No 

No. 97-605

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 275N

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF

ROBERTA ANDERSON,

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and

JOHN (JACK) MORELLI, 

Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Hill,

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The Honorable John Warner, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Gary S. Deschenes, Randy L. Tarum, Deschenes Law Office, Great Falls, Montana

For Respondent:

John (Jack) Morelli, Bigfork, Montana (pro se)

Submitted on Briefs: March 26, 1998

Decided: November 12, 1998

Filed:

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__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1. Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be 

filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be 

reported by case title, Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter 

Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases 

issued by this Court.

¶2. Roberta Anderson (Roberta) appeals from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 

of Law, Judgment and Decree, and post-judgment rulings of the Twelfth Judicial 

District Court, Hill County. We affirm. 

¶3. Roberta raises eight issues on appeal, however we have consolidated them into 

four dispositive issues and restate them as follows:

¶4. 1. Did the District Court err by ruling that Roberta failed to file a timely 

objection to the Special Master's Final Report?

¶5. 2. Did the District Court err when it appointed a special master to be the 

settlement master and judge in the trial of this case?

¶6. 3. Did the District Court err by awarding custody and visitation without having 

an independent evaluation of the family conducted to determine the custody 

arrangement that was in the best interest of the parties' minor child?

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¶7. 4. Did the District Court err by requiring Roberta to pay her own attorney's fees 

and half of the Special Master's fees?

Factual and Procedural Background

¶8. Roberta and John (Jack) Morelli were married on September 23, 1989. Roberta 

and Jack have one child, Michael John Morelli, who was born on April 13, 1990. On 

April 1, 1994, Roberta filed an Amended Petition for Legal Separation. Two months 

later, on June 6, 1994, Jack filed a response to Roberta's petition for legal separation 

wherein he petitioned for dissolution of marriage. 

¶9. On September 21, 1995, Jack moved the court for the appointment of a special 

master pursuant to Rule 53, M.R.Civ.P. On October 12, 1995, the District Court 

appointed John B. Kuhr (Kuhr) to serve as special master. Because of a conflict of 

interest, on October 16, 1995, the District Court dismissed Kuhr and appointed 

Curtis G. Thompson to serve as special master. The District Court's Order stated 

that Jack and Roberta were to each pay one-half of the Special Master's fees. On 

December 6, 1995, the District Court issued an Order Fixing Compensation for 

Special Master that stated that each party would share the cost of the Special Master 

equally.

¶10. From May 8, 1996, to May 10, 1996, the Special Master conducted a trial on this 

matter. Apparently, the Special Master met with each party separately before the 

trial in an attempt to settle the case. Roberta and Jack agreed at the trial to submit 

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by May 30, 1996. Jack met this 

deadline. Roberta, on the other hand, did not submit proposed findings of fact and 

conclusions of law. 

¶11. On June 18, 1996, the Special Master submitted his draft report to Roberta and 

Jack. Jack provided the Special Master with suggestions concerning the report, 

albeit one day after the deadline set to submit suggestions. Due to the unavailability 

of her attorney, Roberta provided suggestions to the draft report pro se. Roberta's 

suggestions were also provided one day late. Subsequently, Roberta's attorney filed 

two motions requesting extensions of time so that he could provide suggestions to the 

draft report. Despite these requests, Roberta's attorney did not provide the Special 

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Master with any suggestions.

¶12. The Special Master filed his Final Report on October 1, 1996. The Special 

Master attached to his Final Report his Suggested Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 

Law and Decree; his child support worksheet; Roberta's child support worksheet; 

and Jack's child support worksheet. On October 11, 1996, Jack filed his objections to 

the Special Master's Suggested Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree. 

The Special Master filed the transcript of the hearing on October 24, 1996. 

¶13. Roberta filed a motion to hold Jack in contempt of court on October 16, 1996. 

Roberta filed an affidavit supporting this motion that stated that Jack had not been 

paying child support or maintenance, that Jack hid assets from the Special Master, 

and that she was disabled. On December 6, 1996, Roberta filed a notice stating that 

she was unable to pay the Special Master and that she was contesting his fee. In her 

affidavit supporting this motion, Roberta asserted that the Special Master was unfair 

and biased. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on May 7, 1997, to hear 

testimony and receive evidence on the issues raised in Roberta's motions. 

¶14. On July 14, 1997, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 

of Law which adopted most of the Special Master's suggested findings and 

conclusions. The District Court also issued its Judgment and Decree on that date. 

Subsequently, Roberta filed motions to alter or amend judgment, to amend the 

District Court's Findings of Fact, and for a new trial. On August 21, 1997, the 

District Court denied these motions. Roberta appeals from the District Court's 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree, and post-judgment 

rulings.

Issue 1.

¶15. Did the District Court err by ruling that Roberta failed to file a timely objection to 

the Special Master's Final Report?

¶16. The District Court ruled that Roberta did not file timely objections to the 

Special Master's Final Report. Roberta asserts that her Motion for Holding 

Respondent in Contempt with Affidavit in Support filed on October 16, 1996, served 

as her objections to the Special Master's Final Report. Although Roberta admits that 

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these "objections" were "perhaps not in the form anticipated by the District Court," 

she contends that the District Court should have considered this motion and its 

accompanying affidavit as her written objections to the Special Master's Final 

Report.

¶17. Rule 53(e)(1), M.R.Civ.P., requires special masters to prepare and file a report 

on the matter submitted to them. Rule 53(e)(2), M.R.Civ.P., states that, in nonjury 

actions such as the case at bar, the district court "shall accept the master's findings 

of fact unless clearly erroneous." A party who wishes to challenge a special master's 

finding of fact must file written objections to the special master's report within ten 

days after being served with notice that the special master has filed a report. Rule 53

(e)(2), M.R.Civ.P. The objecting party has the burden of proving that the special 

master's finding of fact is clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Doolittle (1994), 265 

Mont. 168, 171-72, 875 P.2d 331, 334. 

¶18. We have strictly construed Rule 53(e)(2), M.R.Civ.P., by holding that parties 

who do not file written objections to a special master's finding of fact within the tenday period waive their right to object. In re Marriage of Hays (1993), 259 Mont. 302, 

304, 856 P.2d 227, 229. Beyond this, we ruled in Doolittle that objections not made to 

the district court within the ten-day period will not be considered by this Court on 

appeal. Doolittle, 265 Mont. at 172, 875 P.2d at 334. See also Hays, 259 Mont. at 304, 

856 P.2d at 229 (explaining that a timely objection to a special master's final report is 

required to preserve the issue for appeal). 

¶19. In the instant case, Roberta asserts that the District Court erred by not 

considering her Motion for Holding Respondent in Contempt and its accompanying 

affidavit as her written objections to the Special Master's findings of fact in regard to 

her disability, the assets in the marital estate, Jack's income, child support, and 

maintenance. Notwithstanding Roberta's argument, we cannot construe this motion 

as written objections to the Special Master's Final Report because the record shows 

that Roberta did not file this motion and its accompanying affidavit as her objections 

to the Special Master's Final Report. In fact, in this motion, Roberta requested the 

District Court to toll the time period allowed to respond to the report. Roberta also 

requested an extension of time to respond to the Special Master's Final Report in a 

brief filed on October 30, 1996. Roberta noted in this brief that the deadline to object 

to the Special Master's Final Report had passed and explained that she had not yet 

responded to the report because of "excusable neglect." Furthermore, at the District 

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Court hearing on May 7, 1997, Roberta's attorney argued that Roberta did not have 

a reasonable opportunity to file written objections to the Special Master's Final 

Report because the Special Master did not file a transcript of the trial with his Final 

Report. Finally, on May 27, 1997, Roberta filed Petitioner's Brief Against Making 

Decree Adopting "Conclusions of Law" and "Findings of Fact" of Curtis Thompson, 

Special Master wherein she objected to the Special Master's suggested findings and 

conclusions. 

¶20. The record, therefore, shows that Roberta did not file her motion to hold Jack in 

contempt as objections to the Special Master's Final Report. To the contrary, the 

record shows that Roberta requested the District Court to extend the time in which 

to file objections to the report and continued to argue for an extension of time to file 

objections to the report. The record also shows that Roberta filed objections to the 

report even though the District Court did not grant her request for an extension of 

time. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in ruling that Roberta failed to file 

timely objections to the Special Master's Final Report. 

¶21. Because Roberta did not file objections to the Special Master's Final Report 

within the ten-day period as required by Rule 53(e)(2) M.R.Civ.P., she waived her 

right to object to the report. Hays, 259 Mont. at 304, 856 P.2d at 229. Consequently, 

we will not consider the issues that Roberta raised concerning Jack's income for 

child support purposes, the distribution of the marital estate, maintenance, or her 

disability because Roberta did not file timely objections to the Special Master's 

findings and conclusions regarding those issues, and thus did not preserve those 

issues for appeal. Doolittle, 265 Mont. at 172, 875 P.2d at 334. See also Hays, 259 

Mont at 304, 856 P.2d at 229.

Issue 2.

¶22. Did the District Court err when it appointed a special master to be the settlement 

master and judge in the trial of this case?

¶23. Roberta argues that the District Court erred by appointing a special master 

under Rule 53, M.R.Civ.P., because no exceptional circumstances existed that 

required the District Court to appoint a special master. In addition, she argues that 

the District Court erred by requiring the Special Master to sit as the trier of fact in 

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the case after he had unsuccessfully tried to settle the case. After reviewing the 

record, we conclude that Roberta failed to preserve these issues for appeal.

¶24. To preserve an issue for appeal to this Court, a party must make a timely and 

specific objection in the lower court. C. Haydon Ltd. v. MT Min. Properties, Inc.

(1997), 286 Mont. 138, 154, 951 P.2d 46, 56. We have repeatedly held that this Court 

will not review issues or theories raised for the first time on appeal. Kovarik v. 

Kovarik, 1998 MT 33, ¶ 27, 55 St.Rep. 117, ¶ 27, 954 P.2d 1147, ¶ 27 (citing In re 

Marriage of Binsfield (1995), 269 Mont. 336, 344, 888 P.2d 889, 894). See alsoWelch v. 

Welch (1995), 273 Mont. 497, 502, 905 P.2d 132, 136. The policy behind these rules is 

that a district court cannot be placed in error for something that it did not have the 

opportunity to decide. Kovarik, ¶ 27.

¶25. The record in the instant case shows that Roberta did not object to the 

appointment of the Special Master. Rather, the record suggests that Roberta agreed 

to have the case tried before the Special Master. The record also shows Roberta did 

not object to the Special Master sitting as the trier of fact after he had tried to settle 

the case until after he had issued his Final Report. Thus, we conclude that Roberta 

did not make a timely objection to the scope of the Special Master's appointment. 

Accordingly, we will not consider Roberta's argument that the District Court erred 

by appointing a special master because she raises this issue for the first time on 

appeal. Moreover, we will not consider her argument regarding the scope of the 

Special Master's appointment because she failed to make a timely objection in 

District Court.

Issue 3.

¶26. Did the District Court err by awarding custody and visitation without having an 

independent evaluation of the family conducted to determine the custody arrangement 

that was in the best interest of the parties' minor child?

¶27. The District Court did not adopt the Special Master's suggested finding of fact 

number 7, which states that "[b]oth parties agree that an independent evaluation of 

the immediate and extended family situations, to the extent that the situation may 

involve, influence or impact the minor child, should be performed." Roberta 

contends that the District Court erred by not adopting the Special Master's suggested 

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finding and by awarding custody and visitation without considering the results of 

such a study.

¶28. The standard of review for custody and visitation is whether substantial credible 

evidence supports the district court's judgment. This Court will not overturn a 

district court's custody or visitation decision unless the court's findings and 

conclusions clearly demonstrate an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Boyer

(1995), 274 Mont. 282, 288, 908 P.2d 665, 668 (citing In re Marriage of Hunt (1994), 

264 Mont. 159, 164, 870 P.2d 720, 723). We have stated that "[t]he district court has 

broad power to address all problems concerning custody and visitation." Boyer, 274 

Mont. at 288, 908 P.2d at 668. 

¶29. The District Court did not adopt the Special Master's finding regarding an 

independent family evaluation reasoning that Jack and Roberta have litigated this 

case to the point where both have exhausted almost all of their resources and, 

therefore, that the expenditure of further funds would be unwise. It is clear that the 

District Court found the Special Master's recommended finding clearly erroneous 

because of the cost to Jack and Roberta. The record shows that Jack had trouble 

paying his attorney's fees on time. Additionally, Roberta has argued that she is 

unable to pay the money that she owes the Special Master. Consequently, we hold 

that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded custody and 

visitation without having an independent evaluation of the family conducted.

Issue 4.

¶30. Did the District Court err by requiring Roberta to pay her own attorney's fees and 

half of the Special Master's fees?

¶31. Roberta argues that the District Court erred by ruling that each party is to pay 

their own attorney's fees. She also argues that the District Court erred by requiring 

her to pay half of the Special Master's fees. 

¶32. Section 40-4-110, MCA, permits a district court, after considering the financial 

resources of both parties, to order one party to pay a reasonable amount for the 

other party's costs of maintaining a marital dissolution case and for attorney's fees. 

This Court will not disturb a district court's determination regarding costs and 

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attorney's fees in a marital dissolution case absent an abuse of discretion. In re 

Marriage of Lee (1997), 282 Mont. 410, 423, 938 P.2d 650, 658 (citing In re Marriage 

of Walls (1996), 278 Mont. 413, 420, 925 P.2d 483, 487). Moreover, in a marital 

dissolution case, a district court must simply " 'indicate its reasons for refusing to 

grant attorney[']s fees.' " In re Marriage of Voelkel (1987), 226 Mont. 143, 147, 734 

P.2d 217, 220 (quoting In re Marriage of Rolfe (1985), 216 Mont. 39, 49, 699 P.2d 79, 

84). 

¶33. Roberta cites In re Marriage of Skinner (1989), 240 Mont. 299, 783 P.2d 1350, to 

support her argument that the District Court erred by ruling that she is to pay her 

own attorney's fees. In Skinner, we upheld an award of attorney's fees because of a 

"great financial disparity between the parties." Skinner, 240 Mont. at 307, 783 P.2d 

at 1355. Skinner, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar.

¶34. Here, the District Court considered the property distribution, the history of this 

case, and the parties' assets in ruling that Roberta and Jack should pay their own 

attorney's fees and costs. This is a clear indication of the District Court's reasoning in 

ruling that each party should pay their own attorney's fees. See Voelkel, 226 Mont. at 

147, 734 P.2d at 220. Furthermore, unlike the appellant in Skinner who could afford 

to pay the attorney's fees, the record in the instant case shows that Jack had trouble 

paying his own attorney's fees. Thus, after reviewing the record, we hold that the 

District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring each party to pay their own 

attorney's fees.

¶35. With regard to the Special Master's fees, the District Court noted that Roberta 

and Jack agreed to have the case heard by a special master. In addition, the record 

shows that Roberta did not object to paying half of the Special Master's fees until one 

year after the District Court issued its order stating that Roberta and Jack were to 

share the Special Master's fee equally. Thus, we hold that the District Court did not 

abuse its discretion in requiring Roberta to pay half of the Special Master's fees.

Conclusion

¶36. We hold that the District Court did not err in ruling that Roberta did not file 

timely objections to the Special Master's Final Report, in awarding custody and 

visitation without having an independent family evaluation conducted, or in 

requiring Roberta to pay her own attorney's fees and half of the Special Master's 

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fees. Because Roberta did not file timely objections to the Special Master's Final 

Report, we do not reach the issues regarding Jack's income for child support 

purposes, the distribution of the marital estate, maintenance, or her disability. 

Moreover, we will not consider Roberta's argument that the District Court erred by 

appointing a special master because she raises this issue for the first time on appeal 

and we will not consider her argument regarding scope of the Special Master's 

appointment because she failed to make a timely objection in District Court.

¶37. Affirmed.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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