NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 17-5742

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEONA GORMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

OPINION

Before: KEITH, ROGERS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Keona Gorman pleaded guilty to and was convicted of 

lying to a grand jury. Facing an advisory guidelines range of 21 to 27 months of imprisonment, 

she received a below-guidelines sentence of 16 months. She raises two issues on appeal. One: 

Did the district court err in assessing a criminal-history point for her prior criminal-impersonation 

conviction? Two: Was her sentence substantively unreasonable? Because the district court 

properly followed the advisory guidelines in counting Gorman’s criminal-history score, and 

because the district court did nor plainly err or abuse its discretion in imposing Gorman’s belowguidelines sentence, we affirm.

I

The Sentencing Guidelines instruct sentencing courts to compute a defendant’s criminal 

history by including all felony offenses and some misdemeanors. Certain misdemeanors “and 

offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are counted only if (A) the sentence 

was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, or 

(B) the prior offense was similar to an instant offense.” USSG § 4A1.2(c)(1). Those certain 

misdemeanors include giving “[f]alse information to a police officer.” Id. Under § 4A1.2, then, 
No. 17-5742, United States v. Keona Gorman

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the district court should count Gorman’s prior criminal-impersonation conviction if it was similar 

to the offense of giving false information to a police officer and (1) Gorman’s “sentence was a 

term of probation of more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days” or

(2) Gorman’s “prior offense was similar to [her] instant offense” of lying to a grand jury. But, 

there is another way to count Gorman’s prior criminal-impersonation offense: if Gorman’s prior 

conviction is not similar to any of the § 4A1.2 offenses in the first place, then the guideline does 

not apply and the district court should count the prior offense so long as no other guideline counsels 

its exclusion.

Gorman’s prior misdemeanor criminal-impersonation conviction arose under Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-16-301, which provides in relevant part that

(a) A person commits criminal impersonation who, with intent to injure or defraud 

another person:

(1) Assumes a false identity;

(2) Pretends to be a representative of some person or organization;

(3) Pretends to be an officer or employee of the government; or

(4) Pretends to have a handicap or disability.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-301 (2009).

In determining whether this offense is similar to giving false information to a police officer, 

we and the district court are advised to “use a common sense approach,” USSG § 4A1.2 cmt. 

n.12(A), taking into account factors including the elements of the crimes and the seriousness of 

and punishment for each offense. Id.; see also United States v. Duckro, 466 F.3d 438, 448 (6th 

Cir. 2006). Taking such an approach, we can find no fault in the district court’s conclusion that 

criminal impersonation under Tennessee law is not similar to providing false information to an 

officer. After all, a conviction for criminal impersonation can be sustained when the defendant 

has neither pretended to be a police officer nor made any representation whatsoever to a police 

officer. And giving false information to a police officer does not require the defendant to 

impersonate anyone. Cf. United States v. Hall, 71 F.3d 569, 572–73 (6th Cir. 1995). We therefore 

affirm the district court’s holding that Gorman’s prior criminal-impersonation conviction is not 
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excluded from sentencing consideration by § 4A1.2 and should be counted as a prior offense in 

the calculation of Gorman’s criminal-history score.

II

Gorman next appeals her sentence as substantively unreasonable. We review this challenge 

under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Yancy, 725 F.3d 596, 598 (6th 

Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). “A sentence may be considered 

substantively unreasonable when the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the 

sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or gives an 

unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Brown, 501 F.3d 722, 

724 (6th Cir. 2007). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as the district court here recognized, the sentence 

imposed must, among other things, be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . , to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 

offense.” See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 47:22–24.

Gorman undoubtedly presents a sympathetic case: among other things, she is a single 

mother with a dependent baby and no felony background, and the grand-jury proceeding in which 

she lied was a proceeding against her abusive boyfriend. But the district court recognized those 

circumstances and the seriousness of Gorman’s crime, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and 

imposed a below-guidelines sentence well within its discretion. Nor does the district court’s failure 

to explain the precise basis for its sentence (that is, why it departed downward by five months but 

not more than that) make the sentence unreasonable. Gorman’s below-guidelines sentence is 

presumed to be reasonable, and it is Gorman who bears the “demanding” burden of proving that 

such a sentence “is unreasonably long.” United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008). 

The district court amply articulated its reasoning to support a sentence of confinement, see

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 48–50, and considered the factors weighing in favor of a below-guidelines 

term, see id. 50–56. We cannot say that the district court plainly erred or abused its discretion in 

sentencing Gorman.
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III

We therefore AFFIRM the district court and dismiss all outstanding motions as moot.