate. 6 W e review an agency’s 4

justification de novo

, 7 but when the information request ed concerns 5

national security, courts “must accord substantial weight to an agency’s 6

affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed 7

record.” 8 “Ultimately, an agency ’ s justification for invoking a FOIA 8

exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible.” 9 9

“Affidavits or declarations

. . . giving reasonably detailed 10

explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption 11

are suf ficient to sustain the agency ’ s burden” and “are accorded a 12

presumption of good faith.” 10 “ Summary judgment is warranted

. . . 13

w hen the affidavits describe the justifications for nondisclosure with 14

reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the informat ion withheld 15

5 Wilner

, 592 F.3d at 71 (internal citation omitted ).

6 Id. at 69.

7 I d. at 72

.

8 ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice

, 681 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Wolf v.
CIA , 463 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

9 Wilner , 592 F.3d at 75 (citing Larson v. Dep't of State , 565 F.3d 857, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).

10 Id . at 69 (quoting Carney v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 19 F.3d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) ).9 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted 1

by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency 2

bad faith

. ” 11 3

I. FOIA Exemptions 4

Here, the CIA based its Glomar response on FOIA Exemptions 5

1 and 3

. 6

a. Exemption 1 7

Exemption 1 permits the nondisclosure of classified records 8

that are : “(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an 9

Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or 10

foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such 11

Executive order.” 12 The CIA contends that the r ecords are classified 12

under the criteria set forth in Executive order 13

, 526

. 13 Shiner’s 13

affidavit attested that , in accordance with the criteria set forth in 14

11 Id . at 73 (quoting Larson , 565 F.3d at 862).

12 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).

13 Executive order 13,526 allows records to be kept secret when: “(1) an original classification authority is classifying the information; (2) the information is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control of the United States Government; (3) the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order; and (4) the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.” Classified National Security Information, Exec. Order. No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009)

.10 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

Executive order 13,256 : (1) s he was an original classification authority; 1

(2) the information was possessed by the United States Government; 2

and (3) the information sought related to intelligence activities, 3

intelligence source or methods, foreign relations or activities, 4

including confidential sources. Shiner then detailed why “any 5

sub stantive response would reveal sensitive information about the 6

CIA’s intelligence sources, methods, and activities that is protected 7

from disclosure under Exemption 1.” 8

b. Exemption 3 9

FOIA Exemption 3 applies to records “specifically exempted 10

from disclosure by statute,” provided that the statute “requires that 11

the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave 12

no discretion on the issue.” 14 The CIA pointed to Section 102(A)(i)(1) 13

of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by 50 U.S.C

. 14

§ 3024(i)(1) (the National Security Act), which mandates that the 15

Director of National Intelligence “shall protect intelligence sources 16

and methods from unauthorized disclosure

. ” Shiner attested that 17

Exemption 3 applied because a substantive “ response would reveal 18

information that concerns intelligence sources and methods

, ” which 19

the National Security Act expressly protects from disclosure

. 20

14 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).11 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

Agent Shiner’s affidavits, together with the appropriate 1

deference owed to the a gency, carried the CIA’s burden of showing 2

that the two exemption s appl y

. They set forth “logical or plausible” 3

justifications for both Exemption 1 and 3. 15 4

In sum, w e find that both exemptions apply because any 5

substantive response could reveal , as Shiner attested, “whether or not 6

the United States exercised extraordinary legal authorities to covertly 7

influence the political, economic, and/or military conditions in Syria” 8

or “the C IA ’s connection to such a pr ogram, if one existed.” At a 9

minimum, a substantive response to whether the CIA had any 10

documents would reveal that the agency had an interest

– or lack 11

thereof

– that could expose agency priorities, strategies, and areas of 12

operational interest. 13

II. Official Acknowledgement Doctrine 14

The Times argues that the CIA’s Glomar response , which 15

refuses to confirm nor deny the existence of records related to the 16

covert program at issue, is inappropriate because the President’s 17

statements, both in the tweet on July 24, 2017 and in the Wall Street 18

Journal interview the following day , officially acknowledged t he 19

15 Wilner , 592 F.3d at 72

- 73 (citing Larson , 565 F.3d at 862

– 63) (noting that agencies “need only proffer one legitimate basis for invoking the Glomar

response and FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 are separate and independent grounds in su pport of a Glomar response”).12 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

existence of the covert program and, therefore, the CIA waived its 1

right to assert a FOIA exemption. 2

“[ W ] hen an agency has officially acknowledged otherwise 3

exempt information through prior disclosure, the agency has waived 4

its right to claim an exemption with respect to that information.” 16 5

More than a decade ago

, in Wilson v. CIA

, 17 we applied a precise and 6

strict t est for claims of official disclosure. Classified information that 7

a party seeks to obtain or publish is deemed to have been officially 8

disclosed “ only if it (1) ‘ [is] as specific as the information previously 9

released, ’ (2) ‘ match[es] the information previously disclosed, ’ and (3) 10

was ‘ made pu blic through an official and documented disclosure.’” 18 11

We caution ed in Wilson that courts will “not infer o fficial 12

disclosure of information classified by the CIA from (1) widespread 13

public discussion of a classified matter

, (2) statements made by a 14

per son not authorized to speak for the Agency

, or (3) release of 15

information by another agency, or even by Congress .” 19 The 16

consequence of our holding in Wilson is that just because the existence 17

of classified activity may be inferred from publicly available 18

information or from official statements, government waiver will not 19

16 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. C.I.A. , 710 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

17 586 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2009)

.

18 Id

. at 186 (quoting Wolf

, 473 F.3d at 378).

19 Wilson , 586 F.3d at 186

- 87 (internal citations omitted) (collecting cases).13 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

be found unless all legal criteria ha ve been met. As relevant here, a n 1

agency is precluded from issuing a Glomar response if the existence or 2

nonexistence of the specific record s sought by the FOIA request has 3

been the subject of an official public acknowledgment. 20 4

T he Times contends that district court: (1) erred by finding that 5

President Trump’s statements were too ambiguous to have officially 6

acknowledged the records at issue ; and (2) misread Wilner as holding 7

that a Glomar response is appropriate whenever the CIA might have 8

an “interest” in the discussed covert program even if the program is 9

conducted by another agency. 10

As an initial matter, the district court did not mis read Wilner

. 11

In Wilner

, the “record [ w as] clear” that the “general existence of the 12

[relevant covert program ] ha[d] been officially acknowledged” 13

through express statements by President Bush and CIA Director 14

Michael Hayden

, although those statements did not disclose “ the 15

specific methods, targets, and informatio n obtained. ” 21 We held that

, 16

even though the general existence of the program had been disclosed

, 17

a Glomar response was still appr opr iate with respect to “those aspects 18

of the program that have not been subject to such disclosures.” 22 19

Additionally, w e found that “an agency only loses its ability to 20

20 Wilner

, 592 F.3d at 70 (emphasis added)

.

21 Id

. at 69.

22 Id . at 70.14 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

provide a Glomar response when the existence or nonexistence of the 1

particular records covered by the Glomar response has been officially 2

and publicly disclosed.” 23 This aligns with the district court’s reading 3

of Wilner that “a general acknowledgement of the existence of a 4

program alone does not wholesale waive an agency’s ability to invoke 5

Glomar where certain aspects of the program remain undisclosed.” 24 6

E ven assuming arguend o that President Trump’s statements revealed 7

the general existence of the alleged covert program, a Glomar response 8

is still appropriate if none of the relevant statements officially 9

acknowledged the existence or nonexistence of specific records. 25 As 10

we will explain, in light of the Wilson test, the relevant statements did 11

not officially acknowledge the existence of a covert program , much 12

less the existence of corresponding , specific records. 13

The Times maintain s that Wilner “supplies no basis for the 14

CIA’s Glomar response” because , by disclosing the records sought, the 15

CIA would only be revealing its “interest” in the allegedly disclosed 16

program

. We disagree. T he Shiner affidavits contain sufficiently 17

detailed justifications for invoking Exemptions 1 and 3 that are 18

23 Id . (emphasis added).

24 N.Y. Times Co. , 314 F. Supp. 3d at 530.

25 See Wilner , 592 at 70.15 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

broader than just a potential interest in the program : they include 1

protecting classified information and sources and methods

. 26 2

W e have repeatedly advised that official disclosure is a “strict 3

test
, ” and here, we agree with the district court that the President’s 4

statements do not satisfy the “specificity” or “matching” 5

requirements set forth in Wilson

. 27 Wilson starkly illustrated the 6

specificity requirement

. There, plaintiff Valerie Plame Wilson, a 7

former CIA agent , sued the CIA arguing that her pre

- 2002 service 8

with the CIA could not remain classified. 28 Agent Wilson pointed to 9

a letter, written on CIA letterhead

, that specified the actual dates of 10

her prior service

. An official from the Agency’s personnel 11

department signed the letter, which Wilson claimed to be an official 12

acknowledgment

. 29 A ware that the CIA still demanded that her 13

26 See Executive order 13,526 (allowing classified records to be kept secret when “the information falls within one or more of the categories of information listed in section 1.4 of this order,” which includes records that “pertain[]” to “intelligence activit ies (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods”); see also James Madison Project v. Dep’t of Justice , 302 F. Supp. 3d 12, 30 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, ACLU ’s narrow holding is not controlling here because the FBI i n this case asserts a broader justification for issuing a Glomar response than merely concealing an ‘interest’ in the Synopsis.”)

.

27 See, e.g.

, Wilson , 586 F.3d at 186; N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice

, 756 F.3d 100, 120 (2d Cir. 2014), opinion am ended on denial of reh'g

, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2014), supplemented

, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014).

28 Wilson , 586 F.3d at 173

– 74.

29 Id . at 1 81, 195

.16 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

service dates remain secret, Wilson then authori zed a member of 1

Congress to publish the CIA letter in the Congressional Record. 30 2

In Wilson

, w e acknowledged that th e letter was “reliable as 3

evidence of [plaintiff]’s prior CIA affiliation

, ” but stated that it was 4

“hardly akin to the CIA director personally reading relevant 5

information into the Congressional Record , as took place in Wolf v. 6

CIA .” 31 Accordingly, we held that there had been no official 7

acknowledgement even though the letter specified Wilson’s dates of 8

service

. 32 It was our view that anything less than the official 9

disclosure upheld in Wolf “ necessarily preserves some increment of 10

doubt regarding the reliability of publicly available information

, ” and 11

that the CIA’s “refusal to permit the elimination of that remaining 12

doubt . . . protects valuable information.” 33 Ultimately, we 13

“decline[d] to discount the importan ce of such ‘lingering doubts’ to 14

maintaining the secrecy of CIA sources and methods

. ” 34 A nd we do 15

so again here, notwithstanding the public statements by the President 16

and General Thomas regarding governmental activities in Syria. 17

30 Id . at 174.

31 Id

. at 195

.

32 We held that the CIA had not officially acknowledged the plaintiff’s

pre

- 2002 service even though the Agency letter expressly stated “Dates of Service: CIA from 11/9/1985 to 1/9/2006

– total 20 years, 7 days.” Id

. at 181.

33 Id . at 195.

34 Id

. (internal citation omitted).17 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

Likewise here, even afte r the public statements by President 1

Trump and General Thomas, lingering doubts remain as to the 2

information sought

. The President never specified that there was any 3

program

– let alone one led by the CIA

– designed to arm and train 4

Syrian rebels. While the matching aspect of the Wilson test does not 5

require “absolute identity,” 35 the Times is asking us to draw 6

inferences that the President acknowledged the existence of a covert 7

CIA program. For insta nce, regarding the President’s statement to 8

the Wall Street Journal that the program was “not something that [he] 9

was involved in” and that the decision was “made by people, not me,” 10

it remains unclear what “decision

, ” made by unidentified “people,” 11

President Trump was not “involved in.” While the Times argue s that

, 12

at a minimum, it “plainly” must be a decision to end a covert CIA 13

program, th e s e statements, even packaged together, do not remove 14

all doubt as to their meaning. 36 15

We agree with the Times that one reasonable way to interpret 16

President Trump’s tweet regarding “massive, dangerous, and 17

wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad ” is with respect to 18

payments tied to the alleged covert program

, as referenced in the 19

35 N.Y. Times Co. , 756 F.3d at 120

.

36 See ACLU , 710 F.3d at 428 (holding that official statements left “no doubt” that some agency operates drones and thus this program was officially acknowledged).18 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

antecedent Washington Post article. A s the district court suggested

, 1

however, these statements “could just as easily be the President 2

relaying what he believed to be the Post’s ‘fabricated’ 3

characterizations.” 37 Indeed, the t weet and the President’s interview 4

both focus on the Washington Post’s allegedly inaccurate reporting

. 5

The reference s to payments are incidental to this criticism

, which 6

obscure s what

, if anything, the President actually “disclosed.” T he 7

t weet and interview thus are not the straightforward disclosures 8

satisfying Wilson that the dissent depicts them to be. 38 9

Further, n either the tweet nor the Wall Street Journal interview 10

mentions the CIA and, therefore, anything other than a Glomar 11

response would likely reveal or refute that the CIA had an intelligence 12

interest in the program , evidenced by a cache of records

. 39 The dissent 13

minimize s the fact that neither the tweet nor the interview explicitly 14

37 N.Y. Times Co. , 314 F. Supp. 3d at 529.

38 See Dissent at 2

– 5.

39 The dissent argues that “while the majority speculates that a Glomar response may additionally be appropriate to disguise any ‘intelligence interest’ the CIA has in the program, the CIA never advances this as a justification for its response and we are thus foreclosed from justifying t he CIA’s nondisclosure on this basis.” Dissent at 1. We disagree. To the contrary, the Shiner affidavits invoke the CIA’s “intelligence and regional interests,” App’x 60, as a basis for its Glomar response. Agent Shiner
declared that a non

- Glomar response “would reveal the presence or absence of Agency priorities, capabilities, authorities, interests , resources, and relationships with foreign entities.” App’x 22 (emphasis added).19 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

reference s the CIA

, 40 but the absence is significant because it means 1

that there are “lingering doubts” as to th e CIA’s interest in the alleged 2

program. A n official response that acknowledged the existence

– or 3

nonexistence

– of responsive records would e lim in ate those doubts. 41 4

The Times point s to New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice

, 42 5

to support its contention that the information sought needs only 6

“substantial overlap” with that which is publicly disclosed

. [BB 18] 7

This argument is unpersuasive. First, the Times in this case takes th e 8

phrase “substantial overlap” in the prior case out of context. In th at 9

earlier case, the Times sought a n Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and 10

Department of Defense (DOD) Memorandum containing information 11

regarding targeted killings. 43 We held that the CIA had officially 12

acknowledged its role in targeted killings as a re sult of numerous, 13

express statements from President Obama, CIA Director Panetta, 14

Director of National Intelligence Clapper, and various senior

- ranking 15

members of Congress

. 44 We also referenced a publicly

- released DOJ 16

40 S ee Dissent at 3, 7

– 8

.

41 Wilson , 586 F.3d at 195 (holding that “anything short of an [official disclosure] necessarily preserves some increment of doubt regarding the reliability of the publicly available information”).

42 756 F.3d at 116

.

43 Id

. at 103.

44 We noted three interviews, two instances of congressional testimony, and one speech in which these officials disclosed the CIA’s involvement in targeted killings as the basis to conclude that such killings “ha[d] been20 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

White Paper that “virtually parall el [ed]” the sought

- after 1

information

. Moreover, Attorney General Holder had publicly 2

acknowledged a “close relationship ” between the DOJ White Paper 3

and the information sought

. 45 4

We then applied the Wilson test to hold that the information 5

contained in the OLC

- DOD Memorandum had been official ly 6

disclosed because it was “as specific as the information previously 7

released in the DOJ White Paper, it match[e d ] the information 8

previously disclosed, and was made public through an official and 9

document ed disclosure.” 46 W e still held , however, that other portions 10

of the Memorandum remained exempted due to a lack of specificity 11

and matching with the official disclosures. 47 12

The Times ’ s continued reliance on ACLU v. CIA

, 48 which held 13

that the CIA’s Glomar response pertaining to drones used for targeted 14

killings was unjustified, is also misplaced. The Times argues that 15

ACLU supports its contention that there is no “basis for the CIA’s 16

publicly acknowledged at the highest levels of the Government.” Id . at 118

- 19.

45 Id . at 116

- 17.

46 Id . at 120 (citation omitted).

47 Id . at 117. (“The loss of protection for the legal analysis in the OLC

DOD Memorandum does not mean, however, that the entire document
must be disclosed.”)

.

48 710 F.3d at 422

.21 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

Glomar response” because the CIA would be revealing nothing more 1

than its “interest” in the allegedly disclosed program

. T his argument 2

is unavailing for two reasons. 3

First, the pertinent official statements in ACLU were far more 4

precise , thorough, and numerous than those found here. The ACLU 5

c ourt found that the “extent of the official statements” regarding 6

drone strikes was highly significant

. 49 President Obama “publicly 7

acknowledged that the United States uses drone strikes against al 8

Qaeda. ” 50 I n a speech

, the President’s counterterrorism advisor, John 9

Brennan

, discussed the United States’ procedures for conducting 10

drone strikes. 51 CIA Director Panetta answered questions about 11

drone strikes during separate public remarks

. 52 While no statement 12

expressly indicated “ that the CIA has documents relating to drone 13

strikes,” 53 the D.C. Circuit had no difficultly concluding that the 14

statements were detailed enough to “ le[ave] no doubt that some U.S. 15

agency” operates drones. 54 Thus, it was nei th er “logical” nor 16

“plausible” to maintain that the CIA had no documents related to 17

49 Id

. at 429.

50 Id

.

51 Id

.

52 Id . at 431.

53 I d . at 430

.

54 Id . at 429.22 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

drones

. 55 The difference between the circumstances in ACLU and this 1

case is stark : h ere, based upon the doubts left by the statements, we 2

are unable to find an official acknowledgement

. 3

Seco nd, as in the recent D.C. district court case, James Madison 4

Project

, the CIA “asserts a broader justification for issuing a Glomar 5

response than merely concealing an ‘interest’ in the [requested 6

document].” 56 As Agent Shiner attested

, acknowledging the existence 7

of responsive documents would: (1) “confirm the existence and the 8

focus of a sensitive Agency activity that is by definition kept hidden 9

to protect U.S. Government foreign policy objectiv e s” ; (2) “ reveal 10

whether or not the Unite d States Government exercised extraordinary 11

legal authorities to covertly influence the political, economic, and/or 12

military cond i tions in Syria

, ” which could, “in turn, either 13

compromise a specific foreign policy goal . . . or serve as confirmation 14

for U. S. adversaries that there was no such objective” ; and “require 15

the disclosure of an intelligence source or method.” 57 As we have 16

55 Id . at 431.

56 302 F. Supp. 3d 12, 30 (D.D.C. 2018)

.

57 Even assuming, as the Times argues, that the CIA would have an intelligence interest in arming and training rebel groups in Syria, just as it does with drone strikes, the statements here do not rise to the level of specificity found in ACLU to have waived the CIA’s right to claim an exemption. ACLU

, 710 F.3d at 239

- 40. The ACLU court relied on “the extent of the official statements on the subject,” before holding that forcing the CIA to reveal whether it had an intelligence interest in drone strikes “wou ld23 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

noted, these justifications are sufficiently specific to support our 1

finding that the claimed Exemptions are “logical and plausible.” 2

Wolf v. CIA , in the D.C. Circuit, is also distinguishable

. 58 There, 3

the CIA issued a Glomar response to a FOIA request for records 4

relating to Jorge Eliecer Gaitain, a Colombia politic ian , who had been 5

assassinated

. 59 The Court held the information was officially 6

acknowledge d when the CIA Director testified before Congress and 7

“explicitly read some excerpts of [ CIA] dispatches related to” Gaitan’s 8

assassination into the record

. 60 After finding that the official 9

acknowledge ment waiver applied, the D.C. Circuit made clear that it 10

“relates only to the existence or nonexistence of the records about 11

Gaitan disclosed by [the CIA Director]’s testimony

. ” 61 Therefore, the 12

plaintiff was entitled to the disclosure of only “ the existence of the 13

CIA record s about Gaitan that have bee n previously disclosed (but 14

not any others). ” 62 15

reveal something not already officially acknowledged .” Id . at 242 (emphasis added).

58 Wolf v. CIA , 4 7 3 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

.

59 Id

. at 373.

60 Id . at 379.

61 Id

.

62 Id . (emphasis added). We also recognize that a D.C. district court recently held, upon examining the same presidential tweet before us, that
the CIA’s Glomar response was improper because the tweet was sufficient to officially acknowledge such a program. Leopold v. CIA , 419 F. Supp. 3d24 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

Finally, the Times contends that U.S. Special Operations 1

Commander General Thomas’s statements independently undermine 2

the plausibility of the CIA’s justifications for its Glomar response. At 3

oral argument, however, the Times conceded that General Thomas’ s 4

statements acted only as an “extra add

- on” to those ma de by 5

President Trump. In any event, it is undisputed that General Thomas

, 6

a high

- ranking officer in the Department of Defense, was not 7

authorized to speak for the CIA

, and courts will “not infer official 8

disclosure of information classified by the CIA from . . . statements 9

made by a person not authorized to speak for the [CIA].” 63 10

56 (D. D.C. 2019). However, we are not persuaded by the district court’s reasoning. As an initial matter, apart from the fact that the ruling is not precedent, the district court itself observed that courts can only “infer such
a disclosure wh en the statement does n ot explicitly disclose the information, but leaves no doubt as to its existence.” Id . at 6 6

- 6 7 (citing Leopold I , 380 F. Supp. 3d at 2 4 ) (emphasis added). As discussed, we think lingering doubts remain as to the existence of any pr ogram and corresponding records.

63 Wilson , 586 F.3d at 186; see also Frugone v. CIA , 169 F.3d 772, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that disclosures are not “official” when “made by someone other than the agency from which the information is being sought”) (collecting cases). Additionally, General Thomas’s comments appear to have been made in his personal capacity ( e.g. , “based on what I know about that program”), albeit with knowledge gleaned from his position as U.S. Special Operations Commander. Thus, they differ from
those in Wilson ( e.g. , CIA disclosures on agency l etterhead).25 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

As it did before the district court, the Times relies on Florez v. 1

CIA

. 64 The Times, however, reads Florez too broadly. In that case, 2

Florez filed a FOIA request seeking “t he disclosure and release of any 3

and all records between 1958 and 1990 related to and or mentioning 4

[his] father, Armando J. Florez,” who had served in several high

- level 5

diplomatic roles on behalf of Cuba. 65 The CIA answered with a Glomar 6

response, which was upheld by district court. 66 During the pendency 7

of Florez’s appeal, the FBI “released several declassified documents 8

pertaining” to Florez’s father. 67 The narrow issue facing us was 9

whether the FBI disclosures were “relevant” and

, if so, whether 10

remand was required. 68 We remanded the case to allow the district 11

court to consider the new FBI disclosures in the first instance

, without 12

determining their effect on the Glomar response. 69 Moreover, we 13

confirmed that the official acknowledgement doctrine is “limited only 14

to official and public disclosures made by the same agency providing 15

the Glomar response, and therefore does not ‘require[e] [the agency] 16

64 829 F.3d 178 (2d Cir. 2016).

65 Id . at 180.

66 Id . at 181.

67 Id

.

68 Id . at 183.

69 Id . at 190.26 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

to break its silence’ as a result of ‘statements made by another 1

agency.’” 70 2

To be sure, there are times when other agency disclosures can 3

be “relevant evidence” regarding the “sufficiency of the justifications 4

set forth by the CIA in support of its Glomar response

. ” 71 But that is 5

not the case here. As the district court noted, G eneral Thomas’s 6

statements are more ambiguous than the ones in Florez

. 72 General 7

Thomas stated that he did not “know enough about the [program] to 8

criticize it

, ” that he could not describe the program because it was too 9

complex, and that he offered his op inion based only upon what he 10

gathered the program to be. He also stated (without identifying the 11

agency) that the organization was one that he was not “necessarily . . 12

. affiliated with [.]” 13

In sum, after according appropriate deference to “ the uniquely 14

executive purview of national security,” 73 we conclude that the 15

70 Florez , 829 F.3d at 186 (quoting Furgone v. CIA , 169 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).

71 Id . at 184, 187.

72 In Florez , the FBI disclos e d that: “(1) the FBI investigated Dr. Florez’s background and tracked his career development, official activities, and international relocations; (2) the FBI cultivated informants in order to obtain information concerning Dr. Florez, including material whi ch pertained to both his professional and personal conduct; and (3) several other government departments and agencies provided to or received from the FBI information concerning Dr. Florez.” Id. at 178.

73 Wilner , 592 F.3d at 76

.27 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

President Trump’s statements
, even when coupled with General 1

Thomas’ s statements, left lingering doubts and thus were insufficient 2

to amount to an official acknowledgement of the alleged covert 3

program in Syria , much less the existence of records related to the 4

program

. I t is still “logical or plausible” that disclosing the existence 5

or nonexistence of an intelligen ce interest in such a program would 6

reveal something not already officially acknowledge d and th ereby 7

harm national security interests

. 8

III. The President’s Statements Did Not Declassify the 9

Existence of the Cover t Program 10

The Times next contend s that the President’s tweet and 11

statements to the Wall Street Journal interviewer declassified the fact 12

that the program existe d , thus precluding the CIA from inv o king 13

FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. The Times argue s that this “conclusion 14

flows inexorably from the President’s supreme authority in matters 15

of classification .” This novel argument is without merit. 16

It is true that t he President has broad authority to classify and 17

declassify

, derived from the President ’s dual role “ as head of the 18

Executive Branch and as Commander in Chief” of the armed forces. 74 19

Th e “authority to classify and control access to information bearing 20

on national security . . . flows primarily from this constitutional 21

74 Dep't of Navy v. Egan , 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).28 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any 1

explicit congressional grant.” 75 2

To make its declassi fication claim, the Times essentially recasts 3

its “official acknowledgement” claim as one of “inferred 4

declassification.” T o prevail in any claim of declassification, inferred 5

or otherwise

, the Times’ s must show : f irst, that President Trump’s 6

statements are sufficiently specific ; and second, that such statements 7

subsequently triggered actual declassification

. The first is easily 8

disposed of because we have already found that the statements are 9

insufficiently specific to quell any “lingering do ubts” about what they 10

reference. The second requires further discussion. 11

Declassification cannot occur unless designated officials follow 12

specified procedures

. 76 Moreover, c ourts cannot “simply assume, 13

over the well

- documented and specific affidavits of the CIA to the 14

contrary,” that disclosure is required simply because the information 15

has already been made public

. 77 The Shiner affidavit s , in addition to 16

75 Id . (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy , 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961)).

76 As explained above, Executive order 13,526 established the detailed process through which secret information can be appropriately
declassified.

77 Phillippi , 655 F.2d at 1325 , 1330. The Times is also concerned that “unless the President declassifies information by formal means or with magic words

– or the circumstances are otherwise “exceptional”

– a court

can never infer declassification[.]” [BB 33] Such concerns are mitigated, however, by the “official acknowledgement” doctrine. If the President publicly disclos es the existence of a covert program within the Wilson29 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

justifying the two FOIA exemptions, expressly stated that no 1

declassification procedures had been followed with respect to any 2

documents pertaining to the alleged covert program. 78 Moreover, the 3

Times cites no authority that stands for the proposition that the 4

President can inadvertently declassify information and we are aware 5

of none. B ecause declassification , even by the President, must follow 6

established procedures, that argument fails. 7

Finally, a s the district court recognized, the suggestion that 8

courts can declassif y information raises separat ion of power s 9

concerns. 79 In light of the executive branch’s “compelling interest” in 10

preventing declassification of highly sensitive information, 80 we 11

decline to hold that the judiciary may conclude that certain executive 12

branch statements may trigger inadvertent declassification because 13

such determination s encroach upon the President’s undisputedly 14

broad authority in th e realm of national security

. 15

framework, [BB 32

- 32] then there would be no need for courts to “infer
declassification

. ”

78 While the Times argues that the Court is “not bound by conclusory statements” in the CIA Affidavits, it does concede that such affidavits are entitled to “[d]eferential review[.]”

79 See N.Y. Times Co. , 314 F. Supp. 3d at 527.

80 Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509, n. 3 (1980 ).30 No. 1 8

- 2112

- cv

In sum, mindful of the requisite deference courts traditionally 1

owe to the executive in th e area of classification

, 81 we decline to find 2

that President Trump ’s statements inadvertently declassified the 3

existence of the alleged covert program. 4

CONCLUSION 5

For the reasons stated above

, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 6

district court. 7

81 S ee United States v. Nixon , 418 U.S. 683 (1974)

.1 K ATZMANN
, Chief Judge , dissenting: 1

Unlike the majority, I believe that President Trump’s public statements 2

cannot be logically interpreted as anything other than an acknowledge ment of 3

the existence of “payments to Syrian rebels.” The justifications the CIA provides 4

for issuing a Glomar resp onse are neither “logical [n]or plausible” given the 5

President ’s public acknowledgement of the program the CIA purportedly seeks 6

to keep secret. Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency , 592 F.3d 60, 73 (2d Cir. 2009)

. 1 And 7

while the majority speculates that a Glomar response may additionally be 8

appropriate to disguise any “intelligence interest” the CIA has in the program, 9

the CIA never advances this as a justification for its response and we are thus 10

foreclosed from justifying the CIA’s nondisclosure on this basis

. See id

. at 68 (the 11

“agency resisting disclosure of the requested records” bears the burden of 12

justifying application of a FOIA exemption). A Glomar response is “justified only 13

in unusual circumstances, and only by a particularly persuasive affidavit .” Florez 14

1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alterations, footnotes, and citations are omitted.2 v. CIA , 829 F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 2016). Because I do not believe this is such a 1

circumstance, I respectfully dissent. 2

It is worth emphasizing the limited nature of the question before us

, and 3

the extraordinarily limited practical consequences o f requiring the CIA to issue a 4

non

- Glomar response

. The question before us is not whether the CIA must 5

disclose whether it has run, or even been involved in , any program of covert 6

payments to Syrian rebels . And it is not whether the CIA must disclose any 7

records it possesses concerning such a program

, if it indeed possesses any 8

records. The question before us is solely whether the CIA must disclose the fact 9

that records responsive to the Times’ request either do or do not exist. Were we 10

to find a Glomar response unjustified, the CIA could still avoid disclosing the 11

contents of any responsive records by making a proper showing before the 12

district court. See, e.g. , ACLU v. CIA , 710 F.3d 422, 4 32 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“The 13

collaps e of the CIA’s Glomar response does not mark the end of [a] case.”). 14

I. President Trump’s Official Acknowledgment 15

The majority finds that President’s Trump’s tweet

— “The Amazon 16

Washington Post fabricated the facts on my ending massive, dangerous, and 173 wasteful payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad

, ” App. 39

— is ambiguous 1

because it could “just as easily” be read in two ways

. According to the majority, 2

the President c ould mean either that : (1) he had ended a program of payments to 3

Syrian rebels that he himself thought was “massive, dangerous, and wasteful;” 4

or (2) the Post fabricated the existence of the payments program and described 5

that fictitious program as involvi ng “massive, dangerous, and wasteful 6

payments to Syrian rebels fighting Assad.” See Maj. Op. a t 17

– 18 (finding that the 7

tweet “could just as easily be the President relaying what he believed to be the 8

Post’s ‘fabricated’ characterizations.” ). 9

I find only t he first reading plausible. Like the D.C. district court to 10

address the same tweet in another FOIA case, I can locate “ no logical reading

. . . 11

in which the tweet does not acknowledge that the U.S. government had some 12

knowledge of some payments to Syrian r ebels .” Leopold v. CIA

, 419 F. Supp. 3d 56, 13

67 (D.D.C. 2019 ) (emphasis in original)

. 14

E ven setting aside what we already understand as ordinary readers, we 15

know that the President was not relaying the Post’s characterizations of the 16

fabricated program because the Post never characterized the program as 174 “massive, dangerous, and wasteful.” In the Post’s reporting, it is the President’s 1

decision to end the pa yments that is dangerous and waste ful , not the payments 2

themselves. The Post article focuses on the perspectives of officials who believed 3

that the payments program was valuable, concluding that “[e]ven those who 4

were skeptical about the program’s long

- ter m value[] viewed it as a key 5

bargaining chip”

— a value that, in the Post’s reporting, was lost by the 6

Administration’s decision to end the program

. 2 App. 37. While some of the 7

officials who were skeptical of the program may have viewed it as “wasteful,” 8

th e article never uses this word. And n o where does the article describe the 9

payments to Syrian rebels as “massive” or “dangerous.” Only the President 10

describes the payments as “massive, wasteful, and dangerous”

— qualities that 11

2 For instance, the Post reported that s ome analysts “said the decision to end the program was likely to empower more radical groups inside Syria and damage the credibility of t he United States” and might cause the United States to “lose its ability to block other countries, such as Turkey and Persian Gulf allies, from funneling more sophisticated weapons . . . to anti

- Assad rebels, including more radical groups.” App. 36

– 37. One analyst equated the decision with “falling into a Russian trap” by “making the moderate resistance more and more
vulnerable.” Id. at 36. Another concluded that “Putin won in Syria.” Id. One former official described “ending the aid to the rebels altogethe r” as “a huge strategic mistake.” Id. at 37.5 payments can only have if they e xist. 1

T he President’s comments to t he Wall Street Journal the day after the tweet 2

offer yet further confirmation that he was intentionally acknowledging the 3

payments . Discussing “ the story about Syria that was in The [Washington Post] 4

the other day,” Pres ident Trump said that “they didn’t write the truthful story” 5

because “[i]t turns out it’s

— a lot of al

- Qaeda we’re giving these weapons to.” 6

App. 44. R eading the exchange leaves an ordinary reader with no doubt that the 7

President is clearly, consciously acknowledging and discussing the payments 8

program in order to dispute the Post’s characterization of the program and to 9

advocate for more serious efforts to root out leaks in his administration

. 10

Despite all this evidence of the President’s meaning, th e maj ority 11

nevertheless concludes that the President did not acknowledge the payments 12

program because his statements are not clear enough to “remove all doubt as to 13

their meaning.” Maj. Op. at 17. But we have never suggested that the ability to 14

read any doubt w hatsoever, no matter how implausible or how belied by 15

context, into a statement calls an official acknowledgment into question . The 16

majority’s d escription of the value of even an “increment of doubt” is borrowed 176 from a discussion of a very different kind o f doubt, the “lingering doubts” left as 1

to information’s accuracy when it is disclosed to the public by unofficial means 2

without official acknowledgment. Wilson v. CIA

, 586 F.3d 171 , 195 (2d Cir. 2009)

. 3

In Wilson , w e concluded that “anything short” of an o fficial disclosure 4

“necessarily preserves some increment of doubt regarding the reliability of the 5

publicly available information,” or, in other words, plausible deniability. Id

. ; see 6

also id

. at 196

– 99 (Katzmann, J ., concurring in the judgment ). Here, we are not 7

addressing an unofficial statement that would leave this kind of doubt as to 8

accuracy ; we are addressing a disclosure that came directly from the President. 9

H ad the President himself publicly stated the dates of Ms. Wilson’s employment 10

in the CIA

— the information there at issue

— Wilson would have been a different 11

case entirely. 12

T o t he degree that the majority is suggesting that some critical mass of 13

official statements is required to find official acknowledgment , I disagree

. 3 I see 14

3 See Maj. Op. at 1 9

– 20 (discussing the number of statements in New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 756 F.3d 100, 1 16

– 20 (2d Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh'g

, 758 F.3d 436 (2d Cir.), supplemented

, 762 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014) ) ; Maj. Op. at 21 (discussing the number of statements in ACLU , 710 F.3d at 422, 429

– 31)

.7 no support in case law or in logic for the position that more than one official 1

acknowledgment is required, or that a public, official, documen ted statement 2

directly from the President is insufficient to constitute an official 3

acknowledgment. Rather, even a single statement by the President

— who is, after 4

all, the official charged with the functioning of the entire Executive Branch

— may 5

suffice, wi thout the need for external corroboration or support. To hold 6

otherwise would fail to accord the proper weight and respect owed to 7

presidential statements. 8

T he majority also contends that the President’s statements do not meet the 9

“specificity” and “matchi ng” requirements for official disclosure. Maj. Op. at 14

– 10

17 . But “[i]n the Glomar context, the ‘specific information’ at issue is not the 11

contents of a particular record, but rather the ‘existence vel non ’ of any records 12

responsive to the FOIA request.” AC LU , 710 F.3d at 427. As t he majority notes

, 13

we have on occasion considered official statements that are more “precise” and 14

“thorough” than the President’s statements here. Maj. Op. at 2 1

. However, the 15

level of precision and detail in an official statement is relevant to what has been 16

officially acknowledged, not whether there has been any official 178 acknowledgment at all . Here, the question before us at this time is only whether 1

the President has officially acknowledged the existence of a payments program, 2

not whether he provided a thorough description of the program. The latter 3

would be relevant to the determination of what records concerning the program 4

must be disclosed were the CIA to issue a non

- Glomar response, not whether the 5

CIA ca n issue a Glomar response declining to disclose the program’s existence. 6

President Trump’s acknowledgment of the payments’ existence is sufficient for 7

Glomar purposes. 8

Presumably, in choosing to repeatedly acknowledge the existence of the 9

payments program, the President engaged in a calculus, weighing whether the 10

need to dispute the Post’s characterization of the program as valuable and of his 11

administration’s termination of it as “falling into a Russian trap

, ” App. 36, 12

outweighed the national security risk s posed by acknowledging that such a 13

program had indeed existed. The President evidently determined that the 14

benefits of official disclosure outweighed the risks. It is not our business as 15

judges to second

- guess the President’s decision , or to create doubt to avoid its 16

consequences

. See, e.g.

, Wilner

, 592 F.3d at 76 (noting “our deferential posture in 179 FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive purview of national security” given 1

“the relative competencies of the executive and the judiciary”). We must proce ed 2

on the basis of whatever decision the President has made as to disclosure, 3

regardless of whether we would have made the same determination had we th e 4

authority to do so

. 5

II. The CIA’s Justifications 6

Given the President’s acknowledgment of the payments program, the CIA 7

has failed to meet its burden of showing that its justification for invoking 8

E xemption s 1 or 3

— that a substantive response would disclose the existence of 9

the program

— “appear s logical or plausible

. ” Wilner , 592 F.3d at 73

. 10

I agree with the majority that, under our precedent in Wilner , even where a 11

FOIA request concerns “a program whose existence has been publicly revealed,” 12

id

. at 69, an agency may provide a Glomar response if the reques t concerns 13

“aspects of the program that have not been the subject of such disclosures,” id

. at 14

70. However, unlike in Wilner , a non

- Glomar response would not reveal 15

undisclosed aspects of the payments program ; it would only reveal the already

- 1610 disclosed fac t that some payments program existed. 4 1

The CIA argues that a Glomar response is justified because acknowledging 2

the existence of responsive documents would: (1) “confirm the existence and the 3

focus of a sensitive Agency activity that is by definition kept hidden to protect 4

U.S. Government foreign policy objectives

, ” App. 21; (2) reveal “ whether or not 5

the United States Government exercised extraordinary legal authorities to 6

covertly influence the political, economic, and/or military conducti ons in Syria

, ” 7

which “ could, in turn, either compromise a specific foreign policy goal . . . or 8

serve as confirmation for U.S. adversaries that there was no such objective

, ” App. 9

4 In Wilner , the plaintiffs were requesting records showing whether they had been a target of surveillance under the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”) Terrorist Surveillance Program, see 592 F.3d at 64, which was then “no longer a secret program in light of the gove rnment’s public acknowledgment of its existence and purpose following its controversial disclosure by the news media,”
id

. at 69. We held that the NSA could still issue a Glomar response because, although the program was public, the fact of whether plainti ffs had been a target of surveillance was not and would be revealed by a non

- Glomar response to the detriment of national security concerns. Id. at 7

– 74. But the Wilner plaintiffs’ request is not analogous to the Times’ request in the instant case. Unlike in
Wilner , h ere the CIA did not simply refuse to confirm or deny the existence of particular records relating to the payments program, but refused to confirm or deny that any records related to such program exist

— even though, as discussed above, the Presid ent himself has acknowledged the existence of the program.11 60; and (3) reveal “whether or not the CIA is exercising covert action” and 1

t hereby “require the disclosure of an intelligence source or method

, ” App. 60. In 2

other words, the CIA argues that a Glomar response is necessary to keep the 3

program secret. Given that the President has already disclosed the program, this 4

justification is n o longer plausible. To the extent that the CIA also argues that a 5

non

- Glomar response would reveal additional details of the program’s focus or 6

methods, this may serve as justification for withholding release of the contents of 7

certain specific responsive documents, but does not justify a blanket Glomar 8

response. A non

- Glomar response would not result automatically in disclosure of 9

the contents of any responsive records and therefore would not disclose whether 10

the CIA was involved in the payments, only that it had records concerning them. 11

The majority conjectures that a Glomar response additionally may be 12

required to avoid reveal ing whether the CIA had an “intelligence interest” in the 13

payments. Maj. Op. at 2 7

. The majority leaves unclear the degree to which it 14

actually believes that any “lingering doubts as to the CIA’s interest in the alleged 15

program” can be maintained, id . at 17

– 1 8, at some points describing the need to 16

avoid disclosing any CIA “interest” and at other points stressing the fact that the 1712 CIA “asserts a broader justification for issuing a Glomar response than merely 1

concealing an interest in the requested document,” i d. at 21 ; see also id

. at 14 (“The 2

Shiner affidavits contain sufficiently detailed justifications . . . that are broader 3

than just a potential interest in the program . . . .”). 4

But even if it could be plausibly maintained that there are any lingering 5

dou bts about whether the CIA might be interested in the existence of a program 6

providing payments and training to Syrian rebels, the CIA has never justified its 7

Glomar response on the ground that it is necessary to conceal any “intelligence 8

interest

, ” 5 likel y because the Central Intelligence Agency itself does not consider it 9

5 T o defend its reliance on the purported need to avoid disclosure of an “intelligence interest,” the majority refers to two paragraphs in the Shiner
affidavits that claim that the CIA’s “interest s” would be impaired by a non

Glomar response. Maj. Op. 18 n.37. But each paragraph only asserts that the CIA’s interests would be harmed by the disclosure of CIA involvement in any covert payments program. See App. 22 (“A response other than Glomar as to the existence or nonexistence of a program and any CIA involvement would disclose a
classified fact. . . . [I] t would reveal the presence or absence of Agency priorities, capabilities, interests, resources, and relationships with foreign entities.”) (emphasis added); id . at 60 (“Further, the CIA’s connection to such a program , if one existed, would tend to reveal the Agency’s capabilities, intelligence and regional interests, accesses, funding, and relationships or lack thereof.”) (emphasis added). The government’s brief confirms

— relying upon the very same paragraphs cited by the majority

— that the CIA’s objection is only to disclosure of its involvement with a covert payments program. See Appellee’s Brief at 9 (“A13 “logical” or “plausible” that “an agency charged with gathering intelligence 1

affecting the national security does not have an ‘intelligence interest’ in [such 2

payments], even if that age ncy does not operate the [payment program] itself.” 3

ACLU

, 710 F.3d at 430 (addressing the plausibility of the CIA having no 4

intelligence interest in drone strikes). As a recent D.C. district court opinion 5

addressing a Glomar response to a similar FOIA request observed, “it seems 6

wildly unlikely that, in the eight and a half years since the Syrian civil war began, 7

the Central Intelligence A gency has done no intelligence

- gathering that 8

produced a single record even pertaining to payments Syrian rebels are receiving 9

from somewhere , or a single record even mentioning or referring to any program to 10

arm or train anti

- Assad rebels. ” Leopold , 419 F . Supp. 3d at 67. 11

To the contrary, t he CIA has been clear that it seeks only to conceal its 12

actual “involvement or non

- involvement ” in the payments. Appellee’s Br. 23; see 13

confirmation or a denial of the CIA’s connection with any such program would therefore reveal the presence or absence of CIA priorities, capabilities, intelligence and regional interests, resources, and relationships with foreign entities.”) (citing App. 22, 60) (emphasis added)

. Therefore, in my view, the record does not support the majority’s position that, even if the program’s existence has been confirmed, the CIA has asserted a need to hide any interest in the program.14 also id. at 24 (arguing that issuing a non

- Glomar response “would be tantamount 1

to disclosing

. . . whether the CIA was in fact involved in such a program” 2

(emphasis added)). Indeed, the CIA argues that a non

- Glomar response would 3

“reveal more than the CIA’s general intelligence interest in a program”

— thus 4

implicitly conceding that such an interest would not, standing alone, be 5

sufficient

— and urges that non

- disclosure is justified because a non

- Glomar 6

response would reveal “information about a CIA operational role or lack or one.” 7

Id. at 25

– 26. 8

There is no question that it is the CIA’s bu rden to present and prove its 9

justification for a Glomar response. Wilner , 592 F.3d at 68. Our role is merely to 10

ensure that the justifications the CIA puts forth are logical and plausible, not to 11

advance bases for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not claimed. 12

Accordingly, avoiding disclosure of the CIA’s intelligence interest in payments to 13

foreign rebels is not a basis for us to affirm. 14

CONCLUSION 15

Reversing the district court would leave the CIA free to argue on remand 16

that every single responsive document or even that any information about those 17

documents other than their m ere existence is exempt from disclosure

. Instead of 1815 reversing and remanding to district court to allow the CIA the opportunity to 1

make such a showing, the majority decision puts its “imprimatur to a fiction of 2

deniability that no reasonable person would re gard as plausible”

— that the 3

President never acknowledged the existence of payments to Syrian rebels. ACLU

, 4

710 F.3d at 431. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 5

6

7