J-S19043-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee :

:

v. :

:

JOSEPH E. WALLACE, III, :

:

Appellant : No. 2868 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on September 24, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,

Criminal Division, No. CP-15-CR-0001266-2000

BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2015

Joseph E. Wallace, III (“Wallace”), pro se, appeals from the Order 

dismissing his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

The PCRA court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as 

follows:

On February 28, 2000, [Wallace] stabbed his wife Eileen as 

she slept in her bed. Eileen Wallace died as a result of her 

wounds. On December 6, 2000, [Wallace] entered a plea of 

guilty but mentally ill to the charges of third[-]degree murder, 

possessing an instrument of crime and tampering with physical 

evidence. He was sentenced that day to a term of imprisonment 

of twenty-three and one-half to forty-seven years. [Wallace] did 

not appeal his sentence. On September 3, 2013, [Wallace] filed 

a pro se PCRA [P]etition. Because this was [Wallace’s] first 

PCRA [P]etition, [the PCRA court] appointed Robert Brendza, 

Esquire [“Attorney Brendza”] as [Wallace’s] counsel. [Attorney] 

Brendza reviewed [Wallace’s] claims and court file, determined 

 

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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that [Wallace’s] PCRA [Petition] was not timely, and moved to 

withdraw his appearance as PCRA counsel. [The PCRA court] 

also reviewed the file and record, [and] also determined that 

[Wallace’s] PCRA [Petition] was untimely, and on June 18, 2014, 

[the PCRA court] gave [Wallace] [N]otice of [the court’s] intent 

to dismiss his [P]etition without a hearing. [Wallace] responded 

to this [N]otice with two pro se filings. On July 17, 2014, [the 

PCRA court] directed that [Attorney] Brendza review these 

submissions, and inform the [c]ourt of his findings. [Attorney] 

Brendza complied with this [O]rder, and after [the PCRA court’s] 

review revealed that [Wallace] was entitled to no post-conviction 

relief, [the court] dismissed [Wallace’s] PCRA [P]etition on 

September 24, 2014 [and granted Attorney Brendza’s Motion to 

withdraw]. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 11/25/14, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

Wallace, acting pro se, filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a courtordered Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal. 

On appeal, Wallace raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [PCRA] court commit legal error in failing to 

acknowledge, respond to, and/or grant Wallace’s request to 

invoke his right to self-representation?

2. Did the [PCRA] court commit legal error in failing to 

adequately and exclusively consider and respond to Wallace’s 

pro se claims/requests: (unlawfully-induced guilty plea claim, 

after-discovered evidence claim, request for the appointment 

of a psychopharamacologist, and request for an evidentiary 

hearing)? 

Brief for Appellant at 2 (capitalization omitted). We will review Wallace’s 

claims together, as they both require a determination as to whether the 

PCRA court properly concluded that Wallace’s Petition is untimely, and that 

he failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s timeliness bar. 

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA 

in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA 
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level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court 

and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s 

ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal 

error. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

Initially, under the PCRA, any PCRA petition “shall be filed within one 

year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) 

(emphasis added). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion 

of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the 

United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of 

time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the 

merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed. 

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

Here, Wallace’s judgment of sentence became final on January 5, 

2001, when the thirty-day period of time in which to file an appeal with our 

Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P 903(a). 

Accordingly, Wallace had until January 7, 2002, to file the instant PCRA 

Petition, but he did not do so until September 3, 2013. Thus, Wallace’s 

Petition is facially untimely.

Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the 

appellant can explicitly plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth 

under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Any PCRA petition invoking one of these 
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exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have 

been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2); Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1094.

In this case, Wallace has invoked the exception provided by section 

9545(b)(1)(ii), pertaining to newly-discovered evidence. Brief for Appellant 

at 7. This exception requires Wallace to allege and prove that there were 

facts that were unknown to him, and that he could not have ascertained 

those facts by the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth v. 

Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008); see also id. (stating that the 

focus of the exception is “on [the] newly discovered facts, not on a newly 

discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.”) (citation 

omitted). 

Here, Wallace asserts that one of the defense psychologists who 

evaluated him, Dr. Gerald Cooke (“Dr. Cooke”), was unaware of the

prescription medications that Wallace was taking when he murdered his 

wife, including Ambien, Ritalin and Paxil. Brief for Appellant at 10-11. 

Wallace has presented the supplemental opinion of Dr. Cooke, wherein Dr. 

Cooke posits that the medication may have exacerbated Wallace’s psychosis, 

and may provide Wallace with a partial defense of involuntary intoxication. 

Brief for Appellant at 11; see also Supplemental Opinion, 8/4/14, at 1-2. 

However, Dr. Cooke defers to a psychopharmacologist to provide expert 

opinion on this issue. Id. We conclude that these are not “newly discovered 

facts,” but merely “a newly willing source for previously known facts.” See
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Marshall, 947 A.2d at 720. Such a claim does not invoke the timeliness 

exception at section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Therefore, we conclude that the PCRA 

court properly dismissed Wallace’s Petition as untimely. 

Order affirmed.

Stabile, J., joins the memorandum.

Jenkins, J., concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2015