J-S46002-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3674 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002529-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3676 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002530-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.I.W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3678 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 15, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000682-2018
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IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A.A.B., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3679 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 15, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000683-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2019

T.B. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees entered November 15, 2018, 

that granted the petitions of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(“DHS”), and involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his sons, A.I.W. 

(born June 2012), and S.A.A.B. (born May 2013) (collectively, “Children”).1 

Father also appeals the orders entered the same day that changed Children’s 

permanent placement goals to adoption. After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history of this matter 

as follows:

On November 15, 2016, the [c]hildren became known to the 

Department of Human Services (“DHS”) when DHS received a 

General Protective Services (“GPS”) report alleging that there was 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of S.W. 

(“Mother”), the mother of A.I.W. and S.A.A.B. Mother appealed the decrees 

terminating her parental rights, and we address her appeal in a separate 

memorandum.
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no food in the parental home; that the home was heated with 

electric space heaters; that the home had no hot water; and that 

Mother and Children were residing in a shelter. The report also 

alleged that Father was currently hospitalized recovering from a 

bullet wound and that there was [a] history of domestic violence 

between Mother and Father. On November 15, 2016, DHS visited 

the home and found [c]hildren A[.]W[.] and S[.]B[.] with Mother. 

DHS observed that the home was infested with bed bugs; the 

stove [was] greasy; and the basement smelled of raw sewage. 

Child A[.]W[.] and [c]hild S[.]B[.] lacked proper dental care and 

had a foul o[dor]. As a result of the home visit, DHS obtained an 

Order for Protective Custody (“OPC”) for the [c]hildren. On 

November 30, 2016, following a hearing, the [c]hildren were 

adjudicated dependent. 

On March 9, 2017, a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) was created. The 

parental objectives for Mother were to receive mental health 

treatment and enroll in job counseling. The parental objectives of 

Father were to enroll in parenting classes and mental health 

treatment. On February 18, 2018, a revised SCP was created. The 

parental objectives for Mother were to visit the [c]hildren biweekly separate from Father; (2) Mother was to attend anger 

management classes; (3) Mother was to attend mental health 

treatment; (4) Mother would make the house suitable for the 

[c]hildren; and (5) Mother would seek employment and 

appropriate housing. The parental objectives for Father were (1) 

to visit the [c]hildren bi-weekly; (2) to attend anger management 

counseling; (3) to receive weekly mental health treatment and (4) 

to make the house suitable for the [c]hildren.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/8/19, at 2-3 (citations to the record omitted).

On August 21, 2018, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate the 

parental rights of Mother and Father and to change Children’s permanent 

placement goals to adoption. The court conducted hearings on the petitions 

on September 14, 2018 and November 15, 2018.2 

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2 Children were represented by Attorney James Martin as legal counsel and 

Attorney Daniel Kurland as guardian ad litem.
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DHS presented the testimony of Jasmine Mitchell, the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager for Turning Points for Children; Majita 

Mohammad, a life skills and visitation coach; and Sakina Shaddiq, a visitation 

coach. Father testified on his own behalf. On November 15, 2018, the court 

entered decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to Children,

and orders changing Children’s permanent placement goals to adoption. On 

December 17, 2018, Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).3 This Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated Father’s 

appeals. 

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court’s decision to involuntarily terminate 

T.B.’s parental rights to his children A.W. and S.B., was not 

supported by clear and convincing evidence warranting such 

determination?

2. Whether the trial court’s decision to change A.W.’s and 

S.B.’s permanency goal from reunification with the parent to 

adoption was not supported by clear and convincing evidence 

demonstrating that such decision would best protect the children’s 

needs and welfare and be in the child[ren]’s best interests?

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3 Generally, a party must file his or her notice of appeal within thirty days after 

entry of the order. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (“Except as otherwise prescribed by 

this rule, the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed within 30 days after the entry 

of the order from which the appeal is taken.”). Thirty days after November 15, 

2018, was Saturday, December 15, 2018. Thus, Father timely filed his notice 

of appeal on Monday, December 17, 2018. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 

(“Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, 

. . . such day shall be omitted from the computation.”).
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Father’s brief at 5.

We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis: 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). This Court may 
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affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights 

with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, we will focus our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which 

provides as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under Section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows:
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 As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for 

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.” . . . 

 This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for termination 

under § 2511(a)(2): 

 A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can 

seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon 

parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 

1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of 

performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who 

refuses to perform the duties. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements: 

(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot 

or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 

(Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, 

those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform 

parental duties. See In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. See id. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of 

uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may 

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. See id. at 340.

Father asserts the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) because the evidence “presented at trial did 

not establish any substantial parental objective plan that [F]ather failed to 

meet to prohibit reunification.” See Father’s brief at 17. Father contends that 

he parented Children and has been in their lives since birth. See id. at 20. 

Father asserts DHS provided minimal assistance with housing, and that his 

housing was appropriate. See id. Further, Father argues that he obtained 

employment and was pursuing a Social Security Disability claim. See id. 

Accordingly, Father contends that the conditions that led to Children’s 

placement have been substantially remedied. See id. at 21. 

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2), reasoning that Father failed to timely obtain appropriate housing, 

complete mental health treatment, or attend parenting classes. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 5/8/19, at 5-6. Further, the court observed that Father failed 

to appear for drug tests. See id. at 6. The court found DHS’s witnesses to be 

credible and Father’s testimony to be neither compelling nor credible. See id.
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at 7. Accordingly, the court determined that DHS met its burden of proof with 

respect to Section 2511(a)(2).

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Jasmine Mitchell, the 

CUA caseworker, testified that the family initially came to DHS’s attention due 

to allegations involving the family home having a broken water heater, a lack 

of food and supervision, and poor hygiene. See N.T., 9/14/18, at 18. Children 

were adjudicated dependent November 30, 2016, and have been in placement 

since that time. See id. Father’s SCP objectives were to attend mental health 

therapy; appear for drug screens; obtain appropriate housing and 

employment; complete a fatherhood program; attend a parenting program at 

the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”); and obtain a parenting capacity 

evaluation (“PCE”). See id. at 30-32, 34-37, 52-53. Shortly before the 

termination hearing, Father was able to make his housing appropriate. See 

id. at 23, 34-36, 67-68. Further, Father was consistent with his mental health 

therapy after April 2017. See id. at 30-31. Overall, Father’s compliance with 

the SCP was moderate. See id. at 57.

However, Mitchell testified that Father attended the first portion of the 

PCE after failing to attend four appointments between October 2017 and March 

2018. See id. at 31-32, 69-70. Father failed to appear for drug testing that 

would allow for the completion of the PCE. See id. at 31-32. Moreover, Father

failed to complete the fatherhood program and the ARC program. See id. at 
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36-37, 55. Although Father asserted he worked, he claimed his work was 

under the table and did not provide documentation. See id. at 55-56. 

Additionally, Father did not visit Children from November 2016 until 

February 2017 because he could not be contacted. See id. at 23-24. Once 

Father began visits, they were always supervised, in large part because of his 

lack of impulse control. See id. at 57.

Majita Mohammad testified regarding Father’s visits with Children, 

noting that, from August 2017 through February 2018, Mother and Father 

were offered approximately twenty-five visits and attended four. See id. at 

102-03. After February 2018, Father’s attendance became more consistent. 

See id. at 108. 

Father testified that he was compliant with his objectives, and that, to 

the extent he failed to achieve objectives, it was because DHS failed to contact 

him. See id. at 140-44. Father asserted that he never missed a visit, and that 

the visits went well. See id. at 150; N.T., 11/15/18, at 5-6. 

Father contended that he earned money by performing light 

maintenance work for his family, and that he had applied for Social Security 

Disability. See N.T., 9/14/18, at 147-50. Father testified that he applied for 

disability as a result of unknown assailants shooting Father on three separate 

occasions. See N.T., 9/14/18, at 131-35; N.T., 11/15/18, at 11-12, 15. Father 

asserted that he lives in a four-bedroom house, and that his housing is

appropriate. See N.T., 11/15/18, at 11. However, he acknowledged that he 
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was still attending anger management, never started the fatherhood program, 

and did not attend any ARC programs. See id. at 15, 17, 19-20. Father 

testified that he was never asked to complete a parenting class. See id.

As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while 

a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting 

responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s 

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope 

for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 

2006). 

Here, the court credited the testimony of DHS’s witnesses, and the 

record substantiates the conclusion that Father’s repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused Children to be without 

essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their physical and 

mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. 

Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy this situation. As noted above, in 

order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the 

trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) before assessing the 

determination under Section 2511(b), and we, therefore, need not address 

any further subsections of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384. 

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). The 

requisite analysis is as follows. 
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Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, 

Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and 

the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation 

marks and citations omitted).

Father argues that DHS presented insufficient evidence that termination 

of his parental rights was in Children’s best interests, and further argues that 

DHS failed to present evidence regarding the negative effects that terminating 

his parental rights would have on Children. See Father’s brief at 23.

Accordingly, Father contends that terminating his parental rights would sever

a necessary and beneficial bond. See id. at 24.

The trial court found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in 

the best interests of Children pursuant to Section 2511(b). See Trial Court 
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Opinion, 5/8/19, at 4. The court emphasized Children’s need for stability and 

continuity. See N.T., 11/15/18, at 33-34.

The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Mohammad testified 

that, during visits, Children and Father greeted each other by hugging and 

kissing, and Father was engaged with Children. See N.T., 9/14/18, at 104. 

However, Children did not tell Father they miss him. See id. Similarly, 

Mohammad observed that Children were excited to see Father but do not cry 

when he leaves and do not suggest they want to leave with Father. See id. at 

121-22. Moreover, counsel for Children indicated that Children are happy 

living with their paternal grandmother, and did not indicate they wanted to 

return to Father. See N.T., 11/15/18, at 27. 

In contrast, Father testified that he raised Children since birth, Children 

refer to him as “dad,” and Children want to return home. See N.T., 11/15/18, 

at 12-14. Father further testified that he wants to be reunited with Children 

and shares a bond with them. See id.

The credited testimony supports the trial court’s decision that it would 

best serve the needs and welfare of Children to involuntarily terminate 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). Preserving Father’s 

parental rights would serve only to deny Children the permanence and stability 

to which they are entitled. See In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1220

(“Clearly, it would not be in [the child’s] best interest for his life to remain on 

hold indefinitely in hopes that [Father] will one day be able to act as his 
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parent.”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating Father’s 

parental rights to Children pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In his final issue, Father argues the trial court erred in changing 

Children’s permanent placement goals to adoption because the court failed to 

give primary consideration to the physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of Children. See Father’s brief at 17, 25. Father also argues that he 

substantially remedied the conditions that led to Children’s placement and 

maintains a bond with Children. See id. at 21-22.

The Juvenile Act governs proceedings to change a child’s permanent 

placement goal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6375. Trial courts must apply the 

following analysis: 

Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when 

considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the 

juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing 

necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent 

of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of 

progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and 

feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a 

likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) 

the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement 

for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best 

interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must 

guide the trial court. As this Court has held, a child’s life simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon 

the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.

In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). We review the court’s ruling to ensure it is supported by 
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evidence of record and to determine if it constitutes an abuse of the court’s 

discretion. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

Although the trial court did not specifically address this issue in its 

opinion, our review of the record supports the trial court’s orders changing 

Children’s permanent placement goals to adoption. At the time of the 

proceedings, Children had been in foster care for nearly two years. Father 

failed to demonstrate an ability to parent Children during their time in care. 

Accordingly, it is clear that Father will not be in a position to provide Children

with a safe and permanent home at any point in the foreseeable future. 

Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in changing 

Children’s permanent placement goals from reunification to adoption.

Accordingly, we affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating Father’s 

parental rights, and the orders changing Children’s permanent placement 

goals to adoption.

Decrees affirmed; Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/6/19