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. S. ____ (2010) Per Curia m 

## SUPREME CO URT O F THE UNI TED STATES RICK T H AL ER, DIRE CTOR, TEXA S DEPAR T MENT OF C R IMINAL JU STI CE, C O RR ECTIONALINSTITUTIONS DIVISION v. ANT H ONY CARDE LL HAY N ES ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATE S COU R T OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIR C UIT No. 09–2 73. Dec i ded Febr uar y22, 2010 P ER C UR IAM
. This case p r esents the question w h ether any decision of this Court “clearly est ablishes” that a jud g e, in ruling on an objection to a peremptory cha llenge under Batsonv. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 7 9 (1986), must reject a demeanor

based explanation for the challenge unless the judge per

sonally observed and recalls the aspect of the prospectiv e juror’s dem e anor on w h ich the explanation is based. Th e Court of Appeals appears to have concluded that eithe r Batsonitself or Snyder v. Louisian a, 552 U. S. 472 (2008), clearly established suc ha rule, but the Court of Appea l s read far too much into those decisions, and its holding, if allowed to stand, would have important implications. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari, g r ant respon

dent’s moti on to proce e d in form a paup eri s , and revers e the judgme nt of the Court of Appe als. I Respondent was tried in a Texas state court for the murder of a police officer, and the State sought the death penalty. During voir dire , two judges preside dat different stages. Judge H a rper presid ed when the attorneys ques

tioned the prospectiv e jurors individually, but Judg e Wallace took over whe nperemp tory challeng es were exer cised. Wh en the pros ecutor struckan African-American juror named Owens, re spondent’s attorney rai s ed a Batso n2 THALER v. HAYNES Per Curia m objection. Judge Wallace determined that respondent had made out a prima facie case under Batson , and the prose

cutor thenoffered a race-neutra l explanation that was based on Owens’ demeanor during individual questioning

. Specifically, the prosecutor asse rted that Owens’ de

meanor had been “somewhat hu morous” and not “serious” and that her “body lan guage” had belied her “true feeling.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 187. Based on his observations of Owens duri ng questioning by respondent’s attorney, th e prosecutor stated, he b e lieved thatshe “had apredisposi

tion” and would not look at the possibility of imposing a death sentence “in a n e utral fashion.” Id., a t188. Re

spondent’s attorney did not dispute the prosecutor’s char

acterization of Owens’ demeanor, but he asserted that h e r answers on the jury q u estionnair e “show[ed] that she was a juror who [was] leaning towards the State’s case.” Ibid. After considering the prosecutor’s explanation and th e arguments of defense counsel, Ju dge Wallace stated that the prosecutor’s reason for the str i ke was “ra ce-neutral” and denied the Ba ts onobjection without fu r t her explan a tion. Id., at189. The case p r oceeded to trial, resp ondent was convicte d and senten ced to death, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals aff i rmed the convicti on. Rejecting respondent’s argument t hat “a tria ljudge wh o did not witness the actual voir dire cannot, as a matter of law, fairly evaluate a Batsonchallenge,” id

. , at 173, the Court of Criminal Appeals wrote: “There are many facto rs which a trial judge—even one who did not preside ove rthe voir dire examina t ions— can consider in determining whether the opponent of the peremptory stri kes has met his burden. These in

clude the nature and strength of the parties’ argu

ments during the Ba tsonhearing and the attorneys’ demeanor and credibility. And, when necessary, a3 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Per Curia m trial judge who has not witnessed the voir dire may refer to the record,” id., at 173–174 (footnote omitted). With respect to the strike of juror Owens, the court hel d that Judge Wallace’s a cceptanc e of the prosec utor’s expla

nation was not clearly erron eous and noted that “[t]he record does reflect tha tOwens was congenial and easyg o ing during voir dire an d thather attitude wa s less formal than that of other veniremembers.” Id. , at 172. This Court denied respondent’s petiti on for a writof certiorar i. Haynes v. Texas, 535 U. S. 999 (2002). After the T e xas courts denied his application for state habeas relief, respondent filed a federal habeas petition

. The Distric tCourt den i ed the petition and observed that this Court had never held that the deference to state-court factual determination s that is mandated by the federal habeas statute is inapplicable when the judge ruling on a Batsonobjection did n o t observe t h e jury selection. Ap p. to Pet. for Cert. 80, n. 10. A panel of the Court o f Appeals g r anted a certificate o f appealabilit y with res p ect to res p ondent’s Batson objec

tions concerning Owe ns and on e other prospective juror. Hay n es v. Quar ter m a n , 526 F. 3d 189, 202 (CA5 2008)

. In its opinion granting t h e certificate, the panel discussed our opinion in Snyderat length and then concluded: “Under Sny d er’s application of Batson,

. . . a nappel

late court applying Ba tsonarguably should find clear error when the record r e fle cts that the trial court wa s not able to verifythe aspect of t h e juror’s d e meanor upon which the prosecutor based his or her peremp

tory challenge.” 526 F. 3d, at 199. When the same panel later ruled on the merits of re

spondent’s Batsonclaim regar d ing juro r Owe ns, 1 the cour t

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1 Beca us e the pa nel held tha t th e strike of Owens violated Batson , the panel did not r u le on the leg i timac yof the otherstr i ke as to whic h a4 THALER v. HAYNES Per Curia m adopted th e rule that it had previously termed “ar

guabl[e].” See 526 F. 3d, at 199; Haynes v. Quar ter m a n , 561 F. 3d 5 35, 541 (C A5 2009). The court concluded that the decisions of the state courts were not owed “A EDPA deference” in this case “because the state courts engage d in pure ap pellate fact-finding foran issue that turns e n tirely on demeanor.” Ibid

. The court then held that “no court, including ours, can now engage in a proper adjudicatio nof the de fendant’s demeanor-ba sed Bat

sonchallen g e as to prospe ctive juror Owens because we will be relying solel yona paper record and would thereby contravene Ba tsonand its clearly-established ‘factual inq u iry’ requirement. See, e.g. , Snyd er , [552 U. S., at 47 7]; Batson , [476 U. S., at 95].” Ibid. (foot

note omitted). II Respondent cannot obtain federal habeas relief under 28 U. S. C. §22 54(d)(1) unless he can show that the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “was contrary t o , or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” A legal principle is “cl early established” within the mea n ing of this provision only when it is embodi ed in a holdi n g of this Court. See Ca rey v. Mu sladin , 549 U. S. 70, 7 4 (2006); Wil liams v. Taylor , 529 U. S. 362, 412 (2000). Under §2254(d)(1), a habeas petitioner may obtain relief (1) “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reache d by this Court on a q u estion of law or if th e state court decides a c a se differen t ly than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts”; or (2) “if the state court identifies t h e co rrect governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but un reasonably applies that

—————— certificate of appeal abi lity had been issued. Haynes v. Qua r te rman , 561 F. 3d 53 5, 541, n

. 2 (CA5 2009).Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) 5 Per Curia m principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id., at 413. III In holding that respondent is entitled to a new trial, th e Court of Ap peals cited two decisions of this Court, Ba tso n and Snyder , but neith e r of thes e cases h e ldthat a de

meanor-bas ed explanation for a peremptory challenge must be rejected unless the judge personally observed and recalls the releva nt aspect o f the prosp e ctive juror ’ s demeanor. The Court of Appeals appears to have concluded tha t Batson supports its decision bec ause Batso nrequires a judge ruling on an objection to a peremptorychallenge t o “ ‘undertake “a sensitive inquiry into such circumstanti a l and direct evidence of intent as m a y be available.” ’ ” 561 F. 3d, at 540 (quoting Batson , 476 U. S., at 93, in tu rn quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Ho using Dev e l

opment Co rp. , 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977)). This general requirement, however, did not cl early establish the rule on which the Court of Ap peals’ decision rests. Batsonnoted the need fora judge ruling on an objection to a peremptor y challenge to “tak[e] in to account all possible explanatory factors in t h e particul a r case,” 4 76 U. S., at95 (intern a l quotation marks omit ted). See alsoMiller-El v. Dr etk e , 545 U. S. 2 31, 239 (2005); Johnson v. California , 545 U. S. 162, 170 (2 005). Thus , where the explanation for a per emptory challenge i s based on aprospective juror’s de

meanor, the judge should take into account, among other things, anyobservations of the j u ror thatt h e judge was able to mak e during the voir dire

. But Batsonplainly did not go further and hold that a demeanor-ba sed explana

tion must be rejected if the judge did not observ e or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor. Nor did we establish such a rule in Snyder

. 2 I nt h a t

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2 Even if Snyderdid al ter o radd to Bats on ’s rule (as the Court of6 THALER v. HAYNES Per Curia m case, the ju dge who presided overthe voir di realso ruled on the Ba ts onobjections, and thu s we hadn o occasion to consider how Ba tsonapplies when different judges preside over these two stages of the jury selection pr ocess. Sny

der , 552 U. S., at 475– 478. The part of Snyd er on which the Court of Appeals relied concerned a v e ry different problem. The prosecutor in t hat case asserted that he h a d exercised a peremptory challenge for two re asons, one of which was based on demeanor ( i.e. , that the juror had appeared to be nervous), and the t r ial judge overruled the Batsonobjection without explanation. 552 U

. S., at 478– 479. We concluded tha tthe record refuted the explanation that was not based ondemeanor and, in ligh tof the par

ticular cir c u mstances of the case, we held t hat the per

emptory ch allenge cou l d not be sustained on the de

meanor-bas ed ground, which migh t not ha ve figured in th e trial judge’s unexplained ruling. Id., at 479–486. Nothing in this analysis supports the bla n ket rule o nwhich the decision below appears to rest. The opinion in Snyderdid note that when the explana

tion for a peremptorychallenge “invoke[s] a juror’s d e meanor,” th e trial jud g e’s “first ha nd observat ions” are of great importance. Id. , at 477. An d in explai ning wh y we could not assume that the trial j u dge had credited the claim that the juror was nervous, we noted that, because the peremptory challenge was n o t exercised until some time after t h e juror wa s questioned, the trial judge migh t not have recalled the juror’s demeanor. Id. , a t479. These observations do not su ggest that, in the abs ence of a per

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—————— Appeal s seem s to have co ncluded), Sny der c o uld not hav e c o nstituted “clearly estab lished Federa l law as de t e r m ined by” this Cour t for purposes of respondent’s habeas petit i on because we decided Snyder near lysixy e a r s afterhis c o nv ic tion bec a me finaland mor e than s i x years after the relevant state-court decision. See Willi ams v. Taylor , 529 U. S. 3 62, 390 (2 00 0) (opin i onforth e Cou r t byS TEVENS , J.); id

. , a t 412 (opin i onforth e Cour t by O’ Con n o r , J.).7 Cite as: 55 9 U

. S. ____ (2010) Per Curia m sonal recollection of th e juror’s demeanor, the judge cou l d not have accepted the prosecut or’s explanation. Indeed , Snyderquo ted the observation in Hern andez v. New York , 500 U. S. 3 52, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion), that the best evidence of the intent o f the at torn ey exercising a s trike is often that attorney’s de meanor. See 552 U. S., at 477. Accordin gly , we hold that no decision of this Court clearly establishes the categorical rule on which the Cour t of Appeals appears to have relied, and we therefore re

verse the judgment a n d remand the case for proceeding s consistent with this opinion. Our decision does not man

date the rej e ction of respondent’s Batsonclaim regar d in g juror Owen s. On rem and, the Court of Appe als may con

sider whet her the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ d e termination may be overcome under the federal habeas statute’s standard for reviewin g astate court’s resolution of questions of fact. It is so orde red.