[Cite as Ranazzi v. Fire Recovery USA, L.L.C. , 2023
- Ohio
- 3281.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Andrew Ranazzi Court of Appeals No. L

- 23

- 1024 Appell ant Trial Court No. CVE 2210031

v. Fire Recovery USA, LLC DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appell ee Decided: September 15, 2023
* * * * * Andrew Ranazzi, Pro se. Taylor R. Ward, for appellee.
* * * * *
O SOWIK , J. {¶ 1} This is an appeal of a January 3 0, 2023 judgment of the Sylvania Municipal Court, Lucas County, Ohio, granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment , and denying appellant’s motion to strike the summary judgment supporting affidavits

. Appellant filed no brief in opposition to appellee’s motion for summary judgment

. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.2

. {¶ 2} This case arises from a n October 5, 2021 motor vehicle accident between

appellant and another vehicle in Pittsfield Township, Michigan (“Pittsfield”)

. Following the accident, State Farm, appellant’s insurer , received a $435 emergency services cost recovery claim from Pittsfield for reimbursement of the costs of fire department services
incurred by Pittsfield as a result of the collision

. State Farm allowed $250 of the $435
claim , and tendered payment in that amount

. Th is appeal centers upon th e $185 re sidual balance following the insurance payment

. {¶ 3} Pro se appellant, Andrew Ranazzi, sets forth the following three assignments
of error: I. The Trial Court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment without allowing appellant to respond or file his opposition to it.
II. The Trial Court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment [given] Judge Bonfiglio’s prior decision [].
I II. The Trial Court erred in denying appellant’s motion to strike []. {¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On October 5,
2 021, appellant backed his motor vehicle out of a driveway in Pittsfield and into the path
of oncoming traffic , resulting in an accident

. {¶ 5} A Pittsfield fire department crew was dispatched to the accident scene to
secure it , evaluate and furnis h any needed medical care, evaluate and furnish any needed site cleanup, and conduct a n investigation

. The report generated by the fire department3

.

reflect s that , upon arrival at the accident scene , they attempted to examine appellant for
medical injuries. App ellant refused to undergo a medical examination or treatment

. In
response, a refusal form was provided to appellan t and executed by him

. In addition, the fire department performed a site assessment to determine if any hazardous materials or liquids had spilled during the collision that needed to be cleaned up

. It was determined
that no such spillage occurred. {¶ 6} On October 14, 2021, in conformity with a Pittsfield ordinance, State Farm received a $435 claim on behalf of Pittsfield

. State Farm allowed the claim, and tendered

a payment of $250 to Pittsfield. Appellan t later received a statement requesting payment
of the $185 remaining balance from appellee, Pittsfield’s third

- party billing administrator. {¶ 7} The record reflects that a ppellant denied financial responsibility and refused
to tende r payment. O n April 13, 2022, appellee sent a demand letter to appellant

. On April 28, 2022, i n response to the demand letter , appellant filed a complaint in Sylvania Municipal Cou rt, alleging that he sustained $6,000 in damages as a result of appellee’s pursuit of the $185 balance

. {¶ 8} In the complaint , appellant allege d that , “[N]o Pittsfield fire department personnel appeared to be on the scene nor did they render assistance to anyone.” However, the record irrefutably reflects that fire department personnel were dispatched to the scene, secured the scene, offered medical as sistance, obtained an executed refusal
form from appellant , and performed a site assessment regarding cleanup

. The fire4

.

department crash report reflected that , “ [Fire Department truck] T10

- 1 parked to protect the scene and went to check for injuries and h azards * * * crew members obtained signed
refusal [from appellant] * * * T10

- 1 blocked traffic until released by Pittsfield Police, returning to in

- service at that time. At fault information, according to police: [Appellant] .” {¶ 9} Appellant allege d that as a result of appellee’s demand for payment of the $185 balance he, “suffered damages in the form of having increased insurance costs, as well as a threat to his credit rating.” The record is devoid of evidence demonstrative of
these claims. {¶ 10} On Ma y 6, 2022, appellee’s CFO submitted correspondence to the trial court requesting that the case be dismissed. Given that a motion to dismiss had not been properly filed, as conceded by appellee, the case was not dismissed. {¶ 11} On November 14, 2022 , appelle e filed a motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion for summary judgment, appellee attached the supporting affidavits
of Lt. Yurkunas (“Yurkunas”) , the fire department member who was dispatched to the
accident scene and offered assistance to appellant , and the affidavit of his superior, Fire
Chief Gleason (“Gleason”) . Appellee emphasized in support of summary judgment that appellant’s principal claim in the complaint , that the fire department did not respond to the scene or provide services , w as contrary to the record of evidence , including the crash report, photographs, and su pporting affidavits

.5

. {¶ 12} A ppellant did not file a brief in opposition to appellee’s motion for

summary j udgment. Rather, appellant filed a motion for an extension of time , accompanied by a motion to strike, setting forth unsupported claims that the two
affidavits submitted by the above

- referenced fire department members were not based
upon their personal knowledge and were , therefore, improper. The trial court was not persuaded. {¶ 13} On January 30, 2023, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to strike and granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined in relevant
par t,
There is no credible evidence that * * * Pittsfield F ire D epartment did not appear at the scene of plaintiff’s accident to render aid. Plaintiff’s claim to that effect is totally without merit. Plaintiff presents no evidence * * * that the charge of $185 for services rendered is excessive. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the affidavits [of Lt. Yurkunas and Chief Gleason] is found not well
taken * * * [D] efendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. This appeal ensued. {¶ 14} Appellant’s first two assignments of error are premised upon the position that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly , the y will be considered simultaneously.6

. {¶ 15} It is well

- established that an appellate court reviews a disputed trial court

summary judgment determination utilizing the same standard a s that used by the trial court. Summary judgment will be granted if the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lorain Natl. Banl v. Saratoga Apts ., 61 Ohio App3d . 127, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist. 1989). Civ.R. 56(C). {¶ 16} In support of the claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee, appellant a lleges that , “ B oth affidavits * * * have impermissible hearsay * * * neither is germane to the proceedings nor within the personal knowledge of any of the affiants.” The record of evidence does not comport with appellant’s position. {¶ 17} Civ.R. 56(E) establishes that, “Affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.” In conjunction, the Ohio Supreme Court determined in Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co ., 95 Oh io St.3d 314, 2002

- Ohio

- 2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 26, “The personal knowledge standard requirement in Civ.R. 56(E) tracks the personal knowledge standard of Evid.R. 602 covering lay witness testimony at trial. ” {¶ 18} In applying the above

- discussed legal paramet ers for proper summary judgment supporting affidavits, this court held in Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Brunner ,7

.

2013

- Ohio

- 128, 986 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.), “The foundation for personal knowledge may be furnished by the witness’s own testimony. Evid.R. 6 02. A mere assertion of personal knowledge satisfies Civ.R. 56(E) if the nature of the facts in the
affidavit , combined with the identity of the affiant , creates a reasonable inference that the affiant has personal knowledge of the facts.” {¶ 19} T he affidavit o f Yurkunas sets forth that the affiant , in his capacity as an

on
- duty fire lieutenant with Pittsfield on the day and time of appellant’s accident , was dispatched to the accident scene to secure it, assess it, and to provide medical and cleanup
services. He further attests to his direct observations upon arrival at the scene, and the actions that he took in response to his observations . Lastly, he attests that he draf ted the crash report documenting the accident

. {¶ 20} Next, the affidavit of Gleason sets forth that the affiant, in his capacity a s Pittsfield’s fire chief, reviewed th e reports prepared by Yurkunas related to this case , and based upon t hat review , he was familiar with the actions taken by the fire department in response to the accident. In addition, as the Pittsfield fire chief, he further attests to his personal knowledge of , and experience with , department policies and practices, including the post

- collision third

- party administrative cost recov ery billing pr o cess underlying this

case. {¶ 21} I n accord with Civ.R. 56(E), Bonacorsi , and Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn. , as regards to appellant’s claim that the affidavits were not based upon personal knowledge8

.

and were improper, we find that the nature of the facts set forth in the affidavits, combined with the identity of the affiants, creates a reasonable inference that the affiants had personal knowledge of the facts. Accordingly, t he affidavits were not improper. {¶ 22} Based upo n our de novo review , we find that reasonable minds can only
conclude that appellee furnished credible , unrefuted evidence reflecting that Pittsfield fire department personnel were dispatched to, and performed emergency services at , appellant’s crash scene

. Appellant furnished no evidence of impropriety in connection to appellee’s emergency services cost recovery effort. T he trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee. Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are
found not well

- taken. {¶ 23} In appellant’s third assignment of error, appellant similarly contends that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to strike appellee’s summary judgment supporting affidavits. We do not concur. {¶ 24} As this court held in Bli ss v. Johns Manville , 172 N.E. 3d 1146, 2021

- Ohio

- 1673, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.) , “A trial court’s decision to deny a motion to strike will not
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Hizer , 6th Dist. Lucas
No. L

- 13

- 1035, 2013

- Ohio

- 4621, ¶ 16, citing State ex. rel. Mora v. Wilkinson , 105 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005

- Ohio

- 1509, 824 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 10. Abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscion able. Wilkinson at ¶ 10.”9

. {¶ 25} In support of the third assignment of error , appellant again a sserts that ,

“[T] hese affidavits both fail because neither of the affiants have any personal knowledge
of the accident.” {¶ 26} As discussed in detail above, the record refl ects that the nature of the facts
set forth in the affidavits , in combination with the identity of the affiants, created a reasonable inference that the affiants had personal knowledge of th ose facts , in conformity with Civ.R. 56(E), Bonacorsi , and Fed

. Natl. Mtge. Assn

. Accordingly, no basis for striking the affidavits was manifest. Appellant has not demonstrated that th e trial court ’s denial of the motion to strike the affidavits was unreasonable, arbitrary , or unconscionable . Wherefore, w e find appellant’s third assignment of error not well

- taken. {¶ 27} On consideration whereof , the judgment of the Sylvania Municipal Court is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.
24. Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.10

. Andrew Ranazzi v. Fire Recovery USA, LLC

L

- 23

- 1024

Thomas J. Osowik, J.

____________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda , J. CONCUR.

____________________________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle , J.

____________________________ CONCUR S IN JUDGMENT JUDGE ONLY.

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.