IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

September 12, 2006 Session

LAURA JOHNSON v. CLOVER BOTTOM DEVELOPMENT 

CENTER, ET AL.

 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 03-2324-I Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor

No. M2005-01440-COA-R3-CV - Filed on January 31, 2007

An employee of Clover Bottom Development Center appeals the summary dismissal of her action

under the Tennessee Handicap Act. The employee alleged she was the victim of discrimination due

to her medical limitations. The trial court dismissed the action finding the employee failed to show

she sustained an adverse employment action, an essential element of her claim. We affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed

FRANK G.CLEMENT,JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM C.KOCH,JR.,P.J.,

M.S., and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, J., joined.

Rebecca T. Garland, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellant, Laura Johnson.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; and Steven B. McCloud, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellee, Clover Bottom Development Center, and State of Tennessee Department

of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities.

OPINION

Laura Johnson was hired byClover Bottom Development Center in 1996 as a developmental

technician. Clover Bottom, which is operated by the State of Tennessee Department of Mental

Health and Developmental Disabilities, serves as a residential and training facility for individuals

who are mentally and physically handicapped. 

Initially, Ms. Johnson’s duties as a developmental technician required that she interact with

residents of Clover Bottom. Shortly after beginning work at Clover Bottom, Ms. Johnson suffered

a stroke, after which she was able to return to work with certain medical restrictions due to

prescribed blood thinners. Her doctor recommended that she avoid exposure to injuries that might

cause bleeding. She was also limited to the amount of weight she could lift. Because her job as a

developmental technician required interaction with the residents, which exposed her to the potential
Ms. Johnson claims she was instructed to run some errands to pick up supplies for Clover Bottom, which 1

included sacks of feed and fertilizer. Ms. Johnson asserted that the weight of these items exceeded the amount of weight

she was permitted to lift.

The record is silent as to whether Ms. Johnson carried out the task under protest or simply refused to complete

2

the assigned task. 

Ms. Johnson additionally cited the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA) in her complaint; however, Ms.

3

Johnson has not alleged that she was the victim of discrimination based on race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or

national origin, being the foundation of a claim under the THRA. In response to a Motion to Dismiss that was ultimately

denied, her counsel explained the Tennessee Handicap Act provides an aggrieved person such as Ms. Johnson all of the

rights provided for in the THRA, and it was for that reason the THRA was cited in the complaint in this action. Ms.

Johnson, however, did not file a sworn complaint with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission. Accordingly, we will

limit our review to the Tennessee Handicap Act.

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for injuries that might cause bleeding, Clover Bottom created a position of a clothing clerk for Ms.

Johnson, which was classified as a “light-duty” position. In her new position as a clothing clerk, Ms.

Johnson was responsible for maintaining clothing for the residents, keeping track of each resident’s

clothing inventory, and handling seasonal storage of clothing, which duties were suitable for Ms.

Johnson’s restrictions. 

Almost five years later, in June of 2002, Ms. Johnson alleges that her supervisor gave her a

work assignment that violated her medical restrictions. Upon receiving the assignment, Ms. 1

Johnson reminded her supervisor of her medical restrictions, following which her supervisor 2

requested that she provide an updated list of restrictions. On June 28, 2002, Ms. Johnson delivered

an updated medical restriction letter to her supervisor. Thereafter, Ms. Johnson alleges that her

supervisor told her there was no job for her at Clover Bottom and that she should go home. 

Ms. Johnson alleges that over the next month she attempted to reconcile her employment

situation by contacting “various state officers.” A meeting was held at Clover Bottom on July 31,

2002, after which Ms. Johnson returned to work with her restrictions having been updated and an

agreement having been reached as to the appropriate accommodations for Ms. Johnson. 

One week later, on August 9, 2002, Ms. Johnson states that her supervisor threw a resident’s

clothing on the floor in front of her and ordered Ms. Johnson to clean up the mess. Ms. Johnson

states that she complied and cleaned up the mess. The next day, August 10, 2002, while away from

work shopping, Ms. Johnson suffered a severe stroke that left her permanently and totally disabled.

Ms. Johnson filed this action against Clover Bottom alleging it discriminated against her in

violation of the Tennessee Handicap Act, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103. To prove handicap 3

discrimination, she was required to show Clover Bottom took an adverse employment action against

her, and she contends the stroke she suffered on August 10, 2002, was the adverse employment

action because the stroke was the direct result of a supervisor’s misconduct and resulted in her no

longer being able to work.

 
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Clover Bottom timely filed an Answer denying any violation of the Tennessee Handicap Act.

After discovery was taken, Clover Bottom filed a Motion for Summary Judgment contending, inter

alia, that Ms. Johnson failed to establish a causal connection between her alleged disability and an

adverse employment action. The trial court found that her stroke did not qualify as an adverse

employment action, which is an essential element of a claim under the Tennessee Handicap Act, and

dismissed Ms. Johnson’s case. Ms. Johnson appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issues were resolved in the trial court upon summary judgment. Summary judgments

do not enjoy a presumption of correctness on appeal. BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Co. v. Johnson,

100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003). This court must make a fresh determination that the

requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51

(Tenn. 1997). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and

resolve all inferences in that party's favor. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002).

When reviewing the evidence, we first determine whether factual disputes exist. If a factual dispute

exists, we then determine whether the fact is material to the claim or defense upon which the

summary judgment is predicated and whetherthe disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. Byrd

v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993); Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 102,

104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Summary judgments are proper in virtually all civil cases that can be resolved on the basis

of legal issues alone, Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210; Pendleton v. Mills, 73 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2001); however, they are not appropriate when genuine disputes regarding material facts exist.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party seeking a summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating

that no genuine disputes of material fact exist and that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Godfrey, 90 S.W.3d at 695. Summary judgment should be granted at the trial court level when

the undisputed facts, and the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, support one

conclusion, which is the party seeking the summary judgment is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law. Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn. 2002); Webber v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001). 

The court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the non-moving

party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, discard all countervailing evidence, and,

if there is a dispute as to any material fact or if there is any doubt as to the existence of a material

fact, summary judgment cannot be granted. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210; EVCO Corp. v. Ross, 528

S.W.2d 20 (Tenn. 1975). To be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively

negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or establish an affirmative defense that

conclusively defeats the non-moving party's claim. Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 82-83 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2000).
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ANALYSIS

The Tennessee Handicap Act prohibits discrimination in the work place based on an

employee’s handicap or perceived handicap. Specifically, it prohibits:

Discrimination in the hiring, firing and other terms and conditions of employment of

the state of Tennessee or any department, agency, institution or political subdivision

of the state, or of any private employer, against any applicant for employment based

solely upon any physical, mental or visual handicap of the applicant, unless such

handicap to some degree prevents the applicant from performing the duties required

by the employment sought or impairs the performance of the work involved.

Tenn. Code Ann. 8-50-103(a). A plaintiff alleging discrimination in violation of the Tennessee

Handicap Act must establish three elements:

1. The claimant was qualified for the position;

2. The claimant was disabled; and

3. The claimant suffered an adverse employment action because of that

disability.

See Barnes v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000). All three of these

elements are essential to a successful claim. Id. 

The trial court summarily dismissed the Tennessee Handicap Act claim upon a finding that

Ms. Johnson’s August 10, 2002 stroke, which left her permanently and totally disabled and unable

to work, did not qualify as an adverse employment action by Clover Bottom.

An adverse employment action, as contemplated by the [Tennessee Handicap Act],

is a material and adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. See

generally Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1996). The change

must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job

responsibilities. Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136

(7th Cir.1993). The following is a non-exhaustive list of adverse employment

actions: termination of employment; demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or

salary, by a less distinguished title, or by a material loss of employment benefits; or

a significant reduction of material responsibilities. Crady, 993 F.2d at 132; see also

DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 804 (4th Cir.1995) (indicating a reprimand and

reassignment may constitute an adverse employment action); Dahm v. Flynn, 60 F.3d

253, 257 (7th Cir.1994) (stating dramatic downward shift in skill level required can

constitute an adverse employment action); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis

County, Mo., 729 F.2d 541, 547 (8th Cir.1984) (holding transfer, with the same pay,

from hearing officer to staff attorney was adverse because less prestigious); Frazier
The discriminatory and retaliatory action of her supervisor to which Ms. Johnson is referring is her supervisor’s 4

alleged act of throwing the resident’s clothes on the floor and instructing her to clean the mess.

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v. Heritage Fed. Bank for Savings, 955 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)

(noting reduction in duties and prestige were “materially adverse changes” in terms

and conditions of employment).

Barnes, 48 S.W.3d at 707.

In Barnes the plaintiff was laid off by Goodyear, which the court found was “clearly an

adverse employment action.” Id. As the Court explained, Goodyear's decision to lay off the plaintiff

and to offer him a “temporary, hourly position which would have paid the plaintiff approximately

one-half of his previous salary . . . [that] did not include employee benefits, and acceptance of the

position may have terminated the plaintiff's right to be recalled as a salaried worker . . . constituted

an adverse employment action.” Id. That is not the case here. 

Ms. Johnson contends she “suffered the most adverse of employment actions, i.e. no longer

able to be employed . . .” and that “while Defendants did not directly terminate [her], the result of

the discriminatory and retaliatory action of [her supervisor] effectively did so.” However, Ms. 4

Johnson presented no competent medical evidence of a causal link between her supervisor’s alleged

behavior on August 9, and the stroke she suffered on August 10. Furthermore, she presented no

evidence to support the conclusory statement that her supervisor’s behavior was in any way related

to her medical limitations preceding the stroke on August 10. 

Looking to the undisputed facts, the stroke on August 10, 2002, is the sole reason Ms.

Johnson has not and cannot return to work at Clover Bottom. This is evident from the fact the Social

Security Administration has declared Ms. Johnson one hundred percent disabled. It is not because

of any employment action by Clover Bottom, adverse or otherwise. As a consequence, Ms. Johnson

was unable to establish an essential element of her claim. Accordingly, summary dismissal was

proper. 

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded with costs of appeal

assessed against Appellant, Laura Johnson.

___________________________________ 

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., JUDGE