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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 46485

LARRY ALAN TAYLOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EILEEN TAYLOR and KIMBERLY 

NAGAL,

Defendants-Respondents.

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Filed: October 30, 2019

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. Richard S. Christensen, District Judge. 

Judgment dismissing complaint, affirmed. 

Larry Alan Taylor, Boise, pro se appellant. 

Jonathon Frantz, Post Falls, for respondents. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Larry Alan Taylor appeals from a judgment dismissing his complaint alleging claims for 

breach of contract. Eileen Taylor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The district court 

entered an order granting the motion to dismiss on behalf of both Eileen Taylor and Kimberly 

Nagal (Respondents). Taylor appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Taylor filed a complaint on December 8, 2017, in Ada County. Although not entirely 

clear, the complaint appears to allege breach of oral contract claims based on events that 

occurred in 2007. Taylor’s complaint further alleges that “he wanted to file this action at an 

earlier time, and had contacted” an attorney in approximately 2009. Respondent filed a motion
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to change venue to Kootenai County, where she resided, and to dismiss the complaint.

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 The Ada 

County district court granted the motion to change venue. Thereafter, the Kootenai County 

district court considered the motion to dismiss. The motion alleged that Taylor’s complaint was

a continuation of repeated harassment of both Respondents and that the complaint failed to state 

a claim upon which relief could be granted because the statute of limitation had expired on 

Taylor’s claims. The district court granted the motion to dismiss Taylor’s complaint. Taylor

appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

As an appellate court, we will affirm a trial court’s grant of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion 

to dismiss where the record demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 

case can be decided as a matter of law. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,

398, 987 P.2d 300, 310 (1999). When reviewing an order of the district court dismissing a case 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the nonmoving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record 

and pleadings viewed in its favor. Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 398, 987 P.2d at 310. A motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claim that would entitle the plaintiff to 

relief. Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 P.3d 156, 160 (2005). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Taylor presents two issues on appeal. First, Taylor requests that this Court “review and 

give an opinion” on the order changing venue from Ada County to Kootenai County. Second, 

Taylor argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint. Specifically, Taylor 

argues that the district court erred in concluding his claims were barred by the applicable statute

of limitation. Respondents argue that the district court properly transferred venue to Kootenai 

County because they reside there and that the district court correctly concluded Taylor’s claims

 

1 The motion also sought to strike portions of the complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(f) and to 

have Taylor declared a vexatious litigant under I.C.A.R. 59. Those requests are not at issue in 

this appeal.
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are time-barred. We conclude that Taylor has failed to show that the district court erred in 

changing venue or in dismissing the complaint.

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A. Venue

Taylor contends that transferring venue from Ada County, where he is currently 

incarcerated, to Kootenai County violated Article I, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution by depriving 

him of any opportunity to personally appear in the proceedings. Additionally, Taylor makes a 

vague assertion that transferring the case to Kootenai County could have had a “negative impact”

on his claims because that was the county where the criminal matters involving Taylor and 

Respondents were adjudicated. Respondents argue that the district court correctly granted a 

change of venue to Kootenai County because Respondents reside there. 

Appellants must support their arguments with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 

parts of the transcript and record relied upon. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Trotter v. Bank of New York 

Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 847-48, 275 P.3d 857, 862-63 (2012). A party waives an issue on appeal 

if either argument or authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 

440 (Ct. App. 1997). Thus, appellate courts will not consider issues unsupported by relevant 

authority. See Trotter, 152 Idaho at 848, 275 P.3d at 863; Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 60, 

244 P.3d 197, 204 (2010). 

Taylor has not cited any controlling precedent supporting his argument that the venue 

change to Kootenai County violated his constitutional rights. Taylor’s argument relies on an 

early Idaho criminal case, State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927). Arregui decided the 

admissibility of evidence obtained under an invalid warrant. The case does not support an 

argument that a venue change in a civil case can violate a party’s constitutional rights. Because 

Taylor’s contention that the district court erred in granting a change of venue is unsupported by 

relevant legal authority, he has waived the issue. Moreover, the order granting the change of 

venue is not included in the record on appeal. It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a 

 

2 In addition to his opening and reply briefs, Taylor has submitted various attachments and 

an affidavit. An appellate court cannot consider materials that are not part of or contained in the 

record on appeal. Chisholm v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 142 Idaho 159, 162, 125 P.3d 515, 

518 (2005). Because Taylor never moved to augment the record with any of the documents 

attached to his briefs or with his affidavit, they will not be considered.
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sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. Powell, 130 Idaho at 127, 937 P.2d 

at 439. In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, we will 

not presume error. Id. 

B. Statute of Limitation

Taylor contends that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint, arguing his 

claims are not time-barred. Alternatively, even if his complaint is untimely, Taylor argues that 

equitable principles should exempt his claims from the statute of limitation. Respondents argue 

that the district court correctly dismissed the complaint because all of Taylor’s claims are 

time-barred. 

An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument of 

writing shall be commenced within four years. I.C. § 5-217. The statute of limitation does not 

begin to run until a claim accrues upon the breach of contract. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 

770, 890 P.2d 714, 721 (1995). In support of its conclusion that Taylor’s claims are time-barred, 

the district court found that Taylor’s complaint, which was filed in 2017, alleged breach of oral 

contract claims based on events that occurred in 2007. The district court also found that Taylor 

had sought counsel in 2009 to bring these claims. Because Taylor alleged no claims based upon 

events occurring after 2007 and raised no arguments that the statute of limitation was tolled, the 

district court concluded that the statute of limitation for Taylor’s claims expired no later than 

December 31, 2011. Consequently, the district court dismissed Taylor’s complaint because, 

“viewing all facts and inferences from the pleadings in favor of” Taylor, he could “prove no set 

of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”

Taylor has not cited any controlling legal precedent to support the arguments presented in 

his opening brief that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint. Taylor’s arguments 

allude to Article V, § 20 of the Idaho Constitution and three court cases. The constitutional 

provision Taylor cites establishes the jurisdiction of Idaho’s district courts and is irrelevant to the 

application of a statute of limitation. The three court cases Taylor cites are also irrelevant to the 

application of a statute of limitation. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897) is a United States 

Supreme Court case relating to a court’s authority to punish contempt. Balla v. Idaho State Bd.

of Corr., 595 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Idaho 1984) is a federal case relating to constitutionally deficient 
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prison conditions. The third case Taylor cites is Arregui, the same Idaho criminal case cited in

relation to Taylor’s challenge to the district court’s venue change order. 

In his reply brief, Taylor presents additional arguments accompanied by citations to 

authority which appear to relate to his assertion that he was entitled to tolling of the statute of 

limitation. Generally, this Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply 

brief. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). Moreover, there is nothing in 

the record to indicate Taylor’s tolling arguments were considered by the district court. 

Generally, issues may not be considered for the first time on appeal. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 

Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991). Therefore, this Court will not presume error. See 

Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 127, 937 P.2d 434, 439 (Ct. App. 1997). In sum, Taylor has 

failed to cite any legal basis to support his argument that the district court erred in dismissing his 

complaint as barred by the statute of limitation. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Taylor has failed to show that the district court erred in changing venue to Kootenai 

County or in dismissing his complaint. Therefore, the judgment in favor of Respondents is 

affirmed. Costs are awarded on appeal to Respondents as the prevailing party.

Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.