### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 12, 200 6 S es sio n LAU RA JOHNS ON v. C LOV ER BOTTO M D EVE LOP MEN T CENTER, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 03-2324-I C laud ia Bon nym an, Chan cellor

No. M2005- 01440-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on Jan uary 31, 2007

An employ ee of

Clover B ottom Development C enter appea ls the s ummary dismiss al of he r ac tion under the Tenne ssee Handica p Act. The employ ee alleg ed she was the victim of discrimination due to her medic al limit ations. The trial court dismissed the ac tion finding the e mploy ee f ailed to show she sustained a n adver se employment action, an e ssential element of her c laim. We affirm. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Aff irm ed
F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., joined.
Rebec ca T . Garland, B rentwood, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, L aura

J ohnson.
Robert E. Cooper, J r., Att orney Gene ral and Reporter ; and S teven B. McCloud, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appellee , Clover B ottom Development Center, and State of Tenne ssee De partment of Me nta l H e a lth& De ve lop me nta l D isa bil iti e s. OP IN ION
L aura J ohnson was hire d by Clover Bottom Deve lopment Ce nter in 1996 as a de velopmental technician. C l o v er Bo ttom, which is operated by the State of Te nnessee Depa rtment of Menta l He a ltha ndDe ve lop me nta l D isa bil iti e s, se rv e s a s a

re sid e nti a l a ndtr a ini ng fa c ili ty fo r i nd ivi du a ls who ar e mentally

and phy sically

handica pped.
I nit ia lly , M s. John so n’ s d uti e s a s a de ve lop me nta l te c hn ic ia n r e qu ir e d th a t sh e int e ra c t w ith residents of Clover

Bottom. Shortly afte r beginning work at Clover Bottom, Ms. J ohnson suffer ed a str ok e , aft e r w hic h s he wa s a bleto r e turn to wo rk

wi th c e rt a in m e dic a l r e stric tio ns du e to presc ribed blood thinners. Her doctor recommende d that she avoid e x posure to injuries that mig ht c aus e ble e din g
. She wa s a lso lim ite d to thea mou nt o f w e ig ht s he c ou ld l if t. B e c aus e he r j ob a s a developmenta l technician r equire d interac tion with the residents, which e x posed her to the potentialM s
. John s on cl ai ms s he was i ns t r uct ed to ru n so m e e r r ands t o pi ck up s uppl i es for Cl over B ot t om , wh i ch 1 i ncl ud ed s acks of feed and fert i l i zer. M s. Jo hnson ass ert ed t hat t he wei ght of t hese i t em s exceed ed t he am o unt of weight sh e w a s p e rm itt e d to li ft.

T h e re c o rd is sil e n t as to w h e the r M s. J o h n so n c a rr ie d o u t the ta sk u n d e r p ro te st o r sim p ly re fus e d to c o m p le te 2 the a ssig n e d tas k

.

M s. Jo hn so n a d d i t i o na l l y ci t ed t he T en ne ssee H um an R i gh t s A ct (T H R A ) i n he r c o m p la in t ; ho w ev er, M s. 3 Joh n s on h as n ot a l l eg ed t h at s h e wa s t h e v i ct i m of di s cr i mi n at i on ba s ed o n race , c reed , c ol or , r el i g i on , s ex , a g e or n a tio n a l o rig in, b e ing the fo u n d a tio n o f a cla im u n d e r t h e T H R A

. In re sp o n se to a M o tio n to D ism iss tha t wa s u lti m a te ly d eni ed , her counsel exp l ai ned t he T enness ee H and i cap A ct pro vi d es an aggr i eved pe rs o n s uch as M s. Jo hnson al l of t he rights p ro vid ed fo r i n the T H R A , an d i t wa s fo r t ha t rea so n the T H R A wa s cit ed i n the c o m p l aint i n thi s ac t i o n. M s. J o h n so n , ho w e v e r, d id no t f ile a sw o rn c o m p la int w ith the T e n n e sse e H u m a n R igh ts C o m m issio n . A c c o rd ing ly, w e w ill lim it o u r re v ie w to the T e n n e sse e H a n d ic a p A c t. -2- fo r i nju ri e s th a t mig ht caus e ble e din g , Clov e r B ott om cr e a te d a posi tio n of a cl oth ing c le rk fo r M s. John so n, wh ic h wa s c la ssi fi e d a s a “ lig ht- du ty ” po sit ion . In h e r n e w p os iti on a s a c lothin g c le rk , M s. J ohnson was responsible for maintaining clothing for the residents, keeping trac k of ea ch re sident’s clo th in g inv e nto ry , a ndha nd lin g se a so na l st or a g e of c lothin g , w hic h d uti e s w e resu ita blefo r M s. J ohnson’s restric tions. Almost five y ear s later, in June of 2002, Ms. J ohnson alleg es that her supervisor g ave he r a wo rk ass ignm ent that vi olate d h e r m e dic a l r e stric tio ns
. Up on re c e ivi ng thea ssi g nme nt, Ms. 1 J ohnson reminded he r supervisor of her medical r estrictions, following which her supervisor 2 reque sted that she provide an update d list of restrictions. On J une 28, 2002, Ms. J ohnson delivere d an update d medical r estric t i o n l et ter to her supervisor. The rea fter, Ms. Johnson allege s that her supervisor told her

there was no job for

her at Clover Bottom and that she should g o home.
Ms. J ohnson alleg es that over the next mont h she attempted to re concile he r em p l o y ment situation bycontac ting “various state office rs.” A meeting was he ld at Clover B ottom on J uly 31, 2002, afte r which Ms. Johnson returned to work w ith her re strictions having been updated and an ag ree ment having been r eac hed as to the a ppropriate acc ommodations for Ms. J ohnson.
One we ek later , on Aug ust 9, 2002, Ms. J ohnson states t hat her supervisor threw a r esident’s c lo th in g o n th e f

lo o r in f r o n t o f h e r a n d o r d e r e d M s
. Jo h n s o n to c le a n u p th e me ss. Ms. J ohnson states that she complied and cleaned up the mess. Thenext day , Aug ust 10, 2002, while away from work shopping , Ms. J ohnson suffer ed a se vere stroke that lef t her pe rmane ntly

and totally

disabled.
Ms. John so n f

ile d th is a c tio n a g a ins t Clo ve r B ott om a lle g ing it d isc ri min a te d a g a ins t he r i n violation of the Tenne ssee Handica p Act, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 50-103. To prove handicap 3 dis c ri min a tio n, sh e wa s r e qu ir e d to sh ow Clo ve r B ott om too k a n a dv e rs e e mpl oyme nt a c tio n a g a ins t her, and she conte nds the stroke she suf fe re d o n Aug ust 10, 2002, was the adve rse e mploy ment action because the s troke was the di rec t result of a supervisor’s misconduc t and re sulted in her no longe r being able to wor

k.-3-

Clo ve r B ott om time ly fi le d an An sw e r de nying a ny vio latio n o f the Te nn e sse e Hand ic ap A c t. After discovery was taken, Clover Bottom filed a Motion for Summary J udg ment contending , inter ali a , that Ms. Johnson f

ailed to e stablish a causa l c onnection betwee n her alleg ed disabilityand an a dv e rs e e mpl oyme nt a c tio n. Th e trial cou rt fo un d th a t he r s tr ok e didno t qu a lif y a s a n a dv e rs e employ ment action, which is an essential element of a claim under the Tenne ssee Handicap Ac t, and dismiss ed Ms. J ohnson’s ca se. Ms. J ohnson appea ls.
S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW
Th e iss ue s we re re so lve d inthetria l c ou rt up on su mma

ry jud g me nt. Sum mary

jud g me nts do not enjoy

a pre sumption of corre ctness on appe al. BellSouth Adve rt. & Publ’g Co. v. Johnson , 100 S.W .3d 20 2 , 205 (Tenn. 2003) . This court must make a f resh de termination that the require ments of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have be en satisfied. Hu nte r v . B ro wn , 955 S.W .2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997) . We consider the e vidence in the light most favor able to the n o n -m oving pa rty and resolve a ll inferenc es in that party ' s favor

. Go dfr ey v . R uiz , 90 S

. W

. 3 d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002)

. Whe n r e vie wi ng thee vid e nc e , w e fi rs t de te rm inewh e the r f a c tua l di sp ute s e xist. I f a

fa c tua l di sp ute exis ts, we then de term i n e whether the fa ct is material to the c laim or defe nse upon which the summary judgme nt is predicate d and whether the disputed fac t c reates a g enuine issue f or trial. By rd
v . H all , 84 7 S. W.2 d 2 08 , 2 14 (T e nn . 1 99 3) ; Rutherford v. Polar T ank Trailer, Inc ., 978 S.W .2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
Sum mary jud g me nts arepr op e r i n v irtua lly a ll c ivi l c a se s that c a n b e re so lve d o n th e ba sis of leg al issues alone, By rd , 8 47 S.W. 2da t 21 0; Pe nd le ton v . Mill s , 7 3 S.W.3 d 115 , 1 21 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 01 ); ho we ve r, the y are no t app ro priate wh e n g e nu inedis pu te s r e g ard ing mate ri a l f a c ts e xist. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party seeking a sum mary judgme nt bear s the burden of demonstrating that n o genuine disputes of material fa ct existand that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Godfrey , 90 S.W .3d at 695. Summary judgme nt should be g rante d at the trial c ourt level whe n the undisputed fac ts, and the infer ence s rea sonably draw n from the u n d i s p u ted fa cts, support one conclusion, which is the party seeking the summary judgme nt is entitl ed to a judg ment as a matter of law. Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee , 9 0 S. W.3 d 6 14 , 6 20 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; W e bb e r v . S tate Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 49 S.W .3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001)

. The court must take the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence in favor of the non-moving party , allow all re asonable infere nces in favor of t hat party , discard a ll counterva iling evide nce, and, if t here is a dispute as to any materia l fac t or if there is any doubt as to the exist enceof a material fac t, summary

judgme nt can not be g rante d. By rd , 8 47 S.W. 2da t 21 0; EV CO Cor p. v . R os s , 528 S.W. 2d20 (T e nn . 1 97 5) . T o b e e nti tle d to su mma ry jud g me nt, themov ing pa rty mus t a ff irmativ e ly neg ate an essential ele ment of the non-moving party ' s claim or e stablish an aff irmative def

ense that conclusively

defe ats the non-moving party ' s claim. Cherry v. W illiams , 36 S.W .3d 78, 82-83 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2000).-4- A N A L Y SIS
The Te nnessee Handica

p Act pro h i b i ts discrimination in t he wor k place based on an e mpl oy e e ’s ha nd ic ap o r p e rc e ive d h a nd ic ap. Spe c if ic a lly , it pr oh ibi ts: Discrimination in the hiring , firing and other terms and conditions of employment of the state of Tenne ssee or any department, ag ency , instit ution or politi cal subdivision of the state, or of any

private e mploy er, a g ainst any applicant f

or employment based solely upon any

phy sical, mental or visua l handicap of the applicant, unless such handica p to some deg ree preve nts the applicant from performing the duties requir ed by the employ ment soug ht or impairs the performanc e of the work involved.
Tenn. Code Ann. 8- 50-103(a ). A plaintiff a lleg ing disc rimination in viol at i o n o f t h e Tennessee Hand ic ap A c t mu st e sta

bli shthr e e e le me nts :
1. The c laimant was qua lified for the position; 2. The c laimant was disabled; and 3. The claimant suffe red an adver se employ ment action beca use of that d i s ab i l i t y.
See B arnes v. Goody ear Tire and Rubber Co. , 4 8 S. W.3 d 6 98 , 70 5 (T e nn
. 20 00 ). Al l thr e e of the se elements a

re e ssential to a succ essful claim. Id

. The trial c ourt summarily dismiss ed the Tenne ssee Handica p Act claim upon a finding that Ms. John so n’ s Aug us t 10 , 2 00 2 s tr ok e , w hic h le ft he r p e rm a ne ntl y

a ndtot a lly

dis able d a ndun able to w or k, didno t qu a lif

y a s a n a dv e rs e e mpl oyme nt a c tio n b y Clo ve r B ott om.
A n a d v e r s e e mp lo y me n t a c ti o n , a s c o n te mp late d b y th e [T e n n e s s e e H a n d ic ap A c t] , is a materia l and adve rse c hang e in the t er ms and conditions of employ ment. See g e n e r a l l y Sm a r t v
. B a l lS ta t e U

niv

. , 8 9 F

. 3 d 4 3 7 , 4 4 1 (7 t h C i r. 1 9 9 6 ). T h e c h an ge must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenienc e or an alteration of j ob responsibilities. Crady v. L iberty N at'l Bank & Trust Co. of Ind ., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993). Th e fo llowing is a non- exhaustive list of adve rse e mploy ment actions: termination of e mploy ment; demotion evidence d by a dec rea se in wag e or salary , by a less distinguished title, or by a material loss of employ ment benef its; or a sig nificant re duction of material responsibilities. Crady , 9 93 F .2 d at 13 2; se e als o DiMeglio v. H

aines , 45 F.3d 790, 804 (4 t h C i r.1995) (indicating a re primand and re a ssi g nme nt m a y

c on sti tut e a n a dv e rs e e mpl oyme nt a c tio n) ; Dahm v. F lynn , 60 F.3d 253, 257 (7th Cir.1994) (stating dramatic downwar d shift in skil l level re quired c an constitute an adve rse e mploy ment action); Go od win v
. Circ uit Cou rt of St. Lou is County, Mo. , 7 2 9 F

. 2 d 5 4 1 , 5 4 7 ( 8 t h C i r
. 1 9 8 4 ) ( h o l d i n g tr a n s f e r , w i t h t h e s a m e p a y, fr om h e ari ng of

fi c e r t o s ta ff

a tto rn e y wa s a dv e rs e be c aus e le ss p re sti g iou s) ; FrazierT h e d isc rim ina to ry a n d re ta liato ry a c tio n o f he r su p e rv iso r to w h ic h M s. J o h n so n is re fer rin g is he r su p e rv iso r’s 4 all eg ed ac t o f

t hro w i ng t he resid en t ’ s clo t he s o n the fl o o r an d i nstructi ng he r t o clea n the m ess. -5- v. He r itage Fed. Bank

for Savings , 9 5 5 S. W. 2 d 6 3 3 , 6 3 6 ( T e n n
. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 9 7) (n oti ng re du c tio n indu tie s a ndpr e sti g e we re“ mate ri a lly a dv e rs e c hang e s” in t e rm s and conditions of employment).
Barnes , 48 S.W .3d at 707.
I n Barnes t h e p laintiff was la id off by Goody ear , which the c ourt found wa s “cle arly an adver se employment action.” Id . As the Court e x plained, Goody ear ' s decision to lay off the plaintiff a ndto o ff e r h im a “ te mpo ra

ry , ho ur ly po sit ionwh ic h w ou ld h a ve pa id the plaintif f a pp ro xima te ly one-ha lf of his previous salary

. . . [t hat] did not include employ ee be nefits, and a cce ptance of the position m ay

have te rminated the pla intiff' s rig ht to be rec alled as a salarie d worke r
. . . constituted an adve rse e mploy ment action.” Id . That is not the case here

. Ms. J ohnson contends she “ suffe red the most adver se of e mploy ment actions, i.e. no long er able to be employ ed

. . .” and that “while Def endants did not dire ctly

terminate [her], the re sult of thedis c ri min a tory

a ndre ta liatory

a c tio n o f [h e r s up e rv isor ] effect ive ly didso .” Ho we ve r, Ms.

4 J ohnson prese nted no compete nt medical evide nce of a causal l ink betwee n her supe rvisor’s a lleg ed behavior on Au g ust 9, and the stroke she suffe red on A ug ust 10. Furthermore, she pr esente d no evidenc e to support the conclusory statement that her

supervisor’ s behavior w as in any way related to her medic al limitations prec eding the stroke on Aug ust 10.
L oo kin g to the un dis pu te d f a c ts, thestr ok e on Au g us t 10 , 2 00 2, is the so le r easonMs. J ohnson has not and cannot return to work at Clover Bottom. This is evident fr om the fac t the Social Se c urity Ad min ist ratio n h a s d e c lare d M s. John so n o ne hu nd re d p e rc e nt d isa ble d. It is no t be c aus e of any employ ment action by

Clover B ottom, adverse or otherwise. A s a conse quence , Ms. J ohnson was una ble to es t ablish an esse ntial element of he r cla im. Accor dingly , summary dismiss al was proper
. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirme d, and this matter is remanded with costs of a ppeal assessed a g ainst Appellant, L aura J ohnson.

___________________________________

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE