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2018 IL App (3d) 160186 

Opinion filed December 18, 2018 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT 

2018 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

) Will County, Illinois, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) Appeal No. 3-16-0186 

v. ) Circuit No. 15-CF-1745
 

)
 

ERIC W. CATCHINGS, ) Honorable
 

) Edward A. Burmila Jr., 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Holdridge and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Eric W. Catchings, appeals from his convictions for aggravated domestic 

battery and domestic battery. Defendant raises two issues on appeal: (1) he was denied a fair trial 

where the court allowed the State to use his prior felony conviction for possession of a weapon 

by a felon for impeachment purposes and (2) his conviction and sentence on count IV is subject 

to vacatur under the one-act, one-crime rule. We affirm in part and vacate in part. 

¶ 2	 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 In September 2015, the State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated domestic 

battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5), (a) (West 2014)) and two counts of domestic battery (id. § 12­
 

 

 

 

 

 

3.2(a)(1)). Relevant to this appeal, count II alleged that defendant “knowingly caused great 

bodily harm to Misty Bronzell, a household member of the defendant, in that said defendant 

struck Misty Bronzell about the head.” Count IV alleged that “defendant knowingly and without 

legal justification caused bodily harm to Misty Bronzell, a family or household member, in that 

said defendant struck Misty Bronzell about the head.” 

¶ 4 Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to prevent the State from introducing 

evidence of his prior felony convictions. The motion alleged that defendant had two prior felony 

convictions for possession of a weapon by a felon in 2011 and aggravated assault in 1995. The 

court ruled that the State could not use defendant’s 1995 conviction for impeachment, and it 

reserved its ruling on the 2011 conviction. Regarding the State's use of defendant’s 2011 

conviction, the court was concerned 

“that the jurors will get the impression that the defendant has a habit of going 

around armed. I don’t know what the facts of the case are going to be, and they 

would be determinative in my mind of whether I’m going to allow you to use this 

even to impeach the defendant.” 

Defendant’s case proceeded to a jury trial. 

¶ 5 The State called the victim, Misty Bronzell, as its first witness. Bronzell stated that she 

had a dating relationship with defendant. On August 19, 2015, around 7 p.m., defendant visited 

Bronzell at her apartment. At that time, defendant was drinking an alcoholic beverage and 

appeared drunk. Defendant acted “real belligerent,” and Bronzell told defendant that she did not 

want him drinking in her home. Defendant responded “F that” and “I can do what I want. You 

are not my woman ***. I am a free man.” 

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¶ 6 Approximately one or two hours later, Bronzell and defendant were sitting on the couch 

when defendant punched Bronzell in the head. Bronzell was afraid and did not move. Defendant 

appeared very angry and punched Bronzell another 15 to 20 times on her head. Bronzell thought 

she was going to die and began to lose consciousness. Defendant then placed his hands around 

Bronzell’s neck, applied firm pressure, and said “you’re going to die, you’re going to die.” 

Bronzell could not breathe and the chokehold bruised the skin on her neck. When defendant saw 

blood in Bronzell’s mouth, defendant began to cry and said “my God, what did I do to you?” 

Defendant retrieved ice from the freezer and instructed Bronzell to place it on her swollen face. 

Bronzell asked defendant to leave and assured defendant that she was not going to call the 

police. Bronzell told defendant that she would tell anyone who asked about her injuries that she 

had fallen and hit her head on a table. At the time, Bronzell did not realize the severity of her 

injuries and feared that defendant would kill her if she notified the police. 

¶ 7 When defendant left the apartment, Bronzell fell asleep. Around 6 or 7 a.m. the next 

morning, Bronzell’s roommate, Jamie Albert, entered the apartment. Upon seeing Bronzell’s 

injuries, Albert said he was taking Bronzell to the hospital. Bronzell told Albert that defendant 

had caused her injuries and she was afraid to notify the police because she thought defendant 

would kill her. 

¶ 8 Two police officers met Bronzell at St. Joseph Medical Center. Before the trial, the State 

showed Bronzell the written statement that she made at the hospital to an officer. Bronzell was 

otherwise unable to recall making the statement. At the time of Bronzell’s hospital admission, 

Bronzell’s face was so swollen that she could barely open her mouth. A computerized 

tomography (CT) scan of Bronzell’s head showed a subdural hematoma. Following the scan, 

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Bronzell was admitted into the neurological intensive care unit (ICU). Bronzell spent three days 

in the ICU and one day in a regular hospital room before being released. 

¶ 9 The State introduced photographs of Bronzell’s injuries. Bronzell explained that exhibit 

Nos. 1 and 2 showed bruising to her arm. Bronzell thought the bruises were caused by defendant 

grabbing her arm. Bronzell said that she tried to cover her head with her arm while she was 

sitting on the couch. Exhibit No. 3 showed the bruising on the right side of Bronzell’s face. 

Bronzell explained that the bruising remained for nearly one month. Bronzell also suffered from 

disorientation, memory loss, and anxiety. 

¶ 10 Bronzell said that no one was present in the apartment at the time of defendant’s attack. 

Bronzell also said that she did not incur her injuries as a result of a fall. 

¶ 11 Albert testified that at around 7 a.m., on August 20, 2015, he returned to the apartment 

that he shared with Bronzell. Albert noticed that Bronzell’s face was very swollen and she had 

several cuts and bruises. Albert took Bronzell to the hospital. 

¶ 12 Joliet Police Officer Joe Hernandez testified that he met with Bronzell at the hospital. 

Hernandez recalled that Bronzell had suffered bruising to her face and arm and she seemed 

disoriented. Bronzell made a written statement and told Hernandez that defendant had caused her 

injuries. Two other officers then arrested defendant. 

¶ 13 Joliet Police Officer Shawn Wascher testified that he assisted Hernandez in interviewing 

Bronzell at the hospital. Wascher and Hernandez met with Bronzell while she was in the 

neurological ICU. Bronzell had bruising on her neck, face, and arm, and bleeding on her brain. 

Bronzell had a difficult time communicating with the officers. After speaking with Bronzell, 

Wascher interviewed defendant. Defendant told Wascher that he and Bronzell had gotten into an 

argument and that Bronzell tripped over her sundress and fell onto a stool. 

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¶ 14 Emergency room (ER) nurse Christine Somodi testified that she treated Bronzell on 

August 20, 2015. Bronzell’s face was swollen and her arm was bruised. Bronzell told Somodi 

that the injuries were the result of being physically punched and choked. Bronzell made no 

reference to a fall. Bronzell stayed in the ER until the medical personnel received the results of 

her CT scan. 

¶ 15 Dr. Richard Louissaint testified that he treated Bronzell in the ER. At the time, Bronzell 

complained of suffering injuries in an assault and battery. Bronzell appeared to be in moderate 

distress, but was able to answer Louissaint’s questions. Louissaint observed bruising along 

Bronzell’s arm and right angle of her jaw. Following a CT scan, Louissaint diagnosed Bronzell 

with a subdural hematoma. Louissaint explained a subdural hematoma is usually caused by the 

application of “a great amount of force.” The force applied to the patient causes bleeding in an 

area surrounding part of the brain. Typically, a subdural hematoma results from a vehicle 

collision, fall, or an assault with a weapon. Louissaint further explained that subdural hematomas 

can be mortal injuries because the bleeding causes pressure to build around the brain. 

Additionally, a subdural hematoma can cause a patient to suffer memory loss and weakness on 

one side of the body. Following the subdural hematoma diagnosis, Louissaint admitted Bronzell 

to the neurological ICU for observation. Louissaint opined that Bronzell’s injuries were not 

consistent with a fall because she had injuries to more than one area of her face and body. 

¶ 16 Neurosurgeon Dr. Tamir Hersonskey testified that he treated Bronzell on August 20, 

2015. Bronzell had been admitted to the hospital with a traumatic subdural hematoma. 

Hersonskey monitored and treated the hematoma while Bronzell was in the hospital. Hersonskey 

explained that 

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“a small percent of people who present with intercranial bleed, we call them the 

people who speak and die. They can initially present with an intact neurological 

examination, but later there can be development of increase in the size of the 

hematoma or brain swelling, potentially seizure, which can create a neurological 

deterioration and potentially even death.” 

Hersonskey said that Bronzell’s injury could cause cognitive deterioration or dementia. 

¶ 17 Bronzell’s mother, Joan Woods, testified that on August 20, 2015, she received a 

telephone call from St. Joseph Medical Center that Bronzell had been admitted to the 

neurological ICU. Upon entering Bronzell’s hospital room, Woods did not recognize Bronzell. 

Woods explained “[i]t was like the most horrifying thing a mother could see. She looked 

bludgeoned. There was bruising on the right side, the left side. There was blood coming out of 

her mouth. Horrible pain.” Bronzell’s speech was mostly incomprehensible, but Woods was able 

to glean that Bronzell had been repeatedly punched and lost consciousness three times. When 

Bronzell was released from the hospital, she suffered from memory loss and nightmares. Woods 

said Bronzell’s bruises did not fade for two weeks. 

¶ 18 The State rested after Woods’s testimony. The court then ruled on the admissibility of 

defendant’s 2011 conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon. 

“After reviewing all of the evidence in this case, there wasn’t any argument that 

the defendant used a weapon, which is what I was most concerned about. So in 

regard to the Motion in Limine, if the defendant chooses to testify, the State will 

be able to use the fact of his felony conviction to impeach his credibility.” 

¶ 19 Following the court’s ruling, defendant elected to testify in his defense. Defendant said 

that he dated Bronzell “off and on” starting in December 2014. Around 5 p.m. on August 19, 

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2015, defendant went to visit Bronzell at her apartment. Defendant and Bronzell conversed, 

drank an alcoholic beverage, ate, and watched movies. Defendant said that neither he nor 

Bronzell were drunk that night. A few hours later, defendant went to leave, Bronzell said she did 

not want defendant to leave, and an argument ensued. During the argument, Bronzell jumped up 

off the couch, slipped on her sundress, and fell on the floor. Bronzell then sat up and made eye 

contact with defendant, and defendant left the apartment. Defendant did not check to see if 

Bronzell was okay, but recalled that he did not see any injuries. Defendant said that he did not 

punch, choke, or grab Bronzell. 

¶ 20 After defendant’s testimony, the State moved to admit into evidence a certified copy of 

defendant’s prior felony conviction. The court admitted the certified copy over defense counsel’s 

objection. The State proposed the following phrasing for the introduction of defendant’s prior 

conviction: 

“In rebuttal we wish to present a certified conviction of the defendant dated 

November 9, 2011, for the felony charge of possession of weapon by a felon, not 

as a habitual criminal.” 

The court ordered the State to remove the words “habitual criminal” from the statement and 

allowed the State to use it to impeach defendant’s credibility. Thereafter, the State introduced a 

certified copy of defendant’s 2011 conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon. 

¶ 21 At the beginning of the jury instruction conference, the State submitted its proposed 

instructions to the court. The court then reviewed the list of proposed instructions with the 

parties. Included with the State’s proposed instructions was Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 

Criminal, No. 3.12 (approved Oct. 17, 2014) (hereinafter IPI Criminal No. 3.12) “regarding the 

use of a prior conviction.” In response to the court’s reference to IPI Criminal No. 3.12, defense 

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counsel said “[n]o objection.” Subsequently, the court instructed the jury that “[e]vidence that a 

witness has been convicted of an offense may be considered by you only as it may affect the 

believability of that witness.” 

¶ 22 The jury found defendant guilty of each of the charged offenses. 

¶ 23 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the court erred in denying 

defendant’s pretrial motion to exclude evidence of defendant’s prior conviction. The court 

denied the motion. 

¶ 24 The court sentenced defendant on counts I and II to concurrent terms of six years’ 

imprisonment. The court sentenced defendant on counts III and IV to concurrent terms of 90 

days in jail. Defendant appeals. 

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 26 A. Prior-Crimes Evidence 

¶ 27 Defendant argues that the court infringed on his right to a fair trial where it allowed the 

State to impeach his credibility with his 2011 felony conviction for possession of a weapon by a 

felon. Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence because 

(1) defendant’s prior conviction was irrelevant, (2) the court failed to balance the prejudicial 

effect of the conviction against its probative value, (3) the court compounded this error by 

reading the prior-crimes instructions for a testifying witness instead of a testifying defendant, and 

(4) the admission of defendant’s possession of a weapon by a felon conviction violated the merefact rule. 

¶ 28 Generally, evidence of a defendant’s other crimes is inadmissible to show a defendant’s 

propensity to engage in criminal activity. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). 

However, where defendant elects to testify, the State may impeach his credibility with evidence 

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of a prior conviction. People v. Tribett, 98 Ill. App. 3d 663, 675 (1981). In People v. 

Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516-19 (1971), the supreme court adopted the 1971 proposed draft 

of Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Congress subsequently enacted a different form of 

Rule 609, but the Montgomery rule continues to apply in the Illinois courts. People v. Naylor, 

229 Ill. 2d 584, 596 (2008). On January 11, 2011, the supreme court codified and adopted the 

Illinois Rules of Evidence. Illinois Rule of Evidence 609 (eff. Jan. 6, 2015) codified the 

Montgomery rule. Rule 609 states: 

“(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 

evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of 

nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death 

or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 

convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the 

punishment unless (3), in either case, the court determines that the probative value 

of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. 

(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible 

if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or of the 

release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date.” Ill. R. Evid. 

609(a), (b) (eff. Jan. 6, 2015). 

¶ 29	 In this case, the court allowed the State to impeach defendant’s credibility with evidence 

of defendant’s 2011 possession of a weapon by a felon conviction. This impeachment falls under 

the first proposition—it was a crime punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year. Id. 

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¶ 30 We review the circuit court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 

2d 62, 68 (2009). “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court’s ruling is 

arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by 

the trial court.” People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2000). 

¶ 31 1. Relevancy 

¶ 32 Defendant first contends that the court abused its discretion in admitting his prior 

conviction because his “prior conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon is *** not very 

relevant to the issue of credibility” and this should have caused the court to give little, if any, 

weight to the probative value of the prior conviction. See People v. Adams, 281 Ill. App. 3d 339, 

345 (1996). 

¶ 33 Historically, the impeachment by prior conviction rule was “premised upon the 

assumption that a person with a criminal record has a bad general character, evidenced by his 

willingness to disobey the law, and that his bad general character would lead him to disregard his 

oath to testify truthfully.” Michael H. Graham, Cleary and Graham’s Handbook of Illinois 

Evidence § 609.1, at 552-53 (2018 ed.). Under this rule, evidence of a defendant’s prior criminal 

offense was relevant to impeach his credibility because it showed a propensity to disregard the 

law. This theory has fallen out of favor because “evidence of a prior conviction tends to persuade 

the jury that, on the basis of past conduct, defendant is a probable perpetrator of the crime or [it] 

influence[d] jurors to convict simply because they feel he is a bad person deserving of 

punishment.” Id. at 553. Partly in response to these concerns, Montgomery adopted a balancing 

test. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 517. A defendant’s prior conviction would be excluded from 

evidence where its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. Id. at 517-18. 

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“On one side of the scale the trial judge was to place the probative value of the 

prior conviction. That is, the judge must consider the relevance of the prior 

conviction to an evaluation of the defendant’s credibility as a witness. On the 

other side of the scale, the trial judge was to place all the factors that could result 

in unfair prejudice to the testifying defendant.” People v. Elliot, 274 Ill. App. 3d 

901, 906 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 

48 (1996). 

In conducting this test, a circuit court should consider 

“the nature of the earlier crimes, the length of the defendant’s criminal record, his 

age and circumstances, whether it was more important for the jury to hear the 

defendant’s version of the facts than to know of his earlier conviction, the 

nearness or remoteness of the earlier conviction, the defendant’s career after the 

conviction and whether the earlier crime was similar to the one charged.” People 

v. Barner, 374 Ill. App. 3d 963, 969-70 (2007). 

¶ 34 In this case, defendant’s prior conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon was a 

“status-based” offense. See People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424, ¶ 29. In contrast to the 

charged offense, this conviction included no element of serious harm, and it bore little similarity 

to the charged offenses. The lack of similarity reduced the prejudice to defendant as it avoided 

the propensity problems that generally bar prior convictions. See Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 170. 

Further, this conviction was probative of defendant’s credibility because it was part of 

defendant’s larger criminal history. Defendant’s criminal history included the more remote, but 

similar, 1995 conviction for aggravated assault. Additionally, defendant’s possession of a 

weapon by a felon conviction was relatively recent to the charged offense as it occurred 

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approximately four years earlier. In light of these factors, we find that defendant’s 2011 

conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon was relevant to and probative of defendant’s 

credibility. 

¶ 35 2. Balancing Test 

¶ 36 Defendant argues the court failed to conduct a proper Montgomery hearing because it 

merely mentioned the dissimilarity of the charged offenses to defendant’s 2011 conviction and 

did not balance the probative value of the conviction against its prejudicial effect. 

¶ 37 At the outset, we note that the court need not expressly conduct the Montgomery 

balancing test on the record. People v. Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2011) (citing People v. 

Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 462 (1999)). 

¶ 38 The record in the instant case establishes that the court implicitly conducted the 

Montgomery balancing test. During the hearing on defendant’s motion in limine, the court 

expressed concern that defendant’s prior conviction might be more prejudicial than probative 

because it was potentially similar to the charged offenses. Therefore, the court reserved its ruling 

until it heard the State’s evidence. Ultimately, the State’s case, which included no reference to 

the use of weapon, allayed the court’s prejudice concerns as the evidence did not show that 

defendant had used a weapon. While the court did not know if defendant intended to testify, it 

was aware that defendant’s credibility was a central issue to the case. This made the State’s 

impeachment evidence relevant to the overall case. Therefore, the record establishes that the 

court did not abuse its discretion as it implicitly balanced these factors when it ruled the State 

may use defendant’s 2011 conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon for purposes of 

impeachment. 

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¶ 39 3. Jury Instruction 

¶ 40 Defendant argues that the court’s allegedly erroneous admission of his prior crimes was 

exacerbated by the court’s mistaken use of the IPI Criminal No. 3.12, the impeachment of a 

witness by prior conviction instruction, instead of IPI Criminal No. 3.13, for the impeachment of 

a defendant by his prior conviction. 

¶ 41 Initially, we reaffirm our finding that the court did not err when it allowed the State to 

impeach defendant’s testimony with his 2011 conviction. Supra ¶ 38. However, in the interest of 

completeness, we address defendant’s argument. 

¶ 42 Defendant’s argument fails for two reasons. First, defendant acquiesced to the court’s use 

of IPI Criminal No. 3.12 when he expressly did not object to the instruction or independently 

seek the use of IPI Criminal No. 3.13. Second, any error caused by the court’s use of IPI 

Criminal No. 3.12 was harmless. 

¶ 43 Both IPI Criminal Nos. 3.12 and 3.13 instruct the jury on the proper use of prior crimes 

impeachment evidence. However, IPI Criminal No. 3.12 is directed at the impeachment of a 

testifying witness and states “[e]vidence that a witness has been convicted of an offense may be 

considered by you only as it may affect the believability of the witness.” IPI Criminal No. 3.13 

instructs the jury on the use of a defendant’s prior conviction and directly instructs the jury not to 

consider defendant’s prior conviction as evidence of guilt. It states, “[e]vidence of a defendant’s 

previous conviction of an offense may be considered by you only as it may affect his 

believability as a witness and must not be considered by you as evidence of his guilt of the 

offense with which he is charged.” (Emphasis added.) IPI Criminal No. 3.13. 

¶ 44 In this case, the State impeached defendant’s testimony with evidence of defendant’s 

2011 conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon. Therefore, IPI Criminal No. 3.13 was the 

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more appropriate jury instruction. However, the Committee Note to IPI Criminal No. 3.13 states, 

“[t]his instruction should be given only at the request of the defendant when there has been 

impeachment of the defendant by proof of a prior conviction.” (Emphasis added.) See People v. 

Cook, 262 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1019 (1994) (“Giving this instruction at the behest of the State may 

unfairly accentuate defendant’s past criminal record.”). 

¶ 45 The record establishes that defendant did not request IPI Criminal No. 3.13. Instead, 

when the court referenced IPI Criminal No. 3.12, defense counsel responded “[n]o objection.” 

Defense counsel thus acquiesced to the use of IPI Criminal No. 3.12. As a result, defendant 

cannot complain of this alleged instruction error. See People v. Rachel, 123 Ill. App. 3d 600, 606 

(1984) (“It is axiomatic that a defendant cannot complain of error in instructions to which he has 

acquiesced, induced or invited or which were given at his request ***.”). 

¶ 46 Even if we set aside defendant’s acquiescence, we find the court’s issuance of IPI 

Criminal No. 3.12 was harmless error. “An error in a jury instruction is harmless if it is 

demonstrated that the result of the trial would not have been different if the proper instruction 

had been given.” People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109, 137 (1991). 

¶ 47 Here, the evidence at trial was heavily weighted against defendant. Bronzell testified that 

defendant choked and beat her to the point that she lost consciousness. As a result of defendant’s 

actions, Bronzell suffered bruising to her arm, neck, and head, and a subdural hematoma that 

necessitated a stay in the neurological ICU. Altogether, Bronzell spent four days in the hospital 

and continues to suffer from cognitive and memory issues. Bronzell’s explanation of the cause of 

her injuries was corroborated by Dr. Louissaint’s testimony that Bronzell’s injuries were 

inconsistent with a fall. Defendant’s testimony contradicted Bronzell, as he said that Bronzell 

suffered the injuries as a result of a fall. However, defendant’s testimony failed to refute 

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Louissaint’s statement that Bronzell’s injuries were too extensive to have been caused by a fall. 

Moreover, defendant’s explanation that he observed Bronzell’s fall, but did not render aid, 

despite the severity of her injury, was implausible. According to defendant, he was in a 

relationship with Bronzell at the time, but did not help Bronzell after she fell on the stool and 

instead left the apartment. In light of this evidence, any error incurred by the court’s use of IPI 

Criminal No. 3.12 was harmless, as it did not affect the outcome of the trial. 

¶ 48 4. Mere-Fact Rule 

¶ 49 Defendant argues that the court should have excluded his prior conviction for possession 

of a weapon by a felon because its use violated the “mere-fact” impeachment approach that was 

rejected by the Illinois Supreme Court in Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 458. Defendant contends that 

the State impeached his credibility with two convictions—possession of a weapon by a felon and 

the unnamed predicated felony. Defendant argues that the unnamed predicated felony 

impermissibly resulted in his impeachment by the “mere fact” that he had a prior unspecified 

felony. 

¶ 50 “The mere-fact method of impeachment informs the jury only of the ‘mere fact’ of a 

witness’ prior conviction, but not the nature of that conviction.” Id. at 457. In Atkinson, the 

supreme court expressly rejected the mere-fact method of impeachment and reaffirmed the use of 

the Montgomery analysis. Id. at 458, 461. In People v. Cox, 195 Ill. 2d 378, 386 (2001), the 

supreme court reasserted its rejection of mere-fact impeachment, stating “[i]n Atkinson, however, 

we held that ‘trial courts should not consider the mere-fact method of impeachment.’ (Emphasis 

added.) Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d at 461. We find no suggestion in this unequivocal language that a 

trial court’s discretion encompasses mere-fact impeachment.” 

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¶ 51 The record in the present case establishes that the court did not admit defendant’s prior 

conviction in contravention of Atkinson. The State impeached defendant’s credibility with 

evidence of his 2011 conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon. The nature of this 

conviction required reference to defendant’s status as a felon. This reference is not tantamount to 

the introduction of a second conviction, as it does not describe the name or nature of the 

predicate felony. It is simply a part of the prior conviction that was used for impeachment. 

Moreover, the prejudicial effect of the State’s reference to defendant’s prior felon status was 

limited because the State did not provide the name or nature of defendant’s prior felony. See, 

e.g., People v. Williams, 2015 IL App (1st) 130097, ¶ 51 (finding the court did not err in 

allowing the State to enter the name of the prior conviction—unlawful use of a weapon by a 

felon—because it accurately informed the jury of the nature of the prior crime); People v. 

Lillard, 200 Ill. App. 3d 173, 181 (1990) (finding the court did not err when it allowed the State 

to impeach defendant with his prior conviction for unlawful use of a firearm by a felon where the 

court deleted reference to the predicate felony). Therefore, the State’s reference to defendant’s 

felon status did not contravene the supreme court’s rejection of “mere-fact” impeachment. The 

reference was simply a necessary part of the felony that the State used to impeach defendant’s 

credibility. 

¶ 52 B. One-Act, One-Crime 

¶ 53 Defendant argues that his conviction and sentence entered on count IV must be vacated 

under the one-act, one-crime rule because it is included in count II. The State concedes that 

defendant’s conviction on count IV is subject to vacatur. 

¶ 54 Upon review of the record, we accept the State’s concession and find defendant’s 

domestic battery conviction, entered on count IV, is included within defendant’s count II 

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conviction for aggravated domestic battery. The one-act, one-crime rule disallows multiple 

convictions that are “ ‘carved from the same physical act.’ ” People v. Miller, 238 Ill. 2d 161, 

165 (2010) (quoting People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977)). We review de novo the issue of 

whether defendant’s conviction is subject to vacatur under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. 

People v. Almond, 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 47. 

¶ 55 In this case, counts II and IV of the indictment contained the similar and nonspecific 

allegation that “defendant struck Misty Bronzell about the head.” The trial evidence regarding 

these charges was similarly general, as the State did not differentiate which punch or strike to 

Bronzell’s head caused each injury. Therefore, the conviction imposed on counts II and IV arise 

out of a single physical act. Accordingly, we vacate the less serious conviction for domestic 

battery. See People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1996) (multiple convictions are improper 

if they are based on the same physical act). 

¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 57 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

¶ 58 Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

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