alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-23-00089-CV

In the Interest of D.W.W., a Child

On Appeal from the

135th District Court of Victoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 22-03-88446-B

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed. The Court orders the 

judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED. No costs are assessed due to appellant’s 

inability to pay costs. 

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

June 22, 2023
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-11290

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-00186-GAP,

Bkcy No. 6:13-bk-09954-CCJ

In re: KIMBERLEY COLETTE NEMCIK,

Debtor.

____________________________________________________

BANK OF AMERICA, NA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KIMBERLEY COLETTE NEMCIK, 

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(September 3, 2014)

Case: 14-11290 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 1 of 3 
2

Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Bank of America appeals from the district court’s order affirming an order 

from the bankruptcy court voiding Bank of America’s lien on Kimberley Nemcik’s

property in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding she initiated. Nemcik’s property 

was subject to two mortgage liens at the time she filed for bankruptcy. The debt 

owed on the first mortgage exceeded the fair market value of the property. 

Because the debt secured by the first lien exceeded the value of the property, Bank 

of America’s junior lien was considered to be wholly “underwater.” This being the 

case, Nemcik moved the bankruptcy court to “strip off” or “void”—that is, 

extinguish in its entirety—Bank of America’s lien. 

Bank of America’s response to Nemcik’s motion acknowledged that under 

binding Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a wholly underwater junior lien is 

voidable, the motion should be granted. See Folendore v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., 

862 F.2d 1537, 1538–39 (11th Cir. 1989); see also McNeal v. GMAC Mortg., 

LLC, 735 F.3d 1263, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). For that reason, the 

bankruptcy court granted Nemcik’s motion. Bank of America appealed to the 

district court, but moved for summary affirmance in light of this Court’s binding 

precedent. The district court granted the motion, and Bank of America now seeks 

Case: 14-11290 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 2 of 3 
3

the appellate review that its motion for summary affirmance was intended to 

expedite. 

Bank of America maintains that Folendore and McNeal should be 

overturned in light of Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992), 

which held that a chapter 7 debtor could not “strip down” a creditor’s lien on real 

property where the value of the property is less than what is due to be paid to the 

creditor. Id. at 417, 112 S. Ct. at 778. But in McNeal, we reaffirmed Folendore

despite the holding in Dewsnup. McNeal, 735 F.3d at 1265–66. As Bank of 

America concedes, we are bound as a panel to follow our Court’s decision in 

McNeal. We therefore AFFIRM. 

Case: 14-11290 Date Filed: 09/03/2014 Page: 3 of 3
#### Steneman, Respondent, vs. Breyfogle, Appellant.

*February 7*

March *7, 1933.*

*7For the appellant there were briefs by *Ernest E. Watson*of Minneapolis, Minnesota, and *W. T. Doar*of New Richmond, and oral argument by *Mr. Doar.*

For the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of *Spencer Haven*of Hudson.

Wicichem, J.

The defendant first appeals from that part of the order which provides “that the answer of the jury to question number one of the special verdict be changed by the court from ‘No’ to ‘Yes;’ that the answer to question number three be supplied and that said question be answered ‘Yes.’ ” This portion of the order is not ap-pealable. *Larson v. Hanson,*207 Wis. 485, 242 N. W. 184, and cases there cited.- Defendant also appeals from that part of the order which grants the defendant the option, to be exercised within ten days, to let judgment be taken against him for $1,800 and costs. This portion of the order is not appealable. There is nothing adverse to the defendant in the mere granting of an option, and, if there was, defendant may refuse to exercise the option.

A more serious question is presented by the portion of the order which provides that, if neither party exercises his *8option within the time limited, a new trial upon the question of plaintiff's damages only is granted. Two doctrines are well established in this state, and the question relates to their application to the present situation. The first is that an order after verdict and before judgment denying a new trial is not appealable because it does not in effect determine the action nor prevent a judgment from which an appeal may be taken. *Borowicz v.*Hamann, 189 Wis. 212, 207 N. W. 426; *Victor Sewing Machine Co. v. Heller,*41 Wis. 657. Hence, in so far as this appeal may be considered as taken from those portions of the order which explicitly or in effect deny defendant’s motions for a new trial, it must fail.

It is equally well established that no litigant can appeal from an order made upon, his motion or request. *Treat v.*Hiles, 75 Wis. 265, 44 N. W. 1088; *Larson v. Hanson, supra.*Hence, it is contended by the plaintiff that the order for a new trial was made upon motion of the defendant and falls within this rule. On the other hand, defendant contends that his motion was for a new trial upon all the issues, and that a new trial limited to damages only cannot be considered to have been made at his request. This contention is without merit. While defendant appeals from the order granting a new trial on the subject of damages, he has no objection to that order so far as it goes. He does not claim that the damages were not excessive, or that the court did not have adequate grounds for granting relief. The essence of his complaint is that the order did not go far enough, — that the court denied a new trial upon all the issues. This portion of the order is not appealable.

It follows that the appeal must be dismissed.

*By the Court.*— Appeal dismissed.
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 214 (Tuesday, November 5, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 87929-87930]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-25697]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Service

Bureau of the Fiscal Service


Notice of Rate To Be Used for Federal Debt Collection, and 
Discount and Rebate Evaluation

AGENCY: Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Fiscal Service, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice of rate to be used for Federal debt collection, and 
discount and rebate evaluation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Secretary of the Treasury is responsible for computing and 
publishing the percentage rate that is used in assessing interest 
charges for outstanding debts owed to the Government (The Debt 
Collection Act of 1982, as amended). This rate is also used by agencies 
as a comparison point in evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a cash 
discount. In addition, this rate is used in determining when agencies 
should pay purchase card invoices when the card issuer offers a rebate. 
Notice is hereby given that the applicable rate for calendar year 2025 
is 5.00 percent.

DATES: January 1, 2025, through December 31, 2025.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Department of the Treasury, Bureau of 
the Fiscal Service, Disbursing and Debt Management, Alternative 
Payments Division (LC-RM 349B), 3201 Pennsy Drive, Building E, 
Landover, MD 20785 (Telephone: 202-874-9428).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The rate reflects the current value of funds 
to the Treasury for use in connection with Federal Cash Management 
systems and is based on investment rates set for purposes of Public Law 
95-147, 91 Stat. 1227 (October 28, 1977), as calculated by the 
Department of the Treasury's Office of Debt Management. The annual 
Interest Rate Factors used in determining the Current Value of Funds 
Rate are based on weekly average Fed funds less 25 basis points for the 
12- month period ending every September 30, rounded to the nearest 
whole percentage, for applicability effective each January 1. Quarterly 
revisions are made if the annual average, on a moving basis, changes by 
2 percentage points.

[[Page 87930]]

The rate for calendar year 2025 reflects the average investment rates 
for the 12- month period that ended September 30, 2024.
    Authority: 31 U.S.C. 3717.

Linda Claire Chero,
Assistant Commissioner, Disbursing & Debt Management and Chief 
Disbursing Officer.
[FR Doc. 2024-25697 Filed 11-4-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-AS-P
La seguridad y la salud me importan

#Sanoysalvoeneltrabajo
Argued and submitted March 31,

reversed and remanded June 9,

reconsideration denied September 22,

petition for review denied October 26, 1993 (318 Or 26)

#### STATE OF OREGON, *Appellant, v.*WILLIAM DENNIS KELLER, *Respondent.*

(92-CR-0026-15; CA A75522)

854 P2d 472

Kaye E. Sunderland, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief were Charles S. Crookham, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem.

Ingrid MacFarlane, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender, Salem.

Before Warren, Presiding Judge, and Edmonds and De Muniz, Judges.

PER CURIAM

*94PER CURIAM

Defendant was indicted for felony driving while suspended or revoked. ORS 811.182. Before trial, he moved to exclude evidence of his license revocation as a habitual traffic offender. The trial court granted the motion, and the state appeals. ORS 138.060(3). We reverse.

Defendant based his motion on two grounds: (1) that the notice sent by the Motor Vehicles Division (MVD) for the revocation failed to comply with certain notice requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act, specifically ORS 183.415(2)(c); (2) that the notice also failed to comply with due process. The trial court granted the motion on the first ground, although it relied on ORS 183.415(2)(d). In *State v. Vandepoll,*118 Or App 193, 197, 846 P2d 1174 (1993), we held that ORS 183.415 does not apply to a license revocation notice issued by MVD. The trial court erred in holding that it did.

Because the trial court granted the motion on the statutory ground, it did not address defendant’s due process argument. Normally, we would remand to the trial court to determine that issue in the first instance. However, because defendant raised that argument below and the parties thoroughly brief it on appeal, we consider the merits. Having reviewed the contents of the revocation notice, we conclude that it satisfied due process requirements. *See Bell v. Burson,*402 US 535, 91 S Ct 1586, 29 L Ed 2d 90 (1971); *State v. Jones,*76 Or App 157, 708 P2d 1168 (1985).

Reversed and remanded.
#### ALEXANDER ANDERSON Adm’or. *vs.*JOHN A. TAYLOR.

A partner, without a stipulation to that effect, is not entitled to compensation for any services in conducting the trade, or settling the business of the co-partnership, beyond his share of the profits.

The case of *Buford*v *Neely, %*Dev. Eq. Rep. 481, cited and approved.

This was a bill filed by the plaintiff, as -administrator of Aaron Lazarus, dec’d -for the -settlement of a partnership, which had existed between the said Lazaras and the defendant Taylor to carry on a mill for plaining lumber in-the town of Wilmington. The bill was filed at Spring Term, 1842, of New Hanover Court of Equity, and the defendant having answered, a reference was made to the Clerk and Master to state the accounts of the copartnership. Upon his report coming in, exceptions were taken on both sides, and the cause was transmitted for hearing-to the Supreme Court. The exceptions depended exclusively upon questions of fact, except one upon which alone it seems necessary to report the opinion .of the court. The copartnership was dissolved in 1841, by the death of Lazarus, The defendant first claimed $900 a year, according to a stipulation jn -the partnership agreement, for his personal superintendence of the mill* in addition to his share of the profits.— Th-is .claim was rejected by the court, upon the ground that ■by a subsequent agreement the defendant had relinquished, with the assent of his partner, the personal management oí the mill, and engaged in other business which fully occupied his time. The defendant then excepted to the Master’s report, because he bad not allowed him a reasonable compensation for settling the copartnership business after (he *death*
      *421of Lazarus. Upon this exception the court gave the following opinion, the case having been argued by

*Mordecai*for the plaintiff.

*J. H. Bryan*for the defendant.

Ruffin, C. J.

So, as connected with'it, must also his second exception be overruled. That' is, that the Master, after rejecting the claim for salary, has not allowed the defendant a reasonable compensation for settling the business. But the rule is clear, that, without a stipulation to that effect, a partner is not entitled to compensation for any services in conducting the trade, beyond his share of the profits. *Buford*v *Neely,*2 Dev. Eq. Rep. 481. Here, it is true, there was a stipulation for compensation ; but, as we have already seen, that was abandoned or waivedand the services, as there specified not having been rendered, so as to entitle the defendant to claim under the agreement, the case stands precisely as if the articles had been silent on the subject. — • The defendant did not'act as managing partner, as contemplated in the agreement; but another person supplied his place, and afterwards he only acted as any and every partner would, simply from his interest in the concern.

Pbr Cukiam. Exception overruled.
Exhibit 32.0

Certification of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Accounting Officer

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

with Respect to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q

for the Period Ended September 30, 2009

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title
18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Vermillion, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Company), does hereby certify, to the best of such officers knowledge, that:



|1. | The Companys quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009, (the Form 10-Q) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act); and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |  |  |  |  |                                                                                                        
|------------------ |  |  |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 20, 2010 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ Gail S. Page                                                                                       
|                   |  |  |  |  |  | Gail S. Page
Executive Chairperson, President and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
|                   |  |  | 
|Date: May 20, 2010 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ John H. Tran                                                                                       
|                   |  |  |  |  |  | John H. Tran
Vice President of Finance and Chief Account Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)         

The certification set forth above is being furnished as an Exhibit solely pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as a separate disclosure document of the Company or the certifying officers.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 827 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 827

          To establish drawback for imports of N-cyclohexyl-2-
      benzothiazolesulfenamide based on exports of N-tert-Butyl-2-
                       benzothiazolesulfenamide.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 19, 1999

  Mr. Rockefeller (for himself and Mr. Byrd) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
          To establish drawback for imports of N-cyclohexyl-2-
      benzothiazolesulfenamide based on exports of N-tert-Butyl-2-
                       benzothiazolesulfenamide.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF DRAWBACK BASED ON COMMERCIAL 
              INTERCHANGEABILITY FOR CERTAIN RUBBER VULCANIZATION 
              ACCELERATORS.

    (a) In General.--The United States Customs Service shall treat the 
chemical N-cyclohexyl-2-benzothiazolesulfenamide and the chemical N-
tert-Butyl-2-benzothiazolesulfenamide as ``commercially 
interchangeable'' within the meaning of section 313(j)(2) of the Tariff 
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1313(j)(2)) for purposes of permitting drawback 
under section 313 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1313).
    (b) Applicability.--Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to any 
entry, or withdrawal from warehouse for consumption, of the chemical N-
cyclohexyl-2-benzothiazolesulfenamide before, on, or after the date of 
enactment of this Act, that is eligible for drawback within the time 
period provided in section 313(j)(2)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 
U.S.C. 1313(j)(2)(B)).
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of A.S.V., Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Gary Lemke, Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


                                        /s/ Gary Lemke
                                        -----------------------
                                        Gary Lemke
                                        Chief Executive Officer
                                        August 9, 2004


                                       23
#### L. A. PASCHALL, Adm’r., v. L. H. BULLOCK.

*Practice*— Appeal.

Where there is no statement of the facts proved at the trial in the court below, and no error appears on the record, this court will, on appeal, affirm the judgment.

*(Utley*v. Foy, 70 2L C., 303; *Brumble*v. *Brown,*71 1ST. C., 513; *State*v. *Powell,*74 N. C., 270; *Green*v. *Castleberry,*77 2ST. 0., 164, cited and approved.)

Appeal from an order made at spring term, 1878, of Granville superior court, by *Seymour, J.*

*Messrs. J. B. Batchelor*and *E. Q. Haywood,*for plaintiff.

*Messrs. Merrimon, Fuller & Ashe,*for defendant.

Smith, C. J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Granville county, affirming the action of the clerk in giving leave to the plaintiff to sue out execution on his judgment which had become dormant. Due notice of the motion for such leave was given the defendant, and proof made before the clerk that no part of the debt had been paid. No statement of facts proved upon the trial of the cause before the judge and no assignment of errors appear in the record.' We have repeatedly held that it is incumbent on the appellant to make out' his case and show error. He has not done so, and nothing remains for this *9court to do, but to affirm the judgment. *Utley*v. *Foy,*70 N. C., 303; *Brumble*v. *Brown,*71 N. C., 513: *State*v. *Powell,*74 N. C., 270; *Green*v. *Castleberry,*77 N. C., 164.

There is no error and the judgment is affirmed. This will be certified to the superior court of Granville, to the end that further proceeding be therein had according to law.

No error. Judgment affirmed.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ·•r! ~ 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS '·'-· 1

• 

WASHINGTON, DC 

TRAVEL GROUP, INC., D/B/A REPUBLIC AIR TRAVEL 

AND SCOT SPENCER 

AIRLIFT GROUP, INC. 

AND RICHARD BERNARD 

Unauthorized Air Transportation, Unfair and Deceptive 

Practices and Unfair Methods of Competition, and 

Violations of Public Charter Rules 

EXPRESS ONE INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

Unfair and Deceptive Practices and Unfair Methods of 

Competition, and Violations of Public Charter Rules 

Enforcement Proceeding 

STATUS REPORT 

~, .. 1 ll: 5 i 

DOT -OST -1995-272 

formerly 

Docket 49233 

The Office of the Assistant General Counsel for Aviation Enforcement and 

Proceedings ("Enforcement Office"), pursuant to Your Honor's March 22, 2006, Order 

staying this proceeding, files this report detailing the current status of this proceeding and 

settlement negotiations. 

The Department has not ruled on the outstanding motions filed by Respondents 

and opposed by the Enforcement Office in Ascend Aviation Group, Docket OST-2004-

17486. 
,. 

' 2 

There have been no further settlement discussions. 

Date: July 27, 2012. 

Respectfully submitted, 

~---- Assistant General Counsel for 

Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings 

~li~~Cv~ Senior Trial Attorney 

United States Department of Transportation 

Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Room 96-429 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

TEL: 202-366-9342 

FAX: 202-366-7152 
3 

Docket No. DOT-OST-1995-272 

I hereby certify that on this 27th day of July, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing Status Report was served in the following manner to the following: 

Original 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Docket Operations, M-30 

West Building Ground Floor 

Room W12-140 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

By First Class Mail 

The Honorable Ronnie A Yoder 

Chief Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

TEL: (202) 366-2142 

FAX: (202) 366-7536 

By First Class Mail 

Scot Spencer 

SBD Aircraft Services 

255 S Leland Norton Way 

Sam Bernardino, CA 92408