Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 1 

Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT 

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION v. ANTHONY CARDELL 

HAYNES 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09–273. Decided February 22, 2010 

PER CURIAM. 

This case presents the question whether any decision of 

this Court “clearly establishes” that a judge, in ruling on 

an objection to a peremptory challenge under Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), must reject a demeanorbased explanation for the challenge unless the judge personally observed and recalls the aspect of the prospective

juror’s demeanor on which the explanation is based. The 

Court of Appeals appears to have concluded that either 

Batson itself or Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U. S. 472 (2008),

clearly established such a rule, but the Court of Appeals

read far too much into those decisions, and its holding, if

allowed to stand, would have important implications. We 

therefore grant the petition for certiorari, grant respondent’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and reverse 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

I 

Respondent was tried in a Texas state court for the

murder of a police officer, and the State sought the death 

penalty. During voir dire, two judges presided at different 

stages. Judge Harper presided when the attorneys questioned the prospective jurors individually, but Judge

Wallace took over when peremptory challenges were exercised. When the prosecutor struck an African-American 

juror named Owens, respondent’s attorney raised a Batson 
2 THALER v. HAYNES 

Per Curiam 

objection. Judge Wallace determined that respondent had

made out a prima facie case under Batson, and the prosecutor then offered a race-neutral explanation that was 

based on Owens’ demeanor during individual questioning. 

Specifically, the prosecutor asserted that Owens’ demeanor had been “somewhat humorous” and not “serious” 

and that her “body language” had belied her “true feeling.” 

App. to Pet. for Cert. 187. Based on his observations of 

Owens during questioning by respondent’s attorney, the 

prosecutor stated, he believed that she “had a predisposition” and would not look at the possibility of imposing a 

death sentence “in a neutral fashion.” Id., at 188. Respondent’s attorney did not dispute the prosecutor’s characterization of Owens’ demeanor, but he asserted that her 

answers on the jury questionnaire “show[ed] that she was 

a juror who [was] leaning towards the State’s case.” Ibid. 

After considering the prosecutor’s explanation and the

arguments of defense counsel, Judge Wallace stated that 

the prosecutor’s reason for the strike was “race-neutral”

and denied the Batson objection without further explanation. Id., at 189. 

The case proceeded to trial, respondent was convicted

and sentenced to death, and the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals affirmed the conviction. Rejecting respondent’s

argument that “a trial judge who did not witness the 

actual voir dire cannot, as a matter of law, fairly evaluate 

a Batson challenge,” id., at 173, the Court of Criminal 

Appeals wrote: 

“There are many factors which a trial judge—even one 

who did not preside over the voir dire examinations—

can consider in determining whether the opponent of

the peremptory strikes has met his burden. These include the nature and strength of the parties’ arguments during the Batson hearing and the attorneys’

demeanor and credibility. And, when necessary, a 
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Per Curiam 

trial judge who has not witnessed the voir dire may

refer to the record,” id., at 173–174 (footnote omitted). 

With respect to the strike of juror Owens, the court held

that Judge Wallace’s acceptance of the prosecutor’s explanation was not clearly erroneous and noted that “[t]he 

record does reflect that Owens was congenial and easygoing during voir dire and that her attitude was less formal 

than that of other veniremembers.” Id., at 172. This 

Court denied respondent’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 

Haynes v. Texas, 535 U. S. 999 (2002). 

After the Texas courts denied his application for state

habeas relief, respondent filed a federal habeas petition. 

The District Court denied the petition and observed that

this Court had never held that the deference to state-court 

factual determinations that is mandated by the federal

habeas statute is inapplicable when the judge ruling on a 

Batson objection did not observe the jury selection. App. 

to Pet. for Cert. 80, n. 10. 

A panel of the Court of Appeals granted a certificate of

appealability with respect to respondent’s Batson objections concerning Owens and one other prospective juror. 

Haynes v. Quarterman, 526 F. 3d 189, 202 (CA5 2008). In 

its opinion granting the certificate, the panel discussed 

our opinion in Snyder at length and then concluded: 

“Under Snyder’s application of Batson, . . . an appellate court applying Batson arguably should find clear

error when the record reflects that the trial court was 

not able to verify the aspect of the juror’s demeanor 

upon which the prosecutor based his or her peremptory challenge.” 526 F. 3d, at 199. 

When the same panel later ruled on the merits of respondent’s Batson claim regarding juror Owens,1 the court 

—————— 

1Because the panel held that the strike of Owens violated Batson, the 

panel did not rule on the legitimacy of the other strike as to which a 
4 THALER v. HAYNES 

Per Curiam 

adopted the rule that it had previously termed “arguabl[e].” See 526 F. 3d, at 199; Haynes v. Quarterman, 

561 F. 3d 535, 541 (CA5 2009). The court concluded that 

the decisions of the state courts were not owed “AEDPA 

deference” in this case “because the state courts engaged

in pure appellate fact-finding for an issue that turns entirely on demeanor.” Ibid. The court then held that 

“no court, including ours, can now engage in a proper 

adjudication of the defendant’s demeanor-based Batson challenge as to prospective juror Owens because 

we will be relying solely on a paper record and would 

thereby contravene Batson and its clearly-established

‘factual inquiry’ requirement. See, e.g., Snyder, [552

U. S., at 477]; Batson, [476 U. S., at 95].” Ibid. (footnote omitted). 

II 

Respondent cannot obtain federal habeas relief under 28

U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) unless he can show that the decision 

of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”

A legal principle is “clearly established” within the meaning of this provision only when it is embodied in a holding 

of this Court. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. 70, 74 

(2006); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000).

Under §2254(d)(1), a habeas petitioner may obtain relief

(1) “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to 

that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the 

state court decides a case differently than this Court has 

on a set of materially indistinguishable facts”; or (2) “if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that 

—————— 

certificate of appealability had been issued. Haynes v. Quarterman, 

561 F. 3d 535, 541, n. 2 (CA5 2009). 
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Per Curiam 

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id., at 413. 

III 

In holding that respondent is entitled to a new trial, the

Court of Appeals cited two decisions of this Court, Batson 

and Snyder, but neither of these cases held that a demeanor-based explanation for a peremptory challenge 

must be rejected unless the judge personally observed

and recalls the relevant aspect of the prospective juror’s 

demeanor. 

The Court of Appeals appears to have concluded that 

Batson supports its decision because Batson requires a

judge ruling on an objection to a peremptory challenge to

“‘undertake “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial 

and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” ’” 561 

F. 3d, at 540 (quoting Batson, 476 U. S., at 93, in turn 

quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977)). This general

requirement, however, did not clearly establish the rule on 

which the Court of Appeals’ decision rests. Batson noted 

the need for a judge ruling on an objection to a peremptory

challenge to “tak[e] into account all possible explanatory 

factors in the particular case,” 476 U. S., at 95 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). See also Miller-El v. Dretke, 

545 U. S. 231, 239 (2005); Johnson v. California, 545 U. S. 

162, 170 (2005). Thus, where the explanation for a peremptory challenge is based on a prospective juror’s demeanor, the judge should take into account, among other

things, any observations of the juror that the judge was

able to make during the voir dire. But Batson plainly did

not go further and hold that a demeanor-based explanation must be rejected if the judge did not observe or cannot 

recall the juror’s demeanor.

Nor did we establish such a rule in Snyder.2 In that 

—————— 

2Even if Snyder did alter or add to Batson’s rule (as the Court of 
6 THALER v. HAYNES 

Per Curiam 

case, the judge who presided over the voir dire also ruled 

on the Batson objections, and thus we had no occasion to 

consider how Batson applies when different judges preside

over these two stages of the jury selection process. Snyder, 552 U. S., at 475–478. The part of Snyder on which 

the Court of Appeals relied concerned a very different

problem. The prosecutor in that case asserted that he had 

exercised a peremptory challenge for two reasons, one of 

which was based on demeanor (i.e., that the juror had

appeared to be nervous), and the trial judge overruled the 

Batson objection without explanation. 552 U. S., at 478– 

479. We concluded that the record refuted the explanation 

that was not based on demeanor and, in light of the particular circumstances of the case, we held that the peremptory challenge could not be sustained on the demeanor-based ground, which might not have figured in the 

trial judge’s unexplained ruling. Id., at 479–486. Nothing

in this analysis supports the blanket rule on which the 

decision below appears to rest.

The opinion in Snyder did note that when the explanation for a peremptory challenge “invoke[s] a juror’s demeanor,” the trial judge’s “first hand observations” are of 

great importance. Id., at 477. And in explaining why we 

could not assume that the trial judge had credited the 

claim that the juror was nervous, we noted that, because

the peremptory challenge was not exercised until some 

time after the juror was questioned, the trial judge might 

not have recalled the juror’s demeanor. Id., at 479. These 

observations do not suggest that, in the absence of a per-

—————— 

Appeals seems to have concluded), Snyder could not have constituted 

“clearly established Federal law as determined by” this Court for

purposes of respondent’s habeas petition because we decided Snyder

nearly six years after his conviction became final and more than six

years after the relevant state-court decision. See Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U. S. 362, 390 (2000) (opinion for the Court by STEVENS, J.); id., at 

412 (opinion for the Court by O’Connor, J.). 
Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 7 

Per Curiam 

sonal recollection of the juror’s demeanor, the judge could

not have accepted the prosecutor’s explanation. Indeed, 

Snyder quoted the observation in Hernandez v. New York, 

500 U. S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion), that the best 

evidence of the intent of the attorney exercising a strike is 

often that attorney’s demeanor. See 552 U. S., at 477. 

Accordingly, we hold that no decision of this Court 

clearly establishes the categorical rule on which the Court

of Appeals appears to have relied, and we therefore reverse the judgment and remand the case for proceedings

consistent with this opinion. Our decision does not mandate the rejection of respondent’s Batson claim regarding 

juror Owens. On remand, the Court of Appeals may consider whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination may be overcome under the federal habeas

statute’s standard for reviewing a state court’s resolution 

of questions of fact. 

It is so ordered.