J-S06019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEYEEN DWONNE JEFFERSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1128 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 30, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-28-CR-0000546-2020

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

Appellant Keyeen Dwonne Jefferson appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his conviction for criminal attempt—indecent 

assault. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

by granting the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the information and 

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the underlying facts of this case as follows:

The event in question occurred on April 11, 2020 at 702 Lincoln 

Way East, Chambersburg. Aleysia Barnes ([the victim]) was 

playing board games with Tera Franklin, Desmond Divens, and 

[Appellant]. N.T. Trial, 11/15/21, [at] 34. Tera Franklin is the 

victim’s mother and, at the time, she was in a relationship with 

[Appellant]. Desmond Divens is [Appellant’s] daughter. The 

victim, Ms. Franklin, Ms. Divens, and [Appellant] were all drinking 

and the victim passed out around midnight. Id. at 146-147.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Appellant] picked the victim up and Ms. Franklin and Ms. Divens

followed him while he carried the victim to her bedroom. Id. at

51. They laid the victim with her head “on top by the pillow.” Id. 

at 56. Ms. Franklin testified that the victim was lying “straight”

on the bed at this point in time. Id. Then Ms. Franklin went 

outside to smoke a cigarette. Id. at 51. [Appellant] came outside 

to tell her that he was going to go upstairs and smoke marijuana. 

Id. Ms. Franklin testified that she had “a bad feeling” so she went 

upstairs. Id. 

Ms. Franklin saw [Appellant] in her unconscious daughter’s 

bedroom. Id. She testified, “When I walked into that room . . . I 

could [see] my daughter’s bare butt. I could see that she was 

pulled closer to the edge of the bed.” Id. She testified that the 

victim “was in a v shape pulled close to the edge of the bed and 

her bottom was fully exposed, her butt was fully exposed. Her 

pants were pulled down right underneath probably her butt 

cheek.” Id. at 61. [Appellant] was “right up against the bed.”

Id. Ms. Franklin could see that [Appellant] “had his penis in his 

right hand and he jumped back and when he jumped back he 

grabbed his pants with his left hand and he put his penis in his 

pants.” Id. at 52. [Appellant] left the victim’s bedroom and went 

into the bathroom. Id. 

Ms. Franklin testified that she “acted like nothing happened 

because [she] was so shocked and disgusted. . . .” Id. at 54. She 

went downstairs, saw that Ms. Divens was asleep on the coach, 

and went upstairs with [Appellant] and acted like she was asleep. 

Id. After a half an hour to an hour later, [Appellant] left their 

shared room. Id. at 54. She caught him trying to go back into 

the victim’s room. Id. at 55. The next morning, the victim woke 

up in her bed wearing the same clothes she had on the night 

before. Id. at 35. Ms. Franklin then took the victim to Altoona to 

visit with her grandmother. Id. at 36. Ms. Franklin told the victim

what happened the night before and, after they visited [the 

v]ictim’s grandmother, they went to the Chambersburg Hospital 

for a rape kit. Id. at 36. The victim does not remember the 

incident but did not consent or discuss having sexual contact with 

[Appellant]. Id. at 37 and 43. 

Officer Orien Hippensteal with the Chambersburg police was then 

called to the Chambersburg Hospital to make contact with the 

victim. Id. at 99. The case was then assigned to Detective James 

Iversen. Detective Iversen interviewed the victim and Ms. 

Franklin. He contacted [Appellant] over the phone and asked if 
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he could speak to him regarding the events that happened on April 

11 and 12. Id. at 113. [Appellant] told him that he could be 

interviewed on April 14th around 2:30. Id. at 116-117. The 

interview was audio and visually recorded and played for the jury 

during trial. While in the interview, [Appellant] told Detective 

Iversen that he needed to leave in about 10 to 15 minutes so he 

could go to work. Id. at 118. During the interview, [Appellant]

kept repeating questions and asking why he was there.

[1]

 Id. at 

119.

Detective Iversen then got a search warrant for [Appellant’s] DNA. 

Id. at 124. [Appellant] was residing with his sister and law 

enforcement attempted to execute the warrant. Id. at 125-126. 

They knocked on the door 10 times and nobody answered. Id. 

Detective Iversen informed another patrol unit to remain in the 

area. Id. After 15 minutes, [Appellant] exited the residence. Id. 

Detective Iversen, in an unmarked vehicle, attempted to make 

contact with [Appellant] by calling out to him three different times, 

but [Appellant] kept walking. Id. Detective Iversen got out of his 

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1 Appellant’s recorded police interview was also included in the certified 

record. See Commonwealth’s Ex. #5. However, because a transcript of this 

interview was not included in the certified record, we cite to the interview by 

timecode. During the interview, Appellant stated that he was drinking and 

playing games with the victim, Ms. Divens, and Ms. Franklin on the night of 

April 11, 2020. Id. at 2:41:31 - 2:41:46. Appellant stated that after the 

victim passed out, he carried her up to her bedroom. Id. at 2:43:56 -

2:44:40.

Appellant indicated that later that evening, while Ms. Divens and Ms. Franklin 

were outside smoking a cigarette, he went upstairs to check on the victim. 

See id. 2:52:14. However, Appellant stated that he ultimately left the victim’s 

room without checking on her and walked towards the bathroom, at which 

point Ms. Franklin confronted Appellant and asked what he was doing in the 

victim’s room. Id. at 2:53:06, 2:57:48. Appellant reiterated that he had 

been “checking on” the victim. Id.

When asked why the victim’s pants were pulled down, Appellant stated “her 

pants weren’t down” and then explained he did not “think” that was the case. 

Id. at 2:59:12 - 2:59:16. He also denied that his own pants were pulled down

and repeatedly stated that he did not “do anything sexual” to the victim. Id.

at 2:59:25 - 2:59:30; 3:01:14. Finally, Appellant confirmed that his DNA 

would not appear in any lab results from the victim because he “didn’t do 

nothing with this girl.” Id. at 3:02:13.
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car, approached [Appellant] with the search warrant, and obtained 

a sample of [Appellant’s] DNA though a buccal swab. Id. at 125-

126. [Appellant] said that his DNA “shouldn’t” come back. Id. at 

126. The victim’s rape kit indicated that there was no DNA 

present, so there was nothing to compare the sample to. Id. at

133. Based on his investigation, Detective Iversen contacted the 

Franklin County District Attorney’s Office and filed charges against 

[Appellant]. Id. at 126. 

Ms. Divens and [Appellant] also testified at trial. Ms. Divens

testified that she and Ms. Franklin smoked cigarettes outside. Id. 

at 148. [Appellant] came outside and said that he was going to 

use the bathroom and check on the victim. Id. at 148. Ms. Divens

testified that she, [Appellant], and Ms. Franklin then played 

another board game. After [Appellant] and Ms. Franklin went 

upstairs, Ms. Divens checked on the victim. She testified that she 

was “hanging off the bed like she rolled over” but could only see 

the top half of the victim’s body because she was under a blanket. 

Id. at 150. Ms. Divens then testified that it was not uncommon 

for the victim to pass out drinking and take off her pants in her 

sleep. Id. at 151. [Appellant] testified that when Ms. Franklin

and Ms. Divens smoked cigarettes outside, that he told them that 

he was going to go check on the victim because he wanted to go 

upstairs and smoke marijuana. Id. at 163. When the 

Commonwealth asked about the inconsistency between his 

testimony and his daughter’s testimony, he said that Ms. Divens

was incorrect. Id. at 171. [Appellant] also indicated that he was 

having problems in his relationship with Ms. Franklin. However, 

in his interview with Detective Iversen, he told the Detective that 

the two got along well and were getting married. Id. at 179. 

Trial Ct. Op., 10/6/22, at 4-8.

Appellant was initially charged with one count of indecent assault.2 On 

November 1, 2021, two weeks prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion 

to amend charge from indecent assault to criminal attempt—indecent assault.3

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2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
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The trial court conducted a hearing on November 10, 2021. At that time, 

Appellant argued that he would be prejudiced by the amendment because it 

would necessitate a change in defense strategy. See N.T. Hr’g, 11/10/21, at 

4-5. Specifically, Appellant claimed that his entire defense strategy was based 

on the lack of DNA evidence and his argument that no contact actually 

occurred. Id. at 5. Ultimately, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s 

motion and the matter proceeded to trial. 

On November 15, 2021, following a one-day trial, the jury found 

Appellant guilty of criminal attempt—indecent assault. On March 30, 2022, 

the trial court sentenced Appellant to eighteen to forty-eight months’ 

incarceration. Appellant subsequently filed a post-sentence motion, which the 

trial court denied.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing 

Appellant’s claims.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by granting the Commonwealth’s 

motion to amend the information?

2. Whether the trial court erred by denying [Appellant’s] postsentence motion for judgment of acquittal?

Appellant’s Brief at 12.
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Amendment to Information

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting 

the Commonwealth’s request to amend the information. Id. at 16. In 

support, Appellant contends that he suffered prejudice because the 

amendment changed the factual scenario underlying the charge and modified 

the description of the charge to an entirely separate and distinct offense. Id.

at 18-19. Appellant also argues that the amendment necessitated a change 

in defense strategy. Id. at 19. Specifically, Appellant argues that, prior to 

the amendment, he “intended on presenting evidence that no contact 

occurred, and there was a DNA test that showed that[,]” but following the 

amendment, his “defense strategy then had to shift to an assault of credibility 

on the complainant rather than a specific defense showing[] specific proof that 

no contact occurred.” Id. at 20. Appellant also claims that the timing of the 

amendment weighs in his favor because “[t]he amendment and hearing [on] 

the motion to amend occurred shortly before trial” and “[t]here was 

insufficient time” for him to prepare. Id. Although Appellant acknowledges 

that he did not request a continuance, he claims that the Commonwealth’s 

“negligence in failing to provide adequate notice should not force a defendant 

into having to waive his right to a speedy trial.” Id. at 21.

Appellant concludes that, although the amendment did not add new 

facts, it “was late, changed defense strategy, and called for an entirely new 

criminal charge, not merely a correction or alternative theory. Appellant was 
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clearly prejudiced by the amendment, and the convictions must be vacated.” 

Id.

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend 

an information for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Small, 

741 A.2d 666, 681 (Pa. 1999). As we have explained,

[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is 

rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise 

of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, 

prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. 

If in reaching a conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies 

the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate 

court to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 10 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations 

omitted and some formatting altered).

Rule 564 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as 

follows:

The court may allow an information to be amended, provided that 

the information as amended does not charge offenses arising from 

a different set of events and that the amended charges are not so 

materially different from the original charge that the defendant 

would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the court may 

grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in 

the interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 564. 

“[T]he purpose of Rule 564 is to ensure that a defendant is fully apprised 

of the charges, and to avoid prejudice by prohibiting the last minute addition 

of alleged criminal acts of which the defendant is uninformed.” 

Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2006) 
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(citation omitted). “[O]ur courts apply the rule with an eye toward its 

underlying purposes and with a commitment to do justice rather than be 

bound by a literal or narrow reading of [the] procedural rules.”

Commonwealth v. Grekis, 601 A.2d 1284, 1289 (Pa. 1992).

When presented with a question concerning the propriety of an 

amendment, we consider

[w]hether the crimes specified in the original indictment or 

information involve the same basic elements and evolved out of 

the same factual situation as the crimes specified in the amended 

indictment or information. If so, then the defendant is deemed to 

have been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal conduct. 

If, however, the amended provision alleges a different set of 

events, or the elements or defenses to the amended crime are 

materially different from the elements or defenses to the crime 

originally charged, such that the defendant would be prejudiced 

by the change, then the amend[ment] is not permitted.

Commonwealth v. Mentzer, 18 A.3d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(citations omitted). 

Since the purpose of the information is to apprise the defendant 

of the charges against him so that he may have a fair opportunity 

to prepare a defense, our Supreme Court has stated that following 

an amendment, relief is warranted only when the variance 

between the original and the new charges prejudices [a 

defendant] by, for example, rendering defenses which might have 

been raised against the original charges ineffective with respect 

to the substituted charges.

Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223 (citation omitted). 

In determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice, we consider the 

following factors:
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(1) whether the amendment changes the factual scenario 

supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds new 

facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether the entire 

factual scenario was developed during a preliminary hearing; (4) 

whether the description of the charges changed with the 

amendment; (5) whether a change in defense strategy was 

necessitated by the amendment; and (6) whether the timing of 

the Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample 

notice and preparation.

Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1203 (citation omitted).

With respect to indecent assault, Section 3126(a)(4) of the Crimes Code 

provides:

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent assault if 

the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the 

complainant to have indecent contact with the person or 

intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with 

seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual 

desire in the person or the complainant and: 

* * *

(4) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that 

the complainant is unaware that the indecent contact is 

occurring;

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4). “Indecent contact” is defined as “[a]ny touching of 

the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing 

or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.4

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4 We emphasize that, unlike rape and IDSI, penetration is not an element of 

indecent assault. Compare 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a) (rape) and 18 Pa.C.S. §

3123(a) (IDSI) with 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a) (indecent assault).
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Section 901 states that “[a] person commits an attempt when, with 

intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a 

substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).

Here, the trial court addressed the amendment to the criminal 

information as follows:

The Commonwealth amended the charges from indecent assault 

of person unconscious to criminal attempt-indecent assault of 

person unconscious. By amending the charge, the 

Commonwealth no longer needed to prove indecent contact with 

an unconscious complainant. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4). Rather, 

the Commonwealth needed to show that [Appellant] committed 

any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the 

commission of indecent assault. 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). The court 

conducted a hearing regarding this issue. At the hearing, the 

Commonwealth established that the amendment occurred 

because of the facts that had already been established in 

discovery through the information originally reported. N.T. Hr’g,

11/10/21, at 3. The defense asserted that their strategy “has 

been that this did not happen” but asserted that the amendment 

took away their defense. Id. at 4-5.

The amendment is based on the same nexus of facts as the 

original charge. No additional witnesses or information that was 

not available in discovery was used to support the amendment. 

[Appellant] waived his preliminary hearing on April 27, 2020, 

therefore, the court cannot consider this factor. Of the six factors, 

the only ones that prejudice[s Appellant] are the fourth and fifth 

factors. 

In Brown, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the 

defendant was prejudiced when the Commonwealth, immediately 

prior to the commencement of trial, sought leave to amend the 

information to charge [the] appellant with rape and IDSI with an 

unconscious person instead of the previously charged rape and 

IDSI by forcible compulsion. [Commonwealth v. Brown, 727 

A.2d 541, 543 (Pa. 1999)]. The trial counsel received notice of 

the amendment only immediately prior to trial, and had no time 

to plot a strategy for establishing that the victim was conscious 

and capable of consent during the relevant time period. Id. at 
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544. [On appeal, the Supreme] Court determined that the 

defendant in that case suffered prejudice. 

However, in the present case, the Commonwealth provided ample 

notice for the amendment. The hearing to determine whether the 

court should grant the Commonwealth’s motion occurred on 

November 10, 2021. The trial was not scheduled until November 

15, 2021. The defense still had four days to adjust their strategy 

in light of the Commonwealth needing to prove a substantial step 

rather than contact. N.T., 11/10/2021, at 6. This does not 

account for the Commonwealth putting [Appellant] on notice by 

filing its motion to amend information on November 1, 2021. 

[Appellant] had ample notice and time for preparation. For these 

reasons, [Appellant’s] claim fails.

Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12 (some formatting altered, footnote omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the 

information. See Small, 741 A.2d at 681; see also Belknap, 105 A.3d at 

10. As noted previously, Appellant was initially charged with indecent assault 

of an unconscious person based on Ms. Franklin’s allegation that she saw 

Appellant with his penis in his right hand in the victim’s room at which point 

she observed the victim laying face-down on the bed with her buttocks 

exposed and “pulled closer to the edge of the bed.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 4-8. 

Although the Commonwealth amended the indecent assault charge from a

completed offense to an attempt, that did not change the factual scenario 

underlying the charges or add any facts that were unknown to Appellant. See 

Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1203; Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223. 

We recognize that the description of the charges changed because the 

Commonwealth was no longer required to prove indecent contact, which may 
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have necessitated a change in defense strategy. However, since his initial 

interview with police, Appellant has maintained that he briefly entered the 

victim’s room to check on her, that he exited moments later, that he did not 

have his pants pulled down, and that he did not have any sexual contact with 

the victim. See Commonwealth’s Ex. #5; see also N.T. Trial at 165-66. 

Although Appellant claims that he intended focus his entire defense on the

fact that no male DNA was present in the victim’s vaginal and rectal areas, 

that would not preclude a conviction for indecent assault. See

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 255 A.3d 497, 511 (Pa. Super. 2021) (explaining

that a “defense that no penetration occurred and that there was a general lack 

of physical evidence—if believed by the jury—would no longer permit 

avoidance of all felony convictions, since lack of penetration was no defense” 

to indecent assault), rev’d in part on other grounds, --- A.3d ---, 22 MAP 2022,

2023 WL 4095438 (Pa. filed June 21, 2023).5

Finally, as noted by the trial court, the Commonwealth filed the motion 

to amend the information two weeks before trial, and Appellant did not request 

a continuance when the trial court granted the motion four days before trial

was scheduled to begin. See Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223. For these reasons, 

we conclude that Appellant did not suffer prejudice as a result of the 

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5 We note that in Rivera, our Supreme Court granted discretionary review for 

the purpose of reiterating “that different harmless error standards apply when 

evaluating testimonial references to a defendant’s post-arrest versus prearrest silence.” Rivera, 2023 WL 4095438 at *1. The Supreme Court did not 

address this Court’s conclusions regarding whether the appellant was 

prejudiced by the amendment to the information. Id. at *4 n.3.
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amendment. See id.; see also Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1203. Therefore, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his remaining issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that he took a substantial step towards having indecent contact 

with the victim. Appellant’s Brief at 23. In support, Appellant refers to Ms. 

Franklin’s testimony that the victim’s “buttocks was exposed and she had 

moved on the bed” and argues that it “is not circumstantial evidence of an 

attempt by Appellant to have indecent contact with her.” Id. Further, he 

argues that “while Appellant clearly exposed himself in [the victim’s] room, 

that is not evidence tending to show that he was attempting to have contact 

with [the victim]” and that, “[e]ven coupled with his position within the room, 

it is unclear what he intended to do, and that evidence does not point to him 

attempting to have contact.” Id. at 24. Therefore, Appellant concludes that 

his conviction for attempted indecent assault should be vacated. Id. at 25.

In reviewing Appellant’s claim, our standard of review is as follows:

A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is 

granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth has failed to 

carry its burden regarding that charge. Therefore, in usual 

circumstances, we apply the following standard of review to 

sufficiency claims which arise in the context of a motion for 

judgment of acquittal:

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a 

question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to 

support the verdict when it establishes each material 
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element of the crime charged and the commission thereof 

by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the 

evidence offered to support the verdict is in contradiction to 

the physical facts, in contravention to human experience 

and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as 

a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, the 

court is required to view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the 

benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 175 A.3d 301, 303-04 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered). “In applying the above test, we may not 

weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.”

Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 150-51 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted).

Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

In the present case, the Commonwealth established that the 

victim passed out after drinking and [Appellant] carried her to her 

room. N.T. Trial, 11/15/21, [at] 50-51. [Appellant] positioned 

her on her bed with “her head at the top by the pillow” so she was

lying straight on the bed. Id. at 56.

Ms. Franklin testified that later in the evening, she walked into her 

daughter’s bedroom and saw [Appellant] against the victim’s bed. 

Id. at 61. At this point in time, the victim’s body “was in a v shape 

pulled close to the edge of the bed and her bottom was fully 

exposed, her butt was fully exposed. Her pants were pulled down 

right underneath probably her butt cheek.” Id. at 61. She

testified that she saw that [Appellant] “had his penis in his right 

hand and he jumped back and when he jumped back he grabbed 

his pants with his left hand and he put his penis in his pants.” Id.

at 52. 

[Appellant] asserted that there is nothing in the record to support 

that [Appellant] pulled the victim to the edge of the bed, and 

therefore cannot be considered a substantial step. N.T. Hr’g, 

6/3/22, at 5. [Appellant] argued that the jury also heard 

testimony that sometimes when the victim passes out from 
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drinking she removes her pants in her sleep. Id.; see also N.T.

Trial, 11/15/21, at 151. However, this does not preclude the 

Commonwealth from showing that [Appellant] took substantial 

steps toward the crime. The jury made a credibility determination 

based on the circumstantial evidence presented. The fact finder 

believed Ms. Franklin when she testified that she caught 

[Appellant] holding his penis while her unconscious daughter’s 

pants were pulled down. The Commonwealth provided sufficient 

evidence that [Appellant] took substantial steps toward the 

completion of indecent assault.

Trial Ct. Op. at 15-16.

Following our review of the record, and in viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that there was 

sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s conviction for criminal attempt—

indecent assault. See Stahl, 175 A.3d at 303-04; 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). As 

noted by the trial court, the victim’s mother testified that she saw Appellant 

in the victim’s bedroom holding his penis while the victim was lying face-down 

on the bed in a “v shape” with her pants pulled below her buttocks. See N.T. 

Trial at 61. When viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

we conclude that it was reasonable for the jury to infer that Appellant had 

performed acts constituting a substantial step toward committing indecent 

assault. For these reasons, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails. Accordingly, 

we affirm.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023