[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-16568

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20623-JAL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

FARUT JENNIFER RUIZ MENDEZ, 

a.k.a. Gabriel Lacayo,

 Defendant - Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(August 16, 2013)

Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Farut Jenniffer Ruiz Mendez appeals his 52-month sentence, imposed within 

the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, after pleading guilty to one count of 

reentry by a deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). On 

appeal, Mendez argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable, in light of 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, because the district court placed too much 

emphasis on his criminal history, and failed to weigh mitigating evidence of his

family circumstances. Mendez also contends that his 52-month sentence falls near 

the high end of the Sentencing Guidelines range, in contrast to the low-end 

sentences received in other multiple reentry cases. Finding no reversible error on 

the part of the district court, we affirm.

This court reviews the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential 

abuse of discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 

S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). Under this standard, we will not vacate a sentence unless 

the district court’s ruling constitutes a clear error of judgment. United States v. 

Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In reviewing the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence, we must ensure that the district court imposed a 

sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes”

of sentencing, including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote 

respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, 

and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. 

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§ 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the 

defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the 

pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid 

unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. 

Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7). 

The appellant bears the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable 

in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 

1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the guideline 

range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). 

A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator 

of reasonableness. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 

2008) (per curiam) (holding the defendant’s sentence was reasonable in part 

because it was well below the statutory maximum). The weight given to any 

specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. 

United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). A court’s failure to 

explicitly discuss mitigating evidence presented by the defendant does not render a 

sentence unreasonable where the court indicates it considered all the § 3553(a) 

factors. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). 

We conclude that Mendez’s 52-month sentence is substantively reasonable. 

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The sentence is in the middle of a 46- to 57-month guideline range; consequently, 

we expect it to be reasonable. See Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746. Additionally, Mendez’s

sentence is well below the statutory maximum 20-year penalty, which serves as 

another indication of its reasonableness. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Mendez 

argues the district court failed to adequately consider his family circumstances 

under § 3553(a). To the contrary, the court explicitly stated it had considered the 

parties’ statements in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Additionally, although the 

court acknowledged it was particularly mindful of Mendez’s extensive criminal 

history, the weight to accord any given factor is within the sound discretion of the 

court. Clay, 483 F.3d at 743. 

Mendez also argues his 52-month sentence falls near the high end of the 

guideline range, in contrast to low-end sentences handed down in other multiple 

reentry cases. Once again, Mendez’s sentence falls roughly in the middle of the

46- to 57-month guideline range. Even if we were to accept that Mendez’s

circumstances are factually similar to other multiple reentry defendants who 

received lower-end sentences, Mendez’s sentence merely reflects the broad range 

of discretion that a district court has in imposing a reasonable sentence. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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