### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A U G U ST 24, 200 5 S es sio n
ANNIE B. COCH RAN v. ROBI NHOO D LANE BAPTI ST CHURCH, ET AL 

### .

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. 108014-2 Ar nold B. Goldin, Ch ancellor

No. W2004-01866-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 27, 2005

I n th is a pp e a l, w e are a sk e d b y the app e lla nt to de te rm ine wh e the r the c ha nc e ry c ou rt e rr e d w he n it g rante d summary

judgme nt to the appellee s, finding that there was no consideration to support the Pastor’s Spouse Be nefits ag ree ment betwee n the parties and that the theory of promissory estoppel is inapplicable in this case . On appe al, the appe llant asserts that her prese nce a s first lady

of the ch u r c h , h e r l o s s o f b en ef i t s p re v i o u s l y

re ce i v ed fr o mt h e C h u rc h , an d/ o r t h e r es tra i n to f m arri age p ro v i s i o n i n the ag ree ment constituted leg ally adequate consider ation for the A g ree ment. I n the alternative, the appellant asserts that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable in this case. We a ff ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined. Reg inald L . Eskridg e, Janelle R.Eskridg e, Memphis, TN, for Appellant

Her schel L . Rosenberg , Memphis, TN, for A ppellees
OP IN ION

I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
On S eptember 18, 1981, Revere nd Eug ene Cochran (“Rever end C ochran”) be g an his tenure as P a s to r o f Ro b in h o o d L a n e B ap ti s t C h u r c h ( th e “ Ch u r c h ” )

. T h e r e a f te r , Re v e r e n d Coc hran maintained the position of hea d pastor at the Churc h until his death on August 20, 1995. I n return fo r h is se rv ic e s, the Chu rc h pa id Re ve re nd Coc hr a n a sa lary a s we ll a s pr ov idi ng him wi th c e rt a in
a dd iti on a l be ne fi ts su c h a s c e ll ph on e se rv ic e s, be e pe r se rv ic e s, la wn se rv ic e s, a ndg a s a ndve hic le maintenanc e services. At Reve rend Cochr an’s r equest, the Churc h al s o acc orded the majority ofT h e A greem ent a l s o pr ov i ded t h at t h e Chu r ch w ou l d di s con t i n u e t h e l aw n s er v i ce s i f W i fe s ol d, mov ed, or 1 le a se d he r re sid e n c e in a d d iti o n to the o the r tw o ter m ina ting e v e n ts.
-2- these be nefits direc tly

to Revere nd Cochran’ s wife, Mrs. Annie C ochran (“Wife” or “A ppellant”)

. Be fore his death, Rever end Cochran spoke to sever al dea cons of the Church re questing that the Chu rc h p ro vid e fo r Wi fe if the Chu rc h w a s abl e . On Se pte mbe r 3 , 1 99 5, the Chu rc h e nte re d in to an ag ree ment (the “ Ag ree ment”) w ith W ife whe rein the Church ag ree d to provide Wife with $783.56 on the first and third Sunday every month until September 5, 2010 and would provide lawn ser vices for Wife’s r esidenc e. Pursuant to the ag ree ment, Wife would rec eive these benef its unti l one of two te rm inatin g e ve nts oc c ur

re d: ( 1) he r d e a th; or (2 ) sh e re marrie d. Ho we ve r, if sh e re marrie d w ith in 1 five y ear s of the ince ption of the contra ct, Wife would conti n u e t o re ceive these be nefits for f ive y ear s total. I f Wife remarrie d afte r five y ear s, she would no l ong er r ece ive any benef its. Moreover, the ag ree ment terminated a ll benefits that Wife previouslyrec eived f rom the Church unde r the Church’s or al ag ree ment with Revere nd Cochran f or his service s as pastor.

I n March 1 9 9 6 , the Church discontinued making pay ments to W ife. On A ug ust 9, 1996, Wife fi le d s uit

a g a ins t th e Chu rc h a s w e ll a s K e ir on C. C oc hr a n, Ke nn e th M a lla ry , Cl oy d Sc a le s, Floy d Scales, Frank Tug g le, S r. , T o m m y L . Walker, Sr., Donald Williams, S r., and D avid Ricks (collec tively , the “Churc h Boa rd of Of fice rs, Dea cons, and Tr

ustees” and collectiv el y wi t h the Church, the “ Def

endants” or “A ppellees” ) see king injunctive r elief and/ o r d am ages for bre ach of contra ct and de clar atory

judgme nt. On October 9, 1996, Wife amende d her complaint to include the theory of promissory

estoppel as a

justification for upholding the contra ct.
On Novembe r 15, 2000, the Churc h Boa rd o f Of fi cers, Dea cons, and Tr

ustees, with the exception of Keiron C. Cochr an, filed a m o t i o n t o d ismiss them as def endants. On F ebrua

ry 27, 2001, the Def

endants filed a

motion for summary

judgme nt. On J une 24, 2004, the cha ncery court g rante d th e mot ionfo r s umm ary jud g me nt a s to the Chu rc h. Th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt didno t e nte rt a in the m otion to dismiss beca use t he mot ion was render ed moot by the chancery court’s earlier order

. On May 17, 2005, the cha ncery

court amended its order

to g rant the motion for summary judgme nt as to all of the De fendants.
II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED

Appellant has timely

filed a notice of appe al and pr esents the f ollowing issues for

revie w:
1. Whether t he chance ry

court e rre d when it g rante d summary judge ment finding that the contra ct betwee n Mrs. Cochra n and the Churc h was not supported by leg ally adequate consider ation; and 2. Whether the c hance ry co u rt er red w hen it g rante d summary judgme nt finding the doctrine of promissory

estoppel wa s inapplicable.

F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e de c isi on of

the c ha nc e ry

c ou rt

.-3- III
. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
A court may

g rant su m m ar y j u dg ment when a moving pa

rty establishes “that there is no g enuine issue a s to any

materia l fac t and that a judgme nt may be rende red as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ

. P. 56 .0 4 (2 00 5)

. “ On a mot ion fo r su mma ry jud g me nt, the c ou rt mus t t ake t he s tr on g e st le g iti ma te vie w of the e vid e nc e in fa vo r of the no nmo vin g pa rty , a llo w a ll r e a so na

ble inf e re nc e s in favor of that party , and disca

rd all countervailing evidenc e.” Cal ab ro v . Ca lab ro , 15 S.W .3d 873, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) ( citi n g Ba in v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997) ). “Since our inquiry involves purely

a question of law, no pr esumption of corr ectne ss attache s to the trial court’s jud g me nt, a ndou r t a sk

is co nf ine d to re vie wi ng the re c or d to de te rm ine wh e the r the re qu ir e me nts of Tenn. R. Ci v. P. 56 have bee n met.” C a r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995) (citing Cowden v. Sovran Bank

/Cent. S. , 816 S.W .2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991) ).

IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. Con sideration On appe al, Appellant c o n t en d s t h at summary judgme nt inappropriate in this case. Our analy sis in revie wing a g rant of a motion for summary judgme nt beg ins with determining w hether there are any disputes of materia l fac ts in thi s case
. Mc Ge e v . Be st , 1 06 S.W. 3d48 , 5 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 2000) (c iting Te nn. R. Civ. P . 56). I f there are any disputes as to any

g enuine issues of material fac ts, then s u m mary

judgme nt is inappropriate. By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208, 211 (Tenn. 1993) (c i t i n g P o o re v. M

agnavox Co. , 666 S.W .2d 48, 49 (Tenn. 1984) ). I n this case, the pa rties do not dispute any

materia l fac tual issues. As a re sult, our analy sis turns to whether Appe llees ar e entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.

“Where the proof is undisputed and w hereno conflicting infere nces may be drawn , the question of whethe r an act o r fo rbearanc e constitutes consider ation for a contra ct is a question of law.” Bratton v. Bratton , 1 3 6 S

. W

. 3 d 5 9 5 , 6 0 1 (T en n
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( ci t i n g Applewhite v. Allen , 27 Tenn. (8 Hu m.) 69 7, 70 0 ( Te nn . 1 84 8) ; Es tate of H or de sk i v . F irs t F

e d. Sa v. & Loa n A ss’ n o

f R us se ll County, Ala. , 8 27 S.W. 2d 30 2, 30 4 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 91 ))

. Th us , su mma ry jud g me nt is a

pp ro pria te if the consider ation supporting the Ag ree ment is inadequate as a matter of law

. “All contra cts in writing signe d by the party to be bound, or the pa rty ' s authorized ag ent and attorney , are p ri m a fac ie evidenc e of a consideration.” T.C.A. § 47-50-103 ( 2005). I n such ca se, “[t] he burde n of over coming the presumption of consideration in a validly executed contr act is upon the party asserting lac k of consideration.” Long ex rel. Gene L angley Ford, Inc. v. Langley , No. W2001-01490-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 2865, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002) (c i t i n g Atkins v. K i rkp atrick , 823 S.W .2d 547, 552 (Tenn. A pp. 1991)). “ For there to be a
c on sid e ratio n ina

c on tr a c t be tw e e n p art ie s to the c on tr a c t it is not ne c e ssa ry that some thi ng c on c re te and tang ible move from one to the other. Any benef it to one an d d et ri m en t t o the other may be a sufficie nt consideration.” Wa lke r v . Fi rst Sta te Bank , 849 S.W .2d 337, 342 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (c i t i n g Palmer v. D ehn , 198 S.W . 827, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1946))

.-4-

On appe al, Appellant contends that (1) Appellant’s pr esenc e at the Churc h as first lady of the Church; (2) A ppellant’s loss of bene fits previously rec eived from the Church; and/or (3) Appe llant’s restraint of marria g e pursua nt to the Ag ree ment constituted l egally adequate consider ation for the Ag ree ment. We disag ree
. First, Appe llant contends t h at t h e b en efit of he r pre sence at the Church a s first lady of the Church was adequate consider ation to support a contra ct. Howe ver, now here in the limit ed re cord
on app e a l de mon str a te s th a t Ap pe lle e s be ne fi tte d fr om h e r p re se nc e a t th e Chu rc h. Ap pe lla nt d id not ta ke on any additional responsibilities with the Church nor promise to c ontinue h er ac tiviti es with the Church. I f Appe llant chose to no long er attend the Church a s a member , she would still be elig ible for the benef

its confe rre d to her pursuant to the t erms of the Ag ree ment. Acc ording ly , her
mere prese nce at the Church does not c onstitut e conside ration. Second, Appe llant asserts that her loss of ben efits previouslyrec eived f rom the Church constituted leg ally

adequate considerat i o n. I n order for this loss to constitut e conside ration, Ap pe lla nt mus t hav e ha d a v e ste d rig ht t o th e se be ne fi ts at th e tim e of e xec uti on of

the Ag re e me nt. The be nefits Appellant a sserts that she g ave up a s consideration for the Ag ree ment wer e provide d
as a r esult of Rever end Cochran’s em p l o y m en t contrac t with the Church (the “ Employ ment Contract”) . For Appellant to have a vested rig ht to the benefits confe rre d to her, she must have bee n a n in te nd e d b e ne fi c iary

of the Emplo y me nt C on tr a c t.

To establish that she is an intended benef iciary of the employ ment ag ree ment b etwee n Revere nd Cochran and the Church, Appe llant “must establish (1) a v al i d contra ct made upon sufficie n t co n sideration betwe en the principal parties and (2) the clea r intent to have the contra ct operate for [her] bene fit .

. . .” FirstTenn. Ban k Nat’l Ass’n v. Thorou ghbred Motor Car s, Inc. , 9 3 2 S

. W

. 2 d 9 2 8 , 9 3 0 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g United Am. Bank of Memphis v. Gardner , 706 S.W. 2d63 9, 64 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 5) ). I n ord e r to e sta bli sh a n in te nt t o b e ne fi t, A pp e lla nt mus t s h o w “ a n e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e c o n tr a c tt h a tt h e c o n tr a c t i n g p ar t i e s i n t e n d e d t o b e n e f i tt h e t h i r d p ar t y .

. . or pr oo f that th e pr omi so r’ s perfo rm a nc e wo uldoth e rw ise dis c ha rg e a du ty ow e d to a

thi rdpa rt y benef iciary by the promise . . . .” Id. (c i t i n g Moore Constr. Co. v. C l a rks ville Dep’ t of Elec. , 707 S.W .2d 1, 9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ( citing Re statement (Sec ond) of Contrac ts § 302 (1979)))

. I t is undisput ed that the E m p l o y m en t C ontrac t was valid. As an or al modification of the Emplo y me nt C on tr a c t, R e ve re ndCoc hr a n a ndthe Chu rc h a greed to pr ov ide Ap pe lla nt c e rt a in amenities, such a s cell phone se rvice s, beepe r se rv i ce s, and g as and c ar ma intenance service s for Appellant’s automobile. This modification shows that Revere nd Cochran and the Church intende d to d ir e c tl y

c o n f e r b e n e f it s to A p p e ll a n t p u r s u a n t t o th e E mp lo y me n t C o n tr a c t. T h u s , if A ppellant sti ll ma int a ine d he r ri g hts to the se be ne fi ts a t the tim e of the e xec uti on of the Ag re e me nt, thi s lo ss would constitute consideration for the Ag ree ment.
“A c ontrac t f

or persona l se rvice is te rminated by the death, insanity , sickness, or pe rmane nt dis abil ity of a se rv a nt, wh e re by he is una ble to pe rf

orm his co ntr a c t, unl e ss the pa rt ie s c on tr a c te d to the contra ry .” Am

. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Jackson , 12 Tenn. App. 305, 308- 09 (1930) ( citations omitt ed);
ac c or d Je nkins Subw ay

, Inc . v . J e nkins , 990 S.W .2d 713, 720-21 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting-5-

17A C.J .S. Con tra c ts § 4 65 , at 62 3 ( 19 63 )) . A s such , th e a g re e me nt mus t pr ov ide “ fo r i ts continuance afte r the de ath of one o f the parties.” Jenkins S ubway, Inc. , 990 S.W .2d at 721 (quoting 17A C.J .S. Con tra c ts § 465, at 627-28 (1963))

. “[W ]hether a pa rticular c ontrac t survives the death of one of the parties implicates que stions of l aw be cause , in order to r esolve this issue, the court must c onstrue the parties’ contra ct.” Id. (c i t i n g Ed e le n Tran sfe r & Sto ra ge Co. v . W ill is , 66 S.W. 2d21 4, 21 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 93 2) ; Ro dg e rs v. S. Newspapers, Inc

. , 379 S.W .2d at 799). Apply ing the fore g oing principles, Appellant did not have a rig ht to the benef its confer red t o h erp u rs u an tt o t h e E mp l o y m en tC o n tra ct

. I n h er d ep o s i t i o n , Ap p el l an t co n ce d es t h atal t h o u gh Re ve re ndCoc hr a n a sk e d s e ve ra l de a c on s of the Chu rc h to ass ist his wi fe in s ome way a ft e r h is d e a th if the Church w ere able, he did not condition his employ ment on such re quest. As such, ther e wa s no orig inal provision or oral modification of t he Empl oy ment Contract that would extend the life of the Employ ment Contract bey ond the death of R ever end C ochran. Once the Employ ment Contract terminated, a ll vested rig hts within t hat contra ct expired. Far re ll v . T hird Na t’ l Ba nk in Na shv ill

e , 10 1 S. W.2 d 1 58 , 16 5 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 36 ) ( “ [I ]f the be ne fi c iary a c c e pts the be ne fi ts o f the c on tr a c t, he take s subject to its validity as between the orig inal parties thereto, and subject to the terms a nd condit io n s o f

th e o r ig in a l c o n tr a c t. ” ( q u o ti n g 4 Pa g e o n Co n tr a c ts § 2 3 9 3 , a t 4 2 1 7 , 4 2 1 8 )). Ther ef o re , s i n ce A ppellant had no rights to the be nefits conf err ed to her , Appellant’s subseque nt relinquishment of those benef its c annot constitute consider ation. See 17 C.J .S. Con tra c ts § 90, at 559 (1999). Finally , Appellant asse rts that the provision in the Ag ree ment restraining her f rom marry ing
c o n s t i t u t e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e A g r e e m e n t

. “ W h i l e t o t a l r e s tr a i n t s o f m arr i a g e ar e v o i d [ g e n e r a l l y]
a ndpa rt ia l r e str a int s a

re va lidon ly

if re a so na ble , . . . [an ] a

bs olu te re str a int

of marria g e is v a lidif i t is a limit ation on the duration of owner ship r ather than a condition subse quent req u i ri n g a forf eiture upo n m ar ri ag e.” Harbin v. Judd , 340 S.W .2d 935, 937 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960). “ The d i s t i n ct i o n i s t h er ef

o re u n i v er s al l y

re co gn i z ed t h atwh i l e a co n d i t i o n i n ab s o l u t e r es tra i n to f m arri age is invalid, a limi tation until m arriag e is g ood.” Id. at 938 (quoting 35 Am. J ur. M arriag e § 258).`

I n this case, the pr ovisi o n re s t raining Appellant fr om marriag e is an a bsolute restra int and not a limitation unt il marriag e. Thus, this provision is void as a matter of public policy and cannot constitute consideration.

B. Prom issory Estoppel Appellant conte nds on ap p ea l , as she did at trial, that even if the A g ree ment did not have le g a lly a de qu a te c on sid e ratio n, the Ag re e me nt s ho uldbe up he ld o n a the ory of pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l. We disag ree
. Pr e vio us ly

ou r s up re me c ou rt

ha s d e fi ne d p ro mis so ry

e sto pp e l a s f

oll ow s: “A pr omise which the promisor should re asonably expect to induce action or f

orbea ranc e of a

definite a nd substanti al char acte r on the-6- part o f t he promisee and which doe s not induce such a ction or forbe arance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enfor ceme nt of the promise.” Alden v. Presley , 637 S.W .2d 862, 864 (T en n
. 1982) (quoting Restatement of Contra cts § 90). Whil e br oa d in its def

ini tio n, the the ory of pr omi sso ry e sto pp e l doe s hav e its lim its . As o ur su pr e me court ha s previously

noted,
[d] etrimental a ction or for bear ance by

the promisee in relianc e on a g ratuitous promise, within limi ts constitutes a substit ute for
c on sid e ratio n, or

a su ff ic ie nt re a so n fo r e nf

or c e me nt o f the pr omi se without consi deration. This doctrine is known as promissory estoppel. A promisor who induc es substantial cha ng e of position by the pr omi se e in r e lia nc e on th e pr omi se is e sto pp e d to de ny its enfor cea bility as l acking consideration. The re ason for the doctrine is to a v o id a n u n

ju s t r e s u lt , a n d it s r e a s o n d e f in e s it s li mits. No injusti ce r esults in r efusa l to enfor ce a g ratuitous promise wher e the loss suff ere d in r eliance is ne g ligible, nor wher e the promisee' s action in relianc e wa s unrea sonable or unjustified by the p ro mise. The lim its of pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l are : ( 1) the de tr ime nt s uf fe re d in relianc e must be substantial in an economic se nse; (2) the substantial los s to the pr omi se e in a c tin g in re lia nc e mus t ha ve be e n f or e se e able by the pr omi so r; (3) the pr omi se e mus t ha ve a c te d r e a so na ble in justifiable relianc e on the pr omise as made.
Id. (citing L . Simps on, L aw of Contracts § 61 (2d e d. 1965)). “ Ho we v er , a ‘claim of promissory estoppel is not depende nt upon the exis tence of an expressed contra ct betwee n the parties.’” Cal ab ro v . Ca lab ro , 1 5 S

. W

. 3 d 8 7 3 , 8 7 9 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 9 9 ) ( q u o t i n g Engenius Entm’t, Inc . v. He renton , 971 S.W .2d 12, 19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) ( citations omitt ed))

. Fr om our revie w of the r ecor d on appea l, w e find that there are no disputed issues of materia l fac t as to the promises of Appe llees and Appellant’s ac tions in response to the promises of Appellee s. Viewing these fac ts in a light most fa vorable to A ppellant, we conclude that Appellant has not demonstrate d that she detrimenta lly relied on the promises of Appe llees. Appellant ar g ues on appe al that she c onducted he r l ife in reliance on the benef it she rec eived fr om the Chu rc h. Ho we ve r, in or de r f or the the ory

of pr omi sso ry

e sto pp e l to app ly , A pp e lla nt mus t show that the promises made in the Agre ement induced an action or forbear ance by Appellant to her detriment i n relianc e on those promises afte r Appellees m ade those promises. Appellant ha s failed to demonstrate suc h detrimental re liance. T h e o nly act of forbe arance or

action take n since the execution of the Ag ree ment on the part of Appellant in re liance on the promises made by Appellee s in th e A g r e e me n t w a s th a t A p p e ll a n t d e c li n e d a p r o p o s a l o f ma rr ia g e in o r d e r to a d h e r e to theA pp el l ant al s o cl ai ms t hat s he t oo k out a l oan i n r el i anc e on t he A gr eement

. H owever , Ap pel l ant t oo k t hi s l oan 2

ou t a f t er t he C h u r ch s t opped mak i n g pa y men t s pu r s u an t t o t h e ag r ee men t

. H owe v er , a s s t at ed ea r l i er , t h e t h eor y of p ro m isso ry e sto p p e l is ina p p lica b le w h e re a n in d ivid u a l a c ts u n re a so n a b ly in r e lian c e o n a p ro m ise

. A l den , 637 S. W

. 2d at 864. A pr omi s ee does not ac t re as on abl y wh en he or s h e ac t s i n r el i an ce on a pr omi s e t h at h as a l r ea dy be en br ea ch ed.

-7- conditions of the Ag ree ment. As we have st ated earlier , this restraint of m arriag e is void as a matter 2 of pu bli c po lic y . Si nc e thi s r e str a int c a nn ot b e a de quate con si der a tio n f or the Ag re e me nt, it i s counterintuiti ve to allow this restra int to serve as a basis for upholding the A g ree ment on a theory of promissory

estoppel. Ac cording ly , the theory of promissory

estoppel i s inapplicable in this case

. V. C ONCL US I ON
For the re asons set forth here in, we af fi rm t he dec ision of the chanc ery court g ranting summary judgme nt to Appellee. Costs of this appea l are taxed to Appellant, Mrs. Annie B . Cochran,
a n d h e r s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE