NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 11a0049n.06 No. 09-1928 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

DENN I S DU B UC and

CA RO LDU B UC , Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts

v. TOWNSHI P OF GREEN O AK, MARK ST. C HA R L E S , M I C HA E LKR US ZEW S KI an d K IM HUNT, De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s, M IC H A E L E

. R O S A T I, De fe nd ant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AST ERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

BEF OR E: KEN NE DY , C OLE, and R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. ROGERS, Circ uit Jud ge. Plaintiffs Dennis and Carol Dubuc , propert y o wner s in the Township of Gre en Oa

k, have soug ht to make a fede ral c ase out of zoning deter minations made by the Township. The Dubuc s filed suit ag ainst defe ndants—the Township and va rious planning and zoning offic ials—alleg ing that the Dubucs were d eprived of their prope rty interests without due proce ss and t hat t hey wer e retaliated ag ainst in response to their filing suit. The district c ourt denied the Dubucs’ motion for partial summary judgme nt and g rante d defe ndants’ motion for sum m ary jud g me nt. On a

pp e a l, the Du

bu c s argue that th e y

did no t r e c e ive the re qu ir e d n oti c e and op po rt un ity to b e he ard

be fo re the y

we re de pr ive d o f a prote c te d in te re st i n th e no nc on fo rm ingus e of the irNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

- 2 - pr op e rt y , a nd that th e y we re no t r e qu ir e d to sh owa c tua l pe rm it d e nia ls i n o rd e r t o e sta bli sh that th e ir First and F ourtee nth Amendment re taliation claim was ripe for r eview. Be cause the Dubucs we re provided a dequate notice and a n oppo rt u n i t y t o be hea

rd, and be cause no final dete rmination was

ever rea ched as t o any

of the Dubuc s’ per

mit applications, the district court prope rly g rante d

summa ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f d e fe nd ants
. I. I n F e br ua ry 20 07 , th e Du

bu c s pur c ha se d tw o a djo ini ngpie c e s o f p ro pe rt y in t he To wn sh ip of Gre en Oak from the Estate of Russell B. Ar mstrong. A rmstrong appea rs t o have owned the proper ty from 1966 until his death in November 2005, at which point the property beca me a part of his estate. While Armstrong owned the pr operty , it underwe nt a number of chang es in its z oning classification, which eventua lly led to its being zoned sing le-fa mily resident i al

. Ho weve r, the Dubucs a lleg e that the p ro p erty “had be en openly

used for both indoor and outdoor commer cial

s t o ra ge, wi t h o ff

i ce s , an d m an u fa ct u ri n g wi t h re t ai l s al es as we l l as f o r a co n t ra ct o r s t o ra ge

e qu ipm e nt yard

wi th s ig na g e fo r over 40 y e ars .” Ac c or din g ly , th e Du bu c s a rgue tha t th is u se constituted a leg al, prior nonc onforming use and that they should be permitted to continue to use the pr op e rt y fo r t he se purp os e s. Shortly afte r t he Dubucs purcha sed the prope rty from Ar mstrong’ s estate, Mr. D ubuc visited Gre en Oak Township’s Bu i lding De partment in orde r to seek inf ormation about per

mits for

renovating the pr operty . Acc ording to the Dubucs, fir st L i s a Br o o k ins, a planning officia l for the Township, and then Kim Hunt, a zoni ng enfor ceme nt official f or the Township, infor

med Mr. DubucNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

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- 3 - that the prope rty

was zoned re sidential and could not be used for commerc ial purposes. B rookins alleg edly told Mr. Dubuc that he could s peak with defe ndant M ichae l Kruszewski, a building of ficial fo r t he To wn sh ip, re g ard ingthe pr opert y . T he Du bu c s c la im that late r M r. Du bu c did sp e a k w ith Kruszewski, an d that Kruszewski also stated that the pr operty could not be used f

or commer cial purp os e s. Th e Du

bu c s c on tend th at “this is the fi rs t kn ow n ti me in whic h th e To wn sh ip communicated to a

n owner of the prope rty

that the prior non -conf orming use could not be

c onti nu ed. ” On

Marc h 2 0, 20 07 , M r. Du bu c se nt K

ru sze ws ki a

le tte r a sk ingtha

t he a dd re ss h is “position conce rning [t he] non-confor ming use of this property ,” beca use, as Mr. D ubuc noted, he intended to continue the pr operty ’s nonconf orming use. With t his letter, Mr. Dubuc also sent information, which he believed s upported his position reg arding the historic nonconf orming use of the prope rty

for c ommercia l outdoor storag e. On Apr il 2, 2007, Kruszewski sent his response to Mr. D u b u c , w h i c h s t a t e d

t h a t h e h a d r e v i e w e d

t h e i n f o r m a t i o nan d

v i s i t e d t h e s i t e , an d , a c c o r d i n g l y, deter mined: “The pr operty

has historically

been use d as a c ommercia l o p eration, most recently as an indoor stora g e. Thus, this use is the leg al non-c onforming use pursua nt to our ordinance .” I nstead of dir ectly

appea ling this deter

mination, Mr. Dubuc filed a n ap p l i ca t i o n with the To wn sh ip’ s Z on ingBoard of App e a ls ( Z B A) on Se pte mbe r 5 , 2 00 7, re qu e sti nga c ha ng e in nonconfor

ming use and a va

rianc e to allow two g round sig ns. After a hea ring on October 16, 2007, the Z BAvoted to den y M r. Dubuc ’s application. Following the denial of his re quest for

rec onsideration, Mr. Dubuc sent a letter to the Township Boa

rd on January

29, 2008, asking for a specia l meeting conce rning his r equests reg ardingthe non-c onforming use of the pr operty . This wasNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

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- 4 - not g rante d. The Dubucs filed suit in feder al district court on August 29, 2009, alleg ing pr ocedur al du e pr oc e ss v iol a tio ns . N a me d d e fe nd ants we re Gr e e n O a k T ow ns hip ; Ma rk St. Cha rl e s, in h is of fi c ia l c a pa c ity a s a To wn sh ip Sup e rv iso r an d in his indi vid ua l ca pa c ity ; Mi c ha e l K

ru sze ws ki, in his of fi c ia l c a pa c ity a s B uil din g Z on ingAd

min ist rator and in h is i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity ; and Ki m H un t, in her individual ca

pacity

. Duringthis back-a

nd-for th, the Township issued the Dubucs a plumbing pe rmit and a mecha nical p e r

mi t f o r r e n o v ati o n o f th e p r o p e rty , b u t a d d e d a li mi tati o n to b o th n o ti n g th a t the nonconfor

ming use of the prope rty

was for indoor storag e only . Howeve r, af t er t h e Dubuc s filed suit, the Dubucs alleg e that Kruszewski ref used to proce ss any

more of the ir permit re quests, and that he did so in retaliation for the Dubucs’ leg al ac tion. The Dubucs state the followingactions we re take n w ithre sp e c t to the ir re qu e sts fo r p e rm its : a) Prior to the initial complaint being filed, Plaintiff Dennis Dubuc applied for , and re ceive d permits to e x tensively renovate a fire damag ed building on the prop e rty
. H o w e v e r , a f

te r th e Co mp la in t w a s f

il e d , h is Se p te mb e r

1 8 , 2 008 pe rm it t o r e bu ild

a bath a nd of fi c e on the su

bje c t pr op e rt

y wa s d e nie d, de sp ite the fa ct that t h e el ec trical a nd plumbing per

mits had alrea dy

been issued (prior to this lawsuit) for the same bath and office . Plaintiff Dennis Dubuc was told by

Def endant Kr uszewski that no further pe rmits could be issued for the subject p roperty

pursuant to the advic e of Township Attorney Michae l Rosati. Defe ndant Krusz ew s k i t old Plainti ff Dubuc that if he ha d any qu e sti on s a s t o why per

mit s c ou ld n ot b e iss ue d th a t sh e [sic ] sho uld c a ll a tto rn e y Mic ha e l Ro sati. b) On

Se pte mbe r 5 , 2 00 8 De fenda nts iss ue d a

pe rm it t o Pr e sto n E le c tr ic to provide e lectric al servic e to a small re stroom, office an d a ra diant tube heatingsy stem at the subject pr operty , in two separ ate building s. Howeve r, afte r this lawsuit was filed, Preston’s September 26, 2008 permit reque st was reje cted. Pre ston was advised by the Townshi p that they

wer e told by

the T o w n s h ip a tt o r

n e y n o t to is s u e an y f

u rth e r p e r mi ts f o r [th e p r o p e rty

a t i s s u e ].No. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

Th ou g h th e se date s in dic a te that at le a st o ne pe rm it w a s is su e d a ft e r the Du bu c s f ile d s uit , 1 the Dubucs co n t en d that any permits issued afte r the suit was filed w ere only issued beca

use the defe ndants wer e not y et awa re that the s uit had been fil ed si nce they had not y et bee n serve d. The Dubucs a lleg e that once the defe ndants beca me awa re of the filing of the suit, they stopped issuing the Du bu c s p e rm its

. Howeve r, the pa

rties later stipulated to the court’s dismissal, with pr ejudice, of Rosati from 2 the su it. - 5 - c) On August 22, 2008, Radiant Energ y Sy stems, I nc. applied f or and r ece ived mecha nical per mits from Defenda

nts to install heating sy stems on the subject proper ty . Howeve r, Radi an t ’s October 10, 2008 per mit was rejec ted. Radiant was told by

the Gre en Oak Township Building Depa rtment that the pe rm it r e qu e st w ou ld n ot b e pr oc e sse d b e c a us e of the Pla int if

f” s la ws uit

. 1 These a ctions prompted the Dubuc s to seek leave to amend their complaint to inc lude a r etaliation claim ag ainst Kruszewski pu rsuant to t he F irst and Four teenth Amendme nts and to add the Township’s leg al counsel, Michae l E

. Rosati in his individual capa city , as a na med def endant to the suit. The c ourt g rante d leave to amend on De cembe r 15, 2008. 2 On Marc h 10, 2009, the Dubucs f iled a motion for par

tial summary

judgme nt, asking the court to ente r an or der in their f avor r eg arding defe ndants’ li ability and to set the c ase f or trial on the i s s u e o f d amage s. On April 27, 2009, the def endants filed the ir own motion for judg ment on the pleading s or, i n the alternative, for summary judgme nt pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil P roce dure 56 (c ) a nd /or 12 (b )( 6) . In th is m oti on , th e de fe nd ants a lle g e d that the Du bu c s had fa ile d to e sta

bli sh

a pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss c la im be c a us e the y did no t have a pr ote c te d pr op e rt y int e re st and

be c a us e they rec eived notice and an opportunity to appea l Kruszewski’s deter mination to the ZB A and then in s ta te c ourt . M or e ov e r, the de fe nd ants argue d th a t the in di vidua l de fe nd ants , St . Ch arl e s,No. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

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- 6 - Kruszewski, and Hunt, we re entitled to qualified im munity , and that they wer e entitl ed to dismissal of the off icial-c apac ity

claims ag ainst them, beca use the Dubuc s’ amende d complaint did not refe r t o an y c u s t o m , p o l i c y, o r

p r a c t i c e o f t h e T o w n s h i p t h a t g a v e r i s e t o t h e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n . F i n a l l y, the d e fe nd ants argue d th a t th e Du bu c s f a ile d to e sta

bli sha va lid re ta liatio n c la im a g a ins t Kr us zew sk i, b e c a

us e the Du

bu c s pr e se nte d no e vid e nc e that th e y we re a c tua lly

de nie d a ny pe rm its and bec ause a

reta liation claim is not ripe for re view until a per mit is applied for

and denie d. On J une 26, 2009, the district cour t issued an order deny ing the Dubucs’ motion for pa rtial summary judgme nt and gra nting defenda

nts’ motion for summ ary

judgme nt. Dubuc v . Gree n Oak Twp. , 6 42 F. S up p. 2d

69 4 ( E. D. Mic h. 20 09 ). I n r e g ard to t he Du bu c s’ pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss claim, the di s t rict cour

t first noted that “[b] oth parties ag ree that, under Michig an law, a prior,

no n- c on fo rm ingus e is a pr ote c te d p ro pe rt

y ri g ht a nd is a c cord in gly

su bje c t to du e pr oc e ss protec tions.” Id. at 701. The court found that the rele vant date of the de termination resulting in the alleg ed depr ivation of this protected pr operty rig ht was April 2, 2007. Id. at 703. The district c ourt found that the Dubuc s had notice o f t h i s April 2, 2007 deprivation because they put toge ther information and prese nted it to Kruszewski befor e the de termination was made

. Id. Moreove r, the district court found that the D ubucs had a n opportunity

to be hea

rd re g ardingthis deprivation thr ou g h th e ir

ri g ht t o a pp e a l the zon ing de te rm inatio n to the Z B A a nd , u lti mate ly , to the state c ir c uit court. Id. at 704-05. The dist rict court explained that “[d] ue process i s not violated when Plaintiffs simply do not avail themselves of the opportunity

to have a

hear ing on the ir claim.” Id. at 705.No. 09-1928

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- 7 - Acco rd i n gl y , the district court found that the Dubucs c ould not maintain a claim for violation of pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss. I n r e g ar d t o t h e D u

b u c s ’ r e t a l i a t i o nc l a i m , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtf o c u s e d o nt h e d e f

e n d a nts ’ ripene ss argument. The district court noted t hat t his court “has found that a finality deter mination in con n ection with ‘various constitutional claims arising out of la nd disputes require s that the g overnme nt enti t y ch ar ged with implementing the r egulations must have rea ched a final dec ision reg ardingthe application of the regulations to the property at issue.’” Id. at 7 0 6 (q u o t i n g Grace Cmty. Church v. Lenox

Twp. , 544 F.3d 609, 615 ( 6th Ci r. 2008)) . Moreove r, the district cour t explained, “in order

for a reta liation claim regardi ng land use to be r ipe, there must be a final deter mination by

the ‘g overnme nt entity char g ed with implementing the regulations.’” Id. (quoting G r a c e Cm ty

. Ch u r ch , 544 F.3d at 615-16). B eca use the Dubuc s had fa iled to show any denial or fi na l de c isi on

in r e g ard to t

he ir pe rm it a pp lic a tio ns , th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d th a t th e Du

bu c s’ reta liation claim was not ripe f or re view. Id. Thus, the district c ourt g rante d the def endants’ motion for summary

judgme nt. Id. Th e Du

bu c s n owa

pp e a l. II. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt f

or de fe nd ants on

the Du bu c s’ proce dural due proce ss claim. This cou rt revie ws de novo a district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt. Ciminil lo v. Streiche r , 434 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006)

. Summary judgme nt should be g rante d “if the movant shows that there is no g enuine dispute a s to any materia l fac t and the movantNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

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The M i ch i gan S upreme Court stated in He ath Twp. v . S all , 502 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Mich. 3 1993), that a “ prior nonconf orming use is a vested rig ht in the use of a pa rticular pr operty

that does not c onform to zoning restric tions, but is pr otected beca use it law fully exis ted befor e t h e z o n i ng regulation’s eff

ective da te.” B eca use the available pr ocess in this case wa s obviously adequate, we express no opinion on whether ther e wa s a prope rty interest for

fede ral due proce ss pur

poses, and if so whether the deter

mination in this case amounted to a de privation of the inter est. Se e Hu sse in v . Ci ty of P e rry sb ur g , 6 17 F .3 d 8 28 , 8 32 (6 th C ir . 2 01 0) (h old ingthat mer ely g ivi ngno tic e that a particula r use of proper ty is ill eg al does not amount to a de privation of a pr operty interest). - 8 - is e nti tle d to jud g ment as a mat ter of la w. ” F e d. R. C iv. Pr o. 56 (a ). Th e Du bu c s p ur su e d th e ir proce dural due proce ss claim throug h a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of ac tion. To e sta bli sh a pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss c la im p ur su ant t o § 19 83 , p la int if fs mus t establish three elements: (1) that they have a l ife, li berty or property interest prote cted by the Due Proc ess C l ause of the Four teenth Amendme nt to the United States Constit ution, (2) that they wer e depr ived of this prote cted interest within the meaning of the Du e Pr oc e ss C la

us e , a nd (3) th at the s tate did no t a ff or d th e m a de qu a te pr oc e dura l r ig hts pr ior

to d e pr ivi ngthe m of

the ir pr ote c te d in te re st. Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716 ( 6th Cir. 1999). Even if we assume that the Dubuc s were deprive d of a pr otected pr o p er t y i n t erest in the

no nc on fo rm ingus e of

the ir pr op e rt y , summa

ry jud g me nt w a s stil l a

pp ro pr iate a s th e Du

bu c s’ 3

rec eived ample proce ss. “Ge nera lly , the proc ess that is due bef ore a proper ty deprivation includes prior noti ce and an opportunity for a prede privation hea ring .” W arre n v . City

of A the ns , O hio , 411 F. 3 d 6 9 7 , 7 0 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Harris v. City of Akron , 20 F.3d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Dubuc s cannot c laim that they did not have prior notice of this a lleg ed deprivation, a s they have admitted that Mr. Dubuc submitted letters with inf ormation reg arding the nonconf orming use of the proper ty to Kruszewski on Marc h 20, 2007 and Mar ch 23, 2007. This shows that Mr. Dubuc hadNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

I n their re ply b ri ef

, the Dubucs insist that the deter mination reg ardingthe prior 4 nonconfor

ming use of their pr operty was made prior to Mr. Dubuc ’s re q u esting an off icial deter mination from Kruszewski, which sug g ests that they d i d not rec eive the a ppropriate notice. Howeve r, in Sin c lai r v . Ci ty of E c or se , this court reje cted a

simil ar a rg ument by

stating, [ T h e plaintiff] arg ues her e that he should have bee n g iven notice that the no nc on fo rm ingus e ha d la ps e d at th e tim e the la

ps e oc c ur re d. Ho wever, . . . th is lapse occurr ed mont hs or y ear s befor e Sinclair boug ht the proper ty . There fore , it was not only impractica

ble but (since the City is not possessed as far a s we a re a war e of a cr y stal ball) impossible to give Sinclair notice at that time. 366 F. App’ x 579, 583 (6th Cir. 2010). The steps t a k e nb y

th e T o w n s h ip in

th is c a s e f

a ll in li n e w it h th e n o r ma l p r o c e s s e s when 5 making zoning deter

minations. This court noted as much in Sin c lai r , when we explained, The administrative setup we see in this case is ty pical. An officia l, usu al l y known as the “building i nspector” or “z oning official,” makes a preliminary

deter mination wh e n a part icu lar pie c e of pr op e rt y is s ou g ht t o b e de ve lop e d o r i mpr ov e d. Th is de te rm inatio n in c lud e s w he the r t he pr op e rt

y c on fo rm s to the zon ing or din anc e or , if not, whether

there i s a v i able nonc onforming use. F ollowing this preliminary de te rm inatio n, th e land ow ne r m ay a pp e a l a de c isi on

that th e pr op e rt

y is - 9 - actua l notice of the impendingdeter mination. I n fac t, Mr. Dubuc e s s entially initiated the alleg ed deprivation by

reque sting that a

n officia l determination be ma de. 4 I n reg ard to a

prede privation hea

ring , we have explained, The pre d ep ri v ation proce ss need not alwa y s be ela borate , howeve r; the amount of proce ss require d depends, in pa rt, on the importance of the intere sts at s t ak e. . . . Mo re ov e r, the su ff

ic ie nc y of pred e pr ivatio n p ro c e dure s mu st b e c on sid e re d in conjunction with the options for postdeprivation re view; if ela borate proce dures f

or postdeprivation re view ar e in place , less elabor ate pr edepr ivation pro ce s s may be require d. I n some case s, postdeprivation review m ay possibly be sufficient, and no prede privation proce ss is required. Leary v. D a eschner , 228 F.3d 729, 742- 43 (citations omitted). The Dubuc s were g iven an opportunity

to be hea rd on a numbe r of occ asions. Prior to Kruszewski’s deter mination, the Dubucs 5No. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

nonconfor

mi n g t o t h e ZoningBoa rd of Appe als by

seekinga var iance

— i.e. , a “license to use the prope rty in a way not permitted under an ordinanc e,”—on g rounds su c h a s h ard sh ip o r b a se d o n th e unus ua l f e a tur e s o f t

he pr op e rt

y . In a dd iti on

to seekinga var iance , howeve r, the landow ner ma y also contest the desig nation that the proper ty was prope rly

classified a s nonconfor

ming in the f

irst place. 366 F. App’ x at 583. Specifica lly , the Township’s ordinances permit “an appea l [t o] be taken to the Z BAby any 6 person . . . a ffe cted by

a dec ision of any

body char g ed with enf

orce ment o f this chapter

or of a n administrative offic ial of t he department of building and zoning concerning the administering and e nf or c ingof the pr ov isi on s o f thi s c ha pte r. ” Gr e e n Oa

k Cha rt e r To wn sh ip, Mic h. , Co de c h. 38 , a rt
. I I , div. 3, § 38-94(a) (1998). The app ea l m u s t b e taken within thirty day s of the dec ision being appea led. Id. Moreove r, the appea l “ shall stay all proce eding s in f urthera nce of the a ction appea led from, unless the building administrator ce rtifies to the Z BA. . . that . . . a st ay would, in his opini on, cause imminent peril to li fe or proper ty .” Id. at § 38-94(b) . I n addition, state law provide s that “[a] party ag g rieve d by

the dec ision [ of the Z BA ] m ay appea l to the circuit court for the county in which the prope rty

is located.” Mich. Comp. L aws § 125.3605. Th ou g h th e Du

bu c s d id s e e k a va

ri anc e on the pr op e rt

y —to c ha ng e the no nc on fo rm ingus e 7 to “ c omm e rc ia l of

fi c e and c on tr a c tor

e qu ipm e nt a

nd mate ri a l st or a g e y ard ” on Parc e l N o. 1 an d to
“ c omm e rc ia l RV sale s, se rv ic e , re pa ir and RV sto ra g e ” on Parc e l No. 2— and re c e ive d a he ari ngin re la tio n to thi s r e qu e st, the y ne ve r d ir e c tly

a pp e a le d th e no nc on fo rm ing -u se de te rm inatio n it se lf to the Z BA

. - 10 - wer e able to submit information in suppor t of their position re g arding the non-c onforming use of the proper ty . I n fac t, the Dubucs e ven admit that Kruszewski re quested a dditional inf o r ma ti o n reg arding the intend ed u s e o f t h e prope rty and that the Dubuc s were g iven an oppor tunity to submit further explanations in t his r eg ard. After Kruszewski’s deter mination, the Dubucs had the ability to appea l his de c isi on

to t he Z B A a nd the n to the state c ir c uit c ourt , bu t the y did no t take a dv anta g e of the se 6 op po rt un iti e s. 7 The proce ss pr ovided to the Dubucs did not violate the due pr ocess c lause. In Mathews v. Eldridge , the Supreme Court laid out three fac tors to be consider ed whe n deter mining whe ther theNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

The Dubuc s challenge an y relianc e on these appellate proce dures be cause “a 8 po st- de pr ivatio n a

pp e a l to an a dmi nis tr a tiv e bo dy su c h a s th e Z B A d oe s n ot a llo w a n a g g ri e ve d p art

y the opportunity

to assert c onstitut ional questions.” See Houdini Props., LLC v. City of Romulus , 743 N.W.2d 198 (Mich. 2008). This argu m en t i s incohere nt. The statement a ssumes that what the Dubucs would be raising befor e the Z BAare their proc edura l due proc ess ar g uments. I nstead, the Z BAwould hear

the merits of the D ubucs’ zoning dispute, that is whet h er t h e alleg ed prior - 11 - pr oc e ss p ro vid e d w a s a de qu a te : ( 1) “ the pr ivate int e re st that w ill be a ff e c te d b y the of fi c ia l a c tio n;” (2) “ the risk of a

n err oneous depr ivation of such intere st through the proce dures use d, and the probable value, if any , of additi onal or subst itute proce dural saf eguards;” a

nd (3) “ the Gover

nment’s interest, including the func tion involved and the fiscal and administrative burde ns that the additional or substitute procedur al re quirement would e ntail.” 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). I n this c a se , the Du

bu c s ass e rt an inte re st in av oid ing los t busi ne ss be c a us e of the ina

bil ity to o ff e r o utd oo r s tor a g e , a lle g ing that the pr op e rt y wi ll suf fe r a twe nty -f

ive -p e rc e nt r e du c tio n in

its marke t value without this non-conforminguse. Howe ver, the Township’s intere st in ensuring that the prope rty

is used for t h e p ro per pur pose is also important, as the Township must protec t the interests of the T ownship’s citizens. The final fa ctor is the most s i gn i fi ca n t i n t his case, a s the Du bu c s h a ve fai led to demo ns tr a te why the pr oc e dure s p ro vid e d d o n ot a de qu a te ly pr ote c t th e ir int e re sts , o r, in o the r w or ds , th e y have no t sh ow n that th e y su ff e r a g re a t r isk of be inge rr on e ou sly deprive d of their pr operty interest or that some other subst itute proce dure would be more valuable. I n f a c t, be c a us e the Du

bu c s did no t e ve n ta

ke a dv anta g e of

a ll o f t he pr oc e dure s ava ila

ble to t he m, it would be difficult for the m to arg ue the inade quacy of t he procedure s. I f the Dubuc s had as much convincing evidenc e reg arding the property ’s prior use as they claim they

did, a direc t appea l to the Z BA could have relieve d them of Kruszewski’s adver se deter mination. Moreove r, the Township’s

8No. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

nonconfor

ming use of out door st orag e is still in eff ect. Acc ording ly , this arg ument is circular and does not support the Dubuc s’ proc edura l claims. - 12 - ordinanc e provides fo r a s t ay of any actions in furthe ranc e of the deter mination being a

ppeale d, wh ic h w ou ld h a ve a llo we d th e Du bu c s to c on tin

ue the a lle g e d ou tdo or sto ra g e no n- c on fo rm ingus e of the proper ty

un til the Z B A m a de a

fi na l de te rm inatio n. Ho we ve r, the Du bu c s d id n ot a

va il themselves of these opportuni ties, and they should not be able to now use the ir inaction ag ainst the defe ndants in claiming a violation of due process. Se e Sa nta na v . Ci ty of T uls a , 359 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2004) (“ A par

ty cannot c reate a due proce ss claim by ignor ing e stablished proce dures.” ). I n Sin c lai r v . Ci ty

of E c or se , this court upheld similar proce sses. 366 F. App’x 579 (6th Cir. 2010). The pla intiff in Sin c lai r su e d th e c ity

and so me of its off ic ia ls f or re fu sin g to g ra

nt h im a

cer tificate of occupa

ncy , based on the lapse of a nonconf

orming use, for

a house he purcha sed fr om the county

in a tax sale. Id. at 581-82. The plaintiff’s sole a rg um ent on appe al was that the defe ndants violated his due proc ess rights “by not providing him a hear ing pr ior to terminating the proper ty ’s nonconf

orming use.” Id. a t 58 2. We n ote d th a t “ ‘whe re a pr e -d e pr ivatio n h e ari ngis impractica

ble or quick action is nece ssary , a post-depr ivation hear ing ma y be ade quate.’ ” Id. at 583 (q u o t i n g Ma tor

v . Ci ty of E c or se , 30 1 F

. Ap p’ x 4 76 , 47 9 (6 th Cir

. 20 08 ))

. Ac c or din g ly , “ we h[e ]ld that [t he plaintiff’ s] appeal to the [ZB A], the hear i n g h el d there in, and the judicial re view that followed a ffor ded him complete pr ocedur al due pr ocess.” Id. Th ou g h th e Du bucs did n ot a

va il themselves of the appellate proce sses like the plaintiff in Sin c lai r , t h at case shows that the po std e pr ivatio n r e vie w prov id ed, whic h is muc h li ke that w hic h w a s ava ila ble to t he Du bu c s,No. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

- 13 - satis fi e s d ue pr oc e ss. Ac c or din g ly , the Du bu c s have no t sh ow n th a t th e y did no t r e c e ive a de qu a te du e pr oc e ss. III . B e c a us e the pe rm it a

pp lic a tio ns fi le d by the Du bu c s we re ne ve r de nie d, the Dubuc s’ constitutional re taliation c laim a g ainst Kruszewski is not ripe for revie w. Be fore the district court

e ve n r e a c he s th e me ri ts o f t he Du bu c s’ re ta liatio n c la im, it is pe rm itt e d to dis mis s that c la im if it i s

no t r ipe fo r r e vie w. “ Rip e ne ss i s o ne of se ve ra l pr inc iple s o f j us tic ia bil ity pr e dic a te d o n b oth ‘Article I I Ilimit ations’ and ‘ prudential re asons for r efusing t o ex er ci s e jurisdi ction,’” a nd “[t] he doctrine is ‘de signe d to preve nt the courts, t h ro u gh premature a djudication, from enta ng ling themselves in abstra ct disag ree ments.’” Insomnia Inc . v. City of Memphis, Tenn. , 278 F. App’ x 609, 6 1 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Ky. Press Ass’n v . Kentucky , 45 4 F .3 d 50 5, 50 9 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ). Th is court ha s noted three fac tors to consider in dete rmining i f a cla im is ripe: “‘(1) the likelihood that the ha rm a lle g e d b y

[the ] pla int if

fs wi ll e ve r c ome to p a ss; (2 ) wh eth er the f a c tua l r e c or d is sufficie ntly

develope d to produce a fa ir adjudication of the m erits . . . ; and (3) the har dship to the parties if judicia l relief is de nied at [this] stag e in the proc eeding s.’” Id. (first and third alterations i n o ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g W

arshak v. United States , 4 90 F .3 d 4 55 , 4 67 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) ). Th e Sup re me Court br oa de ne d th is r ipe ne ss i nq uir y in c a se s a ll eging a tak ing of a pr op e rt y int e re st b y

fi rs t requiringthat the g overnme nt entity have r eac hed a f

inal decision re g ardingthe intere st at issue. Id. (citing W ill iam so n Cnt

y . Re g’ l Plan nin g Com m’n v . Ha mi lto n B an k of J oh ns on City , 473 U.S. 172, 1 8 6 (1 9 8 5 ))

. M o re o v er , we ex t en d edt h i s fi n al i t y re qu i re m en t“b ey o n d

cl ai m s o f r egu l at o ry

t ak i n gsNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

We have e x plained the f

ollowing f

our policy considerations that “under l[ ie] the e x tension 9 of the W illiamson County finality

require ment to constituti onal claims arising in la nd disputes:” 1) development of

a full re cord; 2) de monstration of prec isely how a re gu lation will be applied to a particula r piece of proper

ty ; 3) providing the relief the proper ty owner seeks w i t h o u t j udicial entang lement in constitutional disput es, so that disp u t es ca n be dec ided on non-c onstitut ional g rounds whene ver possible; and 4) appre ciating that land-use disputes a re unique ly matters of local conce rn m ore aptly

suited for loca l resolution. Insomnia Inc

. , 2 7 8 F. Ap p ’x at 6 1 3 (q u o t i n g Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n , 40 2 F .3 d 3 42 , 3 48 (2 d Ci r. 20 05 )) . N ota bly , “ the on ly

ty pe of c a se in which we ha

ve not imposed the finality require ment on constitutional claims arising out of land use disputes is that which pre sents a purpor ted violation of proce dural due proce ss.” Id. at 614. Th is p ro vis ion

state s: 10 The e nforc ing a g ency

shall examine an application for a building permit. I f the a pp lic a tio n c on fo rm s to thi s a c t, t he c od e and the re qu ir e me nts of oth e r a pp lic a ble laws and or dinance s, the enfor cing ag ency shall approve the application and issue a bu ild ingpe rm it t o th e a

pp lic ant. An a

pp lic a tio n sh a ll b e g ra

nte d, in who le or

in p art , or denie d within 10 business day s, except that in case o f an unusua lly complicated building or struc ture, ac t i o n shall be take n within 15 business day s. Failure by an e nfo rc ing age nc yto g ra nt, in w ho le or

in p ar t, o r d

e ny an ap pli c ati on with in t

he se periods of time shall be deem ed a denial o f t h e application for purpos es of au tho riz ing

theins tit uti on of a n a

pp e al to th e ap

pr op ria te bo ar

d o f ap pe als

. - 14 - to various other constitutional c laims a rising out of land use disputes,” includingFirst Amendme nt

re ta liatio n c la ims

. Id. at 613, 615-16. Ac cording ly , the di s t ri ct cour t was wa rra nted in requiring 9

a fi na l de c isi on

on the Du bu c s’ pe rm it a

pp lic a tio ns be fo re e nte rt a ini ngthe ir re ta liatio n c la im. The Dubuc s have f

ailed to alleg e any

fac ts to support a finding that their per mit applications

we re e ve r a c tua lly

de nie d. I n f

a c t, Mr

. Du

bu c e ve n a dmi tte d in his de po sit ion that on e of the pe rm its

a t is su e wa s n e ve r d e nie d, and the Du bu c s n ote in the ir br ie f to thi s c ourt that th e e le c tr ic a l pe rm it in dispute was eventually issued and that two other permit applications we re simply never proce ssed. Howeve r, on appe al, the Dubuc s have a sserted for the first time that their per mit applications were constructively

denied pur suant to Mic h. Comp. L aw § 125.1511( 1). Even if this court a cce pts that 10No. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

(Emphasis adde d.) - 15 - this provision caused the c onstructi v e d en i al of the Dubuc s’ per mit applications, that does not

nece ssarily satisfy the finality require ment. I nstead, Grac e Com mu nit yChu rc h v . Le no

xTown sh ip , demonstrates that the permit applications’ denial would not be fina l until ruled up o n by the Z BA

. 544 F.3d 609, 613- 18 (6th Cir. 2008)

. Pursuing this abilit y to appea l would allow the administrative

rec ord to be further develope d, so that the issue might be r esolved a t the administrative level a nd the

un de rl yingre ta liatio n c la im d e e me d unn e c e ssa ry . “ ‘We do no t w ant t o e nc oura g e lit ig a tio n th a t is likely to be solved by further administrative action and we do not w ant to put barr iers to litigation in f ro nt o f l iti g ants wh e n it

is o bv iou s th e pr oc e ss do wn the a dmi nis tr a tiv e ro a d w ou ld b e a wa ste of time and money .’” Id. at 6 1 6 -1 7 (q u o t i n g Bi ge lowv . M

ic h. De p’ t ofNatural R es. , 970 F.2d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 1992)). In the Dubucs’ case , howeve r, it is not appar ent that their issues could not be resolved w ith further a dminist rative a ction, espec ially consideringthe Dubucs’ conce ss i o n that at le a st o ne of

the pe rm its wa s e ve ntu a lly iss ue d and that c omm un ic a tio ns we re re c e ive d in re g ard toNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

I n r e g ard to t he status of

the ir pe rm it a pp lic a tio ns the Du

bu c s st a te d a s f

oll ow s: 11 Var ious permit applications wer e n o t proce ssed for 3 months without any further e xplanatio n a s to why

the y we re no t pr oc e sse d o the r t ha n D e fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s’ pr e f e r e n c e t h a t t h e a

p p l i c a t i o n s g o t o t h e t o w n s h i p a t t o r n e y s . R

. 7 9 , R e s p o n s e to Motion for Attorney

Fe es, Exhibi t A, aff

idavit of Steve Preston of Pre ston Electric, statin g that G re e n O a k T ow ns hip pe rs onne l inf or me d him that the y

we re tol d n ot t o issue permits for Plaintiffs’ pr operty . See also id. , Ex hibit B, aff idavit where in Mr. Preston also states that af ter a pply ing f or an e lectric al permit in September of 2008 that he did not hear

back f rom the township until J anuar y , 2009 (3 months later) whe n he wa s c a lle d a

nd tol d th a t th e pe rm it w a s r e a dy . App are ntl y so me tim e in J anuar y 2009 the Appellee s rea liz ed that their r efusa l to process pe rmit applications was in violation of due proce ss. Also see id. , Ex hibit C, affidavit of David Kue hnl (R a dia nt E ne rg y ), wh e re in h e state s th a t on Janu ary 14 , 2 00 9 h e c a lle d th e towns hip about a pe rmit appli cation that wa s filed with the Township B uilding De pt., three months earlier , on October 10, 2008 and that they

told hi m h e m u s t fi ll out a new application bec ause his orig inal could not be found. There is also a third permit application that was not proce s s ed. Af ter thre e mon ths of

no t be ingpr oc e sse d, the To wn sh ip se nt out the ir fi rs t re sp on se . I t wa s a le tte r s tatin g that th e y

ha d r e c e ive d th e a

pp lic a tio n an d that it wa s def ic ie nt a nd c ou ld not be proc essed. That permit has neve r bee n issued. - 16 - the ot h e r tw o a p p li c a ti o n s . T h u s , th e D u b u c s ’ p e r mi t a p p li c a ti o n s h a v e n o t ye t r e a c h e d a f in al 11 deter mination, and their re taliation claim is not ripe for r eview. IV. Duri ng the pe nd e nc y of thi s a pp e a l, o ne of

the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants , M ic ha e l K ru sze ws ki, died, prompting the defe ndants to f ile a sug g estion of death with the district c ourt on April 19, 2010. Be cause Kruszewski is the onl y party to the defendants’ retaliation claim, this court re quested that the pa rt ie s su bmi t le tte r br ie fs a dd

re ssi ng wh e the r that cla im sho uld be dis mis se d. Th e de fe nd ants ’ letter brie f alleg ed that bec ause the Dubucs fa iled to file a motion for substitution or any motion for extension of time w ithin ninety day s of the servic e of the sug g estion of death, the Dubucs’ r etaliationNo. 09-1928

Du bu c e t al . v . To wns hip of G re e n O ak e t al

.

I n addition, beca

use the district cour

t was cor rec t in gr anting summary j u d gm en t fo r the 12 defe ndants on the Dubuc s’ proc edura l due proc ess and retaliation claims, we ne ed not addr ess the i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d an t s ’ ar g u m e n tt h a tt h e y ar e e n t i t l e d t o qu a l i f i e d i m m u n i t y. - 17 - c la im s ho uld

be dis mis se d p ur su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Pr oc e dure 25 (a )( 1) and F e de ra l Ru le of Appe llate Proce dure 43( a). Ho we v er , the Dubucs c laimed that they wer e not late in see king substitut ion beca

use the de fenda

n t s failed to ser

ve their sug g estion on or indicate who was Kr us zew sk i’ s r e pr e se ntativ e , a nd be c a us e Ap pe llate R ul e 43 do e s n ot c on ta in t he same tim e constraints as Civil Rule 25. I n the alternative, the Dubucs argued that even if they wer e late, the y should be allowed to substitute Kruszewski’s re prese ntative to the suit pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civ i l P r o c e d

u r e 6 ( b ) an d

b e c a u s e t h e i r f a i l u r e t o t i m e l y

s e e k s u b s t i tu t i o nc o n s t i tu t e s e xcu sable neg lect. The Dubucs then f iled a motion for substitution wit h this court o n No v em b er 29, 2010, seekingto substit ute Denise Kruszewski for de fenda nt Michael Kr

uszewski. Be cause we hold that the Dubuc s’ re taliation claim i s not ripe for revie w, t he Dubuc s’ motion fo r s ub sti tut ion

fi le d w iththi s c ourt

on No ve mbe r 2 9, 20 10 is m oo t. 12 V. For these re asons, we A FF I RM the district court’s g rant of summar y j u d gm en t on the Du bu c s’ pr oc e dura l du e pr oc e ss a nd re ta liatio n c la ims

.