[Cite as State v. Coriell, 2023-Ohio-4113.]

COURT OF APPEALS

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES:

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.

 Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.

: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.

-vs- :

:

WILLIAM RALPH CORIELL, : Case No. CT2023-0011

:

 Defendant - Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Muskingum County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

CR2022-0568

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 14, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

RON WELCH RICHARD D. HIXON

Prosecuting Attorney 3808 James Court, Suite 2

Muskingum County, Ohio Zanesville, Ohio 43701

By: JOHN CONNOR DEVER

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

Muskingum County, Ohio

37 North Fifth St., P.O. Box 189

Zanesville, Ohio 43702
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 2

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} William R. Coriell appeals the verdict of the jury in the Muskingum County 

Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of domestic violence, a violation of R.C. 

2919.25(A), a fourth degree felony as a result of a prior offense and Intimidation of an 

Attorney, Victim or Witness in a Criminal Case, in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(1), a felony 

of the third degree. Appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} Coriell contends the trial court erred when it permitted the victim of his 

crimes to testify about his threats and assault and when it allowed a police officer to repeat 

the victim’s post-assault complaint that Coriell had struck her, pushed her against the wall 

and bruised her. He further contends the Counts should have been merged and that the 

verdict was not supported by the manifest evidence. We reject Coriell’s claim that he was 

entitled to shield his actions with the spousal privilege described in R.C. 2317.02(D), that 

the victim’s statements were barred by the hearsay rule and that the charges should 

merge. We find that the verdict was supported by the evidence and that Coriell’s 

Assignments of Error have no merit. 

{¶3} Patrolman Logan Miller of the Zanesville Police Department responded to a 

call from the victim, Katlin Curliss on October 28, 2022 claiming that her husband, William 

Coriell, had assaulted her. She explained that she was obligated to appear at a trial 

regarding domestic violence charges against Coriell later that morning, and that the 

threats and assault were an attempt to persuade her to change her testimony.

{¶4} Curliss told Officer Miller that she returned to her room at the Travel Inn 

where she and her husband were staying and they began arguing about the upcoming 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 3

domestic violence trial. She attempted to leave and Coriell grabbed her wrist and told her 

that she was not going anywhere. She stayed in the room for several hours until it was 

time to prepare to go to court.

{¶5} As she was preparing to leave, Coriell told her that “she needed to change 

it, tell the judge nothing happened, and that she didn't want to file charges.” (Trial 

Transcript, p. 182, lines 7-9). She told the Officer that Coriell “* * * grabbed her throat 

and pushed her up against the wall and said, I want you to walk in the courtroom, tell the 

judge that you want the charges dropped, that you were scared and upset, and that there 

-- nothing else needs to happen with this” and then he let go. (Id. at lines 10-15). She 

continued with her complaint by telling the Officer that they continued arguing and Coriell 

grabbed her by the throat again and threw her down, injuring her elbow. 

{¶6} Curliss insisted on showing the Officer each injury she received. Officer 

Miller photographed each as she pointed out a bruise on her left arm, left elbow and left 

wrist, a scratch and marks on her neck. Curliss filed a domestic violence complaint and 

Officer Miller arrested Coriell. 

{¶7} Coriell was charged with domestic violence, a violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), 

a fourth degree felony as a result of a prior offense and Intimidation of an Attorney, Victim 

or Witness in a Criminal Case in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(1), a felony of the third 

degree. The case was presented to a jury who returned a guilty verdict and the trial court 

imposed an aggregate prison term of thirty-six months. 

{¶8} Coriell filed a timely appeal and submitted four Assignments of Error:
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 4

{¶9} “I. THE JURY’S GUILTY VERDICT AS TO COUNT TWO OF THE 

INDICTMENT WAS BASED ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION 

OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.”

{¶10} “II. THE JURY’S GUILTY VERDICTS AS TO COUNTS ONE AND TWO OF 

THE INDICTMENT WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

{¶11} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT COMPELLED MS. CURLISS’S 

TESTIMONY, DESPITE THE ASSERTION OF THE R.C. SEC. 2317.02(D) SPOUSAL 

PRIVILEGE BY DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.”

{¶12} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING 

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT ON BOTH COUNTS ONE AND TWO, AS THE TWO 

COUNTS SHOULD HAVE MERGED FOR THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING UNDER 

R.C. SEC. 2941.25.”

ANALYSIS

{¶13} Coriell has rearranged the order of his Assignments of Error between the 

statement of the assignments and his argument. We will follow the order presented in his 

argument.

{¶14} Further, he modified the First Assignment of Error between the statement 

of the assignments and the argument. In his argument, he describes the assignment of 

error as “The Trial Court Erred When It Allowed Ms. Curliss’s Testimony Regarding 

Communications Made Between Spouses In Coverture Despite The Assertion Of The 

R.C. Sec. 2317.02(D) Spousal Privilege By Defendant/Appellant” but the corresponding 

assignment of error in the statement of assignments is “The Trial Court Erred When It 

Compelled Ms. Curliss’s Testimony, Despite The Assertion Of The R.C. Sec. 2317.02(D) 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 5

Spousal Privilege By Defendant/Appellant.” For purposes of our review, we will rely on 

the assignment of error described in Coriell’s Argument.

I.

{¶15} Coriell argues in his First Assignment of Error that his demand that Curliss 

“make it right” and his threats to her safety were communications made in coverture 

without the presence of a third person competent to testify and therefore Curliss was not 

permitted to testify regarding the content of those conversations or the acts he committed. 

(R.C. 2317.02(D)). Coriell is implying, without stating, that the privilege is unlimited and 

can be utilized to protect a criminal act when the victim is a spouse. We cannot accept 

his interpretation of this statute and the privilege described therein.

{¶16} The Tenth District Court of Appeals, relying on Sessions v. Trevitt (1883), 

39 Ohio St. 259, found the purpose of spousal privilege is the “public policy which requires 

that husband and wife not be allowed to betray the trust and confidence which are 

essential to the happiness of the marital estate.” Harrison v. Harrison, 10th Dist. Franklin 

No. 91AP-888, 1992 WL 40556, *2. The court found that the privilege provided under 

R.C. 2317.02(D) does not apply to statements that “are not confidential in nature” and 

that “abusive language and conduct of one spouse against another, [was] not privileged 

because they are unrelated to preservation of the marital relationship and do not contain 

an indicia of confidentiality. See Ohio v. Taylor (Aug. 10, 1988), Lorain App. No. 4280, 

unreported (Judge George concurring).” Id.

{¶17} “Verbal threats and violent acts between spouses are not marital 

“confidences” which the privilege was intended to shield from courtroom disclosure.” State 

v. Greaves, 6th Dist. No. H-11-012, 2012-Ohio-1989, 971 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 19. The goal of 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 6

the privilege, to “promote marital peace and harmony” is “wholly lost where one spouse 

has threatened or physically assaulted the other.” Id. at ⁋ 20.

{¶18} Further, we have held that “[i]n criminal cases, spousal privilege is governed 

by R.C. 2945.42* * * .” State v. Nowlin, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2012-0015, 2012-

Ohio-4923, ¶ 38 and that statute expressly excludes communications made or acts done 

“* * * in the case of personal injury by either the husband or wife to the other * * * .” “Such 

threatening or turbulent behavior is incompatible with the traditional premise of interspousal harmony out of which the confidences of marriage are imagined to 

flow.”(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 44.

{¶19} Coriell threatened Curliss in an attempt to convince her to change her 

testimony and followed the threats with a physical attack. We find the spousal privilege 

inapplicable to Coriell’s statements and actions as they are incompatible with the 

“traditional premise of inter-spousal harmony out of which the confidences of marriage 

are imagined to flow” and inconsistent with the goal of marital peace and harmony. The 

threats directed toward Curliss and her assault by Coriell are not communications or acts 

that are protected by spousal privilege.

{¶20} We find that the court did not err by denying Coriell’s assertion that Curliss’s 

testimony violated the spousal privilege. 

{¶21} The First Assignment of Error is denied.

II.

{¶22} In his Second Assignment of Error, Coriell contends that the jury’s guilty 

verdict as to charge of Intimidation of an Attorney, Defendant. Victim, or Witness in a 

Criminal Case was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence. Coriell acknowledges that 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 7

trial counsel did not object to the alleged hearsay testimony so he is obligated to persuade 

this court that the admission of the testimony was plain error.

{¶23} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), a plain error or defect affecting substantial rights 

may be noticed if not brought to the attention of the court. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 

91, 94, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). Plain error is to be invoked only in 

exceptional circumstances to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (Citation omitted.) Id.

{¶24} The test for plain error is enunciated under Crim.R. 52(B). In order for 

Crim.R. 52(B) to apply, a reviewing court must find that (1) there was an error, i.e., a 

deviation from a legal rule; (2) that the error was plain, i.e., that there was an “obvious” 

defect in the trial proceedings; and (3) that the error affected “substantial rights,” i.e., 

affected the outcome of the trial. (Citations omitted.) State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 

27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). We will apply this test to determine whether the admission 

of Curliss’s statements to the Officer was plain error.

{¶25} Coriell contends the Officer’s repetition of Curliss’s statements was hearsay 

and trial court committed plain error by admitting them. Evid.R. 801(C) defines hearsay 

as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Hearsay is 

inadmissible at trial unless it falls under an exception to the rules of evidence.

{¶26} The state counters that even if the statements are hearsay, they are 

otherwise admissible as an excited utterance. The excited utterance exception to the 

hearsay rule is contained in Evid.R. 803(2). If applicable, the exception is valid regardless 

of whether the declarant is available as a witness.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 8

{¶27} An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or 

condition made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the event 

or condition.” The rationale for the admission of these statements is that the shock of the 

event causes the declarant's reflective process to be halted. Thus, the statement is 

unlikely to have been fabricated and carries a high degree of trustworthiness.

{¶28} Coriell contends the shock of the alleged threats and assaults resolved 

before Curliss made her statements to the Officer. While some time had passed between 

the conflict and Curliss’s report, there is no per se amount of time after which a statement 

can no longer be considered to be an excited utterance. The central requirements are 

that the statement must be made while the declarant is still under the stress of the event 

and the statement may not be a result of reflective thought. 

{¶29} Curliss reported the assault hours after the incident but it was still evident 

to Officer Miller that she was under the stress of the event. He reported that “She was 

very adamant about showing me. She started taking her shirt off kind of right in the middle 

of the conversation, and I told her slow down a little bit, let's figure it out. But, yes, she 

was very adamant about pointing to every specific injury.” (Trial Transcript, p. 195, line 

25 to p. 196, line 4). Officer Miller confirmed that she was “[v]ery upset and adamant about 

wanting to report it” and angry with Coriell. (Id. at p. 196, lines 5-6, 14-15). The record 

supports a finding that Curliss was still under the influence of the stress of the event, 

eroding the foundation that the trial court committed plain error.

{¶30} The Supreme Court of Ohio has “acknowledged the discretionary aspect of 

Crim.R. 52(B) by admonishing courts to notice plain error ‘with the utmost caution, under 

exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” Barnes
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 9

at 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240, quoting State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 

372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus as quoted in State v. Lynn, 129 Ohio 

St.3d 146, 2011-Ohio-2722, 950 N.E.2d 931, ¶ 14. Our review for plain error in the context 

of this assignment of error is also limited by the rule that “[a] trial court is vested with broad 

discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as 

such discretion is exercised in line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. 

Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). An abuse of discretion is 

more than a mere error in judgment; it is a “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, 

or moral delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 

748 (1993).

{¶31} We find no plain error in this case because we do not find that the trial court 

abused its discretion by admitting the statement of Officer Logan Miller. There is sufficient 

evidence to demonstrate that the statement was an excited utterance by Ms. Curliss as 

she was still under the stress of the event.

{¶32} The Second Assignment of Error is overruled.

III.

{¶33} In his Third Assignment of Error, Coriell contends that the jury’s verdict was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues that Curliss’s testimony was 

internally contradictory and incorporates his argument that the testimony of the Officer 

was hearsay and should not have been permitted.

{¶34} We have denied Coriell’s Second Assignment of Error and found that the 

trial court did not commit plain error by failing to exclude Officer Miller’s testimony 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 10

regarding Curliss’s description of the offense, so that issue is resolved leaving only 

consideration of the credibility of Curliss.

{¶35} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the 

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility 

of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must 

be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 

N.E.2d 541, 547 (1997) quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR 

215, 219, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721 Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest 

weight of the evidence and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the 

“exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id. See 

State v. Acker, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 22CA008, 2023-Ohio-2085, ⁋ 36.

{¶36} Coriell was charged with “knowingly causing or attempting to cause physical 

harm” to his spouse, Curliss (Domestic Violence) and “knowingly and by force or by 

unlawful threat of harm to [Curliss] or by unlawful threat to commit any offense or calumny 

against [her] attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder [her] in the filing or prosecution of 

criminal charges.” (Intimidation).

{¶37} Curliss clearly described Coriell’s assault of her and pointed out the bruises 

to the Officer for photographing. While Coriell cites to the domestic violence charge in 

his argument and requests that his assignment be granted generally, he does not 

expressly contend that this charge was against the manifest weight of the evidence. After 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 11

a review of the record, we find that the jury did not lose its way when it found Coriell guilty 

of domestic violence.

{¶38} The subject of Coriell’s threats and assault was the pending domestic 

violence trial schedule for the next day. The circumstances support a conclusion that 

Coriell acted to convince Curliss to “make it right” by changing her story in court. Coriell 

offered no other explanation for his attack of Curliss. While Curliss’s testimony suggests 

that she was not intimidated by the verbal and physical assaults, we find that the record 

contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that Coriell knowingly attempted to “to influence, intimidate, or hinder [Curliss] in 

the filing or prosecution of criminal charges.” After considering all the facts and 

circumstances, we find that this was not “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs 

heavily against the conviction.” 

{¶39} The Third Assignment of Error is denied.

IV.

{¶40} In his Fourth Assignment of Error, Coriell argues that the trial court erred by 

failing to merge the two charges for sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, contending that 

the separate incidents were part of a continuing course of conduct rather than multiple 

occurrences. 

{¶41} Appellate review of an allied-offense question is de novo. State v. Miku, 5th 

Dist. No. 2017 CA 00057, 2018-Ohio-1584, ¶ 70, appeal not allowed, 154 Ohio St.3d 

1479, 2019-Ohio-173, 114 N.E.3d 1207 (2019), quoting State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 

482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 12.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 12

{¶42} Revised Code 2941.25 protects a criminal defendant's rights under the 

Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions by prohibiting 

convictions of allied offenses of similar import:

Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or 

information may contain Counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may 

be convicted of only one.

Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses of 

dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of 

the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as 

to each, the indictment or information may contain Counts for all such 

offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

{¶43} The application of R.C. 2941.25 requires a review of the subjective facts of 

the case in addition to the elements of the offenses charged. State v. Hughes, 5th Dist. 

Coshocton No. 15CA0008, 2016-Ohio-880, ¶ 21. In a plurality opinion, the Ohio Supreme 

Court modified the test for determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar 

import. State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061. The 

Court directed us to look at the elements of the offenses in question and determine 

“whether it is possible to commit one offense and commit the other with the same 

conduct.” (Emphasis sic). Id. at ¶ 48. If the answer to such question is in the affirmative, 

the court must then determine whether or not the offenses were committed by the same 

conduct. Id. at ¶ 49. If the answer to the above two questions is yes, then the offenses 

are allied offenses of similar import and will be merged. Id. at ¶ 50. If, however, the court 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 13

determines that commission of one offense will never result in the commission of the 

other, or if there is a separate animus for each offense, then the offenses will not merge. 

Id. at ¶ 51.

{¶44} Johnson's rationale has been described by the Court as “incomplete.” State 

v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, 49 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 11. The Supreme Court 

of Ohio has further instructed us to ask three questions when a defendant's conduct 

supports multiple offenses: “(1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) 

Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus or 

motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions. 

The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio 

St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 31.

{¶45} We have reviewed the record and find that there were two offenses 

separated in time by several hours. After the first offense, Curliss went into the bathroom. 

Hours later, when she was getting ready to go to court, the second offense occurred. The 

offenses “were committed separately” and, therefore separate convictions are permitted.

{¶46} The Fourth Assignment of Error is denied.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011 14

{¶47} The decision of the Muskingum County Court of Appeals is affirmed.

By: Baldwin, J.

Delaney, P.J. and

King, J. concur.