J-S28013-17

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TAMEIKA MINNEFIELD

Appellant No. 1020 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 31, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0003188-2011

BEFORE: OLSON, MOULTON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2017

Appellant, Tameika Minnefield, appeals from the order entered on 

December 31, 2015 dismissing her first petition filed pursuant to the PostConviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. In this appeal 

from the denial of PCRA relief, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed a 

petition to withdraw as counsel and a no-merit brief pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). As 

we conclude that counsel fulfilled the procedural requirements of 

Turner/Finley, and this appeal is without merit, we grant counsel’s petition 

to withdraw as counsel and affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing 

Appellant’s PCRA petition. 
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The factual background of this case is as follows. During September 

and October 2011, Appellant beat her four-year-old daughter with a belt 

about the arms, stomach, back, legs, and buttocks. These beatings caused 

numerous contusions and abrasions. During this same time period, 

Appellant failed to provide her daughter with food.

The procedural history of this case is as follows. On January 23, 2012, 

the Commonwealth charged Appellant via criminal information with 

aggravated assault,1simple assault,2endangering the welfare of a child,3

and recklessly endangering another person.4 On September 5, 2012, 

Appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of a 

child. On October 18, 2012, Appellant was sentenced in absentia to an 

aggregate term of 76 to 152 months’ imprisonment. Appellant appealed her 

judgment of sentence and this Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. 

Minnefield, 87 A.3d 883, 2013 WL 11253513 (Pa. Super. 2013). Appellant 

did not seek allocatur from our Supreme Court.

On July 24, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. On August 

13, 2015, counsel was appointed. On December 7, 2015, the PCRA court 

issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary 

 

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
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hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(A). On December 31, 2015, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition. This timely appeal followed. Appellant’s courtappointed counsel filed a petition to withdraw as counsel and a 

Turner/Finley brief. Appellant filed a pro se response to counsel’s 

Turner/Finley brief. The matter is now ripe for disposition. 

Counsel presents one issue in his Turner/Finley brief:

Whether the PCRA petition filed by [] Appellant lacked arguable 

merit and failed to state any colorable claims for relief due to 

untimeliness, being previously litigated on direct appeal[,] and 

otherwise lacking any substantive merit in failing to implicate the 

legality of sentence as compelled for PCRA relief?

Turner/Finley Brief at 2. 

Prior to addressing the merits of the issues raised in counsel’s 

Turner/Finley brief, we must determine whether he met the procedural 

requirements to withdraw as counsel. Counsel seeking to withdraw in PCRA 

proceedings 

must review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must 

then submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on 

appeal to this Court, detailing the nature and extent of 

counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing the issues which 

petitioner wants to have reviewed, explaining why and how 

those issues lack merit, and requesting permission to withdraw.

Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “nomerit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw; 

and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed 

pro se or by new counsel.

Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that satisfy 

the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court — trial court 

or this Court — must then conduct its own review of the merits 

of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims are 
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without merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and 

deny relief.

Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 510–511 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(ellipses and citation omitted). In this case, counsel fulfilled the procedural 

requirements for withdrawing as PCRA counsel. Therefore, we turn to the 

lone issue raised in counsel’s Turner/Finley brief. 

“Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of 

the underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant 

PCRA petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 

499 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). The timeliness requirement for 

PCRA petitions “is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 143 A.3d 418, 420 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted). Thus, we shall concentrate our attention on whether Appellant 

timely filed her PCRA petition and, if not, whether she has raised a viable 

statutory exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. 

A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the 

judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including 

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the 

review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Because Appellant did not seek 

allocatur from our Supreme Court, her judgment of sentence became final 
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on November 12, 2013.5 Appellant’s PCRA petition was filed on July 24, 

2015. Thus, the petition was patently untimely.6

An untimely PCRA petition may be considered if one of the following 

three exceptions applies:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). If an exception applies, a PCRA petition 

may be considered if it is filed “within 60 days of the date the claim could 

have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “It is the petitioner’s 

burden to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA-timeliness rule.” 

Commonwealth v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153, 1158 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation 

omitted).

 

5 November 10, 2013, the thirtieth day after this Court affirmed Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence, was a Sunday. The following day was a holiday. 

Thus, Appellant had until November 12, 2013 to seek allocatur from our 

Supreme Court. 

6

 The fact that Appellant was sentenced in absentia does not impact the 

timeliness requirement of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Pollard, 911 

A.2d 1005, 1007 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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As noted above, a petitioner must plead and prove the existence of a 

timeliness exception in order for the PCRA court to have jurisdiction over an 

untimely petition. Failure to plead the applicability of a timeliness exception 

in the PCRA petition renders the PCRA court without jurisdiction to consider 

the merits of the petition. See Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 

466, 468-469 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 72 (Pa. 2007). In 

this case, Appellant’s PCRA petition did not allege that she satisfied one of 

the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions. As such, she failed to plead and prove the 

applicability of a timeliness exception and the PCRA court properly held that 

it lacked jurisdiction over her untimely petition.7 Accordingly, this appeal 

lacks merit and we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the order 

dismissing Appellant’s petition. 

Petition to withdraw as counsel granted. Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2017

 

 

7 As we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s 

petition, we need not address the issue discussed in counsel’s 

Turner/Finley brief. 
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