alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Argued October 2,

affirmed October 29, 1973.

#### SCHOCH, *Respondent, v.*STATE ACCIDENT INSURANCE FUND (No. 362-716), *Appellant.*

514 P2d 1352

■ Al' *J. Ldue,*Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief ■were Lee Johnson, Attorney General, and John W. Osburn, Solicitor General, Salem.

*Raymond J. Gonboy,*Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief, were, Richard P. Noble, and Pozzi, Wilson *&*Atchison, Portland.

Before Schwab, Chief Judge, and Lahgtry and Fort, Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *Williamson v. SAIF,*6 Or App 95, 487 P2d 110 (1971).
Opinion issued November 5, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals

For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01

- 1 3

- 00 927

- CV

——————————— IN RE AKHIL PATEL , Relator

O riginal Proceeding on Petition f or Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION
By petition for writ of mandamus, r elator Akhil Patel challenge s the trial

court’s order of October 21, 2013 granting a continuance of the hearing on his

summary judgment motion. 1

1 The underlying case is Nadia Hussain v. Akhil Patel
, No. 2013

- 18455
, in the 125th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Kyle Carter presiding

.2

W e deny relator ’ s petition for writ of mandamus. All outstanding motions

are dismissed a s moot

.
PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Sharp , and Brown.
#### The State of Iowa, Appellee, v. O. S. Pfleajor, Appellant. The State of Iowa, Appellee, v. J. N. Caldwell, Appellant.

Intoxicating Liquors: interstate commerce : constitutionality OP ACTS.

*Appeals from Polk District Court.*

Wednesday, October 29, 1890.

The defendants in each of the above entitled causes were tried and convicted upon a charge of illegally carrying and transporting intoxicating liquors, and they appeal.

*Cole, McVey & Ciarle,*for appellants.

*John Y. Stone,*Attorney General, for the State.

Per Curiam.

These causes involve the identical questions determined by the supreme court of the United States in the case of *Leisey v. Hardin,*19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681. Following that case, the judgments of the district court must be reversed.
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 863

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide for medicaid

coverage of all certified nurse practitioners and clinical nurse specialists

services.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 22, 1999

Mr. DASCHLE (for himself, Mrs. BOXER, and Mr. DORGAN) introduced the

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to provide

for medicaid coverage of all certified nurse practitioners

and clinical nurse specialists services.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Medicaid Nursing In5 centive Act of 1999’’.
2

•S 863 IS

1 SEC. 2. MEDICAID COVERAGE OF ALL CERTIFIED NURSE

2 PRACTITIONER AND CLINICAL NURSE SPE3 CIALIST SERVICES.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1905(a)(21) of the Social

5 Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396d(a)(21)) is amended to read

6 as follows:

7 ‘‘(21) services furnished by a certified nurse

8 practitioner (as defined by the Secretary) or clinical

9 nurse specialist (as defined in subsection (v)) which

10 the certified nurse practitioner or clinical nurse spe11 cialist is legally authorized to perform under State

12 law (or the State regulatory mechanism provided by

13 State law), whether or not the certified nurse practi14 tioner or clinical nurse specialist is under the super15 vision of, or associated with, a physician or other

16 health care provider;’’.

17 (b) CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALIST DEFINED.—Sec18 tion 1905 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1396d) is amended by

19 adding at the end the following:

20 ‘‘(v) The term ‘clinical nurse specialist’ means an in21 dividual who—

22 ‘‘(1) is a registered nurse and is licensed to

23 practice nursing in the State in which the clinical

24 nurse specialist services are performed; and
3

•S 863 IS

1 ‘‘(2) holds a master’s degree in a defined area

2 of clinical nursing from an accredited educational in3 stitution.’’.

4 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

5 this section shall become effective with respect to pay6 ments for calendar quarters beginning on or after January

7 1, 2000.

Æ
```

[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 160 (Thursday, October 2, 2008)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E2212]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

              EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008

                                 ______
                                 

                         HON. PATRICK J. MURPHY

                            of pennsylvania

                    in the house of representatives

                       Thursday, October 2, 2008

  Mr. PATRICK J. MURPHY of Pennsylvania. Madam Speaker, I rise today to 
join thousands of families in my district who are struggling in this 
economy and frustrated at how this Congress is handling this rescue 
package.
  A few days ago I stood shoulder to shoulder with Democrats and 
Republicans in this chamber and the families and businesses in my 
community to try and prevent an economic disaster.
  While the bill we considered on Monday and the one we are voting on 
again is neither perfect nor popular, we have to do something on behalf 
of our Nation and its citizens. We have to fight for the families now 
at risk of losing their homes, the seniors who could lose their 
pensions and the students who are losing their shot at a college 
education.
  Madam Speaker, I hope that our chamber can change the Senate's bill 
so that it does not include extraneous provisions that are unrelated to 
rescuing our economy.
  We worked through the weekend last week and I am willing to do it 
again. We have the opportunity to do this right.
  I believe this bill will ultimately protect middle class families, 
seniors on fixed incomes and students who want to go to college. I 
believe it also provides property tax relief, incentives for 
alternative energy and help for small businesses to create jobs.
  These are provisions that will help families back at home and put our 
economy back on track.
  On Monday we were derailed by too much bitter partisanship and the 
Senate's decision to tack on tax cuts for things like wood arrows, rum 
and race tracks will only make it harder to achieve the unity we need 
to help this great country.
  I am for tax cuts--and have cosponsored more than two dozen in the 
last 22 months, but as I have said before, unrelated spending has no 
place in emergency legislation.
  Madam Speaker, I urge the leadership of this House to strip the 
unnecessary provisions, pass this bill and send it back to the Senate 
with a message: we cannot afford to wait to do what's right.

                          ____________________
```
#### State ex rel. Finnegan, Attorney General, and others, Appellants, vs. Lincoln Dairy Company, Respondent.

*January 9*

February *4, 1936.*

*16For the appellants there were briefs by the *Attorney General, R. M. Orchard,*assistant attorney general, *Fred M. Wylie,*special counsel, and *William A. Zabel,*district attorney of Milwaukee county, and oral argument by *Mr. Wylie, Mr. Orchard,*and *Mr. George H. Gabel*of Milwaukee.

For the respondent there were briefs by *Charles C. Hiken, Max H. Karl,*and *Hersh & Morse,*all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Mr. Herbert Morse, Mr. Karl,*and *Mr. Emil Hersh.*

Rosenberry, C. J.

When this case was called in this court, counsel for the defendant moved that the appeal be dismissed for the reason that the order appealed from was not an appealable order. The contention of the plaintiffs is that, the action being one to revoke a corporate charter and to enforce a milk dealer license and milk control law, an order limiting the examination of the defendant to the period since the enactment of ch. 58, Laws of 1935, is erroneous. The fact that the order is erroneous does not make it appealable. While it is true that the action is one in part to revoke a corporate charter, the action of the court is wholly dependent upon whether the court finds there has been a violation of *17the provisions of ch. 58, Laws of 1935. Sec. 274.33, Stats., provides:

> “The following orders when made by the court may be carried by appeal to the supreme court:

> “(1) . . . (2) . . . (3) When an order grants, refuses, continues or modifies a provisional remedy," etc.

It is considered that this case is ruled by *Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Flagge,*170 Wis. 492, 175 N. W. 777. A decision on a motion to limit the scope of an adverse party examination is nothing more nor less than an authoritative determination as to what evidence may be elicited upon the examination. The procedure is provided, no doubt, so that the parties to the action will have the benefit of the determination of the court rather than by the commissioner before whom the proceedings are pending.

The order in question does not suppress anything. It merely prescribes the field in which the provisional remedy may operate. In reality the words “continue” and “modify” as used in the statute are not applicable to such a provisional remedy as an adverse examination of the opposite party. Those terms apply aptly to such a provisional remedy as attachment. While the whole proceeding for the examination of an adverse party is properly held to be a provisional remedy, determining the procedural steps which may properly be taken when the remedy is invoked in a particular case is not the remedy itself. On the authority of *Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Flagge, supra,*the order is not appealable.

*By the Court.*— The appeal is dismissed without costs.

Fritz, J., dissents.
Exhibit
10.1(a)


 


FIRST AMENDMENT


To That


AMENDED AND RESTATED


EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


Of


ROBERT R. BINNS


 


This First Amendment (the “First
Amendment”) to that certain Amended and Restated Employment Agreement effective
as of January 1, 2009 by and between Global Aviation Holdings Inc.
(formerly Global Aero Logistics Inc.), a Delaware corporation (the “Company”),
and Robert R. Binns (the “Executive”), is made and entered into as of this 16th
day of September 2010 (Global and Executive hereinafter collectively the “Parties”).


 


WHEREAS, Executive and
Company entered into that certain Amended and Restated Employment Agreement
effective as of January 1, 2009 (the “Agreement”) which sets forth the
terms and conditions for Executive’s continued employment; and


 


WHEREAS, the Parties
hereto desire to amend certain provisions of the Agreement.


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in
consideration of the foregoing recital and of the mutual covenants set forth
herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency
of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:


 


1.             Article 5.1, “Annual Base Salary,” is hereby
amended, effective as of November 1, 2010, to increase the Executive’s
Base Salary from $525,000 to $570,000.


 


2.             Article 6.3, “Payments Upon Termination Without
Cause or for Good Reason,” subparagraph “(a)” is hereby deleted in its entirety
and replaced with:


 


(a)           Executive shall be paid severance
compensation in a lump sum equal to eighteen (18) months (or thirty six (36)
months for Termination Without Cause within ninety (90) days following a Change
in Control), of: (i) Executive’s Base Salary and (ii) Executive’s
target Annual Bonus in effect at the time of termination, subject to reduction,
if necessary, to avoid an excess parachute payment under Section 280G of
the Internal Revenue Code.  Any portion
of the Annual Bonus that is earned and already paid in the calendar year of
Executive’s termination, will be deducted from this severance compensation.  The severance compensation will be paid to
Executive in a lump sum within thirty (30) days following the Executive’s
Separation from Service on or after the Executive’s Date of Termination;


 


3.             Continuing Effect. 
Except as otherwise amended hereby, all terms and conditions set forth
in the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect and are incorporated by
reference herein.  Capitalized terms used
but not defined herein shall have the same meaning as in the Agreement.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties
hereto have executed this First Amendment effective as of the month, day and
year set forth above.


 

















 


	
  GLOBAL AVIATION HOLDINGS INC.

  	
   

  	
  EXECUTIVE

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Mark M. McMillin

  	
   

  	
  /s/ Robert R. Binns

  
	
   

  	
  Mark M. McMillin

  	
   

  	
  Robert
  R. Binns
Hoh6rable Ed Guhn

Dls'trlct

Attorney Cameron,Texas Dear Mr. Gunn: OpinionNo. O-5314 Re: Would a duly elected State or county officialbe excluded from~servingas a member of an advisoryboard for registrahts: Said officialrendering 

### such serviceswithout compensation. We have given careful consideration to the question propounded to us in your letter of May 14, 1943,, which reads as follows:



### ."woula

a duly elected State or county officialbe excluded from servingas a member of an advisory board for registrants; said official rendering such serviceswithout compensation." As we understand the duties of "amember of an aavisoryboard for registrants'! he does not hold a position of honor, trust or profit under this State or the United States within the contemplationof Section 33 of Article 16 or Section 12,Article 16 of the State Constitution.

As we understand the duties of "amember of an advisoryboard for registrants"are simply to assist the registrants in finding outwhat are theirrespective duties end advise them how to complywith the various orders promulgated by those in authority during thewar. His acts and advice are not binding upon anyone. He receives no pay therefor and aswe understand, he acts purely In an advisory capacity, and as a courtesy to the registrantswho request his assistance. The registrants are free to accept his advice or not as they see fit.

O-4542. Per your request we enclose a copy of our Opinion Nor, I

Eon. Ed Gum, page 2 O-5314

Yours very truly ATTORNEYGENERAL OF TEXAS

-. ..~ By s/GeorgeW. Bisrcus George W. Baficus

Assistant APPROVED JULY 2, 1943 s/titi. J. Fanning (Aetlng) ATTORNEY GENEUL OF TEXAS Approved Opinion Commiti& By s/BWB Chairman
#### JAMES E. WILLIAMSON *against*CLEMENT H. JORDAN.

The Act of 1762, (Rev. Stat., cli. 54, sec. 1,) allowing a father to appoint a testamentary guardian for his children, does not embrace grandchildren.

(The case of *Ranldn*v. Hoyle, 6 Ire. Eq. 161, cited and approved.)

*47Cause set for hearing upon the bill and answer at Person Court of equity. Fall Term, 1852, and 'by consent transmitted to the Supreme Court.

John W. Williams, late of Person county, died some time in the early part of 1852, having previously made and published his last will and testament, which was duly admitted to probate, and the defendant, one of the executors therein named, took out letters testamentary, and assumed all the duties pertaining to his office. The testator, after giving several slaves and other property to his grandchildren, who were the children of the plantiff by his marriage with a daughter of the testator, adds the following *clause:*— “ And I appoint my wife Mary E. Williams my executrix, and Dr. James E. Williamson, my executor, of this my last will and testament, and I request that the latter will become guardian of both my children and his own.” The bill was filed by the plantiff to compel the defendant to deliver to him the slaves bequeathed to his children, claiming said slaves as their testamentary guardian. The defendant, by his answer, admitted all the material allegations of the bill, and expressed his readiness to deliver the said slaves to any person duly authorized to receive them; but declined delivering them to the plaintiff, for the reason that he had been advised that the testator had no power to appoint a guardian for his grandchildren.

Norwood, for the plantiff.

*E. G. Reade,*for the defendant.

Battle, J.,

after stating the case as above: — The claim of the plantiff to be the guardian of his children, by virtue of the testamentary appointment of their grandfather, is founded, we presume, upon die Act of 1762, (1 Rev. Stat. chap. 54. Sec. 1.) That Statute enacts, *“*that where any person hath or shall have any child or children, under the age of twenty-one years, and not married, it shall be lawful for the father of such child or children, &c.” by deed executed in his lifetime, or by his last will and testament, to appoint a guardian for such child or children. Our Act is very nearly a literal copy of the Statute of Charles 2, ch. 24, and must receive the same construction. In England, it is well settled that none but a father — not even a mother or other *48person standing *in loco parentis*— can appoint a guardian under the Statute of Charles. Macpherson on Infants, page 82, (Law Lib., vol. 25 of New Series,)—1 Bl. Com., 462, in the notes to Chitty or Wend. Ed.—3 Atk. Rep., 519. The words of the Act are plain) and we have no right to extend them by construction. Upon an analogous principle, the power to appoint among children) will not authorize an appointment to grandchildren. *Rankin*v. *Hoyle,*6 Ire. Eq. Rep., 161—Sug. on Pow., ch. 9, sec. 5, page 501, (Law Lib. Ed., vol. 2, page 253.) The bill must be dismissed, with costs.

Per Curiam. Bill dismissed.
**Exhibit 31.2**

I, Fran Ross, certifythat:

1.                                       I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Qof Boston Restaurant Associates, Inc.;

2.                                       Based on my knowledge, this report doesnot contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit  to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.                                       Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations, and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;

4.                                       The registrant’s other certifyingofficers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a)                      Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosure controls and  procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating  to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)                     [omitted]

(c)                      Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this reportour conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this  report; and

d)                         Disclosed in this report any change inthe registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred duringthe registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has  materially affected or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and

5.                                       The registrant’s other certifyingofficers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing theequivalent functions):

(a)                      All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which  are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize, andreport financial information; and

(b)                     Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees  who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
| Date: December 5, 2006 | /s/ Fran Ross                       |
|------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                   | Fran Ross, Chief Financial  Officer |

 

----
```

[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 168 (Thursday, October 23, 2008)]
[Daily Digest]
[Page D1252]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

Committee Meetings
(Committees not listed did not meet)
CURRENT CREDIT MARKETS
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs: Committee concluded a 
hearing to examine turmoil in the United States credit markets, 
focusing on examining recent regulatory responses, after receiving 
testimony from Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation; Neel Kashkari, Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial 
Stability, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of 
the Treasury; Brian Montgomery, Federal Housing Commissioner, Assistant 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; James B. Lockhart III, 
Federal Housing Finance Agency; and Elizabeth A. Duke, Governor, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
```
**EXHIBIT 23.A****CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**          We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3(File Nos. 333-127797 and 333-82412) and Form S-8 (File Nos. 333-127951, 333-126599, 333-126597,333-96959, 333-26813, 333-26831, 333-26823, 033-46519, 033-49956, 033-51851, 033-57553, 033-51853,333-75781, 333-78949, 333-78951, 333-78979, 333-94717, 333-94719, 333-64240, 333-31060) of El PasoCorporation of our report dated February 28, 2006 relating to the consolidated financial statementsand financial statement schedule, management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internalcontrol over financial reporting and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reportingwhich appears in this Form 10-K./s/PricewaterhouseCoopers LLPHouston, Texas