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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-1674

S HAUN J. M ATZ

, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

R OD N E Y K L OTK

A , et al. , Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Eastern Distri ct o f Wi sconsi n. No. 2: 08 CV 0 04 94 — Rudolph T. Ran da , Judg e.
A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 9, 2013

— D E C I D E D O C T OB E R 6, 2014

Before P O S N E R

, R OVN E R

, and H AMI L T O N

, Circ uit Judges.

R OVN E R , Cir cui t Judge. Shaun J. Matz brought thi s a ct i on under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 again st a numb er of current and former Milw aukee P olic e De p art ment offi cers. He clai ms that in Sept ember 2003 the offi cers violated hi s Four t h a nd Fifth Amendment rights by arr esti ng hi m wi thout reasonable
sus pi ci on or probable caus e, fai ling to make a prompt probable
caus e deter minati on once he w as under arr est, and conti nuing2 No. 12-1674

to questi on hi m after he inv oke d hi s right to remain si lent. The di stric t court gr anted sum mary judgment to the defendants, and Matz appeals. W

e affi rm the gr ant of sum mary judgment in fav or of the defendants on Matz’ s § 1983 cl ai ms. I. Becaus e w e are rev i ewing the di stric t court’s gr ant of
sum mary judgment a g ainst Matz, w e recount the facts in the li ght most fav or able to hi m, noting di screpanc i es in the parties’

v ersi on of ev ents where relev ant. See Zepperi- L om an to v
. Am. Posta l W orkers Union, 751 F .3d 482, 483 (7th Ci r
. 2014). O n the
ev ening of Sept ember 16, 2003, Matz and sev eral other indi viduals were o n the por ch of an apartment located at 1335 S outh Layto n Boulev ard in Milw aukee , W i scons in. That same ev ening tw o Milw aukee poli ce officer s then assi gned to the

w arr ant squad, defendants Rodne y Kl otka a nd Kar l Zuberbi er,
w ere dri ving thro ugh the area on an unrelated m atte r
. Klot ka and Zuberbi er w ere both in uni form and w e r e d riving an unmarked squad car

. As they drov e down Layto n Boulev ard, Zuberbi er, who w as t he pass enger , saw a n indivi dual named Javi er Salazar standing wi th the other s on the porch. Zuberbi er recog ni zed Salazar from a w arr ant squad bri efing as a member of the L a tin Kin gs gang who he beli ev ed w as w anted for armed ro bbery

. Specific ally

, Zuberbi er thought there w as a “tempor ary felony w ant” for Salazar , who Zuberbi er beli ev ed

w as also a sus pect in tw o homi ci des and sev eral shootings. Zuberbi er poin ted out Salazar t o Klot ka, who look ed ov er at the in di vidu als on the porch. By the tim e Klot ka w as able to make a U-turn and approach the apartment, ev ery one o n the porch w as leaving. MatzNo. 12-1674 3
admi ts havin g seen t he poli ce, but clai ms that he had already left the porch when their car turned aro und. He acknowledges havin g he a r d so meone say “detects” as he w as leaving the porch. When Klot ka pu lled up to the curb, Zuberbi er j umped out and ran along the south si de of the house where sev eral of the indi vidu als had headed. Klot ka follow ed shortly behind hi m. As Zuberbi er ran into the alley he sa w t hr ee people start ing to run southbound d own the alley and tw o more pe o p l e in a car start ing to driv e aw ay

. As he ran tow ards the
car , he drew hi s gun and poin ted i t at the v ehi cle while shouting, “P olic e! St op!” Matz sa ys that Zuberbi er also threat ened to blow hi s “fuc kin g head o ff ” i f he di d not stop. Klot ka, who by that poin t also had hi s gu n d r a wn, arr i v ed right behind Zuberbi er and or dered Matz and the v ehi cle occupan ts to get out and ke e p their hands vis i ble. Although 1 the parties di ffer as to t he p r e ci se or der of the ev ents that happened next, i t i s clear that the following occurred wi thi n a short per io d of tim e after the stop: (1) Matz w as handcuffed and put into a patro l car; (2) i t came to li ght that the car he w as driving w as stolen; and (3) oth e r o ff i cers (at least si x squads tot al) arr i v ed at the sce ne in response to a call for backup. Klot ka th e n bri efly left the scen e to ascertai n i f any one else from the porch w as still in the vic ini ty

. And although t he r e i s confli cting testimony as to whi ch offi cer arr ested Salazar , i t is

Al though i t i s i mma teri al t o Matz’s cl aim, there i s a di spute ab out the 1

or der i n which the of fi cers arrived on the scene and who di rected Matz out ofthe vehicl e. Kl otka recal l s arriving f i rst, po i nting his gun, and ord eri ng the car to stop, b ut Matz recal l s tha t i t was Zub erbier who fi rst arrived and gav e the command to stop. Klo tka also recal l s tha t another of fi cer remo v ed Matz fro m the veh i cl e whil e he l eft the scene to search fo r the o thers.4 No. 12-1674
undi sputed that he w as arr est e d shortly there after insi de the resi dence. Accordi ng to Matz, whi le he w as in the patro l v an Michael Caballero, a detectiv e in the homi ci de di vis i on, gr abbed hi s left
arm a nd stated, “he’s one of them” when he saw Matz’ s tatt oos. Matz also alleges that Caballero questi oned hi m about tw o homi ci des and conti nu e d t o d o so after Matz sai d he di d not w ant to talk about i t and w anted an att o r ne y

. Matz w as then take n to the ci ty jail, where he w as book ed and g iven a cell. The next mornin g tw o more homi ci de detectiv es, Shannon Jones and Percy Moo re, interv i ew ed Matz about the homi ci des and an armed ro bbery

. Matz clai ms that although he told Jones and Moo re from th e o ut se t that he di d not wi sh to speak to them about the hom icid es and w anted to go back to hi s cell, they conti nued questi oni ng hi m for ov er thre e h ou rs
. Later that
same even ing, Caballero and another defendant, Detecti v e Mar k W a lton, again interr ogat ed Matz in the face of hi s insi stence that he d id no t w ant to talk. Matz says W alton acknowledged Matz’ s rights but insi sted t hat he giv e them a st atement anyw ay

. After sev eral hours of questi oni ng, M a t z , who w as si tting in a “defeated” posi tion, prov i ded a statement admi tting hi s inv olv ement in the homi ci des. Thro ughout thi s period Matz w as nev er prov i ded wi th v arious medi cati ons he had been taking for psychosis and depressi on (Olanzapine, Prozac, Klono pin, and Neurontin). He alleges that being wi thout hi s medi cati on i mpai red hi s thought process, affec ted hi s i mpuls i vity, and caus ed hi m to make poor deci si ons. He

w a s a lso at thi s tim e sti ll recov ering from pneumoni a, fo r whi ch he had been hospi talized unti l tw o days before hi s arr est on Sept ember 16. He later recanted hi s incu lpator y state mentNo. 12-1674 5
and named Salazar as the shooter , although he admi tte d being present. He sai d he confess ed becau se he beli ev ed i t w as the only w ay he could ret urn to his cell. Despi te recantin g hi s statement, Matz pleaded gui lty to one count o f fi rst-degr ee reckles s ho mici de and one count of felony murder wi th
ro bbery as the underlyin g cri me. The Milw aukee County Ci rcui t Court sentenced hi m to a tot al of si xty y ears i mpri sonment and fort y-fi v e y ears ext ended supervis i on betw e en the tw o counts. Matz w as not presented for an ini tial in person appearance before a co ur t commi ssi oner unti l sev en days after hi s arr est. T o s upport thei r c lai m that Matz recei v ed an adequate probable caus e deter minati on, the defendants sub mi tte d an “arr estdetention repo rt ” si gne d by a Milw aukee County Court Commi ssi oner at 10:58 a.m. on September 18, 2003—less than t w o days after hi s ini tial arr est. The repo rt reflects Commi ssi oner L isk a’s deter minati on that probable caus e exis ted to beli ev e that Matz commi tte d a cri me and her deci si on setting cashbai l at $100,000.00. Matz ini tiated thi s sui t under § 1983 in 2010, a l l e gin g that Klot ka, Zuberbi er, Jones, Moo re , W a lton, and Caballero violated hi s F ourt h and Fifth Amendment r i ght s. Th e di stric t court appointed couns el, who fi led a second a mended complaint and ad d e d a n a d d i ti onal Fifth Amendment clai m again st certain defendants. Ultim ately the di stric t court gr anted
sum mary judgment in fav or of the defendants on all of Matz’ s clai ms. The co ur t co nclu ded that Matz had failed to establi sh t hat hi s Four th Amendment rights w ere violated becau se Klot ka and Zuberbi er had reasonable sus pi ci on to detain Matz when he atte mpted to leav e th e sc ene and t hat no reasonable6 No. 12-1674
factfin der w ould conclu de that the offi cers lacked prob a bl e caus e for hi s sub sequent arr est. Re lyin g on the arr est-detention repo rt sub mi tte d by the defendants, the di stric t court also conclu ded that i t w as undi sputed t ha t Matz had received a tim ely probable caus e deter minati on. Fin ally , the di stric t court rej ected Matz’ s Fifth Amendment clai m based on hi s allegedly coerced confess i on, conclu ding that becau se both hi s convic

tion and s entence depended in part o n t he confes si on, Mat z’s challen g e w as barred by Heck v
. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). II. W e rev i ew the di stric t court’s gr ant of sum mary judgment de nov o. Summary judgment i s appropr i ate when “there i s no genuine di spute as to any material fact and the mo v a nt i s entitled to judgment a s a ma tte r of law .” Fed. R. Ci v

. P

. 56(a); e.g. , Hawkins v
. Mitchell , 756 F .3d 983, 990-91 (7th Ci r
. 2014). W e construe the evidenc e in the li ght most fav or able to Matz as the non-movin g party

, and draw all re a s on able inferences from the evidenc e in hi s fav or

. Anderson v
. Liberty Lobby , In c. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Miller v
. Go n za l e z, --- - F .3d

--- -- 2014, 2014 WL 3824318, at *4. A. Reasonable Su spic ion for a T erry Stop The Four t h Amendment prot ects indi vidu als “again st unreasonable searches and sei zures.” U.S. C o nst. amend. IV

. Or dinaril y sei zures are “reasonable” only when supp or ted by probable caus e to beli ev e an indi vidu al has commi tte d a cri me. See, e.g. , D u n aw ay v
. New Y ork , 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979); Bailey

v. United S tat es , 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 (2013). The longstandi ng exception to thi s rule aris es un d e r T e r ry v
. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1No. 12-1674 7 (1968), whi ch authorizes bri ef inv esti gato ry detentions based
on the less d e ma nding standard of reasonable sus pi ci on that cri minal acti vity is a fo ot, id. at 21-22; United States v
. Baskin , 401 F .3d 788, 791 (7th Ci r
. 2005). Such a bri ef detentio n is permi tte d when i t demands only a li mi ted intrusi on into a n indi vidu al’s priv acy and rests on “speci fi c and art i culab le facts

whi ch, take n tog ether wi th rat i onal inferences from those facts, reasonably w arr ant that intrusi on.” T erry, 392 U.S. at 21. Determin ing whether such an inv esti gato ry detention i s consti tutional requires balanc ing the governmental intere st in the se iz ur e again st the degr ee to whi ch i t intrudes on an indi vidu al’s personal liberty

. See id. at 20 -2 1

. A nd although

r e a so nable sus pi ci on i s a less demanding standard tha n probable caus e, such a stop requires at least a mini mal lev el of objectiv e justifi cati on and the offi cer mus t be able to art i culate
more than an “inchoa t e and unparticulari zed sus pi ci on or ‘hunch’” of cri minal acti vity

. Id. at 27; see al so Ill. v
. W ardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 -2 4 (2000). Ultim ately , deter mining whether reasonable sus pi ci on exis ts i s not an e xact sci ence, and “mus t be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about humanbehavi or .” W

ardlow, 528 U.S. at125. Although Matz insi st s t hat Offi cers Klot ka and Zuberbi er hav e demonstrate d nothin g bey ond a n u np a rti cu l a riz e d hunch to supp or t their deci si on to stop hi s car , the recor d establi shes other wi se. The offi cers both saw and recog ni zed Salazar from their w arr ant squad bri efings, where he w as ide nti fi ed as a member of the Latin Kin gs gang w anted in connecti on wi th an armed robbery

. Zuberbi er had also been told that Salazar w as a sus pect in sev eral homi ci des. And by the tim e the offi cers
w ere able to make a U-turn and approach the bu ilding in an8 No. 12-1674

atte mpt to sp e a k wi th Salazar , ev ery indi vidu al on the porch

w as leavi ng the scene. During the chas e that ensued, offi cers 2 had no w a y of knowi ng where exactly Salazar had gone and could reasonably hav e beli ev ed he w as hi dden in the car wi th Matz and o ther individu als from the por ch. In the face of thi s evidenc e, Matz insi st s that nei ther hi s prox i mi ty to Salazar on the porch nor hi s fli ght from offi cers, standing a lone, w ould establi sh reasonable sus pi ci on to supp or t a T

erry stop. Matz’ s asserti on i s corr ect as far as i t goe s. W e hav e recog ni zed that si mply being in the presence of other s who are themselv e s su spected of cri minal acti vity i s insu ffi

ci ent standing alone to establi sh particu larized sus pi ci on for a T erry stop and fri sk. See Ybarra v
. Ill. , 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) ( “[A] person’s mere propinqu i ty to other s independ ently
sus pected of cri minal acti vity d oes not, without more, give ris e to probable caus e to search that person .”) (emphas i s added). Li kewi se, w e hav e acknowledged that suspi ci on of i llegal
a ct iv ity at a particu lar location does not tr ansfer such a sus pi ci on to an indi vidu al leaving the proper ty

. S ee United States v
. Bohman , 683 F .3d 861, 864 (7th Ci r
. 2012). Nei ther does the act of choosing to av oid a police encounter—either by refusing to cooper ate or leaving the scen e

— by i tself create

Matz sub mitted a decl arati on i n the di stric t cour t i n which he maintained 2 tha t he “di d not run fro m the por ch area.” But he ha s no t di sputed the accounts of b oth Klo tka and Zub erbier tha t b y the time t he y exited their

v ehic l es all occ upants of the por ch had l eft and were moving quickl y enough tha t i t was necessary fo r the of fi cers to give chas e i n or der to speak with anyone fr om the p or ch.No. 12-1674 9
suffi ci ent objecti v e justifi cati on for a sei zure or d etention. See, e.g. , Fl. v . Bostick

, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). But i t i s axiomati c that in deter mining whether offi cers had the requisit e particu larized sus pi ci on for a T erry stop, w e do not consi der in i solation each v ariab le of the equati on that may add up to reason abl e sus pi ci on. See, e.g. , United States v
. Johnson , 170 F .3d 708, 714 (1999) (“Applying the T erry standard,

w e hav e consi stently held that reasonable sus pi cio n is to be det e r mined in li ght of the tot ali ty of the ci rcums tances.”). Instead, w e consi der t he sumof all of the information k nown to offi cers at the tim e o f t he stop. T erry, 392 U.S. at 22-23; United States v
. Len oir

, 318 F

. 3 d 7 2 5, 729 (7th Ci r
. 2003). And thi s inclu des behavi or that may in other ci rcumst a nc e s be consi d e red innocent; in other w or ds, context matter s. Baskin , 401 F .3d at 793 (“[B] ehavior whi ch i s sus ceptible to an innocent explanation when i solated from i ts context may sti ll giv e ris e to a reasonable sus pi ci on when consi dered in li ght of all the factors at play

.”); United States v
. Fiasche, 5 20 F .3d 694, 697-98 (7th Ci r . 2008). First, i t i s undi sputed that the offi cers had particu larized
sus pi ci on as to S alazar connecting hi m t o armed ro bbery and multi ple homi ci des. Gi v en that Sa l a z a r a n d Ma tz we re tog ether
on the porch, they also had a basi s from whi ch to conclu de that Salazar may ha v e fled in the same car as Matz and the other indi vidu al vis ible to them in the car

. Although Salazar w as not vis i ble to the offi cers from thei r v antage point outsi de the car , he co ul d hav e been hi dden in the car to av oid detection and capture. In fact, i t i s unli kely that a person poli ce beli ev ed to be

w anted for armed ro bber y and possi bly multi ple homi ci des,10 No. 12-1674
who had run fr o m law enforcement, w ould remain in plain view as offi cers approach e d t he car rat her than hi de in some
w ay

. Gi v en that bot h Salazar and Matz w ere tog ether on the porch and both exited the area si multaneously , the offi cers had
an objectiv ely reasonable basi s to beli ev e that Salazar could be in the v ehi cle wit h M a tz, and there fore had an objectiv ely reasonable basi s to stop the v ehicle and bri efly detain the occupan ts whi le they ascertained whether Salazar w as wit h hi m or whether they w ere compli ci t in helping hi m ev ade law enforcement. And i t does not mat ter whether that w as their actual motiv ation for stoppi ng t he v ehi cle, becau se the test under the Four th Amendment i s whether the seiz ur e w as objectiv ely reasonable. E.g. , Whr en v
. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996)

. In sum, the offi cers possess ed particu larized and speci fi c sus pi ci on as to Salazar , a known gang memb e r su spected of commi tting violent cri mes. Thei r atte mpt to approach Salazar

w as met wi th the preci pi tou s d e partur e of the entire gr oup, inclu ding Matz. In their justifi able atte mpt to apprehend Salazar , Klot ka and Zuberbi er gav e chas e to ev ery one scatter

ing from the porch. They w ere ou t nu mbered as they approached a moving v ehi cle that they reasonably co ul d hav e beli ev ed contai ned Salazar , who w as sus pected of commi tting violent cri mes and who could v ery w ell hav e been armed. Gi v en these ci rcums tances, i t w as reasona ble for them to conduc t further inve sti gation, inclu ding stoppi ng the v ehi cle leaving the scen e and detain ing the occupan ts so they could
asses s the si tuation. See United States v
. Howard, 729 F .3d 655, 659 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (collecting cases and noting that t he S upreme Court “has recog ni zed li mi ted si tuations at the scen e ofNo. 12-1674 11
p o l i ce acti vity in whi ch i t may be reasonable for poli ce t o detain people not sus pected of cri minal acti vity themselv es, so long as the a d d i tional intrusi on on indi vidu al liberty i s marginal and i s outw ei ghed by the gove rnmental intere st in conduc t ing legiti mate poli ce acti viti es safely and free from interfer ence”); cf. W

ardlow, 528 U.S. a t 1 25 (recognizing that when offi cers confront behavi or sus cep t ibl e of tw o potent i al explanations, one innocent and one potent i ally crim inal, they
are e nti tled to “detain the indi vidu als to resolv e the ambi gui ty”). B. Probable Cause for Arrest So O ff icer s Klot ka and Zuberbi er had (narro wly) enough reasonable sus pi ci on to bri efly detain Matz as they atte mpted to get the si tuation under contro l and ascertai n where Salazar had gone. But M a t z arg ues that what they actually di d w as more akin to a full-blown arr est than the limit e d detention per mit ted under T

erry

. And although ev entually the offi cers learned that Matz w as driving a stolen v ehi cle, he maint ains that func tionally

, he w as under arr est before the offi cers had p robable caus e. In asses sing the reasonableness of an inv e s ti ga
tor y stop, w e fi rst consi der whether the detention w as justifi ed from the outset a nd then ask “whether i t w as reasonably rela ted in scope to the ci rcums tances whi ch justifi ed the interfer ence in the fi rst place.” T erry, 392 U.S. at 20 ; s e e also Rabin v
. Flyn n , 725 F .3d 628, 632 (7th Ci r
. 2013); Jewett v
. Anders , 521 F .3d 818 , 824 (7th Ci r
. 2008). A T erry stop may be tr ansformed into a formal arr est requiring pr o ba bl e caus e i f an offi cer’s use of force i s suffi ci ently di spropor tionate t o the purpose of the stop—whi ch may inclu de ensuring the safety of12 No. 12-1674
the offi cers or other s—in li ght of the sur r ounding ci rcumstances

. Rabin , 725 F .3d at 632-33; Jewett , 521 F .3d 824-25. It may also become a de facto arr est i f the detention conti nues longer than necess ary to accompl i sh t he purpose of the stop or becomes “unreasonably intrusi v e.” See United States v
. Bullock , 632 F .3d 1004, 1015 (7th Ci r
. 2011). The inv esti gation following a T erry stop “‘must be reasonably relat ed in scope and duration to the ci rcums tances that justifi ed the stop in the fi rst instance
so that it i s a mini mal intrusi on on the indi vidu al’s Four th Amendment interests.’” Id. (quoti ng United S tat es v. Robinson , 30 F .3d 774, 784 (7th Ci r . 1994)). A lthough the i ssu e i s again close, we conclu de that giv en the ci rcums tances i t w as reasonable for the offi cers to draw a
w eapon and ev en handcuff Matz whi le they contro lled the si t ua t i on and accoun ted for the indi vidu als from the front porch. A t t he o ut set, w e note that only a short period o f t i me elapsed bet w een when the offi cers fi rst detain ed Matz and when they learned that he w as driving a st o l en v ehi cle. Accordi ng to Matz, Zuberbi er ran the VIN for the v ehi cle and di scov ered i t w as stolen someti me bef ore t he backup offi cers arr i v ed at the scen e. And although nei ther si de has presented
a speci fi c tim e line, ev en a gener ous reading of the facts supp or ts the conclu si on that not much tim e coul d h a v e elapsed betw een the tim e Matz w as o r d ered out of the car and the moment Zuberbi er (or another offi cer) learned the car w as 3

Under the of fi cers’ v ersi on of events, Matz was pl aced i n a pol i ce v ehic l e 3 whil e they tracked do wn the other i ndivid uals fr om the p or ch and o ne of the b ackup of fi cers who had arrived on the scene di scovered t hat the car (co ntinued. ..)No. 12-1674 13 stolen, thus prov i ding probab l e caus e for an arr est. Thi s sequenc e of ev ents makes i t clear that p o l ice w ere di li gently inv esti gating to confi rm or di spel their sus pi ci ons about the occupan ts of the v ehi cle. See Rabin , 725 F .3d at 634 (uph oldi ng detention of indi vidu al for approx i mately an hour and a half whi le offi cers v erifi ed legitimacy of hi s fi rear m li cens e and noting that evidenc e suggested offi cers had di li gently pursued li kely av enue to resolv e their sus pi ci ons); United St ates v
. Adamson , 441 F .3d 513, 520 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (“There i s no bri ghtline rule as to how long an inv esti gativ e detention may last; ins tead w e look to whether the poli ce di li gently pursu e d a me a ns of inv esti gating that w as li kely to confi rm or di spel qui ckly their sus picions .”). So the duration of the stop i s unproblemati c giv en that offi cers di li gently pursued information that, as i t turned out, rev ealed in short or der evidenc e that gav e them pro bable c ause f or a full-blown arrest. W e are thus left wi th the questi on whether Matz has created a tr i able i ssu e of fact a s t o whet her the manner in whi ch the offi cers effectuated the detention—poi nti ng guns at Matz wh ile or dering hi m to stop or ris k havin g hi s “fuc kin g head” blown off, fri sking, handcuffing, and placing hi m in a patro l car—w as reasonably relat ed in scope to the ci rcumstances whi ch ini tiall y justifi ed the interfer ence. T erry, 392 U.S. at 20. The use of a fi rear m and handcuff s undoubtedly puts Matz’ s encounter at the outer edge of a permi ssi ble T erry stop.

( ...c onti nued) 3

was stol en. The preci se chrono l ogy i s i mma teri al given our concl usio n tha t under ei ther v ersi on, of fi cers we r e di l i gently pursui ng i nfor mati on to
reso l v e thei r suspi ci ons.14 No. 12-1674
As w e hav e prev i ously recog nized, “‘[s]ubtle, and perhaps tenuous di stincti ons exis t betw een a T erry st op, a T

erry stop
r a pi dly ev olving into an arr est and a de facto arr est.’” Bulloc k , 6 3 2 F .3d at 1016 (internal quotat i ons and ci tation omi tte d ). These tenuous di stincti ons are at the heart of Matz’ s clai m: he asserts that Zuberbi e r a nd K lotk a made a de facto arr est wi thout probable caus e, and the offi cers arg ue, in essenc e, that
a legiti mate T

erry stop ev olv ed rapidl y into an arr est support ed by probable caus e. The offi cers arg ue alter nati v ely that quali fi ed i mmu ni ty prot ects them from li abi li ty becau se under the ci rcums tances i t w ould not hav e been clear to a reasonable offi cer that using for ce and handcuff s to det ain Matz vi olated clearly establi shed law

. See Harlow v
. Fitzg e rald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (setti ng fo r t h w ell-known quali fi ed i mmu ni ty test that gov ernment offi ci als are pro tected fro m ci vil damages as long as conduc t doe s not violate clearly establi shed consti tutional rights of whi ch a reasonable person w ould hav e known); Jo n es v
. Clark

, 630 F .3d 677, 680 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (enti tlement t o q ua li fi ed i mmu ni ty turns on whether facts descri be t he violati on of a clearly establis hed consti tutional ri ght). A l though the hallmarks o f for mal ar rest such as apply ing handcuff s, draw ing w eapons, and placing sus pects in poli ce
v ehi cles should not be the norm duri ng an inv estig a t o ry detention, all of those me a sures hav e been recog ni zed as appropr i ate in certain ci rcums tances. See Bullock , 632 F .3d at 1016 (collecting cases ); T ilmon , 19 F .3d at 1224-2 5 (notin g “for be t ter or for w or se” the tr end of expandi ng T erry sto p s t o inclu de “the permi tting of the use of handcuff s, the placing of
sus pects in poli ce crui sers, the drawing of w eapons, and other
measu res of force more tr adi tionally associ ated wi th a r r e stNo. 12-1674 15
than wi th inv esti gato ry detent io n”); United States v
. W eaver , 8 F .3d 1240, 1244 (7th Ci r . 1993) (meas ured u se of appropr i ate force does not conv er t seizure into arr est). In ev aluating whether the force used conv ert ed a n e nc ounter into a full
a r rest, w e mus t consi der whether the surroundi ng ci rc um
stances w ould supp or t an offi cer’s legiti mate fear for personal safety

. See Jewett

, 521 F .3d at 824. W

e must also take into
accoun t the sus pect’s own behavi or in resi sting an of fic e r ’ s efforts. Id at 825

. (ci tin g United States v

. L aw s h e a , 461 F .3d 857, 860 (7th Ci r . 2006)). First, the offi cers w ere undoubtedly confronting a si tuation where they may hav e legiti mately beli ev ed drawing w eapons
w as necess ary to prot ect t he mselv es. They w ere pursuing an indi vidu al sus pected of havin g commi tte d armed ro bbery and possi bly murder who w as a member of t he Lati n Ki ngs gang. Not only w ere they outnumbered, they were a p proachi ng a moving v ehicle containing indi vidu als who had been wi th Salazar just moments beforeha nd

. Gi v en the possi bi li ty that Salazar w as hi dden insi de the v ehi cle, their clear di sadv antage atte mpting on foot to stop a moving v ehi cle, and the poss ibi li ty , giv en the nature of Sala zar’s sus pected cri mes, that indi vidu als in t he car may hav e been armed, i t w as not unreasonable to draw w eapons to safely effect the stop. These same reasons supp or t the offi cers’ deci si on to detain Matz wi th handcuff s, fri sk hi m, a nd se arch the car to v erify that Salazar w as not insi de. Matz and ev ery one else in the vic ini ty had alread y made i t patently clear that they di d not intend to remain where they w ere and speak to the poli ce, and
so Klot ka and Zuberbi er could r e asonably hav e beli ev ed handcuffing the occupants of th e car w as the most safe and16 No. 12-1674
effi ci ent w ay to asc e r t ain Salazar ’s whereabouts and any pert inent information about hi s sus pecte d cri mes. It w as also
a re a so na ble approach to deal wi th the rapidl y ev olving si tuation and prev ent thi ngs from turnin g violent. Cf. Brendli n
v
. Cal. , 551 U.S. 2 4 9 , 258 (2007) (“It i s also reasonable for pass enger s to expect that an of fic e r a t the scen e of a cri me, arr est, or inv esti gation wi ll not let p e o ple mov e aro und in
w ays that could jeo pardize hi s safety .”). Klot ka and Zuberbi er called for backup almo st i mmedi ately

. W i th the benefi t of hindsi ght w e may be able to thi nk of less intrusi v e w ays–from
a Four th Amendment perspecti v e—the offi cers could have detain ed Matz and the other s. But the “fact that ‘the prot ecti on of the publi c mi ght, in the abstract, hav e been accompl i shed by ‘less intrusi v e’ means does not, by i tself, render the search
un r e asonable.’” T

ilmon , 19 F .3d at 1225 (quoti ng Cady v
. D om browsk i, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)) ; see also United States v
. Ocampo , 890 F .2d 1363, 1369-70 (7th Ci r
. 1989) (stop not render ed unreasonable by fact that offi cer could hav e effectuated i t wi thout drawing hi s gun). Furt hermor e, w e mus t “take
care to consi de r wh e ther the poli ce are acting in a swi ftly d e velo ping si tuation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unreali sti c second- guessing.” United States v
. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Altho ugh w e conclu de that the offi cers’ safety and the dynami c si tuation they confro nt e d justifi ed using force and restr i cting Matz’ s mov ement, w e a gain cauti on law enforcement offi cers t hat i n the or dinary case a T erry stop should not be functi onally indi stingui shab le from a full-blown ar rest. Of particu lar caus e for concern in thi s reg ard i s Zuberbi er’s deposi tion testim ony that he consi ders such detentio ns wit hNo. 12-1674 17
handcuff s a s p a r t of “normal” poli ce w or k: “[W]e detain people all t he t i me. W e handcuff them, w e find out i t’s all legiti mate, talk to them, let them go. I t ’ s part of dai ly poli ce
w or k.” On the contrar y

, w e remin d law enforcement that using h an d cu ffs ge n e ra l l y s i gni fi es an arr est, whi ch requi re s p rob ab l e caus e and not the less demanding reasonable sus pi ci on standard that permi ts only a bri e f a nd mini mally intrusi v e detention. Indeed, the fact that w e hav e recog ni zed exceptions for concerns such as offi cer safety should not be read to i mply that the use of handcuff s and more intrusi v e measu res wi ll not be a si gni fi cant factor in asses sing whether of fic e r s hav e exceeded the bounds of a li mi ted T erry detention. See Ramos v
. City of Chicago , 716 F .3d 101 3 , 1 0 18 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (“The proliferation of cases in thi s court in whi ch ‘ T erry ’ stops inv olv e handcuff s and ev er -increasing w ai t tim es in poli ce v ehi cles i s di sturbing, and w e w ould cauti on law enforcement o ff icer s that the acceptabi li ty of handcuff s in some cases does not si gnal that the restr aint i s not a si gni fi cant consi derat i on in deter mining the nature of the stop.”); see also Rabin , 725 F .3d at 639-41 (concurring opin i on) (detai ling except ions supp or tin g use of handcuff s and other formal hallm a r ks of arr est and reiterat ing that such inv asi v e measu res should be exception not r ule). C. Probable Cause Det ermination Matz next clai ms that after hi s arr est, he nev er receiv ed the consti tutionally req uir ed prompt deter minati on of probable
caus e. It i s w ell-establi shed t hat “the Four th Amendment requires a tim ely judi ci al deter minati on of probable caus e as a prer equi si te for detention.” Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103, 12618 No. 12-1674 (1975). Probable caus e deter minati ons made wi thi n 48 hours of
arr est are presumpti v ely prompt. Coun ty of Riversi de v
. McLaughlin , 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991)

. Bey ond the requirement of
a “prompt” deter minati on, states ret ain wide latitude to craft p r o cedures for probable caus e deter minati ons that “accor d wi th a St ate’s pret rial procedure viewed as a whole,” and the Supreme Court has expr essly recog ni ze d “ the desi rabi li ty of flexibi li ty and exper i mentation b y the St a te s
. ” G e rs te in , 420 U.S. at 123. Matz arg ues prin ci pally that “Milw aukee County’ s practic e of allowing court commi ssi oners to ma k e probable
caus e deter minati ons based on arr est and detention repo rt s” i s inconsi stent wi th Riversi de ’s requirement of a prompt deter mi

nati on of pro bable c ause. Matz’ s clai m cannot suc ceed insofar as i t i s lev eled again st Milw aukee County or the “co urt commi ssi oner” (wh o the parties fai l to describe bey ond refer rin g t o her as “Commi ssi oner Li ska”). A damages sui t under § 1983 requires t ha t a 4 defendant be personally inv olv ed in the alleged consti tutional dep r iv a t ion. See Minix v
. Canar ecci, 597 F .3d 824, 833 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (“[I]nd i vidu al li abi li ty under § 1983 requir e s ‘personal inv olv ement in t he alleged consti tutional depriv ation’”) (quoti ng Palmer v
. Mario n Cty, 327 F .3d 588, 594 (7th Ci r
. 2003)). As the quoted language abov e makes clear , Mat z ’ s clai m hinges on Milw aukee County’ s “practic e,” allegedly follow ed in hi s case, of allowing uns w or n statements in an arr est repo rt

Neither party pro v i des any more detail ab out the “co urt commi ssio ner” 4 and nowhere doe s Matz argue expressly tha t the court commissi oner fail s to sati sfy the requirement of a “j udi ci al determi nati on” of proba b l e cause, so we do not e xplor e the i ssue further.No. 12-1674 19 presented to a county commi ssi oner to supp ly the necess ary probable caus e for arr est. And as tr oubling as thi s practic e may be, M a t z has presented no evidenc e that any defendants named here had anythi ng to do wi th i t. Indeed, the entire thr ust of hi s argument on thi s point has shi fted o n a p peal. In the di stric t court, Matz arg ued that genuine i ssu es of material fact e x ist e d as to whether he receiv ed a tim ely probable caus e deter mina t ion. Speci fi cally , Ma tz c l a im e d th a t C a p ta in Moffet’s affi davit accompanyi n g the “p r o ba ble caus e deter minati on” repo rt si gned by Commi ssi oner Li ska fail e d to establi sh that Moffet w as quali fi ed to
v erify that the repo rt w as kept duri ng the reg ular course of bus iness, and so the repo rt w as inadmi ssab le hearsay as to the questi on of whether Matz receiv e a probable caus e deter mination. Th e di stric t courtrej ected this arg ument, and Matz does not renew i t on appeal. Instead, as di scu ssed abov e, he attacks the practic e of allowing uns w or n statements and the uns w or n statements themselv es. B ut a s the defendants poin t out, the repo rt w as not authore d, si gned, nor other wi se created by any of the named defendants. The repo rt states that i t w as wri tt en by an offi cer Ri chard W earing, who w as assi gned to the w arr ant squad. He describes the encounter Zuberbi er and K l o t k a had wi th Matz that culm inated in the r e vel ation that he w as driving a stolen

v ehi cle. There i s then another paragr aph wri tte n by Detecti v e Gary T emp, who recounts that Omar Rodr i quez w as shot and kill ed fi v e days prior to Matz’ s arr est, Vi ctor i ano Mar i ano w as shot and k ill e d four days before Matz’ s arr est, and that tw o other indi vidu als w ere sh ot and sus tain ed injuries four days before Matz’ s arr est. The repo rt then states that after being20 No. 12-1674

a d vis ed of and w ai ving hi s Miranda rights, Matz admi tte d t o shooting all four indi vidu als. The repo rt be a r s t he seal of a notar y (Davi d B. Zib olski) , who si gned to ver i fy that i t w as sub scribed and sw or n before hi m o n S e ptember 18, 2003. Fina l ly , a box bearin g the heading “Probable Cause Determinati on,” contai ns a si gnature t he parties agr ee to be that of Commi ssi oner Li ska. It i s clear that at least the second port i on of the repo rt, wri tte n by Detecti v e T emp, w as sw or n before a notar y

. B ut Matz clai ms that we cannot consi der thi s secti on becau se i t i s based on his confess i on allegedly procured in violati on of the Fi fth Amendment, and the portion wri tte n by W earing i s als o off li mi ts becau se i t is uns w or n. Ci tin g our deci si on in Haywoo d v
. City of C hicago , 378 F .3d 714 (7th Ci r
. 2004), Matz now adv ances the arg ument that any probable caus e deter minati on i s constit ut i onally inadequate becau se the repo rt contains uns w or n statements—speci fi cally , the port i on wri tte n by Ri chard W earing that recounts Matz’ s arr est. Haywoo d does li ttle for Matz, howev er , becau se in that 5 § 1983 sui t the p l a int i ff sued the Ci ty of Chi cago and tw o arr esti ng offi cers, one of whom forg ed the other ’s name on the complaint p r e se nted to secu re probable caus e to hold the plainti ff. The problem in Haywo od w as that although the complaint purpor ted to sati sfy the Four th Amendment’s

Bo th partie s agree tha t Offi cer Wearing pro v i des a confusing descri pti on 5 of the events l eadi ng to Matz’s arrest. This i s b ecause Wearing refe rs i nterchan geab l y to Salazar an d Matz as the “subject,” and fail s to i denti fy Matz b y nam e, thus l eav i ng i t uncle ar whether Zube r bi er and Klo tka arrested Salazar or Matz after stoppi ng the v ehic l e. But i t i s ulti matel y of no consequence because Matz i s not suing Offi cer Wearing fo r wri ting an i nadequa te re por t ab out the encounter.No. 12-1674 21 requirement that “no W arr ants shall i ssu e, but upon probable
caus e, supp or ted by Oath o r affi rmation,” the only basi s the defense adv anced fo r finding probable caus e “w as a falsely
sw or n complaint whose falsi ty w as, so far as appears, unknown to the judge at the pro bable- caus e hearing.” Id. at 718. Here there i s no allegation t ha t Offi cer W earing or Detecti v e T emp falsely si gned the repo rt or t ha t the repo rt contai ned false in for m ation. Matz beli ev es that becau se the notar i zed seal i s closest to the port i on of the repo rt authore d by T emp, Offi cer W earing’s contribu tion is necess arily uns w or n and there fore in a d e q u a te u n d er the Four th Amendment to e s ta b l i s h p rob ab l e caus e. Haywoo d i s obviously and i mmedi ately di stingui shab le base d o n the fact that both the Ci ty and the indi vidu als who authore d and (fals ely) clai med to hav e authore d the repo rt
w ere sued. Matz has not sued Gary T emp, Ri chard W

earing, or Milw aukee County

, who he clai ms has a “practic e” of allowing uns w or n statements t o suffi ce for probable caus e deter mination s. I nd e e d , as i t i s not a defendant, w e hav e no w ay of knowi ng what Milw aukee County’ s “practic e” i s and whether it w as follow ed here. In any ev ent, what i s clear i s th a t M a t z has presented no evidenc e that Matz, Klot ka, Jones, Caballero, W alton, or Moo re had any hand in crafti ng the repo rt or presentin g i t to the court commi ssi oner for a probable caus e deter minati on. Matz deems i t “i rr elev a nt ” whet her the defendants w ere personally inv olv ed in authoring the arr est repo rt

. But in a § 1983 clai m for damages, the sole i ssu e cannot be, as he w ould hav e i t “whether the distric t court corr ectly found that the
arr est repo rt establi shed, as a matte r o f law” that Matz recei v ed an adequate an d tim ely probable caus e deter minati on.22 No. 12-1674
That questi on i tself i s i rr elev ant i f none of t he se defendants

w ere personally inv olv ed in the alleged depriv ation. It i s thus hardly i rr elev ant whether these defendants partici pated in sub mi tting the arr est repo rt to the commi ssi oner in li eu of prov i ding him w i th a n in- p e rs on probable caus e deter minati on (a process that di d not occur unti l Sept ember 23, 2003, sev en days after Matz’ s arr est and w ell outsi de R i v e r side’s 48-hour win dow). He belatedly arg ues in hi s reply bri ef that Klot ka and Zuberbi er prov i ded some information in the repo rt and W alton, Caballero, Jones, and Moo re w ere inv olv ed in obtaining the allegedly coerced statement recounted by Det ecti v e T emp—and that the named defendants w ere there fore “inv olv ed” in the depriv ation. But according to Matz, it i s the p r acti ce of using uns w or n statements, and the use of a n allegedly coerced confess i on that make the document sub mi tted to Commi ssi oner Li ska defi ci ent. And he has presented no evidenc e that these defendants ei ther knew about that practic e or partici pated in the deci si on to inclu de Matz’ s allegedly coerced confess i on in the r e p o r t

. Thus, they are entitled to
sum mary j ud g ment on Matz’ s Four th Amendment Riversi de clai m. See Hildebrandt v
. Ill. Dep’t of Natural Res. , 347 F .3d 1014, 1039 (2003) (“‘Section 1983 creates a caus e of acti on based on personal li abi li ty and predic ated upon fault; thus, li abi li ty d oe s not att a ch unles s the indi vidu al defendant caus ed or partici

pate d in a c on sti tutional depriv ation.’”)( quoting V ance v
. Peters , 97 F .3d 987, 991 (7th Ci r . 1996)).No. 12-1674 23
D. Fifth Amendment Cl aim That leav es Matz’ s clai m that sev eral of the defendants violated hi s Fifth Amendment rights by continuing to interr ogate hi m after he inv oke d hi s right t o r e ma in si lent. It i s undi sputed that Matz di d not make any incri minat ing statements duri ng e it he r hi s interv i ew in the patro l v an wi th Detecti v e Caballero or the next da y wh e n Jones and Moo re interv i ew ed hi m at the poli ce station. The F ifth Amendment “privi lege again st self- incri minati on, and thus the Miranda doctrine, concerns the use of compelled statements in cri minal prosecuti ons.” Hanson v
. D an e C n ty., W is. , 608 F .3d 335, 339 (7th Ci r
. 2010). No r a tional juro r could conclu de that the fi rst tw o interr ogat i ons violated Matz’ s Fifth Amendment rights—he s ai d nothin g incri minati ng at all, and so there w as obviousl y no stat e me nt used again st hi m in hi s cri minal procee d ing

. See id. (“P olic e cannot ‘violate Miranda,’ despi te colloqui al usage.

... There’s nothin g wrong wi th compelling people to speak.”). Matz, how ev er , clai ms that he may sti ll be entitled to monetar y dama ges again st Moo re and Jones becau se t he i r ini tial interr ogat i ons w ere part of the “caus al chain” that resulte d in hi s later inv oluntary confess i on to Caballero and W

alton. But whether tr eated as a conti nuous interr ogat i on that produced an incu lpator y st a tement or separated into three di stinct interv i ews, w e agr ee wi th the di stric t court that Matz’ s Fifth Amendm e nt claim for damages i s barred under Heck v
. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck , a plainti ff may not
r e cov er damages under § 1983 when a judgment in hi s fa vo r
w ould necess arily i mply the inv ali di ty of a cri minal convic tion24 No. 12-1674

or sentence that has not been rev ersed, expunged, inv ali dated,
or other wi se called into questi on. See id. at 486-87; Helman v
. Duhaime, 742 F .3d 760, 762 (7th Ci r
. 2014). There i s no questi on that Matz’ s conv i cti on and sentence hav e nei ther been inv ali

d a ted nor called into questi on

. The only questi on i s thus 6 whether Matz’ s conv icti on or sentence necess arily depended on hi s allegedly coerced confessi on. W e conclu de, li ke the di stric t court, that suc cess on Matz’s Fi fth Amendment clai m w ould necess arily i mply the inv ali d i ty of Mat z’s sentence. At sentencing, the judge reli ed heavily on Matz’ s confess i on as w ell as hi s sub sequent deci si on to recant hi s admi ssi ons. Speci fi cally , Matz explain ed to the judge that he confes sed out of loy alty to hi s fellow Latin Kin g codefendants in the hopes that he could take the fall and the rest of them “w ould be able to go home.” The sentencing judge rej ected the notion that Matz co nf e ssed becau se “i t w as the right thi ng to do,” an d opin ed instead that Matz thought h e could be out in “fi v e — ten y ears” and emer g e in his “rightful spot” as the leader of the Latin Kin gs brot herhoo d becau se he had stepped up and taken responsibi li ty fo r t he “w eaklin gs” beneath hi m. The judge beli ev ed that when the reality of the pris on sentence Matz w as facing set in and i t came to li ght that hi s fellow Latin K ing s had incu lpated hi m in the cri me, he w as scared a nd realized that i t w as not w o r t h taking the fall for hi s confeder

ates. Th e court accordingly conclu ded that Matz had only a

M atz’s convicti on was affi rmed on di rect appeal and the Wi sc o ns i n 6 Supre me Co urt deni ed hi s peti tio n fo r review; he has also unsuccessfull y peti tio ned under 28 U.S .C. § 22 54 to v aca te, set aside, or cor rect his sentence.No. 12-1674 25
“sort of a selfi sh, self- centered remor se” and thus posed a hi gh ris k of reo ffending. Matz’ s confess i on and the sen t e ncing judge’ s a ss e ssm ent of the reasons behind i t thus fi gured prominen tly in the court’s deci si on to sentence Matz consec utiv ely on the t w o co unt s of convic tion. Becaus e that sentence remain s intact, Matz cannot pursue a § 1983 clai m for damages premi sed on hi s allegedly coerced confess i on b ecaus e suc cess on hi s clai m w ould call into questi on hi s sentence. Heck thus bars Matz’s Fifth Amendm ent clai m. See Davis v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr

. , 507 F .3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir

. 2 0 0 7 ) (barrin g clai m challen gin g sentencing calc ulati on); cf. Muhammad v
. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (200 4) (per curi am) (su mmari zing Heck bar as appli cable to any § 1983 damages acti on that “w ould i mpli ci tly questi on the v ali di ty o f convic tion or duration of sentence ” that has not been previously inv ali dated) (emphas i s added)

. III. For the foreg oin g reasons, w e AFF IRM the di stric t court ’s gr ant of summ ary judgment in f av or of the defendants.