alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

**Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

**(18 U.S.C. 1350)**

 

 

Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of (18 U.S.C. 1350), the undersignedofficer of Boston Restaurant Associates, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the“Company”), does hereby certify, to the  best of such officer’s knowledge and belief, that:

 

(1)                                  TheQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 24, 2004 (the “Form10-Q”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all materialsrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Dated:  November 30, 2004 |   /s/ George R. Chapdelaine       |   |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------|
|                      | George R.  Chapdelaine                 |
|                      | President  and Chief Executive Officer |

 

 

Thiscertification shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of theSecurities Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of thatsection.  Such certification will not bedeemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Actor the Securities Exchange Act.

 

----
#### Madox *v.*Hoskins.

The Defendant had purchased a negro of Ward, who pretended a title under the Plaintiff, and called a man who also had purchased one other negro of Ward, who claimed it in the same manner — objected, he is interested in the question. To this it was answered, that the case of *Farrel*& *Perry,*in Halifax, October, 1790, had settled this point, and had determined that the objection must bo as to his interest in the event of the cause. But per Williams & Macay, Judges, where a man is plainly interested in the event of a question, he hath been ex'cluded by all authorities. And per Williams, Í remember something of that case at Halifax, but the circumstances must have been different from this.

Note. — Overruled, vide the references in the note to *Farrel*v. *Perry, ante 2.*
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

March 22, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
129605 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan EMBOSSING PRINTERS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 129605 COA: 252894 Ct of Claims: 02-000090-MT DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, th e application for leave to appeal the Ju ly 12, 2005 judgment of the Court of Appeals is cons idered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. To the extent that the Court of Appeals opini on rejects the “incidental to s ervice” test adop ted by this Court in Catalina Marketing v Dep’t of Treasury , 470 Mich 13 (2004), it is VACATED.

C AVANAGH
, J., would deny leave to appeal with out further statem ent found in the majority’s order.

s0315 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 22, 2006

Clerk
#### O. L. HALL v. L. GIBBS.

*Statute of Limitations.*

The presumption oí payment of a bond arises after ten years from.the time the right, of notion accrues. Itev. Code, eh. 6o, § IS. (The provisions of section 43'of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to-this cáse.)

*(Hamlin v. Mebane, 1*Jones Eq., 18, cited and approved.)

*5Civil AotioN tried at Spring Term, 1882, of Oabteret -'Superior Court, before *Gilmer, J.*

This action is founded on a sealed note executed by defendant to plaintiff’s intestate on the 24th of January, 1866, payable two years after date, and upon which a credit of 3¡j>85.46 was endorsed on the 14th of September, 1869.

The defence set up was, that the bond was presumed to •have been paid by lapse of time,-and that it had in fact been paid to said intestate in goods.

The action was commenced on the 20th of January, 1881.

The plaintiff’s intestate died on the 17th of April, -1875, and there was no administration on the éstate until the appointment of the plaintiff on the 16th of December, 1880.

On the trial the judge intimated that the bond was presumed to be paid, and in deference to that opinion the .plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit and appealed.

*Messrs. Green & Stevenson,*for plaintiff.

No counsel for defendant.

Ashe, J.

The opinion intimated 'by His Honor is -correct. The bond sued on matured on the 25th of January, 1868, and the cause of action then having accrued to the plaintiff, the.statute of presumptions in force previous to .the ratification of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable. C. C. P., § 16.

The action was not brought until 2.0th of-January, 1881, more than ten years after the right of action had accrued on this bond, and the presumption of its payment or .satisfaction had arisen within that' time. Rev. Code, ch. 65, § 18. {Act of 1826.) I-t is true this presumption may be rebutted, but there was no proof offered in rebuttal in this case. There was nothing shown on the trial to obstruct the •running of the statute. The death of the plaintiff’s intestate, the .obligee of the bond, .could not have .that-effect' I '. *6the act of 1826, which provides for the presumption of payment or satisfaction of bonds, &c., after ten years, there is no saving whatever. “It seems,” as Pearson, C. J., said in *Hamlin*v. *Mebane,*1 Jones' Eq., 18, “to have been intended emphatically as a statute of repose.”

Nor was its eourse suspended by th,e death of the obligee before the expiration of the ten years after the right of action accrued under section 43 of the Code, for the provisions of that section only apply to the limitations prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure.

No- error. Affirmed.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument, and we therefore deny Townsel’s request for oral argument. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

EN/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIC R. TOWNSEL,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

KEN QUINN, Superintendent; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 09-35444

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00482-JLR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 16, 2010** 

Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Washington state prisoner Eric R. Townsel appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison

FILED

MAR 05 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
EN/Research 2 09-35444

officials failed to maintain safe conditions in the shower area and were deliberately

indifferent to his resulting medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo. John Doe 1 v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th

Cir. 2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly determined that the allegations in Townsel’s

complaint failed to demonstrate that prison officials’ conduct in maintaining the

prison shower area violated the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (requiring a successful Eighth Amendment claim based on

inhumane conditions of confinement to show that prison officials knew of a

substantial risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable measures to avoid the

harm); Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining that

allegations describing slippery prison floors, without more, “do not state even an

arguable claim for cruel and unusual punishment”), superceded by statute on other

grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); see also

Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (providing

discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile).

The district court properly dismissed Townsel’s due process claim that he

was entitled to a custody and classification hearing prior to his transfer because he

failed to allege that his transfer imposed an atypical and significant hardship upon
EN/Research 3 09-35444

him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Munk

because Townsel failed to raise a triable issue as to whether Munk was deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-58

(9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a

medical condition, or a difference in opinion between the inmate and prison

medical staff over proper medical treatment does not constitute deliberate

indifference).

Townsel’s pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED.
#### The State of Iowa, Appellee, v. Ed Sloan, Appellant.

Appeal: submission on transcript without evidence.

*Appeal from Mahaska District Court.*— Hon. D. Byan, Judge.

Saturday, May 28, 1892.

*Liston McMillan,*for appellant.

*John. Y. Stone,*Attorney General, *Thos. A. Cheshire,*and *B. W. Preston,*for the state.

Kinne, J.

The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of the offense of keeping a gambling house.’ The cause is submitted on a transcript containing a copy of the indictment, notice of appeal bond, and record entry. An examination of all the records before us discloses no error, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.
Exhibit 32(c)

                                  CERTIFICATION

                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of Georgia Power
Company for the year ended December 31, 2003, we, the undersigned, hereby
certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of our knowledge and belief,
that:

     (1)  such Annual Report on Form 10-K of Georgia Power Company for the year
          ended December 31, 2003, which this statement accompanies, fully
          complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  the information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K of
          Georgia Power Company for the year ended December 31, 2003, fairly
          presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
          results of operations of Georgia Power Company.



                                             /s/David M. Ratcliffe
                                               David M. Ratcliffe
                                             Chief Executive Officer



                                                /s/C. B. Harreld
                                                  C. B. Harreld
                                              Executive Vice President,
                                        Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

Date:  March 1, 2004
#### THOMAS MITCHELL AND OTHERS *vs.*WILLIAM WALKER AND OTHERS.

A commissioner, to whom a matter has boen referred by the court, should state in his report all the evidence, upon which the report is founded — otherwise the report will be set aside.

This case had been referred by order of the Court to a commissioner to make certain enquiries — and the report was now made. The defendant excepted, because the commissioner had not set foith the evidence adduced before him.

No counsel for the plaintiffs.

*Alexander*for the defendants.

Gaston, J.

The defendants have excepte") to the report of the commissioner made in this cause, because he hath not *624reported therewith the testimony, upon which it is made.— This exception must be allowed. The party, against whom any matter referred to a commissioner, hath been found, is entitled to appeal from his judgment to the court; and it is essential, therefore, that the testimony, heard by the commissioner upon that enquiry, should be all put in writing and accompany the report.

Per Curiam. .Report set aside.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

MAURICIO AGUILERA,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 17

- 10048

D.C. No. 3:09

- cr

- 00988

- CRB

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 22, 2018 **

Before: SILVERMAN, GRABER, and GOULD, Circuit Judges

Mauricio Aguilera appeals from the dis trict court’s order granting in part his

motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review discretionary denials of sentence

reduction motions for abuse of discretion, see United States v . Chaney , 581 F.3d

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously conclu des this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 30 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 17

- 10048

1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009) , and we affirm

.

It is undisputed that Aguilera is statutorily eligible for a sentence reduction

under Amendment 782 to the Guidelines , and that t he district court concluded that

a sentence reduction from 168 m onth s to 135 month s was warranted in this case.

However, Aguilera contends that the district court did not adequately explain it s

reasons for reject ing his request for a 120

- month s entence. Under Chavez

- Meza v.

United States , 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018), the district court’s explanation was

sufficient. In light of the record at the original sentencing and the district court’s

certification that it considered Aguilera’s motion and took into account the relevant

Guideline policy st atements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the

district court’s orders demonstrate that it considered the parties’ arguments and that

it had a reasoned basis for exercising its legal decisionmaking authority. See

Chavez

- Meza , 138 S. Ct. at 1 966.

To the extent that Aguilera seeks to raise additional issues for the first time

in his reply brief

, we decline to consider them

. See United States v. Kama , 394

F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Respondent

 v.

AMATADI LATHAM,

 Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 245 MAL 2014

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the

Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2014, the Petition for Allowance of

Appeal is DENIED.
*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is

not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,

and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 25, 2009

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

JENNY L. PURKETT,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 08-1419

v. (D. Colorado)

ROBERT M. GATES,

Defendant - Appellee.

(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-00019-EWN-BNB)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before HARTZ, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

Jenny L. Purkett appeals the district court’s summary judgment dismissing

her equal-employment-opportunity complaint as untimely. For the reasons stated

in the magistrate judge’s recommendation, we hold that the judgment below was

correct.
-2-

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Harris L Hartz

Circuit Judge
```

[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 159 (Wednesday, October 1, 2008)]
[Daily Digest]
[Page D1221]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                        House of Representatives

Chamber Action
  The House was not in session today. The House is scheduled to meet at 
12 p.m. on Thursday, October 2, 2008.
```
##### 



Exhibit 32.2
 Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
As Adopted Pursuant To
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  (1)
    
    the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended June
30, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Dated: September 13, 2005
    
    /s/ Warren D. EdwardsWarren D. Edwards,
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of Affiliated Computer Services, Inc.
EXHIBIT 23

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT AND REPORT ON SCHEDULE

Board of Directors
Airborne Freight Corporation
Seattle, Washington

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement Nos.
33-3713, 2-67161, 33-39720, 33-51651 and 33-58905 on Form S-8 of our
reports dated February 14, 1997, on the consolidated financial statements
of Airborne Freight Corporation and subsidiaries appearing in the Company's
1996 Annual Report to Shareholders and incorporated by reference in this
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1996.

Our audit of the consolidated financial statements referred to in our
aforementioned report also included the financial statement schedule listed
in the accompanying Index at Item 14(a)2.  This financial statement
schedule is the responsibility of the Company's management.  Our
responsibility is to express an opinion based on our audit.  In our
opinion, such financial statement schedule, when considered in relation to
the consolidated financial statements taken as a whole, presents fairly in
all material respects the information therein set forth.


/s/Deloitte & Touche LLP
------------------------
DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP

Seattle, Washington
March 24, 1997
Martin. Michael (OST)

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Dear Mr. Martin,

Justin Mandel <justin.mandel@gmail.com>

Wednesday, May 21, 2014 5:21 PM

Martin, Michael (OST)

Altoona-Blair Airport

As I was unable to attend the airport authority meeting this evening, I wanted to ensure that voice was hear on the

subject of a new subsidized airline serving Altoona airport.

While I understand some people may prefer a larger aircraft, they appear to be uneconomical serving ADO. My family

and I, and many others I know in the area would be very likely to use services that connected to both Pittsburgh and/or

Dulles more frequentlywith smaller aircraft. Reading that fares could be as low as $59 each way this seems to be a very

attractive proposition. Much more than the current services operating from ADO. More frequent services would allow

us to make more connections from these bigger airports. As we would be inside the air-side area of the airport once

arriving in PIT or lAD, we would be more likely to originate our travel at ADO rather than making the 2-3 hour drive to a

hub airport.

In short, we would like to see more frequent services to more airports at better prices, regardless of the equipment

type.

Best regards,

Justin

Justin Mandel

814-931-6282 (NEW NUMBER)

justin. ma ndel@gmail.com

1
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7773

VERNON LEON COHEN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenwood. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District

Judge. (CR-92-410, CA-96-1244-8-20-AK)

Submitted: February 13, 1997 Decided: February 27, 1997

Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Clarence Rauch Wise, WISE & TUNSTALL, Greenwood, South Carolina,

for Appellant. William Corley Lucius, Assistant United States

Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate

judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of

the district court. Cohen v. United States, Nos. CR-92-410; CA-96-

1244-20-AK (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 1996). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Fl) (Ar RIPL - • ;

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 20-0042
STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiffand Appellee,
v. AUTREE ANIEL PEDERSEN,

Defendant and Appellant. 

# ,ED MM 1 1 2021
Bovven Greenwood Clerk of Supreme Court State of Montana ORDER

Autree Aniel Pedersen appeals his Cascade County conviction ofand sentence for Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWC). Pedersen raises three issues on appeal. Pedersen argues in partthattheDistrict Court erred by denying his motion to substitute the assigned districtjudge for the stated reason that the public defender's substitution motion was "ineffective due to late payment ofthe substitution fee. After Pedersen was found guilty by a jury, the court sentenced him to 100 years of imprisonment with no time suspended, restrictions on parole eligibility, and a level 3 sexual offender designation. Pedersen argues that the court improperly imposed an enhanced sentence under § 45-5-503(3)(b),MCA (2015). Thejudge who imposed the sentence has since retired. The parties, by and through their counsel ofrecord,now stipulate that Pedersen is entitled to have his sentence vacated. Without agreeing on the underlying merits of Pedersen's claims, the parties agree the case should be remanded for Pedersen to be resentenced under § 45-5-503(2), MCA (2015). The parties also agree the resentencing hearing should occur before a new sentencing judge with an updated presentence investigation report. The parties have agreed to this resolution and seek dismissal ofthe remaining issues Pedersen raises on appeal. Having reviewed the parties' Motion to Dismiss by Stipulation, and good cause appearing, 05/11/2021

Case Number: DA 20-0042

### IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Cascade County Cause No. ADC-17-417 is

remanded to the Eighth Judicial District Court, with instructions to vacate the November 21,2019 sentencing order. The District Court is directed to designate a new judge to hold a new sentencing hearing with an updated Presentence Investigation Report and to sentence Pedersen pursuant to § 45-5-503(2),MCA (2015). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder ofPedersen's appeal is dismissed with prejudice. TheClerk isdirected toprovidecopies ofthis Orderto allcounselof recordand tothe Judges and the Clerk ofthe DistrictCourt for the Eighth Judicial District,Cascade County. Dated this I I 1-;ay ofMay,2021.
ChiefJustice

Justices